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MOBILIZING CANADA:

**THE NATIONAL RESOURCES MOBILIZATION ACT,
THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE,
AND COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE IN CANADA,**

1940-1945

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**A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the requirements
of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy**

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This thesis is dedicated to my parents, and to my parents' parents, who always knew that I could accomplish this, and spent much of their lives working to ensure that I had the opportunity to do so. It is dedicated especially to two of my grandparents who were not able to see me complete it:

STAFFORD BYERS

and

LOIS RAYMOND-JOHNSON-WARREN

ABSTRACT

Compulsory military service took on the most organized, long-term form it has ever had in Canada during the Second World War. But few historians have looked beyond the politics of conscription to study the creation, administration, or impact of a system that affected more than 150,000 men. This thesis examines the Army's role in creating and administering the compulsory military training system, and particularly the influence of Major-General H.D.G. Crerar and other senior officers. Faced with the federal government's policy of conscripting manpower only for home defence in 1940, and influenced by their own personal and professional desires to create a large, powerful Army that could take a leading role in the fighting overseas, Army leaders used conscripts raised under the National Resources Mobilization Act to meet both purposes. In this development can be found the origins of the "big army" of five divisions that fought for Canada overseas. Ultimately, thanks to the burden created by the "big army," and the entry of Japan into the war in late 1941, the NRMA failed to meet the huge demands imposed on the nation's manpower resources. The result was the political crisis that almost brought down the federal government in October and November 1944.

This thesis also explores the origins and background of

the conscripts themselves, and the impact of the NRMA on their lives. As the NRMA became more and more central to the Army's plans after 1941, conscripts were exposed to a number of pressures designed to convince them to volunteer for overseas service. By late 1944, the only ones who remained were those who had most strongly resisted these efforts, a fact that the country's generals understood better than its politicians. The events of late 1944 brought the Cabinet to an awareness of the situation, but only at the cost of the prestige and influence that the Army had built up over the earlier years of the war. Thus, the way that the Army managed the NRMA came very much to shape the political debates that took place, and the place of the Army in Canada after the war.

RÉSUMÉ

Pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, le service militaire obligatoire est le plus long et le mieux organisée qu'ait connu le Canada. Néanmoins, la plupart des historiens sont demeurés cantonnés dans l'étude des politiques relatives à la conscription et peu d'entre eux se sont intéressés à la création, à l'administration, et à l'impact du programme d'entraînement qui a touché plus de 150 000 hommes. Cette thèse examine le rôle de l'Armée canadienne dans la fondation et l'administration du programme d'entraînement obligatoire, et plus particulièrement celui du major-général H.D.G. Crerar et d'autres officiers supérieurs. Liés par la politique du gouvernement fédéral, qui ne permettait la conscription que pour la défense du territoire canadien en 1940, et poussés par leurs désirs personnels et professionnels de créer une armée grande et puissante qui pouvait obtenir un rôle dominant dans les combats d'outre-mer, les commandants de l'armée durent donc utiliser à ces deux fins les conscrits de la Loi sur la mobilisation des ressources nationales. On retrouve dans ces événements les origines de "la grande armée" de cinq divisions qui a participé au conflit d'outre-mer. Finalement, à cause du poids des besoins engendrés par "la grande armée," et de l'entrée en guerre du Japon en 1941, la Loi sur la mobilisation n'a pas répondu aux besoins énormes qui avaient

été imposés aux ressources des effectifs nationaux, avec comme résultat la crise de la conscription de 1944 qui a failli provoquer la chute du gouvernement fédéral.

Cette thèse se penche aussi sur les origines et les milieux dont étaient issus les conscrits, et l'impact de la Loi sur leur vie. Comme cette Loi est devenu plus importante pour les projets de l'armée après 1941, les conscrits avaient subi a un certain nombre de pressions afin qu'ils se portent volontaires pour le service outre-mer. A l'automne de 1944, les hommes qui sont demeurés conscrits étaient ceux qui résistaient le mieux à ces pressions, un facteur que les généraux ont mieux compris que les hommes politiques. Les événements de l'automne 1944 ont rendu le Cabinet fédéral plus conscient de la situation. Mais cette compréhension est venue après que l'armée ait perdu le prestige et l'influence qu'elle avait acquise durant les années précédentes. Au bout du compte, la façon dont l'armée administra la Loi sur la mobilisation eut des conséquences certaines sur le déroulement des débats politiques de 1944 ainsi que sur la place de l'armée au Canada après la guerre.

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INTRODUCTION

Compulsory military service, like war itself, is as old as Canada. From the earliest days of European settlement, colonial governments possessed the power to compel male citizens to help defend their homes. Provisions to organize and train the inhabitants of New France existed on paper as early as the 1670s, but they were not applied in Canada in a fully sustained or systematic manner until the First World War.¹ Conscription was only introduced in a more direct and deliberate way in October 1917, after voluntary enlistments failed to meet anticipated needs for reinforcements overseas. It came too late to have a significant military impact, and it remained in force for barely a year. The result was a bitter wartime election, and memories of the divisive nature of conscription that would survive for generations among Canadian politicians.²

Despite strong opposition to conscription after 1918,³ the issue reappeared during the Second World War. This time it came earlier in the conflict, and it developed into the largest, most organized, and long-term compulsory training program that Canadians have ever known. Under the authority of the "National Resources Mobilization Act" (NRMA) of June 1940, more than 150,000 men were compelled to undergo training

or serve for up to four years on home defence duties in the Canadian Army - over 15% of the one million men and women who entered the three armed forces between 1939 and 1945.⁴ Although the NRMA's powers were limited to "Canada and the territorial waters thereof,"⁵ almost 60,000 of the country's 150,000 conscripts went on to volunteer for overseas service, providing ten percent of all volunteers in the Army during the war. Another 60,000 men refused to volunteer, but manned defence posts in Canada, releasing an equivalent number of soldiers to proceed overseas. These men were still in uniform in late 1944, when the question of sending 16,000 conscripts to Europe resulted in a crisis almost as serious as that of the First World War.

The numbers raised by conscription are significant. Yet the effects of such massive wartime mobilization have largely been forgotten. Canadian historians have written a great deal about conscription, but they have done so largely from a political perspective, as the source of the many problems and debates that occurred at the national political level during the war. Few historians have investigated the creation, administration, or impact of the training system that was set up under the NRMA, or the experiences of the tens of thousands of Canadians who were subjected to it. The dependence of historians on the records of Prime Minister Mackenzie King and his Cabinet colleagues to reconstruct wartime events have also focused the subject on the politics of conscription, and on

King's treatment of it as the single greatest threat to national unity during the war, rather than on how it was actually put into practice, or how it affected individual Canadians. The aim of the following thesis is to correct that imbalance.

The book that first set the tone for our view of conscription was Bruce Hutchison's 1952 biography of Mackenzie King, The Incredible Canadian.⁶ As a well-known journalist and parliamentary reporter, Hutchison had witnessed many of the key wartime events in Ottawa. He also relied on conversations with key participants, and on King's now-famous diaries, in preparing his book. The resulting account was sympathetic to King, and focused on the machinations that took place at the Cabinet level during the war, as King attempted to prevent the possible breakup of his government, and in his view the country itself. Hutchison devoted little space to the NRMA, except to underscore King's own insecurities over the issue of military manpower, and criticism of the Army for building up forces larger than could be maintained after they were fully committed to overseas fighting in 1943 and 1944. Hutchison also gave much attention to King's claim that he had only agreed to send NRMA soldiers overseas in November 1944 under threat of an open revolt by senior Army officers, after several had threatened to resign in protest at the Cabinet's indecision on the question. Hutchison was careful to note that this was King's conclusion rather than his own, and

defended the Army against King's charges of deliberately plotting to overthrow the government. His assessment, however, remained partial. It provided little information on the NRMA and its workings, or how it had actually contributed to the creation of such large forces before 1944, or to the Army's certainty that there was no other alternative to sending the NRMA men overseas by that point in the war.

Hutchison's suggestion of a potential Army revolt created a minor public furor when it first appeared, and sparked further inquiries by King's official biographer, R. MacGregor Dawson. Dawson, a distinguished political economist and historian at the University of Toronto, took the opportunity sparked by the controversy to conduct his own interviews with various participants, and completed three draft chapters on the events before his death, which were later edited and published as The Conscription Crisis of 1944 (1961).⁷ Unfortunately, Dawson never had time to revise his work, and the results were very one-sided, and based almost entirely on King's own papers. Although he dismissed any thought of a military coup, Dawson criticized senior commanders for openly opposing the politicians' efforts to avoid sending conscripts overseas in 1944, an action which offended his very strict and liberal notions of civil-military relations. He clearly had little sympathy for the Army, and he blamed its leaders for creating the problem by failing to find more effective means to raise additional volunteers. But Dawson dismissed the

Army's actions without investigating the reasons behind them, and especially the larger context of the NRMA and its administration before 1944. As several commentators have noted, Dawson undoubtedly would have carried out further research and produced a more balanced account of events had he lived to complete his full biography of King.⁸ Since Dawson's death, Blair Neatby has carried the story of King's career to 1939. But aside from a heavily edited version of King's own diaries by J.W. Pickersgill, King's former private secretary, Dawson and his successors have not inquired into King's views on conscription beyond the outbreak of war in 1939.⁹

While Dawson was working on the first volume of the King biography, another book appeared that provided the first look at conscription from a perspective more favourable to the Army. E.L.M. Burns' Manpower in the Canadian Army (1956) was a brief but thorough overview of the basic procedures and statistics involved in managing the country's war effort.¹⁰ Burns was well suited to discuss the subject, having been one of the key planners of the domestic training system in 1940-1941, and the senior commander of Canadian forces in Italy in 1944. He was also highly intelligent and articulate, with several books and articles to his credit.¹¹ His study was clearly motivated by the question of how the Army's management of manpower had contributed to the political crisis in 1944, although Burns avoided making such direct conclusions himself. He criticized the Army for its wasteful use of manpower, while

trying to explain why it had occurred, and the political factors that had shaped military planning during the war. In particular, Burns suggested, high numbers of men in training streams and reinforcement pools had resulted from prewar political neglect of the Army, and the resulting rapidity of its wartime expansion, as well as the need to maintain a long line of reinforcements between Canada and Europe throughout the war, in order to maintain the country's forces at full strength overseas. Ottawa's decision to maintain its ground units as a fully independent national Army, including even separate forces for maintenance and support, had also contributed to the problem. In addition, Burns stressed the adverse effects on manpower caused by the need to simultaneously administer a parallel compulsory training and home defence organization, which was again the result of political rather than military considerations. In the end, Burns provided a solid account of the context behind many of the actions of the Army's commanders during the war. But he failed to acknowledge their role in events, and especially their strong influence over their political masters as the major source of advice on such matters. He also failed to indicate how closely linked the overseas and home defence Armies had been, almost from the time that the NRMA was created in 1940, or the problems that the Army had faced in administering the Act during the war.

The most comprehensive review of conscription from the

point of view of the military appeared in 1970, as part of C.P. Stacey's voluminous account of national military policies, Arms, Men and Governments.¹² Stacey wrote as both a respected historian and a long-time Army officer, with full access to the relevant political and military records. He devoted one large chapter to conscription, where he defended the Army's role in events. Like Burns, Stacey provided some idea of the problems the Army had faced in trying to administer both compulsory training and the war overseas before October 1944. But the bulk of his account focused on explaining the more direct causes of the political crisis that emerged in late 1944, and describing the subsequent events within the Cabinet. Stacey was highly critical of the Prime Minister, especially for his treatment of J.L. Ralston, the Minister of National Defence, who was forced by the manoeuvres of King to resign his post during the crisis. Stacey also argued that senior Army commanders had acted properly and simply carried out their constitutional duty by trying to make their political leaders aware of the need to send NRMA men overseas, to the point of open disagreement, in late 1944. Lastly, he suggested that King had created the idea of an Army revolt in his own mind, as a way to justify his last-minute acceptance of his advisors' recommendations. Stacey's account was perhaps overly favourable to the Army, and again included only a few details about the actual operation of the NRMA, its contribution to the events, or its impact on conscripts

themselves. But it clearly reflected the perspective of Stacey, who had served alongside most of the key generals who participated in the events of 1939-1945, and remained noticeably sympathetic to their problems and concerns.

The rest of the 1970s saw a consolidation of historical writing on conscription. The author most responsible for this development was J.L. Granatstein, a former Army officer and a historian who had briefly worked alongside Stacey in the Army's Historical Section in Ottawa. Granatstein came to different conclusions from Stacey about the issue of conscription, ones that reflected his own interest in the more political aspects of the issue, and the concerns of the many ministers and bureaucrats who had attempted to resist the Army's increased role in wartime policy-making. His first book, a history of the Conservative Party between 1939 and 1945, criticized that party's leadership for its handling of the conscription issue.¹³ In 1969, Granatstein produced a short account of the Liberal government's conscription policies during the war whose subtitle, A Study in Political Management, suggested his central theme.¹⁴

Granatstein's most influential contribution to both conscription and larger historical interpretations of the war effort came with Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, in 1975.¹⁵ It was an excellent synthesis of the war's impact on Canada at the national level, which argued that the Second World War marked the first time that the

country had participated in a conflict outside its borders, solely for its own reasons and in its own interests, rather than as a consequence of its colonial relationship with Great Britain. Granatstein also noted the favourable results that the war had brought to the country as a whole, by stimulating national political, economic, and social developments. He devoted a great deal of space to King's manoeuvres on conscription, relying heavily on the records of the Prime Minister and other politicians to reconstruct the events, and concluding that King had managed a divisive issue very effectively during the war.

Granatstein expanded his arguments about conscription in another book co-written with J.M. Hitsman, another former Army historian, in 1977. Broken Promises remains the best overview of the history of conscription in Canada. It again presented King's actions in a positive light, while criticizing the Army's planners for building up forces larger than necessary during the war, and thus creating the huge drain on manpower that led to the problems of 1942-1944.¹⁶ For the first time, however, the authors went beyond politics to include some description of the machinery used to mobilize civilian and military manpower, its role in the political debates, and its impact on Canadians. Still, the authors based their conclusions on only limited evidence, and the broad chronological scope of the book meant that they could provide no more than a brief survey of these questions.

Surprisingly, perhaps, considering the importance placed on Quebec opinion by English-Canadian commentators, conscription and the war have received much less attention from Canada's francophone historians. Aside from Robert Rumilly's detailed but dated history of wartime events, the majority of work on the subject remains in the form of biographies and memoirs, all of which reflect the views of wartime opponents of conscription and the federal Liberals.¹⁷ Scholarly interest has focused on the loosely organized political movement, the *Bloc populaire*, that emerged in Quebec as a result of federal policies during the war.¹⁸ The memoirs of André Laurendeau, one of the Bloc's leaders, are still the most important account of wartime French-Canadian opinion on conscription, and the only major one available in English.¹⁹

In contrast to English-Canadian historians, Laurendeau argued that the NRMA had been seen by many of its opponents in Quebec as a device intended to "sneak" conscription past the province's citizens during the war, rather than to resist pressures for greater compulsion from other parts of the country, as most English-speaking historians had assumed. Consequently, he and other francophone authors showed much greater interest in the political developments of January-April 1942, when a national plebiscite was held to permit the federal government to repeal the provisions against overseas service in the National Resources Mobilization Act.

Laurendeau largely ignored the events of 1944, when the decision was made to send NRMA men overseas, and hinted only vaguely at the impact of conscription on individual French-Canadians.²⁰ Thus, Laurendeau and other francophone authors have tended to focus even more on the political aspects of conscription than English-Canadian historians, leaving a gap in the historiography that remains to be filled.

Since the 1970s, Canadian historians have shown little desire to study compulsory military service. This is partly due to the thoroughness of earlier accounts, and partly to the general shift of historical study towards less traditional, "political" subjects of inquiry.²¹ Yet there is much more to Canada's experience of conscription than just the political debates that took place during the war, and their electoral implications. Changing trends in historical writing have led to a reinterpretation of the war itself, from seeing it in the "good war" tradition of J.L. Granatstein, to exploring its impact on specific individuals, minorities and ethnic groups, and other parts of society.²² Historians have also begun to investigate the way that the war was managed below the political level, as part of the increasing role played by professional civil servants and intellectuals in the making of government policy in this period.²³ The study of war itself is now oriented much more towards investigating the place of the military within Canadian society, and writing the history of battles themselves from the "bottom up," as an experience

of individuals and of groups of soldiers, as opposed to older interests in questions like strategic leadership and decision-making.²⁴

Recently, historians have begun to return to conscription and other wartime political issues, exploring them from these new perspectives.²⁵ But there is still no full-length account of the NRMA, or of what happened to the many men who were called up and spent years on compulsory military training or home defence duties under its authority. The aim of the present study is to fill this gap in the historiography, by describing the history of conscription and the NRMA at the military level, the way it was put into practice and administered, and how people were affected by it. As it argues, the wartime training system that emerged after 1940 resulted in large part from the Army's attempt to adapt to its own purposes a program that was originally imposed for political reasons. Faced with the government's decision to introduce conscription only for home defence in June 1940, its commanders did as they were directed, and created a training organization designed to meet the government's desire to keep compulsory military training separate from voluntary service. At the same time, however, the Army also constructed the training system to meet its own wartime desires as well as those of the government, the most important of which was to create and maintain the largest possible overseas forces, in order to be able to help win the war. The NRMA came to be a

valuable source of overseas volunteers, while those who refused to change their status provided a convenient source of men for the Army to use to meet its home defence commitments, without diverting precious resources from overseas.

The consequences of these developments were significant. The NRMA's availability as a source of overseas recruits allowed the Army to create a total force larger than otherwise might have been possible before 1944, aggravating the manpower situation which became apparent that fall. At the same time, individual conscripts were pressured in many ways to convert to volunteer service from the time they entered the Army. Those who endured this process were even less likely to volunteer to serve outside Canada in the future. When the matter came to a head in 1944, the generals who pushed most strongly for the government to send conscripts overseas were the same ones who had learned from their own experiences just how much resistance existed among the remaining NRMA soldiers. Thus, the character of the compulsory military training system that was set up under the NRMA came to have an important influence over events at the political level by late 1944, shaping both the terms of the debates, and the decisions that were made as a result. This vital context to the conscription crisis of 1944 has not been explored in detail until now.

To investigate the NRMA and compulsory military service, this thesis takes a largely conventional historical approach. It focuses mostly on the way the Army managed the NRMA: how it

organized the compulsory military training system, the decisions that it made, and the results of those developments. In particular, it provides a vital perspective on relations between politicians and the Army during the war. In a small and traditionally "unmilitary" country such as Canada, a democratic nation with little history of broad public interest in peacetime military affairs, its few trained experts played a large role in shaping military policy after the outbreak of the war. Federal politicians seemed reluctant to address many of the questions surrounding the NRMA, leaving the Army to make many of the most important decisions about how it would be put into practice. In these circumstances, the dividing line between policy-making and implementation became blurred, with consequences that were apparent by 1944. While in no way apologizing for the actions of senior officers, this thesis attempts to explain them by placing them within the larger perspective of how compulsory military service was organized and administered during the war, and how it influenced the attitudes of various participants, as well as the events themselves. Doing so reminds us that the Army's behaviour in 1944 was not nearly as clear a question of right and wrong as previous authors have suggested.²⁶

In addition, this thesis attempts to provide some sense of the social impact of conscription and the NRMA in Canada. The sources available for this study give some voice to the conscripts who were part of the compulsory military training

system. They also allow us to gain an understanding of the extent to which manpower was mobilized in Canada in a broader sense during the war. In the years between 1939 and 1945, Canadians experienced a military mobilization that was unparalleled in their history: in total, more than one in ten adult citizens served in the armed forces, while millions more worked in war industry or aided the war effort in other ways. Besides the 150,000 men who were directly affected by the NRMA, countless family members and friends were also touched by it across the country, and those who were not forced to undergo compulsory service felt its presence through numerous controls over civilian occupations. Creating an organization to train the conscripts meant establishing a domestic network of training camps and defences larger than anything Canadians had ever experienced before on their own soil, before or since. The sight of hundreds of men in uniform was a daily reminder of the scale and the cost of the war for dozens of small communities where these facilities were located, many of which had had very little direct contact with the military before 1939. In discussing the compulsory military training system, it is hoped that this thesis will remind readers of some of the ways that the war touched much larger numbers of individuals and communities across Canada in the years between 1939 and 1945.

One further contribution that this thesis makes is to recover a sense of the significance of the NRMA for relations

between English and French Canadians during the Second World War. Despite the assumptions of many commentators, both then and now, the average conscript was not automatically French-Canadian, but came from all parts of the country. As a result of the NRMA, however, larger numbers of francophones did enter the Canadian Army, and senior officers were forced to deal with the situation by creating many new French-Canadian units, and finding the officers necessary to command them. For the first time in its history, the Canadian Army came to reflect both key language groups of the country, and French Canadians gained the ability to function within the Army to an extent greater than ever before, a development that predated the bilingual service policies of the 1960s and afterwards by several decades. In addition, English and French Canadian soldiers often worked closely together during the war, and may have come to understand each other slightly better than either side had done before. Lastly, as we shall see, large numbers of French Canadians served voluntarily as part of the organization that administered the NRMA, and without their contributions the compulsory military training system would not have functioned nearly as well as it did. In all of these ways, this thesis reminds us that the traditional historical views and assumptions about the attitudes of both English and French Canadians during the war are far too simplistic, a subject that has only just begun to be explored, particularly in Quebec.²⁷

To describe the NRMA and compulsory military service, the following account is divided into six chapters. Chapter One describes the passing of the Act itself in 1940, and the way that compulsory military service was put into practice by the Army in the following months. As it shows, the political and military decisions that were made during the first year of operation of the NRMA came to define its structure for the rest of the war. Chapter Two employs statistical, written and anecdotal sources and interviews to create a portrait of wartime conscripts and their experiences of compulsory military service after 1940. It also describes how the compulsory training system came to be shaped to meet both the Army's needs for voluntary manpower, and the government's desire to limit compulsory training to home defence. Chapter Three carries the story of the NRMA as a part of military policy to 1943, and focuses especially on its role in helping to create the huge forces with which Canada fought the rest of the war, both at home and overseas, by mid-1942. It ends with the aborted invasion of the Aleutian island of Kiska in August 1943, the high point for both compulsory service and the home defence effort during the war. Chapter Four follows events to 1944, as the NRMA began to break down as a source of manpower for maintaining the large home defence forces and overseas Army that had been built up in previous years. Chapter Five reviews the events of the summer and fall of 1944, to show how earlier developments in administering the NRMA at the military

level came to shape the political crisis that then took place. The conclusion of the thesis traces the later history of the NRMA, from the time that conscripts were ordered overseas in November 1944 to the end of the war, before going on to identify some of the key themes that emerge as a result of studying the wartime administration of the NRMA.

The sources used for this thesis consist primarily of records from the Department of National Defence and other government departments responsible for administering the NRMA, most of which are held by the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa. These files are vital to understanding the context of the compulsory military training system that was created during the war, and the decision-making processes behind it. They also provide a surprising amount of information on the impact of the program on its individual participants, thanks to the daily records of events that were maintained by every military unit and home defence installation during the war, as well as separate statistics collected by the Army at the time, and written evidence recorded by the conscripts themselves. In addition, the thesis relies on a number of sources preserved by the Directorate of History and Heritage of the Department of National Defence, an important resource for information on particular aspects of the NRMA and its administration. The private papers of several contemporary political and military personalities have proven useful to provide some idea of the larger context of many of the issues

surrounding the NRMA, as have a small number of interviews and letters from former soldiers and participants.

In writing this thesis, I have been aided by many individuals and organizations. Almost every staff member at the National Archives of Canada has assisted me at one stage or another in my research. In particular, I would like to thank Paul Marsden, Robert MacIntosh, Tim Cook, Tim Dubé, Myron Momryk, and Robert Fisher, all of whom have shared with me both their knowledge of the subject and their friendship as I spent countless hours in the Archives over the past several years. Many members of the Directorate of History and Heritage have also provided me with aid and advice in my research, including Carl Christie, the Directorate's former Senior Research Officer, and Serge Bernier and Stephen Harris, its current Director and Senior Historian, respectively, who read and commented on early drafts of some of my conclusions that were later published by the Canadian Historical Association. In addition, Bill Rawling of the Directorate has given me the benefit of his advice throughout the research and writing of this thesis, as well as the use of a spare bedroom in his Ottawa home, which provided me with a convenient base from which to carry out my research during more than one trip to the city. I would also like to thank the staff of the Queen's University Archives, in Kingston, Ontario, who aided me in my research into the papers of Norman Rogers, C.G. Power, T.A. Crerar, and Grant Dexter. In particular, George

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In addition, I could not have completed this thesis without the aid of doctoral fellowships from the Military and Strategic Studies/Security and Defence (Forum) scholarship program of the Department of National Defence, and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, both of which aided me at crucial stages in my research. Funds from the Post-Graduate Students' Society of McGill University enabled me to travel to St. Catharines, Ontario, to present the preliminary results of my research at the annual meeting of the Canadian Historical Association in 1996. My work was also aided by a small bursary from McGill University, and throughout the years by the help and cooperation of the Department of History, which provided me with several teaching assistantships and sessional appointments during the course of my studies, as well as an air-conditioned office that allowed me to complete some portions of my thesis during the long, hot

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My thesis has also benefitted from the personal and professional assistance of a number of friends, advisors, and colleagues. Professor Terry Copp, my academic advisor during my early years of study at Wilfrid Laurier University, first made the suggestion that led to my choice of a thesis subject in 1993, as well as continuing to encourage me in my later pursuits at McGill. Ken Reynolds, Serge Durflinger, Marc Drolet, Lori McNulty, Catherine Cournoyer, and Tara Newell, all former students at McGill, shared frequent conversations with me about my thesis, and helped me to frame many of my conclusions, as did Peter Nayler, a fellow researcher for many years in Ottawa, and Professor Suzanne Morton, of the Department of History at McGill, for whom I worked several times as a teaching assistant. More recently, I have been fortunate enough to meet a new group of friends and colleagues at the Royal Military College of Canada, where I have worked as a sessional instructor since 1998, and where I was again fortunate enough to be given access to much-needed office

space, which allowed me to complete the writing of my thesis in the summer of 2000. Before concluding, I must also mention Georgii Mikula and Mary McDaid, the Administrative Officer and the Graduate Coordinator, respectively, for most of the time that I was a student in the Department of History at McGill. Both have always gone much farther than their jobs call for in assisting the graduate students of the Department, and their efforts have been very much appreciated by hundreds of us over the years. Recently, Mary has been replaced in her duties as Graduate Coordinator by Colleen Parish, who has done an excellent job of filling Mary's shoes. Last, but certainly not least, is my thesis supervisor, Professor Carman Miller, who has never failed to offer me his advice, encouragement, criticism and understanding throughout my time as a graduate student at McGill. I would like to thank all of these people for their guidance and support over the years. Whatever strengths there are in this thesis reflect their contributions. At the same time, any errors that remain are entirely my own.

Endnotes

1. For a discussion of early conscription arrangements, see George F.G. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, 1604-1954: The Military History of an Unmilitary People (Toronto: Macmillan, 1954), pp. 1-25. J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman also provide a good overview of the whole conscription issue to 1914 in Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977; reprint, Copp Clark Pitman, 1985), pp. 5-21 [also cited below as part of the discussion of the historiography of conscription].

2. See Ibid., chapters 2-3, pp. 22-104.
3. Ibid., pp. 105-32. André Laurendeau and C.G. Power discuss interwar attitudes about conscription in Quebec in particular in "The Conscription Crisis of 1942," ed. and trans. by Philip Stratford, in André Laurendeau: Witness for Quebec (Toronto: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 7-10, and Norman Ward, ed., A Party Politician: The Memoirs of Chubby Power (Toronto: Macmillan, 1966), p. 109.
4. According to postwar records, 157,841 men were enrolled for four months' compulsory training from March 1941 to July 1945. This figure does not include some recruits called for shorter training between October 1940 and March 1941, although most were recalled to complete the full training after 1941. Statistics on National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Records of the Department of National Defence, Vol. 18715, File 133.065(D360), "NRMA STATS-1939/45 by DVA, War Service Records d/10 Jan 50," and Vol. 18829, File 133.065(D740), "Second World War statistics received from War Service Records 26 Jan 66: RCN war 1939-45 Appointments and Enlistments period 1939-46 incl; Cdn Army General Service." Also Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, File 111.13(D6), "Return of NRMA on strength by religion, province or place of residence as of 11 Oct 44," and C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), Appendices "R" and "T," pp. 590, and 599-602.
5. "The National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940," 4 George VI, Chap. 13, Acts of the Parliament of the Dominion of Canada, 1939-1940 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940), p. 43.
6. Bruce Hutchison, The Incredible Canadian, A candid portrait of Mackenzie King: his works, his times, and his nation (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Company, 1952).
7. See R. MacGregor Dawson, The Conscription Crisis of 1944 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), esp. p. 5, as well as A.R.M. Lower's comments on the controversy created by Hutchison, in his review of The Incredible Canadian in Queen's Quarterly 59, Winter 1952/53, p. 562.
8. For comments on Dawson's book see Ramsay Cook, "Canada's Continuing War Crises," Saturday Night 76(25), 9 December 1961, p. 40; Alexander Brady, "Letters in Canada: 1961-Social Studies, National and International," University of Toronto Quarterly 31(4), July 1962, p. 514; Maurice Pope, Soldiers and Politicians: The Memoirs of Lt.-Gen. Maurice A. Pope (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), pp. 259-61; and C.P. Stacey, in International Journal XVII(2), Spring 1962, p. 160, and Arms, Men and Governments, p. 451.

9. See J.W. Pickersgill and D.F. Forster, The Mackenzie King Record, 4 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960-1970). The King biography currently consists of three volumes, the first by R. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King, vol. 1, 1874-1923: A Political Biography (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), and the latter two by H. Blair Neatby: vol. 2, 1924-1932: The Lonely Heights, and vol. 3, 1932-1939: The Prism of Unity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963 and 1976).

10. E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1956).

11. On Burns, see his General Mud: Memoirs of Two World Wars (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1970), as well as J.L. Granatstein's more recent and analytical account in The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), chapter 5, pp. 116-44.

12. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, Chapter VII, pp. 397-484. On Stacey's background and work, particularly as a Canadian military historian, see his own memoirs, A Date with History: Memoirs of a Canadian Historian (Ottawa: Deneau, n.d.), as well as Ronald Haycock, with Serge Bernier, Teaching Military History: Clio and Mars in Canada (Athabasca, Alberta: Athabasca University, 1995), pp. 5-8, and Carl Berger, The Writing of Canadian History: Aspects of English-Canadian Historical Writing since 1900, Second Edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), pp. 169-72.

13. J.L. Granatstein, The Politics of Survival: The Conservative Party of Canada, 1939-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967). See also Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, pp. 277-78.

14. Granatstein, Conscription in the Second World War, 1939-1945: A Study in Political Management (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969).

15. Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975).

16. Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, op.cit.

17. See Robert Rumilly, Histoire de la province de Québec, tomes XXXVIII-XLI (Ottawa: Fides, 1968-1969); René Chaloult, Mémoires politiques (Montréal: Éditions du jour, 1969); and Brian McKenna and Susan Purcell, Drapeau (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1980); as well as several studies of Camillien Houde, the wartime Mayor of Montreal: Hertel La Roque, Camillien Houde: le p'tit gars de Ste-Marie (Montréal:

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18. See Michael D. Behiels, "The Bloc Populaire Canadien and the Origins of French-Canadian Neo-nationalism, 1942-8," Canadian Historical Review LXIII(4), December 1982, pp. 487-512, and "The Bloc Populaire Canadien: Anatomy of Failure, 1942-1947," Journal of Canadian Studies 18(4), Winter 1983-84, pp. 45-74, as well as Paul-André Comeau's full-length history, Le Bloc Populaire: 1942-1948 (Montréal: Éditions Québec/Amérique, 1982).

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20. For Laurendeau's comments on the impact of conscription on individuals, see "The Conscription Crisis, 1942," p. 99.

21. On these trends, see Berger, The Writing of Canadian History, pp. 259-320, and John English, "National Politics and Government," in Doug Owsam, ed., Canadian History: A Reader's Guide, vol. 2, Confederation to the Present (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 3-4.

22. For example, see Norman Hillmer, Bohdan Kordan, and Lubomyr Luciuk, eds., On Guard for Thee: War, Ethnicity and the Canadian State, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1988), Ruth Roach Pierson, "They're Still Women After All": The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986), and the following work on wartime labour issues by Laurel Sefton MacDowell: "The Formation of the Canadian Industrial Relations System during World War Two," Labour/Le Travailleur, Volume 3, 1978, pp. 175-96; "The 1943 Strike Against Wartime Wage Controls," Labour/Le Travailleur, Volume 10, Autumn 1982, pp. 65-85; and "Remember Kirkland Lake": The Gold Miners' Strike of 1941-42 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983). The treatment of Japanese and Chinese Canadians was also a popular topic among Canadian historians in the 1970s and 1980s, including W. Peter Ward's White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Towards Orientals in British Columbia (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University

Press, 1978); Patricia Roy, "The Soldiers Canada Didn't Want: Her Chinese and Japanese Citizens," Canadian Historical Review LIX(3), September 1978, pp. 341-58; and Ann Gomer Sunahara, The Politics of Racism: The Uprooting of Japanese Canadians During the Second World War (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1981). The "good war" reference in this paragraph is from Studs Terkel's "The Good War": An Oral History of World War Two (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984).

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24. For a review of these trends, see Haycock and Bernier, Teaching Military History, op.cit.

25. For example, see J.E. Rea, "What Really Happened? A new look at the Conscription Crisis," The Beaver 74(2), April/May 1994, pp. 10-19, adapted from his Presidential Address to the Canadian Historical Association, "A View From the Lectern," Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, Vol. 2, 1991, pp. 3-16, and David Wilson, "Reflections on Conscription, 1944-45," a paper presented at the Sixth Military History Colloquium of the Wilfrid Laurier University Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies, 21 April 1995. John MacFarlane has also recently completed a study of Ernest Lapointe, Prime Minister King's Minister of Justice and "Quebec lieutenant" in the federal Cabinet, titled "Ernest Lapointe: Quebec's Voice in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1921-1941," Ph.D. thesis, Université Laval, 1995. For civilian aspects of wartime mobilization, see Michael D. Stevenson, "National Selective Service and the Mobilization of Human Resources in Canada During the Second World War," Ph.D. thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1996. Both of the latter works are soon to be published.

26. A recent study which adopts this traditional critical approach is R.J. Walker's "Poles Apart: Civil-Military Relations in the Pursuit of a Canadian National Army," M.A. thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 1991, which draws its conclusions largely from previously published sources.

27. In particular, see Paul-André Linteau, René Durocher, and Jean-Claude Robert, Quebec: A History, 1867-1929, trans. Robert Chodos, and Linteau, et.al., Quebec Since 1930, trans.

Robert Chodos and Ellen Garmaise (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1983 and 1991), which summarized much recent work in Quebec when they first appeared in French, and challenged a number of traditional assumptions. On Quebec in the Second World War, see also the recent work of Serge Marc Durflinger, "City at War: The Effects of the Second World War on Verdun, Québec," Ph.D. thesis, McGill University, 1997, who addresses the complexity of Quebec society during the war by studying it from the point of view of one individual community, and Pierre Vennat, Les Héros oubliés: L'histoire inédite des militaires canadiens-français de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, 3 tomes (Montréal: Éditions du Méridien, 1997-1998), a journalistic account that offers a corrective to the usual assumption that all Quebecers opposed military service.

CHAPTER ONE

Mobilizing Canada: The Birth of Compulsory Military Training during the Second World War, 1940-1941

Canada's political leaders entered the Second World War determined not to repeat the mistakes of the Great War. By the time that Canada officially declared war on Germany on 10 September 1939, its politicians had gone a long way to ensure that compulsory military service would not become a major issue. In March, both the Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, and Robert Manion, the Opposition leader, had pledged not to impose conscription for overseas service in the event of war. King repeated this promise to the emergency session of the House of Commons that met on 7 September 1939 to declare war.¹ Liberal promises to avoid conscription were reaffirmed when Quebec Premier Maurice Duplessis called a snap election later that month, arguing that the federal government would use the war to force several unpopular policies on the province, including conscription. Quebec's three federal Cabinet Ministers, Ernest Lapointe, Charles G. ("Chubby") Power, and Pierre J.A. Cardin, all took an unprecedented part in the provincial election campaign, each one declaring that he would never allow conscription to be imposed as long as he served in Ottawa. Should Duplessis be re-elected, however, all vowed to

resign their posts immediately. Not surprisingly, Duplessis was soundly defeated, removing a serious barrier to wartime relations between Quebec City and Ottawa. But the election, along with the promises of March and September, was interpreted in many quarters as an explicit bargain to forego conscription in return for French-Canadian support for the war effort.²

Despite these apparent promises, by June 1940 compulsory military service was a reality. On 21 June, the "National Resources Mobilization Act" (NRMA) became law, providing the federal government with the authority to impose conscription, although with service clearly limited to Canadian territory. At first, the NRMA was seen as only a short-term measure, in response to the desperate Allied situation that emerged in Europe that spring. To only a few people did the NRMA seem to presage the huge political and social divisions that had been sparked by conscription in the First World War. In fact, conscription continued to attract little significant opposition throughout the first two years of its existence. Yet it was during the same period that the foundations were laid for a program that would come to be a much more permanent and far-reaching part of the country's war effort, and one that would eventually help to make conscription as volatile an issue as it had been during the First World War.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore the enactment and early development of the National Resources Mobilization

Act. As it will show, during its first year of operation the story of the NRMA was one of uncertainty and confusion, followed by increasing rationalization as military planners fitted it more fully into their broader mobilization schemes. By early 1941, conscription had taken on the form it would retain for most of the war; one that would have an important impact both on the country's political affairs, and on the thousands of individuals who would be compelled to serve as conscripts during the war.

* * *

To understand the origins of the National Resources Mobilization Act, it is first necessary to review Canada's participation in the first few months of the Second World War. In retrospect, historians have come to see this period as a time when Canadians devoted less than their full attention to the conflict. Throughout the winter of 1939-1940, federal policy was guided by the principle of "limited liability," or the production of food, raw materials and industrial goods, rather than large armies for overseas service. These policies were championed specifically by Prime Minister Mackenzie King, as a way to minimize the chances of costly drains on manpower, as had occurred during the First World War, and the resulting need to impose conscription. It is much easier to see these policies as "limited" in hindsight, however, than it was at the time. In the early months of the war, many Canadians felt that their country was already contributing to the war effort

to the best of its ability, and perhaps even beyond. The armies of France and Britain, along with the entire Atlantic Ocean, stood between Canada and any realistic threat to its security, and the economy was still recovering from the Great Depression of the 1930s, an event that had left deep psychological wounds on the country.³

The best example of the direction taken by Canada during the first months of the war is the Economic Advisory Committee (EAC), an ad-hoc organization created by the Department of Finance to coordinate the country's economic contributions to the war effort. In its early days, the EAC's proceedings were dominated by negotiations to supply wheat, bacon and other products to Great Britain, all of which Canada had in abundance, as well as protecting vital raw materials, and turning manufacturing towards wartime needs. This was seen as the best way the country could aid the war effort: by sending as many as possible of its goods to Great Britain, while working to expand wartime industry. That the results of this policy would benefit Canada's own economy was considered only proper, since it would also help to expand the country's industrial capacity, so that it could be used to contribute even more fully to the war effort later on. At the same time, the policy promised to permit federal politicians to increase the size of the country's military, slowly but steadily, so that it could field larger wartime forces should they later become necessary overseas. This would ensure that any future

expansion of the military would not go beyond the country's ability to maintain it without resorting to conscription.⁴

The military contributions that Canada made to the war effort in 1939-1940 were likewise arranged with a view to reducing the threat of conscription. In the first days of the conflict, the Army recruited two volunteer divisions, only one of which was intended to go overseas. The country's major military effort was identified as the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan (BCATP), an extension of an existing scheme to train pilots and aircrew in Canada which had been arranged earlier in 1939. When British authorities proposed expanding the scheme in October, it offered a welcome opportunity to use Canada's wide-open spaces and distance from enemy borders to contribute to the war effort, while keeping thousands of Canadians at home to operate the program. Canada also had a relatively strong infant air industry, as well as easy access to much larger American production, and was close enough to Europe for pilots to be quickly shipped to Britain after they completed their training. In addition, Canadian airmen were intended to form a large part of the overseas air forces that would eventually be built up under the BCATP. For the Prime Minister, the plan offered the opportunity to emphasize the country's military contributions to the air war, an area where most planners still assumed in 1939 that casualties would be considerably lower than among the large infantry formations of 1914-1918. It is even possible that the Army's 1st Canadian

Division might not have sailed for England in December 1939, had the British suggested the BCATP a few days earlier than they did. As it was, the final agreement for the BCATP was signed on the same day that the first Canadian soldiers arrived overseas.⁵

Despite attempts to press the federal government to make greater military commitments to the war effort, conscription also failed to attract much political interest over the winter of 1939-1940. When Ontario Premier Mitchell Hepburn passed a motion in his province's legislature in January 1940, charging that the federal government was not doing enough to prosecute the war, Prime Minister King took it as a personal challenge to his own policies, and immediately called a federal election. Ignoring the protests of some of their members, who wanted to campaign for outright conscription, the federal Conservatives called only for a "National Government" uniting leaders from all parties. But these proposals still reminded too many people of the First World War, when the creation of a coalition "Union" government under Conservative control had led directly to conscription. King returned to power in March 1940 with the largest majority in Parliament to that point in Canadian history. Thus, many voters apparently agreed that Canada was already doing as much as it could to contribute to the war effort.⁶

Then came a series of rapid German advances during the spring of 1940. In April, Denmark and Norway were quickly

overrun. In May, Germany invaded France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. By early June, France was all but defeated, and the bulk of the British Army had barely escaped destruction at the French port of Dunkirk. Italy declared war on the Allies on 10 June. Suddenly, Canada was ranked as Britain's most powerful ally, and almost any sacrifice seemed necessary to defend the island itself. In response to these developments, the Liberal government established a Department of Munitions and Supply in April, to bring greater speed and efficiency to wartime manufacturing. All available stocks of weapons and supplies were shipped to Great Britain, and munitions production greatly expanded. In late May, Prime Minister King announced plans to send the 2nd Canadian Division overseas, along with additional forestry and railway troops, and enough men to form a Corps headquarters to command Canadian forces in the field, while mobilizing two more divisions to take over home defence duties within Canada. Canadian units also replaced British garrisons in Iceland, Newfoundland, and the West Indies, and the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) took on a much greater share of responsibility for the BCATP, accelerating the planned expansion of its training facilities to meet the changed situation overseas. The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) sent all of its available ships to Great Britain, and both it and the RCAF took on increased roles patrolling the eastern approaches to North America.⁷

It is in this atmosphere that the National Resources

Mobilization Act was conceived and passed in mid-June 1940. The NRMA was drafted by Prime Minister King, who modelled it directly on a similar British measure, the "Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940."⁸ The wording of the NRMA was very broad, granting the federal government the power to

do and authorize such acts and things, and make from time to time such orders and regulations, requiring persons to place themselves, their services and their property at the disposal of His Majesty in the right of Canada, as may be deemed necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of Canada, the maintenance of public order, or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies or services essential to the life of the community.

At the same time, Section Three of the Act explicitly limited military service under the NRMA to "Canada and the territorial waters thereof."⁹

Unfortunately, few records have survived from which to reconstruct the political contexts that shaped decision-making in the summer of 1940. Most of our knowledge is based on the records of the Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, and especially his famous diary.¹⁰ Using these sources, some authors have argued that the broader powers of the NRMA were intended only to hide its true purpose, which was to authorize conscription for home defence.¹¹ In his diary, King stressed his own role in drafting the NRMA, and particularly his worries about its implications for conscription. Certainly, the NRMA came to be identified very quickly with compulsory service. But it may have been intended to do more than this when it was first passed. It is worth remembering that the crisis of May and

June brought pressure from a number of individuals and organizations to expand Canada's war effort, including numerous demands to conscript wealth and industry as well as manpower.¹² In fact, King drafted the NRMA following a visit from the new Opposition leader, R.B. Hanson, who had replaced R.J. Manion as leader of the Conservative Party in May. Hanson reportedly requested that the King government create "legislation putting at the disposition of the State all the manpower and material resources of the nation."¹³ The Cabinet War Committee (CWC), the small inner circle of ministers that had been established in the fall of 1939 to decide the government's war policies, also focused on broader aspects of the NRMA in its deliberations, several members favouring controls over industrial workers and income in addition to military conscription.¹⁴ In the United Kingdom, the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, the law on which King had based the NRMA, was even more explicit. There, compulsory military service was already in place when the bill was passed in May, and the new measure merely extended that government's powers to industrial manpower and a range of other social and economic issues.¹⁵

King himself had other reasons for creating a broad NRMA in June 1940, besides taking attention away from its military aspects. As J.W. Pickersgill has noted, King was genuinely shocked by the speed of German advances in the spring of 1940, and feared that almost any measure might be necessary to help

keep Britain in the war, as the first line of defence for Canada itself. He also wished to prevent panic and stabilize public opinion. The NRMA was designed to do this by setting out explicit powers that the government possessed but had not yet exercised under the existing War Measures Act, a law that had originally been passed in 1914, but which was reactivated on the outbreak of war in 1939.¹⁶ Thus, the NRMA gave a firm sign of the government's leadership in the crisis, while differentiating its actions from those taken in the Great War. During the debate on the NRMA in the House of Commons, King emphasized the psychological aims of the new bill, stating repeatedly that it was meant to do more than simply conscript manpower, comments that were echoed by several members of the opposition parties.¹⁷

In essence, then, the new NRMA was a political compromise that gave the government any conceivable power that it might need in the dark days of June 1940, while making it clear that the government would not go so far as to impose conscription for overseas service. Indeed, many of the measures envisioned at the time were eventually brought into effect during the war, including greater levels of taxation, and a detailed system of controls over industrial manpower.¹⁸ Having decided to introduce a limited form of compulsory military service for political reasons, however, the government then left it to the Army to work out the details of creating and administering the new training system, and finding the

manpower and resources necessary to operate it. As a result, the compulsory military training program that emerged over the next few months would come to be based much more on the needs of the Army than those of the politicians, setting the stage for problems that would become increasingly visible as the war went on.

* * *

The first need that arose after passing the NRMA in June 1940 was to take stock of the actual reserves of manpower and other resources that were available to the government. Before the NRMA was even formally enacted by the House of Commons, a Temporary Committee had been set up to decide what information to gather, and how to go about doing so.¹⁹ Formal regulations were approved in early July, and a new Department of National War Services was established to conduct the planned National Registration.²⁰ It would also be responsible for administering civilian aspects of the NRMA after that time, including deciding which men would be called out for military training, and notifying them of their duty to report, as well as coordinating the country's other voluntary contributions to the war effort.²¹ From 19 to 21 August, eight million Canadians between the ages of sixteen and forty-five reported to polling stations across the country, to fill out and return cards stating their ages, marital status, occupations, and other useful data, information which formed the basis for the increasingly complex mobilization of society

that took place over the next few years.²² Under the terms of the NRMA, any man who became married after 15 July 1940 was legally considered to be single for the duration of the war, and regulations provided for the ongoing registration of adolescents as they turned sixteen, by filling out cards at their local Post Office. By late August, everything was in place to begin the new compulsory military training scheme.²³

Meanwhile, the Army's planners had also begun organizing for the beginning of compulsory training. At first, considerable confusion existed. The Defence portfolio was unexpectedly left vacant when its Minister, Norman Rogers, died in an airplane crash on 10 June. Rogers had been chosen for the post in September 1939, partly because the Prime Minister considered him better able to resist the increased role the military would inevitably play in wartime policy-making.²⁴ In contrast, J.L. Ralston, Roger's successor, was a well-known former battalion commander from the First World War, who had served as Minister of National Defence in the King government of 1926-1930.²⁵ Although King's decision to shift Ralston from Finance to Defence seemed natural in the dark days of June 1940, it may also have been pushed on him somewhat by a lack of other clear candidates for the position following the death of Rogers. Nevertheless, it put in place a man who was much more likely to accept the recommendations of his military advisors without question. In addition, Ralston did not officially leave his duties as Finance

Minister until early July. The result was a vacuum that left the Army without any firm sense of the government's wishes with regard to compulsory military training. In the circumstances it is hardly surprising that the Army's planners would come to play a much more important role in defining the new organization than might otherwise have been the case.

In the absence of Ralston, the first reference to the government's plans for training was made by C.G. Power, the Acting Minister of National Defence, during debate on the NRMA in the House of Commons in June. At that point, Power stated that training would be entrusted to units of the Non-Permanent Active Militia (NPAM), the part-time backbone of the country's peacetime defence organization, and that it would last a maximum of three months for each man.²⁶ But little more was known at this time. Faced with the government's sudden decision to begin compulsory training, Power's military staff was thinking more in terms of eight weeks' training, the minimum considered necessary to teach basic skills to raw recruits, due to shortages of staff and equipment. Under these pressures, the eight-week plan was soon shortened to six weeks, or thirty days of formal training not including weekends - the same as the yearly total for most militia units. By the time the new scheme opened in October, the thirty days had been compressed into a little more than four weeks. Among other options considered early on were having conscripts live at home and train part-time in the armouries

of local militia units, or using the facilities of local units to house and train conscripts full-time. But these options were rejected as too costly and impractical, since they would spread the Department's remaining resources too thinly to be effective. Instead, planners substituted a larger and more centrally-located system of camps, which would be built across the country specifically to train the new conscripts.²⁷

Planning for the compulsory military training program increased in intensity after J.L. Ralston took over his new duties as Minister of National Defence on 5 July. One of his first acts was to recall Major-General H.D.G. Crerar, who was currently serving as the Senior Combatant Officer (in later years the Chief of Staff) of Canadian Military Headquarters in London, to become Chief of the General Staff (CGS) in Ottawa, the Army's highest officer and governmental advisor. Crerar's appointment marked a new stage in organizing both the NRMA and the larger war effort. A career officer, Crerar had risen to command a brigade during the First World War, and spent much of the interwar period training for more senior positions, including postings to the War Office in Great Britain, and its staff and war colleges, institutions designed to prepare soldiers for high command throughout the British Empire. Thus, Crerar was well suited to fulfil his new duties as CGS. In addition, as two of his recent biographers have noted, Crerar was also driven by a strong sense of ambition, both personal and professional, which made him determined to build

the Canadian Army into as large a force as possible during the war, in hopes that it would play a significant role overseas. Not only would Crerar be a strong candidate to command this force in battle, but it would also make the Army a much more visible institution, and prepare it to play a much greater role in postwar military decision-making in Canada. These goals played a significant role in the planning of both the volunteer Army and the NRMA as Crerar developed them after 1940.²⁸

For the moment, however, Crerar's major concern was simply to get the compulsory military training program up and running. As he reported later to Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton, the commander of the Canadian Corps overseas,

On my arrival I found the Government happily committed to compulsory training and, indeed, service but with a very superficial scheme for training and utilizing the man-power so called up. It was too late to change the basis of the training scheme which had already been announced but I made it plain that the best we could hope for after six weeks training of the individual (incidentally, with practically no weapons to train with), was to make these men "military minded." I also stressed to the Minister that this scheme must be regarded as purely an interim measure and that in the course of the next few months the Government would need to face the entire problem of the future organization of military service for Canada.²⁹

Under Crerar's direction, the Department of National Defence completed a more specific training plan by mid-August. All available staffs and equipment would be consolidated into thirty-nine new training centres, which would be built in small but centrally-located communities across the country.

Thirty thousand men between the ages of 21 and 24 would be called out for training every four to six weeks. They would be treated as civilians until they arrived in the camps, but then formally enrolled in the Army, where they would remain under full military authority until they left again. Men would be paid at normal militia rates during their training, and after completing the course they would be posted to nearby militia battalions, officially to continue their training, but more importantly to keep track of them in case they were needed again in the future. In practice, they would return to civilian life. At first, the plan was not expected to be permanent; it would last for roughly one year, after which all eligible male citizens were expected to have completed their training.³⁰

The rest of the summer saw a flurry of activity as the Army scrambled to prepare for the start of the new training scheme. Commanders for the centres were selected and notified to report for their new duties as early as the last week of July, and immediately left for refresher training and other courses to hone and upgrade their skills. Other senior officers and instructors were chosen throughout August. By early September the staffs of the training centres were largely complete, and gathered together in special camps in each of the eleven regional "Military Districts" into which the country was divided, for a further month's training before leaving to take over their individual centres.³¹

In selecting the commanders for the training centres, and their subordinate staffs, the Department of National Defence relied heavily on Canada's existing militia organization. The NPAM had been created in 1855 to encourage citizens to train voluntarily for war in times of peace, and had come to be a significant part of many communities by 1939.³² Recruits raised from units of the NPAM formed the backbone of the country's armed forces in the First World War, and in the process became a much more professional organization. Despite cuts in government funding after the war, many veterans remained part of the peacetime militia, and shared their knowledge with a new generation of volunteers. The NPAM continued to be a strong and vibrant institution in the interwar years, despite a vocal anti-war movement that dominated public debate in the 1920s and early 1930s.³³ In fact, without the contributions of the NPAM it is unlikely that the compulsory military training system would ever have been established in 1940. The new program provided many members with a way to contribute to the war effort regardless of age or physical status, most of whom proved to be eager and conscientious officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs). At the same time, younger members gained the opportunity to participate in the war at a time when the supply of volunteers still far outstripped the pace of the Canadian Army's expansion overseas.³⁴

One of the best examples of the personnel drawn from the

peacetime militia who came to play an important part in the wartime NRMA was Lieutenant-Colonel Eugène Nantel, the first commander of No. 44 "Canadian Militia Training Centre" (CMTC) in St. Jérôme, Quebec. Nantel had served overseas with the famous 22nd Battalion, the only French Canadian infantry battalion in the First World War, where he was twice wounded, the second time during the Canadian attack on Vimy Ridge in April 1917. Nantel remained overseas, serving with the Canadian Army in Siberia in 1918-1919, before returning home, where he rose to command the French-speaking *Régiment de Châteauguay* in the interwar period. When the new compulsory training program was announced in 1940, Nantel left a wartime post as Director of Auxiliary Services in Military District No. 4 (Montreal) to become the commanding officer in St. Jérôme.³⁵ Many senior officers and NCOs in the training centres had similar backgrounds. At least four commanding officers had won Military Crosses for bravery in the Great War, including Major L. Younger of No. 132 CMTC in Grande Prairie, Alberta, who held an M.C. with two bars (additions to the M.C. for later acts of bravery), and Lt.-Col. H.J. Quinn of No. 120 CMTC in Regina, Saskatchewan, who had won the Military Medal, an award equivalent to the M.C. but which indicated that he had not been a commissioned officer when he won it.³⁶ Another officer had even lost a hand in the First World War, but apparently continued to serve his country as a useful member of the militia in the interwar period, before

joining the NRMA as a senior officer in Camrose, Alberta.³⁷

Personnel in the training centres also came from a number of other sources. Some had served in various British units during the First World War, and retired to Canada or made their way into Canadian service after 1918.³⁸ Others accepted reductions in rank to leave their local militia regiments, or gave up commands of their own to serve as subordinates in the training centres.³⁹ Still more came from the Veterans Home Guard (later the Veterans Guard of Canada), a body that had also been created in the summer of 1940, to permit over-age veterans to continue to serve the war effort by guarding vital defence points, internment camps for enemy aliens, and prisoner-of-war camps across the country.⁴⁰ The Canadian Officers' Training Corps, the arm of the NPAM in Canada's universities, was an additional source of officers, some of whom were professors and others still students. Many transferred directly from their contingents to take up their new positions in the fall of 1940.⁴¹

Despite the contributions of the NPAM and other Great War veterans to the NRMA, these sources were still barely sufficient to fill the demand for qualified personnel. As one observer noted,

Difficulty was encountered in securing N.C.O's. who would make good instructors. Very few available except younger men who only had a few weeks experience in a NPAM summer camp, or had a course of instruction in gas or S[mall].A[rms].T[raining].

In some cases junior NCOs had to be found by selecting them

directly from militia units, which were holding their annual summer camps alongside those for the training centre staffs.⁴² Still, by the time the compulsory military training program opened in early October, most of the centres had managed to find enough men to meet their needs, again thanks largely to the peacetime militia.


While the staffs of the training centres were preparing for their new duties, construction crews were also hard at work building the camps that would soon house the thousands of new conscripts. In some cases, Army planners used existing buildings, such as in Fort William, Ontario, where engineers renovated a vacant factory owned by the Steel Company of Canada to serve as offices, living quarters and training areas for over 500 men.⁴³ In Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, officials leased a local luxury hotel and converted it into a barracks for 250 men.⁴⁴ Several camps were built on community fairground or exhibition sites, where accommodations and other facilities were already available, as well as suitable areas for outdoor training.⁴⁵

Yet most of the centres had to be built from the ground up. In all, over 1,150 buildings were erected across the country in a matter of weeks.⁴⁶ Crews were often hard at work finishing huts and other buildings as the first recruits arrived to commence their training on October 9, since lumber and other supplies were not available in many locations before the middle of September.⁴⁷ In one of the more extreme cases,

as the local commanding officer wrote somewhat cynically,

The incomplete state of this camp, in view of [the] number of men expected in less than a week, is appalling, only one of the six living blocks can be occupied and it is not yet complete. Workmen are scarcely moving. Evidently they are trying to make a good thing last as long as possible.⁴⁸

In Portage la Prairie, Manitoba, and Grande Prairie, Alberta, men ate in nearby restaurants at government expense for the first few days of operations, until kitchens and dining halls in the camps could be completed.⁴⁹ In Peterborough, Ontario, trainees spent their first night sleeping on the floors of their huts, as the beds had not yet arrived.⁵⁰ For the most part, however, staffs in the training centres met the conditions with less criticism. As the War Diarist in Gordon Head, British Columbia, noted, workmen there had completed a total of twenty-six buildings and two miles of roads in fifty-one days, along with electricity, water, and sewer lines, a major accomplishment.⁵¹ In many cases, training staffs pitched in to help finish buildings and outfit them before the first trainees arrived. Several Drill Halls were not yet complete when the camps opened, and in some cases they were not ready until January 1941, leaving two successive groups of men to train outdoors in the depths of a typical Canadian winter. In a few cases, recruits spent physical training periods shovelling snow or tramping it down on outdoor parade squares, so that training could continue.⁵² Camp hospitals, rifle ranges, and other buildings also could not be occupied until training centres had been operating for a matter of weeks.⁵³



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
Interior of a typical NRMA barrack hut, Brockville, Ontario, February 1941. Note the "nearly-new" character of the building, which had been constructed only a few months earlier. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 17305, War Diary, No. 30 Canadian Army (Reserve) Training Centre, Brockville, Appendix 6, February 1941.)

One possible motive that has been suggested for creating new training centres rather than relying on existing facilities was to spread their economic impact to regions that had not yet benefitted from wartime defence spending.⁵⁴ Yet there is little evidence that this opportunity was used for patronage purposes. In August 1940, R.B. Hanson attempted to raise the issue of patronage in connection with the NRMA, protesting the choice of a new timber buyer for defence projects in Eastern Canada (which included the training camps). At the same time, he visited the centre in his local riding in Fredericton, New Brunswick, to accuse officers of not hiring Conservatives for construction work. In this case, J.L. Ralston, the wartime Timber Controller, and the officers in Fredericton all assured him that appointments were not being made on a patronage basis.⁵⁵ In Chicoutimi, meanwhile, the town's newspaper complained about the lack of contracts being awarded to nearby firms to build the nearby camp, the traditional route of government patronage, apparently due to outside companies making the best bids to the Department of National Defence.⁵⁶ When Jean-François Pouliot, the federal Member of Parliament for Rivière-du-Loup, sought to use his influence to obtain a job for a local optometrist in the training camp at Rimouski, he was politely referred to the appropriate authorities.⁵⁷

For the most part, the Department of National Defence was motivated by considerations other than patronage in its choice

of sites for the new training centres. One motive was clearly to distribute them as efficiently as possible in relation to the country's population centres, and Montreal in particular provided recruits for several local centres (see Map 1). In more remote regions such as Grande Prairie, Alberta, and North Bay, Ontario, camps were located at regional railroad junctions, to make it easier for men from outlying areas to reach them, and sometimes had to change their training schedules to accommodate the railroads.⁵⁸ Another, more important reason for choosing smaller communities seems to have been to locate them in areas that had not yet experienced the war on a large scale, and thus encourage citizens to identify more closely with the training centres and the larger war effort. Civilians in nearby towns contributed to the success of the camps in many ways. One of the most interesting cases occurred when J.L. Ralston sent a telegram to the mayors of all communities involved in the new program in mid-September, asking for help supplying musical bands, for training and entertainment purposes in the camps. Most replies were favourable, and several towns arranged to provide musicians or instruments. Some raised questions of travel, pay, and the amount of time that could be devoted to such activities by civilian band members. But most went on to echo the sentiments of Gérard Lacourcière, the Mayor of Megantic, Quebec, who wrote:

We are glad to offer this contribution. We gather from your message that you want those boys to feel



that there is somebody who is interested in them and in what they are undertaking to do, and shall do our utmost to meet your desires.⁵⁹

In Red Deer, Alberta, the city donated a set of instruments that had originally been purchased by the trustees of a local CEF unit following the First World War, providing a direct link between its contributions in both world wars.⁶⁰

In many areas, the announcement that a training centre would be built nearby was significant local news, and received considerable coverage in regional newspapers. Clippings collected by several camps reveal the extent to which each town followed the progress of its centre. The Camrose Canadian, for example, trumpeted news that the city was being considered as a site for a camp in early August, and continued to report on every development over the next two months.⁶¹ At the same time, not everyone seems to have fully understood the purpose of the camps. In mid-July, H.C. Nixon, the Provincial Secretary of Ontario and a key member of the Hepburn government, wrote to J.G. Gardiner, the current Minister of National War Services, requesting that married men of thirty-five or even forty years of age be included in the first group of conscripts called out for training under the NRMA, so that the province could "purge" itself of unemployed men still drawing government relief payments as a result of the prewar Depression.⁶²

Local communities continued to contribute to the training centres as opening day approached. In mid-August,

representatives from four of the country's major service organizations - the Canadian Legion, the Knights of Columbus, the Salvation Army, and the YMCA (Young Men's Christian Association) - met with officials in Ottawa to arrange for them to provide and run "Canteen" or "Recreation" huts in each camp.⁶³ Responsibilities were divided among the four groups, and soon citizens in almost every city and town where training centres were located were raising money and collecting items such as books, magazines, writing supplies, radios, games, and furniture for the use of the men.⁶⁴ By early December, the Knights of Columbus Hut at No. 71 CMTC in Edmundston, New Brunswick, reportedly boasted a piano, a violin, a movie projector, ping-pong tables, "and divers[e] other forms of entertainment."⁶⁵ In Kitchener, Ontario, citizens organized a library for their centre that contained over 500 books and magazines, along with "all local weekly and daily newspapers represented by our trainees."⁶⁶ In Fort William, the city's library opened a part-time branch in the training centre, while the personnel of the centre commented on the "kindly and welcome manner" with which they had been received more generally by the citizens of the northern Ontario city.⁶⁷

Public interest in the training centres continued over the next few weeks. In Woodstock, Ontario, 5,000 civilians lined the streets and a civic ceremony was held to welcome the staff of the local training centre when they arrived to take charge of the camp. The men marched through the city, led by

the band of the local militia battalion. Similar scenes were played out in St. Jérôme and in Joliette, in Quebec.⁶⁸ The Department of National Defence ordered district commanders to cooperate as much as possible with reporters wishing to visit the camps, particularly for the arrival of the first group of trainees on Wednesday, October 9, and several newspapers printed lengthy stories about the occasion.⁶⁹ In Kitchener, the director of the centre's new "YMCA Canteen" broadcasted live over a local radio station, interviewing men as they arrived for training, and in Cornwall the first day was recorded by the "March of Time" newsreel organization.⁷⁰ Special civic ceremonies were held to open several of the centres. In Quebec, where the population was predominately Roman Catholic, camps were officially opened and blessed by members of the local clergy, providing not only religious but also significant political support for the new program. The following Sunday saw hundreds and even thousands of curious civilians attend the first of many weekly visitor's days in each training centre, and prominent local and national figures continued to visit camps across the country over the next few weeks, to see and support the training for themselves.⁷¹


One of the most spectacular cases of community involvement in the activities of the early training centres came in mid-October, and caused some consternation for Army officials. On 16 October, both the Department of National Defence and the Department of National War Services received



Members of the first class of NRMA trainees in Brockville, Ontario, October 1940. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 17305, War Diary, No. 30 Canadian Army (Reserve) Training Centre, Brockville, Appendix 7, November 1940.)

telegrams asking them to approach the commanding officer of No. 120 CMTC, in Regina, Saskatchewan, and order him to allow his men to participate in the "world premiere" of the Hollywood movie *North West Mounted Police*, which was scheduled to take place a few days later. The commander had rejected the request due to lack of time in his men's training schedule, and staff members in the Directorate of Military Training in Ottawa tended to agree with him. Because the profits from the premiere were being donated to the local Red Cross, however, and because the event offered an opportunity to enhance the public image of the Regina training centre, he was ordered to cooperate with local officials.⁷² As a result, on 21 October the entire personnel of the training centre joined men from nearby Navy and Air Force installations to parade through the city. As the centre's War Diarist put it, "Many highly resented the use of His Majesty's Forces as an advertising stunt for the Moving Picture Industry."⁷³

In most cases, though, once the initial confusion of examining, documenting, inoculating, clothing, and equipping trainees and finding them sleeping quarters for their first night was over, it was time for them to begin the work for which the centres had been created. Training centres were designed to accommodate conscripts in groups of 250, 500, 750, or 1000 men, divided into battalions numbering one, two, three, or four special training companies, with an additional 75-200 staff members, depending on the size of the camp.⁷⁴



Thirty-day recruits in Camrose, Alberta, during the first compulsory training period, October 1940. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 17291, War Diary, No. 131 Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centre, Camrose, Appendix [E], February 1941.)

Most centres contained four companies, but five 250-man camps were established in remoter regions, where the population was small but still considerable enough to require separate facilities; these included Grande Prairie, Alberta, Charlottetown, P.E.I., Edmundston, N.B., and Chicoutimi and Megantic, Quebec.⁷⁵ Provisions were also made to conduct training in both official languages, particularly in Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick, and one camp in Saskatchewan even reported itself capable of training men in French if it became necessary.⁷⁶ These arrangements remind us of the large and important contributions made to the NRMA by many French-speaking militiamen and Army officials in 1940, and the degree to which they had been part of the militia even before 1939, despite the customary portrayal of the Army as a predominately English-speaking institution in this period.⁷⁷ In fact, when the number of English-speaking conscripts in the Montreal area fell short of that expected, local centres were reorganized in a matter of days to take in further French-speaking men, a transformation that was accomplished with remarkably little disruption to their day-to-day operations.⁷⁸

In addition, in describing the training carried out in the early NRMA centres, historians such as J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman have stressed the degree to which they were designed simply to accustom recruits to the Army, and show that military service could be an enjoyable experience.⁷⁹ Indeed, local newspapers and even some of the units themselves

stressed such concerns.⁸⁰ At the national level, R.B. Hanson criticized the Liberal government in August for not providing a more extensive program of training, charging that its plans were motivated by political rather than military concerns. In October, the Toronto magazine Saturday Night labelled the training a "tragic joke" that would produce men "who can just manage to form threes and shoulder arms if not barked at too ferociously."⁸¹

Yet the Army's planners attempted to prepare recruits as much as possible for real military service, given the restraints within which they were forced to operate in 1940. Officials created a thorough program of training, that called for recruits to learn the same basic military knowledge in four weeks that a normal militiaman was expected to know after a year or more of training. As one War Diary summarized it,

The standard of training to be achieved by each man having completed his thirty day period is that he should:

(1) Have a sound course in physical training, elementary drill and marching.

(2) Have a thorough knowledge of the rifle for ground and anti-aircraft use and shall have fired an instructional course with ball ammunition.

(3) Have a sound knowledge of the principles of individual protection against gas including the use of the Service Respirator.

(4) Be capable of handling the Bayonet.

(5) Have a general knowledge of Field-Craft, digging and wiring and of his elementary duties as a member of a section team.⁸²

To achieve these goals, the thirty days of training were divided into a total of 220 periods, lasting 45 minutes each. This provided for 73 periods for general marching and drill,

39 for rifle training, 35 for tactics and fieldcraft, 24 for physical training and conditioning, 20 for protection against gas, 12 for use of the bayonet, and 6 for military education, which included subjects such as military law and organization, and the histories of the various militia units to which the men were to be posted following their training. This left three periods for additional demonstrations, and eight for handling administrative details and other paperwork.⁸³ Most camps scheduled compulsory sports programs on Wednesday nights or Saturday afternoons as part of their physical training programs, but on other evenings the men were left on their own. Sundays were set aside for church parades in the morning (usually compulsory), and visits to the camp by relatives and friends in the afternoon. The result was a training program that accomplished a great deal in a limited period of time.

The staffs of the training centres, at least, took their jobs very seriously. Despite the First World War experiences of many officers and instructors, they do not seem to have clung to stereotypes of the previous conflict. Instead, they provided a level of training that reflected the knowledge available to the Canadian Army in 1940. In January 1941, when the staff of one centre was shown a training film on tanks produced in 1924, they quickly dismissed it as "obsolete and of little value."⁸⁴ In some cases, local commanders invited squads from nearby centres where training was conducted for overseas volunteers to visit and demonstrate advanced weaponry

that was not included in the NRMA syllabus, such as heavy machine guns, anti-tank rifles, and even the use of armoured cars.⁸⁵ By the end of each training period, recruits were expected to be able to endure lengthy route marches of several kilometres, along with detailed tactical schemes designed to incorporate the various elements learned during their training. In some cases these included complicated night manoeuvres, or cooperation with aircraft from local RCAF bases. In Woodstock, Ontario, for example, training was made more realistic by adding smoke generators and bags of flour dropped from attacking aircraft, while in Red Deer, Alberta, the camp's staff arranged to have a Trans-Canada Airliner fly low over their centre during a regularly-scheduled flight, and used fireworks to simulate anti-aircraft fire, recording that the "Demonstration proved to be very realistic."⁸⁶ In another Montreal-area camp, men participated in a night exercise that tested their ability to use stealth and concealment to approach a group of sentries without being detected. "The only platoon to succeed," the centre reported, "was a platoon of which 82% of the men were [Canadian-born] Italians. Imagine Herr Hitler's wrath if he only knew."⁸⁷

The training accomplished in the centres is even more notable when one considers the shortages of equipment with which most had to deal. Recruits were issued with Ross Rifles, the First World War Canadian weapon that had been removed from service in 1916, after a series of controversies



Trainees in Gordon Head, British Columbia, perform a "march past" for civilian and military authorities at the conclusion of the third thirty-day training period in February 1941. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 17307, War Diary, No. 111 Canadian Army (Reserve) Training Centre, Gordon Head, Appendix 3, December 1940-February 1941.)

over its suitability for the battlefield. They were sufficient for elementary training, however, and they were the only weapons available in large numbers in 1940. These were supplemented with American-designed Springfield rifles and special models of the British Lee-Enfield, both of which had been manufactured in the United States during the First World War. Some even arrived in the original shipping cases into which they had been packed in 1917.⁸⁸ Several centres commented on the faulty or mismatched bayonets, sights, and even bolts that arrived with their rifles, a legacy of their First-World-War service, and other shortages were reported, such as barbed wire, gas and anti-aircraft training equipment, uniforms, blankets, and more minor items.⁸⁹ When the training system was changed and machine guns added to the syllabus in March 1941, most centres had to make do with First World War-era Lewis guns for another year, until they could finally be replaced by modern Bren guns produced in Canadian factories.⁹⁰ As they had done in supplying staffs for the training centres, local NPAM units provided vital assistance in meeting these shortages, temporarily lending weapons and other equipment from their own meagre stocks.⁹¹

A number of other minor problems came to light as the thirty-day training centres went into operation. In PEI, for example, planners suddenly discovered that no local infantry unit existed to which the men could be posted after completing their training. As a result, they became troopers in a local

cavalry regiment. Similar arrangements were made to post trainees in Temiskaming, Quebec, to a nearby Pioneer unit.⁹² Conscientious objectors were required to undergo training, but were permitted to substitute work in camp hospitals, store-rooms, and other administrative duties for normal weapons training. As Major-General Crerar reported to J.L. Ralston in March 1941, "In many cases such recruits subsequently volunteered to follow the complete training programme and several have even volunteered and been accepted for the Active Army."⁹³ For those men who refused to serve, and in later days when compulsory military service was extended to the duration of the war, conscientious objectors caused more problems for the Army. During the early thirty-day training periods, objectors were simply placed under arrest in the camp's guard room while their colleagues completed their training, and returned home with everyone else at the end of the training period.⁹⁴ After April 1941, when compulsory service was extended to the duration of the war, provisions were made to allow conscientious objectors to undergo alternative service outside the Army. Unfortunately, it was up to officials in the Department of National War Services (later the Department of Labour) to decide the status of objectors, and in some cases claims were rejected. This led to at least one case where Jehovah's Witnesses, who were unable to claim status as conscientious objector because their sect was considered illegal by the government, were

transferred out of their training centres and subjected to the harsh discipline of military jails for the duration of the war.⁹⁵ In contrast, in late 1941 two conscientious objectors in Camrose, Alberta, not only agreed to serve in the Army after a few days of detention in their camp, but one man was eventually awarded the rank of Lance Corporal for the high quality of his conduct during training.⁹⁶

On the whole, the early thirty-day camps ran smoothly, and the results of the training lived up to the expectations of at least the staffs who were conducting it. One commanding officer labelled his men the equal of soldiers in the Non-Permanent Active Militia, adding that some of his junior officers even considered the NRMA men to be superior to those militiamen.⁹⁷ When four local militia commanders came to Woodstock, Ontario, to view the men assigned to join their units after the training, they reportedly "expressed astonishment and pleasure at the progress shown by the Personnel undergoing training."⁹⁸ Major-General Crerar also gave his approval to the program in early 1941, again comparing it favourably to the work of the country's part-time militia units.⁹⁹ In addition, as Lt.-Col. D. Carmichael noted at the end of the third thirty-day training period in Brockville, Ontario, his staff could

now be considered to be very good. They are very keen to excel in their work. Although they find the training hours daily, [sic] somewhat long they realize that the thirty day training period is rather short in which to reach the desired standard and they work hard to get results.¹⁰⁰

Comments on the energy and skill of the staffs of the training centres could be repeated from numerous War Diaries and other reports during this period. Still, commanders were also ready to criticize the lack of training of their staffs when necessary, or point out areas where training could be improved for future recruits, again showing their devotion to their new duties.¹⁰¹

Despite being compelled to undergo training, and the intensity of the work itself, on the whole recruits in the thirty-day training centres seem to have enjoyed their early experiences. Although the evidence is somewhat biased, many commanding officers and War Diaries commented on the enthusiasm shown by the conscripts towards their work.¹⁰² Local newspapers echoed these comments. As the Camrose Canadian reported at the end of the first training period, the men there "were pretty proud of their accomplishments," and happy with their instructors.¹⁰³ The Peterborough Examiner printed accounts from four recruits under the title "Trainees Opposed To Camp Life Change Opinions As Time Passes," and the camp's War Diary preserved a song composed by one of the training platoons that suggested that they had not found the training too onerous.¹⁰⁴ English-speaking trainees in Grande Prairie, Alberta, and French-speaking recruits in St. Jérôme, Quebec, both expressed similar views.¹⁰⁵ The Edmonton Journal repeated such comments in connection with later training periods, reporting that men in the Red Deer training

centre

were emphatic on several points-that they had been treated first rate; that officers in command were fine; and they had no complaint about the food.

Two young men, one from East Lethbridge and the other from Leslieville, west of Red Deer, were particularly enthusiastic about the camp. They told the correspondent that they would feel "quite lonely" when they got home.¹⁰⁶

In Quebec, according to one often-quoted study from Military District No. 5, which included Quebec City and eastern parts of the province, the results of the training were "almost unexpectedly successful." According to the reports of individual units from which the study was compiled, the camps "may not have taught much of the technical science of modern warfare, but [they] have laid the beginnings of a foundation of public service, and knocked a lot of mischievous [sic] nonsense out of the minds of the young men of the district." In addition, the author of the survey noted that local cities and towns had done a great deal to ensure the success of the training centres, and citizens were even so friendly and treated soldiers to drinks in local bars so often that it was becoming a danger "which might lead to the extraction of information by enemy agents." While the writer may have been getting a little carried away, his comments do seem to reflect the tenor of the reports on which the study was based.¹⁰⁷

Thus, by the end of the third "thirty-day" training period in February 1941, the compulsory military training program was well established. It had provoked relatively little public opposition, and at the same time it revealed a

high degree of local support. Commanders worked to make the training as thorough and as realistic as possible for the men, and even took advantage of local conditions to add to the syllabus. Recruits in Fort William, Ontario, for example, carried out exercises in winter manoeuvre and camouflage, while centres in Vernon, British Columbia, and Newmarket, Ontario, added ski instruction over the winter for small groups of qualified trainees.¹⁰⁸

According to the contemporary records of the Department of National War Services, during the first three training periods a total of 94,771 men were ordered to report for compulsory training across the country, 90,336 of whom reported to the centres in response to their calls. Another 7,335 were released after reporting, mostly for medical reasons, leaving 82,981 men to complete their training and join the rolls of the Canadian militia.¹⁰⁹ This represented a more than 75% increase over the militia's paper strength of 107,219 men in August 1940.¹¹⁰ Although the training may not have equalled the standards required for Allied soldiers overseas, the Canadian Army had responded quite effectively to the government's political requirements in 1940, and created a short but comprehensive program of training that introduced thousands of conscripts to life in the military, and the duty of Canadians to be prepared to defend their country in case of need.

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At the same time, a number of developments were taking place that would soon come to change the entire face of the NRMA. The major influence behind these changes was Major-General Crerar, who was anxious to rationalize the various functions of the Canadian Army. As he reported to a friend as early as September 1940,

I have taken every opportunity to point out to the Minister that this present scheme of compulsory training and service must be considered as an interim arrangement for in fact it solves none of our military problems and introduces several new and complicated ones.¹¹¹

Crerar repeated these sentiments in a public speech in October, in which he argued that the length of training had been limited only by the shortages of weapons and equipment available in 1940. As he also noted, "the short training period [had] enabled a larger number of young Canadians to gain a proper conception of their national obligations within a given time."¹¹² At the same time, Crerar was considerably more forthright in private. According to journalist Grant Dexter, the parliamentary correspondent for the Winnipeg Free Press and a close confidant of several Ottawa insiders, Crerar described the program to him as "very costly and completely useless" and noted that the government's attempt to follow the dual policies of conscription for home defence and voluntary service overseas were "mutually destructive and in combination they must hamstring our industrial effort."¹¹³

By the time Crerar made these comments, he had already begun putting forward his solution to the problem, by

unveiling plans for an extensive expansion and consolidation of both the NRMA and the larger Canadian Army. In early September, Crerar submitted a thoughtful and well-written memorandum to J.L. Ralston, that began by noting that the Canadian Army would need to expand as much as possible over the next few months, to replace some of the many French and other divisions that had been lost to the Allies in 1940. If Canada exerted its maximum effort, Crerar estimated, it could raise and maintain five to seven divisions overseas, a number that was remarkably close to those he and other officers had used as a basis for mobilization planning in the interwar period.¹¹⁴ At the same time, men would be needed to replace the volunteers who went overseas, and for this Crerar advocated relying on the NRMA. Since the current training system divided the resources of the Army between the NRMA and overseas service, the logical answer was to combine the two schemes. This would result in a four-month training program for both groups, the length of time necessary in Crerar's view to produce fully trained modern soldiers. Conveniently, it would also reduce the disruption caused to industry by calling out only one quarter of the current number of conscripts each month for training, as well as preventing large numbers of volunteer militiamen from being drawn from their jobs to man local defences. This would mean that the country could continue to expand its industrial contributions to the war effort, even as it built up its forces overseas. And at no

time would there be any need to rely on conscription for overseas service. In a final note that betrayed his own postwar ambitions, Crerar added that reorganizing the Army would allow Canada to create a "proper" military force, that would free it from continued dependence on Great Britain and the United States and help look after its own defence needs after the war.¹¹⁵ Taken together, Crerar's memorandum skilfully put forward his own aims, while addressing the many political concerns of the Mackenzie King government in 1940.

Crerar soon followed his memorandum with a more formal statement of his "Canadian Army Programme for 1941." Among his recommendations included plans to send a 3rd and a 4th Division overseas by the summer of 1941, along with one independent tank brigade, while mobilizing units to create two new divisions in Canada, as well as the men necessary to create a full armoured division, which would also proceed overseas at a later date. To prevent having to duplicate the Army's resources by trying to maintain two separate training streams, Crerar called upon the government to merge the two systems, creating a new "Active" Army, which would consist of all volunteers enlisted to serve outside Canada, and a "Reserve" made up of all remaining militia units, and conscripts called out for training under the NRMA. Training centres themselves would be merged and most of the NRMA camps would become "basic training centres," where all Canadian soldiers would receive the first two months of their training.

Existing volunteer facilities would evolve into "advanced training centres," where men would spend the last two months of their training learning the skills of the specific corps^{*} of the Army in which they were expected to serve. The two groups of men would be known as "A" and "R" recruits, and would train side by side in the same centres. In addition, as Crerar noted, the number of "R" recruits trained in 1941 would be just enough to replace the number of volunteers sent overseas during the same period. He also continued to stress the need to provide for the expansion of industry as well as manpower in his mobilization plans.¹¹⁶

Ralston presented Crerar's recommendations to the Cabinet War Committee on 1 October. From the start, the plan sparked lengthy debates. Prime Minister King's reluctance to expand the Army soon became clear, and he quickly supported the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, Angus L. Macdonald, when the latter raised the question of deciding between the priorities of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, all of which were expected to expand greatly over the coming year, before approving the Army's plans. King recommended that the RCN and the RCAF be required to present

^{*}Army terminology is often confusing. The term "corps" can be used to refer to both a headquarters formation that commands troops in the field, and the different types of soldiers and the jobs that they perform within an army (eg. Armoured Corps, Service Corps, etc.). Whenever possible in this thesis, the term is capitalized when referring to the field formation, and left in lower case when describing specific types of soldiers. In most cases the usage should be clear.

their own plans to the CWC before any final decisions were made. As a result, Crerar and his two counterparts appeared before the CWC twice over the next ten days. During this time Crerar reduced his own demands, asking only that one further division be established overseas by mid-1941. But the CWC postponed further debate while J.L. Ilsley, the Minister of Finance, considered the financial ramifications of the three services' plans. By late October, Ralston was pressing the CWC for an early decision on the new training plan, so that detailed planning could begin as soon as possible. The result was another discussion on 23 October, where members raised the question of allowing conscripts to volunteer for service in the RCN or RCAF, or releasing them to jobs in wartime industries, if they chose to volunteer for such positions in the midst of their compulsory training. By the end of the month, the CWC had approved Crerar's plans for reorganization of the Army, and planning began to combine the two training systems.¹¹⁷

Unfortunately, no decision over manpower was so simple, even this early in the war. In late November, Crerar presented his formal plans for the new training scheme to the CWC. The meeting provided another occasion for King to state his opposition to increasing the country's ground forces before making a final decision on the plans of the other two services. Crerar was asked to prepare another version of his plan, to allow conscripts to transfer more easily to industry

or the other armed forces while undergoing training. Crerar and his planners had resisted making such changes, since it would mean wasting all of the time and effort spent training the men before they left. Still, by mid-December a new plan was ready for the CWC. This time, the decision was deferred until the return of J.L. Ralston, who was by then visiting England, accompanied by Crerar, to learn first-hand the military needs of the British for the coming year.¹¹⁸ Discussion resumed on 8 January 1941, on the basis of a telegram from Ralston calling for urgent approval of Crerar's Army program.¹¹⁹ But again the debate was deferred, until Ralston could return and explain the changes directly to the CWC. Only in late January was the final decision made to approve both the Army plan and the new training program upon which it would be founded. In addition, tentative plans were approved to allow NRMA recruits to transfer voluntarily to the RCAF or the RCN after their first two months of basic training, and at the same time to permit employers to request the withdrawal of essential employees, so that they could return to their wartime jobs. The plans of the RCAF and RCN, meanwhile, were also approved without substantial reductions, the Army program having been the key point on which most of the CWC's members concentrated their attention during the discussions.¹²⁰

The result was a substantial victory for Crerar. Despite the length of time spent debating the issue, he had managed to

convince Prime Minister King and other Cabinet Ministers of the need to increase the Army overseas, as well as the country's ability to maintain it through voluntary service. The new plan called for the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and a full armoured division to arrive in Britain by the end of 1941, along with sufficient men to complete the Army's Corps headquarters overseas. As several commentators have noted, part of the reason the program was finally accepted was the reluctance of the CWC to face the whole issue of manpower throughout 1940 and 1941. Yet despite a few vague fears, its members also had few grounds upon which to oppose such a scheme in early 1941, particularly given the arguments advanced by Crerar, and the continuing desperation of the situation with respect to the war overseas.¹²¹

Another, even more significant reason why the NRMA became part of the larger Army training system in 1941 was suggested by the CWC's demands that conscripts be permitted to transfer to the RCAF and RCN under the new program. In fact, as soon as the first thirty-day training centres had opened in October 1940, many camps had begun reporting large numbers of NRMA trainees volunteering for overseas service in all three armed forces. In Charlottetown, for example, three hundred out of five hundred trainees reportedly became members of various active forces during the first two training classes, while in Fort William, Ontario, as many as 80% of trainees were said to have been ready to volunteer after the first training period,

had the Army had the necessary facilities prepared to receive them. Several other centres reported proportions of 45-50% of trainees making similar promises.¹²² In fact, authorities had included a question on the enrolment form used in all the camps, that asked men in what part of the Army they would be willing to serve if they were later called to active duty.¹²³ Many training centres recorded a small but steady flow of men leaving during each training period to join one of the three armed services, and several camps clearly made more formal arrangements to encourage men to volunteer, inviting officers to attend their centres and speak to the trainees. Others noted the number of men spontaneously deciding to volunteer after experiencing life in the camps, and called for the Army to prepare official plans to accept volunteers from future groups of trainees.¹²⁴ Facing a shortage of trained tradesmen for its overseas forces in the fall of 1940, authorities in Ottawa even combed the compulsory training centres for men willing to volunteer for these duties.¹²⁵ By the end of the first training period, 3.5% of NRMA men had reportedly volunteered to join the RCAF, 11.6% the RCN, and 5% had declared that they were moving on to jobs in war industry. Eight percent of all men in the second training class were said to have stated their willingness to serve anywhere within the Army.¹²⁶ In January 1941, Crerar reported to Ralston that 15% of all conscripts in the first two training classes had volunteered for the RCN or the RCAF, and 10% for the

App K

APPLICATION FOR ENLISTMENT IN THE C.A.(A).F

The completion of this form indicates my wish to serve in the C.A.(A).F., and a willingness to appear for a Medical Examination, when called upon to do so. It does not obligate me in any way to serve.

1. SURNAME.....
2. CHRISTIAN NAMES.....
3. P.O. ADDRESS.....
4. NEAREST RAILWAY STATION.....
5. DATE OF BIRTH.....
6. PLACE OF BIRTH.....
7. NATURALIZED..... CERTIFICATE NO.....
8. MARRIED:WIDOWER:SINGLE.....
9. NO. of DEPENDENTS.....
10. RELIGION.....
11. MILITARY EXPERIENCE.....
-
12. EDUCATION.....
13. TRADE & YEARS OF EXPERIENCE.....
-
14. PHYSICAL CONDITION.....HEIGHT.....WEIGHT.....
- MEDICAL CATEGORY.....EYE GLASSES.....
15. UNIT PREFERRED.....
16. ALTERNATIVE.....

WITNESS

SIGNATURE

Serial Number _____

Specimen form introduced by new O.C. (former District Recruiting Officer) for recording particulars of Trainees desiring to serve with C.A.(A) Force and for information of D.M.O. Recruiting Officer.

CANADIAN ARMY (RESERVE) TRAINING CENTRE 131, CAMROSE, Alberta.

Appendix "K"
War Diary
January 1941

Application for voluntary enlistment created by Commanding Officer, No. 131 Canadian Army (Reserve) Training Centre, Camrose, Alberta, January 1941. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 17291, War Diary, No. 131 Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centre, Camrose, Appendix K, January 1941.)

Army.¹²⁷ By the time that provisions for such transfers had been presented to the CWC as part of the new four-month training program, planners were projecting that as many as 2,000 to 2,500 men from each group of 8,000 called out for training could be expected to volunteer for the RCN or RCAF or return to war industry, while further volunteers would opt for overseas service in the Army in each future training class.¹²⁸

These considerations provided another powerful motive for Crerar to merge the two training programs in 1941. In fact, shortly after the first four-month class reported for training in March, Crerar was recommending that conscripts be retained in service for the duration of the war, rather than returning to civilian life after completing their training. The change was authorized in mid-April, and trainees informed of their new status.¹²⁹ Headquarters staffs kept careful track of the reactions of recruits to the news, most of whom seem to have accepted the developments with little opposition. As one report summarized the situation, "There was no enthusiasm shown but neither were there any recriminations or other untoward incident."¹³⁰

For Crerar, the change marked the culmination of his plans for reorganizing the Army in Canada. As Crerar wrote to Major-General A.G.L. McNaughton in May 1941:

The decision to retain the "trainees" in the Service for an indefinite period after they have finished their four months in the Training Centres has been well received. I believe that a high

proportion of these 21-year olds will volunteer for overseas and those which do not will be introduced into Coast Defence and Internal Security Battalions. All these rather represent several bites at the cherry - the cherry being conscription for service anywhere. On the other hand, this progressive process is educating the public to what may well be the inevitable and I believe that if this comes to pass, the final stage will be taken with a minimum of fuss by all concerned. In the meantime, and certainly for the balance of this year, we are assured of all the man-power we require either as reinforcements or for new units in overseas formations.¹³¹

The result would be to make the NRMA a much more significant part of the larger Canadian Army over the next four years, with implications that would come to be increasingly clear to both the country's political leaders and the thousands of conscripts who entered the new four-month training centres after March 1941. By April, planners were already organizing a comprehensive recruiting program to take advantage of the tendency of "R" recruits to volunteer for overseas service, which would lead to a number of allegations of NRMA men being systematically compelled to volunteer during the war. It would also come to shape the larger plans of Major-General Crerar to create an even bigger volunteer Army overseas in 1942 and 1943. The following chapters describe each of these developments in turn, first by exploring the experiences of conscripts themselves in the early days of the new four-month training program in 1941-1942, and then by explaining the implications of those experiences for the higher military and political policies of the middle years of the war in Chapter Three. As we will see, in both cases the result would be to

build on the evolution of the NRMA that had already taken place in the first year of its existence, and make it into an even more integral part of both the country's compulsory home defence forces and its overseas Army, with implications that would only come to be fully faced long after they had passed the stage where their growth might have been halted.

Endnotes

1. The best description of the events of March and September is in J.L. Granatstein, The Politics of Survival: The Conservative Party of Canada, 1939-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), pp. 23-31. See also C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), pp. 397-98, and J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977; reprint, Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1985), p. 133. King's September promise appears in its original form in Dominion of Canada, Official Report of Debates, House of Commons, Fifth (Special) War Session, 1939 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1939), p. 36.
2. In particular, see the comments of André Laurendeau, in Philip Stratford, ed., André Laurendeau: Witness for Quebec (Toronto: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 21-22 and 29-35, and C.G. Power, in Norman Ward, ed., A Party Politician: The Memoirs of Chubby Power (Toronto: Macmillan, 1966), pp. 123-30. Also Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 135-36.
3. For surveys of the early months of the war effort, see C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 6-31, as well as the appropriate chapters of his Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific, vol. 1 of the Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1955), and J.L. Granatstein, Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975).
4. For a survey of the issues considered by the EAC during the first eight months of the war, see National Archives of Canada [hereafter NAC], Record Group [RG] 19, Records of the Department of Finance, Vol. 4660, File 187-EAC-1, "Economic Advisory Committee, General": "Memorandum to Mr. Brockington: Re: Advisory Committee on Economic Policy," 20 January, and

"Interim Report to the Prime Minister's Office on the work of The Economic Advisory Committee," 29 April 1940. Also Ibid., Vol. 777, File 400-16, pt. 1, "Canada's War Potential, 1939-45": "Considerations Relating to War Financial Policy," by R.B. Bryce, 1 September; "Notes on Canada's War Potential," no author, 31 October 1939; and telegram, Secretary of State for External Affairs to High Commissioner for Canada in the United Kingdom, 22 February 1940. In addition, Ibid., Vols. 4660-4664 contain all records of the EAC and its deliberations on various issues during the war. I am indebted to Paul Marsden of the National Archives of Canada for sharing his extensive knowledge of these and other records related to the Department of Finance during the Second World War. He is also the author of an excellent survey of the financial aspects of the early war effort, titled "The Costs of No Commitments: Canadian Economic Planning for War, 1939," in Norman Hillmer, Robert Bothwell, Roger Sarty, and Claude Beauregard, eds., A Country of Limitations: Canada and the World in 1939 (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1996), pp. 199-216.

5. Stacey makes this point in Arms, Men and Governments, p. 17. On the creation of the BCATP, see Ibid., pp. 17-31, and Granatstein, Canada's War, pp. 43-59. For histories of the BCATP, see also F.J. Hatch, Aerodrome of Democracy: Canada and the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1983); W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Vol. II (Toronto: Supply and Services Canada/University of Toronto Press, 1986), pp. 191-293; and Spencer Dunmore, Wings for Victory: The Remarkable Story of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1994).

6. On the election of 1940 see Granatstein, Canada's War, pp. 72-93, and Politics of Survival, pp. 38-51, as well as Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 136-40. John T. Saywell also describes Hepburn's actions in Ontario in greater detail in "Mitch Hepburn and Willie King's War," in Hillmer, et.al., A Country of Limitations, pp. 120-37.

7. For a good overview of these measures, see NAC, Manuscript Group [MG] 26, Prime Minister W.L.M. King Papers [hereafter King Papers], J4, Vol. 353, "Conscription" file, pp. C244224-25: "Summary of Additional War Measures Announced by the Prime Minister," 20 May 1940 (also cited in Granatstein, Canada's War, p. 96).

8. "The Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940," 3 & 4 Geo. 6, c. 20, Halisbury's Statutes of England 33 (London: Butterworth & Co., 1941), pp. 541-42.

9. "The National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940," 4 George VI, Chap. 13, Acts of the Parliament of the Dominion of Canada, 1939-1940 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940), p. 43.

10. See W.L.M. King, The Mackenzie King Diaries, 1932-1949 [Microfilmed Transcript] (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), especially 14-20 June 1940.

11. E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1956), pp. 116-17, and Granatstein, Canada's War, p. 100.

12. For instance, see memorandum by W.J. Turnbull in King Papers, J4, Vol. 353, "Conscription," p. 244226: "Re: Conscription of Wealth and Manpower," 23 May 1940, which summarizes several telegrams received by the Prime Minister's Office during this period (also noted in Granatstein, Canada's War, p. 96).

13. King, Diaries, 17 June 1940. Also described and quoted in Granatstein, Politics of Survival, p. 60, and Canada's War, p. 98.

14. King Papers, J4, Vol. 424, Minutes of Cabinet War Committee [hereafter CWC Minutes], 17 June 1940. Among the Ministers and civil servants recorded as speaking in favour of broader measures were C.G. Power (Minister of National Defence for Air, and Acting Minister of National Defence), Ernest Lapointe (Minister of Justice), O.D. Skelton (Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs), C.D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), and J.L. Ralston (Minister of Finance, and future Minister of National Defence - see below). Compare the account in the CWC Minutes to that of King's Diaries, 17 June 1940.

15. "Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1940," op.cit., and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 140. See also records emphasizing the broader powers of the NRMA on NAC, RG 19, Vol. 296, File 101-53-101: W.C. Clark to J.L. Ralston; "Statement by Hon. J.L. Ralston.;" and notes on NRMA prepared for Ralston; all dated 18 June 1940. For other examples of public reaction to the crisis of 1940 and the NRMA, see NAC, RG 24, Records of the Department of National Defence, Vol. 6923, AHQ Historical Report No. 29, "Canadian Public Opinion on the Employment of the Canadian Army, 1939-1945," by Major R.B. Oglesby, 26 October 1949, pp. 10-14; King Papers, J1, J.M. Dechene, Member of Parliament for Athabaska, to Prime Minister King, 27 June 1940, enclosing letter from a constituent; and NAC, RG 19, Vol. 2721, File 600-8: resolutions, Saskatchewan Junior Chamber of Commerce, 1 August, and Maginot Branch, Canadian Legion, Bracebridge, Ontario, n.d. [August], and anonymous letter to J.L. Ilsley,

9 September 1940, commenting on government policy regarding the NRMA. King's own views on the need for greater effort in order to help Britain and improve the defence of Canada can be found in King Papers, CWC Minutes, 22-23 and 29 May, and 27 June 1940. Stacey also discusses the creation of the NRMA in Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 32-33, and see also Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 140-44.

16. J.W. Pickersgill, The Mackenzie King Record, vol. 1, 1939-1944 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), p. 94. See comments by King himself on the extent of the direct threat to Canada in his Diaries, 17 June, and in King Papers, CWC Minutes, 22, 23 and 29 May, and 27 June, 1940. On the War Measures Act, see "The War Measures Act, 1914," 5 George V, Chap. 2, Acts of the Parliament of the Dominion of Canada, 1914 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1914[?]), as well as the Proclamation placing the measure back in force in 1939, in The Canada Gazette, 3rd Extra edition, 1 September 1939.

17. See debate on the passage of the NRMA in Dominion of Canada, Official Report of Debates of the House of Commons, vol. 1, 1940 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1940), pp. 852-976, as well as King Papers, J4, Vol. 373, "National Resources Mobilization Act," pp. C258604-605: "The National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940: Notes for use in introducing the Bill, or on second reading," n.d. [June 1940], and public comments by C.G. Power, Minister of National Defence for Air, in a radio broadcast included in transcript form in RG 24, Vol. 2050, File HQ 54-27-1-24, circular letter, Major-General B.W. Browne, Adjutant-General [AG], to All District Officers Commanding [DOC], 15 July 1940.

It is also interesting to note that legislators in the United States introduced the "Selective Service Bill," to provide for compulsory military service there, at the same time as the NRMA was passed in Canada. As in Canada, the bill was a direct result of the shock of recent events in Europe, and most of its supporters came from outside the government, arguing that the measure was needed as much to prepare the country for the possibility of greater efforts being necessary in the future, as it was to meet the current manpower needs of the United States Army. It was also clearly limited to home defence, since the country was not yet at war in 1940. One of the amendments proposed for the bill even suggested limiting service more explicitly to the western hemisphere, a provision very similar to Section Three of the NRMA, although there is no evidence that developments in the U.S. directly affected decision-making in Canada during this period. On the passing of the U.S. Selective Service Act, see J. Garry Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer, Jr., The First Peacetime Draft (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1986).

18. These aspects of the NRMA are more properly the subject of a separate study, and are covered by Michael D. Stevenson in "National Selective Service and the Mobilization of Human Resources in Canada During the Second World War," Ph.D. thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1996. For a good general review of these measures, see also Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, chapters 5-6, passim.

19. On the work of the Temporary Committee, see NAC, RG 31, Records of Statistics Canada, Vol. 1414, File 1533, "1940 National Registration for War": draft letter, Minister of Trade and Commerce to Prime Minister, 19 June (enclosed with letter, R.H. Coats, Dominion Statistician, to Minister of Trade and Commerce, 19 June); A.D.P. Heeney to Ian Mackenzie, Minister of Pensions and National Health, 20 June; and Mackenzie to Coats, 21 June 1940, giving terms of reference of the Committee. Also NAC, RG 19, Vol. 3581, File N-02, reports of the Temporary Committee, 24 and 25 June 1940 [copies of these reports are also available in the records of several other government departments]. Plans for the National Registration were also strongly influenced by the country's experiences of a similar registration in 1917. A.F. Duguid, the Director of the Historical Section at the Department of National Defence, and at the time the Official Historian of the Canadian Army in the First World War, was his department's representative on the Temporary Committee, and the questionnaire used in 1940 was modelled on forms used in 1917, which had been circulated by Duguid. See NAC, RG 24, Microfilm Reel C-5121, File HQC 7959, "Policy Regarding National Service," Duguid to R.H. Coats, 4 July; Duguid to Adjutant-General, 5 July; Duguid to Coats, 9 July; and Coats to Duguid, 11 July 1940.

20. See "The Department of National War Services Act, 1940," 4 George VI, Chap. 22, Acts of the Parliament of the Dominion of Canada, 1939-1940, pp. 69-71, as well as King Papers, J4, Vol. 265, "[Department of] National War Services": pp. C181811-18, and C181823-37: "Memorandum for the Honourable J.G. Gardiner [Minister of National War Services] re the Department of National War Services," n.d.; "Department of National War Services," n.d.; and "War Services (Summary)," n.d. [all July 1940]. The varying interpretations of the powers to be given to the new department in these documents serve to reinforce the sense of the NRMA as more than simply a measure intended to raise manpower for military training.

21. For a description of the new department's plans for calling up men for training, see NAC, RG 27, Records of the Department of Labour, Vol. 630, File 22, "Questionnaire for National Registration," confidential memo, no author, 11 July, and Vol. 631, File 58-1, "Military Training, National War Services Department," T.C. Davis, [Associate] Deputy Minister,

to J.F.L. Embury, Court of King's Bench, Saskatchewan, 13 July, and "Notes of Speech - Honourable J.G. Gardiner - in the House of Commons - explaining policy of Department of National War Services in connection with the calling up of men for military training," n.d., enclosed with letter, Davis to A.J. Hills, Chairman, National Labour Supply Council, 2 August 1940.

22. On civilian aspects of mobilization, see chapters three and four of the present thesis, as well as the more detailed account in Stevenson: "National Selective Service," op.cit.

23. For a general summary of the Registration, see NAC, RG 27, Acc. 97-98/052, "Historical Record of The National Registration 1940"; RG 31, Vol. 1414, File 1533, "Memorandum for the Hon. J.G. Gardiner," by T.C. Davis, 26 November 1940, and Vol. 1415, File 1533, pt. 1, "Memorandum for Honourable James G. Gardiner," no author, 25 February 1941; as well as Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 144-45.

24. Granatstein, Canada's War, p. 26.

25. B.M. Greene, ed., Who's Who in Canada, 1940-1941 (Toronto: International Press, 1941), p. ix.

26. House of Commons, Debates, vol. 1, 1940, pp. 861-62 (also quoted in Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 143).

27. For information on the Army's early deliberations on the NRMA, see NAC, RG 24, Reel C-5121, File HQC 7959, R.J. Orde, Judge Advocate-General [JAG], to Acting Deputy Minister (Militia Service), 25 June; B.W. Browne, Deputy Chief of the General Staff [DCGS], to Master-General of the Ordnance [MGO], AG, and Quartermaster-General [QMG], 26 June, enclosing copies of a memorandum on "Training"; and replies to DCGS's letter from MGO, Deputy AG, and Acting QMG, 1-5 July 1940. As late as 10 July, after J.L. Ralston had taken over as Minister of National Defence, he was still speaking publicly of training being conducted for "probably six weeks," and noted that "Probably the first quota will be called up within two months" Ibid., Vol. 2050, HQ 54-27-1-24, transcript of radio address entitled "Men Wanted," included with circular letter, AG to All DOCs, 15 July 1940).

28. On Crerar and his role as CGS during this period see Paul Dickson, "The Limits of Professionalism: General H.D.G. Crerar and the Canadian Army, 1914-1944," Ph.D. thesis, University of Guelph, 1993, pp. 298-321, and "Visions of Professionalism: General H.D.G. Crerar and the Canadian Army, 1939-1942," unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, 1992; as well as J.L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior

Commanders in the Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), pp. 84-95. For Crerar's own views in the summer of 1940, and his desire to promote the future development of the Army, see NAC, MG 30, E 157, Papers of General H.D.G. Crerar [hereafter Crerar Papers], Vol. 1, File 958C.009(D13), "Observations on Canadian Requirements in Respect to the Army...July 1940," memorandum entitled "Observations on Canadian Requirements in respect to the Army," n.d. [July 1940]. For the telegram from the former CGS to Crerar recalling him to Canada on 2 July 1940, see also Ibid., Vol. 1, File 958C.009(D15), "CGS files 1940-1941. Matters to appointment as Vice Chief of the General Staff, June 40-July 40."

29. Ibid., Vol. 1, File 958C.009(D12), "CGS files 1940-1941 - Personal Correspondence Lt-Gen Crerar-Lt-Gen McNaughton. Period Aug 40 to Mar 41," Crerar to McNaughton, 9 September 1940. See also Crerar's comments to the Cabinet War Committee in King Papers, CWC Minutes, 26 July 1940.

30. For a copy of the final training plan, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 6570, File HQ 1161-1-5, "Procedure of National Defence Department Mobilization Act," vol. 1, circular letter, AG to all DOCs, 20 August 1940.

31. The best sources on the creation of the training centres during this period are the daily War Diaries that every unit in the Canadian Army was required to maintain throughout the war, and which are held at the National Archives of Canada. References to War Diaries for specific training centres appear in the following notes. On training for senior officers, see in particular the War Diaries for the various branches of National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, and especially RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 13200, DCGS, Appendix 1, August 1940, and Vol. 13202, Directorate of Military Training, specific entries for period July-September 1940. For a copy of the training program for staffs of the centres in September, see Ibid., Vol. 17021, No. 40 Canadian Militia Training Centre (later A-12 Canadian Army (Advanced) Training Centre), Farnham, Québec, Appendix 1, August-September 1940: "Assembly Training Syllabus," September 1940.

32. On the origins and later history of the NPAM, the best places to begin are George F.G. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, 1604-1954: The Military History of an Unmilitary People (Toronto: Macmillan, 1954), pp. 209-14, and later pages on various developments to 1939; J. Mackay Hitsman, Safeguarding Canada, 1763-1871 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), pp. 156-59; Desmond Morton, Ministers and Generals: Politics and the Canadian Militia, 1868-1904 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970); and Stephen J. Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988).

33. On the peace movement and both pacifism and militarism in the 1920s and 1930s, see in particular Thomas P. Socknat, Witness against War: Pacifism in Canada, 1900-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), pp. 90-161.

34. At least one underage NCO joined the staff of a training centre in Huntingdon, Quebec, for example, specifically to serve his country until he was old enough to go overseas. Interview with Howard Ripstein, former Corporal, No. 41 Canadian Militia Training Centre [CMTC], 22 April 1997.

35. Biographical information in excerpt from La Patrie, 19 January 1941, on NAC, RG 24, Vol. 16913, War Diary, No. 44 NPAM Training Centre, St-Jérôme, Quebec, Appendix 4, January 1941. By the time the new camps opened, their titles had been changed to "Canadian Militia Training Centres." They were changed again to "Canadian Army (Reserve) Training Centre [CA(R)TC]," and finally to "Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centre [CA(B)TC]" over the next few months. The last two titles are those used in endnotes in this and the following chapters, the first to refer to centres that changed their function after the reorganization of March 1941 discussed later in this chapter, and became more specialized centres, and the last to those that retained similar functions as basic training centres after that date.

36. NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17282, No. 120 CA(B)TC, Regina, Saskatchewan, 26 August; Vol. 17305, No. 30 CA(R)TC, Brockville, Ontario, various entries, September; Vol. 17194, No. 32 CA(B)TC, Peterborough, Ontario, 4 September; Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, Alberta, August-September 1940, Appendix 3, untitled newspaper clipping [September 1940]; and Vol. 17265, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, Manitoba, 16 May 1941. For other examples of similar backgrounds for commanding officers in the training centres, see Ibid., Vol. 17290, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, Alberta, 15 August; Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, 16 August; Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, Quebec, 20 August; and Vol. 17236, No. 53 CA(B)TC, Lauzon, Quebec, 1 September 1940.

37. Captain A.A.E. Batchelor of No. 131 Canadian Militia Training Centre had lost his left hand while serving in the 5th Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force, where he earned several awards for bravery, along with his officer's commission. See NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17291, War Diary, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 1 February 1941, as well as other examples of former veterans in Ibid., Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown, 20 August; Vol. 17258, No. 71 CA(B)TC, Edmundston, New Brunswick, 21 and 28 October 1940; and Vol. 17278, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, B.C., 10 September 1941. In addition, Batchelor was not the only one-armed man to be part

of the compulsory training system in 1940, and at least two conscripts themselves were apparently accepted and trained despite having similar physical disabilities. For these cases, see Ibid., Vol. 17306, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, 7 October 1940, and Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, Appendix 5, February 1941, letter, Raymond Lacasse to OC, 24 February 1941.

38. For example, Regimental Sergeant-Major E.W. Salmon of No. 131 CMTC in Camrose, Alberta had served in India before the First World War, and as a Royal Trumpeter at the coronation of King George V. He joined the Canadian Army after the First World War, and was serving in the Veteran's Home Guard when he joined the Camrose training centre (NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17290, War Diary, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 22 September 1940). For other examples of former service in British forces, see Ibid., Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, Ontario, 25 July; Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown, 20 August 1940; and Vol. 17291, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 12 January 1941.

39. Specific examples of such cases are too numerous to be listed in detail, but on this point, and for more general descriptions of the origins and selection of officers, see the War Diaries of various training centres for July-October 1940. In particular, see NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17093, No. 130 CA(R)TC (later A-20 Canadian Army (Advanced) Training Centre [CA(A)TC]), Red Deer, Alberta, 15 July-2 October; Vol. 17290, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 16 July-26 October 1940, and 12 January 1941; Vol. 16970, No. 101 CA(R)TC (later A-4 CA(A)TC), Brandon, Manitoba, 13 August-30 September; Vol. 17307, No. 121 CA(R)TC (later A-6 CA(A)TC), Dundurn, Saskatchewan, 26 August-5 October; Vol. 17225, No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, Quebec, 1-30 September; Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, 1-30 September; and Vol. 17194, No. 32 CA(B)TC, Peterborough, 4 September 1940.

40. Again, comments on former Veterans Home Guard personnel can be found in War Diaries for various training centres. The most obvious case is Lt.Col. E.O. Keeler, who transferred from the Veterans' Home Guard to take command of No. 32 CMTC in Peterborough, Ontario, in 1940 (NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17194, War Diary, No. 32 CA(B)TC, 4 September 1940). On the Veterans' Home Guard, see Stacey, Six Years of War, p. 79, as well as various documents outlining the early numbers and structure of the Guard in Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence, Ottawa [DHH], File 114.1(D31) E9, "Veterans Home Guard."

41. For example, NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17233, War Diary, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, Appendix I, November 1940, lists three of the centre's officers as former university students who joined the staff as Lieutenants. Other notable examples include

Major (Lt.-Col., COTC) E.H. Strickland, who transferred from the University of Alberta COTC to become second-in-command in Camrose, Alberta, and Captain G.F.G. Stanley, a well-known military historian and professor at Mount Allison University, who transferred to take the same post at No. 70 CMTC, in Fredericton, New Brunswick. Stanley later went on to serve in the wartime Historical Section of the Canadian Army in London. See RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17290, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 21-31 August, and Vol. 17254, No. 70 CA(B)TC, Fredericton, 7 September 1940.

42. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 16912, War Diary, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St-Jérôme, 13-16 August 1940, and Ripstein Interview, 22 April 1997. See also criticisms of new staff members in Ibid., Vol. 17305, No. 30 CA(R)TC, Brockville, 17 September, and Vol. 17021, No. 40 NPAM Training Centre (later A-12 CA(A)TC), Farnham, Quebec, 11 October 1940.

43. Ibid., Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, 11 September 1940.

44. Ibid., Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown, 30 September 1940.

45. These included Chatham and Peterborough in Ontario, Huntingdon, Quebec, Regina, Saskatchewan, and Camrose, Alberta.

46. NAC, MG 27, III, B11, Papers of J.L. Ralston [Ralston Papers], Vol. 68, "Construction Projects, 1942: Work carried out since commencement of war...", Major-General E.J.C. Schmidlin, QMG, to Ralston, 11 March 1941. According to information on NAC, RG 24, Vol. 79, HQ 1161-1-8, vol. 3, "Reply of Minister of National Defence to Questions Nos. 3 and 4 of the Honourable Mr. Hanson," the total cost of building the thirty-nine training centres was over \$9.6 million.

47. On the supply of construction materials and for summaries of the state of training centres in each Military District at the end of August, see the following correspondence on NAC, RG 24, Vol. 6570, File HQ 1161-1-5, vol. 1: George H. Cassels, Deputy Adjutant-General (Mobilization) [DAG(M)] to all headquarters Directorates, 23 August; Director of Engineering Services to DAG(M), 30 August; AG to all DOCs, 30 August; letters from DOCs, Military Districts [MD] Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 12, and 13, 1-10 September; and DAG(M) to AG, 4 September 1940. Also Ibid., clipping from Montreal Gazette entitled "Camp Erection is Behind Schedule," 23 September 1940.

48. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17305, War Diary, No. 30 CA(R)TC, Brockville, 4 October 1940.

49. Ibid., Vol. 17264, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, 30 September-11 October 1940, and Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 25 September-9 October 1940. Staffs also had to be accommodated in a similar manner for the first few days before training started in Vernon (see correspondence on Ibid., Vol. 17277, War Diary, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Appendix 3, August-October 1940).

50. Ibid., Vol. 17194, No. 32 CA(B)TC, 9 October 1940.

51. Ibid., Vol. 17306, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, 9 October 1940. For other good descriptions of the unfinished state of the camps, see Ibid., Vol. 16912, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 1-5 October, and Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 5 October 1940.

52. For example, see Ibid., Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 2 January; Vol. 17305, No. 30 CA(R)TC, Brockville, 8 January; Vol. 17167, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, Ontario, 9-10 January; Vol. 17093, No. 130 CA(R)TC, Red Deer, 11 January; Vol. 17249, No. 61 CA(B)TC, New Glasgow, Nova Scotia, 13 January; and Vol. 17258, No. 71 CA(B)TC, Edmundston, 16 January 1941. For reference to snow shovelling during P.T. periods, see also Ibid., Vol. 17220, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, Quebec, 30 November, and Vol. 17194, No. 32 CA(B)TC, Peterborough, 2-3 December 1940.

53. For example, see Ibid., Vol. 17093, No. 130 CA(R)TC, Red Deer, 2 October, 5 December 1940, and 20 January 1941; Vol. 17304, No. 21 CA(R)TC, Long Branch, Ontario, 5 October; Vol. 17153, No. 20 CA(B)TC, Brantford, Ontario, 9 and 17 October, 21 November 1940, and 15 January 1941; Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 12 October; Vol. 17167, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 23 October; Vols. 17306-307, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, 28-29 October 1940, and 28 January 1941; Vol. 17143, No. 10 CA(B)TC, Kitchener, Ontario, 12 November; Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 25 November; Vol. 17194, No. 32 CA(B)TC, Peterborough, 2 December 1940 and 25 and 30 January 1941; and Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, Quebec, 4 December 1940.

54. Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 147.

55. On this issue, and for regulations against favouritism in connection with the training centres more generally, see documents on Ralston Papers, Vol. 68, "Military Camps and Training, 1941: Fredericton, Debert, Training Programmes, Conscription, March," and particularly telegram, Hanson to Ralston, 26 August; letter, H.R. Macmillan, Timber Controller, to Hanson, 27 August; telegram, Ralston to Hanson, 28 August 1940; "Report of Conversation between The Hon. R.B. Hanson and Captain P.C. Ahern, Fredericton, August 1940" [written in

March 1941]; and draft speech by Ralston, 17 March 1941, responding to allegations by Hanson in the House of Commons regarding the Fredericton compulsory training centre and the Army's overseas training camp in Debert, Nova Scotia.

56. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17233, War Diary, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, Appendix IV, August-September 1940: clippings from Le Progrès du Saguenay entitled "Contrats à des étrangers," and "Les constructions sur le Port," 5 and 12 September 1940.

57. NAC, RG 27, Vol. 994, File 2-104-1, part 1, "N.W.S. Army Ministry. D.N.D.", Pouliot to R.M. Gorssline, DGMS [Director General Medical Services], 7 September, and Gorssline to Pouliot, 10 September 1940.

58. For example, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 6570, HQ 1161-1-5, vol. 2, telegram, DOC, MD No. 13, to Department of National Defence, 1 October 1940, which noted that the opening date for the Grande Prairie centre would need to be changed from 9 to 11 October because trains only went through there twice a week. On North Bay and other cases, see similar documents on this file, as well as C. Gunning, North Bay's Fort Chippewa, 1939-1945 (North Bay, Ontario: N.p., 1991), pp. 15, 21.

59. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 6571, File HQ 1161-1-5, vol. 3, Gerard Lacourciere [sic], Mayor, Ville de Megantic, to Ralston, 20 September 1940. See also original telegram, 18 September, included with circular letter, AG to DOCs, 19 September; memo summarizing "Replies as at 25-9-40"; draft memo, AG to Minister of National Defence, 16 October; AG to Minister, 7 November; and letters from various mayors dated 19 September-3 October 1940, all on the same file.

60. Ibid., DOC, MD 13, to DND, 28 September 1940.

61. See "Is Camrose to be Military Training Centre?", 7 August, and other clippings on NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17290, War Diary, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Appendices A to D, August 1940, and Appendices D to G, October 1940. For other examples, see Ibid., Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, Appendix IV, August-September 1940, and Appendix II, October 1940; Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, Appendix 3, August-September 1940, Appendix 7, October 1940; Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, Appendix 3, September 1940, Appendix III, October 1940, p. 1; and Gunning, North Bay's Fort Chippewa, pp. 13-21.

62. NAC, RG 27, Vol. 631, File 58-1, "National War Services Dept.," Nixon to Gardiner, 16 July 1940.

63. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 13202, War Diary, Directorate of Military Training, 15 August 1940.

64. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17290, War Diary, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, October 1940, Appendix D: "Mayor East Asks Citizens to Co-operate in Supplying Comforts at Training Centre," Camrose Canadian, 2 October 1940. See also comments on a meeting between training centre representatives and a local citizens' committee to arrange for entertainments for men in training at No. 30 CMTC, Brockville, Ontario, on Ibid., Vol. 17305, No. 30 CA(R)TC, 7 October, and a benefit dance held for the men of No. 61 CMTC in New Glasgow, in Ibid., Vol. 17249, No. 61 CA(B)TC, entry for 7 October, and Appendix 3, October 1940, Lt.Col. A.E. Macdonald, Officer Commanding [OC], No. 61 Militia Training Centre, to Editor, Evening News, 8 October, thanking local Citizens' Committee for the dance, as well as similar references in Ibid., Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, 6 October 1940, and Gunning, North Bay's Fort Chippewa, p. 16.

65. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17258, War Diary, No. 71 CA(B)TC, Edmundston, 1 December 1940.

66. Ibid., Vol. 17143, No. 10 CA(B)TC, Kitchener, 22 November 1940.

67. Ibid., Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, 22 October (for reference to library), and "Summary," 1-31 October 1940 (for quoted comment). In a similar vein, in Red Deer, the camp's diarist noted that "The City of Red Deer continues to cooperate with the Centre loaning picks and shovels for [digging] weapon pits, a school gymnasium for basketball and other requirements, supplies for which have not arrived." (Ibid., Vol. 17093, No. 130 CA(R)TC, 26 October 1940)

68. Ibid., Vol. 16885, No. 11 CA(R)TC (later S11 Advanced Driving and Maintenance School), Woodstock, Ontario, 29 September; Vol. 17205, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, Quebec, 29 September; and Vol. 16912, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 29 September 1940.

69. For the telegram from the Department of National Defence, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 6570, HQ 1161-1-5, vol. 2, AG to DOCs, 8 October 1940. For examples of local news coverage, see NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, Appendix III, October 1940, pp. 2-3: "Compulsory Military Training Begins at Lakehead," and "500 Young Men Go Into Camp At Fort William," Port Arthur News-Chronicle, 9 October 1940; Vol. 17306, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, Appendix 1, August-November 1940: "Trainees Make Friends As Camp Life Starts," Victoria Daily Times, 10 October 1940; Vol. 17290, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, Appendix E, October 1940: "Formalities Are Over And Trainees Ready For Action," Camrose Canadian, 9 October 1940; Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, Appendix

II, October 1940: "Le centre d'entraînement militaire de Chicoutimi," Le Progrès de Saguenay, 10 octobre 1940; and Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, Appendix 7, October 1940: "Seventy-Six Keen, Husky Recruits Report at Grande Prairie Militia Centre," n.p., n.d. [October 1940], and "Officers, N.C.O.'s Busy at Grande Prairie Military Centre," Edmonton Journal, 17 October 1940. In addition, documents in the following War Diaries provide examples of the arrangements made for handling the trainees as they arrived in the various camps: Vol. 17205, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, Appendix 3, September 1940, Circular [letter] No. 1, 17 September; Vol. 17305, No. 46 CA(R)TC (later A-40 School of Administration), St-Hyacinthe, Quebec, Appendix III, October 1940, p. 5: "Instructions au personnel permanent du centre d'entraînement No. 46, relativement à la réception des mobilisés le 9 octobre 1940," n.d.; and Vol. 17245, No. 60 CA(B)TC, Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, Appendix 1, October 1940: "Memoranda of Instruction for Assembly of Trainees No. 60, N.P.A.M.T.C.," n.d.

70. NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17143, No. 10 CA(B)TC, Kitchener, and Vol. 17188, No. 31 CA(B)TC, Cornwall, Ontario, both 9 October 1940. According to the War Diary for No. 55 CMTC in Rimouski, Quebec, conscripts there were also filmed by the "Associated Screen News" during their training (Ibid., Vol. 17243, 18 October 1940). For another good description of the arrival of trainees, see also Ibid., Vol. 17290, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 9 October 1940.

71. For examples of opening day crowds, see Ibid., Vol. 17143, No. 10 CA(B)TC, Kitchener; Vol. 16885, No. 11 CA(R)TC, Woodstock; Vol. 17148, No. 12 CA(B)TC, Chatham, Ontario; and Vol. 16912, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme; all 13 October 1940. In the first three cases, the centres recorded over 1000 visitors, and in the latter camp 5000, a surprising number considering its location in Quebec. Examples of visits by prominent individuals include the Governor-General and the Prime Minister of Canada to Valcartier, Quebec, in Ibid., Vol. 17306, No. 50 CA(R)TC, 16 October; J.L. Ralston to Charlottetown (also part of his electoral riding) and to Cornwall (accompanied by Major-General H.D.G. Crerar), Ibid., Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Appendix IV, October 1940: "Col. Ralston Inspects Units, Air Fields," Charlottetown Guardian, 31 October, and Vol. 17188, No. 31 CA(B)TC, Cornwall, 22 October; C.G. Power (by then Minister of National Defence for Air) to Manitoba and to Quebec, in Ibid., Vol. 16970, No. 101 CA(R)TC, Brandon, 5 October, Vol. 17243, No. 55 CA(B)TC, Rimouski, Quebec, 19 October, Vol. 17236, No. 53 CA(B)TC, Lauzon, Quebec, 20 October, and Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, Quebec, 20 October; Cardinal J.M. Villeneuve, the head of the Catholic Church in Canada, to Valcartier, 31 October, and to Lauzon and Montmagny on 4 November (all in Diaries cited above); Quebec premier Adelard Godbout to

Montmagny, 6 November; and Major-General L.R. LaFlèche, Associate Deputy Minister of the Department of National War Services, a former Deputy Minister of National Defence, and a well-known public figure in Quebec, who visited the Chicoutimi centre (Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC) on 3 November 1940, along with the local Bishop. In addition, DOCs in each Military District made regular visits to almost every training centre, which can be found throughout the War Diaries of various units.

72. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 6570, HQ 1161-1-5, vol. 2, Brigadier George H. Cassels, DAG(M), to AG, 16 October 1940. See also original telegrams, D.A. McNiven, Member [and] Regina City Chairman, Red Cross Campaign Committee, to Ralston, and J.D. Clare Thacker to Justice T.C. Davis [Department of National War Services], as well as Lieut.-Colonel A.J. Everett, for DAG(M), to AG, and AG to DOC, MD 12, all 16 October 1940. On the film *North West Mounted Police*, see also Michael Dawson, The Mountie from Dime Novel to Disney (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1998), pp. 44-48.

73. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17282, War Diary, No. 120 CA(B)TC, Regina, 21 October 1940.

74. For this information, see Ibid., Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, Appendix II, August-September 1940: "A Canadian Militia Training Centre."

75. For a summary of training centres and their individual strengths at the beginning of the first training period, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 6571, HQ 1161-1-5, vol. 3, "Strength of men reported for Training as at 16 Oct. [1940]."

76. See Ibid., vol. 1, reports of District Officers Commanding, Military Districts [MD] No. 4 (Montreal region), No. 5 (central and eastern Quebec), and No. 12 (Saskatchewan), 2-4 September, and memo, DAG(M), to Director of Military Training, 11 September 1940; NAC, RG 27, Vol. 631, File 58-2, "National War Services Dept.": "Schedules" giving arrangements for French-language training in various centres, 16 and 25 September 1940; and NAC, RG 24, Vol. 80, HQ 1161-1-18, vol. 1, H. DesRosiers, Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence (Army) to J.R. Hurtibise, summarizing French-language training arrangements to 16 July 1941. War Diaries for the various training centres in MDs 1 to 5 (Ontario and Quebec) and No. 7 (New Brunswick) are the best sources for more detailed information on the arrangements made in each particular camp in September-October 1940.

77. For example, see Desmond Morton, "French Canada and the Canadian Militia, 1868-1914," Histoire sociale/Social History II(3), April 1969, pp. 32-50, and "French Canada and War,

1868-1917: The Military Background to the Conscription Crisis of 1917," in J.L. Granatstein and R.D. Cuff, eds., War and Society in North America (Toronto: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1971), pp. 84-103, as well as Granatstein, The Generals, pp. 237-47.

78. For further details on these changes, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 13202, War Diary, Directorate of Military Training, 20 September, and Ibid., Vol. 6570, HQ 1161-1-5, vol. 2, DAG(M) to AG, 14 October 1940, as well as War Diaries for training centres Nos. 40-47 in Military District No. 4, September-October 1940.

79. See comments on this subject in Granatstein, Canada's War, p. 102 and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 147.

80. For example, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17269, War Diary, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, "Summary," 1-30 November 1940, which noted that "Owing to semi-political, trial balloon nature of first months' compulsory training, the entertainment side of the trainee's evenings, was well emphasized." Also Ibid., Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, Appendix 8, November 1940: "Report on Training...", 7 November 1940, p. 3, which noted that "the men had been led to expect a certain amount of luxury from newspaper accounts."

81. For Hanson's comments, see King Papers, J4, Reel H-1538, Vol. 365, "National Resources Mobilization Act": clippings from Ottawa Journal and Ottawa Citizen, 2 August, and Ibid., Reel H-1532, Vol. 353, "Conscription": clipping from Montreal Gazette, 12 October 1940. Quotations reproduced here are from an editorial entitled "Thirty-Day Soldiers," Saturday Night, 12 October 1940. For a more local reflection of these views see also NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, Appendix 3, September 1940: "A Half-Hearted Gesture," Fort William Times-Journal, 3 September, and Appendix IV, November 1940, "The Thirty-Day Training Plan," Fort William Times-Journal, 16 November; as well as Ibid., Vol. 17093, No. 130 CA(R)TC, Red Deer, Appendix E, November 1940, unattributed newspaper clipping: "Defects in Military Training: From the Vancouver Province," 28 October 1940.

82. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17200, War Diary, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 1-2 September 1940. Similar descriptions appear in the War Diaries of No. 131 CA(B)TC (Vol. 17290, 16 July 1940), Camrose, and No. 47 CA(B)TC (Vol. 17225, 20 September 1940), Valleyfield.

83. Ibid., Vol. 17167, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 3 October 1940.

84. Ibid., Vol. 17307, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, 17 January 1941.

85. For examples of machine-gun and anti-tank demonstrations, see Ibid., Vol. 17306, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, 19 October; Vol. 17307, No. 121 CA(R)TC, Dundurn, 18 December 1940; Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, 28 January 1941; and Vol. 17264, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, Manitoba, 29 January 1941. For reference to armoured car training, see also Ibid., Vol. 17153, No. 20 CA(B)TC, Brantford, 6 November 1940.

86. Ibid., Vol. 17306, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, B.C., 19 October; Vol. 17307, No. 131 CA(R)TC, Dundurn, 18 December 1940; Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, 28 January; and Vol. 17264, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, 29 January 1941. On cooperation with the RCAF, see Ibid., Vol. 16885, No. 11 CA(R)TC, Woodstock, 5 November and 18 December, and Vol. 17245, No. 60 CA(B)TC, Yarmouth, 16 December 1940.

87. Ibid., Vol. 17220, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, 5 November 1940.

88. Ibid., Vol. 16885, No. 11 CA(R)TC, Woodstock, 9-12 September 1940. According to J.L. Ralston, in King Papers, CWC Minutes, 27 June 1940, there were only 22000 Lee-Enfield and 40000 Ross Rifles left in the entire country in the summer of 1940, after accounting for units being raised for active service, with which to equip all militia units and the NRMA.

89. For a good example of shortages in one training centre, see the list of missing items and also comments regarding Ross Rifles on NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17225, War Diary, No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, Appendix 5, February 1941: "General Report on Training..." Also Ibid., Vol. 16885, No. 11 CA(R)TC, Woodstock, 11 October; Vol. 17258, No. 71 CA(B)TC, Edmundston, 2 November; Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 12 and 16 October, 1 and 27 November 1940, and Appendices 8-9, November 1940: "General Report on Training..." and "Supplementary to M.F.M. 86 [Report on Training]."

90. NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Volume 17182, No. 22 CA(B)TC, North Bay, Ontario, 5 March, and Vol. 17266, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, 11 March 1942.

91. For example, see Ibid., Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, Appendix III, November 1940: "General Report on Training..." p. 1; Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, Appendix IV, February 1941: "General Report on Training..." p. 2; and Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, unnumbered appendix, December 1940: "General Report on Training..." p. 4. Also Ibid., Vol. 17093, No. 130 CA(R)TC, Red Deer,

Appendix 4, December 1940: "Red Deer Bugle Notes," unattributed newspaper clipping, 27 December 1940. For evidence of awareness of shortages at higher levels, and their impact on training, see the comments of Major-General Crerar and Colonel E.L.M. Burns, his Assistant DCGS, in King Papers, CWC Minutes, 26 July 1940, and Crerar Papers, Vol. 1, File 958C.009(D13), "CGS files 1940-1941 - Observations on Canadian Requirements in Respect to the Army...", Burns to Crerar, 29 October 1940.

92. See NAC, RG 24, Vol. 6570, HQ 1161-1-5, vol. 1, DAG(M) to D. of Org., 28 August; Lt.Col. A.J. Everett, Org. 2(a), to DAG(M), 9 September; and AG, to DOC, MD 6, 12 September; as well as Ibid., vol. 2, Brigadier J.P. Archambault, DOC, MD 4, to Secretary, DND, 3 October; AG to DOC, MD 4, 7 October; and telegram, AG, to Col. A.A. Magee, 9 September 1940.

93. Ralston Papers, Vol. 68, "Compulsory Training, 1942: 4 months Training. Order of Call. N.R.M.A. May-June 1941, May 1942," Crerar to Ralston, 10 March 1941.

94. In particular, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17277, War Diary, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, Appendix 6, December 1940, "Conscientious Objectors: Class of October 9th.-Nov. 22nd, 1940," and various unnumbered appendices, February 1941, describing several cases of conscientious objectors and how they were dealt with during the training period; Vol. 17307, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, 11 January 1941; as well as NAC, RG 13, Records of the Department of Justice, Vol. 2600, File 142035, "Privy Council. If members of "Jehovah's Witnesses" exempt from military service. Sec. 18, National War Services Regulations (Recruits) "Conscientious Objectors". Defence of Canada Regulations. Unlawful Associations. January 14, 1941," M.J. Coldwell, to J.G. Gardiner, Minister of National War Services, 17 December, enclosing typed copy of newspaper clipping, "Objector Will Don Uniform And No 'Buts' Says Colonel," Toronto Star, 27 November 1940, describing another case of a Jehovah's Witness who refused to undergo training in Newmarket.

95. On the legal status of Jehovah's Witnesses, see in particular Ibid., A.D.P. Heeney, to W. Stuart Edwards, Deputy Minister [DM], Department of Justice, 13 January; Edwards to Heeney, 18 January; G.R. Benoit, Supervisor of Recruiting for Military Training, Department of National War Services, to Edwards, 1 February; and Edwards to Benoit, 3 February 1941; and on the case of alleged treatment of such objectors, see Ralston Papers, Vol. 80, "Jehovah's Witnesses, alleged mistreatment of, 1944: Investigation into allegations, May," Major-General J.P. Mackenzie, Inspector-General (Army), Western Canada, to J.L. Ralston, 14 May; Major-General H.F.G. Letson, AG, to Minister, 16 May; Brigadier R.A. Macfarlane, DOC, MD 10, to Letson, 16 May; and Col. G.A. Ferguson,

D[irector]. of Admin[istration]., to AG, 18 May 1944. For good descriptions of alternative service and the treatment of conscientious objectors more generally during the war, see also King Papers, CWC Minutes, 3 April 1941; Socknat, Witness against War, chapter 8, pp. 225-58; David Fransen, "'As Far as Conscience will Allow': Mennonites in Canada during the Second World War," in Norman Hillmer, Bohdan Kordan, and Lubomyr Luciuk, eds., On Guard for Thee: War, Ethnicity and the Canadian State, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War, 1988), pp. 131-49; and Kenneth Wayne Reddig, "Manitoba Mennonites and The Winnipeg Mobilization Board in World War II," M.A. thesis, University of Manitoba, 1989.

96. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17292, War Diary, No. 131 CA(B)TC, 18 December 1941.

97. Ibid., Vol. 17305, No. 30 CA(R)TC, Brockville, Appendix 5, November 1940: "General Report on Training...", p. 4.

98. Ibid., Vol. 16885, No. 11 CA(R)TC, Woodstock, 24 October 1940.

99. Ralston Papers, Vol. 68, "Compulsory Training, 1942," Crerar to Ralston, 10 March 1941. Also Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 147.

100. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17305, War Diary, No. 30 CA(R)TC, Brockville, Appendix 5, February 1940: "Report on Training..."

101. For instance, see the remarks by Lt.Col. J. Landry, the OC in Chicoutimi, on Ibid., Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Appendix III, December 1940: "General Report on Training...", p. 3, and Appendix I, February 1941, "General Report on Training...", p. 3; various comments by Major R.H. Huntingdon on Ibid., Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, Reports on Training of November 1940 (Appendix V), December 1940 (Appendix III), and February 1941 (Appendix IV); and Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, Appendix 8, November 1940, Report on Training, p. 3.

102. Such comments appear throughout the "Reports on Training" found in most training centre War Diaries, and which are referred to in above endnotes, and also in the daily entries of many of the same War Diaries. For one of the best examples of such entries, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17306, War Diary, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, 7 November and 21 December 1940, and an excellent summary of the views of the trainees also appears in Kamp Pain, a newspaper run by the staff of No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, Alberta, in Ibid., Vols. 17295-96: Appendix 8, December 1940, pp. 17, 19; Appendix 7, January 1941, pp. 14-15; and Appendix 9, April

1941, pp. 6-7 and 13.

103. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17290, War Diary, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, Appendix C, November 1940: "A Nice Little Story About Militia Camp," Camrose Canadian, 20 November 1940.

104. Ibid., Vol. 17194, No. 32 CA(B)TC, Peterborough, Appendix 4, September-October 1940: "Trainees Opposed To Camp Life Change Opinions As Time Passes," 7 November 1940, and "The Song of the Seventh Platoon."

105. Ibid., Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, Appendix 5, November 1940: "Trainees Praised At Grande Prairie," Grande Prairie Herald-Tribune [?], 8 November, and Vol. 16912, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, Appendix 5, November 1940: untitled newspaper clipping from La Patrie, 10 November 1940. In addition, according to Ibid., Vol. 17221, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, a trainee there who was questioned as to his views also stated that "he was glad of the opportunity given him so that in case of eventualities, he would be able to defend his country and knew that all felt like him."

106. Ibid., Vol. 17093, A-20 CA(A)TC, Red Deer, Appendix 4, December 1940: untitled clipping from the Edmonton Journal, 21 December 1940.

107. Queen's University Archives [QUA], C.G. Power Papers, Box 70, File D2025, "Military District No. 5": "Survey of Conditions Prevailing in M.D. No. 5 (Based on reports of Unit Intelligence Officers for period from 9th to 22nd Feb. 1941)." Also quoted in Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 181, n. 35. For another, later example of civilians treating recruits in Quebec training centres, see also NAC, RG 24, Vol. 16914, War Diary, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 8 March 1942, which records a local jeweller visiting the camp, who "bought cigarettes and drinks to [sic] all soldiers who were present in the Canteen. Our soldiers will remember him long for his nice gesture."

108. Ibid., Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, Appendix III, December 1940: "Report on Training...", 22 December 1940; Vol. 17167, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 16 January; and Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, February 1941: "Report on Formation of Ski Patrol."

109. NAC, RG 27, Vol. 3022, "Summaries of Mobilization Statistics, 1943," Table 1: "Summary of Mobilization Statistics, first three (Thirty-Day) Military Training Periods."

110. Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 145.

111. Crerar Papers, Vol. 19, File 958C.009(D338), "Personal Correspondence July 1940-June 1941," Crerar to Major-General R.O. Alexander, DOC, MD 2, 11 September 1940.

112. Ibid., Vol. 25, File 958C.009(D426), "General Crerar's personal papers - Addresses and Memoranda by General H.D.G. Crerar...": "The Military Problem," speech to Canadian Club, 23 October 1940. For earlier examples of Crerar's emphasis on equipment shortages as the main factor preventing longer NRMA training, see also his statement before the Cabinet War Committee, in King Papers, CWC Minutes, 26 July, as well as Crerar Papers, Vol. 1, File 958C.009(D13), "CGS files 1940-1941 - Observations on Canadian Requirements in Respect to the Army...", E.L.M. Burns, Assistant DCGS, to Crerar, 29 October 1940.

113. Frederick W. Gibson and Barbara Robertson, eds., Ottawa at War: The Grant Dexter Memoranda, 1939-1945 (Winnipeg: Manitoba Record Society, 1994), 13 September 1940, pp. 73-74. See also Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 148-49.

114. On this subject, see Harris, Canadian Brass, pp. 167-91, and chapter three of this thesis, below.

115. Ralston Papers, Vol. 37, "Appreciations - Chiefs of Staff," memorandum entitled "The Canadian Army," Crerar to Ralston, 3 September 1940.

116. Ibid., Crerar to Ralston, "Canadian Army Programme for 1941," 24 September 1940. See also Crerar's "Appreciation: What should be the Nature of Canada's Military Effort during the next year?," on the same file, which justified his army program by setting out what both British and Canadian planners expected the worldwide situation to be for the next year with respect to the war.

117. For these debates, see King Papers, CWC Minutes, 1, 3, 9-10, 23, and 31 October 1940.

118. For a record of the discussions that took place on this issue overseas, see the minutes of Ralston's meeting with officials at the War Office, dated 2 January 1941, in Ralston Papers, Vol. 117, "Manpower Sixth Division re manpower - with index, July 1941." In addition, see Ibid., Vol. 1, "Secret. Diary. November 28, 1940-January 9, 1941," especially pp. 94-97, which records another less formal discussion with Sir Alan Brooke (Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, in Britain) and General Bernard Paget (Staff Officer to Brooke), on 4 January, regarding the military units Britain desired Canada to supply in 1941, as well as the latter's recommendations with respect to the amount of training that should be provided to Canadian soldiers under Crerar's new army program. Also Stacey, Six

Years of War, pp. 90-91.

119. Ralston Papers, Vol. 68, "Speech File, 1941: 19 February 1941, Departmental Activities, trip to England, Training Programmes, CWAC, Finances, Feb-Dec 1940, Jan-Feb 1941," telegram, Ralston to Prime Minister and to C.G. Power (the Acting Minister of National Defence), 6 January 1941.

120. For the developments described in this paragraph, see King Papers, CWC Minutes, 29 November and 4 and 18 December 1940, and 8, 24, 27 and 28 January 1941, as well as Granatstein and Hitsman, pp. 148-50.

121. The CWC's discussions of manpower needs for industry and other purposes occurred at the same time and often during the same discussions as those devoted to the 1941 army program and the NRMA. See CWC Minutes for dates noted in the above footnotes, as well as 5 November 1940 and 2 January 1941, and the more general comments on policy-making by the CWC during this period in J.E. Rea, "What Really Happened? A new look at the Conscription Crisis," The Beaver 74(2), April/May 1994, pp. 10-19, and T.A. Crerar: A Political Life (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), pp. 206, 209; David Wilson, "Reflections on Conscription, 1944-45," paper presented at the Sixth Military History Colloquium of the Wilfrid Laurier University Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies, 21 April 1995; and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 185-97.

122. NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, "Summary" for November 1940; Vol. 17249, No. 61 CA(B)TC, New Glasgow, 7 November; Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, Appendix 5, clippings entitled "Trainees Praised at Grande Prairie," and "First Group Recruits Finish 30-Day Training," 8 and 14 November; Vol. 17292, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, Appendix E, December 1940, unlabelled newspaper clipping: "A 'Red Letter' Day at Camrose Basic Centre..."; and Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown, Appendix V, January 1941, and Appendix IV, February 1941. In addition, No. 121 CA(R)TC in Dundurn, Saskatchewan reported sending 37 trainees to Saskatoon to become active force tradesmen shortly after the beginning of the third training period in January 1941 (Ibid., Vol. 17307, 16 January 1941).

123. Power Papers, "Survey of Conditions Prevailing in M.D. No. 5," op.cit.

124. For example, see descriptions of lectures and other efforts made to encourage conscripts to volunteer in "Reports on Training" for the following training centres: NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17305, No. 30 CA(R)TC, Brockville, Appendix 5, February 1941; Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi,

Appendix III, December 1940, and Appendix I, February 1941; Vol. 17249, No. 61 CA(B)TC, New Glasgow, unnumbered Appendix, November 1940; Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown, Appendix V, January 1941, and Appendix IV, February 1941; Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, Appendix 8, November 1940, and unnumbered Appendix, February 1941. For specific evidence of recruiters from the RCAF, the Royal Canadian Artillery, and the Canadian Armoured Corps in various training centres, see also Ibid., Vol. 17305, No. 46 CA(R)TC, St-Hyacinthe, 15 December; Vol. 17205, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 16 December; Vol. 17213, No. 43 CA(B)TC, Sherbrooke, 17 December; Vol. 17305, No. 30 CA(R)TC, Brockville, 17 December 1940, and 29 January and 4-5 February 1941; Vol. 17290, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 17-19 December; Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 18 December; Vol. 17201, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 19 December; Vol. 17264, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, 19 December 1940, 29 January and 4 February 1941; Vol. 17093, No. 130 CA(R)TC, Red Deer, Appendix 4, December 1940, clipping entitled "Finishing Second Camp At Training Centre," n.d.; Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 23 January; Vol. 17194, No. 32 CA(B)TC, Peterborough, 31 January; Vol. 17153, No. 20 CA(B)TC, Brantford, 3 February; Vol. 17180, No. 22 CA(B)TC, North Bay, 5 February; Vol. 17203, No. 55 CA(B)TC, Rimouski, 6 February; Vol. 17168, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 5-6 February; Vol. 17144, No. 10 CA(B)TC, Kitchener, 7 February; and Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown, 7 February 1941. In addition, in Gordon Head, British Columbia, thirty-two men signifying their willingness to volunteer for active service were singled out, given special arm bands, and a special course of training to encourage their interest in the army (Ibid., Vol. 17307, No. 111 CA(R)TC, 11 December 1940) while in Long Branch, Ontario, recruiting for the RCAF was aided by the fact that it had a recruiting station in a school across the road from the camp - 205 members of the training class were apparently gathered together and taken there to submit their applications for service in December (Ibid., Vol. 17304, No. 21 CA(B)TC, 19 December 1940). In Camrose, the centre's commander had a special form prepared, based on his previous experience as a District Recruiting Officer, to provide a more tangible record of his trainees' willingness to serve overseas (Ibid., Vol. 17291, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Appendix K, January 1941). For calls for more formal provisions for recruiting, see comments by Major R.H. Huntingdon, OC, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, in Ibid., Vol. 17269, Appendix IV, November 1940: "The 30-Day Training Plan," Fort William Times-Journal, 16 November 1940, while suggestions of the Army's awareness of the likelihood of conscripts volunteering for overseas service once they had begun their training also appear as early as July 1940, in DHH, File 114.1(D188), "Training Centres," memorandum, Major-General B.W. Browne, AG, to CGS, QMG, and MGO, 30 July 1940.

125. On the development of policies in connection with trades training, which also indicate the larger thoughts of several other officials in Ottawa regarding encouraging NRMA recruits to volunteer for active service more generally, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 6571, HQ 1161-1-5, vol. 3, "Minutes of a meeting held at the office of Brigadier G.H. Cassels, to determine the policy of utilization of recruits after they have passed through N.P.A.M. Training Centres," 19 October; same, 24 October; circular letter, AG to All DOCs, 30 October; Major L.M. Chesley, for Colonel, D.S.D., to Brigadier G.H. Cassels, et.al., 2 November; AG to CGS, 5 November; Brigadier K. Stuart, for CGS, to AG, 23 November; and Col. E.L.M. Burns, Acting CGS, to AG, 4 December 1940; as well as evidence of recruiting of potential tradesmen in NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 16885, No. 11 CA(R)TC, Woodstock, 12 December; Vol. 17305, No. 46, No. 46 CA(R)TC, St-Hyacinthe, Quebec, 13 December 1940; Vol. 17307, No. 121 CA(R)TC, Dundurn, 17 January; Vol. 17188, No. 31 CA(B)TC, Cornwall, 25 January; Vol. 16970, No. 101 CA(R)TC, Brandon, 26 January; Vol. 17179, No. 22 CA(B)TC, North Bay, 26 January and 7 February; Vol. 17264, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, 29 January; and Vol. 17168, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 7-8 February 1941.

126. DHH, File 114.1(D87), "PROJECTS 21 & 23 (Compulsory Training)," circular memorandum by Colonel E.L.M. Burns, Assistant DCGS, to CGS, DCGS, et.al., 27 November 1940.

127. Ralston Papers, Vol. 68, "Speech File, 1941," Crerar to Ralston, 26 January 1941. According to the War Diary for No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, these numbers were later made public by C.G. Power, the Minister of National Defence for Air (NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17269, Appendix V, February 1941: "Trainees Request Place In Active Army," Winnipeg Tribune, 13 February 1941). Also Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 148.

128. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 18 December 1940, and 27 January 1941.

129. For Crerar's recommendations, and the resulting change in policy, see Ralston Papers, Vol. 115, "Manpower National Selective Service, miscellaneous material re preparation of Army programme - proposed organization, April 1941-April 1943," Crerar to Ralston, 23 April; King Papers, CWC Minutes, 23 April 1941; and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 150-52.

130. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17233, War Diary, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, Appendix II, April 1941, Lt.Col. J. Landry, O.C., to H.Q., M.D. 5, 1 May 1941. Similar comments appear in Ibid., Vol. 17168, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 26 April, and Appendix D, April 1941: Capt. E.B. Dodgson, for Lt.Col. R.B. Harkness, O.C., to DOC, MD 2, 28 April; Vol. 17180, No. 22

CA(B)TC, North Bay, Appendix 6, April 1941: "Reaction of Recruits Being Put on Active Service," 27 April; and Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 27 April 1941.

131. Crerar Papers, Vol. 1, File 958C.009(D12), Crerar to McNaughton, 19 May 1941. Also quoted in Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 151, and Dickson, "Visions of Professionalism," pp. 322-23.

CHAPTER TWO

Canada's "Zombies": Canadian Conscripts and their Experiences during the Second World War

Between 1939 and 1945, Canada's war effort was dominated by the memory of the Great War, and particularly the overseas conscription crisis of 1917 and its aftermath in the interwar years. Federal politicians, and most importantly the Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, were determined not to repeat the mistakes of their earlier counterparts. The result was the promises and policies with which Canada entered the Second World War. By 1940, as we have seen, the situation had changed, and the National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA) had been introduced, as one of many responses to German successes in Europe that spring. Still, most political leaders remained firm in their insistence that the NRMA would not become simply the first step in extending compulsory military service beyond the borders of Canada, and these considerations affected Army policy throughout much of the first part of the war.

At the same time, the character of the early NRMA had been shaped to a large extent by the needs and desires of the Army itself, and this trend would also continue in the years after 1941. For several military authorities, and especially

Major-General H.D.G. Crerar, it seemed possible to maintain a much larger volunteer Army overseas, without having to provoke a manpower crisis or the extension of conscription to overseas service, as had happened during the Great War. The NRMA increasingly came to be seen as a one way to ensure that the events of the Great War would not be repeated. The result after 1941 was that authorities would set out to make the NRMA an even more integral part of the larger Canadian Army than it already was. During 1941, planners developed a specific set of approaches and policies towards the NRMA, which would come to have important consequences for the thousands of men who would enter compulsory military service during the war. In later years, they would also have significant implications for the larger problem of trying to maintain the war effort through voluntary means.

In order to understand the measures that were introduced by military authorities in 1941 and afterwards, and their influence on events later in the war, it is first necessary to understand who Canadian conscripts were. By the middle of the war, they had come to be known as "zombies" by the Canadian public, a pejorative term drawn from the monster movies of the 1930s, to remind people of the undead creatures who mindlessly obeyed their masters' commands without feeling or opposition.¹ During the war, many Canadians also assumed that they knew who the "zombies" were: these men were predominately French Canadians, or members of minority ethnic groups, neither of

whom seemed to identify fully with the country's dominant British ethic, and therefore refused to support the war effort. But a closer investigation of the "zombies" belies these impressions. In fact, as this chapter will show, Canadian conscripts came from all parts of the country and all walks of life, and they were hardly the mindless mass of automatons portrayed by wartime opinion.

The aim of the following chapter is to investigate the backgrounds and experiences of the 157,841 Canadians who served as "zombies" during the Second World War. It will do so first by presenting a statistical portrait drawn from contemporary records, and then by exploring the day-to-day lives of conscripts in training centres and on later military service, to tell us something about what life was like for men in the Army during the war. An exploration of these aspects of the NRMA can be important in its own right, for what it reminds us about who the "zombies" were, and the fact that they were individuals, every one of whom experienced the war in their own way, and passed those experiences on to friends, families, and spouses. At the same time, investigating the NRMA reveals the extent to which many larger communities supported the war effort across the country, by contributing to the operations of various training centres, and the welfare of individual recruits, whether conscripts or volunteers. Thus, the NRMA is a significant part of the history of Canada, and should be better known.

Yet studying the NRMA in this manner is also significant in a larger sense. The final section of this chapter addresses some of the larger consequences of the NRMA for the Canadian war effort, by investigating the way that the Army came to rely on compulsory military service to meet its needs for both home defence forces and overseas volunteers in the period from 1941 to 1945. It did so by developing a program of recruiting among NRMA recruits, the operation and implications of which are explored here. In particular, thanks to the early success of the program, Army planners came to think that they could be assured of maintaining the strength of much larger forces in Europe after 1941, without ever having to ask the government to advocate conscription for overseas service. As we will see in later chapters, these ideas came to shape Canadian Army policy at the political level in several key ways. At the same time, by the last year of the war the methods used by commanders to encourage NRMA recruits to volunteer for overseas service would also backfire, and help to aggravate the final crisis over conscription when it finally came in October 1944.

* * *

Until recently, little was known about the makeup of the tens of thousands of Canadians who served as conscripts during the Second World War. Basing their opinions largely on impressionistic evidence, many contemporary observers assumed that most NRMA recruits were French-speaking, or members of

minority ethnic groups. By October 1944, when the federal Cabinet finally faced the issue of sending the "zombies" overseas, francophone members resented the idea that all conscripts were "shirkers" from French Canada, Louis St. Laurent, the Minister of Justice, noting that "the fact was that these men were composed of one-third French Canadians, one-third of English Canadians, and one-third of people who had more or less recently come to the country from Europe."² Earlier, in May 1944, Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin, the commander of 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade in British Columbia, had offered a view that has come to be one of the most widely reproduced comments on the NRMA. Macklin first pointed to the large number of French-Canadian conscripts serving in his command. "As regards the English-speaking NRMA soldiers," he added,

The great majority are of non-British origin - German, Italian, and Slavic nationalities of origin probably predominating. Moreover most of them come from farms. They are of deplorably low education, know almost nothing of Canadian or British History and in fact are typical European peasants, with a passionate attachment for the land. A good many of them speak their native tongues much more fluently than they speak English and amongst them the ancient racial grudges and prejudices of Europe still persist.³

Aside from the general attitudes about ethnic minorities revealed by these comments, like many observers Macklin also clearly looked to explain the "zombies'" lack of willingness to volunteer for overseas service by pointing to the degree to which they were cut off from mainstream English-Canadian

society and its ideals, the most important of which was assumed to be firm support for the war effort overseas.

It was not until recent years that the Army's wartime statistics on the NRMA were rediscovered and made available to researchers, and have made it possible to test such conclusions in greater detail. The tables that appear in the following pages are based on statistics that were collected from each conscript at the time they began their military service, and were compiled and tabulated by Army officials during the war.⁴ What the numbers show, is that for the most part NRMA men merely reflected the larger society from which they were drawn. In many ways, including their ethnic and geographical origins, languages spoken, religious convictions, and even the occupations they had pursued before being called out for military training, NRMA recruits came much closer to the population at large than has previously been suggested. Before discussing the statistical information upon which these conclusions are based in greater detail, it should be noted that the number of men listed as NRMA recruits during the war differed slightly from final postwar totals, apparently due to duplication of records. But this error should not be large enough to invalidate the conclusions made here.⁵

Not surprisingly for an organization that required men to report for training by age groups, the first piece of information collected from each conscript by the Department of National Defence was their date of birth. Table I lists this

information by the year in which each man was born, and the year they were called out for training. By reading the table diagonally, we can estimate the ages of NRMA recruits at the time that they entered compulsory service. As Table I shows, almost one-third of all conscripts were approximately 21 or 22 years old when they were called out for training, and nearly three quarters were between 18 and 25. This conclusion is not surprising, since men in these age groups tended to be the most fit for military service, and in the early years of the NRMA's operation all men called out were young and single, and the least likely to have long-term jobs or other ties to keep them from being called out for training. At the same time, close to ten percent of all NRMA recruits were over the age of 30, a fact which reminds us that war was not only a job for the young. Indeed, as we shall see in chapter four, the ages of men liable for compulsory military service were gradually expanded during the war, until they included all single men between 18½ and 43, and married men from 18½ to 32.⁶ Unfortunately, from the information available, it is not possible to calculate the exact numbers of single or married men within the ranks of the "zombies." But anecdotal evidence, combined with the priority given to unmarried men early in the war, would certainly suggest that the majority of men were single at the time they were called out. As young, single males, NRMA recruits clearly differed in many important ways from the typical Canadian in the country at large. Yet

TABLE I - Approximate Ages of NRMA Recruits on Enrolment

Yr Born	Year of Enrolment					N.S. ^a	Total(Age) ^b	%
	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945			
1899	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
1900	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
1901	1	9	8	-	-	-	-	-
1902	-	192	201	-	-	-	-	-
1903	-	245	267	1	-	-	-	-
1904	-	302	311	1	-	-	1 (43)	0.0
1905	1	360	312	4	-	-	9 (42)	0.0
1906	1	345	397	31	-	-	211 (41)	0.1
1907	-	479	437	55	3	-	461 (40)	0.3
1908	2	602	530	69	9	-	560 (39)	0.4
1909	3	851	536	105	9	-	648 (38)	0.4
1910	17	960	695	128	17	[1]	821 (37)	0.5
1911	6	1202	683	136	21	-	861 (36)	0.5
1912	6	1599	844	175	31	-	1132 (35)	0.7
1913	5	2158	1117	957	89	-	1287 (34)	0.8
1914	14	3098	1498	903	90	-	1715 (33)	1.1
1915	137	4449	1607	763	65	-	1910 (32)	1.2
1916	345	6142	1595	724	92	-	3110 (31)	2.0
1917	1092	8254	1974	509	83	[1]	3690 (30)	2.3
1918	4120	9231	1717	498	87	[2]	4517 (29)	2.9
1919	14684	6308	1439	450	70	-	5517 (28)	3.5
1920	11212	7512	1747	566	114	-	6654 (27)	4.2
1921	246	7221	2945	734	129	-	8821 (26)	5.6
1922	19	5392	3918	989	149	-	10880 (25)	6.9
1923	4	2880	4677	1234	194	[1]	12457 (24)	7.9
1924	1	41	4120	2553	294	-	13058 (23)	8.3
1925	2	8	650	4998	480	-	26324 (22)	16.7
1926	1	6	5	1123	1496	-	23879 (21)	15.1
1927	2	5	-	3	5	-	13348 (20)	8.4
1928	1	6	1	1	-	-	13513 (19)	8.5
1929	3	5	1	-	-	-	1823 (18)	1.2
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	51 (12-17)	0.0 ^c
N.S.	75	640	77	-	1	5	798 (-)	0.5
TOTALS	32000	70504	34309	17710	3528	5	158056^d	100.0

^a"Not Stated" on original documents used to compile table.

^bAges estimated by comparing year of birth to year of enrolment.

^cThese age numbers reflect errors apparently made in transcribing original information for tabulation. The total number of errors identified in this table is 386, or 0.2% of all NRMA records.

^dThis figure differs slightly from official postwar totals of NRMA recruits due to later elimination of 215 incorrect records.

in each of these respects, there is little evidence to suggest that they varied from the majority of volunteers who made up the active service Army overseas.

Tables II and III provide further information about the NRMA. The first table lists recruits by their place of residence at the time they entered the Army, and the second by place of birth. As these figures show, the proportions of conscripts from most provinces were slightly lower than those for the population as a whole, particularly in Ontario. Meanwhile, the number of men from Quebec was somewhat higher. The increase in figures for Quebec from year to year is especially noticeable. Thus, there appears to be some degree of truth to wartime assumptions that French Canadians made up a disproportionate number of NRMA recruits. Nevertheless, according to one report compiled by the Army in November 1944, of the 60,000 men who remained in uniform as conscripts at that point in the war, only about 39% came from Quebec, 24% from Ontario, and 37% from the remaining provinces.⁷ These proportions did not differ from those of the larger population nearly as much as one might expect. Clearly, then, there were plenty of men in every province who were fit for military service, but did not wish to serve in the Army overseas.

In fact, the number of conscripts from Quebec comes even closer to its share of the national population when one considers only the proportion of young single men in each province. According to the 1941 census, Quebec had slightly

TABLE II - NRMA Recruits by Place of Residence on Enrolment

<u>Province</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>1945</u>	<u>%</u>
P.E.I.	248	0.8	596	0.8	52	0.2	21	0.1	2	0.0
N.S.	1539	4.8	2870	4.1	1214	3.5	608	3.4	23	0.7
N.B.	1360	4.3	3422	4.9	1782	5.2	469	2.6	132	3.7
Que.	9940	31.1	23270	33.0	11678	34.0	8307	47.0	2207	62.6
Ont.	9777	30.6	21368	30.3	9607	28.0	3956	22.3	446	12.6
Man.	2127	6.6	3664	5.2	2582	7.5	970	5.5	165	4.7
Sask.	2944	9.2	5811	8.2	2575	7.5	774	4.4	155	4.4
Alb.	2442	7.6	4188	5.9	2161	6.3	1390	7.8	294	8.3
B.C.	1621	5.1	5310	7.5	2657	7.7	1212	6.8	1103	3.0
Yukon/NWT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nfld.	-	-	3	0.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
U.S.A.	2	0.0	2	0.0	1	0.0	3	0.0	1	0.0
TOTALS	32000	100	70504	100	34309	100	17710	100	3528	100

<u>Province</u>	<u>NRMA</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>CANADA^a</u>	<u>%</u>
P.E.I.	919	0.6	95047	0.8
Nova Scotia	6255	4.0	577962	5.0
New Brunswick	7165	4.5	457401	4.0
Quebec	55402	35.1	3331882	29.0
Ontario	45158	28.6	3787655	32.9
Manitoba	9508	6.0	729744	6.3
Saskatchewan	12259	7.8	895992	7.8
Alberta	10475	6.6	796169	7.0
British Columbia	10903	6.9	817861	7.1
Yukon/NWT	-	-	16942	0.1
Newfoundland	3	0.0	-	-
U.S.A.	9	0.0	-	-
TOTALS	158056	100	11506655	100^b

^aSource: M.C. Urquhart and K.A.H. Buckley, eds., Historical Statistics of Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965), Series A2-14.

^bSome percentages do not actually total 100 due to rounding.

TABLE III - NRMA Recruits by Place of Birth

Place of Birth	NRMA	% ^a	CANADA ^b	%
P.E.I.	965	0.6	108423	0.9
Nova Scotia	6348	4.0	568797	4.9
New Brunswick	7393	4.7	463127	4.0
Quebec	54100	34.2	3155549	27.4
Ontario	36772	23.3	3123810	27.1
Manitoba	10405	6.6	570349	5.0
Saskatchewan	15145	9.6	667832	5.8
Alberta	9064	5.7	479098	4.2
British Columbia	5238	3.3	335554	2.9
Yukon/NWT	9	0.0	12267	0.1
Not Stated, but Canadian -	-	-	3002	0.0
TOTAL CANADIAN	145439	92.0	9487808	82.5
Newfoundland	112	0.0	25837	0.2
England/Wales	1649	1.0	635221	5.5
Scotland	870	0.6	234824	2.0
Ireland	344	0.2	86126	0.7
Australia	17	0.0	N/A	-
Tasmania	1	0.0	N/A	-
New Zealand	1	0.0	N/A	-
Union of South Africa	5	0.0	N/A	-
British Africa	4	0.0	N/A	-
British Guiana	3	0.0	N/A	-
British India	8	0.0	N/A	-
Other British Countries	27	0.0	21761	0.2
TOTAL BRITISH	3041	1.9	1003769	8.7
TOTAL BRITISH BORN	148480	93.9	10491577	91.2
U.S.A.	1899	1.2	312473	2.7
Mexico	2	0.0	N/A	-
Brazil	3	0.0	N/A	-
Cuba	2	0.0	N/A	-
Ecuador	1	0.0	N/A	-
Haiti	3	0.0	N/A	-
Argentina	4	0.0	N/A	-
Other South American	5	0.0	N/A	-
TOTAL AMERICAN	1919	1.2	312473	2.7
SUB-TOTALS	150399	95.2	10804050	93.9

Place of Birth	NRMA	% ^a	CANADA ^b	%
Poland	2091	1.3	155400	1.4
Russia	949	0.6	117598	1.0
Italy	653	0.4	40432	0.4
Czecho-Slovakia	593	0.4	25564	0.2
Hungary	578	0.4	31813	0.3
Germany	394	0.2	28479	0.2
Roumania	326	0.2	28454	0.2
Norway	273	0.2	26914	0.2
Sweden	221	0.1	27160	0.2
Austria	196	0.1	50713	0.4
Denmark	185	0.1	13974	0.1
Finland	163	0.1	24387	0.2
Holland	119	0.1	9923	0.1
Belgium	111	0.1	14773	0.1
Greece	81	0.1	N/A	-
Lithuania	81	0.1	N/A	-
France	40	0.0	13795	0.1
Switzerland	35	0.0	N/A	-
Syria	30	0.0	N/A	-
Bulgaria	15	0.0	N/A	-
Latvia	14	0.0	N/A	-
Turkey	12	0.0	N/A	-
Estonia	10	0.0	N/A	-
Iceland	6	0.0	N/A	-
Albania	3	0.0	N/A	-
Servia	2	0.0	17416	0.2 ^c
Luxembourg	2	0.0	N/A	-
Other	-	-	23298	0.2
TOTAL EUROPEAN	7183	4.5	653705	5.7
China	9	0.0	29095	0.3
Siberia	3	0.0	N/A	-
Japan	2	0.0	9462	0.1
Other Asian	6	0.0	5886	0.1
TOTAL ASIAN	20	0.0	44443	0.4
Non-British African	2	0.0	N/A	-
NOT STATED	452	0.3	4457	0.0
GRAND TOTALS	158056	100	11506655	100

^aSome percentages are not exact, due to rounding of decimals.

^bSource: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Eighth Census of Canada, 1941 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1950), Vol. I, Table 23, pp. 66B-69.

^cCensus figures are for "Yugoslavia," the only numbers available.

more single men between the ages of 15 and 24, in real numbers, than Ontario, the province with the largest share of the national population. The same was true for men aged 25-34.⁸ At the same time, the number of married men in both age groups was considerably smaller for Quebec than for Ontario. Thus, relatively more of the "zombies" would be expected to have come from Quebec than from Ontario or other provinces, especially in the early years of the war. In later years, as the number of men available for compulsory military service in all provinces began to run short, and as French Canadians came to be targeted more and more openly by public opinion in English Canada, the government's efforts to locate conscripts became more and more concentrated on Quebec. The result was that the NRMA was made to reflect wartime stereotypes more closely than it had in the earlier years of the war.⁹

Another notable feature of the NRMA was the range of languages spoken by its recruits, as shown in Table IV. Since the information was collected from the NRMA themselves, and each man appears only once, it must be assumed that they gave the languages they were most familiar with: in other words, their mother tongues.¹⁰ As Table IV shows, the proportions of NRMA recruits who spoke French, or both French and English, were relatively close to those for Canada as a whole. Thus, even if the first language of all bilingual recruits was French, no more than 40% of all conscripts were francophones during the war.

TABLE IV - Languages of NRMA Recruits

<u>Language</u>	<u>NRMA</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>CANADA^a</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>CANADA^b</u>	<u>%</u>
English	59255	37.5	6488190	56.4	7735486	67.2
French	30125	19.1	3354753	29.2	2181746	19.0
Both	33143	21.0	-	-	1474009	12.8
Neither	-	-	-	-	115414	1.0
German	6470	4.1	322228	2.8	-	-
Polish	3766	2.4	128711	1.1	-	-
Italian	3033	1.9	80260	0.7	-	-
Russian	1038	0.7	52431	0.5	-	-
Spanish	50	0.0	1030	0.0	-	-
Chinese	38	0.0	33500	0.3	-	-
Japanese	2	0.0	22359	0.2	-	-
Other	19310	12.2	1021546	8.9	-	-
Not Given	1826	1.2	1647	0.0	-	-
TOTALS	158056	100	11506655	100	11506655	100

^aFigures are based on mother tongues listed by census respondents, in F.H. Leacy, ed., Historical Statistics of Canada, Second Edition (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1983), Series A185-237, and Census of Canada, 1941, Vol. I, Table 45, p. 710.

^bNumbers are from Census of Canada, 1941, Vol. I, Table 38, pp. 700-1, which provides information only on ability to speak Canada's two official languages.

In addition, the number of "zombies" who spoke neither English nor French was noticeably higher than among the larger population. This was true particularly for the western provinces, while a large majority of Italian-Canadian NRMA recruits came from Ontario and Quebec, most likely reflecting that community's ties to the two major cities of Montreal and Toronto during this period.¹¹ These results again seem to confirm at least some of the conclusions stated by Brigadier Macklin in his 1944 report, quoted above. They are also confirmed by the Army's figures for the 60,000 NRMA recruits remaining in service in November 1944, which found that 28% of them were English-speaking, 20% French-speaking, and 23% bilingual, while a relatively large proportion of 25% were recorded simply as "of other races." As the same report estimated, no more than 37% of all NRMA recruits were francophones, although it is not clear exactly how the Army arrived at this figure.¹² Still, even after allowing for higher proportions of French Canadians and other ethnic minorities in the ranks of the NRMA, it is clear that the "zombies" included men from all parts of Canadian society.

Religion was another area where NRMA recruits reflected the population of Canada reasonably closely. As Table V indicates, Canada in the 1940s was still an overwhelmingly Christian country, with over ninety percent of both NRMA recruits and Canadians more generally professing their adherence to Christian faiths. Yet what is even more

noticeable in this table is the contrast in the breakdown between Protestants and Roman Catholics for the NRMA, and for the population of the country as a whole. It is not clear exactly why this was so. According to the Army's statistics, Quebeckers made up over half of all Roman Catholic conscripts, a number which is actually slightly smaller than its proportion of Roman Catholics in the national population. At the same time, the numbers of Roman Catholic conscripts from New Brunswick, Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan were all higher than each province's percentage for the country as a whole, with Manitoba having the most significant discrepancy at 5.6% of Roman Catholic NRMA recruits, compared to 2.9% of all Roman Catholics in the country.¹³ Since Manitoba and New Brunswick both contained sizeable minorities of French-speaking Canadians, it is possible that many Roman Catholic conscripts from these provinces were francophones. But Canada in the 1940s also contained large numbers of Roman Catholics of other national origins, such as Irish or Italian Canadians. Thus, not all Catholic conscripts can be explained away simply as the result of greater French-Canadian opposition to the war effort.

It is also not clear how closely the number of conscripts of "Other" religions included in Table V mirrored Canada in general, since the Army did not differentiate beyond the major denominations listed here. One notable aspect of Table V is the lack of any Greek or Ukrainian Catholics among the NRMA

TABLE V - Religion of NRMA Recruits

<u>Religion</u>	<u>NRMA</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>CANADA^a</u>	<u>%</u>
United Church	20268	12.8	2208658	19.2
Methodist	813	0.5	N/A	- ^b
Congregational	6	0.0	N/A	- ^b
Anglican	13991	8.9	1754368	15.2
Lutheran	7428	4.7	401836	3.5
Presbyterian	7070	4.5	830597	7.2
Baptist	5381	3.4	484465	4.2
Salvation Army	172	0.1	33609	0.3
TOTAL PROTESTANT	55129	34.9	5713533	49.7
ROMAN CATHOLIC	91320	57.8	4806431	41.8
JEWISH	3479	2.2	168585	1.5
Other Protestant	-	-	231688	2.0
Greek/Ukrainian	-	-	325793	2.8
Other	6709	4.2	243466	2.1
TOTAL "OTHER"	6709	4.2	800947	7.0
Not Stated	922	0.6	17159	0.1
No Religion	497	0.3	-	-
TOTALS	158056	100	11506655	100

^aSource: Urquhart and Buckley, eds., Historical Statistics of Canada, Series A114-132.

^bIncluded in figures for United Church.

recruits. Many members of eastern branches of the Orthodox church were often mistakenly identified as "Roman Catholic" during this period, and this would appear to be the most likely explanation for the absence of separate figures for the NRMA. If this is so, it would bring the proportion of Roman Catholic conscripts slightly closer to that for Canada as a whole. Still, of the 6,709 recruits listed as "Other Denominations" in the Army's statistics, large numbers came from western Canada, in the same way as conscripts speaking languages other than English or French in Table IV.¹⁴ Once again, these figures would seem to confirm that more than a representative number of conscripts came from "non-British" origins, and presumably a majority came from the many well-known ethnic communities that had helped to settle western Canada since before the turn of the century.

Lastly, the number of Jewish conscripts listed in Table V is also worth noting. According to the Army's figures, 2.2% of NRMA recruits were Jewish, compared to 1.5% of the general population. By far the largest proportion of Jewish NRMA recruits came from Ontario (45.7%) and Quebec (40.4%), most likely reflecting the large communities of Jewish Canadians living in Toronto and Montreal at the time. As Gerald Tulchinsky has noted in a recent history of Jewish Canadians, there are a number of possible explanations for the higher number of Jewish conscripts during the war.¹⁵ The Canadian Army did not have a long tradition of openly accommodating

Jewish recruits. Nor did the country have a strong record of objecting to anti-semitism in the 1930s, either domestically or internationally.¹⁶ Yet what is most noticeable about Jewish conscripts is the fact that they were included in the NRMA's figures at all, and in numbers which were relatively close to their share of the national population. Clearly, Jewish Canadians supported or objected to wartime military service in proportions similar to any other part of the country's population.

The last four tables presented here provide information on the occupational backgrounds of conscripts during the Second World War. Table VI lists NRMA recruits by the industries in which they worked before they entered military service, and Table VII by the type of work they performed. Tables VIII and IX list the top twenty-five occupations among both NRMA recruits and the larger Canadian population. Unfortunately, the large number of unclassified conscripts in Table VI makes it difficult to make firm conclusions about the industries from which NRMA recruits originated. Still, the proportion of conscripts in most industries is close to that for all Canadians. In particular, the number of "zombies" from agricultural backgrounds is smaller than for the population as a whole. At the same time, farming was considered to be a vital wartime occupation, and thus came to be more and more protected from the provisions of the NRMA as the war went on. As Tables VIII and IX indicate, farming was

TABLE VI - NRMA Recruits by Industry Group

<u>Industry Group</u>	<u>NRMA^a</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>CANADA^b</u>	<u>%</u>
AGRICULTURE	38318	24.2	1062928	31.6
EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES:	9451	6.0	236302	7.0
Forestry	3953	2.5	93313	2.8
Fishing and Trapping	1958	1.2	50533	1.5
Mining	3540	2.2	92456	2.7
MANUFACTURING:	35184	22.3	735097	21.9
Food/Beverages/Tobacco	4079	2.6	87979	2.6
Leather and Rubber Products	1556	1.0	32392	1.0
Textiles/Clothing	2086	1.3	76294	2.3
Wood/Paper/Publishing	4531	2.9	160327	4.8
Metal/Machinery/Transport	15265	9.7	309763	9.2
Chemical/Petroleum/Minerals	833	0.5	51670	1.5
Other	6834	4.3	16672	0.5
TRANSPORTATION:	18575	11.8	246835	7.3
Railways	5327	3.4	123514	3.7
Other	13248	8.4	123321	3.7
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY	11663	7.4	218732	6.5
RETAIL AND WHOLESALE TRADE	6928	4.4	384046	11.4
FINANCE/INSURANCE/REAL ESTATE	731	0.5	61311	1.8
ELECTRICAL AND GAS UTILITIES	107	0.1	21134	0.6
SERVICE INDUSTRIES:	11111	7.0	355657	10.6
Education	1824	1.2	35872	1.1
Health and Welfare	284	0.2	27998	0.8
Food and Lodging	2023	1.3	58312	1.7
Personal and Recreational	3999	2.5	59955	1.8
Government	896	0.6	111634	3.3
Other	2085	1.3	61886	1.8
NOT STATED/INSUFFICIENT DATA	25988	16.4 ^c	41069	1.2
GRAND TOTALS	158056	100	3363111	100

^aNRMA recruits are classified according to guidelines in Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Classification of Industries and Services, Seventh Census, 1931, and Classification of Industries, Eighth Census, 1941 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1931 and 1941).

^bFigures provided are for gainfully employed males. See Leacy, ed., Historical Statistics of Canada, Second Edition, Series D8-85.

^cIncludes 19511 unspecified recruits listed as "Labourers" or "Workers," and 5110 clerks and other office workers.

TABLE VII - NRMA Recruits by Occupation

<u>Occupational Category</u>	<u>NRMA^a</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>CANADA^b</u>	<u>%</u>
Owners and Managers	2436	1.5	212460	6.3
Professional Occupations	3570	2.3	150379	4.5
Clerical and Sales Workers	14705	9.3	308342	9.2
Operatives	76047	48.1	1375879	40.9
Farmers and Farm Workers	38734	24.5	1061896	31.6
Labourers	21950	13.9	254155	7.6
Not Stated/Insufficient Data	614	0.4	-	-
<u>GRAND TOTALS</u>	<u>158056</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>3363111</u>	<u>100</u>

^aNRMA recruits classified according to Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Classification of Occupations, Eighth Census, 1941 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1941).

^bIncludes only gainfully employed males, as listed in Leacy, ed., Historical Statistics of Canada, Second Edition, Series D86-106.

still by far the largest single occupation among both NRMA recruits and the larger population.

Another notable feature of the economic backgrounds of NRMA recruits is the smaller proportion who came from professions, higher-paid or self-employed occupations, or "white collar" positions such as retail and wholesale trade, finance, insurance, or real estate. In contrast, the number of conscripts listed as "Operatives" (factory workers) or "Labourers" in Table VII is clearly larger than for the population at large. This variation in the types of work performed suggests a degree of bias in the operation of the NRMA, with military service falling more heavily on members of lower-ranking groups on the socio-economic ladder, a conclusion that is not particularly surprising. Many men in occupations classed as "skilled" or "essential" did not have to report for compulsory military training during the war. As we have seen, a large majority of conscripts were also young, single men, who probably had not been in the work force long enough to obtain more skilled or higher-paying jobs. People with lower incomes may have had more difficulty in challenging the decrees of the large civilian bureaucracy that was created to call out men for compulsory training during the war, and the statistics may also have been affected by the last vestiges of the Great Depression of the 1930s. As many historians have noted, large numbers of unemployed men flocked to join the volunteer Army in 1939, and in the early years of

TABLE VIII - Top Twenty-Five Occupations of NRMA Recruits

Rank	As Listed by NRMA ^a	No.	% ^b	By Census Category ^c	No.	% ^b
1.	"Farmer"	31986	20.2	Farmers and Stock Raisers	32592	20.6
2.	"Labourers"	19482	12.3	Non-Farm Labourer	21950	13.9
3.	"Truck Driver"	8300	5.3	Truck Drivers	8300	5.3
4.	"Clerk"	4117	2.6	Office Clerks	6467	4.1
5.	"Machinists"	4054	2.6	Farm Labour (All)	5676	3.6
6.	"Mechanics"	3548	2.2	Mechanics and Repairmen	5234	3.3
7.	"Farm Labourer"	3178	2.0	Machinists (All)	4133	2.6
8.	"Carpenter"	2532	1.6	Store Salespersons	3918	2.5
9.	"Other Miners"	2468	1.6	Lumbermen (All)	3818	2.4
10.	"Apple Packer"	2157	1.4	Miners and Millmen	3245	2.1
11.	"Store Clerk"	2077	1.3	Carpenters (All)	2659	1.7
12.	"Machine Operator"	1947	1.2	Machine Operators	2100	1.3
13.	"Fisherman"	1774	1.1	Welders (All)	2088	1.3
14.	"Painter"	1669	1.1	Painters/Glaziers	1892	1.2
15.	"Butcher"	1629	1.0	Clothing/Textiles	1792	1.1
16.	"Electricians"	1528	1.0	Fishermen	1774	1.1
17.	"Salesman"	1436	0.9	Electricians (All)	1673	1.1
18.	"Welder"	1388	0.9	Retail Owners/Mgrs	1630	1.0
19.	"Shippers"	1343	0.8	Butchers	1629	1.0
20.	"Students"	1185	0.7	Shipping Clerks	1610	1.0
21.	"Other Iron & Steel Workers"	1101	0.7	Woodworkers and Turners	1334	0.8
22.	"Woodsmen"	1071	0.7	Students (All)	1197	0.8
23.	"Plumbers"	909	0.6	Iron/Steel Workers	1101	0.7
24.	"Logger"	886	0.6	Sheet Metal Workers and Tinsmiths	988	0.6
25.	"Lumberman"	877	0.6	Plumbers	909	0.6
TOTALS		102333	64.7		119709	75.8

^aThis column ranks occupations by the individual titles under which they were listed in NRMA records.

^bPercentage of all NRMA recruits enrolled during the war (158056).

^cInformation in this column is arranged by grouping NRMA records according to definitions in the 1941 Classification of Occupations.

TABLE IX - Top Twenty-Five Male Occupations in Canada, 1941^a

Rank	Occupational Category	Number	% of Workforce ^b
1.	Farmers and Stockraisers	630709	18.8
2.	Farm Labourers	431102	12.8
3.	Labourers (not farm, forest, fishing, or mining)	251889	7.5
4.	Office Clerks	110043	3.3
5.	Owners, Managers, Dealers-Retail	100756	3.0
6.	Carpenters	90470	2.7
7.	Truck Drivers	81304	2.4
8.	Salespersons in Stores	81270	2.4
9.	Lumbermen	74000	2.2
10.	Mechanics and Repairmen	67246	2.0
11.	Miners and Millmen	51503	1.5
12.	Operatives-Metal products manu.	49052	1.5
13.	Machinists-Metal	43077	1.3
14.	Painters, Decorators, Glaziers	39058	1.2
15.	Fishermen	33273	1.0
16.	Accountants and Auditors	31384	0.9
17.	Owners and Managers-Manufacturing	30633	0.9
18.	Commercial Travellers	29882	0.9
19.	Stationary Enginemen	29792	0.9
20.	Operatives-Clothing and Textiles	25640	0.8
21.	Sectionmen and Trackmen	24422	0.7
22.	Shipping Clerks	23044	0.7
23.	Electricians and Wiremen	22121	0.7
24.	Teachers-School	21988	0.7
25.	Guards and Caretakers	20815	0.6
TOTALS		2394473	71.2

^aSource: Census of Canada, 1941, Table 61, pp. 772-73.

^bPercentage of gainfully occupied males (total: 3363111).

the NRMA's operation the country was still moving towards full employment. Thus, some men may also have welcomed service in the more compulsory NRMA, in an occupation that paid them for their work, while guaranteeing that they would not be forced to serve overseas. In any case, the same occupations dominate lists for both the NRMA and the larger male population, as shown in Tables VIII and IX. In both cases, "Labourers" made up the second-largest group of men behind farming, while other positions also recur in both lists. At least a few conscripts came from almost every conceivable occupation, as can be seen in Figure 1, which lists all of the job titles given by NRMA recruits themselves when they entered military service (see following two pages).

Taken together, the statistics presented here allow us to make several broad conclusions about NRMA men, as a group, in wartime Canada. Like Canadians in general, most NRMA recruits had been born here or in other parts of the British Commonwealth, and had lived in all parts of the country before being called out for military training. Most were young, and came from almost every type of occupation, although they were most likely to have been farmers or other skilled or unskilled labourers in civilian life. There was a somewhat higher chance that conscripts were French-speaking, or members of ethnic minorities, but not overly so. In using statistics to portray the NRMA, it should be remembered that it is probably as difficult to define the "typical" conscript as it would

**FIGURE 1 - Titles of Occupations of NRMA Recruits, as
Listed on Enrolment Forms, and Collated by
Department of National Defence**

(Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24,
Unprocessed material from "Directorate of Records")

Bed Spring Maker	Ship Caulker	Gas Station Owner	Mining Engineer	Call Boy	Railway Express Man	Gas Welder
Bench Band	Ship Mechanic	Production Manager	Roorman	Car Cleaner	Railway Mechanic	Radio Tube Welder
Bridge & Elevator Workers (NES)	Ship Riveter	Salesman	Surveyors	Car Inspector	Shippers	Rubber Welder & Cutter Co[.]
Broom Maker	Ship Wright	Cigar Clerk	Surveyors Assistant	Car Repair Foreman	Shipping Clerk	Sheet Metal Factory Welder
Brush Maker	Riggers	Commercial Traveller	Shingle Surveyor	Checker	Telephone Engineer	Street Railway Welder & Cutter
Buffer	Shipyard Worker	Hardware Clerk	Diesel Engineer	Chief Clerk	Telephone Inspector	Welding Co[.]
Can Maker	Cabinet Makers	Bread Salesman	Lawyer	Constable (Railway)	Telephone Mechanic	Chiroprapist
Case Maker	Furniture Finisher	Dairy Salesman	Notary Public	Investigator	Telephone Switchman	Clinical Worker
Die Setter & Cutter	Furniture Maker	Ice-man (Salesman)	Solicitor	Lampman	Warehouse Man	Health Agencies
Emery Wheel Worker	Furniture Packer	Mail Order Depot	Dentists	Storeman	Gasoline Expert	Hospital & Asylum Employees
Enameller	Veneerer	Motor Salesman	Dental Mechanic	Strapper	Motorcycle Mechanic	Masseur
Enameller's Helper	Upholsterer (NES)	News Agent	Dentist Helper	Train Despatcher	Motor Mechanic	Medical Orderly
Enamel Ware Maker	Shingle Mill	Newspaper Boy	Nurses	Turn Table Operator	Steam Mechanic	Opticians
Factory Foreman	Band Saw Filer	Newspaperman (Sales)	Physicians	Turn Clerk (Railway)	Typewriter Mechanic & Accounting Machine	Optometrist
File Maker	Edgewood	Oil Salesman	Veterinary Surgeons	Yardman (Railway)	Refrigeration (NES)	Osteopath [sic]
Foundry Store Keeper	Mill Setter	Oil Salesman (Sales)	Religious	Yardmaster (Railway)	Soldiers	Stretcher Bearer
Furnace Maker	Mill Superintendent	Sales Manager	Clergyman	Wiper (RR)	Book Binder	Physiotherapist
Hoop Coiler	Sawmill Worker	Store Clerk	Missionary	Carman	Compositor	Musician
Japanner	Plane Man	Store Floor Manager	Salv. Army Workers	Maintenance Man (RR)	Electrotypist	Teacher of Music
Lathe Band	Notary Sawyer	Window Trimmer	Other Social Workers	Trucker (RR)	Jewellery Engraver	Actors
Locksmith	Saw Filer	Serv. Stn. Attendant	Journalists	Roundhouse Man	Lithotype Operator	Athletes
Lock Maker	Saw Setter	Mail Order (Adjustor)	Reporters	Street RR Employee	Lithographer	Billiard Marker
Machinery Rigger	Other Woodworkers	Bill Posters	Advertising Clerk	Conductor (Street RR)	Monotype Operator	Horse Trainer
Mattress Maker	Box Makers	Bucksters & Peddlers	Advertising Designer	Foreman (Street RR)	Photo Engraver	Jockey
Mechanical Operator	Casket Trimmer	Coal Miners & Colliers	Advertising Manager	Manager (Street RR)	Press Clerk	Motion Picture Machine Operator
Model Makers	Coopers & Stove Mks	Other Miners	Advertising Solicitor	Motorman (Street RR)	Pressman	Ushers
Musical Instrument Workers	Door & Sash Makers	Asbestos Miner	Commercial Writing	Sail & Steamship	Printers	Owners of Theatrical Agencies & Theatres
Pail Maker	Gate Makers	Assayer	Advertising	Boatman	Engravers	Manager of Employees of "
Pattern Maker	Picture Frame & Showcase Maker	Blastor	Newspaper Editor	Cartage Agent	Stereotypist	Owner of Places of Entertainment
Piano Maker	Wood Polisher	Borers	Publisher	Dockman	Typesetter	Manager Other Places of Entertainment
Platers (NES)	Woodworkers & Turners	Copper Miner	Public[.] Commission	Engineers (NES)	Typographer	Employees
Polishers	Agents (Insurance or Real Estate)	Diamond Driller	Actuaries	Fire Setter	Fireman (NES)	Pool Room Keepers
Pump Maker	Commission Agent	Drill Runner	Adjuster	Stationery Engineer (Steam)	Stationery Fireman	Riding Instructor
Railer	Purchasing Agent	Drillers	Estimator	Stationery Works (Steam)	Heating & Air Condi- tioning Engineer	Showmen
Sporting Goods Maker	Traffic Mgr (other than telephone)	Fire Boss	Geologist	Steam Ship Mate	Law Student	Circus Bands
Stock Keeper (Mann.)	Auctioneer	Gold Miner	Interpreter	Stevord	Medical Student	Stage Bands
Sticker Band	Bank Manager	Nickel Miner	Photographer	Stokemen	Medical Student	Ticket Collectors
Surgical Instrument Maker	Brokers	Oil Inspector	Piano Tuner	Booking Agent	Engineering Student	Golf Instructor
Tent Maker	Commission Man	Oil Wells etc. (Incl. Oil Wrencher)	Singer	Telegraph Operator	Students (NES)	Caddie (Master)
Trunk Maker	Dealers & Bus. Mgr	Operatives (Mining)	Statistician	Telephone Operator	Labourers (NES)	Professional Gambler
Automobile Parts Man	Assistant Treasurer	Marble Worker	Other Professional Occupations (NES)	Radio (Any Kind)	Asphalt Worker	Blaster (Building Excavation)
Packer in Auto or Motor Factory	Auto. Bus. Garage Mgr	Coppyman	Taxidermist	Switchboard Operator	Factory Labourer	Diver (Any)
Artificial Limb Maker	Department Manager	Pithead Man	X-Ray Technician or Operator	Wireless Operator	Farm Labourer	Fence Builder
Packerizer	Garage Manager	Prospector	Deliveryman	Teletype Operator	Grader	Riggers (NES)
Car Bldrs & Repairers	Grain Buyers	Pumpman	Carter	Others in connection with Transportation	Groundsman	Water Proofer
Body Worker	Grocer	Swamper	Drayman	Bridgeman	Leverman	Wrecker (Wrecking Co)
Carriage Bldrs & Rep.	Hardware Manager	Tunneller	Driver	Bridge Carpenter	Longshoreman	Electroplate Workers
Carriage Painter	Stock Dealer	Well Borer	Motor Transport	Bridge Repairer	Paver	Chrome Plater
Coach Carpenter	Shop Man	Hydraulic Placer (Mine)	Taxi Business	Bridge Builder	Railway Construction	Electroplater
Wheel Roller	Tea Jobber	Mine Worker	Taxi Driver	Cable Joiner	Road Builder	Copper Plater
Wheeler	Tobacconist	Architects	Transfer	Cable Operator	i.e. Labourer	Gold Plater
Other Vehicle Makers	Horsedealer	Artists	Truck Driver	Cable Worker	Road Foreman	Mill Band
Automobile Makers	Importer	Blue Printers	Liveryman	Express Checker	Section Man	Window Cleaner
Bicycle Maker & Rep.	Jeweller	Draughting Clerks	Tractor Operator	Dredgemen	Stone Mounter	Peat Digger
Automobile Assembler	Jeweller's Assistant	Mech. Draughtsman	Conductors	Elevator Foreman	Acetylene Welder	Maintenance Man
Automobile Mechanic	Junk Dealer	Mechanical Tracer	Brakeman	Engine Hostler	Aeroplane Welder	Electric Welder
Chauffeur Mechanic	Laundry Business	Poster Artists	Trainmen	Export Traffic Mgr		
Driver Mechanic	Machine Agent	Show Card Writer	Locomotive Craneman	Express Messenger		
Locomotive Builder	Manager Farm Supplies	Sculptor	Locomotive Engineer	Grain Elevator Empl.		
Motor Cyclist	Manufacturing Agent	Educational	Locomotive Fireman	Head Shipper		
Automobile Radiator	Tradesmen	Physical Instructor	Locomotive Fitter	Heater (NES)		
Tester	Typewriter Adjuster	Professor	Agents (Railway)	Lineman		
Automobile Fitter	Wholesale Meat Mgr	Teachers	Agent for RR Material			
Motor Superintendent	Woollen & Cotton Jobbers	Engineers (Not Stat- ionery or Steam)	Agents Transportation			
Smith & Carriage Worker	Poultry Buyer	Civil Engineer	Freight Clerk			
Transmission Assembler	Buyer	Electrical Engineer	Hostler			
Boat Makers	Manager Restaurant	Estimating Engineer	Railroad Clerk			
Ship Makers	Fruit Marker[t?]	Gas Engineer	Agent (Ticket)			
Caulker	Proprietor	Gasoline Engineer	Other Steam RR Empl.			
Engine Smith	Casket Coy. Manager	Mechanical Engineer	Air Brake Inspectors			
Ship Carpenter						

(Continued on following page)

Presser	Donkey Engineer	Typist	Owner Lumber Camp	Clothing Factories	Hammerman	Bottle(r)s
Inspector	Elec. Crane Operator	Bank Messenger	River Driver	Clothing Presser	Founder	Brewers & Aerated
Apple Packer	Floor Polisher	Bar Tender	Sawmill Man	Cuff Maker	Foundry Inspector	Water Makers
Beet Worker	Lime Workers	Barber	Shanty Man	Embroiderer	Foundry Man	Distillers/Testifiers
Cattle Driver	Pile Driver	Bell Boy	Timber Inspector	Felt Maker	Iron Founders	Wine Clerk
Cowboy	Riveters	Boarding Housekeeper	Woodsmen	Flower Maker	Copula Helper	Wine Maker
Cream Tester	Riveter's Helper	Boothblack	Grader & Tally Man	Fur Cutter	Shot Moulder	Checker Beverages
Culler (Fruit)	Roofers	Cafeteria Manager	Analyst	Fur Trader	Moulder	Boilerman
Dairy Foreman	Sheet Metal Workers	Caretaker	Analytical Chemist	Furnishers	Steel Casting Moulder	Pulp & Paper Mills
Dairymen	Slater	Caterer	Apothecary	Furriers	Machinists	Loftsmen
Ditching &	Steam Shovel	Charitable Institute	Armourer	Garment Presser	Locomotive Machinist	Pulp & Paper Makers
Irrigation Worker	Crane Man	Worker	Camera Maker	Garment Cutter	Machine Operator	Pulp Foreman
Farmer	Steam Shovel Engineer	Chauffeur	Candle Maker	Glove Maker	Machine Tender	Other Paper Workers
Farm Manager	Steeple Jack	Club Manager	Chemical Product	Hat Maker	Machine Helper	Bag & Paper Box Maker
Farmer's Son	Steel Specification	Coachman	Makers (Others)	Hosiery Maker	Nail Machine Helper	Bag Stamper
Florists	Structural Iron	Collector	Chemicals	Knitted Goods Maker	Machine Ruler	Embosses
Fur Farming	Workers	Cook	Chemist	Lace Weaver	Machine Fitter	Paper Ruler
Gardeners	Superintendent of	Dining Car Employee	Cleaners	Millinery	Flume Tender	Stationery Agent
Bay Presser	Construction	Hair Dresser	Colour Maker	Overall Cutter	Farm Machine Servicer	Stationery Maker
Home Steader	Tile Setter	Horseman	Dye Maker	Plumber	Other Iron &	Wall Paper Maker
Landscape Architect	Other Building Trades	Hotel Keeper	Dispenser	Shirt Maker	Steel Workers	Cotton Mills
Nurserymen	Asst. Town Engineer	Hotel Manager	Drug Clerk	Shrinker	Axle Makers	Mule Spinner
Orchardists	Civil Service	Hotel Porter	Dryers	Designer (Clothing)	Bolt Makers	Woolen Mills
Produce Men	Employees (Prov.)	Janitor	Explosive Makers	Cloth Examiner	Brass Finisher	Carder
Ranchers	Chemical Engineer	Keeper	Glue Makers	Baker	Brass Founder	Spinner
Seedsman	Civil & Munic. Govt.	Lunch Counter Man	Gunsmith	Biscuit Factory	Brass Roller	Wool Carder
Sheep Shearer	Detective	Messenger	Laboratory Assistant	Candy Maker	Chain Makers	Other Textile Workers
Stock Raisers	Drain Inspector	Night Watchman	Machine Band in	Confectioners	Core Makers	Bag & Sack Maker
Stockmen	Fire Inspector	Office Boy	Shell Factory	Bread	Cutlery Makers	Beamer
Sugar Beet Workers	Fire Ranger	Orderly	Match Maker	Pastry Wrapper	Drill Presser	Carpet & Rug Makers
Thresher	Fireman (City)	Ostler	Milling Concentrator	Milk & Cream	Engine Builder	Cloth Percher
Timber Farmer	Food Inspector	Porter	Munitions Inspector	Products Maker	Galvanizers	Cordage & Twine Maker
Poultry Grader	Game Warden	Private Detective	Workers (Munition)	Cheese Maker	Smelterman	Loom fixer
Fox Rancher	Govt. Road Inspector	Restaurant Employee	Nitrate Worker	Butter Maker	Stone Moulder	Millinery Operator
Poultry Farmer	Jailer (Country)	Proprietor	Oil Miller	Butter & Cheese Maker	Stranders	Silk Worker
Bee Keeper	Land Inspector	Despatch Rider	Oil Refiner	Tobacco Maker	Struct. Steel Workers	Rope Maker
Poultry Feed Maker	Life Saver	Domestic Pers. Serv.	Oil Treater	Cigar Maker	Tin Mill Worker	Slasher in Tender
Bricklayers	Police Magistrate	Elevator Operator	Oil (Vegetable)	Millers	Hardware (Shelf) Mks	Tacker (NES)
Masons	Policeman	Footman	Optical Supply Maker	Flour Packers	Iron Fitter	Twister Tender
Stone Cutters	Sanitary Inspector	Furnace Man	Paint Makers	Butcher	Heatman	Warp Twister
Plasterers	Superintendent [of]	Groom	Paint Mixer	Meat Expert	Nail Fitter	Aggricultural
Stone Carver	Playgrounds	Guardian	Photo. Supply Maker	Spinner	Not Makers	Unemployment Worker
Brick Pointers	Water Inspector	Sexton	Powder Makers	Cannery Fish & Meat	Pipe Mills	Buildozerman
Marble Setter	Accountants	Steward	Powder Factory Worker	Curers	Rolling Mills	Pump Expert
Stone Yard Worker	Bookkeepers	Time Keeper	Refiner	Cannery Fruit & Veg.	Sand Blaster	Gas & Elec. Employee
Tiler	Billers	Undertaker	Soap Maker	Coffee Mills	Saw Grinder	Battery Expert
Carpenter	Assistant Accountant	Valet	Perfume Maker	Ice Makers	Saw Smith	Dynamo Tender
Joiners	Auditor	Waiter	Plastic Maker	Other Food Makers	Scale Maker	Electrical Operator
Lathers	Credit Manager	Watchman	Carbonation Operator	Processor	Tool Maker	Gas Engine Fitter
Shinglers	Bank Clerk	Hotel Clerk	Cosmetic Maker	Spice Mills	Tool Sharpener	Gas Fitter
Electricians	Bank Inspector	Veterinary Assistant	Wax Maker	Vinegar Maker	Welder	Gas Mechanic
Electrical Inspector	Assignment Clerk	Tourist Camp Operator	Asbestos Worker	Pickie Maker	Wire Fence Maker	Gas Meter Maker
Electrical Contractor	Card Writer	Building Inspector	Belman	Pork Packers	Wire Worker	Meter Reader
Electrical Helper	Express Clerk	Wrapper (NES)	Brick Maker	Fish Cutter	Boiler Maker	Power House Operator
Painters	Insurance Clerk	Fisherman	Cement Maker	Stock Clerk	Holder on	Tracer
Decorators	Cashier	Fishing & Hunting	Cement Worker	Stockyard Employee	Boot & Shoe Maker	Metal Workers
Glaziers	Cataloger [sic]	Guide	Clay Worker	Sugar Refiners	Last Maker	Bronze Worker (NES)
Varnishers	Clerk (NES [Not Else-where Specified])	Game Keeper	Glass Worker	Tea Taster	Beel Maker	Coppersmith
Sign Writers	Correspondent	Hunters	Glass Blower	Fruit Inspector	Shoe Cutter	Drill & Reamer Maker
Carpet Layer	Dairy Clerk	Trappers	Glass Maker	Packing House Worker	Shoe Factory Operator	Metal Alloyers
Foreman Painter	Despatcher	Hunters & Trappers	Glass Cutter	Fish Grader	Shoe Repairer	Metal Stamper
Sign Painter	(i.e. T. Eaton Co.)	Oyster Shucker	China Maker	Fruit Sorter	Barnes Maker	Nickel Worker
Plumbers	Law Clerk	Axeman	Cement Finisher	Fish Handler	Saddler	Stamp Miller
Steamfitters	Librarian	Bushman	Glass Packer	Egg Candler	Other Leather &	Tool Setter
Pipe Fitters	Paymaster	Deal Piler	Potter	Clock Maker/Repairer	Rubber Workers	Punch Press Operator
Pipe Liner	Receiver	Foreman Lumber Camp	Tile Maker	Watch	Belt Maker	Alum. Worker (Plant)
Solderer	Sales Correspondent	Forestry	Glass Inspector	Jewellery	Currier	Elec. Supply Maker
Tin Workers	Warehouse Clerk	Logger	Bottle Tester	Comb Maker	Rose Maker	Electrical
Builders	Office Appliance	Lumberman	Kneader (Glass Fact.)	Electric Plater	Rubber Tire Inspector	Coil Maker
Concrete Foreman	Operator	Lumberjack	Nice Grader	Spring Fitters Helper	Supervisor of Molded	Motor Winder (Elec.)
Concrete Builders	Office Manager	Lumber Shipper	Tailors	Gold & Silver Worker	Rubber Goods	Spring Winder
Construction Foreman	Secretary	Lumber Surveyor	Other Clothiers	Diamond Cutter	Tanner	Winder
Construction Worker	Stenographer	Lumber Manufacturer	Button Maker	Blacksmith Helper	Tanner Foreman	Insulator
Contractors		Manager Lumber Camp	Cap Maker	Farrier	Tire Builder	Other Manufacturers
Craneman		Mill Sawyer		Drop Forge Man	Tiremaker	Awning Makers
		Other Forestry Empl.			Vulcanizer	Basket Makers

have been to define the typical "Canadian" in the 1940s. Still, as in most other ways, in this respect the NRMA simply reflected the broader society from which they came.

* * *

At the same time, knowing who the "zombies" were, as a group, can only provide a partial understanding of Canada's conscripts during the Second World War. In order to fully comprehend their experiences, it is also necessary to consider how they spent their many months and years in uniform. Unfortunately, few former conscripts have set down their memories of wartime service for posterity. Nevertheless, a number of sources allow us to reconstruct their experiences in at least a general way. By law, every training centre and operational unit was required to maintain several records of their daily activities, a source of information that can be used to recreate the experiences of not just NRMA recruits, but all soldiers who served in Canada during the war.¹⁷ The responses of both individuals and communities to compulsory military service can also be traced through these records, as well as other papers preserved by the Department of National Defence and individual political figures involved in running the program. Using these sources, it is possible to learn a great deal about what the typical conscript was likely to have done and seen during his years of service in Canada.

In fact, from their first day of military service the lives of every soldier consisted in large part of training.


For the NRMA, as we have seen, the focus on training had already been established in the first thirty-day training centres. Once they were merged with the volunteer system in 1941, training took on an even more serious tone. Most camps essentially continued their previous work as newly-renamed "basic training centres," teaching a syllabus known as "Common to All Arms," that covered much the same material as the former NRMA program. Conscripts and volunteers both spent their first two months learning the elementary skills that they would need for later service, no matter which corps of the Army they expected to join. The only major elements added to the new syllabus were machine guns and anti-tank rifles, both of which had already been taught on a voluntary basis by some of the earlier NRMA centres.¹⁸ Once each man graduated from basic training, he went on to one of the many "advanced training centres" that now appeared across the country, most of which were former volunteer camps. In addition, a few former thirty-day centres were converted to deal with the increased numbers of men who would be trained at the advanced level. In the advanced training centres, recruits carried out training "Special to the Arm," which taught them the specific skills they would require to become infantrymen, artillerymen, signallers, engineers, armoured troops, ordnance troops, medics, or one of the many parts of the Army Service Corps.¹⁹ In April 1941, a special advanced training centre was even established in Halifax, Nova Scotia, to teach recruits the




Overhead view of No. 131 Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centre, Camrose, Alberta, June 1941. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 17291, War Diary, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, Appendix A, June 1941.)

specific skills required to serve in the numerous coast defence and anti-aircraft artillery units that began to be established on both coasts as production of both soldiers and guns caught up to the demands created by the crisis of the previous summer (for the locations of all basic and advanced training centres as of April 1941, see Map 2 on the following page).²⁰

For all soldiers who found themselves in uniform, both before and after the changes of March and April 1941, their lives were dominated by the military in a manner that most Canadians had never experienced in peacetime. Conscripts in particular probably found such influences unsettling, at the very least, since they had not even been given a choice about enlisting. Almost every aspect of their lives was regulated, from the time they awoke in the morning until they went to sleep at night. Men were told how to dress and how to behave. They were taught to accept the distinctive hierarchy of authority and discipline that accompanied Army life. Even diets were regulated: meals were served at prescribed times, and recruits had to choose from a menu that was sometimes monotonous, even if it was always nutritious.²¹ In order to be accepted into the Army, a soldier already had to be in excellent health, especially for the infantry, where men were required to meet the highest standards simply so that they could survive the many physical and mental hazards of the battlefield.²² All recruits received free medical care from





"Active" and "Reserve" recruits of No. 131 Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centre, Camrose, Alberta, undergoing an inspection, late summer 1941. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 17291, War Diary, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, Appendix F, August 1941.)

the time they enlisted, and most camps had their own hospitals, as well as regular dental clinics, all of which for many Canadians probably marked the first time that they had ever enjoyed such full and routine access to health care. In fact, it is no accident that the welfare state came to be firmly established as a part of Canadian life during and after the Second World War, as the federal government came to play an enormous role in all aspects of wartime society, the NRMA merely being one of the most far-reaching examples of these principles. As a result, many recruits were in better health by the time they completed their training than before. The large numbers of men brought together by military service also resulted in one further development, which helps to reveal the state of health of the Canadian population more broadly in the 1940s. With the large number of men congregating in training centres and other military camps, and the rapid flow of men through each one, many centres experienced a number of outbreaks of diseases like meningitis, scarlet fever, measles, and influenza, which sometimes led to several barracks or entire camps being placed in quarantine, and in a few cases even deaths among trainees.²³ As these experiences remind us, all of these illnesses were much more serious and prevalent for Canadians in the 1940s than today, when many have been virtually eradicated in developed countries.

Training and other compulsory activities were not the only elements in the lives of the NRMA, either before or after

the voluntary and compulsory systems were merged in 1941. Recruits were also encouraged to participate in a variety of athletic events as part of their physical conditioning. As noted in Chapter One, from the start of the thirty-day training program in 1940, Wednesday evenings and Saturday afternoons were set aside for sports and other physical activities throughout the life of the basic training centres. Organized events often consisted of track and field days or broader programs of "tabloid sports" - a term that took in several less formal activities such as relay races, three-legged races, wheelbarrow races, tug-of-war, and obstacle courses.²⁴ Training staffs and recruits also arranged other, more voluntary activities, and almost every imaginable sport could be found in one or more camps. Drill Halls doubled as gymnasiums for basketball, volleyball, boxing, wrestling, tennis, badminton, weightlifting, and gymnastics,²⁵ while outdoor pursuits ranged from baseball, soccer, rugby, and "football" (apparently referring to the North American adaptation of rugby), to rowing, curling and skiing.²⁶ In fact, baseball seems to have been the sport of choice among trainees in the spring and summer months. At the same time, lacrosse was almost non-existent, despite its claim to being the country's "national sport," a trend noted by other historians of sport in Canada in the interwar years.²⁷

Thanks to the numbers involved in compulsory military training, most basic training centres also sustained a

surprising range of levels of competition for recruits in various sports, and this trend continued after men went on to advanced training centres and operational units across the country. Training centres created their own leagues, with teams organized by companies or platoons, while others participated in exhibitions against local high schools and universities,²⁸ or other competitors. In July 1941, for example, recruits from St. Jérôme, Quebec, visited Montreal to play a series of exhibition softball games against teams from the U.S. Army and two local women's clubs.²⁹ In North Bay, recruits played a similar exhibition against a team from a Warner Brothers movie that was shooting nearby, while baseball teams from two other camps challenged groups of local and even "internationally known" hockey stars to similar contests.³⁰ In Nanaimo, British Columbia, men of the 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade even played an exhibition game in January 1942 against the famous Harlem Globetrotters, before an audience of 1,200 of their fellow soldiers.³¹ Most training centres formed teams that competed in local civilian leagues, or joined together with other camps or nearby Army units to form their own military leagues. In more remote regions, these included teams from local Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) bases and Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) facilities, providing one of the most friendly versions of the many inter-service rivalries that existed in the armed forces throughout the war.³² Many camps also organized other competitions,

especially boxing, which attracted much interest among both their own personnel and the citizens of local communities.³³

The one sport that predominated in every training centre and Army unit across the country, however, was Canada's traditional national pastime: hockey. Almost every training centre built a winter skating rink, and military units formed teams that played at all levels of the sport. In January 1941, recruits and staff members in Joliette, Quebec volunteered their time and took advantage of material left over from the construction of their camp to erect a very professional-looking hockey rink, complete with boards and electric floodlights. Their activities were aided by the city's fire department, which helped to flood the rink.³⁴ In Vernon, British Columbia, the camp arranged to rent time in the local Civic Arena, in return for receiving one-third of ticket receipts from games they played there.³⁵ By 1942, the workings of the compulsory military training system were coming to have a very specific benefit for many centres and other operational units across the country, as one War Diarist in Huntingdon, Quebec, indicated in January 1942, when most of the key players from local hockey teams suddenly found themselves in uniform as "R" recruits: "The Centre Hockey Team is going to win this Year's Championship," he proudly declared.³⁶ In some cases, players "raided" from local teams in this manner included semi-professionals from junior and senior farm teams connected to professional clubs.³⁷ This

APP VI I.L.C. St. U. 7/42

- BOXING -

Appendix VI

- AT -

No. 71 (B) Military Training Center
EDMUNDSTON, N. B.

Friday, Oct. 31 at 8.00 P. M. (Sharp)

HAROLD GERARD - 135 lbs.
MADAWASKA, MAINE

-VS- PTE. E. PETITPAS - 125 lbs. 3 rounds
SHEDIAC ISLAND, N. B.

MARC HEBERT - 130 lbs.
MADAWASKA, MAINE

-VS- PTE. A. ALBERT - 130 lbs. 3 rounds
NEW DENMARK, N. B.

JACK LEIDY - 130 lbs.
FORT KENT, MAINE

-VS- PTE. A. TOMER - 135 lbs. 3 rounds
PRINCETON, MAINE

ALPHE MARTIN - 135 lbs.
MADAWASKA, MAINE

-VS- B. NADEAU - 140 lbs. 4 rounds
(D) COMPANY YORK & CARLETON REG.

CARL BRISSON - 145 lbs.
(D) COMPANY YORK & CARLETON REG.

-VS- SONNY BOURGOYNE - 140 lbs. 4 rounds
MADAWASKA, MAINE

DYKE NADEAU - 135 lbs.
FORT KENT, MAINE

-VS- PTE. CARL ALBERT - 140 lbs. 4 rounds
EDMUNDSTON, N. B.

MAIN BOUT - 6 ROUNDS

BOB LEIDY-165. lbs -vs- Pte. RAYMOND COUTURE-155 lbs.

MADAWASKA, MAINE

BATHURST, N. B.

ADMISSION: 25¢ - Tickets at Sentry Box of Camp.

Poster announcing boxing match in No. 71 Canadian Militia Training Centre, Edmundston, New Brunswick, October 1940. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 17259, War Diary, No. 71 Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centre, Edmundston, Appendix VI, October 1940.)

was true not just for hockey: in 1941 and 1942, conscripts called out in Camrose, Alberta, and Huntingdon, Quebec, were identified as former holders of Canadian boxing championships, while among other compulsory recruits was a professional wrestler and two former Olympic skiers.³⁸

With or without such aid, many training centres formed squads that proved strong enough to reach the playoffs of their respective leagues, in hockey and other sports, and won a number of local and regional championships.³⁹ In 1943, an Army team from Victoria even played for the Allan Cup, the symbol of senior hockey supremacy in Canada, losing a close series to another Army team from Ottawa whose entire roster was made up of former NHL players who were now serving in the armed forces.⁴⁰ Several training centres arranged for recruits to attend professional hockey games as spectators, especially in the early days of the thirty-day training program in 1940.⁴¹

Aside from organized sports, soldiers in training centres and operational units filled their leisure time in many other ways. One of the most popular activities were numerous shows and concerts. At times there seemed to be an almost endless round of local, regional, and even national performers and shows, with names such as the "T. Eaton Co. Masquers," the "M.R.T. Tin Hat Review," the "Blue Bell Bullets Review," the "Evans Sisters," the "'Arf a Mo Concert Party," and the "Lifebuoy Follies."⁴² As some of the names suggest, many

At the
ARENA
Vernon

HOCKEY



ARMY



VERNON

Hurricanes

Reserved Seat Sale at
Vernon Garage
Adult Rush 40c
Reserved 55c
Children 10c
Doors Open 8:00 p.m.

SAT. DEC. 14

9 P.M.

An improved Army Team will be out to avenge the defeat of last Saturday. New players and new coach, working out every day, have made a big difference.

This Is The Vernon Club Home Game - Support The Boys

Army team playing by kind permission Lt. Col. A. C. Sutton, D.S.O.,
O.C. N.P.A.M., T.C. 110

Flyer announcing upcoming hockey game, December 1940.
(Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 17277, War Diary, No. 110 Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centre, Vernon, British Columbia, unnumbered Appendix, December 1940.)

groups were sponsored by well-known private companies and their employees, in order to provide a visible contribution to the war effort.⁴³ But on most occasions, concerts were presented by local organizations, continuing the trend of strong support for the work of the training centres that many communities had established in the early days of the thirty-day program in 1940. In Woodstock, for example, as in countless other cities and towns, recruits were treated to concerts and plays provided by groups such as the "Dramatic Society of the Dundas Street United Church," while in Sorel the "Calixa Lavallée Harmony" a group which perpetuated the memory of the composer of "O Canada," did its part for the war effort, along with the town's local "Women's Voluntary Reserve Corps," which presented a "Khaki Review" show for the men. Other sponsors of similar events included local Kinsmen's Clubs, ladies' clubs, and various "War Auxiliary Service" organizations.⁴⁴

Even more popular were the many dances that took place in every training centre and in most other Army units throughout the war, not least because they provided one of the few occasions when women were permitted to enter military camps.⁴⁵ In some cases, women were specifically recruited by organizers and bussed in to act as escorts.⁴⁶ Attendance at dances often numbered as high as the entire strength of a training centre, attesting to the popularity of the activity.⁴⁷ In arranging these functions, community

CONCERT

offert par les APPENDIX 6

CHEVALIERS DE COLOMB

— aux —

Officiers et Soldats

du centre d'entraînement de Joliette

SOUS LA PRESIDENCE

du Lt-Col. G.-V. DeBellefeuille

OFFICIER COMMANDANT

avec le gracieux concours de

La Fanfare des Zouaves

Ernest Loiselle

Georges Goudreault

LE "TINO-ROSSI" DU CAMP

"Duplessis" et autres

Ce soir, à 8 h.30 précises

Imp. "L'Etoile du Nord", Joliette.

15th. APRIL, 1941.

Flyer announcing concert in No. 42 Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centre, Joliette. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 17206, War Diary, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, Appendix 6, April 1941.)

organizations again played a vital role, along with civilian recreation directors in each camp, unit chaplains, and even recruits themselves, who often formed orchestras to provide music for such occasions.⁴⁸ In other cases, bands from local militia regiments volunteered to fulfil the same role.⁴⁹

In addition to larger dances and concerts, most of the compulsory training centres witnessed a variety of other social activities. Many camps arranged talent shows, "quiz shows," and other contests that tested the skills and abilities of the recruits.⁵⁰ In the 1940s, radio was still in its infancy in many parts of Canada, and local stations were often quite happy to fill their programming schedules by broadcasting such activities, at the same time providing a noticeable wartime service to the community.⁵¹ In Quebec, two stations toured various training centres at separate times in late 1940 and mid-1941, presenting a series of province-wide broadcasts, while in at least two other cases "R" recruits serving in the centres turned out to be producers and broadcasters who had worked at radio stations in civilian life.⁵² In addition, specific companies and platoons often held their own informal social functions within training centres and other military camps, such as "smokers," where men could gather for quieter conversation and camaraderie, bingo parties, and a variety of other, lesser activities.⁵³ Meanwhile, officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) had their own "messes" to which they could retreat for similar

functions, as well as formal mess dinners to mark significant dates on the military calendar.⁵⁴

Aside from the activities that took place within each military camp, recruits participated in a wide variety of events in the communities beyond their gates. From the time that men began their training, most camps had some sort of pass system, and everyone received at least one weekend of leave to visit friends and family during the early thirty-day training periods. Once again, the local support networks established in the early days of the NRMA played a vital role in supporting social functions outside the camps. Many groups in nearby towns and cities organized concerts and dances for recruits, and several created civilian recreation centres where men could spend their leisure time.⁵⁵ Local churches and other community organizations invited smaller groups of staff members and trainees to attend special dinners, teas, or other services, particularly in more remote regions of the country where larger entertainments were less frequent, and many events were specifically tailored for men of the same religious faiths.⁵⁶ At Christmas time, civilians opened their homes to personnel who were not able to visit their own families for the holidays, and many training centres held special dinners and other ceremonies.⁵⁷ Recruits and staff members sometimes returned the favour, holding their own concerts and other demonstrations for the civilians of nearby towns and cities.⁵⁸

CARNIVAL

Fun - Frolic - Frivolity - Games
Refreshments - Novelties

SAT. FEB. 28

19:30 Hours to 22:30 Hours



CAMP DRILL HALL

Sponsored and Arranged By The Staff of

C A (B) T C No. 110

All ranks are invited to attend this monster Carnival and
bring their wives or sweethearts or friends



DRAWING

Given Away

BEAUTIFUL

6-Tube Radio

Buy Your Tickets 10c each or 3 for 25c

Drawing Will Take Place At 21:45 Hours

Advance Tickets for Sale At Sally Ann Hut

Poster for Winter Carnival, Vernon, British Columbia, February 1942. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 17279, War Diary, No. 110 Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centre, Vernon, Appendix 7, February 1942.)

For soldiers looking for other ways to spend their leisure time, a broad range of alternatives existed, particularly in the early compulsory training centres. The recreation huts that were established in every basic training centre in October 1940 continued their work after the changes of early 1941, providing reading rooms, musical instruments, board games, cards, and a variety of other activities to keep men occupied.⁵⁹ Many camps created separate libraries thanks to the wealth of materials donated by local communities.⁶⁰ From the beginning of the compulsory military training program in October 1940, every centre received a movie projector, and obtained a number of films that were shown at least a few times in each training period, and in some cases as often as once or twice per week.⁶¹ Judging from the titles listed in some of the centres' War Diaries, most movies could be summed up in the words of one observer, who described his camp's most recent offering as "an old but a very good film."⁶² Another commentator noted that films were "getting better and becoming more popular" as time went on, and several centres reported large turnouts for screenings.⁶³ Aside from commercial movies, recreation directors in most camps filled out their viewing schedules with newsreels, training films, educational films, recordings of the recruits' own activities, and in a few cases even home movies presented by camp personnel and special visitors.⁶⁴ To see more current films, recruits could attend civilian theatres in their off-duty hours, some

of which arranged for the entire personnel of the local training centre to attend free of charge at the start of each training period, or provided discounted rates at other times.⁶⁵

Several Quebec training centres provided a number of more productive opportunities for recruits to pass their time, including English or French classes, vocational training, mathematics, bookkeeping, typing, and shorthand courses. In some cases, they were taught by professors from nearby civilian institutions, who volunteered their time to aid the war effort.⁶⁶ A few camps also created their own amateur newspapers that relied on recruits to provide material, and usually contained a combination of brief reports on activities in the camps, jokes of varying quality, and schedules for upcoming events.⁶⁷ These pursuits offered a variety of additional ways for men to spend their time at the end of their long training days.

One other area where conscripts were looked after, perhaps more than some of them might have wished, was in providing religious services for the men. Church parades were held for all Protestant and Roman Catholic recruits every Sunday, in Drill Halls, on parade squares, and in local churches across the country, and they were usually compulsory. Arrangements were made for separate services for Jewish-Canadian recruits when numbers warranted, although they were usually held on the same day, rather than the normal Saturday.

In fact, the Second World War seems to have marked a new stage in the way the Canadian Army dealt with Jewish Canadians, as they had never been officially prevented from serving in the past (and many had done so and earned distinguished records during the First World War). But until early in the Second World War recruiting had been left largely to the discretion, and thus the possible prejudices, of local officers. Despite a few cases of similar prejudices between 1939 and 1945, Jewish Canadians served in sizable numbers, and in the records of the training centres there are no signs of outright discrimination, the presence of these men being taken simply as a matter of course. On at least two occasions, local services in Huntingdon, Quebec, were led by Rabbi Gershon Levi, the chief Jewish chaplain for the Canadian Army, who had been appointed to his post in March 1941, and most training camps and other units provided leaves for Jewish recruits whenever possible to honour specific holy days.⁶⁸ In one other case, a special service was held for Greek Orthodox personnel in Portage la Prairie, Manitoba.⁶⁹

Every training centre and operational unit had at least one chaplain assigned to look after the religious needs of its personnel, although only larger camps and units with mixed groups of Protestants and Roman Catholics were permitted to retain chaplains of both faiths on a permanent basis. In most cases, there seems to have been no discrimination against the minority group, which was usually permitted to hold its own

separate services within the camp, or in the communities where they were located, and chaplains were sometimes pressed into duty to lead services for men of other faiths.⁷⁰ Many camps created chapels which served as interdenominational centres for worship, along with focal points from which chaplains could carry out their many other roles in the Canadian Army, including providing personal and psychological counselling to recruits, and helping to arrange many of the social activities that took place in each unit.⁷¹ This was true particularly in Quebec, where the Roman Catholic Church still played a large part in the lives of most citizens. Many training centres in the province marked Catholic holidays with ceremonies in the camps, and one chaplain in a basic training centre in Quebec even undertook a tour of advanced training centres in Ontario in the summer of 1941, to visit members of his "flock" who had gone on to complete their training there, and help ensure their adjustment to their new surroundings.⁷²

Lastly, quite apart from the many organized social functions that were provided for NRMA recruits, both inside and outside the training centres, there were also a range of other, less acceptable activities that took place, over which commanding officers and community leaders could not exert nearly so much influence. One of the most common of these activities was drinking. All canteens in the early thirty-day training centres seem to have been "dry," meaning that they served no alcoholic beverages.⁷³ Yet it soon became clear

that soldiers would find their own means to procure alcohol, as one commanding officer reported in November 1940:

The majority of the recruits trained in our first course drank liquor in one form or another, frequenting the beer parlours in Vernon and adjacent towns & [sic] villages. At times they became a trifle noisy & boisterous, arriving back in camp somewhat "under the weather".

As he went on to note, liquor bottles had been found in barracks rooms inside the training centre, and he recommended that a formal "wet" canteen be established where men could drink under more controlled conditions.⁷⁴ Meanwhile, trainees in Huntingdon, Quebec, were prohibited from entering a local restaurant after several men went absent without leave and were found drunk in a back room, the camp's commanding officer adding that "Further complaints were also received of girls being accosted outside the store."⁷⁵ In North Bay, a "disturbance" that spilled into the streets and led to an entire evening of fighting and rowdiness was also blamed on alcohol, and in Edmundston, New Brunswick, similar problems provoked Rev. James R. Mutchmor, the Joint Secretary of the Board of Evangelism and Social Service of the United Church of Canada, to write to his denomination's local minister. As the latter man replied, "This town is probably the wettest in the Province and the police tell me that to bring one to trial is like bucking up against the rock of Gibraltar." Still, he added, the situation was not due to the presence of the local training centre, but to the lack of licensed establishments and local controls on drinking in general.⁷⁶

In fact, drinking was one area where the Canadian Army had had a great deal of experience in attempting to balance the desires of soldiers with the needs of military service during the First World War. As Tim Cook has argued in a recent article, during that conflict authorities had come to recognize the beneficial effects of alcohol for morale, for dealing with stress, and for other purposes, provided that it was used sparingly, and under tightly regulated conditions.⁷⁷ Recognizing the advantages of bringing alcohol under greater control, by the fall of 1941 officials had agreed to permit wet canteens in basic training centres across the country.⁷⁸ Yet alcohol continued to be a factor in disturbances such as a brawl among men from the Highland Light Infantry that broke out on the streets of Quebec City in February 1941, and in May 1943 in Sussex Camp, Nova Scotia, when men of the Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles and *Les Voltigeurs de Québec* became involved in a scuffle that led to gunshots being fired, and a few men wounded.⁷⁹

Gambling was another activity that clearly existed in many training centres and operational units across the country, although as an illegal activity it left very few traces in the records of these institutions. Still, the fact that most camps felt the need to prohibit such activities explicitly in the "Standing Orders" they issued to their men would suggest at least a fear of its presence. In one of the few available accounts of life in training centres in Canada

during the Second World War, a fictional novel by Earle Birney, the author alludes more than once to the presence of various games of chance in the training centres.⁸⁰

In addition, Birney refers several times to the search for "female companionship" that dominated the thoughts of many soldiers whenever they were permitted to leave camp, since they had so few opportunities to meet members of the opposite sex while on duty.⁸¹ Given the surroundings, it would also not be surprising if some recruits formed same-sex relationships during their time in the Army. Unfortunately, however, due to the many social and legal prohibitions against publicly revealing such relationships in the 1940s, detailed evidence of these relationships is very sparse.⁸²

Along with drinking, gambling, and womanizing, a few recruits engaged in acts of petty thievery and other criminal activities in various training centres across the country during the war. In Red Deer, Alberta, in one of the least significant but most intriguing cases, three men were caught stealing leftover food from the camp kitchen, including "a ten-pound pail of dripping [fat]" which apparently had some value to them.⁸³ In Huntingdon, an "R" recruit was arrested for stealing a car and using it to charge his colleagues for rides to nearby Montreal. Even jail was not enough to escape compulsory service: the man was convicted and transferred to a civilian jail to serve out his sentence, after which he was expected to be returned to complete his military training.⁸⁴

Later that year, another "R" recruit in the same camp was suspected of receiving \$1200.00 in money stolen from a bank in Outremont.⁸⁵ In at least one case, an acting Corporal on the staff of one of the training centres was also arrested "on charges of indecency with recruits," although he was not prosecuted due to lack of evidence, and details on the events are sparse.⁸⁶

In addition to committing crimes inside and outside the training centres, both "A" and "R" recruits frequently failed to report back from leaves at the appointed time, although in most cases the offenses were minor.⁸⁷ At least one "R" recruit chose not to return for more serious reasons: after going home on a weekend pass, according to the camp's War Diary, he "sent his uniform back with express prepaid. A letter in the mail from this man stated he was returning his uniform as he did not like the army."⁸⁸ In another case, an NRMA recruit who was already being detained for other offenses broke out of his cell and attempted to escape from the training centre.⁸⁹ Despite these examples, however, evidence from a few sources and the impressions given by various War Diaries suggest that problems like absence without leave and desertion were just as numerous among volunteers as for conscripts, and there is no reason to suspect that any form of discrimination was practiced against recruits of either type who were disciplined for offenses committed in the training centres.⁹⁰ In fact, as one War Diary noted, it was Active

Army recruits who were often the least disciplined.⁹¹ Other War Diaries commented on the good behaviour shown by both groups of men, reminding readers of the vast majority of the hundreds of thousands of soldiers who passed through the training centres without incident.⁹²

Once "R" recruits had completed their work in the training centres, they found themselves posted to operational units across the country, once more alongside volunteers. For all soldiers, training remained the primary purpose of their existence. For several years in the middle of the war, planners were forced to take the threat of attack on Canada very seriously, and recruits underwent a near-continuous round of individual and unit training, as well as larger exercises, once they arrived in operational units. By 1943, several brigades were being successively rotated from defensive positions on the west coast to participate in brigade-level exercises in Wainwright, Alberta, to test each formation's ability to work together should it be called upon to repel an actual enemy attack.⁹³ These exercises would have been a very rare occurrence in the Canadian Army of the interwar years, which would not likely have been able to field a full brigade of troops across the country. They thus remind us once again of the huge degree to which the Canadian Army was mobilized during the war, as well as the many opportunities it provided for both soldiers and their commanders to experience service in units of this size and complexity.

Still, for most of the time boredom was the biggest enemy. Most soldiers in home defence units found themselves posted to isolated defence posts in British Columbia, eastern Quebec, and the Maritimes, and "R" recruits eventually served in Newfoundland and the Caribbean as well. As a result, fewer opportunities existed to hold concerts, dances, or other social activities, although citizens of nearby towns and cities attempted to provide as many activities as possible for the men. Units in remote areas of B.C. complained about the small number of movies available for viewing at certain times, and the length of time it took to receive recently-released features. As one observer in Prince George, B.C., noted,

The quality of movies being shown to the troops is very poor and they are especially dissatisfied when they read of the American forces, even [sic] in more remote areas, getting the latest releases even in advance of the big-city houses.⁹⁴

Isolation was probably most significant for NRMA men whose first language was not English. Francophone recruits were numerous enough to be able to form their own units, and usually served together under commanders from similar backgrounds. By April 1942, authorities in Ottawa listed eight infantry battalions, several independent companies of infantry protecting vital points, seven artillery and anti-aircraft batteries, and several other engineer, field ambulance, and hospital units, all of which were French-speaking, but many of which were required to serve in areas where there was very little knowledge of their language.⁹⁵

In fact, the number of French-speaking units and men in the Canadian Army is also worth emphasizing for other reasons. Several historians have mentioned the increase in interest that appeared during the war with respect to training French-speaking officers on the part of the Army. All have dealt with the issue mainly in the context of French Canadians serving overseas.⁹⁶ Yet it was the NRMA that was primarily responsible for the rise in demands for French-Canadian officers during the war, to command the large numbers of training centres and operational units that were formed and manned by conscripts on Canadian soil. Many units still did not function at higher levels in the French language during the war, preparing and submitting unit war diaries in English, for example. But to an anglophone historian what is most notable is the opposite side of the coin: the fact that many units were able to operate in the language of their men. For the first time, the need to deal with large numbers of French-speaking soldiers, and the need to allow them to serve in their own language, resulted in opportunities much greater than ever before for both officers and men to exist in a military world in Canada where their language could survive and prosper. Unfortunately, when units served outside Quebec and parts of Atlantic Canada, there were virtually no opportunities for men to speak French beyond the limits of their own camps. But in that case there were other advantages, and Canadians on both sides of the language divide

were exposed to each other on the level of individuals and communities, in a way that many had never experienced before.⁹⁷ French Canadians would not have the same opportunities in the Canadian armed forces until the 1970s.

Overall, by the end of the Second World War every soldier who had served in Canada had been exposed to a number of varied encounters and experiences. At the same time, there was much that was the same about Army life, no matter where recruits served, and no doubt one memory of every Canadian soldier who served on home defence duties during the war is the boredom of endless service and training, whether they were conscripts or volunteers. Despite their separate status as home defence troops, for the "zombies" in particular, life still went on in training centres and operational units, and there is no evidence that they were deliberately barred from recreational or other facilities, or from participating in other events in the camps at any point between 1940 and 1945. Thus, there is much that the NRMA can tell us about the experiences of all Canadians who served on home defence duties in the Second World War, along with the impact of the war on the hundreds of cities and towns across the country where these men were located.

* * *

Still, there was one way in which "zombies" differed enormously from their active service counterparts, and that would come to have a huge impact on their wartime experiences,

as well as the organization of the Army itself. Until November 1944, conscripts could not be required to serve outside the western hemisphere, and the result was one gulf between conscripts and volunteers that could never be completely bridged. In addition, as H.D.G. Crerar had noted in his Army plans as early as 1940, large numbers of NRMA recruits had in fact chosen to volunteer for active service after they arrived in the early thirty-day training centres, and this discovery had played at least a small role in his decision to reorganize the Army in March 1941, and to place "A" and "R" recruits side by side in the new training centres.

Over the next three years, this additional "benefit" of the NRMA would be made into a central aspect of the new training system, with consequences that would come to be very important for individual NRMA recruits. One of the best-known accounts of the implications of the new training system comes from Ralph Allen, a sports writer who briefly served in the 30th ("Sportsmen's") Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, which was formed by the owner of the Toronto Maple Leafs hockey club, Conn Smythe. Allen went on to become a war correspondent for the Globe and Mail, and then edited Maclean's Magazine after the war. Despite being a volunteer, what Allen saw in his basic training in Brantford, Ontario, and advanced training at Camp Petawawa, in north-eastern Ontario, clearly shaped his memory of the conflict.⁹⁸ As he wrote while describing the NRMA in a popular history of the period:

Inevitably and quickly the existence of two such armies side by side led to frictions and differences of the ugliest kind. In their training camps it was the habit - and in many cases the deliberate policy - to mix the R Men and A Men in fairly close ratios and hope that by moral pressure and sometimes by actual physical violence the A Men would help persuade the R Men to "go active" too. Between the two groups there were small distinctions in such things as cap badges and service ribbons and quite often larger ones in their treatment by their officers and noncommissioned officers. Officially there was no discrimination against the R Men and none has ever been officially admitted, but as an Active Service volunteer - who at that time shared the general prejudice against the R Men - the present writer can testify from his own experiences that there was. So can thousands of other ex-servicemen.⁹⁹

Allen provided further descriptions of the conditions that "R" men had faced during the war in two fictional novels, Home Made Banners (1946) and The High White Forest (1964). In both cases, he used the same fictional composite of one basic training centre to set out the types of pressures "R" men were subjected to. These included discrimination in duties assigned to conscripts in the camps, and in granting passes for leave, as well as regular lectures and interviews designed to encourage them to volunteer, and even emotional, verbal, and physical abuse on the part of other trainees, which was carried out with the implicit consent of superior officers and NCOs.¹⁰⁰ Conn Smythe added his own account of the Brantford training centre in his memoirs, describing one case where some of his NCOs subjected "R" recruits to a cold shower for more than two hours until they agreed to volunteer.¹⁰¹ Barry Broadfoot provided a few similar allegations in his 1974 oral

history collection, Six War Years.¹⁰²

Until recently, it has not been possible to substantiate such charges. As the records kept by the Army at the time make clear, however, the potential of the four-month training program was indeed realized from the beginning, and resulted in deliberate efforts to take advantage of it, both at the local and the national level. In addition, complaints began to trickle in from conscripts themselves almost as soon as the new training centres opened. Most of those preserved by the Army were anonymous or came from friends and relatives, and were addressed directly to the Minister of National Defence, suggesting a reluctance to use proper chains of command, for fear of reprisal or due to frustrations with the procedures used for registering complaints within the camps. Taken together, these records provide enough evidence to at least suggest the validity of Allen's and Broadfoot's claims, and to help reconstruct the actual pressures that NRMA men faced during their time in uniform.

Planning for the exploitation of the new compulsory training system in fact began as early as March 1941 at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa, when the Adjutant-General, Major-General B.W. Browne, wrote to H.D.G. Crerar to note that voluntary recruiting numbers were beginning to fall below requirements in several Military Districts. "I feel that not enough attention has been paid previously to the Reserve Army," he added, "which is our

natural source of recruits. I have advocated all along basing our military effort in reinforcement requirements on the Reserve Army, and I am convinced that this course is the best to pursue."¹⁰³ Browne continued his efforts, in July drawing District commanders' attention to "the excellent recruiting results" that resulted from parading "A" and "R" recruits together publicly in the training centres from the time they arrived, in order to call for volunteers:

It has been found that the Active Army personnel present encourage the first volunteers from the "R" recruits, with the result that more "R" recruits step forward to offer their services. ... It is suggested that this method be adopted generally, in all Training Centres, as "R" recruits, whose hold on civilian life has already broken and whose change of status from Home Defence to Active Army involves no financial or other problems, should prove to be a rich source of recruits for the Active Army.¹⁰⁴

A month later, commanders were reminded that another class of "R" recruits were about to finish their training, and that they would automatically be posted to home defence units if they did not volunteer for active service. Browne's letter directed that this "be clearly explained to them beyond any possibility of doubt and that every encouragement be given to them to enlist in the Active Army."¹⁰⁵ The following month, he reported that the number of "R" men volunteering for active service in each training centre had ranged from zero to seventy-eight percent among the first group of recruits to complete the new program. The average for all basic training centres was 20%, while another 16% had volunteered while

undergoing advanced training. As Browne concluded,

It appears from the general results that this rich potential source of recruits is by no means being fully tapped. It is felt that a substantial increase over the percentages mentioned above could be obtained if organized and energetic methods were adopted in encouraging "R" recruits to join the Active Army, Navy or Air Force.

Browne's solution was to order reports from the commanders of every training centre, describing the methods used to convince men to volunteer, and his office began preparing a more formal set of instructions to govern such activities.¹⁰⁶

Released in November 1941, the Army's directions relied heavily on the advice provided by local training centres. Commanding officers were told to hold special parades when men first arrived at the basic training centres, to stress the need for volunteers, and to ask for converts from among NRMA recruits. They were also directed to mix together "A" and "R" men in training platoons, and to hold open competitions to see which ones could "reach 100% active first." Trainees were also to be bombarded with posters and other appeals to their sense of duty, and even chaplains were asked to help in their sermons. In addition, commanders were given permission to award special leaves to any platoon that went 100% active. Junior officers and NCOs received similar instructions, and company commanders and their superiors were directed to meet with each man individually, after all of the other methods had had an opportunity to work. "A friendly, informal personal talk in which the recruit finds himself able to ventilate his

personal circumstances and views to a sympathetic senior Officer," the report noted, "is often the first occasion on which he realizes he is regarded as more than a cog in the machine." Above all, the plan stressed the "importance of continuous effort to achieve the desired results," although Browne also ended his directions by adding that the "coercion of "R" recruits to go Active is strictly prohibited."¹⁰⁷

As this report indicates, many of the training centres had already begun developing such procedures themselves, even before the broader directions arrived from NDHQ. The best source for descriptions of the various techniques used, and their impact at the local level, is the War Diaries of the units that carried them into practice, and particularly those of the basic training centres, where "R" recruits were first exposed to life in the military. In Kitchener, Ontario, for example, the centre's commanding officer held a parade for the first class of "A" and "R" recruits to arrive after the beginning of the new training program in March 1941, noting that they would need to learn to work together and get along while they were there. As the recorder of the occasion added, "Recruits were left with no doubt as to what was expected of them."¹⁰⁸ In Newmarket, recruits were paraded to the camp's Drill Hall one Thursday afternoon in July 1941, led by the centre's pipe band, to hear talks from several officers. By the next day, 223 men had promised to go active, after which each of them was presented with a special pass entitling them

to leave camp from then until the following Monday.¹⁰⁹ All of these events are eerily similar to those described by Ralph Allen in his fictional accounts. Meanwhile, in North Bay, Brantford, Portage la Prairie, and Huntingdon, local newspapers followed the efforts of the training centres to encourage men to volunteer, publishing stories and in some cases photos featuring the new active service recruits.¹¹⁰ In Huntingdon's case, the town's newspaper noted one surge in recruiting that came a few days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and Hong Kong in December 1941, but it was likely stimulated by the larger efforts of the camp's staff, as well. As the centre's diarist had recorded a few days earlier, when the newest group of "R" recruits arrived in the camp: "Over 150 men were received to-day and recruiting begun among them right away. To strike while the iron is hot is the intention."¹¹¹

By many accounts one of the worst training camps in which to serve as a conscript was Cornwall. There, the camp's War Diary faithfully recorded the efforts of Lt.-Col. R. Larose and other senior officers to gain volunteers, and particularly their personal appeals to "R" recruits as they arrived for each training period. One of the best descriptions of such efforts appeared in June 1941, and provides a good summary of the many "positive" forms of persuasion used in centres that were the most successful in gaining active service recruits. In that case, almost a whole day was devoted to recruiting



Newly-created "volunteers" in Huntingdon, Quebec, January 1942. This photograph was taken for the newspaper story mentioned on the previous page, and included only those men in the camp who had converted from compulsory service in the past few days. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 17202, War Diary, No. 41 Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centre, Huntingdon, Appendix IV, January 1942.)

activities, beginning at the commanding officer's parade in the morning, when Larose's second-in-command, "Major Chambers ... made a stirring appeal to the R[eserve].F[orce]. recruits to join the A[ctive].F[orce]." The result was 102 volunteers, who "were attested during the morning." That afternoon, Larose himself spoke to the men, at another "O.C.'s parade," gathering them around him in a hollow square so that he could better get and hold their attention. The result was an event that took on many of the undertones of an evangelical service. Larose spoke to the recruits in both English and French, and called for "converts" to come forward (the term, in fact, which came to be applied to the process in all training centres in contemporary documents). This time, a total of sixteen men responded. That afternoon, all of the day's 118 new recruits were photographed for a feature story in the local newspaper, and in the evening they were piped into downtown Cornwall by the band of the Stormont, Dundas, and Glengarry Highlanders, the local militia regiment, to see a free show at the Capitol Theatre, while carrying placards to make their deeds known to the townspeople.¹¹²

Lt.-Col. Larose also described his efforts to gain active service recruits in his own words, in a later letter which was written in response to complaints about his treatment of NRMA men. As his immediate superior put it in forwarding Larose's letter to Ottawa, it contained "no indication that abnormal procedure has been followed at the Training Centre concerned

with a view to coercion of "R" recruits."¹¹³ What it does do, however, is provide an excellent summary of the techniques used by many centres, as well as the tensions involved in any such process, and what was considered acceptable behaviour by the Department of National Defence in reaching the goal of finding voluntary recruits. As Larose put it in his letter,

On 21st January, 1942, at 1400 hours, an appeal to the "R" recruits to go "Active" was made by me. It was explained to the men that they were in the army for the duration of the war. The benefits of going "Active" were explained. Those who were willing to go active were told to form up ten paces in front of their respective companies. About 190 men responded immediately. Five minutes later on, the men were told that a long week-end would be granted all those who were "Active." About twenty-five more men responded. ... The following day, about 25 more men went "Active." Out of a camp of 1020 men, only 47 remained in the "R" class.

When these efforts failed to convince the final forty-seven recruits, Larose assigned them to all the routine tasks of the camp, including cleaning, sentry duty, fire patrols, and kitchen fatigues. Still, he felt justified in concluding that, "This Centre has nothing to hide as to its recruiting activities, and it is again pointed out that no pressure whatever is exerted on men to go active service."¹¹⁴

More serious claims about the procedures used in Cornwall were made in September 1941, when two men submitted formal affidavits alleging that, in the words of one man, they had enlisted for active service only after "all sorts of vexations, reprimands, [and] harsh punishments, all inflicted without any reason or right and solely with a view to putting

pressure on me and to having me enlist against my will in the Active Force."¹¹⁵ According to the second recruit, passes to leave camp had been routinely and openly denied to him, and he had only been permitted to travel home and visit his family "provided I would use my holiday to try and induce my wife to assent to my voluntary enlistment."¹¹⁶ More importantly, two soldiers had reportedly threatened the first man, Pte. J.R. Miville, in front of twenty witnesses and two NCOs, and "upon the offer of these two soldiers to carry out their threats, all went out of the room and ... I was then beaten to the point of becoming unconscious and having to be taken to the Camp Military Hospital where I received medical attention for a whole day." Even then, Miville added that he had only gone active after the Company Commander and Sergeant-Major both made it clear to him that such actions would continue unless he volunteered.¹¹⁷

The Cornwall case resulted in a formal inquiry by the Department of National Defence. It had to be re-investigated after the Adjutant-General rejected the first report for not treating the case seriously enough.¹¹⁸ The eye injury that caused Miville's hospitalization was never satisfactorily explained. Still, both men involved in the incident ended up retracting their statements and refusing to follow up on their allegations. Without more information, it is difficult to tell whether this was due to a lack of truthfulness in the claims, or pressures put on the men to drop them. Yet as

another commanding officer in Chatham explained, in response to a similar complaint regarding his own training centre,

occasionally strong methods are sometimes used by Active Service men in the same companies and platoons when officers and NCO's are not present. Active and Reserve recruits are placed in the same platoons for training, and it is the desire that these platoons become 100% Active. On the occasion of which, week-end leaves are granted to the whole platoon. Naturally when there are only one or two men left in a platoon who are still "R", they are bound to be a bit unpopular while they remain so. This sort of thing is of course discouraged as much as possible, but in spite of orders in this regard, incidents do occur.

In Chatham, the complaint that led to this letter involved buttons being cut off of a private's greatcoat, and a rifle bolt being stolen and hidden. Those responsible for the actions were eventually found and punished.¹¹⁹

In other cases, however, commanders clearly took a more moderate approach, as is indicated by copies of actual talks given to the first class of "A" and "R" recruits in Portage la Prairie in 1941. There, the commanding officer, Lt.-Col. C.M. Ackland, chose to speak to the two groups separately, emphasizing to each of them the number of sports and other activities that were provided for trainees in the centre. The only explicit reference to the new situation in the camps came when he told "A" recruits that the "R" men were mostly "young chaps from farms who haven't been around very much," and that they would be "quite anxious to join up in the Active Forces" if given a chance. They were "not by any means conscripts and we do not want that word or any similar word used in reference

to them," he added, and "Anything of this sort will be severely dealt with."¹²⁰

Considering the methods that were being used to encourage "R" recruits to "go active" in many basic training centres, it should not be surprising that as the months went on several reported conversion rates even higher than those indicated by Major-General Browne for the first training class in March 1941. In some cases, units reported 100% of recruits in a number of training companies going active during individual training periods, or even 100% of the entire camp. Cornwall claimed rates of 100% of all "R" recruits in two successive months in the summer of 1941, and a year later all but one man volunteered from another group.¹²¹ In Peterborough, 100% of conscripts volunteered to serve overseas in July 1941, while figures in Newmarket and Kitchener reached 98%, and Chatham reported 90%.¹²² Many of the same units recorded special leaves being given to all companies that went 100% active, again confirming the claims of Ralph Allen, and the directions distributed by NDHQ.¹²³ In fact, the staff in Peterborough were so successful at convincing "R" recruits to go active that 131 men from other training centres were transferred there in late October 1941, to encourage more of them to volunteer; within two hours of their arrival the camp had accumulated several new active service recruits.¹²⁴

Once NRMA men moved on to advanced training, a new round of difficulties emerged. Several reports came in of men who

found themselves in engineer, artillery, or other units, without knowing that they had volunteered by doing so. As one man from Quebec wrote to his father, in a letter which was translated and forwarded to the Department of National Defence, during his basic training he had been told by staff in Montmagny that he "might just as well" join an artillery battery that was then mobilizing, since otherwise he would have no choice about where he could serve when he left the camp. The work would be easier, he wrote, and "They told us that it was merely a transfer and not an enlistment," adding that the forms he had signed had been in English, so he had not been able to understand them.¹²⁵ In another case, men ended up in the Royal Canadian Engineers for similar reasons, not discovering until they reached advanced training that they had volunteered for active service. As one officer wrote, these men now "regard[ed] Army matters with such suspicion that they were reluctant to sign the Pay Sheets."¹²⁶ Language difficulties were by no means the only cause of the problems. In Lauzon, Quebec, several men were permitted to begin a course for tradesmen, apparently without being made to realize fully that if they wished to complete it they would have to go active. Recruiting officers reportedly tried several times to convince them to volunteer, and many did so.¹²⁷ Probably the most bitter criticism of efforts to convince men to go active after basic training was forwarded from the Prime Minister's Office to the Department of National

Defence in July 1941. The two authors of the letter were "indignant concerning the manner in which we were so rudely informed that our status as trainees [sic] has been changed to sappers," and described the Prime Minister in less than glowing terms, referring to him as a "stupid blundering, imperialistic Mephistophelean [sic]." ¹²⁸

Pressures to enlist continued throughout advanced training for "R" recruits. One man reported his experience in a letter intercepted by censors, that provides a good summary of the apparent experiences of many men in training centres across the country after 1941. As he put it:

The Commanding Officer has openly boasted that he intends to make it as tough as possible for those who do not intend to join.... Today we were given a chance to again signify what branch of the service we wished to entered [sic]. Those who did not volunteer were taken on a route march without equipment and also without our water bottles. This is in line with their policy of tough stuff.... I don't mind going away [to a home defence unit] but the thing that makes me so mad is the "Shit" that we will have to take between now and the time we are supposed to leave.... So far they have got about a third of the Company. I haven't done anything yet and I am at my wits end. God only know[s] how long the rest of the gang can hold out. ¹²⁹

The man's camp and company commanders both denied the claims when the letter was forwarded to them for comment. ¹³⁰ Yet complaints and reports about the pressures experienced by NRMA recruits continued over the next couple of years. There were never enough specific accusations to follow up on, and they were routinely denied or down-played by local commanders. But common complaints included discrimination granting passes to

leave camp, extra duties required of "R" men in the training centres, and verbal or other abuse of trainees.¹³¹

Once recruits were posted to home defence units, the types of pressures used to encourage them to volunteer were less obvious. "Members (HD [Home Defence])," as NRMA soldiers officially came to be known after completing their training, had little choice about the branch of the Army in which they would serve, or where they would be posted. The impact of being placed thousands of miles from one's home and family for up to four years while carrying out their military service can only be imagined, although certainly each recruit would have been affected differently. Isolation and the lack of entertainment and other activities provided for recruits in many defence posts undoubtedly exerted their own influences in helping to convince some men to go active.¹³² There were many subtle and not-so-subtle differences between conscripts and active service volunteers: in particular, NRMA men were clearly distinguished from volunteers through variations in their uniforms and cap badges. For the first few months of the new compulsory training program, some camps had found their own ways to differentiate between the two groups, permitting only "A" recruits to wear the badges of the units and corps to which they were to be posted for later service.¹³³ In late 1941, the Department of National Defence introduced a more formal policy, prohibiting NRMA recruits from wearing the "Canada" badges that were intended to help

identify the nationality of Canadian soldiers when serving with other forces overseas. A year later, when service for conscripts was extended beyond the precise borders of Canada, the more familiar "General Service" badge was created, and worn for the rest of the war to distinguish active service volunteers. The term itself soon came into general use, in contrast to "Member (HD)" for NRMA men.¹³⁴

Still, as the proportion of NRMA members increased, it became more and more difficult to distinguish between the two groups. During their years of service, NRMA recruits came to play a larger and larger role in the country's home defence forces, and even had the right to become non-commissioned officers. Theoretically, they could exercise command over general service soldiers, especially as active service reinforcements were weeded out of home defence units, and the number of "zombies" who rose to NCO ranks increased.¹³⁵ But Army commanders discouraged such developments. As we shall see, most NRMA men were assigned to more mundane duties and administrative tasks. The one advantage they had over their general service counterparts was that they could obtain leaves and take courses to upgrade their skills more easily, once they had been posted to units, since there was no threat of being called away at the last minute to join a draft of overseas reinforcements. By the end of the war, several commanding officers found themselves rewarded for their services in connection with recruiting efforts in the training

centres, when the government recommended a series of honours and awards for such contributions.¹³⁶ Yet in studying this issue, it should be remembered that it would not be any more realistic to assume that all recruits were treated poorly during their training, or that commanding officers across the country did anything more than strictly carry out their orders, than it is to ignore the opportunities for abuse that were inherent in the compulsory military training system, and the evidence that such abuse existed on at least some level during the Second World War.

* * *

Thus, by the spring of 1942, the policies that would govern the NRMA for most of the rest of the war had been set. From that time on, the experiences of conscripts in training centres and operational units changed relatively little. These policies would come to play a central role in the continued expansion of the Army throughout 1942 and 1943, and the pressures that NRMA recruits faced to convert to active service would come to shape their own views of the compulsory military training program, and the politics of conscription itself. The following chapters address each of these issues, with a view to explaining the impact of the NRMA on both the politics and the administration of conscription for the rest of the war.

Endnotes

1. Ralph Allen, Ordeal by Fire: Canada, 1910-1945 (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1961), p. 394.
2. National Archives of Canada [NAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 26, Prime Minister W.L.M. King Papers [hereafter King Papers], J4, Vol. 425, Minutes of the Cabinet War Committee [hereafter CWC Minutes], draft report on CWC meeting of 19 October 1944, prepared by Major-General Maurice Pope. See also reference to the same comments in W.L.M. King, The Mackenzie King Diaries, 1932-1949 [Microfilmed Transcript] (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 19 October 1944.
3. Directorate of History and Heritage [DHH], File 322.009(D50), "Brigade Groups - Pacific Comd - Org & Admin - Sep 43/Sep 44," Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin, Commander, 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, to General Officer Commanding-in-Chief [GOC-in-C], Pacific Command, 2 May 1944: "Mobilization of 13 Bde on an Active Basis." Also C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), Appendix "S", p. 596, and J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977; reprint, Copp Clark Pitman, 1985), p. 206.
4. For rules governing the collection of this information, and a sample of the form used, see NAC, RG 24, Records of the Department of National Defence, Vol. 6570, File HQ 1161-1-5, "Procedure of National Defence Department Mobilization Act," vol. 2, draft Order-in-Council, 6 September 1940, and formal Order-in-Council (P.C. 4904/1940) authorizing regulations, 17 September 1940. The statistics themselves are part of a collection of unprocessed material from the army's "Directorate of Records," which is also held in RG 24. I am indebted to Tim Cook and Paul Marsden of the NAC for locating these statistics for me, which have not yet been formally accessioned or catalogued.
5. The total number of conscripts listed by the Directorate of Records is 158,056, which represents an error rate of approximately 0.1% compared to the final postwar total of 157,841, as provided in Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, Appendix "T", pp. 599-602.
6. For a good summary of the various age classes used during the war, see also E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1956), p. 146, or Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, Appendix "N", p. 586.

7. Queen's University Archives [QUA], C.G. Power Papers, Box 39, "General Staff Memoranda... October-November 1944": "Report of Cabinet Committee on Army Enlistment for General Service," 6 November 1944. Of the 37% of NRMA recruits from outside central Canada, 6% reportedly came from the Maritimes, 24% from the Prairies, and 7% from British Columbia.

8. Quebec had 304,420 single men between 15 and 24, and 111,916 aged 25-34 in 1941, or roughly 30% of all single male Canadians in each age group. Ontario's totals were 302,473 and 111,083 - also 30%, or slightly less than the province's share of the national population. For these figures, see Dominion of Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Eighth Census of Canada, 1941 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1950), Vol. I, Table 20, pp. 641-52. Figures prepared by the Department of National War Services from the National Registration of 1940 also confirm this trend, showing that the total number of single men between the ages of eighteen and thirty in Quebec was 258,411, and in Ontario 255,037. For these statistics, see NAC, RG [Record Group] 27, Records of the Department of Labour, Vol. 996, File 2-114, pt. 1, "N.W.S. Aliens - Mobilization": "Number of Single Men and Childless Widows 18-30 Years of Age, Both Inclusive, by Provinces, as per National Registration Figures of August, 1940," 5 May 1942.

9. As one memorandum by wartime journalist Grant Dexter suggests, Ralston and other politicians were well aware of the equal division of manpower between Quebec and Ontario as early as December 1941. At that point, Ralston actually viewed conscription more as a way to put English-speaking men into uniform, since the Army had insufficient facilities to train more French-speaking recruits, even had more of them been called up. For Dexter's comments, see Frederick W. Gibson and Barbara Robertson, eds., Ottawa at War: The Grant Dexter Memoranda, 1939-1945 (Winnipeg: Manitoba Record Society, 1994), 9 December 1941, pp. 231-33. On the increasing focus of Ralston and other figures on finding men for the armed forces in the later years of the war, and difficulties faced in enforcing the NRMA in Quebec, see also the discussion in chapter four of this thesis, below.

10. A published report from November 1944 strengthens this assumption, since it provided figures for the languages spoken by NRMA recruits, broken down in a similar manner as here, while noting explicitly that the information denoted only the mother tongues of recruits. For this report, see NAC, MG 32, B5, Papers of Brooke Claxton, Vol. 172, "Manpower - Statistics, Clippings," pamphlet by the Wartime Information Board, entitled "Canada at War," No. 42, November 1944, p. 47.

11. For example, together Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia provided 5,498 (85.0)% of all German-speaking recruits listed in Table IV, and 12,208 (63.2%) of the 19,310 men listed as "Other," while 1,702 (56.1%) of all Italian-Canadian conscripts came from Ontario, and 876 (28.9%) from Quebec. In addition, roughly half of all Polish-Canadian and Russian-Canadian NRMA recruits came from the three prairie provinces, while Saskatchewan and British Columbia alone accounted for 1,760 (96.4%) of recruits stating no religion. NAC, RG 24, unprocessed material from the "Directorate of Records," op.cit.

12. QUA, Power Papers, "Report of Cabinet Committee," op.cit. Also noted in Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 207. In addition, according to figures for the 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade in December 1943, at that point 42.5% of its personnel were "British," 22.2% were "French," 2.5% Russian, 12.4% Polish and Ukrainian, and 20.4% were listed as "Others," again confirming some of Macklin's views. These figures may suggest the origins of some of his views, if they indicate the true makeup of his brigade at the time.

13. Quebeckers made up 56.4% of Roman Catholic NRMA recruits, and 60.2% of Catholics in Canada as a whole. Corresponding figures for New Brunswick are 5.1% and 4.6%; for Ontario, 18.4% and 17.8%; Manitoba, 5.6% and 2.9%; and Saskatchewan, 5.4% and 4.2%. For further details, see NAC, RG 24, "Directorate of Records," Appendix G1, "N.R.M.A. All Ranks by Religion on Enrolment," as well as Census of Canada, 1941, Vol. 1, Table 50, pp. 720-27.

14. NAC, RG 24, "Directorate of Records," Appendix G1, "N.R.M.A. All Ranks by Religion on Enrolment."

15. See Gerald Tulchinsky, Branching Out: The Transformation of the Canadian Jewish Community (Toronto: Stoddart, 1998), chapter 8, and particularly pp. 204-17.

16. On these attitudes, and particularly the resistance of public and governmental officials towards accepting prewar refugees from Nazi Germany, see also Irving Abella and Harold Troper, None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948 (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1983).

17. The following description is drawn in large part from the War Diaries of training centres and operational units across the country where conscripts served during the war, including a complete reading of Diaries for every Basic Training Centre for the first two years of the NRMA's operation (1940-1942). The author has also read a number of Diaries for Advanced Training Centres during the same period, which confirm that the experiences of NRMA recruits were very similar, on a day-

to-day level, once they went on to serve in advanced centres.

18. For example, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17168, War Diary, No. 23 Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centre [CA(B)TC], Newmarket, Ontario, 5 March 1941, which notes the addition of light machine guns to the syllabus, along with lesser items such as map reading and first aid, and mentions personnel being trained to enable them to teach the new subjects.

19. According to Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, pp. 83-88, and 118, and C.P. Stacey, Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific, Vol. 1 of the Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955), pp. 121 and 134, another reason why the training centres were set up this way was to aid in the rapid expansion of the Canadian Army more generally under the Canadian Army program for 1941, so that instructors could specialize in teaching individual tasks, and all recruits could be taught the basic elements of military training in the same place, rather than having to teach similar subjects in different centres (in which case instructors would have needed to be conversant in many more aspects of military training).

20. See NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17120, War Diary, A-23 Coast Defence and Artillery Training Centre, Halifax, 1 April 1941, and entries for the following days, which detail the creation of this centre.

21. From sample "diet sheets" listing daily menus in the War Diaries of several basic training centres, for example, it is clear that the range and choices of food varied from day to day and week to week between the camps, and from one period to another. All centres, however, clearly tried to offer as much variety as possible, including various dishes of meat, poultry, fish, fruits, vegetables, and desserts. For specific cases, see NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, Alberta, Appendix 4, October 1940, and Appendix 4, November 1940; Vol. 17207, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, Quebec, Appendix 8, November 1940; Vols. 17180 and 17182, No. 22 CA(B)TC, North Bay, Ontario, Appendix 8, January 1941, and Appendix 5, January 1942; Vol. 17291, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, Alberta, Appendix J [?], January 1941, and Appendix H, April 1941; and Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, Appendix V, November 1941 (diet sheet is attached to report titled "District Meeting - The People and the Army," 24 November 1941). For indications of complaints about the food offered in the training centres, see also Ibid., No. 30 Canadian Army (Reserve) Training Centre [CA(R)TC], Brockville, Ontario, Appendix 5, November 1940: letters, Col. D. Carmichael, Officer Commanding [OC], to Editor, Prescott Journal, 31 October and 6 November 1940, and newspaper clipping, "Inspection by Local Newspapermen Reveals

Brockville Camps Very Wholesome but Canteen Does Land Office Business," Prescott Journal, 7 November 1940, as well as Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, British Columbia, 27 June 1941.

22. For brief descriptions of these standards at various points in the war, see Stacey, Six Years of War, pp. 112-13, and Arms, Men and Governments, p. 451.

23. For examples of meningitis, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17168, War Diary, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 2 November; Vol. 17245, No. 60 CA(B)TC, Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, 10 and 18 December; Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown, 11 and 20 December (including the death of one trainee); and Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 12 December 1940. On treatment of scarlet fever, see Ibid., Vol. 17282, No. 120 CA(B)TC, Regina, Saskatchewan, 12 December 1940 and 23 June 1941; Vol. 17245, No. 60 CA(B)TC, Yarmouth, 15 January; Vol. 17021, No. 40 CA(R)TC, Farnham, Quebec, 28 January and 4 February 1941; and Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown, 12 and 20 December 1941, and 13 March 1942. On measles, see Ibid., Vol. 16970, No. 101 CA(R)TC, Brandon, Manitoba, 19 and 28 October, 24 and 28 November; Vol. 17307, No. 121 CA(R)TC, Dundurn, Saskatchewan, 29 October-8 November and 11 December 1940, 24 and 28-29 January 1941; Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, Ontario, War Diary entries for 30 October 1940 and 9 May 1941, as well as Appendix IV, February 1941: "General Report on Training...", p. 4; Vol. 17282, No. 120 CA(B)TC, Regina, 24-31 January 1941; Vol. 17238, No. 53 CA(B)TC, Lauzon, Quebec, 28 January and 4 February; Vol. 17168, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 23 February; and Vol. 17278, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 4 December 1941. On influenza, see comments in Ibid., Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 23, 28, 30-31 October and 30 November; Vol. 17282, No. 120 CA(B)TC, Regina, 26 November-24 December; Vol. 17093, No. 130 CA(R)TC, Red Deer, Alberta, 27 November; Vol. 17290, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 28 November; Vol. 17306, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, British Columbia, 28, 30 November and 4 December; Vol. 17307, No. 121 CA(R)TC, Dundurn, 29 November-20 December; Vol. 17305, No. 30 CA(R)TC, Brockville, 3 and 11 December; Vol. 17245, No. 60 CA(B)TC, Yarmouth, 3, 21, 25 December 1940, and 4 January 1941; Vol. 17258, No. 71 CA(B)TC, Edmunston, New Brunswick, 4 and 6 December; Vol. 16885, No. 11 CA(R)TC, Woodstock, Ontario, 6-7 December; Vol. 17304, No. 21 CA(R)TC, Long Branch, Ontario, 10 December; Vol. 17194, No. 32 CA(B)TC, Peterborough, Ontario, 16 December 1940; and Vol. 17148, No. 12 CA(B)TC, Chatham, Ontario, 28 January and 1 February 1941. In addition, Grande Prairie reported cases of both measles and meningitis during the second thirty-day training period in early December, the former causing the entire camp to be put in quarantine, and recruits in New Glasgow, Nova Scotia, suffered through outbreaks of influenza, measles, meningitis,

and one case of pneumonia, the latter resulting in the death of a trainee, and pneumonia struck down recruits in two other camps over the first two years of operation of the NRMA. For these cases, see Ibid., Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, Appendix [7], December 1940: "Progress Report," Major L. Younger, OC, NPAM Training Centre No. 132, to M[ilitary]. D[istrict]. [MD] 13, 5 December 1940, Vol. 17249, No. 61 CA(B)TC, New Glasgow, 30 January-8 February 1941; Vol. 17282, No. 120 CA(B)TC, Regina, 28 and 30 November 1940; and Vol. 17279, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 28 February 1942.

24. For examples of such competitions, see Ibid., Vol. 17306, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, August-November 1940, Appendix 5[?], "Tabloid Sports," 19 October; Vol. 17148, No. 12 CA(B)TC, Chatham, November 1940, Appendix 4, "Athletic Field Day," 2 November; and Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, December 1940, unnumbered appendix, "Programme of Indoor Sports," 7 December 1940.

25. For example, see entries that connect the use of Drill Halls to these various sports in the following entries in Ibid., Vol. 17153, No. 20 CA(B)TC, Brantford, Ontario, 24 November 1940; Vol. 17167, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 17 January; Vol. 17291, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 20 January; Vol. 17021, No. 40 CA(R)TC, Farnham, 22 January; and Vol. 17202, CA(B)TC, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, Quebec, 26 October and 6 November 1941.

26. Many references to baseball, "football," soccer and rugby can be found throughout the War Diaries of the Basic Training Centres. For specific references to less common sports like rowing, see Ibid., Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, Quebec, 10 August 1941; for curling see Ibid., Vol. 16970, No. 101 CA(R)TC, Brandon, 5 December 1940, Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 8 December 1940, and Vol. 17246, No. 60 CA(B)TC, Yarmouth, 14 February 1942; and for skiing, see Ibid., Vol. 17264, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, Manitoba, 25 January and 1 February 1941.

27. The only reference to lacrosse in any Basic Training Centre throughout the first two years of its existence appears in Ibid., Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 24 October 1940. On the popularity of baseball and the decline of lacrosse in general during the interwar period, see John Herd Thompson, with Allan Seager, Canada, 1922-1939: Decades of Discord (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1985), pp. 186-7; Colin D. Howell, Northern Sandlots: A Social History of Maritime Baseball (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), pp. 120, 153-70, and 199-201 (the latter pages discuss the wartime influence of baseball in Halifax, in particular); and Alan Metcalfe, Canada Learns to Play: The Emergence of Organized Sport, 1807-1914 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart,

1987), pp. 85-95 and 204-17.

28. For examples of games against local high schools, see NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17153, No. 20 CA(B)TC, Brantford, 26 October 1940; Vol. 17202, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 24 November 1941; and Vol. 17279, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 24 January 1942. In addition, teams from Fredericton took part in a number of competitions against the nearby University of New Brunswick, including football and track and field. For these cases, see Ibid., Vols. 17254-55, No. 70 CA(B)TC, Fredericton, New Brunswick, 26 October 1940, and 13 May and 4 October 1941.

29. Ibid., Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, 5 and 17 July 1941 (the quotation reproduced here is from the latter date).

30. Ibid., Vol. 17181, No. 22 CA(B)TC, North Bay, 2 August; Vol. 17270, War Diary, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, 17 October 1941 (the source of the quotation); and Vol. 17292, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 7 February 1942.

31. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 14164, Microfilm Reel T-12398, War Diary, Headquarters, 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 23 January 1942.

32. For example, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17265-66, War Diary, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, 16 June, 2 July, and 9 August 1941, and 3 January 1942, which record baseball games being played against nearby RCAF teams and a Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve contingent from Port Arthur, Ontario, as well as the creation of a hockey league including both the training centre and local RCAF teams. In addition, Ibid., Vol. 17270, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, records exhibition basketball games against the local RCN Volunteer Reserve contingent and two local women's teams, while another example of hockey games against RCAF teams can be found in Ibid., Vols. 17282 and 17284, No. 120 CA(B)TC, Regina, 6 January 1941 and 28 January 1942.

33. For instance, as early as mid-October 1940, conscripts in North Bay, Ontario, took part in a local boxing match at the city arena (Ibid., Vol. 17179, No. 22 CA(B)TC, 18 October 1940). For other examples of similar activities, most of which were arranged by the centres themselves, see Ibid., Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 17 October 1940 and 14 May 1941, as well as Appendix [32], May 1941; Vol. 17093, No. 130 CA(R)TC, Red Deer, Appendix 4, December 1940: newspaper clipping: "Military Ring Finals Fought At Red Deer," 21 December 1940; Vols. 17269-70, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, 18 June, 15 July, and 28 November 1941; and Vol. 17259, No. 71 CA(B)TC, Edmunston, 10 and 31 October, and 7 November 1941, and Appendix 6, October 1941.

34. Ibid., Vol. 17205, No. 42 CA(B)TC, 7 January 1941. In a similar vein, recruits in North Bay, Ontario, avoided the heat of the summer of 1941 by damming a local creek to create a swimming hole (C. Gunning, North Bay's Fort Chippewa, 1939-1945 [North Bay: Privately published, 1991], p. 42).

35. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17277, War Diary, No. 110 CA(B)TC, 15 January 1941.

36. Ibid., Vol. 17202, No. 41 CA(B)TC, 27 January 1942.

37. Ibid., Vol. 17155, No. 20 CA(B)TC, Brantford, 12 February 1942. For an interesting discussion of the problems of applying compulsory service regulations to professional hockey players more generally, see also Bruce McIntyre, "Which Uniform to Serve the War: Hockey in Canada versus Military Service During World War Two," B.A. thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1992, which was later published in revised form in the Canadian Journal of History of Sport XXIV(2), December 1993, pp. 68-90. Also Douglas Hunter, War Games: Conn Smythe and Hockey's Fighting Men (Toronto: Viking, 1996; reprint, Penguin Books 1997), and especially pp. 63-64, 84-85, and 96-98, on the impact of compulsory military service on the sport, and correspondence on NAC, RG 25, Records of the Department of External Affairs, Vol. 3041, File 4198-A-40, "Status of Hockey Players under United States and Canadian Selective Service Regulations."

38. NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17291, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 10 April 1941; Vol. 17203, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 19 February; Vol. 16914, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, Quebec, 21 April; and Vol. 14164, Reel T-12399, 13th Brigade, Appendix III, May 1942: "French-Canadians at Nanaimo; Quebec Outfit Becoming Bi-Lingual," unattributed newspaper clipping, 11 May 1942. In another case, Gérard "K.O." Boisvert, a local amateur boxing champion, was called out as an "R" recruit in Megantic, Quebec, and proceeded to win a further meet while carrying out his training. See NAC, RG 24, Vol. 16891, War Diary, No. 52 CA(B)TC, 3 May 1941, as well as newspaper clippings on Appendix 4 for the same month.

39. For example, in 1941 the Huntingdon team played in their local City Championship, losing in the third period of overtime of the third game of a best-of-three final. A year later, teams from Rimouski, St. Jérôme, and Joliette, Quebec, reached their respective city's playoffs, while those from Newmarket and Peterborough, Ontario, participated in playoff games at various levels in the Ontario Hockey Association, Peterborough winning the "Senior B" Championship. For these cases, see the following War Diaries (in order) in NAC, RG 24: Vol. 17201, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 7 March 1941; Vol. 17243, No. 55 CA(B)TC, Rimouski, 1, 5, 7, 22, and 26 February,

and 1 March 1942; Vol. 16914, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 19 February 1942; Vol. 17208, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 27 February 1942; Vol. 17168, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 19 February 1942; and Vol. 17196, No. 32 CA(B)TC, Peterborough, 24 March 1942. Similar examples of teams reaching playoffs in other sports can be found in Ibid., Vol. 17249, No. 61 CA(B)TC, New Glasgow, 14 August; Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, Quebec, 17 August and 7 and 14 September 1941; Vol. 17246, No. 60 CA(B)TC, Yarmouth, 5 September 1941; and Vol. 17149, No. 12 CA(B)TC, Chatham, 18 March 1942.

40. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 13802, Reel T-10560, War Diary, Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, 6th Canadian Division, 28 April 1943. For a good overview of the "professionalization" of military hockey leagues in the war, and particularly the Allan Cup finals of 1943, as well as the exploits of a team from No. 31 CA(B)TC in Cornwall (which actually beat the Montreal Canadiens in an exhibition game in October 1942), see also Hunter, War Games, pp. 95-110.

41. NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17307, No. 121 CA(R)TC, Dundurn, 24 October; Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, 17 December 1940; Vol. 17282, No. 120 CA(B)TC, Regina, 17 January; and Vol. 17144, No. 10 CA(B)TC, Kitchener, Ontario, 24 January 1941. In fact, conscripts in Long Branch, Ontario, were even marched into Toronto to see a Maple Leafs game in January 1941. Unfortunately, the event also took a tragic turn when an automobile driven by one of the men struck the rest of the group as they marched home in the dark, resulting in one death and a number of other injuries (Ibid., Vol. 17304, No. 21 CA(R)TC, 29 January 1941).

42. On the "T. Eaton Co. Masquers" see Ibid., Vol. 17225, No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, Quebec, 9 July; Vol. 17202, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 23 October 1941; Vol. 17220, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, Quebec, 5 February; and Vol. 17208, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 5 March 1942. For the "M.R.T. Tin Hat Review," see Ibid., Vol. 17213, No. 43 CA(B)TC, Sherbrooke, Quebec, 8 December 1940; Vol. 17207, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 21 August; Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 3 July; and Vol. 17202, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 18 September 1941. For the "Blue Bell Bullets Review," see Ibid., Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 11 September; Vol. 17207, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 29 September; Vol. 17202, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 27 November 1941; Vol. 17226, No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, 12 March; and Vol. 17208, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 17 April 1942. For the "Evans Sisters," see Ibid., Vol. 16914, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 21 November; Vol. 17226, No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, 5 December 1941; Vol. 17208, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 10 January; and Vol. 17220, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, 18 February 1942. For the "'Arf a Mo" concert party, see Ibid., Vol. 17306, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon

Head, 18 October 1940 and 31 January 1941. For the "Lifebuoy Follies," see Ibid., Vols. 17194 and 17196, No. 32 CA(B)TC, Peterborough, 14 January and 18 March 1942, and Gunning, North Bay's Fort Chippewa, pp. 40-42.

43. In one case, two tobacco companies in Quebec even sponsored shows and visited training centres in the summer of 1941, and handed out free cigarettes, coincidentally offering an early example of what would today be referred to as "brand identification." See NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 18 June; Vol. 17206, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 23 June; and Vol. 17214, No. 43 CA(B)TC, Sherbrooke, 4 July 1941.

44. For Woodstock and Sorel, see Ibid., Vol. 16885, No. 11 CA(R)TC, 11 December 1940, and Vol. 17221, No. 45 CA(B)TC, 21 January, 6 February, 15 April, and 11 September 1941, and 24 May 1942. For similar examples see Ibid., Vol. 17291, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 29 October 1940, 22 April, 2, 6, 11 and 14 May 1941; Vol. 17258, No. 71 CA(B)TC, Edmunston, 1 and 3 November, 8 December 1940, and 24 April 1941; Vol. 17254, No. 70 CA(B)TC, Fredericton, 4, 27, 30 November 1940, 24 January 1941, and 14 January 1942; Vol. 17144, No. 10 CA(B)TC, Kitchener, 26 January; Vol. 17307, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, 28 January; Vol. 17305, No. 30 CA(R)TC, Brockville, Ontario, 3 February; Vols. 17269-70, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, 2 April and 1 May 1941, and 24 March 1942; Vol. 17221, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, 15 April; Vol. 17296, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 12 May; Vol. 17270, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, 24 September, 10 October 1941, and 2 March 1942; Vol. 17238, No. 53 CA(B)TC, Lauzon, Quebec, 26 January and 19 February 1942; and Vol. 17234, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, 22 April 1942.

45. In fact, small numbers of women from the Canadian Women's Army Corps (CWAC) began arriving in training centres in mid-1942, mainly to take over various administrative tasks that had previously been carried out by men. But their activities were strictly regulated, and fraternization with male soldiers officially frowned upon. On the CWAC, see Ruth Roach Pierson, "They're Still Women After All": The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986), and Phylis Bowman, We Skirted the War (Port Edward, British Columbia: Privately published, 1975).

46. For example, in Chatham, Ontario, employees from various local factories were invited to participate in a dance held at the centre's Drill Hall, while in Long Branch they came from a local training school, and Newmarket's War Diary recorded that for one dance "Girls were imported from Toronto by bus." See NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17149, No. 12 CA(B)TC, 22 October 1941; Vol. 17304, No. 21 CA(R)TC, 6 December 1940; and

Vol. 17168, No. 23 CA(B)TC, 10 May 1941; as well as another similar example in Ibid., Vol. 17202, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 14 November 1941.

47. See examples cited in the previous note, as well as Ibid., Vol. 17282, No. 120 CA(B)TC, Regina, 20 October 1940 and 22 January 1941; Vol. 17202, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 19 December 1941; and Vol. 17156, No. 20 CA(B)TC, Brantford, 31 March 1942.

48. For example, during the second thirty-day training period one dance in the Long Branch training centre featured an orchestra made up entirely of men in training who "proved to be professional musicians in civilian life" (NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17304, War Diary, No. 21 CA(R)TC, 24 January 1941). For other examples of such cases, see also Ibid., Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, 15 January; Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 1 February; and Vol. 17296, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 25 April 1941.

49. Ibid., Vol. 17225, No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, 5 February; Vol. 17304, No. 21 CA(R)TC, Long Branch, 6 February; and Vol. 17265, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, 29 June 1941.

50. For examples, see Ibid., Vol. 17021, No. 40 CA(R)TC, Farnham, 17, 21, and 23 October; Vol. 17306, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, 25 October, 13 and 20 December; Vols. 17290 and 17292, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 24 October, 5 December 1940, 12, 19 and 26 September 1941; Vols. 17264 and 17266, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, 28 October 1940, and 6 and 20 April 1942; Vol. 17254, No. 70 CA(B)TC, Fredericton, 30 October and 10 December 1940; Vol. 17258, No. 71 CA(B)TC, Edmundston, 25 November and 1 December 1940; Vols. 17233-34, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, 25 November 1940, and 15 and 22 October 1941; Vols. 17220-21, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, 2 December 1940 and 24 January 1941; Vol. 16885, No. 11 CA(R)TC, Woodstock, 12 December 1940; Vol. 17305, No. 30 CA(R)TC, Brockville, 12 December 1940 and 4-6 February 1941; Vol. 17153, No. 20 CA(B)TC, Brantford, 16 December 1940 and 25 March 1941; Vols. 17201-2, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 30 January and 20 October; Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, 9 July; Vol. 17278-79, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 9 October 1941, 23 March and 1 April 1942; Vol. 17283, No. 120 CA(B)TC, Regina, 15 November 1941; Vol. 16914, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 2 February; Vol. 17243, No. 55 CA(B)TC, Rimouski, 11 February; and Vol. 17226, No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, 20 February 1942.

51. Ibid., Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 4 November and 17 December; Vol. 17306, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, 5 December 1940; Vol. 17220, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, 6

November; Vol. 17225, No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, 13 November; Vol. 17207, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 20 November; Vol. 17214, No. 43 CA(B)TC, Sherbrooke, 27 November; Vol. 16914, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 11 December 1941; Vol. 17155, No. 20 CA(B)TC, Brantford, 7 January; and Vol. 17284, No. 120 CA(B)TC, Regina, 18 March 1942. For good examples of the content of other types of radio broadcasts more generally, see Ibid., Vol. 17291, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, Appendix L, January 1941 ("Programme to be broadcast over station CFRN on 28th January..."), Appendix C, March 1941 ("Concert Party and Radio B'Cast [sic] Make For Jolly Evening at 'Sally Ann', " Camrose Canadian, 5 March), and Appendix C, April 1941 ("Broadcast Programme, Tuesday 8th April, 1941," and newspaper clipping: "500 Officers, Men Attend Broadcast at 'Sally Ann', C.A.T.C."); Vol. 17296, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, unnumbered appendix, March 1941: "Address by Major L. Younger, March 31/41"; and Vol. 17148, No. 12 CA(B)TC, Chatham, Appendix A, June 1941: "Military Training Centre Program," 17 June 1941. In addition, as Gunning notes in North Bay's Fort Chippewa, p. 95, French-speaking recruits there provided a half-hour weekly broadcast from the training centre in their own language for the many francophone citizens of the region.

52. For the first case of tours of Quebec training centres, see NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17306, No. 50 CA(R)TC, Valcartier, Quebec, 7 December; Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, 7 December, and Appendix I, December 1940: "Nos militaires à la radio," Le Progrès du Saguenay, 12 décembre; and Vol. 17243, No. 55 CA(B)TC, Rimouski, 13 December 1940. For the second case, see Ibid., Vol. 17206, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 17 July; Vol. 17221, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, 24 July; Vol. 17225, No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, 31 July; and Vol. 17214, No. 43 CA(B)TC, Sherbrooke, 7 August 1941. Examples of former broadcasters among the "R" recruits appear in Ibid., Vol. 17306, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, 5 December 1940, and Vol. 17278, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 15 August 1941.

53. For examples of "smokers," see Ibid., Vols. 17205 and 17207-8, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 1-5 November 1940, 19 September 1941, and 4 February and 15 April 1942, and on bingo games for recruits held both inside and outside the training centres see Ibid., Vol. 17220, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, 28 October 1940 and 3 April 1941; Vol. 17258, No. 71 CA(B)TC, Edmunston, 22 January; Vol. 17201, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 8 April; Vol. 17145, No. 10 CA(B)TC, Kitchener, 12 August; Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, 15 September 1941 and 6 January 1942; Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 16 September; and Vol. 17234, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, 24 November 1941.

54. For example, see Ibid., Vol. 17249, No. 61 CA(B)TC, New Glasgow, 19 December 1940, which records a mess dinner held by Sergeants serving in that training centre, as well as Vol. 17282, No. 120 CA(B)TC, Regina, 28 January 1941, which records a dinner held by the officers for the Lieutenant-Governor of Saskatchewan.

55. In Kitchener, for example, conscripts in the early NRMA training centres witnessed a concert in their honour at the local high school, by the city's "Philharmonic Quire [Choir]," while in Woodstock a local ladies organization arranged a dance for recruits in a local factory. See Ibid., Vol. 17143, No. 10 CA(B)TC, Appendix XII, November 1940, and Vol. 16885, No. 11 CA(R)TC, 1 November 1940, as well as other examples in Vol. 17243, No. 55 CA(B)TC, Rimouski, 24 October; Vol. 17258, No. 71 CA(B)TC, 30 November; Vol. 17153, No. 20 CA(B)TC, Brantford, 26 November; Vol. 16912, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 28 November; Vol. 17264, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, 5 December 1940 and 11 June 1941; Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, 10 December; Vol. 17305, No. 30 CA(R)TC, Brockville, 11 December 1940; Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown, 27 and 30 January; Vol. 17291, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 4 February; Vol. 17296, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 4 April; Vols. 17148-49, No. 12 CA(B)TC, Chatham, 29 May 1941 and 19 March 1942; and Vol. 17279, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 20 February 1942. For examples of recreation centres being established for military personnel in local communities, see also the following War Diaries: Vol. 16970, No. 101 CA(R)TC, Brandon, 24 October; Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 2 November; Vol. 17305, No. 30 CA(R)TC, Brockville, 23 November 1940; Vol. 17205, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 15 February; Vol. 17195, No. 32 CA(B)TC, Peterborough, 22 August and 18 September 1941; and Vol. 17203, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 11 February 1942.

56. Ibid., Vol. 17258, No. 71 CA(B)TC, Edmunston, 17 October; Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 23 October; Vol. 17264, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, 2 December 1940; Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, 30 January; Vol. 17201, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 6 February; Vols. 17249-50, No. 61 CA(B)TC, New Glasgow, 11 December 1941 and 30 April 1942; Vol. 17279, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 13 February, as well as correspondence on Appendix 5, February 1942; and Vol. 17270, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, 8 March 1942. In addition, Fort William's War Diary specifically mentions a dinner given by "Local Ukrainian organizations" to recruits of Ukrainian ancestry in the city's "Ukrainian Hall," and Tulchinsky, Branching Out, pp. 220-21, mentions the support networks provided for Jewish-Canadian recruits by local communities, while NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17254, No. 70 CA(B)TC, Fredericton, notes a local Baptist organization making its gymnasium available for trainees to use for various sports.

57. Although no men were actually undergoing training at Christmas 1940, a few events were held for staff members. By 1941, training centres were operating much more regularly, with the result that there were many more activities arranged for the men. For examples of both, see Ibid., Vol. 16970, No. 101 CA(R)TC, Brandon, 14 December; Vol. 17283, No. 120 CA(B)TC, Regina, 21 December 1940 and 25 December 1941; Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, 24 December 1940 and 30 December 1941; Vol. 17234, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, 24-25 December; Vol. 17201, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 24-25 December; Vol. 17205, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 24 December; Vol. 17225, No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, 24-27 December; Vol. 17305, No. 46 CA(R)TC, St-Hyacinthe, 25 December 1940; Vol. 17292, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 19 and 25 December; Vol. 17278, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 25-26 December; Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown, 25 December 1941 and 1 January 1942; and Vol. 17237, No. 53 CA(B)TC, Lauzon, 31 December 1941.

58. For example, see Ibid., Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, 17 October, 2 and 4 December 1940, and 23 January 1941; Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 3 November, 13-17 December 1940, 10 January and 3-5 February 1941; and Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown, 24 September 1941.

59. For comments on such activities, see Ibid., Vol. 16885, No. 11 CA(R)TC, Woodstock, 19 December; Vol. 17306, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, 24 October and 4 November; Vol. 17153, No. 20 CA(B)TC, Brantford, 24 November 1940, and 14 and 19 February 1941; Vol. 17296, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 29 March; and Vols. 17291-92, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 31 March and 25 November 1941. In addition, Gunning describes the recreation hut in No. 22 CA(B)TC, in North Bay's Fort Chippewa, p. 42.

60. For example, see comments on libraries in NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17307, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, Appendix 3, December 1940-February 1941, and Appendix IV, March-April 1941: "Report[s] of Chaplain & Hon.Capt. G.H. Hamilton," 6 January-10 February 1941, and 10 February-7 April 1941; Vol. 17291, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 22 January, 1 March, 3 June and 7 September 1941; and Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 9 September 1941.

61. A description of the distribution of movie projectors to all thirty-nine of the early NRMA training centres appears in NAC, RG 24, Vol. 13271, War Diary, Deputy Adjutant-General, Appendix IV, November 1940: "Summary of Information Respecting Activities in the A.G. Branch," 21 November 1940. For evidence of the most frequent cases of movies being shown to recruits, see also NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, 11 January, and Vol. 17258, No. 71

CA(B)TC, Edmunston, 17 April 1941. Also Gunning, North Bay's Fort Chippewa, p. 96.

62. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17306, War Diary, No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, 23 November 1940. The film referred to in this case was "The Great Obsession."

63. For quote, see Ibid., Vol. 17207, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 25 September 1941. In addition, Charlottetown reported that more than three hundred men attending one show (essentially the entire strength of the centre, including the training staff), "which was greatly enjoyed by all," while Vernon and Gordon Head in British Columbia both reported packed lecture huts for their films (Ibid., Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, 11 August 1941; Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, 15 October and 26 November 1940; and Vol. 17307, No. 111 CA(R)TC, 14 January 1941).

64. Ibid., Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 25 October and 2 December; Vol. 17243, No. 55 CA(B)TC, Rimouski, 26 October; Vol. 16912, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 28 October and 12 December 1940, 18 August 1941, and 22 April 1942; Vol. 17205, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 30 October; Vol. 16885, No. 11 CA(R)TC, Woodstock, Ontario, 1 November; Vol. 17290, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 1 November; Vol. 17258, No. 71 CA(B)TC, Edmunston, 25 November; Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, 28 November; Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, 4 December 1940; Vol. 17305, No. 46 CA(R)TC, St-Hyacinthe, Quebec, 21 January; Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, 3 February and 29 April; Vol. 17206, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 29 May; Vol. 17168, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 18 July; Vol. 17202, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 8 August; and Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown, 10 November 1941.

65. For example, see Ibid., Vol. 17205, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 12 October; Vol. 17194, No. 32 CA(B)TC, Peterborough, 16-18 October; Vol. 17179, No. 22 CA(B)TC, North Bay, 18 October 1940 (according to later diary entries, every new class of recruits at this centre was also marched to the local theatre and provided with free admission, and Gunning, North Bay's Fort Chippewa, pp. 95-96, in fact confirms that this practice went on every month for three years); NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17258, No. 71 CA(B)TC, Edmunston, 24 October, 6 November, and 3 December 1940, and 2 April 1941; Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 2 December; Vol. 17220, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, Quebec, 21 December 1940; Vol. 17168, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 18 July 1941; and Vol. 17149, No. 12 CA(B)TC, Chatham, 18 March 1942. In Huntingdon, Quebec, a local theatre and an amusement company even donated a more substantial projection and sound system to the camp, along with a full-sized movie screen, in order to provide

better facilities for recruits to view films (Ibid., Vol. 17202, No. 41 CA(B)TC, 7 July and 16 August 1941).

66. Ibid., Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, 15 January and 1 March; Vol. 17306, No. 46 CA(R)TC, St-Hyacinthe, 9 April; Vol. 17236, No. 53 CA(B)TC, Lauzon, Quebec, 2 May, 8 July, 11 and 18 August, and 11 September; Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 17 June; Vol. 17205, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 25 September and 19 December 1941, and 14 January 1942; Vol. 17234, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, 21 January; and Vol. 17243, No. 55 CA(B)TC, Rimouski, 2 March 1942.

67. For examples of camp newspapers, see first issues of the following ones in Ibid., Vol. 17205, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, Appendix 2, October 1940: Le "Petard", 18 octobre 1940 [later changed to "La Hutte" in February 1941]; Vol. 16912, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, Appendix 8, November 1940: Le Chevalier, 23 novembre 1940; Vol. 17295, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, diary entry for 18 October 1940, and Appendix 8, December 1940: Kamp Pain, n.d. [December 1940]; Vol. 17148, No. 12 CA(B)TC, Chatham, Appendix 5, April 1941: Chins Up, n.d. [19 April 1941]; Vol. 17221, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, Appendix V, April 1941: Le Fort Richelieu, 7 avril 1941; and Vol. 17265, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, Appendix 5, November 1941: The Centurion No. 1, 1 July 1941. Other examples of newspapers given in Gunning, North Bay's Fort Chippewa, pp. 95 and 114, include North Bay's own The Bullet, as well as The Beret, in No. 121 CA(B)TC, Maple Creek, Saskatchewan, which replaced the camp of the same number in Dundurn, after 1941. Also NAC, RG 24, Vol. 14164, Reel T-12398, War Diary, Headquarters, 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, entry for 20 January 1942, and Appendix 6, January 1942: The Brig. News, 20 January 1942. In the first two cases listed above, newspapers were organized by the local civilian representative of the Knights of Columbus, while all but almost all of the rest were run by training centre staffs. In Sorel and apparently also in North Bay, newspapers were operated by the camp chaplain. In most cases, newspapers listed here continued publication for at least a few months (and sometimes years) after 1941 before disappearing from view, although they were also sometimes sporadic in the dates they appeared. All can be located in the later volumes of the War Diaries listed above.

68. In fact, Howard Ripstein, a Corporal in No. 41 CA(B)TC in Huntingdon, remembers Levi's visits, but did not think of them, or of being Jewish more generally, as other than a minor aspect of his life in the camp. As he recalled in 1997, when told to find enough men to provide a good crowd for Levi, he simply walked into his barracks, pointed to his men, and said "You're Jewish" (Interview with Howard Ripstein, 22 April 1997). For references to Jewish services being held in various training centres, see also NAC, RG 24, War Diaries,

Vol. 17143, No. 10 CA(B)TC, Kitchener, 13 October; Vol. 17021, No. 40 CA(R)TC, Farnham, 13 October 1940; and Vol. 17148, No. 12 CA(B)TC, Chatham, 11 May 1941. On leaves for Jewish Canadian recruits, see Ibid., Vol. 17307, No. 121 CA(R)TC, Dundurn, 11 October 1940, and Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 10 April 1941. On Gershon Levi and Jewish-Canadian experiences of the war more generally, see Ibid., Vol. 17201, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 23 March and 20 April 1941, and Tulchinsky, Branching Out, chapter 8, pp. 204-34. For a good portrait of recruiting policies and their impact on minorities during the First World War, see also James W.St.G. Walker, "Race and Recruitment in World War I: Enlistment of Visible Minorities in the Canadian Expeditionary Force," Canadian Historical Review LXX(1), March 1989, pp. 1-26.

69. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17266, War Diary, No. 100 CA(B)TC, 29 March 1942.

70. In one case, according to Gerald Tulchinsky, Branching Out, pp. 226-27, a Protestant chaplain had to be prevailed upon by a Jewish colleague in Ottawa to lead Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur services for Jewish recruits in remote Prince George, B.C., since no Jewish chaplains could arrange to be present. He apparently did so without incident, despite his worries that his lack of knowledge of the faith would prevent him from being able to properly conduct the services.

71. See NAC, MG 27, III, B11, Papers of J.L. Ralston [hereafter Ralston Papers], Vol. 73, "Chapels in Training Centres and Camps, 1943: Costs and Contractors for 27 chapels in all Military Districts, May," Ralston to A.G. Sampson, Chairman, National Catholic Lay Committee, 7 May 1943, which provides a list of twenty-seven buildings in the process of being constructed or upgraded at that point in the war. For specific examples of chapels created in various training centres, see NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, Appendix II, October 1940: "Extrait du journal Le Progrès de Saguenay, 10 octobre 1940; Vols. 17143-44, No. 10 CA(B)TC, Kitchener, 1 November 1940 and 26 January 1941; Vol. 16912, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 8 December; Vol. 16891, No. 52 CA(B)TC, Megantic, 13 December; Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 18 December 1940; Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, 4 January; Vol. 17180, No. 22 CA(B)TC, Appendix 6, March 1941: "Religion is Not Neglected at North Bay Training Centre," North Bay Nugget, 29 March; Vol. 17243, No. 55 CA(B)TC, Rimouski, 16 May and 24 August; Vol. 17148, No. 12 CA(B)TC, Chatham, 18 May; and Vol. 17168, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 24 September 1941; as well as Gunning, North Bay's Fort Chippewa, pp. 85-86.

72. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17240, War Diary, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, 7 July 1941. Montmagny's chaplain also undertook a number of other activities mentioned in this paragraph, including arranging concerts for trainees, a talent show, money-raising events to pay for Christmas celebrations, and a show by the camp for the population of the town (Ibid., 11, 12, 17 and 25 October 1940, and 17 December 1941, as well as various other Diary entries during this period). For an excellent overview of similar contributions by another camp chaplain, see also "Report[s] of Chaplain & Hon.Capt. G.H. Hamilton," No. 111 CA(R)TC, Gordon Head, 6 January-10 February 1941, and 10 February-7 April 1941, op.cit., as well as NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17093, No. 130 CA(R)TC, Red Deer, Appendix 4, December 1940: newspaper clipping, "Military Ring Finals Fought At Red Deer," 21 December 1940, which records the local chaplain acting as a boxing coach for men in the camp; Vol. 17266, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, 20 April 1942, which describes the centre's Protestant and Roman Catholic chaplains organizing an "amateur night"; and Vol. 17292, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, Appendix VI, January 1942: "Camrose Training Centre Only Military Unit In Canada With Daily Prayer Group For Men," Camrose Canadian, 28 January 1942. For examples of special arrangements being made for holidays (other than Christmas), see also Ibid., Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, 11 April; Vol. 17213, No. 43 CA(B)TC, Sherbrooke, 11 April and 22 May; and Vol. 17221, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, 22 May 1941. In addition, Ibid., Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 24 May 1941, and Vol. 17220, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, 24 May 1942, note special ceremonies being held in honour of the victory of Dollard des Ormeaux against a party of Iroquois warriors in 1660 in those two training centres, a date of central significance in the history of the province of Quebec.

73. In fact, according to King Papers, CWC Minutes, 21 March 1941, canteens in basic training centres remained "dry" for several months after the beginning of the four-month training program, as well, although advanced training centres were permitted to have "wet" canteens from April 1941 on.

74. Ibid., Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, Appendix 5, November 1940, Arthur C. Sutton, Lieut. Colonel, Commanding, NPAM TC 110, to Headquarters, M.D. No. XI, 12 November 1940.

75. Ibid., Vol. 17201, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Appendix VI, February 1941, letter, Lt.Col. C.C. Brooks, OC CA(R)TC #41, to AA&QMG [Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General], MD 4, 28 February 1941.

76. On North Bay, see Ibid., Vol. 17180, No. 22 CA(B)TC, Appendix 6, April 1941, R.L. Denison, Lt.Col. Commanding, No. 22 (Basic) T.C., to Major-General B.W. Browne, Adj[utan]t-

General, N.D.H.Q. [National Defence Headquarters], 21 April 1941, and attached "Report on Behaviour of Troops in North Bay, April 19, 1941," by Capt. D. Younger, Intelligence Officer, 28 April 1941. In fact, Lt.Col. Denison received a telephone call from the Toronto Star following the incident, asking to confirm rumours that it had been caused by differences between "A" and "R" men, even though most of the recruits involved in the events were actually volunteers who had just arrived in the camp. The cause of the disturbance was reported to be poor discipline among the men, as they had not yet had time to become acclimatized to military life ("Report on Behaviour of Troops"). On developments in Edmunston, see United Church of Canada, Archives, Acc. 83.052C, Records of the Board of Evangelism and Social Service, Box 55, File 194, Mutchmor to "Major [H. Stanley] Bland, Senior [District] Chaplain, Military District 7," 16 May; Aitken to Mutchmor, 19 May [source of quotation]; Mutchmor to Aitken, 22 May; Bland to Mutchmor, 22 May; Aitken to Mutchmor, 26 May; Bland to Mutchmor, 4 June; Aitken to Mutchmor, 7 June; and Mutchmor to Aitken, 7 June 1941.

77. Tim Cook, "'More a medicine than a beverage': 'Demon Rum' and the Canadian Trench Soldier of the First World War," Canadian Military History 9(1), Winter 2000, pp. 7-22.

78. For evidence of "wet" canteens being established in specific training centres, see NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17259, No. 71 CA(B)TC, Edmunston, 15 September, and Vol. 17154, No. 20 CA(B)TC, Brantford, 16 September 1941.

79. For these incidents, see various documents on NAC, RG 24, Vol. 2193, File HQ 54-27-63-20, vol. 1, "Disturbances, C.A.S.F. Troops M.D. No. 5"; Vols. 2196-97, File HQ 54-27-63-34, vols. 1-3, "Disturbance at Sussex Camp between Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles and Les Voltigeurs de Québec"; and Ralston Papers, Vol. 77, "Sussex Camp Disturbances, 1943: 6 May 1943, between Dufferin and Haldimand Battalion and Voltigeurs de Quebec [sic], May and June."

80. Earle Birney, Turvey: A Military Picaresque (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1949), pp. 10 and 16. As Elspeth Cameron notes in Earle Birney: A Life (Toronto: Viking, 1994), pp. 205-11 and 232-36, Birney was well-placed to write about these issues, having served as a Personnel Officer both at home and overseas during the war.

81. Birney, pp. 16-18, 32, 40-42, and 61.

82. For further details on the question of homosexuality in the Canadian military during the Second World War, see the work of Paul Jackson, a doctoral student at Queen's University, who is currently completing his dissertation on

this subject.

83. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17093, War Diary, No. 130 CA(R)TC, Red Deer, Appendix 4, December 1940: unattributed newspaper clipping, "Charged With Pilfering From Military Camp." For other minor examples, see Ibid., Vol. 16885, No. 11 CA(R)TC, 7 December 1940, which records \$115.00 being stolen from a recruit in the barracks of the Woodstock training centre, and Vol. 17278, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, where the Salvation Army Canteen was broken into on 14 July 1941, and \$17.00 and a quantity of cigarettes stolen.

84. Ibid., Vol. 17202, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, Appendix IV, July 1941, S. Echenberg, Colonel, Commanding No. 4 District Depot, to OC, [No.] 41 Training Centre, 11 June 1941, as well as OC to DOC's Representative, MD 4, 2 July 1941, and Lt.Col. K.M. Perry, AA & QMG, MD 4, to OC, CA(B)TC #41, 4 July 1941.

85. Ibid., 13 October 1941.

86. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17277, War Diary, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 15 December 1940, and 20 January 1941.

87. For example, see comments on this subject in Ibid., 1, 5, and 7 June 1941.

88. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17196, War Diary, No. 32 CA(B)TC, Peterborough, 6 April 1942.

89. Ibid., Vol. 17168, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 16 August 1941.

90. In fact, commanders were explicitly reminded by army officials that all deserters were to be dealt with in the same way, in Ralston Papers, Vol. 68, "Compulsory Training - NRMA, 1942: pressure on recruits to go active, regulations. April 1941-March 1942," circular letter, AG to G.O.C. in C. Pacific Command, G.O.C. in C. Atlantic Command, and All District Officers Commanding [DOCs], 13 August 1941. Unfortunately there is no systematic statistical information available on offenses committed or punishments awarded in training camps and operational units, other than fragments contained in various War Diaries. According to figures on Ralston Papers, Vol. 74, "Discharges and Deserters, 1943: May," AG to Minister, the number of volunteers who deserted between April 1942 and March 1943 was estimated to be 5,210, while the number of NRMA men 3,720, a proportion of 9.5% of the total number of NRMA men then serving in Canada, compared to 6.5% for volunteers, but still not a noticeably larger figure. For a good summary of cases in one early thirty-day training centre, see also NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17277, War Diary, No. 110

CA(B)TC, Vernon, Appendix 9, November 1940, "Supplementary to M.F.M. 86," p. 3, and unnumbered appendices, December 1940 and February 1941: "Summary of Crime Sheets," 21 December 1940, and 10 February 1941. The author's conclusions as presented here are based on the above evidence, as well as a thorough reading of War Diaries for all thirty-nine basic training centres for their first two years of existence under the NRMA, none of which showed noticeable signs of discrimination in the numbers of men punished or in the lengths of sentences awarded for similar crimes between NRMA and volunteer soldiers.

91. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17233, War Diary, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, 30 April 1941. As the diarist added, the lack of discipline of "A" recruits was most likely due to the more varied and older ages of many of these men compared to the "R" recruits who were being called out for training at this point in the war, as well as volunteers having already spent some amount of time in uniform at District Depots waiting to be sent for training, in more transitory surroundings, and with a consequently lower amount of control from officers.

92. For example, see Ibid., Vol. 17188, No. 31 CA(B)TC, Cornwall, 12 October 1940, and Vol. 17225, No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, 26 August 1941. In addition, Ibid., Vol. 17221, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, 26 January 1941, even notes the case of one trainee who found a purse lost by the wife of the town's mayor, and took it upon himself to return it to her.

93. See NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 14169, Reel T-12403, Headquarters, 14th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 3 June to 23 July; Vol. 14173, Reel T-12406, Headquarters, 16th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 18-26 July; Vol. 14175, Reel T-12408, Headquarters, 19th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 23 July to 31 August; and Vol. 14175, Reel T-12408, Headquarters, 18th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 31 August to 15 October 1943.

94. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 13806, Reel T-10564, War Diary, Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, 8th Canadian Division, 6 May 1943. For other examples, see also Ibid., Vol. 14164, Reel T-12398, Headquarters, 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 19 January 1942; Vol. 14171, Reel T-12404, 15th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 15 October 1943; and Vol. 14169, Reel T-12403, 14th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 24 April and 13 May 1944.

95. Ralston Papers, Vol. 69, "French Speaking Units, Lists of, 1942: 7th & 8th Divisions, April": "French-Canadian Units in Canada"; "French-Speaking Units, 7th Division"; and "French-Speaking Units, 8th Division"; all 10 April 1942.

96. See Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 420-24, Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 160-61, and Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), chapter 9, pp. 237-57.

97. For example, see comments in an unattributed newspaper clipping on NAC, RG 24, Vol. 14164, Reel T-12399, War Diary, 13th Brigade, Appendix III, May 1942, "French-Canadians at Nanaimo; Quebec Outfit Becoming Bi-Lingual," op.cit., 11 May 1942.

98. Few sources exist from which to reconstruct Allen's own background and experiences of the war, but for general information see the "Editor's Note" to Christina McCall Newman, ed., The Man from Oxbow: The Best of Ralph Allen (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1967), pp. 1-8, and particularly Conn Smythe, with Scott Young, If You Can't Beat 'Em in the Alley (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1981), pp. 145, 149, and 153.

99. Allen, Ordeal by Fire, op.cit., pp. 393-94.

100. Allen, Home Made Banners (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Co., 1946), pp. 38-75, and The High White Forest (New York: Doubleday, 1964), pp. 170-94. The characters and situations described in the two books are very similar, and obviously based on the same example. For further discussion of this issue, see also Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 154-56.

101. Smythe, If You Can't Beat 'Em in the Alley, pp. 147-48.

102. See Barry Broadfoot, Six War Years, 1939-1945: Memories of Canadians at Home and Abroad (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1974), pp. 3-4 and 334-35.

103. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 6571, HQ 1161-1-5, "Procedure of National Defence Department Mobilization Act," vol. 4, Adjutant-General [AG] to Chief of the General Staff [CGS], 27 March 1941.

104. Ralston Papers, Vol. 68, "Compulsory Training - NRMA, 1942," AG to DOCs, 17 July 1941.

105. Ibid., AG to DOCs, MDs Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 12, and 13, 12 August 1941.

106. Ibid., AG to DOCs, 26 September 1941.

107. Ibid., 4 November 1941.

108. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17144, War Diary, No. 10 CA(B)TC, 22 March 1941.

109. Ibid., Vol. 17168, No. 23 CA(B)TC, 10-11 July 1941. For further examples of parades explicitly being used to encourage volunteers, see also Ibid., Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 8 July; Vol. 17283, No. 120 CA(B)TC, Regina, 11 and 14 July; Vol. 17246, No. 60 CA(B)TC, Yarmouth, 15 November; Vol. 17168, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 17 November; Vol. 17234, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, 3 December 1941 and 16 January 1942; Vols. 17259-60, No. 71 CA(B)TC, Edmunston, 13 December 1941 and 21 March and 18 April 1942; and Vol. 17144, No. 10 CA(B)TC, Kitchener, 14 January 1942.

110. See in particular the regular reports in the following clippings from the North Bay Nugget, in Ibid., Vol. 17180, No. 22 CA(B)TC, North Bay: Appendix 5, May 1941 ("Trainees Sign On For Active Service With Canada's Army," 19 May); Appendices 5 ("N.R.M.A. Recruits Enlist For Active Service," 12 July) and 6 ("183 Youths Enlist At North Bay," 11 July), June 1941; Appendix 7, December 1941 ("65 Recruits From Camp 'Go Active'," 30 December); and Appendix 7, January 1942 ("50 New Trainees Join Active Army," 14 January). Also Ibid., Vol. 17202, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, Appendix VI, December 1941, newspaper clippings: "Recruits Ready for Service Anywhere They're Needed," and "96 of 142 at Huntingdon Centre Have Volunteered Already, O.C. Announces," Montreal Daily Star, 10 December 1941; Vol. 17266, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, Appendix I, February 1942: "Home Defence Recruits Volunteer For Overseas Service," Winnipeg Free Press, 4 February 1942; and Vol. 17156, No. 20 CA(B)TC, Brantford, Appendix VII, March 1942, p. 13, unattributed clipping, n.d.: "Platoon Of 59 Men Goes Active Service" [March 1942]. The last case provides further evidence of leaves being promised to men who went active, the 59 new volunteers representing the entire strength of "R" recruits originally posted to the platoon. As the newspaper story indicates, all men were given an extra day of leave "In token of appreciation" for doing so.

111. Ibid., No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 4 December 1941. On this subject, see also related entries on various recruiting activities in the same War Diary, 7-10 December 1941.

112. Ibid., Vol. 17188, No. 31 CA(B)TC, 3 June 1941. Cornwall was also used as an example of the methods used to encourage NRMA recruits to go active by J.M. Hitsman, the co-author with J.L. Granatstein of Broken Promises, in a factual narrative written while preparing the official histories of the Canadian Army in the Second World War. Hitsman in fact quotes the same passage, although without commenting on the degree to which Cornwall might or might not have been representative of the entire training system. See NAC, RG 24,

Vol. 6926, AHQ Historical Section Report No. 63, "Manpower Problems of the Canadian Army in the Second World War," 17 August 1953, pp. 41-42. For a similar example of 54 recruits being publicly acknowledged and praised for volunteering for active service in Quebec, see also NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17243, War Diary, No. 55 CA(B)TC, Rimouski, 25 January 1942.

113. Ralston Papers, Vol. 68, "Compulsory Training - NRMA, 1942," Brigadier F.L. Armstrong, DOC, MD 3, to Secretary, Department of National Defence, 9 February 1942.

114. Ibid., Larose to DOC, MD 3, 5 February 1942.

115. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 80, File HQ 1161-1-18, "Complaints Generally Reserve Training Centres," vol. 2, statement by Joseph Robert Miville, 7 September 1941. Both the original document in French and an English translation appear on this file, the latter being the source of the above quotation.

116. Ibid., statement by J. Albert Lefebvre, 7 September 1941.

117. Ibid., statement by Miville.

118. See in particular Ibid., reports from DOC, MD 3, 8 and 11 October; AG to DOC, 30 October; AG to Ralston, 12 December; and Ralston to J.T. Thorsen, Minister of National War Services, 18 December 1941.

119. Ibid., Lt.Col. E.M. Ansell, OC, No. 12 Basic Training Camp, to Col. W.H. Kippen, MD 1, 19 February 1942, plus attached documents.

120. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17264, War Diary, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Appendices 1-2, March 1941: "Colonel Ackland's Address To Reserve Army Recruits," and "Colonel Ackland's Address To Active Army Recruits," n.d. [both 21 March 1941]. Ackland also spoke to the same group of "R" recruits at the end of their training period, choosing once again to take a more moderate approach and emphasize the reasons the war was being fought, as well as the men's duty to serve the country. See Ibid., Vol. 17265, Appendix 3, May 1941: "Speech by Lt.Colonel C.M. Ackland, M.C., V.D., to 'R' Recruits of 4th Course" [16 May 1941]." For further examples of similar talks mentioned in the centre's War Diary, see also entries for 18 April, 4 August, and 8 December 1941, and 12 January 1942.

121. Ibid., Vols. 17189-90, No. 31 CA(B)TC, 2-5 July and 11 August 1941, and 21 April 1942. See also the comments for 23-24 January 1941, which also suggest that very close to 100% of "R" recruits went active out of a further group of men that arrived in the camp that month.

122. Ibid., Vol. 17195, No. 32 CA(B)TC, Peterborough, 11 July; Vol. 17168, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 26 July; Vol. 17145, No. 10 CA(B)TC, Kitchener, 16 September; and Vol. 17149, No. 12 CA(B)TC, Chatham, 26 November 1941. Kitchener had also held a special parade the previous month for three of four companies that had reached 100%, and several platoons reported 100% volunteering again later in September, while the entire camp exceeded 90% once more in November (see entries for 26 August, 25 September, and 26 November 1941). In Newmarket, the centre managed to convert all "R" recruits, "with the exception of about twenty men," again in August (22 August 1941), and in October No. 62 CA(B)TC in Charlottetown reported that all but six "R" men had gone active from its latest class (Ibid., Vol. 17252, 23 October 1941). Brantford also reported two platoons going active there within a week in March 1942 (Ibid., Vol. 17156, No. 20 CA(B)TC, 6 March 1942).

123. Ibid., Vol. 17189, No. 31 CA(B)TC, Cornwall, 1-3 July 1941, 24 January and 24 April 1942; Vol. 17195, No. 32 CA(B)TC, Peterborough, 11 July; Vol. 17168, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 23 August; and Vol. 17145, No. 10 CA(B)TC, Kitchener, 1 September 1941. For further evidence of promising leaves to recruits, individual interviews being held by commanding officers or more junior officers, and other efforts to convert NRMA men similar to those noted in Major-General Browne's November 1941 letter and in Allen's accounts, see also Ibid., Vol. 17221, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, 13 May and 11 June; Vol. 17225, No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, 11 July; Vol. 17207, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 5 August; Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, 5 and 7 August; Vol. 17283, No. 120 CA(B)TC, Regina, 22 November 1941; Vol. 17266, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, 1 January, and Vol. 16914, No. 44 CA(B)TC, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 5 March 1942.

124. Ibid., Vol. 17195, No. 32 CA(B)TC, 29 October 1941. In addition to Peterborough's "success" at gaining active service recruits up to this point, a new group arrived to begin their training on 30 October, of which over 70% also became volunteers within the next two days (1 November 1941).

125. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 80, HQ 1161-1-18, vol. 1, Camille Chouinard to Hormidas Chouinard, 27 June, Précis of letter from Hormidas Chouinard to Ernest Lapointe, 2 July, and A. Tessier, Capt. & Adjut., for OC, A-13 Infantry Training Centre [Valcartier], 27 August 1941.

126. Ibid., vol. 2, Brigadier F.L. Armstrong, DOC, MD 3, to DND, 3 September 1941.

127. Ibid., Marcel Lacroix, Adrien Boudreault, Raymond Berube, et.al. [to DND], 9 September 1941; Lt.-Colonel J.N. Turgeon, Officer Commanding Canadian Army Basic Training

Centre No. 53, Lauzon, Quebec, to Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Military District No. 5, 24 September 1941.

128. Ibid., M. McCabe and J. Leclair to King, 25 July 1941.

129. Ibid. vol. 1, letter from Camp Borden (author's name severed by censors), 9 July 1941.

130. Ibid., Major W.E. Macklin and Lt.Col. J.P. Girvan, A-10 Infantry (Advanced) Training Centre, to Camp Headquarters, Camp Borden, 31 July 1941.

131. See Ibid., Lt.Col. P.L. Park, Officer Commanding 15th Field Regiment, RCA, to Headquarters, RCA, 4th Division, 3 December 1941, Deputy Minister (Army), to Adjutant-General, 16 March 1942, and Lieut.-Colonel G. Francoeur, Officer Commanding, Canadian Army Basic Training Centre No. 44, St. Jerome, to Headquarters, Military District No. 4, 24 March 1942. Also Ibid., vol. 3, Robert Phaneuf to Minister of National Defence, 18 January 1942; Major J. Henri Labrie, Commanding Officer, Canadian Army Basic Training Centre No. 55, Rimouski, to Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General, Military District No. 5, 2 February 1942; Norman Smith, Editor, Ottawa Journal, to AG, 21 May 1943, plus attached items; anonymous letter from "N.R.M.A. Personel" [sic], 13 June 1944; and Assistant Private Secretary, DND, to AG, 22 September 1944.

132. For further comments on the experiences of recruits after going on to home defence units, see also Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, pp. 122-23, and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 155.

133. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17180, War Diary, No. 22 CA(B)TC, North Bay, Appendix 6, June 1941: "183 Youths Enlist at North Bay," North Bay Nugget, 11 July 1941.

134. For examples of these developments, see Ibid., Vol. 17292, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 12 November; and Vol. 17259, No. 71 CA(B)TC, Edmunston, 13 December 1941; and Ralston Papers, Vol. 68, "Compulsory Training - NRMA, 1942," Routine Order No. 1526, 24 December 1941, prohibiting the wearing of "Canada" badges by NRMA personnel. Also Allen, Home Made Banners, p. 51; Gunning, North Bay's Fort Chippewa, p. 62; and Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 429.

135. For general policies on conscripts serving as NCO's, see NAC, RG 24, Reel C-5270, File HQC 7959-3, "Policy re - N.R.M.A. N.C.O.-s," and particularly circular letter by AG, 22 April 1942, along with undated documents: "Draft Memorandum" [July 1944], and "Policy re N.R.M.A. N.C.Os." [summer 1944].

136. Among the officers honoured for their services to the home defence organization, and particularly for their efforts to find active service recruits in the training centres, were Lt.-Col. Eugène Nantel, who was mentioned in chapter one of this thesis as the first commander of No. 44 CA(B)TC in St. Jérôme, for being "instrumental in getting many National Resources Mobilization Act soldiers to go active," Lt.-Col. Paul Brosseau, who took over from Lt.-Col. Nantel in St. Jérôme in December 1942, and Major L. Younger, the commander of No. 132 CA(B)TC in Grande Prairie, and other later training centres, were also cited for similar reasons, and all three were gazetted as "Officers" in the Order of the British Empire in 1946. I am indebted to Mr. Hugh Halliday for this information, which was given to me from a database created by him from a collection of uncatalogued award citations held by the Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence, Ottawa.

CHAPTER THREE

Creating a "Big Army": The National Resources Mobilization Act and the Expansion of the Canadian Army, 1941-1943

Between 1941 and 1943, the Canadian Army expanded to its largest size of the Second World War. By 1943, the country had created an entire field Army overseas, numbering three infantry divisions, two armoured divisions and two independent tank brigades, along with two Corps headquarters, and the tens of thousands of additional troops necessary to supply and maintain these units in the field. At the same time, Canada's domestic defence forces increased dramatically, in response to the continued deterioration of the war effort in both Europe and North America during 1941 and 1942. Dozens of artillery and anti-aircraft units were established on both coasts, and three further infantry divisions mobilized, bringing the total number manned by the country to eight. At its peak in March 1944, the Canadian Army totalled almost 500,000 men and women, in addition to vastly increased numbers in the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN).¹

The large ground forces that were created after 1941, and particularly Canada's battlefield formations overseas, have come to be known by historians as the "big army," in contrast to the "smaller" Army of two divisions that had been put

forward at the start of the war. The term was first coined during the debates of 1941 and 1942 that led to the authorization of the "big army" overseas, and was set down most notably by journalist Grant Dexter, who had the benefit of direct contact with a number of observers in Ottawa in piecing together the events that took place behind the scenes.² The question for historians has always been why the federal government accepted the "big army" plan in December 1941 and January 1942, despite the acrimony described by Dexter and other commentators over the issue, and in the face of serious doubts on the part of at least some ministers that a larger Army could be maintained in later years, without having to resort to extending conscription to overseas service.

In the early years after the Second World War, the issue of the "big army" was largely ignored by historians in favour of the two political crises over conscription that had dominated the war in 1942 and 1944.³ Early historians of the Army, such as E.L.M. Burns and C.P. Stacey, described the origins and the development of the "big army" and its implications for the larger political crises, but without setting out the precise connections between the two.⁴ The problem of the "big army" and its ties to the political events of the war was more forcefully stated by J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman in their 1977 book, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada, which explained the decision to accede

to the Army's requests in 1941 and 1942 through the sheer force and skill with which the generals had presented their arguments, and the lack of expertise possessed by their political masters with which to challenge the Army's views.⁵

Granatstein's and Hitsman's arguments were further confirmed by historians in the 1980s, who suggested a connection between the hypothetical mobilization plans created by the Army in the interwar period, and the force that eventually emerged in the Second World War.⁶ These ties were further reaffirmed by the biographical work of Paul Dickson and J.L. Granatstein in the 1990s, both of whom emphasized the degree to which Major-General H.D.G. Crerar's personal and professional ambitions had shaped the Canadian Army during the war, a point which was touched on in Chapter One of this thesis.⁷ Most recently, historians have begun to point to the wartime weaknesses of the federal Cabinet itself, and its smaller counterpart, the Cabinet War Committee (CWC), to explain the reluctance of ministers to challenge the Army and to come to a decision on which most members held very divided opinions. The result, they suggest, was to leave policy to be made at lower levels by men such as Crerar.⁸

None of these arguments fully explains exactly how and why the "big army" came to be accepted at the political level by 1942. As this chapter will show, one other key influence in shaping the actions of both generals and politicians during this period was the National Resources Mobilization Act

(NRMA), and the context that it set for the political debates that took place. Thanks to the way that the NRMA was operating by late 1941, as seen in Chapter Two, most major decision-makers had the thought in the backs of their minds that if the number of civilian volunteers ever began to fall short of the Army's requirements, the NRMA could be used to maintain the strength of its voluntary units in Europe, without actually having to send conscripts overseas. Thus, for H.D.G. Crerar the NRMA provided a firm foundation upon which to build his new, more professional, "big army," without requiring further measures of conscription. For Prime Minister Mackenzie King and other Cabinet ministers, it offered the promise (or in the case of J.L. Ralston, at least the hope) that the Army could be expanded to meet public demands for greater forces overseas after 1941, on the same basis of being able to avoid extending conscription. The result by early 1942 was approval for Crerar's plans, a decision that eventually set in train the exact developments that some ministers had feared during the earlier debates.

The following chapter addresses the role of the NRMA in helping to create the "big army" in 1941 and 1942, and some of the early implications of that policy. It does so by first describing how the developments explored in chapter two came to shape the Army's thinking on wartime expansion by mid-1941. It then goes on to trace the development of policies with respect to the NRMA during the rest of 1941, and particularly

its influence in helping to create the "big army" by the end of the year. The last section of the chapter deals with some of the early implications of the decision to accept the "big army," and especially the further expansion that took place in Canada's home defence forces after Japan entered the war in December 1941. It ends by discussing Canadian participation in the American invasion of Kiska, in the Aleutian Islands, in August 1943, an event which marked the high point for the NRMA and for larger home defence forces in Canada during the war. Until that time, very few restrictions appeared to prevent the continued expansion of the Canadian Army, either at home or overseas, and the "big army" policy seemed to be a complete success. As chapter four will show, however, by then the Army was already beginning to face some of the longer-term implications of the decision to create the "big army" in 1941. The results would come to have an even more important impact on political developments later in the war.

* * *

As was explained in chapter one, the role of the NRMA in expanding the Canadian Army can be traced back to the earliest stages of planning the compulsory military training program in 1940. The reorganization that occurred in the winter of 1940-1941 was motivated at least partly by the desire of the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Major-General H.D.G. Crerar, to rationalize training under the NRMA, and to make conscripts available for service on home defence duties for the duration

of the war. At the same time, large numbers of men began volunteering for service outside of Canada almost as soon as they entered compulsory training. The pressures that were put on these men to volunteer for overseas service throughout the rest of the war were not the only consequences of the new compulsory training program that emerged after 1941. In the months following the creation of the new four-month training plan, the NRMA also came to be tied much more closely to the broader issue of providing reinforcements both for Canada and overseas, as the Army's planners came to realize the potential of the NRMA to meet all of its manpower needs. Thus, the NRMA had much to do with the growth of the Army even before the huge expansion that followed the beginning of the Pacific war in December 1941.

In fact, the first development that helped bring commanders to see the value of the NRMA as a source of reinforcements for the Canadian Army came just as the new military training program went into operation in March and April 1941. In early May, the federal government announced its first official recruiting drive of the war, a campaign that would attempt to find over 30,000 volunteers from among the nation's civilian population. In describing the 1941 recruiting campaign, historians have tended to emphasize the shortage of potential volunteers that it seemed to reveal at even this early stage in the war, and the slow response of Canadians to the campaign itself.⁹ Yet the drive should more

accurately be seen as the logical result of the new "Canadian Army Programme" that the Cabinet War Committee had authorized earlier that spring. As numerous units began to be mobilized to make up the new formations, it was only natural that the Army's need for men to fill these units would grow, and the federal government would begin to make use of what was still essentially an untapped reserve of manpower in the country.

In addition, the recruiting campaign was an even more direct result of the evolution of the NRMA during the same period. The idea for the campaign actually emerged on 23 April, on the same day as J.L. Ralston came before the CWC to present Major-General Crerar's request to extend the length of service under the NRMA to the duration of the war. The extension was needed in order to meet the requirements of the new Army program, Ralston argued. The NRMA men would be used to release volunteers from home defence duties, so that the latter could move on to new overseas duties, as Crerar had foreseen in his submissions over the past few months. It was the Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, who suggested that the CWC organize a formal recruiting drive at the same time, so that the Army would not have to rely solely on the NRMA to meet its various needs. Over the next few weeks, plans for the drive were finalized, and the campaign was officially approved by the CWC on 9 May.¹⁰ Two days later, Ralston announced its commencement to the Canadian public.¹¹

Although the 1941 recruiting drive began slowly, the Army

finally reached and then exceeded its projected targets. A number of methods were used to encourage men to volunteer, including support from professional public relations experts, and broadcasts and speeches by Ralston, Ernest Lapointe, and other government ministers, and a speaking tour of western Canada by Prime Minister King in late June. In the end, roughly 48,000 men came forward to volunteer during the campaign, of whom 34,625 were accepted and placed in uniform. Another 12,000 men joined the RCAF in the same period, and 3,500 entered the RCN, bringing the total number of volunteers found during the drive to more than 60,000. From then on, civilian recruiting was conducted on a much more organized and continuous basis for the rest of the war.¹²

Another way in which the NRMA was involved in the 1941 recruiting drive was through the participation of the Army's training organizations themselves. As the central focus of the war effort in many communities, and in some cases the only military installations for miles around, basic training centres played particularly significant roles in finding civilian volunteers during the campaign, and several camps doubled as local recruiting depots to take in and process men from towns and cities across their regions.¹³ Most also played more active roles, especially in Quebec, where the prospect of finding recruits was considered less hopeful, and organized military displays and parades, and participated in civilian rallies designed to stimulate public interest in the

campaign.¹⁴ Efforts to find volunteers also sometimes merged with other activities, such as the 1941 Victory Loan campaign, which was going on at the same time, and occasioned further parades and rallies in individual training centres.¹⁵ Linking together such activities in closely-related campaigns had in fact proven successful at stimulating patriotic feelings in the First World War, and to a certain extent they were consciously coordinated again in 1941.¹⁶

Of the many activities carried out by the training centres in an effort to further the government's recruiting campaign, one of the largest and most popular was "Army Day," which was held on the last Saturday of June 1941 in every training centre and other military installation across the country. The event drew thousands of visitors. Every centre provided displays of physical training and military drill for the occasion, along with rifle shooting and other weapons, as well as the tactics used by the men, their leisure activities, life in the barracks, and even the types of food served in the centres (for an example of the last case, see the photograph on the following page). "Army Day" was followed with special church parades in each training centre the next morning, to which the public was again invited.¹⁷ The weekend's activities were so successful that they were repeated two weeks later in most Montreal-area camps, and nationally the following year, as part of an even larger "Army Week" program of recruiting.¹⁸ As the 1941 campaign wrapped up in early



A special "Army Day" display by No. 42 Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centre, Joliette, June 1941, which illustrates the diet of a typical recruit at the centre. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 17206, War Diary, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, Appendix 9, June 1941.)

July, a "Call to Arms" proclamation was distributed to thousands of towns and cities across Canada, training centres and other military units providing honour guards for dozens of ceremonies in the immediate vicinity of each camp.¹⁹ Other efforts to find civilian volunteers continued after the end of the formal campaign in July.²⁰ At Christmas time in 1941, for example, recruits were promised an extra day of holidays for every new civilian that they managed to convince to volunteer while they were away, to a maximum of three additional days of leave.²¹ In early 1942, an "Army Train" crossed the country with fifteen cars full of military displays, once more with the support of many training centres and other military units along the way.²²

In the end, although the official recruiting campaign proved to be quite successful in 1941, returns were sparse in certain areas, and particularly the Montreal region, which fell short of its share of the national recruiting quota. War Diaries for Montreal-area training centres confirm these results, noting that in many cases local populations turned out in large numbers for recruiting rallies, but few men were willing to volunteer for overseas service.²³ The knowledge that the staffs of these training centres put so much effort into encouraging recruiting, however, and that some men still chose to volunteer for general service, reminds us of the dangers of generalizing about the opinions and actions of any group during the war, and especially French Canadians in

GRANDE DEMONSTRATION d'Une Colonne Motorisée AU CAMP CARILLON DE ST-JEROME

ARRIVEE

Mercredi le 23 juillet à 5 heures p. m.

Arrivée de la colonne motorisée à la jonction des routes
Montréal-St-Jérôme et St-Jérôme-St-Lin.

*100 unités mécanisées - Canon 4.5 pces - Une boutique mobile
- Porte-troupes - Chars d'assauts miniatures - Cuisine mo-
biles - Cantine des Chevaliers de Colomb - Porte mitrail-
leuses Bren, etc.*

DEFILÉ

Grande parade à travers les rues de la ville.
Rue St-Georges jusqu'chez L. C. Taillon, rue Labelle jusqu'au
Bureau de Poste. Salut militaire aux autorités de la ville,
puis rue Labelle jusqu'à jonction Labelle et St-Georges, des-
cente de la rue St-Georges jusqu'à rue Nantel, rue Fournier à
Palais, Palais à Melançon, Melançon à Parent, Parent à St-
Georges, St-Georges jusqu'au Camp.

Programme de la Soirée à 8 heures

Centre d'entraînement illuminé :: Camp ouvert au public

Exercices de drill --- Canons et mitrailleuses en action --- Attaques simulées avec
tanks, artillerie et infanterie --- Grenade à mains --- Fusées incendiaires, etc...

Venez visiter le camp en foule avec vos amis à cette occasion

Entrée gratuite sur le terrain.

La Oie de Publication de Saint-Jérôme, Ltee, Saint-Jérôme, P. Q.

Poster announcing upcoming recruiting events in St. Jérôme, Quebec, July 1941. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 16913, War Diary, No. 44 Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centre, St. Jérôme, Appendix 5, July 1941.)

Quebec, who possessed a much more complex and diverse society than that which is often portrayed by historians of both languages for the war years. In fact, Montreal was not the only Military District across the country to fall short of its recruiting quota: Military Districts No. 3 (eastern Ontario) and No. 11 (British Columbia) also failed to reach their assigned totals. At the same time, Military District No. 5, which covered Quebec City and the lower St. Lawrence, considerably exceeded its goals during the campaign.²⁴

The large number of volunteers found by the training centres in May and June 1941 did not come wholly from the communities outside their gates, either. As was described in chapter two, from the beginning of the four-month training program the decision to mix together "Active" and "Reserve" recruits had begun to bear fruit, in the form of "R" recruits volunteering for general service. During the government's public campaign in 1941, at least 1,400 volunteers came directly from the Army's training centres, and perhaps as many as 2,500. Another 400 to 1,300 were accepted into the RCAF or RCN.²⁵ Throughout the summer of 1941, War Diaries recorded an almost constant stream of "R" recruits converting to active service in individual training centres, and a similar stream of recruiting officers visiting the camps looking for men for their particular units and formations. At times, it seemed as if the only reason that the training centres had been created was for their recruiting benefits, and camps played host to

representatives from seemingly every arm and corps of the Canadian Army, as well as monthly visits from the RCAF, and less frequently from the RCN.²⁶ In most cases, the results were satisfactory, although in at least one centre a representative from the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals probably had less success, when he managed to start a small fire while attempting to demonstrate a radio set to a group of recruits.²⁷ Still, throughout 1941 a total of 7,868 NRMA men converted to general service, providing over seven percent of all the Army's volunteers for the year, and an additional 3,725 went to the RCAF, and 376 to the RCN, for a final total of almost 12,000 volunteers over the year.²⁸

In addition, as the above figures suggest, among the many recruiting officers who visited the training centres in 1941, those from the RCAF were the most welcome. Officers usually arrived to find a long list of men waiting to transfer to their service. Consequently, they were able to pick and choose from among only the most promising candidates for air training. By far the largest number of NRMA recruits went to the RCAF in 1941, and recruiting by the RCAF and RCN in the training centres actually proved to be so successful that it was ended in May 1942, in order to prevent the constant drain from the Army of its most well-educated and thus desirable recruits. Of the 1,357 NRMA recruits who transferred to the RCAF throughout the rest of the war, most presumably came from waiting lists that had not been processed before the men were

called up for their Army training.²⁹ The irony in this is that 1941 was also the year when the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan began to turn out pilots and aircrew in large numbers for overseas service, the majority of whom went on to join Bomber Command, the British air force's strategic bombing arm, and one of the most intensively-engaged and costly combat formations of the Second World War. Many of the NRMA men, along with other active service recruits who also transferred to the RCAF in 1941, probably found themselves facing even harsher conditions in later years than they would have found in the Army, experts calculating shortly after the war that personnel in Bomber Command had only about a 25% chance of completing their first tour of thirty missions without being killed, wounded, or shot down and captured by the enemy.³⁰

Along with recruits undergoing training, thousands of personnel on the staffs of the training centres were affected by the increased emphasis on recruiting for overseas service in the summer of 1941. When the training centres were first organized in the fall of 1940, most militiamen who were called out were paid at the same rates as other volunteers, but they were not made liable for overseas service. In mid-1941, staffs in the former NRMA training centres were asked to change their status, so that they could be moved more easily among various camps, and rotated with personnel who began returning from Europe to instruct recruits on the most up-to-date tactics being used overseas. In most cases, all or

nearly all of the camps' staffs volunteered for general service, and some went on to join the RCAF or RCN, just as their trainees were doing.³¹ Not all staff members chose to volunteer, however, although once again the trend was not noticeable only in Quebec, as some commentators might have assumed.³²

All of these developments set the stage for planners to take the first step in expanding the overseas Army further in mid-1941. In early June, Major-General Crerar appeared before the CWC and urged that the 3rd Canadian Division now be sent overseas, as had been envisioned in his Army program for 1941. At the same time, he recommended that a new unit be formed in Canada to replace the 3rd Division, a political requirement more than a military one on the part of Canadian planners. The new division was made necessary by defence plans between Canada and the United States that had recently been completed by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, a body that had been established following the famous meeting of Prime Minister King and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt in Ogdensburg, New York, in August 1940. Under these plans, the Canadian government had agreed to maintain at least two divisions on home defence duties at all times, mainly at the insistence of the Americans, although for the most part strategic planners in Canada agreed with the assessments of their counterparts.³³ In any case, most of the infantry battalions needed to form the new division had already been mobilized for

internal security duties, Crerar informed the CWC, and all that needed to be done was to authorize the remaining units, and bring them all up to full strength. Since the division would remain in Canada, he added, "R" recruits could be used to fill out the new units, under the arrangements made in April to extend the length of their service. Conveniently, a large number were just about to begin passing out of the advanced training centres and become available for this use. Thanks to the success of the 1941 recruiting campaign, then, and the assurances offered by the development of the NRMA over the past few months, there seemed to be more than enough men to provide for the expansion of units both at home and overseas in the summer of 1941, and to keep them up to strength indefinitely.³⁴

Still, Crerar's recommendations provoked considerable discussion before the CWC permitted him to proceed. Several members worried that even the current request would result in a force that was too large to maintain indefinitely without having to send conscripts overseas. As they had been earlier in the year, the arguments put forward by Crerar were difficult to refute, especially considering the current favourable situation with respect to manpower. In addition, although the request was clearly calculated to increase the size of the Canadian Army, from the point of view of the CWC in the summer of 1941 it may also have offered a way to set limits to its future expansion. Under Section Three of the

NRMA, no conscript could be sent outside Canada against his will. Thus, by approving the new formation on the terms stated by Crerar, the CWC could ensure that "A" and "R" recruits would become so mixed together that it would be much more difficult for Crerar to later argue that this division, too, should go overseas - at least not without causing a very public debate about the issue, that would not have been in the interests of either side at that point in the war.³⁵ As a result, Crerar's recommendation was approved at the end of July, the CWC committing Canada to maintain a total of four divisions overseas (1st, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions, along with one independent tank brigade, and 5th Canadian Armoured Division, which was still being organized but was due to go overseas before the end of the year), and two further home defence formations in Canada (4th and 6th Canadian Infantry Divisions). For now, the latter formation would consist of only three main brigade groups, without ancillary units, and serve as independent reserves for forces in eastern, central, and western Canada, respectively.³⁶

In putting forward his revised plans, Crerar was undoubtedly motivated by his own ambitions, as well as the many strategic and public pressures that were acting on both him and the federal Cabinet during this period, to try to build up the largest possible Army overseas. Yet there is little evidence to suggest that Crerar did so as part of any deliberate plan to force the government to accept an Army

larger than could be maintained in later years. Under the arrangements made for the NRMA by mid-1941, it seemed quite possible to find all the men that were needed, either directly by recruiting civilians into the Army, or simply by increasing the flow of men called up under the NRMA. Crerar suggested to more than one friend during this period that he expected large numbers of volunteers to come forward from the training centres, while indicating that although as a military man he preferred full conscription, he recognized the current limits set by the federal government.³⁷ As early as May 1941, Victor Sifton, the publisher of the Winnipeg Free Press, and a former soldier who had been recalled to serve as Master-General of the Ordnance at the start of the war, had also stated privately that the NRMA should be used to maintain the Army overseas, although he strongly disagreed with Crerar's plans to increase the current size of the force. In fact, it is possible that Sifton directly influenced the views of Crerar and the Adjutant-General, Major-General B.W. Browne, who was responsible for developing the deliberate recruiting program in the training centres described in chapter two.³⁸ Even J.L. Ralston referred to the idea of relying on the NRMA to provide future volunteers when he spoke at a press conference in mid-July announcing the end of the government's spring recruiting campaign, pointing specifically to two of the basic training centres where 100% of "R" recruits had recently gone active, and noting that in the future "this

would be a very valuable source of recruiting."³⁹ With this step, what had begun mostly as a political response to the military crisis of June 1940 became a much more central and integral part of the force-development structure used by the Army for the rest of the Second World War. At the same time, it would come to be a more and more significant influence in helping to lull some of the same planners into a false sense of security, should the constant stream of reinforcements promised by the NRMA begin to dry up in the future.

* * *

For the remainder of 1941, the NRMA played a key role in continuing to expand the home defence Army in Canada. In describing the expansion of compulsory military service during 1941, it should be noted that not all "zombies" went on to serve on home defence duties as infantry soldiers, as many observers would come to assume by 1944. In presenting Major-General Crerar's revised plans to the CWC in April, J.L. Ralston had noted that what were needed most were artillerymen to fill the ranks of the many coast defence units that had been planned as far back as the late 1930s, but were only now being formed as modern arms and equipment began to flow out of Canadian factories.⁴⁰ Ralston repeated these arguments in his speech inaugurating the government's recruiting campaign in May, adding that only ten percent of all volunteers needed by the Army at that time were intended to be infantrymen.⁴¹ In addition, by the late summer of 1941, a few "R" recruits

had begun to trickle back into various training centres, gradually taking up positions such as batmen, clerks, cooks and even instructors, so that some of the general service volunteers on the staffs could move on to other jobs.⁴² The trickle turned into a more steady flow as the months went by.⁴³ By October 1941, the total strength of Canada's home defence forces had risen to 147,149 officers and other ranks, of whom 13,974 (9.5%) were NRMA recruits or "Members (HD)." At the start of February 1942, 1,586 (15.6%) of the 10,140 men in the still-forming 6th Division were conscripts, while NRMA men made up 3,075 (21.3%) of the further 14,431 personnel who were serving in coast defence and anti-aircraft units across the country.⁴⁴

In the midst of the expansion that was taking place in both the NRMA and the larger Canadian Army by the end of 1941, it is also important to remember that not every Canadian was readily accepted into uniform during the war, even under the compulsory provisions of the NRMA. One group that was prevented from serving their country in any capacity was a considerable number of Asian Canadians. In late September 1940, the CWC had quietly decided to omit Chinese and Japanese Canadians from being called out for compulsory training, in response to a letter from Duff Pattullo, the Premier of British Columbia, who objected to the fact that Asians who had served in the First World War had been able to use their service to gain access to B.C.'s racially-restricted vote

after the war. While the CWC noted that everyone should be required to serve under the NRMA, and especially anyone who was clearly Canadian by birth, in the end it justified its decision not to call out Japanese Canadians for training on the basis of Pattullo's opposition, and a more general desire not to stir up anti-Japanese feelings on the West Coast. The policy was reconsidered when Pattullo withdrew his province's objections in late November 1941, on condition that any Japanese Canadians who entered the Army be sent out of B.C. as soon as possible after enlisting. In light of Japan's entry into the war a few days later, officials in the Department of External Affairs, who proved to be among the most consistent defenders of Japanese Canadians, also argued that such men should be given an opportunity to serve their country in a visible way, to prove their loyalty to other Canadians. Nonetheless, few changes were made, and for the rest of the war the CWC stuck rigidly to its policies on Asian Canadians, relenting only in the final few months to allow small numbers to volunteer and then serve on loan with the forces of other countries.⁴⁵ In spite of these policies, a few Chinese and Japanese Canadians did manage to find their way into the Canadian Army as conscripts, as the War Diary of at least one basic training centre confirms, and they may even have faced some of the same pressures to volunteer that were being applied to other recruits: in December 1941, the newspaper story that noted the presence of five Asian-Canadian "R"

recruits in Camrose, Alberta, also reported that two of them had recently decided to "go active," including Private Shogi Yamauchi, the sole Japanese Canadian in the group.⁴⁶

Other Canadians who faced difficulty being accepted for service in the military in any form were Sikhs and other Canadians from the Indian sub-continent. In this case their problems resulted more from their religious views than their ethnicity. In the Army, officials objected to accepting Sikhs unless such men could be accommodated in numbers large enough to justify forming separate units, where their unique requirements of food and dress could easily be met. Due to the small size of the Sikh population, however, even compulsory service would apply to only a few dozen men, and thus the restriction was not likely to be overturned.⁴⁷ In the Air Force, meanwhile, and to a lesser extent the Navy, objections were based on more openly racial grounds, the RCAF refusing to accept anyone for other than ground duties who was "not of pure European descent," as non-Europeans were not considered to be of "suitable disposition and temperament" for other roles. In addition, it was assumed that members of visible minorities would cause antagonism when serving alongside men of other backgrounds on operational duties, a policy that the RCN also followed with respect to its ships.⁴⁸

Another group that was affected by the NRMA was Canadians of African descent, although in this case the NRMA actually

acted in some ways to their benefit. At a time when African Canadians still faced many types of discrimination, the NRMA was one measure that treated them as citizens like any other. War Diaries that note the presence of African Canadians in specific training centres tend to repeat some of the stereotypes and assumptions of their age, recruits usually coming to their attention for their prowess as entertainers, boxers, or simply for performing duties as capably as other soldiers, something that apparently surprised some observers. In one of the best examples of such entries, an African-Canadian private who was serving as a storesman in Newmarket, Ontario, was singled out for leading his camp's church services one week when the chaplain was absent: "It was remarked that this was an excellent example of the democracy of the present army," the Diarist recorded, "and the service reflected great credit on Pte. Cornish."⁴⁹ Still, despite these attitudes, what is important is that training centres recorded the presence of African Canadians in uniform. In late 1943, when a story broke that local military officials had asked the civilian director of mobilization in Manitoba not to call out African Canadians for compulsory service, officers in both Winnipeg and Ottawa denied that there was any such policy. No trace of the request was found in the files of that Military District, although the local commander who had allegedly made it was no longer serving in the area. The local civilian official was censured for proceeding only on

the basis of a verbal request from his military counterpart, and the Department of National Defence took the opportunity to state that "Negroes were being called regularly the same as any of the classes of persons designated by Proclamation for the purposes of the Mobilization Regulations."⁵⁰

One further group that was affected by the NRMA, but in this case objected to their treatment as citizens like any other, was Canada's aboriginal peoples. The resistance of aboriginal Canadians to compulsory military service was based not on their desire to avoid military service, as large numbers of native Canadians in fact participated in both World Wars. For a people who had been deliberately separated from the rest of Canadian society under successive Indian Acts, however, and many of whom had never formally accepted Canada's sovereignty over their lives and territories, being forced to bear arms in the interests of the same state was unacceptable. In addition, the Indian Act prevented native peoples from exercising many of the rights and privileges that most other Canadians took for granted, unless they renounced their status as "Indians" and accepted citizenship as full "British subjects." Aboriginal peoples were treated as minors under the Act, meaning that they had no more standing before the government than children to their parents. Nevertheless, when the Department of Justice was asked to rule on the status of Indians under the NRMA in January 1941, it ignored all of these factors, declaring that aboriginal Canadians were

British subjects and thus liable for compulsory service. The Department's legal experts stuck to their decision in the face of numerous protests throughout the war, even though it proved to be much more difficult to enforce the regulations at the local level. As with Asian Canadians, the Cabinet War Committee again reconsidered the government's position on aboriginal peoples in the last few months of the war. But its members never went so far as to change their previous policies, except to prevent Indians affected by certain treaties from being sent to Europe when conscription was extended to overseas service in 1944.⁵¹

In the meantime, as 1941 went on the attention of both the Army's planners and their political superiors began to be drawn towards an even more vital issue regarding manpower. As early as July 1941, when the CWC was still considering Major-General Crerar's request to mobilize a sixth division, he had begun laying the groundwork for an even larger force overseas. In this task he was aided by J.L. Ralston, who in late May asked his Adjutant-General to review a recent study on manpower produced by the Department of Munitions and Supply, and look at its implications for the Army. Major-General Browne's study reflected the optimism of his source, and portrayed the manpower situation very positively with respect to the Army. According to the figures, Browne wrote, the country had enough manpower to create at least two more divisions for overseas service, in addition to the four that

were then authorized, and keep them up to strength for more than six years. If the government instead used some of these extra reinforcements to build up more divisions, as many as ten could be mobilized and maintained for over four years, even after taking into account the needs of the Air Force and the Navy. Browne's report was very brief, and offered few details about the nature of his own estimates of manpower needs. Despite their scale, however, he considered his figures to be conservative.⁵² Weighing in on the debate, Crerar suggested that the casualty numbers estimated by Browne were also probably too high, and that this would give the Army even more of a margin for error if it went ahead with plans for further forces. The result was that by the end of July Ralston was already hinting at further Army expansion in the CWC, suggesting that the 4th Canadian Division could be sent overseas and replaced by a seventh home defence division. Significantly, he also refused to be pinned down by the Prime Minister, when asked to state that even the six-division force then being contemplated "could be adopted without recourse to conscription." As Ralston replied, "he wished to avoid commitment in advance and remain free to meet circumstances as they arose."⁵³ Clearly, a rift was beginning to open between the two men, King seeing overseas conscription as the most vital factor in deciding the ultimate size of the Army, while Ralston was ready to support further proposals on the basis of his professional experts' advice of what was needed and what

was possible in the immediate future.

In addition, Browne's study appears to be the source of a more critical version of the Army's expansion plans reported by Grant Dexter, following a private conversation with Victor Sifton in early June. As Dexter put it,

Victor says that there is a plot to double the size of the army. The plotters are McNaughton and Crerar with Price Montague [the Senior Combatant Officer at Canadian Military Headquarters in London] as a consenting party. Both staffs of course are in it (McNaughton's and Crerar's). These people want 2 corps of 3 divisions each plus one armoured division and 1 tank brigade, each.⁵⁴

There is little evidence in the private writings of various generals in the summer of 1941 to indicate that they were working to quite so deliberate a plan, or that the General Staff was scheming in such a well-coordinated way. Yet Crerar was clearly thinking in terms of at least one additional overseas division at the time, and the further possible implications for he and his colleagues. As he suggested to Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton, in August,

This would result in too large a Corps, but have you ever considered the pros and cons of a Canadian Army comprising 2 Corps each of 2 Divisions and an Armoured Division? I fully admit that this is a pretty ambitious proposal because the necessary increase in Corps, etc., troops will be fairly heavy. At the same time, I do not think that the picture is an impossible one.⁵⁵

Taking into account further forces in Canada, the result would be a total force of seven divisions, a figure that came suspiciously close to that produced by the Army during the 1930s, in theoretical mobilization plans that had argued that

the country could afford to raise a total of six infantry and one cavalry divisions overseas, and maintain them voluntarily, in the event of a future war. At the same time, these plans had not taken into account the need to simultaneously maintain the huge efforts of the RCAF and the RCN in the Second World War, or the massive demands caused by the expansion of industrial output during the war.⁵⁶

Suspensions about the links between prewar plans and Crerar's wartime program are confirmed by one further memorandum that he forwarded to Ralston in September 1941, shortly before submitting his official "Army Programme" for 1942-1943.⁵⁷ Written by Brigadier Maurice Pope, the Assistant CGS and one of the Army's rising stars,⁵⁸ the report drew explicit links between the Army's interwar defence schemes and its current organization, noting that militia units had been reorganized in the late 1930s to ensure that the proper infrastructure was in place to mobilize seven wartime divisions. These units had in fact been mobilized in that order as the Army expanded after 1939. The government's passing of the NRMA had changed the situation after 1940, Pope commented, but not so much by providing a justification to expand the Army further, as by making sure that it would be able to meet all of its commitments, both at home and overseas, without ever having to resort to extending the powers of the NRMA.

Pope's memorandum was actually written to deal with

another issue that had been raised by combining the prewar plans with the NRMA after April 1941: as more and more long-term "R" recruits began to become available for service over the next few months, and current home defence formations were brought up to strength, the Army began to run out of units to put them in. After mobilizing six divisions and other home defence battalions, the Army had few militia regiments that could quickly be raised for this purpose. One possible solution was to create entirely new units, rather than relying on the militia, but Pope argued against this alternative as both wasteful and inefficient. The real problem, he noted, lay in the fact that only a few home defence units had been officially designated to receive NRMA men, mainly for political reasons, since most of them had been recruited mainly through volunteers in local communities, and still hoped to proceed overseas as a group rather than as part of an anonymous reinforcement stream. The arrival of even a few "R" recruits in these units would signal the end of such hopes, a problem that caused one of Ralston's key civilian advisors to write to him a few days later, arguing for the option that Pope had rejected.⁵⁹ In forwarding Pope's report to Ralston, Crerar noted that there was little hope of any of these units ever going overseas, and agreed with Pope that the Army should be permitted to begin filling them with NRMA men, and withdrawing the volunteers to send them overseas. Thus, not only did Pope's memorandum provide evidence for the lengthy

origins of Crerar's current plans, but it added another indication of the latter's desire to merge the two programs of military service even further, primarily in order to keep up the Army's volunteer forces overseas.⁶⁰

All of these efforts culminated in Crerar's new "Army Programme" for 1942-1943, which was officially submitted to Ralston in mid-November, following a trip to England by both men to consult with their British counterparts. In his formal presentation, Crerar noted that the strategic situation had actually improved in Canada over the past few months as the United States came closer to being fully involved in the war. At the same time, the provision of additional divisions remained a priority overseas, to help defend the British Isles and to release British divisions to fight in North Africa, the last land theatre where Commonwealth forces remained in direct contact with the enemy. These factors, Crerar suggested, along with the possibility of continuing to use the NRMA to release volunteers for overseas service, meant that the Army in Britain could and should be expanded further. This could be done by sending the 4th Canadian Infantry Division to Europe, after converting it into an armoured division to meet British requests for further mechanized units. A second independent tank brigade would also be required to support infantry units overseas, and a second Corps headquarters to command the 4th and 5th Armoured Divisions in battle. Under the new program, no further formations would actually be

created in Canada, since 4th Division would remain there at least until early 1942, and after that the 6th Division would be sufficient to meet the country's needs. Should the situation deteriorate, however, it could be met by mobilizing a 7th Canadian Division made up predominately of NRMA recruits, a convenient source of men that would allow the Army to maintain its overseas expansion while at the same time putting the NRMA to the exact military use for which it had ostensibly been introduced in 1940.⁶¹ With the submission of his new Army program, Crerar turned over his post as Chief of the General Staff to Major-General (Lieutenant-General after November) Kenneth Stuart, the former Vice CGS, and left to take up a field command in England as General Officer Commanding, 2nd Canadian Division.⁶² Like Crerar, Stuart was a career officer. He was also an English-speaking Quebecker from Trois-Rivières, and well-known for having edited the original Canadian Defence Quarterly, the Canadian Army's well-respected professional journal, in the late 1920s and early 1930s. He had been hand-picked by Crerar to take over as CGS when Crerar went overseas.⁶³

In the meantime, between July and November manpower also remained a contentious issue at the political level, and further studies were prepared at the request of the CWC. In particular, the Labour Supply Investigation Committee, a body which had grown out of several earlier efforts to keep track of industrial manpower, completed a report in October 1941

that was more critical of the country's ability to find men for the Army than previous studies had led planners to believe. The report was delivered to the CWC at the same time as the Army program for 1942-1943, and caused a number of members to take pause. Their doubts were not eased by the fact that even the LSIC's figures came into question during the CWC's discussions. Moreover, it became clear almost immediately that even the number of men that the LSIC reported to be available for the armed forces could be found only

if drastic changes were made in existing labour policy by the introduction of large numbers of women into employment, the wide extension of [industrial] training facilities, the adjustment of wage policies and an active policy of industrial recruitment.⁶⁴

Many ministers balked at the thought of introducing such controls, doubting even then that every man needed could be pried loose from civil occupations and made useful to the armed forces. Others noted the disruption that such policies would bring to Canada's industrial expansion, which was daily becoming more significant to the larger Allied war effort.⁶⁵

At the same time as the LSIC's report was being presented to the CWC, Lieutenant-General Stuart forwarded a new report to Ralston which gave details of the Adjutant-General's plans for finding manpower to support the 1942-1943 Army program, and schedules for filling the establishments of specific formations. Major-General Browne's figures had to be revised a number of times in late November, to take into account criticisms from the CWC for being too ambitious, but the one

aspect that remained constant was his forecast that based on experiences with the first three classes of "R" recruits trained under the four-month program, in the future 20% of each new group would volunteer for the Army, 20% would go to the RCAF or RCN or be discharged for various reasons, and the remaining 60% would stay in uniform as conscripts. "If 5,000 "R" recruits are requisitioned each month," Browne concluded, "it is therefore assumed again with necessary reservation, that 1,000 of each such requisitions [sic] will enlist into the Active Army." In addition, Stuart himself estimated that another 1,000 men would be released from home defence duties by conscripts each month, thus providing a total of roughly 2,000 out of the 7,500 volunteers per month that the Army would need to meet its expanded plans.⁶⁶

In the midst of these debates, the CWC finally began discussing the specifics of the Army program at the beginning of December. C.D. Howe, the Minister of Munitions and Supply, and T.A. Crerar, the Minister of Mines and Resources, both quickly pointed to the problems that the Army would have in meeting all of its new commitments, when added to the drain caused by the country's efforts to simultaneously maintain two other large armed forces, as well as industrial output. At the same time, Prime Minister King questioned the Army's assumption that 5,500 volunteers could be found from among the public every month.⁶⁷ It was at this point that the NRMA became particularly important to the debates. When

Lieutenant-General Stuart and Major-General Browne appeared before the CWC to defend the Army's plans on 3 December, both alluded to the fact that the NRMA would allow every possible general service volunteer to be weeded out of home defence formations. If the number of civilian volunteers began to fall short of their projections, they added, the NRMA could also be applied to civilian occupations to make more men available to serve in uniform, either as volunteers or as conscripts. Even more significant was the implicit reliance of various speakers on the role of the NRMA once conscripts were placed in training, to find further volunteers. As Prime Minister King himself recording privately that day, "It must be remembered that conscription for service in Canada, means providing men properly trained for service overseas who may wish to enlist voluntarily."⁶⁸

The climax of the debate, as far as the Army program was concerned, came during the same discussion, when King, having already decided to support the new plan as long as it would not lead to overseas conscription, finally turned to Stuart and asked:

Could the Army staff give any assurance that their proposed programme could be carried out by the voluntary method; further, was this programme being presented as an effective maximum Army contribution on Canada's part, or would it be subject to increase later on? ... Stuart replied that, in his opinion, the programme proposed could be carried out on the voluntary system and it had been prepared solely on that basis. ... In a recent memorandum to the Minister he had expressed the view that the programme represented the "visible ceiling". Its adoption would constitute an

excellent, well-balanced and adequate contribution by the Canadian Army in the European theatre.⁶⁹

As Granatstein and Hitsman have commented in their history of conscription in Canada, "from this moment King's eventual support for the army program was guaranteed."⁷⁰ Although the program was not officially approved at this meeting, it never again came up for such lengthy or detailed discussion. When General Stuart met with Grant Dexter a month later, he appeared to be quite satisfied, as Dexter himself reported:

I asked him if a Canadian army of two corps plus two tank brigades was absolutely all the general staff wanted in this war. He said--absolutely all. This he said is the kind of an army a soldier dreams of commanding, hard-hitting, beautifully balanced, incredibly powerful.⁷¹

Stuart's sentiments probably would have been mirrored by Major-General Crerar, who had laid most of the groundwork for the force, and was now serving overseas, ready to command some of the same divisions. A few months later, in fact, partly thanks to the combined arguments of McNaughton and Crerar overseas, the CWC consented to adding an Army headquarters to the country's forces in England, to command the two Corps, five divisions, and additional support units that had already been established. Such a step was only logical once everything else had been authorized, and it was also difficult to avoid if the government wished its forces to fight together on the battlefield.⁷²

Even more importantly, the political result of these deliberations was the establishment of the "big army." As

Granatstein and Hitsman have put it,

a crucial decision had been taken and Canada was now committed to maintaining a large army, possibly one larger than the country could support. Given the enormous scope of the industrial and agricultural effort, an army of five divisions plus the thousands of ancillary troops, as well as a very large air force and a substantial navy would be exceedingly difficult to maintain. In retrospect, it is clear that the conscription crisis of 1944 became almost a certainty with this decision.⁷³

These conclusions are easy to make in hindsight. When the "big army" was being planned, Major-General Crerar could not have foreseen just how much the war would be transformed only a few weeks later. Even then, he had considered the possibility, and clearly relied on the NRMA to meet such dangers. If his political masters were really serious in stating that compulsory military service was intended to provide for home defence, then it was only logical and natural that he do so.⁷⁴ At the same time, Crerar had organized the compulsory military training system to ensure that even if it was not needed in Canada, it could be used as much as possible to support the Army's efforts overseas, a policy that made sense, from a military point of view, and one that his superiors chose not to countermand. The problem came when the country suddenly needed to try to do both things at once after December 1941, and on a scale which few could have prepared for in advance.

* * *

On 7 December 1941, a new and even more significant

threat to the Allied war effort appeared, when Japan launched its "infamous" surprise attack on the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor. Over the next several hours and days, attacks followed on Guam and Wake Islands, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Malaya, and Burma. Ultimately, the entry of U.S. forces into the war would prove to be one of the key turning points in the conflict. But for the next several months success seemed to follow success for Japanese forces in the Pacific. By early June, Japan's conquests stretched from the Dutch East Indies in the east all the way to the two westernmost islands in Alaska's Aleutian chain, Attu and Kiska. On 20 June a Japanese submarine directly attacked Canadian territory, for the first and last time in the war, when it shelled a remote lighthouse on Vancouver Island.⁷⁵

Although Canada did not end up playing a large role in the Pacific, Hong Kong marked the first major combat action for the country's troops, and two units, the Winnipeg Grenadiers and the Royal Regiment of Canada (from Quebec City) were lost when the garrison surrendered on Christmas Day, after a short but sharp battle.⁷⁶ At home, these defeats, along with Japan's entry into the war, added a new sense of immediacy to plans for home defence, and led to new calls for conscription to be extended to overseas service. In addition, in November 1941, Arthur Meighen succeeded R.B. Hanson as leader of the Conservative Party. As the author of the Military Service Act in the First World War, and still a

staunch conscriptionist, Meighen was sure to begin making conscription into an issue once more.⁷⁷

While these events were going on, the Liberal government itself was still grappling with the issue of the Army program for 1942-1943, and its manpower implications. Almost as soon as the extent of the Japanese attacks of early December was known, Prime Minister King was raising the question of whether the program should go ahead, or whether the country might be better to focus on increasing its own defences, a policy that would also clearly aid in avoiding any cries for conscription to be extended to overseas service. As far as the Army's key planners were concerned, however, there was still little chance of a direct attack on Canadian territory in any form larger than a temporary raid, an undertaking which would be designed to do just what King was suggesting, and divert Canadian and American attention away from Europe. As a result, Stuart recommended against any change to the Army's previous plans for overseas expansion.⁷⁸

Meanwhile, in early December the CWC turned to considering the broader issue of ensuring that enough men could be found to meet the many commitments that it was in the process of approving. A special "Cabinet Manpower Committee" was formed to begin considering ways to transfer men from jobs of lesser importance to positions in war industry or the armed forces.⁷⁹ At the same time, discussions moved from the CWC to the larger Cabinet, as members came to focus more and more

on the political consequences of these various developments. In particular, Ralston began to harden his stance, refusing to commit to maintaining the overseas Army without ever having to resort to conscription, and arguing more and more strongly that the government should in fact remove the limits it had imposed on conscription, as a sign of its awareness of the new seriousness of the war. At times, the arguments became highly acrimonious, and led to major rifts between individual ministers.⁸⁰ The response of King and some of his colleagues was to instead advocate going to the country in a plebiscite, to ask the public to release the government from its pledges on conscription. The vote was announced in the Speech from the Throne that began a new session of the House of Commons in January 1942, and took place on 27 April. Sixty-four percent of the national population signified their acceptance of the government's change in policy, while seventy-three percent of Canadians in Quebec voted against it.⁸¹


The result was further debate within the Cabinet, Ralston having pressed throughout the plebiscite for a decision on exactly what would be done in the event that the country voted "yes."⁸² A compromise of sorts was finally reached, Cabinet members agreeing to repeal Section Three of the NRMA, while not actually extending conscription to overseas service until it became "necessary" to do so.⁸³ Even then King's preference was to recall Parliament and request formal authority to alter the government's previous policies, a

Souvenons-nous de
HONG-KONG

Souvenons-nous de
L'AUSTRALIE

Gardons nos conscrits chez nous !
Empêchons M. King de pouvoir
les expédier hors du Canada.

AU PLÉBISCITE, RÉPONDONS :



NON

LIGUE POUR LA DÉFENSE DU CANADA
354 est, rue Ste-Catherine,
Montréal

L'Imprimerie Populaire, Limitée, Montréal

Handbill distributed by the leading "Non" organization in Quebec, the "Ligue pour la défense du Canada," during the 1942 plebiscite campaign. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Manuscript Group 32, B5, Papers of Brooke Claxton, Vol. 132, "Canada at War.")

decision that had supposedly just been approved by the plebiscite, and a process that Ralston and other ministers feared would simply spark a renewal of the debates that were currently taking place within the Cabinet, with further delays as the changes were then debated in the House of Commons. In fact, their worries came remarkably close to what would actually end up happening in 1944, and probably accurately reflected the hopes of King and some of the other Cabinet ministers in 1942.⁸⁴ Ralston reportedly came to the point of resigning more than once over the issue, and finally submitted a letter of resignation in early July, but King refused to accept it.⁸⁵ In the end, in the event of conscription becoming "necessary" the Cabinet agreed to pass an Order-in-Council and then recall the House of Commons for a brief vote of confidence on the measure before it was implemented, with a limit of two days on any debate. Section Three of the NRMA was finally repealed by "Bill 80," which passed into law in early August,⁸⁶ preceded by the resignation of P.J.A. Cardin, the senior French Canadian minister in the Cabinet after the death of Ernest Lapointe in late November 1941. But King managed to avoid further defections from the party, and with this step came the end of what has come to be known by historians as the "first conscription crisis."⁸⁷

Despite the significance of the "first conscription crisis" at the political level, in practice it changed very little with respect to administering the NRMA. What was more

important during this period was the ease with which the organization that had been built up over the past two years enabled the Army to respond to the vastly increased calls for home defence forces that emerged after Pearl Harbor. In fact, as panic gripped the West Coast the Army's planners came to seem remarkably prescient, and the country's defence forces expanded greatly. Yet despite the implications of these decisions for the Army's future manpower, they came not as a result of pressure from the Army, but its political masters, and particularly the Prime Minister. King first raised his concerns in a serious manner at a mid-February meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, questioning the strategic assessments of his military advisors, who had repeatedly urged that the country's current arrangements were more than adequate.⁸⁸ As a result, the three service Chiefs were summoned to appear before the CWC, where they repeated their previous opinions, noting that there was little danger of a direct attack on North America larger than a nuisance raid. As Lieutenant-General Stuart pointed out, even American planners had recently confirmed that the Allies' first priority should be Europe, reversing their own earlier preferences,⁸⁹ and in an emergency Canada still had the part-time members of its Reserve Army to rely on, in addition to thousands of staff members and other personnel in training centres and other military camps across the country, enough of whom were sufficiently well-trained and well-equipped to be rapidly

concentrated into another field division if necessary.⁹⁰

Nevertheless, King continued to press for further consideration of the issue as more and more demands for action began to pour in from party members and the larger public in British Columbia.⁹¹ In mid-March, both the RCAF and the Army finally came forward with plans to increase their home defence forces. In the Army's case, Stuart turned to his predecessor's earlier projections, and recommended that the government complete the mobilization of 6th Division as a field formation, adding headquarters and other administrative units, while at the same time raising the main brigade groups necessary for a 7th Division, and using the new force to replace the 4th Division when it went overseas later in the year. In addition, Ralston told the CWC during these discussions, the Army would increase the size of its independent defence formations in individual localities in British Columbia, and "Longer range plans would probably call for an 8th Division."⁹² Two days later, Ralston returned to the CWC to request permission to complete the 7th Division and to mobilize the three main brigade groups of the 8th Division, which "would be stationed across the country to provide additional defensive strength."⁹³ By June, Stuart was also requesting the formation of an 8th Division headquarters, in order to help exercise command over the numerous and widely-scattered units that were now serving on the west coast.⁹⁴

In the meantime, Stuart and the rest of the Army's

commanders also had to begin finding men to fill out all of these new units. Over the next few months, some twenty new infantry battalions were mobilized and brought up to strength, along with dozens of communications, logistics, artillery, and headquarters units, all for the 7th and 8th Divisions, as well as further infantry, artillery, and anti-aircraft formations for separate coast defence duties. In May 1942, the need for coast defence anti-aircraft units alone was estimated at sixty batteries, thirty-nine on the east coast and twenty-one in the west, with about 6,000 men, while the 8th Division was so short of qualified officers and NCOs that units were permitted to recruit directly from university students with only partial training in the Canadian Officers' Training Corps, and even among suitable civilian businessmen.⁹⁵ For a while, "R" recruits were posted directly from basic training centres to operational units, completing their advanced training there.⁹⁶ In two cases, the results were particularly ironic: in early January 1942, Army leaders reconstituted the Winnipeg Grenadiers and the Royal Rifles of Canada, the two infantry battalions that had been lost at Hong Kong, in an effort to improve recruiting and boost morale. Instead, both units had to be brought up to strength using large numbers of "R" recruits.⁹⁷ In other cases, NRMA men provided the resources needed to mobilize numerous infantry, artillery and anti-aircraft regiments, and many men were sent straight to their units without even stopping in basic training centres. As one



J.L. Ralston during a tour of western-Canadian training centres, summer 1942. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Manuscript Group 27, III, B 11, Papers of James Layton Ralston, Vol. 58, "Western Canadian Visit by Min. of Nat. Def. 1942 (Winnipeg, Calgary, Edmonton).")

author described the situation with respect to anti-aircraft formations in early 1942, "Often the unit's issue of Bofors guns arrived practically simultaneously with substantial incoming drafts of untrained "R" recruits, and all would be plunged immediately into an operational role."⁹⁸ In July 1942, officials even established "No. 1 Armoured Train," a specially designed and built armour-plated engine and a number of cars, that carried several artillery and anti-aircraft guns and a company of infantry. It made regular trips over the single rail line linking Prince Rupert and Terrace, B.C., starting at the end of the month. The train first ran twice a day, then once a day, and later once per week, until September 1943, emphasizing both the scale to which the west coast had been mobilized and the difficulty of protecting every point at once in such a vast, unsettled region.⁹⁹ In addition, the rapid mobilization and concentration of units on the west coast set off a new wave of defence construction, crews working feverishly throughout 1942 to complete permanent barracks and other facilities for dozens of new units, some of which still ended up spending most of the winter of 1942-1943 under canvas.¹⁰⁰

The extent to which Canadian society became mobilized for war also increased in other ways during this period. In early 1942, the Reserve Army was extensively reorganized and given a serious operational role, to act as a second line of defence for the country in the event of an attack. Since late 1940,

when Major-General Crerar had reorganized the larger Army, the primary role of the Reserve Army had been to provide reinforcements for active units.¹⁰¹ As the number of volunteers who could easily leave civilian society began to decline in the summer of 1941, Crerar began searching for other roles, finally settling on what he considered "the quite limited but respectable responsibilities of 'Home Guard' and 'Aid to the Civil Power'."¹⁰² With the events of December 1941, these roles suddenly became much more important, and reserve units were formed into twelve brigade groups across the country, which theoretically could be mobilized quickly to fight as field formations should it become necessary. Although service in the Reserve Army remained a part-time occupation, training was much longer and more thorough, and efforts were made to equip units as much as possible to wartime standards. In order for the scheme to work, units also needed to be kept at wartime strengths in personnel, and in April 1942 a major drive was launched to find enough men to bring every unit up to its full establishment.¹⁰³

In fact, some reserve units made very visible contributions to the war. Authorities in British Columbia organized 115 companies of "Pacific Coast Militia Rangers" in the summer of 1942 (a total of over 14,000 men), in order to augment the defences of more remote areas along the coast. In Quebec, the *Fusiliers du St. Laurent* raised a 2nd and a 3rd Battalion of their regiment, 2,500 men in all, to guard the

Gaspé region after German submarines entered the St. Lawrence River in the same period.¹⁰⁴ In both cases, these forces enabled Army commanders to respond to public concerns without having to dissipate their resources of more scarce full-time personnel.

In addition, the Cabinet War Committee continued to wrestle throughout 1942 with the implications of the "big army" program, and the combined needs of the Army, the RCAF, the RCN, and wartime industry. At the end of January 1942, the Cabinet Manpower Committee reported on ways to increase the number of men in wartime industry and the armed forces, and the CWC began to consider various controls on civilian manpower.¹⁰⁵ The main causes of disagreement were the degree to which the measures should focus on finding men for industry, agriculture, or the armed forces, and to which they should be made compulsory or voluntary. The result was that the CWC attempted to do everything, and at the end of March the country's "National Selective Service" organization officially came into existence, with responsibilities divided between the Departments of National War Services and of Labour.¹⁰⁶ As the months went on, and the demand for manpower of all types increased, more debate followed, and ministers repeatedly failed to make a final decision on the matter. In a series of steps from September 1942 to January 1943, all functions relating to manpower were successively transferred to the Department of Labour, and controls

established over more and more aspects of civilian employment and manpower.¹⁰⁷

As the armed forces and industry expanded, and the number of men available for these positions began to decline, women also began to take on increasingly significant roles in the war effort. By 1943, the number of women working in paid employment had increased by 437,000, or over two-thirds more than their prewar numbers, while another 750,000 were estimated to be contributing to the operation of family farms.¹⁰⁸ In mid-1941, the Canadian Women's Auxiliary Air Force (later the RCAF Women's Division) and the Canadian Women's Army Corps came into existence, and a year later the Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service, joining women who had been participating in the services as Nursing Sisters and other parts of the medical services since before the First World War. For the rest of the war over 50,000 women served in the three armed forces, including 21,624 in the CWAC, performing duties that ranged from traditional "women's jobs" such as cooks, clerks, or waitresses, to non-traditional ones like drivers, mechanics, wireless operators, and aircraft controllers.¹⁰⁹

The result of this massive expansion was that by the beginning of July 1943 the Canadian Army's contemporary strength returns indicated a total of 478,053 men and women serving in the active Army, including 69,389 NRMA recruits and "Members (HD)," and 11,913 members of the Canadian Women's

Army Corps. Thus, 14.5% of the entire active Army was made up of conscripts, 3,129 of whom were serving on duties outside Canada, forming one-third of the total of 9,613 Canadians in these posts. One quarter of the 264,084 men and women who were serving on Canadian soil were conscripts (66,260 men), and the proportions on operational duties inside Canada's territorial limits were even higher: 8,419 NRMA men served under command of 6th Canadian Division (70.7% of its total strength of 11,902), 6,903 in 7th Division (68.8% of 10,027), and 5,945 in 8th Division (72.4% of 8,215), while over eighty percent (82.9%, or 2,998) of the 3,617 men of the 21st Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, which was then posted independently in Valcartier, Quebec, were NRMA recruits. In addition, almost half (15,435, or 49.4%) of the remaining 31,232 personnel serving on other operational duties in Atlantic Command, Pacific Command and miscellaneous coast and internal defence units were conscripts.¹¹⁰

The reason why 3,129 conscripts were serving outside the country by July 1943 was one last development which took place in 1942-1943, and which reveals the extent to which the country's defence forces had expanded by then, both numerically and in the scope of their service. The result of the repeal of Section Three of the National Resources Mobilization Act in August 1942 was a number of successive changes to the definitions of where NRMA men could be ordered to serve. Even before Japan's entry into the war in December

1941, experts had begun exploring the possibility of extending the NRMA to include areas such as Newfoundland and other posts that were outside the country, but could be argued to be vital to its security, and where the likelihood of attack was not much larger than on Canadian soil. If this could be done, then even more general service soldiers could be released for duties overseas.¹¹¹ After December 1941, conditions became even more favourable for expanding the conditions of service under the NRMA, and according to the Justice Department changes could have been made simply by using the War Measures Act to override the NRMA.¹¹² Few Liberals were willing to go that far without first taking the political step of asking to be released from earlier pledges, however, and one aim of the plebiscite of April 1942 and later debates over Bill 80 was clearly to prepare the ground for such changes.¹¹³ The first official extension of service under the NRMA came just as Bill 80 was being introduced in Parliament, when small numbers of men were ordered to the United States (U.S.) as part of their routine duties.¹¹⁴ As events in the Pacific went from bad to worse, Canadian airmen and then ground troops were sent as far as Alaska to help defend American territory. The first major amendment to the NRMA came a month after Bill 80 passed into law, when two anti-aircraft batteries were sent to Annette Island, in the Alaskan panhandle (just north of Prince Rupert and the Queen Charlotte Islands), to protect RCAF aircraft there.¹¹⁵ In a matter of days, the scope of the NRMA had

been expanded to include Newfoundland and Labrador, and by August 1943 authorities had passed a blanket Order-in-Council permitting NRMA recruits to be posted to Newfoundland, Labrador, the U.S., Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, and British Guiana; in other words, every place in the western hemisphere where Canadian troops were currently serving.¹¹⁶

As a result of these developments, by August 1943 Canadian soldiers had also seen action on a small but still significant combat basis in North America. On 15 and 16 August 1943, over 5,000 Canadian soldiers of the 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade and the combined Canadian-American "First Special Service Force" joined roughly 30,000 Americans in landings at Kiska, in the Aleutian Islands, aimed at retaking the island from the Japanese. The event was notable for two reasons: it was the first time that Canadian troops had ever taken part in a field operation under U.S. command, and it marked the first use of NRMA soldiers in a combat role in the war. The campaign grew out of closer ties between Canadian and American commanders that had emerged more generally in the earlier years of the war, with the need to coordinate various defence measures in North America, and particularly on the west coast. There, Major-General George R. Pearkes, the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Pacific Command, had formed a strong working relationship with Lieutenant-General John L. DeWitt, his American counterpart, and in April 1943 Pearkes suggested that DeWitt consider including Canadians in

planned U.S. operations in the Aleutians. The idea made its way to Ottawa by way of the American military, who contacted Lieutenant-General Stuart through Major-General Pope, who was by then serving as Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in Washington. By the time Stuart took the idea to his Minister, it had already been worked out in most of its essentials, and the Cabinet War Committee was not happy to be presented with this fait accompli. But Pearkes, Stuart and a few other officials strongly supported the plan, noting that it would further Canadian-American relations, improve the training, morale and public exposure of the country's home defence forces, and especially give conscripts an opportunity to take an active role in defending the continent, dispelling some of the feelings that had begun to grow up against them. The CWC finally agreed to permit Canadian forces to participate in the attack, with a number of reservations designed to prevent any repeat of the criticisms of untrained and poorly-equipped troops being sent to fight in the Pacific, that had followed the loss of the Winnipeg Grenadiers and the Royal Regiment of Canada at Hong Kong two years earlier.¹¹⁷

Preparations for the Kiska landings began almost as soon as permission to proceed was received. Asked to contribute a force similar to a U.S. "Regimental Combat Team" (roughly a brigade), Pearkes assigned 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, the most senior brigade in his command, to act as the headquarters for the operation. Infantry battalions and other units for

the brigade group were chosen from throughout Pacific Command, to ensure that only the strongest and best-trained were sent. Among those selected were the reconstituted Winnipeg Grenadiers, and a fourth infantry battalion, *Le Régiment de Hull*, which was added to the normal three of a Canadian infantry brigade, to carry out the duties of corresponding "combat engineer" units under the U.S. organization. The *Régiment de Hull*'s role was to defend the landing beaches from enemy counter-attacks, and to bring up supplies for the three lead battalions, a task for which the Brigade commander later noted they were "highly praised by all concerned."¹¹⁸ With the addition of the *Régiment de Hull*, the Brigade also conveniently came to include units from all parts of the country.¹¹⁹ That summer, Canadian soldiers turned in their British-pattern equipment for U.S. tools, helmets, arctic clothing, and other supplies, again for the first time in the country's history, keeping only their own battledress and personal weapons. Meanwhile, special Orders-in-Council were passed to ensure that NRMA soldiers could be sent to the Aleutians, and to allow Canadian soldiers to come under the command of American officers, both of which were implemented in a series of stages as the CWC assured itself that every possible step was being taken to guarantee the force's readiness.¹²⁰

Ultimately, to the embarrassment of many (although undoubtedly the relief of most of the men who participated in



An Intelligence Section Corporal illustrating the load carried into combat by Canadian troops at Kiska: a Thompson sub-machine gun, 200 rounds of ammunition, a 35-oz. [approximately one litre] water bottle, Bowie knife, rations, bed-roll, shovel, haversack containing personal effects, a tent, poles, and pegs, and extra clothing. Total weight 85 lbs. [almost 40 kilograms]. Note also the American-style helmet, but British battledress, worn by the Corporal. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 14165, War Diary, Headquarters, 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, Appendix XI, October 1943.)

the attack), the force arrived on Kiska only to find that the Japanese garrison had abandoned the island three weeks earlier. In retrospect, a number of signs of the evacuation might have been detected. Yet at the time commanders were more concerned with their previous experiences of combat in the Pacific, where Japanese forces had refused to concede territory and had repeatedly fought to the last man. Preparations for the Kiska campaign were taken very seriously, the capture of neighbouring Attu having required a month of hard fighting in May, and casualties of roughly a third of the attacking force, as well as the deaths of almost the entire Japanese garrison of 2,500 men.¹²¹ The fleet that evacuated Kiska was spotted but was instead assumed to be bringing reinforcements to the island, which already had at least twice as many men as Attu. When activity on the island ceased in early August, it seemed only that the garrison had left its main headquarters to move into prepared defences in the hills, which could be used to make the fighting even tougher. Fog and bad weather combined to make it difficult to confirm or deny their presence.¹²² The attack was not completely bloodless, as a number of men accidentally fired at each other in the fog, or triggered Japanese booby-traps, land mines, or other munitions. Casualties included four Canadian dead, and four others wounded. Judging by the comments of one observer it was just as well that the force had not faced the Japanese: as the War Diarist for the 13th Brigade recorded, "every hill,

more especially every high ridge, was alive with Jap positions and dummy positions. This would have been a terrific fight."¹²³

* * *

With the end of the Kiska landings came the end of the almost-continual expansion of the Canadian Army that had been going on for the past two years. In that time, Canada had managed to raise a total ground force equivalent to more than eight divisions, half-a-million men and women in all, and one that was now proving itself capable of simultaneously sending combat forces to two major theatres of war. The country had also been extensively mobilized in other ways by 1943, and was now maintaining three huge armed services, while also making economic contributions out of all proportion to its size, all of which would earn it a place of respect among the western Allies following the war.

Yet this was also exactly the situation that many members of the Cabinet and its smaller War Committee had feared in 1940 and 1941. By August 1943, the Canadian Army had grown far beyond the size that had been foreseen at the beginning of the war, partly due to the influence of the senior generals who had been responsible for shaping its character in those years, and partly due to the events of the war itself. In fact, in some cases politicians had proven themselves just as prepared to press for expanding Canadian forces, particularly in response to the panic of their own citizens, as the

generals that some of them so distrusted.

The one central factor in all of these developments was the National Resources Mobilization Act. As we have seen, the NRMA allowed Major-General Crerar and several of his subordinates and successors to argue for expanding the Army throughout 1941 and 1942, not because they disagreed with the policies of their political masters or were trying to push the government towards conscripting men for overseas service, but because they really seemed to believe that the Army could be maintained without having to resort to conscription, thanks to the successful way in which the NRMA was functioning. The NRMA also enabled Lieutenant-General Stuart to respond to huge new demands following the outbreak of war in the Pacific in late 1941, and the concurrent rise in pressures for action from members of the Cabinet War Committee, without needing to change the Army's existing plans for overseas expansion. At the same time, the NRMA may have helped to convince some of his superiors that the Army could keep being expanded in this period for the same reasons, and in some cases against their own better judgement.

Unfortunately, the ultimate result of these decisions was to create a force that did prove larger than the Army's ability to maintain it indefinitely, especially against the combined pressures of competition from the country's two other armed forces and civilian industry, rising casualties in Italy and later in north-west Europe in 1943 and 1944, and the need

to keep such large forces up to strength both at home and overseas, something that none of the Army's planners had foreseen on the scale that they were facing by 1942 and 1943. The main difficulty would come if the rigid and complex structure that had been built up in Canada ever began to break down, thus ending the constant stream of reinforcements that the planners had counted on to build up and later maintain the country's overseas forces. By August 1943, some of the problems that would begin to cause this breakdown were already becoming apparent. As we shall see in Chapter Four, over the next few months these difficulties would become more and more obvious, and would cause the Army to begin questioning its own ability to maintain such large forces overseas. The result would be to set the stage for the second and even larger conscription crisis that followed in the fall of 1944.

Endnotes

1. According to C.P. Stacey, in Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), p. 48, the army reached its highest total strength for any specific point in the war on 22 March 1944, with 495,804 all ranks, including 15,845 women and 74,391 NRMA recruits, with an overseas strength of 242,463, while the RCAF also peaked near the end of 1943 with 206,350 personnel, of whom 46,272 were serving overseas, and the RCN in January 1945, due to more complicated manning requirements, at which time its total strength was 92,441 all ranks. The peak for Canada's home defence army came during the spring and summer of 1943, with about 60,000 troops serving in North America, and a training capacity of over 75,000 additional recruits, along with several thousand further men and women who were serving on the staffs of training centres, in other camps, and in headquarters and administrative facilities across Canada. For home defence numbers, see Stacey's other work covering the same period: Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and

the Pacific (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1955), pp. 135, 174-76. For further discussion of the expansion of the RCAF in Canada and its experiences overseas, see W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Vol. II (Toronto: Supply and Services Canada/University of Toronto Press, 1986), and Brereton Greenhous, Stephen J. Harris, William C. Johnston, and William G.P. Rawling, The Crucible of War, 1939-1945: The Official History of The Royal Canadian Air Force, Vol. III (Toronto: Supply and Services Canada/University of Toronto Press, 1994), and for the RCN, see Gilbert Norman Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada: Its Official History, Vol. II, Activities on Shore during the Second World War (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1952); Joseph Schull, Far Distant Ships: An Official Account of Canadian Naval Operations in World War II (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1950; reprint, Toronto: Stoddart, 1987); Marc Milner, North Atlantic Run: The Royal Canadian Navy and the Battle for the Convoys (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), and Canada's Navy: The First Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), chapters 5-8, pp. 79-157.

2. See Frederick W. Gibson and Barbara Robertson, eds., Ottawa at War: The Grant Dexter Memoranda, 1939-1945 (Winnipeg: Manitoba Record Society, 1994), 16 September 1941, p. 195, as well as Dexter's later memoranda during this period, all of which used the term "big army" to describe the plans that were being debated.

3. See in particular Bruce Hutchison, The Incredible Canadian, A candid portrait of Mackenzie King: his works, his times, and his nation (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Company, 1952), and R. MacGregor Dawson, The Conscription Crisis of 1944 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961).

4. E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1956), and Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945, op.cit. The most detailed description of the actual development of the Army during this period can be found in Stacey's Six Years of War, op.cit., chapter III, "The Expansion of the Army, 1939-1943," pp. 93-104.

5. Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977; reprint, Copp Clark Pitman, 1985), particularly pp. 156-58.

6. On this issue, see M.A. Hooker, "Serving Two Masters: Ian Mackenzie and Civil-Military Relations in Canada, 1935-1939," Journal of Canadian Studies, Spring 1986, and Stephen J. Harris, Canadian Brass: The Making of a Professional Army, 1860-1939 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988),

especially pp. 167-91.

7. See Paul Dickson, "The Limits of Professionalism: General H.D.G. Crerar and the Canadian Army, 1914-1944," Ph.D. thesis, University of Guelph, 1993, and "Visions of Professionalism: General H.D.G. Crerar and the Canadian Army, 1939-1942," paper presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, 1992, as well as J.L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), pp. 95-99.

8. J.E. Rea, "What Really Happened? A new look at the Conscription Crisis," The Beaver 74(2), April/May 1994, pp. 10-19, and David Wilson, "Reflections on Conscription, 1944-45," paper presented at the Sixth Military History Colloquium of the Wilfrid Laurier University Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies, 21 April 1995.

9. On this issue, see in particular Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 150-51. C.P. Stacey provides an overview of recruiting in 1939 and 1940 in Six Years of War, pp. 53-53, 79-80, and 112-15, and on the events of the 1941 campaign itself see pp. 115-16, as well as Granatstein and Hitsman, pp. 152-54, and Granatstein, Canada's War, pp. 201-4.

10. On the origins and development of the recruiting campaign, see National Archives of Canada [NAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 26, Papers of Prime Minister W.L.M. King [hereafter King Papers], J4, Vol. 424, Minutes of the Cabinet War Committee [hereafter "CWC Minutes"], 23, 25 and 30 April, and 9 May 1941.

11. Among the themes emphasized by Ralston in his announcement was the fact that the new campaign was not meant to meet a sudden new need for volunteers, but merely to accelerate the army's current plans for expansion. For a copy of this speech, see NAC, Record Group [RG] 25, Records of the Department of External Affairs, Vol. 2633, File 715-40, "National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940. Military Service in Canada," pt. 1: "Call for Men for the Army: An Address by Honourable J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence, Delivered over a national network of Canadian radio stations, 11th May 1941."

12. Stacey, Six Years of War, p. 116, and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 154. See also comments in Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 20 May and 12 June 1941, pp. 169-71, and 176-78.

13. For example, as the entry in NAC, RG 24, Records of the Department of National Defence, Vol. 17277, War Diary, No. 110 Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centre [CA(B)TC], Vernon,

British Columbia, 28 February 1941, notes, that camp was "acting as the district recruiting centre for the Active Force" even before the 1941 recruiting drive, processing over seventy prospective general service men in the month of February alone. See also Ibid., Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, 20, 22, 28 and 31 May, 17 and 23 June 1941, which records a total of ninety-five civilians being sent there by the local recruiting officer for enlistment and training during the 1941 campaign.

14. In particular, see various War Diaries for training centres in Military District No. 5, which reveal a detailed and well-coordinated campaign where recruiting parties were sent out separately to towns and parishes throughout their regions: NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, Quebec, 30 May; Vol. 17236, No. 53 CA(B)TC, Lauzon, Quebec, 4, 10-11 June; Vol. 17243, No. 55 CA(B)TC, Rimouski, Quebec, 4 June; and Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, Quebec, Appendix II, June 1941 (also diary entries for 11-13 June). In addition, see Ibid., Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, Quebec, 11 and 15 June 1941, which records a special display of tents, dugouts, and equipment outside that city's post office, as well as flag-lowering ceremonies conducted every day in the city by the centre's band, and a concert where recruiting speeches were made by both the camp's commanding officer and the local curé. For examples of similar activities outside Quebec, see Ibid., Vol. 17291, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, Alberta, 16 and 23 May, where a former District recruiting officer was seconded to the centre and a committee of several officers formed to coordinate its activities in support of the national recruiting drive, as well as Vol. 17296, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, Alberta, 23 May, where a party of men was sent to join a rally by the Canadian Legion, and Vol. 17144, War Diary, No. 10 CA(B)TC, Kitchener, Ontario, 19 June 1941, which records a special parade that was held for an estimated 10,000 spectators in that city's Victoria Park, with demonstrations of "Battalion drill while formed up in mass, Lewis gun team-work, bayonet-fighting, mass singing of marching songs, mass physical training exercises, a recruiting speech by Miss Lowe, Y.W.C.A. secretary, A.A. demonstration, and a March Past with Brig. D.J. McDonald [the District Officer Commanding (DOC), Military District No. 1] taking the salute."

15. For example, see clippings on Ibid., Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, Appendix [31], May 1941: "Biggest Military Parade In Vernon's History Is To Be Staged Saturday," Vernon News, 8 May; "Vernon Thrilled by Big Patriotic Parade," Vancouver Sun, 12 May; "Vernon Holds Monster Parade In Support of War Savings," Vancouver Daily Province, 12 May; and "City's Patriotic Parade Is Witnessed By Hundreds," Vernon News, 15 May; as well as Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown,

Appendix V, June 1941, various clippings, and particularly "Enthusiastic Opening Of Victory Loan Campaign," 3 June [title of newspaper missing]; Vol. 17296, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 31 May; Vol. 17265, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, Manitoba, 2 June; Vol. 17291, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 9 June; Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, 12 June; and Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, 15 June 1941.

16. On the linking of various patriotic activities during the First World War, see Daniel T. Byers, "The Conscription Election of 1917 and Its Aftermath in Orillia, Ontario," Ontario History LXXXIII(4), December 1991, p. 279. For evidence of links during the 1941 campaign, see comments in NAC, RG 25, Vol. 2633, File 715-40, pt. 1: "Call for Men for the Army: An Address by Honourable J.L. Ralston...", op.cit.

17. For a few of the more detailed or notable descriptions of events in individual training centres, see NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17180, No. 22 CA(B)TC, North Bay, Ontario, 28 June; Vol. 17188, No. 31 CA(B)TC, Cornwall, Ontario, 28 June; Vol. 17195, No. 32 CA(B)TC, Peterborough, Ontario, 28 June; Vol. 17221, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, Quebec, 28 June; Vol. 17269, No. 102 CA(B)TC, Fort William, Ontario, 28 June; Vol. 17144, No. 10 CA(B)TC, Kitchener, 28-29 June; Vol. 17206, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, Quebec, 28-29 June; Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 28-29 June; and Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 28-29 June 1941.

18. Ibid., Vol. 17202, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, Quebec, 12-13 July; Vol. 17206, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 12-13 July; Vol. 17214, No. 43 CA(B)TC, Sherbrooke, Quebec, 12-13 July; Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 12-13 July; and Vol. 17221, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, 12-13 July 1941; as well as Stacey, Six Years of War, p. 116.

19. For example, NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17133, War Diary, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, Appendix I, July 1941, "Distribution des proclamations, 3 juillet, 1941," lists parties of men being sent to fifty different towns and parishes in the area on that day alone. See also Ibid., Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, 3 July 1941, which notes that every officer but one in each training company, along with three additional officers supplied by the Advanced Infantry Training Centre in Valcartier, were all assigned to deliver the proclamation, in order to ensure that it was distributed to every local parish. Also Ibid., Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown, 3 July, and Vol. 17265, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, 3 July 1941.

20. For examples of later recruiting activities, see Ibid., Vol. 17202, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 22-23 August, and Appendix IV, August 1941: "Report on Recruiting Activities.

Week Commencing 30th August.... [ellipses in original] Ending 6th Sept., 1941"; Vol. 17154, No. 20 CA(B)TC, Brantford, Ontario, 23-25 August, and Appendix IX, August 1941, documents related to a tour of the camp by a group of Canadian newspaper editors, and particularly "Syllabus for Saturday Afternoon August 23rd," which gives an excellent layman's summary of the types and range of training carried out by a typical basic training centre at this point in the war. Also Ibid., Vol. 17207, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 26 November, and Appendix 8, November 1941, "Programme ... Visite centre 42, Joliette, 26 Nov. 1941," which records the centre's hosting of the DOC and other officers from MD 4, along with "a continual stream of Parish Priests, Municipal Officials and Citizens" from the surrounding area, all for a "Recruiting Special Meeting," as well as very similar meetings in Vol. 17222, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, 2 December, and Appendix 5, December 1941, "Visite -- centre 45, Sorel, 2 dec. 1941"; Vol. 17226, No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, Quebec, 3 December; and Vol. 17214, No. 43 CA(B)TC, Sherbrooke, 18 December 1941, which provides a particularly detailed description of the activities and speeches held during its recruiting meeting. Lastly, see also indications of individual training centres continuing to act as enlistment depots for local civilian volunteers after July 1941, in Vol. 17252, No. 62 CA(B)TC, Charlottetown, 2 September, 22 and 24 November 1941, and 3, 7, 20, and 28-29 April 1942; Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 17 and 27 September 1941; and Vol. 17208, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 5, 9, 11-12, 16-21, 23-24, and 28 February 1942.

21. Ibid., Vol. 17226, No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, Appendix 9, January 1942, circular letter, Adjutant-General to General Officers Commanding-in-Chief [GOSC-in-C], Atlantic and Pacific Commands, 4th Canadian Division, All District Officers Commanding [DOC], et.al., 13 December 1941, and Vol. 17298, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, entry for 9 January 1942.

22. Ibid., Vol. 17208, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 26 March 1942; and Stacey, Six Years of War, p. 116. In addition, see the description of activities carried out in connection with the Second Victory Loan campaign in Fort William, Ontario, and Portage la Prairie, Manitoba, in NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17270, No. 102 CA(B)TC, 16 and 21 February, and 3 March, and Vol. 17266, No. 100 CA(B)TC, 19 February 1942.

23. Ibid., Vol. 17221, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, 16 June, and Vol. 17206, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 26 June 1941. For later examples, see also the description of a "monster Recruiting Rally" that was held for 1500 citizens in Joliette, north of Montreal, in mid-July, on Ibid., Vol. 17206, No. 42 CA(B)TC, 15 July 1941, as well as comments made in Vol. 17202, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, unnumbered appendix from August 1941: "Hemmingford, Athelstan, Huntingdon Enlistment Commendable,"

newspaper clipping from the editorial page of the Huntingdon Gleaner, 3 September 1941. For a similar example from outside Quebec, see Ibid., Vol. 17153, No. 20 CA(B)TC, Brantford, 28 June 1941, which notes that although approximately 1000 people had visited the camp on "Army Day," the impact on recruiting was considered to be "Questionable." The next day 250 civilians returned for church services and other displays, but the centre's War Diarist was even more pessimistic, quoting from a report by the Orderly Officer that stated: "In consideration of the small number and ages of those who visited the camp, it is generally conceded that recruiting would not benefit directly but possibly indirectly by this procedure."

24. On the recruiting campaign in M.D. 5 in particular, see sources cited in note 14, above, as well as NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17233, War Diary, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, 11 July 1941, which proudly noted the Military District's surpassing of its objectives. On the recruiting drive more generally, and particularly concerns about the response in Quebec at a higher political level, see King Papers, CWC Minutes, 20 and 30 May, 24 June, and 15 July 1941; memorandum dated 12 June 1941, in Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, pp. 176-78; J.L. Granatstein, Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 201-204; and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 152-54.

25. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, Appendix "T," p. 600. Unfortunately, figures for NRMA recruits volunteering for general service in the army, navy, and air force are available only by individual months for this period, while the campaign actually ended part of the way through July. Thus, the low number of 1,400 cited here is taken from figures for May and June alone, while the higher one includes all of July, which in fact had the highest single totals for the year, the large majority of which likely came thanks to the campaign.

26. For example, see NAC, RG 24, Vols. 17144-45, War Diary, No. 10 CA(B)TC, Kitchener, which records separate visits from recruiting officers from the RCAF, the RCN, the Canadian Armoured Corps, "the Canadian Armoured Division Signals," the Royal Canadian Artillery, the local active force ambulance unit (15th Field Ambulance), and a representative looking for candidates for trades training, all specifically to recruit NRMA men, and all between 8 May and 9 July 1941. Similar cases of representatives coming from most of these branches and services appear in other War Diaries, as well as the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, the Royal Canadian Engineers, and the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps. For examples of RCCS and RCE recruiting, see especially Ibid., Vol. 17168, No. 23 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, Ontario, 17 June and 29 July (as well as

other entries over the following months, and references to "R" men being recruited for the Sault Ste. Marie and Sudbury Regiment on 9 and 18 September); Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, 30 September; and Vol. 17195, No. 32 CA(B)TC, Peterborough, Ontario, 9 December 1941. For the RCOC, see Ibid., Vol. 17182, No. 22 CA(B)TC, North Bay, 12-13 January 1942. In Quebec, a Major S.F.H. Lane of the 14th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, toured several Montreal-area training centres searching for men for his unit in early April (Ibid., Vol. 17206, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 8 April; Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 8 April; Vol. 17221, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, 9 April; and Vol. 17213, No. 43 CA(B)TC, Sherbrooke, 10 April 1941), as did representatives of the 112th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, RCA, in Alberta later that year (Ibid., Vol. 17292, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 17 November 1941, and Vol. 17298, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 14 January 1942). Huntingdon was visited by the 6th Duke of Connaught's Royal Canadian Hussars and the Royal Montreal Regiment, while other units like the 6th Field Ambulance took advantage of their own stay in the same camp for unit's basic training, to fill the last of their needs with volunteers from among the NRMA men (Ibid., Vols. 17201-2, No. 41 CA(B)TC, 23-24 April, 12 June, and 1 November 1941). St. Jérôme played host to officers from two French-speaking units, the Régiment de Hull and the 50th Battery, RCA (Ibid., Vols. 16913-14, No. 44 CA(B)TC, 8 and 16 September, 17 October, 27-28 October, and 3 November 1941), while in Ontario Major Conn Smythe, the owner of the Toronto Maple Leafs, came to Brantford to recruit men for his 30th ("Sportsmen's") Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, and the unit later returned there to conduct its own basic training in late 1941, as noted in chapter two (see Ibid., Vol. 17154, No. 20 CA(B)TC, 8 October 1941, as well as Douglas Hunter, War Games: Conn Smythe and Canada's Fighting Men [Toronto: Viking, 1996; reprint, Penguin Books, 1997], particularly pp. 77-78). At least one conscript in Quebec also went active to join the Provost Corps, more popularly known as the "Military Police," a body that later helped track many NRMA defaulters and deserters as the war went on, (NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17208, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 20 March 1942), while New Glasgow, Nova Scotia, played host to recruiters from the Canadian Forestry Corps at around the same time (Ibid., Vol. 17250, No. 61 CA(B)TC, 27 March 1942). For other examples of volunteers going to the 12th Field Ambulance, No. 16 Canadian General Hospital, the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps, several different Fortress or Coast Defence artillery units, the Provost Corps, the Forestry Corps, and even one man who converted to active service to join the Postal Corps, see also Ibid., Vols. 17278-79, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, July 1941-January 1942.

27. Ibid., Vol. 17202, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 8 July 1941.

28. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, Appendix "T," pp. 599-600.

29. For these numbers, see Ibid., pp. 600-602. The decision to limit recruiting in the training centres can be found in King Papers, CWC Minutes, 8 and 14 May 1942.

30. Charles Messenger, 'Bomber' Harris and the Strategic Bombing Offensive, 1939-1945 (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1984), p. 191.

31. For example, according to NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17195, War Diary, No. 32 CA(B)TC, 9-14 July 1941, the entire administrative and training staff of the Peterborough, Ontario, training centre went active at the same time as one of its classes of NRMA recruits in early July, making the whole camp officially 100% active just as the government's official recruiting campaign came to an end, a feat that attracted considerable attention. In Sorel, Quebec, all officers and sergeants on the training centre's staff volunteered for active service after a talk by their commander, Col. G.D. Massue, while in Valleyfield the camp's War Diary recorded that "The recruiting Campaign proves to be a success, as most of our Staff [are] going active." St. Jérôme reported its "staff and recruits signing up satisfactorily" for general service in late June, and by mid-July at least 33 personnel had gone active. In Montmagny, a number of staff members volunteered for active service in the midst of the 1941 recruiting campaign, "Causerie sur le patriotisme en faveur du recrutement par le Capt. Adj. L. Cantin," while in Rimouski 126 out of 139 went active in July, and later "plusieurs de nos officiers et sous-officiers" were transferred to the region's main active service regiment, Les Fusiliers du St-Laurent, in early 1942. For these examples see Ibid., Vol. 17221, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, 16 July; Vol. 17225, No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, 19 July; Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 27 June and 16 July; Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, 12-13 June; and Vol. 17243, No. 55 CA(B)TC, Rimouski, 9 July 1941 and 10 February 1942; as well as comments in Ibid., Vol. 17237, No. 53 CA(B)TC, Lauzon, 5 July 1941. For references to staff members joining the RCAF, see also Ibid., Vol. 17225, No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, 15 August, and Vol. 17207, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 10 December 1941.

32. For example, see Ibid., Vol. 17201, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 15, 23-24 and 30 April 1941, which records the slower and more piecemeal conversion of members of the staff there, as well as comments on Ibid., Vol. 17207, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 14-15 October 1941. For a similar example outside Quebec, see Ibid., Vol. 17265, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage la Prairie, 3 and 21 June 1941, where 43 out of 200

other ranks on the staff had still not volunteered for active service by late June.

33. On the creation of the Ogdensburg Agreement and the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, as well as later defence planning, see in particular Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 336-54, and Granatstein, Canada's War, pp. 124-32, and specific references to the significance of these agreements in setting the two-division total in the CWC Minutes cited in the following endnotes.

34. On the genesis of the new division, and particularly Major-General Crerar's recommendation to bring it up to its full establishment, see Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence [DHH], "AHQ Rpt (D7)": "The 6th Canadian Division," pp. 1-5, as well as NAC, MG 27, III, B 11, Papers of J.L. Ralston [hereafter Ralston Papers], Vol. 37, "Appreciations - Chiefs of Staff," CGS to Minister of National Defence, "Appreciation: The Nature of the Canadian Army Effort, Mid-Summer 1941 to Spring 1942," 18 May, and Chiefs of Staff Appreciation, 28 May; and King Papers, CWC Minutes, 5 June 1941.

35. In fact, during the summer of 1941 Crerar was facing not only the traditional suspicions of the military by Canadian politicians, but also relatively strong criticism from the Globe and Mail and other newspapers, who questioned his newly-organized training program, arguing that these men should instead be called up, administered and trained by local militia units, an idea that looked back to the procedures of the First World War. In Crerar's view, this would result in a much less efficient system of training and would produce men incapable of fighting as professionals, as was needed overseas, and he thus spent a good deal of time combatting the press campaign. On this issue, see NAC, MG 30, E 157, Papers of General H.D.G. Crerar [Crerar Papers], Vol. 1, File 958C.009(D12), "CGS files 1940-1941 -- Personal Correspondence Lt-Gen Crerar -- Lt-Gen McNaughton. Period Aug 40 to Mar 41," Crerar to McNaughton, 26 June; Vol. 25, File 958C.009(D426), "General Crerar's personal papers -- Addresses and Memoranda by General H.D.G. Crerar," vol. I, press release: "Text of address today by Major-Gen. H.D.G. Crerar, Chief of the General Staff, to a conference of Commandants of Training Centres from all parts of the Dominion...", 8 July; and Vol. 19, File 958C.009(D333), "General Crerar's personal correspondence file ... July 1940-June 1941," press release, 22 July: statement by Lt.-Gen. McNaughton on training in Canada; as well as MG 30, E 133, Papers of General A.G.L. McNaughton, Vol. 227, File CC7/CRERAR/6, Crerar to Minister of National Defence, 27 June; and newspaper clippings: "They Walk Before They Run," Calgary Herald, 25 July, and "Dominion's War Training Plan Wins Full Approval From Corps Commander

McNaughton in England," Montreal Daily Star, 30 August 1941. Also Grant Dexter, in Gibson and Robertson, eds., Ottawa at War: The Grant Dexter Memoranda, 28 July 1941, pp. 186-88.

36. For the CWC's deliberations on the 6th Division, see King Papers, CWC Minutes, 5 June, 15 and 29 July; as well as Ralston's notes on the recommendations in Ralston Papers, Vol. 52, "Manpower," vol. 2: "Canadian Formations," 5 July, and "Re. Source of Recruits for 5th and 6th Divisions," 27 July; and Dexter's report in Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 30 July 1941, pp. 188-90.

37. Crerar Papers, Vol. 19, File 958C.009(D338), "General Crerar's personal correspondence file..., July 1940-June 1941," Crerar to Brigadier E.L.M. Burns, Brigadier, General Staff [BGS], Canadian Corps, London, England, 24 May, and Vol. 19, File 958C.009(D333), "General Crerar's personal papers -- Personal Correspondence - Vol. II. July 1941-November 1941," Crerar to Lt.Col. F.G. Malloch,, Commandant, Canadian Signals Training Centre, Kingston, 16 July 1941 (source of quotation).

38. See in particular Grant Dexter, in Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 7 May 1941, pp. 167-68, and 12 June 1941, p. 178. As Dexter noted at the time (p. 168), "Victor tells me that he had no trouble with H.D.G. Crerar who seemed agreeable to doing anything V. wanted. Sam Browne saw the idea and backed Victor up like everything."

39. Queen's University Archives [QUA], Grant Dexter Papers, Box 2, File #20, memorandum dated 25 July 1941.

40. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 23 April and 9 May 1941. See also NAC, RG 24, Vol. 6921, "AHQ [Army Headquarters] Historical Section (G[eneral]S[taff]) Reports": No. 1, "Fixed Coast Artillery Defences on the Pacific Coast," pp. 1-8; No. 2, "The Anti-Aircraft Defences of the Pacific Coast," pp. 1-6; and No. 4, "The Anti-Aircraft Defences of the Atlantic Coast," pp. 1-14; and DHH, "AHQ Report (D3)": "The Employment of Infantry in the Pacific Coast Defences (Aug 39 to Dec 43)," pp. 1-11.

41. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 2633, File 715-40, "Call to Men," op.cit.

42. Ralston Papers, Vol. 68, "Compulsory Training - NRMA, 1942: pressure on recruits to go active, regulations. April 1941-March 1942," circular letters authorizing employment of "R" recruits on training centre establishments, Brigadier George H. Cassels, for Major-General B.W. Browne, Adjutant-General [AG], to GOSC-in-C, Atlantic and Pacific Command, and all DOCs, 13 May; Lt.Col. A.J. Everett, for AG, to same recipients, 19 May; Lt.Col. H.T. Cock, for AG, to same, 6

August; and later circular letters expanding the trades and occupations to which "Members (HD)," could be posted, by Col. Orville M.M. Kay, for AG, 2 September and 25 October 1941. As early as August 1941, such men were in fact arriving in basic training centres to join the camps' staffs, as shown in NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17278, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 28 August and 7-8 October 1941, 7 and 12 January 1942; Vol. 17292, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 29 August, 1 September 1941; and Vol. 17298, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 9 January 1942. In Chicoutimi, Quebec, seven "R" recruits were even reportedly chosen from among one training class in August, and sent for further training to become NCO instructors. Two months later, the centre's commanding officer specifically requested that he be permitted to retain further "R" recruits, writing that such policies would "go far towards maintaining the desired standard of efficiency of the administrative staffs of the basic training centres," instead of having to accept what he considered to be the inferior active service personnel that were sent to him by district headquarters. See Ibid., Vol. 17233, No. 51 CA(B)TC, 9 August 1941, and Appendix I, October 1941: Lt.-Col. J. Landry, O.C. - CA(B)TC No[.] 51, to H.Q., M.D. 5, 4 October 1941. For other examples of "R" recruits serving particularly as NCOs in basic training centres, or sent for further training to become NCOs, see also Ibid., Vol. 17202, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 20 August, 21 November, and 23 December 1941, and Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, 28 March 1942.

43. For example, see Ibid., Vol. 17214, No. 43 CA(B)TC, Sherbrooke, 2 December 1941, and Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, 9 January, and Vol. 17234, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, 10 January 1942, which record groups of 51, 80, and 25 home defence personnel, respectively, being transferred in blocks to join the staffs of these training centres. For a list of every unit to which Members (HD) were posted by the start of 1942, and the numbers in each location, see also Ralston Papers, Vol. 72, "Shortage of Military Personnel: Officers and Other Ranks, 1942: January-February, July, October," tables labelled "East Coast Defences," "West Coast Defences," and "6th Division," all dated 30 January 1942.

44. Ibid., "6th Canadian Division: Shortages as at 24 Jan 42," 30 January, and "Coast Defence & Anti-Aircraft: Shortages as at 24 Jan 42," 31 January 1942; as well as Vol. 37, "Armed Forces Strength, 1941," strength summary for Canadian Army dated 3 October 1941. On the development of the 6th Division during this period, see also DHH report, "The 6th Canadian Division," op.cit., pp. 6-8, and 9-10.

45. In addition, a "Special Committee on Orientals" was created to further investigate the situation, and confirmed the CWC's decision a few months later. On the committee and

the decision to exclude Chinese- and Japanese-Canadians from compulsory training, see King Papers CWC Minutes, 26 September, 1, 3, and 8 October 1940, and Patricia E. Roy, "The Soldiers Canada Didn't Want: Her Chinese and Japanese Citizens," Canadian Historical Review LIX(3), September 1978, pp. 341-58, which provides a good overview of these issues, and attitudes towards Asian-Canadian participation in the military more generally throughout the war. For further details, see also the correspondence of H.L. Keenleyside (head of the Special Committee on Orientals) and other officials inside and outside his Department of External Affairs, in RG 25, Vol. 2818, File 1154-40C, "Participation of Orientals in Canada in Military Training Scheme" - especially petition dated 28 September 1940, forwarded from Department of National War Services, from thirty-four Chinese-Canadian men in the Victoria area, who readily accepted their duty to carry out their military service, but asked to be granted the full privileges of citizenship in return, including the right to the vote. Also Ibid., similar correspondence regarding T.S. (Sew Kwong) Wong of Toronto, who was rejected when he tried to enlist in the RCAF, but then ordered to report for compulsory training (L.R. LaFlèche, Associate Deputy Minister [DM], Department of National War Services, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, 6 October 1941).

46. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17292, War Diary, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, Appendix E, December 1941, unattributed newspaper clippings, n.d.: "4 Chinese, Lone Japanese Are Camrose Camp Buddies," and "Four Chinese, One Japanese, Enjoying Army."

47. For correspondence on the government's handling of Sikhs in the Canadian military see NAC, RG 25, Vol. 2818, File 1154-40C, J.S. Hundel, The British Asiatic Importers & Exporters Co., to Professor H.F. Angus, Department of External Affairs, 18 January and 21 March; Angus to N.A. Robertson, USSEA, 27 March; L.R. LaFlèche, Associate DM, Department of National War Services, to USSEA, 27 April; "Memorandum for Mr. Robertson: East Indians and National War Service Regulations," [author unknown] 5 May; and Col. H.T. Cock, for Adjutant-General, to Dr. H.L. Keenleyside, USSEA, 2 December 1942; A. MacNamara, Director, National Selective Service, 8 February; Robertson to DM of Labour, 15 February; Robertson to J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence, 18 February; Ralston to Robertson, 20 February; MacNamara to Robertson, 8 March; Robertson to Ralston and to MacNamara, both 12 March; Robertson to High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, 18 March; "Minutes of a Meeting...", 28 April; "Memorandum...", 5 May; J.E. Read [Department of External Affairs Legal Advisor], for USSEA, to MacNamara, 2 November; and MacNamara to USSEA, 8 November 1943; and J.J.S. Garner, Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, to USSEA, 15 December, and Read to Garner, 27 December 1944.

48. For the RCN's policies, see RG 25, Vol. 2818, File 1154-40C, W.G. Mills, Acting DM, Department of National Defence, Naval Service, to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs [USSEA], 2 December 1941, and on the RCAF see NAC, RG 25, Vol. 2793, File 715-40, pt. 2, S.L. de Cartere, DM, Department of National Defence for Air, to USSEA, 12 December 1941 (from which the quotes in this paragraph are also taken).

49. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 17168, No. 23 CA(B)TC, 3 August 1941. For other examples of references to African-Canadian trainees and personnel in training camps, see Ibid., Vol. 17306, No. 111 Canadian Army (Reserve) Training Centre, Gordon Head, British Columbia, 28 October; Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 13 December 1940; Vol. 17194, No. 32 CA(B)TC, Newmarket, 28 May, which singled out one "A" recruit who was serving in what actually seems to have been an entirely African-Canadian training company at the centre, for his qualities as a "former circus performer" who entertained a group of officers at a mess dinner, including an "exhibition of step-dancing and singing." Huntingdon, Quebec, also played host to "a large number of British West Indians," although it is not made clear whether these men were from those parts of the British Commonwealth, or simply Canadians of Caribbean descent. The main reason that they came to the diarist's notice, however, was because they reportedly "find the cold very trying. Snow is a new experience to them." (Ibid., Vol. 17202, No. 41 CA(B)TC, 12 November, as well as later reference on 19 November 1941). At the same time, the centre's war diary also recorded in early January 1942 that "Many of our West Indian Boys have been invited out for New Years week-end by the town's people," indicating a welcoming attitude among local citizens, and providing evidence of activities similar to those held for other groups of recruits who attended special holiday services hosted by churches and local service organizations across the country mentioned in chapter two (Ibid., 4 January 1942). African-Canadian trainees in Chatham, Ontario, attracted notice for the same reason, "all coloured troops" in the camp being "invited to attend a Christmas party given by the young people of the First Baptist Church at 2000 hours. Each was to bring a gift not exceeding fifteen cents in cost." For this case, see Ibid., Vol. 17149, No. 12 CA(B)TC, 23 December 1941, and for another example of references to African-Canadians, see also Vol. 16913, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 3 August 1941.

50. Ralston Papers, Vol. 81, "National Resources Mobilization Act, 1944. Negroes in Canadian Army," extract from "Annual Army Estimates, 1943-44," dated 28 January 1944. On the dispute, see also NAC, RG 27, Records of the Department of Labour, Vol. 1486, File 2-162-9, "Exception to N.N.S.S. [sic] Mob. Regulations. Negros [sic] Chinese Japanese Etd. [sic] not acceptable to Army for non-medical reasons," internal

memorandum, E.G. Bjarnason to S.H. McLaren, 29 November; Supervisor of Mobilization to Colonel C.D. McPherson, Divisional Registrar "J," National Selective Service, 30 November; McPherson to Charles Henry, Supervisor of Mobilization, 6 December; assorted newspaper clippings, 29-30 December; Supervisor of Mobilization to McPherson, 13 December 1941; and particularly A. MacNamara to McPherson, 12 January 1944.

51. See King Papers, CWC Minutes, 6 May and 20 June 1941, and 22 December 1944, as well as NAC, RG 13, Records of the Department of Justice, Vol. 2601, File 142069, "Sec. 3, National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits). Application to Indians," which records the Department's deliberations on the liability of natives for compulsory service, and protests from no less than ten separate bands or their legal representatives from across the country, along with the North American Brotherhood of Indians, arguing that they should be exempted from compulsory military service due to their lack of British citizenship, explicit promises that had been made in various treaties, an Order-in-Council in the First World War that had exempted natives from the Military Service Act, and the fact that since they were wards of the state and therefore not permitted to exercise any of the rights of citizenship, they should also not be eligible (or considered legally to have the capacity) to be forced to serve in the army. Officials in the Justice Department refused to consider any of these arguments, disputing or simply rejecting most of them, along with requests in several cases to at least submit the decision to the courts, finally noting in one internal memorandum that the case was "not of sufficient public importance to warrant a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada." (W.R.J[ackett]. to DM, 2 March 1945). At the same time, no native group was willing or able to undergo the cost of challenging the law on their own during the war. The Department's official legal ruling on the issue can be found in the same file, in letters from W. Stuart Edwards, DM, to G.R. Benoit, Director of Recruiting for Military Training, Department of National War Services, 30 January, and Edwards to A.D.P. Heeney, Secretary, Cabinet War Committee, 16 May 1941. For more detailed discussions of native Canadians and their responses to both voluntary and compulsory service during the Second World War, see also R. Scott Sheffield, "'Of Pure European Descent and of the White Race': Recruitment Policy and Aboriginal Canadians, 1939-1945," Canadian Military History 5(1), Spring 1996, pp. 8-15, and Michael D. Stevenson, "The Mobilisation of Native Canadians During the Second World War," Journal of the Canadian Historical Association, Vol. 7, 1996, pp. 205-26. Although few direct references record aboriginal personnel undergoing training in individual camps, see also references to this in NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17277, No. 110 CA(B)TC, Vernon, 20-22 January, and Vol. 16913,

No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 3 August 1941.

52. Ralston Papers, Vol. 52, "Manpower," vol. 2: "Manpower Memorandum No. 2," AG to Minister, 24 July 1941. For a copy of the Department of Munitions and Supply's study, see Ralston Papers, Vol. 68, "Compulsory Training, 1942: 4 months Training. Order of Call. N.R.M.A. May-June 1941, May 1942": "Memorandum on Man-Power Requirements and Supply in Canada," 11 June, enclosed with H. Carl Goldenberg, Associate Director-General, Economics and Statistics Branch, Department of Munitions and Supply, to Ralston, 12 June 1941. In addition, on Ralston's referral of the study to Browne, and Crerar's opinions on it, see Ibid., Vol. 117, "Manpower - Sixth Division re manpower - with index, July 1941," Ralston to G.S. Currie, Executive Assistant, 26 May; Currie to CGS, 4 July; Crerar to Currie, 9 July; Currie to Ralston, 9 July; and Currie to Minister, 28 July 1941.

53. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 29 July 1941.

54. Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 12 June 1941, p. 177. In another memo later that summer (16 September 1941, p. 195), Dexter also recorded his conversation with "Prof. Goforth, formerly of McGill, now a major on the general staff. I was astounded to find him fairly sizzling with the plan for 8 divisions--4 armoured, 4 infantry. He was quite communicative, indicating that the plan has been very widely discussed by the general staff. The plan, he said, came from McNaughton and the British war office and represented what Canada was believed able to do. ... The politicians, he intimated, were under steady pressure and would cave in sooner or later. Already a great deal of the 8 division establishment was approved and in existence, without the politicians knowing what was being done. Thus the army training establishment was of 8 division calibre and so on. It would be very wasteful indeed, not to fill out the programme now." As he later added (Ibid., p. 196), "Ralston knows all about this. He has no [emphasis in original] confidence in the general staff but is at a loss to know how to handle Crerar. He cannot fire him unless he has a successor in view, which he hasn't."

55. Crerar Papers, Vol. 1, File 958C.009(D12), Crerar to McNaughton, 11 August 1941. This letter is also quoted in greater detail in Stacey, Six Years of War, p. 94.

56. Harris, Canadian Brass, op.cit., pp. 167-91.

57. Ralston Papers, Vol. 38, "Army Programme (Secret) 1940-41," Brigadier Maurice Pope, ACGS, to CGS, 23 September: "Army Organization: A Survey as of September, 1941." Also CGS to Minister, 29 September 1941, submitting memorandum.

58. On Pope, see his own Soldiers and Politicians: The Memoirs of Lt.-Gen. Maurice A. Pope (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), as well as Granatstein, The Generals, pp. 207-17.

59. Ralston Papers, Vol. 68, "Reinforcements - Overseas and Canada, 1941: July to October," A.A. Magee, E.A. [Executive Assistant], to Minister, 4 October, as well as Ralston's notes on the issue on the same file: "Re: Manpower," 4 October 1941.

60. Crerar to Ralston, 29 September 1941, op.cit.

61. Crerar Papers, Vol. 1, File 958C.009(D1), "CGS files 1940-41 -- Canadian Army Programme 1942-1943; Manpower Memorandum No. 3; "R" Recruits -- Financial and Economic Summary 1942-43; Crerar Papers," CGS to Minister, 18 November 1941: "Army Programme, 1942-43."

62. As Crerar noted in a private speech in December, being Chief of the General Staff in wartime was "not in accordance with my personal ambitions." With most of his work apparently complete in Ottawa, Crerar gave up the chance to be promoted to Lieutenant-General himself as CGS, instead of Stuart, after reportedly making it "quite clear to the Minister that I would rather be a Major-General in an overseas command than a Lieut.-General in an office job in Ottawa." Ibid., Vol. 25, File 958C.009(D426): "Remarks - Farewell Dinner - 4th December, 1941.

63. On Stuart, see Granatstein, The Generals, pp. 217-27.

64. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 1 December 1941.

65. For discussions of the report of the Labour Supply Investigation Committee, and its connections to the 1942-1943 army program, see Ibid., 10 September, 2 October, and 6, 19 and 26 November, and 1 December 1941, as well as Grant Dexter, in Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 18 and 20 November and 3 December 1941, pp. 222-24, 227-29. For the earlier history of various reports on manpower, and developments between 1940 and late 1941, see also Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 185-87; and Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 403-404.

66. Crerar Papers, Vol. 1, File 958C.009(D1), two memos, CGS to Minister, 26 November, respectively enclosing manpower tables and commenting on them, and AG to Minister, 26 November 1941: "Manpower Memorandum No. 3: Army Programme 1942-43." See also later version of the same memorandum, 27 November, as well as AG to Minister, 4 December 1941, and "Memorandum on Canadian Army Programme, 1942-1943," summarizing the above reports, produced by the CGS's office, n.d. [December 1941].

Also Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, pp. 228-29.

67. On the views of T.A. Crerar and other Cabinet ministers, see also Dexter memoranda of November and early December 1941 cited in previous endnotes; as well as his comments at the end of the original version of his memorandum of 8 December 1941, in QUA, Dexter Papers, Box 2, File #20; and J.E.Rea, T.A. Crerar: A Political Life (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), pp. 206-209.

68. King Papers, J4, Microfilm Reel H-1532, Vol. 354, "Conscription": "Personal View With Respect to 1942-43 Proposed Programme of the Army," 3 December 1941.

69. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 3 December 1941.

70. Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 158.

71. Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 12 January 1942, p. 258. For other examples of similarly clearly-stated comments from McNaughton and Ralston, see King Papers, CWC Minutes, 18 February 1942.

72. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 11 March 1942, and Stacey, Six Years of War, pp. 96-99.

73. Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 158.

74. Evidence that the Prime Minister was in fact thinking along these lines can be found in Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 7 November 1941, p. 218. According to Dexter, King had told friends that war in the Pacific was imminent, and would result in two or even three divisions having to be raised in Canada, mostly of NRMA recruits.

75. This comment does not of course include the well-known Japanese balloon attacks, which were carried out later in the war, and worked remotely, using the jet stream to carry small amounts of explosives and incendiaries to the Canadian and American mainland. For further details, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 6923, AHQ Historical Report No. 28, "The Japanese Balloon Enterprise Against North America." For a general description of Japanese advances in the first half of 1942, see also Peter Calvocoressi, Guy Wint and John Pritchard, Total War: The Causes and Courses of the Second World War, Revised second edition (London: Penguin Books, 1995), chapters 15-19, pp. 940-1072, and on the Japanese shelling of Estevan Point on Vancouver Island, see Stacey, Six Years of War, p. 173.

76. On Canadian involvement in the defence of Hong Kong, see Stacey, Six Years of War, chapter 14, pp. 437-91, and Brereton Greenhous, "C" Force to Hong Kong: A Canadian Catastrophe,

1941-1945 (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997).

77. On public criticism of the King government and the return of Meighen to leadership of the Conservative Party during this period, see in particular J.L. Granatstein, The Politics of Survival: The Conservative Party of Canada, 1939-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), pp. 73-95, and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 159-60, 162-63.

78. See in particular Dexter's comments, in Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 8, 9 and 11 December 1941, pp. 230-34.

79. On the Cabinet Manpower Committee, see Ibid., 11 and 15 December, pp. 233-35, and King Papers, CWC Minutes, 10 and 16 December 1941. In addition, see comments on the planned committee in various memoranda in RG 25, Vol. 2793, File 715-40, pt. 2: "Memorandum for the Prime Minister: Re: Manpower-organization," by A.D.P.H[eeney]. [Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet and CWC], 9 December, "Memo" by H.F.A[ngus]., 17 December, and E[scott].R[eid]. to Norman Robertson, 17 December 1941.

80. The clearest statement of such views can be found in a perceptive article by J.E. Rea, "What Really Happened? A new look at the Conscription Crisis," op.cit., which points out how strongly Ralston's firm advocacy of the army's policies separated him from many of his colleagues, making them less inclined to support his views during the later debates over conscription that took place in October-November 1944. In addition, see Rea, T.A. Crerar, pp. 209-10, and comments by Dexter in Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 6 and 20 January, 13 March, and 9 July 1942, pp. 254, 264-65, 297-98, and 331-36.

81. On the origins and events of the plebiscite campaign, see Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 163-71, Rea, pp. 210-11, as well as Dexter memoranda in Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 15-22 December 1941, pp. 235-37, 6 January to 5 February, 28 February, 9 and 13 March, and 19-26 April 1942, pp. 254-70, 279-84, 290-91, 296-98, and 310-13. Also "The Dominion Plebiscite Act, 1942," 6 George VI, Chap. 1, Acts of the Parliament of the Dominion of Canada (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1943), pp. 3-7.

82. See especially Ralston's notes on various issues during this period, and particularly a copy of a memorandum prepared by A.L. Macdonald, the Minister of Naval Services and a close friend, on "Conversation Ralston and I had with P.M., Saturday, January 31," all in Ralston Papers, Vol. 54, "Plebiscite, Gen. (Secret), 1942."

83. In the famous words of the Prime Minister, during his speech on the second reading of the government's bill to amend the NRMA, his policy would be "not necessarily conscription, but conscription if necessary" - a statement that was later reversed to become the one more well-known to history (Dominion of Canada, Official Report of the Debates of the House of Commons, Vol. III [Ottawa: King's Printer, 1942], p. 3236, and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 177).

84. For example, see the comments of Grant Dexter and J.W. Dafoe, the editor of the Winnipeg Free Press, on Ralston's and King's positions in Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 7-8 May, pp. 315-20.

85. For a very good summary of Ralston's views during this period, see various items on Ralston Papers, Vol. 116, "Manpower - notes made by J.L. Ralston for manpower discussions, n.d."

86. "The National Resources Mobilization Act Amendment Act, 1942," 6 George VI, Chap. 29, Acts of the Parliament of Canada, 1942, op.cit., p. 131.

87. On developments between April and July generally, see Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 19 and 30 April, 7-13 May, 15-25 June, and 9-21 July, pp. 311, 313, 315-23, 326-28, 331-49; as well as miscellaneous notes taken by Ralston during the various debates, May-June 1942, in Ralston Papers, Vol. 42, "Conscription Gen. (Secret)"; Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 172-80; and Rea, pp. 211-13.

88. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 18 February 1942.

89. In fact, American military planners had agreed to this policy several months earlier, and officially confirmed it at the famous "Arcadia" Conference at the end of December 1941. Stacey, Six Years of War, pp. 310-11.

90. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 20 February 1942. See also Dexter's report of events in Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 26 February 1942, pp. 278-79.

91. For example, see King's comments in King Papers, CWC Minutes, 5-6 March, as well as Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 13 February and 16 March, pp. 276-78, 299-301, and particularly Dexter's record of a talk with the Prime Minister, 28 February 1942, pp. 279-8, which suggests that King's motives for advocating such changes were also more personal. According to Dexter, King saw recent Japanese successes as a sign that his military experts were not able to properly judge strategic matters, and was trying to use the situation to reduce the military's influence in Cabinet,

reportedly stating: "the true ambition of our general staff was to build up an army in Britain not particularly for the defence of Britain but to be the spearhead of the attack on Germany," a view which was true, but betrayed a degree of confusion over why the army had been established there in the first place. In the words of Dexter, "King egged Brucie [Hutchison] and me on to keep banging away at the generals. He had done nothing to quiet the row on the Pacific Coast for more defence. He hoped it would continue." In fact, King was so intent in his desire to increase the size of the army in Canada in this period that he barely heard the comments of A.G.L. McNaughton, commander of the Canadian Corps and the senior Canadian overseas, who was present at the CWC meeting of 6 March and had earned the respect of the Prime Minister for his opposition to the idea of conscription for overseas service. McNaughton supported the views of Stuart and the other service advisors in their attempts to avoid being drawn into excessive defence preparations on the west coast, arguing that the focus of the army's war effort should continue to be overseas. After the general had returned to England, however, King returned to the CWC, stating that after private conversations, McNaughton now "recognized the need of taking measures to allay public apprehension as a result of reverses in the Pacific. In this connection, he had expressed the view that a large mobile force should be established on the west coast" (CWC Minutes, 18 March). On McNaughton's visit to Canada, see also Gibson and Robertson, eds., 4-9, 13 and 16 March 1942, pp. 284-91, and 296-302.

92. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 18 March 1942. For a good overview of the RCAF's expansion of home defence forces, which eventually reached thirty-six squadrons, see W.A.B. Douglas, "The Air Defence Dilemma in Canada, 1939-1945," Canadian Defence Quarterly 14(2), Autumn 1984, pp. 43-48. Significantly, Douglas also makes similar points to those that are made here, noting the importance of public and political opinion in forcing the RCAF to roles greater than the experts themselves wished or felt necessary, in early 1942 - with the difference that as a fully voluntary organization the RCAF could more easily draw down its strength and transfer excess personnel to Europe than the army, once the threat to North America had again diminished. In addition, on the further development of the 6th Division and the origins of the 7th and 8th Divisions during this period, see also "The 6th Canadian Division," op.cit., p. 8, and DHH, "AHQ Rpt (D8)": "The 7th Canadian Division," pp. 1-4, and "AHQ Rpt (D11)": "The 8th Canadian Division, 1942-1943," pp. 1-4.

93. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 20 March 1942.

94. "The 8th Canadian Division," op.cit., pp. 12-13.

95. According to Ralston Papers, Vol. 38, "Army Programme 1943-44, General," CGS to Minister: "Memorandum on Canadian Army Programme 1943-44," 17 January 1943, only four of the sixty anti-aircraft batteries had been in existence the previous year. For the points noted in the above paragraph, as well as a good overview of the huge expansion that took place during this period, and the many new units that were created or moved from one part of the country to another, see RG 24, Vol. 6921, AHQ Historical Reports No. 1, "Fixed Coast Artillery Defences on the Pacific Coast," pp. 9-17; No. 2, "The Anti-Aircraft Defences of the Pacific Coast," op.cit., pp. 6-12; No. 4, "The Anti-Aircraft Defences of the Atlantic Coast," pp. 14-29; as well as DHH, "The Employment of Infantry in the Pacific Coast Defences," op.cit., pp. 11-20; "The 6th Canadian Division," pp. 8-11; "The 7th Canadian Division," pp. 4-16; and "The 8th Canadian Division," pp. 4-22.

96. For example, training centres in Sherbrooke, Valleyfield, Sorel, and Huntingdon, Quebec, provided 129, 63, 11, and 59 "R" recruits, respectively, for the *Régiment de St-Hyacinthe*, while Joliette provided at least 26 NRMA men, along with 113 trainees whose status as "A" or "R" recruits was not clear, and more than 25 local civilians and another 25 or more former "R" recruits who had gone active, all for the *Régiment de Joliette* - along with its commanding officer, Lt.Col. G.V. de Bellefeuille, who was the regiment's former OC, but had been commanding the training centre since its creation in 1940. In addition, St. Jérôme provided 33 trainees for the *Régiment de St-Hyacinthe* and 52 for the *Régiment de Joliette*, although in both cases the unit's War Diarist did not record the status of the men, while Joliette and Sherbrooke transferred sizable numbers of NRMA recruits to the *Régiment de St-Hyacinthe* in early April (29 and 34 men, respectively), all of whom had been employed on their administrative staffs. In MD 5, groups of 46, 91, 46 and 67 "R" recruits went from Chicoutimi, Montmagny, Rimouski, and Lauzon to the *Fusiliers du St. Laurent*, while New Glasgow, Nova Scotia, provided 86 "R" men for the "Sydney and Canso Defences," and 584 were transferred from Regina, Saskatchewan, along with 181 in Camrose, Alberta, all for the King's Own Rifles of Canada (Moose Jaw) in early 1942. For these examples, see NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 17215, No. 43 CA(B)TC, Sherbrooke, 14 February, 6 April; Vol. 17226, No. 47 CA(B)TC, Valleyfield, 16 February; Vol. 17220, No. 45 CA(B)TC, Sorel, 6 April; Vol. 17203, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 8 April; Vol. 16914, No. 44 CA(B)TC, St. Jérôme, 16 February, 3 March; Vol. 17208, No. 42 CA(B)TC, Joliette, 11 and 17-19 February, 5, 9-12, 14, 17-18, 24 and 26-28 March, 2-3, 6 and 8 April; Vol. 17234, No. 51 CA(B)TC, Chicoutimi, 16 February; Vol. 17240, No. 54 CA(B)TC, Montmagny, 17 February; Vol. 17243, No. 55 CA(B)TC, Rimouski, 17 February; Vol. 17238, No. 53 CA(B)TC, Lauzon, 18 February; Vol. 17250, No. 61 CA(B)TC, New Glasgow, 9 March, and Appendix D, April 1942,

monthly returns of outgoing "R" recruits; Vol. 17284, No. 120 CA(B)TC, Regina, 17 and 26 February and 11 and 14 March; and Vol. 17292, No. 131 CA(B)TC, Camrose, 11 and 14 February 1942.

97. Training centres in Rimouski and Lauzon, Quebec (across the St. Lawrence River from Quebec City) provided 18 and 40 "R" recruits, respectively (as well as 16 "Members (HD)" from the staff of the Rimouski training centre), for the Royal Rifles of Canada, while as many as 470 more were transferred from Huntingdon, and another 150 from Peterborough, Ontario. In MD 10, meanwhile, whose headquarters was in Winnipeg, 35 NRMA men from Fort William, Ontario, and 189 from Portage-la-Prairie, Manitoba, along with another 42 and 244 men whose status as "A" or "R" recruits was not clear, were sent to the newly-reformed Winnipeg Grenadiers, while another 50 "R" men transferred to the Grenadiers from Grande Prairie, Alberta, 20 of whom had apparently volunteered before being transferred. In both units, the total number of "R" recruits accounted for over half the wartime strength of an infantry battalion. For these cases, see Ibid., Vol. 17243, No. 55 CA(B)TC, Rimouski, 17 February; Vol. 17238, No. 53 CA(B)TC, Lauzon, 18 February; Vol. 17203, No. 41 CA(B)TC, Huntingdon, 15, 20, and 25 February, 13 and 19 March, and 13 April; Vol. 17196, No. 32 CA(B)TC, 5 March; Vol. 17270, No. 102 (CA(B)TC, Fort William, 11 February, 11 March; and Vol. 17266, No. 100 CA(B)TC, Portage-la-Prairie, 12, 17, and 27 February, and 12 and 19 March; and Vol. 17298, No. 132 CA(B)TC, Grande Prairie, 11 February 1942.

98. "The Anti-Aircraft Defences of the Pacific Coast," op.cit., p. 11. According to the same report (p. 12), such postings continued from August to December 1942, with 500 "R" recruits per month arriving on the west coast, without either basic or artillery training, most of whom were provided with only a rapid four-week course and then posted to operational units. An excellent example of similar difficulties in one artillery regiment can be found in NAC, RG 24, Reel C-5204, File HQS 8522-7, "Reports from 6th Canadian Division," Brigadier R.A. Fraser, "Report on Inspection of 20th Fd. Regt., R.C.A., Valcartier Camp, 6th and 7th July 1942," which notes that 195 "R" recruits had been "taken on strength within the past two weeks from Inf. & M.G. [Machine Gun] T.C.'s," but the regiment was still short some 70 men, 53 NCOs, and 15 officers, while all three battery commanders were holding positions beyond their training and experience. Of the remaining 99 NCOs, 14 were not yet qualified for their ranks, 10 were undergoing training, and 33 of the total were NRMA men, Brigadier Fraser noting that they could not be promoted beyond the lowest NCO ranks under current policies, since "Active Service personnel resent serving under H.D. N.C.O.'s." The regiment had also just received its first modern 25-pounder guns on which to train. Still, most of the problems

were due to the speed with which the unit had been mobilized, especially considering that this one was French-speaking, and Brigadier Fraser concluded that "In spite of the rather severe criticism, [sic] I have had to make, I consider the Regiment has good potentialities. ... I was impressed with the calibre of both Officers and other ranks and a definite esprit de corps is evident." For similar cases of "R" men going straight from induction depots to infantry battalions, see also Ralston Papers, Vol. 72, "Shortage of Military Personnel: Officers and Other Ranks, 1942: January-February, July, October," Major-General H.F.G. Letson, AG, to Minister, 20 April 1942; and "The Employment of Infantry in the Pacific Coast Defences," p. 15, paragraph 63, and "Amendments to Narrative," par. 63.

99. See "The Employment of Infantry in the Pacific Coast Defences," p. 22; Reginald H. Roy, For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George R. Pearkes, V.C., through two World Wars (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977), p. 182; and Louis E. Grimshaw, "No. 1 Armoured Train," Canadian Defence Quarterly 21(2), October 1991, pp. 40-44. As Roy notes (p. 178), "Pearkes was somewhat surprised at the degree of precautionary measures in force" when he arrived in B.C. in September 1942 to become GOC-in-C of Pacific Command, especially compared to England where the danger of attack was much greater, and which he had just left after serving for two years as GOC of 1st Canadian Division.

100. "The Employment of Infantry in the Pacific Coast Defences," p. 17.

101. Ralston Papers, Vol. 53, "Miscellaneous," CGS to Minister, 23 November 1940: "The Position of Reserve Formations & Units," and Vol. 72, "Reserve Army - Reserve Units, 1942: Administrative and Training Staffs, June 1940-September 1940, March 1941," CGS to Minister, 5 February, and draft circular letters, AG to GOSC-in-C, Atlantic and Pacific Commands and All DOCs, 8 February and 1 March 1941.

102. See Crerar Papers, Vol. 19, File 958C.009(D333), Crerar to Brigadier E.L.M. Burns, 13 July 1941.

103. On the reserve army, as well as the recruiting drive in 1942, see documents on NAC, RG 13, Vol. 2869, File 143782, "National Defence: Recruiting Committee - Reserve Army, May 13, 1942," and particularly "Brigade Groups of the Reserve Army: An Explanation of their Function and Responsibilities," by Brigadier F. Logie Armstrong, DOC, MD 3, 11 April; as well as Ralston Papers, Vol. 72, "Reserve Army, 1942: Draft Statement: Policy for Recruitment, April," B.W. Browne, D.G.R.A. [Director General, Reserve Army], to Minister, 22 April 1942; and a number of miscellaneous files on the reserve

army in 1942 located in the same box (Vol. 72) of Ralston's papers; and E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, pp. 136-40. According to one memorandum of March 1942, the total strength of the reserve army at that time was 132,959 officers and men, including 16,835 former thirty-day NRMA recruits who were apparently still serving as part of reserve units, and another 46,464 who were still "supernumerary to establishment," with most of the latter due to be called up for further compulsory training in the near future. By January 1944, the reserve army's strength was listed as 88,357 all ranks, although no figures are available to indicate whether or not any NRMA men remained with these units. For these figures, see Ralston Papers, Vol. 68, "Australia, Token Force for, 1942: also Canadian Home Guard, East & West Coast Reserve Militia, March," CGS to Minister, 25 March 1942, along with Vol. 82, "Reserve Army, 1944: Report, Instructions re [sic] attendance, leave, Dates of Summer Camps, July 1942-Jan, March, June 1944": excerpt from "Annual Army Estimates, 1944-45," on "Reserve Army of Canada," 29 January 1944.

104. On the PCMR, see "The Employment of Infantry in the Pacific Coast Defences," op.cit., pp. 23-24; Ralston Papers, Vol. 81, "Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, 1944: Rationale for, role of, organization, strength, conditions of service...": excerpt from "Annual Army Estimates, 1944-45" on "Pacific Coast Militia Rangers," 28 January 1944; and Roy, Pearkes, pp. 177-78, who notes that the PCMR actually reached a strength of 137 companies and 15,000 personnel at their peak in 1943. On events in the St. Lawrence River, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 6923, AHQ Historical Report No. 30, "Army Participation in Measures taken by the Three Services for the Security of the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Lower River during the Period of German Submarine Activity, 1942-45."

105. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 31 January 1942. On early consideration of this issue, see also Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 14, 15 and 28 January 1942, pp. 258-62, and 269.

106. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 4, 13, and 26 February 1942; Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 26 February 1942, pp. 279; Granatstein and Hitsman, pp. 188-90; and Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 404-5.

107. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 8, 15, 17, 22, 29 and 31 July, 19 August, 9, 17 and 23 September, 7 and 21 October, 30 November and 9 December 1942; as well as Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 4, 9, 15, 19, 21 July, 2 and 27 August, 25 September, 5, 14, 23, 29 October 1942, and 3 January 1943, pp. 328-39, 345-49, 358-69, 375-86, and 394-95; Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 190-96; Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 405-10; and Michael D.

Stevenson, "National Selective Service and the Mobilization of Human Resources in Canada During the Second World War," Ph.D. thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1996.

108. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 416.

109. Ibid., as well as Ruth Roach Pierson, "They're Still Women After All": The Second World War and Canadian Womanhood (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1986), particularly pp. 95-113. On women's experiences during the war more generally, see also "The Clio Collective" (Micheline Dumont, et.al.), Quebec Women: A History, trans. Roger Gannon and Rosalind Gill (Toronto: The Women's Press, 1987), pp. 277-300; Alison Prentice, et.al., Canadian Women: A History (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988), pp. 295-307; Carolyn Gossage, Greatcoats and Glamour Boots: Canadian Women at War (1939-1945) (Toronto: Dundurn, 1991); and for two very good memoirs by former members of the CWAC and the RCAF (WD), see Phylis Bowman, We Skirted the War (Port Edward, B.C.: Privately published, 1975), and Mary Hawkins Buch, with Carolyn Gossage, Props on Her Sleeve: The Wartime Letters of a Canadian Airwoman (Toronto: Dundurn, 1997).

110. Of the 3,129 NRMA men serving outside Canada, 2,090 were in Newfoundland, 211 in Goose Bay (Labrador), 664 in Jamaica, and 164 in Alaska. For all figures cited in this paragraph, see Ralston Papers, Vol. 76, "Strength Return, 1943: as at 8 May 1943 and 3 July 1943, May-June 1943," weekly strength return for 3 July, dated 12 July, and Vol. 73, "Canadian Army - Progress Report on Programme, 1943: 4-10 July 1943": "Progress Report No. 136," 15 July 1943, as well as the discussion in Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, pp. 134-35, which provides similar but slightly differing figures for the peak period of expansion in the country's home defence forces. Although he does not identify the exact date when the figures peaked, information provided there and in Stacey, Six Years of War, pp. 174-76, suggests that it came at about the same time as the strength returns cited here, in the spring and early summer of 1943.

111. For example, see the comments of Brigadier Pope near the end of his memorandum of 23 September 1941, op.cit., as well as correspondence between Pope, the CGS, and the Minister of National Defence on the same file, 31 October-6 November 1941, and comments by Prime Minister King himself during the CWC's discussions on manpower in November in King Papers, CWC Minutes, 26 November 1941, who noted that "there was no reason why the operation of the Natural [sic] Resources Mobilization Act should not be extended to Newfoundland - this would release additional volunteers for overseas."

112. See NAC, RG 25, Vol. 2793, File 715-40, pt. 2, H.L. Keenleyside, Assistant USSEA, to Pope [now a Major-General and Vice CGS], 22 December; Pope to Keenleyside, 23 December; "Memorandum for Mr. John Read" [Legal Advisor, Department of External Affairs], by Keenleyside, 24 December; and Read, for USSEA, to F.P. Varcoe [DM, Department of Justice], 26 December; and NAC, RG 13, Vol. 2608, File 143364, "Privy Council. Despatching of Military Forces to Adjacent Territories. War Measures Act. National Resources Mobilization Act. January 13, 1942," A.D.P. Heeney to Varcoe, 24 December; "Memorandum" by Varcoe on legal issues regarding amending the NRMA, 29 December; E. Miall [Assistant DM, Department of Justice] to Varcoe, 30 December 1941; Varcoe to Heeney, 5 January; "Memorandum" by Varcoe, 31 January; Varcoe to J.L. Ralston, 5 February; and newspaper clipping, "Men Called Up Under N.R.M.A. Stay in Canada," Ottawa Journal, 12 May 1942.

113. On this issue, see King's comments to Dexter, recorded in Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 28 February 1942, p. 283.

114. Order-in-Council P.C. 4105, 15 May 1942, cited in Stacey, Six Years of War, p. 123.

115. As noted in Ibid., and "The Anti-Aircraft Defences of the Pacific Coast," op.cit., p. 18, these changes were made by Order-in-Council P.C. 7995 of 4 September 1942, which in fact authorized three batteries to go to Annette Island, only two of which ended up being sent. On RCAF participation in the defence of Alaska, see Douglas, Creation of a National Air Force, pp. 410-20; F.J. Hatch, "The Aleutian Campaign," part one, Roundel, May 1963, pp. 18-23, and part two, June 1963, pp. 18-23; and Hatch, "Allies in the Aleutians," Aerospace Historian 21(2), Summer/June 1974, pp. 70-78.

116. Stacey, Six Years of War, p. 123, and Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, p. 123. For a list of all Orders-in-Council respecting the use of NRMA men that were passed during the war, see also DHH, File 006.066(D4), "Employment of NRMA. List of Orders in Council re - 4 Sep 42/23 Nov 44."

117. Unless otherwise noted, information in this and later paragraphs is drawn from Stacey, Six Years of War, pp. 492-505; Roy, Pearkes, pp. 184-94; Galen R. Perras, "An Aleutian Interlude: Canadian Participation in the Recapture of the Island of Kiska," M.A. thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 1986, pp. 33-121, and the expanded version in his later doctoral dissertation: "Stepping Stones on a Road to Nowhere? The United States, Canada, and the Aleutian Island Campaign, 1942-1943," Ph.D. thesis, University of Waterloo, 1995; as well as DHH, File 595.013(D4), "The Canadian Participation in the Kiska Operations," by G.W.L. Nicholson,

11 December 1943; and NAC, RG 24, Vols. 14164-65, Microfilm Reel T-12399, War Diary, Headquarters, 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, June-August 1943. For American views on these events, see also Stanley W. Dziuban, Military Relations between the United States and Canada (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1959), pp. 256-68, and Brian Garfield, The Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1969), which provides a detailed overview of all aspects of American participation in the Aleutian campaign.

118. DHH, File 595.013(D3), "Report on Kiska Operation (1943) - 13 Cdn Inf Bde - by Commander, 13 Cdn Inf Bde [Brigadier H.W. Foster]," 3 September 1943. In addition, as G.W.L. Nicholson noted a few months later (paragraphs 139-43), parties of the *Régiment de Hull* had been forced to carry loads physically across the beaches through ice-cold water on the first day of operations, and then up the steep hill that overlooked the landing area, as well as aiding Canadian engineers in searching manually for land mines on the beach.

119. In all, the brigade group put together for the Kiska operation included the Rocky Mountain Rangers, the Canadian Fusiliers, Winnipeg Grenadiers, and the *Régiment de Hull*, as well as one company of the Saint John Fusiliers (MG) for heavy machine gun support, the 24th Field Regiment and the 46th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, RCA, 24th Field Company, Royal Canadian Engineers, 25th Field Ambulance, Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps, and smaller detachments from various service and support organizations (Nicholson, "Canadian Participation in the Kiska Operations," paragraphs 11-13).

120. The two Orders-in-Council were numbered P.C. 5011 and 5012, and both passed into law on 18 June 1943. Nicholson, paragraph 14.

121. On the invasion of Attu, see in particular Garfield, pp. 208-58, who notes that the casualties suffered there were the second highest of the entire Pacific war for the U.S. compared to the number of troops committed (at least 12,500), behind only Iwo Jima - the final total being 549 dead, 1148 wounded, and an additional 1200 cases of frostbite and 614 of disease.

122. For a good discussion of these issues, see Stacey, Six Years of War, pp. 503-4; Perras, "An Aleutian Interlude," pp. 100-3; and Garfield, pp. 271-85. In addition, NAC, RG 24, Vol. 14165, Reel T-12399, War Diary, 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, noted Japanese activity on 24 July, speculating that it was either to reinforce or evacuate the Kiska garrison, but adding that even a new attack on Attu or Adak had to be considered "within the bounds of possibility." On 9 August, the diarist reported that all enemy activity on Kiska had

ended, suggesting that it either indicated an evacuation, a mutiny, or "They have abandoned their main camp and gone into the hills, if the latter is true then ours may well be the long hard job of digging them out."

123. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 14165, Reel T-12399, War Diary, 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 17 August 1943. In addition, see the same Diarist's description of the many false reports of contact with enemy forces and defences catalogued during the Brigade's actual landings the previous day.

CHAPTER FOUR

The National Resources Mobilization Act and the Failure of the "Big Army," 1943-1944

By mid-1943, the "big army" advocated by H.D.G. Crerar, Kenneth Stuart, and other Canadian generals in the early years of the Second World War was a reality. The Canadian Army numbered five divisions in Europe, along with two additional armoured brigades, two Corps headquarters, and a First Canadian Army headquarters to command it all. Meanwhile, at home the Canadian Army had also expanded, less expectedly following Japan's entry into the war in December 1941. Almost as soon as this huge force had been created, however, planners were beginning to dismantle it. Faced with rising casualties after Canadian troops became involved in combat in Sicily and Italy after July 1943, officials began to call more and more insistently on the resources available in Canada, first to help complete the "big army" overseas, and then to keep it up to strength as casualties began to take a rising toll on its numbers.

Yet it was much easier to create the "big army" before 1943 than it would be to reduce it afterwards. During the "second conscription crisis" of November 1944, several federal Cabinet members were shocked to discover that 120,000 general

service soldiers remained on duty in Canada, and another 90,000 in England. As Prime Minister King's official biographer and one of the earliest historians of the 1944 crisis wrote in the 1950s,

Any layman (and this, according to rumour, includes more than one Cabinet member of the time) simply cannot believe the statement that it was impossible to secure 15,000 men from a pool of 210,000, or, properly excluding those in the training stream, a pool of between 165,000 and 170,000.¹

As E.L.M. Burns and C.P. Stacey later pointed out in defending the Army against these charges, and as we shall see in chapter five, the problem in November 1944 was not a shortage of all soldiers overseas, but only of infantry, the troops that faced the harshest conditions and bore some of the largest burdens on the battlefield. By 1944, all suitable infantrymen had been removed from home defence units, while a large majority of the men who remained behind were necessary simply to keep an Army the size of Canada's operating in the field.²

In addition, as J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman argued in the 1970s, and as was noted in chapter three, in a larger sense the problem by 1944 was also the "big army" itself. Its creation required huge numbers of men, and a large number of units just to maintain and support its later operations. The unexpected expansion of the Army following events in the Pacific in 1941 and 1942 also led the "big army" to drain the country of its reserves of manpower more quickly than planners had expected, even before facing combat on an even larger scale after the Allied invasion of Normandy in 1944.³

Yet neither Granatstein and Hitsman nor earlier historians of the 1944 crisis have delved deeply into the workings of the National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA), to explain exactly how the Army's commanders knew that there were no more suitable infantrymen left in Canada by 1944, despite the huge numbers appearing on their strength returns, or how the "big army" drained the manpower resources of the country in this period. The following chapter explores the failure of the "big army" in 1943 and 1944, by describing the role of the NRMA in each of these developments. As it will show, by 1943 J.L. Ralston and his subordinates in the Department of National Defence were already well aware of the pressure that the "big army" was putting on the country's manpower, and did their best to avoid the implications of this realization. With the successful landing of Canadian troops on Kiska in August 1943, planners turned almost immediately to reducing the Army's home defence forces, in an effort to remove as many general service men as possible for service overseas. By early 1944, the Canadian Army had gone a long way towards weeding out all of its reserves of manpower of this type, despite the incredulity of politicians at the time, and of some historians in later years.

As a result, and as this chapter will also show, planners began to rely more and more firmly on the NRMA to find manpower that was not already present in the Army. From early 1943 on, calls for men were stepped up, and the age groups and

classes liable for service steadily expanded. At the same time, the Minister of National Defence entered into a number of disputes with his colleagues in the Cabinet War Committee (CWC), that showed the seriousness of the situation by 1944, and particularly the difficulty of finding men from any source to fill the needs of the "big army" by then. The chapter ends by describing the Army's decision to turn back to the only men that it had left as a source of potential reinforcements by early 1944, its NRMA recruits, and the deliberate recruiting campaign that was undertaken in April and May, in an effort to persuade as many NRMA men as possible to volunteer for overseas service.

With the mixed results of this campaign came confirmation of the worst fears of officers in Canada. By early 1944, it seemed clear to the Army, at least, that it had removed almost every possible soldier from the ranks of the country's home defence forces. It was also apparent that should any unexpected event take place to alter the demands of the "big army" for reinforcements overseas, there would be nowhere left to turn except the thousands of Canadians who remained in uniform as conscripts by that time.

* * *

For the men of 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, huddled in their small "pup" tents or individual sleeping bags, and using their supposedly waterproof American "ponchos" as coverings against the wind and rain of Kiska, such concerns of high

policy were far from their minds in late August and early September 1943.⁴ From the time they had arrived in Alaska, they had discovered the vagaries of the local weather, the Brigade's War Diarist describing the area at one point as a "land that only an Alaskan Tourist Guide book could depict as inviting."⁵ Within a day of landing on Kiska the men had experienced their first storm:

As the last light faded, heavy clouds swirled down and drenched our little camp, the wind rose and finally reached a velocity of almost 50 MPH [80 kilometres per hour]. Everyone and everything got wet. Improvised shelters collapsed, slit trenches containing beds that floated [sic], waterproof covers blew away -- few will forget that unhappy night.⁶

The following evening, troops had to deal again with heavy winds and "torrential rains" that tore through their campsite, two themes that would become almost constant refrains over the next several months.⁷ Added to the wind and rain was the ever-present mud that existed throughout the Aleutians, and was churned up by digging into the treeless surface tundra to create roads, shelters, and other facilities for the men. As the 13th Brigade's War Diarist put it,

Kiska mud almost defies description. The rain of the past few days aided and abetted by the threshing treads of almost countless tractors, snow jeeps and bulldozers has left Main Camp a sea of mud; the 400 yd [approximately 365 metres] roadway from our H.Q. to the beach runs downhill and then, about 150 yds [140 metres] from the shoreline, straightens out between two small lakes. Day after day the road has been sinking; this morning the inevitable happened --- the first big "cat" sank about 4 f[ee]t [1.2 m] into the mud and it took two huge "D-8s" to pull it out. In this camp about 4 tractors lie, abandoned, almost buried in the mud.



As the 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade's War Diarist put it in describing this photograph: "Just a little mud above the B[riga]de H.Q. ... The ever present tow wire is about to be used. About three days after this picture was taken the mud got bad --- the road was closed for repairs." (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 14165, War Diary, Headquarters, 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, Appendix XI, October 1943.)

To sink up to ones [sic] knees is not by any means an unknown experience.⁸

Later, hail and snow storms were added to the mix of weather faced by Canadian soldiers on Kiska, and in one case even an earthquake caused by the slumbering volcano that rose to a height of 6,400 metres at the northern tip of the island, in the zone given to the 13th Brigade to control.⁹ Several times in December and January of 1943 and 1944, parties of shovellers had to move through the camp clearing snow from doorways so that the occupants could leave their tents, and before the Canadians left the island, three U.S. servicemen in the neighbouring American camp lost their lives due to snow storms, in one case when a soldier lost his way walking only fifty metres from his unit's Mess Hall back to his tent after a Christmas celebration on 25 December, and the second in early January, when two men died after a building collapsed under the weight of the snow on its roof.¹⁰


In fact, one of the first activities carried out by soldiers of the 13th Brigade after they arrived on Kiska was to begin to construct a permanent camp, to prepare for the coming of winter on the island. Within a few days, a site for their camp had been found in the north-central part of the island, and crews began to dig pits approximately one metre in depth and large enough into which to fit the Quonset, or "Pacific" Huts, that they were due to be supplied with in later months, so that the buildings could be anchored in solid ground below the surface tundra. For the time being, the pits



The Canadian camp at Kiska, looking out to sea, October 1943. Note the "winterized" tents dug into the permafrost, for protection from the wind. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 14165, War Diary, Headquarters, 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, Appendix XI, October 1943.)

also proved useful for "winterizing" existing American tents, allowing them to be sheltered at least a small amount from the island's constant winds. With the addition of a small stove and a few candles for light (or a weak light bulb if a unit was lucky enough to find and salvage an abandoned Japanese generator), these tents became home for most Canadian troops throughout their time on Kiska.¹¹

Unfortunately, the preparations made by Canadian and American personnel did not always prove to be adequate in the face of Kiska's climate. Even when tents stayed fixed to the ground, moisture found its way into every corner when it rained, and turned the floors to mud, while the noise as the wind pulled at their canvass sides was said to be "unbelievable."¹² By the end of August, a number of tents had already been torn apart by the wind, and some were actually pulled from their foundations and blown away. In late October, after another windstorm, the Brigade's War Diarist recorded the experiences of one of its units, which reported that "one Marquee and six tents had just become airborne [sic] and 'when last seen were heading for Amchitka'." A week later, several tents were reported lost or heavily damaged following yet another storm, including at least twelve from the lines of the Winnipeg Grenadiers alone.¹³ Most units had standing orders for men to sleep with their American-issue "Bowie" knives beside them, in order to cut their way out of collapsed tents before the stoves inside



Another view of the Canadian camp at Kiska, with the Brigade Signals hut in the centre-right of the photograph. Note the "Pacific" Hut being used to house the H.Q., as well as others in the centre background. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 14165, War Diary, Headquarters, 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, Appendix XI, October 1943.)

could set them on fire.¹⁴

Despite the poor conditions on Kiska, the men of the Brigade eventually found a number of ingenious ways to make their new home more bearable. Rare pieces of lumber and glass were scrounged from former Japanese buildings and used to make permanent doorways for tents, and to allow daylight in through the sides and roof.¹⁵ In another case, Canadians used leftover Japanese pipes to divert water from a river above the camp into a large storage tank for use by the men of the Brigade.¹⁶ Gunners of the 46th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery built a washing machine out of scavenged bicycle parts, an old oil drum, and an abandoned four-cylinder engine that had only one cylinder still firing. The Winnipeg Grenadiers, meanwhile, created a bath house complete with hot water, using corrugated iron, an oil burner, and an air tank from an American torpedo that had been found on the runway of the former Japanese base on the island.¹⁷

Aside from merely surviving on Kiska, every man, whether he was an NRMA recruit or a general service soldier, was also kept busy with more serious matters during his time there. As the first historian of the Brigade summarized the period at the end of 1943, "Three major occupations employed the working hours of the Canadian troops on Kiska during September, October and November, - labour, defence, and training."¹⁸ In early September, 13th Brigade's work parties won the praise of their American commanders for

setting an all time Alaskan record for unloading supplies. So far we have, without piers of any kind, unloaded 90,000 tons [90,000 metric tonnes] of freight; in other parts this quantity has not been equalled with piers and docks to help the operation [underlining in original].¹⁹

For the first few weeks, the danger of Japanese raids or other attacks on Kiska was still considered high, and members of 13th Brigade spent much of their time siting weapons and laying fields of fire, manning coastal outposts, and sending out regular patrols over the northern half of the island.²⁰

At the same time, Canadians and Americans both worked to build up Kiska's military facilities for use as a possible staging point for later attacks against Japan.²¹ In fact, the 13th Brigade's Diarist frequently recorded explosions near the Canadian camp, first as American engineers destroyed Japanese booby-traps, land mines, and other munitions in the area, and later as they blasted thousands of tons of rock out of local cliffs to provide the foundations for every road that was built on the island, a process that was necessary in order to keep them from simply disappearing into the mud again as soon as they were finished.²²

As the threat of attack declined and plans to use the island as a base for future operations were downgraded, units focused more and more on training, using these activities to maintain the fitness and alertness of their men, and to overcome the boredom and monotony of Kiska. In October, when American commanders issued a surprise order for two Canadian infantry battalions to proceed immediately to nearby beaches

as part of a defence training scheme,

In 20 min[utes]. the R[égiment] de Hull were on the road, all 700 men fully equipped, ammunition loaded, water bottles filled, tractor motors turning over. Col. Fye [from the American headquarters] was amazed; he declared it was miles ahead of anything he had ever seen before in the U.S. army.²³

Just before they left Kiska, the men of the Brigade also took advantage of their presence on the barren island to put on a display of combined arms in a live-firing exercise, on a scale which would have been much more difficult to achieve in its normal training areas in British Columbia. On 12 December, Major-General H.N. Ganong, the commander of 6th Canadian Division, and Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin, the head of administration for Pacific Command and soon to be the Brigade's new commanding officer, were both present as the unit fired all of its Bren and medium machine guns, 3-inch mortars, Bofors anti-aircraft guns (used as anti-tank weapons), and its own 25-pounder and American-issued 75-millimetre artillery, in a series of shoots for an audience of roughly 3,000 men, before packing up their equipment and beginning to load it on board ship for the return to Canada.²⁴

Despite their isolation, and the limited facilities available for entertainment, Canadians also found other, more enjoyable ways to pass their time on the island. Following the example of earlier Canadian units, Canadians and Americans both worked together to create a small newspaper, which

appeared in late August and ran weekly until after the end of the 13th Brigade's stay in January 1944.²⁵ U.S. personnel established a local radio station that opened on the same day as the first issue of the camp newspaper, and rebroadcasted signals from stations in the United States, as well as recordings of earlier broadcasts shipped to the island.²⁶ In early October, men from the Royal Canadian Signal Corps erected a loudspeaker so that the local station could be heard by the entire Canadian camp, and one of the first events to be broadcast was the first game of the 1943 World Series (at 7:15 a.m., local time).²⁷ Soldiers were also soon hard at work building crude facilities for a number of sporting activities, including an outdoor volleyball court constructed by the men of the Brigade headquarters. The Winnipeg Grenadiers created a parade square which was also intended to be used for soccer and baseball, and Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps troops built "a dirt covered soccer pitch" complete with goal posts and nets, all of which were used for several contests between various units over the next few weeks.²⁸

In addition, after as much as eight weeks without access to any movies, the Brigade was happy to receive a projector in September, even though it arrived late and was prone to breakdowns, and required scarce electricity to power it.²⁹ The U.S. military's service organization provided an American-style "P.X." ("Post Exchange") shop for the Brigade, where items such as cigarettes and candy could be purchased at



The Winnipeg Grenadiers' parade ground, Kiska, October 1943.
(Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 14165, War Diary, Headquarters, 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, Appendix XI, October 1943.)

discount prices, as well as delivering special pre-packaged recreational kits containing radios, gramophones, plastic flutes, sports equipment, and reading material for each unit.³⁰ Other pastimes included a series of "Klondyke Nights" where men could play blackjack, crown-and-anchor, or other games of chance, for pennies rather than dollars, along with regular concerts, dinners and "At Homes" by individual units, bingo games, and special celebrations for Christmas Day and the American Thanksgiving holiday in November. The Winnipeg Grenadiers and the *Régiment de Hull* both had choirs that performed for their fellow soldiers, while the senior officers of the Brigade held a lecture series near the end of their stay, taking turns describing the work of their respective units and corps to their colleagues.³¹

The highlight for most soldiers on Kiska probably came in mid-November, when a special U.S.O. troupe arrived on the island to entertain the men. The shows proved so popular that they had to be held on a number of nights for separate units due to a lack of suitable accommodation, and tickets had to be distributed using a lottery system.³² In addition, the entertainers were notable for being an all-male U.S.O. group, a reminder of another type of isolation faced by the men of 13th Brigade throughout the four months that had gone by since they had left Canada. The only woman seen by any of the men during their stay on Kiska was one civilian nurse on the transport ship that arrived to take the lead elements of the

Brigade home a few days later in November.³³ Canadian troops also had little access to alcohol on Kiska, "wet" canteens having been prohibited by the Canadian government, but in this case commanders did have stocks of service rum that could be, and were, issued on a relatively frequent basis.³⁴ Lastly, the Brigade had its full complement of chaplains, three Protestants and two Roman Catholics, who presided over regular church services, and in one case even held a Mass at one of three Shinto shrines that the Japanese had built during their occupation.³⁵

The 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade finally left Kiska in late December 1943 and early January 1944. Almost as soon as the island was captured, authorities in Canada and the United States had begun to realize the difficulties that they would face in trying to sustain further operations in such a remote and forbidding region, while farther south troops were advancing successfully across the Pacific. The Cabinet War Committee (CWC) took up the question of recalling Canadian troops in mid-October. At first, members considered leaving behind a token force, to "show the flag" as part of the larger American garrison, but since that too was being reduced, the Chief of the General Staff (CGS), Lieutenant-General Stuart, argued that there was little point in not bringing everyone home.³⁶ The main part of the force set sail on Christmas Eve, with the rest of the Brigade following in mid-January. On arriving in Canada the men were granted a special thirty-

day leave, before taking up new duties in British Columbia.³⁷

During its time on Kiska the Brigade had experienced a great deal, and Canadian planners had learned a number of lessons about operating in northern climates, using American equipment, and working alongside American servicemen, that would all come to be important in postwar years. In particular, Canadian troops found American rations to their liking,³⁸ as well as U.S. combat helmets and other types of equipment. At the same time, they reportedly considered their own British-style battledress uniforms and web equipment "more comfortable and serviceable" than the equivalent U.S. items, and Canadian mess tins and cutlery were singled out as superior to American versions, "as the former will not stand up to the heat and the latter rust easily." In a more serious vein, the commander of the Brigade, Brigadier H.W. Foster, reported his view that

the U.S. method of trying to catch and issue initially for every contingency of weather and warfare is neither necessary nor economical. Personnel cannot carry heavy loads in action and the surplus calls for additional kit bags or rucksacks for each man which have to be handled on and off ships and then transported forward.³⁹

The problem, of course, was one that many countries have envied U.S. troops for having, both then and now, and especially in Canada, where soldiers have always compared the quantity and quality of their own equipment to that of their counterparts south of the border. Aside from their comments on U.S. equipment, commanders had very little to say about the

Canadians' relations with U.S. troops, which had apparently been quite cordial all around. Nevertheless, most members of 13th Brigade were undoubtedly relieved to be leaving Kiska as they slipped away from the island in late December. In the words of the Brigade's War Diarist, "To a man we prayed that as long as we might live and as far as we might travel we would never again land on these desolate shores."⁴⁰

Meanwhile, in the time that 13th Brigade had been away on Kiska a number of changes had taken place in Canada that revealed the first hints of worries within the Army about its ability to maintain the strength of volunteer units in Europe. As we have seen, none of the key generals involved in planning the country's home defence forces had ever felt nearly as much threat of a direct attack on Canada after December 1941 as their civilian counterparts, and by August 1943 the landings on Kiska had made that possibility even more remote. As early as March, Lieutenant-General Stuart was writing to J.L. Ralston to suggest that the Army begin scaling back its home defence forces, consolidating units and releasing general service men to go overseas, as had originally been planned before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor caused large numbers of men to be diverted into new units in Canada. The result, Stuart reported, would be to release as many as 44,000 general service personnel for service in Europe.⁴¹ Consequently, in July five infantry battalions were disbanded, four of which were 3rd Battalions of units that already had a

1st Battalion serving overseas, and a 2nd one on active duty in Canada. At the same time, five more infantry battalions made up largely of volunteers, along with three Royal Canadian Artillery field regiments, one reconnaissance regiment, and a field company of the Royal Canadian Engineers were all withdrawn from home defence formations, and their general service men sent overseas, bringing the total number of cuts so far to 15,000 officers and men.⁴²

At the end of August 1943, Stuart submitted a more formal memorandum to his Minister, recommending that the 7th and 8th Divisions be disbanded entirely, that coast defence units be reduced, and that the remaining units of 6th Division be formed into three relatively independent brigade groups, which would remain in British Columbia as mobile reserves, in the event of a deterioration in the war in the Pacific. The changes were carried out in October, and the new brigade groups were reorganized based on the structure used by 13th Brigade in Kiska, with four infantry battalions instead of three. At the same time, Atlantic Command's reserves were reduced to a single "Training Brigade Group," which was created out of 7th Division units and headquartered in Debert, Nova Scotia, to provide final refresher training for men of all arms before proceeding overseas. While the staffs of these units remained at their posts as instructors, most of their general service personnel went on to overseas postings, and conscripts were released to take up other duties.

Across the country, at least ten further infantry battalions were disbanded as a result of the cuts of October 1943, while other formations such as static artillery and anti-aircraft units were simply ordered to make do with five to twenty percent fewer men. Altogether, the cuts were expected to remove 20,000 soldiers from positions in Canada, allowing volunteers released from these duties to be sent directly to Europe, while "Members (HD)" moved on to other units to take the place of further volunteers. Infantry units in particular were told to reduce their general service personnel to "a cadre of eighty key men per battalion."⁴³ Unfortunately, some of the savings proved to be illusory, as most units had never managed to reach their fully authorized strengths since being created in 1942, a fact that Stuart made clear to the CWC when the cuts were being made.⁴⁴ But they did reduce the need to meet these larger requirements, while releasing at least 14,000 men directly for service overseas, and removing several higher headquarters units and other costly administrative formations, and thus making Canada's remaining home defence forces much "leaner" and more efficient. At the same time, however, the reductions of 1943 provided the first sign of both the Army's and the government's recognition that the country could no longer afford to maintain such expensive home defence forces, at least without suffering significant military and political consequences.

* * *

Along with the Army's own difficulties over the number of men that it already had in uniform, a number of other signs were emerging by late 1943 that the country was reaching the limits of its manpower resources. As needs for men had grown in all parts of the country during 1942 and 1943, conflicts emerged over how many men should go to industry, the Army, or the other armed forces, and which groups should have priority. At the same time, planners began to become aware of a whole series of problems that prevented the NRMA from being able to live up to the demands that both the Army and its political superiors had assumed could be placed upon it when creating the "big army" of 1941-1942. The result, by 1944, was increasing resources being devoted to finding decreasing numbers of NRMA recruits, and consequently a decreasing number of volunteers from among the NRMA men as they were called up and entered training.

In fact, even in the midst of the Cabinet War Committee's lengthy debates over National Selective Service (NSS) in 1942, signs had emerged that the number of men available for the Army were, in the words of Minister of National War Services J.T. Thorsen, "far less than that indicated by statistical estimates." As Thorsen told the CWC in mid-1942, the classes of men liable for compulsory military training now included all single men between twenty and forty years old. Among the younger men ostensibly added to the rolls by taking this step,

large numbers could be expected to have already enlisted voluntarily, a fact which could not be confirmed under the mobilization procedures used during the Second World War until notices had been mailed to prospective NRMA recruits. In the older age groups, and as they were extended upwards and in the future to married men, returns would become smaller and smaller due to lower numbers of candidates who could meet the Army's physical standards. Moreover, many older men worked in essential industries. Already, Thorsen noted, "it was necessary to send out as many as nine notices to obtain one man. Army requisitions for July, August and September could probably be met, but the [current] manpower pool available for the Army would, by then, be substantially exhausted."⁴⁵

One remedy for this situation was to begin reducing the numbers of men employed in less essential industries through the work of the NSS organization, an idea that was a major consideration behind the creation and widening of the NSS's powers throughout 1942. As the year went on, the number of men reporting for each new compulsory military training period fell farther and farther short of the Army's requirements, and J.L. Ralston began to press more firmly for NSS officials to put its powers into practice, and expand the classes of men liable for training under the NRMA, despite the lower returns that could be expected. In particular, he urged that compulsory military service be extended to include married men. In response to opponents who argued that each of these

actions would take men away from essential industries and disrupt the continued expansion of wartime production, Ralston pointed out that the Army needed only the most physically-capable recruits, and those who left employment could be replaced by less fit men transferred from other industries. Unfortunately, the same indecision that had plagued the larger debates on creating the NSS in 1942 also shaped the CWC's responses to this issue, and it was not until early December that members finally agreed to extend compulsory training to all single men over the age of nineteen, and all married men 20-25. Meanwhile, debates over larger priorities continued into the New Year.⁴⁶

By early 1943, the proportion of NRMA recruits who were reporting for compulsory military training compared to the numbers requested from the Department of Labour (which by now was responsible for calling out men) were falling to what the Army considered dangerously low levels. According to its figures, the number of men entering the training centres had plummeted from over ninety percent of those requisitioned from civilian officials up to mid-1942, to thirty percent or less during much of the period since then. Significantly, when the figures were calculated by Military Districts, Quebec City came the lowest, with an average rate of 57.6% of men called for training ending up in military service over the past two years, although Military District No. 3 (Kingston and eastern Ontario) came a close second with a rate of 59.9%. Montreal,

meanwhile, came fifth out of the eleven districts, with 78.6% of calls for men being met, a respectable showing considering the high concentration of industry in the region, and compared to the Toronto area's lower rate of 66.7%. Military District No. 6 (Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island) had the highest reporting rate at 88.0%⁴⁷

In addition to the widening gap between calls for men and the enrolment of NRMA recruits in early 1943, advisors at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) also began to worry privately about the attitudes revealed by NSS officials in a series of "Interpretive Letters" that the latter began to distribute to local Mobilization Boards in January 1943, with the commendable goal of ensuring greater uniformity in the policies used to call out men across the country. As the Vice Adjutant-General wrote after viewing the first three directives, "the tone of all these letters so far seems to me to indicate a definite leaning towards industry and agriculture and against the Army."⁴⁸ Brigadier A.E. Nash and others objected especially to "Interpretive Letter No. 1," which outlined policies for postponing military service for farm workers, defining such workers very broadly, and directing Boards to accept requests for postponement without even asking individuals to provide evidence of their status, a procedure that made it difficult to question any claim. Surprisingly, perhaps, these directions affected operations more negatively in rural provinces like Saskatchewan, where

one might have expected Boards to be more tolerant of requests for agricultural postponement, compared to others where less people were involved in agriculture. The change brought protests from one member of the NSS Mobilization Board in Saskatchewan, who wrote to J.G. Gardiner, the federal Minister of Agriculture and the province's representative in the Cabinet, to note the opposition that the new policy would spark from families who had already lost sons and husbands to voluntary service or the NRMA. If the new directions continued in effect, he added, almost everyone in Saskatchewan might request postponements on the basis of some connection to agriculture, and "it will be absolutely impossible to supply the manpower calls made by the Department of Militia and Defense [sic]."⁴⁹

In addition to these problems, as Major-General H.F.G. Letson, the current Adjutant-General, pointed out in February 1943, there was also the difficulty that several senior officials at NSS seemed to see no difficulty with the number of conscripts reporting to training centres falling short of that requested by the Army, since numbers of civilian volunteers had been higher than expected in recent months, apparently making up the difference. "If voluntary enlistments suddenly take a dip and National Selective Service is counting on continued good results from voluntary recruiting," Letson noted, perhaps hinting at his own fears for the future, "then the combined results may seriously

suffer."⁵⁰ To be fair to the personnel of NSS, Letson and others in the Department of National Defence stated a number of times that their NSS counterparts seemed to be trying to cooperate with the Army's demands. In addition, for NSS officials faced with conflicting demands for manpower from several departments, the situation probably did not seem nearly as serious as it did to the Army, which had only its own needs to fill. NSS workers were also hard-pressed owing to the extra burden created when the government merged all manpower functions under the Department of Labour at the end of 1942, and lastly they objected to changes made by the Army in early 1943, that toughened physical standards for NRMA recruits. The last development actually resulted from the Army having temporarily lowered standards for the past few months, in the hope of being able to reclaim some men to useful service from lower medical categories. But the experiment did not produce adequate results, thereby increasing the difficulties of both sets of officials in finding enough men to meet the Army's needs.⁵¹

From the Army's point of view, all of these trends were very problematic. Between the number of unplanned units that had had to be brought up to strength to man the country's home defence forces during 1942-1943, and the degree to which commanders had come to rely on the NRMA to provide both conscripts and overseas volunteers, the figures were clearly worrying, and led to a number of attempts to push NSS

personnel to deal more systematically with the problem.⁵² In fact, Ralston was so disturbed by the various trends that he began what would turn out to be a lengthy exchange of correspondence with Humphrey Mitchell, the Minister of Labour and the man responsible for administering all aspects of NSS and the NRMA after late 1942.⁵³ Ralston understood the NSS organization's difficulties in meeting the Army's needs, he wrote in April 1943, but greater efforts had to be made to keep up the flow of men into the Army. Among his suggestions were a number of steps that were not really his right to demand of another minister, revealing the degree of strain to which the situation had brought the two men by then. NSS officials should create extra Mobilization Boards to deal with calling up men if the work was too heavy, he noted. New classes of men should be called out for training, this time by extending the age of married men liable for service under the NRMA. Mitchell's own experts strongly resisted the last suggestion, as it was expected to be disruptive to industry, as well as unnecessary to meet the Army's requirements, which they were confident would eventually be met. "Whether or not that may be so if spread over a long period of time," Ralston argued, the Army's requirements were urgent, and the current approach was "not panning out on [the] basis of the adjusted monthly requirements which we arranged with you."⁵⁴

Two days later, Ralston wrote to Mitchell again, this time to protest Interpretive Letter No. 1 and its impact on

rural manpower. "It would be different if the requisitions for men were being filled but week by week they are falling behind," he wrote, "and the Army needs men."⁵⁵ At the end of the month, Ralston took his concerns to the CWC, an action that provoked criticism of NSS operations from several other ministers, and launched debates about strengthening NSS that went on throughout the summer, both in the CWC and in the larger Cabinet. For the first time, other ministers seem to have begun to sense the need for tougher measures to compel civilians to move from less essential to more essential industries, and Ralston successfully argued for further extensions in the age groups and categories of men liable for compulsory training. Another result was a series of changes to NSS itself in August 1943, just as the Army was moving towards large cuts in its own home defence forces, that were designed to strengthen the administration of civilian manpower regulations. At the same time, the CWC authorized a number of measures intended to push employees more firmly to transfer to work of greater importance to the war effort.⁵⁶

Unfortunately, however, the new measures were not much more successful than previous ones. NSS officials continued to disagree over manpower priorities and enforcing civilian mobilization regulations, and numbers continued to fall short of the Army's needs. After the situation had deteriorated further in the winter of 1943-1944, Ralston wrote to Mitchell in March 1944, pressing even more firmly for the NSS to meet

the Army's manpower requirements, particularly for conscripts under the NRMA. Mitchell's only reply was to describe once again the difficulties faced by NSS. As he noted, in order to find 34,000 recruits for the Army over the past six months, NSS personnel had had to issue call-up notices to almost 185,000 men, a situation that could only get worse as the age groups liable for compulsory training were expanded over the rest of the year. The result did not satisfy Ralston, who replied with his most forceful statement yet, commenting that:

You say that 'No stone has been left unturned to meet the demand'. I of course, have to accept that, but I can suggest that there are some stones that, while they may have been turned, have, perhaps not been turned all the way over, under which there will be found quite a number of prospective recruits.⁵⁷

Yet, aside from increasing tension, the letter produced results no different than before. As J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman have aptly put it, "the country had effectively reached the bottom of the manpower barrel."⁵⁸

At the same time as these debates were going on between Ralston and Mitchell, several pieces of evidence were emerging that hinted at other reasons why Ralston was so adamant about increasing calls for NRMA men, and that indicate yet another way that the Act worked to find volunteers for all three armed services during the Second World War - as well as the implications of the declining numbers of men who were reporting for training by early 1944. In November 1943, planners conducted a study that confirmed an assumption that

had been evident in many of the CWC's discussions on the NRMA. Of almost 200,000 volunteers, all of whom had entered the Army directly from civilian life, a total of thirty-seven percent reported that they had done so at some point after receiving their first notice to report for medical examination under the NRMA, but before actually presenting themselves for induction as an NRMA recruit.⁵⁹ As Humphrey Mitchell had noted during his earlier exchanges with Ralston, even many workers in essential industries received postponements from training only after their employers applied on their behalf, and ended up volunteering shortly afterwards, evidently through a combination of peer pressure and the realization that they were needed overseas. "In one company reporting recently from Toronto," Mitchell had written, "nine of the first ten men listed as key workers for whom postponements was [sic] requested became volunteers in a period of six or eight months."⁶⁰ If these numbers held true for the entire Army, then it is possible that the NRMA was responsible for helping to nudge over 200,000 of the total of 572,318 men and women who volunteered for general service directly from civilian society during the war to take that step, in addition to the 58,434 men who volunteered after being enrolled as conscripts under the NRMA. Thus, as many as forty percent of all men who served as volunteers in the Canadian Army during the war may have been induced to do so in one way or another by the NRMA. Commanders clearly had yet another reason to worry as they

watched the numbers of NRMA men decline in 1943 and 1944.⁶¹

Another factor that intruded into the CWC's discussions during this period, and brought Ralston into conflict with other ministers besides Mitchell, was the issue of leave policies for soldiers to work in civilian jobs. As manpower resources shrank throughout 1942 and 1943, some members began to call for Ralston to release larger numbers of troops from home defence duties, to meet shortages in specific industries. Leading the charge was C.D. Howe, the Minister of Munitions and Supply, and thus the head of wartime production. Debate centred around several key primary industries, which had some of the harshest working conditions in Canada, and were losing men steadily to other, better-paying wartime jobs. They also needed fit, healthy men to replace those lost, the same men who were needed most desperately by the Army. As early as October 1942, Howe managed to convince the federal Cabinet to pass an Order-in-Council temporarily freezing labour in industries such as forestry, coal and base metal mining, and steel production.⁶² Ralston resisted these developments, pointing out that the Army could not be expected to meet the industries' needs when civilian mobilization regulations were not being applied more firmly. Concessions would only encourage other industries to make similar demands, he noted, discouraging direct recruiting for the Army, and encouraging the idea that military service was not the most important way that men could contribute to the war effort. But as the

debates went on it became more and more clear that the majority of the CWC's members were prepared to treat industry more leniently than the Army when it came to weeding out men from unessential duties.⁶³

As a result, by March 1943 Ralston was forced to extend the Army's existing leave policies to include a number of primary industries, as well as shorter agricultural leaves at seeding and harvesting times, a process that at least kept men on the Army's rolls, so that they could be recalled in the future rather than releasing them completely to civilian life.⁶⁴ But the measures hampered the Army's efforts to ensure proper training for men in its home defence forces, and to bring these units up to full strength, despite the fact that they had been created largely through pressure from some of the same ministers who were now criticizing them for being too large. Demands from industries continued to grow, and Howe and others pressed increasingly for the Army either to cut its forces or to lend men for further temporary civilian uses. The criticism also helped press planners to begin cutting the size of home defence forces in mid-1943, now that their political superiors no longer felt the need for them. Unfortunately, as has already been noted, the changes did not do nearly as much as ministers had assumed they would to improve the civilian labour situation, since most of the men released were immediately required to fill other Army commitments, both at home and overseas.⁶⁵

The needs of various industries continued to come up for debate throughout the winter of 1943-1944.⁶⁶ Meanwhile, the result was to draw off a few thousand more men that the Army desperately needed to meet its own manpower requirements: by mid-1943, at least 3,000 NRMA men were on leave from compulsory service, with even higher numbers on agricultural leave during the spring and fall. By late September 1944, the total had increased to over 13,000, and by November, after conscription had exploded back onto the political scene, the number of men on leaves of various types still totalled almost 9,000.⁶⁷ At the same time, these developments ensured that it would be even more difficult to convince many conscripts to volunteer for overseas service, since the new measures now offered them the best of both worlds, allowing them to fulfil their obligation to serve their country without leaving Canada, while also releasing them to work in very lucrative jobs in wartime industries.

One further development that occurred in this period that again shows how badly men were needed for the NRMA was the government's decision to widen the classes of men liable for training to include people who were not yet even Canadian citizens. In mid-November 1941, Norman Robertson, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, had written to Prime Minister King to suggest extending the regulations from the current definition of "British subjects" who were "normally resident in Canada," to include non-Canadian citizens. Even

though it was no fault of their own, Robertson explained, there were many complaints about "foreigners" taking jobs away from Canadians called out for military service. Changing the NRMA to apply to non-Canadian citizens would counteract the charges, while adding roughly 25,000 men to the rolls of potential conscripts.⁶⁸

Robertson's suggestion was timely, and well-calculated to find favour with the CWC. But it resulted in much correspondence over the next year before it could be brought to fruition. Extending the NRMA required a series of complicated reciprocal agreements and other arrangements, for diplomatic as well as legal reasons, with Commonwealth countries, the United States, and the governments-in-exile of several European countries who were currently recruiting and training forces from among their own nationals in Canada, with the permission of the Canadian government.⁶⁹ Ireland, which was still part of the British Commonwealth but had passed its own citizenship laws and declared itself neutral at the start of the war, made particularly strong representations about its citizens being considered British subjects for the purposes of the NRMA. Changes were also made to naturalization and immigration laws, so that the NRMA could be applied to men from neutral countries, who could not be compelled to serve in the forces of a belligerent under international law. Instead, Canadian laws were changed so that when these men were called out they could either formally "declare" their intention of

becoming future Canadian citizens, and then undergo their training, or identify themselves as neutrals and avoid serving. If they chose the second option, they were permanently barred from becoming permanent Canadian residents, and threatened with deportation at the end of the war. The result was in effect to compel them to carry out the duties of citizenship if they wished to take advantage of its benefits. Army leaders even agreed to accept enemy aliens for both compulsory and voluntary service, as long as they declared their intention of becoming Canadian residents in the same way as neutrals, and passed a security check by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to ensure their loyalty.⁷⁰

According to records compiled by the Department of National War Services in 1941 and 1942, when these changes were finally put into place in late 1942 the result was to add up to 35,000 Canadians to the lists of potential NRMA recruits.⁷¹ As the statistics provided in chapter two of this thesis show (Table III), the final number of men enlisted under the NRMA who were born outside of Canada was over 12,500, a not-inconsiderable number, although it is not clear how many were already naturalized Canadian residents before 1942, and thus previously subject to the NRMA. But the results were again small compared to the amount of time and effort that had gone into achieving them, another sign of the decreasing numbers of men available for the Army by 1943 and 1944, and the increasing difficulty of putting them in

uniform.

One last development that revealed even more clearly the need for men for the Army, and the great reluctance on the part of some Canadians to serve under the NRMA, was the increasingly strong effort that was being made to locate deserters and defaulters by 1943. From the start of compulsory military service in 1940, at least a few men had failed to report for training, and the Department of National War Services had developed policies for dealing with such cases.⁷² But as manpower resources declined during 1942 and 1943, and the number of delinquents began to rise, J.L. Ralston began to press for more thorough efforts to apprehend and prosecute such offenders.⁷³

Unfortunately, when it came to enforcing NRMA regulations authorities were faced with a number of problems, and a whole series of means could be used to delay or avoid military service, some legal and some not. Before a man's mobilization even began, he was assumed to have complied with the National Registration of 1940, a step that relied on the traditionally law-abiding habits of Canadians. After the registration, every man received a certificate as proof of his status, which for much of the war had to be presented before legally being able to work in most jobs. Yet employers could "look the other way" in hiring workers, especially as supplies of manpower became more and more scarce after 1942, and the risk of breaking the regulations became more profitable. In some

cases men altered or borrowed certificates, or even ordered official duplicates for friends who did not possess them, by reporting their own as lost or stolen.⁷⁴ As the war went on, a number of cases emerged of certificates being forged or sold on the black market, as well as forgeries of other records such as certificates of rejection or postponement from compulsory military service, or discharge from the armed forces for medical or other reasons.⁷⁵

Once a man complied with his registration, there were still a number of ways to avoid service legal and illegal. The first step in the mobilization process was a notice to report for medical examination, which usually arrived by registered mail a few weeks before authorities planned to have a man report for training. At this point, prospective recruits were required to visit a civilian doctor of their choice, and undergo a general examination, under directions provided by the Army. Any man who did not meet the Army's physical standards was categorized as unwanted, and thus exempted from training. Officials soon realized that some doctors tended to be more lenient than others, and by 1942 special boards had been created to review questionable cases. Meanwhile, for those who were willing to go farther to evade military service during the war, more than one civilian doctor and even some military personnel were implicated in accepting bribes for placing men in lower medical categories than they should have been. Others helped men to avoid being called out

for training in other ways, in more than one case accepting money when they already knew that the man was never likely to be called, and thus unlikely to question the value of the "services" being performed by their supposed benefactors.⁷⁶ In other cases, local mobilization officials reported attempts to bribe them to alter records in district offices.⁷⁷

The final stage in becoming an NRMA recruit was a man's actual call for training, which again appeared by registered mail. At this point, any man who felt that his services were more vital to the war effort working in agriculture or industry could apply to be postponed from training. Many took advantage of this opportunity during the war, necessitating yet another level of paperwork to deal with each case.⁷⁸ If a man did not technically want to break the law, there was one more step that he could take to avoid training before he was actually reported as a delinquent: knowing what registered letters from the Department of National War Services (later NSS) likely meant, many men simply refused to accept them. In these cases notices had to be delivered in person by police officers, a costly and time-consuming task but one that was necessary to prove that the man had received the notice.⁷⁹ Mobilization officials came to depend on the voluntary cooperation of local and provincial police forces to carry out such duties, despite early difficulties in Ontario and Quebec, both of which objected to the extra burden that the work would put on their own officers. Officials eventually convinced

Current and following pages: samples of Notices to Report for Medical Examination, Notice to Report for Re-examination, Notice of Postponement of Military Training, and Notice to Report for Military Training, used during the first two years of operation of the NRMA. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 31, Vol. 1430, "National Registration 1940-1950," pt. 1.)

HAND THIS NOTICE TO THE EXAMINING PHYSICIAN

EXAMINING PHYSICIAN WILL PLEASE ATTACH THIS NOTICE TO THE MEDICAL EXAMINATION AND CERTIFICATE FORM COMPLETED FOR THIS MAN AND TO BE SENT TO THE DIVISIONAL REGISTRAR.

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL WAR SERVICES
National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940
National War Services Regulations, 1940
(Recruits)

NOTICE OF CALL
Serial Number
Re A 1

From: Divisional Registrar,
Administrative Division "A",
National War Services,
Carling Block,
London, Ont.

Date Issued:
BY PROCLAMATION OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL

TO

NOTE:—This department will pay the examining physician but no other cost in connection with your medical examination.

You have been called out to undergo military training and, in accordance with the National War Services Regulations, 1940, (Recruits), are hereby notified to present yourself for medical examination within three clear days, to any one of the nearest duly appointed examining physicians in this Administrative Division. If you are found fit, you will be notified to report for military training at a time and place which will be indicated to you. If necessary, a warrant for transportation will be forwarded with the notice to report for training.

SPECIMEN

TO

NOTE:—This department will pay the examining physician but no other cost in connection with your medical examination.

You have been called out to undergo military training and, in accordance with the National War Services Regulations, 1940, (Recruits), are hereby notified to present yourself for medical examination within three clear days, to any one of the nearest duly appointed examining physicians in this Administrative Division. If you are found fit, you will be notified to report for military training at a time and place which will be indicated to you. If necessary, a warrant for transportation will be forwarded with the notice to report for training.

(This copy to be retained by Divisional Registrar.)

reminded that in connection with your medical examination, any question which you may wish to take up should be taken up with the nearest addressed to you. You are also reminded that you must notify appears in the upper left hand portion of the "Notice-Medical Examination". You are also reminded that you must notify your Divisional Registrar immediately if you are a student at some University or College, or a member of the Navy, the Army or the Air Force, or of a Non-Permanent Active Militia. Should you have reason to make application for the postponement of your period of military training, you must apply to your Divisional Registrar. Your Divisional Registrar will not receive any application for postponement after three clear days of the date appearing on the enclosed "Notice-Medical Examination". If you are notified to report for military training you will receive a transport warrant covering only the distance from your stated place of residence to the training centre to which you will be notified to report. The Department will pay no other transportation. By following the above instructions you will be serving your best interests.

HAND THIS NOTICE TO THE MEDICAL REVISION BOARD

"NOTICE - MEDICAL RE-EXAMINATION"

"NOTICE OF CALL"

From: Divisional Registrar,
Administrative Division,
National War Services,
Post Office, Upper Town,
Quebec City, P.Q.

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
WAR SERVICES
(National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940)
(National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits))
(Consolidation 1941)

Serial Number

Re

Date issued:

In accordance with Section 12 (4) of the National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits) (Consolidation 1941) you are hereby notified to present yourself for medical re-examination by a National War Services medical revision board at the time and place indicated hereunder. If you are found fit for military training, you may expect to be notified by your Divisional Registrar at a military training centre to perform military

TO

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training as prescribed by Proclamation of the Governor in Council. The Department will pay the fees of the members of the board but no other cost in connection with your medical re-examination.

Report to

TO

SPW

training as prescribed by Proclamation of the Governor in Council. The Department will pay the fees of the members of the board but no other cost in connection with your medical re-examination.

Report to

On

(This copy to be retained by Divisional Registrar)

At

From: Divisional Registrar,
Administrative Division "N",
National War Services,
Court House,
Edmonton, Alta.

**DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
WAR SERVICES**

(National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940)
(National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits)
(Consolidation 1941))

"Notice—
Medical Examination" serial number
to be inserted here:

Date issued:

After due consideration, your application for the postponement of your period of military training has been by the Board of this Administrative Division.

TO



Your period of military training, therefore, is postponed until at least one full month before the expiration of your postponement, you may expect, if medically fit, to be called for the period of military training immediately following the expiration of your postponement. It is important that you quote the serial number appearing in the upper right hand corner of this postponement order in any communication addressed to the Divisional Registrar. Any change of address must be notified forthwith to the Divisional Registrar. Under National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits) (Consolidation 1941) heavy penalties are provided for failure to notify such change of address to the Divisional Registrar.

NATIONAL WAR SERVICES REGULATIONS, 1940 (RECRUITS) (CONSOLIDATION 1941) DO NOT PROVIDE FOR ANY EXEMPTION. THIS POSTPONEMENT IS TEMPORARY AND MAY BE REVOKED AT ANY TIME. WHEN IT MUST BE RETURNED AS MAY BE DIRECTED. THIS POSTPONEMENT ORDER MUST BE RETURNED TO THE DIVISIONAL REGISTRAR WHEN APPLYING FOR A FURTHER POSTPONEMENT. NO APPLICATION FOR A FURTHER POSTPONEMENT WILL BE CONSIDERED UNLESS THIS POSTPONEMENT ORDER IS IN THE HANDS OF THE DIVISIONAL REGISTRAR.

NPO

Copy for Man's File

Copy for the Representative of the District Officer Commanding

(Notice—Military Training)

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL WAR SERVICES

(National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940)

From: The Divisional Registrar,
Administrative Division "N"
Court House,
Edmonton, Alta. (Date issued):

NOTICE OF CALL

Serial Number used on
"Notice—Medical Exam-
ination" to be inserted
here

BY PROCLAMATION OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR GENERAL

You have been called out to undergo military training and, in accordance with National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits) have been medically examined and found fit for training. Therefore, you are hereby notified to appear within three clear days, to the Officer Commanding, Military

TO

Training Centre at
Transport Warrant No.

is enclosed herewith.

(Note: If transportation is not required, Divisional Registrar will strike out.)

TO

Training Centre at
Transport Warrant No.

is enclosed herewith.

(Note: If transportation is not required, Divisional Registrar will strike out.)

(This copy is to be retained by Divisional Registrar)

Ontario to permit its police to cooperate, but Quebec refused to do so, and several letters from Ernest Lapointe, the federal Minister of Justice, to his provincial counterpart asking for aid went unanswered. Authorities in Quebec finally agreed on a less formal level to help prosecute offenders in provincial courts on behalf of the federal government. But throughout the war they refused to participate actively in enforcing the NRMA, a decision that was probably motivated not only by the cost but also the general level of distaste for the measure in Quebec, and the Godbout government's need to distance itself from its federal Liberal counterpart, which had helped so openly to get it elected in 1939, and then introduced such an unpopular policy into the province.⁸⁰

Once a man had received his notice to report for military training, there was still one further and more illegal way that he could escape military service. In many cases, men chose to disobey their notice to report for training, thus becoming defaulters under the NRMA. Others left the Army after they had been inducted, thereby becoming deserters. Large numbers of notices went undelivered during the war owing to men moving from their homes and not notifying the National Registrar of their new addresses, and in a number of cases the omissions proved to be deliberate.⁸¹ Meanwhile, the need to track down and verify that every man was a defaulter added yet another task to the already heavy burdens of RCMP officers and officials from NSS.⁸² As early as 1942, authorities began

checking names against lists from the Department of National Defence of men who had volunteered for the Army, to eliminate obviously irrelevant cases from its files. As the need to identify other, similar types of cases became more urgent in 1943, private companies were hired to do some of the work.⁸³

In late 1943, local police and mobilization officials finally went one step further in their search for defaulters, launching a series of what were termed "roundups," in large cities across the country. In each case, officers swooped down on taverns, pool halls, beer parlours, and other "shady establishments" where men tended to congregate, rounded up groups of men, and checked their registration certificates and other papers. NSS personnel usually located a few defaulters and deserters, and larger numbers of men who were unemployed or working in non-essential jobs, a status that was also illegal or at least frowned upon by this point in the war.⁸⁴ At the same time, in December 1943 NSS officials ordered employers to carry out a "compulsory check-up" of all workers, and report any that did not possess proof of meeting the requirements of wartime mobilization regulations.⁸⁵ Thus, by the beginning of 1944 the Canadian public was becoming more and more aware of the seriousness of both civilian and military mobilization regulations, and it was becoming more difficult to avoid such service, although in some ways the actions were reminiscent of procedures used in totalitarian states rather than a democratic country like Canada,

emphasizing yet again the extent to which society had been mobilized on all levels by 1944.

As the war entered what would turn out to be its last full year, there were still considerable numbers of men who could not yet be found for the Army, and officials faced more and more frustration in their attempts to find and apprehend defaulters. Friends and family often sheltered these men, and in more remote regions it was possible to go for months or even years before being caught. In British Columbia, one man eluded the RCMP for more than a year before being captured, fleeing into the bush and at one point diving into a local river to escape pursuing police officers. He was only taken into custody in June 1946, when he finally decided to surrender.⁸⁶ In another case in Quebec, a man fired several shots over the heads of Military Policemen as they pursued a friend of his who was a deserter, yelling, according to the later report of the MPs, "that there was no sons of bitches that were going to take any French Canadians out of this town."⁸⁷ In addition, large numbers of defaulters from Quebec were alleged to be living across the border in the northern United States, which had a sizeable French-speaking population, or in lumber camps in northern Ontario.⁸⁸ Advisors in External Affairs went so far as to suggest making a formal agreement with the United States to apprehend and return these types of men from each other's countries, but formal settlements never went beyond the negotiating stage.⁸⁹

In early 1944 a series of new problems emerged in Quebec, when defence lawyers for men accused of violating the NRMA discovered that by appealing every conviction for violations against mobilization regulations, they could gain more time for their clients by backing up cases in higher courts.⁹⁰ In addition, local officials in rural parts of Quebec sometimes insisted on police using complicated procedures to arrest defaulters, although in this case the cause seems to have been a desire to run up costs, which were paid by the federal government, rather than deliberately to delay enforcement of the NRMA.⁹¹ This time, the province's officials proved to be more cooperative than in earlier years, and even agreed to allow procedures to be altered temporarily by Order-in-Council to cut down on appeals for the duration of the war.⁹²

Despite these many measures, evasion of various aspects of the NRMA remained a significant concern throughout the war, and added yet another difficulty to the many that were already worrying both NSS officials and the civilians and generals of NDHQ by the end of 1943. Approximately 20,000 men remained unaccounted for at the end of the war, down from about 200,000 since the Department of Labour had taken over administering the NRMA at the end of 1942.⁹³ Unfortunately, even then the numbers were deceptive: of the 20,000, only a small proportion turned out to be due to anything other than errors and inefficiencies in the administration of National Registration regulations. Over the next year, NSS personnel located

another large proportion of the last 20,000 men, most of whom turned out to be farmers who had not been aware that they were required to apply for postponement when they received their notices, or names that had been accidentally duplicated in compiling registration records. As of the end of June 1946, the total number of defaulters still on the government's books was a much lower figure of 6,724.⁹⁴ At the same time, according to C.P. Stacey, 7,255 NRMA men were struck off strength as deserters at the end of the war, a figure which would account for approximately half the 14,835 men that remained unapprehended in 1946, a high percentage of the total but again a small overall number, thanks largely to the efforts of NSS. Still, the numbers betrayed yet again the large amount of effort that was being expended for declining returns by 1944.⁹⁵

Of the total number of defaulters remaining at large under the NRMA in 1946, a considerable proportion (4,926, or 73.3%) came from Quebec. It is also notable that in one study conducted in 1942, men were rejected for medical reasons at almost twice the rate in Quebec than in Ontario. This conclusion should not be surprising, given some of the anecdotal evidence noted above, as well as general attitudes towards conscription in both English and French Canada during the war. Not all defaulters or deserters came from Quebec, however, and Army doctors rejected men from Quebec at the same rate as civilian doctors, suggesting that other factors were

at work aside from deliberate efforts to avoid the regulations.⁹⁶ Added to these influences was the fact that Quebec had only two mobilization districts devoted to administering the NRMA during the war, compared to four in Ontario, as a result of the prewar imbalance in English- and French-speaking militia units, which had been used as a basis for organizing the districts. The lack of cooperation on the part of provincial police added to the difficulty of dealing with such cases in a more timely manner. Lastly, considering the general stereotypes that existed on the part of many English-Canadians during the war, it would not be inappropriate to assume that officials might have focused their efforts more intently on identifying defaulters in Quebec compared to elsewhere.

Still, it is clear from the numbers that by early 1944 the country was reaching the last of its manpower reserves. Despite the complaints of Ralston and some of his senior advisors, there were few places to turn to find more men for overseas service, other than lowering the age of liability for training, a step that was taken in August 1943 when it dropped to 18½.⁹⁷ At the same time, over the winter of 1943-1944 the numbers of men volunteering from civilian life began to dwindle, dropping from a high for the year of 12,218 in January 1943, to a low of 2,789 in December, and rising only slightly again in the first months of 1944. The number of men enlisted as NRMA recruits also fell relatively steadily from

mid-1942 on, enrolments going from 6,833 in July 1942 to 5,820 in January 1943, and 1,631 that December. Meanwhile, the number of NRMA men converting to general service went from 2,526 in May 1942 to 1,003 in January 1943, and only 295 for all of December. The number of NRMA men going active as a percentage of the number being enrolled had slipped from as much as forty percent in mid-1942 to less than twenty in late 1943.⁹⁸ As the Army looked ahead to the increased fighting that would come in Europe that spring, it was clear that the NRMA was no longer meeting the demands of an Army that would soon be facing even higher casualties than before.

* * *

In these circumstances, commanders turned to the one source of men that remained available to them as reinforcements: the thousands of soldiers who were still in uniform as part of the home defence Army. As early as February, planners at NDHQ were clearly worrying about the coming year. Orders arrived in Pacific Command from NDHQ, directing units to scrutinize every general service soldier below the rank of sergeant for possible release to overseas service, "to ensure that the reinforcement stream be brought to the volume required for maintenance of necessary reserves in the United Kingdom."⁹⁹ A month later, instructions were issued for commanding officers to interview every non-commissioned officer (NCO) and even Warrant Officer in their units who was of the proper age and physical category to serve

overseas, large numbers of whom could not be sent unless they voluntarily agreed to relinquish their ranks, in an attempt to convince them to do so. Failing that, commanders were told to report anyone "not qualified or suited [underlining in original]" to hold their current ranks, so that they could be forcefully demoted in preparation for being sent overseas.¹⁰⁰

In late March 1944, authorities decided to go one step further, and launched a new recruiting campaign in Pacific Command. In an idea that had apparently originated in 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, whose officers had supposedly been told many times by the NRMA men under their command that they were prepared to go overseas voluntarily if the Brigade went as a unit, officials in Ottawa promised just that. The tactic was clearly patterned on the same type of approaches that had worked so well in training centres in past years, by relying on peer pressure to convince "R" men to volunteer. The 13th Brigade was the logical place to begin this campaign, having just returned from Kiska, where both groups of soldiers had worked side by side for months. The Brigade was also considered to be at its peak in terms of training and morale. For Major-General G.R. Pearkes, an eager and energetic commander who reportedly had not yet lost faith in the hope either that his units would participate in further active operations, or that the NRMA men were soldiers like any others, the idea seemed to have great potential, and the Brigade quickly got to work.¹⁰¹

Unfortunately, there were significant differences between recruiting operations in training centres earlier in the war and the situation in 13th Brigade. By early 1944 the number of conscripts in the Brigade far outnumbered volunteers, ranging from sixty percent of the staff of the Brigade's headquarters to eighty-five percent of other ranks in the Rocky Mountain Rangers, and even ninety-five percent in the *Régiment de Hull*. As Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin, the new commander of the Brigade after its return from Kiska, noted in his later report on the recruiting campaign:

Le Regiment [sic] de Hull actually had two N.R.M.A. acting warrant officers, and most of its serjeants [sic] were N.R.M.A. Other units also had N.R.M.A. serjeants, corporals and Lance Corporals on strength. If there ever had been any outward distinction between the volunteer and the N.R.M.A. soldier in these units it had long since disappeared. I had hoped that it would not reappear but this hope was not fulfilled. The instant the announcement was made that 13 Infantry Brigade would mobilize on a volunteer basis the active personnel mentally ranged themselves in a body on one side and the N.R.M.A. ranged themselves on the other, and the gulf between them widened and deepened daily.¹⁰²

In hindsight Macklin noted a number of other problems that had not been evident at the time, but which affected the Brigade's cohesion and morale at the start of the recruiting campaign. These included the granting of thirty days' leave for all personnel after its return from Kiska, large numbers of senior officers being rotated through the Brigade after its stay in the Aleutians (among them Macklin himself), and several junior officers being transferred out of the Brigade in mid-March, to

serve in the British Army as part of the recently established "Canloan" scheme.¹⁰³

The result of all these developments was that commanders quickly realized that there would be little chance of one hundred percent of the Brigade volunteering for general service. Arrangements were made for each battalion to draw men from two further home defence units in Pacific Command, and at first the results of the campaign seemed positive: in the first two days over 150 men enlisted within the Brigade. But by early April, the numbers of men volunteering each day had fallen to a few men in each unit, and there they stayed. Commanders transferred the NRMA men most firmly opposed to volunteering out of the Brigade, in an attempt to keep them from influencing their colleagues, and took away NCO ranks from many conscripts who possessed them; not surprisingly, the latter were said to be showing "a noticeable lack of leadership" during the campaign.¹⁰⁴

As the month went on, conscripts were moved to a special "Tent Camp" on the outskirts of the Brigade's Vernon, B.C., headquarters, and subjected to a series of route marches, assault courses, and night training schemes, and "six inches of mud that could hold its own against the Kiska variety."¹⁰⁵ All requests for leave were cancelled, and three successive Victoria Cross winners visited Vernon to exhort the men to volunteer, including Major Paul Triquet of the *Royal 22e Régiment*, who had recently won his V.C. during some of the

harshest fighting of the Italian campaign. Triquet spoke in French to the *Régiment de Hull*, managing to convince twenty-three men to volunteer.¹⁰⁶ Major-General Pearkes, himself a V.C. winner from the First World War, spoke to the Brigade a few days later, and Lt.Col. J. MacGregor, another V.C. winner, took command of the "Tent Camp," spending several days speaking with conscripts on an individual level.¹⁰⁷ Almost every method was used to find volunteers, although Macklin denied using open coercion. As he put it,

We have used every form of persuasion that could be thought of - interviews, discussions, sermons, films, speeches. We have appealed to their pride, to their manhood, to their patriotism and even to their self-interest. But we have NOT [capitals in original] used threats or intimidation nor subjected these men to extra fatigues or menial duties.¹⁰⁸

The senior Roman Catholic chaplain in Pacific Command was another of the many people who arrived to conduct personal interviews with NRMA recruits, and reportedly he was capable of doing so in a number of different languages. But he "reduced more than one man to tears without succeeding in persuading the man to enlist."¹⁰⁹ As the Brigade's War Diarist concluded after the first week of the campaign, "The men do not seem interested at all and the thought of being separated from their platoons and buddies has no effect on them."¹¹⁰

Elsewhere, the methods being used to convince NRMA recruits to go active in Pacific Command attracted more interest. In fact, officials faced criticism from almost

every direction. On one side, the Vernon branch of the Canadian Legion, a determined supporter of conscription for overseas service at the national level, and particularly the branch's president (who also happened to be the Mayor of Vernon), criticized Pearkes and the government for demeaning the Victoria Cross by requiring Major Triquet to speak to NRMA recruits in Vernon. Howard Green of the Progressive Conservative Party rose in the House of Commons to question Ralston on the matter, seeing it as a sign of the need to extend conscription to overseas service.¹¹¹ Meanwhile, in Quebec City the municipal council passed a motion calling for a full Royal Commission to look into the events on the west coast, feeling that the campaign was a less-than-veiled attempt to force conscripts to volunteer. Other allegations were received from 133 former members of the *Régiment de Hull*, who were among the NRMA men transferred out of their unit and eventually to the *Fusiliers du St. Laurent* as part of the recruiting campaign. J.S. Roy, federal Member of Parliament for the Gaspé, questioned Ralston regarding comments made by Pearkes during the campaign, and René Chaloult, a well-known opponent of conscription in Quebec, put forward a motion in the provincial legislature that stated its objection to any move to send conscripts overseas, although at the same time the legislature affirmed its support for the broader war effort. Both motions passed by large majorities.¹¹²

By late April 1944, the recruiting campaign in Pacific

Command was winding down. In all, 793 men in 13th Brigade and 491 from other west coast units went active during the campaign, compared to 278 General Service men already in the Brigade, and 1102 posted in from other units. A total of 177 officers and 2664 other ranks went overseas when the Brigade left in May, including "practically every G.S. soldier below the rank of Sergeant" from Pacific Command.¹¹³ The numbers were not wholly disappointing, since almost half of the men were converts, but it was clear that these numbers would continue to decline as the least firmly opposed NRMA men volunteered. Within a few days, 13th Brigade embarked for the east coast, from which it sailed for England in late May. There, the Brigade became a training formation, similar to No. 1 Training Brigade Group in Debert, Nova Scotia, but devoted to teaching reinforcements brigade-level manoeuvres and bringing them up to combat efficiency after they arrived in England. Most of its other rank personnel soon moved on as reinforcement drafts to various operational units in western Europe, the first being a platoon of men from the *Régiment de Hull*, which left to join the *Régiment de Chaudière* in June.¹¹⁴

At the same time, authorities moved forward with plans for a similar recruiting campaign on the east coast in late April and early May. Since no independent operational brigade existed there, three separate infantry battalions were nominated to go overseas, provided that each managed to raise

their strength to 500 or more volunteers (roughly half the strength of an infantry battalion, and more for a typical home defence unit). In what was either a case of wishful thinking or a result of the fact that French-speaking reinforcements were urgently needed in Europe (or perhaps both), the units selected included two French-speaking battalions, the *Régiment de Joliette* and the *Régiment de Montmagny*, as well as the Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles.¹¹⁵ The results were even less encouraging than in Pacific Command, and none of the three battalions reached their quota. The Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles managed to persuade only 196 recruits to go active, and the campaign of the *Régiment de Joliette* ended almost before it had begun, with only two recorded converts.

Judging from the War Diaries of these units, the efforts made to encourage men to go active in Atlantic Command were less strenuous than on the west coast. This should not be surprising, since the units were smaller and served separately in widely-scattered defence posts that kept them isolated from each other to an extent even greater than in Pacific Command. Thus, it was more difficult to concentrate the attention of their men on the campaign. It also did not help that in the case of the Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles, a group of 150 men left on furlough the day after the campaign began.¹¹⁶ In the *Régiment de Joliette*, officers were subjected to colleagues from the Reserve Army who arrived to help interview conscripts to try to convince them to go active. Instead, according to

the battalion's War Diarist, "they more or less told us that we were slackers and are to blame for our men not signing active."¹¹⁷ Still, the *Régiment de Montmagny* did go overseas, despite falling short of its quota, after absorbing general service volunteers from the *Régiment de Joliette*. Its commanding officer was decorated after the war for his efforts to find recruits during the campaign.¹¹⁸ In August, one further battalion was permitted to try the same experiment. The Victoria Rifles of Canada eventually sailed for England in November, with a strength of 499 men, at least ninety of whom were drawn from other units on the east coast - including one platoon from the Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles.¹¹⁹

* * *

A few days after the 13th Brigade arrived in England, Canadian troops joined larger British and American forces in the famous landings of 6 June 1944 in Normandy that finally opened the long-awaited "second front" in north-west Europe. At the same time, Allied armies in Italy had just completed the capture of Rome. Over the next few weeks, 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade would be joined by the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, 4th Canadian Armoured Division, and the headquarters of both II Canadian Corps and First Canadian Army, under the overall command of General H.D.G. Crerar. Meanwhile, I Canadian Corps soldiered on in Italy, and by late June forces in both theatres were facing huge drains on their reinforcement pools. Over the

next several months, the plans and arrangements of the past four years by Crerar and other generals would be put to the ultimate test, and everyone, politicians and generals alike, would find out if the system that had been created would be sufficient to meet the demands the Army would put on it.

As we have seen, however, by early June 1944 the fate of the reinforcement system was already largely decided. Since mid-1943, the huge home defence forces that had been created earlier in the war had been considerably reduced, and another brigade of men had been sent overseas just that month. In the search for men for the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and for agricultural and industrial production, Canadian society had come to be mobilized on a scale unknown in the country's history, either before or since. Unfortunately, these measures had not been sufficient to find the numbers demanded by the Army, and by early 1944 the limits of manpower were rapidly being reached, whether by extending the age groups and classes of men liable for training, by calling out residents who were not Canadian citizens, or by making more and more systematic efforts to locate defaulters who had managed to evade the NRMA up to that point in the war. In addition, the potential for voluntary recruitment had also run out, partly due to the increased use of the NRMA to place men in uniform, either as conscripts or as volunteers. By April and May 1944, it was becoming clear that the last reserve of possible volunteers in the form of the 70,000 or more "zombies" that

were by then serving on home defence duties had also largely been worked dry.

The result was to set the stage for the final crisis over conscription that would eventually come in October and November 1944. By early 1944, the NRMA and the way that it had been administered by Army officials had come to shape not only the character of the country's armed forces, but also the parameters of the debate that would emerge. As 1944 went on, all of the factors that had been set in place before that time began to come together, to make the situation increasingly a political rather than a military problem, and one that both sides would eventually have to face head on. As we shall see in the next chapter, the result would be to force both sides to a decision that they had created the entire compulsory military training system to avoid. The only problem was that now it was that same system that was leading them towards the final decision.

Endnotes

1. R. MacGregor Dawson, The Conscription Crisis of 1944 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961). As noted in the introduction to this thesis, the material for Dawson's book was actually collected and drafted in the 1950s, but only published after his death.
2. E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1956), and C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), particularly pp. 434-41.
3. J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977; reprint, Copp Clark, 1985), especially pp. 185-

207.

4. On these various items of American equipment, see Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence, Ottawa [DHH], File 595.013(D4), "The Canadian Participation in the Kiska Operations," by G.W.L. Nicholson, 11 December 1943, paragraphs 42, 100, and 144, and File 595.013(D3), "Report on Kiska Operation (1943) - 13 Cdn Inf Bde - by Commander, 13 Cdn Inf Bde [Brigadier H.W. Foster]," 3 September 1943.

5. National Archives of Canada [NAC], Record Group [RG] 24, Records of the Department of National Defence, Vol. 14165, Microfilm Reels T-12399-400, War Diary, Headquarters, 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade [hereafter "War Diary, 13th Brigade"], 19 July 1943.

6. Ibid., 17 August 1943.

7. Ibid., 19 August 1943.

8. Ibid., 25 August 1943. Among the many other references to wind, rain, and mud in the 13th Brigade's War Diary was a monthly summary of weather for October (31 October), which recorded a total of 147 millimetres of rain that month, with winds of over 50 km/h on 22 days, a maximum steady wind (meaning that it was recorded at that speed for at least one minute by U.S. Meteorological Section instruments on the island (8 October) of 100 km/h, and gusts of up to 130 km/h. Fog was recorded on 13 days, and overcast skies for two-thirds of the month, while the average temperature was 42.3° Fahrenheit (5.7° Celsius). The mud was simply described as "Unrecordable."

9. Nicholson, "Foreword" to "The Canadian Participation in the Kiska Operations," op.cit.

10. War Diary, 13th Brigade, 7 December, and Appendix IV, January 1944: "Headquarters 13 Canadian Infantry Brigade (Rear Party Diary)," 25-26 and 29 December 1943, 2-3 and 10 January 1944.

11. Nicholson, paragraphs 180-181.

12. War Diary, 13th Brigade, 15 September 1943.

13. War Diary, 13th Brigade, 28 October and 6 November 1943. According to the latter entry, by then the Brigade had lost 40 tents out of a total of 54 for various reasons, along with the camp's first Union Jack flag. "At the time of this entry," the diarist recorded, the replacement that had been put up only three days earlier was "flapping madly --- already torn

in several places." For further quotes from this and other entries in the 13th Brigade's War Diary with respect to weather conditions, see also Reginald H. Roy, For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George R. Pearkes, V.C., through two World Wars (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977), p. 195.

14. War Diary, 13th Brigade, 26 September 1943.

15. War Diary, 13th Brigade, 20 September 1943.

16. Nicholson, paragraph 182.

17. War Diary, 13th Brigade, 13 October 1943, and Roy, Pearkes, p. 196.

18. Nicholson, paragraph 184.

19. War Diary, 13th Brigade, 3 September 1943.

20. Nicholson, paragraphs 185-86.

21. On American plans to use Kiska and Attu for continued attacks on Japan, and more particularly the efforts of Pearkes and other Canadian officials to continue and even increase Canada's role in such operations, see War Diary, 13th Brigade, 12 September 1943; NAC, Manuscript Group [MG] 26, J, Papers of Prime Minister W.L.M. King [King Papers], J4, Vol. 425, Minutes of the Cabinet War Committee [hereafter CWC Minutes], 31 August and 8 September 1943; Roy, Pearkes, pp. 196-98 and 204-9; Galen R. Perras, "An Aleutian Interlude: Canadian Participation in the Recapture of the Island of Kiska," M.A. thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 1986, pp. 122-33; and Perras, "Stepping Stones on a Road to Nowhere? The United States, Canada, and the Aleutian Island Campaign, 1942-1943," Ph.D. thesis, University of Waterloo, 1995, chapters 11-12, pp. 303-54.

22. In at least one case, in fact, the blasting occurred so close to the Canadian camp that tents were torn by flying debris. For this and other examples, see War Diary, 13th Brigade, 17 and 26 August, 7, 12 September, 13, 24, 27, and 29 October, and 3, 13, and 23 November 1943.

23. War Diary, 13th Brigade, Reel T-12400, 6 October 1943.

24. Ibid., 9, 12, and 14 December 1943.

25. See War Diary, 13th Brigade, Appendix XXI, August 1943: Kiska Volcano, Vol. 1, No. 1, 29 August 1943, as well as later appendices, and particularly the final issue before the rear party of the Brigade left Kiska, in Ibid., Appendix III,

January 1944, Vol. II, No. 1, 1 January 1944.

26. Ibid., 29 August 1943. For later comments on the programming and other aspects of the station, see also entries for 7 September and 17 December 1943, and Appendix IV, January 1944, Rear Party Diary, 24 December 1943.

27. Ibid., 5 October 1943.

28. Ibid., 23 and 30 September and 1-2, 10-11, and 27 October 1943. In addition, in early December a few men borrowed skis from U.S. Special Service troops and tried their hand at skiing on the island (Ibid., 8 December 1943).

29. Ibid., 18 September; 7, 14, 21-22 October; 4, 9, 11, 18, 23, 26 November; and 5, 8, 12, 17 December 1943; Appendix IV, January 1944, Rear Party Diary, 25, 29-30 December 1943; and Nicholson, paragraph 193.

30. Nicholson, paragraphs 86 and 192, and War Diary, 13th Brigade, 27 September 1943.

31. For examples of all of these various events, see the following entries in Ibid.: 28 September, 2, 9, 13, 15-16, 18, 23, 25 and 28-30 October, 3, 8, 23, 25, 27, and 29 November, and 3-4, 7, 9, 18-19, and 25 December 1943. Also Appendix IV, January 1944, Headquarters 13 Canadian Infantry Brigade (Rear Party Diary), 24-25 December 1943.

32. Ibid., 12 and 15-16 November, and Appendix VII, November 1943, Major T.A. McWaters[?], for Major L.J. St.Laurent, A/C of S [Acting Chief of Staff] to Officer[s] Commanding, All Units and Det[achment]s, 13 Cdn Inf Bde, 13 November 1943.

33. Ibid., 20 November 1943.

34. Ibid., 24 August and 11 September 1943. For further details, see also Nicholson, paragraph 191.

35. Nicholson, paragraphs 50 and 194, and War Diary, 13th Brigade, 5 September 1943.

36. On these issues, see the sources cited in note 21, above, as well as King Papers, CWC Minutes, 12 October 1943.

37. War Diary, 13th Brigade, 24 December 1943, and 5, 7, 19 and 26 January 1944, as well as Appendix IV, January 1944, Rear Party Diary, 12 and 25 January 1944.

38. In the words of the Brigade's war diarist (Ibid., 8 September 1943), "Three meals out of five we encou[n]ter a pink, compressed, meatish substance rejoicing in the name of

Spam; its basic origin is lost in mists of bovine (not equine) genealogical antiquity. Fortunately it usually snares the mess tin with liberal helpings of vegetables, fruit and bread and sometimes a further meat offering concealing its identity under generalization "Hash". The grub is definitely good --- although differing somewhat from our usual Canadian fare." As Nicholson reports (paragraph 191), "Rations were plentiful and generally popular in their quality and variety."

39. "Report on Kiska Operation (1943)" by Brigadier H.W. Foster, op.cit. On lessons learned from the Kiska operation, see also Nicholson, and particularly paragraphs 211-220.

40. War Diary, 13th Brigade, 24 December 1943.

41. See NAC, MG 27, III, B1, Papers of J.L. Ralston [Ralston Papers], Vol. 76, "Reinforcements, 1943: Authorization for, strength summary, estimates, recommendations, January, March," CGS to Minister, 28 March 1943, as well as King Papers, CWC Minutes, 6 January and 13 May 1943.

42. Ibid., 18 June 1943; DHH, "AHQ Report (D3)": "The Employment of Infantry in the Pacific Coast Defences (Aug 39 to Dec 43)," p. 28; and Ralston Papers, Vol. 82, "Troops, Reduction of Operational, 1944: strength return summaries and decisions, January," excerpt from "Annual Army Estimates, 1944-45: Reduction of Operational Troops in Canada," 27 January 1944.

43. "The Employment of Infantry in the Pacific Coast Defences," p. 28. On the various cuts across the country during 1943, see also King Papers, CWC Minutes, 21 July and 31 August 1943; "The Employment of Infantry in the Pacific Coast Defences," pp. 27-30; DHH, "AHQ Rpt (D7)": "The 6th Canadian Division," pp. 12-15, "AHQ Rpt (D8)": "The 7th Canadian Division," pp. 11, 17-18, and "AHQ Rpt (D11)": "The 8th Canadian Division, 1942-1943," pp. 17-18, 23-25; NAC, RG 24, Vol. 6921, "AHQ Historical Section (GS) Reports": No. 1, "Fixed Coast Artillery Defences on the Pacific Coast," pp. 10-13, No. 2, "The Anti-Aircraft Defences of the Pacific Coast," pp. 14-27, and No. 4, "The Anti-Aircraft Defences of the Atlantic Coast," pp. 40-70; as well as Ralston Papers, "Annual Army Estimates, 1944-45: Reduction of Operational Troops in Canada," op.cit., and Vol. 82, "Training - Brigade Group at Debert, 1944: January," excerpt from "Annual Army Estimates, 1944-45: Training Brigade Group," 27 January 1944. Also Stacey, Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific, Vol. 1 of the Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1955), pp. 183-6, and Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 410-11, as well as Roy, Pearkes, pp. 203-5.

44. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 13 May and 31 August 1943.

45. Ibid., 17 July 1942; as well as Frederick W. Gibson and Barbara Robertson, eds., Ottawa at War: The Grant Dexter Memoranda, 1939-1945 (Winnipeg: Manitoba Record Society, 1994), 27 August 1942, p. 365; and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 191-92. For information on the classes of men liable for training at this time in the war, see also Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, p. 146, and Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, Appendix "N," p. 586.

46. See records of these debates on King Papers, CWC Minutes, and particularly meetings of 9 September, 28 October, 4, 11, 18, and 30 November, and 9 December 1942, and 10 and 24 February 1943. Also Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 25 September 1942, p. 367.

47. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 2915, File HQS 9011-9-5, "Questions from and Reports to the Minister - National Selective Service": "Interim Results of Requisitions Under the National War Service Regulations (Recruits) And the National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations, by Military Training Periods, 20 Mar 1941 to 2 Apr 1943," and same, by Military Districts, 9 May 1943.

48. Ibid., Brigadier A.E. Nash, Vice Adjutant-General [VAG], to D.Req. [Director of Mobilization and Requirements], 20 February 1943. Also Major-General H.F.G. Letson, Adjutant-General [AG], to Minister, 20 February, and Ralston to Letson, 21 February 1943, on same file.

49. Ibid., A.G. Stewart, Member, Mobilization Board, Division "M," Regina, Saskatchewan, to Gardiner, 6 March 1943. See also similar protest by Lt.-Col. A.W. Pascoe, Dist. Recruiting Officer, M.D. No. 12, to Lt.-Col. James Mess, Director of Army Recruiting, 11 February, and comments of Col. J.A. deLalanne, Directorate of Mobilization and Requirements, to VAG, 25 March, as well as in an earlier memorandum regarding "Matters Discussed with General Riley [Supervisor of Mobilization, NSS] this afternoon," 22 January 1943, all on the same file.

50. Ibid., Letson to Minister, 17 February 1943. See also letter from Humphrey Mitchell, Minister of Labour, to Ralston, 4 March 1943, on the same file, who in fact forwarded a copy of an internal NSS memorandum from Major-General H.J. Riley to Arthur MacNamara, the Director of NSS, dated 2 March, which repeated the same comments more directly, Riley noting that "As long as the total number is provided and there are enough to satisfy General Service requirements it does not matter how small the numbers of N.R.M.A. recruits is or how many subsequently enlist."

51. On the attitudes and problems of NSS officials, and responses from the Department of National Defence, see Ibid., deLalanne memorandum, "Matters Discussed with General Riley, op.cit., 22 January; Nash, VAG, to Minister [of National Defence], 4 February; circular letter, Letson, AG, to General Officer Commanding-in-Chief [GOC-in-C], Pacific Command, and All District Officers Commandings [DOCs], 6 February; L.R. LaFlèche, Minister of National War Services, to Humphrey Mitchell, Minister of Labour, and to C.D. Howe, Minister of Munitions and Supply, to Mitchell, both 16 February; MacNamara to Nash, 18 February; Letson to Minister, 20 February; Letson to Minister, 8 March; Justice A.M. Manson, NSS Division "K" (British Columbia), to A. de Gaspé Taché, Supervisor of Mobilization, NSS, and to Ralston, both letters 16 March; telegram, Manson to Ralston, 17 March; draft telegram, Ralston to Manson, 19 March; Mitchell to Ralston, 19 March; and "Notes on Matters discussed at Meeting held in the Office of the V.A.G. at 1100 hours 23 March, 1943."

52. For example, see Ibid., Letson to Minister, 8 March, for his responses to some of these problems, which was also later forwarded by Ralston to Humphrey Mitchell, on 9 March 1943.

53. On the origins of Ralston's concerns, in addition to the sources cited in the past few notes, see Ibid., Ralston to AG, 7 January; Letson to Minister, 12 January; Major A. Chassé, D[irectorate]. of Requirements, to Col. J.A. deLalanne, and Letson to Minister, both 15 January; O.J. Waters, Private Secretary, Minister of National Defence, to Brigadier A.E. Nash, Vice AG, 3 February; Nash to D.Reg, 4 February; Nash to Minister, two letters, both 4 February; Waters to Nash, 16 February; and Mitchell to Ralston, 23 March; as well as Ralston Papers, Vol. 52, "Manpower," vol. 2, Ralston to A.D.P. Heeney, Secretary, War Committee of Cabinet, and to Mitchell, 20 February, and J.G. Gardiner, Minister of Agriculture, to A. MacNamara, Deputy Minister of Labour, 27 February 1943.

54. Ibid., Ralston to Mitchell, 1 April 1943.

55. Ibid., 3 April 1943. For further comments by Ralston on his problems with NSS during this period, see also Ibid., Ralston to Mitchell, 13 April 1943.

56. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 28 April, 24 and 28 June, 2 and 7 July, 15 September; as well as NAC, RG 27, Records of the Department of Labour, Vol. 3057, File 21-14, "N.S.S. Mobilization. Aliens," Ralston to Mitchell, 4 June, and Mitchell to Ralston, 22 June; Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 10 May 1943, pp. 411-12; and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 198-202.

57. Ralston to Mitchell, 1 April 1944, quoted in Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 202, as well as Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 431, and Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, p. 120.

58. Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 203.

59. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 6926, AHQ Historical Section Report No. 63, "Manpower Problems of the Canadian Army in the Second World War," by J.M. Hitsman, 17 August 1953, and Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, p. 120.

60. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 2915, File 9011-9-5, Mitchell to Ralston, 23 March 1943. In addition, as Brigadier A.E. Nash noted a few days later, in Ibid., VAG to AG, 18 April 1943, another factor that helped convince some men to volunteer was their medical examination, which had to be completed before an application for postponement could be considered: "when a man called under the N.R.M.A. finds from the initial civilian medical examination that he is fit, he often volunteers."

61. The figures for these calculations are taken from Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, Appendix "T," pp. 599-602. For evidence of assumptions about the NRMA's role in recruiting during the war, see the comments of C.G. Power, the Minister of National Defence for Air, in King Papers, CWC Minutes, 26 February 1942, who during the CWC's discussions on the "big army" and conscription in early 1942 "referred to his previously expressed view that the calling up of larger numbers of men under the National Resources Mobilization Act would assist in meeting the problem of obtaining recruits for overseas service. In addition to enlistments from those actually called up for training, others were induced to enlist in anticipation of being called." For other such examples, see Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 27 September 1942, p. 371, where Dexter reports his memory of a statement by J.L. Ralston that "He was going to get 125,000 [volunteers] in the year. This, of course, was the result of the call-ups. The men were volunteering instead of being conscripted for home defence." Also Ibid., 29 October 1942, p. 383, reporting a more general consensus on the subject among senior bureaucrats and politicians in Ottawa, and Hitsman, "Manpower Problems of the Canadian Army," p. 143, who notes that in April 1944 Humphrey Mitchell publicly acknowledged the "common knowledge" that there was a connection between the NRMA and voluntary recruiting during a routine press conference (also noted in Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, p. 119). Numerous more vague allusions to such assumptions can also be found among the records of the CWC cited in chapters two and three of this thesis, especially during the "big army" debate of 1941-1942, and the debates that led to the creation of NSS later in 1942.

62. Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 23 October 1942, p. 382.

63. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 7 and 14 April, and 5 and 14 May 1943.

64. For copies of regulations on each of these subjects, see Ralston Papers, Vol. 73, "Agricultural and Compassionate Leave, 1943: Regulations memoranda. Hansard. March, May-July," circular letters, AG to GOSC-in-C, Atlantic and Pacific Commands, All DOCs, et.al., 17 March (spring agricultural leaves), 30 March (lumbering in British Columbia), and 5 July (fall harvest leaves), and Vol. 68, "Compulsory Training - NRMA, 1942: pressure on recruits to go active. regulations. April 1941-March 1942," same, 31 March 1943, covering war industries and seasonal and essential occupations, as well as leaves for men for compassionate reasons.

65. On this subject, see above, p. 281, as well as the CWC Minutes referred to in note 44.

66. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 21 July, 31 August, and 8 and 15 September 1943, as well as 20 January 1944. On developments in leave policies in 1942 and 1943, see also Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 411-12.

67. According to Ralston Papers, Vol. 76, "Strength Return, 1943: as at 8 May 1943 and 3 July 1943, May-June 1943," weekly strength return for 3 July, dated 12 July 1943, 3,064 NRMA men were on special "National War Service Leave" in the first week of July 1943. The figure of 13,000 comes from DHH, File 111.21065(D1), "Reinf. situation - Cdn Army, 1944": Summary of Personnel on 'Extended Leave' or 'Duty' as at 30 Sep 44," dated 2 November 1944, which noted that 3,000 men were on "Farm Duty," 6,283 on "Farm Leave (Compassionate)," 1,227 on harvest leave, 563 were working in mining, 485 in "Industry," 136 in logging, and 1,405 in other pursuits, for a total of 13,099. For the November 1944 figures, see Queen's University Archives, C.G. Power Papers, Box 39, "General Staff Memoranda... October-November 1944": "Report of Cabinet Committee on Army enlistment for General Service," 6 November 1944 (the exact number of NRMA recruits on leave according to this report was 8,676).

68. NAC, RG 25, Records of the Department of External Affairs, Vol. 2633, File 715-40, pt. 1, "National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940. Military Service in Canada": "Memorandum for the Prime Minister," 14 November 1941. For examples of criticism of aliens being omitted from the provisions of the NRMA, see also NAC, RG 27, Vol. 996, File 2-114, "N.W.S. Aliens - Mobilization," pt. 1, clippings from the Montreal Herald, 16 April; Le Devoir, 15 July; and the

Vancouver Sun, 16 October; as well as correspondence from Justice A.M. Manson, National War Service Board "K," Department of National War Services [DNWS], to L.R. LaFlèche, Associate Deputy Minister [DM], DNWS, 6 November 1941.

69. On the work of these organizations, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 6924, "Historical Report No. 35, Historical Section (G.S.), Army Headquarters: Allied Forces in Canada, 1940-1943."

70. For correspondence on all these aspects of changing the NRMA to apply to aliens, see in particular records on the following files: NAC, RG 25, Vols. 2633 and 2793, File 715-40, pts. 1-2, and especially pt. 2, "Memorandum for Mr. Robertson: Compulsory Military Service for United States Citizens in Canada," by "ER" [Escott Reid], 7 May 1942; Vol. 2818, File 1154-40C, "Participation of Orientals in Canada in Military Training Scheme"; Vols. 2633 and 2795, File 715-F-40, "Conscription of Aliens and Non-Canadian British Subjects in Canada by Canadian Military Authorities -- Proposals," pts. 1-3, particularly pt. 1, "Compulsory National Service in Canada, Military and Civilian: Application to Aliens and Other Groups Now Exempt," by Reid, 4 December, "Recommendations of Inter-Departmental Committee on Recruitment Questions, December 22nd, 1941," "Memorandum for Council: Compulsory Military Service, Application to Aliens and Other Groups Now Exempt," 29 January, "Press Release: ...Compulsory Military Service for Aliens and Certain Other Groups Hitherto Exempt," 1 October 1942, and "Call-Up of Aliens Issued by Ottawa," clipping from Montreal Gazette, 16 March 1943; Vol. 3227, File 5460-40, "Deportation from Canada of Neutral Aliens Seeking Exemption from Military Service -- General Policy re [sic]," J.E. Read, for USSEA, to A.L. Jolliffe, Acting Director of Immigration, 27 October 1943; Vol. 2796, File 715-F-7-40, "Extension of Canadian Conscription Laws to Enemy Aliens (Other than Japanese) - Discussions re [sic]" (as well as similar files on "Aliens having forces in Canada" [715-F-1-40], on "non-Canadian British subjects" [715-F-2-40], and "U.S. Citizens" [715-F-3-40], in Vols. 2795-96); RG 13, Records of the Department of Justice, Vol. 2608, File 143505, "Compulsory Military Service. Application to Aliens and Other Groups Now Exempt. Power to Revoke Naturalization Certificate Under Sec. 9 Naturalization Act. Persons Detained. February 10, 1942," especially J.F. MacNeill, to F.P. Varcoe, Deputy Minister of Justice, 28 January 1942; Vol. 2871, File 145384, "National Sel. Service. Position of Irish Citizens Under the National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations. Proposed Order in Council. 2-6-43"; RG 27, Vols. 996-97, File 2-114, pts. 1-5; Vol. 3057, File 21-14, "N.S.S. Mobilization. Aliens"; Vol. 1486, File 2-162-9, "Exception to N.N.S.S. [sic] Mob. Regulations. Negroes Chinese Japanese Etd. [sic] not acceptable to army for non-medical reasons"; Vol. 1495, File 2-295, "Enlistments and Enrolment of Alien and Naturalized

Canadian Citizens in the Canadian Army"; Vol. 1523, File Z1-2, "Armed Services of Canada. Call-up of Aliens"; Ralston Papers, Vol. 73, "Aliens, Number of in the Army, 1943: Enlistment of [and] Enrolment in Canadian Army, April-June"; Vol. 78, "Aliens, Enlistment of, 1944: Policy of enlistment and enrolment of Aliens in Canadian Army, n.d."; and, most importantly, RG 25, Vol. 3498, File 20-3-2-1946/1, memorandum summarizing various developments on this issue throughout the war entitled "Conscription of Aliens and Non-Canadian British Subjects in Canadian Forces," [no author] 15 July 1948. Also King Papers, J4, Vol. 424, CWC Minutes, 19 November 1941, 7 and 23 January, 13 February (recording the CWC's approval in principle of calling aliens, and authorizing the Department of External Affairs to begin communicating with various governments to initiate the policy), 22 July, 18 November (directing "That the existing authority to call up aliens be exercised forthwith."), and 30 November 1942.

71. For example, see the lists compiled in NAC, RG 27, Vol. 996, File 2-114, pt. 1, "Statement showing by nationalities and by provinces the number of non-British subjects between the ages of 21 and 45, both inclusive, who registered in Canada in August 1940," Department of National War Services, 30 September 1941; pt. 2, "Number of aliens born in the years 1912 to 1921, both inclusive...", and a second untitled table, both dated 1 May 1942; and pt. 3, "Table showing, by age groups, the number of nationals of European countries, single or childless widowers as of July 15th, 1940...", 21 September, and two similar tables for "Asiatic" and "European" countries, both dated 22 September 1942.

72. On early developments within the Department of National War Services, see NAC, RG 27, Vol. 1478, File 2-117-1, "Delinquents, Police Action," L.R. LaFlèche, Associate DM, DNWS, to "All Chairmen and Divisional Registrars," Circular Memorandum No. 22, 27 September 1940; S.T. Wood, Commissioner, RCMP, to T.C. Davis, Associate DM, DNWS, 31 January; LaFlèche, Circular Memorandum No. 159, 12 February; same, No. 219, 5 May, No. 235, 22 May, and No. 284, 25 July 1941.

73. For example, as early as March 1942 Ralston was writing to J.T. Thorsen (Minister of National War Services) and Louis St. Laurent (Minister of Justice, and thus responsible for administering the RCMP), to request that greater measures be taken to track down defaulters. For these letters, see Ralston Papers, Vol. 114, "Manpower, Vol. 3," Ralston to Thorsen, 4 March, and Ralston to St. Laurent, 13 March 1942. For later developments, see also Ralston's comments during larger debates on the NSS, in King Papers, CWC Minutes, 18 and 30 November 1942, and his point-form notes on an air force memorandum regarding manpower in mid-1943 in Ralston Papers, Vol. 52, "Manpower," vol. 2, 27 May 1943. Also NAC, RG 24,

Vol. 2915, HQS 9011-9-5, Brigadier Nash, for AG, to Minister, 29 May 1943. On the reluctance of NSS officials to deal with the issue in greater detail early in the war, see Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 25-27 September 1942, pp. 369 and 372, and NAC, RG 24, Vol. 2915, HQS 9011-9-5, deLalanne, "Matters Discussed with General Riley....," op.cit., 22 January, and VAG to Minister, 4 February 1943.

74. For examples of various cases, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 6570, File HQ 1161-1-2, vol. 1, "National Registration Regulations," Commissioner S.T. Wood, RCMP, to DM, Department of National Defence [DND], 5 November; L.R. LaFlèche, ADM, DNWS, to Brigadier George H. Cassels, Deputy AG (Mobilization) [DAG(M)], 13 November 1940; Superintendent K. Duncan, Assistant Director of Criminal Investigation, RCMP, to T.C. Davis, ADM, DNWS, 7 July; and Wood to DM, DND, 31 July, 14 and 25 August 1941; as well as NAC, RG 13, Vol. 2113, File 145335, "W.S. Boyd, Legal Assistant to Chief Registrar, National Registration, Department of Labour, to A. MacNamara, DM, 12 October 1943.

75. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 2250, File HQ 54-27-98-5, "Forgery and Sale of Certificates Generally," vol. 1, Commissioner Wood, RCMP, to DM, DND, 9 August; Superintendent H. Darling, Assistant Director of Criminal Investigation, RCMP, to DM, DND, 9 October; Wood to DM, DND, 3 December 1943; J.A. Regan, for Commissioner, to DM, DND, 15 May, along with two more cases, both forwarded on 26 June; Commissioner to DM, DND, 10 August 1944; Assistant Commissioner V.A.M. Kemp, Director of Criminal Investigation, to Major M.E. Gladman, DND, 12 May 1945; J.S. Cruickshank, for Commissioner, to DM, DND, 25 April 1946; and Commissioner to DM, DND, 13 January 1947. In the first case listed here, a corporal from No. 44 Canadian Army (Basic) Training Centre in St. Jérôme, Quebec, was implicated for stealing the documents used by the forger. The latter was caught when he confused training centre numbers, stamping his documents with No. 44, but calling it "Joliette" (which was actually No. 42 CA(B)TC). See also further case described in NAC, RG 25, File 715-40, "R.C.M.P. Reveal Cards Forgery For Vote Fraud," clipping from Montreal Gazette, 9 December 1940.

76. For an overview of mobilization procedures that describes how medicals and other steps in the process were carried out, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 2915, HQS 9011-9-5, "Procedure [for] Call-Ups Under N.R.M.A.," no author, 23 March 1943. For both proven and alleged cases of bribery, see also Ibid., Vol. 2915, File HQS 9011-6-0, vol. 5, "Requirements - National Selective Service - Generally," A. de Gaspé Taché, Registrar, Mobilization Division "E", Montreal, to Director, Mobilization Section, NSS [NSS(M)], 16 October, and 3 and 23 November 1944, as well as later correspondence on the same file, all related to a doctor in Montreal who was alleged to have taken money to

help men get medical rejections; Col. J.E. MacDermid, D.Admin. [Directorate of Administration], to Liaison Officer, NSS, 23 December 1944, reporting a lawyer investigated for helping people obtain deferments and discharges illegally; anonymous letter, 14 February 1945, and Ibid., Vol. 2250, HQ 54-27-95-5, vol. 1, Raoul Paré, to DND, 16 January, making two separate reports of bribery that were too vague to be investigated, but give a good sense of how easy it was to make such allegations; Ibid., report by Constable J.I.P. Poirer, Rivière du Loup Detachment, RCMP, 28 April, and later correspondence to 6 July 1945 regarding a man who allegedly sold discharge certificates with the aid of military personnel (but which were later found to be useless forgeries); and Ibid., vol. 2, report by Constable C.J.F. Georget, Sherbrooke Detachment, RCMP, 17 July 1945, and "P.M.," for DM (Army), to DM, Department of Justice, 1 November 1946, on a similar case; as well as NAC, RG 27, Vol. 3055, File 21-3-10, "N.S.S. Mobilization. Prosecutions," H.A.R. Gagnon, Assistant Commissioner and Director, Criminal Investigation, RCMP, to M.W. Wright, Legal and Enforcement Division, Mobilization Section, NSS, 29 October 1945, dealing with possible misconduct by a senior officer at Camp Borden, and other documents on file to April 1946; and documents regarding a group of officers and other ranks convicted of accepting bribes for deferments, in Ralston Papers, Vol. 75, "Medical Prosecutions - Québec, 1943: General Courts Martial Forfeitures re alleged irregularities in Medical Examinations, February-March," and Ibid., "Medical Prosecutions - Québec, 1943: Newspaper Clippings + Hansard Extracts, February."

77. NAC, RG 13, Vol. 2871, File 145990, "Labour. Consolidation of the National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations. November 13, 1943," H.R.L. Henry, Private Secretary, Department of Justice, to DM, 29 November; W.R.J[ackett]., to DM, 2 December; F.P. Varcoe, Assistant DM, to Supervisor of Mobilization, NSS, 9 December; and Henry to DM, Department of Justice, 16 December 1943.

78. According to Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, Appendices "O", "P", and "Q", pp. 587-89, postponements of compulsory military training for all reasons totalled 246,133 on 31 January 1943 and 246,938 on 31 May 1944, rising to 267,468 a year later. At the end of the war in Europe on 7 May 1945, a total of 280,926 men either currently had their training being postponed or were in the process of applying, while another 25,004 were exempted as members of various police forces, clergy, or other specific categories, leaving an overall total of 305,930 men, or 16.8% of the 1,816,868 in the age groups and classes liable for training between 1940 and 1945. Throughout the war officials processed 746,478 requests for postponements and granted 664,525 of them, some of which were extensions, however, rather than new requests.

79. See in particular NAC, RG 27, Vol. 997, File 2-106-303, "Men called out under National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits) (Consolidation 1941) who refuse to take delivery of notices sent by Divisional Registrars," Captain G.R. Benoit, Supervisor of Recruiting for Military Training, DNWS, Circular Memorandum No. 303, 27 August; Raymond Ranger, Registrar, Administrative Division "E," Montreal, to Benoit 28 August; Benoit to Ranger, 30 August; and Edgar W. Mingo, Registrar, Administrative Division "G," Halifax, to DNWS, 30 August 1941.

80. NAC, RG 27, Vol. 1478, File 2-117-1, "Delinquents, Police Action," L.R. LaFlèche, ADM, DNWS, circular letter to all provincial Attorneys-General, 26 March, and various replies, dated 31 March-7 April (particularly from "Assistant-procureur général," to LaFlèche, 3 April); and further correspondence between LaFlèche and Quebec's Assistant Attorney-General, 7 April and 1 May; Captain G.R. Benoit, Supervisor of Recruiting for Military Training, to S.W. Edwards, DM of Justice, 5 May; Edwards to Benoit, 16 May; Benoit, Circular Memorandum No. 231, DNWS, 16 May; Commissioner S.T. Wood, RCMP, to LaFlèche, 30 May, enclosing comments of Superintendent H.A.R. Gagnon, Commanding "C" Division, RCMP, to Commissioner, 26 May; Benoit to Lt.Col. W.H. Stringer, Commissioner of [Ontario] Provincial Police, 5 June; Benoit to Woods, 2 July 1941; and Circular Memorandum No. 304, DNWS, 28 August 1941; as well as G.D. Conant, Attorney-General, Ontario, to LaFlèche, 7 October; LaFlèche to Conant, 30 October; and LaFlèche to Humphrey Mitchell, Minister of Labour, 12 December 1942. On efforts to convince Quebec to participate in the enforcement procedures, see also NAC, RG 13, Vol. 2600, File 142037, "R.C.M.P. Enforcement of Military Training Regulations. January 15, 1941," T.C. Davis, ADM, DNWS, to Ernest Lapointe, Minister of Justice, 14 December; Commissioner Wood, RCMP, to Lapointe, 19 December 1940; Wood to Lapointe, 6 January; Lapointe to Wilfrid Girouard, Procureur-Général, 7 January; Wood to DM of Justice, 13 January; F.P.V[arcoe]., "Memorandum for the Deputy Minister," 18 January; W. Stuart Edwards, DM, Department of Justice, to Wood, 18 January; and R.R. Tait, Assistant Commissioner and Director, Criminal Investigation, RCMP, to Edwards, 1 May 1941.

81. For specific examples of men defaulting in this manner, see NAC, RG 27, Vol. 1478, File 2-117-1, Captain G.R. Benoit, Supervisor of Recruiting for Military Training, to Superintendent K. Duncan, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigation Division, RCMP, 15 February; Benoit to Lorne McDonnell, Divisional Registrar, Administrative Division "C," Kingston, Ontario, 6 March; and Henri-Paul Drouin, Divisional Registrar, Division "F," Quebec City, to Benoit, 6 June 1941.

82. According to NAC, RG 27, Vol. 3055, File 21-3-7, "N.S.S. Mobilization. Functions & Appointments of Enforcement Officers," Commissioner S.T. Wood, RCMP, to Louis St. Laurent, Minister of Justice, 5 and 28 June, and 23 July 1943, in the four months between March and June 1943, RCMP officers opened 19,384 new cases for investigation under NRMA regulations, completing investigations for 15,448 and carrying over 9,925 for continued study after the end of June (see also Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 414). For comments about the workload required to identify and deliver notices to men more broadly, see also NAC, RG 27, Vol. 1478, File 2-117-1, "Delinquents, Police Action," Edgar W. Mingo, Divisional Registrar, Administrative Division "G," Halifax, to DM, DNWS, 14 May; LaFlèche to Wood, RCMP, 19 May; Wood to LaFlèche, 26 May; F.C. Wilson, Divisional Registrar, Administrative Division "M," Regina, to Captain G.R. Benoit, Supervisor of Recruiting for Military Training, 5 June; and Henri-Paul Drouin, Divisional Registrar, Division "F," Quebec City, to Benoit, 6 June 1941; as well as NAC, RG 13, Vol. 2603, File 142619, "National War Services. National War Services Regulations. If person who leaves his home address immediately after receiving notification to report for military training should be returned to place of offence for trial. August 10, 1941": G.R. Benoit to DM of Justice, 28 August; W.R.J[ackett], "Memorandum for the Deputy Minister of Justice," 9 September; and W. Stuart Edwards, DM, Department of Justice, to Benoit, 10 September 1941.

In addition, officials were so frustrated by men refusing to accept notices even when delivered by police officers that they submitted recommendations to the Department of Justice more than once requesting that such actions be made illegal. Experts in the Department of Justice resisted such amendments, however, noting that they would introduce the principle of assuming that someone *intended* to commit the illegal action of not reporting for military training, without waiting for the act to actually be committed, during which time a man might change his mind. For these cases, see Ibid., Vol. 2028, File 144043, "Amendment to National War Services Regulations. Power to 'Peace Officer' to Arrest Delinquent Without Warrant, August 15, 1942," Benoit to F.P. Varcoe, 14 August; Jackett to Acting DM, Department of Justice, 16 August, and E. Miall, Acting DM, to Benoit, NSS, 16 August 1942; Ibid., Vol. 2615, File 145218, "Labour. Enforcement of National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations, 14-4-43," F.J. Mead, Assistant Commissioner, and Director, Criminal Investigation, to A. MacNamara, DM, Department of Labour, 9 April, Jackett, "Memorandum for the Deputy Minister of Justice," 10 May, and F.P. Varcoe, DM, to DM of Labour, 11 May 1943; and NAC, RG 27, Vol. 3055, File 21-2-3, "N.S.S. Mobilization. Delivery of Orders Military Training by Post-Office," MacNamara, Director, NSS, to Commissioner, RCMP, 19 April 1944.

83. On sharing of information between DND and NSS, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 2915, HQS 9011-9-5, Col. deLalanne, D.Req., to VAG, 15 January 1943, and Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 3 January 1943, pp. 394-95, and for tracing work and hiring of private companies, see NAC, RG 24, Vol. 2915, HQS 9011-9-5, Nash, for AG, to Minister, "Call Under N.R.M.A.," 29 May; NAC, RG 27, Vol. 3055, File 21-3-2, "N.S.S. Mobilization. Tracing of Delinquents," Major-General H.J. Riley, to A. MacNamara, 7 and 28 September 1943; and Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 414. For further information on tracing activities, see also related files in the same volume of records in RG 27.

84. For example, see the following cases on NAC, RG 118, Records of the Department of Manpower and Immigration, Acc. 1977-78/103, Vol. 115, File 21-64, vol. 1, G.H. Preston, DEO [District Enforcement Officer], Windsor, Ontario, to Edward M. Dillon, Regional Enforcement Officer, Toronto, 1 October; J.H. Healy, DEO, St. Catharines, to Dillon; 1 November; and F.F. Sewell, DEO, Sudbury, to Dillon, 16-17 December 1943; and the following newspaper clippings on the same file: "Thirteen Ordered To Report For Jobs In City Roundup," The Windsor, n.d. [October], "Police Seize 59 Loungers; Detain Five," "Dragnet Nabs 100, Majority Cleared," and "250 Rounded Up In Draft Drive At Hamilton," all in Globe and Mail, 30 October; as well as Commissioner Wood, RCMP, to A. MacNamara, DM, Department of Labour, 18 December, reporting apprehensions of 105 deserters, 344 defaulters, and 164 people who had violated National Registration regulations, out of 39,973 people investigated in raids on 1,659 establishments across the country.

85. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 415. According to Stacey, another 10,040 potential NRMA recruits were found in this manner, as well as 258 army deserters and absentees.

86. See NAC, RG 27, Vol. 3055, File 21-3-10, "N.S.S. Mobilization. Prosecutions," Director, Criminal Investigation, RCMP, to Director, Mobilization Section, NSS, 12 June 1945, and various other documents to March 1947; as well as another similar example in Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 414; and more general comments in Ibid., Vol. 2615, File 145218, F.J. Mead, Assistant Commissioner, Director, Criminal Investigation, RCMP, to A. MacNamara, DM, Department of Labour, 9 April 1943, with respect to delinquent farmers. In addition, see records of attempts to get concealment of deserters and defaulters made more serious and easily-prosecuted offenses under wartime regulations, due to the number of cases involved, in NAC, RG 13, Vol. 2871, File 145972, "National Defence. Concealment of Deserters and Absentees. Suggested Amendment to Defence of Canada Regulations. November 10, 1943," H. DesRosiers, DM (Army), to DM of Justice, 6 November 1943, and following correspondence

to February 1944 (particularly copy of Order-in-Council P.C. 826, 11 February 1944, putting amendments into effect), as well as Ibid., Vol. 2872, File 147257, "National Defence (Air). Defence of Canada Regulations 31.A.(1)(C) - Concealment of Deserters or Absentees suggested amendment to include 'or harbours or aids or assists in harbouring such member.' June 6, 1944," DM, Department of National Defence for Air, to DM, Department of Justice, 12 June 1944, and later correspondence to April 1945.

87. On this case, see NAC, RG 24, Microfilm Reel C-8376, File HQS 8815, "Disturbances at Military Training Centres," vol. 1, District Officer Commanding, Military District No. 4, to Department of National Defence, 29 May, and documents attached to letter (particularly Investigation Report by "Sgt. Salconi" and "Pte. Brown," the two MPs who were shot at, and from which the quotation is taken), as well as Wood, Commissioner, RCMP, to DM, Department of National Defence (Army), 6 June 1945.

88. NAC, RG 25, Vol. 2851, File 1539-B-40, "Arrangements between United States and Canada re the return of deserters and draft evaders -- General File," pt. 1, confidential memorandum, Office of the Director, Intelligence Division, War Department, forwarded by L.B. Pearson, Chargé d'Affaires, Canadian Legation, Washington, to Secretary of State for External Affairs [Prime Minister King], 12 August 1942, and NAC, RG 118, Acc. 1977-78/103, Vol. 115, File 21-64, F.F. Sewell, DEO, to E.M. Dillon, REO [Regional Enforcement Officer], 16 December, and G.E. Fraser, A/[Acting] Enforcement Officer, North Bay, to Sewell, DEO, 17 December 1943. For other examples of allegations of misconduct in various parts of the country, see also assorted documents in NAC, RG 27, Vol. 1479, File 2-117-14, "Re: Men Obtaining Postponement Through False Pretenses."

89. NAC, RG 25, File 715-40, pt. 1, USSEA to Hume Wrong, Canadian Legation, Washington, 27 November, and Wrong to Robertson, USSEA, 3 December 1941; King Papers, J4, Vol. 424, CWC Minutes, 9 April 1942; and all correspondence on RG 25, Vol. 2851, File 1539-B-40, "Arrangements between United States and Canada re the return of deserters and draft evaders -- General File," January 1942-October 1945.

90. NAC, RG 13, Vol. 2621, File 146609, "Labour-National Selective Service. Delay in Hearing of National Selective Service Appeals - Quebec. Amendment to Section 749 - Criminal Code. January 13, 1944," G. Hems, for Associate Director of Mobilization, NSS, to F.P. Varcoe, Department of Justice, 11 January 1944. On this subject, see also Ibid., Varcoe to Associate Director of Mobilization, 28 February, and S.H. McLaren, Associate Director of Mobilization, to DM, Department of Justice, 7 March 1944; as well as earlier comments

regarding similar problems with appeal procedures more generally under the NRMA, in NAC, RG 13, Vol. 2615, File 145218, "Labour. Enforcement of National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations. 14-4-43," F.J. Mead, Assistant Commissioner and Director, Criminal Investigation, RCMP, to A. MacNamara, DM, Department of Labour, 9 April, and Varcoe to DM of Labour, 11 May 1943; and NAC, RG 13, Vol. 2114, File 146035, "National Selective Service. Ernest Pilon, Point Gatineau, Lemay Lake, P.Q. Court Adjournments. November 25, 1943," D/Insp. [Deputy Inspector] R. Armitage, for Director, Criminal Investigation, RCMP, to Supervisor of Mobilization, NSS, 19 November 1943.

91. NAC, RG 27, Vol. 3055, File 21-3-1, "N.S.S. Mob. Enforcement General," F.J. Mead, Deputy Commissioner, RCMP, to A. MacNamara, DM, Department of Labour, 10 July 1944.

92. On changes to appeal procedures, see NAC, RG 13, Vol. 2621, File 146609, Varcoe to McLaren, 10 March; Varcoe to Léon Casgrain, Attorney-General of Quebec, 11 March; Casgrain to Varcoe, 13 March; Varcoe to Casgrain, 4 April; and Deputy Attorney-General, Province of Quebec, to Varcoe, 12 April; and various other correspondence on file between March and August, as well as final Order-in-Council enacting changes, P.C. 6713, 25 August 1944.

93. According to Raymond Ranger, Acting Associate Director, NSS (Mobilization), to Arthur MacNamara, DM of Labour, 5 May 1945, at the end of April the number of men not yet accounted for totalled 21,934, while Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 415, and Appendix "O", p. 587, provides a number of 20,591 as of a week later at the end of the war in Europe in May. For reference to the decline in cases from 200,000 at the end of 1942, see also NAC, RG 27, Vol. 3055, File 21-3-12, "National Selective Service (Mobilization). Enforcement. Check Up and Prosecution of Delinquents After Cessation of Hostilities," Humphrey Mitchell, Minister of Labour, to D.C. Abbott, Minister of National Defence, 8 March 1946.

94. On problems with the figures at the end of the war, and later revisions and totals, see Ibid., Administrative Instruction No. 117, 9 May 1945; S.H. McLaren, Acting Chief Executive Officer, to A. MacNamara, 19 February, and Raymond Ranger to MacNamara, 19 June and 6 July 1946.

95. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 415, and NAC, RG 27, Vol. 3055, File 21-3-12, Col. A.L. Tosland, D.Liaison, DND, to A. MacNamara, DM of Labour, 23 March 1946.

96. Ibid., Ranger to MacNamara, 6 July 1946, op.cit.

97. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, Appendix "N", p. 586, and Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, p. 146.

98. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, Appendix "T," pp. 599-601.

99. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 14166, Microfilm Reel T-12400, War Diary, Headquarters, 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade [War Diary, 13th Brigade], Appendix V, February 1944, A/Comd [Acting Commander] 13 Cdn Inf Bde: "Manpower for Overseas: Withdrawal from 13 Cdn Inf Bde," 7 February 1944.

100. Ibid., Appendix IV, Brigadier i/c Administration, Pacific Command, to Heads of Departments and Services, and O.'s C., All Units and Formations, Pacific Command, "Pacific Command Circular Letter No. 184," 3 March 1944.

101. On the origins of the recruiting campaign in Pacific Command, see Ibid., 13 April 1944, Roy, Pearkes, pp. 209-10; Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 204; Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 428-29; and DHH, File 322.009(D50), "Brigade Groups - Pacific Command - Org & Admin - Sep 43/Sep 44": "Conference - Manpower - 1 Apr 44," 4 April, and Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin, Commander 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, to GOC-in-C, Pacific Command: "Mobilization of 13 Bde on an Active Basis," 2 May 1944, pp. 4-5 (also reprinted almost in full in Stacey, Appendix "S", pp. 591-98, and quoted in Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 205).

102. Macklin, "Mobilization of 13 Brigade," op.cit., pp. 9-10 (also quoted in Roy, Pearkes, p. 213).

103. Macklin, "Mobilization of 13 Brigade," pp. 1-4, and Roy, Pearkes, pp. 210-11. On the Canloan scheme, see also Stacey, Six Years of War, p. 139, and Wilfred I. Smith, Code Word CANLOAN (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1992), particularly pp. 1-27.

104. War Diary, 13th Brigade, 11 April 1944.

105. Ibid., 8, 11-14 (quotation can be found in latter entry), and 21 April 1944, and Macklin, "Mobilization of 13 Bde," pp. 6-8.

106. War Diary, 13th Brigade, 11 and 13 April; Appendix X, "Hero of Italian Battlefronts, Major Paul Triquet, in Vernon," Vernon News, and "Quick Response To VC Winner's Appeal," Vancouver Sun, both 13 April; and Appendix XIX, "It Is In The Hands Of Our Young Men," advertisement sponsored by Vancouver Breweries Limited, n.d., referring to Triquet's visit. On Triquet's actions in Italy, see also G.W.L. Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945, Vol. II of the Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War (Ottawa: Queen's

Printer, 1957), pp. 310-14.

107. On Pearkes, see War Diary, 13th Brigade, 20 April, and Appendix XIX, "General's Appeal to Recruits," Vancouver Sun, and "Gen. Pearkes Asks Troops To Go Active," Vancouver Daily Province, both 21 April 1944, and for descriptions of visits of all three V.C. winners, see also Macklin, "Mobilization of 13 Bde," pp. 6-7, and Roy, Pearkes, pp. 211-13.

108. Macklin, "Mobilization of 13th Bde," p. 14.

109. Ibid., p. 6. According to Macklin, and to War Diary, 13th Brigade, 4 April 1944, the name of the officer was Lt.Col. Shimnowsky, suggesting the non-British backgrounds of many of the country's volunteer troops, as well as NRMA men.

110. Ibid., 10 April 1944.

111. DHH, File 322.009(D50), "MEMO for G.O.C.-in-C., by Brigadier i/c Administration, 21 April; as well as Ralston Papers, Vol. 82, "Triquet, Major Paul V.C., 1944: re use of Triquet, Victoria Cross, for recruiting, April," two undated documents recording statements of President of Legion Branch in Vernon, and statement by Ralston in reply; Ibid., Vol. 81, "Recruiting for Overseas, 1944: Camp Vernon, B.C., Pacific Command, April-June," excerpt of speech from Hansard by H.C. Green, n.d., p. 2348; Letson, AG, to Minister, 25 April; "Draft Statements" on Green question, 25 and 27 April; and point-form notes by Ralston on subject, n.d.; Dominion of Canada, Official Report of Debates of the House of Commons, Vol. I, 1944 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1944), p. 2283; and War Diary, 13th Brigade, Appendix XXVIII, April 1944, "Support for Stand Taken By Pearkes," Vancouver Sun, 25 April; "B.C. Campaign Stirs Controversy in House," Vancouver Daily Province, and "No Coercion of Draftees Says Ralston," untitled clipping, both 27 April; and "Army Getting 3000 Volunteers A Month," and "Vernon Legion Repeats Protest Over Appeal," both Vancouver Daily Province, 29 April 1944 (as well as several related articles on the same appendix).

112. War Diary, 13th Brigade, Appendix XXVIII, April 1944, "Ralston Backs Gen. Pearkes," Vancouver Sun, 28 April 1944; Ralston Papers, Vol. 81, "Recruiting for Overseas, 1944: Camp Vernon," excerpt from "Orders of the Day," n.d. [April 1944], recording question from J.S. Roy, MP for Gaspé; Brigadier Marcel Noel, DAG, to AG, 15 May, enclosing "abridged translation" of clipping from Le Soleil, 13 May, recording protest of municipal council; Director of Army Recruiting, to Minister, 20 May; Ralston to F.X. Chouinard, City Clerk of Quebec, 6 June; "Textual translation of a letter sent to Alderman Matté of Quebec City by 133 French-Canadian call-ups at Vernon, B.C.," n.d. [June 1944]; telegram, Commanding

Pacific (Pearkes) to AG (Letson), 25 June; draft press release, 25 June, and "Draft Statement by Minister on Allegations of Former Members of Regiment [sic] de Hull," 26 June 1944, both responding to allegations in Matté letter; as well as Ibid., Vol. 78, "Conscription, 1944: Hansard References 1942, Jan, March, May-July 1942," telegram, Cmdg 13 Cdn Inf Bde (Macklin) to, AG, 23 May, and point-form notes by Ralston, "RE: Recruiting - Pacific Command," 30 May; and Ibid., Vol. 81, "Recruiting for Overseas, 1944: in British Columbia. Newspaper Clippings, April-May," newspaper clippings: "Quebec House, 55-4, Votes Against Sending Conscripts Overseas," Globe and Mail, 27 April; "La ville de Québec demande une enquête royale sur les incidents qui se sont produits à Vernon; des conscrits forcés de signer pour outre-mer, L'Action Catholique, and "Enquête royale demandée par le conseil de ville," Le Soleil, both 13 May 1944.

113. DHH, File 322.009(D50), Major-General George Pearkes to Major-General H.F.G. Letson, Adjutant-General, 13 May 1944.

114. War Diary, 13th Brigade, and particularly 26 April, 1-5 May, 25 May-1 June, and 8 and 18 June 1944.

115. DHH, File 322.009(D50), Major-General J.C. Murchie [Vice CGS], personal letter to Pearkes, 26 April 1944.

116. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 15054, War Diary, Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles, 3-4 May 1944.

117. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 15184, War Diary, Le Régiment de Joliette, 10 May 1944.

118. Uncatalogued award citation for Lt.-Col. Joseph Napoleon Emile Grenier, as Officer, Order of the British Empire, held at DHH, Ottawa. Information supplied by Mr. Hugh Halliday.

119. For developments on the east coast more generally, see NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 15054, Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles, April-May 1944; Vol. 15184, Régiment de Joliette, April-May 1944; Vol. 15189, Régiment de Montmagny, April 1944; and Vol. 15279, Victoria Rifles of Canada, August-December 1944. Also Hitsman, "Manpower Problems," op.cit., pp. 149-51, and Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 430.

CHAPTER FIVE

Revolt or Realization? The National Resources Mobilization Act and the Conscription Crisis of 1944

In October 1952, Bruce Hutchison published an excerpt from his recently completed biography of Mackenzie King, entitled "Mackenzie King and the 'Revolt' of the Army." The excerpt told the story of King's actions in October and November 1944, during the second Cabinet crisis of the war over conscription. Although King finally agreed to send 16,000 conscripts overseas at the height of the crisis, Hutchison revealed, he had gone to his grave believing that he had been forced to do so by his senior generals, who were on the verge of wresting control of the country's political affairs away from the government. King conveniently forgot that he had been facing a number of pressures from members of his own Cabinet to introduce conscription by late November, and the threat of the political collapse of the government, as Hutchison reminded readers when his longer biography appeared. In Hutchison's view, the Prime Minister had created the claim of an "Army revolt" in his own mind, "by self-hypnosis to save his Government, his nation, and himself."¹

Still, King's accusations raised a number of questions about the actions of senior Army officers during the

conscription crisis of 1944. When R.M. Dawson investigated the incident in the 1950s, he came to the conclusion that:

while it is true that there was no revolt in the Canadian army, there was a real trial of strength between the civil and the military powers. There is no doubt that the soldiers were playing with political gunpowder and the consequences could have been catastrophic if a few matches had been carelessly tossed around by irresponsible participants. In this sense, and in this sense only, there was an army revolt, and it succeeded.²

In contrast to Dawson's views, C.P. Stacey presented most of the Army's actions as correct and proper in his 1970 study of the crisis from the military's point of view. The generals knew what their political superiors did not seem to be willing to realize, he suggested, and there was no other option but to send conscripts overseas. In this case, it was not surprising that by late November one senior officer had resigned in protest at the policy, and others seemed to be ready to do so. In a democracy like Canada, resignation was the only alternative open to military officers who could not in all good faith follow the policies that they had been ordered to carry out by their political superiors.³

The problem in attempting to understand the events of October and November 1944 is that in practice the situation was not nearly so simple. In a few cases, as we shall see, senior officers did go beyond the strict limits of civil-military relations in the actions that they took, breaking down the barrier that many authorities consider should exist between the military's role of providing professional advice

to its civilian masters, and the latter's role of making all decisions with respect to policy, based on that advice. At no time in a healthy system of civil-military relations is it considered proper for the military to go beyond that point.⁴ In the particular circumstances of the fall of 1944, however, what Prime Minister King and some of his colleagues seemed to fail to understand was just how certain some of those officers were that the voluntary system had failed, and their frustrations with the apparent refusal of their political superiors to admit that. Many officers had spent years attempting to make the government's current conscription policies work, with the results and consequences that have been discussed in earlier chapters of this thesis. By late 1944, in their minds, these efforts were no longer working, and some officers tried in every way possible to convince the government of this fact. Still, in the end all realized that should the federal Cabinet refuse to accept this fact, it was their duty as military servants to resign and make way for others who were prepared to carry out the current policies.

Thus, the real issue for historians seems to be not to judge the actions of Army officers in 1944, but to try to understand *why* they saw the situation in the way they did. And in this respect it is vitally important to understand the context set by the National Resources Mobilization Act (NRMA). When the final crisis came in 1944, the actions of both sides were shaped in significant ways by the views that they had

come to hold about the NRMA, and for the Army in particular by its last four years of interaction with the thousands of men who had served under the authority of the NRMA. At the same time, many of the problems that emerged by late 1944 had been brought on by the Army itself, as a result of the way that the compulsory military training system had been organized in previous years, and made into such an integral part of the "big army." As we have seen, these developments were not necessarily intended to lead to conscription; in fact, far from it. But by 1944, to Ralston and to almost all of his planners working in the Department of National Defence, it was clear that the NRMA was no longer working to meet the Army's needs. As they saw it, it was their duty to admit that they had been wrong, and deal with the problem, regardless of the personal or professional costs to themselves or to the Army as an institution, in order to keep faith with the men overseas.

The difficulty for the Army in late 1944 was that many of the politicians to whom they reported were not yet as aware of the true situation as they were. Consequently, throughout the events of October and November 1944, what was really going on was a process of educating the Army's political masters. Given the short time in which to act, it is not surprising that in some cases, the generals who were trying to make their superiors aware of the situation acted inappropriately. Ultimately, however, their actions could be said to have been successful. In the end, whether or not the Prime Minister

justified his change of position as a result of a "revolt" by the Army, or on other grounds, this result was less important than the fact that he did finally become aware of the true seriousness of the problem, and agree to introduce conscription for overseas service. Unfortunately, the Army would later pay a price for its actions, losing most of the prestige and influence that it had built up in the earlier years of the war.

The following chapter reviews much that is already known about the conscription crisis of October and November 1944. In doing so, however, it attempts to focus on the NRMA and its role in the debates, and to remind readers of the larger context that shaped decisions on both sides, and particularly for the Canadian Army. As it shows, the Allied invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944 marked the final failure of the attempts of generals such as H.D.G. Crerar to take advantage of the NRMA to build up a "big army" that could survive on a voluntary basis overseas. It also marked a watershed for the NRMA. With the invasion came a rise in tensions between NRMA recruits, their general service counterparts, and especially their officers, who came to see themselves as carrying out an almost impossible duty in attempting to convince further NRMA men to volunteer for overseas service. The result was the events that took place within the federal Cabinet and across the country in the fall of 1944, and the feeling that the Army was unduly resisting the policies of its superiors, whether or

not this was in fact the case.

* * *

It was at home that the impact of the Normandy invasion was first felt with respect to the NRMA. As historian R.H. Roy has noted, the Normandy invasion marked a dividing point in relations between conscripts and general service recruits. Before then, there had been little evidence of open animosity between the two groups. But tensions increased as Canadians became more involved in the fighting overseas.⁵ At the same time, authorities launched a new nation-wide recruiting campaign, aimed specifically at NRMA men, targeting friends and family and the larger Canadian public, to try to encourage them to press every NRMA recruit to volunteer for overseas service.⁶ Meanwhile, the most immediate result of the invasion was a noticeable surge in volunteering among NRMA men, and the number "going active" in June more than tripled to 3,259 from the previous month's total of 1,025, before falling back to the previous level in July - although figures remained higher throughout the summer than they had been in the early months of 1944.⁷ Nevertheless, these numbers were not nearly as high as many planners hoped, especially as the month of June went on, and the nature of the fighting in Europe became clearer. A week after D-Day, J.L. Ralston called on his Cabinet colleagues to reduce recruiting for the navy and air force, a request that C.G. Power met by suspending all activities until October. As Power commented

to his son in late June, "At the present time Ralston wants a certain number of men for General Service every month and he is just about getting them by the skin of his teeth."⁸ As the summer went on, further cuts were also made to anti-aircraft units and other coast defence formations in Canada, in an attempt to release another 4,000 general service soldiers for duties overseas.⁹

These developments, along with the Army's earlier recruiting campaigns among home defence units in April and May, provoked a number of incidents that revealed the larger differences between "A" and "R" recruits by 1944. In May, Major-General G.R. Pearkes admitted to one "very minor brawl" having taken place between a general service and an NRMA soldier during 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade's recruiting drive in Vernon, British Columbia.¹⁰ In late June, another disturbance involving 100 to 200 men was linked to a fight between an NRMA and a general service recruit at A-1 Canadian Artillery Training Centre in Petawawa, Ontario. Discipline had apparently deteriorated to the point that a Sergeant was thrown to the ground and "pick[ed] on" by several men for trying to break up the fight. When another man tried to intervene, he reported later, the participants argued about "whether he was fighting for the General Service or the N.R.M.A." In investigating the dispute, Defence Minister J.L. Ralston uncovered evidence of another case two months earlier in the neighbouring A-2 Artillery Training Centre, at the same

camp, where a fight had been sparked by one general service soldier objecting to another singing a song in French, an incident that may again have been related to anti-NRMA sentiments.¹¹

In mid-July, tensions between NRMA and general service men erupted even further into the open at Currie Barracks (A-16 Canadian Infantry Training Centre) in Calgary, Alberta. In a story carried by the Canadian Press, a group of 150 general service and NRMA recruits were reported to have taken part in a "battle" at the camp, during which "rifles and bayonets were brandished."¹² Further investigation revealed that in fact no weapons had been raised, and the centre's acting commandant reported that less than one hundred men had been involved. The incident had actually been sparked by an encounter between two NRMA sentries and an inebriated general service soldier, after the latter man had attempted to follow two members of the Canadian Women's Army Corps back to their huts through the sentries' lines, and fell off the bicycle that he was riding at the time. Conveniently forgetting the details of the event in his drunken state, he reported to friends that his cuts and bruises had been caused by the sentries. The following night, fifteen to twenty general service men returned to the NRMA hut, turning over beds and breaking windows before nearby officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) arrived to break up the crowd that had formed outside. The incident proved to be the most serious example of tensions between these two

groups during the war. As the acting commandant suggested in his initial report to Ottawa, "At present, when the friends and relatives of the Active boys are becoming casualties on the several battle fronts, a very bitter feeling exists against N.R.M.A. personnel."¹³ In the investigation that followed, several witnesses confirmed these sentiments. Other slights that were said to have contributed to the tensions were the greater ease with which NRMA men could obtain leaves or take vocational courses. General service men also recited examples such as NRMA men being driven in trucks during a field exercise while volunteers marched, or conscripts being served soup in the mess when "G.S." men were not. In both cases, local officers noted that events had been blown out of proportion. At the same time, NRMA recruits were not blameless, reportedly referring to general service volunteers as "General-" or "Government-Suckers."¹⁴

Another example of the increased feelings that existed at this time is a song that was originally thought to have sparked the disturbance in Calgary, and was preserved on the same file by authorities at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa. Called "Salute to a Zombie," it was sung to the tune of "My Darling Clementine," and was heard in the local canteen a few weeks before the events in Calgary. The copy that appeared on the file was forwarded from an anonymous soldier in British Columbia. As he commented on the bottom of the page, "this is what we find on the table when we go on

meal parade."¹⁵ The song was quite average, emphasizing the "shame" of being a "zombie," and resentment at NRMA men sharing the Army's benefits but not the costs of serving overseas, and ending with a call for the "zombies" to go active. But undoubtedly it had its own impact on the men subjected to it in training centres and home defence units across the country:

SALUTE TO A ZOMBIE

I'm a Zombie, I'm a Zombie,
 I'm a Zombie. Yes, I am.
 I'd much rather be a Zombie
 Than an Active Service Man.

I'm a Zombie, I'm a zombie,
 I'm a Zombie, till I die,
 Active Service makes me nervous,
 So I'll never go and try.

I was a Zombie, I was a Zombie,
 I was a Zombie, and its [sic] right,
 While in Col. Ralston's Army,
 I'll never have to go and fight.

I was a Zombie, I was a Zombie,
 I was a Zombie I'll allow.
 Tired of BS., I put up a GS
 So I'm in the army now.

So I joined Active Service,
 Sailing over with the tide,
 I can walk along the street now
 And never have to go and hide.

Now come listen all you Zombies
 You drink our wine, you drink our beer,
 But you won't turn G.S.
 For a handcuffed volunteer.

That's the end of our story,
 All you Zombies, Please take heed,
 Why not join the Active Service,
 Help us out, where ere there's need.

"Salute to a Zombie" was also not the only pejorative song

invented during the war. By 1944, it had been joined by such stirring poems and ballads as "The Zombie Psalm," "The Zombie Prayer," and "Seventy Thousand Zombies," all three of which portrayed Prime Minister Mackenzie King as the "saviour" of the "zombies," protecting them from being sent overseas (for samples of two of these songs, see the following page).¹⁶ In fact, King himself brought the "Zombie Psalm" to the attention of the Cabinet War Committee (CWC) in 1942, reporting that a friend had recently seen it openly displayed at "an army establishment in Ontario."¹⁷

In September 1944, a story appeared in the Victoria Times that indicates how far tensions had gone between "zombies" and the broader public by that point in the war, and provides a good summary of attitudes in the weeks before the second Cabinet crisis over conscription. As the Times put it, citizens in Duncan, British Columbia, were "enraged with the home defence men." The report quoted a local citizen and member of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, who despite being an Army officer did not seem to think it imprudent to comment publicly that:

'When they first came here... they were handsomely treated - the Canadian Legion War Services ran a canteen for them and the I.O.D.E. worked hard to entertain them and make them at home.'

Now, he said, the men boast they'll never fight, talk disparagingly and insultingly of active service men and are generally provocative in the presence of other soldiers who wear the G.S. badge.¹⁸

Fortunately, tensions do not seem to have gone beyond that

THE ZOMBIE PSALM

Mackenzie King is my Shepherd,
I shall not wander.
He maketh me not to wear the O.S. Badge.
He restoreth my vote.
He leadeth me along the paths of Canada for
his Party's sake.
Yea, though I move about from one camp to another
I fear no draft,
For Mackenzie King is with me.
His Government and his Cabinet they comfort me.
He prepareth a table before me
In the presence of my Active enemies.
He does not clip my hair too short.
My glass runneth over with Canadian beer,
Surely the Government will not alter this
Its policy at this late date
And I shall live in the confines of Canada forever.

AMEN.

THE ZOMBIE PRAYER

We thank Thee, Lord, for Mackenzie King,
Who keeps his promise not to bring
Such divers trials and tribulations
As making us fight for Allied Nations,
Who looks Canadians in the eye,
and says, "My Zombies shall not die."

We also thank Thee, too, O Lord,
That he provides us with our board,
He gives us lodging, clothes and guns,
But keeps us clear of nasty Huns.

And when our country fights the Japs,
And men are needed to fill the gaps,
And Pray, dear Lord, to spare us boys,
And send those awful O.S. guys.

From Active Service us preserve,
We really haven't got the nerve,
Content we are to serve him well,
Who keeps us from the front line Hell.

Grant us this, O Lord, and we will be,
Always grateful unto Thee.

AMEN.

Copies of the "Zombie Psalm" and the "Zombie Prayer," as mentioned on previous page. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Manuscript Group 27, III, B11, Papers of James Layton Ralston, Vol. 85, "Resignations - Miscellaneous - Caucus Notes, Diary, Memoranda, Speeches, Correspondence, Statement, 'Zombie Prayers'.")

stage before November 1944. But even at this level they were serious, and given such sentiments it is hardly surprising that few remaining NRMA soldiers were willing to change their mind and volunteer for overseas service as the summer went on.

Meanwhile, as the Army's needs became more pressing by mid-1944, its leaders began to seek more systematic answers to the question of why some NRMA men continually refused to go active throughout the war. The question is not easily answered, even by historians, since little direct evidence of the views of the "zombies" exists. As a result of the Army's recruiting drive among NRMA recruits in April and May 1944, however, a few officers recorded their findings on the subject. Together with other information, their answers provide some hints about why conscripts refused to volunteer. According to the commander of 13th Brigade, Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin, whose views on the ethnic backgrounds of the "zombies" were quoted in chapter two, one major reason why NRMA men would not go active was because a high proportion were French-speaking or otherwise "non-British." As we have seen, his views were inaccurate, although by 1944 the ranks of the "zombies" did contain a larger proportion of French-speaking conscripts and men from other non-British backgrounds than among the national population. Considering their longer history in Canada, and their recent memories of conscription during the First World War, it is not surprising that larger numbers of French Canadians failed to identify with the war

effort as fully as English-speaking Canadians. As at least one commentator noted during the war, French-Canadian conscripts tended to resist volunteering not necessarily to avoid overseas service, but because participation in overseas wars had come to be seen as something forced on them by English Canadians, rather than a free choice by French Canadians, many of whom might otherwise have been quite prepared to serve.¹⁹

Beyond the racial views indicated in Macklin's report, some of his other conclusions have more of a ring of truth to them. To him, many conscripts seemed to be strongly tied to the land, and thus unwilling to leave Canada and serve overseas, a view that would not have been out of place given the government's conflicting statements on the priority of agricultural production and military service during the war, and the tensions in Ottawa over the subject that we saw in Chapter Three. Macklin also noted complaints from NRMA men about the large number of deserters that reportedly remained at large in Canada, flaunting the laws of the land without punishment, as well as policies regarding leave for employment in essential industries, all of which contradicted claims that overseas service was the most important contribution one could make to the war effort. As Macklin put it, "I am convinced that thousands of NRMA soldiers will resolutely decline to enlist as long as the prospect of farm or other leave is dangled before them like a carrot before a donkey."²⁰

Among Macklin's conclusions, the most important and also most controversial was his belief that many NRMA men refused to go active because of their broader opposition to the government's conscription policies. According to the commander of the *Régiment de Hull*, whose report on recruiting Macklin forwarded to authorities along with his own in May,

A large percentage of the NRMA. [sic] personnel are perfectly willing to serve their country anywhere but are firm in the stand that they should be ordered officially to go overseas. ... A number are determined never to sign active in protest against the repeated attempts to have them sign, against the taunts and jibes suffered over the years from Active personnel and the public who classified them as 'Zombies', 'Westypoofs', 'Conscripts', 'Women's Home Companions', 'Pantywaists', 'Poltroons', 'The Lily Livered' and other unmentionables.²¹

These arguments were echoed by a number of other officers in 13th Brigade, with respect to both English and French-speaking conscripts, as well as by those involved in the recruiting campaign in Atlantic Command that spring. As the War Diarist for the Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles noted in May, "The men all agree they should be active but will do nothing within themselves to help the matter until the government takes the responsibility ... to order conscription."²² In fact, these comments became so widespread during the war that they almost seem to have become received wisdom among authorities, who clearly were not impartial on the subject. To some opponents of conscription within the federal Cabinet in November, these arguments may have seemed too convenient as Army officers tried to convince them to extend conscription to overseas

service. Yet the number of times that they appear in various documents, and the strength with which correspondents reported them, suggests that there must have been at least some truth to the view. At the same time, it is possible that NRMA men themselves adhered to such explanations, not necessarily as a firm belief, but as a way to unconsciously rationalize their behaviour and thus gain a small measure of revenge for the way that they had been treated by the Army over the past few years. This rationalization also might have helped them avoid having to admit to themselves more practical motivations, such as remaining behind to earn money in wartime factories, as some of the above-quoted reports noted, or to avoid having their lives, families, and businesses disrupted any more than absolutely necessary by the NRMA. In addition, there was the perfectly legitimate desire to avoid the prospect of being killed or wounded overseas.

Macklin's various conclusions on the motivations of NRMA men are supported by a few other pieces of evidence from 1944. As Private G.D. Williams, one of the two sentries involved in the Currie Barracks incident in Calgary in July, stated to the inquiry that investigated these events:

I have not definitely made up my mind about going active. The reason I haven't gone active is that my father is sickly and alone on the farm and I can get Harvest Leave to help him. After I get harvest leave I am going to consider the matter further.²³

As another individual who was called out in March 1944 but chose instead to volunteer has written, his initial reaction

on receiving his first notice was:

'OK, Army, here I am. At age 30, with a wife and two children to support, I didn't really think I'd get called up. But never mind that. I'm here. I certainly don't expect to make much difference to our overall war effort, but I'll do my bit. Whatever you want me to do, I'll try to do....'

[As for the NRMA men] I remember thinking that you can't generalize. Some may have had reasons we would have considered unpatriotic, but how could I know about those I came in contact with, when we didn't talk about it? I could think of logical reasons for not going Active: family (compassionate) reasons; and the feeling that I know some had: Why should I stick my neck out when others aren't when it's not required?²⁴

In another earlier case, a municipal politician wrote to J.L. Ralston on behalf of a Scottish-Canadian widow in Alberta, whose only son was called out for training and could not get harvest leave to return and help her work the family farm. In contrast to some of the perceptions about the racial character of the NRMA on the part of Brigadier Macklin, the civilian author complained that "If the boy had a German name ... he would be released at once." Upon further investigation, it turned out that the real problem was that the man wished to remain in the Army, and apparently he was not volunteering simply out of a sense of duty to his mother.²⁵ Explanations such as these are worth emphasizing, for they remind us that every individual NRMA recruit and volunteer soldier who served in the armed forces during the war faced similar feelings and decisions, that often involved such "mundane" concerns as the needs of families or friends, or pressure from parents or spouses not to enlist. They also illustrate the complexity of

trying to understand why so many men chose not to volunteer for overseas service, and remained firm in their convictions, despite months or even years of pressures intended to convince them otherwise.

Thanks to the increasing efforts of the Army to find volunteers in 1944, one more piece of evidence exists that provides a slightly more rigorous picture of the views of at least one small group of conscripts, and confirms several of the larger conclusions noted above. In May 1944, a total of 115 NRMA personnel were interviewed in south-western Ontario, to find out why they would not go active, and the results recorded in detail. Over half of those questioned listed personal reasons, twenty-one stating that they needed to stay in Canada to help ailing parents or families (the majority to maintain farms), while twelve said they could not enlist due to resistance from parents or spouses (seven of whom were under twenty years of age). A further seventeen declared that they had either tried to volunteer and been rejected by one of the services, or felt that their health was too poor to withstand intensive training. Seventeen refused to give any answer. Of the remainder, eleven simply said that they would not go active for any reason (four of them were accused of being "anti-Canadian" by interviewers). Sixteen stated that they disliked the Army or wished to enlist in an area other than infantry, a consideration that is worth noting especially strongly, here, given the knowledge that there was a very real

risk of dying associated with such service by late 1944 - a factor that became even more important as infantrymen came to be the only type of volunteers accepted for overseas service by mid-1944, as a result of those same risks. Seven other men explained that they wanted to stay in Canada and earn money as long as others were permitted to do so. Five claimed that they supported conscription, but wanted to force the government to send all conscripts overseas, a statement that verifies the conclusions of many officers in 1944, but one that also indicates how few men made this claim when they were actually forced to stop and think about their reasons for not volunteering. Of the last nine men, three decided to go active, three stated that they planned to do so as soon as they could put family problems in order in Canada, two agreed to reconsider, and the last was an American citizen who agreed to enlist as long as it did not affect his citizenship. Interestingly, of a total of 141 NRMA men for whom information was collected during the survey, 87 (61.7%) were single and 54 (38.3%) married, 34 with one or more children. Eighty (56.7%) were Roman Catholic, 50 (35.5%) Protestant, and 3 (2.1%) Jewish, figures that are very close to those given in chapter two for the NRMA as a whole, while 113 (80.1%) were Canadian-born, a number lower than that provided in chapter two. Significantly, only 57 (40.4%) of the men surveyed came from families where both parents had been born in Canada.²⁶

What was also clear from these numbers, as well as the

general tensions between NRMA and general service soldiers throughout the summer of 1944, was that as time went on fewer and fewer NRMA men were likely to volunteer for overseas service. As Brigadier Macklin wrote in early May:

Within the army a campaign of education may help but I am inclined to think that the bulk of the remaining NRMA men are beyond the influence of any education which can be imparted to them in a few weeks or months. As they say themselves, they will go if they are sent. Some few may change their minds but most will not, unless there is some new and powerful impulsion which will convince them that it is in their own self-interest to volunteer.²⁷

Macklin's superior, Major-General Pearkes, was "inclined to take a more optimistic view of the future."²⁸ But one way or another, the limits of recruiting on a large scale from among NRMA personnel had clearly been reached, a fact that was obvious to anyone who had dealt closely with the NRMA over the past few months.

* * *

Meanwhile, as these events were going on in Canada, the fighting continued overseas. By 6 June 1944, when the western Allies landed in Normandy, the Canadian Army in Britain was large enough to be granted sole responsibility for one of the five D-Day beaches, while the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) provided considerable levels of support for the operation. Although casualties among ground troops were lighter than expected on D-Day, the Normandy campaign quickly degenerated into a costly battle to break out of the early bridgeheads, against strong opposition from

German forces, particularly in the British-Canadian sector. As a result, Canadians played a key role in some of the toughest battles of the campaign. Operations in Normandy ended up lasting much longer than most planners had expected, some Canadian units fighting almost continuously from early June until the end of August. Then, instead of resting, First Canadian Army was assigned the task of opening the approaches to the Belgian port of Antwerp, in what would become known as the Scheldt campaign, which lasted until the end of October. During the two campaigns, the Canadian Army suffered a total of roughly 25,000 casualties, a large proportion in front-line infantry units, and only in early November were Canadian units finally withdrawn and placed in reserve.²⁹

The implications of these operations were highly significant, not just for the war overseas, but politically at home. The story of the crisis that emerged in Canada's overseas reinforcement organization in the summer of 1944 has been told elsewhere, and does not need to be explored in great detail here.³⁰ But three problems came together by October to help bring the Canadian Army to the point where it was facing an imminent shortage of men. In the first place, lacking their own experience with which to estimate casualty rates, Canadian generals had relied on British calculations, which before 1943 were based almost entirely on operations in Africa and other theatres around the world, and mostly on defensive rather than offensive battles in the early years of

the war. As a result, casualties in some parts of the Army fell short of expectations in Italy and north-west Europe in 1943-1944, while those among infantrymen were much higher.³¹

This problem was aggravated by a second factor that helped lead the Canadian Army into difficulties. Like their colleagues in most western armies, Canadian leaders had organized their formations based on experiences earlier in the war, which suggested that mechanized operations and firepower would be the key elements in helping to move men forward on the European battlefield. Instead, from the beginning of operations in Italy the infantry bore the brunt of the fighting, as it has throughout military history, taking seventy-five percent of all casualties among Canadian units, rather than the fifty percent that reinforcement pools had been based upon - figures that would be very similar in north-west Europe in 1944.³² Thus, even before June 1944, surpluses of some types of Canadian soldiers were already piling up in overseas depots, while the number of infantrymen fell below levels commanders considered necessary to sustain operations for a reasonable period of time in Europe.

As a result of these developments, the real difficulty that led to political problems in Canada in 1944 was not a shortage of all volunteers overseas, but those of very specific types. As early as April, arrangements were made to begin "remustering" Canadians in England, and large numbers of surplus armoured troopers, artillerymen, and members of the

Army Service Corps suddenly found themselves posted to infantry establishments for retraining as infantrymen. For some of these men, the change may have been particularly ironic, considering that large numbers of NRMA recruits had gone active to join corps and arms other than infantry earlier in the war, at least a few of whom must have been serving overseas by 1944 and suddenly found themselves once again becoming infantrymen. Along with their efforts in England, authorities in Canada spent the next several months sending as many infantry volunteers as possible overseas, in place of other arms, a decision that helped lead to the east and west coast recruiting drives described in Chapter Four.³³ By the end of the summer, new policies required all NRMA men of suitable categories who were prepared to volunteer for overseas service to do so as infantry, a change that clearly affected the decisions of some of the conscripts interviewed during the May 1944 study in south-western Ontario described earlier in this chapter.

By mid-1944, then, a number of efforts were underway to deal with infantry shortages overseas. Although commanders would later be criticized for attempting to retrain Canadian soldiers instead of announcing their difficulties immediately to the government, at first the policy made sense, and most men were given sufficient time to prepare fully for their new roles in England.³⁴ As C.P. Stacey has noted, the Canadian government had made its position against conscription for

overseas service very clear, and Lieutenant-General Stuart, who was by now the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters in London, was particularly aware of these problems thanks to his earlier service as Chief of the General Staff (CGS) in Ottawa. As a result, he tried to deal with the situation quietly in England, not so much to avoid federal politicians discovering that the Army had miscalculated its needs, as might be supposed, but rather to protect those politicians from having to deal with the issue in the first place.³⁵ Unfortunately where Stuart erred was in making this decision at all, without at least informing his superiors more fully of the potential for trouble, a task it was his duty to do as one of the government's most senior military advisors.

The third factor that finally brought conscription back to the political level as an issue in 1944 was the fact that the fighting in north-west Europe turned out to be much longer and more intense than officials had predicted. Thanks again to a lack of experience of its own, the Canadian Army had relied on British forecasts that assumed that the intensity of operations would vary over time, permitting reinforcement organizations to rebuild reserves in periods between major battles. Instead, Canadian units fought almost constantly from the time they arrived in Normandy until late October. By early August, every Canadian formation was actively involved in combat, both in Italy and in north-west Europe, and from then on losses began accumulating at an alarming rate. The

result was that the expedients that had been adopted in the hope of surviving the next few months until reinforcement organizations in Canada could be permanently readjusted broke down, and by September criticism of the Army was beginning to emerge into public view.

Meanwhile, as planners struggled to come to grips with difficulties overseas, events in Canada went on much as before. As C.P. Stacey has noted, J.L. Ralston was aware of some of the early warnings of danger overseas, and appointed Lieutenant-General Stuart as his Chief of Staff in December 1943 partly to keep track of the manpower situation there, as well as to rein in commanders who seemed to keep taking on new needs and commitments for the overseas Army, without properly referring them to Ottawa.³⁶ At the same time, these commanders kept sending what were termed "alarmist cables" to NDHQ, warning of possible shortages. As Ralston put it in a letter in March, one of Stuart's tasks was to get officials in London to spend more time trying to keep manpower under control, and finding the men needed to maintain the voluntary war effort, rather than endlessly debating the exact number of shortages, as seemed to be occurring.³⁷

Ralston also continued to worry about finding men in Canada. Although he does not seem to have been aware of the precise degree of the threat that existed overseas by the end of the summer, he kept track of figures more fully than some previous historians have suggested. In early June, the

Adjutant-General reported to Ralston that based on current predictions of enlistment in Canada, and conversion rates among the NRMA, there would be enough men to meet existing needs overseas until at least the end of 1944 - but only if the rate of volunteering did not fall lower than it already had among either NRMA men or the general public, and only by using more men drawn from home defence units to make up the current difference between recruiting figures and the needs of the Army overseas. Ominously, Lieutenant-General Letson added that by the end of the year suitable general service personnel from this source would "have shrunk to below 20,000, and will be approaching the point where further withdrawals may not be feasible."³⁸

At the same time, evidence began to appear that suggested that planners were coming to view the NRMA more seriously as a source of potential reinforcements for Europe, without waiting for them to volunteer. As early as January 1943, while still CGS, Lieutenant-General Stuart had noted that the continued presence of NRMA men in home defence forces would

provide us with a strategic reserve available to meet unforeseen future contingencies, not only in Canada but also overseas should the situation so demand. ... This might be necessary if voluntary recruiting should fall below the minimum required for overseas reinforcement requirements or in the event of the First Canadian Army suffering casualties over and above the rate of replenishment being provided.³⁹

In presenting his plans to reduce the size of the country's forces in August 1943, Stuart also justified retaining men in

Canada not only for strategic reasons, but "As a potential source of reinforcements for the Canadian Army overseas."⁴⁰

By February 1944, Ralston himself was stating publicly in the House of Commons that one reason the NRMA men were being kept in uniform was in case they were needed later overseas.⁴¹ In June, an anonymous advisor was even more open in a private memorandum, commenting that:

Up to the present, reinforcement demands have been met entirely on a voluntary basis but should this become impossible in the future I have no doubt that the Military Members [of the Defence Council, within NDHQ] will advise you to obtain authority to utilize these N.R.M.A. soldiers as reinforcements on a compulsory basis.

Either Ralston or this correspondent later altered the second part of the above sentence to read simply "should this become impossible in the future these N.R.M.A. soldiers are available and trained as reinforcements on a compulsory basis." As the author of the memorandum added, however, even the number of men enrolled as conscripts under the NRMA had been falling for months. Consequently, "even without any conversions to G.S. status whatsoever current enrollments under the N.R.M.A. would not be more than sufficient to provide for estimated normal wastage," a sign that even relying on the NRMA might not be enough to meet the Army's needs for long.⁴² At almost exactly the same time, in June 1944, after speaking with Ralston, Grant Dexter set down his own perceptive observation that although Ralston was genuinely trying to work within the current voluntary system, he was also acting just as

politicians had done before conscription was introduced during the First World War, when they "had known the hopelessness of the situation for months but had delayed action in order that the proof should become 'overmastering' and therefore the country be unified in support of the policy."⁴³

Along with these developments in the summer of 1944, Ralston and the rest of the CWC were also facing new political challenges. In mid-June, C.P. McTague rebelled against efforts to shift what was now the "Progressive Conservative" Party slightly to the left and away from some of its more traditional policies, such as conscription. In a nomination speech to his riding association, with the new leader of the party present, McTague publicly demanded that the federal government send conscripts overseas, to aid in the fighting in Europe. At the same time, the Liberal Party was facing challenges from the left on the part of the "Cooperative Commonwealth Federation" (CCF), the social-democratic party that had emerged out of the Great Depression in the early 1930s, and swept to victory in the Saskatchewan provincial election of June 1944.⁴⁴ As the summer went on the attention of politicians was drawn more and more towards responding to the political threats of both the Conservatives and the CCF, and developing other domestic policies to avoid the return of the Depression after the war, and away from the fighting that was still going on overseas. By September, the thoughts of Prime Minister King had turned to the federal election that he

would have to call by 1945, and plans for reorganizing his Cabinet, to emphasize the tasks of re-establishing civilian society and the economy after the war.⁴⁵ In the middle of the month, both the Cabinet and the CWC began considering the roles Canadians would play in the Pacific war in 1945, and finalizing demobilization policies for the large numbers of men and women who were expected to be released from the armed forces with the end of the fighting in Europe.⁴⁶

Optimism about the war led to another action that marred relations between individual ministers in Canada, just as the problems of manpower were beginning to loom larger overseas. In mid-September, Canada played host to the second "Quebec Conference" between British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt. During the conference, King and his ministers rubbed elbows with both men, and held two special CWC meetings with Churchill and British military advisors to discuss plans for the war against Japan.⁴⁷ Most also took time to attend a dinner at the Quebec Reform Club for Liberal Party workers, during which King, in his own words

spoke about conscription and how I had maintained the position that there would be no conscription unless it were absolutely necessary. That I never believed it was necessary. Now men saw for themselves those who had served had done so voluntarily.⁴⁸

According to the Minister of Naval Services, A.L. Macdonald, who was present at the dinner, King's words had more meaning to others who heard them. As he described the speech:

"Have you had conscription", he [King] asked. "If you have not had it up to now, is it likely that you will ever have it when the war in Europe is nearing its end?" What we have said was that we would only apply conscription if it was absolutely necessary. It has not been necessary up to the present, but if it should become necessary, then somebody else would have to enforce it, and he would back out of public life. He hoped, however, that if he did that he would not have to go alone, but that some Liberals would go with him.⁴⁹

Considering that King was speaking in Quebec City, and the informal and partisan nature of the dinner, it is not surprising that he took the opportunity to make such statements. He was also clearly carried away by the emotion of the moment. Moreover, the experiences of the past few days in Quebec City seemed to have convinced King and a number of other Cabinet ministers that the war was almost over. But the story of the speech grew with the telling.⁵⁰ For J.L. Ralston, who had not been present but was told the story by Macdonald and others, the statement was especially offensive, since King appeared to be repudiating the entire policy that he had agreed upon in Cabinet in 1942. As a former military man, and in view of the difficulties that he had been facing over the past two years in trying to keep the overseas Army at full strength, he also knew better than to make such assumptions. As Grant Dexter later noted, Ralston discussed the matter with King, but the two could not agree on the exact meaning the words conveyed: "So nothing much happened, except that the Col. hates his guts more than ever."⁵¹

Yet as the summer came to an end there were few signs of

an impending crisis overseas. News of the war's progress seemed positive, as Allied forces finally broke out of Normandy in late August and advanced rapidly across France, liberating much of the country and seizing the Belgian port of Antwerp at the beginning of September. Unfortunately, German troops had not vacated the approaches to the port, and it was only later in the month that commanders began to realize that the war might not be won in a matter of weeks, as many had begun to hope. At the same time, British Field-Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery launched his famous attempt to end the war in 1944 in mid-September, with Operation "Market-Garden," the failure of which helped to ensure that the war would last well into 1945, although it would take longer for the public to become aware of this fact than the generals at the front.

In addition, in late July, despite early hints of problems in France, Lieutenant-General Stuart returned to Canada to appear before the Cabinet War Committee, and request permission for another 6,000 men for the Army overseas, 1,764 of whom had already been committed to new units. Stuart also recommended establishing a 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade in Italy, to increase the numbers of infantry in 5th Canadian Armoured Division, so that it could carry out all of its required tasks in that theatre. Although Stuart proposed using existing men in Italy to create the 12th Brigade, including anti-aircraft and armoured car units that were no longer needed for their usual duties, it still meant that yet

more infantry would be needed to replace losses once the new formation went into action. As Stuart reported to the CWC in a well-known statement on 3 August,

although the Army had been fighting for some twelve months in Italy and two months in France, the reinforcement situation was very satisfactory. At present there were reinforcement personnel available for three months at the intensive battle casualty rate. ... The only factor which was causing anxiety was the shortage of reinforcement personnel for French Canadian units.⁵²

After the reinforcement crisis erupted in October, Stuart was roundly vilified for making these statements, not least by the members of the Cabinet War Committee themselves. But before leaving for Canada in July, Stuart had authorized new efforts to remuster men from various corps overseas, and at that point it was still assumed that First Canadian Army would be able to count on a respite from operations by the end of the month. Thus, the problem did not seem to be nearly as dangerous then as it does in hindsight. At the same time, one has to wonder at Stuart's confidence in requesting yet more men for overseas service even at that point in early August.

* * *

Six weeks later, in fact, Stuart's confident assertions came into question in a very public way. On 18 September 1944, Major Conn Smythe returned to Toronto, after being wounded commanding his 30th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery in France. A day later, the Toronto Globe and Mail published charges by Smythe that the Canadian Army was facing a serious shortage of manpower in Europe, and soldiers were entering

combat without proper training. Smythe ended by calling for the trained men of the NRMA to be sent overseas. According to Smythe's own account, his view of the situation had been shaped while recovering from his wounds overseas, as he spoke to a number of wounded men about their experiences in both France and Italy. After consulting with the publisher of the Globe, George McCullagh, a personal friend and a firm opponent of the government's conscription policies, and whose views Smythe shared, he decided to make his concerns public.⁵³ At first, Smythe's statement attracted little notice in Ottawa, and was assumed to be merely another attempt to turn conscription into a political issue. But as newspaper stories and letters to Ottawa began to increase, eventually ministers were forced to pay greater attention to the controversy.⁵⁴ At the same time, according to other sources, Ralston had already begun to worry about the tone of recent reports from England, and decided to investigate further.⁵⁵ In early October, he left for Europe to see the situation for himself.

What Ralston found when he arrived in the war zone confirmed Smythe's views, but for somewhat different reasons than Smythe had alleged. During his visits to Italy and north-west Europe, Ralston began to uncover the more general problems that the Army had been facing in maintaining its infantry forces overseas, and which had grown worse in late August and September as reserves fell, and efforts to remuster men failed to meet requirements in the field. Stuart now

admitted to Ralston that based on the experiences of the past four months, casualties would be far higher in the future than anticipated. Even after remustering and shipping all remaining volunteer infantrymen from Canada, reinforcements for this arm would be completely exhausted by January 1945. In addition, Ralston heard a number of complaints from men in the field. Some troops, especially in Italy, had now served in Europe for almost five years without receiving a furlough to visit Canada. Others called attention to the government's refusal to send NRMA men overseas, which seemed to them to be a sign of their country's lack of support for its soldiers overseas.⁵⁶ Ralston returned to Canada in mid-October, accompanied by Stuart. On 19 October, he presented the disheartening news to the CWC, along with Stuart's recommendation that the government find the necessary men to keep the Army's reinforcement pools up to strength by extending the NRMA to include overseas conscription.⁵⁷

The news came as a shock to several members of the CWC, and particularly the Prime Minister. In the face of the overly optimistic reports that were still appearing in his evening newspapers, and some of his more official telegrams from Great Britain, King could not bring himself to believe that the situation was as serious as Ralston had made it out to be. He was also haunted by fears of the domestic divisions that conscription would bring. Over the next few days, King advanced a number of reasons for avoiding the policy. The

change would have to be introduced in the House of Commons, and likely fought out in a general election, and it would have a number of impacts on Canada's allies. At one stage, King even suggested that extending compulsory military service to Europe would prevent world peace after the war, because Canada would not be able to take the lead in creating postwar organizations. As the debates went on it became clear, as King stated on the first day, that while "He wished to do everything possible to win the war, including overseas conscription were this necessary ... he could not bring himself to say that it was."⁵⁸

In contrast, Ralston and several of his colleagues reminded King of his 1942 promise that if conscription became "necessary," a definition that they had taken to mean needed militarily, then it would be introduced without delay. They also disagreed with King's reading of domestic politics. In response to suggestions that Canada cut back its forces overseas, Ralston and Lieutenant-General Stuart both pointed out that the Canadian Army had been organized to fight in the front lines of the western Allies, as one small part of a much larger force, and thus there were few ways to cut troops without directly affecting operations at the "sharp end." What was also left unsaid was that Allied commanders were implicitly relying on First Canadian Army to continue bearing the weight of a certain amount of the fighting in western Europe, in making plans for their own cuts, a position that

Canada could not do much to protest in the face of their larger Allies' dominance of strategic decision-making.⁵⁹ Although King made a few tenuous attempts to prod Churchill and Roosevelt to help him out of his difficulties during the crisis, even he seems to have recognized the problem of officially asking British or American troops to take on a larger share of the war effort so that Canada could avoid sending conscripts overseas.⁶⁰

Throughout the rest of October, most of the government's key ministers met almost daily to discuss the issue, either in the CWC or the larger Cabinet. Despite lengthy deliberations, within a few days it had become clear that neither side would back down. Both were obviously divided over the precise definition of "necessary." At the same time, Cabinet members were torn over their views of the war effort overseas. As King pointed out on more than one occasion, there was no reason to assume that the fighting would go on continuously for the rest of the year, as it had until now, a reading of the situation that in the end would prove to be correct. After making such an embarrassing mistake and relying on more optimistic forecasts earlier in the summer, however, and in the face of the Army's own experiences since June, it is not surprising that Stuart took a more pessimistic view, along with Ralston and a few other members of Cabinet.⁶¹

One of King's most telling criticisms came when he called both Ralston and Stuart to task for coming to him with a

shortage of reinforcements at all. "Throughout the whole course of the war," he was recorded as saying,

he had always asked in respect of any increase in the size of the Army if the particular increase in question jeopardized the Government's policy in respect to volunteer enlistment for overseas. He had always been assured in this respect by the Government's military advisors.⁶²

Of course, as we have seen, the difficulty was not a shortage of all reinforcements, but only infantry, a problem that could not easily have been foreseen before 1944. Nevertheless, on a larger scale King's comments were valid. And in this development the NRMA had played a key role. It had helped to encourage commanders to create the "big army" overseas in the first place, and by 1944 planners had been forced to rely heavily on the NRMA just to keep these forces up to strength. Even before the shortages overseas, the situation had come to the point where there were few ways to find yet more men when a problem such as the current one emerged. That it would be likely to cause a major crisis was thus almost inevitable.

In addition, the knowledge that a large body of NRMA men existed, and could easily be sent overseas, clearly influenced the actions of opponents on both sides of the issue in late 1944. From the point of view of the "pro-conscriptionists," as both Ralston and Stuart noted at different times (although in Stuart's case, only by stepping onto political ground on which it was not his right to tread), it would be difficult to convince Canadian soldiers overseas or the public at home that firm measures such as reducing voluntary units were necessary,

when such a large, well-trained group of men remained behind in Canada.⁶³ On 23 October, furthermore, Lieutenant-General J.C. Murchie, the current CGS, suggested a number of expedients that might find at least a few more general service infantry reinforcements from among home defence forces in Canada. These included reducing physical standards for infantry, accelerating training by prohibiting leaves and shipping men directly from advanced training centres to reinforcement organizations overseas, moving surplus men from other arms and shipping them directly to England for remustering there, forcing NCOs and other skilled personnel to go overseas as general duty infantry, and cutting the age for men to serve overseas from 19 to 18½. The result would be to add only another 5,500 infantrymen to the Army's reinforcement pools by the end of the year, a figure that revealed the true seriousness of the crisis.⁶⁴ Still, such expedients might have delayed the Army's difficulties for at least a few weeks, and given authorities a little more time to consider other solutions. Most of Murchie's suggestions were in fact approved by the CWC, and then quickly forgotten over the next few days as the political crisis in the Cabinet heated up.⁶⁵ In the face of the ease with which the Army's needs of 15,000 infantry could be met by sending NRMA men overseas, Ralston and other pro-conscriptionists continued to press firmly for that measure to be introduced. As King confided to his diary on 25 October, "What annoys me about the Defence Dept. is that

any proposal made, short of conscription of N.R.M.A. men, meets with instant rejection."⁶⁶

On the other side, as noted in Chapter Four, several ministers were shocked when they discovered that 120,000 general service soldiers remained in uniform in Canada. As C.G. Power wrote in his memoirs: "I, for one, found it difficult to understand why it should be necessary, with the great mass of manpower available, to take the drastic steps recommended."⁶⁷ As we have seen, the existence of such large numbers was partly the result of the huge organization that had been built up under the NRMA in 1942 and 1943, and had proven to be much more difficult to cut down again afterwards. When Ralston, Power, and Angus L. Macdonald were assigned to review the Army's figures in late October, to see if any new men could be found, it quickly became clear that after eliminating men who were already in the training stream and on the way overseas (and thus included in previous statistics as reinforcements), every man who could be released from vital duties was too old, or of too low a physical or mental category to be able to serve overseas.⁶⁸ But the presence of these numbers, even if they were mostly only on paper, made it difficult for "anti-conscriptionists" in the government to accept the fact that conscription might be necessary to find the required men.⁶⁹ Thus, the way that the NRMA had been administered in previous years came back to haunt the current debates yet again.

By the end of October, matters seemed to be moving to a head. At that point, Cabinet members were considering one more recruiting drive among NRMA men, a step that King, at least, was hopeful would produce enough men to end the crisis. Among the suggestions put forward to improve the chances of the campaign was the idea of altering existing policies to pay NRMA men more than the normal war service gratuities and other increases that they and all volunteers were awarded from the time they enlisted, by making them retroactive for several months before a man went active. King also put great emphasis on the impact that he and other ministers could have by making personal appeals and speeches to the NRMA men.⁷⁰

Unfortunately, King's comments only revealed how far he and other ministers were from understanding the true nature of the situation by October 1944. During the discussions, Ralston read portions of the report on recruiting in 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade that Brigadier Macklin had prepared earlier in the year. King's only response was to write in his diary that "Ralston took up considerable time in reading reports of his officers who had tried to recruit from the N.R.M.A. men. One could see that the officers had been very strongly biased in favour of conscription."⁷¹ The result was that Ralston began to threaten more and more firmly to resign if his recommendations were not put into effect without further delay.⁷² Meanwhile, King found a solution to Ralston's threats of resignation in the person of former

General A.G.L. McNaughton, who had broken with Ralston and been removed from command of First Canadian Army in December 1943, after opposing sending Canadian troops to Italy. His fall had also come as a result of a loss of confidence in his abilities on the part of his British superiors.⁷³ King had talked with him several times since his official retirement in September 1944, and considered making the General the first Canadian-born Governor-General. Then, in mid-October, McNaughton spoke out strongly against conscription for overseas service in a convocation speech at Queen's University. By the first of November, after further discussions with McNaughton, King had decided to make him the new Minister of National Defence.⁷⁴

The decision led to the famous scene on 1 November, when King, expecting Ralston to suggest his plans to resign once again, suddenly found his opponent softening and offering to support one further recruiting campaign among NRMA men, as long as a final date was set to end it. After that time, if it was not successful, Ralston asked that the Prime Minister promise to extend conscription. Instead, King chose to draw out the resignation letter that Ralston had delivered to him in 1942, but King had not accepted, and announce that he was now doing so. The action was, in the words of one Cabinet minister, "cold-blooded," and consequently it has drawn much attention from historians describing the events of October and November 1944.⁷⁵

Yet, another three weeks would go by between McNaughton's accession to power as Minister of National Defence, and the King government's final decision to institute conscription for overseas service. During that time, commanders across the country were asked to return once again to the men they had been trying to convince to go active for several years, and make one more attempt to find volunteers. The events of these three weeks have come to form the heart of the debate over the "Army revolt" of 1944, as senior officers became involved in a number of incidents that called into question their loyalty in the eyes of politicians and later historians. It was probably understandable if they did not have much hope of success, after everything that had gone on in Canada over the last four years. They were also officers in the Canadian Army, however, and their duty was to serve their political masters to the best of their ability. Many did so despite their own views of the hopelessness of the situation. In fact, Ralston had only begun wavering in his opposition to the idea of another recruiting campaign on 1 November, after a telephone call to Major-General Pearkes on the west coast, who seemed willing to proceed with another campaign as long as authorities realized that conversions were not likely to come quickly or in large numbers. He also recommended setting aside a minimum of three weeks to allow any recruiting measures to take effect. Pearkes' support for the campaign came as a surprise to more than one Cabinet minister, some of

whom apparently considered him strongly pro-conscriptionist, despite the amount of effort he had put into previous efforts to find converts among NRMA men in his command. As King put it on 1 November, "In the course of the discussion, MacKinnon [the Minister of Trade and Commerce] came out quite strongly that he thought Pearkes was no good; that he really had not his heart in trying to get the men; he really wanted conscription."⁷⁶

Following the introduction of McNaughton to the Cabinet on 2 November, the new recruiting campaign got underway. In the first few days, a Cabinet Recruiting Committee made up of some of the strongest supporters of the proposal prepared a brief report on which to base the campaign, which provided much information on the composition of the NRMA in late 1944, as was noted in chapter two. Members of the committee also received a report on attitudes of NRMA personnel from the Adjutant-General's office, which identified the Army's view of most of the reasons for resistance to volunteering for general service discussed earlier in this chapter.⁷⁷ Thus, the Cabinet was well aware of the challenges that needed to be overcome. L.R. LaFlèche, formerly one of the key figures responsible for mobilizing NRMA recruits in the Department of National War Services, and now its Minister, prepared a separate report on French-Canadian conscripts, and took responsibility for developing special measures aimed at this particular group of men.⁷⁸ On 8 November, Prime Minister

King opened the campaign with a nation-wide radio broadcast. Soon afterwards, instructions were sent to commanding officers across the country, ordering them to recall the roughly 8,000 NRMA men who were on leave working in agriculture or industry, and begin concentrating all recruits capable of serving as infantry for re-training in that arm, in order to impress upon them the seriousness of the situation, and thus begin the latest effort to find volunteers from among their ranks.⁷⁹

Unfortunately, the A.G.L. McNaughton who took office in November 1944 had had little contact with the country or its home defence forces for much of the war. He had also lost touch with the Canadian Army overseas since December 1943. Although he was still the confident, energetic man King had known for a number of years, aside from the very wise expedients mentioned above, his campaign relied on little more than his own faith and optimism in its success.⁸⁰ As McNaughton saw the situation, even twenty years afterwards:

a substantial portion of the N.R.M.A. had been discouraged under the influence of propaganda evidently directed for political and personal motives[,] and with the passing of time and under the pressure to build up a division for employment in the Pacific, the superior recruits and potential NCO's were withheld from the training stream and naturally became increasingly reluctant to accept the liabilities for service in the European theatre and the reduction in rank and pay entailed in the transfer.⁸¹

In contrast, many Canadians viewed McNaughton almost as a traitor for siding with King against Ralston, an opinion that became clear when he encountered opposition during his first

public speech as Defence Minister in Arnprior, Ontario, on 5 November. The next day, he was shouted down when he appeared before a meeting of the Canadian Legion in Ottawa.⁸² In the words of Brooke Claxton, a young minister who had just entered the Cabinet in October, and who would go on to become Minister of National Defence himself in the late 1940s and early 1950s, "I did not like bringing in a general to head off an essentially political difficulty."⁸³ At least some members of the country's home defence forces also sensed the high degree of animosity that existed between Ralston and McNaughton as a result of the latter's dismissal as commander of First Canadian Army, and assumed that McNaughton had only taken the position to gain revenge on Ralston.⁸⁴ McNaughton's animosity extended to Lieutenant-General Stuart, who had also played a part in removing McNaughton, and one of the new minister's first acts on taking office was to call for Stuart's dismissal - a request that Stuart anticipated by submitting his own resignation at almost the same moment.⁸⁵

As the month went on, McNaughton took further steps that suggested his lack of understanding of the true situation in Canada, and his assumption that his own popularity and energy would be sufficient to end the crisis. One of the most famous was his appearance before a meeting of all District Officers Commanding and General Officers Commanding various Military Districts and operational headquarters across the country, on 14 November. After summoning the men to Ottawa to conduct

what most assumed would be a discussion of how to deal with the current problem of trying to find volunteers among the NRMA, McNaughton merely reviewed the situation, summarized the policies that would be followed with respect to encouraging the NRMA men to go active, and then reportedly prepared to leave the room. As R.H. Roy has written, in more dramatic fashion than the official minutes of the meeting reveal:

For a moment there was a complete silence. Other officers as well as Pearkes must have wondered whether or not McNaughton had any idea of what had been done already.... He had just about reached the door when several officers rose. Among them was Pearkes who called out "Don't you wish to hear the reports from the District Officers Commanding?" ... McNaughton listened, repeated his declaration that the former generous leave to N.R.M.A. men to work in the farms and fields would be restricted and then left. Certainly his senior officers left him in no doubt whatever about the chances of getting a quick, substantial response which would somehow make the "new" governmental policy a success.⁸⁶

As Minister of National Defence, McNaughton was correct in his obvious assumption that now that the government's policies had been stated, and he had ordered his subordinates to follow them, it was their responsibility to do so. But his actions gave the impression that he did not even want to hear their advice on the matter. Furthermore, for many officers who had spent countless hours over the past few years attempting to convince NRMA men to go active, it must have seemed clear that none of their political superiors were willing to accept what their advisors considered to be the true situation in Canada.

As a result, the frustrations of a number of senior officers began to show through. Two days after the conference

in Ottawa, McNaughton issued a press release which implied that everything was fine, and that as a result of the meeting all the volunteers needed for overseas would be easily found. The statement sparked Major-General Pearkes and four District Officers Commanding across the country to write to NDHQ in protest, declaring that they had told McNaughton exactly the opposite.⁸⁷ Then, on 20 November, Pearkes gathered all the senior officers of his command in Vancouver, to pass on the Minister's orders. A number spoke to reporters outside their meeting room before the conference, admitting their own views that the new campaign was not likely to be successful. Although the remarks were made at a time of crisis, they went beyond the bounds of acceptable behaviour for Army officers, by speaking publicly, and both McNaughton and Prime Minister King took them as evidence of a more deliberate attempt to frustrate the government's desire to maintain the policy of voluntary service.⁸⁸ On 22 November, Brigadier R.A. MacFarlane, one of the men who had challenged McNaughton's press release a few days earlier, finally submitted his resignation as District Officer Commanding (DOC), Military District No. 10 (Manitoba and northern Ontario), the only acceptable action for an officer to take if he disagreed with his government's policies.⁸⁹ At the same time, Lieutenant-General Murchie, the CGS, wrote to McNaughton on behalf of several of the government's senior Army advisors, to report that in their opinion, "After a careful review of all the

factors and the latest expression of their views by the District Officers Commanding, I must now advise you that in my considered opinion the Voluntary system of recruiting through Army channels cannot meet the immediate problem."⁹⁰

These events were dramatic, and they have received much attention from historians over the years. Yet they do not reflect the behaviour of all senior officers across the country. Even in Pearkes' case, there is evidence that he genuinely intended to make every effort to try to ensure the campaign's success. As J.L. Ralston's son, Stuart, who served as a junior officer during the war, reported to C.G. Power in the 1950s:

I was particularly impressed when I was at Staff College in Kingston in the winter and spring of 1945 to meet Captains and Majors from all over the country and to receive from themselves their accounts as to how hard their commanders from Generals down worked to persuade the Zombies to volunteer and this up to the very last moment. One chap from British Columbia told me that General Pearkes called a meeting of some 2500 officers, being every officer in his command, and that his address to them was absolutely hair-raising in its appeal and urgency that everything possible should be done to make the voluntary system work.⁹¹

In south-western Ontario, where the views of NRMA recruits had been canvassed earlier in the year, the new drive was followed with almost as much attention as earlier events, and reveals even better some of the difficulties that commanders faced in most parts of the country, as well as the honest efforts of many officers to find general service recruits. According to the records of Military District No. 1, which was responsible

for running the November campaign in south-western Ontario, it took one week just to get organized and begin what the District Officer Commanding, Brigadier P. Earnshaw, called "a redoubled effort and a new appeal" that would target every individual NRMA recruit suitable for overseas service. In fact, despite being one of the DOC's who had written to Ottawa to protest McNaughton's press release, after returning from Ottawa Earnshaw presented his local officers with orders that:

I want you to do all possible to get N.R.M.A. soldiers 'to go active'. This appeal can take many forms - to patriotism, to personal gain, etc., etc. You are to ensure that N.R.M.A. soldiers are spoken to either individually or at least in very small groups of 3 or 4, and where possible by yourself.

In addition, he directed commanders to emphasize the Prime Minister's speech of 8 November in appealing to the men. "In short," he concluded, "I want you, as C.O., to do your very best in every way to get every N.R.M.A. soldier to go active at once, and to ensure that all those fit for it to [sic] go into the infantry training stream at the earliest moment."⁹²

Over the next few days, reports poured in from commanders throughout the region, but unfortunately the flow of recruits converting to general service remained but a trickle. As one commanding officer put it after reporting that only five out of the ninety-three NRMA men in his unit were willing to volunteer, "I can assure you that we made a very fair and strong appeal to these men, and regret to have to report such a poor result."⁹³ As another officer noted a few days later, revealing some of the frustrations faced by local commanders,

his unit contained only one NRMA man suitable for overseas:

He has been approached regarding "going active" on scores and scores of occasions during the year he has been on strength here. Approach has been made from every conceivable angle, but with no result. ... He is of the opinion that he is unfit for service even in Canada, and to that end representations have been made at Ottawa, of which a letter has been received from D.A.A.G., M.D. No. 1 today.⁹⁴

Across the country, results were similar, and a meagre 694 NRMA men converted to general service throughout the first three weeks of November, a relatively large figure compared to some of the results in the winter of 1943-1944, but still far short of the numbers that the Army needed to find in a matter of weeks for overseas.⁹⁵

Meanwhile, at the political level, Prime Minister King was also facing another deadline by 22 November. The methods used by King to remove Ralston at the start of the month had shocked more than one minister, and pushed T.A. Crerar in particular to take an increasingly firm stance in support of conscription as the month went on. As we have seen (see chapter three), Crerar had strongly opposed the growth of the Army in earlier years, fearing the type of difficulty that had now appeared. By late 1944, however, he was aware of the strength of calls in English Canada to send NRMA men overseas, and despite his previous opposition he now agreed with the views of Ralston and other pro-conscriptionists that the NRMA men needed to be sent overseas. So did Angus L. Macdonald, J.L. Ilsley, the Minister of Finance, and by the middle of the

month, C.D. Howe, the Minister of Munitions and Supply.⁹⁶ Early in November, both Macdonald and Crerar wrote to King to advocate much the same policy as Ralston had been requesting before he was removed: if the new recruiting drive was not successful, a firm date needed to be set, after which conscripts would be ordered overseas. King's only response was to argue that such views would only weaken efforts to make the drive a success, by assuming that it would fail in the end.⁹⁷ But clearly he was beginning to feel the pressure from some of his own Cabinet members to implement conscription for overseas service. And although the pro-conscriptionists remained a minority within the Cabinet, the balance of numbers was beginning to shift.⁹⁸

On 22 November, members of the House of Commons returned from their fall recess, at the request of King, so that his government could explain and defend Ralston's resignation and its current policies. But by the same day, Macdonald, Crerar, and several other ministers had met and agreed that if King did not accept conscription immediately they would resign. It was at this moment that McNaughton telephoned King with his fateful news about the views of the Army. As King described the conversation, in an oft-quoted comment, McNaughton

expressed the opinion that it was like a blow in the stomach. He also said that he had the resignation of the Commander in Winnipeg. That if the Commanders, one after the other, began to resign the whole military machine would run down, begin to disintegrate and there would be no controlling the situation.⁹⁹

What is even more significant, though, is what King added afterwards. As he put it in his diary, "It is apparent to me that to whatever bad management this may have been due, we are faced with a real situation which has to be met and now there is no longer thought as to the nature of the military advice tendered."¹⁰⁰ This settled the issue for King, and for most of the rest of the day he went about preparing the ground for exactly the policy that he had refused to waver from until that morning. By the end of the day the decision was made, and next morning the Cabinet met to decide the final form of the Order-in-Council that would send the "zombies" overseas.

* * *

In retrospect, then, 22 November was a fateful day. For both McNaughton and King, two of the staunchest opponents of conscription, the developments of the past few days finally seemed to culminate and bring them to admit what the Army had been trying to tell them for some time. In deciding to advocate conscription, both men had clearly been influenced by the actions of a small number of Army commanders, and the mounting evidence of the firmness of these men's views. For the Prime Minister, there were also political considerations, and the decision to support the extension of conscription actually enabled King to head off a political revolt within his Cabinet that threatened to bring down the government regardless of the actions of the Army.

What was significant to the Army, however, was simply the

fact that the government had finally been brought to see what most of its senior commanders considered to be the reality of the situation. In the end, while senior generals clearly prepared to follow the precepts of western civil-military traditions, and resign rather than take action to force the government to see the situation their way, what was also clear was that the consequences of the Army's actions during this period were less important to it than the apparent need that it saw to send men overseas, to maintain the forces fighting there. As far as its commanders were concerned, the loss of influence and even charges that it had been "plotting" against the government probably would have been acceptable, as long as the result was to keep faith with the men overseas.

In shaping these views, the NRMA had played a significant role. It had not been the immediate cause of the crisis in 1944, but it had helped to bring the situation to that point over the longer term. And during the events of October and November 1944, it clearly came to shape the actions of people on both sides of the debate. For Ralston and several of his senior commanders, there seemed little option other than to send NRMA men overseas. At the same time, for King and other opponents of conscription in the Cabinet, the crisis marked the point where the Army seemed to have betrayed the promises made over previous years, as the "big army" had been put forward and created. The result was a situation where a full month of tension-filled debate was required before Army

leaders were finally able to convince the government that conscription really was "necessary," in both military and political terms, by late 1944.

Endnotes

1. See Bruce Hutchison, "Mackenzie King and the 'Revolt' of the Army," Maclean's Magazine, 15 October 1952, pp. 7-9, and 57-70, as well as The Incredible Canadian, A candid portrait of Mackenzie King: his works, his times, and his nation (Toronto: Longmans, Green and Company, 1952), from which the quotation is taken (p. 7).
2. R. MacGregor Dawson, The Conscription Crisis of 1944 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), p.
3. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), pp. 397-484, *passim*.
4. On civil-military relations, particularly for western democracies, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), as well as Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1960), and Sir John Hackett, The Profession of Arms (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1983).
5. See Roy, "Morale in the Canadian Army in Canada during the Second World War," Canadian Defence Quarterly 16(2), Autumn 1986, pp. 40-45 which also provides a good overview of this issue (which few historians have yet explored).
6. Roy, "Morale," p. 44, and J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977; reprint, Copp Clark Pitman, 1985), p. 207.
7. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, Appendix "T", p. 601.
8. Queen's University Archives [QUA], C.G. Power Papers, Box 1, "Political Jottings," Vol. III, C.G. Power to "Pen[dleton]" Power, 27 June 1944. On events in the CWC, see also National Archives of Canada [NAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 26, Papers of Prime Minister W.L.M. King [hereafter King Papers], J4, Vol. 425, Minutes of the Cabinet War Committee [hereafter CWC Minutes], 14, 21, and 28 June 1944.

9. Ibid., 26 July 1944, and NAC, Record Group [RG] 24, Records of the Department of National Defence, Vol. 6921, AHQ Historical Report No. 2, "The Anti-Aircraft Defences of the Pacific Coast," p. 28, and No. 4, "The Anti-Aircraft Defences of the Atlantic Coast," pp. 33-34, and 70.

10. Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence, Ottawa [DHH], File 322.009(D50), "Brigade Groups - Pacific Command - Org & Admin - Sep 43/Sep 44," Pearkes to Major-General H.F.G. Letson, Adjutant-General [AG], 13 May 1944.

11. NAC, MG 27, III, B 11, Papers of J.L. Ralston [Ralston Papers], Vol. 81, "Petawawa Disturbances, 1944: Statement on incident, Court of Inquiry, Documentation for the Court Inquiry, July," draft "Statement - Petawawa Disturbances," for delivery in the House of Commons, 20 July 1944.

12. For example, see Ralston Papers, Vol. 79, "Currie Barracks Disturbances, 1944: Report, Messages, Orders, Clippings, July": "Battle Starts When Zombies Taunt Active Men in Canteen," Ottawa Journal; "Active-draftee Clash Is Reported in Calgary," Montreal Gazette; and "Bayonets Flash When Troops At Calgary Clash," Ottawa Citizen, all 20 July; as well as NAC, RG 24, Vol. 2197, HQ 54-27-63-38, "Disturbances Between G.S. and N.R.M.A. Personnel, A-16 Currie Barracks, Calgary, 18-7-44": "Song Blamed for Trouble," Toronto Globe and Mail, 21 July 1944.

13. Ibid., Lt.-Col. J.O.R. Evans, A[cting]/Commandant, A16 Can. Inf. Training Centre, to Headquarters, M[ilitary]. D[istrict]. 13, 20 July 1944. For another study that argues that the Calgary incident revealed larger tensions at this time, see Dean F. Oliver's, "'My Darlin' Clementine'? Wooing Zombies for \$6.50 a Night: General Service-NRMA Relations in Wartime Calgary," Canadian Military History 7(3), Summer 1998, pp. 46-54.

14. Unless otherwise noted, the story of these events is taken from various reports in NAC, RG 24, Vol. 2197, HQ 54-27-63-38 (particularly the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry that investigated the incident, 27 July 1944), and Oliver, "My Darlin' Clementine," both cited above. In addition, for other comments revealing resentment of "zombies" for having an easier time getting leave and well-paying jobs, see also NAC, RG 24, Vol. 14166, Reel T-12400, War Diary, Headquarters, 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, Appendix XIV, April 1944: Major C.R. Davis, Officer Commanding, 13 Inf.Bde.W[or]ks[h]o[p.], Canadian Electrical [and] Mechanical Engineers, to H.Q., 13 Inf.Bde., 16 April 1944.

15. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 2197, HQ 54-27-63-38, "Salute to a Zombie," forwarded to Adjutant-General by O.J. Waters, Private Secretary to the Minister of National Defence, 18 July 1944.

16. See copies on the following files: Ralston Papers, Vol. 85, "Resignation - Miscellaneous - Caucus Notes, Diary, Memoranda, Speeches, Correspondence, Statement, 'Zombie Prayers'," as well as King Papers, J4, Vol. 365, Microfilm Reel H-1538, "National Resources Mobilization Act."

17. King Papers, J4, Vol. 425, CWC Minutes, 26 August [quoted] and 2 September 1942.

18. DHH, File 322.009(D39), "PCMR, Duncan B.C. - Org & Admin - 13 Mar 44/29 Oct 45," story from the Victoria Times, 13 September, quoted in correspondence, Major H.C. Bray, G.S.O. 2 Intelligence (Security), Pacific Command, to Staff Officer, P.C.M.R. [Pacific Coast Militia Rangers], 25 September 1944. In fact, the latter correspondence was instituted by officers inquiring as to whether charges should be laid against the officer, for speaking to the public against the prohibitions of Army regulations.

19. DHH, File 322.009(D50), Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin, Commander 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, to GOC-in-C, Pacific Command: "Mobilization of 13 Bde on an Active Basis," 2 May 1944, Appendix "A": "Enrolling NRMA. [sic] Personnel for Active Service: 1 Bn. Le Régiment de Hull C.A." [by Lt.Col. L.J. St. Laurent], n.d.

20. Ibid., Macklin report, pp. 11-13 (quotation taken from p. 13). Also Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, Appendix "S", pp. 595-6, and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 206.

21. Ibid., Lt.-Col. L.J. St. Laurent, "Enrolling NRMA. Personnel for Active Service: 1 Bn. Le Régiment de Hull," op.cit.

22. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 15054, War Diary, Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles, 20 May 1944. In addition, see similar comments in Ibid., Vol. 14166, Reel T-12400, War Diary, Headquarters, 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 3 and 8 April; and Vol. 15184, Le Régiment de Joliette, 10 May; as well as Macklin report, Appendix "C," Lt.-Col. J. MacGregor, Officer Commanding, 13 Cdn Inf Bde Transit Camp, to Macklin, 28 April: "Observation of Attitude of (H.D. Personnel) Going Active"; Appendix "D," Lt. W.E. Saunders, O.C. "B" Co[mpan]y., 13 Cdn Inf Bde Transit Camp, to Macklin, 1 May: "Report on N.R.M.A. Personnel"; and Appendix "E," Capt. R.R. Sanger, O.C. "A" Coy., 13 Cdn Inf Bde Transit Camp, 19 April 1944: "Attitude of H.D. Personnel."

23. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 2197, HQ 54-27-63-38, proceedings of Court of Inquiry, 20 July 1944.

24. Hugh McVicar, personal letter to the author, 28 January 1997. For further details on Mr. McVicar and his experiences of the war, see also his article, "'Backdoor to War': A Canadian Infantryman at Hochwald and Xanten, February-March 1945," Canadian Military History 4(2), Autumn 1995, pp. 75-81. Another example of similar attitudes can be found in the case of a French Canadian from Verdun, Quebec, Driver René Bison, who chose to go active only after being called out under the NRMA during 1943, and later stated almost exactly the same thoughts about not having realizing that he was needed. Bison's case is described in an unpublished paper by Serge Durflinger, "The Patriotism of Local Identity: Verdun, Quebec Responds to the Second World War," presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association, 31 May 1996. I am also grateful to the author for sharing with me his recordings of his interview with Bison, to enable me to confirm Bison's views.

25. See NAC, RG 27, Records of the Department of Labour, Vol. 996, File 2-114, "N.W.S. Aliens - Mobilization," pt. 2, Charles J. Christie, Secretary, Municipal District of Stauffer, quoted in letter, L.R. LaFlèche, Associate Deputy Minister, Department of National War Services [DNWS], to J.P. McIsaac, Divisional Registrar "N," DNWS, 20 March, and LaFlèche to Brigadier O.M.M. Kay, Deputy AG, 30 March 1942.

26. With respect to religious faiths, 5 of the remaining 8 men were Greek Orthodox, 1 was from the Church of Latter-Day Saints, and no information was available for 2. Of the 141 NRMA recruits, 5 (3.5%) had been born in Great Britain or Ireland, 17 (12.1%) in Europe, 3 (2.1%) in the United States, and 1 in Syria, and information was again unavailable for 2 men. Among recruits whose parents had not been born in Canada, 26 (18.4%) came from families where one or both had been born in Great Britain or Ireland, 48 (34.0%) in Europe, 5 (3.5%) in the United States, and the same man from Syria, whose parents both came from there, as well as the 2 men for whom information was not available. Statistics in this paragraph have been compiled from DHH, File 161.009(D8), "N.R.M.A. - MD 1 Nov/Dec 1944: Persuasion NRMA," records of interviews and other documents concerning A-29 Canadian Infantry Training Centre, Ipperwash, Ontario, 9-12 May 1944. I am indebted to Dr. Carl Christie, the former Senior Research Officer at the Directorate of History and Heritage, who made this restricted information available to me on condition that it be used only in anonymous aggregate form.

27. Macklin report, op.cit., p. 14.

28. DHH, File 322.009(D50), Pearkes to Letson, AG, 13 May 1944, op.cit.

29. On Canadian involvement in the campaigns of 1944 in north-west Europe, see in general C.P. Stacey, The Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-West Europe, 1944-1945, Vol. III of the Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1960), pp. 3-425; Terry Copp and Robert Vogel, Maple Leaf Route, 5 vols. (Alma, Ontario: Maple Leaf Route, 1983-88); R.H. Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1984); J.L. Granatstein and Desmond Morton, Bloody Victory: Canadians and the D-Day Campaign 1944 (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1984; reprint 1994); Bill McAndrew, Donald E. Graves, and Michael Whitby, Normandy, 1944: The Canadian Summer (Montreal: Éditions Art Global, 1994); and McAndrew, Bill Rawling, and Michael Whitby, Liberation: The Canadians in Europe (Montreal: Éditions Art Global, 1995).

30. In particular, see Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 424-41.

31. Ibid., pp. 425 and 434-35.

32. For a discussion of these issues, see NAC, MG 30, E 537, Papers of Ernest William Sansom [Sansom Papers], Vol. 2, "Report on Survey of Reinforcement Situation - Canadian Army Overseas," 29 March 1945, pp. 2-3.

33. In addition to Stacey's comments on this subject, see also Ralston Papers, Vol. 81, "Recruiting for Overseas, 1944: Camp Vernon, B.C., Pacific Command, April-June," point-form notes by Ralston, n.d. [late April], and "Draft Statement" on recruiting in 13th Brigade, 27 April.

34. Stacey, pp. 437-41, and Sansom Papers, "Report on Survey of Reinforcement Situation," op.cit., pp. 10-11. According to Stacey, pp. 437-38, and the Sansom report, p. 4 and Appendix No. 18, a total of 1,875 other ranks were remustered in late April and early May 1944 in England, although the process only began "in earnest" in mid-August. Ultimately, over 12,500 other ranks were remustered overseas up until January 1945.

35. See Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 433-34, and particularly the letter from Stuart to Lieutenant-General J.C. Murchie, the new CGS in Ottawa, 2 June 1944, quoted on p. 433.

36. The diverting of reinforcements into "ad-hoc" units that were intended to meet immediate needs, but ended up becoming almost permanent elements of the Canadian army overseas, as well as a tendency to keep requesting further "frills" in the way of line-of-communication and other rear-area formations,

was a particular problem during the war - especially in the early years when there were few immediate demands for such men for other purposes. As Lieutenant-General E.W. Sansom noted in his "Report on Survey of Reinforcement Situation," pp. 8-9, the problem of "ad-hoc" units was especially important because these men were calculated as part of the reinforcement stream, despite being unavailable as such. On this issue, see also E.L.M. Burns, Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company, 1956), chapter 5, pp. 62-75.

37. See DHH, File 312.009(D52), "Stuart Corresp File - Personal - rec'd [sic] from General Foulkes, 3 Jan ? [sic]," Ralston to Stuart, 26 March, as well as other correspondence between the two men tracking the issue between January and June 1944. The reference to "alarmist cables" comes from Ibid., Stuart to Ralston, 13 May 1944, and Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 426, who also deals with this whole issue on pp. 424-27.

38. Ralston Papers, Vol. 86, "Resignation - Reinforcement - figures, allocations, overseas situation, candidates bulletin," Letson to Minister, 7 June 1944. Also King Papers, CWC Minutes, 14 June; and Frederick W. Gibson and Barbara Robertson, eds. Ottawa at War: The Grant Dexter Memoranda, 1939-1945 (Winnipeg: Manitoba Record Society, 1994), 22 June 1944, pp. 465-66.

39. Ralston Papers, Vol. 38, "Army Programme 1943-44, General": "Draft Memorandum on Canadian Army Programme 1943-44," by Stuart, 17 January 1943.

40. Ralston Papers, Vol. 39, "Army in Canada, General (Secret)," Stuart to Minister, 30 August 1943. See also King Papers, J4, Vol. 424, CWC Minutes, 31 August 1943.

41. As Ralston put it, "If a man wants to volunteer to go overseas, I would rather have him. If we can get it, I would rather have a volunteer army. If the time comes when it is necessary to do something else, then, as I have said to this house before, as far as I am concerned I shall be ready to make the recommendation." For a copy of this statement, see Ralston Papers, Vol. 45, "Enlistments, General," extract from Hansard, 14 February 1944. Also Dominion of Canada, Official Debates of the House of Commons, Vol. I, 1944 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1944), p. 462.

42. Ralston Papers, Vol. 86, "Resignation - Reinforcement - . . .," unknown author, to Minister, 26 June 1944. Presumably this letter was from Major-General Letson, as it appears in the middle of a series of memoranda from the AG collected by Ralston and placed on this file.

43. Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 23 June 1944, pp. 467-70, and particularly p. 470 for quotation. In addition to all of these statements, Ralston also reportedly replied to criticism within his own Liberal caucus in late June with similar comments that "The N.R.M.A. are potential reinforcements for overseas" (Public Archives of Nova Scotia, MG 2, Angus L. Macdonald Papers, Vol. 1503, Personal Diaries, Folder 392 [hereafter "Macdonald Diaries"], 29 June 1944).

44. On changes within the Conservative Party in particular, and the Saskatchewan election, see J.L. Granatstein, The Politics of Survival: The Conservative Party of Canada, 1939-1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), pp. 113-78; and Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 284 and 335-36; as well as Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 208-9; Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 24 June, pp. 470-73; and DHH, File 312.009(D52), Ralston to Stuart, 25 June 1944.

45. On these developments, see W.L.M. King, The Mackenzie King Diaries, 1932-1949 [Transcript] (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980) [hereafter "King Diaries"], 5, 7-8, 26-29 September, 5-6, 12-13 October; Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 17-25 September and 6 October 1944, pp. 481-85; and Granatstein, Canada's War, pp. 335-36; .

46. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 22-23 September; King Diaries, 6-7, 20, 22-23, and 28-29 September, 5 and 11 October; and Macdonald Diaries, 22 September, and 5 and 11 October 1944. On plans for participation in the war against Japan, see also Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 54-65, and 482-84.

47. For records of King's activities at the conference, along with other developments, see King Diaries, 10-14 September; Macdonald Diaries, 13-14 September; and Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 17, 22, and 25 September 1944, pp. 480-84.

48. King Diaries, 14 September 1944.

49. Macdonald Diaries, 14 September 1944.

50. For example, see Grant Dexter's second-hand account of the speech in Gibson and Robertson, eds., Dexter Memoranda, 22 September 1944, pp. 481-82.

51. Ibid., 25 September 1944, p. 484. On Ralston's meeting with King in Quebec City, see also King Diaries, 15 September, and Macdonald Diaries, 21 September 1944.

52. See King Papers, CWC Minutes, 3 August, and Macdonald Diaries, 3 August 1944, as well as Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 210, and Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 436. On the formation of 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade, see also G.W.L. Nicholson, The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945, Vol. II, of the Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957), pp. 479-81.

53. On Smythe's views, and the origins of his statement, see his own account in Smythe, with Scott Young, If You Can't Beat 'Em in the Alley (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1981), pp. 140, 147, and pp. 160-67, as well as Douglas Hunter, War Games: Conn Smythe and Hockey's Fighting Men (Toronto: Viking, 1996; reprint, Penguin, 1997), pp. 121-40, and Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 440-41.

54. For a good survey of some of the press comments and letters produced on both sides of the debate in late September and early October, see Hunter, War Games, pp. 140-50, and 165-83, as well as King Papers, CWC Minutes, 11 October 1944, which notes that Prime Minister King brought Ontario Premier George Drew's statement on the issue to the attention of his colleagues and "read a telegram which he had despatched to the Minister of National Defence ... suggesting that a public statement on the subject be made by the Minister." This comment is the first sign of any concern on the part of the Prime Minister about the issue.

55. QUA, Grant Dexter Papers, Box 5, File #37, "Correspondence General 1950 Jan-June," memorandum by George S. Currie (Executive Assistant to Ralston and Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence until late September, who returned to help guide Ralston through the crisis), dated 4 November, and sent by Currie to Dexter on 18 January 1950. Also Ibid., Richard S. Malone, confidential memorandum to Dexter, 19 January 1950; Malone, Missing from the Record (Toronto: Wm. Collins and Sons, 1946), pp. 151-53; and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 210-11, who quote Currie's memo mentioned above.

56. On Ralston's trip, see Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 441-42.

57. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 19 October 1944. See also Stuart's official recommendation to Ralston, 19 October 1944, in Ralston Papers, Vol. 57 (unlabelled black binder containing key documents on fall 1944 crisis), and Ralston's own notes of 21 October, in the same source, which were apparently prepared to guide his presentation of the issue to the full Cabinet a few days later. Also Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 443-44; as well as C.G. Power's record of Ralston's activities

following his return, in QUA, Power Papers, Box 12, "Conscription Crisis, November 1944": "Notes" by Power recording events of October-December [hereafter "Power notes"], 18-19 October 1944; and NAC, MG 32, B5, Papers of Brooke Claxton, Vol. 253, "Memoirs, World War II," [hereafter "Claxton Memoirs"], p. 640.

58. King Papers, J4, Vol. 425, draft report of the CWC's meeting of 19 October prepared by Major-General Maurice Pope, who was by then serving as a personal staff officer to Prime Minister King, and Military Secretary to the CWC. For the various arguments advanced by King during the debates, see also King Diaries, 13, 15, 18-19, 24-27, and 30 October; Macdonald Diaries, 19-20, 24, 26-27 October; Power notes, 19 and 26 October; Claxton Memoirs, p. 646; and QUA, Papers of T.A. Crerar, Box 119, "King, W.L.M. ... Jan 1942-Dec 1947[,] July 1963": "Notes for the record on the recent crisis in the Government over reinforcements" [hereafter "Crerar notes"], 26 December 1944, p. 1 and 3.

59. For these counter-arguments, see the same sources cited in the previous note.

60. On King's attempts to get Churchill to provide a statement against the need for conscription, see his Diaries, 21-22 and 25-27 October 1944, and on his approaches to U.S. officials, see Pope, Soldiers and Politicians: The Memoirs of Lt.-Gen. Maurice A. Pope (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), pp. 252-54, and on both subjects see Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 466-67.

61. For example, Angus L. Macdonald, a strong supporter of Ralston and of overseas conscription, agreed with Stuart's casualty estimates after reviewing these and other figures with Stuart, Ralston, and other officers on the night of 26-27 October (see below), defending them in the CWC the next day. At the same time, C.G. Power, who was also present at the meeting and a close colleague of Ralston's but opposed conscription, noted Stuart's strong resistance to even considering the suggestion that First Canadian Army might be withdrawn from operations at least temporarily in the coming weeks. See Macdonald Diaries, 27 October, as well as Power notes, 26 October 1944.

62. Pope's minutes of CWC meeting, 19 October 1944, op.cit. For similar comments, see also King Diaries, 18-19 and 24 October, and Power notes, 19 October 1944.

63. Pope's minutes of CWC meeting, 19 October 1944.

64. Ralston Papers, Vol. 57, black binder on conscription crisis, Murchie to Minister, 23 October 1944.

65. On discussion of Murchie's recommendations, see King Papers, CWC Minutes, 24 October; King Diaries, 24 October; Macdonald Diaries, 24 and 26 October; and Power notes, 24 October 1944.

66. King Diaries, 25 October 1944. As King added the next day, "The different proposals that we put forward, such as beginning a recruiting campaign, paying the N.R.M.A. men for the time they have been in training, etc. are just pushed to one side."

67. Norman Ward, ed., A Party Politician: The Memoirs of Chubby Power (Toronto: Macmillan, 1966), p. 153. For similar comments, see King Diaries, 25 October 1944, and Claxton Memoirs, p. 643.

68. See in particular figures collected by Power, in Power Papers, Box 39, "General Staff Memoranda Notes re War Committee Meetings, October and November 1944": "Approximate Analysis of Strength of General Service Other Ranks --- Canada and Adjacent Territories, 27 Sep 44." On the meeting to review these figures, and their presentation to the CWC the following day, see also Power notes and Macdonald Diaries, both 26-27 October; King Papers, CWC Minutes, and King Diaries, both 27 October 1944; and Crerar notes, p. 2.

69. In addition, see King's own comments on this subject in King Diaries, 25-26 October 1944.

70. On the origins and discussion of the recruiting plan, see King Diaries, 20-21, 24-26, and 30-31 October; Power notes, 20 October; Ralston Papers, Vol. 57, black binder on conscription crisis, Murchie to Minister, and copy of memorandum, A.D.P. Heeney to Prime Minister, both 23 October, as well as notes by Ralston, titled "Timetable," and prepared in connection with the CWC meeting of 26 October; King Papers, CWC Minutes, 24 and 26 October; and Macdonald Diaries, both 24, 26, and 30-31 October; and Claxton Memoirs, p. 651.

71. King Diaries, 26 October 1944. On Ralston's discussion of the 13th Brigade recruiting report, see also Macdonald Diaries, 26 October, and King Papers, J4, Vol. 425, CWC Minutes, 26 October 1944.

72. On Ralston's threats to resign, and particularly King's thoughts on the issue, see King Diaries, 20, 24-28, and 31 October; Power notes, 21-22 October; and Macdonald Diaries, 26 and 31 October 1944.

73. On the events surrounding McNaughton's removal as commander of First Canadian Army, see John Swettenham, McNaughton, Vol. 2, 1939-1943 (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969),

chapter 10, pp. 271-350; Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 231-47; and J.L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War (Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), pp. 53-80.

74. On King's discussions with McNaughton, and the origins of his consideration of placing McNaughton in the Defence portfolio, see King Diaries, 22-23 September, 21, 23-24, 31 October, and 1 November 1944. On McNaughton's Queen's speech, see also Ibid., newspaper clipping, "McNaughton Creed Bars Compulsion," Montreal Gazette, 23 October (following diary entry for 21 October), and on McNaughton's discussions with King, see his own handwritten notes, dated 31 October and 1 November 1944, in MG 30, E 133, Papers of A.G.L. McNaughton, Vol. 267, "McNaughton. A[ppointmen]t. to Cabinet et seq. 2 Nov. 1944," as well as Swettenham, McNaughton, Vol. 3, 1944-1966 (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969), pp. 38-48.

75. Colin Gibson, Minister of National Revenue, as quoted in Macdonald Diaries, 1 November 1944. On the events of that date, see Macdonald's and King's Diaries, as well as Crerar notes, pp. 2-3; Power notes, 12 November; and Claxton Memoirs, pp. 656-59. On the events of the end of October and the first of November more generally, see also Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 453-60; Granatstein, Canada's War, pp. 350-54; and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 218-21.

76. King Diaries, 1 November 1944. See also Macdonald's description of the same discussion, and of his and Ralston's call to Pearkes, in his own diary on the same date, as well as records of the Pearkes conversation in Ralston Papers, Vol. 57, black binder on conscription crisis, "Telephone Conversation Mr. Ralston - General Pearkes, November 1, 1944," and "Notes of Telephone Conversation between Honourable A.L. Macdonald and Major General Pearkes, 2 p.m., November 1/44."

77. Power Papers, Box 39, "General Staff Memoranda... October and November 1944": "Report of Cabinet Committee on Army enlistments for General Service," and memorandum on "Attitude of N.R.M.A. Personnel," both 6 November 1944. Copies of this report can also be found in the papers of most of the key participants in the events of November 1944, including A.G.L. McNaughton, Brooke Claxton, and T.A. Crerar. See in particular various documents recording the work of the committee in McNaughton Papers, Vol. 255, File 892-10, "Gen. (Secret) Recruiting Committee of Cabinet."

78. T.A. Crerar Papers, Box 176, "Military Secrets": "Memorandum Re: Reinforcements for French-Canadian Infantry Regiments now Overseas," by L.R. LaFlèche, 6 November 1944. Also Macdonald Diaries, 7 November 1944.

79. See DHH, File 161.009(D8), op.cit., "Canada's Support of the Army Overseas: Broadcast by Right.Hon. W.L. Mackenzie King, M.P., Prime Minister of Canada, Ottawa, November 8, 1944"; circular letter, AG to GOSC-in-C, Pacific and Atlantic Commands, et.al., 8 November; memorandum entitled "Future Policy N.R.M.A.," 10 November; and telegram, CGS to GOSC-in-C, Atlantic and Pacific Commands..., 11 November 1944; as well as Swettenham, McNaughton, Vol. 3, pp. 50-51; Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 460-63; and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 224-25.

80. For example, as C.G. Power described McNaughton in his Notes, 20 October, "He was convinced that he could break down the core of resistance in the Zombies and get them to enlist. He seemed to be full of vim and vigour..."

81. McNaughton Papers, Vol. 358, "'Reinforcement Crisis' of 1944 ... Made in 1964 + 1966": "The Reinforcement Crisis 1944 (Statement by General A.G.L. McNaughton, 12 February, 1964.)" According to A.L. Macdonald, McNaughton also stated at the height of the conscription crisis, that "he did not think that the volunteer method had been tried with sufficient enthusiasm in the past." (Diaries, 20 November 1944)

82. On these events, see in particular, Swettenham, McNaughton, Vol. 3, pp. 51-54, and Granatstein, Canada's War, pp. 358-59. For a sense of the Legion's views on this issue, see also QUA, Power Papers, Box 78, "Conscription General, Speeches, statements, etc.": "Statement issued by the Dominion Executive Council of the Canadian Legion, B.E.S.L., ... November 6th, 1944, and addressed to the People of Canada."

83. Claxton Memoirs, p. 661. On Claxton's actions and views during the conscription crisis of 1944, see also David Jay Bercuson, True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), pp. 129-32.

84. For an example of such views, see Claxton Papers, Vol. 137, "Conscription - A," Major And.H. Stott, Royal Canadian Artillery, Comd 122nd Fd.Bty., R.C.Arty, to 6 November 1944.

85. On Stuart's resignation (or dismissal), see Swettenham, McNaughton, Vol. 3, p. 50.

86. Reginald H. Roy, For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George R. Pearkes, V.C., through two World Wars (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977), p. 224. Also noted and discussed in Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 225-26; Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 463-64; and Swettenham, McNaughton, Vol. 3, pp. 54-55. On the meetings themselves, see DHH, File 111.21065(D1), "Reinf. situation - Cdn Army, 1944": "Minutes

of a Conference of GOSC and DOSC held in the Defence Council Chambers at 0900 hrs, 14 Nov 44"; "Minutes of Afternoon Meeting of GOSC-in-C & DOSC held...14 Nov 44"; Macdonald Diaries, 14-16 November; and McNaughton Papers, Vol. 270-1, House of Commons, #4, "D.Os.C. Conference - Press Statement, November 15, 1944": "Outline of Address to DOSC and GOSC by Minister," and attached documents, n.d. [13-14 November 1944].

87. For a copy of the document, see Ibid., press release, 16 November 1944. On the larger events surrounding the press release, see also Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 464-65; Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 226; and Roy, Pearkes, p. 225.

88. Roy, Pearkes, pp. 225-27; Swettenham, McNaughton, Vol. 3, pp. 55-56; Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 468-69; and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 226.

89. Roy, Pearkes, p. 228; Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 470; and Swettenham, McNaughton, Vol. 3, p. 59.

90. DHH, File 111.21065(D1), CGS to Minister, 22 November 1944. Also Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 226; Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 470-71; and Swettenham, McNaughton, Vol. 3, pp. 59-60.

91. QUA, Power Papers, Box 8, "Ralston, Stuart," Stuart Ralston to Power, 6 August 1952.

92. DHH, File 161.009(D8), Earnshaw to All Commanding Officers (Active Force Units), 17 November 1944.

93. Ibid., Colonel R. Bland Crouch, Commandant, S-5 Canadian Driving and Maintenance School [advanced training centre], Woodstock, to Headquarters, Military District [MD] No. 1, 17 November 1944.

94. Ibid., Major W.E. Weekes, Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps, Officer Commanding Woodstock Military Hospital, to District Officer Commanding, MD No. 1, 20 November 1944. For further examples, see other correspondence from commanders of local units on this file, dated 17-23 November 1944.

95. Dawson, The Conscription Crisis of 1944, p. 78. Some views of these numbers were more optimistic. For example, see Brooke Claxton's comments in his Memoirs, p. 652.

96. A succinct view of Howe's position on conscription in particular appears in C.G. Power's notes, 21 November 1944: "Howe said he was willing to support any stand Conscription or no Conscription, but for God's sake let us make up our minds." See also Robert Bothwell and William Kilbourn, C.D. Howe: a

biography (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979), and particularly pp. 165-8 and 191, which are the only references to the issue in the entire biography, and where the authors note that Howe in fact paid very little attention to this issue throughout the war.

97. See T.A. Crerar Papers, Box 119, "King, Hon. W.L.M.... Jan 1942-Dec 1947[,] July 1963," Crerar to King, 3 November; King to Crerar, 10 November; Crerar to King, 17 November; King to Crerar, 18 November; and Crerar to King, 20 November; as well as Crerar Notes, p. 3; and Macdonald Diaries and Power Notes, both 13 November 1944. On Crerar's views more generally during this period, see also J.E. Rea, T.A. Crerar: A Political Life (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997), pp. 226-30.

98. For instance, see Macdonald's comments in particular, who noted in his Diaries for 20 November 1944 that even McNaughton and St. Laurent were beginning to soften on the issue of preventing conscription in any circumstances. McNaughton was reported as saying that "He thought he should have two weeks more for his appeal. He said that as a soldier, he had an alternative plan in mind. By this I took him to mean that if the appeal failed, he would resort to conscription. He said, "I have put things entrain [sic], so that [if] these men have to be moved, they can be moved more quickly than they could have been moved on November 2." In addition, St. Laurent was reported as saying that "he thought that the position was better now than it was on November 2. At that time the talk of a shortage of reinforcements came as a great surprise, but now the feeling might be different. Up to this point he seemed to be more or less accepting the idea that conscription would have to come. Later, however, he seemed to veer away." Also Power Notes, 20-21 November, and Crerar Notes, p. 4.

99. On the events of 22 November, see King Diaries (source of quotation), Macdonald Diaries, and Power Notes, all for that date, as well as Crerar Notes, pp. 5-6, and more generally Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 226-31; Granatstein, Canada's War, pp. 362-70; and Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 469-73.

100. King Diaries, 22 November 1944.

CONCLUSION

On 23 November 1944, the federal Cabinet passed Order-in-Council P.C. 8891, authorizing it to send 16,000 Canadian conscripts overseas for service in "the United Kingdom and/or ... European and/or Mediterranean operational theatres."¹ Over the next few weeks, the sense of political crisis in Ottawa declined. The Liberal government survived the vote in the House of Commons approving its Order in the early morning hours of 8 December, and managed to maintain the support of most of its members. At the end of the month the Quebec legislature passed a motion protesting the measure, but for the most part the political crisis was quickly forgotten amidst renewed interest in postwar planning and demobilization, and plans for a federal election as soon as the fighting ended in Europe.²

Yet the history of the National Resources Mobilization Act did not end with the decision to send Canadian conscripts overseas in November 1944. In fact, for the next few days the sense of military crisis was stronger than ever. In British Columbia, where most of the trained NRMA men were found, news of the government's change in policy reached them by radio before their officers. The result was a series of disturbances. The most serious case came in Terrace, B.C.,

when a sit-down strike by two companies of the *Fusiliers du St. Laurent* led to larger protests by most of the men in the camp. For several days, NRMA recruits refused to appear on parade or obey orders from their officers, and some broke into storerooms and seized ammunition and weapons, including Bren light machine guns and Sten sub-machine guns. Technically, the men were in a state of mutiny, and for a few days the situation was taken very seriously by political and military authorities. The problems were aggravated by the fact that most of the senior officers were away from the camp, dealing with the repercussions of the 20 November conference in Vancouver, discussed in chapter five, where their comments about recruiting from the NRMA had helped to push the federal government towards invoking conscription for overseas service. On 23 November, Major-General Pearkes had recalled the officers to Vancouver again, after Ottawa ordered him to conduct a full investigation and report on the comments.³

At the same time, rumours of men mounting anti-aircraft guns and machine guns around the camp turned out to be much exaggerated, and NRMA men continued to carry out fatigues and other duties throughout the "mutiny" in Terrace. Canteens and recreational facilities remained open, and men viewed movies and played sports much as they had always done. According to the officers present, most of the men insisted that they did not want to be ordered overseas, in contrast to the statements of their commanders to the press in Vancouver a few days

earlier. The comments also suggested a different view from that which military authorities had been concluding for a number of years about the majority of the NRMA. On Saturday 25 November, a large group of men paraded through the camp in Terrace, bearing banners with slogans such as "Down With Conscription," and "Zombies Strike Back" (see photos on following pages). As one high-ranking officer described the parade, providing a sense of both the order maintained among the men, and the "unreal" character of the situation:

as they passed me a portion of the parade paid their compliments, which I returned and told them as they passed that they were marching damn badly. This parade reminded me rather of an overgrown lot of school boys who had just told the teacher to jump in the lake and she had done it.⁴

Two days later another large group of men marched through Terrace itself. The disturbance was clearly a serious breach of military discipline, and in a few cases loaded weapons were openly displayed. Once or twice, men even allegedly pointed their rifles at officers attempting to enter their huts, and threatened violence.⁵ In addition, when the Prince Albert Volunteers (an ironic name for a unit composed almost entirely of NRMA men) attempted to leave the camp to begin moving overseas on 28 November, all but one small group were stopped from reaching the outgoing train by men from other units. Armed guards had to be posted along the rail line after a few of the latter soldiers threatened to stop the train using force.⁶ With most units in Terrace numbering as few as six volunteers among their entire other rank personnel, there was



Current and following page: photographs taken during the "mutiny" of NRMA units at Terrace, British Columbia, in December 1944. The numbers appearing in some of the photographs were used to attempt to identify some of the men involved in the disturbance, although most had already left for Europe before authorities could investigate and prosecute offenders. (Source: National Archives of Canada, Record Group 24, Vol. 2654, File HQS 3545, vol. 5 [documents from the investigation into the disturbances at Terrace, December 1944].)



little that officers could do except read the relevant sections of the Army regulations to their men, and work on a more personal level to convince them to stop their activities. At the same time, it should be noted that at least one group of twenty-one men volunteered to go active during the Terrace "mutiny" in protest at their comrades' actions, indicating that the events were not supported by everyone. Eventually, the protest petered out, and by 30 November everyone was back on parade, with almost all stolen ammunition and weapons returned to the camp's stores. Within a few days the first units of 15th Brigade began leaving Terrace, on the first stage of their eventual journey overseas.⁷

The Terrace mutiny was not the only protest among NRMA men to break into the open in British Columbia in 1944. In Vernon an unrecorded number of men from the 16th Canadian Infantry Brigade paraded through the streets of the city on the evening of 24 November, followed four days later by another group of about seventy-five soldiers, who "dispersed after cat calling and shouting."⁸ In Nanaimo, about 130 NRMA men marched through the city on 26 November, and the next day "384 men mainly from the 25th LAA Bty [Light Anti-Aircraft Battery] RCA" marched through the city of Prince George, reportedly carrying placards bearing slogans such as "Win the War in Ottawa Before the War in Berlin," "Conscript Wealth and Industry," and "Down With the Legion - This is Just the Beginning."⁹ Further demonstrations were recorded in

Courtenay, Chilliwack, and Port Alberni.¹⁰ But in every case the disturbances died down relatively quickly, and by early December units were preparing for their moves overseas.¹¹ By January, every available trained NRMA infantryman had been stripped from Pacific Command for overseas service, and a large-scale policy of remustering had been introduced for many of the rest.¹²

At the same time, preparations were also going on in Ottawa to begin shipping NRMA men from Canada. Instructions were issued that permitted NRMA soldiers to continue to volunteer for general service even after the extension of conscription to overseas service, and many did so during November and December, some even on board ship as they sailed for England. Another 7,800 out of the 16,000 men ordered overseas chose a contrary option, going absent without leave as their units moved from British Columbia to Halifax. These absences occurred mostly while the men were on the standard embarkation leave that was offered to all soldiers before they left Canada. By the end of March 1945, 4,000 of these men remained unaccounted for. In addition, the first group of "zombies" to proceed overseas included one NRMA recruit who threw his rifle overboard while waiting to sail from Halifax harbour, and several other men who attempted to organize a "'sit-down' strike" to prevent their embarkation. The first event led to several charges of poor discipline during A.G.L. McNaughton's campaign for a seat in the House of Commons in

early 1945 (see below), although when it was investigated the lone man involved turned out to be mentally unstable. Fortunately for the government, the aborted strike did not attract as much notice.¹³

Once the NRMA men arrived in Europe, their officers' main concern was to make sure that they entered combat as quickly and efficiently as possible. Commanders in London and on the continent both agreed that the best way to deal with the new recruits would be to break them up and place them in the reinforcement stream as individuals, with the goal of mixing them throughout the Army, rather than identifying them separately as groups of conscripts. In addition, as Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin, who knew the NRMA men well and was now serving as Deputy Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) in London, noted in a report in early December, the Army could at least be sure that most of the NRMA men would be relatively well-trained. In fact, he noted, many would probably be above the standard of some of the soldiers that had been produced by the rapid remustering program in England of September and October.¹⁴ Although it would be difficult to disguise fully the identity of NRMA recruits, authorities tried to ensure that they received the same uniforms, badges, and treatment as other soldiers. The result was that, in the words of Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar, now the commander of First Canadian Army, conscripts would "stand, or fall, in the eyes of the ranks now here, on how they prove themselves

as soldiers."¹⁵

Unfortunately, there is very little evidence with which to assess the performance of Canadian conscripts in combat operations. As the Chief of Staff of CMHQ, Lieutenant-General P.J. Montague, informed Crerar when conscripts first began arriving in January, one of his staff officers had seen the men and "was well pleased with their appearance and general attitude which seemed cooperative."¹⁶ When the Inspector-General of the Canadian Army, Lieutenant-General E.W. Sansom, spoke to reporters a month later, he told the story of a group of NRMA recruits at one Canadian training camp in England, who had been "reported by the stationmaster as having left the cleanest Cdn [sic] troop train ever to have come into his station."¹⁷ More importantly, according to one brief survey of the attitudes of unit commanders in all three Canadian divisions in Europe in early March 1945, NRMA men proved to be the equals of volunteers in a number of categories, including their general attitudes, their standard of training, their fighting ability, and their morale. As the author of the summary noted with respect to 4th Canadian Armoured Division, "Up until the query, unit COs were not aware that any NRMA personnel had been posted to their units."¹⁸ In the end, a total of 9,667 NRMA men reached the front as conscripts, two-thirds after the end of hostilities in Europe in early May. Of that number, 2,463 saw duty in operational units, 69 were killed, 232 wounded, and 13 taken prisoner.¹⁹ Meanwhile, as

Lieutenant-General Montague informed the CGS in Ottawa in early April, the number of infantry reinforcements available to Canadian units in north-west Europe was "now stronger than at any time since D-Day."²⁰ Thus, the NRMA seemed to have accomplished at least one of the goals of the Army's administration of the program throughout the war, by creating a force of well-trained, competent soldiers that could conduct themselves well in combat.

Still, as soon as it became clear that the war in Europe was almost over, federal politicians were eager to end a program that remained unpopular among many Canadians. In mid-March 1945, when the last of the original 16,000 NRMA soldiers had gone overseas, McNaughton recommended that the Cabinet War Committee send general service soldiers instead of NRMA men to add to the current reinforcement pool, a policy that was now possible thanks to the earlier use of the NRMA, and resulting improvements in the balance of G.S. recruits, as well as some delays in the retraining of conscripts. Seven weeks later, even before the fighting had officially ended in Europe, the CWC temporarily suspended the calling up of further men under the NRMA. The decision was confirmed on 8 May.²¹

At the same time, proceedings against deserters and defaulters under the NRMA continued after hostilities ended in Europe. In the view of several senior officials, apprehending and prosecuting offenders for violating such serious aspects of the country's laws as conscription should not stop simply

because of the end of the fighting, and enforcement in fact went on well into 1946.²² At the same time, staffs in the Department of Labour continued to track down and remove men from their lists who did not really deserve to be there. As was noted in chapter four, by June 1946 the number of delinquents had been reduced to less than 7,000, and at the same date the numbers of NRMA deserters and defaulters stood at 7,225. By mid-1946, officials began to realize the futility of trying to track down every offender, and as the immediacy of the war faded authorities began to consider forgiving all men who remained at large for their crimes. On 14 August 1946, all existing civilian and military regulations under the NRMA were revoked, and a general amnesty proclaimed for all offenders who remained at large as of 11:00 a.m. the next day.²³ Authorities were also advised to reconsider the sentences of all men who had been captured and were already imprisoned for similar violations, although in at least one case officials refused to pardon offenders who had willingly and repeatedly flaunted the mobilization laws during the war.²⁴ For most Canadians, however, the NRMA soon passed into history.

Politically, the fallout from the administration of the NRMA, and particularly the crisis of October and November 1944, was even more significant over the last few months of the Second World War. For the generals who had harboured such great hopes of creating a large, professional Army during the

war, and who hoped that their views on military matters would be welcomed and even sought after by their government in the years after 1945, the result was the exact opposite. The Army emerged from the crisis with even less standing in the eyes of the country's civilian leaders, and especially its Prime Minister, than the small amount that it had possessed before 1939. Even A.G.L. McNaughton, a former general and a colleague of Major-General Pearkes, was so annoyed with the statements made by Pearkes and his officers in Vancouver on 20 November 1944 that he sent the Inspector-General of the Army, Lieutenant-General E.W. Sansom, to the west coast to conduct an official inquiry into the events. Although the investigation exonerated Pearkes, it was clear that he was now even less trusted in the eyes of his political superiors than he had been earlier.²⁵ A few weeks later, Sansom was off to Europe to investigate the origins of the 1944 crisis there, again on behalf of McNaughton.²⁶ In early November, Lieutenant-General Stuart had also resigned his post, if not in disgrace, then certainly with the suspicions of many members of the wartime Cabinet hanging over his head.

In late December, meanwhile, Pearkes got himself into more trouble, when he chose to unburden himself to the Chief of the General Staff over the policies that he had been asked to pursue in recruiting general service recruits among the NRMA during the war. His statements were so forceful that the Department of National Defence (DND) considered prosecuting

him for violating Army regulations by challenging the orders of his superiors. Wisely, perhaps, legal experts in the Department of Justice recommended against doing so. It is not clear who precisely within DND initiated the investigation, but the result was that Pearkes finally resigned his commission in disgust in February 1945, and entered politics soon after as a Conservative. These actions were certainly not calculated to dispel any of the doubts that some Liberals had expressed about him in 1944.²⁷

At a higher level, for A.G.L. McNaughton the result was a very brief political career. In early 1945, McNaughton ran for a seat in the House of Commons in a by-election in the rural Ontario riding of Grey North. Angry at his role in the conscription debates of November 1944, and that he had turned down an offer to enter politics on the side of the Progressive Conservatives, members of that party campaigned vigorously against him. During the campaign, McNaughton's opponents combined personal attacks on him for the Roman Catholic heritage of his wife, with various administrative blunders in the enforcement of conscription since it had been extended to overseas service in November. As a result of these and other factors, McNaughton was defeated in Grey North on 5 February. Four months later, he also failed to gain a seat in his home-town riding of Qu'Appelle, Saskatchewan.²⁸ The result was unfortunate, since despite his subordinates' opposition to his policies in November 1944, his accession to the portfolio of

Minister of National Defence had marked the first time that such a high-ranking and previously well-liked military leader had ever held the post. Had McNaughton been able to retain his position, it is possible that he might have been able to preserve some of the larger status that the Army had managed to gain in political councils during the first half of the war, while at the same time tempering some of its insistent demands for resources beyond the willingness or the perceived capacity of the government to provide to military commanders that later proved to be a factor in the early postwar period.

Instead, Brooke Claxton found his way into the Department of National Defence in December 1946. Although he proved to be a strong, dedicated, and long-serving advocate for all three services, his party's political priorities came first, and particularly that of cutting the budget of the Department of National Defence.²⁹ The result was a loss of influence once again for the Army. In the first two years after the end of the war, the country's ground forces were reduced from a total of almost 500,000 men and women, five divisions, an Army headquarters, and numerous other formations and ancillary troops, to a total of roughly 16,000, with one brigade of field troops, which was not even permitted to recruit to full strength.³⁰ Given the traditional peacetime apathy of Canadians for military affairs, it is highly unlikely that the Canadian Army would have numbered anything close to its wartime strength after 1945, even without the image problems

that it had faced in the later years of the war. But its wartime difficulties undermined the hopes of H.D.G. Crerar and some of his later successors for an Army that would at least have a successful tradition of representing the country abroad by the end of the conflict, while avoiding the kinds of controversies over conscription that had done so much to hurt its standing after the First World War. As Lieutenant-General Kenneth Stuart had put it in recommending a reduced but still sizeable and stable home defence force for Canada in mid-1943,

In my opinion the present framework and general composition of the operational troops is one that we should have had before the war. It is now answering our purpose admirably. I sincerely hope that it will be retained after the war.³¹

Unfortunately, this would not be what happened.

Considering the degree to which manpower problems had thrust the Canadian Army into trouble yet again during the Second World War, what is even more surprising is that it did not seem to have learned any lessons from its experiences. Senior officers began advocating conscription for the postwar Army only two months after the end of hostilities in Europe, and long before the heightened tensions of late 1944 had been given an opportunity to die down. As J.L. Granatstein has noted, they continued to do so until well into the 1950s.³² Given the divisions to which conscription seemed to have led the country during the Second World War, meanwhile, it is not surprising that most Canadians just wanted to forget about the issue, and that it died a quick death at the political level.

For those 150,000 men who had actually experienced the impact of conscription, the result was probably even less support for the idea of applying a similar policy to other men in the future. Thus, despite some of the positive impacts that the NRMA had had in helping to organize and maintain larger, more effective, and professional military forces, it was quickly forgotten after the war.

Forgotten also were the impacts that the NRMA had had on relations between English and French Canadians beyond the divisions and debate that took place at the level of political affairs. For those French-Canadians who had served in the Army during the Second World War, the NRMA had ironically offered a number of new opportunities to command troops and deal with men in their own language, and brought many men into contact with citizens from other parts of Canada. It also brought English Canadians, both soldiers and civilians, into contact with French-speaking soldiers. The NRMA had forced the Army to deal with the issue of finding a place for French-speaking officers and men. In the fever created by the larger divisions that had opened up at the political level during the war, however, and with the general desire to forget conscription after the war, these lessons and experiences were also soon forgotten. They would have to be learned all over again, when the changes of the 1960s brought the federal government to introduce the policy of "bilingualism and biculturalism" that has helped to make the armed forces much

more open to francophones in more recent times.

In fact, the impacts of conscription and the NRMA were largely forgotten in almost every way after the Second World War. For almost five full years, the country had been mobilized to an extent that no Canadian has ever known, before or since. Dozens of training centres and military camps were spread across the country, from coast to coast. Over one million men and women served in the armed forces, of whom over 150,000 did so as conscripts at one point or another during the war. More felt the impact of the NRMA in helping to nudge them towards deciding to volunteer for military service, and in the vast administrative machinery and civilian controls that were established by 1945 to regulate almost every aspect of the workplace in Canada. Some citizens even spent parts of the war running from civilian authorities, hiding for months or even years with families or friends, criminals not for an act that they had committed, but for something that they had refused to do.

After the war, most Canadians returned to their traditional disinterest in military affairs. Their lack of concern was probably helped along by memories of the divisiveness that conscription had engendered, and as a result, at the public level we have almost completely lost sight of the huge scale and degree to which our usually peaceful Canadian society was mobilized to contribute to the war effort between 1939 and 1945. As this thesis hopefully

reminds readers, these contributions were both voluntary and compulsory, and reached down to every city, town, and even individual across the country, male and female.

More importantly, for most historians, and for military historians in particular, it is often difficult to avoid forgetting the individuals who peopled the past that we write about. The tendency is even more likely when studying the NRMA, which can only be understood by exploring the massive bureaucratic and administrative structures that were set up to ensure its effective operation during the war. It is hoped that this thesis helps to regain some knowledge of the impact that the war had on individual conscripts, how they spent their months and sometimes years in service, and the many personal questions and struggles that they had to face throughout their time in uniform. In doing so, it may also remind us of the impact of the NRMA on the larger families and friends of these 157,841 individuals, and the countless more families that were affected by the operation of the NRMA, on both a military and a civilian level during the war.

Lastly, and most importantly, by studying the way that the NRMA was organized and administered this thesis offers a new and important perspective on the larger political and military developments that took place in Canada during the Second World War. As we have seen, the choices that the Army made in creating the NRMA, and later in fitting it more fully into their own needs and purposes, significantly shaped the

debates that took place on the issue of conscription. H.D.G. Crerar in particular sensed the many promises of the NRMA, not only for creating the largest possible and most efficient forces with which to fight the war, while remaining in accordance with government policies against conscription for overseas service, but also for building up a large, professional force that could play a greater role in postwar affairs in Canada. The result was the "big army" of 1941 and 1942. During the debates over the creation of the "big army," both sides accepted Crerar's recommendations, largely because of the hope that the NRMA offered that it could meet the demands of the Army (and much of the Canadian public) for larger ground forces, while not having to force an open break within the Cabinet over other manpower priorities, or conscription for overseas service. Several ministers realized the possible implications of increasing the size of the Army, not least among them J.L. Ralston, who demanded that the government decide in advance what it would do in the event that conscription did become "necessary." Thanks to the assurances of Crerar, however, and his successor, Ken Stuart, and despite the implications of the "big army" for political events throughout the first half of 1942, Prime Minister King was able to keep the issue at the level of hypothetical debate, and thus avoid making the actual military decision to extend conscription beyond North America until late 1944.

The problem was that after the "big army" was accepted,

the war against Japan came to exercise a more and more important influence over military policy. Army planners again came to rely on the NRMA to meet the government's new demands for home defence forces, and refused to allow it to interrupt the approved expansion of the overseas Army. The result was that the demands made on Canadian manpower by the NRMA increased enormously, and much of the next two years were spent trying to find the men needed to meet all of the Army's commitments. These efforts also led to heightened tensions between Ralston and several of his colleagues in the Cabinet War Committee, which certainly did not help him in the early days of the "second conscription crisis" of October-November 1944, when the need for conscription for overseas service became a real rather than a hypothetical problem. By exhausting both its own manpower reserves and those of the country at large in earlier years, the Army ensured that there would be few alternatives by November 1944 but to send overseas the only remaining reserves that were left: its NRMA men. By that time, thanks to the degree to which it had organized compulsory military training around pressuring NRMA men to volunteer for overseas service, the Army had also made it certain that few of these remaining men would go voluntarily. The result was frustration and tension on both sides in late 1944, when opponents of conscription failed to fully understand these aspects of the situation.

The consequence of these divisions was Prime Minister

King's private charges that key generals had been actively plotting against him to ensure overseas conscription. While most historians have rejected the idea of open collusion on the part of the Army to force its desires on the government, they have emphasized the degree to which commanders demanded larger forces in the early years of the war, and frustrated efforts to find another solution when the final crisis came in 1944. As this thesis reminds us, at the practical level decision-making is a much more complex matter, especially in wartime when the influence of the military is increased, and that of politicians is decreased. It also involves an intricate web of motivations, attitudes, and personalities that come together to help shape events. When ministers failed to realize the urgency of the situation and the lack of other options available, their generals felt themselves to be forced to resort to the strongest means available to them to make their superiors aware of the problem, with the result that one senior general resigned and several others were on the verge of resigning by late November. While this may not have been to the liking of Prime Minister King, it was in fact a less "political" action than it would have been for them to remain behind and attempt to follow policies that they could not in good conscience press to the fullest of their ability.

At the same time, the generals involved in administering the NRMA do not remain blameless. As we have seen, the personal and professional ambitions of H.D.G. Crerar and other

uniformed members of the Department of National Defence had much to do with shaping the NRMA, especially before 1942, and the debates that took place as a result. In the summer of 1944, when difficulties emerged with respect to overseas reinforcements, Lieutenant-General Stuart's duty was to ensure that his Minister and the government were fully aware of his decisions and their implications, no matter how likely it seemed to him that the situation could be solved through his own actions. The behaviour of Major-General Pearkes and other commanders during the Cabinet crisis of October and November reveals the complexities of attempting to put conflicting policies into practice during the war, but they also suggest that these men were beginning to allow their frustrations to become public, something that officers are forbidden to do in most circumstances. At the same time, as a review of these issues and the history of the NRMA makes clear, the actions of senior officers in 1944 were not nearly as simple a question of right and wrong as previous authors have suggested.

Endnotes

1. For a copy of this Order-in-Council, see Directorate of History and Heritage, Department of National Defence, Ottawa [DHH], File 112.3S2009(D326), "Reinforcements - Cdn Army, d/15 Mar 42/19 Jun 45."

2. J.L. Granatstein and J.M. Hitsman, Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1977; reprint, Copp Clark Pitman, 1985), pp. 234-38, and Granatstein, Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 370-402.

3. On the events noted in this and the following chapter, see DHH, File 341.PR009(D27), Court of enquiry into disturbance or riot by NRMA at Terrace, BC - Dec 44," and particularly the proceedings of the court of inquiry into the disturbances, 7 December 1944; Ibid., File 746.009(D8), "PA Vol[unteer]s reports on disturbances by NRMA at Terrace, d/Nov 45"; as well as Reginald H. Roy, "From the Darker Side of Canadian Military History: Mutiny in the Mountains - The Terrace Incident," Canadian Defence Quarterly 6(2), Autumn 1976, pp. 42-55; Roy, For Most Conspicuous Bravery: A Biography of Major-General George R. Pearkes, V.C., through two World Wars (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1977), pp. 229-33; Daniel German, "Press Censorship and the Terrace Mutiny: A Case Study in Second World War Information Management," Journal of Canadian Studies 31(4), Winter 1996-97, pp. 124-42; and Peter A. Russell, "BC's 1944 'Zombie' Protests Against Overseas Conscription," BC Studies, No. 122, Summer 1999, pp. 49-76.

4. DHH, File 341.PR009(D27), proceedings of court of inquiry on Terrace disturbances: testimony of Lt.-Col. W.B. Hendrie, CO [Commanding Officer] Mtn Warfare School, Terrace, B.C.

5. DHH, File 746.009(D8), Lt.Col. M.D. Robertson, Commanding Officer, Force Polar Bear, to Headquarters, Pacific Command, 21 December, forwarding "Report on recent disturbance Terrace Military Camp," 20 December 1944: statement by Acting Captain G.A. Anthony, 2 1/c [second in command], "C" Company, Prince Albert Volunteers, who had been Acting Company Commander of the same company during the disturbances in late November.

6. On the posting of an armed guard on the rail line, see DHH, File 341.PR009(D53), "Sitreps on Terrace incident by NRMA in Nov 44," Capt. G.W. Burrell[?], for Lt-Col G.F. Paulin, Officer Commanding, Prince Rupert Defences, to GSO [General Staff Officer] I Ops, GSO 2 Int (Security), and Off[ice]r i/c Adm[inistration], Pacific Command, 29 November 1944.

7. In addition to the sources cited in the previous note, on these events see also NAC [National Archives of Canada], RG [Record Group] 24, Records of the Department of National Defence, Vol. 14172, Microfilm Reel T-12405, War Diary, Headquarters, 15th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 24-30 November 1944, and Appendix I, "Special Brigade Orders," by Brigadier A.R. Roy, Comd 15 Cdn Inf Bde, 28 November 1944, which contains a copy of the army regulations read to the troops; as well as Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 231-34; and C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), pp. 474-78. On 15th Brigade's move overseas, see also entries in its headquarters War Diary for 3 December 1944 to 19 January 1945.

8. NAC, RG 24, Vol. 14173, Reel T-12406, War Diary, Headquarters, 16th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 24-25 November, and particularly 28 November 1944.

9. NAC, RG 24, War Diaries, Vol. 14169, Reel T-12403, Headquarters, 14th Canadian Infantry Brigade, 26 November, and Vol. 13803, Reel T-10561, Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General, 6th Canadian Division, 27 November 1944.

10. Roy, Pearkes, p. 230.

11. For example, see descriptions of various activities in War Diaries, 14th and 16th Brigades, op.cit., 30 November 1944 to 11 January 1945, and 13-20 December 1944.

12. For the movement order listing units and formations to be sent overseas, see DHH, File 112.3S2009(D326), op.cit., CGS [Chief of the General Staff], to AG [Adjutant-General], QMG [Quartermaster General], and MGO [Master General of the Ordnance], 25 November 1944.

13. For figures on the NRMA, and the description of the rifle being thrown overboard, see Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, p. 479. For a few further statistics with respect to the NRMA overseas, see also National Archives of Canada [NAC], Manuscript Group [MG] 27, III, B11, Papers of J.L. Ralston [Ralston Papers], Vol. 86, "Resignation - Reinforcement - figures, allocations, overseas situation, candidates bulletin": "Memo re N.R.M.A. Men," 20 February 1945; and on the sit-down strike, see NAC, MG 26, Papers of Prime Minister W.L.M. King [King Papers], J4, Vol. 425, Minutes of the Cabinet War Committee [CWC Minutes], 8 January, as well as minutes for the same day and those for 24 January and 7 and 21 February 1945, for further discussion of NRMA men absent without leave or having deserted before going overseas.

14. NAC, MG 30, E157, Papers of General H.D.G. Crerar [hereafter Crerar Papers], Vol. 5, File 958C.009(D129), "GOC-in-C file 6-2. Reinforcements; French-Cdn Reinforcements; Reinforcement Programme; NRMA Reinforcements. Period 5 Apr 44 to 24 Jun 45," Macklin to Chief of Staff, Canadian Military Headquarters [CMHQ], 1 December 1944.

15. Ibid., Crerar to Lieutenant-General P.J. Montague, Chief of Staff, CMHQ, 11 December 1944. On the treatment of NRMA men overseas, see also the following correspondence on the same file: Crerar to Chief of Staff, 1 December; Montague to Crerar, 5 December 1944; and comments by Lieutenant-General E.W. Sansom to Canadian reporters, as described in telegram, Sansom to A.G.L. McNaughton ("Canmilitary" to "Defensor"), 21 February 1945. Also NAC, MG 26, Papers of W.L.M. King [hereafter King Papers], J4, Vol. 425, Minutes of the Cabinet

War Committee [CWC Minutes], 22 December 1944.

16. Ibid., telegram, Montague to Crerar ("Canmilitary" to "HQ First Cdn Army"), 12 January 1945.

17. Ibid., Sansom to McNaughton, op.cit., 21 February 1945.

18. Ibid., untitled table attached as Appendix "A" to correspondence, General Officer Commanding, 2nd Cdn Corps, to First Canadian Army, 9 March 1945.

19. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 481-82, and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, p. 234.

20. Ibid., telegram, Montague to Lieutenant-General J.C. Murchie, CGS ("Canmilitary" to "Defensor"), 4 April 1945.

21. King Papers, CWC Minutes, 14 March, 1 and 8 May 1945.

22. See in particular King Papers, CWC Minutes, 14 and 22 March 1945, as well as NAC, Record Group [RG] 27, Records of the Department of Labour, Vol. 3055, File 21-3-12, "National Selective Service (Mobilization). Enforcement. Check Up and Prosecution of Delinquents after Cessation of Hostilities," Raymond Ranger, Acting Associate Director, N.S.S. (Mobilization), to Arthur MacNamara, Deputy Minister [DM] of Labour, 5 May 1945; copies of letters by MacNamara to Vice Adjutant-General, Minister of National Defence, Commissioner, RCMP, and Minister of Justice, all 9 May 1945; similar letters to all Chairmen, Divisional Registrars, and Regional Directors of NSS, same date; replies from same, 11-28 May; MacNamara to Ranger, 9 May; W.L. Clow to M.W. Wright, "A Summary of Replies from Registrars, etc., . . .," 20 July 1945; Ranger to MacNamara, 9 August and 15 December; and MacNamara to Ranger, 19 December 1945.

23. On the revoking of the NRMA regulations, see NAC, RG 27, File 21-3-12, "Extract of Minutes of Meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee, held on Wednesday, July 24th, 1946"; Ranger to MacNamara, 29 July; J.R. Baldwin, Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, to Humphrey Mitchell, Minister of Labour, 1 August; MacNamara to F.P. Varcoe, DM, Department of Justice, 9 August; copy of circular letter, Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin, Acting Adjutant-General [AG], to "Mailing List 'A'" [Department of National Defence], 12 August; copy of Order-in-Council, P.C. 3264, 14 August; and copy of circular telegram, AG, Department of National Defence, to Commander Northwest Highway System, General Officers Commanding Western, Prairie, Central, Quebec, and Eastern Command, 14 August 1946; as well as NAC, RG 13, Records of the Department of Justice, Vol. 2122, File 151133, "Labour. National Registration Regulations, 1940 and the National Selective Service Mobilization

Regulations, 1944. Revocation of Regulations. Draft Report to Council, August 13, 1946," W.R.J[ackett]., "Memorandum for the Deputy Minister," 10 August, and draft Order-in-Council, 10 August 1946. In addition, for further information on the voluminous amount of work that was necessary to consolidate or revoke various wartime regulations more generally, including those in connection with the NRMA, see also Ibid., Vols. 2119-21, Files 149885-1 to 149885-26, "Committee to Review Orders in Council passed under the War Measures Act" [organized by Department].

24. NAC, RG 27, Vol. 3055, File 21-3-7, "N.S.S. Mobilization. Prosecutions," S.B. Picken, Custodian of Mobilization Records, Division "K," Vancouver, to Ranger, Assistant to the DM, 8 November 1946. Interestingly, in this case the man was one of three brothers, all of whom had been born in Canada to English parents, which reportedly gave them "a double-barreled reason for fulfilling [their] duties as a citizen," but all three had repeatedly refused evaded the mobilization regulations. All were also said to have been "aided and abetted by their mother who gave misleading information to police officers which carried our investigations to Washington, D.C.," and two were apprehended and convicted of breaking various sections of the mobilization regulations in the course of the war.

25. Roy, Pearkes, pp. 227-29, and NAC, MG 30, E537, Ernest William Sansom Papers, Vol. 3, "Scrapbook, 1939-1971," newspaper clipping, "General Arrives to Probe Officers' Draftee Remarks," Vancouver Sun, 24 November 1944.

26. On this subject, see Ibid., Vol. 2, "Report on Survey of Reinforcement Situation, Canadian Army Overseas, 1945," and particularly Appendix No. 1, McNaughton to Sansom, 15 January 1945, stating the terms of reference for the inquiry. Also various correspondence reporting Sansom's progress and the comments of various overseas officers on the results of his investigation, in Crerar Papers, Vol. 5, File 958C.009(D129), op.cit., January-April 1945, and Sansom's report to the CWC on his return from overseas, in King Papers, J4, Vol. 425, CWC Minutes, 11 April 1945.

27. On this issue, see NAC, RG 13, Vol. 2628, File 148600, "National Defence (Army). Major-General G.R. Pearkes, VC, CB, DSO, MC, February 17, 1945, and particularly R.F. [?], "Memorandum for the Deputy Minister: Re: Major-General Pearkes, G.R.," 19 February, and F.P. Varcoe, DM, Department of Justice, to [severed under Access to Information], 1 March 1945; Roy, Pearkes, pp. 235-39; and Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, pp. 480-81. Unfortunately, due to information severed by the Access to Information section of the National Archives of Canada under Section 19(1) of the Access to Information Act, the person who initiated the reference to the

Department of Justice is not clear in this file.

28. On the election in Grey North, see John Swettenham, McNaughton, Vol. 3, 1944-1966 (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969), pp. 71-80; Granatstein, Canada's War, pp. 389-94, and 409; and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 236-37.

29. On Claxton, see David Bercuson, True Patriot: The Life of Brooke Claxton, 1898-1960 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993).

30. On defence policy in the early postwar period, see James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, Vol. 3, Peacemaking and Deterrence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972); Bercuson, Claxton, pp. 153-74; and Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 247-49.

31. Ralston Papers, Vol. 115, "Manpower," vol. 5, Stuart to Minister, 29 June 1943.

32. On postwar attempts to institute universal military service to maintain the peacetime forces of the Canadian army, see Granatstein, "'Strictly on Its Merits': The Conscription Issue in Canada After 1945," Queen's Quarterly LXXIX(2), Summer 1972, pp. 192-206, which forms the basis for the concluding chapter of Granatstein and Hitsman, Broken Promises, pp. 245-63.

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