THE NATURE OF KHRUSHCHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY, 1958-60.

A Thesis

by

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FOREWORD

For over four decades Soviet leaders have preached the doctrine of world revolution and the final victory of Communism. The doctrine was brought into new focus with the recent scientific and technological achievements of the Soviet Union, particularly by the acquisition of a thermonuclear capacity in 1953 and a missile advantage in 1957. Since Malenkov's announcement in 1953 that the Soviet Union had broken the United States' monopoly of thermonuclear weapons, the major powers have been faced with the threat of nuclear destruction in any future war. Khrushchev, having recognized the implications of war in the nuclear age, has asserted that all states must accept the principle of peaceful coexistence and has challenged the West to a contest of economic strength.

The principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems is not new. It was used by both Lenin and Stalin, but it has become a principle of Soviet foreign policy and been incorporated into Communist ideology, in its Soviet interpretation, only in the Khrushchev era. The theoretical foundation for this principle was laid by Khrushchev in his report to the Twentieth Party Congress. While reaffirming Lenin's precept that the economic basis giving rise to war remains valid as long as imperialism exists, Khrushchev denied that war was "fatalistically inevitable". However, this revision in doctrine was made conditionally upon acceptance by the West of the international status quo and refraining from any use of force to stem the world revolution.

The second theoretical revision at this Party Congress was that a new correlation of world forces had made possible a peaceful transition to socialism through parliamentary means.

The importance of these doctrinal changes for the free world is that Khrushchev, in breaking with Stalin's policy, constructed upon the principle of peaceful coexistence a new offensive strategy for the realization of a world socialist state. This policy, as developed in 1955 and 1956, was designed to secure the withdrawal of American military forces from Europe and the elimination of N.A.T.O. With the disintegration of this powerful military force in Europe, the Soviet Union would seek to establish its influence in the Afro-Asian states. The crises within the Communist bloc in the fall of 1956 forced the Soviet Government to concentrate its attention on these difficulties. However, by late 1957 the Soviet Union was able once again to pursue its offensive against the West.

With the failure to achieve his goals in Europe, Khrushchev embarked upon a new policy of removing every center of Western influence and all military bases from the Afro-Asian states and the weakening of the economic strength of the West. Both of these objectives he sought to achieve by the attraction of the neutral states to the Soviet Union through economic and technical assistance, political support and Soviet propaganda. Once Western influence is removed from these countries, their transition to socialism is assumed.

This strategy of peaceful coexistence is based upon the assumption that eventually all states will undergo the transition from capitalism to socialism, but given the present nuclear stalemate only economic and political means remain for hastening this process. It is economic competition, rather than revolutionary violence, by which Khrushchev plans to secure Soviet policy objectives. The new stage in the economic challenge to the West began with Khrushchev's announcement to the Twenty-first Party Congress that with the fulfillment of the current seven-year plan the Soviet Union will become the "world's leading industrial power".

NOTE:

Quotations from the Soviet press, obtained through the Current Digest of the Soviet Press published by the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, are acknowledged in the following manner:

i) - the name of the Soviet newspaper and its date;

ii) - volume number, publication number and page number of the Digest,

e.g. Pravda, January 28, 1959. XI:4,19.

I. Peaceful Coexistence : A Definition

Peaceful coexistence, as a tactic providing the Soviet Union a "breathing space" during which it can consolidate its forces, has its origins in the early years of the Soviet Republic.

With the success of the October Revolution in Russia, the Bolsheviks felt confident that the First World War would bring about the imminent collapse of the capitalist system. In March 1919 Lenin stated:

> "It becomes clear, if we take into account that the course of events since the imperialist war is facilitating the revolutionary movement of the proletariat, that the international world revolution is beginning and increasing in all countries ..."[1]

Trotsky's belief, based on Marx's theory of permanent revolution, that the Russian Revolution would be followed by world revolution or collapse at the hands of world capitalism was not disputed by his contemporaries during those first years. The first congress of the Communist International revealed an optimistic faith in the imminence of the revolution in Europe.

Realization that there was no immediate prospect for world revolution came with the failure of the Spartakusbund in January 1918 to bring about the revolution in Germany, the collapse of the Bela Kun regime in Hungary in August 1919 and the defeat of the Red Army outside Warsaw in the summer of 1920.

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1. V.I. Lenin, "Speech at the Opening of the First Congress of the Communist International". Selected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1943), X, p.27.

At the fourth congress of the Comintern in 1922, Zinoviev underlined the regime's need to revaluate the international situation and the position of the Soviet Union within this order. "The breakdown of capitalism is indeed inevitable .... But we must see things in their true light and must estimate the factor of 'time' with greater caution than in the past."[2]

Due to Russian economic needs and the failure of the world revolution to materialize, Soviet theory had to account for the continued existence of the Soviet Union in a non-Communist world. Stalin's thesis of "socialism in one country" was the doctrinal justification for a period of "coexistence" between the Soviet Union and the West. Stalin contended that as a consequence of the failure both of Allied intervention in Russia and of the world revolution a balance of forces had emerged between the two camps. He concluded: "The basis of our relations with capitalist countries consists in admitting the existence of two opposed systems."[3] Peaceful coexistence, a policy dictated by weakness, emerged as a necessary expedient until that time when the Soviet Union would achieve economic parity with the West.

Peaceful coexistence was the only way out of this dilemma. Wishing to assure the eventual victory of Communism and the expansion of the political influence of the Soviet Union

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1. Quoted in Michael T. Florinsky, World Revolution and the U.S.S.R. (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p.113.

2. Quoted in Julian Towster, "The Dogma of Communist Victory," Current History, XXXVII (November 1959), p.259.

but refusing to sacrifice the gains of the October Revolution Lenin and Stalin accepted peaceful coexistence as an unavoidable temporary accommodation. The enlargement of the socialist camp after the Second World War, the rapid economic growth of the Soviet Union and the nuclear stalemate have brought about a basic change in the significance of the concept of peaceful coexistence.

At the outset of this study it is necessary to accept a premise which is fundamental to the concept of peaceful coexistence; this concept is applicable only to relations between states divided by antagonistic contradictions which can be resolved, as Marxists believe, only by the ultimate victory of Communism and the establishment of a world socialist state. Peaceful coexistence describes the relations between these two opposing systems - capitalism and socialism, from the time when the first socialist state, the U.S.S.R., emerged until that time when the last non-socialist state succumbs to the revolution.

The policy of peaceful coexistence, which was basically defensive in its original conception, has, since the early 1950's, become the core of an offensive strategy. As interpreted by Khrushchev, peaceful coexistence is one aspect of a global strategy which challenges the West in all areas of the world. "Peaceful" coexistence has become "competitive" coexistence.

By 1953, Stalin had initiated discussion of possible modifications in the ideology of Soviet foreign policy in view

of Soviet successes and new world conditions.[1] In referring to the shifting balance of power, Stalin based his assumptions upon three basic factors and the relationship among them at any definite time: (1) the strength of the Soviet Union, economic and military; (2) the strength of the world revolutionary movement; and (3) the strength of the capitalist countries.

The transition from the "building of socialism in one country" to a new theory of "permanent revolution" begun by Stalin in the early 1950's was strengthened at the Twentieth Party Congress. The development of this thesis by Stalin's heirs indicated a switch to an expansionist policy, differences of opinion existing only in regard to the means to be employed.[2]

The speeches given at the Twentieth Party Congress reflected the optimism of Soviet leaders as to the probable success of the new policy. Vice-Premier Mikoyan stated that Communism was no longer a "spector ... haunting Europe," as described by Marx and Engels, but Communism "in the flesh" going forth "with a firm and relentless tread not only through Europe but through the whole world."[3]

The theory of "capitalist encirclement" was described by Krushchev at the Twenty-first Party Congress in 1959 as no

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1. See J. Stalin, Problems of Leninism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953) and Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953).

2. See Herman Achminov, "The Soviet Communist Party in Search of a New Strategy." Bulletin V (January 1958), 19-20.

3. Pravda, February 20, 1956.

longer having any validity since the Soviet Union is "able to repel any attack by an enemy."[1] Also of decisive importance to the world outlook of Soviet policy makers were the increasing national liberation movements and the alledged "breakdown of imperialism" as predicted by Lenin.

Thus, it was maintained that a new balance of world forces had arisen due to the simultaneous weakening of the Western powers due to the disunity and destruction resulting from the Second World War, (it must be remembered that Soviet leaders tended to minimize the achievements of the Marshall Plan and the rapidity of European recovery), the acquisition by the Soviet Union of thermonuclear weapons and rockets, and the increased strength of the anti-colonial movement in the Afro-Asian states. These conditions, necessary for the emergence of socialism from the confines of one country, were partially valid during Stalin's time, but, it was Khrushchev, with the threat of mutual destruction from nuclear war, who had to assert and explain the implications for Soviet foreign policy. This he did in his statements on the meaning of peaceful coexistence. For it is in Khrushchev's definitions of this concept that one can find the general principles which govern the relations between the socialist and capitalist states in the current period.

Khrushchev's conception of peaceful coexistence reflects four basic considerations: (1) the need for time to develop the

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1. Pravda, January 28, 1959. XI:4, 19.

Soviet economy, in order to enable the Soviet Union to enter into economic competition with the United States and Western Europe; (2) the popular desire for peace both outside and within the Soviet Union; (3) the genuine belief that nuclear war would destroy not only the capitalist world but would cost the Soviet Union its leadership of the socialist camp if not its existence; and (4) the realization that in the emerging decade economic penetration is the last weapon which the Soviet Union can utilize without restriction, given the impossibility of nuclear war and the danger of political subversion leading to war due to the existence of world alliance systems.

The factor of decisive importance is the possession by both major powers of sufficient nuclear weapons to destroy the other. It is in this respect that Khrushchev has described peaceful coexistence not as a policy of choice but an "accepted unescapable reality". On March 25, 1960, Khrushchev stated: "Given the present balance of power and the level reached by military technology, peaceful coexistence has become a real fact ..., an imperative necessity for all states."[1]

Khrushchev's insistence on the renunciation of the use of force in the settlement of international disputes underlines his conviction that there is very little geographical scope for limited wars, as long as the Soviet Union and the United States

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1. Pravda, March 26, 1960.

maintain their present alliance systems, and that a global war would "not spare anyone, and would cause mankind unprecedented sacrifice, devastation, and suffering."[1]

The conclusion to be drawn is that at present neither total nor limited war offers reliable guarantees of success to the Soviet Government. Rather, economic penetration has replaced military conquest as the most effective means of extending Soviet influence at the present stage of the struggle between the socialist and capitalist blocs.

While the policy of peaceful coexistence was adopted to prevent a nuclear war, the possibility of the Soviet Union using force to aid the advance of world revolution remains. Although Khrushchev has demanded that the use of force as a means of settling disputes be renounced, Soviet ideology continues to admit the rightiousness of the utilization of force in "just wars" and in the transition to socialism. It is in regard to civil wars and national liberation movements that the balance between the threat of force and its actual employment is most delicate. While Khrushchev has shown restraint from intervention in these "just wars", such action might be taken in order to assure that the outcome would coinside with the "predestined" course of history. The presence of these two attitudes in Soviet thought - the desire to avoid a nuclear war with the West versus the desire to aid the

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1. Pravda, November 1, 1959.

process of transition to socialism, was noted by Walter Lipmann during a recent trip to the Soviet Union.

> "On the one hand, the evidence was convincing that the U.S.S.R. is not contemplating war and is generally concerned to prevent any crisis, be it in Laos, in Cuba, or in Germany, from becoming uncontrollable. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the Soviet Government has a relentless determination to foster the revolutionary movement in the underdeveloped countries. This relentless determination springs from an unqualified faith in the predestined acceptance of Communism by the underdeveloped countries." [1]

While active military aid to socialist movements in the Afro-Asian countries remains a possibility, the Soviet Government will probably use its military strength not for direct challenges to the West but primarily as a deterrent against interference by the United States in revolutionary situations. It is the threat of war which will be utilized.

Even though Soviet leaders have on occasion claimed that a nuclear war would be totally destructive only for the West, such remarks can be dismissed as bravado or designed for domestic consumption, since they have too much common sense not to realize that nuclear war would prove equally destructive to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's own remark to this effect at the Twentieth Party Congress [2] was later contradicted by Shepilov's remark, while

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1. Walter Lippman, The Coming Tests with Russia (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1961), pp. 28-29.

2. Khrushchev: "Nor is it fortuitous that prominent leaders of bourgeois countries with increasing frequency frankly admit that 'there will be no victory in a war in which atomic

(this note continued on page 9)

speaking in an official capacity, that: "The atomic bombs are a threat to the whole of mankind."[1]

Peace is also a prerequisite for the achievement of the economic goals which the Soviet Government has undertaken to reach. At the Twenty-first Party Congress, Khrushchev declared that world Communism will be achieved, "not through armed interference by the socialist countries in the internal affairs of the capitalist countries", but through the conclusive demonstration that "the socialist mode of production possesses decisive advantages over the capitalist mode of production."[2] Peaceful coexistence will enable the Soviet Union to pursue its objective of economically surpassing the United States. At the departure from Moscow by China's Premier Lai in November 1960, Khrushchev reminded his guest: "War will not help us reach our goal - it will spoil it. We must rest on the position of coexistence and nonintervention, and eventually Communism will be in force all over the earth."[3]

Instead of a period of transition from capitalism to socialism marked by civil wars and revolutionary violence, Khrushchev, having recognized the destructiveness of war in the nuclear age,

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(continuation of footnote 2 from previous page 8)
weapons are used'. These leaders still do not venture to state that capitalism will find its grave in another world war, should they unleash it, but they are already compelled openly to admit that the socialist camp is invincible." Pravda, February 15, 1956.

1. Pravda, February 13, 1957.

2. Ibid., January 28, 1959.

3. Time, November 21, 1960, 26.

has developed peaceful coexistence into a policy of prolonged economic competition with the West. As explained by Khrushchev: We are attacking capitalism from the flanks, from economic positions, from the positions of the advantages of our system."[1]

The "flanks" of capitalism are the underdeveloped countries. Through economic aid and political support Khrushchev's policy is designed to take advantage of the strong anti-Western feeling in these countries, which is the residue of the colonial period. Replacing Western influence in the political and economic lives of the Afro-Asian states by Soviet influence would be the first step toward the eventual assumption of power by local Communist parties. With the denial of raw materials to the Western economies and the enhanced strength of the socialist camp, it is hoped that the West will capitulate. Thus, an all-out conflict could be avoided and the victory of Communism achieved through non-violent means.

It is in the belief that socialism will soon enable the Soviet Union and its allies to enjoy "an abundance of material and spiritual wealth" and to satisfy "the needs of every individual as well as every nation" that Khrushchev has challenged Western supremacy in the underdeveloped nations. Soviet loans, equipment and technical advisors have been made available to the Afro-Asian states. Through economic policies the Soviet Government has broken through the containment lines established by the West. As the

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1. N.S. Khrushchev, For Victory in the Peaceful Competition with Capitalism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959), p.312.

prosperity and productivity of the Soviet bloc increases, so will the air granted to the underdeveloped states. The resolve of the Soviet Union and its allies to consolidate and expand the sphere of their economic activities is demonstrated by the adoption in December 1959 of the charter establishing the Mutual Aid Economic Council and by Khrushchev's speech to the Twenty-first Party Congress.

> "Thus, by that time (five years after the completion of the current seven year plan) or perhaps sooner, the Soviet Union will emerge first in the world in both physical volume of production and per capita output. This will be a world historic victory for socialism in the peaceful competition with capitalism in the international arena." [1]

Khrushchev's statements reveal his belief that as the advantages of socialism are made evident, by surpassing the United States economically, its ideas will encompass the world.

Another factor making war improbable is world public opinion. Khrushchev's peace overtures to the Afro-Asian nations reflect his desire to convince the Afro-Asian leaders that the Soviet Union is strongly opposed to war. In fact, Khrushchev has encouraged cooperation between the Soviet Union and the neutralist states as a force sufficiently strong to prevent the outbreak of war. Certainly much more is to be gained by the Soviet Government if it projects itself as a defender of peace rather than the leading nation in a worldwide revolutionary struggle. An anti-war position is also demanded by the Russian people themselves, due to the extensive destruction and loss of life inflicted upon them during the Second World War.

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1. Pravda, January 28, 1959. XI:4,17.

Peaceful coexistence, the corner-stone of Khrushchev's foreign policy, has, in his words, "always been and remains the general line of our country's foreign policy".[1] However, this principle, as defined by Khrushchev, has acquired a significance which it did not possess when used by Lenin as a tactical necessity when the Soviet Union was a weak revolutionary center surrounded by capitalist countries.

If peaceful coexistence implied merely acceptance of the existing situation and noninterference, then it could be said that the Soviet Union and the West have successfully coexisted since the October Revolution with the exception of the period of Allied intervention and the Russian belief in imminent world revolution and the refusal of Nazi Germany to coexist either with the West or the Soviet Union. However, the policy of peaceful coexistence, as interpreted by Khrushchev, does not imply a modus vivendi between states of conflicting social systems, in which changes take place gradually and in accordance with carefully worked out agreements. Rather, it implies a strategy of conflict based upon a deterministic conviction that capitalism will inevitably be destroyed. This competitive struggle, however, will be conducted by economic and political means and not by military struggle.

The term "peaceful" in this concept signifies the pursuit of Soviet objectives without resort to war, while the term "coexistence" denotes the simultaneous existence of two systems basically antagonistic to one another for a prolonged but not indefinite period

1. Pravda, October 31, 1956.

of time. In this respect, Khrushchev was correct when he stated that peaceful coexistence was a necessity dictated by historical conditions and not a Soviet goal or policy. "Peaceful coexistence" as "competitive coexistence" is, however, a policy of choice, and one by which Khrushchev hopes to achieve the ultimate goal of Soviet policy - the establishment of a world socialist state.

When asked in an interview with Western journalists in February 1955 how long the period of peaceful coexistence would last, Khrushchev was indefinite in his reply, but it revealed the temporary nature of this period.

> "A situation has developed in which two systems exist simultaneously in the world ... You hold that capitalism is immutable, and that the future belongs to the capitalist system. We on our part, consider that Communism is invincible, and that the future belongs to the Communist system ... As to how long this coexistence can last, the answer is that that will depend on historical conditions, and historical development." [1]

One of the most extensive definitions of peaceful coexistence by Khrushchev was given in an interview with John Walters, editor of the Melbourne Herald. In spite of the length of Khrushchev's reply, much of it is given below, as this definition leads to many important issues within the scope of this thesis.

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1. Quoted by Milton Kovner, The Challenge of Coexistence (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961), pp.15-16 from W. Hearst, K. Smith, and F. Conniff, We Stand for Peaceful Coexistence: Interviews with N.S. Khrushchev, N.A. Bulganin, G.K. Zukov (New York: New Century Publishers, 1955), p.9.

> "The gist of it (peaceful coexistence) ... is, first, that the form of state organization and the form of social organization of any particular country must be decided by the people of that country themselves; secondly, that no state or any external forces can or should impose on other nations their way of life or their political or social system; thirdly, since man's social development takes place along an ascending line, it inevitably gives rise to new forms of life for society. Consequently, the appearance of states with a socialist system, as a result of the operation of the objective laws of social development, is just as natural as was, in its day, the appearance of bourgeois states; and lastly, in order to rid mankind of devastating wars and, in particular, of the threat of the most destructive war ever known by humanity - nuclear war - we feel that the principle of peaceful coexistence and cooperation must prevail in relations between the socialist and capitalist states." [1]

Khrushchev has also stated that peaceful coexistence "suggests that political and economic relations among states should be built on the basis of full equality of the parties and mutual benefits." [2] This definition purports that the Soviet Union must be recognized in international negociations as an equal to the United States and that better relations between these two states could be achieved through mutually beneficial trade and cultural exchanges.

In summary, peaceful coexistence means the absence of military hostilities but not a truce in the economic, ideological and political struggle between the capitalist and socialist camps. In this struggle, called peaceful competition, all non-military means will be utilized to weaken the position of the West in the world and to facilitate the "inevitable" transition of socialism.

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1. N.S. Khrushchev, op.cit., pp.477-8.

2. Pravda, April 9, 1958.

II. Peaceful Coexistence as Acceptance of the Status Quo and Noninterference.

Khrushchev's thesis that war is no longer inevitable, which was introduced at the Twentieth Party Congress, was made conditionally upon Western acceptance of the present status quo and the principle of noninterference in the affairs of other states. Both of these conditions have been incorporated into the policy of peaceful coexistence, and Khrushchev has stated that the benefits of this policy to both power blocs could be realized if the prevailing situation were recognized. "It will then be easy to reach agreement on many questions and to create conditions for the normalization of relations among states."[1]

At a luncheon for President Kekkonen of Finland, who was visiting the Soviet Union, in May 1959, Khrushchev underlined the necessity for the acceptance by all states of the status quo if war were to be avoided.

> "In order to establish stability in the world and avert a new war, it is necessary to recognize the status quo - this is, the prevailing situation - and not to try to change the situation by force. Otherwise the inevitability of war will have to be recognized."[2]

Khrushchev's use of the term status quo,[3] which he has linked to the principle of noninterference, has led to misunderstandings

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1. Pravda, December 22, 1957. X:1,5-6.

2. Ibid., May 24, 1958.

3. The definition given by the Diplomaticheskiy slovar (Moscow: Government Publishing House, 1950), II, p.763) is: "Status quo is the existing state of things at a definite moment. To support the status quo is to preserve the position which has evolved."

and semantical difficulties in the West. Khrushchev has defined this term as the fact that "there are two systems of states in the world - the capitalist and the socialist systems".[1] However, it is necessary to realize that Khrushchev is speaking of the formal geographical-political division between the two systems and not of the present international balance of power, which he views as shifting in favor of the Soviet Union.

Agreement by the major powers to respect the formal status quo would yield certain benefits to the Soviet Union, for it would shield the satellite states of Eastern Europe, where the present division of influence might be upset by Western political or economic penetration, internal disruption or a combination of both. Khrushchev, as did Stalin, has made American recognition of the legitimacy of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe a precondition for the relaxation of tensions between the two powers. Both Stalin and Khrushchev have considered the maintenance of the present territorial division in Europe as necessary to the security of the Soviet Union. However, recognition by the West of Soviet primacy in Eastern Europe has a new significance for Khrushchev. For the Soviet Union to relinquish its hold on a single state which has entered the socialist camp would, in Soviet eyes, jeopardize its claim that the world has entered into a new era of history which will witness the ultimate victory of Communism. Such a setback would also weaken, if not destroy, the Soviet Union's position as the leading state of the socialist camp.

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1. As quoted by Milton Kovner, The Challenge of Coexistence, (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1961), p.17.

If the status quo is to be accepted in Europe, it must follow approximately the military demarcation fixed at the end of the Second World War, but Berlin is the tangible symbol of the unresolved issue of where the Western boundary of the Soviet bloc should be. The Soviet Union's conception of the preservation of the status quo in Europe, i.e., the security of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, challenges the political balance in Berlin, while a change in the political structure of Berlin would in Western eyes upset the present balance of power.

At present the territorial division in Europe is frozen for both sides by the nuclear stalemate. While the Soviet Union may not be pleased with the existing situation, it will not risk a nuclear war with the West to bring about a change in it.

While Khrushchev is sincere in his desire to preserve the present demarcation line in Europe between the two blocs with the exception of Berlin, since such an agreement would lessen the possibility of war and certain benefits would accrue to the Soviet Union, recognition of the present status quo by the Soviet Union cannot be permanent as this would necessitate changes in the ideology itself. Rather, once the Soviet Union has achieved economic parity with the United States, it will be prepared to challenge the status quo and enter into the final stage of the decisive struggle with the West. This is not to imply that the challenge will be of a military nature, rather Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence is founded on the belief that victory can be gained through economic, ideological and political means.

In the meanwhile, the Soviet Union will strive to establish its influence in those geographical areas where such a modification will not risk nuclear war. This could be effected by a radical change of government or reorientation in foreign policy. The nuclear stalemate does not guarantee the existing status quo in Africa, Asia or Latin America as it does in Europe. This fact is often forgotten in the West.

The term status quo has thus been interpreted by Khrushchev to denote acceptance of grographical delineation simultaneously embodying the concept of a worldwide revolutionary transformation. While peaceful coexistence recognizes the need for mutual concessions in state relations, no similar compromise is possible in matters of ideology. In his speech to the Supreme Soviet in October 1959 the Soviet Premier stated:

> "Mutual concessions in the interest of the peaceful coexistence of states must not be confused with concessions on matters of principle, on matters that touch upon the very nature of our socialist system, our ideology. Here there can be no question whatever of any concessions or any accommodation. If concessions are made on principles, on questions of ideology, it will mean backsliding to the positions of our antagonists. It will signify a qualitative change of policy. It will be treason to the cause of the working class. He who embarks on that path takes the road of betrayal of the cause of socialism, and, of course, a baggage of merciless criticism must be opened against him." [1]

It is understood that the continuation of the ideological struggle is part of Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence and not in opposition to it. In answer to claims by Western analysts

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1. Pravda, November 1, 1959. XI:44, 4.

of Soviet foreign policy that ideological struggle and peaceful coexistence are incompatible Khrushchev replied that this misunderstanding arises "by confusing the problems of ideological struggle with the question of relations between states."[1] Peaceful coexistence is a policy of struggle and no Soviet claims to the contrary have been made, but it is struggle waged without recourse to war.

The lead article of the November 1959 issue of the Party journal Kommunist[2] contained the two ideas most central to this issue. First, the whole world "must" adopt the policy of peaceful coexistence through the elimination from the international scene of all issues which could lead to war, and, secondly, there can be no ideological truce or coexistence on the political front. The article noted that the existence of the two systems, capitalist and socialist, has another side, that of class rule. Because of the existence of these two classes, the struggle between the two systems is irreconcilable. "The class struggle," stated Khrushchev, "will continue as long as there is capitalism."[3]

It is because of the irreconcilability of the class struggle and the adherence of the Soviet Union to the Marxist-Leninist ideology that the recognition of the status quo by both systems cannot

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1. N.S. Khrushchev, "On Peaceful Coexistence", Foreign Affairs, XXXVIII (October, 1959), 4.

2. Kommunist, No. 16 (November 1959), 8-12.

3. N.S. Khrushchev, For Victory in the Peaceful Competition with Capitalism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959), pp. 293-4.

lead to a modus vivendi between the two systems. Acceptance of the existing situation will, however, in Khrushchev's opinion, lessen the tension between the two power blocs and the possibility of war.

In a Pravda article of December 8, 1959, R. Timofeyev attacked the French sociologist Raymond Aron for the latter's conjecture that with time there would be a lessening of differences in the socio-economic aspects and the class structures of both the capitalist and socialist systems. Thereupon, Aron concluded, agreement on basic differences would be greatly facilitated. Timofeyev wrote:

> "The peaceful coexistence and competition of the two systems does not at all mean a weakening of socialist ideology but rather a continuation and further development of the struggle between the socialist and bourgeois ideologies in new conditions and in new forms." [1]

Since peaceful coexistence is only a temporary policy until the establishment of a world socialist state, the status quo must itself eventually be relinquished. To those in the West who expect changes in the political program of the Soviet Union Khrushchev commented that they would be obliged to wait "until the crab whistles".[2]

While the Soviet Union will not challenge the status quo in the West at the risk of war, it will strive to change it in the non-Communist world little by little, preferably by economic, ideological and political means. Although Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence demands from the West acceptance of this gradual change,

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1. Pravda, December 8, 1959. XI:49,16.

2. International Affairs (Moscow), No. 1 (January 1956), 195.

the Soviet Union will defend, at any cost, the Soviet part of the present international status quo. That the Soviet Union does not intend to allow a change in the present territorial division between the Communist and non-Communist world detrimental to itself was demonstrated in Hungary. Khrushchev, speaking in a Hungarian city, warned the West that any attempt to overthrow the present regimes in Eastern Europe would be met by force.

> "We declare that, if a new provocation is staged against any socialist country, the provocateurs will have to deal with all the countries of the socialist camp, and the Soviet Union will always be ready to come to the help of its friends and to give the required rebuff to the enemies of socialism, if these enemies attempt to disturb the peaceful labor of peoples of the socialist countries." [1]

A second principle which the West must accept if war is to be avoided is the principle of noninterference in the affairs of other states. This principle, as Khrushchev's demand that the status quo be recognized, has been incorporated into the policy of peaceful coexistence. In fact, Khrushchev has even equited this principle with peaceful coexistence.[2]

At the Twenty-first Party Congress Khrushchev replied to accusations in the Egyptian press of interference by local Communist parties in the Arab states by stating that while the Soviet

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1. Pravda, April 9, 1958.

2. N.S. Khrushchev, op.cit., p.297.

Government supported all national liberation movements it did not interfere in the internal affairs of other states.

> "In each country it is the people themselves who determine their own destiny and choose the direction of their development. The Soviet Union does not want to force anyone to take the Soviet path. We guide ourselves entirely by V.I. Lenin's principle that revolutions cannot be exported." [1]

Khrushchev has been quite vague as to what constitutes interference in the affairs of other states. While he has pledged that the Soviet Union has no intention of fostering socialist revolutions upon states by force of arms, he has repeatedly emphasized that the Soviet Union will extend economic and political support to all national liberation movements and "progressive forces", i.e. pro-Communist elements.

Based on an interview with the Soviet Premier, Avrill Harriman wrote the following of Khrushchev's concept of noninterference.

> "Khrushchev ... predicted that one day the workers in the rest of the world would be persuaded by the superiority of Soviet conditions to adopt the Communist system. Sooner or later, he kept repeating, capitalism would be overthrown."
>
> "Although to reassure me, he added that the timing of these uprisings would depend on the conditions in each individual country and would be determined not by the Kremlin but by the workers in each country. However, he made it abundantly clear that when the time was decided, the Soviet Union would render all necessary assistance to assure the success of the revolution." [2]

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1. Pravda, December 8, 1959. XI:49,16.
2. A. Harriman, Peace with Russia?, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1959), p.15.

Khrushchev's support of the principle of noninterference is in part an attempt to counter the contention that most of the socialist revolutions in Eastern Europe occurred because of the presence of the Red Army and to aleviate the fears of the non-socialist countries bordering the Soviet Union that they may be threatened by a similar fate. The majority of Khrushchev's speeches on the principle of noninterference have made reference to Eastern Europe. While striving to remove the stigma attached to these regimes, Khrushchev has also warned the West that the form of government which the satellite states are to have is a closed issue. In regard to Eastern Europe, the Soviet definition of peaceful coexistence as noninterference has undergone modification since the Twentieth Party Congress.

The declaration of October 30, 1956, of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. made the following comment on the principle of noninterference in the affairs of other states:

> "The unshakable basis of the U.S.S.R.'s foreign relations is ... the policy of peaceful coexistence, friendship and cooperation with all states.
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> "The profoundest and most consistent expression of this policy is seen in the mutual relations held between the socialist countries." 1

In the above statement no distinction was made between the application of the principle of noninterference between socialist states and as applied between socialist and capitalist states.

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1. Pravda, October 31, 1956.

This distinction was introduced into Soviet statements in late 1956 after the explosive crises in Hungary and Poland. The new line was explained by I.P. Pomelov in an article in Kommunist, the theoretical journal of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.

> "The principle of coexistence is the principle of the peaceful association of countries which have differing and opposing social and economic systems. It is not difficult to see that it would be a great mistake to carry this principle of coexistence over to the reciprocal relations between similar Socialist states or the relationships between Communist parties, which have a common aim and a common ideology." [1]

This modification was necessitated by the need to justify Soviet intervention in Hungary. Once the distinction had been made and the principle of noninterference was understood to apply only to relations between socialist and capitalist states, Khrushchev developed the theory that it is the international duty of a socialist state to prevent another socialist state from deserting the "popular-democratic system". Thus, the Soviet Union assumes the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another socialist state.

During his trip to Hungary in the spring of 1958, Khrushchev justified the Soviet action in Hungary while contrasting Soviet intervention to that of the Western powers.

> "When bourgeois governments send troops to other countries they do so with the intent to conquer, and seek to establish their exploiter rule over the working people of those countries. We helped you, so that you could defend your interests against a handful of fascist conspirators and safeguard the people's right of building

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1. I.P. Pomelov, "Razvitie sotsializma" : Proletarskii internatsionizm". Kommunist, No. 1 (January 1957), 16.

"its own life without exploiters. By helping the Hungarian people to smash the counterrevolution we performed our internationalist duty." [1]

In contrast to Khrushchev's condemnation of Western "interference" in the affairs of other states, the Soviet-Hungarian Treaty signed on May 27, 1957, stated in Article 1:

"The temporary presence of Soviet troops on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic does not in any way infringe on the sovereignty of the Hungarian State. The Soviet troops do not interfere in domestic matters of the Hungarian People's Republic." [2]

Thus, Khrushchev enunciated a doctrine, which may be seen as a counterpart to the Truman and Eisenhower doctrines for resistance to the advance of Communism. Where socialism has been established, counter-revolution will not be permitted, and if necessary, the socialist regime will be maintained by Soviet troops. It was particularly in regard to Eastern Europe that Khrushchev made his statement that the West must recognize the principle of noninterference if war were to be avoided, although this condition was also made in reference to any state which might in the future establish a socialist government.

A further condition of peaceful coexistence is that the West cease all anti-Soviet propaganda directed to Eastern Europe and drop its insistence on discussing the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe at international conferences. In Khrushchev's words:

"It is time for the Governments of the Western Powers to realize that the question of the system of government of the People's Democracies, as well as

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1. Pravda, April 8, 1958.
2. Ibid., May 28, 1957.

> "that of any other sovereign state, is not a matter for discussion at international conferences, for it has long been settled by the peoples of these countries, who have firmly and unequivocally embarked upon the course of building socialism." [1]

Because of the nuclear stalemate Khrushchev has been forced to change the tactics for achieving the final goal of Soviet foreign policy. The new attitude toward the status quo and the principle of noninterference are designed to preserve the present socialist camp in toto, while enabling the Soviet Union to effect changes in the status quo in the non-Communist world when this can be done without risking war. Khrushchev's "peaceful" approach also serves as useful propaganda in the neutral nations in furthering the present effort to project an image of the Soviet Union as the leading nation in the peace movement.

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1. N.S. Khrushchev, op.cit., p.427.

III. Khrushchev's Revision of the Leninist Principle on the Inevitability of War.

A major task confronting the Soviet leaders at the Twentieth Party Congress was to revise the Party's ideological tenets in the realm of foreign policy, in order to accommodate those innovations introduced since Stalin's death and to create the guidelines for the future course of action. In order to justify these innovations, revisions were made where necessary and past doctrines were quoted to give the new approach ideological legitimacy. Emphasis was placed on creating a policy for future action, rather than the attempt to preserve past doctrines, which were discarded when necessary.

A most striking aspect of the Congress was its repudiation of the rigidity and inflexibility of attitude, which had been so characteristic of the Stalin era. Although Khrushchev did not raise the issue of flexibility specifically in connection with foreign policy, he stated that in exposing shortcomings on the domestic scene, the Party had "smashed obsolete ideas and resolutely swept aside everything that had outlived its time and was hindering our progress".[1]

In order to give credibility to the continued assertions by Khrushchev and his colleagues of their peaceful intentions and sincere desire for peaceful coexistence, it became necessary to modify those doctrines which stressed revolutionary violence and were in opposition to the projected image of the Soviet Government as the leading "fighter for peace". The theses introduced into Soviet

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1. Pravda, February 15, 1956. VIII:4, 3.

ideology by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress were designed to bring doctrine into confirmity with the policy of peaceful co-existence.

Khrushchev modified the Marxist-Leninist theory on the inevitability of war, advanced the theory that the transition to socialism could be without violence and that Communist parties could come into power through parliamentary means, and in contrast to Stalin, he gave recognition to the importance of the world peace movement in the realization of Soviet policy objectives.

These innovations, closely linked with the practical demands of changes in foreign and domestic political situations, reflect Khrushchev's understanding of the international situation during the second half of the 1950's and his desire to obtain the maximum advantages of the changes which had occurred on the international scene. Khrushchev's innovations were implemented to the view of winning the support of non-socialist countries for Soviet policies through a diplomacy which would attract the largest following while being the least offensive.

Khrushchev's modification of the Leninist doctrine on the inevitability of war raises certain difficulties, since it was highly ambiguous. In traditional Marxist usage, the theory referred primarily to wars among capitalist countries. As such, the theory was at the center of Lenin's doctrine of imperialism. War, according to Lenin, was inevitable with the intensification of economic contradictions among the capitalist states, an unavoidable part of

historical development.

In October, 1952, on the eve of the Nineteenth Party Congress, Stalin wrote that the Leninist theory on the inevitability of war was still valid. He raised the argument that the theory was obsolete due to the emergence of a strong "peace bloc" only to repudiate it. "This is not true .... To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to abolish imperialism."[1] However, Stalin did establish a unique role for the Soviet Union. While war was "inevitable" among the capitalist states, the Soviet Union would remain immune from future conflict, in contrast to its involvement in the Second World War. Stalin based his postulate on the assumption that a war among capitalist states would bring into question only the issue of supremacy among the Western powers, while a war with the Soviet Union would threaten the "existence of capitalism itself".[2] The belief that the Soviet Union will not be the object of Western "aggression" due to its strength has been carried over into the present.

Conversely, Khrushchev's modification of the doctrine on the inevitability of war refers primarily to a conflict between the Soviet Union and the West. In this respect, the modification made by Khrushchev is consistent with Stalin's conception of the doctrine. However, the same factors which Khrushchev claims will prevent a conflict between the Soviet Union and the West, could tend to counteract war in general. Therefore, even war among the Western powers would seem no longer "inevitable".

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1. J. Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952), pp.40-1.
2. Ibid., p.39.

Being a basic tenet of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, the doctrine on the inevitability of war could not be simply ignored. Yet it was essential for Khrushchev to modify this doctrine as it was in fundamental opposition to his concept of peaceful coexistence. Consequently, Khrushchev and Suslov undertook the task of modifying Lenin's doctrine at the Twentieth Party Congress.

Khrushchev introduced his modification by attacking the element of economic determinism in Stalin's thesis that war was still inevitable among capitalist countries.

> "War is not only an economic phenomenon. Whether there is to be a war or not depends in large measure on the correlation of class, political forces, the degree of organization, and the awareness and determination of the people." [1]

Khrushchev did not repudiate the precept that war is inevitable as long as imperialism exists, rather he stated that war is no longer "fatalistically inevitable". Lenin's precept was a correct reflection of the political situation when evolved, explained Khrushchev, for at that time "imperialism was an all-embracing world system, and the social and political forces which did not want war were weak, poorly organized, and hence unable to compel the imperialists to renounce war".[2] Khrushchev went on to explain that war is no longer inevitable due to the new "correlation of world forces". It can be prevented by virtue of the enhanced economic strength of the "peace-loving" populations of the non-socialist countries.

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1. Pravda, February 15, 1956. VIII:4, 11.
2. Ibid.

As explained by theorist Suslov:

> "The balance of forces in the world arena has now changed radically in favor of the supporters of peace and not the supporters of war ... Now, under the new historical conditions, there are mighty forces possessing considerable resources for preventing the imperialists from unleashing a war, and, if they try to start one anyway, for crushing the aggressors and for burying forever both war and the capitalist system." 1

The speeches by Khrushchev and Suslov to the Twentieth Party Congress clearly demonstrate the optimism of Stalin's heirs in 1956 in regard to the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the West. This outlook was based on the following premises: the era of "capitalist encirclement" had come to an end, the sufficiency of Soviet military strength to deter any Western attempt to use force against Soviet interests and that the emergence of the Afro-Asian nations had caused a shift in the balance of world forces which favored the Soviet Union.

A corollary to the modification of the doctrine on the inevitability of war was the change in official attitude toward the so-called peace movement, for the existence of this movement is, according to Khrushchev, instrumental in preventing war.

As noted above, Stalin was skeptical of the ability of the peace movement to prevent war, and he was also skeptical about the ability of the Soviet Government to exploit this movement in the interests of Communism. While he recognized that the peace movement might be able to prevent a "particular war" or preserve a "particular peace", he held that its existence did not make

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1. Pravda, February 17, 1956. VIII:8, 23.

the doctrine on the inevitability of war obsolete.[1]

The change in attitude was brought out in the Moscow Declaration, which asserted that if the West began a war, the people of all countries would demand the immediate end of "imperialism". At the Twentieth Party Congress Khrushchev clearly indicated that the peace movement was regarded as a force which could be utilized by the Soviet Government against the West.

> "The forces of peace have been considerably augmented by the emergence of a group of peace-loving European and Asian states which have proclaimed non-participation in blocs as a principle of their foreign policy. The leading political circles of these states rightly hold that to participate in the closed imperialistic military alignments would merely increase the dangers to their countries becoming involved in the aggressive forces' military gambles and being drawn into the ruinous maelstrom of the arms race." [2]

Ultimately, the modifications of doctrine introduced at the Twentieth Party Congress were part of Khrushchev's policy to identify the Soviet Government with the cause of peace and thereby create an incentive for further cooperation between Communists and non-Communists. In his call for cooperation between Communist and non-Communist workers' parties, Khrushchev stated that "if the working class comes out as a united, organized force and acts with firm resolution, there will be no war."[3] What Khrushchev hoped to achieve through his policy was a rapprochement among all socialist and labor parties, which would constitute a powerful anti-Western

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1. Pravda, November 22, 1957.
2. Ibid., February 15, 1956.
3. Ibid.

bloc under the banner of "peace". In return for their support Khrushchev was promising them that there would not be war. While creating an image of the Soviet Government as the leading force in the "struggle for peace", the Western governments were not credited with any positive contribution to the preservation of peace. Thus an assertive effort was made to convince the Western socialist parties and the leaders and intelligentsia of the underdeveloped countries that only through cooperation with the Soviet Union could world peace be assured. The success of Khrushchev's policy would have strengthened the power position of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the United States, and such cooperation would prevent the emergence of a truly neutralist bloc comprising the Afro-Asian states, which might oppose Soviet policy objectives.[1]

The major element of the forces supporting peace, as defined by Khrushchev, is Soviet economic and military power. While the threat of war persists as long as "imperialism" continues to exist, the Soviet Union has the material means, in Khrushchev's words, "to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war, and if they actually try to start it, to give a smashing rebuff to the aggressors and frustrate their adventurist plans."[2] Khrushchev's belief that Soviet power is now so overwhelming that the Western powers have been successfully deterred from provoking war is the essential factor in his thesis that war can be prevented.

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1. After 1958 Khrushchev directed himself to the Afro-Asian countries alone, since his earlier efforts to win the support of socialist parties in Europe had produced no tangible results.

2. Pravda, February 15, 1956.

With the launching of the first Soviet space satellite into orbit, Khrushchev undertook to create the stereotype of the Soviet Union as the world's foremost military and scientific power. The Soviet success in putting a satellite into orbit was utilized as unchallenged "proof" that the Soviet Union possessed intercontinental ballistic missiles and had surpassed the United States in military science and technology. While this demonstration of Soviet strength was part of a larger policy employing the tactic of intimidation designed to win certain diplomatic concessions from the West, it did support Khrushchev's thesis that the socialist camp had sufficient military strength to deter the West from undertaking any action which would risk war with the Soviet Union.

Stalin's thesis that a war with the Soviet Union would bring into question the existence of capitalism was maintained. A 1959 text on Marxist-Leninist ideology commented that the First World War and the Second had "served as powerful accelerators of revolutionary explosions." After noting the gains to the socialist camp made after the Second World War, the author concluded that "from these historical facts the conclusion can be fully drawn that in the epoch of imperialism, world wars ... inevitably lead to revolutionary upheavals."[1]

At the Twenty-first Party Congress held in 1959 Khrushchev stated that with the fulfillment of the current seven year plan the

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1. Osnovi marksisma-leninizma, ed. O.V. Kuusinen (Moscow: Government Publishing House of Political Literature, 1959), p.519.

balance of world forces would be altered even further in favor of the socialist camp due to the increase in the economic potential of the Soviet Union. In connection with his comments on the enhanced economic strength of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev introduced a further modification to the Leninist doctrine on the inevitability of war. In contrast with his statement at the Twentieth Party Congress that war was no longer "fatalistically inevitable", at the Twenty-first Party Congress Khrushchev stated that an effect of the achievement of the seven year plan would be a "real possibility of excluding world war from the life of society even before the complete triumph of socialism, even with capitalism existing in part of the world."[1] Thus, even the element of Lenin's thesis on the inevitability of war which Khrushchev had maintained at the Twentieth Party Congress - the thesis that the economic base for producing war remains as long as capitalism exists, was discarded. In referring to the possibility of eliminating war while capitalism still existed, Khrushchev made no reference to the economic base producing wars but only stated that there would still be "adventurers who might start a war."[2] He added that such attempts would be crushed and the adventurers "put where they belong". However, the acceptance of the possibility that certain statesmen might risk a war is not consistent with the economic determinism which underlay Lenin's theory that war was inevitable.

Closely linked to this new modification was Khrushchev's attempt to reach a settlement with the United States. In contrast

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1. Pravda, January 28, 1959. XI:4, 20.
2. Ibid.

with past statements, Khrushchev voiced in a speech to the Supreme Soviet upon his return from the United States his conviction that the majority of Americans, and especially President Eisenhower, "wish to find ways of strengthening peace."[1] And in subsequent speeches Khrushchev spoke of Eisenhower's "earnest desire for peace." Of course, there were still "reactionaries" in the United States, such as military leaders and Secretary of State Dulles, who opposed Soviet-American cooperation. However, to contribute to American statesmen a sincere desire for preserving peace and a willingness to pursue "constructive" efforts for this goal did denote a change in tactics and attitude.

The new approach was expanded by Otto Kuusinen in a speech on the occasion of the Ninetieth Anniversary of Lenin's birth. Kuusinen conceded that Khrushchev's thesis was a revision of Leninism but a revision of "form and not of spirit." While paying lip-service to the dogma that "aggressiveness" is inherent in the nature of imperialism, he went on to state that

> "one should not be dogmatic and regard this aspect of the matter only ... In order to be loyal to Marxism-Leninism today it is not enough to repeat the old truth that imperialism is aggressive. The task is to make full use of the new factors working for peace in order to save mankind from the catastrophe of a new war. A dogmatic position is an obsolete position." 2

The implication of this speech was that a further factor supporting Khrushchev's thesis that war was no longer inevitable was a change in the nature of imperialism. While Kuusinen admitted that

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1. Pravda, April 23, 1960

2. Ibid., November 1, 1959 XI:44, 5.

"aggressiveness" was a character of imperialism, he implied that in view of current world forces the Western states would not resort to war in the last stage of their historical development. Because of this change war could be eliminated even though "imperialism" continued to exist.[1]

Not only had Khrushchev revised Lenin's thesis on the inevitability of war, but by early 1960 he had denied the validity of the thesis. Lenin's thesis was replaced in official ideology by Khrushchev's thesis that in the near future war may be eliminated as a means of settling international disputes, even before the complete triumph of socialism.

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1. The contention that Kuusinen's speech implied a change in the nature of "imperialism" is supported by the attack made upon Kuusinen's speech in the Chinese press. The following quote is taken from Honggi (Red Flag), June 15, 1960, as reprinted in English in Peking Review, June 21, 1960. "Lenin and Stalin never held that the inner contradictions of imperialism would enable imperialism to change its nature. There are various factions within the ruling quarters of American imperialism who quarrel among themselves, but not a single fact can be cited to show that among the bickering groups there is one that is so 'sensible' as not to regard all questions from an imperialist viewpoint. What they are quarreling about is which method can better serve their class interest. Whether the mothod of peace should be the principal method or the method of war, whether to adopt the 'brink of war' policy or a direct war policy, to fight a small one or a big one."

IV. Khrushchev's Thesis of Peaceful Transition to Socialism.

The second major thesis introduced into Soviet ideology by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress was that the transition from capitalist society to a socialist society could be achieved through parliamentary and nonviolent means. The concept that armed revolution was necessary for the overthrow of the old order made Khrushchev's policy of peaceful coexistence untenable, as did the Leninist thesis on the inevitability of war.

It was primarily, however, practical considerations, and not ideological requirements, which prompted Khrushchev to effect this change in ideology. As long as the Russian example of 1917 was held as the correct path in bringing the transition to socialism into reality, local Communist parties in non-socialist countries would be regarded as potential threats of civil war and violence. Furthermore, national leaders in the Afro-Asian countries, despite the attractions of socialist blueprints for the rapid transformation of their economies, would continue to look upon the local Communist parties as opponents rather than supporters of their policies. Having only won their independence from the Western colonial powers the Afro-Asian governments were unwilling to accept the economic and political domination of the Soviet Union.

The logical conclusion from the thesis that the armed form of revolution and the same forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat are essential for the achievement of the transition from capitalism to socialism is "world revolution". The acceptance

and support of civil war, implying outside assistance, as the revolutionary duty of socialist countries would negate Khrushchev's pledged support of the principle of noninterference and his policy of peaceful coexistence, since the renunciation of war would, given the acceptance of this thesis, be equivalent to renouncing the revolution itself.

Khrushchev's thesis of transition to socialism through parliamentary means was an attempt to resolve these major contradictions between theory and practical needs, most of which had already been effected in practice.

After defending the Russian path to socialism as the correct one in its historical circumstances, since the Russian Bolsheviks did not have the opportunity to utilize a parliamentary institution, Khrushchev noted that "radical changes in the world arena" had made possible new forms of transition to socialism and that the "implementation of these forms need not be associated with civil war under all circumstances ...."[1]

Khrushchev's thesis of a peaceful acquisition of power in the transition to socialism was based on three premises. The first was that while revolutions are the eventual outcome of social contradictions and inevitable in the transition from one social system to another, the revolutionary transformation of society and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat

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1. Pravda, February 15, 1956. VIII:4, 11.

need not follow the same path of development in all countries, nor necessitate the same methods or clash with the same sharpness in the overthrow of the old social order. To justify his thesis, Khrushchev repeated Lenin's assertion that each country would eventually reach socialism, but due to historical differences this might be achieved in different ways, each country contributing something unique from its own experiences.[1] What is essential in this approach is not whether a peaceful transition to socialism is or is not feasible, but the historical conditions of the country concerned. The revolution will not be repeated in the same form in every country, but in the end it will bring about a similar social transformation. Khrushchev's thesis asserted that the means utilized in effecting the transition to socialism should not be fixed by rigid dogmas but determined by the concrete circumstances of the struggle in question.

In support of Lenin's thesis that socialism could be reached by different paths and Khrushchev's thesis that the transition to socialism could be achieved without violence, Mikoyan, in his speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, cited the People's Democracies in Eastern Europe as examples.

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1. "As far back as the eve of the Great October Socialist Revolution Lenin wrote: 'All nations will arrive at socialism - this is inevitable, but not all will do so in exactly the same way, each will contribute something of its own in one or another form of democracy, one or another variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat, one of another rate at which social transformations will be effected in the various aspects of social life.'" N.S. Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress. Pravda, February 15, 1956. VIII:4, 11.

> "Because of the favorable postwar situation in Czechoslovakia the socialist revolution was carried out by peaceful means ... In their own way, yet also without civil war, the working class of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Poland, and other people's democracies arrived at the victory of the socialist revolution." 1

The "favorable postwar situation" which allowed Czechoslovakia and Hungary, for example, to achieve the transition to socialism through parliamentary institutions rather than street barricades was their proximity to the Soviet Union. Although no mention was made of the role played by Red Army or Russian agents, Mikoyan stated:

> "And now, when considering the question of the ways of revolution during the contemporary period, we are compelled, as in their time Marx and Lenin were, to proceed from a precise assessment of the balance of class forces both in every individual country and on a world scale. It is clear to everyone that in our time no country can develop by itself without being subject to certain influences from other countries. Lenin foresaw that in a small bourgeois country, with the presence of socialist countries in the neighborhood, the transition to socialism can take place by peaceful means. Lenin made it understood that not only the correlation of class forces in one country should be taken into consideration, but also the presence of victorious socialism in neighboring countries." 2

Thus, because of the "friendship" and "protection" of the Soviet Union a peaceful transition to socialism had been possible in the East European countries.

Khrushchev also made reference to the East European regimes, although he singled out the Chinese People's Republic

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1. Pravda, February 18, 1956.

2. Ibid.

as an example of how each country could make an individual contribution to Marxist-Leninist revolutionary tactics from its own experience in the transition to socialism.

> "Much that is unique in socialist construction is being contributed by the Chinese People's Republic, possessing an economy which was exceedingly backward and bore a semi-feudal and semi-colonial character until the triumph of the revolution. Having taken over the decisive commanding positions, the people's democratic state is pursuing a policy of peaceful reorganization for private industry and trade and their gradual transformation into components of the socialist economy in the course of the socialist revolution." 1

Thus the Chinese path in the transition to socialism offered an alternative to the Russian pattern, and one which might be utilized in Asian countries possessing social and economic conditions resembling those of pre-socialist China.

Khrushchev's reference to the East European regimes and his stress on the peaceful acquisition of power also reflect his attempt to steer a middle course between collaboration with the national bourgeoisie and local Communist parties, particularly in the Middle East. This was more strongly emphasized at the Twenty-first Party Congress when the Soviet Premier attacked statements by the press of the United Arab Republic which accused the local Communist parties of attempting to weaken the effort for Arab unification.

Although Khrushchev laid great emphasis on his thesis of a peaceful acquisition of power by the working class, the possibility of violence and civil war was not abandoned in theory.

1. Pravda, February 15, 1956.

Khrushchev stressed that the transition to socialism could not in all countries be achieved through parliamentary means.

> "In those countries where capitalism is strong and has a huge military and police apparatus at its disposal, serious resistance by reactionary forces is inevitable. Then the transition to socialism will be attended by a sharp revolutionary class struggle." 1

Since the class struggle is an integral part of the revolution there can be no guarantee that the transition to socialism can be achieved through peaceful means. Attacking the "reformists" for maintaining that the only correct path to socialism in present circumstances is through peaceful means, Khrushchev stated:

> "True, we recognize the need for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into socialist society. It is this that distinguishes the revolutionary Marxist from the reformist, the opportunist ..... But the forms of social revolution vary. And it is not true that we regard violence and civil war as the only way to remake society." 2

Thus, Khrushchev's thesis left unchanged the basic tenet of Marxist-Leninist ideology calling for the "revolutionary transformation of society." 3

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1. Pravda. VIII:4, 12.
2. Ibid. VIII:4, 11.
3. Marx and Engels did not specify the political forms of the transition to socialism, rather these were variables which could not be fixed by theory as the transition was the historical function of the proletariat as a revolutionary class. The means for effecting the transition to socialism were to be derived from the then prevailing political and economic situation. Marx and Engels did note the possibility of a transition to socialism through parliamentary means, although it was their conviction that the capitalists would not surrender their privileges without violent struggle. Thus, the concrete forms of the transition were variable, although its class basis was not. See K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1949-50), I, pp.109-27.

However, the use of violence and the degree to which it is employed in a revolution are not due to any desire on the part of the Communists to utilize such means but are determined by the resistance encountered by the working class in its attempt to establish a new social order.[1] If the "exploiting classes" are willing to voluntarily relinquish their position of economic and political control, then the transition can be accomplished through peaceful means. If they resist, the working class will be "forced" to resort to violence andccivil war. As explained in a Soviet periodical: "The whole question is not whether the Marxists and the revolutionary workers desire a peaceful revolution or not, but whether objective conditions exist for this."[2] In this manner, Khrushchev and Suslov were able at the Twentieth Party Congress to rebuke the charge that Communists were "advocates of armed uprisings, violence and civil war" while maintaining the possibility of a non-peaceful transition to socialism.

The second premise underlying Khrushchev's thesis on the transition to socialism by peaceful means was the assumption that the labor and socialist parties of a number of capitalist countries had swung further to the left and by forming a "popular front" headed by the Communists had the opportunity to secure a majority

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1. The statement that Communists will not use force except when met by the "resistance of reactionary forces" is reminiscent of Stalin's remark to H.G. Wells in 1934:
"You are wrong if you think that the Communists are enamoured of violence. They would be very pleased to drop violent methods if the ruling class agreed to give way to the working class." The New Statesman and Nation, October 27, 1934.

2. As quoted by Thomas W. Wolfe, "Khrushchev's Disarmament Strategy", Orbis, (1960-61), 18.

in parliament.[1] By giving new emphasis to the Marxist idea of "varied forms" in the transition to socialism Khrushchev was able to re-introduce the tactic of supporting "popular front" movements to bring about the revolution. As explained by Khrushchev:

> "The present situation offers the working class in a number of capitalist countries a real opportunity to unite the overwhelming majority of the people under its leadership and to secure the transfer of the basic means of production into the hands of the people .... The working class, by rallying around itself the toiling peasantry, the intelligentsia, (and) all patriotic forces ... is in a position to defeat the reactionary forces opposed to the popular interest, to capture a stable majority in parliament, and to transform the latter from an organ of bourgeois democracy into a genuine instrument of the people's will." [2]

As with Khrushchev's thesis on the evitability of war, this thesis contains a reason for cooperation between Communist and non-Communists.[3]

While supporting the thesis that the transition could be achieved through the obtainment of a parliamentary majority by the combined strength of the "anti-reactionary" forces, Khrushchev emphasized that the political leadership of the Communist party,

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1. This premise was further developed in the Moscow Declaration. See Pravda, November 22, 1957.

2. Ibid., February 15, 1956. VIII:3, 12.

3. In September 1956, seven months after Khrushchev's speech at the Twentieth Party Congress, an article in Kommunist made direct reference to Stalin's opposition to a united peace front. Stalin was criticized for his insistance that in order to achieve the victory of Communism, the "conciliators with the capitalists" must be the main object of opposition. The article went on to state that the conception of intense opposition against "social-reformism", as essential to the victory of Communism, was coming "more and more in conflict with reality." No. 14 (September 1956), 20.

the "working class headed by its vanguard", was of paramount importance. "Without this there can be no transition to socialism."[1]

That Khrushchev's thesis did not imply acceptance of deviations from socialism as practiced by Moscow was made clear by Suslov's address to the Twentieth Party Congress. Suslov stated that only the working class was capable of insuring the completion of the transition to socialism and the prevention of a return to power by the overthrown exploiting classes.[2]

Thus, while Khrushchev's thesis accepted "varied forms" in the transition itself, the end result would be the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the destruction of the parliamentary system through which it had come to power.[3]

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1. Pravda, February 15, 1956. VIII:4, 12.

2. Suslov: "Political leadership of the state by the working class is necessary in order that over a shorter or longer period, depending upon the specific conditions, the capitalist class be deprived of ownership of the means of production and that the means of production be made public property, that all attempts by the overthrown exploiting classes to restore their rule be repulsed, and that socialist reconstruction be organized." Ibid., February 17, 1956. VIII:4, 23.

3. A statement by Khrushchev in an interview with John Walters of the Melbourne Herald on June 11, 1958, demonstrates that this thesis denoted a change in means but not in ideology:
"It was V.I. Lenin who developed the concept that, provided such fundamental principles of the socialist transformation of society as the dictatorship of the proletariat and the leading role of the Communist Party were observed, each country would make its own contribution to the establishment of the socialist system, in accordance with the specific conditions of the given country. The Twentieth Congress of our Party only gave concrete form to this proposition of Lenin's as applied to the situation today ..."
N.S. Khrushchev, For Victory in the Peaceful Competition with Capitalism, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959), p.494.

By 1958, it was apparent that Khrushchev's new approach had failed to bring about a unity of socialist parties in Europe and their cooperation with the Soviet Union. Consequently, greater emphasis was placed upon the establishment of socialist regimes in the Afro-Asian states and the need for local Communist parties to provide leadership and impetus to the revolutionary movement. The actions of the Soviet Government, however, were tempered by an unwillingness to alienate the national governments.

The article "The International Communist Movement at the New Stage# by B. Ponomarev in the October 1958 issue of Kommunist underscored the concern of the Soviet Government not only in regard to the encouragement of national liberation movements in the underdeveloped countries, but also of the role to be assumed by the local Communist parties in realizing the transition to socialism.

> "The progressive forces of these countries draw inspiration for their struggle from the treasure-house of socialist ideology. This advanced ideology promotes the growth of self-consciousness of the popular masses; it opens effective perspectives for the liberation not only from the foreign yoke but also from social slavery; it works out paths of development that respond to the aspirations of the liberated peoples, the path of building a new life." 1

In regard to the local Communist parties the article adds:

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1. B. Ponomarev, "Mezhdunarodnoe Kommunisticheskoe dvizhenie na novom etape," Kommunist, No. 15 (October 1958), 20.

> "The Communist parties alone are showing the popular masses the right way in the struggle for freedom, peace and social progress. The Communist parties alone always remain true to the cause of the workers. The Communist Party, even when it is small, plays an important and progressive role, for it gives the proper orientation to the working class, helps it to understand complicated events and to recognize the political intentions of one or another political grouping ..." [1]

This line was repeated by Khrushchev at the Twenty-first Party Congress, where political problems concerning the underdeveloped countries were mentioned in revolutionary terms, in contrast to problems concerning Europe and the United States which were dealt with on the level of Soviet state policy. This emphasis on the revolutionary aspect in Soviet policy toward the underdeveloped countries marked a change in the tone of Soviet policy since the Twentieth Party Congress.

This change may reflect a less optimistic outlook on the part of Soviet leaders in regard to world conditions than was evident at the Twentieth Party Congress. For the third premise upon which Khrushchev introduced his thesis at the Twentieth Party Congress was that due to "radical changes" on the international scene the transition to socialism need no longer be achieved through revolutionary violence. These changes were explained by Khrushchev as follows:

> "The forces of socialism and democracy have grown immeasurably throughout the world, and capitalism has become much weaker. The mighty camp of socialism with its population of over 900 million is growing and gaining in strength. Its gigantic internal forces, its

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1. B. Ponomarev, "Mezhdunarodnoe Kommunisticheskoe dvizhenie na novom etape," Kommunist, No. 15 (October 1958), p.30

> decisive advantages over capitalism, are being increasingly revealed from day to day. Socialism has a great power of attraction for the workers, peasants, and intellectuals of all countries. The ideas of socialism are indeed coming to dominate the minds of all toiling humanity." [1]

Undoubtedly, Khrushchev felt that the military strength of the Soviet Union would deter the West from opposing the establishment of a socialist regime in any of the underdeveloped countries. However, the emphasis was placed on the appeal of Soviet economic accomplishments as a means of influencing the political and economic development of the Afro-Asian and Latin American states. This appeal would strengthen socialist demands and enable them to gain a parliamentary majority. In such a case, the "reactionary classes" would realize the futility of resistance and voluntarily capitulate to the revolution. Thus, the revolution would be achieved through parliamentary means.

The change in emphasis at the Twenty-first Party Congress may be interpreted as reflecting Khrushchev's dissatisfaction with the achievements of his policy inaugurated at the Twentieth Party Congress and his fear that the workers might become "ideologically disarmed" and that the transition would not be completed. While advancing the thesis on the possibility of a non-violent transition to socialism, Khrushchev did not conceal that socialism means revolution; not a series of progressive reforms, but a complete change in the existing social order.

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1. Pravda, February 15, 1956. VIII:4, 12.

A further difficulty inherent in Khrushchev's thesis was that deviations in the path to socialism might become widespread, thus endangering the position of the Soviet Union as the titular head of the Communist movement.[1] The centrifugal forces could be overcome only by convincing all local Communist parties that the establishment of a socialist state can be reached only with the aid and experience of the Soviet Union, the "most advanced socialist state". The monolithic unity of the socialist bloc might then be enhanced. However, unity can be achieved in this manner only through Soviet hegemony, which contradicts Khrushchev's thesis that socialism can be reached by different paths and his effort to achieve cooperation with non-Communist parties.

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1. This difficulty was apparent in Khrushchev's temporary acceptance of the idea of "national roads to socialism" at the Twentieth Party Congress, in order to improve the situation in Eastern Europe and to give those Communist parties a new vitality. The Polish and Hungarian revolutions in the fall of 1956 had shown this liberal course to be unrealistic. Consequently, the Soviet attitude in 1958 toward the concept of "national roads to socialism" as represented by Yugoslavia, marked a half-way point between the course announced at the Twentieth Party Congress and Stalin's uncompromising attitude.

V. Soviet Economic and Cultural Diplomacy toward the Afro-Asian States.

The Bandung Conference of 1955 and the trip of that same year made by Bulganin and Khrushchev to Afghanistan, Burma and India forced the Soviet leaders to clarify their policies toward the new nationalistic regimes in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. The Stalinist concept of the cold war as a politico-military dual between the Soviet Union and the United States for world domination was unable to explain the international significance of the winning of independence by former colonies or dependent territories. In fact, this concept could admit of no "neutral" or "uncommitted" nation. These territories remained an Anglo-American preserve until that time when they became part of the Communist system.

A major contribution by Khrushchev to Soviet ideology has been the resuscitation of the doctrine of long-range economic competition between the Socialist camp and the West. This doctrine, while a repudiation of the Stalinist politico-military conception of the world situation, was made within the framework of a basic continuity of doctrine.

In 1920, Nikolai Bukharin's Economics of the Transition Period was published.[1] Bukharin's concept of the world revolution was a gradual historical process in which the socialist countries

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1. Nicolai Bukharin, Ekonomika perekhodnogo perioda, Moscow: Government Publishing House, 1920.

would draw former colonies into their sphere of influence by force of "economic attraction". The process would work as follows:

> Former colonies and backward agrarian countries, where there is no proletarian dictatorship, nevertheless enter into economic relations with the industrial socialist republics. Little by little they are drawn into the socialist system, approximately in the same way that peasant agriculture is drawn into it in individual socialist countries. Thus does the world dictatorship of the proletariat grow little by little. As it grows, the resistance of the bourgeoisie weakens, and toward the end the remaining bourgeois complexes will in all probability surrender with all their organizations intact.[1]

It was this image of historical development which underlay Stalin's well-known remark of 1927 in regard to the "victory of socialism in the area of world economy."[2]

However, in the early 1930's the concept of Soviet expansion through "conquest of the world economy" was replaced by the concept of the cold war as a politico-military duel between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. Stalin in re-editing his writings after the war deleted the phrases "conquest of the world economy" and "in the

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1. Ibid., p.153

2. Stalin's formulation of the world revolutionary process, made during an interview with a delegation of workers from the United States, was quoted out of context after the Second World War to show that Stalin had foreseen the "Cold War". However, the "Cold War" in the late 1940's was a politico-military duel between two armed camps, while Stalin in 1927 had cited economics as the decisive factor in the world conflict.

arena of the world economy" from his 1927 statement. By 1934, he stated that a new war "will certainly unleash a revolution," and after the completion of the Second World War Stalin took the path of imperialist expansion and created the satellite states in Eastern Europe. Thus the theory of expansion through "conquest of the world economy" was laid aside until 1956, when it was given new significance by Khrushchev.

Stalin, shortly before his death, recognized that the Second World War had greatly deepened the "crisis of international order", but he failed to realise the extent to which the international system built by the European powers in the nineteenth century had deteriorated. He wrote that the "general crisis" had entered a second stage, especially with the loss of China and the Eastern European countries to the world capitalist system. While one component of this process of dissolution of the colonial empires was the augmented size and strength of the socialist bloc in opposition to the West, the major component - not noted by Stalin, was the departure of the Afro-Asian nations from a position of colonial dependency and tutelage of the West.[1] While some students of international affairs in Moscow understood the trend of developments, for example, the economist

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1. While Stalin in his Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R wrote of the "disintegration of the single world market" and its effect upon the capitalist system, no mention was made of the Afro-Asian nations or colonies. Rather Stalin wrote of the creation of a new economic power (the Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe) in opposition to the West.

Eugene Varga, Stalin overruled such appraisals and insisted that no meaningful change had taken place. The granting of independence to the colonies was in Stalin's opinion simply a "fiction" by which the colonialists and their native agents could stay in power.

The downfall of the old international order is now nearly complete, and it is the revolutionary implications of this historical fact to which Khrushchev had to make the necessary adjustments in Soviet ideology.

The concept of world history as reflecting a "general crisis of capitalism" remains valid, and Soviet doctrine holds to Stalin's tenet that during and after the Second World War the "general crisis" entered into a second and greatly aggravated stage. However, under Khrushchev the post-war collapse of Western hegemony over most of the Afro-Asian states has been recognized, not only as a fait accompli of history, but also, as demonstrating the deepening of the crisis in the second stage. A Soviet monograph written in 1958 notes that this former "reserve of imperialism", showing anti-Western tendencies, could become a "peace zone" serving Soviet interests.[1] The

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1. Quoted in Robert C. Tucker, "Russia, the West, and World Order," World Politics, XII (October 1959), p. 14, from Materialy vsesoiuznogo soveshchaniia zaveduiushchikh kafedrami obshchestvennykh nauk, Moscow: Government Publishing House of Political Literature, 1958. Dragilev's monograph is one of a dozen included in the Materialy.

The term "reserves" was used as early as January 1957 in an editorial in the Soviet journal Kommunist. "The importance of these gigantic reserves is very great for the outcome of world competition."[1] The underdeveloped countries are not an issue in themselves, rather their importance for the Soviet Union lies within the framework of the conflict with the West. Khrushchev's economic policy toward the underdeveloped countries is part of the Soviet strategy to undermine the economic strength of the West.

Since the status quo in Europe is frozen by the nuclear stalemate, the Soviet Union must concentrate on non-European countries in its attempt to weaken the Western bloc as a whole. Seeking the weakest link in the chain, the Soviet Government has turned its attention to the underdeveloped countries, where conditions are propitious for the achievement of Soviet objectives. The importance of this shift in Soviet policy and the aspirations of Soviet leaders were noted in an article in a 1956 issue of the journal Voprosy Ekonomiki.[2]

> The development of antagonisms between metropolitan territories and the colonies has acquired a new character in contemporary conditions; it consists in the disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism.... The question of the complete liquadation of the shameful system of colonialism has been placed on the current agenda as one of the most acute and fateful problems. The peoples of the East, which had played an important role in the development of human civilization but which later fell under the yoke of imperialism, are in

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1. "Vyshe znamia marksistsko-leninskoi ideologii," Kommunist, No. 1 (January 1957), 8.

2. G. A. Deborin, "Leninskii printsip mirnogo sosushchestvovaniia gosudarstv razlichnykh sotsial'nykh sistem," Voprosy ekonomiki, No. 4 (April 1956), 20-21.

> the process of regeneration. These peoples take an increasingly more active part in decisions concerning the fate of the whole world.... The disintegration of the colonial system of imperialism means the loss by the monopolies of an important source of profits. This leads not only to a weakening of the general position of capitalism and of the aggressive forces that it generates, but imperialism loses the opportunity of manoeuvering and overcoming difficulties at the expense of colonial countries. It looses markets, spheres of investment, and millions of colonial slaves on whose sufferings and bones the wealth of multi-millionaires was built up. Imperialism looses the opportunity to receive cheaply military-strategic raw materials.

In this opening report to the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev introduced the subject of economic aid, which was to become an important part of Soviet diplomacy toward the underdeveloped countries. He noted the need of the underdeveloped countries for credits and machinary in order to carry forth their plans for industrialization, and the ability of the Soviet Union to supply these needs. The Soviet Union was presented as an example of rapid economic development.

> These countries, although they do not belong to the socialist system, can draw on its achievements in building an independent national economy and in raising their peoples' living standards. Today they need not go begging to their former oppressors for modern equipment. They can get it in the socialist countries, free from any political or military obligations.[1]

Prior to the Twentieth Party Congress, Soviet economic aid to the Arab-Asian nations had not been spectacular. The lack of

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1. Pravda, February 15, 1956. VIII:4,7.

emphasis placed on an economic offensive was due to the inability of Moscow to match American offers of credits and technical assistance and to the maintenance of a policy orientated largely along lines of political warfare. The most striking success of Soviet strategy in the Middle East had been the arms deal with Egypt. This shipment of arms led to a series of notes between the Soviet and Western governments. While Soviet insistence on an equal voice in Middle Eastern affairs, implicit in the notes, was resisted by the Western powers, the Soviet handling of the issue was not without effectiveness.

Almost simultaneous with the arms shipment to Egypt occurred Bulganin's and Khrushchev's tour of Afganistan, Burma, and India in late 1955. In contrast to the arms shipment to the Egyptian Government, offers of aid for economic development were made to the Asian states. A 132 million dollar credit at low interest was offered to India. This credit would be used to finance the Soviet undertaking of building a steel plant at Bhilai. In Burma the Russians offered to build a technological institute, hospital, theater, sportsstadium and hotel as a gift to the Burmese people. While Afganistan was granted military equipment valued at 25 million dollars, the emphasis was on the granting of Soviet credit to finance projects which would have an immediate effect upon the national economy. A credit of 100 million dollars was granted.

Since its inauguration during the Bulganin-Khrushchev tour, the Soviet aid program has been expanded to include development programs

in many of the Afro-Asian countries.

The change in tactics is most evident in the Middle East. In this vital geographical area, economics now play a major role in Soviet diplomacy. While the objectives of this policy are still politico-strategic, the means of achieving these objectives are no longer military or political threats but economic. In regard to political tactics, the Soviet Government has shown great hesitancy to give any support to local Communist parties. The vital element which makes possible the pursuance of economic policies is the enhanced economic strength of the Soviet Union since its economic recovery from the devastation of the Second World War. The combination of the expanded economic capabilities of the Soviet Union and the intense nationalism of the former colonial countries, with their aspirations for rapid economic development, has given to the Soviet effort to win influence in these areas a dynamic which it formerly lacked.

Economic support is closely linked to support by the Soviet Union of nationalistic, revolutionary movements. In discussing programs for economic aid, Soviet spokesmen have continuously stressed that political independence cannot survive unless economic independence is assured, i.e. economic independence of the West. In 1960 on the anniversary of Lenin's birth, Kuusinen stated: "Our relations with the states that have newly arisen rest on comprehensive, disinterested assistance in the consolidation of their political and economic independence."[1]

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1. Pravda, April 23, 1960. XII:17, 9.

Public statements by Soviet officials stress that the Soviet Government does not seek any advantages for itself. While no political clauses are attached to grants of credits and technical aid, they are carefully designed to produce long-range economic consequences favorable to the achievement of Soviet policy objectives. If not, it would be difficult to understand Khrushchev's principle of "mutual advantage", since the terms of such grants are most generous, consisting of long-term maturities and low interest rates. For example, the repayment clauses of Soviet grants usually provide for redemption in the products of the recipient country. This mode of redemption serves Soviet policy objectives by making Soviet grants more attractive than those of the Western states, since the underdeveloped countries are unable to finance grants by gold payments or in hard currencies, and the repayment by the export of primary products binds more closely the foreign trade of the recipient country to the Soviet Union.

A case example is the orders by the Soviet Union for Egyptian cotton in 1955. The initial Soviet orders pushed the price of Egyptian cotton above the world market price and thus decreased Western orders. This unfavorable condition plus the cost to the Egyptian Government for arms deliveries from Czechoslovakia in 1955 lead to a decrease in Egypt's holding of hard currencies and to the need for economic aid and the desire for economic experimentation. President Nasser's requests for Soviet aid were granted in January 1958 with a loan of 700 million rubles, followed by loans from Czechoslovakia and East Germany. By

creating a sharp increase in imports of capital goods, which in turn necessitates a larger export of domestic produce, Soviet grants are able to effect the economies of the recipient countries.

Khrushchev's policy of economic assistance to the underdeveloped countries as part of his policy of economic competition with the West has not gone unopposed in the Communist bloc,[1] and in the answers to these critics the motives behind these grants are brought more clearly into focus. In answer to the critics' charge that economic aid would strengthen non-Communist regimes it was argued that even Lenin recognized that pre-industrial societies must pass through a minimul state of economic development before they would be ready for a proletarian revolution. The charge that economic aid would weaken the position of local Communist parties in the underdeveloped countries was answered by Academician Arzumanyan in "Pravda" on July 9, 1958. He noted that the underdeveloped countries are unable to solve the problems of rapid industrialization "along ordinary capitalist lines". He justified the granting of economic aid, in that "the peoples of these countries will become more and more convinced that not capitalism, but socialism, is their immediate future."[2]

The Khrushchev argument for economic aid must be seen in its long-range political effect. While such aid may strengthen the economic position of the recipient country as a non-socialist state,

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1. For example, see Maxim Saburov's speech of recantation at the Twenty-first Party Congress, in which he stated that the "anti-Party group" opposed Soviet economic assistance to the underdeveloped countries.

2. Tucker, op. cit., 17.

it does, however, reinforce the political and economic status of non-attachment to the West. And accelerating the movement away from the Western political order and Western influence is viewed by Khrushchev as altering the balance of world power in favor of the Soviet bloc. In opposition to tactics of internal subversion, which necessitate internal economic and political chaos creating a vacuum which the local Communist party can fill, Khrushchev has chosen to adopt those tactics so long attributed to the Western powers. In Khrushchev's words:

> "The magnanimous aid of the socialist countries, which is enjoyed by the states that have gained independence, will help to put an end to distrust of the ideas of socialism and Communism, while this in turn will also aid the movement toward socialism." [1]

In further support of Khrushchev and in answer to the criticism that Soviet economic aid will create "state capitalism" in the recipient countries, a contributor to a collection of monographs compiled by the Ministry of Higher Education of the U.S.S.R. in 1958[2] argues that the emergence of "state capitalism" in these countries will strengthen them against Western economic penetration or political influence and will constrict Western markets, thereby causing a detrimental effect upon the economies of the Western states. The example given is the effect upon the British textile industry resulting from the development of a textile industry in India. Dragilev, the author of the monograph, advances the theory that

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1. V pomoshch politicheskomu samoobrazovaniiu, (Moscow: Government Publishing House of Political Literature, 1959), p.53.

2. Tucker, op.cit., 13-14.

this harmful effect upon the Western economies will intensify the difficulties between labor and management, thus intensifying the internal class struggle.

The short-range objective of Soviet economic aid is to win influence among the peoples of the underdeveloped countries by aiding them in their desire for rapid technological development and to make the recipient countries economically and politically independent of the West. The long-term objective is the creation of conditions which will favor the development of the recipient country's economy along socialist lines, thereby also effecting the political framework of the state and to bring that country into closer alignment with the Soviet bloc. These objectives can best be achieved, according to the supporters of current Soviet policies, by making the foreign trade of the underdeveloped countries dependent upon the Soviet Union through trading policies and Soviet grants, and secondly, by the creation of an industrial proletariat. While Soviet propaganda has been able with some success to exploit local nationalism and anti-Western feelings, the achievement of Soviet policy objectives have been obstructed in the Middle East, for example, by the force of the Islamic faith and the prevalent existence of an illiterate fellahin or peasant class. As the Russian peasant class presented a serious obstacle to the implementation of the first Five-Year plan, so do the peasant masses of the underdeveloped countries pose a barrier to Soviet plans. By promoting industrialization of these countries, the Russians can hope to accelerate the process of transformation of these masses

into a class of industrial workers.

In an effort to win the support of Afro-Asian intellectuals for Soviet policies, a substantial proportion of Soviet aid to the underdeveloped countries has been allocated to cultural undertakings. In his speech of February 21, 1960, at the Indonesian University of Gadjah Mada, Khrushchev announced that a University for the Friendship of Peoples would be founded in Moscow.[1] In keeping with the principles of "peaceful coexistence" and "noninterference in the affairs of other States", the University for the Friendship of Peoples was not created as a training school for revolutionaries, but rather to facilitate the creation of a pro-Soviet intelligentsia. Of course, as in all Soviet Universities, students will be expected to attend a basic course in social science based on the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of history. However, the purpose of the University for the Friendship of Peoples does denote a major change from the policy of the former Communist University of the Toilers of the East, whose purpose, according to Stalin, was to send forth "warriors armed with the powerful weapon of Leninism."[2] The end result may be the same, but the difference in approach demonstrates the new orientation of Khrushchev's policy toward the underdeveloped countries.

No longer is Soviet propaganda directed primarily to the proletarian or peasant masses of the Afro-Asian countries, but rather,

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1. Pravda, February 22, 1960.

2. J.V. Stalin, Sochineniia, (Moscow: Government Publishing House of Political Literature, 1952), IX, p.313.

scholarships are offered for study in the Soviet Union, which are easily obtainable by almost any qualified student. Other methods are also employed to attract the support of Afro-Asian intellectuals, as, for example, the publication of articles by leaders and writers of the Afro-Asian countries in Soviet journals, for which the authors are remunerated.[1] A series of Afro-Asian conferences of writers, youth groups, cinema producers, economic specialists, etc., in 1958 and 1959 afforded Soviet delegates the opportunity to make contacts with leading African and Asian intellectuals. Of great assistance to the Soviet Government has been the Musilum population of Soviet Central Asia, where the Afro-Asian Conference of Writers was held in Tashkent in October 1958.

The praise given to local intellectuals, as well as financial support through translations of their writings, is part of a Soviet policy designed to alienate the Afro-Asian intellectuals from the West. The slogans "anti-colonialism" and "appreciation for native cultural traditions" have been utilized in an attempt to convince Afro-Asian intellectuals that "only in socialist countries are their national cultural traditions sincerely appreciated."[2]

The short-run objectives of these cultural policies are several: the undermining of Western influence; to present to

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1. To cite one example, the May 1959 issue of Sovremennii vostok included articles by Prince Norodom Sihanouk of the Cambodian Royal Government, an Indian journalist and Algerian, Indonesian and Korean contributors.

2. Frederick C. Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy (Princetown, N.J.: University Press, 1960), p.195.

the peoples of these countries, particularly to the intellectuals, an appealing picture of Soviet life and a justification of Soviet domestic and foreign policies; to establish contacts between Soviet cultural, educational and scientific organizations and their counterparts in the Afro-Asian countries; and to influence the attitudes and, if possible, the policies of local political leaders.

In conclusion, the basic trends in the current policy (1958-1960) of the Soviet Union toward the Afro-Asian states are: to establish better relations between these countries and the Soviet Union through economic and cultural policies, while exploiting the resentment against the West accumulated during the colonial period, in order to estrange them from the West; to encourage economic development by offering technical and financial aid and the Soviet Union as a model of a country having achieved rapid industrialization, while evoking suspicion against financial assistance from the West; and to support all quarrels of the Afro-Asian states with the West and the trend toward political neutrality, a term which the Soviet Union understands as denoting an anti-Western attitude.

VI. Soviet Policies toward the National Bourgeoisie.

The third key to an understanding of Soviet tactics toward the Afro-Asian nations is the support of nationalistic movements for independence from the colonial powers and the national bourgeoisie, which comprises the ruling group in the new states.

As stated above, the Bandung Conference of April, 1955, signified the emergence of a new bloc on the international scene - the Afro-Asian bloc of neutralist nations, which made necessary a readjustment in the attitude of the Soviet Government toward the former colonial states. The change from Stalin's oversimplified division of the world into two blocs began as early as 1954, when the Soviet leaders sought to achieve a policy of collaboration with nationalistic governments of the Nasser type. This more moderate course in the relations of the Soviet Union with the neutralist states was codified by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress in February, 1955. Khrushchev noted that the world was now divided into three camps. In addition to the Soviet bloc of "peace and democracy" and the "imperialist" bloc, there had emerged a "peace bloc" as typified by India.[1]

In his attack on the "sectarian errors" of Soviet orientalists and historians who had condemned such national leaders as Gandhi as reactionaries, Kuusinen introduced at the Twentieth Party Congress the new interpretation of the role of the national bourgeoisie in the winning of independence for their countries. The magazine "Sovetskoe

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1. It was in this report by Khrushchev to the Twentieth Party Congress that the phrase "peace bloc" was officially introduced into Soviet doctrine.

vostokovedenie", in accordance with this new directive, wrote that several countries; India, Burma, Egypt and Indonesia being cited as examples, had achieved their sovereignty "under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie."[2] The rehabilitation of the national bourgeoisie and the recognition of the "progressive role" played by these leaders in liberation movements enabled the Soviet Union to form closer relations with the national leaders of the Afro-Asian countries and to support the formation of a neutralist bloc. As long as national leaders such as Nasser, Nehru and U Nu were referred to as "instruments of the imperialists," the Soviet Government would not be able to aid the process of abandonment of the Western camp by the new states for a neutralist bloc.

The change in attitude toward the policy of neutrality enabled Khrushchev to praise the national leaders for their neutralist position and to work for a closer alliance between the two "peace" blocs in opposition to the West. Addressing the Indian Parliament during his trip to India in February, 1960, Khrushchev praised Nehru and the Indian Government for its "wisdom" in pursuing a policy of neutrality and for "its policy of keeping out of war blocs." He went on to justify the military strength of the Soviet Union, which had been "compelled" to arm itself, in order to "counter-balance the aggressive military alliances of the imperialist powers." But,

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2. Quoted in Georg A. von Stackelberg, "'Peaceful Coexistence' Between the Communists and the National Bourgeoisie," Bulletin, VII (July 1960), 5, from Sovetskoe vostokovedenie, No. 1 (1956), 8.

he continued, "we would be happy to see all the war blocs abolished..." [1]

However, what is envisaged in Soviet policy is not the emergence of a bloc truly neutralist in its policies, but a decidedly anti-Western bloc comprising a great majority of nations and peoples.[2] In the 1958 monograph by M.S. Dragilev mentioned above, the phrase "anti-imperialist bloc" is used as an alternative to the phrase "peace zone".[3] Underlying Soviet comments praising "neutralism" and pledging Soviet support to governments pursuing a policy of neutralism is the conviction that the Afro-Asian nations, once a "reserve" of imperialism, will gradually adopt a pro-Soviet attitude, while becoming increasingly anti-Western in their policies. It is this brand of neutralism which Soviet economic and cultural policies are designed to promote, thereby enhancing Soviet world strategy. The anti-Western element in the neutralism which is envisaged for the Afro-Asian bloc was emphasized in the Declaration of the Moscow Conference of Eighty-One Communist Parties, which was

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1. N.S. Khrushchev, O vneshnei politike Sovetskogo Soiuza (Moscow: Government Publishing House of Political Literature, 1961), I, p. 77.

2. That a practical reason for supporting the national bourgeoisie was its anti-Western character was noted in the leading editorial of the May 1956 issue of Sovetskoe vostokovedenie. "Whatever may be the difference in the social and economic structure of those countries (the Afro-Asian states) and the countries of the socialist system, their struggle for peace and economic independence objectively deepens the general crisis of capitalism, leads to further disintegration of the imperialist colonial system, strengthens the position of peace, democracy and socialism in the whole world." Quoted in Wladyslaw W. Kulski, Peaceful Co-existence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959), p. 216.

3. Passages from this monograph are quoted in Robert C. Tucker, "Russia, the West, and World Order," World Politics, XII (October 1959), 1-10.

held in November and December of 1960.[1]

> In the present circumstances, the national bourgeoisie of the colonial and dependent countries, not being linked with imperialistic circles, has an objective interest in achieving the main tasks of the anti-imperialist, antifeudal revolution and therefore retains the capacity to participate in the revolutionary struggle against imperialism and feudalism. In this sense, it possesses a progressive character.[2]

Closely linked to the Soviet concept of neutralism is Khrushchev's attitude toward the national bourgeoisie. Although there has been a significant change in attitude toward the national bourgeoisie since Stalin's death and his successors have called for a revaluation of the role played by such leaders in the liberation of their countries, Stalin's standpoint as regarding the role of the national bourgeoisie as useful but only temporary in nature has not lost its general validity. While Soviet leaders since 1955 have been careful not to create sufficient antagonism to steam the anti-Western sentiments of many of the Afro-Asian leaders, the temporary nature of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the national bourgeoisie was brought into the open at the Twenty-first Party Congress and in subsequent articles in Soviet periodicals. By 1959 the "peace Bloc" and "united front" tactics initiated by Khrushchev in 1955 and 1956 had not produced the political successes, which Khrushchev had undoubtedly anticipated in 1955. In contrast to his address to the Twentieth Party Congress, which emphasized economic aid and the principle

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1. While the Conference occurred six months after the Summit Conference in Paris and thus falls outside the general time limit of the thesis the above quotation was utilized as it did not represent a change in policy but rather, was a more precise statement on a policy already in practice.

2. Pravda, December 6, 1960. Italics added.

of "peaceful transition to socialism" for the benefit of the neutralists, Khrushchev in his address to the Twenty-first Party Congress denounced those in the U.A.R. responsible for anti-Communist statements and denied the allegation that the local Communist parties deviated from the Arab nationalist cause. He placed far greater emphasis than in 1956 on the need of the Afro-Asian states for continued Soviet support, both in their economic development and in the "joint struggle against imperialism." However, Khrushchev repeated his support for the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states. While recognising the difficulties in ideological accommodation between the socialist and neutralist countries, Khrushchev went on to explain the need for closer cooperation between the two blocs.

> We do not conceal the fact that we and some of the leaders of the United Arab Republic have divergent views in the sphere of ideology. But our position coincides with theirs in questions of the struggle against imperialism, of strengthening the political and economic independence of countries that have freed themselves from colonialism, and of the struggle against the war danger. The differences in ideological views should not impede the development of friendly relations between our countries and the cause of joint struggle against imperialism.[1]

Although articles written after the Twentieth Party Congress on the role of the national bourgeoisie made the reservation that social revolution could be achieved only under the leadership of the proletariat, Soviet views on the role of these leaders had undergone modification by 1959.[2] The new line implies that with the

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1. Pravda, January 28, 1959. XI:4,21.
2. Ibid.

achievement of independence the national bourgeoisie retards the necessary social and economic reforms which should follow.[1]

There is also evidence that the dogma of the proletariat as the only class capable of achieving full independence is being given new emphasis. In an article entitled "The dissolution of the colonial system in Africa", the author, I.I. Potekhin, writes that in certain countries, i.e. the people's democracies of North Korea, North Viet Nam, China,

> the political rule of the foreign imperialist bourgeosie is replaced by the authority of the people headed by the working class; then along with the end to political enslavement also comes the end to the economic enslavement and exploitation of the country by foreign monopolies.
> ...
> In other countries... the colonial regime is replaced by the authority of the national bourgeoisie or even of the local feudal lords, and then the economic dependence of a country on foreign capital is maintained for some time, even for a prolonged period.[2]

An entire section - Section IV, of the Declaration issued by the Moscow Conference of Eighty-one Communist parties in November 1960 was devoted to the new attitude toward the national bourgeoisie. The Declaration upholds the principle on non-interference and states that the choice of means to solve economic and social problems is an internal affair, and as did the 1957 Declaration, it called for a

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1. For example, Pravda on February 3, 1959, printed in its entirety a statement by Khaled Beglash, head of the Syrian Communist Party, criticising the Egyptian Government for "forbidding the democratic press, all democratic publications" and for the arrests of "progressively inclined patriots."

2. Quoted in Georg A. von Stackelberg, op. cit., 7, from Problemy vostokovedeniia (January 1960), 15.

"united national democratic front of all the patriotic forces of the nation." However, and in this respect the 1960 Declaration differs from its predecessor, it stressed that "the working class... stands for the consistent completion of ... the national, anti-imperialist, democratic revolution" and that emphasis should be placed on the creation of a "state sector in the national economy, particularly in industry, independent of foreign monopolies, and consequently developing into a decisive factor in the country's economy."[1]

An understanding of this new attitude explains the seemingly contradictory policy of Khrushchev toward Egypt, to cite one example, where President Nasser was attacked in the Soviet press and journals for his anti-Communist actions, while the Soviet Government continued to grant economic aid to the Egyptian Government. The main factor in the coexistence with the national bourgeoisie is the maintenance by these governments of an international position of neutrality, which is of great importance to the Soviet Union. Economic aid will continue to be granted in order to maintain such neutrality. On the other hand, beginning in 1959 Soviet propaganda more strongly stressed the "essential role of the Communist parties" in economic and social reform. An article in the April 1960 issue of Kommunist openly stated that "whoever raises a hand against the Communists [referring to local Communist parties in the Asian states]

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1. Pravda, November 22, 1957.

is in fact attacking the national-liberation movement in the East as a whole, willy-nilly furthering the evil cause of colonialism and imperialism."[1] Such remarks constitute an indictment of the national bourgeoisie for having made concessions to Western governments or business interests at the expense of their country's effort to make itself economically and politically independent. The magazine Problemy vostokovedeniia in the January 1960 issue referred to gradual constitutional reforms as the "tactics and strategy of the imperialist powers aimed at preventing with all means possible the dissolution of the colonial system."[2] The article went on to state that while the national bourgeoisie had fought for its country's independence, it had done so primarily "in order to safeguard their class interests" and not the interests of their country or people.

The new emphasis upon the proletariat as the only "consistent fighter for national and social freedom" and the criticism by the Soviet press of such national leaders as Nasser did not imply a change as regards the problem of cooperation with the national bourgeoisie, but rather demonstrate the temporary nature of such cooperation.

The resumption of a negative attitude toward the national bourgeoisie was closely related to those comments in the 1960 Declaration which referred to the favorable conditions at present for the formation of "national democratic states" in many countries. The term "national democratic state" is similar in meaning to the term "people's democracy", although the former stresses an alleged independence

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1. Kommunist, April 1960, 100.

2. Quoted in Georg A. von Stackelberg, op. cit., 9, from Problemy vostokovedeniia (January 1960), 21.

from the policies of Moscow. According to Communist doctrine in regard to the development of a colonial country into a proletarian dictatorship, a national bourgeois revolution, i.e. a revolution freeing a country from colonial dependence and leading to the establishment of a nationalistic bourgeois government, should be followed by a bourgeois democratic revolution, i.e. the formation of a coalition government with Communist participation. The latter in turn should undergo transition into a "national democracy", i.e. a government in which the Communist party is dominant.[1]

In contrast to the 1957 Declaration which urged collaboration with social-democratic parties, the 1960 Declaration criticized the "demogogic exploitation" by bourgeois politicians of socialist slogans. Thus, although Khrushchev states that the Soviet Government supports the principle of noninterference, it may be inferred that the term "socialism" must be understood as Moscow interprets it, or the national leader will be reproached for using socialistic slogans for demogogic purposes.

The 1960 Declaration also enumerated several tasks which confront the "progressive forces" in the Afro-Asian countries. These tasks include the development of economic and cultural collaboration with the socialist countries, to continue the national revolution after the achievement of independence, and the creation of a comprehensive state sector of industry.

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1. Malaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 3rd ed. (1958), II, p. 33.

The conclusion of Section IV of the Declaration stated that:

> the countries of socialism are sincere and loyal friends of the peoples who are fighting to free themselves or who have already freed themselves from the imperialist yoke ... [1]

With the publication of the 1960 Declaration it appeared that Moscow would continue its policy of cooperation with the national bourgeoisie without any break in the near future. However, the Declaration made clear in the strongest language since the adoption of the new line at the Twentieth Party Congress the temporary nature of such cooperation. This modification brings the Soviet attitude toward the national bourgeoisie much closer to Khrushchev's understanding of peaceful coexistence with the West.

The greatest difficulty in cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Afro-Asian countries was noted by W. Laquer in an article entitled "Arab Unity vs. Soviet Expansion." In writing of post-revolutionary Iraq, he stated:

> The startling growth of Communist strength in Iraq following the change of regimes soon threatened the Communist-nationalist partnership with the same peril that had wrecked Communist alliances with the national bourgeoisie as far back as the 1920's. This peril springs from the fact that Communist-nationalist collaboration, though possible as long as the Communist movement remains relatively small and uninfluential, inevitably breaks down whenever the Communists become strong enough to present a major threat to the national ruling stratum. [2]

The significance of Khrushchev's attitude toward the national bourgeoisie is that having recognized that this class holds the power of government in the Afro-Asian states because of the insufficient strength

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1. Pravda, December 6, 1960.

2. Walter Z. Laquer, "Arab Unity vs. Soviet Expansion," Problems of Communism, VIII (May-June 1959), 42.

of the Communists, Khrushchev sought to win the cooperation of this element while not sacrificing the essential interests of the local Communist parties. In order to win the support of the national bourgeoisie the Soviet Government has supported the idea of moderate revolutions with a broad base including all anti-Western elements, Communist and non-Communist. During the initial stages of the revolution, the local Communist parties are to compensate their numerical inferiority by making temporary alliances and supporting moderate reforms. The Communist parties will work to strengthen the anti-Western attitude and to prepare themselves for the eventual assumption of power. As expressed in an article in Kommunist in 1955:

> The existence of significant feudal survivals in these countries is combined with the foreign imperialist oppression. The people's democratic revolution is not only anti-feudal but also anti-imperialist and a national liberation revolution. This circumstance widens the social base of the revolution in the colonial and dependent countries. The proletariat may rely on attracting to the liberating struggle not only the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia, but also the national bourgeoisie interested in liberating the market and national economy from foreign competitors, and in the destruction of feudal survivals. However, the policy of making use of the revolutionary potential of the national bourgeoisie does not eliminate the problem of the struggle of the working class against the national bourgeoisie for leadership in the liberating movement.[1]

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1. N.V. Tropkin, "O strategii i taktike leninizma," Kommunist, No. 1 (January 1955), 98.

VII. The Soviet Union and Western Military Alliances.

The primary task of any government faced by a strong adversary is to weaken, if not disintegrate, the enemy coalition. Thus, a major objective of Soviet foreign policy is to weaken the Western system of alliances. A disintegration of this system, global in scope, would greatly affect the balance ofpower in the underdeveloped countries, and it is in this area that Soviet policy is challenging the West, since no major changes can be effected in Europe in the near future without the risk of war. The rapidity with which the United States and Great Britain were able to send troops to the Lebanon and Jordan in the summer of 1958 clearly demonstrated to the Soviet leadership the need to cripple the military mobility of the United States. Therefore, the elimination of American power in Europe and the overseas bases of the United States was of primary importance to the power position of the Soviet Union. Until the Soviet Union acquires a sufficient stockpile of long-range ballistic missiles to counterbalance the strategic disadvantage of distance with equal power of retaliation against the United States, the existence of American bases on the periphery of the Soviet Union will remain a major problem for a Soviet Government wishing to change the status quo.

Soviet opposition to American bases on foreign territory often takes the form of moralistic arguments. It is claimed that the United States, pursuing aggressive aims through its military alliances, is a threat to world peace. Soviet bases are either not mentioned or defended as existing only for defensive purposes. Typical is the

following statement from an article printed in Pravda.

> "The establishment of the American military bases on foreign territories does not pursue any other objectives but the preparation of an aggressive war and the imperialist expansion of the USA ... The American bases represent a serious threat to the peoples on whose territories they are located ... Millions of simple people in all countries, acting in the interest of peace and security, demand the evacuation of American armed forces from foreign lands." [1]

Many of the neutralist states are receptive to the Soviet propaganda against American bases, as they feel, and not without reason, that there is little risk in criticizing Western imperialism or colonialism, which is already of small significance, or Western military blocs and bases. However, similar condemnation of Soviet military policies would lead to a deterioration in relations between the two states. Striving to secure their independence, these states often pursue a policy of maintaining relations with both blocs, thereby receiving financial and technical assistance from both the Soviet Union and the West. Having once been colonial dependencies of the West, it is quite natural that they should assert their independence in policies of an anti-Western orientation.

Also of importance is a difference in attitude on the part of the neutralist states to the distribution of international forces. Because their national interests are of a more limited geographical scope, they are more sensitive to the local balance of power than

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1. T. Belanshchenko, "Amerikanskiie voennye basy - ugroza mira," Pravda, February 8, 1956.

to the conflict between the Soviet Union and the West. For example, the participation of Pakistan in SEATO and the former Baghdad Pact were of greater significance to India than the world distribution of forces.

The weakening of Western military strength being a major objective of Soviet foreign policy, NATO is of great significance for the Soviet Union. With the introduction of nuclear warheads and intermediate range ballistic missiles into NATO troops in December 1957, the Soviet Union was confronted with the prospect of a strong military power on the European continent under American control. With the strengthening of NATO forces, there was a corresponding increase in Soviet pressure to weaken this military alliance. For to Soviet leaders, NATO represented the penetration of the United States militarily and politically into the European landmass and the creation of a bridgehead contrary to Soviet interests.

The core of the alliance system upon which the United States depends is NATO, and an integral part of this alliance is West Germany. If Soviet diplomacy could achieve the withdrawal of the occupation forces from German territory and the withdrawal of the West German Government from NATO, the Soviet Government might hope for a substantial weakening if not the disintegration of the alliance. The importance of the economic and military contributions of West Germany to the total power advantage of the West is understood, if not exagerated, by Khrushchev. The economic strength of West Germany is an essential part of European prosperity, and the military support

of West Germany is necessary if NATO is to serve a greater function than to furnish a legal right for the retention of American and British troops in Central Europe.

In an attempt to curb American military power on the European continent, Khrushchev has tried to widen the differences between the Western allies by stirring up European nationalistic feelings against alledged American interference and to revive anti-German sentiment. Since the admission of West Germany to NATO in 1955, and particularly after the decision to supply NATO forces with nuclear warheads in 1957, the Soviet press has attacked this alliance, created for defense against Soviet aggression, as an aggressive military alliance and has stressed the danger of new German military "adventures".

An Izvestia editorial, undoubtedly for British consumption, noted the implications for Great Britain of a militarily and economically strengthened West Germany.

> "Only a few years ago, Britain had no serious competitors as American's No. 1 ally. Its voice was the strongest among the capitalist powers of Western Europe on all major political problems in this area. In recent years, the Bonn Government has succeeded in replacing Britain to a great extent as Washington's favorite. It now feels strong enough to reject any form of British leadership in Western European affairs. Moreover, it has concluded, at least for the time being, an informal alliance with France, Britain's ally for the past 50 years, an alliance directed to a considerable extent against Britain." 1

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1. S. Madzoievsky, Izvestia, September 5, 1959. XI:36, 15.

During his trip to France in March 1960 Khrushchev made continual references to past Franco-German relations and to the devastation wrought upon France by German armies. The Soviet press stressed the theme that German rearmament was equally dangerous to France and the Soviet Union, and that "it would be naive to believe that the West German revanchists have forgotten the road to the West."[1] The Soviet press also bitterly attacked the Franco-German rapprochement as a union of French "reactionary circles" and West German "revenge-seekers", a union contrary to the true interest of the French people and which increases the danger of war. That Khrushchev had hoped for some success in his effort to disrupt the Franco-German union explains the imprecise and unenthusiastic nature of his speech at the Luzhniki Sport Palace in Moscow upon his return from France. While the Soviet press described the trip in a rapturous tone, there seemed to be a puzzled attitude among the Russians as to the indifference with which the French reacted to Khrushchev's anti-German remarks.[2]

These warnings of the German "danger" have been accompanied

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1. M. Voslensky, Izvestia, March 26, 1951. XI:12, 31.

2. In a private conversation with writer and former BBC commentator Alexander Werth one Soviet correspondent remarked: "The thing that has bothered us most during his (Khrushchev's trip to France is that the French seem to have forgotten the German invasions. Can it be that Verdun - which was, after all, their Stalingrad - no longer rings a bell? Makes one wonder whether Ehrenburg and all our other 'French experts' have not gorssly exaggerated the anti-Boche sentiment existing in France." Alexander Werth, The Khrushchev Phase (London: Robert Hale Ltd., 1961), pp.240-41.

with threats of nuclear anihilation, should NATO take aggressive action against any member state of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Great Britain was warned by Deputy Bazhan of the Supreme Soviet, that in case of war, "Britain will be subject from the very first day, if not from the very first hour, to crippling retalitory blows dealt with every modern means of destruction."[1]

Throughout 1958 Soviet efforts to eliminate West Germany as a military power were intensified. Indeed, in Khrushchev's view, a strong pro-Western state, especially Germany, in the heart of Central Europe presented a major threat to the present balance of power on the Continent and an obstacle to Soviet long-range objectives in Europe.

The signing of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization was proposed by Khrushchev in May 1958 as part of his policy to secure the neutralization of Germany. New support was also given to the idea of disengagement. A plan which created some interest in the West and was supported by Khrushchev was the Rapacki plan, named after Poland's foreign minister. This plan was first presented by the Polish Government to the General Assembly of the United Nations in October 1957. Encountering objections by the Western delegates, the plan was redrafted and submitted for the second time in February 1958. The Rapacki plan for the neutralization of Central Europe would have created a zone comprising Poland, Czechoslovakia and both sectors of Germany,

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1. Pravda, December 27, 1958. XI:3, 22.

which would be free from the production and stockpiling of atomic weapons. The Soviet Government gave its full support to the plan and proposed a conference of the major powers to discuss it. However, the West rejected the plan as an effort to consolidate Soviet predominance in Central Europe and to leave Germany defenseless against interference in its affairs by para-military forces.

The failure of the Soviet Government to gain acceptance for such a plan lead to a reemphasis on the liquidation of foreign military bases. With this end in mind plus the desire for a Summit Conference, Khrushchev proposed in March 1958 a ban on arms in outer space in return for the liquidation of all military bases on foreign soil.[1] Appeals were also made to the countries on whose territory missile sites were located to reject them, these appeals often being accompanied by threat of nuclear anihilation. Throughout 1958-1959 Khrushchev tried to reintroduce the subject of disengagement into international negociations. The Balkan countries were urged to forbid the placement of missiles on their territory, thus paving the way "for the restoration of lasting peace in this area and for its conversion into a zone free of atomic weapons and missile bases."[2] At the Twenty-first Party Congress Khrushchev announced that an atom-free zone in the Far East and Pacific basin "can and must be created."

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1. Quoted by J.M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 209, from the Observer, March 16, 1958.

2. Pravda, May 31, 1959.

However, by mid-1958 it was evident that the Western powers were unwilling to call a Summit Conference to discuss the issue of disengagement in Central Europe, and West Germany was rapidly being incorporated into the Western defense system. It was in this atmosphere that the Berlin challenge came forth in November 1958.[1] Thus, a new offensive against Western Europe was initiated through the Berlin issue by the interjection of the use of the threat of war. Although Khrushchev was quick to inform the West that the Soviet Union had not issued an ultimatum, the seriousness of the issue lead to an exchange of visits among world leaders and an agreement to hold a Summit Conference in May 1960. Though Khrushchev's tactic contained an element of risk, the Soviet Union did succeed, against the backdrop of the Berlin crisis, in reopening discussion on the issue of European security. At the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Geneva in the summer of 1959 the Soviet Union again raised the issues of disengagement in Central Europe, the "military threat" to the Soviet Union by NATO and recognition of East Germany.

While the Berlin crisis raised the threat of war, the ultimate action of the Soviet Union demonstrated that Khrushchev

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1. Mackintosh, op.cit., p.217, states: "It would be an exaggeration to say that the Soviet Government deliberately raised the Berlin issue ... to compel the Western Powers to agree to a Summit Conference. But it is probably true to say that the Berlin issue was raised in order to recapture the initiative in the diplomatic field, to reactivate the pressure on the Western bridgehead suspended during the Middle East crisis, and to try to force the West once again on to the political and diplomatic defensive."

was unwilling to challenge the status quo in Western Europe without the ability to retreat in the advent that war would be precipitated. Rather, the Soviet Government will attempt to achieve the weakening of American power in Europe and the exclusion of West Germany from NATO through negociations and concessions.

More effective than Soviet threats of the use of force or direct challenges such as in Berlin has been Khrushchev's strategy of supporting the peace movement in the neutral countries combined with Soviet propaganda depicting the United States and West Germany as the chief opponents of peace.[1] West Germany is held to be a threat to European security and the likely center of a future war, while the United States is indicted for reviving German imperialism through economic and military support of the Federal German Republic.

Khrushchev's demands for summit conferences, complete

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1. The directives of isolating the United States and holding up Germany as the greatest threat to world peace as part of the Soviet peace offensive were set forth in the November Declaration (the Declaration of the 1957 Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries). For the text of this Declaration see Pravda, November 22, 1957. IX:47, 3-7. The importance of this document for an understanding of the tactics of Soviet foreign policy is emphasized by Herman Achminov in his article "The Soviet Communist Party in Search of a New Strategy" in the January 1958 issue of the Bulletin.

and total disarmment,[1] the creation of a zone in Central Europe free of nuclear weapons, etc., are all part of an effort to put this policy into practice. In a speech to the Supreme Soviet in October 1959 Khrushchev stated that:

> If the Western powers are not prepared to accept general anc complete disarmament, we feel it possible and necessary to reach an understanding at least on partial measures in the sphere of disarmament. The Soviet Union holds that such measures include: the prohibition of atomic weapons and in the first place the cessation of their testing, the establishment of a control and inspection zone with an accompanying reduction of foreign troops on the territories of the respective countries in Europe, the creation of an atom-free zone in Central Europe, the elimination of foreign military bases on alien territories, the conclusion of a nonagression pact between the member states of NATO and the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization ...[2]

Since the United States is unable to abandon nuclear weapons, as its defence system is constructed around them, and no government in West Germany at present would be able to accept the division of Germany as permament, Soviet proposals, as the one quoted above, place the United States and West Germany in a very difficult position. The image of the Soviet Union as willing to accept either complete or partial disarmament enhances its

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1. Khrushchev's proposal for complete and general disarmament was given in detail in his speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations on September 18, 1959. The text of the speech was printed in the New York Times and Pravda on the following day.

2. Pravda, November 1, 1959. XI:44, 10.

position in the neutral states, where the Soviet Government is interested primarily in the propaganda value of its proposals. The effectiveness of this policy must not be underestimated, for Soviet proposals for disarmament have received support not only in the Afro-Asian states but also among groups in Western Europe.

Part of Khrushchev's policy to isolate the United States and its military allies in Western Europe from the rest of the world are his repeated statements that the cold war originated in the West. Western leaders are held responsible for the continuence of the cold war in contrast to the "desire" of the Soviet Government for peace and the lessening of international tensions. In May 1958 Khrushchev stated:

> "Recent events show that the ruling circles of the Western Powers continue to do everything to step up the arms race, from which a handful of monopolists are enriching themselves at the expense of millions of ordinary workers, and continue to oppose the easing of international tension and to cling to the cold war policy." 1

In the implementation of his strategy for weakening the military position and strength of the United States and its allies in Western Europe vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Khrushchev has utilized the tactics of intimidation, anti-Western propaganda

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1. N.S. Khrushchev, For Victory in the Peaceful Competition with Capitalism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959), p.399.

propaganda and a diplomatic campaign to secure a detente with the West. The second tactic was part of Soviet diplomatic practices throughout the period under study. The objective sought was the cooperation and support of the Afro-Asian states for Soviet foreign policies. This campaign has been conducted within Khrushchev's peace offensive against the West. The first and second tactics are employed in the diplomatic relations of the Soviet Union with the West. With the failure to achieve Soviet objectives through negociations in 1958 Khrushchev instigated the Berlin crisis. The maximum gain to the Soviet Union would have been the withdrawal of Western troops from West Berlin or far-reaching concessions in the face of the Soviet threat of force. Although the West remained firm in maintaining its position in West Berlin, Khrushchev did gain acceptance of his proposal for a summit conference for heads of states. From November 1959 to the failure of the Paris Conference in May 1960 Soviet diplomacy sought to achieve its policy objectives through negociations with the Western Powers.

VIII. An East-West Detente

Since any attempt by the Soviet Union to effect a change in the status quo in Europe would most likely involve it in a war with the West, Khrushchev has accepted the present status quo and sought to secure a detente with the West. Although the Soviet Government does not recognize the present territorial division between the two blocs as having a permanent validity, it has, in view of the danger of a nuclear war, adjusted its current objectives in Europe to those which can be achieved by non-military means and without incurring the risk of war. Likewise, the nuclear stalemate has frozen the European status quo for the West, for the Soviet Union intends to retain its hold on Eastern Europe, by force if necessary, as was proven in Hungary. As stated in a Soviet journal concerned with international affairs: "We do not make of it a secret that a crushing answer will be given to any attempt the imperialist would make, to change by arms in its favor the distribution of forces in the world arena."[1]

That the post-Stalin leadership was unwilling to assume risks which might materialize in a war with the West was underlined by Khrushchev in his secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress in a critical remark against Stalin. Probably referring to the Berlin blockade and the Korean War, Khrushchev stated: "During Stalin's leadership our peaceful relations with other nations were

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1. Quoted by Wladyslaw Kulski, Peaceful Co-existence: An Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1959) p. 150, from Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn', No. 3 (1957), 3.

often threatened."[1] A Pravda article on May 24, 1958, repeated Khrushchev's apprehension of the risks involved in any future war.

> "A future war, if the aggressors succeed in unleashing it, threatens to become the most devastating war in the history of mankind, because there is no guarantee that it would not become an atomic war with all its catastrophic consequences. Millions of people would perish, big cities and industrial centers would be swept from the surface of the earth ... It is extremely dangerous, for fear of crushing retaliation, to have recourse to nuclear weapons of mass destruction in our time ..."

There can be very little hope in Moscow for a Communist revolution in Western Europe in the near future, since the only major Communist parties, the French and the Italian, do not play a decisive part in the determination of their countries' domestic or foreign policies. Consequently, the Soviet Government will continue its economic and political offensive in the underdeveloped countries, first, to secure their "neutrality" in the East-West conflict and eventually their alliance with the socialist camp. The avoidance of a military conflict in Europe will allow the Soviet Union to proceed with its own economic development and the extention of its influence in the underdeveloped countries, which will increase the international position of the socialist

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1. The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism: A Selection of Documents (New York, Columbia University Press, 1956), p.80.

bloc.[1] However, while a detente between the Soviet Union and the West would facilitate negociations on issues where compromise is possible and would lessen the danger of war, there can be no settlement on basic issues of difference between the two blocs, for these differences are the products of basic class antagonisms which admit of no permanent accommodation.

The major problem in maintaining the present territorial division in Europe is Germany, and in particular Berlin, for it is here that the major powers disagree on what should constitute the status quo. Throughout 1959 Khrushchev pressed for a conference of heads of states to facilitate the signing of a peace treaty with the two German states, thus ending the "remnants of the Second World War." Since no conference was convoked to discuss the German question, a shift in tactics was necessary.

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1. Mackintosh writes that the "underlying conviction" of Khrushchev's policy is "that the correct Soviet strategic approach to the West should continue to be one of general detente in order to press on with a policy of undermining the West's authority and influence in the uncommitted areas of the world. For this he still required a degree of guaranteed stability in Europe, and his decision not to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany on his return from Paris was certainly consistant with his aim. In fact, the evidence provided by Soviet policy in Europe during 1959 and 1960 leads to the conclusion that while the Soviet planners wanted to secure as a first priority the elimination of American military power from the European bridgehead they still required a generally stable situation on their Western flank. If they could not achieve this by extracting concessions from the West, they would reach it through deadlock. This would enable them to concentrate their attention on the Middle East and Africa."
J.M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp.219-20.

On November 27, 1958, the Soviet Government reopened the issue of the status of West Berlin by releasing a statement calling for the eventual reunification of Germany, the evacuation of West Berlin by the occupying powers and the establishment of a "free city" in West Berlin. If at the end of a six-month period the Western Allies had failed to reach an agreement providing for a change in the status of West Berlin, the Soviet Union would turn over its authority in East Berlin to the East German authorities and sign a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic.

The Soviet note proposed an agreement among the occupying powers to respect the free-city status which was to be established for West Berlin, and the Soviet Government stated that it would have no objection to the United Nations supervising the maintenance of such status. In regard to the internal structure of West Berlin the Soviet noted stated:

> "The Soviet Government considers that upon the ending of foreign occupation, the population of Western Berlin should be given the right to establish a way of life at its own choice. Should the inhabitants of Western Berlin desire to preserve the present way of life, based on private capitalist ownership, it is up to them to do so." [1]

In addition to the withdrawal of the allied occupation forces, the Soviet note stated that all "subversive" activity originating in West Berlin should be ended. In an interview with Hans Kemsky of Suddentsche Zeitung Khrushchev stated that the Soviet Union would respect the internal independence of West Berlin,

1. Current History, XXXVI (February 1959), 112.

but added: "We propose only one thing - that West Berlin should not permit on its territory any hostile, subversive activity and propaganda aimed against any state, above all, against the G.D.R."[1]

While acceptance of the Soviet proposal would alter the status of West Berlin, Khrushchev made it clear that no change in the status of East Berlin would be permitted. In referring to Western suggestions that East Berlin be included in any "free city", the Soviet Premier replied: "Apparently these gentlemen are forgetting that Berlin is the capital of the German Democratic Republic. They have big appetites."[2]

The raising of the Berlin issue with its ominous overtones of an ultimatum did lead to Prime Minister Macmillan's visit in February 1958 to Moscow and the Geneva Conference, which lasted from May 11 to August 5, 1959. At the first session of the Geneva Conference, Andrei Gromyko submitted the "new Soviet proposal" which stipulated that the four occupying powers should conclude an interim agreement on the status of West Berlin as a free city for a fixed period of time. The proposal included the following points: (1) a reduction of the occupation forces of the Western powers in West Berlin to token contingents; (2) the ending of subversive activity in West Berlin directed against the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe; (3) and an agreement not to station atomic weapons or missiles in West Berlin.[3]

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1. Pravda, December 13, 1958. X:50, 35.
2. Ibid., March 10, 1959. XI:10, 11.
3. Ibid., June 29, 1959. XI:26, 16.

In challenging the status quo in Berlin, Khrushchev hoped to achieve an eventual solution, if only gradually, to what is in Soviet eyes an abnormal and unpermissible situation in Berlin. What Khrushchev demanded was to "codify" the status quo in Germany by recognizing the existence of three elements, West Germany, East Germany and West Berlin. This would require de facto recognition of the German Democratic Republic by the Western powers and fixing the international status of West Berlin as a free city. A fallback policy, which was presented by A. Gromyko at Geneva, would allow a fixed number of years during which the two German states would negociate a form of union, thus settling the status of West Berlin. However, if no agreement were reached the legal rights of occupation would lapse. A third alternative, and one with which Khrushchev threatened the West in November 1958, was the signing of a separate peace treaty between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic, thereby giving Soviet control over access to West Berlin to the German Democratic Republic. However, even with the failure to achieve the first or the second alternatives, Khrushchev lifted the six month time limit and the question of the international status of West Berlin remained open for negociation.

While unwilling to risk nuclear war over the question of the status of West Berlin, Khrushchev remained determined to effect a change in this status if possible either by threat of war or negociation. As he explained to Senator Humphry of the United States, West Berlin "is a bone in my throat". Not only is the stationing of Western troops in the city a symbol of Western commitment and

determination to remain in Europe and to resist further expansion by the Soviet Union, but West Berlin serves as the "show window of the West." Furthermore, the continued presence of Western troops and material prosperity in West Berlin create difficulties for the Communist Government in East Germany in its attempt to consolidate its own position. Not only did the economic and political contrast between the western and eastern sectors of the city threaten the morale of the people in East Berlin, but West Berlin served as an escape route into Western Germany - a population drain which was bound to create serious difficulties for the East German Government.

During the crisis of November 1958 the issue of the re-unification of Germany was also raised. The Berlin crisis provided the Soviet Government with the opportunity to demand either a neutralized united Germany or a clear and final break between the two states. The first alternative would decrease the military potential of Western Europe, while the second would enable the Soviet Union to proceed with the final absorption of East Germany into the Communist system. Either alternative would be favorable to the present situation for the Soviet Union.

Despite the warning of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. to the Bundestag of the Federal German Republic in March 1958 that the "atomic arming of West Germany would bar firmly the only path which remains ... to the restoration of the national unity of the German people,"[1] the Soviet Government has not fully closed the door

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1. Pravda, March 31, 1958. X:17, 8.

on German reunification. Khrushchev has maintained, however, that the question of reunification must be settled by the German people themselves, a condition which makes reunification almost impossible, since unification would mean the end of one system and both German states realize this. Although Khrushchev has stated that the question of German reunification is not a subject for examination at an international conference[1] and that the Soviet Government will respect any decision made by the German people themselves,[2] he has been quite frank in regard to the "conditions" under which German unity would be feasible. Since the leaders of the East German Government will not endorse a policy which would jeopardize their own position, they can be trusted to observe these conditions.

The first condition, in regard to which the Soviet Union and the Western powers hold fundamentally different views, is that the two German states must enjoy equal representation regardless of population or geographical area. The Western demand for proportional representation within a loose confederation has been described by Khrushchev as "unwarranted and inadmissible". In a 1959 speech the Soviet Premier defended the principle of equality and stated that any council representing an all-German state "should have equal numbers of representatives and (the two states) be given equal chances, so that neither might dictate its will to the other."[3]

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1. Soviet Government Memorandum of March 24, 1958. Pravda, March 25, 1958. X:12, 23.

2. Khrushchev in a press conference in Jakarta, February 29, 1960. Ibid., March 1, 1960. XII:9, 6.

3. Ibid., June 20, 1959. XI:26, 12-13.

The second condition is that the West must recognize the permanence of the socialist system in East Germany, which conflicts with the Western demand for free elections in both German states. In a speech in Leipzig Khrushchev stated:

> "Those who express the interests of the working class cannot even think of having the workers and peasants of the German Democratic Republic, who have created a workers' and peasants' state and are successfully building socialism, lose all their gains through the reunification of Germany and consent to live as before in capitalist bondage." [1]

While recognizing that the abolition of the Federal German Republic cannot be made a condition for reunification, Khrushchev has, on the other hand, stated that a unified Germany in which the Federal German Republic was predominant would "mean the spread of militarism, revanchism and reaction to the whole territory of Germany." [2] According to a reporter of the New York Times, who interviewed the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, Khrushchev would agree to German reunification under the following circumstances:

> "Big industry would have to be nationalized, Ambassador Smirnov said, the power of 'monopoly capital' would have to be broken, and the working class would have to assume political dominance." [3]

Under these conditions reunification could be achieved only by effecting radical changes in the political and economic structure of the Federal German Republic, since Khrushchev has been explicit in his

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1. Pravda, March 7, 1959. XI:13, 4.
2. Ibid., January 28, 1959. XI:4, 20.
3. New York Times, March 14, 1960.

statements that the present system in the German Democratic Republic is to be maintained.

The above attitude is embodied in the Soviet Draft Treaty of January 10, 1959, on the solution of the German problem. This draft treaty proposes to leave the two German regimes intact within the framework of a loose confederation, while negociations on re-unification would be left to a later date. The German Democratic Republic would enjoy full equality of representation with the Federal German Republic and there were no provisions in the draft treaty for elections on the nature of the future all-German Government. Thus, the Soviet Union would be able to maintain its control over the East German Government, while West Germany would be left open to political penetration. Articles 16 and 17 of the draft treaty state that the Communist party and allied groups should enjoy the right of "unhampered activities", while all "revanchist and revisionist" activities should be banned. The latter adjectives have been used in the past by Soviet spokesmen to describe most political groups within the Federal German Democracy and could be utilized to bann all anti-Communist parties.

In 1958 Soviet support for German reunification was undoubtedly prompted by the desire to prevent the instilation of nuclear arms on West German soil. As Khrushchev stated, the possibility of reunification was "a question of rapprochement and the reaching of an understanding between these two German states. Without doubt, this is only possible provided West Germany renounces the policy

of reviving German militarism and revanche ...."[1] Khrushchev went on to say that the Soviet Union was ready to support the establishment of an antom-free zone in central Europe and the reduction of troops on German territory, proposals which would "facilitate" the reunification of Germany.[2]

Although the Soviet Government continued to support the Rapacki plan in 1958 and showed a willingness to accept neutralization as a solution to the German question, Khrushchev's statements in 1959 and early 1960 displayed a greater willingness to accept the present territorial division of Germany as permanent, in so much as the Soviet Union accepts the status quo as permanent. Of course, West Berlin remains an unsolved issue for the Soviet Government, which will continue to try to effect a change in its status. At the Ninth All-German Workers' Conference in Leipzig in 1959 Khrushchev stated:

> "We stand for the unity of Germany and the German people want unity. But can the peoples of the world exist if the two German states are not unified? They can, and they can exist quite well. Can the Germans live without reunification? They can, and they even live quite well. Although the problem is important, therefore, it still is not fundamental." 3

Furthermore, the Soviet Government has given full support to the East German Government's concept of confederation, which, because of its demands upon the West German Government, makes reunification practically an impossibility.

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1. N.S. Khrushchev, For Victory in the Peaceful Competition with Capitalism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959), p.490.
2. Ibid.
3. Pravda, March 7, 1959. XI:13, 4.

There are strong reasons for the Soviet Government supporting the present division of Germany until reunification can be achieved on its own terms. Although a neutralist Germany would reduce the military potential of Western Europe, it could become a disruptive force in Eastern Europe. No Russian leader is likely to forget the eastern aspirations of Germany in the past. A rapprochement with Germany involving the readjustment of the Polish-German border would be detremental to Soviet-Polish relations. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has been able to utilize the anti-German sentiment in Czechoslovakia and Poland to its own benefit.

Since early 1955, a goal of Khrushchev had been a top-level meeting between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States.[1] During the visit of Vice-President Nixon of the United States to the Soviet Union in the summer of 1959, Khrushchev raised the possibility of a world divided into two spheres of influence, the Soviet Union to play the leading role in one sphere, the United States in the other.

> "We would like to live in peace and friendship with the Americans, since our two countries are the most powerful in the world, and since, if we were friends, other states would also have to live in peace .... If any country happened to have warlike

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1. In an interview with several American journalists, Khrushchev expressed his desire to visit the United States "in order to study the American methods of livestock raising." Pravda, February 11, 1955.

> intentions, we would both take it gently by the ear and would say to it: take care, you are forbidden to quarrel now; we are living in the atomic age, and if any fool unleashes a war, then it may happen that even a clever chap will be unable to find a means of putting an end to it." [1]

The exchange of invitations between Eisenhower and Khrushchev was largely the outcome of a series of situations from the modest wish of 1955 to the Berlin crisis in November 1958. The goal of Khrushchev's policy was to reach an understanding with the United States on the international status quo. While such an agreement could be only temporary, certain benefits would accrue to the Soviet Union. If an understanding were reached between the two powers, negociations would be very fruitful on such issues as European security, which is centered around the question of German unity and the status of west Berlin, the withdrawal of troops stationed on foreign territories and the dismantling of overseas bases, disarmament and the reduction of armed forces and finally the discontinuation of atomic tests and the banning of nuclear weapons.[2] Certainly, the achievement of a detente between the Soviet Union and the United States would not negate the primary aim of Soviet policy in regard to the West - weakening of the economic and military position of the Western Powers vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Rather, it is Khrushchev's belief that a detente

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1. Quoted by Nikolai Galay, Reflections on the Failure of the Paris Conference, Bulletin, VII (June 1960), from Der Spiegel, September 16, 1959.

2. See Khrushchev's speech at an electoral meeting in the Kalinin Constituency. Pravda, February 25, 1959.

would facilitate this policy. Two important benefits, which Khrushchev hoped would accrue automatically upon reaching a detente with the United States, were recognition by the United States of Moscow's primacy over Eastern Europe and the expansion of trade between the two countries. As seen by Khrushchev, these and other benefits could be reached without renouncing the dogma of world victory of Communism.

Khrushchev has stated that the cold war was conceived in the West and can be ended only by a change in attitude on the part of Western political leaders,[1] meaning that the present non-military conflict between the two blocs can be ended only if the United States and its allies cease to oppose the advance of the world revolution. Two conditions made by Khrushchev for the achievement of a detente between the Soviet Union and the United States were recognition by the latter of the status quo, i.e. recognition of the existence of two German states, the Chinese People's Republic and the permanence of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the renunciation by the Western Powers of the policy of "positions of strength". If disputes between the two blocs are to be settled by peaceful means stated Khrushchev:

> "then the imperialists must abandon the 'cold war' policy and the arms race and their hopes of forcibly changing the world to please the monopolists. For

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1. "The cold war was conceived in the West and, consequently, it is necessary for only one side to abandon it for it to be eliminated." N.S. Khrushchev, For Victory in the Peaceful Competition with Capitalism, p.362.

> the burden of the imperialist 'position of strength' policy is to compel the Soviet Union to accept Western ultimatums and 'settle' certain political issues on conditions favorable to the imperialists." 1

That acceptance of the status quo by the United States meant renouncing all attempts to weaken the Soviet position while accepting the inevitability of world revolution was made clear by Khrushchev in an interview with a group of American Congressmen and members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs during the Soviet Premier's trip to the United States.

> "Changes in social formations in human society are not a process that occurs in all countries simultaneously. When and how the social system of a country changes is the affair of its own people. Recognize this, and peace will be assured. If you do not recognize it, war will be unavoidable. If you are going to seek a forcible change in the system of other countries, the peoples of those countries will naturally have to defend themselves. And that will mean war!" 2

In other words, have either revolution or war.

In spite of the increased emphasis within the Soviet bloc on economic self-sufficiency, an idea contained in Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., the current seven year plan has made imports from the West even more imperative for the Soviet Union. During the period of NEP (1921-1929) the importation of

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1. Pravda, December 22, 1957. X:1, 4.

2. N.S. Khrushchev, Let Us Live in Peace and Friendship (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959), p.79.

equipment and techniques from the West was a great aid to the development of the Russian economy. Khrushchev has likewise utilized imports from the West to procure scarce goods needed to supplement domestic produce and to accelerate the economic development of the Soviet Union.

After Stalin's death the new Soviet leaders expanded trade with the West and waged a propaganda campaign to convince the world that only through increased East-West trade could international cooperation and understanding be achieved. At the Twentieth Party Congress Mikoyan modified the Stalinist concept of two world markets by stating that the existence of two different systems in the world did not preclude mutually beneficial trade and that there was much to be gained from universal division of labor, a position formerly absent from Soviet pronouncements on international trade.

> "We proceed from the fact that our trade with capitalist countries is profitable for both sides and has the objective prerequisites for further development. This is conditioned by the very necessity of the social division of labor, under the universally known tenet that not all types of goods can be turned out with equal advantage in all countries .... In this respect international trade has been and is to an ever-increasing degree an expression of the rational division of labor among nations." 1

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1. Pravda, February 18, 1956. VIII:8, 6.

In spite of Soviet statements that the Seven Year Plan can be achieved through "our own efforts, our own resources",[1] Khrushchev's admission of the weakness of the Soviet chemical equipment industry in a speech to the Central Committee in May 1958 reveals the necessity for imports of these materials.

> "We will soon need a large amount of equipment which must be designed and produced anew. It would also be expedient to order part of this equipment in capitalist countries, primarily the United States, West Germany and Britain .... The Soviet Union would be given the opportunity of quicker fulfillment of its program for the construction of a new chemical enterprise without wasting time on creation of plans and mastering of the production of new types of equipment."[2]

Since most of the goods needed by the Soviet Union are classified as strategic exports and therefore barred to the Soviet Union, Khrushchev during his trip to the United States attempted to remove these barriers by making an expansion of trade a precondition for a detente between the two countries and by promises to Western businessmen of large Soviet orders. At the Twentieth Party Congress Mikoyan states that "stable peaceful coexistence is unthinkable without trade",[3] and while in the United States Khrushchev referred to trade as the "litmus paper" of the state of relations between countries.[4]

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1. Pravda, March 7, 1959.
2. Ibid., May 10, 1958.
3. Ibid., February 18, 1956. VIII:8, 6.
4. Ibid., September 22, 1959. XI:39, 12.

However, there are several major factors limiting the expansion of East-West trade. Khrushchev has made long credits from the West a prerequisite for any substantial increase in trade, and Western exporters are reluctant to involve themselves in the instability of Soviet import practices. In a meeting with American businessmen Khrushchev dismissed without any counter-argument the statement that Soviet organizations in the past had been interested only in buying simple machines which would then be copied in the Soviet Union. No concessions were offered to the objections of Western businessmen to an expansion of East-West trade, rather, Khrushchev sought to achieve the lifting of Western ban on strategic goods as part of a negociated detente between the Soviet Union and the West.

CONCLUSION

In 1952 the Soviet Government began to shift from a policy of overt aggression against the West to a policy of peaceful coexistence as economic competition with the West. What had once been a tactical maneuver has, in its competitive form, become a permanent feature of Soviet strategy. Khrushchev's strategy of peaceful coexistence is based on the premises that all countries will eventually evolve toward Communism, but given the development of nuclear weapons and the dangers of a nuclear war the Soviet Union must not risk a war with the West in order to hasten this "natural process". Peaceful coexistence does not involve a renunciation of the dogma of the world victory of Communism or the class struggle. Rather, it rejects the "inevitability" of war in the nuclear age and asserts economic competition, rather than revolutionary violence, as the major weapon in the conflict between the Soviet Union and the West. At the Twenty-first Party Congress Khrushchev stated that the victory of Communism will be achieved not "through armed interference by the socialist countries in the internal affairs of the capitalist countries", but by the conclusive demonstration that "the socialist mode ofproduction possesses decisive advantages over the capitalist mode of production."[1] Thus, the active support of the Soviet Government for the exportation of revolution has been subordinated to the rapid economic development of the Soviet Union in order to demonstrate the economic and cultural superiority of socialism over capitalism.

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1. Pravda, February 15, 1959.

The primary goals of the strategy of peaceful coexistence are to secure the status quo in Europe (which in the Soviet view makes necessary a revision in the status of West Berlin), to undermine the military and economic strength of the West and to utilize the underdeveloped countries as the main area of conflict in the economic competition with the West. Having recognized the fact that the Soviet Union had little to gain from a direct challenge to the West in Europe Khrushchev has turned to the underdeveloped countries in order to effect the balance of world power in favor of the Soviet Union. In regard to the underdeveloped countries, Soviet policy is still based on the Marxist-Leninist analysis that:

> "one of the main sources from which European capitalism draws its chief strength is to be found in the colonial possessions and dependencies. Without the control of the extensive and vast fields of exploitation in the colonies, the capitalist powers of Europe cannot maintain their existence for a short time." [1]

Soviet support for national liberation movements and the economic offensive of the Soviet Government in the Afro-Asian states are part of the current Soviet policy to deny the West this assumed source of its economic strength. This policy is designed not only to deprive the West of markets and raw materials but is also intended to intensify political antagonisms between the underdeveloped

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1. Quoted by Milton Kovner, The Challenge of Coexistence: A Study of Soviet Economic Diplomacy (Washington, D.C. Public Affairs Press, 1961), p.110, from Thesis and Statutes of the Third (Communist) International Adopted by the Second Congress, Moscow, 1920, p.71.

countries and the Western Powers, to foster the growth of an anti-Western "neutralism" and to create popular opposition to the existence of Western military bases on their territories and the involvement in military alliances.

Khrushchev's recognition of the significance of the achievement of independence by the Afro-Asian nations and his policies for the utilization of this factor to the benefit of the Soviet Union has been one of his most significant contributions to Soviet foreign policy for the realization of world revolution. Khrushchev's strategy of peaceful coexistence is designed to utilize the national liberation movement in the underdeveloped countries and the present scientific-technological revolution to the benefit of the Marxist-Leninist revolution. Scientific and technological progress and rapid industrialization are viewed as eventually assuring the Soviet Union of a predominant position in the world, a development which it is strengthening by encouraging the adoption of a policy of "neutralism" in the underdeveloped countries in order to create a "zone of peace" encompassing the Sino-Soviet bloc and the neutralist states. Securing the "national liberation" of the underdeveloped countries through economic assistance and the political support of the Soviet Union is the first step in the gradual process of bringing local Communist parties into power and the ultimate absorption of these countries into the Soviet orbit. It is hoped that the denial of the raw materials and markets of the underdeveloped countries to the West and the gradual "encirclement" of the West,

the non-Communist world will be so weakened as to make the final victory of Communism possible through non-violent means. Peaceful coexistence as a prolonged economic struggle with the West in the underdeveloped countries was what Khrushchev meant when he stated: "We are attacking capitalism from the flanks."[1]

In order to achieve these objectives it was necessary to discard the Stalinist two world concept and to assume a new approach toward the nationalistic elements in the underdeveloped countries. This Khrushchev did in his address to the Twentieth Party Congress. Accepting the principle that "who is not against us is with us", Khrushchev attacked Stalin for the latter's failure to recognize the "progressive role" played by the national bourgeoisie in the achievement of national independence. In order to facilitate cooperation between Communists and non-Communists Khrushchev introduced his theses of the peaceful transition to socialism and national roads to socialism, and he revived the "popular front" tactic.

In its relations with the West the Soviet Union has placed great stress on the avoidance of a nuclear war and the need for a period of peaceful coexistence, during which the Soviet Union will proceed with its economic development and the extention of its influence in the underdeveloped countries. Because of the Soviet commitment to a rapid rate of economic growth, which imports

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1. N.S. Khrushchev, For Victory in the Peaceful Competition with Capitalism (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959), p.312.

from the West would facilitate, and the desire to consolidate the Communist portion of the present international status quo, Khrushchev has sought to negociate a detente with the West. While peaceful coexistence permits agreements to be reached with the West for the avoidance of nuclear war and the expansion of trade between the Soviet Union and the West, it does not permit the settlement of basic issues which are part of the ideological conflict. Thus, Soviet policy toward the West has been one of general detente, while seeking to secure concessions on such issues as trade, the banning of atomic tests, disarmament, the neutralization of NATO and the status of West Berlin through negociations. While seeking a detente with the West, Khrushchev continued to pursue a policy of undermining Western influence in the underdeveloped countries, thereby effecting the military and economic strength of the West, and a policy for changing by political, economic and ideological but not military means the status quo in the non-Communist world to the detriment of the West.

In conclusion, Khrushchev's strategy of peaceful co-existence is part of the new theory of "permanent revolution", the emregence of socialism from the confines of one country and the creation of a series of socialist states, joined together in a single "world system". This new stage in the intensified struggle for world revolution began at the end of the Second World War, and the policy of peaceful coexistence as developed by Khrushchev is the means of achieving this goal. "The policies of peaceful coexistence," stated Khrushchev, "facilitate the victory

of the Communist Party and other progressive organizations of the working class in capitalist countries, make it easier for the peoples to combat aggressive war blocs and foreign military bases, and contribute to the national liberation movements."[1] As a policy of economic, ideological and political struggle, peaceful coexistence is seen as the best method of assuring the overthrow of capitalism and the final victory of Communism. Every victory gained by socialism intensifies the contradictions between capitalism and socialism and sharpens the conflict between the two systems. This conflict is coexistence. The unique feature of Khrushchev's concept of peaceful coexistence is the idea of economic competition, which is the decisive factor in resolving the conflict between capitalism and socialism.

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1. Pravda, January 17, 1960.

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Problemy vostokovedeniia	Problems of Oriental Studies
Izvestia	News