BAJO ETHNIC MINORITY LIVELIHOODS, MOBILITY, AND RESISTANCE IN THE WAKATOBI NATIONAL PARK, SOUTHEAST SULAWESI, INDONESIA

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Abstract

The traditionally nomadic, seafaring Bajo of Southeast Asia now often live a more settled lifestyle, primarily in fishing communities of stilt houses in the coastal or littoral zones of the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Bajo livelihoods and culture remain entangled with the sea, and many Bajo communities rely on rich marine ecosystems that Southeast Asian states and international organizations now aim to protect through conservation initiatives. In this thesis, my aim is to examine how local Bajo women and men strategize their livelihoods in one of Indonesia's largest and most populated marine parks – the Wakatobi National Park of Southeast Sulawesi, Indonesia. During eight months of fieldwork (2014-5) in the Bajo community of Sama Bahari, located in the Wakatobi National Park, I collected data from local Bajo resource users and community leaders through semi-structured and conversational interviews, Photovoice, and participant observation. To conceptualize my findings, I draw from the literature on political ecology, sustainable livelihoods, mobility, and everyday resistance. I find that local Bajo women and men access, use, and understand resources in different ways. Moreover, the livelihoods of local Bajo resource users have not been considered in conservation policy planning or implementation, which has had significant implications for local Bajo livelihoods. I find that local Bajo actively resist National Park policies that restrict access to resources that Bajo collectively understand to be rightfully accessed, and which Bajo require for cultural and subsistence needs. Bajo individuals also have vast social networks that enable them to maintain mobile livelihoods, further helping them to circumvent state and external conservation efforts. I argue that government policies and conservation initiatives must seriously consider local livelihood realities, cultural values, and gender dynamics to effectively manage important ecosystems, and to address local livelihood sustainability and food security.

Résumé

Les Bajo, minorité ethnique de tradition nomade, vivant de la pêche et évoluant sur les côtes de l'Asie du Sud-Est, se sont aujourd'hui sédentarisés. Ils se sont installés dans les communautés de pêcheurs des zones côtières ou littorales des Philippines, de la Malaisie et de l'Indonésie et vivent principalement dans des maisons sur pilotis. Étroitement intriqués avec les ressources des milieux marins, les moyens de subsistance et la culture Bajo dépendent étroitement de la biodiversité des écosystèmes marins, ces mêmes écosystèmes marins que les États de l'Asie du Sud-Est et les organisations internationales tentent de protéger par l'entremise d'initiatives de conservation. L'objectif de ma thèse est d'examiner comment les Bajo élaborent, maintiennent et négocient leurs stratégies de subsistance dans l'un des plus grands et des plus peuplés parcs marins d'Indonésie, le parc national Wakatobi du Sulawesi du Sud-Est. Au cours des huit mois de recherche sur le terrain (2014-5) que j'ai effectué dans la communauté Bajo de Sama Bahari, j'ai recueilli des données auprès des acteurs locaux Bajo et des dirigeants communautaires par le biais d'entrevues semi-structurées et conversationnelles. La grille d'analyse et de conceptualisation de mes résultats s'appuie sur la littérature portant sur l'écologie politique, les moyens d'existence durables, la mobilité et la résistance quotidienne. Il ressort de cette analyse que les femmes et les hommes Bajo accèdent, utilisent et comprennent les ressources de façons différentes que celles prévues par les politiques de conservation. Il apparaît en outre que les moyens de subsistance des Bajo ne sont pas pris en compte dans la planification et la mise en œuvre des politiques de conservation, ce qui a des conséquences importantes sur les moyens de subsistance des Bajo. Ces politiques visent à restreindre l'accès à des ressources naturelles perçues par les Bajo comme étant inaliénables et par ailleurs fondamentales à leur mode de vie, leurs moyens de subsistance et leur culture. En conséquence, les Bajo s'appuient sur de vastes réseaux sociaux qui leur permettant une plus grande mobilité pour maintenir leurs moyens de subsistance et contourner les efforts de conservation. J'en conclus que les Bajo résistent activement aux politiques de conservation du parc national Wakatobi, et je soutiens que les politiques gouvernementales et les initiatives de conservation doivent considérer attentivement les moyens de subsistance locaux, les valeurs culturelles et la dynamique de genre afin de développer des modes de gestion durables qui maintiennent et supportent les moyens de subsistance locaux et la sécurité alimentaire des populations et communautés locales.

Abstrak

Pengembara tradisional, pelaut Bajo Asia Tenggara, sekarang menjalani gaya hidup yang lebih menetap, terutama diantara masyarakat nelayan di Filipina, Malaysia dan Indonesia yang tinggal di rumah panggung di pesisir. Mata pencaharian dan budaya orang Bajo tetap terjerat dengan laut, dan banyak masyarakat Bajo bergantung kepada ekosistem laut yang dilindungi oleh negara-negara Asia Tenggara dan organisasi internasional yang mempunyai inisiatif konservasi. Dalam tesis ini, tujuan saya adalah untuk meneliti strategi mata pencarian orang Bajo di salah satu taman laut yang terbesar dan terpadat di Indonesia – Taman Nasional Wakatobi Sulawesi Tenggara, Indonesia. Selama delapan bulan di lapangan (2014-5) dengan masyarakat Bajo Sama Bahari yang terletak di Taman Wakatobi Nasional, saya mengumpulkan data dari masyarakat asli Bajo dan pemimpin komunitas, melalui wawancara informal dan semi-terstruktur, 'Photovoice,' dan observasi perserta. Untuk mengembangkan hasil penemuan saya, saya menarik dari sastra ekologi politik, mata pencaharian berkelanjutan, mobilitas, dan ketahanan sehari-hari. Dari analisa saya, saya menemukan bahwa perempuan dan laki-laki Bajo mengakses, menggunakan, dan memahami sumber daya alam dengan cara yang berbeda. Bahkan, mata pencaharian orang lokal Bajo tidak dipertimbangkan dalam perencanaan kebijakan atau implementasi, dan ini mempunyai implikasi yang signifikan kepada mata pencaharian orang lokal Bajo. Saya menemukan bahwa orang lokal Bajo secara aktif menolak kebijakan Taman Nasional yang memiliki tujuan untuk membatasi akses kepada sumber daya alam mereka sendiri, dan yang mereka perlu untuk kebutuhan budaya dan nafkah hidup. Orang Bajo juga memiliki jarangan sosial yang luas, dan ini memungkinkan mereka untuk mempertahankan mata pencaharian yang mudah berpindah, dan lebih lanjut dapat membantu mereka untuk menghindari upaya konservasi oleh negara dan organisasi lainnya. Saya menganjurkan bahwa kebijakan pemerintah dan inisiatif konservasi harus mempertimbangkan realitas mata pencaharian, nilai-nilai budaya, dan dinamika jenis kelamin/'jender' orang lokal supaya secara aktif dapat mengelola ekosistem yang bernilai, dan supaya dapat mengatasi mata pencaharian dan ketahanan pangan secara berkelantujan.

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List of Abbreviations

BAPI	Biodiversity Action Plan for Indonesia
BBM	*Program Konpensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak* (Fuel Subsidy Reduction Compensation Program)
BLT	*Bantuan Langsung Tunai* (Cash Transfer Assistance)
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
COREMAP	Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Monitoring Programme
DFID	Department for International Development
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IBSAP	Indonesian Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan
ILO	International Labour Organization
KAT	*Komunitas Adat Terpencil* (Remote Indigenous Communities)
LMMA	Locally Managed Marine Areas
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PKAT	*Pemberdayaan Komunitas Adat Terpenci* (Empowerment of Remote Indigenous Communities)
PNPM	*Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat* (National Program for Community Empowerment)
RP	*Rupiah*
TNC	The Nature Conservancy
UNCLOS	United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
US	United States
WNP	Wakatobi National Park
WWF	World Wildlife Fund

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCING THE BAJO OF THE WAKATOBI REGION, SOUTHEAST SULAWESI, INDONESIA

> They know no other home than their boats... All of their work is in fishing and by this they barter for what they need… And as they put down very few roots, they move easily to other parts, having no fixed dwelling but the sea; and this notwithstanding the fact that they acknowledge certain settlements where they are gathered, with a few families in them, dispersed along the coves and low beaches, convenient for their fishing (Combés, 1667 [1904]: 104-105).

Francisco Combés wrote the first brief description of the social and political complexities of the seafaring vagabonds in the Sulu region of the Philippines. For the centuries that followed this first account, 'sea nomads,' 'sea people,' 'sea gypsies,' and 'boat people' were all generalised titles given to the boat-dwelling peoples of Southeast Asia (for example, LeBar et al., 1964; Sopher, 1965). Today we recognize several different traditionally nomadic communities that live in coastal and littoral zones across the region. There are at least three major culturally and linguistically distinct ethnic groups that make up these coastal societies, namely the Moken, the Orang Laut, and the Bajo. These ethnolinguistic groups live in notably different geographical areas (see Map 1.1). The Moken reside in the Mergui Archipelago of Burma (Myanmar) and the islands of southwest Thailand, while the Orang Laut live in the Riau-Lingga Archipelago spanning Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia (Sather, 1999). The Orang Laut also reside in other Indonesian islands such as Batam and eastern Sumatra, as well as in southern Johor, Malaysia (Sather, 1999). The Bajo, ancestors of the seafaring people in Combés' account, comprise the largest and most widely dispersed maritime minority in Southeast Asia. They inhabit the Sulu Archipelago of the Philippines, the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak on the island of Borneo, and several eastern Indonesian islands, including Sulawesi (Stacey, 2007).

The Bajo are at the center of this thesis, in which I focus on their livelihood strategies in the Wakatobi National Park (WNP) of Southeast Sulawesi, Indonesia. I unpack my aim and objectives next in Section 1.1. I illuminate conceptualizations of sea space in Southeast Asia in Section 1.2, explore National Parks and local livelihoods in Indonesia in Section 1.3, and introduce my field site, the Bajo village of Sama Bahari in the WNP in Section 1.4.



Map 1.1: Distribution of maritime minorities in Southeast Asia, where A= Mergui Archipelago, B= Riau-Lingga Archipelago and eastern Sumatra, C= Sulu Archipelago, eastern Borneo, Sulawesi, and eastern Indonesia, where the Bajo reside. (Modified from: Sather, 1999: 322).

1.1. THESIS AIM AND OBJECTIVES

The **aim** of my research is to analyze how local ethnic minority Bajo women and men strategize their livelihoods in the WNP, Southeast Sulawesi, Indonesia. Specifically, I ask three main **research questions**:

1. In what ways do local Bajo women and men negotiate access to different livelihood assets?
2. What are the patterns and processes of local Bajo mobility, and what are the socio-economic and broader livelihood effects of such mobility?
3. Do local Bajo harness control over natural resources in the Wakatobi National Park and is there any local resistance to National Park policies? If so, how and in what ways?

In addressing these questions, I attempt to fill three main gaps in literature within the social sciences. First, my research builds upon a small body of literature written on Bajo ethnic minority livelihoods (Sopher, 1965; Nimmo, 1968; Sather, 1999; Nagatsu, 2007; Stacey, 2007; Clifton et al., 2010; Christensen, 2016) and on the livelihoods of Southeast Asian maritime minorities more

broadly (Lenhart, 1995; 1997; Sather, 1995; Wee and Chou, 1997; Benjamin and Chou, 2002; Chou, 2003; 2009). Second, I expand upon a scarce literature on non-linear mobility,[1] rural to rural mobility, and mobility as a positive choice, all within the Global South (Uteng, 2006; Gough, 2008; Hammond, 2011; Rigg and Salamanca, 2011; Lund et al., 2014; Turner and Oswin, 2015). Finally, while most research on resistance has focused on overt forms, I address everyday forms of resistance in the context of Bajo men and women living within the WNP (c.f. Scott, 1985; 1986; 1990; Kerkvliet, 1986; Hart, 1991; Camp, 2004; Turner, 2012). Next, in order to set the scene, I explore historical conceptions of sea space in Southeast Asia.

1.2. CONCEPTUALIZING SEA SPACE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Across Southeast Asia, colonial knowledge of 'natives' worked largely within a discourse of mapping, and this mapping failed to acknowledge the presence and practices of a number of indigenous groups, such as upland shifting agriculturalists, and maritime groups living and travelling in littoral spaces. These spaces were considered to be empty, and maritime groups, with no evident homeland, appeared not to fit into colonial imaginations of structured space (Warren, 1983). In Indonesia, changing structures of governance during the late-colonial and post-independence periods were connected to increasingly territorialized conceptions of space and belonging that have played a role in "shaping contemporary Indonesian ideas of 'ethnic difference' and the apparently anomalous position that 'sea people' occupy in relation to others" (Gaynor, 2007: 53).

Conceptualizations of sea spaces have long been important to Southeast Asian political imaginaries (Gaynor, 2007). Maritime ideologies have worked to inform our understandings of changes in the configuration of social difference in the littoral zones of Southeast Asia. The concept of 'homeland' is often used to express national ideologies, and for colonial and independent Indonesia, this geopolitical notion of place included the seas in explicit and territorial ways. Early 20th century anti-colonial nationalists used the term *Tanah Air,* which can be translated to 'land of seas', to refer to a space of national belonging (Gaynor, 2007). The concept of *nusantara* has been reinvented many times since its conception in 14th century Java to first describe 'others,' but more recently as a synonym of *Tanah Air,* referring to the islands and seas between mainland Asia and Australia (Gaynor, 2007). The latter conceptualization of *nusantara* marked the creation of a national geo-body (Thongchai, 1994) or territorial space that encompassed all of Indonesia's islands and seas.

[1] I use the term mobility to encompass both micro- and macro-scale movements. Mobility is further defined in Chapter 2.

The Indonesian state[2] has mobilized the concept of *nusantara* to justify its territoriality (defined in Chapter 2). For example, at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1973, when Indonesia's exclusive economic zone was extended to 200 nautical miles off Indonesia's coasts, many states in the region were concerned about territorial disputes over small islands between Indonesia and Malaysia. In response to these concerns, the Indonesian government promoted the concept of *nusantara* to justify increased monitoring over the relationship between population and territory, and did this by stressing it would encourage a more settled population in these areas. This, in turn, had problematic consequences for nomadic populations, such as seafaring Bajo, who had historically lived intermittently across those waters and on these small islands. Thus, despite increasingly territorialized seas leading the Indonesian state to recognize populations living at sea, seafaring Bajo represented a kind of anomaly as the state consistently marginalized Bajo to be on the edge of governance. Bajo were forced to settle as state strategies worked to control Bajo relationships to the seas in order to lay claim to disputed territory (Gaynor, 2007).

Across Southeast Asia, these conceptualizations of sea space and the ideologies that govern such spaces have implications for the livelihoods and identity of maritime ethnic groups like the Bajo (Mari Pangestu, 1991; Mubyarto, 1992; 1997; Lenhart, 1995; 1997; Wee and Chou, 1997; Duncan, 2004; Gaynor, 2007). As a result of their physical distance from the land, and their structural-ideological distance from state administration and governance, Bajo access to marine resources has generally become increasingly restricted. Moreover, land ownership is rare for these communities and citizenship for Bajo individuals often goes unrecognized (Clifton et al., 2010; Clifton et al., 2014). Now, I turn to national parks and local livelihoods in Indonesia to further contextualize my research questions.

1.3. NATIONAL PARKS AND LOCAL LIVELIHOODS IN INDONESIA

As the fourth most populated country in the world, Indonesia is home to 254 million people (World Bank, 2016) and over 300 reported ethnic groups (Annata et al., 2014). Indonesia is also the largest Muslim country globally. With approximately 17,000 islands (Convention on Biological Diversity [CBD], 2016), 580 million hectares of seas, and approximately 81,000 kilometers of coastlines fringed by biodiverse habitats (Djohani, 1996), Indonesia is the largest archipelagic state in the world. Marine ecosystems in the archipelago are recognized as the most rich and biodiverse across

[2] Indonesia was largely under Dutch colonial rule for the 300 years proceeding independence in 1945. See Section 3.2.1 for further discussion on Indonesia's political landscape.

the globe, and the health of these ecosystems are of international interest (Djohani, 1996; Cleary et al., 2014; CBD, 2016).

Indonesia's first protected area was a game reserve established in 1967, and its first National Park was created in 1982, the year Indonesia hosted the World Congress on National Parks (McNeely, 1984). In 1990, the Indonesian state adopted its Conservation Law (5/1990) that modeled national park creation on Yellow Stone National Park in the United States, preserving nature and forbidding human uses of resources within national parks. This law restricted local communities' rights and access to resources in protected areas. In 1993, with the development of the Biodiversity Action Plan for Indonesia, conservation became the state's top priority (CBD, 2016). At first, the state's park-based conservation strategy followed colonial narratives of 'backward' villages who damaged valuable environments with 'primitive' ways of harvesting and accessing resources (Li, 2015). After the fall of Suharto in 1997-8, villages bordering parks across the nation began to criticize park-based conservation projects for wastefulness and corruption (Mehring and Stoll-Kleemann, 2011). This political mobilization was supported by local and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), who reinforced narratives of indigenous rights to land, and worked with locals to produce evidence of indigenous land rights and of indigenous knowledge of ecological processes (Mehring and Stoll-Kleemann, 2011; Li, 2015). In response, international conservation NGOs (which funded over 50 percent of Indonesia's park-based conservation projects at the time), developed more 'participatory' projects that aimed to increase the 'low' conservation awareness among local people; however, these projects did not aim to support sustainable livelihoods, increase local incomes, or restore claims to land (Li, 2015).

Today, there are 566 protected areas in Indonesia, covering over 36 million hectares. Of those, 112 are marine protected areas that cover over 17 million hectares (Yulianto et al., 2013; CBD, 2016). While park projects on land have more recently been dwarfed by REDD initiatives (Li, 2015), the Indonesian state aims to increase marine protected areas to span 31 million hectares, or 10 percent of its territorial waters (Yulianto et al., 2013). The Conservation Law had not been revised since its enactment in 1990, but is currently under revision as I finish writing in early 2017. Indonesia's protected areas have overall yielded unsatisfactory results for conservation, due mainly to failures in enforcement and lack of collaboration with local resource users (Cullen-Unsworth et al., 2013). In many cases, locals have lost their rights to land in the development of parks (see Li, 2007, writing on Central Sulawesi). In other cases, local support for conservation has decreased due to crop raiding or violence imposed by protected species such as tigers or elephants (see Nyhus et al., 2000 and Nyhus and Tilson, 2004, writing on Sumatra). Christie et al., (2003; Christie, 2004) claim that marine protected areas in Indonesia may be biological successes, but are most often

social failures, as artisanal fishers tend to become marginalized by other forms of resource use, such as dive tourism. Unfortunately, I find this to be the case in the context of my field site, the WNP, which I introduce next.

1.4. THE WAKATOBI NATIONAL PARK AND SAMA BAHARI VILLAGE

The Wakatobi Region (Map 1.2) is located in the center of the Coral Triangle (Map 1.3), off the coast of mainland Southeast Sulawesi, east of Buton Island in the Banda Sea. The region is home to some of the most biodiverse marine ecosystems in the world (Pet-Soede and Erdmann, 1998; Turak and DeVantier, 2003; Clifton et al., 2010). The government of Indonesia established the WNP in 1996, spanning the entire region (Elliot et al. 2001). With a total area of 1.4 million hectares, WNP is the third largest marine park in Indonesia (Clifton et al., 2010). The WNP has faced several problems since its implementation. Elliott et al. (2001) note that the Park has suffered from a lack of sufficient funding, limited community participation in natural resource management, ineffective enforcement of National Park regulations, and inappropriate zoning. This has had important implications for local populations, as does the rise in tourism in the region. The WNP has been increasingly targeted for ecotourism by both foreign organizations, and more recently, the national government, as the Indonesian state has started promoting the WNP as a 'new Bali' (Siniwi, 2016; Susanty, 2016; Tempo, 2016).

The Wakatobi is also the most populated National Park in Indonesia with about 104,000 individuals living within its territory (Kabupaten Wakatobi, 2009; Clifton et al., 2010). The main ethnic group, the Orang Tukang Besi, makes up 92 percent of the population, and the remaining eight percent of the population (approximately 8300 people) are Bajo. As such, the case study population for this thesis is the smallest ethnic minority group in this area.

Bajo communities have been travelling thousands of kilometers across Southeast Asian waters to reach the rich marine resources in the Wakatobi region since the 14th century (Stacey, 2007). With increased state pressure for nomadic populations to settle since independence, Bajo within Indonesia have begun to lead more sedentary lives. In the 1960s, a Bajo community that became known administratively as Sama Bahari, (or locally as Sampela) settled on pile houses (Photo 1.1) in the littoral zone of the Wakatobi Region, between the islands of Kaledupa and Hoga (see Map 1.2). The establishment of the WNP in 1996 has had important implications for local Bajo communities like Sama Bahari.



Map 1.2: Location of Sama Bahari in relation to the Wakatobi region of Southeast Sulawesi, Indonesia. (Source: author).



Map 1.3: The coral triangle, in dark red. Colours indicate total species richness of the world's 141 coral biogeographic ecoregions. (Modified from: Veron et al., 2009: 95).

Photo 1.1: Pile houses in the Bajo village of Sama Bahari. (Source: author).

1.5. THESIS OUTLINE

I begin this thesis by developing a conceptual framework in Chapter 2, where I highlight the key building blocks I use to guide my analysis from literature on political ecology, sustainable livelihoods, mobility, and everyday politics and resistance. In Chapter 3, I contextualize my research by examining ethnicity and ideology in Indonesia, and the political landscape affecting maritime minorities. I examine marine ecosystems and conservation in Indonesia before focusing in on the resource-rich region of the Wakatobi. I end the chapter by introducing the Bajo ethnic group. I describe my methodology in Chapter 4, by going over logistics, my positionality, and ethical considerations. I describe my data collection methods, which include overt participant observation, semi-structured and conservational interviews and Photovoice. I conclude Chapter 4 by explaining my approach to data analysis. I then turn to my results in Chapter 5 by examining Bajo livelihoods and mobility. I answer my first two research questions in Chapter 5 by investigating Bajo livelihood activities, access to resources, and the use of migration as a livelihood strategy. In Chapter 6, I address my final research question by examining everyday politics of resource use and everyday resistance in WNP. I conclude with further interpretations and assessments of my research findings in Chapter 7.

CHAPTER 2: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING MOBILE BAJO LIVELIHOODS

In this chapter, I develop a conceptual framework that guides my analysis of Bajo livelihoods in Sama Bahari, drawing from four bodies of literature: political ecology, sustainable livelihoods, everyday politics and resistance, and mobility. Political ecology is applied as a foundation for this framework, and is examined in the first section, while Section 2.2 provides a critical analysis of the sustainable livelihoods approach. My conceptual framework is expanded in Section 2.3, to include everyday politics and resistance as significant livelihood strategies. Finally, I review the literature on mobility in Section 2.4, to better understand mobile livelihoods of the Bajo in Sama Bahari. I connect these interrelated bodies of literature in attempt to avoid conceptual gaps and to target a more nuanced understanding of Bajo livelihood strategies in Sama Bahari. The key ideas from these bodies of literature on which I will draw are shown in Figure 2.1.



Figure 2.1: Conceptual framework for my thesis.

2.1. POLITICAL ECOLOGY

Several concepts from political ecology are central to my research on Bajo livelihoods within the WNP, and form the analytical backdrop to my research. Political ecology, as defined by Blaikie and Brookfield (1987: 17):

> Combines the concerns of ecology and a broadly defined political economy. Together this encompasses the constantly shifting dialectic between society and land-based resources, and also within classes and groups within society itself. We also derive from political economy a concern with the role of the state. The state commonly tends to lend its power to dominant groups and classes, and thus may reinforce the tendency for accumulation by these dominant groups and marginalization of the losers, through such actions as taxation, food policy, land tenure policy and the allocation of resources.

Political ecology is thus an attempt at understanding the environment as an arena where different actors with asymmetrical political and/or economic power compete for access and control over resources (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Political ecologists aim to apply a historically rooted, actor-oriented approach to understanding the institutions and processes surrounding social-environmental interactions (Bryant, 1992).

Political ecology calls for local-level empirical data to target a multi-dimensional, multi-scalar analysis of the interactions between society and the environment (Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003). A political ecological approach highlights the social construction of environmental knowledge and the need to consider situated knowledge and the perspectives of various stakeholders when addressing environmental problems (Harvey, 1977; Blaikie, 1995).

Power relations are central to political ecology analyses regarding access to environmental resources (Bryant and Bailey, 1997). In this thesis, I draw from the Foucauldian definition of power, which describes the exercise of power as "a way in which certain actions modify others" and claims that power only exists when put into action (Foucault, 1982: 787). Specifically, following Paulson et al. (2003: 205), I conceptualize power as "a social relation built on the asymmetrical distribution of resources and risks and locate power in the interactions among, and the processes that constitute, people, places, and resources." Politics are thus understood as "the practices and mechanisms through which such power is circulated" (Paulson et al., 2003: 205).

Related to the concept of power is the concept of access. Access to resources does not necessarily depend on property rights, but rather on abilities. I employ Ribot and Peluso's (2003: 153) theory of access to understand access as "the ability to derive benefits from things", which makes access akin to "a bundle of powers". Broadening focus from rights to access (as in property theory) toward ability to access illuminates a broader array of social and political relationships that

untangle the complex ways in which people use and benefit from resources (Peluso and Vandergeest, 2001; Ribot and Peluso, 2003).

I argue in Chapter 6, in the context of resource use in the WNP, that local Bajo and park authorities negotiate power over resources through resource access, despite a lack of official property rights. The key ideas that I draw on from political ecology are feminist political ecology and gender relations, governmentality, environmentality and territoriality. Each is discussed in more detail next, followed by a critique of political ecology.

2.1.1. Feminist political ecology and gender relations

Feminist political ecology adds important nuance to general political ecology approaches by exploring the gendered, socio-economic, and political contexts in which environmental policies and practices occur (Harcourt and Nelson, 2015). Feminist political ecology combines insights from feminist cultural ecology (Formann and Bruce, 1988; Croll and Parkin, 1993; Leach, 1994) with political ecology (Blaikie and Brookfield; 1987; Carney 1993; Peet and Watts, 1993) feminist geography (Fitzsimmons, 1986; Katz and Monk, 1993; Hartmann, 1994) and feminist political economy (Thomas-Slayter, 1992; Agarwal, 1995; Mackenzie, 1995). While political ecology focuses largely on the politics of access and control over resources based on class or ethnicity, feminist political ecology:

> Treats gender as a critical variable in shaping resource access and control, interacting with class, caste, race, culture, and ethnicity to shape processes of ecological change, the struggle of men and women to sustain ecologically viable livelihoods, and the prospects of any community for 'sustainable development' (Rocheleau et al., 1996: 4).

This sub-discipline to political ecology explores the gendered socio-political and economic factors that influence, and are influenced by, environmental policies and practices (Carney and Watts, 1991; Rocheleau et al., 1996; Schroeder, 1999). Since feminist political ecology considers gender and environment to be interrelated (Leach, 1994; Rocheleau et al., 1996), this yields insights into gender dynamics around resource access, decision-making, and livelihood opportunities (Carney and Watts, 1991; Rocheleau et al., 1996; Harcourt and Nelson, 2015).

Feminist political ecology has been critiqued for categorizing women as a homogenous group (Green et al., 1998), and for a minimizing the role of agency and identity in resource negotiations (Dolan, 2001), though recent developments (such as Harcourt and Nelson, 2015) have begun to explore these factors. I apply a feminist political ecology approach to help understand the gendered power relations that frame resource use and livelihood decision-making for Bajo women

and men in Sama Bahari. For example, in Chapter 5, I analyze the differences in livelihood activities, access to assets, and mobility for local Bajo men and women. Focusing on gender as a key variable in these relationships yields important insights into the gendered differences in resource use, rights, and access. It also provides a useful analytical backdrop to better understand differences in livelihood activities, opportunities, strategies, and outcomes for women and men.

2.1.2. Governmentality, environmentality, and territoriality

Foucault developed the concept of governmentality to describe the ways in which governments exercise control over their populations (Li, 2005). This concept has become extremely popular in political ecology debates as a useful tool for analyzing state patterns and practices of understanding, monitoring, and controlling its citizens in areas of ecological value (for example Escobar, 1999; Li, 2005; West et al., 2006). Nonetheless, this approach has been subject to critique. Notably, Braun (2000) argues that Foucault's concept of governmentality ignores the ways in which the physical geography of a territory contributes to political rationality in various ways. Braun (2000: 13) suggests:

> One cannot understand 'governmentality' apart from how the territory of the state is brought into being as a space of difference, any more than one can understand forms of state rationality apart from the historical emergence of 'population' as a problem of governance.

In other words, Braun suggests that the concept of governmentality should be analyzed in tandem with concepts of territoriality and the social construction of environmental knowledge. Territoriality can be defined as "a concept that summarizes a significant part of the processes involved in the social translation of space as an abstract category into territory as socially meaningful quotidian reality" (Vaccaro et al., 2014: 2). Drawing on these works and critiques, in Chapter 3, I relate the concepts of governmentality and territoriality to the Indonesian state's discursive framing of the seas and maritime minorities, and in Chapter 5, to National Park policies.

Foucault's concept of biopower "serves to bring into view a field comprised of more or less rationalized attempts to intervene upon the vital characteristics of human existence" (Rabinow and Rose, 2006: 196-7). Within the field of biopower, the term 'biopolitics' is used to:

> Embrace all the specific strategies and contestations over problematizations of collective human vitality, morbidity and mortality; over the forms of knowledge, regimes of authority and practices of intervention that are desirable, legitimate and efficacious (Rabinow and Rose, 2006: 197).

Subsequently, environmentality is an approach drawing from political ecology and feminist environmentalism to better conceptualize contemporary conservation efforts. Specifically, it combines the concept of governmentality with Foucault's concept of biopower to analyze a state's regulation of social interactions with the environment (Agrawal, 2005). The concept of environmentality becomes extremely useful in analyzing power relations within a territory of ecological interest that has become a space of difference. One example of such a space would be a protected area, such as a National Park. West et al., (2006) understand protected areas as a way of seeing, understanding, and (re)producing nature and culture. They argue that protected areas can be seen as a hegemonic attempt to manage and control the relationship between society and the environment; or between the people and resources within park boundaries. In Chapter 6, I analyze the ways in which the Indonesian state and conservation NGOs use structural, material, and discursive means to alter or control the relationships between local Bajo and marine resources in the WNP.

2.1.3. Critiques of political ecology

While political ecology is strong in highlighting the dynamics of politicized environments (Bryant, 1992), the field has been widely critiqued for placing a heavy focus on socio-political processes over biological ones (Vayda and Walters, 1999). Other critiques include the failure of political ecology to make useful connections between the natural and social sciences (Scoones, 1999). Political ecology once tended to focus on natural resource control, and as a result, often overlooked social capital and infrastructure as relevant resources in their analyses (Moffat and Finnis, 2005), though the literature has now expanded to analyze a wide array of resources (Robbins, 2012; Bryant, 2015; Perreault et al., 2015). Political ecology is also critiqued for focusing on individual case studies without comparing or contrasting case studies to synthesize individual, micro-scale studies into broader, integrated, larger-scale analyses (Walker, 2003; 2005). Additionally, critics have argued that political ecologists often falsely profess relationships of political power to be incontrovertibly true (Vayda and Walters, 1999), and the literature is criticized for being complex, densely theoretical, overly critical, and for not producing compelling or concise counter-narratives (Roe, 1994; Walker, 2005). Political ecology has expanded to include many world views and thus is critiqued for lacking coherence or consistent meaning (Watts, 2000). Furthermore, for a field that emerged from critiques of policy, there is much inconsistency toward policy among political ecologists (Walker, 2005). To address these criticisms, I combine a political ecology approach with the sustainable livelihoods approach, which focuses on assets beyond natural resources. I also draw

from the literature on everyday politics and resistance to deepen my analysis of relationships of power.

2.1.4. Drawing from the political ecology literature

I draw from the literature on political ecology to help guide my analysis of the gendered power relations framing resource use and livelihood decision-making for Bajo women and men in Sama Bahari. By focusing on gender as an important variable in these relationships, I attempt to gain insight into the differences in livelihood opportunities, strategies, and outcomes for men and women. I reflect upon the concepts of governmentality, environmentality, and territoriality throughout my analysis as well, to gain more nuanced understandings of the power relationships between National Park authorities and resource users.

2.2. SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS

Livelihoods have been defined as comprising "the assets (natural, physical, human, financial, and social capital), the activities, and the access to these (mediated by institutions and social relations) that together determine the living gained by the individual or household[3]" (Ellis, 2000b: 10). Long (2001: 241) defines a livelihood as individual or household practices which enable them to:

> make a living, meet their consumption necessities, cope with adversities and uncertainties, engage with new opportunities, protect existing or pursue new lifestyles and cultural identifications, and fulfill their social obligations.

Livelihoods analysis became a popular approach in the 1980s as a means of examining the ways in which individuals or households make a living beyond employment or economic-focused measurements (Solesbury, 2003; Weeratunge et al., 2010). Earlier notions of poverty were one-dimensional and focused mainly on strict income measurements, while livelihood conceptualizations encompassed situated notions of well-being (Chambers, 1994; Whitehead, 2002).

A subsequent approach, sustainable livelihoods, was conceived in the early 1990s and was widely attributed to the work of Robert Chambers and Gordon Conway. Chambers and Conway (1991: 6) describe a livelihood to be sustainable if it can:

> Cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities

[3] A household can be defined as "a person or co-resident group of people who contribute to and/or benefit from a joint economy in either cash or domestic labour" (Rakodi 1998, 7), though household members may live in different locations at times. These groups are often based on kinship, and are not necessarily cohesive in decision-making processes, motives, or strategies (see Rigg, 1998; Long, 2001; Bouahom et al., 2004; de Haan and Zoomers, 2005; Turner, 2012).

> and assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation; and which contributes net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels and in the short and long-term.

Sustainability is understood as a multi-scalar and multi-faceted notion, while sustainable livelihoods approaches also add a temporal component to previous livelihoods analyses (Turner, 2014). As such, the sustainable livelihoods approach aims to include political, environmental, and social assets, and to analyze the ways in which people meet material and subsistence needs (Staples, 2007).

Since its conception, the literature on sustainable livelihoods has become increasingly nuanced. Scoones (1998; 2009), for example, highlights the importance of including a political analysis at the centre of livelihood perspectives. Following Sen's (1997) capability approach, Bebbington (1999; 2004) focuses on livelihood assets as capabilities, and examines social networks and relationships as an important asset, while de Haan and Zoomers (2005) highlight the need for a clear conceptualization of access, and for clarifications of the links between livelihood opportunities and decision-making. Some scholars created practical frameworks (Ellis, 2000b), while others developed schematic representations of livelihood assets (Carney, 1998), outlined in Section 2.2.1.

Research on fishing communities in the Global South has made important contributions to the sustainable livelihoods literature. Allison and Ellis (2001) for example, use the livelihoods approach to examine technology in fisheries and access to fishing territories. Allison and Horemans (2006) examine the ways in which the sustainable livelihoods approach aligns fisheries policy with policy reduction in West Africa. Weeratunge et al., (2010) focus on the impact of development processes and socioecological changes on gendered employment within fisheries and aquaculture. These contributions are helpful in understanding livelihoods that are heavily dependent on open access resources or common property regimes, such as the livelihoods of Bajo fishers.

A number of practical frameworks have emerged over the past decades with slight variations. What most sustainable livelihoods frameworks have in common is the combination of a group of capital assets, some sets of factors that mediate access to such assets, and a group of activities that actors do to generate livelihood outcomes. In this section, I discuss how assets, access, and activities are defined in the literature. I draw mainly from the Department for International Development (DFID)[4] framework (Figure 2.2) as it illustrates useful feedback loops that reflect the complexities within the realities of the livelihood process, that other more linear frameworks (such as Ellis 2000b) do not. I also make some modifications to the DFID framework,

[4] Set up in 1997, the Department for International Development was set up in the United Kingdom to address issues of poverty, disease, mass migration, insecurity and conflict, globally (Government of the United Kingdom, 2017).

which I highlight at the end of Section 2.2, to help me analyze the livelihoods of Bajo individuals and households in Sama Bahari.



Figure 2.2: Sustainable livelihoods framework. (Source: DFID, 1999:1).

2.2.1. Livelihood assets

Livelihood assets can be understood as building blocks of overall livelihoods that individuals and/or households use to produce goods, offer services, and exchange these goods and services with other individuals or households (Ellis, 2000b). Assets are often divided into five main categories: human, natural, physical, financial, and social (Chambers and Conway, 1991; Narayan, 1997; Ellis, 2000b; Moser, 2008a; Scoones, 2009). These assets are illustrated in the asset pentagon positioned at the core of the DFID framework (Figure 2.2), and are the basis of the process of generating a livelihood.

Human capital is defined as the skills, education, knowledge, and health of an individual or household (DFID, 1999; Ellis, 2000b). This conceptualization of capital is useful in analyzing an individual or household's ability to command labour, but it has been critiqued for reducing humans to agents of productivity (Sen, 1997). Nonetheless, I find the concept to be useful when paired with other analyses (such as political ecology, and everyday politics and resistance) that together can add nuance to understanding the position of humans as political actors.

Natural capital represents elements of the biological environment that individuals or households access, including land, water, and/or marine resources (DFID, 1999; Ellis, 2000b). For

local Bajo, natural capital is an extremely important asset, as many locals collect marine and coastal resources for subsistence and livelihood purposes. As discussed in the previous section, natural capital is also a key aspect to political ecology analyses. In Chapter 6, I analyze the political aspects of natural capital access and availability.

Physical capital (or produced capital) refers to economically produced goods such as tools and infrastructure (such as electricity, secure housing, bridges) that are available to an individual or household (Ellis, 2000b; Moser, 2008a). As a local example, Bajo fishers require access to boats, bait, nets, and other fishing gear in order to fish. Physical capital access is analyzed in Chapter 5.

Financial capital is understood as any financial resources including savings and access to formal or informal financial institutions (Ellis, 2000b). A lack of financial capital can lead to fewer capabilities and contribute to an individual or household's vulnerability, while more financial capital can create capabilities and reduce vulnerability for individuals and households (Sen, 1997). A local example of financial capital includes government cash assistance programs, examined in Chapters 3 and 5.

Finally, social capital describes an intangible asset that allows "its members to achieve their individual and community objectives" (Moser, 2008a: 50) through "trust, social norms, and networks which affect social and economic activities" (Nakagawa and Shaw, 2004: 7). Social capital can also be conceptualized as "the asset through which people are able to widen their access to resources and other actors" (Bebbington, 1999: 2012). Social capital is perhaps one of the more interesting capital assets in terms of a conceptual tool, being intangible and hence more difficult to quantify. Bonding, bridging and linking social capital comprise three main conceptualizations of social capital which I outline here because of their relevance to livelihoods in Sama Bahari.

Bonding social capital refers to strong personal ties within communities of individuals with commonalities that build intra-group solidarity (Narayan, 1999; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Goodhand et al., 2000; Falk and Surata, 2007; Ramirez-Sanchez and Pinkerton, 2009). An example of bonding social capital would include social links between local Bajo neighbours in Sama Bahari used to access assets like financial capital in the form of urgent, interest-free loans.

Bridging social capital refers to weaker social ties between more diverse groups that build inter-group solidarity (Narayan, 1999; Goodhand et al., 2000; Bebbington, 2004; Ramirez-Sanchez and Pinkerton, 2009). This type of capital can refer to local Bajo relationships with other ethnic groups. Local Bajo usually build these types of relationships at the local marketplace on Kaledupa Island with Tukang Besi individuals, in order to sell their catch and purchase fresh water (see Chapter 3).

Linking social capital is used to explain connections that involve relationships between different levels of authority or power (Falk and Surata, 2007; Turner, 2007a). For instance, Bajo fishers who cooperate with National Park authorities build linking social capital. These ties can prove useful for Bajo who wish to gain access to natural resources that would otherwise be protected and illegal to collect. My research reveals that Bajo fishers who nourish relationships with local government staff also tend to have greater access to government financial aid or other assets. I examine these relationships in Chapters 3 and 6.

Social capital is usually conceptualized as positive, being inclusive of individuals, yet negative, exclusive, or anti-social capital also exists (Ports and Landolt, 1996; 2000). Negative social capital is described as "the societal and institutional processes that exclude certain groups from full participation in the social, economic, cultural and political life of societies" (Narayan, 1999: 6). As a form of negative social capital, outsiders might characterize cohesive communities by racism, fear, distrust, or exclusion of non-members (Baum, 1999). Though social capital can be examined at the community or even country-wide level (Putnam, 1995; Grootaert, 1999; Adler and Kwon, 2002), social capital is not equally available to all individuals, even within a community (Portes, 1998), and varies according to other factors including gender (Campbell, 1996; Burt, 1998), ethnicity (Wallace, 1993; Nazroo, 1998; Brondolo et al., 2012), age (Morrow, 1999) and socio-economic status (Cooper et al., 1999).

Portes (1998) identifies four negative consequences of social capital, including: 1) the exclusion of outsiders; 2) excess claims on group members, which refers to the issue of free-riding members who take advantage of intergroup relations; 3) restrictions on individual freedoms, as community or group participation creates demand for conformity; and 4) 'downward levelling norms', which Portes (1998: 17) explains occurs because:

> Group solidarity is cemented by a common experience of adversity and opposition to mainstream society… Individual success stories undermine group cohesion because the latter is precisely grounded in the alleged impossibility of such occurrences. The result is downward leveling norms that operate to keep members of a downtrodden group in place and force the more ambitious to escape from it.

Additional categories of capitals have also been identified, such as political (Yaro, 2004) or cultural capital (Bebbington, 1999). For the purposes of this thesis, I consider political awareness and participation to be forms of human capital because they closely relate to (in)formal education and the knowledge that an individual holds. I consider culture not as a capital asset, but rather as a factor that underlies each aspect of the livelihood process. I argue this because culture cannot be acquired like assets, but rather is part of the context within which the livelihoods analysis

framework is placed. It is also important to note that assets can fall into multiple categories, as is the case with livestock, which can be both a natural capital asset and storage of financial capital.

2.2.2. Access to assets

Following a livelihoods approach, external factors influence individual or household access to assets and to specific livelihoods, with individuals having variable control over these factors. This set of external factors is described as the vulnerability context, comprising shocks (such as natural disasters or economic crises), trends (such as rising sea level or population growth), and seasonality (such as changes in wind patterns during the monsoon season) (Chambers and Conway, 1991; Ellis 2000a; Wisner, 2009). Alongside this vulnerability context exist mediating factors that influence one's access to assets. In the livelihoods framework outlined by Ellis (2000b), these mediating factors are grouped under social relations, institutions, and organizations, while in the DFID framework they are classified as transforming structures (such as private and public organizations) and processes (comprising policies, legislation, institutions, and culture) (1999; Figure 2.2). I consider culture to be more than a transforming process, and as already noted, I assess the degree to which culture impacts each aspect of the framework. Like Michaud and Forsyth (2011), I contend that culture is not accounted for enough in the sustainable livelihoods literature, forming the base of the context in which individuals pursue their livelihoods. Culture can be understood as encompassing spirituality, language, kinship, and connection to place; as being intimately linked to place; and as affecting every part of people's lives (Wilson, 2003; Panelli and Tipa, 2007; Paolisso and Derry, 2010; Adger et al., 2013; Cairney et al., 2015; Reid et al., 2016).

2.2.3. Livelihood strategies

Livelihood strategies describe individual or household consumption and/or activity choices, given access to various livelihood assets (Allison and Horemans, 2006). Livelihood strategies can be short or long term, and are commonly referred to as 'coping' or 'adapting' strategies respectively (Allison and Horemans, 2006). Typical livelihood strategies described in the literature include intensification, extensification, diversification, and migration (Ellis, 2000b; Rigg 2007a; Turner 2007a). Intensification refers to "more output per unit area through capital investment or increases in labour inputs," while extensification describes a process where more land is under cultivation, or fishing is done in across a larger area (Scoones, 1998: 9).

Diversification can be either a positive agency in choice – when a household deliberately chooses to diversify their livelihood activities to increase wealth or security, for example, or a negative, reactive strategy which a household will pursue in response to a crisis (Davies and

Hossain, 1997; Bryceson, 2002; Eakin et al., 2006; Turner, 2007a). These positive and negative types of diversification have also been categorized as 'progressive' or 'distress' diversification (Bouahom et al., 2004), or 'thriving' and 'coping' diversification (Start and Johnson, 2004). Turner (2007a) defines a third approach called 'selective diversification,' whereby a temporal aspect is incorporated into the decision-making processes of households' livelihood diversification strategy.

I argue, following Bonnin and Turner (2012), that resistance is also a livelihood strategy, one that is missing from the sustainable livelihoods literature, but is significant, as it reflects the active roles agents play in strategizing their livelihoods given rules, regulations, or actions of authorities that are locally perceived as unjust. I examine the literature on migration in a broader discussion on mobility in Section 2.3, and resistance in Section 2.4.

2.2.4. Critiques and contributions to the sustainable livelihoods literature

The sustainable livelihoods approach has been critiqued for allocating too much agency at the individual scale, with less regard for structural aspects that influence livelihood generation, and for not focusing enough on power relations (Turner, 2014). The literature also fails to address links between social capital and the local political economy (Bebbington 1996; Bebbington et al., 2006; Turner, 2007b), such as "relationships governed by the logics of the state, market, and civil society" (Bebbington, 1996: 2021). Moreover, the negative dynamics of social capital are often ignored in sustainable livelihoods analyses (Portes and Landolt, 2000; Radcliffe, 2004; Turner, 2007b). Some critics argue that with social capital being separated from the other capitals, it can be overemphasised in development policies using the sustainable livelihood approach (Bebbington, 2002; Mayer and Rankin, 2002; Woolcock, 2003). Overemphasising social capital in the community development process has been dangerous in certain empirical studies (Das, 2004).

The sustainable livelihoods approach does not include any suggestions on approaching culture (Tao et al., 2010) or leisure (Brinson et al., 2009), which may both influence the sustainability of resource use. Furthermore, the substitutability of assets is often unclear – can financial capital really substitute for natural capital (Morse and McNamara, 2013)? Aiming to capture the complexity of people's lives and development problems, the sustainable livelihoods approach has been criticized for its lack of focus, depth, and clarity (van Dillen, 2002), resulting on more descriptive results than analytical. Moreover, the sustainable livelihoods approach has been critiqued for lacking translation into policy interventions that will actually help people (Morse and McNamara, 2013).

The livelihoods approach has also been critiqued for discounting the individual freedom and/or power gained through capital access (Bonnin and Turner, 2012). Other scholars have

recognized this agency, and have defined assets as building blocks that people use to survive and adapt, but also as the "basis of agents' *power* to act and to reproduce, challenge or change the rules that govern the control, use and transformation of resources" (Bebbington, 1999: 2012). I utilize this second definition of assets throughout my thesis because it illustrates the ways in which individuals or households actively and strategically access assets. It also describes the ways in which assets can influence one's financial, but also social or political capabilities.

Sustainable livelihoods literature lacks an analysis of the gendered processes of decision-making (Hapke and Ayyankeril, 2004; Weeratunge et al., 2010) or the ways in which gender influences livelihood strategizing. I argue, following Weeratunge et al. (2010), that there is a gendered variation in access to livelihood assets and strategies that must be accounted for. While gender is listed under 'social relations' in Ellis' framework, I contend that it is necessary to examine gender in *all* aspects of the livelihood generation process. I show in Chapter 5 that Bajo women and men access and benefit from assets in different ways, face different obstacles when pursuing livelihood activities, and strategize their livelihoods differently. I draw from the literature on feminist political ecology to analyze gendered dynamics of livelihood generation in Sama Bahari.

While livelihood diversification has been studied, there has been an unfocused account of the fluidity of livelihoods – livelihoods that, in many cases in the rural South, are constantly reworked in response to changing economic contexts given globalizing forces of market integration (Bouahom et al., 2004; Turner, 2007a). I examine the fluidity of local Bajo livelihoods in Chapter 5. Finally, while migration is considered a significant livelihood strategy, I contend that a focused discussion of mobility is lacking in the sustainable livelihoods literature, given the circulation of movement that occurs at micro and macro scales, across space and time, thus lifting the concept of livelihood out of its sedentarist roots (Lund et al., 2014). I account for this by drawing from mobility literature, which I outline and critique in the following section.

2.3. MOBILITY

The concept of mobility "encompasses both the large-scale movements of people, objects, capital and information across the world, as well as the more local processes of daily transportation and movement through public space, and the travel of material things within everyday life" (Hannam et al., 2006: 1). While mobility is not a new concept, there has been a recent shift in mobility literature, aimed at transcending a variety of disciplinary boundaries in order to explore new trajectories of social research (Hannam et al., 2006). This shift, or the 'new mobility paradigm', was conceived in the early 2000s, and has since been expanded upon by scholars such as Uteng (2006), writing on non-Western immigrant discourses; Urry (2007), who develops the new mobilities

paradigm by examining a wide array of mobile concerns from texting to terrorism; and Cresswell (2010), who outlines key ideas for a geographical theoretical approach to the politics of mobility by reconceptualising mobility not just as a 'singular thing' but rather, as a complex process that differs in motive force, velocity, rhythm, route, experience, and friction.

The new mobilities paradigm also "expands the current area of migration analysis by studying not just the relation between place of origin and place of destination, but the whole manner in which people maneuver through space" (Lund et al., 2014: 2). Many mobility scholars have noted that mobility is not simply a linear, but rather dynamic, as movement changes shape and form according to personal factors and external opportunities (de Haan, 1999; Kothari, 2003; Cresswell, 2010; de Haas, 2010). Thus, mobility is a concept that can be understood across scales, from micro movements of the body, like dancing, walking or running, to global flows of capital (Lund et al., 2014). Lund et al. (2014) identify three main types of mobility that are relevant to my own research: mobility as a livelihood strategy, mobility as a social process, and gendered mobility. I outline these concepts next.

2.3.1. Mobility as a livelihood strategy

Mobility as a livelihood strategy can be described as the "social and spatial practices of people involved in migratory movements, and lifts the concept of 'livelihood' out of its locally bounded context" (Stepputat and Sorensen, 2001: 770). This builds upon current migration literature by highlighting a movement over any period of time, and by transcending false rural-urban dualisms (Rigg, 2007b; Bunnell et al., 2013). In this conceptualization, mobility can be understood as a "positive agency in choices" (Dyer, 2010: 307).

Agency in choice of movement in the context of rural livelihoods is understudied to date, with most mobility studies in the Global South focused on forced migration or migration as a last resort livelihood strategy (Lund et al., 2014). For example, scholars using a neoclassical economic approach to understanding migration usually focus on rural to urban migration and suggest the reason for such migration is due primarily to economic prosperity in urban areas (Todaro and Harris, 1970; Castles, 2009). New mobility research aims to push past such reductionist understandings of migration by highlighting a number of factors that influence mobility, including positive choice (Adger et al., 2002; Ellis, 2003; Portes and de Wind, 2007; Gray, 2009; Hunter et al., 2014). Expanding scope beyond linear, rural to urban studies of migration, some scholars have found that migration in the Global South is often between rural areas or to and from small cities, and is intended only as a temporary strategy (Dufour and Piperata, 2004; Fan and Wang, 2008; Padoch et al., 2014).

Furthermore, recognizing mobility as an important livelihood strategy and examining the dynamics of mobility across space and over time can help us understand the complex interactions between mobility and resource use (de Haan, 1999; 2000; Ellis, 2003; de Haas, 2006; Rigg, 2007b; Carr, 2008; Scoones, 2009; Hoffman, 2011; Hoffman et al., 2011; Gupta, 2014). I argue (in Chapter 5) that migration can indeed be a positive livelihood approach, not simply a response to distress. In Chapter 5, I also illuminate the non-linear, dynamic process of mobility for many Bajo of Sama Bahari.

2.3.2. Mobility as a social process

Mobility can be understood as a socially transforming process in the context of local social structures and relationships, meaning that "social relations are co-constituted across space and context" (Rigg, 2007a: 119). Underlying factors, such as ethnicity, age, disability, education, social ties, and wealth, work to mediate mobility in this conceptualization. For example, someone who is relatively wealthy could more likely afford to migrate as a livelihood strategy than a relatively poor neighbour. Mobility can be examined as a social process by analyzing physical mobility, as well as by investigative the interaction between locals and outsiders who enter local communities (Rigg, 2006; Xu, 2006; Lund et al., 2014).

Scholars have studied the ways in which mobility differs for diverse subjects, including soldiers (Woodward and Jenkings, 2014), children (Christensen et al., 2011; Holdsworth, 2014), drivers and passengers (Yannis et al., 2007; Dant, 2014) or the diseased (Keil, 2014). I follow scholars examining the tourist as a mobile subject (Cohen 1972; 1979; Desforges, 2000; Andrews, 2006; Franklin, 2014; McCabe, 2014) in Chapter 6. I also examine mobility as a social process for the traditionally nomadic Bajo settled in Sama Bahari in Chapter 5, following research on nomadic mobility (Doel, 1996; Cresswell, 1997; d'Andrea, 2006). Specifically, I illuminate the ways in which conservation policies in the WNP alters the mobility of tourists and local Bajo in diverse ways, through an analysis of mobility as a social process in Chapter 5.

2.3.3. Gendered mobility

Gender is also an important factor that mediates mobility. A number of scholars writing on gendered mobilities have noted that gender and mobility have deep and meaningful influences on each other (Uteng and Cresswell, 2008; Hanson, 2010; McCann; 2011). Researchers writing on gendered mobilities in the Global South note that women's mobility is often restricted due to reproductive responsibilities (Sen and Grown, 1987; Momsen, 1996; Wolf, 1997; Harris-White,

1998; Kwagala, 1999; Togunde, 1999; Schroeder, 2000; Mandel, 2007). Some scholars argue that women's mobility can be extended only once another female can take on reproductive responsibilities within the home (Wolf, 1997; Schroeder, 2000; Mandel, 2007). Others highlight greater agency for women in mobility decision-making, as studies show how women strategically 'know one's place' (Williams, 2005) and negotiate alternative positions and roles through mobile processes (Barber, 2000; Williams, 2005; Hanson, 2010).

Restrictions on mobility can work to reinforce subordination, while on the other hand, a reduction of the barriers to mobility can work to transform gender relations and lead to more equality (Lund et al., 2014). Established gendered mobilities and divisions of labour are being eroded and reworked in literature on rural livelihoods in the Global South (Rigg, 2007a). I examine gendered mobility in Sama Bahari in Chapter 5.

2.3.4. Critiques and contributions to the mobility literature

A developed literature on migration within Southeast Asian studies exists (for example Ong, 1987; Mills, 1999; Lindquist, 2008), but has tended to be overlooked by 'mobility turn' scholars (Turner and Oswin, 2015). Furthermore, despite a decade and a half having passed since the new mobility paradigm emerged, there exists a problematic Western bias in the mobility literature. Rigg (2007a) describes the need for a Southern mobility paradigm to challenge sedentarist peasant livelihood models embedded in this literature, and to identify new mobilities that are emerging in the Global South. Following a small group of scholars such as Uteng (2006), Gough (2008), Hammond (2011), Rigg and Salamanca (2011), Lund et al. (2014) and Turner and Oswin (2015), I contribute to research within the mobility turn in the Global South by analyzing the patterns and processes of (im)mobility for semi-nomadic Bajo men and women in Sama Bahari, and subsequently, examining the ways in which mobilities influence livelihood strategies or decision-making.

2.4. EVERYDAY POLITICS, EVERYDAY RESISTANCE, AND THE MORAL ECONOMY

In this section, I present the fourth body of literature upon which my conceptual framework is built – everyday politics and resistance – inspired mainly by the work of Benedict Kerkvliet (1986; 1990; 2009) and James Scott (1986; 1990). To conceptualize my research findings, I draw from Scott's concepts of hegemonic narratives, hidden transcripts, and moral economy, as these concepts relate closely to everyday politics and resistance. I describe the useful linkages between concepts in the following sections.

The notion of everyday politics "involves people embracing, complying with, adjusting, and contesting norms and rules regarding authority over, production of, or allocation of resources and

doing so in quiet, mundane, and subtle expressions and acts that are rarely organized or direct" (Kerkvliet, 2009: 232). Everyday politics describe individual or group actions that are more covertly political than official politics, that are not organized, and that are taken by actors who may or may not consider their actions to be political. Kerkvliet (2009) describes four main forms of everyday resistance, including support, compliance, modifications and evasions, and resistance.

In turn, the concept of everyday resistance describes the ways in which the subaltern actively harness power by challenging features of the governing ideology in informal, surreptitious ways. Specifically, covert or everyday resistance (Scott, 1986; 1990; Kerkvliet, 1986; 1990; 2009) are terms used to describe a group's non-confrontational actions that reveal a general "disgust, anger, indignation, or opposition" to what the group considers to be unjust or unfair actions by people or groups in a position of higher authority, wealth, or power than they (Kerkvliet, 1986: 108).

Overt forms of resistance have been studied at length in academia (Polanyi, 1957; Gramsci 1971), while the often-ignored concept of covert resistance is slowly gaining more traction in case studies of peasant resistance in the rural South. Everyday politics are not necessarily organized or direct, and can be carried out either independently or collectively (Scott 1985; 1990). The concept refers to actions that may or may not be considered political by the actors themselves (Kerkvliet, 2009; Turner, 2012). This is an important livelihood strategy as well, as people are not simply passive recipients of (what they perceive to be) unjust rules and regulations, but are actively involved in negotiating their own livelihoods.

There are two main goals of everyday resistance. The first goal is to survive and persist within an unjust system, by working the system to the actors' minimum disadvantage (Hobsbawm, 1973; Scott, 1986). Unlike some overt forms of resistance, the aim is not "directly to overthrow or transform a system of domination, but rather to survive—today, this week, this season—within it" (Scott, 1986: 30). The consequences of different acts of everyday resistance could lead to a renegotiation of regulations or the overthrowing of a system. It could lead to no changes to structures or processes at all, or it could even potentially backfire, but that possibility will usually not result in actors ceasing to resist. The second goal of everyday resistance is justice (Kerkvliet, 1986; 1990). People attempt to claim what they believe is rightfully theirs, based on "values and rights recognised by a significant proportion of other people similar to them" (Kerkvliet, 2009: 233).

There are a variety of forms of everyday resistance, such as language, deceit, foot-dragging, destruction, or flight. Language can be used as a tactic for the subaltern to communicate with each other in a way that authorities cannot understand. Local Bajo, for example, are excluded from

positions of power, and can choose to communicate with each other using the Bajo language that authorities do not understand. Language can also be used to critique authorities or to show disapproval and disgust toward hegemonic structures that are perceived to be unjust or unfair. As noted by Kerkvliet (2009: 233), the "nasty, derogatory things peasants say or the jokes they crack about their landlords, employers, government officials, or the like behind their backs can be forms of everyday resistance." Actors in less powerful positions can deceive authorities by disguising illegal actions as a second form of everyday resistance. This form of everyday resistance appears most frequently in my interviews, as local Bajo resist National Park regulations by deceiving National Park authorities. 'Foot-dragging' describes the ways in which local residents can resist instructions from authorities by working less efficiently or effectively than possible. An example of foot-dragging in the case of Bajo in Sama Bahari could be when National Park authorities ask that Bajo fishers in no-take zones leave the area, and Bajo fishers purposely take longer than needed to do so. Subtly damaging the property of authorities can constitute resistance as well. For example, farmers can resist by slightly damaging farm equipment belonging to wealthier farmers they work for. My research has not revealed that local Bajo employ this form of resistance. People may also resist governing groups, structures, and processes by leaving or parting from something if they consider it to be unfair or unjust. This type of resistance is conceptualized as 'flight'. Some local Bajo express their desire to leave Sama Bahari due to regulations they consider to be unjust, but many would not leave the village permanently due to the strong sense of community and tight social ties. I explore these acts of local resistance in Chapter 7.

2.4.1. Hegemonic narratives and hidden transcripts

Scott's (1976) work on everyday resistance has remained influential because his conceptualization of the term moved debates away from structural-functional analytical approaches to focus on the concepts of agency and ideology in the context of the rural poor and the rural lower class. Specifically, Scott (1976) was interested in how cultural factors influenced agrarian social change, and how the political actions of the rural poor and lower classes could limit elite economic relations and the elite's ability to exploit the subaltern. Necessarily then, Scott re-conceptualized hegemony, because the concept of ideological hegemony in the 1970s was defined as a process that excluded alternatives to the current structure of power and status (Sivaramakrishnan, 2005). During the 1980s, influential formulations of hegemony were emerging in historical anthropology literature, whereby culture was not seen as being subsumed within hegemony, and meaning was not understood to be reducible to the postures of power. E. P. Thompson (1971), who influenced Scott

at this time (Edelman, 2005), disagreed with the idea that "hegemony entailed acceptance by the poor of the gentry's paternalism in any uncontested sense" (Sivaramakrishnan, 2005: 347).

Scott (1976) rejects the false consciousness central to Hegel's (1977) definition of hegemony. Instead, he builds upon Williams' (1977) notion of hegemony as a constellation of lived meanings, and follows Thompson (1971) in highlighting the pressure arising from below that challenges hegemonic discourse. For Scott (1985), hegemony is constantly being challenged by the rural poor in a struggle to reject the ideological persuasion to maintain acts of routine compliance.

The term public transcript can be used to describe the overt actions that people show to authorities (Scott, 1985). These acts tend to include compliance and acceptance. The hidden transcript, on the other hand, is used to conceptualize the ways in which the subaltern covertly critique or resist authorities. It is argued that the social space for hidden transcripts exists as a result of a mutual perception of shared benefit between the dominant and subaltern groups, which is avoiding open confrontation (Sivaramakrishnan, 2005). Therefore, the extent to which hegemony is negotiated is telling of both the forms of subaltern resistance and the extent of dominant power.

Scott (1985) contends that the subaltern actively harness some power by challenging features of the governing ideology through everyday resistance. I argue in the case of the Bajo in Sama Bahari, that local men and women actively resist regulations of the WNP. I aim to analyze the extent to which hidden transcripts are effective in negotiating hegemony and balancing power.

2.4.2. Moral economy

The concept of moral economy can be understood as an economy based on ideas of justice, values, and rights recognized by a significant proportion of a community (Scott, 1976). Inspired by E.P. Thompson's (1971) work, Scott writes of a moral economy in the context of peasant rebellion in Southeast Asia. He claims:

> If we understand the indignation and rage which prompt them to risk everything, we can grasp what I have chosen to call their moral economy: their notion of economic justice and their working definition of exploitation—their view of which claims on their product were tolerable and which intolerable (Scott: 1976: 3).

Scott's concept of moral economy leads to a greater appreciation of the normative roots of the politics of the subaltern. Sivaramakrishnan (2005) argues that it is within Scott's concept of moral economy that the negotiation of rights and obligations are permitted. That is, some form of moral obligation of the dominant class exists that consequently weakens the interdependent relationship among classes. In the context in which Scott writes, the degree to which peasants feel exploited depends on intervening factors, including peasant alliances with other classes, the elite's

capacity to dominate, and the social organization of the subaltern itself (Scott, 1976). The concept of a moral economy is useful in connecting the concepts of resistance (defined in Section 2.4), power (defined in Section 2.1.4) and hegemony (defined in Section 2.4.2).

I use the concept of moral economy in my research to analyze the ways in which local Bajo justify continued access to illegal resources within the WNP. I also investigate if there is any evidence that a sense of moral obligation of state representatives exists in this context. I examine these questions in Chapter 6.

2.4.3. Critiques and contributions to the everyday politics and resistance literature

The everyday politics and livelihoods literature has been critiqued for allocating too much power at times to human agency over structure, and for focusing on the micro- and meso-scales that do not contribute to greater theories at the macro level. While Scott's initial notion of everyday resistance is gender blind, there has been a growing focus of gendered resistance in the literature on everyday politics (for example Ong, 1987; Hart, 1991; Agarwal, 1994; 1995; 1997; 1998; 2000; Camp, 2004). These contributions find that women often must work to circumvent additional or different barriers (due to gender norms or roles, for example) that they collectively perceive as unjust as a way of negotiating agency over their own lives. This is an area where more research needs to be done to better understand the gendered variation in forms and goals of covert resistance, and to highlight the gendered differences in patterns or processes of resistance as a livelihood strategy. In the case of Sama Bahari, I find that women covertly resist gender norms and roles in order to access capital assets that are otherwise deemed out of reach. I examine gendered aspects of local covert resistance in detail in Chapter 6.

2.5. CONCLUSIONS

Within this chapter I have created a conceptual framework for this research, drawing on reviews and critiques of four main bodies of literature: political ecology, sustainable livelihoods, mobility, and everyday politics and resistance. Through the lens of political ecology and feminist political ecology more specifically, I examine gendered power dynamics in Sama Bahari at the individual and community scale. I also mobilize the political ecology concepts of governmentality, environmentality, and territoriality throughout this thesis to analyze the socio-political structures that influence local Bajo resource use in the WNP. I contend that political ecology is extremely helpful in providing a broad approach to understanding human-environment interactions surrounding resource use.

I also draw on three key core building blocks from the sustainable livelihoods literature to inform my research. These include a focus on livelihood assets, how individuals gain access to a range of assets, and livelihood strategies. I have argued that existing literature on sustainable livelihoods has often failed to include gender and culture as significant mediating factors to livelihood generation. This literature has also failed to address resistance as a livelihood strategy.

Expanding my conceptual framework to include mobility, I draw from the mobility literature, the conceptualizations of mobility as a livelihood strategy, mobility as a social process, and mobility as a gendered process. Specifically, I analyze the agency, dynamism, and personal factors that influence mobility processes in Sama Bahari. I contend that the recent turn in the mobility literature has tended to ignore the Global South in general. I examine the ways in which mobility influences the decision-making processes and livelihood strategies of Bajo in Sama Bahari.

From the everyday politics and resistance literatures, I focus on language and deceit as actions by which local Bajo covertly resist norms and policies they consider unjust. Research on resistance has tended to focus on overt forms, while research on everyday politics has often ignored gendered forms. These four bodies of work intersect and inform each other in my conceptual framework. Everyday resistance is mostly absent in sustainable livelihoods analyses (Bonnin and Turner, 2012; Turner, 2012), yet I contend that everyday resistance is an important livelihood strategy for Bajo individuals and households in Sama Bahari because people are actively involved in negotiating their own livelihoods. In addition, I pair the sustainable livelihoods approach with political ecology to find an analytical balance between structure and agency, while highlighting power dynamics in livelihood processes. Throughout my analysis, I actively draw links between social capital and political ecology. Finally, I contend the everyday resistance is significant for sustainable livelihood analyses (Bonnin and Turner, 2012; Turner, 2012).

CHAPTER 3: CONTEXT

Indonesia's WNP, Southeast Sulawesi was created as a state strategy for marine conservation, tourism, and governance. For centuries, ethnic minority Bajo have been reliant upon marine resources in the Wakatobi Region for cultural, livelihood, and subsistence purposes. A more settled lifestyle, newer fishing technologies, and increased restrictions on fishing and resource collection through the establishment of the WNP have had diverse consequences for local Bajo livelihoods.

In this chapter, I contextualize my case study of the Bajo village of Sama Bahari, Wakatobi Region, Southeast Sulawesi, within the wider geographic, economic, social, and political context of Indonesia. I begin in Section 3.1 by outlining the political landscape of Indonesia, explaining in particular, the functions and impacts of decentralization and democratization. I then summarize the government program for empowering isolated communities (*Pemberdayaan Komunitas Adat Terpencil* or PKAT), which provides insight into the structural framework in which minorities like the Bajo are subjected to primitivizing discourses. In Section 3.2, I focus on conservation in Indonesia before examining Bajo in the Australian Fishing Zone. In Section 3.3, I introduce the Wakatobi Region, providing an overview of regional geographic and socio-economic factors, before narrowing focus on National Park rules and regulations. This section ends with an introduction to Sama Bahari village, my study site. I conclude with Section 3.4 by introducing Bajo identity, traditional beliefs, and livelihood activities.

3.1. POLITICAL LANDSCAPE IN INDONESIA AFFECTING MARITIME MINORITIES

As noted in Chapter 1, Indonesia is located central to the Indo-Pacific region. It is the largest archipelagic state in the world, with approximately 17,000 islands (CBD, 2016), 580 million hectares of seas, and approximately 81,000 kilometers of coastlines fringed by biodiverse habitats (Djohani, 1996). Home to 254 million people (World Bank, 2016) and over 300 reported ethnic groups (Annata et al., 2014), Indonesia is also the country with the largest Muslim population in the world. For the 300 years preceding its independence in 1945, Indonesia was largely under Dutch colonial rule. After 1945, the country experienced two authoritarian leaderships under the rule of presidents Sukarno and Suharto. Suharto ruled the country for over 30 years until his downfall in 1997 (Jenkins, 2010). Since then, a number of presidents have been in power, the most recent being Joko Widodo since 2014. Indonesia is now one of the largest democracies in the world.

3.1.1. From authoritarian rule to democratization; centralization to decentralization

3.1.1.1. Centralization and authoritarian rule

To better understand the current political climate in which Bajo make their livelihoods, it is important to understand specific policies that the Indonesian government has implemented over time. The Dutch colonial government introduced regional self-governance and autonomy rights that were based at both the provincial and local levels (Wollenberg et al., 2009). However, after independence in 1945, a lack of funding, human resources, and experience within regional governments made the continuation of decentralization difficult. In 1959, Indonesia's first president, Sukarno, abolished limited attempts at regional autonomy and adopted centralized power (Wah and Ojendal, 2005). This marked the start of a 'guided democracy' era that lasted until 1965, when Suharto seized power through a coup.[5]

Indonesia's second president, President Suharto, ruled from 1967 to 1998. Through his New Order regime, Suharto aimed to establish firm central control over the Indonesian archipelago, restore economic stability, and initiate legitimacy through a continued centralized system that sought to maintain political stability to facilitate an influx of foreign capital (MacAndrews, 1986). In 1979, Suharto imposed a local political structure that was uniform throughout Indonesia, to allow the central government to have greater control at the village level in a hierarchical decision-making process (Wollenberg et al., 2009). Laws and regulations were drafted without regional or local level consultation, and applied across the archipelago to over 600 ethnic groups (Wollenberg et al., 2009).

As part of the drive for centralization and increasing authoritarian rule, the central government facilitated the appropriation of land from local landowners for the purpose of industrial development through intimidation and force. By the start of 1997, Indonesia's gross domestic product (GDP) was growing at a rate of 7.4 percent per year (International Labour Organization [ILO], 2014), and while social protection was not a priority, Suharto had brought Indonesia's economy to prosper, though wealth was clustered into few hands (Wah and Ojendal, 2005). However, Suharto's rule was characterized by a military-ruled government, corruption, and ethnic violence, and as outlined next, could not withstand the 1997-98 financial crisis.

[5] See Vatikiotis (1993), Ramage (1995) and Wah and Ojendal (2005) for more information.

3.1.1.2. Democratization and decentralization

The Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998 exposed the vulnerability of the Indonesian economy. By January 1998, the Indonesian *rupiah*[6] (RP) was worth a mere 20 percent of its peak value during the previous year, and economic growth was negative throughout the subsequent months (Waters et al., 2003). Inflation during the first two thirds of 1998 ran at a rate of 58 percent. During this time period, average food prices increased by approximately 80 percent and the price of the country's staple, rice, increased by 50 percent (Asian Development Bank, 2014). Unemployment and other economic challenges, such as a decline in real wages, resulted in 25 percent of Indonesian's non-poor sliding into poverty between 1997 and 1998 (World Bank, 2006).

During the financial crisis, resentment among the general population toward Suharto grew regarding the hegemonic structure of governance, corruption, cronyism, environmental issues, and the lack of attention given to the poor (Wollenberg et al., 2009). The deepening financial crisis led to a growth in social movements, protests, and eventually triggered riots.[7] These movements were emboldened by international and domestic pressures to reform (Wah and Ojendal, 2005). Together, these activities weakened the central state and triggered the uprising that forced President Suharto to resign and dismantled a number of his government's authoritarian structures (Wah and Ojendal, 2005).

The era immediately after Suharto's downfall, known as *Reformasi* or political reform (initially led by President Habibie), sought to move beyond the collusion and corruption characterizing the New Order regime, favouring democratization instead (Wah and Ojendal, 2005). In 1999, as part of the Second Amendment of the Constitution of 1945, Article 18, was revised, and stipulated that "the state shall recognize and respect *adat* law communities with their traditional rights as long as they still exist and are in accordance with community development and the principle of the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia" (Second Amendment to the Rep. Ind. Const., 1999, art. 18b). In addition, Decentralization Law 22/1999 declared that a village is a "single legal community that possess the authority to govern and administer the local community based on local origins, customs, and traditions that are recognized in the national governance system and exist in the district" (Rep. Ind. Decentralization Law 22, 1999, art. 1/o). The purpose of this decentralization was to "support democracy, public participation, equality and justice, and to eliminate corruption" (Wollenberg et al., 2009: 16).

[6] The *rupiah* (RP) is the basic monetary unit of Indonesia. One Canadian dollar is equal to approximately 10 000 RP.
[7] For more information on these political events, see Kingsbury (2002), Wollenberg et al. (2009), and Crouch (2010).

While decentralization was positive in theory, some of the new laws assigned authority to provincial levels while others assigned authority to districts, and confusion over coordination arose between province and district governments. There was no explicit specification about customary rights (so all lands without certificates were still considered to be owned by the state), nor was there any stipulation on what activities were to be sanctioned within customary territories, or how competing *adat* claims were to be addressed (Tyson, 2010). These decentralization laws have been criticized as hasty attempts at passing laws without public consultation (Duncan, 2004). In 2004, the government issued yet another law, the Law Concerning Regional Administration 34/2004, to repeal Decentralization Law 22/1999, and to re-establish the hierarchy between province and district (Duncan, 2004). There was now space for local communities to contest state ownership over land and regain customary land rights. At the time of my data collection, Village Law 6/2014 was introduced, which meant that the village had a strengthened role as its own self-governing entity with the authority and right to manage the community and natural resources, no longer in a subordinate position under the sub-district level government (Purwanto and Moestrup, 2016). Given the stipulations of Conservation Law 5/1990 (outlined in Chapter 1), it is currently unclear as to how the village is to manage natural resources within conservation areas. The current revision of the Conservation Law as I finish writing in 2017, is expected to define the roles and responsibilities of the village in conservation activities.

In sum, Indonesia has had a turbulent political history; oppression and fear of talking about politics has given way to a far more open political landscape very quickly. Though decentralization in Indonesia is widely criticized, local communities like Sama Bahari are able to consult their local governments to address community concerns—a more democratic and locally accessible system than had previous existed under Suharto's authoritarian rule. In Chapter 5, I examine the relationships between the local government in Sama Bahari and local Bajo, within the context of analyzing Bajo livelihoods.

3.1.2. 'Developing' indigenous minorities in Indonesia

Bajo are often categorized by the Indonesian state under the official translation for 'indigenous peoples,' *masyarakat adat*, along with many other non-indigenous ethnic minority groups in Indonesia. Historically, there have been three main labels used to identify ethnic minorities in Indonesia. The first dates back to Dutch colonial rule, when the concept of 'natives' (*pribumi, bumi putera*) referred to all Indonesian people who were not European or 'foreign Orientals,' which included Chinese, Arabic, and other Asian immigrants (Fasseur, 2007; Wignjosoebroto, 2014). Also under Dutch rule, the term *masyarakat hukum adat* (customary law communities) was developed to

distinguish groups of 'natives' from each other, based on kinship ties, territorial ties, and social organization (Safitri, 2015). The latter term was adopted into legislation in the 19th century, but was later revised to *masyarakat adat* after the fall of Suharto, as the *masyarakat hukum adat* had been used derogatorily during Suharto's New Order regime (Safitri, 2015).

A third term had been introduced by the Government of Indonesia in 1951, shortly after independence. *Komunitas adat terpencil (*KAT), translates to either 'geographically isolated customary law communities' or more often 'remote indigenous communities." The term was introduced in official documents of Suharto's village development policy, to identify ethnic groups that were considered to be 'lagging behind' mainstream, modernizing Indonesian society (Duncan, 2004). The label describes "groups bound by geographical unity and shared economic and/or socio-cultural systems. More importantly, the KAT are distinct because they are poor, living in remote areas and/or socio-economically vulnerable" (Safitri, 2015: 4-5). Groups classified under this label were understood by the government to be one of the biggest obstacles to 'developing' or 'modernizing' its citizens. At the time, this program focused mainly on gathering ethnographic data on target populations.

In 1999, the rhetoric of the program changed slightly, as minorities were now meant to be 'empowered'[8] rather than 'developed' (*Pemberdayaan Komunitas Adat Terpencil* or PKAT, which translates to 'empowerment of isolated customary law communities,' or more often, 'empowerment of remote indigenous communities') (Duncan, 2004; Republic of Indonesia, 2014). The program began to focus on incorporating 'isolated' and 'backward' (*terbelakang*) communities into mainstream Indonesia society (Duncan, 2004). This rhetoric is still used today by the Ministry of Social Affairs, who manage the program for the empowerment of indigenous peoples in remote areas (PKAT). Through the PKAT program, the government has intervened in nearly every aspect of the lives of target communities, including:

a. settlement;
b. administration of population;
c. religious life;
d. health;
e. education;
f. food security;
g. provision of access to job opportunity;
h. provision of access to land;
i. social advocacy;
j. social services; and/or
k. environment (Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia, 2015: online).

[8] Some objectives of the program include religious leadership, increasing security, and resettlement of communities (see Duncan, 2004).

Activities of social empowerment activities under the act include:

a. diagnosis and motivation;
b. skills training;
c. mentoring;
d. giving the capital stimulants, business equipment, and business place;
e. improved market access of products;
f. supervision, and social advocacy;
g. strengthening social harmony;
h. structuring the social environment; and/or
i. further guidance (Sekretariat Kabinet Republik Indonesia, 2015: online).

The program has been widely critiqued for having generated little benefit for target groups (Li, 1999; Duncan, 2004; Surbakti, 2005).

It has been suggested by Li (1999) that the rationale for the Indonesian government needing to 'develop' or 'modernize' minorities stems from the general logic of governmentality. Li (1999: 296) argues that Foucault's conceptualization of governmentality describes the "emergence of a distinctive, modern form of power which seeks to govern or regulate the conditions under which people live their lives" as well as the rationale that seeks to justify such regulations, and the concentration of government within the state apparatus. I argue that the PKAT program is one example of the Indonesian state's attempts at governing ethnic minorities, and is a problematic form of governmentality.

The Bajo are among the minorities that have been relentlessly subjected to primitivizing discourses in Indonesia (Lenhart, 2008; Benjamin and Chou, 2002; Duncan, 2004; Gaynor, 2007), and are categorized as an isolated tribe under the PKAT program. What the Bajo "have often been isolated from, however, are not other people and places—they have after all been involved in some degree of travel and trade—rather they have become isolated in relation to administrative structures and their centers" (Gaynor, 2007). To some degree, the PKAT program has created a specific discourse among Indonesian bureaucrats when thinking about Bajo and other ethnic minorities (Duncan, 2004). The rhetoric in PKAT literature illustrates the views of the Indonesian government on indigenous populations and minorities, and has problematic consequences, such as a continuing disregard for such communities (Duncan, 2004).

3.1.3. Government programmes targeting the poor

As of 2011, extreme poverty in Indonesia has been relatively low, but 44.4 percent of the population is on the edge of poverty, living on or under $2 US per day (World Bank, 2011a).

Indonesia has developed a mix of social programs since the Asian financial crisis (1997-98) that have, to some degree, worked to reduce poverty in the country. Table 3.1 shows the social assistance and subsidies offered by the Indonesian government to help poorer citizens access food, education, healthcare, infrastructure, and cash assistance.

One of these programs, developed in 2005 by the central government, is a public health insurance scheme called *Jamkesmas*, which currently insures 76 million of Indonesia's poorest citizens, including many Bajo in Sama Bahari (Harimurti et al., 2013). Government expenditure for *Jamkesmas* was 7.3 trillion RP (approximately $546 million US) in 2012. While the program aims to provide universal healthcare, it is performing below its potential as "there is evidence of high levels of mis-targeting and leakages to the non-poor, low levels of socialization and awareness of benefits, low utilization and relatively low quality of care" (Harimurti et al., 2013: 1). The World Bank (2011b) estimates 52 percent of the poorest 30 percent are without health insurance, while 28 percent of middle income earners and 11.8 percent of high income earners are covered by *Jamkesmas*.

Many Bajo in Sama Bahari benefit from a government rice subsidy for the poor known as *Raskin*. As mentioned above, the Asian economic crisis led to an increase in rice prices. This resulted in a drop of rice consumption and consequently, a decline in the health status of children (ILO, 2012). The government introduced this rice subsidy in 1998 to ensure adequate consumption of Indonesia's main staple food.[9] Problems with the program include limited distribution, varying quality of rice, lack of transparency, mis-targeting, high cost of program management, and ineffective program monitoring and evaluation (Hastuti and Mawardi, 2012; Sambijantoro, 2015).

In 2005, the Indonesian government reduced fuel subsidies in March and October, which increased fuel prices from 1,810 RP ($0.18 US) per liter at the start of the year, to 4,500 RP ($0.45 US) per liter by October (Beaton and Lontoh, 2010). Between the two subsidy cuts, the government launched two short-term interventions: an unconditional cash transfer program, *Bantuan Langsung Tunai* (Cash Transfer Assistance program, or BLT) and the *Program Konpensasi Pengurangan Subsidi Bahan Bakar Minyak* (Fuel Subsidy Reduction Compensation Program, or BBM), which provided support targeted toward affected groups by increasing social spending on health, school, and rural infrastructure (Beaton and Lontoh, 2010). BLT payments were made in two installments of 300,000 RP ($30 US) in October 2005 and January 2006 to target households (Beaton and Lontoh, 2010). Fuel prices rose in 2008 from 5,000 ($0.50 US) to 6,000 ($0.60 US) per liter and

[9] In 1998, the Government supplied 1.05 million tonnes of rice (ILO, 2014). By 2012, the government budgeted 15.7 trillion RP (approximately $1.17 billion US) to subsidize 3.41 million tonnes of rice to 17.5 million households (ILO, 2014).

one more installment of BLT payments were made, before fuel prices fell back to 4,500 RP ($0.45 US) per liter in 2009. In 2010, the Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources announced in was to eliminate its subsidies entirely by 2014-2015, which occurred during the time of my fieldwork, as prices rose from 6,500 RP ($0.65 US) to 8,500 RP ($0.85 US) per liter by 2015 under Jokowi's administration (Wulandari et al., 2014). I reveal my respondents' experience with these fuel hikes, BLT and BBM in Chapter 5.

The final program I briefly discuss here, which directly impacts Indonesia's poor and has implications for Bajo households, is the *Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri* (PNPM Mandiri). In 2007, the Indonesian government launched the program as an effort to harmonize the numerous community empowerment programs run by various ministries (ILO, 2012). PNPM Mandiri is aimed at reducing poverty, while increasing prosperity and employment opportunities for poor individuals and communities (PNPM Mandiri, 2014). PNPM Mandiri provides local level governments, including that of Sama Bahari, with control over project development, design, implementation, and monitoring (ILO, 2012). PNPM Mandiri is divided into two sub-programs: *PNPM Inti*, an area-based community empowerment program; and *PNPM Penguatan*, a community empowerment program for specific sectors, such as agribusiness development, fisheries, or tourism (ILO, 2012). The budget for PNPM Mandiri was 13.4 trillion RP (approximately $1 billion US) in 2012 (ILO, 2012).

In sum, the political landscape in Indonesia has affected maritime minorities in numerous complex ways over time and space. Each of the programs that I have outlined and critiqued here have brought broad, overall benefits to the case study population for this thesis. Decentralization in Indonesia has been widely criticized, but it has worked to support some level of democracy in local communities like Sama Bahari. The government programs *Jamkesmas, Raskin,* and *PNPM Mandiri* also tend to benefit local Bajo households and communities. Yet, some of Indonesia's programs, like PKAT, are problematic for Bajo communities, as it subjects them to a primitivizing discourse. More specific, mixed local experiences with these programs will become clear in my analysis in Chapter 5.

Table 3.1: Social assistance and subsidies in Indonesia. (Reproduced from: ILO, 2012: 6).

Target Group	Types of Benefits	Institution	Supervisory Ministries
Poor households (defined as living on purchasing power parity of $2 US or less)	Free health care	Jamkesmas	Ministry of Health
	Subsidized rice	Raskin	Ministry of Welfare (coordinating ministry)
	Conditional cash transfer for households with children	*Program Keluarga Harapan* (Conditional Cash Transfer), *Program Kesejahteraan Sosial Anak* (Social Cash Transfer for Disadvantaged Children)	Ministry of Social Affairs
	Cash assistance (300,000 RP per month) for people with severe disabilities	*Jaminan Social Penyandang Cacat Berat* (Social Cash Transfer for the Severely Disabled)	Ministry of Social Affairs
	Cash assistance (300,000 RP per month) for vulnerable elderly	*Jaminan Sosial Lanjut Usia* (Social Cash Transfer for the Elderly)	Ministry of Social Affairs
	Scholarships for poor students	Scholarships for the poor	Ministry of Education
Poor communities	Block grants to communities to develop social and physical infrastructure at sub-district and village levels	*Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri* (National Program for Community Empowerment)	Ministry of Welfare (coordinating ministry), Ministry of Home Affairs (rural PNPM), Ministry of Public Works (urban PNPM)
Small and micro enterprise	Small and micro enterprise empowerment through micro-credit programme	*Kredit Usaha Rakyat* (Credit for Business)	Ministry of Economy (coordinating ministry)
Universal	Free childbirth care	Jampersal	Ministry of Health
	Block grants to schools	*Bantuan Operasional Sekolah* (School Operational Assistance)	Ministry of Education

3.2. MARINE ECOSYSTEMS AND CONSERVATION

3.2.1. Marine ecosystems and National Parks

Marine ecosystems in the Indonesian archipelago are home to a number of habitats such as reef flats, seagrass beds, lagoons, mangroves, and coral reefs. These habitats support what is recognized to be the richest and most biodiverse marine fauna in the world (Djohani, 1996). However, only 7 percent of Indonesian coral reefs and 27 percent of mangrove forests in Indonesia remain in good condition (Elliott et al., 2001; CBD, 2016). Threats to coral reefs include local factors such as pollution, overfishing, destructive fishing practices, coral reef mining, sedimentation, and tourism

(Cleary et al., 2014; CBD, 2016), while more widespread disturbances include mass bleaching events and climate change (Cleary et al., 2014). The health of Indonesia's reefs and related marine biodiversity are of international interest, and the Indonesian government has felt increasing international pressure to implement policies to protect such areas.

Environmentally sustainable coastal resource development became a national and primary goal of Indonesia's development strategy in its sixth Five-Year Development Plan, 1994-1999 (Djohani, 1996). In 1993, the National Development Planning Agency generated a document called the Biodiversity Action Plan for Indonesia (BAPI), which aimed to prioritize conservation measures within and beyond protected areas (CBD, 2016). The Indonesian government implemented a policy to protect 30 million hectares of marine and coastal areas by 2000 (Djohani, 1996). Today, Indonesia has 566 protected areas that cover a total of 36,069,368 hectares (CBD, 2016). Of these, there are 112 marine protected areas that cover a total of 17,144,702 hectares (Yulianto et al., 2013). The Indonesian state has set a target to increase marine protected areas to 10 percent of its total territorial waters (or 31 million hectares), with 20 million hectares of its waters to be protected by 2020 (Yulianto et al., 2013). Of the total marine protected areas, local governments manage 4,589,006 hectares (CBD, 2016). The BAPI was retitled in 2003 as the Indonesian Biodiversity Strategy and Action Plan (IBSAP). At the time of writing my thesis, this plan was being integrated into the Medium-Term National Development Plan for 2014-2019, with goals for better monitoring, evaluating, and implementation at national and local levels (CBD, 2016).

The Indonesian government considers conservation to be imperative for various sectors of its economy, including tourism development and exports (Djohani, 1996). The direct contribution of tourism (including economic activity generated by National Parks) was 3.2 percent of total GDP in 2014 (World Travel and Tourism Council, 2015). The fishing industry accounted for 3 percent of National GDP in 2012 (Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], 2012). The fishery sector is also significant with regards to food security in Indonesia, as it provides a relatively cheap source of animal protein and employment in remote areas (FAO, 2012).

Local involvement in conservation strategies, from formulation to management, is an essential prerequisite to sustainable development (Djohani, 1996). In Indonesia, however, general failures in enforcement and lack of collaboration with local fishers lead to unsatisfactory results for conservation (Cullen-Unsworth et al., 2013). Local communities are expected to comply with these new National Park regulations with little regard to the adverse effects they might have on their livelihoods (Elliott et al., 2001). In many cases this leads to conflict over resource use and lack of local support for protected areas, which I consider further in following sections. Furthermore, discourses of conservation and popular conceptualizations of nature as a pristine, static structure are

socially and politically constructed by governments and conservation organizations in such a way that often frames local people as the cause of natural resource destruction (Scoones, 1999). These discourses directly impact Bajo communities because they rely almost completely on marine resources for their livelihoods. I examine the local everyday politics of resource use in Chapter 6.

3.2.2. Bajo in the Australian Fishing Zone

It is estimated that Bajo from Indonesia have been sailing in wooden boats to the waters of the north coast of Australia and in the Timor and Arafura Seas for seasonal commercial trips since the early 1700s (Stacey, 2007; Christensen, 2016). Since the 1960s, Australia has been expanding its maritime territory, resulting in increasing losses of fishing grounds for Bajo and other Indonesian fishers (Stacey, 2007; Christensen, 2016).

In 1974, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Australia and Indonesia attempted to recognize the interests of Indonesian fishers in Northern Australian waters, approximately 1,000 to 1,500 kilometers away from the Wakatobi (Stacey, 2007; Christensen, 2016). The MOU permits subsistence fishing for 'traditional' fishers; that is, fishers who have been taking fish and other marine resources from the area for decades. Due to amendments made to the MOU in 1989, the area where traditional fishing is permitted has been reduced to one small zone (see Map 3.1). Under the 1989 amendments, fishing methods were restricted to 'traditional' methods, defined as fishing without the use of engines (Fox, 1998; Stacey, 2007). This policy aimed to permit small-scale artisanal fishing to continue, but prevent Indonesian commercial fishers from entering the area (Christensen, 2016).

The amended MOU has led to a number of problematic consequences for Indonesian fishers including Bajo individuals, and for marine resource management. First, the MOU has not restricted the numbers of vessels allowed in the area, leading to over-exploitation of resources in the legal fishing area. Second, technological restrictions have dangerous consequences for the safety of fishers in bad weather conditions. Third, the legal fishing zone is a relatively poor shark fishing ground. Because Bajo fishers venture to the Australian Fishing Zone for shark fins, they thus tend to fish illegally beyond the borders of the legal zone. This suggests the ineffectiveness of the MOU to recognize appropriate historic fishing grounds and commodities (Stacey, 2007; Christensen, 2016). Fourth, the legal fishing area is not clearly indicated with signage or geographical features—it is only demarcated on maps. This demonstrates the lack of consideration given to Bajo forms of navigation—which are characterized by the use of the stars, winds, or familiar landmarks—especially given that the MOU restricts fishing in the area to 'traditional' fishing methods (Stacey, 2007).



Map 3.1: Australia-Indonesia Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement Agreement line and 1974 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 'box' (after the amendments made in 1989), Timor Sea. (Source: Christensen, 2016: 144).

When Indonesian fishers are caught fishing outside of the small legal fishing zone, they are processed in the Australian cities of Darwin or Broom, charged with illegal fishing under the Australian Fisheries Management Act of 1991, their boats are usually burned or sometimes sold or auctioned by the Australian Fisheries Management Authority, while their gear and catch are seized (Stacey, 2007). Australian authorities then repatriate Bajo fishers by plane to either Kupang or Denpasar, Bali, where fishers may or may not be met by Indonesian Social Department officials, who assist with their trip home, though the service is erratic (Stacey, 2007). In the rare event that a fisher can afford to pay security bonds to return to Indonesia in their boats, Australian authorities tow the vessel to international waters (Stacey, 2007). Enforcement costs the Australian government millions of dollars each year with around 100 Indonesian boats being ceased annually, though the process has been shown to be ineffective in deterring illegal Bajo fishing in the Australian Fishing Zone (Stacey, 2007). I analyze Bajo activity in the Australian Fishing Zone in a wider investigation into the mobile livelihoods of the Bajo in Chapter 5.

3.3. THE WAKATOBI REGION

3.3.1. Geography and socioeconomics

The four main islands of the Wakatobi are situated in the Banda Sea, off the coast of mainland Southeast Sulawesi (see Map 1.2). The name, Wakatobi, is an abbreviation for the region's four main islands: Wangi Wangi, Kaledupa, Tomia, and Binongko. There are also a number of smaller islands that are mostly uninhabited within this region. The Wakatobi region was previously known as the Tukang Besi Islands—a name that translates to 'iron-worker' or 'blacksmith,' referring to some of the finest metalwork in Sulawesi that is still carried out today on Binongko Island (Stacey, 2007). The islands of the Wakatobi are coral, rather dry, and unfertile. The primary source of financial returns for Wakatobi residents is from fishing, and it is also a main source of subsistence in the region (Clifton et al., 2010).

Positioned in the center of coral triangle, the Wakatobi encompasses 50,000 hectares of fringing reefs, offshore atolls, platform reefs, and one barrier reef (Clifton et al., 2010). There are over 390 different species of hard coral that belong to 68 genera and 15 families (Turak and DeVantier, 2003). There are 590 fish species from 52 families found in the Wakatobi region (Pet-Soede and Erdmann, 1998). The diversity of this ecosystem is one of the highest on record in the world (Clifton et al., 2010).

As of 2006, the Wakatobi region had a total human population of 104,000, distributed on the islands of Wangi-Wangi (50 percent), Kaledupa (18 percent), Tomia (17 percent), and Binongko (15 percent) (Kabupaten Wakatobi, 2009). There are 64 villages across these four islands that vary in size from 450 to 3000 people (Clifton et al., 2010). The main ethnic group makes up 92 percent of the population, but the identification of this ethnic group varies in the literature. Some authors refer to this group as Orang Tukang Besi, after the original name of the islands (Stacey, 2007), while other scholars refer to them as Butonese (Clifton et al., 2010). Yet the identification of this ethnic group as Butonese is somewhat misleading, as these people do not come from Buton Island. Thus, identification is not based on ethnic identity, but rather on an historical allegiance, dating back to the time of the Buton Sultanate that once ruled the Tukang Besi Islands (Stacey, 2007). Local islanders refer to themselves by a name related to the specific island they are from. For example, people from Kaledupa refer to themselves as *Orang Kaledupa,* or Kaledupan people. They distinguish themselves from people from the other three main islands of the Wakatobi because the people of each main island have their own local dialect and some cultural differences. The remaining eight percent of the population (approximately 8300 people) are Bajo, living in six different villages in the Wakatobi: Mola Utara and Mola Selatan villages off the southern coast of

Wangi-Wangi; Sama Bahari, Mantigola and Lahoa villages, surrounding the island of Kaledupa; and Lamanggau village off the southwest coast of Tomia Island (Clifton et al., 2010). As such, the case study population for this thesis is the smallest ethnic minority group in this area.

3.3.2. The Wakatobi National Park

The WNP was established in 1996 and implemented in 1998 (Elliot et al. 2001). WNP is the third largest marine park in Indonesia, spanning 1.4 million hectares of land and sea (Unsworth and Clifton, 2010). The Park's territory is the entirety of the Wakatobi region (its zones are illustrated in Map 3.2). With 104,000 individuals living within its borders, the Wakatobi is also the most populated National Park in Indonesia (Kabupaten Wakatobi, 2009; Clifton et al., 2010).

As mentioned in Chapter 1, Elliott et al. (2001) identify a limited funding, lack of community participation in conservation activities, poor enforcement of Park regulations, and inappropriate zoning, as main issues the Park has faced since its implementation. However, there have been efforts focused on improving natural resource management within the Park, such as the Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Monitoring Programme (COREMAP) funded by the World Bank since 1998 (Moosa, 2004). The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) have also worked closely with Park authorities to develop the newest version of the management plan that was put in place in July 2007 (Clifton et al., 2010).

The WNP is one of the national government's most recent targets for tourism promotion. There are two main types of ecotourism in the area: dive tourism and research tourism. Tomia Island is the principal location for dive tourism, where a Swiss dive company has established a resort in 1995 and secured a no-take zone in front of it. This was organized ahead of the establishment of the National Park to protect the reefs for its visitors. The company has also invested in infrastructure that supports this sector of the economy, including the development of an airstrip. Dive tourism is also becoming increasingly popular on Hoga Island, three kilometers from the northeast coast of Kaledupa, with the development of two resorts by Indonesians, and a no-take zone established on one side of the island (Clifton, 2003).

Research tourism is extremely popular between the months of March and August on Hoga Island. Operation Wallacea is a United Kingdom-based research organization that focuses on conservation management research around the globe. This organization has been working in the Wakatobi region since 1999, and has established a research station on Hoga Island (Stanford, 2008). While a small number of Bajo from Sama Bahari are employed at these resorts and at the research station, many locals have revealed that the wages offered to them are low and the work is only seasonal. Furthermore, many Bajo are not qualified for these jobs, due to lack of *Bahasa Indonesia*

or English language abilities, which leads the research station and tourism facilities to employ Indonesians from farther islands.



Map 3.2: Political map of the Wakatobi region, showing the regional border which also delineates the National Park. (Source: Clifton, 2003: 392).

3.3.3. Sama Bahari

The first families to settle in Sama Bahari village did so in the early 1960s due to increasing pressure from the government to lead more sedentary lives (Focus Group, 26/06/2013), as the Suharto administration generally perceived sporadic indigenous and ethnic minority movement as a threat to national unity (Safitri, 2015). Specifically, the rebellion against the national government led by Kahar Muzakkar between 1950 until his death in 1965, was a period of unrest and upheaval for many people in South and Southeast Sulawesi, including the Bajo of the Tukang Besi Islands (now the Wakatobi). For most of the rebellion, much of Southeast Sulawesi was controlled by the rebels. Some Bajo supported the rebellion, but their support and actions were rejected by the people and government of Kaledupa (Stacey, 2007). Indeed, the National Indonesian Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) based on Kaledupa, instigated violent attacks and reprisals against the Bajo, as they wished to have tighter control over local Bajo populations (Stacey, 2007). During this time, Bajo from Mantigola migrated to Sama Bahari, including some of my older respondents, like

Buana, an 80-year-old widowed man (07/12/2014). Until the end of the rebellion, there was much Bajo migration within and beyond the Tukang Besi Islands due to the unrest and upheaval (Stacey, 2007). Many Bajo migrated from Mantigola and Sama Bahari to Mola, off the coast of Wangi-Wangi Island, as Bajo were granted permission to settle there from the government of the coastal village of Wanci, which supported the rebellion (Stacey, 2007). While most Bajo living in Mola by the end of the rebellion remained there, some returned to the villages of Sama Bahari and Mantigola due to the villages' desirable proximity to offshore coral reefs (Stacey, 2007). One of my respondents claims that Sama Bahari was once located by the atolls off Kaledupa Island (approximately 25 kilometers away from current-day Sama Bahari)– which was perhaps an even better locale (Ali, 23/11/2014) [10]. He claims the village was forced to move as a result of the rebellion (Ali, 23/11/2014).

Sama Bahari is the administrative name for the Bajo village locally known as Sampela. In Indonesian, *Sama* means 'same', and *Bahari* means 'nautical' or 'maritime'. The oblique translation of the village name is 'one with the sea'. The village is located in a littoral zone, entirely above water and completely disconnected from land, approximately one kilometer off the northeast coast of Kaledupa Island in the Wakatobi region (see Map 1.2). Today, Sama Bahari is a community of roughly 1700 people (Sulaiman, 30/06/2013). The settlement is one of six Bajo communities in the Wakatobi (see Map 1.2). The village of Sama Bahari became officially recognized in 1998, and elected its first village head (*Kepala Desa*), Pak Suhaele, two years later (Focus Group, 26/06/2013; Suhaele, 30/07/2013). Pak Suaele held his position until March 2014, when the statutory limitation for him to be re-elected was reached. Pak Rustam was elected as Pak Suhaele's successor, and is the village head as I finish writing in 2017.

As of the year 2000 (Ali, 23/11/2014), Sama Bahari village is divided into four main sub-villages: Katatuan, Wanda, Sampela, and Pagana. In the center of Sama Bahari is a mosque, three government-funded school buildings, a healthcare center, and a soccer pitch built upon a coral stone foundation. At its early stages, Sama Bahari was a cluster of disconnected stilt houses, and canoes were used to move from house to house. Government projects funded by PNPM have built bridges and walkways that connect houses to one another, though not all houses in the village are accessible via these walkways. The main bridge in Sama Bahari was built in 2011, and additional walkways have been built since then, as shown in Photo 3.1. Other government projects have included a wooden pavilion that is used for a range of activities, as shown in Photo 3.2.

[10] Name, date style citations are interviewees. All names are pseudonyms, with the exception of the two village leaders, Pak Suaele and Pak Rustam who agreed to be named.

Locals are connected to wider society through television and radio. Personal or village generators provide electricity to locals who can afford it, though the generators usually only run for a few hours at night. Locals gather in homes and on walkways to watch news and entertainment, such as sports and dramas. Other sources of entertainment include one billiard table in the center of the village, gambling, cards, dominos, cock fighting, and consuming alcohol for some, though these activities are mostly done by men. Otherwise, locals spend their free time chatting with friends and of course, fishing.

Photo 3.1: Walkway in Sama Bahari. (Source: author).

Photo 3.2: Pavilion in Sama Bahari. (Source: author).

3.4. BAJO LIVELIHOODS

3.4.1. Bajo ethnic group and identity

Bajo are one of the most widely dispersed ethnic groups in Southeast Asia (Sather, 1984). Initially, western scholars thought Bajo to have originated from the Riau Lingga archipelago, south of the Malay Peninsula, gradually migrating toward the western coast of Borneo and along the coasts of Sulawesi during the 14th to 17th centuries (Sopher, 1965). However, further ethnographic (Nimmo, 1968) and linguistic (Pallesen, 1985) studies suggest that Bajo originated in south-western Mindanao, the Philippines, travelling south and toward the eastern coasts of Insular Southeast Asia after the 10th century (Nagatsu, 2007). The Bajo population is estimated to be 1 million total, with approximately 200,000 living in Indonesia (Nagatsu, 2007).

Bajo are a traditionally nomadic population, known for travelling thousands of kilometers in search of reefs rich in marine life (Pet-Soede and Erdmann, 1998). However, Bajo, like other maritime minorities, have since faced increasing pressures from governments to settle. Within Southeast Asia, the romanticization of Bajo as ‘sea gypsies’ began in the colonial period, as they were considered to be constantly in transit (Gaynor, 2007). Much recent literature has described Bajo to be settled (for example Nagatsu, 2007; Clifton et al., 2010; 2014; Said, 2011). Thus, Bajo are widely considered by academics to have ‘lost their authenticity’ (Gaynor, 2007). However, Bajo

have been recognized to have settled by choice over the past century (Sather, 1999), while my research indicates that even individuals living in settled communities like Sama Bahari are still semi-nomadic, travelling for short and long periods of time for a variety of reasons.

Bajo settlements are usually positioned in coastal or littoral zones (Stacey, 2007). A variety of pile house styles tend to exist within communities, as building materials range from palm leaves, bamboo, mangrove or other wood, dead coral stones, and concrete (Clifton, et al., 2010), depending on household size, wealth, and personal preferences. Houses are sometimes connected via walkways or bridges, or not connected at all when a canoe is used to travel. Settlements tend to house fewer than 2000 people (Clifton, et al., 2010). Extended families often live together under the same roof, or in houses next to one another. Other kin reside close by, and freely access each other's residences daily. Sather (1999) has described these closely related households as clusters.

Most Bajo follow a syncretic religion which incorporates traditional Bajo cosmology and ritual practices into a Sunni Islamic faith, though Bajo individuals adhere to the faith of Islam with varying degrees of observance (Stacey, 2007). Some elements of Islam are widely observed among the Bajo, like fasting during the month of Ramadan, while other practices like praying at a mosque, are less common. In the village of Sama Bahari, most people observed Ramadan, while only a small group of mostly men went to the mosque regularly. Respondents suggested that those people who attended the mosque were more elite and of higher social status than other members of the community, though they did not necessarily hold any greater authority or power (Dian, 19/08/2014; Yuda, 19/08/2014; Rahman, 20/08/2014; Sinta, 21/08/2014; Ali, 25/08/2014; 05/11/2014; Wibowo, 30/09/2014).

Bajo traditional beliefs are heavily centered around their relationship with the sea and the marine environment. Bajo also retain distinct animist traditions revolving around marine animals, like octopus, and physical aspects of the marine environment like water currents or reef flats (Cinta, 18/02/2015; Wibawa, 21/02/2015). Octopuses are sacred animals according to Bajo belief, and octopus spirits (*Kutti*) exist in the sea, along with the spirits of late Bajo ancestors, (*Maleka*) (Cinta, 18/02/2015; Wibawa, 21/02/2015). One central aspect to the spiritual life of a Bajo individual is the belief of their supernatural twin that inhabits in the sea. When a Bajo is born, the placenta is sent to sea as part of a traditional ceremony. The placenta is received by three prophets, at which point it becomes the child's spiritual twin (*Kaka*) (Stacey, 2007; Cinta, 18/02/2015; Wibawa, 21/02/2015). Bajo decision-making is often mediated by spiritual beliefs, as offending the spirits of the sea is believed to result in bad luck for fishing, health, or other aspects of daily life.

Select Bajo individuals have the knowledge of magic, which they have been passed down by generations or acquired from a teacher, and which lends them higher social status within their

community (Stacey, 2007). Knowledge of magic is kept secret to maintain its power, while magic can be used to connect with spirits to either ask for forgiveness, or ask for assistance in overcoming challenges (Stacey, 2007; Wibawa, 21/02/2015). Individuals who can communicate with spirits and have the knowledge of traditional ceremonies passed down from shaman parents, can become a shaman (Cinta, 18/02/2015; Wibawa, 21/02/2015).

Unlucky or ill individuals consult Bajo shamans to mend spiritual relationships. Shamans conduct one of several distinct traditional ceremonies that often include offerings of rice, fruit, or chickens, depending on the illness and the spirits causing such illness (Cinta, 18/02/2015; Wibawa, 21/02/2015). These offerings are presented to the spirits on a platter or spirit-boat (*pamatulakan*) that is released to the sea to carry away the sickness-causing spirits (Sather, 1999; Cinta, 18/02/2015; Wibawa, 21/02/2015). In the case of death for Bajo in Sama Bahari, a shaman usually conducts a ceremony and the entire village gathers outside of the home with the family death. Friends and neighbours bring required material to build a coffin and help transport the corpse to be buried to a cemetery on the nearby island of Kaledupa, as shown in Photo 3.3.

Photo 3.3: Friends, family, and neighbours helping to bring a late Bajo from Sama Bahari to the cemetery on Kaledupa Island. (Source: author).

In sum, Bajo households were traditionally nomadic, but increasingly they are leading more semi-nomadic lifestyles, based in communities built above water in coastal or littoral zones. Bajo live by the sea to be close to the resources they depend upon for their livelihoods, but also because their traditional beliefs[11] are heavily centred on their spiritual relationships with the sea and the marine environment.

[11] For more information on Bajo traditional beliefs, see Sather (1999), Stacey (2007), and Yakin (2013).

3.4.2. Bajo livelihood activities

The main livelihood activities for most Bajo individuals and households in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, include fishing, aquaculture, boat building, trading, collecting forest products from nearby islands, and some land-based farming (Stacey, 2007). I have also observed other activities such as gleaning,[12] seaweed farming, and managing local stores as significant livelihood activities. Bajo employ a variety of fishing techniques, including fish traps, hand-lines, cast nets, kite fishing, shark nets, spear gun fishing, spear fishing and fishing with bait (Fitriana and Stacey, 2012). Bajo hand-fashion their goggles, nets, spears, spear guns, traps and bait themselves. Usually swimming or diving under water without any technology to facilitate breathing, fishers will hold their breath for minutes at a time, including when free diving meters below the surface of the water.

In recent decades, Bajo fishers have become known for their use of destructive fishing methods such as bomb fishing, cyanide fishing, trawling or tiger nets, as is also common among other fishers in the region (Pet-Soede and Erdmann, 1998). Bomb fishing, taught to Bajo individuals in the 1940s by the Japanese (focus group, 26/06/2013), is perhaps the most dangerous of these methods. It is an entirely non-selective fishing technique whereby the fisher throws dynamite into the target area, killing the target species, along with non-targeted species. Dynamited reefs are estimated to take approximately 40 years to recover to 60 percent of hard coral cover (Djohani, 1996). While this fishing approach is illegal in Indonesia, and the use of this technique has been reduced, it is still employed today by both Bajo and other groups.

3.5. CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I provided a brief history of authoritarian rule and democratization in Indonesia alongside centralized and decentralized policies. I then highlighted several important government programs that target ethnic minorities and the poor; both categories that Bajo fit within. I illustrated the rich maritime environment found in Indonesia and more specifically, in the WNP, before introducing the village of Sama Bahari, the field site of my research. I concluded with a brief description of Bajo identity and livelihoods. In the following chapters, I draw from the themes presented here to provide a more detailed analysis of contemporary Bajo livelihoods, mobility, and resistance in Sama Bahari.

[12] Gleaning is the activity of collecting marine resources such as clams or sea cucumbers within intertidal and shallow subtidal seagrass meadows for subsistence, commercial, or recreational reasons (Cullen-Unsworth et al., 2013).

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

Long-term, in depth, ethnographic research is essential in order to examine the intricate, covert, and gendered livelihood strategies of Bajo in Sama Bahari. However, in order to gain access to such information, a researcher must negotiate complex relations, navigate practical and ethical dilemmas, and reflexively consider the ways in which the research process can influence data (Valentine, 2005; Scott et al., 2006). I begin this chapter by describing my field site and the logistics of my research. I go on to describe the data collection methods and analytical approaches that I applied to produce the results of my study. I used a multi-method approach that included overt participant observation, semi-structured and conversational interviews, as well as Photovoice. I close the chapter by describing my analysis techniques.

4.1. LOGISTICS, POSITIONALITY AND ETHICS

My research is based on eight months of primary data collection in Sama Bahari, between the months of August 2014 and March 2015. I had previously been in the village for six weeks, between the months of June and August 2013 to collect data for my undergraduate honour's thesis. My return to the village provided an opportunity to follow up with respondents I had spoken with in 2013, and allowed me to form comparative observations involving temporal or seasonal dimensions.

For my eight-month stay, I established my home base in the village of Sama Bahari itself, which allowed me to gather data at different times of day and to observe daily life in the village more closely. For the first month, I resided with one of my interpreters and his family, where I learned to do basic daily activities such as gathering fresh water or paddling a canoe. After the first month, I rented a pile house in the sub-village of Pagana in Sama Bahari from a family who was migrating temporarily.

A male researcher (Ed[13]) from England, about my age, whom I had met in Sama Bahari in 2013, was staying with me as well while he conducted preliminary fieldwork for his Master's degree. Many locals asked us at the start if we were married, and found it strange to learn that we were not. This was the subject of many local jokes, even throughout my stay in the village. However, I find this did not seriously impact the results of my research or negatively influence my relationships with locals, as they have been in contact with western researchers every year through Operation Wallacea (as I discuss below) and with occasional tourists. Locals' access to television also acquainted them with less conservative ways of life. My living with Ed was, in my reflection

[13] I have received consent from Ed to refer to him by his name in this thesis.

and interpretation, perceived as strange, but not disrespectful. As my time in the village grew longer and as locals asked and learned more about me, trust grew stronger and I appeared less strange or unknown.

Sama Bahari is located approximately two kilometers away from Hoga Island (see Map 1.2), where a conservation management research organization called Operation Wallacea[14] houses its researchers for two to three months of the year. It is through this organization that I had conducted my undergraduate research and initially gained social access to the community via connections to local translators and the village head. Although Operation Wallacea's main research focus is on the surrounding coastal and marine ecosystems, local Bajo do have contact with a small number of researchers (one to three) almost every year, and thus are acquainted with foreigners.

Although I was somewhat able to communicate with locals using my limited Indonesian language abilities, I hired two interpreters during my data collection stage. I employed two local Bajo men of ages 28 and 32, with whom I had worked previously. They assisted me in communicating with participants by translating to and from the local Bajo language and English. I worked with the first interpreter to conduct a set of semi-structured interviews, and the other interpreter to conduct a second set of semi-structured interviews, as well as conversational interviews, and the Photovoice project. Both interpreters are married. Their wives, with whom I was in frequent contact, were accustomed to their husbands spending time with researchers, as both are seasonally employed by Operation Wallacea. Likewise, locals were accustomed to seeing my two interpreters with both male and female researchers, so it was obvious to the community what my purpose was spending time with the men.

I recorded responses using pen and paper. This was a conscious effort to be sensitive to the "complex power relationships that exist between researchers and interviewees" (Valentine, 2005: 124) by avoiding the use of digital recorder that might have made respondents uncomfortable, and to create a more casual setting during interviews. I had tested the use of an audio-recording machine with a few respondents, but it appeared to create a more formal, sometimes even tense setting for interviews that was undesirable for my research. As Operation Wallacea had been conducting research in the village for over 15 years, many of my respondents were familiar with aspects of the interview process including note-taking. I also respected the tradition put in place by Operation Wallacea and followed the guidance of my experienced translators by compensating participants with 20 000 RP ($2 US) each, though this was not discussed with respondents ahead of the

[14] Operation Wallacea is a research-tourism organization based out of the United Kingdom. At the time of writing, this organization hosts approximately 200 university students for six to eight weeks between the months of June and August, and many more high school students for shorter periods of time between March and May.

interviews. I did, however, make it clear to respondents that I was not associated with Operation Wallacea. Interviews took place wherever respondents felt comfortable. This included public places such as on bridges between houses, or more often than not, I was invited to conduct interviews in a respondent's home, on their porch, or on the coral platform beneath their home (see Photos 4.1 and 4.2). Social access for my Master's thesis research was facilitated by the prior relationships I had made within the community, as many locals whom I had interacted with in 2013 saw me as less of an outsider during my second stay. My prolonged immersion in the village further enabled me to gain trust and rapport with locals and form social bonds.

Photo 4.1: Author taking notes during an interview taking place on a coral platform. (Source: Shannon Lynch, 2015).

Photo 4.2: View from coral platform beneath home. (Source: Photovoice respondent Nurul, 28/02/2015).

I recognize my positionality here in a reflexive manner by investigating how my identity influenced the interactions I had with respondents. My identity can be defined in a number of ways; it is something that is "negotiated in the relational moment of the interview," and in my case, through other interactions during my stay in the village (Valentine, 2005: 113). I note my privileged position while I was in the field, as an educated researcher who is relatively wealthy compared to my informants. My identity is also rooted in being Caucasian, a native English speaker, female, non-religious, vegetarian, and unmarried. A number of other things may also have shaped the ways in which each of my respondents and I view the world differently. These factors also influence the ways in which respondents chose to present their identities in the interview space we created. As noted by Moser (2008b), aspects of my personality, including my social skills, interest in local events, and ways in which I conducted myself with others, also influenced the ways in which I was perceived by locals. Thus, the data I collected was also influenced by my personality, as people with different personalities responded to me and opened up to me with varying degrees.

To enable reflexivity at the analysis stage, I kept notes on personal factors including my mood, health status, how the weather and time of day influenced my sense of strength, and so on, to reference while interpreting the data I collected. The degree to which I was considered an outsider

changed as my time in the field grew longer and my relationships with members of the community evolved. The level of social integration into my field site was influenced by my own "participation in group activities, commitment to group values and norms, and level of group affiliation" (Bucerius, 2013: 691). For example, I would attend informal social gatherings in common spaces and I was always mindful to wear culturally appropriate clothing that covered my shoulders and knees.

I noticed that when I first arrived in the village, locals with whom I had spoken with in 2013 recognized me, some remembered my name, and many were happy to talk with me again. I had given my respondents a photo of their family as a 'thank you' gift for allowing me to interview them for my undergraduate research in 2013, and some showed me where they had kept that photo, usually on a wall in their home. It seemed that respondents remembered me more often than they remembered Ed, who had also conducted interviews in 2013, and I believe it was because of the photo. This made it easier for those respondents to open up to me, as they felt they had already met me before. In general, it was easier for me to strike a rapport with women than men, which allowed me to ask questions about gendered aspects of livelihoods for which I believe would be more challenging for a male researcher to receive answers. Young men in the village quickly opened up to Ed through evenings of smoking cigarettes and talking about village life, or days of fishing. Young women my age were often in their homes taking care of family responsibilities, which made it harder at first to become acquainted with them; however, by gathering with my neighbours on the walkways for activities like weaving pandang leaves, cooking or eating, I socialized with women my age who opened up to me.

In the village, age is a sign of social status, and elders are some of the most respected in the community. I was conscious to always show signs of respect to everyone in the village, and if walking by elders on the walkway, I would bow and lower my arm while passing them, a custom in Bajo communities. As a young researcher, I found that young respondents felt that I could relate to them, and older respondents did not perceive me as a threat to their status. As a female and obvious white outsider, people knew I was not associated with state authorities, which I felt made it easier for them to share sensitive information about illegal fishing practices. For example, one of my younger respondents named Slamet, a student who studies at a university in Kendari, would not ask the same questions that I asked to local men in positions of power, as he felt it would create conflict (as I discuss in Chapter 5).

Finally, the questions I asked, the ways in which I asked them, and the ways in which I analyzed the responses I received would have been further altered by my positionality. As researchers, we "fold our own values and beliefs into research, and they can influence both what we

study and how we interpret our research" (Bradshaw and Stratford, 2010: 71). As a western researcher, the ways in which I phrase and ask questions can influence interviewee responses. Though I prepared my questionnaire thoughtfully, my background, knowledge and experiences may have led me to assume certain aspects or overlook particular factors. For example, asking for the age of respondents seemed like a straightforward question to me; however, most local Bajo do not keep count of their age and do not know their birthday[15]. To address these problematic questions, I met with my interpreters to confer about my prepared interview guides and to discuss the topics in which I was interested. I worked with my interpreters to review and rephrase questions as needed, to ensure we would pose them clearly within the local context. I describe data collection in more detail in Section 4.3.

Importantly, the positionality of my interpreters also influenced the data I collected (Turner, 2010; MacKenzie, 2015). While my interpreters shared similar histories with respondents, their identities were fashioned in the interview space depending upon their prior relationships. Because both of my interpreters were male, gender influenced the responses received from respondents. Having male interpreters helped me to overcome the gender barrier when interviewing men. My interpreters would offer my male respondents a cigarette during interviews, as this is a common activity for local Bajo men while socializing. On the other hand, very few local Bajo women smoke, so my female respondents were not offered anything in particular by my interpreters. Further, the moods and emotions of my interpreters may have influenced the interpretations of responses. As I became more acquainted with my interpreters, I was better able to detect variations in their moods and they became more open to talking about their emotions and personal life with me. I used memos in my transcripts to note any factors that may have influenced the data, for instance, if a neighbor entered the house and listened to the interview, or if my interpreter seemed fatigued, perhaps due to a particularly hot day or to periods of fasting.

The Research Ethics Board I of McGill University granted permission for me to conduct fieldwork. All participants provided oral consent for their responses to be used in this thesis and I explained that pseudonyms would be used to maintain confidentiality, except for the two village heads who consented to be named. I did not request written consent bearing in mind the low literacy rate in the village. Photovoice respondents also obtained consent of any individuals who appeared in their photos. Furthermore, I received permission from the *Kepala Desa* (village head) upon my arrival to stay and conduct research in the village.

[15] The age of my respondents mentioned in this thesis are mostly estimates.

4.2. DATA COLLECTION

The village of Sama Bahari is divided into four sub-villages known administratively as Pagana, Wanda, Katatuan, and Sampela (the oldest part of the village from where Sama Bahari gets its common name). Initial research revealed that these four administrative units also represent an approximate divide between socio-economic groups. In order to compare and contrast findings across socio-economic groups, I conducted research in all four sub-villages.

I selected respondents using a stratified purposeful sampling technique. I followed the administrative sub-districts of Sama Bahari to divide the sample population into strata, and then selected a purposeful sample from each stratum to capture variations in gender and age. Within these stratifications, I then chose purposive sampling as opposed to probability sampling, as I was more concerned with deliberately selecting individuals based on their ability to provide experiential information rather than aiming to achieve representativeness (Teddlie and Yu, 2007). I conducted my research at various times of day, days of the week, and across seasons, to be able to interact with respondents with different livelihood strategies and activities. I applied a multi-method qualitative approach to my data collection, which encompassed participant observation, semi-structured interviews, conversational interviews, and Photovoice, which I describe in detail in the following sections.

4.2.1. Participant observation

Participant observation is a method of understanding and experiencing the subject's world through both observation and participation (Laurier, 2010). I employed this method for its intimacy and grounded perspective on places, processes, and people (Laurier, 2010). In the context of my study, these equate to my study site of Sama Bahari, local Bajo households, and the ways in which Bajo individuals and households negotiate their livelihoods within the WNP. I kept a journal of my daily impressions of life in the village and also used photos to record observations. This method entailed as much participation as it did observation, since I was often invited to participate in routine daily activities such as sharing a meal, as well as larger social events such as village meetings, weddings, and funerals. This participation enabled me to create strong bonds with my neighbours and other members of the community. This allowed for casual conversations that would provide insight into local perspectives, beliefs, and traditions. As I became less of an outsider, my observations became more developed and insightful.

Although staying with an interpreter for the first month of my field research was very positive for observing roles within the household, staying with a friend for the following seven

months was a way for me to gain a better understanding of what life was like in the village. However, I did not lead an identical lifestyle to the locals. For example, I made frequent trips to farther markets that offered a greater variety of food, I could afford more vegetables than others, and I had brought technologies from Canada. I participated in the daily activities that are required of someone living in the village, such as taking a canoe to reach the nearest market, or waiting in line to fill up plastic buckets with fresh water for laundry and showers. This participation gave me a greater appreciation and a deeper understanding of daily life in Sama Bahari. In order to better observe the context of local trade, I also made trips to other Bajo villages (such as Mantigola and Mola), as well as nearby non-Bajo villages and cities that local Bajo often access for market purposes (such as Wanci, Kendari, and Bau Bau) (see Map 1.2).

4.2.2. Semi-structured interviews

Interviewing was the main method of data collection that I employed, chosen for its strength in revealing individual experiences through sensitive people-oriented dialogue (Valentine, 2005). Interviews allow respondents to speak about subjects that they feel are important and bring up topics that the researcher may not have identified, leading to profound and multi-layered responses (Longhurst, 2010). In particular, I chose to employ semi-structured interviews for the flexibility they allow to change the order of predetermined questions if appropriate, and the ways in which respondents can choose to address topics (Dunn, 2010).

I developed a semi-structured interview guide before entering the field, having identified specific themes relating to my research questions that I wanted to explore. As described in Section 4.2, my interpreters helped me to reconstruct certain questions as needed. They then worked together to translate the questions into the local Bajo language to create an interview guide. This way, interview questions were asked in a similar manner to each respondent, allowing for better comparisons across interviews.

I ran a series of pilot interviews during the first week of my data collection, to identify concerns with the ways questions were asked, irrelevant questions, time constraints, and the flow of the overall interview. I developed the final interview guide through this iterative revision process, and decided to divide my questioning into two parts, after recognizing the length at which interviewees were responding to certain questions. Therefore, I conducted two sets of semi-structured interviews with my respondents (see Appendices A and B). The first dealt with general context, livelihood strategies, daily activities, financial capital, and gender. These interviews took an average of 70 minutes to complete, with the longest interview lasting 110 minutes and the shortest lasting 40 minutes. The second set of interviews questioned political views and migration

patterns, and these were often shorter, lasting on average 40 minutes with the shortest interviews being only 18 minutes, and the longest lasting 75 minutes. This second interview also proved to be an opportunity for participant validation or member checking, whereby I confirmed my interpretations of previous responses with respondents (Dunn, 2010) and followed up on unfinished or confusing ideas revealed in the first interview. I was able to conduct the second interview with all but two of my initial respondents, one of whom had temporarily migrated and did not return before I left the village, and the other who chose not to participate a second time. I had 84 respondents who completed both sets of semi-structured interviews. I interviewed 42 women and 42 men between the ages of 18 and 80, with the average respondent being 39 years old.[16] Figure 4.1 shows the percentage of male and female semi-structure interview respondents in each age category.



Figure 4.1: Structure of the sample population for the semi-structured interviews. All respondents were over the age of 18 years old.

4.2.3. Conversational interviews

After completing the semi-structured interviews and some preliminary coding, I conducted conversational interviews with an additional cohort of individuals to gather more information on emerging themes in the data I had collected. These interviews were more informant-focused than the content-focused, semi-structured interviews I had previously conducted, and focused on specific topics that were relevant to the individual (Dunn, 2010). I interviewed 7 men and 13 women aged

[16] The overwhelming majority of my respondents did not know their exact date of birth, but estimated their age with the help of my interpreter, through a brief discussion in which they placed personal life events in reference to memorable local occurrences. Therefore, the ages of respondents that I reference in this thesis are approximations.

22 to 80 for approximately 45 minutes each on themes surrounding government, trade, and business strategies. Each interview was unique, with questions emerging through conversation (Kitchin and Tate, 2000).

I also used conversational interviews to obtain important information from key informants. I identified nine people who held key information relevant to my research, but I was only able to interview seven. My key informants included a male and female shaman, a member of the village staff, the village secretary, a healthcare professional, a government teacher, and a volunteer teacher. These informants agreed to be identified by their occupation. Despite approaching the *Kepala Desa* (village head), whom I had interviewed for my undergraduate thesis while he was running for his current position, he declined an interview on multiple occasions, stating he was very busy.

4.2.4. Photovoice

Photovoice is a creative data collection method whereby cameras are entrusted to participants and they use them to address a broad research question. I had conducted a pilot Photovoice project in the village as part of my undergraduate research that yielded positive feedback and interesting results. Accordingly, I decided to incorporate this method into my Master's thesis fieldwork. The purpose of Photovoice is to "enable community members, who may not otherwise be heard, to share their voices, by using photographs about everyday realities" (Partners of the Nova Scotia Participatory Food Costing Project, 2013: 5). This method is strong in its ability to foster trust and balance power in the researcher-respondent relationship, as it allows respondents to "gain control and set the agenda for the ensuing interview" (Castleden and Garvin, 2008: 1398).

I had ten Photovoice respondents, half of whom were women, between the ages of 17 to 30. I did approach older individuals, but they were not interested in participating, as they did not feel comfortable using a camera. In fact, none of my respondents had used a camera before, but those who chose to participate were all excited to learn. I lent a digital camera to each Photovoice respondent and asked them to take photos that represented their livelihoods, and how those livelihoods may be similar or different from those of other women and men. Each respondent was instructed to take as many photos as they liked, and to choose 12 photos to discuss in a follow up interview (see Appendix C). Respondents were given up to three days to complete the assignment, but most often, given that they were eager to start taking photos immediately, they were finished by the following day.

My interpreter and I gave a short lesson to each respondent on how to use the camera (as seen in Photo 4.3). We requested that respondents obtain consent from all subjects in their photos, and explained why this was important. I also remained available for respondents to come and ask

me questions— about technical difficulties or about the research question itself—during their time with the cameras. Once the photos were taken, I conducted short follow-up interviews with respondents individually, regarding the photos they took and the Photovoice process. These follow-up interviews lasted around 45 minutes each. Photovoice participants were provided with the same compensation as interview respondents and were also given a copy of their photos.

Photovoice proved to be very useful in revealing different angles on important themes. Without the direction of an interviewer and without being contained to one interview space, Photovoice respondents were able to reach spaces that, as an outsider, I could not reach, and visually share moments of their life through their own perspectives. The images that were produced through this project (and that I share throughout this thesis), provide extremely valuable insight into the everyday lives of these individuals, which I analyze in the following chapters.

Photo 4.3: Aisyah, a local Bajo woman, is learning to use a camera with the help of a local interpreter for the Photovoice method. (Source: author).

4.3. DATA ANALYSIS

After transcribing my interviews, I arranged my transcripts using open (Strauss, 1987), thematic (Waitt, 2010), or descriptive (Cope and Kurtz, 2016) coding with the purpose of both organizing and opening up my data for analysis. I began the coding process by describing the data with a word or phrase. For example, one of my descriptive codes was ‘livelihood activities’. I then went over my transcripts a second time to organize those themes into more specific, analytical codes (Cope and Kurtz, 2016). As I developed these second set of codes as I analyzed my descriptions and placed them within my conceptual framework (Figure 2.1). For example, under the descriptive code ‘mangrove harvesting’, I had analytical codes like ‘social capital’ and ‘gendered livelihood

activities'. For a third and final time, I cross-coded my transcripts in a process of constant comparison to identify patterns in the data as they related to other codes I had made. In the final set of codes, for example, I identified similarities and differences within my codes on 'gendered livelihood activities' and how those codes might relate to other analytical codes like 'resistance'. For example, one of my comparison codes was 'women's resistance tactics in illegal mangrove harvesting'. Through the coding process, I not only organized my data and revealed patterns within, but I also identified how different themes intersected, which enabled me to come up with new understandings and meanings of the data (Cope, 2010).

I began the coding process while in the field and this had many advantages. For one, I was able to check back with respondents about their views and responses through the process of participant validation/member-checking (Cope, 2010). Second, the themes that emerged through the coding of semi-structured interviews helped me generate topics for the conversational interviews that followed. Once I had left the field, the coding process continued to help me see the data in new ways, as I kept looping my codes back to my research questions, my observations, the photovoice responses, and the literature.

4.4. CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I explained how I have positioned myself within the context of my research, and described the logistic and ethical considerations surrounding my time in the field. I outlined the methodological strategies of data collection and analysis that I applied in my research, namely semi-structured and conversation interviews, Photovoice, participant observation, and thematic coding. I described the strengths of each method that led me to employ them, and I illustrated the processes in which I carried out each approach. The following chapters are the results of my analysis.

CHAPTER 5: MOBILE BAJO LIVELIHOODS IN THE WAKATOBI NATIONAL PARK

5.1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I analyze local Bajo livelihood portfolios in order to address my first and second research questions. First, I ask: In what ways do local Bajo women and men negotiate access to different livelihood assets? Second, I inquire: What are the patterns and processes of local Bajo mobility, and what are the socio-economic and broader livelihood effects of such mobility? I draw from the literatures on sustainable livelihoods and mobility to guide my analysis. From the sustainable livelihoods literature, I draw on the concepts of livelihood activities, livelihood capitals, and access. From the mobilities literature, I reference the key building blocks that I developed in my conceptual framework (Chapter 2): mobility as a strategy, mobility as a social process, and gendered mobility.

In Section 5.2, I examine the financial capital of Bajo women and men, with a focus on paid livelihood activities, spending and government assistance, and remittances. I analyze Bajo access to human capital in Section 5.3, specifically decision-making, political participation, and education. I explore the ways in which Bajo access social capital (bonding, bridging and linking), and use mobility as a social process in Section 5.4. I then analyze Bajo access to natural capital (Section 5.5) and physical capital (Section 5.6). I summarize asset portfolios at the village level and at the household level in Section 5.7. I reveal the influence of gender in livelihoods activities (Section 5.8), and conclude by uncovering how mobility is a significant livelihood strategy for local Bajo (Section 5.9).

5.2. FINANCIAL CAPITAL

5.2.1. Paid livelihood activities

In this section, I explore the livelihood activities of local Bajo women and men. Respondents openly listed every paid livelihood activity[17] they pursue, and Figure 5.1 outlines the ten most common paid livelihood activities reported by female respondents (n=42) and male respondents (n=42): net fishing, hook and line fishing, gleaning, prepared food vending, local fish vending, octopus fishing, night gleaning, spear gun fishing, mangrove harvesting/vending, and seaweed farming. I examine these ten livelihood activities below, in order of prevalence.

[17] Paid livelihood activities refer to the ways in which local Bajo earn financial returns.



Figure 5.1: Respondent's ten most common paid livelihood activities by gender (n=84).

The most common paid livelihood activity for my respondents is net fishing, with 27 respondents pursuing this activity. Most respondents employ this method in shallow waters surrounding the village. With this method, fishers extend their net and use a shoot of bamboo to hit the surface of the water in order to scare fish into the mesh. According to my respondents (n=27), net fishers can earn up to 100,000 or 200,000 RP ($10 to $20 US) on a good day, and an average monthly return of 600,000 RP to 1 million RP ($60 to $100 US). This activity is most common for my male respondents, and is common for Bajo of all ages. Nets are usually fabricated by the fishers themselves, and a commissioned worker charges 200,000 RP per day to make a net, while nets could take up to one week to complete, depending on size (Hasan, 18/08/2014).

Hook and line fishing is also a very common livelihood strategy. Though mainly reported to be for subsistence purposes, hook and line fishers (n=26) earn an average return of 600,000 RP ($60 US) per month by selling their catch. Bajo of all ages, male and female, can be found fishing with a hook and line.

Gleaning refers to the collection of marine resources such as clams or sea cucumbers within intertidal and shallow subtidal seagrass meadows, and is done for subsistence, commercial, or recreational reasons (Cullen-Unsworth et al., 2013). Gleaning is the most common activity among my female respondents. Night gleaning is also common, more so for male respondents. My day gleaning (n=17) and night gleaning (n=10) respondents indicate a monthly return of 300,000 to 600,000 RP ($30 to $60 US) from gleaning, for instance, giant clams, a species that it is illegal to glean, can be sold at the local market for 200,000 ($20 US) each.

The second most common activity for my female respondents after gleaning is prepared food vending. Vendors bake small breads and cakes in the early morning, and/or rice or noodle dishes with fish in the afternoon. Vendors walk through the village with their goods and announce their presence. Clients usually shout for the vendors to enter their home to make a sale, or customers send their children out to the walkway to purchase food. Local prepared food vendors can earn up to 900,000 RP ($90 US) per month selling daily, or even 200,000 RP ($20 US) for a single, large gathering, according to my respondents (n=15). Usually, though, most vendors earn only supplementary financial returns of less than 300,000 RP ($30 US) a month.

Being a fish vendor at the local market is also a common activity for Bajo women. This involves maintaining relationships between fishers and customers. Fishers tend to be either related to or a neighbor of the vendor. Vendors with less social capital tend to have professional agreements with fishers that are characterized by exclusivity or price. Local fish vendors earn an average return of 600,000 RP ($60 US) per month while selling legal species, or 200,000 RP ($20 US) a day for illegal species, according to respondents (n=13).

Octopus fishers sometimes catch octopuses using handmade bait that looks like an octopus (Photo 5.1). Others search for octopuses using handmade goggles and catch the species by hand. They earn average returns of 1 million RP ($100 US) per month, although on a good day, octopus fishers can earn 250,000 RP ($25 US), according to respondents (n=11). Some respondents identify octopus fishing as an activity with low social status, due to the spiritual meaning of the species (as noted in Chapter 3) and the low skill level required for the job (Darma, 07/03/2015).

Spear gun fishing (Photo 5.2) is highly respected in the village, as it requires an immense level of skill to pursue. Spear fishers free dive meters deep and swim near or walk on the sea floor to be close to reef fish, often holding their breath for minutes at a time. Spear gun fishing can be for subsistence, but the method is also used for catching larger species that are required to be kept alive for sale, such as turtles. As shown in Figure 5.1, this activity is only done by men, and nine of my interviewees pursued spear gun fishing. Teenage boys in the village would go spear gun fishing for recreation, but the high level of skill required for the task usually means years of practice before the method is used as a primary subsistence strategy.

Photo 5.1: Handmade octopus bait. (Source: Photovoice respondent Bambang, 28/02/2015).

Photo 5.2: Spear fisher checking his gear before fishing. (Source: author).

Mangroves are harvested illegally in the WNP, usually from the mangrove forests off the coast of Kaledudpa within a few kilometers of the village. Mangrove collectors earn about 600,000 to 900,000 RP ($60 to $90 US) per month (as per respondents, n=9), selling the wood within the village for local use in the form of building material or cooking fuel. Mangroves are usually harvested by women in groups. I discuss mangrove harvesting in Chapter 6 in a discussion on resistance.

Seaweed farming is a common livelihood activity in Sama Bahari. A particular seaweed genus, *Gracilaria,* is produced for the sole purpose of export for agar production (Armisen and Galatas, 1987). Seaweed production has recently boomed in the village due to a global increase in demand for agar, and thus increased returns for producers. Seaweed is tied to a rope that is left at sea to grow. Once the seaweed reaches the desired length, the rope is pulled in and the seaweed is clipped and set to dry (Photo 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6). Clippings are tied back to the rope and the process continues. Seaweed farming is extremely labour-intensive. Seaweed is farmed by both men and women of all ages, and oftentimes, households or groups of kin produce the commodity together. Regional seaweed traders, usually Bajo women, tend to pay local seaweed farmers 2,000 RP to 2,500 RP ($0.20 to $0.25 US) per meter-line with seaweed tied onto it (as per respondents, n=5). When sold to regional traders, local Bajo can earn approximately 500,000 RP ($50 US) per month farming seaweed independently (Raja, 21/08/2014), or 2.5 million RP ($250 US) per month working with friends (Cahya, 29/09/2014). If a household or individual has enough money to travel to the city, seaweed can be sold for up to twice the price.

Photo 5.3: Woman tying seaweed on a line and letting it hang to dry. (Source: Photovoice respondent Yohanes, 24/05/2015).

Photo 5.4: Woman putting seaweed out to dry on the communal walkway. (Source: Photovoice respondent Bambang, 28/02/2015).

Photo 5.5: Canoe full of seaweed being brought from the sea to dry. (Source: Photovoice respondent Bambang, 28/02/2015).

Photo 5.6: Women tying seaweed. (Source: Photovoice respondent Purnama, 10/03/2015).

Though not in the top ten most common livelihood activities, regional trading of marine resources offers significant financial returns. Locals who can travel to sell their catch earn much more than those who sell their catch locally at the Sampuatu market on Kaledupa Island (see Map 1.2). This is because most Bajo fishers from Sama Bahari who participate in the market economy will send their catch to be sold at Sampuatu and saturate the market. A lack of physical capital to preserve the catch (such as iceboxes and ice), and lack of financial capital limits many Bajo from travelling to sell their catch. Some who have access to the required physical and financial capitals have identified this market inefficiency and have become regional traders, usually specializing in the trading of one of a few specific species caught locally. For example, turtles tend to be caught live and taken to Bali, Indonesia, along with large fish species such as grouper or Napoleon wrasse, to be sold in the aquarium industry (Raja, 16/01/2015). Other turtles are eaten locally, and the shells then sold in Bali to be turned into

jewelry (Wayan, 15/11/2014). In Bali, grouper and Napoleon wrasse can be sold live for approximately 25,000 RP ($2.5 US) per 1 kilogram, usually weighing in at about 100 kilograms (Raja, 16/01/2015). Live turtles are sold for 200,000 RP to 600,000 RP ($20-$60 US), depending on their size (Wayan, 15/11/2014; Kuwat, 27/02/2015). Shark fins are often sold in Pepela, East Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia, for 750,000 RP ($75 US) per kilogram, from where they are then exported for soup.

Working as a crew member on large fishing boats also offers significant financial returns. Local Bajo tend to earn a stable wage of 600,000 RP ($60 US) to 750,000 RP ($75 US) per month when working as a crew member on large fishing boats (Wayan, 15/11/2014). Local Bajo crew members will travel with Bajo captains from Mola or Mantigola, who own large fishing boats, or will meet captains from other ethnicities (such as Bugis or Chinese) at the fishing destination. I examine this activity further in Section 5.9 on mobility.

Overall, household returns for my respondents average 1.2 million RP ($120 US) per month. The top earners have financial returns of 4 million RP ($400 US) per month, while the poorest (often households of divorced or widowed women) earn a mere 600,000 RP ($60 US) per month. Local livelihoods are fluid, as individuals and households pursue different activities depending on access to and availability of capital assets, which fluctuate according to trends (such as supply and demand), shocks (such as a rise in the oil price or extreme weather event), and seasonality. Thus, many of my respondents pursue an average of three main livelihood activities upon which they rely, which reduces vulnerability given fluctuating capital access and availability. Household livelihoods have also diversified over time, as Bajo begin to pursue non-fishing activities such as agar farming, and as women enter the workforce. I expand upon this latter trend in Section 5.8.

5.2.2. Spending and cash assistance

Subsistence is a large part of most of my respondents' livelihoods. Fish is the main source of protein locally, and most locals source their own fish, or are given fish by kin. Fish are usually only purchased when the catch is low due to an off day, bad weather, or illness. Nearly all my respondents also participate in the market economy, and over half of my respondents' cash returns are spent on food. Rice, the local staple food, is subsidized by the government through the Raskin program outlined in Chapter 3. Most locals benefit from the Raskin program, and pay 2000 RP ($0.20 US) for one liter of rice (Abdullah, 07/03/2015). Vegetables are expensive, and are rarely consumed, other than garlic, shallots and tomatoes.

The second highest cost for respondents was petrol. About one third of my respondents received BLT or BBM payments between 2005 and 2014, though payments were inconsistent and varied in amount. Respondents who benefitted from these programs received between one to three

installments since the program began in 2005, and amounts ranged from 200,000 RP to 900,000 RP ($20 to $90 US) each installment, with installments usually totaling 300,000 RP or 400,000 RP ($30 to $40) each time (Amir, 09/12/2014; Dian, 16/01/2015; Mawar, 18/01/2015; Sri, 11/02/2015; Sinta, 11/02/2015; Wulan, 21/02/2015; Sar, 18/01/2015). Several respondents identify corruption within the program, like many other recipients nation-wide (International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2011). For example, with reference to BBM assistance geared toward rural infrastructure, Anisa (06/03/2015) states:

> [The *Kepala Desa*] came here and took my name and took my picture, but I wait for BBM and never get it. The picture is for the report to the government in Wanci [Wangi-Wangi Island]. The *Kepala Desa* told me that the government wants to help me, so he took my name and my picture. But then, the *Kepala Desa* changed my name to give BBM to a different person, but he didn't take the other person's picture or write down their name.

Once the *Kepala Desa* of Sama Bahari creates a report to send to the regional government in Wanci listing the names of who should receive BBM assistance, he then informs the recipients of BBM payments to go collect their funds. However, it appears that some recipients' names are changed off the list between the time the report is sent to Wanci and the time recipients receive their assistance, raising questions of corruption for many of my respondents (Wahyu, 06/12/2014; Putu, 07/12/2014; Cahya, 16/01/2015; Sri, 11/02/2015; Agus, 27/02/2015; Kuwat, 27/02/2015; Asih, 03/03/2015; Anisa, 06/03/2015). Some of my respondents indicate they received their BBM and BLT cash assistance from the *Keplala Desa* himself (Wayan, 26/08/2014; Ibrahim, 21/02/2015), while others received it from a government official on Kaledupa Island (Nyoman, 03/03/2015), or from the bank in Wanci (despite not having a bank account) (Nirmala, 06/12/2014), which shows inconsistency in program administration.

The remainder of respondent's spending goes toward clothing (purchased twice a year on average), cigarettes (usually only for men), children's school costs,[18] fishing equipment, other basic needs, and home improvements. Many respondents claim that the financial returns generated from livelihood activities in Sama Bahari are just enough for surviving day-to-day, and indicated that saving money is extremely difficult. Cash savings are very low for my respondents, as only 4 of 84 respondents claimed to have any. Savings are mostly for children's education, in case of emergencies or in case of sickness. Some respondents have savings in less liquid forms, such as jewelry. Access to formal financial institutions are very low, as only two of my respondents have

[18] The subsidized primary school costs range from 300,000 RP to 500,000 RP for students (including uniforms and books), while high school students pay between 3,000,000 RP to 5,000,000 RP ($300 US to $500 US) (Mansur, 10/09/2014).

access to a bank account. Most lending is done informally, drawing on social capital, as Bajo borrow from wealthier Bajo or Kaledupan lenders, or through patron-client or crew-captain relations. Some of my respondents formally borrow from PNPM (described in Chapter 3).

If my respondents were to earn greater financial returns, 12 would either buy a new home or make improvements to their current residence; 11 would purchase a motorboat, canoe, or ship; 10 would keep it as savings; 9 would spend it on their children's education; and 7 would make the pilgrimage to Mecca[19]. Other responses include using the additional cash returns to start a local business, to purchase clothing, to buy household supplies, or to upgrade fishing equipment. Overall, spending in Sama Bahari is mainly for basic needs, while levels of saving are low.

5.2.3. Remittances

Within the migration and mobilities literatures, remittances are conceptualized by the flow of cash or goods from a mobile agent back home, in order to support household needs (Lund et al., 2015). In the context of my research, remittances are often sent back home from migration trips lasting three weeks or longer. Nearly all my respondents have either sent or received remittances at some point in time, though remittances are not received on a permanent basis for many households. Remittances are sent back in many forms, including fish, jewelry, and cash (Dian, 16/01/2015; Wira, 17/11/2014, Susila, 08/12/2014). According to my respondents, the amount of cash sent back varies on the success of the mobile individual, and ranges between 20,000 RP ($2 US) to 2 million RP ($200 US) each month (Dewi, 08/12/2014; Mawar, 18/01/2015). When cash is sent to close family members in Sama Bahari it is usually spent on food and daily needs (Bima, 05/12/2014). Larger amounts tend to be saved for emergencies, invested in the house, or used to repair canoes, boats, and fishing equipment (Putra, 15/11/2014; Rahman, 17/11/2014). Some households strategize migration activities in such a way that remittances are used to bring the rest of the family to meet the mobile household member at their destination during temporary migration lasting over one year (Taufik, 15/11/2014; Intan, 16/01/2015). Overall, I found that returns from remittances tend to be invested in local livelihoods and do not serve to increase daily consumption.

While examining the financial capital of local Bajo by analyzing cash returns, spending, saving, and the importance of remittances, I find that cash returns are extremely low in Sama Bahari, and spending is mostly on basic needs. The level of saving in the village is low as well, and

[19] Only one person in Sama Bahari has made the Hajj, but there are about one dozen other Bajo in Mola who have made the pilgrimage as well. Those who make the Hajj are the wealthiest members of the community and are very highly respected.

those who save do so mainly for their child's education or in case of emergencies. Remittances also play an important role in supporting livelihoods in the village.

5.3. HUMAN CAPITAL

5.3.1. Household decision-making power

I begin my analysis on human capital by examining household decision-making power. I use the term 'household decision-making' to refer to the everyday decisions affecting a household, including financial decision-making and decisions regarding general livelihood activities and strategies. There is a gendered gap in household decision-making, according to my data, with 35 percent of households having the husband make decisions, 12 percent of households claiming the wife to be the primary decision-maker, and 31 percent of households where decisions are made as a couple (Figure 5.2). The remaining 22 percent of my respondents were either widowed or divorced, and made household decisions on their own, or with the guidance of a friend, neighbour, elder, or extended family member.

Literature has shown that improving women's "ability to participate in decision-making processes enhances the capabilities of the entire household and of society in general" (Weeratunge et al., 2010: 406). Unfortunately, some of my respondents, like Wahyu (20/08/2014), a male octopus fisher, explain that it is common in the village for women to be absent from decision-making processes: "I make the decisions. My wife just follows me, even if she disagrees. My wife has a common Bajo profile. She keeps a low profile, and I prefer her like that." Overall, men are more often household-decision makers in Sama Bahari; however, women are increasingly gaining decision-making power at the household level, as I reveal in Section 5.8.



Figure 5.2: Household decision-makers in Sama Bahari.

5.3.2. Political participation

Shifting focus from household to village-level decision-making—the local village government in Sama Bahari is and has always been a small group of men. When I asked the previous *Kepala Desa* the reason for this gender divide, he stated that "women over here do not have enough education to work in the village government" (Suhaele, 01/08/2013). He went on to explain that women who did pursue higher education tended to focus on education geared towards nursing or teaching, rather than politics. When discussing participation in local village politics, he stated that "we don't have an issue with gender here. Women don't do certain jobs like participate in politics, because they are simply not interested" (Suhaele, 01/08/2013).

Some of my female respondents describe the exclusion they feel from local village politics, despite the desire to participate. For instance, Lestari (19/08/2014), a 40-year-old mangrove harvester, states: "I would also like to be involved in formal government meetings. I am interested in that. But my husband is not elite and they only invite the wives of elite men, or elite women." Melati (10/11/2014), a female shaman, suggests: "The headman office is for men, not for women. I don't want to go because it is just for men." Other respondents suspect that the local government does not provide assistance to single women. Kusuma (19/08/2014), a middle-aged widowed woman, for example argued: "The government of Sama Bahari discriminates against me. If they have a project, they won't help me. You can see my house [in poor condition]. I don't have a husband, so the government doesn't help me."

During my time in the village, I observed two village meetings taking place, with participants being overwhelmingly men (as shown in Photo 5.7), and only including women who were either the wives of elite men or Kaledupan women who held relevant positions, such as government teachers. It is at these meetings that important information is passed along and suggestions are made for village improvements using funding received from the federal or regional governments. With the majority of Bajo women being excluded from these meetings, important decisions for village development may not take into consideration the needs and suggestions of nearly half of the local population who, as I show in this chapter, use infrastructure and resources in different ways.

Photo 5.7: Sama Bahari village meeting with all men attendees. (Source: author).

5.3.3. Education

Opportunities for formal education have increased in the village over the past decade, due to the construction of school buildings and educational subsidies from the government. Photo 5.8, taken by Citra, a Photovoice respondent, shows the two elementary and middle school buildings built in the mid-2000s to early 2010s in Sama Bahari, while Photo 5.9, taken by another Photovoice respondent, Yohanes, illustrates the high school in the village. Citra, a 30-year-old woman, explains that before these were built, "Bajo children had to go to school on Kaledupa once they finished elementary school. Now, they can continue on Sampela."

It is common for job training and skills to be acquired from parents, neighbours, and friends, and these informal means of education contribute to increased human capital. In terms of formal educational, attainment was highlighted by respondents as the reason women have entered the workforce. Wahyu (20/08/2014), a 30-year-old octopus fisher, for instance, states: "There have been some changes because some women have gotten an education and now they can find money to support the family." Sinta (21/08/2014), a 46-year-old woman, suggests that her formal education and language skills give her more confidence:

> Education makes me higher than my husband. I have more education than him. I went to primary school and I am confident in my *Bahasa Indonesia* skills because my father is from Kaledupa Island. Because of my language ability, I am comfortable going to Bau Bau and Kaledupa.

Some respondents have identified a link between formal education and feelings of independence—developed through time spent outside of the home (Ketut, 10/09/2014; Indah, 10/09/2014; Mansur, 10/09/2014). Buana (25/08/2014), an 80-year-old widowed man, for example states:

> In the past, children followed their fathers. Decisions were respected by the children. Now, they are more independent. Same for women. They don't respect the men, and girls spend lots of their time out of their houses. In the past, no women had profits

> from a shop, but now, a lot of women do. The change is because of education. In the past, no one went to school.

However, when other factors such as household wealth are held constant, girls seem to drop out of school earlier than boys. Fatimah, a 30-year-old ice vendor, for example, dropped out of school because "it was too hard as a woman, to be in school for that long. Lots of my friends had dropped out" (18/01/2015). Aminah, a female *arak* vendor, had a similar experience when she wanted to continue her education at the high school on Kaledupa, before one was built in Sama Bahari: "I stopped because I was the only woman who went to school on Kaledupa" (09/12/2014). Women I interviewed also tended to drop out earlier due to marriage at an early age (as early as 16) and responsibilities in the household (Wulan 05/12/2014; Nirmala, 06/12/2014; Putri, 07/12/2014; Annisa, 18/01/2015; Sar, 18/01/2015). Overall, formal education has been made increasingly available in Sama Bahari, but tends to be accessed by boys more than girls.

Photo 5.8: Elementary and middle school buildings in Sama Bahari. (Source: Photovoice respondent Citra, 11/03/2015).

Photo 5.9: High school in Sama Bahari. (Source: Photovoice respondent Yohanes, 24/05/2015).

5.3.4. Social difference based on education and wealth

In this section, I examine the ways in which education and wealth work to mediate mobility, and also focus on the results of such mobility for the community upon the return of the mobile individuals. For instance, a young, wealthier, more educated Bajo in Sama Bahari who can afford to travel to a city to obtain a higher education, has very different social interactions than an older, less educated or less wealthy local Bajo who travels a similar distance to fish. Once university-educated Bajo return to Sama Bahari, their mobile experiences become part of a socially transforming process, working to either reinforce or circumvent existing social structures and relationships in the village.

Slamet a young man in his early 20s, has 14 years of education and is now currently studying at IAIN University in Kendari (the capital of Southeast Sulawesi) for several months of the year. During his university breaks, he returns to Sama Bahari, and brings with him knowledge and experience gained at university, in the city, and on land—experiences that are not common for many local Bajo. Despite having ideas on how to improve the village, Slamet will not bring them up to the village head, in fear of creating conflict:

> I want the government to help by giving financial aid and rice subsidies to the community. I have never suggested it to the village head. I am a little shy because I have an education and I don't want to have conflict with the village head. I don't want the government to be angry with me (Slamet, 18/01/2015).

Slamet understands his place within society to be of lower status than the village head, but having an education means that he is of higher social ranking than other less educated Bajo. Slamet sees the potential for conflict, and for these reasons, chooses not to discuss his ideas with the village head. He tries to share what he has learned in university with others in the village, but explains:

> Some groups[20] are not my group and I am excluded even if I am educated. Some younger people in my group are there with older groups and the younger people try to be patient and explain about education. But when we build a discussion, they change the topic to fishing grounds and they are not interested in my group (Slamet, 20/08/2014).

Thus, in the case of the younger generation who have had the opportunity to move to attend university (approximately ten youth according to the previous village head, Suhaele, 01/08/2013), mobility serves as a socially transforming process for those mobile agents. However, the knowledge and experience of such higher education does not transcend the social boundaries between the more and less educated, but rather it serves to reinforce social difference.

Other respondents also identify education as a factor that creates or reinforces social difference. Bethari (30/10/2014), a 53-year-old widowed woman who fishes with a hook and line, for instance states, "people who don't have education do not welcome me because I talk about something and people who didn't go to school don't believe me or don't trust me." Bethari only has 4 years of education, but she can speak, read and write in *Bahasa Indonesia* – which is not common for other local Bajo her age. Lutfi (22/08/2014), a teenage boy, similarly explains: "I am excluded

[20] The term 'group' here is used to describe individuals who are of similar social status, and who socialize with each other or work together to accomplish common goals. The term, as used by my respondents, refers to perceptions of identity and social class. Groups that are identified by my respondents include elders (*atatoa*), those who go to the mosque, people who fish together using a particular method (such as octopus fishers), men who gamble together, and so on.

from Wanda [sub-village]. This is because they have education. I feel that they and I are at the same level, but they think that they hold a higher position than me because I am an uneducated person."

Like Lutfi, other respondents claim they feel socially excluded from large parts of the village. Respondents from Pagana and Katatuan feel particularly excluded by the sub-village of Wanda and Sampela, where the relatively wealthier and more educated live (Lestari, 19/08/2014; Komang, 20/08/2014; Iskandar, 26/08/2014; Abdul, 27/08/2014; Budi, 27/08/2014; Tirta, 01/11/2014; Putu, 01/11/2014; Ahmad, 05/11/2014; Melati 10/11/2014). At the same time, those in Wanda and Sampela do not feel welcome in Pagana or Katatuan, due to lack of trust or sense of shared community (Wahyu, 20/08/2014; Ali, 25/08/2014; Sar, 30/10/2014; Widya, 02/11/2014). Thus, return-migration for the purpose of education is exacerbating spaces of difference within Sama Bahari. For example, Cinta (20/08/2014), the elderly widowed woman introduced in Section 5.2.3, claims: "People in Wanda sub-village don't welcome me when I go there. This is because they love to talk to hold themselves in a better position. They like to make other people think that they are better and smarter." Kusuma, a 45-year-old widow, describes her exclusion to be a result of financial difference:

> In Sampela and Wanda, on the other side, I don't go there to buy fish because they don't welcome me. Only people around Katatuan welcome me because we are the same level. People in Sampela or Wanda discriminate. They talk about how I am poor and I owe money. That influences me. I feel poor (Kusuma, 19/08/2014).

Similarly, Agung (27/08/2014), a 40-year-old hook and line fisher suggests: "Lots of people in Sampela and Wanda do not respect me if I'm around there. It's because they think I'm poor and they're better than me." For Siti, a 44-year-old gleaner, her ability to move her place of residence was restricted within the village, due to social differences:

> Over there [in Wanda], people don't say hello to me. There are not many people who go to school here, around Katatuan. Pagana village doesn't welcome me either. I wanted to make a new home over there, but people over there said I cannot come to that area to make my home because it isn't my community (Siti, 31/10/2014).

Annisa (10/09/2014), a 35-year-old gleaner and prepared food vendor, makes a connection between wealth, education, and modernity that make the Wanda sub-village feel less like a Bajo village to her:

> Many groups exclude me in this village. It is the rich groups. They discriminate against me and don't respect me. They love to gossip about people who have debt. Around Wanda, people exclude me. Over here [in Katatuan], it feels like it is the same place as it was a long time ago—it feels like Bajo. But in Wanda, it is modern. People are smarter over there.

Thus, I reveal that underlying factors such as education and wealth serve to mediate everyday mobility by creating spaces of exclusion in Sama Bahari, while return-migration for increased education or wealth can be a socially transforming process that reinforces or exacerbates existing social difference and weakens community ties locally.

5.4. SOCIAL CAPITAL

Social capital is extremely important in Sama Bahari, as kinship ties and social networks govern virtually all interactions and activities of local Bajo. However, following the critique of several scholars (outlined in Chapter 2) I argue that social capital can be overemphasised when it is separated from other capitals (Bebbington, 2002; Mayer and Rankin, 2002; Woolcock, 2003; Das, 2004). Thus, I partially analyze social capital in other sections, within the context of interactions between social capital and other assets. Here, I briefly examine the main types of social capital and the extent of access for local Bajo.

5.4.1 Bonding, bridging, and linking social capital

The type of social capital most accessed by local Bajo is bonding social capital, which refers to relationships between Bajo individuals and households, within and beyond Sama Bahari. Within Bajo communities, there is a sense of social trust that governs customary institutions of reciprocity. For example, if a fisher borrows a canoe from someone in the village but does not catch any fish, the lender will not charge the fisher for borrowing their canoe that day. These types of customary institutions underlie social relations between Bajo individuals and households, and generate a high level of bonding social capital. Bonding social capital tends to be divided along the axis of gender, as Bajo women have greater bonding social capital with other Bajo women, and men with men.

I use the term bridging social capital to refer to Bajo relationships with other ethnic groups, like Kaledupans. Certain Bajo individuals and households have some bridging social capital ties with Kaledupan people. For elite men, these relationships are fostered through local government meetings, friendly gatherings and games of dominos (Hasan, 18/08/2014; Yuda, 19/08/2014; Komang, 20/08/2014; Kadek, 22/08/2014; Mansur, 10/09/2014). For boys, these relationships may be built through soccer games on Kaledupa (Slamet, 20/08/2014), or for those who attend school on Kaledupa (Budi, 27/08/2014). Non-elite men, women and girls develop these relationships through interactions at the Sampuatu market, or when Kaledupan people come to Sama Bahari to purchase or sell goods (Lestari, 19/08/2014; Kusuma, 19/08/2014; Wati, 20/08/2014). Some local Bajo have Kaledupan relatives, which facilitates bridging social capital ties with other Kaledupan people (Nur, 20/08/2014; Kadek, 22/08/2014; Aminah, 27/08/2014; Ratu, 19/09/2014).

Bajo people working as crew members for a captain of another ethnicity are usually introduced through Bajo friends and family (their bonding capital). Relationships between crew and captain are not always strong or positive, though many Bajo do benefit from informal financial loans from captains of other ethnicities. Thus, there is some access to this type of bridging social capital for Bajo in captain-crew relationships.

For Bajo who are not crew members on a fishing boat, bridging social capital tends to be constrained to relationships with Kaledupan people, and many local Bajo feel a sense of negative or excluding social capital in Bajo-Kaledupan relations. For example, Mansur, (10/09/2014) explains: "I think Kaledupan people exclude Bajo people because they think that they're at a higher level." Similarly, Yuda (19/08/2014) states:

> It's because our own confidence is low when we go on land, that we do not feel welcome on Kaledupa. It's because the Bajo always feel that we are a lower class than Kaledupan people. It is because our parents taught us this. If us Bajo were sitting on chairs and a Kaledupa person was coming, our parents would yell at us and tell us to get off the chairs. They would say: 'Don't sit there! The Kaledupan people are coming and the chairs are for them'.

Notably, many women feel discriminated against in the market when dealing with Kaledupan customers (Bulan, 18/08/2014; Tri, 19/08/2014; Dewi, 10/09/2014). I further examine these negative social relations in Chapter 6.

Linking social capital is not easily accessed in Sama Bahari, except for a small group of about 20 elite men. Elite men and sometimes their wives are invited to participate in formal and informal local village meetings (as examined in Section 5.3.2.), while non-elite Bajo may attend but may not speak (Komang, 20/08/2014; Rahman, 20/08/2014). A few Bajo, usually the same elite men, have linking social capital with National Park authorities (Komang, 20/08/2014; Kadek, 22/08/2014), but most Bajo do not have access to this type of social capital. I analyze the ways in which local Bajo individuals interact with authorities in the following chapter.

5.4.2. Mobility as a social process

Social capital influences access to resources in different places and shapes mobility dynamics (Massey et al., 1987; de Haan, 2000; Palloni et al., 2001). Even at the local scale, Bajo mobility between land and water is restricted. As bridging social capital is limited, interactions with Kaledupan people are further restricted by a lack of human capital. Specifically, many local Bajo do not have a conversational proficiency in Indonesian, and a majority of my respondents cannot understand the regional Kaledupan dialect of Indonesian, despite Sama Bahari's close proximity to Kaledupa, just one kilometer off the coast (Setiawan, 03/11/2014). Thus, even at the local scale,

socio-cultural structures including a lack of bridging social capital and a lack of human capital (language skills) work to limit local Bajo mobility.

At the regional and national scales, mobility is mediated by access to social capital. Ali, a married hook and line fisher in his mid-50s, like many other local Bajo, returns to his village after temporary migration because of his strong kinship ties and the sense of community in Sama Bahari. Ali (17/11/2014) states: "Right now, I've stopped travelling. I stay here because I was born here. When we stay in other places, I think I should come back home." While Ali returns to Sama Bahari to reconnect with friends and family by choice, others like Sari are drawn back due to a lack of social ties elsewhere, which limits her ability to pursue paid livelihood activities:

> I was with my first husband who had a home in Sapogda [an island east of Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi] but when he died, I moved back here. I moved here because when I wanted to work, it was just me and I couldn't work in Saponda. I didn't have any family there. I had family here—my mother. Now, I stay here and it is fine (Sari, 08/12/2014).

Sulaiman, a middle-aged father of two, was similarly pulled back to Sama Bahari after having gone to Tanjung Pinang (Riau Islands) for six months in search of a better job, failing due to lack of social ties:

> I went to look for other jobs. I wanted to work in a shop, not fishing. I never ended up worked in a shop because I didn't have relationships with people in Tanjung Pinang. I went fishing using a gillnet instead, but that was too hard for me, so then I came back (Sulaiman, 16/11/2015).

Local Bajo, like Sulaiman, tend to remain working in the fishing sector, even when migrating long distances, because Bajo skillsets (human capital) are generally focused on fishing, and Bajo social networks consist mostly of other Bajo in far-reaching places (bonding social capital), whom they rely for work and information about fishing opportunities at their destinations. Many Bajo are not proficient in Indonesian*,* and need not speak that language when working with other Bajo. Thus, while Bajo social networks are geographically vast, they are largely restricted, due to a lack of bridging social capital ties, which could connect local Bajo to non-Bajo groups. Bonding social capital that connects local Bajo with Bajo in other places tends to constrain opportunities to mainly the fishing sector, and does not aid local Bajo in overcoming social barriers between communities on land and water. Thus, Bajo mobility is largely mediated by social capital at the local, regional, and national scales. I further examine Bajo mobility in Section 5.9.

5.5. NATURAL CAPITAL

The majority of livelihood opportunities in Sama Bahari are natural resource based. When considering all livelihood activities that my 84 respondents openly listed, Figure 5.3 illustrates the number of respondents who pursue livelihood activities that are dependent upon natural and non-natural resources. While 61 percent of livelihood activities include the extraction of natural resources, such as fishing, gleaning, and harvesting mangroves, an additional 13 percent of livelihood activities are directly or indirectly dependent upon natural resources, such as trading fish locally, farming cassava or seaweed, working in aquaculture, and the building or maintaining fishing equipment. Only 26 percent of livelihood activities pursued by respondents are not dependent upon local natural resources. These livelihood activities included running/owning shops, construction work, fresh water trading, NGO employment, and more. Thus, natural capital is essential for the majority of local livelihood activities.



Figure 5.3: Livelihood activities according to dependence on natural resources.

Access to natural capital is mediated through trends and shocks, and varies by season. Trends include natural resource depletion, habitat degradation, as well as increased enforcement of National Park regulations. In turn, shocks in this context refer to extreme weather events, while seasonality, such as the monsoon and dry seasons, affect fishing patterns. These trends, shocks, and seasonal influences create a vulnerability context which influences Bajo access to natural resources.

The marine environment is important for local Bajo not just in the form of natural capital that provides important livelihood opportunities, but also for local Bajo identity, as highlighted in Chapter 1. Many Bajo I interviewed believe that the marine environment is interrelated with the

well-being of the human community (Sinta, 21/08/2014; Raharjo, 02/11/2014; Ratna, 06/03/2015). While certain ocean species (like octopus) are considered to be sacred (as stated in Section 3.4), fishing and other ways of gaining resources from the sea (such as gleaning) are considered to be an essential part of Bajo identity (Kadek, 22/08/2014). According to Iskandar (26/08/2014), a 41-year-old widowed man, regardless of social status, fishing in Sama Bahari is an activity for all Bajo people: "Even if I am close with the government, PNPM[21], and district leaders, it is okay for me to become a fisher because I am a Bajo." Indeed, the former village head of Sama Bahari, along with current village staff, can frequently be seen fishing around the village.

In sum, access to a range of natural capital is essential for local Bajo livelihoods, regardless of social status. Bajo depend upon marine and coastal resources directly for subsistence needs as well as for trade.

5.6. PHYSICAL CAPITAL

Elsewhere, Kim (2015) investigates sidewalks as important yet overlooked, everyday public spaces in urban Vietnam. Following her analysis, I find that everyday mobility has increased with the gradual development of PNPM Mandiri-funded walkways and bridges in the village since 2010 (focus group, 26/06/2013). This physical capital[22] is important for local livelihoods because, prior to the development of such walkways, houses were disconnected and accessible only via canoe (Yohanes, 24/02/2012).

Highlighting important links between physical, human, and social capitals, nearly all my respondents suggested that information in Sama Bahari is mainly shared through social networks (for example Hasan, 18/08/2014; Bulan 18/08/2014; Dian, 19/08/2014; Lestari, 19/08/2014). When houses were disconnected, information was mainly shared through male fishing networks, while women remained in the household for much of the day (Annisa, 10/09/2014; Intan, 11/09/2014; Wahyu, 20/08/2014). Women's mobility was significantly increased once walkways connected homes, facilitating easy travel throughout the village, and providing a common space for socializing, exchanging information and equipment, and trade. The walkways have allowed women

[21] PNPM Mandiri is aimed at reducing poverty, and increasing prosperity and employment opportunities for poor individuals and communities in Indonesia, as was described in Chapter 3 (Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Mandiri, 2014).

[22] Another source of physical capital that I do not focus on in this thesis includes fishing gear. Most fishing gear is made by Bajo fishers themselves. Even for navigation, many fishers use their traditional knowledge to guide them at sea. Global positioning systems (GPS) became recently available in markets around the Wakatobi, but are quite expensive. Thus, many local fishers use the stars to navigate, or make a compass using a blade and needle in water. If Bajo resource users do not own fishing gear, they rely on their social capital to facilitate access, and borrow from friends, family, or traders at little to no cost.

to build social capital networks more easily, which allow women to gain important information when deciding to pursue paid livelihood activities (such as the price of goods or how to do a certain task). Walkways also allow them to develop a reliable network for these paid activities (for example, women can connect with others who can lend a canoe, or source fish for them to trade). Annisa (10/09/2014), an ice vendor and gleaner, for instance, states: “Many women are actively gaining money. It is because the bridges make alternative options for women. In the past, they would just stay in the house.” Eka (27/08/2014), a 50-year-old married woman, similarly suggests: “A woman’s profile has changed because now; for many women, responsibilities in the household are less and they spend time outside because of the bridges.” Accordingly, Intan (11/09/2014), a young fisher vendor, states: “In the past, before we had walkways, women didn't socialize but now they socialize a lot.” The result, according to many of my respondents, is as Indah (10/09/2014), a young, divorced mother states, “women are becoming more independent, just like men.”

I identify a number of links between increases in human and physical capitals that lead to increased social and financial capital, specifically, access to formal education and increased mobility in the form of connected walkways. Women now spend more time outside of their house and built stronger social ties with other women, which has increased access to information that is shared formally through education or informally via social networks. This results in increased independence and increased opportunities for pursuing paid livelihood activities, as was revealed in Section 5.2. Photo 5.10, taken by my Photovoice respondent, Purnama, a young female gleaner, highlights the use of the walkways as a space for women to socialize, share information, and work. The photo illustrates Bajo women tying seaweed onto a rope, which will then be brought out to sea to grow. Purnama shares why she took this photo: “I like the time we can meet with neighbours and then, when our husbands go fishing far away, women can do this job and make money.” Photo 5.11, taken by Photovoice respondent Citra (11/03/2015), illustrates a woman walking in the village. Citra, a 30-year-old woman, thought this photo was important because “Bajo women are always walking to meet their friends and to gather information. This is important because when Bajo women do not have jobs in the home, they can find their friends” (Citra, 11/03/2015).

Photo 5.10: Bajo women sitting on a walkway and tying seaweed. (Source: Photovoice respondent Purnama, 10/03/2015).

Photo 5.11: Bajo woman walking on a walkway. (Source: Photovoice respondent Citra, 11/03/2015).

5.7. OVERALL ASSET PORTFOLIOS

Overall, natural and social capitals are the most available assets, while levels of physical, financial, and human capital are low. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 schematically illustrate livelihood assets for a typical female- and male-headed household, respectively, as described above using asset pentagons (c.f. Carney, 1998). An asset pentagon is "a five-axis graph on which the relative wealth in each category of assets can be plotted, with the centre of the pentagon representing zero level of an asset" and the perimeter representing an idealistic full amount of the asset for the individual, household or community under study (Ellis, 2000b: 48). The amount of one asset is measured and plotted in relation to other assets, and the resulting pentagon is meant to the relationship between assets, which assets are most important to livelihoods, and which assets are substituted to access less available assets.



Figure 5.4: Asset pentagon for typical female-headed household in Sama Bahari.



Figure 5.5: Asset pentagon for typical male-headed household in Sama Bahari.

At the village level, access to natural capital has decreased in recent decades due National Park regulations and the declining health of marine environment, though marine and coastal resources are still one of the most important and widely accessed assets in Sama Bahari. Access to bonding social capital is abundant, and is substituted for other assets, but fewer Bajo have access to bridging or linking social capital. Physical capital is limited in terms of infrastructure, though recent developments such as the PNPM-funded bridges have meant increased access to improved physical capital for locals. Financial capital is increasing as more women enter the workforce and Bajo pursue paid livelihood activities beyond fishing. Human capital has also increased as a result of new schools in Sama Bahari, though formal education still remains low. At the household level, I find gender influences access to financial and human capitals, as women are ostracized for pursuing certain paid livelihood activities, tend to drop out of school at earlier ages, and have less influence in village politics. I further examine the gendered aspects of local livelihoods in the next section.

5.8. BRINGING GENDER INTO LIVELIHOOD EQUATIONS

Differences in men and women's livelihood activities in Sama Bahari are rooted in ideological notions of gender identity and gender roles. For instance, women are associated with many unpaid activities or reproductive activities (Waring, 1988), including household chores. Figure 5.6 illustrates all the unpaid activities that my respondents claimed to pursue regularly, when asked to openly list their activities. While socializing is the most common unpaid activity for respondents overall, the top three most common unpaid activities for my female respondents are cooking, cleaning, and childcare. Most unpaid activities are the responsibility of female respondents, following rather typical gendered divisions of labour throughout Indonesia (Silvey, 2004; 2006). On the other hand, the most common unpaid activity for male respondents, maintaining fishing equipment, directly relates to their paid activities.

With the additional time taken for housework and childcare, women tend to have less time to spend on paid activities. Thus, if local women choose to pursue paid activities as well, they tend to choose activities that can be done close to the village. Gleaning, for example, is undertaken close to the village in short periods of time, and women tend to pursue this activity with their children helping them. Women who prepare and sell food such as bread and cake do so early in the morning and much of the preparation is done within the home. Many women also pursue local fish trading as a livelihood activity, since they often go to the market anyway to purchase fresh water for showers and washing clothes.



Figure 5.6: Unpaid activities by gender (n=84).

Multitasking is extremely evident among local Bajo women's daily routines. Photo 5.12, for example, taken by Tirto, a young male Photovoice respondent, illustrates a woman taking spider conches and octopuses to the local market by boat—all of which she caught. He took the photo because he wanted to show "it is not just men who can have a job, but this woman is doing two jobs. Women are strong too and can have many jobs" (08/03/2015). Similarly, Yohanes (24/02/2015), a 25-year-old male Photovoice respondent, photographed a Bajo woman taking fish to the market in her canoe, while bringing empty plastic containers to fill up with fresh water at the same time (see Photo 5.13). On the other hand, Bajo men tend to pursue livelihood activities that are not necessarily close to the household or market, and may choose to pursue fewer, but longer daily activities.

Bajo men and women learn skills at a young age that lead them to follow particular work-life courses over others, thus reinforcing gender roles. The work-life course, as described by Hapke and Ayyankeril (2004: 230) in relation to gendered livelihoods in a South Indian fish market, refers to "the patterns of remunerative work engaged in by men and women throughout their life." On a daily basis in Sama Bahari, I observed girls assisting their mothers with unpaid activities, such as cooking or cleaning. Girls also help with any paid activities that their mothers might pursue, such as gleaning or managing a shop (Wati, 20/08/2014; Krisna, 25/08/2014). I regularly observed boys

assisting their mothers with gleaning, but only at a very young age, while older boys fish in the village, accompany their fathers on fishing trips and learn to make or repair fishing equipment (Aminah, 27/08/2014; Citra, 11/03/2015).

Photo 5.12: Bajo woman taking spider conches and octopuses to the local market. (Source: Photovoice respondent Tirto, 08/03/2015).

Photo 5.13: Bajo woman taking fish to the local market and bringing empty plastic containers to fill with fresh water. (Source: Photovoice respondent Yohanes, 24/02/2015).

The majority of my respondents identify women's primary roles in Sama Bahari as domestic and reproductive, while men are perceived to be responsible for supporting the household financially. Despite these perceived gender roles and responsibilities, many of my female respondents do participate in the workforce, as described in Figure 5.1. Hapke and Ayyankeril (2004), suggest that complex interactions between economic necessity and social status can underlie a woman's decision to participate in paid activities. Some interviewees, both men and women, explain that they prefer the wife to stay home rather than performing low-status, paid work outside of the house which is considered the mark of a low-status household. However, this decision can only be made if the household is financially able. In Sama Bahari, my data suggests that this cultural and social ideal is one of the calculations that women consider when deciding to enter the workforce. For example, Wati, a 50-year-old widowed woman, suggests that she would have a higher social status if she could stay home, but goes fishing because she does not have a husband who can provide for her:

> I am free to pursue fishing activities, but this is because I need money. If I had a husband and I had money, I would just stay in the house. If I had a husband, I would like to have a shop. I don't borrow money to make a shop because I worry that I will go bankrupt. That's why I do line fishing instead. I believe many people disrespect women like me because I go fishing. There is more respect for women who manage a household (Wati 20/08/2014).

Wati considers a female shop owner (who usually sets up a stall at the front of her house) to be far more respectable than a female fisher.

Many respondents, both men and women, explained that women have started pursuing remunerative work in the past 20 years because the decrease in fish stocks has made it difficult for men to act as a household's sole cash-earner (Ali, 05/11/2014; Nirmala, 26/08/2014; Wira, 19/09/2014; Kasih, 06/11/2014; Sri, 07/11/2014; Batari, 10/11/2014). For example, Kadek (22/08/2014), a 42-year-old married man, suggests: "There has been change over time in particular with women's involvement in finding money. It's because now it is too difficult to get money. If men do find money, it is not enough. Our fish stock is decreasing." Similarly, Tri, a 30-year-old woman, states that she and her husband earn the same amount, and this differs from the previous generation:

> My father was the only one to find money and my mother didn't work for money. Now, my husband and I both find money. I think it's because some husbands are having trouble finding money since the fish resources are not enough to support the fisheries (Tri, 19/08/2014).

Non-fishing activities, such as seaweed farming, selling prepared food, running a small shop, or harvesting mangroves, tend to be pursued by women. Men like Hidayat (20/08/2014), Komang (20/08/2014), and Ali (25/08/2014) explain that when families had previously lived together on boats, before they settled in Sama Bahari, fishing was a joint effort. Now, however, "many women have non-marine jobs. This is because many men have changed their mindsets and feel embarrassed if they go fishing with their wives. Yet, women want to be active too" (Komang, 20/08/2014). Non-fishing activities tend to yield steadier financial returns than fishing activities, which can fluctuate seasonally. Fishing tends to yield less and less financial returns over time due to many factors including climate change, habitat destruction, and overfishing in the region. Cahya (29/09/2014), a widowed woman, states:

> My money comes from selling cakes and from working with friends, farming seaweed. It takes 12 hours to take the seaweed off the line. Early in the morning, I sell cake. I have two seaweed farms and I make 2.5 million RP (approximately $250 US) a month from each. From selling cakes, I get money every day, usually between 30,000 to 50,000 RP (approximately $3 to $5 US) per day. Women are usually responsible for cooking in the household, but now, women's responsibilities have changed. Some men are lazy if they see their wife has money and they just stay in the home and wait.

What results, according to an 80-year-old woman named Nur, (20/08/2014), is that "many women now are finding money, and their money is more than their husbands'." Ali (25/08/2014), a middle-

aged male net and spear gun fisher, agrees, stating "the money earned by some men is now supplementary to the returns gained by their wives, not the other way around." While Slamet (20/08/2014), a student in his early 20s, suggests in reference to female head of households pursuing paid work, "many women are involved in finding money now. In the past, the men were the leaders. Now, in some families, the women have become leaders." I explore driving forces behind this shift, below.

Despite important changes in the community with regards to financial, human and social capitals, not everyone is accepting of women earning cash returns, gaining independence, and socializing. Harta (28/10/2014), a male mantis shrimp fisher stated "In the past, women were more closed. They were just in the house and thought about their husbands' activities. A woman now is freer. I prefer it like in the past when it was just about family." Adi (01/10/2014), a 23-year-old net fisher, also voiced concerns, suggesting that:

> Women's responsibilities should be waiting in the home, but now women find money as well. Women's responsibilities are changing because in the past, women would just wait for their husbands to return from the sea. Now women only care about their associations, friends, and social circles.

Wibowo (30/09/2014), a 43-year-old widow, shares a similar sentiment: "Women must wait for their husband to return from the sea, and make food and drinks, but their responsibilities have changed. In the past, they had big commitments to the home. Now, they just spend the day with friends, socializing." About half of the men I interviewed would still prefer their wives stay at home, or only pursue certain livelihood activities.

I found that women were often feeling specific *pressure* to gain greater financial returns. Cinta (20/08/2014), an elder and widowed woman, suggests that in Katatuan—the poorest sub-village of Sama Bahari—many women are the primary cash-earners of the household:

> In this corner of the village, household returns come from the wife. Men go fishing, but not intensely. It is more of a hobby. Sometimes they get no catches, even when they go every day. They don't think about money. Women have money in their mind. If you look around here at this moment, there are three women fishing and one female trader. Everyone in this corner is a woman who is fishing. Lots of women now actively find money, and not just from fishing. In the past, no women in Sampela were trading, but now many women are traders.

Why are some respondents suggesting that women feel more pressure than men to earn greater financial returns? It may be due to the fact that women are the primary treasurers of the

household, and thus, are responsible for purchasing daily needs[23]. This was suggested by three respondents, who indicated that a woman feels stressed if the cash returns provided by her husband is not enough to cover daily needs or to achieve higher standards of living (Budi, 27/08/2014; Aminah, 27/08/2014; Wira, 19/09/2014). Aminah (27/08/2014), a 26-year-old *arak* (local alcohol) vendor, for example, explains: "A woman's responsibilities have changed because in the past, the lifestyle was more subsistence-based. Even if we didn't catch a lot, we were satisfied. Now, a lot of women stress here. If our husbands don't give us enough money, we stress." Regardless of these frictions, about one third of the Bajo women I interviewed are empowering themselves to build social networks, pursue paid livelihood activities by choice and resist pressures to remain in the house. In Chapter 6, I discuss how some women covertly resist these pressures.

Overall, in this section I have shown that local women are generally responsible for more unpaid activities than men, mainly because long-standing cultural norms of gender roles and identity lead locals to understand a woman's primary role as domestic and reproductive. However, some women navigate around these expectations and pursue paid activities in addition to their unpaid work, if there is financial need. Nonetheless, a woman's involvement in paid activities can influence the ways in which she and her household are perceived and respected within the community, not necessarily for the better. Despite local gender norms and roles, I also interviewed local women who had made a decision to enter paid work by choice rather than economic necessity.

While it is true that some Bajo women, like Wati and Tri, are entering the workforce out of necessity, other Bajo women choose to pursue paid livelihood activities by choice. Cahya (29/09/2014), a 40-year-old widow, for example claims that she is proud of her livelihood, suggesting that she does not face social pressures to give up her work if she had the opportunity to stay home: "If I had a husband who could provide enough money, I would still farm seaweed because it is a good activity for women." Seaweed farming is considered to be ideal for women because most of the work can be done at home, as the tasks include tying and removing seaweed to and from the lines or setting seaweed in the sun to dry. Taufik (21/08/2014), a 27-year-old male tuna fisher, notes, for example, that "in the past, not many women had a business. Women would only find money if the husband's money was not enough."

The types of livelihood activities that women are choosing to pursue are no longer limited to those requiring little physical or financial capital, or little preparation (in other words, emergency or last-resort livelihood activities). Rather, women's livelihoods cover a diversity of paid activities

[23] Bajo women are usually responsible for guarding financial assets and purchasing daily needs based on household decisions, though they are not always responsible for financial decision-making.

nowadays, from fishing, to seaweed farming, or owning a small business in the village, as mentioned by Taufik. Krisna (25/08/2014), a 45-year-old male tuna fisher, states:

> The man's responsibilities have not changed over time, but women's responsibilities have. In the past, women would just go gleaning. Now, they find other money. It is because they are motivated more than men to change their quality of life. In particular, they have the motivation to have a rich family.

Krisna suggests that, because women are motivated to enhance their quality of life, they decide to pursue paid livelihood activities, rather than choosing so out of economic necessity or as a last-resort. Other respondents had similar suggestions. Kadek (22/08/2014) suggests "women aspire to be rich so they help their husbands make money." Wati (20/08/2014) agrees that "responsibilities for women have changed. Many women are now finding money. Many women have a shop, sell cakes, or go to Wanci for business. Many people aspire to be rich." Sinta (21/08/2014), a 46-year-old woman, claims that this motivation is fueled by migration, and the opportunity to send their children to school:

> In the past, a woman just thought about daily needs, like we would worry if there was enough food. Now, things have changed. There is competition between friends to be rich. That's why Bajo women find money. This happens because of migration. People see outside situations and that motivates them. Secondly, because of education and school. Some people start to think about sending their children to school, and this makes them want to earn more.

Regardless of whether women are undertaking economic activities for necessity or to increase their social status, there is no simple calculation that underlies every woman's decision to pursue paid activities in Sama Bahari. In many cases, rather, my data suggest that there is a shift occurring in the current generation of working-aged Bajo in Sama Bahari, in which more women are pursuing a more diverse set of paid activities. This generational shift, with more and more women contributing to household returns, is in line with the increased access to physical, human, and financial capital, that has occurred over the past two decades in Sama Bahari. Specifically, my data suggest that increased education (human capital) and the building of walkways in the village (physical capital) have facilitated the transition for more Bajo women to pursue paid livelihood activities. This local shift sits within the broader context of changing expectations of women and work as imagined through images communicated through television, through travels to larger towns and cities, and through foreigners visiting the Wakatobi.

5.9. MIGRATION AS A LIVELIHOOD STRATEGY

To analyze the mobility of Bajo from Sama Bahari, I follow Olwig and Sorensen's (2002: 1) mobile livelihood approach, which focuses on:

> The ways in which making a livelihood links up with larger-scale patterns of population movement, the range and variation in mobility that such movements involve, the social institutions and networks facilitating and sustaining mobile livelihoods, and the social and spatial practices of mobile populations.

Unless sponsored by the government (like *transmigrasi*[24]), large-scale population movement is often interpreted by states as a threat to stability, and in response, governments often aim to restrict mobility, ignoring the fact that many populations have never been completely sedentary (Skeldon, 1997; de Haan, 1999; Winkels, 2004; Gaynor, 2007). In the context of my study, the Indonesian state has increasingly pressured Bajo populations to lead more sedentary lifestyles, as Bajo nomads have been depicted as obstacles to Indonesian modernity and to development, or even threats to national unity (Lenhart, 1995; 1997; 2008; Duncan, 2004; Gaynor, 2007; Safitri, 2015). Eventually succumbing to these pressures (as explored in Chapter 1 and 3), Bajo communities have settled, but have done so in a way that has facilitated mobility around the local marine environment—by settling over the water. Apart from their spiritual connection to the sea, settling over water has meant reduced costs of travel to local natural resources that sustain local Bajo livelihoods, and has facilitated access to fishing grounds regardless of tidal height. Settling over the water also shows Bajo resistance to state policies that do not consider their cultural dynamics or traditional lifestyles. Despite having settled in areas like Sama Bahari, local Bajo continue to lead mobile lifestyles, consistently travelling short and long distances in order to reduce vulnerability and obtain more financially-secure livelihoods.

Map 5.1 illustrates the approximate extent to which contemporary local Bajo livelihoods are mobile. It shows the 137 destinations to which my 84 respondents (42 men and 42 women) have travelled in their lifetimes, ranging across Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, the Philippines, Vietnam and Australia. The majority of the migratory movements (64 percent) were for economic purposes (shown in blue), while 30.5 percent of the movements were for social reasons (shown in red), and the remaining 5.5 percent were for health, education, relaxation or simply stop-overs. Virtually all economic activities were fishing-related, with only a few respondents claiming to

[24] *Transmigrasi* is a controversial transmigration program initiated by the Dutch colonizers in 1905 and continued by the independent Indonesian state, aiming to resettle people from densely populated Indonesian islands like Java, to outer, less populated islands for the proclaimed purpose of increase welfare and resource use (though aims and benefits of the program are contentious) (Fearnside, 1997).

pursue other paid livelihood activities such as working on a tobacco farm or as a nanny. Men's movements accounted for 72 percent of the total movements to 128 destinations (as shown in Map 5.2), while women's movements accounted for 28 percent of the total movements ranging 43 destinations (as shown in Map 5.3). Economic reasons were the main driving factor for both male and female travel, while movements for social reasons, such as to visit family members or attend a ceremony, such as a traditional healing ceremony, marriage, or religious gathering accounted for a larger proportion of women's movements (32 percent) than men's (7 percent). These data are based on interview responses, and thus provide only an approximation of the extent of local Bajo mobility, as responses are dependent upon interviewees recollecting each movement, among other factors.



Map 5.1: Reach of local Bajo mobility. (Source: author).



Map 5.2: Reach of mobility for Bajo men. (Source: author).



Map 5.3: Reach of mobility for Bajo women. (Source: author).

Migratory movements are "embedded in the societies' strategies to obtain livelihoods, and socio-culture structures give migration particular forms" (de Haan, 1999: 16). For local Bajo, a mobile livelihood is an important livelihood strategy. Change of location can reduce external vulnerability, and local Bajo movements are shaped and mediated by financial and social capital, environmental trends, seasonality, access to information, and structural processes.

Of the migratory movements recorded for economic purposes, 76 percent were for the purpose of fishing or marine resource collection. One of the patterns observed, was that of young Bajo who tend to leave school and then pursue long-term, distant migration for fishing or gleaning prior to marriage, for the purposes of helping their family with remittances and due to a desire to explore (Yuda, 09/12/2014; Sulaiman, 16/11/2014; Dian, 16/01/2015; Sri, 11/02/2015). Nearly one quarter of my respondents pursued this type of migration. Ali (17/11/2014), for example, explains: "I want to be inspired. I want to know. I want to travel to places that I've never been." Ali is one of the most-travelled Bajo in Sama Bahari. He left school in 1975 when he was about 16 years old, having obtained an exceptional education for a local Bajo at the time. "My father couldn't make enough money and I thought to myself, 'I want to help my father.' It was too hard for him to make money here. The teacher always told me to go help him" (Ali, 17/11/2014).

In some instances, migration is employed as a livelihood strategy when Bajo are unsuccessful in their livelihood activities locally. For example, Bima (05/12/2014), a spear gun fisher, explains:

> I have a son who has lived in Sanana for 11 years. He lives in another Bajo community, and fishes for octopus and lobster. He moved to Sanana because it was too hard for him to find octopus and lobster here. In Sanana, there are many lobsters.

Similarly, Putra (15/11/2014), a 30-year-old married man explains:

> I go to many places for making money because when I live here I lose money. I can buy everything I need in Sama Bahari but I cannot save any money here. That's why I migrate—to find more money to save. I can make about 2 million RP ($200 US) for one month in Malaysia. In Tanjung Pinang [Riau Islands], I can save about 1.6 million RP ($160 US) per month.

Putu (07/12/2014), a female coral miner, gleaner, and local fish vendor, describes her son's similar experience: "I have a son who has been living in Tanjung Pinang for about 20 years now. He works on a fishing boat and uses a gillnet to fish. He went because he didn't always find fish here, but in Tanjung Pinang he can work." Unlike Bima's son, Putu's son works as a member of a fishing boat, rather than working alone. This tends to reduce vulnerability as members have access to greater physical capital, such as fishing gear. They also have access to financial capital through stable

wages or the ability to borrow money from the captain to send back home in the form of remittances, and in some instances, are provided with meals and cigarettes (Sulaiman, 16/11/2014; Yuda, 09/12/2014; Muhammad, 07/12/2014; Ketut, 08/12/2014; Sanana, 18/01/ 2015; Sri, 11/02/2015).

Seasonality tends to factor into migratory movements of shorter-distances. For example, Abdul (05/12/2014) leaves the village for a few days twice a month during the calm season to fish in the Kaledupan atolls, about 25 kilometers away from Sama Bahari. For his own safety, he will not risk travelling that distance by canoe during monsoon season.

Overall, migration is a significant livelihood strategy for local Bajo, and especially for Bajo men. In the context of my research, migration tends to be temporary and for economic purposes; both proactive and reactive. Local Bajo migrate short and long distances, but tend to pursue similar livelihood activities elsewhere as done locally, in part, as noted earlier due to their specific social capital ties with other Bajo, rather than with outsiders. Thus, local Bajo diversify their livelihoods spatially, but do not usually diversify their livelihood activities.

5.9.1. The risks of using migration as a livelihood strategy

Migration can be understood as "a livelihood activity that both enables households to manage risks while also representing a source of risk itself" (Winkels, 2004: ii). Travelling—as part of the migration process—can be expensive, as it can include the financial costs of petrol and chartered boats, and the opportunity cost of work-days lost during travel time. Adding further to possible risks, some Bajo migrate long distances (at times over 1000 kilometers) without complete information about the availability of waged work or natural resources to collect (Intan, 16/01/2015). Thus, to take full advantage of livelihood opportunities elsewhere, "the poor have to be able to negotiate the distance to access resources and convert them into productive assets" (Naybor et al., 2016: 405). Bajo tend to be flexible in their movements, when faced with unexpected or difficult situations. As Abdul (05/12/2014), a married teenager explains:

> I stayed in Kokko for such a long time because there were many octopuses, lobsters, and fish that I could take. I stayed in the other places for shorter periods of time because there wasn't much to catch.

A lack of information can be problematic for mobile Bajo. Amir (09/12/2014), a 57-year-old man, recounts his experience being deported:

> I was in Kunak [east coast of Sabah, Malaysia, on the island of Borneo] for seven days to catch fish but the government brought me to their office. It was not in Indonesia. I had a passport and a pass for my boat, so I don't know why they brought me to their office. Then they moved me for three days to Tawau [also in Sabah].

> Then they moved me for one day to Nunukang [North Kalimantan, Indonesian Borneo]. The police let me go there, but I didn't have any money. The policemen said that we cannot go to that area and said next time not to do it. My boss sent me money to get to Tawau again.

As mentioned above, working with a 'boss' or captain with economic power serves to reduce vulnerability, as was the case for Amir. After being deported, Amir simply returned to Malaysia again with the documents he claims allowed him to and with the money provided by his captain. Amir was not caught a second time on that trip, and continued to fish in Malaysian waters. When travelling around Indonesia, local Bajo tend to work for Bajo captains they meet through their social or fishing networks. When working on larger boats on the Malaysian/Indonesian border, like Amir, captains are usually Chinese. Local Bajo are connected with these captains through friends and family who have worked as crew members in the area. Captains usually provide zero-interest loans to Bajo staff, or cash advances, so fishers can send remittances back home. The cost of relocation, food, and cigarettes for Bajo fishers are usually covered by captains as well. Fish species caught while working for a captain varies, and depends on location of fishing activity. Oftentimes, Bajo work for a captain catching the same species they fish around Sama Bahari. Working for a captain eliminates the need for Bajo to find a buyer for their catch. Furthermore, when working for a captain, local Bajo usually gain a steady wage regardless of their catch, and this is one of the most appealing benefits for fishers. Long trips of many months to a few years are almost never pursued alone, due to the risks associated with such long-term migration.

Like Amir, other Bajo interviewees admit to crossing international borders and fishing illegally. Ahmad (08/12/2014), a 45-year-old man, for instance states: "I was in Australia for one month, fishing for shark with a hook and line. I know it is illegal, but I have never been caught." Hasan (16/01/2015) claimed to benefit from being caught shark fishing in Australia:

> I was in Australia for seven months. I got caught fishing shark. The police brought me to work inside a prison and gave me a salary for building part of the prison. When police from Australia bring Indonesian people to prison, they always give jobs to them.

Thus, structures such as international borders mediate Bajo mobility to some extent, but are largely perceived simply as obstacles to be navigated in creative ways. While Bajo choose mobile livelihoods to manage risks, mobility can also represent a risk in and of itself, especially as Bajo lack information or are presented with unexpected consequences at their destination. Working as part of a crew for a captain with high levels of financial and physical capital is one of the ways in which many Bajo tend to negotiate the distance travelled to earn a livelihood.

5.10. CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I have drawn from the literatures on sustainable livelihoods and mobility to analyze Bajo livelihood activities, access to assets, and migration as a livelihood strategy. I examined the most common livelihood activities for local men and women. I have untangled the gendered dynamics of livelihood strategizing in Sama Bahari, by analyzing the paid and unpaid work that local men and women pursue. I argued that a woman's decision to take on remunerative work to some extent is based on some calculated balance between economic need and social pressure, but that some women are also choosing to pursue paid activities with the goal of improving the quality of life for their families. I have highlighted the relationship between education and the built environment, and independence for Bajo women, and in doing so, I have suggested that women use and benefit from certain resources differently than do men. Specifically, I found that access to education and walkways facilitate local Bajo women's pursuit of a diverse set of fishing and non-fishing livelihood activities. Finally, I have illuminated the gendered gap in decision-making at the household and village level.

Mobility from the local to the international scale is an integral part of Bajo society. At the local scale, infrastructural developments have increased everyday mobility, especially for women. Yet, social factors underlying Bajo relationships delineate zones of inclusion and zones of exclusion within the village, and restrict everyday mobility for many. When we understand mobility as a social process, it becomes apparent that differences in mobility as a result of differences in physical, social, human, or financial capital have served to alter local perceptions of the world, and has led to segregation and exclusion within the village. This reinforces socio-economic divides and hierarchies. Even so, strong bonding social capital in general has enabled Bajo individuals and households to pursue mobile livelihoods. Local Bajo pursue mobile livelihoods as a strategy to reduce vulnerability, and travel across Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei, and Australia, mainly to pursue traditional livelihood activities. In sum, structural factors, such as National Park policies or international borders, and the positionality of mobile agents themselves serve to both extend and restrict mobility in complex ways, while mobility for local Bajo both reinforces traditional practices and introduces new ways of thinking.

CHAPTER 6: BAJO RESISTANCE

6.1. INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I explore my third research question: Do local Bajo harness control over natural resources in the Wakatobi National Park and is there any local resistance to National Park policies? If so, how and in what ways? My investigation of this question is guided by the literature on political ecology, specifically, feminist political ecology, and the concepts of governmentality, environmentality, territoriality; and the literature on everyday politics and resistance, including the concepts of hegemonic narratives, hidden transcripts, and moral economy. I begin in Section 6.2 by identifying the various authorities that attempt to harness control over local natural resources in the WNP. I then explore the discursive and practical tactics these stakeholders use to gain such control over such resources. I analyze forms of local Bajo resistance that counter such restrictions to local natural resources in Section 6.3. Finally, I investigate gendered forms of everyday resistance in Sama Bahari, in Section 6.4.

6.2. AUTHORITY AND HARNESSING POWER

As highlighted in Chapter 3, the Indonesian government has felt increasing international pressure to implement policies to protect ecologically important areas such as the Wakatobi Region (Elliott et al., 2001). Likewise, the Indonesian state has actively worked to maintain marine protected areas as a strategy for developing its tourism industry. The government's approach to economic growth in the region has therefore consistently prioritized tourist needs while access to adequate infrastructure, education, or skills development for local people have not been so attentively addressed, as examined in Chapter 5. In this section, I argue that WNP authorities mobilize specific narratives to justify National Park regulations and further develop infrastructure for tourism in the region. Though state functionaries have official rights to control local natural resources, a number of international organizations actively harness some control over local resources as well.

6.2.1. Environmentality and conservation policy narratives in the WNP

Many of Indonesia's National Parks, like the Wakatobi, are inhabited by people. The ways in which states govern people within these spaces can be analyzed using the concept of environmentality, as defined in Chapter 2. West et al. (2006), who examine the social impact of protected areas through a review of relevant literature in anthropology, suggest that protected areas are ways for states to socially and politically (re)produce nature and culture in an attempt to manage and control the relationships between society and the environment. The ways in which the Indonesia state

reproduces nature and culture, and manages society-environment interactions within its National Parks can be seen to illuminate a specific style of environmentality in Indonesia. In the case of the WNP, local Bajo relationships with marine resources are being reconstructed through National Park policies, such that their culture, subsistence, and livelihood activities are pressured to change to fit more 'modern' conceptualizations of nature (as pristine) and society (as separate from nature). Since the 14th century, Bajo have been accessing resources in the Wakatobi Region under an open access regime wherein no property rights had been established. With the establishment of WNP in 1996, local Bajo are expected to (re)conceptualize certain natural resources as state property. Tourists are granted access to no-take zones for recreational purposes, while locals are denied access to these same areas for subsistence and other livelihood needs. This serves to limit livelihood opportunities for local Bajo and creates a sense of unfairness, as the Indonesian state seemingly prioritizes tourist requirements over local needs.

Just as Li (2005) argues that there are institutions beyond 'the state' that attempt to govern, I recognize that there are a number of stakeholders that hold authority over resources in the WNP namely, TNC, WWF, Tomia Resort, and Operation Wallacea. I find that these stakeholders harness control using mainly discursive means (c.f. Fairhead and Leach, 1995; Armitage, 2004). I identify two main policy narratives that overlap and interact in conservation efforts in the Wakatobi Park: the *fortress conservation* policy narrative and the *community conservation* policy narrative. The fortress conservation policy narrative, in the context of coastal-marine conservation practice, is when:

> Human presence is incompatible with conservation of coastal-marine biodiversity. Conservation is framed by exclusion (or severe limitation) of human activities via e.g., creation of MPAs with no-take zones and prevention of consumptive use (Berdej et al., 2015: 215).

In coastal-marine conservation, the community conservation policy narrative can be defined as having:

> Emphasis on the role and rights of 'community' in coastal-marine decision-making and policy creation. Conservation is framed by society-centered activities such as community-based conservation or locally managed marine areas (LMMAs) (Berdej et al., 2015: 215).

While it seems these conservation strategies are incompatible, both policy narratives are prevalent in the discourse surrounding conservation of the WNP. I find that the community conservation policy narrative is used by government officials and NGOs, despite conservation policies aligning more with the fortress conservation policy narrative in practice. It is common for multiple narratives

to overlap in conservation discourses (Büscher and Whande, 2007), and I note that narratives must not necessarily be objectively true to be widely adopted, but must only be compelling and/or persuasive to be widely adopted (Roe, 1991; Fairhead and Leach, 1995; Berdej et al., 2015). In this section, I show how narratives interact and compete, and impact conservation practice and local livelihoods in the WNP.

Narratives position actors in specific roles, and are often propagated by actors with power (Roe, 1991; 1994; Fairhead and Leach, 1995; Campbell, 2002; Berdej et al., 2015). In the context of the WNP, NGOs and tourism organizations harness control through what Carr (2010) calls an 'enactment of expertise.' Carr (2010: 19) defines the concept of expertise as "implicated in semi-stable hierarchies of value that authorize particular ways of seeing and speaking as an expert." Through an enactment of expertise, these organizations frame marine biologists and international development agencies as experts in conservation due to their 'modern,' scientific knowledge, which positions these external agencies as more powerful in conservation decision-making processes.

From a review of every online news article I could find on Google News in English on the WNP until September 2016 (649 screened, 53 reviewed in full), and in analyzing the literature written by international NGOs working with the WNP Authority (for example: TNC, 2014; WWF, 2016), it becomes evident that the conservation discourse surrounding policy of the WNP is mobilized through narratives of expertise. For example:

> 'NGOs come to Wakatobi because of the National Park and the biodiversity here' [Wakatobi Regent, Pak Hugua] explained […] 'They offer expertise. I don't have the budget to pay experts to come and patiently work with local communities, so I work together with [the Park and the NGOs]' (Kaye, 2015: online).

This becomes problematic because these narratives portray local fishers as non-experts with a need to be educated regarding their local environment, and thus exclude local communities from participating in policy development and implementation. Narratives of expertise privilege certain ideologies and perceptions about problems, and interact with narratives fortress conservation, which serves to exclude local fishers. These interacting narratives are tied to underlying assumptions about the role of experts and communities in conservation (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Campbell, 2002; Berdej et al., 2015).

Another example comes from a report by TNC (2014: online) in which the organization states their "concerted efforts are making local communities more cognizant of the impacts their actions have on the environment." Similarly, a report written by a gaming company that partnered with WWF for a conservation project in the WNP, uses a narrative of expertise alongside a crisis narrative that serves as a prime motivation for NGO intervention: "We came to believe that if the

public becomes aware of these issues, then they will be in a better position to support marine conservation and fisheries sustainability efforts, before it is too late" (Maulani, 2015: online). In framing local fishers in this way, these narratives interact to socially and politically construct locals as uneducated, and as the cause of natural resource destruction.

Through participant observation, Photovoice, and interviews, my research reveals that the vast majority of local Bajo have a high level of awareness of ecological trends such as sea level rise, degradation of marine environments including coral reefs and seagrass meadows, as well as declining fish stocks. This finding is unsurprising, given that Bajo have been dependent on marine ecosystems for their livelihoods for centuries. However, my fieldwork also reveals that local Bajo have not been consulted in the design, implementation, or management of the National Park. Therefore, I suggest that, contrary to the rhetoric mobilized in these articles and reports, it is not that local Bajo are unaware of the ecological effects of their interactions with the marine environment. Rather, local Bajo knowledge is not valued by policy makers, conservation agencies or tourism organizations, and Bajo interests are not truly considered in conservation efforts.

As the WNP has been increasingly marketed for tourism, I examine how an ecotourism conservation policy narrative interacts with narratives of nature as a spectacle. The terms 'virtualism' (West and Carrier, 2004), 'derivative nature' (Büscher, 2010), and the 'spectacle of nature' (Igoe, 2010), are used to describe the ways in which human-environment relationships and expectations are shaped "through mass production, distribution, and consumption of modern and replicable forms of representation" (Büscher et al., 2011: 16). The term 'spectacle' was defined by Marxist critical theorist, Guy Debord (1967: thesis 4) as "a social relationship between people that is mediated by images." This definition was extended by Igoe (2010: 376) to include "the mediation of relationships between people and the environment by images." Igoe (2010) uses the concept of a 'spectacle' to reveal connections between biodiversity conservation and neoliberal capitalism in the context of his fieldwork in Tanania's Tarangire National Park. He illumines the ways in which NGOs spectacularize nature through images and descriptions to mobilize resources for their own interventions, in order to 'solve' environmental problems. The spectacularization of nature is perhaps:

> Most clearly seen where images of pristine wilderness are essential to the transformation of landscapes according to Western tourists' dreams, and these same transformed landscapes then support the production of more wilderness images (Igoe, 2010: 376).

I argue that the Indonesian government, NGOs and tourist organizations depict the WNP as a spectacle, and this is powerful in producing hegemonic visions of ecotourism and fortress

conservation beliefs and values. Narratives of spectacles frame nature as pristine and untouched by society. An example of this is illustrated in the following website advertising services provided by an international tourist organization called Performance Freediving International, which operates within the park:

> Wakatobi [Resort] is set on a tranquil island far from crowds and cities, with no other divers for at least 100 miles. As a five-star resort it combines *civilized* comforts with a *pristine* natural environment; a pairing that has secured its reputation as one of the world's finest resorts (Whelan, 2016: online. Italics added by author).

Another use of the same rhetoric is found in the Wakatobi Tourism and Creative Economy Authority's (2014) 'Hello Wakatobi' tourist handbook, with phrases like: "[Trying] to get away from it all?" (15) and "Wakatobi offers excellent scuba diving in some of the most *pristine* coral [reefs] in the world" (27). Similarly, an article written by the Wakatobi Dive Resort's marketing manager, states:

> Today, Wakatobi's surrounding reefs remain among the healthiest and most *pristine* in the world. The story begins with a search. Lorenz Mäder [the resort's founder] spent years traveling through the islands of the Indian Ocean, seeking the perfect location to create a dive resort. He found it at Wakatobi…The setting was remote, and seemingly far removed from the problems that plagued more *civilized* regions (Stearns, 2016: online. Italics added by author).

Such a vision is problematic in that nature is separated from society, when the two are so inextricably linked. Denevan (1992) coined the term 'pristine myth' to describe the ways in which nineteenth-century romanticist and primitivist writers describe the landscape of the Americas in 1492 as a sparsely populated wilderness, despite substantial evidence of a humanized landscape at large. The use of the word 'pristine' to describe the natural environment of the Wakatobi (as in Wakatobi Tourism and Creative Economy Authority, 2014; Stearns, 2016; Whelan, 2016, above), is evidently a myth as well. Since the establishment of the WNP, this false dichotomy of nature and society has become increasingly normalized as tourism agencies and conservation organizations repeatedly discursively displace local fishers who have been interconnected with those specific natural locales for centuries.

Some of the Bajo respondents in my study identify the positive benefits of the National Park for their livelihoods—namely, the Park represents an effort to protect the sustainability of fish stocks and marine ecosystems that act as a main source of livelihood and subsistence for many locals. However, many efforts by the WNP authority focus on educating local Bajo on marine and coastal environmental processes of which locals are aware, rather than on collaborating on sustainable conservation efforts. Some net fishers that I interviewed, such as Dian (19/08/2014) and

Yuda (19/08/2014) identified positive relationships between local Bajo and the National Park authorities, due to the government's provision of free nets with larger mesh holes. For example, Yuda, a 44-year-old net fisher and local village staff member, stated:

> I have a good relationship with the park rangers because they have a program with the Bajo here to save the environment. They come here and discuss with the fishermen about how to save the marine ecosystems. They sometimes give us money for nets of larger mesh holes (19/08/2014).

However, these efforts by park rangers to interact and collaborate with local Bajo are limited, and, thus, only benefit a small portion of the population.

In sum, the policy narratives mobilized by the state and external conservation agencies working within the WNP illustrate the governing environmentality. These narratives benefit the state and external agencies at the expense of local fishers. Local fishers identify a limited number of benefits from conservation projects, and are aware of local environmental trends, but overwhelmingly view regional conservation efforts in a negative light. Thus, many local fishers, gleaners, and natural resource collectors chose to resist National Park regulations, as I outline in Section 6.3.

6.2.2. Park officials' covert tactics of harnessing power

A lack of collaboration with local fishers means WNP rangers are unable to successfully take full control over natural resources, and are thus unable to harness all the power in these relationships. Therefore, National Park rangers attempt to harness control and power over natural resources and resource users in a number of creative ways. In this section, I describe the WNP officials' covert tactics of harnessing power over natural resources and in socio-ecological relationships. I find that through bribery, intimidation, and wasting time of local fishers, many National Park rangers attempt to reclaim some control over natural resources.

Through my interviews and participant observation, it became clear that there is a lack of communication between National Park officials and local Bajo. Rangers often lack official channels to gain knowledge of locals' day-to-day fishing activities and resource access. In this context, bribes are usually exchanged in the form of information or permissions, rather than money. Thus, rangers bribe a few insiders to provide them with information about illegal resource access. In exchange, those bribed can essentially access any resources in the WNP by any method and without punishment. For example, I spoke with two men in the village who use blast fishing multiple times a week while National Park officials look the other way (Hasan, 18/08/2014; Komang, 21/08/2014). A respondent estimates that approximately five fishers continue to use blast fishing locally – an

activity that is frowned upon by many locals (Mansur, 09/11/2014) – though it was more common in the past (Bima, 09/10/2014). Photo 6.1 illustrates a bombed reef approximately one kilometer away from Sama Bahari.

Apart from those who gain bribes, intimidation is used to instill fear into local fishers, to encourage them to abide by National Park regulations. This is done in a number of ways. Photo 6.2 illustrates some National Park officers coming to the village to speak with specific individuals about a fine. They have brought friends with them, who are not National Park officials, from the Tukang Besi ethnic group. They have just come from scuba diving in the no-take zone two kilometers from the village, so they have a lot of very expensive gear with them. This demonstrates differences in wealth and resource access, as they access reefs for leisure activities while locals are not permitted to access those reefs for livelihood purposes. This, paired with the group dynamic – of wealthier, more powerful, Tukang Besi people who are of higher social status than local Bajo – instills and makes evident sense of unequal power dynamics, which is leveraged as an intimidation tactic.



Photo 6.1: Bombed reef one kilometer away from Sama Bahari. (Source: Jack Laverick, 2013).

Photo 6.2: Park officials in Sama Bahari. (Source: author).

National Park rangers also aim to harness power by wasting the time of local fishers. Nine of my respondents (all women) shared stories about being taken to the official's office on the island of Wangi Wangi (see Map 1.2), and left waiting for hours without being given any information. Buana (25/08/2014), an 80-year-old widow, for example explains:

> Last year, I went fishing and met with the rangers around Hoga. I collected four small clams. When they saw that in my canoe, they got angry. The rangers said that clams were protected, but I wanted to eat them. I complained and they began to take

> me to their office. The rangers threw my clams back into the sea and, midway to the office, they cut my canoe free and let me free.

In this case, Buana had collected clams illegally. If we understand access as power, Buana had some power in her relationship with the National Park Authority. Park officials aimed to reclaim some of the power in this relationship by bringing her far away from the reefs where she was collecting, reminding her of the power gap and authority over resources within the National Park. Similarly, the rangers harness authority over protected resources and claim power in relationship with resource users by abusing their power, as Annisa (07/11/2014), a prepared food vendor and gleaner, describes: "When I want to eat clams, the park rangers say that I'm not allowed. Sometimes the park rangers take my clams in a speedboat to the office and sometimes they eat my clams." In other cases, park rangers confiscate the canoe of an illegal resource user who cannot afford to pay the steep fines (up to 5 billion RP or $500,000 US). For example, Alya (06/01/2015), a 25-year-old woman, states:

> I met the park rangers once and they brought me to their office. They took my canoe. I didn't know about the clams and I didn't know they shouldn't see me selling clams. They saw me and brought me to their office. They never gave me the canoe back.

Many Bajo people I have interviewed have been stopped by park rangers out at sea while fishing legally, and asked a lot of questions about what they are doing, what others are doing, and so on. Adi (01/10/2014), a 23-year-old man, for example, fishes legally, and feels this constant disturbance is distracting to his livelihood activities: "I have met with the rangers many times in the sea. They make me feel like I am not free to fish there. I dislike them because they ask me lots of questions. I want to focus on fishing, but the rangers always bother me." Wasted time becomes problematic for fishers who live on a day-to-day returns generated by fishing, and thus, have only a limited amount of time to make a livelihood.

As I was unable to interview park rangers about why they employ tactics such as accepting bribes from some individuals, wasting the time of other illegal resource users, while confiscating the property of others again, my interpretations regarding these actions are inconclusive. However, I would suggest that these differences probably arise due to a number of reasons, including whether or not the resource user can afford to pay a bribe, access to linking social capital, whether or not the resource users own the canoe she or he is using, and the severity of the illegal resource collection being undertaken when an individual is caught. In sum, park authorities try to maintain control over local natural resource use in several ways, such as receiving bribes, using intimidation, or wasting the time of locals. It is clear from my interviews that these actions only serve to further erode the

relationships between park officials and local fishers—a relationship that needs to be stronger in order for the National Park to be managed efficiently and sustainably.

6.3. LOCAL BAJO RESISTANCE TO WAKATOBI NATIONAL PARK REGULATIONS

The zoning and regulations of the WNP do not take into consideration local historical resource use, and instead, favor the protection of local ecological processes and tourism. Local communities are expected to comply with new regulations with little regard to the adverse effects they might have on their livelihoods. Therefore, it is not surprising that National Park regulations are met with local resistance.

The central pillars of such resistance are a discourse of rights, justice, reliable subsistence, and a moral economy embedded in local society. In the case of the WNP, competing moral economies exist. A moral economy, as described in Section 2.4.1, refers to an economy based on ideas of justice, values, and rights recognized by a significant proportion of a community (Scott, 1976). Bajo resource access is officially limited to protect an internationally valuable marine biodiversity, while Bajo consider it to be morally just to access local resources they have been accessing for centuries. Therefore, the main goals of Bajo resistance are not necessarily to change the regulations of the National Park, but rather to continue using resources in a way that allows them to maintain their livelihoods—in a way that they consider to be morally just or fair, despite the illegality of these actions (c.f. Scott, 1976; Kerkvliet, 1990).

In their view of the local moral economy, Bajo reject conceptualizations of local marine resources as state property. The implementation of the WNP in 1998 imposed new regulations on resources that were previously accessed through an open access property regime. Historical patterns of local resource use and the lack of enforcement of relatively new National Park regulations influence the ways in which local Bajo understand marine resources. Local Bajo understand resources as regulated by either state property regimes or by open access regimes. My research suggests that local Bajo increasingly use everyday forms of resistance to negotiate agency over their own lives and livelihoods within the structural bounds of the WNP.

6.3.1. Scale and forms of local everyday resistance

Local Bajo resist what they perceive to be oppressive policies and unjust actions of authorities in a number of creative ways. This resistance includes continuing to collect natural resources illegally, avoiding contact with or hiding from park rangers, allying with each other to illegally access resources or withhold information from authorities, and by covertly critiquing authorities.

In the WNP, it is illegal to cut down mangroves. The punishment for doing so is severe. Photo 6.3 shows a sign posted in the middle of Sama Bahari, which states the maximum punishment for illegal mangrove collection is either 10 years in prison or 5 billion RP, (equal approximately $500,000 US). Despite these harsh penalties, many locals use mangroves because they are a vital and versatile resource. Mangroves are used to make stilts and frames for houses and to make fish fences. Most importantly, mangroves are used on a daily basis as a cost-effective fuel for cooking, as other forms of cooking fuel (such as kerosene) can be expensive or simply unaffordable to some. Many Photovoice respondents took photos of mangroves being cut, (see Photos 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6) which illustrates the prevalence and importance of this resource to local Bajo livelihoods.

Photo 6.3: Sign describing fine for cutting down mangroves, posted in Sama Bahari. (Source: author).

Many respondents resist National Park policies that restrict mangrove use by avoiding contact with the park rangers. The first step in avoiding contact is to keep watch for the rangers' boat. Nyoman, a 38-year-old woman, for instance, has never met with the rangers anywhere in her life. Nyoman (03/03/2015) and her friends "just look for their speedboat in the sea and avoid the rangers. We have to race [the rangers] to the mangroves when we want to take wood." Some locals race to the mangroves before the rangers can witness them illegally accessing resources. If caught with mangrove wood, collectors often lie to officials and claim they found the wood already cut down (Bethari, 20/11/2014). Once the mangroves have already been cut, it is easier for mangrove collectors to claim the resources as legally harvested. For example, Bethari (30/10/2014), a 53-year-old widow, states: "Sometimes the park rangers come to my house and look for cut mangroves. I can talk my way out of it." Others, like the elder introduced in Section 5.2.4, Nur (20/08/2014), simply hide in the mangroves and wait for the park rangers to pass before collecting the resources she needs. Melati (10/11/2014), introduced in Section 5.6.3, does the same: "If they see me taking mangroves, I hide. When they go, I continue to take them."

Photo 6.4: Stack of mangroves. (Source: Photovoice respondent Purnama, 10/03/2015).

Photo 6.5: Woman chopping mangrove. (Source: Photovoice respondent Yohanes, 24/02/2015).

Coral mining is also illegal in the WNP. However, coral stones serve as a relatively affordable and accessible building material. Coral stones are used to build platforms for houses, as Wira is doing in Photo 6.7. Coral stones protect the stilts of the house and provide stability. A coral foundation under a house also serves as an additional breezy and shaded place to work, cook, or socialize. One of my female respondents, Bama (28/02/2015), states, "I have been caught by the park rangers once when I was taking coral. I saw the rangers and put the coral back in the water. I just went back to get it later." This quote demonstrates the limited effectiveness of patrolling the area, when policies do not consider local livelihood needs. It highlights the everyday resistance techniques used—a public transcript of following the rules is balanced by a hidden transcript of mining coral when authorities are out of sight.

Photo 6.6: Women brining mangrove wood to Sama Bahari. (Source: Photovoice respondent Arif, 10/03/2015).

Photo 6.7: Woman building foundation for home using coral stones. (Source: author).

A number of locals continue to access no-take zones—zones where it is completely forbidden to fish. Photo 6.8 illustrates a local Bajo spear gun fisher, fishing in the no-take zone by Hoga Island. There are several no-take zones in the National Park, including some of the closest reefs, located two kilometers from the village (see Map 1.2). The designation of these specific no-take zones (like the one by Hoga Island in Photo 6.8) as a tourism area creates a sense of unfairness for locals. For example, Wayan (08/20/2016) noted "the Hoga security is always yelling at us to get away from the area", while Cinta (08/20/2015), a female elder, shared a similar account: "When we pass [Hoga Island] by canoe, they tell us to get away from the area."

Photo 6.8: A local Bajo fishing with spear gun in the no-take zone by Hoga Island. (Source: author).

As already noted, local Bajo frequently avoid contact with park authorities as a form of resistance. For example, Dian (19/08/2014), a 28-year-old married man, covertly resists interactions with authorities by hiding:

> I dislike the park rangers because they control me every day. The park rangers have come to me many times in the sea. They explain too much to me and ask me too many questions about bomb fishing and cyanide fishing. The rangers waste my time. When I see them coming, I go to the seaweed farms where there are lines of seaweed surrounding my boat, or I go to the shallow waters so they cannot get to me.

This is a clear act of resistance because Dian actively evades notice and detection by avoiding interactions with authorities that he claims control him. When resources are accessed illegally for food, one strategy is to "eat them right away and then throw the remains back into the sea" (Wibowo, 23/11/2014).

Drawing on their bonding social capital, local Bajo ally with each other to help access resources and deceive authorities. Locals in the village and out at sea will keep look out for officials, and warn neighbours when park rangers are near. Apart from a select few who engage in bribery, locals also tend not to share information with officials. For example, Utari (27/02/2015), a 65-year-old woman, states:

> I met the park rangers once when I was gleaning. They wanted to know where people use cyanide. I didn't tell them. I don't want people to use cyanide either, but I don't like the park rangers. We can't take anything in the sea and they always [tell us not to].

Utari refuses to work with the rangers who enforce restrictions upon the livelihoods of her community. Utari highlights the lack of cooperation between local Bajo resource users and National Park officials. She states that, because National Park authorities do not consider the interests of local fishers, she chooses not to communicate with them—despite the fact that she too is concerned about destructive fishing methods, such as the use of cyanide.

I frequently observed locals critiquing National Park officials for their misuse of power and their failure to efficiently regulate resource access. For example, Wayan (08/20/2015), a 48-year-old net fisher, highlights the priority of officials to be focused on tourism rather than conservation: "[The no-take zone by] Hoga Island is actually only protected when tourists come here." This demonstrates a moral critique of the burden of National Park policies on the livelihoods of local Bajo. Critical local narratives serve to discursively take power from the park officials. As such, local Bajo resist National Park regulations and what they perceive to be the unjust actions of authorities by continuing to access resources illegally, avoiding contact with park authorities, allying with each other, and critiquing park authorities.

6.3.2. Successful resistance? Goals and outcomes

Bajo justified their resistance to National Park policies to me in different ways. Many locals explained that they resist in order to covertly protest actions they perceive as unjust or unfair. In fact, in analyzing my interview transcripts, I note that freedom was a recurrent theme that arose when discussing National Park authorities. For example, Nur (08/12/2014), an 80-year-old woman, noted: "A long time ago, I was free to take everything because there was no government here. Now, I can't take mangroves or coral. Sometimes I still take them, but the rangers can't know." Taufik (21/08/2014), a 27-year-old man, expresses his joy of being out in the open sea, away from the constant watch of authorities, despite his activities being completely legal: "I love tuna fishing because it is like I am free in the sea. There are no police and no rangers. The sea is mine." This highlights the effect that constant surveillance of park authorities has on feelings of freedom for many local Bajo, beyond those who use resources illegally.

Bajo also resist in order to continue leading lives similar to those they had led prior to the establishment of the WNP. Acts of resistance, such as continuing to access illegal resources, are justified by respondents if they directly enable people to subsist. For example, Ibrahim

(21/02/2015), a 40-year-old night gleaner, states: “I can’t take clams, coral, mangroves, or sand because of the rangers. I still get them, but not for selling, just for my home or for cooking.” Putra (15/11/2014), a 30-year-old man, is one of many respondents that describes disagreements with policies that forbid him to access resources for subsistence needs: “I just don't trust the rangers because when I want to take clams, they say not to catch them. I tell them I just take them to eat, but they still say that I cannot do that.” Alternative options are limited for affordable and accessible food in the area, so resistance is used as a means to subsist.

These acts of resistance have important consequences for conservation and the sustainability of resources. Hasan (18/08/2014), a 33-year-old man, for example, stresses: “I still use marine resources as I normally would, but I am starting to worry about the National Park’s potential.” This quote exemplifies the dilemma for local Bajo. They require a sustainable resource base for their livelihoods and food security, but the National Park Authority does not take the needs of local Bajo into consideration. Lack of cooperation in conservation efforts leads to failures in conservation strategies because local Bajo are not passive subjects to what they perceive to be unjust regulations. Rather, they actively resist in order to continue subsisting and accessing resources in a way that the local community collectively agrees to be fair.

6.4. GENDERED RESISTANCE

In Chapter 5, I introduced the differences in access to a range of livelihood capitals for men and for women. I noted that gender norms and expectations limit women’s access to resources and to certain livelihood activities. However, local Bajo women do not passively accept such restrictions upon their livelihoods and oftentimes they resist many gender norms, roles, and expectations.

Because of the additional barriers that women face accessing different capitals, my data suggest that women tend to use resistance as a strategy more often than men. This is because not only are their livelihood activities restricted by National Park regulations and controlled by park authorities, but women are also constrained by gender norms and expectations that serve to impose further controls upon which livelihood activities are permissible for them. For example, Yuda (19/08/2014), a 44-year-old net fisher and village staff member, states: “I restrict my wife from going fishing and finding money because it is my responsibility.”

Female resource users are more inclined to resist National Park regulations because many activities that have been traditionally understood as women’s tasks are now illegal. Wati (20/08/2014) explains, “I hate the rangers. I am a widow and I don’t have a husband. I mine coral and I cut mangroves because those are the jobs for me, but the rangers protect the coral and the mangroves.” Wati continues accessing resources illegally because those types of livelihood

activities are locally perceived to be jobs for women, and hence are a culturally acceptable way for her to gain small financial returns. Mangrove and coral harvesting, as discussed in the previous section, are activities very commonly undertaken by women in Sama Bahari.

As an alternative to traditionally accepted women's roles that are now deemed illegal, Wati must undertake a legal activity that is deemed only appropriate for men, for her to meet her livelihood and food security needs. When Wati (20/08/2014) goes fishing legally, she engages in an activity that local society deems unacceptable for women. It is also evident that social status is linked to marital status, as married Bajo women can often depend on their husband for financial returns, and are able to fulfill locally culturally appropriate gender roles and expectations by staying at home.

Other women chose to reject gender expectations actively. Cinta (20/08/2014), a widowed traditional healer, states: "I know others like me do not go fishing and stay in the house, but it is my hobby. I cannot be away from the sea." This also shows Tri (19/08/2014) also enjoys fishing, but as a married woman, must navigate the expectations of her husband and family:

> My husband and family restrict me from going fishing, even if I love to go with a hook and a line. My husband would be embarrassed if he had a wife who went fishing. If my husband is not here, sometimes my daughter and I paddle and fish; just for consumption, not for sale.

Intan (11/09/2014) explains, "women are not free to go fishing because it is the husband's job." Yet, just like Cinta and Tri, Intan rejects these constraints and goes fishing when her husband temporarily migrates.

Apart from fishing, some of my respondents felt restricted from pursuing other livelihood activities, even if they are culturally and socially understood as women's tasks. To some extent, dominant cultural norms held by broader Muslim society in Indonesia are influencing how some Bajo view gender and work. In recent decades some conservative strains of Islam have factored into the ways in which women's roles are socially constructed. One reading of women's position in relation to men, as understood by many Muslims in Indonesia, is as a subordinate, and is embedded in a moral hierarchy constructed alongside Indonesian notions of family and nation, "in which gender roles are conceptualized as a source of security and social continuity" (Adamson, 2007: 9). Lestari's (19/08/2014) husband restricts her from selling cakes around the village because it gives the impression that her husband is unable to provide for their family:

> Now I sell cakes, but only from my house so my husband is okay with it. If I tour around the village with my cakes, my husband would restrict me because he is shy. He doesn't like me asking people to buy my cakes because it looks desperate. If I stay inside the house, it is okay. It is a pride issue. If I have a problem with family

> finances, I go around anyway and sell cakes. I try to explain that to my husband, or when he is not home, I will go around the village and sell cakes anyway.

Unlike Tri, or Intan, who reject their husband's instructions purely by choice, Lestari ignores her husband's requests depending on household finances. Much like Wati, Lestari resists gender expectations with the goal of meeting her family's subsistence needs and food security.

Many of the examples of Bajo resistance provided in this chapter have been on an individual scale. However, when it comes to collecting mangroves, resistance is a truly collaborative effort. During observations, interviews, and the Photovoice project, Bajo villagers described mangrove forests as the National Park areas authorities patrol the most, and mangrove wood is in constant demand for daily use. While collecting mangrove wood, women tend to work in groups to keep watch for rangers and hide from them as needed (Nur, 20/08/2014; Batari, 10/11/2014; Iman 08/12/2014).

Women also collaborate in other livelihood activities. Indah, for example, a single mother living in Pagana, takes local catches of fish to Sampuatu market on the northeast coast of Kaledupa Island (see Map 1.2), as one of her main livelihood activities. Her friends who are not tied-up in contracts with other traders, always give their husbands' catch to her to sell, despite being able to get better prices from other intermediaries. This is an obvious case of bonding social capital as it illustrates the solidarity of the group that puts one group member's interest ahead of everyone's individual benefit.

Finally, women covertly resist gender norms and expectations by critiquing men. In some interviews, women describe men as 'lazy' (Cinta, 20/08/2014; Ratu, 19/09/2014; Cahya, 29/09/2014; Putri, 23/09/2014). While many women are taking on paid livelihood activities in addition to housekeeping and childcare tasks (as described in Chapter 5), they critique men for their lack of help in the home. For example: "Men around here are lazy. They fish, eat lunch, sleep and go the billiards everyday" (Cinta, 20/08/2014). Men are critiqued for their lack of effort and motivation as well, as women are increasingly earning financial returns: "Men are lazy now. Their wives find money so their efforts for fishing are lower and they have less motivation" (Ratu, 19/09/2014). Many activities done by women go unpaid, such as reproductive work including housework or childcare, (as explored in Chapter 5) (Sen, 1999; Harcourt and Nelson, 2015). As such, I argue that women critique men as a means of claiming recognition for their hard work, and to discursively harnessing power in these relationships.

Traditionally, the nomadic Bajo carried out most tasks as a family, as families were together in their houseboats for most hours of the day. Many respondents claim that it is only since settling in houses has the division of labour become gendered. As the house and boat became separated, so

too did the responsibilities in each. Thus, by no means am I observing new roles for women as fishers. Rather, I find that women are reclaiming these activities at sea. Women who participate in non-fishing activities, however, appear to be exploring new beginnings for Bajo women as cash-earners, perhaps influenced by their connections to broader Indonesian society through television and radio.

Overall, I reveal that local Bajo women resist local cultured gender expectations and norms through a variety of techniques. I find that women, more than men, tend to use resistance strategies in order to gain financial capital and natural capital (mangrove wood, fish, and coral), due to the additional obstacles they encounter when attempting to pursue livelihood activities. Women resist gender expectations by ignoring the instructions of their husbands, by working cooperatively, and by critiquing men for working less than women. Women also resist national park regulations when pursuing livelihood activities. While the women I interviewed often resist for different reasons, depending on their individual circumstances, each had the goal of either claiming their right to a subsistence livelihood.

6.5. CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter I applied a political ecology perspective to analyze the everyday politics of resource use in the WNP. Specifically, I examined how conservation policy narratives serve to place scientists as experts and portray local fishers as uneducated or as villains of environmental degradation (Section 6.2). Because local fishers have not been involved in the National Park design, nor in the day to day management, the regulation and control of natural resources is met with local covert resistance. National Park officials aim to harness control over natural resources and highlight the power in their relationships with resource users. They do this through bribery, intimidation, and wasting the time of local residents. Local Bajo resist by continuing to access resources illegally, avoiding contact or deceiving park officials, and by critiquing park rangers (Section 6.3). I find that local Bajo women resist additional barriers when pursing livelihood activities due to local cultural gender norms and expectations (Section 6.4). They do this by refusing to follow men's orders, mobilizing their social capital to work collaboratively, and critiquing men. In the following chapter, I compare these findings on resistance in this National Park with other empirical studies in the literature.

CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

In this final chapter I reflect upon and extend three important themes that emerged in my results chapters. In Section 7.1, I uncover the ways in which my research highlights a need for more academic attention to the gendered aspects of livelihoods and everyday resistance. In Section 7.2, I analyze the politics of mobility in the WNP, and compare my findings to other contemporary mobility research focusing on the Global South. I then investigate the ways in which my research contributes to the broader literature on the politics of resource use and conservation in National Parks in the Global South, in Section 7.3. Finally, I conclude this thesis by revisiting my research aim and objectives, and highlighting the key findings presented in each of chapter.

7.1. GENDERED LIVELIHOODS AND RESISTANCE

Fishing is often considered to be a male livelihood option in the Global South (Choo et al., 2008), partially due to traditional gender roles that regard men as providers and women as caregivers, and sometimes due to the physical demands and heavy equipment often used. It is also a result of the narrow definition of fishing as collecting species with specific physical capital such as lines or nets. This ignores the fact that fishing activities done without equipment, such as gleaning, are often done by women (Schwerdtner Máñez and Pauwelussen, 2016). There has also been a considerable gendered bias in academic research on fishing. The first consolidated work on women fishers was the book edited by Nadel-Klein and Davis (1988) *To Work or to Weep*. Soon after that publication, a number of other works emerged, including a special issue on gender and fisheries in the journal *Development* (Cole, 1991; see also Meltzoff, 1995; Yodanis, 2000; Bennett, 2005; Binkley, 2005; Muszynski, 2005; Neis et al., 2005; Clay and Olson, 2007; Béné and Merten, 2008; Frangoudes et al., 2008; Wit, 2008; Weeratunge et al., 2010; Harper et al., 2013; Zhao et al., 2013). Still, much of the social science research on fishing has focused on men (Allison, 2003; Schwerdtner Máñez and Pauwelussen, 2016).

My findings have shown that many logistical duties are pursued by women in small-scale fisheries that allow fishing operations to be successful, including processing, bringing catch to market, and determining the price of fish. This is in line with findings of Schwerdtner Máñez and Pauwelussen (2016: 194), who examine marine resource use through a gender lens. They find that:

> In many fishing communities, women provide substantial financial contributions from other income sources to fishing operations, and it is often their support that keeps fishing viable. Still, in most economic, social and historical research they have largely been ignored.

It is my hope that my research contributes to filling this gap in the literature, by providing a detailed gender analysis of the livelihoods of Bajo villagers in Sama Bahari. I argue that gender needs to be focused upon more centrally in sustainable livelihoods analyses, and should not be considered merely a 'mediating factor' to resource access. Rather, my research recognizes important gendered differences in resource access, use, and need; in histories, meanings, and understandings of resources; in livelihood opportunities, capabilities, strategies, and outcomes; in decision-making; and in forms, strategies, and reasons for covert resistance. Specifically, local Bajo women have less access to financial and human capital than Bajo men, as gender norms restrict opportunities for economic activities, formal education, and political participation. Bajo women benefit more than men from an increase in physical capital in the form of walkways. Walkways increase mobility for women, and this mobility in turn facilitates social interactions and strengthens group solidarity (social capital), and increases the sharing of news and information (human capital). Women take on fishing and non-fishing activities, and resist structural and ideological barriers such as National Park policies and gender norms. Some local Bajo women pursue paid livelihood activities as a negative, re-active livelihood strategy, but for many, pursuing paid activities is a positive choice, reflecting their agency.

7.2. POLITICS OF MOBILITY IN THE WAKATOBI NATIONAL PARK

Mobility has been a central theme within my research. The concept of mobility "facilitates critical discussion of the politics and power dynamics that animate processes of movement" (Eidse, et al., 2016: 342). In the context of the WNP, certain forms of mobility are officially permitted in certain spaces, yet this depends on the positionality of mobile subjects. WNP policies privilege 'modern' tourist mobility over that of local 'traditional' fishers. The idealisation or fetishization of tourist mobility excludes locals who are positioned as "not free [to move] in the same way" (Ahmed, 2004: 152). Thus, structures such as no-take zones have presented new restrictions on mobility that work to limit the spatial capacity for Bajo livelihood opportunities. These structural processes create spaces of inclusion or exclusion based on the positionality of mobile subjects. This is in line with other findings, such as McCann, (2011) writing on urban policy mobilities in Vancouver, Canada, who reveals the ways in which mobility is mediated by access to resources and positionality. In the case of local Bajo, these resources are mainly financial and social capital, while their positionality is specified by factors such as race, class, and gender.

Many researchers have noted the gendered axis along which power dynamics are drawn, and have shown that mobility is different for women and men, and that gender and mobility profoundly influence each other (Uteng and Cresswell, 2008; Hanson, 2010; McCann; 2011). Scholars have

shown women's mobility to be restricted in many locales in the rural Global South based on assigned reproductive responsibilities (Sen and Grown, 1987; Momsen, 1996; Harris-White, 1998; Kwagala, 1999; Togunde, 1999; Mandel, 2007), with numerous studies finding women can gain greater mobility for economic purposes beyond the home, only once another female can fulfil responsibilities within the home (Wolf, 1997; Schroeder, 2000; Mandel, 2007). Conversely, my findings suggest that, through covert resistance tactics, women are mobile for economic purposes, regardless if there is another female that can fulfil household responsibilities. I find that this mobility is increased with greater levels of physical capital (for example, the walkways in Sama Bahari) and bonding social capital (group solidarity).

7.3. POLITICS OF RESOURCE USE AND CONSERVATION IN THE WAKATOBI NATIONAL PARK

> Any biodiversity conservation programme that hopes to address such complex realities and to create viable alternatives to simple 'preservation' or 'development' options must recognize both women and men and a myriad of other groups in their daily use and experience of the living environment (Rocheleau, 1995: 10).

The WNP is just one of many conservation initiatives that enables capital accumulation for state actors and private organizations at the expense of local communities (see also Igoe and Brockington, 2007; Brockington and Duffy, 2010; Arsel and Büscher, 2012). In WNP, the market for dive-tourism is booming, partially due to the growth of private-sector and market-based conservation initiatives that aim to conserve marine resources for tourists rather than locals. This is in line with other studies on conservation and tourism (Corson and MacDonald, 2012; Fairhead et al., 2012; Sullivan, 2013). More specifically, my findings support other studies that highlight the important role of local inhabitants if conservation initiatives are to succeed in Southeast Asia. Dressler and Roth (2010), for example, find that neoliberal[25] conservation governance can be coercive, and can serve to both support and restrict local livelihoods, which can result in contradictory results for conservation.

Importantly, Dressler et al. (2010) note that some communities are not particularly interested in cooperating with conservation NGOs or state representatives for developing or implementing conservation policies, as they deem the interventions to be incompatible with local culture and

[25] Dressler and Roth (2010:10) define neoliberal as "a political and an ideological project which seeks to overhaul governance toward that with a smaller role for the state and a greater role for the capitalist markets and an assumption of an idealized homo-economicus as the primary subject and agent. Policies are marked by privatization, cuts to the public sector, mass commodification, voluntarist limits on capital and an increased role for civil society."

livelihood needs. However, in a discussion on community-based resource management, it is imperative that:

> Planners and practitioners [need] to privilege social and environmental justice (for example individual and communal rights) over neoliberal logic. […] This means ensuring that social inequity be redressed by identifying ways (with and) for marginal people to access, use and control locally valued natural resources with senses of entitlement and political empowerment that also support conservation (Dressler et al., 2010: 21).

While some of my respondents refused to collaborate with park authorities, as I have shown in Chapter 6, many others have participated in countless failed conservation initiatives, including workshops on how to make fishmeal balls, or an abandoned tuna processing plant (Cinta, 20/08/2014; Aminah, 27/08/2014). Some respondents continue to hope for a successful project that can contribute to food security and sustainable livelihoods, while others seem jaded from short-term, unsustainable initiatives that fail to consider cultural needs.

In the context of local farmers in the tropical forests of Northern Thailand, Roth (2004) highlights the importance of understanding spatial expressions of knowledge that operate across scales in order to integrate local knowledge and practice with those of the state. My research also demonstrates the importance of understanding local livelihood activities and patterns of mobility. With this knowledge, we can better understand conceptualizations of certain spaces and resources within those spaces; how local inhabitants conceptualize the political construct of the WNP; and what the results are for local livelihoods and conservation efforts when National Park policies are implemented and enforced.

Some scholars have identified a trend in conservation narratives that has been called ‘back to the barriers’ (Oates, 1999; Terborgh, 1999; Wilshusen et al., 2002; Hutton et al., 2005; Dressler et al., 2010). As global approaches to conservation have shifted, from fortress conservation dominating 20th century initiatives, to community-based approaches spreading rapidly in the 1980s, and an overlapping of the two approaches from the 1990s onward, they are seemingly returning ‘back to the barriers’ with fortress conservation ideals increasingly dominating conservation practice (Hutton et al., 2005). My findings are in line with this literature, as I have shown the overlap of the two dominant conservation policy narratives in the WNP (fortress conservation and community-based conservation policy narratives), with fortress conservation ideals defining WNP policy and practice.

7.4. THESIS CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this research was to investigate **how local ethnic minority Bajo women and men strategize their livelihoods in Sama Bahari, Wakatobi Region, Southeast Sulawesi, Indonesia.** To guide my analysis, I developed a conceptual framework in Chapter 2 based on literature on political ecology, sustainable livelihoods, everyday politics and resistance, and mobility. I detailed the wider geographical, economic, social, and political context of my study site within Indonesia in Chapter 3. I employed a mixed-method approach to data-collection during my eight months in Sama Bahari, which included participant observation, semi-structured and conversational interviews, and Photovoice, as described in Chapter 4.

I analyzed my research aim through three specific questions. I answered my first research question in Chapter 5: **In what ways do local Bajo women and men negotiate access to different livelihood assets?** I found that local Bajo pursue a fluidity of livelihood activities in strategic ways. Each livelihood activity serves a particular function, including subsistence or market purposes, and social networks are key in connecting locals with larger regional, national, and even international markets. Levels of financial capital are low at the village level, with little savings and minimum access to formal financial institutions. At the household level, remittances are a common means of gaining greater financial returns. For women, access to financial capital tends to be lower than for men, because many paid livelihood activities are not socially acceptable for women to pursue, and because women spend much of their time doing unpaid livelihood activities due to dominant cultural and gender norms. Household decision-making, a form of human capital, is usually done by men, but trends in my data indicate more women are becoming involved. At the village level, it is mostly men who participate in village politics while women are almost always excluded. Access to formal education for children has increased recently with the development of primary and secondary schools, though girls tend to drop out much earlier than boys. Uneven levels of education and wealth are exacerbating existing social divides in Sama Bahari, though general bonding social capital ties are strong within the village and between Bajo communities. Bridging social capital is largely limited to ties with Kaledupan people, and is not easily accessed by many. Linking social capital is low, with only a small group of elite men having access through relationships to local government officials and/or National Park authorities. Natural capital in the form of marine and coastal resources is essential for Bajo livelihoods and cultural practices, though it is somewhat limited by National Park regulations, and is decreasing due to negative environmental trends. The increase in physical capital in the form of PNPM-funded walkways has led to increases in human capital (space for sharing of information), social capital (space for socializing), and mobility, especially for women. I found that women are key players in fishing operations because of their

roles managing finances, processing catch, and connecting produce to larger markets using important social networks.

I also answered my second research question in Chapter 5: **What are the patterns and processes of local Bajo mobility, and what are the socio-economic and broader livelihood effects of such mobility?** I found that local Bajo, despite having settled in Sama Bahari in the 1960s, continue to lead a highly mobile lifestyle. Migration is used as a strategy to reach markets farther away to sell and purchase goods at better prices than are locally available; to reach paid labor; or to fish in areas with greater resource abundance and/or fewer political restrictions on resource access. Mobility is mediated by social capital, and a lack of linking social capital restricts mobility to mainly the fishing sector. Local Bajo also travel to connect with friends and family, or to gain formal education. Mobility is a social process, and mediates social interactions once mobile subjects return. Differences in formal education as a result of heighted mobility for certain Bajo are exacerbating social differences in the village. Mobility at the regional scale has been reduced since the implementation of National Park regulations, especially due to no-fishing zones and restrictions on mangrove harvesting, which have created spaces of exclusion. At the same time, government policies and structures serve to increase 'modern' tourist mobility at the expense of local, 'traditional' fishers. At the local scale, mobility increased with the development of PNPM-funded walkways connecting houses to one-another. This especially benefits women, who were previously confined in their home for much of the day, and who now use the walkways for socialization and increasingly for economic activity.

In Chapter 6, I investigated my third research question: **Do local Bajo harness control over natural resources in the Wakatobi National Park and is there any local resistance to National Park policies? If so, how and in what ways?** I examined how conservation policy narratives mobilized to exclude local fishers from natural resources they have used for centuries, while privileging economically powerful, external private organizations and state actors. I highlighted the tensions between the competing moral economies of local resource users and active conservation organizations in the WNP as local Bajo continue to use and access natural resources in ways they collectively deem fair, while conservation organizations aim to protect natural resources they consider require preservation. While WNP regulations aim to conserve natural resources and in this case, provide 'pristine' reefs for visiting tourists, local fishers aim to continue accessing resources as they have done for centuries as subsistence and livelihood strategies. I examined the ways in which National Park officials aim to harness control over resources and negotiate power in relationships with local Bajo resource users through the use of bribery, intimidation, and wasting time. Local Bajo, having not been consulted in the Park's design or management, are active agents

and use covert resistance to negotiate resource use within the park. Specifically, they continue to accessing resources illegally, avoid contact with and deceive park officials, and critique park officials. Local Bajo women resist additional barriers to resource use, due to local cultural gender norms and expectations. They do so by ignoring directives of their husbands, covertly pursuing activities that are socially and cultural constructed to be responsibilities for men, and mobilizing their social capital networks to resist gendered restrictions upon their livelihoods.

In sum, my research contributes to a scarce literature on the Bajo ethnic minority group, and provides an increased understanding of Bajo ethnic minority livelihoods in the context of the Wakatobi National Park. Specifically, I find that despite being settled, Bajo in Sama Bahari continue to create highly mobile livelihoods and lifestyles. Local Bajo have vast social networks connecting Sama Bahari with other communities for work and socializing, and with larger markets to purchase and sell goods. Bajo find creative ways to maintain lifestyles that allow them to connect with marine environments for cultural, spiritual, subsistence and livelihood means. These findings contribute to a greater understanding of the complexities of everyday resistance strategies and mobilities in the Global South, as well as of the gendered dynamics of such resistance and mobility. Specifically, Bajo resist National Park policies that restrict access to resources that they collectively understand to be rightfully theirs to access. Moreover, Bajo women resist cultural and gendered norms that restrict their livelihood opportunities and might endanger their household's food security.

Moreover, this study reveals that gender is not a mere mediating factor to livelihood strategizing or mobility; rather, gender underlies each aspect of livelihood generation within this community in complex and meaningful ways. Thus, the additional value of my research is that it reveals a more nuanced understanding of the covert and gendered aspects of the livelihoods of Wakatobi National Park resource users that can only be revealed through in-depth and long-term fieldwork. A greater consideration of these nuanced livelihood aspects is needed when considering the well-being of Wakatobi National Park inhabitants, both men and women. In my case study, local Bajo resource users require protected marine resources for subsistence and livelihood needs; understand these resources to be culturally and spiritually valuable; and are not passive recipients of state policies, but rather actively harness power over natural resources in ways they collectively consider to be just. Thus, an understanding of the complex cultural and gendered norms in relation to resource use is especially needed to form a basis for discussions and critiques surrounding conservation and for national park policy-making in the Global South.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A: Semi-Structured Interview Guide Part One

1. What activities do you (as an individual) do to earn money on a daily basis?
2. What activities do you do that are not for money? Why do you do these activities that are not for money?
3. Are there any (paid or unpaid) activities that you want to do, but cannot or do not pursue? If so, what are they and what is preventing you from pursing these activities?
4. What activities does your spouse do to earn money? What do they do that are not for money?
5. Who makes decisions in the household? Why?
6. If you do not agree with a decision that is made by the household decision-maker, what do you do? Is there anything that gives you more power of persuasion?
7. In which ways/settings do you communicate with others? How do you get or share news? How do you get or share gossip?
8. Which household members contribute to the household income? Who makes the most money in your household? Do you think this is because this person works more, has more skills, does higher paying activities, or do they do the same work as another member of the household?
9. What do you spend your money on? If you had more money, what would you spend it on? What does your [husband/wife] spend their money on? Are there any differences in spending (on the health/education of children, for instance)? If so, why do you think that is?
10. Do you have access to loans? If so, where do you get the loans from (i.e. government, bank, friends, clients)? If you don't have a loan, would you be able to get one if you needed it? Would you be able to borrow money from another source if you needed to? If so, who?
11. Can you list the activities that women are more likely to do? And men? What are some of the differences in these activities (i.e. Does the government invest more in certain activities? Do some activities pay more? Are some more risky (economically/for health reasons/legally)? Do some require more group work? Etc.) In your opinion, what is the main duty/responsibility of a woman in Sama Bahari? And a man? Have these activities or responsibilities changed over time (was it the same situation for your parents)?
12. Can you describe the groups of people you associate with on a day-to-day basis? Are these people men or women? Which ethnicity? Do you trust these people? Which activities do you do together? What activities are you already doing cooperatively, if any? What are the mechanisms that allow this to work?
13. Are there any groups that you feel excluded from? If so, can you describe these groups, why you are excluded (gender/income/age/ethnicity/etc.), and how this affects you?
14. Do certain groups have different rights? How are these rights enforced/safeguarded?
15. What is the current state of relations between different groups?
16. Are there any places where you do not feel welcome (either in the village or elsewhere)? If so, why do you feel this way? Are these places generally occupied by men or women?
17. Can you please describe the different actors (i.e. fish collectors, park authority, ice vendors, etc.) involved in your main livelihood activity? Can you please describe your interactions with these people and the places you go to meet them?
18. Do you feel you are able to make your own livelihood choices or do you feel constrained by family pressure and/or social norms? If you do feel constrained, do you do anything in particular to avoid these constraints?

Appendix B: Semi-Structured Interview Guide Part Two

1. How often do you leave the village? Your spouse? Your children?
2. For what purposes do you leave the village? Your spouse? Your children?
3. Please list the places you've been, the extent of your stay and the reasons why you went there (social/economic/etc.).
4. Did you choose to leave the village or were you pressured to?
5. Did you send money back to your family? If yes, how much and how often?
6. If you had a boss while you migrated, please describe your relationship
7. If you do not leave the village often, why do you stay (is it by choice or due to notions that you should not stray)?
8. Can you speak Bahasa Indonesia? Can you read and/or write (Indonesian or Bajo)? If so, where did you learn these skills?
9. Do you participate in local village meetings? Why or why not? Do you vote in elections? Why or why not? Do you follow politics? Why or why not?
10. Do you feel that the current government (at any level you want to talk about) is creating opportunities for you personally (to live/work/live a better life)? For others?

Appendix C: Photovoice Follow-Up Interview Guide

1. What is this photo of?
2. Why did you take this photo?
3. Why is this photo important to you?
4. Which photo is your favourite and why?
5. Are there any photos that you wanted to take but did not? If yes, what was it a photo of, why did you want to take it, why was it important to you, and why didn't you take the photo?
6. What did you think of the Photovoice process?