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A Sociolinguistic Study of Storytelling Events
from Appalachian Georgia and North Carolina

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a sociolinguistic study of eighty-three storytelling events from Appalachian Georgia and North Carolina. Probably the first sociolinguists to offer an analysis of narrative, Labov and Waletzky base their approach on an a priori definition of the phenomenon. The present study points to some limitations inherent in such an approach and calls for another to be based on the concept of the speech event. As developed by Hymes, this sociolinguistic concept makes for a detailed and comprehensive description of the corpus, which in turn provides an occasion to build on, clarify and challenge a number of Labov and Waletzky's assumptions and observations. The data show, on the one hand, the utility of Labov and Waletzky's model and on the other, call into question their definition of narrative.

RESUME

Cette thèse est une étude sociolinguistique de quatre-vingt-trois
"storytelling events" provenant de la région des Appalaches en Georgie et
en Caroline du Nord. Labov et Waletzky ont été probablement les premiers
à s'attacher l'analyze sociolinguistique du récit. La présente étude qui
fait ressortir quelques déficiences inhérentes à l'approche de Labov et
Waletzky propose une autre approche. Alors que Labov et Waletzky partent
d'une définition a priori du récit, l'approche utilisée ici est basée sur
le concept de "speech event", tel que définit par Hymes. Ce concept
sociolinguistique qui permet une description du corpus a la fois détaillée
et complète nous donne la possibilité de développer, d'eclaircir et de
critiquer certaines suppositions et observations de Labov et Waletzky.
Les données présentées démontrent, d'une part, l'utilité du modèle de
Labov et Waletzky, mais met en question, d'autre part, leur définition du
récit.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study of eighty-three storytelling events from Appalachian
Georgia and North Carolina owes a great deal of its inspiration and develop-
ment to the seminal work of William Labov and Joshua Waletzky (1967, 1968,
1972). To my knowledge Labov and Waletzky were the first to offer a con-
sciously sociolinguistic scheme for the analysis of stories. The only sub-
sequent effort in this direction, that of Karen Ann Watson (1973), makes use
of Labov and Waletzky's analytical framework. Watson (1973: ?51)
points out that this framework is sociolinguistic in that it is both formal
and functional and analyzes narratives in their social context.

The starting point of this study, then, is a critical examination of
Labov and Waletzky's approach to narrative;[1] its goal is a sociolinguistic
description of a corpus of narrative events. The inherent limitations of
Labov and Waletzky's approach lead me to suggest the value of another approach
to the phenomena of stories and storytelling -- an approach based on the speech
event. As Dell Hymes (1972) has developed it, this concept deals with the con-
text and purposes as well as the form and content of the communicative inter-

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[1]For the most part I use the words "story" and "narrative" interchange-
ably to refer to the speech message -- the principally verbal product of the
action of "storytelling". "Story" (or "narrative") and "storytelling" are
thus semantically overlapping but separate items in the vocabulary of this
study. Labov and Waletzky, however, use the word "narrative" to refer in a
general way to both the message and the action, and in presenting their views
I also use the word in that sense.

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action. The framework I consequently use centers on each of these aspects — on the components of the speech event — and allows me to describe a corpus of events in the manner and spirit of Hymes' sociolinguistics. In itself, the description is a contribution to the ethnography of speaking and particularly to the study of one "way of speaking". Further, it provides an occasion to build on, clarify and challenge some of Labov and Waletzky's assumptions and observations about narrative.

In the present chapter I discuss the background to the collection of my data, the selection of the events for the corpus and some superficial characteristics of the stories and the narrators. In chapter II I look at the nature of sociolinguistics as conceived by Hymes (1970, 1972) — its principles, goals and methods as well as its interrelations with linguistics and social science. This provides a vantage point for the exposition and examination of Labov and Waletzky's work that follows in chapters III and IV. In chapter III I review the authors' approach. In chapter IV I take issue with their approach and suggest that another is in order, such as that put forth by Hymes. In chapter V I provide the ethnographic background to the description, in chapter VI the description itself. I conclude in chapter VII by briefly taking up the empirical and theoretical aspects of Labov and Waletzky's work in light of the evidence accumulated in the previous chapter. On the empirical level, I deal with the applicability of their description of narrative; on the theoretical, with the concept of narrative implied by their approach.

1.1 Fieldwork

In gathering the data for my corpus, I was fortunately able to collaborate with the staff of _Foxfire_ magazine. Since 1966 high school students and their advisors at the Rabun Gap-Nacoochee School in the Appalachian mountains of northeastern Georgia have been tape-recording interviews with local old people about the skills, experiences and opinions they have acquired over lives that span two eras in local history. From these interviews, transcribed and edited, the students and their advisors assemble _Foxfire_ magazine, which has enjoyed such success that four collections of articles have now appeared in book form (_The Foxfire Book_ 1972; _Foxfire 2_ 1973; _Foxfire 3_ 1975; and _Foxfire 4_ 1977) and a fifth is planned. When I came to work with _Foxfire_ in the summer of 1973, the organization had amassed about a dozen reel-to-reel tapes and over one hundred cassettes, and it was from this archive that I put together the bulk of my corpus.

Foxfire conducts most of its interviews within a radius of about thirty miles from the chool, either in Rabun Country, Georgia or Macon County, North Carolina. Over the years the organization has established a network of "contacts" in various ways: students took _Foxfire_ to visit their relatives, and neighbors; advisors went to interview their friends; and one contact often suggested another. New students are introduced to old contacts and at the same time bring in new ones, so that the network is maintained. From the outset the visitors from the chool have been welcomed into local homes, and only a small number of interviews have been refused or avoided.

During the three months I was with _Foxfire_ the staff was

reduced for the summer, but included about six experienced students from the area and three advisors, among them Eliot Wigginton, the founder of the magazine. In general, I participated in the day-to-day life of the organization, and I accompanied the staff on visits, errands and interviews. My presence at an interview did not make any material difference since the contacts accepted me as another student from the school. Besides keeping field notes, I took notes on the visual aspects of the interviews, as well as on any critical comments made by the visitors before or after the interview. I also gathered opinions about people as storytellers and about specific stories when an occasion arose or when I could create an occasion, for instance, while someone was helping me with a transcription.

In all, I was present for the recording of thirty out of the eighty-three stories of the corpus -- five out of nineteen interviews, two of which I arranged and conducted on my own. With the information marked on each tape and the help of the staff, I was able to reconstruct fairly closely the circumstances of the interviews for which I was not present. I made almost all of the transcriptions during the summer and when I had difficulty understanding what was being said, I consulted one of the staff members.

1.2   The corpus

The smaller part of my corpus is formed from those stories and storytelling events that I myself witnessed. The larger part is formed from stories recorded before my arrival and the storytelling events they entailed. In selecting these, my policy was to listen

to the tapes of a variety of interviews -- those with younger and
those with older speakers, those with speakers who had been mentioned as good
storytellers and those with speakers who had not been mentioned in this regard
-- and as far as the quality of the recording allowed, transcribe every story,
at least until I had a fair number of stories from a particular narrator. From
this point on, I refer to the total of eighty-three stories and storytelling
events as "the Foxfire corpus".

A stretch of speech qualified for the Foxfire corpus if it (1) struck me
as a story; (2) was referred to as a story by any member of the speech commun-
ity; or (3) fulfilled Labov and Waletzky's definition of a narrative. For es-
tablishing a corpus of stories out of a collection of conversations, none of
these criteria is very satisfactory on its own. All are problematic from a
theoretical point of view; (2.) from a practical one (because not enough refer-
ences are made to stories qua stories). Ideally, a corpus is selected so as to
reflect the behavior of members of the relevant speech community or communities.
Researchers therefore try to systematically tap the knowledge underlying that
behavior, but given the difficulties of sampling the population, formulating
the questions, choosing the situation for asking the questions, etc.,[2] any cri-
terion or combination of criteria such as above that is likely to allow in a
range of possible stories will serve temporarily. For the purposes of this
study, it is best to accept that all of the items in the corpus are indeed sto-
ries; and similarly, to accept that they begin and end where I designate.

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[2]Some of these difficulties are brought out by the inconclusive results
of Rayfield's experimental study "What is a Story?" (1972).

Two sets of events in the corpus are of special note: they involve interaction primarily between two contacts rather than between a contact and a representative of Foxfire. Both sets come out of sessions featuring old friends. Initiating the first of these, Eliot Wigginton and four students went to visit Bill Corn,[3] who was already entertaining his crony, Red Taylor. As the recording begins, the two friends agree to "swap out" stories. Eliot Wigginton explains that he is interested in hunting stories, and the conversation continues partially in response to this request and partially in fulfillment of the two friends' agreement. The emotional solidarity between Bill and Red made each an important member of the other's audience, while the visitors from Foxfire acted as a catalyst for the two friends' bantering and storytelling. In the case of the second session, a group of people from Foxfire brought Jim Mize to visit his childhood friend, Aunt[4] Eula Brown, whom he had not seen in several years. Although the young visitors sometimes paused to listen to or participate in the conversation between the old people, for the most part they took up tasks around Aunt Eula's house. The visit was not intended to be an interview, and I was the one who taped the conversation. These storytelling events are significantly different from the rest on two counts: (1) the principal participants are status equals and (2) Foxfire's role is minimized by the friends' interest in each other. These events, then, contribute in an im-

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[3] "Bill Corn" is a pseudonym, as are all the names of the narrators in this study, as well as the names of individuals referred to in the stories. The pseudonyms are drawn from the local stock of given and family names.

[4] In this part of Appalachia "Aunt" is a title of respect and affection for an elderly woman.

portant way to the representative variety of the corpus.

The large majority (seventy-four) of the stories give accounts of (what is presented as and what is credible as) personal experiences, the narrator having been one of the actors in the incident(s) represented, though not necessarily the central one. The other stories concern, with a single exception, (what is presented as and what is credible as) the experiences of a specific person with whom the narrator could be expected to identify -- a relative, friend or neighbor. Eighty-two out of the eighty-three stories are thus narratives of personal or near-personal experience. In this, they are probably typical of most of the stories told in the speech community and in North America generally.

Even though focused on personal experiences, a few of the stories include folk motifs: a headless man, a witch, a ghost indicating buried treasure, a ball of light. A folk motif, according to Brunvand (1968: 80), is a striking or unusual element (in these cases of content, but sometimes of structure) that recurs in "traditional" materials. These stories, however, are better described as potentially feeding into the development of "traditional" tales (in this case tales validating certain beliefs in the supernatural) than as coming out of such a development. They are repetitions of tales already well established. In short, even if they show the influence of "traditional" tales,[5] they seem to

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[5] My use of the word "traditional" is not meant to imply that a sharp distinction can or should be made between "traditional" messages and "non-traditional" ones. Folklorists are increasingly uncomfortable with such a division because they recognize that an effort at oral art draws on both the resources of the community and those of the individual -- represents an interplay of convention and creation (see Bauman 1975, especially 302 - 306). Thus the term traditional here implies only a relative distinction between messages that are more or less widespread and more or less established through repetition. That

have originated with the narrator or someone in the narrator's circle of acquaintances: they are based on experiences the narrator knows or assumes to be personal.

Finally, the stories are for the most part quite brief. They range from approximately eight seconds to eleven minutes, but the overwhelming majority (seventy-seven) are less than three minutes long, which is commensurate with the fact that most concern a single temporally compact experience (see chapter VI, sections 4 and 5) not greatly elaborated.

As we will see in chapter III, the characteristics we have been discussing put the stories of the Foxfire corpus in the category that Labov and Waletzky purposefully select for the study of narrative. Rather than being the well-polished efforts of practiced storytellers supported by a lively tradition of storytelling in a community that places a high value on the art, they are the generally casual (see chapter VI, section 6) efforts of speakers who may or may not consider themselves good raconteurs but who exercise their art only now and then and rarely if ever in a formal setting. This is to say that storytelling in Rabun and Macon Counties occupies a place similar to that which it occupies in most of North America. On its own, storytelling does not attract much attention: it is not a major form of entertainment or of art. In any case, due to to the correspondence between the narratives of the Foxfire corpus and those

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stories qualifying for this use of "traditional" are known to the people of the speech community is evidenced by an article on "Boogers, Witches and Haints" in Foxfire 2 (Wigginton, ed., 1973: 324 - 360). Writing the introductions to the sections of this article, David Wilson, a member of the staff of Foxfire born and reared in Rabun County, makes a distinction between "retellings of personal or interfamily experiences" and "tales that have been told and retold throughout the Appalachians for years". The latter, he says, are "part of a rich oral mountain tradition (349)."

collected by Labov and Waletzky, a description of the former yields results that are meaningfully compared to Labov and Waletzky's conclusions.

While the stories are not, as I have noted, "well-polished", a large number of them are doubtlessly part of the narrator's repertoire: they have been told several and in some cases many times before. This is partially attributable to Foxfire's interests, which center on a way of life disappearing almost as fast as the oldest generation. Foxfire's interviewers questioned contacts about the past, especially the distant past, so that the stories they told were those kept alive in their memories by repetition.

Out of the corpus of eighty-three stories I selected twelve for a detailed analysis in the manner proposed by Labov and Waletzky. The theory and method behind this analysis, as well as its notation and vocabulary, are explained in chapter III and further elucidated in chapter IV (where I employ various aspects of the analysis in constructing my own description). The products of the analysis are presented in the appendix. There the full transcription of each story, introduced by a paragraph giving the preceding speech context, is annotated according to Labov and Waletzky's scheme and followed by a diagram displaying one aspect of the analysis.

Like the rest of the stories of the corpus, these twleve were not chosen in any systematic way. Besides seeking variation in the length of the narrative and the renown of the narrator, I included several stories from the two sessions described above: some that prompted favorable evaluations and some that none; one that seemed confused; one by the youngest narrator and one by the oldest. Information about these stories and storytelling events is summarized in figure 1, which gives the narrator's sex, age and his breadth of experience in

geographical terms; an enumeration of the audience; a statement of whether
the narrative was part of the narrator's repertoire (whether it had been told
at least several times before); an indication of its quality from the point of
view of the members of the speech community (as gleaned from spontaneous reac-
tions or comments); and its length measured by the number of independent clauses.

1.3 The narrators

Sixteen different narrators are represented in the corpus, six women,
ten men, ranging in age (at the time they told the stories included in the cor-
pus) from forty-two years old to ninety. The average age was seventy-three.
With one exception -- the youngest narrator -- none had gone beyond high school;
most had attended grammar school but had not completed more than eight years of
schooling. Again with one exception, all had been born in Rabun or Macon County.
Most had also spent the best part of their lives in one or the other of the coun-
ties, the women housekeeping and looking after families; the men, farming and
raising stock and when they could, taking jobs in logging or construction. The
youngest and best educated narrator had served in the U.S. Army for twenty years;
one other narrator had gone overseas in World War I. The only black narrator had
been born in the neighboring county of South Carolina, reared on a plantation
there, but she had worked for years as a domestic in Florida and Washington,
D.C.

The number of stories in the corpus told by each narrator varies consid-
erably: four narrators are responsible for only a single story; three narrators
for over twelve apiece; and the rest for between two and nine narratives.

FIGURE 1

INFORMATION ABOUT STORYTELLING EVENTS ANALYZED IN DETAIL

NAME OF NARRATOR NUMBER OF STORY	NARRATOR			AUDIENCE	Part of Repertoire	STORY Quality	Length*
	Age	Sex	Experience				
Calvert Connor Story 2	42	M	wide	researcher	yes		143
Bill Corn Story 41	80	M	local	Red Taylor, Mrs. Corn, an advisor, 3 students	probably	not out-standing	16
Story 42				same as above	probably	remembered by an advisor	21
Red Taylor Story 8	60	M	mostly local	Bill Corn, Mrs. Corn, an advisor, 3 students	yes	enjoyed, remembered by several	39
Ruth Brown Story 9	61	F	local	niece, friend of niece's, an advisor, a student	perhaps	enjoyed by niece	30

*Number of independent clauses

FIGURE 1 -- Continued

NAME OF NARRATOR NUMBER OF STORY	NARRATOR			AUDIENCE	STORY		
	Age	Sex	Experience		Part of Repertoire	Quality	Length
Hilliard Brown Story 50	84	M	mostly local	Mrs. Brown, distant relative, an advisor, 2 students	probably		45
Edith Kelso Story 17	62	F	state of Washington; local	researcher	perhaps	enjoyed, remembered by a student	14
Jim Mize Story 52	87	M	state of Washington, local	daughter, researcher, an advisor, a student	yes	remembered by an advisor	17
Story 58				same as above	yes	remembered by daughter	72
Story 60				same as above	yes	remembered by daughter	72

FIGURE 1 -- Continued

NAME OF NARRATOR NUMBER OF STORY	NARRATOR			AUDIENCE	Part of Repertoire	STORY	
	Age	Sex	Experience			Quality	Length
Eula Brown Story 70	88	F	local only	Jim Mize, researcher, an advisor, a student and her 2 nieces	no		11
Will Reid Story 78	90	M	local	Mrs. Reid, an advisor	probably not		16

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF SOCIOLINGUISTICS

In this chapter I explore the nature of sociolinguistics as it has been outlined by Dell Hymes (1968: 99; 1972: 38). Perhaps more than any other figure in this emerging field, Hymes has concerned himself with building up a "basic science" that relates language to the structure of human behavior in the interest of contributing to a general "science of man". Hymes is concerned not only with delineating the principles, aims and methods needed to guide the new science, but in promoting the "fit" between sociolinguistics and the sciences of linguistics, anthropology and sociology. A broad and integrative vision of the study of speech, Hymes' sociolinguistics provides a perspective on Labov and Waletzky's approach to narrative as well as one means to supplement it.

2.1 Aims of sociolinguistics

The study of speech envisioned by Dell Hymes goes either by the name "ethnography of speaking" or "sociolinguistics". The term "sociolinguistics" has been associated with correlations between dialects and social groups or linguistic variables and sociological features, but this study of language and society as two separate entities is not the discipline I describe here. The sociolinguistics that Hymes champions is concerned with systems

of speaking in which languages are communicative resources: the emphasis is on the way in which members of various speech communities use the language(s) of their community. Nor is language -- even in its various forms of speech, writing, speech-derived whistling, etc. -- the only specialized system of communication to be considered: paralanguage and kinesics are also of interest. "I shall refer to 'speech' and 'speaking'," says Hymes (1968: 108), "but these terms are surrogates for all modes of communication and a descriptive account should be generalized to comprise all." But the central fact is that they belong to the general sociocultural order. Speaking is above all a form of social interaction, and like other forms, it is meaningful because it is socially instituted.

To see some of the aspects of such an interaction, let us visualize an abstracted instance of one: a potential speaker, motivated by social expectations and/or personal goals, assesses the environment to discover whether it favors or at least permits speech in general and some message in particular. This he does "in light of his own cultural background, personal history and what he knows about his interlocutors" (Gumperz 1972: 15). Deciding in the affirmative, he constructs a message by choosing among elements of the communicative codes; he adapts form and content to his perceptions, including what he has perceived of his listeners' reactions. Once conveyed, the message becomes a factor in the environment of other potential speakers.

Sociolinguists take on the task of explaining the speaker's choices by referring to the 'rules' or 'norms' or 'relations' of speech -- the conventionalized ways of relating purposes to forms to contents to texts such that utterances, usually appropriate, convey particular meanings. (Appropriateness is

often a precondition for conveying the intended meaning and always an expectation of the speech community. It is thus frequently the first concern of the sociolinguist.) Only in the light of numerous interactions can the researcher establish these rules or relations with any certainty, and it is the ensemble of interactions between members of the speech community that constitute the evidence for that group's system of speaking.

Put at its most abstract, then, the goal of research in sociolinguistics is to describe -- by attention to the underlying functions -- the structures of speech implicitly recognized by the members of a particular speech community, and since the speech community is a group that shares notions of the relations between the functions and structures of speech -- speech in at least one but perhaps multiple varieties of language (Hymes 1972: 54) -- the goal of research is equally to delineate speech communities. The resulting stockpile of comparative data on systems and communities will form the basis of a theory explaining why mankind maintains and develops different "ways of speaking". Explaining ways of speaking -- all the conventionalized patterns from speech acts through styles to codes -- is of course no less than "explaining the meaning of language in human life" (Hymes 1972: 41).

If from one perspective the aim of sociolinguistics is to explain ways of speaking, from another it is to "mediate between linguistics and other disciplines by seeking to bring into view aspects of language that have been neglected, that had been let fall between the usual frameworks of linguistic description, on the one hand, and social and humanistic study on the other" (Hymes n.d.: 2). Systematic attention to ways of speaking is precisely

what has been missing from linguistic and social scientific inquiry: by and large social scientists have ignored this subject in practice, while linguists have excluded it on principle. Sociolinguistics undertakes to remedy this, at the same time extending linguistics into social science, to the mutual benefit of both endeavors.

2.2 Sociolinguistics in relation to linguistics

For approximately twenty years the progress of linguistics in North America has been linked to the development of a transformational-generative theory of grammar. Like linguists in other modern "schools", transformationalists seek to describe and explain linguistic structures, but they proceed within a framework fundamentally different from that of the structuralists, who dominated the linguistic scene in the 1930s, 40s and 50s. Chomsky and others have argued that the complexity of linguistic structures and in particular syntactic structures is beyond the grasp of structuralist analyses. Such analyses take as their starting point sentences as they are observed -- layering them into their constituent units -- and thus end by recognizing only explicit syntactic relations. But in order for an analysis to deal with syntactic complexity it must also recognize implicit syntactic relations and this transformational grammar claims to do, beginning with a new notion of what it means to describe a language.

Within the framework of transformational-generative theory, to describe a language is to formulate a system of rules that "in some explicit and well-defined way" assigns structural descriptions to the well-formed or

grammatical sentences of that language. The core of such a system --
known as a "grammar" -- is its syntactic component. The syntactic com-
ponent generates or produces by rule all the strings of minimal syntactic
units that constitute well-formed sentences. The other two components
merely interpret the strings produced by the syntactic component. The
phonological component specifies the phonological representations and the
semantic component specifies the semantic ones. In other words, phonological
and semantic rules render sentences pronounceable and meaningful, such that
they correspond to actual utterances.

More precisely, the syntactic component specifies representations at
two levels, a level of "deep structure" and a level of "surface structure".
Phrase-structure rules generate the basic structures of sentences in terms
of hierarchies of constituent units (starting with "sentence → noun phrase
+auxiliary + verb phrase") convert these deep structures into surface
structures by means of operations on the constituent units. The phonological
component actually interprets the strings produced by the transformational
rules; the semantic component actually interprets those produced by the
phrase-structure rules. The two levels are fundamentally distinct in that
the representations at the level of deep structure show the relations be-
tween syntactic units as they are intuited by speaker-hearers while the re-
presentations at the level of surface structure show the arrangement of syn-
tactic units as they are expressed in observed sentences.

The explanatory potential of a level of deep structure proved to
be greater than Chomsky first recognized and it opened the way to an analy-
sis of meaning. Starting in 1965 Chomsky (1965: 3-5) began to explicitly

equate describing a language with describing the competence of a fluent
speaker of that language. This introduced a new dimension into linguistic
explanation, one that could be handled by two features of the grammar --
its rule-governedness and (2) its abstractness, in particular its level
of deep structure. By identifying the syntactic component with a finite
set of rules able to produce all the sentences of a language, transforma-
tional grammarians provided a model for a speaker's capacity to create any
number of novel sentences. Further, by describing a level of deep structure
that abstracts considerably from the observed arrangement of units, trans-
formational grammarians provided an account of a speaker's ability to in-
terpret a number of kinds of sentences or, alternatively, to understand cer-
tain relations between sentences. To use the now famous examples of lin-
guistic "competence", native speakers of English recognize the difference
between such sentences as "John is easy to please" and "John is eager to
please" despite the apparent similarity of structure; they recognize the
equivalence between the active and passive versions of a sentence despite
the apparent dissimilarity of structure; and, finally, they distinguish the
different underlying structures inherent in "The police ordered the drinking
to stop at midnight." The deep structure analysis of the first pair of sen-
tences above would specify, for example, that "John" functions as an "object"
in the first of these sentences, but as a "subject" in the second. This des-
cription expresses the relations that any fluent speaker knows are present
between the syntactic units of the sentences in question. Obviously, in such
cases the relations delineated at the level of deep structure are those that
determine the meaning of the sentence. "Meaning and grammatical analysis , . .

turn out to be two sides of the same coin" (Crystal 1972: 212).

Yet in the earliest published version of transformational theory
Chomsky ignored this relationship. The theory he proposed in 1957 assumed
that syntactic rules "operated in complete independence of meaning."
Thus the fact that the transformational rule converting active sentence
structures into passive ones preserved the meaning of the sentences was
theoretically irrelevant (Leech 1974: 326 - 327). In this earliest
version of the theory, then, syntactic functions were no more than
functions within an internally consistent system of syntax. In later
versions of the theory, however, including that sketched in part above,
Chomsky (1965: 161 - 163) recognized that the level of deep structure en-
tailed syntactic functions that were also partially semantic. From this
beginning the history of transformational grammar, as Leech (1974: 327)
describes it, "has been broadly a matter of conceding to semantics a more
and more important position in linguistc thepry" -- though the relative
importance of syntactic structures and semantic ones in the production of
meaning is at the present time an unsolved problem and a controversial issue.
In fact, the relation of semantics to syntax is at present the subject of
a major debate.

In the interest of briefly presenting this controversy among trans-
formational grammarians, let me portray the "classic" model of 1965 a little
more fully. As we saw above, the syntactic component is composed of two sets
of rules, namely, phrase-structure rules and transformational rules. The
first make up the "base" component, which has as its output, after the in-
sertion of words and other meaningful units, the deep structures of sentences;
and the second make up the "transformational" component and has as its out-
put the surface structures. We saw further that the surface structures are

made into pronounceable sentences by phonological rules, while the deep
structures are made into meaningful ones by semantic or "projection"
rules. These latter are rules for combining the meanings of words and
idioms according to the structures in which they occur. The semantic
component synthesizes the basic meanings that are generated at the level
of deep structure.

The controversy that has developed since 1965 reflects a split along
two lines, the first theory relating the semantic component less closely
to the base component and the second merging the two. The first holds, in
brief, that the rules specifying meaning operate on both the surface and deep
structures. In this model the level of deep structure is no longer the
source of all basic meaning. The second theory claims that the "base" com-
ponent is the semantic component (and thus there is no need for "projection"
rules). In this model the level of deep structure has been "deepened" or
further abstracted until the deep structures of sentences are equally their
semantic representations. Such a move calls for description in terms of
"logical" elements rather than constituent units, such that, for example,
a noun phrase becomes an argument and a verb phrase a predicate. A semantic
representation is roughly the "natural language equivalent of the formal sym-
bolic logical representations of philosophy" (Leech 1974: 327). The impli-
cation of the first, or "interpretist" position (so called because the se-
mantic component "interprets" the structures of the base component) is that
the level of deep structure is to be justified on the grounds of grammatical-
ness alone: it must produce structures that satisfy linguistic intuitions
about the relations of units. The implication of the second, or "generati-

vist", position (so called because the semantic component "generates" the basic structures) is that deep structure is to be justified on the grounds of meaningfulness: it must produce representations that satisfy linguistic intuitions about the relations of meanings (including relations between meanings of sentences).

While the controversy mainly centers around which model provides the most coherent, economical and generally satisfying analyses of particular structures, the point here is not the validity of any one model but the interest transformational grammarians have shown in semantic function. The generativists even go so far as to propose that the basic structures of a language are produced by semantic rules. The model based on this idea has an intuitive appeal that the other transformational models do not, for we generally believe that "speakers put meanings into sentence form, and that the meanings they want to express may be said to determine the specific sentences that are chosen, rather than vice versa" (Wardhaugh 1972: 150).

The direction pointed by this interest in describing meaning and, in particular, by the generativists'interest in seeing all linguistic structures in terms of meaning at last brings the subject matter of transformational-generative grammar within the realm of communicative behavior -- within the realm of sociolinguistics.[1] But the extent to which transformational grammarians approach description from what Hymes calls a functional perspective

[1]This is not to imply that linguists in this century have been entirely adverse to seeing language as a medium of communication. While linguists of the structural school also ignored the uses of language, they did so not so much out of principle but in order to concentrate on phonology, then morphology, then syntax. It is Chomsky who has declared that the study of speech is theoretically dependent on the study of language as a self-contained and independent system.

is measured by the types of meaning they take into account. Semantics within the transformational framework is concerned almost entirely with "conceptual" meaning -- and for reasons that have much more to do with the logic of linguistics than with the properties of speech. Conceptual or denotative meaning is confined to that part of meaning which can be codi-. fied by a finite set of symbols representing the features that distinguish one referent from another. While recognizing that conceptual meaning is "not always the most important element of an act of linguistic communica- tion," semanticists assign it priority on the basis that it "has the com- plex and sophisticated organization of a kind which may be compared with, and cross-related to, similar organizations on the syntactic and phonologi- cal level of language", in particular, that it can be analyzed in terms of contrastive features and constituent structures (Leech 1974: 11). As narrow as is the range of conceptual meaning, it is at least important in one of the functions of speech, that of conveying information. Semantics within the transformational framework, then, is preoccupied with one aspect of reference, that related to conceptual meaning and for the rest, takes even this function for granted.

For the most part, the concerns of linguistics come this close and no closer to the concerns of sociolinguistics, which, as I have noted, re- volve around the variety of functions underlying speech. Outside the main- stream of linguistics, however, some linguists have recently shown an in- terest in "pragmatics" -- an interest that promises to at least broach the specific concerns of sociolinguistics within linguistics by drawing atten- tion to "extralinguistic" context. Whereas most transformationalists con- .

sider meaning to be independent of any context, linguists such as Oller
(1972) are dissatisfied with a stance that fails to account for sentences
which seem meaningless by themselves but meaningful in particular contexts
(e.g., "The theory of relativity is blue" in reference to an account of the
theory in a blue binder). To understand such sentences, they propose to
look at speakers' knowledge of the world, especially their knowledge of the
immediate environment. The content of a speaker's knowledge, they say, ex-
plains why certain kinds of reference are impossible and certain others are,
after all, possible. These linguists, then, recognize in general the role
of context in meaning, but they are still concerned in specific with refer-
ential meaning. They do not follow transformationalists in taking the func-
tion of reference for granted, but neither do they move beyond it.

For the most part it is still true to say, therefore, that linguists --
even those lately advocating an integrated theory of syntax, semantics and
pragmatics -- deal in referential meaning alone. If in the course of per-
forming a syntactic or semantic analysis, a linguist is confronted with the
uncomfortable fact that a single form or two referentially equivalent forms
are open to more than one interpretation, that is, they have more than one
meaning because they have more than one function, he may invoke contextual
or social features ad hoc to show why the analysis in effect need not deal
with these "other" interpretations. In other words, he will show that the
"added" meanings can be accounted for by phenomena outside the realm of lin-
guistics proper. That these features should be investigated systematically,
prior to the analysis, is not considered.

In short, linguists have failed to see speech functions as problem-

atic. Only the referential function of language has been taken seriously; the other functions of language -- to express feelings or attitudes, persuade or direct, make contact, maintain or shape social bonds, establish a social identity, create an artistic effect -- have been virtually ignored. As linguistics is currently conceived, there is no place for the recognition of a plurality of speech functions, functions that, in Hymes' words, "can neither be taken for granted, nor merely postulated" but must be empirically determined (n.d. 3).

Sociolinguistics is deeply involved in linguistic description, but in bringing a functional perspective to linguistics, it makes new demands on linguistic theory. At the same time, it remains open to the aims of the parent science -- or, more precisely, an expanded version of those aims. For example, it can be expected to add to the description of linguistic structures by delineating new elements and relations -- "an organization of sounds, forms and meanings that partly cuts across and partly goes beyond" transformational grammar (Hymes n.d. 9). Sociolinguists believe that language, long understood by linguists as a system of systems, entails structures other than those now recognized, structures that make up different ways of speaking and form yet another system, and that this system of speaking deserves attention.

2.3 Sociolinguistics in relation to social science

Whereas in one light sociolinguistics can be seen as an extension of linguistics, in another it can be seen as a part -- a deepening at one point -- of social science. Hymes' assertion that modes of communication belong

to the sociocultural order makes it plain that sociolinguistics is to be involved in ethnographic description -- as we have seen, such description is required to uncover the functions of speech -- and grounded in social theory.

Social science in this century has been considerably more fragmented than linguistics, yet one viewpoint, concerned with the power of meaning, not only runs through but today holds a central position in the study of social life. This viewpoint began to take form in discussions before the turn of the century that engaged both philosophers and social scientists, scholars who were intrigued by the notion that man lives in a reality of his own making because only such a reality has meaning -- and on meaning depend thought and action. Eager to understand the world of meaning, these scholars looked to both formal and interpretive analyses: the former to uncover the properties of structures of signification and the latter to disclose their import. Formal analyses consider systems in their own terms; interpretive ones, systems in context. That structure creates possibilities for meanings, but that only social life gives expression to these possibilities were the fundamentals of their thought. In Mary Douglas's words, "they drove the study of meaning straight to the study of social relations", providing the beginnings of an "unbroken but submerged tradition" for modern-day social scientists, philosophers, linguists and now sociolinguists (1973: 9, 11).

In recent years this submerged tradition has surfaced in social science as schools of thought that are -- as we would expect -- relevant to sociolinguistics; once social life is viewed from their perspective, speech acts

are readily identifiable with social acts. Among these are ethnosemantics
and ethnomethodology, two approaches that have interacted and overlapped
with sociolinguistics, partially because they take a specific interest in
language as a reflection of and a means to the reality that man constructs.
It is particularly clear from these two lines of inquiry that sociolinguistics
is open to the aims of social science, at least insofar as these aims touch
on speech.

Like other social scientists, ethnosemanticists and ethnomethodolo-
gists seek to explain the discernible regularities of behavior in social
life, but unlike others, they do so by going back to the genesis of behavior
-- to the nexus of underlying meanings[2]. They are thus concerned with action,
that is, with behavior informed by social or public knowledge, intentional
and communicative. Although starting from different assumptions and employ-
ing different methods, ethnosemanticists and ethnomethodologists investigate
the processes that give rise to actions.

Ethnosemanticists systematically probe the meanings of a group's ver-
bal expressions in order to arrive at a description of that group's knowledge
or theory of reality. They do so believing that such a cognitive system is,
as Kay (1970: 29) puts it

> employed by people as a device for classifying their environment,
> evaluating various states of that environment, predicting what the
> outcome of the various behavioral possibilities open to them will
> have on that environment and ultimately selecting a course of action.

And this course of action, whatever else it may be -- whatever purpose it
may serve and whatever meaning it may have -- will be "appropriate". In prac-
tice an act is "appropriate" when it is acceptable to any insider, any mem-

ber of the actor's group -‌ and therefore when it can be anticipated by
any outsider with a sufficient knowledge of that group's culture (Frake
1969: 471). Constructing a model of a cognitive system thus involves
specifying what one must know to sort appropriate acts from inappropriate
ones.

When ethnosemanticists, or rather, ethnographers who do ethnosemantics
(few ethnographers rely on ethnosemantics alone), seek to explain some par-
ticular regularity of behavior, they necessarily pursue a course more modest
than constructing a model of the entire cognitive system. They frame "cul-
tural rules", or, in Kay's term, "fragments of cultural rules"; they describe
a pathway through the cognitive system. A cultural rule is typically drawn
up as a set of contingency statements that refer to classifications and evalu-
ations of the environment. Once the statements have been filled in with the
classifications and evaluations that are relevant to the case at hand, the
rule predicts the expected action. More abstractly, a rule expresses a struc-
tured relation between a variant of behavior and a context: it represents
the nature of an appropriate act.

While ethnosemanticists focus on the content and form of the processes
that give rise to actions -- in particular try to frame rules that reflect
something of the way in which decisions will be made on a particular issue --
ethnomethodologists focus on the contexts in which such processes take place.
This is necessary, they feel, because certain decisions are made ad hoc; they
are not the products of pre-existing pathways and cannot be described in ad-
vance.

Insisting on the problematic quality of the everyday consensus that

ethnosemanticists attribute to shared knowledge, ethnomethodologists search "an indefinitely large domain of appropriate settings" or situations in order to, first, show that "'choice' among alternatives of sense, facticity, objectivity, cause, explanation and communality of <u>practical actions</u> is a project of members' actions" (Garfinkel 1972: 321) and, second, to discover by what means participants achieve their common understandings. As a necessary part of selecting a course of action -- a practical, familiar, "appropriate" course of action of the type discussed above -- people work to establish the properties of a situation. More specifically, using their conceptions of the social order, they try on the one hand to detect and on the other to demonstrate the situation's intelligibility as a representation of or evidence of some facet of that order. They try to establish what counts as sensible, factual, objective, etc., and thus render the situation meaningful.

Ethnomethodologists recognize cultural rules, including rules of speaking, but they believe that a participant cannot finally identify a situation through rules that are necessarily prior to and outside of that situation. Likewise for an investigator

> . . . how a person is speaking or acting, the task of describing a
> person's method of speaking, is not satisfied by and is not the same
> as showing that what he said accords with a rule for demonstrating con-
> sistency, compatibility and coherence of meanings (Garfinkel 1972: 320).

Participants arrive at one kind of understanding by using cultural rules that prescribe how to speak, e.g., metaphorically, euphemistically or how to act, but before they can make out what is being said or done as quite "clear, coherent, understandable . . . in a word as rational" (Garfinkel 1972: 320), they must <u>invent</u> rules that prescribe how to apply or transcend the given

rules. And it is because such a rule or method is invented ad hoc that the understanding it provides must be actively accomplished -- and is always contingent. Ethnomethodologists thus search situations in order to get at rules for incorporating rules. Actions taken to invoke methods of understanding form the basis for practical actions, so that to explain the latter the former must be taken into account.

Whatever the differences between these two lines of inquiry, the important similarity here is that both point the way to the study of speech acts as social acts. Neither makes a distinction between the processes that give rise to actions and those that give rise to speech. From the perspective of either, acts communicate qua acts, whether they involve an overt message -- a speech message -- or not. This means that speech does not derive its meaning in isolation but rather in the context of an act, that an act involving speech possesses meaning as an entity and that an act not involving speech also possesses meaning as an entity. Both speech and action ultimately fulfill social functions. A single theoretical framework should thus accommodate both, although given the complexity of language, speech acts may constitute a privileged domain for the understanding of social reality.

Note further that ethnomethodology, ethnosemantics and sociolinguistics, in common with transformational grammar, all propose to explicate knowledge or competence. Because "data are understood as being underlaid by the mental capacities of the participants [of speaker-hearers in the case of linguistics] and as being the product of those capacities" (Gumperz and Hymes 1973: 305), an explanation of the regularities of behavior in social life is seen to lie with a description of competence, whether that competence is partly revealed

in verbal expressions (as the ethnosemanticists claim) or partly hidden in ordinary actions (as the ethnomethodologists claim). Sociolinguistics can be expected to help achieve this aim by explicating knowledge of ways of speaking.

As we have seen, ethnosemanticists and ethnomethodologists differ in their view of the kinds of knowledge that underlie action and consequently they differ in their definitions of culture. Whereas for ethnosemanticists the basis of culture is shared knowledge of determinate rules, for ethnomethodologists it is shared knowledge of the rules for achieving consensus -- a knowledge that can only be realized in context (Gumperz and Hymes 1973: 304). Although potentially both these types of knowledge are of concern to sociolinguists, the first takes priority. Nonetheless, the use of rules of speaking is not completely clear except in light of the use of rules for incorporating rules -- the province of ethnomethodology -- and vice-versa. Thus, as Gumperz and Hymes (1972: 309) point out, "ethnomethodology goes beyond most sociolinguistic research, but presupposes and stimulates it . . . ."

2.4 Research in sociolinguistics

As sociolinguistics can be characterized by its relationships to linguistics and social science, so it can be characterized by its approach to research. That approach is, first of all, descriptive. Needed now, in order to establish "a body of systematic knowledge" are "ethnographic descriptions of communities in terms of ways of speaking"(Hymes 1972: 52, 58). Only in light of such descriptions will sociolinguists be able to assess the terms and concepts they have begun to employ and thus develop adequate forms of

description. This is most important, says Hymes (1972: 53), for "approximation to a theory for the explicit, standard analysis of individual systems of speaking will also be an approximation to part of a theory of explanation."

As the primary focus of description and the basic unit of analysis Hymes (1972: 56) proposes the speech event, defined as any activity or aspect of an activity that is "directly governed by the rules or norms for the use of speech." A speech event necessarily represents one "way of speaking" -- a conventionalized translation of function into structure. It is a socially defined unit, a meaningful interaction of the type pictured (and for the sake of simplicity somewhat distorted[3]) at the beginning of this chapter. As Gumperz (1972: 17) points out, when compared with the sentence, the analogous unit in grammar, the speech event represents not only an extension in size from single utterances to stretches of utterances, but also "a shift in focus from emphasis on text to emphasis on interaction." In comparison with the term "speech event" the term "speech act" denotes a minimal unit, and it is actually this pair of concepts that is included in the cover term "speech event".

The validity of the analytical constructs "speech event" and "speech act" rests on the extent to which speech events are recognized -- that is, used -- by members of the speech community. Sociolinguists designate the

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[3] It is distorted in that it is represented from the speaker's point of view, rather than from both the speaker's and the listener's, (the listener's role is implied) and because it emphasizes construc-struction of the message.

speech event as a unit of analysis because they are relatively certain that "members of all societies recognize certain communicative routines which they view as distinctive wholes, separate from other types of discourse", often set off by opening and closing sequences and often identified by labels such as "saying hello", "praying", "giving a pep talk" or "telling a joke" (Gumperz 1972: 17). Even when the limits of a routine are not particularly clear and the whole tends to merge with other routines, people still recognize the distinctive association between purpose, form, content and context that is the real crux of a speech event. Beyond this, sociolinguists are relatively certain that these routines are used to organize a large part, if not the whole, of speech. Thus the speech event takes its place as the key to the study of speech.

The speech event in turn is composed of and can be analyzed into a number of components. If speech events represent the means by which speakers and listeners organize speech, the components represent the means by which they organize a speech event -- the considerations that eventually result in particular meanings. A potential speaker constructs a speech event by choosing values for each of these components, thereby giving the event its identity and particular meaning. Correspondingly, a listener interprets a speech event from the speaker's choice of values. In fact, a speech component may be defined as a feature of a speech event such that a change in its value potentially results in a different speech event. It is the values of speech components that enter into the rules or relations of speaking.

In 1972 Hymes (59-74) suggested the following components:

1. message form, including phonological, syntactic and semantic structures

2. message content, including topic

3. setting: the physical circumstances of the event

4. scene: the setting as it is culturally defined, thus, the psychological setting

5. participants, e.g., speaker and listener(s) or addressor, addressee, hearer(s) or source, spokesman, addressees

6. purposes: a. "conventionally recognized and expected outcomes", i.e., the community's purposes

        b. personal goals, i.e., the speaker's purposes

7. key: "the tone, manner or spirit" in which the event is accomplished

8. channel: the medium and mode used for the transmission of the speech message, e.g., oral medium or channel, whistling mode

9. form of speech: the functional variety of language used in the speech message ("variety" may denote a language, dialect, etc.)

10. norms of interaction: the specific behaviors attached to the speech message

11. norms of interpretation: the interpretations given to the above, plus any rules for incorporating rules that apply to the speech event

12. genre: the message if it includes "formal characteristics traditionally recognized"

To discover the formal characteristics of messages, researchers take the view that all speech consists of genres. From this stance, Hymes (1072: 65) points out, "the analysis of speech into acts is an analysis of speech into instances of genres," even though as types of message, "genres may occur in (or as) different events."

Speech events and components constitute a framework for the description of speech in any community, but the relevant events and components are themselves part of what is to be described. Although preliminary concepts and terms are necessary, they are not givens but possibilities. As an analytical

construct the speech event focuses on social interaction, for in social interaction is the community's system of speaking expressed, maintained and revised. Underlying the system of speaking, as we have seen, is the shared knowledge of participants, the knowledge that is used in the cogni- tive processes that give rise to actions. Any description of a speech system, is to be judged on how well it reflects what parti- cipants know. As part of that description, preliminary terms and concepts are to be judged on the same basis -- and amended so that they better reflect that knowledge.

CHAPTER III

LABOV AND WALETZKY'S APPROACH TO NARRATIVE

As we saw in the previous chapter, Dell Hymes (1972: 52) provides

a framework for the study of speech, but he is careful to caution that

> [it] is quite preliminary -- if English and its grammarians per-
> mitted, one might call it "toward toward a theory." Some of it
> may survive the empirical and analytical work of the decade ahead.

Indeed, "a great deal of empirical work will be needed just to clarify the

interrelations of genres, events, acts and other components of speech

events (65)." The scheme that Hymes proposes is frankly heuristic --

necessary so that description can begin, yet put forward to be altered.

It is provocative to compare Hymes' stance toward describing speech,

as revealed in the words cited above, with Labov and Waletzky's toward des-

cribing narrative. Somewhat as Hymes develops an approach to speech from

the concept of the speech event, Labov and Waletzky develop an approach to

narrative from a definition. Their definition of narrative leads to a frame-

work for the analysis of English-language stories of personal experience.

To create this framework the researchers promise that they will

> first introduce definitions of the basic units of narrative and then
> outline the normal structure of the narrative as a whole. Finally,
> we will present some general propositions about the relation of for-
> mal properties to narrative functions . . . . (Labov and Waletzky
> 1967: 12).

In their work the authors faithfully follow this plan, without any retro-

spective examination of the definition that launched it.

The difference in tone represented by these two passages, the first introducing a framework for the description of speech, the second a framework for the description of narrative, goes beyond ideas about how scholarly material should be presented and points up the priorities of these students of speech, Hymes on the one hand and Labov and Waletzky on the other. The tone adopted by Labov and Waletzky is assured and positive, that adopted by Hymes modest and tentative, reflecting the fact that Labov and Waletzky secure the basis and boundaries of their subject matter by means of a definition, while Hymes takes the basis and boundaries of any speech message or event as problematic. In Hymes' view, not only does a description present terms and concepts, it works toward them. Thus an investigation should ideally be both reflexive and exploratory, seeking a broad understanding of the structures of speech and the practices of the members of the speech community. Progress in understanding any one type of message or way of speaking is no more important and is in fact dependent on progress in understanding a community's system of speaking. Thus, by Hymes' standards Labov and Waletzky's decision to found their analysis on a strict, message-bound definition of narrative is premature and confining. On its own terms, of course, the decision is effective. It promotes a description of narrative structure that is useful for their own purposes and is widely applicable -- or so the <u>Foxfire</u> corpus suggests.

This contrast sets the scene generally for the present chapter and the following one, which deal with Labov and Waletzky's approach to narrative and the limitations of that approach. In this chapter I review

authors' work on narrative, with attention to the aims of their research. My
outline should make clear that Labov and Waletzky's analysis is shaped by their
definition of narrative, a definition that reflects their strong interest
in the structures and functions of the speech message.

3.1 Labov and Waletzky's work on narrative

From 1965 to 1968 Labov headed a study of the black English vernacular
(BEV) spoken in south-central Harlem (Labov et al. 1968: 1; Labov 1972:
xiv), and in this context he and Waletzky made their contributions to the
literature on narrative. Hoping to account for the high rates of reading
failure among ghetto youth, Labov and his project co-workers concerned them-
selves with both the structure and the use of BEV -- particularly as they.
conflicted with the structure and use of standard English. As the re-
search progressed, the investigators confirmed their prescience that "major
reading problems [do] not stem from structural interference [between BEV
and standard English] in any simple sense," and they increasingly turned
their attention to uses of the vernacular (Labov 1972: xiii-xxiv). This
is the subject of the second volume of the report of their findings, in
which one part of Labov and Waletzky's work on narrative appears (Labov et
al. 1968). Because the vernacular is found "in its most consistent form
in the speech of black youth . . . who participate fully in the street cul-
ture of the inner cities" (Labov 1972: xiii) -- the same youth who have

the greatest tendency toward reading failure (Labov et al. 1968: 159-183) the investigators concentrated on uses of the vernacular salient to that culture, singling out ritual insults and narratives for particularly close examination. Narratives of personal experience were of special interest in that they exemplified, even when they had been recorded in the presence of an outside observer, relatively unselfconscious speech (Labov 1972: 354-355). Such speech allowed the investigators to document the prodigious verbal skills of black adolescents in the inner city, thus putting to rest the idea that "verbal deprivation" causes poor reading. In particular, with a method of analysis able to yield comparable information about narrative structure, it was possible to compare the narrative skills of white and black adolescents (Labov et al.: 286-338).

Labov and Waletzky present such a method of analysis in a separate publication (Labov and Waletzky 1967). In this paper they deal with narrative apart from the specific cultural context of the inner city, but they continue to focus on narratives of personal experience. They view this choice as strategic:

> In our opinion, it will not be possible to make very much progress in the analysis and understanding of these complex narratives until the simplest and most fundamental narrative structures are analyzed in direct connection with their originating functions. We suggest that such fundamental structures are to be found in oral versions of personal experiences: not the projects of expert storytellers that have been re-told many times, but the original productions of a representative group of the population (Labov and Waletzky 1968: 12).

In the course of some 600 interviews, including 250 of children, adolescents and adults from their research in south-central Harlem, Labov and Waletzky (1967: 13, 42) collected narratives of personal experience from a variety

of American speakers, black and white, rural and urban, from ten to seventy-two years old. None, however, had completed high school. Labov and Waletzky (1967: 41) warn that their conclusions "are restricted to the speech communities that [they] have examined," but their interest in comparison and their selection of a broad cross-section of speakers indicate that they are aiming for a description of narratives of personal experience applicable to any American, or North American, English-speaking community. Ultimately, they want to be able to compare narrative skills among many subgroups of the population (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 41).

To this end and to the end of understanding "the more complex types of narration developed by skilled storytellers and preserved by oral tradition" (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 41), Labov and Waletzky propose a framework for the analysis of narratives. Based on the finding that narratives are characterized by interchangeable units and their recurrent combinations, the analysis is formal, say Labov and Waletzky, because it isolates these structural elements. It is also functional, because it relates these elements to reference and evaluation. Labov and Waletzky identify the referential function as recapitulating experience; the evaluative function as rendering experience socially significant (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 12-13). Although this analysis is based on linguistic techniques, it is sociological in its regard for the functions of language in its social context. Evaluation, in particular, cannot be understood outside of the relevant sociocultural context -- what narrators and listeners take to be significant varies with time, place and situation.

3.1.1 Labov and Waletzky's analysis and description of narrative

The following summary synthesizes Labov and Waletzky's three works on narrative, i.e., the 1967 paper, discussed immediately above; the lengthy section from Labov et al. 1968, also discussed above and Labov's 1972 revision of that section (which appears as a chapter in Labov's Language in the Inner City: Studies in the Black English Vernacular). The 1967 essay lays the groundwork for the 1968 study, which focuses on the various means for fulfilling the function of evaluation, particularly those that involve syntactic complexity. This topic is treated briefly here because in describing the Foxfire corpus I have occasion to enumerate almost all of Labov and Waletzky's categories. From this point on, with only occasional exceptions, I will not distinguish between these studies, which are complementary.[1]

It should be made clear at the outset that Labov and Waletsky's description of narratives is not in any strict sense a description of the narratives of their corpus. The authors doubtlessly draw on the corpus for their conclusions, but not explicitly. For the most part, they present these conclusions without reference to any specific group of stories, as befits their desire for a description that is widely applicable.

Definition of narrative

Labov and Waletzky define narrative in terms of the referential function: narrative is "one verbal technique for recapitulating past experience, in particular, a technique of constructing narrative units

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[1]Where the authors' opinion does appear to have shifted from their earlier work, their later view is represented in this synthesis.

which match the temporal sequence of that experience" (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 13). For Labov and Waletzky, the sine qua non of narrative is chronological order, in which the sequence of clauses is matched to the sequence of events that actually occurred.[2] While there are other means of reporting a sequence of events -- with past perfect verbs, for instance, or by means of syntactic embedding -- they do not qualify as narrative because they do not preserve the order of events (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 20; Labov et al. 1968: 287). Clauses here are limited to independent clauses because subordinate ones are "removed from the temporal sequence of narrative" (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 21).

The importance of chronological order stems from the way in which listeners, according to Labov and Waletzky, go about semantic interpretation: "the semantic interpretation of a narrative . . . depends on the expectation that the events described did, in fact, occur in the same order as they were told in" (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 30). Thus, when the authors refer to "temporal sequence," they have in mind those clauses whose order cannot be changed among themselves without a change in the original semantic interpretation (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 21; Labov et al. 1968: 287). For example, "I punched this boy and he punched me" does not mean the same thing as "This boy punched me and I punched him" (Labov and Waletzky 1968: 287).

Displacement sets

The idea of temporal sequence is the basis for a procedure that iden-

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[2]Although Labov and Waletzky devised their definition to cover stories of personal experience, it can be broadened to include other kinds of stories without violating the central notion : the experience referred to in the definition need not be real -- events that actually occurred -- it may be either real or imagined.

tifies the three types of clauses that appear in narratives, including those that correspond to the "narrative units" referred to in the definition above. In this procedure every independent clause is tested for its potential range of displacement: it is moved to each position occupied by another independent clause, with all the other clauses moved up or down to fill the space it vacates, and the new arrangement is reviewed for a change in the semantic interpretation. Given a clause "c", those clauses before which c can be placed without a change in the semantic interpretation constitute the "displacement set" of c (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 21 - 22). "Narrative" clauses — those that correspond to narrative units — have displacement sets that "extend to but do not include the preceding and following narrative clauses", unless the narrative clause is also a "coordinate" clause, in which case it has a displacement set that includes some preceding or following narrative clause(s). "Free" clauses have displacement sets that range over the entire narrative; "restricted" clauses, displacement sets that range over some of the narrative clauses but not over the entire narrative (Labov and Waletzky 1968: 288 - 289). What these displacement sets represent semantically is that non-coordinate narrative clauses report events that happened in succession: coordinate clauses refer to events that happened at the same time; free clauses describe states that prevailed through all the events of the narrative and restricted clauses, states that prevailed through some of the events.

Labov and Waletzky symbolize sets by a system of subscripts: each independent clause is assigned a letter in sequence and then given a left-hand subscript indicating the number of clauses before which it can be

placed and a right-hand subscript indicating the number of clauses after which it can be placed. Thus, for instance, the displacement set of a free clause designated "c" appearing in a story along with nine other independent clauses would be represented symbolically as $_2c_7$.

Definition of a minimal narrative

To sum up what has been said about non-coordinate narrative clauses so far, they are not only ordered with respect to the events that actually occurred but also with respect to each other. In other words, the displacement set of one narrative clause never includes a second narrative clause for the reason that no clause of this type can take the place of another such clause without a change in the semantic interpretation. Thus, Labov and Waletzky say that non-coordinate narrative clauses are separated by "temporal juncture" (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 25 and 27; Labov et al. 1968: 288).

Narrative heads

On the basis that narrative clauses are temporally ordered, Labov and Waletzky not only limit them to independent clauses but also to clauses that are headed by non-habitual verbs. Clauses headed by the modal "would", the quasi-modal "used to" and the "general present" refer to repeated events and thus can occupy any position in the narrative without a change in the inferred order of events. The authors reason that over the number of occasions on which any particular iterated event occurred, it both preceded and followed any other, with the result that "it is impossible to falsify the situation by reversing clauses" (Labov et al. 1968: 289).

Primary sequence of a narrative

Displacement sets supply the information needed to formulate the "primary sequence" of a narrative. The primary sequence, Labov and Waletzky assert (1967: 30-31), is the basic underlying semantic form of a narrative -- the most explicit statement of the a-then-b relationship, represented in stories by temporally ordered clauses. Displacement sets merely show the extent of temporal order in a narrative; the primary sequence shows its importance.

The primary sequence is derived in three steps: (1) free clauses are moved to the beginning of the narrative; (2) restricted clauses are moved to a point as early as possible in the narrative without a change in the original semantic interpretation and (3) coordinate clauses are coalesced to single units. This results in a string of clauses in which narrative clauses, coordinate and non-coordinate, are pushed to the end, so that all clauses describing states precede all clauses reporting events. This means that, unlike the sequences of clauses presented by most narratives, the primary sequence of any narrative offers the action of the story uninterrupted, since the last part of the sequence sets forth only the a-then-b relationships.

In this way the primary sequence isolates the "skeleton" of a narrative, which consists of all the temporally ordered clauses. And because temporally ordered or narrative clauses are the primary agent of reference, and thus the defining feature of narrative, the skeleton is the most important part of a narrative. It may be considered a sort of framework for the

narrative as a whole.

Overall structure of narrative

While the primary sequence is an arrangement of clauses related to the referential function, the complete "overall structure" is related to both the referential and evaluative functions. For this reason the latter, unlike the former, actually describes a large number of narratives. In terms of the overall structure, the skeleton of a narrative is coextensive with the "complicating action" and "resolution" -- the sections of a story that tell what happened and what finally happened (Labov et al. 1968; 300) and are the most important for reference. Labov and Waletzky propose that a "normal" or "fully-formed" narrative (they use the first term in 1967 and the second in 1968) includes, in addition to its complicating action and resolution, the following sections: an "abstract", "orientation", "evaluation" and "coda". The abstract, at the beginning of a story, summarizes the content in one or two clauses. The orientation follows, naming the time, place, actor(s) and their activity or situation. The coda, at the end of a story, closes off the complicating action. The orientation and coda usually consist of one or more free clauses (Labov and Waletzky 1967; 32-33, 39-41; Labov et al. 1968; 294-297). The evaluation -- composed of at least one but usually a group of coordinate, free or restricted clauses separating the complicating action from the resolution -- highlights the latter and thus clarifies the point of the story.

Explaining this means of fulfilling the evaluative function, Labov and Waletzky say that the very process of appearing to stop the action with clauses of the types named above "calls attention to that particular

part of the narrative as important and connected to the point" (Labov
et al. 1968: 307). Further, because the clauses show up just before
the resolution, they both emphasize the major break in the structure of
the story and generate suspense about its resolution. And suspense
naturally serves to focus even more attention on this part of the story
(Labov and Waletzky 1967: 34-37; Labov et al. 1968: 307).

Evaluation

The evaluation section described immediately above is an important
means of fulfilling the second function of narrative, but in any given
narrative it is almost sure to be supported by other means of evaluation.
According to Labov and Waletzky, "the evaluation of [a] narrative forms a
. . . structure which is concentrated in the evaluation section but may be
found in various forms throughout the narrative" (Labov 1972: 369). Col-
lectively - these forms constitute "perhaps the most important element in
addition to the basic narrative clause" (Labov et al. 1968: 297). Without
them, a narrative may seem difficult to understand because its significance
-- its raison d'être -- has not been made clear (Labov and Waletzky 1967:
33; Labov et al. 1968: 297-298).

Normally, say the authors, a narrative serves another function besides
that of reference, namely, "a function of personal interest determined by a
stimulus in the social context in which the narrative occurs" (Labov and
Waletzky 1967: 13). In answering a question, for instance, a speaker may
find himself in a position where he must substantiate his claim with the
story of a certain experience or lose credibility (Labov and Waletzky 1967:
34). At the least, a good narrator is interested in warding off the "So

what?" question that awaits any dull or pointless story (Labov et al. 1968
297-298). For this reason he uses evaluative forms to show up the un-
usual or "reportable" character of his experience (Labov et al. 1968:
301). Many narrators are also desirous of presenting themselves "in the
most favorable possible light" (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 34).

The forms that help to establish such points of personal interest --
the aggrandizement of self, the unusual character of an experience -- are
extremely varied, but they have in common that they "reveal the attitude
of the narrator toward the narrative by emphasizing the importance of some
narrative units as compared to others" (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 37). Be-
sides suspension of the action, which can be identified by an arrangement
of clauses (once types of clauses have been differentiated), Labov and
Waletzky note devices that can be identified on several different counts --
semantic, syntactic, paralinguistic and kinesic. In general, the authors
contend that evaluation is frequently signalled by departures from the bare
necessities of narrative construction, that is, from the simple syntax ade-
quate for an uninterrupted succession of narrative clauses (Labov et al.
1968: 308-309). Indeed, a complex construction draws attention to itself
-- with evaluative effect -- just because it is rare (Labov et al. 1968:
311; Labov 1972: 378). A group of clauses suspending the complicating
action either before the resolution or elsewhere in the narrative; a clause
or clauses reporting an actor's, or the narrator's comments (which are either
internal or external to the action of the story: ": . . and I said, 'I don't
think that's right at all'" vs. "But it was quite an experience"); clauses

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referring to an actor's action (which are always internal to the story,

e.g., "I was shakin' like a leaf"); clauses that explain or qualify;

smaller syntactic units; paralinguistic and kinesic units (Labov et al.

1968: 307-328) -- all these are potential agents of evaluation. In each

case, however, the question must be posed: is this structure or unit neces-

sary for referential clarity? If so, it may not be evaluative (Labov et al.

1968: 328). For whatever the nature of the structure or unit, the funda-

mental definition of evaluation remains a semantic one (Labov and Waletzky

1967: 37).

Labov and Waletzky's description in relation to their definition

The notion of temporal sequence and its embodiment in narrative

clauses provides the entering wedge for Labov and Waletzky's analysis of

narrative. Once narrative clauses are accounted for as the agents of refer-

ence -- the clauses that relate what happened -- the other clauses that

regularly appear in stories beg to be accounted for as well. As Labov and

Waletzky (1967: 21) put it after examining one of their examples -- a

narrative made up exclusively of narrative clauses -- "inspection of the

other examples shows that the relationships between clauses and events is

not simple." In other words, not all clauses match events. Indeed, the

idea of displacement sets or, alternately, of free and restricted clauses

is introduced almost at the outset of the analysis in order to recognize

the existence of clauses other than narrative ones.

The evident conclusion that not all clauses match events leads

and Waletzky to extend their description beyond the terms of the definition

they propose, so that they can explain why there are non-narrative clauses and, further, "why in most narratives the linear ordering of clauses departs significantly from the order of the primary sequence" (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 32). The explanation lies, first, in the evaluative function of narrative and, second, in the sections of narrative. The authors point out that "evaluation sections are responsible for those deviations from the order of the primary sequence of the narrative that complicate the a-then-b relationship of narrative" (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 36). Further, orientations and codas, the former needed to set the scene for the action and the latter to close it off definitively, are responsible for free clauses both at the beginning and at the end of a story. In general, without free and restricted clauses the achievement of referential clarity would be gravely handicapped and the possibilities for evaluation would be seriously limited.

The distinction between narrative and non-narrative clauses that guides Labov and Waletzky's analysis also organizes their presentation. The first part of the authors' 1967 essay, for example, is concerned with construing the definition they set forth, a definition that is summed up in the idea of a "narrative" clause. That definiton, however, does not represent all of the features required for a "normal" or "fully-formed" narrative, and so the second part of the essay is concerned with describing these. It is only at this point that the analysis or description takes on an inductive quality: the stories collected by Labov and Waletzky rather than the definition they propose serves as the basis for discussion.

CHAPTER IV

LABOV AND WALETZKY'S APPROACH TO NARRATIVE

IN RELATION TO THIS STUDY

In this chapter I contrast Labov and Waletzky's approach to narrative,
or rather, the initial line of the approach as it is highlighted by their
definition, with my approach to the Foxfire corpus. Though Labov and
Waletzky presumably never intended their analysis to serve as a paradigm
for the future study of stories and storytelling — it was formulated in
response to the aims of a study with an entirely different focus as we saw·
in the previous chapter — its status as the first and practically only
sociolinguistic treatment of narrative makes it a prime target for critical
examination. The critical examination performed here reveals that Labov
and Waletzky forego certain kinds of exploration in order to make certain
kinds of progress. Responsible for a significant part of this progress are
some limitations inherent in their approach. The approach I take, drawn from
Hymes' recommendations for the ethnographic study of speech, is devised specifi-
cally to avoid these limitations. The result is a description that is frankly
open-ended, leading to more questions than answers. I maintain, however,
that such tentativeness is part of the program necessary for sociolinguistics
to become a thoroughly social science. In any case, the framework
proposed here is flexible enough for describing the Foxfire corpus and gen-
eral enough to accommodate Labov and Waletzky's insights, so that the des-
cription provides, as I have said, an occasion to build on, clarify and

challenge Labov and Waletzky's assumptions and observations. To begin with,
there is little doubt that Labov and Waletzky's approach through a
particular definition of narratives makes for a clear and coherent analysis,
which, moreover, generates an interesting description. The definition, as
with any definition, has the virtue of being relatively explicit, in this
case explicit both in describing certain features of narrative and in
distinguishing the phenomenon. A statement of Labov and Waletzky's core
ideas about narrative, the definition (see p. 41 - 42) asserts (1) that
the function defining — and thus presumably dominant in — narrative is
reference and (2) that reference is carried out by (a) independent clauses
(b) chronologically ordered by being matched to events. According to Labov
and Waletzky, these are the outstanding features of narratives. Further,
the definition presents chronologically ordered clauses, that is, narrative
clauses, as the identifying feature of narratives. On both these levels —
distinguishing and describing narratives — the definition lends clarity to
the discussion. Then, too, the definition provides coherence. As we saw
at the end of the last chapter, the idea of narrative clauses guides a
large part of the analysis and organizes its presentation. Labov and
Waletzky are not the first to recognize that a definition — at least
one that reflects the investigators' core ideas — makes a neat center-piece
for an entire investigation. As prologue to his definition of religion,
Clifford Geertz (1973: 90) states:

> . . . although it is notorious that definitions establish nothing in
> themselves they do, if they are carefully enough constructed, provide
> a useful orientation, or reorientation, of thought, such that an extended
> unpacking of them can be an effective way of developing and controlling
> a novel line of inquiry.

4.1 Limitations of Labov and Waletzky's approach

As clear and coherent as is Labov and Waletzky's analysis, it gives rise to certain questions about the possible limitations of their approach and about the choices that led to those limiations. One question concerns aims: as their definition indicates, Labov and Waletzky intend to analyze and describe narratives more or less in isolation from the other aspects of the communicative interaction. The definition refers only to the function and structure of the speech message. I acknowledge that at this point Labov and Waletzky's decision to focus on the speech message alone is perfectly defensible, as would be the decision to focus on some other speech component, but later in this chapter I argue that their choice is ultimately short-sighted. It helps to perpetuate a bad habit within sociolinguistics that in turn helps to support an inadequate means of conceptualizing speech messages. My argument takes in not only the issue of setting the scope and focus of the investigation of a type of speech message or event but also the closely related issue of defining such a message or event: what is the best way to formulate a definition in sociolinguistics?

Another question concerns methods: Labov and Waletzky make several assumptions — points (1) and (2) above — yet never acknowledge them as such or move to examine them. Like the decision to isolate the message, this decision to pass over the assumption on which the analysis rests is expedient. Unlike the other, however, it is not so much a legitimate choice that happens to be questionable but an illegitimate choice — a methodological sleight of hand.

In terms of the progress of Labov and Waletzky's scheme, any attempt to rethink these assumptions potentially disrupts all of the discussion up to the formulation of the primary sequence and part of the discussion concerning evaluation (see the previous chapter). As well as being presented in the definition, the ideas designated (1) and (2) above are built into the analysis — which tends to disguise the fact that they are statements subject to verification rather than ones already verified. Whether or not to examine them at some point in the study itself is a matter of choice, but their status as hypotheses is not. An analysis goes forth on hypotheses as well as facts, but for any further thought or investigation, the distinction is important. By not labelling their assumptions as such Labov and Waletzky imply that the basic nature of narrative — the foundation of their study — has been settled once and for all.

Related to the way the authors treat their assumptions is the way they use — or rather, fail to use — their corpus. Labov and Waletzky do not devote much attention in either their 1967 study or their 1968 report to the body of materials on which they draw. They do not mention, for instance, how many narratives they examined, nor how many narrators were involved, nor — most importantly — how narratives were distinguished from the surrounding speech. But their analysis does not require such description: the corpus does not serve as an independent source of data and therefore its properties are irrelevant. Indeed, readers are left to assume that the definition is the basis on which narratives are ultimately included in the corpus, which means that it is impossible for the corpus to harbor a narrative that is not characterized by narrative clauses,

is not a "fit" for the definition. Whatever the link
between the assumptions and the corpus Labov and Waletzky do not reveal
it. For the most part their conclusions are couched in general terms and
the corpus provides examples to explain and support them.
The corpus recedes into the background, as do the assumptions: the
conclusions and the individual stories come to the fore.

Labov and Waletzky's assumptions are not easy ones to treat
critically — at least insofar as the information so far accumulated is
concerned. Only in recent years have narratives, particularly non-traditional
narratives, attracted systematic attention. The work of some linguists
associated with the Summer Institute of Linguistics and interested in a
semantic approach to discourse, has, however, begun to reveal the mechanisms
of reference and presents some evidence that pinning reference to independent
clauses chronologically ordered is a simplistic solution to a complex problem.
One effort toward a semantic analysis of discourse — focused on travel
narratives in Saramaccan — demonstrates that clauses do not always correspond
to events on a one-to-one basis. Applying the notion of semantic deep
structure, Grimes and Glock (1970) relate the events mentioned in a narrative
not to verb phrases but to logical predicates. In the resulting representa-
tion at the line of deep structure every event is shown to be of equal weight
to every other event, which would not necessarily be the case in a
representation at the level of surface structure. For example, take the
following version of the essentials of one Saramaccan travel narrative:
at the level of surface structure the events referred to in sentences j
and k would be represented by one verb phrase apiece (as indicated by the
designation "one clause"):

a   'Go to the Saramacca region.'

b   'Arrive at Guyaba [in the Saramacca region].'

c   'Sleep at Guyaba.'

d   'Continue.'

e   'Leave Guyaba.',

f   'Go to Semoisi.'

g   'Sleep at Semoisi.'

h   'Continue.'

i   'Leave Semoisi.'

j   'Go sleep at Pempe' [one clause].

k   'Continue, leave Pempe' [one clause].

l   'Go to Godo.'

m   'Sleep at Godo.'

n   'Continue.'

As the authors point out:

> The sequence of verbs 'go, (arrive), sleep, continue, (leave)' is
> cycled through four times, in a-e, f-i, j-k and l-n, with reference to
> each of four different stopping places. In the j-k cycle, however, what
> seems very clearly to be the same semantic information that was spelled
> out in four sentences in f-i appears packed into two sentences.

In general terms, the example shows that a uniform relation does not exist
between the syntactic form and the semantic content: although the possibilities
differ, in every language "there are different ways of packaging the same
information" (Grimes and Glock 1970: 415). Thus while it is always accurate
to say that reference to events is carried out in clauses, it may not always
be accurate to say for English or any other language that it is carried out
by clauses, or more exactly, by the verb phrase of a clause.

Another effort in the same direction — this time focused on
discourses in some languages of Brazil and New Guinea — shows that
clauses need not be chronologically ordered for reference to take place.
Grimes (1972: 513) describes organization of discourses by overlay,
which, in contrast to the familiar outline, entails "near repetition of
substantial stretches of speech in such a way that certain elements in
one stretch are repeated in another, while other elements are novel each
time." When overlay shows up in narratives, references to some events
occur both before and after reference to others and thus are not
chronologically ordered in Labov and Waletzky's sense. Only the novel
elements cannot be moved to other positions without a change in the semantic
interpretation. Then, too, overlay opens up the possibility that a
reference will not be ordered with regard to all the references in the
section or "plane" it overlays — even though it is ordered with regard to
the references in its own plane. This occurs when an "overlaid" reference
has no exact corollary in the preceding plane and so cannot be exactly
placed. Clearly, in narratives organized by overlay, reference to events
does not always proceed in chronological order.

The point made empirically by this material echoes that made theoretically
in the discussion immediately preceding it: assumptions, even seemingly
reasonable assumptions, warrant examination. Given that the innate
capacities of speakers and listeners anywhere are, sociolinguists assume,
the same, the characteristics of stories in one community at least help
establish the possibility of similar features in other communities. The
issue here is not, for instance, whether overlay organization exists in

English-language narratives — the available data and this native speaker's experience data suggest that repetition is far less predictable — but whether narratives and listeners depend on chronological order to the extent that Labov and Waletzky imply. Any description, including a definition, is valid only insofar as it describes how participants actually treat language. The assumptions that chronological order is always carried out by narrative clauses and the others Labov and Waletzky make in their definition are subject to and call for examination in light of new data, such as that undertaken in the final two chapters of this study. A definition often makes a useful tool, but the very data that the definition helped organize (and that in an intuitive way gave rise to the definition in the first place) is available to evaluate it — should the investigators decide to proceed in that fashion. This process is well described by Crystal (1972: 202) speaking about what is probably the most important definition in the study of syntax:

> Most linguists . . . would start their grammatical study by taking the notion of a sentence and applying it to the analysis of data. They may give it a working defintion to guide investigation . . . and elaborate or modify this as new material emerges. There may also be clues in the data which can be used in the process of identifying sentences, such as punctuation or intonation. But these matters are ancillary to the main task of postulating a unit which will act as a satisfactory basis for coherent and comprehensive analysis. The total definition of a sentence, then, ultimately comes out of this analysis: it is one of the products of a grammar, and not something which we have available when we begin.

Likewise, a definition of narrative ultimately comes out of the study of narrative.

Labov and Waletzky's decision to pass over the assumptions we have been discussing closes off certain possibilities for investigation by suggesting that their initial statements about narrative are beyond dispute. The

authors' decision to focus on the message closes off other possibilities, but not by means of any sleight-of-hand. It keeps the investigation in familiar territory, where it can draw on methods of recording, description and analysis already developed in linguistics. If the investigation took any other component as seriously the analysis would have had to rely to a much greater extent on new or at least tentative terms and concepts. The one decision is expedient because it ignores problematic assumptions, the other because it seizes on the best-understood subject matter. The first, as I have said, results in methodological sleight-of-hand, the second only in narrowed — though perhaps dangerously narrowed — aims.

More than most of the other components of an event, the message meets A. I. Richard's requirement for "something to investigate that is accessible and detachable" (1929: 9). By means of tape and then perhaps transcription a version of the message — paler without its kinesic or kinesic and paralinguistic elements but nonetheless an entity — can be separated and got down as "data". Partially because it is susceptible to being recorded — and recorded in ways that are agreed upon — it is susceptible to being analyzed — again in ways that are agreed upon. The two processes are not completely separable, and the interest that encouraged the development of one also encouraged development of the other. In any case, the speech message is concrete in a way that purpose or key or scene is not: the very fact that these components go under terms whose referents are vague indicates that sociolinguists do not know exactly where or how to "locate" them. It is also, in fragmented form at least, within the province of linguistics. By focusing on the speech message — and particularly on those aspects of it

that are of long-standing interest to linguists, i.e., phonology, morphology
or syntax — Labov and Waletzky put themselves in a position to take advantage
of the progress linguists have made and then to capitalize on the confidence
that progress has produced.

Labov and Waletzky's analysis is founded on a semantic notion — that
of temporal sequence (embodied in the authors' definition of narrative), but
the thrust of their analysis is toward identifying syntactic or at least
quasi-syntactic correlates of semantic characteristics or concepts. Labov
and Waletzky strive, in their own words, for a "formal" analysis. They
settle for less, if the term "formal" is taken in the strict sense of
"syntactic". The analysis delineates units of narrative, i.e., narrative,
free and restricted clauses, by attention to both syntax — all the units
are independent clauses — and semantics — each type of unit has a relation
to the narrative's temporal sequence (in other words, has a characteristic
displacement set). A great deal of the description proceeds in terms of
these units. Nonetheless, at a few junctures the authors point up purely
syntactic markers: reference to events is carried out by independent
clauses headed by certain verb forms; evaluation is frequently carried out .
by forms that are syntactically complex.

In fact, Labov and Waletzky (1967: 12 - 13), like others investigating
discourse, neglect much of the information available to them "on the syntax
and semantics of English below the sentence level" in order to describe
the characteristics of the form itself. To accomplish this, Labov and
Waletzky, like others (e.g., Longacre 1968; Grimes and Glock 1970; Grimes
1971) seize on semantic notions — notions that are capable of describing

the organization of the narrative of a whole, or at least an important part of that organization. In formulating such an analysis, however, the investigators are free to make use of already established descriptions of syntactic units and structures.

But whether form or content predominates, the analysis is focused on the message, and to this there can be no theoretical objection. "So far as one can tell at present," says Hymes (1972: 66), "any component may be taken as starting point and the others viewed in relation to it." In other words, though some components may be more influential than others, sociolinguists are not yet in a position to demonstrate that fact. From this point of view, then, Labov and Waletzky's decision to focus on the message is, as I have noted, legitimate. No component deserves priority over another at this point. From a practical one, however, the choice is likely to end in the same limitations that have traditionally characterized work in linguistics.

The danger of assigning priority to message form is that the analysis tends to get stuck there, in familiar territory. Linguists are no exception to the rule that people prefer to do what they already do well -- or whatever comes closest. The expertise that is the reason Labov and Waletzky's choice is expedient is also the reason it is dangerous.

The danger has a further ramification. When an analysis takes into account only the message, it reinforces the idea that promotes such analysis, namely, that the message exists and conveys meaning in isolation -- apart from the speech event. This notion is in fact firmly embedded in linguistic practice, where the presence of a message for every event seems to have obscured the relationship between the two. It has also obscured the nature

of the event. A speech message brings into being a speech event, and vice-versa. On different levels both the message and the event are coherent and meaningful wholes. Message aside, the very fact of a storytelling event has meaning. Yet the meaning of an event is finally shaped by the message, and the meaning of the message is bounded by the meaning of the event. In concrete terms, speakers and listeners construct and interpret messages as parts of events — with a purpose and within a context. The speaker's decision to launch the message and to give it a certain form and content are determined by his purpose(s) and the context, the message recognized and interpreted on the same basis.

It is as a precedent for other investigations, then, that I object to the authors' choice of focus. If speech messages are dependent on speech events, then messages analyzed in isolation are analyzed incompletely. Imperfection is to be expected at this stage of research, but for sociolinguists to truly make the connection between social life and language, to discover the full range of structures in speech, to describe a particular type of message as it is used, investigations must look beyond the message and eventually they must take on the speech event as a whole. This means expanding the scope and broadening the aims of research, a move that will result in some confusion out of which will emerge guidelines for the serious systematic study of speech. I am ready to make a case for spreading description over a wider area. The results will light up the unfamiliar territory, helping researchers think through the best ways of approaching their task. In the end it is easier to thoroughly describe one part of a speech event with a picture of the whole in mind. And developing pictures of the whole requires practice.

The idea of the interdependence between speech messages and speech events, finally, has implications for Labov and Waletzky's definition of narrative. The argument that the complete analysis of a speech message is impossible without reference to the event, to the association of components that constitutes the event, extends to the definition of a message as well. Both aspects of the argument are based on the interest sociolinguists take in the knowledge of the members of the speech community: any effort in sociolinguistics is, or ought to be, an effort toward explicating that knowledge which underlies speech. Thus an analysis that is not guided by and does not reflect the way in which members use speech is ultimately inadequate. If narratives are treated by the members of the speech community as parts of speech events, then the terms proper to a definition are not those of the speech message alone. In the final chapter I pursue this line of thought, drawing on the description of the _Foxfire_ corpus presented in chapter VI. In the remainder of this chapter I lay out a plan for that description.

4.2 An approach drawn from Hymes to stories and storytelling

Following Hymes, I have argued that the speech event is the key to the study of speech. Among those structures that linguists have traditionally neglected, the speech event, itself an organization of structures, stands out as the one that is also a integral activity -- a bounded social inter-. action informed by social knowledge. Despite the risks involved in expanding the scope of analysis, then, the approach I advocate here focuses on the speech event rather than on the message or on any other structure less comprehensive than the event.

As we have seen, description of a speech act revolves around the components that show up in (and under study help show up, Hymes 1972: 66) the relations that structure the event, which is equally to say that description of a speech act revolves around the participants' considerations as they (the participants) act in accordance with the rules of speech. My own description in chapter VI thus proceeds from component to component (I make use of Hymes' heuristic list, presented in chapter II), describing the values they have in the stories of the _Foxfire_ corpus and noting some of their interrelations.

Further, since the speech event is not merely the product of the participants knowledge but the participants knowledge in use, of the participants' _actions_, I also consider the phases of the speech event from both the speaker's and listener's point of view. In the process of the communicative interaction the narrator constructs the speech event, as I described in chapter II and the listener interprets it in terms of their shared knowledge of meanings, specifically the meanings that arise from different associations of values. In more detail, the speaker constructs an event by _deciding_ to launch a particular message at a particular time and place in the company of particular people and by _constructing_ that message from the elements of the communicative code. The listener in his turn interprets the event by _recognizing_ the message as an instance of a particular type of message and by _interpreting_ the event in its context. This view gives us four phases of speech interaction -- on the part of the narrator, decision and construction and on the part of the listener, recognition and interpretation -- which provide an economical means of linking a description centered on components

to the process of communicative interaction. As each component is broached in my
description it is considered with reference to its use in these four phases.
But since not all components are equally relevant in each phase, the discussion
of a particular component focuses on those phases in which it generally plays
plays an important role. This use of the phases of an interaction adds a
further dimension to the description, while helping to organize the welter of
data brought in by the expanded focus of the speech event.

The descriptive framework I have been describing, and which will be
further explained at the beginning of chapter VI, does not develop from a
set of prescribed ideas about the phenomena of stories and storytelling, but
rather calls for a variety of terms and concepts applicable to the data.
It makes no assumptions other than that some factors influencing storytelling
exist and bear relationships to each other. The framework itself does not
in itself give priority to one or another aspect of the speech event,
although priorities can later be assigned. In short, the description seeks
to lay out data such that the investigator is in a position to draw and then
support conclusions. It is designed to be a means of exploration and discovery,
ready to incorporate a variety of insights.

CHAPTER V

THE WIDER CONTEXT:

RABUN COUNTY, GEORGIA AND

MACON COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA

The immediate context of most of the storytelling events of the _Foxfire_
corpus is a _Foxfire-initiated_ interview, but the wider context is the social
life of Rabun County, Georgia and Macon County, North Carolina, where all the
narrators made their homes. In this chapter I sketch some of the features of
this border area of Southern Appalachia, features that are not in every case
shared by other areas of the region. This sketch serves as an introduction to
the following chapter where the storytelling events are described, familiar-
izing the reader with the environment -- physical, social and cultural -- in
which the stories had their genesis, first as the narrator's experience and then
as his creation. Perhaps most importantly, the sketch includes a statement of
my stance toward understanding the stories and events. I argue that their
meaning is, in general, accessible to any North American. Contrary to what the
literature as a whole implies, the residents of this area of Southern Appalachia
participate in a recognizable version of American social life. The position
of the analyst is thus more akin to that of the native reflecting on the pro-
ductions of his own culture than that of the anthropologist reaching for the
native's point of view.

5.1 The region and the counties

The large section of the United States known as Southern Appalachia --
a region that includes the upland portions of the states of West Virginia,
Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, Georgia and Alabama -- consists of three
physiographic provinces running northeast to southwest: (1) the Blue Ridge
Mountains, including the Great Smokeys in the east, i.e., the Appalachian Moun-
tains, (2) the Allegheny Mountains and Plateau and the Cumberland Plateau in
the west, i.e., the Appalachian Plateau and (3) the system of valleys and ridges
in between, i.e., the Greater Appalachian Valley (Campbell, 1921: 12; Vance,
1962: 55, 58; Pearsall, 1966: 129 - 132). To some extent the fate of the
population of the region varied by subregion, but beyond that, by county or
neighborhood, according to the accessibility of the area and its resources, fac-
tors that have together determined the degree to which a particular segment of
the population fits the popular and academic stereotype. Despite the hetero-
geneity of its population, researchers have inherited an idea of Southern Appa-
lachia as an isolated enclave of subsistence-level farmers, woodsmen or miners,
burdened by the values and customs of a by-gone era. While at one time a sig-
nifigant part of Soutern Appalachia was largely cut off from the mainstream of
American life, this is no longer true, though the heritage of a more independent
and rugged existence -- and the fact of economic exploitation from outside the
region -- remains.

Topographically, the two counties that are the subject of this chapter
represent the southern tip of the Blue Ridge, Rabun being the northeastern-most
county in Georgia and Macon adjacent to it in North Carolina. In general,
people living in the Valley province had more contact with America beyond the

mountains than those inhabiting the highland provinces, but because of Rabun
and Macon's location on the edge of the mountainous area, where the valleys
spread out, neither transportation nor communication were ever as limited as
in other areas of the Blue Ridge. Anywhere in Southern Appalachia people down
in basins, valleys or coves were not as likely to be cut off as people up on
ridges -- a fact that folk who want to be left alone continue to make use of.
In Rabun and Macon as in many other counties the bottom land was cleared for
farming, while after the turn of the century, the rest of the accessible land
was logged. Unlike the Allegheny and Cumberland province, the Blue Ridge was
not rich in coal, only timber, so that the land was plundered once rather than
twice by large outside interests -- at least if today's tourism is discounted.
Whatever demoralization resulted from mining -- which took families out of their
neighborhoods into company-owned villages, then failed to cushion them from eco-
nomic disaster -- was spared the people of the Blue Ridge. For the most part,
poverty in this area does not have a chronic character as it does in some parts
of West Virginia and Kentucky.

In short, it is difficult to generalize about Southern Appalachia as a
whole. The variation Campbell found in 1921 continues to exist -- although
there is disagreement about whether it is increasing or decreasing[1] -- and its
implications remain the same. "While it is . . . possible to survey a community

[1]Whereas Southern Appalachia as a whole may be moving toward greater
conformity with the rest of the United States, heartland Appalachia (parts
of Kentucky, Tennessee and the north of West Virginia) may be stagnating --
a backwater profitable to industrial interests (see, e.g., Pearsall 1966,
Dix 1973).

or even a county," said Campbell (1921: 28), "and to draw true pictures of the various groups within that particular area, one is less able than in the past to make such a survey and to say that what is found is typical of large areas." Thus, in the following paragraphs I focus on the small area directly relevant to this study, circa 1973, making use of the literature on other parts of Southern Appalachia only where it supports survey data or my own observations.

The population of Rabun County numbers about 8400, or approximately twenty-three people per square mile; the population of Macon County about 15,000, or approximately twenty-four people per square mile (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1970: vol. 12, 233; vol. 25, 196; for areas of the counties, see Seltzer, ed. 1952: 1547, 1110). In Rabun County, and similarly in Macon, only about one-quarter of the inhabitants live in villages. ost people make their homes in open country neighborhoods (U.S. Department of Commerce 1970: vol. 12, 233): typically, houses and trailers strung along a road through low-lying land. The communities often bear the name of some feature of the area -- a "holler", a valley, a creek, a mountain. One such neighborhood is described in Foxfire (Brunson, Thomas, Taylor, eds. 1975: 3):

> Betty's Creek [occupies] a small, narrow, winding valley lying partly in North Carolina, but mainly in Georgia where its newly paved road begins . . . . Rolling pastures and sprinklings of houses old and new help define the landscape now, but one can imagine by gazing at the high, close, wooded mountains what it must have looked like to the first settlers over a hundred years ago.

In the view of local people, Betty's Creek and other neighborhoods are "geographical and social entities" (Stephenson 1968: 4) with a known history of settlement by certain families. People in a neighborhood tend to have more dealings with each other than with people outside, relatives excepted. There

is a homemakers' club on Kelly's Creek, for instance, and during the fall and winter a number of women on Betty's Creek meet for quilting.

The state/county line between Rabun and Macon acts more as a governmental division than as a social one. The most traveled of Rabun's two state highways, by tourists and natives alike, runs north through Macon's county seat. People in the northern part of Rabun seem about as likely to shop in the county seat of Macon -- twenty-five miles away and somewhat larger -- as in their own county seat. Since Macon is legally "dry", its men regularly cross over to Rabun to buy beer and wine. Most families visit relatives in the other county at one time or another, and as with Betty's Creek, some communities actually straddle the state line.

In both counties the county seats are the largest settlement; in fact, Clayton, Georgia with a population of about 1500 and Franklin, North Carolina with a population of about 1170 are the only settlements of any size (U.S. Department of the Interior Geographical Survey 1970: 337 - 417). In Rabun the other villages range in population from less than one hundred to somewhat over five hundred (Seltzer, ed. 1952: 1347, 1110; U.S. Department of the Interior Geographical Survey 1970: 337 - 417). While Clayton and Franklin are the commercial centers for their respective counties, offering supermarkets, hardware, dime, clothing, hobby and gift stores, gas stations, car dealerships, banks, loan and insurance offices; a village like Mountain City, Georgia provides only a gas station and grocery store.

Clayton is approximately sixty miles from each of the two large towns[2] nearest it, Gainesville, Georgia (population 17,500) and Anderson, South Caro-

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[2]"Large town" here designates places of over 10,000 people.

lina (population 41,000). Franklin is similarly about sixty miles from Asheville, North Carolina (population 62,000, U.S. Department of the Interior Geographical Survey 1970: 337 - 417). Today all of these towns are linked by good roads, but even before their construction, a short line railroad, completed in 1907, connected Franklin to Clayton and Clayton to the Southern Railroad, that is, to Athens and Atlanta, Georgia. Although old people rarely go further afield than one of the county seats, middle-aged people and their children take the family car or truck to such places as Asheville and Atlanta several times a year.

For convenience and sociability, most households have a telephone and for entertainment, most have a radio or television.[3] In the summer of 1973 the Watergate affair was frequently a topic of conversation -- just as it was in the rest of the United States -- largely because the hearings were televised. Despite the variety in houses -- some families live in brick split-levels; many more inhabit wood or cinderblock cottages; one old man lives in a converted bread truck -- almost all are electrified. Stephenson's observation in the community of "Shiloh"[4] holds true in Rabun and Macon: ". . . electricity, and

[3]The 1958 Southern Appalachian Studies' Survey team found that two-thirds of their sample of rural households had television sets; the 1950 Census, that 94 percent of all the households in the region had radios (Belcher 1962: 51).

[4]I very much recommend John B. Stephenson's ethnography of "Shiloh" (1968) to the reader interested in fairly accessible parts of the Blue Ridge, counties like Rabun and Macon. Shiloh resembles a community that might exist in either. (Stephenson tells us only that the community he studies is located in mountainous North Carolina.)

Though based on a slightly more recent summer spent in a county adjacent to Rabun, John Gordon's report (1971) does not reflect my own experience. Gordon spent most of his time with two families, and this skews his description. Perhaps he reveals a kind of life that exists in Rabun, but from which I was "protected" by my connection with Foxfire.

sometimes even a telephone is installed in a house before bathroom facilities are brought indoors" (1968: 7), which makes perfect sense given the Blue Ridge climate, pleasant in summer, rarely severe in winter. Electricity is valued for radios and televisions but perhaps more for refrigerators and freezers, which allow families to store food and especially their garden produce for longer periods of time. In general, people have chosen the paraphernalia of modern life discriminately.

Most households consist of a married couple and their offspring. As a rule, grown children establish their own households when they marry, not infrequently near those of their parents.[5] (In Rabun less than three percent of couples are without their own households; in Macon less than two percent.) The cumulative fertility rate[6] for the two counties suggests that families of middle-aged parents average two or three children[7](U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census: vol. 12: 233; vol. 35, 196); as recently as the grandparental generation, however, families were certainly larger.

Thanks to a relatively favorable economy, the population of Rabun County remained stable and that of Macon decreased only slightly (U.S. Department of the Interior Geographical Survey 1970: 241, 244) during the 1950's, a decade that saw a devastating loss of population in many counties of Southern Appa-

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[5]According to Brown and Schwarzweller (1970: 87) ". . . the vast majority of rural Appalachian households include only members of the conjugal family." See also Brown and Hillery 1962: 76 on the establishment of new households.

[6]The cumulative fertility rate is defined as children ever born per 1000 women aged 35 to 44 years of all marital classes.

[7]My estimate is in keeping with Brown and Schwarzweller's finding that the average household in Appalachia consists of 3.6 persons (1970: 86).

lachia.[8] In Rabun and Macon, as in other areas of the Blue Ridge, "the development of industry and tourism served to retard out-migration, which was substantially lower than in the Plateau areas"(Brown and Hillery 1962: 58). By 1970 industry and tourism (plus tourism's companion, construction of second or vacation homes) had grown to central importance in the two counties, as reflected by some of the employment figures.

Over a third of the working population of Rabun and almost a third of the working population of Macon is employed in manufacturing (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1970: vol. 12, 235; vol. 35, 197). Of this group, by far the largest number work in textile mills and clothes factories -- in Rabun over seventy-five percent, in Macon over sixty-nine percent. After manufacturing, construction accounts for the most employees in both counties (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1970: vol. 12, 567; vol. 35, 422). In Rabun three large second-home communities are in the process of being developed, one in conjunction with a country club, one in conjunction with a ski resort (Thomas, Taylor and Brunson, eds. 1975: 47).

Tourism is promoted from both inside the counties and out, for an influx of people from lowland Georgia and Florida means not only jobs for the population at large but profit for those already involved in the business, and in Rabun and Macon tourism is a long-standing business. The wealth of the most influential family in Rabun County and one that regularly involves itself in

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[8] In fact, the Appalachian counties of Georgia "had the smallest net loss of migrants in Appalachia in the 1940-1950 decade (35,000) and their loss was not much greater in the later decades" (Brown and Hillery 1962: 59).

public affairs was founded on hotels and motels.

On balance, however, neither tourism nor industry, especially the textile and clothing industries, which are traditionally low-paying (Nordheimer 1973: 38), bring the median incomes of the two counties up to the state level. The median family income in Rabun was $6056 ; in Macon $5666 and this despite the fact that over forty percent of the wives living with husbands are employed. (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1970: vol. 12, 235; vol. 35, 197). This means that twenty-one percent of the families in Rabun and twenty-five percent of those in Macon have incomes below the federally established poverty line (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1970: vol. 12, 234; vol. 35, 197). Although the rate of unemployment is not particularly high -- 3.6 percent in Rabun and 4.6 percent in Macon (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1970: vol. 12, 235; vol. 35, 197) -- many people must depend on agency checks (welfare, unemployment, Army retirement and social security) to get along.

Even with such assistance, some people in the two counties are without dependable or sufficient food, clothes, shelter during a part of the year. On the other hand, poverty figures provided by the federal government should not be taken at face value -- especially in an area where people are used to living off the land. Subsistence farming, which was not long ago the principle economic activity of the area, survives in several ways but particularly in small-scale gardening. Almost every family or individual has a garden, often one large enough to be plowed. It supplies an important part of the household's food. Some families also have fruit trees. The produce is grown or picked in the summer and early fall, but usually some is frozen or otherwise

stored for the winter. In Rabun a cannery, open during harvest months for the benefit of the community, facilitates this task. Some families keep live-stock as well, most often chickens or guinea hens, but sometimes a cow or two. Finally, many men hunt and fish, although game is not now as plentiful as it once was. To a greater or lesser extent -- greater in general for blue-collar workers with a farming background -- most individuals and families depend on these means of food-getting.

Beyond these survivals from subsistence farming, at least some aspects of the pattern of reliance on self, family and neighbors that grew up in assoc-iation with it, remain in evidence. People often make their own repairs and improvements around the house, perhaps with equipment borrowed from relatives and neighbors. Alternately, they rely on the skills of relatives and neighbors, who are less likely to expect payment. It still happens that a house is put up by the owner, his relatives and neighbors. Rather than being paid for, ser-vices are frequently exchanged. In short, gardens, livestock, the countryside, know-how, neighbors and relatives are resources which, although not represented in income, keep some people out of desperate straits and allow others to live more comfortably. The effect for many is portrayed by Barbara Taylor (1973: 138) in an assessment of her own family's economic situation:

> My family [is] not rich. We have just enough money to get by on. We pay our debts and try to be saving with everything. We're not middle class -- our house, truck and barn don't fit in that category. But we're not poor either; I've never gone to bed hungry or been ill without get-ting medical care. We are a typical mountain family, I think.

As Barbara Taylor's statement indicates, people in Rabun and Macon, like people elsewhere in Southern Appalachia, feel that highlanders are or are per-ceived to be different from people in other parts of the United States, espec-

ially from "typical" middle-class, urban Americans. In the realm of values, where it is not safe to say much of anything, it is safe to say that many people in the two counties regard religion and family (and to a lesser extent, long-term friends)[9] as central to their lives, and that this sense is heightened by the comparison they draw between themselves and others elsewhere. Indeed, in some cases it is reinforced by another attitude, namely, disdain for or distrust of the world in which, it is supposed, family and religion are not taken so seriously. Success in that larger world is particularly suspect. Thus some people emphasize the qualities that make a man a good father or neighbor or Christian, believing that these are nowadays neglected for those that make a good businessman or politician.

Religion is important to many residents of Rabun and Macon, but whether religion as a fact of everyday life more often takes the form of religiousness or religion-mindedness -- deep beliefs that hold sway over behavior or simply concern for those beliefs (see Geertz 1971: 18) -- is another and difficult

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[9]Long-term friends approximates relatives. As Schneider (1968: 53-54, 70-71) points out, both friend and relative relationships are ideally characterized by enduring, diffuse solidarity. But the difference between a friend and a relative is that while you can drop a friend, you cannot drop a relative. A friend of long-standing is one who has not been dropped, and the longer he has been a friend, the less likely it is that he will be dropped.

In some rural areas, including Rabun and Macon, friendship is even more likely to approximate kinship through the fact that long-standing friends are often neighbors and people may be "born with" their neighbors, rather as they are "born with" their relatives. As Schwarzweller et al. (1971: 61) report for eastern Kentucky: "Relationships among neighbors, especially if they have lived near each other for a long time . . . tended to take on familiar tones." Such long-term friendships, often with neighbors, help make up the strong sense of belonging to place that is common to many residents of Rabun and Macon, especially the older ones.

question. The same type of question is of course relevant to the importance
of family, although it is more evident, at least to me, that allegiance to
family does indeed influence conduct. In any case, nowadays many people do not
attend church, at least on a regular basis, pa[...]ly because the church no
longer provides a unique opportunity to get out and meet friends and relatives.
At the same time, as Gordon (1971: 341) discovered for the county immediately
west of Rabun:

> . . . it is unusual to find a mountain person who was not brought up in
> the church and who did not have at least some youthful contact with reli-
> gion. And of [the] non-churchgoers the large majority still profess be-
> lief in the Bible as the word of God and in the other standard doctrines
> of Christianity.

In Rabun and Macon, as elsewhere in Southern Appalachia (see Stephenson
1968: 29-30, 56-60; Gordon 1971: 341-342 and Gerrard 1971: 99-114), churches
of two different types are recognized by both natives and outsiders. Churches
of the first type are generally members of one of the larger Protestant groups,
especially the Baptist, Methodist and Presbyterian ones; churches of the second
type are generally independent, although they are also Protestant and in some
cases are termed "Baptist".

For local people the important differences between the two types center
on doctrine and style. Churches of the first type stress points of belief
common to all Protestant denominations. Their services are formal, conducted
by a minister who is a full-time professional. In contrast, churches of the
second type emphasize personal salvation through faith, usually in a crisis ex-
perience[10] and advocate strict limitations on habits and amusements. Their

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[10]For a good account of "being saved", and of the meaning of religion
to some people in Appalachia, see the chapter on Ellen Rector in Hillbilly
Women (Kahn 1972: 137-43).

services are informal; they "involve more participation, activity and emotional expression" (Stephenson 1968: 30). A highlight is the sermon, preached by a minister who has been "called" rather than trained.

Implicitly recognizing some of the cultural and social characteristics associated with this type of church, Barbara Taylor (ed. 1973: 76) describes a "called" minister of a Missionary Baptist church as an "old-timey, backwoods preacher". In other words, this man leads a congregation whose members (1) enjoy religious practices that were at one time more common in the area -- indeed tend to believe that their congregation has kept to the old, true religion, especially in its attitude toward the literal truth of the Bible, while other congregations have not -- and (2) live in the open country on secondary or tertiary roads. They are less likely to be well-off than members of a Southern Baptist church, a fact reflected in their modest building. Animated, focused on the individual and egalitarian in comparison with "modern" religion, "old-time" religion attracts a different group of people, to a large extent those who are metaphorically and literally away from centers of secular influence.

5.2 A perspective on the literature

Various aspects of the literature on Southern Appalachia are misleading, but none more so, at least in terms of this study, than the aspect concerned with values. Researchers and especially ethnographers devote a striking amount of space to the "values", "beliefs", "attitudes" and "orientations" of mountaineers, that is, to the "cultural themes" of Appalachian society, largely because they want to show that the population of Southern Appalachia is cul-

turally distinctive. I contend, however, that this idea owes at least as much
to the authors' vested interests as to their honest observations. It is un-
doubtedly easier and more satisfying to describe bold differences between cul-
tures or sub-cultures than it is to explore subtle variations in a culture
that is essentially familiar. As Moerman (1969: 464) points out, many obser-
vations in social science are reported precisely because they contrast with
what researchers believe to be true of white, middle-class Americans. The
temptation to emphasize differences is especially great when the group in ques-
tion is an embarrassment to the larger society. Then distinctive values can
be employed to explain why the group continues, perversely, to be poor or
apathetic or in any bothersome way nonconformist. In the case of Southern
Appalachia, the desire to see differences leads researchers to caricature the
culture they mean to describe. And the distortions threaten to unnecessarily
complicate the task of any social scientist working in the region, especially
the task of any researcher interested in the products of the supposedly distinc-
tive culture.

The picture is distorted despite the authors' awareness that it is not
possible to thoughtfully discuss the values of the entire region or even of
any entire community in sweeping generalizations. Thus, most of the research-
ers proceed by presenting a distinctive set of values that they attribute not
to the population of Southern Appalachia as a whole but to a particular seg-
ment of it -- after the fashion of Campbell who as long ago as 1921, focused
on the most rural elements of the population. Thus Pearsall (1959: 136-166)
specifies that only poor people in remote areas come close to an "exclusively
folk culture". In a similar vein Weller (1965: 5-6) declares that the six

basic traits of Southern Appalachia's "folk culture" do not apply to the "pro-
fessional and middle" classes, while Schwarzweller, Brown and Mangalam (1971:
58-67, 211-214) state that a set of orientations akin to Weller's apply most,
perfectly to the "high and intermediate" classes. Stephenson (1968: 135-136),
following the lead of Pearsall and Weller, notes a high correlation between
families whose heads are employed on a less than full-time basis in semi- and
unskilled jobs and participation in the "traditional" culture. Finally, Ford
(1962) and Photiadis (1971), writing on the basis of surveys
rather than fieldwork, acknowledge the principle but, looking at cultural
change, skirt the problem. They indicate that insofar as a provincial culture
survives, it is strongest among the rural poor.

Whatever the probably considerable value of this refinement, the litera-
ture as a whole is confusing -- confusing enough to cast doubt on the reality
of any list that purports to describe a distinctive set of values, even one in-
tended to characterize only one group within the population. The confusion has
both an internal and external aspect. Part of it stems from the fact that the
authors' conclusions are not always consistent. As I mentioned above, Weller
on the one hand and Schwarzweller et al. on the other ascribe similar traits
to mutually exclusive groups. Stephenson (1969: 108), by his own admission,
focuses on roughly the same segment of population as Weller, yet he challenges
Weller's attribution of "fear psychology" (i.e., emphasis on life's insecurity
and uncertainty).

Another part of the confusion stems from the fact that the authors' con-
clusions are not always compatible with other conclusions that are equally part

of the ethnographic record. It may be that more thorough investigation and description would resolve the internal conflicts of the literature, but I doubt it. The problem goes deeper. In the rush to identify a distinctive set of values, the researchers not only scrimp on investigation, they also narrow their perspective. They fail to consider values either in the context of life in Southern Appalachia or in the context of American life in general. The result is a conceptual muddle that undermines any attempt at balanced description.

In what amounts to a critique of the literature on Southern Appalachia, Robert Coles (1967) points up the importance of the first context. Only in the light of everyday life is the true nature of values evident. Standing apart from social science as an academic endeavor, Coles finds that many descriptions of the population of the region do not square with his own observations, made over a period of four years visiting ten separate families. He writes:

> Who . . . is to say that such people are "suspicious" or "doubtful" or "egocentric" or "depressed" or "now-oriented", or all the other things they are called? Why don't we simply summarize the problem and call them "realistic", which means smart about the world, plain and simple smart about their world (295).

As one example of a man smart about his world, Coles cites "Paul Evans":

> Like all of us, Paul Evans switches back and forth with respect to a number of "attributes" he has or "issues" he thinks about . . . . He . . . recognizes some of his own inconsistencies and talks about them. Again and again those inconsistencies have to do with Rock Creek [where he lives] and the Appalachian way of life . . . (231).

Indeed, says Coles (571), in the wake of new opportunities and possibilities the mountaineer "abandons . . . some of the social and psychological characteristics people like me take pains to observe, analyze and fit into one or another 'frame of reference'." Put simply, in Southern Appalachia as elsewhere

the situations of everyday life influence values. Values are thus sometimes

mutable; priorities are sometimes ambiguous or ambivalent. For my argument

this means that a list of values based on short-term investigation -- the kind

of description typical of the literature on Southern Appalachia -- is likely

to constitute a very general description or an inaccurate one.

While Coles gives evidence that such lists are indeed inaccurate, there

is also evidence that in some respects they are merely very general; despite

the authors' intention of identifying a distinctive set of values, they actually

describe values that are characteristic of the population of North America as

a whole. In itemizing the important themes of Appalachian culture, each of the

authors mentioned above names some form of "individualism" -- a doctrine that

as "individual-centeredness" Hoebel (1968: 400) includes in the American

world-view. Pearsall and Ford cite religious fundamentalism, even though it is

widely acknowledged that the most striking change in religious affiliation in

the United States in the last fifteen years has been the growth of fundamenta-

list congregations. Pearsall, Schwarzweller et al. and Stephenson name "fami-

lism" (i.e., allegiance to family), while Herman Kahn (1973: 20) asserts that

along with religion "what the average American cares about is . . . family,

life." Plainly, the authors' claim that some distinctive set of values char-

acterizes the population of Southern Appalachia does not easily fit the facts

as they are seen by certain observers, and the conflict points up the impor-

tance of the second context. Only when American values are examined will it

be clear whether -- or to what extent -- Appalachian values are distinctive.

If, however, it is true that values are related to the situations of everyday

life, then it is probably also true that values in Southern Appalachia are

similar to those in North America generally, for everyday life in Appalachia is permeated by American life. In my view, Ralph Ellison's remarks about the likelihood of a distinctive Negro culture in the United States apply equally well to the likelihood of a distinctive Appalachian culture. There is, says Ellison (1964 in Valentine 1968: 124) an American Negro (read "Southern Appalachian") idiom and way of life, but it is in no way "separable from the conditions of American society, nor from its general modes of culture -- mass distribution, race and intranational conflicts, the radio, television, its system of education, its politics."

Ultimately any attempt to see values apart from the context of life in Southern Appalachia necessarily misconceptualizes values and any attempt to see it apart from American life in general not only reinforces that misconceptualization but also -- and this is the most unfortunate consequence for this study -- distances the culture of the region. Perhaps it is for these reasons that Coles comes to regret the ascription of certain values and traits to the population of Southern Appalachia and finally the idea that it is appropriate or useful to ascribe any distinctive values or traits at all.

I do not want to argue that Coles' stance should be generally adopted in social science, although I tend to agree that if the subject of values cannot be treated more open-mindedly than it has been in the past, it is better neglected. Rather, I want to make the point that the stories and events of the Foxfire corpus demand very little in the way of expressly acquired knowledge from a North American. In particular, it is appropriate for those approaching the stories and events to have faith in their spontaneous responses.

Insofar as I have developed a critical perspective on the literature of Southern Appalachia, it has been to make this point and to clear away a bias that plagues the ethnography of the region. The stories presented here are primary data not just for sociolinguists but for ethnographers as well. Southern Appalachian ethnography needs new data, and it should be given a fresh launching.

CHAPTER VI

THE STORYTELLING EVENTS

In this chapter I describe the stories and storytelling events of the
Foxfire corpus in accordance with framework sketched in chapter IV. That
framework centers on the components of the speech event, especially as they
figure in the narrator's construction of the event and the listener's
interpretation of it; in other words, as they are used by the participants.
In most cases — and certainly in the events of the Foxfire corpus — the
importance of the components varies predictably by phases. Each phase
proceeds more in terms of some components than of others. The components
comprise the circumstances of the event play a large part in the narrator's
decision to tell a story, then, correspondingly, in the listener's recognition
of it, but not in the narrator's construction of the story or in the listener's
interpretation of it. The scene, setting, participants, the community's
purposes or expectations and the speech context of the story generally
influence the potential narrator to choose to tell a story or not. Once the
decision is made, however, that is, once the narrator has chosen what he
thinks is a favorable environment for storytelling, the focus shifts from
circumstances to constructions. At this point the form and content of the
story, including the key, are generally more important in both construction
and interpretation than the scene, setting, participants and to some extent
the speech context.

To the general rule that the circumstances are the focus of attention in decision and recognition but give way to form and content in construction and interpretation, there are three exceptions. The first concerns the community's purposes. Since these are a matter of the culture of the community and therefore given rather than chosen, perpetually the same in any one community, they offer no clues for recognition, and would not even if purposes were discernible at the outset of the event. The second exception concerns one element of the form of the message, namely, openings, which occur early enough in the story to figure in recognition. The third exception concerns the content of the message. Although the form of a story is to some extent determined by the fact of a particular type of storytelling event, and thus need not enter into the potential narrator's deliberations, the content is provided by the narrator.

The view of the speech event that I have been propounding here, a view that provides an important dimension of the descriptive framework, is depicted graphically in figure 2. Figure 2 shows the components as the vertical axis and the phases of the speech interaction as the horizontal axis of a grid that indicate which components are the most important or relevant to each phase. Both circumstances and constructions are indicated in the list of components, along with the components that are neither, i.e., the narrator's purposes, the listeners' reactions and the speech event itself. The speech event is in a category apart, especially for the purposes of this description. It entails both circumstances and constructions, and it is important in all phases of the interaction. But here it has only one value — the storytelling event — and thus establishes

FIGURE 2

A VIEW OF THE STORYTELLING EVENT

PHASES OF SPEECH INTERACTION

SPEECH COMPONENTS			Decision to launch message and event	Recognition of message and event	Construction of message	Interpretation of message and event
Circumstances		Setting	highly relevant	highly relevant		
		Scene	highly relevant	highly relevant		
		Parti-cipants	highly relevant	highly relevant		
		Community's purposes	highly relevant		highly relevant	highly relevant
		Preceding conversa-tional context	highly relevant	highly relevant		
Constructions		openings		highly relevant		
		Message form			highly relevant	highly relevant
		Message content	highly relevant		highly relevant	highly relevant
	(Key)	Narrator's purposes	highly relevant		highly relevant	highly relevant
		Listeners' reactions			highly relevant	
		Speech event	highly relevant	highly relevant	highly relevant	highly relevant

the boundaries of the description. That is to say, the description is concerned with the choice of whether or not to tell a story, but not with the choice of whether to tell a story or launch some other kind of speech event.

This view and these boundaries translate into a description as follows: each section of this chapter deals with a particular component and specifically with the values it assumes in the storytelling events of the _Foxfire_ corpus. It opens with a paragraph which states the role of that component in the interaction and the description goes forth in light of that role. For example, the setting, scene and participants are mainly important in decision and recognition. Thus, the section devoted to these three components shows something about how the different settings, scenes and types of participants influence the potential narrator and consequently inform the listener. Form is important in construction and interpretation, and the section devoted to it shows something about what the different forms represent to the narrator and consequently the listener. Finally, each discussion mentions certain relations between or among the components, sometimes in specific terms (i.e., a familiar setting contributes to an informal scene) and sometimes in more general ones (i.e., the content is usually compatible with the narrator's purposes). In short, the description means to show storytelling events as an association of values brought about by the actions of knowledgeable narrators and listeners, actions taken in accordance with the rules of speech, including those that specify the significance of each value a component assumes. Let me add that as in any speech event, the narrator's actions are aimed not only at fulfilling the

purposes particular to storytelling (goals which will be discussed in
section 6.6) but also the purposes common to speakers. The narrator aims
at the very least to complete the message with the listener's attention
intact. For this reason he wants the message to be intelligible and
significant. This is the goal that underlies any other.

The components that structure this description are not precisely the
same as Hymes', given in chapter IV (see pp. 33 -34). They have been adapted
for this particular project. "Channel" and "forms of speech", being limited
by the nature of the corpus (the first exclusively to oral, the second
largely to an informal variety of Appalachian English), are omitted.
"Norms of interaction" and "norms of interpretation", insofar as I have
data bearing on them, are subsumed under "message form" and "listeners'
reactions", with the exception of one possible rule for incorporating rules.
This norm is suggested in the final section of the concluding chapter, where
I sketch a concept of narrative that takes into account the fact that
recognition of a story is not automatic. "Key", a component that needs
further definition, is discussed briefly in connection with the narrator's
purposes. "Genre", or rather, the question of whether stories or narratives
constitute a genre, that is, whether they include "formal characteristics
traditionally recognized" (Hymes 1972: 65) is beyond the scope of this
study. The question requires investigation, first of all, into what features
participants consciously identify.

In contrast to Labov and Waletzky's description, which does not explicitly
refer to a corpus, this description is quantitative as well as qualitative.
Most parts of the description take into account all (or as many as possible)

of the eighty-three stories or events; in each section I mention the data
which are the basis of my conclusions.

Data on the stories and events is, of course, imperfect. Typical of
both sociolinguistic and folkloristic practice, I collected little in the
way of kinesic information, let alone information on any of the other non-
verbal signs, and transcribed only a small amount of the paralinguistic
information available from the tapes. A lone researcher without camera is
limited in what he can both collect and record. This is a problem faced
by any researcher on his own, but a problem faced by even a team of
researchers concerns the built-in biases of a situation that yields stories
easily. The fact that these stories are, so to speak, artifacts of Foxfire
makes for some skewing of the data. Specifically, in comparison to a
representative sample of comparable storytelling events from the same
community, which would be the ideal, these events feature a higher number
of older narrators; probably a larger number of stories concerning the
not-so-recent past and generally more attentive audiences. The overall
effect of these biases is not clear, but where I have judged that one or more
has had a significant effect on the patterns emerging from the data, I
remark on it.

Each of the eighty-three stories and storytelling events of the corpus
have been numbered in order of the increasing age of the narrators and, within
that, in order of occurrence in the session or interview. These numbers,
given in parentheses, identify the particular story or event. In the
interests of clarity and space, stories are often quoted in part rather than
in full; in an excerpt, the comments of a listener, the narrator's response

to a listener's comment, a narrator's aside or an interruption are sometimes left out. In such cases, no indication of an omission is given; other types of omission are indicated with ellipsis points.

In citations from the stories initials refer either to myself ("B.K.") or to one of Foxfire's advisors ("E.W." for Eliot Wigginton, "P.R." for Pat Rogers, "S.A." for Suzy Angier and "M.B." for Margie Bennett). Other symbols are listed in the table below.

_____	Underlining without words above indicates a stretch of speech that was not decipherable.
( )	Parentheses enclose guesses as to what was said; they indicate that a stretch of speech was not readily decipherable.
. . .	Ellipsis points indicate either an omission in the citation (see above) or an interruption to the speech event.
" "	Quotation marks enclose a quotation given in a special manner, a manner meant to suggest the speech of the actor being quoted.
<u>word or words</u>	Underlining with a word or words above indicates stress laid on that word or words.
(.), (,), (?), (!)	Punctuation marks indicate the speaker's intonations, not grammar.
[ ]	Brackets enclose descriptions (indicating, for instance, paralinguage or kinesics) or explanations added by the researcher, not transcribed speech.

6.1 What settings, scenes and participants are featured in the story-

telling events of this corpus?

The circumstances of a storytelling event comprise its setting, scene

and participants, along with the community's purposes or expectations, which

I will discuss in the next section. These circumstances[1] -- the immediate

social context -- influence the potential narrator's decision because they

affect both his own and the listeners' frame of mind. In most cases, the

potential narrator's first concern is to gauge whether the audience will be

receptive -- specifically, a matter of the listeners' characteristics, their

relationship to him and to each other, the setting and the scene. And his

judgment at that point helps to shape his own mood. Further, listeners share

with narrators a knowledge of the circumstances conducive to storytelling, so

that the same circumstances that incline a narrator to tell a story alert a

listener to the possibility of one. In this way the circumstances of story-

telling figure in both the decision to tell a story and the recognition of one.

As I noted in chapter I, over a period of ten years Foxfire has recorded

a large number of stories, including all but sixteen of the eighty-three stories

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[1]Except for the community's purposes, the circumstances of a storytelling
event are not necessarily constant throughout the event. True, in North
America at least, the setting does not usually shift, but participants do some-
times join or leave. The scene, dependent in part on the setting and partici-
pants, is thus susceptible to change. More interestingly, the storytelling
event itself can modify the scene or the relationship of the participants. Be-
cause of its strong associations with a certain type of scene and a certain
kind of relationship between teller and listeners -- those discussed in this
section -- the event suggests, that is, helps to create such a scene and such
a relationship. This type of transformation does not, however, occur in the
storytelling events of the Foxfire corpus: as in most events, the associations
mentioned already obtain because they are the ones congenial to storytelling.
Indeed, in all significant ways, the circumstances of the storytelling events
of the Foxfire corpus are constant and will be treated as such here.

in what I call "the Foxfire corpus". While some of the interviews were arranged to elicit stories, others were not but did all the same. It is clear from this that Foxfire's interviewing practices are compatible with and even conducive to storytelling. These practices, largely established by Eliot Wigginton and the first generation of Foxfire staff members, give us insight into the circumstances of the storytelling events of the corpus, especially because the circumstances have a psychological dimension not so evident from the events in themselves. In this section, then, I look at Foxfire's interviews in general and twenty-four interviews in particular to deduce the circumstances that characterize the events of the corpus. Although the practices that shape these interviews are passed from one generation of students to another by example, and fall in with local patterns of visiting (see the following section), they are to some extent conscious. On one occasion members of the staff drew up instructions for interviewing, and I refer to these in the following description. From the perspective of Foxfire's practices, the interviews:

1) come to pass only after the contact has been visited at least once by a representative of Foxfire. "Go visit the people," say the instructions mentioned above, "bring along a magazine and explain its operation and purpose. [Then] set up an interview." By virtue of the community's small size and Foxfire's extensive network of communication, the contact is often acquainted with both the visitor and the organization, if not personally, by reputation.

2) involve as participants the contact, two or three students, an advisor and not infrequently some member(s) of the contact's family, such as his spouse. The contact is almost always personally acquainted with one or more

of the visitors. In eleven of the twenty-four sessions I documented, the advisor was the contact's friend or one of the students was his relative.

. 3) takes place at the home of the contact. Twenty-one of the twenty-four interviews took place at home; one on the road in the contact's truck; and another at a picnic. An interview carried out at a contact's home entails a short-term "visit" -- in this community a significant category of informal social interaction between relatives, friends and acquaintances living within easy reach of each other. A visit is not always welcome, but it generally is. Moreover, many consider knowing how to enjoy a visit and treat visitors (the two go together) important knowledge. Daisy Burton, for example, told me she didn't mind one bit if visitors interrupted her work; she'd put it right down in order to socialize with them.[2]

4) are casually structured and open-ended. Initially the visitor taking primary responsibility for the interview, often an advisor but sometimes a relative, makes a request for stories or asks questions, but he does not insist on covering certain topics even when he has them in mind. Many interviews go largely where the contact takes them. The instructions advise "study [your] questions beforehand" and "don't read them off the paper What -- were -- times -- like -- when -- you -- were -- young? Ask them casually . . . ." In

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[2]Sarah Dowdle, interviewed in Foxfire (Wigginton, ed. 1973: 97) expresses similar thoughts about the proper way to treat visitors. Contrasting country manners with city ones, she says:
  "And they're simply friendlier in the country. Them city people don't
  even ask you to come in and they don't have time t' fool with you. If
  you want anything, you have to tell 'em what you want right at their
  door; and if they don't have time, they'll say, 'Well, come back some
  other time' or so on."

short, most interviews are conversational.[3]

5) are designed to please the contact. The visitors drop any opinion or topic that seems to embarrass, offend or anger the contact. And they extend this sensibility to personal traits. As the instructions recommend: "If you run into someone who does not like red coats -- don't wear red coats to see him." Moreover, they look interested in what the contact has to say: "The main thing to remember is that you are after their [the contacts] thoughts, ideas and way of life."

This description, then, suggests the set of circumstances characteristic of the storytelling events of the Foxfire corpus, even those that were not collected in interviews or by Foxfire. From the speaker's point of view, the setting is own or familiar territory, as seen in item 3. The scene is relaxed and informal, as would be expected from the contact's readiness for the visit, item 1; the composition of the audience, item 2; the setting, item 3 again; the nature of the talk, item 4 and the audience's stance toward the contact, item 5. The relationship of the speaker to the listeners is sometimes intimate and at least friendly, as seen in item 2; also, the speaker's status is equal or (by virtue of age) superior to the listeners'.[4] Although Foxfire

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[3]Labov and Waletzky (1972: 354) make a very similar point. In fact, their interviewing practices are not unlike Foxfire's:
"Our techniques do not utilize fixed questionnaires, but a schedule of topics with some transitions and questions specified in exact detail. It should be noted that the placement of the question ["Were you ever in a situation where you were in serious danger of being killed?"] is an important point. Ludicrous results are obtained when students introduce it in a mechanical way in the style of a conventional interview."

[4]In the majority of the storytelling events of the corpus the status of the narrator is superior to that of any of the listeners, simply because the narrator is older; in some events the narrator's status is presumably equal

concentrated its efforts on circumstances that would affect the speaker's frame of mind -- help make him a willing narrator, for instance -- the same circumstances for the listener would affect his frame of mind equally -- help make him a receptive member of the audience. Thus, we could generalize these circumstances a bit more to indicate what would be just as conducive to receptive listeners as willing narrators, to wit: a familiar setting; a relaxed and informal scene and a friendly relationship between participants, with the narrator's status equal or superior. As such, these circumstances are probably characteristic of a large number if not the majority of storytelling events in North America.

They are also a set by more than happenstance; not only are they likely to occur together, they support each other. A familiar setting and especially the home is often populated by relatives and friends, and these two circumstances together help create an informal scene.

Two unsuccessful (and atypical) interviews underline the relation between a relaxed and informal scene and storytelling: lack of the former may block the latter. They also point to the relation between a relaxed and informal scene, storytelling and the community's expectations for storytelling, a relation broached in the following section.

In the first of these interviews I joined a group who visited Florence Hartley nine people strong. Five students and their advisor from outside

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to that of one of the listeners, that listener being the narrator's spouse. As we saw in chapter I, however, the corpus includes two sets of stories that follow neither pattern: the interaction is primarily between two people of equal status, old friends, who alternate between the roles of teller and listener.

the area accompanied two Foxfire students. One of the students had already
called on Florence twice before, the second time arranging this interview.
Florence, eighty-four years old, had lived in this part of the North Carolina
mountains all her life, carrying out domestic duties first for her natal family
and then her conjugal one.

We trooped into the Hartley's living room through the porch, where we
said hello to Florence's husband and her sister, took seats aimed at Florence
and waited -- generally ill-at-ease -- for members of the Foxfire staff to
position their tape-recorders. Florence sat stiffly in her chair, swinging
her foot back and forth, back and forth.

The tape-recorders on, one of the staffers began asking Florence about
her life and times: Where had she grown up? What was her childhood like?
How was growing up different nowadays? Had she gone to school? Had she played
any games, had any favorite toys? What had she liked to do best?, etc. Flo-
rence answered each question briefly, each answer very much to the point. She
rarely volunteered any extra information. She couldn't tell us anything,
really, she remarked more than once: her husband and her sister were the ones
to ask.

Indeed, her husband did call in a few things from the porch, so that
members of the audience began to drift out to him. The tape-recorders clicked
off, but the staffer kept talking to Florence, in all about seventy minutes.
Toward the end of that period, with only four listeners still in the living
room, Florence appeared to speak more readily, but she maintained her posture
and continued to give the same unanimated, spare replies.

That the interview had not been a great success was plain to everyone.

Florence had not talked very much -- she certainly had not told any stories --
and people had not enjoyed themselves. Someone suggested that we had never
hit on anything that Florence was interested in.

Yet under the circumstances, I felt that it would have been difficult
to tap any of Florence's interests. The interview made demands on her that
she had not anticipated. She seemed willing to accept the role of an infor-
mant in the strict sense but not the role of an authority. That role must have
seemed thrust on her by the properties of the occasion, i.e., the large audi-
ence of mostly unfamiliar faces, the two tape-recorders, the battery of ques-
tions, the ultimate destination of her words. As her comments about her hus-
band and sister indicate, she was certainly not used to or comfortable with her
role of an authority -- and would have liked to have given it over to them.
Further, if her role was defined as that of an authority, the questions put to
her were not conversational. For Florence this scene was neither relaxed nor
very informal. The audience of outsiders sensed this. As a result their ill-
ease never wore off and their manner reinforced Florence's impression. Here
the characteristics of the speaker (she is unworldly) and the relationship
between the speaker (they were previously unacquainted) and the listeners have
influenced the speaker's definition of the scene, which in turn has influenced
the listeners'. The overall result is a scene, mutually defined, that is not
conducive to, nor characteristic of storytelling in the Foxfire mold.

In the second of the interviews -- more an aborted interview -- I led
the group. From almost the beginning of my stay with Foxfire, I had wanted
to hear Jim Wieland, whose skill at storytelling was well-known. After one
of Foxfire's staffers mentioned my name and interest in Jim, I persuaded her

and two other friends associated with <u>Foxfire</u> to go with me to make an appointment to see him. Jim said he was busy until the next Tuesday. Though in his late seventies, he was still a practicing blacksmith, having blacksmithed, logged, built roads and raised livestock in this area of Georgia and North Carolina most of his life, with a few years spent overseas as a soldier in the First World War. He allowed that he had had a lot of experiences; what did we want him to talk about -- hunting and fishing? wild animals? Oh, that's fine, I said.

Six days later we again found him in his shed, looking worn out from his work over the forge. He did not seem happy to see us. Without acknowledging the purpose of our visit, he told us how much work he had to do. Then, complaining of the heat, he went to the house for a drink. By the time he came back, we had decided not to stay. He looks awful tired, said one of my friends. I explained to Jim that we could easily come back some other time, and he took us up on it, saying he was sorry; he hadn't expected to still be so busy.

Like Florence, Jim was unhappy with the demands our visit made on him, only in this case the demands were of time and energy. For him, a tired and busy man, the scene was not relaxed and we quickly assimilated his view.

Even more clearly than the first example, this one shows that an important aspect of a relaxed and informal scene is the feeling of "time-out", time-out not only from taxing or pressing work, as in Jim's case, but time-out from threatening or annoying personal encounters, as in Florence's; generally, time-out from strenuous effort or worry. Both Florence and Jim were preoccupied, she with her situation, he with his work. Neither was in a position to take time-out. Thus neither was ready for much conversation, let alone story-

telling. Remember, too, that because of the close association between time-out and storytelling, storytelling signals time-out. And neither narrator was in a position to risk encouraging the listeners to prolong their stay.

As the examples above show, these two speakers not only refused to tell stories, they were also reluctant to talk; two facts not unconnected. All of the stories of the Foxfire corpus are embedded in conversations and the same circumstances that are characteristic of the Foxfire storytelling events are characteristic of the conversations. In general, the circumstances conducive to the one are conducive to the other,[5] although I expect that the circumstances must be present with even more certainty for storytelling to take place. A feeling of time-out and a friendly relationship between narrator and listeners are especially important. A story consumes more time and concentration than a conversational remark. It thus requires participants with a certain amount of time on their hands, at the least participants who do not want to get away because they are harassed by work or worry. The more the narrator feels free, the more he can settle himself into a storytelling mood; the more the listeners share this feeling, the more they can enter into the event. A story further focuses attention on the narrator[6] and -- if the stories are those of

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[5]The three factors Labov (20 February 1973) lists as promoting talk are consistent with the circumstances named here. Labov's factors are (1) an informed scene (2) power superior or equal to the potential listener's and (3) the maximum degree of shared knowledge between the potential speaker and listener. A "maximum degree" of shared knowledge may not be as conducive to storytelling as a high degree of shared knowledge (a high degree of shared knowledge opens up possibilities for interesting content, as we will see in the section on content; whether a "maximum degree" would expand or limit these possibilities is difficult to say), but the factors in general describe the narrator's situation as outlined in this section.

[6]Narrators can adjust the amount of focus, however, as we will see in section 6.6 on narrator's purposes.

personal experience -- on his history. It therefore requires a storyteller who is willing to take on this presentation of self. The more the narrator feels assured of a friendly audience, the more he is ready for storytelling. Thus, the circumstances most relevant to a decision to tell a story and, correspondingly, the most relevant to a story's recognition may be sketched as a gathering of friends for or at leisure.

6.2 What expectations for outcome are featured in the storytelling events of this corpus?

Like the setting, participants and scene, the community's purposes figure in decision; additionally, they figure in construction. In deciding to tell a story, the potential narrator judges that the story will satisfy the community's expectations; and in constructing it, he endeavors to fulfill his own purposes without compromising the community's. The community's purposes and the narrator's are not necessarily conflicting, nor even necessarily distinct. Moreover, the community's purposes have the same hold on the narrator as they do on the listeners or on non-participants. For any member of the speech community they are prescribed and prescriptive. In other words, a story is legitimate only when it meets the community's expectations.

Unlike the other circumstances, the community's expectations are given as part of the community's system of speaking -- rather than being chosen for a particular event. For this reason, and unlike the narrator's purposes which are also chosen, they do not in most cases figure in interpretation.

As I saw it, storytelling events have two purposes in the community from which the Foxfire corpus is drawn: the primary purpose is passing time

pleasantly; the secondary one is sharing socially relevant knowledge. The latter is complementary to the former in that socially relevant knowledge -- about people or conditions in the community, for instance -- is interesting. Its transmission becomes one element in passing time pleasantly. I offer no proof that these are the expectations characteristic of the storytelling events of the corpus or of the storytelling events of the community -- that requires further investigation of listeners' reaction to and opinions about the events -- but I do offer some, literally, circumstantial evidence for the existence of what I have named as the primary purpose.

First, the relation between storytelling, passing time pleasantly and the circumstances discussed in the previous section is a close one. Indeed, the relation between the latter two is a close one, storytelling aside. A familiar setting, a relaxed and informal scene (that includes the feeling of time-out) and participants who are friendly -- these are circumstances that are conducive to passing time pleasantly, and the narrator takes advantage of them when he introduces a story in their midst. He builds on the pleasure already generated. A story, for instance, is a natural and agreeable addition to a sociable conversation; or a natural and welcome break in a companionable silence. That the circumstances characteristic of the storytelling events promoted by Foxfire are those that lend themselves to passing time pleasantly serves as one sort of evidence that passing time pleasantly is among the community's expectations.

Second, the association between storytelling and visiting is significant. We saw in the last section that the large majority of Foxfire's interviews entail visits and that visits are an occasion for taking time-out.

Time-out here and in general means not only having or making time but having or making time away from serious concerns. In other words, a visit or any time taken out should be time passed pleasantly. That so many stories arise during visits and that one purpose of a visit is to pass time pleasantly, then, serves as another sort of evidence that passing time pleasantly is among the community's expectations.

It could be argued that so many stories arose during visits not in response to the requirements of a visit but in response to the requirements of an interview. I think, however, that the more salient aspect of the occasion for both contacts and staff members alike was visiting. The interviews did not just entail visits, they constituted visits. Foxfire's visits were similar to other visits in the community, say, between friends. The staff members acted like visitors because they perceived themselves to be visitors, not just because they wanted to suggest a familiar occasion. Thus, the stories were told to fulfill the requirements of a visit -- that is, pass time pleasantly -- as much as or more than to fulfill the requirements of an interview -- that is, give out information.

As I imply above, people in the community told stories during visits in which Foxfire had no part. In my observation, they also told stories during periods of planned leisure, at or after supper, for instance, when they expected to pass time pleasantly. And they also told them during periods of routine work, quilting or pea-picking, for instance, when it was possible to pass time more pleasantly without interfering with the job at hand. These associations are further evidence that one purpose of storytelling is indeed passing time pleasantly.

6.3 What immediate speech contexts are featured in the stories of this
corpus?

Besides the social context created by the scene, the setting, the
participants and the community's purposes, the stories of the Foxfire corpus
all possess a speech context: they are, as I noted in section 6.1 embedded in
conversations. The utterances immediately preceding a story are of special
interest because they often prompt the decision to tell it; in Labov and
Waletzky's words, they are the "stimuli to which the narratives respond" (Labov
and Waletzky 1967: 20). And these utterances, when they prompt the decision
to tell the story, also of course cue recognition.

In this section I account for the immediate speech contexts of the
eighty-three stories of the Foxfire corpus by categorizing the stories as
they relate (or do not relate) to those contexts.[7] Two groups of stories
respond to listeners' utterances. They are requests and questions. Twenty-one
out of eighty-three stories fulfill requests,e.g., a Foxfire student says to
her father, Stan Williams: "Well, you told some stories or started t' tell one
this evenin' , why don't you just tell it -- sounded like a pretty good-un."

(4)   Stan: I don't remember what it was. _____

        Student: Yeah, Ardilla [Stan's sister] told us somepun about it --
                    one that he [Stan's father] told.

        Stan: Well, he used t' waggonery, haul freight like people
                    drives trucks today, etc.

The large number of stories in this category is partially attributable to

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[7]One story appears in two contexts so that the total is eighty-four
rather than eighty-three.

Foxfire's aims, which from time to time included collecting stories. This is suggested by the two sessions specially cited in the introductory chapter. In these, interaction between peers predominates and Foxfire's influence is at a minimum. At only one point during these sessions does one friend request a story from the other, and then for Foxfire's benefit.[8]

Another six stories answer questions, e.g., a Foxfire interviewer asks Jim Wieland about the injury he has just mentioned: "Did you fix your own arm?"

(40) Jim: Yeah, I went over there to -- uh -- get him to take

the cast off an' by gosh, he said, they didn't know

where the doctor was, etc.

The questions that elicit these stories are marked by their specificity: they ask for a particular point of information. Only one of the six is aimed at calling forth a story, but it, too, is specific. In an interview that he hopes will be devoted to hunting stories, Eliot Wigginton asks Bill Corn: "What -- what's the -- best hunt you went on that maybe you were the most pleased with after you got back, what were you the proudest to bring in? Do you remember that?"[9]

Another two groups of stories particularize the narrator's own utter-

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[8]On the other hand, the pattern that Foxfire follows of young people requesting stories from old people seems quite natural. The extent to which it arises in the community apart from Foxfire's visits makes an interesting question.

[9]Two of Foxfire's interviewers told me (and others were aware) that blunt, non-specific questions generally failed to elicit stories. Labov and Waletzky (Labov 1972: 354) makes the same point:
"Many formal interviews use questions of the form 'Can you tell me something amusing (dangerous, exciting, important) that has happened to you?' Though such questions will produce some response in some listeners, they are quite unsatisfactory as a rule to both listener and interviewer . . . ."

ances -- generalizations or assertions. Nineteen stories support a genera-
lization, e.g., a _Foxfire_ student is talking about how the driver's foot can
get pinned back on a go-cart when Clifford Willis breaks in with "Well, I
know. You take them ol' -- ah -- T-model cars. They used t' be -- they'd --
they'd cut out under, ya know."

(27)   Student: Yes, sir.

       Clifford: So -- us -- the first one I ever got ahold of, I
                 started around a curve, a quick curve, an' I just
                 cut it like an' the durn thing cut under, jus' come
                 right aroun', turned over, etc.

This story of Clifford's first experience with a Model-T is evidence that
"they'd cut out under." In another interview, with Will and Sarah Reid, Eliot
Wigginton asks about Sarah's ability to "blow fire" (take pain from a burn),
"stop blood" (from a gushing wound) and cure "thrash" (i.e., thrush) infecting
babies' mouths and in particular wants to know: ". . . what do doctors think
of all that stuff?"

(80)   Sarah: Doctors say to hunt up a thrash doctor.

       E.W.:   Will they?

       Sarah: Yeah [she and Will chuckle].

       Will: _____ everybody in the whole community aroun' goes --
                 now, Rel Long, I was well-acquainted with him. His little
                 kid had thrash. They took it t' the doctor an' it didn't
                 seem to do it no good and some of 'em told him, he better
                 bring it to her, let her look at it, see what she thought
                 about it. So, Rel fixed it up and brought it, etc.

This story about Rel Long shows that "everybody in the whole community aroun' goes": not only did Rel bring his baby to get cured, several people advised him to do so.

Eight stories more elaborate or explain an assertion, e.g., during a visit arranged by Foxfire, Aunt Eula Brown says to her old friend Jim Mize: "I cain't walk from here [Eula's house] -- I'd be afraid to try it.

> (69)   One day I went down the road. _____ I walk with that stick, ya know. I can walk without that stick, ya know, but I kin cetch the stick if I go t' fall an' it heps me awalkin'. It strikes me right there, Will, whatever it is strikes me right there . . . . I started t' the graveyard that day, an' -- uh -- I took a hoe t' clean off Julius [Eula's late husband] an' Poppy an' Mommy's graves then. An' got right below T.R.'s house and somepun hit me right here . . . . An' somepun hit me right there. Knocked me to the ground. I didn't -- I didn't know what to do. I cain't get up when I fall -- I jus' cain't get up hardly t' save my life. So I got ahold a my stick -- I throwed my stick out -- I throwed my stick outa the way t' keep from fallin' on it. I got ahold a the stick an' held to it till I got up, but when I got up, I couldn't stand up, etc.

As a result, Eula was nearly run over by a car. Here Aunt Eula both elaborates on not being able to walk and explains why she is afraid to try.

A fifth group of twenty-four stories reflects spontaneous associations with some element in either the narrator's or listeners' utterances, e.g., a Foxfire student asks Aunt Eula if there is anything she needs at the store.

(70)   Student: Are you outta flour or anything? Sugar?

        Eula: No, I run outa coffee the other day. I got so tickled

                  I didn't know what to do. An' I said, "Edna [a neighbor

                  who frequently visits], git me some coffee." She come in,

                  I said, "Where's my coffee?" "O-o-oh, forgot it! The

                  durn thing, I . . . " [laughs]. Well, I said, (I better

                  not be too many days). She went back an' went t' town an'

                  got me four packages a coffee, brought it.

Like the other narratives in this category, Aunt Eula's story is linked to a preceding remark, but not in any logical way. For this reason the utterance gives no indication that a story will follow.

The final group of stories bears no discernible relation to the imme-- diate context. Four of the six are frankly volunteered, e.g., Jim Mize says unexpectedly:

(59)   .   They rared at me. I don't know how -- I don't know how

                  I done it; I'll tell you how it was, etc.

Two others, however, are related not to remarks that immediately pre- cede them but to remarks elsewhere in the conversation. Both are from the interview with Bill Corn and Red Taylor. One fulfills Bill's promise to tell a story "on" Red and the other responds to Eliot Wigginton's request for hunting tales, but the promise and request are separated from the stories.

This count shows that almost two-thirds (fifty-three) of the eighty- three stories of the corpus are categorizable as replies, examples, explana- tions or elaborations; that is, they directly follow and are straightforwardly connected to requests, questions, generalizations or assertions. Unlike the

contexts that prompt stories by association, these contexts are identifiable
from their form and content. They thus alert the listener to the possibility
of an upcoming story.

Even when requests are discounted -- on the grounds that they are dis-
proportionately represented in the Foxfire corpus -- questions, generalizations
and assertions constitute more than a third of the total number of contexts.
This proportion seems even more significant when we consider that very old
narrators have a greater tendency to tell stories that are related to the im-
mediate context by association or not at all. As I have discussed elsewhere
(Keller 1975), narrators over eighty do not care or cannot afford to care as
much whether their stories are logically bound to a preceding remark. Since
the Foxfire corpus represents a much higher percentage of over-eighty narra-
tors than does the population of the community, the corpus is skewed away from
contexts that serve recognition.

As we have seen, most of the stories in the corpus are straightforwardly
related to utterances that immediately precede them in one of the five ways
discussed above. A few stories, however, are prompted by utterances that occur
somewhat earlier, such as the two cited above from the interview with Bill Corn
and Red Taylor. Both kinds of utterances may be responsible, at least in part,
for the stories that follow them, but the more an utterance is removed from the
story it prompts, the less it is likely to serve as a signal for an upcoming
story. While the two kinds of remarks probably play potentially similar roles
in the decision to tell a story, the first plays a much stronger role in recog-
nition.

Discussing generalizations and assertions that lead to stories, we have

arrived at an analytical borderline between the decision to tell a story and its construction. Whereas a request or a question is a circumstance of a storytelling event -- it is not under the direct control of the narrator -- a generalization or an assertion may be a construction, a statement made by the narrator in order to pave the way for a narrative he has in mind. An analyst has no good way of discrimating between a remark that prompts a story and a remark that is offered to introduce one (although the spontaneity with which the narrator takes over the conversation is one indication: a smooth transition from remark to story, without a pause longer than is normal between sentences, suggests that the remark was calculated). Thus, a generalization or assertion that appears as an immediate context cannot be assumed to prompt the story that follows it.

However, whether it prompts the story or not, a generalization or assertion and the story that follows it are straightforwardly bound to each other; moreover, they are together straightforwardly bound to the conversation in which they are embedded. As elements in the conversational train of thought, they are part of an established speech event. And a story thus connected is one that appeals to a potential narrator. If the listeners have been receptive to the conversation up to the point when the story begins, they are likely to remain so. Questions and requests tend to assure the narrator of a receptive audience -- one of the listeners did ask the question or make the request. So do stories that contribute to the development of the conversation -- the listeners have been engaged in the conversation so far. Certain speech contexts, namely, statements that lend themselves to particularization, are therefore conducive to storytelling in much the same way as are certain social contexts.

That is to say, generalizations and assertions do provide the immediate stim-
uli for some stories, but they also provide attractive spots for storytelling.

6.4 What forms are featured in the stories of this corpus?

The form of a story is the substance of its construction and interpre-
tation. Just as the decision to tell a story and its recognition depend on
attention to the setting, scene, participants and speech context, so the con-
struction of a story depends on attention to the message form, and inseparable
from form, the message content.

While Labov and Waletzky's work provides points of comparison throughout
this chapter, this section and the following one, concerned with form and
content, are largely addressed to the central issues of that work. The
description here does not break new ground: drawing on Labov and Waletzky's
terms, I add to and comment on their observations concerning the parts of
narratives. Where the data dictate, I challenge their assumptions, especially
those entailed in their definition of narrative (see chapter IV). Then, in
the conclusion of this study I capitalize on the continuity between this
description and Labov and Waletzky's by using the former to judge the latter.
Finally, it is because I am following Labov and Waletzky that some aspects of
form are neglected, most importantly, length, a feature that in some cases at
least figures in the decision to tell a story, as most other aspects of form
do not. In future descriptions, this feature should be considered.

I am also following Labov and Waletzky in only partially separating the
message form from the message content, that is, from the information the form

conveys. The following section is concerned with the content of stories as wholes and not with their content as it is subdivided among syntactic units. It is probably unwise to attempt such a separation. Indeed, in chapter IV I hinted that Labov and Waletzky fail to take this point seriously enough and rely too heavily on syntactic forms that do not adequately correspond to content.

6.4.1 What openings are featured in the stories of the Foxfire corpus?

Unlike other forms or parts of the story, openings are likely to figure in recognition. They occur early enough to cue the listener that a story has begun when the matter is still uncertain. In describing the overall structure of a story, Labov and Waletzky name two elements that often appear at the beginning, namely, the abstract and the orientation, but they neglect certain opening phrases and remarks that show up in the Foxfire corpus. In this subsection I discuss these openings as well as the abstracts and orientations.

Opening phrases and remarks

Almost half (thirty-eight) of the eighty-three stories of the Foxfire corpus begin with an opening phrase or remark. Neither form offers much explicit information, but both signal that a story is beginning. Labov and Waletzky (1967: 297) note that many narratives include forms that mark the beginning and the end of the message, but add that the "fixed formulas" found in traditional folk tales and fairy tales are "not available for personal narratives" While the phrases that show up in so many of the stories of the Foxfire corpus are not exclusive to stories or even to the beginnings of stories, they are all variations on the phrase "one time" and in that sense are "fixed".

The remarks, on the other hand, are exclusive to the beginnings of stories, but they are not "fixed":

Twenty-eight stories feature the phrases "one time" or "one day/night/ morning". One story even presents one of each. In response to his daughter's request for huntin' stories, Stan Williams begins a narrative (opening phrases are underscored with an interrupted line):

(5)   Well, one day Grampa went huntin' one time. They come up on

       some cattle an' they decided they'd have 'em some fun, etc.

And Aunt Eula Brown, speaking of the local doctor, commences a story:

(65)   He got -- he got mad down here one day, down, down -- down at --

       uh -- Harley Watts'. Saree [Harley's wife] had the pneumonia

       fever an' she and it bad, too, etc.

And finally in response to her niece's request, Ruth Brown begins the story about, in her own words, "the time I lived on Mud Creek and my cow was witched":

(13)   Well, I don't know if they really is things 'r not but I begin to

       think there might be because I'll tell you what did happen. We

       had a good Jersey cow and that milk you could strain it up 'n the

       cream would rise on it about that much [indicates with her fingers].

       'N' took cream off that and makes two pounds of butter -- it was so

       rich. Well, one morning, I strained it up an' took it 't' the spring

       box and I took my cream 'n' take my churn and next -- that night I

       poured the night's milk in with it 'n' next morning that milk wadn't

       a thing in the world but -- have you ever seen buttermilk where

       people pours water in their churn t' make it gather the butter?, etc.

Four more stories feature further variations on "one time": "once",

"that same time", "the last time" and "the first time" each appear in one story. Red Taylor, for example, mentions that "[Deer] make a funny racket when they see ya, too -- sounds like a feist dog abarkin' -- snortin' they call it -- just a little 'yap, yap' kinda like," and begins a story:

(7)   Me an' Bill was together the first time I ever heard one
        snortin', taking John Miller [deer-huntin] , making drives
        on the ridge fer each other, etc.

As the examples above suggest and as I mention above, "one time" and its variations appear in several different places toward the beginning of a story. Like the formula "once upon a time", a few of the phrases occur at the very beginning (story 5 above), but most show up in an abstract (story 65 above, where the first sentence summarizes the story and includes "one day"); after some introductory comment; after an orientation (story 13 above, where both an introduction comment and an orientation precede "one morning"); in an orientation (story 30 below) or after an abstract and an orientation.

Furthermore, "one time" and its variations occasionally appear later on in a story. This is because, unlike "once upon a time", these phrases do have meaning beyond their marking function. "One time", "one day", etc. as we have been discussing them and as they appear in these stories[10] refer to a relatively short, experientially coherent span of time -- a day, a morning, a night if the phrase indicates -- belonging to the not recent past. About three-quarters (sixty-nine) of the stories of the corpus concern a compact, distant experience, so that this phrase or one of its variations appropriately

[10]The "one time" and "once" under discussion here are not those in which one is solely a counting number, as in "I've only seen him one time." Nor is the "one day/night/morning" that in which "one" is synonymous with "some", as in "She will come one day." Instead, the "one" here probably denotes unity.

represents the temporal dimension of any of these narratives. In some of the other stories, however, the phrase is suited to representing the temporal dimension of a part rather than the whole. For example, Ruth Brown tells a long story (11) about a ghost horse in several different episodes: how she and her husband bought the "hainted" place, how they found out about the horse and how they eventually heard it. The last two episodes begin as follows: "Ed's Daddy was down here one day; he said, 'Have you ever heard the big horse?'" and "So one day, now, when it start . . . ." Both of these episodes depicts an aspect of the overall experience, but each represents a temporal segment as well, appropriately referred to as "one day".[11] When "one time" and its variations do appear toward the beginning of a story, however, they cue the listener that a story is beginning and help him to grasp one dimension of its content, albeit an aspect that can often be correctly presupposed.

Besides the thirty-two stories that feature these phrases, six stories open with remarks that announce a story is beginning. Referring directly to either the story, the telling or the incident that constitutes the story's subject (though only by a pronoun) and providing little or no other information, these remarks are the most straightforward kind of opening. Jim Mize, for example, commences a story about his first job out in the state of Washington:

(57)   I'll tell ya what I done, (a sorta little story).

And Bill Wieland, adding a bit of orienting information, begins a story about

---

[11]"The other day" may be an opening phrase equivalent to "one time" or "one day", one applicable to the recent past rather than the not-recent past. It occurs toward the beginning of four stories. Due to Foxfire's interest in the old days, however, only seven stories in the entire corpus deal with recent occurrences, all told by Aunt Eula Brown during Jim Mize's visit. And without more stories of this type, the status of "the other day" is unclear.

shooting a cow for a wild animal:

(37) Look what I done, by gosh, comin' back from a dance at Highlands.

And another of Jim Mize's opening remarks artfully combines a reference to
telling with allusions to coming events:

(59) They just rared at me -- I don't know how I done it; I'll tell

ya how it was.

Abstracts and orientations

As we saw in chapter III, Labov and Waletzky (1967: 32 - 39; 294 - 301)
identify three elements of narratives in addition to the complicating action,
evaluation and resolution: the abstract, orientation and coda. While the coda
marks the end of a message, the abstract and orientation mark its beginning.
As we will see (subsection 6.4.5), the coda further closes off the complicating
action. An abstract and an orientation open it, the first by introducing the
content of the story; the second by setting the scene. The authors describe
an abstract as two or three clauses summarizing the story, and the orientation
as clauses, phrases or lexical items -- but most commonly a group of clauses
reporting background information (in Labov and Waletzky's term "free clauses")
-- naming the time, place, actors and their activity or situation. In answer
to his wife's question "What about that frog -- a frog she put in that other
girl's throat?," Clifford Willis tells a story that features both an abstract
and an orientation. In this story the first three clauses summarize the story;
they also introduce the two main actors (albeit with some confusion in pro-
nouns: Riverbend and the first"she"refer to two different girls). The follow-
ing clauses depict the situation -- one girl has in her possession a tree frog,
described in detail -- and portray Riverbend. The last two clauses further

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specify and reiterate the situation: "we'as sittin' there" and "this little

girl had that tree frog in her hand".

(30)   'At [other] was a girl we called Riverbend; she throwed a frog in

abstract   her throat. She liked t' swallow that cussed tree frog.

She had a little ol' tree frog that she'd caught, jus' a little ol'

bitty one, you've seen 'em . . . . It's kinda the color of a limb 'r

anything, little pot-bellied thing. It ain't big. Well, she'd --

she'd caught one o' them an' she had it. Well, this girl -- I be-

orienta-   lieve -- I believe -- I believe her name was Polly Fenster -- I be-

tion   lieve -- but I -- but -- uh -- she was from Riverbend, somewhere in

Georgia, place they call Riverbend an' we alway just called her

"Riverbend". An' -- uh -- when she laughed, she'd just lay her head

back and open her mouth widest you ever seen an', jus' laugh at any-

thing here. 'Ell, we 'as sittin' there one time an' this little

girl had that little ol' tree frog in her hand, etc. [The compli-

cating action begins.]

Over two-thirds (fifty-five) of the eighty-three stories of the corpus

start off with some orienting information (apart from any contained in the ab-

stract, if there is one). A majority of these orientations name' the situation

(thirty-four) and the actor(s) (twenty-eight). A minority identify the place

(seventeen) and the time (only six). The typical or modal orientation (there

are nineteen) names both the actors and the situation. Clifford Willis' story

(30) above provides one example. And Jim Mize begins a story about the first

time he drove a locomotive:

(55) I'd ride the trains up -- up in the mountains, ya know, an' ever

morning; they'd bring me in of a night. An' I know one day they

had a good ol' engineer there an' -- an' I 'as sitting over 'ere,

'as firin' fer him, etc.

The first clause identifies the main actor -- Jim himself -- and the others

give the situation, including Jim's activity. As in the large majority (forty-

four) of the orientations, the information here is contained in independent

clauses devoted to describing properties of the setting, accomplished facts,

characteristics of the actor's ongoing activities -- in short, clauses that

refer to states rather than events (in Labov and Waletzky's term most of them

are "free", a few of them "restricted"). A small number of stories, however,

present orienting information in clauses that refer to the first or even second

event of the story. Bill Wieland, for instance, follows a story about acci-

dentally shooting a cow with one about a friend accidentally shooting a dog;

he begins:

(38) Fred Davis come down there about a month later, etc.

This clause names the main actor and gives the place -- the same spot where

Jim had his accident -- and the time -- about a month after that accident.

About one-fifth (sixteen) of the stories begin with an abstract. The

large majority (thirteen) of these abstracts include some orienting informa-

tion, but insofar as the orienting information is included in separate clauses,

the abstracts precede the orientations. Besides giving orienting information

and providing a summary, however, about half (six) of the abstracts provide

insight into the narrator's attitudes toward the experience represented in the

story. Take, for example, the opening of Ruth Brown's story about her step-

mother, Aunt Lolly:

> (9)   I remember one time she like to beat me to death. Jim, my
>
>   brother, he was about two 'r three years old -- he got choked
>
>   on a sweet apple, etc.

This follows on Ruth's statement that she loved her step-mother, but "she
was -- I don't know, she just didn't like me -- us [Ruth and her friend] for
some reason." Plainly, the first clause of the abstract shows that Aunt Lolly
was severe, particularly with Ruth. Compare this, then, with the opening of
Jim Wieland's story about a practical joke that got out of hand:

> (36)   I think they played a trick one night on -- uh -- I think it 'as
>
>   one o' the Howard girls, Belle Thomas an' a few o' 'em out there --
>
>   sent a couple o' girls t' get a bucket a water -- needed some water.
>
>   They was -- uh -- somebody out there wrapped up in a bedsheet out
>
>   there, etc.

Jim's abstract outlines the incident, but stops short of his attitude toward
it. Specifically, it provides no hint that the trick was in fact dangerous.
As Jim explains later in the story, after the boys scared them, the girls
"felt dead, by God, I thought we'd never get 'em back with us."

In total, some combination of opening phrases, opening remarks, abstracts
and orientations begins seventy-three out of the eighty-three stories of the
Foxfire corpus. Though I have distinguished them for the purposes of analysis,
except for the opening phrase "one time" and its variations, they are not neces-
sarily discrete from each other or from the rest of the story. Opening remarks
and abstracts sometimes contain orienting information; orienting information
is sometimes mixed in with the clauses that begin the complicating action.

Nonetheless, coming as they do toward the beginning of the story, they all cue the listener that a story is beginning, opening remarks unmistakeably, the others less so. We have seen that besides being important to recognition, "one time" and its variations figure in interpretation. This, obviously, is even more true of abstracts and orientations: an abstract gives an overview of the story that frequently directs the listener's attention to its most important elements and conveys their affective meanings, while an orientation provides necessary background information.

In the previous section we saw that most of the stories of this corpus are closely, that is, straightforwardly connected to the immediate speech context. In addition, many of the stories are closely connected to the contexts by reason of the latter's actual contributions to the information of the story. When it provides the kind of information that otherwise shows up in an opening phrase, abstract or orientation, the immediate context plays a part in the story's construction. Almost all the requests, questions, generalizations and assertions that precede the stories of the corpus supply some orienting information; one question and four requests form abstracts of the stories to follow; and two requests even supply a variation on 'one time'. These contexts thus obviate the need for certain information in the story itself. For instance, Blanche Willis asks her husband, "What was it you tore down the first time you tried to drive?" and Clifford replies only:

(26)   Tore down the side of a barn an' a -- an' half of a cane patch

         an' then turned over an' I went out a there on my hands and knees.

Employing "the first time", identifying the actor or the activity would be redundant here since Blanche's question has already done so. On the other hand,

these contexts create the possibility for emphasis. For example, Red Taylor

requests Bill Corn to "Tell 'em about the time that little devilish ol' boy

scared you to death nearly with that dumbull [bullroarer]," and Bill responds:

(48)   Well, that was dangerous. He was a little chunk of a young-un

         an' he seed somebody with an' ol' dumbull, etc.

Using "one time", naming the actor or supplying the point of the story would

be repetitive here, yet Bill adds to the abstract ("that was dangerous") and to

the description of the boy ("a little chunk of a young-un"). These particular

forms of emphasis show that Bill has his tongue in his cheek (as does Red):

what both men know is that the boy was not just any prankster but Red himself

as a kid. "Dangerous" stresses the fact that both men now see the incident as

perfectly harmless.

The dependence of the stories of the corpus on their immediate speech

contexts, as illustrated above and in the previous section, as well as the

variety and coincidence of openings suggests that neither narrators nor lis-

teners feel the need to distinguish an absolute beginning to a story; an

approximate one will do.. If the conversation moves easily into a story and

if the story gradually signals its own existence, nothing has been lost of

the message or the event for either the listener or the narrator.

6.4.2 What order and apportionment of information specifically about events

   are featured in the stories of this corpus?

   This is one question to which Labov and Waletzky (1967: 13) in effect

address themselves when they define narrative as "a technique for constructing

narrative units which match the temporal sequence of [a past]experience."

By "narrative unit", as we saw in chapter III, Labov and Waletzky mean a

"narrative" clause.[12] Thus, their definition asserts that reference to

events is carried out by the apportionment of information about these events

into clauses that are temporally ordered, that is, ordered to match the

sequence of events.[13] These clauses together constitute the complicating

action.

   Putting aside for later the question of whether the most important

information in stories is about events — this is an assumption implicit in

the definition[14] — it is at least clear that all of the stories of the Foxfire

corpus do include information about two or more events. (Events, of course,

are not limited to acts: there are events of thinking, feeling and speaking

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[12]Quotation marks enclosing the words "narrative", "free", "restricted"
and"coordinate" indicate that I am specifically referring to the meanings
Labov and Waletzky assign these terms.

[13]Thus, clauses "out of (temporal) order" are ones that do not correspond
to   the (inferred) order of events. "Temporally ordered events", a phrase I
use frequently, may seem redundant — events occur in time and are therefore
temporally ordered — but it emphasizes that we perceive events to be
chronologically ordered.

[14]As I pointed out in chapter IV, the definition makes reference
the defining function, thus presumably the dominant function in narrative.
If reference is the dominant function and reference has to do with events,
it follows that the most important information in narratives is about events.
This claim will be briefly considered at the end of subsection 6.4.4 and again
in the concluding chapter.

as well). The question that arises, then, is whether "narrative" clauses are the only clauses that report events. In the stories of the Foxfire corpus they certainly bear the major burden. The overwhelming majority of clauses reporting events in the twelve stories of the appendix, for example, qualify as "narrative". At the same time, a few dependent clauses, "restricted" clauses and "free" clauses do report events in these twelve stories, despite Labov and Waletzky's claims. As we saw in chapter III, the authors explicitly exclude these three types of clauses from those eligible to be "narrative units". "Restricted" and "free" clauses, as defined by Labov and Waletzky (1968: 288 - 289), contrast with "narrative" clauses precisely in that they are not temporally ordered: "restricted" clauses can be moved over a certain range, and "free" clauses over the entire range of a narrative without a change in the semantic interpretation. Dependent clauses, according to Labov and Waletzky (1967: 21, Labov et. al. 1968: 289), are simply irrelevant to the temporal sequence: their temporality is fixed only in regard to the clauses on which they are dependent. Labov and Waletzky contend that because clauses of these types are not temporally ordered, they can neither report temporally ordered events nor constitute part of the complicating action.

Yet in at least two stories of the appendix clauses name events, and events that are crucial to the interpretation of their respective narratives. In one story Will Reid tells about the time his wife "stopped blood" from a gash in a horse's leg. He ends the story (independent clauses are lettered; dependent clauses indented):

(78)   p.   And they [the people who brought the horse to Mrs. Reid] said

in less than five minutes that horse's leg quit bleedin'.

Here the resolution appears as a clause of indirect discourse subordinated

to clause p.   In putting the resolution into the mouth of those best quali-

fied to know, the narrator makes the mention of the event a verb phrase complement.

In another story, briefly excerpted in subsection 6.4.1, Ruth Brown

tells about getting in trouble with her stepmother, Aunt Lolly:

(9)   a   I remember one time

b   Stan, my brother, he was about two 'r three years old

. . .

e   This little ol' apple [was] 'bout that big

f   and Ruby's mother was there

g   and she said to me, she said, "You better watch him."

h   She said — uh — Aunt Lolly is on her high horse.

i   She's mad, you know.

j   And she said, "If he gets one a them in his mouth

'n gets choked"

said, "she'll kill you."

k   And so, she didn't wait t' get back t' the house

till Stan poked one of them little ol' apples in his mouth.

Here the complication appears in an adverbial clause subordinated to clause k.

Note that the sentence involved would make the same sense if the semantic

content of the dependent clause were transferred to the independent clause

(i.e., "And so, Stan didn't wait till she got back t' the house to poke one

of them little ol' apples in his mouth). With this clause and the one above

both the order and the importance of the events named is apparent, even though only one of the clauses appears in temporal order. The clause subordinated to clause p in story 78 is out of order (first the horse's leg quit bleeding, then the owners of the horse reported that fact to the Reids), yet it conveys information that is indispensable to the story. The information conveyed by the clause to which it is subordinated, on the other hand, serves merely as a frame or introduction. The clause subordinated to clause k in story 9 is, of course, temporally ordered: the independent clause and the dependent one are in fact related in the way that Labov and Waletzky's term "coordinate" (see chapter III).

In another three stories "restricted" clauses name events. These clauses are either out of order or in an indeterminate order, and for this reason appear in Labov and Waletzky's scheme as "restricted" clauses, no matter what their import. The beginning of Calvert Connor's story about getting lost features a group of out-of-order clauses reporting events:

(2) $_0z_9$. An' in the meantime we found the plane

$_1a^2{}_6$ —we walked all day, just about lookin'

$_3b^2{}_5$ and left pretty early that mornin'.

$_4c^2{}_4$ We told — un — Brian's grandmother

   where we were goin'.

$_5d^2{}_3$ An' — uh — we told her

   we were goin' t' look for that plane;

$_6e^2{}_2$ we'd be back before dark.

$_7f^2_1$ An' we left early that mornin'

$_8g^2_0$ an' packed us a little lunch

$_8h^2_1$ an' we found the plane.

In this sequence the narrator begins at the chronological end (finding the plane), goes back in time one step, then another, then another (from walking all day to leaving to telling Brian's grandmother where they are going); then back to a previous step (leaving), then back one step of that (packing lunch) to get to the chronological end (finding the plane) once more. Given these regressions and overlaps, no two clauses can be said to be ordered with respect to each other. The order of events is not established by the order of the clauses, so that no change in the order of clauses can be said to result in a change in the semantic interpretation. Yet the order of events is clear, just as in the excerpt from story 7A above. The narrator and his friend, for instance, certainly packed their lunch before leaving home, even though clauses b^2 and f^2 precede clause g^2. In short, this example challenges Labov and Waletzky's assumption that the interpretation of temporal sequence is "based on the expectation that the events described did, in fact, occur in the same order as they were told in" (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 30). It makes more sense to assume that the interpretation is based less on what is in the story than what is brought to it. For the most part, listeners correctly infer the order of events (for reasons I will discuss further in the concluding chapter) and even when they are in doubt about the exact order (e.g., in story 2 did Calvert and Brian tell Brian's grandmother they were leaving before or after or

at the same time as they packed their lunch?), they understand that the events were ordered. Another group of "restricted" clauses reporting events appears in story 60, clauses $\bullet$ through g^2 (see appendix).

As for clauses in an indeterminate order, Jim Mize's story about some pranksters trying to frighten him with a dressed-up stump includes a single but, again, indispensable clause of that type. Clause c^3 is not ordered with regard to several "narrative" clauses, probably because the exact time of the occurence named is secondary; only the fact of the occurence is primary:

(58) an' they — uh — after that his first encounter with the
        pranksters happened

$_2u^2_0$ Jake Grant, one of Jed's brothers, give me a pistol.

$_0v^2_2$ Said, You can carry it

$_0w^2_0$ an' hide it over there

$_0x^2_0$ an' not carry it on the work.

$_0y^2_1$ I said

        I wouldn't carry it on the works at all.

$_{51}z^2_{20}$ I had this little ol' tree on the side a the road
        when it hit over here at the highway

$_1a^3_0$ an' I put it in the stump.

$_0b^3_3$ An' — uh — so I come back that night

$_{10}c^3_{17}$ an' they'd blacked that [stump]

$_{11}d^3_{16}$ an' had that coat on [it]

The past perfect tense in clause c^3 indicates that sometime before Jim arrived on the scene the stump was set up, which is the only part of the order of

events that the listeners need to know. Most of the rest of the clauses

report Jim's actions and do so such that they correspond to the order of

the actual events, but the prankster's actions are independent of that

sequence. Again, listeners understand that an order existed, though it

may not be important.

In another story (52) of the appendix "free" clauses report events. These

clauses are headed by verbs indicating habitual actions and they describe

iterated events. They are thus temporally ordered only within one sequence

of events. To Labov and Waletzky this means they are not temporally ordered

at all. Explaining one such group of clauses the authors say:

> Because all of these clauses refer to general events, which have occurred
> an indefinite number of times, it is not possible to falsify the situation
> by reversing clauses. Clauses f and g refer to ordered events on any one
> occasion, but since they are in the general present they refer to an indefi-
> nite number of occasions, so that it _is_ the case that some g followed
> some f (Labov et al. 1968: 289).

It is true that listeners distinguish between a repeated series of events and

a unique one, but it does not follow that they consider a repeated series of

events to be outside the realm of content possible for a story. Indeed,

story 52, which is discussed at the end of the following, closely related

subsection, refers almost exclusively to iterated events. I admit that it is

a "story" by virtue of having been included in the Foxfire corpus on the grounds

that it strikes me as a story, but at present we need to rely on our intuitions.

Whatever the status of "free" clauses reported iterated events, Labov and

Waletzky's definition of "narrative" clause is too restrictive. Correspondingly,

dingly, their assumption of how listeners go about interpretation is faulty.

As a result, they fail to recognize that, on occasion, dependent and "restricted"

clauses do indeed report events and devise an analytical framework that cannot

account for such clauses.

6.4.3 What narrative heads are featured in the stories in this corpus?

According to Labov and Waletzky (1967: 28 - 29, 43; 1968: 289), only certain verb forms head narrative clauses, that is, clauses that report events: "the principal forms are simple past and simple present," with other possibilities being past and present progressive and the modal "could" (though in 1967 only examples of the past progressive had shown up in the authors' materials). The authors state categorically that the modal "would", the quasi-modal "used to" and the "general" present do not appear as narrative heads. These types of verb refer to habitual action and so, like the free clauses discussed above, are excluded. Past and present perfect probably do not appear as narrative heads (and in 1967 no examples had shown up).

The stories of the <u>Foxfire</u> corpus support Labov and Waletzky's contention that simple present and past verbs head narrative import[14] clauses more often than other forms. The stories do not, however, support their assertion   that only habitual action verbs head narrative import clauses. Watson (n.d.: Chapter IV, 50), who has used Labov and Waletzky's scheme to analyze her own corpus of storytelling events, disagrees with them on the use of these verbs and suggests that a corpus like the <u>Foxfire</u> corpus would be particularly fertile ground for finding them:

It should be noted that non-narrative verb tenses by Labov's definition . . . .can be and are understood by the audience as narrative verbs . . . .

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[14]Since I have taken issue with Labov and Waletzky's definition of a narrative clause on the grounds that some clauses it excludes are a part of the complicating action, it is now more appropriate to be concerned with "clauses of narrative import" rather than "narrative clauses".

it is entirely possible to tell a story wholly in habitual tenses. A good example of this kind of narration in a "real-life" situation is the tendency of older people (parents or grandparents) to adopt habitual tenses when relating experiences of their personal history to children or grandchildren.

In at least four stories of the Foxfire corpus habitual action verbs head clauses of narrative import. Each of these stories mixes habitual with non-habitual verbs to some degree. In Ruth Brown's response to her niece's request we can see one reason why both sorts of verbs might show up in the same narrative. Asks the niece: "Would -- would you tell us about that, you know, that true story that you say -- is it really true, about the ghost horse trampin' around the house?" Ruth replies (heads of narrative import clauses are underscored with an interrupted line):

(11)   . . .

They're agonna think I'm crazy. No, this is really the truth. 'Uh, John Carpenter he bought this place

. . .

And so -- uh -- Big Pete come down. He said, "Did ya ever hear the big hoss?" I said, "No." Well, he said, "You will." I said, "Maybe." So, one day, now hit, when hit start, I've heared Ned [her husband] get up. I said, I know ol' Sam's out -- that's our horse. I said, I hear him out there in the yard. And he'd get up and put on his clothes and go to the barn and the door is shut and the barn -- the horse is in the barn. Well, just as sure as we blowed that light out, you could hear that horse comin' clip-clomp-like-clomp, like that [slapping her knees] and he'd come right to the winder and tromp till you started to get up and time your feet hit the floor, he was gone. And it wasn't a thing in the world but

a horse gallopin' up there and stomped and stomped. Now, that's
the truth if I never get outa this chair.

While there may be some disagreement about whether the other three items
are full-fledged stories[15], this example is not likely to raise any questions.
At the same time it includes a variety of verb forms as heads of narrative-im-
port clauses, four of them referring to habitual action. The heads are the
following: "come" (probably simple past)[16], "said" (simple past), "said"
(simple past), "said" (simple past), "said" (simple past), "have heared" (pre-
sent perfect), "said" (simple past), "would get up" (would), "would put on"
(would), "is" (the clause actually means "he finds the door shut"[17] and the
verb is "general" or habitual present), "is" (the clause means "he finds the
horse in the barn," and the verb is habitual present), "could hear" (could),
"would come" (would), "would tromp" (would), "started" (simple past), "hit"[18]
(simple past), "was gone" (simple past). Contrary to Labov and Waletzky's
statements, "would" and the present tense appear along with the simple past as

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[15]Some casual questioning ("Does this strike you as a story?") outside
of Rabun and Macon Counties did indicate disagreement.

[16]"Come" can be either a present or a past tense form in Southern Appalachian
speech. Williams (1968: 154 - 155) notes that "five of the most common verbs
ordinarily retain their infinitive forms throughout the tenses. Only contex-
tual use, for example, would reveal the tense of "begin," "come," "eat," "live," "run."

[17]The semantic intuitions necessary to Labov and Waletzky's analysis
sometimes go beyond understanding the supposed order of events, as with this
clause and the succeeding one. "The door is shut" refers to action -- the
action of perceiving -- rather than to a state of affairs. It is important
that clauses like this one be recognized as having narrative import.

[18]". . . till you started to get up" and "time your feet hit the floor"
are two more dependent clauses with narrative import. The supposed sequence
of events was: the horse came to the window; the horse tromped; Ruth or Ned
started to get up; the horse stopped tromping; the horse left; Ruth or Ned's
feet hit the floor.

narrative heads. Further, in one clause ("I've heared Ned get up"), the present perfect appears as a narrative head with the meaning of an habitual action. Labov and Waletzky's prediction that "could" can appear as a narrative head is confirmed ("you could hear that horse comin'").

The story begins with references to incidents that occurred once (i.e., Pete's asking if they had heard the ghost horse and hearing him for the first time, the latter being indicated by "one day") and concludes with references to an incident that had occurred many times (i.e., hearing the horse), although it seems to be the first occurrence that the narrator has in mind here. In any case, when the narrator makes the shift from non-habitual verbs to habitual ones, it is not complete (from a past perfect to a simple past to another simple past to "would", etc.). Both the confusion between the final incident -- hearing the horse -- as a unique occurrence and as a repeated one and the overlap of verb forms suggest that narrators make no sharp distinction between a single sequence of repeated actions and a unique sequence of actions, as Labov and Waletzky would have us believe. Both concern a series of temporally ordered events, even when expressed by different verb forms.

Jim Mize tells a story in which the majority of narrative heads are habitual; the incident described took place a number of times. Pat Rogers asks Jim, "Did you enjoy working on the Railroad?" and Jim replies, "I shore did". According to Labov and Waletzky's scheme of analysis, all the clauses are "free", as indicated here by the subscripts of the letters labelling them)

(52) $0^a{}_{16}$ I'd get back, I tell ya

       $1^b{}_{15}$ I'd get back

       $2^c{}_{14}$ an' then we started.

3^d_{13} I'd get back

4^e_{12} I -- we'd get our te-- we worked ten hours then, ya know

5^f_{11} an' I'd get back

6^g_{10} an' I lived on a mountain

7^h_9 an' my supper's on the table

8^i_8 an' my breakfast's on the table

9^j_7 an' my dinner on the table

10^k_6 I'd eat it

11^l_5 I didn't much want it

12^m_4 I jus' lay down

13^n_3 an' lay a little

14^o_2 an' get up

15^p_1 an' hit 'er right back.

16^q_0 Now, that's the way

I done, the way

I'as served.

Here the clauses of narrative import are headed by "would", the simple past and the simple present, but with the exception of clause c, they all appear in temporal order, representing a single sequence of repeated actions. In general, whether the stories in question are made up entirely or partially of actions repeated on different occasions, Labov and Waletzky's exclusion of habitual verbs and especially "would" seems unjustified: they are both used and understood, at least sometimes, as referring to temporally ordered events.

6.4.4 What information besides that specifically about events is featured

in the stories of this corpus?

Underlying Labov and Waletzky's scheme for distinguishing "narrative"
from "non-narrative" clauses is a basic distinction between clauses that con-
vey information about temporally ordered events and those that convey infor-
mation about the background, distinguishing characteristics or significance
of those events -- in other words, information that pertains to events but
which is not directly related to them (for convenience, I call this informa-
tion about"states"). Though only partially carried out by the authors' defini-
tion of "narrative"clause, this is a useful distinction. It separates what
I have called "clauses of narrative import" from those clauses that constitute
the story's complicating action -- from other clauses.

Beyond this, however, Labov and Waletzky make an equally important dis-
tinction between units that convey information necessary to referential clar-
ity -- this includes all clauses that describe events and some that describe
states -- and those that do not. Whereas the first fulfill the function of
reference, the second fulfill another function, which the authors call"evalu-
ation". They introduce the idea of an evaluative function by saying:

> . . . we . . . find that narrative which serves [reference] alone is
> abnormal: it may be considered empty or pointless narrative. Normally,
> narrative serves an additional function of personal interest determined
> by a stimulus in the social context in which narrative appears. We
> therefore distinguish two functions of narrative: (1) reference and (2)
> evaluation (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 13).

Thus, Labov and Waletzky name two different categories of information:
one related to the referents of clauses, the other to the functions of units
and structures. The categories tend to overlap, but they are not comparable.

Many clauses that describe states, for instance, are not necessary to reference and they are therefore evaluative. And clauses that describe events are always necessary to reference. On the other hand, since evaluation can be carried out by a unit within a clause (a word, for example), it is possible for a clause conveying referential information to also convey evaluative information. In this section, then, I want to look at the units and structures that convey evaluative information in the stories of the Foxfire corpus, whether the units be found in or associated with clauses describing events or -- as is more often the case -- clauses describing states. Before proceeding, however, we should know what we mean by "evaluative information", and to do this we must clarify Labov and Waletzky's use of the term "evaluative function". The authors apply the term to related functions on two different levels, recognizing only implicitly that they do so.[19]

On the one hand, they show that the evaluative function entails the role of

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[19]Watson (n.d.: chapter IV, 55) points out that "little research has been done on the purposes (goals) of narration from the standpoint of the narrator. The realm of functions, intentions and purposes involves several levels which should be delineated and clarified." The discussion in this subsection is an attempt to sort out two levels of function, only one of which should be identified with the narrator's purposes.

Watson (1973: n.d.: 51-52) criticizes Labov and Waletzky's notion of evaluation on the grounds that "the term . . .seems an inappropriate gloss for so mixed a group of functions as Labov has identified." To avoid the problems posed by the notion, she proposes stopping short at a distinction between clauses that describe events and those that describe the background and significance of events, without inquiring into whether the latter are needed for referential clarity. Thus clauses in orientation sections would be clauses of "mediation" (Watson's term) no more and no less than clauses in evaluation sections. Some clauses of mediation might have the "specific usage" Labov and Waletzky assign to evaluative clauses, says Watson, but describing them in those terms would be of secondary importance. I think that the functions of evaluation are not as "mixed" as Watson claims, and my discussion should indicate the unity that prevails across the confusion of the two levels.

the narrative in establishing a point of personal interest. This is the meaning

employed in the quotation above. The authors explain that

> Narratives are usually told in answer to some stimulus from outside,
> and to establish some point of personal interest. For example, among
> the narratives given here we find many examples of narratives dealing
> with the danger of death. When the subject is asked if he were ever
> in serious danger of being killed, and he says 'Yes,' he is then asked,
> 'What happened?' He finds himself in a position where he must demon-
> strate to the listener that he really was in danger. The more vivid and
> real the danger appears, the more effective the narrative. If the narra-
> tive is weak and uninteresting, he will have made a false claim.
>   Beyond such immediate stimulus, we find that most narratives are so
> designed as to emphasize the strange and unusual character of the situa-
> tion -- there is an appeal to the element of mystery in most of the narra-
> tives . . . . Then, too, many of the narratives are designed to place
> the narrator in the most favorable possible light; a function we call
> self-aggrandizement (Labov and Waletzky 1967; 34).

Thus, the establishment of a point of personal interest, including self-aggran-

dizement, is a function of a narrative as a whole in its social context.

On the other hand, they show that the evaluative function also entails the

role of the narrative's units and structures in evaluating the eleménts of the

story's content -- objects, qualities, actors, actions, situations -- and parti-

cularly in indicating the relative importance of events. This role corresponds

to that of units and structures in presenting the elements of a story. Speci-

fically, evaluation is a function of clauses, features of clauses and arrange-

ments of clauses; also of non-syntactic units, such as vowels, stress and ges-

tures. Both evaluation and reference are functions of a story's parts and not

the story as a whole.

To evaluate an element of a story, Labov and Waletzky explain, is to re-

veal some part of the narrator's attitude toward that element. The sum of a

story's evaluation, then, along with the sum of its references defines the

narrator's state of mind in regard to the experience represented in the narra-

tive -- not only his idea of what came to pass, but his idea of the signifi-
cance of what came to pass. Stories are constructed so as to fulfill the
functions of reference and evaluation -- these are intrinsic functions --
and thus contribute to evaluation in the sense of establishing a point of
personal interest. Putting forth a particular view of an experience is tanta-
mount to establishing a point of personal interest.

While recognizing the close connection between the two levels of evalu-
ation, I propose to define"establishing a point of personal interest"as a
social function of a narrative as a whole and"evaluation"as an expressive func-
tion of some structures and units within a narrative. Keeping the two func-
tions distinct allows me to adhere to description in terms of components: the
fulfillment of the social function is almost always among a narrator's purposes
and will be discussed under that heading; the fulfillment of the expressive
function, which dictates both form and content, will be discussed here.

Practically the whole of sociolinguistic thought lends credence to Labov
and Waletzky's contention that besides a referential function, the structures
and units of a narrative (or of any message, for that matter) carry out
an expressive function (see Hymes 1968, 1970).[20] Sociolinguists recognize,
for instance, that precisely because of the expressive functions of parts of
a story, a literal paraphrase does not represent it adequately (cf. Bauman
1975: 293 - 294). Theoretically, "a sender cannot help but express attitudes
toward each of the . . . factors in a speech event, his audience, the style of

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[20]This is not to suggest that all speech should be described along these
two axes, but they do seem to be the most relevant to a functional description
of the parts of narratives.

his message, the code he's using, his topic, the scene of his communication"
(Hymes 1968: 119). Nonetheless, most narrators in the circumstances des-
cribed in section 6.1 are less likely to concentrate on the code, form, lis-
teners, setting and scene and more likely to concentrate on the content. The
listeners have been judged supportive, the setting comfortable and the scene
relaxing and thus the code and the form of no more consequence than the narra-
tor wants to make them. Thus, given the primacy of the content, it is reason-
able to expect some parts of a story to strongly convey information about the
narrator's attitudes toward individual elements of a story's content -- in
other words, evaluate them[21] -- and in this way contribute to the story's point.
To say what is reasonable to expect of the units and structures of a story is
not of course to prove that they function evaluatively, but the description

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[21]Interestingly, E.M. Forster's description of the two basic functions
of novel-writing (as presented in Aspects of the Novel 1927) provides unex-
pected support for the view that not only reference but evaluation are crucial
to a story -- that unless referential and evaluation functions are fulfilled
no normal or satisfying story is possible. These functions, or rather their
novelistic equivalents, are crucial, argues Forster, because they are reflec-
tions of the two most important ways we perceive reality. Thus, despite his
prejudice against stories (he sees them as primitive novels, hence the final
sentence of the quotation below), Forster presents an idea of what must be con-
veyed in a novel that is very close to the idea presented here of what must be
conveyed by the parts of a story:

"Daily life is . . . full of the time-sense. We think one event occurs
after or before another, the thought is often in our minds, and much of
our talk and action proceeds on the assumption. Much of our talk and ac-
tion, but not all; there seems something else in life besides time, some-
thing which may conveniently be called 'value,' something which is measured
not by minutes or hours, but by intensity, so that when we look at our past
it does not stretch back evenly, but piles up into a few notable pinnacles,
and when we look at the future it seems sometimes a wall, sometimes a cloud,
sometimes a sun, but never a chronological chart. So daily life, whatever,
it may be really, is practically composed of two lives -- the life in time
and the life by values -- and our conduct reveals a double allegiance . . . .
And what the story does is to narrate the life in time, and what the entire
novel does -- if it is a good novel -- is to include the life by values as
well. . . . "

below is aimed at illustrating the existence of evaluative devices. The
question of proof is taken up once again at the end of this section.

One part of the narrator's evaluation of an element is the importance
he attaches to it, and all structures and units with evaluative import draw
attention to some element or elements of the story, very often events. An-
other part is the affective meaning he assigns to it -- this character, for
instance, is intrepid; this circumstance is ominous; this event is unfortunate.
It is by adding information to the story that an evaluative device is able to
characterize an element, but the smaller the scope of the information the
smaller the scope of the evaluation. Any device that indicates the affective
meaning of an element necessarily draws attention to it, although this is only
one way among several to emphasize an element.

In the following subsection, then, I outline the forms of evaluation
that appear in the stories of the Foxfire corpus, and particularly in the
twelve stories of the appendix. The forms are organized into groups according
to the ways they convey evaluative information; each group is briefly described
and each form is illustrated with one or more examples. The groups are roughly
those of Labov and Waletzky (1967: 34 - 39; Labov et al. 1968: 301 - 328;
Labov 1972: 370 - 393), who find many of the same forms in their narratives
(forms not appearing in Labov and Waletzky's work are marked by an asterisk).
Where I have modified the authors' scheme it is because I do not share one of
their assumptions -- a point I discuss at the end of this subsection.

Of course, any list of this sort is incomplete and tentative because it
depends on the semantic intuitions of the analyst who must decide what forms
can suggest the narrator's attitude toward an element of the story. (This is

comparable to the analyst having to decide what kinds of clauses can describe temporally ordered events.) Further, a list of this sort can at best name types of potential evaluative devices. Evaluation, Labov and Waletzky (Labov et al. 1968: 301) can be accomplished by a wide variety of means, only some of them involving well-defined arrangements of clauses or well-defined syntactic forms. But no matter how well-defined, any form may be present by reason of reference alone. Thus, the analyst must not only intuit the forms but the functions as well: there is the possibility that any form needed for reference does not serve evaluation. In the appendix I have noted each form listed below (with one exception: evaluation by arrangement of clauses is better represented by the displacement set diagrams) opposite the clause to which it applies or in which it appears. However, I have also marked with an asterisk any form that seems referential rather than evaluative.

Types of evaluation

I. Evaluation by suspension of the action. Some clauses give the impression of stopping or suspending the story's action, thereby drawing attention to the events referred to in the surrounding clauses. The second of two clauses describing simultaneous events (in Labov and Waletzky's terms both clauses are "coordinate" ones) marks time; so does a clause describing a state (in Labov and Waletzky's terms a "non-narrative" clause).[22] Although a group of clauses is usually involved, even one clause can give the impression of stopping the

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[22]Here I am mainly discussing independent clauses, though some dependent clauses describing states or simultaneous events can probably appear to suspend the story's action, either in conjunction with the clause to which they are subordinated or on their own. Like independent clauses, however, those that are needed for reference are not likely to serve evaluation.

story's action, for example, clause r in the following excerpt from Red Taylor's story about what his friend Bill Corn said one time around the campfire:

(8) $_0j_0$ Directly Bill said, By the way, boys, there ain't money enough in the Bank o' Clayton t' get me t' do like Law here . . .

$_1l_0$ Somebody said, "what'll _they_ do, Bill?"

$_0m_0$ He said, Well, dang their souls [laughs], throw a few rations together in a little ol' haversack, he says,

$_0n_0$ an' tie a quilt 'r a blanket 'r two on the thing

$_0o_0$ an' roll ('at up)

$_0p_0$ an' go out on Nantahaly in that big laurel, he says

$_0q_0$ an' stay fer as high as three days an' nights just by their lone selves,

$\longrightarrow _{17}r_{21}$ I didn't say nothin'

  fer I knowed why Bill wadn't

$_1s_0$ but -- Hoyt Perry, -- he

  "Why wouldn't ya, Bill?"

$_0t_0$ By (golly), he says, I'm afraid to --

$_0u_0$ [that's] exactly why

Clause r describes a state, the state of being silent. Its temporal relation to the other clauses in the story can be shown on a diagram of displacement sets. In such a diagram (see figure 6), as Labov and Waletzky explain (Labov 1972: 374 - 375), the horizontal axis represents the clauses of the narrative as they occurred; the vertical axis represents the displacements sets or "the

range of clauses which could have been placed before or after any given clause without changing the temporal sequence of the original semantic interpretation." So long as all of the clauses that report events occur in temporal order, the diagram accurately represents the temporal relations among the clauses of the story. While this is the case with story 8, not every clause that reports an event occurs in temporal order, as we saw in subsection 6.4.2, and therefore not every diagram is accurate. Despite their limitations, however, in most instances these diagrams provide a helpful way of visualizing the movement or flow of stories. The displacement set of clause r, for example, shows up as a line running the length of the diagram (because it includes every other clause in the narrative), and this indicates that the clause describes a state persisting throughout the events of the story. In contrast, the displacement sets of clauses q and s appear as a very short vertical line and the absence of any vertical line respectively (because they include in the first case one other clause and in the second no other clauses), and this indicates that the clauses describe events. Thus the movement of the story is shown to be forward - pause - forward, with clause r the source of the pause. The action of the story appears to stop for a second at clause r and this draws attention to clauses q and s, that is, to what Bill Corn and Hoyt Perry said. Beyond that, clause r (aided by Bill's comment indicating an explanation to come) creates a bit of suspense -- what will be said next? -- and thus focuses even more attention on Hoyt's question. In general, if the action appears to stop at a moment of particular interest, the result is suspense.

Further on in the same story, clause a^2, which describes not a state but an action concurrent with the action described in the preceding clause, has the same effect of making the action appear to stop:

y   I'm just afraid to be out by myself in the night, [said Bill]

z   An' ol' Willis just slapped his leg, ya know

a^2 an' laughed

b^2 till he -- "What're you afraid of, Bill?"

c^2 He said, "Boogers, the same durn thing you are!"   [everybody laughs heartily].

The displacement set of clause a^2 appears on the diagram as a line matched to the line for clause b^2 because the two clauses can be reversed without a change in the semantic interpretation. The action (which has already been diverted from one character's doings to another's) appears to stop, drawing attention to Willis' action and his question.[25]

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[25]Labov and Waletzky (1967: 35 - 38; 1968: 307) do not seem to apply the same stipulation to this type of evaluation as they do to the others, namely, that if the form is needed for reference, it is not likely to serve evaluation. According to their definition, of course, all "coordinate" clauses are "narrative" ones and therefore referentially necessary (with the exception, presumably, of repeated or paraphrased clauses). Without debating this point, the stories in the appendix show that some clauses that describe an event concurrent with a previous event actually elaborate the first event -- they add little referential information. These are the most likely to have evaluative import. Many other clauses of this type, however, do add referential information (see story 50, clauses j^2 and k , for example). In the majority of these cases the clauses describe the simultaneous actions of two different actors (see story 5, clauses f^4 and g^4, for example). Thus, while the action may not be progressing toward the resolution in a temporal sense, it is progressing in a semantic one. The same may be said for "non-narrative" clauses, clauses that describe states: as Labov and Waletzky acknowledge, some are referentially necessary and these contribute to the semantic progress of the story. Indeed, such clauses are often those that, if reformulated, could be narrative clauses (see story 2, clauses z^3 - d^3, for example). The question of what the listener takes as an interruption to the progress of a story is a thorny one -- and far beyond the scope of this study. But it does seem possible that for the listener to feel that the action has stopped, his attention must be torn between the progress of the story and some other line of information. Thus, when a clause describing a state or a simultaneous event contributes in an important way to the complicating action, it is not perceived as suspending the action. By the same token, it does not draw attention to the surrounding events.

In the previous section I argued that some clauses excluded by Labov and Waletzky's definition function nonetheless as "narrative" clauses, that is, they report temporally ordered events. Insofar as reference is concerned, they are the equivalent of "narrative" clauses. Insofar as evaluation is concerned, they are not all equivalent. Specifically, when narrative import clauses out of temporal order are interrupted by clauses describing states, the interrupting clauses appear to stop the action in the way described above, but they can usually not create suspense. If the surrounding clauses are in reverse temporal order, the action referred to in the clause preceding the interrupting clause took place after the action referred to in the clause following it. Thus the uncertainty needed for suspense is absent: the listener already knows what happened next. More generally, clauses out of temporal order do not allow suspense to build because they continually preempt uncertainty. Thus it may be this potential for evaluation through suspense, along with ease of reference, that accounts for the preponderance of temporally ordered clauses among clauses of narrative import in the stories of the Foxfire corpus.

II. Evaluation by remarks and actions.

A. Evaluative remarks. Evaluative remarks conjure up associations or make connections that reflect on the significance of elements of the story. The remarks may be more, less or not at all embedded in the story's action. Some are represented as having been made by one actor to another at the time of the action; some appear as a piece of background information. Finally, a few are made directly to the listener at the time of story-telling. All three types appear in Calvert Connor's story

his friend Brian see their situation go from bad to worse and are about to

give up hope of finding their way out of the mountains when they see a mysterious light. Clauses e^4 and n^4 are portrayed as what Calvert said to Brian and Brian said to Calvert respectively. Clauses m^3 and o^3 are presented as information-elaborating the preceding events. Clause m^6 is, of course, a remark directed at the listener.

(2)

k^3	-- we came out int' a real bad thicket	
l^3	an' about that time we heard a wildcat 'r a panther scream.	
$\longrightarrow m^3$	I mean it was a deadly scream.	
n^3	An' -- uh -- the dog run to us in place o' goin' to it.	
$\longrightarrow o^3$	-- it scared the dog, too.	

. . .

t^3	An' we got -- we walked out on the point of a hill --
u^3	what we thought was a hill --
	an' we couldn't see any lights from any town 'r anyplace.

. . .

y^3	an' we begin to look for the matches
z^3	an' the matches had gotten wet.

. . .

d^4	we couldn't build a fire.
$\longrightarrow e^4$	So, I said, I'm not gonna stay here all night.
f^4	We might as well jus' start walkin'.

. . .

m^4	An' -- uh -- Brian said, Only think I know t' do
$\longrightarrow n^4$	we better pray about it.
o^4	So we got down on our knees

p^4 an' started praying [laughs].

     An' -- uh -- when we got off our knees

q^4 we looked

r^4 an' we saw a light -- just a round ball o' light.

$\bar{s}^4$ An' the light would kindly come toward us

t^4 an' then it would just kinda leave.

     . . .

$\bar{x}^4$ An' it was up in the air, up in the sky, not down on the

       horizon.

y^4 An' I said, Well, let's follow the light.

z^4 So we started following the light

     . . .

q^5 an' stepped off into the main road.

r^5 We followed the main road and met all the neighbors come

     lookin' for us

     . . .

f^6 It wadn't no illusion 'r anything like that

g^6 -- we actually saw a light, a ball o' -- a bright light.

     . . .

$\longrightarrow m^6$ So that's -- uh -- it makes the hair stand up on end

       when you start thinkin' about it [laughs lightly].

More or less directly, all of the remarks named above convey affective meanings. The comment "it was a deadly scream," for instance, leaves no doubt that the cry of the panther was ominous. "We better pray about it" suggests just how serious were the incidents that led up to Brian and Calvert's present

situation. Like many evaluative remarks, this one draws attention to and indicates the affective meaning of a group of events, such that they reflect on the significance of a large part of the story. Some evaluative remarks -- and especially those made directly to the listener -- reverberate throughout the action of a story, for example, Calvert's closing comment "it [the appearance of the ball of light] makes the hair stand up on end when you start thinking about it." By implying a supernatural origin for the light, Calvert's remark indicates that happenings in the story were more than eerie, they were inexplicable. As another example, Jim Mize's remark early in a story (60) about an encounter with some robbers --"an' I'll tell ya how I done an' it's a pretty good'un"-- suggests that Jim was a clever fellow. Remarks such as this go further than other evaluative devices. By emphasizing and characterizing a principal element (the main character, Jim above, for instance) or a group of elements, they embody the point of the story. With this type of remark, the two levels of function I have separated out draw together; almost independently of the rest of the story they establish a point of personal interest. In general, the effect of an evaluative remark fans out through the story.

B. Evaluative actions. Evaluative actions also conjure up associations but of course they cannot make connections verbally. Otherwise they emphasize and characterize elements of the story as do remarks. In Calvert Connor's story excerpted above, for instance, a panther screams, clause 1^3, and later, the frightened dog runs back to the boys, clause o^3. These actions (supported in the first case with the evaluative remark "And it was a deadly scream") show that the situation that night was extraordinarily unsettling. Being lost is one thing; being lost when a panther screams and your dog cowers is another.

Some evaluative actions, like the panther screaming, depend so much on conventional associations that Labov and Waletzky's 1967 (38) term "symbolic" makes an apt description for them. Like evaluation remarks, evaluative actions have a widespread effect in the story.

III. Evaluation by intensification. Intensifiers, as the name indicates, intensify or reinforce certain information, either referential or already evaluative, about elements of the story. By doing so, they draw attention to those elements. Some intensifiers also add information that suggests, or more likely hints at affective meanings. In comparison with the effect of an evaluative remark or action, the effect of an intensifier is usually limited. As a part of a clause or something superimposed on a clause, an intensifier emphasizes and characterizes one or two elements --those referred to in the clause -- and rarely is one of these the principal element of the story. In the few cases where an intensifier is a clause (see emphatic parentheses, ritual utterances and repetition and paraphrase below), it emphasizes but does not characterize.

One way to break down the wide variety of devices in this category is to refer to those that depend on lexical meaning and those that do not. Below, then, are "lexical" and "non-lexical" intensifiers.

A. Lexical intensifiers.

1. Quantifiers, including "very", "really/real", "all", "completely", "just" (in the senses of "exactly", "barely" or "only a moment ago"), "right" (in the senses of "exactly" or "completely"), "almost", "scarcely", "plumb", "mortly" (the last two are characteristic of Southern Appalachian speech and may be glossed as "completely" and "really" respectively) as well as "little",

"big" and relatively large or small numbers used as measurements, e.g., "right",
"plumb" and "eighteen" below

-(60)   Jim Mize tells about his initial move for outwitting some
         robbers: "I grabbed that money outer my pocket book
         an' -- an' -- an' -- an' I put it right on top o' my
         head."

-(50)   Hillard Brown describes the effect of his oxen running
         away: "Then I had to walk plumb across the mountains
         over there, my boys did . . . ."

-(42)   Bill Corn quotes Bill Wieland on the subject of the fish
         the latter caught: "Just kep' one for me an' the boys t'
         eat this morning -- it's a rainbow about eighteen inches
         long . . . I give Henry Martin the other."

2. <u>Double or triple attributives</u> have a cumulative impact, e.g.,

-(2)   Calvert Connor describes one more misfortune: ". . . we
         got in a real thick area, a real thicket, swamp-type
         place."

3. <u>Intensifying adverbials</u>, including "even", "still", "just" (in the
sense of "merely" or "simply"), "only" (also in the sense of "merely" or "sim-
ply") and the sentence adverbials "actually", "really", "in fact" and "all
right", e.g., "even", "just", "actually" and "really" below

-(17)   Edith Kelso describes her and her sister's ignorance:
         "an' we didn't even know where we was comin' to because
         it had been so long since we'd been back we couldn't
         remember."

-(52)   Jim Mize tells what he did after a ten-hour workday:
         "I'd eat [my supper]. I didn't much want it. I jus'
         lay down an' lay a little while."

-(2)   Calvert Connor relates the first of many misfortunes:
         "Then, by the -- actually what happened, dark just snuck
         up on us all at once -- really, it got dark before we
         realized what time it was."

4. <u>Emphatic auxilliary</u> "do", e.g.,

-(58)   Jim Mize describes throwing a rock at some men threaten-
         ing to rob him: "an' one of 'em, I just did miss his head."

5. Quasi-modal "keep (on)" indicates the persistence of an action, e.g.,

-(2)   Calvert Connor tells what he and his buddy did before
       they realized they were lost: ". . . an' we jus' kept
       walkin' -- we thought we were headed in the right direc-
       tion."

6. Exclamations[26], e.g.,

-(60) Jim Mize refers to his wife's feelings about some recent
       robberies: ". . . Ada, she was, shucks, she was uneasy
       about it . . . ."

7. Emphatic parentheses, e.g.,

-(58) Jim Mize describes how some pranksters set out to fool
       him: "But they put that little black stump up, I'm
       telling you, and fixin' it jus' like they done an' blacked
       the face, ya know . . . ."

8. Ritual utterances mark some certain point in the story, e.g., "So
there we were" in the following excerpt from Calvert Connor's story about
getting lost.

-(2)   "So we tried to figure out which way to go an' we started
       walkin' down by followin' that stream that we had crossed
       because we had always been taught to follow a stream an' it
       would run into a larger stream. So we went downstream
       followin' the stream and it went underground. So there
       we were."

9. Certain lexical items are "loaded," e.g., "kill" in the following
excerpt from Ruth Brown's story about a run-in with Aunt Lolly.

-(9)   "And [Ruby's mother] said, 'If he gets one o' them in
       his mouth 'n gets choked,' said, [Aunt Lolly] 'll kill
       you'."

10. Present tense in clauses of narrative import makes the actions re-
ferred to seem more immediate, e.g., "says" below

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[26] The category exclamations here subsumes Labov and Waletzky's wh-
exclamations.

-(8)   Red Taylor quotes Bill Corn on the foolhardy adventures
        of their friends: "[Bill] said, Well, dang their souls,
        throw a few rations together in a little ol' haversack,
        he says, an' tie a quilt 'r a blanket 'r two on the
        thing an' roll ('at up) an' go out on the Nantahaly in
        that big laurel, he says, an' stay fer as high as three
        days an' nights just by their lone selves."

11. Repetition and *paraphrase of clauses or parts of clauses, e.g.,

-(66)   Jim Mize describes his actions in the presence of some
        robbers: An' -- an' -- an' I'd -- an' I jus' took
        it like nothin' happened t' me at all but -- I had my
        hat pulled down. I jus' walked on as easy as -- like --
        there'as nothin' happened."

-(2)   Calvert Connor refers to his and his friend's predica-
        ment: "An' we decided we were lost. We were going
        around in circles."

When the repetition or paraphrase involves a clause that repeats or para-

phrases the preceding clause, if that clause describes an event, the repe-

tition or paraphrase is evaluative on two counts. First, it intensifies the

information given in the preceding clause; second, like other clauses that

mark time, it draws attention to the events referred to in the surrounding

clauses. Technically, such a clause refers to an event "that occurred at the

same time as the event referred to in the preceding clause" and these have .

been discussed in division I above.

B. Non-lexical intensifiers

1. Gestures, e.g.,

-(78)   Will Reid says, ". . . an' [the horse] cut his leg jus'
        like that," at the same time he makes a slicing motion
        with the edge of his flattened hand, then adds, "plumb
        into the bone."

2. Expressive phonology, including special pitch contours, added stress,

lengthened vowels, e.g.,

-(50) Hillard Brown refers to his unreliable oxen: ". . . an'
       -- uh -- when I first got 'em, they <u>would</u> runaway with
       ye."

-(70) Eula Brown quotes her conscientious neighbor: "'O-o-oh,
       I forgot [your coffee]! The durn thing . . . .'"

3. <u>Paralanguage</u>, including increased or decreased tempo, raised or
lowered pitch, raised or lowered volume, laughing and crying, e.g., clauses
g^5 to p^5 in Calvert Connor's story (2, see appendix) about getting hopeless-
ly lost are delivered at a faster tempo than the rest; these clauses describe
what happened between the moment Calvert and his friend, who have just started
following the mysterious ball of light, arrive at the edge of a cliff and the
moment they step off into the main road, safe at last. The tempo reflects the
speed of events.

4. <u>Vocal expression</u> is the use of various phonological and paralinguis-
tic features to suggest the speech of an actor at a particular moment in the
story, e.g.,

-(9)   Ruth Brown mimics herself exclaiming angrily,"'You spit
       that out!'"

-(8)   Red Taylor mimics Bill Corn delivering his punchline reply
       to the question, "What're you afraid of, Bill?":"' <u>Boogers</u>,
       the same durn thing you are.'"

*5. <u>Lists</u>, such as are represented by nouns, phrases or clauses refer-
ring to a series of three or more items, thoughts, actions, etc., (like double
or triple attributives) have a cumulative impact, e.g.,

-(17) Edith Kelso relates Miz Bob Mason's comment about her and
       her sister: "[Miz Mason] told me later that she thought
       we were the daintiest little ol' girls, that she jus'
       couldn't understand how pretty we were and how we were
       dressed an' how we were fixin' up our face."

*6. <u>Unusual word order</u>, e.g.,

-(9)   Ruth Brown tells what happened after she forgot to keep watch over her little brother: ". . . and here come Aunt Lolly when she heard him scrawl."

*7. Ellipsis, here, is the omission of syntactic units generally present, such as initial articles or subject nouns and pronouns; it speeds up the telling of the story, and this sometimes suggests the speed of events, e.g.,

-(50)   Hillard Brown describes the climax of a trip with two unreliable steers hauling a log down a mountain: "It [the log] just left rhe road and hit that tree. Snapped that yoke, slapped them steers right in the middle."

or, when used in quoting, an actor's breathlessness, e.g., Eula Brown's version of what her neighbor said, "'O-o-oh, forgot it!'"[27]

IV. Evaluation by possible events or states. A number of syntactic forms introduce into the facts of the story reference to a possible event or state. Not unlike evaluative remarks and actions, these possibilities reflect on the significance of elements of the story. The syntactic forms in question include futures, interrogatives, imperatives, modals, quasi-modals, clauses or phrases with "if" or "whether", comparatives and superlatives. The effect of one of these forms is usually more limited than that of an evaluative remark but less limited than that of an intensifier; it at least emphasizes, and often characterizes, a principal element or a group of elements, but it does not embody the point of the story.

When one of these syntactic forms draws attention to or conveys the

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[27]Paradoxically, ellipsis and increased tempo, the latter mentioned under Paralanguage, can also de-emphasize information. When events are related as fast as possible, they may seem unimportant -- preliminaries to be gotten out of the way -- as in this excerpt from Jim Mize's story (58) about getting fooled by some pranksters, ". . . an' thought it they'as niggers -- they'as just as black. Come out. They said, 'Hands up!'" Here "Come out" is thrown in hurriedly.

affective meaning of one or more elements, it does so in most cases (I mention one group of exceptions below) through both the nature and status of the possible event or state. Insofar as the speaker (interpreted by the narrator or the narrator himself) is concerned, a possible state or event may be merely possible, probable or certain; it may also represent someone's wish, intention or obligation. These "modalities" are present to a large extent in the syntactic forms themselves (there is an affinity between imperatives and wishes or obligations, for instance [Lyons 1968: 308]), although stress, pitch, pause or context often help distinguish one modality from another. Thus, along with the kind of event or state, the status of that event or state in the speaker's mind plays an important part in what a given possibility indicates about a particular element or group of elements.

A. Futures, interrogatives and imperatives in quoted speech refer to possible events or states in the future. While all the forms named in this division frequently appear in the quoted speech of an actor, futures, interrogatives and imperatives do so almost exclusively.[28] This makes for some subtleties in the ways they convey affective meaning, which I discuss in relation to Jim Mize's story below. Many incidences of futures, interrogatives and imperatives foreshadow an event or state, such that it seems important

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[28]The exceptions are two questions addressed to the listener, e.g., at the end of a story about a plumber getting even with a doctor (14) Ruth Brown asks: "An' I don't blame him, do you?" This, of course, qualifies as an evaluative remark.

Besides this, a small number of interrogatives appear in connection with checks on the listener's understanding (e.g., "You know what [a snakin' gully] is?") and an even smaller number of futures in connection with introductions (e.g., "I'll tell you how it was"; see section 6.4.1 on opening remarks).

when it later appears not as a possibility but as a fact. Two imperatives

occur in a brief excerpt from Calvert Connor's story excerpted at length above

the second foreshadows an event:

(2) r^4.   an' we saw a light -- just a round ball o' light

    s^4 An' the light would kindly come toward us

    t^4 an' then it would just kinda leave.

$\longrightarrow u^4$ An' I said [to] Brian , Look at that light

    v^4 -- somebody must be comin' lookin'.

    w^4 [I said] , No, it's up in the sky.

    x^4 An' it was up in the air, up in the sky, not down on the

        horizon.

$\longrightarrow y^4$ An' I said, Well, let's follow the light.

    z^4 So we started following the light

The imperative in clause u^4 draws attention to the appearance of the light,

which is the principal element of the story. Calvert's command, which obliges

Brian to look at the mysterious object, shows that to Calvert the light is al-

ready important. The imperative in clause y^4 again draws attention to the

light, but it also foreshadows Calvert's and Brian's next action -- the action

that leads them to safety. Finally, the command, which this time obliges both

boys to follow the light, shows that to Calvert the light is now more than im-

portant, it is worthy of their trust. In other words, the light is more than

a chance phenomenon.

Interrogatives and futures are no less evaluative than imperatives, as

we see in the following excerpt from Jim Mize's story about being fooled by

(58) b^3 An' -- uh -- so I come back that night.

 c^3 an' they'd blacked that thing

 d^3 an' had that coat on

 e^3 -- oh, it was the awfullest lookin' thing

 f^3 I said, "Now, boys, I hate t' shoot anybody

——→ g^3 but," I said, "I'll shoot you just as sure as the dickens."

 h^3 I said, "Now, I'm gonna do 'er,"

——→ i^3 An' I said, Wh-what's up?

 j^3 I hollered two 'r three times at 'em.

The future tense in clause g^3, reflecting Jim's intention to shoot, indicates that Jim is prepared to handle this situation, dangerous though it may be. The interrogative in clause i^3, reflecting Bill's certainty that something is up, draws attention to later events, which include the resolution of the story.

It is true that Jim's characterizations of his situation and himself are belied by the story as a whole -- he faced only pranksters and a stump -- but the interrogative conveys evaluative information just the same. Even more than with evaluative devices in general, evaluative devices such as this, and they often appear in quoted speech, are not independent of the rest of the story. When a narrator portrays his or another actor's attitude toward one or more of the events of the story at the time of the action, he is not necessarily presenting his present attitude. But this will be evident from other evaluative or referential information in the story. For instance, in light of the story's outcome, Jim's ideas of himself as prepared and the situation as dangerous actually indicate the opposite: Jim was not prepared for the prank and the situation was ludicrous. These meanings are supported by Jim's laughter (see

appendix, clauses p^3 and t^3). In other words, only the _sum_ of the story's

evaluations and references can be counted on to reveal the narrator's state

of mind toward the experience represented in the story. I made this point

above, but it is worth making again here because it is particularly

obvious with the many evaluative devices that convey "false" meanings in iso-

lation.

    B. Modals, quasi-modals, "if" and "whether" refer to possible events or

states in the past, present or future. The modals are "can/could", "may/might",

"will/would", "shall/should" and "must". The relevant quasi-modals (those that

appear in the stories of the _Foxfire_ corpus) share meanings with true modals:

"ought to" and "be supposed to" with "should"; "be to" with "should" and

"would"; "need to" with "should" and "must"; "have to" and "had better" with

"must" and "be going to" with "will".[29] Most of the sentence that feature

clauses introduced by "if" contain modals or quasi-modals, either in the "if"-

clause or in the "then" (i.e., independent)-clause, where they refer to possi-

ble consequences. When an "if"-clause is headed by a modal or quasi-modal,

only the former device is noted in the appendix since both the "if" and the

modal go toward presenting the same possible state or event.

    Two modals, one quasi-modals and an "if"-clause appear in this excerpt

from Hillard Brown's story about some steers hauling a log down a mountain:

    (50)   p   An' come a shower of rain

---

[29] I have grouped these verbs as quasi-modals mainly on semantic grounds,
although they each have some of the syntactic features that characterize true
modals (Thomas 1965: 129; Roberts 1968: 89 - 91). For describing evaluative
devices (though not for writing a grammar of English) the semantic affinities
are more important than the syntactic ones.

q   -- [it got] slick --

r   an' started off down there

s   an' I knowed them steers

    I had.

    ⟶   If I'as t' holler at 'em

    ⟶ t   they'd run

    an' when I first got 'em

    ⟶ u   they would run away with ye.

The quasi-modal in the clause subordinated to clause s, that clause it-
self (introduced by "if") and the two modals "would" in clauses t and u to-
gether present the possibility of the steers' running away. This possibility
indicates that the cattle are not reliable and at the same time foreshadows the
story's subsequent events, for the steers do indeed take off down the mountain.
Interestingly, the clause "If I'as t' holler at 'em" absolves the narrator from
responsibility -- shows him to be blameless -- because he never hollered at the
cattle and still they ran away. Later in this story two more quasi-modals re-
inforce the notion that the steers are unreliable, perhaps even a little mad:
"And -- uh -- them old big'uns, they ought to ha' known, ha' more sense."

C. Negatives refer to nonexistent events or states, possible but un-
realized in the past, present or future. While all negative events or states
are certain (whatever it was did not come to pass), they may represent wishes,
intentions or obligations like the other syntactic forms discussed above. A
single but important negative occurs in this excerpt from Jim Mize's story
about

(60) n^2 an' I come along

where they robbed that man.

. . .

s^2 I said -- I heared 'em awalkin'.

t^2 -- there'as two of 'em.

$\longrightarrow u^2$ I didn't know what to do.

v^2 An' they just flew over to me in a minute.

w^2 I grabbed that money outer my pocket book.

x^2 an' -- an' -- an' -- an' I put it right on top o' my head

y^2 an' 'en I took it

z^2 an' pulled my hat down as tight

as I could pull it

a^3 pulled 'er real tight

b^3 an' just went walkin' on straight, ya know.

The negative in clause u^2 makes the contrast between what Jim says about him-
self and what he subsequently does, and this contrast shows that Jim is a
quick-witted fellow: one minute he doesn't have any ideas, the next minute
he is carrying them out! The contrast also draws attention to Jim's actions,
which are the proof that he is clever as well as quick-witted.

Two negatives appear along with an imperative in Ruth Brown's story
about getting into trouble with Aunt Lolly:

(9) f and Ruby's mother was there

g and she said to me, she said, "You better watch
[your brother Stan] ."

h She said -- uh -- Aunt Lolly is on her high horse.

i   She's mad, you know.

j   And she said, "If he gets one o' them in his mouth

       'n gets choked",

       said, "she'll kill you."

⟶ k   And so, she didn't wait t' get back t' the house

       till [my brother] poked one of them little ol' apples

       in his mouth

l   and I said, "You spit that out!"

⟶ m   And he didn't spit it out.

The negative in clause k simply indicates that Ruth's brother could hardly have been quicker and by implication, more contrary. The imperative in clause l, right before the negative in clause m, draws attention to Stan's next action. Then, both the imperative and the negative, the latter reflecting Ruth's wish that her brother would spit out the apple, make clear that Stan's action is undesirable and demonstrates.

D.   Comparatives and superlatives refer to two events or states that are similar to each other in some quality, one a fact of the story, the other a possibility implied by that fact (as "longer" and "longest" imply long). The possibility supplies the background or standard for the fact. Unlike the possibilities discussed above, a possibility introduced by a comparative or superlative has only one relevant dimension -- the quality it shares with the realized event or state. It has no other nature, no other status. Thus, while the possibilities introduced by other syntactic forms reflect on the significance of elements from several angles, comparatives and superlatives are

limited to one.

Comparatives take several forms besides the morphological ones (e.g., "slower" and "more slowly"), including constructions with "as . . . as" ("as tight as I could pull it"), "too . . . to" ("too small to be a moon"), "so . . . that" ("so long since we'd been back [that] we couldn't remember") as well as phrases with "like" and clauses with "as if", "as though", "as" and "like". A simple comparative appears at the end of Will Reid's story about the time his wife "stopped blood" from a gash in a horse's leg:

> (78) 1   And they stopped then with the horse in the road.
>
>   m   and hollered
>
>   n   and told her Mrs. Reid to come out there
>
>   o   She told 'em
>
>   it wadn't no use, just t' stand still a few minutes
>
>   n   And they said
>
>   ⟶   in less than five minutes, that horse's leg quit bleedin'.

The comparative in the clause subordinated to clause n shows that Mrs. Reid not only gets results, she gets quick results.

Two comparatives occur toward the end of Jim Mize's story about an encounter with robbers:

> (60) n^3 An' — an' — an' I'd — an' I just took it
>
>   ⟶   like nothin' happened t' me at all
>
> o^3 but — I had that on top my head an' my hat pulled down.

p^3 I jus' walked on as easy

          as -- like -- there'as nothin' happened.

q^3 An' they never come on.

r^3 never followed me.

There are two forms of comparative here: a clause with "like" in the clause subordinated to clause n^3 and a construction with "as . . . as" in clause p^3 and the clause subordinated to it. Both indicate the same thing, namely, that Jim's actions are very, very cool, and the repetition (cited under intensifiers) reinforces this information.

V. Evaluation by simultaneity. Two syntactic forms refer to events that occur simultaneously with other events: the progressive aspect and participles appended to main verbs. Progressives can also indicate extended action (and in orientation sections often do), while appended participles, with "be" deleted and no tense marker, can only indicate simultaneous action. Clauses headed by progressives indicating simultaneity are already included among types of clauses that seem to suspend the story's action, as discussed in division I above. By referring to states or simultaneous events, the clauses discussed there make the story mark time. This draws attention to events referred to in the surrounding clauses and opens up the possibility of suspense. Though they cannot act as heads of clauses, appended participles do exactly the same thing on the same semantic principle. An appended participle and a progressive both help mark time in Hillard Brown's story about runaway steers:

(50)   z   Well, they's goin' so fast

      a^2 they's goin' fast enough

b^2 an' I didn't say nothin', just lettin' 'em work it

$\longrightarrow$ c^2 only I was kina tryin' to keep up with the pole behind 'em

d^2 But that pole got up so much speed jus' 'fore

it got to that chestnut tree

it didn't stay in this snakin' gully, ya know.

The progressive in clause a^2 expresses duration, but the progressive in clause c^2 expresses simultaneity: Hillard was trying to keep up with the pole at the same time the steers were going fast. The first part of clause b^2 describes a state -- the state of silence -- while the second part contains an appended participle that is concurrent with both the state and the action described previously. This means that clauses b^2 and c^2 together make the action seem to stop, drawing attention to what the steers did on the one hand, and what the pole, as a result, did on the other. And because clauses b^2 and c^2 are in a position to create suspense -- the moments they represent are crucial to the story -- even more attention is focused on the action of the log, which is about to hit a tree and snap the steers' yoke.

VI. Evaluation by explication. Dependent clauses introduced by "because" or "for" ("fer" in Southern Appalachian speech) offer explanations for events or states described in the story. Such clauses (along with their embedded clauses are subordinated to clauses referring to an event or state. By indicating how or why that state or event came to be, the subordinate clause draws attention to it. The effect of an explicative is usually as limited as the effect of an intensifier, except that the event or state emphasized may be a principal element of the story as in Edith Kelso's story about coming "home" to North Carolina:

(17)   But the last time I come back in '23

a   I was twelve year old.

b   An' we -- uh -- we -- uh come back t' Clarksville, Georgia

c   We come back by train

    . . .

f   an' -- uh -- so me an' my older sister Pansey, Keener, was

    jus' young girls

g   an' we thought

        we was very pop'lar at that time [laughs].

h   an' we didn't even know

        where we was comin' to

        because it had been so long

        since we'd been back

        we couldn't remember.

The explicative subordinated to clause h tells why Edith and her sister were ignorant about their former home, thereby drawing attention to this state of affairs. And Edith and Pansey's ignorance, along with their vanity ("we thought we was very pop'lar at that time") turn out to be the story's principle elements (see discussion of this story in section 6.6).

These, then, are some of the forms that convey evaluative information in the stories of the Foxfire corpus. Judging from the twelve stories of the appendix, some means of evaluation are far more common than others, both in terms of numbers and appearance in stories. The most common are quantifiers (forty-nine in ten stories), negatives (forty-two in nine stories), clauses suspending the action (not including repeated clauses, forty in twelve stories), repetitions (forty in eight stories) and intensifying adverbials (thirty-seven

in nine stories). But whether more or less common, the evaluative devices
in these stories tend to show up in groups. As we have seen in many of the
examples above, one form of evaluation often supports another: two devices
draw attention to the same element; two devices convey affective meanings that
are complementary.

Not only do evaluative devices cluster, they cluster around the story's
complication and resolution. Excluding clauses that suspend action from the
tabulation, there are seventeen concentrations of evaluative devices in the
twelve stories. Twelve of these overlap or come within three independent
clauses of overlapping with the complication or resolution of their respective
stories. All of the clauses that refer to a story's temporally ordered events
make up its complicating action, but in previous sections I have also distin-
guished one complicating event -- "the complication" -- from the rest. "The
complication" is the first event that is a significant step toward the reso-
lution. "The resolution" is the event (and occasionally non-event: something
that did not happen) at or near the end of the story that caps the complicating
action.[30] (Every story in the Foxfire corpus can be said to have a complica-
tion and a resolution, though from the listener's point of view they may be
more or less satisfactory; in the appendix complications and resolutions are
marked by a"c"and an"r"respectively on the far left-hand of the page.) The
complication is thus the first principal event of a story and the resolution
the last. We have seen that, in general, evaluative devices emphasize and
characterize elements of the story, and especially important elements; in

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[30] A story may have more than one part and therefore more than one com-
plication and resolution, for example, Bill Corn's story (41, see appendix).

particular, they emphasize and characterize the complication and resolution.
In this sense they _establish_ the complication and resolution.

Labov and Waletzky assert that clauses suspending the action often play
an important part in drawing attention to a story's resolution, but the stories
of the appendix do not bear this out. In their 1967 article the authors
state

> . . . it is necessary for the narrator to delineate the structure of the
> narrative by emphasizing the point where the complication has reached a
> maximum: the break between the complication and the result. Most nar-
> ratives contain an evaluation section which carries out this function.
> Many evaluation sections are defined formally. Multicoordinate
> clauses or groups of free or restricted clauses are frequently located
> at the break between the complicating action and the resolution of these
> complications (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 34 - 35).

But in only two stories out of twelve do clauses describing states appear be-
fore the resolution; in none of the stories do clauses describing simultaneous
events appear in that position. The sentence "an' this'as Miz Bob Mason that
was along" separates the complicating action from the resolution in Edith
Kelso's story (17) about coming home. And the following passage separates the
complicating action from the resolution in Hillard Brown's story about run-
away steers:

(50)　37^{11}_{7}　And -- uh -- them old big'uns, they ought to ha' known,
　　　　　ha' more sense.

　　　38^{mm}_{6}　I had to sar his horns off 'bout three times to keep
　　　　　him from hittin' the other 'un in the eye.

　　　39^{nn}_{5}　His (boss), you know, would hook at him.

(See figures 8 and 9 for the displacement set diagrams of these stories.)
Thus, clauses suspending the action seem to be less important than other forms
of evaluation in establishing the resolution of a story.

I noted above that I have modified Labov and Waletzky's scheme for the presentation of evaluative devices to the extent that it is based on what I consider an unnecessary assumption. The assumption, admittedly logical enough, is that syntactic forms alone -- apart from their semantic content -- have evaluative import. The authors point out that "the narrative clause is one of the simplest grammatical patterns in connected speech. The surface structures are for the most part quite simple and related in a straightforward way to an equally simple deep structure" (Labov and Waletzky 1968: 311 - 312). Therefore, "since syntactic complexity is relatively rare in narrative, it must have a marked effect when it does occur" (Labov 1972: 378), namely, a marked evaluative effect. And as the authors declare, "it is not necessary to belabor the fundamental simplicity of narrative syntax: it can be observed in any example," either from their own corpus or from the Foxfire corpus. Among the syntactic forms that occur in narrative are futures, interrogatives, imperatives, modals, quasi-modals, progressives, appended participles, comparatives, superlatives, double and triple attributives and clauses that function as neither temporal adverbials nor verb phrase complements for verbs of saying and knowing (for example, clauses with "because"). Despite the admitted simplicity of the syntax of narratives, including the narratives of the Foxfire corpus, it seems unnecessary to assume that the rarity of a syntactic form draws attention to an element of the story when all the forms that come under Labov and Waletzky's heading of "uncommon syntax" have been shown to draw attention to elements of the story through their semantic and expressive meanings. (Indeed, this can be said for all the forms of evaluation discussed above.)

Watson (1972: 255) points out that the only way to prove that certain

forms function evaluatively is to establish correlations between "audience reaction (behavior changes) and the use of evaluation." Since this sort of data is difficult to acquire, it seems best for the analyst to depend forthrightly on his own intuitions -- not only in regard to whether evaluative devices exit but how they function. Whereas the effect of intensification, possibilities, simultaneity and explication are intuitively obvious to me, the effect of rare syntax is not, and I omit that part of Labov and Waletzky's scheme that revolves around syntax. Of course, Labov and Waletzky's assumption may be correct, but like the existence of evaluative devices, its verification — like the verification of so much in these realms — awaits sophisticated tests not yet devised.

To conclude, in the stories of the _Foxfire_ corpus information about the elements of the content seems to form one semantic structure; information about the significance of those elements -- the narrator's attitude toward them -- seems to form another. The latter constitutes the story's evaluation. Together these two structures portray both the experience which the story is concerned and the narrator's state of mind toward it.

This perspective on the content of the story brings us back to Labov and Waletzky's contention that the most important information in stories is about events. In general, the stories of the _Foxfire_ corpus support this claim, as well as the claim -- also implied by the authors' definition of narrative -- that this information is carried exclusively in clauses reporting or naming (not merely concerned with) events. This latter claim immediately suggests difficulties for, as we have seen, clauses naming events cannot be automatically identified, first, with the set of independent clauses headed by certain verb forms and , second, with the subset of temporally ordered

clauses. As a result, the analyst must rely on his own intuitions to discriminate between clauses that report events and those that do not. And ultimately, though the distinction is of use in perceiving and describing evaluative forms (especially evaluation by suspension of the action) and in understanding the movement of a narrative, it is probably not isomorphic with a distinction between relatively important and relatively unimportant clauses.

On the one hand, though clauses embedded on verbs of saying and knowing refer to events (the events of thinking and speaking), they do not actually name them and yet in a number of the stories of the Foxfire corpus what the actors say or think is of primary importance. The fact that something is said is overshadowed by what is said. One example of this occurs in Will Reid's story (78) about the time his wife "stopped blood", already discussed in a slightly different context in subsection 6.4.2. Another occurs in Clifford Willis' story (64) about the great flu epidemic, cited in subsection 6.4.5, where the punchline is a clause of indirect discourse. Indeed, examples of this sort abound (see, for another instance, the appendix, story 2, clauses n^2 to a^3 and consider the loss of meaning if all clauses embedded on verbs of saying or knowing were omitted).

On the other hand, in at least two stories of the Foxfire corpus some clauses that do not at all refer to events are of primary importance. It is true that all the stories of the corpus include information about two or more events in the form of temporally ordered clauses, and more generally, that clauses describing events form, to use Labov and Waletzky's term, a "skeleton" on which most of the rest of the information is hung. In many cases the events more or less speak for themselves, and the evaluative information merely enhances or highlights their message. It is probably reasonable to say that the skeleton figures more prominently in the construc-

tion and interpretation of the story than does the flesh. Yet in Jim Nize's story (52) about his days' working on the railroad, quoted in subsection 6.4.3, and Edith Kelso's (17) about coming home to Georgia, excerpted in subsection 6.4.4 (see appendix for both) information not specifically about events seems to take precedence. In Jim's story clauses h through j are not only memorable to the ear, they stand out in the mind. They do not so much enhance the clauses reporting events as they are enhanced by them. Clauses g and h in Edith's story, while not constituting such a dramatic example, also carry a large part of the meaning of the story. For the most part, then, reference specifically to events both structures and gives meaning to the stories of the corpus, while reference to states is supportive; but this is not the case in every story.

6.4.5 What closings are featured in the stories of this corpus?

Somewhat less than half (thirty-three) of the eighty stories of the Foxfire corpus for which I have sufficient data[31] end with an event or a non-event (something that did not happen) — usually the resolution, but sometimes an event elaborating the resolution. These stories do not have closing sections, but the resolution signals that they are finished. Every story has a resolution, as I have noted, so that such a signal is always available and it easily serves the purpose. Not only does it cap the complicating action, it is usually highlighted by evaluative devices.[32] Through these evaluative de-

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[31] The corpus includes eighty-three stories, but the endings of three stories were unclear on the recordings.

[32] A few resolutions match what we perceive as endings or results in real life: a task is performed, a debt is paid back, someone dies. Such events make natural and obvious resolutions to a story.

vices, resolutions provide insight into the narrator's attitudes. Most reso-
lutions thus cue the listener that the story is over and help him assess the
narrator's state of mind toward the experience represented there. That is,
they are important for interpretation on two counts. Consider, for example,
Jim Wieland's story about a practical joke that got out of hand:

(36) [A couple o' girls] went out t' the spring, an' -- uh when
      they got there, these two fellas had a bedsheet around 'em.
      An' they stepped on out in the trail an' -- an' -- them girls
      had glass jugs t' get water in [laughs], so [laughs] when they
      they seen, got the jugs full o' water, one of 'em had a jug
      done full an' the other had it 'bout nearly full, them fellas
      popped out (by God) across the spring on the other side an' the
      moon was shinin' just as bright, an'₂there'as about four 'r five
      inches o' snow on the ground, had been fer several days an'
      those girls they felt dead, by God, I thought we'd never get 'em
      back with us. We toted 'em t' the house an' roughed them around
      . . . Pete Stiles got on his horse an' as goin' t' get the rubbin'
      doctor t' see if he could get 'em back an" they come to [every-
      body laughs]. Boys, they never played that game no more . . . .
      John Cannon and ol' Harv Vinson [one of the girls' fathers] he
      was there, too -- I tell you, them fellas, my God, he about --
      'bout killed them boys [the audience chuckles, murmurs and some-
      body says, No wonder].

The clause containing the resolution, namely, the clause reporting that Harv
beat the practical jokers, includes several evaluative devices: emphatic paren

thesis"I tell you" the exclamation"My God"and the lexical item"kill" These all indicate that Harv's reaction was pretty extreme. The clause itself describes an evaluative action, one whose import dovetails with the import of the other devices: the girls' collapse is grave, thus Harv's reaction is extreme. At the same time, then, the resolution caps the complicating action -- what finally happened was that the boys got a whipping -- and reveals the narrator's attitude toward two elements of the story.

A small number of stories (four) end with an event that is not only the resolution of the narrative but its climax as well, for example, Clifford Willis' story about the great flu epidemic of 1918:

> (24)   I'as down 'ere in the graveyard talkin' t' one, one time, a
>   man 'ere -- come, been t' town, come back by 'ere -- diggin'
>   graves. Here come a man adashin' up on a mule, said, 'Boy,
>   double that grave; his brother's dead now.

Here the resolution is of a special type: it is a punchline. A punchline does not merely convey the narrator's attitudes toward elements of the story, or embody the point of the story as do some evaluative remarks, it _is_ the point of the story. Surprise makes a punchline, but, paradoxically, surprise must be calculated. As Labov and Waletzky (1967: 41) suggest, only practice enables a narrator to shape a story with a punchline. And indeed the four stories in question are part of the repertoire of three enthusiastic storytellers. Each of these stories sets up a very close relationship between the content of the complicating action and the resolution/climax without in any way foreshadowing the actual remark. Thus, it is surprise that cues the listener

that the story is finished and the point made.[33]

Slightly more than half (forty-two) of the stories, however, do not end with an event, or at least not one that is part of the complicating action or elaborates it. These are the stories with closings proper -- one or more clauses that follow the resolution and close off the complicating action -- called by Labov and Waletzky (1967: 40; Labov et al. 1968: 297)"codas". As clauses that are not needed to complete the complicating action, that in fact go beyond the complicating action, codas signal that stories are finished even more obviously than resolutions. Like resolutions, they involve evaluative devices -- often those with the broadest scope -- so they provide insight into the narrator's attitudes as well.

A coda looks back at the story so far, in either the temporal sense of that phrase or the intellectual one. The first means altering the listener's time sense, bringing him from the story's past to the storytelling present. The second means expanding the listener's perspective, making him see the story as a whole. Either change removes him from the flow of the narrative.

The Foxfire corpus shows that there are a number of ways in which a coda can disengage the listener from the immediacy of the complicating action, most of them familiar from Labov and Waletzky's work (1967: 40; Labov et al. 1968: 297). And these ways of formulating codas are fairly frequently combined.

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[33]Just as it is possible for a narrator to unknowingly "signal" the end of an unfinished story with a well-evaluated resolution, so it is possible for a narrator to misplace a punchline. In his story(41) about what Bill said one time around the campfire, Red Taylor should have stopped with Bill's exclamation -- "'Boogers, the same durn thing you are!'" This line prompts a fit of laughter, but Red continues on with Willis' response (see appendix).

Thus, some codas have more than one part, each able to mark the end of the story.

The simplest kind of coda consists of a closing remark. Jim Mize concludes a story about lifting a railroad tie:

(56) Now I done that!

And Bill Corn ends the first part of a two-part story told "on" Red Taylor:

(41) Well, that's what he done.

These are announcements that the story is finished, corresponding to the opening remarks discussed in section 6.4.1. Like most opening remarks, they offer no explicit information. Five such codas appear in the stories and each depends on the word "that". At one and the same time "that" refers to all the significant events of the story in the story and pushes them into the past.

As we see from closing remarks, one way to shift to the present is by using words that can point to the past -- "that", "those" and "there" as opposed to "this", "these" and "here". Generally, "that", "those" and "there" refer to a thing or a place that is not near. In stories, however, "that" and "those" usually take on the temporal rather than the spatial sense of not near and "there" goes along with "that" and "those". For example, Bill Corn concludes a story about a turkey hunt:

(46) I got 'em both right there that mornin'.

Contrast Bill's coda with this passage near the end of Calvert Connor's story about getting lost:

(2) I went an' told Mother what had happened an' -- uh -- she convinced him [Calvert's father] that this story had happened, that somepun had really happened, that he shouldn't spank me

> for somepun that had happened, this -- this -- such a fan-
> tastic thing had happened.

This passage is probably part of a long coda describing what happened, after Calvert and his friend were found, but for the listener to be removed from the action at this point would leave him ready for the final part of the coda, which is a number of clauses further on. Accordingly, the passage maintains the listener's sense of the past-as-present with "this", rather than altering it with "that".

Another way to bring the listener toward the present is by extending the effect of the events past the time represented in the narrative. Ruth Brown tells a story about how she guessed the secret of a ghost horse that had been "haintin'" the Browns' property:

> (12) And so we come back home and that night we turned the light
>   out. We'd got used to it, but I didn't hear the horse. I
>   said, "John." He said, "What?" I said, "I don't hear that
>   horse, do you?" He said, "Is it nine o'clock?" I said, "It's
>   after nine." And we didn't hear that horse that night and we've
>   never heard it since.

The last clause puts the time at the present: right up to now we've not heard that horse. In Labov and Waletzky's words, such a coda bridges "the gap be- tween the moment of time at the end of the narrative proper and the present" (Labov et al. 1968: 296). And Jim Mize relates a story about the first time he drove steel with a black man:

> (53) an' I was hittin' faster 'n him, ya know. He said, Who-a-a,

whop, he said, I'm agettin' the same money you are, said,

Son, You cut that out, though -- you hit, you hit as soon

as I hit [narrator and P.R. laugh]. I never will forget

it [chuckles]. I drove with him then a long time.

The final clause, while not referring to the present, puts the time well be-
yond that of the story's last event. Both codas bring the listener out of the
past toward the storytelling present.

One way to bring the listener to the present and make him see the story
as a whole is by asking his opinion of what happened. Jim Mize tells several
versions of the story about lifting a railroad tie. In one he concludes:

(59)   I jus' picked that thing up an' that fo'man, ya know, he'as

hollerin' at me, Jim, don't do that, don't do it. I put that

on my back -- it'as 550 pounds, an' if I didn't turn it around

an' walk around wi' it an' lay it back down. Hit don't look

reasonable, does it?

And Ruth Brown ends a story about a plumber getting even with a doctor:

(14)   And I don't blame him, do you?

These questions may be rhetorical, but they do engage the listener in a con-
sideration of his present state of mind. At the same time they reflect on
the story as a whole by revealing to the listener the narrator's state of mind:
that lifting the tie was not reasonable -- actually it was incredible; and that
the plumber shouldn't be blamed -- it was the doctor's fault.

A second way of surveying the story as a whole is, naturally enough, to
summarize it. In a story about a bewitched cow, excerpted in subsection 6.4.1,
Ruth Brown skillfully casts the coda as a letter to Grandma, who told her how

to break the witch's spell:

> (13) But the next day I strained up the milk an' it was just as
>
> good like always. I wrote Grandma a letter and told her
>
> the witch had come, an' she didn't get nothin' an' the milk
>
> was good. Now that's the truth.

Another way, also illustrated by Ruth's coda, is by asserting the story's truth. This kind of coda shows up when there is reason for the truth of the story to be in doubt.[34] Ruth's story, for example, concerns the supernatural. Stan Williams retells an experience of his father's, one that he had not witnessed. At the end he claims:

> (4) He [Stan's father] said that'as so.

The truth of the story is doubtful because the experience is hearsay. Stan's statement indicates that while he, Stan, cannot vouch for the truth of what happened, his father could and did.

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[34]Based on her work with tall tales from the rim of the Okeefenokee swamp, Kay Cothran (personal communication) believes that to the participants of a storytelling event (if not for folklorists) the truth of the story is an unimportant issue. For this reason, Cothran views assertions of truth as storytelling conventions, one way to frame an experience, even a blatantly untrue experience. My observations lead me to believe, however, that the truth of a personal experience story is an important issue. Unlike with tall tales, listeners start off assuming that a narrative of personal experience is true, true at least in the eyes of the storyteller. Narrators therefore do not usually make assertions of truth. When they do, the assertion serves as a recognition that the listener has some particular reason to doubt that his assumption of truth was valid.

I agree with Cothran, however, that the truth of a story, even a personal experience story, is only relatively important: the past event, the experience that is being represented has "less significance than the present event, the storytelling, for the participants" (Cothran 1972: 140). Because stories of personal experience are assumed to be true, narrators must not stray too far from reality. Beyond that, the more skillful the storyteller, the more he can invent without undermining the listener's interest. A well told story passes time pleasantly. A badly told one may not, especially if it insults the intelligence of the listener. One Foxfire student spoke with disdain about a

Finally, several ways of surveying the story as a whole depend on evaluative devices discussed in the previous subsection. The point of the story embodied in an evaluative remark can constitute a coda, as we saw in Calvert Connor's story about getting lost:

> (2) . So that's -- uh -- makes the hair stand on end, when you
>   start thinkin' about it.

And Jim Mize concludes a second version of the story about lifting a railroad tie:

> (54)   Now, it don't look like a man could do that, but I done 'er,
>   me jus' you might say a boy. I'as fourteen years old.

Here the coda is one kind of evaluative remark; in the version of this story cited previously (59) the coda is another kind of evaluative remark -- a question eliciting the listener's opinion: "Hit don't look reasonable, does it?" The effect is much the same, although only the question is able to draw the listener into the present.

One or more possible events or states can also form a coda. Jim Mize concludes a story about coming upon some robbers with a string of possibilities (indicated by modals, negatives, imperatives and clauses with "if") that show how clever he is:

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man known for his wild stories. Citing a particular storytelling event, the student said: "He told us one time he jumped out of a helicopter 'r airplane 'r something a hundred feet off the ground, landed on a deer's back, killed him an' before the plane could get off the ground, he was done back up in the plane with everything." Such a story is obviously untrue; the listener took it as a personal experience story, and found it wanting.

(60) But after I got outa their sight, I never, never made a
bit o' hurry. I knowed if I made any hurry, they would
run and catch me an' -- an' -- an' I'd -- an' -- an' I
just took it like nothin' happened t' me at all, but I
had that [money] on the top o' my head an' my hat pulled
down. I just walked on as easy as -- like there'as nothin'
happened. An' they never come on, never followed me. But
as soon as they took a hint, they'd a got my money. They
never took no hint.

Ruth Brown ends the story of her father's death with a single, poignant possibility:

(15) Well, they got the doctor there, too, just as quick as they
could an' he said when he lifted him [Ruth's father] up like
that to put it up on that chair, ardry [artery] -- a blood
vessel in his leg busted an' run to his heart an' killed him.
That's what Dr. Green told me. He said now if there had been
some men there to ha' jerked him up to his -- stood him up on
his feet, he said, it probly wouldn't ha' killed him.

A repetition of the most important event or state constitutes a coda
as well. Bill Corn tells a story about being so scared he couldn't get his
lips together ("My chin keeps jerkin'loose") to whistle up his dog. At the
end he says:

(47) I tried again t' see if I could whistle an' I could whistle
just as good as I wanted. I wadn't cold neither, I just run
out there an' called that dog, an' boy, that chin was jerkin'

till I couldn't whistle.

These last two clauses actually take the listener back in time, but only in the interest of expanding his perspective.

All of the codas formed by evaluative devices, including assertions of truth, which qualify as evaluative remarks, reflect on the story as a whole by evaluating some of its elements. Simply as evaluative devices, they convey considerable information about the narrator's attitudes; but as codas, they also have pride of place. The coda is the narrator's last word, so to speak[35], and how he expends it makes an impression on the listener.

In sum, seventy-six stories out of eighty finish with some finality: thirty-three stories present events or non-events that either are or are related to resolutions and forty-two stories -- the ones I have been most concerned with here -- present codas. Both resolutions and codas end stories on significant notes, but codas round off the complicating action, temporally or intellectually, such that the closing is particularly clear and telling. Labov and Waletzky (Labov 1972: 370) comment that codas are found less frequently

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[35]Actually, the coda is not necessarily the narrator's last word even if it is his final word in the story itself: the narrator is the first to speak again after at least eleven of the eighty stories examined here. He contributes some piece of background information that could have been included in the story, discusses the implications of the story or begins a new conversation related to some topic introduced by the story. (In two cases the narrator begins a second story related to the one he has just finished.)

The end of a story is not in doubt, however, just because the narrator is the first to speak again. With a single exception, the narrator drops the pitch of his voice as he reaches the end, a phenomena Bollinger (1968: 32) describes as "running down". Also, with the same exception, the narrator -- along with the audience -- is silent for a second or more after the conclusion. (The exceptions occur in one of the cases where the narrator goes on to tell a second story.) In a number of narratives, there are several codas or parts of codas, each a potential ending, but the narrator's silence identifies the final one.

than the complicating action, abstracts, orientations or resolutions, but
this is not true for the stories of the Foxfire corpus. While codas appear
less frequently than the complicating action, orientations or resolutions,
they are more than twice as common as abstracts (forty-two codas in eight sto-
ries; sixteen abstracts in eighty-three stories). The authors point out that
"the reference of [an] abstract is broader than the orientation and complica-
ting action;" it includes the evaluation. As a result, an abstract "states
not only what the story is about, but why it was told." Many codas perform
one or the other of these functions, and some, those involving repetition, for
instance, perform both. In addition, a coda has the advantage over an abstract
of location at the end rather than at the beginning of a story. It is thus not
surprising that codas outnumber abstracts.

6.5 What contents are featured in the stories of this corpus?

Content, besides being, along with form, the substance of construction
and interpretation, figures in decision. As a narrator begins a story he must
have something in mind to talk about, namely, some experience that can be
transformed into a narrative. He may not remember the experience in detail or
even from beginning to end, but he has judged that it constitutes the raw
material for a story: events in a context of states encompassed by a perspec-
tive. Even when the experience is second-hand and has come to the narrator
in story form, he has been obliged to consider whether the experience as he
knows it can be transformed into a narrative.

The large majority of stories in the Foxfire corpus focus on one experi-

ence -- something that happened to the narrator, his spouse, a relative, a friend, a neighbor or someone the narrator knows about. The coherence of these stories, and they are all coherent, seems to stem from the very fact that each represents what the narrator perceives as a distinct experience. Insofar as the narrator is concerned, everything that came to pass during a certain period of time bore on everything else, and the whole formed an experience. In certain stories this sense of unity shines through various difficulties of interpretation: absence of a related conversational context, clauses out of temporal order, groups of clauses out of temporal order, pronouns without clear referents, lack of a closing, etc.

Six out of eighty-three stories are exceptions: they focus on two experiences. Three of these stories are perfectly coherent because they deal with the narrator's experience but on two different occasions, the occasions being linked in one case by content, and in two by content and time (they are successive). Two stories, however, are less coherent. They deal not with one person's experience but with two people's. In one Clifford Willis tells about (1) his own experience of a woman coming to visit and (2) the woman's experience, as she related it to him during the visit, of trying to survive a blizzard. This story within a story is relatively difficult to follow, and is not like the other stories of the corpus in which the narrator presents someone else's experience. Whereas those stories begin with an allusion to the fact that the experience being related is not the narrator's own, they focus exclusively on the other person's experience.

Coherence in the Foxfire stories is thus strongly related to content. The contents of the stories refer in turn to experiences conceived as integral

units. But beyond this very general description the contents are not easily accounted for. Some pattern does emerge, however, from categorizing the stories -- more precisely, the contents -- in two admittedly superficial ways: according to substantive topic and according to affective quality. "Topic" denotes with a noun what kind of events supposedly occurred; and "quality" denotes the same with an adjective, which, of course, makes for a different kind of description. The first term concentrates on the experience as an external fact and the second, on the experience as an internal one.

I do not pretend that the topics or qualities named reflect in any systematic way the dimensions of content taken into consideration by narrators. Even from the analyst's point of view, the categories are hardly subtle enough for the material. And at the outset my effort is limited to those topics and qualities that lend themselves to being named. Every story does not present a quality, but every story does present a topic, yet only forty-seven out of the eighty-three stories are conveniently categorized by topic, as follows:

1) ten stories concerning the supernatural, e.g., Calvert Connor's story (2) about the appearance of a ball of light; Ruth Brown's story (13) about taking the spell off a bewitched cow; a series of stories (78, 79, 80, 82 and 83) by Will and Annie Reid about "curing thrash, blowing fire and stopping blood" with a God-given power

2) nine stories concerning sickness, injury or accident, e.g., Clifford Willis' story (18) about coming down with the 1918 flu; Jim Wieland's story (40) about prematurely removing the cast from his broken arm; Aunt Eula Brown's story about almost getting run over by a car

3) six stories concerning errors of judgment, e.g., Bill Corn's story (41) about Red Taylor shooting a doe; Red Taylor's story (6) about Bill Corn

shooting a doe; Jim Wieland's story (37) about killing a cow because he
thought it was a wild animal

4) six stories concerning feats of strength or daring, e.g., Clifford
Willis' story (29) about a girl hefting a calf; Jim Mize's four stories (55,
56, 59 and 63) about lifting a railroad tie

5) five stories concerning crime or attempted crime, e.g., Jim Mize's
story (60) about an encounter with some robbers; former sheriff Calvin Darnell's
story about taking a wanted man into custody

6) five stories concerning practical jokes, e.g., Clifford Willis' story
(30) about one girl tossing a frog down the throat of another; Jim Wieland's
story (36) about some boys dressing up as ghosts to scare some girls

7) four stories concerning death, e.g., Ruth Brown's story (15) about
her father's death; Clifford Willis' two stories (20 and 24) with the punch-
line "double that grave; his brother's dead now"

8) two stories concerning good luck, e.g., Jim Wieland's story (35)
about winning a calf at a corn-shucking party.

The qualities I have recognized account for more stories than the topics
I have recognized: sixty-one stories are conveniently categorized by quali-
ties. Unlike the idea of a topic, the notion of a quality intrinsic to a
story's content is not a familiar one and bears further discussion.[36] The
quality of a story is plainly related to its evaluative devices, but as I

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[36]See, for example, Ervin-Tripp's treatment of topic in "On Sociolin-
guistic Rules: Alternation and Co-occurrence" (1972). "When conversations
have an explicit message with informational content," she explains, "they can
be said to have a 'topic'"(243). This holds for stories, as well, which, of
course, always have topics.

stated in subsection 6.4.4, an evaluative device suggests the affective
meaning of elements of content. The term "quality" refers to the affective
meaning of the entire content. Evaluation and reference together convey the
meaning of a story, that is, the narrator's state of mind toward the experi-
ence represented -- one aspect of which may be an affective quality that domi-
nates the content. An affective quality, then, has no necessary connection
with the narrator's feelings or the listener's at the time of the storytelling
event. Rather, it has to do with the feelings of the narrator about the ex-
perience as it happened and as he reflected on it later. When he tells the
story, he is largely detached from those feelings; he remembers what they are
and expresses them (for the most part through evaluative devices), but he does
not relive them. Neither does he expect the listener to relive them. In
other words, he anticipates not so much the responses "I'm frightened!" or
"I'm amazed", for example, but "That must have been frightening" or simply
"Amazing!" The listener is called to appreciate the danger, surprise, humor,
etc. of the experience, not to participate in it.

Twelve narratives concern what was frightening or dangerous, e.g.,
Hillard Brown's story (50) about his steers running away; Ruth Brown's story
(10) about an escaped convict coming by her house; Clifford Willis' story
about using a ladder for a sled:

> (22) Talkin' about sleds, one time I'll never forget one time we
> stole my Daddy's ladder -- like t' kill us. Me an' my bro-
> ther, me an' my brother took that thing up the hill. We
> made us a route. We'as comin' down an' that ol' ladder,
> we's settin' on it. Got down the hill, right about where

it'as gettin' fast, (that) thing led off justa little

bit an' jus' straddled that stirrup, An' when it hit,

that durn thing jus' swapped ends, an' boys, we jus'

sent way over an' _____ 'fore we hit the ground.

It hurt us, now, boys, that did, I'm atellin' you. That

thing -- that's a dangerous aridin' a thing like that --

'cause it's too long when it turns a somerset, that throwed

us too high up off the ground.

Thirteen stories concern what was amusing or funny, e.g., Bill Corn's
story (47) about being so scared he couldn't get his lips together to whistle
up his dog; Jim Mize's story (58) about being fooled by some pranksters; Aunt
Eula Brown's story about a little girl's reaction to a snake:

(74)   Now when (them) young-uns started home yeste'day -- Irene's

girl (an' them) was here yeste'day -- an' when they started --

home they got on a snake right out there at the end o' the

porch. I never went out there, An' one o' 'em come runnin'

back in an' I said, What's the matter? Said, they got on a

snake. An' the little girl, she was little -- that size [in-

dicates height with her hand] -- boy, she wouldn't pass that

snake, you couldn't git her. She come down here, went out

this way an' went out that way. She wouldn't pass that snake.

She wouldn't pass -- tickled me!

And thirty-three stories concern what was surprising, strange, crazy,
amazing or shocking, e.g., Bill Corn's story (46) about bagging two turkeys
one after the other; Bernice Hill's story (94) about her brothers putting her

on a wild-tempered horse; Will Reid's story about a deer getting killed:

> (81)   Aback in yonder, Nantahalia, and back through here, back
>
> in the back o' these big high mountains here, there's lots
>
> o' deer. They come down -- where Daniel Chastain lives.
>
> They come down there (once) while I lived down there on
>
> Kate's Creek. And it'll follow them children aroun' t'
>
> play with it. And the dogs happened to discover it and
>
> they got after it 'n killed it. 'Ull, that little thing'ud
>
> come down there, 'ull, it'as way up that high an' follow
>
> around among them ch-kids, where they was playin'.

Neither the categories of quality nor those of topic are mutually exclusive. Calvert Connor's story (2) about the appearance of a ball of light, for instance, deals with events that are both frightening and strange.[37] Will and Annie Reid's stories about "curing thrash, blowing fire and stopping blood" are concerned with the supernatural and also with sickness or injury. Moreover, the categories of topic and quality are not exclusive of each other. Not surprisingly, thirty-seven stories can be classified in both ways.[38] An injury is often dangerous; good luck, surprising; a practical joke, funny; the supernatural necessarily strange, and so on. The only topic not obviously

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[37]Three overlapping stories bring the total of stories categorizable by quality to sixty-one.

[38]Whether the stories are prompted by requests or not seems to make little difference in the ways they can be categorized. Fourteen out of twenty-one requested stories are categorizable by topic; fourteen out of twenty-one by quality; ten out of twenty-one by both. This compares with forty-seven, sixty-one and thirty-seven respectively out of eighty-three.

connected with a quality is that of errors of judgment. Three of the six

stories in this category present funny occurrences, but in the next section

we will see that narrator's purpose probably accounts for this group of stories

better than content. It is not so much the intrinsic interest of errors as

the narrator's interest in evaluating himself or others that makes this show

up as a category.

Looking closely at the categorization by topic, we see that while the

number of stories featuring each topic is probably not significant -- one

narrator can too easily weight a particular category; for instance, Jim Mize

tells five out of the six stories concerning feats -- the topics themselves

are: they point up a notable feature of the contents of most of the Foxfire

stories. The qualities do the same, but perhaps less plainly. As Labov and

Waletzky (Labov et al. 1968: 361) observe, certain inexplicable, incredible

or threatening matters -- like the supernatural, feats, sickness, injury,

death and crime -- are always "reportable." They are of intrinsic interest to

listeners and tellers alike because they are beyond the realms of everyday

experience. Indeed, the more uncommon an occurrence, the more it is report-

able. And the more reportable -- or we could say "sharable"-- the content of

a story, the more certain its appeal under any circumstances of storytelling.

The qualities we have been discussing are corollaries to the topics:

they indicate the ways in which an occurrence strikes the listener as uncommon.

The actions broke an unexpected rule of behavior, so they were shocking; the

situation was not secure and familiar, so it was frightening; the incident was

not predictable, so it was surprising; the happenings challenged an accepted

pattern, so they were funny (Douglas 1968: 365). Yet from many of the ex-

amples given above it is evident that an occurrence need not be associated with the strongest versions of these qualities to serve as the content of a story: most of the stories in the Foxfire corpus do not deal with the very out of the ordinary matters like death and the supernatural. After all, in a lifetime such things are generally in short supply. The incidents featured in a story, then, may be only mildly amusing, as, for example, Aunt Eula's story (74) above, or only somewhat frightening or only slightly crazy. Still, most of the contents do have something of the uncommon about them.

A close relation exists between a story's content, the community's purposes or expectations and the narrator's purposes or intentions. Indeed, at some early point in the storytelling process the narrator probably ceases to treat them as separate considerations. Through the form and content of a story, he hopes to fulfill the community's purposes and his own. We saw in section 6.2 that the principal outcome expected from a Foxfire storytelling event was that it pass time pleasantly. By sticking to an unusual occurrence, the narrator is almost certain to tell an interesting story, thereby fulfilling the community's purpose. Sometimes he is also fulfilling his own goal of portraying a remarkable experience.

On the other hand, given the circumstances of a Foxfire visit, the narrator does not have to feature content that is highly reportable to tell an interesting story. The question is: Interesting to whom? Among people well-acquainted with each other, having similar backgrounds, the only content of note is not just that dealing with uncommon events. This is where the impression made by my schema of topics and qualities might be misleading. Though only fourteen stories out of eighty-three cannot be described in terms of one

of the topics or qualities named, one important set of stories indicates that the more intimate the narrator and the listener, the fewer the number of stories with remarkable content. In general, Foxfire's interest in the old days suppressed this relation, but it is evident in the stories that Aunt Eula Brown tells to Jim Mize.

In the session that gave rise to these stories Foxfire's influence is at a minimum, as I have already mentioned: the two old people, friends since childhood, converse with each other, intermittently attended to by the visitors from Foxfire. Four of the eleven stories Aunt Eula tells fit into none of the categories discussed above. The same four stories deal with recent events. In fact, the only stories in the corpus to do so are from this visit. Not surprisingly, stories about recent events also turn out to be stories about everyday events. Whereas occurrences that have been remembered for a considerable length of time are likely to be unusual, yesterday's occurrences are much more likely to be usual. Take as an example this story that follows immediately on Jim's mention of a mutual friend by the name of Mack Harmon:

(66) Eula: He [Mack Harmon] come the other day, the other day
             t' see me.

      Jim: Did he?

      Eula: When I haveta lay down -- _____ya hafta lay down --
             I shet that door [the front door] an' I lay back there
             an' leave this door open an' the door was open an' that
             poor fella come an' hunt ever'wheres an' (wouldn't)
             open the door -- an' couldn't find me an' went to Miss
             Speed's an' told her t' tell me he'd been here an'
             couldn't find me [Jim laughs]. Well, I'll say he didn't
             look much didn't holler.

Presumably, what it takes to be interested in this story is knowing and caring about Mack Harmon or Aunt Eula. Given these concerns, it is irrelevant that the occurrence is ordinary.

6.6 What goals show up in the storytelling events of this corpus?

While the form and content are the means, the narrator's purposes are the ultimate aims of construction and interpretation -- interpretation of both the story and the storytelling event. It is useful to distinguish the narrator's purposes on the level of the message -- responding to the listener or establishing a point of personal interest -- and on the level of the event -- enjoying the process of storytelling. This is an analytical distinction (since the message is necessary to the event and vice-versa), but it does signal the difference between telling a particular story and telling stories. In this section, then, I deal first with goals as they motivate particular stories and then as they motivate two different ways of storytelling.

To reiterate, in section 3 I named establishing a point of personal interest as a social function of stories. Putting this now in terms of purpose, it means that the narrator uses a story, and in particular the modes of reference and evaluation, to convey his view of an experience. This goal shows up clearly in almost all the stories of the corpus.

One other goal on this level shows up clearly in a significant number of stories, but it does not compete with establishing a point. As we saw in section 6.3, twenty-eight stories are told to answer a question or fulfill a request. Only three of these lack points. One answers a question, one fulfills

a request and the third is part of a single speaker's discourse. This last barely emerges from the conversational context. In each of these cases the narrator's intellectual and emotional investment was probably slim -- not enough to provide a point.

But a story told solely to fill in a conversation or accomodate a listener is rare. While the narrator often finds an initial stimulus in a question or a request or even a train of thought, he decides to tell and constructs a story as much to satisfy himself as to satisfy the requirements of the conversation. And in the processes of decision and construction the point is not only the idea that he wants to put across, it is the idea around which he can organize the story. A central idea provides greater coherence than the idea of an experience, discussed in the previous section, but the two are closely linked. The narrator's conception of an experience is bounded -- at least in part -- by his perspective on that experience. Thus, in the genesis of a story-idea the point and the content are likely to become inseparable. As a narrator begins a story, he has something to talk about and a reason for talking about it.

By examining the points made by the stories of the Foxfire corpus, we can specify several goals that fall under Labov and Waletzky's general heading of "establishing a point of personal interest". Overall, the stories are directed toward portrayals -- focused pictures -- either of a participant (sometimes participants) in an experience or of an experience itself. Approximately half the stories portray actors and half portray incidents.

While most stories in the corpus make one point, at least eleven make two or three. This occurs for several different reasons: two experiences are

combined in the same story, as we saw in the previous section; a tangent shifts the topic and forms a separate part of the story, although the experience is the same; or two points complement each other. As an example of this last, in a story (47) about being so scared he couldn't get his lips together to whistle up his dog, excerpted in subsection 6.4.5, Bill Corn not only portrays himself as "cowardly of a night" -- he also portrays the incident: it was very funny. Humor is a natural accompaniment of self-deflation. It indicates that the narrator's weakness is not serious; it reveals that the narrator can -- literally -- make fun of himself. The character weakness is thus balanced by a strength. In this way self-deflation does not degenerate into self-criticism, painful for the narrator and audience alike.

Bill's remark "I always was cowardly of a night" immediately precedes his story. A number of points established by the stories of the corpus are given explicitly, like this one, in the conversational context. The narrator makes a comment and then follows it with a story that either supports, explains or elaborates on it. Not every story that is straightforwardly linked to the context (see section 6.3) reveals its point there, but twenty out of twenty-five of them do. The stories in this group portray experiences and participants, but they differ from most of the other Foxfire stories in that they are more sharply focused: the nature of the incident or the character of the actor(s) -- or merely the fact of the experience or its result -- is laid out in the context. Take, for example, Bernice Hill's story about going horse-riding. Talking about the animals on the plantation where she and her brothers grew up, she remarks: "We didn't pay any attention to 'em -- we didn't have sense enough." Then, spontaneously:

(34)   I never will forget -- my father an' mother was very --

they was big churchgoers -- an' one day, I think it 'as

one day, I don't know -- I believe they went to town an'

my brothers, we decided we was gonna go horse-ridin'. We

was --" we caught out the mules, the ones we -- we could

catch, you know. Outa eight 'r ten you jus' ha -- might

not catch, which one you could catch the easiest. We --

the boys got -- got them a mule an' we had -- uh -- they

[Bernice's parents] was now keepin' the plantation --

they [the livestock] belonged to the plantation -- we

got the big -- I got the big black horse. I never will

forget that. We got up on blocks an' got up on them, that

horse an' the horse -- uh -- just rared right straight up.

You couldn't get a kid to do that now. We wouldn't -- we

didn't know anything about being afraid an' that horse jus'

rared up an' I jus' slid right off the back [S.A. laughs gen-

tly] an' then on -- an' then got, lead him back up to a block

an' got back on it. An' my[chuckles] brother says [chuckles] --

that's how crazy we were -- my brothers they always called

me "Sis" -- an' he said [urgently], "Sis, you get back on

him." An' ya know -- uh -- they had a great big buggy whip

-- they had them, so my oldest brother said, "Sis, you get

back up on him, an' I bet he won't do that no more" [narrator

and S.A. laugh]. I got up on it an' -- uh -- he commenced

pra-a-ancin' arou-ound an' my brother jus' got that big whip

an' got behind him an' give him a -- jus' hit him as

hard as he could with that whip an' (all mean) [narrator

laughs heartily; S.A. lightly]. An' then they --'they

got on their mules an' right up the road we went -- up

the road [laughs].

The point of this story is exactly what the narrator asserts in her

remark: when it came to animals, we were reckless. Notice, too, that she

reinforces the point already stated with the evaluative remark "that's how

crazy we were." The story as a whole supports and explains the remark that

prompted it. In most cases, listeners must surmise the point of the story,

but not when the narrator provides it in the context or in the course of the

story (an evaluative remark) or as a punchline at the end.

The point of a story directed at the portrayal of an experience can

usually be indicated --,in a kind of shorthand -- by one of the topics or

qualities named in the previous section. Jim Mize, for example, relates a

story (62) about dropping down on the riverbank and being carried home in a

wagon, "an' that night at midnight, I didn't know a thing." The point here is,

simply, "I was really sick that time." And Clifford Willis recounts a story

(28) about riding on a tractor that "commenced ball hootin'," scaring him so

much he jumped off; the machine, however, just "went straight off int' the

road, turned around in the road and stopped." And the point is "That sure

was surprising."

The point of a story directed at the portrayal of a participant or

participants can usually be indicated -- again in a kind of shorthand -- by

a quality of human (or in one case canine!) character. As occurrences are

presented as having been dangerous, amusing, strange, etc., actors are presented as having been clever, wise, inconsiderate, "cowardly of a night", etc. Often the point is generalized from such traits to aggrandizement, justification, deflation or censure of the participant. In these cases the narrator indicates how he would have the listeners perceive the actor: this person is not only clever, he should be admired. These people are inconsiderate and should be disapproved. The narrator's value judgment is a prominent part of the point.

Not surprisingly, most of the aggrandizing stories in the corpus are told about self.[39] Jim Mize's stories are the most unabashed (see stories 52 and 60 in the Appendix, for example). Two stories slip from aggrandizement into justification. In one, Aunt Eula Brown describes getting angry with the local doctor, a man she respected:

(65) [Dr. White] got -- he got mad down here one day, down --

down at -- uh -- Harley Watts'. Saree [Harley's wife] had

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[39]Labov and Waletzky (1967: 34) generalize, probably on the basis of their corpus of Black Vernacular English narratives, that "many narratives are designed to place the narrator in the most favorable possible light: a function which we may call self-aggrandizement." In their work on BVE the researchers collected many fight stories from members of adolescent peer-groups, boys who viewed skill at fighting as an important source of prestige (Labov 1972: 245). A significant number of these stories are indeed self-aggrandizing (although the claim is not repeated in the 1972 revision, in the 1968 study the authors assert that the point of almost all BVE fight stories is self-aggrandizement, Labov et al.: 299). In the Foxfire corpus, however, only sixteen stories out of eighty-three are self-aggrandizing, including nine by a single narrator, Jim Mize. Self-aggrandizement can be accomplished in a covert way by self-deflation, as we saw with Bill Corn's story (47) above, yet only twenty-two stories in the corpus are directed at portraying the self in any light. As Watson (1973: 255) suggests, the importance of the goal of self-aggrandizement may vary from speech community to speech community. It may also vary from story topic to story topic.

the pneumonia fever an' she had it (bad), too. Boys, she
like t' die in spite o' all -- all we could do, doctor an'
ever'body else. An' it'as aw-aw-awful bad day, that day,
he come ridin' up an' he said somepun t' me an' it didn't
stike me jus' right an' I said more back t' him than he did
t' me. I sure did. I said, I took all -- I ain't gonna
take things off a doctor an' pay him too [student laughs].
I don't have to. I was half-white and free-borned an' I
had dinner on the table. An' Harley always has plenty t'
eat, Harley Watts does. An' Saree was in the same -- in the
same -- jus' - just had one little ol' side shed, an' one
room is all they had right over across the hill right over
there -- it's tore down now, burnt up. An' -- uh -- he come
in that day an' he said somepun that I didn't like an', Lord,
I didn't take a word of it. An he'd adone spun it an' done
spun it an' done spun it an' I needn't care a cent. No sir,
my feelings 'as just as good as his-uns an' I couldn't help
Saree bein' sick an' I couldn't help her bein' so bad off.

The story leaves no doubt that in being outspoken Aunt Eula had right on her
side.

Though fewer in number, aggrandizing and justifying stories are also
told about relatives and friends. Stan Williams, for instance, relates a
story about his father coming upon some bullies in the road. The men tried
to get him to swig some liquor and refused to move their buggy out of the way.
Stan's father spoke to them tolerantly. Then they threatened him. At that,

his patience worn thin, he grabbed an ax from the front of his wagon and said:

(4)   "If you teech your hand 'r anything toward your (pocket),

I'll split your brains out," and he'd adone it, too. An'

he said he didn't ask no more t' move his buggy, said, he

let his mules and wagon move it, said, he tore one hind

wheel plumb off the man's buggy. Told him, you even bat

your eye, said, I'll kill you. I'll throw this ax plumb

through you. He said he went on, said that's how come, nigh

he come t' gettin' killed. He said that'as so.[40]

It is not surprising that most aggrandizing stories in the corpus are
told about self; but most deflating stories, too, are told about self. Edith
Kelso, for example, describes coming "home" to North Carolina after having
been raised in another part of the country:

(17)   But the last time I come back in '23 I was twelve year old.

An' we -- uh -- we -- uh come back t' Clarksville, Georgia.

We come back by train an' we come down t' Clarksville,

Georgia an' Miz Bob Mason got on the train an' -- uh --

so me an' my older sister Pansey, Keener, was jus' young

girls an' we thought we was very pop'lar at that time [laughs]

an' we didn't even know where we was comin' to because it

had been so long since we'd been back we couldn't even

---

[40] Interestingly, this story follows the pattern that Labov and Waletzky
describe for BVE fight narratives: in the first part of the story the pro-
tagonist is shown to be cool but firm and in the second he is presented as a
"dangerous fighter" -- somebody who can only be pushed so far before he "goes
crazy" (Labov 1972: 368).

remember. So we come back -- uh -- up jus' below Tallulah

Falls an' decided that we'd make our faces up, so we got

out our little compacts an' our lipstick an' our powder

and fixed our face. An' this'as Miz Bob Mason that was

along, said, told me later that she thought we were the

daintiest little ol' girls that she jus' couldn't under-

stand how pretty we were an' how we were fixin' up our face.

Edith and her sister are presented as vain, albeit ingenuously vain, young

ladies. While Miz Bob Mason may have been taken in, the point of the story is

that the girls were not as "dainty" as they thought they were.

Deflating stories not told about self are told about firends. Red

Taylor, for example, recounts a story about his friend Bill Corn killing a

"doe deer" -- this is one of the mistake stories mentioned in the previous

section. Before beginning, Red notes that "Bill had t' tell that-un on me

about the doe-deer [chuckles] --

(6)   I'm gonna tell that-un on him [chuckles] -- we was down on

        Lick Log _____. one time, me an' him, Hoyt Perry, Kenny

        Kilby, Lake Wilson and Law Dover, Boy, the tracks was thick:

        (the fight was on). Bill says, Now, Boys, whatever we do,

        let's don't kill no little ol' deer this time. There's

        a plenty o' good ones in here -- let's get a good, big deer.

        Okay. Well, next mornin' Lake and Kenny took the dogs, went

        off up a cove an' went out -- come pit at the ol' Pierce House

        place there on Lon's mountain -- good stands there. Me an'

        Hoyt was gonna make a drive on 'em -- him [Bill] and Law --

an' we had the understandin' if we shot one why we'd blow
the shotgun barrel like you'd blow a horn. We hadn't gone
but just a little ways, maybe two -- 'r -- three hundred
yards. "Bang" went Bill's gun. "To-o-o-t . Well, I'll
be damned, you think they killed one already?" Yeah, Lake
Wilson said, That's the signal. Let's go. Well, went over
there, he'd shot a little ol' doe -- he'd run three out over
'em. An' he shot the least-un in the whole bunch -- it
dressed out, I guess, ever'bit o' forty-five pounds.

Finally, two censuring stories are told, not at all surprisingly about
others. In one, Aunt Eula Brown describes a visit from some of her late hus-
band's relatives:

(77)   Ya know, Ernest Moore come here not long ago an' was gonna
move in that trailer right over there an' him an' his wife
move in here [on Eula's piece of property] an' take care o'
me. _____ next thing I know they've gone over yonder
where Mr. Jones now lives an' she got tired. Mary -- whatever
his wife's name is -- she got tired an' her an' that other
girl come here an' (brought) that other boy with (them).
They went over t' Mr. Jones' and played all around, come t'
the house, come here an' stay a while, went off an' never
said "turkey". Ain't been back t' say nothin' about it since.

But the largest group of stories that portray an actor other than the
narrator -- neighbors, acquaintances, strangers and canines as well as friends
and relatives -- are neither aggrandizing, justifying, deflating nor censuring.

In other words, the narrator's judgment is not a prominent part of the point. Along with displaying a quality of character, some of these narratives register mild appreciation, as with Aunt Eula's story (70) about her neighbor Edna (see appendix) or mild dismay, as with Aunt Eula's story (66) about another neighbor, Mack Harmon, cited at the end of the previous section but nothing stronger. Edna, for instance, is shown to be sweetly conscientious and Mack, curiously shy.

The narrator's intent -- or as we have been discussing it, the point of the story -- is one step removed from the content of the story. Not every quality of an occurrence that shows up in a description of content, for instance, is presented as the story's central idea. For the listener, if not so much for the narrator, the point is distinct in that it calls for a higher order of interpretation than the subject matter. Even when the point is made explicit in the context or in the story itself, the listener must be able to recognize it. Nonetheless, the points discussed so far do not transcend the experiences or participants that gave rise to them; in one way they are still "about" the contents. They do not reflect an abstraction from the particulars to the principles of life. But at least three stories in the corpus make points that operate on two levels -- at least one remove from the content and at a second remove as well. They portray or evaluate an actor and through this portrayal, portray or evaluate some feature of life.

In one of these cases, Calvert Connor tells a story about his niece's husband. After I interrupt the beginning of the story with a question, Calvert continues:

(1)   An' what happened was, he was -- had been drivin' a fuel

oil truck --, he works at a fillin' station -- he'd been
drivin' a fuel oil truck, deliverin' -- making fuel de-
liveries to all parts o' Rabun County an' all different
hours o' the night, in case of emergencies. An' -- uh --
his child got sick, a little boy, became very ill with a
high fever of 104. An' he took the child's temperature
an' he found out that it was extremely high an' they had
already given the kid -- uh -- some medication. An' --
uh -- they proceeded to call a doctor at home, Dr. Lovett.
An' Dr. Lovett asked Henry what was the matter with the
child an' Henry told him he had a fever of 104. He says,
Well -- uh -- cain't I bring the child up, don't -- don't
ya need t' see the child? An' he says, No, today's -- uh
-- Sunday, says, I'm not in my office. Said -- uh -- just
give the child two aspirins every four hours an' put 'im t'
bed. See that he gets plenty o' juices an' liquids an' rests.
So Henry proceeded t' follow the instructions an' he said,
Bring 'im to me in a day 'r two if he don't get any better
[B.K. laughs]. So, little by -- by Monday ev'ning when Henry
came in from work, the child was gettin' better -- his fever
had broken, he was actually getting better. He had a twenty-
four hour virus. So, about a week later it was extremely
cold, one night about eleven o'clock an' Henry and his wife
were in bed an' the phone ring an' who was on the phone but
Dr. Lovett. An' Dr. Lovett told -- uh -- asked Albert, said,

Would you _please_ come an' put some fuel oil, said, I'm
freezin' t' death; my house is cold, I don't have any-
thing in the -- no fuel in the tanks. An' -- uh --
Henry said, Well, it is mighty cold tonight, Dr. Lovett,
says -- uh -- tell you what t' do. You open your furnace
an' put in two aspirins [B.K. laughs] an' close the door
an' says, I'll see ya tomorrow mornin' about 8:30 [narrator
and B.K. laugh]. So, so -- uh -- Henry just hung up the
phone an' went back to sleep [laughs]. An' this is a true
story, by the way, this did actually happen.

The story over, I comment: "I just love that, 'cause the -- it seems doctors
so rarely get their comeuppance, ya know. An' they have these matters of life
an' death in their hands an' all sorts of worried people always coming to
them." Calvert replies with a neat statement of the point of the story:
"That's right, but the shoe can be on the other foot also."

On one level the story is "about" Henry but on another it is "about"
what fate, or circumstance, can achieve. The story involves two men who in
the usual scheme of things possess unequal power over people's lives. When
his son got sick, Henry was at the doctor's mercy; then, in an unexpected re-
versal, the doctor was at Henry's mercy. At one level Henry is justified by
the story. At another he is presented as the agent of justice. And the point
is as relevant apart from the actors and incidents concerned as it is relevant
to them. This is indicated by a second version of the story, Ruth Brown's, in
which the roles of Henry and Dr. Lovett are taken by an unnamed plumber and
doctor. Significantly, I think, Calvert and Ruth's story is the only one I

encountered in two versions told by two different narrators. It not only

has a point to make on an abstract level, it has the folkloristic capacity

to attach itself to different actors and relate to the experience of numerous

listeners.

At this juncture let me specify some of the goals covered by "establish-

ing a point of personal interest." One goal apart from these has already been

identified, namely (1) satisfying a question or a request. Other goals in-

clude: (2) clarifying a statement or substantiating a claim (3) portraying

a noteworthy experience (4) portraying self or others, sometimes in ways that

are aggrandizing, justifying, deflating or censuring and (5) making an obser-

vation about the way life is or should be. Although each of these goals ex-

cept the first is inferred from the points made in the stories of the corpus,

the second cannot be inferred from particular stories so much as it can be in-

ferred from a group of stories -- those that serve as examples, elaborations

or explanations. As I noted in section 6.3 we cannot be sure whether a parti-

cular remark prompts a story or whether the decision to tell a certain story

prompts that remark. Some remarks are constructed to be introductions.

As befits the little sociolinguists know about narrator's goals, these

have been stated conservatively. They stick closely to the evidence from the

actual speech messages. According to my definition, the establishment of a

point of personal interest is a social function, but the roles of particular

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[41]As Watson (n.d.: Ch. IV, 55) points out succinctly, "little research
has been done on the purposes (goals) of narration from the standpoint of the
narrator" -- a problem ramified by the ad hoc treatment motivations and inten-
tions receive at the hands of social scientists.

stories in social interaction <u>beyond speech interaction</u> is largely a matter of speculation. By portraying himself or others in aggrandizing, justifying, deflating or censuring ways, does the narrator intend to influence the listeners' opinions, as I have suggested? By substantiating a claim, does he mean to build or maintain his credibility in the eyes of the listeners? By portraying his own experiences, does he intend to convince the listeners that he is a man (or woman) of parts? And, ultimately, how is the fulfillment of each of these goals meant to affect his social relationships?

Answers to these questions and many similar ones await further ethnography (informed by what Hymes [1972: 70] calls "the purposes and needs of human beings engaged in social action"), but a few stories of the <u>Foxfire</u> corpus suggest two forthrightly social purposes for telling particular stories. One narrative arises from Jim Mize's visit to Aunt Eula Brown, discussed in the previous section; the others from Red Taylor's visit with Bill Corn. As I pointed out in Chapter I, these two sessions are of special interest because they provide examples of interaction between peers, which would otherwise not be present in the corpus.

In the first of these sessions Jim tells a story cited above and Aunt Eula peppers it with comments:

(62) Jim: You recollect when your poor old Daddy--- I'll never forget it. You recollect when I took the fever an' me astandin' down there in the garden an' your Daddy said, There's somepun the matter with Will -- he had t' sit on the Creek bank. He said, He's not workin' fast enough. He said, He always just went. An' he

said, There's somepun the matter with Will.

Eula: I know it.

Jim: That's what he said.

Eula: I remember things like that just as well as if they
        was just yesterday, Jim.

Jim: You know about it. You recollect it -- that long --
        all about it. Well, let's see, somebody come along
        with a wagon. Ned Carver!

Eula: Yeah.

Jim: Took me to the house an' that night I didn't know a
        thing.

Eula: Yeah.

Jim: An' he took me over t' the house.

Eula: I remember.

Jim: I took Ada [Jim's wife], an' she took the horse over
        t' the house an' I had a few _____ I had t' cut
        an' I sat down on the Creek bank an' Uncle George,
        he an' Daddy said, There's somepun the matter with
        Will. Ned came along an' said, You come here. He
        Come an' met me an' _____ an' he took me in the
        house an' that night at midnight, I didn't know a thing.

The point here, as I noted above, is that Jim really was sick at that time,
but Aunt Eula's presence allows him to use the story in another way -- to
reminisce -- and Aunt Eula is his willing partner. The story evokes a common
memory that is evidence of a shared past. In doing so, it reaffirms old ties

a purpose of storytelling that may be especially common among old people.[42]

In the second session, where Foxfire's presence is more prominent, Red Taylor and Bill Corn tell several stories "on" each other, one of which (60) is cited above. The point of these stories is deflation, but with the objects of deflation present, deflation becomes teasing. The conversational context makes this doubly clear. Red begins the session by joshing Bill: "Tell him [Eliot Wigginton] a big story now." The two men agree they'll tell stories "on" each other. Suggests Red: "Go ahead, we'll swap out then." When Bill commences his story, he first says, "Well, we was out adeer-huntin' one time an' Red Taylor," then pauses for effect. When Eliot responds, "Yeah," Bill chuckles and goes on with the narrative (41, see appendix). Later, Bill tells the story cited above. Bill and Buck use these stories to tease each other, an activity generally confined to intimates. Thus, the stories exercise their friendship and display their solidarity. Neither teasing nor reminiscing is confined to storytelling, of course, but these particular stories do have a role in maintaining close or salient relationships.

In the previous section I referred to the close relationship between content, narrator's purposes and community's purposes. On the level of particular stories the narrators' goals are largely compatible with presentation of interesting content in particular and time passed pleasantly in general. In the stories of the Foxfire corpus points are not made at the expense of the listeners' enjoyment. For example, when the narrator's purpose is to por-

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[42]Another goal of this story may be recall. As I have suggested elsewhere (Keller 1973), old people especially may recount particular stories in an effort to keep alive important memories.

tray an experience, the experience is most often an unusual one. When the
narrator's purpose is to portray a participant, the participant is often known
to the listeners (and he is more likely than not to be the narrator himself).
Further, should the goal be aggrandizement, a surprising or amazing occurrence
is frequently in order; should the goal be deflation, a funny one. As we saw
with Bill Corn's story (46) about being "cowardly of a night", humor is often
present to take the sting out of an unflattering portrait. In short, the
point of a story commonly binds up content of intrinsic interest. Since Fox-
fire narrators and listeners share many of the same concerns, this is not sur-
prising. At the same time, the point is frequently of interest in its own
right, representing as it does the narrator's perspective on himself or other
members of the community. Or it is of interest in its context, where it clari-
fies what the narrator has to say.

On the level of the storytelling event the narrator's purposes and the
community's merge: the common expectation is to pass time pleasantly. The
narrator's goal is to enjoy himself, but depending on his manner of presenting
the event, his enjoyment -- as well as the listeners' -- tends to derive from
one of two ways of speaking. Representing a growing number of folklorists
who are interested in reorientating their field toward communication,
Bauman (1975) has recently focused on and developed the notion of "performance"
as a way of speaking. In storytelling, performance can be contrasted with an-
other way of speaking -- call it "recounting". Both recounting and performance
depend on the narrator setting up a frame of interpretation.

If the narrator delineates an interpretative frame that centers atten-
tion on the story's message, he subordinates his own role to the message and

encourages the listeners to support his activity. This makes the storytelling event a relatively casual one, in which narrator and listeners are brought together by their shared responsibility for the message. The narrator derives enjoyment not only from holding the floor, sharing an experience and giving his view -- these are enjoyments common to both recounting and performance -- but from participation in a mutual enterprise.

In contrast, if the narrator delineates an interpretative form that centers attention on the activity of telling a story, he highlights his own role and encourages the listeners to evaluate his skill. This makes the event a relatively intense one, in which the narrator is kept apart from the listeners by his display and their critical stance. In Bauman's words, performance "calls forth special attention to and heightened awareness of the act of expression and this gives license to the audience to regard the act of expression and the performer with special intensity (1975: 293)." As the enterprise is no longer a mutual one (it is still interactive, of course), the narrator and the listeners do not derive the same enjoyments. The narrator has put himself on the line but if he succeeds in his performance, he is in a position to derive enjoyment from the prestige and control that accrue to a performer:

> . . . to the extent that [the listeners] value his performance, they will allow themselves to be caught up in it. When this happens, the performer gains a measure of prestige and control over the audience -- prestige because of the demonstrated competence he has displayed, control because the determination of the flow of the interaction is in his hands (Bauman 1975: 305).

With performance, rather than sharing in the same kind of enjoyment as the narrator, listeners derive enjoyment from the narrator's vivid treatment of the story's message.

Performance and recounting set up frames of reference that are not mutually exclusive, but rather merge along a continuum. It may be that the recounting frame is isomorphic with the interpretative frame established by the majority of storytelling in the Foxfire corpus. Put differently, recounting is the unmarked activity; performance is the marked one, though we should say it is marked in increments. What I take to be elements of performance do show up in the stories of certain Foxfire narrators, notably Ruth Brown, Bill Corn and Bill Wieland. Without intending to broach a subject beyond the scope of this study, I can point out that descriptive imitation and elaboration tend to characterize their narratives. In any case, "recounting" much better describes the ways of speaking represented in the events of the Foxfire corpus than does "performance." And the enjoyment aimed at by Foxfire narrators is much more of the type to be derived from a casual undertaking than from an intense one.

This distinction between recounting and performing or between an intense undertaking and a casual one helps explain why Labov and Waletzky's notion of the consequences of telling a pointless story -- and the idea of the relationship between narrator and listeners it implies -- may fit the storytelling events they encountered but not those of the Foxfire corpus. "Pointless stories," they say, "are met (in English) with the withering rejoinder, 'So what?' Every good narrator is continually warding off this question; when his narrative is over, it should be unthinkable for a by-stander to say, 'So what?'" (Labov et al. 1972: 297 - 298). The image of a listener in the context provided by Foxfire folding his arms on his chest and saying "So what?" out loud or in his mind just does not wash. True, the goals of Foxfire commit the lis-

teners   to an outward show of interest, but the type of storytelling makes

it inappropriate for the listeners to say, "So what?" The narrators do not

take on responsibility for a performance; further, they invite the partici-

pation of the listeners. A story gone wrong might be greeted with an "Oh

well" -- or a question aimed at clearing up the bothersome aspect -- but not

a "So what?" Essentially, listeners have no right to a "So what?"; moreover,

they have no interest in one. Such a stance does not contribute to passing

time pleasantly.

It might be helpful here to think of recounting and performance in terms

of the component key, a casual key corresponding to the frame of interpreta-

tion set up by recounting and an intense key corresponding to the frame of

interpretation set up by performance. Like frames of reference as understood

by Bauman (1975: 295 - 297), keys are signalled by some part(s) or aspect(s)

of the message form, sometimes a paralinguistic, kinesic or phonetic feature.

The keys casual/intense overarch those that are usually mentioned by socio-

linguists, such as "joking", "serious", "threatening", "perfunctory" (e.g.,

Hymes 1972: 62; Sankoff 1972: 39 - 41; Mitchell-Kernan 1972: 175 - 176).

since a story can be recounted jokingly or performed jokingly. These other

keys are represented in the stories of the Foxfire corpus, and like the over-

arching keys, they are important to interpretation. For instance, they help

discriminate a deflating story, told in a joking or wry tone (an example of the

later is Edith Kelso's story [17] about coming home to North Carolina) from a

censuring one, told in a serious tone. To again make the analytical distinction

that opened this section, the keys joking, wry, serious, etc. are important to

interpretation on the level of the story, while the keys intense/casual are

important on the level of the storytelling event.

6.6 What reactions on the part of the listeners show up in the storytelling events of this corpus?

We saw in section 6.3 that listeners sometimes contribute to the beginning of a story by merely asking the question or making the request that prompts the story. The narrator builds on that question or request, finding no need to repeat the information they contain in his orientation. At the middle and end of stories, too, listeners' actions -- now reactions -- play a part in construction. While the narrator carries the main responsibility for constructing a story, in a casual storytelling event he looks to the listeners for support and occasional guidance. And the listeners' reactions are one manifestation of the mutual enterprise described in the previous section.

Even within the limitations imposed by my data -- and they are considerable not only because a large part of the listeners' reactions are visual rather than aural but also because even some aural reactions are doubtlessly lost in recordings oriented toward the narrator -- a clear trend emerges for listeners' reactions during and following the stories of the Foxfire corpus.[43] I examine listeners' reactions during the stories in the twelve narratives of the appendix; and listeners' reactions following the stories in the narratives

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[43]Although this section concerns the reactions of any member of the audience, one listener is almost always more prominent than the others in a given session, as the recordings show. Whichever visitor feels most responsible for the interview is likely to take the lead in conversing with the contact; the contact focuses on him and he is more responsive than the others.

of the corpus as a whole.

One reaction especially characterizes the listeners' response during the events of the corpus: a more or less continuous and open gaze at the narrator's face. Unfortunately, this behavior is recorded only as silence, but silence -- keeping silent -- is necessarily a prominent reaction. As a measure of this, thirty-five utterances show up in eight of the twelve stories of the appendix: for the rest of the stories the rest of the time, silence. Furthermore, these utterances are largely compl mentary to, rather than disruptive of, the narratives. First, none is longer than one sentence: most consist of a single word, a vocal segregate, such as "mhmm"[44] or a form of laughter. Second, four-fifths occur at the end of a clause or a sentence, where the narrator naturally pauses. And third, only three contain any information new to the story. For the most part, then, these reactions do very little to oreak the flow of the narrative.

All but three of the reactions are spontaneous, and all but one of them expresses understanding of some point or phase of the story. "Mhmm," "mm" and "yeah" convey comprehension; laughter, exclamations ("wow!", "oh lord!") and statements of agreement convey appreciation as well. They indicate to the narrator not only "I follow you there" but also "I 'got' that." The single most common utterance is laughter, which ranges from a light chuckle to a hearty guffaw. Jim Mize's story about being fooled by some pranksters features a good deal of laughter and a statement of agreement. At one point Jim con-

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[44]This is Trager's term, suggested by Bateson. The category includes "mhmm", "mm", "uhhuh", "uhuh", "uh" and "other sounds that [do] not seem to fit into [the] ordinary phonological frame" (1964: 277).

fronted a tree stump dressed up to look like a man:

(58)   Jim: . . . an' I said, "Speak t' me" [B.K. and Edith

laugh]. They wouldn't speak -- he couldn't speak.

B.K.:   I guess not.

Jim: But I -- I took that gun out an' I said, Bang, bang

[everybody laughs].

The one reaction that does not express understanding expresses, in fact,

the opposite. As her father is beginning the story cited immediately above,

Edith Kelso asks a question intended to get at why Jim was expecting trouble

on his way home from work that day:

(58)   Edith: Hadn't you got paid an' you thought they'd -- some-

body . . . .

Jim: Yeah, yeah, yeah, they'd paid me that day an' they

was over at Otto then.

Although Edith's question might be considered a special case -- by requesting

the story from her father and by hosting Foxfire's visit she was in a way

sponsoring Jim's narrative -- other listeners with no special relation to

the narrator on occasion request missing information. As Jim is beginning

another story, this one about his first job out in the state of Washington,

he is stopped by one of Foxfire's advisors:

(57)   Jim: When I went t' Washington I'd never seen no riggin',

no dunkey in my life, never seed one.

P.R.:   Never seen a what?

Jim: Never seed 'em ayardin', ya know, no yarder, dunkey --

I'd -- they'd call 'em dunkeys out there, ya know, the

old steam thing apullin' in the logs.

P.R.: Oh, I see, yeah.

Jim: An' -- an' -- an' so I went t' the fo'man etc.

Thus, listeners sometimes pose questions in the interest of clarity; further, narrators sometimes preempt such questions. The three non-spontaneous reactions noted above are affirmative answers ("mhmm" and "yeah") to questions in which narrators anticipate problems of clarity. Just having used the term "snakin' gully" in a story (50) about logging, Hillard Brown asks the listener, "You know what that is? Where you drag the pole." Eliot Wigginton replies "Mhmm" and the story continues. The question may be implicit, implied by a pause, as well as explicit. Bill Corn substitutes a pause for a question in the story (41) he tells "on" Red Taylor. He says to Eliot Wigginton, "Well, we'as out adeer-huntin' one time an' Red Taylor," then pauses. The implied question is "You know who I mean?" Since Red Taylor is sitting right there in the room, participating in the conversation, the pause and implied question are for effect, as mentioned in the previous section, but the pattern holds for other narratives in the corpus. Ruth Brown, for example, tells a story about her father's death in which she implicitly makes some inquiries:

(15) Ruth: We lived in an old house right there where the
              cannery is [pause].

      M.B.: Mhmm.

      Ruth: At Dillard [pause].

      M.B.: Mhmm.

      Ruth: At the community school. Well, they brought him on, etc.

These and the other reactions in the twelve stories of the appendix -- with the exception of the one question -- might be called "positive," meaning

that they encourage the narrator to carry on with the narrative. Negative reactions, in contrast, encourage the narrator to modify, particularly to shorten, the narrative. As I pointed out in the previous section, Foxfire commits the members of its staff to at least a show of attention, so that their responses during the stories may be at least partially due to the organization's goals. (Even the one question is better described as "neutral" than "negative" since it requires only the addition of information.) On the other hand, the lack of negative reactions may be more apparent than real, many negative reactions involving as they do gaze (e.g., averted), facial expression (e.g., blank), gesture (e.g., fiddling with hair or clothes), posture (e.g., slumped) or body movement (e.g., getting up from a sitting position)—all of which are not a part of my audible data.

While silence is the rule for listeners during a story, an audible reaction is the rule following it. Out of the seventy-seven storytelling events for which I have sufficient data[45], one or several members of the audience utters something -- after a pause of a second or more -- at the end of sixty-four stories. Only five of these utterances cannot be classed as reactions: instead of acknowledging the story just completed, the listener plunges into a topic or pops a question that is unrelated. Of the remaining thirteen stories, two are followed by long silences (six seconds or more) and eleven by the narrator's words alone (as he adds to the story, comments on it, etc., see footnote 35, p. 181).

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[45] The corpus includes eighty-three storytelling events, but the post-narrative period was garbled or cut-off on the recordings of six stories.

The large majority of these fifty-nine reactions express understanding, here not so much of a particular point or phase of the story but of the story as a whole. They say to the narrator "I took that all in." Otherwise, they are qualitatively the same as the other reactions we have been discussing with the important difference that coming as they do at the end, they also acknowledge that the story is finished. Indeed, this fact may account for the perfunctory way in which some of the responses are uttered: the listener is more interested in signalling the close of the story than his understanding of it. As with reactions during stories, a number express appreciation as well as comprehension. Again, segregates and affirmatives like "mhmm," "hmm," "yes" and "yeah" convey comprehension and appreciation. Actually, a variety of ways of expressing appreciation show up in the stories of the corpus: besides laughter and exclamations, there are evaluative comments ("That's amazing"), statements of the point of the story and paralinguistic signs like a sharp intake of breath.

About two-thirds of the reactions serve only the purposes named in the preceding paragraph, but while serving these purposes, a small number of reactions also establish the listener's (or listeners') turn at speaking. They take the floor for the audience by commencing a new speech event, albeit one based on the old. A discussion of the story just completed or a conversation centered on a related topic or another story about a similar subject all constitute smooth transitions from the stories they follow, expressing the listener's comprehension and shifting the roles of speaker and listener. Eliot Wigginton, for example, responds to Thomas Bradley's story (16) about the doctor who cured his hound of hepatitis with another story that begins: "You -

know, talking about curing things . . . ." This phrase and the story it introduces, first, show that Eliot has grasped Thomas' story and, second, set Eliot up as the speaker. The start of a new speech event, of course, definitively signals the end of the old.

Again paralleling reactions during stories, a small number of reactions following stories express not understanding but the lack of it. Some questions are aimed at clearing up a particular fact. At the end of Ruth Brown's story about a ghost horse, excerpted at length in subsection 6.4.3, one of Foxfire's advisors pursues a point:

(11) Ruth: . . . and he'd come right to the winder and tromp till you started to get up and time your feet hit the floor, he was gone. And it wasn't a thing in this world but a horse agallopin' up there and stopped and stomped. Now, that's the truth if I never get outa this chair!

M.B.: But you never saw him?

Ruth: No, you'd -- it was gone -- it'd hush 'fore you'd get out there.

Others, however, are aimed at clearing up the general import. At the end of Bill Corn's story about hunting with Jud Henslee, Red Taylor makes a pivotal inquiry:

(43) Bill: Me and Jud Henslee went deer-huntin' one time an' I put him in the stand and I went over from him, sorta outa the gun shot of him, ya know, over the hill. Directly I heared him! Bang, bang. Well, I waited --

I heared the deer go down the holler _____

[Red and E.W. chuckle]. I went out t' see what'as

wrong. When I got out there -- it was pretty cold

that morning -- but, boys, he was shaking the staves.

Boys, he said, it's cold this mornin', ain't it? I

said, Yes. I've had them very kinda chills myself --

uh -- [chuckles], (I got clear of 'em) [listeners

chuckle].

Red: Had he hit or missed?

Bill: He'd -- uh -- hit an' missed, too, I'd call it. He

        didn't shoot over ten steps at the furthest, but the

        deer got away.

With this last bit of information, it is much less difficult to make out the

point of the story, which is deflation of Jud, who has not only missed a deer

that should have been an easy hit , but has tried to excuse himself on the

basis of the cold.

The majority of listeners' reactions as we have been able to examine

them here indicate to the narrator that the story is clear at a certain point

or as a whole. Rather than being disruptive, reactions during stories en-

courage the narrator to continue on in the same vein. Reactions following

stories encourage the listener to leave the story as it. And by confirming

the resolution and the coda, they even discourage the narrator from continuing

on.

All of these reactions bring up the interesting -- and at present in-

solvable -- problem of the relationship between the listener's feelings about

a story and his reactions to it. In a casual event, where focus on the message invites the listeners to take part in (rather than a critical stance toward) the storytelling, dissatisfied listeners have several options: (1) negative reactions aimed at altering the story (2) questions aimed at clarifying it and (3) positive reactions. The listener may choose positive reactions in order to help maintain the casual nature of the event. Negative reactions and too many questions run the risk of challenging the interpretative frame -- of seeming to take a critical stance toward the narrator -- but positive reactions do not. And if positive reactions are kept to a minimum (for example, attentive silence plus answers in response to questions during the story plus an utterance at the end of the story), they are not likely to prolong the message. This means of supporting the event without encouraging it usually allows the story to pass time not unpleasantly and the listener has only to substitute "oh well" for efforts to affect the message. It is often difficult -- reactions uttered mechanically excepted -- to distinguish positive reactions that are enthusiastic from those that are pragmatic. Both kinds provide support for storytelling, but the pragmatic ones do not of course reflect the listener's opinion of the story.

Besides reactions indicating clarity, a minority point out to the narrator problems of clarity. These questions encourage him to add information. And in contrast to the reactions discussed in the two preceding paragraphs, they clearly evince the listener's interest in the story's message. Whereas the other reactions provide support in continuing or concluding the story, these provide both support and guidance -- support because they reassure the narrator of the listener's attention and guidance because they show the narrator what needs to be appended.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In the previous chapter I described a corpus of eighty-three storytelling events using a framework devised from Dell Hymes' concept of the speech event -- a framework that provides the scope and accommodates the detail necessary for a full description. Like any ethnographic description, this one succeeds in a basic way if it gives us an idea of the complexity and beyond that allows us to see the variability of the phenomena -- variability within the class that has been designated as a particular phenomenon and variability between that class and other classes of a similar type.

As I pointed out in chapter II, Hymes (1973: 52, 58) assigns priority at this stage of sociolinguistic investigation to ethnographic description of the different "ways of speaking" in and across speech communities. He emphasizes that "each case and type is valuable, enlarging and testing general knowledge," which knowledge in turn sets individual cases and types into relief (1973: 71). To put sociolinguistics on a sure footing "we require a widely ranging series of descriptions . . . . Neither a descriptive model nor an explanatory theory is convincing if it has not met the test of diverse situations, of a general body of data" (1972: 71). And one of the first tests a model or theory must meet is the utility of the terms and concepts on which it relies. The question is: can they be widely applied in a meaningful, explicit fashion? The tools of

comparison and generalization, they are more than part of a descriptive model;
they are a step toward an explanatory theory. As such, they should not only
prove useful, they should reflect the knowledge underlying communicative interaction

The description contained in the previous chapter stands on its own
as a contribution to the stockpile of sociolinguistic knowledge. In the
context of this study it serves as a body of data that can be brought to
bear on the terms and concepts that figure in Labov and Waletzky's des-
cription. To some extent the previous chapter was concerned with this
task. Here I focus on the most prominent aspects of Labov and Waletzky's
description. Of interest are not only the authors' definition of narrative
and their outline of its "overall structure" but also their fundamental
concept of the nature of the phenomenon. While in chapter IV I mounted a cri-
tique of Labov and Waletzky's work from a theoretical persepective , in
this chapter I explicitly examine their description from an empirical
perspective, that provided by the Foxfire corpus. In the first part of
the chapter I consider the applicability to the corpus of the authors' .
definition and outline; in the second part I consider the plausibility of
the authors' concept, then speculate on an alternative one.

7.1   An examination of "the overall structure"

To recapitualate their description, Labov and Waletzky(1968: 244) pro-
pose that a "fully-formed narrative" includes, in addition to its complicating
action and resolution, an abstract, orientation, evaluation and coda. Each of
these sections is characterized both by the type of information it conveys (an ab-

stract summarizes the content; an orientation names the time, place, actors and their activity or situation; the complicating action and resolution relate what happened; an evaluation gives the narrator's attitudes toward element[s] of the content and a coda closes off the complicating action) and to a greater or lesser extent by a certain arrangement of "free," "restricted" and "narrative" clauses. Whether defined semantically in terms of information -- the more comprehensive tactic -- or syntactically/semantically in terms of arrangement of clauses and information, each of these parts, with the exception of evaluation, is clearly present in the stories of the Foxfire corpus. Then, too, if the conversation immediately preceding and the listeners' reactions immediately following the story are taken into account, they include on occasion constituents of abstracts, orientations and codas. I make an exception of evaluations because as we have seen and as Labov and Waletzky partially acknowledge (Labov 1972: 369), evaluation is more adequately described as a semantic structure parallel to the complicating action than as a section of narrative appearing between the last event of the complicating action and the resolution: of the twelve stories of the appendix only two feature one or more clauses that appear to suspend the complicating action just before the resolution. Evaluation manifested in any of the large number of forms named in the previous chapter are obviously and abundantly present in the stories of the Foxfire corpus, as almost any of the examples cited above illustrates. The import of the forms -- that they constitute a semantic structure that helps convey the narrator's state of mind toward the occurrences represented in the story -- cannot be proved but it can be convincingly argued. In short, from the evidence of the Foxfire corpus, the terms

"evaluation," "abstract," "orientation," "complicating action" and "coda" seem to be useful descriptions of stories and storytelling events, terms that probably reflect a part of the knowledge that goes into construction and interpretation. A speaker, for instance, knows -- which is not to say he is consciously aware of -- the value of the information entailed in an abstract, an orientation, etc. We should note, however, that the terms "fully-formed" or "complete" (Labov 1972: 369) describe only seven out of the eighty-three stories of the corpus, even when an evaluation section is not required. In their 1967 paper Labov and Waletzky (40) venture to call a fully-extended structure "the normal form" of a narrative of personal experience, but they do not designate a "normal form" in either their 1968 report or its 1972 revision. Certainly the Foxfire corpus does not justify the use of the term "normal". And whether "fully-formed" or "complete" correspond to any ideal of narrative held by speakers and listeners remains an open question.

7.2 An examination of Labov and Waletzky's definition

To reiterate, Labov and Waletzky (1967: 13) define narrative as "one verbal technique for recapitulating experience, in particular, a technique of constructing narrative units which match the temporal sequence of that experience." The key to this definition is the authors' idea of a "narrative unit", which (except for "coordinate" clauses) is strictly limited to independent clauses "locked in position" vis-à-vis each other -- clauses whose "order cannot be changed without changing the inferred sequence of events in the original semantic interpretation" (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 21, 22). According to the authors, dependent clauses are irrelevant to the temporal sequence of the narra-

tive "because once a clause is subordinated to another, it is not possible to disturb the original semantic interpretation by reversing it" (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 21; Labov et al. 1968: 289). In addition, clauses headed by habitual verbs and referring to repeated events are incapable of reporting a temporal sequence because "it is not possible to falsify the situation by reversing clauses," any one event over the number of occasions on which it occurred having both preceded and followed any other" (Labov et al. 1968: 289). Thus, what Labov and Waletzky call "narrative" clauses are the only "narrative units" -- they and they alone refer to the events that form the temporal sequence or the complicating action of the narrative. Since this part of Labov and Waletzky's description is presented as a definition, the terms "narrative," "narrative unit" and its synonym "narrative clause" are obliged to be more than useful in describing a group of stories, they are obliged to be adequate for describing (in part, of course) any story. And I do not think they are.

The authors readily acknowledge that "narrative is not the only method for referring to a sequence of events": use of the past perfect or embedding of syntactic units constitute "perfectly logical, orderly and acceptable" ways of doing this (Labov and Waletzky 1967: 20). What they do not acknowledge -- and the lack leads them, I think, to artificial distinctions, including perhaps the one above -- is that the communication of temporal order is partially accomplished through background knowledge. Background knowledge is simply the ensemble of understandings and principles that speakers and listeners bring to any speech event. Because they have knowledge about the ways of the world, including patterns of speaking, listeners are predisposed to grasping the chronological order of events -- insofar as that is necessary for interpreting the story --

even when it is not distinctly or scrupulously represented by the order of the clauses reporting those events. As ethnomethodologists like Sacks and Garfinkel have brought to the fore, "understanding what someone says is not tantamount to the mere process of decoding his speech signal. It involves the successful use of perceptual strategies that are based on [shared] asumptions, and hence [shared] strategies of interpretation" (St. Clair 1974: 932). The construction and interpretation of speech events, in other words, depends on the speakers' and listeners' background knowledge (Gumperz 1972: 23).

Sacks (1972: 331) points out an important use of background knowledge in the interpretation of sentences or clauses representing events, one that is directly relevant to Labov and Waletzky's exclusion of clauses out of temporal order:

> While it is quite clear that not any two consecutive sentences, not even any consecutive sentences that report occurrences, are heard and properly heard, as reporting that the occurrences have occurred in the order which the sentences have, if the occurrences ought to occur in that order, and there is no information to the contrary (such as a phrase at the beginning of the second, like "before that, however"), then the order of the sentences indicates the order of the occurrences (emphasis mine).

Likewise, if the events ought not to occur in that order, they will not be "heard" as representing that order. This is in contradiction to Labov and Waletzky's claim that the interpretation of narratives "depends on the expectation that the events described did, in fact, occur in the same order as they were told in" (1967: 30).[1] In general, it does, but the expectation is itself dependent on the resulting interpretation being compatible with background know-

_____

[1] Or, to put this slightly more accurately -- taking into account coordinate clauses -- interpretation depends on the expectation that the events did not occur in an order the reverse of the order the clauses were told in.

ledge. This understanding of the significance of the role of background know-
ledge leads us to doubt that only clauses ordered with respect to the events
that actually occurred are capable of forming the complicating action.

There is little reason to assume that a few clauses out of order
or in an indeterminate order but reporting events, such as show up in several
stories of the Foxfire corpus, do not count in the processes of constructing and
interpreting the complicating action. A limit may exist as to how many clauses
can be out of order before the processes are disrupted: the more listeners are
disoriented — because of unfamiliar or bizarre content, a sketchy orientation
or simply a large number of clauses out of order — the fewer such clauses they
can tolerate. But up to that limit, out-of-order clauses can help portray the
sequence of events.

Similarly, there is little reason to assume that dependent clauses report-
ing events, of which we have also seen some examples in the Foxfire corpus, do
not count in constructing and interpreting the complicating action. A clause
may be subordinated — put in relation, temporal and otherwise — to another
clause without becoming irrelevant to the sequence of events.

To summarize, some independent clauses out of order or in an indeterminate
order and some dependent clauses are, as far as I can see, the equivalent of
Labov and Waletzky's "narrative" clauses in this way: they can and do refer to
the events of the complicating action. Further, at this stage of investigation,
semantic intuition is the only comprehensive means of distinguishing clauses of
narrative import. It is neat but not fully accurate to discriminate narrative-
import clauses on the basis of syntax. Indeed, once matching order is no longer
considered absolutely necessary for "narrative units" and the syntactic markers

of "matchability" (clauses must be _independent_; they must be headed by _certain_ verbs and not others) are disregarded, there is no theoretical reason why clauses employing the past perfect and even syntactic units other than clauses cannot, on occasion, constitute part of the complicating action. To put the argument more strongly, there is no theoretical reason why _clauses_ should constitute the whole of the complicating action when, as we saw in chapter IV, a uniform relation does not exist between the syntactic form and the semantic content. Clauses are not the only syntactic units capable of reporting events, nor are they always the most logical representations of events.

Besides failing to recognize the role of background knowledge and excluding the three sorts of clauses discussed above from those eligible to be "narrative units", Labov and Waletzky fail to understand one aspect of the operation of semantic knowledge — and because of this wrongly exclude another sort of clause. Clauses headed by habitual verbs and reporting iterated events are entirely capable of constituting all or part of a story's complicating action. As five narratives in the _Foxfire_ corpus suggest, the processes of constructing and interpreting a story proceed in much the same way for an experience composed of a sequence of repeated actions as for an experience composed of a sequence of unique actions, the difference in verbs notwithstanding. This is because the narrator and the listener focus on a single experience at a time—not that they are unaware that the sequence of events occurred on a number of occasions; rather, they hold that knowledge back. Thus a sequence of iterated events refers to a temporal order that might as well be non-reversible. It is irrelevant that if all the sequences of repeated actions were considered together, any clause could be put in the place of any other. Again, semantic intuition is the only sure means

of distinguishing clauses of narrative import, and intuition merely requires
that a clause refer to an event temporally ordered within the time span of a
single sequence of events, repeated or not.

In the previous paragraphs I have been arguing that certain stories in
the Foxfire corpus include evidence that does not support Labov and Waletzky's
stringent definition of a "narrative unit" -- that clauses out of order, clauses
in indeterminate order, dependent clauses and clauses headed by habitual verbs
do, on occasion, fulfill essentially the same function as do "narrative" clauses.
Namely, they are used by the narrator to recapitulate and understood by the lis-
tener as recapitulating events of the complicating action. Clauses out of tem-
poral order do differ from other clauses that refer to the events of the story
in one respect that Labov and Waletzky have taken care to delineate; while
"narrative" clauses create the possibility for suspense, clauses out of order
do so only imperfectly if at all. In other respects they are equivalent, but
this is an important one -- a primary reason for making the distinction between
clauses reporting events and those reporting states.-

These criticisms of Labov and Waletzky's definition of "narrative unit"
can be translated into criticisms of the authors' definition of narrative since
the second definition hinges on the first. As we have seen from the preceding
discussion of clauses excluded by Labov and Waletzky's definition of "narrative
unit", the authors' claim that the order of clauses must be matched to that of
events is not always warranted. Further, their strictures on what clauses are
eligible to be "narrative units" -- and even their insistence on clauses -- is
a distortion of the fact that the large majority of "narrative units", that is,
units reporting the events of the story, can indeed be delimited as "narrative"

clauses. If a definition of a narrative must be given, I propose along with Watson (n.d.: ch. IV, 51) that "a more flexible [one] is in order," one which will, not incidentally, better reflect the knowledge underlying the communicative interaction.

This is not to deny that in its present form Labov and Waletzky's definition is flexible enough to include all but two of the stories of the Foxfire corpus. Indeed, it is likely that the definition covers the vast majority of narratives told in North American speech communities. Remember that the definition of a minimal narrative, derived from the more general definition given above, requires only the presence of two "narrative" clauses. After all, independent clauses ordered with respect to the order of events and headed by non-habitual verbs are by far the most common type of clause in the corpus and the most common means of reporting events. The two stories not covered by the definition concern experiences that occurred an indeterminate number of times. Thus in Labov and Waletzky's terms they are composed entirely of "free" clauses, even though the heads of all the clauses are not habitual verbs (see p. 52) for a discussion of one of these narratives; the other is similar).

Labov and Waletzky's definition rests on one further set of claims, less obvious than those related to the definition of a "narrative unit". By setting up reference as the defining function, the definition implies that the most important information in narratives has to do with events. This aspect of the definition -- shorn as it is of all requirements for matching and for specific kind of units and even for the information to be specifically about events, that is, name them -- comes down to a "general usage" definition of the type proposed by Watson (1973: 243, 252): a narrative is an account of an event or a series of

events. Such a definition has the virtue of being based in semantics, as are Labov and Waletzky's definitions of the sections of narrative, but it also has the defect of offering little in the way of description. In any case, it is flexible enough to include all of the narratives in the Foxfire corpus. It is not certain, however, that the information most important to the processes of construction and interpretation can be limited to that concerning events. As I noted in the previous chapter, at least two stories of the corpus feature clauses that are not necessary for describing events as we usually conceive them, yet carry a large part of the meaning of the story.

Further, by setting up a pair of "narrative" clauses as the defining structure, the definition implies that the most important information in narratives is carried by "narrative" clauses. But even when the notion of a "narrative" clause is expanded to include those sorts of clauses excluded by Labov and Waletzky's definition and discussed above, it is not clear that the information most important to the processes of construction and interpretation is always contained in clauses referring to events. As I pointed out in the previous chapter, such a stipulation would, for instance, eliminate all clauses embedded on verbs of saying or knowing, so that some stories depending for their meaning on the words or thoughts of the actors would be seriously truncated. And these considerations are all pervaded by the thorny problem of discriminating exactly which clauses do refer to events.

In general, the most important information in the stories of the Foxfire corpus and probably in the large majority of North American stories does concern events; further, this information is usually conveyed by clauses referring to events. But given our uncertainty about the extent to which these two statements

are true, and, more significantly, the role of information concerning events versus the role of information concerning states in the construction and inter- pretation of narratives, it is premature to base a definition exclusively on one aspect of content (information about events) or, even more, on one aspect of content (information reporting events) plus one aspect of form (clauses). This is especially true when many interesting observations can be made about stories without asserting, as do Labov and Waletzky followed by Watson, that information about events and in particular the complicating action is "necessary and sufficient to define a narrative" (Watson n.d.: ch. IV, 49).

7.3 Labov and Waletzky's concept of a narrative and an alternative concept

Though it falls short of describing all the stories of the Foxfire corpus and of reflecting the full range of knowledge possessed by narrators and listen- ers, Labov and Waletzky's definition does point to two prominent characteristics of a large number of narratives: that they convey information about events and that they do so by means of "narrative" clauses. Behind their definition, how- ever, and here to be discussed apart from it, is Labov and Waletzky's concept of narrative. By "concept" I mean more than the description provided by the defini- tion; I mean Labov and Waletzky's idea of the phenomenon -- an idea of its fun- damental nature, not necessarily an idea the authors would be willing to put into words but one implied by the definition. The definition implies, first, that the stories are well circumscribed, determinate phenomena: that all speakers and listeners in a particular speech community consider the same items to be stories and that each individual speaker or listener is sure whether a particular item is a story or not. And it implies, second, that stories exist as such apart from storytelling events: that they are constructed and interpreted on the basis of form and content. As I see it, both of these propositions are at best partial

truths, and although in the following discussion I do not try to prove their limitations, I offer another concept of the phenomenon to show that it is plausible and perhaps even more satisfying than Labov and Waletzky's. A great deal more research will be necessary to decide how narrative can best be conceptualized and defined; any effort at this stage, like any effort at description, is exploratory. Nonetheless, with concepts of and approaches to phenomena mutually dependent, each conceptualization at least suggests a possibly productive direction for the work ahead.

One theme of chapter II on the nature of sociolinguistics is very much to the point here and bears reiteration. Sociolinguists are interested in the description of speech interaction -- how speakers and listeners use language in accordance with their knowledge of the structured relations of the speech system. I speculate that as in other areas of language use, variability, both inter- and intra-subjective, is inherent in narrators' and listeners' practices of decision, recognition, construction and interpretation. Differences and uncertainties are a real part of the speech community's knowledge of stories and thus should be accommodated in a concept of the phenomenon.

A credible way to think of and perhaps ultimately to define a narrative such that variability can be explained is as a bundle of characteristics. Labov and Waletzky's definition, as we have seen, points to two prominent characteristics of the type that might be relevant. But the characteristics would not be confined to those of stories proper; they would include characteristics of the storytelling event. No story arises without an event and this fact is mirrored in the narrators' and listeners' knowledge.

I speculate that the interdependence of the components of a speech event --

not just the interdependence of the form and content of a message -- is an inescapable part of speakers' and listeners' practices of decision, recognition, etc. The range and combinations of the possibilities for components are as much a part of the community's knowledge as are the differences and uncertainties and should also be accommodated in a concept of the phenomenon.

As I see it, the bundle of characteristics -- each of them not necessarily of equal significance -- determines whether an utterance is confidently presented and received as a story. The more characteristics that are present and the more these characteristics are significant, the more united and emphatic the agreement. At the same time, utterances are presented and received as communications even when such agreement is absent. The requirements of communicative, interaction do not demand that all participants have the same notion of whether an item is a story or have any strong notion about its status at all: interpretation, for instance, is aided but not dependent on recognition. Just as there is grammatical indeterminacy without wholesale misunderstanding, so can there be speech message indeterminacy. What is true of grammaticality may well be true of storyness, namely, ". ... we often find no sharp dichotomy between grammatical and ungrammatical but rather a continuum on a scale of grammaticality"(Wardhaugh 1972: 101), and only on one end of the scale do we find nonsense. Story-like utterances exist about which, in words that Crystal (1971: 66) applies to sentences, "we do not have clear intuition[s]. They [may] sound odd in some way, but not in a way which is easy to define." They are acceptable as communications although not necessarily as stories. I submit that indeterminacy comes about when some but not enough of the right features are present.

The characteristics pointed out in Labov and Waletzky's definition may well

be among the more elemental -- significant -- ones, but the description of
the Foxfire corpus in the previous chapter suggests a number of other potential
characteristics: friendly participants, familiar setting, relaxed and informal
scene,"one time"and its variations, an abstract, an orientation, the simple pre-
sent or past tenses, evaluative devices, a notable complication and satisfying
resolution; a coda, out-of-the-ordinary content that is of interest to the narra-
tor and the listener, a point, the capacity for passing time pleasantly and sup-
portive reactions from the audience, largely silence. These are hopefully not
just features of a significant number of storytelling events, features that would
show up in many storytelling events taking place in North American speech com-
munities, but features of North American speakers' and listeners' grasp of these
events. Needless to say, the list is no more exhaustive than it is definitive.

Not surprisingly, differences and uncertainties about whether an item truly
is a story seem to be linked to negative evaluations of that item. In other
words, a "good" story is not an indeterminate one -- the speech event that mani-
fests it includes many features of the type given above. This connection, as
well as a borderline story, is illustrated in no less an institution of American
life than the comic strip Peanuts. In a cartoon featuring Poor Charlie Brown
up against no-nonsense Peppermint Patty, Charles Schulz shows us what results
when not enough characteristics of a storytelling event come together in a par-
ticular instance. Charlie and Patty are leaning their elbows on a wall as the
former says to the latter:

> My dad says that years ago when his mother and father went somewhere for
> the evening he'd stay home with his grandmother . . . . His dad would
> give him fifteen cents so he could run up to the hamburger shop, and buy
> two hamburgers for himself and one for his grandmother. His dad would
> also leave him thirty cents so they could go to the show . . . . In those

days they always had a comedy, a short, a newsreel and then "The End",
and my dad says he was always worried that his grandmother would think
the whole movie was over . . . so each time it happened, he'd turn and
whisper, "That just means the newsreel is over, Gramma . . . . The
real show is still coming!" and she would always whisper back, "Yes, I
know." Years later, he realized that his grandmother was smarter than
he thought she was . . . .

Peppermint Patty responds: "What kind of story is that, Chuck?" The answer to
Patty's question, in part, is that it is a story told in habitual verbs, con-
cerning an occurrence repeated an indeterminate number of times about an ex-
perience that is not at all remarkable concerning someone who is of little in-
terest to Patty. At the same time, it is a story told to a friend in an informal
scene and it includes an orientation (". . . years ago, when his mother and
father went somewhere for the evening, etc.") and a coda that gives the point of
the story ("Years later, he realized that his grandmother was smarter than he
thought she was . . ."). Patty's question -- a subtle put-down of the story --
reflects not only her dissatisfaction but her uncertainty: Charlie's story
sounds "odd in some way, but not in a way which is easy to define." Certain
features of the utterance suggest a story; others are ambiguous. They do not
impede its interpretation; still less do they negate its existence. On the other
hand, they do not contribute to its recognition.

A status similar to that Labov and Waletzky grant evaluation, expressed in
the authors' claim that a story is not normal without evaluation, should, I be-
lieve, be extended to other characteristics of narrative: the presence of a
number of the right features is necessary for an utterance to be wholly satis-
fying as a narrative. Thus, no one feature -- of content or structure, for in-
stance -- constitutes a story, although some features may contribute more sig-
nificantly to its realization.

If this concept of a story has merit, then the importance of describing stories from the perspective afforded by the speech event is magnified. To grasp the nature of a story is to understand the nature of the storytelling event. The two are not only inseparable in reality, they should be brought together in research. The concept of a story as a bundle of features with limits that can be described only by statistics (at present we can say at most that a story grows in storyness as the features accumulate) accommodates the notion of inter- and intra-subjective variability. And if the postulate of variability is correct, then any non-statistical definition that offers precise limits is inadequate and should not be employed to establish a corpus. For as long as the study of narratives is corpus-based, the analyst cannot afford to deliberately block the variability that is an inherent part of the speech community's knowledge with a definition fixated on one or two or even more aspects of the phenomena.

APPENDIX

The appendix comprises twelve stories analyzed in the manner proposed by Labov and Waletzky. Each story is represented by a transcription (introduced by a paragraph giving the preceding speech context), an analysis performed on that transcription and a diagram that displays one aspect of the analysis. The pages of the transcription are divided into three columns: the column to the right shows the story clause by clause (independent clauses are lettered); the middle column gives each (independent) clause's displacement set and indicates whether the clause is "narrative" ("n"), "non-narrative" (nn) or of narrative import ("ni"); the column to the left lists the evaluative forms that appear in or are effected by that clause. Asterisks in the left-hand column indicate which forms probably serve reference rather than evaluation. On the far left the complication and resolution are marked with a "c" and an "r" respectively. The other symbols that appear on the transcriptions have been explained on p. 92.

The diagram that accompanies each text maps the displacement sets of of the story, that is, establishes the distribution of "narrative", "coordinate", "restricted" and "free" clauses. It also shows the relations of clauses to the complication and resolution. Each clause is represented by a mark opposite its letter, a dash in all cases but the complication ($\cup$) and the resolution ($\cap$). To the left of each letter is the clause's displacement set represented by a vertical line through the mark

(see chapter III for Labov and Waletzky's analytical framework; also chapter VI, subsection 6.4.2).

The stories are _not_ arranged in strict numerical order, some being grouped together because they occurred in the same session or interview. Their order is the following:

Calvert Connor, Age 42
June 1973
143 clauses

Soon after Calvert Connor learned I was interested in stories, we met a friend of his at Irene's diner and Calvert told us this story. Later when my tape-recorder was available, I asked him to repeat it for me: "Would ya tell me the other one, would ya tell me the other one, too? The one about the three-legged dog an' the. . . ." He began:

- quantifier (<u>right</u>)	$0^a 142$ nn	Oh, this was -- uh -- back in nineteen - an' forty -- forty-six.
		right after the war was over.
	$1^b 141$ nn	There was a plane crash back in, back in here on the mountain called Double Knobs
- quantifier (<u>two</u>)*	$2^c 140$ nn	-- there's two mountains
- quantifier (<u>just</u>)*		that look just alike
	$3^d 139$ nn	an' they're -- they're peaks
- quantifier (<u>almost</u>)* - repetition		that -- uh -- look like almost identical twins

240

4^e138

nn

an' they call 'em Double Knobs

5^f137

nn

an' they're back toward Rabun Bald.

An' -- uh -- when the plane crashed

6^g136

nn

my father was workin' down on the lower end
a Warwoman

7^h16

nn
ni

an' -- uh -- they helped -- they helped --
they proceeded t' carry the dead G.I.'s
out

8^i134

nn

-- there were seven of 'em.

repetition

9^j14

nn
ni

They carried 'em out.

10^k13

n

An' -- uh -- they went in

0^l12

n

an' went up

0^m11

n

an' looked at the plane

13ⁿ129
nn

an' the plane had hit on the backside a
these Double Knobs

14^o128
nn

-- it [had] hit solid rock.

- intensifying
adverbial (just)

15^p127
nn

It just wasn't high enough t' clear the
mountain.

B. K.: Boy !

- de-emphatic
ellipsis
- quantifier
(completely into
smithereens)

16^q126
nn

An' tore the plane completely into smither-
eens

17^r125
hn

-- one engine was scattered one place on the
mountain

18^s124
nn

an' the other was down at the foot of the
mountain

- intensifying
adverbial (just)

19^t123
nn

an' bodies were just scattered all over the
top of the mountain.

20^u122
nn

Anyway, t' make a long story short -- uh
-- I had a hot rod car

$13^n 129$
nn

an' the plane had hit on the backside a
these Double Knobs

$14^o 128$
nn

-- it [had] hit solid rock.

- intensifying
adverbial (just)

$15^p 127$
nn

It just wasn't high enough t' clear the
mountain.

B. K.: Boy !

- de-emphatic
ellipsis
- quantifier
(completely into
smithereens)

$16^q 126$
nn

An' tore the plane completely into smither-
eens

$17^r 125$
hn

-- one engine was scattered one place on the
mountain

$18^s 124$
nn

an' the other was down at the foot of the
mountain

- intensifying
adverbial (just)

$19^t 123$
nn

an' bodies were just scattered all over the
top of the mountain.

$20^u 122$
nn

Anyway, t' make a long story short -- uh
-- I had a hot rod car

I was workin' on over at the Rabun Gap - .
Nacoochee School

21^{V}121   an' [it was] -- uh -- under -- in the shop
nn   at that time.

22^{W}120   (This time) I'as takin' shop in high school
nn   -- an' --

23^{X}119   -- uh -- I needed some material to make a
nn   bubble for the top.

11^{Y}8   So a friend a mine, fellow by the name o'
n   Brian Kilby an' an old dog by the name
                     o' Bill

who had got his front leg shot off fer
   chasin' sheep -- uh --

B. K.: Oh, I didn't -- you didn't say that
          was the reason he got his leg [laughs]

That's why he got
                        his leg shot off.
[B. K. laughs]

B. K.: Poor Bill.

and -- uh -- we proceeded to go look for
this -- these -- this plane

that had crashed for some material to make
our hot-rod.

0^z9

n

An' in the meantime we found the plane

- quantifier (all) $1a^2_6$ -- we walked all day, just about lookin'
- intensifying
  adverbial (just)   nn
- appended participle*   ni

$3b^2_5$ [and] left pretty early that mornin'.

nn
ni

$4c^2_4$ We told -- uh -- Brian's grandmother

nn
ni

where we were goin'.

- repetition $5d^2_3$ An' -- uh -- we told her

nn
ni

we were goin' t' look for that plane;

$6e^2_2$ we'd be back before dark.

nn
ni

- repetition	$7f_1^2$	An' we left early that mornin'
	nn	
	ni	
	$8g_0^2$	an' packed us a little lunch
	nn	
	ni	
- repetition	$8h_1^2$	an' we found the plane
	n	
	$34i_{108}^{12}$	but it was about one or two o'clock in the afternoon
	nn	
		by the time we made it to the plane crash
- quantifier (<u>all</u>)*	$1j_0^2$	an' we worked around on getting the plastic off an' the aluminum all free from it an' getting us up the part o' the plastic bubble
	n	
		that was a machine gunner's nest on the tail o' the plane.
		B. K.: Mhmm.
- intensifying adverbial (<u>just</u>) - quantifier (<u>all at once</u>)	$0k_3^2$ n	Then, by the -- actually what happened, dark just snuck up on us, all at once

- intensifying adverbial (<u>really</u>)	$_1l_2^2$	-- really, it got dark
- paraphrase	n	
		before we realized what time it was.
		An' on our way back, while we were on our way back down toward the foot of the mountain
- quantifier (<u>real</u>)	$_2m_1^2$	we got in a real thick area, a real thicket,
- double attributive	n	swamp-type place.
- repetition	$_3n_0^2$	An' it became dark
	n	
- intensifying adverbial (<u>just</u>)	$_0o_6^2$	an' we just kept walkin'
- quasi-modal	nn	
	$_1p_2^2$	-- we thought
	n	
		we were headed in the right direction;
- repetition	$_2q_1^2$	we thought
	n	
		we were headed down toward Darnell Creek.

$_0r^2_0$

n

       An' -- uh -- we looked down

$_0s^2_0$

n

       an' realized

- quantifier (<u>right</u>)

       the old dog was right behind us

- repetition*

$_0t^2_1$

n

       an' we realized

- progressive*

       we were walkin' in circles

- explicative with
<u>because</u>

       because we came to a sandbar

       where we crossed a little ol' branch

       an' we -- we saw the dog's track an' our
           track twice

       where we crossed the same place.

             we struck

$_0u^2_0$ An' -- uh --

n B. K. [**softly**]: I'm.   some
        matches, some matches to look at it.

$_0 v^2_0$ an' we got down
n

$_0 w^2_0$ an' got us some -- uh -- grass
n

$_0 x^2_0$ an' lit it for a torch
n

- modal $_0 y^2_0$ an' we could see
n

where the tracks were.

$_0 z^2_1$ An' we decided
n

that we were lost.

- progressive * $_1 a^3_0$ [We decided] we were going around in circles.
- paraphrase n

B. K.: [softly] I guess so.

$_0 b^3_0$ So we tried t' figure out which way to go.
n

$0c_1^3$ an' we started walkin' down by following' that stream

n

that we had crossed

- explicative with
  because*

because we had always been taught to follow a stream

- modal* $55d_{87}^3$ an' it would run into a larger stream.

nn

$2e_1^3$ So we went downstream

n

followin' the stream

$0f_0^3$ an' it went underground.

n

B. K.: That wasn't much help, was it ?
[laughs].

- ritual utterance $0g_6^3$ So there we were.

nn

- negative $1h_{35}^3$ We didn't know which way to go.

nñ

2^{13}_{1}

n

We tried t' follow in a straight line from

〈 where it had gone underground

- negative 61^{j3}_{81}

nn

an' that didn't help either

- quantifier (<u>real</u>) 1^{k3}_{0}

n

-- we came out int' a real bad thicket

- evaluative action 0^{13}_{1}

n

an' about that time we heard a wildcat 'r a panther scream.

- evaluative remark 64^{m3}_{18}

nn

I mean it was a deadly scream.

- evaluative action 1^{n3}_{3}

n

An' -- uh -- the dog run to us in place a goin' to it

- evaluative remark 2^{o3}_{20}

nn

-- it scared the dog too.

- evaluative remark 3^{p3}_{53}

nn

I guess

it was afraid o' whatever it was

– quantifier (<u>right</u>) – evaluative action	$2q_0^3$ n	and -- uh -- he came right up under our heels.
	$0r_1^3$ n	An' we tried t' send him on t' find the way
– modal – negative	$32s_{50}^3$ nn	an' he wouldn't leave us.
	$1t_1^3$ n	An' we got -- we walked out on the point of a hill -- what
		we thought was a hill --
– modal – negative	$47u_{70}^3$ nn	An' we couldn't see any lights from any town 'r anyplace.
– evaluative action	$1v_0^3$ n	An' -- uh -- we both got scared.
– interrogative	$0w_0^3$ n	An' we said, What're we gonna do ?
– quasi-modal – future *	$0x_0^3$ n	We're gonna build a fire
– present tense	$0y_5^3$ n	an' we begin to look for the matches

	$22z^3_{65}$ nn	an' the matches had gotten wet.
	$53a^4_{64}$ nn	We had a small pack a matches
- repetition	$24b^4_{63}$ nn	an' they'd gotten wet
- modal - negative	$25c^4_{41}$ nn	an' we couldn't strike a match
- ellipsis - negative - modal	$26d^4_{40}$ nn	couldn't build a fire.
- negative - evaluative remark	$2e^4_0$ n	So, I said, I'm not gonna stay here all night.
- modal - intensifying adverbial (jus')	$0f^4_0$ n	We might as well jus' start walkin'
- modal - paraphrase	$0g^4_0$ n	-- we might as well walk in one direction 'r another.
- ellipsis	$0h^4_1$ n	An' -- uh -- tried t' send the dog home again
- stress - negative	$48i^4_{33}$ nn	an' he wouldn't leave.

Increased tempo (vertical label at left)

− quantifier (<u>real</u>) − evaluative action	$1\,{}^{j4}_{0}$ n	'Bout that time this wild cat 'r panther, one, screamed again, real shrill scream.
− double attributive − quantifier (<u>right</u>) − evaluative action	$0\,{}^{k4}_{0}$ n	An' the ol' black hound-dog ran back under our legs, right up next to us
− ellipsis − modal − negative − evaluative action	$64\,{}^{14}_{30}$ nn	-- wouldn't leave us at all.
− ellipsis	$1\,{}^{m4}_{0}$ n	An' -- uh -- Brian said, Only thing I know t' do --
− evaluative remark − **quasi-modal**	$0\,{}^{n4}_{0}$ n	we better pray about it.
	$0\,{}^{o4}_{0}$ n	So we got down on our knees
− laughter	$0\,{}^{p4}_{0}$ n	an' started praying [laughs].
		An' -- uh -- when we got off our knees
	$0\,{}^{q4}_{0}$ n	we looked
− intensifying adverbial (<u>just</u>)	$0\,{}^{r4}_{2}$ n	an' we saw a light -- just a round ball o' light.

– modal	96^s_{46} nn	An' the light would kindly come toward us
– modal – intensifying adverbial (just)	97^t_{45} nn	an' then it would just kinda leave.
– imperative	2^u_0 n	An' I said, look at that light
– modal	0^v_0 n	-- somebody must be comin' lookin'.
– negative	0^w_0 n	[I said] No, it's in the sky.
– negative – repetition	101^x_{41} nn	An' it was up in the air, up in the sky, not down on the horizon.
– imperative	1^y_0 n	An' I said, Well, let's follow the light.
	0^z_0 n	So we started following the light
	0^a_1 n	an' about that time, my feet slipped out from under me
	1^b_2 n	an' I looked down a rock cliff.

Note: the superscripts on the code numbers (e.g. 96^s_{46}) carry a "4" or "5" above; reading as 96^{s4}_{46}, 97^{t4}_{45}, 2^{u4}_0, 0^{v4}_0, 0^{w4}_0, 101^{x4}_{41}, 1^{y4}_0, 0^{z4}_0, 0^{a5}_1, 1^{b5}_2.

- negative * - intensifying adverbial (<u>even</u>)	$106c_1^5$ nn	I didn't even realize
		I'as to it
- explicative with <u>because</u> *		'cause it was dark
- quantifier (<u>pitch</u>) - repetition	$49d_{35}^5$ nn	-- it'as pitch dark.
- intensifying adverbial (<u>jus'</u>)	$3e_0^5$ n	An' -- uh -- I jus' went slidin' down
	$0f_1^5$ n	an' I hit on a landin', kinda little ledge.
- present tense - quantifier (<u>right</u>) - word order	$1g_0^5$ n	An' here come the hound dog right behind me
- present tense	$0h_1^5$ n	an' he get behind me
- present tense - repetition - word order	$1i_1^5$ n	an' here come Brian behind, behind (me) in a while, behind me on this little ledge.
- intensifying adverbial (<u>jus'</u>)	$0j_1^5$ n	An' I jus' looked down

$114^k\!{}^5_{28}$ an' it looked like solid ground

    nn

- ellipsis $0^{l}\!{}^5_0$ an' got me a stick

    n

$0^m\!{}^5_1$ an' touched the ground

    n

$117^n\!{}^5_{25}$ -- it was solid ground.

    nn

$1^o\!{}^5_0$ An' we got down off the rock clift

    n

$0^p\!{}^5_0$ walked I guess ten 'r fifteen steps

    n

$0^q\!{}^5_0$ an' stepped off into the main road.

    n

$0^r\!{}^5_0$ We followed the main road

    n

r - quantifier (all) $0^s\!{}^5_0$ an' met all the neighbors come lookin'
                                       for us.

    n

increased tempo

B. K.: I bet they were.

- ellipsis*
- lexical item
  (ever'thing)
	$123^t{}^5_{19}$
	nn
		[They had] lanterns, flashlights,
		    ever'thing.

- quasi-modal	$85^u{}^5_4$ nn	An' -- uh -- Dad was, my father was gonna spank me.
- negative	$25^v{}^5_{17}$ nn	I don't know

- possibility with
  if
		if Brian's father was [gonna spank him]
		    'r not.

- quasi-modal - paraphrase	$86^w{}^5_2$ nn	He was gonna whip me
		after I got home.
	$4^x{}^5_0$ n	I went home
	$0^y{}^5_0$ n	an' told Mother
		what had happened
- evaluative action	$0^z{}^5_{13}$ n	an' -- uh -- she convinced him

when he got home

that this story had happened

– intensifying adverbial (<u>really</u>) – repetition	that somepun had really happened
– modal – negative	that he couldn't spank me for somepun
– repetition	that had happened
– comparative – repetition	this -- this -- such a fantastic story as this had happened.
– negative – possibility with <u>whether</u>	$130\,a_0^6$ nn	See, they didn't know whether to believe it or not.

$7^b{}_{11}^6$

nn

But Brian an' I had the same story

$9^o{}_0^6$

nn
ni

-- he went home

$0^d{}_9^6$

n

an' told his Mother an' Dad 'r his Grand-
    mother the same story, see.

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$134e^6_{18}$ So, I mean, he saw the same thing

nn

I saw.

- negative $135f^6_7$ It wadn't no illusion 'r anything like
that

nn'

- intensifying $136g^6_6$ -- we actually saw a light, a ball o' -- .
adverbial (actually)   a bright light.
- repetition   nn

$137h^6_5$ An' it was too big t' be a moon

nn

- comparative   I mean, I mean, too small t' be a moon

- comparative $138i^6_4$ an' it'as too big t' be a star.

nn

$139j^6_3$ It looked

nn

like it was about six -- 'bout six inches
in diameter.

- modal $140k^6_2$ an it'd move in
- repetition

nn

- modal
- repetition $141\,{}_1^6$ an' then it would move back.

                                 nn

                             B. K. [softly]: Wow.

- evaluative remark $142\,{}_m^6\,0$ So that's -- uh -- it makes the hair stand
                                                   up on end

                                 nn

- laughter   when you start thinkin' about it [laughs
                                                   lightly].

clause a b c d e f g h i j K l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z a² b² c² d² e² f² g² h² i² j² K² l² m² n² o² p² q² r² s² t² u² v² w² x² y² z² a³ b³ c³ d³ e³ f³

FIGURE 3

DISPLACEMENT SETS OF STORY 2

yzabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklm

Foxfire went to visit Bill Corn and found him at home with his old friend Red Taylor. Red immediately urged Bill to "tell him [the interviewer Eliot Wigginton] a big story," but added that he (Red) would also have to "tell a story on Bill." Bill countered by saying he'd have to tell one on Red -- "for killin' that doe-deer."

"Go ahead,, we'll swap out then," proposed Red.

Before they could swap out, however, the interviewer began to describe the purpose of Foxfire's visit: "Yeah, see in this issue we're gonna have a whole section just o' huntin' stories, ya know, just people talkin' about things they've done an' we're gonna have a whole bunch ef them, so anything is fine, just anything you run into and. . ." Bill interrupted with:

- progressive $0^a 15$ Well, we was out adeer-huntin' one time

                     nn

                     $0^b 0$ an' Red Taylor. . .

                     n

                     E.W.: Yeah [E.W. and Red Taylor chuckle].

                     I left him astandin'

c $0^c 1$ I guess

                     n

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I got a hundred yards from him

1^d_0
n
an' a deer come out

0^e_0
n
an' he shot it down

- expression

0^f_0
n
an' he hollered, "Hey Bill" as quick

- comparative

as if he had shot himself [E.W. laughs].

0^g_0
n
I went back up there to 'im

2^h_8
nn
ni
an' he had killed a doe.

- quasi-modal
- evaluative remark

8^i_7
nn
I'm -- I'm gonna tell it on him.

Red Taylor: Go ahead, I've got one t' tell
on you, as well [everybody laughs].

9^j_6
nn
Well, that's

what he done

$_4k_0$ n	but I went back

c — intensifying adverbial (<u>all right</u>)

$_0l_1$
 n — I hepped dress the deer all right

— progressive

$_1m_3$
 nn — an' we's askinnin' on the deer

$_\triangleleft 1^n_0$
 n — an' he got his hand in my way

— paraphrase

$_0{}^o_0$
 n — an' I hacked him a little bit -- cut him him a little bit

r — imperative expression

$_0{}^p_0$
 n. — I said [deadpan], "Keep your hands outa my way while I'm busy."

FIGURE 4.

DISPLACEMENT SETS OF STORY 41

Story 42
Bill Corn, Age 80
June 1970
21 clauses

A few minutes after Bill told story 41 (the previous story in this appendix), Eliot Wigginton requested "that story about Bill Wieland and the fish."

Bill demurred: "No, you'll have to get Red t' tell that; I don't know how the fish story went."

0^a20 Red Taylor: No, you -- you was talkin'
     about . . . that one

nn

- quasi-modal*
     when Bill was gonna catch him in a lie

     E. W.: Yeah.

     an' he caught him in the truth -- one
       about giving Henry Martin that fish.

     [At this point Bill takes over:]

- progressive *
1^b19 Yeah, we was goin' down there

nn

0^c0 an' I saw -- we passed 'em

n

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where Bill and Henry Martin was camped.

- appended participle 0^d0 We went on up the river fishin'.

n

0^e0 Next mornin' he [Bill Wieland] come up
                  there

n

0^f0 an' axt me

n

was I doin' any good

- negative* 0^g0 an' I told him, No, not much.
- quantifier (much)*

n

- interrogative* 0^h0 I said, You do any good?

n

0^i0 He said, I fished last night,

n

- negative*   ain't fished none today.

- interrogative* 0^j0 I said, Did ya catch any?

n

c	- quantifier (<u>ten or twenty</u>)	$_0k_0$ n	Well, he said, I guess I got ten or twenty pounds.
	- intensifying adverbial (<u>just</u>)	$_0l_0$ n	An' he said -- uh -- Just kep' one for me and the boys t' eat this mornin'
	- quantifier (<u>about eighteen inches</u>)	12^m8 nn	-- it's a rainbow about eighteen inches long --
		$_0n_0$ n	an' he said, I give Henry Martin the other.
		$_0o_0$ n	I thought
	- modal		I'd catch him in that-un.
	- progressive*	$_0p_0$ n	I was runnin' up with Henry in about a week or two
		$_0q_0$ n	-- I axed him about it.
r		$_0r_0$ n	An' Henry said
	- evaluative remark		it was the truth

- quantifier (<u>that many</u>)	1^s0	said there was that many pounds of 'em 'r more
- **comparative**	n	
- quantifier (<u>all</u>)	0^t0	said he give two more men all the take of 'em
	n	
- comparative	0^u0	then had more than
	n	

he wanted hisself.

FIGURE 5

DISPLACEMENT SETS OF STORY 42

a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u

clause
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
l
m
n
o
p
q
r
s
t
u

Later in the session that provided stories 41 and 42 (the two previous stories in this appendix), one of the students asked Bill and Red, "Have you ever been scared when you was out in the woods ?"

"Scared ?" Red **asked**.

"Oh, been scared so many times I couldn't mention that," said Bill. Everybody laughed.

"That made me think of it," put in Red

		that, that same time that Bill killed that pitiful little doe-deer down there on Lick Log
- progressive*	0^a38 nn	we was talkin' around the campfire that night
	1^b0 n	-- some of the boys went out
- double attributive	0^c0 n	an' caught a big, fat kitten coon
	0^d0 n	brought it back
	0^e0 n	an' me an' Bill dressed it

0^f0
n
an' put it on t' cook

0^g0
n
(then) went on up Buckeye Branch, out huntin'
again

0^h0
n
an' he an' I (we -- we-all) come back in
directly

- appended article*

0^i0
n
an' [we was] (sittin') aroun' the fire there,
whittlin'.

c - negative*

0^j0
n
Directly Bill said, By the way, boys, there
ain't enough money in the Bank o'
Clayton t' get me t' do like Law here

10^k28
nn
-- that'as Law Dover, ya know, an' Dick,
his boy, an' ol' man Claude Pitts.

- interrogative*
- expression

1^l0
n
Somebody said, "What'll _they_ do, Bill ?"

- exclamation (<u>dang
their souls</u>)
- laughter
- present tense

0^m0
n
He said, Well, dang their souls [laughs],
throw a few rations together in a
little ol' haversack, he says,

0^n0
n
an' tie a quilt 'r a blanket 'r two on
the thing

0^o0
n
    an' roll ('at up)

- present tense 0^P0
n
    an' go out on Nantahaly in that big laurel, he says,

- intensifying adverbial (just) 0^q0
n
    an' stay fer as high as three days an' nights just by their lone selves.

- negative 17^r21
nn
    I didn't say nothin'

- explicative with for   fer. I knowed

- negative   why Bill wadn't

- modal*
- negative*
- expression 1^s0
n
    but -- Hoyt Perry, he -- "Why wouldn't ya, Bill ?"

- present tense 0^t0
n
    By (Golly), he says, I'm afraid to

- ellipsis*
- quantifier (exactly) 0^u0
n
    -- [that's] exactly why.

- present tense 0^v0
n
    Now, he says, I -- I've yet got t' see a man

that I'm afraid of.

- present tense - quantifier (plenty)	$_0{}^w{}_0$ n	Says, I've seen plenty o' men
- modal*		that could whup me
- modal		an' make me like it too, I guess
- present tense	$_0{}^x{}_0$ n	but $\quad$ he says $\quad$[E. W. chuckles] $\quad$ I've yet t' see the man
- repetition		that I'm afraid of.
- intensifying adverbial (just)	$_0{}^y{}_0$ n	I'm just afraid t' be out by myself in the $\qquad$night.
- intensifying adverbial (just) - evaluative action	$_0{}^z{}_1$ n	An' ol' Willis just slapped his leg, ya $\qquad$know
	$_1{}a{}_0^2$ n	an' laughed
- interrogative* - expression	$_0{}^b{}_0^2$ n	till he -- "What're you afraid of, Bill?"

Features	Code	Text
- stress - lexical item (boogers) - expression - laughter	$_0c_0^2$ n	He said, "Boogers, the same durn thing you are !" [everybody laughs heartily].
- subjunctive*	$_0d_0^2$ n	Oh _____ oh, he said, Boy, I wish I ha' knowed that, he says
- modal*	$_0e_0^2$ n	I'd ha' took you off up on a ridge here somewheres acoon-huntin'
- modal*	$_0f_0^2$ n	an' I would ha' run off
- modal*	$_0g_0^2$ n	an' left you up there.
- modal* - negative* - expression	$_0h_0^2$ n	Bill said, "No, you'd not have left me."
- modal* - quantifier (all)	$_0i_0^2$ n	He said, I might ha' stayed up there all night with a corpse
- negative* - modal* - intensifying adverbial (still) - laughter	$_0j_0^2$ n	but I still wouldn't ha' been by myself [everybody laughs, especially the narrator].

? modal $\quad\quad\quad\quad 0^{k^2}_0 \quad$ Anyways, I _____ ⟍

$\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad$ n

$\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad 0^{1^2}_0 \quad$ (if I) thought

$\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad$ n

– quasi-modal $\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad$ you was gonna run off

– quasi-modal $\quad\quad\quad\quad 0^{m^2}_0 \quad$ an' leave me.

$\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad\quad$ n

FIGURE 6

DISPLACEMENT SETS OF STORY 8

FIGURE 6

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DISPLACEMENT SETS OF STORY 8

A student took <u>Foxfire</u> to visit her aunt, Ruth Brown, and Ruth soon broached the subject of her step-mother, a woman -- she explained -- everyone knew as "Aunt Lolly".

"Well, we loved her," Ruth said, "But she was -- I don't know why -- she just didn't like us [Ruth and her friend Ruby] for some reason. And she was rough on us."

0^a29 I remember one time

nn

- quasi-modal   she like to beat me to death.
- quantifier (<u>to death</u>)

1^b28 Stan, my brother, he was about two 'r
                three years old

nn

2^c15 he got choked on a sweet apple.

nn

- intensifying 3^d26 He was only 'bout three.
  adverbial (<u>only</u>)
- repetition   nn

4^e25 This little ol' apple [was] 'bout that
                big

nn

5^f24 and Ruby's mother was there

nn

- comparative 6^g0 and she said to me, she said, "You better
- repetition   watch him."

n

0^h0 she said -- uh -- Aunt Lolly is on her
                high horse.

n

- paraphrase 0^i0 She's mad, you know.

n

- possibility with if 0^j0 And she said, "If he get one a them in
- evaluative remark   his mouth

n

- possibility with if   'n gets choked"

- future   said, "She'll kill you."
- lexical item (kill)

c - negative 0^k0 And so, she didn't wait t' get back to
                          the house

nn

ni till Stan poked one of them little ol'
            apples in his mouth

- expression — 0^1_0 — and I said, "You spit that out!"
- imperative — [narrator's niece laughs].

n

- negative — 12^m_{17} — And he didn't spit it out

nn

1^n_0 — and he swallowed it

n

0^o_0 — and we hollered

n

- quantifier (*right*) — 0^p_2 — and Lou come right back

n

16^q_{13} — -- that was Ruby's mother --

nn

- paraphrase — 2^r_0 — she come over there

n

0^s_1 — and she gouged it out with her finger

n

1^t_0 — and beat him in the back [niece laughs]

n

- word order — 0^u_0 — and here come Aunt Lolly

n

when she heard him scrawl.

r	0^v4	'N' I remember
	nn	
	ni	she beat me in the back with her fist.
- quantifier (<u>real</u>) - comparative	22^w7	I had real long hair, longer 'n Minnie's
	nn	
	23^x6	it hang down my back
	nn	
	3^y5	and she hold me by that hair
	n	
- intensifying adverbial (<u>just</u>) - repetition	0^z0	and just beat me.
	n	
- quantifier (<u>plumb</u>)	$0^a_0^2$	She took me plumb in the house
	n	
	$0^b_1^2$	and struck my head in the chimney
	n	
-repetition	$1^c_0^2$	an' beat me.
	n	

- negative

29d_0^2

nn

Na, it didn't do me a bit of good to
tell Mama

- explicative with
  <u>because</u>
- negative

-- because she wasn't there long enough
to do anything about it.

FIGURE 7

DISPLACEMENT SETS OF STORY 9

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Displacement Sets of Story 9

Toward the end of a session Hilliard Brown suggested to the interviewer Eliot Wigginton: "If you've got some [tape] left, I'll tell one."
"All right, yeah, we still have -- we still have some more," said the interviewer with enthusiasm. Hilliard began:

0^a44   Remember

nn

- interrogative *   when we used to get out -- probably you
- quasi-modal *   don't remember 'em gettin' out the
- negative *   chestnut telephone poles in this
                                      country?"

                                   E. W.:   Mhmm.

1^b43   But we stripped it, you know

nn

2^c42   and -- uh --. I was up in the mountains,
                    up here on the head of this creek,
nn   me and one of the boys, one day

3^d41   and I had a-a roan yoke of cattle

nn

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4^e10 an' I went up on the mountain

n

5^f39 -- there's a long ridge

nn

6^g38 everybody calls it now the "Long Ridge".

nn

- quasi-modal * 7^h37 (The road) over here we used t' took

nn

- quantifier (plumb)   come plumb on down around the head of the creek.

- quantifier (right) 8^i36 We had a snakin' road right down that one place.

nn

As we come down

9^j35 the head of the ridge bared a little

nn

10^k34 an' went down

nn

11^l33 an' bared a little back the other way.

nn

- emphatic auxiliary	12^m32 nn	Right here it bared a little, the snakin' road did
- quantifier (<u>right</u>) - word order	13^n31 nn	and stood a big chestnut treet right there
- quantifier (<u>right</u>)	$14°30$ nn	-- we went right around it.
c - word order	10^P0 n	An' come a shower of rain
- ellipsis	0^q0 n	-- [it got] slick --
- ellipsis	0^r4 n	an' started off down there
	18^S26 nn	an' I knowed them steers
		I had.
- possibility with <u>if</u>		If I'as t' holler at 'em
- modal	19^t25 nn	they'd run

an' -- uh -- when I first got 'em

- modal - stress	$20^{u}24$ nn	they <u>would</u> run away with ye.
- intensifying adverbial (<u>jus'</u>)*·	$22^{v}23$ nn	I had a thirty-five foot B pole, one time, jus' a log, ya know.
- ellipsis	$4^{w}0$ n	Come down
- ellipsis	$0^{x}0$ n	made a little pitch-off
	$0^{\not W}0$ n	and it bared there aroun' that tree.
- quantifier (<u>so</u>)	$7^{z}8$ nn	Well, they's goin' so fast
- repetition	$8^{a}_{7}^{2}$ nn	they's goin' fast enough
- negative - intensifying adverbial (<u>just</u>) - appended participle	$2^{b}_{5}^{2}$ nn	An' I didn't say nothin', just lettin' 'em work it
- progressive	$3^{c}_{0}^{2}$ n	only I was kina tryin' to keep up with the pole behind 'em.

- comparative - quantifier (jus')	$_0d_3^2$ n	But that pole got up so much speed jus' 'fore
		it got to that chestnut tree
- negative		it didn't stay in this snakin' gully, ya know.
- question*	$30e_{14}^2$ nn	[Very softly, as an aside] You know what that is?
	$31f_{13}^2$ nn	Where you drag the pole. E. W.: Mhmm.
- intensifying adverbial (jus')	$7g_0^2$ n	It jus' left the road
	$_0h_0^2$ n	and hit that tree.
- ellipsis	$_0i_0^2$ n	Snapped that yoke
- quantifier (right)	$_0j_4^2$ n	slapped them steers right around the middle
- quantifier (right)	$_1k_3^2$ n	and broke it in two, right in the middle.

- double attributive - quasi-modal - comparative	37l_7^2 nn	And -- uh -- them old big-uns, they ought to ha' known, ha' more sense.
	38m_6^2 nn	I had to sar his horns off 'bout three times to keep him from hittin' the other-un in the eye.
- modal	39n_5^2 nn	His (boss), you know, would hook at him.
r - quasi-modal	$3°\text{l}_1^2$ n	I had to run him about a quarter of a mile down the mountain
		where we was able to stop him with his half of the yoke
		an' the other one, when I hollered "whoa"
- intensifying adverbial (just)	4p_0^2 n	him, he just stopped.
- quasi-modal - quantifier (plumb)	0q_0^2 n	Then I had to walk plumb across the mountain over there, my boys did
	0r_0^2 n	-- borrowed a yoke to go back --

0^S_0 and sling my pole on him

n

− modal

till I could make one.

FIGURE 8

DISPLACEMENT SETS OF STORY 50

a b c d e f g h i j K l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z a^2 b^2 c^2 d^2 e^2 f^2 g^2 h^2 i^2 j^2

		clause
0	4 4	a
1	4 3	b
2	4 2	c
3	9 1	d
4	9 0	e
5	3 9	f
6	3 8	g
7	3 7	h
8	3 6	i
9	3 5	j
10	3 4	K
11	3 3	l
12	3 2	m
13	3 1	n
14	3 0	o
10	0 0	p
0	0 0	q
0	0 4	r
18	2 6	s
19	2 5	t
20	2 4	u
21	2 3	v
4	0 0	w
0	0 0	x
0	0 0	y
7	9 8	z^2
2	8 5	a^2
2	5 5	b^2
3	5 0	c^2
0	0 3	d^2
3 0	1 4	e^2
3 1	1 3	f^2
7	0 0	g^2
0	0 0	h^2
0	0 0	i^2
0	0 4	j^2
0 1	4 3	k^2
3 7	3 7	l^2
3 8	7 6	m^2
3 9	6 1	n^2
3	6 1	o^2
4	1 0	p^2
0	0 0	q^2
0	0 0	r^2
0	0 0	s^2

FIGURE 8

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DISPLACEMENT SETS OF STORY 50

$p q r s t u v w x y z a^2 b^2 c^2 d^2 e^2 f^2 g^2 h^2 i^2 j^2 K^1 l m n^2 o^2 p^2 q^2 r^2 s^2$

When Foxfire came to interview Edith Kelso's father, Jim Mize, Edith took an active part in the conversation. She told this story to one of the students; the student later mentioned it to me. I called Edith and asked, "Might I tape that story you told?" She hesitated over the telephone, but when I went to her house on a separate errand, she agreed.

I brought out the tape-recorder and began: "Now -- um -- could you jus' tell me about when you come back -- the first time when you come back from the State of Washington [where Edith and Her family were living to their native Macon County] -- how old you were an' when you arrived here an' just what train station you come into an' all that?"

"Well, now, honey, I'll tell ya, the first time I come back here I jus' don't remember just how -- uh -- uh -- how old I was."

But the last time I come back in 'twenty-three

$0^a{}_{13}$ I was twelve year old.

nn

B.K.: That's the time, yeah.

$1^b{}_2$ An' we -- uh -- we -- uh come back t' Clarksville, Georgia.

n

- repetition $2^c{}_{11}$ We come back by train

nn

- repetition $3^d{}_0$ an' we come down t' Clarksville, Georgia

n

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c
0^e0 an' Miz Bob Mason got on the train

n .

- intensifying
  adverbial (jus') 5^f8 an' -- uh -- so me an' my older sister
                             Pansey Keener, was jus' young girls

nn

6^g7 an' we thought

nn'

- quantifier (very)   we was very pop'lar at that time [laughs]
- evaluative remark
- laughter

- negative 7^h6 an' we didn't even know
- intensifying
  adverbial (even)   nn

                      where we was comin' to

- explicative with   because it had been so long
  because
- comparative

                      since we'd been back

                      we couldn't
- negative   remember.
                      B.K.: Yeah.

- quantifier (jus') 3^i1 So we come back -- uh -- up jus' below
                                Tallulah Falls

n

$_1j_0$
n

an' decided

that we'd make our faces up

$_0k_0$
n

so we got out our little compacts an'
our lipstick an' our powder

$_0l_0$
n

an' fixed our face.

12^m1
n

An' this'as Miz Bob Mason

that was along

r — evaluative remark

$_1n_0$
n

said, told me later

that she thought

— superlative
— triple attributive

we were the daintiest little ol' girls

— intensifying
adverbial (jus')
— modal
— negative

that she jus' couldn't understand

- list (of noun
  clauses)

how pretty
                    we were
[B.K. laughs]

an' how we were dressed

an' how we were fixin' up our face
.[laughs].

FIGURE 9

DISPLACEMENT SETS OF STORY 17

abcdefghιjKlmn

clause

a b c d e f g h i j K l m n

0 1 3
1 3 2
2 1 1
3 0 0
0 0 8
5 0 7
6 8 6
7 7 1
3 6 0
1 1 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
2 0 0
1 0

Foxfire visited Jim Mize to learn about his days building the
railroad. Early in the session the interviewer Pat Rogers asked him
how long he had worked on the railroad.

Jim explained that he had helped build the track from Dillard
to Franklin -- that took more than three years -- and he never missed
a day. "An' I lived on Taylor Gap up here. Well, they counted it,
it-it goin' and comin', I just counted it, the goin' and comin' was
tw-twenty miles. It'as -- I walked anyhow ten miles goin' up there an'
ten back; ya know. Had to make the twenty miles a day."

"You did that everyday?" said Pat.

"I done that ever'day, I never lost a day."

c

0^a16 I'd get back, I tell ya

nn
ni

- repetition 1^b15 I'd get back

nn
ni

2^c14 an' then we started.

nn
ni

- repetition 3^d13 I'd get back

nn
ni

- quantifier (ten) 4^e12 I -- we'd get our ta -- we worked ten
                            hours then, ya know

nn

- repetition	5^f11	-- an' I'd get back
	nn	
	ni	
	6^g10	an' lived on a mountain
	nn	
	7^h9	an' my supper's on the table
	nn	
- repetition	8^i8	my breakfast's on the table
	nn	
- repetition	9^j7	an' my dinner on the table.
	nn	
	10^k6	I'd eat it
	nn	
	ni	
- negative - quantifier (much) - evaluative remark	11^l5	-- I didn't much want it.
	nn	
- intensifying adverbial (jus')	12^m4	I jus' lay down
	nn	
	ni	
- quantifier (little) - repetition	13^n3	an' lay a little while
	nn	
	ni	
	14^o2	an' get up
	nn	
	ni	

r   — quantifier (<u>right</u>) $15p_1$ an' hit 'er right back.

                                   nn

                                     ni

                             $16q_0$ Now, that's the way

                                     nn

                             I done, the way

— paraphrase   I'as served.

FIGURE 10

'DISPLACEMENT SETS OF STORY 52

abcdefghijklmnopq

Later in the session that provided story 52 (the previous story in this appendix), Edith said to her father, "Why don't you tell them about your trips backwards and forth [to the work site] —about what they done to ya?"

"Oh, they tried to make me quit the railroad," Jim replied with a laugh.

"Your parents?" asked the interviewer Pat Rogers. Answered Jim:

0^a_{71} The boys, he had some boys here

nn

- quantifier (no)* 1^b_{70} [me] walkin' so fer, you know, they want me t' get bored up there in Rabun.

nn

2^c_{69} An' I walked from there home, ya know.

nn

3^d_{68} an' (they counted it)

nn

- quantifier (twenty)* 4^e_{67} we figured up twenty miles -- goin' an' comin'

nn

5^f_5 an' this kid, ya know, they blacked theirselves like a nigger

n

6^g_{65} an' [th]ere's an old buckeye stump on the road

nn

7^h64
nn
-- it's in a laurel thicket over here on
    Coweeter --

2^l48
nn
an' -- an' they put a coat on it, ya know

3^j47
nn
an' made a big face

- superlative

10^k61
nn
-- it'as the awfullest lookin' thing

- laughter

you ever seen [everybody laughs].

o

1^l5
n
I walked up

$12^m59.$
nn
an' -- an' that night I thought

they'as niggers

0^n33
nn
an' Jake Grant -- one of my wife's brothers
    -- give me a gun.

Edith: Hadn't you got paid an' you thought
    they'd -- somebody . . .

Yeah, yeah, yeah, they'd paid me that day
an' they was over at Otto then

	14^o29	an' I thought it
	nn	
– repetition *		they'as niggers
– comparative	15^P30	-- they'as just as black.
	nn	
– (de-emphatic) ellipsis	5^q0	Come out.
	n	
– imperative * – expression	0^r0	They said, "Hands up!"
	n	
– negative*	0^s0	I said, "I guess not."
	n	
– imperative* – repetition – lexical item – expression	0^t0 n	They said, [B.K. laughs] "Hands up, hands up or die."
	0^u2	I said, All right now, I-I-I see.
	n	
– negative* – quantifier (too)*	21^v22	It wasn't too dark
	nn	

22^w21
nn

-- it'as in the night --

2^x0
n

but I run in the creek

0^y0
n

an' got me a rock

- quantifier (<u>jus</u>')
- emphatic auxiliary

0^z0
n

an' one of 'em, I jus' did miss his head

- laughter

as he went behind a tree [laughs].

- laughter

0^{a2}_6
n

An' -- uh -- [laughs] so -- the -- he run
    back out.

- ellipsis*

27^{b2}_{44}
nn

Thought

- modal

they would get me t' run, ya know

18^{c2}_{15}
nn

an' they had them ol' knives

29^{d2}_{42}
nn

-- you've seed 'em --

that you open

- future*
- negative* $30e^2_{41}$ an' they won't shet

   `nn

   till ya mash a spring.

   $31f^2_{40}$ I bought one a them that day

   nn

   $22g^2_{11}$ an' I happened t' have it in my pocket.

   nn

   $6h^2_3$ I grabbed hit out

   n

   $34i^2_{37}$ an' -- an' I thought

   nn

   it was the niggers

- quasi-modal   that 'as gonna take my little dab o' money

   they got.

– negative	$_{35}J^2_{36}$ nn	I didn't get much
– quasi-modal – evaluative remark	$_{36}k^2_{35}$ nn	but I'as agonna keep it.
		An' when one of 'em come back t' me
– repetition		an' when he come back t' me
	$_3l^2_0$ n	I made a dive fer him that way
	$_0m^2_0$ n	an' stuck in his shirt collar here
	$_0n^2_1$ n	an' I cut that shirt, an' -- an' his britches, his waist
– quantifier (plumb)	$_1o^2_1$ n	an' grained the hide plumb down
		till I cut his britches' braces.
	$_0p^2_0$ n	He said, I'm cut.
	$_0q^2_1$ n	He run back

$_0q^2_1$ He run back

n

- ritual utterance $_{43}r^2_{28}$ an' that ended it up [P.R. laughs lightly].

nn

c - emphatic $_0s^2_8$ But they put that little black stump up,
   parenthesis   I'm telling you, an' fixin' it
   - appended participle   nn
                           ni

- intensifying   jus' like they done
  adverbial (jus')

                     $_1t^2_7$ an' blacked the face, ya know

nn
ni

                     an' they -- uh -- after that happened

                     $_2u^2_0$ Jake Grant, one of Jed's brothers, give
                                 me a pistol.
nn
ni

- (de-emphatic) $_0v^2_0$ Said, you can carry it
  ellipsis
- modal   n

- modal $_0w^2_0$ an' hide it over there

n

- negative* $_0x^2_0$ an' not carry it on the work.

n

$_0r^2_1$ I said

n

- modal*
- negative*   I wouldn't carry it on the works at all.
- quantifier (<u>at all</u>)

$51\,z^2_{20}$ I had this little ol' tree on the side o'
                    the road

nn

                when it hit over here at the highway

$_1a^3_0$ an' I put it in the stump.

n

$_0b^3_3$ An' -- uh -- so I come back that night

n

- paraphrase* $10\,c^3_{17}$ an' they'd blacked that thing

nn

                $11\,d^3_{16}$ an' had that coat on

nn

- exclamation $56\,e^3_{15}$ -- oh, it'as the awfullest lookin' thing.
- superlative

nn

- expression $3\,f^3_0$ I said, "Now, boys, I hate t' shoot anybody

n

- quantifier (<u>just</u>) - comparative - expression	$_0g_0^3$ n	but," I said, "I'll shoot you just as sure as the dickens."
- quasi-modal - expression	$_0h_0^3$ n	I said, "Now, I'm gonna do'er."
- interrogative	$_0i_0^3$ n	An' I said -- uh, Wh-what's up?
	$_0j_0^3$ n	I hollered two 'r three times at 'em.
	$_0k_0^3$ n	I took pretty -- I walked up a little closer
- imperative - expression	$_0l_0^3$ n	an' I said, "Speak t' me," [B.K. and Edith laugh].
- modal - negative	$_{20}m_7^3$ nn	They wouldn't speak
- modal - negative	$_{21}n_6^3$ nn	-- he couldn't speak.
		B. K.: I guess not.
	$_2o_0^3$ n	But I -- I took that gun out

- laughter $_0p_1^3$ an' I said, Bang, bang [everybody laughs].

            n

- negative $_{69}q_2^3$ It never moved

            nn

            $_1r_0^3$ an' I walked up to it

            n

r $_0s_1^3$ an' kicked it

            n

            $_1t_0^3$ an' hit that stump dressed [everybody
                                    laughs].

FIGURE 1

DISPLACEMENT SETS (

a b c d e f g h i j K l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z a^2 b^2 c^2 d^2 e^2 f^2 g^2 h^2

clause

a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
K
l
m
n
o
p
q
r
s
t
u
v
w
x
y
z
a^2
b^2
c^2
d^2
e^2
f^2
g^2
h^2
i^2
j^2
K^2
l^2
m^2
n^2
o^2
p^2
q^2
r^2
s^2
t^2
u^2
v^2
w^2
x^2

FIGURE 11

PLACEMENT SETS OF STORY 58

,$^2c^2d^2e^2f^2g^2h^2i^2j^2k^2l^2m^2n^2o^2p^2q^2r^2s^2t^2u^2v^2w^2x^2y^2z^2a^3b^3c^3d^3e^3f^3g^3h^3i^3j^3k^3l^3m^3n^3o^3p^3q^3r^3s^3t^3$

	Col A	Col B
t	0 0	0 2
u	2,1	2 1
v	2	2 6
w	2 0	0 0
x	0 0	0 6
y	2 7	4 4
z^2	1 8	4 5
a^2	2 9	4 2
b^2	3 0	4 1
c^2	3 1	4 0
d^2	2 2	4 3
e^2	3 6 4	3 7
f^2	3 5	3 6
g^2	3 3	3 5
h^2	3 0	0 0
i^2	0 1	1 1
j^2	0 0	0 0
k^2	0 0	0 0
l^2	4 3	2 8
m^2	3 0	8 7
n^2	0 1 2	0 0 0
o^2	0 0	0 1
p^2	0 0	0 0
q^2	0 0	0 0
r^2	5	2
s^2	1 1	0 0
t^2	1 0	0 3
u^2	1 0	1 7
v^2	1 1	1 6
w^2	5 6	1 5
x^2	3	0
y^2	0 0	0 0
z^2	0 0	0 0
a^3	0 0	0 0
b^3	0 0	0 0
c^3	2 2	7 6
d^3	0 1	0 1
e^3	2 8	2 2
f^3	0 1	0 1
g^3	6	0
h^3		

FIGURE 1
DISPLACEMENT SETS

a b c d e f g h i j K l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z a² b² c² d² e² f² g²

clause

0	7 1
1	4 6
2	4 8
3	6 8
4	2 5
5	6 6
	2 6
7	2 1
8	2 3
	3 6
10	6 1
11	6 0
12	5 9
13	5 8
16	1 1
7	1 0
8	0 2
0	1 0
1	0 4
2	4 3
24	4 7
2 5	4 6
2 0	0 2
2 8	4 3
2 9	4 2
2 0	0 9
3 2	3 9
2 0	0
3 5	3 6
1 0	0
1	3 3
1	3
40	3 1
41	3 0
4	0 3
0	0 3
1	3 1
45	2 6
46	1
2	6
0	0
0	0
0	

a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
K
l
m
n
o
p
q
r
s
t
u
v
w
x
y
z
a²
b²
c²
d²
e²
f²
g²
H²
i²
j²
K²
l²
m²
n²
o²
p²
q²
r²
s²
t²
u²
v²
w²
x²
y²

FIGURE 12

CEMENT SETS OF STORY 60

This page consists of hand-written columns of digits, a column of letter labels with superscripts, and a hand-drawn diagram of vertical lines with T-shaped marks forming a descending staircase on the right side.

Column 1 (digits, top to bottom):
8 0 0 1 2 0 1 2 4 5 2 0 8 9 2 0 2 1 0 5 0 1 1 0 1 4 0 1 5 6 2 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 9 1 0 9 2 2 0 3 4 5 6 7 4 6 7

Column 2 (digits, top to bottom):
0 0 2 1 0 4 3 2 7 6 0 2 3 2 0 9 0 1 6 0 3 3 1 0 3 6 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 5 0 2 0 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0

Column 3 (sparse digits):
2 2 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 5

Letter label column (top to bottom):
q r s t u v w x y z a^2 b^2 c^2 d^2 e^2 f^2 g^2 h^2 i^2 j^2 k^2 l^2 m^2 n^2 o^2 p^2 q^2 r^2 s^2 t^2 u^2 v^2 w^2 x^2 y^2 z^2 a^3 b^3 c^3 d^3 e^3 f^3 g^3 h^3 i^3 j^3 k^3 l^3 m^3 n^3 o^3 p^3 q^3 r^3 s^3 t

444

Story 60
Jim Mize, Age 87
July 1973
72 clauses

A few minutes after Jim told story 58 (the previous story in this appendix) at his daughter's suggestion, Edith reminded her father of another story -- about the time he was robbed in Macon County. Jim corrected her: "No, that'as in Washington State."

	0^a71	They'ad got t' robbin' in there, ya know, there
	nn	
- negative	1^b46	an' I didn't know what t' do
	nn	
- future*	2^c48	an' I'll tell ya how
	nn	
		I done
- evaluative remark	3^d68	an' it's a pretty good-un.
	nn	
	4^e25	I come in
	.nn	
	ni	
- exclamation (shucks)	5^f66	-- an' -- uh -- Ada, she was, shucks, she was uneasy about it
- evaluative remark	nn	

312

- future 1^g26 an' she said, They'll git it.

          nn
          ni

          7^h1 They come in one night

          n

          8^i23 an' they's some people there

          nn

          1^j6 an' I grabbed my gun ahangin' up

          n

          10^k61 -- it'as a thirty-thirty an' a rifle

          nn

          11^l60 an' I had a wood shed off

          nn

          12^m59 an' it'as built off thataway

          nn

          13^n58 -- you've seed 'em --

          nn

          6^o11 an' -- an' he run

          nn

- repetition* 7^p1 an' I grabbed the gun

          n

                    when he come in the door.

– repetition	8^q0 n	I grabbed my gun
	0^r0 n	an' he run
	0^s2 n	an' went through the wood shed
– repetition*		an' as he went through the wood shed
– quantifier (<u>jus'</u>)*	1^t1 n	I shot jus' through the buildin'
– intensifying adverbial (<u>jus'</u>) – repetition	2^u0 n	jus' shot the buildin'
– modal*	0^v4 n	an' could see him run -- his light
– modal* – repetition	1^w3 n	an' I could see him run fer a hundred yards.
– quantifier (<u>mortly</u>) – progressive	2^x2 n'	He'as mortly gettin' away from there [laughs].
	24^y47 nn	Ol' Harvey Sanders, he'd come t' stay awhile

- quantifier (all)* 25^z_{46} an' sometimes he'd stay all night with
                                             us
                             nn

- expression $2a^2_0$ an' Ada, she — that scared her, poor
                                             old thing
                             n

- intensifying $0b^2_2$ — she jus' begged Harvey t' stay all night.
  adverbial (jus')
- quantifier (all)   n

                             $28c^2_{43}$ No sir, he come t' stay
                             nn

- negative $29d^2_{42}$ but he didn't stay
                             nn

- laughter $2e^2_0$ — he left [laughs].
- paraphrase
- evaluative action   n

- negative $0f^2_1$ Well, then Ada said, I won't stay here
                                             nary night, with that money
                             n

                             $32g^2_{39}$ — it'as, I forget four 'r five hundred
                                             dollars
                             nn

- negative* $1h^2_0$ So I said, I cain't go t'day
                             n

- future* $0i^2_1$ but I'll go t'night.
                             n

$35J^2_{36}$ They keep it [the bank] open [th]'ere till ten 'r eleven o'clock.

nn

$1k^2_0$ I come in outa the woods

n

$0l^2_1$ an' eat my supper

n

$1m^2_{33}$ an' it'as dark

nn

$1n^2_3$ an' I come along

n

where they robbed that man.

$40o^2_{31}$ I think

.nn

it'as about three hundred it took from him

- (de-emphatic) $41P^2_{30}$ -- robbed him.
  ellipsis
- paraphrase   nn

$49q^2_0$ I come t' that crossin'

n

- intensifying adverbial (<u>just</u>)*		where I turned down towards the bank -- Burlington, just a little town.
	$_0r^2_3$ n	An' so I studied.
	$_1s^2_1$ n	I said -- I heard 'em awalkin'
	$_{45}t^2_{26}$ nn	-- there'as two of 'em.
- negative	$_{46}u^2_1$ nn	I didn't know what to do.
- intensifying adverbial (<u>just</u>)	$_2v^2_6$ nn ni	An' they just flew over [to] me in a minute.
	$_1w^2_0$ n	I grabbed that money outer my pocket book
- quantifier (<u>right</u>)	$_0x^2_0$ n	an'-an'-an'-an' I put it right on top o' my head
	$_0y^2_0$ n	an' 'en I took it
	$_0z^2_1$ n	an' pulled my hat down as tight

– comparative		as I could pull it
– quantifier (<u>real</u>) – repetition	$_1a_0^3$ n	–– pulled 'er real tight
– intensifying adverbial (<u>jus'</u>)	$_0b_1^3$ n	an' jus' went walkin' on straight, ya know.
– expression	$_1c_0^3$ n	I said, "Hello, fellers."
	$_0d_1^3$ n	They looked around a little
– quantifier (<u>awful</u>) – evaluative action	$_9e_{15}^3$ nn	but they'as awful slow
	$_1f_0^3$ n	an' spoke.
	$_0g_1^3$ n	They went on.
	$_{59}h_{12}^3$ nn	I believe
		they had an idee.
– intensifying adverbial (<u>just</u>) – repetition	$_2i_0^3$ n	They went on just a little piece

$0J_1^3$ an' they slowed up

n

- intensifying $0k_9^3$ an' they was walkin' just as slow
  adverbial (just)
- evaluative action   nn

- comparative   like they'as talkin' t' one another.
- evaluative action

r   But after I got outa their sight

- repetition $63l_8^3$ I never, I never made a _____ bit
- negative   _____ hurry.

nn

                 $17m_7^3$ I knowed

nn

- possibility with   if I made any hurry
  if

- modal   they could run and catch me.

- intensifying $18n_6^3$ An'-an'-an' I'd -- an'-an' I just took it
  adverbial (just)
- evaluative remark   nn

- comparative   like nothin' happened t' me atall
- negative

$19o_5^3$ but I had that on top o' my head an' my
                 hat pulled down.

nn

- intensifying $20p_4^3$ I jus' walked on as easy
   adverbial (jus')
- evaluative remark   nn

- comparative   as -- like -- there'as nothin' happened.
- negative
- repetition

- negative $68q_3^3$ An' they never come on

nn

- negative $69r_2^3$ never followed me.
- paraphrase

nn

                           But as soon as they took a hint

- modal $70s_1^3$ they'd a got my money.
- evaluative remark

nn

- negative $71t_0^3$ They never took -- uh -- took no hint.

nn

Story 70
Eula Brown, Age 88
August 1973
11 clauses

Foxfire brought Jim Mize to visit his long-time friend Eula Brown. They had been talking to one another for about an hour when one of the students interrupted to ask Aunt Eula if she needed anything from the store: "Are you outa flour 'r anythin? ... Sugar?" Eula said:

c

0^a_0 ^b I ran outa coffee the other day.

n

- comparative

0^b_9 I got so tickled

nn

- negative
- evaluative remark

I didn't know what t' do.

1^c_0 An' I said t' Edna, Git me some coffee.

n

0^d_0 She come in.

n

- interrogative

0^e_0 I said, Where's my coffee?

n

- expression
- ellipsis
- exclamation (durn)
- laughter

0^f_0 "O-o-oh, forgot it! The durn thing, I --
       [laughs]."

n

- quasi-modal

$_0g_0$ Well, I said, (I better not be too many
n   days).

$_0h_0$ She went back
n

$_0i_0$ an' went t' town
n

$_0j_0$ an' got me four packages o' coffee.
n

r   - ellipsis/ $_0k_0$ Bought it.
                      n

FIGURE 13

DISPLACEMENT SETS OF STORY 70

Story 78
Will Reid, Age 90
July 1967
16 clauses

Eliot Wigginton interviewed Will and Annie Reid to learn about Annie's power to "blow fire," "cure thrash" and "stop blood" (i.e. take the pain from burns, cure thrush in infants and stop bleeding).

Explained Annie: "I just talk to the Lord, that's all."

"I see. Huh!" said the interviewer.

"I'll tell you what I seed her do one time," volunteered Annie's husband.

"All right," replied Eliot Wigginton, so Will began:

	0^a15	We lived on Mud Creek up yonder
	nn	
- double attributive	1^b14	one of a -- our neighbor's boys there, a Brown, had a big black horse
	nn	
	2^c8	and he was back over at this little place at work
	nn	
- modal*	3^d12	and -- uh -- he'd throw the mowin' blade down
	nn	
	4^e0	and the horse was pickin' aroun' there
	n	
	0^f0	and he happened to run agin it
	n	

o   - gesture
      - quantifier (jus')
      - quantifier (plumb)

0^g1

n

an' cut his front leg jus' like that [makes a slicing gesture with the flat of his hand] plumb into the bone.

- present tense
- quantifier (jus')

7^h8

nn

The blood is jus' like that.

1^i7

nn

That horse abled

- comparative

till he was so weak

- modal*
- quantifier (hardly)

he could hardly walk.

- quasi-modal

2^j1

n

Now he was agoin' t' try to get the doctor up there to see about him

1^k0

n

an' Ned -- I believe it was, wadn't it?

Mrs. Reid: No, I think it was Mel.

Maybe it was.

Mrs. Reid: I think it was Mel.

Mel told 'em what

— modal she could stop the blood.

$_0l_0$

n
And they stopped then with the horse in the road

$_0m_0$

n
and hollered

$_0n_0$

n
and told her to come up there.

$_0o_0$

n
She told 'em

— negative*
— intensifying
adverbial (just)*
it wadn't no use, just t' stand still a few minutes.

$_0p_0$

n
And they said

r — comparative in less than five minutes, that horse's leg quit bleedin' !

FIGURE 14

DISPLACEMENT SETS OF STORY 78

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