PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL'S PHILOSOPHY

Thesis:

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MR. BERTRAND RUSSELL'S PHILOSOPHY.

by.

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Contents.

Introduction

No adequate or complete introduction to the philosophy of Russell can be given within the compass of a few pages, and, therefore, no such attempt will be made. This study, itself, is an attempted introduction to his philosophy carried out chiefly from the psychological point of view. The immediate intention here, therefore, is to briefly state the purpose of the whole discussion and to give some idea of the attitude in which the approach is made, while attempting at the same time to correct certain prejudices that frequently exist against the man and his work.

In stating the purpose of this study, therefore, we might say, as the title already implies, that it is an attempt to discover the psychological implications of Russell's philosophy. To this end, we shall chiefly consider that aspect of his thought which, in its genesis and general implications, is most closely related to modern psychology. In the conclusion to our study the attempt will be made to give a general view and estimate of his whole philosophy through the medium afforded by a critical discussion of his logic, which appears in various forms in different aspects of his work.

Before proceeding to carry out the purposes last mentioned, it might be advisable to state the attitude in which our approach to Russell's philosophy will be made. We shall endeavor to make this study as free from prejudicial loyalty to any one school, or system of thought, as possible. This does not always seem to be done, today, by some of the critics of Russell. In many intellectual circles he is unpopular even though his philosophic and scientific attainments are of a high order. The causes of this appear to be mainly due to certain forms of prejudice existing against him, chiefly on account of his moral and social theories, and also perhaps, in some instances, because of the consistent pacifistic attitude which he displayed in the recent European conflict. Opinions regarding Russell or his work which are based on these grounds, are, to say the least of them, both unintellectual and unfair. To have a liking, or disliking, for a particular theory or belief is no criterion of its truth, and we should be sufficiently emancipated, in approaching the study of his philosophy, to adopt something of Russell's own attitude of honest, logical and scientific criticism.

There are many things to admire in Russell because he seems to be imbued with the highest and most intellectual ideals. The chief feature of his work, from this standpoint, is its characteristic honesty. This form of his idealism is revealed, first of all, in his mathematical and

and scientific philosophy where he attempts to develop his neo-realistic system of thought. In this aspect of his work, he reveals himself as a careful intellectual logician who calmly seeks to perfect his system of reasoning, before he attempts to examine and relate his concepts. In this respect, he is a close adherent to the ideals of neo-realism, which refuses to allow itself to be influenced in making its inferences by considerations arising from personal wishes. Russell's philosophical system may not be perfect, indeed we shall have occasion to criticize it, but we cannot help but admire the intellectual honesty which generally characterizes its discussions.

It is in this spirit that he begins his social philosophy. There is first of all a careful search made in order to discover the causes of social chaos, and an attempt made to discover the humanistic elements at our disposal for the solution of these problems. When all of these are once found, something of the subdued fire of the intellectual, moral and social reformer seems to imbue his personality, and he quietly, but firmly, sets to work to enlighten humanity regarding its misconceptions and mistaken behavior. Often Russell's moral appeal becomes almost sermonic in its style, as is the case in the essay on "A Free Man's Worship". Here the Miltonic spirit of rebellion, as seen in Paradise Lost, seizes Russell and he revolts against a world that seems to be purposeless and unfriendly to the finest human

ideals. Indeed he is almost Promethean in his courage as he preaches the religion of common sympathy and love. This essay is the finest revelation Russell gives of the humanistic spirit that permeates all his social philosophy.

In the social philosophy his hatred of sham is revealed in his criticism of modern morals. Russell does not wish to see men restrained in their vital activities by forms of moral control which belong to a less complex, and less enlightened, system of society. Many of these, he believes, have been originated from primitive taboos or superstitions, or have been derived from an a priori form of reasoning which has little or no relation to human nature. The scientific and empirical evidence against these social imperfections is advanced by Russell with a vigor, and an enthusiasm, that are born of a living faith in the possibilities and worth of human achievement. It may be that we do not always agree with many of his ideas, but whether this is so or not, we should at least appreciate one, who, in his moral and social theories, is one of the most honest and courageous of modern thinkers. It is with these conceptions of Russell in mind that we shall approach the study of his philosophy.

Chapter I.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF BEHAVIOR.

One of the fields into which Mr. Russell has entered as a philosopher, and in which he has written considerably, is that of social philosophy. His earlier work had been done in the more abstract realm of mathematics, but with the war a change came over him, and he was led to take up the study of the forces which had really been operative in bringing about the conflict between the belligerent powers. Russell was not satisfied with the reasons for the war that were popularly given, and he came to the conclusion that the causes were of a psychological and social nature rather than being of a purely ideal nature. For Russell, therefore, war, and the necessity for reconstruction afterwards, were chiefly problems in psychology, and so he wrote his social philosophy with this view in mind. He says "While the war lasted, abstract pursuits were impossible to me ..... During 1915, I wrote Principles of Social Reconstruction (or Why Men Fight, as it is called in America), in the hope that, as men grew weary of fighting, they would become interested in the problem of building a pacific society. It was obvious that this would require changes in the impulses and unconscious desires of ordinary human beings; but modern psychology shows that such changes can

be brought about without great difficulty."[1] Russell's faith in psychology as a basic factor in social philosophy is still more clearly evinced when he says, "At bottom, the obstacles to a better utilization of our new power over nature are all psychological, for the political obstacles have psychological sources."[2] In considering therefore, his psychology as it is explicitly or implicitly stated in his writings it becomes necessary first of all to consider his social philosophy.

In dealing with this phase of Mr. Russell's work it is not difficult to trace in his teachings the influences of many streams of psychological thought, and it will be necessary briefly to indicate a few of these. One can easily see the strong impressions which have been made on Russell by such men as David Hume, William James, Bernard Hart as the representative of the new psychology, and J.B. Watson as the expositor of behaviorism. There is no doubt that these men clearly represent different schools of thought, which in many instances are poles asunder in their dissimilarities. Yet there is a fundamental aspect in all their teachings in which they are similar to a very great degree, and it is this aspect which finds its expression in Mr. Russell's social teaching, viz. an anti-intellectualistic view of human behavior. All these men unite in viewing the human organism as being directed

1, 2. Selected Papers Of Bertrand Russell. pp.xii & xvi (Introd.).

primarily by irrational factors such as impulses, instincts, or habits, rather than by purely intellectual considerations.

Hume's position was that, the reason is only the servant of desire and the part played by reason is only that of choosing suitable means for the satisfaction of these urges of irrational origin. Much the same general view is expressed by William James. With him thought only intervened when activity was blocked, and then its only purpose was to effect a re-adjustment so that activity might flow again unimpeded. In the case of Bernard Hart and the new psychologists behavior is explained almost wholly in terms of sub-conscious, or unconscious, processes which chiefly direct all activity. The conscious part of the thought processes acts so as to give as much satisfaction as possible to these sub-conscious urgings, and later offers itself rationalizations or pseudo-reasons for having acted in certain ways. In J.B. Watson this anti-intellectual movement comes to a head with the denial, not only of mind as the causal agent of behavior, but Watson goes so far as to deny the existence of mind altogether. According to him, all behavior can be explained in terms of the conditioning of physiological mechanisms.

Russell's affinity with the general point of agreement found in all these men can be well illustrated by a number of quotations from his writings. It will be necessary only to mention a very few of these in order to indicate more

clearly this connection. His general thesis, which is at the basis of all his social philosophy, is couched in the following terms. "All human activity springs from two sources: impulse and desire." ..... "When men find themselves not fully contented, and not able instantly to procure what will cause content, imagination brings before their minds the thought of things which they believe would make them happy. All desire involves an interval of time between the consciousness of a need and the opportunity for satisfying it."[1] "When an impulse is not indulged in the moment in which it arises, there grows up a desire for the expected consequences of indulging the impulse."[2] By impulse, as here used, Russell means particular acts which instinctively follow the appropriate stimuli. When any event arises which interferes with this harmonious relationship and causes the inhibition of this activity, the individual then visualizes to himself certain effects which he has been denied. The thought of these denied effects constitutes for that individual his desire and becomes a conscious end for which he may strive. It is not the purpose of this discussion,here, to deal critically with this view. This will be done later. The only concern here is to point out the influences which have considerably affected Russell. For him the behavior of the human organism is of an impulsive non-mental origin, and it is guided chiefly in its activity by the circumstances with which it meets.

1. Why Men Fight. p. 7.
2. Why Men Fight. p. 9.

If this activity is impeded in any way there is a state of unrest and unhappiness produced, which is directly proportional to the degree in which the impulse is compelled by such circumstances to be inhibited. It is with this conception of the human individual in mind that Russell propounds his social philosophy and deals with the problems of human existence. This view expresses itself repeatedly throughout his philosophy and it is the basis of his whole social outlook. We will, therefore, examine it in the following pages in greater detail.

For Russell, as we have already seen, the basis of all behavior is irrational in origin. He says, "Impulse is at the basis of our activity, much more than desire. Desire has its place, but not so large a place as it seemed to have. Impulses bring with them a whole train of subservient fictitious desires; they make men feel that they desire the results which follow from indluging the impulses, and that they are acting for the sake of these results, when in fact their action has no motive outside itself . . . .; direct impulse is what moves us, and the desires which we think we have are a mere garment for the impulse."[1] Russell's language is here somewhat vague when he seeks to tell us of the origins of human behavior. When he uses the term 'impulse' he does not define what he maens by it as he does in the case of the word 'desire'. With regard to the latter expression, he makes his

1. Why Men Fight. p. 11.

meaning clear and we are made aware that he is referring to the conscious mental aspects of behavior. With regard to the former term he is unfortunately not so explicit. All that we can gather here as to his meaning is that he is referring to a tendency to behave in ways not previously learned and that this tendency is dominent in all hyman behavior. The vagueness which is characteristic of Russell in this respect may be in part an indication of his decidedly behavioristic inclinations, because the representatives of that school are rather vague when they come to discuss unlearned behavior.

It is also no doubt true that his indecisive treatment of original equipment is, in his early work, partly due to the immaturity of his psychological knowledge, because he frankly tells us that it was not until the early years of the war that he commenced this work. Be that as it may, his indefiniteness disappears to some extent, though by no means wholly so, in some of his later works. In one of these he becomes a little more definite with regard to the mechanisms which constitute the original basis of behavior. He says, "The new born infant has reflexes and instincts, but no habits . . . . There is one well- developed instinct, the instinct of sucking."[1] This statement does admit definitely that there is a fairly well defined non-learned basis for behavior, though even here the content is somewhat meagre and general. In his admission of

1. Education and The Good Life. (1926) p. 88.

instinct and his denial of pre-natal habits, however, Russell is out of agreement with the extreme form of behaviorism as typified by J.B. Watson. This view is modified by Russell to some extent at a very little later date.

In one of his most recent publications he says, "To distinguish between learned and unlearned responses is not always an easy task. It cannot be assumed that responses which are absent during the first weeks of life are all learned . . ; as the body grows and develops, new modes of response come into play, modified, no doubt, by experience, but not wholly due to it . . . . . It would therefore be a fallacy to suppose that we can distinguish between learned and unlearned responses by observing what a new-born infant does, since reflexes may come into play at a later stage. Conversely, some things which a child does at birth may have been learned, when they are such as it could have done in the womb - for example, a certain amount of kicking and stretching. The whole distinction between learned and unlearned responses, therefore, is not as definite as we could wish. At the two extremes we get clear cases, such as sneezing on the one hand and speaking on the other; but there are intermediate forms of behavior which are more difficult to classify . . . It is not possible to make a logically shapp distinction in this matter; in certain cases we have to be satisfied with something less exact. For example, we might say that those developments which are merely due to normal

growth are to count as unlearned, while those which depend upon special circumstances in the individual biography are to count as learned . . . . The whole distinction, therefore, is one of degree rather than of kind; nevertheless it is valuable."[1]

In the above statements, while still advancing the view that there is a basic element in behavior which is unlearned, or non-learned as it should more accurately be termed, Russell now declares that there may be some movements which are learned pre-natally. This is a modification of the view which he enunciated a short time previously. There is apparently no justification for it except a change in his own opinion showing a tendency more in the direction of behaviorism. There is no experimental data either for or against the possibility of pre-natal learning. The whole problem regarding learned and non-learned behavior is characterized by much uncertainty and a great deal of Russell's vagueness can be accounted for on these grounds.

His first and chief difficulty is to draw a line of demarcation between what is learned and what is unlearned, or non- learned as it should more accurately be termed. Secondly, even if he could draw this line he is in difficulties regarding the number of primary drives which we possess. With regard to the first difficulty, Russell cannot get around the fact that there is a certain non-learned basis for all behavior but he finds difficulty in reconciling this with his behavioristic

1. Philosophy. (1927). pp. 21-23.

tendencies. He is unwilling to follow Watson completely in attributing all behavior patterns to training or conditioning and yet he feels that this is an important concept. Russell is strongly impressed by the flexibility in the mode of expression which is open to each instinct and he is inclined to fall into the behavioristic fallacy of over-emphasizing this facile aspect of instinct. There is, however, an innate aspect of behavior which he cannot explain away and this constitutes a problem for him. Granted that there is a non-learned basis for all behavior Russell is faced with the second difficulty of naming the primary drives which constitute it. He is by no means the first to face this difficulty and his quandary is no doubt deepened by the different classifications of instinct offered by psychologists who believe in these innate forms of response.

Yet although he is unable to state fully the nature and number of instincts which the normal individual possesses, one would expect him to be a little more definite regarding the nature of impulse since hs is so well aware of the important part it plays in human behavior. While many instincts may be resolvable into more primary ones thus making complete classification difficult, yet it does appear that there are some which we definitely know to be primary, e.g. hunger, escape, pugnacity, and sex, which seem to be necessary in any explanation of human behavior which professes to be at all complete. Although Russell repeatedly asserts the importance of impulse throughout

his writings yet he only gives to instincts a very casual reference. He is more inclined to talk in abstract terms about 'changing impulses', or 'training children' than he is to state specifically what it is that is to be changed or trained in each case. Unlike thoroughgoing behaviorists such as Watson, Russell definitely states that there is a certain amount of behavior which is non-learned and impulsive in its action, and although some of it may not be found in very young babies yet it comes about through the maturation of the nervous system and not as a result of training.[1] He is unnecessarily vague as to its constituent elements and although Russell is inclined to waive the importance of this vagueness yet it seems to be fundamental to the whole problem of training as we shall discover later when discussing Russell's conception of changing behavior.

As we consider Russell's psychological view of man we discover that he has a very firm belief in the possibility of effecting a great change in man's behavior. Yet while he has this faith regarding the possibility of such a change he also recognizes to some extent that there are certain fundamental aspects of human action which cannot be changed, viz., reflexes and the less rigid and more malleable parts of non-learned behavior which he variously terms impulse, instinct or instinctive, native equipment, or some such term. His views can be

1. Loc. Cit. pp. 11-12.

presented in the fairest and most impartial manner by quoting a series of representative passages from his most important writings. The following are the selections chosen from his various works:-

"A man's impulses are not fixed from the beginning by his native disposition: within certain wide limits they are profoundly modified by his circumstances and his way of life."[1] "There is a not uncommon belief that what is instinctive in us cannot be changed, but must be simply accepted and made the best of. This is by no means the case. No doubt we have a certain native disposition, different in different people, which co-operates with outside circumstances in producing a certain character. But even the instinctive part of our character is very malleable."[2] "The instinctive desires of children, . . ., are vague; education and opportunity can turn them into many different channels . . . . A proper education would make it possible to live in accordance with instinct, but it would be trained and cultivated instinct, not the crude unformed impulse which is all that nature provides. The great cultivator of instinct is skill;"[3] "The instincts and reflexes with which a child is born can be developed by the environment into the most diverse habits, and therefore into the most diverse characters. Most of this happens in very early childhood; consequently it is

1. Why Men Fight. p. 14.
2. Ibid. p. 37.
3. Education and the Good Life. pp. 136 - 137.

at this period that we can most hopefully attempt to form character. Those who like existing evils are fond of asserting that human nature cannot be changed. If they mean that it cannot be changed after six years old, there is a measure of truth in what they say. If they mean that nothing can be done to alter the instincts and reflexes with which an infant is born, they are again more or less in the right, ... But if they mean, as they usually do, that there is no way of producing an adult population whose behavior will be radically different from that of existing populations, they are flying in the face of all modern psychology . . . It is the business of early education to train the instincts so that they may produce a harmonious character . . . . The crude material of instinct is, in most respects capable of leading to desirable and undesirable actions."[1] "For practical purposes one may say that, in human beings, emotions take the place of instinct. Some situations rouse pleasurable emotions and some the reverse. The human infant - or the human adult, for that matter - tries all sorts of ways to procure the pleasant situations and avoid the unpleasant ones, acts which have succeeded in either of these aims tend to be repeated, and so habits are formed. The new born infant has no habits. He has a number of reflexes and a very few "unlearned reactions", which are what remains to him in the way of instinct."[2] (Cf. also in this connection 3).

1. Education and the Good Life. pp. 314 - 315.
2. Harper's Magazine. 1927. No.155. p. 315.
3. Loc. Cit. pp. 11-12.

"If human nature were unchangeable, as ignorant people still suppose it to be, the situation would indeed be hopeless. But we know, thanks to psychologists and physiologists, that what passes as "human nature" is at most one-tenth nature, the other nine-tenths being nurture. What is called human nature can be almost completely changed by changes in early education."[1]

In the foregoing statements Russell is obviously under two influences between which he fails to work out a complete agreement, viz. psychoanalysis and behaviorism. These influences are well expressed in Russell's own words taken from his writings: "The study of psychology, and more particularly of psycho-analysis, has torn aside the cloaks that our egoism wears, and has shown that when we think we are being unselfish this is hardly ever in fact the case."[2] "Very few adults, whether men or women, can preserve instinctive happiness in a state of celibacy; this applies even to those women who have no conscious desire for sexual satisfaction. On this point, the evidence of psycho-analysis may be taken as conclusive."[3] "Men are strangely unconscious of their passions, and the envy which dominates most middle-aged professional men is a thing of which they know nothing, though the methods of psycho-analysis reveal it unerringly."[4] "There is much in the detail of psycho-analysis which I find fantastic, and not supported by adequate evidence. But the general method appears to me

1. Sceptical Essays. pp. 254 - 255.
2. The Prospects of Industrial Civilization. p. 164.
3. Ibid. p. 168.
4. Ibid. p. 174.

very important, and essential to the creation of right methods of moral training. The importance which many psycho-analysts attach to early infancy appears to me exaggerated; they sometimes talk as if character were irrevocably fixed by the time a child is three years old. This, I am sure, is not the case. But the fault is a fault on the right side."[1] "Two diverse movements in psychology have led to the emphasis on infancy among scientific students of human nature. The two movements I mean are psycho-analysis and behaviorism. Both are part of the wider movement against the intellectualist theories which formerly prevailed among professors,." . . . . "The study of mental diseasex had led to the belief that they very frequently have their source in some emotional shock or bad environment during the first few years of life . . . . To avoid the conditions which bring about these bad results must, therefore, be one of the first cares of those who have charge of infants." . . . "Whatever may be thought of behaviorism as ultimate truth, there can be do doubt that it supplies the only valid method for the study of animal and child psychology."[2] "I agree with Dr. Watson that the explanations of habit-formation which are usually given are very inadequate, and that few psychologists have realized either the importance or the difficulty of the problem. I agree also that a great many cases are covered by his formula of the conditioned reflex." . . . "But when

1. Education and the Good Life. p. 44.
2. Harper's Magazine. 1927. No. 155. pp. 313 - 314.

considered as covering all the ground, it seems to me to suffer from two opposite defects. In the first place, there are cases where no habit is set up, although by the law it should be. In the second place, there are habits which, so far as we can see at present, have different genesis."[1] (See also footnote 2).

There are two influences here which, in Russell, receive varying degrees of emphasis; sometimes at the expense of each other. From the references which have been given it will appear that sometimes Russell seems more strongly to favor psycho-analysis, which, with its emphasis on fundamental drives, would limit the extent to which a change in human behavior is possible. At other times, Russell seems to make little or nothing of inherited drives as, e.g., when he speaks of 'emotions taking the place of instinct"[3] or when he commends, even with slight reservations, Watson's 'formula of the conditioned reflex'.[4] It seems that in these respects Russell has something of a duality of conception because he is unable to work out a practical synthesis, or harmony, between two positions which, in their radical aspects, are opposed. Sometimes, in reading Russell, one would be led to

1. Philosophy. pp. 36 - 37.
2. The chief point of Russell's criticism here is irrelevant to our present discussion. It is simply that to Watson's law regarding conditioned reflexes Russell would add the factor of 'insight' mentioned by Köhler in his 'Mentality of Apes", p. 198.
3. Loc. Cit. p. 16. Ref. 2.
4. Loc. Cit. p. 19. Ref. 1.

think that the possibility of modifying human behavior to any great extent was hedged about by a great many inherited difficulties, while at other times it would appear as if these factors were a negligible detail. His difficulty is due to the element of vagueness regarding inherited drives to which I have already made reference in previous pages.[1]

Russell cannot make up his mind as to what are the fundamental constituents of our native equipment and this has the effect of making him really unsettled as to how far change in behavior is possible. In this respect he never really reaches a decision and so the two opposing influences dominate his thought alternately. It is only in his abstract theorizing that he works out a semblance of agreement.[2] The degree of emphasis which Russell will give to either the psycho-analytic or behavioristic viewpoint seems to be largely dependent upon the nature of the subject which he happens to have under discussion. If he is attempting to show what he considers to be the evils of certain systems of morals, or of institutions, or organizations of society, then he seems to feel that he cannot say too much about the strength of inherited drives and the dangerous, and sometimes pathological effects, that result from not giving these more expression, or from causing their partial or complete inhibition. If on the other hand he is talking of the possibility of bringing to pass certain prospects

1. Cf. pp. 8.-16.
2. Loc. Cit. p.12.

that to him appear ideal, then he is inclined to place all the emphasis upon the effect which he believes training will have upon the individuals whose behavior he hopes to change. At such times the enthusiasm of the social reformer seems to make Russell almost overestimate the part played by training in human behavior. In such a situation as this he is inclined, as has been already stated, to reduce the part played by inherited nature to an almost negligible minimum. When, however, he is simply weighing these two views from the standpoint of abstract philosophy into which no social factors enter, he is inclined to be more balanced in his view, though still undecided.

Russell has an interesting illustration with reference to three different conceptions held in contemporary thought regarding the fundamental nature of man. His illustration represents these tendencies under the threefold imagery of a mould, a machine, and a tree.[1] He says, "A machine or a mould is what its maker chooses; a tree has its specific nature, and can only be made into a better or worse example of the species." Of these three, the first two represent two aspects of behaviorism, a school first completely introduced by Max Meyer in 1911, and now chiefly represented by John B. Watson.[2] In this school the mouldlike aspect of its views is revealed in its concept of 'conditioning' as the process by which behavior is determined, and the machine-like conception

1. Education and the Good Life. p.144 (Cf. especially pp. 145 - 146.)
2. John B. Watson. 'Behaviorism'. 1924.
   W.B. Pillsbury. 'The History of Psychology'. 1929 290 ff.

is represented in the mechanical view of organized behavior which the theory presents. According to behavioristic theory as taught by Watson, behavior, after being built up by the 'conditioning of reflexes', is released by the action of a stimulus, or stimuli, to which the organism has been trained to react.[1]

On the other hand, the conception of organisms being anologous in nature to trees illustrates the general viewpoint of what it might be permissable to term, for present purposes, the 'naturalistic' group of psychologists and by this is meant those who are in general, though not particular, agreement with the view that man poseesses a fundamental nature made up of inherited instincts or drives which, though modifiable to some degree, cannot be completely violated or changed. This 'naturalistic' group would include (a) the psycho-analytic tradition, viz. such men as Charcot, Janet, Freud, Jung, Adler, Prince and others, and (b) what might be called the 'instinct' school represented by such men e.g. as James, McDougall, Thorndike, Drever, etc.

This 'naturalistic' group are in fundamental agreement with the notion that man has certain innate drives which are influential, at least in a general fashion, in predetermining and governing behavior. Now both the 'naturalists' and the behaviorists have each a certain amount of factual or

1. John B. Watson. 'Behaviorism'. 1924. Especially pp.166 ff.

empirical justification for the views which they advance. No doubt there is a certain amount of truth in each position but the problem is to decide how much in each case. This has not been completely done in psychology and Russell reflects this problem, though perhaps, to an abnormal degree. He, himself, on the whole, seems to favor the 'tree' conception of human nature, though not completely, introducing as he does the new concept of 'psychological constructiveness' the meaning of which is known fully only to himself.[1] Presumably it is the modification of behavior by training that he means, and if that is all that is intended, then he is in fundamental agreement with the 'naturalistic' tradition except in so far as he tends to over-estimate the part played by training in human behavior.

On the whole it would seem as if the facts favored the 'naturalistic' interpretation. Psycho-analysis has shown the ill-effects of repressing fundamental drives, and the 'instinct' school, of whom McDougall is the leader, has much evidence to show that there seems to be certain inherited drives which have played a definite part throughout the history, and present experience, of the human race.[2] Both psycho-analysis and 'instinct' psychologists include the factor of training in a modified degree; the former speak of 'sublimation' while the latter tend to speak of 'training'.

1. Education and the Good Life. p. 146.
2. McDougall - Social Psychology.
   " - An Outline of Psychology.

Both schools, it is true, have not reached complete agreement, either in their own groups or between groups, as to the number of inherited primary drives which the average individual is believed to possess. Yet it would seem, despite a difference of terminology, that a general agreement is in process of being reached regarding some of the most primary drives viz. sex, hunger, flight or escape, pugnacity, etc., and possibly Russell is a bit weak in his treatment of social problems in not making the part played by these drives more explicit than he does.

However, in all the foregoing discussion, the position taken by Russell as a contemporary scientific philosopher, in the main, reflects the condition of present-day psychology in these respects. His vagueness regarding instinctive nature implies that psychology will have to do more experimentally towards the solution of this problem before it can render fuller service as an applied, as well as a pure, science.

As was said earlier in this discussion, Russell has a great faith in the possibility of radically changing human behavior. It would appear that his faith in this respect is too great, and it is largely his zeal as a social reformer which leads him to this extreme. When he is speaking in revolutionary terms against what he considers to be evils of present-day society he goes to the other extreme of

emphasizing almost wholly the importance of inherited impulses when considering problems of behavior. Considered from both these aspects Russell's philosophy is really a plea for a new man and a new society. It does not appear that Russell ever finally settles how each of these is going to arise. According to his social philosophy, new educational methods and new group influences coming from reformed social life are going to make the new man, but the question is, how is this new society going to arise? A society is nothing apart from the individuals who compose it, and if the society is to be new, it must of necessity be already composed of the new men and women which it is its very function to create, according to Russell. Regarding education he says, "I have tried to bring before the reader the wonderful possibilities which are now open to us. Think what it would mean: health, freedom, happiness, kindness, intelligence, all nearly universal. In one generation, if we chose, we could bring the millenium."[1] These results, for which Russell hopes, cannot be achieved so quickly as he would lead us sometimes to suppose, and the truth would seem to be that it is neither by inheritance or training alone that we can hope to progress, but by the interaction of both these factors. This is a point which Russell does not make sufficiently explicit. It he treated inherited and

1. Education and the Good Life. p. 316.

environmental factors more from the synthetic standpoint of interaction, Russell would present a more balanced and accurate account of the relative strength and importance of both heredity and environment. He would then realize that when social change can only come about by the gradual interaction of these two elements, the prccess must of necessity be a slow one, due to the fact that inherited nature is a very real and important factor, and that it is not quite so pliable as he would attempt sometimes to make out. No one denies that it is modifiable but the point is that the modification of instinctive behavior can only be very gradually accomplished through the expenditure of much time and effort. From what has been said in this discussion, therefore, it will appear that Russell's views are, in these respects, somewhat inadequate.

Chapter II.

THE PSYCHOLOGY AND FUNCTION OF BELIEF.

In the preceeding chapter the endeavor was made to show that there are two main lines of influence expressed in Russell, viz., the behavioristic and what were termed the 'naturalistic' tendencies. The behavioristic aspect is emphasized in his somewhat extreme views of the possibility of changing behavior through training, a view which is held to some extent also by the 'naturalistic' group. Since there is, no doubt, a measure of adaptability in human behavior through the capacity which it has of being modified to some extent, it might be worthwhile at this juncture to consider in greater detail Russell's conception of changing behavior and the methods by which he hopes to bring this about.

In one of his writings Russell gives a list of the factors which he believes to be instrumental in changing behavior. Speaking of the modification of human behavior he says, "It may be changed by beliefs, by material circumstances, by social circumstances, and by institutions."[1] The purpose of the discussion here will be confined to a consideration of his views regarding belief and how it influences human behavior. Mention will be made later of the other elements which he names.

1. Why Men Fight. p. 37.

The first statement which Russell makes regarding belief is that much of it is of irrational origin. "All activity", says Russell, "springs from impulse and desire".[1] The beliefs which men have are, therefore, for the most part merely rationalizations. Russell also states, "But most of what passes for thought is inspired by some non-intellectual impulse, and is merely a means of persuading ourselves that we shall not be disappointed or do harm if we indulge this impulse."[2] "Impulses bring with them a whole train of subservient fictitious desires; they make men feel that they desire the results which will follow from indulging the impulses, and that they are acting for the sake of these results, when in fact their action has no motive outside itself."[3]

In another of his works Russell says much the same thing when he states, "Men are strangely unconscious of their passions, and the envy which dominates most middle-aged professional men is a thing of which they know nothing, though the methods of psycho-analysis reveal it unerringly."[4] These passages taken from some of Russell's writings will serve to give his views with regard to the irrational origin of some of the beliefs held by individuals. These references are all that are necessary here though others are given at the foot of the page.[5]

1. Why Men Fight. p. 7.
2. Op. cit. p. 10.
3. Op. cit. p. 11.
4. Prospects of Industrial Civilization. p. 174.
5. Why Men Fight. pp. 13 - 15.
   Prospects of Industrial Civilization. pp. 6, 133-136, 141-149.
   Education and the Good Life. pp. 284 - 291.
   Analysis of Mind. pp. 58 - 76.
   Sceptical Essays. pp. 46 - 54.

Before passing on to consider these views of Russell's it might be better here to make reference to a work of Bernard Hart's whose influence Russell acknowledges.[1] Hart says, "The two mechanisms which manifest themselves" . . . viz.. . . "the unconscious origin of beliefs and actions, and the subsequent process of rationalization to which they are subjected, are of fundamental importance to psychology. They may be observed every day in every individual. That a man generally knows why he thinks in a certain way, and why he does certain things, is a widespread and cherished belief of the human race. It is, unfortunately, an erroneous one. We have an overwhelming need to believe that we are acting rationally, and are loth to admit that we think and do things without being ourselves aware of the motives producing those thoughts and actions. Now a very large number of our mental processes are the result of an emotional bias or complex of the type we have described. Such a causal chain is, however, incompatible with our ideal of rationality. Hence we tend to substitute for it a fictitious logical process, and persuade ourselves that the particular thought or action is its reasonable and natural result."[2]

In all these references we see the unconscious source and nature of the beliefs of which Russell is speaking. In a great deal of our thinking, no doubt, there are many beliefs which are irrationally derived though they may have

1. Why Men Fight. p. 10.
2. Bernard Hart. Psychology of Insanity. pp. 65 - 66. (Cf. especially the whole of Chap. V.)

the appearance of rationality. In many instances we unconsciously tend to find a 'reason' for certain modes of behavior to which we feel impelled, or for which we have a desire, rather than in consciously tending to be impelled, or to desire, to behave in certain ways because we have a good reason for so acting. These are, no doubt, some of the beliefs, which as Russell says, strongly influence much of the behavior that passes as rational. He seems to imply in some instances in his writings, especially in his diatribes against the existing state of society, that these irrational beliefs are the absolute, or at least general, rule in human thought. That this is true of a great deal of human thought is, as has been already said, no doubt true, but that it is true of all human thought does not appear to be correct.

In the discussion of the relative parts played by impulse or instinctive tendencies and reason we must remember that we are not dealing with groups composed wholly of standard individuals, though for purposes of discussion we shall have to deal only with reference to one type of personality viz.,the normal individual. But in practical instances we shall have to consider the variables, who deviate in their behavior from this standard, in the light of the central tendency or type common to the group we are observing. In all the groups that we consider we shall meet with a great variety of individual differences which can however be classed under three general heads, viz., sub-normal, normal and supernormal. The first named, relative to our present discussion,

would be those people in whose lives impulse dictates belief to a greater extent than that found in normal types, while the last named would be those individuals in whose thought beliefs are dictated by rational considerations more frequently than is the case in normal persons. It does not seem to be that anyone is completely rational, or that anyone is completely impulsive excepting perhaps mental defectives, and for purposes of our present discussion these are irrelevant.

In reading certain books of Russell's, however, e.g., "Why Men Fight" and "Prospects of Industrial Civilization", one would be led to think, at times, that Russell held the view that all human thinking is irrational. This would lead to several difficulties such as e.g., (1) Where did Russell get his beliefs? Would he be prepared to say that they were irrational? (2) If all beliefs are irrational creation of how does he hope to influence people to change their beliefs by means of a rational type of argument such as is found in his social philosophy and in his educational theories and ideas? That Russell, himself, does not accept the position that all beliefs are irrational is hinted at in "Why Men Fight" but does not become explicit except in his educational theories although the rationality of some beliefs is implied in his whole social philosophy. The very foree of his argumentative treatment of social problems rests on the assumption that individuals are subject to a change of belief

effected by rational considerations, at least, in some instances. In his educational theories he pins his hope for the origination and acceptance of rational beliefs on the development of the instinct of curiosity which seeks to know simply for the sake of knowing. Russell says, "The instinctive foundation of the intellectual life is curiosity, which is found among animals in its elementary forms."[1] "And I should not wish to encourage the young to look too closely for an ulterior purpose in all knowledge; disinterested curiosity is natural to the young, and is a very valuable quality. It is only where it fails that I should appeal to the desire for skill such as can be exhibited in practice. Each motive has its place but neither should be allowed to push the other aside."[2] We can see from these considerations that Russell does have a place for rational beliefs and that these may influence behavior.

Russell's view of rational and irrational belief receives fuller discussion in an essay which he wrote entitled "Can Men Be Rational".[3] In this essay he defines rationality by saying, "I should define it merely as the habit of taking account of all relevant evidence in arriving at a belief." That is, although belief is largely dictated by impulse it is not wholly subjective because it has an objective reference. This is what Russell means when he speaks of "opinions which

1. Education and the Good Life. p. 74.
2. Education and the Good Life. p. 244. (Cf. also (especially pp. 74-78, 240- 246).
3. Sceptical Essays. pp. 46 - 54.

are rational in an objective sense." If would seem that his definition of rationality is not quite accurate enough because as he says in the same essay, "Our beliefs are, however, often contrary to fact; even when we only hold something is possible on the evidence, it may be that we ought to hold it to be improbable on the same evidence." It might be more accurate to say that rational belief is that function of behavior by which the individual or group acts only in the light of the unbiassed perception of all the facts which he can command at a given time. This brings out the meaning of rationality more clearly, thus e.g., rational belief would be the unbiassed observation and interpretation of facts, while irrational belief would be the direct opposite of this.

It might here be objected that if all belief is related to some drive how can it be possible to have an unbiassed interpretation at all! Any objection such as this would itself be based on an irrational idea viz., that belief is only rational when it acts without, or in opposition to, the impulsive side of life. This objection will receive a fuller answer in a later part of this discussion and we shall only pause long enough now to point out that any belief which would be wholly unrelated to impulse such as e.g., the instinct of curiosity, would be meaningless to life and experience. The fact that all beliefs arise under the impelling power of impulse does not of itself determine that all beliefs will be

irrational. We must differentiate between beliefs that are originated in conformity with, and colored by, impulse and its wishes, and those beliefs which are motivated by an impulse to discover the truth in answer to the vital needs of the organism, or under the drive of curiosity. Russell knows the inadequacy of a logic that is unrelated to impulse of any kind when he says that in order to be effective it must be pelated to a dominant desire or impulse even should it only be the impulse to know the truth at any cost.[1]

We now come to the mainpoint of our present discussion viz., how do beliefs, either rational or irrational, influence behavior? Now it is evident from what has already been said that when we have a number of objective facts upon which to build a logical and rational belief that the ideas we form are very frequently not the result of a rational interpretation of the facts which we have before us. It would seem in some instances that instead of belief directing impulse, the opposite is true, and that impulse tends to influence belief. It seems, however, that in normal life we cannot say that either one influences the other completely to the exclusion of the other, and that the relative strength of either belief or impulse in influencing behavior is different in different people, and different in the same people in different situations. Russell alludes to the last mentioned

1. Why Men Fight. p. 6.

form of individual difference when he rightly points out that some scientists can be quite rational in the beliefs which they form in their own particular field but be quite irrational in other fields of thought.[1]

It seems that in the average individual there is an interaction between belief and impulse. Certain impulses give rise to certain beliefs, and these beliefs in turn influence the expression of other impulses. This may be seen, for example, in the case of the herd instinct which may tend to make a person believe in the superiority of his own group or nation and that belief will, to him, justify the expression of certain other instincts, such as pugnacity, in a destructive fashion. Again this interaction of belief and impulse may take another form. We may find, for example, that in a certain individual the instinct of flight causes him to experience the wish to escape from an unpleasant or dangerous situation, and that in order to do this it is necessary that all available objective facts relative to the situation be discovered and rightly interpreted by him. An easy illustration may be taken which will suffice to show what is meant. For example, an individual may wish to hire a private secretary but before doing so it will be necessary to know if the prospective employee is honest, diligent, etc., in order that his employer may be saved a great deal of anxiety. The

1. Education and the Good Life. p. 289.

greatest care will, therefore, be taken by the latter in forming a rational belief based on the facts at his disposal. The belief thus formed and proved to be well grounded by experience may in turn influence the expression of the gregarious instinct and cause the employer to make a friend and confidant of his servant.

It may be said, therefore, in the light of the foregoing illustrations, that irrational beliefs will tend to arise and to influence behavior when it appears necessary for the well-being of the individual or group to express some drive. Beliefs will then be invented, in most cases unconsciously, to justify a certain line of action. Perhaps it will be objected here that the appearance of the necessity for action to which allusion has just been made may at least make the expression of the impulse rational, if not the subsequent beliefs. It might be pointed out in this connection that care was taken to use the qualifying work 'appearance' which may mean that the perception of an element of necessity in the situation was due to an irrational interpretation of the facts and that therefore there was no objective element of necessity whatever to justify the claim that the behavior was rational. But to proceed. On the other hand rational beliefs will tend to arise and to influence behavior when the well-being of the organism is dependent upon an accurate interpretation of facts, or in other words, when the necessary

behavior is vitally related to the life of the individual. Perhaps this is what Russell has partly in mind when he speaks of "an ulterior purpose in all knowledge."[1] At any rate, it seems that it is implied in his social philosophy that rational thought will arise and be accepted in the cases where need is felt for vital action and that it will influence subsequent behavior. Russell looks at the present social situation and believes he perceives a need for changed conditions. In response to this perceived need he attempts to work out a rational solution. He believes that this solution which he has made will affect other individuals since he believes that they are facing a vital situation in which there is need for action because of the unhappiness and restraint they appear to suffer. Russell appears to believe further that the individuals whom he has in mind are conscious of their need and that his logic will relate itself to their desire and influence their behavior. This is what appears to be the psychology that is implied in this aspect of his social philosophy.

There is another situation which we have to discuss in this connection, and that is, how do rational beliefs, which justify a change in conditions, stimulate an individual who is not dominated by intellectual curiosity, or who does not perceive the immediate necessity for discovering new truth. This situation is particularly difficult when the

1. Education and the Good Life. p. 244.

individual is satisfied with things as they are. The response may tend in some cases to be negative, in which case the individuals concerned will adopt a prejudiced attitude which may ultimately result in behavior that will oppose every move towards reform such as is found in the fundamentalist opposition to science in religion. The problem therefore is, in such cases, to create a positive response. The only thing that logic can do in these cases is to show clearly how much fuller satisfaction impulses and desires would receive if conditions were changed and it appears that this is Russell's aim. This will not involve the creation of new impulses, however, as he appears to believe possible,[1] but will rather cause the release of dormant or repressed impulses already existing in the individual.

This change to be effected by means of logic however involves the necessity for a relationship to instincts and drives. But Russell,himself, points out that the restraining of these impulses may result in a false belief regarding the things which may be erroneously supposed to give satisfaction. He says, "We all believe many things which we have no good ground for believing, because, sub-consciously, our nature craves certain kinds of action which these beliefs would render reasonable if they were true."[2] "Per contra, there are desires which do not correspond to instinctive needs."[3]

1. Why Men Fight. (Cf. whole of Chap. I.)
2. Ibid. pp. 5 - 6.
3. Principles of Industrial Civilization. p. 169.

Such being the situation, how then is logic going to be related to drives that have needs which are not consciously perceived. It seems that Russell tends a great deal to overemphasize, at times, the general non-consciousness of needs, and paints a picture, which, if it were wholly true of social life, would involve the necessity for a general psycho-analytic treatment of whole communities which is not only impossible but unnecessary. While no doubt being partly true,as has been indicated earlier in this discussion,it is not true to the extent that Russell makes out in the revolutionary parts of his philosophy. If it were true to the extent he claims his logical treatment of social problems would be worse than useless.

It seems that Russell makes the mistake of confounding 'repression', which is an abnormal phenomenon, with 'inhibition', which is a normal phenomenon. The latter is very much more general than the former and while no doubt dissatisfaction often ensues from it, the cause of such uneasiness is much more likely to be conscious and the subject who experiences it is much more likely to perceive the logic of new proposals as to how it may be satisfied. To repress an instinct means to drive out of consciousness all awareness of the troublesome urge, or the conflict which it causes. On the other hand, to inhibit an instinct means simply to hold it in check. The capacity to inhibit actions is the basis of the delayed response which is a feature of intelligence, while repression is just the opposite because it does not solve a conflict, but gives up in despair

and is capable only ofpsycho-analytic, and not logical, treatment.

Now, really, what in effect, Russell is trying to do is to obtain a release for certain inhibitions and this can be effected ultimately by logical solutions, as he implies in his teachings, if the inhibited drive can be related by intelligence to the rational arguments advanced. Now this involves the question of insight in many ways. It implies, that individuals will have the insight, firstly, to see the advantages of the scheme advanced; secondly, to perceive its rational basis in fact; and thirdly, to see its practicality and the means to bring it about. Now, in objection to this implied psychology it might be urged that the intelligence factor and educational experience of the general population is not great enough to perceive, even if it could be demonstrated that Russell's extreme reforms were rational, the wisdom of such radical and complete changes. Such revolutionary reforms do not take place suddenly but come at the end of a long process of interaction between belief and practice, or theory and experiment, and the slowness of this process is due, in part at least, to limitations of intelligence and educational experience on the part of the general population. This inaccurate view of society leads Russell to advocate a standard form of society, viz., socialism, for a society of individuals who, though inborn differences, are not standard and cannot be made so by any amount of training. His position in this respect is, therefore,

from a psychological standpoint erroneous and it is not necessary to labor the point further than to say that in this aspect, Russell's feform psychology is ineffective.

We can see the influence of beliefs upon behavior worked out further in Russell's philosophy. His criticism of present-day society and his revolutionary philosophy rest to a very great extent upon his revelation of the irrational beliefs, handed down from one age to another by tradition and custom, that influence individual and group behavior. Most of these fallacious beliefs are not consciously originated and this makes it all the more difficult for those who hold them to perceive their irrational nature. They are what Nietzsche would term 'vital lies' i.e., false beliefs which are necessary to the group because of its present mode of organization. They are the beliefs which help to maintain the present structure of society. Russell believes that society's present mode of social organization needs to be changed and so he rightly perceives that the vital myths upon which every state of society must rest, whether that society be good, bad, or indifferent, must first of all be subjected to criticism and changed, before the mode of society which they control can be altered.

One of the mechanisms which is implied in Russell's philosophy as being necessary to bring about this change in social beliefs and the subsequent behavior which they influence, is criticism, expressed through a critical social

philosophy. In the previous paragraph the attempt was made to truly estimate from the psychological standpoint how valuable Russell's philosophy is for this purpose. The other method which he explicitly advocates is education, which will influence behavior by its effect upon belief. His general concept that education is a valuable mechanism to social reform and progress is of course indisputable and is generally recognized by the average thoughtful person everywhere. It might be necessary to insert the caution here, however, that while appreciating its helpful qualities we must not blind ourselves to its limitations, and that while realizing that it may change our 'nurture' completely, it cannot in the same fashion change our 'nature' though it may modify its behavior. This is a factor which Russell frequently neither implies nor makes explicit, but it is a distinction which it is necessary to recognize in formulating an effective educational theory. There is not space here to consider Russell's particular theories of education in detail. His ideas contain some thoughts that are good, but none of them are new, and he is in the main repeating what has been said a great deal better in other places, because other writers have had a much wider experience upon which to build their ideas. Some of the educational theories which Russell holds are contradictory such as e.g., when he speaks of teaching pupils to think for themselves and not to think as the teacher thinks, which is a fine ideal no doubt, but then Russell

himself contradicts this where in places he urges some definite content of thought which he thinks should be taught to children e.g., moral precepts and views regarding history. We shall not, however, refer to these contradictory aspects of his educational theory further here, though there may be occasion to refer to them by the way in other discussions later.

There is another sense also which Russell mentions in which irrational beliefs may arise and this takes place when instinctive urges do not receive satisfaction. Some of Russell's general explicit statements and implications in this sense with regard to morality are valuable. He says, "The sense of strain, ... is due to instinctive maladjustment."[1] The cause of the sense of strain may not always be consciously perceived because, when a great deal of dissatisfaction arises due to the almost complete inhibition of instinct, that same element of dissatisfaction, if it is great enough, tends to pervade the whole personality and cloud the rational insight as to its true cause. We might almost say that there is a law such that, the ability to interpret the true cause of dissatisfaction, in certain respects, varies directly as does the pervasiveness of the feeling tone. In other words, the greater the pervasiveness of feeling, the more difficult it will be to rightly infer its true cause and therefore have a true and correct desire.

1. Prospects of Industrial Civilization. p. 172.

When dissatisfaction becomes pervasive, it is on such occasions that everything seems to be going wrongly. In such a situation, when instinct is blocked, desires arise which are really theories as to the nature of the things which we need to give us satisfaction, but they are like all other theories, viz., not always either correct or incorrect. An accurate desire as to what is needed, is dependent upon the degree in which inhibition and consequent dissatisfaction takes place. If dissatisfaction is only slight we tend to find out more easily and accurately what we really need to give us satisfaction than in the cases where dissatisfaction becomes general. It is for these reasons that it would appear that Russell is only partly right when he says, "Impulses bring with them a whole train of subservient fictitious desires."[1] Again, he says, " . . . instinctive needs . . . often exist without corresponding explicit desires."[2] "Per contra, there are desires which do not correspond to instinctive needs."[3]

The degree of truth which is in these statements justifies to some extent his reaction against a morality that causes too complete an inhibition of instincts so that satisfaction is impossible, though it is necessary that at all times, while safeguarding the rights of the individual, we must be careful not to violate the rights of the group. All

1. Why Men Fight. p. 11.
2. Prospects of Industrial Civilization. pp. 167 - 168.
3. Ibid. p. 169.

that Russell is commended for, here, is with regard to his appeal that greater consideration should be given to the instinctive needs of the individual which has not always been done in the past. This has been the case either because that morality came from a more primitive state of society, or for the reason that the theory of the accepted moral code was dominated by the social viewpoint without due regard being given to the individual's instinctive needs. Russell's advocacy of the teaching of an enlightened self-interest is a principle worth considering, because it is based on the psychological fact of the dominance of the ego as the ultimate point of reference in all behavior.[1] Russell's principle teaches that the violation of the rights of others tends to react upon the individual himself thus serving to create further unhappiness and dissatisfaction for him.

There is no doubt that many systems of morality have grown up irrationally and have led to irrational precepts and practices. Others, again, have grown up as the result of conscious thought but they, too, have not been always rational in theory or in practice because they have tended to disregard the instinctive element too much. There is a very real grain of truth in what Russell says when he states, "There is also, in all conventional moralists, a gross ignorance of psychology."

1. Ibid. pp. 163 - 164. Cf. also:-
   Selected Papers of B. Russell. Intro. p. xviii.
   Education and the Good Life. p. 148.

It does not follow that they were wholly to blame for this, since psychology is a modern science, but there is no reason why many irrational moral notions should dominate modern society.

Many systems of morality sprang up from custom and irrational taboos, and they contain those elements which men think they ought to obediently practise. Such moral systems have often been concerned mainly with repression, and not enough with expression. They have often, in consequence, dictated a form of activity which was supposed to be rational, but which, as this discussion will seek to show, was irrational because it was too negative. Russell is no doubt right in a great many instances when he says, "Reason as preached by traditional moralists was too negative, too little living, to make a good life."[1] Kant was not wholly right when he said that the 'I ought' implies the 'I can'. There is a sense, no doubt, in which the acceptance of the 'ought' implies the 'can', but the force of this argument rests on the assumption that the content of the 'ought' is always practicably possible. In a theoretical and abstract sense the argument is logical, but in particular concrete cases the argument would often be illogical and irrational, since often times what an individual 'thinks' he ought to do, and what he 'can' do, have frequently no relationship whatever.

Such irrational beliefs often spring from the

1. Why Men Fight. p. 6.

undue development of the self-regarding sentiment which tends to make the individual estimate his natural capacities more highly than the facts would warrant. This is seen especially in ascetic morality, against which it appears that Russell is chiefly directing his attack. This form of morality tends to call instinctive behavior wrong simply because it is instinctive and natural. This view of instinctive behavior is of course quite irrational, but it is the one which is dominant in ascetic morality and it, therefore, tends to place a too rigorous restraint upon all natural urges. The individual in such cases tends to become proud and austere in his life because he is contemptuous of the very forces upon which, if he were truly rationally minded and not dominated by a false logic, he would see, his life is dependent. The non-realization of this dependence constitutes the irrational factor in all morality that is ascetic in tendency,or nature. The ascetic is contemptuous of instinct and so he seeks to restrain it too much,and this restraint often operates to his own ultimate detriment and to that of the group in which he lives.

A morality which disregards too much the instinctive life of the individual is irrational, since the right expression of all the instincts is necessary to the furtherance of life itself. Instead, therefore, of first inventing a content for the 'ought' which has little or no relationship to the instinctive side of life, a true psychology of morals would first of all discover those things

which can be done, and on the basis of this, have a belief as to what ought to be done. It would appear that this is what Russell implies in his social philosophy.

Society is formed through the operation of the herd instinct and it begins with certain postulates, e.g., the right to property won in warfare. This led to the retention of prisoners as slaves etc. As social organization becomes greater this form of morality could not be maintained in its entirety and had to receive some modification. It worked very well in small groups where every warrior was more or less a private owner of property for which he needed slaves. In a more complex and different form of society it does not work at all. The point of this discussion here, and of which Russell at least implies, is that traditional ethics is too often concerned with maintaining more primitive forms of morality in a society which has become more highly organized and cannot therefore adapt the primitive form of morality to a complex society's needs. Yet this always tends to be the irrational practice of traditional moralists who do not consider the nature or effect of the instinctive inhibitions which an archaic system imposes.

This can be seen in another aspect. Morality is a group control and it is designed to be operative only within the group upon which it is imposed. When the group is small it can ordain a great many inhibitions which will become effective within its boundaries, but these same

impositions cannot be made to operate with the same efficiency in societies of larger and more complex organization. The reason for this is that in the small group any member can get outside his tribe or clan almost at any time he desires to do so, e.g., through the means of raiding parties etc. In this way he need no longer be controlled by tribal moral impositions but can express his inhibitions to an almost unlimited extent by violation of the tribe which he despoils. When the group is small a strongly inhibitory morality works well because there is the easy escape factor due to the size of the group. In a large group, a morality that only allows for the partial expression of a few instinctive desires, and calls for the almost complete inhibition of others, will not be a successful system. The inadequacy of traditional morals may in part account for, and be indicated by, the rise in increasing number of criminal gangs, night clubs, secret fraternal societies, etc., where obligation is only recognized within a small social area of immediate associates. A morality which is going to be effective will have to take account of all instinctive urges, and seek by sublimation or training to find socially acceptable ways in which these drives can be expressed; an effective morality cannot rely completely on the mechanism of inhibition.

It is not intended here to imply that traditional morality arises consciously in the manner which has

been outlined. Indeed the manner of its origin is mostly unconscious and herin lies its irrationality. In a simple society, while many moral judgments are made on objective grounds, many are also made which do not have any objective validity, i.e., deeds or things are judged to be right or wrong on superstitious grounds rather than on a factual basis which would judge a thing or action by its effects. This partly irrational system of morals becomes handed on to more complex societies through tradition, and causes irrational inhibitions. As society grows more highly organized the inadequacy of such morals becomes greater, and causes a great deal of dissatisfaction, the cause of which is not always realized. The older form of morality is thought to be right simply because it is older, or is supposed to have worked very well in the past. Because it is thought to be right it is thought to be rational. This is an erroneous judgment on the part of those who make it. Behavior which attempts to fall in line with this irrationally derived aspect of morality is found to be difficult in more complex groups, if indeed it is not found in some cases to be utterly impracticable; yet it is often judged to be nonethe less rational, partly no doubt because it is generally thought to be so by the group and the attempt to practise it gains their approval. It is generally considered to be wiser and more beneficial for an individual to think and act as the group does unless he wishes to gain its severe censure, or opposition. The

group also tends to praise the individual who attempts the difficult, or even in some cases the impossible, simply because the acts attempted have these qualities. The attempt therefore, to conform with traditional morality becomes a mechanism for obtaining group recognition, whether the system itself gives individual satisfaction or not. These irrational factors all tend to make for the continuance of a traditional system which does not seek to take account of, or give proper valuation to, instinctive urges.

It is generally under an irrational system of morals that people begin to talk of 'reason', as opposed to impulse or instinct, as if true 'reason' can ever be fundamentally opposed to instinct of which it is the correlative rather than the opponent. Such a view is psychologically inaccurate, as Russell would affirm, and in addition it has all the philosophic difficulties attendant upon the creation of a dualism. The only form of instinct to which 'reason' is ultimately opposed is that in which one instinct, wish, or tendency, receives emphasis to the almost complete exclusion of all others. It is the fault of many traditional moralities that they have done this, and these are the theories which find, and talk about, a fundamental opposition between 'reason' and 'instinct'. Instinctive modes of response are looked on as inferior, and 'reason' is thought to be elevated because it is invoked in opposition to impulse.

In this way arises such a morality as Stoicism

which calls desires of the 'flesh' evil and desires of the 'mind' pure. Thus a false antithesis is created. According to such a view as this, if an individual accepted its morality and sought to practise it without any regard for his instincts, this was considered to be a victory for reason, and reason was in this way supposed to be elevated. His consolation for repressed desires was found to some extent through the strength and operation of his self-regarding sentiment, because men praised him for having achieved the difficult. It also satisfied those individuals with strong masochistic tendencies. Instead of being rational, this conduct was irrational, because in many instances it almost wholly deprived the instinctive elements of their rightful satisfaction, thus tending to produce in many individuals, whose masochistic impulse was not strong, a dissatisfaction, if not in some cases a pathological type. The psycho-analytic psychology is a very effective brief against this form of morality and irrational belief.

The true type of rational morality arises at the conscious level, when men take into account all the facts of the social situation including their own instinctive urges, the needs of which, are more easily perceived when the instincts are not abnormally restrained through irrational moral codes. A truly rational system of morality is that which does not ignore instinct as a base and carnal entity but seeks rather to find legitimate expression for it. In

other words, a wide and all embracing positive morality is more effective, and psychologically more rational, than a morality of negations and inhibitions. As Russell says, "Positive morality is, therefore, a very tremendous power."[1] This is the truly intelligent and rational form of moral conduct. Intelligent behavior is that which in an unbiassed fashion takes account of all the facts, and guides itself in judgment and action in the light of those factors. This system of thought would seek to so express impulses as to give satisfaction to the individual and the community. Russell is right in holding that the chief factors in morality are psychological and that no system of morality can be effective which does not build upon, and in accordance with, psychological laws. A morality which gives due regard to the potency of psychological factors will have a wider empirical basis, and tend to be less a priori and therefore less removed from the facts of life. Russell is right when he advocates the elimination of the a priori element as much as possible. He says, ". . ., that actions are to be judged by the results to be expected from actions of that kind, and not by some supposed a priori moral code."[2] Morality must accord with the experience of human nature, and its judgments must be empirically derived, in order to be in any way effective.

At the same time it is needful to point out that Russell does not advocate the naturalism of Rousseau.

1. Prospects of Industrial Civilization. p. 165.
2. Prospects of Industrial Civilization. p. 166.

This is his avowal, at least, though at times he comes near it as when, for example, he discusses sex. He says regarding Rousseau, "Neither the old belief in original sin, nor Rousseau's belief in natural virtue, is in accordance with the facts. The raw material of instinct is ethically neutral, and can be shaped either to good or evil by the influence of the environment." [1] This is the view held by most contemporary child psychologists and it appears to be sound.[2]

While all this is true, it would appear that Russell is substituting another 'naturalism' for that of Rousseau. This might be termed the 'naturalism of habitual or acquired character', and it appears to me to be altogether too naive to function in a completely efficient manner in all human behavior. It would seem that Russell's reliance upon it as the almost sole mechanism of character is too great. At least, his mode of developing it is inadequate to constitute an efficient preparedness with which to meet the totality of life-situations encountered in the course of human existence. His habit system tends to be too 'particular', i.e., it relates too much to particular situations and neglects too much the development of general habits, principally that of general self-control. It is true, as Russell asserts, that habits can be developed by training, but it is equally true in many instances that they can also be disorganized by

1. Education and the Good Life. p. 136.
2. Cf.:- Freeman, F.N., How Children Learn. pp. 50-54.
Waddle, C.W., Introd. to Child Psychology. pp. 209-210.

subsequent experience. Further, new situations, which the individual is constantly meeting, require responses to be made for which habits have not been developed. Natural responses may be inadequate and may need to be checked in favor of more intelligent adaptive responses.

All these situations require an inborn capacity of control to be developed, viz., that capacity of behavior which is popularly termed the will. It appears that Russell is rather weak in his treatment of this factor. By the term 'will', as used in this discussion, is meant that capacity which is possessed by organisms to facilitate or inhibit all behavior except that which is purely and undeniably reflex. The chief function of this capacity is not, as Russell appears to think, restrained to the inhibition, or in some cases repression, of bad desires allowed to become rampant under a false view of human nature and a faulty theory of education.[1] This factor is essential to some extent in all good character and the degree to which it can be exercised is one of the indications of intelligence. Russell further thinks that the child can be so trained by a rigid system of habits to act rightly in various situations, so that there will be little need to build up any habits of will. While morality, as has been indicated earlier, would be wrong in building entirely upon inhibition, yet a certain amount of it is necessary in certain situations. No morality can be devised, nor can there be organized such a complete system of habits, so that every possible situation can be

1. Education and the Good Life. pp. 42-44.

cared for before it arises. There will always be new situations which will constitute a problem and in such cases it will be necessary to delay response until a solution has been found and a means of legitimately expressing the impulses discovered. The factor of inhibition will also have to be incurred in some cases, and at certain times, in order to prevent the over-expression of one urge to the exclusion of others, and therefore, to prevent the consequent exhaustion or dissipation of the organism that would ensue upon unbalanced activity. These factors all involve the will, or what is to be understood as personal control of the individual in any life-situation.

Indeed the concept of will is exceedingly necessary to any theory of changing behavior, because to change any mode of activity means to inhibit previously developed customary, or accepted, modes of response now judged to be valueless or even harmful, and to facilitate new methods of reaction now believed to be valuable or beneficial. All this is done in the light of new beliefs, which are themselves believed to have validity or life-value. It would rather appear that it is necessary to stimulate, and to develop early in childhood, the capacity to inhibit or facilitate modes of behavior with a view to ensuring the well-being of the individual, or the group to which he may belong. It is also needful that the individual should be able to keep dominantly in mind in any situation, that the ultimate end of all behavior should be personal or social well-being whether the immediate

stimuli arouse, in the conscious present, a pleasant or unpleasant affectivity. This is the factor of delayed response and it is highly important and of great personal value to the individual who can exercise it efficiently. No system of morality that hopes to be effective can afford to ignore it.

Under Russell's proposed theories of education, he would tend to develop in the child the belief that the world was all pleasant. For example, the most pleasant methods of learning would be used, the modes of correction would be as pleasant as possible, (all of which is of value of course though not wholly true to life) and the conception of a possible type of social life to be presented to the child is too pleasant. The idea that it is possible to bring about a millenium by the elimination of a few evils is an erroneous belief and would itself ultimately lead to discouragement and dissatisfaction because it is an impossibility, at least as aimed at by Russell. Even if such a millenium were achieved the individuals concerned would be bored to death by the very ennui of it. But to return to the main point, it would seem that Russell's system is inadequate in the sense that it would not sufficiently prepare the child to meet the element of pain which is attendant on all real life situations. It is necessary that the child should be made to realize that unpleasant modes of response have sometimes to be chosen for the sake of

achieving distant pleasant or beneficial ends. Russell would also tend to develop the belief that what is pleasant in every case is always good or to be desired. This, of course, is not so. It is for these reasons that there is justification for saying that Russell overlooks too much the need for the development of will in his concept of changing behavior by means of belief or otherwise. His discussion of belief, while it contains many worthwhile features, is also in some respects inadequate.

Chapter III.

A PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS.

In the preceeding chapter note was made of the four environmental factors which Russell mentions as having a very strong directive influence upon behavior. In addition to beliefs he spoke of material circumstances, social circumstances, and institutions. Of these three, the first two are relatively unimportant from the standpoint of this discussion since they are more or less a matter of common knowledge. In reference to social institutions the same cannot be said. With regard to these it would seem as if Russell implies a point of view which has been made articulate in Kantor[1] and also in Judd. This view as formulated by Judd, and implied in Russell's teaching, is that instincts are too general in the mode of behavior which they dictate to fully account for, and to explain, the particular varieties of human behavior which we find in social life arising from the operation of any one instinct. These differences of behavior are not slight enough to be ignored since they give rise to some of the major conflicts of life. An explanatory principle has therefore to be found for these particular modes of expressing any one general instinctive trend in behavior. Kantor and Judd may both be said to find this explanatory principle in a difference of stimulation. Judd points out that some of the

1. Kantor, J.R. An Outline of Social Psychology.
   Judd, C.H. Psychology of Social Institutions.

most important factors in causing a difference of stimulation are social institutions. Institutions according to Judd not only give rise to a difference in the modes of expressing instincts but also in their turn come to be among the causal factors which are operative in producing new forms of expressing instinctive tendencies. Their influence is so complete as to cause, in many instances, an almost complete difference in thought and behavior between different social groups existing contemporaneously either within or without the same larger general social unit.

As an illustration of the foregoing point of view it might be worthwhile to quote a representative passage taken from Judd's discussion. He says, "Every social institution becomes . . not merely the embodiment of an idea or tendency which brought it into being, but a force influencing the consciousness and behavior af all who come into contact with it. The individual must have the capacity for developing expectations and modifications of his own conduct, but the particular modes of behavior which he takes on are not determined by his natural tendencies; they are determined by the demands and example of society."[1] It may be that Judd disregards the natural tendencies too much. Natural tendencies do seem to account in part for many differences and similarities in behavior but they do not fully explain all of these. There does seem

1. Judd, C.H. Psychology of Social Institutions. p. 65.

to be a definite part played by environmental influences such as institutions in determining behavior and it would seem as if Russell implies something of the foregoing position.

It would seem as if Russell's social philosophy makes explicit the need for a closer psychological study of institutions. From one viewpoint it might be said that this aspect of his philosophy is designed to show the power and effects of these social factors. In fact it might be called a philosophy of institutions based on the psychological viewpoint since his emphasis is continually on the psychology of the various situations he is discussing. Russell indicates what he believes to be the effects of some of these social organizations and in the following pages the attempt will be made to develop some of the general principles which he explicitly makes or implies. For this purpose reference will be chiefly made to his treatise entitled 'The Prospects of Industrial Civilization' since it is here that his fundamental concepts regarding what might be termed his 'psychology of institutions' are most clearly exemplified, though many of these factors are found in some of his other writings.[1.]

With regard to Russell's psychological views

1. Why Men Fight.
   What I believe.
   Sceptical Essays.
   Marriage and Morals.

of institutions it has been already said that he implies the viewpoint of Kantor and especially of Judd. This can be seen in the fact that Russell is not so much interested in the general tendencies of behavior directed by instinct, as he is in the particular forms in which a single instinct, or series of instincts, have been expressed. Russell sees that the chief social problems are not centred so much in the fact that instincts furnish the urges which determine men of every race to behave in the same general ways, but that rather, social problems have arisen because, within the confines of some general instinctive tendency, men have practised one particular mode of behavior in preference to others. The principle that Russell implies is that instincts only give the tendencies to behave in some general fashion while other environmental factors such as institutions mold the instinctive behavior into the form which it takes. This principle is implied in many of his discussions but it will only be necessary to refer to one as an illustration.[1]

With the advent of the industrial revolution arose the institution which is known in the modern world as 'industrialism'. The meaning of this institution is defined by Russell when he says, "The essence of industrialism is the employment of elaborate machinery, and other means . . . of diminishing the total labor of production."[2] His meaning evidently is that the machinery which is used is too elaborate,

1. Prospects of Industrial Civilization. Chap. II.
2. Ibid. p. 23.

costly, and intricate, and requires so many specialized forms of skill that it cannot be operated and owned by each individual. This results in the organization of labor under employers at certain centres where machines are set up such as factories. The need of conforming to the ways of the institution, and also the advent of the institution itself are no doubt primarily dictated, in the first instance, by the urge of the food-getting instinct. But this does not of itself explain the later forms which behavior takes. Other causal factors have to be discovered and amongst these is the institution. As soon as industrialism became organized and gained power it brought about a great many changes in behavior from that which had characterised the pre-industrial era. Some of these are mentioned by Russell such as, for example, the inability to be self-subsistent, and the changes which resulted in religion and morals, etc. The effects of this one institution are sufficient to change completely the form in which instinctive behavior expresses itself. A great part of Russell's discussions are, therefore, taken up with criticisms of the changes in behavior produced by industrialism. For him, this and other institutions play a definite part in influencing behavior. Thus Russell implies that it is necessary to include institutions as causal factors in any complete explanation of behavior.

While Russell may at times be inclined to overestimate the influence of institutional factors this much appears to be true, viz., that their effect upon behavior is just as real as are the individual drives of an instinctive nature which human beings experience. A great deal might be said in support of this viewpoint. Sometimes institutions are only treated with respect to their origin from our instinctive nature and little attention is paid to their effect upon behavior. Yet the latter aspect is just as important as the former, and it is wrong to emphasize either one at the expense of the other. The source does not completely account for the stream and neither does any one, or all, of the instincts account completely for the whole behavior cycle. Institutions largely govern the mode of expression given to instincts; they may at times cause the complete inhibition of some and the abnormal expression of others. Institutions store the funded experiences of society and help to condition its new arrivals so that they will tend to develop habits conforming to the standards or modes of behavior accepted by the group. These organizations ensure, in the main, the development of social habits or uniform ways of acting without which co-operative group activity resulting from controlled and directed instincts would be impossible. By handing on the experiences of the group, institutions largely compensate for the seeming short-comings of biological heredity by helping the intelligent

individual, practically to start where his immediate ancestors left off. Thus institutions profoundly influence social and individual behavior. These social organizations are interactive with instincts. Sometimes they are the effects of antecedent instinctive tendencies and at other times they retard, accelerate, or cause particular expressions of instinctive behavior.

Institutions influence behavior in other ways. They materially affect the individual's thinking and beliefs. In fact if it were not for institutions that increasingly complex system of behavior known as civilization would not be at all possible. Instincts alone and unaided could not effect civilization though they also are necessary to it as the factors which furnish its main general drives or trends. But civilization is also dependent upon the tools of thought and action which man has invented in order to accomplish complex purposes. These tools include not only machines but also social organizations. They continually influence behavior through thought and belief. The instinct of curiosity impels individuals to seek knowledge but it does not dictate how or what it is possible to discover. This is what institutions do for man. They acquaint him with the thoughts of past and present generations. Sometimes they are also efficient in causing the individual to think

in particular ways. National groups, as Russell never tires of pointing out, accomplish this through various institutions. The government schools and sections of the daily press help to create belief in the superiority of ones own national group. In these and other ways institutions strongly affect thought and belief.

If we wish to account fully for the differences in behavior between modern man and his primitive or immediate ancestors we shall have to very materially consider social institutions as being at least part causal factors in bringing about those changes. Social organizations are as important to man as the development of new receptors and effectors. Nature has given man the intelligence in varying degrees to invent new mechanisms of adjustment and control as the need arises instead of confining him to the fixed repertoire bestowed by biological inheritance. These inventions become social property and largely influence behavior. It is in this way that the products of intelligence do not become the sole heritage of those who possess it in the highest degree or are able to apply it in special ways. The thoughts and inventions of genius become the endowment of more mediocre or less specialized individuals thus enabling them to become more effective in spite of natural or circumstantial limitations. These inventions become, or form part of, social institutions and thus these organizations are led to exercise an influence upon behavior. In a complete

psychology of human behavior it is not correct to exalt biologically inherited capacity at the expense of that which is socially inherited or acquired; it is wrong to emphasize instincts at the expense of institutions. They are all necessary for the explanation, and the efficient working, of a complete behavior cycle and each factor differs only in the manner, and not in the ultimate nature, of its importance.

As soon as organization of even the most primitive nature is effected an institution is created automatically at the instant that union takes place. Some need or instinct may draw the members of the group together but the institution is the means by which they consummate their social life. The instincts explain 'why,' and the institutions explain 'how', the co-operation is effected in the first instance. But as the institution begins to function it also becomes part of the 'why' or explanation of the resultant behavior. Instincts may explain the general tendencies of the subsequent behavior but when we ask why was this particular mode of response chosen rather than that, the explanation will generally have tc include a description of the way in which some institution had trained the individual to respond, whether it be school, church, criminal gang, government, family, or whatever institution, or institutions, played a significant role in determining behavior. They are the mechanisms of organization

and they effect this through determining by training what responses the individual will give in the various situations in which he may be. The more efficiently the institutions control and direct the behavior of those who come within their influence the more effective is the character of the social organization which they bring about. This is what Russell indicates with regard to industrialism when he says it makes society more organic.[1] But it would seem to be true also, in varying degrees, of all institutions depending upon the extent and efficiency of their control. Thus these social organizations tend to influence behavior very materially by organizing it for definite social ends. They exercise a control upon the individual in such a way as inclines him to think and act in ways which he would not otherwise do in a less highly organized society. They organize instinctive behavior into those particular habit responses which are both socially acceptable and useful to the group in which they become operative.

These habit responses, when well established, become effective in producing a fixed particular type of response. As William James has pointed out, habits are amongst the strongest forces which operate in determining human behavior. They are built up and manifest themselves as particular continuous modes of satisfying some need which

1. Prospects of Industrial Civilization, p.24.

is generally of an instinctive nature. Institutions are the mechanisms which by conditioning the individual serve to generate these uniformities of response. Their importance in influencing behavior therefore cannot be overlooked. Russell realizes the great power of institutions in this respect and he seeks to make it explicit. This is one of the main general points in all his social philosophy.

Russell implies a great deal more than this, however. He seeks to show that institutions, in order to create an efficient social life, must generate forms of behavior that will give general instinctive satisfaction. He says, "Our problem is to preserve instinctive happiness for the many, not only for a privileged few."[1] It is his belief that there are many institutions which have gained a great deal of power, either through tradition, or by controlling the necessaries of life, which do dictate forms of behavior that do not give general satisfaction. Not only do they not give satisfaction but Russell thinks that they tend to produce actions which in the end are harmful to those who practise them.

He seems therefore to imply two methods for judging an institution psychologically. The first is that of estimating whether the end it has in view will take full account of the psychological factors it will have to control, and the second is that of judging a social organization by the discoverable psychological effects which it has, whether

1. Prospects of Industrial Civilization. pp. 167 ff.

they be consciously or unconsciously connected with the institution. It is in this way that he appears to judge many of these organizations and chief among those which Russell criticizes is industrialism. This example can be taken as an illustration of his general proceedure.

With reference to the first method of judging an institution we can see in the case of industrialism that the dominant end, which Russell believes characterizes it to-day, is not sufficient. Industrial managers seek to emphasize too much and in a narrow way the idea of 'production'. The usual aim of industrial concerns is to produce as much as possible at the very minimum of cost to the firm concerned and thus increase financial returns. Russell is of the opinion that the whole proceedure is only viewed from the standpoint of the comparatively few individuals who control industry. This has a tendency to produce a disregard for the psychological factors that constitute the nature of the workers. It is easy under such conditions to fall into the fallacy of regarding them merely as machines. It is not enough that one instinct should be satisfied through work, such as, for example, the food-getting instinct, when the very process by which such satisfaction is obtained calls for the almost complete inhibition, or at least unsatisfactory expression, of other important drives. All this only tends to develop a feeling of unpleasantness regarding work, and probably in the long run serves only to retard, rather than accelerate, production.

Russell seeks to show that since production is the dominant end everything is subjected to this purpose. The tendency is to produce standardized products because they are more quickly and cheaply manufactured and therefore bring in larger returns. This standardization of work has the effect of producing in the worker the feeling of monotony since he is confined to the same job day after day and therefore little appeal is made to his instinct of constructiveness. Interest in the task therefore tends to wane. There is also the tendency for the employers to cut the rates of pay, to lengthen work periods, or to increase the amount of work done per hour. These all produce a state of dissatisfaction which has the tendency to gradually increase, and to influence behavior. Employers who follow such a policy overlook the fact that the worker is not merely a food-seeking animal but a highly complex and differentiated organism whose instinctive nature is denied many things which it needs, by being forced to follow such methods. No human being is constructed to live in such a narrow and highly controlled environment, nor can he do so for long without having his thought and general behavior considerably changed.

These are the factors which Russell is indicating when he goes on to say, "The sense of strain, which is characteristic of all grades in an industrial community from the highest to the lowest, is due to instinctive maladjustment. Every kind of failure to satisfy deep instinctive needs

produces strain, but the manifestations are somewhat different according to the instinct which is thwarted. The chief needs thwarted by industrialism, as at present conducted, are: the need of spontaneous and variable activities, the need of occasional quiet and solitude, and the need of contact with the earth."[1] There are many more instinctive needs thwarted under such a rigorous system than those which Russell here shows, but these are sufficient to indicate how it is possible to influence behavior in various ways by means of an institution even when such an organization is very meagrely adapted to the general instinctive life of those concerned. There are certain limits, of course, to which this meagreness of adaptation to instinctive needs can go. If these are overstepped then it is possible that something akin to revolution against the offending institution may take place. If this happens then the behavior of the individuals concerned will tend to cause a change in the policy and in the directive influence of the social organization whose reformation is sought. It is in these ways that an interactive influence is seen to manifest itself between instincts as embodied in individuals, and the power to influence behavior which is exemplified by institutions.

With reference to the second means of judging institutions, viz., by their psychological effects upon those whom

1. Prospects of Industrial Civilization. pp. 172 - 183.

they influence, this has been mentioned to some extent already in the foregoing paragraphs but deserves a little further exemplification. There are many instances of this in Russell's discussions.[1] In discussing educational theory and practice he attempts to show the tendencies and effects which certain methods and matter of instruction have upon the individuals who come under their control. He also seeks to reveal what he believes to be the effects of certain other institutions when he presents his impressions of social and industrial life. If we take again as an illustration, Russell's discussion of industrialism we can see where he indicates many of these effects. He points out, for example, that the struggle to reach a position where the financial returns will be sufficient to ensure a modicum of comfort so that a man can support a family is intensified by modern industrial conditions. This delays marriage and this retardation brings in its train many sexual and moral problems. Industrialism has the tendency also to produce monotony and nervous tension which in turn require highly stimulating pleasures as a counteractive. All known effects therefore must be taken into account when estimating the efficiency of an institution since they are attributable to its influence to some extent.

Industrialism as at present constituted tends to cause many wide changes, not only in the field of behavior which it directly controls, but also in wider circles

1. Cf.:- Education and the Good Life. Especially pp. 1-41.
Prospects of Industrial Civilization. Esp. pp. 22-41
Roads to Freedom. Esp. pp. 146-167. (141-188.

its influences are indirectly felt. It creates certain types of thought as Russell indicates when he says, "There is one other tendency which has hitherto been very strong in industrialism, . . .; I mean, the tendency to value things for their uses rather than for their intrinsic worth."[1] There is no doubt a great deal of truth in this statement, since in the industrial concerns in which they work, individuals are taught to value things in relation to their usefulness for certain purposes. This has the tendency to become a general habit of thought which will become pervasive in all their thinking. Thus there comes about in education an inclination to appreciate and emphasize only those elements which are of value for commercial purposes. This can be seen in highly organized industrial countries.

Another indirect effect of industrialism is that it tends to influence morality. One of its consequences is manifested in the marriage relationship. Russell points out that, "When the woman goes out to industrial work like her husband, and the children spend most of their day at school, the economic tie between husband and wife is enormously weakened."[2] This is perhaps especially true in cases where there are no children and where the man and woman are instinctively maladjusted to each other. But where there are strong instinctive ties, and also where there are

1. Prospects of Industrial Civilization. p. 38, Also pp. 39-41.
2. Ibid. p. 34. Also pp. 33 - 35.

children, industrialism does not have the same disruptive tendency, though where both parents are in employment, their influence over the children may be weakened. Industrialism at least tends to change the organization of the working class families and this influences behavior by bringing about new forms of moral relationship.

The influence of present-day industrialism on morality is also seen in business ethics. Where the financial end is the dominant one, as it generally is in industry, all conduct tends to become subservient to this major aim and the behavior which results is not always of a very ethical type. Emotional sympathies are ruled out and the only morality that is generally recognized is the right of the strong to survive. Speaking of such a code as this Russell says, "In this code, "success" is defined as the acquisition of a large income."[1] Conduct therefore tends to become monetarily efficient and any forms of behavior which are conducive to financial success are the ones which tend to be practised. Whether we approve of such conduct or not does not matter from the standpoint of this discussion. The point is that industrialism as an institution tends frequently to bring about a divorce between the ethics of business and those which are approved by the social group.

The indirect influence of industrialism is seen also in religion. Russell thinks that under modern industrialism there is less religion among wage-earners and he says

1. Prospects of Industrial Civilization. p. 163.

that this is chiefly due to the fact "that the welfare of industrial wage-earners is more dependent upon human agency, and less upon natural causes, than is the case with people whose manner of life is more primitive . . . The industrial worker is not dependent upon the weather or the seasons, except in a very minor degree. The causes which make his prosperity or misfortune seem to him, in the main, to be purely human and easily ascertainable. It is true that natural causes affect him, but they are not such as we are accustomed to attribute to supernatural agency."[1] This is no doubt at least partly true. As men become more emancipated with regard to nature through industrialism they tend to become less physically dependent upon supernatural forces and come to depend more upon human agency and science for the accomplishment of their immediate purposes. It does not appear, however, that this makes for the abolition of religion but only for a change in its emphasis and form. Industrialism, it may be said, tends to effect changes in the modes which religious behavior and belief take.

Russell goes on to point out that another effect of industrialism is that it tends to bring about a general standardization in all behavior. He says, "In a thoroughly industrialized community, . . ., there is little appreciable difference between one person and another; eccentricity is hated, and every man and woman endeavors to

1. Prospects of Industrial Civilization. pp. 36 - 37.

be as like his or her neighbors as possible. Their clothes, their houses, their household utensils, are all produced to standard pattern by the million, without any of those individual differences that characterize the products of handicrafts."[1] In modern industrial concerns the tendency is to make all products standard because they can thus be produced at less cost and they become therefore more marketable. This standardizing process tends to become pervasive, no doubt, though it does not seem that its quality in this respect is wholly due to the influence of industrialism as Russell would attempt to indicate. The tendency to become similar in behavior to others, has an instinctive basis in human nature itself, due to the influence of the instinct to imitate the ways of the groups with which one may be more or less identified. This tendency may be accentuated by the influence of institutions, but it does not appear that it is solely due to their operation, though they may stimulate it to act in particular ways. Likewise, it does not seem as if the standardizing of behavior is a process which is accentuated only by industrialism. The tendency of every institution is to create a uniformity of behavior amongst its members, and probably in every instance each institution exercises a pervasive influence in this respect.

From Russell's treatment of institutions it would appear that he implies that there is a certain hierarchy amongst them, and that the ones which generally are dominant, are those through which the food-seeking instinct is served

primarily. This will differ in different cases according to the type of institution through which a person earns his living, but all would appear in the last analysis to be chiefly dependent upon modern industrialism. It is this which creates the wealth upon which all are finally dependent. Since it is the primary source from which all derive physical existence, and since the instinct for which it furnishes the means of satisfaction is of paramount importance to life, industrialism tends to dominate all other institutions. The slightest change in its behavior tends to influence the activities of other organizations and cause consequent modifications in their behavior. Russell attempts to show, for example, that industrialism dictates on some occasions the policies of governments.[1] The influence of industrial organization upon other institutions is seen in the fact that when a conflict ensues between the former and the latter, adjustments tend to be chiefly effected through the adaptations of other institutions to the policy of industrialism. Russell shows, for example, how modern industrial conditions have the tendency to cause changes in the family by weakening the economic tie which is one of the factors holding the members together. He says, "One of the most important effects of industrialism is the break-up of the family resulting from the employment of women. The employment of women has two effects; on the one hand it makes them economically independent of men, so that they cease to be

1. Prospects of Industrial Civilization. pp. 200 - 217.

subject to husbands; on the other hand it makes it difficult for them to bring up their children themselves."[1] There is no doubt that the dissolution of the factor of economic dependence tends to weaken the bonds of family union. In such a case the family as a subordinate institution to industrialism has the tendency to change its mode of organization as a means of adjusting itself to the more influential institution. What is true in this instance with regard to the power of industrialism is true also in many other cases and it would therefore seem as if there were a hierarchy of social institutions which therefore differ in their power to modify human behavior.

Finally, it might be said here, as was stated at the outset of this chapter, that Russell implies the viewpoint that among the causal factors which bring about particular forms of behavior social institutions must be named as highly effective causes. No social psychology, therefore, would seem to be complete which does not include this point of view. It is not sufficient to explain every phenomena of behavior only from the standpoint of instinct, important as this is, but it seems to be necessary to show that particular forms of thought and activity are the direct and indirect results of institutional influence.

1. Ibid. p. 32.

Chapter IV.

THE NEUTRAL MONISM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS.

In this chapter we shall endeavor to deal with that aspect of Russell's philosophy which attempts to formulate an interpretation of modern scientific tendencies that will be indicative to some extent of their probable ultimate meaning. In this respect Russell has an exceedingly difficult task since the two sciences with which he deals chiefly, viz., modern theoretical physics and psychology are in a rather unsettled condition to state it mildly. In either of these sciences at the present time it might be almost said with literal truth that no sooner is a book written than it tends to become out of date. This is especially true of physics since the introduction of the relativity and quantum theories. In psychology the schools of thought are as varied as they are numerous, and it is therefore difficult to develop a system which will be synthetic, and which at the same time will include all the essential features of each school without becoming overbalanced and contradictory in the process.

This is but a mere sketch of some of the obstacles with which any modern thinker has to contend who would seek to develop a systematic view of two large and diverse fields of scientific enquiry, but however slight our knowledge of the difficulties may be it should at least serve to modify

to some extent the severity of any criticism we may feel called upon to make upon anyone who with courage and modesty tackles the problem as does Russell.

In Russell's philosophy we have many schools of psychology placed side by side and this, if it did nothing more, would help us to gain a more balanced view of each, since they are here related to the whole of experience rather than remaining confined to the narrow field in which they were originated and applied. The work of philosophy is in so far as possible to take a comprehensive view of the entire world of our experience. It does not therefore follow exclusively the work of any one school or branch of science, but seeks rather to present a unified picture of knowledge as a whole, and if possible with such a viewpoint to discover the ultimate meaning of all existence. When many branches of research are brought together in this way we see each one in a new perspective and relationship and this is what Russell is attempting to do with regard to physics and psychology. How successful he is remains to be seen, but it at least appears to be certain that his work is not without some value in the manner mentioned above.

When we come to consider the philosophy of science, which Russell attempts to infer from the data he possesses, we encounter discussions of a more abstract and technical description than those which have been reviewed in the

preceding chapters. Here Russell encounters an old dualism of thought viz., mind and matter. It is one of those persistent problems that have come down to us from the time of the Greeks and which has influenced modern philosophy in various ways since the times of Descartes. Russell seeks to solve this problem by the discovery of a single principle which is basic to both the 'logical constructs' of mind and matter, and from which he believes both arise by inference, rather than by implying any real existence in a dual and diversified manner. As an approach to his problems Russell is much impressed by the present tendencies of both modern psychology and physics. At first sight he believes they appear to be inconsistent and it is his desire to attempt to reconcile these opposing tendencies in modern thought because he is of the opinion that their divergence is more apparent than real.

Pursuant to the foregoing Russell states, "On the one hand, many psychologists, especially those of the behaviourist school, tend to adopt what is essentially a materialistic position, as a matter of method if not of metaphysics. They make psychology increasingly dependent on physiology and external observation, and tend to think of matter as something much more solid and indubitable than mind. Meanwhile the physicists, especially Einstein and other exponents of the theory of relativity, have been making "matter" less and less material. Their world

consists of "events", from which "matter" is derived by a logical construction. Whoever reads, for example, Professor Eddington's Space, Time and Gravitation (Cambridge University Press, 1920), will see that an old-fashioned materialism can receive no support from modern physics. I think that what has permanent value in the outlook of the behaviourists is the feeling that physics is the most fundamental science at present in existence. But this position cannot be called materialistic, if, as seems to be the case, physics does not assume the existence of matter."

Russell continues by saying, "The view that seems to me to reconcile the materialistic tendency of psychology with the anti-materialistic tendency of physics is the view of William James and the American new realists, according to which the "stuff" of the world is neither mental nor material, but a "neutral stuff", out of which both are constructed. I have endeavored in this work to develop this view in some detail as regards the phenomena with which psychology is concerned."[1]

The foregoing statements give Russell's general view of the problem as it presents itself to him, and his most important discussions with respect to it are contained in the Analysis of Mind (1921), and in the Analysis of Matter (1927). Although the latter is a later work, yet

1. Analysis of Mind. Preface. pp. 5 - 6.

for present purposes it will not concern us so much as will the former, since we are primarily interested in the psychological aspects of the problem. Moreover each is but an approach to the same general problem in a detailed fashion from two different fields of study, but the conclusion in each case is in the same general vein. In the one case, the data upon which the conclusion is based are those of physics, in the other those of psychology. In either case the conclusion always is that "the distinction between physical and mental is superficial and unreal." [1] The major interest of this discussion will therefore be centred in the psychological basis and implications of Russell's philosophical teaching regarding the neutral monism.

In this phase of his philosophy Russell reveals a wide and comprehensive knowledge of psychology. There are many writers and schools which interest and influence him. This part of Russell's work reveals more clearly than ever the way in which he has been affected by some of the psychologists mentioned earlier.[2] There can be no doubt but that Russell is chiefly indebted to William James and he admits this especially with regard to the doctrine of neutral stuff. Other influences are also apparent and are seen to be basic to this theory. Amongst

1. Analysis of Matter. pp. 402
2. Loc. Cit. chapter 1.

these are the behaviourism of John B. Watson, the mnemic psychology of Richard Semon, the new psychology of the psycho-analytic school, i. e., chiefly Sigmund Freud and Bernard Hart. In addition to these, Russell has occasion to make use of material from Thorndike, Rivers, Cannon, Sherrington, Head, Drever, Dunlap, Ribot, Wohlgemuth, Dewey and others. The materials from these diverse sources are used to furnish data for 'the analysis of mind' which is carried out from the standpoint of structural psychology.

In carrying out this analysis Russell discusses the various aspects of mental behavior which have been held to be characteristic of mind and to mark it off as a reality distinct from everything else. Russell attempts to show that these distinctions which have been believed to demarcate mind from matter are by no means so real or fundamental as they would appear, and that in reality, both mind and matter are built up out of some neutral stuff common to both. His main thesis in the psychological analysis is that all mental phenomena are built up out of sensation and images. In this connection Russell says, "If we have been right in our analysis of mind, the ultimate data of psychology are only sensations and images and their relations. Beliefs, desires, volitions, and so on, appeared to us to be complex phenomena consisting of

sensations and images variously interrelated." [1] Having thus reduced mentality to these two elements Russell goes on to state, "I have maintained ... that the data of psychology do not differ in their intrinsic character from the data of physics. I have maintained that sensations are data for psychology and physics equally, while images, which are in some sense exclusively psychological data, can only be distinguished from sensations by their correlations, not by what they are in themselves." [2]

Thus we see that, according to Russell, sensations are common to both the physical and mental worlds and, therefore, images alone amongst the data of psychology are peculiarly mental. This arises from the fact that images are causally, though not intrinsically, distinct from sensations. Their causation is mnemic, i. e., they are dependent for their appearance not only upon present observable stimuli, but also upon the past experience of the organism. These past experiences must not only be considered as being sequences in a causal chain of which images are the end result, but as proximate causes operating simultaneously with the observable stimuli which bring about the images. Thus amongst all the data of psychology the only constituents that Russell believes to be exclusively mental are the images which are mnemically aroused

1. Analysis of Mind. pp. 299 - 300
2. Ibid. P. 297

in the manner described by Richard Semon.[1] Russell realizes however that since mnemic phenomena are dependent for their existence upon a nervous system which is physical, the psychological laws by which they are described may be ultimately reducible to those of physics and therefore, according to this type of analysis, any claims which they might possess to being regarded as irreducible characteristics of mental phenomena would at once be abrogated. Russell goes on to indicate, however, that this is only a theoretical possibility and that for the present, at least, mnemic phenomena are to be regarded as being chiefly characteristic of mentality.

It appears however that Russell does not only carry out the analysis in the foregoing way. He finally prefers to state the ultimates of mentality in another manner, since the former statement lands him in difficulties which he is quick to see. In the first analysis which he makes, after considering the various so-called irreducible characteristics of mentality found in traditional psychology, such as consciousness, introspection, belief, meaning, perception, general ideas and thought, will, etc., Russell came to the conclusion that out of all these the only real ultimates were images and beliefs regarding them. What distinguished images in consciousness

1. Analysis of Mind. pp 77-92. 289-295.
Cf. also Richard Semon - Die mnemischen Empfindungen (Leipsig 1909) or the same work translated from the German by B. Duffy, entitled Mnemic Psychology (London, 1923)

from those of pure imagination was their belief reference to objective happenings either in the past or present. Russell states, "The belief must be of that sort that constitutes objective reference, past or present." [1] Every image was thus accompanied by some form of belief attaching to it either of a time, or localizing, description.

The difficulty for Russell came however when he had to solve the problem of how we are conscious of an image. This seemed to involve the necessity of having an image of an image ad infinitum. Russell realized this difficulty and although he attempted to give a solution of it, the attempt did not seem to be wholly satisfactory even to himself. Finally, he believes he sees a way out of the difficulty through hiw view of consciousness. Here Russell has the tendency to greatly diminish its importance, if not to deny its existence altogether. He tries therefore to minimize the importance of the problem with which he is faced with regard to the consciousness of images by indicating that in his view such awareness is by no means an ultimate, but is rather a relative quality depending upon certain complexity of structure. Thus he says, "Enough has, I hope, been said to show that consciousness is far too complex and accidental to be taken as the fundamental characteristic of mind. We have seen that belief and images both enter into it. Belief itself

1. Analysis of Mind. p. 289.

. . . is complex. Therefore, if any definition of mind is suggested by our analysis of consciousness, images are what would naturally suggest themselves. But since we found that images can only be defined causally, we cannot deal with this suggestion, except in connection with the difference between physical and psychological causal laws." [1]

All this leads Russell to state the ultimates of analysis in other terms, and he thinks he finds these in so far as present knowledge goes in a difference of causal laws. The causal laws described by psychology are distinguished from those of physics by certain characteristics. Regarding this Russell says, "The two most essential characteristics of the causal laws which would naturally be called psychological are subjectivity and mnemic causations; these are not unconnected, since the causal unit in mnemic causation is the group of particulars having a given passive place at a given time, and it is by this matter of grouping that subjectivity is defined." [2]

To this last mentioned term a very special meaning is given by Russell which might be stated in the following way. Every perception is made up of a number of 'particulars' such as the size, shape, etc., of the object perceived. These 'particulars' are our sense data

1. Ibid. PP. 292-293
2. Analysis of Mind. p. 307.

and in Russell's view they are common to both the physical and mental worlds. The difference between these two worlds is consistuted by a different grouping and relationship existing between the particulars in each case. In the physical world these 'particulars' are perceived in a certain context, only they have different appearances in different'perspectives'. Thus, for example, Russell defines a piece of matter by saying, "A physical object or piece of matter is the collection of all those correlated particulars which would be regarded by common sense as its effects or appearances in different places." [1] An object is thus nothing more than a system of its appearances, and in all perspectives this system maintains itself in varying form. This system constitutes the relationship by which we infer it to be a 'thing', or a piece of "matter'. There is, however, no underlying substance that constitutes the unity of 'things'; a thing is simply the system of its appearances and nothing more, according to this neo-realism.

A 'mind' however, according to Russell, is characterized by a different system of relationships. When a mind or living brain is in a given place it has subjectivity, i. e., it perceives everything from its own particular point of view, or, according to Russell's terminology it has 'perspectives'. The 'perspectives' of two things

1. Ibid. p. 101.

may be experienced simultaneously. This simultaneity constitutes a time relationship which binds the two 'perspectives' together in our experience and makes them part of a 'biography'. A biography is therefore, according to Russell's use of the word, that series of perspectives which make up one person's experience. This time relationship can also manifest itself in another way. Our perspective of the one object, which we may happen to be perceiving, may change and we will get a series of perspectives which will also be characterized by a time order such as before, or after. These time relations will also constitute part of a biography. Russell believes that it is the relationships which one part of our experience has to another that constitute its unity, and which groups particulars and perspectives into the unity that constitutes a biography or what we term a mind. One of the essential relationships to that end is that of time, and he points out that "Semon's 'engram' is formed by all that we experience at one time". This, Russell believes, is in harmony with the theory of relativity regarding time, because, as he states, "There is not one universal time, except by an elaborate construction; there are only local times, each of which may be taken to be the time within one biography." [1] Biographies or 'minds' are therefore made up in part of local time relations, and

1. Ibid. p. 128

this local time and point of view constitutes their subjectivity, which is deemed by Russell to be one of the chief factors distinguishing 'mind' from 'matter'.

Such subjectivity, as Russell indicates, would not of itself be a very radical distinction since it may also be a characteristic of certain physical objects such as a photographic plate. Time relations are not therefore sufficient to demarcate 'mind' as an ultimate reality. Another element must now be added to make mental subjectivity complete, and to give a further distinguishing quality to it and to the phenomena of which it is characteristic. Here, Russell again brings in mnemic causation as having an essential connection with subjectivity and as being necessary to its complete definition.[1.] Mnemic causation has already been explained in this discussion and nothing further need be said regarding it here except to note that Russell now makes it necessary to a complete definition of subjectivity as a characteristic of mental phenomena.

The upshot therefore of the whole analysis is that subjectivity and, (or which includes), mnemic causation are the ultimate elements of mental phenomena. As was pointed out, however, the mnemic quality in mind may be reducible to physical laws, and, in the event of such a possibility taking place this would leave subjectivity

1. Loc. Cit. Ref. 1. p. 75.

alone as the ultimate. But, as Russell has indicated, this is no special characteristic of mind since it may be also a property of the phenomena which we describe as physical. The distinction therefore between mind and matter, according to this analysis, is not very great.

Thus in following this line of argument, as set forth by Russell, it is not difficult to discover how he ultimately sees no essential difference between the subject matter of psychology and physics other than a difference of causal law. This difference he believes is not very radical and he is of the opinion that, theoretically at least, we may entertain the possibility of reducing the causal laws of psychology to those of physics. If that should ever be possible Russell believes that his philosophical theory regarding mind and matter would be amply vindicated. Until that is done, however, this difference of causal law will be the chief distinguishing mark of physics and psychology.

Yet according to Russell's philosophy, in so far as science is able to go at present, he thinks the conclusion is not unjustified that whether we are dealing with mental or physical phenomena we are always working with the same particulars only they are arranged in different relationships. This difference as we have seen, theoretically at least, need not necessarily be considered ultimate. Whether this is true or not, however, the particulars

in each case are always the same and are common data for both psychology and physics. Therefore Russell believes he is warranted in asserting on the basis of his philosophical interpretation of present scientific tendencies that there is good ground for the belief that mind and matter are made up of a 'neutral stuff'. This is his philosophy of the neutral monism.

This aspect of Russell's philosophy, if accepted, does tend to support the position adopted by some psychologists, especially the behaviourists, that psychology, as a science, can only be accurately defined as the study of behavior. These men are of the opinion that the terms'mind' and 'matter' may be useful in philosophy, though this also may be questioned from some standpoints, notably neo-realism, but that in any science which aims at exactness, these terms ought to be omitted. It might be pointed out here, that there are many arguments which tend to support this view.

The first difficulty that confronts us with respect to this problem, as J. B. Watson and others have indicated, is that 'mind' and 'matter' are terms which do not appear to have a definite general content.[1] Their meanings and connotations have become so varied through popular and philosophical usage that it is now difficult, in many instances, to understand exactly what the terms

1. J.B. Watson. Psychology from the Standpoint of A Behaviourist.

are meant to convey. Now in a science which seeks to define accurately its purpose and subject-matter, only those terms should be employed which have a certain amount of definiteness attached to them. For this reason it would appear to be necessary to change the definition of psychology in favor of a more explicit terminology as mentioned above.

The weight of scientific evidence also tends to imply that the differences between mind and matter are not so fundamental as the Cartesian philosophy and popular opinion might lead us to suppose. In ordinary experience we observe two main general forms of behavior which we term mental and physical respectively, and which appear to be radically different. Common-sense, therefore, supposes that there are two underlying different realities which correspond to these variant modes of expression. The tendencies of modern theoretical physics and psychology, however, would seem to indicate, as Russell has pointed out, that these divergences are not so real or fundamental as they seem, and that it is difficult to draw an absolute line of rigid distinction between the mental and the physical. The study of genetic psychology shows that the degree of behavior which we might term mental is relative to a certain complexity of neural structure, and that as we move backwards through the evolutionary scale until finally we reach one-celled

organisms, mentality becomes less and less until it is little better than a number of tropisms and chemical reactions.

As J. Laird points out, behaviourism, psycho-analysis, and gestalt psychology all tend to indicate that the existence of anything corresponding to any such reality as mind, conceived of as being essentially distinct from other supposed realities, is highly questionable.[1] Some forms of behaviourism deny its existence altogether; psycho-analysis emphasizes the importance of the unconscious and seeks to find a biological basis for it; the treatment of psychology as a series of events, as in Gestalt-theorie, comes very near the viewpoint of modern theoretical physics which regards matter as a series of events rather than conceiving of it in more substantial terms. Laird also points out that Sir Henry Head, in one of his most recent works, tends to find a much closer identity between the mental and the physical than he formerly did. The latter is quoted as stating that the unity of mind and body "is the product of the organism's vital activity from the lowest spinal to the highest cerebral centres. There is no more difficulty in understanding how an act of consciousness can affect a physiological process, than to comprehend how one reflex can control and modify another of a lower order."[2]

1. John Laird. Modern Problems in Philosophy (1928) pp. 42-47
2. Ibid. p.47. Cf. also Sir Henry Head, "Aphasia", vol. 1., p. 496.

Since, therefore, all these tendencies within psychology itself, tend to be subversive to the existence of mind, at least with regard to many of the older conceptions of it, it would seem to be better, so far as psychology as a science is concerned, to abandon its usage in favor of some more specific definitive terminology. The problem with regard to the existence or non-existence of mind is chiefly a philosophical one, and it would seem better to allow philosophy to make the final pronouncement regarding it. It might be pointed out here that the present discussion, so far, makes no brief for any particular doctrine regarding the ultimate nature of mind. All that the arguments are intended to convey is that on account of the scientific tendencies already mentioned, of which Russell's philosophy is an interpretation, it might be better to make the amendments in psychological definition suggested, and thus more accurately distinguish between psychological and philosophical problems.

Russell's philosophy regarding the neutral monism, if established, would tend to have an effect upon an old theory in philosophy and psychology, viz., the doctrine of psycho-physical parallelism. In this theory the notion was held that mind and matter existed side by side without either one influencing the other directly. It would s-em that little support can be adduced for such a belief from present scientific tendencies, especially physiological

psychology. Least of all does the philosophy which Russell advances lend any support to it, but would rather tend to deny it. The ultimate difference between the subject-matter of psychology and physics is, according to him, a difference of causal law, which, theoretically at least, is not to be regarded as ultimate. But even where this difference is recognized, however, mental and physical behavior are not regarded as being non-interactive. A physical stimulus is believed to arouse a psychological response, and the latter is believed to be capable of exercising effects in the physical world. Either way, no hard and fast distinction can be drawn as to where one process ends and the other begins. The two, therefore, do not have a non-interactive existence but appear also to be inter-dependent being really, according to Russell, parts of one process viewed in two different ways. His philosophy would, therefore, give more support to the double-aspect hypothesis.

It was suggested earlier in this discussion that one of the advantages, afforded by Russell's philosophy, is that it places different schools of thought side by side in such a way that each tends to modify the extreme conceptions of others. Especially is this true with regard to psychological theories. The result is that we tend to get a more balanced view of each system when all are applied together in the wider field of philosophy, and when each

one is taken out of the parochial setting in which it arose and was applied. When different psychological systems are taken together in this way, the extremes of each have the tendency to be modified as we attempt to put the concepts of each school together in the world of our experience. What we experience must have a necessary unity or else there will be contradiction. When, therefore, two or more systems of thought do not very well join together, there is a discrepancy between them the cause of which must be discovered before we can arrive at true conceptions. In philosophy, too, each system of scientific thought is viewed with reference to its bearing upon ultimate conceptions. If, however, the thought of each school is ultimately irreconcilable in this sphere this would also imply, to some extent, that their concepts need revision. The use to which philosophical criticism can be put is evidenced in Russell's philosophy with respect to his critical treatment of some of the concepts of Watsonian behaviourism. Russell is often spoken of as if he were a complete follower of behaviourism. This is not so, and in setting forth his philosophy Russell finds many points where he has occasion to make criticisms of that school which are of some importance.

This is seen especially in Russell's discussion of the general problem of knowledge which includes chapters on memory, words and meaning, general ideas and thought,

truth and falsehood, and belief. In nearly all of these sections Russell has some criticism to offer regarding the behavioristic theory of knowledge as advocated by Watson. He begins his criticism when discussing memory by saying, "I do not myself believe that the analysis of knowledge can be effected entirely by means of purely external observation, such as behaviourists employ."[1] In this preliminary statement he is expressing doubt with regard to the completeness of a purely objective method of study and description, as a means of obtaining and interpreting certain data in psychology.

In the first place, with regard to memory itself, Russell seeks to show that Watson's attempt to account for this process solely in terms of habit is insufficient. In this instance Russell says, ". . ., images without beliefs are insufficient to constitute memory; and habits are still more insufficient. The behaviourist, who attempts to make psychology a record of behaviour, has to trust his memory in making the record. 'Habit' is a concept involving the occurrence of similar events at different times; if the behaviourist feels confident that there is such a phenomenon as habit, that can only be because he trusts his memory, when it assures him that there have been other times. And the same applies to images. If we are to know - as it is supposed we do - that images are 'copies', accurate

1. Analysis of Mind. p. 157

or inaccurate, of past events, something more than the mere occurrence of images must go to constitute this knowledge. For their occurrence, by itself, would not suggest any connection with anything that had happened before.[1]

In Watson's account of memory he, of course, treats it as a purely biological phenomenon. Just as physical habits are built up by a process of "conditioning", so he thinks memory can be accounted for by a similar conditioning procedure. It no doubt contains some truth so far as it goes, but as Russell points out, it is not by any means a completely descriptive account nor explanation of the memory process. He indicates, for example, that it might explain, in some instances, the recurrence of the memory-image of a particular type of event, where the experience is fixated by a process of habitual activity. Habit does not account for the fixation of memories which are formed from single experiences and which have not, therefore, any habitual characteristics.

The fundamental point which Russell makes in this connection, however, is that habit does not explain how it is that memory images are known to have any relationship to a past experience, or in other words, how it is that they are recognized. In this connection it might be pointed out that Watson, of course, denies the existence of any sort

1. Ibid. p. 160.

of images, while for Russell their general existence is undeniable, being due to mnemic causation. Watson might therefore seek to elude this problem regarding memory by pointing out that he denies the existence of images, but whether images exist, or not, is beside the point here. The fundamental point of criticism is that habit does not explain the factor of recognition which accompanies memory. It seems, therefore, that Russell's contention is well maintained and is a valuable criticism of the behaviouristic theory in this respect.

Continuing this criticism, in his further discussion of memory-knowledge, Russell says, "It is sometimes suggested, by those who favour behaviourist views, that recognition consists in behaving in the same way when a stimulus is repeated as we behaved on the first occasion when it occurred. This seems to be the exact opposite of the truth. The essence of recognition is in the <u>difference</u> between a repeated stimulus and a new one. On the first occasion there is no recognition; on the second occasion there is. In fact, recognition is another instance of the peculiarity of causal laws in psychology, namely, that the causal unit is not a single event, but two or more events. A stimulus occurring once has a certain effect; occurring twice, it has the further effect of recognition. Thus the phenomena of recognition has as its cause the <u>two</u> occasions when the stimulus has occurred; either alone is insufficient."[1]

1. Analysis of Mind. p. 172.

What Russell obviously means, in this instance, is that in the first occurrence of some of our experiences there is a fixating process, but in all ensuing instances of recall, no two of such experiences are the same, because there is a recognition factor which grows richer in content the more numerous the experiences happen to be. This is just a further argument against the behaviourists, in order to demonstrate more fully their inability, by the concept of habit alone, to explain the recognition element in memory.

In discussing the relation of words and meaning to the problem of knowledge, Russell goes on to point out how useless it seems to be for behaviourists to attempt to deny images by means of the theory of word-habits. In certain cases, no doubt, we react solely to words, though even here, perhaps, it is doubtful that we do not have any mental image, should it only be the image of the word in some form or other. Russell's chief criticism against word-habits as complete substitutes for images, is that he does not see how they can account for the narration of real or imagined experiences. [1] In either case, the narrator is describing an occurrence from the mental imagery which he has, and, in Russell's opinion, the concept of word habits, as a mode of complete explanation, is insufficient. In other words, sub-vocal activity does not satisfactorily

1. Ibid. pp. 200 - 209.

explain thought processes. Of course the behaviourist, when he limits himself to objective observation, cannot observe such data as images and can, therefore, only observe language responses in the form of what appear to be word habits. The real effect of Russell's criticism, here, is to demonstrate the insufficiency of behaviouristic methods of explaining thought processes. It also is an effective argument against the sole use of the objective method of study in psychology, and it strongly supports the employment of introspection as a legitimate auxiliary method.

Russell goes on to say, in this connection, that it is through the association of words with images that we have the perception of 'meaning'. He says, ". . . this is really the most essential function of words, namely, that originally through their connection with images, they bring us into touch with what is remote in time or space." [1] Thus, because the behaviourist denies images he raises a problem with regard to 'meaning' as applied especially to words. The latter do not have any meaning at all without the awareness of some form of mental image with which they are associated. It is easy, as Russell points out, to account for the word-response 'box', for example, when the box is actually present as a stimulus. The word is then easily brought forth as a response by its association with

1. Ibid. p. 203.

the object, when the latter is perceived. But, if we deny images, the meaningful use of the word 'box' cannot be so easily accounted for when the objective stimulus is not present. In this event, there must be some other explanatory factor to account for it,and this,Russell believes to be a memory image of some kind with which the word is associated. In support of Russell, we might say that sub-vocal activity or word habits do not explain away imagery. They are only, themselves, imagery of another type, viz., kinaesthetic. From all of the foregoing, therefore, it would appear that Russell is right in implying that, by the denial of images, the behaviouristic account of meaning is weak and is,in consequence,inadequate.

In discussing general ideas and thought in relation to the problem of knowledge, Russell is now led to criticize the behaviourists with reference to their views of physics. He believes that they accept too naively the common-sense ideas of the physical world by thinking, as they seem to do, that all its data can be described from one general point of view. Because, therefore, they hold these notions with respect to physics, and deem the method of that science to be the beau idéal of exactness, they covet for psychology the same supposed certainty which, according to their preconceptions, such a point of view seems to give. Russell points out that the behaviourists are mistaken in regarding physics in this way, because the theory

of relativity seems to show, that the physical world, itself, is "infected through and through with subjectivity", and that it "contains the diversity of points of view which we have been accustomed to regard as distinctively psychological." Russell is of the opinion, therefore, that "we are brought back by this different road to the necessity for trusting observations which are, in an important sense, private."[1] According to this view, Russell, would affirm, rather than deny, the importance and validity of private observation as a scientific method. The element of privacy that is characteristic of introspection is, therefore, no argument against it, and according to Russell's argument, the behaviourist objection is futile.

We might add, in support of this criticism of the behaviourists, that it seems to be impossible to eliminate the method of introspection from science at all, because, even when we are describing behaviour which all can observe, we are not actually reporting on the objective behaviour itself, but on the sensory experience which each of us has regarding it. Thus objective observation is, in a very real sense, subjective after all, and it is the naive fallacy of common-sense language to say that we can actually compare experiences. We can only do this through the symbolism of language, etc., and this might, on occasions, give

1. Analysis of Mind. p. 230.

what is after all only a seeming similarity of representation and interpretation of phenomena. As a rule, probably such experiences are fairly accurate and similar, but the case of the color-blind shows that one might live a lifetime among one's fellow creatures, using a common language to describe objective events, and not note any disparity in mutual experiences. Both the introspective, and objective, methods have each their limitations, and the latter does not seem to have a very much greater probability of truth attaching to it than does the former. Russell seems to be right, therefore, in his criticism of the behaviourists and his philosophy has some important implications in this respect.

His system of thought with regard to the neutral monism is not by any means perfect, and it seems to be open to a number of criticisms which we shall now consider. The first of these is with reference to the method of psychologizing which Russell here adopts. The whole "Analysis of Mind," as was mentioned earlier, is written in the terms of structural psychology which has the tendency to view consciousness in static, rather than in dynamic ways. The most important feature of this school is that it tends to emphasize analysis, and so, to divide consciousness into its respective states in the hope of perceiving its ultimate elements. This group of psychologists, of which Titchener was the great leader, has made many contributions

to psychological thought, and as a method of studying certain problems it has, no doubt, much useful data to add to our knowledge of them. But when its point of view is adopted as the main, and almost sole, method of building a philosophy, or a complete psychology, of mental phenomena, then its excellencies are considerably modified by its limitations.

This is the fallacy into which Russell seems to fall in his work which he names the "Analysis of Mind". Its very title suggests that structural psychology will be the chief method employed, and it is possibly natural, considering the type of logic which he advocates, that he should feel the strongest affinity with this group. True it is that he makes use of data from other schools such as behaviourism, psycho-analysis, etc., but it seems that this material is only brought in where it is suitable to his purpose to do so. The main part of his work, here, is done in the approved structuralist fashion, and consequently, some important views of consciousness are not taken into account. It is interesting to note, that while he employs materials taken from William James' work with regard to his conception of "neutral stuff", and criticisms of consciousness, he overlooks one important feature of James' psychology. The latter regarded mental phenomena in a dynamic, rather than in a static, fashion, and although this view has received considerable support from psychological science, yet

throughout the whole analysis which Russell makes the concept is not made use of, or even so much as mentioned.

Now since functional psychology describes mental phenomena in a way that is different from that employed in the structuralist point of view, it seems to be a natural corollary to suppose that the former will perceive some data omitted in the latter's discussions. No philosophy of mind can be complete which is partisan in its loyalty to one group in a particular science, since it will be more or less limited in its conceptions by its use of an incomplete set of data furnished by one aspect of study. Ruseell's philosophy of mind, therefore, is defective since it omits the facts which the dynamic point of view furnishes.

The mind which Russell examines appears to be an abstraction made from many individual minds. This may be due to the tendency of his own thought, of which the mathematical philosophy is the example par excellence, to be more concerned with abstract, rather than concrete, facts. Since it is an abstraction, rather than a definite reality, which he studies this may account for the fact that Russell is inclined to view mental phenomena in static terms. It can hardly be denied, that when we actually carry out an introspective, or even objective, study of consciousness, that careful observation reveals that it is dynamic, rather than static, in character. This is revealed by the fact that, in attending to one object, our attention is constantly

being directed from one to another of the features which characterize it. Also in our thinking we are continually passing from one image, or thought, to another. It is because Russell regards mind almost exclusively in a cross-sectional fashion that he misses this additionally important logitudinal view.

If he were to incorporate this latter conception in his thinking he would see, that while sensations and images seem to be the theoretical ultimate data of psychology since they are common to every mental experience, there is also a qualitative and quantitative diversity of mental experiences which sensations and images, in themselves, are not sufficient to constitute, or explain. It would appear, therefore, that there are other elements in the "stream of consciousness" which must be used to explain more complex phenomena.

Moreover, from the standpoint of analysis as viewed by Russell, it does not appear to be really necessary to include images amongst the ultimate data of psychology since they are complex entities. Images also have a common sensational core, as Russell himself states, and why not therefore say that sensations alone are the ultimates? If other entities are to be ruled out of consideration because they are "too complex" to be considered, it seems only logical, in Russell's own sense of the term, to do the same with images. If mnemic causation must be brought in to explain

images, it seems only right that other causal factors need to be employed to explain other complex mental phenomena. We do not learn much about "belief, desires, volitions, and so on" when we are told that they appear "to be complex phenomena consisting of sensations and images variously interrelated."[1] This phrase appears to be more of a confession of our ignorance regarding complex mental states than a description of them that warrants the disregard with which Russell treats them. The fact that we know so little about them would seem rather to call for their further study than for their arbitrary dismissal. Each of these experiences has a distinctive quality which differentiates it from the others, and from the sensations and images which appear to be among their characteristics, but not their sole constituents. There would appear to be elements here which he has not discovered, and he, perhaps, unconsciously, covers up the deficiencies of his explanation by the glib phrase mentioned above which just tells us nothing.

Russell seems always to have in the back of his mind a mathematical analogy by which he sees the terms of the various mental formulae, that describe the complexity of belief, etc., composed of so many sensations in proportion to a certain number of images. Now, the particular number of sensations or images, no matter how variously

1. Analysis of Mind. pp. 299-300.

they may be compounded, cannot alone explain a belief or a volition. It seems as if it is necessary to have additional factors by which to do this, and it also appears, that as sensations and images enter the conscious process, they become transformed in their union with these factors. What these elements are which give the characteristic difference to mental states it is for psychology to discover, but it does not seem to be of any value to explain their differences by the number, or complexity, of their common features. This mode of attempting to explain complexities is due to the type of logic which Russell employs, and which will be criticized elsewhere in this discussion.[1] Russell would have done better, it seems, to have adhered more generally and firmly to historical psychological science.

If he had done this his "Analysis of Mind" would have been carried out differently, and perhaps, more accurately. It is with regard to the method of Russell's psychological treatment of the phenomena which he discusses in this work that the criticisms of it made by Professor F.C.S. Schiller have most force.[2] The chief features of his attack are that, in his opinion, Russell is not concerned with the actual course of mental development in its individual and racial forms, and that, on the contrary, he arranged mind in an esthetically pleasing, rather than real, order.

1. Cf. Conclusion.
2. Journal of Philosophy. Vol. XIX, No.11., pp.281-288.

In reply to this, Russell alluded to some of the instances where he had made reference to the work of various schools, but he goes on to point out that he believes, that "the interest in development which came in with evolution is a barrier to the elementary understanding of the simpler facts upon which any solid science must be built." [1] Continuing, Russell says, "Laplace's Mécanique Céleste presupposed Galileo, Kepler and Newton, who treated the solar system as a stable adult. Similarly there will be no beginning of a genuine science of psychology so long as people are obsessed by such complex facts as growth and progress." [2]

With reference to the first part of Russell's reply, we have already pointed out that his use of material from other psychological schools than structuralism is only made where it suits his purpose to do so. The reference which Russell makes to Laplace, etc., is only an argument from analogy,and therefore, it has no force. The last part of his argument is based on the general viewpoint of the particular logic which he employs to which a reference has already been given. Suffice it to say briefly, in this connection, that Russell only regards the "simples" of logical analysis as real, and therefore, he disregards entities which are complex. It does not appear that he has established his general contention in this reply which he makes, and so his argument against the scientific usage of the

1. Ibid. p. 650
2. Ibid. loc. cit.

concepts of growth and progress, the former of which terms, at least, is a fact of experience, is valueless.

As was indicated elsewhere in this discussion, the evidence of many of the schools of psychology would tend to support Russell's philosophical view with regard to the "neutral monism". If, therefore, he had kept closer to the findings resulting from these various departments of psychological science, he would probably have been less open to criticism than he is by relying as he does, chiefly on structural psychology and the method of mathematical logic to establish his theory. In this chapter we have outlined our objections to Russell's reliance on the structural psychology, and we shall leave the criticism of his logic to be discussed in the general conclusion of this study.

We might say, however, in concluding here, that Russell is to be commended in his philosophical work for his discussion of the relations between physics and psychology, and for his general interpretation of the tendencies of these two sciences. His criticisms of the behaviourists, notably of John B. Watson, seem to be valuable. On the whole, therefore, it might be said that Russell has made a clever, and in many respects masterly, attempt to give an ultimate synthetic meaning to the findings of the psychological and physical sciences.

Conclusion.

It is the function of a conclusion to take a retrospective glance over the whole philosophical position of which we have had a glimpse, in part, in the preceeding discussion. We have been chiefly concerned with the psychological aspects and bearing of Russell's philosophy, and perhaps, therefore, the presentation may have been imperfect because of its neglect of other features. The attempt will be made here, however, to remedy this possible defect by endeavoring to give a general criticism and evaluation of the principles which seem to be basic to Russell's whole philosophy. In pursuance of this broader aim, illustrations will be taken from some of his other numerous and varied philosophical writings, in addition to those already mentioned, to which we have not made reference heretofore. It is hoped in this way to give a more complete representation of the most important features of Russell's philosophy.

His great major contribution to philosophy is generally acknowledged by most of the competent critics, to be in the field of his mathematical philosophy, or logic, part of which was written in collaboration with Dr. A.N. Whitehead.[1.] Regarding this aspect of Russell's work Professor R.B. Perry says, ". . . one of Russell's most

1. B.Russell & A.N.Whitehead, Principia Mathematics. 3 vols. (1910 - 1913).

signal contributions to contemporary thought is his unification of logic and mathematics; logic borrowing from mathematics its symbolic method, and mathematics borrowing from logic its fundamental premises."[2] Perry, in a footnote, points out that mathematics and logic thus merge into one branch of knowledge, which may be called (according to differences of emphasis) "Mathematical" or "symbolic logic", or "the philosophy of mathematics." Regarding this mathematical philosophy of Russell's, Professor R.F.A.Hoernle also says, "In the solution, for example, of the contradictions which have been supposed to beset the concepts of continuity and infinity, the logico-analytic method has achieved its most characteristic triumphs."[1] Here Russell, and the mathematical philosophers generally, have achieved a noteworthy feat by following Boole, Frege, Peano, and other mathematicians, in showing that the foundations of mathematics are indistinguishable from logic. In this work of Russell's, therefore, it would appear that he has made some contributions of a lasting nature.

His admiration for the certainty and precision of mathematics leads Russell to advocate the logico-analytical system as a general method for philosophy. The essence of this system is that it proceeds by deduction from the smallest possible number of simple indefinable ultimates to deduce all

2. R.B.Perry, Philosophy of the Recent Past, (1926) p. 212
1. R.F.A.Hoernle, Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, (1920) p. 35.
Cf. also B.Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World, (1914) Chs. v-vii.

possible complexities. This is the method which Russell carries into his psychological and physical analysis, and it is open to question, if in these fields it affords a complete method. As evinced in the analytical philosophy of matter and mind, this method proceeds to analyze what has popularly been called 'mind' and 'matter' into their ultimate indefinables, viz., sensations and images, and particulars and events. With these as a basis Russell attempts to show that the mental and physical worlds, as we perceive them,are nothing but 'logical constructs", Russell, himself, points out that he extends this system of logic to his analytical philosophy. He says, "One very important heuristic maxim which Dr. Whitehead and I found, by experience, to be applicable in mathematical logic, and have since applied in various other fields, is a form of Ockham's razor . . . . The principle may be stated in the form: "Wherever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities for inferences to unknown entities."[1.] "In this philosophy of mental occurrences there are also apportunities for the application of our principle of constructions versus inferences . . . . . Most of my Analysis of Mind consists of applications of this principle."[2.] From the foregoing therefore it can easily be seen that Russell attempts to extend his logico-analytic method to almost every part of

1. Contemporary British Philosophy. Edited by J.H.Muirhead (1924) Article by B. Russell, entitled Logical Atomism, pp.362-363.
2. Ibid. pp. 366 - 367.

his philosophy. Seeing that this is the fundamental principle of his philosophical thought it is not difficult to understand his affinity with Watsonian behaviorism. The logic in both is the same.

It is with respect to the way in which Russell has carried out the extension of this principle of mathematical logic that most of the criticism has been forthcoming. The first difficulty that is met with is that different schools of philosophy are not in agreement with each other as to what is really known, and as to what can actually be taken as data from which to make inferences. For example, in any one method of knowing there may be data which realism would term 'soft' but which other systems would regard as 'hard'. Then again, there is the problem with regard to other methods of knowing, such as the intuitionism of Bergson, and then a priorism of Kant and other idealists. Russell and the realists would not admit that these systems could furnish data out of which true constructions of reality could be made, but that would not necessarily invalidate the position of idealism, or any school of thought for that matter. We cannot take time to deal with this in detail here, since it would involve too much discussion for any treatment that might attempt to be adequate, but it is worth while to indicate in passing, that there are possibly legitimate uses to which these methods can be put and which perhaps realism neglects. Suffice it to say, that each can make out a very good case for its logic and theory of knowledge.

In addition to the foregoing difficulties we might point out that this principle of Russell's could not be completely successful when applied to philosophy in general, unless we could always be sure that we had a perfect summary of all possible data. What we are attempting to indicate here is that it is just as possible to have erroneous and false 'constructions out of known entities', because in each case the data out of which constructions can be made, or unknowns inferred, are exactly the same with respect to quality and quantity in any given method of knowledge. If the inferences to unknowns are likely to be wrong, it is just as likely that logical constructions will also be wrong, since, in such an instance, they would have exactly the same data with which to work, and their constructions would after all only be inferences of another kind. In many instances if one datum were missing from a construction, the ensuing result would no more resemble reality than would any falsely inferred unknown. It may be that realism is neglecting some data, which, to the realists, do not appear 'hard' but which may be essential factors in a true construction just the same.

Furthermore, if constructions are to be made out of known entities, we must first of all analyze our complex 'appearances' in order to find these ultimate indefinables, according to Russell's logic, and then re-assemble them again by substituting the method of mathematical logic for natural, or common-sense ways of regarding experience. As

Rogers, in his objections to Russell's philosophy, has pointed out, before this logico-analytic method can operate we have to begin by analyzing appearances as common-sense regards them before we have the data with which to make logical constructions at all.[1] The common-sense view of appearances has always to be presupposed before we can arrive at logical ways of regarding them. It therefore seems futile for Russell to despise common-sense beliefs so completely as he does since he is continually dependent upon them for the discovery of his data.

With regard to Russell's discussion of perspectives, and with reference to his treatment of sensations and images as qualia out of which logical constructs are to be made, Rogers has a timely objection which it is worthwhile to note. He says, "Russell's position would be more persuasive were it not that, even if "things" were actually as real as ordinarily we think them to be, it still would be possible to justify the same data, and to effect the same construction. As a matter of fact we plainly never should have reached the notion of perspectives to begin with, except in terms of appearances to a "mind" occasioned by a cause existing in a common space, and standing in relation to different organisms. And not only this is so; it is significant that we cannot state Russell's theory - at least it would be a highly difficult task which he makes no move to undertake - without continuing at every step to presuppose

1. Rogers. - English and American Philosophy Since 1800.

the common-sense world, and using it to give meaning to our description. With this world assumed, an object would of course be found appearing under various forms according to the position or the distance of an observer; and these appearances might be arranged in series, such as could be used to define the location of the object which they presuppose, and on which their character depends. But just because the undertaking is equally compatible with two hypotheses, its success cannot be used to give one of them an advantage over the other. This advantage can only come again from an initial presumption, Russell's attempt will only go to show - what hardly needed proving - that when we have analyzed a complex situation into elements, we can reverse the process in a way to redefine the whole into which the elements enter. What has been said above will seem to indicate clearly that what the logical construction starts from is not a mass of isolated sense-data, but data already regarded as belonging to a system, which system has constantly to be held before us if we are not to lose our way completely."[1.] This criticism seems so pointed and effective that it does not need any comment to bring out its forcefulness. We need simply to remark that Russell's mathematical logic has serious limitations when used as the one general method in formulating a philosophy of 'mind' and 'matter'.

When we consider the further applications of

1. Rogers. - English and American Philosophy Since 1800.

the logico-analytic method we find that Russell himself is not always sure of its uses or applicability. Sometimes he describes it as being meant only for dealing with the abstract and general and not with what is concrete and empirical.[1] In using the method in this way, Russell believes that philosophy can be made to rise into the realm of true speculation and that we are taken by it above the mundane concerns of usefulness. According to this idea philosophy would only have a higher purpose than pragmatists or instrumentalists like James and Dewey would admit. For them philosophy is of value only in so far as it ministers to the actual needs of life. Philosophy, when using the logical method as Russell here advocates it, no doubt exercises a worthy purpose which makes it fulfill the highest ideal of contemplation. But that this is the only purpose and concern of philosophy might be doubted.

Russell, himself, does not hold to it always, and this vacillation results in some irreconcilable contradictions in his philosophy. He is constantly changing his position from time to time. Mr. Santayana praises Russell for his willingness to change his opinions, and believes that this changeableness is a sign of development, and also that it indicates a freedom from dogmatism.[2] It is true, no doubt, that there is some development in Russell's philosophy but all changes are not developments. They are

1. Cf. Russell's Mysticism and Logic. esp. pp. 111 - 112.
2. C. Santayana. - Winds of Doctrine.

often nothing more than oscillations between contradictory positions. Russell seems to have the fallacy of adapting his philosophy only to the particular problem he happens to have in mind, and does not seem ever to develop a system that he can use in all fields of his experience. When, for example, he is dealing with the abstractions of mathematics, it is easy for him to see that philosophy should only be concerned with abstract contemplation, but later he finds that this view of philosophy is not sufficient to meet his general needs. He later finds that the problem as to 'our knowledge of the external world' also presses itself upon his attention as a difficulty that cannot very well be ignored. The logico-analytic method is then brought down from the lofty realm of abstraction and contemplation to deal with the particulars afforded by 'hard' data as opposed to 'soft'. This is his philosophy in the year 1914.[1] In the year 1917 we are back again to the notion that philosophy, and the mathematical logic, are only concerned with the abstract and general.[2] Then in the year 1928 we find philosophy once more dealing with the particulars of our knowledge of the external world.[3] This, surely, is not development but oscillation and contradiction, and it seems to support what was said earlier with regard to Russell's use of his own method.

1. Our Knowledge of the External World. (Frst.Ed.1914), Chs. ii-iii
2. Mysticism and Logic. (1917). Chs. vi.
3. Our Knowledge of the External World. (Scnd.Ed.1928),

In addition to the foregoing, Russell at times sets forth the teaching that philosophy is not concerned with values. He says, "It is my belief that the ethical and religious motives in spite of the splendidly imaginative systems to which they have given rise, have been on the whole a hindrance to the progress of philosophy, and ought now to be consciously thrust aside by those who wish to discover philosophical truth. Science, originally, was entangled in similar motives, and was thereby hindered in its advances. It is, I maintain, from science, rather than from ethics and religion, that philosophy should draw its inspiration."[1] Russell goes on to point out that philosophy should not be based on the results of science so much as on its methods. We might raise an objection to the position which Russell here adopts by pointing out that he, himself, does not adhere to it, because his philosophy of mind and matter is largely based on results of science which are new, some of which may, or may not, be subsequently substantiated. The idea that philosophy can confine itself to abstract contemplation is too narrow a view. Philosophy deals with all the ultimate facts and problems of life which we experience, and pragmatism is so far right when it urges that the needs of action dictate at least a tentative solution. One of the reasons why philosophy occupies so much of our thinking is that we cannot help philosophizing. The solutions which

1. Mysticism and Logic. pp. 97 - 98.

such thinking give us may not have an absolute value, but they do at least give us a relative truth and help us to adjust ourselves to the world of our experience. Among the things which aid us in solving the problems with which we are confronted are scientific results, and, thus far, they are essential to philosophy. Indeed, they are often so important as to alter the whole trend of philosophic enquiry and belief.

Likewise among the facts of experience which we cannot ignore are values. Sooner, or later, as Russell himself finds, they have ultimately to receive consideration. Values are ideals, i.e., thoughts which represent what we aspire after, or wish to see attained, rather than being ideas of things already existing and taking place. The attitude that Russell adopts towards these factors, which is more of less common of realism in general, is desirable in so far as it warns us against allowing what we desire to see accomplished, to exercise a bias in our interpretation of the existing facts. It does not seem to be accurate , however, to say that philosophy should not concern itself at all with such things. The ideals of humanity are just as much facts of our experience as is anything else that comes within our knowledge. Any philosophy which, therefore, would make the least pretensions to being complete, cannot rule them out of its ultimate consideration. It is useless to seek to dismiss values such as ethics by saying, as Russell

does, that they are "essentially a product of the gregarious instinct".[1] That only explains 'how' they arise and not 'why' they do so. There is still a problem with regard to these values which philosophy has to attempt to answer. Merely to explain their origination does not solve all problems with regard to them, nor throw them out of the court of philosophical consideration.

It seems that Russell's disregard of values is due to the fact that he is attempting to make the mathematical logic universally applicable in philosophy. The value, which is complex, is analyzed and is seen to arise as a by-product of the process of living, thus having no ultimate reality of its own. It is dismissed in exactly the same way as he later does with regard to consciousness; it is regarded as being too complex and accidental to be taken as a fundamental characteristic.[2] Other indefinables can be discovered with regard to values and therefore these latter can be disregarded by philosophy. Our objection would be that this analytic logic does not give a complete explanation of the phenomena that are complex, and this statement definitely includes values. The complex entities are just as real in our experience, and are just as essential to it, as are the ultimate indefinables. The objection might be summarized by saying that the ultimates of genesis do not explain the ultimates of complex existence.

1. Loc. cit. p.
   Cf. also Analysis of Mind. p. 292.

It may be that some of these complex entities are constituted by various relationships of ultimate entities which can be discovered by analysis, but, the fact is, the various complexities are themselves new things which deserve philosophical consideration as such. They are not merely to be analyzed and disregarded because we may happen to discover their constitutive prescription. Such a treatment of problems is sufficient for science which necessarily seeks to explain phenomena in terms of discoverable processes. Science is not directly concerned with ultimate 'whys'; this is the business of philosophy, and it does not seem as if mathematical logic can pretend to be a complete method for philosophy, either with respect to values, or other subjects worthy of its consideration.

Russell, himself, has at times to recognize that he cannot always disregard values in his own philosophy. Prior to, contemporaneous with, and later than, the position referred to with regard to values, Russell does enunciate a philosophy which does deal with, and recognize their importance. In a work written in 1916 Russell says, "The world has need of a philosophy, or a religion, which will promote life. But in order to promote life it is necessary to value something other than mere life. Life devoted only to life is animal without any real human value, incapable of preserving men permanently from weariness and the feeling that all is vanity. If life is to be fully human it must serve some end which seems, in some sense, outside human

life, some end which is impersonal and above mankind, such as God or truth or beauty."[1] Here Russell is led to see by the experiences of living that he cannot ultimately ignore the importance of values in his philosophy.

Again, in the splendid essay entitled, "A Free Man's Worship", published in the same volume which contains his article that denies there is a place for values in philosophy, we have Russell definitely dealing with religious and ethical values, and setting forth a philosophy with regard to the ultimate nature of the universe. In this essay he sets forth a picture of men born in a purposeless physical world which is definitely unfriendly to their highest ideals and capacities. In such a world the only thing men can do is to defy with Stoic courage the forces opposed to them, and live a life of love and sympathy with their fellow-creatures, since all are faced with a common doom. Here, we have philosophy definitely concerned with a world-view, or Weltanschauung, in relation to ethical values. This is an obvious contradiction of a position already advanced in the same volume.[2]

We come now to a later work of Russell's, published in 1923, and written in collaboration with his wife. In this book there is a statement which shows the real need for values in human life. After describing the

1. Why Men Fight. p. 268.
2. Mysticism and Logic. Chp.III. Cf.with this,chp.VI.

purposeless existence which some people have lived since the late war, Russell says, "There is only one cure for this despair, and that is a faith that a man can believe. No man can be happy unless he feels his life in some way important; so long as his life remains a futile round of pleasures or pains leading to no end, realizing no purpose that he can believe to be of value, so long is it impossible to escape despair." . . . . "Although it may sound old-fashioned to say so, I do not believe that a tolerable existence is possible for an individual or society without some sense of duty."[1] The whole concern of this book is with social values, and the above passage is typical of the general tenor of the work.

It can easily be seen from the foregoing that when Russell has to deal with the real problems of life he cannot disregard values in his philosophy, but has to recognize them in a very real sense. This is a further illustration of the fact that the abstract philosophy is not completely satisfying to human needs. Men have need of higher purposes and faiths in order to live effectively in the world of common experience. Since therefore values are so necessary to life a complete philosophy must take account of them. Russell, at times, attempts to rule them out but the endeavor only has the effect of causing him to oscillate from one position to another thus leading him to set

1. Prospects of Industrial Civilization. p. 156.

forth contradictory viewpoints.

In considering the general application of the logico-analytic method to social philosophy, we find that, in this aspect of Russell's teaching, it appears in a form somewhat different from that seen elsewhere in his work. Here, it is not so much concerned with philosophical abstractions as it is with the explanatory and causal factors of empirical science. The social philosophy of Russell is not based on idle theories, as perhaps some systems of the past have been, but on a scientific analysis of the causes of social chaos, and a reconstruction of the social order in the light of scientific principles.

All this is seen throughout his various treatments of social problems, and also in an essay which he wrote on the "Value of Scepticism." This essay might fitly be regarded as a preface to Russell's social teaching because, in it, the principle is advocated "that it is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no good ground whatever for supposing it true."[1] By the application of this maxim he attempts to explode many popular social and political theories. This a similar proposition to that advanced in another work which advised that constructions out of known entities should be made in preference to making inferences to unknown entities. Their similarity lies in the fact that both advocate the making of constructions or hypotheses out of known facts rather than by forming these

1. Sceptical Essays. pp. 11 - 25.

by questionable forms of inference. Thus, for example, in social life men have had all kinds of doubtful theories regarding the causes of their difficulties and the means for remedying them. Such ideas have often been far from being true because they were not reached by a process of careful analysis, and consequently they were based on an insufficient or inaccurate representation of facts. This, Russell seeks to remedy by the introduction of careful scientific analysis as to the causes of social unrest. Having found these, the next step is to formulate a hypothesis that will include a synthetic organization of the known factors that will tend to bring this about.[1.] From the foregoing it can be seen that the technique used here is in some respects similar tc that employed in the logico-analytic method.

It is more successful in this instance, however, because amongst the known entities out of which constructions are made, there are included all the facts known to the author, and which human beings really experience, including the facts of science. The method is here used, not to serve abstract contemplation, but a practical philosophy of social life. While we may not always agree with his theories yet it seems that Russell is adopting the right method of constructing a philosophy that will be helpful because of its close relationship to the facts of experience.

1. Prospects of Industrial Civilization. Cf. preface to this book and also general plan and method of the work.

Although, in the case of the social philosophy, the type of logic which Russell uses works very well, it does so because it has changed its form somewhat. It is here placing within its logical propositions different types of entities from those used elsewhere. First of all, it was used only with reference to a number of indefinables which were the ultimates of logical analysis such as can be found in mathematics. Then, later, it was used with regard to sensations, mnemic phenomena, etc., which were regarded as being the ultimate indefinables of mentality. Now it deals with entities that are complex and that are not analyzed into their ultimate constituents such as instincts, desires, wishes, etc. The point we make here is that in each field of study in which Russell's logic is applied its variant success is directly due to the degree in which it has changed its original method to suit the subject studied. It is all very well in abstract subjects such as mathematics to make his logic discover and deal with ultimate indefinables, but, in this form, the method is not applicable when it comes to building a real philosophy of science.

In order to have a philosophy in this sense, it is not the ultimates of a priori logical analysis with which we have to construct our system of thought, but with the empirically discovered causal factors of scientific phenomena. It is these data, even though they are not 'indefinable simples , that we must use as the basis of philosophical

concepts and inferences if our thinking would be in any way related to experience and be practical. In other words, it is impossible in every instance to build a philosophy out of ultimate indefinables in the way in which Russell would sometimes attempt to do. Russell said that philosophy should use the method of science only, but it would appear to be highly necessary to use its results also as he himself has to do in his social philosophy.

Russell's logic, as first formulated, is not therefore universally applicable in philosophy. Although we might, by the methods of logic, analyze mind into sensations and images as Russell does in some instances, yet these are not the only factors which psychology discovers in its analysis of mental behavior. This science treats as relatively real, and uses as causal concepts, such factors as instincts, wishes, desires, and drives of various kinds. These are all used in explaining its findings until some further experimental, not merely logical, analysis can be made. If Russell's philosophy in this respect is to be in keeping with the facts, its logic will have to formulate its concepts out of the empirical indefinables of science, and not seek to replace these with the ultimates of logical analysis since such a method can seldom arrive at truth.

In the social philosophy his logical method meets with some success because he does not attempt to carry his logic beyond the discoveries of science but confines him-

self to its ultimates and his conclusions, therefore, are more in keeping with the facts. If this were not so,his logic would fail here also since the ultimates and indefinables of logical analysis are of little or no value in dealing with social phenomena. His logic, as first promulgated, could not be universally applied or be successful in philosophy unless it could always discover the same type of indefinables with which to work. Since that does not appear to be possible it would only seem to be capable of a limited application and should therefore be confined to the field where it is most successful. When applied elsewhere it is unable to use successfully its ultimates of logical analysis but must deal rather with the empirical ultimates of science. If it is changed in this way it works very well, but then, that is to change the logic and this shows that it is not universally applicable.

When we take a general and comprehensive glance over the whole of Russell's philosophy we can see that there are some fundamental contradictions which appear, and which, in the manner of its present formulation, would prevent his system from being classed as a complete philosophy. It would appear that he has not synthesized the various aspects of his philosophical thought. But when it is taken in relation to particular portions of experience it is not without some value. For example, the mathematical philosophy is regarded by competent critics as being a contribution to philosophical

thought. Russell's social philosophy has much in it that is good and it at least serves to keep us from being too satisfied with our world as it is. The philosophy regarding the neutral monism is a pioneer effort made in order to attempt to express general scientific tendencies in a harmonious form and reveal their probable ultimate meaning. We may not agree with its details and methods of analysis but we can recognize it as being stimulating to thought. We can see, also, that it has some value in orientating our thinking in two important fields of scientific enquiry and we can therefore honor it in the spirit in which it is offered, viz., as an initial constructive effort after philosophical unity from the general standpoint of neo-realism.

Since we are dealing here with a still very active contemporary it is impossible to evaluate his ultimate position in philosophy, but one thing is certain and that is, that in Russell, we have a courageous, acute, virile thinker whose work is comparable to much of the best our age has produced.

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