“An amicable correspondence between us:”
Dongan, Denonville, and the Treaty of Neutrality in America, 1686.

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ABSTRACT

On November 16, 1686, representatives of James II of Great Britain and Louis XIV of France signed a “Treaty of Peace, Good Correspondence & Neutrality in America,” to keep their respective American colonies out of future wars between France and England on the European Continent. This treaty, often ignored by historians as unimportant and irrelevant due to the events on the European Continent quickly surpassed the usefulness of the treaty, proves its value when one considers the correspondence of Jacques-Rene de Brisay de Denonville, Governor-General of New France (1685-1689), and Colonel Thomas Dongan, Governor of New York (1682-1688). Although the intention of the treaty was to prevent war and promote good correspondence in America, it also gave the colonial governors the power to practice diplomacy and negotiate across intercolonial borders. Unfortunately for Dongan and Denonville complications arose which would not only require the governors to maintain “Good Correspondence,” but also to negotiate the implementation of the treaty. The negotiations concerned numerous questions of critical importance to their respective colonies. Questions such as how to stop the illegal arms trade to Native allies; which nation had the right to sovereignty over the Iroquois; which nation had the right to trade in the pays d’en haut; and was Denonville’s proposed invasion of Iroquoia legal. The correlation between the Treaty of Neutrality and the Dongan-Denonville correspondence is unique to the colonial record and an invaluable tool that historians such as Francis Parkman, W. J. Eccles, John Romeyn Brodhead, Herbert Osgood, and others have overlooked in their quest to tell the colonial story of North America.
RÉSUMÉ

Le 16 novembre 1686, les représentatives de James II de Grande-Bretagne et Louis XIV de France signé un « Traité de Paix, Bonne Correspondance & Neutralité en Amérique », pour garder leurs colonies américaines respectives hors des guerres futures entre la France et l’Angleterre sur l’Européenne Continent. Ce traité, souvent ignoré par les historiens, étant insignifiant et sans importance en raison des événements sur le continent européen, pour surmonter rapidement l’utilité du traité, prouve son utilité quand on considère la correspondance de Jacques-René de Brisay de Denonville, gouverneur général de Nouvelle-France (1685-1689) et Colonel Thomas Dongan, Gouverneur de New York (1682-1688). Bien que l'intention de le traité fût d'empêcher la guerre et promouvoir bonne correspondance en Amérique, il a également donné aux gouverneurs coloniaux le pouvoir de pratiquer diplomatie et négocier à travers les frontières intercoloniales. Malheureusement pour Dongan et Denonville, des complications se sont produites, ce qui nécessiterait non seulement des gouverneurs de maintenir une « bonne correspondance », mais aussi de négocier la mise en œuvre du traité et les négociations portaient sur de nombreuses questions d'importance critique pour leurs colonies respectives. Des questions telles que la façon d'empêcher le commerce illégal d'armes à Native Allies ; Quelle nation avait le droit à la souveraineté sur les Iroquois ; Quelle nation avait le droit de commercer dans les « pays d'en haut » ; Et Denonville a proposé l'invasion d'Iroquoia légale. La corrélation entre le Traité de Neutralité et la Dongan-Denonville correspondance est unique à le record colonial et un inestimable outil cet historiens telle que Francis Parkman, W. J. Eccles, John Romeyn Brodhead, Herbert Osgood, et d’autres ont négligé en leurs quête raconter l’histoire coloniale de l’Amérique du Nord.
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Second, I would like to thank Dr. Catherine Desbarats for teaching me that it is ok to make mistakes if you learn from them and continue to work towards your goals. Dr. Desbarats introduced me to the Dongan-Denonville correspondence and without her encouragement; I would have given up on the Dongan-Denonville correspondence and would never have learned about the Treaty of Neutrality, 1686.

Third, I would like to thank all my University of Wyoming (UW) and McGill University colleagues, professors, advisors, and friends, without whom I would not be where I am today. I would especially like to thank Drs. Jeffery Means, Pamela Innes, and Christopher Caskey-Russell at UW for their continued support and advice both academically and personally. Furthermore, from McGill, I would like to thank Dr. Lorenz Luthi for helping me re-discover my writing style and Dr. Nancy Partner for teaching me the history and theory of history as fiction. I would also like to thank my friend and mentor, currently completing his post-doctoral studies at the University of British Columbia, Dr. Nicholas May, who taught me to be myself and read many early versions of the chapters presented in this thesis.

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Appendix A: Transcript: “Treaty of Peace, Good Correspondence & Neutrality in America, Between the most Serene and Mighty Prince James II. By the Grace of God, King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, &c. And the most Serene and Mighty Prince Lewis XIV. The Most Christian King: Concluded the 6/16th Day of Novemb. 1686” .................................................. 98


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TECHNICAL NOTES

I. Transcription/Translation Errors: All transcription/translation errors within this document are mine and mine alone.


III. Dual/Split Dating: The occurrence of Dual or Split Dating within the correspondence, such as 1/11 December 1687, refers to the differences between the Gregorian Calendar, introduced by Pope Gregory XIII in 1582, and the Julian Calendar, introduced by Julius Caesar in 45 BCE. France converted to the Gregorian Calendar in 1582, while England did not adopt it until 1752. There was a ten-day difference between two calendars, which accounts for the Dual/Split Dating. In the example above, 1/11 December 1687, the “1” represents the Julian Calendar and the “11” represents the Gregorian Calendar. This note applies to all instances of the Dual/Split Dates.


IV. Dual/Split Years. The occurrence Dual or Split Years within the correspondence, such as 1687/8, refers to the use of different dates for the beginning of the New Year. France accepted the Gregorian Calendar in 1582, which prescribed that the New Year begin on January 1. England continued to use March 25 as the start of the “Legal” New Year as prescribed by the Julian Calendar of Julius Caesar until 1752.

CHAPTER 1
Introduction

1.1 “Treaty of Peace, Good Correspondence & Neutrality in America, 1686”¹

On November 16, 1686, representatives of James II of Great Britain and Louis XIV of France signed a treaty to keep their respective American colonies out of future wars between France and England on the European continent. In addition to preventing future wars in America, the treaty also ordered colonial governors to maintain “a firm Peace, Union, Amity and good Correspondence” within their realms of responsibility. Although the intention of the treaty was to prevent war and promote good correspondence in America, it also gave the colonial governors the power to practice diplomacy and negotiate across intercolonial borders. Moreover, it created a wider arena in which the “governor as diplomat” could operate and it led to increased importance for the governors in the maintenance of intercolonial, colonial, and imperial policies.²

In addition, Ian K. Steele suggests,

Inclusion of colonies in formal peace treaties redefined meaningful space, initially in terms of communications possibilities. Peace was an innovation of Europe’s New World, transforming colonial warfare from an endemic local condition into a transatlantic event to be declared by monarchs on behalf of all their subjects.

The argument presented by Steele is reversible when considering the Treaty of Neutrality. James II and Louis XIV declared colonial neutrality as a condition of peace between England and France, thus forcing colonial warfare to cease and creating a colonial space that became

¹ NOTE: There are three versions of the treaty, an English version, a French version, and a Latin version. I will refer to the treaty with a shortened form of the French title: “Treaty of Neutrality,” “Treaty of Peace,” or just “treaty.”

² Great Britain, “Treaty of peace, good correspondence & neutrality in America between the most serene and mighty Prince James II by the grace of God, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, &c: and the most serene and mighty Prince Lewis XIV, the most Christian King: concluded the 6/16 day of Novemb. 1686, In the Savoy [London]: Printed by Thomas Newcomb... 1686,” Early English Books Online (EEBO)/ProQuest, LLC, (accessed June 16, 2017), 3.
politically meaningful, which in turn gave colonial officials more power to affect the
intercolonial political environment. When the treaty arrived in New York and Montreal, in June
1687, it found fertile ground for its implementation.  

1.2 “Good Correspondence”

The Treaty of Neutrality provided additional incentives for the Governor General of New
France, Jacques-Rene de Brisay, Marquis de Denonville, and the Royal Governor of New York,
Colonel Thomas Dongan, to continue with their correspondence, which had begun shortly after
August 1685 when Denonville arrived in Montreal. After November 1686, Dongan and
Denonville discovered additional incentives to maintain amicable relations and beneficial
correspondence in relation to the treaty; these motivations included the interpretation,
negotiation, and implementation of the treaty’s articles. In June 1687, the treaty arrived on the
shores of North America and imbedded itself within the correspondence and diplomacy of
Denonville and Dongan. Between June 1687 and August 1688, Dongan and Denonville
corresponded 20 times concerning the Treaty of Neutrality or impediments to its implementation.
This abundant correspondence helps to understand the complex relationship between the
governors and is a vital window on the multifaceted negotiations associated with the Treaty of
Neutrality. The correspondence also serves as a detailed chronology of the treaty’s negotiation
and implementation.  

1.3 Historiography

Many Historians, such as Francis Parkman, W. J. Eccles, John Romeyn Brodhead,

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Herbert L. Osgood, have ignored the correlation between the Treaty of Neutrality and the Dongan-Denonville correspondence. No monographs or secondary works examine the Treaty of Neutrality in any depth. In most cases, scholars give the impression that the Treaty was not an important part of the colonial narrative during the seventeenth-century. While the correspondence of Denonville and Dongan did grace more pages than the Treaty, it did not rate an in-depth discussion or explication. Historians have shown much more interest in conflicts involving the Iroquois situation than in the minutiae of communications, diplomacy, and negotiation.

Consequently, in undertaking a thorough examination of the Denonville-Dongan correspondence considering the Treaty of 1686, this thesis ventures into uncharted terrain. However, my research has benefited from the work of several historians interested in the themes of communications and diplomacy in the late seventeenth-century Atlantic World.

Ian K. Steele’s, *The English Atlantic, 1675-1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community*, provides vital data on transatlantic communications. This work attempts to “challenge existing preconceptions about English Atlantic communications” by exploring the three most “widely held suppositions about early modern Atlantic communications.” These suppositions were that “they were slow, infrequent, and dangerous.” While Steele agrees that early modern Atlantic communication was slow, infrequent, and dangerous, he explores the variability of time and argues that time is not a “Newtonian” constant, which suggests that “speed of communication was bound up with legitimate expectations” based upon “a learned social value developed from observable motion.” For instance, one could not sail in a straight line within the Northern Atlantic; this was due, according to Steele, to “the great sailing circle” which “corresponded…with the cosmic clockwise gyro of winds and currents circling the usually
calm waters of the Sargasso Sea.” In addition to Steele’s discussion of “the great sailing circle” he also expounds upon the nature of seasonality of communication with the New World.⁵

Time, speed, and seasonality, according to Steele, a central feature of communications between Europe and North America. These factors explain the delay between the signing of the Treaty of Neutrality in November 1686 and its arrival in the New World in June 1687. He also defines the routes and types of communications between Britain and her American holdings. Steele’s purpose was to understand how England could defend an Atlantic maritime empire during the early modern period. He does this by breaking down the various routes of communication within the Atlantic world into definable sectors and types of route based upon the nature of the communication. Overall, Steele provides a thorough examination of the English Atlantic World and how it functioned in theory and practice.⁶

The second important work bearing on this thesis is Kenneth J. Banks,’ *Chasing Empire Across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763*, a book similar in some way to Steele’s. Banks “examines the role of transatlantic communications had in creating and maintaining French imperialism during the height of France’s first overseas empire in the eighteenth century.” His arguments represent a synthesis of comparative, social, and cultural history. Banks argues that “the role of transportation and information exchange in the creation of a transoceanic administration” were the defining factors in the building of a truly French Atlantic Empire. Banks’ discussions revolve around the creation, maintenance, and distribution of written documents and orders throughout the Atlantic World and the development of a hierarchy that bridged the metropolis and the colonial world. The development of strict

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⁵ Steele, *English Atlantic*, ix, 5, 7.
hierarchy in government led to greater control over transportation and communications and therefore allowed the metropole to integrate the Atlantic World into a French Atlantic Empire. A close analysis of the Dongan-Denonville correspondence provides detailed evidence in support of Banks’s argument about the binding of the state and the colony through communications.7

Banks also addresses the cultural and the social level of communications. He explains the pacing of treaties, the development of merchant networks, the different rhythms of land and sea communication, among other important issues in the realm of communications and the state. While Banks’ work mostly discusses the eighteenth-century, he does give credit for the development of France’s Atlantic empire to the innovations of the seventeenth-century, such as the nationalization of the French Atlantic world by Louis XIV and the development of the Ministère de la Marine. Overall, Banks’ work provides a backbone for any study of the French Atlantic World and the system of correspondence and communications between the metropole and the colonial administration.8

While Banks and Steele tackled the overarching study of transatlantic communications April Lee Hatfield’s, Atlantic Virginia: Intercolonial Relations in the Seventeenth Century, and Katherine Grandjean’s, The Communications Frontier in Early New England, represent localized studies of communications and intercolonial relations in North America. While neither work examines New France or New York, both were vital to understanding communications and intercolonial relations at the local level.

Hatfield’s study suggests that the Atlantic world was “held together by a web of connections” based upon the movement of goods, information, and people. Her argument is that

7 Kenneth J. Banks, Chasing Empire across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-1763 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006), xi-xii, 4-5.
8 Banks, Chasing Empire, 7-12, 14-28.
international networks were essential to the development of colonies. She attempts to “reevaluate” the conclusions that early colonies were geographically limited communities. One of the most important contributions Hatfield provides to the study of the Treaty of Neutrality and the Dongan-Denonville correspondence is how “Indian precontact interaction patterns shaped the way colonial Virginians perceived their colony’s boundaries after they supplanted the Powhatans.” Hatfield’s idea that Native geography shaped colonial perceptions of geography, is easily transferable to an understanding of New France, New York, Iroquoia, and the pays d’en haut. Native beliefs and lifeways shaped the geography and boundaries between the colonies in a more meaningful way than European paradigms. Hatfield suggests that European ideals of topographical boundaries were less important than Native social and political geographies. In support of Hatfield’s general point, my research indicates that the issues the Treaty of 1686 and the Dongan-Denonville correspondence attempted to grapple with were also rooted in precontact territorial conflicts between the Iroquois and their neighbors.  

Hatfield also addresses the conformity to commercial and political regulations within a world of overlapping and intertwined political geographies. Official borders represented an ideal geography that only elites and officials attempted to maintain. In fact, the process of attempting to maintain and enforce such boundaries resulted in unsanctioned and disputed journeys such as those led by Major McGregor and Johannes Rooseboom in 1687. Overall, Hatfield’s work addresses the ambiguities associated with political, cultural, social, topographical, and geographical borders and their ambiguity and porosity.  

Where Hatfield’s work deals with geography and colonial Virginia, Katherine

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Grandjean’s, *American Passage: The Communications Frontier in Early New England*, addresses travel and communications in the North East. Grandjean argues that colonial travel and communications was a “strong barometer of power,” since whoever controlled the travel routes, communications corridors, the issuance of passports, and the flow of information, controlled the colony. In addition, this study looks at how the arrival of Europeans aggravated existing Native rivalries. Similar rivalries are evident in the Dongan-Denonville correspondence when discussions turned to the Iroquois and their desire to control the fur trade and which lands they owned by right of conquest.11

Grandjean’s greatest contribution to an understanding of colonial communications and travel deals with how drastic changes in the “living, moving landscape” tied the English colonies into a tighter knit community. According to Hatfield, it was the flow of Europeans into Native lands that created New England.12

Where European diplomacy of this period is concerned, this thesis relies on an important study by William James Roosen, *The Age of Louis XIV: The Rise of Modern Diplomacy*. Roosen proposes that “diplomacy was not an activity whose main purpose was to maintain peaceful relations between rulers” until the late seventeenth-century. He asserts that it was not until “the Peace of Utrecht in 1713/14…that diplomacy” became “a permanent function of” European states. Roosen argues that the Age of Louis XIV is the perfect period to study early-modern diplomacy, not because of great innovations but because the systems of diplomacy began to solidify and mature into an institution based upon law, and a consensus between rulers.13

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Roosen proposes that “a study of diplomatic institutions and practices can…increase our understanding of the Age of Louis XIV” beyond the field of diplomacy. Following G. A. Craig, he uses a “new” approach to the study of diplomacy, which takes into consideration “the relationship between structures—whether ideological, socioeconomic or institutional—and personality in history.” Roosen’s approach helped to guide this study of the Treaty of Neutrality and the Dongan-Denonville correspondence in that it directs attention to the ideological, socioeconomic, and institutional structures underlying that North American diplomatic relationship, as well as to the personalities of the two main protagonists.14

The literature presented here provided important background on the topics of communications and diplomacy in the “Age of Louis XIV,” helping to orient my examination of the Treaty of Neutrality and the related correspondence between the governors of New France and New York.

Chapter 2: Governors, Instructions, and Correspondence before the Treaty (1682-1686)

2.1 Introduction

By the late-1670s both France and England instituted formal hierarchical systems of governance within their colonial empires. These formalized systems attempted to ensure accountability and colonial integration into the expanding and more sophisticated English and French Atlantic Worlds.

The French colonial administration, under direct royal authority, had a comparatively clear-cut hierarchy and chain of command, which began with Louis XIV. By the mid-1660s, every colonial governor, intendant, and lesser official was personally selected, appointed, and approved by Louis XIV or his handpicked officials, especially the Minister of the Marine. In New France, the chain of command flowed from Louis XIV to the Minister of the Marine then to the Governor General and Intendant; from there it progressed to the Sovereign Council of Québec. While of lower rank than the governor, the Intendant was the most important civil official due to his administrative responsibilities.¹⁵

In addition to a clear hierarchy, the French system also instituted a system of communication between the metropole and its colonies. The King, as lawgiver, issued royal orders to his secretaries of state who then released those orders to the colonial officials. In many cases, the secretaries countersigned royal edicts and instructions then submitted them to the king for final approval. The system of official communications followed the same communications chain as the power structure, but could skip certain officials depending on the communications

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involved.  

The English system was slightly different but was just as complicated and hierarchical. In the British system, the growing importance of England’s colonies called for a closer integration of the colonies with the metropole. This integration included increasingly detailed and more frequent communications with the English colonies and their governors. In the 1670s, England instated an additional level of colonial government called the Council of Plantations, which joined the Privy Council in governing England’s Royal Colonies. The Council prepared official instructions to governors, scrutinized colonial laws, and maintained steady communications and correspondence with colonial governors. The integration of power and authority for Royal Colonies into a single body helped to standardize gubernatorial powers and responsibilities within the colonies and streamlined the delegation of Royal authority.  

Within both the English and French systems, communications between the metropole and their respective colonies was not the only concern. Inter-colonial communications, in this case between New France and New York, became a vital aspect of maintaining peace in North America. Both Louis XIV and James II encouraged correspondence, diplomacy, and communication between their French and English possessions. In fact, by the early-1680s Charles II, James II, and Louis XIV issued instructions to their governors to use diplomacy, avoid war at all costs, and await further orders when disputes did arise with other colonies.  

By the 1680s, both the French and English colonial systems had increased their administrative integration while attempting to exert greater control over colonial politics, communications, and economics. Each metropole endeavored to issue clear-cut orders and

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instructions to governors and other colonial officials. More precise and expansive orders and instructions helped empower governors to cultivate closer correspondence, communication, and diplomatic engagement with competing colonies.\(^{19}\)

### 2.2 Colonel Thomas Dongan of New York (1682-1685)

In 1680, New York was in serious economic, financial, political, and social difficulties due, according to his political enemies, to the mismanagement of Edmund Andros, the Provincial Governor of New York. The Duke of York (the colony’s proprietor and later to be crowned James II) summoned Andros to England to stand for charges made against him by prominent citizens of the colony. In addition to Andros’ bypassing of the Navigation Acts by favoring the Albany and Dutch merchants of New York to the detriment of English trade, these citizens accused him of misappropriating the duke’s funds and revenues. While James’ revenue council dismissed the charges against Andros for lack of evidence, he nevertheless removed him as Governor of New York.\(^{20}\)

James decided to appoint someone he could trust and chose Colonel Thomas Dongan, a fellow Catholic. James believed Dongan would protect his interests and revenues, save the colony from bankruptcy, rehabilitate the colony financially, and conserve his colonial revenues. In addition, James wanted someone who could offset the influence the French had over the Iroquois and counter the machinations of the Governor General of New France, Louis de Buade, Comte de Frontenac. Furthermore, James desperately needed an administrator who would

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\(^{19}\) Banks, \textit{Chasing Empire}, 23; Steele, \textit{English Atlantic}, 234; Hatfield, \textit{Atlantic Virginia}, 188.

reconcile the colonists’ differences, defuse the tensions between the Dutch merchants of Albany and the English merchants of New York, and suppress any further civil disturbances associated with the customs regulations established by James II and his deputies.²¹

Thomas Dongan, was born at Castletown, Kildrought, County Kildare, Ireland in 1634 to Sir John Dongan and Mary Talbot Dongan. The Dongan family were staunch Catholics and ardent supporters of the House of Stuart and when Oliver Cromwell wrested the English throne from Charles I, the Dongan family fled to France. Thomas, at the age of 15, joined the Régiment d’Irlandais in the French army under the command of Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne, Vicomte de Turenne. By 1674, Dongan earned a promotion to Colonel of the Irish Regiment and retained his position until Turenne’s death in 1675.²²

In 1677, Charles II, fearing a war between England and France, issued a proclamation, which forced Dongan, and several thousand other English officers to resign their commissions in the French Army and forfeit pay owed to them by the French aristocracy and gouvernement. Upon returning to England, Dongan appealed to Charles II for help in securing his arrears pay but instead of pursuing the issue Charles awarded Dongan an annual pension of £500 and a commission as a general officer in the English Army. In 1678, Charles appointed Dongan Lieutenant-Governor of Tangiers and after only a year and a half at his post, Charles recalled

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him to England in preparation for a planned invasion of the Netherlands.  

While Charles II placed Dongan’s career on hold, James made his decision to replace Andros as governor of New York. James believed in Dongan’s skills and appointed him to the post of Governor on September 30, 1682. It was not until January 27, 1683 that James delivered Dongan’s much-delayed instructions, which consisted of civil, social, and colonial administrative items. However, James did call upon Dongan “to support and maintaine yᵉ charge of the governem’ of those parts both Civill & Military.” In addition, Dongan was “to endeavor to ascertaine and agree yᵉ Boundaryes of” James’ “territories,” “to gaine and procure from the Indians…such tracts and quantityes of ground as are contiguous to” the Duke of York’s “other lands or convenient for” his “territories in trade.” While Dongan reviewed his orders, and prepared to depart for New York, Louis XIV began reconsidering his choice of Louis de Buade, Comte de Frontenac as Governor General of New France.

2.3 **Governor Dongan and Gouverneur General La Barre (1682-1685)**

In 1682, the gubernatorial situation in New France was becoming critical as prominent habitants and the clergy leveled serious accusations against Governor General Frontenac. His alleged transgressions included the mismanagement of the Sovereign Council, the use of his office for personal gain, the violation of royal orders, aggressive disputes with his Intendant, the mismanagement of Native affairs, the illegal acquisition of fur trade revenues, and abuses of power. Louis XIV recalled Frontenac and his Intendant, Jacques Duchesneau de la Doussinière

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et d'Ambault, in 1682.  

Louis XIV decided to change the administration of New France drastically by appointing Joseph-Antoine le Febvre de la Barre, a member of the noblesse de robe, to the position of governor-general of New France. Louis chose La Barre to replace Frontenac in the hope that he could find a solution to the problems plaguing New France, especially the emerging Iroquois situation. La Barre’s instructions were to protect the Illinois, Ottawa, and other Native allies of the French; promote peace and trade; restore order and good government; avoid quarrels with the English Colonies and their Native allies; reduce the Iroquois to obedience; and retain the western fur trade for France.

La Barre inherited a situation in which the Seneca had launched a full-scale war against the Illinois, Ottawa, and Miami tribes in the Ohio and Illinois countries due to their perceived encroachment upon lands claimed by the Iroquois by the right of conquest over the Shawnee, Huron, and other Native groups, whom they forced to leave the region. The war in the west threatened France’s fur trade and endangered trade at Michilimackinac (at the Straits of Mackinac, between Lake Huron and Lake Michigan) in the pays d’en haut and the developing Mississippi trade. In addition to Iroquois aggression, La Barre inherited the problem of maintaining Governor Frontenac’s and Rene-Robert Cavalier de la Salle’s line of forts along the south shore of Lake Ontario and as far west as the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers.

The opening correspondence between New France and New York began in late 1683/4 when Dongan appropriated Governor Andros’ Indian policy and wrote to La Barre claiming the

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26 W.J. Eccles, *Frontenac, the Courtier Governor* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 157-158.

Iroquois as subjects and their lands as belonging to New York and England. He wrote, “the Iroquois...they having traded with this government above forty years and nowhere else...I am sure they are nearer to this place than yours...and all to the south and south West of the lake of Canada [Lake Ontario].” Dongan assumed that all lands claimed by the Iroquois belonged to the English due to their trade relations with the Iroquois, and before them with the Dutch.\(^{28}\)

La Barre’s commandant of Fort St. Louis, Louis-Henri, Chevalier De Baugy, sent a trading expedition consisting of seven canoes and 14 men with trade goods to the Native tribes along the Mississippi River. The Seneca attacked and plundered the canoes and captured La Barre’s men. After seizing the convoy, the Seneca attacked De Baugy at Ft. St. Louis. By May, several *coureurs de bois* arrived in Quebec to inform La Barre of the attacks in the west. These attacks angered La Barre and he immediately wrote to Dongan protesting, “L’attaque imprévue que les Iroquois Sonnontouans [Seneca] et Oiogoins [Cayuga] m’ont faite l’un fort...et le pillage entier de Sept Canots français charges de marchandises de Traité, et detention pendant dix jours de 14 français.”\(^{29}\)

However, La Barre advised Dongan that he intended to remain at peace with the Iroquois. Furthermore, La Barre asked that Dongan forbid the Albany merchants from trading “armes, poudre et plomb” to the Iroquois and from inciting them to attack the French and their Native allies. He also informed Dongan that he had received new communications from Europe that asked him to live “en grande Union et fraternité” and that he planned to follow Louis’


directives.\textsuperscript{30}

La Barre’s other response to the Iroquois attacks was to send troops and munitions to several forts in the \textit{pays d’en haut} and to plan a punitive expedition against the Iroquois. The purpose of this punitive expedition was to humble the Iroquois and send a message to the English. La Barre hoped to impress the Iroquois with French power and force them to abandon their attacks against the western tribes and remain at peace with New France, thus satisfying all three demands of Louis and his ministers.\textsuperscript{31}

While La Barre planned his expedition, Dongan hastily urged La Barre to cancel his proposed expedition into the west. He wrote, “You can not be ignorant that those Indians are under this Governm' and I do assure you they have againe voluntarily give up both, themselves and their lands to it.” He added: “S.r I should be very sorry to hear that you invade the Dukes [James’] Territories…and my promise, that the Indians shall punctually perform whatever can be in justice required for all these injuries.”\textsuperscript{32}

Dongan immediately called for a conference of the Iroquois sachems at Albany and attempted to keep tighter control on the independent Iroquois sachems through diplomacy and gifts. Dongan used the 1684 conference to warn the Iroquois of La Barre’s plan to invade Iroquoia and the Illinois Country.\textsuperscript{33}

La Barre left Montreal on July 26, 1684 and marched to La Famine on the Salmon River via Ft. Frontenac at Cataracouy. At La Famine, he summoned the Iroquois to a conference of peace, but realized he had neither enough provisions nor ammunition to show the strength he

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item[{30}] La Barre, “Copie d’une lettre de La Barre au Colonel Dongan, (15 juin 1684),” LAC/BAC, 265-265v.
\item[{32}] Dongan, “Governor Dongan to Monsieur de La Barre, Fort Albany, July 5\textsuperscript{th} 1684,” in \textit{Documents}, ed. Brodhead, 449; Kennedy, 61.
\item[{33}] Kennedy, \textit{Thomas Dongan}, 58.
\end{thebibliography}
desired. Furthermore, the swampy land caused fevers and sickness to spread rapidly through his impoverished army.\textsuperscript{34}

On September 3, 1684, the Onondaga, Oneida, and Cayuga Iroquois arrived at La Famine and met with La Barre “who was so ill he was barely able to walk.” During the next two days, the French Governor and a “famous Onondaga orator named Otréouati,” also known as “Big Mouth,” negotiated a new peace treaty. La Barre enumerated the Iroquois transgressions against the French and their allies; he accused them of leading the English into the French controlled territory, invading the Illinois country, attacking the Illinois and Miami, taking captives, and maltreating and robbing French traders on French soil. However, due to his illness and unpreparedness for battle, La Barre, agreed to a less than acceptable treaty with the Iroquois. The terms of the treaty were simple: a peace between New France and the Iroquois would exist, the French would leave the Illinois Country immediately, La Famine would be the new meeting place between the French and the Iroquois instead of Fort Frontenac or Montreal, the Iroquois would make amends for the robberies they committed, and the French would abandon the Illinois to their fate at the hands of the Iroquois. The next day, La Barre and his men left La Famine and headed back to Quebec.\textsuperscript{35}

La Barre thought he had won the contest against the Iroquois by securing peace. Dongan used La Barre’s failure to negotiate a proper peace with the Iroquois to assert his superiority over the French governor-general. Louis XIV’s response to the treaty was immediate and merciless: he laid the blame firmly at the feet of La Barre for his failure and recalled him to France to

\textsuperscript{34} Eccles, \textit{Canada}, 133; Eccles, \textit{Frontenac}, 159, 169; Kennedy, \textit{Thomas Dongan}, 61.

answer for his actions.36

In La Barre’s place Louis XIV appointed Jacques-René de Brisay de Denonville, the Marquis de Denonville. His mission was to correct the failures of both La Barre and Frontenac and return New France to peaceful relations with the English and Iroquois.37

2.4 Governor Dongan and Governor-General Denonville (1685-1686)

The commissioning of Denonville on January 1, 1685, changed the direction of intercolonial affairs between New York and New France. Dongan would find in Denonville an antagonist as shrewd and as adept at diplomatic politics as himself. This pairing would produce an amazing quantity of correspondence and would change the nature of negotiation and counter-negotiation across intercolonial borders in North America.38

Jacques-René, born on December 10, 1637, to Pierre de Brisay and Louise d’Alès de Corbet, was the seventh of fourteen children and the first to reach adulthood. Jacques-René spent his childhood 50-miles (80km) southwest of Paris at his family’s estate of Denonville. Upon attaining his majority, he inherited the title of marquis de Denonville. At the age of 27, he joined the Régiment royal d’infanterie at the rank of sous-lieutenant, quickly rose to full lieutenant and captain by 1664, and found himself on the African coast fighting pirates barbaresques (Algerian pirates). On February 8, 1666, he returned to France, assumed command of the Régiment Royal as a captain, rapidly rose to the rank of major, and found service in the Netherlands. During the closing months of the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-67), Denonville and his regiment were in

36 Dongan, “Governor Dongan to Monsieur de La Barre, 1684,” in Documents, ed. Brodhead, 452; Brodhead, History, 430.
37 Kennedy, Thomas Dongan, 63; Parkman, France and England, 87; Brodhead, History, 430.
Flanders occupying the Flemish lowlands.39

After hostilities ceased in January 1668, Denonville reverted to the rank of captain of the Régiment des Dragons in regular French army service. In November, Denonville took leave from his command, returned to France, and married Catherine Courtin. Denonville remained in regular army service and by 1669 rose to the rank of colonel-general of the dragoons40

During the Franco-Dutch War (1672-78), Denonville fought in the Netherlands and gained a reputation as a great soldier and diplomat. During 1672/3, he earned the rank of lieutenant-colonel of the Queen’s Dragoons and by 1675 achieved the rank of colonel-lieutenant of the Régiment des Dragons. After the war, Denonville returned to France as inspector-general of the dragoons until 1683 when Louis XIV promoted him to the rank of brigadier.41

In late 1684, Louis XIV finalized Denonville’s nomination and commission as governor-general of New France and appointed him as the military commander for all forces within the colony as lieutenant-général de la Nouvelle-France. With the acceptance of this commission, Denonville took responsibility for correcting the mistakes of his predecessors and of informing his superiors of the “real” conditions in New France.42

Before Denonville departed La Rochelle on June 7, 1685, the political situation in England took a drastic turn with the unexpected death of Charles II and the ascension of his brother, the Duke of York, to the throne as James II on February 6, 1685. Although new orders and commissions would not make it to English America until June 1686, New York and all other American possessions owned by James II became Royal Provinces. The new designations of

40 Eccles, DCB; Prince-Falmagne, Un Marquis Du Grand Siècle, 34, 47-52.
41 Eccles, DCB; Prince-Falmagne, Un Marquis Du Grand Siècle, 34-35.
42 Eccles, DCB; Prince-Falmagne, Un Marquis Du Grand Siècle, 35.
James’ governors and their seemingly elevated status incorporated new tensions into the already delicate political and diplomatic situation in the Americas.⁴³

While England and her colonies were still reeling from Charles’ death and adjusting to James’ more hands-on approach to government, Denonville received his orders on March 10, 1685. His instructions consisted of fifty-two paragraphs covering everything from social issues, commerce, taxes, religion, to war and security. The most pressing concerns, according to his orders, were subjects touching upon the Iroquois, the English in New York, and the security of New France. In addition, the instructions discussed the colonial borders of New France with New York and New England, Hudson’s Bay, the maintenance and training of the militia, the protection and reinvigorating of the colony’s alliances with her indigenous allies and neighbors, and the conversion of the Natives to Christianity by the Jesuits and Récollets.⁴⁴

Seven paragraphs addressed the problem of the Iroquois and the situation in the Illinois country and pays d’en haut. Louis stated his complete dissatisfaction with the current situation in New France and urged Denonville to establish not only a firm peace, “mais…abaisser l’orgueil des Irroquois, Soustenir les Illinois et les autres alliez que le S.’ De la Barre a abandonné,” but also commanded Denonville to re-forge strong alliances with the Illinois, Ottawa, Miami, and all other former allies in the Great Lakes Region and the Illinois Country and to support them “contre les Sonnontoüans [Seneca].” Louis laid out his ultimate plan for the Iroquois, France’s Native allies, and the habitants of New France:

Il ne faut pas Seulement S’appliquer a empescher les violences des Iroquois contre les françois, il doit aussi prendre un soin particulier de maintenir en paix les Sauvages entr’


Eux et empescher par tous moyens les Iroquois de faire la guerre aux Illinois et autres peuples les voisins, estant tres certain qui Si ces nations de qui on tire les pelleteries qui sont le principal commerce de Canada Le voyent a couvert de la violence des Iroquois par la protection qu’elles recevront des François, elles seront dauntant plus excitées aporter leurs marchandises, et augmenteront le commerce par ce moyen.

Louis wanted the governor to prevent violence against his French subjects and their allies by the Iroquois, as well as increasing trade with the west. Per Denonville’s Instructions, the Iroquois question was an easily solvable problem that would only take determination and a firm hand to bring about a peaceful conclusion.  

Meanwhile, while Denonville prepared to leave France for Canada, Governor Dongan granted permission for an expedition to Michilimackinac to trade with France’s Native allies. Launched in summer 1685, the expedition consisted of Johannes Rooseboom, the expedition leader and merchant of Albany; a few Iroquois warriors; and several renegade coureurs de bois. His expedition was successful and he received an invitation from the Ottawa and Huron to return the following year with a promise from the inhabitants that they would not trade with the French in the spring. This “invasion” of the pays d’en haut became a critical issue in the tenuous relations between New France and New York.  

Denonville’s ship arrived at Quebec on August 1, 1685 and he immediately called up 150 engagés to fill in for the over 300 troupes de la marine taken ill during the voyage from France. The condition of the seven-companies of Troupes de la Marine was horrendous and the King’s stores were in complete disarray. In Quebec, there was no magazine and much of the reported arms and military stores were missing or in disrepair. In fact, over one-third of the muskets and arms in Quebec City were useless and La Barre did not use his regiments of the troupes de la

46 Brodhead, History, 429; Osgood, American Colonies, Volume III, 373.
appropriately in the upkeep of Quebec’s defenses. He immediately demanded an
accounting and discovered that the Intendant, Jacques de Meulles, was trafficking in government
goods. He replaced the locks on the King’s stores and sent a statement of the affair to the
Minister of the Marine. Denonville ordered the engagés and the healthy troupes de la marine to
build new magazines, palisades, and bulwarks to bolster Quebec’s defenses.47

Over the next several days, Denonville met with prominent members of the colony to
determine his next course of action and in compliance with his instructions, he decided to focus
on security. Immediately after his council with the Sovereign Council of Quebec he set out on a
tour of New France. His first stop was Montreal, which he found in dire need of defensive
fortifications. Once again, he ordered the troupes de la marine and engagés to build palisades
and defensive bulwarks around not only Montreal but also the communities along the St.
Lawrence between Quebec and Montreal.48

In September, Denonville learned of Rooseboom’s expedition to Michilimackinac and
ordered him stopped at Niagara; unfortunately, Rooseboom escaped back to New York. As
summer gave way to autumn, Denonville began making active plans for an invasion of Iroquoia
to stop the Seneca and their depredations against the French and their Native allies. It was during
this time that Denonville and Dongan began their correspondence and immediately found an
issue that required resolution. Dongan stated on October 13, 1685, “Quand a Vos fugitifs…ce
lieu ne luy Sera pas un refuge.” This passage refers to the French deserters seeking refuge with
the English at Albany.49

47 Eccles, Canada, 139-141.
48 Jean Leclerc, Le Marquis de Denonville, 44.
49 Leclerc, Le Marquis de Denonville, 41-54; Eccles, Canada, 146; Dongan, “Copie de la lettre du Colonel Dongan à
Denonville, (13 octobre 1685),” LAC/BAC: cote: MG1-C11A, Série C: Correspondance Générale, vol. 7, fol. 67-
By late 1685, Denonville developed a plan by which both the English and the French would benefit and wrote to Seignelay on November 12, 1685, stating,


Denonville’s suggestion of buying New York, from a monarch in continual need of money, was a brilliant scheme, while expedient in solving the Iroquois problem, did not fit with Louis XIV’s longterm goals for the English king. Louis XIV vetoed the plan due to his ongoing peace negotiations with the English.\textsuperscript{50}

In spring 1686, Colonel Dongan issued passports and authorized another trade expedition to Michilimackinac. This new expedition, guided by renegade coureurs de bois, consisted of two separate expeditions that would travel independently but would join forces in the pays d’en haut then continue to Michilimackinac. Once again, Dongan appointed Johannes Rooseboom to lead one of the companies, while Major Patrick MacGregorie, a Scottish officer, led the other.\textsuperscript{51}

On May 22, 1686, Governor Dongan sent a letter to Denonville and pleaded, “(I cannot beleev it) that a person that has your reputation in the world, would follow the steps of Mons\textsuperscript{5} Labarr, and be ill aduized by some in your govern' to make disturbance…when all those differences may be ended by an amicable correspondence between us.” He also informed him that he had sent for the Five Nations Iroquois to meet at Albany with the intention of restricting them to the south shore of the Great Lakes and admonishing them not to disturb France’s Native allies or traders. In addition, he informed Denonville that the Iroquois were apprehensive of war


\textsuperscript{51} Eccles, Canada, 148; Eccles, Frontenac, 177-178.
due to the French “putting stores into Cataract [Cataracouy also known as Fort Frontenac] and ordering some forces, to meet there.” He further explained that the French “will not attack the King of England’s subjects” and that “you [Denonville and France] can have no pretense to them.” Furthermore, Dongan admonished Denonville for building a fort at “Ohniagero” or Niagara, which he claimed as lands belonging to the Iroquois and English. Dongan declared that he hoped for peace and a day “when all those differences,” arising between New France and New York, “may be ended by an amicable correspondence between us.”

While Dongan asserted that all lands south of the Great Lakes belonged to England, his Instructions from James II, dated 29 May 1686, did not support these claims, or even address them. In fact, the Instructions insisted that Dongan provide maps “with the Exact Description of ye whole territory under yo' Governm',” which according to the Treaty of Breda of 1667 consisted of New York, New Jersey, Delaware, and Connecticut, and portions of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, not the entirety of all lands south of the Great Lakes as Dongan argued. In addition, Dongan’s declaration that the Iroquois were English subjects proved inconsistent with his orders, which stated, “When any opportunity shall offer for purchasing great Tracts of Land for us from the said Indians [Iroquois] for small sums, you are to use yo' discretion therin.” This statement shows that James did not claim Iroquois lands through their subjugation to the English; in fact, it shows just the opposite: that James, while wishing to procure lands from the neighboring Native peoples (the Iroquois), was not yet willing to cause a rift with France over the issue of sovereignty. Furthermore, James admonished Dongan by stating, “you doe not, by color of any power or authority hereby given you, commence or declare Warr without Our

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knowledge and command...except it bee against Indians.” This statement negated Dongan’s threats against Denonville that New York, and by extension England, would protect the Iroquois, as subjects, if the French invaded and attacked their villages. However, Denonville did not know that Dongan was forbidden to engage in war on behalf of the Iroquois.53

With the secret preparations by Denonville and the issuance of new orders to Dongan, the nature of correspondence between Dongan and Denonville began to change and acquire a new urgency to settle the differences between New France and New York. On June 5, 1686, Denonville wrote to Dongan informing him that he had received Dongan’s letter of 13 October 1685. The issue of French deserters, military and civilian, came to the fore. Denonville pleaded with Dongan not to trust the “vagabonds, rogues & worthless rascals” who “through a spirit of avarice” left New France. The difficulties in securing an understanding between the colonies caused increased tensions in the summer of 1686 and Denonville’s demands for the return of the deserters became more forceful.54

Once again, the correspondence turned to the Iroquois, specifically the Seneca. In June 1686, Denonville responded to Dongan’s statement of October 13, 1685: “Il [La Barre] s’est mis dans une affaire qui auroit pû causer de L’indiference entre les deux Couronnes,” with “I presume you refer to his [La Barre’s] quarrel with the Seneca.” Denonville commented further: “I believe you understand the character of that nation sufficiently well to perceive that it is not easy to live in friendship with people who have neither religion, nor honor, nor subordination.” “La Barre,” he added, “had many causes of complaint,” and “their conduct has not improved.”

53 James II “Instructions to Governor Dongan, 29th day of May 1686,” in Documents, ed. Brodhead, 369-375.
With one expertly written paragraph, Denonville demolished Dongan’s attempts at gaining a supporter against La Barre’s perceived failings. In addition, Denonville slyly suggested that the Seneca did not submit themselves to “subordination” and thus subjugations, such as Dongan continued to suggest.55

In addition to discrediting of Dongan’s argument for Iroquois subjugation, Denonville argued against the arming of the Iroquois by either side; to do so would lead to “the destruction of their [European] brethren and their own country. Furthermore, he wrote that Dongan as “a man of rank and abounding in merit” should persuade the merchants at Albany to cease the trade in “arms to wage war against us [New York and New France].” This admonition against the sale of arms to the Iroquois echoes La Barre’s pleas in his letter to Dongan dated 15 June 1684. Overall, Denonville’s letter attempted to defuse the tensions between New York and New France by establishing a common cause against the depredations of the Iroquois and by appealing to a common cause and shared European ideals to win out over profit and distrust.56

On June 20, without waiting for Dongan’s response to his last letter, Denonville dispatched another letter to New York. In response to accusations that he was clandestinely supplying the French forts to make war upon the Iroquois, Denonville wrote,

Vous avez M’. trop de connaissance du service et de la maniere que l’on se doit conduire pour pouvoir prendre aucun ombrage de vivres que j’envoye a Catarocoüy [Fort Frontenac] pour la subsistence des soldats que j’y ay…qu’il y auroit beaucoup d’imprudence a moy de laisser ce lieu sans y avoir les vivres et munitions necessaire pour une annee de temps.

With these statements, Denonville easily evaded questions about his actions in the pays d’en


and along the trade routes to Michilimackinac, especially the building up of fortifications and the rearmament of his forts.\textsuperscript{57}

Furthermore, Denonville argued that if the Iroquois were afraid of war with the French, it was due to their conscience and that peace was possible if the Iroquois corrected their conduct towards the French and France’s Native allies. In addition, Denonville again warned Dongan about the faithlessness of the “rogues” who “seek refuge” with his merchants in Albany. He reiterated that Dongan’s mistaken claims to all lands south of the Great Lakes and that he was “sans doute que vous n’estes pas [bien] informé de toutes les prises de possessions qui se sont faites au nom du Roy,” Denonville’s master. Denonville, after explaining his intentions emphatically promised to “Vous informer parfaitement de mes intentions” and refused to make any reply to Dongan’s letter of 22 May.\textsuperscript{58}

In response to Denonville’s dismissive letters of June 5 and 20, Dongan responded on 26/27 July with an oddly upbeat letter of his own. He stated, “I have found very much satisfaction by the hopes of a good correspondence with a person of so great merit worth and repute.” In fact, Dongan was attempting to ingratiate himself into Denonville’s good graces before requesting that Denonville act upon his behalf with Louis XIV to gain his 25,000 livres of arrears pay owed him for service in the French Army and guaranteed, he claimed, by the

\textsuperscript{57} Denonville, “Copie de la lettre de Denonville au Colonel Dongan, (20 juin 1686 / Ville-Marie).” LAC/BAC: cote: MG1-C11A, Série C: Correspondance Générale, vol. 8, fol. 172-173, microfilm reel F-8, (accessed June 16, 2017), 172. NOTE: The quote is taken from two separate paragraphs and spliced together, therefore it is meant to be read separately. In the letter of June 20, 1686, Denonville left his paragraph beginning with “Vous avez” hanging with the statement “j’y ay.” Denonville obviously meant in a round about way that Dongan should not take offense to the food Denonville sent to his troops stationed “there” at Fort Frontenac.

\textsuperscript{58} Denonville, “Monsieur de Denonville to Governor Dongan, June 20, 1686,” in Documents, ed. Brodhead, 459; Denonville, “Copie de la lettre de Denonville au Colonel Dongan, (20 juin 1686 / Ville-Marie),” LAC/BAC, 172v-173.
Intendant of Nancy, Monsieur de Louvoy.\textsuperscript{59}

In addition to his request for intervention, Dongan discussed the French Troupes de la Marine who deserted to Albany and their fate if returned to Denonville and the French. “I desire you [Denonville] to give me the assurance that [the deserters] shall not lose their lives” if sent back to New France. Furthermore, Dongan called upon the Iroquois to meet in Albany and Informed Denonville:

[H]ave sent for one of each nation to come to me and then those beastly crimes you reproove shall be checked severely and all my endeavours used to surpress their filthy drunkennesse, disorders, debauches, warring and quarrels, and whatsoever doth obstruct the growth and enlargement of the Christian faith amongst those people.\textsuperscript{60}

Denonville did not respond to this letter until September 29, 1686. As the year wore on both men took time away from writing to the other while they took care of governing their colonies.

While Dongan expected conciliatory language based upon his attempt to pacify the Iroquois, Denonville lashed out with, “Je ne crois pas M.\textprime que le Roy vostre maistre approuve tous les soins, que vous avez pris de sollicitces par present, et en arimant toute la nation Iroquoise pour nous faire la guerre cette année.” Furthermore, he admonished Dongan and accused him of exhorting the Iroquois to plunder French trade in the \textit{pays d’en haut}. He also claimed that the emissary Dongan sent to the Onondaga “told all the Nations, in your name, to pillage and make war on us.” Denonville’s intelligence gathering also helped him learn of the Rooseboom-MacGregorie expedition, which departed Albany during the summer of 1686. He wrote, “vous n’ignorez pas l’entreprise des marchands sur Michilimaquina.” Denonville seemed to have all


\textsuperscript{60} Dongan, “Governor Dongan to Monsieur de Denonville, 26 July 1686,” in \textit{Documents}, ed. Brodhead, 460.
the proof he needed to demean Dongan and make demands.\textsuperscript{61}

Denonville demanded that Dongan give up all deserters that fled to Albany, no matter if they were \textit{coureurs de bois}, soldiers, or criminals. In addition, he chastised Dongan for letting the Iroquois attack the “Outoüan [Ottawa]” and others in the west who were under the protection of “des saints missionnaires.” However, as a small act of conciliation, Denonville offered to forward Dongan’s application to Louis XIV, but without the “proofs or vouchers of your debt…I fear M. de Louvoy will not recollect your affair.”\textsuperscript{62}

Dongan wrote sometime after 1 October, “J’en ay envoyé une copie en anglois,” and dispatched his letter in both English and French. He also stated, “Je Souhaitez que vous continuiez dans la Veritable opinion quil ne manquera rien de ma part de cequi peut contribuer à Une bonne et agreeable correspondence.”\textsuperscript{63} Dongan’s conciliatory and self-justifying tone permeated this and many later letters. Staggered by Denonville’s accusations of inciting and arming the Iroquois, he defended himself by stating,

\begin{quote}
Soyez assuré Monsieur que je n’ay point Solicité n’y fait de presens aux Indiens pour armer et faire guerre contre vous, au contraire tous mes Soins ont este de conserver ces peuples en repos qui estant d’inclination pour la guerre y Sont portez facilement. Je leur ay deffendu expressement de Se joindre aux autres contre vous…Je souhaite, Monsieur, que vous nous donniez avis qui est celuy qui pretendoit avoir mon ordre pour les Indiens affin de piller et faire la guerre contre Vous.
\end{quote}

After asking Denonville to approach Louis XIV on his behalf, Dongan obviously felt the pressure of the Iroquois situation building and of his control over their sachems faltering as they


\textsuperscript{62} Denonville, “Copie de la lettre de Denonville à Dongan, (29 septembre 1686),” LAC/BAC, 101v, 102, 103.

prepared themselves to push even more aggressively into the west. Once again, Dongan begged for Denonville’s intervention with Louis XIV for his arrears pay.⁶⁴

After this final letter of 1686, Dongan and Denonville realized the gravity of the situation facing them in the spring. However, they did not know of the momentous diplomatic changes taking place between England and France. The Treaty of Neutrality in America of November 16, 1686, would drastically change the nature of the diplomacy between Denonville and Dongan, but would not address most of their issues of concern. In fact, while the early years of Dongan’s governorship were quiet and peaceful, an undercurrent of animosity, greed, and a desire to push westward, soon exacerbated the situation and began changing the very fabric of the already unsteady relations between New France and New York. While Dongan’s appointment was due to his understanding of the French, he found that he lacked a thorough understanding of the Iroquois and their relationships towards other Native peoples and European interlopers. On top of Dongan’s inadequacy to understand fully the motivations of the Iroquois, he had found himself beset with a governor in New France, Joseph-Antoine le Febvre de la Barre, whose conflicting orders, and inept leadership caused more harm than good to the delicate Native-European relations in the region. With the replacement of La Barre by Governor by Jacques-René de Brisay de Denonville, Dongan hoped the situation would stabilize and settle. However, Denonville found himself facing a poorly equipped and defended colony as well as an aggressive Native population bent on the destruction of his Native allies and his colony. In addition, Denonville found in Dongan a wily adversary he desperately needed to understand to defeat him and secure peace for his colony.

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⁶⁴ Dongan, “Réponse du Colonel Dongan à la lettre que Denonville lui écrite le 1er octobre, 1686,” LAC/BAC, 174-174v. NOTE: Brodhead dates this letter 1 December 1686 but the archival copy is not dated.
Chapter 3:
Peaceful Relations and the Origins of the “Treaty”

3.1 Introduction

The “Treaty of Peace, Good Correspondence and Neutrality in America” did not spring fully formed from the maelstrom of European political turmoil of the late-seventeenth century. The treaty required an intersection of English and French international interests to arise before English goals and French ambitions could overcome centuries of animosity, hatred, and political intrigue and by the mid-seventeenth century these circumstances emerged.  

In England, the restoration of the Stuart monarchy in May 1660 represented the beginning of a process of reconciliation as well as a starting point for general peace between the two nations. The reconciliation and peace process began when the newly restored monarch, Charles II, found his powers reduced and tied to parliamentary approval. The most notable reason for Charles II to reach out to his cousin, Louis XIV of France, was money. English Parliament, upon Charles’ ascension, rolled back all parliamentary and constitutional actions to January 30, 1649, the date of Charles I’s beheading. This roll-back repealed many bills and acts, which reduced Charles’ ability to levy taxes and maintain a standing army.

Charles wished to emulate the government of France and operate as his own chief executive in a manner comparable that of his cousin Louis who took control of his government in 1661. However, Charles needed money and Parliament controlled that money.

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Throughout his kingship, Charles II looked to Louis XIV to support him and his army in exchange for subsidies and bribes. By supplying Charles with money, Louis gained an ally that he could easily manipulate and coerce. While Parliament saw Louis’ ambition as dangerous, but Charles valued his friendship as a means to gain financial independence from Parliament. Both Charles and Louis desired to eliminate the Dutch trade monopoly in the Northern Atlantic and Charles II wanted the riches associated with having an Atlantic maritime trade monopoly of his own, while the security conscious Louis wished to secure his northern border and his claims in the Americas. In late 1662 Louis approached Charles for an alliance, but Charles was determined to declare war on the Dutch, a war for which Louis was not politically or militarily ready.\(^{68}\)

The Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665-1667) was a disaster for Charles and England. The only tangible gain for England was the capture of New Netherland. With England’s failure to subdue and defeat the truculent Dutch, Louis found his opening to aid Charles in exchange for friendship and mutual support. In late-1668, Charles approached Louis for an alliance, which he hoped would keep France neutral in his next expedition against the Dutch and Louis accepted.\(^{69}\)

Meanwhile in Europe, an anti-French alliance was forming consisting of Sweden, the Netherlands, and anti-French pundits in the English Parliament. This Triple Alliance aimed to curb Louis’ ambitions in the Dutch Lowlands. Understanding Charles’ motives, Louis sent his ambassador, Colbert de Croissy, with orders to break up the Alliance by any means necessary. De Croissy was to turn England against Sweden and the Netherlands and to do so Louis gave permission for him to bribe English officials and Charles. The bribes and secret negotiations with Charles worked and the Triple Alliance failed to produce any momentum towards curtailing

\(^{68}\) Harris, Restoration, 60.

\(^{69}\) Fraser, *King Charles II*, 347-350.
France’s mobilization and military preparations.\textsuperscript{70}

With Charles firmly in his pocket, Louis changed his international diplomatic policy towards martial diplomacy; diplomacy through military strength and war. With the help of Charles, Louis launched his war against the Dutch, and since Parliament prevented Charles from following Louis’ aggressive foreign policy, he sought peace with the Dutch in 1674. Charles decided to turn towards interventionist diplomacy and neutrality as his foreign policy, while remaining staunchly pro-French. Charles did not desire war with France and therefore his new political position was to prevent other European nations from declaring war with his ally. In addition, he realized he could not topple the Netherlands from their maritime trade superiority through war, so he began supporting Louis’ claims to the Dutch Lowlands through diplomacy. This change in diplomatic tactic was the greatest single development which led to sustainable peace between England and France.\textsuperscript{71}

France’s gains during the Franco-Dutch War allowed Louis to turn his attention to his eastern borders as the German Princes, the Habsburg Dynasty and the Italian States began to coalesce into an anti-French Alliance. Louis no longer needed Charles and the English to help secure his northern border therefore he stopped all subsidies to Charles.\textsuperscript{72}

In the 1680s Louis’ foreign policy became more aggressive, which led to increased political turmoil throughout Europe and renewed discussion of mutual aid and assistance pacts among his enemies. Meanwhile, Charles, knowing that French subsidies were the only thing keeping him solvent, threatened to call the anti-French parliament unless Louis continued to pay.

\textsuperscript{70} Fraser, \textit{King Charles II}, 347-350.
\textsuperscript{71} Fraser, \textit{King Charles II}, 423.
As Europe arrayed itself against him, Louis had no choice except to pay the remaining subsidies. In fact, Louis realized that Charles and England were his only allies. With the continuing subsidies, Charles created a foreign policy which was neutral and pro-French.\(^73\)

During the 1680s, colonial issues plagued Charles and as he dealt with these concerns, Louis swept into the power vacuum left by the Dutch and Spanish in Europe. In fact, Louis ordered his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Colbert de Croissy, to exploit international law and treaties to France’s benefit in opposition to all rules of international politics and diplomacy.\(^74\)

On February 6, 1685, Charles II died after a brief illness and his brother, James, the Duke of York, a staunch Catholic, became king of England as James II. His relationship with Louis was cordial and friendly and his first act was to reiterate that England would continue its neutrality and pro-French stance. In addition to remaining neutral, James was more interested in colonial issues than his predecessor.\(^75\)

James and Louis recognized that they needed an accommodation to secure their rights in the Atlantic World. Throughout 1684 and 1685 Louis received reports from his American holdings complaining of “des pirateries, des rivalités entre compagnies, des empiétements territoriaux, des entraves au commerce susceptibles de dégénérer en guerre ouverte.” These reports flooded in from all corners of the French Atlantic: “Saint-Christophe, de Saint-Domingue, de Sainte-Alouzie, de Gouave, de la Baie d’Hudson, de l’Acadie et du Canada.”\(^76\)

Louis wanted the English and French colonies to live in a closer union and collaborate more efficiently no matter the international situation occurring in Europe. To do this, Louis

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\(^76\) Leclerc, *Le Marquis de Denonville*, 221
authorized François d’Usson de Bonrepaus to work closely with the ambassador, Paul Barillon d’Amoncourt, Marquis de Branges, as well as James’ Privy Council to negotiate a peace treaty.\textsuperscript{77}

James and Louis hoped that these negotiations would end hostilities between the English and French in the Americas and more importantly, if the colonies could settle their own disputes then both Louis and James could concentrate on European politics and the rising anti-French sentiments of the Spanish, Dutch, the Holy Roman Empire, the German Principalities, and the Italian states.\textsuperscript{78}

After months of negotiations, on November 16, 1686 the Privy Council and Barillon agreed to suitable terms and signed the “Treaty of Peace, Good Correspondence & Neutrality in America.” The treaty is unique and unprecedented in its scope and its redefinition of meaningful space in colonial America. While meant to allow James and Louis to concentrate on European affairs, the treaty created a new dynamic of gubernatorial control and empowerment that created new avenues of intercolonial communication and diplomacy.\textsuperscript{79}

3.2 The “Treaty”: Analysis and Explication\textsuperscript{80}

The Treaty of Neutrality attempted to redefine colonial space as an extension of monarchical power by empowering colonial governors to address intra and intercolonial issues without validation or instructions from the metropole. However, it still relied upon the good intentions of both France and England to succeed. While James II and Louis XIV agreed to the terms of the treaty and attempted to create peaceful relations, neither monarch truly understood the conditions in their colonies or the intercolonial situations arising in the New World. They

\textsuperscript{77} Miller, \textit{James II}, 160; Leclerc, \textit{Le Marquis de Denonville}, 221.

\textsuperscript{78} Miller, \textit{James II}, 131.

\textsuperscript{79} Great Britain, “Treaty of peace,” 3; Steele, \textit{English Atlantic}, 189, 244, 248.

\textsuperscript{80} See Appendices A, B, and C for the English, French, and Latin versions of the treaty.
believed that their appointed governors could solve all disputes without assistance from their governments in Europe. Therefore, each colonial official was at the mercy of the local situation while trying to implement a treaty that might or might not apply to the circumstances within the colonial official’s realm of influence. While the treaty was a masterwork of inclusive governance that granted the American colonies the right to settle disputes without interference or input from the sovereign or the councils appointed over colonial affairs, it would prove almost impossible to maintain and implement the articles contained within its optimistic ideals.  


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81 Great Britain, “Treaty of peace,” Title Page (1); Steele, *English Atlantic*, 189, 244, 248.; NOTE: See Chapter 2, 4 and 5 for these colonial issues.

touchant les Païs des deux Rois en Amérique.” Other names for the treaty are the “Treaty of Whitehall, 1686” and the “Treaty of American Neutrality.” The English text, and therefore the Latin version, includes language expressing the long-standing English claims, dating back to 1337, to the French throne: “Prince JAMES II. By the Grace of GOD, King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland.” Even in 1686, James II styled Louis XIV as “the most Serene and Mighty Prince LEWIS XIV.”

The full title, the opening explanations in the French version, and the opening articles specifically address the Americas; however, the treaty does not cover relations between England and France on the European continent or in any other realms or territories. The focus on the Americas shows the importance each monarch attached to their American possessions and the possibility, or more likely the high probability, of misunderstandings, incidents, violence, and outright war occurring in the New World. James and Louis understood that antagonism between the French and English in the Americas would affect not only the balance of power in the Americas, but also in Europe. Therefore, the treaty tried to calm the various tensions causing friction between the English and French in the New World to ensure that these did not shatter the delicate peace in Europe.

The treaty contains twenty-one articles and the optimism of the treaty is evident from the


very first article in which the monarchs agree, on behalf of their American subjects and officials, to maintain “a firm Peace, Union, Amity and good Correspondence.”

The treaty does not specifically mention boundaries or territories claimed by the respective parties. One reason for this is that many of the colonial holdings, did not have defined and agreed upon borders; for instance, the borders between New France and New York, as well as the borders between the various New England colonies and New France, were not fully defined in the early 1680s. This uncertainty gave rise to shifting and conflicting territorial claims and the disputed borders of New France and the English colonies were of great concern to James and Louis. Another issue with borders was that the Iroquois claimed all lands south of the Great lakes and from Lake Champlain in the east, south along the Hudson River and west to the Mississippi River by the right of conquest and Dongan asserted that the Iroquois were subjects of New York and England and therefore those same lands belonged to the English. Such a claim on the part of the English contradicted French claims over the Iroquois by virtue of the work of the Jesuit missionaries and the bringing of Christianity to the Iroquois and to their sauvage neighbors in the west. While Dongan claimed all lands south of the Great Lakes for England and New York, James II did not agree and refused to acknowledge this claim even though his Privy Council and Dongan urged to do so. Despite Dongan’s alliance with the Iroquois and his claims to the vast “wilderness” of the Ohio and Illinois countries, James demurred because his need for French money and his fear of war made him reluctant to challenge Louis’ claims to the pays d’en haut.

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Article III of the treaty maintains a certain ambiguity as to the status of the Iroquois. It alludes obliquely to the growing military conflict between the Five Nations and the French. The article states, “neither shall they (the inhabitants) give any Assistance or Supplies of Men or Victuals to the barbarous or wild Indians, with whom (either) the most Christian King (or the King of Great Britain) shall have a War.” The article and the treaty, while not naming the Iroquois as the peoples at war with New France, clearly has them in mind when it alludes to “barbarous or wild Indians.” Although James refused to claim the Iroquois and their territory as English, he still maintained a stake in the outcome of any French and Native war and wished to remain neutral.87

In addition to the unsettled status of the Iroquois and their territory, another issue arises from Article III and Article X, that of language and meaning. The English version states, “barbarous or wild Indians” and “Barbarous and wild Inhabitants,” while the Latin version reads, “Barbaris” and “Barbaros loci Incolas” and the French reads, “Sauvages” and “les Sauvages habitans du lieu.” The English version, presented above, uses the terms “barbarous” and “wild Indians,” which seems synonymous with the translation of the French word “Sauvage” into the English word “savage.” However, the English term “Savage” became derogatory and meant “feral,” “ferocious,” “untamed,” or “a brute,” while his French term “Sauvage,” which per Antoine Furetiere’s 1690 Dictionaire Universel, means “des hommes errans, qui sont sans habitation reglées, sans Religion, sans Loix, & sans Police,” gives a different understanding of the Natives of the Americas. In the Latin of the Seventeenth Century, “Barbarian” was closer to the English definition for savage than the original Roman Latin meaning of “men living outside the Roman Empire” or the original Greek meaning of “one who is not Greek,” and thus without

In addition to the issue of language, Articles III and X also address a major concern in North America, the prohibition of aiding Natives at war with France or England with arms and ammunition. While the treaty does not specifically address the trade in arms, it was one of the chief concerns of the French in conjunction with the Iroquois. For instance, La Barre’s letter of June 15, 1684, expressly asked Dongan to forbid the Albany merchants from providing “armes, poudre et plomb” to the Iroquois. In addition, in Denonville’s June 5, 1686 letter, he demanded that Dongan prohibit the trade in arms to the Iroquois. After the publication of the treaty these accusations of trading arms to Native peoples, especially the Iroquois, took on a critical importance in North America.

These uncertainties of boundaries, alliances, subjugation, and language opened the possibilities for confusion, not only in intercolonial communications and diplomacy, but also in how to administer these disparate colonies from the European continent. Therefore, the drafters of the treaty came up with an ingenious solution and decided to leave it to the governors. The drafters created Article XVII to address the growing disputes. This article is where the monarchs and their advisors granted the various colonial governors the power to settle and adjudge any

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differences and disputes between the colonies. It also ordered each governor not to infringe upon nor interrupt the “Peace and Good Correspondence,” which James and Louis “Concluded and Agreed” that their subjects must maintain “without exception.” James and Louis gave the various American governors a year to settle disputes and if after that year, the governors failed to settle their differences, the monarchs would involve themselves and thus “determine” the “Justice” “as they shall think fit.” To James and Louis, it was vital that the colonial governors resolve intercolonial disputes at the local level, precluding the need to wait on orders from Europe. In theory, this would allow James and Louis to concentrate on European affairs without devoting critical resources and manpower to quelling intercolonial disputes.\textsuperscript{90}

The remaining articles of the treaty cover many subjects and procedures intended to eliminate misunderstandings between the French and English in America. For instance, Articles V through VIII address the proper procedures for entering the ports of the other power. The articles not only exclude French and English ships from entering the other’s ports for trade but also enforce the English Navigation Acts. The provisions forbade the ships of the other to break “bulk” or cargo in the other’s waters and ports. In addition, Article V forbids the fishing and trading of goods in the other’s waters. These articles originated in the second half of the 1660s and the early 1670s when the French attempted to destroy the Dutch slave trade and solidify French-English relations in the Caribbean and Southern Atlantic. During that time, the French excluded the Dutch from French ports and confiscated or destroyed enemy foreign ships. However, Louis ordered the exemption of English ships from acts of destruction and confiscation


Another major issue in the Americas was the continuing problem of piracy and it was not only a crisis in the Caribbean but throughout the Atlantic World. Articles XII through XV discuss privateering and piracy. The articles discuss the commissioning of privateers, the treatment of pirates when discovered, and the forbidding of taking “any Commission, or Letters of Mart [\textit{sic}].” Privateers obtained a letter of marque or a license to plunder enemy ships and ports either directly from a monarch or from his duly appointed representative. The privateer was required to share a portion of any confiscations, or booty, with said sovereign or patron. “The years after 1678 [the Franco-Dutch War] were the ‘golden age’ of the French buccaneers,” and “about 1,000 freebooters” joined French privateer Laurent de Graffe at his base of Petit-Goâve (Haiti). This assemblage of men for large invasions of protected ports, such as those on Trinidad, Margarita, Vera Cruz, was normal in the Caribbean during this period. In fact, Saint-Domingue, along with the nearby island of Tortuga, was one of the largest French privateer bases in the Caribbean.\footnote{Great Britain, “Treaty of peace,” 12-15; France, “Traité de Neutralité,” Cramoisy, 11-13; France, “Traité de Neutralité,” Leonard, 7-9; James Pritchard, \textit{In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670-1730} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 104-106; Boucher, \textit{France and the American Tropics}, 206-207.}

In the North Atlantic, privateers and pirates were equally a menace to shipping and commerce, though less so than in the Caribbean. Colonists and merchants in the North Atlantic dealt with homegrown pirates as well as pirates from the Caribbean and Europe. For instance, in 1687, Captain George Heathcote of the ship \textit{Good Hope or Hopewell}, on his way from New York to England, found himself beset between Long Island and Nantucket by a pirate from Youghal, County Cork, Ireland. Through the treaty, James and Louis demanded that piracy between England and France cease immediately and empowered their colonial officials to
eliminate the problem.\textsuperscript{93}

The most impractical, yet inspiring and important article in the treaty is Article XVIII. This article discusses the issue of war between England and France and instructs the American colonies that, “true and firm Peace and Neutrality shall continue,” even if, war should happen to break out between the two powers. An article of pure wishful thinking, which in many ways gave James and Louis hope that their union of friendship should live beyond the unfortunate politics of Europe and outlive both monarchs.\textsuperscript{94}

The treaty between England and France is unique in its scope and intentions. In fact, it became one of the first treaties in which monarchs addressed their colonies directly and not European nations or other monarchs. According to Ian K. Steele, during the waning years of the seventeenth-century and early years of the eighteenth, the “inclusion of colonies in formal peace treaties redefined meaningful space, initially in terms of communications possibilities.” Steele’s phrase “meaningful space” suggests that the American colonies were not only an extension of Europe, but a part of European international policy, diplomacy, and politics. In addition, colonies almost became an equal part of the larger nation state. The English colonies of the Americas became England and the French colonies became France, not just extensions of monarchical power and vestigial appendages easily disposed of when no longer needed or wanted. While European monarchs attempted to exert greater control over their American possessions, the inclusion of colonies in European peace treaties not only unified the respective colonial worlds but also gave colonial governors a stake in the outcome of treaties and allowed them to be quasi-independent agents of peace implementation.

\textsuperscript{93} Brodhead, \textit{History}, 466.

\textsuperscript{94} Great Britain, “Treaty of peace,” Title Page (1), 16-17.
In addition, Steele refers to “Peace Beyond the Line” or “the spread of peace and war beyond the Tropic of Cancer,” which he suggests began with the changing notions and perceptions of the Americas and their importance in European peace treaties. In Article XXI, the drafters of the Treaty of Neutrality provided for the dissemination of the text around the Atlantic world: it should, “within the space of eight Months, or sooner if it may be, be published in all Kingdoms, Dominions and Colonies.” The lapse of eight months derived from what Steele calls “four separate peace zones.” With the expansion of European power into the Atlantic and beyond the Tropic of Cancer, the Americas presented practical problems, not only to peace treaties but also to declarations of war and ceasefires. The difficulty comes from the pace and speed of correspondence and orders across the Atlantic to various points in the Americas.95

Steel suggests that England, and most Western European monarchies, assumed that peace was to begin in Americas at the same time as peace in Europe. However, that was not practical or enforceable due to the great distances and the difficulties of trans-Atlantic communications. Therefore, the English began to use four peace zones to pace the acceptance of peace and the cessation of hostilities. The first peace zone, or 12-day zone, covered the “Narrow Seas” (the channels between England, Europe, and Ireland) “from the Soundings to the Naze of Norway” (the cape at the southern tip of Norway). The Second zone, or “6-week zone,” extended “from the Soundings” south to “Cape St. Vincent” (the southernmost tip of Portugal) and incorporated Northern and Western Europe, “the Bay of Biscay, the Azores, and the Atlantic coast of the Iberian Kingdoms.” The third zone, or “10-week zone,” extended south “from Cape St. Vincent to the equator” and west to the “temperate coasts of North America.” However, peace declared in

the fall effectively placed “Canada, Newfoundland, and Hudson’s Bay ‘beyond the line’” of the 10-week zone. The final zone, or eight-month zone, included all lands south of the equator and therefore, “eight months became the convention” for the transmission of peace “beyond the line.” The pace of peace is evident in Article XXI and demonstrates the drafters’ understanding of trans-Atlantic communications and the time required to transmit and establish peace in both the English and French Atlantic Worlds.96

The Treaty of Neutrality redefined meaningful space by expanding monarchical power and influence beyond the metropole. It also insisted that colonial officials use their power and influence in a constructive and meaningful way to form “a firm Peace, Union, Amity and Good Correspondence…between the British and French in America.”97

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96 Steele, The English Atlantic, 193-195.
Chapter 4:
1687 -- Dongan, Denonville, and the Early Implementation of the Treaty

4.1 Introduction

The Treaty of Neutrality changed the nature of inter-colonial correspondence and communications in the Americas, especially in North America where Colonel Thomas Dongan, the Provincial Governor of New York, and Jacques-Rene de Brisay, marquis de Denonville, the Governor General of New France, disputed territorial boundaries and the fate of the Iroquois. These changes in communication and correspondence stemmed from the governors’ obligation to settle their colonial disputes as outlined in Article XVII of the treaty. The governors found themselves in a quandary as to how to settle the disputes plaguing them in a timely manner and in conformity with the letter and spirit of the treaty.\(^98\)

Since Denonville’s appointment as Governor General in 1685, his attempts at inter-colonial diplomacy with Colonel Dongan failed on multiple occasions. Therefore, Denonville turned toward a more European-style diplomacy, which offered a semi-institutionalized framework for negotiation. This system defined the basic principles associated with the practice of diplomacy. While Denonville adopted semi-formal diplomatic practices, Dongan continued to employ a straightforward diplomacy based in demand and consent.\(^99\)

A major flaw in the treaty was that it did not provide specific guidance for the key issues that existed between New France and New York: the Iroquois and the borders between the respective colonies. In England, the French ambassadors and the English Privy Council continued to debate these issues throughout the winter of 1686 and well into 1687 without any


\(^{99}\) Roosen, The Age of Louis XIV, 1, 5-6.
change in the status of the Iroquois or the settlement of colonial borders.\textsuperscript{100}

The Iroquois continued to be the greatest diplomatic issue at stake between the colonies. In New York, Dongan found the Iroquois to be uncontrollable and every attempt he made to advise them was rebuffed with contempt. In addition, while Dongan continued to claim the Iroquois were subjects of England and New York, the Iroquois at times accepted this notion and at others protested his claims. Dongan also misinterpreted Iroquois politics and the Iroquois rejected European notions of subjugation. While Denonville and Dongan made plans for the Iroquois, the Iroquois themselves began debating a complete break from the English and the French, and the possibility of declaring their complete neutrality in relation to European politics and disputes. In order accomplish this, the Iroquois needed to force the English and French to understand that they were not subjects of Corlaer, Onontio, or their European masters. As the situation began to escalate, the Treaty of Neutrality arrived on American shores.\textsuperscript{101}

4.2 Denonville’s 1687 Expedition against the Seneca and the Treaty

During the winter of 1686/7, Denonville continued to rebuild the neglected fortifications along the Saint Lawrence and began to consolidate the scattered settlements into fortified strongholds. In addition, he continued to secretly rebuild, garrison, and supply his western forts from which he planned to launch his expedition. Meanwhile in New York, Colonel Dongan still endeavored to develop a plan of action to force the Iroquois to be more acquiescent and to lead them away from negotiating with the French.

\textsuperscript{100} Osgood, \textit{American Colonies, Volume III}, 375-376.

\textsuperscript{101} Trelease, \textit{Indian Affairs}, 115-118; Daniel K. Richter, \textit{The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization} (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 131-132. NOTE: “Corlaer” was a name given by the Iroquois to the governors of New York; it derived from Dutch merchant Arent Van Curler who was stationed at Fort Orange in the mid-seventeenth century. “Onontio” or “Great Mountain” is the name given to the governor-general of New France by Native allies; it derives from the surname of an early French Governor, Charles Huault de Montmagny.
In early spring 1687, Denonville sent detailed instructions to his field commanders in preparation for the expedition. In addition to these secret orders, he ordered Père Jean de Lamberville to invite the Iroquois sachems to Fort Frontenac (Cataracouy) for a peace conference. Meanwhile, the intendant, Jean Bochart de Champigny, secretly took command of the fort to oversee the capture of the Iroquois sachems. Denonville felt pressure to follow the directive Louis XIV issued to La Barre on July 21, 1684, which required the Governor General to send Iroquois captives to France as galley slaves for the Mediterranean fleet. Although Denonville disagreed with this directive, he felt obliged to obey Louis’ order.102

During the planning of the Cataracouy peace conference and expedition, Denonville’s plans leaked and found their way to Dongan at Albany. With this knowledge, Dongan called the Iroquois to a conference in April 1687 and ordered them to boycott Lamberville’s summons to Cataracouy. During the remaining days of the Albany conference, Dongan informed the Seneca and the rest of the Five Nations of Denonville’s proposed invasion. Unfortunately for the Onondaga, Onieda, and Cayuga they ignored Dongan’s warning and traveled to Cataracouy in May 1687.103

While Denonville continued to prepare for his expedition, momentous news was on its way from France. On May 1, 1687, Philippe de Rigaud, marquis de Vaudreuil, left France with 800 French troups de la marine, 168,000 French livres, dispatches for Governor General Denonville, and the Treaty of Neutrality. As Denonville gathered his troops and marched to Montreal, he received word on June 5, 1687 that, “6 navires[,] 3 de guerre[,] qui amenoient 800

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102 Eccles, Canada, 150; Brett Rushforth, Bonds of Alliance: Indigenous & Atlantic Slaveries in New France (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 146-147; Parkman, France and England, 108; Eccles, Frontenac, 186-187. NOTE: Sachem: Algonquian word for a leader or chief, used by Parkman, Eccles, etc.

103 Brodhead, History, 474.
hommes de troupes, lesquelles n’ont esté que 33 jours à venir en Canada,” landed at Quebec on June 3. On 8 June, Vaudreuil and the treaty arrived in Montreal. While at Montreal and before launching his expedition, Denonville wrote to Seignelay with an update of his plans and to inform him that Louis’ orders of 3 March arrived in New France. However, Denonville never mentions the receipt of the treaty in this mémoire. 104

Denonville launched his expedition on 13 June and it lasted until August 13, 1687. The Cataracouy peace conference captured 58 Iroquois sachems from the Onondaga, Oneida, and Cayuga Nations, while the expedition destroyed all four of the main Seneca villages: Gannagro, Gannogarae, Gannounata, and Totiaxton. He also burned over 350,000 minots (700,000 bushels) of green corn and 50,000 minots (100,000 bushels) of old corn. At the end of June 1687, Durantaye captured the English trade expedition led by Major McGregor at Detroit and a few days later Du Lhut, De Tonty, and Durantaye, captured Johannes Rooseboom at Niagara. After arriving at Niagara, Denonville ordered the establishment of a fort. Overall, Denonville carried out all the tasks he planned and the expedition appeared to be a huge success. 105

While Denonville was away on his expedition, the Treaty of Neutrality arrived in New


York on June 19 and reached Dongan at Albany on June 20. In addition to the treaty, Dongan received two sets of orders, one from James II’s Privy Council and one from Robert Spencer, the 2nd Earl of Sunderland, the Lord President of the Privy Council. The letter from Sunderland, dated 22 January 1687, addressed directly to Dongan, addressed the complaints made against Dongan by La Barre and Denonville. Sunderland wrote, “It being our pleasure that you entertain a good correspondence with the Governors and Officers of the said King in those Parts, and take care that no just complaint be brought unto us against you in that behalf.” This statement suggests that Sunderland could not protect Dongan if the French governor made further complaints against him.106

After reviewing his orders and the treaty, Dongan immediately dispatched a letter to Denonville that he hoped would alleviate any difficulties remaining between them. While, Dongan’s letter started with his wish to settle the disputes between New France and New York as prescribed by the Treaty of Neutrality.107

Upon his return to Montreal, Denonville found correspondence from Dongan, dated 11 June and 23 July, awaiting his attention; he wrote the second letter in Latin. Dongan assured Denonville that he would rescue all French prisoners held by the Iroquois and that he would live by the Treaty of Neutrality in “pacem tranquilliam,” or tranquil peace. Dongan’s decision to write in Latin was an attempt to ensure Denonville understood his message and preclude any

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106 Brodhead, *History*, 475; Robert Spencer, Comte de Sunderland, “Order to Governor Dongan for the Cessation of Hostilities, 22nd day of January 1687,” in *Documents*, ed. Brodhead, 504. NOTE: There is some confusion as to when the treaty arrived in New York. According to Brodhead the treaty arrived on June 8, while Dongan’s letter of 20 June 1687 states “The inclosed came to my hands last night,” suggesting that he received the letter on 19 June. However, the letter could have arrived on June 8 at New York and was transported to Albany and arrived on the 19th.

107 Thomas Dongan, “Governor Dongan to Monsieur de Denonville, 20 June 1687,” in *Documents*, ed. Brodhead, 465. Note: This letter is discussed more thoroughly in section 4.3.
With great misgivings about the results of the expedition starting to settle in, Denonville began preparing reports for Louis XIV and the Ministre de la Marine. In addition, he decided to keep 22 of the 58 Onondaga, Oneida, and Cayuga prisoners taken at Cataracouy. His decision was a strategic one: he hoped to appease the Christian sachems friendly to Père Lamiberville by releasing their relatives. In fact, two of the captives were relatives of the Iroquois orator Big Mouth (Grande-gueule or Otréouati). Even though Denonville felt that the shipment of the remaining 36 Iroquois to France was ill-conceived and posed major problems to the peace process, he had no choice but to comply. Therefore, he prepared the captives for the journey before ice closed Quebec’s port.

The arrival of the Treaty of Neutrality in the colonies changed the nature of the Dongan-Deronville correspondence by making the articles of the treaty a focal point that shaped future arguments. Despite his weaker position, Dongan hoped to be creative in countering Denonville’s legalistic black and white interpretation of the treaty. Both governors would twist the timing of the treaty to their own advantage, while denying the same option to the other. In fact, both understood the seventeenth-century concept of the pace of peace and attempted to adjust the pace to serve their respective agendas.

In addition to the treaty, Denonville and Dongan needed to deal with the aftermath of Denonville’s expedition against the Seneca. While Dongan assumed the mantle of savior of the Seneca, Denonville struggled with the consequences of provoking the ire of the other Iroquois Nations. Denonville’s expedition was a general failure; the major benefit of the expedition was not a military success, but rather an attempt to maintain peace with the Iroquois nations.

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that it secured New France’s western frontier and the fur trade, but this perceived security would not last. While the Seneca were no longer a threat, the remaining four nations, the Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, and Cayuga, were mobilizing and uniting militarily against New France.

Denonville realized that the expedition did not secure the St. Lawrence, destroy the Iroquois’ ability to make war, or silence Dongan. In fact, it had the opposite effects: it angered the Iroquois and forced them to combine their military might for mutual protection. Negotiation with the Five Nations became the only recourse left to silence the war drums. The treaty became the only basis for diplomacy with New York at Denonville’s disposal and Dongan’s misinterpretation of Iroquois politics became a boon to Denonville as he began negotiations with the overwrought Iroquois. However, neither governor would find complete satisfaction in their dealings with each other or with the Iroquois.

4.3 Dongan, Denonville, and the Treaty

With new orders from Louis XIV, the Treaty of Neutrality, and Dongan’s letters of the early summer of 1687, Denonville began planning the next phase of his operations. He began by writing to Dongan on 22 August. In this letter, he leveled several accusations against the governor of New York and began the task of countering Dongan’s arguments. He argued that Dongan did not appear honest and that his actions did not match his words.110

Denonville then proceeded to build his case against Dongan, accusing him of contravening the treaty by providing “de plomb, de poudre, et d’armes…et de munitions de Guerre” to the Iroquois. Furthermore, he alleged that Dongan did not understand the history of

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110 Denonville, “Monsieur de Denonville to Governor Dongan, 21. August 1687,” in Documents, ed. Brodhead, 466; Denonville, “Copie d’une lettre de Denonville à Dongan, (22 août 1687),” LAC/BAC: cote: MG1-C11A, Série C: Correspondance Générale, vol. 9, fol. 54-57, microfilm reel F-9, (accessed June 16, 2017), 54. NOTE: The Brodhead translation is missing specific passages and other passages are out of order. In addition, the date for the Brodhead copy is 21 August while the archival LAC/BAC copy is 22 August.
the French in the *pays d’en haut* and accused him of issuing passports for trade at Michilimackinac, French territory since the time of Champlain.

Cependant M. dans le même temps que vous me faites des Civilitez vous donnez des ordres et faites expédier des passeports pour envoyer des canots commercer à Missilimaquina ou jamais aucun anglois n’avoit mis le pied et ou nos français Sont establis il y a plus de 60 ans.

He continued, addressing Dongan’s disregard for the treaty, specifically Article V.

[Q]ui en est en possession et après cela lisez l’article 5° du traité de neutralité et vous verra-t si vous avez eu raison de donner des ordres pour aller à main armée establir vostre commerce à Missilimaquina. Comme je vous envoye la Copie de vostre lettre avec la reponce à chacun des articles je n’ay pas besoin de vous repeter en cette lettre ce qui est compris en ladite reponce il suffit de vous dire pour finir celle cy que je retiens icy vostre off. et le S. Gregoire et tous vos commasideal pour vostre expedition pretendue.

Denonville further accuses Dongan of acting “contre le traité de neutralité du 16.° no. 1686.”

He calls upon the governor to, “discontinuiez de proteger les ennemis de la Colonie.” Denonville further demands that Dongan was using the Iroquois situation as a pretext for the territorial expansion of New York and such practices were in direct contravention of the orders they both received. Denonville informed Dongan that he would retain several prisoners until Dongan complied with the treaty and the orders of James II.³

That same day, 22 August 1687, Denonville wrote his first two-column letter and response to Dongan. Denonville used Dongan’s letter of 11 June, responding to each of his opponent’s arguments and statements. Dongan’s letter stated, “j’en observeray jusques aux moindre parties” the treaty and warned Denonville “J’espere que un bon moyen pour empescher vous peuples de chercher quelq’. Corespons° avec nos Indiens de ce costé du grand Lac.” Denonville countered these statements by warning Dongan not to go against the rights of their
monarchs by attempting to change the boundaries between the two colonies. This argument for letting the monarchs settle the borders came up in virtually every letter between the governors.\footnote{Denonville and Dongan, “Copie d’un lettre de Dongan (11 juin) et réponse de Denonville (22 août), (1687),” LAC/BAC: cote: MG1-C11A, Série C: Correspondance Générale, vol. 9, fol. 58-60v, microfilm reel F-9, (accessed June 16, 2017), 58.}

Denonville next attacked Dongan’s presumptions of ownership to the Iroquois Country, the \textit{pays d’en haut}, and all lands south of the Great Lakes just as he did on His grounds are that French missionaries sent by the king of France took possession of the lands and thus the Iroquois during the time of Champlain. He wrote, “Vous savez que depuis plus 20 ans nous Sommes en possession des cinq Villages iroquois par plusieurs raisons et sur tout par celle des missionaires que le Roy.” Denonville felt that French claims were unassailable, but Dongan was less confident about English claims. Therefore, Dongan needed to get Denonville to renounce claims to the Iroquois in order to establish English sovereignty.\footnote{Denonville and Dongan, “Copie d’un lettre de Dongan (11 juin) et réponse de Denonville (22 août), (1687),” LAC/BAC, 58.}

Dongan continued his strategy to force Denonville to admit that western lands were either Iroquois or free lands and turned his arguments to the Iroquois and his belief that “les nations esloignes,” the Natives of the west, were free peoples with whom it was “free and common” to trade until such time as their European masters saw fit to settle the boundaries. Denonville countered this argument with a complete dismissal of the subject, by stating,

\begin{quote}
\textit{Cet article n’est pas recevable pour vrai principe Sur lequel Vous puissiez justifie Vos injustes entreprises de l’an passé et de cette année, et ne Vous met pas en droit de faire la guerre pour etendre Vos limites quand Vous m’avez demandé de les laisser regler à mes maistres.}
\end{quote}

With this statement, Denonville hoped to shut down Dongan’s argument for free trade in the west, but it led to an even wider dispute.\footnote{Denonville and Dongan, “M. de Denonville’s Remarks on Governor Dongan’s Letter: Copy of a}
Dongan’s next two paragraphs addressed the conference between the Onondaga and the French at Cataracouy. In addition to the meeting, Dongan confronted Denonville about the hostages captured by deceitful means and accused him of not keeping “bonne correspondance” as a priority between them. Once again Denonville’s response involved the missionaries and martyrs of the French and “le grand nombre de missionnaires jesuites que depuis plus de 80 ans travaillent avec des peines infinies pour la conversion des pauvres Sauvages de ce pays.” In addition, he stated his reasons for inviting the Iroquois to Cataracouy and his motives for their capture; “Puisque vous avez esté Informé que je desirois Voir les Iroquois à Cataracoüy pour regler avec eux les suiets de mecontantemens que j’ay de leur violence et mechante conduit.” According to Denonville, the Iroquois had to pay for their crimes and it did not matter if they were Seneca or other nations who committed those actions. He concluded with, “Si vous avez ayant La Paix et l’union Vous y auriez envoyé quelqu’un de Vostre part pour contribuer [unreadable] a La paix generale entre les nations,” accusing Dongan of inaction to prevent hostilities.115

Dongan’s next argument masterfully countered Denonville’s accusations and insisted that the French governor ordered the arrest of Frenchmen and Natives found leaving New France. Dongan confessed that he did order the arrest of the French and Natives leaving New France and offered to recall his orders. Denonville’s response to these accusation and defense was to ignore the subject and turn the discussion to passports, rogues, and bankrupts.

Vous voulez bien que je vous dise que vous ne [unreadable] rien de ce que Vous promettez Surtout Sur le Suiet des francois qui Vont chez Vous Sans passeport de moy et qui desertent…vous savez…plusieurs autres fripons et banquerout[ier] comme eux sont

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115 Denonville and Dongan, “Copie d’un lettre de Dongan (11 juin) et réponse de Denonville (22 août), (1687),” LAC/BAC 58v-59.
Chez Vous…mais je suis surpris que Vous m’ayez promis de ne les pas souffrir, que Vous me le prometiez encore et que Vous ne fassiez rien de ce que vous promettez.

This accusation is the same as the one Denonville presented in 1686. In addition, De Tonty, Du Lhut, and Durantaye captured several renegade *coureurs de bois* and deserters accompanying McGregor and Rooseboom.116

Dongan’s final offering to Denonville was a plea for peace and a hope that the governors could visit one another if they could come to terms on all their differences and disputes. He wrote, “I should wish, Sir, with all my heart to be able to serve you and to visit you but the distance between us is too great. I have much respect for all the people of quality of your nation and especially such as have served in the armies.” Dongan petitioned for closer communication and peace between the governors throughout the correspondence. Dongan’s brute honesty in his pleas for good correspondence and peace leads to the notion that he did desire such an outcome.117

Denonville’s response addressed Dongan’s gift of oranges in June 1687 which he did not receive until he returned to Montreal in August of that year.

Whether Denonville was making a statement about rotten oranges or the state of affairs between New France and New York is unknown, but his unwarranted flippancy temporarily closed a path towards peace with Colonel Dongan and his attempts at bridge building. Francis Parkman seems to suggest that the statement did have a second meaning. In this passage, Denonville seems to

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116 Denonville and Dongan, “Copie d’un lettre de Dongan (11 juin) et réponse de Denonville (22 août), (1687),” LAC/BAC, 59v-60; Eccles, *Canada*, 152.

have failed to realize that the gift of oranges was a peace offering from Dongan and by subjecting the English governor to ridicule, he not only failed to see the oranges as a gift, but he also failed to see the hand of friendship which Dongan presented.\textsuperscript{118}

Fearing for the safety and the health of the captives taken at Cataracouy, Denonville wrote to the Ministre de la Marine on 25 August 1687. He informed the minister that he was following the orders presented to La Barre on July 21, 1684, but he also politely requested:

\textit{Vous m’avez ordonné de vous envoyer les prisonniers…Dans le nombre des prisonniers il y en a quelques uns que je ne dois point vous envoyer estans proches parens de nos Sauvages chrestiens, outre qu’il y en a du village des Onontalez [Onondaga] que nous devons menager pour tacher de les desunir des Sonontoüians [Seneca] et pour nous en servir pour negocier si nous en avons besoin…Monseigneur comme vous les desirez je me contanteray de retenir Ceux que je croisay me pouvoir estre util…si cependant Monseigneur vous voulez bien les retenir en lieu d’ou on les put retirer en cas de besoin et que dans la suite on puisse venir à un acomodement general je croy que ce seroit une chose très utille au pays.}\textsuperscript{119}

After receiving Denonville’s letter and fearing for the safety of his colony, Dongan immediately dispatched Captain John Palmer to England with orders to inform the Privy Council of Denonville’s recent actions and to beg for a decision on the fate of the Iroquois. By early September, he ordered the erection of English forts along major waterways as a defensive barrier and as an early warning system against French incursions into English territory. He also instituted a militia draft in which one out of every tenth militiaman received orders to report to Albany.\textsuperscript{120}

Deciding to winter at Albany, Dongan wrote to Denonville on 9 September stating, “J’ay receu la vostre du 21.\textdegree{} Aoust dernier et suis navrry que Monsieur de Denonville a sitost oublié

\textsuperscript{118}Denonville and Dongan, “Copie d’un lettre de Dongan (11 juin) et réponse de Denonville (22 août), (1687),” LAC/BAC, 60v; Parkman, 100-101; Brodhead, \textit{History}, 476.


\textsuperscript{120} Osgood, \textit{American Colonies, Volume III}, 375; Brodhead, \textit{History}, 485.
les orders qu’ila de bien vivre avec les sujais de sa Majesté.” In a sharp turn of strategy, Dongan accused Denonville of not wishing to live by the treaty. He continued: “Since you cannot with bribes or other means gain them [the Iroquois] to be of your party, is of a longer date then three or foure yeares, since Mons’ Denonville follows the same steps his predecessors trod in, tho’ he proposed to himselfe so fair a beginning.” In addition, Dongan caught Denonville in a lie concerning his actions of the previous winter. He wrote, “Vostre reponce estoit (comme peut se ressouvenir Mons.’ de Denonville) que l’hyver estoit longes vostre resolution estoit d’avoir quantitie d’hommes a Catarakoui conformement tous faisiez des provisions pour eux.”

Dongan found justification in accusing his Canadian counterpart of deception. Besides the provisioning of Cataracouy, Dongan accused Denonville of, “semparant des Territoires du Roy d’Angleterre d’une maniere d’hostilite,” in contravention of the treaty. In addition, he emphatically defended his own actions with, “Major MaGregorie et les autres que vous avez pris prisonniers il n’avoient point de passeport pour aller a MissilimaKinak mais bien un passeport d’aller au Outaouaes [Ottawa].” In addition, he continues, “I ordered Major MGregory to carry them [the Ottawa prisoners] to the Ottawaways and if your claim be only Missilimaquina, what cause had you to hinder Magregory to go to the Ottawawas.” Once again, Dongan claimed that he never issued passports to trade at Michilimackinac. Curiously, both Rooseboom and McGregory carried passports issued by Dongan, both believed the pays d’en haut belonged to England, and both admitted that their destination was Michilimackinac. By admitting that he issued passports to McGregory and Rooseboom to trade amongst the Ottawa, he inadvertently admitted to breaking Article V of the treaty. However, throughout this and other

letters, Dongan defended his actions in supporting the McGregor and Rooseboom expeditions by stating that the lands of the Ottawa, Illinois, and other western peoples did not belong to the French, but to the Iroquois. In addition, Dongan agreed that Michilimackinac did belong to the French, but believed it was “free and common.”

Dongan readily admitted that he did provide arms to the Iroquois and emphatically stated, “What you allege concerning my assisting the Sinnakees [Seneca], with arms, and ammunition to warr against you,” was true and only after he learned of your “invading the King, my Masters territories, in a hostile manner. I gave them powder lead and armes; and united the five nations together to defend that part of our King’s dominions from your injurious invasion.” Dongan, who accused Denonville of breaking the treaty by attacking the Seneca obviously did not see the difficulty he created for himself. He claimed the Iroquois for England, but had no orders to this effect from James. In addition, both Dongan and Denonville agreed that their masters in Europe would decide the issue of the Iroquois and the borders. While this seemed a minor point, the subject was still volatile and unsettled. In fact, by providing arms to the Iroquois, Dongan violated Article III by giving assistance and supplies to the Iroquois. One side of the argument suggests that James II had still not claimed the Iroquois as English subjects and therefore Denonville’s expedition was legal according to the treaty but Dongan’s actions violated the treaty. However, the other side of the argument argues that Dongan was only protecting the Iroquois and therefore defending English territory while Denonville violated the treaty by attacking English subjects.


The unsettled nature of the Iroquois question suggested that Dongan violated Article X by accepting the Seneca refugees into his territory, harboring them, and protecting them from French aggression. However, the opposite is also true, in that Dongan was only protecting English subjects by accepting the refugees at Albany. These questions of sovereignty over the Iroquois would persist as Dongan and Denonville continued to implement the treaty.\textsuperscript{124}

Dongan furthered his attack: “vous me dites qu’au cas que j’assiste Iroquois vous m’estimerez un ennemy de la Colonie de Mo[ns.\textsuperscript{f},] Permettez moy de vous faire connoistre que vous [êtes] bien un plus grand Ennemy que moy a vostre colonie.” Dongan, then demanded, I “advise Mons\textsuperscript{f} Denonville to send home all the Christian and Indians prisoners the King of England’s subjects you unjustly do detaine, this I thought fit to answer to your reflecting and provoking letter.”\textsuperscript{125}

While Dongan and Denonville josted in September 1687, a situation of more consequence began plaguing New France. In the late summer and early autumn, a band of Mohawk warriors, from the easternmost nation of the Iroquois Confederacy, descended upon the outlying seigneuries of New France and attacked remote settlements throughout the Saint Lawrence Valley. Without waiting for Dongan’s replies to his letters, Denonville wrote two letters in early October. On October 2, Denonville complained that, “J’aye encore tout nouvellement sujet de me plaindre de vous et de vos officiers, puisque depuis peu vous avez loué un party de soixante aniez [Agnier – Mohawk] pour tenir faire le degast dans le pays de la nouvelle france.” Denonville once again attempted to take the upper hand by claiming the Iroquois were lawful combatants not subject to the English. He ended his letter with the charge

\textsuperscript{124} France, Cramoisy, 11.

that the English were furnishing the Iroquois with arms and ammunition to war against New France: “Je ne croy pas Monsieur que ce soit vostre Intention puis que ce n’est pas celle du Roy d’Angleterre” to contravene the treaty in this way.\footnote{Eccles, \textit{Canada}, 155; Denonville, “Lettre de Denonville à Dongan, gouverneur de New-York, (02 octobre 1687),” LAC/BAC: cote: MG1-C11A, Série C: Correspondance Générale, vol. 9, fol. 94-95v, microfilm reel F-9, (accessed June 16, 2017), 94-95v.}

Before the 2 October letter made it to Albany, Denonville wrote a second, longer letter dated October 12. This letter was a direct response to Dongan’s letter of September ninth. In a controversial paragraph, Denonville claimed that he did not receive the treaty until he returned to Montreal after his expedition ended. However, it is known that Vaudreuil not only carried orders from France, which Denonville admitted receiving, he also carried the treaty, which means that Denonville received it at the same time as his orders. However, it is possible Denonville did not study the treaty prior to his departure for Fort Frontenac. A strategic reason for Denonville’s evasion was plausible deniability and the possibility that he felt he had indeed violated the treaty by invading Iroquoia and attacking the Iroquois. Unfortunately, his reasoning is not evident within this or any subsequent letters. His evasion did have a purpose: it cemented his argument that Dongan contravened the treaty while attempting to prove that he, Denonville, did not break the treaty.\footnote{Denonville, “Lettre de Denonville à Dongan, (Québec, 12 octobre 1687),” LAC/BAC: cote: MG1-C11A, Série C: Correspondance Générale, vol. 9, fol. 98-103, microfilm reel F-9, (accessed June 16, 2017), 98v-99.}

While Denonville pleaded for Dongan to await a judgement by their masters, he reinvigorated his arguments against Dongan and his Iroquois policy.

Il faudra pour cela que vous cessiez de donner vostre protection aux Sauvages qui nous feront la guerre et que vous empeschiez que les sujais du Roy d’Angleterre ne leur donnet des armes et de la poudre…Cependant si les Iroquois continuent de faire des actes d’hostilité vous croyez bien Monsieur que je ne moubliray pas de chercher les moyens de leur en faire sentir la peine.
He further stated that he wanted all prisoners taken by the Seneca returned immediately as a show of good faith.\textsuperscript{128}  

Denonville ended with a reaffirmation of his intention to live “en bonne Intelligence selon les Intentions de nos Maistres” but with the “interest de mon Maistre” fully in mind. This letter shows a dramatic change in Denonville’s approach to Dongan. He began attempting to calm the situation and persuade Dongan to await word from Europe on the limits of their colonies and the Iroquois. At the same time, Denonville began to hold Dongan personally responsible for the actions of the Iroquois and this strategy seemed to mean that Denonville felt that the ruling on who possessed authority over the Iroquois would not go in France’s favor. This led to Denonville wanting Dongan to do what he claimed he could do, take control of the recalcitrant sachems.\textsuperscript{129}  

On October 24, 1687, a force of Mohawk and Mahican warriors descended upon the Richelieu River some twenty miles south of Montreal and besieged the French garrison at Fort Chambly. In addition, to the siege of Fort Chambly, the eastern nations of the Iroquois Confederacy began attacking remote settlements along the Saint Lawrence River causing a steady stream of refugees to pour into Quebec, Montreal, and Trois-Rivières. Meanwhile the reinvigorated western nations of the confederacy began blocking the Ottawa trade routes between the \textit{pays d’en haut} and Montreal, thus stifling the already suffering fur trade. These actions exacerbated the issues dividing Denonville and Dongan and would stifle any attempts at “une ferme paix, union, concorde, & bonne correspondence,” not only during the coming winter but also for the foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{130}  

\textsuperscript{128} Denonville, “Lettre de Denonville à Dongan, (Québec, 12 octobre 1687),” LAC/BAC, 99v.  
\textsuperscript{129} Denonville, “Lettre de Denonville à Dongan, (Québec, 12 octobre 1687),” LAC/BAC, 100.  
\textsuperscript{130} Eccles, \textit{Canada}, 156; Brodhead, \textit{History}, 488.
On October 25, Dongan wrote to Denonville in response to the October 2 letter. Dongan countered Denonville’s accusation that Dongan hired sixty Iroquois to attack New France. He argued, “I did not hyre them but I could not in justice hinder them from revenging themselves for your unjust proceedings against them.” Dongan’s confident style reverberated throughout the letter and he attempted to prove that Denonville breached the treaty by attacking the Seneca first. In addition, he contended that Article III stated that no subject of the English shall injure, attack, etc., any subject of the French and according to Dongan, the Iroquois were English subjects and therefore, Denonville violated Article III. Following this logic, both the French and the Iroquois were definitely guilty of breaching the treaty and Dongan was guilty of flaunting the treaty by his inaction and by his failing to prevent the Iroquois from attacking the French.131

Throughout the letter, Dongan countered Denonville’s claims and his policies. However, he did attempt to soften his tone and become more conciliatory as he made an offer to his opponent, “I shall be att Albany all this winter and if you will send anybody to mee…I will order that he shall come without any danger.” Dongan requested a French envoy and opened the door to a semi-formal European style diplomacy.132

After receiving Denonville’s communication of the 12th, Dongan fired back on 31 October. Dongan began with a slightly veiled accusation, “Et a l’Egard du stile dont je me suis servi du quell vous me paroissez etre offensé, je n’ay pû m’en servir d’un autre [unreadable] une personne qui ma voulu accuser d’une chose de laquelle il m’en auroit couté la teste ayant Eté trouve coupable.” However, Dongan suggested that if he followed Denonville’s advice and toned

down his arguments, he would not be doing his job and therefore would be guilty of treason.\textsuperscript{133}

Dongan also presented his first tangible demands to the French Governor.

1.\textsuperscript{5} Que satisfaction soit faite pour les effets et marchandises qui ont été prises des Chrestiens

2.\textsuperscript{5} Que vous demolissiez les deux forts, sc\'avor, celuy de Niagara Et l\’autre que vous avez fait bastir cet Été

3.\textsuperscript{5} Que vous renvoyez les Indiens des cinq nations qui ont été pris prisonniers par vos gens; Et alors nous laisserons La decision a nos Maistres touchant Les bornes Et Limittes si nous ne pourrons en convenir ainsi que Le traité de Neutralité nous le marque Et si Ils trouvent que cela Soit dependant de Vostre gouvernement Je vous y souhaitteray toutes sortes de Joyes Et benedictions.\textsuperscript{134}

Dongan’s Indian policy was not new; it originated with Edmund Andros, the former Governor of New York, but Dongan made the policy more aggressive and believed James II and England would benefit from adopting his policy as a counter against the French and their Native allies. Additionally, the Iroquois provided a buffer zone between the French in Canada and New York.\textsuperscript{135}

With the onset of colder temperatures, the Iroquois finally lifted the siege of Fort Chambly on November 2, 1687. In addition to the withdrawal from Fort Chambly, the Iroquois began a general withdraw into their own territories but continued to harass outlying settlements along the St. Lawrence. During the late autumn and early winter the Iroquois attacked: Île St. Hélène, Montreal, Fort Chambly, and several forts in the \textit{pays d\’en haut}.\textsuperscript{136}

Once again Dongan put pen to paper and wrote to Denonville on November 10. His letter


\textsuperscript{134} Dongan, “Lettre de Dongan pour répondre à celle de Denonville du 12 octobre, (31 octobre 1687),” LAC/BAC, 166.

\textsuperscript{135} Trelease, \textit{Indian Affairs}, 254-294.

\textsuperscript{136} Jose Antonio Brandao, \textit{Your Fyre Shall Burn No More: Iroquois Policy toward New France and Its Native Allies to 1701} (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), Table D.1.
was polite and to the point. Dongan duly sent McGregor to Montreal with this letter and awaited Denonville’s response.  

Denonville’s letter of 28 December 1687 was a letter of compromise and the first letter to question when the Treaty of Neutrality became effective. He informed Dongan, that on December 3, he received Dongan’s letters of October 31 and November 10 and Denonville informed him, “c’est le premier et principal article des Intentions que J’ay [unreadable] En recevant du Roy le Gouvernement general de ce pays; Jay assurance que Sa [Majesté] ny Epargnera ny hommes ny argent pour y réussir.” Denonville’s reference to his orders of March 10, 1685, was an attempt to show Dongan that he had an obligation to protect New France at all costs from the Iroquois and the English. In this letter, he attempted to counter Dongan’s statement of October 25, “I will stand by those Indians who have submitted themselves their lands and conquests under the obedience of the King of England to the last.” In addition, he showed that his orders predated the Treaty of Neutrality and thus were inviolable no matter the current treaty and its assumptions.  

In addition to arguing that his orders of 1685 directed his mission in New France, Denonville went on to state,  

[I]t is Sir the last treaty of newtrality concluded between the two crowns which doe sufficiently testify that the two Kings do reciprocally abandon the savages who shall be in warr against the subjects of either Kinge. The question now Sir is the Execution of the

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last treaty of the 16th of Novr 1686. in which you find difficulties by the right which you
will have over the five nations before this question be decided and regulated between our
Masters as you had proposed to me by your letter of the 22nd of May 1686 and which I
had accepted by my answer of the 20. of June of the same year.\footnote{Denonville, “Monsieur de Denonville to Governor Dongan, Quebec 28\textsuperscript{th} Dec’ 1687,” in \textit{Documents}, ed. Brodhead, 518.}

He continued to assure Dongan that he only wanted peace and good correspondence and
broached the subject of envoys which Dongan raised in his 10 November letter.

Vous desirez très fort de voir quelqu'un de ma part aupres de vous pour conferer de toutes
choses…J’ay crû ne pouvoir choisir une personne qui vous pu Estre plus agreeable que le
R. P. Vailland [Vaillant] Jesuite qui ne vous Est par Inconnu puisqu’il estoit Missionnaire
a Agnié [Mohawk] dans le temps que vous arriviastes au gouvernement general de la
nouvelle York…Quoy que je n’ignore pas que vous sçavez assez nostre Langue pour
confrerer avec led.\textsuperscript{1} Pere : Cependant Je luy ay [unreadable] le Sieur Du Mont qui parle
Anglois.”

In addition to announcing that he was sending an envoy, Denonville upped the stakes by
allowing Father Francois Vaillant de Gueslis to speak for him and negotiate in his own right
based upon specific instructions. In previous negotiations between Dongan and the French
governors, they used trusted messengers to relay letters and answers between them, but did not
allow these messengers to speak for them or negotiate. In December 1687, Denonville suggested
that they institute a European style diplomacy to settle their disputes by allowing envoys to speak
about and negotiate specific matters of concern within definable parameters. According to
William James Roosen, in the seventeenth-century, monarchs employed “extraordinary
ambassadors,” such as France’s François d’Usson de Bonrepaus, to complete a negotiation when
the object of that mission was uncommon and/or for a short duration. Envoys, on the other hand,
were lesser diplomats used by rulers; they had less prominence, but the envoy often had the same
powers as the “extraordinary ambassadors.” Obviously Denonville did not want to overstep his
position by appointing an ambassador, which only a monarch could do, but he needed his
diplomat restrained by and under the provisions provided by the protections offered to all diplomatic officials. Therefore, he called Vaillant an envoy and prepared him for his mission to Albany.  

While Dongan and Denonville settled in for the winter, everything seemed quiet and peaceful but they still feared the unsettled nature of their shared problems and disputes. Unfortunately for both the English and French in America, the winds of change were blowing in Europe, not only in the courts of Louis XIV and James II, but in the halls of Spain, the Habsburg Empire, Italy, the German Principalities, and the Netherlands.

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Chapter 5:
1688 -- Dongan, Denonville, the Iroquois, and the Treaty

5.1 Introduction

The Treaty of Neutrality changed the way Dongan and Denonville approached their correspondence, but another significant event further altered the epistolary dynamic between the governors. During the summer and fall of 1687 the Privy Council (PC) of James II met with representatives of Louis XIV to resolve the issues of their respective colonial bounds and limits and the political fate of the Iroquois. The negotiations took place between May and December 1687 and included James’ PC, Louis’ Ambassador, Paul Barillon d’Amoncourt, Marquis of Branges, and his Envoy Extraordinary, François d’Usson, Marquis de Bonrepos.\textsuperscript{141}

In the first memorial, the PC introduced the French diplomats and declared their appointment by Louis XIV to negotiate in his name “the adjusting” of “all Differences that have arisen or might arise between both Nations in America @ particularly for the better execution of the late Treaty of Neutrality.” On 10 November 1687, after the second conference, James issued orders to Colonel Dongan stating that the Iroquois “have submitted themselves to our Government and by their acknowledgements of our Sovereignty are become our subjects.” This was James’ first official claim to the Iroquois as subjects. He further ordered,

\[\text{[I]f any Incroachment be allowed on our Dominions or the French permitted to invade our Territories or to annoy our subjects without a due care in us to preserve the Peace of our Governments, and to give all due protection to such as have brought themselves under our Subjection [and to withhold the Iroquois] from disturbing the French in any manner whatsoever.}\]

In addition, James gave Dongan permission to “the utmost of” his “power to defend and protect” the Iroquois, and to “levy, Arm, and employ all persons” to withstand “the invasion or attempts

of the French.” Besides protecting the Iroquois, James also allowed Dongan to build forts within
the bounds of James’ territories. Even with this declaration, the bounds and limits of James’
territories were still not set and determined by the ongoing negotiations between the French and
English.¹⁴²

This letter suggests a fundamental change in James’ attitude toward his nascent American
colonial empire. By authorizing Dongan to protect the Iroquois, James attempted to shift the
balance of power in North America. By accepting the Iroquois as subjects, he implicitly claimed
all lands claimed by the Iroquois, which meant all lands south of the Great Lakes, including the
Ohio and Illinois Countries. In addition, the “subjugation” of the Iroquois added a new
dimension to the colonial debates raging at Whitehall and in North America. Even before
England’s earliest explorations in North America, the Iroquois ranged “as far as the South Sea,
the North West Passage and Florida, to war, and extended also their conquests over the part of
the Country now called Canada.” Therefore, England believed if they could establish sovereignty
over the Iroquois, then they would, own all lands and peoples the Iroquois held by the right of
conquest and by the “Tributarty subjugation” of their defeated foes. Therefore, owning the
Iroquois would secure North America for the English. Therefore, if England could legaly claim
the Iroquois and their territories based upon and agreed upon by European ideals of ownership,
then England could effectively block French south-westward expansion into the Ohio and Illinois
countries and thus deny France access to greater fur trade gains.¹⁴³

The PC suggested that James inform the French of British pretentions to sovereignty over
the Iroquois and the territories they dominated.

¹⁴² PC, “Memorials, &c., between the French Ambassador and English Commissioners about New-York Affairs,
1687,” in Documents, ed. Brodhead, 506; Brodhead, History, 494; James II, “Warrant authorizing Governor Dongan
to protect the Five Nations, 10th day of November 1687,” in Documents, ed. Brodhead, 503-504.
¹⁴³ Jennings, The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire, 12.
That it may be given in answer [to the French] that the Five Nations Viz\' the Maquaes [Mohawks], Senecas, Cayouges, Oneydes, & Onofagues [Onondagas] are your Mat\'s subjects as appears by their submissions @ acknowledgements made by them from the first settlements in these parts, and more lately by the voluntary submission made @ confirmed by them in writing to the Crown of England, the 30th day of July 1684.

In addition, they suggested, “your Mat\' be pleased to protect and support those Indians…to give them all necessary aid and assistance and oppose the French in case of another Invasion and that Coll Dungan [Dongan] be directed to build Forts.” These suggestions were appropriate, if the Iroquois belonged to the English, a proposition that the French vehemently denied.\textsuperscript{144}

Based upon James’ resolution to claim the Iroquois, the PC wrote to Dongan on 1/11 December 1687 an “Instrument for Preventing Acts of Hostilities in America.” The letter informed Dongan that he was to desist in aggravating Denonville and let the PC work towards “quieting and determining all controversies and Disputes that have arisen” and “to settle and determine the Bounds and Limitts of the Colonies.” In addition, they informed him that he should expect new orders on the subject shortly. Furthermore, they demanded that he not “commit any Act of Hostility against or to invade the subjects” of the French. The PC hoped this new “Instrument” would calm the rising tensions between Dongan and Denonville, while the PC finished negotiating the unsettled issues in North America.\textsuperscript{145}

After the PC presented James’ resolution, the French diplomats responded on 3/13 December. They stated that the Iroquois…


themselves his subjects. Shortly after, some of the Iroquois having revolted, the said Sieur de Tracy reduced those rebels, and took possession anew of their lands and forts; due record whereof was executed on the 17th October, 1666.¹⁴⁶

On January 22, 1688, Sunderland wrote to Dongan demanding an end to all hostilities between New York and New France in accordance with the Treaty of Neutrality. This letter combined with James’ “Warrant authorizing Governor Dongan to protect the Five Nations” and the PC’s “Instrument for preventing Acts of Hostility in America,” empowered Dongan to set the pace of peace and the settlement of issues between New France and New York.¹⁴⁷

However, the French did not accept James’ newfound sovereignty over the Iroquois. In fact, the French maintained that the bounds of their Colony and the subjugation of the Iroquois were never an issue between the monarchs because the Iroquois were subjects of the French. Louis vehemently disagreed with the English resolutions and issued urgent orders to Denonville on March 8, 1688. He advised Denonville to send men to the Great Lakes and the Illinois Country immediately to take possession of those French territories and to reiterate to Dongan that his pretentions to authority over the Iroquois were still false and that he, Denonville, would continue along his course to punish the recalcitrant Iroquois for their recent rebellion against French sovereignty.¹⁴⁸

During the winter of 1687, at Whitehall, the French and English attempted to put their differences aside, come to terms as to the bounds and limits of their territories, and determine the true masters of the Iroquois. This wrangling over sovereignty deepened the animosity between


Dongan and Denonville and made their correspondence more contentious as they endeavored to implement of the Treaty of Neutrality in 1688.

5.2 February 1688 -- Dongan and the French Envoys

Dongan’s and Denonville’s only European-style diplomatic exchange occurred in January 1688, when Denonville sent Jesuit Father François Vaillant de Gueslis and Monsieur Eustache Dumont to Albany as envoys. Denonville also sent along his replies to Dongan’s letters of 31 October and 10 November.149

By the end of January 1688, Vaillant and Dumont had arrived in Albany. Dongan’s first letter to the envoy, dated “3rd Feb’y 1687/8,” stated that Denonville contravened the Treaty of Neutrality by violating “the 3rd Article.” He also argued that

[I]n the month of May last in the year 1687 [when Denonville captured, detained, and confiscated the goods of Major McGregory and Johannes Rooseboom.] 2ly…in the month of June last, the French took several of the Indians…that went to trade at Cadarachqui [Cataracouy]…some whereof the Governor of Canida hath sent to France. And, “3ly…in the month of July last the French invaded the Sinnekes [Seneca] country…and built a fort att a place called Onyagro [Niagara].

While these accusations were true, the French position, as expressed by Louis XIV, the French diplomats negotiating at Whitehall, and Denonville, was that the lands and peoples involved belonged to France.150

In addition to these accusations, Dongan suggested that in order to “maintain a right

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149 Brodhead, History, 489. NOTE: Elambert Dumont: Eustache Lambert, also known as Dumont, was born December 18, 1658 in Quebec City. He was a merchant and Frontenac appointed him Second Captain of the militia in 1691. His date of death is unknown. http://genealogiequebec.info/testphp/info.php?no=27347. NOTE: Denonville’s letter of December 1688 is discussed at the end of Chapter 4.

150 Dongan, “Governor Dongan’s first Demand of the French Agents, 3rd Feb’y 1687/8,” in Documents, ed. Brodhead, 520; Brodhead, History, 494.
understanding with the Governor and Government of Canida:"

First: That all the arms and goods that were taken from Major Maggregory Mr.
Roseboom and the people that were along with them, may be restored or the value of
them.

2nd That the fort or forts built att Onyagaro or anywhere else upon the Mohegs
[Mohawks], Oneyede [Oneida], Onnondage [Onondaga], Cayouge [Cayuga],
Sinnondowanne [Seneca] land since the said 5/16 of Nov 1686. be demolished.

3dly That the prisoners of all the five nations that are in your possession may be set at
liberty and sent home to there countrey, and also that those who are sent to France be
delivered by the French Ambassadour at London to the Secretary of State there, or to
the King of England's ambassador or Agent at Paris, that a course may be taken for
there transportation to New Yorke.

4th In a word, that the Governour of Canida leave all things as they were at the makeing
of the said Articles of Neutrality.

Dongan’s demands to the French agents were the same demands he made to Denonville starting
in 1687 and remained the same throughout his governorship.151

On February 4, Vaillant and Dumont informed Dongan of the “ill treatment contrary to
all right and law” they received at the hands of drunken Mahicans, “subjects to the “Government
of New Yorke.” Specifically, the Mahicans, according to Dumont, threatened to kill “all the
French returning into Canada” and to burn all the Jesuits. Dongan was quick to reply, promising
he would restore the goods taken and punish the “offenders…for the Affront.” However, Dongan
questioned Dumont’s translation of the conversation because it differed from McGregory’s. In
fact, Dongan stated, “I have enquired of Major Maggregory and hee sayses he does not beleve
the Indyans sayd any such matter;” he suggested that Vaillant produce the drunken Mahican who
uttered the statements. This situation would continue to plague the envoys and Dongan
throughout their negotiations in Albany.152

152 Franciscus Vaillant, and Elambert Dumont, “First Paper of the French Agents to Governor Dongan, 4/14 Febr
1687/8,” in Documents, ed. Brodhead, 521; Dongan, “Governor Dongan’s second Paper to the French Agents,
February 1688,” in Documents, ed. Brodhead, 522.
Vaillant turned his attention to the treaty; in his second letter, he stated Article III of the treaty did not apply to the case of McGregor and Rooseboom. In fact, he maintained, “the 5th Article...prohibited...the subjects of the King of England to trade in the rivers or other places...subjected to the Government of the King of France.” He further wrote that McGregor and Rooseboom confessed that they were travelling to Michilimackinac. In addition, he argued that Dongan had violated Article III by supplying powder and guns to the Iroquois who were at war with the French. In addition, he contended that Denonville took the Iroquois at Cataracouy because they were enemy combatants. Finally, he denied the English claim to sovereignty over the Seneca and Niagara.153

Before ending his letter, Vaillant asserted:

I[n] his [Governor General Denonville’s] name I demand:
First: that the controversies of the limits, of destroying the fort, of restoring the goods maybe referred to the two kings as it is commanded in the treaty of neutrality.
Secondly, because a peace can not bee made without the consent of all nations, which are concerned in the war, that there be time given to call them together, and a convenient place appointed where they may all savecly meet — but since some of them lives so remote, that it will be 15 months before they can come, therefore before that time a generall peace cannot be concluded.
Wherefore Thirdly, in the mean time I demand that there may be a cessation of armes on both sides, lett not the Sinnekes or any other nation molest or damnify the Indians belonging to the French, and let not them make any excursion to the Ottowose, less any of them be killed by ours not knowing of this treaty.
Fourthly, within this time we shall hear what the two kings shall have agreed upon concerning the limits, the Fort of Niagara, and the restitution of the goods: in this manner we shall not now conclucl anything contrary to the will and pleasure of the Kings our Masters; for example, if they comand the forts to be demolished, the goods to be restored, then those shall be demolished and these restored.
Fifthly, I demand that all the prisoners, and first the Indian called Sogaresse, who with his wise and sonne is here kept closs in a certain place, and all other Indians Inhabitants of Mont Royal, and all the French detained here or amongst the Indians, lastly all the Ottowose and Hurones two yeares taken, be all restored to me, and I promise to returne as many Indians taken by us or detained either in Canada or in France —

Sixtly, if before the two Kings conclude anything concerning the limits, if the Sinnekes or any of the rest shall contrary to the 3rd art: of this present treaty act any hostility against the French or Barbarians their associates or subjects, then shall the French have right and power to renew warr, and Govr Dongan in that cause shall have no right or power to assist the Indians with armes, victuals, and other warlyke provisions, as he confesses he has done hitherto nor shall the French in that case [acquire] by that warr any other right or title to the villages of the Indians, but what they have long since purchased.

The demands presented by Vaillant, in Denonville’s name, to Governor Dongan would not change during the remainder of Denonville’s governorship.\(^{154}\)

In Dongan’s third letter, he made a major diplomatic blunder by misinterpreting the meaning of Article VI of the Treaty. He stated that McGregory’s capture contravened the treaty because Article VI authorized “shipps and other vessels of either nation for refreshing themselves &c: to go into the harbours and rivers of the other.” By using Article VI, Dongan admitted that McGregory and Rooseboom were in fact in the rivers and waters of the French. In addition, Article VI states: the vessels of the other nation can only enter the waters of the other if they “be forced through stress of Weather, pursuit of Pyrates and Enemies, or any other urgent Necessity, for the seeking of Shelter and Harbour.” These conditions obviously did not apply to the trade expeditions of the Albany merchants.\(^{155}\)

During the remainder of February 1688, Dongan and Vaillant traded diplomatic blows with neither gaining any credible traction toward getting their demands met. In addition, at no time did Dongan inform Vaillant that he received orders from James II and the Privy Council concerning the Iroquois. However, on “8. Febr\(^{1687/8}\)” Dongan wrote to his translator and messenger among the Iroquois, Robert Livingston, to inform the sachems that “the Kinge has


sent mee full orders to protect you.” Dongan obviously referred to James’ letter of November 10, “Warrant authorizing Governor Dongan to Protect the Five Nations.”

Overall, Vaillant’s diplomatic mission did not accomplish what Denonville hoped it would and Dongan sent Vaillant and Dumont back to Canada on 27 February 1688 with a terse letter for Governor Denonville. Dongan immediately wrote and dispatched a letter to Lord Sunderland on 19 February 1688. He informed Sunderland of the French diplomatic mission of Vaillant and the lack of progress between the two governors towards a resolution of their disputes and disagreements. With this dispatch to Sunderland, the first and only diplomatic mission between New France and New York ended in a stalemate with neither side gaining any ground towards the resolution of differences or further implementation of the treaty.156

5.3 Denonville and the Unstable Iroquois Situation

With the spring thaw of 1688, Denonville began thinking of a way to settle several of the disputes existing between New York and New France. Most of the disagreements between Dongan and Denonville resulted from the ambiguity associated with the Iroquois and the fractious nature of the Iroquois political system. Two defined political stances dominated the political landscape of Iroquoia. While most of the Iroquois leaned toward a pro-English political

156 Dongan, “Propositions of Governor Dongan to the Six Nations. 8. Febr 1687/8,” in Documents, ed. Brodhead, 533; Dongan, “Governor Dongan to the Lord President, Albany ye 19th feb. 1688/7,” in Documents, ed. Brodhead, 510-512. NOTE: The title of this letter is in error. The Iroquois did not admit the Tuskarora (the sixth Nation) until 1722. NOTE: See Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York: Procured in Holland, England, and France, Volume III: London Documents: I-VIII, 1614-1692, edited by John Romeyn Brodhead, pages 528-532, for the remaining Dongan, Vaillant, and Dumont correspondence. These remaining letters state the same arguments found in the first three letters from each party. NOTE: Dongan’s letter to Denonville (“Governor Dongan to Monsieur de Denonville, 17th Feb 1688,” in Documents, ed. Brodhead, page 519-520, states Dongan wrote the letter on 17 February 1688, while the LAC/BAC archival letter-response letter written by Denonville (“Lettre de Dongan à Denonville date du 27 février et réponse de Denonville date du 24 avril, (24 avril 1688),” LAC/BAC: cote: MG1-C11A, Série C: Correspondance Générale, vol. 10, fol. 32-36, microfilm reel F-10), states Dongan’s letter was dated 27 February 1688. The original letter in the MG8-A1 Series from Dongan agrees with the 27 February date. This discrepancy of 10 days could be accounted for if the original letter was dated 17/27.
stance, a stronger and more cohesive pro-French coalition began to form as Iroquois resources and society became strained due to the continuous wars plaguing the region. This so-called “pro-French faction” did not favor surrender of sovereignty to the French, but rather sought to cultivate relations with the French as a counterweight to English pretensions. Denonville could settle the issues arising from his expedition against the Seneca, the taking of the Cataracouy captives, and the exchange of prisoners without Dongan’s interference if he could secure a lasting peace with the Iroquois. That only left the determination of limits and borders, and the McGregory-Rooseboom expeditions to settle. However, with the Iroquois at peace with France, Denonville hoped peace would settle the issue of his western borders, the pays d’en haut, and France’s claims to the Illinois Country. In addition, he hoped that Fort Niagara, instead of appearing as a threat to the Iroquois, would become a bastion of trade on the south shores of the Great Lakes.\textsuperscript{157}

To procure peace Denonville needed to deal with the problems his expedition and the subsequent Iroquois retaliations raised. Beginning in the autumn of 1687, the flood of refugees into Montreal, Trois-Rivières, and Quebec City exacerbated the already strained economy of New France; by March 1688, famine, disease, and overcrowding had begun to take a toll on the colony’s infrastructure. In addition to the population pressures, the Iroquois turned the month of March into the bloodiest month of Denonville’s governorship. With the spring thaw the Iroquois began menacing Montreal and the settlements along the Saint Lawrence. In addition, disease and Iroquois attacks took their toll on Forts Frontenac and Niagara, as well as the native villages of the pays d’en haut. Fort Frontenac and Cataracouy fell to the Iroquois in April 1688 and the occupation continued until a new detachment of troupes de la marine arrived in early summer.

\textsuperscript{157} Richter, \textit{The Ordeal of the Longhouse}, 105-161.
Even more disastrous than Fort Frontenac was the state of Fort Niagara which lost 90-percent of its garrison to disease and famine. These difficulties forced Denonville to abandon Fort Niagara on July 6, and concentrate on protecting the trade routes adjacent to Cataracouy. The only bright spot for the beleaguered governor was the beginnings of peace negotiations between himself and Grande-gueule (Big Mouth or Otréouati), the Onondaga peace chief.158

Throughout the spring and early summer, Denonville met with Grande-gueule in negotiations toward a mutual peace. On 8 June 1688, Denonville agreed to peace with the Iroquois and the return of the Cataracouy captives. He immediately sent to France for their return and release. In addition to the return of prisoners on both sides, on June 15, Grande-gueule emphatically rejected English sovereignty, stating that the Iroquois were independent and that their lands belonged to the Iroquois. Grande-gueule and Denonville agreed to a conference set for later that year which would include the Iroquois, the French, and the Native allies of the French.159

Unfortunately for Denonville and the Iroquois, the delegation of Iroquois leaders, led by Deskanesoa (Teganissoren) an Onondaga chief, never arrived in New France at the prescribed time and place. In fact, a Huron sachem, Kondiaronk, known as the Rat, led a surprise attack on the delegates. Only one escaped and reached Fort Frontenac with the dire news of the unprovoked attack. The escapee made his way to Onondaga to explain the situation, but he did not arrive in time to forestall one of the greatest massacres in the history of New France. On August 5, fifteen-hundred Iroquois, not knowing of the Rat’s treachery, descended upon Lachine, and destroyed the village. During August and September Denonville continued to await the

158 Parkman, 125-126.
159 Parkman, 129-130.
arrival of the Iroquois delegates at Montreal until news reached Denonville concerning Kondiaronk’s treachery. The peace process stalled and punitive raids by the Iroquois continued.160

The failure of Denonville’s proposed Iroquois peace deflated the governor general and forced him to focus on mitigating Dongan’s growing power over the Iroquois; this growing influence threatened to destabilize the already fragile treaty negotiations.

5.4 Dongan, Denonville, and the Final Treaty Negotiations

In early-spring 1688, as Denonville prepared to offer a cease-fire and peace to the Iroquois, Father Vaillant and Eustache Lambert Dumont, made their way to Montreal. In addition to their personal reports to the Governor General, the envoys brought correspondence from Dongan. Denonville wrote to Dongan on April 24, 1688, using the two-column format for the second time. He attempted to counter Dongan’s arguments in the latter’s 27 February letter. Dongan’s letter of 27 February began by assuring Denonville that the assault upon Father Vaillant’s person made him “extrêmement fâche” and he promised to punish the drunken “sauvages” who were responsible. However, Denonville’s response called into question Dongan’s truthfulness in the matter: “On vous les montra Et vous ne pristes pas la peine de les faire arrester.” Vaillant’s report had apparently informed Denonville that Dongan did not arrest the culprits when he had the opportunity.161

In the very next exchange, Dongan complained that he had no idea what powers Denonville granted to Vaillant, but that it was inadequate to the task of negotiation and that

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160 Brodhead, History, 579; Parkman, 130-133.
Vaillant disregarded Dongan’s demands, which Dongan felt were “si justes Et si raisonnables.” Denonville’s response was an accusation that Dongan did not want to settle anything with Father Vaillant and refused “de remettre tous nos differens à nos Maistres suivant les ordres que vous Et moy En avons receu.” He added, “Lizez sil vous plait L’article 17. du traité de neutralité,” which instructed the governors to submit their grievances to their respective monarchs if they should encounter an impasse.162

Despite attempts to maintain “a firm Peace, Union, Amity and good Correspondence,” Dongan once again inserted his demands into the Dongan-Denonville correspondence. In addition, Dongan followed his demands with the assertion that, “Ce sont les commandames de moy Maistre.” Denonville did not believe Dongan received orders from James II or the PC and stated so in his rebuttal. In addition to questioning Dongan’s truthfulness about orders from England, Denonville assured Dongan that he would await orders from Louis before continuing any discussion of Dongan’s demands.163

Denonville’s certainty that Dongan had not received such orders came from the intelligence gathered by his envoy, Father Vaillant. However, the “Warrant authorizing Governor Dongan to protect the Five Nations,” dated November 10, 1688, did make it to New York in January 1688. Proof of this comes from Dongan’s letter to the Iroquois dated “8. Febr. 1687/8,” in which he stated, “the Kinge has sent mee full orders to protect you.” In addition, the opening of Dongan’s 17 February letter mentions that “severall papers have passed between us,” Dongan and the French envoys, which suggests that Dongan kept the French envoys at a distance and did

163 GB, 3; Denonville and Dongan, “Lettre de Dongan à Denonville date du 27 février et réponse de Denonville date du 24 avril, (24 avril 1688),” 32v-33.
not inform them of the arrival of orders from England. The latter were not very astute spies. Consequently, Denonville and Vaillant did not know of Dongan’s new orders.\footnote{James II, “Warrant authorizing Governor Dongan to protect the Five Nations, 10th day of November 1687,” in Documents, ed. Brodhead, 503-504; Dongan, “Propositions of Governor Dongan to the Six Nations. 8. Febr’ 1687/8,” in Documents, ed. Brodhead, 533; Calières, De La Maniere de le Negocier avec les Souverains De l’Utilité des Negociations, du Choix des Ambassadeurs & des Envoyez, & des Qualitez Necessaires pour Réüssir dans Ces Emplois (Amsterdam: pour La Compagnie, MDCCXVI [reprint Farmington Hills, MI: Gale Making of Modern Law Print Editions, 2013]), 30. NOTE: Calières states that it is the function of all diplomats to became “un honorable Espion” and in the case of Father Vaillant failing to notice the arrival of orders from Europe, he obviously failed his mission as a spy.}

The subject of language came up due to Dongan’s attempt to define who was “sauvage” and who was not when it came to the imposition of imperial or colonial sovereignty. As noted in Chapter 3, Articles II and X of the treaty employed ambiguous and conflicting language. In his 27 February letter, Dongan wrote:

> Et Pour ce qui est du traité de Neutralité dans la copie française le mot de sauvage M’f fait aucune difference mais il n’y Est pas de mesme de la copie Anglaise ou on Se Sert du mot de Sauvage Indien pour distinguer [ceux] qui sont Soumis sous un Gouvernement d’aux ceux qui ne le sont pas.

Denonville countered with:

> Vous ne pouvez par aucune subtilité de Signification donner aucun atteinte aux Termes de l’article troisième du traité de Neutralité dont vous voulez parler puis que la version Latine du Traité de Neutralité que vous m’avez Envoyée m’explique Suffisamment que L’Intention de nos Maistres Est de comprendre Sous le mot de, Barbaris, celuy de tous les Sauvages avec lesquels l’un des deux Roys sera Est guerre Et le mot de Barbaris En Latin signifie Sauvages En français Et Barbarous Wil[d] Indien En Anglais Est toute la mesme chose quel Barbaris En Latin Et Sauvages en français vostre Langue n’est pas Inconnue En france non plus que Le français En Angleterre.

In one single paragraph, Denonville refuted the claim that language was an obstacle to the implementation of the treaty and to determining which Natives could and could not be subjects of their colonies.\footnote{Denonville and Dongan, “Lettre de Dongan à Denonville date du 27 février et réponse de Denonville date du 24 avril,” 34v.}

Dongan next suggested that he and Denonville, “laisser les choses dans le mesme Estat
ou Elle Estait lorsque Le traité fut signé.” Denonville responded in the following terms:

Si Vous aviez voulu...laisser les choses comme Elles Estaient alors Et de remettre a nos Maistres La decision des limites vous n’auriez pas Entrepris de les regler de Vostre chef comme Vous avez voulu faire...Je vous demande de remettre la chose au Jugement de nos Maistres. 166

This was not the first time Denonville admonished Dongan for not leaving the decision concerning the borders and limits of the colonies to James and Louis to settle and it would not be the last. Denonville begged for Dongan to see the wisdom of letting their masters settle the matter of bounds and limits because he believed that all lands not contained within the former colony of New Netherland, now New York, belonged to France. He based this upon the explorations of Rene-Robert Cavelier, Sieur de la Salle and the missionary work among the Natives of the pays d’en haut and the Illinois Country. As mentioned earlier, Dongan believed that all lands south of the Great Lakes and west of New York belonged to the Iroquois and by default the English. The remainder of the letter and response concerned the exchange of prisoners and the taking of captives.

In April 1688, James II and the PC instituted the Dominion of New England and on April 22, they wrote to Dongan ordering him to resign his government to Edmund Andros. The decision was not easy for James; he had the choice of promoting the aggressive Catholic Governor of New York, Colonel Thomas Dongan, or the calmer and gentler Protestant Edmund Andros. While James was happy with the Catholic governor’s administration, he decided that it was more prudent to appoint the more tranquil Andros to such a delicate position. In addition, Dongan’s Catholicism was a detriment due to the anti-French sentiments of the English

166 Denonville and Dongan, “Lettre de Dongan à Denonville date du 27 février et réponse de Denonville date du 24 avril, (24 avril 1688),” 34v-35. NOTE: A more in-depth discussion of the French and English debates into the ownership and sovereignty over the Iroquois and their lands id found in the opening section of this chapter.
Meanwhile with the spring thaw, a letter from Louis XIV, dated March 8, arrived in Canada. Louis praised Denonville’s handling of the Seneca expedition, the McGregor-Rooseboom arrests, and the response to Dongan’s demands. Louis also wrote, “Je luy donne avis [avis] que le Roy dang.re [d’Angleterre] a rappellé le Colonel D’onguent [Dongan].” This piece of news suggests that Louis dispatched the letter immediately after learning of Dongan’s recall and it is possible that Denonville knew of the recall even before the English governor, though there is no evidence that Denonville took advantage of any such intelligence. ¹⁶⁸

In early May, as the harsh winter turned to spring, Dongan made his way to Albany to be on hand to calm the situation between the French and the Iroquois. Meanwhile, Denonville began dealing with reactions to the 1687 expedition in the form of increased Iroquois attacks against French traders and settlements. He wrote to Dongan on May 12, 1688: “Les loints que vous continuez de prendre pour Engager Les Sauvages a ne point cessé de faire Les actes d’hostilité contre les sujais [sujets] du Roy mon Maistre…c’est contre Les ordres que vous en avez recue du Roy Vostre Maistre Suivant Le traité de neutralité.” In addition, Denonville reminded Dongan that his previous orders from James II, which Dongan shared with him, explained “assez nettement que vous ny pouvez contrevenir Directement ou Indirectement Sans Vous Exposer a une très fascheusse.” Denonville further went on to accuse Dongan of giving “des presens [présents] excessifs aux Sauvages pour Les obliger de marcher contre La Colonie” of New


France.  

After accusing Dongan of inciting the Iroquois to attack New France, specifically Fort Chambly, he offered some advice to the English governor: “Le meilleur avis que j’aye a vous donner Mons.  est de faire reflexion Sur Les Suittes d’une Si fascheuse affaire qui vous arrivera Infailliblement Si vous continuez des user de meme…Je vous declare pour la troisième foy [foi] que suivant Le traité de neutralité fait Entre leurs Majestés.” Denonville added that he only wanted “La Bonne Intelligence…Entre nos Maistres,” but Dongan made that accommodation very hard to achieve. In addition, Denonville asked Dongan to reign in the merchants at Orange and to restrain the Iroquois from attacking the French in Canada.

Except for the occasional raids by the Iroquois, the frontier between New France and New York remained quiet during the early summer months of 1688 as Denonville met with Grande-gueule in Montreal. Throughout the summer Denonville continued to correspond with Dongan in pursuit of peace. On June 18, 1688, he wrote a short letter to the New York governor, opening his missive with news of a second Treaty of Neutrality dated 1/11 December 1687. This new treaty reiterated the need for peace in the Americas. In addition, Denonville informed Dongan of his ongoing negotiations with the Iroquois to secure “un accommodation general,” addin that he wished to continue correspondence with the English governor. “Je souhaiterois fort avoir l’honneur de vous Entretenir autrement que par Lettre a fin de voir avec vous Si nous ne pourions pas faciliter Les moyens d’Exeucter une Chose Si avantageuse a la Religion Et Si glorieuse a [à] nos Maistre.”


170 Denonville, “Lettre de Denonville à Dongan, (Montréal, 12 mai 1688),” 46v-47.

In June 1688, Dongan finally received orders issued in January by James II and the PC. The first of these letters, dated 22 January 1687, was an “Order to Governor Dongan for the Cessation of Hostilities,” and the second, dated 1/11 December 1687, was the “Instrument for Preventing Acts of Hostility in America.” The first communication demanded that Dongan cease antagonizing Denonville and restrain the Iroquois. The “Instrument for Preventing Hostilities,” stemmed from the December 1687 treaty, which reinforced the precepts of the 1686 Treaty. In fact, the “Instrument” expressly forbade him “to committ any Act of Hostility against or to invade” the other.\textsuperscript{172}

With the arrival of these vital documents of peace, Dongan wrote to Denonville, and informed him he hoped, “nos deux Maistres accommoderont tous nos Differens a L’amiable et presentement Le passage entre nos deux gouvernements Est libre, Et s’il y a quelque chose qui soit dans mon gouvernement Il est a votre Service Et vous n’avez qua Commander.” Beginning with the Summer correspondence the situation between the two governors seemed to become amicable and their actions seemed to be tending towards greater cooperation for the good of both colonies.\textsuperscript{173}

While Denonville awaited the arrival of the Iroquois sachems for further peace negotiations, he wrote to Dongan on 5 July. Denonville assured Dongan that he continued to want amicable relations and that it was easy to see “Les Bons desseins que Vous avez d’executer

\textsuperscript{172} Sunderland, “Order for the Cessation of Hostilities, 22\textsuperscript{nd} day of January 1687,” in Documents, ed. Brodhead, 504; PC, “Instrument for preventing Acts of Hostility in America, 1/11 day of December 1687,” in Documents, ed. Brodhead, 505. NOTE: The date of 22 January 1687 is correct according to the English calendar which used 25 March as the beginning of the new year until 1752. The letter is 1688 according to the modern calendar. See Duel/Split Year Information.

ponctuellement tous les ordres que Vous avez receu du Roy vostre Maistre pour la maintien de L’Union entre Les Deux Colonies.” Denonville raised no disputes or concerns over the implementation of the treaty or any current situations that required Dongan’s attention. Overall, the letter was benign and friendly, unlike the correspondence prior to June 1688.\footnote{Denonville, “Lettre de Denonville à Dongan, (Montréal, 05 juillet 1688),” LAC/BAC: cote: MG1-C11A, Série C: Correspondance Générale, vol. 10, fol. 56-58v, microfilm reel F-10, (accessed June 16, 2017), 56.}

While Denonville wrote his letter, Dongan was doing the same, except he wrote his in Latin. Dongan felt that the urgency and importance of the message required Latin, to prevent a misinterpretation or misunderstanding. Dongan informed Denonville that the orders he received from England that allowed him to protect the Iroquois, James II having decided to accept them as subjects of the crown. In addition, Dongan promised to do all in his power to quell any unrest among the Iroquois and to punish all transgressions and injuries against New France. Without mentioning the treaty, Dongan promised to uphold Article III, which stated that no subject of either King shall attack or cause injury to subjects of the other.\footnote{Dongan, “Lettre de Dongan à Denonville, (Albany, 07 juillet 1688),” LAC/BAC: cote: MG1-C11A, Série C: Correspondance Générale, vol. 10, fol. 59-60, microfilm reel F-10, (accessed June 16, 2017), 59-60.}

After writing his letter of July 7, 1688, Dongan moved from Albany back to Manhattan to receive additional orders expected from England. On July 28, he received Edmund Andros in Manhattan, together with James’ order of recall dated April 22. After turning over his government to Andros, Dongan retired to his estate at Hampstead, Long Island. Denonville wrote one last letter to Colonel Dongan, dated August 20, 1688. It was a conciliatory letter informing his counterpart that the prisoners Dongan released in July had made their way to Montreal and that Denonville released additional Iroquois prisoners. Unknown to Dongan, Denonville had abandoned Fort Niagara in July, but Denonville, feeling magnanimous, stated, “A L’Egard du
fort de Niagara dont vous m’escrives [écrive] Je veux bien vous assurer que sitost [sitôt] que Je verray quelques sevres lés sur les affaires Je retireray la garnison qui y est pour contribuer a une bonne paix.” With the fort already abandoned, Denonville had nothing to lose and everything to gain politically, not only with the Iroquois but also with the English. Therefore, the white lie, which he also told the Iroquois, became a treaty negotiation point in favor of the French. Dongan would never answer this last letter; instead his successor, Sir Edmund Andros, took over the correspondence.176

5.5 Denonville, Edmund Andros, and the Death of the Treaty

Sir Edmund Andros arrived back in North America in 1688 with a commission as Viceroy of the Dominion of New England and instructions to continue the good work of Colonel Dongan in New York, especially his work with the Iroquois. In late-July Andros made his way to Manhattan to meet with Dongan and transmit his letter of recall. After relieving Dongan of his government, Andros immediately called a conference with the Iroquois at Albany.177

Before departing for Albany, Andros wrote to Denonville informing him of the situation in the English Colonies and of the decision of James II “de reconnaître les cinq nations ou cantons des Indiens” as his subjects. In addition, Andros stated, “Jadjouteray a cecy que j’auray toutes sortes d’égards par traite fait entre les Roys.” This affirmation suggests that James II and the PC thoroughly briefed Andros on the treaty and their desire that he uphold it. In fact, Andros finishes his letter promising to avoid misunderstandings and to “entertaine a good


177 Brodhead, History, 509, 512, 517.
correspondence” with Denonville.  

On August 30, Andros met with the Iroquois and informed them that James II accepted them as subjects. In mid-September, Andros named the Iroquois ‘Children’’ in the same fashion as his predecessors, but dissention arose among the Five Nations as the Mohawk rejected the term “children” and demanded that the former agreements between the Mohawk and the English remain, insisting that they would only refer to Andros as “Corlaer” and not “Brother” or “Father.” Corlaer. Following this assertion by the Mohawk orator Sindackseigie, the Cayuga, Oneida, Onondaga, and Seneca accepted Andros as “Father Corlaer” thus changing the nature of the covenants between the English and four of the Iroquois Nations. The sachems present at the conference promised not to negotiate with the French without first seeking permission from Andros. However, this arrangement would bring peace only if the Iroquois could negotiate peace with Denonville.

Shortly after Andros’ mid-September meeting with the Iroquois, he once again wrote to Denonville on September 19, accusing him of sending his Native allies to kill anti-French Iroquois and raid their villages. Once again, the implementation and application of the treaty became contentious as Andros told Denonville that, because of the difficulties involved “je n'ay fait aucune poursuite Et les Cinq Nations mestant venues trouver Ici. Je leur ay mis en memoire d’observer ponctuellement La derniere trève faite.” Overall, Andros’ second letter attempted to

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179 Brodhead, History, 517-518.
put Denonville on the defensive.\textsuperscript{180}

In Denonville’s mémoire to the ministre de la marine of October 1688, he asked for the return of the Cataracouy captives to soothe tensions between the colony and the Iroquois. This request coincided with the attack on the friendly sachems heading to Montreal by the Huron Kondiaronk (the Rat). By returning the Cataracouy prisoners, Denonville hoped to appease the injury caused by this treacherous ally.\textsuperscript{181}

Andros wrote to Denonville on October 1, 1688, demanding that he refrain from violating Articles III or X of the treaty, which state respectively, “neither shall they give any Assistance or Supplies of Men or Victuals to the barbarous or wild Indians, with whom the King of Great Britain shall have a War,” and “The Subjects of either Nation shall not Harbor the Barbarous or wild Inhabitants…Neither shall they give them any Assistance or Protection in their said Depredations.” With Andros’ arrival, the amity and good correspondence which Dongan and Denonville fought to achieve and foster was over.\textsuperscript{182}

Denonville responded to the English Viceroy on 23 October. This would be his last letter to an English official as governor general of New France. Denonville applauded Andros’ “bonnes intentions pour le maintien de la bonne intelligence entre les deux Colonies” and his willingness to refer disputed interpretations of the treaty to James and Louis. He informed Andros that “les Iroquois estoient convenus avec moy cet été de m’envoyer des deputés des cinq villages qui m’aprenant la ratification de la paix.” In addition, he raised the subject of the


missing sachems who he expected to meet with him in mid-summer. In an attempt at appeasing Andros concerning the Cataracouy prisoners, Denonville assured him,

A L’Egard des prisonniers Iroquois que j’ay envoyé en France ayant promis aux Iroquois comme J’ay fait que je les demanderois au Roy vous ne devés pas avoir peine a croire que je m’employeray de boneur [?] pour l’amour de vous a faire mon possible pour obtenir la grace de sa Majesté de les renvoyer Icy.

By informing Andros of the impending release of the Cataracouy captives, Denonville hoped to put to rest one of the few remaining disputes between New York, New France, and the Iroquois.  

The winter passed quietly in America, but momentous events were taking place in Europe which would end the cooperation between the English and French in America. While Andros and Denonville negotiated the remaining items of dispute between them, William of Orange and his wife, Mary, the daughter of James II, landed on English shores, launching the Glorious Revolution which would remove James from the throne of England and Andros from power in the colonies. In addition to isolating France and depriving her of her only true ally, the invasion effectively ended the treaty.

News of the Glorious Revolution reached America in February 1689 and by May the League of Augsburg had declared war against France. On May 31, Louis issued orders for Denonville’s recall. In October 1689, Louis de Baude, Comte de Frontenac, returned to New France with the Cataracouy captives and the recall order for Denonville. Denonville and his family sailed for France that same month with war looming in North America. Thus, ended the

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first peace treaty to give colonial governors power to settle their own disputes.\textsuperscript{185}

Chapter 6:
Aftermath and Conclusion

6.1 England, France, and Europe

The Glorious Revolution, and the subsequent declaration of war, terminated the Treaty of Neutrality and the work of Dongan and Denonville. After forcing James II to flee to France, William and Mary immediately joined the League of Augsburg against Louis XIV. This act pitted England and her new allies against France and ended three decades of mutual assistance and peace in the French and British Atlantic worlds. Louis found himself beset on all sides with no ally to turn to. War erupted on 27 September 1688, known variously as the War of the League of Augsburg (1688-1697), the Nine Years’ War, and the War of the Grand Alliance, and in British America as King William’s War. The arrival of war in North America put an end to the “Treaty of Peace, Good Correspondence and Neutrality in America.”

6.2 New York, New France, and the Iroquois

News of the Glorious Revolution reached American shores in late 1688, but the repercussions struck New York on April 26, 1689. On this day, the Massachusetts Bay Colony declared the Dominion of New England was defunct and re-instituted their charter. Edmund Andros, the Viceroy of the Dominion, found himself arrested and imprisoned for treason. While the Dominion of New England and Andros never formally negotiated the implementation of the Treaty of Neutrality, his imprisonment effectively ended the treaty in North America as each colony re-took control over their own affairs from the Dominion.

When news of the Massachusetts rebellion against the Dominion reached New York an anti-papist, anti-Catholic, anti-James II campaign began growing among the staunch Protestant

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186 Miller, James II, 205-209; Levi, Louis XIV, 257; Wilkinson, 175; Trelease, 295; Francis Jennings, 194-195.
population. Jacob Leisler, a German-born colonist, wealthy fur trade entrepreneur, and militia Captain, stepped into the power vacuum and took control of the government. The anti-Catholic/anti-French Leisler ended all cooperation between the New York and New France, thus destroying the treaty. As the unstable government of New York began their anti-French and anti-Catholic purges and campaigns, the new governor of Canada, Louis de Baude, Comté de Frontenac prepared for war. The Iroquois sided with the English and prepared for war against the hated French. All Denonville and Dongan’s hard work and struggles towards an amicable peace between New France and New York crumbled as France, England, and their colonies Prepared for War.\textsuperscript{188}

6.3 Colonel Thomas Dongan

When Dongan received his royal order of recall in July 1688, he turned over his government to Edmund Andros and retired to his estate in Hampstead. During the aftermath of the Glorious Rebellion, Jacob Leisler swore out several arrest warrants for Colonel Dongan forcing him to attempt a voyage to England in June 1689. Unfortunately for Dongan, he quickly succumbed to severe sea sickness and returned to New York; after landing he fled to Connecticut in August, eventually ending up in Rhode Island. In November, he snuck back to his Hampstead estate, staying there until he received word that Leisler’s militia had orders to arrest him on warrants issued on February 15 and 21, 1690. Dongan fled to New Jersey and eventually to Massachusetts in May 1690 where he met up with the recently escaped Edmund Andros.\textsuperscript{189}

Dongan finally boarded his second ship to England and arrived sometime in 1691. Prior to his arrival, William III and Parliament passed a new set of laws barring Catholics from public

\textsuperscript{188} Lovejoy, 251-256, 315.

\textsuperscript{189} Kennedy, 102, 105, 106-107; Danaher, 45-46.
and governmental office. This limited his choices under the Protestant regime. In addition, Dongan learned of his brother’s exile in France along with James II. During the next two years he petitioned for the return of the Dongan estates in Ireland and for his unpaid pension. These petitions failed. In 1698, Dongan’s brother, William, the First Earl of Limerick, passed away in exile and Thomas immediately petitioned for the return of his rightful title and the lands associated with the earldom. Unfortunately, Parliament and William III gave away his lands to their Dutch supporters and Thomas received only his title as the Second Earl of Limerick, but no revenues or lands. Throughout the next seventeen years, Dongan continued to petition for funds, pensions, and lands to no avail.  

On December 14, 1715 Colonel Thomas Dongan passed away destitute, forgotten, having never married and with no offspring, at the age of 82. His tombstone at St. Pancras churchyard in London, “bears the following inscription: THE RIGHT HON. THOMAS DONGAN, EARL OF LIMERICK, DIED, DECEMBER 14, 1715, AGED 82 YEARS. REQUIESCAT IN PACE. AMEN.” A memorial marker erected at St. Peter’s Church, New York City, by the “Fourth Degree Knights of Columbus, in October 1911, reads:

IN MEMORY OF
THOMAS DONGAN
BORN 1634       DIED 1715
EARL OF LIMERICK  GENERAL IN THE
ARMIES OF ENGLAND AND FRANCE,
IRISH PATRIOT AND DEVOTED CATHOLIC,
GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK, 1683-1688,

FATHER OF THE FIRST REPRESENTATIVE ASSEMBLY, AND
“THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES”
GRANTING POPULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS TOLERATION,
TRIAL BY JURY, IMMUNITY FROM MARTIAL LAW,
FREEDOM FROM ARBITRARY ARREST,
FRAMER OF THE FIRST CHIT CHARTERS FOR

190 Kennedy, 107, 109-112; Danaher, 45-46, 49-50; Phelan, 138-139.
6.4 Jacques-René de Brisay, Marquis de Denonville

Even before leaving New France, Denonville was appointed as “sous-gouverneur du duc de Bourgogne” by Louis XIV. Denonville’s appointment took effect on August 20, 1689, while he was still governor of New France. He left the colony soon after relinquishing his government to Frontenac in October 1689. Upon arriving back in France, on December 26, he immediately made his way to Versailles to prepare a memoire concerning the state of affairs in New France.¹⁹²

Less than a year later, on March 10, 1690, Louis XIV appointed Denonville to the post of “Maréchal des camps et armées du Roi.” In August of the same year Louis once again rewarded his faithful servant by appointing him as the “sous-gouverneur du duc d’Anjou.” Denonville’s star continued to rise as Louis appointed him to additional posts and granted him additional incomes. On August 24, 1693, the king “le chargea de cette même fonction auprès du duc de Berry.” Throughout the remaining years of his life, Denonville continued in the good graces of Louis XIV.¹⁹³

In September 1710, at the age of 73, Jacques-Rene de Brisay, marquis de Denonville

¹⁹¹ Kennedy, 112; Danaher, 51; Phelan, 142. Note: Kennedy’s dates associated with Dongan’s death does not agree with Danaher and Phelan’s. Both Danaher and Phelan state he died on December 14, 1715, while Kennedy states he died on December 15, 1715. Danaher’s Address seems the most authoritative of the texts but also glosses over a lot of the more questionable actions of Dongan.

¹⁹² Eccles, Canada, 167; Leclerc, 256-257, 262; Prince-Falmagne, 258-259.

¹⁹³ Prince-Falmagne, 266-267.
passed away at the “château de Denonville” in Denonville, France. His burial took place “en présence de son fils Pierre-René et de son gendre, Charles-Louis de Rogres, Marquis de Champignelles.” The location of his grave is the cellar of the Catholic Chapel at the Château de Denonville.  

6.5 Conclusion

The Treaty of Peace, Good Correspondence and Neutrality in America became a footnote to North American history due to its short lifespan and its questionable success. The purpose of the treaty was to keep the American colonies out of European wars and to prevent conflict between the English and French colonies themselves. The governors of the colonies were to maintain “firm Peace, Union, Amity and good Correspondence.” The treaty also gave the governors power to practice intercolonial diplomacy, thus enhancing their political role within the Atlantic World and creating a politically meaningful colonial space.  

Dongan and Denonville attempted to maintain amicable relations and good correspondence during the life of the treaty. Unfortunately, neither governor had the appropriate preparations for such a task. Both were military officers; neither possessed training in the arts of diplomacy. In spite of these limitations, each governor made a valiant and tenacious effort to interpret, negotiate, and implement the treaty. The two expressed their respective views and policies into a mutual correspondence that provides historians with an invaluable window into the complexities of their mutual relations. Their letters also allow us to chart the evolution of intercolonial relations at a crucial period of conflicts and tense negotiations.  

However, while the governors did adhere to and attempt to implement the treaty in the

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194 Prince-Falmagne, 268.
195 GB. “Treaty of peace.”
196 Callières, Negocier avec les Souverains, 210-212; Roosen, 67, 74.
manner which their respective monarchs demanded, the only significant issues and disputes settled by the treaty were those peripheral to the treaty itself and not mentioned explicitly within the treaty’s articles. The most important question was which nation would claim the Iroquois as their subjects. The Five Nations, while not firmly in the English camp when the treaty arrived on American shores, were, according to Colonel Dongan, English subjects who accepted Charles II and then James II as their sovereign. The actions of Frontenac, La Barre, and Denonville only pushed the Iroquois more firmly into the arms of the English. This issue predated the treaty, but it pervaded every discussion between Dongan and Denonville of the treaty and its implementation.

The treaty and the correspondence also attempted to find common ground between New France and New York and to settle their mutual borders in the interests of peace and amity. While the governors never achieved total harmony, they did stave off war between New France and New York and eventually calmed the ire of the Iroquois to such a degree that they requested a peace treaty with the French in 1687. In fact, by June 1688, the correspondence between the governors had become quite amicable.197

The treaty did accomplish some of its goals, especially in opening up communications between the governor-general of New France and the governor of New York. While the system of good correspondence did not outlive the tenures of Dongan and Denonville, it does seem that the right men were in office at the right time and they did create a contentious amity between the colonies. In fact, early in his governorship, Colonel Dongan of New York proved he was willing to communicate with his rivals in Canada to settle disputes even in the absence of a Treaty of Neutrality. Later, when Denonville replaced La Barre, he also proved ready to come to terms

197 Parkman, 129,
with and communicate with his counterpart.

Why then have most historians in the field of Colonial American field, such as Parkman, Osgood and Eccles, failed to see the value of the correspondence and the Treaty of Neutrality? First, the treaty did not have any major impacts on the history of New France or New York; second, the treaty did not last long enough to make a true difference in colonial politics; and third, events in Europe superseded the treaty and radically changed the political climate in America. In total, the treaty existed in America for 18-months and accomplished very little for either nation.\(^{198}\)

However, it is the intangibles, the elusive facts, emotions, ideals, and philosophies of the governors that makes the correlation between the treaty and the correspondence a vital item of study. The sheer number of letters between Dongan and Denonville and the subjects contained within those letters paint a picture of intercolonial politics and diplomacy in the late-seventeenth-century. These letters and the treaty depict the minutiae of colonial governance, which requires further exploration if historians are to fully understand the 229 years of conflict and cooperation that marked relations between the English and French in North America. Historians tend to emphasize conflict between these imperial rivals, but there were in fact extensive periods of peace. Even if the Treaty of Neutrality only makes up a year and a half of that history, it nicely illustrates the pacific dimension of French-English relations in colonial North America.\(^{198}\)

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TREATY Of Peace, Good Correspondence & Neutrality IN AMERICA, Between the most Serene and Mighty Prince JAMES II. By the Grace of GOD, King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, Defender of the FAITH, &c. And the most Serene and Mighty Prince LEWIS XIV. The Most Christian King : Concluded the 6/16th Day of Novemb. 1686.

Published by his Majesties Command.
Printed by Thomas Newcomb in the Savoy. 1686.

TREATY Of Peace, Good Correspondence and Neutrality in America, Between the most Serene and Mighty Prince JAMES the Second, By the Grace of GOD, KING of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, &c. And the most Serene and Mighty Prince LEWIS the Fourteenth, The Most Christian King : Concluded the 6/16th Day of November 1686.

I.

IT is Concluded and Agreed, That from this day forward there be a firm Peace, Union, Amity and good Correspondence, as well by Land as by Sea, between the British and French in America, as well Northern as Southern ; and within the Islands, Colonies, Forts, Cities and Governments (without exception of Places) belonging to the most Serene King of Great Britain, or to the most Serene most Christian King, and which are under the Jurisdiction of either King respectively.

II.

That no Ships or Vessels, great or small belonging to the most Serene King of Great Britain’s Subjects in the said English Islands, Colonies, Forts, Cities and Governments, shall be fitted out or imploied to Invade or Attack the most Serene most Christian King’s Subjects in
their Islands, Colonies, Forts, Cities and Governments, or to do them any injury or damage. In like manner than no Ships or Vessels, great or small, belonging to the most Serene most Christian King’s Subjects in the said French Islands, Colonies, Forts, Cities and Governments, shall be fitted out, or employed to Invade or Attack the most Serene King of Great Britain’s Subjects in their Islands, Colonies, Forts, Cities and Governments, or to do them any injury or damage.

III.

That no Soldiers, Armed Men, or any others whatsoever, inhabiting and living in the said English Islands, Colonies, Forts, Cities and Governments, or who come out of Europe to be in Garison there, shall commit any Act of Hostility, or do any injury or damage directly or indirectly against the most Serene most Christian King’s Subjects in the said French Islands, Colonies, Forts, Cities and Governments, neither shall they give any Assistance or Supplies of Men or Victuals to the barbarous or wild Indians, with whom the most Christian King shall have a War.

In like manner no Souldiers, Armed Men, or any others whatsoever, inhabiting and living in the said French Islands, Colonies, Forts, Cities and Governments, or who come out of Europe to be in Garison there, shall commit any Act of Hostility, or do any injury or damage directly or indirectly against the most Serene King of Great Britain’s Subjects in the said English Islands, Colonies, Forts, Cities and Governments; neither shall they give any Assistance or Supplies of Men or Victuals to the barbarous or wild Indians, with whom the King of Great Britain shall have a War.

IV.

It is agreed, That both Kings shall have an retain to themselves all the Dominion, Rights
and Pre-eminences in the American Seas, Roads, and other Waters whatsoever, in as full and ample manner as of right belongs unto them, and in much manner as they now possess the same.

V.

And therefore the Subjects, Inhabitants, Merchants, Commanders of Ships, Masters and Mariners of the Kingdoms, Provinces and Dominions of each King respectively shall abstain and forbear to Trade and Fish in all Places possest, or which shall be possest by the one or the other Party in America, viz. The King of Great Britain’s Subjects shall not direct their Commerce and Trade, nor Fish in the Havens, Bays, Creeks, Roads, Shoars, or Places which the most Christian King holdeth, or shall hereafter hold in America; and in like manner the most Christian King’s Subjects shall not direct their Commerce and Trade, nor Fish in the Havens, Bays, Creeks, Roads, Shoars, or Places which the King of Great Britain possesseth, or shall hereafter possess in America. And if any Ship or Vessel shall be found Trading or Fishing contrary to the Tenor of this Treaty, the said Ship or Vessel with its Lading (due Proof thereof being made) shall be Confiscated; Nevertheless the Party, who shall find himself aggrieved by such Sentence of Confiscation, shall have liberty to apply himself to the Council of State of that King, by whose Governours or Judges the Sentence has been given against him, and there complain of the Matter, which nevertheless shall not stop the Execution of the Sentence: But it is always to be understood, That the Liberty of Navigation ought in no manner to be disturbed, where nothing is committed against the genuine sense of this Treaty.

VI.

It is also agreed, That in case the Subjects and Inhabitants of either of the Kings with their Shipping (whether Publick and of War, or Private and of Merchants) be forced through stress of Weather, pursuit or Pyrates and Enemies, or any other urgent Necessity, for the seeking
of Shelter and Harbour, to retreat and enter into any of the Rivers, Creeks, Bays, Havens, Roads, Ports and Shoars belonging to the other in America, they shall be received and treated there with all Humanity and Kindness, and enjoy all friendly Protection and Help: And it shall be lawful for them to refresh and provide themselves at reasonable and the usual Rates with Victuals, and all things needful either for the Sustenance of their Persons, or Reparation of their Ships, and Conveniency of their Voyage; and they shall in no manner be detained or hindered from returning out of the said Ports or Roads, but shall remove and depart when and whither they please, without any let or impediment: Provided always, that they do not break Bulk, nor carry out of their Ships any Goods, exposing them for Sale, nor receive any Merchandise on Board, nor employ themselves in Fishing, under Penalty of the Confiscation of Ships and Goods, as in the foregoing Article is expressed. And it is further agreed, that whencesoever the Subjects of either King shall be forced to enter with their Ships into the other’s Ports, as is above mentioned, they shall be obliged at their coming in to hang out their Flag or Colours of their Nation, and give notice of their coming by thrice firing a Cannon, and if they have no Cannon, by thrice firing a Musket, which if they shall omit to do so, and however fend their Boat on Shoar, they shall be liable to Confiscation.

VII.

If any Ships belonging to either of the Kings, their People and Subjects, shall within the Coasts or Dominions of the other stick upon the Sands, or be Wreckt (which God forbid) or suffer any Damage; all friendly Assistance and Relief shall be given to the Persons Shipwrackt, or who shall be in danger thereof, and Letters of Safe-conduct shall likewise be given to them for their free and quiet passage thence, and the return of every one to his own Country.
VIII.

When it shall happen, that the Ships of either Party, (as in abovementioned) through danger at Sea, or other urgent cause, be driven into the Ports of the other, if they be Three or Four together, and may give just ground of Suspicion, they shall immediately upon their arrival acquaint the Governor or Chief Magistrate of the Place, with the Cause of their Coming, and shall stay no longer than will permit, and shall be requisite for the furnishing themselves with Victuals, and the Reparation of their Ships.

IX.

It is also agreed, That the King of Great Britain’s Subjects, inhabiting the Island of St. Christophers, may fetch Salt from the Salt-Ponds there and carry the same away, as well by Sea as by Land, without any Hindrance or Molestation : And also that the Most Christian King’s Subjects of the said Island may enter into the Rivers of the great Road, there to fetch or provide themselves with Water ; upon condition nevertheless, that the King of Great Britain’s Subjects shall only in the day time lade Salt upon their Ships or Vessels ; and in like manner that the Most Christian King’s Subjects shall fetch Water in the day time only. And also, that the Ships or Vessels, of either Nation, which shall come for Salt or Water, shall be obliged to give Notice of their coming, by hanging out there Flag or Colours of their Nation, and by thrice firing as Cannon, and if they have no Cannon, by thrice firing a Musquet. And in case any Ship of either Nation shall Trade or Trafick under pretence of fetching Salt or Water, the said Ship shall be Confiscated.

X.

The Subjects of either Nation shall not Harbor the Barbarous or wild Inhabitants, or the Slaves or Goods, which the said Inhabitants have taken from the Subjects of the other Nation.
Neither shall they give them any Assistance or Protection in their said Depredations.

XI.

The Governors, Officers and Subjects of either King shall not in any wise molest or disturb the Subjects of the other, in settling their respective Colonies, or in their Commerce and Navigation.

XII.

And the more to assure the Subjects of the King of Great Britain, and of the Most Christian King, that no Injury shall be offered to them by the Ships of War, or private Men of War, of either side; all the Captains of the Ships as well of His Majesty of Great Britain as of the Most Christian King, and all their Subjects, who shall set out private Men of War; and likewise their Priviledged Companies shall be enjoyned not to do any Injury or Damage whatsoever to the other; which if they do, they shall be punished, and moreover be liable to satisfie all Costs and Damages by Restitution and Reparation, upon Pain and Obligation of Person and Goods.

XIII.

For this Cause all the Commanders of private Men of War shall from henceforth be obliged, before they receive their Commissions, to enter before a Competent Judge into good and sufficient Security, by able and responsible Men, who have no Part or Interest in such Ships, in the Sum of One Thousand Pounds Sterling, or Thirteen Thousand Livres, and when they have above One Hundred and Fifty Men, then in the Sum of Two Thousand Pounds Sterling, or Six and Twenty Thousand Livres, that they will give full satisfaction for any Damages or Injuries whatsoever, which they or their Officers, or others in their Services, shall commit in their Courses at Sea, contrary to this present Treaty or any other whatsoever, between His Majesty of
Great Britain and the said Most Christian King, and upon Pain of Revocation and Annulling their said Commissions; in which it shall be always inserted, that they have given such Security as abovesaid: And likewise it is agreed, that the Ship it self shall be also liable to make satisfaction for Injuries and Damages done by Her.

XIV.

And whereas several Pirats Roving up and down the American Seas, as well Northern as Southern, do much damnifie Trade and molest the Subjects of both Crowns in their Navigation and Commerce in those Parts; it is agreed, that strict Orders shall be given to the Governors and Officers of both Kings, that they give no Assistance or Protection to any Pirates of what Nation soever, nor suffer them to have any Retreat in the Ports or roads of their respective Governments; and the said Governors and Officers shall also be expressly Commanded to punish, as Pirats, all such, who shall Arm out any Ship or Ships for Privateering, without lawful Commission and Authority.

XV.

No Subject of either King shall ask or take any Commission, or Letters of Mart for Arming any Ship of Ships to go Privateering in America, whether Northern or Southern, from any Prince or State, with whom the other is in War; and if any Person shall take such Commission or Letters of Mart, he shall be punished as a Pirate.

XVI.

The Most Christian King’s Subjects shall have full Liberty to Fish for Turtles in the Islands of Cayman.

XVII.

That in case it should happen, any differences or disputes should arise between the
Subjects of the said Most Serene Kings in the said Islands, Colonies, Forts, Cities and Governments under the Dominion of either respectively, whether at Sea or at Land, this Peace and Good Correspondence shall not thereby be interrupted or infringed; but the said differences, which may happen between the Subjects of both Kings, shall be adjudged and determined by the Governors of each Jurisdiction respectively, where they shall have arisen, or by them whom they shall depute; and if the said differences cannot within the space of one Year be determined by the said Governors, they shall transmit the same, with the first, to the Most Serene Kings, to determine the same according to Justice, in such manner as they shall think fit.

XVIII.

It is further concluded and agreed, That if any Breach should happen (which God forbid) between the said Crowns in Europe, no Act of Hostility, neither at Land nor at Sea, shall however be done by any of the most Serene King of Great Britain's Garisons, Souldiers or Subjects whomsoever of the Islands, Colonies, Forts, Cities and Governments, which now are, or hereafter shall be under the English Dominion in America, against the most Serene most Christian King’s Subjects, inhabiting or residing in any of the American Colonies: Likewise reciprocally, that in the abovesaid case of a Breach in Europe, no Act of Hostility, neither at Land nor at Sea, shall however be done by any of the most Serene most Christian King’s Garisons, Souldiers or Subjects whomsoever of the Islands, Colonies, Forts, Cities or Governments, which now are, or hereafter shall be under the French Dominion in America, against the most Serene King of Great Britain’s Subjects inhabiting in any of the American Colonies, or residing there. But a true and firm Peace and Neutrality shall continue in America between the said British and French Nations in the same manner, as if such Breach in Europe had not happened.
XIX.

It is provided and agreed, That this present Treaty shall not in any wise derogate from the Treaty concluded between the said most Serene Kings at Breda 21/31 day of July, in the year of our Lord 1667. But that all and singular the Articles and Clauses of that Treaty shall remain in force and be observed.

XX.

That all Treaties or Articles at any time heretofore made and concluded between the said Nations, upon the Island of St. Christophers or elsewhere in America, shall be in force as formerly, and shall be observed on both sides as heretofore, unless where they shall be found contrary to this present Treaty.

XXI.

Lastly, It is agreed and concluded, That this present Treaty, and all an singular the Matters therein contained, shall, as soon as may be, be ratified and confirmed, and that the Ratifications thereof shall within the space of two Months from the date of these Presents be reciprocally exchanged between both Parties: And within the space of eight Months, or sooner if it may be, be published in all Kingdoms, Dominions and Colonies, as well in America as elsewhere, of both the Kings.

In Witness whereof, We, Plenipotentiaries, have Signed and Sealed this present Treaty.

Given in His Majesties Palace of Whitehall the 6/16th day of November 1686.

Jeffreys C. (L. S.) Barillon d’Amoncourt (L. S.)
Rochester (L. S.)
Sunderland P. (L. S.)
Middleton (L. S.)
Godolphin (L. S.)

FINIS.

A PARIS, Par SEBASTIEN MABRE-CRAMOISY, premier Imprimeur du Roy, & Directeur de Son Imprimerie Royale.

M. DC. LXXXVI

De l’exprés commandement de Sa Majesté.


LE Tres-Haut & Tres-Puissant Prince LOUIS XIV. Roy Tres-Chrestien de France & de Navarre, & Tres-Haut & Tres-Puissant Prince JACQUES II. Roy de la Grande-Bretagne, n’ayant rien plus à cœur que d’établir tous les jours de plus en plus une amitié mutuelle entre eux, & une sincere concorde & correspondance entre les Royaumes, Estats & Sujets de leurs Majestez ; & à cét effet ayant jugé à propos de faire un Traité de Paix, bonne correspondance & neutralité en Amérique, pour prévenir, autant qu’il seroit possible, toutes les contestations & les différends qui pourroient naistre entre les Sujets de l’une & de l’autre Couronne dans ces Païs éloignez :

Leursdites Majestez ont résolu d’envoyer de part & d’autre leurs Plénipotentiaires, pour en traiter, & en convenir : sçavoir, Sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne, le sieur Paul Barillon d’Amoncourt, Marquis de Branges, Conseiller ordinaire en son Conseil d’Estat, & son Ambassadeur extraordinaire ; & Sadite Majesté Britannique, les sieurs Georges Baron de Jeffreys de Wem Grand Chancelier d’Angleterre, Laurent Comte de Rochester Grand Tresorier d’Angleterre, Robert Comte de Sunderland Président du Conseil Privé & Secretaire d’Estat,
Charles de Middleton aussi Secrétaire d’Estat, & Sydney sieur de Godolphin, tous du Conseil Privé de Sa Majesté : pour convenir, après l’échange des Lettres de plein pouvoir, des Articles qui suivent.

I.

IL a esté conclu & accordé, que du jour du présent Traité il y aura entre la nation Françoíse & la Nation Angloise une ferme paix, union, concorde, & bonne correspondance, tant sur Mer, que sur Terre, dans l’Amérique Septentrionale & Meridionale, & dans les Isles, Colonies, Forts, & Villes, sans aucune distinction de lieux, sises dans les Estats de Sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne, & de Sa Majesté Britannique, & gouvernées par les Commandans de leursdites Majestez respectivement.

II.

QU’AUCUNS Vaisseaux, ou bastimens, grands ou petits, appartenans aux Sujets de Sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne, ne seront équipez, ni employez dans lesdites Isles, Colonies, Forteresses, Villes & Gouvernemens des Estats de Sadite Majesté, pour attaquer le Sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique dans les Isles, Colonies, Forteresses, Villes & Gouvernemens de Sadite Majesté, ou pour leur faire aucun tort ni dommage. Et pareillement qu’aucuns Vaisseaux ou Bastimens, grands ou petits, appartenans aux Sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique, ne seront équipez, ou employez dans les Isles, Colonies, Forteresses, Villes, & Gouvernemens de Sadite Majesté, pour attaquer les Sujets de Sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne dans les Isles, Colonies, Forteresses, Villes, & Gouvernemens de Sadite Majesté, ou pour leur faire aucun tort ni dommage.

III.

QU’AUCUNS soldats ou gens de guerre, ou autres personnes quelconques qui habitent &
demeurent dans lesdites Isles, Colonies, Forteresses, Villes, & Gouvernemens de Sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne, ou qui y viennent d’Europe en garnison, n’exerceront aucun acte d’hostilité, & ne feront aucun tort ou dommage, directement ou indirectement, aux Sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique dans lesdites Isles, Colonies, Forteresses, Villes, & Gouvernemens de Sadite Majesté ; & ne presteront ni donneront aucune aide, ou secours d’hommes ou de vivres aux Sauvages contre qui Sa Majesté Britannique aura la guerre. Et pareillement, qu’aucuns soldats ou gens de guerre, ou autres personnes quelconques qui habient & demeurent dans lesdites Isles, Colonies, Forteresses, Villes, & Gouvernemens de Sa Majesté Britannique, ou qui y viennent d’Europe en garnison, n’exerceront aucun acte d’hostilité, & ne feront aucun tort ou dommage, directement ou indirectement, aux Sujets de Sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne dans lesdites Isles, Colonies, Forteresses, Villes, & Gouvernemens de Sadite Majesté ; & ne presteront ni donneront aucune aide, ou secours d’hommes ou de vivres, aux Sauvages avec qui Sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne aura guerre.

IV.

IL a esté convenu que chacun desdits Rois aura & tiendra les Domaines, Droits & Prééminences dans les Mers, Détroits, & autres Eaux de l’Amérique, & avec la mesme étendue qui leur appartiennent de droit, & en la mesme manière qu’ils en jouissent à présent.

V.

ET que pour cet effet les Sujets & Habitans, Marchands, Capitaines de Vaisseaux, Pilotes & Matelots des Royaumes, Provinces, & Terres de chacun desdits Rois respectivement, ne feront aucun commerce ni pesche dans tout les lieux dont l’on est ou l’on sera en possession de part & d’autre dans l’Amérique. C’est à sçavoir, que les Sujets de Sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne ne se mesleront d’aucun trafic, ne feront aucun commerce, & ne pescheront point dans les Ports,
Rivieres, Bayes, embouchures de Rivieres, Rades, Costes, ou autres lieux qui sont ou feront cy-après possédez par Sa Majesté Britannique en Amérique : & réciproquement les Sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique ne se mesleront d’aucun trafic, ne feront aucun commerce, & ne pescheront point dans les Ports, Rivieres, Bayes, embouchures de Rivieres, Rades, Costes, ou autres lieux qui sont ou seront cy-après possédez par Sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne en Amérique. Et au cas qu’aucun Vaisseau, ou Barque ce qui est porté par le présent Traité, ledit Vaisseau, ou Barque, avec sa charge, sera confisqué, après que la preuve de la contravention aura esté légitimement faire. Il sera néanmoins permis à la partie qui se sentira grévée par la Sentence de confiscation, de se pourvoir au Conseil d’Estat du Roy dont les Gouverneurs ou Juges auront rendu ladite Sentence de confiscation, & d’y porter sa plainte, sans que pour cela l’exécution de la Sentence soit empeschée : bien entendu néanmoins que la liberté de la navigation ne doit estre nullement empechée, pourveû qu’il ne commette rien contre le véritable sens du présent Traité.

VI.

DE plus, il a esté accordé que si les Sujets & Habitans de l’un ou l’autre desdites Rois, leurs Vaisseaux, soit de guerre & publics, soit Marchands & particuliers, sont emportez par les tempestes, ou estant poursuivis par les Pirates ou par les Ennemis, ou pressez par quelque autre nécessité, sont contraints pour se mettre en feûreté de se retirer dans les Ports, Rivieres, Bayes, Embouchures de Rivieres, Rades, & Costes quelconques appartenantes à l’autre Roy dans l’Amérique, ils y seront bien & amiablement receûs, protegez, & favorablement traitez : qu’ils pourront, sans qu’on les empesche en quelque maniere que ce soit s’y rafraischir, & mesme acheter au prix ordinaire & raisonnable des vivres, & toutes sortes de provisions nécessaires ou pour la vie, ou pour redoubler les Vaisseaux, & pour continuer leur route : qu’on ne les empeschera non plus en aucune maniere de sortir des Ports & Rades, mais qu’il leur sera permis.
de partir, & s’en aller en toute liberté quand & où il leur plaira, sans estre molestez ou
empeshez : qu’on ne les obligera point à se défaire de leur charge, ou à décharger, & exposer en
vente leurs Marchandises ou Balots : qu’aussi de leur part ils ne recevront dans leurs Vaisseaux
aucunes Marchandises, & ne feront point de pesche sous peine de confiscation desdits Vaisseaux
& Marchandises, conformément à ce qui a esté convenu dans l’Article précédent. De plus à esté
accordé que toutes & quant es fois que les Sujets de l’un ou de l’autre desdits Rois seront
contraints, comme il a a este dit cy-dessus, d’entrer avec leurs Vaisseaux dans les Ports de l’autre
Roy, ils seront obligez, en entrant, d’arborer la Banniere ou marque de leur Nation, & d’avertir
de leur arrivée par trois coupe de mousquet : à faute de quoy faire, & d’envoyer une Chaloupe à
terre, ils pourront estre confisquez.

VII.

PAREILLEMENT si les Vaisseaux de l’un ou de l’autre desdits Rois, & de leurs Sujets
& Habitans viennent à échoûër, jetter on mer leurs Marchandises, ou, ce qu’à Dieu ne plaise,
faire naufrage, ou qu’il leur arrive quelque autre malheur que ce soit, on donnera aide & secours
avec bonté & charité à ceux qui seront en danger, ou auront fait naufrage : il leur sera délivré des
Saufs-conduits, ou Passeports pour pouvoir se retirer dans leur païs en feûreté, & sans estre
molestez.

VIII.

QUE si les Vaisseaux de l’un ou l’autre Roy qui seront contraints par quelque aventure
ou cause que ce soit, comme il a esté dit, de se retirer dans les Ports de l’autre Roy, se trouvent
au nombre de trois ou de quarte, & peuvent donner quelque juste cause de soupçon, ils feront
aussitost connoistre au Gouverneur ou principal Magistrat du lieu la cause de leur arrivée ; & ne
demeureront qu’autant de temps qu’ils en auront permission dudit Gouverneur ou Commandant,
& qu’il sera juste & raisonnable, pour se pourvoir de vivres, & pour radoubé & équiper leurs Vaisseaux.

IX.

DE plus on est convenu qu’il sera permis aux Sujets de Sa Majesté Tres-Chriestienne qui demeurent dans l’Isle de Saint Christophle d’entrer dans les Rivieres de la grande Baye pour faire de l’Eau, & s’en fournir ; qu’il sera aussi permis aux Sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique de prendre du Sel aux Salines dudit lieu, & de l’enlever, tant par mer, que par terre, sans estre inquiéitez, ni empeschez ; pourveu néanmoins que lesdits Sujets de Sa-Majesté Tres-Chrestienne puissent de l’Eau pendant le jour seulement, & qu’aussi lesdits Sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique ne chargent du Sel dans leurs Vaisseaux ou Barques que pendant le jour : & que les Vaisseaux ou Barques de l’une & de l’autre Nation respectivement qui viendront se fournir d’Eau ou de Sel feront sçavoir leur arrivée en arborant la Banniere ou marque de leur Nation, & en avertiront par trois coups de Canon, ou s’ils n’ont point de Canon par trois coups de Mousquet. Que si aucun Vaisseau de l’une ou l’autre Nation, sous prétexte de venir prendre de l’Eau ou du Sel, entreprend de trafiquer, il sera confisqué.

X.

QU’AUCUNS Sujets de l’une ni de l’autre Nation ne retireront les Sauvages habitans du lieu, ou leurs Esclaves, ou les biens que lesdits Habitans emporteront appartenans aux Sujets de l’autre Nation ; & qu’ils ne leur donneront aucune aide ni protection dans lesdites enlevemens ou pillages.

XI.

QUE les Commandans, Officiers & Sujets de l’un des deux Rois ne troubleront ni molesteront les Sujets de l’autre Roy dans l’établissement de leurs Colonies respectivement, ou
dans leur Commerce & Navigation.

XII.

ET afin de pouvoir plus pleinement à la sûreté des Sujets, tant de Sa Majesté Très-Chrestienne que de Sa Majesté Britannique, & à ce que les Vaisseaux de guerre, ou autres Vaisseaux armez en guerre par des Particuliers ne leur fassent aucun tort ni dommage, il sera défendu à tous les Capitaines de Vaisseaux, tant de Sa Majesté Très-Chrestienne, que de Sa Majesté Britannique, & à tous leurs Sujets qui équiperont des Vaisseaux à leurs dépens, comme aussi aux Privilégiiez & Compagnies, de faire aucun tort ou dommage à ceux de l’autre Nation, sous peine d’estre punis en cas de contravention, & de plus d’estre tenus à tous dommages & intérêts, à quoy ils pourront estre contraints, tant par saisie de leurs bien, que par emprisonnement de leurs personnes.

XIII.

ET pour cette cause tous Capitaines des Vaisseaux armez en guerre aux dépens des Particuliers, seront dorénavant tenus, avant qu’on leur délivre des patentes ou commissions spéciales, de donner pardevant un Juge comptant bonne & suffisante caution de gens solvables, & qui n’auront aucune part ni intérêt dans ledit Vaisseau, pour la somme de mille livres sterling, ou treize mille livres ; & lors qu’il y aura plus de cent cinquante hommes, pour la somme de deux mille livres sterling, ou de vingt-six mille livres : s’obligeant de satisfaire entierement à tous torts & dommages quelconques qu’eux ou leurs Officiers, ou autres gens estant à leur service causeront pendant de cours de leur navigation contre le présent Traité, ou autre Traité quelconque fait entre Sa Majesté Très-Chrestienne & Sa Majesté Britannique, sous peine aussi de révocation, & cassation de leurs commissions & lettres spéciales, dans lesquelles il seratoû jours fait mention qu’ils auront, comme dit est, donné caution. Et de plus, il est convenu que le
Vaisseau mesme sera tenu de satisfaire aux torts & dommages qu’il aura causez.

XIV.

ET dautant que les Pirates qui courent les Mers de l’Amérique, tant Septentrionale que Meridionale, font beaucoup de tort au commerce, & causent de grands dommages aux Sujets de l’une & de l’autre Couronne qui trafiquent, & font commerce dans ces païs : il a esté accordé qu’il sera expressément enjoint aux Gouverneurs & Officiers de l’un & de l’autre desdits Rois, de ne donner en quelque maniere que ce soit aux Pirates, de quelque nation qu’ils soient, aucun secours, aide, ni retraite dans les Ports & Rades sises dans leurs Estats respectivement ; & qu’il sera expressément ordonné ausdits Gouverneurs & Officiers de punir comme Pirates tous ceux qui se trouveront avoir armé un ou plusieurs Vaisseaux en cours sans commission & autorité legitime.

XV.

QU’AUCUN Sujet de l’un ou de l’autre des deux Rois ne demandera ou prendra d’aucun Prince ou Estat que ce soit avec qui l’autre aura guerre, aucun pouvoir ou commission d’armer, & équiper en cours un ou plusieurs Navires dans l’Amérique Septentrionale ou Meridionale ; & que si quelqu’un prend un tel pouvoir ou commission, il soit puni comme Pirate.

XVI.

QUE les Sujets de Sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne auront pleine & entiere liberté de pescher des Tortuës dans les Isles de Cayman.

XVII.

QUE si survient des contestations ou différends entre les Sujets de leursdites Majestez dans les Isles, Colonies, Forts, Villes & Gouvernemens qui sont sous leur domination : la Paix faite par le présent Traité, ne sera pour cela ni interrompuë ni enfrainte ; mais ceux qui
commanderont dans les lieux ou les contestations seront arrivées, ou qui seront par eux députez, connoiront desdites contestations survenues entre les Sujets de leursdites Majestez, & les régleront & décideront. Et au cas que lesdits Commandans ne puissent vuider & terminer lesdits contestations dans un an, lesdits Commandans les enverront au plustost à l’un & à l’autre desdits Rois, pour estre fait droit en la maniere qu’il sera convenu entre Leursdites Majestez.

XVIII.

DE plus, il a esté conclu & accordé, que si jamais, ce qu’à Dieu ne plaise, il arrive quelque rupture en Europe entre lesdites Couronnes, les Garnisons, Gens de guerre, ou Sujets quelconques de Sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne estant dans les Isles, Colonies, Forts, Villes & Gouvernemens qui sont à présent ou seront cy-aprés sous la domination de sadite Majesté dans l’Amérique, n’exerceront aucun acte d’hostilité par Mer ni par Terre contre les Sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique qui habiteront dans quelques Colonies que ce soit de l’Amérique, ou y demeureront. Et réciproquement, audit cas de rupture en Europe, les Garnisons, Gens de guerre, ou Sujets quelconques de Sa Majesté Britannique estant dans les Isles, Colonies, Forts, Villes & Gouvernemens qui sont à présent ou seront cy-aprés sous la domination de Sa Majesté Britannique en Amérique, n’exerceront aucun acte d’hostilité, ni par Mer ni par Terre, contre les Sujets de Sa Majesté Tres-Chrestienne qui habiteront dans quelques Colonies que ce soit de l’Amérique, ou y demeureront. Mais il y aura toujours une véritable & ferme paix & neutralité entre lesdits Peuples de France & de la Grande-Bretagne, tout de mesme que si ladite rupture n’estoit point arrivée en Europe.

XIX.

IL a esté réglé & accordé que le présent Traité ne dérogera en aucune maniere au Traité conclu entre leursdites Majestez à Breda le 31/21 jour du mois de Juillet 1667. mais que tous &
chacuns les articles & clauses desdit Traité demeureront dans leur force & vigueur, & seront observez.

XX.

ET que tous les Traitez & Articles conclus & arrêtez cy-devant, en quelque temps que ce soit, en Amerique, ou ailleurs, entre lesdites deux nations, touchant l’Isle de Sainte Christophle, demeureront dans leur force & vigueur, & seront observez de part & d’autre, comme ils l’ont esté cy-devant, si ce n’est en ce qui s’y trouvera de contraire au present Traité.

XXI.

ENFIN il a esté convenu & accordé, que le present Traité, & toutes & chacunes choses contenuës en iceluy, seront ratifiées & confirmées de part & d’autre, le plutost qu’il sera possible, & que les ratifications seront reciprocuellement échangées en bonne forme de part & d’autre dans un mois, à compter de la datte du present Traité : & que dans huit mois, ou plutost s’il est possible, le present Traité sera publié dans tous les Royaumes, Domaines & Colonies de l’un & l’autre desdites Roys, tant en Amerique qu’ailleurs.

EN foy de toutes & chacunes lesquelles choses, Nous susdits Plenipotentiaires avons souffigné de nos propres mains le present Traité, & nous y avons apposé les Sceaux de nos Armes. FAIT dans le Palais Royal de Withal, le 16/6 jour de Novembre mil six cens quarte vingt six. Ainsi signe, BARILLON D’AMONCOURT. JEFFREYS. C. ROCHESTER. SUNDERLAND. P. MIDDLETON. GODOLPHIN. Avec leurs sceaux.

CUM PRIVILEGIO. (unreadable)

Typis Thomæ Newcomb, unius ex Typographis Regiis in vico vulgò dicto The Savoy, 1686.

TRACTATUS PACIS, Bonæ Correspondentiae, & Neutralitais in Americâ, Inter Serenissimum & Potentissimum Principem JACOBUM SECUNDUM, Dei Gratia Magnæ Britanniæ, Franciæ Et Hiberniæ Regem, Fidei Defensorem, &c. Et Serenissimum & Potentissimum Principem LUDOVICUM XIV. Eadem Dei Gratià Regem Christianissinum,

Conclusus 6/16 die Mensis Novembris, Anno Dom. 1686.

I.

Conclusum & Concordatum est, quòd ab hoc usque die fit firma Pax, Unio, Concordia, & bona Correspondentia tam Terrâ quàm Mari inter Nationes Britannicam & Gallicam in Americâ, sive Septentrionali, sive Meridionali, & super Insulas, Colonias, Fortalitia, Civitates, & Praefecturis, sine distinction locourum, sub Serenissimi Regis Magnæ Britanniae, vel Serenissimi Regis Christianissimi ditione in Americâ positas, & Praefectis utriusque Regis respective Gubernatas.

II.

Quòd nullæ Naves aut Navigia majora vel minora ad Serenissimi Regis Magnæ Britanniae

III.

Quòd nalli Milites, hominesve Militares, vela lii qualescunque habitantes & commorantes in prædictis Anglici juris Insulis, Coloniiis, Fortalitiis, Civitatibus, & Præfecturis, vel qui illuc ex Europâ in Præsidia veniunt,  ullum actum hostilitatis,  ullumve damnum aut injuriam, directè vel indirectè faciant aut moliantur adversus Serenissimi Regis Christianissimi Subditos in prædictis Gallici juris Infulis, Coloniiis, Fortalitiis, Civitatibus, & Præfecturis; neque  ullum auxilium, aut  ullas suppetias hominum, vel victualium præbebunt, aut ferent Barbaris, cum quibus Rex Christianissimus bellum geret. Pari modo, quòd nulli Milites, hominesve Militares, vela lii qualescunque habitants & commorantes in prædictis Gallici juris Insulis, Coloniiis, Fortalitiis, Civitatibus, & Præfecturis, vel qui illuc ex Europâ in Præsida veniunt,  ullum actum hostilitatis,  ullumve damnum, aut injuriam directè vel indirectè faciant aut moliantur adversus Serenissimi Regis Magnæ Britanniae Subditos in prædictis Anglici juris Insulis, Coloniiis, Fortalitiis, Civitatibus, & Præfecturis, neque  ullum auxilium, aut  ullas suppetias hominum vel victualium præbebunt aut ferent Barbaris, cum quibus Rex Magnæ Britanniae bellum geret.
IV.

Conventum est, quod uterque Rex habent, retineatque sibi omnia Dominia, Jura & Praeeminentias in Maribus Americanis, Fretis atque Aquis quibuscumque, eadem pari amplitudine, quæ illis jure competit, & eodem modo quo illis jam fruuntur.

V.

Atque indcircò Subditi & Incolæ, Mercatores, Navarchi, Naucleri, Nautarque Regnorum, Provinciarum, Terrarumque utriusque Regis respectivè abstinebunt, cavebuntque sibi a Commerciis & Piscatuià in locis omnibus quæ ab unâ vel alertâ parte occupantur vel occupanbuntur in Americà, nimirum Regis Magnæ Britanniae Subditi Negotiationem non dirigent, Mercaturam non exercebunt, & Piscaturam non facient in Portubus, Fulminibus, Sinibus, Æltuariis, Stationibus, Litoribus, locisvè, quæ Rex Christianissimus in Americà tenet, vel in polterum tenebit ; Et vicissim Regis Christianissimi Subditi Negotiationem non dirigent, Mercaturam non exercebunt, & Piscaturam non facient in Portubus, Fluminibus, Sinibus, Æstuariis, Stationibus, Litoribus, locisve, que ibidem as Rege Magnæ Britanniae possidentur, vel in posterum possidebuntur ; Et si Navis alqua sive Navigation deprendetur Mercaturam vel Piscaturam faciens contra hujus Tractatūs tenorem, Navis ista sive Navigium unà cum onere (probatione legitimà factâ,) fisco adjudicetur ; Uicebit tamen parti, quæ se gravatam senserit ejusmodi Confiscationis sententia, Concilium Statūs istius Regis, à cujus Praefectis vel Judicibus lata suerit contra ipsam sumentia, adire, ibidemque querelam suam eà de re exponere, quod tamen executionem Sententiae non impediat : Intellectum tamen semper esto, libertatem Navigationis neutiquam interrumpi debere, modò nihil adversus genuinum hujus Tractatūs sensum committatur.
VI.

Item Concordatuum est, quod si alterutrius Regis Subditi & Incolæ cum Navibus suis, sive Bellicæ sint & publicæ, sive Onerarum ac privatarum, procellis abrepti suerint, vel perseuentibus Piratis, Inimicis, ac Hostibus, aut aliquâ aliâ urgete necessitate coacti fuerint, se ad Portum quærendum in alterius Regis Flumina, Sinus, Æstuaria, ac Stationes recipere, vel ad Litora quæcunque in Americâ appellere, benignè omnique humanitate ibidem excipiuntur, amicâ gaudeant protection & benevolent tractentur; Nullò autem modo impedianter, quo minus integrum omninò habeant resicere se, Victualia etiam & omne genus Commeatum sive Vitæ sustinendæ, sive Navibus reparandis & Itineri faciendo necessarium, æquo & consueto pretio comparare: Nullà quoque ratione prohibeaturn ex Protu & Statione vicissim solver, ac egredi, quin ipsis licitum sit, pro libitum, migrare loco, liberèque discedere, quanocunque & quocunque visum fuerit, absque ullò molestatione aut impedimento. Cautum verò semper sit, ut Onus non distrahat, neque Mercium aut Sarcinarum aliquid è Navibus efferent, & vendi exponant, nec etiam Mercimonia ab alterâ parte in Naves recipient, vel Piscaturam faciant, sub pœnâ Confiscationis Navium & Mercium, eo modo, quo præcedenti Articulo conventum eæ Concordantum insuper est, quod quotiescunque alterutrius Regis Subditi cum Navibus suis alterius Portus ingredi, prout supradictum est, coacti fuerint, ipso ingress Vexillum vel Signum Nations suæ exponere & adventus sui notitiam trinà Tormenti majoris explosion dare tenebuntur, sin autem majora ipsis non suerint Tormenta, trina Sclopetæ explosion sufficient: Quòd ni fecerint, Scapham autem ad terram miserint, Confiscationi obnoxii erunt.

VII.

Pari ratione, si Naves alterutrius Regis ejusdemq: Subditorum ac Incolarum ad Oras aut in ditionibus quibuscunque alterius impegerint, jactum fecerint, vel (quod Deus avertat)
Naufragium aut damnun quocunque passæ fuerint, Periclitantibus aut Naufragis benevolè & amicissimè subveniatur, atque auxilium feratur, Literæque illis Salvi-conductūs exhibeantur, quibus inde tutò & absque molestiā exire, & ad suam quisque Patriam redire valeat.

**VIII.**

Quando alterutrius Naves (uti supradictum est) Maris periculo, aliève cogente ratione compulsae in alterius Portus adigantur, sit res quatuorve fuerint, justamque suspicionis occasionem præbere potuerint, adventus istiusmodi causa Gubernatori vel Primario loci Magistratuistatim exponetur, nec diutiûs ibi mora traetur, quàm quæ illis a dicto Gubernatore aut Præfecto permissa, & victui comparando, Navibusque tum resarciendis, tum instructis comoda atque æqua fuerit.

**IX.**

Conventum insuper est, quòd Regis Magnæ Britanniae subditis Insulam Sī. Christophori habitantibus licebit Salem de Salins ibidem petere, ac sine ullâ molestiā vel impedimento aliquot tam Mari quàm Terrā asportare ; licebit etiam Subditis Regis Christianissimi præditæ Insulæ, Flumina sinus Magni ibidem intrare ad aquam hauriendam vel comparandam : Proviso tamen, quòd Regis Magnæ Britanniae Subditi salem Navibus vel Navigiis non nisi diurno tempore imponent, itidemque Regis Christianissimi Subditi aquam diurno tantum tempore haurient ; Et quòd Naves vel Navigia utriusque respectivè Nationis, quæ Salis petendi vel Aquæ hauriendæ gartiā accesserint, adventum suum Vexilli vel Signi Nationis suæ exposition, & trinâ Tormènti majoris explosion significabunt ; sin autem majora ipsis non fuerint Tormenta, trina Sclopetæ sufficient explosion. Si vero aliqua Navis alterutrius Nationis, sub prætextu petendi Salis vel hauriendæ Aquæ, Mercaturam fecerit, fisco addicetur.
X.

Quòd Subditi neutrius Nationis excipient Barbaros loci Incolas, vel Servos, sive Bona, quæ ab alterius Nationis Subditis direpta dicti Incolæ auferent, aut auxilio protectionemve ipsis exhibebunt in ejusmodi Direptionibus vel Depräedationibus.

XI.

Quòd Praefecti, Officiales, & Subditi alterutrius Regis, alterius Subditis nullam molestiam inferent in Coloniiis respective sui stabiliendis, aut in Commercio & Navigacione faciendâ.

XII.

Et quò Serenissimi Regis Magnæ Britanniae, Serenissimi item Regis Christianissimi Subditorum securitatí abundantuís cautum sit, quòd nulla injuria, per alterutrius partis Naves Bellicas, vel alias sumptibus privatis ad Bellum instructas, iis inferetur i omnibus tam Serenissimi Regis Magnæ Britanniae, quàm Serenissimi Regis Christianissimi Navium Praefectis, omnibusque eorum Subditis qui sui impensis Naves instrument, ut & Privilegiatis hinc inde Communitatibus, omni in alteram partem injuriâ & damno quocunque interdicetur: Sin secus faciant, pœnas luent, & præterea obstricti erunt de damno cum omni causa & eo quòd interest, satisfacere, per Reparationem & Restitutionem sub obligatione & nexu Personæ Bonorumque.

XIII.

Ob hanc causam singuli Navium, sumptibus privatis ad Bellum instructarum Praefecti, antequam Diplomata sive Commissiones suas speciales recipient, sufficientem fiduciariam cautionem per viros idoneos, qui solvendo sunt, & in tali Navi partem vel interesse non habent, coram judice competenti inter (ponere un pofteru nu tenebunuir; unreadable), in Summâ Mille Librarum Sterlingarum, sive Tredecim Millium Librarum (vulgò Livres) & quoties Centum & Quinquaginta numero excedent Homines, in Summâ bis Mille Librarum Sterlingarum, sive
Vinginti Sex Millum Librarum, se Damnis & Injuriis quibuscunque, quas suo cursu Navali, ipsi
vel sui Officiales, aliive sibi inservientes, contra præsentem hunc Tractatum vel alium
quemcunque inter Serenissimum Regem Magnæ Britannæ & Serenissimum Regem
Christianissimum committant in solidum satisfacturos, sub Pænâ etiam Revocations &
Cassationis Literarum Commissionalium, specialium ac Diplomaturn, in quibus semper inseretur,
talem cautionem ab ipsis (ut præsertur) interpositam fuisse. Et insuper convenunt est, quòd
Navis etiam ipsa Damnis & Injuriis a se illatis satisfacere tenebitur.

XIII.

Cum verò Piræ (?),er Maria Americæ tam Septentrionalis quam Meridionalis huc illuc
discursantes, multa Commerciis inferunt damna, & utriusque Coronæ Subditos in partibus istis
Navigantes, & Mercaturam exercentes variis afficiunt Molestiis, Concordatum est, quòd
utriusque Regis Praefectis & Ministris strictè injungatur, quatenus Piratis, cujuscunque fuerint
Nationis, nullum omnino Auxilium, Patrocinium, vel etiam Recessum in Portibus aut
Stationibus sub eorum respectivè ditionibus sitis quoquo modo præbeant : Prædictis etiam
Praefectis & Ministris expressè mandetur, ut omnes, qui Navem vel Naves sine Legitimà
Commissione ac Authoritate ad tursum instruere deprehendentur, tamquam Piratas puniant.

XV.

Nuilus utriusvis Regum Subditus Diploma aut Commissionem, Navem vel Naves ad
cursum in Americâ sive Septentrionali sive Meridionali armandi & instruendi petat vel accipiat, a
quovis Principe, aut Statu, cum quo alter Regum Bellum gerit, siquis autem istiusmodi Diploma
vel Commissionem acceperit, ut Pirata puniatur.

XVI.

Christianissimi Regis Subditi plenâ fruantur libertate piscandi Testudines in Insulis vulgò
Cayman dictis.

XVII.

Quòd siquæ unquan Differentiæ ant Controversiæ inter Subditos prædictorum Serenissioroum Regum in prædictis utriusque juris Insulis, Coloniis, Fortalitiis, Civitatibus, & Præfecturis (sive Mari sive Terrâ) orate fuerint, Pax hæc & Bona Correspondentia non idcirco interruppetur aut infringetur, verùm istæ Controversiæ, quæ inter Subditos amborum Regum evenerint, cognoscantur, decernantur, & determinentur a Præfectis utriusque respectivè jurisdictio近乎, ubi controvernæ orate fuerint vel ab iis quos ipsi deputaverint : Si verò eædem differentiæ a dictis Præfectis intra spatium unius Anni determinari non poslunt, prædicti Præfectieas utrique Serenissimo Regi quantocyus dirnittant, ut pro Justitiâ, eo modo quo inter ipsos convenient, determinentur.

XVIII.

Conclusum insuper & concordatum est, quòd si unquam aliquà rupture (quod Deus avertat) inter dictas Coronas in Europâ acciderit, nullas tamen Actus hostilitatis, neque Terrâ neque Mari, excercèbitur, ab ullis Serenissimi Regis Magnæ Britanniæ Præsidiis, Militibus, aut Subditis quibusvis Insularum, Coloniarum, Fortalitiorum, Civitatum, & Præfecturarum nunc existentium, vel quæ in posterum erunt juris Anglici in Americâ, adversus Serenissimi Regis Christianissimi Subditos, in ulla Americæ Coloniiis habitants vel ibidem commorantes. Item reciprocè, quòd in suprædicto casu rupturæ in Europâ, nullus hostilitatis Actus, neque Terrâ neque Mari, exercèbitur, ab ullis Serenissimi Regis Christianissimi Præsidiis, Militibus, aut Subditis quibusvis Insularum, Coloniarum, Fortalitiorum, Civitatum, & Præfecturarum nunc existentium, vel quæ in posterum erunt juris Gallici in Americâ, adversus Serenissimi Regis Magnæ Britanniæ Subditos, in ulla Americæ Coloniiis habitants, vel ibidem commorantes ; fed
Pax & Neutralitas vera & firma remanebit in America inter prædictas Nationes Britannicam &
Gallicam, eodem plane modo, ac si talis rupture in Europâ non accidisset.

XIX.

Provisum & concordatum est, quòd præsens iste Tractatus nullo modo deroget Tractatui
inter prædictos Serenissimos Reges 21/31 die Mensis Julii Anno Domini 1667 Bredæ concluso,
fed quòd omnes & singuli illius Tractatûs Articuli Clausilæque suo in vigore maneant &
observentur.

XX.

Quòd omnes Tractatus sive Articuli ullo antehac tempore inter prædictas Nationes super
Insulam Sî. Christophori, vel alibi in Americâ, facti & conclusi, pristinum sum vigorem
obtineant, & ab utrâque parte observentur, sicut antea, nisi in nquantum contrarii esse reperiantur
præsenti huic Tractatui.

XXI.

Conventum denique & conclusum est, quòd præsens Tractatus omniaque & sigula in eo
contenta, quàm maturè fieri poterit, hinc inde ratihabebuntur & confirmabuntur, quòdque
Ratificationes desuper habitae intra duos menses a datâ Praesentium reciprocè riteque inter
ambas partes permutabuntur, atque intra Octo Mensium spatium, aut citus si fieri poterit per
omnia utriusque Regis Regna, Dominia, & Colonias tam in Americâ quam alibi, publicentur.

In quorum Omnium & Singulorum fidem, Nos Plenipotentiarii præsentem
Tractatum Manibus nostris & Sigillis mutuis subsignavimus & munivimus, &c. Datum in Palatio
Regio de Whitehal Die 6/16 Mensis Novembris. A. D. 1686.
Jeffreys C. (L. S.)
Rochester (L. S.)
Sunderland P. (L. S.)
Middleton (L. S.)
Godolphin (L. S.)

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FINIS.
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Lewis XIV, the most Christian King: concluded the 6/16 day of Novemb. 1686, In the Savoy [London]: Printed by Thomas Newcomb ..., 1686. Early English Books Online (EEBO)/ProQuest, LLC.


Secondary Sources


