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NATIONALISM, ARCHAEOLOGY AND IDEOLOGY IN IRAQ FROM 1921 TO THE PRESENT

HIND A. HAIDER

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Institute of Islamic Studies
McGill University, Montreal
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To my parents,

Abdulrazzaq Haider and Muna al-Khalidi

Abstract

Name: Hind A. Haider

Thesis: Nationalism, Archaeology and Ideology in Iraq from 1921 to the Present

Degree: M.A.

This thesis examines the use of archaeology in the development of national identity in Iraq from the period before the establishment of the Hashimite monarchy in 1921 to the present Ba'th regime and Ṣaddām Ḥusayn. During King Faysal I's period (1921-1933), archaeology was used to highlight the 'Arabness' of the ancient Mesopotamians so as to keep the nation on a pan-Arabist course and steer away from developing a regional identity. Iraq's pre-Islamic heritage was approached with much reserve since the government feared alienating the majority Muslim population by glorifying the country's achievements before the advent of Islam. In contrast, 'Abd al-Karīm Qāsim's regime (1958-1963) focused unbridled attention to the Mesopotamian heritage in an effort to distance the newly established republic from the pan-Arabists' call to join with the United Arab Republic. Between the two poles of identifying the national identity with either the Arab or Mesopotamian character, the Ba'th regime embarked on a cultural campaign that used both identities in defining the modern Iraqi man and woman. While the campaign was relegated strictly to the cultural sphere of the nation, the intent was political in that the regime shifted to stressing the Muslim-Arab identity of Iraq when appealing to support from other Arab nations; and to the pre-Islamic Mesopotamian identity when dealing with the religious and ethnic cleavages in Iraqi society.

Résumé

Nom: Hind A. Haider

Thèse: Nationalisme, Archéologie et Idéologie en Irak de à 1921 nos Jours

Grade: Maîtrise

Ce mémoire étudie l'utilisation de l'archéologie dans le développement de l'identité nationale en Irak entre la période de l'établissement de la monarchie Hashimite en 1921 et l'actuel régime du Ba'th de Ṣaddām Ḥusayn. À l'époque du roi Faysal I (1921-1933), l'archéologie fut utilisée pour faire ressortir « l'arabité » de l'ancienne Mésopotamie, dans le but de garder la nation ouverte sur le pan-arabisme et de prévenir le développement d'une identité régionale. L'héritage pré-islamique de l'Irak était abordé avec réserve, car le gouvernement craignait de s'aliéner la population à majorité musulmane en glorifiant les réalisations du pays avant l'avènement de l'Islam. À l'opposé, le régime d''Abd al-Karīm Qāsim (1958-1963) porte un effort effréné à la promotion de l'héritage Mésopotamien avec l'objectif de distancer la nouvelle république de l'appel des « pan-arabistes » à joindre la République arabe unie. Entre ces deux pôles théoriques visant à définir l'identité nationale, l'un axé sur le caractère arabe de l'Irak et l'autre sur celui mésopotamien, le régime du parti Ba'th se lance dans une campagne culturelle qui utilise les deux identités dans la définition de la femme et de l'homme de l'Irak moderne. Bien que la campagne se soit limitée à la sphère culturelle, l'intention première était politique. Ainsi, le régime pouvait insister sur l'identité arabo-musulmane lorsque celui-ci avait besoin du support des autres nations arabes et insister sur l'identité mésopotamienne lorsqu'il devait traiter avec les différentes factions religieuses ou ethniques de la société irakienne.

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Transliteration

Transliteration follows the system used by the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University.

Introduction

The topic of national identity is one that has occupied many scholars in political and cultural studies. It can be viewed within the historical context of charting a nation's personality from the inception of nationhood or from other viewpoints, such as a group's common language, territorial fidelity or common aspirations. In defining its identity as a nation, it is natural for a collective group to look back to a common history and clothe the nation's personality accordingly. While most endeavors of this kind look to the political or ethnic past, a few have placed emphasis on the archaeological remains that provide clues to a former ancient civilization. For example, nations like Turkey and Egypt have devoted a large portion of government expenditure in the preservation of their respective cultural heritages, Hittite and Pharaonic antiquities. Although the link between archaeology and national identity is not a new phenomenon, it has received little attention, however, by scholars, particularly in the Islamic world.

This thesis will discuss the relevance of archaeology to politics in Iraq since the inception of its nationhood in 1921 to the present time, and examine how the field has been utilized by various regimes to formulate a congruent national identity. The discussion will undoubtedly consider the pre-Islamic Mesopotamian heritage in addition to the Islamic Abbasid archaeological remains.

Chapter I will provide a brief history of Iraq from the time of its emergence into

nationhood in 1921 before proceeding with an overview of the ethnic, religious and cultural elements that constitute Iraq's diverse population. The discussion will then present the beginnings of the archaeological impulse in the political sphere in Iraq during King Faysal I's reign (1921-1933).

Archaeology at the beginning of Faysal's reign was a new science, not yet appreciated by the intellectual elite or the population at large. This was mainly due to the pre-Islamic character of most of Iraq's antiquities. In this period, Iraq was a new nation caught between dependence on imperial power and a desire to lead the Arab world by achieving it's independence. Archaeology in Iraq was emblematic for this struggle. From a field dominated by Western countries, especially Britain, it was to become a means for asserting Iraq's independence through legislation and official demands for the return of its antiquities from the West. Much of the credit for this endeavor could be given to Sāṭi' al-Ḥuṣrī, who was appointed Director of Antiquities in 1934. Not wanting to stress the Mesopotamian identity of Iraq, however, the pan-Arabist al-Ḥuṣrī set out to 'Arabize' the ancients and integrate the pre-Islamic heritage into the pan-Arab ideology.

Chapter II will analyze the identity-building campaign that began under 'Abd al-Karīm Qāsim and the gradual shift of focus to a single historical element, the Mesopotamian identity. During Qāsim's reign, the country was plagued by warring political factions representing on the one hand the country's pan-Arab aspirations, and on the other, belief in regional identity. Having become a republic in 1958, the country was dominated by the Iraqi Communist Party, which received ample support from

Qāsim, who wanted to distance the nation from an imminent merger with Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir's United Arab Republic. There is, unfortunately, little information regarding archaeology during this period, since Qāsim's reign was brief (1958-1963), and since the government was expending most of its available resources on improving the economic infrastructure of the country. The importance of Qāsim's regime, though, in relation to our subject, is the massive support he gave to emphasizing the Mesopotamian identity of the nation. Qāsim sought to cover the ethnic and religious schisms in society with a Mesopotamian blanket that was large and wide enough to encompass everyone in the country, i.e., the Arabs, the Kurds, the Persians, the Turcomans, the Armenians, the Sunnīs and Shī'īs, the Jews and the Christians.

The final chapter will deal with the Ba'th Regime of 1968 and its use of Iraq's pre-Islamic and Islamic heritage in political dialogue. The identity-building campaign initiated by this regime will receive a more detailed examination in comparison to the previous two regimes, as there are more resources available on this topic. The Ba'th regime, under the direction of Ṣaddām Ḥusayn, placed a spotlight on the cultural link between the ancient Mesopotamians and Iraqis, so as to avoid political opposition. Unity, one of the main elements of Ba'thist ideology, focused attention on the efforts of the Arab nations to unite in the creation of the one single Arab state. The cultural campaign afforded the Ba'th regime space to maneuver between the two poles of pan-Arabism and Iraqism.

Archaeology during this period received unprecedented government attention supported by the country's oil boom of the 1970s. Antiquities became a symbol of the

continuity of the people of Iraq. The aim was to instill the belief that the Iraqi man and woman were direct descendants and heirs of ancient Mesopotamians. The chapter will also examine the shift towards the Islamic component of the cultural campaign during the Iraq-Iran War, when the focus turned towards emphasizing the Muslim-Arab character of the Iraqis. This was mainly done to advertise the war as a reincarnated Battle of Qādisīyah, a war between Muslim-Arabs and Persian non-Muslims in 634 AD, in an effort to raise expectations of a similar victory and gain outside support from Muslim-Arab countries.

The theme carried throughout the present work is the close relationship between politics and archaeology. Archaeology was not a field embraced in Iraq purely for it's scientific relevance. Rather, the ideological and symbolic harvest reaped from antiquities was the driving initiative behind government support.

Chapter One

Faysal ibn Ḥusayn ibn 'Alī I

Historical Background

The name 'Mesopotamia,' used prior to World War I to refer to the region known today as Iraq, is derived from classical Greek, and means 'the land between the two rivers.'[1] During the period of Ottoman rule of the region, the Greek name was used in reference to the three primary *vilayets* (provinces) of Baghdad, Basra and Mosul.

After the conquest of the area by Arab tribes in the seventh century, scholars and geographers began referring to the region by two terms: *al-Jazīra* and *al-'Irāq* . The former term was used by Arab geographers to designate the northern part of the territory located between the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers,[2] while the latter was later on applied in reference to the environs around the Persian Gulf where a distinction was made between *'Irāq al-'Arab*, the Arab Iraq, and *'Irāq al-'Ajam,* the non-Arab, Persian Iraq.[3] With the end of the Ottoman Empire the emergent state felt a need to distance itself from its Ottoman past, so that gradually the traditional Arabic term *'Irāq* was

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[1] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1970 ed., s.v. "Mesopotamia," vol. 15, pp. 203-208.

[2] H.R. Gibb, J. H. Kramers, E. Levi-Provencal, and J. Shacht, eds. *The Encyclopedia of Islam*, 1960 edition, (London: E. J. Brill), s.v. "al-Djazira" by M. Canard, vol. 2, pp. 523-524.

[3] Magnus T. Bernhardsson, "Reclaiming a Plundered Past: Archaeology and Nationalism in Modern Iraq, 1808-1941" (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1999), pp. 173-174.

adopted when referring to the territory in British official correspondence.[4]

Fearing that Persia might pose a threat to its oil supplies in the Persian Gulf, especially to the oil refinery at Abadan, Britain decided to deploy troops in Iraq to secure the area in November 1914. The troops invaded and conquered Basra with little difficulty as they were met with limited resistance. They then proceeded towards Baghdad but were forced to surrender upon encountering Ottoman forces at Kut al-Amara.[5] Nearly three years later, the British army regrouped and launched a new offensive, conquering Baghdad in March 1917. Not long after, the forces moved farther north and captured the province of Mosul in 1918, thereby gaining control over the three major Ottoman provinces constituting historical Mesopotamia.[6] To manage the newly acquired territories, the British set up a civil administration similar to the one operating in India, where officials ruled with the collaboration of local leaders.[7]

Signs of public discontent with the new political reality emerged in the form of a rebellion against British rule in June 1920.[8] Although the attempt was politically

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[4] Magnus T. Bernhardsson, "Reclaiming a Plundered Past," pp. 172-173. The author also mentions the uncertainty surrounding the exact meaning of the term *'Iraq*. He refers to G.W. Lane's Arabic-English Lexicon and Ibn Manzūr's Lisan al-'Arab, both of which define the term as generally meaning the "side or shore of water or of a sea. More specifically it denotes the border of the rivulet (for irrigation) by which water enters a garden." As the region had a long history of irrigated plains, the author infers that it is "conceivable that the region bore the name of its environmental characteristics." In addition, the above mentioned references cite several sources stating that the term *'Iraq* is Arabized from the Persian name meaning "having many palm trees and other trees."

[5] Ibid., pp. 131-132.

[6] Derek Hopwood, "Social structures and the new state 1921-1958." In H. Ishow, T. Koszinowski, and D. Hopwood, eds., *Iraq: Power and Society* (Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1993), p. 6.

[7] Ibid.

[8] It should be noted that a year before the first popular revolt took place, British civil commissioner Andrew T. Wilson ordered British and Indian troops to destroy the nascent Kurdish state in May 1919. The action was taken to erase the threat of the separation of Mosul from the future Iraqi state that

unsuccessful, it demonstrated the existence of public discontent with the presence of a foreign power and was the first sign of the birth of Iraqi nationalism. The revolt began mainly among certain tribes in the mid-Euphrates area who felt that Britain was refusing to allow Iraq's full independence.[9] At the time, British administrators viewed the revolt as the product of military, political and socio-economic factors: "Military, because the British felt that Iraqis perceived a British military weakness; political because the Arabs felt betrayed by the Sykes-Picot agreement and lack of progress of the [Arnold] Wilson's 14 points and the Anglo-French Declaration, and finally socio-economic factors due to the difficult economic situation following the end of the war."[10] It soon became obvious to the authorities that a different form of governance was necessary to prevent Arab nationalism from spreading into its mandate state from the surrounding region.

The Period of Faysal ibn Husayn ibn 'Alī I (1883-1933)

Britain elected to alter its form of occupation in Iraq from direct to indirect rule by contriving an Iraqi government with an Arab ruler to quell public disapproval of a

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Wilson had envisioned on forming. At the time, Kurdish leader Maḥmūd al-Barzanī's group was scheming to set up an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq. The immediate and harsh action taken against the Kurds signified Britain's shift from being a liberator of the people from Ottoman control to an oppressive conqueror. Cited from Bernhardsson, "Reclaiming a Plundered Past," p. 184.

[9] Bernhardsson, "Reclaiming a Plundered Past," p. 185.

[10] Ibid., p. 186.

foreign presence. The British government had decided to create a kingdom out of their newly gained *vilayets* and to install a foreign Arab king who would depend on British assistance to maintain his throne in a country that could not claim him as her native son. The primary concern for Britain was to maintain control of the socio-economic and foreign policy domains of Iraq while relegating the internal political sphere to the elected ruler. The candidate chosen to occupy the throne was Faysal ibn Ḥussein ibn 'Alī, third son of the ruler of the Hijāz, Sharīf Ḥusayn bin 'Alī of Mecca.[11] On 23 August 1921, he was crowned Faysal I in the new Kingdom of Iraq.[12]

Under the provisions of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922, a British advisor was appointed to every Iraqi minister of state and to each official post in government. While they were supposed to serve only as advisors to the ministers, they were in fact the ones in charge by virtue of their power to approve or reject any law or provision against British interests. Faysal also had an advisor, Percy Cox, who held the title of High

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[11] Other contenders for the throne included three local candidates: Sayyid 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Gaylanī, Sheikh of Muḥammarah, and Sayyid Ṭālib. Although the British administration had cordial dealings with al-Gaylani, who had served as the Naqib (mayor) of Baghdad, his advanced age made him an unlikely candidate. The Sheikh of Muḥammarah was not favored because he was a Shī'ī. The last local candidate, Ṭālib, was considered a threat to British authority due to his nationalist tendencies. At a private dinner party, in which a reporter from the Daily Telegraph had attended, Ṭālib threatened that there would be an uprising if the British interfered with elections. Shortly after this incident the High Commissioner Percy Cox had Ṭālib arrested and deported to Ceylon. Further details see Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq 1914 - 1932* (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), p. 67.

[12] Gibb, Kramers, Levi-Provencal, and Shacht, *The Encyclopedia of Islam,* s.v. "Faysal I," by S. H. Longrigg, vol. 2, p. 872. Born in Ta'if, in today's western Saudi Arabia, Faysal accompanied his father to Istanbul at the young age of 8 where he was to remain for the next 18 years. In 1909 he returned to Mecca with his father and took part in battles against the Idrīsī of 'Aṣīr in 1912-1913. Faysal then became the leader of the British-backed Arab rebellion against the Ottoman Empire during World War I that was begun by his father. After successfully taking most of Syria, he declared himself king with the approval and blessings of the leaders of the Arab-nationalist movement. His brief position as ruler of Syria from 1918-1920 came to an abrupt end when France claimed the territory forcing him to flee to England to seek temporary asylum.

Commissioner in Iraq. Consequently, the latter had Britain's full support allowing him to wield greater authority than Faysal since he had the backing of the military to secure his demands. Faysal was left in a rather weak position regarding his immediate influence over the political affairs of the country and found himself increasingly relegated to the role of mediator between Britain and Iraq's citizens.[13]

As a foreigner, Faysal had not only to rely on Britain to secure his position as king but also on a close circle of ex-Ottoman officers and intellectuals to insulate his cabinet from opposition.[14] His reason for accepting the crown was his desire eventually to extend his rule beyond the borders of Iraq. The British would later discover that the region Faysal had in mind was outside their limited authority.

Faysal's vision as a leader can be summarized briefly as follows: first, he wanted to gain full international recognition of Iraq's independence; and second, having lost Syria in his first attempt at establishing and leading an Arab kingdom, he never gave up the hope of recapturing Damascus and installing his authority there.

The primary objective of gaining international recognition of Iraq's independence was of great importance for Faysal as he was aware of the internal opposition to the mandate arrangement with Britain as expressed by the nationalists. He believed that the disharmony in Iraqi society could be rectified at least to some

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[13] A revised Treaty of 1922 retained most of the same provisions of the original Anglo-Iraqi treaty, which Faysal originally opposed but was forced to sign or face losing the throne.

[14] Examples of Faysal's entourage included Nurī al-Sa'īd, Yasīn al-Hāshimī, Rustam Ḥaidar and Sāṭi' al- Ḥuṣrī. The first two were later to serve as Iraqi prime ministers and Ḥuṣrī's role in Iraqi politics will be taken up in greater detail in the latter part of this chapter.

extent by unifying the populace under the banner of an independent nation. While not paying too much attention to Kurdish unrest at this early stage of statehood, he charted a plan that would quell dissent by throwing the blanket of pan-Arabism over the various ethnic and religious factions.[15] Winning independence for Iraq through patient and skillful diplomatic relations with the British government could then earn Iraq an honorary position in the pan-Arab quest, as it would be the first Arab nation to be recognized by the League of Nations. Moreover, it would push Faysal to the foreground of pan-Arab idealism by proving his ability at leading a country to independence. He held that with Iraq's independence, he could then direct the nation's attention away from local, ethnic, tribal and religious affiliations and towards his greater dream of uniting Iraq with Syria.

Perhaps due to his close reliance on Britain throughout his political career, Faysal's relationship with the Iraqis from the beginning was one of distrust. Nonetheless, the new king allayed this distrust by demonstrating his talents to Westerners and Arabs alike for leadership and diplomacy, combining the grace and honor of an Arab sheikh with the worldly know-how that lent him ease when dealing with Western diplomats. Likewise, throughout his career Faysal was recognized for his ability in appeasing opposing groups in Iraq and working diligently to maintain the fragile balance that existed between the nationalists' and British interests. He did not,

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[15] At this point, the Kurds received little of the outside support which they were later to enjoy in Iraq's contemporary history that has included outside assistance from Iran, Turkey and more recently from the United States and Britain.

however, meet all of Britain's expectations, since in the latter part of his career he proved to be far more nationalistic than he was previously thought to be. Faysal never gave up the dream of leading an Arab nation with Damascus as his capital, even after his campaign in Syria failed and he was forced into exile.

The maintenance of good Anglo-Iraqi relations became a primary task for Faysal upon receiving the crown. Having experienced defeat in Damascus, Faysal tried to conduct state matters more practically and in a manner that would ensure Iraq's full independence and eventually his long sought after ambition of uniting Iraq and Syria into one state under his leadership. He understood that the stability of the new state would depend on the successful integration of its heterogeneous socio-political groups. One solution to this dilemma was the implementation of universal conscription, an act that took the British by surprise since Faysal pressed for the creation of a national army not long after becoming king. The urgency behind the establishment of an Iraqi army was that it would fill a few key gaps in Faysal's design of leadership. First, it would strengthen the king's hold on power against external forces (i.e., Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Persia) and to internal opposition (i.e., the Shī'ah, Kurds, and tribal sheikhs). Second, a national army would play an important role in unifying the various groups in Iraq.[16] As far as the other Middle Eastern lands were concerned, Faysal held that the existence of an Iraqi army would send out a positive signal identifying Iraq as the

[16] The minority groups were primarily against conscription for the fear of the Sunnī officers' domination of the army.

liberator of the region and furthering his pan-Arab ambitions.[17]

On 3 October 1932, Faysal ushered in the new era of an independent Iraq with it's acceptance into the League of Nations. Little more than a year later, however, he died in a clinic in Berne, Switzerland on December 8, 1933, after being admitted for heart problems. His only son, Ghazī I (born in Mecca in 1912) succeeded him.

Internal Realities in Iraq at the Dawn of Statehood

The domestic realities in Iraq presented King Faysal, on his accession to the throne, with the daunting task of uniting a severely heterogeneous society. After taking office in Iraq, he came to the realization that the internal strife inherent in the various religious sects and ethnic groups could be detrimental to his political ambitions. The main components of the splits in Iraqi society could be grouped into three basic categories: the religious groups, the ethnic groups, and the socio-political groups. One author, Derek Hopwood, attributes the origin of these intrinsic divisions in Iraqi society to the period of Ottoman governance.[18] During that era local loyalty to one's religious leaders or tribal head was an accepted part of life. Under the Ottoman *millet* system, which granted minorities the right to conduct their own internal matters as long as the taxes were paid, division along ethnic lines was encouraged. The deep cleavages prevalent in the mandate era can therefore be attributed to this long history of semi-

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[17] Aḥmad 'Abd al-Razzāq Shikarah, *Iraqi Politics, 1921-41 : The Interaction Between Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy* (London: LAAM, 1987), p. 34.
[18] Hopwood, "Social structures," p. 13.

independent local factions.[19]

The religious groups in Iraq included the majority Muslims (split between the Sunnī and Shī'ah sects), the Christians, the Jews and the Yazidis. The ethnic groups, on the other hand, consisted of the Arabs, Kurds, Turcomans, Armenians, Assyrians, and the Chaldeans.[20] Added to this were the socio-political classes, which included the traditional wealthy Sunnī urbanites, the tribal sheikhs, and the poor peasants in rural Iraq. By far, the most obvious example of national division was found in the political sphere with the predominance of Sunnī Arabs to the exclusion of any other religious or ethnic group. In government, the singular domination of the Sunnī Arabs had been the norm from the time of the Ottoman Empire to the time of Faysal's reign. One reason for the exclusion of other religious or ethnic groups from governmental positions was the lack of similar educational opportunities.[21] Another reason was the fact that the Ottoman government that controlled the region before the creation of Iraq was a Sunnī administration that employed Sunnī Arabs in official government posts.

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[19] Shikarah, *Iraqi Politics*, p. 18.

[20] Hopwood, "Social structures," p. 13

[21] Yitzak Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 111-112. Not only was the government expending less if any resources to institute educational facilities in the Shī'ah and Kurdish areas, but it should be noted, as author Yitzak Nakash states, that for some areas in the Shī'ah neighborhoods, the religious leaders passed orders to ban attendance of government schools as a form of opposition. With the growing instability of the nation after King Faysal's death, the traditional Shī'ah clergy lessened their adversity towards Western education when it became apparent that the community could not afford to remain outside the pool of opportunities offered through higher education. A member of the Literary Society in Najaf portrayed this new vision to Loy Henderson, head of the U.S. Legislation in Iraq, in 1944: "The time has come when we should apply our intellect and our energy to improving the lot of our people; to raising their education qualifications, and to assisting them to benefit from the scientific knowledge of the advanced countries in the West. We realize that we personally cannot hope to be scientists, economists, or political scientists in the Western sense. Nevertheless, we hope that by our efforts we shall make it possible for those coming behind us to partake of the fruits of Western civilization."

Even after the British had taken possession of the area, a select portion of the ex-Ottoman elite continued to enjoy economic and political privilege as its members were employed by the new government due to their social connections and political experience.[22] The arrangement lent further barriers to the mobility of the rest of the populace. Moreover, the polarization of socio-economic and political stratification in society only worsened the many economic hardships faced by the peasants and farmers who were deprived of some of the basic necessities.[23]

There were also divergences in the social and political standing of the associations which centered in the towns and among the tribesmen living outside of towns and cities.[24] The task of integrating the various mid-Euphrates and southern marshes tribesmen proved a difficult enterprise for the government. Faysal strove to maintain good relations with the tribal leaders for he knew that to be accepted as king he needed their recognition and support. While not wanting to grant them unlimited power of influence and movement, he had to be cautious about implementing any new rules that might change the hithertofore ancient local loyalties, out of fear of a popular revolt or internal strife.

Not knowing how to deal with the various religious and ethnic groups, and faced

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[22] Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 1114.

[23] Shikarah, *Iraqi Politics*, p. 15.

[24] Hopwood, "Social structures," p. 13. The Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation Law of 1916 is just one of may examples of laws and government policies that existed in Iraq before the Mandate period which directly contributed to or effected the strong splits in society. This law granted local sheikhs the freedom to administer and own large tracts of land. This law also contributed to the dire economic hardships and entrapment of the workers to the landowners.

with the void left by the need of a national identity to unify the nation, the ruling elite embarked on a course of forced assimilation which seemed to offer the quickest solution to the disjointed nature of the nation.[25] This goal was certainly doomed to failure as the opposition to Faysal and the central government's domestic policies became more fervent.

The divisions in society proved too much of an obstacle for Faysal's hopes of finding popular support among the Iraqis. In such a complex web of affiliations, the concept of a national identity was lost in the many pockets of subjective identities. A new and intangible ideal such as national identity could not compete with the long-existing loyalties given to religious leaders, tribal sheikhs and local consciousness. To rectify this impediment, Faysal strongly campaigned for the ideal of pan-Arab unity with the hope that it would act as a cohesive agent for the nascent Iraqi nation.

Arab Nationalism vs. Iraqi Identity

When Iraq became a mandate state, the ruling elite were faced with the urgent task of finding a national identity with which to clothe the ideologically naked state after the removal of its Islamic-Ottoman identity. The reality of the political climate in Iraq during the mandate period was characterized as a time of disharmony, discord and distrust of the various competing interests, such as, for example, between the British

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[25] Ibid.

authorities and Faysal, the Iraqis and Faysal, the minorities and the British, and the small ruling Sunnī elite and the majority Shī'ah population.

Initial opposition to the mandate state stemmed from the large Shī'ah population who were against the historical rule of the Sunnī elite in the central bureaucracy system and regarded the mandate period as an extension of the British presence in Iraq. A sense of the discordant elements at the time may be gained from these lines by the contemporary Iraqi poet Ma'rūf al-Raṣāfī:

> A flag, a Constitution, and a National Assembly
> each one a distortion of the true meaning
> Names of which we have only utterances
> but as to their true meaning we remain in
> ignorance
> He who reads the Constitution will learn
> that it is composed according to the Mandate
> He who looks at the flapping banner will find
> that it is billowing in the glory of aliens
> He who sees our National Assembly will know
> that it is constituted by and for the interests of any but the
> electors
> He who enters the Ministries will find
> that they are shackled with the chains of foreign
> advisors.[26]

Three strands of political thought were presented to Faysal to help solve this dilemma of identity. The first was supported by the radical Islamic intellectuals who advocated a Waḥḥabī-style, anti-British, Arab-Islamic identity. The second option was suggested by a group of thinkers advocating a French or British concept of patriotism which basically stressed territorial nationalism and the need for an Iraqi leader for the

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[26] Quoted in Bernhardsson, "Reclaiming a Plundered Past," p. 201.

Iraqi people. The third and last option was the one presented by the modernized Sunnī-Arab elite who embraced secular Pan-Arabism formulated on the German-based model of language and culture as the components of nationalism.[27] Supporters of the first and second strands of thought were equally opposed to Faysal and his benefactors, so that the only viable option left was the last choice that provided some justification for his position as king.

As a Hashimite from the Ḥijāz, Faysal knew that the only claim he could possibly make for the legitimacy of his role as ruler was in the context of the Islamic element. Nevertheless, he rejected this lineage as the focus for his leadership and instead turned to the ideal of Arab nationalism and unification. Not all the citizens of the new kingdom were in favor of this policy, such as the Kurds and Shī'ah, for example, who feared the consequences of pan-Arab ideology for their communities.[28] For Faysal, pan-Arab nationalism was a policy that lay very close to his political ambitions and provided a distraction from the regional nationalists' call.

The reader should not be misled into thinking that Faysal made no effort to promote a specifically Iraqi identity. The notion of an Iraqi *waṭanīyyah* (regionalism) was exemplified in a speech delivered by Faysal on August 1921, shortly after becoming king, which included the following line: "Oh noble Iraqis, this land had been in past

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[27] Amatzia Baram, "A Case of Imported Identity: The Modernizing Secular Ruling Elites of Iraq and the Concept of Mesopotamian-Inspired Territorial Nationalism, 1922-1992." *Poetics Today*, 15 (Issue ii, 1994), pp. 279-319.

[28] The Iraqi Kurds and Shī'ī population felt alienated by the pan-Arab ideology which stressed Arab characteristics to the exclusion of all other ethnic identities. The other fear was that the hoped-for one Arab nation would most likely be headed by Sunni Arabs, who would be in the majority if Iraq was to be unified with the other Middle East states (themselves mostly populated by Sunni Muslims).

generations the cradle of civilization and prosperity, and the centre of science and knowledge."[29] The quote demonstrates that while he was not stressing the idea of ethnic continuity between the ancient dwellers of Mesopotamia and the modern citizens of the region, he was asking citizens to take pride in the region's history as the cradle of a once great and prosperous civilization -- one that any new nation would be proud to have. Afraid to isolate Iraq from the rest of the Arab world and thereby shatter his dream of a greater Arab nation, Faysal steered away from promoting a regional identity. The reason for this was that by placing too much emphasis on whatever was exclusively Iraqi he would have undermined his legitimate role as an Arab king. In addition, stressing the pre-Islamic history of Iraq might have had fierce repercussions from the predominantly Muslim population. The focus, rather, was to stress Iraq's central role as a contributor to Arab achievements in the contemporary period.

The Iraqis at the time, much to Faysal's disappointment, did not join the pan-Arab drive en masse. With the many economic discrepancies in society and the political opportunities given to a select few, it is not surprising that the majority of the population demanded immediate changes to the economic, educational and political policies affecting their lives rather than appeals to lofty ideals that did little to improve their standard of living. The new nation needed to embark on a national identity-

[29] Amatzia Baram, "A Case of Imported Identity," p. 284.

building campaign that could address the many diverse groups and unite all under a common allegiance to a national ideal.

To achieve this grand assimilation of the populace into his pan-Arab vision, Faysal entrusted the enterprise to the prolific educator and thinker, Sāṭi' al-Ḥuṣrī, who served as Director General of Education from 1923 to 1927 and who for this reason has been referred to as the "father of public instruction in Iraq."[30] The primary task of the identity-building campaign was to direct state politics, education, and culture towards a pan-Arabist orientation. During the process, the budding and controversial field of archaeology in Iraq became a major component in cultivating a national awareness and identity, mirroring the pan-Arab ideal.

Archaeology in Iraq

Western interest in Iraq's pre-Islamic antiquities can be traced as far back as 1899 when a German excavation team under the direction of Robert Koldewey worked on an ancient Babylonian site.[31] The region's ancient ruins have continued to be a source of inquiry and interest for the Western world from that time to the present; indeed, archaeologists around the world are still waiting for the political clouds to clear

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[30] William L. Cleveland, *The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought of Sāṭi' al-Ḥuṣrī* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 62. More will be said about Sāṭi al-Ḥuṣrī in the latter part of this chapter.

[31] Bernhardsson, "Reclaiming a Plundered Past," pp. 120-122. With the establishment of the *Kommission fur die archaologische Erforschung der Euphratund Tigrislander* (Commission for the Archaeological Study of the Lands of the Euphrates and Tigris) in 1897, the Germans wanted to dominate archaeological research in Mesopotamia similar to the exclusive French arrangement undertaken in Iran at the same period. German excavation began in 1899 at Babylon and by 1903 had produced large portions of the famed city walls of the monumental Ishtar Gate facade.

to permit them entry and permission to resume or undertake new excavations.

Politics and archaeology in Iraq, however, were mixed long before the emergence of the new state. Magnus Bernhardsson explains how British archaeologists under the cover of excavation work at the time of World War I became useful as intelligence agents due to their knowledge of the Middle East region, its culture, the people and the language.[32] Examples of such archaeologists-turned-intelligence officers include T.E. Lawrence, Leonard Wooley, David Hogarth, and Horatio Kitchener.[33]

Due to either lack of awareness of the educational, cultural and political relevance of their country's relics, or to the insufficient tools and understanding of the study of archaeology, Iraq's political and intellectual elites displayed almost complete neglect of this precious heritage. While the British authorities opted on managing their mandate state through indirect rule so as to avoid igniting a national rebellion that might cost them valuable financial resources and manpower to contain, their efforts in the field of archaeology were much more directly controlled in terms of commissioning excavations and exporting antiquities from Iraq.

> It is not entirely clear why the British took this stance in archaeological matters. Their position and rationale is never explicitly stated in official circles yet they obviously viewed it as their exclusive domain. However, one can assume that their view of the cultural sophistication and level of education of the Iraqi population was not

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[32] Ibid., pp. 126-127.

[33] Ibid. Lawerence, Woolley, and Hogarth were involved in archaeological work before the war and later became intelligence officers operating from Egypt. Kitchener produced extensive surveys of Palestine in 1878 that were then used to produce an extremely detailed map at a scale of one inch to a mile.

> particularly favourable. For example, an internal report by the Keepers of the British Museum, stated that Iraq was not populated by 'highly educated and intelligent classes,' necessary for the creation of an indigenous archaeology. In formulating antiquities legislation in Iraq, the Keepers argued that 'science, fully as much as political consideration' demands that the legislation ensure Western interests and guarantee the export of antiquities from Iraq. They did not deem the Iraqis capable or interested to work on their own archaeological matters... Another more significant reason is that the British felt that archaeology was too important and valuable to allow the Iraqis any role in the decision-making process.[34]

For the British, the newfound treasures of Iraq were regarded as trophies of war to be shipped back to England, as the influential politician Percy Cox,[35] High Commissioner to Iraq from 1922 to 1926, demonstrated in his letter dated 13 February 1922 to the Colonial Office: "My hope in sending home the Samarra antiquities before the Iraq Government succeeded the British administration was that they could be regarded as spoils of war taken by our troops ... and to discuss them with the Iraq government would be unnecessary."[36] They were to symbolize Britain's imperial power and riches.

In the much heated debate concerning legal ownership and the return of pillaged

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[34] Ibid., pp. 201-202.

[35] Percy Cox (1864-1937) was appointed High Commissioner to Iraq in 1920 and retired in May 1923. He served as the chief political officer to the Mesopotamia expeditionary force during WWI where he was responsible for all local relations in Iraq. He is known best for the pivotal role he played in the establishment of the Hashemite monarchy, constitution and political life in Iraq. Referenced from *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* 1970 ed., s.v. "Cox, Sir Percy," vol. 6, p. 686.

[36] Bernhardsson, "Reclaiming a Plundered Past," p. 150. The Samarra collection will be dealt with further in the latter part of this chapter as its return was to become a source of major national contention during Sāṭi' al-Ḥuṣrī's term as Director of Antiquities in 1935.

antiquities to their native land, Britain supported the claim that the ancient Mesopotamian heritage belonged in essence to civilized man as historical evidence of the progress man made when first embarking on creating a civilized form of society (their definition of civilized man doubtless being that of a modern European). Bernhardsson helps to clarify the inherent paradox surrounding the issue of ownership by providing the following explanation:

> Ancient artifacts play many complex symbolic and pedagogical roles that reveal and represent the talents and endurance of humans in history. In this sense, cultural property such as antiquities may be considered universal in character. Such creative and historical artifacts transcend present political boundaries because they are not merely material evidence of a near or distant past, but also involve a sense of community and continuity with known and unknown peoples and civilizations. Therefore, the question is posed whether such artifacts can be regarded as belonging to any one nation. And if a nation is an owner of an historic artifact, does it have exclusive rights attached to it? And finally should such artifacts be given special protection during wartime?[37]

As the Iraqi people were not considered to be a civilized nation according to Western standards at the time of the mandate period, the Mesopotamian heritage was regarded as lost on the local Iraqi populace. Hence, there was no ethical dilemma facing the British officials who felt it their inherent right to confiscate and transport their many discoveries to their own country.

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[37] Ibid., p. 135.

The topic of ownership rights to the antiquities found in Iraq between 1917-1920 came to the fore when faced with the question "[S]hould they belong to the country in which they were found, to the excavator's nation, to the nation that funded the mission, the presiding political power or, to the nation that could most easily appreciate its value."[38] The practice current at the time of the division of the spoils among Western nations, irrespective of Iraq's rights over it's own antiquities, seemed to be inconsistent with the sovereignty of a newly independent state. To curtail the widespread practice of illegally exporting antiquities outside of the country, the Iraqi government decided that the constitution and other laws needed the necessary provisions to protect the nation's historical treasures.

Iraq's first Antiquities Law was finally passed in 1924 through the efforts of Gertrude Bell, who was appointed Honorary Director of Antiquities by Faysal in October 1922. The legislation was designed to safeguard the country's interests and monitor all archaeological expeditions in the country.[39] The new law, however, did very little to dissipate the Iraqis' suspicion that Western countries were continuing to plunder the many valuable antiquities of the country. If anything, the new law seemed instead to legitimize the act of plundering committed by these nations.[40] There are two important and controversial articles in the Antiquities Law of 1924 that seem to justify

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[38] Ibid., p. 164.

[39] Ibid., p. 247. Gertrude Bell is more frequently cited for her role as the Oriental Secretary to the British High Commissioner in Baghdad where she served under Percy Cox in 1920-1922 before he was replaced by Arnold Wilson in 1923.

[40] Ibid.

such doubts:

> At the close of excavations, the Director shall choose such objects from among those found as are in his opinion needed for the scientific completeness of the Iraq Museum. After separating these objects, the Director will assign [to the excavator] ... such objects as will reward him adequately aiming as far as possible at giving such persona representative share of the whole result of the excavations made by him. (Article 22)
>
> Any antiquities received by a person as his share of the proceeds of excavations under the proceeding article may be exported by him and he shall be given an export permit free of charge in respect thereof. (Article 23)[41]

The unequal and biased division of the finds aroused nationalist sentiment against the treatment of the country's resources. A new national consciousness was awakened in political circles with regard to the antiquities confiscated by foreigners and taken out of Iraq. The government began comparing its policies pertaining to antiquities with that of the Egyptian government, which by that time had much more experience in the field. The Iraqi government elected to pass similar restrictions on the export of antiquities and based its division of the found treasures along the same guidelines as used in Egypt.[42] This meant that the responsibility of dividing the excavated material was that of the Director of Antiquities, who would be responsible for choosing all the best preserved and important pieces for Iraq, allowing the foreign excavating team to have the remaining pieces and a few of the best ones only if the national museum had doubles. In the case of valuable pieces that did not have a duplicate, the national

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[41] Ibid., p. 221.
[42] Ibid., p. 297.

museum would have the option to lend such a piece to a given foreign museum where they could make a replica of the original and then send the authentic item back.

Excavations During Faysal's Reign: "There is enough work to be done in the land to keep ten expeditions busy for 500 years."[43]

The first official archaeological excavation was organized by the British archaeologist Leonard Woolley in 1922 with the auspicious support of Gertrude Bell, then Oriental Secretary to the British High Commissioner, and Sir Percy Cox, appointed Provisional Director of Antiquities by Faysal I.[44] Finds began streaming in from Ur, Kish, Uruk, and Tel al-'Ubayd and were described by Bell in her letters as "sensational" and at times left the viewers "unspeakably thrilled."[45]

A prominent figure in archaeology during this time, Woolley was the son of an Anglican clergyman in whose footsteps Woolley had originally wanted to follow. He later chose to pass on the clergy in pursuit of a career that would allow him to prove the historicity of the Bible.[46] His discoveries included vast amounts of antiquities of Sumerian origin; but his greatest contribution to the discipline of archaeological research in Iraq was the extensive body of writings he produced on the topic that

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[43] Excerpt from a letter dated December 16, 1921 by the American Assyriologist Albert T. Clay to Clyde Garbett, a British Official. Cited from Bernhardsson, "Reclaiming a Plundered Past," p. 203.
[44] Baram, "A Case of Imported Identity," p. 282.
[45] Lady D. B. E. Bell, ed., *The Letters of Gertrude Bell* (vol.2) (London: Ernest Benn, 1927), pp. 665-666, 680-682.
[46] Bernhardsson, "Reclaiming a Plundered Past," pp. 233-238

attracted a great deal of interest in England and America. Subsequent to the first official excavation permit issued to Woolley, many requests followed from various international archaeologists who wanted to take part in the opportunity to excavate in Iraq.

To illustrate the extent of Western archaeological interest in Iraq during Faysal's reign, below is a list of the more famous and prominent excavations:

1922-1934	Penn (University of Pennsylvania) - BM (British Museum) mission to Ur. Funded by John D. Rockefeller Jr.; under the direction of Leonard Woolley and Sidney Smith.
1923-1933	Field Museum in Chicago and Oxford University mission to Kish near Babylon; under the direction of Ernest Mackay and Steve Langdon.
1928-1929	Harvard-Baghdad School Expedition to Nuzi (modern Yorghan Tepe); directed by Robert Pfeiffer.
	Michigan -Baghdad School Expedition to Seleucia (Tall 'Umar), under the direction of Leroy Waterman.
	Deutsche-Orient Gesellschaft (DOG) expedition to Ctesiphon, under the direction of Oscar Reuther.
	Louvre and University of Kansas to Tallu' headed by l'Abbe de Genouillac.
1928-1939	Deutsche-Orient Gesellschaft mission to Warka, Sumerian remains, under the direction of Julius Jordan.
1929	University of Chicago's Oriental Institute (OI) mission to Diyala area, headed by James Henry Breasted.
1929-1935	University of Chicago's Oriental Institute mission to Khorsabad. Funded

by John D. Rockefeller; headed by Edward Chiera[47] and later by Gordan Loud.[48]

The Iraq Museum

With the passing of the Antiquities Law in 1924 and its reinforcement by the Iraqi government, Western archaeologists who worked diligently on various sites became apprehensive over the maintenance and protection of Iraq's allotment of major historical pieces. At this early juncture of archaeological excavations in Iraq, the country did not have the experience or facilities to conserve or display such important finds. The establishment of the Iraq Museum grew out of this concern to house and protect the country's share of the newly discovered artifacts, in addition to preventing Britain from shipping all the finds to British museums for interim storage.

The division of the excavated material at Ur in 1923 prompted Bell, along with the assistance of J. M. Wilson, an architect and British official in Iraq, and 'Abd al-Qādr Pachamjī, a former employee of the Museum of Istanbul, to organize the pieces on tables in a small room in one of the official government buildings and present the

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[47] Bernhardsson notes that Chiera led the first official Iraqi excavation team at Tarkalan near Kirkuk which yielded Assyrian finds in 1925-1931. The excavation was funded by the Iraq Museum along with the new American School of Archaeology in Baghdad. Chiera's work near Kirkuk was to be continued by later missions sponsored by the Fogg Art Museum in Boston, Harvard's Semitic Museum and the American School of Oriental Research, which were known together as the Nuzi expeditions: under Chiera in 1927-28; Robert H. Pfeiffer in 1928-29; and Richard F.S. Starr in 1929-31. The discoveries of the missions included "more than five thousand tablets which provided critical information about the economic, religious and legal institutions of the Nuzian/Hurrians who were believed to be the Biblical Horites." See Bernhardsson, "Reclaiming a Plundered Past," pp. 242-243.

[48] Ibid., pp. 232-245.

first archaeological exhibition in Iraq.[49] The grand opening was attended by British and Iraqi notables, including King Faysal I, who inaugurated the museum on June 1926.

Beginning with 3,000-4,000 pieces, by the end of the year the collection had grown to include a little more than ten thousand objects.[50] Improvements to the museum were soon to follow as government funding was increased in the years following the initial opening, culminating six years later in the construction of a new and larger museum to house the growing national collection.[51] Government expenditures on the expansion and renovation of the museum were due in large part to the Parliamentary Education Committee's newfound interest in the artifacts' educational contribution to the nation. This stage marked the first real acknowledgment by Iraqi politicians and intellectuals of the value of the relationship between the citizens of the modern state and their Mesopotamian predecessors. As was stated by the parliamentary educational committee in reference to the need to preserve the nation's antiquities: "These are the treasures which the grandfathers left as a bequest to their grandsons, to serve as evidence of their bright civilization."[52]

As these advancements in archaeology were being achieved, Faysal acquiesced to developments with a certain reserve, as he did not wish for public interest to focus too drastically on the pre-Arab, pre-Islamic period of Iraq's history. His concern was

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[49] Ibid., p. 265.
[50] Ibid., p. 267.
[51] Ibid., pp. 270-271.
[52] Baram, "A Case of Imported Identity," p. 285.

that such an obsession might lead to the country's political isolation from the pan-Arab foundation, and consequently his own estrangement from the people. Paradoxically, the ancient Mesopotamian discoveries received little if any reaction from the ruling elite, either due to the fact that the discipline of archaeology was new and foreign to Iraq, or to the prevalent view that the practice was mostly a western hobby. As for the general public, their lack of enthusiasm for ancient relics can be attributed to doubts about linking the national identity with the past glories of the *jaḥilīyah* period in Iraq's history, meaning to the time before the advent of Islam. Therefore, to hold tightly to a national identity that invoked this aspect of the region's history could be construed as veneration of the culture and achievements of the civilizations that came before Islam. For some religious groups, like the Shī'ah for example, this could be seen as a form of sacrilege and idolatry. The representation of the pre-Islamic history of the country was also not in tune with the more important ideology of the time endorsing Arab nationalism and the common historical thread of Islam and language binding all Arabs together.

It is debatable whether Faysal withheld his own enthusiasm over the uniqueness of the nation's pre-Islamic, pre-Arab identity for these same religious considerations in addition to his fears of politically isolating Iraq from the rest of the Middle East. What can be inferred, however, is that placing too much emphasis on the archaeological finds highlighting Iraq's distinctly regional history might, according to Faysal, adversely create a regional nationalism that could foster doubt as to the legitimacy of his position as king. A clue to his thinking on this issue can be drawn from his appointment of the

famous educator Sāṭi' al-Ḥuṣrī as Director General of Education, already noted above.

At first, Ḥuṣrī viewed the country's pre-Islamic treasures with disinterest and showed a reluctance to advocate or support such an undertaking for mostly the same reasons as Faysal. Yet as the topic of protecting the national resources from foreign influence escalated, Ḥuṣrī found in archaeology a vehicle to promote pan-Arabism by actively involving the nation in opposing foreign dominance. This was achieved primarily through the education system, which was directed by Ḥuṣrī to educate the public about the history of the ancient peoples of the Middle East, while steering the lessons along the lines of pan-Arab ideology.

The Ideology of Arab-Nationalism as Instituted by Sāṭi' al-Ḥuṣrī in Iraq

Sāṭi' al-Ḥuṣrī had been born in Yemen in 1882 to a successful commercial family originally from Syria. His father was the chief Ottoman *qadī* (judge) in Yemen,[53] and so his own education was provided mostly by tutors who conveyed a thoroughly Ottoman training. He graduated from Istanbul's Mulkiye Mektebi, a famous school designed to train Ottoman bureaucrats, and began his life-long career as an educator in the empire's Balkan provinces. During this period of his career, he witnessed the emergence of Balkan nationalism which advocated a full understanding of and role for language as essential to the struggle for national unity. This experience left a lasting impression on Ḥuṣrī and would later be a primary focus of his writings, as the following

[53] Bernhardsson, "Reclaiming a Plundered Past," p. 213.

excerpt illustrates: "The life of the nation is based on its language...The nation which falls under the rule of a foreign power loses its independence...but it does not lose its life while it preserves its language."[54]

His talents as an educator earned him the position of Director of the Teachers' Training Institute in Istanbul. He joined Faysal in Syria after WWI and followed him to Iraq where he served the Director General of the Ministry of Education from 1922 to 1927.[55] He was not well-liked in the Ministry because he limited educational access only to those few members of the elite, mainly Sunnī-Arabs, who would later act as political leaders.[56] Due to limited resources, he wanted to provide a high level of education to a few at the expense of the rest of the population. This angered the majority Shī'ah who were not provided with facilities for higher education in their areas, as well as the Kurds, who were forced to master Arabic in order to participate in the economic life of the nation.

Anti-British sentiments and Arab nationalism found an outlet in the writings of Sāṭi' al-Ḥuṣrī, who deplored the artificial boundaries drawn by the imperial powers in an attempt to divide what he considered a single Arab nation, stretching from Morocco to Iraq. While Ḥuṣrī paid respect to Islam as part of the Arab heritage, his focal point for the call to unity was mainly secular, in that he constantly referred to the common

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[54] Phebe Marr, "The development of a nationalist ideology in Iraq, 1920-1941." *The Muslim World,* 75 (1985), pp. 85-101.
[55] Ibid., pp. 89-90.
[56] Ibid.

language and history shared by the inhabitants of the Middle East, going back centuries. These two elements were repeatedly stressed in his writings as the main constituents in the life of a nation. Later, the main Ba'ath ideologue Michel 'Aflaq would elaborate further on this theme.

Downplaying the theme of Iraqi nationalism, Ḥuṣrī emphasized the Arabness of Iraqis and the shared goal of all Arabs in the creation of a unified Arab state: "We must try to unify the Arab countries to become a strong modern nation...and enter the ranks of advanced nations."[57] In this regard, his message to Iraqis was that all individual, isolationist national tendencies should be sacrificed for the good of the greater Arab nation. Phebe Marr states that under Faysal, Ḥuṣrī implemented several initiatives to promote the creation of an Arab national identity in Iraq.[58] First, he directed that Turkish be replaced by Arabic as the primary language of state education. Second, he limited accessibility to education, as mentioned earlier, to only a select group of students, favoring quality rather than quantity. Third, he banned institutions of sectarian private education provided by the Kurdish, Shī'ī, Christian and Jewish minorities in an effort to centralize state education. Finally, he revised the previously British-based school curriculum to refocus the orientation of history towards Arab nationalism: "The primary purpose of teaching history in elementary schools is to teach the history of the nation, and the ultimate aim intended by this is to strengthen patriotic

[57] Ibid., p. 91.
[58] Ibid., pp. 92-94.

and nationalistic feelings in the hearts of the students."[59]

It is important to mention that during this same period, a theory was circulating in Europe and the Middle East regarding the origin of the ancient Semitic civilization. Called the Winckler-Caetani Semitic wave theory, it postulated that the ancient Semite people had originated in the Arabian peninsula and that over time they had migrated from that location to various outlying areas.[60] The theory was included in the history lessons of the 1922-23 primary school curriculum. Why would such a theory be important to an Arab nationalist like Ḥuṣrī? The theory's relevance lies in the fact that it allowed writers and politicians to portray, as in the example of Iraq, that the ancient Chaldeans and Assyrians were kin to the Arabs because they had emerged from the Arabian peninsula. One writer, Muḥammad 'Izzat Darwazah, went even further in claiming that the original Semitic people had originated in Iraq but had migrated to the Arabian peninsula owing to a flood, only to reemerge later to settle in Iraq, Syria, and Palestine.[61] These reemerged groups established the Babylonian, Assyrian and Chaldean nations in Iraq, and the Canaanites, Phoenicians, Aramaens, and Hebrews in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine.

Ḥuṣrī's decision to enshrine this theory in the curriculum was designed to justify the pre-Islamic Mesopotamian civilization in the context of the Arab presence in Iraq.

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[59] Ibid., p. 94.

[60] Baram, "A Case of Imported Identity," p. 292. The Winckler-Caetani Semitic wave theory was adopted by many intellectuals in the Middle East following WWI.

[61] Ibid. The theory first appeared in an Iraqi school textbook in 1929 written by the Palestinian pan-Arabist intellectual, Muḥammad 'Izzat Darwazah.

In effect, the theory acted as a barrier preventing any possibly meaningful connection between the modern Iraqis and the ancient Mesopotamians that was not linked with the Arabness of the people. Faysal was content to stay the course of shadowing the distinctly regional Mesopotamian characteristic and maintaining the Arab identity of Iraqis; and through the educational reconstruction implemented by Ḥuṣrī, this aim was for the most part achieved.

Bell, Ḥusrī and Archaeology in the Service of National Ideology

At the beginning of the mandate period, the nation's antiquities and the laws surrounding them were left by Faysal mainly to the responsibility of the famous Gertrude Bell. Her role in Iraq's formation as a nation and the appointment of Faysal as king cannot be undervalued. However, for brevity's sake, our focus here will be mainly on her influence on the development of the practice of archaeology during this period.

Gertrude Bell had a sincere personal interest in the archaeological discoveries in Iraq that were increasingly being made during her residence there. From the time of her appointment as Honorary Director of Antiquities in October 1922, she worked assiduously in her official role as a promoter of Iraq's archaeological potential.[62] It was to her credit that the nation's first Law of Antiquities was passed in 1924. Nevertheless, she was eventually to meet with resistance on the part of the Iraqi government mainly in the person of Sāṭi' al-Ḥuṣrī, who in October 1934, became the first Iraqi to bear the

[62] Bernhardsson, "Reclaiming a Plundered Past," p. 211.

title of Director of Antiquities.[63]

With Ḥuṣrī's unambiguous support for Arab nationalism as expressed through his prolific writings and career as an educator, the British were understandably pessimistic about the liberty previously enjoyed by archaeologists during Bell's tenure as Director. At first not as interested in archaeology as Bell was, Ḥuṣrī grew increasingly sensitive to the issue of protection of the national heritage as it acquired symbolic implications for preserving the nation's status as an independent entity. For him the focus was on dominating the field and thereby controlling at least this one aspect of the nation's resources. In line with this endeavor, he fostered local appreciation through lessons in archaeology in the new schools and by allowing for new opportunities to sponsor students to study abroad so as to master the field. Reclaiming Iraq's heritage from foreign control could be seen as a campaign to establish pride and encourage active participation in the struggle against imperialism. Ḥuṣrī attempted to integrate Iraq's pre-Islamic heritage into the dialogue of Arab nationalism by connecting Mesopotamian achievements with the contemporary struggle towards retrieving and continuing the glories of the Arab nation.

In contrast to Bell's policies, which still tended to favor Western archaeologists, Ḥuṣrī's objective as director was to change the laws to reflect and respect the new

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[63] Ibid., pp. 318-351. Ḥuṣrī lost his position as Director of Antiquities in 1941 when he was forced to leave the country because of his support of the anti-British and pro-German Rashīd 'Alī al-Gaylanī *coup d'etat* that took place that same year. He was never to return to Iraq again.

political reality of an independent Iraqi state.[64] A noteworthy outcome of his undertaking to secure national rights on all archaeological matters was that of the modifications implemented in the revised Antiquities Law passed by parliament in May of 1936. Much to the chagrin of foreign archaeologists, the old pro-Western division of objects was to come to an end with the inclusion of amendments to the law such as Article 49:

> All antiquities found by excavators shall be the property of the Government. Nevertheless as a reward for his labors the excavator shall be given (firstly) the right to make castings of antiquities found by him, (secondly) half of the duplicate antiquities and (thirdly) certain antiquities already in the possession of the Iraq Government or included among the articles discovered by an archaeological expedition which the Iraq Government can dispense with in view of the existence in the Iraq Museum of other articles sufficiently similar in respect to kind, type, material, workmanship, historical significance and artistic value.[65]

Ḥuṣrī also stressed the need to cultivate Iraq's Islamic heritage with special reference to the period of the reign of the 'Abbasid Caliphates (750-1258) in Iraq. As an example of this, in 1936 he chose to have the site of Wasit excavated under the direction of Edward Chiera, who had headed the University of Chicago's mission to Khorsabad in 1929. This was the first official Iraqi excavation and was chosen for the site's significance as the ancient capital of the Iraqi province under the Ummayyad

[64] Ibid., p. 217.
[65] Ibid., p. 331.

dynasty (661-750) and an important regional city during the 'Abbasid Caliphate.[66] This aspect of archaeology, covering the Islamic history of Iraq, intrigued Ḥuṣrī considerably for it functioned as a visual tool with which to strength his pan-Arabist ideology.

To display the new finds and to give them proper importance in the national culture alongside the pre-Islamic Mesopotamian antiquities, the Museum of Arab Antiquities was established in 1937 to house objects from Iraq's Islamic era.[67] The building chosen for the museum was the legendary Khan Marjan in Baghdad, which had functioned as a covered market in previous centuries and which had at one point served as an inn for passing caravans and traders.

Reclaiming the Plundered Past

Faced with the problem of reclaiming illegally exported antiquities, Ḥuṣrī contributed substantially to the preservation of Iraq's cultural history when in 1935 he sought the return of the famous Samarra collection from the British Museum. In April of that year, the Iraqi Foreign Minister issued a request to the British Ambassador for its restitution, arguing that it was unjust that "such antiquities, discovered in and rightly belonging to Iraq, should be distributed among various museums in Europe and America to the deprivation of Iraq thereof."[68]

The collection in question was originally discovered before WWI by a German

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[66] Ibid., p. 343.
[67] Ibid., p. 348.
[68] Ibid.

excavation team, and it included Samarran fragments from the time of the 'Abbasid Caliphate. The objects fell into British hands in the form of war booty and were transported to Britain with the approval of Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary, and Percy Cox. The division of the collection was then undertaken by T. E. Lawrence and Ernst Herzfeld, who distributed the finds among various Western institutions and allocated a "representative" share for the future Iraq Museum.[69] The Iraq Museum had been established a decade earlier, but had yet to receive it's share of the collection. The British Museum's attitude towards the postponement of Iraq's portion was stated clearly by its director, George Hill, who wrote that the shipment would include "archaeological junk and no serious purpose can be served in shipping it to Baghdad."[70] In the end, under political pressure from the British Foreign Office, the British Museum was finally compelled to ship Iraq's share free of charge to Baghdad, where it arrived in September 1936, fourteen years after the original agreement was drawn.[71] This episode was a major achievement for both Iraq and Ḥuṣrī as it confirmed the nation's independence through its persistent drive to reclaim its historical past.

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[69] Ibid. The share allocated to Iraq included pieces of pottery and segments of architectural decoration in poor condition that were considered not even worth the cost for their transportation to Iraq.
[70] Ibid., p. 349.
[71] Ibid., p. 350.

Summary

King Faysal inherited the crown to rule a country encompassing an extremely heterogeneous society. He had to deal with the daunting task of achieving independence from Britain's domination as well as of establishing popular support and stability for his own regime. At the time, archaeology in Iraq was a booming enterprise, catering to Western interests and ambitions. The discipline struck a minor cord in Faysal's political scheme but soon became a major element in the creation of a national identity for such intellectuals as Sāṭi' al-Ḥuṣrī.

The King entrusted the identity-building campaign to Ḥuṣrī, who took up the cause of protecting the nation's antiquities since it fit so well into the pan-Arab ideology. Along with the establishment of the Iraq Museum, Ḥuṣrī inaugurated the Museum of Arab Antiquities to reflect Iraq's Islamic heritage and prestige. In this period of the national identity-building campaign, the stress was on Iraq's Arabness and how the history of pre-Islamic civilizations served as a testament to the continuing achievements of its Arab population. Applying the Winckler-Caetani Semitic wave theory to justify the continuity of this line of thought, Ḥuṣrī found in archaeology a tool to stir national pride and awareness. Yet while Ḥuṣrī's stress on the ancient Mesopotamian civilizations was later toned down so as not to steal the limelight from Arab nationalism, the regime that came into power after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 opened a blinding floodlight on ancient Mesopotamia in its national identity-building campaign.

Chapter Two

ʿAbd al-Karīm Qāsim

ʿAbd al-Karīm Qāsim

ʿAbd al-Karīm Qāsim, the first president of the Republic of Iraq, was born in a poor quarter of Baghdad, known as Mahdīyah, on 21 December 1914. He was the youngest of the three sons of Qāsim ibn Muḥammad ibn Bakr. Various accounts of his parents' lineage are given, but the official records indicate that both were of Arab descent. His father's lineage can be traced to the southern Arab clan of Qaḥṭaniyah and his mother's to a northern Arab clan, the ʿAdnānīyah.[72] His father was, moreover, a Sunnī Arab, while his mother's parents were Shīʿī Kurds (Faylīs) who came originally from a region in Iran.[73]

Qāsim's single-minded dedication to his studies earned him a government scholarship to attend secondary school. After graduating in 1931, he taught at an elementary school in Baghdad for a year. In 1932 he was accepted into the Military

[72] Uriel Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963* (London: Pall Mall, 1969), pp. 21-22. The author states that other biographers have denied the Arab origin of his parents claiming that his father was a Turcoman and his mother a Kurd.

[73] Ibid. Both parents died before the revolution of 1958 that made their son the first president of the Republic of Iraq.

College, whence he graduated in 1934 as a second lieutenant.[74] In 1941, due to his continued academic achievements, he graduated from the Iraqi Staff College with top grades and later passed a senior officers' course in Britain in 1950.[75]

Qāsim's military career included participation in the suppression of the Middle Euphrates tribal uprisings in 1935 and the unrest in the northern Kurdish region in 1945. He served in the Iraqi military action in Palestine from May 1948 to June 1949 and later commanded a battalion of the First Brigade, stationed in the Kafr Qāsim sector, 15 miles east of Tel Aviv. He also served in Mifrāq, a region north of Jordan, in 1956-57 during the Israel and Egyptian struggle over the Sinai.[76] He was greatly admired by his colleagues for his professionalism and gained a reputation as "a disciplinarian; irascible, painstaking and honest."[77]

In 1936 Iraq experienced its first *coup d'etat,* staged by Bakr Ṣidqī. The event seems to have had a major impact on Qāsim who was then in his twenties. Majid Khadduri states that Ṣidqī was greatly admired at the time by the younger officers, including Qāsim, for his "remarkable personality," such that "many of them aspired to emulate him."[78] Shortly after the coup, King Ghazī I appointed Ḥikmāt Sulaymān

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[74] Ibid. It was possible for more students to be accepted into the higher military schools since the opening of the prestigious Military College by King Faysal in 1932 to enlarge the Iraqi army.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid., p. 22.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Majid Khadduri, *Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 75. Qāsim had the opportunity to join Bakr Ṣidqī's inner circle and observe the workings of political forces and military discipline. Khadduri states that the opportunity was made available to Qāsim by Muhammad 'Alī Jawād, Commander of the Air Force and a close friend to Ṣidqī. Jawād's brother, 'Abd al-Jabbār, was married to Qāsim's sister. An

prime minister, after Yasīn al-Hāshimī resigned from the post, and Ṣidqī became Chief General of Staff.[79] Ṣidqī and Sulaymān primarily wanted to maintain Iraq's independence and its modernization. Both men had little enthusiasm for pan-Arabism and supported the principle of 'Iraq for Iraqis.'[80] Even though the Ṣidqī-Sulaymān government was politically unsuccessful (it was overthrown one year later in 1937), it represented for Qāsim the peoples' struggle against the existing regime; indeed, he was later to admit that "his own plans to liberate his country originated from about that time."[81]

Qāsim and the Mesopotamian Heritage, Part I

Archaeology during Faysal's reign was, as we have seen, a new science that adopted itself well to the nationalist discourse on independence from European imperialism. By the time of the 1958 Revolution, the political climate did not allow for attention to be spared to such cultural issues. The nation was in a whirlwind of transformation with an uncertain government undergoing coups and counter-coups.

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important influence of the Ṣidqī group on Qāsim was their stress on Iraqi unity between the Arabs and the Kurds. Bakr Ṣidqī himself was an Iraqi Kurd.

[79] Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 88-89.

[80] Shikarah, *Iraqi Politics*, pp. 112-113. In the 1930s, Iraqi politics was revolving around two major trends: Iraqi nationalism and pan-Arabism. The new prime minister after the 1936 coup, Ḥilmat Sulaymān, wanted to maintain Iraq's independence in the Anglo-Iraqi alliance, in addition to providing protection to the religious and ethnic communities. He said: "I keenly sympathize with the Arab cause. I however feel compelled first to establish my own country on a firm footing. How can we endeavor to establish an All-Arabia empire before we have first ensured for each component section of such an empire a good, strong and independent government." (Cited in Shikarah, *Iraqi Politics*, p. 113).

[81] Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, p. 22.

Qāsim did not have the available resources or support of the people to indulge in archaeological endeavors, for his main concern was to solidify his power and prevent warring factions from overturning the fragile scale of stability. After its nationalization in the late 1950s of the major industries, however, the government enjoyed a new era of prosperity in which education and cultural fields were imbued with new vigor. The latter part of this chapter will deal at greater length with this aspect of Qāsim's activities. However, it is necessary to present here a brief description of the events leading up to the revolution of 1958 and the major political parties involved to help the reader better understand the political climate during this period. It must be kept in mind that there is only limited information regarding archaeological activities in this period, due partly to the greater focus given to the United Arab Republic under Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir and partly to the fact that the Iraqi people were less enthused with archaeology at a time when the country was in the midst of rapid change and political turmoil.

The Free Officers

The Free Officers movement in Iraq recieved its initial impetus from the success of the 1952 Egyptian revolution led by Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir, who, with the support of a group also called the Free Officers staged a coup to overthrow King Farūq of Egypt and transformed the country into a republic. In the Iraqi army the first secret cells were created in 1952 by military engineers, Major Rif'at al-Hāj Sirrī and Major Rajab 'Abd

al-Majīd.[82] Following the example of the Free Officers in Egypt, Sirrī began secret meetings in five engineering corps while al-Majīd conducted meetings in the mechanical and electrical units. As a precaution against detection, each group operated independently of the other.[83]

Qāsim had by this time risen through the military ranks to become commander of the Nineteenth Infantry Brigade, Third Division. He did not formally join the Free Officers' organization until 1955 when it became evident to the other Officers that he was leading a separate group in the army for a similar purpose.[84] He was close to Staff Colonel 'Abd al-Salām 'Ārif who was commander of the Third Battalion, Twentieth Infantry Brigade, Third Division. Both men were stationed in Jordan, in 1956 and after becoming acquainted with one another, discovered that each shared revolutionary plans and harbored discontent for the existing regime. Having the reputation of an honest leader and respected military officer, Qāsim was sought out by the Free Officers, whom he eventually joined, becoming chairman of the Supreme Committee of Free Officers not long after joining the movement.

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[82] Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*, p. 771. The most reliable information on the creation of the clandestine group in Iraq comes from retired Colonel Ṣabīh 'Alī Ghālib who was once a member of the Supreme Committee of Free Officers in Iraq. Rif'at al-Hāj Sirrī was born in Baghdad in 1917. His father was an Arab Sunnī officer who served in the Ottoman army. Batatu gives a description of his character as being "unassuming, simple in his habits, strongly attached to family, free from the slightest shade of anything like malice, and reportedly one of the bravest officers in the Iraqi army. But he was so trustful, so ready to believe others, that he not infrequently placed himself and his comrades in jeopardy: this would one day cost him his life." Quotation from Batatu, p. 771.
Rajab 'Abd al-Majīd was born in 'Ānah in 1921. His father was a sheep merchant. He was less popular than Sirrī but was more practical and exercised more caution.

[83] Ibid., pp. 772-773.

[84] Ibid., p. 786.

Hanna Batatu provides a listing of the original Supreme Committee members, providing detailed information on family backgrounds and officers' ranks. This data points to certain important similarities between the members: all were, for example, of roughly the same age group, in that the oldest was born in 1914 and the youngest in 1921; all were Muslim Arabs (the majority being Sunnī); and nearly all were born in Baghdad. Out of the 15, all but one had graduated from the Military Academy Staff College.[85] Similar religious backgrounds seem also to have had an influence on the officers' ideology, which was closely linked to Islam. Many regarded Islam as occupying a prominent position in the pan-Arab ideology. An example of this link between Islam and Arabism is expressed in the following passage by Nāḍhim al-Ṭabaqchalī, a prominent member who was later executed:

> I beg your mercy, O God, O God of the Arabs, O God of Islam! I turn to you, O God, as a Moslem and as a believer in my nation and in my Arabism ... I beg your forgiveness, O God and bear witness that there is no god but God and that religion is truth, and Arabism is truth, and the Qur'ān is truth, and Islam is truth![86]

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[85] Ibid., pp. 778-783.

[86] Ibid., pp. 772, 810-811. Nādhim al-Ṭabaqchalī was a member of the Qāsim-'Ārif group within the Free Officers movement. Ṭabaqchalī believed in the pan-Arab ideology and had a strong attachment to Islamic values. He was Commander of the Second Division in the Kirkuk-Arbil area when he was removed from his post on 14 March 1959 for his participation in the Mosul Revolt of 8 March 1959. Even though he participated in the Free Officers movement as a supporter of Qāsim, he became exasperated by the increasing influence of the communists in Iraq and Qāsim's leniency towards them. He was executed on 20 September 1959. Further information on the Mosul Revolt is provided in Appendix II.

Another example may be found in the memoirs of Salāḥ al-Dīn al-Ṣabbāgh,[87] leader of the officers in the 1941 movement, who backed every position taken with a Qur'ānic verse or ḥadīth (Prophetic tradition). [88]

A special reverence for Islam was to become a major feature for Qāsim's attitude, for after surviving an assassination attack in 1962, he became convinced that he could not be harmed out of a belief that he was guarded by divine providence. Ironically though, as we shall see later, Qāsim met with staunch opposition from the religious groups who did not approve of his support for the Iraqi Communist Party, which reached its apex during his leadership.

The Revolution of 1958

On 14 July 1958, Qāsim and a group of Free Officers staged a coup to overthrow the monarchy. In the early morning hours, while the capital city slept, Colonel 'Abd al-Salām 'Ārif and his battalion marched into Baghdad and established

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[87] On 1 April 1941, the four colonels known as the Golden Square, with the cooperation of General Amīn Zakī, Acting Chief of the General Staff, and Rashīd 'Alī al-Gailanī, staged a *coup d'etat* to overthrow the government of Prime Minister Ṭaha al-Hāshimī. Charles Tripp states that the coup was different from other coups because the aim was no longer only about replacing an unpopular prime minister but was aimed directly against the monarchy, especially in the person of the regent 'Abd al-Ilāh. The regent was the uncle of King Faysal II who was then too young to accept the duties of state. Britain intervened to restore the monarchy by deploying forces to Iraq on 2 May 1941. On 29 May, Gailanī fled across the border to Iran and the monarchy was restored. Cited from Tripp, *A History of Iraq*, p. 103.

[88] Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*, pp. 205, 772. Colonel Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ṣabbāgh was part of the Golden Square that also included colonels Kāmil Shabīb, Maḥmūd Sulmān, and Fahmī Sa'īd. The Golden Square had a hand in the downfall of Bakr Sidqī on 11 August 1937 whom they criticized him for drowning the army with Kurdish officers, thereby decreasing the prominence of the Arab element. By the end of 1938, the Golden Square was a primary force in the politics of the country.

their headquarters at the radio station whence they called on the people to rush into the streets to demonstrate in support of the revolution.[89] Once 'Ārif was in control of Baghdad, Qāsim assumed de facto supreme command of the revolutionary forces and was ready to provide rear guard protection against a possible counter-attack. After hearing 'Ārif's declaration of the downfall of the monarchy announced on the radio, he marched into Baghdad and proceeded to the Ministry of Defense where he established his own headquarters.

Not long after this initial broadcast, the kings' palace was besieged and the royal family executed.[90] The original decision made by the Revolutionary Council prior to 14 July was that King Faysal II was to be sent into exile and the Crown Prince 'Abd al-Ilāh and Premier Nurī al-Sa'īd brought to trial without delay. There are several accounts of the execution of the royal family, but all of them are unclear as to the exact intentions or orders issued at the time of the palace siege.

The revolution brought an overflow of emotions and great masses of people out into every street in Iraq. The following passage is taken from an account given by Norman Daniel, who served with the British Council in Baghdad from 1947 to 1979 and

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[89] See Appendix I for Proclamation No.1, the first official document of the new regime.

[90] During the time of 'Ārif's first broadcast, the royal family was awakened by the sound of gunfire in the vicinity of the palace. Even though the palace was guarded by 2,000 soldiers, Ṭaha al-Bamarnī, Commander of the Royal Guard, failed to resist the much smaller revolutionary forces who had by now surrounded the palace. At one point, the King and Crown Prince sent one courtier to negotiate with the captors for the terms of surrender but he was shot dead. Unaware of the fate of the messenger, the palace was stormed and they were all taken out through the back door to the courtyard where they were gunned down by Captain 'Abd al-Sattār Sab' al-'Abusī, an emissary, who emerged from the palace at a run with a submachine gun in his hand and instantly fired into the backs of the royal family. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*, pp. 800-801.

was an eyewitness to many of the more public events:

> Anyone who was present can have seen only a small part of the action taking place over a densely populated city. I can cite only my experiences. I think that by mid-morning there were still men coming onto the streets, perhaps arriving from neighboring villages; in any case a continuous stream of cheering and shouting men, mostly in small groups, seemed to be hurrying somewhere, but as if to a fair, not to storm the Bastille. Possibly they ended up at the Ministry of Defense, where crowds did converge in a dense mass and were difficult for the army to control. No one who was on the streets that morning will doubt the cheerful air of spontaneity with which this celebration of sudden freedom began, the prevailing mood was a sense of release and liberation, and perhaps of almost personal escape from the many burdens of which only a few had in fact been lifted.[91]

By late afternoon on the same day, Qāsim imposed a curfew and martial law in order to keep people off the streets. As the dust settled, the state was converted into a republic with Qāsim as president and 'Ārif as the new vice-president. In contrast to Faysal, who had been faced on his accession with the difficult task of unifying the differing interest groups in the country, Qāsim gained power at a time when the current was moving in the direction of greater Arab unity. Economically, however, the nation was suffering from the effects of severe economic inequity as a result of the old landowning policies that left much to be desired.[92] The skewed distribution of wealth

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[91] Norman Daniel, "Contemporary Perceptions of the Revolution in Iraq on 14 July 1958." In Robert Fernea and Wm. Roger Louis, eds. *The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), p. 11.

[92] Uriel Dann points out that by the 1958 Revolution, 67.1% of the registered land was owned by a few landowners holding estates of over 1,000 dunums (approximately 2,500 sq, meters), while the peasant owners controlled 15.7% of land up to 100 dunums. These discrepancies in the socio-

had been a major domestic issue long before the revolution. Faysal and the British authorities had in fact realized the dire consequences of the economic divisions in society and urged Prime Minister Nurī al-Sa'īd to pass new agrarian legislation to alleviate the deplorable poverty in much of the country.

To fulfill its promise of social reforms, Qāsim's regime undertook major social, economic and political measures within the first few months immediately following the revolution. Muḥammad Ḥadīd, Minister of Finance and Deputy Chairman of the National Democratic Party, defined the economic policy of the government as following along the lines of a welfare state.[93] One of the more important laws implemented by the new government was the Agrarian Reform Law passed on 30 September 1958, designed to redistribute land among the population.[94] Some of the main provisions of the law were that it limited the extent of agricultural holdings, facilitated the expropriation excess land, and made provision for its redistribution amongst farmers.[95]

The revolution brought a glimmer of hope not just to poor farmers and peasants but also to other groups in Iraq, such as the Shī'ah population. For the majority of the latter group, the prospect of having a constitution with representation offered them the

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economic fields made themselves blaringly evident in the capital of the country where hundreds of peasants and farmers left their work and land to escape the hardships of serf-like conditions. The result was a large population of jobless people living in slums on the outskirts of the city in extreme conditions of poverty. Dann, *Iraq under Qassem*, p. 4.

[93] Uriel Dann gives examples of the measures taken to achieve the goal of a welfare state on pp. 54-56, that included, for example, the Social Security Law of 1956 and the Rent Control Law.

[94] Ibid., pp. 54-57.

[95] Ibid., pp. 57-58.

opportunity to take an active part in the political affairs of the nation. For the Kurdish population, on the other hand, the revolution came as a double-edged knife. One side was sharp enough to cut through the long history of government animosity and repression, while the other side posed the threat of cutting a new dividing line, since the new government was headed by military officers who, for the most part, supported the pan-Arab ideal. In fact, immediately after the new government was installed, many of the Free Officers, like 'Ārif, for example, and Arab nationalists in and outside Iraq, spoke openly of their desire for Iraq to join with 'Abd al-Nāṣir's United Arab Republic.

The New Government

Qāsim's primary goal after the revolution was to ready the nation for a new era of constitutional government. The revolution of 1958 was viewed by its citizens and those of other Arab countries as a positive step towards national unity and Iraq's eventual induction into the United Arab Republic (UAR). Establishing an immediate pact of unity with Egypt and Syria might have been the principal next step for most of the Free Officers, who harbored pan-Arab views in the revolutionary clique; but Qāsim at least had not intended for Iraq to join the UAR right after the revolution; indeed, it might be argued that he never intended for it to join at all.

Works written on this period of Iraq's history present different views on the reasons for Qāsim's reluctance to join the UAR, ranging from his personal greed for power to his fear that Egypt would economically dominate the combined wealth of the

three states.[96] He knew that the monarchy from the beginning and more so after the death of Faysal I, had been a puppet state of Britain. In overthrowing the royal family, the Free Officers wanted to rid Iraq of foreign domination and the social injustices plaguing society. To join the UAR was not an option for Qāsim ; he had not risked everything to free Iraq from one foreign domination only to subject her to another. As far as the UAR was concerned, Qāsim wanted to have cooperation between the two states, but he wished mainly to build an independent Iraqi republic.[97]

On a more personal note, Qāsim was aware of 'Abd al-Nāṣir 's fame and prominence, and probably feared a threat to his hold on power if the country were to join the UAR. His fear was not based on any single reason, as it was for other groups like the Kurds and the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) who feared the UAR because they believed it would act as a vehicle to build Egypt's economy and regional strength through the use of Iraq's resources and manpower. For this reason, Qāsim's foreign policy towards the UAR was to show support and cooperation but otherwise to steer the country on an independent course. Not surprisingly, this state of affairs angered many pan-Arabists like 'Ārif who toured the country to raise public support for joining

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[96] On this point see Uriel Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem: A Political History, 1958-1963* (London: Pall Mall, 1969), Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1987); Robert A. Fernea, and Wm. Roger Louis, eds., *The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited.* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1991); Majid Khadduri, *Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958.* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

[97] Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem,* especially pp. 69-76.

the UAR. In response to this, Qāsim turned for support to the group most opposed to such a venture, the ICP.

Political Parties in Iraq, 1958

As president of the new Republic of Iraq, Qāsim had to deal with warring political factions. During Qāsim's short rule, political parties emerged into the public arena and became a prominent feature in the political scene. By far the strongest party during this period was the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), which prospered thanks to Qāsim's support, or rather his indifference to its political activities.

To the dismay of the National Democratic Party and the Ba'thists, Qāsim sided from the start with the ICP. Two reasons may be attributed for this stance: first, the ICP had the greatest amount of influence on the majority of people in the country; and second, the ICP was staunchly against Iraq joining the UAR.[98] This was in contrast to the Ba'th Party's position which called for Iraq to join the UAR immediately after the revolution. The ICP stated its position very strongly, and under the party's ideological banner all aspects of Iraqi culture, ethnicity and religious sects were to be protected which won them majority support. The communist party was given free rein as to what they printed and the number of rallies they held, but Qāsim maintained a certain level of control over them by never allowing them, for example, to be recognized as a legal

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[98] See Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, pp. 195-204, for information regarding the national parties and the prominence of the Iraqi Communist Party in rallying mass support.

political party by the new constitution.

Qāsim's inability to reach a comprise between the positions of the parties precipitated his political downfall as the public began gradually to lose faith in his ability to transfer power to a constitutional government. It is best to look at the history of the three prominent parties in Iraq during this period to gain a better understanding of the political climate.

The National Democratic Party (NDP)

The National Democratic Party evolved from 'al-Ahali,' a social club founded in the 1930s by Iraqi intellectuals. Prominent members included 'Abd al-Waḥḥāb Mirjān, a lawyer from Hillah and a son of a rich landowner and wheatmill proprietor; 'Abbūd al-Shāljī, a lawyer from an old Baghdadi mercantile family; 'Abd al-Karīm al-Uzrī, the London-educated ex-assistant chief of the Royal Diwan and a wealthy property owner from Kādhimain; Yūsuf al-Hāj Ilyās, lawyer and son of a Mosul merchant; Ṣādiq Kammūnah, a lawyer from a prominent family from Najaf; and Ḥusayn Jamīl, a lawyer from Baghdad.[99] The chairman of the party was Kāmil Chaderchī who was considered the ideal leader to head a reformed Iraq. His deputy was Muḥammad Ḥadīd, a successful businessman and a graduate of the London School of Economics.[100]

The early contributions to the party newspaper, also called *al-Ahali*, raised the

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[99] Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*, p. 306.
[100] Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, pp. 13-14.

issues of British imperialism and national independence. Attention was also given to the absence of democratic rights and the lack of social and economic reforms. The party was fueled by the idealism of a new generation of Western-educated intellectuals who blamed British imperialism for failing to create a progressive democratic system and for dominating the political process and exploiting the resources of the country. They held that the land settlements ratified by the government in the 1930s were the cause of the inequities suffered by the peasants. They supported the idea of land distribution by the state to the poor and landless, and a more equitable system of taxation based on income.[101] Owing to the influence and number of the rising national bourgeoisie, their concerns over the national economy shifted in the 1950s towards articulating more the interests of the entrepreneurial class.

In this period the NDP's programs dealt with three major issues: the agrarian question; the developmentalist mission of the national state as a protector and facilitator of indigenous small private capital; and the Iraqi nation-state as the historical norm.[102] The party also renounced the prospect of a single unitary Arab nation and called instead for a regional-type federation that would permit national autonomy by guaranteeing each of the Arab nation-states separate territorial entities and independent political and social institutions.[103]

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[101]Samira Haj, *The Making of Iraq, 1900-1963: Capital, Power & Ideology* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), pp. 85-91.
[102]Ibid.
[103]Ibid.

The Iraqi Communist Party (ICP)

Founded in 1935, the party's mission was to build a unified national movement to fight imperialism and end British political domination in Iraq. Included in its agenda were what they considered the limitations imposed on Iraq by the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 and the dismantling of all foreign military bases.[104] The 1930 treaty had mainly been designed to define Iraq's relations with Britain after Iraq's independence in 1932. The treaty furthermore stipulated that all domestic policies were the responsibility of the king, while it also gave Iraq control over its own defense.[105]

The party's program was not much different from the NDP's, except for the fact that it emphasized the need to organize the Iraqi working class in trade unions and enforce an eight-hour workday. In contrast to the other two parties, moreover, the program also called for recognition of national rights of Kurdish people and the granting equal rights to women.[106] The ICP had the support of the majority of the masses in

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[104]Geoff Simons, *Iraq: From Sumer to Saddam* (London: Macmillan Press, 1994), p. 194. The treaty passed on 16 November 1930 was a ratification of the first Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922.

[105]A major reason for the public's lack of enthusiasm for the treaty was the provision by which the treaty allowed for Britain's Royal Air Force to maintain two major military bases in the country, one at Ḥabbānīyah near Baghdad and the other at Shī'aybah near Basra. Also, the treaty permitted Britain free movement of its troops through Iraq in the event of war and stipulated that Britain would provide the Iraqi army's equipment and military advisers. The length of the treaty was another cause of dispute, as it was to remain in effect for twenty-five years from the date of Iraq's acceptance into the League of Nations, with the possibility for renegotiation after twenty years. Cited from Tripp, *A History*, p. 66.

[106]Haj, *The Making of Iraq*, p. 98.

Iraq. The party was known for its unmatched skills in organizing mass rallies at any moment throughout Iraq. The ICP was able to do this due to the expansive area of control the party exerted on the populace through such closely affiliated organizations as the Student Federations, the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions, and the Iraqi Teachers Union, to name a few.[107]

The ICP supported Iraqi nationalism over pan-Arab nationalism because they feared the party would suffer the same fate as the other branches of communist parties in other Arab states that were ardently forbidden, such as was the case in the UAR. In contrast to the NDP, the ICP supported the establishment of an Iraqi nation-state, not as an end in itself, but as a necessary precondition for the socialist revolution. The party can be said to have come closest to attaining this goal during the period of Qāsim's rule. After Qāsim's removal from power, however, the new president 'Abd al-Salām 'Ārif, with the support of his own favorite political party, the Ba'th, unleashed a relentless attack on the communists who were never able to regain the power and influence they enjoyed under Qāsim's patronage.

The Ba'th Party

The Ba'th Party's origins go back to 1944 in Damascus where three young French-educated intellectuals, Michel 'Aflaq, a Greek Orthodox Christian, Salāh al-Dīn Bitār, a Sunnī Muslim, and Zakī al-Arsuzī, an Alawite, built it on a shared belief in pan-

[107]Ibid.

Arabism. The core of the party's ideology was the conviction that all the individual Arab states are part of a single united Arab nation.[108] The party worked to establish an Arab rather than an Iraqi identity and envisioned the creation of an Arab nation instead of an Iraqi one. The members of the party were committed to the "revival" and "resurrection" of the historic "Arab Nation" and considered Iraqi nationalism a betrayal to Arabs and their history, since the existing borders of the Arab countries were a reflection of colonialist policy.[109] They held that the commonality of language, culture and history provided the ideological basis for an Arab nation.

The theme of commonality of history found expression in many of their pamphlets and speeches that made reference to the belief that the essential character of the Arabs as a nation (an *ummah*) goes all he way back to the Prophet Muhammad and the rise of Islam:

> The true birth of Arab nationalism took place with the rise of Islam...Islam was revealed by an Arabian Prophet, in the Arabic language, in Arabia. We read in the Qur'an: 'A messenger has now come to you from among yourselves...' There is a tradition that the Prophet said one day: 'I am an Arab, the Qur'an is in Arabic and the language of the denizens of Paradise is Arabic.'...One of the basic aims of Islam was to replace the narrow blood and tribal ties existing among the Arabs in pagan days or the 'Days of Ignorance' by a broader and a wider 'religious patriotism' found in Islam itself. The Arabs were to be united into one great community, the Community of the Faithful - the Ummah or the Arab Nation, al-Ummah al-Arabiyyah was thus a nation

[108]Ibid., pp. 89-92.
[109]Ibid.

> originally born out of Islam. Islam was the prime creator of the national life and political unity of the Muslim Arabs.[110]

While Ba'thism is primarily a secular idea, the party held that Islam was the essential 'moment' in Arab history in which Christians and Muslims alike should take pride. Their writings concerning this link between their ideology and Islam is often very vague and mystical and has an almost romantic, otherworldly feel to it, as expressed, for example, in this quotation by 'Aflaq:

> Our attachment to the Spirit of the nation and its heritage will increase our drive, strengthen our forward march and ensure our orientation; thus we shall not be irresolute for we shall then be confidant that everything will be consistent with the spirit of the nation.[111]

In terms of economic policies, the party believed in its own form of Arab socialism, defined as a commitment to the protection of private property without denying the existence of material inequalities in the nation and the need to distribute wealth more equitably. 'Aflaq was the main ideologue of the party and maintained in his writings the implicit connection between Islam and Arabism. Batatu states that in the writings of Michel 'Aflaq one finds "a mixture of essentially humanitarian nationalism and aspects of the individualism of the Enlightenment, the democratism of Jacobins, the youth idealization of Mazzini, the class standpoint of Marx, the elitism of

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[110]Ibid.

[111]Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, *Iraq Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship* (London: I. B. Tauris, 1987), p. 88.

Lenin, and over and above that, a strong dose of Christian spirituality and a nationalistically interpreted Islam."[112] From such diverse and equally powerful intellectual influences, 'Aflaq developed the three main cornerstones of the Ba'th party: unity, freedom, and socialism. These elements formed an indivisible whole for 'Aflaq in the one Arab nation inspired by the Ba'th party.

The concept of 'unity' in the party's ideology was not held to be a means to an end but a natural right. For the Ba'thists, unity was historically inevitable and a moral necessity as "none of the Arab countries can, in isolation from others, fulfill the conditions necessary for its life." Indeed, "all differences among the sons [of the nation] are incidental and false and will vanish with the awakening of Arab consciousness."[113] The practical aim in such rhetoric was to harness emotions called forth by Islam and direct them to the service of the Arab national movement or to that of the Ba'th Party. With 'Aflaq as their ideologue and his romantic rhetoric, it is easy to imagine the party's appeal to the public when we read lines like: "[*the spirit of Arab nationalism is*] in our past achievements and our present agonies, in our virtues and our vices, in our written history and in the history engraved deep inside us," it is "love before everything else"; "Nationalism ... is like the lineaments of our face which are bequeathed to us even before our birth ... It is an overpowering fate."[114]

The second element of the Ba'th's main ideology, 'freedom,' was defined as the

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[112] Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*, p. 731.
[113] In 'Aflaq's works, cited by Batatu, p. 731.
[114] 'Aflaq cited by Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*, pp. 733-734. Italics are mine.

liberty of a nation to direct its own affairs without interference from external forces or an indigenous arbitrary rule. The party was primarily committed to a democratic state, but maintained that at the beginning of a new unified nation, the people may not yet be well enough educated to choose an appropriate candidate.[115] This ultimately meant that power had to be entrusted to the hands of one party.

The last of the three, 'socialism,' aimed not at abolishing private property, which was held to be a natural right, but at giving the government the power to guarantee a minimum real property for all citizens by imposing certain limits on ownership.

Qāsim and the Mesopotamian Heritage, Part II

While King Faysal I avoided emphasizing Iraq's Mesopotamian heritage so as not to isolate the country from the trend of Arab nationalism, Qāsim gave full support to this aspect of the nations' identity. The purpose of providing the brief information above regarding the active political climate during Qāsim's reign, was to establish an understanding for the regimes' full embrace of the pre-Islamic identity as a tool to distance the country and its leadership from the UAR's sphere of influence. What is interesting about the Iraqi-Mesopotamian identity-building campaign during Qāsim's presidency was the method of its implementation. Baram explains that the campaign took shape in two stages. First was the task of Arabizing all the ancient civilizations of

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[115]Ibid., pp. 735-736.

the region, and the second the Iraqizing of most of the Mesopotamian peoples.[116]

This was not difficult to do, as the writers and intellectuals of this period simply expanded on the already mentioned Winckler-Caetani Semitic wave theory to promote the continuity of the Iraqi people. This was substantiated by several educators and intellectuals, like Muḥammad 'Izzat Darwazah,[117] for example, who believed that since all or the majority of the Semites originated from the Arabian Peninsula, then all ancient civilizations of the region should be considered as kin to one another.[118] Therefore, the Mesopotamians were imbued with the Arab character just as the Iraqis were imbued with the qualities of their ancient forbears. This ideological manipulation of the theory helped to eliminate the tangible cultural differences between the ancient and modern Iraq. With that obstacle neutralized, politicians, poets, and artists were then free to make the claim that the history of the Arab-Iraqi people was an uninterrupted continuity in the land's successive inhabitants. This theme will also be expounded upon when we deal with the policies of the second Ba'th regime, founded in 1968, in the following chapter.

The thrust behind Qāsim's support of such developments was his desire to distance the nation from the Arab nationalist tradition of the monarchy and the pan-Arabists. He sought to encourage the development of an independent Iraqi identity through cultural programs. Examples of government expenditures on the programs for

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[116]Baram, "A Case of Imported Identity," p. 300.
[117]See Chapter I of this work, footnote 58 on page 27, for a reference to Muḥammad 'Izzat Darwazah.
[118]Baram, "A Case of Imported Identity," pp. 292-293.

the development of national identity include Jawād Salīm's monumental statue named "Fourteenth July" (later changed to the "Liberty Monument" under the Ba'th) in central Baghdad's Liberation Square.[119] The work was commissioned by the government and it incorporated Mesopotamian themes in addition to the symbols of the revolution of 1958, incorporating artistic elements similar to those in the works of Picasso and Soviet socialist realist artists.

Various parades were held throughout the country displaying floats that were decorated in Mesopotamian themes celebrating the heroes and history of Mesopotamia. To depict Iraq's growing sense of a separate national identity to the outside world, Qāsim's regime decided to alter the symbols representing the country. In commemoration of the Mesopotamian heritage, the Akkadian sun was adopted as the new national emblem, while the Star of Ishtar became the central image depicted on the Iraqi flag.[120]

These symbols of justice from ancient times did not last long as they were eliminated after the overthrow of Qāsim by Ba'thist officers in 1963 and replaced by an eagle. The official justification by the Ba'th for its removal of the images as national icons simply stated that they were not representative of "the spirit of the revolution and the effort toward Arab unity."[121] What is ironic about this episode is that the eagle, theoretically seen by the Ba'th as a more "Arab" symbol, was in fact a Roman emblem

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[119]Ibid., p. 301.
[120]Ibid.
[121]Ibid.

that had originally been adopted by the Romans from ancient Mesopotamia!

The Revolution of 1963

By 1963 there were many army officers and political associates who, like 'Ārif, could no longer accept Qāsim's hold on the country. The main issue of dispute was the unprecedented influence the Iraqi Communist Party seemed to have over the regime. As a consequence, the Free Officers' main aim of uniting Iraq with Naṣir's UAR seemed to be evaporating ever more so with Qāsim in power. For the disgruntled officers and politicians, Qāsim was not only isolating the nation from the pan-Arab current but also detaching himself from everyone else. The Iraqi public also began to grow disillusioned with their leader, who kept promising them a constitution and national stability but had yet to deliver. No longer able to stomach Qāsim's increasingly dictatorial ways and political shortcomings, various members of the Ba'th Party began planning for his overthrow.

The first move to overthrow Qāsim took place on 7 October 1959, and took the form of an assassination attempt.[122] The party suffered major losses as many arrests and purges of party members and sympathizers were carried out immediately after the episode.[123] The ICP responded by mobilizing massive demonstrations in support of the

[122]The assassins involved in the unsuccessful plot on Qāsim's life included the then 22-year old Ṣaddām Ḥusayn, the future president of the Republic.
[123]Tripp, *History of Iraq*, p. 158.

'Sole Leader.'[124]

The second attempt came on 8 February 1963 when Ba'thist officers, led by Brigadier Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Bakr, staged a military coup. The success of the second attempt can be largely attributed to two reasons: the organizational skill of the Military Bureau of the Ba'th[125]; and Qāsim's refusal to take decisive action to counter the rebels' attack.[126] Qāsim was finally captured on 9 February and immediately brought to trial where he faced a tribunal composed of Ba'thist and pan-Arab officers. Qāsim was sentenced to death and shot the same day at 1:30 PM.[127]

A National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC) was created directly after the coup and for a time thereafter it functioned as the primary source of power in the country. The council was made up of sixteen members, twelve of whom were Ba'thists and four Arab nationalist officers.[128] 'Abd al-Salām 'Ārif, who was not a Ba'thist but had a considerable following in the armed forces, was elected as president.[129] Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Bakr held the dual role of vice-president and prime minister.

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[124]Ibid.

[125]The Bureau was formed in 1962 and was composed of 'Alī Ṣāliḥ al-Sa'dī and a few senior Ba'thist Officers that included Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Bakr and Lieutenant Colonel Ṣāliḥ Mahdī 'Ammāsh. Tripp, *History of Iraq*, p. 169.

[126]Authors recounting the events of the 1963 point to the probable fact that Qāsim knew beforehand about a plot against him but remained passive about it. He held the belief that the support of the people and Providence would protect him from being overthrown. For further details, see Dann and Tripp.

[127]Dann, *Iraq Under Qassem*, p. 372.

[128]Tripp, *History of Iraq*, p. 170.

[129]'Ārif served as president for only a short period as his political career ended tragically in a helicopter crash in April 1966. His brother, 'Abd al-Raḥmān 'Ārif became president after his death but proved to be a weak political leader and not possessed of the charisma that had attracted many supporters to 'Abd al-Salām.

The regime established after the 1963 coup was short-lived owing to disagreements regarding the direction of the country. In addition to rifts between Ba'thists and non-Ba'thists, the Ba'th party itself in Iraq had major splits and could not forge any unity of purpose.[130] The public was also becoming less tolerant of the new regime due to its brutal and extensive persecutions of alleged Communists and sympathizers of the ICP. Instead of reaping the benefits of a more democratic society, the country felt terrorized and unstable under the wrath of the Ba'th in power. It was during this period that the figure of Ṣaddām Ḥusayn finally emerges in Iraqi politics. Not yet a member of the Ba'th party, but a distant relative to Bakr, he was eventually able to rise through the ranks of the party by relying on the traditional custom of clan solidarity. Enjoying the support of influential officers in the party like Hardān al-Tikrītī, Mahdī 'Amāsh (who served as defense minister), 'Adnān Khairallah (Ḥussein's cousin and brother-in-law), and the new prime minister, Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Bakr,[131] his ascent was rapid.

After being inducted into the party, Ṣaddām Ḥusayn wasted no time in urging it to create a special security apparatus to insulate the party against the army, known as the special security organization, Jihāz Ḥanīn (Instrument of Yearning). Confirming Ḥusayn's fears of the army's ambitions, the Ba'th regime was overthrown in November

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[130]Ibid.
[131]Simons, *Iraq*, p. 241.

1963.[132] Ḥusayn was forced to go into hiding but he maintained control of the security apparatus until the second Ba'thist coup took place on 17 July 1968.

Summary

Archaeology in Iraq during after the Revolution of 1958 was a rather neutral factor in contrast to the important role given to it during Faysal's reign. The upheavals caused by the warring political factions and personalities in government could not easily be abated by turning the public's attention to cultural campaigns. The failure of Qāsim's endeavor to direct public focus on the cultural campaign can be attributed to the weakness of his government, which had to walk a tightrope above the gaping jaws of the ambitious political parties. Iraq under Faysal was attracted to archaeology as it symbolized national determination in the face of British control. It was embraced by leading government figures, such as Sāṭi' al-Ḥuṣrī, to act as a cohesive agent for the various groups in the new nation. Qāsim's period, on the other hand can be seen as little more than mid-point for archaeology in Iraq, whereas the Ba'th regime was to utilize the pre-Islamic heritage to the maximum in promoting a unified domestic identity and the 'Abbasid Islamic heritage to promote Iraq's image in the foreign sphere.

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[132]Ibid., p. 242.

Chapter Three

Ṣaddām Ḥusayn

On 17 July 1968, Ba'th officers orchestrated a *coup d'état* overthrowing the government of 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-'Ārif[133]. The coup was met with little resistance, and unlike other such incidents in which the fate of the leader was often tragic, 'Ārif was simply put on plane and exiled to England.[134] The success of the coup was due in part to the cooperation of four prominent army officers: Colonel 'Abd al-Razzāz Nāyif, head of military intelligence; Colonel Ibrāhīm 'Abd al-Raḥmān Da'ūd, Commander of the Republican Guard; Colonel Sa'dūn Ghaydān, Commander of the Republican Guard's armored brigade; and Colonel Ḥammād Shihāb, commander of the Baghdad garrison.[135] Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Bakr became the president and Commander in Chief of the army,[136] finally giving his protege Ṣaddām Ḥusayn a direct link to power through the top man of the country.

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[133]The first Ba'thi coup installed 'Abd al-Salām 'Ārif as president. He died in a helicopter accident in April 1966 and was replaced by his brother, 'Abd al-Rahmān 'Ārif. See Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 185-187.

[134]Simons, *Iraq*, p. 244.

[135]Ibid., p. 243.

[136]Majid Khadduri, *Socialist Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1968* (Washington: Middle East Institute, 1978), pp. 25-30. In addition to being the president and head of the army, Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Bakr also maintained his posts as secretary general of the Ba'th Party in Iraq and head of the Revolutionary Command Council. For further information regarding this point, see Simons, *Iraq*, especially, pp. 243-244.

Saddām Husayn (b. 1937)

Ṣaddām Ḥusayn was born on 28 April 1937 in the village of Shawish near Tikrīt, to Subha Tulfah and Ḥusayn 'Abd al-Majid. He grew up in poverty, not knowing his father as the latter died shortly before or after his birth.[137] He lived with his mother and stepfather, Ibrāhīm Ḥasan, who was also his paternal uncle. At the age of ten he ran away from his abusive stepfather to live with his maternal uncle Khayrallāh Tulfah[138], who played a major role in his formative years.

Ṣaddām spent his adolescence in Baghdad with his uncle Khayrallāh's family until he was forced to flee from the police after his participation in the 1959 assassination attempt on 'Abd al-Karīm Qāsim.[139] He fled to Syria to avoid capture, and from there he proceeded to Egypt where he spent several years before returning to Iraq in 1963.

Rise to Power

By 1968, at the age of 31, Ṣaddām Ḥusayn was the deputy chairman of the

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[137]Elaine Sciolino, *The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the Gulf Crisis.* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1991), pp. 55-60.

[138]Khayrallāh Tulfah was a soldier and teacher whom the young Ḥusayn admired. Tulfah was also an adamant pan-Arab nationalist who indoctrinated his young nephew with much of the Ba'thist ideology. For a more detailed biography, see Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography* (New York: Free Press, 1991).

[139]After becoming president of Iraq in 1979, this episode in Ḥusayn's life was dramatized into a movie, *Al-Ayyām Al-Tawīlah (The Long Days), and* was aired annually in celebration of his birthday, which was made into a national holiday. He is depicted in the film as a young nationalist hero who courageously uses a knife to extricate a bullet, which he sustained during the assassination attempt, from his own leg with a knife and then escapes on foot to Syria. For more on this, see Karsh and Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein,* pp. 17-18.

Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the most feared man in the country due to his control of the internal security apparatus. Motivated by caution, Ḥusayn remained second in command to Bakr until he was ready to make a bid for the presidency in 1979. During this interval, it was generally acknowledged by Ba'th party members and officers alike that he, and not Bakr, was the one increasingly calling the shots. Authors Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi provide two specific reasons for Ḥusayn's cautious approach to claiming the seat of power: first, the interim afforded him the opportunity to build his key weapon, the internal security apparatus[140]; and second, he was smart enough to know that he was not yet in a position to depose of a popular party and military figure like Bakr.[141]

The core of Ḥusayn's strength (then as now) lies in his tight control of the nation through the special security organizations that act as his eyes, ears and fists in Iraq. To guarantee the complete control and devotion of such a formidable unit, he has installed relatives and in-laws, and close Tikrītī clan members to key positions in the system.[142] And as he knew the value of Bakr's importance to his own image. Bakr was

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[140]The main arm of the secret police was conceived between 1964 and 1966 and was referred to as al-Jihāz al Khās (the Special Apparatus), codenamed Jihāz Hanīn. The secret police would eventually branch out to include the military intelligence unit, Istikhbarāt, and the party intelligence unit, Mukhābarāt. The former mainly employed embassy personnel who kept a record of political activities and Iraqi citizens abroad. The latter was essentially a comprehensive intelligence organization designed to monitor other policing networks and control the activities of state and corporate institutions like the army and government departments. Cited from Kanan Makiyya, *The Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq.* (Berkeley: University of California, 1989), pp. 3-15.

[141]Karsh and Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein,* p. 88.

[142]The dependence of close relations and the overwhelming Tikrītī clan presence in government is the most striking element of Ṣaddām Ḥusayn's power base. The group acts as a buffer zone shielding Ḥusayn from social and political opposition. Examples of family members in key governmental positions include his stepbrothers, Barzan al-Tikrītī, Ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva;

an indispensable figurehead with an untarnished revolutionary record that offered Ḥusayn the public respectability and prestige that he lacked.[143] Unlike other popular national leaders, such as like Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir or 'Abd al-Karīm Qāsim, who were both military officers, Ḥusayn was never accepted in the military. For that reason, Bakr was Ḥussein's main link to the armed forces, which he needed to consolidate his hold on power.[144] It also helped Ṣaddām Ḥusayn's position to have a fellow Tikrītī in the leadership post who was related to him through marriage.[145]

By the time Bakr realized the extent of his understudy's authority, the aging and ailing leader could do no more to prevent the power from slipping through his fingers. Feeling ready to emerge into the limelight and no longer in need of Bakr's patronage, Ṣaddām Ḥusayn became the new president of the republic on 11 July 1979, after forcing Bakr to step down.[146] By this time, Ḥusayn had secured his position by surrounding

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Wathban Ibrāhīm, head of the State Internal Security, (Amn); and Sibawi Ibrāhīm, head of Mukhābarāt (Party Intelligence). Adnān Khayrallāh, Ḥusayn's cousin and brother-in-law, was appointed Minister of Defense in 1977. Ṣaddām Ḥusayn's cousin and son-in-law, Ḥusayn Kāmil Hasan al-Majid served as the Minister of Industry and Military Defense since 1988, and Ṣaddām Kāmil, younger brother to Ḥusayn Kāmil, was a colonel in the missile brigade. The Kāmil brothers defected to Jordan in 1995 and were executed in 1996 after their return to Iraq. Cited from Said Aburish, *Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge* (London: Bloomsbury, 2000), pp. 337-339; Simon Henderson, *Instant Empire: Saddam Hussein's Ambition for Iraq* (San Francisco: Mercury House, 1991), p. 87; and Karsh and Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein*, pp. 180-181.

[143] Aḥmad Ḥasān al-Bakr was a highly regarded member of the Free Officers who overthrew the monarchy in 1958 in addition to serving as secretary general of the Ba'th party. See Khadduri, *Socialist Iraq*, especially pp. 11-48.

[144] Karsh and Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein*, p. 88.

[145] Bakr's daughter was married to Ṣaddām Ḥusayn's brother-in-law. For a diagram of Ṣaddām Ḥusayn's family tree, see Simon Henderson, *Instant Empire: Saddam Hussein's Ambition for Iraq.* (San Francisco: Mercury House, 1991), p. 87.

[146] In addition to being the president, Ṣaddām Ḥusayn also appointed himself the "chairman of the RCC, general secretary of the Regional Command of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, chairman of the Supreme Planning Council, chairman of the Committee on Agreements, chairman of the Agricultural Council, and chairman of the Supreme Council on the Eradication of Illiteracy, among other things."

himself with a small clique of relatives, Tikrītī clan members, and close associates who functioned according to his demands in controlling the country.

Saddām in Power

After successfully gaining the presidency, Ṣaddām Ḥusayn turned his attention to the public. An unelected leader, he knew that in order to win the loyalty of the masses, "they had to be incorporated into a system, which would indoctrinate them and permeate every aspect of their daily lives."[147] His means to this end were a shift of focus on Iraqi identity and the vast new economic resources in the country.

Iraqi society by the mid-1970s was still wavering between two poles of identity: Iraqi and pan-Arab.[148] The latter identification was unacceptable to Iraqi Kurds and Shī'ah, for they felt it conveyed an inherent bias towards Sunnī Arabs. The Shī'ah, in particular wanted the central government to follow a policy that stresses equality and gave the populace a sense of belonging in the nation's political community.[149]

One of the Ba'th party's three main principles was the call to unite the various Arab states into one nation. Since the party looked down upon isolationist tendencies,

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Source cited, Makiyya, *The Republic of Fear, p.* 110.

[147]Karsh and Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein,* p. 89.

[148]Amatzia Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba'thist Iraq, 1968-89* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 131.

[149]Disenchanted with Ḥusayn's repressive regime, the Shī'ah community would eventually profess allegiance to a higher Iraqi structure, that of establishing an Islamic Iraqi polity that would promote equality between the various Islamic sects as well as the various ethnic groups. The call went unheeded among the rest of the population as the prospect of living under an Islamic entity, particularly one dominated by the Shī'ah, did not have popular appeal. On this point, see Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology,* p. 126.

any stress laid on local identity might cause major rifts in the regime and possibly lead to a coup. The government, instead, opted to strike a balance between pan-Arab nationalism *(qawmiyah)* and local Iraq patriotism *(wataniyah)*, with more emphasis on the latter:

> These political changes that came to serve particular Iraqi interests at the expense of the party's pan-Arab ideals were heralded and then accompanied by a new cultural and ideological policy. By giving historical depth and cultural substance to what it saw as a still poorly formed and hitherto little recognized Iraqi national identity, the regime thus sought to forge a double-edged sword that could cut both ways. On the one hand, as pointed out above, it was designed to assure Shi'is, Kurds and others who feared unity that their future was secure, as under no circumstances would Iraq dissolve in a pan-Arab crucible. On the other hand, however, the regime endeavored to legitimize its Iraqi-oriented policies in the eyes of Iraqi pan-Arabs.[150]
>
> It seems that the new line was also the result of Ba'thi recognition of a wider sentiment; after half a century of statehood, the ordinary Iraqi citizen could no longer view his state, as the party would have it, as an ephemeral and, worse still, an illegitimate creature, conceived and born in sin as the result of unnatural relations between foreign imperialism and the local exploiting classes.[151]

While the Ba'th had achieved political hegemony over Iraq, the party was certainly not as popular or powerful as the Syrian Ba'thist government, led by Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad. Hence a shift towards local identity would also serve to curb the public's

[150]Ibid., p. 25.
[151]Ibid., p. 133.

expectation of union between the two parties.[152]

The second major tool for fostering local support and unity was Iraq's burgeoning oil wealth. With the nationalization of the oil industry in 1968, Iraq's revenues yielded US$476 million, a figure which had jumped to US$26 billion by 1980.[153] The country's growing economic resources enabled Ḥusayn to embark on wide-ranging economic development programs designed to transform the country into a socialist state and increase its military capabilities. Furthermore, with the increase of the country's wealth, the Ba'th regime was able to sponsor the most costly and ambitious cultural campaign ever undertaken in Iraq.

National Identity and The Mesopotamian Link: Creation of the new "Iraqi Man"[154]

The Ba'th government, in its desire to foster a national awareness of Iraq's history, was not faced with selling a completely new concept, since an identity campaign had already been introduced to the public since the late 1920s. The goal instead was to continue the campaign at a more moderate pace so as not to provoke any criticism from within or outside the party. As there was an important segment of the traditional pan-Arab community with strong reservations about an emphasis on the pre-Islamic histories of particular Arab countries, the regime limited itself to a purely

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[152]Ibid., p. 16.
[153]Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (London: Longman, 1985), pp. 242, 336.
[154]Karsh and Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein,* p. 123.

cultural rather than political display in its presentation of Iraq's past.

In contrast to Sāṭi' al-Ḥuṣrī's aim of 'Arabizing' the ancient Mesopotamians to justify the relevance of Iraq's pre-Islamic heritage and its contribution to modern Iraqis, Ḥusayn's Ba'th regime did not seem to place too much emphasis on this trend. Rather, the focus was more on presenting the modern Iraqi citizens as the direct heirs and biological descendants of the ancient peoples and civilizations of Mesopotamia. The historical evidence in support of such a claim is ambiguous at best, but Ḥusayn's intention was not to sponsor the collection of scholarly data to justify the link. He wanted the Iraqis view their country's history from pre-Islamic times to the contemporary period as a continuity, held together by a single, unique culture:

> [Foreign occupation] of the Middle East and North Africa ... did not sever the bond between the ... Babylonian civilization and the Islamic one ... Hellenism, which arrived here with Alexander, ... did not influence the region's basic civilizational structure as deeply as seen by most historians ... [This way a] civilizational continuum was created, influenced by external events [but] not to the degree of a rupture.[155]

By focusing on the purely cultural link between the people of ancient Mesopotamian and those of modern Iraq, the Ba'th regime moved away from defining the nation's identity through the confines of religion, ethnicity, or language. The aim was to provide people with a secular basis for a national identity and Ḥusayn with historical legitimacy by having him portrayed as the culmination of a continuous

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[155] 'Abd al-Latīf Sharara quoted in Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology*, p. 99.

succession of great Iraqi leaders. The regime also wanted to emphasize an historical common denominator to unite the Sunnīs, Shī'īs, Arabs and Kurds and to reinforce Iraq's uniqueness. The final goal was to inspire the public to take pride in Iraq's ancient history and accept the responsibility of leading the Arab nation.[156] A poignant expression of the above-mentioned goals is to be found in the Iraqi national anthem:

> Homeland that spreads wing to the horizon
> And clad itself in civilization as mark of honor
> Blessed is the Land of the Two Rivers, homeland wherein
> Splendor and resolve, majesty and grandeur
> This land is a flame and splendor
> And loftiness that dwarfs the sky ...
> Babylon inside us, Assyria is ours
> And with us history is filled with glow...
> You will always be to the Arabs a shield, O Iraq
> And the suns that turns the night into morning.[157]

To instill the theme of continuity, the Ba'th government invested in a comprehensive cultural campaign that was able to reach into many facets of Iraqi life, such as public institutions, the arts, and folklore. However, the most ambitious investment of all was in the field of archaeology.

Cultural Campaign

When the Ba'th Party came to power in 1968, the national feeling was in a fragile state owing to a decade of unstable political climate in Iraq. The Ba'th regime opted to mobilize all efforts to develop a clearly Iraqi identity through a cultural

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[156]Ibid., pp. 136-137.

[157]Ibid., pp. 95-96. The national anthem was written by the poet, cultural commissar and Ba'thi veteran, Shafiq al-Kamali.

campaign. The primary theme of the campaign was to highlight Iraq's central role in pan-Arabism by virtue of its prestigious past.

Iraqi folklore was given substantial official encouragement under the Ba'th regime starting in late 1968 as a field in which to assert the Iraqi personality. The ideological aim of the cultivation of Iraqi folklore was: first, to illustrate the existence of a rich and unique Iraqi tradition; second, to instill an idea of unity of the various ethnic communities in Iraq; and third, to stress the cultural and possibly ethnic link between the Iraqi citizen and the people of antiquity.[158]

The Iraqi Fashion House (*Dar al-Azya)* was created in 1970 as a showcase of national folklore and the associated and fashions. Baram states that the "Fashion House was to not only study the dress styles of times gone by in Iraq's provinces, but also to duplicate these sources in collections of clothing designed for display throughout Iraq and the world."[159]

Music, folktales, and poetry depicted symbolic images and emotions of the past to help create an intimate connection with the ancient dwellers of Iraq. In the field of drama and theater, between 1968 and 1979 there were at least six different plays produced in Iraq depicting the times of ancient Sumer or Babylon, the most important of these being the play titled *Gilgamesh.*[160]

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[158] Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology*, p. 34.

[159] Ibid., p. 33. "[The articles of clothing were] to reflect the figures and living landscapes which flourished in Mesopotamia thousands of years ago. [The clothing] are a kind of summons to profound thought about our history and the channels of our civilization from the most ancient epochs up to the present." Quote cited in Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology*, p. 33.

[160] Amatzia Baram, "Mesopotamian Identity in Ba'thi Iraq." *Middle Eastern Studies*, 19 (1983),

The cultural campaign also extended to the field of the arts in Iraq. Visual arts in support of the nation's Mesopotamian character fell into two schools of thought - the "Primitive Group" led by Fa'iq Ḥasan and the "Baghdad Modern Art Group" led by Jawād Salīm and Shākir Ḥasan al-Sa'īd. The first group found inspiration in the primitive Iraqi art and folklore whereas the latter "sought to express ... modern life, while keeping in perspective the artistic heritage of ancient Iraq."[161] In addition, numerous literary venues became prominent in contributing to and popularizing the themes of the past. During the early 1970s, there appeared various articles in magazines that tried to popularize and reinterpret at varying scholarly levels Mesopotamian history and culture. Poetry, the most esteemed literary art in Iraq, began incorporating Mesopotamian and other pre-Islamic mythology and historical themes in the verses of the foremost contemporary poets like Badr al-Sayyab, 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Bayyatī, Buland al-Haydarī, and Shādhil Taqā.[162]

The most popular aspect of the cultural campaign involved the festivals that celebrated Iraqi identity by stressing the Mesopotamian theme. These events were meant to cross the cultural and sectarian boundaries of the population and to transfer the idea of what Baram calls "Iraqidom."[163] The Mosul Spring Festival was the most popular of these events and was held in the district with the most palpable cultural and religious divisions in its population make-up. The central theme of the festival

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p. 432. Gilgamesh is a mythical Mesopotamian hero-figure in literature.

[161] Ibid.

[162] Ibid., pp. 431-432.

[163] Ibid., p. 430.

was Iraqi history, though it did include the concept of an Iraqi pan-Arab mission. The festival embodied the ideas of cultural continuity between Mosul and ancient Mesopotamia and the folklore unity of Mosul, where Arabs, Kurds, Turcomans, and Chaldeans live in close proximity.[164] It was during this cultural campaign that archaeology in Iraq prospered the most.

Archaeology

Having appreciated almost from the start the significance of archaeology in bolstering the nation's identity, the Ba'th regime devoted unprecedented resources to unearthing, restoring and maintaining ancient sites and relics.[165] Ṣaddām Ḥusayn, speaking at a convention of Iraqi archaeologists, stated:

> Antiquities are the most precious relics the Iraqis possess, showing the world that our country, which today is undergoing an extraordinary renaissance, is the [legitimate] offspring of previous civilizations, which offered up a great contribution to humanity.[166]

An example of the prominence given to archaeology in government policies was the law passed in 1979 that elevated the Administration of Antiquities to the rank of State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage.[167] Through the foreign affairs office, moreover, the regime took up the issue of repatriating ancient relics. For instance, the

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[164] Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology*, pp. 21, 55.

[165] The Ba'th government's financial investment in archaeology during the period of 1964-1968 amounted to 417,263 dinars. This figure rose 81% during the period of 1969-1973 to the amount of 757,526 dinars. Figures cited from Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology*, p. 41.

[166] Quoted in Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology* p. 41.

[167] Ibid., p. 42.

Antiquities Law of 1936 was amended by the RCC in 1974 to allow the government the right to confiscate relics held in private possession.[168] The following statement issued by the regime portrays the purpose of the effort as that of reclaiming national treasures:

> The stele of Hammurabi awaits impatiently in the Louvre, and the library of Ashurbanipal is in the British Museum, and the Procession Street and the gate of Ishtar have yet to return, and are languishing sadly in [East] Berlin ... their abandonment ... in the museums of the world, and their inability to return to the homeland from which they emerged is a cultural calamity and a major crime... In previous periods [in Iraq, governments] did not grasp the importance of these antiquities, taking no interest whatsoever in these stolen treasures ... but since the revolution [of July 1968], there has been great progress ... the Iraqis and their nationalist-socialist revolution are determined to restore the treasures which are the symbol of the first greatest civilizations in human history.[169]

To accommodate the government's ambition to safeguard the nation's antiquities, the regime invested heavily in large-scale projects devoted to the renovation and construction of museums throughout the country. The National Museum, for example, was renovated and enlarged in the 1970s, while new museums were erected in Basra, Nasiriyya, Ctisphon-Madain, Irbil, Kirkuk, and Nineveh, in addition to a small museum at Baghdad University.[170] Pledges were also made to building new museums in other cities including, Ramadī, Rumaytha, Najaf, and Karbala.[171]

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[168]Ibid., p. 43.
[169]Ibid. Baram also mentions that Iraq threatened to cease archaeological cooperation with all those failing to return relics to their land of origin.
[170]Ibid., p. 44.
[171]Ibid.

Long lost ancient cities were reborn during this national restoration crusade such as Nineveh (Mosul), Nimrod, Ashur, Hatra (al-Hadar), the Ziggurat of Aqarquf, and Samarra.[172] All the sites dated to the pre-Islamic period except for Samarra, which was an Islamic site, situated just outside Baghdad.[173] The most ambitious and costly undertaking however was the rebuilding and restoration of the ruins of Babylon. The project was begun in 1978 with a ten-year plan that, it was estimated, would cost 10 million dinars (US$30 million).[174]

Excavations were also pursued with renewed zeal to help furnish the many new museums in the country. While archaeological work in Iraq was still focused primarily on pre-Islamic sites, there were a few notable excavations of Islamic sites that included al-Mustansiriyah, the 'Abbasid fortress of Baghdad, and the great mosque of Samarra.[175] The sheer number of expeditions undertaken during this period best demonstrates the prosperity of archaeological work in Iraq during the 1980s. For example, the 1979-80 excavation season included work at 79 sites, the 1981-82 season at 50 sites, and the 1983-84 season at 62 sites, with the focus largely on the Ṣaddām Dam Salvage Project (previously known as the Eski Mosul Dam) in the northern part of the country. There were no fewer than 29 sites being explored during the 1984-85

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[172] Ibid., p. 45. The Qāsim regime had begun preservation projects in 1960 in Aqaraquf, al-Hatra, Ur, and Babylon but work discontinued in most of the sites by the mid-1960s. See Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology,* p. 158, footnote 35.

[173] The sites of Hatra, Nineveh, Nimrod and Ashur are located in the northern region of country. The Ziggurat of Aqarquf is located to the west of Baghdad.

[174] Baram, "Mesopotamian Identity in Ba'thi Iraq," p. 428.

[175] Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology,* p. 43.

season.[176] The Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage was the primary sponsor of many of the projects, in addition to a few conducted in cooperation with foreign expeditions.

Government sponsorship of archaeological work during the 1980s did not seem to waiver despite the fact that the Iraq-Iran war, which had erupted at the beginning of the decade, was steadily depleting the nation's economic resources and manpower. In fact, Ḥusayn's support of archaeology during this period may have robbed the war-effort of much needed funds. The abundant government backing given to the large-scale project of the rebuilding and restoration of the Babylonian ruins, located in the southern sector of Baghdad and inhabited by a large Shī'ah population, was an example of the regime's concern to divert the nation's attention to themes of unity:

> The urgency of the regime's efforts in this direction, at a time of war, cannot be overrated: the ties - of family, religion and culture - connecting the Shi'i population of the holy cities ... with their Iranian counterparts, and sometimes, the Tehran authorities, had been a thorn in Iraqi flesh ever since the state's constitution at the end of World War I ... In this context, Babylon's ruins were transformed into one of the regime's principle cultural-ideological instruments, not merely for uniting Iraq's political community, but also for the concomitant effort to wean parts of the country's population away from rival external affinities, primarily to Iran.[177]

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[176] "Excavations in Iraq, 1979-80." *Iraq,* 43 (1981), pp. 167-198; "Excavations in Iraq, 1981-82," *Iraq,* 45 (1983), pp. 199-224; "Excavations in Iraq, 1983-84," *Iraq,* 47 (1985), pp. 215-239; "Excavations in Iraq, 1985-86," *Iraq,* 49 (1987), pp. 231-251.
See Appendix III for a complete listing of all excavation sites for the seasons of 1979-1980, 1981-82, 1983-84, and 1985-86.

[177] Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology,* p. 49.

For at the other end of the Iraq-Iran conflict, Iran was urging the Iraqi people to overthrow the Ba'th regime, accusing it of illegitimacy by Islamic standards. The accusations were due in part to the regime's brutal methods in suppressing Shī'ī opposition, which included imprisonment, torture and execution.[178] The act that galvanized Shī'ī criticism against the regime was the execution on 9 April 1980 of the popular opposition leader Ayatollah Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr and his sister Aminah al-Ṣadr, also known as Bint al-Huda.

Al-Ṣadr came from a highly respected pious and educated family that had held chief religious authority from the time before the creation of the monarchy.[179] He was the first Shī'ī cleric to speak openly against the Ba'th regime and inspired a loyal following that accepted his ideals of establishing a just Islamic polity. From this group, emerged one of Iraq's largest underground political movements, known as *al-Da'wah al-Islamīyah* (the Islamic Call).[180]

Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt, the Shī'ah opposition refrained from criticizing the regime's pre-Islamic-oriented cultural campaign. Baram

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[178]A good source on this topic is Joyce Wiley, "The Islamic Political Movement of Iraq," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1988).

[179]Ayatollah Muḥammad Baqir al-Ṣadr was born in the Holy City of Kāẓimīyah in 1931. His father, Sayyid Haidar al-Ṣadr, and grandfather, Ismā'īl al-Ṣadr, held high positions in the positions in the Shī'ah clergy; and his great-grandfather, Sayyid Ḥasan al-Ṣadr was a religious figure in Kāẓimīyah before the arrival of the British in 1917. Of the family's renown, Gertrude Bell wrote in 1920 that "among the worthies in Kaẓimīyah is the Ṣadr family, possibly more distinguished for religious learning than any other family in the whole Shī'ah world." Information and quote cited from Wiley, "The Islamic Political Movement of Iraq," p. 128.

[180]Makiyya, *The Republic of Fear,* pp. 107-108. At present, the organization is outlawed in Iraq and functions from its headquarters in Iran. For an in-depth understanding of al-Ṣadr's political philosophy, read Muḥammad Baqir al-Ṣadr, *Our Philosophy* (London: KPI, 1987).

attributes this to the cultural campaign's likely popularity with educated Iraqis, Shī'ī and Sunnī alike.[181] Ṣaddām Ḥusayn eventually shifted the focus to Iraq's Arab identity when he began referring to the war as the second Qādisīyah, essentially, a continuation of the ethnic Arab-Persian conflict dating back to pre-Islamic times.[182] This can be seen as an attempt on his part to consolidate national support by eliminating religious criticism against the regime by turning the conflict into a reincarnation of the struggle between the pious Arab Muslims of old and the irreligious Persians. It also served to draw in support from other Arab nations by transforming the war into a battle in which Iraq was sacrificing itself for the glory of all the Muslim Arabs. More importantly, on the domestic front, the Ba'th regime's continued support for the excavation of Iraq's pre-Islamic antiquities to instill in the population a sense of a "near eternal history [that] precludes or at least implies near eternal future."[183]

Summary

When Ṣaddām Ḥusayn claimed the presidency in 1979, Iraq was enjoying an upswing of economic prosperity. Politically, the country was for the most part stable, due mainly to Ḥusayn's complete control of the government and internal security apparatus. Nevertheless, ethnic and religious diversity remained a source of division.

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[181]Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology*, p. 115.
[182]Ibid., p. 116. The Battle of Qādisīyah was fought between the Arabs and Persians in AD 635. The much smaller Arab army won a decisive victory over the army of the Persian Empire and forced it to embrace Islam. See also Karsh and Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein*, p. 152.
[183]Karsh and Rautsi, *Saddam Hussein*, p. 177.

Looking beyond Ba'th ideology, which deplores regionalism, Ḥusayn aimed to create a new Iraqi citizen. In archaeology Ḥusayn found a potent means of realizingy his agenda of uniting the country and at the same time promoting himself as a great leader. This latter was very much in line with the long history of leaders who have come from Iraq.

Under the patronage of the Ba'th regime the field of archaeology prospered, attaining unprecedented levels of importance. By endeavoring to make a link between ancient Mesopotamians and modern Iraqis, Ḥusayn wanted to convey a sense of cultural continuity. Avoiding criticism from the Ba'th party members and public disapproval of the regime's focus on the pre-Islamic past, Ḥusayn charted a cultural campaign to steer away from political disputes. The cultural aspect especially allowed the regime to avoid crossing religious, ethnic or linguistic boundaries when addressing the topic of national identity. Instead it aimed to instill in the people an appreciation of the pre-Islamic history of the country -- a history that was large and ambiguous enough to cover the schisms in society.

Conclusion

By examining three important regimes that have ruled Iraq from the time of its birth into nationhood to the present time, this work has aimed to present a deeper understanding of the nation-identity building campaign in that country. We began by looking at King Faysal I's regime and the relevance of archaeology in the pan-Arab dialogue. At this period, exploitation of Iraq's antiquities was confined mostly to pointing to their symbolic contribution to the Arab homeland by functioning as visual proof of the Arab's ancient existence in the Arabian Peninsula. The focus was thus on the Arab rather than the regional Mesopotamian-Iraqi identity.

The 1958 Revolution changed the monarchical state into a republic and set the country on an ambitious course towards creating an independent Iraqi identity. This path was followed by 'Abd al-Karīm Qāsim as a means of defusing the call to unite with the United Arab Republic. The Mesopotamian element became a key factor in justifying the regime's isolationist policies by stressing Iraq's uniqueness.

By the time of the 1968 Ba'th regime, Iraq's national identity was going to receive a cultural makeover. The Ba'th regime balanced the pan-Arab with the eternal Iraqi identity through the use of archaeology to depict the nation as a continuation of past civilizations. The focus was flexible enough that it could be shifted from the Mesopotamian to the Muslim-Arab identity by the government in times of need. What

the Ba'th regime established, essentially, was a dual identity. On the domestic front, the focus was on the country's distinct Iraqi identity which had its roots in the ancient civilizations that preceded Islam and which could point to these roots in the extensive archaeological projects underway at the time. On the foreign policy side, the regime stressed Iraq's importance in the Arab Islamic timeline so as to achieve a sense of commonality and superiority in Arab leadership.

While there is a modest amount of research dealing with the affects of archaeology on the Iraqi identity, there is no data on the effectiveness of such a connection. It is important, therefore, to conduct extensive field research or survey to gauge the actual feeling of Iraqis in regard to their Mesopotamian heritage. It is then that the results of the efforts of various regimes in Iraq may be measured.

APPENDIX I

(Radio speech by Colonel 'Abd al-Salām 'Ārif presented on the morning of 14 July 1958.)

Noble People of Iraq,

Trusting in God and with the aid of the loyal sons of the people and the national armed forces, we have undertaken to liberate the beloved homeland from the corrupt crew that imperialism installed ...

Brethren,

The army is of you and for you and has carried out what you desired... Your duty is to support it ... (in the wrath that is pouring on the Rihab Palace and the house of Nuri as-Sa'id) Only by preserving it from the plots of imperialism and its stooges can victory be brought to completion. We appeal to you, therefore to report to the authorities all offenders, traitors, and corrupt people so that they could be uprooted...

Citizens,

(While admiring your fervent patriotic spirit..., we call upon you to remain calm and maintain order and unity ... in the interest of the homeland.)

O People,

We have taken oath to sacrifice our blood and everything we hold dear for your sake...Power shall be entrusted to a government emanating from you and inspired by you. This can only be realized by the creation of a people's republic, which will uphold complete Iraqi unity, tie itself in bonds of fraternity with the Arab and Muslim states, act in keeping with the principles of the United Nations and the resolutions of the Bangdun Conference, and honor all pledges and treaties in conformity with the interests of the homeland. Accordingly, the (new) national government shall henceforth be called the Republic of Iraq... .

Source: Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 802.

APPENDIX II

The Mosul Revolt of 1959

The Mosul Revolt was a counter-revolutionary movement led by Colonel 'Abd al-Waḥḥāb al-Shawwāf in Mosul on 8 March 1959. The movement was composed of the military factions opposed to Qāsim whom they believed betrayed the July Revolution. Qāsim's policy of supporting the Iraqi Communist Party and other radical elements to counteract 'Ārif and other pan-Arabists embittered many officers. The revolt was planned by Rif'at al-Haj Sirrī, Nāḍhim al-Ṭabaqchalī, and Shawwaf. The initial plan was for Shawwaf to march his troops in Mosul initiating the revolt, whereby Ṭabaqchalī would follow with his troops for support while Sirrī, in cooperation with pan-Arab officers in Baghdad, would surround Qāsim's office and force him to step down.

Wanting to obtain the title of Commander of the Revolution himself instead of Ṭabaqchalī as other leaders had demanded, Shawwāf began the revolt without the notification or consent of Sirrī and Ṭabaqchalī on 8 March 1959. Major clashes took place between pan-Arab and anti-communist groups in Mosul against those sympathetic with the ICP. By the second day, the central government had deployed the reinforcements to quell dissent and the revolt was crushed. Shawwāf was assassinated while getting treatment in a hospital by a Kurd loyal to Qāsim .

Source: Majid Khadduri, *Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 104-110.

APPENDIX III

EXCAVATIONS IN IRAQ, 1979-80

1.	Tell Ababra		Helga Piesl-Trenkwalder
2.	Tell Abqa'	University of Munich	B. Hrouda and L. Trumpelmann
3.	Abu Ghuraq	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Qāṣim al-Radhī
4.	Tell Abu Husainī	Italian Archaeological Expedition	A. Invernizzi
5.	Tell Abu Qāṣim	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Awad al-Kessar
6.	Ahmed al-Hattu	Deutsche Orient-Gesellschaft	D. Surenhagen
7.	Tell Ali		
8.	Aqar Quf	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Amire al-Khayyat
9.	Assur	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Muhammed Suphī
10.	Babylon	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Muayad Sa'id Damerjī
11.	Borsippa		Helga Piesl-Trenkwalder & WilfridAllinger-Csollich
12.	Tell Bustan	Palestinian Archaeological Mission	Abu Ghosh
13.	Tell Chokheh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Salāh Salmān Rumeiyidh
14.	Ctesiphon (Al-Madain)	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Yasin Rashīd and Alī Hashim
15.	Tell al-Der	Belgian Archaeological Mission	L. De Meyer and M. H. Gasche
16.	Ishan Derwish	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Salāh Salmān Rumeiyidh
17.	Tell Gubba	Japanese Archaeological Mission to the Hamrin Basin	Hideo Fujii
18.	Habibiyeh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Muhammed Baqir al-Husseinī
19.	Tell Haddad	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Nail Hannoun and Burhan Shakir
20.	Tell Haizalun	British Archaeological Expedition	Robert Killick
21.	Tell Hasan	Italian Archaeological Expedition	A. Invernizzi
22.	Hatra	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Hazim 'Abd al-Hamid and Hazim al-Najafī
23.	Al Hira	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Majid al-Shams
24.	Tell Imlihiyeh	German Archaeological Institute	R. M. Boehmer and H. W. Dammer
25.	Jar'at Hamid	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Salāh Salmān Rumeiyidh
26.	Jar'at 'Uleiyeh		

27. Kemaliyeh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Mu'tasim Rashid 'Abd al-Rahmān
28. Tell Kesaran	Italian Archaeological Expedition	A. Invernizzi
29. Tell Khallaweh	Archaeological and Cultural Research Center at Mosul University	Adil Najim
30. Tell Kharbud	Italian Archaeological Expedition	A. Invernizzi
31. Tulul al-Khattab	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Nahidah 'Abd al-Fattāh
32. Kheit Qāṣim	French Archaeological Mission	J. D. Forest
33. Kish	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Qāṣim al-Rādhī
34. Tell Madhhur	British Archaeological Expedition	M. D. Roaf
35. Tell Mahmūd	Italian Archaeological Expedition	A. Invernizzi
36. Ishan Mizyad	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Daniel Izhaq and Mu'tasim Rashid 'Abd al-Rahmān
37. Tell Muhammed	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Nahidah 'Abd al-Fattāh
38. Tell al-Muqdadiyeh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Fadhil Madhloom and Hussain 'Alī Hamza
39. Al-Museifneh	University of Mosul and University of Clermont-Ferrand	Adil Najim and J. C. Poursat
40. Nineveh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Manhal Jabur
41. Quṣair	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Mudhaffar Izzet Sheikh Qadir
42. Tell Razuk	Chicago- Copenhagen Expedition	McGuire Gibson
43. Tell Rihan	Italian Archaeological Expedition	S. Tusa
44. Tell Rubeidheh	British Archaeological Expedition	Robert Killick
45. Tell al-Sa'adiyeh	University of Warsaw	S. Kozlowski
46. Samarra	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Tariq al-Janabi
47. Tell al-Sarah	Italian Archaeological Expedition	A. Invernizzi
48. Tell al-Sib	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Na'il Hannoun
49. Sippar	University of Baghdad	Walid al-Jadir
50. Tell Suleimeh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Mohammed M. Shakir and Salāh Salmān
51. Tell Sungur	Japanese Archaeological Mission	Hideo Fujii
52. Tell al-Tuwajneh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	'Abd al-Rahmān Muhammed 'Ali
53. Tell 'Uweisat	East German Archaeological Expedition	Liane Jakob-Rost
54. Tell 'Uleimiyeh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Salāh Salmān Rumeiyidh
55. Tulul Wadhheh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Salāh Salmān Rumeiyidh
56. Yarim Tepe	Soviet Archaeological Mission	Raouf Munchaev
57. Tell Yelkhi	Italian Archaeological Expedition	A. Invernizzi
58. Tell Zubeidi	German Archaeological Institute	R. M. Boehmer and H. W. Dammer

Haditha Dam Salvage Project

1.	'Amriyeh, Bechariyeh, 'Uladiyeh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Tahsin 'Abd al-Wahhab
2.	'Ana Island	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Nadhir 'Abdullah 'Ali and Muhammed Zeki
3.	Bijan Island	University of Warsaw	Michel Gawlikowski
4.	Judeideh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	'Abd al-Jabar 'Abd al-Majid
5.	Khaliliyeh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Ratib 'Ali Faraj
6.	Kifrin	Italian Archaeological Expedition	A. Invernizzi
7.	Meshhed	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Khaled Suweid
8.	Mujeddideh, Qasr, and Quseiriyeh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Mahfudf 'Abdullah Najib
9.	Nufeili	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Muhammed 'Ajaj Jurjis
10.	Rawa	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Ratib 'Ali Faraj
11.	Shuweimiyeh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Ratib 'Ali Faraj
12.	Sur Jur'ch	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	'Abd al-Rahmān Muhammed 'Ali
13.	Sur Muhreh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Muhammed 'Ajaj Jurjis
14.	Sur Telbis	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	'Abd al-Jabar 'Abd al-Majid
15.	Ta's al-Kuffar	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Iliya Milki Ibrahim and Muhammed 'Ajaj Jurjis
16.	'Usiyeh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	'Abdullah Amin Agha and Tahsin 'Abd al-Wahhab

EXCAVATIONS IN IRAQ, 1981-82

1.	Abu Salabikh	British Archaeological Expedition to Iraq	Nicholas Postgate
2.	Tell Abu Thor	Japanese Archaeological Expedition of Kokushikan University	Hideo Fujii
3.	'Ana Island	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage British Archaeological Expedition	Mahir Mohammed Jalal Michael Roaf & Alastair Northedge
4.	'Anbeh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Mohammed Faiedh & Ibrahim Amer
5.	Ashur	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Mohammed Suphi
6.	Tell 'Azzo	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Tariq Mahmud

7.	Babylon	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Awad al-Kessar (then by Dr. Munir Taha)
8.	Tell Baqaq 1	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Kerim Toma
9.	Tell Baqaq 2	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Kerim Toma
10.	Bijan Island	Polish Centre of Mediterranean Archaeology	Michael Gawlikowski & Maria Krogulska
		of the University of Warsaw	
11.	Tell Bismaya	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Ali Hashim
12.	Dawali	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Nadhir ar-Rawi
13.	Tell Dhiba 'I	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Nahida Abdul Fetah
14.	Khirbet ed-Diniyeh	French Archaeological Delegation	Christine Kepinski
15.	Fuheimi	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Mdhaffar Fleiah & Hafedh Ramadhan
16.	Tell Grai Qasim	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Mahfudh Abdullah Najib
17.	Tell Haddad	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Burhan Shakir
18.	Hajiluk	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Tariq Mahmud
19.	Hatra	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Hazim an-Hajafi
20.	Tell Jikan	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Mahfudh Abdullah Najib
21.	Jo 'aneh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Hassan Farari
22.	Tell Jumbur	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Kerim Toma
23.	Khan Bani Sa 'ad	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Munir Taha
24.	Kifrin	Italian Archaeological Expedition	A. Ivernizzi
25.	Larsa	French Archaeological Delegation	Jean-Louis Huot
26.	Mawrid	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Abdul-Hamid Sa'dun
27.	Tell Mizyad	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Ali Mehdi
28.	Tell Muhammad 'Arab	British Archaeological Expedition	Michael Roaf
29.	Tell Muhammad	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Ammil Matab
30.	Muhreh	German Archaeological Expedition	Jakob-Rost & Klengel
31.	Muqaber Majwal	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Ahmed Reshwan
32.	Tell Museifneh	University of Mosul	Adil Abbu
		University of Clermont-Ferrand	J.C. Poursat
33.	Nimrud	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Myesser Sa'id
34.	Nippur	Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago	McGuire Gibson
35.	Tell el-'Oueili	French Archaeological Delegation	Jean-Louis Huot
36.	Tulul es-Sadireh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Ammil Matab

37.	Sahliyeh	German Archaeological Expedition	Jakob-Rost
38.	Samarra '	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Mu 'ayyad Sa 'id
39.	Tell Selal	University of Mosul	Amer Sulaiman
40.	Shuweimiyeh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Ratib 'Ali Faraj
41.	Sippar	University of Baghdad	Walid al-Jadir
42.	Tell Suleimeh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Muhammed Mahmud Shakir
43.	Sur Jur 'eh	British Archaeological Expedition	Michael Roaf
44.	Sur Telbis	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Qahtan 'Izzi, Salahadin Hamid Farid, and Nadhir ar-Rawi
45.	Sur Umm al-Khawashij	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	
46.	Tilbis Island	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Qahtan 'Izzi, Salahadin Hamid Farid, and Nadhir ar-Rawi
47.	Ukhaidhir	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	
48.	'Usiyeh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Salah-ad-din Hamid Farid & then by Majid 'Abd al-Rahman al-Hadithi
49.	Warka	Deutsches Archaologisches Institut, Abteilung Baghdad	R. Boehmer
50.	Tell Yemniyeh	Canadian Expedition from the Royal Ontario Museum	T. Cuyler Young

EXCAVATIONS IN IRAQ, 1983-84

During the 1983-84 season, the focus shifted largely to the Saddam Dam Salvage Project (previously known as the Eski Mosul Dam) in the northern part of the country.

1.	Tell Abu al-Qaws	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	
2.	Abu Salabikh	British Archaeological Expedition to Iraq	Nicholas Postgate
3.	'Anbeh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	
4.	'Ana Island	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Mahir Mohammed Jalal
5.	Tell Bismaya	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	
6.	Borsippa	Austrian Archaeological Expedition to Iraq	H. Trenkwalder
7.	Tell id-Dehemiya	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	'Adb al-Sittar al-'Azzawi
8.	Tell al-Dhiba 'I	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	
9.	Khirbet ed-Diniyeh	French Archaeological Delegation	Christine Kepinski

10.	Fuhaimi	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	
11.	Habl as-Sahr	British and Belgian Archaeological Expedition	H. Gasche and R. Killick
12.	Tell Haddad	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Burhan Shakir
13.	Tell Ibrahim al-Khalil	Austrian Archaeological Expedition to Iraq	H. Trenkwalder
14.	Isin	Duetsche Forschungsgemeinschaft , the Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, and the University of Munich	B. Hrouda
15.	Kifrin	Centro Scavi di Torino	A. Ivernizzi
16.	Lagash	Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York and the University of California	D. Hansen
17.	Larsa	French Archaeological Delegation	Jean-Louis Huot
18.	Maqabir Majwal	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	
19.	Mawrid	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	
20.	Tell Muhammad	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	
21.	Tell el-'Oueili	French Archaeological Delegation	Jean-Louis Huot
22.	Shuweimiyeh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Ratib 'Ali Faraj
23.	Sippar	University of Baghdad	Walid al-Jadir
24.	Tell Sulaimah	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	
25.	al-Tar Caves	Institute of Cultural Studies of Ancient Iraq, Kokushikan University	Hideo Fujii
26.	Tilbis Island	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Nadhir Abdullah
27.	'Usiyeh	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Abdul-Majid 'Abd al-Rahman, Ratib 'Ali Faraj, and Barkat Ahmed Barkat
28.	Warka	Deutsches Archaologisches Institut, Abteilung Baghdad	R. Boehmer

Saddam Dam Salvage Project

1.	Anzeh Cemetery	Austrian Archaeological Expedition to Iraq	H. Trenkwalder
2.	Babneet Village	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Hikmet Bashir al-Aswad
3.	Tell Baqaq 1	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Kerim Toma
4.	Tell Baqaq 2	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Kerim Toma
5.	Tell Baqaq 3	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Najat Yunus & Kerim Toma
6.	Tell Baqaq 4	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Kerim Toma
7.	Bir Hami	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	'Abd al-Salam Sam 'an
8.	Khirbet Derak	Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique	J.D. Forest
9.	Der Hall	Institute of Cultural Studies of Ancient Iraq, Kokushikan University	Hideo Fujii
10.	Tell Dhuweij	University of Mosul	Zamir Sulaiman
11.	Tell Fisna	Institute of Cultural Studies of Ancient Iraq, Kokushikan University	Hideo Fujii

12. Khirbet Hatara	Centro Scavi di Torino	P. Fiorina
13. Jamrash Muhammed	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Hanna Yalda Hanna & Ghalib al-Khashab
14. Tell Jikan	Joint expeditions❖	
15. Tell Karana 1 and 2	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Kerim Toma
16. Tell Karana 3	Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Centro Studi Ricerche Ligabue, & University of Bologna	M. Fales, G. Wilhelm, S. Tusa, and C. Zaccagnini
17. Karhol Sufla	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Hikmet Bashir al-Aswad
18. Kharabeh Shattani	Edinburgh University	E. Peltenburg & T. Watkins
19. Kharabok	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Abdullah Amin Agha
20. Khirbet Khatuniyeh	British Museum	John Curtis
21. Tell Kutan	Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique	J.D. Forest & L. Bachelot
22. Tell Mishrifeh	Institute of Cultural Studies of Ancient Iraq, Kokushikan University	Hideo Fujii
23. Mishrifeh Mill	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Abdullah Amin Agha
24. Mishrifeh Village	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Abdullah Amin Agha
25. Tell Muhammad 'Arab	British Archaeological Expedition	Michael Roaf
26. Qaradere	British Archaeological Expedition	
27. Khirbet Qasrij	British Museum	John Curtis & Dominique Collon
28. Qasrij Cliff	British Archaeological Expedition	John Curtis
29. Tell Rifan	Polish Centre of Mediterranean Archaeology	W. Chmielewski
30. Tell Rijim	Polish Centre of Mediterranean Archaeology	
31. Tell Ronak	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	'Abd al-Salam Sam 'an
32. Khirbet Saleh	Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft & Centro Studi Ricerche Ligabue,	M. Fales, G. Wilhelm, S. Tusa, and C. Zaccagnini
33. Tell Selal	University of Mosul	Amir Sulaiman
34. Sheikh Hamza	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Dhanun Yunus Abdullah
35. Wadi Khatkhun	Manchester University	C. A. Burney

❖	a) Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	Hikmet Bashir al-Aswad
	b) Institute of Cultural Studies of Ancient Iraq, Kokushikan University	Hideo Fujii
	c) Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Centro Studi Ricerche Ligabue, & University of Bologna	M. Fales, G. Wilhelm, S. Tusa, and C. Zaccagnini
	d) Austrian Archaeological Expedition to Iraq	H. Trenkwalder

EXCAVATIONS IN IRAQ, 1985-86

1.	Tell Abu Dhahir	British Archaeological Expedition	Warwick Ball
2.	'Ain Shayi ' and al-Dakakin	Caves Institute of Cultural Studies of Ancient Iraq, Kokushikan University	Hideo Fujii
3.	Borsippa	Austrian Archaeological Expedition to Iraq	H. Trenkwalder
4.	Khirbet Deir Situn	British Museum	John Curtis
5.	Tell Deir Situn	British Museum	John Curtis
6.	Tell Dhuweij	Institute of Cultural Studies of Ancient Iraq, Kokushikan University	Hideo Fujii
7.	Tell Gir Matbakh	British Archaeological Expedition	Warwick Ball
8.	Tell Grai Darki	British Museum	John Curtis
9.	Khirbet Hatara	Centro Scavi di Torino	Paolo Fiorina
10.	Isin	Duetsche Forschungsgemeinschaft , the Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, and the University of Munich	B. Hrouda
11.	Tell Jessary	Institute of Cultural Studies of Ancient Iraq, Kokushikan University	Hideo Fujii
12.	Tell Jigan	Institute of Cultural Studies of Ancient Iraq, Kokushikan University	Hideo Fujii
13.	Khirbet Karhasan	British Archaeological Expedition	Warwick Ball
14.	Larsa	French Archaeological Delegation	Jean-Louis Huot
15.	Nemrik 9	Polish Centre of Mediterranean Archaeology	S. K. Kozlowski
16.	Nineveh	Northern Directorate-General of Antiquities	
17.	Tell el-'Oueili	French Archaeological Delegation	Jean-Louis Huot
18.	Qasr Benat		
19.	Qirniz Dir	British Archaeological Expedition	Ellen McAdam
20.	Tell Rifan	Polish Centre of Mediterranean Archaeology	Piotr Bielinski
21.	Tell Rijim	Polish Centre of Mediterranean Archaeology	Piotr Bielinski
22.	Samarra'	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	
23.	S-e-h Qubba	British Archaeological Expedition	Warwick Ball
24.	Seleucia ad Tigrim	Centro Scavi di Torino	
25.	Tell Shelgiya	British Archaeological Expedition & Edinburgh Univ.	W. Ball and Trevor Watkins
26.	Khirbet Shireena British	Archaeological Expedition	Warwick Ball
28.	Sippar	University of Baghdad	Walid al-Jadir

27. Siyana Ulya	British Archaeological Expedition	Warwick Ball
28. Umm Kheshm	Iraqi State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage	'Abdulmajid Abdul Rahman al-Hadithi
29. Uruk (Warka)	Deutsches Archaologisches Institut, Abteilung Baghdad	R. Boehmer

Sources: "Excavations in Iraq, 1979-80." *Iraq*, 43 (1981), pp. 167-198; "Excavations in Iraq, 1981-82." *Iraq*, 45 (1983), pp. 199-224; "Excavations in Iraq, 1983-84." *Iraq*, 47 (1985), pp. 215-239; "Excavations in Iraq, 1985-86." *Iraq*, 49 (1987), pp. 231-251.

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