

!NFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps.

ProQuest Information and Learning
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
800-521-0600

UMI[®]

NOTE TO USERS

Page(s) not included in the original manuscript are unavailable from the author or university. The manuscript was microfilmed as received.

1:42

This reproduction is the best copy available.

UMI[®]

Original Fracture:
Plato in the Philosophies of Paul Natorp and Martin Heidegger

Alan Kim
Department of Philosophy
McGill University, Montreal

March 2001

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfilment of
the requirements of the degree of Ph.D.

Copyright © Alan Kim 2001



**National Library
of Canada**

**Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services**

**395 Wellington Street
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

**Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada**

**Acquisitions et
services bibliographiques**

**395, rue Wellington
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4
Canada**

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-75646-7

Canada

Table of Contents.....	i
Abstract/Sommaire.....	iii
Acknowledgements.....	iv
Introduction.....	v
Chapter One: Kant's Plato.....	1: 1
§1.1. Introduction.....	1: 1
§1.2. Plato in the <i>Inaugural Dissertation</i>	1: 2
§1.2.1. Kinds of intuition.....	1: 8
§1.3. Considerations.....	1: 14
§1.4. Kant's knowledge of Plato.....	1: 18
§1.5. Plato in the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i>	1: 23
§1.5.1. Mental taxonomy refined.....	1: 23
§1.5.2. Reason's problems.....	1: 26
§1.5.3. Platonic problems.....	1: 30
§1.5.3.1. Economy.....	1: 30
§1.5.3.2. Ideas and <i>ideai</i>	1: 33
§1.5.3.3. Critique and self-critique.....	1: 37
§1.6. Plato's wrong intuition.....	1: 38
§1.7. Conclusion.....	1: 42
Chapter Two: From Königsberg to Marburg.....	2: 1
§2.1. Introduction.....	2: 1
§2.2. German Idealism: posit and process.....	2: 1
§2.3. German empiricism and psychologism.....	2: 8
§2.4. The sources of neo-Kantianism.....	2: 16
§2.5. The neo-Kantian theory of cognition and science.....	2: 21
§2.5.1. Induction dependent on "concept-functions".....	2: 21
§2.5.2. Scientific experience and the dissolution of ontology.....	2: 28
§2.6. Plato and the Marburg theory of the history of philosophy.....	2: 39
Chapter Three: Natorp's Plato.....	3: 1
§3.1. Introduction.....	3: 1
§3.2. <i>Phaedrus</i> : the enthusiastic program.....	3: 3
§3.3. <i>Theaetetus</i>	3: 9
§3.4. <i>Phaedo</i>	3: 27
§3.4.1. Preliminaries.....	3: 27
§3.4.2. Analysis of the dialogue.....	3: 36
§3.5. Conclusion.....	3: 65
Chapter Four: From Natorp to Heidegger.....	4: 1
§4.1. Introduction.....	4: 1
§4.2. Phenomenology and neo-Kantianism.....	4: 2
§4.3. Phenomenological truth.....	4: 16
§4.4. Questions of being.....	4: 24
§4.5. Fundamental Ontology.....	4: 28
Chapter Five: Heidegger's Plato.....	5: 1
§5.1. Introduction.....	5: 1
§5.2. Outline of Platonic concepts according to Heidegger.....	5: 2
§5.3. Plato through Aristotle.....	5: 5

§5.4. <i>Nous</i> as <i>Verstehen</i>	5: 13
§5.5. <i>Logos</i> as <i>Rede</i>	5: 19
§5.6. <i>Nous</i> and <i>logos</i>	5: 29
§5.7. Truth and falsehood.....	5: 32
§5.8. Dialectic.....	5: 36
§5.9. <i>Eidos</i>	5: 45
§5.10. <i>Logos</i> , <i>nous</i> , and truth.....	5: 48
§5.11. What is the meaning of "pure" <i>nous</i> ?	5: 50
§5.12. The cave allegory	5: 54
Epilogue.....	6: 1
Bibliography	

Abstract.

The dissertation treats of Paul Natorp's and Martin Heidegger's interpretations of Plato. My goal is twofold: sympathetically to expound each of these interpretations in its own right, and to contrast them against each other as emblematic of the conflict between neo-Kantianism (Natorp) and Phenomenology (Heidegger). The philosophical controversy centers on the relation of thinking and being, a controversy which in this specific context may ultimately be traced back to Kant. Natorp and Heidegger both, for different reasons, return to the Platonic "theory of forms" in order to ground their respective conceptions of thinking and being. Accordingly, I discuss in Chapter One the role of the Platonic forms in Kant's own philosophy. In Chapter Two, I examine the central doctrine of neo-Kantianism and its roots in post-Kantian German philosophy. In Chapter Three, I show how this doctrine is embodied in Natorp's analysis of several of Plato's dialogues. In Chapter Four, I lay out the principal points of Phenomenology's dispute with neo-Kantianism, as well as Heidegger's understanding of that dispute. Finally, in Chapter Five, I show how Heidegger's fundamental ontology is expressed in his interpretations of several key passages of Plato.

Sommaire.

Cette dissertation traite des interprétations de Platon faites par Paul Natorp et Martin Heidegger. L'objectif poursuivi est double: d'une part, il consiste à exposer chacune de ces interprétations; d'autre part, il consiste à les mettre en contraste et à présenter ce contraste comme emblématique du conflit entre le néo-kantisme (Natorp) et la phénoménologie (Heidegger). La controverse philosophique est centrée sur la relation entre la pensée et l'être, une controverse qui peut, dans ce contexte, être ramenée jusqu'à Kant. Natorp et Heidegger retournent tous deux, pour différentes raisons, à la "théorie des Idées" de Platon pour fonder leur conception de la pensée et de l'être. Je discuterai, dans le premier chapitre, le rôle de la "théorie des Idées" de Platon dans la philosophie de Kant. Ensuite j'examinerai, dans le second chapitre, le cœur de la doctrine du néo-kantisme ainsi que ses racines qui plongent dans la philosophie allemande post-kantienne. Dans le troisième chapitre, je montrerai comment cette doctrine prend corps dans l'analyse que fait Natorp de plusieurs dialogues de Platon. Dans le quatrième chapitre, je développerai les principaux points de la dispute entre la phénoménologie et le néo-kantisme de même que la perception qu'a Heidegger de cette dispute. Enfin, dans le cinquième chapitre, je montrerai comment l'ontologie fondamentale d'Heidegger est exprimée dans son interprétation de plusieurs passages clés des textes de Platon.

Acknowledgements.

I owe thanks to the following persons for dialogue, criticism, and countless moments of friendly aid: Emily Carson, David Davies, Vianney Décarie, George DiGiovanni, Angela Fotopoulos, Frédéric Fournier, Michael Hallett, Alison Laywine, Claudine Lefort, Miriam McCormick, David Norton, Lydia Patton, Sarah Stroud and Barbara Whiston in Montreal; Robert Crouch, Sean Gurd, Emmet Robbins, and Anna Zalewski in Toronto; Jessica Gelber, Debra Pughe, Paul Reitter, and Paul Thomas in Berkeley; Robert and Katherine Martin at Bard College; Till Engel, Wolfgang Engel, Ann-Kathrin Hake, Steve Lofts, Glenn Most, Thomas Petersen, Harald Pilot, Lawrence Schmidt, Robert Schmitt-Brandt, and Thomas Schmitz in Heidelberg; Matt Bloch, Art Luther, Brother Ansgar Santogrossi, and Mark Woolman in Oregon; Lisa Andrews, Gary Aylesworth, Robert Barford, Manfred Baum, Sara Beardsworth, Martina, Niklaus, Verena, Barbara, Florens and Karin Deuchler, George Dunkel, Kathleen Eamon, Mihaela Fistioc, Todd and Kathy Gooch, Paul Hardy, Lucian and Natalie Kim, Theodore Kisiel, Eric Kligerman, Reiner Rohr, Wolfgang Schlauch, Megan Sullivan, and Becca Topol at various points along the way.

I would like to thank McGill University for two McGill Major Research Fellowships (1996-98) which made possible research at the University of California, Berkeley, where Hans Sluga and A.A. Long showed unexpected generosity to an outsider, and at the University of Toronto, where Brad Inwood did likewise. I am also grateful to the United States and German Fulbright Commissions for a Fulbright Full Grant (1998-99) and its extension (1999-2000) to pursue research at the University of Heidelberg, where Martin Tavakolian, Dominic Kaegi, Reiner Wiehl, and Hans-Georg Gadamer offered invaluable German perspectives on my work. I also thank my new colleagues and students at the University of Memphis for their patience as I completed my dissertation in my first year of teaching.

I am especially grateful to the members of my dissertation committee, Philip Buckley and Marguerite Deslauriers, for their advice and support; to my parents, for their encouragement; to Anne Carson, for her friendship; and to Stephen Menn, for his uncompromising and unconditional devotion as a teacher.

Introduction.

In 1990, I submitted a B.A. thesis at Haverford College, entitled "*Gestell* and Its Antagonists," in which I analyzed the relation between Nietzsche's conception of nihilism and Heidegger's critique of technology. I also parroted my two authors in their many criticisms of Plato. Strangely, perhaps, I suffered pangs of conscience for having repeated bad things about Plato which, as far as I was concerned, were mere hearsay. So I returned to graduate school to get to the bottom of the matter.

It was soon clear that a proper evaluation of Heidegger's reading of Plato would involve much more than just studying Plato, and then checking if Heidegger was fair and faithful to the text. There was another equally good question: why does Heidegger interpret Plato in the first place? Answering it demanded an investigation of the sources and motivations of Heidegger's philosophy itself, and what role Plato played in it. On the suggestion of one of my advisers, Prof. Menn, I began examining the neo-Kantian context of Heidegger's early thought, especially Paul Natorp's book, *Platos Ideenlehre*. And this inquiry took me back, naturally, to Kant, and Kant's Plato. (To my surprise, Nietzsche never re-entered the picture, though he would sometimes peer in at the edge.)

This dissertation, therefore, does not argue for a particular position on a Platonic problem; rather, it is a kind of investigative report on the motives of two thinkers, Natorp and Heidegger, in interpreting and appropriating Plato in their philosophies. As such, I think it will be most useful as an illustration, on the one hand, of how far two modern thinkers with very different agendas and commitments can find support and inspiration in Plato; and, on the other hand, of how open Plato's philosophy really is to radically divergent interpretations. The dissertation's goals are modest: to expose English-speaking scholars to two quite unfamiliar German readings of Plato's theory of forms; and, more generally, to stimulate further exploration of (neo-)Kantian and phenomenological interpretations of ancient systems of thought.

A word concerning the title. "Original Fracture" means many things, as I think the dissertation will show. First, it means the many ambiguities and tensions inherent in the interpretations of Plato, whom both Heidegger and Natorp place at the origin of the tradition. That origin seems "fractured:" Plato is susceptible to radically opposed readings, and not just because his texts are hard, but because he often seems to disagree with himself. Yet there are also deeper philosophical issues in the notion of "fracture," namely the split between sense and sensibility, and more crucially, between mind and its world. This split can equally well be figured as obtaining between the ideal and empirical, as between the authentic perception of the world as it is and the world as it seems. It is fundamentally this fracture that is the beginning of all these thinkers' thoughts, namely the desire or imperative to trace a way back to wholeness.

Plato was very rhetorical, and obscure, and in such a way that he often did not understand himself.
--Kant¹

1. Kant's Plato.

1.1. Introduction.

I begin my story with Kant's Plato. My aim is not to explain Plato's influence in Kant's thought for the sake of understanding Kant, but rather for the sake of laying bare the roots of a rich, strange, and powerful way of interpreting Plato's theory of *ideai*. For Kant's appropriation of that theory necessarily involves an interpretation of what it means, and that interpretation in turn is governed by the end towards which Kant intends to use Platonic *ideai*. That end is the critique of pure reason, both practical and theoretical.

"Critique" and "criticism" and "critical idealism" are names for the project of defining the conditions of possibility of practical reasoning and theoretical knowledge. As we shall see when we turn to the neo-Kantians, this project is itself open to various interpretations. For neo-Kantians like Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp--of particular interest for their readings of Plato--critical idealism is primarily a methodological project. Right moral action and true scientific knowledge both depend on correct method; hence Cohen and Natorp seek to locate and describe the conditions of that method in cognitive activity.

By contrast, Kant's own approach appears more static. As we will see in examining both the pre-critical² *Inaugural Dissertation* and the first *Critique*, Kant's first task is to delineate the structure of the cognizing subject itself. In this context, critical idealism amounts to figuring out the nature of the subject's cognitive

¹ *BL*, 36.

² On the status of the *Dissertation* as "pre-critical," see, e.g. Friedman, 1992: 34; Beiser, 1992: 49-51, and esp. 52-53: The *Dissertation* "brought Kant close to the threshold of the critical philosophy. [Etc.]"

apparatus and its legitimate scope of application. I shall therefore focus on Kant's appeal to Platonic *ideai* as a taxonomic strategy. I thereby hope to show what a critical interpretation of Plato *can* look like (for Kant's transcendental idealism is only one of several varieties). Nonetheless, Kant's critical interpretation of Plato is also the first, the source of all that follow. Therefore, it is important to understand exactly what role Plato plays in Kant's project, in order to see how both that role and that project are transformed in the nineteenth century by Cohen and Natorp. I first discuss Plato's role in the *Inaugural Dissertation* of 1770, and the Platonic element in Kant's "Copernican revolution" in both ethics and metaphysics. I then consider the origin and *critical* meaning of his hermeneutic principle of understanding an author better than the author understands himself. Finally, I examine how Kant applies this principle in his critique of the mind's faculties, and the consequences of this account for his "softening" of Plato's philosophy.

1.2. Plato in the *Inaugural Dissertation*.

Throughout Kant's career, Plato's thought always appears in connection with the *a priori*. Take the *Dissertation*: from the start, a venerable tradition grounds Kant's assumption of two generically different sources of cognition, distinguished as empirical or *a posteriori*, and non-empirical or *a priori*. Here Kant designates the *a posteriori* and *a priori* as, respectively, the "sensual" and "intelligent" or "intellectual;" in the first *Critique*, he further divides intellect into "understanding" and "reason."

The intellect operates "by means of ... abstract notion[s]," while the sensibility represents such general notions by representing them to the mind "in the concrete by a distinct intuition" (*Diss.* §1/II 387).³ Kant conceives the intellect's operations as not necessarily representable by sensuous intuition (*Diss.* §1/II 389);

³ The Roman numeral refers volume II of the Academy edition of Kant's works, the Arabic numeral to the page number.

that is, he conceives the intellect as an independent *source* of ideas. Whereas sensuality receives its representations from some present object, the intellect "(rationality) is the faculty of a subject by which it has the power to represent things which cannot by their own quality come before the senses of that subject" (*Diss.* §3/II 392). The objects of sensibility and intellect Kant calls, respectively, *phenomena* and *noumena* (*Diss.* §3/II 392), the discussion of which he praises as "that noble institution of antiquity" (*Diss.* §7/II 395).

A phenomenon is an "object of experience," Kant writes in §5; a phenomenon, *qua* object, is therefore not to be confused with an appearance or mere "sensum" (*Diss.* §4/II 393). In fact, "object of experience" is a pleonasm to the extent that both an object, and so too the experience of an object, are simultaneously generated upon the "reflective cognition which arises when several appearances are compared by the intellect" (*Diss.* §5/II 394). The contrast between a noumenon and a phenomenon, then, is not between some purely intellectual representation and some purely sensual representation (between, say, an "idea" and an "appearance"), since a phenomenon is already more than a mere sensum. A phenomenon is an object which has gained objectivity through the intervention of the intellect into the manifold of sensa received by the passive sensibility.

Rather, the contrast is between the phenomenon as an intellectual and sensual compound, on the one hand, and the noumenon as that same compound conceived minus all sensible components, on the other. Thus Kant writes:

[A]n intellectual concept *abstracts* from everything sensitive, but is *not abstracted* from things which are sensitive, and perhaps it would more rightly be called *abstracting* rather than *abstract*.

(*Diss.* §6/II 394)

This passage says that an intellectual concept is not, say, a universal concept of some sensible thing (which would simply be an abstract version of the sensible object);

rather it is that which remains once we have subtracted or "abstracted" the sensitive contribution to the cognition of any object whatsoever; hence such a concept could not possibly be empirical. Kant ends §6 by renaming intellectual concepts "*pure ideas*," and these are the *noumena* (*Diss.* §6/II 394).

According to Kant, "metaphysics" is the name of "the philosophy which contains the *first principles* of the use of the *pure intellect*," i.e., of the cognition of non-sensual concepts or *noumena* (*Diss.* §8/II 395). But his aim here, as later in the first *Critique*, is a more modest "propaedeutic science ... which teaches the distinction of sensitive from intellectual cognition," in short, the identification of just how a noumenon is correctly to be conceived.

Kant proceeds by adducing examples of noumena, and it is here that he introduces Plato, both implicitly and explicitly. Everywhere in this propaedeutic discussion, we may for the first time observe the careful winnowing of legitimate from wrongheaded conceptions of Platonic noumena, which will come to characterize all of Kant's Plato-interpretations. For example, when Kant writes that

the concepts met with in metaphysics are not to be sought in the senses, but in the very nature of the pure intellect, and that not as concepts *born with it*, but as concepts abstracted out of the laws planted in the mind (by attending to its actions on the occasion of an experience), and so as *acquired* concepts [.]

his immediate target may well be Locke, but his point implicitly touches Platonic recollection as well (*Diss.* §8/II 395).⁴

On the other hand, Kant explicitly appeals to Plato in explaining the "dogmatic" or constructive role of "things intellectual" as paradigmatic exemplars Kant calls "noumenal perfections" (*Diss.* §9/II 395-396). He divides "noumenal

⁴ Cf. "Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie" (VT): 624; *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, I.7., n.* (Ac. Ed., Vol. VII: 140-141); *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik* #4851 (Ac. Ed., Vol. XVII: 9).

perfections" into the "theoretic" and the "practical," very elliptically identifying the theoretic sort as "the highest being, GOD" (*Diss.* §9/II 396). In an ambiguity that will persist into the critical writings, he acknowledges God as *the* (unique) example of noumenal perfection,⁵ yet also seems to countenance lower-level examples, viz. the "maximum" or ideal paradigm of "any genus of things whose quantity is variable [... which is the common measure and principle of cognising]" (*Diss.* §9/II 396). He writes:

The *maximum* of *perfection* is at the present time called the ideal, while for Plato it was called the idea (as in the case of his idea of the State).

(*Diss.* §9/II 396)

Such a generic maximum is the "principle of all the things which are contained under the general notion of some perfection, in as much as the lesser grades, it is held, can only be determined by limiting the maximum" (*Diss.* §9/II 396).

Kant identifies Plato's *ideai*, not with the notion of a noumenal perfection *tout court* (i.e. God), but rather with the generic perfections Kant here calls *ideals*; we will see the importance for Kant of this seemingly minor distinction when we turn to the first *Critique*. Given Kant's use of the Platonic republic to illustrate an ideal, it seems that the theoretic and the practical forms of noumenal perfection cannot always be neatly distinguished, since the ideal state serves both a theoretic end (viz. in helping us determine which political groupings count as states), as well as a practical end (viz. in providing either a standard by which to judge the adequacy of some empirical state, or a model for the construction of an empirical state). We shall later see how Kant distinguishes ideal and idea in the first *Critique*, while retaining an ambiguity between the practical and theoretical functions of both.

⁵ Cf. Scholium to §22/II 418.

As we have seen, the noumena are the objects of the intellect, while the phenomena are those of the sensibility. It remains to discuss how "being the objects of" differs in these two cases, for we might reasonably expect the objects' objectivity to vary with the nature of their respective subjective faculties. As I stressed above, phenomena are *not* equivalent to brute sensa; as *objects* of experience, phenomena have a formal component in addition to the material supplied by the senses (i.e. the brute sensa) (*Diss.* §4/II 392). Kant characterizes this formal aspect of a phenomenon as

the *specificity* of the sensibles which arises according as the various things which affect the senses are co-ordinated by a certain natural law of the mind.

(*Diss.* §4/II 392-393)

Crucially, Kant denies that the form of a phenomenon is "some adumbration or schema" of the object by which the subject's sensibility is affected (i.e., of the object from which the sensa are received),⁶ claiming instead that the form arises from

a certain law implanted in the mind by which it co-ordinates for itself the sensa which arise from the presence of the object.

(*Diss.* §4/II 393)

That is, because "objects do not strike the senses in virtue of their form or specificity"—i.e. their unitariness—Kant attributes the specificity of the phenomenal *object* to an act of mind "in accordance with stable and innate laws" (*Diss.* §4/II 393).⁷

⁶ Kant *does* acknowledge that the form of the sensible representation of some source-object "is undoubtedly evidence of a certain respect or relation in the sensa" (*Diss.* §4/II 393).

⁷ Is the specifying formal law in fact space/time, as described in §10? As we will see in our discussion of the first *Critique*, Kant adheres to this view of phenomena, although he refines and elaborates it in terms of the doctrine of categories. As I discuss in the next chapter, it is particularly passages like these which encourage a "psychologistic" reading of Kant.

Though it is not altogether clear from the text, Kant seems in §5 to assign the formal or specifying "law-function," as I call it,⁸ to the intellect, and not the sensibility, since he later (§10) explicitly interprets the sensibility's receptivity as a *passive* power of intuition, never speaking of any active sensitive power. How then is this formal law-function related to the two-fold use of the intellect Kant lays out in §5? He distinguishes a "real" and a "logical" use. The former is the use by which the intellect "gives" concepts themselves; the latter is the use whereby the intellect hierarchically ranks or "subordinates" concepts among themselves (*Diss.* §5/II 393).

Given Kant's statement that sensitive cognitions are "subordinated by the logical use of the intellect to other sensitive cognitions as to common concepts, and phenomena are subordinated to more general laws of phenomena" (*Diss.* §5/II 393), it seems clear that the specifying function either is identical with the logical use or somehow closely connected to it. For although he does not spell out in these passages just how the mind "co-ordinates for itself the sensa" (*Diss.* §5/II 393), or just what the "certain natural law of the mind" (*Diss.* §5/II 392-393) is, by which that coordination comes about, it seems clear that any *specification* of the phenomenon can only occur through some initial "subordination" of the sensa themselves to some concept by which they are unified into some one object or proto-object. The "form" which the mind imposes upon sensual "matter" is a "certain law implanted in the mind by which it co-ordinates for itself the sensa which arise from the presence of an object" (*Diss.*, §4, II 393).

Thus, according to Kant, the objectification of phenomena, as well as the higher-order or "reflective" organization of phenomena into experience, is exhaustively covered by the logical function of the intellect, and has nothing whatever to do with its real use:

⁸ Cf. *Diss.* §11/II 397.

[i]n so far as intellectual things strictly as such are concerned, where the *use of the intellect* is *real*, such concepts whether of objects or relations are given by the very nature of the intellect and they have not been abstracted from any use of the senses nor do they contain any form of sensitive cognition as such.

(*Diss.* §6/II 394)

The real use is the *pure* use of the intellect, which was defined in §3 as "the *faculty* of a subject by which it has the power to represent things which cannot by their own quality come before the senses of that subject" (*Diss.* §3/II 392). In short, the intellect's *proper* objects are noumena, or non-sensible things. But just *how* can we execute the real use, how can "concepts themselves be given" (*Diss.* §5/II 393)?

1.2.1. Kinds of intuition.

The great puzzle which we now face is just how we can have noumenal cognition, i.e. how we can know such "things which cannot by their own quality come before the senses" (*Diss.* §3/II 392). As we shall shortly see, in the first *Critique* Kant will resolve some aspects of this puzzle by simply denying that we can have *bona fide* cognition of noumena at all. He is there forced to do this because he retains a fundamental distinction laid down here in the *Dissertation*, viz. between the passive power of intuition and the active power of thinking. But while Kant maintains, in the *Dissertation*, that we can cognize "things intellectual," he describes this cognition as so limited as to seem, in fact, not worthy of the name.

"There is not given (to man) an *intuition* of things intellectual," he writes, "but only a *symbolic cognition*;" and this "symbolic cognition" or "intellection is only allowable for us [humans] through universal concepts in the abstract and not through a singular concept in the concrete" (*Diss.* §10/II 396). Kant here distinguishes between the intuitive and the discursive as between *immediate* and

mediated, arguing as follows. All our intuition is "bound," as he puts it, "to a certain principle of form," viz. space and time. But since that formal principle "is the condition under which something can be the object of our *senses* ... it is not a means to *intellectual* intuition" (*Diss.* §10/II 396; emphasis added). As Kant argues later in the *Dissertation* (§25) against the subreptic axiom,⁹ i.e., against the meaninglessness of the notion of an "intellectuated phenomenon" (*Diss.* §24), "we rightly suppose that *whatever cannot be cognised by any intuition at all is thereby not thinkable* and so impossible" (*Diss.* §25/II 413).¹⁰

Neither in §10 nor in §25 does Kant give an *argument* why all human intuition should be bound to an exclusively *sensitive* principle of specifying (individuating) form, viz. space and time; he simply asserts it as an observation: "we cannot by any effort of mind, not even by inventing it, obtain any other intuition than that which occurs in accordance with the form of space and time" (*Diss.* §25/II 413). Whenever we try to think of some individual thing *as that thing*, i.e. in its specific singularity and not under the general concept "individuality") we cannot but conceive it as spatial and persisting through time. We can of course *think* without so conceiving or perceiving some thing, but then we do so at the level of general concepts which "symbolically" stand for and so "mediate," to use Kant's words, that thing.

We thus find in the *Dissertation* the embryonic phases of two principles we later see fully developed in the first *Critique*:

- 1) the distinction, not clearly made but implicit in the text, between "intellectual concepts" wholly *a priori* but applicable to phenomena alone (i.e. proto-categories) on the one hand; and the intellectual notions of noumenal perfection (i.e. proto-ideas), on the other (*Diss.* §§8-9);

⁹ Cf. §24/II 412.

¹⁰ Cf. *KrV* A51-52/B75-76.

2) the formal principle of the sensibility (space and time) "in which" but not "under which" individual objects may be given (appear) to our intuition.

In our discussion of the first *Critique* we shall see how these incipient critical principles develop. At any rate, it is clear that already in the *Dissertation* the formal principle of space and time, though an *a priori* subjective principle, cannot be considered as itself an intellectual concept. Moreover, the proto-categories of §8 are not to be cognized in any other way but "symbolically," in accord with §10. What are the consequences for the study of these concepts which, as "the first principles of the use of the pure intellect" Kant calls "metaphysical?" At the very least, it seems, the "symbolic" interpretation of such concepts as "possibility, existence, necessity, substance, cause, etc., together with their opposites or correlates" suggests that these can *never* be cognized in their singularity, but only ever in systematic relation to the others.

But does the same hold true of the notions of noumenal perfection, of those concepts Kant associates with Plato's ideas? One possible answer, though again not clear from the text, is that these noumena are cognized symbolically insofar as they are conceived as *maxima* of perfection. For for them to be maxima, they must necessarily stand *in relation* to things of lesser grade, and can only be made sense of as components of such a relation. At the same time, the concept of "lesser grade" is also dependent on the maximum, at least as Kant describes it:

[The maximum of perfection] is the principle of all the things which are contained under the general notion of some perfection, in as much as the lesser grades, it is held, can only be determined by limiting the maximum.

(*Diss.* §9/II 396)

But our own intellect confuses the issue; it rebels, hungry, against merely symbolic knowledge.

In §1, Kant writes that "the abstract ideas which the mind entertains when they have been received from the intellect very often cannot be followed up in the concrete and converted into intuitions" (*Diss.* §1/II 389). But the mind exerts a "subjective resistance" (*Diss.* §1/II 389) to this inability, because, as he says in §25, we cannot help but "subject all things which are possible to the sensitive axioms of space and time" (*Diss.* §25/II 413). Thus our "subjective resistance" compels us to conceive abstract ideas as singular things: the mind tends to hypostasize or reify that which in fact only has symbolic meaning. Just this reification of the symbolic into the phenomenal is what Kant calls "subreption"—it is the source of metaphysical illusion.¹¹

In this connection, let us note a distinction that is of great importance for Kant's Plato-interpretation, viz. between the notions of divine intuition and pure intuition. As Kant will ultimately conclude, Plato's ignorance of just this distinction leads him to imagine that the mind's hunger for intuitive intellectual cognition can be stilled by contemplating the contents of God's mind. When he speaks of the passivity of intuition, Kant is always careful in the *Dissertation*, as in later writings, to stress that this passivity is a feature of *our human* intuition (cf. *Diss.* §§10, 25). This is because *for us*, intuition is bound to our sensibility, which as affective or receptive of *sensa*, is also passive. But Kant often contrasts the fact of our intuition's passivity against some imaginable or hypothetical *divine* intuition, one which, as he puts it, is "perfectly intellectual" (*Diss.* §10/II 397).

What are we to understand by "intellectual intuition," in view of Kant's claim that we ourselves are by nature incapable of having it? What *would* it be like? In the *Dissertation*, Kant has this to say about intellectual intuition:

[D]ivine intuition ... is the *principle* of objects and not something principled, since it is independent[; it] is an archetype

¹¹ Cf. *Diss.* §24/II 412.

(*Diss.* §10/II 397; emphasis added)

[A] pure intellectual intuition [is] exempt from the laws of the senses,
such as that which is divine

(*Diss.* §25/II 413)

There are two distinct features here: an intellectual intuition is

- (a) a principle, independent, archetypal;
- (b) exempt from the laws of the senses.

That it is exempt from the laws of the senses implies, minimally, that it does not "occur in accordance with the form of space and time" (*Diss.* §25/II 413), insofar as intellectual intuition is "not principled", and space and time just are the *principle* of form of sensible intuition. Intellectual intuition is "immediate," i.e. not mediated through space and time: its objects do not appear "in" some form, they are "not principled." Instead, they are themselves the principles which, *when formed by space and time*, appear as phenomena. In other words, the phenomena are the mediated (by space and time) "ectypes" (to use a later term of Kant's) of some independent archetype.

But perhaps this rendering does not fully capture the subtlety of Kant's position. Let me note an oddity in his mode of expression in §10. He does not say that divine intuition is *of* special objects (e.g. of noumena), which are independent of that intuition. Rather, he says that the divine intuition is itself the principle and archetype of objects; this suggests that divine intuition actively *generates* its objects. Precisely what Kant may mean by this is unclear, though why he must say it is clear: the autogeneration of the divine intellect's objects is required for that intellect's absolute independence. For if the objects of divine intellectual intuition were independent of being intuited, the former's autonomy could be compromised in one of two ways. On the one hand, the objects' independence would imply that they possessed some principle other than the divine intellect; in that case, the latter,

insofar as it perceived them, would be "principled" by them (or, more precisely, by their principle). On the other hand, perhaps Kant thinks that if the divine intuition did not generate its objects, then it, like our sensibility, would require some formal principle analogous to space and time, "in which" the independent noumena could "appear" to it. Again, the divine intellect would then no longer be independent, since it would depend upon that formal principle, and Kant clearly takes independence to be an essential attribute of the divine.

It remains then to distinguish the notion of a divine intuition from what Kant calls *pure* intuition. Kant speaks of both kinds of intuition in both the *Dissertation* and the first *Critique*; I here focus only on the notion as it appears in the former. In §12, Kant defines pure intuition as "an intuition which is empty of sensations, but not for that reason intellectual."¹² In other words, pure intuition is the principle of phenomenal form (space and time), considered as such, separately from any phenomenal matter (*sensa*). Thus the "things" which we think as "pertaining to pure intuition" are not phenomena, but only the *forms* of possible phenomena (*Diss.* §12/II 397), i.e., as we saw above, what Kant calls the phenomena's principle of individuation or singularity. Therefore he writes here that human intuition "is not a universal or logical concept *under which*, but is a singular concept *in which*, sensibles no matter what are thought, and so it contains the concepts of space and time" (*Diss.* §12/II 397).

Kant conceives the individuating principles of space and time as contributing nothing to the *quality* of phenomena—apparently quality is a material factor supplied by or inherent in or identical with the *sensa* alone. Thus he writes that space and time are only objects of cognition ("science") "in respect of *quantity*" (*Diss.* §12/II 397).

¹² I.e. not for that reason to be conceived as intellectual intuition.

Hence *pure mathematics* deals with *space* in *geometry*, and *time* in *pure mechanics*. ... So pure mathematics, giving expression to the form of all our sensitive cognition, is the organon of each and every intuitive and distinct cognition.

(*Diss.* §12/II 397-398)

Kant now makes an observation which is as hard as it is necessary to understand for his later criticism of Plato. He says that

since its [i.e. pure intuition's] objects themselves are not only the formal principles of every intuition, but are themselves *original intuitions*, it provides us with the most veridical cognition and at the same time an exemplar of the highest kind of evidence in other cases.

(*Diss.* §12/II 398)

Kant here seems to be saying either (a) that the formal principles of every intuition, space and time, are themselves intuitions, called "original" because they have no other principle "in" or "under" which they are in turn intuited or otherwise cognized; or (b) that the objects of, e.g., geometry, intuited purely (i.e. without sensible matter) are formal principles of every *sensible* intuition--viz. of every phenomenon--insofar as the latter is somehow objectively constructed or constituted out of or in accord with the laws of geometry. In the latter case, the objects of pure intuition would themselves be "original intuitions" in the sense of being archetypes of correlative sensible intuitions. It is not clear to me which of these two readings is correct. I am inclined towards the latter, since Kant uses the phrase "original intuitions" to name the objects of pure mathematics. But even so, it remains unclear if by "objects of pure mathematics" he means space and time as such, or as more specifically determined (e.g. the concept of triangle, purely conceived).

1.3. Considerations.

In the preceding pages I have laid out certain themes and concepts from Kant's pre-critical *Dissertation* that play a large role in his later interpretations of Plato. Let me now gather them together and make some observations. The basic issue that has concerned us thus far has been the nature of our cognitive apparatus. I have tried to explicate Kant's theory of the subjective components of that apparatus, on the one hand, and of their respective objects, on the other.

Sensa are received by the passive, receptive faculty of intuition. To this sensitive "matter" the formal principle of specificity or individuation is applied, namely space and time, resulting in the intuitions of which we are actually conscious—phenomena or phenomenal singularities. These phenomena are further determined by the logical use of the intellect: by subordinating the phenomenal individuals under more or less specific concepts, these individuals now appear as more or less determined objects that are actually cognized as such. Thus, experience of more or less determinate content arises from the reception and processing of *a posteriori* material elements by *a priori* functions. These *a priori* functions in turn are sensual (space and time) as well as intellectual (the power of symbolic or discursive conceptualization). But precisely because of its *a posteriori* material basis, experience as such is always *a posteriori* and "sensitive."¹³

Our intellectual faculty, considered apart from the matter of experience, is by contrast, entirely *a priori*. Moreover, it is active and not passive. It is a power of symbolic cognition through universal concepts in the abstract. As symbolic, it is a *mediating* power, which subsumes and subordinates and organizes given representations through concepts. In the *Dissertation*, these representations can be given *either* by the sensitive intuition *or* by the intellect itself; the former are

¹³ Cf. *Diss.* §5/II 393: "[I]t is of the greatest importance here to have noticed that cognitions must always be treated as sensitive cognitions however extensive may have been the operation of the logical use by the intellect upon them. For they are called sensitive *because of their genesis....*"

phenomena, the latter noumena. Examples of noumenal representations are maxima of perfections. Here a certain asymmetry appears.

HUMAN	HUMAN	HUMAN	DIVINE
phenom. (really given in sens. intuit.)	<--symb. cogn. of phenom/symb. cogn. of noum.-->	noum. (ideally given in intell. intuit.)	

Because we humans are not equipped with an intellectual intuition, these noumenal representations are only ever given to us symbolically, and never immediately as are phenomena. However, since we only have symbolic knowledge of noumena (which is for the pre-critical Kant nonetheless *bona fide* knowledge), it is only natural to posit an intellectual intuition--symmetrical to our phenomenal intuition--in which noumena are given immediately. Kant calls this *hypothetical* or *ideal* intellectual intuition "divine intuition."

As presented in §10, the relation of the assumed noumenal objects of this divine intuition to the human mind is exceedingly problematic: are the objects of divine intuition mediated to our consciousness by our symbolic (purely intellectual) or by our intuitive (sensitive) faculty? I am not sure this problem finds a solution anywhere in Kant; it certainly persists into the first *Critique*. For, on the one hand, insofar as our intellectual faculty is capable of *purely* thinking noumena (though only symbolically), phenomena need not enter into the account at all; this suggests that noumena are mediated solely by intellectual symbols. On the other hand, Kant considers noumena to be archetypes and independent principles of all *objects* (*Diss.* §10/II 397). This suggests that it is the *phenomena* that count as the noumena's "ectypes;" phenomena would thus be conceived as noumena *as they appear to us*, conditioned by space and time.¹⁴

¹⁴ This is the "schwärmerisch" picture: "Der Ursprung aller philosophischen Schwärmerey liegt in Platons ursprünglichen Gottlichen [sic] Anschauungen aller möglichen [sic] objecte, d.i. den

Part of the problem may simply lie in the tension implicit in the notion of a divine intuition: for as intellectual intuition, divine intuition comes close to the (purportedly) nonsensical formula, "intellectuated phenomenon," of the subreptic axiom described in §24. If we focus on divine intuition as *intellectual* intuition, then we are inclined to conceive its objects as naturally mediated by our *intellect*. By contrast, if we think of it as intellectual *intuition*, then we are more inclined to think of its objects as just like the objects of *our* intuition, only not conditioned by *our form* of intuition (space and time).

Without trying to settle the issue here, I suggest that the stress be on *intellectual* intuition. Hence, the commonality between divine and human intuition lies not in the commonality of their objects, such that God can know immediately the things themselves—the *very same things* which we can only know as phenomena conditioned by space and time. Rather, the commonality consists in the *immediacy* of the respective, but generically different objects of the two kinds of intuition. *We* are given objects in our intuition, and though they are conditioned by space and time, they are not *symbolically* mediated: individual objects are immediately given to consciousness. *God*, on the other hand, is not *given* objects at all. His intuition is not passively dependent on external sources of sensa. Rather, He creates His objects: they are the spontaneous *products* of His intellect. It is their spontaneity which makes them intellectual, and it is their immediacy which makes them intuitive. For us, by contrast, intuition is immediate but passive, while the intellect is spontaneous but symbolic. On this picture, the human mind is schizoid, the divine mind unitary.

Of particular interest are the allusions to Plato's *ideai* in the *Dissertation*, and how Kant sees them as fitting into his system of subjective faculties and their objects. As we saw above, Kant uses the *ideai* to illustrate a peculiar sort of "things

Ideen, da wir nur sie durch ihre Erscheinungen anschauen, also nur passiv" (*Reflexion* #6051 (phase ψ [?]; Ac. Ed. XVIII: 437; emphasis added).

intellectual," namely noumenal perfections or maxima of perfection. Kant's conception of these noumenal perfections in the *Dissertation* has been taken as importantly different from his later conception of "concepts of reason" (*Vernunftbegriffe*), which we will discuss below. Yet, while it is true that, in contrast to the *Critique*, Kant here speaks of *cognizing* these noumenal perfections, he also urges that this cognition is symbolically mediated¹⁵ and not intuitional. In other words, as I said earlier, he already so severely limits the scope of pure reason that we must wonder wherein lies the difference that makes a difference between the two views of noumenal perfection. While Kant certainly gives up any notion of cognizing noumena in the first *Critique*, the way in which he there describes their utility and reality seems basically to amount to the position of the *Dissertation*. In neither text is the notion of a perfection or an "ideal" conceived of as intellectually intuited, but only as a limit-concept which must needs be posited¹⁶ if we are to be able to "determine the lesser grades." This implies that ideals are only known to us "symbolically" in a special way, namely through the *fact* that we determine grades of better and worse.¹⁷

1.4. Kant's knowledge of Plato.

The *Dissertation* was published in 1770, and, as we have seen, Plato plays an interesting if supporting role in Kant's description of the intellect. But in the years immediately following the *Dissertation*, he brings Plato much more into the forefront. One may fairly say that Plato is one of Kant's chief interlocutors in the Transcendental Dialectic of the first *Critique*. It is both by means of, and in contrast against his interpretation of Plato's *ideai* that Kant is able to articulate his critical account of *a priori*, hyper-empirical concepts which are, in his view, the *sine qua*

¹⁵ Cf. *Reflexion* #4275 (phase μ); Ac. Ed., Vol. XVII: 491-492.

¹⁶ Cf. *Reflexion* #4893 (phase ϕ); Ac. Ed., Vol. XVIII: 21.

¹⁷ Cf. *Reflexion* #3917 (phase κ); Ac. Ed., Vol. XVII: 342.

non of science and of morality. Hence it is important to try to reconstruct how and why Kant came to attend ever more closely to Plato.

While the facts are rather murky, there appear to have been two main sources that influenced Kant's views on Plato: Johann Jakob Brucker's *Historia Critica Philosophiae*, and Moses Mendelssohn's *Phädon*. We know that Kant was familiar with both of these works.¹⁸ While I have not yet established how or in what order Kant came across these works,¹⁹ I wish briefly to explain what difference that would make to understanding Kant's relation to Plato.²⁰

One view, argued by Max Wundt (1924) and Gerhard Mollowitz (1935), is that Brucker was Kant's primary source; this view has been most recently adopted by Mihaela Fistioc in her doctoral dissertation (2000). I have read Fistioc's citations of Brucker, as well as William Enfield's abridged English translation of Brucker (1819), Brucker's discussion of Plato and Pythagoras in his *Miscellanea Historia*, and have taken some hints from Reich (1939). All these make me suspect that Brucker's primary interest in Platonic *ideai* is as archetypes or paradigms of natural objects of experience. Brucker seems to stress the *ideai*'s speculative function, being especially concerned with their purported Pythagorean origin and their

¹⁸ Kant cites, then attacks Brucker in the first *Critique* (*KrV*, A316/B372-373). As for Mendelssohn, Reich writes: "Kant considered that the appearance of his own work[,] the *Träume eines Geistersehers*[,] had stimulated Mendelssohn in bringing out his book; and it appears that in opening the *Phädon* he must have had the impression that, after the *Träume*, Mendelssohn had felt compelled to bring Plato into the lists to counterbalance his own scepticism and 'misology'" (Reich, 1939a: 345). In support, Reich cites a letter from Kant to Mendelssohn (8 April 1766): "It is the cause of no small pleasure to me to see that my essay, small and slight as it is, is to have the good fortune to draw from you a thorough consideration of the matter ... [viz.] to seek data for the problem of the presence of the soul in the world, both in material natures and in natures of its own kind" (quoted in Reich, 1939a: 345, n. 1).

¹⁹ M. Fistioc's doctoral dissertation provides a detailed account of possible sources of Kant's knowledge of classical philosophy, focusing especially upon what he may have learned from Brucker. She does not however deal with Mendelssohn's influence. T.K. Seung, in his *Kant's Platonic Revolution in Moral and Political Philosophy* (1994), does not discuss *how* Kant came to Plato.

²⁰ The following discussion should be seen as tentative, since I have been unable to examine Brucker's original text.

connection to number. He gives their moral applicability very short shrift, considering it a baroque flourish of Plato's incorrigibly obscurantist mind.

An alternative view is that Kant's incorporation of Platonic philosophy was prompted by the 1767 publication of Mendelssohn's *Phädon*. Klaus Reich (1939)²¹ is the only advocate of this view known to me, though no less persuasive for that. Reich argues that reading the *Phädon* would have mainly influenced Kant's ethics, and that this influence first shows itself in the *Dissertation* (Reich, 1939a: 345). In particular, he interprets Kant's contrast at §9 of Plato with Epicurus and the latter's latterday followers—"Shaftesbury and his supporters"—as a sign that it was Platonic *rationalist ethics* as presented in the *Phädon* which caused Kant to abandon the commitment to the moral-sense ethics which he held at least until 1767 (Reich, 1939a: 344).

Reich highlights the *Phädon*'s critique of pleasure and pain as criteria for practical reasoning, focusing on the immeasurable, incalculable fluctuation of pleasure and pain (cf. *Phaedo* 60bc), as well as on the *irrationality* of founding the virtues on desire (for pleasure) and aversion (to pain). For example, on a hedonistic ethics I act fearlessly out of fear (of the pain of appearing fearful). Or it is through desire for maximal, long-term pleasure that I act "moderately" in the short term, denying myself pleasures through fear that short-term immoderation will lead to long-term pain. The virtue I display is a virtual virtue, since its true, underlying motivation remains determined by vice. Only wisdom, *φρόνησις*, can serve as the touchstone that invariably and without contradiction lets my soul act truly virtuously. "[W]ithout wisdom all that can be achieved is an exchange of passions for a painful shadow of virtue, which itself is in bondage to vice" (Reich, 1939a: 347).

Because Kant so closely associates Plato with moral perfection in the *Dissertation*, Reich's argument that Kant came to recognize the "reality" of

²¹ The first part deals with Plato's role in the Copernican revolution (Reich, 1939a), the second, with Panaetius's influence on Kant through Cicero (Reich, 1939b).

noumenal perfections through Mendelssohn is attractive. Reich's view also helps explain how Kant was able to criticize Brucker for missing the point of the Platonic *ideai*. Kant did not expend much effort in reconstructing ancient theories through direct research; as Fistioc and others have persuasively argued, he will have likely gotten his knowledge of Plato through secondary sources. Thus, if Brucker had been his only source, how could Kant have felt so confident that his own positive interpretation of the *ideai* had any basis in reality? What would have made him reject Brucker's view that Plato had muddled the clear and direct ethical practice of Socrates? What would have instead convinced him that *Plato* had made a discovery indispensable to morality? Of course it is possible that Kant simply second-guessed Brucker;²² but we need not resort to this unsatisfying solution if Kant was using the insights gained from Mendelssohn's book, which *directly* makes the case for the necessity of noumenal perfections or moral norms cognized by pure reason alone, and *explicitly* associates such norms with Plato's *ideai*.

So let us make the following, I hope plausible, reconstruction: Kant reads Mendelssohn's *Phädon* around the time of its publication in 1767, and this book tells Kant, as Reich writes, "that every system which base[s] morality on the senses or on feeling [is] necessarily inadequate; the the distinction between the morally good and the morally bad ha[s] to be grounded on pure reason; that duty must be thought of as the concern of reason alone, and that morality ha[s] to be based on Ideas and only on Ideas" (Reich, 1939a: 347). Moreover, when Kant later reads the *Historia Critica*, he uses Mendelssohn against Brucker on the point of the transcendental necessity of "Ideas" for morality. If this reconstruction is correct, does any *positive* role remain for Brucker in the story of Kant's Platonic education? By all means.

²² Fistioc apparently believes this; it should be noted that Brucker generally sticks closely to the letter of the philosophical systems he describes, making him more easily second-guessed than most authors.

I suggest that Brucker's relentless criticism of the *ideai* as archetypes of nature may well have prompted Kant to reconsider his notion of the noumenal in the *Dissertation*. As Reich writes,

Kant's whole position in the *Dissertation* [concerning] the sensible and intelligible worlds was conditioned by two factors: first, by his realisation, in 1769, that space and time were ideal, not real; and secondly, by his having before him a well-grounded *model* of a purely rationalist ethical theory in the shape of what we may describe as the Platonic doctrine of morals. It was on the pattern of this that Kant sketched a purely rationalist metaphysics.

(Reich, 1939a: 351)

Reich argues that Kant's recognition of the objective validity of super-sensible Ideas in the *practical* sphere seduced him into overextending that validity to all concepts of pure reason, including those of the *theoretical* sphere. Kant "failed to realise that in this latter field [i.e., the speculative knowledge of God and nature] he had a special duty to show that the assumption was reasonable" (Reich, 1939a: 351).

I am not suggesting that reading Brucker led Kant to acknowledge that "special duty" and embark on the project of the first *Critique*. Rather, my suggestion is that Brucker's criticism of the Platonic *ideai* as mathematical archetypes of natural things in the divine mind, *together with* Kant's own broader project of defining pure reason's speculative scope, can neatly account for the much more nuanced and discriminating *reading of Plato* which Kant gives in the first *Critique* and after. An examination of that reading, to which we next turn, will show how Kant discriminates precisely between the practical and theoretical utility of pure ideas. These remain central and indispensable for morality, whereas their function in the theoretical use of reason is radically redefined and attenuated. Kant reads Plato accordingly. The *moral* reality of Platonic *ideai* is reaffirmed and praised. By contrast, Kant repeatedly criticizes Plato's purported attribution of *speculative* reality

to the *ideai* as "fanatical;" the mistake lies, so Kant, in Plato's profound misunderstanding of the nature of geometry. This criticism of the *ideai* as somehow mathematized, speculative archetypes of nature contained in a divine intellectual intuition may well have its roots in Brucker.²³ But let us examine more closely how Kant reads Plato in the first *Critique*.

1.5. Plato in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The *Critique of Pure Reason* continues to pursue the *Dissertation*'s taxonomic analysis of the mind and its faculties. As in the *Dissertation*, Kant conceives this analysis as a propaedeutic to a genuinely scientific metaphysics (*Diss.*, §8/II 395; cf. *KrV*, A viii, A xx). In what follows, I shall focus on how Kant in the first *Critique* refines the account he gave in the *Dissertation* of the mind's "intellectual faculty." Since that is the topic of the Transcendental Dialectic, I shall restrict myself largely to that section of the *Critique*. Whereas Kant called Plato's *ideai* examples of "noumenal perfections" in the *Dissertation*, in the first *Critique*, the bond between Kant and Plato is to be found in the word "idea." Kant uses this term to denote what he calls "concepts of reason," or *Vernunftbegriffe*, and draws special attention to its Platonic resonations and origins.²⁴ What are these Kantian ideas? In what sense are they "Platonic?" What are Kant's criticisms of Plato, and are they justified?

1.5.1. Mental taxonomy refined.

As I pointed out earlier, Kant's bipartite division of the mind into sensuality and intellect is too simple even for his purposes in the *Dissertation*. Already we discerned a tension within the intellect between its logical and real uses: the first

²³ Note: the foregoing paragraphs on Mendelssohn, Brucker and Kant remain very speculative. I am continuing to investigate this issue.

²⁴ *Kritik der reinen Vernunft (KrV)*, A313/B370.

gives the law to our sensations, the second represents to itself non-phenomenal (i.e. noumenal) things. In the first *Critique*, that tension finally snaps, and the intellect is articulated into two independent faculties, the understanding and reason.²⁵

As in the *Dissertation*, Kant in the first *Critique* (still) maintains that human knowledge derives from two and only two sources: "the first is [the power] to receive representations (the receptivity of impressions); the second, the power to cognize an object through these representations (spontaneity of concepts)" (*KrV*, A50/B74).²⁶ The former he calls "sensibility [*Sinnlichkeit*]," the latter, "the understanding [*Verstand*]" (*KrV*, A51/B75). Kant declares the equal legitimacy and indispensability of both faculties' contribution to cognition:

Keine dieser Eigenschaften ist der anderen vorzuziehen. Ohne Sinnlichkeit würde uns kein Gegenstand gegeben, und ohne Verstand keiner gedacht werden. Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind. Daher ist es ebenso notwendig, seine Begriffe sinnlich zu machen, (d. i. ihnen den Gegenstand in der Anschauung beizufügen,) als seine Anschauungen sich verständlich zu machen (d.i. sie unter Begriffe zu bringen).²⁷ Beide Vermögen, oder Fähigkeiten, können auch ihre Funktionen nicht vertauschen. Der Verstand vermag nichts anzuschauen, und die Sinne nichts zu denken. *Nur daraus, daß sie sich vereinigen, kann Erkenntnis entspringen.* Deswegen darf man aber doch nicht ihren Anteil vermischen, sondern man hat große

²⁵ At the beginning of Book II of the *Transcendental Analytic*, "Die Analytik der Grundsätze," Kant gives a division of the intellectual faculty, which he here calls the "higher powers of cognition:" "These are: *Understanding, Judgement, and Reason.*" It is important to note, however, that he also classes all three under the broad rubric of "Understanding in general" (A130/B169).

²⁶ Cf. *KrV*, A494/B522, A567/B595, A581/B609.

²⁷ Cf. *Diss.*, §3/II 392.

Ursache, jedes von dem andern sorgfältig abzusondern, und zu unterscheiden.

(*KrV*, A51-52/B75-76; *italics added*.)²⁸

Neither of these features is to be preferred over the other. Without sensibility, no object would be given to us, and without understanding, no object could be thought by us. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. Hence it is just as necessary to make one's concepts sensible (i.e. to supplement them with an object in the intuition), as it is to make one's intuitions understandable (i.e. to bring them under concepts). Both faculties or capacities, moreover, cannot exchange their respective functions. Understanding is unable to intuit anything, and the senses are unable to think. *It is solely through their unification that cognition can originate.* But this is no reason to confuse their respective contributions; on the contrary, one has every reason carefully to discriminate and distinguish one from the other.

Kant devotes the rest of the Transcendental Analytic to the specification of how "knowledge springs from" the cooperation of intuition and understanding.

To summarize: the understanding is the *intellectual* source of all cognition. By means of its pure *a priori* concepts, the categories, it allows the mind to impose form upon the sensual matter supplied by our only other source of knowledge, viz., sensible intuition. It is through the conceptual function of the understanding that we

²⁸ Cf. *KrV*, A62/B87; *DWL*, 752: "A concept is a *repraesentatio discursiva*.--The action whereby we give to a concept the corresponding intuition is called exhibition [Darstellung, exhibitio]. Cognition is more than *conceptus*, more than *intuitus*, it is both together. We seek objective reality, which we attain through application to intuition." Cf. Berkeley, *Siris*, §305: "As understanding perceiveth not, that is, doth not hear, or see, or feel, so sense knoweth not; and although the mind may use both sense and fancy as means whereby to arrive at knowledge, yet sense or soul, so far forth as sensitive, knoweth nothing. For as it is rightly observed in the *Theaetetus* of Plato, science consists not in the passive perceptions, but in the reasoning upon them."

are able to synthesize and organize—literally, to understand—our manifold intuitive representations, and thereby attain cognition and experience. Kant never ceases to emphasize that "all our cognition in the end pertains to possible intuitions: for through these alone is an object [i.e. of knowledge] given" (*KrV*, A719/B747). Finally, the categories, though they are pure *a priori* concepts, nonetheless have no independent reality or use apart from their synthetic function. They are wholly bound up with experience: without intuitive representations, pure or empirical, to serve as matter for that synthesis, the categories are "empty."

Now, if the *Critique's* "understanding" can be considered as analogous²⁹ to the intellect's "logical use" in the *Dissertation*, then "reason" turns out to be the name given in the *Critique* to that aspect of intelligence utterly divorced from sense-experience, which Kant in the *Dissertation* says can represent to the mind non-phenomenal things. Only now in the *Critique*, reason no longer *represents* any "things;" rather, it merely "conceives" notions which have no source whatsoever in (sense) experience. Yet given Kant's insistence on the understanding's monopoly (from the side of "spontaneous" intellect) on cognition, this additional intellectual faculty appears very problematic.

1.5.2. Reason's problems.

First, since it is by definition in no wise connected to intuition—whether empirical or pure—what contribution to knowledge can reason possibly make? Second, Kant holds that reason has *its* own pure *a priori* concepts, analogous to the categories, viz. "concepts of reason [*Vernunftbegriffe*]" or "ideas [*Ideen*]." Now if, as Kant maintains, a concept without an intuition is empty, and the concepts of reason can have no possible connection to intuition, then what content, significance, or use could such rational concepts have? Put another way, if the pure concepts of reason

²⁹ But not identical: the categories are functions of synthesis, whereas the logical use of the intellect seems not to constitute unities.

can never be "fulfilled" by some concrete intuition, how could we ever cognize such a concept? Let us approach these questions through Kant's own words concerning ideas:

Ideen aber sind noch weiter von der objektiven Realität entfernt, als Kategorien; denn es kann keine Erscheinung gefunden werden, an der sie sich in concreto vorstellen ließen. Sie enthalten eine gewisse *Vollständigkeit*, zu welcher keine empirisch mögliche Erkenntnis zulangt, und die Vernunft hat dabei nur eine systematische Einheit im Sinne, welcher sie die empirische mögliche Einheit zu nähern sucht, ohne sie jemals völlig zu erreichen.

(*KrV*, A567-568/B596-597; *italics added*)

Ideas are even more distant from objective reality than are *categories*; for no appearance may be found in which they [the ideas] could be represented *in concreto*. They contain a certain *completeness* to which no empirically possible cognition could attain. [In its ideas], reason merely conceives of a systematic unity, to which it [reason] seeks to bring closer that unity which is empirically possible, without ever reaching it fully.

This passage provides us with a synopsis of the distinction of understanding and reason, categories and ideas.

It tells us that ideas in no way help us *to cognize* anything, nor can they in any way *be cognized* by us, since they stand in no relation to our intuitions which provide us with the necessary matter for all cognitions.³⁰ Nevertheless, Kant states here what sort of concept he has in mind, namely a concept of absolute "completeness," which reason conceives of as a "systematic unity." Though we can

³⁰ Cf. A247/B304: "Durch eine reine Kategorie nun, in welcher von aller Bedingung *der sinnlichen Anschauung, als der einzigen, die uns möglich ist*, abstrahiert wird, wird also kein Objekt bestimmt, sondern nur das Denken eines Objekts überhaupt, nach verschiedenen modis, ausgedrückt" (emphasis mine).

never have an empirical representation of such unity, yet this concept provides the intellect with a standard "to which it seeks to bring empirically possible unity closer" (*KrV*, A568/B597). Thus, while the understanding performs an "immanent" function in cognition, reason has a "transcendent" one:³¹ the categories "refer to experience, so far as it can be given," while the ideas "aim at completeness, that is the collective unity of all possible experience, and thereby transcend every given experience" (*Proleg.* §40: 76). It is just because the ideas "transcend every given experience" that they cannot "ever be reached." Hence, while they play no direct—or "immanent"—role in cognition, the ideas govern, not cognition, but the systematic *ordering* of our cognitions.³²

Kant's description of the categories makes clear that by themselves they do not exhaust our intellectual reality. Two essential aspects of that reality would remain forever inexplicable in terms of the categories' function alone.³³ First, the categories can never tell us, once we have "in hand" the cognitions they have seized and synthesized out of the sensible manifold, how we should organize those cognitions with respect to each other.³⁴ Nor can they tell us what sort of cognitions we should seek. In short, they are insufficient to explain how *science* is possible, where science is conceived (a) as a hierarchically organized set of propositions expressing our cognitions in ascending orders of generality, and descending orders of specificity;³⁵ and (b) as having "research programs," that is, as having problems to which it seeks solutions. By means of the categories alone, we can never be aware of such a thing as a theoretical problem, much less feel impelled to solve it.

³¹ With respect to corporeal nature, "we have no need of an Idea, i.e. of a representation that transcends [übersteigenden] experience, to think [it] in accordance with its *inner possibility*, i.e. to determine the application of the categories upon it" (*KrV*, A684/B712).

³² However, Kant elsewhere describes an "immanent" role for reason insofar as it is directed at organizing and unifying the understanding's cognitions (*KrV*, A643/B671).

³³ *Proleg.* §40, p. 76.

³⁴ Put in terms of the *Dissertation*, the categories cannot tell us according to what hierarchical scheme the logical use of the intellect is in fact to be exercised.

³⁵ *Proleg.* §56: 97.

The second aspect of our intellectual reality which the categories cannot explain is practical reasoning. Again, the categories are unable to provide us with the basis for an "ought." In the theoretical context, the categories cannot provide us with reasons for ranking one cognition over another; in the domain of morality, the categories are insufficient to provide us with reasons for acting. They can tell me neither what I ought to do, nor how to judge a done deed. Yet for Kant there is no question that we have moral experience; the categories cannot account for its possibility.

In a word, what these examples show is that the categories are incapable of providing us with *standards*. In both theoretical and practical reasoning, standards (a) allow us to judge, and (b) provide us with goals of action. Thus, in science, as Kant understands it, standards allow us to judge the significance of a given cognition and its place in the (hierarchical) body of scientific knowledge. They also provide us with a research program insofar as they set the conditions of an ideal completeness of scientific knowledge, which, precisely due to its distance, impels our inquiries (*KrV*, A668/B696). Likewise, in practical reasoning, standards both allow us to judge actions, and guide our deliberations about how we should act. We can see from these examples themselves that such standards cannot be derived from experience. Experience is modally poor: it never tells us what ought to be the case, but only what is the case.

That which cannot be cognized, which forever keeps itself from being experienced and known by us, is a *noumenon*. Thus the ideas exist as noumena only; they are, as Kant puts it in the *Prolegomena*, "pure beings of thought" (*Proleg.* §45: 80). We are of course familiar with this connection of standards and noumena from §9 of the *Dissertation*. But whereas there Kant seems to consider these noumena to be the *objects* of the intellect, they are later reduced to the status of *problems*, or *problematic concepts* (*Proleg.* §34: 63, *KrV*, A335/B392,

A339/B397). These problematic concepts, Kant is at pains to show in the first *Critique*, are not mere figments of the brain. On the contrary, as problems—which cannot conceivably be "given" in experience³⁶—they are precisely what we must presuppose to make sense of all our theoretical and practical (scientific and moral) projects *which themselves are given facts*.

Thus, as problems,³⁷ the ideas are at the same time *tasks*. As Kant writes in the very first paragraph of the first *Critique*, "[q]uestions plague us which are *inevitable*, for they are presented to us by reason's very nature, but reason cannot answer these same questions" (*KrV*, A vii, emphasis added). What I have translated as "presented to us" is in German "*aufgegeben*:" these questions, these inevitable problems are therefore *Aufgaben*, or tasks. Because, according to Kant, these questions are inevitable products of reason's very nature, any indifferentism towards metaphysical questions in the contemporary sciences is futile, since human beings, insofar as they are rational creatures, *cannot be* indifferent to these Ideas (*KrV*, A x). Let this suffice, then, as an initial overview of the distinction of the understanding and reason, and the categories and the ideas, respectively.

1.5.3. Platonic problems.

1.5.3.1. Economy.

Now in what sense does Kant think the ideas are *Platonic*? In a sense, this question has already implicitly been answered in the *Dissertation*. Ideas are noumenal, and noumena—or at least noumenal *perfections*—are what "Plato called ideas" (cf. *Diss.* §9/II 396). In the first *Critique*, Kant simply makes that connection explicit by appropriating Plato's own terminology. He justifies his appropriation by appealing to two maxims of neologicistic economy. The first maxim states: If you have a

³⁶ *KrV*, A476 ff.; also A494–496.

³⁷ Cf. A 498, A508.

concept that needs naming, do not coin a new term to denote it if you can find, in a "dead and scholarly language, ... [that] concept together with its appropriate expression" (*KrV*, A312/B369). Kant adds a codicil:

Even if the ancient currency of this expression were to have become somewhat unstable due to the carelessness of its minters, it is still better to stabilize the meaning that was primarily proper to it (even if it remains doubtful whether [the term's originator] had in mind that very same meaning), than to ruin one's enterprise by making oneself unintelligible [through coining neologisms].

(*KrV*, A312/B369)³⁸

The second maxim aims to avoid the just-mentioned terminological neglect. It states: Having reserved a term to express a certain meaning, be frugal with it, and restrict its application only to the specific concept you intend to denote. This maxim is intended to contain the semantic inflation that results from lavish spending through "synonymy" for the sake of stylistic variation.³⁹

For otherwise it can easily happen that, after the expression no longer holds our attention, losing itself in a heap of other expressions of strongly deviating signification [*Bedeutung*], the thought [*Gedanke*] gets lost as well, i.e. the thought which that expression alone could have preserved.

(*KrV*, A313/B369)

These maxims of course presume that the concept originally denoted by the ancient expression be interpreted in such a way that it appears sufficiently similar to the modern unnamed concept. Kant intends his maxims of neologistic economy to alert us both to the peculiarity of his own interpretation of the Platonic "idea"--one which

³⁸ Cf. *KrV*, A319-320/B376-377.

³⁹ This second maxim, of course, reflects an age-old philosophical preoccupation with equivocation, from Plato and Aristotle to Hobbes's obsession with definition and the evils of metaphor.

will restore solidity to the ancient concept and its expression--as well as to his very restrictive usage of this term, in accordance with that interpretation.

Before we turn to Kant's interpretation itself--our chief object--we should note a remarkable observation about interpretation and understanding he makes in this context:

It is nothing unusual, both in everyday discourse and in writings--by comparing the various thoughts an author expresses on his topic--to understand him even better than he understood himself, in that he had not sufficiently determined his concept, and thus sometimes spoke--or even thought--against his own intention.

(KrV, A314/B370)⁴⁰

This observation is connected to the preceding maxims of economy in that the task of "stabilizing the primarily proper meaning of a term" amounts to "determining its concept" "better than" the term's originator had--or could have--done. Yet this task of stabilization presupposes that one have an independent criterion for determining the concept in question, since, *ex hypothesi*, it had not only been originally determined insufficiently, but also had subsequently suffered semantic devaluation through neglect.

Of course, in the case of the Platonic term, "idea," Kant has established just such an independent criterion:⁴¹ by "idea" we can (better) understand Plato to have "intended" the very *Vernunftbegriffe* whose general character we laid out above. It is

⁴⁰ Heidegger, 1992: 11: "Wie denn überhaupt über die Frage des Verstehens zu sagen ist, daß die Späteren die Vorausgegangenen immer besser verstehen, als diese sich selbst verstanden haben. Gerade darin liegt das Elementare der schöpferischen Forschung, daß sie sich selbst im Entscheidenden nicht versteht." (Compare this fundamental hermeneutic principle of Heidegger's to Barnes's criticism in Barnes, 1990.)

⁴¹ "All citations, if they are to provide grounds of proof, contain historical belief[;] if I did not intend to hold something to be true on the testimony of someone else, I would not cite him, i.e., call him as a witness. I can of course tell something, e.g., that Plato claimed this and that, and quote the passage, but then I am not citing Plato.-- In regard to science of reason, citation is a *heterogeneum*. The two do not fit together. It is a great weakness, consequently, when one sees oneself compelled to add historical belief to the grounds of reason." *VL*, 897.

just because he already has developed his own basis for the *Vernunftbegriffe*, and so for an interpretation of the Platonic *ideai*, that Kant does not feel tempted to enter upon a "literary investigation to discern the sense which the exalted philosopher connected with his expression [*idea*]" (*KrV*, A313-314/B370; emphasis added).⁴² Nonetheless, Kant must have *some* general interpretation of *Plato's* understanding of the *ideai* for them even to be determinable specifically as *Vernunftbegriffe*, and not arbitrarily be pressed into service as such. What is this interpretation of the Platonic *ideai* that justifies Kant's appropriation of the term to express the concept of *Vernunftbegriff*? To this question we next turn.

1.5.3.2. Ideas and *ideai*.

It is worth quoting in full Kant's initial summation, in the first *Critique*, of the meaning of the Platonic term *idea*. He writes:

Plato utilized the expression "Idea" in such a way that one can easily see that he understood it to mean something which not only is never

⁴² Schleiermacher's notorious assertion that the task of hermeneutics is "to understand an author better than he understood himself" (Schleiermacher, 1855: 7), finds, as Bollnow and Gadamer point out, its earliest attested formulation in this passage of the first *Critique* (Gadamer, 1965: 180; 182, nn. 1-3). However, Gadamer is clearly right, as against Bollnow, to say that Kant and Schleiermacher mean two wholly different things by it. For Kant (and Fichte), "handelt [es] sich da überhaupt nicht um einen Grundsatz der Philologie, sondern um einen Anspruch der Philosophie, durch größere begriffliche Klarheit über die in einer These zu findenden Widersprüche hinauszukommen.

Es ist also ein Grundsatz, der ganz im Geiste des Rationalismus die Forderung ausspricht, allein durch Denken, durch Entwicklung der in den Begriffen eines Autors gelegenen Konsequenzen, zu Einsichten zu gelangen, die der eigentlichen Absicht des Autors entsprechen--Einsichten, die er teilen müßte, wenn er klar und deutlich genug gedacht hätte. ... Die umstrittene Formel formuliert also nichts weiter als den Anspruch philosophischer Sachkritik. Wer das, worüber der Autor spricht, besser zu durchdenken weiß, der wird das, was der Autor sagt, im Lichte einer ihm selbst noch verborgenen Wahrheit zu sehen vermögen. In diesem Sinne ist der Grundsatz, man müsse einen Autor besser verstehen, als er sich selber verstanden hat, uralt--so alt nämlich, wie wissenschaftliche Kritik überhaupt, er gewinnt jedoch seine Prägung als Formel für philosophische Sachkritik im Geiste des Rationalismus.

(Gadamer, 1965: 182-183)

Furthermore, it is clear Kant does not mean to formulate a principle of philology from the fact that he explicitly refrains from a "literary," i.e., a properly philological investigation, in favor of a *conceptual* analysis (*KrV*, A314/B370), or what Gadamer here calls scientific "Sachkritik im Geiste des Rationalismus."

derived from the senses, but even far transcends the concepts of the understanding which preoccupied Aristotle, in that nothing is ever encountered in experience which congrues with it.⁴³ The Ideas are for Plato paradigms of the things themselves [*Urbilder der Dinge selbst*], and not mere keys to possible experience, like the categories. In his opinion, they flowed out of the supreme Reason, whence human reason came to partake in them, which latter, however, no longer finds itself in its original condition, but must toil to recall the old, now very obscured Ideas through recollection⁴⁴ (which is called "philosophy").

(*KrV*, A313/B370)

Plato very clearly saw that our power of cognition feels a much higher need than merely spelling out appearances in accordance with synthetic unity,⁴⁵ so as to be able to read them as experience. And he saw that our reason naturally⁴⁶ soars up to cognitions that go much further than that any empirical datum could ever congrue with them, but which nonetheless have their reality [*Realität*], and are by no means mere figments of the brain.

(*KrV*, A314/B370-371)

These two passages may serve as a digest of the whole Kantian interpretation of Plato's theoretical virtues and vices.

⁴³ Kant frequently contrasts Aristotle and Plato as the philosophers of categories and ideas, respectively. This contrast involves a distortion of Aristotle, for it can hardly be said that categories play a role in Aristotle's philosophy similar in importance to that of the ideas in Plato's thought. Kant is drawn to this opposition because of his own preoccupation with the distinction between the *Verstandesbegriffe* and *Vernunftsbegriffe*.

⁴⁴ On Platonic *anamnêsis* and Kantian "Rekognition," see Natorp, 1910: 20.

⁴⁵ Following Erdmann, I read "nach synthetischer Einheit [zu] buchstabieren."

⁴⁶ For Kant's use of the word "natural," see *KrV*, A4/B7-8.

In light of our discussion of the nature of *Vernunftbegriffe*, it is clear why Kant attaches such importance to *Plato's* theory. For Kant, its crucial feature is the absolute, hyper-empirical status of the *ideai*, for it is precisely this that distinguishes them from the (quasi-Aristotelian) categories. Of equal importance is Plato's recognition that the source of these concepts lies in reason itself, and that they therefore are "natural" and "have their reality." The tenor of these two passages from the first *Critique* is familiar from the *Dissertation*. But in these two passages from the first *Critique* it is noteworthy that Kant here describes the Platonic *ideai* only as archetypes of empirical objects, and it is this feature of Plato's theory which Kant will repeatedly criticize.

Not that he ignores the *ideai's* practical function. Indeed, Kant believes that Plato "found his ideas primarily in all that is practical, i.e. that rests on freedom, which, for its part, stands under cognitions that are a peculiar product of reason" (*KrV*, A314-315/B373). Kant reiterates the practical indispensability of *ideai*, arguing from the fact that we have standards not derivable from experience, but which, on the contrary, *themselves make possible* the act of judging moral worth.

We all realize that when someone is presented as a model of virtue [*Muster der Tugend*], I still always have the true paradigm in my own head alone, against which I compare and judge this purported model.

(*KrV*, A315/B371-372)

This original paradigm in "my own head" is "the idea of virtue, of which all possible objects of experience may serve as instances [*Beispiele*], but not as paradigms or prototypes [*Urbilder*]" (*KrV*, A315/B372).

Kant insists that "the fact that no human being's action will ever achieve what is contained in the pure idea of virtue does not reveal this idea to be chimerical," for only such an idea makes possible "all judgement about the moral value or non-

value" (*KrV*, A315/B372). He expands this fundamental insight into the nature of norms or ideals of pure practical reason by returning to the *Platonic* example in the *Dissertation*: the ideal republic. The Platonic commonwealth has been utterly misapprehended, he complains, as a "supposedly conspicuous instance of dreamed-up perfection, which can only have its seat in the brain of an idle thinker" (*KrV*, A316/B372):

Brucker finds absurd [Plato's] assertion that a prince will never rule well if he has no share in the Ideas. Yet one would do better to pursue this thought ... and illuminate it through new efforts, instead of dismissing it with the very pathetic and harmful objection that it is unfeasible.

(*KrV*, A316/B372-373)⁴⁷

Kant's new effort is to argue that a constitution of the "greatest human freedom in accordance with laws, which effect the mutual subsistence of each person's freedom with the others," is a necessary *idea* which must inform not only any actual constitution but also all subsequent legislation of any good state.⁴⁸ The lawmaker must ignore any obstacles which may *contingently* obtain, and which, Kant suggests, themselves originated from inattention to the guiding *idea* when the constitution was established. Although such a state may never be realized, yet

that idea is wholly correct, which sets up this maximum as a paradigm, so that, with respect to it, the legal constitution of human beings might be brought ever closer to the greatest [empirically] *possible* perfection.

(*KrV*, A317/B374)⁴⁹

⁴⁷ But see *Rep.* 540d-e.

⁴⁸ This formulation of the goal of the ideal polity need not be read as Kant's interpretation of the *Republic*; the point here is merely about the status and indispensability of idea(l)s.

⁴⁹ Cf. esp. *Rep.* 471c-473b.

Despite this spirited and respectful defense of Plato in the moral sphere, Kant's *critical* orientation makes his overall picture of Plato in the first *Critique* a much more problematic one.

1.5.3.3. Critique and self-critique.

Earlier, I speculated that Kant's special attention to the illusions, errors, and dangers of Plato's theory of *ideai* for metaphysics can be explained by his having read Brucker's criticisms of the *ideai* as archetypes of nature; certainly Kant's description of the *ideai* in the passages I cited above (*KrV*, A313-314/B370-371) echoes much in Brucker. But whatever Kant's relation to Brucker and Mendelssohn, my central claim is this: Kant's praise and blame of Plato in the first *Critique* is equally praise and blame of Kant's own conception of noumena in the *Dissertation*. In a sense, in the *Dissertation*, Kant committed the very error for which he now blames Plato—and which he also excuses as natural and understandable—namely conceiving the pure ideas of reason as speculative objects.⁵⁰ As we saw above, in the *Dissertation* Kant sanctions the notion of a divine intellect which generates or contains, through intellectual intuition, the noumenal archetypes (*Diss.* §10/II 397). This is precisely the view he now attributes to *Plato*: "The Ideas are for Plato paradigms of the things themselves ... flow[ing] out of the supreme Reason, whence human reason [comes] to partake in them, ..." (*KrV*, A313/B370). The first *Critique*'s criticisms of Plato, consequently, amount to a self-critique of the *Dissertation*. It is not that Kant now denies any speculative reality to ideas. Rather, he now considers the notion of a divine or supreme intellect as the real source or container of archetypes as an *illusion* of reason. This in no way, however, diminishes the ideas' crucial and legitimate speculative functions in science as organizing or "regulative" principles.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Cf. Reich, 1939: 352-353.

⁵¹ Yet it is striking that though Kant faults Plato for conceiving the *ideai* as constitutive rather than regulative ideas, it is just in Kant's "milder" conception of the ideas' epistemological function that he seems utterly innocent of the *Platonic* origin of such notions as "rational interest," of

1.6. Plato's wrong intuition.

But why does *Kant* think that Plato fell victim to the illusion of the ideas' *constitutive* reality, his soul enthusiastically flapping its wings towards a fanatical mysticism?

What does Kant think saved himself from a similar fate? Here we must return to the distinction I made earlier between pure and divine intuition. Essentially, Kant thinks that Plato became convinced of the reality of a Supreme Reason with intellectual intuition, on the one hand, and our capacity to attain to this same intuition, on the other, through ignorance of this key distinction—one which it was left to Kant to discover. This led him to the brink of *Schwärmerey*, Kant's rubric for a lazy, misological, irrational, misanthropic, theosophical, and, ultimately, tyrannical irresponsibility.⁵² In short, the opposite of the sober, careful, and *Herculean labor* of thought.⁵³ (Again, Kant seems unaware how entirely Platonic this contrast is.)

In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss Kant's criticism and account of Plato's error. It is given most clearly in the essay, "Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie" (1796), in §77 of the *Critique of Judgement*, as well as in numerous of the *Reflexionen*.⁵⁴ In these places Kant's former association of the *ideai* with moral norms has all but vanished. Especially in his private reflections, Kant seems now to see Plato exclusively through a Brucknerian lens as a kind of numerologist and geometry

reason's dialectical "ascent" and "descent," of *synagōgē* and *diairesis*. Cf. *Phaedo*, 96a7-8: νέος ὢν θαυμασιῶς ὡς ἐπεθύμησα ταύτης τῆς σοφίας ἦν δὲ καλοῦσι περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν. Natorp, 1921: 341 on "Lust der Erkenntnis" in the *Philebus*. Kant, too, calls reason's "interest" a "Begierde" (*KrV*, A796/B824) and a "Hang" (*KrV*, A797/B825).

⁵² For the vices of lazy reason (*ignava ratio*) and misology, cf. *KrV*, and *Reflexion* #6051, Ac. ed., Vol. XVIII: 437; on misanthropy: "Der Mensch erhebt sich in der Schwärmerey über der Menschheit" (*Reflexion* #6053, Ac. ed., Vol. XVIII: 439; concerning "theosophy," cf. *Reflexion* ##6050, 6055, Ac. ed., Vol. XVIII: 435, 439; on the political consequences of the "aristocratic" or "superior" tone in philosophy, cf. "VT": 627, ff. Compare: *Logik*, Ac. ed., Vol. IX: 93: "Die Idee der Menschheit, die Idee einer vollkommenen Republik, eines glückseligen Lebens u. dgl. m. fehlt den meisten Menschen. Viele Menschen haben keine Idee von dem, was sie wollen, daher verfahren sie nach Instinct und Autorität."

⁵³ "VT": 623.

⁵⁴ Cf. esp. *Reflexionen* ##6050-6056; Ac. Ed. Vol. XVIII: 434-439.

buff veering towards Pythagorean mysticism. This is his description of Plato in the 1796 polemic against the "elevated tone in philosophy:"

Plato, eben so gut Mathematiker, als Philosoph, bewunderte an den Eigenschaften gewisser geometrischer Figuren, z.B. des Cirkels, eine Art von *Zweckmässigkeit*, d.i. Tauglichkeit zu einer Mannigfaltigkeit der Auflösung eines und desselben Problems ... aus einem Princip, gleich als ob die Erfordernisse zur Construction gewisser Grössenbegriffe *absichtlich* in sie gelegt seyen, obgleich sie als nothwendig *a priori* eingesehen und bewiesen werden können. Zweckmässigkeit ist aber nur durch Beziehung des Gegenstandes auf einen Verstand, als Ursache, denkbar.

("VT:" 623)

Plato, as much a mathematician as a philosopher, marvelled at the fact that among the properties of certain geometric figures, e.g. of the circle, there was a kind of *purposiveness*, i.e. a utility for a multiplicity of solutions of one and the same problem ... out of a single principle, just as if the requirements for the construction of certain concepts of magnitude were *intentionally* laid into them, although they can be seen to be necessary *a priori* and proved as such. But purposiveness is only conceivable through the relation of the object to an understanding, as its cause.

Kant alludes here to a topic treated in §62 of the third *Critique* (Analytic of Teleological Judgement), viz., the manifest utility or expediency (*Zweckmässigkeit*) of geometric figures,⁵⁵ constructed from a single principle, for solving an infinite variety of geometric problems, or, as he says here, for solving a single problem in a great number of ways.

⁵⁵ Kant gives examples using the circle, the ellipse, the parabola, and conic sections.

But the very nature of geometry's truths and of its objects—at least on Kant's theory of mathematics—doubly misled Plato. Plato misinterpreted the source of geometry's *a priori*, which forced a further misinterpretation of the nature of intuition. Let us consider these two errors in turn. Kant understands mathematics to be a set of synthetic *a priori* propositions, i.e. propositions about non-empirical entities which are not analyzable from the definition of those entities. As we saw earlier, geometry is the branch of pure mathematics which deals with space, "giving expression to the form of all our sensitive cognition" (*Diss.*, §12/II 397-398). Further, Kant thinks he has shown in the Transcendental Aesthetic that space is the subjective form of all outer intuition, i.e. is that which makes possible all experience of objects "in" space. Thus geometry's theorems express the truths following from the laws of the form of our (outer) intuition. It is the *formal* nature of space as the transcendental condition of all possible outer intuition which makes its laws *a priori*.

Now Plato, according to Kant, recognized that geometric truth was *a priori*, for "he clearly saw that

if he wanted to claim to be able to intuit the object in itself
empirically in the intuition which founds geometry, then geometry
and all mathematics would be mere empirical science, which
contradicts the *necessity* which (in addition to its intuitive nature) is
precisely what guarantees geometry such a high rank among all the
sciences.

("VT:" 624, n. *)

Hence, because geometry expresses *a priori* synthetic propositions (geometric truths) about spatial intuitions, Plato "had to assume *a priori intuitions* for us humans" ("VT:" 623; cf. *KU*, 273-274).⁵⁶ The trouble was that he could not have

⁵⁶ While delighting in the apparent utility of their figures, the ancient geometers recognized the *a priori* necessity of geometric truths, independent of all experience (*KU*, 273); and Plato,

suspected ... that there do indeed exist *a priori intuitions*, but not of human understanding but of the sensibility (under the names of space and time), ... and that the forms [of all phenomena, or things given as sensible objects], which we can determine *a priori* in mathematics, are not of the things in themselves but rather the (subjective) forms of our sensibility....

("VT:" 624, n. *)

Thus, two considerations led Plato to locate the objects of geometry in a *divine Understanding* endowed with *intellectual intuition*: first, their objective purposiveness and utility; second, their *a priority*. Yet the former consideration was based on a confusion of formal and real purposiveness; because purposiveness is "only thinkable in the relating an object to an understanding" ("VT:" 623), and because it is clear that the purposiveness of geometric figures is "objective" and not arbitrary, Plato quite reasonably, but wrongly, concluded that geometrical figures had a real design, and hence a designer.⁵⁷ The latter consideration was based, as we have seen, on an ignorance of the *a priority* of our pure *sensitive* intuition.

Here in the "Vornehmer Ton" essay, Kant describes Plato's purported conception of this divine Understanding in just the way we saw him describe the divine intellectual intuition in the *Dissertation* and the first *Critique*.⁵⁸ God's mind *directly intuits* Ideas which are the *proto-* or *archetypes* [*Urbilder*], as well as the ultimate ground [*Urgrund*] of all things. That is: of all things which *we* only *indirectly* intuit (albeit as synthetic *a priori*) as *ectypes* or "shadow-pictures"--the *phenomenal* appearance of the things in themselves ("VT:" 624). Moreover, our soul is afflicted with the schizophrenia I mentioned earlier--a falling out into

himself a "master of geometry," tried to account for the *a priority* of geometric figures by deriving them from a "pure intuition inherent in the human spirit [*Geiste*]" (*KU*, 273-274).

⁵⁷ *KU*, 271, 274.

⁵⁸ Cf. e.g. A577 quote on p. 35 above.

NOTE TO USERS

Page(s) not included in the original manuscript are unavailable from the author or university. The manuscript was microfilmed as received.

1:42

This reproduction is the best copy available.

UMI

But while the purpose of reason as a regulative guide of the understanding may be advanced by its illusory projections, not recognizing them for what they are is fatal to metaphysics, for its most basic concepts are misapprehended.

Kant gives a simple and profound definition of illusion: it is the result of mistaking what is subjective for what is objective.⁶² *Critique* is the rectification of that reversal: it aims to demonstrate the subjective ground of what is naturally and pre-reflectively taken to be objective. The errors Plato allegedly committed are all explicable by his lack of critique. But as we will see in the next chapter, it is all still much more complicated.

⁶² *KrV*, A294/B351; A297/B353-A298/B354; etc.

Und hier bin ich bei meinem Anfang zugleich in meinem Mittelpunkt.
--Hermann Cohen¹

2. From Königsberg to Marburg.

2.1. Introduction.

Three quarters of a century pass between the last we hear from Kant and the first appearance of the neo-Kantian schools that come to dominate German academic philosophy between the 1870's and 1920's.² It goes without saying that this period, which sees the flourishing and decline of what is called "German Idealism," and the subsequent rise of what I call here "German Empiricism," is much too rich for me to discuss in any detail here. In order to avoid the danger of caricaturing either movement, I will focus on three key concepts: posit (*Setzung*); history; process. The neo-Kantians, and especially the Marburg School, took these notions and made them the core of their reinterpretation of Kant.

2.2. German Idealism: posit and process.

Paul Natorp's work, *Platos Ideenlehre*, carries the subtitle, "Eine Einführung in den Idealismus." Natorp insists that the Marburg philosophy is *critical* idealism, and that he is interpreting Plato's theory of ideas as a form of such idealism. Yet, as a closer examination of the Marburg School will show, it differs importantly from Kant's own conception of idealism. This difference might tempt one to overrate the neo-Kantians' innovation; in fact, I shall argue, neo-Kantianism's main deviations from Kant's *Kritizismus* have their roots in post-Kantian idealism and the scientism of the German Empiricists. In this section, I shall focus on those aspects of the former which we will find put to new use by Cohen and Natorp: the "processualization" of knowledge (and the closely related historicization of philosophy), and the notion of the posit.

¹ Cohen, 1916: 303.

² Cf. Schnädelbach, 1983b: 13.

As we know, Kant aimed to put an end to the "dogmatic" approach of speculative metaphysics by subjecting to critique and interrogating the subject's cognitive capacities.³ Where such a metaphysics pretends to investigate the transcendent grounds of the empirical world, critique asks whether our capacities are so constituted that a transcendent, hyperphenomenal reality is in principle accessible to them. As we already saw in Chapter One, the answer is, of course, No. Because the mind's passive or intuitive faculty can only give the mind *phenomena*, the mind's active or *a priori* categories can have no application beyond the given phenomena. Its other *a priori* concepts, the ideas, are neither passively intuited (for they are not phenomena), nor do they play an active role in the constitution of experience; they merely guide the *systematic ordering* of that experience.

Kant calls his philosophy, equivalently, "transcendental"⁴ or "critical idealism." It is "transcendental" insofar as it studies what "precedes experience *a priori*," viz. the nature of our cognitive faculties which are, in Kant's parlance, the conditions of possibility *through which* experience, the *a posteriori*, is constituted. And so transcendental idealism is also "critical" because it defines the *limits* of application of these *a priori* faculties. But in what sense is it "idealism?" Kant defines (standard Berkeleyan) idealism (which he rejects) as the "assertion that there are none but thinking beings, all other things which we think are perceived in intuition, being nothing but representations in the thinking beings, to which no object external to them in fact corresponds" (Kant, 1950: 36). Kant's own philosophy is not idealistic in this sense; indeed, he hastens to add that it "is the very contrary" (Kant, 1950: 36). Kant's philosophy is idealistic only in its claim that none of the qualities of existent objects have any "proper existence outside our representation" of them, or, in other words, that "all the properties which constitute the intuition of a body belong merely to its

³ Beck, 1950: ix. Cf. Kant, 1950: 122-123, n. 2.

⁴ C.f. *KrV*, A11-12/B25.

appearance" (Kant, 1950: 37). Another way of putting this point, adopted by the neo-Kantians, is to say that all qualities are but possible predicates of judgement--by the cognizing subject.

Thus we may call Kant's transcendental idealism a form of *subjectivism*⁵ in the following specific sense: as "transcendental" it considers the *a priori* faculties of the cognizing *subject*; as "idealism" it holds that this subject's *a posteriori* experience is entirely determined by those faculties. At the same time, however, it is only a "relative," non-Berkeleyan idealism, for it grants "by all means that there are bodies without us, that is, things which, though quite unknown to us as to what they are in themselves ... [are] not therefore less actual" (Kant, 1950: 36). The true idealism against which Kant contrasts his "very contrary" sort, denies the existence of any such things in themselves.

The feature I want to bring out through this précis of Kantian idealism is the preservation of an extra-subjective⁶ realm which in some (necessarily) ineffable way functions as a counterweight to the subjective activity of the categories, namely the realm of the *Ding an sich*. I now suggest that it is in the rejection of the "thing in itself" that the key neo-Kantian concept of *Setzung* finds its root in post-Kantian idealism. So long as the Kantian dichotomy of noumena (here: *Dinge an sich*, not "thoughts") and phenomena holds, the mind (for which alone these phenomena exist) remains poised against an independent, transcendent reality. The synthetic categorial function of generating experience, and the subsequent ordering of that experience into science, both remain dependent upon *what is given* to the mind from without. As Kant writes, the phenomena are "representations of things which are unknown as regards what they may

⁵ I use this term with some trepidation, since "subjective" usually connotes "arbitrariness," "relativistic," etc.--the opposite of "objectivity." That is decidedly not what I mean. Kant does not think that our cognition is arbitrary; on the contrary, one of his chief aims in the first *Critique* is to show how the use of the subject's categories can have objective validity (*objektive Gültigkeit*) (cf. *KrV*, B120; Rose, 1981: 2, ff.; Pippin, 1989: 8; 16, ff.), for if they do not, *then* subjectivism in the sense of arbitrariness would inevitably arise.

⁶ But not therefore "objective!" (See previous note.) Only that which is susceptible to the activity of the categories is possibly objective, for it is through that activity that it becomes (or is) an object for us. The *Ding an sich* is not so susceptible, hence also not objective. It falls outside any possible categorial purchase.

be in themselves" (*KrV* B164).⁷ The spontaneous⁸ activity of the mind is linked to and limited by its passive receptivity: without intuitions, its concepts are empty.

Fichte upsets this balance, in a way which foreshadows the neo-Kantians' departure from Kant, both in its basic terminology and in the way he sees himself as working fully in the spirit of critique—perhaps even more so than Kant himself. Fichte takes over from Kant the notion of the mind's spontaneity,⁹ but rejects the (for Kant) concomitant notion of the mind as passive, viz. as receptive to intuitions. "The intellect, for idealism, is an act, and absolutely nothing more; we should not even call it an active something, for this expression refers to something subsistent in which activity inheres" (Fichte, 1982: 21; quoted in Pippin, 1989: 44). As Pippin writes, the mind's activity "[f]or Fichte ... appears to mean a kind of complete autonomy" (Pippin, 1989: 44). The *completeness* of the mind's autonomy entails the rejection of any counterposed transcendent reality as contributing (in whatever mysterious manner) to the constitution of the mind's objects, as well as the rejection of the faculty of intuition as a *receptive* faculty.¹⁰

Now the "activity" of the intellect consists in the reflexivity of absolute "self-positing" (*sich selbst setzen*); the absoluteness of this self-positing seems encoded in *how* intellect posits itself, namely *as* so positing itself.¹¹ Schlegel distills Fichte thus: "Der einzige Anfang und vollständige Grund der Wissenschaftslehre ist eine *Handlung*:"

[D]ie Totalisierung der reflexen Abstraktion, eine mit Beobachtung
verbundene Selbstkonstruktion, die innre freie Anschauung der Ichheit,

⁷ Cf. Rose, 1981: 4.

⁸ Cf. *KrV*, A97; B132, et passim.

⁹ Cf. Pippin, 1989: 45-46.

¹⁰ Cf. Pippin, 1989: 52.

¹¹ Cf. Pippin, 1989: 48, 50; Henrich, 1966. As Pippin argues, Fichte "is careful to point out that the self's original self-positing is not 'for itself' an act of self-creation, and that this activity must be distinguished from what happens when you make yourself the object of a conscious intention" (Pippin, 1989: 50). This seems to imply that the self-positing of the mind or intellect is not itself a *self-conscious* act, but one which must follow from the conception of mind as pure spontaneity.

des Sichselbstsetzens, der Identität des Subjekts und Objekts. Die ganze Philosophie ist nichts anderes als Analyse dieser einigen, in ihrer Bewegung aufgefaßten, und in ihrer Tätigkeit dargestellten Handlung.

(Schlegel, 1958: lv, emphases added)¹²

The totalization of reflexive abstraction, a self-construction connected with observation, the inner free intuition of "I-ness," of *positing*-oneself, the identity of subject and object. The whole philosophy is nothing more than the analysis of this unified action, grasped in its motion, represented in its activity.

Again:

Er [the first principle] muß nach der Sprache dieser Epoche, "schlechthin gesetzt" sein, und zwar von einem "schlechthin unabhängigen, ursprünglichen Selbst", das "gesetzt ist, nicht weil es *gesetzt* ist, sondern weil es selbst das Setzende ist". Dies ist Fichtes "ursprünglich durch sich selbst gesetztes Ich", das sich durch "absolute Kausalität" selbst setzt und in seinem "Gesetztsein ... durch nichts außer ihm bestimmt" ist.

(Schelling, 1856-61, Vol. I: 96, ff.; cited in Schlegel, 1958: xxxix; emphases added)

The first principle must be, in the language of this epoch, "absolutely posited," to wit, by an "absolutely independent, originary Self," which is "posited, not because it is *posited*, but because it itself is that which posits." This is Fichte's "'I,' which is originally posited through itself," which posits itself through "absolute causality," and which is, in its "being-posited, ... determined through nothing external to itself."

¹² Cf. Taylor, 1975: 529: "[T]he truth of speculative philosophy is just that thought, the Concept, produces its own content out of itself. In the end, all matter must be seen as posited by the Idea."

This notion of the "posit" (*Setzung*) thus represents a shift from an apparently static Kantian conception of mind to an exclusively dynamic interpretation of subjectivity.¹³ I do not pretend to comprehend the meaning of these mysterious phrases, but they seem to suggest that the mind just *is* the self-creative act of thinking itself. Perhaps there is no way to explain this further; what is worth pointing out is that the neo-Kantians come to talk in the same way about *their* conception of mind, explicitly acknowledging the *Rätsel* of the *Ursprung*, of the mind's self-positing.

Now, for Fichte, as in German Idealism generally, the interpretation of mind is at the same time an interpretation of science (*Wissenschaft*). Since mind is that which knows (*weiss*), i.e. which *does* science, the true interpretation of the mind as knowing amounts to understanding the conditions of possibility of the sciences. For that reason, in turn, the science of mind amounts to a science of science. Yet, because the science of science is the mind's knowledge of how all other sciences are possible for it, that science cannot be itself "conditioned" by any other science; rather, as the science of science its principle (*erster Grundsatz*) must be of entirely *philosophical* origin. As we will see below, this close connection—if not confusion—of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science becomes important for understanding the Marburg School's rejection of a psychological or "psychologistic" interpretation of Kant's philosophy.

It is hard to say whether this historicization of knowledge directly influences the Marburg School. On the one hand, they have a very similar notion of the mutability of categories, with interesting consequences for both their interpretation of the Platonic *ideai* and of the nature of scientific progress. On the other hand, as we will see, the Marburg conception of thought's history is *not* the Hegelian one of progress through successive sublimations and transfigurations of *Geist*, but rather of one and the same conflict being played out again and again.¹⁴ Their attempt nonetheless to reconcile this

¹³ Cf. Schnädelbach, 1983b: 106-107: "Dynamisierung der Wissenschaft; 113, 114, 115, 116, 118.

¹⁴ Cf. Cohen, 1916: 310.

cyclical conception of history with a theory of infinite progress in the sciences is treated below.

A further, even more striking similarity between the Marburg School and post-Kantian Idealism lies in the fundamental importance given to the notion of *system*.

Schnädelbach writes:

A philosophy which has based itself on the absolute point of unity of thinking and being, subject and object, truth and goodness, can represent its knowledge only in a single *absolute* whole, i.e. a whole which comprehends in itself *everything*, and which, moreover, for the sake of the scientificity of this knowledge, must be a *system* and not a mere aggregate of cognitions.

(Schnädelbach, 1983b: 20)

For Hegel in particular, philosophy conceived as such an absolute system of knowledge—as absolute science—must consider all actual knowledge of the sciences as finite, relative and pre-philosophical, as needing, in short, incorporation into the absolute system.¹⁵ The cognitions of the empirical natural sciences are thus seen as incomplete because not fully systematized; it is this systematic incorporation and philosophical legitimization of the results of empirical science which Taylor means by "synthesizing commentary"—an approbation which scientists of the mid-nineteenth century thought they could do without. Decades later in a radically changed scientific landscape, as we will see, the Marburgers revive—with crucial alterations—the notion of "system" as fundamental to scientificity, and again maintain that it is *philosophy's* special task to ground such a system.

To sum up: the most important link between the German Idealism and Marburg neo-Kantianism is the transformation of Kant's conception of spontaneity into a radicalized conception of the intellect as the absolute source of itself and the world as

¹⁵ Cf. Schnädelbach, 1983b: 20-21.

cognized. This move returns idealism neither to a pre-Kantian form of speculation, nor to the pre-Kantian variety of idealism; it remains transcendental in Kant's sense.

However, the subject's transcendental, *a priori* categories of cognition, freed from the gravity of the ineffable noumena, are reconceived as entirely dynamic and spontaneous, "positing" or projecting the objective world as a kind of *speculum* or mirror in which *Geist* manifests itself to its finite offspring (us). This positing takes place in history; or rather, history just is the successive conflicts and syntheses of the posits which give us our world. The Marburgers will adopt this notion of an autonomous source of knowledge, with the concomitant dynamism of categories, while radically reinterpreting these notions in light of the natural sciences and the scientism which followed upon the lapse of German Idealism.

2.3. German empiricism and psychologism.

The collapse of speculative idealism, followed by the rise of scientific empiricism is a commonplace of German intellectual history. Yet, as Max Wundt writes, "die Wendung von dem Zeitalter der spekulativen Systeme zu dem der Einzelwissenschaften, von der Romantik zum Positivismus, ist geistesgeschichtlich schwer zu fassen und noch wenig geklärt" (Wundt, 1932: 341). Idealism did not so much "collapse" as retreat into the obscurity of academic departments: "the *Zeitgeist* ... simply turned its face away from philosophy in general, in order to pursue science in a post-Hegelian sense"

(Schnädelbach, 1983b: 21, 118-119).¹⁶ Nonetheless, there was a reason for all this retreating and ignoring, namely the discredit brought upon Hegel's system as a whole by the foundering of his philosophy of nature: "dominée par un anti-mathématisme vigoureux et opposée à la théorie de Newton, [sa philosophie de la nature] se retourna contre l'édifice qu[e Hegel] avait élaboré avec tant de soin, puisqu'il était clair qu'un segment fondamental du *système* était insoutenable" (Philonenko, 1989: 7).¹⁷

¹⁶ Cf. Natorp, 1918: 5..

¹⁷ Cf. Schnädelbach, 1983b: 101, 109.

Because Hegel conceived his philosophy as a system, the discrediting of one of its pillars, the philosophy of nature, cast the whole into doubt.¹⁸ In particular, the systematic *approach* was called into question. As early as 1811, Schleiermacher, in his lectures on dialectic, criticizes the practice of

setting up an epitome [*Inbegriff*] of propositions which ostensibly contains the essential elements of knowledge in such a way that all the rest can be developed from it, whether they call it a doctrine of science, or logic, or metaphysics or natural philosophy, or whatever.

(Schleiermacher, 1976: 28, ff.; cited in Köhnke, 1986: 77)

Schleiermacher here attacks speculative idealism's characteristic manner of *positing* a "so-called axiom [*Grundsatz*] at the head [of the system] as that with which knowledge necessarily begins, and which itself must simply be assumed without having been previously contained in prior thoughts from which it could have been developed" (Schleiermacher, 1976: 28, ff.; cited in Köhnke, 1986: 77). Positing principles or axioms as the cornerstone of one's system led to what Köhnke calls the "anarchy of systems" (Köhnke, 1986: 77). The "anarchy of systems" is another way of describing the contrast between philosophy's *Personengebundenheit* and the natural sciences' commitment to impersonal research programs.¹⁹ This contrast indicates an important difference between the Marburgers' notion of systematicity and that of the speculative idealists, which I will discuss below.

To say that beginning in the 1830's German science becomes "empiricized" is not to make a statement about actual scientific practice of the day; rather, it is to make the metascientific point that during this era the nature of science comes to be *interpreted* specifically as empiricism--a doctrine held less by philosophers (having crept away) than by self-reflective scientists.²⁰ Empiricism rejects as the warrant of science's

¹⁸ Philonenko, 1989: 7, n. 1. On speculative philosophy of nature, see Taylor, 1975: 350, ff.; Schnädelbach, 1983b: 100, ff.

¹⁹ Cf. Schnädelbach, 1983b: 120.

²⁰ Cf. Schnädelbach, 1983b: 108, 110.

scientificity the deductive-systematic approach of a Schelling or Hegel, favoring in its stead certain procedural rules.²¹ These "standard operating procedures" in turn *generate* scientific experience, properly so called (Schnädelbach, 1983b: 108).²² This generated experience is the proper object of scientific theory, furnishing the grounds for *inductive generalizations* from empirical fact to scientific law. The experimental and inductivist nature of science was articulated by one of the champions of German empiricism, Hermann von Helmholtz: "genuine science [is] ... nothing but methodically and purposely completed and cleansed experience,"²³ where "cleansed" means "experimentally generated," and "completed" means "inductively generated."²⁴ The Marburgers ultimately attack empiricism at what they consider its weakest point, namely its inductivism, the result of what they argued is a misguided commitment to psychologism.

What is psychologism? In our context, "psychologism" is an umbrella term used by its critics²⁵ to belittle the supposed error of various empiricist theories of cognition which held sway in Germany from the 1830's²⁶ through the 1920's.²⁷ Mach, Avenarius and

²¹ Cf. Schnädelbach, 1983b: 109.

²² Cf. Diemer, 1968.

²³ Helmholtz, H., cited in König, in Diemer, 1968: 90, ff., cited by Schnädelbach, 1983b: 111.

²⁴ Schnädelbach, 1983b: 111.

²⁵ Schnädelbach's erroneous remark that Husserl and Frege were the lone fighters of psychologism typifies the neglect the Marburg School--and especially Natorp--has suffered among scholars. Cf. Natorp 1887, 1901; Frege, 1918; Dummett, 1994: 22, ff.; Kusch, 1995: 276.

²⁶ Perhaps Friedrich Eduard Beneke first articulated logical psychologism in post-idealist Germany. He saw as central to philosophy a pure psychology, "rein auf unser Selbstbewußtsein begründet.

... Nur auf diese Weise ist wahre Einheit und Ordnung ... [und] Allgemeingültigkeit für die Philosophie zu erringen. Alle philosophischen Begriffe sind ja Erzeugnisse der menschlichen Seele; und nur durch die Erkenntnis der Art und Weise also, wie sie entstanden sind in dieser, können sie ihre höchste Klarheit erhalten.

(Beneke, 1832: 89, ff., cited in Köhnke, 1986: 82-83)

On the one hand, as Köhnke suggests, the early psychologism of Beneke and his contemporary, Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg, was the first herald of a philosophy that abandoned speculative system-building, and saw itself as "theory of knowledge [*Erkenntnistheorie*]" (Köhnke, 1986: 109). Yet, on the other hand, it was precisely psychologism in the realm of logic which the *Erkenntnistheoretiker* of Marburg, as well as Frege and Husserl, would particularly come to combat. On Fries as the originator of a Kantian psychologism, see Natorp, 1887: 262.

²⁷ Kusch shows that "the wide variety of characteristics suggested [by the term, "psychologism"], as well as their vagueness, makes it an easy feat to identify psychologism or psychologistic tendencies in

Cornelius, who argue for a "biological foundation of logic from the perspective of the 'economy of thought'" belong to the psychologistic sinners as much as the logicians, Sigwart, Erdmann, Heymans, Wilhelm Wundt, Riehl, Lipps, and Schuppe, to name but a few.²⁸ All²⁹ are said to have derived their views from the associationism³⁰ of the archpsychologists Hume³¹ and the Mills, père³² et fils.³³

The particular species of psychologism most relevant to the philosophy of science, and which comes most to exercise critics such as Natorp, Husserl and Frege, is *logical psychologism*. This term is notoriously slippery and opaque, and has been given a startling variety of definitions.³⁴ Let us use J.S. Mill's as a first orientation:

Logic is not a Science distinct from, and coordinate with, Psychology.

So far as it is a Science at all, it is a part or branch of Psychology.... Its

each and every philosophical system" (Kusch, 1995: 6). See esp. his chart of "Accused and Accusers," on p. 7.

²⁸ Natorp, 1901: 277.

²⁹ It has been pointed out to me by Stephen Menn that not all forms of psychologism in fact are based on associationism; the anti-associationism of such thinkers as James McCosh and Leonard Nelson would also have offended Natorp. I will explore these aspects of the psychologism-debate at a later time.

³⁰ Ryle, in his account of the philosophical movements against psychologizing theories of mind writes: "Brentano realized that the then prevalent English theories of mental life were impotent to do justice to the notions of conception, judgement and inference, of the will and of the feelings. The attempt to reduce all mental operations, attitudes and states to sensations and their echoes, randomly coagulated by association, inevitably eliminated just what make the differences between thinking and mere wandering, between choice and mere impulse, between judgment and mere fancy, between inference and mere suggestion, between doubt and mere vacancy" (Ryle: 1971a). However accurate this may be as a description of Brentano's attitude, it does not reflect the transcendental critique of neo-Kantianism. Their problem was not that the associationism of "English theories" implied a "random coagulation" of thoughts, but on the contrary, that associationism presupposed the mind attending to certain features of experience, its associations happening through (rule-governed) procedures of identification and comparison. These procedures, it was argued, presupposed certain *a priori* concept-functions. This is discussed below.

³¹ "Here is a kind of *attraction*, which in the mental world will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various forms" (*Treatise*, Book I, §IV). Cf. esp. *KrV*, A766/B794.

³² James Mill gave Hume's associationism its "most rigorous exposition." "In his *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind* [J. Mill] describes 'sensations' and 'ideas' as the two 'primary states of consciousness'; these were mechanically linked by association, now reduced to a single principle--'order of occurrence.' Its strength is determined by two main conditions--frequency and vividness" (*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 1968: "Psychology").

³³ "In particular Mill's *System of Logic* (1843) stimulated (chiefly as an emetic) a galaxy of original thinkers into reconsideration of the principles of logic, epistemology and psychology" (Ryle, 1971b: 215).

³⁴ For a representative catalogue, see Kusch, 1995: 4-5.

theoretic grounds are wholly borrowed from Psychology, and include as much of that science as is required to justify the rules of an art.

(Mill, 1874: 359)

The "laws" of logic, according to Mill, are ultimately rooted in experience, out of which they spring as generalizations in accord with the *psychological* laws of association. Hence, "logic, as Mill saw it, does not yield necessary truths, only propositions whose negation we take as *inconceivable* (1843, bk. 2, chap. 5, sec. 6)" (Macnamara, 1986: 13). Mill holds that both the principle of non-contradiction (like the law of excluded middle) is to be explained as being "one of the first and most familiar generalizations from experience" (Mill, 1843: Bk. II, Ch. 7, Sec. 5; quoted in Macnamara, 1986: 13). From this spirit, then, the German psychologistic logicians took their inspiration.

It is important for understanding the neo-Kantians' anti-psychologism to see that Kant himself can be and often has been read as a psychologistic logician. Thus the Marburgers would have been dismayed, if not surprised, at Gillian Rose's remark that "in spite of Kant's separation of objective and subjective validity, of the question of right from the question of fact,³⁵ of an empirical from a transcendental account, the critical philosophy lends itself to a psychological reading" (Rose, 1981: 4); or at Macnamara's simple designation of Kant as the "forerunner of psychologism" (Macnamara, 1986: 11). The point is not hard to see. In the first *Critique*, both the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic seem straightforwardly to conceive logic as the rules by which the understanding constitutes objective experience. As Rose puts it,

a transcendental account may transform the logical question of validity into the epistemological question of how we may rightly acquire knowledge. Objective validity is established by dividing the mind into faculties, and by reference to perception and representation. According to this reading, the whole project for a transcendental logic reduces

³⁵ Cf. Rose, 1981: 2.

validity to the synthesis of representations, to the description of processes of consciousness.

(Rose, 1981: 4)

This psychological interpretation of Kant was not universally held in the German psychologistic camp. While Helmholtz and especially Wilhelm Wundt³⁶ did so understand Kant, the more common view seems to have been articulated by Benno Erdmann. On the one hand he defines logic as the "general, formal, normative science of the methodical presuppositions of scientific thought,"³⁷ a definition agreeable to the Marburgers insofar as it respects Kant's conception of logic as exclusively concerned with the "mere form of thinking."³⁸ Yet Erdmann goes on to argue that since logic studies the validity of assertoric judgements, and since judgements are psychological acts, logic must investigate those mental processes "factically found in our consciousness" which make judgements true or false, valid or invalid.³⁹ Thus he opposes Kant insofar as he thinks Kant's separation of logic from the actual contents of cognition "goes too far," and that logic must take into account the concrete psychological processes of thinking.⁴⁰

We can now see how close the connection between inductivism and psychologism is. Induction is one of those mental processes "factically found in our consciousness" which *ground* the possibility of judgement. Indeed, it is the basic form of thinking, insofar as it is through the association, comparison and identification of common features of percepts that we are able in the first place to generate any concepts whatsoever.⁴¹ Thus psychologism, at least of the Mill-inspired variety, is linked to the empiricist conception of science by the principle of induction. On the one hand,

³⁶ Rose, 1981: 5.

³⁷ Erdmann, 1907: 25; Smith and Smith, 1995: 28.

³⁸ Kant, *KrV*, A54/B78.

³⁹ Erdmann, 1907: 26. Cf. esp. Natorp, 1887: 261, ff.; Sluga, 1993; 1980: 12-13; Carl, 1994: 11. ff.; 204.

⁴⁰ Erdmann, 1907: 26. For other neo-Kantian critiques of Erdmann, see e.g. Cassirer, 1910: 29-31.

⁴¹ Cf. Cassirer, 1910: 5, et passim. Cassirer, 1953: 4.

according to psychologism, induction underlies the original formation of the mind's fundamental logical rules; on the other hand, it in particular constitutes the investigative method of science (i.e. generalizing over the empirical data experimentally gained); hence, scientific thought is inductive both *qua* thought (psychologism), and *qua* scientific (empiricism).

Antipsychologism. Antipsychologism often hints of the alarmist—psychologism is not just false, we must not allow it to be true!—the same tone encountered among opponents of relativism. This is not accidental: the danger of psychologism precisely lies in the prospect of relativism and skepticism. Since the question of psychologism's danger is distinct from that of its truth, I shall take up each in turn.

First, psychologism appears dangerous because epistemological skepticism and relativism are seen to flow from the lack of certainty of any inductive inference, and because the possibility of authentic science is negated—at least in the standard conceptions of *Wissenschaft* as a system of certain *knowledge*, and not probable *conjecture*; or, alternatively, as a system of *laws* and not mere regularity or "constant conjunction."⁴² For if our concepts, and thus our judgements, can be no more than probably or for the most part true, then how can the judgements of science and ethics not lose their respective claims to apodicticity and normativity? Of course, someone like Mill just doesn't see this consequence as a problem with psychologism, much less an argument against it. As we saw above, he simply admits the contingency of even such an apparent "necessity" as the law of contradiction; insisting that it *is* necessary will not move him who says it merely *seems* so.

Psychologism's enemies must show why it is wrong. One line of attack, familiar from Frege and Husserl, is to show that psychologism makes nonsense of things we want. Thus, if psychologism is true, then there is no such thing as objectivity; and if

⁴² Cf. Natorp, 1917: 227.

there is no objectivity, communication is rendered impossible. For if thoughts and meanings were themselves constituted in and by the individual psyche, they would be radically private and meanings could not be communicated. If what I mean by "dog" and what you mean by "dog" is really constituted in our respective mental processes, we could never know if our meanings were the same; nor could we even know if we meant the same thing by "same." Communicability of meanings presupposes their objectivity and trans-subjectivity, and cannot therefore belong to the private realm of empirical psyches.

As if the incoherence of communication were not an ill enough consequence, related consequences prove even more vexing to psychologism's defenders, for they undermine the scientific foundation of psychologism itself. Even if one disregards the fact that without communication science is scarcely conceivable, it is more directly threatened by the sacrifice of objectivity. For should science be considered as a mere heap of individual impressions and ideas, it would forfeit the very possibility of *rigor* which is thought to distinguish it from the anarchy plaguing speculative idealism.⁴³ Why should the scientists' probabilities command more respect than the idealists' posits? Do they not both appear equally loose and arbitrary? Objectivity is required if *norms* and *standards* are to be possible against which rigor—scientificity—can be judged.

The problem runs deeper yet: perhaps the lack of objectivity can somehow be accommodated in "sciences" whose propositions have a very high probability of being right (based on very large samples), but it is utterly embarrassing to psychologistic logicians, especially if they are unwilling to pay Mill's price:⁴⁴ the sacrifice of logic's validity (*Geltung*).⁴⁵ Yet, it seems, pay the price they must: for how can psychology, an empirical science which, *qua empirical*, must remain within the realm of inductive

⁴³ Cf. Cassirer, 1910: 31.

⁴⁴ Cf. Farber, 1943: 102.

⁴⁵ Natorp, 1887: 262.

probability or relative truth, justify such an absolute bindingness?⁴⁶ If psychologism is true, the truths of logic and arithmetic themselves are reduced to the status of mere probabilities--a result only a radical skeptic, and certainly few scientific empiricists, would be prepared to swallow.

2.4. The sources of neo-Kantianism.

In the foregoing pages I have tried no more than to sketch the sources of the dilemma faced by many philosophers who, in the words of Ryle,

[a]ll alike were in revolt against the idea-psychology of Hume and Mill;
 [who] all alike demanded the emancipation of logic from psychology;
 [who] all alike found in the notion of meaning their escape-route from
 subjectivist theories of thinking; [who] nearly all ... championed a
 Platonic theory of meanings, i.e. of concepts and propositions; [and
 who] all alike demarcated philosophy from natural science by allotting
 factual enquiries to the natural sciences and conceptual enquiries to
 philosophy....

(Ryle, 1971a)

Ryle is here describing the situation of Husserl, Meinong and Frege, of Bradley, Peirce, Moore and Russell. He does not mention the neo-Kantians, though they too were leaders among those pursuing the "rehabilitation of philosophy."⁴⁷ Still, his omission is in a way fitting, because for all their similarities and sympathies with the thinkers in Ryle's list, the Marburgers differ crucially in one respect: while indeed appealing to a "Platonic theory," they do not interpret it as a "theory of meanings," at least not in the

⁴⁶ Cf. Natorp, 1901: 272.

⁴⁷ Schnädelbach, 1983b: 132-133.

sense common to Husserl and Frege.⁴⁸ Like Frege, the neo-Kantians argue for a third realm, not of meanings, but of "validity" (*Geltung*).

As Rose has correctly pointed out, the Marburg School relies on Hermann Lotze's distinction between being and validity (*Sein* and *Geltung*), which it is therefore appropriate to discuss briefly. As she writes,

"[v]alidity" for Lotze, in opposition to Kant, pertains to propositions not to concepts. Propositions can be affirmed or denied regardless of whether we are in a position actually to perceive or experience the objects to which the contents of those propositions refer. Hence a proposition which we affirm or deny has a reality which is different from the reality of events which "occur," or of things which "exist" or "are." The reality of a proposition means that it holds or is valid, and that its opposite does not hold. ... This kind of reality, the validity of truths, is quite distinct from the question of whether their contents can be related to any object in the external, spatio-temporal world.

(Rose, 1981: 6-7)

For us, Lotze's *Sein-Geltung* distinction matters not because the Marburgers adopt it,⁴⁹ but because he shows how there can be a "reality" other than and not reducible to "being," a reality which is accessible to thinking alone. "Accessible," I say, but not therefore "constituted in;" in other words, just as the realm of being (i.e. really existing or occurring things and events) is accessible to, but not dependent upon perception ultimately rooted in intuition, so is the realm of valid truths thinkable by, though not dependent upon thought. As Rose puts it,

⁴⁸ See esp. Cassirer, 1910: 32: "Neben dasjenige, was der Inhalt seinem materialen sinnlichen Gehalt nach ist, tritt dasjenige, was er im Zusammenhang der Erkenntnis *bedeutet*, und diese seine Bedeutung erwächst ihm aus den wechselnden logischen 'Aktcharakteren', die sich an ihn heften können." Cf. Macnamara, 1986: 42-44.

⁴⁹ They do not, contrary to Rose. Cf. Rose, 1981: 5, 9; cf. esp. Natorp, 1921b: 201.

Lotze's demarcation of validity set it apart from any relation either to processes of consciousness or to consciousness in general (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*). Validity was separate even from transcendental genesis⁵⁰.... Lotze kept the examination of perception and cognition strictly separate from the logic of thinking.

(Rose, 1981: 9)

Lotze carves out a domain of logic entirely separate from experience, and thus without any "transcendental" import; a) the objects of this logic are independent of psychic cognitive processes; b) the logic itself consequently is not the logic of the conditions of possibility of (psychic) experience.

Of course, it seems very odd to say that the logic of validity is not a (Kantian) logic of cognition, but then also to call it a logic of thinking, imagining that *this* would separate logic from psychology once and for all; for is "thinking" not also a psychic activity, as Erdmann points out? What other kind of thinking is there? As we will see, the point of separating "thinking" from "cognition" is not to separate logic from *mind* entirely (a patent absurdity), but rather to grant mind a domain untouchable by experience (I will address the big question--*how* mind can be granted such a domain--below). Psychologism is defeated not when logic is shown to have nothing to with *thinking*, but rather when logic is shown not to *derive* from psychological activity specifically conceived as *cognitive experience*. It is for this reason that Lotze and the Marburgers abandon *Kant's* project of transcendental criticism (defining the conditions of possibility of all *experience*) in favor of a "pure logic,"⁵¹ "pure" because the validity (*Geltung*) of its truths is atemporal, and therefore beyond possible *experience*.

The Marburg strategy is to use the independent realm of thinking, secured by Lotze, as a base from which to attack psychologism's reliance on induction as the engine

⁵⁰ By this, I take it Rose means that validity has nothing to do with experience even as its *a priori* conditions of possibility.

⁵¹ Cf. Rose, 1981: 10. I dispute her point that Marburg philosophy is not transcendental in the following paragraph.

of thought. This strategy, while departing significantly from the philosophy of the first *Critique*, remains fundamentally transcendental. It does not, however, concern itself with the conditions of possibility of psychically empirical objects. Rather, it is concerned with the conditions of possibility of the exact (mathematical) sciences.⁵² It is as though they rise from Kant's primary concern with the categorial logic of cognition to the ideal logic of the scientific concatenation of those cognitions. As I will argue, the move is analogous to the Platonic ascent from *doxa* to *epistêmê*, if by *doxa* we understand the objectivation of experience as opposed to the scientific *norms* of objectivity we attain with *epistêmê*.

Let us characterize the general strategy of the anti-psychologistic arguments sketched in the previous section as "consequentialist:" *if* psychologism is true, *then* such and such bad results follow.⁵³ By contrast, the neo-Kantian strategy⁵⁴ is to show how the psychologistic account of the inductive process itself *presupposes* certain "functional concepts" or "concept-functions"⁵⁵ which themselves cannot have had their origin in induction; on the contrary, they are its very conditions of possibility. Thus, the Marburgers do not "revolt against" psychologism by rejecting its scientific, inductivist principles outright.⁵⁶ Instead, somewhat furtively appropriating certain idealistic notions, they attempt to reinterpret them as the conditions of possibility of science—not as speculative philosophers dictate it ought to be—but as it really is practiced and experienced by the empirical scientists themselves.

Earlier we saw that a key respect in which German empiricism differs from speculative idealism is its foundation in impersonal rules of procedure, i.e. in *method*. It is in just this notion of method that the neo-Kantians find the hook by which to link

⁵² Cf. esp. Natorp, 1910: 1-4.

⁵³ For Husserl's consequentialism, see Farber, 1943: 109, ff.

⁵⁴ Cf. Natorp, 1887: 262, for another approach, which I shan't rehearse here.

⁵⁵ I discuss the meaning of *Begriffsfunktionen* and *Funktionsbegriff* in the next section.

⁵⁶ In this they differ from the early Husserl, who endeavors to distance himself from both idealist and empiricist failures by a radical rejection of the whole tradition. But by 1917, at least, Natorp argues that Husserl has become "entirely rooted in critical philosophy," and that his basic interest is identical with Kant's—"however freely he may go beyond him" (Natorp, 1917: 246).

empiricism and idealism. They argue that method itself is not and cannot be derived in any way from experience; rather, the method by which experience is "cleansed," to recall Helmholtz's term, is not taken from, but rather imposed upon, empirical phenomena. Method purifies experience,⁵⁷ thereby *generating* genuinely *scientific* experience. But since that method is itself non-empirical, the Marburgers argue, it is *a priori*. It is precisely here that they resort to that favorite term of Fichte and Schelling, *Setzung*, to name the activity of mind that constitutes the *a priori* of scientific method. The next step is a natural inflection, linguistic and conceptual, of *Setz-ung* (posit) into *Ge-setz* (law), from the activity into its result.

It is crucial to see, however, that since it is *method* which is posited, the Marburgers reconceive subjectivity. Yes, method has, and must have, an *a priori* foundation, but that foundation is an anonymous subjectivity to which any individual scientist subjects himself *qua scientist*: it is, perhaps, what one means by "the scientific mind." This trans-subjective mind emerges out of and simultaneously governs the inter-subjective dialectic called scientific discourse, either between individual scientists or within a single scientist's mind. They do not "posit" in or for themselves individually, but always in accordance with the method of science which, though not empirical is also not for that reason subjective. It is in method that the scientific mind constitutes itself. *Method*, then, is the neo-Kantian, post-positivist name for an *a priori*, anonymous *process*, the objectivity of which is warranted by its trans- and inter-subjectivity. It is this objectivity alone which, in turn, underwrites the legitimacy of scientific *laws*. Whereas empiricist theory of science holds the laws of nature to be no more than inductive generalizations, the neo-Kantians offer the idealistic alternative of law as a concept-*function* which makes possible the process of induction itself. This alternative entails a radical and *transcendental* reconception of the relationship between object and concept.

⁵⁷ "Erfahrung ist selbst eine solche Synthesis der Wahrnehmungen, welche meinen Begriff, den ich vermittelt einer Wahrnehmung habe, durch andere hinzukommende vermehrt" (*KrV*, A764/B792).

Before turning to that reconception, it is important to stress two points. First, the neo-Kantians of course do not deny that induction yields concepts.⁵⁸ However, because induction only yields *a posteriori* probability, they do deny that induction can yield genuinely scientific propositions, propositions, that is, which *gelten* with the atemporal absoluteness proper to the realm of validity.⁵⁹ For Natorp, there is no such thing as an "inductive proof," which tries to conjure up universal propositions out of individual *fact* (as if such were already secured in advance)" (Natorp, 1917: 241). Thus, to argue that the process of induction presupposes an *a priori* concept-function is *not* intended to show that inductive conclusions possess bona fide scientific status after all; this argument applies only against the *psychologistic* view that all our propositions are mere *a posteriori* generalizations, by showing that generalization itself presupposes certain *a priori* concepts.⁶⁰ Second, the establishment of the necessity of *a priori* concept-functions for all thinking naturally leads the neo-Kantians to the further and distinct view that science in actual practice does *not* proceed by inductive generalization at all, but by hypothetical *positing*, which just is the activity of *a priori* functions.⁶¹ The consideration of these two points is the first task of the next section.

2.5. The neo-Kantian theory of cognition and science.

2.5.1. Induction dependent on "concept-functions."

In *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff*, the last of the Marburgers, Ernst Cassirer, gives a lucid account of the transcendental turn behind the neo-Kantian version of scientism. Closely following Natorp, he shows how complacent common-sense realism

⁵⁸ Cf. Cassirer, 1910: 20: "Ob aus der Festhaltung dieser Identität der Beziehung ... zuletzt ein abstrakter *Gegenstand*, ein allgemeines *Vorstellungsbild* sich entwickelt, in dem die ähnlichen Züge vereint sind, ist lediglich eine psychologische Nebenfrage, die die logische Charakteristik des Begriffs nicht berührt."

⁵⁹ Cf. Cassirer, 1910: 17, 24-25. Cf. Natorp, 1917: 228-229. Indeed, Natorp writes, a "thesis" or "posit" must, as a thesis, be followed by a confirmatory induction: "confirmation of the thesis through its execution [i.e. through working out its implications] is the meaning of all genuine induction..." (Natorp, 1917: 240-241).

⁶⁰ Cf. Cassirer, 1910: 21-22; esp. 29, 31, 32, esp. 33. Cf. Natorp, 1917: 227.

⁶¹ Cf. Cassirer, 1910: 15, 18; 27.

ultimately runs up against problems which, in its naivety, it cannot accomodate.

Cassirer, like Natorp, locates the historical source of this realism in Aristotle's logic and ontology.⁶²

Aristotle's realist axiom is that a world of independently existent, real things is given to us. The task of the inquiring scientist is to uncover the common moments that are given to us along with or in the things, but which require abstractive processing in order to become manifest; one gathers many individual instances of things, and then abstracts from the contingent features belonging to them as individuals. This abstraction displays their general features which, taken together, is their concept.⁶³ But as Cassirer adds, the "concept is not a mere subjective schema, in which we pull together the common elements of some arbitrary group of things;" rather, the concept that is sought by the process of abstraction is the "real *form*, which warrants the causal and teleological *connexion* of the individual things" (Cassirer, 1910: 9). For Aristotle, the formal concept, which is given as a *part* of the individual thing, counts as explanatory of that thing.⁶⁴ The ontological category of *substance*, conceived as an individual *thing*, is paramount: a "solid thing-ly substrate" must be present at hand (*vorhanden*) in order for any of the higher "logical-grammatical kinds of being to find their real traction and ground" (Cassirer, 1910: 10). Cassirer's account of Aristotle is simply the orthodox Marburg line, most polemically and painstakingly advanced by Natorp. Aristotle, the neo-Kantians say, took a turn that would bend European philosophy in favor of the substance-interpretation of the concept: "[t]he basic categorial relation of the *thing* to its *qualities* from now on remains the guiding point of view..." (Cassirer, 1910: 10). He turned, they say, into a blind alley.

Cassirer argues that the substance-interpretation survives (underground, as it were) into the present day. Later disputes between nominalists and realists, and even

⁶² Cassirer, 1910: 4, ff. Cf. Natorp, 1887: 276, ff.; 1969: 8; 16, ff.; *PI*: 384-456.

⁶³ Cassirer, 1910: 5.

⁶⁴ Cf. Cassirer, 1910: 10.

Berkeley's "psychological critique of 'abstract' concepts," all take for granted that a concept, be it of *things* or of *ideas*, is properly defined as a representation of their common features, i.e. of their *similarities* (Cassirer, 1910: 11).⁶⁵ All alike fail to question whether "the genuinely scientific concept—particularly of *mathematics* and *physics*—might not have a different task to accomplish than the one which this scholastic explanation sets for them" (Cassirer, 1910: 11-12). The "substantial forms" that constitute for Aristotle the aim of abstractive conceptualization are replaced, in the modern reconception, by "certain basic elements which remain constant through the entire region of sensations and 'perceptions'" (Cassirer, 1910: 12): this is, for example, the basic assumption of Mill's associationism (Cassirer, 1910: 13). "The only difference between the ontological [Aristotelian] and the psychological [Millian] point of view is that the 'things' of scholasticism were *beings* copied in thought, whereas the objects of the latter view are no more than contents of *mental representations*" (Cassirer, 1910: 14; emphasis added).⁶⁶

The full scope of Cassirer's critique of what has been sketched as (Aristotelian) realism will become clearer when we uncover its Natorpian roots in the course of the next chapter, I want here just to focus on Cassirer's undermining of the empiricist account of induction as the *origin* of concepts. As we have seen, this account makes two key claims: (a) *things* exist and are *given* to us, along with (b) their *similarities* or *commonalities*, which allow us, by some psychological process (say, "association"), to form their concept through which we then can cognize them (Cassirer, 1910: 18-19). Cassirer points out that the "similarity of *things* obviously can only then become productive [i.e. of concepts], if it is *grasped* and *judged as such* [i.e., as similar].

Daß die "unbewußten" Spuren, die von einem früheren

Wahrnehmungsbild in uns zurückgeblieben sind, einem neuen Eindruck

tatsächlich gleichartig *sind*, bleibt für den Prozeß, um den es sich hier

⁶⁵ Cf. Cassirer, 1910: 12, 14.

⁶⁶ Cf. Cassirer, 1953: 11

handelt, so lange gleichgültig, als beide Elemente nicht als ähnlich *erkannt sind*. Damit aber ist zunächst als Grundlage aller "Abstraktion" ein Akt der *Identifikation* anerkannt.

(Cassirer, 1910: 19; emphasis added)

The fact that the "unconscious" traces of an earlier perceptual image which have remained in us *are* in fact similar to a new impression, this fact is irrelevant for the process we are interested in here as long as both elements are not *recognized* as similar. However, this immediately means that an act of *identification* is the foundation of all "abstraction."

In other words, abstraction of similarities from the manifold presented in the "thing" depends on the *identification* of the similarities *as* similarities. And this "act of identification" in turn depends on a criterion of similarity, which the manifold manifestly cannot of itself provide. A moment of reflection will tell us, Cassirer urges, that a categorial concept "is not itself given among the [perceptual] contents as yet another, new content; similarity or dissimilarity do not *appear* as sensual *elements* in their own right, alongside sense-perceptions of color, sound, pressure, touch" (Cassirer, 1910: 21).⁶⁷ Rather, the criterion is decided or posited by the mind; it is the "function" or "act" (*Handlung*)⁶⁸ by which certain features of the manifold are discerned *as* similar, or (as Cassirer, following Natorp, adds) different, or even or odd, bigger or smaller, etc. It thus functions as the *Grundlegung* for the "perception" of similarity, difference, and any other categorial (conceptual) features in the manifold.⁶⁹ Without this grounding function, "'abstraction' would remain directionless and rudderless" (Cassirer, 1910: 31).

We see now how the neo-Kantian outflanks the psychologistic realist. He demonstrates, by transcendental argument, that the mind controls an autonomous and foundational cognitive sphere, namely of pure concepts or categorial functions, which

⁶⁷ Cf. Natorp, 1917: 227.

⁶⁸ Natorp, 1910: 22.

⁶⁹ Cassirer uses the terms, *Grundlage* and *Grundlegung*, loaded with Kantian (transcendental) significance, at, e.g., 1910: 19, 22, 33.

provide the criteria for our judgements concerning the phenomenal manifold. These *functional* concepts (of which mathematical functions are Cassirer's paradigm⁷⁰) serve literally to generate objects out of the manifold. Thus, while the neo-Kantians expose the explanatory crudeness and inadequacy of the inductivist doctrine of abstraction, they at the same time call into question the meaning of the realist ontology.

Nevertheless, our discussion thus far will have left some scratching their heads: is it not psychologistic to speak of the *a priori* functions, whatever they are, as some kind of a mental apparatus whose operation makes induction possible? We face here a fundamental problem in interpreting the Marburgers' thought. They commonly speak of "thoughts" and "thinking," even as they deny that the logic (of thinking) has anything to do with mind (*psyche*). This seems paradoxical, as I said above, since thinking seems inconceivable without (a) mind to *do* the thinking. Husserl tries to evade the problem by positing a "transcendental ego" as the object of his "pure"—i.e. non-psychologizing, yet not therefore *psychological*—phenomenological investigations. As dubious as some might find Husserl's move, at least he makes the effort; the Marburgers do not. It therefore remains for the charitable interpreter to do his best to figure out how they can conceive of thinking without a thinker, of thoughts, as Dummett puts it with regard to Frege, "extruded from the mind."

The basic problem lies in the ambiguous meaning of the Marburg shibboleth, "function." In Natorp especially, and to a lesser degree in Cassirer, "function" is used synonymously with "Akt" or "Handlung" (act), in which use they appeal to Kant. A function, then, is a "thought-act," an act of synthesis, of relation, of construction. But they also use "function" in the sense of "Grundfunktion" or "basic function" of thought to name (Kantian) categories. Are the categories acts? What could that mean? Thirdly, Cassirer illustrates the conception of function using mathematical functions as its

⁷⁰ Cassirer, 1910: 27; cf. v, 21, ff.; 26, ff.; et passim. This tendency is already evident in Cassirer's teacher, Cohen. Cf., e.g., Cohen's discussion of the Plato's philosophical foundation of logic in mathematics at Cohen, 1902b: 447, ff.; 1916: 307.

paradigm case. Are mathematical functions "acts?" Are they assimilable to categories in some respects? The common issue in all these cases is how these acts and functions can be conceived independently of an actor, viz. of a mind that is doing the thinking, and, if so, in what sense they could still be considered acts.⁷¹

Natorp sometimes speaks of "Denkinhalte".⁷² these thought-contents are what is thought when we think. Secondly, Natorp means, when he speaks of thinking, specifically thinking in the mathematical and exact sciences. The *Denkinhalte*, then, are the contents of scientific thought, or, in short, they are scientific thoughts or *Erkenntnisse*. These thoughts, are constructed concepts, that is, they are synthesized *a priori*, and then *applied* to phenomena. Now, although we have not yet shown that they are non-psychological, let us see how these synthetic *a priori* concepts might be "functionally" conceived. It helps to remember that Kant, too, not only conceives the *Grundfunktionen* of thought, the categories, as "functions," but also has a conception of non-analytic synthetic concepts that seem to fit the Marburg sense of "function." In discussing the notion of synthesis in Kant, J. M. Young writes:

[S]ome concepts are made rather than given. With concepts of this sort, which Kant thinks are characteristic of mathematics and natural science, we begin, as it were, by *legislating* the conditions a thing must satisfy to qualify as an instance of the concept in question. In mathematics, for example, we give a definition, whereas in empirical science we establish the criteria by which things of a certain kind are to be identified. We then proceed to determine what further predicates hold of the things in question, not by uncovering what was implicit in our initial concept, but instead by adding predicates to that concept, either by constructing it and producing a demonstration (in mathematics) or by observing instances

⁷¹ Conversely, if we grant that they in fact are acts of thinking *mind*, then we might ask how that could be interpreted non-psychologically.

⁷² Natorp, 1910: 21.

of the concept (in empirical science). ... [W]e begin by *laying down* a few predicates, to which we then add.

(Young, 1992: 111-112; emphasis added)

When these synthetic concepts are applied to phenomena, their functional nature is revealed from a new angle. They now can be understood as actively forming the manifold, that is, bringing it into the relations prescribed by the concept.⁷³ This phase of the concepts' application of course requires a thinking mind, although the concepts' "validity" holds whether or not this particular mind applies it; so its "existence" does not imply psychologism. Moreover, although the concept required a mind to construct it, it did not require any particular mind to do so, nor did it require any particular mind's *experience*; consequently its genesis does not imply psychologism either.

What was the mind doing when it constructed or synthesized its function-concept? It made clear to itself what already must logically be thinkable; this making-clear is called thinking because its object is a thought, not the other way around. We can use the Platonic simile of vision to illustrate this very platonistic point of view. Plato's metaphor of the mind's eye can be read as suggesting a belief in intellectual intuition; I suspect this is why Natorp avoids all mention of the cave allegory in *Platos Ideenlehre*. However it need not be read this way; it can instead suggest that a thought need not be the thought of a thinker, but could, like a visible thing, have its own independent existence; instead of being visible, it is *thinkable*. We could therefore rephrase Natorp's "thought-content" as a "thinkable" (parallel to the Stoic *lekton*, or "sayable").⁷⁴ Just as a *lekton* need not be said to "exist," but in fact makes the sayer *say something* instead of babbling, so by analogy a "thinkable" need not be actualized by a

⁷³ If this proves impossible, then the concept is rejected as scientifically incorrect; its incapacity to generate a genuine object, however, does not impugn its *a prioricity* (cf. *Phaedo*, 100-102).

⁷⁴ Can the synthetic, relational character of thinking be done justice on this analogy? I believe so, as long as one recognizes that seeing is in no wise passive, that vision, too, synthesizes, that is, can be said to "pick out" its objects, and so constitute them as seen objects for itself.

mind to "exist," but on the contrary makes the mind truly *think something* instead of streaming along through a fog of impulses and impressions.

Thus the mind faces two tasks: first, it must (re)construct the functions of thought, which are not themselves dependent on it for their "being." Second, it then needs to apply these concepts, as categories,⁷⁵ to the intuitional manifold that is concretely given, be it pure or sensible. It is in this second phase that they are functions in the sense of "acts," for the mind is actively forming its (scientific) experience through them. "Logic," then, is for the Marburg School simply the study of the rules that govern (or describe) the relational structure of these ideal thought-contents.

2.5.2. Scientific experience and the dissolution of ontology.

Science. Of course, the neo-Kantian critique of psychologism and realism is not primarily intended to rectify the theory of everyday perception and cognition. Rather, it is a propaedeutic to a new theory or "logic"⁷⁶ of *scientific experience*, of which the ideally rigorous paradigm is "exact science" (e.g. theoretical physics).⁷⁷ Science is a fact; as Cohen curtly puts it, "die Wissenschaften ... liegen in gedruckten Büchern vor" (Cohen, 1902a: x). These "printed books" contain propositions expressing cognitions of objects or objective states of affairs, and claim to be systems of knowledge, i.e. of science. Philosophy's task is to give a non-inductivist account of how these knowledge-systems (science) are possible.⁷⁸ The inductive method of abstraction and generalization can never yield *exactness* of scientific cognition, where "exact" (also)

⁷⁵ Cassirer thus speaks of these functional concepts generally as "categorical functions" (cf. Cassirer, 1910, Chs. 1-2). Natorp also thinks of these categorical concepts as unlimited in number, unlike Kant (Natorp, 1910: 35).

⁷⁶ Natorp, 1969: 11, et passim.

⁷⁷ In this aim, neo-Kantianism truly does continue a project begun by Kant, perhaps most clearly exemplified by the "Second Part of the Main Transcendental Problem" of the *Prolegomena*, where he asks, "How is Pure Science of Nature Possible?" Cf. Kant, 1950: 42-74 (§§14-39); Natorp, 1969: 13; Rose, 1981: 2.

⁷⁸ It is crucial to see that this specifically philosophical task presupposes an interpretation of just what the "fact of science" consists in. As we have already seen, the Marburg interpretation has it that science determines the *laws* of phenomena; that it links these laws *systematically*, and that it does so through an anonymous, objective, methodical *procedure*.

implies the *mathematical necessity* of such cognition. By contrast, the notion of functional categorial concepts, in Kant's sense of *Verstandesbegriffe*, enables the Marburgers to give a transcendental account of this ideal scientificity. Yet while both Kant and the Marburgers would agree that categories are active functions which "make possible" or indeed generate scientific experience, there is nonetheless a big difference between the two systems.

Here the neo-Kantians adopt a key modification made by the German Idealists to Kant's idealism, the abolition of the *Ding-an-sich*, which here, too, results in the same "total idealism." Fichte's unbound, unbounded subjectivity entails that the world of nature is the posit or *Setz-ung* of mind; so too do the neo-Kantians attribute the experience of nature as an idea of science entirely to the work of the mind's foundational cognitive legislation, its hypotheses or *grundlegende Ge-setze*.⁷⁹ But as I noted earlier, they avoid the arbitrariness of the speculative systems of nature by reconceiving the positing function as coordinate with *method*. We may understand the crisis of German Idealism as a legitimization crisis of subjectivity. The speculative philosophers conceive positing as a brute act by a self whose *nature* it simply is to posit; yet such a view of subjectivity, while appearing to grant it total and absolute power, in fact fractures its autonomy at the very root. For if the self posits by nature, then, like an archaic god, it legislates by fiat, irrationally, heteronomously if not helplessly enslaved to a *thetic compulsion*. The Marburg move to method amounts to an evolution from will to reason, from simple *Setzung* to *Ge-setz*, i.e. from fiat to law. The positing subjectivity attains to true cognitive autonomy at the moment that it subjects itself to what Natorp elsewhere⁸⁰ calls the law of lawfulness (*Gesetz der Gesetzlichkeit*), which enjoins that *there ought to be law*. The fact that subjectivity itself posits this first law in no way lessens its imperative force. On the contrary, it cements it. For subjectivity posits the law *categorically*, and so simultaneously places itself under it. It is precisely in this self-

⁷⁹ Cf. Cohen, 1902b: 449; 1916: 308, ff.

⁸⁰ E.g. Natorp, 1887: 285; 1911: ;1917: 246.

giving of law, without restriction, that subjectivity asserts its auto-nomy; it is through abiding by it that it confirms its legitimacy.⁸¹

If the law of lawfulness is the prime directive of scientific rationality, it is through method that this directive is executed. The neo-Kantian notion of method is based on a view of how empirical science in fact works: the rational community commits to common rules, in accordance with which it systematically proceeds and progresses towards an ideal of complete knowledge of nature. The propositions of science are neither deduced from, nor incorporated into some speculating individual's static system, established and justified by intuitive fiat.⁸² Moreover, neo-Kantianism, like empiricism, understands method as the rational cleansing of ordinary experience by which it becomes "scientific experience."⁸³ The key difference is that this cleansing is not interpreted as the exfoliation of contingencies from the *object's* essential core. Rather, for experience to become scientific its *subjective* or transcendental source must be purified. But this just means that experience must be anchored in the pure concepts which are the understanding's laws of experience. We do not capture an empirical object scientifically by disclosing its substantial essence, but by locating in an *a priori* categorial system the functional principle through which experience of that object is made possible.⁸⁴ For as we saw above, the Marburgers hold that only the functional conception of cognition can warrant the objectivity of (scientific) experience. Hence a double philosophical task is delineated: to isolate the *a priori* categorial system; and to do so in a way that explains the fact of science's endless progress.

⁸¹ Cf. *KrV*, A839/B867.

⁸² Cf. Natorp: 1887: 259-260 (emphasis added): "Auch diese allgemeine Correlation zwischen Gesetz und Gegenstand dürfen wir ... wohl auch sachlich als festgestellt annehmen; festgestellt *nicht durch das Gutdünken oder die Systemsucht dieses oder jenes Philosophen*, sondern durch die That der Wissenschaft, die überall im Gesetze den Gegenstand constituiert."

⁸³ Cf. esp. Natorp, 1917: 237; 246; 1969: 13.

⁸⁴ Cf. Natorp, 1917: 226.

Reconstruction of root-functions and "categories." In earlier sections I have tried to explain why, from the transcendental standpoint, the objects of experience are conceived as the products of synthesis (and not simply given to us ready-made); yet the source and process of that synthesis is hidden from us. For the Marburgers, retracing the process to its source is crucial, not for the sake of a human psychology, but for grounding the syntheses of scientific cognition. Natorp writes:

[D]as Denken schafft zwar (in den Wissenschaften) nach sicheren Gesetzen der Synthesis, aber in weitem Umfang ohne dieser Gesetze sich zugleich bewußt zu sein. Sein Interesse sind unmittelbar nicht sie, sondern das, was an Erkenntnisgehalt durch ihre Kraft zutage gefördert wird. Es ist je auf seinen besonderen Gegenstand gerichtet; es ist ein ganz neues Stadium der Reflexion, nicht nach dem jedesmaligen Gegenstand, sondern nach den Gesetzen zu fragen, wonach dieser und überhaupt irgendein Gegenstand der Wissenschaft sich zum Gegenstand erst gestaltet. Diese neue Art der Reflexion ist es, die wir Logik⁸⁵ nennen.

(Natorp, 1969: 10-11)⁸⁶

It is true that thinking operates [*schafft*] (in the sciences) in accord with secure laws of synthesis, although to a large extent at the same time it is unconscious of these laws. Its interest is not primarily these laws, but rather that scientific content which is generated thanks to these laws. Thinking is in each case focused upon its particular object. An entirely new level of reflection is required to investigate, not the particular object, but the laws in accordance with which this and any scientific object in

⁸⁵ Cf. Natorp, 1969: 13.

⁸⁶ Connected to Plato (*Republic*) at Natorp, 1969: 12.

general first constitutes itself as an object. This new kind of reflection we call "logic."

For Natorp, this new kind of reflection or "logic" takes the form of a "reconstruction" of the synthetic acts that come prior to and generate experience by giving the law to the manifold. Given the transcendental doctrine of function-concepts, reconstruction seeks the pure, categorial root-functions of synthesis.⁸⁷ And since the logic of science starts from the "fact" of accomplished syntheses, it must return to their root by analysis. The Marburg method of grounding science is the analytic deduction of the pure root-functions. This grounding also leads to the cleansing of scientific experience, since the analytic ascent is complemented by a re-synthesizing, *constructive* descent to cognition; this second synthesis, while no longer the business of philosophy, but rather of science, is now *fully* scientific—i.e. "logically" justified—because the prior analysis has laid bare the source of its "unconscious" laws and their bindingness (*Gültigkeit*).⁸⁸ Science proceeds constructively on foundations precisely known and anchored (it is hoped) in the bedrock of reason's ultimate principle: *law*.⁸⁹

Just what, then, are these root-functions of cognition? Both Natorp and Kant take thinking to be a discursive cognition through concepts.⁹⁰ Concepts, in turn, are the predicates of possible judgements.⁹¹ Hence, for both Natorp and Kant, the root-functions of thinking are the root-functions of judgement as such, abstracted from any content, and these are *categories*.⁹² Nonetheless, Natorp seems undecided whether one can exhaustively tabulate the categories, as Kant does in the *Transcendental Analytic*. Though we cannot here explore the differences between neo-Kantian and Kantian

⁸⁷ "Ich verstehe ... unter Synthesis in der allgemeinsten Bedeutung die Handlung, verschiedene Vorstellungen zueinander hinzuzutun, und ihre Mannigfaltigkeit in einer Erkenntnis zu begreifen" (*KrV*, A77/B103).

⁸⁸ Natorp, 1969: 13. Cf. Natorp, 1917: 224; 236; 241; 243; 246; 1888: 128, ff.

⁸⁹ Cf. Natorp, 1969: 10. Cf. esp. *KrV*, A77-78/B103, ff.

⁹⁰ Cf. *KrV*, A68/B93.

⁹¹ Cf. *KrV*, A69/B94.

⁹² Cf. *KrV*, A70/B95.

doctrine, it is important to note that for Natorp and Cohen, "category" has a much broader meaning than for Kant.⁹³ The categories are no longer merely the conditions of synthesizing sensible intuition into empirical cognitions, but are themselves the laws of scientific thought.⁹⁴ Thus the function of Kant's "Ideas" is collapsed into that of his categories, yielding a new, fluid, hybrid *a priori* concept. Perhaps this is because they dissolve Kant's distinction between "predicaments" and "praedicabilia" (*Prädikamente* and *Prädikabilien*). "Predicaments" is another word for "categories," while the "praedicabilia" are what Kant calls the "equally pure [but] derived concepts," e.g. "force, action, passion, community, presence, resistance," etc. (*KrV*, A81-82/B107-108). Natorp seems to consider praedicabilia, too, to be "categories," as well as *all other* scientific concepts that are posited and imposed *a priori* upon the phenomena. Thus, e.g., he names the Kantian praedicabile, "force," in the same breath as "acceleration, energy, atom, ion, etc.," all of which are *a priori functional* concepts.⁹⁵

Nonetheless, this does not mean that Natorp holds that there are no *primitive* root-functions. Take the following remark:

"Absolut" ist ..., wenn man so will, die *Methode*, die *Gesetzlichkeit* der Bestimmung; absolut--*wenn es gelänge*, es mit voller Sicherheit aufzustellen--das *kategoriale Grundgerüst*....

⁹³ This is an inheritance from Cohen. For Cohen, every concept is a *Grundlegung* (Cohen, 1902c: 377), which, in turn, is a "category." For discussions of what Lembeck (1993) calls the "radical openness of Cohen's category-system," cf. Lembeck, 1993: 128; Edel, 1994: 334, ff.; Marx, 1981; 1984.

⁹⁴ To understand the use Cohen makes of Plato's ideas in his epistemology, one must understand how Cohen conceives the relationship of that epistemology to the natural sciences. It is primarily by elaborating the role of epistemology vis-à-vis the natural sciences that Cohen thinks of himself as a Kantian. This role has a double moment: (1) it determines and grounds the sciences, i.e. it gives the correct interpretation of the *meaning* of science; (2) it grants philosophy its own proper *scientific* role in the unending "task" of cultural progress.

The seeds of both of these moments may already be found in Kant's attempt to delimit the scope and field of pure reason, and in the grounding of that attempt upon the *fact* of mathematics and the (mathematically) exact sciences. As Dussort points out, Cohen believes an understanding of the implications of Kant's relation to the sciences to be an indispensable element of understanding Kant's contemporary (i.e. nineteenth-century) importance. "[C]'est en étudiant la science de la nature, et non *in abstracto*, dans l'éther de la spéculation, que Kant en est venu à déterminer la nature de la science" (Dussort, 1963: 122).

⁹⁵ Cf. Natorp's mention of gravity at Natorp, 1887: 263.

(Natorp, 1917: 246; original emphasis)⁹⁶

The *method* is "absolute," the *lawfulness* of determination; absolute, that is, *if one were successful in erecting the basic categorial structure* with complete certainty.

Natorp sounds skeptical whether a "basic categorial framework" could be "set up with total certainty." At the same time he admits that "lawfulness of determination" is absolute. Does this not suggest that at least those concepts must be just as absolute which are implicitly bound up with the very notion of law, the ultimate *conditio sine qua non* of thinking?⁹⁷ Would the less certain "categorial framework" then not name the system of praedicabilia lower down in the conceptual hierarchy? For Natorp, lawfulness in thinking just means synthesizing (i.e. unifying), and determining (i.e. identifying).⁹⁸ Hence, he must consider at least the concepts of unity⁹⁹ and identity¹⁰⁰ to be absolute root-concepts. But as we shall see below, the concept of unity is embedded in a co-original system¹⁰¹ of other mutually implied, equally primitive concepts, e.g., relation, identity, difference.

The reconstructive ascent attains to an *a priori* realm of subjectivity or consciousness, which, for Natorp (as for Husserl), is not psychological¹⁰² but philosophical, i.e., to the realm of atemporal, transempirical validity of (scientific) law. The systematic interrelations and interconnections of the root-functions are not the real conditions of possibility of some concrete psyche's acts of thinking (the object of empirical psychology); rather, they are the ideal conditions of possibility of the

⁹⁶ Cf. Natorp, 1917: 230: "[D]em echten Empirismus, dem kein Erfahrungssatz je schlechthin, als Letztes, Absolutes gelten darf, entspricht der echte Apriorismus, dem ebensowenig irgend ein Satz 'a priori' als Letztes, Absolutes gilt."

⁹⁷ Cf. Cohen, 1871: 96-97; Philonenko, 1989:23.

⁹⁸ Cf. Natorp, 1969: 20; 1917: 233.

⁹⁹ Cf. Lembeck, 1993: 128.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. Holzhey, 1986: 229, n. 12.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Natorp, 1969: 21.

¹⁰² Where Husserl calls the cleansing of experience and laying bare of this realm and its structures the "eidetic reduction," the study of which is "transcendental phenomenology," Natorp calls the cleansing process "reconstruction," and the study of the reconstructed realm "pure psychology" (Natorp, 1917: 226).

"scientific mind's" acts of giving law to experience, i.e., of generating knowledge in the strict sense. Whatever the psychophysical circumstances of scientific cognition, it is not these circumstances which lend it its status as knowledge, since (as the critique of psychologism showed) the objectivity of knowledge would be threatened and undermined. Rather, the status of knowledge is warranted by a particular cognition's being anchored in, and derivable from, the system of root-categories which *constitute* that autonomous and anonymous form of subjectivity called "scientific mind."¹⁰³

Thinking. For Natorp as for Kant, the legislation of experience, the generation of objectivity in the flux of sensibility, is called thinking.¹⁰⁴ Thinking is not something mind does "with" its categories; it does not "use" them to "have" experience; thinking is the activity of the categories which *are* mind; mind *makes* experience.¹⁰⁵ Or, as Natorp puts it, a category is no "organ" of consciousness. For again, if mind were to require or use an organ, then its cognition would be mediated, and mind lose its autonomy. This autonomy consists precisely in its legislative decision, its categorial incision into the given manifold of the *X*; in turn, this decision consists in *positing*, *hypo-thesizing*, *laying-down* or *in* its own pure concepts or "Denksetzungen" into the manifold.¹⁰⁶ Thinking de-termines the indeterminate flux.¹⁰⁷ The process of determination is a spontaneous act of mind, with two distinct moments: the posit of a point of view (*Hinsicht* or *Gesichtspunkt*) from which to consider the *X*, and the subsequent synthetic act of relating the *X* to that point of view.¹⁰⁸ This posit is what Natorp calls "hypo-

¹⁰³ See esp. Natorp, 1917: 225-226.

¹⁰⁴ Again, we must be clear to specify that for Cohen and Natorp thinking is always *scientific* thinking through *scientific* concepts, the predicates of possible *scientific* judgements concerning a *scientifically* undetermined object.

¹⁰⁵ *Nous* is *poietikos*. Cf. Augustine, *Confessions*, Bk. XI, Ch. 5 (Augustine, 1963:261).

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Natorp, *PI*: 203: "So aber ist [die reine Einheit] *nur* Denksetzung und nicht irgend einer andern Behandlung fähig als durch Denken."

¹⁰⁷ Cf. Natorp, 1969: 16, ff.

¹⁰⁸ As Cassirer says, since the hypothesized point of view belongs to the "form of consciousness," it is "categorial" (in the broader neo-Kantian sense of "category") (Cassirer, 1910: 33).

thesis,"¹⁰⁹ which he literally translates as *Grund-legung*, the *Ge-setz* or law of synthesis.¹¹⁰ This *Ge-setz*, which we discussed above, thus reveals itself as the point of view, a functional *principle* in accordance with which the mind synthesizes disparate representations by relating them in a single conceptual nexus (*Verknüpfung*).¹¹¹

We now see that Cassirer's *a priori* "functions" are, as it were, the legislative decisions or cuts by which thinking generates objectivities out of the sensible manifold. For this reason, Natorp calls the neo-Kantian theory of objects "genetic" (Natorp, 1969: 16). Objects are constructed, not given; what is "given" is merely and solely the utterly indeterminate *X* of the manifold.¹¹² Hence, objects can be no more than a goal or *task* of the understanding: given the *X*, the understanding has to determine--literally, to determine, to de-fine--these data, *thereby* constituting the objects of experience. Harking back to Kant, Natorp puts it this way: things are not *given simpliciter* (*gegeben*), but are *given as tasks* (*(als Auf-gaben) auf-gegeben*).¹¹³

At the same time, this process of determination does not unfold in a conceptual vacuum; it is restricted and structured by other cognitions which, for the purpose of determining some given *X*, are taken as (provisionally) established. Without such parameters, "the task of cognizing the object would not only be insoluble, but also incoherent" (Natorp, 1887: 258). Natorp compares the task of determining an *X* to solving an equation for an unknown variable. The object which is to be determined out of the manifold, the *X*, is not an absolutely unknown quantity:

¹⁰⁹ On the origin of this in Cohen's philosophy, see Holzhey, 1986.

¹¹⁰ Cassirer uses the concept of "equality" (*Gleichheit*) to illustrate the necessary activity of mind in positing or hypothesizing a point of view from which to compare two representations as to their (in)equality (Cassirer, 1910: 33). Both Natorp and Cassirer follow Cohen in their use of the word "hypothesis" (cf. Cohen, 1902b: 449).

¹¹¹ Cf. esp. Cassirer, 1910: 33; Natorp, 1969: 11.

¹¹² Cf. *KrV*, A109, et passim. Cf. Natorp, 1969: 16 (?).

¹¹³ Who or what gives this task [*Aufgabe*]? It seems that the neo-Kantians take the task as implied by rationality's prime directive. "Let there be law" must mean (at least from the perspective of the mind's theoretical interest) "let there be law for *experience*," i.e. "let the manifold be *understandable* and *understood*."

the sense [*Bedeutung*] of an equation's X is determined through the relation expressed in that equation to the known quantities; likewise, in the "equation" of cognition [*Erkenntniss*]*—*even before its solution*—*the object's sense must be determined through a determinate relation to the data of cognition. ... To wit, just as the equation's form predetermines the *general* sense of the X , so too is the general sense of the object predetermined through what we would call the "form" of cognition.

(Natorp, 1887: 258; emphasis added)

Although a given determinative act is always restricted within certain parameters, those parameters are only ever provisionally and relatively fixed, namely with respect to the particular point of view that has been laid down (hypo-thesized). As we saw, the only "absolute" is the methodological imperative, viz. that any hypothesis must be integrated or integrable in the system of all the other cognitions (which, for their part, are again only relatively fixed).

The relativity of the mind's system of cognitions (i.e. science) is not surprising, since these cognitions have meaning *exclusively* with respect to the manifold (otherwise being empty and sense-less). But the manifold is absolutely indeterminate, absolutely relative, and infinitely fecund. Hence Natorp, like Husserl, conceives the task of science as infinite: it is a "*progressively and inexhaustibly* more precise identification ... [of a transcendent world that is] *determinable and to be determined*" (Natorp, 1917: 233). The objectivity or *being* which the mind imposes on the flux by determining the X is itself in flux, i.e. constantly progressing, becoming*—*but according to *law*. Natorp illustrates this seeming paradox with the infinite progress and possibility of progress of mathematics:

Das alles *besteht* kraft der sicher gegründeten Begriffe der Mathematik, die eben nur Begriffe von den reinen Methoden, von dem gesetzmäßigen Gange des Denkens selbst sind und diesen Gang zur höchsten

erreichbaren Klarheit bringen wollen. Dieser Gang ist kein Zeitgang, also gewiß kein psychologischer oder bloß historischer.

(Natorp, 1969: 17; cf. 35, ff.)

All this *subsists* thanks to the securely grounded concepts of mathematics, which just are concepts of pure methods, of the lawful process of thinking itself, and which try to bring this process to the highest attainable degree of clarity. This process is not a temporal process, and thus certainly not a psychological or merely historical process.

Natorp radically reinterprets Kant's famous phrase, "the fact of science." In science, Natorp argues, *method* is everything--

im lateinischen Wort: der *Prozeß*. Also darf das 'Faktum' der Wissenschaft nur als 'Fieri' verstanden werden. Auf das, was getan wird, nicht was getan ist, kommt es an. Das Fieri allein ist das Faktum: alles Sein, das die Wissenschaft 'festzustellen' sucht, muß sich in den Strom des Werdens wieder lösen. Von diesem Werden aber, zuletzt nur von ihm, darf gesagt werden: es *ist*.

(Natorp, 1969: 14)

or to use the Latin word: *process* is everything. Thus the "*factum*" [that-which-has-been-done] of science must only be understood as "*fieri*" ["that-which-is-being-done"]. The *fieri* alone is the *factum*: all being which science seeks to "establish" must again resolve itself into the stream of becoming. It is only of this stream [lit. of this becoming], however, that one may ultimately say: it *is*.

Natorp delights in the paradox: "[D]as Werden--ist, der Gang--besteht, die Entwicklung ins Unendliche findet statt, so objektiv wie nichts anderes" (Natorp, 1969: 17).

Predication and the dissolution of ontology. Natorp writes that "*being-determined* [is] the only acceptable meaning of being-given," which determination can only be conceived as the "result and expression of an *act of determination*." (Natorp, 1917: 229-230).¹¹⁴ This statement encapsulates the genetic critique of the realist position, which Natorp calls "dogmatic." Since the sensible manifold is entirely indeterminate, there can be no question of any *being* or *thing* giving itself to us. But whereas before the conflict between the critical and realist, or genetic and dogmatic notions of objectivity was framed in epistemological terms, we now confront a further result: the dissolution of ontology. Traditionally, ontology is conceived as the study of the being of beings. Yet, for it to have an object of study, it must take for granted that *beings are*, that is, that they have an independent, objective existence as things, and that they are *given to us* as such. Just this objective being of things is denied by the genetic conception of objectivation. What in our pre-philosophical attitude we naively perceive as the givenness or presence of real beings is an illusion: "Subjektiv, bloß für uns gültig, sind im Gegenteil alle willkürlichen Abschlüsse, die uns Stillstand *vortäuschen*, wo in der Wahrheit der Sache ewiger Fortgang ist" (Natorp, 1969: 17; emphasis added). Natorp may as well have said that "being-determined is the only acceptable meaning of being, period." "Being" takes on an exclusively functional meaning, namely the function of predication; it is nothing more than the copula in a true predication expressing a scientific judgement; it has the sole function of relating, of identifying, of connecting subject and predicate, thereby synthetically generating cognition. As a result, "ontology," the science of being *qua* being, is resolved into a logic of judgement.

2.6. Plato and the Marburg theory of the history of philosophy.

History as history of philosophy. A historiographical commonplace of nineteenth-century German philosophy has it that the neo-Kantian labor of grounding the sciences

¹¹⁴ Cf. Natorp, 1917: 233.

was divided between the Marburg and Baden Schools, the former attending to the natural sciences, the latter to the human sciences. Recent scholarship has sought to complicate this picture, reminding us of Heinrich Rickert's contributions to philosophy of natural science,¹¹⁵ and noting that the Marburgers, too, have a theory of history.¹¹⁶ No doubt. Already Cohen argues that the disciplinary division between systematic philosophy and the history of philosophy is artificial and harmful; he insists that "[d]as Studium der Philosophie ... die Verbindung des systematischen und des historischen Interesses [fordert]" (Cohen, 1902b: 440).¹¹⁷ This injunction to integrate philosophy's "systematic and historical interest" motivates Natorp's and Cassirer's historical studies of Kant, Leibniz, Descartes, Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Nicholas of Cusa--and Plato.

Still, the common view, however incomplete, is not wrong, for the Marburg theory of history has a very different starting-point than does the Baden School. Unlike Rickert and Windelband, Cohen and Natorp do not begin their theory of history from the "fact" of historical science, in the way they begin their theory of the natural sciences from the "fact" of mathematical physics. When the Marburgers speak of history, they mean history of *philosophy*; only secondarily are they interested in political, economic, or social history, and only insofar as it advances their primary project.¹¹⁸

The Marburg conception of genuine philosophy as *in the first place* a transcendental logic of natural science¹¹⁹ therefore restricts history to a history of "scientific idealism."¹²⁰ In rejecting the common view that scientific progress is better understood exclusively from a "systematic" perspective, "detach[ed] ... from its

¹¹⁵ E.g. Rickert, 1899, 1902. Cf. Bambach, 1995; Cassirer, 1953: 221-222.

¹¹⁶ Cf. esp. Edel, 1994; Laks, 1994; Lembeck, 1994.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Cohen, 1902b: 443.

¹¹⁸ For more general considerations on nineteenth-century German philosophical approaches to history, see Schnädelbach, 1983b: 120, ff.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Cohen, 1902b: 445: "[Die Frage, welche Wissenschaft es eigentlich sei, mit der die Logik in Verbindung stehen und bleiben müsse,] führt zu der andern nach dem Begriffe der Wissenschaft. Diese letztere Frage jedoch ist die Hauptfrage der Logik und die Grundfrage der Philosophie."

¹²⁰ "Der Zusammenhang mit der Geschichte bedeutet zuvörderst den Zusammenhang mit der Wissenschaft" (Cohen, 1902b: 443). Cf. Lembeck, 1994: 2, 4.

historical bonds,"¹²¹ Cohen remarks that the "very value and security of science is rooted in its own history, as it were connected with the general history of mind [*Geist*]" (Cohen, 1916: 310). This sounds odd since we have heard again and again that science is rooted in its *method*, but now are told it is rooted in its history. Perhaps the paradox is only seeming. As I argued above, German Idealism's abolition of the *Ding an sich* leads to a "processual" view of the mind as positing the world, and the historicization of knowledge. We now find a similarly intimate connection between the Marburg School's notion of hypothesis as the active posit of mind, on the one hand, and its notion of science as essentially historical, on the other. Their conception of the logic of science as the dynamic of categorial hypotheses implies that science can only be grasped developmentally, i.e. historically.

Yet the Marburg view of that history differs importantly from Hegel's, in that it is not based upon a sequence of conceptual contradiction and resolution. For Hegel, history is the *linear* evolution of *Geist*'s self-knowledge through time; the further to the right you go, the more advanced the stage of (self-)consciousness. These stages—the "phenomena"—of *Geist* are inseparable from, indeed just *are* their cultural manifestations.¹²² Cohen and Natorp also take genuine history to be the history of rational self-consciousness, but for them this simply means reason's consciousness of the basis of science: method. This principle is in itself unchanging, eternal, atemporal; it is not expressed in phenomena, but instead makes possible and generates phenomena as such. Because its object is essentially detached from time, this history is not conceived with respect to time.¹²³ Of course science develops in time, and may be tracked diachronically along a time-line, yet its innermost core is the self-same atemporal idea, around which science *circles*, its progression represented by ever wider, but concentric

¹²¹ Cf. Cohen, 1902b: 439.

¹²² I mean "culture" in the widest sense to include religion, politics, art, and science.

¹²³ As Faulkner said: "Das Vergangene ist nie tot. Es ist nicht einmal vergangen."

orbits.¹²⁴ Thus, for the Marburgers, the history of science is *ideal*, in the sense of focusing solely upon those moments of reflective illumination when science becomes self-conscious--through philosophy--of its rational foundation or transcendental nucleus.¹²⁵ Cohen writes: "In der Geschichte einer jeden Wissenschaft nämlich vollzieht sich immer konzentrisch die Geschichte der allgemeinen wissenschaftlichen *Vernunft*" (Cohen, 1916: 310). He considers the fact that each of these moments of self-consciousness must occur in concrete circumstances and have a unique point on a real time-line to be as obvious as it is irrelevant.¹²⁶

Plato: the historical core and living marrow of scientific idealism. The transcendental nucleus is method, and method is the meaning of idealism; hence, idealism is born when reason becomes self-conscious of its thinking as methodical and scientific.¹²⁷ Since this birth has a historical locus, Cohen argues, "idealism's historical origin ... conditions idealism through its connection with the methodological foundation of science no less than its material origin in methodology" (Cohen, 1916: 309).¹²⁸ Put another way, idealism connects with its methodological foundation *by* connecting with its historical origin.¹²⁹ It follows that idealism has two related historical tasks, on the Marburg view:

¹²⁴ Kant expresses a similar thought: "Indessen drehen sich die menschliche Bemühungen in einem beständigen Zirkel und kommen wieder auf einen Punct, wo sie schon einmal gewesen seyn; alsdenn können Materialien, die jetzt im Staube liegen, vielleicht zu einem herrlichen Baue verarbeitet werden." (Kants Antwort an Garve, Prolegomena, ed. Vorländer, S. 194; quoted in Heidegger, 1962: 43). Cf. Schlegel's notion of philosophy's circular-progressive "Gang" (Schlegel *KA* VIII: xlv).

¹²⁵ As Tom Stoppard puts it: "If an idea's worth having once, it's worth having twice."

¹²⁶ Cohen writes: "[N]ichts [ist] so irreführend für die Charakteristik einer geschichtlichen Tatsache, als die Demonstration auf ihre *Einmaligkeit*, die sie freilich als brutale Tatsache behalten muß. Aber von dieser Tatsächlichkeit und Isoliertheit aus erfordert ihre geschichtliche Würdigung, daß sie in Reih und Glied gestellt werde mit allen den verwandten Zeugnissen aller Zeiten" (Cohen, 1916: 310). In this passage he implicitly criticizes the Baden School's opposition of nomothetic and idiographic sciences, with its stress on the uniqueness and unrepeatability of historical--in contrast to scientific--facts. Cf. e.g. Natorp, 1994: vii, ff.

¹²⁷ "Der Idealismus ist in seinem sachlich historischen Grunde als wissenschaftlicher Idealismus, in der Begründung der Wissenschaft entstanden" (Cohen, 1916: 309).

¹²⁸ "[D]er historische Ursprung, wie der sachliche der Methodik, bedingt den Idealismus durch diesen seinen Zusammenhang mit der methodischen Begründung der Wissenschaft." A good example of what Edel calls Cohen's "hermetic diction" (Edel, 1994: 329).

¹²⁹ Cf. Cohen, 1902b: 450: "So weist der Idealismus der reinen Vernunft auf die Geschichte hinaus, welche in ihrer nie versiegenden Arbeit das unverdächtige Recht erlangt hat, immer neue Grundlagen sich auszugraben. Zugleich aber giebt der Idealismus der wissenschaftlichen Vernunft den Halt und die

the primary task is to open and maintain a direct connection to its origin. This involves a secondary task, viz. retracing *previous* scientific connections to that same primal idealism, which alone can serve as the criterion of their "relatedness [*Verwandtheit*]." ¹³⁰ The history of idealism is therefore not of its *evolution*, but of its periodic *rebirths*.

The history of science is one of often contradictory or incommensurable theories, each of which is represented as a ring in Cohen's image. Nonetheless--as *scientific*--the variety of theories express the central, unitary activity of reason: positing hypotheses. Because of this constant *unity of scientific reason*, a "continuous connection of reason and the fundamental forces [*Grundkräfte*] of its history is required" (Cohen, 1916: 310). By "fundamental forces" Cohen just means Greek antiquity; ¹³¹ specifically, *Plato*:

Plato wird der Begründer des Systems der Philosophie ... weil er die Logik begründete, und in ihr das System der Philosophie. Er gilt allgemein als der Begründer des Idealismus. Aber das Wort Idealismus ist in der gesamten Geschichte der Kultur, in welcher es trotz alledem das führende Stichwort geworden und geblieben ist, nur an leuchtenden Wendepunkten ¹³² aus einer unklaren und ungenauen Bedeutung herausgetreten.

(Cohen, 1902b: 446)

Plato is the founder of the system of philosophy ... because he founded logic, and thereby the system of philosophy. He is generally to be understood as the founder of idealism. But the word, "idealism," in the

Sicherheit der Geschichte, dass sie nicht zu fürchten hat, in Flugsand ihre Grundlagen zu legen; sondern dass sie in einem Schachte zu graben vermag, der unerschöpflich, aber auch unerschütterlich ist; ewig wandelbar, aber ebenso unveränderlich; daher den ewigen und einheitlichen Grund der Geschichte der Kultur bildet, und zuvörderst den der Wissenschaft."

¹³⁰ Cf. Cohen, 1916: 310. The striking similarity between this double task and the means and ends of Heidegger's "Destruktion" of the history of European metaphysics will concern us in a later chapter.

¹³¹ "Im Idealismus der wissenschaftlichen Methodik erweist sich die Antike als die lebendige Grundkraft für die Geschichte der Wissenschaft" (Cohen, 1916: 309).

¹³² Cf. Cohen, 1902b: 450, ff.; 1916: 303.

whole history of culture, in which it has against the odds remained the guiding slogan, has only emerged at certain illuminating turningpoints from an unclear and inexact meaning.

History's "illuminating turningpoints," when idealism's meaning manifests itself clearly and distinctly, are the moments when the *generative principle* of scientific knowledge shines forth, drawing the mind from its hyperbolic forays into the void back into the regular orbit of reason; when we realize that we cannot simply be guided by the things as they appear to us. They are the moments of reason's recollection, rebirth, and self-renewal.¹³³

Hence the Marburgers consider it of the utmost significance that their heroes—especially Galileo, Leibniz and Kant—explicitly connect their conceptions of science to Plato. As Cohen and Natorp select and interpret their predecessors in idealism, they see illustrated in them the crucial, *immanent* role of historical reflection in science, by which it ascends to transcendental self-reflection upon its methodological foundation.¹³⁴ As Cohen puts it, "history is ... a sign [*Wahrzeichen*] of the inner life and growth of all problems of scientific reason as they emerge out of the root of their methodology" (Cohen, 1916: 310); and that root is, historically, *Plato*: "Der Idealismus ist der Idealismus der Platonischen Idee" (Cohen, 1916: 305).¹³⁵ For Cohen and Natorp, "Plato" signifies the organizing principle of science as a historically unfolding, living enterprise; to stop reading Plato is to subtract from science its rational core, and deprive it—not of its method, which it will always have *qua* science—but of the self-transparency of its own foundation and legitimacy.

¹³³ Cohen, 1916: 309.

¹³⁴ Cf. Cohen, 1902b: 450: "So weist der Idealismus der reinen Vernunft auf die Geschichte hinaus, welche in ihrer nie versiegenden Arbeit das unverdächtige Recht erlangt hat, immer neue Grundlagen sich auszugraben. Zugleich aber giebt der Idealismus der wissenschaftlichen Vernunft den Halt und die Sicherheit der Geschichte, dass sie nicht zu fürchten hat, in Flugsand ihre Grundlagen zu legen; sondern dass sie in einem Schachte zu graben vermag, der unerschöpflich, aber auch unerschütterlich ist; ewig wandelbar, aber ebenso unveränderlich; daher den ewigen und einheitlichen Grund der Geschichte der Kultur bildet, und zuvörderst den der Wissenschaft."

¹³⁵ Yet more pregnantly, provocatively put: "Philosophie ist Platonismus" (Cohen, 1912: 245).

Although history, according to Cohen, "discloses the origin of idealism from the start," we must rely no less upon our methodic understanding of idealism in order "to recognize this idealism correctly wherever it appears" (Cohen, 1916: 305). This statement confirms the hermeneutic inseparability of system and history: each supports the other. By "systematically" determining idealism as the method of science, we enable idealism to recognize itself in its historical manifestations; these manifestations, in turn, furnish the "fact" of science to be systematically determined. This reciprocity of history and theory informs the following passage, in which Cohen links Plato with the Marburg program.

[D]er Begriff des Idealismus muss logisch bestimmt werden. Diese Bestimmung ist die tiefste Aufgabe und der höchste Inhalt der Logik. Plato hat diese Bestimmung getroffen, indem er die Verbindung mit der Wissenschaft für die Logik feststellte und dadurch die Logik begründete. Die Bestimmung liegt in dem Begriffe der Idee, deren Missverständniss die Unbestimmtheit des Idealismus zur nothwendigen Folge hatte. *Was bedeutet die Idee?*

(Cohen, 1902b: 447)

The concept of idealism must be determined logically. This determination is the most profound task and the highest content of logic. Plato found this determination by establishing logic's connection to science, and thus grounding logic. The determination lies in the concept of the Idea [i.e. Platonic form], the misunderstanding of which led necessarily to the indeterminacy of the notion of idealism itself. *What does Idea mean?*

In other words, to succeed in the methodic or "logical" determination of idealism, we can do no better than ask the historical question of how *Plato* "hits upon this determination."

Considerations. Hans-Georg Gadamer favorably contrasts Heidegger's approach to Greek philosophy against the neo-Kantians', who, he says, "hasten[ed] ... to reconcile and equate the Greek beginnings with Kant and transcendental philosophy--in the way, for instance, that Natorp had turned Plato into a Kantian before Kant" (Gadamer, 1994: 27-28). Gadamer's characterization of Natorp is not quite accurate, for as the next chapter will show, Natorp's Plato is not a Kantian but a *neo-Kantian avant la lettre*. We have already seen some of the great differences between Kant's philosophy and the Marburg School's, especially the latter's focus on the epistemology of science purified of any psychologistic overtones, and the radical openness of its categorial system.¹³⁶ There is virtually no trace of what in Chapter One we saw *Kant* to have found "Kantian" in Plato, because the entire domain of the "Ideas" or *Vernunftbegriffe* has disappeared from neo-Kantianism.

The Marburg "theory" of history, in sum, is this: Plato's moment of insight into the truth of transcendental idealism (à la Cohen), is followed by millenia of dark irrelevance, punctuated by the shining rings of recollection, culminating in ... the Marburg School. If there was something abstract or even cubist about the Marburgers' ontological dislocations laid out earlier in this chapter, the picture I have just painted of their *Philosophiegeschichtsphilosophie*¹³⁷ will strike many as downright surreal. I shall not plead the contrary. Yet before leaning in to scrutinize Natorp's Plato, it seems right to note the following.

Though we must understand the Marburgers' conception of history in order to grasp their motivation for reading and re-reading Plato, yet we need not accept that conception in order to appreciate either Cohen's logic of science or Natorp's readings of Plato. Karl-Heinz Lembeck puts it well in the introduction to *Platon in Marburg*:

¹³⁶ Still, Cohen can write: "Idealism is the idealism of the Platonic idea, and Kant, with a profound understanding of history, also connected his idealism to Plato" (Cohen, 1916: 305).

¹³⁷ The term is Lembeck's; cf. Lembeck, 1994: 1-2.

It is not a matter of proving that Plato's philosophy is not transcendental idealism; that is self-evident, and so is taken for granted. It is however something entirely else to show why Cohen and Natorp believe that Plato, at least in principle, laid the groundwork for this idealism.

(Lembeck, 1994: 5)

Fortunately for them, we can betray their *idée fixe* of Plato as the living heart of transcendental idealism without, as they would think, destroying or dismissing their work. Indeed, we can perhaps better appreciate what is of value in Natorp's reading of Plato if we do *not* think of it as support for Marburg idealism *per se*, but simply as an ingenious attempt to make sense of the relation of ideal form and empirical particular, an attempt that merely takes Cohen's logic of categorial functions as its point of departure--as a hypothetical springboard.

3. Natorp's Plato.

3.1. Introduction.

In *Platos Ideenlehre*, Natorp takes up Cohen's philosophical and historical intuitions and forms them into an overarching interpretation of the Platonic theory of *ideai*.¹ Examining some twenty dialogues through more than 450 pages, Natorp relentlessly promotes the thesis that the *ideai* signify not noetic substances or *things*, but "hypotheses," or, equivalently, "laws of thought," "methods of science." For all its severe adherence to the Platonic texts and its strict internal coherence, traits which give the work a sense of almost hermetic self-containment, *Platos Ideenlehre* stands at that extraordinarily complicated nexus of influences and arguments which I sketched above. Natorp dons the mantle—as so many others—of an apostle of the true Platonic doctrine, and defends it against Aristotle the Apostate. But this apparent preoccupation with Aristotle's misinterpretation of the theory of *ideai* much obscures the true objects of Natorp's critique, for whom Aristotle stands in as an icon.² For just as the true philosophy is perennial, so are, Natorp thinks, its misunderstandings, and Aristotle was the first misunderstander. Thus, in criticizing Aristotle, Natorp is at once attacking a whole tendency of thought that is parasitic on the perennial philosophy, a canker which now threatens Kant, Idealism's latest bloom.

Perhaps the most suspect feature of Natorp's Plato-interpretation is that it proves too much. In the dialogues he everywhere finds evidence either of straight Marburg doctrine or its anticipation; passages that appear to support the orthodox interpretation of the *ideai*, are crisply explained away as "metaphorics." Natorp is convinced that to read Plato is to see idealism sprout and grow in its pristine, native habitat: "In Plato ist der Idealismus urwüchsig, gleichsam autochthon" (*PI*: viii-ix).³ Yet even in Greece,

¹ On Natorp's relation, and specifically *PI*'s indebtedness to Cohen, see Philonenko, 1989: 10-11.

² Cf. esp. Natorp, 1887: 276. Here the conflict between Plato and Aristotle is likened to, if not identified with, the conflict between contemporary Idealism and Positivism; which conflict, in turn, is generally described as the "Streit um den Vorrang des Allgemeinen oder des Einzelnen."

³ Cf. *PI*: x-xi, 129, 316; Cohen, 1878: 346; 1916: 322: "Der Vorzug der Antike liegt vor allem anderen in ihrem Alter, und das will sagen, in ihrer *Ursprünglichkeit*."

idealism grows slowly, and blossoms late. Plato's idealism has to pass through several phases, from static concepts through static categories before producing the mature and infinitely fecund theory of functional hypotheses--the seeds of all genuine science. This picture also governs Natorp's chronology of the dialogues, a chronology which is based less on stylistic or stylometric considerations, and more upon his view of an evolution from a dogmatic to a functional interpretation of the *ideai*.⁴

In depicting and elucidating Natorp's Plato, I will not try to summarize his argument as he pursues it through all the dialogues, but will focus on those which best exemplify his view. I begin with the *Phaedrus*, because it is here that we see Natorp deal with the "mysticism" that so distresses Kant, and the ocular metaphors that lead to the Aristotelian reading of the *ideai*-as-things.⁵ I then turn to the *Theaetetus*, which Natorp considers a watershed in Plato's development, before finally turning to the *Phaedo*. It is in the *Phaedo*'s account of the method of hypothesis that Natorp thinks

⁴ Cf. *PI*: ix-x. Kant already expresses a similar anti-philological sentiment in a letter to Karl Morgenstern, thanking the latter for his *de Platonis republica*: "Ich werde daraus viel lernen, ... und ich glaube an Ihnen den Mann zu finden, der eine Geschichte der Philosophie, nicht nach der Zeitfolge der Bücher, die darin geschrieben worden, sondern nach der natürlichen Gedankenfolge, wie sie sich nach und nach aus der menschlichen Vernunft hat entwickeln müssen, abzufassen im Stande ist, so wie die Elemente derselben in der Kritik d. r. V. aufgestellt werden" (Letter of 8/14/1795, in Ak. Ed. XII: 36).

Platos Ideenlehre at once argues for a certain interpretation of the theory of forms, and advances a chronology of the dialogues. The two projects mutually support each other: the interpretation is supposed to furnish content-based grounds for the chronology; the chronology is supposed to make plausible the interpretation. Natorp's approach is one of the last great efforts to argue for a chronology primarily on *material* rather than *formal*, i.e. stylometric, grounds.

For the reasons I discuss below, Natorp felt compelled to establish an early dating for the *Phaedrus*, i.e. before the *Theaetetus*, the *Republic*, and of course the late dialogues. Already in 1899 and 1900, four years before the publication of the first edition of *Platos Ideenlehre*, he published a three-part article on the dating of the *Phaedrus* and *Theaetetus* (Natorp, 1899). The contemporary consensus is for the following order: *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, *Theaetetus*.

Second-guessing as a hermeneutic principle is already familiar to us from Kant. Unlike Kant, however, the Marburgers may well be charged with that fourth hermeneutic misdemeanor identified by Robinson, viz. "misinterpretation ... for the sake of *insinuating the future*, that is to say, of reading into your author doctrines that did not become explicit until later." As he puts it: "Such insinuation of the future is often a way of improving your author, of smoothing out his mistakes; and it is common both among those who wish to increase the prestige of an ancient writer and among those who wish to recommend a modern doctrine" (Robinson, 1953: 3). It is another question whether Natorp's "misinterpretation" might not prove to be a "valuable device" for "disentangling a new idea from old matter, and to develop it more than its originator did" (Robinson, 1953: 4). Cf. Augustine, *Confessions*, Bk. XI.

⁵ Heidegger includes a reflection on the *Phaedrus*, very much opposed to Natorp's general line, in Heidegger, 1992. He emphasizes the *rhetorical* topos of the dialogue, which Natorp, typically, considers a mere "occasion" for the *Ideenlehre*. Cf. *Was ist Metaphysik?*

Plato finally abandons the "mysticism" of the *Phaedrus* in favor of a sober logic of the sciences.

3.2. *Phaedrus*: the enthusiastic program.

Stubborn naivety. For Natorp, the *Phaedrus* marks the threshold between the "Socratic" and the "idealistic" Plato: here he for the first time focuses upon non-empirical concepts *qua* non-empirical, and especially how they must be treated by a proper science of their own: dialectic. This is, from a Kantian perspective, a great advance for "criticism." Plato opens a view to pure *a priori* concepts or categories, the mind's unique property. But the *Phaedrus* has all the ambiguity of a threshold. To Natorp, it seems as though Plato, in his enthusiastic rush to get inside, hasn't properly wiped his feet upon crossing from the muddy wilds of dogmatism into the pristine house of criticism. The traces of those errant paths remain in alarming evidence.

Natorp chiefly objects to the "mystical," the "poetic," the "metaphoric" renderings of pure concepts, specifically, the description of their existence in a separate, pure, hyperuranian "place." This kind of extravagance, Natorp thinks, invites Aristotle and all the other critics to charge the theory of *ideai* with the paradoxes of separation. While he insists that Plato is merely speaking metaphorically here, Natorp nonetheless admits that more than poetic licentiousness is to blame: Plato himself has not fully disentangled the ramifications of his insight into the "reality" of *a priori* concepts.⁶

In particular, Natorp holds that Plato's talk of intuition or psychic *vision* betrays a lingering psychologistic conception of cognition. Earlier I discussed the correspondence between psychologism's logical and its psychological doctrines. I also exposed the psychologism implicit even in anti-associationist intuitionism of non-empirical objects. It is psychologism of this latter kind which informs the *Phaedrus*'s intuitionistic (mystical) discourse of the "seeing" soul. The psychology of inner sense

⁶ Cf. esp. Natorp, 1911: 66, f.; *PI*: 293.

as *organon* is dogmatic, because its view of the subject presupposes an object as given. Natorp holds that the naive, essentially pre-philosophical world-view of dogmatism is overcome only slowly, if at all, in self-reflection. For even when the mind gains an inkling that there are such things as pure concepts, its dogmatic preconceptions incline it to think of these pure concepts as "things," and interpret its knowledge of them as intuited—not through an outer sense—but by the soul conceived as an organon, as having or being an "eye."

He interprets the *Phaedrus* as exhibiting the psychologistic confusion faced by a naive dogmatist at the moment the notion of pure *a priori* concepts dawns on him. A lingering *Ding*-ontology leads Plato to describe a super-sensible realm of true being, one in which the disembodied soul views or intuites (*anschaut*) essences, objects radically divorced from the sensible world of becoming. Thus dialectic—the operations of logical functions—is still conceived merely instrumentally, namely as a means of purifying the soul-*qua*-intuiting-organ, enabling it to regain that primordial, unencumbered intellectual vision.⁷ This kind of language suggests that these essences are, as objects of vision, objects external to the mind, i.e. that they are supersensible yet thought-independent *things*.⁸ Plato has not yet articulated dialectic as reason's own active method of spontaneously positing its own pure concepts.⁹

⁷ Cf. Dummett, 1994: 62-63. "What Frege here ["Logik" (1897), *Posthumous Writings*, 145] calls 'the most mysterious process of all' is the mental act of grasping a thought. From the standpoint of his mythology of the third realm, it indeed appears mysterious. We perceive physical objects by means of our senses, and perceive them always in some particular way; by one or another sense-modality, by means of this or that sense-organ, from a certain distance, in a certain direction, in particular physical circumstances. But with what organ do we grasp a thought? It cannot be presented to you and to me in different ways: if you grasped it in one way and I in another, the way each of us grasped it would be part of the sense, and hence it would not be precisely the same thought that we both grasped.

This is what Barry Smith refers to as the 'linkage problem.' ..."

⁸ There is an obvious problem with Natorp's story here: the dogmatic view he thinks Plato abandons by the *Republic* seems premised on exactly the same analogy between the carnal and the psychic eye.

⁹ Natorp tells a curiously similar story of Husserl's struggle properly to understand the nature of the eidetic structures of the transcendental ego in *Ideas*. In that work, Natorp argues, one can actually observe Husserl overcoming the tenacious dogmatism encoded in his talk of "eidetic intuition," and advance to a functional account of the *eidē*. Cf. esp. Natorp, 1917: 231.

Plato's program. Natorp describes the *Phaedrus* as a mixture of poetry and philosophy—in this he states the obvious. On the other hand, his explanation of this mixture deserves close scrutiny. I have already mentioned the first reason he gives for Plato's poetic expression, namely that he has not yet gotten clear about the true significance of the opposition of being and becoming. Related to this is a second reason, namely the annunciatory nature of the *Phaedrus*. Placing, as he does, the *Phaedrus* before the *Theaetetus*, *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, and *Republic* (in that order), Natorp follows Schleiermacher in considering it to be a programmatic dialogue, both as a sketch of genuinely Platonic philosophy, and as an "explanation of [Plato's] intended manner of teaching," i.e., dialectic (*PI*: 60).¹⁰ Natorp maintains that the programmatic thrust of the dialogue explains why, though the *Phaedrus* calls for argumentation as the heart of philosophy, it exhibits little of the same, striking, as it may, the reader as a collection of precepts: Plato's purpose here is simply to *assert* distinctions in a schematic way, with the tacit promise of later justification (e.g. in the *Theaetetus*). To this end, he requires language that will impress as strongly as possible upon the reader the radical novelty of his conception of dialectic and its relation to the true, pristine realm of being. That language unfortunately is a poetic *Metaphernspiel* which suggests an intuitionistic interpretation of the Platonic doctrine. Plato asserts his theses, for instance in the third speech, in the form of "revelations of hitherto unknown, indeed unheard-of truths, which have been more intuitively gazed upon than rationally worked out" (*PI*: 62).

Focus on method. The "revelation" in question is Plato's progress beyond Socratism. The Socratic dialogues were especially concerned with the concepts of various virtues, and dialectic was subordinated to ethical investigation, serving it as an instrument of

¹⁰ "Nur darin irte [Schleiermacher], daß er deshalb [i.e. wegen der programmatischen Absicht des Dialogs] glaubte den *Phaedrus* ganz an den Anfang des platonischen Wirkens setzen zu müssen. Er bezeichnet gleichwohl einen Anfang, nämlich den Anfang des ganz eigenen, über die Sokratik selbständig hinausgehenden Wirkens und Forschens des Philosophen" (*PI*: 61).

conceptual analysis. Passing beyond Socrates's preoccupations in the *Phaedrus*, attention supposedly shifts from the ethical *content* to the scientific (i.e. logical) *form* of philosophy.¹¹ The formal logic of argument is thematized independently here for the first time as dialectic, presented as an "absolutely founding [*grundlegend*] philosophical discipline" (*PI*: 63). Natorp argues that Plato's new elevation of the formal aspect of science as itself worthy of "scientific reflection," i.e. "as itself a science," constitutes the discovery of method as such, which just is the "form of science," "mak[ing] science science" (*PI*: 63-64). The study of dialectic as method is, therefore, the "first, foundational science;" as he puts it somewhat breathlessly, "the world-historical name of Plato's method is 'dialectic'" (*PI*: 64; cf. 72-73).

In the *Phaedrus* we ostensibly find prefigured the dialectical method of synthesis and analysis. While the formal requirements of true dialogue have already received occasional treatment in the Socratic dialogues, Natorp stresses that the new *procedural* elements of "synthesis" and "analysis" introduced in the *Phaedrus*, adapted and elaborated as they may be in later dialogues, are never abandoned by Plato.¹² They constitute the formal structure of philosophy as Plato henceforth understands it.¹³ This emphasis on the *Phaedrus*'s equation of dialectic and philosophy has deep Kantian roots. For Kant, philosophy is nothing more than the "discursive con-nexion of concepts," to wit, along chains of syntheses (to ever more general and less conditioned concepts), or of analyses (into ever more specific and more conditioned concepts). It is no accident that Natorp emphasizes the identity of philosophy and dialectic here, since

¹¹ Cf. 2:28.

¹² Plato of course does not use the words "synthesis" and "analysis"—Natorp is referring to the *Phaedrus*'s well-known description of dialectic as a dual process of collection and division.

"Collection," may be read as combining species (?), individuals (?), and so ascending in generality, while "division," separates such dialectically (synagogically) collected wholes into their "natural" parts, and so descends into specificity. Natorp discusses synthesis and analysis in detail in his (1910: 16-26), q.v.

¹³ Cf. *PI*: 64; cf. 66.

he fears that precisely the *Phaedrus's* presentation of that identity might tempt one into a non-discursive, intuitionistic interpretation of mind, and so of Platonism.¹⁴

Method and being. Corresponding to the thematization of dialectic, the *Phaedrus* also demarcates a special region of dialectic's proper objects, namely pure concepts. According to Natorp, it is just this separation of the pure concept from any admixture of sensibility which Plato tries to express by starkly opposing the realm of (sensible) becoming and that of (noetic) being: "Es soll der Begriff *von allem Sinnlichen rein abgelöst*, es soll die Denksetzung rein nach dem darin gesetzten Inhalt, ohne jede fremdartige Beimischung, im Gedanken festgehalten werden" (*PI*: 71). Natorp writes:

Ohne Zweifel aber ist es genau dies, was [Plato] nun [im *Phaedros*] zur vollen Klarheit gekommen ist, und was er ausdrücken will mit der durch *bloße Vernunft*, durch *ungemischte* d.i. von aller Sinnlichkeit unberührte Erkenntnis erfaßlichen, farb- und gestaltlosen, unberührbaren, wahrhaft seienden Wesenheit (247c), mit der Erkenntnis, die am Werden nicht teilhat, nicht irgendwo ist, eine andre in einem Andern von dem was wir jetzt seiend nennen, sondern als wahrhafte Erkenntnis nur in dem *ist*, d.h. ihr Objekt hat, was wahrhaft ist ([*Phaedrus*] 247de).

(*PI*: 72)

Without a doubt it is precisely this which Plato now in the *Phaedrus* has seen with full clarity, and which he wants to express by a color- and formless, untouchable and truly being essence [Wesenheit] that is only graspable by *mere* reason, through an *unmixed* cognition, i.e. one which is untouched by any sensibility; by a cognition that has nothing to do with Becoming, which is in no place, and is another kind of cognition in

¹⁴ It appears that Kant's condemnation of Plato's mystical tendency, too, is aimed at the *Phaedrus* ("VT").

realm other than the one we now call real, and that true cognition *is* only in that--i.e. has its object--which is true (wahrhaft).

It is this, and this alone, Natorp maintains, that we are to understand by the vexing term *chôrismos*, namely the separation of the *standpoint* from which reason and concepts are to be considered. That is, we are to consider them *apart from* (*chôris*) any and all contributions of sensible intuition.

By isolating them in this way, we can get clear about *reason's* contributions, which make possible knowledge, *epistêmê*, or, for the Marburgers, *Wissenschaft*. This cognition (*Erkenntnis*)--viz. the pure, unmixed elements of cognition--is conceived as the "absolutely *original*" aspect of cognition, the priority of which is *expressed as* supersensible intuition. Plato speaks metaphorically about the conditions under which the soul might attend to its own pure, non-empirical, and spontaneous contributions to cognition when he says that only a soul completely free of the body (i.e. of sensible representations) is capable of such an intuition. To the incarnate soul, this supersensible intuition is available only derivatively, "als schwacher Abglanz jener ursprünglichen Schau," i.e.,

as recollection of that which the soul saw once upon a time, as it surveyed that which we now say *is*, when it dove up into true being ([*Phaedrus*] 249c).

(*PI*: 72)

What the "pure and unblemished" soul saw up there were the "spectacles on which we gazed in the moment of final revelation": "whole and unblemished likewise, free from all alloy, steadfast and blissful." And "pure was the light that shone around us, and pure were we, without taint of that prisonhouse which now we are encompassed withal, and call a body..." (*Phdr.* 250bc).¹⁵

¹⁵ Hackforth, 1961.

Natorp, interpreting this "poetic" passage in light of Plato's later, purportedly non-mythical explications of the same basic notions, dismisses the visionary cloak of metaphors as symbolism derived partly from Orphic sources,¹⁶ partly from the vocabulary of Parmenides's poem. One may distill the purely "logical" meaning of all this, namely "the pure separation of the content that is posited in thinking and through thinking, e.g. Unity, Identity, and thereby Being" (*PI*: 72). Thus Plato goes beyond the Socratic "concept," which is used merely as an instrument for the treatment (*Bearbeitung*) of other representations, whatever their source might be. He is now fastening upon the concept as the "pure, proper *creation* [*Schöpfung*] of thinking," and, coordinately, upon the "proper object of a proper, or rather the only *pure* type of science or knowledge" (*PI*: 72). Authentic Platonic dialectic, in the neo-Kantian understanding, is more than what Kant calls the "discursive connexion of concepts," the work of the understanding; rather, it is in its first moment a discursive analysis of the *pure* concepts which underlie all of thinking's synthetic work.¹⁷ Only by taking these pure concepts as its objects can dialectic transcend the ancillary role of an organon, of a "bloß immanente Methode" in the service of another science, be it ethics, mathematics, or an empirical science.

3.3. *Theaetetus*

Natorp considers the *Theaetetus* to be the first installment of the program announced in the *Phaedrus*, and dates it between the *Phaedrus* and the *Phaedo* (*PI*: 96). At long last, Plato gives the "most central of all philosophical questions," the question of knowledge,¹⁸ a rigorous, non-metaphoric treatment, in isolation from ethics (*PI*: 92).¹⁹

¹⁶ Cf. Hamilton, 1973: 54, n.1.

¹⁷ Cf. esp. Natorp, 1910: 9.

¹⁸ Precisely what Natorp means by "knowledge" in the context of the *Theaetetus* is unclear: does he mean cognition by the concrete, individual *psyche*, or does he instead mean "science?" In Cohen's view, this question, "What is knowledge [*Erkenntnis*]?" is Plato's fundamental question. But, he writes, if we translate ἐπιστήμη as "*Erkenntnis*," we may be making an error: "Wir übersetzen hierbei [i.e. mit *Erkenntnis*] jedoch das griechische Wort nicht ganz genau; wir könnten und sollten

He separates and orders the faculties of sensibility and of conceptual thought, and develops a new theory of judgement to "ground" our cognitions (*PI*: 90-91). These two achievements of the *Theaetetus* lay the groundwork for the full elaboration of the theory of *ideai* in the *Phaedo*. In the former, the *ideai* are defined as rigid, quasi-Kantian categories or *Grundbegriffe*; in the latter, they get incorporated into a *scientific method* as flowing, quasi-neo-Kantian categories or *Grundsätze*. That is, according to Natorp, the *Theaetetus* shows how the elements of science—namely individual cognitions—are possible. In turn, the *Phaedo* will show by what method these cognitions can be connected into judgements, the further systematic concatenation of which is science.²⁰

Eidos and idea. One of the key claims of the Marburg interpretation of the *Ideenlehre* is that the Platonic *idea* somehow goes beyond the Socratic *eidos*.²¹ A concept, in the Kantian vocabulary, is a representation of the mind that unifies any number of intuited

vielleicht ebenso genau übersetzen: was ist Wissenschaft?" (Cohen, 1902b: 447; emphasis added). Thus, it appears that "Erkenntnis" signifies (as it does for Kant) the moment of empirical cognition, the moment, that is, when the psyche understands an intuitively given representation (what Rose calls a "cogneme" [Rose, 1981: 10]). While Cohen goes on to interpret the question of knowledge as the question of science, Natorp, in his philologically more circumspect way, seems to interpret the *Theaetetus*, at any rate, as restricting its claims to psychology, albeit *pure* or *transcendental* psychology, in the sense discussed above.

¹⁹ This view, that a lingering "Socratic" interest in ethics hampered Plato in developing his true interest—the pure theory of knowledge—is attacked by Stenzel, who argues that the Marburgers distorted Plato's *really* central interest, namely "*politeia*" (Stenzel, 1956). Stenzel's argument against the Marburg School depends in large part on the assumption of the *Seventh Letter*'s authenticity, and its coordination with the *Phaedrus*. Cf. Natorp, 1911: 70.

²⁰ An advantage of Natorp's chronology is that it explains and justifies Plato's assumption of the existence of the forms in the *Phaedo*. It is of course also possible that, should the *Theaetetus* in fact have been written after the *Phaedo*, as most now suppose, the explanation of the forms in the *Theaetetus* could have been current before the *Phaedo*. In any case, the important point is that Plato does explain the sense of the *eidos* somewhere, and so need not feel compelled to repeat this explanation in the *Phaedo*. Thus Rowe's judgement that "by portraying [the idea that forms somehow exist separately from particulars] as a familiar topic to those present Plato avoids the need to explain in detail what believing in 'forms' might amount to," is much too harsh (Rowe, 1993: 8). The "implication" is *not*, or *need not be*, "that any philosophically-minded reader will easily come to see that, whatever 'forms' may be, and whatever their relationship with particulars, the assumption that they exist is necessary and uncontroversial" (Rowe, 1993: 8). The implication might instead be, as Natorp argues, that this relationship may well be controversial and opaque, but that it has already been established elsewhere. One needs a good argument to counter Natorp's point that it would be perverse for Plato, in the middle of stressing the need for *justified* hypotheses, simply to assume the hypothesis of the forms (*PI*: 137-140).

²¹ Cf. Brommer, 1939/40; Poma, 1997: 23-24.

(either *a posteriori* or *a priori*) objects, with respect to one or more similar characteristics.²² This--or something very like this--is what the Marburgers think Plato means by *eidos*. Nevertheless, up to this point in Natorp's chronology of the dialogues, Plato has used the word *idea* in more or less the same sense.

Drawing a Kantian distinction, Natorp considers the meaning of "concept" from two points of view. On the one hand, a concept functions as a means of determining a "given" (i.e. an intuition). I intuit a sense-datum (*das Gegebene*) which my understanding then isolates from the flux of experience by determining or identifying it as, say, "a plate." My understanding is only able to do this if I have formed the (empirical) concept, "plate," whose typical traits I now identify in my perception of the datum.²³ On the other hand, a concept can also be considered *in isolation* from any datum, merely with respect to other *concepts*. Thus I do not need to have a plate before me (i.e. actually be perceiving a plate) in order to think the concept. I can represent the concept "plate" to myself either in my imagination or by a mere definition or *logos*. Again, I can think this concept, abstractly, in relation to any number of other concepts: without once having to picture plates or cups or silverware, much less actually sense them, I can manipulate the mere concepts of "cup," "plate," and "silverware," say, while I determine how many and what sort of these items I will need in the course of a banquet.²⁴

Now Natorp thinks that *eidos* means concept (*Begriff*) generally, but that it stresses the first aspect of the concept's function, i.e. the unifying, synthetic grasp (*Griff*) of a multiplicity of *given* instances, and which takes the form of a *logos*--a "*Begriffserklärung, Definition*" (PI: 98-99). Theaetetus himself illustrates the procedure of *Begriffsbestimmung* with a mathematical example. *Begriffsbestimmung*

²² Cf. *KrV*, A320/B377.

²³ Cf. *KrV*, A137/B176.

²⁴ This is not to say, however, that the concept "plate" can be given any sense without ultimately "grounding" it in a sensible intuition. But once it has been grounded, I do not have *imagine* a plate everytime I use, meaningfully, the word "plate." Cf., e.g., Heidegger, 1993: 155.

here amounts to "grasp[ing] together into a unity, by which we can denote" the manifold instances (*Theaet.* 147de)—i.e. a definition.²⁵ As we see when Socrates exhorts Theaetetus a bit later, the text supports Natorp's contention that *eidos* and *logos*, concept and definition, are intimately connected:

πειρῶ μιμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπόκρισιν, ὥσπερ
ταύτας πολλὰς οὔσας ἐνὶ εἵδει περιέλαβες, οὕτω καὶ τὰς
πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν.

(*Theaet.* 148d; emphasis added)

Imitating your answer about the *dunameis*, try to encompass these many beings in one *eidos*, and in this way express the many [kinds of] knowledge in a single *logos*.

Natorp's further interpretation of "*idea*," as it appears in the later syllable-letter²⁶ problem (*Theaet.* 202ff.), seems more questionable. Natorp writes:

Noch in einem späteren Zusammenhang ... finden sich scharf
bezeichnende Ausdrücke der Begriffseinheit: die "Silbe" stellt gegenüber
den "Buchstaben", d.h. der komplexe Begriff gegenüber seinen
einfachen begrifflichen Bestandteilen, "eine Idee", d.h. ... "eine Einheit"
dar (203 C); dann: *ein* "Eidos", welches eine ihm selbst eigene "Idee" hat
(Schleiermacher: "eine Gattung, welche ihre eigene Wesenheit und
Gestalt für sich hat"; ich verstehe: "*eine* Grundgestalt, welche für sich
eine Einheit darstellt", 203 E); eine unteilbare Einheit ("*ein* ungeteiltes
Wesen", Schleiermacher, 205 C); jedes für sich ein
Unzusammengesetztes; ein Eingestaltiges, Unteilbares; eins und teillos
(205 C-E).

(*PI.* 99)

²⁵ "... συλλαβεῖν εἰς ἓν, ὅτι [πάσας ταύτας] προσαγορεύσομεν [τὰς δυνάμεις]."

²⁶ The just-cited use of συλλαβεῖν (*Theaet.* 147de) seems intended to foreshadow this later example.

Later, in another connection, we again find expressions clearly signifying conceptual unity: with respect to the "letter," the "syllable" represents "one idea," i.e. ... "one unity", i.e. that of the complex concept over against its simple conceptual elements (203C). Next: *one* "eidos," which possesses an "idea" proper to it (Schleiermacher: "one genus which has its own essence and form;" I take it to mean: "*one* basic form, which in itself represents one unity" 203E); one indivisible unity ("*one* undivided essence," Schleiermacher, 205C); each in itself something non-composite; something uniform, indivisible; one and without parts (205C-E).

Natorp here focuses on an aspect of *eidos* and *idea* not generally recognized in the literature; he seems here to say that the term "*idea*" somehow emphasizes the "unity" of the concept, namely by abstracting from its determinative use, which retains a connection to the sensible manifold, and stressing instead its *separateness*, i.e. its capacity to be considered alone, merely *qua* concept. The critical question then arises whether Plato really is using *idea* in a technical sense here; "*mia tis idea*" need not mean more than "some one entity."

Fortunately for our project, we do not need to decide here whether this is a reasonable interpretation of the occurrences of *idea* at *Theaet.* 203 c and 203e. Of consequence is that Natorp seems in this passage to identify an incipient distinction between *idea* and *eidos*, for he goes on somehow to connect this "separating" sense of *idea* with the meaning of "es selbst" or "an sich selbst" [αὐτός; καθ' αὐτός].²⁷ In the *Theaetetus*, "*idea*" simply signifies an *eidos* conceived "in pure isolation from any application to something given somehow else than through the concept itself, as is the case in the entire realm of 'pure' mathematics" (*PI*: 99).²⁸ He writes:

²⁷ Natorp is thinking of *Theaet.* 203e4: ἐν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον

²⁸ Cf. *KrV*, A713/B741.

Der so verstandene Begriff ist das "an sich" Seiende, von dem Plato redet *wie* von einer eigenen, bloß gedanklichen Existenz. Auch diese Existenz hat ihren guten Sinn. *Ein Begriff existiert als Begriff*, sofern er im systematischen Zusammenhang der Begriffe zulänglich begründet ist. So reden die Mathematiker von der Existenz der Zahl π oder e , überhaupt des Irrationalen, des Imaginären u.s.f., und denken dabei nicht im entferntesten an ein einzelnes Vorkommen irgendwo oder irgendwann sei es in der Sinnenwelt oder in einer andern Welt hinter oder über dieser oder wie man sonst dies seltsame Ortsverhältnis des Nirgendwo zum Irgendwo zu bezeichnen vorzieht.

(*PI*: 99; emphasis added)

The concept understood in this sense is that which is "in itself," of which Plato speaks *as if* of a unique, merely mental existence. Indeed, this existence has its proper sense. *A concept exists as a concept*, insofar as it is sufficiently grounded in a systematic connection/relation [*Zusammenhang*] of concepts. Thus mathematicians speak of the existence of the number π or e , and in general of the irrational or imaginary [numbers], etc., without ever in the least thinking of a particular occurrence somewhere or sometime, be it in the sensible world or in some other world behind or above it, or however else one prefers to signify this strange locative relation between the nowhere and the somewhere.²⁹

The "existence" of a concept--i.e. just the sense in which we say it "is"--is entirely determined by its relationship to a *system* of concepts. A given concept "has being" if it can coherently be fit into relations with other, already established, grounded concepts.³⁰

²⁹ Cf. Hilbert, *Foundations of Geometry*.

³⁰ The method by which such coherence, and thus being can be tested and confirmed is not explained until the *Phaedo*; cf. *PI*: 114.

And a concept (*eidos*) conceived purely in this systematic relation is, according to Natorp, what Plato specifies with the term, *idea*.

Because it focuses on the sense of *eidos* as a single, separate conceptual unity "in itself"—i.e. as *idea*—the *Theaetetus* starkly contrasts the opposition of "absolute positing through pure concepts against the boundless relativity of the sensible" (*PI*: 100).³¹ Although this gives what Natorp later calls a "one-sided" account of concepts (one which Plato is to correct with his method of empirical science), its one-sidedness advances Plato's goal of clearly defining philosophy's proper objects, viz. "jegliche Natur eines jeden von dem, was *ist*, in seiner Ganzheit."³² If philosophy is knowledge of the "realm of being," Natorp insists that this "being" means nothing else than a) the being of concepts as possible predicates of judgements (the sense just described); and b) the valid predication of those concepts of a subject (a sense yet to be discussed).³³

No symbolic talk of paradigms (*Musterbilder*) should mislead us to believe that Plato has in mind some other sort of being than that which is

grounded in the systematic connexion of concepts, in true cognition. "It is [exists]" simply means, "it is the case," "the state of affairs in truth obtains as stated," It is valid in this way after it has been proved—in virtue of the "iron and adamantine reasons" of the *Gorgias*. It is valid in the "idea" itself, which alone is meant by "paradigm"—i.e. it is valid as the unchangeably immovable *compass-point of thinking*, and nothing else.

(*PI*: 100)

³¹ Cf. Natorp, 1887: 283.

³² ...πάσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνημένη τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου ὅλου... (*Theaet.* 174a).

³³ "Der Logos selbst ist nicht nur 'eine der Grundarten von dem was *ist*', sondern die grundlegende für alle: würde uns das genommen, so ließe überhaupt nichts mehr sich aussagen, mit Sinn u. Geltung aussprechen (*Soph.* 260A), ja es würde überhaupt nichts mehr 'sein'. Nie und nirgends bedeutet 'Sein' bei Platon, wenn von der Idee ausgesagt, etwas anderes als den Aussageinhalt." (Natorp, 1911: 70; emphasis added).

All this is nothing but an animadversion to the Kantian *categories*. For the categories are the foundation of the "systematic connexion of concepts in true cognition;" and, as the understanding's pure, *a priori* concepts, they are the "immovable compass-points of thinking" that exhaust the ways in which objects can be said "to be."³⁴ Without explicitly laying out this Kantian framework, Natorp is saying that in the *Theaetetus*, the *ideai* are equivalent to the categories.

A concept is as such synthetic (syllabic); pure concepts are the pure forms or types of synthetic unity—categories (in Kant's sense), basic concepts, *Grundbegriffe*. As forms of synthesis, categories are therefore forms of *relations*, for a concept unifies disparate elements in thought by bringing them into a certain relation to each other. He lists the following as occurring in the *Theaetetus*: being; identity and difference; singularity and plurality; number in general;³⁵ similarity and difference.³⁶ Earlier in our discussion of Cassirer's argument against abstraction, we saw that these *basic* concepts cannot themselves be given as sense-data. They must therefore be *a priori*. Natorp argues that in the *Theaetetus* Plato pursues a similar line of argument.

*Erkenntnis ist nicht Sinnesdatum.*³⁷ Natorp focuses on Theaetetus's first hypothesis concerning the nature of knowledge, viz., that it is sense-perception. He interprets this hypothesis as Plato's *via negativa* towards a positive account of knowledge: by dialectically deconstructing what Natorp calls Protagoras's (psychologistic) "sensualist-relativist" thesis, Plato purportedly lays the groundwork for his own transcendental account of knowledge. Crucially, Natorp argues that even as Plato demolishes the

³⁴ Cf. Natorp, 1911: 71, 73.

³⁵ *Theaet.* 185cd.

³⁶ Natorp, 1911: 73.

³⁷ Natorp, 1911: 70.

sensualist account of knowledge, he advances beyond the *Phaedrus* by giving "the legitimate claims of sensibility their due" (*PI*: 101-102):³⁸

Die Sinnlichkeit ist ihm [Plato] nicht mehr bloß der finstre Nebel, den man durchdringen muß, um zum Lichte der Wahrheit empor zu gelangen [wie im *Phaedrus*], sondern es wird ihm ein wesentlicher Anteil am Erkennen, in genauer, unaufheblicher Beziehung zur Denkfunktion, zuerkannt.

(*PI*: 102)³⁹

Sensibility is no longer for Plato the dark fog which one must penetrate to attain to the light of truth [as in the *Phaedrus*]; rather he recognizes the essential part it plays in cognition [*Erkennen*], in a precise, indissoluble relation to the thought-function [*Denkfunktion*].

Again, this passage makes oblique reference to the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In Kantian language, the goal of Natorp's argument is, ultimately, to show that the meaning of "knowledge" for Plato is not knowledge *of* pure forms as such, but knowledge *through* pure forms.⁴⁰

Socrates's attack on sensualism is a classic example of what Gadamer calls "speculative dialectic:" Socrates does not adduce *external* counter-arguments to the "Heraclitizing time-philosophy"⁴¹ ... of the subtle Aristippus."⁴² Instead, he subjects the theory to an *immanent* critique by developing the consequences of its principles to the

³⁸ By the same token, Natorp regards the dialogue's second hypothesis, that knowledge is "true *doxa* plus account," as a parodic *reductio* of the "Dogmatismus der 'wahren Vorstellung.'" Accordingly, he pays the second half scant attention (*PI*: 115, ff.).

³⁹ Cf. esp. Natorp, 1911: 70-71.

⁴⁰ This is equivalent to showing that for Plato knowledge is of *experience*, which Natorp must do if he wants to save Plato from Kant's accusations. For if Platonic knowledge is *of* and not *through* *ideai*, then this knowledge is only possible through intellectual intuition. For if it were not, it would have to be knowledge *of ideai*, *through ideai*, which would lead to an infinite regress. In the end, knowledge *must* be grounded in intuition, if it is to have "sense." Cf. *KV*, A240/B299.

⁴¹ Cf. *Theaet.* 152e-153a, for mention of Heraclitus and the description of fire as "ὃ δὴ καὶ τὰλλα γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτροπεύει," but which is itself generated "ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρύψεως· τούτω δὲ κινήσεις." See also: *Theaet.* 153cd; 179e ff.

⁴² Cf. Natorp, 1911: 71.

point where the theory dissolves itself.⁴³ Natorp presents Plato as advancing a transcendental argument from the fact of determinate concepts.⁴⁴ It establishes this fact by extending the sensualist's position to its necessary extremes, namely that the senses deliver to consciousness *nothing but* fluctuating appearance; therefore all determinate concepts—including those used by the relativist—can only be contributions or "positings" of the faculties of *thinking*, rather than of sensibility.

On this basis, Natorp proceeds to give a straightforward Kantian interpretation of the *Theaetetus*'s "doctrine" of sensibility, viz. that in transmitting the bare, indeterminate flux of appearance, the senses provide consciousness with its matter, its *X* or "problem." Plato accepts the "Heraclitean-Aristippean" theory its basic claim that ἔστι <μὲν γὰρ> οὐδέποτε οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται (*Theaet.* 152 de). Like the sensualists, Plato attributes sheer flux to our sense-data, yet unlike them, he does not draw the conclusion that objective cognition is impossible. Rather, by admitting the fluctuating nature of appearance, and the total "relativity and variability" of sensibility, he *contrasts* these to the "positive predicates proper to the *concept-function*" by which the mind generates (relatively) stable objectivities in that flux (*PI*: 103).⁴⁵ Plato thereby sets

⁴³ On "speculative dialectic," see Gadamer, 1976. In language that suddenly seems laden with Kantian import, Socrates ironically describes his attack upon the sensualists' theory as "uncovering the hidden truth of their mind [... ἀνδρῶν ὀνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνήσωμαι...]" (*Theaet.* 155de; cf. 152c), which is merely concealed by their "mysteries" (*Theaet.* 156a).

⁴⁴ Cf. esp. *Theaet.* 185ab; 185cd; 186a-e. Whereas in the *Phaedrus* space and time were still considered as features of the sensible world of appearance, Natorp now also interprets the denial of the possibility of spatial (and, implicitly) temporal determination of appearance at *Theaet.* 153de as anticipating a transcendental argument for the ideality of space and time. See also: *PI*: 105; 110; 161; 277; 323; 365; 374-376.

⁴⁵ I confess that it is at such places that I question my own general interpretation of the Marburg conception of knowledge and science. I have been generally arguing that the "matter" upon which the mind's *Begriffsfunktionen* operate is *not* sensory data, however conceived, for that would return us to the realm of psychology. Rather, I argued, the concept-functions are those of science, by which the various particular cognemes (in this or that empirical psyche, the constituents of its "experience") are organized and rectified (if necessary). This view, however, seems undermined by the kind of account Natorp gives here of the relation of thought to sense-perception. The tension is evident throughout his corpus, I should say, in fairness to myself.

into relief the determinate position (*Setzung*) of "unity," "being in itself," "something," etc. (*PI*: 103).⁴⁶

Plato begins by translating Theaetetus's simple statement, that "knowledge is nothing but sense-perception" (*Theaet.* 151e),⁴⁷ into Protagoras's dictum: "Of all things man is the measure, of those that are, that they are, of those that are not, that they are not" (*Theaet.* 152a). Kantians must acknowledge a correct insight here, namely that the measure of things is grounded in the measuring--i.e. cognizing--subject, and not in the measured object. But Plato and the Kantians reject the (alleged) conclusion that knowledge therefore is *itself* "subjective," i.e. "relative"--to the human species or the individual human psyche.⁴⁸ It is on account of that conclusion that Natorp considers Protagoras the father of "subjectivism" or "psychologism" (*PI*: 104).

Socrates grants the Heraclitean-Protagorean first principle, that all is motion.⁴⁹ All motion is either action or passion (*Theaet.* 156a). Active and passive motions, when they come into contact, always generate "twins," viz. perception (αἴσθησις) and the perceived/perceivable (αἰσθητόν). The perceptible *qualia* (λευκότης, σκληρόν, θερμόν, κτλ.) which arise in the intentional space between perception and percept "are" nothing at all "in themselves," but come-to-be-and-pass-away perpetually, mere epiphenomena of the universal motion (*Theaet.* 156e-157a). Hence Socrates reasons that, on the subjectivist view, one cannot speak of "being" (*Theaet.* 157a), "since being implies determinacy" (*PI*: 104).⁵⁰ Worse, one also cannot speak "of anything through which

⁴⁶ Cf. Natorp, 1887: 283.

⁴⁷ Theaetetus's definition in fact stems from an observation which from the Kantian point of view is entirely correct: "δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπιστάμενός τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἐπίσταται"--and this (in itself correct) *perception* of Theaetetus merely *appears* (falsely) in the form of this experimental definition.

⁴⁸ I say "alleged," because, strictly speaking, one need not draw a relativistic conclusion from the dictum at all. Indeed, one can draw a purely Kantian/Platonic conclusion. The problem arises when one interprets it, as Socrates does, to be about *phenomena* (cf. his violent rephrasings at 158a and 158e). Relativism clearly follows from making phenomena the basis of the "measurement," since, as both sides agree, there is nothing fixed in the flux of appearances that could serve as a standard *of* measurement. But then Protagoras speaks of *onta*, and says nothing about *phainomena*.

⁴⁹ τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν (*Theaet.* 156a).

⁵⁰ It should be noted that Schleiermacher consistently translates the word εἶν, not as "Eines," but as "ein Bestimmtes."

something would be *mentally determined* [*gedanklich festgestellt*]" (PI: 104), e.g., one cannot speak "of 'something,' nor of 'whomever,' nor of 'mine,' nor of 'this,' nor 'that,' nor any other fixed determination ..." (*Theaet.* 157b). Conclusion: "Hence one must only speak *in this way* [i.e. only of something coming-into-being, or decaying, or acting or being acted upon], both of the [single] part as well as of the things compounded of many [parts], by which composition 'human being,' 'stone,' and each living creature and its kind [ἐἶδος] are designated ['are posited:'] τίθενται]" (*Theaet.* 157bc; emphasis added).

But what of dreams, or insanity, or other kinds of *misperceptions*? Such cases would seem easily to disprove the sensualist-relativist thesis, since they are, almost by definition, perceptions of what is not the case.⁵¹ Yet, while it seems ludicrous to consider dreamt or hallucinated figments to be *true* percepts, simply in virtue of being percepts (as Protagoras would have us do), Theaetetus can think of no clear sign by which one can tell if one is awake and sane, rather than asleep or mad.⁵² As the sensualist (ironically played by Socrates) presses his point, the properly relativistic consequences of Protagoras's theory are drawn: the becoming or being⁵³ of the perceiver is linked to the percept--and only *that particular* percept--which is responsible for making the perceiver a perceiver, and vice versa. More simply put, the intentional bond between perceiver and percept is what makes the subject and its object "become" (or "be") *perceiver* and *perceived*, for the perceiver is not a perceiver without the percept, nor the percept a percept without the perceiver.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Cf. *Theaet.* 157e-158a.

⁵² Cf. *Theaet.* 158e.

⁵³ Force of habit or unsophisticated ways of thought may force us to persist in the primitive language of "being" (*Theaet.* 157b).

⁵⁴ I note a problem here. In the context of the Protagorean argument, the "being" at issue is always the being of the perception, *not* of the perceiving subject or the perceived object. The dispute is over the being of a *quality*, i.e. a predicate. The *being* meant here can therefore only be *copulative being*. Is this how scholars generally interpret the use of the word ὄντων in Protagoras's dictum; that the sentence means "of the things that are [x], that they are [x], and of the things that are not [x], that they are not [x]"? Not the existence of Socrates or of the wine is in dispute, but of the "bitterness" or "sweetness" "of" the wine. Natorp does not seem to address this question directly. Yet it is important insofar as the dispute over the "existence" of concepts seems to have centered on concepts of *quality* or

So sind also "wir", ich und mein Objekt, nur in untrennbarer Wechselverknüpfung mit einander. Es gibt überhaupt kein isoliertes Sein oder Werden, sondern nur ein Sein oder Werden in Beziehung auf etwas: des Subjekts in Beziehung auf ein Objekt, des Objekts in Bezug auf ein Subjekt (160AB).

(*PI*: 105)⁵⁵

Thus, "we," I and my object, exist [are] only in an indissoluble mutual bond with one another. There is absolutely no isolated being or becoming, but only a being or becoming with respect to something else: of a subject with respect to an object, of an object with respect to a subject (160AB).

Now since, as the sensualist argues, this intentional relation is in each case unique—e.g. this wine "is" sweet for Socrates when he is "healthy-Socrates" at t_1 , but bitter when he is "sick-Socrates" at t_2 —then

my sense-perception is true for me, for it is always my being. Hence, according to Protagoras, I am the judge [$\kappa\rho\iota\tau\eta\varsigma$] both of the things that are [x], that they are [x] to me, and of the things that are not [x], that they are not [x].

(*Theaet.* 160c)

And if my mind ($\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\nuοι\alpha$) truly judges these things I sense are [x] (or are becoming [x]), then I must *know* them (*Theaet.* 160d). Therefore, sense-experience is knowledge.

According to Natorp, Plato's purpose in bringing Protagoras's puzzle to such a head is to point out that

relation, concepts which are possible predicates in sentences asserting a quality of a subject, rather than predicates of the "is of identity" (e.g. "Socrates is a man."). Does Natorp think that all concepts (*eidē*) ultimately are to be thought of qualities? So that this last example *means*: "Socrates displays the characteristics typical of 'man'?" Perhaps the Kantian definition of a concept (see above) as a representation of *common characteristics* forces such a reading.

⁵⁵ Cf. Natorp, 1887: 260, ff. (§2).

appearance ... does not transmit absolute determinations; rather, it merely indicates ... [the realm] of limitless relativity, *unless* that realm be limited in and through the concept.

(*PI*: 106)

Thus Socrates's immanent critique ensnares the sensualist in *aporia*: on the one hand he holds that "determinations" are never and nowhere to be found in appearance; on the other hand he maintains that there is thinking, subjectivity, and determinations—for otherwise there would be no "I" for whom "*S* is *P*" could be true. In this way, the relativistic thesis hits an apex that necessarily flips over to its "self-negation [*Selbstaufhebung*]" (*PI*: 106). For, as Natorp writes,

[t]his limitless relativity is *unthinkable*; it annihilates all determinacy of positings, destroys all sense of propositions. Not only would all subsistent Being be annulled, but also Becoming could no longer be expressed, nor any (determinate) appearance.

(*PI*: 106)

If everything were constantly gripped by flux, both spatial and qualitative, should nothing persist or subsist for a single moment, "then no subject could even be identified as that *which* changes" (*PI*: 109). No-thing would remain that could be *thought*:

One could no longer say, it is thus or not thus; there would no longer be any thus and not-thus; no *Being* thus or not-thus, also no *Becoming* or *Appearing* thus and not-thus; rather, one would have to invent an entirely new language to be able to express such an utterly fluctuating state of affairs. The most apt expression would be 'not-in-any-respect,' but best of all we would call it the *indeterminate* (*ἄπειρον*) (183B).

(*PI*: 110).⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Cf. esp. Natorp, 1911: 70.

The transcendental strategy has now become clear: since, on the one hand, this "character of thoroughgoing relativity and subjectivity really is the character of *pure* sensibility;" and on the other hand, even the sensualist must admit thinking, determining, and subjectivity. Yet the concepts by which the subject thinks and determines the sensible manifold—the stock of predicates by which mind determines flux—are not given by the flux; indeed, the Heraclitean thesis, granted by Plato, renders vain any thought of any (sensible) *thing* being given at all, from which some concept could be abstracted.⁵⁷ Therefore, the "predicates of identical determinacy and so of objectivity must belong to" a being that stands over and against pure sensibility (*PI*: 107).⁵⁸ In a word: "All determination is therefore the *achievement of thinking*," of the "*Denkfunktion*" (*PI*: 110).⁵⁹ And this "function" of thinking is what Natorp calls a "thesis," "*thinking's own positing*, and not a datum" (*PI*: 106).⁶⁰

At the same time, Natorp argues that these concepts only have sense *with respect to* sensibility. True, Plato continues starkly to oppose the realms of concepts (being) and of sensibles (becoming), and a method of thinking the sensible through the conceptual has nowhere been elucidated. Nevertheless, Natorp urges, Plato has shown the determinative function of concepts to be grounded in the basic root-concepts—the types of synthesis—and synthesis can only be of a manifold, determination only of the indeterminate.⁶¹ As *foundational* concepts, the categories operate upon the as yet entirely indeterminate, and this, as we have seen, just is the flux of the *sensible* manifold.⁶² Since the sensible manifold is endlessly indeterminate, it can and must

⁵⁷ "So kann also von keinem 'gegebenen' Gegenstande mehr die Rede sein; also auch nicht von Erkenntnis als bloßer Analyse dieses Gegebenen. Gerade der Gegenstand vielmehr ist *Aufgabe*, ist *Problem ins Unendliche*" (Natorp, 1969: 18).

⁵⁸ Cf. esp. *PI*: 114.

⁵⁹ Cf. Cassirer, 1910: 27-28; 33-34.

⁶⁰ Cf. Cohen, 1902b: 450.

⁶¹ Natorp, 1911: 71.

⁶² Of course, this does not mean that the sensible manifold is the only manifold. There are also relative manifolds, i.e. manifolds of elements already determined to some degree, which are conceived as manifold with respect to some further unifying concept. This is the case, e.g. with syntheses of sensible individuals under species, or of species under genera.

present the understanding with its *problem* and *task*, but absolutely nothing more.⁶³ Thus Natorp finds in Plato a conception of cognition as an infinite synthetic (unifying) process of objectivation, as defined in *Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften*: "Erkenntnis, als auf den Gegenstand gerichtet, [ist also] notwendig Synthesis in *Kants* Sinne, d.h. Erweiterung, beständiger Fortgang" (Natorp, 1969: 18).

Thinking is judgement of relations. What is a synthesis? It is the setting of two or more disparate elements (a manifold) into a single relation.⁶⁴ Synthesis consists in positing relations into the manifold; put another way, the manifold is synthesized into determinate unities through the posit of relations. Natorp says that this synthesis can only occur by bringing temporally diverse⁶⁵ elements into simultaneous presence before the mind, to go through them, compare them, and thus *judge* them *as* being in such and such a relation.⁶⁶ He argues that Plato, too, grounds judgement in the synthetic act of relating.⁶⁷ Moreover, judging (κρίνειν)—specifically the judgement of relations—is the basic function of thinking (διανοεῖσθαι).⁶⁸ Because the manifold is in flux, thought must "overarch [*übergreifen*]" the temporal separation (*Auseinanderstellung*) of the flux in past, present and future, "by setting that which is necessarily so separated in sensible appearance into a (supertemporal [*überzeitlich*]) relation" (1911: 73).

⁶³ We need, of course, not be convinced. For one thing, it is not clear that concept denotes a mental *function* or *act* of unification, rather than the *result* of such an act. And again, the examples of unification of multiplicities in the *Theaetetus* include unification of *non-sensibles*, such as geometric entities and letters.

⁶⁴ This is not to say that the meaning of the relation is unifying. "A differs from B" is a separating relation. Nonetheless, *qua* relation, it is synthetic, for it brings A and B together under a single point of view, namely that of difference.

⁶⁵ Why does Natorp specify *temporal* diversity? Can synthesis not also be of a spatial manifold? There is not enough textual evidence to be able to answer these questions, but perhaps Natorp believes that spatial intuition is somehow parasitic upon temporal intuition, that the intuition of space only follows upon the temporary fixation of the sensible flux. If so, one cannot ignore the similarity of this view to Heidegger's attempt at deriving space from time in *Being and Time*.

⁶⁶ *PI*: 112; cf. esp. *Theaet.* 186ab.

⁶⁷ Natorp quotes *Theaet.* 186b: πρὸς ἄλλα κρινεῖν.

⁶⁸ *PI*: 113; cf. Natorp, 1911: 73; esp. *Theaet.* 186ab.

The picture is this. Mind is presented with a manifold in flux. This flux (*qua* flowing) appears under the form of intuition called time. Time already forms, that is, *separates and orders* the flux into a succession of appearances. But this ordering of the flux only makes possible *intuition*; it does not make possible *experience*. Experience depends on the *connection* of successive appearances, and this connection is the synthetic act of *thinking*. Thinking tracks the temporal succession, i.e. goes *through* the intuited appearances as they succeed one another, while also overarching and holding them together. The holding-together (συν-λαβεῖν) itself is "supertemporal" insofar as the overarching, binding connection is not given *in* or *through* the temporal phenomena themselves, but is imposed from "above," i.e. from mind's (relatively) stable vantage.

Hence, insofar as thinking tracks the temporal succession of phenomena, it is thinking-*through* (διὰ-νοῖα), viz. through time; insofar as it synthesizes these phenomena by fixing them in a relation, it passes judgement. This judgement is just what Natorp calls the "answer" of mind to the "problem" or "question" posed by the senses. Or to put it more precisely: the senses give the problem, out of which intuition formulates a proper *question*, to which thought (*logos*) gives an *answer* in the form of a judgement.⁶⁹ It is the judgement that such and such relation obtains which generates a comprehensible objectivity, a cognizeable object or *being*, but because the problem given by the senses is an infinite task, the inner dialogue through which *logos* passes (διεξέρχεται) must be an infinite dialogue, a way towards (*met-hodos*) an ideally complete cognition or total objectivation of the *X*.⁷⁰ The mind's answers are but stations on the way, temporary judgements or *doxai*.⁷¹ Thus cognition or knowledge or science (ἐπιστήμη) is "reduced [*zurückgeführt*] to judgement, to the general function of 'synthetic unity;' concepts are reduced to basic concepts as the *basic types of synthesis*,

⁶⁹ Cf. Natorp, 1911: 71, 72, 73.

⁷⁰ Natorp, 1911: 73.

⁷¹ *PI*: 113; *Theaet.* 189.

as the *basic functions of judgement*" (PI: 113). Not that all judgement is knowledge, not every *doxa* is *epistêmê*. For a *doxa* to be true, to become genuine knowledge, it must be connected to and harmonized in thorough-going unity with other judgements, integrated into a "system of judgements," viz. science.⁷²

Although, according to Natorp, the pure concepts or pure predicates have now been bound into a necessary relationship with the sensible, Plato does not overcome the separation of the two realms in the *Theaetetus*. The pure concepts thus are conceived as rigid in the manner of *Kantian* categories or *Grundbegriffe*. We must wait until the *Phaedo* for a "logic of becoming," in which Plato animates the lifeless *Grundbegriffe* into (*neo-Kantian*) "basic posits" or *Grundsetzungen*. Only then can one understand the *method* of mind's binding the temporally disparate, which is also the binding of the conceptual and the sensible realms themselves; only then, too, will "experience" in the strict sense be comprehensible.

More anti-intuitionistic consequences. Just as Natorp drew psychological consequences from his critique of intuitionism in his reading of the *Phaedrus*, so too the epistemological results of his *Theaetetus* interpretation again lead him to draw conclusions about what mind cannot be like if its *ideai* are what he says they are. Thus, in *Genesis der platonischen Philosophie*, Natorp sees the *Theaetetus* as now explicitly denying a presupposition of intuitionism, namely some receptive, mediating function on the part of consciousness.⁷³ If the cognitive subject, the *psychê*, is "purely and rigorously defined through the unity-function of consciousness...",⁷⁴ then "[t]his 'psychê' is thus not some kind of thing, but pure activity; it is also not the organ of such activity, but is expressly described as without organ ([*Theaet.*] 185 D, E)..." (Natorp,

⁷² PI: 113-114.

⁷³ Let it be said that, at the very least, Natorp is reading into Plato's text here.

⁷⁴ This *Einheitsfunktion* is more closely identified as "that unity (*μία τις ἰδέα*) towards which the sensible manifold must commonly tend (*ξυντείνειν*), if we are to recognize it as one, identical, etc." (Natorp, 1911: 72). *Psychê* meanst "consciousness" for Natorp; cf. PI: 111, ff.

1911: 72). The transtemporal nature of thinking as the synthesis of relations becomes especially important in this context. Natorp argues that no passive or mediating organ could possibly transcend the temporal particularity of the phenomena it mediates, as thinking must.⁷⁵ Nonetheless, as we saw above, this synthetic function, while itself without organ, depends on sensibility and the sense-organs to provide it with its *problem*, the indeterminate manifold, involving consciousness in a dialectical relationship with sensibility: sensibility poses questions, mind proposes answers.

3.4. *Phaedo*.

3.4.1. Preliminaries.

We now turn from the "basic concepts" introduced in the *Theaetetus* to the "basic propositions" or *Grundsätze* purportedly introduced in the *Phaedo*.⁷⁶ My aim here goes beyond explicating Natorp's analysis of the *Phaedo*: I am more especially interested in how these "basic propositions" are related to Natorp's puzzling claim that in the *Phaedo* Plato radically transforms the sense of "*idea*," from meaning "pure category" to meaning "scientific method," and just what he means by "method" here.

Natorp's identification of the *ideai* in the *Theaetetus* with Kant's categories may strike many as forced and anachronistic. Still, *if* "*idea*" signifies and stresses a certain aspect of "*eidos*," viz. the concept considered *qua* concept; and *if* Plato has in mind *a priori* concepts; *then* one might admit a certain isomorphism—if not in authorial intent, perhaps in philosophical content—between *ideai* as they appear in the *Theaetetus* and the

⁷⁵ Cf. Natorp, 1911: 73.

⁷⁶ At the end of his chapter on the *Phaedrus*, Natorp sketches Plato's progress; his program is to have evolved through three main stages: first, the *Theaetetus* establishes the existence and nature of *Grundbegriffe*; these are developed into *Grundsätze* in the *Phaedo*; the *Grundsätze*, finally are organized into a concatenated system of science in the *Symposium* and *Republic* (PI: 76-77). Cf. PI: 133 (cf. quote on p. 4: a *Grundsatz* is already made at Ph. 99E, viz. the "Grundsatz des Idealismus"); Natorp, 1911: 74; PI: 154: "Man darf dies Prinzip, in dem der *methodische Sinn der Idee* rein und radikal zum Ausdruck kommt, von sonstigem, abweichendem Sprachgebrauch unbeirrt, das *Prinzip des Idealismus* nennen; wofern diese Vorsicht nötig ist: des kritischen oder, wie wir noch lieber sagen, des methodischen Idealismus."

Kantian category. But the prospect for such a charitable reading seems to evaporate when we turn to Natorp's interpretation of *ideai* in the *Phaedo* as "methods."

There are two problems. The less serious is that Plato seems still (on Natorp's chronology) to use *eidos* and *idea* more or less interchangeably; certainly the *Phaedo* does not make an unambiguous distinction between an older and newer use. It is especially odd that although Natorp tries hard to demonstrate such a distinction, his theory does not require it. He can advance his interpretation of *ideai* even if *eidos* and *idea* are interchangeable terms, especially since, on his account, *idea* is but an *aspect* of *eidos*.⁷⁷

The more serious problem lies in his reading itself, particularly in the strange-sounding claim that *idea* means "method."⁷⁸ Natorp's thesis that in the *Theaetetus* *idea* means "concept" retains what plausibility it has partly because "*idea-as-concept*" implies a certain unity and fixity, what one might call the concept's "determinateness" or *Bestimmtheit*. But if *idea* were to signify logical *procedure*, it would lose the connotation of determinacy, since the notion of procedure implies *movement*. In the Platonic context, one naturally connects "procedure" with "dialectic," which Plato indeed describes as an upward or downward movement. But this movement would seem to be a movement "up" towards or "down" from the fixed *ideai*; the *ideai* are not themselves the movement. Yet Natorp apparently wants to show just this: that the *idea* is, in a sense, dislodged from its fixity and integrated into the motion of dialectic, rather than being the goal of that motion.

Natorp's approach might seem to reflect the fundamental difference between a more rigid Kantian and more fluid Marburg system of scientific progress. To the degree that Kant grants his ideas and ideals a certain reality--viz. as fixed and

⁷⁷ The main reason why Natorp would want to maintain the distinction even in the *Phaedo* is that *ideai* are those *eidê* which are grounded in a system of scientific cognitions. An *eidos* taken as such need not have that connotation, in Natorp's view; after all, we can have non-scientific concepts.

⁷⁸ Cf. *PI*: 63, 74, 83, 87, 88, 89.

immovable concepts of maximal perfection—he does more faithfully adhere to the orthodox view of the *ideai* as transcendent substances. Of course, he severely qualifies their "reality" as an (indispensable) rational construct, indispensable, that is, for systematically ordering our cognitions. We should especially note that Kant explicitly likens the *Platonic ideai* not to his own *Ideen* (*Vernunftbegriffe*), but to his *ideals*, and these in fact do have an immanent function in scientific research.⁷⁹ Thus the Kantian ideals in a certain way approximate the Marburg conception of categories, and indeed both Kant and the Marburgers equate their respective notions of ideal and category to Plato's *idea*.

On the other hand, the methodological, scientific role of the Kantian ideals depends precisely upon their fixity. As immovable standards and goals for both the ethical and theoretical use of the understanding, they regulate and guide the use of the understanding by presenting it with a problem; for Kant, ideas and ideals mark off *reason's* interests, the fulfillment of which is the infinite task of the understanding. Now the Marburgers, as we have seen, call any concept which determines data a "category;" moreover, it is just this determining act which is that concept's *immanent* function in scientific thinking (assuming the concept at issue is methodically grounded). Thus, the separate functions given by Kant to ideals and categories are fused, on the Marburg view. Consequently, the Marburgers do not conceive Plato's *ideai* as Kantian ideals or perfect exemplars, for, as we have heard again and again, the *ideai* are merely functions; and functions are not themselves instances of what they generate, *a fortiori* cannot be perfect exemplars thereof.

The idea in method. The *Phaedo* is the "chief witness" for Natorp's claim that "Plato's 'Idea' rests on nothing else, has as its essential content nothing other than *logical procedure*" (*PI*: 133). This "logical procedure," in turn, Natorp identifies as dialectic or

⁷⁹ I argue for this point elsewhere.

pure logic—ή περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνη (*Ph.* 90b). Only by following this technical procedure can one hope to reach truth, or "cognition of that which is"—τῆς τῶν ὄντων ἀληθείας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης (*Ph.* 90d):

Denn in den Denksetzungen (λόγοι) ist, nach dem (99E) bestimmt ausgesprochenen *Grundsatz des Idealismus*, die Wahrheit dessen, was ist (der ὄντα), in den logisch gegründeten, nach 90C den "wahren und sicheren, einsehend zu erkennenden" (ὄντος δὴ τινος ἀληθοῦς καὶ βεβαίου λόγου καὶ δυνατοῦ κατανοῆσαι), nach der ganzen, weiteren Ausführung 99 ff. durch zulängliche Deduktion gesicherten "Aussagen" *d.i. Sätzen der Wissenschaft ist die Wahrheit der Gegenstände* allein zu ersehen. Diese Sicherheit aber gründet sich in nichts als dem logischen Verfahren; wie es nicht nur eingehend entwickelt, sondern auch unter diesem Namen der "Weise des Verfahrens" (τρόπος τῆς μεθόδου, 97B, vgl. 99D, 100B usw.) ... hervorgehoben wird.

(*PI*: 133; emphasis added)⁸⁰

The clearly expressed principle [*Grundsatz*] of idealism (at *Phaedo* 99e) states this: that the truth of what-is [the *onta*] is only to be seen in the logically grounded, "true and reliable and comprehensible" statements [*Aussagen*], i.e. those which, according to the whole broader exposition at 99 ff., have been secured through a sufficient deduction. That is, the truth of objects is only to be seen in *the propositions* [Sätzen] *of science*. This security, moreover, is grounded in nothing more than the logical procedure itself—a point which is not only developed in detail, but which is stressed by the title, "manner of procedure" (τρόπος τῆς μεθόδου, 97B, cp. 99D, 100B etc.).

⁸⁰ Cf. Natorp, 1913: 179.

The *Phaedo*'s "technique of *logoi*" develops the so-called *Unterredungskunde* of the *Phaedrus*, by elaborating the notion of "pure thought" (διάνοια/διανοεῖσθαι [*PI*: 134])⁸¹ already advanced at *Theaetetus* 189e, which Socrates there characterizes as

λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν
σκοπῇ ... [in which the soul] ... διανοοῦμένη οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ
διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ
φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα.

(*Th.* 189e; emphasis added)

a *logos*, which the soul itself by itself runs through concerning the things which it would investigate ... [in which the soul], in thinking through, does nothing but discourse, in that it asks and answers itself, affirming and negating.

The question-and-answer of Socratic dialogue is coordinated with the Platonic doctrine of recollection⁸² into authentic dialectic, in which the soul asks and answers its own questions itself by itself, discovering (recollecting) its answers, restricted exclusively to the domain of *pure* psychology.

More importantly, Natorp argues that the *Phaedo* explicitly sets the mind's "pure thought-determinations [*Denkbestimmungen*]" into a precise relationship with the question-and-answer procedure of this dialectic. He argues that these *Denkbestimmungen* or "so-called *Ideas* ... are virtually defined through this relationship" (*PI*: 133), marshalling the following passages as evidence:⁸³

αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία ᾗς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ
ἀποκρινόμενοι....

(*Ph.* 78cd)

⁸¹ Cf. Natorp, 1969: 16.

⁸² As we might expect, Natorp interprets the doctrine of recollection as a poetic expression of the mind's analysis of its own *a priori* structures, which it possesses transcendentally, "itself by itself."

⁸³ The same citations appear at Natorp, 1911: 75.

The very *ousia* of whose *einai* we give an account, *asking and answering*...⁸⁴

οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἴσου νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν μᾶλλον τι ἢ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ὁσίου καί, ὅπερ λέγω, περὶ πάντων οἷς ἐπισφραγίζομεθα τοῦτο, [τὸ] "[αὐτὸ] ὃ ἔστι",⁸⁵ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσιν ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν ἀποκρινόμενοι.

(Ph. 75cd)

For our *logos* does not now concern the Equal more than it does the Beautiful itself, and the Good itself, and the Just, and the Holy, and, I say, all those things upon which we stamp [this (seal?)], the "what it is [itself]," both in our *questions, when we ask questions, and in our answers, when we answer*.

ἐρρήθη γάρ που οὕτως ἡμῶν εἶναι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ πρὶν εἰς σῶμα ἀφικέσθαι, ὥσπερ αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν τὴν τοῦ ὃ ἔστιν.

(Ph. 92d)

⁸⁴ Cf. Rowe, 1993: 183. Natorp: "Jenes Sein 'selbst' (οὐσία und zwar αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία), von dem wir *Rechenschaft geben, daß es ist, im Fragen und Antworten*" (PI: 134).

⁸⁵ Whereas for once all the manuscripts agree here [d2]: "...ἐπισφραγίζομεθα τοῦτο 'ὃ ἔστι',....," the editors have experimented as follows. Robin opts for Burnet's emendation: "...ἐπισφραγίζομεθα τὸ 'αὐτο ὃ ἔστι',...."; Rowe and the OCT editors opt for Heindorf's compromise of tradition plus τὸ: "...ἐπισφραγίζομεθα τοῦτο, τὸ 'ὃ ἔστι',...." Natorp himself quotes the manuscript version (PI: 134): "Es ist hier nicht bloß vom Gleichen die Rede, sondern ebenso gut vom Schönen selbst, vom Guten selbst, vom Gerechten, vom Heiligen, kurz von allem, welchem wir diese [!] Marke aufprägen des 'Was es ist' (ἐπισφραγίζομεθα τοῦτο ὃ ἔστι, was hier ganz als Formel zu verstehen, mit dem als bekannt vorausgesetzten Sinn: was 'es selbst', d.h. was der Sinn der jedesmaligen Prädikation ist), in unsern Fragen, wenn wir fragen (z.B. Was ist das Schöne?), in unsern Antworten, wenn wir antworten (Das Schöne ist das und das)."

For it was stated that our soul, before it enters the body, is in the same condition as that *ousia* which belongs to it, which is called, eponymously, "that which it is."⁸⁶

τοῦτο γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀσφαλέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐμαυτῷ
ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἄλλῳ, καὶ τούτου ἐχόμενος ἡγοῦμαι οὐκ ἂν
ποτε πεσεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι καὶ ἐμοὶ καὶ ὁποῦν ἄλλῳ
ἀποκρίνασθαι ὅτι τῷ καλῷ τὰ καλὰ καλὰ....

(*Ph.* 100e)

For this seems to me to be the safest/most certain way of *answering* both myself and anyone else; and if I cling to this [answer], I believe I will never fall, but that it is safe to say, in answer both to myself and anyone else, that the beautiful things are beautiful through the Beautiful.

σὺ δὲ δεδιὼς ἂν, τὸ λεγόμενον, τὴν σαυτοῦ σκιὰν καὶ τὴν
ἀπειρίαν, ἐχόμενος ἐκείνου τοῦ ἀσφαλοῦς τῆς ὑποθέσεως,
οὕτως ἀποκρίναιο ἂν.

(*Ph.* 101cd)

You, however, fearing--as the saying goes--your own shadow and your inexperience, clinging to that safe/certain hypothesis, would always *answer* in this manner.

What Natorp thinks these passages suggest when taken together is that the *ideai*--i.e. the ὁ ἔστι or οὐσία--are nothing but the *answers* to the soul's dialectical self-interrogations. Moreover, the rightness of these answers is grounded in nothing but the

⁸⁶ Rowe (1993: 220) disputes the well-attested αὐτῆς, recommending αὐτῇ instead. This would of course not suit Natorp, who uses this passage as evidence that that Being (*ousia*) which is called the "what it is," is the special possession of consciousness, which is clarified as such through an internal dialectic of question and answer.

procedure of that interrogation, is not in any way underwritten by some external warrant of truth. Nothing but the dialectical *method of justification* itself provides that warrant.

This dialectical task is familiar from our discussion of the Marburgers' philosophical project of grounding the sciences in a logic of science. For Plato, too, philosophy's task is to anchor all of the mind's cognitions, to maximize their security, a) by linking them all to "something sufficient," and b) by harmonizing them with each other. In this double-task, Natorp finds the principles of a) sufficient reason and b) non-contradiction anticipated in the *Phaedo*; these are the principles of meaningful predication, and thus of "being."⁸⁷ This, in Natorp's eyes, constitutes the *Phaedo*'s great advance over its predecessors: that while Plato earlier used the "ὁ ἔστί" as a formula to express the "Socratic requirement" for giving definitions, the "ὁ ἔστί" is now embedded in a procedure of justification and proof, and this latter procedure "is raised to the actual *foundation of the doctrine of ideas*" (*PI*: 134).⁸⁸

The new link with a deductive proof-procedure (λόγον διδόναι) deepens the notion of *idea*:

[*Idea*] no longer has merely the sense of a predication to be fixed in unchangeable identity, say, the predication as beautiful, as good, etc., but rather especially this: that a first assumption is laid down in order that one may attach all conclusions to it; that the *law* must be valid in unchangeable identity through the entire manifold of cases, upon which it is not applied, but rather into which it is developed.

(*PI*: 136)

Thus "the concept is grounded in the law,⁸⁹ and each law is grounded in ever higher laws up to the highest that are reachable" (*PI*: 136). The Marburg understanding of the meaning of being, its preoccupation with the "logical procedure" of science, and its

⁸⁷ Cf. *PI*: 156-157.

⁸⁸ Cf. Natorp, 1911: 75.

⁸⁹ In the senses discussed earlier. Ge-setz: *thesis*, *posit-ion*; Grundlegung: *hypo-thesis*.

transcendental orientation come to full expression here, for the logical procedure of giving proof and justification (*Begründung* and *Rechenschaft*) is the ascent to the ultimate condition(s) of possibility of thinking, that is of positing being in relations, and doing this in a systematic way.

Λόγον διδόναι *and the meaning of being*. In our discussion of the Marburg School's dissolution of ontology, we saw that the only meaning of being they countenance as having any sense is the being of predication, of the copula. This becomes very important in understanding Natorp's account of the relation of *ousia* and *logon didonai*. ὁ ἔστί--the "what it is" equated with οὐσία--amounts to nothing more than "the meaning of the respective predication [*der Sinn der jedesmaligen Prädikation*]" (*PI*: 134). When Plato (or, as Natorp would have it, any right-thinking person) speaks of "being," he means the being of predication, which is "the own property of consciousness" (*Ph.* 76de), through which the judgement of a relation is made.⁹⁰ For all relations are expressed in a judgement of the basic form "*S is P*," which judgement is also always, implicitly or explicitly, the *answer* to the *question*, "What is *S*?" As we just saw, Natorp argues that the *idea* (the ὁ ἔστί or οὐσία) is the answer, i.e. the predicate *P* in the judgement, *S is P*. Thus, *P* is the *idea*, a concept, a possible predicate. The predicate answers how *S* is to be determined, namely *as P*. The meaning of "is" is nothing, according to Natorp, more than the indicator of the mind's subsumption of *S* under *P*, by which *S* is determined. Insofar as a given *P* defines this *S*, *P* constitutes the οὐσία of *S*; by being subsumed under *P*, *S* "participates" in *P*.

Yet if we leave it at that, then *any P* said of *S* would by definition be an *idea*, and that consequence is nonsense. Any statement, "*S is P*," rather, is merely a *doxa*, insofar as it is *judged* to (seems to) subsume *S*; what elevates it to the higher epistemic status of "truth," and the "*P*" to that of *idea*? *P* becomes an *idea* by being *justified*, namely by

⁹⁰ Cf. *PI*: 134.

being given a *logos* that grounds it in ever higher reasons--and ultimately in some sufficient (ἔκτατον) reason--at the same time systematically integrating it with other so established *ideai*. Only once this is done can the *is* in the proposition, *S is P*, take on the strong sense of being associated with the *ideai*, namely that of truth and knowledge. In Marburg terms, only this justification can confirm a *doxa's scientific* status. This "strong being," the copula in a scientific judgement, is, as Natorp puts it, simply "the 'being' in the *logically grounded answer to the question*: what *is* the Beautiful, the Good, etc." (*PI*: 134).⁹¹ It is crucial to stress, however, that the *idea's* status does not depend on the system being *completed*, as though some last cataleptic closure to the system of *ideai* were required to justify its absolute truth. For Natorp, *all* that is required for an *idea's* justification is that it be implicated in a methodical *process* of rational ("logical") grounding. The system is open; justification, like determination, an infinite task. All that grants scientific status is the adherence to method-governed thinking.

3.4.2. Analysis of the dialogue.

Pure concepts assumed. Natorp sees the development of the theory of *ideai* presented in four distinct stages in the texts of the *Phaedo*, beginning with the "First introduction of the theory of ideas: pure thought and the pure objects of thought (pag. 65-68)" (*PI*: 137). This section covers much the same ground as the *Theaetetus*. Indeed, as Natorp would have it, it takes for granted the key accomplishments of the *Theaetetus*, i.e. the isolation and determination of pure concepts and the positive role of the sensibility. The main point in the *Phaedo's* reiteration is the impossibility of reaching truth *via* the senses: the soul attains truth, or "etwas von dem was *ist*," not *via* the body (i.e. the senses), but

alone through the pure activity of thinking, in which it releases itself
from the body and is "by itself."

⁹¹ Cf. Natorp, 1911: 76.

(*PI*: 137)⁹²

As soon as Socrates has established the unreliability of the senses (*Ph.* 65a-c), he abruptly changes the topic, asking Simmias:

Do we say the just itself to be something or nothing?

We certainly say so, by Zeus!

And the beautiful and the good--do we assert these to be something?

How could we not?

(*Ph.* 65d4-8)

It is in this exchange that Natorp sees Plato's assumption of the *Theaetetus*'s deduction of "pure determinations of thought." In short, Natorp again stresses Plato's attention to that being or "whatness in itself" which is not transmitted or mediated by the senses (*PI*: 137-138). In particular, he points to the formulaic use of "αὐτὸ καθ'αὐτό" which he takes to signify nothing more or less than the exclusive focus on the posited "self-identical" content of the concept--exclusive, that is, "of any particularity or change of whatever other determinations that may interweave themselves [with the concept] in a given case:" "The purity of thinking and of its object thus far signifies nothing more than the purity of abstraction" (*PI*: 138).⁹³ Natorp argues that the matter-of-fact use of this phrase suggests that the *Phaedo* follows the *Theaetetus*, where the existence of concepts, identified as αὐτὸ καθ'αὐτό--was *argued for and proved*, in explicit contradistinction to the "boundless relativity" of our sense-data (*PI*: 139).

Occasional sensibility. The second section's heading encapsulates what is perhaps the most truly Kantian element of Natorp's reading of the *Phaedo*; it reads: "The origin-ality of cognition, and the contribution of the senses." In this section he interprets the

⁹² Cf. *Ph.* 65c11-d2: "...ἡ τοῦ φιλοσόφου ψυχὴ μάλιστα ἀτιμάζει τὸ σῶμα καὶ φεύγει ἀπ'αὐτοῦ, ζητεῖ δὲ αὐτὴ καθ'αὐτὴν γίγνεσθαι."

⁹³ Cf. Natorp, 1887: 270-271.

"originality of cognition" as the *a priori*⁹⁴ of our pure concepts; the act of "recollection" as the philosophical insight into those concepts *as a priori*; and this act itself as necessarily dependent upon the intuitions of the sensibility. From the point of view of the critical philosophy, the "discovery" of pure *a priori* concepts in the *Theaetetus* is unsatisfactory, for they remain too rigidly opposed to the senses. All this, we are told, changes for the better in the *Phaedo*, where we are shown how sensible experience *occasions* the cognition of *a priori* concepts. And although Natorp does not remark on it, Plato here and elsewhere in the *Phaedo* makes the very Kantian point that this is the only way we humans *can* know these *a priori* concepts at all.⁹⁵ Both of these points are established in Plato's argument that our recognition of equality among sensibles implies the "existence" or "reality" of non-sensible standards.

First, the obvious proposition is granted that if one recollects something (x_2), one must have known it before (x_1) (*Ph.* 73c). Next, the somewhat less obvious proposition is granted that one's recollection of x_2 may be prompted or occasioned by an entirely dissimilar y (*Ph.* 73c-74a). These two possible occasions of recognition form the basis, then, for the argument for *maxima*, since in the case of recollecting like from like, unlikeness also plays a role:

ἀλλ' ὅταν γε ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων ἀναμνησκηταί τις τι, ἄρ' οὐκ
ἀναγκάζον τόδε προσπιάσχειν, ἐννοεῖν εἴτε τι ἐλλείπει τοῦτο
κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα εἴτε μὴ ἐκείνου οὐδ' ἀνεμνήσθῃ

(*Ph.* 74a)

⁹⁴ Cf. *PI.* 143.

⁹⁵ As far as *human* knowledge goes, this recognition never goes beyond the level of *intimation*: either after death or nowhere, Socrates says, will we have such *pure* knowledge (*Ph.* 66e). Why Natorp ignores this and other properly *Kantian* points is another interesting question. It could well have to do with the neo-Kantian suspicion that this *anthropological* description of cognition could easily slide into (or indeed already is) a species of *psychologism*. Thus Plato's repeated caveats in the *Phaedo* concerning the limits of *human* knowledge go unmentioned as potential embarrassments.

But whenever someone recollects something from things that are *similar*,⁹⁶ does he not necessarily experience this as well, viz. becoming aware whether this thing falls short to some degree in similarity, or not, to that thing of which he was reminded?

This is illustrated by the example of "equal" sensibles and "the equal itself," or "Equality."⁹⁷ Here Plato makes the point that while we affirm there to be such a "thing" as "the equal itself," we take the knowledge of this equality from the *seeing of* "equals."⁹⁸ That these equals are *different* from "Equality" is made clear from the fact that the "equal" stones or sticks—remaining self-identical—now *appear* equal, now not,⁹⁹ whereas "the equal" is never also "not-equal."

Thus it is established both that there is such a "thing" as "the equal"—i.e., the *concept of equality*—and that we come to know it through the (sensible) experience of *equal things*. But this is still compatible with the concept of equality merely being an empirical, *a posteriori* concept. Socrates now draws our attention to the additional fact that "Equality" is *superior* to the equals. He asks:

ἀρα φαίνεται ἡμῖν οὕτως ἴσα εἶναι ὥσπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὅ ἐστιν ἴσον, ἢ ἐνδεῖ τι ἐκείνου τῷ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ὅλον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ οὐδέν;

(*Ph.* 74d5-7; cf. 75b7)

Do they appear to us to be just as equal as the [what is] Equal itself? Or do they fall short of that to some extent [τι], in respect of being such a thing as the Equal, or not at all?

⁹⁶ Determinative γέ; cf. Rowe, 1993: 167.

⁹⁷ As has been often noted, Plato speaks *both* of "the equals themselves" *as well as* of "Equality" at *Ph.* 74b. For discussion and references, see Rowe, 1993: 169-170.

⁹⁸ Cf. *Theaet.* 184b; Heidegger, 1997: 166, ff.

⁹⁹ Cf. *Th.* 155bc for an almost identical example--Socrates himself *stays* the same, though now he is called short, now tall.

The empirical instances always seem somehow to be lacking, or, put another way, to be "wanting to be [βούλεται εἶναι]" something else: in particular, they are wanting with respect to a maximal standard of perfection. The central feature of the *a priori* of certain of our concepts in this discussion is already familiar to us from Kant's argument for such concepts, viz. as just such maxima or standards of perfection.

Again, it is both interesting and troubling that Natorp does not take the straightforward Kantian route here, which would be to stress the notion of hyperempirical maxima or standards, as Kant himself does. Perhaps Natorp fears that this would lead him back to the quasi-transcendence and ultimate illusoriness of ideas and ideals as Kant conceives them, rather than the immanently functioning concepts he wants to show they are.¹⁰⁰ Hence he characterizes τὸ ὕσον simply as a concept over against the sensible τὰ ὕσα, where the singular noun indicates no more than that "the concept is ... the *unity* of the *manifold* of occurring cases [i.e. of the concept]" (*PI*: 143). This would seem a perverse simplification of Plato's intention here: if anything, Plato wants to say that τὸ ὕσον is not *merely* a unity but also a standard that lies *beyond experience*: after all, it is just this hyper-empirical "location" that both makes it possible for it to be a true *standard*, and that tells us that it is an *a priori*, and not an empirical concept.

Natorp's whole focus here is entirely upon the empirical occasioning of the "pure" concept; he takes up the *idea*'s normative function later. This "occasioning" or sparking of the mind's self-consciousness of its own proper (pure) concepts is what Plato calls "recollection." As Socrates emphatically puts it at *Ph.* 75a:

¹⁰⁰ Natorp interprets the imperfection of a sensible quality simply as *impurity*, i.e. as being complicated with "contradictory determinations," while the *idea*, by contrast, is *auto kath'hauto* pure and *a priori*. Thus, in his discussion of the *Republic*, he argues that *auto kath'hauto* "means nothing more or less than that we unconfusedly think One as One, the Second as Second, Larger as Larger, Smaller as Smaller, and so each thing as what it is and nothing else, in determined discrimination; whereas in sense-perceptions the same thing may appear as One and also as Two, as Larger and also as Smaller, without the sensibility itself being able to dissolve this entanglement of contradictory determinations, and to decide, which of these mutually contradictory messages or reports of the senses is correct" (*PI*: 202).

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε ὁμολογοῦμεν, μὴ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸ [i.e. τὸ ἴσον—
later generalized to all pure concepts] ἐννενοηκέναι μηδὲ δυνατόν
εἶναι ἐννοῆσαι ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ἰδεῖν ἢ ἅψασθαι ἢ ἐκ τίνος ἄλλης
τῶν αἰσθήσεων.

(*Ph.* 75a)

But this too we concede, that we have come to conceive [the Equal] from
nowhere else than from seeing or touching or some other of the senses--
and that we are unable to conceive it [from any other source].

A few lines later he reiterates the point: we "take up [ἀναλαμβάνομεν]" these pure
concepts by "using our senses [ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι χρώμενοι]" (*Ph.*, 75e). The "taking
up," is "later" than the original, "prior" knowledge, and hence is styled "recollecting
[ἀναμνησκέσθαι]" (75e; cf. 74cd). Natorp sets aside Socrates's inconsequent
conclusion to the soul's existence prior to incarnation, and focuses on the "explicit and
repeated acknowledgement of the indispensable *share of sensibility* in cognition:

es sei nicht anders möglich die rein gedanklichen Bestimmungen, die wir
freilich nur, als ursprünglich unser eigen, aus dem Quell des eignen
Bewußtseins schöpfen können, ins Bewußtsein zu heben ..., als infolge
der sinnlichen Wahrnehmung oder von ihr ausgehend (ἀπό, 76A). Zwar
nur das Bewußtsein selbst vermag, als ganz sein Eignes, den Begriff zu
erdenken, nichts Sinnliches vermag ihn ihm zu geben; aber es bedarf, um
ihn zu erdenken, gleichwohl der Wahrnehmung: nur am sinnlichen
Abbild erkennt es, d.h. erkennt es *wieder*, das Urbild. Das entspricht
ganz der Rolle, welche der Sinnlichkeit im Theaetet zuerkannt wurde.

(*PI*: 144-145)

it is not possible to bring to consciousness the purely noetic
[*gedanklich*] determinations--which, as originally belonging to us, we
can of course only derive [*schöpfen*] from our own consciousness--

except as a result of sense-perception or by taking sense-perception as a basis. It is true that only consciousness alone can conceive the concept, as something entirely proper to itself; nothing sensible is able to give the concept to consciousness. Nonetheless, in order for the concept to be conceived, sense perception is required: only in the sensible image [*Abbild*] does consciousness cognize—i.e. *recognize*—the paradigm [*Urbild*]. This is entirely in accord with the role which was granted sensibility in the *Theaetetus*.

Natorp again points out that the senses do not "give" the concept, but rather that they "ask the question, to which the concept answers" (*PI*: 145). Again we see the interdependence between the sensibility and the understanding which is itself "dialectical" at the deepest level. The understanding is dialectically dependent upon the sensibility, insofar as the "entire function of the concept [is exhausted] ... by *determining this indeterminacy=X*" (*PI*: 146). In this connection, Natorp stresses the relational nature of these *Grundbegriffe*, illustrated here by "Equality." As he puts it, a relation can only be posited insofar one at the same time posits a "manifold" which the relation relates to a "unity" of thought. The relation itself, however, is only *achieved* by thought; relation subsists only in thinking, and thinking consists entirely in relation.

(*PI*: 145; emphasis added)

He concludes: "This originality and self-propiety of consciousness's unity-function forms the indestructible nucleus of the entire, profoundly constructed inquiry [of this section]" (*PI*: 145).

We thus see how the self-interrogation of the mind's dialogue with itself by itself is *dialectically* related to this empirical dialogue of mind and sensibility. All thinking is the mind answering some question, and sensibility's questions are only one *kind* of question, viz. the questions whose answers constitute *experience*. But the mind

can also ask questions of itself in a self-reflective mode, and it is this mode which here appears as internal dialectic. Instead of answering sensibility, the self-reflective mind is spurred by its empirical dialogue now to ask how it is able to give those answers, how it was able to generate the objects it in fact experiences. This new internal dialectic is simply the analytic ascent of a transcendental deduction; its "answers" are the mind's own functional concepts *thanks to which* I can have some empirical *a* or *b* or *c* to ask the *ti esti* question *about*. This latter conversation constitutes what Plato designates the "craft of *logoi*," described by Socrates as his "midwifery:" the ability to bring to light and life what is *already latent* in us. Philosophical dialectic, then, can only take its starting-point from sense-experience, as Socrates says, and proceed to deduce the conditions of possibility of that experience.

When one has succeeded in purifying one's concepts, and considers them "as objects" (*PI*: 146), one has both reached the highest goal of dialectic (to anticipate: to move solely among the *eidê*) and generated a (necessary) metaphysical illusion, viz. of ideas as things-in-themselves. Here, too, lies the greatest philosophical danger, namely of forgetting that these abstractions are *nothing more than* abstractions, and have no meaning "in themselves." Kant thinks Plato on occasion fell prey to this illusion; Natorp thinks Plato never even generated it. Kant thinks the illusory objectivity of our ideas is necessary for providing science with its *goals*; Natorp ignores the problem of scientific goals and concerns himself solely with scientific method; goals change, method remains. For this reason he interprets the *ideai* as hypothetical propositions within the body of scientific cognitions itself. To his arguments for this interpretation, the heart of his interpretation of Plato *tout court*, we now turn.

The being of becoming. Natorp's goal in the next two sections of his discussion (C and D) is to show that the *Phaedo* establishes a method for a "science of experience," where this phrase is to be construed in the strictest Kantian sense: "science" means "system of

cognitions;" "experience" means "sensible phenomena." The two sections are closely linked: Section C paves the way for Section D, and Section D in turn substantiates the claims of C. Since, according to Natorp, Plato has thus far kept knowledge and experience apart and opposed--as much out of a lingering Eleatic influence as out of the philosophical necessity of discriminating the various sources of our cognition¹⁰¹--his task now is to show how their synthesis, how real *epistēmē* of the phenomenal world, and not mere *doxa*, is possible.

Natorp argues that in the *Phaedo*'s third major argument (the so-called "Affinity Argument," *Ph.* 78-84),¹⁰² Plato grants, for the first time, that a certain kind of being can be ascribed to the realm of sensible phenomena, namely by fixing a relationship between the phenomenal realm of becoming and the noetic realm of being. Since it is for Plato an epistemological principle that "knowledge" can only be had of what *is*, or "has being," the possibility of *knowledge* of phenomena ("empirical science") comes into view, viz. insofar as a *method* of mediating pure concepts and sensible intuitions can be established, so that "being" can be said of phenomena. Section D, the *Phaedo*'s dialectical capstone, establishes the method through which the realm of being is brought into relation to the realm of becoming.

In Natorp's view, the unfortunate consequence of Plato's earlier "Eleaticism," the complete divorce of the realms of being and becoming, is now, at least in principle if not entirely in expression, overcome. The argument for immortality from affinity takes its

¹⁰¹ Cf. *KrV*, A51-52/B75-76.

¹⁰² Natorp's title for this section (C), "The two kinds of being: the unchangeable and the changeable," epitomizes his general attitude towards the *Phaedo*: it is not a dialogue "περὶ ψυχῆς" (much less "ἡθικῶς"), as the scholiast would have it; nor is it in the end concerned with "proving" personal immortality (as most commentators acknowledge). Thus Natorp simply ignores the entire "deduction" of the soul's deathlessness, instead focusing on a key hypothesis from which the simplicity and indestructibility of the soul follow almost as a mere corollary. Though we might accept Natorp's estimation of the relative philosophical weight to be assigned to the general argument for two genera of being, on the one hand, and to the specific argument for the soul's immortality, on the other hand, yet it is remarkable that he pays no attention to the hypothetical procedure already applied by Socrates at this stage of the dialogue. This omission might be no more than a rhetorical strategy: Natorp does not want to spoil the purity of his textual scheme, and wants to reserve the discussion of hypothesis and the method of the *ideai* for the last section of the dialogue, where it is explicitly raised by Plato himself.

starting point from a more general question: What sort of thing is destructible (scatterable), what sort is indestructible? Things composed of parts are subject to destruction, while non-composite things—should there be any—are not. Most likely—it is argued—that which always subsists in one and the same condition also is non-composite, whereas that which fluctuates in different ways is composite. Socrates then introduces "ἡ οὐσία ἧς λόγον δίδομεν τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἐρωτῶντες καὶ ἀποκρινόμενοι... [the *ousia* of whose *einai* we give an account, asking and answering...]" (*Ph.* 78cd). Such *ousiai* that are always and only "themselves" never accept or receive (ἐνδέχεται) any change (78d). By contrast, the many equal things, the many beautiful things, etc., that are objects of the senses, especially of vision, these are, as *sensibilia*, never "the same" (*Ph.* 78e-79a). The simple self-sames, on the other hand, are objects of thinking alone: "but you could not reach those things that subsist self-identically in any other way than through the *logsimos* of thought [*dianoia*]" (*Ph.* 79a).¹⁰³

Thus two kinds of beings (δύο εἶδη τῶν ὄντων) are *posited* (θῶμεν) (*Ph.* 79a),¹⁰⁴ the visible-changing, and the invisible-immutable. It is this thesis of the two genera (*eidē*) of being(s) which Natorp identifies as the great advance, pregnant with consequence.

Man hat hier den bestimmten Gedanken zu erkennen, daß eine Wahrheit der Erfahrungserkenntnis, eben auf Grund der Ideenerkenntnis, wiederum möglich, ja durch diese Grundlegung gerade ermöglicht wird. Das Sinnliche ist Schein und bloße Meinung, solange es nicht auf die reinen Setzungen des Denkens "zurückbezogen" ist, solange der Wechsel der Erscheinung gesetzlos, mithin unbestimmt bleibt. Aber diese Zurückbeziehung, diese gesetzliche Bestimmung des Wechsels der

¹⁰³ τῶν δὲ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἐχόντων οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτῳ ποτ' ἂν ἄλλῳ ἐπιλάβοιο ἢ τῷ τῆς διανοίας λογισμῷ....

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Robinson, 1962: 93, ff.

Erscheinung ist möglich, muß möglich sein, also kommt dem Sinnlichen ein ihm eigentümliches Sein, eine ihm eigentümliche Wahrheit zu.

(*PI*: 149; emphasis added)

Here we must recognize the clear view that a truth of empirical cognition is in turn possible on the basis of cognition of ideas, indeed, that it is precisely made possible through this basis

[posit=hypothesis=*Grundlegung*]. The sensible is illusion [*Schein*] and mere opinion as long as it is not "related back" [derived] to the pure posits of thinking, as long as the alteration of appearance remains lawless, and so undetermined. But this derivation [*Zurückbeziehung*], this lawful determination of the mutation of appearance is possible, must be possible; hence the sensible is granted a being peculiar to it, a truth peculiar to it.

Natorp portrays both form and conclusion of the argument as a "Kantian" one, viz. as an attempt at deducing the conditions of possibility of the *fact* of true empirical judgements, of predications about sensible phenomena. But this "postulate" of the two ontic orders can only be secured through the "Nachweis der *Methode* einer Wissenschaft des Sinnlichen" (*PI*: 149).

How is the realm of sensible intuitions connected with the noetic realm? In what sense can we attribute to sensibilia their own peculiar form of being and truth? Since, as Natorp constantly stresses, "being" always indicates predication; and since to predicate is equivalent to making a judgement; it follows that "being in general only signifies the function of judging, and has no other specifiable sense" (*PI*: 150).¹⁰⁵ The question can therefore be rephrased: In what sense can one make (true) judgements about sensible intuitions? How are synthetic *a posteriori* judgements possible? Now, empirical being cannot have its source or ground in our intuitions, since, as was ostensibly demonstrated

¹⁰⁵ Cf. *PI*: 240.

in the *Theaetetus*, sensible phenomena *as such* have no being, but always only fluctuate in an incoherent streaming. Therefore, according to Natorp, we can make (true) empirical judgements and form bona fide empirical cognitions only insofar the being of these empirical judgements is grounded in, i.e. derives its validity from, the being of our *pure* judgements.

Since the "being" of pure judgements functions as the foundation or warranty underwriting the "being" of empirical judgements, the two orders of being are assigned different *grades*.¹⁰⁶ The challenge of course remains to show *how* pure judgements can be applied or "related [*bezogen*]" to the realm of phenomena; or as Natorp elsewhere puts it, how the mind can move from the tautological cognition of pure concepts to "heterological" cognition. Only if we can explain how it is possible to make the judgement "A is B," rather than "A is A," can we account for the possibility of making true, i.e. properly scientific, propositions about phenomena.¹⁰⁷

Socrates's "intellectual autobiography." The impulses that lead one into this last zone of self-reflection become clearer as we examine Socrates's "intellectual autobiography." Natorp characterizes this part of the *Phaedo* as the story of Plato's own journey from dogmatism through skepticism to criticism.¹⁰⁸ In order to explicate Natorp's point, I will focus on the meaning of Socrates's "blinding." For it is the "blindness" caused by the dominant *περὶ φύσεως* style of inquiry which led Socrates to devise his own "second-best" method--the method of hypothesis which is Natorp's chief interest.

As Natorp says, the goal of the natural historians is to understand, to gain insight into the *αἰτία* of each thing: "εἰδέναι ... διὰ τί γίνεται ἕκαστον καὶ διὰ τί ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τί ἔστιν [to know through what each thing comes to be, through what it perishes, through what it subsists]" (*Ph.* 96a). What do they mean by

¹⁰⁶ *PI*: 150.

¹⁰⁷ Natorp, 1969: 11.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. *PI*: 150-151.

"each thing," and what counts as a $\tau\acute{\iota}$, $\delta\iota\alpha$ which it could be explained? Based on Socrates's account, and judging by the title of their investigations, the natural historians mean by "thing" a physical thing, a natural thing, e.g., an animal or a human being, the moon, a star.

This is the common-sense or "dogmatic" conception of a thing:¹⁰⁹ it is a sensible, and its $\alpha\lambda\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$ is also a sensible, or more accurately, a non-evident form or function *of* a sensible. Thus, in the theory that when "the warm and the cold are gripped by putrefaction," animals are generated, the warm, the cold, and putrefaction are sensible phenomena; but just *how* the animate is to emerge from their co-presence or interaction remains non-evident. The same holds for the other examples Socrates cites: blood, air, fire, etc. are all proposed as that $\delta\iota\alpha$ $\tau\acute{\iota}$ we think, the addition of bone to bone and of flesh to flesh as that $\delta\iota\alpha$ $\tau\acute{\iota}$ the body grows. But in all these cases the *how* of the $\delta\iota\alpha$ $\tau\acute{\iota}$ remains non-evident, that is, not itself accessible to direct sensible verification.

Instead, the explanatory work is done by what Natorp calls "*analogies to the sensible*" as the given, the purportedly understood.

One presumes to understand the given because it is familiar to us from experience, and then thinks the non-given [i.e. the non-evident $\alpha\lambda\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha$] as similar to this given.

(*PI*: 151)

Natorp frames this aetiological issue as the question of causation as such. The $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota$ $\phi\upsilon\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma$ explanations fail *generally* because they cannot account for the *how* of transition from state *x* to state *y* within the common-sense, mechanistic parameters they dogmatically set for themselves.

Man versteht nicht *aus* einer gegebenen Tatsache wie eine andre, von ihr verschiedene, in irgend einer Hinsicht ihr *kontradiktorische* aus ihr hervorgehen soll.

¹⁰⁹ *Ph.* 96c.

(*PI*: 151)

One does not understand *out* of a given fact or state of affairs how a different fact or state of affairs, one which in some respect is contradictory to the first one, is supposed to come about.

This is the problem, according to Natorp, which "blinded" Socrates, which shocked him out of the naive dogmatism that underlay even the most sophisticated *περὶ φύσεως* explanations, and sent him spinning into "skepticism"—or at least into *ἀπορία*.

Natorp compares this moment to Hume's insight into the problematic concept of cause (*PI*: 151). This comparison, while not entirely apt,¹¹⁰ deserves further attention since it furnishes a window into Natorp's conception of natural science. As the just-quoted passage puts it, the phenomena themselves by themselves cannot suffice to explain their own mutation. But this insight is not the crucial one: indeed, the *περὶ φύσεως* writers themselves share it, insofar as they resort to the non-evident in their aetiologies. Rather, the crucial insight is that the concepts we use in framing our explanations *as cognitions* of phenomena do not *derive* from the phenomena themselves, but from the mind. As long as we merely look at the phenomena—conceived by common-sense as the things themselves, as τὰ πράγματα—and try to discover the causes in the phenomena, we will be blinded. And as long as we conceive of the causes as non-evident but nonetheless same in kind as their effects, à la the natural historians, we will also be blinded—only by a more dazzling light.¹¹¹

The point is made clear by Socrates's own puzzles concerning relative size. He used to think "that when a large man stood by a small one he was taller by a head, and so a horse was taller than a horse," though he "now" thinks that he is "far, by Zeus, from believing that I know the cause of any of those things" (*Ph.* 96de). The physical

¹¹⁰ Hume attacked the *a priori* reading of causation *into* phenomena, not the *a posteriori* reading of causation *in* phenomena.

¹¹¹ Consider Socrates's mocking account of vision in the *Meno*, in which he uses the jargon of Empedocles's theory of emanations. Cf. *Ph.* 100c.

explanation that the cause of one man's tallness is that he is taller "by a head" than another is not a real explanation, because "by a head" could just as well be adduced to explain the other man's *shortness* (*Ph.* 96de, 100e; *PI.* 151); hence the same "cause" would explain two contradictory "effects." Conversely, in the case of the generation of the same effect—a pair—two different "physicalistic" descriptions, two contradictory "causes," can be adduced, viz. "bringing together" or "splitting apart" (*Ph.* 96e-97b). As Natorp writes, the text implies that for a proposed cause (*Grund*) to count as a *true* cause—i.e. have explanatory force—it must be an "identity."¹¹²

If natural science, a science of experience—a system of cognitions that explains phenomenal fluctuations with apodictic force—is to be possible, *then* the grounds of this possibility can only be gained by the transcendental turn. In the "easy" cases of size or number adduced by Socrates, this means recognizing that "tallness," "shortness," "unity," and "two-ness" are not traits of things in themselves (πεφυκέναι).¹¹³ Instead, for the (neo-)Kantian, they are concepts laid into (*hineingelegt*) or imposed upon the given phenomena *by the subject* making the respective judgement: "S is tall;" "S is short;" "S is a unity;" "S is a pair;" etc. On Natorp's view, Socrates was blinded, as was Hume, by looking directly at τὰ ὄντα (*Ph.* 99d), at τὰ πράγματα (*Ph.* 99e), and realizing that in this way one can discern no cause (i.e. frame no explanation), and thus gain no knowledge.

But unlike Hume, who consequently surrenders the possibility of science in the strict sense, (Plato's) Socrates does not remain a skeptic. Natorp draws this contrast three times in *Platos Ideenlehre*;¹¹⁴ his point is always the same. All rationalists—starting with Plato—"who have been clear about their own principles," agree with Hume that

¹¹² *PI.* 151, 153, 156.

¹¹³ Cf. *Ph.* 102bc.

¹¹⁴ Cf. *PI.* 151, 163, 431.

[d]ie gegebene empirische Lage, oder auch der bisherige Lauf des Geschehens, ... keinen *Grund* [i.e., no αἴτιον] [enthält] warum in dem und dem Zeitpunkt die und die Veränderung erfolgt.

(*PI*: 431)

the given empirical situation, or the preceding sequence of events, ... contain no *reason* why such and such a change results at such and such a point in time.

But the (critical) rationalists advance beyond Hume by rejecting the conclusion that there are no αἰτίαι, only constant conjunctions that are habitually thought of as causal links. Instead they acknowledge the reality of αἰτίαι, of *Gründe*, whose reality is grounded in the "law," in the *Ge-setz*: that which is posited, laid-down, laid-over, or laid-under, the phenomena—by thinking. Natorp echoes Kant here in his estimation of Hume, who performed a great service in undermining the "ineradicable [Aristotelian] dogmatism of *things as causes*," but did not advance beyond this "correct negation" to the "positive answer that clarifies everything" (*PI*: 431): he failed to see the "law" as αἴτιον (*PI*: 163).¹¹⁵ It is just this positive insight which Natorp identifies in the "second-sailing."¹¹⁶

Socrates prefaces his own method with an account of a guide he thought promised an escape from the blinding dogmatism of natural history: Anaxagoras. Socrates says that he had once heard someone read from Anaxagoras's book "ὥς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος... [that *nous* is the orderer and the cause of all things (the universe)...]" (*Ph.* 97bc). This notion pleased young Socrates because "ἔδοξέ μοι τρόπον τινὰ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον [it struck me *in some way* to be right that *nous* should be the cause of the universe]" (*Ph.*

¹¹⁵ "Plato trug mystische intellectualia, Aristoteles logische intellectualia vor; Letzterer fehlte darin, daß er sagte, sie wären auch in den Sinnen gelegen. Denn der Begriff der Ursache lag niemals in der sinnlichen Anschauung." (Kant: "Reflexionen zur Metaphysik," #4868, Phase φ. Academy Edition, Vol. XVIII: 15.) Cf. Kant, 1950: 5-6.

¹¹⁶ τὸν δεῦτερον πλοῦν—LSJ report this as a proverb, meaning "the next best way."

97c; emphasis added).¹¹⁷ Socrates specifies in what way *he* thought, at that time, *nous* should serve as an explanation, and how he expected Anaxagoras to use *nous*:

καὶ ἡγησάμην, εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως ἔχει, τὸν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα
πάντα κοσμεῖν καὶ ἕκαστον τιθέναι ταύτῃ ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ
εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιτο τὴν αἰτίαν εὑρεῖν περὶ ἐκάστου ὅπῃ
γίνεται ἢ ἀπόλλυται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὑρεῖν,
ὅπῃ βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστὶν ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὅτιον πάσχειν ἢ
ποιεῖν. ἐκ δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τούτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν
προσθήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων,
ἄλλ' ἢ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον

(*Ph.* 97cd)

And I figured, if this is the way it is, then certainly *nous*, in doing the ordering, will order everything and place [*tithenai*] each thing in whatever way is best. Now if someone wanted to discover the *aitia* of each thing, in what wise it comes to be or perishes or subsists [*esti*], it is necessary for him to find out this about it, [namely] in what way it is best for it either to exist or to suffer [undergo] or to do anything at all. On the basis of this *logos* it is not fitting for a person [*anthrōpos*] to seek/investigate [*skopein*] anything other than the good and the best, both concerning this [particular] matter and others....

Socrates expected Anaxagoras to explain the cause of each thing individually (ἐκάστῳ), and of all things generally (κοινῇ πασι), by explicating the best state (τὸ βέλτιστον) for the individual and the good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) for the whole (*Ph.* 98b).¹¹⁸ Socrates was of course disappointed in this expectation of a teleological natural history, since

¹¹⁷ Cf. Rowe, 1993: 234.

¹¹⁸ Cf. *PI*: 152.

Anaxagoras relied purely on mechanistic "causes," altogether neglecting *nous* or considerations of goodness or fitness as explanatory factors.

A Kantian interpreter of this passage faces several problems. On the one hand, a turn away from a mechanistic explanatory scheme in favor of a teleological one would seem attractive, insofar as such a turn amounts to a rejection of the naive materialism described by Socrates at *Phaedo* 96a-d. On the other hand, the kind of appeal to *nous* described by Socrates remains "pre-critical," a) insofar as *nous* is seen as a real cause, acting in a world of material things as a kind of objective Providence; and b) insofar as teleology is seen as an explanation of the things in themselves and of those providential arrangements, instead of merely an indispensable heuristic device for explaining phenomena.¹¹⁹ Why then does Socrates mention Anaxagoras? Because, disregarding the just-mentioned problems in both young Socrates's and Anaxagoras's conceptions of *nous*, the *αἰτίαι* of the world are for the first time located in *mind* or a *subject*, rather than in *things* or *objects*. This is the crucial first step towards the "transcendental turn."

Implicit in this turn is a vertiginous double-switch in perspective. For just as the *subject's* cognitive apparatus is made the site of all objective determinations, so all reality seems to get sucked out of the *world*. As the familiar solidity of everyday things dissolves into abstract "functions," so the things themselves retreat mutely behind a noetic veil. Ontology yields to epistemology: we are left with "objectivities" but no objects, wholly abandoned to our own internal complexities; falling into ourselves, we are no longer with things, and they are no longer with us. However dismaying this sudden loss of all things may be, it is crucial to distinguish it from the ontic loss suffered through subscription to the "Heraclitean relativism" or "Protagorean subjectivism" discussed earlier. As "sensualistic" doctrines that count nothing but the sensible-phenomenal flux as real, they admit of no being whatever, whether ontological or logical. That loss is absolute. By contrast, the ontological loss of the critical

¹¹⁹ It will be interesting to determine how Socrates's early commitment to teleology and the "good" implicit in *nous* is maintained in the method of hypothesis he ultimately constructs.

philosophy is only relative. On the one hand, being, i.e. objectivity, is retained, as we have seen, as a function of judgement. On the other hand, external reality is not denied in principle--only *knowledge* of it is denied us.

To see the ontological loss implicit in the transcendental turn as merely relative allows for a straight Kantian interpretation of Socrates's otherwise somewhat puzzling characterization of his method as the second-best option or "second-sailing." We can see, for one thing, what the *ideal* option would have been: direct looking, direct knowing, unmediated intuition of the things themselves. Yet because all *we* can intuit (look at) is phenomenal (or: phenomenally mediated), and the phenomena are continuously flowing, we are faced with three options: two equally unattractive (1 and 2); and one less so (3). Either 1) we go with the flow, entirely giving up on the possibility of rational explanation ("sensualism"); or 2) we persist in framing causal, rational explanations, *as if* our senses delivered not merely phenomenal flux but real objects (the dogmatism of the natural historians); or 3) we recognize the flux of sensibility but seek the ground of its rational explicability in the subject, not the things. The last option--a compromise or mixture of 1) and 2)--happens also to be the only one that--for the Kantian--truly reflects our situation.¹²⁰

Socrates's response to this compromise exhibits a corresponding mixture of disappointment that our powers of cognition are not unlimited,¹²¹ and hope at the

¹²⁰ There is yet another interpretation, one which I have come to believe is correct after finishing this chapter. In short, I would argue that the second sailing is not second-best with respect to an immediate intuition of causes "in" things à la the mechanists--Socrates rejects the *peri physeōs* thinkers outright. Rather, his "confused" method is second-best compared to the *teleological* mode of explanation "promised" by Anaxagoras. Socrates laments having never encountered a teacher of *this* method just prior to describing the second sailing. This interpretation gains support from a parallel passage at 85c, where Simmias speaks of resorting to a makeshift raft in the absence of a divine doctrine. My view is that the teleological mode of explanation to be just such a divine doctrine, which Anaxagoras as a mere mortal could not possibly have delivered. Thus my interpretation brings this passage into very close connection with Plato's account of the form of the good in the cave allegory, and the images at the end of *Rep.* 6; for the question now arises of how teleology and hypothesis are in fact connected. I am working this out in a separate article.

¹²¹ Socrates's critical impulse is expressed in his vocabulary of fear: e.g. *ἐδείσα* (*Ph.* 99e); *δεδιώς* (*Ph.* 101d); of the clumsiness of our thought (*Ph.* 101d); and what is "safe" (*Ph.* 101d).

heartening prospect that despite the limits of these powers, we nonetheless have access to real truth and knowledge. He says:

– ἔδεισα μὴ παντάπασιν τὴν ψυχὴν τυφλωθείην βλέπων πρὸς τὰ
 πράγματα τοῖς ὅμμασι καὶ ἐκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐπιχειρῶν
 ἄπτεσθαι αὐτῶν. ἔδοξε δὴ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους
 καταφυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τῶν ὄντων τὴν ἀλήθειαν.
 ἴσως μὲν οὖν ᾧ εἰκάζω τρόπον τινὰ οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐ γὰρ πάννυ
 συγχωρῶ τὸν ἐν λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκόσι μᾶλλον
 σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν ἔργοις.

(*Ph.* 99e-100a)

I was afraid lest my soul be utterly blinded, in looking at the *pragmata* with my eyes, and trying to grasp them with each of my senses. It seemed necessary to me, seeking refuge in *logoi*, to see [*skopein*] in these the truth of the *onta*. Maybe however my manner of description is not quite accurate; for I would completely disagree that he who looks [*skopoumenon*] at the *onta* in *logoi* is looking at them in images [*eikosi*] more than he who looks at them in fact [*ergois*].

Socrates is not denying that he is looking at things by images; he is simply asserting that the dogmatist *also* only sees images or icons of the things themselves, and that his, Socrates's, "logical" method will let us see or inquire into the *pragmata*, the *onta*, safely, whereas the dogmatist will surely be blinded.

It is important to see that Socrates does not conceive his own mixed method as a method to solve the problems of his περὶ φύσεως youth. That aetiological project, such as establishing the real cause of organic growth, has been given up altogether, and a new set of problems, an entirely new *Fragestellung* has emerged.¹²² It is this new

¹²² When Socrates has finished relating the kinds of issues the first problematic deals with, Cebes asks,

νῦν δὲ δὴ – τί σοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν;
 (*Ph.* 96e)

problematic which Socrates's mixed method addresses, viz. how to get the images or icons of reality right.

The method of hypothesis. After Socrates has finished his *Selbstdarstellung*, and recounted his disappointment with Anaxagoras's false start, he finally introduces his own mixed method.

ἀλλ οὖν δὴ ταύτη γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον
 ὃν ἂν κρίνω ἑρρωμενέστατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ τούτῳ
 συμφωνεῖν τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν
 ἄλλων ἀπάντων, ἃ δ' ἂν μὴ, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ.

(*Ph.* 100a)

Well then, at any rate, I turned in this direction, and, laying-down
 [ὑποθέμενος] in each case that *logos* which I judge to be the strongest
 one, I posit [τίθημι] that which seems to me to agree with [that *logos*] as
 being true, whether concerning causes or anything else, [and I posit] that
 which does not [seem to me to agree with the *logos*] as being not true.

Natorp interprets this passage and its development as evidence for his three main theses about Plato's mature thought. First, Platonic idealism is "critical idealism:" the *logoi* are the *Urbilder* of which the phenomenal things are the *Abbilder*. Second, this critical idealism is also a methodical idealism: the *logoi* are confirmed as "scientific cognitions," secured in a system of other such cognitions, which entire system is based on pure basic

But *now* what seems to you to be the case regarding these things?

"Now" means "now": the moment in which Socrates is relating the autobiography, the "now" of the cell, a time when he has long been using his own mixed method. One might expect him to say: with *my* method, all is clear! Instead he replies:

πόρρω που ... ἐμὲ εἶναι τοῦ οἶεσθαι περὶ τούτων του τὴν αἰτίαν
 εἰδέναι

(*Ph.* 96e)

[It seems that] I am far indeed from believing myself to know the cause of these things.

This is the sign, if we are to seek one, of Socrates/Plato's "transcendental turn": the search for "causes" of the things themselves is given up because we become "blinded" if we try to look τὰ πράγματα directly in the face: "Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind" (*KrV*, A51/B76).

concepts/judgements (*Grundurteile*), and ultimately anchored in the *fundamentum* of a single sufficient principle. Third, since these *logoi* ultimately reveal "the truth of what is (of the *onta*, here definitely: *empirical* truth), Plato's method[ologic]ical [*methodischer*] idealism amounts to an idealistic method of natural science" (PI: 154). Let us investigate these three claims in order.

What does Natorp mean when he says that the "*logische Gestalt des Seins*" is the *Urbild*, the "paradigm" of all objects, and that these, in turn, are its *Abbild* (PI: 154)? To answer this, we must first remember that he means by the "*logische Gestalt des Seins*" the pure judgements of the understanding that are expressed as definitional predications. Since *Sein* can only mean the predicative copula, it can only *have* meaning within a logical structure or *Gestalt* (e.g. a well-formed sentence); at the same time, the structure of being is pure and *a priori* (all *a posteriori* experience is of becoming).

Now it is these *logoi* which are the predicative *acts* of the thinking (pure) ego, or, to avoid all hint of psychologism, of pure thinking *tout court*: thinking just consists in this spontaneous power of (predicative) being. This act is an act of "laying-down," of setting down propositions, and in this act thought itself is what it is: it gives *itself* its hypo-theses, its pro-positions, its *Grund-legungen*, its *Ge-setze*--in short, its laws. Herein it exhibits its spontaneous *autonomy*.

Only what falls under such a "law" can even count as an objectivity--not in the pretheoretical sense, but in the proper, *scientific* sense. For only in science is true objectivity attainable, i.e. in thinking that is not bound in any way by phenomenal fluctuation, but that proceeds wholly autonomously, in accord with its own *Denksetzungen*. Because these objectivities are law-ful, because they hang together systematically, according to a rational principle, all *phenomenal* objectivities must now be harmonized with these noetic objectivities, to the extent any *knowledge*, and not mere *doxa*, is to be had of them. In other words, these highest *logoi*, which lay down objectivity, are not abstracted from lower, less clear and distinct phenomenal

objectivities. They have an entirely independent source in the understanding, and determine to what degree the latter *are* objectivities at all, i.e. conform to their absolute standards. This is what Natorp means by calling *logoi* "*Urbilder*." The *Abbilder* are coherent, thinkable *Bilder* only insofar as they conform to the determinations of the *Urbilder*.¹²³ Hence these *logoi* have a normative function as well, namely as *standards* for both perceptual and doxastic objectivation, enabling us to *correct* the misunderstandings and false opinions rampant at those levels.¹²⁴

Participation. Like the *Urbild-Abbild* terminology, Natorp regards Socrates's description of the relation between phenomenal and noetic objectivity as "participation" as another vividly metaphoric attempt to express an inchoate, germinating thought. The *logos* is the *Urbild* in that it is itself logically prior and unchanging *with respect to* the particular phenomena it objectivates. It expresses the definition of a concept as an unchanging identity, unchanging insofar as *logos* is a pure, self-identical product of thinking alone (though not therefore unreviseable or irreplaceable). The phenomenal object is the *Abbild* insofar as it "participates" in the "logical concept."

Natorp's interpretation of this most doubtful of Platonic notions is impudently simple. Socrates begins to talk about the relationship of particulars to forms at *Ph.* 100b, ff. All beautiful things are beautiful because they μετέχει in the Beautiful (*Ph.* 100c); which is equivalent to the παρουσία or κοινωνία of the Beautiful in the beautiful (*Ph.* 100d). This relationship is left intentionally vague by Socrates:

εἴτε ὅπη δὴ καὶ ὅπως προσγενομένη, οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο
 δισχυρίζομαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῷ καλῷ πάντα τὰ καλὰ γίγνεται καλὰ.

(*Ph.* 100d)

¹²³ Again, it must be stressed that Natorp is not making the psychological claim that the generation of *Abbilder* (empirical objectivities) happens at the level of perceptual objectivation; rather, it happens at the noetic level of self-reflective objectivation of "scientific" entities.

¹²⁴ Natorp believes that Socrates prescribes the method for this correction in the rest of this passage.

I do not want further to assert anything about whence or in what manner [this presence or participation] comes about, but that all beautiful things become beautiful through the Beautiful.

Natorp interprets this "participation," here as throughout *Platos Ideenlehre*, as meaning "subsumption." A sensible k is called k correctly (i.e. calling it " k " expresses a truth about it) insofar as K , the "logical form" is predicable of it.

We must be clear about what *Natorp* means by participation-as-subsumption. He cannot intend the usual meaning of subsumption, namely that an individual is subsumed under a concept if it possesses the features which the concept "bundles together."¹²⁵ This latter interpretation of subsumption leaves no room for the functional notion of concept (i.e., the notion that the individual is generated by the concept), but seems more naturally linked to the substantial or "essential" notion of concept: the concept is conceived as separate from the individual (either really or nominally), and the subsumption relation is determined by matching the traits of the one with the other. But, as we saw above (2.4.), the Marburgers reject *Substanzbegriff* in favor of *Funktionsbegriff*. What does "participation" or subsumption mean on the functional interpretation?

Natorp's meaning becomes clearer when, like Cassirer, we take a mathematical equation as an example. In a plane whereon a Cartesian coordinate system has been imposed, the points on the plane constitute a manifold.¹²⁶ Now take the following simple equation:

$$y = x^2$$

¹²⁵ Cf. *PI*: 155-156. Subsumption, from this passage, clearly does mean the falling of an individual under some concept. Natorp qualifies this by saying that in the passage under discussion (*Ph.* 100-102) subsumption has not yet been considered with respect to time. Perhaps the way to put the matter is this: subsumption and participation can be seen from a subjective-active or objective-passive point of view. Subsumption carries an active, participation a passive sense, but refer to the same relationship. In subsuming an individual under a function-concept, mind in fact generates the individual *as* an individual, viz. of such and such nature. The "resulting" objectivity then can be said to "participate" in that concept, to fall under it. Cf. esp. *PI*: 156.

¹²⁶ Of course, the points on this plane have already been determined in virtue of their relation to the coordinate system.

This equation—expressible as the function: $f(x) = x^2$ —"determines the manifold," generating an objectivity—a parabola—in and out of the manifold. In Marburg language, certain points in the manifold can be said to "participate" in f , namely those whose coordinates it generates. Thus $(-2, 4)$ and $(3, 9)$ "participate" in F , whereas $(10, 10)$ does not. Moreover, the entire curve described by the generated ordered pairs "participates," in f . The function here is entirely *a priori* with respect to the manifold and to the coordinates and curve it generates. As a formula of a rule, it gives the law to the manifold, out of which, *a posteriori*, the parabola may be generated. The function is in no way itself a curve; yet the parabola falls under it, is subsumed, participates in it. The paradigm and model is the function, not some parabola drawn in a noetic *topos* or in the imagination. The graphed image of the parabola is an "*Abbild*" of the function.

This interpretation of methexis naturally leads to Natorp's explanation of how empirical judgements are "grounded" and thus are able to be "true." They derive their contingent truth from the necessary truth of the definitions or *Grundurteile* under which they fall as a "case" does under a "law." The latter truth never changes, but a particular phenomenal objectivity may cease to be subsumed under it, and come to fall under its contradictory. If this happens (as it always does in the flux), the first correctly predicated concept "retreats" and the other "conquers," to use the terms of the *Phaedo*. But the first concept does not "perish," does not cease to exist as a definition which can be validly predicated of *other* phenomena, or of the same phenomenon at another point in time.

Being and time. Being, in the strong sense, as Natorp believes to have shown, resides in pure concepts and pure judgements. Empirical objects and objectivities are said "to be" in a secondary sense, insofar as they participate in a pure concept, i.e. are subsumed by it. But how is the *becoming*, and not just the *being* of an objectivity explicable? That is, how can a *being change* from hot to cold, from small to large, from A to not- A ? For "es

sagt jeder Satz des Werdens von demselben Subjekt-*X* kontradiktorische Prädikate *A* und nicht-*A* aus..." (Natorp, 1911: 76). Or, as he puts it in the *Ideenlehre*,

the logical foundation for empirical judgements ... consists solely in this:
to demonstrate the general possibility of connecting contradictory
predicates with the same subject.... For this is the concept of becoming—
generation and corruption—that at one point it is said of it that it is *A*, and
at another point, it is not *A*, and that both assertions nevertheless can
subsist with each other as well as with the basic judgements
[*Grundurteile*]

(PI: 158)

Natorp sees his own theory of time anticipated, inchoate but with "all premises present," in the *Phaedo*'s discussion of how contradictory predicates may be said of the same subject, or, in Platonic language, how the same thing can "participate" in contradictory ideas. According to Natorp, Plato solves this problem in a quasi-transcendental fashion, by introducing something like the notion of time in the requirement that contradictory predicates somehow be separated. The contradictories do not

in fact coincide [*aufeinandertreffen*] (in which case they would of course
be mutually annihilated), but are held apart, either by a difference in
temporal relation [*Zeitbezug*] (*A* holds [*gilt*] at moment 1, not-*A* at
moment 2), or, given an identical temporal relation, by some other
relational difference (e.g. *B* is large compared to *A*, small compared to
C).

(Natorp, 1911: 76)¹²⁷

The predicate or determination itself in no wise changes, only its *relation* to the subject does.

¹²⁷ Cf. PI: 158-159.

[D]as Werden, die Veränderung wird Wanderung der dabei immer identisch bleibenden Bestimmtheiten (ἐξ ὧν, ἰδέεαι, μορφαί) A, B ... *von Stelle zu Stelle* des zu Bestimmenden, Sinnlichen (von X_1 zu X_2 zu X_3 ..., die im letzten Grunde nur den *Stell*bezug selbst bezeichnen).

(Natorp, 1911: 77; *emphasis added*)

Becoming or change is seen as the migration of constant, identical determinations [*Bestimmtheiten*] (ἐξ ὧν, ἰδέεαι, μορφαί), A, B, ... from place to place of the sensible *X* that is to be determined (i.e. from X_1 to X_2 to X_3 ..., which ultimately merely denote the place-relation itself).

Hence Natorp interprets the *Phaedo's* talk of a form's "retreat" as the "possible change of the relational locus [*Beziehungsort*]" which enables contradictory predications of the same subject (Natorp, 1911: 76-77); this relational change presupposes "a 'migration' [*Wandel*] of concepts," as well as space and time as the "basic condition[s] of possibility of a proposition of becoming" (Natorp, 1911: 77). "Time means and ultimately merely *is* this separation [*Auseinandersetzung*] in (logical) consciousness" (*PI*: 159).¹²⁸ Through temporal separation, contradictory predicates are placed [*auseinandergestellt*] into different logical places [*Stellen*], specifically temporal places [*Zeitstellen*].¹²⁹ Time here is conceived *logically*, i.e. as a condition of predication, not psychologically as an element or feature of some "experience" (*Erlebnis*) of fluxion. Again, we must keep in mind what Natorp is trying to accomplish. He is *not* seeking to account for the flux itself; for *that*, there is no account. Rather, what demands explanation is how objectivities in the flux are possible, how, that is, we can say any thing has "being" in becoming. For that is what science does. Further, he does not want to explain everyday time-consciousness, any more than he wants to explain

¹²⁸ "After all, we assert that the past *is* no longer, and that the future *is* not yet, i.e. that both *are not*. Where else can this *not-being* [*Nichtsein*] be *posited* [*gesetzt*] if not in thinking, since being, and so too [*vollends*] not-being have absolutely no specifiable sense besides affirming and negating positing in thinking?" (*PI*: 159)

¹²⁹ *PI*: 159.

everyday consciousness in general; rather, he wants to explain what time must mean in order to underwrite *scientific judgements* about empirical reality.

Granting that this scheme explains the possibility of changing predications, the status of the *subject* of predication nonetheless remains obscure. For the temporal and spatial "places" (*Stellen*) are not what the predicates determine; the places are "nothings,"¹³⁰ or more precisely, "*in themselves empty places*," what Natorp calls a "substrate"¹³¹ of "carriers" (*Träger*), into and out of which the determinations are shuttled and switched (*PI*: 160; original emphasis), through which they "wander." Natorp's solution to this problem is murky (partly due to lamentable terminological imprecision). At one point he calls the stock of predicate-determinations the "*Grundbestand*" of *eidê*, and at another he calls the *Stellensystem* itself a *Substrat*; then again he speaks of the necessity of a *Substanz des Geschehens* (*PI*: 161) or a *Substanz des Werdens* (Natorp, 1911: 77). All of these "stocks," "substrates," and "substances" represent different structural elements whose *stability* is a precondition for thinking through the fluctuating *X*.

As I can reconstruct Natorp's train of thought through several different texts,¹³² "substance of becoming" signifies not some *metaphysical* substrate of becoming but rather the *dialectical* requirement (*Denkforderung*) that when we think change, ... we must think some foundation [*Grundbestand*] or "substance" of becoming in all becoming, if becoming is to be conceptually grasped at all; this is the essential result of this deduction [i.e. in the *Phaedo*].

(Natorp, 1911: 77)

¹³⁰ Cf. *PI*: 375. The *Stellen* must be empty, for "everything through which they would otherwise be defined would again be such determinations which are not bound to this or that place, but can change their places" (*PI*: 160). Natorp interprets *χώρα* in the *Timaeus* as signifying just this notion of an empty, purely receptive container for determinations (*ideai*). Cf. *PI*: 160-161; 366; 375.

¹³¹ Cf. Natorp, 1911: 77; *PI*: 371-2; 374; 375.

¹³² *PI*; Natorp, 1911; 1969.

Because this "substance" is conceived as having being, i.e. as being determined in some way, one must distinguish this term from the spatial and temporal *Stellensysteme*, for these places are merely *empty forms* (not of intuition, but of the relation-function).¹³³ Rather, *Substanz des Werdens* can only signify one of the "factors" which occupy the places in the system, i.e. one of the determinations. Such a determination must by definition again be an *idea*--not one which itself retreats, but one which provides a "foundation" (and not merely a "place") for the other determinations to be said of it. As such posited ultimate factors, Natorp names "matter, material elements, mass points, etc." (*PI*: 406). He himself considers "energy" to be the scientifically most radical factor of experience yet discovered (Natorp, 1969: 383-384). For the law of conservation of energy expresses the maintenance (i.e. "being") of change, or, as he puts it, of "change itself in *its* substance (i.e. an ultimate identity).

Das ist das große Paradoxon, mit dessen Erkenntnis der allererste Zugang zu einer *Wissenschaft* von den Veränderungen der Natur gewonnen...war: daß der positivste Bestand des Seins in der Veränderung nichts anderes ist als die Substanz der Veränderung selbst. Wenn nichts vorginge, d.h. sich änderte, so wäre es so gut, als ob überhaupt nichts wäre; allgemeiner Stillstand wäre allgemeiner Tod, Zunichtewerden des "physischen" Seins, das eben Sein des Werdens ($\phi\upsilon\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$), nicht Sein als Gegensatz des Werdens ist. Die Veränderung selbst in ihrem Grundbestand sich erhaltend denken, heißt "Natur" denken. Das liegt als tiefster Sinn in der Forderung der Erhaltung des Bewegungszustands und nicht des Orts, d.h. der Nicht-Bewegung.

(Natorp, 1969: 368-369)

This is the great paradox, whose discovery constituted the very first entrance to a *science* of natural change: that the most positive subsistence

¹³³ Cf. Lembeck, 1994: 263.

[*Bestand*] of being in change is nothing but the substance of change itself. If nothing occurred, i.e. altered, then that would amount to nothing being; a general standstill would be a general death, the annihilation of "physical" being, which just is the being of becoming (*phyesthai*), but not being as the contrary of becoming. To think of change itself as maintaining itself in its basic subsistence means to think "nature." This is what constitutes the deepest meaning of the requirement of the preservation of motion, and not of place, i.e. of non-motion.

Of course any subject-determination is only ever *relatively* a "substance of becoming," namely only with respect to other determinations predicated of it. Even "mass" or "energy" are concepts which *science* recognizes ever more clearly to be "merely footholds [*Ansätze*], not ultimate foundations; only assayed, not final determinations" (*PI*: 406). Ultimately, then, even the ultimate objectivities of (scientific) experience which function *as* the substance of all becoming are hypotheses with no claim to absolute existence.

3.5. Conclusion.

Herewith the essence of Natorp's interpretation of the theory of *ideai* has been expounded. Let us summarize. It should be clearer what Natorp means by calling the *ideai* "methods" of empirical science: it is but his peculiar way of saying that an *eidos* (or *idea* in the weak sense of "pure concept") becomes an *idea* in the strong scientific sense by being methodically justified. A *logos* or account must be given of an *idea*-candidate, which a) implicates and harmonizes the candidate in a network of other, already established *ideai*; and more especially b) deduces it from a *higher*, already established *idea*. But Natorp also means the equation of *idea* and method in a more literal sense: method conceived as the progressive *scientific* determination of flux solely consists in *ideai*, which function as footholds of thinking (*Haltepunkte des Denkens*), or

in the words of *Republic VI*, as "springboards" (*epibaseis*). These footholds constitute method in its most literal sense of a "path-towards" knowledge, i.e. an "approach" which yields science. Scientific knowledge is not conceived, on this view, as something which is ever absolutely attained or attainable, but as a judgement (and collection of judgements) which are justified, i.e. anchored in *logoi*. Thus the *ideai* are not *methodoi* towards some *end* of knowledge, not to speak of themselves *being* that end (which is perhaps the orthodox view); rather, "method" here is equivalent to posit, *Ge-setz*, law, *hypo-thesis*, groundwork (*Grundlegung*). Yet whereas these latter terms connote the immobility of the *foothold*, "met-hod" connotes thinking's ceaseless (dialectical) motion among the *ideai* and its active generation of ever more *ideai*. Moreover, as we have said, this activity is an unending task because, as Natorp thinks, the *ideai* are not isolated *auta kath'auta*, but only have meaning and sense with respect to the flux, and the flux is infinitely determinable. Finally, they maintain their normative role insofar as they are in fact justified, and so not mere *doxai*.

4. From Natorp to Heidegger.

4.1. Introduction.

Like Natorp, Heidegger *uses* Plato to think with, and for the same reason: Plato is a radical, an original thinker. I do not mean by this that Plato's ideas are novel, but that his thought aims at the root or *archê* of the world. But what does this mean? As we have seen, Natorp idealistically interprets the root as root-functions.¹ These root-functions are conceived as the spontaneous, mutually implicative "hypotheses" or "laws" that underlie all scientific consciousness (i.e. knowledge) of anything whatsoever. These foundational posits in turn are again subordinated to a *single* principle, the law of lawfulness, which Natorp identifies with the *idea tou agathou*. The conditions of possibility of scientific consciousness are ultimately reducible to this single origin--the *Ur-sprung*.

Our task in this chapter is to understand how the Platonic root might be differently construed, namely in the specific context of Heidegger's phenomenology. To fulfill this task, we must first describe how Heidegger's notion of phenomenology diverges from that of Husserl. I argue that Heidegger criticizes and goes beyond Husserl at just those points where the latter tends towards Natorp's and Cassirer's *genetic* theory of objectivity. This tendency, evident especially in Husserl's *Ideas* (1913), abandons, in Heidegger's view, phenomenology's *ontological* dimension of investigating the phenomena *as beings*. Next, having established the specific goals of Heidegger's phenomenology, I briefly lay out its basic framework in *Being and Time*, concentrating on those terms needed to grasp his interpretation of Plato. Once these have been sufficiently clarified, I show why Heidegger's reading of Plato is motivated, if not necessitated, by his phenomenological commitments.

¹ As I think is clear by now, the field of application of these functions is ambiguous. I have argued above that the *basic* Marburg position is that these functions are the basic concepts which allow us to generate *scientific systems*. Natorp's discussion of functions in *Platos Ideenlehre*, however, often gives the impression that these root-functions are categorial operations of consciousness.

4.2. Phenomenology and neo-Kantianism.

Neo-Kantianism had by 1900 attained dominance at German universities. Although it itself arose in response to a deep cultural crisis in late nineteenth-century Germany, and although the neo-Kantians themselves conceived their philosophy as a perpetual revolution, academic preeminence lent them the fatal respectability of the mandarin. This alone invited much derision and abuse. Their opponents saw the neo-Kantians as ideologically allied with the liberal and technological trends of an incipient mass-culture. In particular, the Marburgers' preoccupation with the logic of science² provoked those who felt that philosophy had sacrificed the rich immediacy of lived life for the aridity of *Methode*. The *fin de siècle* saw neo-Kantianism besieged by Nietzscheans, *Lebensphilosophen*, neo-Romantics, anti-modernists, futurists, and archaists.³ The situation was chaotic, the political lines confused. Turning the kaleidoscope, the neo-Kantians appear as conservative, even reactionary thinkers, their opponents as radical modernists; turn it again, and everything shifts.

However confusing the relation of neo-Kantians and their antagonists, one may discern a constant conflict between what I call, advisedly, "punctualism" and "holism." As I argued in Chapter Two, a basic concept of neo-Kantianism is the anonymous subject of science, a free-floating point watching as if from nowhere as the phenomenal manifold—*an sich* mute and meaningless—flows by. Only that subject can impose sense by positing relations into the flux. Since the task of imposing sense (*Bestimmung*, *Objektivierung*) is conceived as necessarily infinite, the crack running through the world, separating subject and object, is in principle irreparable. Although on the considered neo-Kantian view, neither the object *nor* the subject is ever fully constituted, the neo-

² By "science" I mean both *Geistes-* and *Naturwissenschaft*.

³ The academic crisis was of course not limited to philosophy, nor indeed to the *Geisteswissenschaften* alone. As Heidegger looks back on the first decades of the twentieth century, all the *Wissenschaften* were rocked by *Grundlagenkrisen* (cf. SZ: 9-10).

Kantians' opponents, either out of malice or ignorance, often chose to read it that way.⁴ This atomistic or "punctual" conception of the subject (to use Charles Taylor's term)⁵ and the fragmentation of the world are of course no more than constructions within a theory of science, but its critics saw in this very theory either the cause or symptom of the social, religious, and cultural dislocations of the age.

For the holists, *Gestalt*, or integral form, is the fundamental principle of truly human life. The world is not a meaningless mass of disconnected sense-data, they urge, but in itself a harmonious unity of meaningful forms or *Gestalten*.⁶ A human life is not a sequence of events on a time-line, beginning with birth and ending with death; rather, it is informed and shaped by a *Gestalt*-principle that gives it unity and meaning. Some holists, like the influential circle around the poet Stefan George, saw individuality, art and religion fused in a notion of ideal community; the integration of the individual with the divine and with other individuals through art was for them the highest *Gestalt* of human life. Authentic *Erlebnis*, as opposed to dry scientific *Erfahrung*, demands an openness to the objective *Gestalten* in the world, as well as the personal integrity and determination to give shape to one's own life in harmony with those *Gestalten*. This neo-Romantic rhetoric sees formlessness (*Gestaltlosigkeit*) as itself the sickness of modernity: a vast tumescence manifested in science, technology, and especially in the technological and industrial transformation of the social sphere. Torn from the whole fabric of farm, guild, village, all clearly bounded and defined by custom, the human being is thrust into the urban centers, represented simultaneously as chaotic and inhumanly regimented.⁷

⁴ Heidegger himself often speaks this way; see following note.

⁵ Taylor, 1989: 159, et passim; Taylor most likely has taken this term from Heidegger: cf. SZ: 119, 146, et passim. Cf. Marcuse, 1968: 57; Husserl, 1929: 202.

⁶ Again, this view is not in itself incompatible with neo-Kantianism. An important and now forgotten work of Plato-scholarship, Heinrich Friedemann's *Platon: Seine Gestalt* (1914), relied both on the notion of *Gestalt* as well as on Natorp's interpretation of the *ideai* as hypotheses. I stress, therefore, that my version here is of the simplistic *rhetorical* tropes which, unfortunately, determined much of the debate.

⁷ To some extent, of course, the critics have a point. Neo-Kantianism was in fact a hypertheoretical,

Perhaps because of the early Husserl's relative obliviousness to the cultural politics that motivated many holists, his phenomenology proved the least tendentious and most rigorous of the philosophical alternatives to neo-Kantian scientism.⁸ By turning to the "things themselves" and making it a precept not to erect theories unanchored in a careful description of the phenomena, Husserl's approach appealed to a

scientific *Logizismus*, and as such ignored (or abstracted from) real life (whatever that means). But both fairness and historical accuracy demand that we sharply delimit the validity of this critique, rooted as it is more in the polemics of cultural revolution—particularly during the first World War and the Weimar years—than in substantial criticism. In the case of phenomenological critique (as we shall see in Heidegger's case), it often seems assumed that the neo-Kantians had *unconsciously* chosen science or the theoretical attitude as their starting-point, all the while seeking the same ends as phenomenology, viz. a description of intentional states, or of such conditions as love, anxiety, or fear of death (cf. e.g., Kaufmann, 1949: 807, 839). As I hope the foregoing chapters have adequately shown, such a criticism misses the mark. Precisely as philosophers of science, they explicitly and self-consciously exclude all other concerns, all other modes of conscious life as possible starting point for *reconstructing* the original well-springs of knowledge.

The second point is that the anti-neo-Kantian polemics misrepresent the neo-Kantians themselves as dogmatic *Kathederphilosophen*, their academic power as monolithic. It is especially this caricature which has perpetuated the eclipse of neo-Kantianism, and which even now seems to prejudice scholars who work on neo-Kantianism; (as an example, I mention the many references to "*Kathederphilosophen*" in Charles Bambach's useful book, *Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism*). Not only were the various "schools" of neo-Kantianism recognized as such only in retrospect, each had a distinct character and orientation. As I hope my discussion of the Marburg School clearly indicates, Cohen and Natorp were anything but narrow-minded dogmatists. What united neo-Kantians was a commitment to philosophize in a "Kantian spirit"—a commitment vague enough to include even an opponent such as Heidegger. The monolithic view also ignores the crucial fact that Neo-Kantianism itself arose in an earlier phase of the same intellectual and cultural crisis—Germany's industrialization and transformation into a modern mass society—and that especially the Marburgers militantly propagated a mythology of themselves as philosophers of crisis.

Cohen and Natorp believed that once the well-spring of knowledge has been analytically isolated, the system and logic of science can and should serve as a model or framework for the other two chief domains of Kantian critique, ethics and aesthetics; and they hope that by integrating all three domains, they could construct what they call a "*scientific culture*." "Idealism" as they understood it was precisely offered as an alternative (often also as distinctly German) to the *same* bogies their opponents loathed: English and French positivism and materialism. And as I have mentioned, Cohen, Natorp and Cassirer all saw in this idealism the foundation not of natural science alone, but also of the very possibility of a distinct and meaningful German culture. This *continuous* sense of mission only increased during the Weimar Republic and the years of Nazi ascendancy, inspiring the neo-Kantian Klaus Reich to write these lines which could have come from Heidegger's pen: "Now in twentieth-century Germany we have no natural philosophical tradition, and there is therefore nothing absurd in our falling back on historical sources and studying the thinkers from whom mankind first learnt" (Reich 1939a: 338). Reich likens twentieth-century German philosophy to a "bankrupt," in contrast to the eighteenth-century "owner of a flourishing business." It must be precisely in the larger *cultural* pretensions of the neo-Kantian mandarins, and not in their philosophy of science *per se*, that the *competitive* motivations of their many critics must be sought.

At the same time, it is a legitimate question to ask why the broader neo-Kantian aim of a philosophy of culture should or could be based on a logic of the natural sciences. Does such an aim not presuppose the *applicability* of scientific logic to other realms alien to it? Conversely, if the ultimate aim is to ground a philosophy of culture, why should one assume that the logic of science is an appropriate foundation? We shall examine some of these questions below.

new generation of philosophically serious thinkers alarmed by the deracination allegedly implied by the neo-Kantian world-view. One of these was Heidegger. He not only associated the chief tenets of neo-Kantian *Subjektivitätsphilosophie* with what he considered the slack shapelessness of modern times, but tried to show that they were necessarily connected. We shall for now limit our attention to those elements of Husserlian phenomenology which are directly pertinent to the deeper conflict between Heidegger and Natorp.

Similarities. Before turning to the deep differences between Natorp and Husserl, it is important to note their general agreement about the final aim of philosophy.⁹ Thanks to the long dialogue between them, this agreement became marked enough to permit Heidegger later to assimilate them, in contrast to his own so-called "fundamental ontology," and even led Gadamer to call Husserl's later thought "neo-Kantian."¹⁰ Lying at the edge of the late nineteenth-century tradition of *Subjektivitätsphilosophie*, Husserlian phenomenology, like neo-Kantianism, focuses on consciousness and the autonomy of logical thinking.¹¹

Husserl, like Natorp, sees his task as securing philosophy's position against the claims of scientific positivism, but he came late to the fight against psychologism; the Marburgers had already been combating it for decades when his famous refutation

⁸ Cf. Kaufmann, 1949: 802-803.

⁹ Cf. Kaufmann, 1949: 803-804. (For Marcuse, this agreement is a function of merely being different moments of "bourgeois" thought; see Marcuse, 1968.)

¹⁰ Gadamer, 1986-87: 15, 17; cp. Heidegger, 1982: 201; Gethmann, 1989: 104, ff. If anything, it was the late Natorp who veered from what Gadamer has called Marburg's *Methodenfanatismus*, in his late exploration of *das Urkonkrete*, a turn with which Heidegger would have had more affinity than with the late Husserl. This is discussed in Brach, 1996, and represents an angle of Heidegger's relationship to Natorp which I purposely leave aside in this inquiry. It is my view that Natorp's phenomenological *Kehre*, like Heidegger's, has been exaggerated. The so-called "*Metakritischer Anhang* [Metacritical Appendix]" to the 1921 edition of *Platos Ideenlehre* is often held up as evidence of Natorp's purported change of heart, but even a cursory reading shows that he holds fast to the basic tenets of the first edition. As Heidegger suggests in his *Nachruf auf Paul Natorp*, Natorp was only beginning to revise those views at the time of his death in 1924 (Heidegger, 1992: 1).

¹¹ On "consciousness" as a key *topos* of the age, see: Hughes, 1961: 15, 63-64.

appeared in the *Logical Investigations* of 1900.¹² Both Husserl and Natorp approach their common task by attempting to found the *a priori* rules of thinking that make the sciences possible as *logical* systems, and both try to demonstrate the autonomy of mind by reconstructing (Natorp) or reducing (Husserl) the *a priori* functions (Natorp) or structures (Husserl) of reason. And like the Marburgers, Husserl was initially concerned with the mental phenomena of scientific cognition.

The similarity between Natorp and Husserl most important for understanding Heidegger's critique turns on their focus on consciousness. Despite the great difference in their final conceptions of consciousness, the mere fact that they choose it as their philosophical starting-point determines, so Heidegger, their respective interpretations of the meaning of being. In Natorp's case, that meaning is "the copula in a (true) predication;" for Husserl it turns out to be "maximal intuitive fulfillment." What Heidegger especially comes to criticize in both of these interpretations of the *Seinssinn* is that they unquestioningly interpret it in terms of *theoretical* consciousness. We have seen the reason for this in the case of Natorp: theoretical consciousness is the explicitly acknowledged *fact* whose possibility he wants in the first place to explain, before moving on to the domains of morality, politics, and art. It is less clear why Husserl should cling, initially, to the same foundation for his interpretation of being. As I will show, Heidegger's critique of Plato partly serves to illuminate this question (although Heidegger nowhere claims this as his purpose).

Differences. The basic difference between neo-Kantianism and phenomenology may be best illustrated by their respective conceptions of phenomenon and intuition. Natorp takes phenomena to be the objectivities which the mind generates out of the sensible manifold. But these are not the objects of science; *scientific* objects are never phenomenal, but are theoretically generated. Thus, an obvious problem with Natorp's

¹² Husserl, 1900. For an interpretation of the differences between Husserl's antipsychologism and that

conception of science is that he seems to grant phenomena no ontological status whatever, which is on the face of it very strange;¹³ after all, the phenomena are not nothing. True, even for Natorp certain phenomena possess being, but only parasitically: they feed off of "pure" being by being judged to be thus and such, i.e. by being subsumed under a concept. This phenomenal being is not existential, but merely predicative. Natorp himself says that the *Sinn des Seins* of phenomena is *imposed upon* phenomena. As his reading of the *Phaedo* shows, phenomena can only be the objects of judgements—that is, manufactured into, constituted as objects by an act of judgement.¹⁴

Let us approach phenomenology's rival conception of phenomenon through Heidegger's slogan, "Phenomenology is Ontology."¹⁵ This phrase seems to presuppose an equivalence between *to phainomenon* and *to on*. But how are we to reconcile this with the traditional *opposition* of "phenomena" (appearances) and "onta," the "(real) beings/things?" Should we not expect "phenomenology" to name the "science of appearances" *as opposed to* the "science of being(s)?"¹⁶ Now for Kant, the world presents or "gives" itself to us only as appearance and never as itself, an insight which leads to the dissolution of ontology:¹⁷ for how can there be a science of that to which we can in principle have no access, the *Dinge* (onta) *an sich*? Though Kant does not put it quite this way, the sciences would on his view all be "phenomenologies," namely the systematic con-nexions of our experience, where "systematic" means "rule-governed," and "experience" always means "sensible"—i.e. phenomenal—experience; philosophy

of his neo-Kantian predecessors, see: Farber, 1968: 110-111.

¹³ As I have argued, "phenomena" are beings for Natorp, for even as objects given in intuition, they are more than brute sense-data: they have already been worked over by intuition itself, having been *formed* by space and time; in Kant, as I have also pointed out, some texts seem to tend in a similar direction.

¹⁴ This view, as we will see, is one of Heidegger's main targets in *Being and Time*. For even if we grant Natorp that his theory works as a logic of science, i.e., even if phenomena considered as scientific objects must be thought of as "objectivated" instances of scientific *Ge-setze*, why should the very notions "phenomenon" and "being" be restricted to this scientific sense?

¹⁵ Cf. SZ: 27; Heidegger, 1982: 11; 1985: 72.

¹⁶ Cf. SZ: 28.

would on this view be transcendental critique of such "phenomenology." To the degree that an ontology could be at all countenanced by Kant or the neo-Kantians, it would not be as a *logos* of any *thing*, but merely of the little *word* "is"—a mere phantom of what ontology in the full-blooded sense intends. This Kantian meaning of "phenomenon" (and the meaning of "phenomenology" we might expect to derive from it) is challenged by Husserl. It is by seeing how Husserlian phenomenology reinterprets the concept of "phenomena" that we can begin to understand Heidegger's paradoxical slogan.

The Marburgers essentially equate the notion of "phenomenon" with "fact:" *a posteriori* facts or phenomena require a transcendental analysis of their *a priori* conditions of possibility. Consequently, they distinguish the empirical from the *a priori* by marking off phenomena from non-phenomenal, purely logical or discursive functions; the phenomena do not and cannot receive any philosophical treatment in themselves. Husserl, on the other hand, conceives the *a priori-a posteriori* dichotomy very differently: the *a priori* is not of a wholly different order from the empirical, as it is for the Kantian. Rather, aprioricity is a function of how the empirical realm is *approached*, namely through a methodical exposure of the invariant structures of (conscious) experience: the so-called *eidê* (essences). Husserl's conception of the *a priori* is thus framed more in terms of static essence, as opposed to the dynamic potency implicit in the Kantian "condition of possibility." As we will see, a crucial consequence of his essentialism is that it gives the *a priori* infinitely wider scope than a (neo)Kantian could countenance.

Husserl's disagreement with the (neo)Kantian notion of fact also has another dimension: it is not scientific.¹⁸ As I suggested above, the natural sciences may be

¹⁷ This view is controversial: Heidegger, for one, in his dispute with Cassirer, thought that Kant's project precisely was ontology.

¹⁸ By this I do not mean Husserl thinks philosophy is not *scientific*. Indeed, no less than the Marburgers, he is concerned with the scientificity of philosophy. For the former, this is gained scientifically, viz. by orienting philosophy by science: philosophy is scientific because it is critique of science. For the latter, philosophy's scientificity is autonomous, depending entirely upon the possibility of rigorous self-reflection, something Husserl thinks is only, and in the highest degree,

thought of as "phenomenologies" in a Kantian sense; of course, the sciences do not understand themselves as (merely) establishing the rules governing the train of *appearances*, but as giving us true knowledge of *reality*, and in this they take (or have been seen by certain philosophers to take) for granted a naively realistic ontology.¹⁹ As we saw in Chapter Two, the neo-Kantian philosophy of science is one response to such realism; Husserl's phenomenology is another. The neo-Kantians refocus attention on *phenomenology* as the *logic* of the sciences of phenomena, and in this respect rightly see themselves as developing a Kantian theme. Husserl, by contrast, turns his attention to *phenomenology* as the "science" of *phenomena*, i.e. to the different modes in which the phenomena give themselves (or, as Kant would put it, "are given") to our sensibility. But the difference in emphasis is everything here! The neo-Kantians unquestioningly accept the definitional restriction of phenomena to the parameters of natural science; in other words, the phenomena whose logic they seek are from the start the phenomena of science. Husserl, on the other hand, places no restrictions on the sorts of phenomena or the point of view from which phenomena are to be investigated.

The main reason for this catholicity of scope is a difference in philosophical temper. The battle-cry of the phenomenologists is not "Back to Kant!" but "To the things themselves!" They are skeptical of a theory like Natorp's, not because it is transcendental, but because it seems to skip²⁰ too quickly over the facts—in this case, the

possible in phenomenology.

¹⁹ I do not think Kant would have been upset by this (non)self-conception of scientists *qua* scientists. Self-reflection on the conditions of possibility of science is not their job: doing science is. Of course, Kant *would* have objected to a philosophical account of science that promoted a realist ontology.

²⁰ Indeed, this skipping is not accidental, but a necessary result of their obsession with reducing subjectivity to a single, spontaneous *Ursprung*. We saw how that obsession led the Marburgers to reinterpret both *Vernunft* and *Anschauung* into the only truly active source of meaning, *Verstand*; they rejected *Anschauung* because it was defined as passive, *Vernunft* because it is not active in the full sense of *generating* experience. Moreover, they sought to reduce the understanding's categories to a unitary source. Reason was collapsed into the understanding, and Cohen ultimately tried to eliminate any passive aspects of intuition whatever, holding the phenomena themselves to be generated by the mind. Even in Natorp's more moderate idealism, the passively intuited component of cognition remains an amorously chaotic material principle—the datum *X*—possessing no determinations of its own. It is thus so featureless as to be unthinkable, which for the neo-Kantians amounts to not being. The entire focus for Natorp as for Cohen lies in the spontaneous act of genetic objectivation, of

"phenomena" of consciousness.²¹ This does not mean that the phenomenologist is ultimately less interested than the Kantian in the transcendental conditions of perception or of scientific cognition. Unlike the Kantian, however, the phenomenologist demands a prior, thoroughgoing description of whatever the transcendental conditions of possibility are to be established *of*, e.g. the conception of number or the electron, but also the perception of the table or flock of birds.

In sum, anything which appears, or shows, or "gives" itself to the mind counts as a phenomenon for the Husserlian. This includes all the phenomena the Kantian would countenance, but *also*, paradoxically, the *essences* of those first order phenomena, since essences, no less than percepts, are given to the mind for contemplation. Yet more paradoxically, these essences are considered to be phenomena to the highest degree, since they show themselves *purely* and *invariably*, as opposed to the factual variation and contingency of perceptual phenomena. As we will see in the next chapter, this Husserlian conception of essence is of great moment for Heidegger's interpretation of Plato.

Methods of innocence. Although Husserl likely would see in the *Selbstverständlichkeit* of Marburg scientism the naivety of sophistication, phenomenology, too, strives for a "naive" point of view or presuppositionlessness.²² Neo-Kantianism's interpretation of philosophy as the logic of science is not the main problem for Husserl; indeed, as I said, his own initial impulses came from seeking the foundation of logic and of science. Rather, he objects to the metaphysical presuppositions and conclusions of that neo-Kantian logic and its application to all other domains of experience. Husserl therefore adopts a more cautious approach.²³ First, he acknowledges that logic and scientific

literally thinking objects into being. For the neo-Kantians, consciousness—specifically scientific cognition—consists solely in this activity.

²¹ Cf. Kaufmann, 1949: 808, ff.

²² Cf. Heidegger, 1985: 39.

²³ Cf. Kaufmann, 1949: 805-806.

cognition are *given* to us as *psychic phenomena*; second, he does not isolate and privilege some one domain of the psychic—viz. that of science—and then ground the *a priori* on it alone.²⁴

While there is agreement that philosophy is to investigate the *a priori*, Husserl's different conception of its meaning naturally leads to a different conception of philosophy: not critique, but phenomenology. He conceives the latter as fundamentally a *descriptive* enterprise, since the *a priori* essences are already given in and through *a posteriori* experience. Of course, they need to be isolated from and purified of factual contingency, but that process is but a means to the end of seeing, fixing, and describing them in their transcendental purity.

Husserl believes that the transcendental, absolutely innocent point of view is achievable through such various techniques as "phenomenological reduction" and "eidetic variation."²⁵ The reductions proceed by means of *epoché*. Where the Kantian *reconstructs* the faculties or powers or functions that generate phenomena, phenomenology reduces, "suspends," or "brackets" our commitment to the real existence of phenomena given in the world of experience, thereby focusing our attention

²⁴ Does such a turn to the "psychic" not flirt dangerously with psychologism? Natorp thinks so. The neo-Kantian aversion to considering pre- or non-theoretical phenomena is rooted in anti-psychologism. Phenomena that are not considered from the perspective of anonymous or trans-subjective objectivity are merely subjective, all too closely wrapped up in the quirks of the individual human psyche. Natorp would consider such phenomena as anxiety or love or fear of death not to be possible objects of transcendental inquiry, but solely of empirical psychology. For such reasons he is suspicious of phenomenology. But whereas "psychologism" names a *speculative* stance concerning the origin of phenomena, phenomenology, as an anti-theory, aims at unprejudiced *description* of phenomena. It makes no metaphysical claims concerning the nature or source of experience beyond what is *immediately given* to the inquirer; the phenomenologist is first of all interested in just the facts—and *only then* in their conditions of possibility.

²⁵ I cannot go into the vast and quite obscure area of these methods and their varieties here; cf. Husserl, 1922: §§56-62; Husserl, 1954b: §82; Cobb-Stevens, 1990: 153; Berniet, et al., 1993, Chapter 2. For a critical view, see Marcuse, 1968: 58-61. Consider the complexity (if not confusion) in just the following sentences: "Important motives which have their ground in epistemological requirements justify us in referring to 'pure' consciousness, of which much is yet to be said, also as *transcendental consciousness*, and the operation through which it is acquired as *transcendental ἐποχή*. On grounds of method this operation will split up into different steps of 'disconnexion' or 'bracketing,' and thus our method will assume the character of a graded reduction. For this reason we propose to speak and even preponderatingly, of *phenomenological reductions* (though, in respect of their unity as a whole, we would speak in unitary form of *the phenomenological reduction*). From the epistemological viewpoint we would also speak of transcendental reductions...." (Husserl, 1962: 103).

on the phenomena purely as phenomena, i.e. as appearances for the mind: "Thus we fix our eyes steadily upon the sphere of Consciousness and study what it is that we find immanent in *it*" (Husserl, 1962: 102). This "study," in turn, may proceed by means of eidetic variation: we isolate the invariant from a particular given phenomenon by "free fantasy," which seems to mean something like imagining many irreal variations of the given and observing what remains the same.²⁶ As a result, it is hoped, we will penetrate to the essence of the empirical phenomenon, shining through in its purity, shining, that is, as a *pure* phenomenon. We phenomenologically grasp it in what Husserl calls, notoriously, *Wesensschau* (eidetic intuition; literally: "viewing of essence"). Since *any* phenomenon may be reduced to its essence, Husserl maintains that the *epoché* allows the phenomenal realm to be investigated globally.²⁷ Further, whereas the (neo)Kantians only allow an *a priori* investigation of the conditions of possibility of phenomena, but not of the phenomena themselves, the *epoché* also permits an *a priori* (namely eidetic) investigations of the phenomena *qua* phenomena. Thus, Husserl holds that phenomenology can in one stroke attain both the desired innocence of the *a priori* as well as its true scope.

I earlier said that phenomenology is animated by a different temper than is neo-Kantianism, and suggested that a skepticism towards transcendental deductions of *a priori* functions lies behind its focus on the *Sachen selbst*. This difference in outlook is substantively confirmed by the most basic observation of transcendental consciousness that appears upon performance of *epoché*, namely that consciousness is "intentional." In every conscious experience, consciousness "intends," or is *of*, an object;²⁸ conversely, the object appears *to*, appears *for* a consciousness, no matter if the mode of

²⁶ The free or "arbitrary" variation of a phenomenon in order to isolate its essence need not be restricted to phenomena of transcendental consciousness, but would seem to work also for "unreduced" phenomena. Cf. Marcuse, 1968: 58, 62.

²⁷ Cf. Bernet, et al., 1993: 79, 80, 84.

²⁸ Here "object" is used in a broader, though no less rigorous sense than in our earlier discussion of objectivity in neo-Kantianism. Where the term there meant a phenomenon as determined (more or less) by a cognizing subject, it here denotes the correlate of any subjective mode of consciousness, be it

consciousness is that of willing, loving, thinking, desiring, etc.²⁹ There can on this view be nothing that one may call "consciousness" prior to consciousness-of-something. Since there is no consciousness prior to its contents,³⁰ there can also be no deduction, as Natorp thinks, of contentless functions which constitute *pure* consciousness. Instead, phenomenology's task is to lay bare and articulate the manifold modes of the intentional arc spanning and binding consciousness (intentional subject or *intentio*) and its content (intentional object or *intentum*); it does not speak like neo-Kantianism of "objectivation," but simply of objects, since at the immediate level of consciousness we are conscious of objects, but not of objectivation.

Hence the transcendental Kantian approach must be radically modified. For *if* *intentio* and *intentum* are co-original, then there can be no reason why I should begin my philosophical investigation with the subjective *rather than* the objective side of the intentional arc. I cannot *prima facie* consider the conditions of possibility of conscious experience to lie on one side or the other. For this reason, one must begin with description. Instead of asking, "How is it possible that I have the experience I in fact have?" one asks more simply: "What is the quality [*das 'Wie'*] of this experience I in fact have?" The point of this descriptive task is to expose the kind of structure we are dealing with, whose nature we are trying to figure out. To take a phenomenological starting-point is, in the first place, to observe the phenomena without initially privileging one kind of phenomenon, since, at the *level of description* no justification remains to think that one sort of experience will yield *a priori* knowledge rather than another. *Any* experience may yield *a priori* knowledge; the *a priori* structures or "essences" of any

explicit scientific theorizing or hazy musing.

²⁹ Cf. Sartre, 1953: 11, ff.

³⁰ "There are ... not two things present in immanent experience; the object is not immanently experienced and then next to it the intentional, immanent experience itself; ... rather, only one thing is present, the intentional, immanent experience, of which the essential descriptive characteristic [of presenting an objectivity] is precisely the relevant intention" (Husserl, 1901 [*LU V*: §11a], quoted in Bernet, et al., 1993: 91).

domain of phenomena may be rigorously established, provided it is approached through *epoché*.

Intentionality and intuition. Thus far I have framed the opposition of neo-Kantianism and phenomenology in very general terms. First I discussed phenomenology's new conception of the phenomenon, and I introduced the notion of intentionality as an essential feature of consciousness. This notion now brings us to the heart of another basic disagreement between the Marburgers and Husserl, the nature of "intuition." Whereas for Natorp the receptivity inherent in Kant's notion of intuition is antithetical to Kant's conception of consciousness as spontaneity, for Husserl every "act" of consciousness has an inherently passive or receptive moment in virtue of its essential intentionality: the object of consciousness appears *to* the subject of consciousness; consciousness, consequently, is affected *by* its object. Moreover, to the degree Natorp is willing to give intuition a role, it is strictly limited to the domain of the sensible.³¹ But for Husserl, it is just because objective *appearance* is an essential feature of *all* consciousness that "phenomena" in the phenomenological sense have no special connection to the sensibility.³² All phenomena are considered simply *qua* phenomena of the mind, both in the sense that they are considered exclusively from the psychic point of view (i.e. with no empirical speculation as to their origin in an external, material world), and in the sense that they appear as objects for and of a mind. Hence, since *all* objects of consciousness (thoughts) are taken as phenomena,³³ consciousness is

³¹ In this he differs from Kant; Natorp reinterprets the notion of *reine Anschauung* as itself an entirely *logical function*. Cf. Natorp, 1910: 2; esp. 268, ff.

³² Tugendhat, 1970: 91. For Husserl, "intentionality appears consistently as a phenomenological property of acts of consciousness, something we immediately experience: we are in every case conscious of an object *whether or not such an object actually exists in the world beyond consciousness*" (Smith & Smith, 1995: 15; emphasis added).

³³ Cf. Ricœur, 1967: 108; Marcuse, 1968: 57-59.

generally conceived as "intuition," viz. as something of the sort to which a phenomenon *can appear*, as something of the sort to which an object *can be given*.³⁴

This phenomenological conception of intuition stems from the simple observation of consciousness as directed. It need not suggest any view about the *origin* of phenomena as outside or inside the mind, nor of the *ultimate* nature of consciousness as generative or passive. Yet this is precisely how Natorp consistently interprets Husserl's notion of eidetic intuition: as a form of "dogmatism" which takes the object not as a product *generated* by mind, but as a thing *given* to mind. Here we hit upon what can only be described as a blind spot in Natorp's theory of mind; he determines consciousness *exclusively* as the synthetic act producing a phenomenon (an object), rather than as intentional directedness towards a phenomenon. Yet is it not obvious that—except in the reflective moment of (meta)scientific cognition which involves the conscious construction of concepts—any synthetic construction of the objects of consciousness is itself *unconscious* ... which is precisely why it requires a transcendental deduction?³⁵ Again, the core of the disagreement lies in neo-Kantianism's scientism, specifically in a residue of realism. As Marcuse paraphrases Husserl's point of view,

the Kantian critique of reason "erred" in directing itself toward the constitution of the given spatio-temporal world rather than toward "all possible worlds." Thus, for Husserl, Kant's critical thought remained caught in "mundane" realism.

(Marcuse, 1968: 57)

This criticism of Kant applies equally to Natorp. His whole conception of the "dogmatism of the given" presupposes that "given" means "given from without," e.g. as

³⁴ It should be noted that Husserl does *not* identify intuition and intentionality *schlechthin*. "Intuition" as a phenomenological term of art implies a certain fullness of presence of the intentional object, as opposed to its mere "anticipation" or "presumption." This distinction notwithstanding, even these latter "empty" intentions can be understood as intuitions insofar as they are intentions *of* some (non-present) object; I suggest they be called, accordingly, "empty intuitions."

sense-data. It is just this presupposition which phenomenology insists on bracketing; because Natorp does not do so, he cannot help but see a perpetually heteronomous, *a posteriori* factor in the sensible origin of phenomena, rendering them incapable of *a priori* consideration.³⁶ Thus it is also clear why he rejects (or, typically, reinterprets) Husserlian eidetic intuition.

But we, in light of the intuitive dimension inherent in intentionality, now see that the previously obscure, and for a Kantian wholly repugnant notion of *Wesensschau* loses much of its mystery. *Wesensschau* is simply consciousness *of* a phenomenon *qua* the latter's invariable traits, for the traits persisting through the procedure of eidetic variation just are what for Husserl constitutes "essence." When essence is focused upon or "thematized," i.e. appears to the mind *as such*,³⁷ then we intend it, are conscious *of* it, or, insofar as we are given it as an object of contemplation, intuit it. The word "*Schau*" (view) is no more than a visual metaphor for the intentional and *immediate* relation between the self-reflective subject and its object.

4.3. Phenomenological truth.

As we shall see in the next chapter, perhaps the most important theme in Heidegger's interpretation of Plato is truth. Here I outline the phenomenological conception of truth that forms the background for that interpretation. Again, let us begin by considering the conception of truth implied by the neo-Kantian system. It is necessarily a very thin conception; since neo-Kantianism denies any independent reality or being to what lies beyond or outside judgement, truth cannot be any possible relation to such a reality. A

³⁵ Cf. Heidegger on transcendental deductions: SZ: 145.

³⁶ "Also: *wir haben gar nicht die reinen Denkobjekte*, sie sind uns *gar nicht gegeben*, denn, wenn gegeben, würden sie damit schon empirisch und nicht mehr rein sein" (PI: 240; *emphasis added*).

³⁷ Cf. Tragesser, 1984: 5: "Phenomenology begins as a descriptive theory of the noematic, a descriptive theory of what is thought in acts of thought as it is thought. While this is where phenomenology begins, its aim is to develop a theoretical characterization of the domain of all possible thoughts and thus also all possible entities which can be thought." He discusses the priority of description in contrast to Frege's notion of the "third realm" at Tragesser, 1984: 2-5. Cf. Bernet, et al., 1993: 70, 71.

glance at the tables of contents and indices of Natorp's and Cassirer's major works in philosophy of science, *Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften*, and *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff*,³⁸ respectively, shows a correspondingly scant concern with truth. When in *Platos Ideenlehre* Natorp cannot avoid dealing with ἀλήθεια, he does so entirely within the parameters of his theory of scientific judgement.³⁹ Not surprisingly, phenomenology takes a very different view of the matter. In keeping with the ideal of naivety, the phenomenologist is loath to redefine a phenomenon as central to science as truth in a way so paradoxical as to make nonsense of what we seem, naively, to mean by it.

Like many key aspects of his phenomenology, Husserl's concept of truth grew out of his early preoccupations with logic and the epistemology of science.⁴⁰ Since he (like the neo-Kantians) conceives science as a system of true cognitions, he primarily thinks of phenomenology as grounding that particular form of consciousness called "cognition:" phenomenology must establish clearly and distinctly what it means for a

³⁸ But see Chapter 4.II. of Cassirer, 1910.

³⁹ Consider the following. With respect to the *Theaetetus*: "Da nun in diesen [beiden großen Gebieten der *ousia* und *ôphelia*] alle Möglichkeit des *Urteilens*, aller bestimmte *Sinn der Aussage* begründet ist, so gibt es durch sie allein, und nicht durch das sinnliche Erlebnis, ein *Sein* (im weitesten Sinn des Aussageinhalts); mithin Wahrheit, mithin *Erkenntnis*" (PI: 113; emphasis added). With respect to the *Phaedo*: "Denn in den Denksetzungen ... ist, nach dem ... bestimmt ausgesprochenen *Grundsatz des Idealismus*, die Wahrheit dessen, was ist ..., in den logisch gegründeten, ... durch zulängliche Deduktion gesicherten 'Aussagen' d.i. *Sätzen der Wissenschaft* ist die *Wahrheit der Gegenstände* allein zu ersehen" (PI: 133; emphasis added; the sentence is ungrammatical, but the meaning clear). With respect to the *Republic*: "'Wahrheit', das heißt aber: den Begriff..." (PI: 185-186); "Sein=Wahrheit" (PI: 204), where *Sein*, as we saw in the last chapter, means the "strong" being of a copula in a scientific, i.e. more, rather than less, grounded judgement. Likewise, the "true" forms (*Gestalten*) of, e.g., the paths of the heavenly bodies "können nur die auf den *absoluten Raum* bezogenen Gestalten der Gestirnbahnen sein... Nicht das Ding da, das wir zu sehen meinen, ist Träger einer Bewegung von der und der Geschwindigkeit (und Richtung), sondern die durch die und die (so und so gerichtete) Geschwindigkeit definierte *Bewegung* selbst definiert *das was sich bewegt*..." (PI: 209-210). Die "*Wahrheit in der Erscheinung*, eine empirische Wirklichkeit nach Kants Begriff, ... [setzt] eine Anwendbarkeit der Begriffsfunktion auf das Sinnliche [voraus]..." (PI: 220). With respect to the *Philebus*: "Wahrheit und Falschheit sind ursprünglich Qualitäten des *Urteils* (37C; eine aus dem Sophisten uns bekannte Bestimmung; s. das. 262E, 263B)" (PI: 339).

⁴⁰ Since Husserl's theory of truth underwent a complicated evolution which I cannot rehearse here, my discussion schematically isolates those features of that theory which Heidegger will criticize. Cf. Tugendhat, 1970, and Heffernan, 1998.

cognition to be true, and thus qualify for integration into the system of science.⁴¹ Hence his theory of truth is a key part of the eidetic description of consciousness as focused on the transcendental conditions of cognition. As such, it seeks to describe the essence of the moment when we *experience* something—a state of affairs or a proposition—as *being true*; in other words, it seeks to describe the nature of that self-validating experience which underlies truth-claims. In short, a phenomenological theory of truth seeks to identify the universal, essential epistemic conditions under which we are conscious of truth (i.e., under which we have knowledge).⁴² Thus a phenomenological logic investigates not this or that empirical mental or linguistic act, but the essence of these acts that *characterize* them as "true (or "false"), which on Husserl's view is what we *mean* when we use the words, "true" and "false."⁴³

What, then, is the phenomenological conception of truth, i.e., what is the eidetic structure or act which grounds truth? Traditionally, Husserl says, truth is defined as the correspondence of thought and thing (*veritas est adequatio rei et intellectus*): this is the "phenomenon" of truth whose eidetic structure requires elucidation. If the proposition expressing the thought "grass is green" is true if and only if grass is green, then phenomenology's task is to explain through what acts of consciousness I know *that* grass is green, and, consequently, know that the proposition, "grass is green" is true--i.e., how I know that the fact of the matter corresponds to the thought.

Husserl's answer is that the truth of a proposition is *ultimately* warranted by the evidence of *direct* intuition.⁴⁴ On the one hand, I can think the proposition "grass is green" without at that moment having to perceive the greenness of grass; my thought would then be said to presume, anticipate, or "emptily intend" the state of affairs--that grass is green. On the other hand, the full presentation, in which the matter (the greenness of grass) is itself the intentional object, is the intentional act of "intuition."

⁴¹ Husserl, *LU*, Introduction to Vol. 2: 7.

⁴² Cf. Sluga, 1999: 31; 40.

⁴³ Cf. Willard, 1972: 98, 100.

Husserl considers "evidence" to be yet a third act, in which the presumption (that "grass is green") is *itself* fulfilled by the matter (the intuited state of affairs, that grass is green):⁴⁵ the evidence-act occurs just when I perceive the greenness of grass—when grass shows itself to me *as* green—and the presumption and the intuition collapse in an identity.

Now, inevitably, all this talk of "acts" of "presumption," "intention," and "intuition"—be they never so "pure" or "transcendental"—make Husserl's account of truth sound very psychological indeed. And if Husserl is adducing this catalogue of psychological acts in order to ground the truth of logic and science, it is hard to see how he can avoid renewed charges of psychologism against himself. In the foregoing account, he assiduously strives to avoid psychologism by not describing the relation of *res* and *intellectus* as the correspondence between an immanent psyche and external matter.⁴⁶ It seems he thinks that such a conception would lead to a naturalized conception of truth, insofar as one would be tempted to describe the "adequacy" between the external thing and the psyche's representation in psychophysical terms. He therefore instead conceives both parts of the correspondence entirely in *noematic* terms;⁴⁷ it is this "noeticism" which makes his account "pure," i.e. not dependent for its explanatory power upon some account of how a real mind actually comes to have this experience. (Still, it is debatable whether it is therefore no longer psychological and psychologicistic.)

⁴⁴ Husserl, 1993: 283-284 (§136).

⁴⁵ Heidegger, 1985: 50. Cf. Husserl, *LU* VI: §39: "Halten wir zunächst den eben angedeuteten Begriff der Wahrheit fest, so ist die *Wahrheit* als Correlat eines identifizierenden Actes ein *Sachverhalt*, und als Correlat einer deckenden Identifizierung eine *Identität: die volle Uebereinstimmung zwischen Gemeintem und Gegebenem als solchem*." See also: Willard, 1972: 147.

⁴⁶ Cf. Levinas, 1973: 68; Willard, 1972: 147.

⁴⁷ Tugendhat, 1970: 91. For Husserl, "intentionality appears consistently as a phenomenological property of acts of consciousness, something we immediately experience: we are in every case conscious of an object *whether or not such an object actually exists in the world beyond consciousness*" (Smith & Smith, 1995: 15; emphasis added).

Husserl interprets the correspondence-theory entirely in terms of different modes of intending an object (*noema*)⁴⁸ of consciousness: in both the presumptive and the intuitive acts the intentional object (the *noema*) is identical, viz. "grass's greenness."⁴⁹ The two sides of the correspondence-relation thus have the *same noematic content*, and differ merely in *how* that content is intended, viz. as presumptively unfulfilled or intuitively fulfilled, respectively. The act of "evidence" identifies the presumptive act with the intuitive: when the intuitive *noema* fulfills the presumptive *noema*, then the latter is *seen to be true*, its truth is *e-vident*.

From this first concept of truth Husserl derives two more elementary concepts of truth, which are crucial for later understanding Heidegger's critique. If, as we just saw, the relation of *noesis* and *noema* is considered as a single whole, then "truth" means the identification of the presumed and intuited *noemata* (=truth-as-correspondence).⁵⁰ But either side of this relation may also be considered in isolation from the other, yielding what we may call the concepts of "noetic" and "noematic" truth, respectively.

Noetic truth is a property of the intentional act or "noesis" (either presumptive or fulfilled), *insofar* as this intention corresponds to the state of affairs; Husserl calls this truth "correctness [*Richtigkeit*]."⁵¹ Noematic truth, on the other hand, is a property of the intended object itself (i.e. the appearance or presentation of the object itself) as the *noema*.

[O]n the side of the fulfilling evidence-act, we experience *the given object in the mode of the presumed object*: it is the fullness [of the presumption] itself. This [object], too, can be denoted as "Being," as truth, as *that which is true*, insofar as it is here experienced not as a

⁴⁸ Since *noema*, *noemata*, *noesis* and *noeseis* are terms of art in phenomenology, I do not here transcribe them as Greek words (e.g. *noêma*, *noêsis*, etc.).

⁴⁹ Cf. Tugendhat, 1970: 50.

⁵⁰ Husserl, *LU* VI: §39, #1. Cf. Tugendhat, 1970: 93.

⁵¹ Husserl, *LU* VI: §39, #4.

merely adequate perception, but as the *ideal fullness* of an intention, insofar as it is experienced as *truth-making*....

(Husserl, *LU VI*: §39, #3)

Husserl ultimately modifies the notion of evidence in a way that even more strongly shifts the locus of truth from the logical-epistemological sphere of propositional truth to the ontological sphere of the *object* of truth-intentions. He redefines the evidence-act as the "fulfilled, intuitive act itself," the noematic correlate of which *is* "truth," where "truth" is a noematic property of *the thing itself*.⁵² The locus of truth has now shifted from the noetic to the noematic, or from the "logical" to the "ontological" pole of the intentional arc. If we seek truth, it is ultimately to be found in the thing itself as it "truly is."⁵³

But what *is* this "thing itself," what *is* this truth-giving *noema*? To answer this question, we must consider the different ways intentional objects or *noemata* are "given" to consciousness. If we consider more closely the paradigmatic mode of givenness, namely perceptual (visual) intuition, Husserl says, we notice that our intentions of things cannot always be reduced to what is given in perception alone. While perceiving the greenness of grass may suffice to fulfill completely the presumption "grass is green,"⁵⁴ a presumption such as "this is a book" cannot be verified in the same way, because the book can never be given to me in a single perceptual act. I am only ever given one side or aspect of the book in perception, which Husserl calls an "adumbration [*Abschattung*]."⁵⁵

Yet we do not primarily intend "sides" of things, but the things themselves. I do not intend a series of adumbrations of this book, but intend this book "itself." Husserl writes:

⁵² Cf. Tugendhat, 1970: 94-95; SZ: 71; 74; 87; 381.

⁵³ Cf. esp. Tugendhat, 1970: 103.

⁵⁴ Assuming that this perception is not illusory.

⁵⁵ "Adumbration" literally translates *Ab-schattung*: its Latin root, *umbra*, means "shadow." Cf. Bernet, et al., 1993: 180-181; Farber, 1968: 412, ff.; Heidegger, 1985: 43; 57-58; Sokolowski, 1974: 90-92; Tugendhat, 1970: 126-127; 70, ff.

Whether I look at this book from above or below, from within or without, I always see *this book*. It is always one and the same thing, not merely just physically, but also in the presumption of perception itself.

(LU VI: §47)

However, if it is not the perceptual fragments that I intend, how then can the "book itself" be given to me? Or, with respect to our discussion of truth, how can the truth of the proposition "this is a book" be grounded? Perception alone gives me adumbrations, but the intended thing is a whole, *of which* the perceptual data are mere adumbrations.⁵⁶ Since this whole *as* a whole cannot be given through perception, it must be interpreted as an *ideal* object which gives the percepts a unifying *meaning* or *sense*. This objective sense is called the "*eidos*."⁵⁷

Eidos is Husserl's term for the essential nature of a thing, conceived as its "look," or *Anblick*. I *perceive* various fragmentary adumbrations, but *see* (genuinely intend) a book, or a horse, or a star. In other words, when I perceive these fragments, I do so *through* their essence or look: only this eidetic intention makes it possible for me to say that I see a *book*, rather than some indeterminate blur of percepts.⁵⁸ While an *eidos*, then, is an intentional object (*noema*) given to us, it is never given through (sense-)perception. Nonetheless, it is precisely the *eidos* that grounds truth, since it gives itself ideally to consciousness as nothing but *what* it is, as pure essence--it is the "thing itself."

However, just as I do not primarily intend the perceptual fragments, I also do not primarily intend an essence. Rather, I see a thing *as* that thing through a co-intended *eidos* always already applied to the percepts, through what Husserl calls an "eidetic synthesis" of the perceptual fragments. Because percepts are always fragmentary, no percept or series of percepts can be adequate to grounding the truth of an intention; only

⁵⁶ Husserl, LU V, §14. Cf. Heidegger, 1985: 35, 37, 43; Tugendhat, 1970: 95.

⁵⁷ As I will show in the next chapter, this relation of adumbration (*Ab-schattung*) and *eidos* is isomorphic to the relation of shadow (*Schatten*) and *idea* in the cave allegory.

the *eidos*, the underlying intentional "surplus,"⁵⁹ can furnish the underlying *sense* (*Bedeutung*) to the fragmentary, ever inadequate flux of experience. Therefore, phenomenology must try to isolate this *eidos* as such, and so latch onto the *noema* that grounds the *truth* of our intentions.

As we saw, Husserl defines evidence as the act in which the presumed thing and the intuited thing itself are identified. Now, if what is intuitively given in perception are merely fluctuating adumbrations of the actually intended *eidetic sense*, then the evidence of perceptual intuition only *partially fulfills* the initial presumption. By the same token, only an intuition of the eidetic sense (*eidos*) can *completely satisfy* the presumption of that sense.⁶⁰

Summary. When we look back upon our outline of basic phenomenological notions, we can see certain important connections between them. Phenomenology aims to contemplate and describe (give the *logos* of) phenomena, i.e. of whatever presents itself or appears (*phainesthai*) to or in the mind. In other words, it aims to contemplate consciousness *qua* its contents. Now, as I have argued, all consciousness is, as intentional, also intuitional. The aim of pure or "naive" phenomenal contemplation can therefore be conceived as *pure intuition*.⁶¹ To achieve pure intuition, consciousness must be purged of its realistic commitments, which the *epoché* is meant to achieve. While *epoché* and eidetic variation are *subjective acts*, they reveal an entirely new kind of appearance, namely the phenomena *qua eidê*: phenomena divorced from facticity and considered only in their invariable core. *Epoché* bends the mind's intentional ray back upon itself; it is a means of (transcendental) self-reflection. It amounts to treating the

⁵⁸ Cf. Aristotle, *De Anima* II.6: 418a20, ff., on "incidental" perception.

⁵⁹ Cf. Husserl, *LU* VI: §40; Heidegger, 1973: 375.

⁶⁰ It is these notions of partial and complete fulfillment, and the grades of evidence they imply, which are critical to Heidegger's interpretation of truth in the cave allegory. On grades of evidence, see Husserl, *LU* VI: §38.

⁶¹ This has nothing to do with Kant's pure intuition.

real things of this world as mere phantoms, and the world itself as a mirror in which to descry the essences that constitute our mind's true structure.

The *eidē*, precisely because they now have been made to show themselves purely and constantly, are phenomena *par excellence*: they are the truly real (*ontōs on*) beings, the *Sachen selbst*. For, on the one hand, the *eidē* are what is "really" intended in all less adequate intentions; and on the other hand, their maximal being consists in their truthfulness, i.e. in their complete self-showing as what they are. Because ultimately it is these *eidē* which let empirical objects appear *as* objects of this or that kind, they are also the ultimate ground of all true propositions about objects.⁶² Only the *eidos* can *ideally*, or *maximally* fulfill a presumptive *noesis*. As the *noema* which founds truth, its character is itself "true" in the primary (noematic) sense. Because the *eidē* are the maximally full objects of intention, the eidetic intuition is correspondingly full and completely adequate. Indeed, it is maximal *adequatio* insofar as *res* and *intellectus* collapse in an identity.

4.4. Questions of being.

Having laid out the phenomenological background, we now have the resources for understanding Heidegger's critique both of neo-Kantianism and of Husserl's thought. In this section, I take up the basic concept of "being," by comparing its status in neo-Kantianism and Husserlian phenomenology. I then discuss how Heidegger's notion of being diverges from both.

Being and the object of philosophy. The meaning of being for Natorp and Husserl, respectively, is determined not so much by their differing conceptions of philosophy's object, as by their means of specifying and attaining that object. While their common goal is a scientific account of consciousness, for Natorp this implies an account of

⁶² I say "objects," though Husserl thinks of "essences" of colors as well. But color is immediately

scientific consciousness, whereas for Husserl it implies an eidetic account of consciousness *tout court*.⁶³ Heidegger, as we will see, differs from them on all these points.

For neo-Kantians of all stripes, "being" signifies nothing more than the copula in a true predication expressing a true judgement. We must keep in mind the peculiarity of the neo-Kantian conception of judging: I do not make a judgement about an object given to me as a datum, a datum *about which* I can make a judgement that can be true or false with respect to some objective determinations given *with or in* that datum. Natorp condemns such a conception of "givenness" as "dogmatic." Rather, the judgement itself *constitutes* the object for me: the object *qua object* has *no being* outside of that which my judgement, "*s is p*" *generates*. As a result, "ontology," the science of the being of beings, is resolved into a logic of correct judgement. The neo-Kantian conception of "being" is restricted to a theory of science: it is radically uninterested in pre-theoretical phenomena, because there can only be *doxa* about the non-scientific.

Phenomenology, on the other hand, strives to give an eidetic account of all phenomena by reducing the various ways of givenness of empirical *onta* to essences and essential modes of givenness. This eidetic account may be interpreted as ontology, since it purports, in its way, to explain the being of beings (where the beings are all inadequately intended phenomena, and being is their essences). It is important to see how closely this ontological aspect of phenomenology is associated with the descriptive moment of Husserl's development. Because phenomenology starts out with a description of the phenomena *as* "the things themselves" (i.e. in their being *qua* phenomena, and not as appearances of something else "behind" them), it is already oriented towards the phenomena as beings (i.e. as what-is [*Seiendes*; *onta*], rather than as what-*merely*-appears [*Erscheinungen*; *phantasmata*]). This ontic orientation

given, not adumbrated, as objects are. But cf. Farber, 1968.

⁶³ (Neo-)Kantianism: account of *a priori* knowledge; phenomenology: *a priori* account of knowledge (and all other modes of intentionality).

progressively descends to deeper *ontological* layers as the phenomenological reductions are brought into play and the phenomena are redescribed in eidetic terms. Yet, as I mentioned in this chapter's introduction, the Cartesian move implicit in the phenomenological *epoché* leads Husserl gradually to abandon the descriptive-ontological dimension of his early phenomenology and tend ever more towards a *genetic* theory of objectivity à la Natorp.

Indeed, Gadamer even calls Husserl's idealistic phase "neo-Kantian"⁶⁴ insofar as "being" (as a philosophical concept) is understood as "nothing else than the Correlate of [consciousness], i.e. Being is just what Consciousness has as its 'accusative'..." (Ryle, 1929: 363).⁶⁵ I say this is (neo-)Kantian because it excludes the possibility of a science of being *as such*: being has a sense here *only* as a correlate of consciousness; and this amounts to much the same (for Heidegger, anyway) as the neo-Kantian argument that "being" is simply the positing by consciousness of (true) scientific propositions, in which "being," as the copula, constitutes the con-nexion of empirical phenomena.⁶⁶ The "neo-Kantian" moment of Husserlian phenomenology consists precisely in the concentration on the intentional structures of the consciousness that receives (or constitutes) the phenomena. By contrast, the question of the being of those phenomena, of the *intenta*, is "neglected," as Heidegger puts it;⁶⁷ or better: the question is systematically rephrased as a question of the nature of the *intentio*. The point to stress for our discussion of Heidegger is that the genetic orientation leads Husserl inexorably to the same sort of resolution of ontology into a theory of subjectivity, if not into epistemology, as we see in neo-Kantianism. The "being" of objectivities (phenomena) is no longer something to be laid bare by a combination of reduction, variation, and

⁶⁴ Cf. Gadamer, 1986: 15.

⁶⁵ Cf. Buckley, 1992: 38.

⁶⁶ Admittedly, Husserl and Natorp differ insofar as Natorp regards "Being" as an *act* of consciousness, whereas Husserl considers it a "correlate"—which view is more "Platonic" is a question for later.

⁶⁷ Cf. Heidegger, 1985: §§12, 13.

description; instead, objectivities are accounted for in terms of the ego's *acts of generation*.⁶⁸

Fundamentalism. It is precisely at this juncture in the evolution of Husserl's thought that Heidegger most clearly and critically diverges from his teacher.⁶⁹ Heidegger rejects not only the "neo-Kantianism" of Husserl's genetic turn, but moreover throws eidetic science, as conceived by Husserl, into question. Both of these facts are of basic importance to understanding his interpretation of Plato.

We might characterize the situation thus: Husserl begins his phenomenology with the phenomena "themselves," but already at the descriptive level is led by his interest in consciousness and the nature of subjectivity towards essences and away from the phenomena in their facticity. This stage of phenomenology pleases no one. On the one hand, Natorp criticizes it as dogmatic and gets Husserl to see consciousness in terms of generative activity. This is, when it comes to the study of consciousness, a necessary and correct step, but in taking it, Husserl can be said to abandon the agnosticism originally motivating the whole project; the phenomena *qua* phenomena again fall into oblivion, and they are considered only in terms of the subject, or, at best, as the "correlates" of subjective acts.

On the other hand, Heidegger, like Natorp, considers Husserl's descriptive eidetics misguided, but instead of moving forward towards genetics, he wants to hold fast to the phase of descriptive phenomenology *before* the move to eidetics--which means, unfortunately, giving up the substance of Husserl's philosophy. Indeed, the central notion of reduction which gets us to the eidetic level can on Heidegger's view only be seen as a mistake. We have to be very clear and careful here. As we will shortly see, Heidegger is not opposed to eidetics as such; his own project of

⁶⁸ That Husserl divided generation into "active" and "passive" kinds should not distract us from the inevitable focus on subjectivity as the ground of phenomena. Passive genesis *still* involves seeing the subject as the source of the phenomenon.

fundamental ontology is also an eidetic exploration.⁷⁰ Rather he is opposed to the world-bracketing, facticity-suspending method of *epoché*. Given the ontological dimension of Husserl's eidetics, one might expect Heidegger to have more sympathy with it, yet it is especially here that his critique is most trenchant. As we will observe when we turn in the next chapter to Heidegger's essay, *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*, the critique he offers of the Platonic conception of the *eidē* in the *Republic* is just as applicable to the *eidē* of what Husserl himself (in a letter to Natorp) called the "static Platonism" of descriptive phenomenology.⁷¹ In sum, Heidegger rejects and criticizes *both* Husserl's neo-Kantian turn to genetics *and* the notion of eidetics it replaces, returning instead to the original impulse of description. The reactionary fundamentalism of this move, so typical of Heidegger, is nonetheless rooted in phenomenology's claim to be a science as radical as it is rigorous. Indeed, from Heidegger's perspective, by holding fast to the original ontological impulse, he is adhering to the spirit of phenomenology more faithfully than Husserl.

4.5. Fundamental Ontology.

Fundamental ontology vs. phenomenology. Heidegger's radicalization of the incipient ontological orientation of Husserl's eidetics of consciousness has two key aspects. First, Heidegger thinks that if phenomenology's task is the *ontological* investigation of "regions" whose ontic study it leaves to the special sciences, then phenomenology had better first inquire into the meaning of being.⁷² For if it neglects this question, the sense of "essence," true being, its proper object, remains unclear. Phenomenology would be uncertain of its own goal and unable to live up to its lofty claim to be a rigorous—indeed

⁶⁹ (For which reason I do not go further into Husserl's genetic phenomenology.)

⁷⁰ Namely of the essence of *Dasein*, which is existence; cf. *SZ*: 12; esp. 298: "Das Wesen dieses Seienden [i.e., des Daseins] ist seine Existenz."

⁷¹ "[W]obei ich noch bemerken darf, dass ich schon seit mehr als eine[m] Jahrzehnt die Stufe des statischen Platonismus überwunden und der Phänomenologie als Hauptthema die Idee der transzendentalen Genesis gestellt habe" (*RI Natorp* 29.VI.1918 [Husserl-Archive signature]; quoted at Buckley, 1992: 38; 52, n.7).

the most rigorous—science. Second, this ontological project cannot gain the necessary self-reflective transparency by proceeding directly, as Husserl does, to eidetics of the transcendental ("reduced") ego. The fundamentalist phenomenology Heidegger pursues thus has as its theoretical goal the being of beings at the fundamental level of experience. He calls it, accordingly, "fundamental ontology." What we know as *Being and Time* is Heidegger's attempt at clearing the way towards this fundamental ontology through a radicalized phenomenology of subjectivity.

There are thus several ways in which he modifies Husserlian doctrine. While Heidegger follows Husserl in turning to the *Sachen*, the first *Sache* he marks is that the fundamental level of experience is itself unselfconscious. This has two important methodological consequences. First, Heidegger does not, like Husserl, immediately reorient himself to the *Sachen*-as-phenomena *for a consciousness*. Rather, he seeks to describe structures of lived experience, or as he puts it, to lay out the mode of being of that being *which* knows, to lay out the meaning of the *sum* of the *cogito*. Thus he first notes that at this basic stratum, phenomena do not present themselves *as intenta* (or even *as phenomena*), but *as things or beings*; that the *sum* is always a being-together-with, both with "things" and with "others;" and that one of the essential features of all such beings is that they "encounter" us within an environment or "world."⁷³ This is true of all intentional states, be they everyday, scientific, or hallucinatory. Heidegger thus notices that before all consciousness (which for both Natorp and Husserl amounts to reflective *self*-consciousness), we "always already" stand in a relation to *beings*, from which he concludes that we must always already understand *being* in some way. This "always-already" understanding, as we shall see, *constitutes* the entity Heidegger designates by the term "*Dasein*"—that being which each of us is. At the same time, it is precisely this notion of environing world which indicates for Heidegger that not all

⁷² Cf. esp. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, *Γ*.1.

⁷³ Cf. esp. Plotinus, *Ennead* V.1.4, ll. 16-22.

phenomena of experience can in the end be reduced to the *intentio-intentum* template as the universal structure of *consciousness*.

The second consequence of marking the unselfconsciousness of basic experience is Heidegger's rejection of the theoretical stance implicit in the Husserlian suspension of the factual world in order to isolate essences. For Heidegger, "world" itself requires--*qua phenomenon*--a phenomenological analysis. Indeed, "world" denotes just that *Ur-phenomenon* of lived experience in which our pre-conscious (though *not* un-conscious!) modes of being or "comportments" are anchored. It is in encountering and being encountered by things and others within a world, that intentionality manifests itself at the primitive stratum; for *before* an "I" is conscious of itself as a knower (or wisher or lover, etc.), or of the surrounding things as "objects" of knowledge (or desire, or love), that "I" *exists*, and its objects are given to me simply *as being*. It is here, then, that Heidegger's brand of ontology begins its investigation, asking: What does "being" mean when I say I "exist" or the things given to me "are?" What does "being" mean at this primitive level of everydayness? If, moreover, phenomenology is to be true to its guiding principle, *To the things themselves!*, and if it wants to analyze them in their modes of givenness (i.e. ontologically), then the last thing it should do is bracket the field in which they appear, viz. the "world."⁷⁴ The world is

⁷⁴ As Ryle writes:

Heidegger is critical of this naïve assumption; and Phenomenology must, he urges, so far from accepting the alleged cleavage between Consciousness and Being, select as its first task of all, the analysis and description of that most primitive level of Experience in which is generated *for us* that seeming polar opposition. Our attitude of regarding Being as the opposite of Consciousness is itself one of the intentional experiences, and perhaps the most important of the intentional experiences that Phenomenology must examine.

(Ryle, 1929: 363)

As Heidegger sees it, he is trying to refound phenomenology in its own true spirit: *zu den Sachen*, can only primarily imply an ontology, and not an epistemology (although it of course does not *prevent* an epistemology from being developed along phenomenological lines). It is important to emphasize Ryle's point, that Heidegger aims at the "most primitive level of Experience in which is generated *for us* that seeming polar opposition" between consciousness and being. For it is *not* the case that Heidegger wants to "complete" Husserlian phenomenology simply by refocusing his investigations upon the "neglected *intenta*," and so balance out Husserl's investigations of the *intentio*. Heidegger can sometimes give that impression. But that cannot be his goal, for it would completely undermine

not itself a *thing*, is not, in our pre-theoretical experience of it, an intentional object at all: rather, it is the opening in which phenomena are given--or simply *are*--for us in the first place. Thus world cannot help but be a crucial theme of any *fundamental* ontological investigation, insofar as it is the environing zone in which things exist.⁷⁵ From Heidegger's perspective, to suspend the "world" is to bracket the most basic stratum.⁷⁶

Despite these important modifications of orthodox phenomenology, Heidegger's phenomenological practice in *Being and Time*, as well as in the Plato-lectures, remains concerned with the structure of subjectivity. For while the ultimate end is a re-opening of the question of the meaning of "being," the method involves an analysis of the *essential* structures of human being (*Dasein*), i.e. a phenomenological account of "human ontology." Thus, though neither world nor *Dasein* are suspended but considered in their mutual embeddedness, this consideration still exhibits a transcendental motif. In explaining his project, Heidegger constantly says that he is laying bare the "conditions of possibility" for such a phenomenon as, e.g., theoretical subjectivity. These conditions turn out to be the primordial structures of everydayness, which--if they are to be described ontologically, i.e. as the *essential* structures of *Dasein*--can only be displayed by something like Husserl's "free variation."

his starting point, so clearly stated in the opening paragraphs of *Being and Time*, that there is a question of being (cf. Ryle, 368): simply focusing on the *intenta* would vitiate such a question, for then being would lie in the *intenta*. Cf. Pöggeler, 1980: 125.

⁷⁵ Cf. Bernet, 1990: 146.

⁷⁶ While this may or may not have the desired effect of clearing the ground of the contingent, it certainly *does* have the problematic result of taking us away as far as possible from den Sachen selbst: for they are "in the world,"--indeed the existence of a world itself is perhaps the most primordial phenomenon, precisely the one we must abolish, according to phenomenology. The problem can be rephrased as the difficulty in distinguishing between theoretical "prejudice" and "phenomenological fact"--or indeed, the difficulty in falling prey to a prejudice and regarding prejudice as itself a primordial phenomenon of existence. Ryle writes:

The most fundamental presuppositions are ontological presuppositions; and it is to this field that Phenomenology must go, deliberately postponing the study of the twigs until it has completed its examination of the root. And the root is Being (Sein). The root problem of Phenomenology is the Meaning of Being--not in the sense that a *definition* is sought for it, for that would be a nonsensical demand, but that an insight of a new--phenomenological--sort is wanted, in possessing which we shall know "with a difference" something which, of course, we must understand or know "in a way" already. And by "Being" is meant not this or that entity of which we can say that it is or that it is something, but the universal which these exemplify.

It is therefore important to distinguish (1) the end of fundamental ontology from (2) the means of the "existential analytic." And within the existential analytic, one must again distinguish between (3) the positive phenomenological goal of laying bare the primordial stratum of being-in-the-world, on the one hand, and (4) the negative goal of showing why, in accord with the nature of this primordial stratum, it conceals itself from itself.⁷⁷ All of these moments contain implicit critiques of Husserl: (1) insofar Husserl "neglects" the meaning of being no less than the neo-Kantians; (2) and (3) insofar as Husserl's inquiries remain at the level of theoretical subjectivity; (4) by showing *why* Husserl—*qua* a philosophizing *Dasein* himself—neglects the fundamental ontological project, *in accordance with Dasein's essence*, avoiding the ultimate level of self-thematization and reflection.

Fundamental ontology vs. neo-Kantianism. Heidegger's critique of Husserl and neo-Kantianism generally centers upon the "skipping over" [*Übersprung*] of primal strata of experience in favor of scientific or theoretical experience and its transcendental conditions. Particularly upsetting for Heidegger is the consequent annihilation of ontology—although Husserl had himself demonstrated the possibility of rigorous, i.e. non-doxic, ontological investigation, viz. in the *eidetic* distillation of intentional structures. Heidegger's critique of neo-Kantianism—both directly in the analysis of theoretical subjectivity in *Being and Time*, and indirectly in his Plato-lectures' reinterpretations of "eidos" and "idea" as rooted in a phenomenological investigation of primordial strata of experience, rather than in some (natural-)scientific project—embodies a more literally Skeptical sense of *epoché*, namely the suspension of belief in theories that go beyond the phenomenologically evident.⁷⁸

(Ryle, 1929: 363)

⁷⁷ I have thus far not discussed Heidegger's notion of *Verfall* or "decadence." This gets treated in the next chapter.

⁷⁸ To anticipate: 1) the *Seinsart* of the "cognizing subject" is left unanalyzed in neo-Kantian epistemology: this, as we have seen, is the task of phenomenology; 2) the theoretical attitude as a

One of the *Sachen* the neo-Kantians ignore with their story of indefinitely extendible genetic processes of objectivation is the plain fact that our conscious experience of phenomenal data is not of undetermined *x*'s, but of *beings*, and that these beings are, moreover, given in many different ways. As we saw above, phenomenology in general accuses (neo-)Kantianism of naivety in assuming the uniformity of the objects the mind purportedly objectivates, a uniformity which derives from taking the phenomena of mathematical physics as the facts whose conditions of possibility call for analysis. This scientific starting-point, and the consequent monotony of phenomena within the very restricted domain whose root Cohen and Natorp seek, leads to a correspondingly narrow conception of the meaning of our basic concepts (being, difference, unity, etc.). And it is this conception which we earlier saw Natorp extend as the norm over all other phenomena, insofar as they are possible objects of (scientific) experience. Yet why should we think that we will discover the root meaning of concepts like "being" by taking *scientific* objects as paradigmatic beings? While Natorp's interpretation of the meaning of being as the copula may be defensible *within the limits of natural scientific experience*, it is by no means obvious that this interpretation gives the meaning of being as such.

We should note a paradoxical, though only seeming affinity between Heidegger and Natorp, over against Husserl. Heidegger thinks that the meaning of being implicit in European metaphysics since the ancients is "being-as-presence" (*Anwesen*; *parousia*).⁷⁹ It is this interpretation of being that Heidegger blames his contemporaries (particularly Husserl) for adopting unawares, and which he wants, through fundamental ontology, to call into question. Yet Heidegger's characterization of the traditional meaning of being seems completely to mischaracterize the neo-Kantian notion of being. Indeed, one might even say that it is the notion of being-as-presence which *also*

"Nur-hinsehen" (cp. SZ, 69, 86, 349); 3) Heidegger's repeated observations that we never experience "pure sensation" i.e. that the phenomenal flux is itself a theoretical fiction (cp. SZ, 59; §13).

⁷⁹ The *Anwesen*-interpretation of *Sein* was "decided" in Plato (though not "by" Plato), and then was

constitutes the target of *Natorp's* critique of Husserlian phenomenology, insofar as being-as-presence has the "dogmatic" overtones of the givenness of an *object* to the subject's gaze.

We find in Natorp (and Cohen) *both* a radically untraditional concept of being, conflicting with any interpretation of being-as-presence, *as well as* an extended argument that their "functional" concept of being was in fact discovered by Plato and periodically reconfirmed, not in Western metaphysics (i.e. "ontology"), but in its opposite, Western *idealism*. In other words, Natorp and Heidegger share a deep dissatisfaction with the interpretation of being as presence, only where Heidegger thinks it was cemented by the metaphysical tradition of Platonism, Natorp thinks this is precisely what that tradition, as he understands it, has always struggled against. Still, Heidegger cannot view as an advance Natorp's interpretation of being as purely copulative, except perhaps insofar as its radicality might inspire renewed thinking of being. For, as we have said repeatedly, Natorp entirely abolishes the question of being: even more than in Husserl, Natorp represents an extreme of the idealistic tendency totally to reduce the world to what appears, or what is allowed to appear, within the parameters of the system: the world of beings *is* nothing but what has been *ge-setzt* into the *Stellensystem* which Heidegger later calls *das Gestell*.

At the outset of *Being and Time*, Heidegger makes a *prima facie* case for two points: 1) that the *Seinsfrage*--implicitly opposed to the *Bewußt-seinsfrage*--is the basic question of phenomenology (and hence of philosophy); 2) that the appropriate, indeed the only possible access to this question, the only basis for interpreting the meaning of being is *Dasein*. He stresses that whatever the plausibility of this *prima facie* case, his way of proceeding must be justified in and through the actual analysis itself; in particular, Heidegger thinks that his procedure will show its philosophical superiority to the *Bewußtseins*-approach by demonstrating how the latter's interpretations of being (both

essentially reconfirmed by the tradition of metaphysics, up to and including Husserl.

Natorp *and* Husserl are meant here) are derivative forms of a more basic meaning of being revealed by the existential analytic.

Thus Heidegger constructs phenomenology as a science prior to any epistemology such as Natorp's. In *Being and Time*, he works towards this goal in a very systematic way, giving a phenomenological account of every conceptual moment of the neo-Kantian system, and showing that this system is grounded in deeper "existenzial" structures.⁸⁰

Erkenntnistheorie < Ontologie

Bewußtsein < Dasein

Mannigfaltigkeit < Welt

Urteil < Verstehen/Auslegung

Aussage < Rede

Before explicating and evaluating these oppositions, it is crucial to note that the priority of Heidegger's phenomenologico-ontological approach also extends to his interpretation of Plato *with respect to* Natorp's, with a similarly parallel structure: for every neo-Kantian interpretation of a Platonic notion or theme, Heidegger gives a phenomenological one. He does not thereby aim to "disprove" the former; on the contrary, his aim is to show that the neo-Kantian interpretation is in many ways "correct" [*richtig*], but that for *just this reason* it cannot penetrate to the *phenomenological* radicality of Plato's "questioning." Admittedly, this statement will strike the reader as obscure, and it is my aim in this chapter and the next to clarify especially this point. To anticipate, Heidegger regards Natorp's Plato-reading as "correct" precisely because neo-Kantianism is the culmination (as Natorp himself claims) of one of two tendencies within Plato's thought. These two tendencies, which we shall examine closely in what follows, are in constant tension in the dialogues, though Heidegger believes that the one which Natorp champions is the one which Plato

⁸⁰ "<" means "is posterior to and parasitic on."

was in some sense pre-determined to "decide." This decision, in turn, closed off the radical questioning in which Plato and the pre-Socratics had engaged. These obscurities, too, I will address in what follows.

Fundamental ontology and history. While it is obvious that despite his disagreements Heidegger owes his basic inspiration to Husserl, the positive influence of Natorp has been mostly overlooked. There are two main reasons for this. First, one is tempted to think that what Heidegger rejects in Husserl is precisely an idealism owed to Husserl's close critical relationship with *Natorp*. Second, the cliché—that the Marburgers focused on science and not on history or the historicity of consciousness—might further lead one to underestimate the Natorpian influence on Heidegger. Some recent scholarship has begun to set the record straight on this point, and my earlier account of the Marburgers' *historical* motives for reading Plato should also serve to challenge this misperception. Yet those who have traced the influences of Heidegger's view of history have looked mainly to the Southwest "historical" school, or Dilthey,⁸¹ or Hegel.⁸² My aim is not to minimize their importance, but to call attention to the striking structural parallels between Heidegger's and Natorp's views of the tradition.⁸³

One of Heidegger's chief aims in *Being and Time* is to explicate *Dasein's* essential historicity, i.e. to show that and how *Dasein* always already finds itself within a tradition of encountering and being encountered by the world. But perhaps it is wrong to say that *Dasein* "finds itself;" rather, in Heidegger's view, it *loses itself* in tradition, entirely unconscious of the original meaning of most or all the concepts through which

⁸¹ Cf. esp. Bambach, 1995.

⁸² Cf. Marx, 1971, and Kisiel, 1971. Marx brings out the Hegelian overtones of Heidegger's philosophy of history. That should not, however, obscure the connections between Heidegger and the Marburg theory of the history of philosophy.

⁸³ It should be noted that Brach (1996) does indeed trace a connection between Heidegger and Natorp, but thinks it is the *late* Natorp that is relevant, not the Natorp of *Platos Ideenlehre*. Indeed, commentators have perceived a kind of radical *Kehre* in Natorp's late period, and point, for example, to his "Metakritischer Anhang" to *Platos Ideenlehre*. As a reading of this latter piece will show,

the world appears to it and which give the world sense. Thus, insofar as it has been given that world through tradition, *Dasein* stands in an *inauthentic* relationship [*uneigentliches Verhältnis*] towards its world.

In Heidegger's view, one of philosophy's tasks is to challenge *Dasein* to recollect and make explicit those concepts, to reendow them with their original force, and so regain an authentic relationship to the world. Hence, for Heidegger (as for earlier Romantic predecessors), philosophy has an essentially historical dimension, for the process of recollection can only proceed by retracing the evolution of our basic concepts through the tradition of what he calls "Western metaphysics." But recollection is more than merely retracing; it also means unravelling the conceptual web which tradition has, purportedly, spun around its origins, enveloping them in a hard opaque cocoon. Heidegger calls this unravelling and retracing *Destruktion*. In *Being and Time*, the concept at issue is perhaps the most fundamental: *being*. Hence, in order to "ask the question of being" anew, we must understand the origins of our *current* interpretation of being, an interpretation which has become obscured in "self-evidence" (*Selbstverständlichkeit*).

But what is the cocoon made of? What is this mysterious substance of tradition which the philosopher must unravel? There is no unequivocal answer to this question for Heidegger: he seems to conceive of tradition as a kind of fog of platitudes through which we err blindly about; or else, and worse, as the conscientious activity of scholars, who work out the infinite permutations of an idea, or study it as an antiquarian curiosity, not seeing that its origin lies in an urgency of thought, in a live problem. Perhaps this is the simplest answer: tradition consists in answers without questions; in a word—dogma. Because dogma as tradition of answers has a history, one might expect its *Destruktion* to proceed in reverse chronological order, and indeed Heidegger often speaks as if that were his aim.

however, that turn has been very much exaggerated. Natorp there strongly reaffirms the basic

But in fact he jumps discontinuously about, now pursuing "deconstructive" or "phenomenological" analyses of Descartes and Kant, now focusing upon the ancient sources of the tradition, Aristotle and Plato. Indeed, we can without much exaggeration say that the conception of *Destruktion* as a systematic de-construction or *Abbau* is a myth, that on the contrary, Heidegger's historical practice is to slice straight through to the ancient core. But this direct connection to the ancients, first pursued in Heidegger's lectures on the *Sophist*, recalls Natorp's schema of philosophical history. For one thing, the key figures who represent its *Sternstunden* are the same: Kant, Descartes, Plato; and both Natorp and Heidegger conceive tradition as the dark dead matter separating these shining rings. The figures of Descartes, Kant and Plato are especially crucial; for Natorp, because they (re-) discovered idealism; for Heidegger because they thought beyond the traditional, broke with tradition ... only of course invariably to reconfirm the commitment to the traditional interpretation of being. Thus Heidegger's *Destruktion* of the history of Western metaphysics *precisely* mirrors the triumphalist story of European idealism told by the Marburgers. The depth of that connection only becomes apparent in Heidegger's Plato-readings, in which his unstated aim is to deconstruct the dominance of Marburg-style epistemology. Similarly, even the critiques of science and technology of his late period fundamentally depend on and react against the specifically Marburg template of the historical evolution of idealism, and Natorp's interpretation of time as a *Stellensystem*.⁸⁴

On the other hand, Heidegger's impulse towards *epoché* is also reminiscent of Husserl, only instead of bracketing the world, he brackets tradition. *Destruktion* is *epoché* applied historically. But while *Destruktion* resembles Husserl's *epoché*, there is one overriding difference, which brings Heidegger much closer to Natorp in spirit: Heidegger does not think that *Destruktion* will yield *answers*; the purity he seeks lies not in the clarity of the answer, but in the innocence of the question, of the living, urgent

principles of "orthodox" Marburgism.

problem at the *root* of tradition. Authenticity consists in confronting the world as a problem—that is what "openness to being" means.

The thesis I develop in the next chapter is that just as Natorp interprets Plato's thought as an autochthonous idealism, so Heidegger discerns there an aboriginal phenomenology. I argue that consciously or not, intentionally or not, Heidegger tacitly distinguishes two Platos. The first Plato is phenomenological in the radical sense Heidegger discerns in the Husserl of the *Logical Investigations*, and whose purity he tries to emulate in *Being and Time*; by contrast, the second Plato's Greek (pre-) understanding (*Verständnis*) of being-as-presence gives rise to an inchoate dogmatism—namely the one described in the first pages of *Being and Time*. Heidegger is torn between these two Platos, just as he is torn between two Husserls. Ultimately, he sees his *own* "phenomenology" reflected in the early Husserl and in the first Plato. But he does not distinguish the Platos chronologically; rather, Heidegger's Plato is fissured, himself struggling to break from the inauthenticity of received "wisdom" to a recognition of his own ignorance and renewed search for knowledge of what is.

⁸⁴ I shall deal with this topic in a separate paper.

5. Heidegger's Plato.

5.1. Introduction.

In the last chapter, I showed how Heidegger goes beyond Husserl in the interpretation of the phenomena of subjectivity. In particular, I expounded Heidegger's attempt to disclose a primordial *fundus* that underlies even the phenomena of intentionality.

Turning now to his reading of Plato, I shall pursue these issues further. I have two related aims; the first is to present the outlines of Heidegger's "phenomenological" interpretation of Plato; I want to lay out as straightforwardly as possible Heidegger's multiple theses concerning Plato's theory of forms and its relation to dialectic. I caution the reader that this presentation will at first sound very strange, and ask for patience.

The second aim is to argue that this reading of Plato is at root equivalent to a critique of Husserlian eidetics. In particular, I will show how Heidegger elucidates Plato's implicit recognition of the phenomenon of intentionality as the fundamental structure of thinking (*noein*), and how Heidegger finds entailed by this Platonic recognition many *additional* fundamental structures, viz. certain of the existenzials familiar from *Sein und Zeit*, as well as his reinterpretation of the concept of truth. At the same time, Heidegger describes a tension in Plato's thought: while the dialogues betray Plato's own insights into the existenzial structure of *Dasein* (*psychê*), these same insights are not thematically developed into an ontological system. Instead, he focuses entirely on the intentional state of *noein* (i.e., Husserl's *noêsis*). This focus on *nous*, in turn, fundamentally distorts and obscures the other existenzials, and so occludes any access to the primordial stratum of being. Heidegger continually alternates praise of Plato's recognition of the ontological problem--that is, the meaning of "being,"--with criticism of his seeming inability to penetrate beyond ontic interpretations of that meaning. I hope to show how Heidegger's phenomenological approach both provides us with a new hermeneutic starting-point for reading Plato, as well as furnishing Heidegger with the resources for constructing a fundamental ontology of *Dasein*. As we will see, the key

element in his strategy is the analysis of *logos* as constitutive of *nous*, a move which allows him to propose a radical reformulation of the split between "discursive" and "intuitionist" interpretations of the *ideai*.

5.2. Outline of Platonic concepts according to Heidegger.

In this section, I give an overview of Heidegger's translation and interpretation of certain key Platonic terms, and how they are related to each other. Discussion follows.

- ψυχή. *Psychê* means *Dasein* or "*Existenz des Menschen*,"¹ and not "soul," much less "subject."
- νοῦς/νοεῖν. *Noein* means *Vernehmen*, or, more specifically, *verstehendes Vernehmen*.² "*Vernehmen*" is a German word for "perceiving," whose root is *nehmen*, "to take."³ It does not, however, imply *sense*-perception. We must understand "perception" phenomenologically, i.e. in its broadest sense, as an intentional state, as a phenomenon of *mind* rather than a physical activity.
- διανοεῖν. *Dianoein* means "thinking-through." Heidegger sometimes equates it with *noein*.
- λόγος. *Logos* primarily means *Rede*. *Rede* is an ontological, originary constituent of *Dasein*, loosely translated as "speech." *Rede* is the channel through which *Dasein* has access to its world. But just as *Rede* also has a secondary sense (i.e. "talking"), so too does *logos* have several derivative forms, the most important for us being *Aussage*, "proposition," and *logos qua legomenon*, "that which is said, or spoken about."
- διαλέγεσθαι. *Dialegesthai*, is a particular mode of *logos*, viz. "ein hinblickendes Sprechen über," "a speaking-about with regard to something" (GA 19: 349). As in the case of *dianoia*, Heidegger stresses the force of *dia-*, which suggests both separation or division, as well as the bonding gap of the "between." In *dialegesthai*, a critical

¹ GA 19: 319.

² GA 34: 101.

³ Heidegger somewhere gives an account of the relation of this verb to its perfect nominal form, *Vernunft*, which is of course the German word for "reason," "*ratio*."

discussion occurs *between* partners involving an *analysis* of the matter at hand; *dialegesthai* in this sense corresponds closely to the German term, *Aus-ein-ander-setzung*.⁴ But as we can see from his translation, Heidegger downplays the intersubjective overtone of *dialegesthai*; he does not write: "ein hinblickendes Besprechen über," i.e. "a *discussion* with respect to something." Rather, the analytic activity is central here, one which does not require an interlocutor but may occur entirely within *Dasein* itself. As we will see, one of the more interesting aspects of Heidegger's reading is his interpretation of *dialegesthai* as "a *noein* in the strong sense" (GA 19: 410).

- ἰδέα/εἶδος. In his reading of the *Sophist*, Heidegger interprets *idea*, in the context of the dialectical moments of *diairesis* and *synagôgê* described in the *Phaedrus*, to mean something like "the understood whole" which is (then?) to be articulated through division.⁵ He distinguishes this sense of *idea* from that of *eidos*, which he interprets as the "Anblick" or "look" of a thing, as one of its several *aspects*. Never does Heidegger in the *Sophist*-lectures translate *idea* or *eidos* as "Wesen," "essence." This interpretation changes in his reading of the cave-allegory, however, where he seems to equate *idea* with *eidos*, and treat both as if they were essences in the Husserlian sense.

- γένος. *Genos* means "Stamm," more in the sense of our "phylum" than of the traditional (logical) meaning of "genus." While saying that Plato has not yet drawn a fine distinction between *genos* and *eidos*, Heidegger argues that it is significant that the *Sophist* culminates in an account of *megista genê* rather than of *megista eidê*. The use of *genê* here signifies, according to Heidegger, a truly ontological turn, as opposed to the still ontically tainted meaning of *eidos*. This distinction will be clarified below.

- οὐσία. *Ousia*, of course, means *Sein*, "Being." But it is precisely the *Sinn* of "being" which concerns Heidegger. He constantly presses the point that "being" for the Greeks

⁴ To my knowledge, Heidegger does not himself make this connection.

⁵ Cf. esp. GA 34: 334-335.

means "presence"--*Anwesenheit* or *Gegenwart*. I will examine this point in detail below.

- δόξα. Though it is typically translated as "opinion" in English, *doxa* is a difficult term for anyone to grasp, even for as bold a translator as Heidegger. He begs off with the observation that Plato himself failed to use the term consistently—a failure which does not usually keep Heidegger from his conjectures. At times he translates *doxa* as *Ansicht* and *Verständnis* ("[point of] view," "understanding" [in the ontic sense]), at others as *Meinen* (in the phenomenological sense of "intending"). The problem of *doxa* is closely related to that of *to pseudos*, and his final interpretation of the former will depend on that of the latter.

- ἀλήθεια. *Alêtheia* means "truth," *Wahrheit*. But what is truth? For Heidegger, it is not to be characterized as the property of a belief or proposition such as "correspondence with the world," and even less as a semantic property of a sentence. Indeed, it is not primarily to be said of propositions or sentences at all, but of *things* (*Sachen*). Truth is the unconcealedness or disclosure of things to *Dasein*.⁶ This notorious claim is probably the only aspect of his work in ancient philosophy to receive a sustained critique by classical philologists. For us the issue is less whether or in what sense his translation of *alêtheia* is philologically defensible (I give a brief account of the various positions in an appendix), but rather what it means in the context of his phenomenology and his phenomenological reading of Plato. As in the case of *ousia*, only more so, we will observe the curious *Wechselwirkung* typical of Heidegger's engagement with the ancients: fundamental ontology reveals certain unnoticed primordial structures, which in turn provide a new basis for interpreting ancient texts.

⁶ For a useful contrast of the extreme options (Tarski: "exact, but trivial;" Heidegger: "global, but vague"), see Tugendhat, 1970: 2, ff. Tugendhat's statement (Tugendhat, 1970: 3-4) that Heidegger's concept of truth is no longer recognizable as what we understand by "truth" is correct, yet misleading. On Heidegger's view, it is of course the case that we cannot recognize our *selbstverständlich* conception of truth in "disclosure" precisely because *Dasein* is so constituted to lose access to its ontological structure. In fact, Heidegger's description, while global, is anything but vague; he gives a rigorous, systematic account of how the fundamental ontological concept of truth coheres with the other *Existenzialien*.

On the other hand, the ancient texts, so interpreted, provide further "evidence [*Belege*]" for fundamental ontology. The key point to remember, however, is that fundamental ontology never *depends* upon the interpretation of ancient ontology,⁷ but is oriented in the first place towards the *Sachen* themselves, in this case towards *Dasein*. Heidegger's interpretation of truth as disclosure is not based on his reading of *alêtheia* in the ancient texts, nor will it fail should that reading fail.

- ψεῦδος. Like his re-reading of *alêtheia*, Heidegger's interpretation of *pseudos*, or "falsity," depends on a combination of etymological constructions and a critique of the tradition's "location" of truth in propositions rather than things. He interprets it fundamentally to signify the *Verstellung* or "distortion" or concealment of a *thing*. When you tell a *pseudês logos*, you speak either in such a way as to "twist" the presentation of the matter, or to conceal it altogether.

5.3. Plato through Aristotle.

In order to understand Heidegger's Plato, we must always keep in mind Heidegger's starting-point: Aristotle. Heidegger simply asserts that the only way to understand Plato is to read him through Aristotle, that is, as darkly anticipating problems, methods, and solutions that only Aristotle treats with adequate clarity and rigor.⁸ Heidegger uses this premise in order to help him interpret certain key terms common to Plato and Aristotle, most of which were laid out in the preceding section. Because Aristotle ostensibly gives a clearer account of these terms, Heidegger says one should use that account to fix their meaning—or at least delimit their general semantic field—in Plato. We will see how this works in the next section, as we examine Heidegger's analysis of the modes of ἀληθεύειν in *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI.

⁷ Cf. esp. SZ: 220. By "ancient ontology," I mean, with Heidegger, the ontology of Plato and Aristotle.

⁸ Cf. e.g. GA 19: 190.

It is remarkable that in the case of Plato, Heidegger's approach seems to reverse his general commitment to historical *Destruktion*. *Destruktion* peels away the outer, temporally later shells of thought from an inner, vital kernel, the outer shells all being treated as more or less misunderstandings or distortions of the kernel. But in this case, Heidegger says that Aristotle (the outer) is the *clear* starting point, from which we are to interpret the obscure Plato (the inner). Is this really an inconsistency, and if so, what accounts for it?

First, we should note that, in retrospect, Heidegger's attitude in the *Sophist*-lectures appears as merely a phase. Already in *Sein und Zeit* (1926-1927), and more clearly in the lecture courses on the cave-allegory and the *Theaetetus* (1931-1932),⁹ he seems to abandon the notion that Plato is but an incubator of concepts which don't hatch until Aristotle. Indeed, the later Heidegger altogether conflates Plato and Aristotle as equally responsible for the obscuring of the *archaic* Greeks' putative "openness to being."¹⁰ Thus, far from being obscure and primitive, Plato comes ultimately to represent a positively *modern* impulse in ancient thought. I say all this in order to show that "*Destruktion*" is a very plastic term: its terminus recedes ever further into the past.

Still, in 1924-1925, when Heidegger lectures on the *Sophist*, he is staking out a highly controversial and idiosyncratic position on the significance of ancient philosophy for contemporary thought, in direct opposition to the neo-Kantian view. Having read the prefatory "Nachruf auf Paul Natorp," full of respectful praise for the recently deceased scholar, one cannot but be struck by the violent overturning of Natorp's guiding hermeneutic principle in the very next section. That principle, we will recall, is to approach the dialogues without prejudice—and most especially without "Aristotelian" interpretations. *Natorp's* approach, it would seem, is *Destruktion* in a much purer vein.

⁹ The lectures on the cave-allegory and the *Theaetetus* are part of a single course, and are bound together in *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 34; I will henceforth cite them as "GA 34."

¹⁰ I shall deal with Heidegger's "archaism" in a separate paper, entitled "ΙΔΕΑ as *Gestalt*: Heidegger, Reinhardt, and the Georgian Platonists."

But Heidegger will have none of it—and the proximity of his rejection to the *Nachruf* strongly suggests that his fixation on Aristotle is at least in part just a reaction against a neo-Kantianism whose doctrine he rejects on every other point as well.

Yet it is too superficial to characterize Heidegger's reversal of Natorp as simply an instance of his general anti-Marburgism. Heidegger faces a genuine dilemma which Natorp does not satisfactorily deal with, viz. the question of how to gain access to what the ancient texts *really mean*; using Aristotle as a touchstone is his solution. The dilemma concerns presuppositions: when we read a text to say *x*, how do we know that *it* means *x*, and that *we* haven't read *x* into it? Natorp, in his preface to *Platos Ideenlehre*, reasons unconvincingly as follows:

In Plato ist der Idealismus urwüchsig, gleichsam autochthon. ... Darin liegt der unauslöschliche Reiz, darin der unvergängliche didaktische Wert des Platostudiums. Die Einführung in Plato ist die *Erziehung zur Philosophie*; erwächst doch bei ihm zuerst ihr ganzer Begriff. Die Philosophie aber, nach diesem ihrem strengsten historischen Begriff, ist keine andre als: der Idealismus. Also ist es nicht Hineintragung eines fremden unhistorischen Gesichtspunkts in eine doch historisch gemeinte Betrachtung, wenn die entwickelnde Darlegung der Ideenlehre Platos sich gestaltet zu einer Einführung in den Idealismus.

(PI: viii-ix; emphasis added)

In Plato, idealism grows pristinely, autochthonously. ... That is the source of the unending delight and eternal didactic value of studying Plato. To be introduced to Plato is to be *educated into philosophy*, as the very concept of philosophy finds its root in Plato. Philosophy, however, in accordance with its most rigorous historical [i.e. Platonic?] conception is nothing other than Idealism. Thus it is not importing a foreign, unhistorical perspective into an essentially historical study if the

progressive presentation of Plato's doctrine of ideas amounts to an introduction to idealism.

Natorp's reasoning (for I shan't call it an argument), as I can make it out, runs as follows: In Plato we find idealism in its pristine form. In Plato, philosophy for the first time appears as idealism. Therefore, Plato's dialogues are valuable as introductions to philosophy, i.e. to idealism. Therefore, it is not anachronistic or otherwise tendentious to use Plato's doctrine of ideas as an introduction to idealism. Of course Natorp *claims* not to be reading his own idealistic thesis into Plato, viz. that "die Ideen *Gesetze, nicht Dinge* bedeuten" (PI: x). He says he has derived it "so streng als nur möglich aus den platonischen Texten allein" (PI: x). But Natorp entirely begs the question, for how is he to know that for Plato philosophy meant his brand of "critical" idealism, and what makes him sure he is not reading it into Plato?

Heidegger, to his credit, does not pretend to a presuppositionless standpoint. Every interpretation has a point of view, and the interpreter's first task must therefore be to gain the *appropriate* standpoint, the *appropriate* mode of access (*Zugangsweise*) to the text. The problem is thus removed one step: how do we gain this "appropriate" point of view? Heidegger thinks that two ideals need to be borne in mind, which I for convenience designate "objective" and "subjective." On the one hand, the objective ideal enjoins the interpreter to respect the text: of course, Heidegger says, we must aim at the ideal of "letting the [text] speak entirely for itself"—only to add, sarcastically (and perhaps with the just-quoted passage from Natorp's preface in mind):

Das ist eine Selbstverständlichkeit; heute macht jeder Anspruch darauf, die Texte selbst sprechen zu lassen. Das ist heute eine Phrase geworden. Aber die Verpflichtung, die man mit diesem Anspruch übernimmt, ist doch meist nicht verstanden. Denn es genügt nicht, daß man ein möglichst großes Textmaterial aufführt und nicht sagt, was nicht

im Text steht. Dadurch ist nicht gewährleistet, daß man auch nur das Geringste verstanden hat.

(GA 19: 227-228)

That is obvious. Today everyone claims to let the texts speak for themselves. That's become a slogan nowadays. But the duty which one accepts in making this claim is generally not understood. For it is not enough to present as much textual material as possible without saying anything that is not in the text. That by no means guarantees that one has understood it the least bit.

Only the second, the subjective ideal supplies what is lacking in mere "textual analysis;" it enjoins the interpreter to enter as completely as possible into the (subjective) horizon of the text's cultural-linguistic community. In this case, we must strive to adopt the "Greeks'" interpretive standpoint, and so (subjectively) try to understand the dialogues *as the Greeks did*, if we are to gain the desired (objective) transparency.¹¹ At the same time, we can only gain the necessary (subjective) standpoint by interpreting the (objective) texts. You cannot advance towards one ideal without respecting the other.

It is with these two ideals in mind that Heidegger uses Aristotle as an approach to Plato. Heidegger, like many, believes that much of Aristotle's philosophy has evolved out of Plato's philosophy; or put more starkly: Aristotle's philosophy is the clear perfection of what is darkly incipient in Plato's.¹² I suspect this is not the only—or even the chief—reason why Heidegger resorts to Aristotle to gain access to Plato; for if it were simply the case that Aristotle said more clearly what Plato meant to say, why read Plato? We will see, in what follows, that Heidegger uses Aristotle less to provide an

¹¹ It is reasonable enough, as an ideal, to try to privilege the "Greek" point of view, but how do you decide what that is? Moreover, how do you decide *which* of the Greek perspectives to take on. Heidegger often speaks of the "Greek" way of looking at things, in a way which makes it sound as if he simply *was* such a Greek, that no highly "artificial operation" or *Umstellung* (to use his turn of phrase), no "cultural *epoché*" were required for us to "go Greek." Other times, he indicates that by "the Greeks," he specifically means Plato and Aristotle (as when he equates "Greek ontology" with Platonic and Aristotelian ontology in *Sein und Zeit*).

¹² GA 19: 190.

access to Plato in particular, than to "Greek" ways of looking at things in general. Gaining this access is crucial for satisfying the subjective ideal, "das spezifisch Griechische ... klarzumachen" (GA 19: 229-230).¹³

But why should we not expect to gain the desired access via the pre-Socratics, or Socrates himself, or someone else, instead of Aristotle?¹⁴ At first Heidegger's only rationale seems to be the one we heard from Kant in Chapter One:

Wir machen die Voraussetzung, daß Aristoteles Plato verstanden hat. Auch wer Aristoteles nur roh kennt, wird aus dem Niveau der Arbeit sehen, daß es nicht kühn ist, zu meinen, Aristoteles habe Plato verstanden. *Wie denn überhaupt über die Frage des Verstehens zu sagen ist, daß die Späteren die Vorausgegangenen immer besser verstehen, als diese sich selbst verstanden haben.*

(GA 19: 11; emphasis added)

We take as granted that Aristotle understood Plato. Even one who has but a rough familiarity with Aristotle will see from the level of his work that it is not overly bold to believe that Aristotle understood Plato. Just as it is generally true, regarding the question of understanding, that those who come later always understand their predecessors better than the latter understood themselves.

But what entitles Heidegger to this assumption? Is it any more justifiable to assume with Heidegger that Aristotle understood Plato, than to assume with Natorp that he had radically misunderstood him? I do not have a good answer to this question. Still, one reason why Heidegger might see Aristotle as especially useful for this task is the role *endoxa*—views widespread or eminent—play in Aristotle's thought. Aristotle's endoxic approach to philosophy in certain respects resembles Heidegger's tactic of *Destruktion*.

¹³ In the case of the *Sophist*-lectures, the point is to show that in the Greek view, *alêtheia* and *logos* are intimately entwined.

¹⁴ Natorp, for example, begins with Socratic "concepts," and traces the evolution of Platonic "ideas" from them.

Both Aristotle and Heidegger are in the first place concerned with stating the *endoxa*, the *legomena*, the what-one-traditionally-says about some matter or other. But this is merely a preliminary step.¹⁵ Next, they try to "appropriate"¹⁶ these *endoxa*, that is, grasp their inner meaning. How do they do this? Not primarily by isolating internal inconsistencies and never by appealing to some authority, not even to the "tribunal of reason." Rather, they both consistently turn to the matter, the *Sache* itself, and measure the *endoxon* against it. In this way, the *endoxa* find a touchstone in the *Sachen selbst*, a touchstone upon which most of them shatter, thereby letting the *Sachen* show forth all the more purely.

Of course, we now find ourselves facing a similar dilemma with regards to *endoxa* and *Sachen* that we earlier faced regarding texts and presuppositions. When Aristotle or Heidegger engages in endoxic *Destruktion*, how does he know a) that he and the *endoxon* are talking about the same thing; and b) that the *Sache* he is using as his criterion is not itself contaminated by his own unconscious presuppositions (*endoxa* in a loose sense)?

Let us observe how Natorp's and Heidegger's Platonic hermeneutics both reflect and conflict with their idealistic and phenomenological starting points, respectively. First, Natorp's *stated* hermeneutic principle finds itself awkwardly in discord with both his *actual* hermeneutic practice and his philosophical commitments. If there exists no object that is not constituted by a judgement, if all is flux unless it is determined by the active forming power of reason, which *reads into the flux* what is otherwise *consistent with the text of science* (to recall Cohen's phrase about science being in books), then must this not *a fortiori* be the case with a manifold as complex and ambiguous as the Platonic corpus? How can Natorp speak in the case of *philology* as if there were such a thing as letting the corpus, the *Text-an-sich* speak, when he does not allow it in any other area of rational inquiry? Yet in fact he does *not* let the text speak in the manner he

¹⁵ Eine vorläufige Vorbereitung, to speak with Heidegger.

¹⁶ "Aneignen" would be Heidegger's term.

suggests he will. His interpretive practice (if not his interpretive theory) is in complete harmony with his idealism: he *posits* that Platonism=Idealism, and then considers as true whatever agrees with this, and untrue whatever does not so agree.

Similarly, Heidegger's project of *Destruktion* appears to conflict with the guiding hermeneutic principle of the *Sophist*-lectures, viz. "vom Hellen ins Dunkle zurück [zu gehen], vom Klaren bzw. relativ Ausgewickelten zum Verworrenen" (GA 19: 190). This principle states that our position in time is "bright and clear," whereas that to which we return is "dark and confused." Yet it seems unjustifiably optimistic in view of *Destruktion*'s contrary assumption that we always already find ourselves in darkness, and must find our way back to the light. There appears, moreover, no way in which *Destruktion* can be reconciled with the view that "in der aristotelischen Forschung nichts anderes vorliegt als eine *radikalere Fassung der Probleme*, mit denen Plato und die Früheren gerungen haben" (GA 19: 190). Yet I hope I have shown why Heidegger's use of Aristotle to gain access to Plato need not be at cross-purposes with *Destruktion*. Aristotle stands out as a special case because of his endoxic approach—not that any particular *endoxa* are actually germane to the discussion of the *Sophist*. It is because the endoxic approach is subject to phenomenological checks that it promises to disclose the semantic field of certain key philosophical concepts.

B understands predecessor A better than A understood himself; for this reason B's texts may be valuable for understanding A. Yet B does not for this reason escape the fate of *Destruktion*. In Heidegger's view, the very fact that B now *understands* is, paradoxically, the reason for B losing contact with the *question* motivating A, and so also a falling away from the *Sache* prompting the question. B's understanding is the beginning of the progressive *Abschleifen* of A's discourse. For this reason, we may *use* B to see how the terms of A's discourse are to be *understood*; but we must then "*destroy*" B to penetrate to A's living question itself.¹⁷

¹⁷ I readily grant that this last statement seems inconsistent with Heidegger's quoted remark, that Aristotle's researches embody a "more radical grasp of the problems Plato and the his predecessors

5.4. *Nous* as *Verstehen*.

As we know, Heidegger's inquiry into the primordial being of *Dasein* has as its final goal the clarification of the meaning of being (*Sinn des Seins*). We may reformulate this abstruse-sounding goal more plainly: what, at bottom, do we mean when we say something *is*? In order to reach this "bottom," we must penetrate to the primordial level of our experience of beings, and make explicit to ourselves *how* they are for us. As I have already discussed, they *are* for us by *appearing* to us: *onta* are *phenomena*, and this is true whether they are "sensible" or not. Another word for "appearance" is "disclosure [*Erschlossenheit*];" when a being appears, it is disclosed. Heidegger's project in the first division of *Sein und Zeit* is to make explicit the basic "structures"--or, as he himself sometimes puts it--the "conditions of possibility" of that disclosure. These basic structures are what he calls the "existenzials." Because they make possible disclosure, they also underlie any "meaning of being" accessible to *Dasein*.

Heidegger writes: "Erschlossenheit wird durch Befindlichkeit, Verstehen und Rede konstituiert ..." (SZ: 220). I addressed "*Befindlichkeit*" in my accounts of *Dasein*'s essential worldedness; and I shall describe *Rede* in the next section by giving the basic contours of the field of *logos*, viz. the *ti*, the *genos*, and the *onoma*. These contours of *logos* cannot be more closely determined without a provisional (*vorläufig*) explanation of *Verstehen* in the existenzial sense, which for Heidegger is, I argue, equivalent to *one* sense of *nous/noein*. By the same token, only that clearer conception of *logos* will allow us to grasp Heidegger's full interpretation of *nous*. Thus we have the following stages ahead of us:

- the preliminary explanation of *nous* as *Verstehen*;

wrestled with." But it is not inconsistent. The paradox is that as long as the problem remains unsolved, it lives; when it is understood--especially "*more radically*"--it is threatened with ossification. Heidegger sometimes speaks as though this sclerosis of thought actually sets in with Aristotle, sometimes not; but he does see Aristotle (and later, Plato) as the catalyst of the hardening process.

- the three modes of *logos* and its specification of *logos* as the "genetic" or "relational" explication of *Verstehen*;
- the specification of *nous* as *nous synthetos*, i.e. as essentially dianoetic and dialectical, as well as the status of "pure *nous*."

In §31 of *Sein und Zeit*, "Das Da-sein als Verstehen," Heidegger takes *Dasein*'s being-in-its-world as the starting-point for analyzing *how Dasein* is in that world, the *modality* in which that world is there [*ist da*] for and to it. He writes: "*Befindlichkeit hat je ihr Verständnis*"--loosely translated: every finding-itself-in-a-world has its understanding. In plain English, we always find ourselves in the world essentially *understanding* that world. It is crucial to keep this statement's *existenzial-ontological* import in mind, otherwise it seems trivially false. For can I not imagine myself in circumstances which are so utterly alien to me that I do not understand them at all? Yes, but that would constitute an *ontic* instance of (non-)understanding, not of understanding as an existenzial element of *Dasein*'s essence. On the contrary, Heidegger would argue, such a thought-experiment only *verifies* the existenziality of understanding, since *Dasein* always either understands or does not understand--but in either case must be of such disposition so as *to* understand--its world (cf. SZ: 143). It is this disposition he calls *Verstehen*.

What is the nature of this "understanding?" Here §31 presents a problem, in that Heidegger seems primarily concerned with how *Dasein* understands *itself*, and only secondarily *its world*,¹⁸ but only the latter is relevant to our purpose. The world and its beings appear to *Dasein*, i.e they are *understood by Dasein*, in terms of their *Worumwillen*, their what-for, their οὐ ἐνεκα.¹⁹ This what-for (or good-for-what) constitutes the meaningfulness of the world (SZ: 143).²⁰ But at the level of

¹⁸ Cf. esp. SZ: 144, 145, 146.

¹⁹ I hesitate to call this understanding "teleological," however, because that term seems to convey an overly thematic purposiveness. Cf. GA 19: 366.

²⁰ "Im *Worumwillen* ist das existierende In-der-Welt-sein als solches erschlossen, welche *Erschlossenheit Verstehen* genannt wurde [i.e. at SZ: 85]" (SZ: 143). Cf. (SZ: 147): "In der

Befindlichkeit, the what-for is grasped not explicitly but rather in terms of possibility. When I see the hammer, I do not immediately understand it *explicitly* as "good-for-banging-nails;" I would reach this level of explicitness only if, say, I needed to hang a picture at that very moment. (And even then: would I *explicitly* say or think to myself: "This being is good-for-banging-nails?") Yet insofar as the hammer appears to (or encounters) me in my world, I must understand it with respect to its what-for; for if I did not, it would not appear to me *as a hammer* at all.

Heidegger stresses that *Dasein* does not *thematically* grasp the possibilities through which it understands beings. As he writes, "[s]olches Erfassen benimmt dem Entworfenen gerade seinen Möglichkeitscharakter, zieht es herab zu einem gegebenen, gemeinten Bestand, während der Entwurf im Werfen die Möglichkeit als Möglichkeit sich vorwirft und als solche *sein* läßt" (SZ: 145). In sum, *Dasein* understands all the beings in its environing circumstance in terms of their what-for; and conversely, they are disclosed to *Dasein* through their "dynamic" character of having the possibility to be used for, to be good-for some end, although this what-for or good-for character is, *at this level of understanding*, never explicit.

Lastly, we must discuss the crucial introduction of "sight"-terminology in the context of *Verstehen*. Heidegger writes: "Das Verstehen macht in seinem Entwurfscharakter existenzial das aus, was wir die *Sicht* des Daseins nennen" (SZ: 146). Again, he first discusses understanding *qua* "sight" with respect to *Dasein's self*-understanding, and only then turns to sight with respect to the world; and again, I focus only on the latter. He writes:

Der Ausdruck "Sicht" muß freilich vor einem Mißverständnis bewahrt bleiben. Er entspricht der Gelichtetheit, als welche wir die Erschlossenheit des Da charakterisierten. Das "Sehen" meint nicht nur nicht das Wahrnehmen mit den leiblichen Augen, sondern auch nicht das

Entworfenheit seines Seins auf das Worumwillen in eins mit der auf die Bedeutsamkeit (Welt) liegt Erschlossenheit von Sein überhaupt."

pure unsinnliche Vernehmen eines Vorhandenen in seiner
Vorhandenheit. Für die existenziale Bedeutung von Sicht ist nur *die*
Eigentümlichkeit des Sehens in Anspruch genommen, daß es das ihm-
zugänglich Seiende an ihm selbst unverdeckt begegnen läßt. Das leistet
freilich jeder "Sinn" innerhalb seines genuinen Entdeckungsbezirkes.

(SZ: 147)

The seeing by which *Dasein* understands the world ("subjectively") *corresponds to the Gelichtetheit*, to the illumination or luminousness with which ("objectively") the things of the world shine-forth (*er-scheinen, phainesthai*) to us. Hence, it is through "understanding sight" that the world *is* for us primordially; but because this understanding is inexplicit and unthematic, Heidegger writes: "Sein ist im Entwurf *verstanden*, nicht *ontologisch begriffen*" (SZ: 147; emphasis added): being is understood but not ontologically conceptualized or grasped.

Now I said at the outset that Heidegger's conception of *Verstehen* pertains to his interpretations of *nous* in ancient philosophy; in fact, Heidegger interprets *nous* (or at least *one* aspect of it) just to be this existenzial, *Verstehen*. The key link lies in Heidegger's identification of *Verstehen* with *Dasein*'s "Sicht" or "sight." That is also how he conceives *nous*. It is not a sensual seeing, but rather a *perceiving*. So we have the following terminological equivalences: *Verstehen*=*Sicht*=*Nous*=perception, in which the percept lets *onta* encounter *Dasein* "in themselves and without distortion" (SZ: 147). Heidegger uses yet another term to translate *nous*: "*Vernehmen*" (cf. §5.2, above); *noein*, the activity of *nous*, is, as he puts it in the *Theaetetus*-lecture, "*verstehendes Vernehmen* [a perceiving that understands]" (GA 34: 101). *Nous* is the intentional state of perceiving-through-understanding its object; that is, it perceives the object *by* understanding it, and understands it *in* perceiving it. Its object, moreover, is understood inexplicitly, tacitly, unthematically, viz. as a simple *ti*, a mere "something." And this *ti*,

insofar as it is understood to be *something*, is understood in terms of its what-for or good-for.

Heidegger derives this structural analysis of *nous*'s intentionality from various passages in Plato. Let me briefly discuss one of them,²¹ *Sophist* 228; the context is the analysis of bodily sickness and ugliness:

[228 c] S: Well then, suppose something that's in motion [κινήσεως μετασχόντα] aims at a target [σκοπόν τινα θέμενα] and tries to hit it [πειρώμενα τούτου τυγχάνειν], but on every try [καθ' ἐκάστην ὁρμήν] passes by it and misses [παράφορα αὐτοῦ γίγνηται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνη]. Are we going to say that it does this because it's properly proportioned or because it's out of proportion?

T: Out of proportion, obviously.

S: But we know that no soul is willingly ignorant of anything.

T: Definitely.

[228 d] S: But ignorance [τό γε μὴν ἀγνοεῖν] occurs precisely when a soul tries for the truth [ἐπ' ἀλήθειαν ὁρμωμένης ψυχῆς], but swerves aside from understanding [παράφορου συνέσεως γιγνομένης]²² and so is beside itself [παράφροσύνη].

T: Of course.

S: So we have to take it that an ignorant [ἀνόητον] soul is ugly and out of proportion.

(*Sophist*, 227e-228d)²³

Heidegger uses this passage as support for his contention that Plato understood *Dasein* (*psychê*) as an essentially *intentional* entity, by excavating the condition of

²¹ Heidegger pursues another such "deduction" of Plato's insight into noetic intentionality with respect to Parmenides's prohibition concerning thinking (*noêma*) non-being at *Sophist* 237a, ff.

²² Schleiermacher translates: "bei der *Einsicht* ... vorbeikommenden Seele" (Schleiermacher, 1969: 663; emphasis added).

²³ White, trans., in Cooper and Hutchinson, 1997.

possibility of the Stranger's analysis of psychic disproportion and ugliness. Heidegger focuses upon ll. 228c, ff. He points out the following structural features of the *psychê* presupposed by the Stranger: (a) the soul "carries within it *kinêsis*,"²⁴ i.e., it is directed (*Von-zu*), and is "on the way" (*unterwegs*) towards something (GA 19: 366). That "something" is (b) *skopon tina*, "a target," literally, "that which is *sighted*," thus the *kinêsis* has an essentially built-in *end*. (c) Psychic motion, moreover, does not move in just any direction, but has a *hormê*, a positive impulse towards a *specific* end (*skopos*); it is only this specific directedness which makes possible a *missing* (*paraphora*) of the *skopos*. Heidegger concludes that ugliness "in the sense of deformity [*Mißverfassung*] is only possible where we have a constitution [*Verfassung*] before us which in itself has a *direction towards something*, and [thus] can veer from and miss the *skopos*" (GA 19: 366).

Just what *is* this *kinêsis* in the *psychê*, which has both a *hormê* and the possibility of a *paraphora*? "*Dieses Phänomen in der ψυχή ist das νοεῖν ...*" (GA 19: 367). *Paraphrosunê*, "derangement" (or, as White has it, being "beside oneself"), is a defect of *nous*, since Heidegger seems to maintain that in this passage *phronein/phronêsis* are concrete *forms* of *noein* (GA 19: 367). We must first ask whether his conclusion is forced, given that neither "*nous*" nor "*noein*" appears here. No; for both the words *agnoia* and *anoêton* provide him with support. *Agnoia* is not related to *noein*; rather it is privative from the root of *gignôskein*, which has largely the same meaning as *noein*;²⁵ hence *agnoia* is the "want of perception" (LSJ). *Anoêton*, which means "ignorant," on the other hand, is directly related to *noein*, viz. as the privative of the adjective *noêton*, "falling within the province of νοῦς" (LSJ). Thus, derangement occurs when *Dasein* misperceives, and so is ignorant. This derangement

²⁴ This mistranslation of *metaschonta*, participle of *metechein*, "to partake, participate in," has no effect on Heidegger's point.

²⁵ γινώσκω: "know by observation" (as opposed to "know by reflection" [*oída*]), discern, distinguish, *perceive* (LSJ).

is a *privation*, and hence, Heidegger argues, a (negative) modality of the directed psychic *kinēsis* called *noein*. Since this movement is directed *ep' alētheian*, "at truth" (*Sophist* 228c10), *agnoia*, too, is fundamentally directed at truth, but *qua* misdirection.

Heidegger concludes: "Das Wesentliche ist, daß das νοεῖν, diese ὁρμή der Seele auf das ἀληθές, als das Ursprünglichste der menschlichen Verfassung gesehen wird" (GA 19: 368). In other words, *nous* as that existenzial structure of *Dasein* which I showed is, for Heidegger equivalent to *Verstehen*, is *intentional*, viz. with the object of the disclosure of beings (in the world) as such.²⁶

One will object, however, that Heidegger's use of *nous* is not only forced, but turns Plato's own conception of *nous* entirely on its head. For we know from the Divided Line that *noēsis* (*Rep.* 511d8) or *nous* (*Rep.* 511d4) is reserved for the highest and most perspicacious psychic condition. Insofar as Heidegger equates *nous* with *Verstehen*, where *Verstehen* appears to be either some sort of vague sort of awareness, or a general term for intentionality (as *noesis* is in Husserl), he clearly misrepresents Plato's meaning. This objection is completely warranted, and although Heidegger's use of *nous* may be explained (as I propose to do), his misrepresentation of Plato cannot be explained away. When we return to a fuller account of *nous* as "*meta logou*" below, it will become clear what Heidegger is doing here; it does not thereby make it any less misleading as an interpretation of *nous* in Plato.

5.5. *Logos* as *Rede*.

As I have said, *Dasein* has a complex structure. Although all *Dasein*-related phenomena may be reduced to the basic phenomenon of disclosure or *Gelichtetheit*, this phenomenon itself occurs in an irreducibly complex way. *Noein* or *Verstehen* is *one* of the conditions of possibility of disclosure, but only one; *logos* or *Rede* is another (*SZ*: 220). In other words, the existential analytic in *Sein und Zeit* shows that *ontologically*,

²⁶ We will return to this point below, in our examination of the cave allegory.

Dasein is constituted by *nous* and *logos* equiprimordially: there is no *noein* without *legein*, and vice versa.²⁷ Of course, having said that, we must immediately note that factually, *noein* may occur without *legein* and *legein* without *noein*; I will discuss the former phenomenon in a later section under the heading of "pure *nous*;" the latter, which constitutes the phenomenon of "*legomena*" or "*freischwebender logos*," I treat at the end of this section. The main point here may be expressed in two ways: a) the interdependent *noein* and *legein* are the ontologically distilled and therefore *authentic* modes of *nous* and *logos*; this fact does not prevent them, of course, from manifesting themselves *inauthentically*. Or b): *noein* and *legein*, properly grasped as modes of disclosure, must be, ontologically, essentially connected; when they operate in isolation from each other, as they often (perhaps even for the most part) do, then they do not and cannot fulfill their authentic disclosive function.

In the previous section we made a first run at Heidegger's conception of *Verstehen*, and I argued that he equates it with *noein* in an extremely broad sense. In this section, I will discuss his conception of *logos* as *Rede* at a similarly general level. First, I discuss how Heidegger arrives at his view that *logos* was understood by the Greeks as a fundamental feature of human being (though not, of course, in any self-

²⁷ It is hard not to read Heidegger's insistence upon the adamant bond between *nous* (= *Verstehen*=*Sicht*) and *logos* without recalling Kant's view of a similarly unbreakable connection between *Anschauung* (*intuitus*) and *Verstehen* (*discursus*). Heidegger and Kant both hold that in some sense, there can be no seeing without discourse, and no discourse without seeing. Still, the differences leap to the eye. First, as we saw in Chapter 1, Kant isolates and distinguishes *Anschauung* and *Verstand* as the basic structures of our *Gemüt*, and associates "seeing" (by definition) with the former, and "discourse" (*logos*?) with the latter: seeing and understanding are *contrasted*, and discourse is seen as the activity of the understanding. Heidegger, on the other hand, isolates and distinguishes *Verstehen* and *Rede* as the basic structures. In so doing, he dissociates discourse from understanding, and instead assimilates *seeing* to understanding. As we saw earlier, understanding *is* seeing; and as we shall see in this section, discourse (*logos*) is *how* we articulate what we see. As I will discuss below, Heidegger, simply in virtue of how he cuts up the basic mental phenomena, *structurally* avoids the conundrum of "intellectual intuition." Or put another way: granting his phenomenological analysis of *Verstehen* and *Auslegung*, the "problem" of intellectual intuition can only appear as a false problem. (The problem arises because "seeing" is at the outset determined to be distinct and distinguishable from "understanding," such that it makes no sense, given this premise, to ask how understanding [or intellect] can "see.") One key advantage of Heidegger's approach is that he can explain the phenomenon of pure *nous* (i.e. of *Anschauung* minus discourse), so that his view is not saddled with its own equivalent to the problem of intellectual intuition; I deal with this issue in detail below.

reflectively explicit manner, *as* an "existenzial), with reference to his reading of the *Phaedrus*. I then explain what Heidegger thinks the different modes or manifestations of *logos* are, and again, how those modes play an important if inexplicit role in determining the Greek (Platonic) interpretation of *logos*.

The Phaedrus as a guide to logos. In *Sein und Zeit*, Heidegger writes: "Die Griechen haben kein Wort für Sprache, sie verstanden dieses Phänomen 'zunächst' als Rede" (*SZ*: 165).²⁸ Although this claim appears without support, yet it is in fact a precipitate of the *Sophist*-lectures. Through his analysis of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, as well as the first five definitions of the sophist in the *Sophist*, Heidegger arrives at the tentative hermeneutic-phenomenological conclusion that "der λόγος selbst von den Griechen als das Phänomen verstanden wurde, von dem aus sie die Existenz des Menschen deuteten" (GA 19: 306).²⁹ In order to verify whether this general, tentative claim holds for *Plato*, he turns in a lengthy excursus (§§50-55) to the *Phaedrus*. Most of this analysis (§§53-55) concerns technical issues of dialectic, which I treat in a later section.

Here I want only to show why Heidegger chooses the *Phaedrus* to open a window upon the "Greek" understanding³⁰ of language, and thus on Plato's alleged, inexplicit assumptions about the nature of *logos*. In order to proceed, Heidegger says, we must ask the following question:

Welches ist die Stellung Platos zur Rhetorik? Denn die Rhetorik ist die τέχνη, die das rechte Reden selbst ausbildet und lehrt oder beansprucht sich als solche. Mindestens indirekt muß aus der Stellung Platos zur Rhetorik seine Stellung zum λόγος sichtbar werden.

(GA 19: 307)

²⁸ Cf. *SZ*: 32; GA 19: 590.

²⁹ This is of course precisely the strategy he himself adopts in *Sein und Zeit*. Cf. GA 19: 449.

³⁰ Here "understanding" must be taken in the existenzial sense of *pretheoretical* understanding.

What is Plato's position regarding rhetoric? For rhetoric is the *technê* which forms or trains correct speech, or at any rate claims to be such.

Thus his position regarding *logos* must become visible at least indirectly from his position regarding rhetoric.

Rhetoric is the *technê* that trains or teaches correct speech (*das rechte Reden*), or which, at any rate, claims to be such.³¹ Plato's position on *rhetoric* should therefore—at least indirectly—become visible through his position on *logos*. This interpretive assumption is not only the basis for Heidegger's reading the *Phaedrus* in the *Sophist*-lectures, but it also underlies his decision, in *Sein und Zeit*, to equate *Rede* and *logos* (e.g. §7.B.). This equation makes sense when we remember that *Rede*, in standard German, has the same semantic field as does *logos* in the *Phaedrus*: on the one hand it simply means "to talk" (*reden* as *daherreden*); on the other hand, it means "to give a speech" (*eine Rede halten*); a public speaker or *rhêtôr* is a *Redner*.

In the *Phaedrus*, *logos* maps onto *Rede* in just this way. The kind of *logos* discussed by Phaedrus and Socrates is the rhetorical speech of the *Redner* Lysias. Lysias, as *rhêtôr*, fascinates Phaedrus because he holds out the promise, not of teaching Phaedrus something altogether new, but of how to do *well* (εἶ) something he is always already doing: *legein*, *reden*, speaking. Because *eu legein* thus appears as a fundamental mode (if not *the* fundamental mode) of *eu zên*, *logos* simultaneously appears as an *ontological* element of *Dasein*. By the same token, because *logos* is an existenzial structure of *Dasein*, it becomes the battleground for competing interpretations of authentic existence (i.e. "the good life"). Here, the competing interpretations are rhetoric and that special sort of *logos* called "dialectic."³²

Heidegger sees the *Phaedrus* as a search for the conditions of possibility of authentic utterance (*Sich-aussprechen*) to and communication (*Mit-teilen*) with another

³¹ Cf. *Gorgias* 448b-449a; 451, ff.

³² Another interpretation of authentic *logos* was poetry; cf. Detienne, 1981.

person, with respect to some matter (*Sache*) (GA 19: 322). For example, Heidegger notes how broadly *logos* is construed in the following phrase: τὸν λόγον ὅπη καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν καὶ ὅπη μὴ, σκεπτέον (*Phdr.* 259e1, ff.).³³

Heidegger interprets this speaking and writing as modes of utterance: "Sich-Aussprechen im weitesten Sinne, gewissermaßen als Sich-Veröffentlichen [=Sich-Anderen-Mitteilen]" (GA 19: 323).³⁴ For speeches to be spoken well and finely,

δεῖ ... τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος διάνοιαν εἰδύλαι τὸ ἀληθὲς ὧν ἂν
ἔρευν πέρι μέλλῃ[.]

(*Phdr.* 259e4-6; emphasis added)

the *dianoia* of the speaker must have seen the truth concerning the things about which he intends to talk[.]

That is, the speaker's *dianoia* [=Erfassen und Bestimmen im weitesten Sinne, des Seienden] must be in such a condition that it has *already* seen the beings about which it intends to speak, in their unconcealedness [τὸ ἀληθὲς] (GA: 323). This holds both of grand rhetorical speeches as well as of the minor utterances of everyday life (cf. *Phdr.* 261a-b; GA 19: 324).³⁵ Once I have "seen" the *Sache* in question, *then* I can express and communicate them, either orally or in writing. The importance of this *order* becomes clear in the next section.³⁶ As I mentioned above, I will not deal with

³³ "[W]e must examine in what way to speak and write the *logos* finely, and in what way not."

³⁴ "Sichaussprechen" and "Mitteilen" become central issues in SZ §34.

³⁵ Cf. esp. GA 19: 308-309.

³⁶ Heidegger's reading of the *Phaedrus* represents an instructive contrast to Natorp, both in style and content. While Natorp largely rejects the *Phaedrus* as an early and embarrassingly "enthusiastic" phase of Plato's career, Heidegger takes the *Phaedrus* seriously, not least because he is not as tendentious as Natorp in his interpretations. Natorp pays scant attention to the role of rhetoric and sophistic in Plato's thought: in what ways and to what degree did rhetoric and sophistic *determine and motivate* the development of Platonic dialectic? Such a question does not concern Natorp, who would consider it a distraction from the *Hauptsache*, the *Ideenlehre*. Heidegger, too, is not primarily interested in the historical development of dialectic for its own sake, yet he thinks that we can discern symptoms of a more primordial stratum of *logos*--namely its "natural" and everyday predominance in the guiding form of rhetoric. (By "predominance" I here have in mind Heidegger's frequent association of the word "Herrschaft" with "Gerede" in *Sein und Zeit*. Rhetoric is, on this rather jaded and historically certainly inaccurate view, equated with the mass-media.) If we can discern how Plato represents these primordial aspects and dimensions of *logos*, Heidegger reasons, *then* we may better understand what Plato's contraposition of dialectic against those aspects tells us about its nature as *authentic logos*.

Heidegger's analysis of the *Phaedrus* further here, but will refer to it in my topical treatment of *diairesis* and *synagôgê* below.

The modes of logos. Let us assume for the sake of argument that Heidegger's equation of *logos* and *Rede* is based on a similarity of usage in Greek and German. What can this tell us about the philosophy of either Plato or Heidegger? In fact, a great deal. It is the phenomenon of *logos qua Rede* which provides us with a key insight into how Plato to a large degree anticipates and governs (if only from behind a veil) some of the crucial analyses of *Sein und Zeit*, on the one hand; and it is these analyses, in turn, which illuminate an unprecedented, innovative, and, to my knowledge, unstudied interpretation of dialectic and the meaning of the forms.

Heidegger finds in the *Sophist* an ontological analysis of the various basic aspects of the "unified field"³⁷ of *logos*, viz: *onoma*; *genos*; *ti*; the secondary (but no less essential) aspects, which only appear through an analysis of the first three, are: *diairesis*; *synagôgê*; *logos synthetos*; and *logos qua legomenon*, with which I deal in later sections.

How does Heidegger identify these aspects? In an extremely unlikely manner. Early in the *Sophist*, Socrates asks the Stranger: "... τί ταῦθ' οἱ περὶ τὸν ἐκεῖ τόπον ἤγοοντο καὶ ὠνόμαζον [;]"—"what did the people where [the Stranger] comes from think about these things and apply the [following] names to[?]"³⁸ (*Soph.* 217a1). In just these few words, Heidegger purports to descry the basic structure of *logos* as understood by Plato:

Ganz roh ist gegeben ... eine *Sache*, wonach gefragt wird: der

Philosoph. Gefragt wird, als was diese *Sache* zu nehmen ist, und ferner, wie sie zu benennen ist.

³⁷ GA 19: 248.

³⁸ The following names being "sophist," "statesman," "philosopher." Translation a slight modification from White's, in Cooper & Hutchinson, 1997.

(GA 19: 247)

In a very rough way we have here a *matter of inquiry: the philosopher*.

It is inquired *as what this matter is to be taken*, and further, *what it should be called*.

These three moments are related in the following way:

[J]edes Sprechen als Besprechen hat ein Worüber des Besprechens, ein τί, im weitesten Sinne, jedes Sprechen ist Besprechen von etwas *als etwas*, von etwas her es deuten, auslegen, zum Verständnis bringen; es hat also formal ein γένος; und jedes Besprechen ist, wenn es konkret wird, ein *Verlautbarung*; die Sache, über die man spricht, hat ihren Namen, ihre Bezeichnung; sie heißt, wie wir sagen, so und so. So ist im konkreten Phänomen des λόγος das Worüber, das Als-was und die lautliche Bezeichnung gegeben.

(GA 19: 248)

Every speaking *qua* discussion has its *object*, a τί in the broadest sense; and every speaking is a discussion of something *as something*, an interpretation of it from somewhere, a bringing it to comprehension; hence it formally has a γένος; and every discussion is, when it is concrete, *voiced*; the matter under discussion has a name, its designation; as we say, it's called "thus and such." Thus the "object" [the concerning-what], the as-which, and the voiced designation are all given in the concrete phenomenon of λόγος.

Thus, from a sentence (*Soph.* 217a1) which in itself says nothing about the structure of *logos*, Heidegger gains the structure of *logos*. Indeed, the word *genos* is not even present at all; yet it is implied, Heidegger would have it, by the fact that Socrates is asking about the Stranger's philosophical home! It is somehow hard to take this seriously.

Yet, for the sake of the argument, let us grant Heidegger this: every *logos* has the essential structure of a *ti*, a *genos*, and an *onoma*. This tripartite structure also contains implicitly Heidegger's entire analysis of *Rede* familiar to us from *Sein und Zeit*. To wit:

- Every *logos* is a *logos* about something; it is directed at some *given* matter (*Sache*).
- Every *logos* explicates its *Sache*, its *ti*, in terms of a *genos*. This "genetic" moment of *legein* reappears at SZ §§32 and 33, "*Verstehen und Auslegung*" and "*Die Aussage als abkünftiger Modus der Auslegung*." The *genos* is that "as-which"³⁹ the *ti* is "*ausgelegt*" in an "apophantic" *logos*.

- Not every *logos* necessarily reaches the point of vocal expression (*Verlautbarung*). Still, the *primary* mode in which *logos* exists (i.e. appears in *Dasein*'s world) is as the spoken word, *onoma*. Now the lexicon translates "*onoma*" as "name" or "noun," but Heidegger renders it variously as "*Sachbezeichnung*,"⁴⁰ "*Wort*," and "*sprachlicher Ausdruck*,"⁴¹ he writes:

*Das λέγειν jeder Rede ist zunächst da im Gesprochenwerden, in der redenden Verlautbarung. Diese kommt vor, begegnet mir innerhalb des Seienden, das in der Welt da ist. Es wird gesprochen, draußen auf dem Gang, genau so wie der Wagen knarrt auf dem Pflaster. Knarren und Sprechen kommen also vor, sind vorfindlich. ... Was zeigt sich nun an diesem phänomenalen Bestand, daran, daß Reden zunächst als Sprechen vorfindlich ist? Es begegnen im Worte-sagen zunächst Worte, eine Mehrheit von Worten, eine Wortfolge.*⁴²

³⁹ I shall henceforth refer to the "as-which" as the "as-structure" or "Als-Struktur."

⁴⁰ GA 19: 246.

⁴¹ GA 19: 582.

⁴² GA 19: 416. It is interesting to note that Heidegger seems unsure what the meaning of "word" is. In footnotes 6 and 7 at GA 19: 584, Heidegger writes "*Wörter?*" and "*Wörtern!*" respectively, as possible alternatives to the plural of *Wort* that appears in the main text, viz. "*Worte*" and "*Worten*." These two plural forms of *Wort* differ importantly and reflect, in each case, a different interpretation of the singular. *Wörter* is the plural of *Wort* understood as a single, atomic speech unit (e.g., the word, "wool"). *Worte*, on the other hand, is the plural of *Wort* understood as a whole phrase or thought. Heidegger uses this latter form to interpret *onoma*, a possible interpretation according to LSJ, but clearly not the appropriate one in the context. Cf. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, for a similar distinction in seventeenth-century English.

(GA 19: 583-584)

The legein of every speech is primarily there in being-spoken, in talking vocalization. This vocalization occurs, it encounters me *among the beings which are there in the world.* There is talking out in the hall, just as the wagon creaks on the cobblestones. Creaking and talking, then, occur and can be found in the world. ... Now, what comes to light in this phenomenal state of affairs, in the fact that speech [*logos*] is primarily to be encountered as talking? In saying words [i.e. vocalization], it is *words* we encounter first, a *multiplicity of words*, a string of words [or: an order of words].

Heidegger calls the elemental appearance of *logos* "onomatic."⁴³ *logos* is primordially the word. Yet this onomatic aspect of *logos* is "phenomenally undifferentiated" from what he calls its "delotic" aspect, i.e., the intentional directedness integral to the word as such, which brings its *Sache* to light.⁴⁴ As he stresses everywhere, although words occur (*vorkommen*) in the world, they do *not* do so as a string of "noises [*Geräusche*]," nor should we understand speech in terms of a "living creature which produces noises with its mouth" (GA 19: 584).

[E]in ὄνομα, ein Wort, ist ja keine bloße Verlautbarung im Sinne eines Geräusches. Es ist ja nicht so, daß ein Laut hörbar wird und daneben bzw. darauf gelegentlich eine sogenannte Vorstellung auftaucht.⁴⁵ ... Schon im natürlichen Reden miteinander, im Gespräch, sind wir ja nicht auf die Laute selbst, die auftreten, eingestellt, sondern primär und ganz natürlich auf das Gesagte.

(GA 19: 416)

⁴³ GA 19: 582.

⁴⁴ GA 19: 583.

⁴⁵ Cf. GA 19: 594.

An *onoma*, a word, is not a mere utterance in the sense of a noise. It is not as if a sound becomes audible, and then next to or on top of it a so-called "representation" appears. ... For already in naturally talking with each other, in conversation, we are not focused on the noises themselves which occur, but primarily and entirely naturally upon that which is said [*das Gesagte*].

Rather—as the last sentence suggests—every word primordially always appears embedded in a "speaking together *about something* [*Miteinandersprechen über etwas*]" (GA 19: 584), and as such already "meint" something.⁴⁶ Every word has a *meaning*, which, understood phenomenologically, is to say that every word *intends something*. This intentionality in turn is *delotic*, insofar as its meaning (*Be-deutung*) indicates (*deutet*) at (ἐπὶ) its *Sache* (*ti*), thereby bringing it to light and marking it (*be-zeichnen*). "*Im ὄνομα als solchem ... liegt schon das ἐπὶ, das 'auf die Sache zu'*" (GA 19: 417).

What I have said in this section should be taken as a general introduction to Heidegger's conception of *logos qua Rede*. The key points to bear in mind as we proceed are two: 1) *logos* is essentially intentional, i.e. is always of something, about something (*logos tinos*); 2) *logos* is essentially articulation and discrimination, viz of the *ti*. Since these two features are *essential* features of *logos*, we must expect to see them manifested in each of its aspects. Intentionality is obviously a feature of the *ti qua* intentional object as such. It is also implied in the as-structure, since the latter sets the *ti* into relation with a *genos* (or an *eidos*), which, in turn functions as a second *intentum*. While the intentionality of these two aspects of *logos* seems relatively unproblematic, Heidegger's conception of onomatic intentionality seems less so, at least so long as we conceive of names or words as mere labels. His phenomenological analysis of *how* words are, however, shows that it is the label-conception which is artificial (derivative)

⁴⁶ GA 19: 416; cf. 452-453.

and not true to how words *immediately* disclose beings in the world.⁴⁷ The second key aspect of *logos*, articulation, is implied by *logos*'s intentionality. For it is only thanks to some act of discriminating articulation that a *ti* can at all be isolated *as* an *intentum*; or be further articulated; or be disclosed by an *onoma* as the *Sache* named by that *onoma*.

The most important aspect of Heidegger's analysis of *onomata*, however, is that they are how *logos* most apparently appears to us; they constitute the surface of *logos*, while the intentional substructure is hidden from pre-thematic awareness. One consequence of this separation of the vocally or graphically expressed from the "internally" intended is that, as Heidegger puts it, the former can break loose of its original mooring to a *Sache* and take on a peculiar life of its own as *legomena* or "things said"--which I wish to translate here as "hearsay." At root, the *legomenon* is that which is said (*legein*), i.e. that *as which* the intended-understood *Sache* is articulated. As I pointed out earlier, it is in fact this *legein* as bound to *noein* which is authentic *logos*; consequently, as long as it remains authentic, the *legomenon* or *onoma* *also* remains authentic, and properly delotic: it discloses the thing (*Sache*, *ti*) which the *logos* is articulating. However, in case it becomes dislodged from *nous*, it positively serves to obscure or distort the *Sache* by simultaneously meaning, but not disclosing the *Sache* which has been lost from sight. This sightless *logos* is *mere* hearsay;⁴⁸ its double directedness, or fractured intentional ray, is illustrated in the cave allegory; I take this up after further discussion of truth and the meaning of dialectic.

5.6. *Nous* and *logos*.

I have so far shown how Heidegger interprets *nous* and *Verstehen*, and that he thinks that *nous* always involves the possibility of *logos*; consequently, as we will see next, he

⁴⁷ It would be interesting to pursue Heidegger's analysis of the delotic function of words in the context of the *Cratylus*, especially regarding Plato's notion of the originary language instituted by a dialectical lawgiver.

⁴⁸ *Gerede*: cf. e.g. GA 19: 306, 340. See §5.10., below, and Ch. 4, on unfulfilled presumptions in Husserl.

interprets this as saying that *Verstehen* always involves the possibility of *Auslegung*.⁴⁹

Heidegger explains the relation of *Auslegung* to *Verstehen* at *Sein und Zeit* §32:

Das Entwerfen des Verstehens hat die eigene Möglichkeit, sich auszubilden. Die Ausbildung des Verstehens nennen wir *Auslegung*. In ihr eignet sich das Verstehen sein Verstandenes verstehend zu. In der Auslegung wird das Verstehen nicht etwas anderes, sondern es selbst. Auslegung gründet existenzial im Verstehen, und nicht entsteht dieses durch jene. Die Auslegung ist nicht die Kenntnissnahme des Verstandenen, sondern die Ausarbeitung der im Verstehen entworfenen Möglichkeiten.

(SZ: 148; emphasis added)

The drafting-projection [*Entwurf*] of *Verstehen* has its own possibility to be filled out.⁵⁰ We call this development or filling-out of *Verstehen* "*Auslegung*." In *Auslegung Verstehen* understandingly appropriates that which it understands [i.e.: in interpretation, understanding appropriates its object by understanding it]. In interpretation [*Auslegung*], *Verstehen* does not become something else, but rather it becomes itself. *Auslegung* is existenzially grounded in *Verstehen*—*Verstehen* does not emerge out of *Auslegung* [i.e. understanding is not the *result* of interpretation, but rather interpretation's condition of possibility]. *Auslegung* is not [simply] coming to know or acknowledging what is understood; rather it is the working-out of the possibilities that are drafted/projected [*entworfen*] in *Verstehen*.

To say that a thing in the environing world is disclosed, Heidegger writes, is to say that "the already understood world is laid-out," that "[t]hat which is ready-at-hand [now]

⁴⁹ "Auslegung," the standard German word for "interpretation" (along with "Deutung"), literally means "laying-out," and I shall sometimes use this less happy but more perspicuous term to translate it.

⁵⁰ As, for instance, a draft-sketch is filled out and developed in painting

explicitly enters into the understanding sight" (SZ: 148). In particular, he connects this explicit understanding with various activities, such as preparation, organizing, outfitting, refurbishing, a connection the importance of which will become clearer shortly.

Let us first note two points. First, the interpretation of *Auslegung* as *legein*, and thus as *logos*; and second, the manner in which *Auslegung* is related to *Verstehen*, i.e. how *logos* is connected to *nous*. To anticipate: on the one hand, *legein/Auslegung* turns out to be what Heidegger calls the "*Als-Struktur*," i.e. the interpretation of one thing as another, conceiving it with respect to something else. *Legein* is thus shown to exhibit both a fundamentally *synthetic* structure, in addition to an intentional one. On the other hand, he argues that human *nous* is inherently *meta logou*: because one of the existenzials is, as we saw, *logos/Rede*; thus *nous/Verstehen* can never be *aneu logou*, so long as it is the *nous* of *psychê/Dasein*.

In *Sein und Zeit* §32, Heidegger argues that the explicit thematization of understood beings in the world is only possible because they have *already* been understood implicitly.⁵¹ I am only able to focus in on the hammer and take it in hand to bang nails, because I have already understood it, unthematically, as being good for that end. Thus, the explicating *Auslegung* does not itself *introduce* articulations into the world; rather, world as inexplicitly, tacitly understood is necessarily always already articulated. "Alles vorprädikative schlichte Sehen des Zuhandenen ist an ihm selbst schon verstehend-auslegend" (SZ: 149).

Here Heidegger's use of *Nicomachean Ethics* VI plays a critical role. Heidegger draws attention to the way Aristotle classifies the various modes of *alêtheuein*. The first four—*technê*, *epistêmê*, *phronêsis*, *sophia*--are grouped together as being *meta logou*,

⁵¹ I know of no place where Heidegger makes the following observation, yet his interpretation of *nous* as *Verstehen* and *logos* as *Auslegung* throws light on the hidden meaning of Aristotle's phrase for "essence," *to ti ên einai*—literally, "the to be that which it was" (which Natorp condemns as Aristotle's "barbaric" expression of the meaning of *eidos* [PI: 2]). *To ti ên einai* is the ontological constitution of a thing, "previously," i.e. "*always already*" inexplicitly grasped, "now" explicitly "laid out." Cp. the elsewhere quoted line: "Sein ist im Entwurf verstanden, nicht ontologisch begriffen." But this is merely speculation on my part.

"with *logos*," whereas *nous* is *aneu logou*, "without *logos*." Although Heidegger's analyses of these states is of historical interest for the development of *Sein und Zeit*, yet I do not propose to rehearse them here. Rather, I will focus on the relation of *logos* and *nous*, for this relation has important consequences for the rest of our discussion.

Heidegger observes that Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of *noein*, viz. pure and "so-called [*kaloumenos*]" *noein*. As noted above, "*nous*," for Heidegger, means "Vernehmen," or "perception." In particular, "*nous*" names an intentional state in which the perceived *intentum* (*noêma*) is simple. In this respect *nous* resembles *aisthêsis* (*sense-perception*), for *aisthêsis*, too, taken in and for itself, is of simples: this blue patch, that red fleck, that shrill shriek.⁵² Thus, pure or divine⁵³ *noein*, according to the *Metaphysics*, is a *thigein*.⁵⁴ The simplicity of its intentional objects is the reason why *nous* is without *logos*: *logos* is essentially articulation, but the objects of *nous* are without parts. Yet the human being, *Dasein*, is ontologically determined as a *zôon logon echon*.⁵⁵ Therefore, Heidegger concludes, for *Dasein*, all *noein* must be mediated and articulated. "So besteht eine διαφορά zwischen dem reinen νοῦς und dem νοῦς σύνθετος (vgl. [*Nic. Eth.* 1177]b28 sq): der νοῦς des Menschen ist immer vollzogen in der Weise des Sprechens" (GA 19: 179-180). And again: "Der νοῦς des Menschen ist nicht der eigentliche, sondern ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς" (GA 19: 180).⁵⁶

5.7. Truth and Falsehood.

Before we can explore Heidegger's interpretation of dialectic as *authentic legein*, i.e. *legein* which is coordinate with and bound to *noein*, we have to get clear about his concept of truth. That is because authenticity for Heidegger is essentially connected to

⁵² Cf. GA 19: 183.

⁵³ *Nic. Eth.* VI, 1177b30, ff. Cf. GA 19: 179-180.

⁵⁴ *Meta.* IX, 10; 1051b24; GA 19: 179.

⁵⁵ Heidegger always translates this phrase as "the animal that has speech/language," never as "rational animal."

⁵⁶ Heidegger cites *De Anima* III.9; 432b27.

truth; those modes of *Dasein* which are truth-making or truth-disclosing are authentic, while those which do not are inauthentic. Hence, if we wish to understand in what sense he considers dialectic to be authentic, we have to understand what the "truth" is which he thinks dialectic discloses.

Dasein and "disclosure:" the modes of ἀληθεύειν. Heidegger begins the *Sophist*-lectures with a reading of *Nicomachean Ethics* VI because Aristotle there gives what may be described as a partial catalog of *Dasein*'s intentional states (*hexeis*), namely of the intellectual virtues: *technê*, *epistêmê*, *phronêsis*, *sophia*, and *nous*, which he calls modes of "*alêtheuein*." What does this word mean? Translated literally, it means something like "truth-making." Heidegger rightly points out how strange this word must seem if we understand truth in the traditional sense as a property of beliefs or sentences: what could "truth-making" have to do with *technê* or *phronêsis*? He suggests an alternative interpretation of *alêtheuein* based on the translation of *alêtheia* as "unconcealedness" or "disclosure" (*Unverborgenheit*, *Erschlossenheit*, respectively); *alêtheuein* consequently is the act of unconcealing, or *Aufdecken*.⁵⁷ Correspondingly, this interpretation casts the five intentional states in a new and unified light: they are different modes in which *alêtheuei hê psychê*, i.e. in which *Dasein* discloses the things of the world, or, equivalently, through which the beings of the world disclose themselves to us.⁵⁸ It is through its modes of *alêtheuein* that beings are present to and for *psychê*. Thus *Nic. Eth.* VI appears (to Heidegger) as a phenomenological project in the strict sense. Although in fact the book says very little about the objects of the intellectual virtues, Heidegger sees it as a description of the ways in which *onta* appear to *psychê*, i.e. of the intentional structures of the *onta* as phenomena (appearances, presentations) for a *psychê*.

⁵⁷ Literally: uncovering; compare *entdecken*, dis-cover.

⁵⁸ Cf. SZ: 220.

What is it to say *alêtheia* means "unconcealment," "unconcealedness," or "disclosure," as Heidegger notoriously does in *Sein und Zeit* §44? In Chapter Four, I expounded his conception of *Dasein* as fundamentally "in (the) world." This conception carries two implications. First, *Dasein* always finds itself environed, finds itself "in" its surroundings. Second, the environment encounters *Dasein*; the world is always understood by *Dasein* as the zone in which beings exist, and out of which they obtrude (*hineinstehen*, *herausstehen*) into *Dasein*'s own being. When we say a thing "gives itself" or "is given" to us, we mean just this obtrusive character. Thus, when Heidegger speaks of *Dasein*'s relation to the world—to *its* world—he speaks of "*Erschliessen* [disclosing]" or "*Erschlossenheit* [disclosure]." To say that *Dasein* essentially exists in a world in which and out of which beings are given to it—to say this is just to say that a constitutive phenomenon of *Dasein* is *Erschlossenheit*, disclosure. *Dasein* is ontologically so structured as to disclose beings.

Although we speak of *Dasein* as constitutively disclosive, the fact that we are speaking of *dis*-closure (*Er-schliessung*) suggests that the world is *not* primordially transparent to it, but rather concealed (*ver-schlossen*—literally, locked up). Things obtrude and so encounter us, and we them, but only rarely does this encounter occur explicitly, i.e. such that the thing is encountered in its being, *as what it is in and for itself*. Rather, the encounter of *Dasein* and world generally occurs in the mode of *Verstehen*—i.e. of a pretheoretical understanding which allows us to move "automatically" through our world, "coping" seamlessly with the beings enveloping us in their webs of (unthematic) signification (*Bedeutungszusammenhänge*). Husserl, in order to penetrate to the *thing itself*, thematized it by suspending its "reality," isolating it from the world in which it is encountered. Despite the differences in Heidegger's approach to *epoché* (pointed out in the previous chapter), he makes a similar point here: the being of a thing must be wrested and torn from this web; the things as they are given are not given unstintingly—they must be *taken*; indeed, Heidegger says we must *rauben*

them—"rob" (or "rape" in the archaic sense of "seizing by force").⁵⁹ Only when they have been explicitly thematized in their being as beings can we (and do we) say we know the "truth" about them. The tendency of *Dasein* to find and so to lose itself in its world is equi-primordial (*gleichursprünglich*) with its tendency to disclose the world;⁶⁰ Heidegger calls the former "*Verfall*," decadence, decay, falling away and apart.

Der volle existenzial-ontologische Sinn des Satzes: "Dasein ist in der Wahrheit" sagt gleichursprünglich mit: "Dasein ist in der Unwahrheit." Aber nur sofern Dasein erschlossen ist, ist es auch verschlossen; und sofern mit dem Dasein je schon innerweltliches Seiendes entdeckt ist, ist dergleichen Seiendes als mögliches innerweltlich Begegnendes verdeckt (verborgen) oder verstellt.

(SZ: 222)

The full existenzial-ontological sense of the sentence, "Dasein is [exists] in the truth," equiprimordially also says: "Dasein is in untruth." But only insofar as Dasein is disclosed is it also closed-off; and insofar as innerworldly beings are [always] already disclosed with the existence of Dasein, such beings are covered-over (concealed) or distorted, [viz.] as innerworldly beings that it is *possible* to encounter.

Therefore:

Dasein [muß] wesenhaft das auch schon Entdeckte *gegen* den Schein und die Verstellung sich ausdrücklich zueignen und sich der Entdecktheit immer wieder versichern.

(SZ: 222)

⁵⁹ *Destruktion* is the historical application of this principle.

⁶⁰ Indeed, as we shall see below, Heidegger interprets falsehood as a kind of co-operation between these two contrary tendencies.

Dasein must essentially explicitly appropriate also that which has been disclosed over against illusion and distortion, and must reassure itself of their disclosure again and again.

Finally:

Die Wahrheit (Entdecktheit) muß dem Seienden immer erst abgerungen werden. Das Seiende wird der Verborgenheit entrissen. Die jeweilige faktische Entdecktheit ist gleichsam immer ein *Raub*. Ist es Zufall, daß die Griechen sich über das Wesen der Wahrheit in einem *privativen* Ausdruck (α -λήθεια) aussprechen?

(SZ: 222; emphasis added)

Truth (disclosure) must always first be wrested from what-is. What-is [beings] is torn away from concealment. In each case, factual disclosure is always as it were an act of robbery. Is it a mere coincidence that the Greeks expressed the essence of truth with a *privative* expression?

In other words, Heidegger understands the basic phenomenon of truth-as-disclosure as the explicit appropriation of a thing in its being. This appropriation has to combat *Dasein's* (existenzial) decadence into the world as world, literally into the *mundanity* of the familiar and self-evident: λήθη.⁶¹ Hence he calls the phenomenon of *Erschliessung* "*α-lethêia*."⁶²

5.8. Dialectic.

I have thus far laid out Heidegger's existenzial interpretations of *nous*, *logos*, and *alêtheia*, as *Verstehen*, *Rede*, and *Unverborgenheit*, respectively. I have tried to present

⁶¹ Heidegger makes a plausible, if cursory, argument that his *phenomenologically explicit* analysis of alethic phenomena was anticipated by Heraclitus (Fr. 1). I shall discuss this in a later paper.

⁶² *Alêtheia* is a so-called "alpha-privative" construction, in which the word's root, **lath-*, "hiddenness," is negated by the prefixed alpha. That *alêtheia* means something like "unhiddenness" was not Heidegger's insight; Passow's lexicon of 1831 gives this etymology, as does Liddell and Scott's. Of course, what exactly "un-hiddenness" *meant* for the archaic Greeks has been a topic of hot dispute among philologists: does it imply a concealment of objects themselves, as a cloud hides the sun, or does it primarily mean a subjective concealment, viz. what we call "forgetting?"

these equivalencies as plausibly as possible, while pointing out how his conception of *nous*, in particular, seems to turn Plato's conception of it upside down. As I suggested earlier, because Heidegger's readings of *nous* and *logos* as *Verstehen* and *Rede* are *existenzial*, they are for this reason neutral with respect to authenticity and inauthenticity. His interpretation of *nous*, for example, describes the fundamental ontological character of perception, whether or not that perception happens to be "sensible," and whether or not it is "true," and, therefore, whether or not it is "authentic" (i.e. ontologically disclosive). That is not how Plato uses the word *nous*; for him, it is a term of art for precisely the authentic and truth-disclosing moment of intentionality, as represented most clearly in the Divided Line. There, Plato associates *noêsis* with dialectic, just as he associates *dianoia* with geometry (and possibly other "hypothetical" modes of thinking), and *pistis* and *eikasia* with two grades of sense-perception (*Rep.* 509d-511e). Heidegger treats dialectic as authentic *logos*, namely as *logos* which discloses to *nous* the *Sache* in its ontological structure. Thus, as we proceed through his account of dialectic, the familiar Platonic sense of *nous* will come more and more clearly into focus again, for it turns out that for Heidegger as for Plato, authentic *logos* (dialectic) constitutes *nous* in the strict sense as directedness towards being.

As we saw above, Heidegger does *not* claim that all *logos* has an ontologically disclosive function; not every *logos* lets *nous* "see" the being of beings. On the one hand, some *logoi*, e.g. commands or pleas, have no "sighting" function at all; on the other hand, some *logoi*, while apophantic, are *false*, i.e. *logoi* which, while sighting beings, do so in such a way as to conceal or distort their being. It is this latter type of *logos* which interests Heidegger in the *Sophist*, since this dialogue concerns the conditions of possibility of non-being and false statements. Heidegger's interpretation of the *Sophist* depends on establishing Plato's *positive* understanding of being and truth, from which standpoint non-being and falsity may then be "derived" as privations.

According to Heidegger, the *logos apophantikos*, to use the Aristotelian term, is the general kind of *logos* which is inherent in *nous*. Only *this* kind of *logos* possesses the as-structure; it shows a being by showing it *as* something. This as-structure is the condition of possibility both of true (*alêtheis*) and false (*pseudeis*) *logoi*: the former is the *authentic logos apophantikos* which discloses the beings (*Sachen*) *as they really are* (*an sich; selbst*), while the latter, the *inauthentic logos apophantikos*, discloses the beings *as other* than what they are. Thus the battle between the philosopher and the sophist is a battle between authentic and inauthentic *logos*.

συναγωγή and διαίρεσις. As we know from various passages in Plato, dialectic is alethic *logos par excellence*: through dialectic the soul comes to see the truth; through dialectic the things as they really are (*die Sachen selbst*) are disclosed to *nous*. Like Natorp, Heidegger considers the *Phaedrus* to be not a dialectical investigation in itself, but a *description* of "the methodical character of dialectic" (GA 19: 329). Though Socrates and Phaedrus determine that a good *logos* must have an organic structure (*Phdr.* 264c2, ff.), Heidegger considers this issue superficial. Rather, he thinks that Socrates's central concern is with "the *Sache*, and the exposition [*Herausstellung*] of the *Sache* [matter] to be discussed in the [given] *logos*" (GA 19: 330). The two conditions of this exposition are *synagôgê* and *diairesis*.

The first requirement is "εἰς μίαν ἰδέαν συννορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα" (*Phdr.* 265d3, ff.). Heidegger translates *mia idea* as "eine Sicht"—or "one view," "one look"—stressing the synoptic moment of dialectic expressed by the requirement to *synoran*—"see together," "bring together in a synopsis"—the diverse aspects of the matter in question. Plato's stress on verbs of seeing indicates what Heidegger calls the "*eigentliche Sacherfassung*" (GA 19: 330): the *Sacherfassung* is the moment when the matter is grasped, when the thing itself is *seen* in a *single* look, which is defined and determined (*Phdr.* 265d4). Thus the *logos* "*dêlon poiei*" or "makes

evident, discloses" the object of the *logos*. We are not, Heidegger claims, to interpret this Platonic statement from the perspective of "some historical dialectic or some other formal logic;" rather, his language suggests, we are to see it in phenomenological terms (GA 19: 331). Although, typically, he does not explicitly say so, Heidegger seems to take the synagogic function of dialectic to be that of *eidetic variation*:

Es handelt sich darum, daß das, worüber gesprochen wird, der Tatbestand—hier gedacht an die Liebe—, die verschiedenen *phänomenalen Aspekte* desselben, gesammelt und zusammengesehen werden *auf einen Grundbestand hin*, so daß mit diesem συνορῶντα ἄγειν εἰς μίαν ἰδέαν der gesamte phänomenale Bestand dessen, worüber gehandelt werden soll, aufgenommen wird, und zwar so, daß er von *einer* Sicht her verstehbar ist.

(GA 19: 331; emphasis added)

At issue is that the object of discussion—here: love—[and] its various phenomenal aspects be collected and synoptically viewed with respect to one basic feature [*Grundbestand*], so that with this συνορῶντα ἄγειν εἰς μίαν ἰδέαν the entire phenomenal content [*Bestand*] of that which is to be treated is taken up, and in such a way that it is comprehensible from *one* perspective.

At the same time, we have to be careful not to understand this eidetic variation too simply as "Husserlian," at least not without some caveats.

To wit: in the previous chapter, I suggested that a peculiar Platonism lies embedded in Husserl's seemingly "realistic" slogan, *Zu den Sachen selbst!* For it turns out, I argued, that the *Sache* is not the "real" object in front of me here and now, accessible through my senses; rather it is the *eidos* of that object—an *ideal* object. Now

if this is what Husserl means, and if Heidegger agrees with him,⁶³ then this passage in the *Sophist*-lecture may be read with precisely this Husserlian "Platonism" in mind. We must therefore read Heidegger's mention of "*Tatbestand*" and "*das Konkrete*" correspondingly as *not* referring to the empirically available, but to the eidetically distilled. Hence, Heidegger objects primarily to the notion that Plato means to "isolate [*isoliert herausstellen*] an Idea and then to organize the other *eidē* with respect to it, thereby forgetting about the *Sache selbst*" (GA 19: 331). In other words, the purpose of seeing the varied aspects of an object "together" is not in the *first* place to construct an eidetic *system* on the basis of an Idea, but rather to gain a more precise disclosure and profound description of the "thing itself."

How does the notion of *synagôgê* fit with our earlier discussion of *nous* as *Verstehen* and *logos* as *Rede*? I wish to argue here that just as *dialectic* is the Platonic analogue to Heidegger's phenomenology, so are the moments of dialectic--*synagôgê* and *diairesis*--Platonic analogues to *Verstehen* and *Auslegung in their authentic*, i.e. *purely ontological modes*. By this I mean to rule out an obvious misreading of *synagôgê* and *diairesis*, viz. one which would identify them with *Verstehen* and *Auslegung tout court*. For *Verstehen* and *Auslegung*, as essential modes of *Dasein*, are continuously operative in primordial everydayness, whereas *dialectic* of course is not; dialectic is an extremely rare, authentic activity of mind, "divine" because as far removed as humanly possible from everydayness.⁶⁴ Yet, as a possible mode of existence for *Dasein*, it nevertheless *must* be explicable in terms of *Dasein's* existenzial constitution. Thus *synagôgê* and *diairesis* are the authentic manifestations of *Verstehen* and *Auslegung*, respectively. Let us proceed with this in mind.

⁶³ I strongly suspect he does; see SZ, §7.A, esp. p. 31, on the difference between the "vulgar" and properly phenomenological phenomena. Cf. also GA 19: 346, on the difference between an *εἶδωλον* and a *Sache*.

⁶⁴ Some might wonder why I privilege dialectic as "authentic." I do so for a very Heideggerian reason, namely that dialectic is the activity of *nous*, which is oriented towards the being of beings. *Nous qua* perception can, as we saw, be *misperception*, and it can be "fallen" perception, i.e. non-ontological. Through dialectic, *nous* is maximally itself, viz directed at *Sein*.

Synagôgê, then, is the initial, authentic orientation of noetic *logos* (*verstehende Rede*, understanding speech), the moment of understanding Heidegger calls the *Entwurf*. *Entwurf*, as we saw, is an orientation towards possibilities, i.e. towards the "what-for." *Synagôgê*, on this interpretation, is the apperception of beings in terms of their goodness (i.e. as good, *ôphelimon*, *agathon*). *Synagôgê*, as I have discussed elsewhere,⁶⁵ is not the antithesis of *diairesis*, but its complement; every collection is simultaneously a division, namely the partition of the collected items from everything else. In what sense, then, are these terms *not* interchangeable? In what sense do they designate distinct moments of dialectic?

We can understand the distinction in Heidegger's terms as follows. The synagogic moment is, as Heidegger correctly points out, itself a first articulation—and hence a division—of the world. Yet, it is called "collection" because, as *verstehend*, it does not intend, is not oriented towards distinctions as such. This is because *Verstehen* is never thematic or discriminating (even in its authentic mode as *synagôgê*), tending instead towards continuity and wholeness. The first noetic cut into the world is *collecting* in the sense that at this stage beings first appear as *beings*, i.e. as *whole* entities emerging out of the environing world. *Diairesis*, as a *dialectical* moment, can only become operative once an *on* has "collected itself" and now stands within *nous*'s sight as a genuine phenomenon, i.e. as a *ti* or *Sache*.

Diairesis cuts into this *on* along its "natural joints" (*Phdr.* 265d). What does this mean in Heideggerian terms? The natural joints are the being's inherent articulations, according to which it was "collected" together and so appeared as a single *idea* (sight) in the first place. That *collection*, as I argued above, just is *nous*'s *Entwurf* of the being in terms of its what-for. In other words, a being, in order to appear to *nous* as that being, i.e. as a *whole* of a certain kind (*idea tis*), depends essentially on a specific *Sinneszusammenhang* of its parts. *Diairesis* is the *Auseinander-setzung* of these

⁶⁵ In my Ph.D. Candidacy Paper, "Dialectic and Its Kinds," 1995.

Zusammen-hänge, the laying out of the inherent "meanings" which made it meaningful to collect *these* components rather than some others together as parts of a whole. This laying-out is the explicitly discriminating thematization of the parts *as* contributing to the end (the *Worumwillen* or *Wofür*) of the being, in terms of which it was initially sighted in *synagôgê*.

This interpretation is radically at odds with that implicit in the usual translation of these notions. For example, in Nehamas's and Woodruff's translation, *mia idea* is rendered as "one kind," and *kat' eidê* as "according to its species" (Cooper and Hutchinson, 1997: 542). The translation assumes, and in turn forces upon us, a very *abstract* conception of collection and division, namely one that operates entirely with concepts (kinds and species) and their systematization. I do not wish to judge the correctness of that conception here; but it serves as a vivid contrast to the *phenomenological* reading of the same lines. The latter, despite appearances, imports *less* into the Platonic text. Heidegger takes more seriously, for instance, Plato's use of "cutting" words: these words suggest, he says, that dialectic is concerned with *Sachen*, and not abstractions like kinds and species (cf. GA 19: 286). Species are not parts of genera in the sense of organically constituting them. "Cat," "ferret," "rat," and "mouse" do not constitute "mammal" or "animal," in the way my bones are *parts* of my skeleton; the divisions between them are not "natural joints" in the way the divisions between my bones are: species have no "functional"⁶⁶ coherence.

Someone will object that while this kind of organic interpretation of *synagôgê* and *diairesis* may work for the *Phaedrus*, it cannot do so for the *Sophist*. That is, the *Sophist's* divisions *are* indubitably genus-species trees, in which the species are not constitutive parts of the genus. Therefore, it would make no sense to say, in this

⁶⁶ I am not saying that one cannot metaphorically conceive of genus-species trees as whole-part relationships with correct ("natural") branchings; that is obviously the very metaphor one thinks Plato is using here. I *am* saying that the phenomenological reading is closer to the text; moreover, as I will discuss shortly, its *organization* can much more readily accommodate the ruling ontological and epistemological concept of the Good.

instance, that the *Sachen* (which in this case would have to be the various *genera*), when they are dissected, are interpreted in terms of their what-for. The species is not beneficial to the genus in any way. How can this objection be met? It points to an important general problem in Platonic dialectic, namely the relationship between dialectic and the Good;⁶⁷ it is a problem which translations like that of Nehamas and Woodruff obscure by assimilating divergent conceptions of dialectic.⁶⁸

Heidegger writes:

Das Wesentliche in [der Dialektik] ist das ὁρᾶν. Die συναγωγή ist eine Weise des Sehens, nämlich des εἶναι; und auch die διαίρεσις ist als Aufdecken vollzogen aus dem ständigen Hinblicken auf das εἶναι; die διαίρεσις der εἰδή is ein Abheben von Aussehen gegen Aussehen, was selbst nur im Sehen vollzogen werden kann. In diesem ständigen Hinblicken auf das εἶναι bzw. das γένος ist dieses ständig da, und zwar so, daß es in jeder weiteren Abhebung bzw. in dem was gegeneinander

⁶⁷ A parallel problem exists concerning teleology's function in the method of hypothesis; cp. *Meno* 86d, ff., and esp. *Phaedo*, 97b-100b.

⁶⁸ On the other hand, a Heideggerian distinction may help us approach this problem. At *Sein und Zeit* §33, Heidegger distinguishes the "existenzial-hermeneutic 'as'" and the "apophantic 'as'" (SZ: 158). The former is the "as" which governs the existenzial understanding which unthematically interprets beings-in-the-world in terms of their what-for; the latter is the "as" of the *Aussage* or predication. Both "as-structures" have in common a sighting of some one (εἶναι) thing (*ti* or *Sache*) which is diairetically split apart and laid out. Now the dialectic which is taken as authentic *logos* differs from other modes of logical *alêtheuein* specifically in abstaining from utilizing or otherwise manipulating its objects. Instead, it adopts a simultaneously theoretical and ontological stance: it "merely" looks and lets be seen the encountering beings, in their own being or "in themselves." That is, dialectic lets beings appear according to their nature, their essence. This theoretical intentionality is therefore not primarily oriented towards the practical use of things (their *Wofür*) (although of course it will consider useful things—*Zuhandenes*: utensils, artifacts, organs, etc.—in their utility to the extent that utility constitutes their essence). It contemplates other matters besides the immediately understood practical world of the *oikos*—indeed, it contemplates *all* other things, "in the sky and beneath the earth," as well as in the *polis*, e.g. the politician, the philosopher, and the sophist. Their *eidê* may turn out to be grasped best from the point of view of their utility or benefit (*ôphelimon*, *agathon*) (to the city, to other persons), but that is not the *starting point* of the dialectical inquiry—rather, it is its terminus. Theorizing dialectic considers all its objects as simply there before it (*vor-handen*); its *logos* takes the form of *dia-legein* (laying-out) them in *relation* to each other, and establishing just those relationships (say, as genera and species). Thus, the originary "hermeneutic 'as'" is transformed through this dialectical *apophansis* into a "with-respect-to," which is not fundamentally oriented towards "the Good," but "merely" at the *eidê* in their appearance and their relations among each other.

abgehoben wird, präsent bleibt. So ist das λέγειν im Sinne des διαλέγεσθαι ein hinblickendes Sprechen über.

(GA 19: 349)

The essential feature [of dialectic] is ὁρᾶν. συναγωγή is a way of seeing, namely of the εἶναι. Also διαίρεσις, as a mode of disclosure, is achieved in the constant looking-upon the εἶναι. The διαίρεσις of the εἶδη is a contrasting articulation [*Abheben*] of one look against another look, which itself can only be achieved in seeing. In this constant looking-upon the εἶναι or γένος, the εἶναι is constantly there, and in such a way that it remains present throughout all further articulations. Thus λέγειν in the sense of διαλέγεσθαι is a looking-upon-speaking-about [i.e. a speaking-about which simultaneously constantly looks-upon its object].

In other words, *diairesis* is a mode of *dialegesthai*, which is a mode of *apophansis*, which in turn is a mode of *legein*, which, finally, is the manner in which beings are clarified (*dêloun*), illuminated, and so seen (*noein*) by *Dasein* (*psychê*). *Diairesis* is *authentic* because it is the method of presentation (*Vergegenwärtigung*) of the ontological structure of a being (*Sache*) in its essential content (*wesentlichen Gehalt*) (GA 19: 285). It is the manner in which we gain knowledge of the *Sache*. That knowledge consists in the indication of the thing's *Sachgehalt*, its *eidê* (GA 19: 286).

We can see the essentially "logical" moment of the diairetical cutting ([*dia*]*temnein*). The *eidōs* which is revealed through *diairesis* is always so revealed *with respect to*, or *over against* that which lies on the other side of the "joint." An "article" only has meaning as a part among parts, all of which are parts of a whole. In other words, each *eidōs* among the *eidê* constituting the one *idea*⁶⁹ is revealed through the as-

⁶⁹ On the Heideggerian distinction between *eidōs* and *idea*, see 5.9. Although Plato nowhere opposes *eidōs* and *idea*, we have already seen them be distinguished in Natorp's opposition of "Begriff" and "Grundlegung."

structure which characterizes *Auslegung*.⁷⁰ Thus, Heidegger's interpretation of dialectic productively combines the analytic description of dialectic as *diairesis* and *synagôgê* with the visual terminology of the *Phaedrus* in a way which does not require him to dismiss the latter as metaphor, but which actually illuminates the meaning of collection and division: the seeing of truth (the disclosure of beings' essences) is achieved *through logos*, specifically dialectic. *Synagôgê* brings into focus (*faßt ins Auge*) out of the environing background the object of discussion, the intentional object as such, the *zêtêma prôton*; *diairesis* then orients itself with respect to this object in articulating the *eidê* (GA 19: 319).

5.9. *Eidos*.

I have spoken thus far somewhat loosely of *ideai* and *eidê* as the respective objects of dialectic's synagodic and diairetic moments. That dialectic stands in some special relation to *eidê* and *ideai* is in no doubt. The question is: what are *eidê* and *ideai*? Our answer to this question is coordinate with the answer concerning the meaning of dialectic. As we saw in earlier chapters, the neo-Kantian answers were these: *eidê* are "concepts," *ideai* are "hypotheses," and dialectic is the "discursive concatenation of concepts according to the hypothetical method." Dialectic is "anamnetic" in its backwards tracing movement to the ultimate hypotheses or *Grundsätze*. Let us call this conception the "discursive" conception of dialectic, in order to stress the lack of any intuitional contribution to thought; the visual connotations of *eidos/idea* are on this view entirely metaphoric, and, as such, unfortunate.

Against this conception, let us contrast what we might call the Husserlian conception, one marked by eidetic intuition.⁷¹ On this conception, *eidos* means

⁷⁰ Heidegger discusses Aristotle's term, *atomon eidos*, in this connection, but I will take this point up below.

⁷¹ I remind the reader that Husserl himself gave no sustained reading of Plato.

"essence;"⁷² dialectic correspondingly names the process by which thinking is purified of all empirical elements, in order to reveal these essences to a direct intuition or *Wesensschau*. Dialectic is "anamnetic" on this interpretation because, as in neo-Kantianism, it seeks the conditions of possibility of knowledge, but these are not *purely relational* concepts as for Natorp, but essences which can be isolated and "viewed."

Let us briefly recollect, from Chapter Four, the basic features of Husserl's eidetics, so as lastly to bring out the features of the third view, Heidegger's. Husserl's conception of *eidōs* is integrally linked to his conception of truth and evidence as modalities of intentionality. Put simply, certain classes of intentions, which I call *noeseis* (as opposed to wishes, loves, hatreds, and other affective intentions), can intend their objects with various degrees of perspicuity, ranging from unfulfilled presumption to fulfilled intuitions. The degree of a given intention's fulfillment depends on the degree of noematic evidence, i.e. on how perspicuously the intentional object (*noema*) appears as it is in itself to the mind. This truth-giving *noema* or "thing itself" is called by Husserl an *eidōs*.

I wish to stress a key feature of the Husserlian view for contrast with what we so far know of Heidegger's interpretation. Husserl's "method" of reduction, and especially of eidetic variation purports to *isolate eidē* and expose them to immediate vision; this naturally assumes both that *eidē* are accessible to such a vision, and that our minds have the capacity of such vision. In such a vision, moreover, the *eidōs* appears to the mind's noetic vision as itself and only as itself—*auto kath'hauto*. We can now readily see how Heidegger's interpretation differs from the Husserlian one.

First, it is clear from our discussion of the existenzial analysis of *nous* as equiprimordial with *logos*, that there can be no question for Heidegger of intuition of *eidē* unmediated by *logos*; *logos*, specifically *qua dialectic*, is the mode through which

⁷² "*Idea*" means for Husserl something like "Kantian idea of reason," i.e. a limit-concept of absolute perfection (cf. Bernet, et al., 1993), but I am not concerned with Husserlian notions of limits here.

the *Sachen* are disclosed to *nous*, through which *nous* perceives and understands them. It is in this very sense that for Heidegger all *noein* is *dia-noein*.⁷³ Second, because *logos*, for its part, is essentially structured by the "as"—in its pre-predicative form as the "existenzial-hermeneutic 'as,'" and in its authentic, diairetical form as the "apophantic 'as'"—it is impossible for an *eidos* ever to appear in isolation and *still be understood*. Understanding is always understanding something as something else, or over against something else, or in terms of something else. Only this interweaving of the *eidē* (the authentically, dialectically distilled *noemata*) can grant *sense* to any one thematized *eidos*. Thus, Heidegger all but imperceptibly replaces Husserl's notion of evidence with the notion of explicit articulation of what has already been understood: just as *Verstehen* replaces Husserl's concept of (unfulfilled) presumption, so *Auslegung* replaces his concept of intuitive fulfillment or identification. *Auslegung* is always mediating (as governed by the as-structure), and it is through this mediation that it accomplishes its delototic function of disclosure; "pure" intuition without the mediation of *logos* results in *agnoia* (nur-noch-Hinsehen). This is because only *logos* gives *sense* (*Sinn*) to our percepts (whether sensible or noetic), and only what is meaningful can, ultimately, be understood.⁷⁴

Indeed, it seems clear that Heidegger differs from Husserl also in this: that whereas the latter understands the *eidē* to be "the *Sachen* selbst," i.e. that which is always already co-intended in any perception (*noesis*), Heidegger interprets the *eidē* as *Sinne*, i.e. as the meanings and meaning-complexes which let the *Sachen* appear as they are. Thus, whereas the true *Sachen* for Husserl are not of this world, but of a separate realm or *Seinssphäre* of their own, for Heidegger there is but one "world," namely

⁷³ Cf. e.g. GA 19: 609.

⁷⁴ Meanings, for Heidegger, are only comprehensible in the *Zusammenhänge*, that is, in some systematic concatenation; there are no "independent" meanings, no *atoma eidē*.

Dasein's, and the *eidê* are the *Sinne* through which *logos* articulates and so discloses the beings in that world to the sight of *nous*.⁷⁵

5.10. *Logos, nous, and truth.*

I have laid out the chief components of Heidegger's interpretation of Plato; it is now time to explain their interconnection, and what it tells us about Plato. *Dasein* has the ontological structures of *Verstehen* and *Rede*; that is: *psychê* has the ontological structures of *nous* and *logos*. *Verstehen* "sees" the world in which *Dasein* "finds itself [*sich befindet*];" it does so inexplicitly and tacitly, but nonetheless "always already," i.e. essentially. As seeing, *Verstehen* is intentional, directed; its "object" is not primarily some *particular* thing (for *qua* particular it would be thematized), but rather the openness or "illumination" that is *Dasein's* world. This world is not a meaningless blur; as a world, it is always already meaningful, constituted by *Sinnes-* or *Bedeutungszusammenhänge*. If we are to rephrase Heidegger's view in Greek terms, *nous* is primordially directed not at some particular object, but at the *kosmos* as *noêtos* (intelligible).⁷⁶

Nous, or *Verstehen*, is the existenzial through which the world is primordially disclosed to us; to say that *Verstehen* intends the world's *Erschlossenheit* is another way of saying that *nous* is directed at *alêtheia*, the unconcealment of the world's being. But what does "the world's being" mean? As I explained in Chapter Four, *world itself* is ontologically constituted as the appearance of beings to *Dasein*; or, put otherwise, *Dasein* encounters the world as its encounter of *beings-in-the-world* (*onta*). There is no world without beings, no *kosmos* without *onta*. *Nous* is therefore directed at the beings which constitute *psychê's* *kosmos*, i.e. the understood order in which *psychê* is always embedded. It is important, however, to note that *nous* is a *particular* form of *psychê's*

⁷⁵ Cf. esp. SZ §32: 151.

⁷⁶ Heidegger does not, so far as I know, equate *Welt* and *kosmos*; I do so for the sake of a plausible parallelism.

intentionality, one which is "ontological" in an eminent sense, for Heidegger. *Nous* is a *Sicht* which does not "take action" with respect to its objects, unlike, say, those other modes of *alêtheuein*, *technê*, and *phronêsis*; rather, it allows its objects, the beings of the *kosmos*, to appear to it as what they are. As Heidegger might put it, *nous qua Verstehen* "läßt das Seiende *sein*" (cf. *SZ*: 145).

Now it is precisely *nous*'s "alethic" or disclosive function which indicates the essential connection between *logos* and (*daseinsmäßiges*) *nous*; for *Rede* is the "how" of *Dasein*'s *Verstehen*. In other words, *logos* is the basic modality in which we make sense of the world we perceive around us. *Logos* is the manner in which the world's intelligibility is made *explicit*, both to each of us individually, as well as to the others with whom the world is always shared.⁷⁷ From *Sein und Zeit* §31 we learn that this intelligibility of beings consists in their *Worumwillen*, their "what-for," or "good-for-what" (*SZ*: 143); this is *how* things appear to *nous* when the world is articulated to it as a world *of* beings.⁷⁸ It is in this *Worumwillen* that the most primordial aspect of *logos* as the articulation through the *Als-Struktur* is rooted. For the *ti* which appears to me inexplicitly becomes explicitly laid-out (*ausgelegt*) "hermeneutically" in terms of its *Worumwillen*, at the level of everyday "coping." On the other hand, it is laid out "apophantically" in terms of a *genos*, at the level of theoretical thematization; its being is disclosed through the function of *logos* which shows it (*apophainesthai*) as belonging to or stemming from some *genos* or other. "Das Wahrsein des λόγος als ἀπόφανσις ist das ἀληθεύειν in der Weise des ἀποφαίνεσθαι: Seiendes aus der Verborgenheit herausnehmend--in seiner Unverborgenheit sehen lassen" (*SZ*: 219: cf. 218). In other words, for *nous* to "let" (*lassen*) a being be itself, *logos* must nevertheless extract it from its inexplicit embeddedness so as to "let" it appear, "let" it be seen.

⁷⁷ "Die Rede [ist] die Grundart des Zugangs und Umgangs mit Welt ..., [ist] die Art ..., in der die Welt zunächst da ist, und nicht nur die Welt, sondern auch die anderen Menschen und jeweilig der Einzelne selbst ..." (GA 19: 231).

⁷⁸ It is a separate question how broadly this is to be understood. Are stars understood in their "what-for?" For that matter, can animals be so understood? Heidegger is silent on this issue, at least in *Sein und Zeit*.

Here we come to the heart of the matter, and to the core of Heidegger's interpretation of Plato. That interpretation does not merely consist in the apparent *derivation* of the notions of *Rede*, *Verstehen*, *Wahrheit*, etc. through a careful, if idiosyncratic, reading of the dialogues, especially since Heidegger relies heavily on Aristotle, too. Rather, the real importance of Heidegger's reading lies in his interpretation of *logos* as an equiprimordial, i.e. essential and inseparable *aspect* of *nous*, for Aristotle *as well as for Plato*. However much we might irritably poke at any particular part of his argument, if Heidegger is right about this (and if I am right about Heidegger on Plato!), then we have an important and highly original solution to the Platonic problem that has nagged us throughout this dissertation, viz. whether Plato believes in "intellectual intuition." In what remains, I will argue that Heidegger's development of *logos* and its relation to *nous* does in fact accord with some Platonic texts (despite some willful misreadings).⁷⁹

5.11. What is the meaning of "pure" *nous*?

In the *Sophist*-lectures, Heidegger's discussion sometimes seems unclear on a key point: is pure *noein* a possible *hexis* for *Dasein*, i.e. for the *zōon logon echon*, or does its characterization as "divine" signal that it is merely a conjectured ideal? On the one hand, the sentences quoted at the end of 5.6. seem plain enough: human *nous* is always mediated by language, human *nous* is only "so-called *nous*." Heidegger nevertheless goes on to discuss the nature of *nous aneu logou*:

Allerdings muß dieses Vermeinen, sofern die ἀρχή erfaßt werden soll, den λόγος hinter sich lassen. Es muss ἄνευ λόγου sein, um die Möglichkeit zu haben, ein ἀδιάρητον zu erfassen. Der Charakter des λέγειν ist es ja, etwas als etwas anzusprechen. Was aber schlechthin

⁷⁹ Due to time-constraints, I have been unable to catalogue these. The most egregious and bizarre, however, are to be found in Heidegger's interpretation of the relation of *ideai* to the "light" of truth in *Rep.* VI, an error he repeats even in his diagrams (GA 34).

einfach, ἀπλοῦν ist, das kann nicht mehr als etwas anderes angesprochen werden. Alles ἔσχατον und alles πρῶτον kann nur eigentlich erfaßt werden, wenn das νοεῖν kein διανοεῖν, sondern *reines Hinsehen* ist. Das Aufdecken [*alêtheuein*] in der Vollzugsart des λόγος versagt hier und tritt zurück.

(GA 19: 180)⁸⁰

To be sure, this perception [*Vermeinen*] must leave *logos* behind, insofar as the *archê* is to be grasped. It must be *aneu logou* [without logos] if it is to have the possibility of grasping an *adiaireton* [indivisible/undivided]. For the character of *legein*, after all, is to express something as something. But that which is absolutely simple, *haploun*, can no longer be expressed as something else. Everything that is *eschaton* [ultimate] or *prôton* [first] can only be truly grasped if *noein* is not *dianoein*, but a *pure looking-upon*. Disclosure [*alêtheuein*] in the mode of *logos* fails here and retreats.

What are we to make of this? Let me spell out what I see as the confusion here. On the one hand, Heidegger says that for Aristotle, *nous*, insofar as it is a *hexis* of the *human psychê*, is *dianoia*, and therefore mediated by *logos*; this mediation is an *ontological*, i.e. *essential* feature of *Dasein*. On the other hand, Heidegger also says that in the case of the perception⁸¹ of simples, *logos* "fails and retreats," so that in the case of simple objects, *noein* is a "pure gazing" (GA 19: 180). He does not go on to conclude that since *Dasein* is essentially *logon echon*, such gazing *aneu logou* is impossible for us. While the rest of the *Sophist*-lecture and *Sein und Zeit* often seem to suggest that pure *nous* is not for us a possibility, there is further evidence pointing in the other direction. For example, at the outset of section §26 (on *nous*) Heidegger writes:

⁸⁰ The unclarity is repeated in the next section, §26b.β., pp. 182-183.

⁸¹ Not necessarily *sense*-perception.

Der νοῦς ist die höchste Bestimmung des Menschen, so daß er sogar als das Göttliche gefaßt werden muß; das Leben im νοῦς ist ein θεῖον ([1177]b30 sq). *Jedoch bewegt sich das menschliche Verhalten zumeist und vor allem zunächst nicht im reinen νοεῖν, sondern im διανοεῖν.*

(GA 19: 179)

Nous is the highest determination of the human being, so that it must even be taken as the divine; life in *nous* is *theion* [divine]. Yet human comportment moves mostly and especially most immediately not in pure *noein*, but in *dianoein*.

While Heidegger speaks, with Aristotle, of *nous* as the "highest determination [*Bestimmung*] of the human," he appends a crucial caveat, viz. that "for the most part [*zumeist*] and especially as the immediate condition of *Dasein* [*zunächst*], human comportment does not move in pure *noein*, but in *dianoein*." This caveat suggests that Heidegger holds *nous* in its pure form to be possible for us, except that *for the most part* we have fallen away from it. If this is right, then the characterization of *Dasein*'s *nous* as "*synthetos*" and "*kaloumenos*" should be understood as "ontological" only to the extent that *Dasein* is ontologically determined to decadence, to "falling away" from its authentic being.

Does Heidegger mean to say that for *authentic Dasein*, pure *nous* is possible, but since *Dasein essentially* tends to decay into inauthenticity and so for the most part live inauthentically, it for the most part, too, moves in the domain of *dianoia*--"not the authentic [*eigentlich*] but the so-called *nous*" (GA 19: 180)? Moreover, why would Aristotle mention divine *nous* in a phenomenology of *Dasein* (*psychē*), if it were impossible for *Dasein* to possess and exercise it? The fact is that Heidegger simply makes no clear statements on this point in the *Sophist*-lectures; nevertheless, I venture the following interpretation. "*Reines νοεῖν*" can be interpreted in two ways: either it means something like the pure *noesis* of Husserlian eidetic intuition; this would be *aneu*

logou. Or it means something like taking a disinterested, non-intervening stance that understanding *nous* takes in letting the *onta* show themselves as they are, but always *meta*, i.e. *dia logou*; it is only "pure" in its disinterest, not in being free of *logos*. From what I have argued throughout this chapter, the latter interpretation is in fact Heidegger's interpretation; what then of the former? Is it "impossible?" No--just as *logos* can become decoupled from *noein*, and so become a free-floating *legomenon*, so too can *noein* become decoupled from *legein*. Yet this decoupling is not an advance to a *higher, more authentic* form of *nous*, but a privation, indeed a blinding of *nous*. This becomes abundantly clear from a passage at SZ §32:

Daß im schlichten Hinsehen die Ausdrücklichkeit eines Aussagens fehlen kann, berechtigt nicht dazu, diesem schlichten Sehen jede artikulierende Auslegung, mithin die Als-Struktur abzusprechen. Das schlichte Sehen der nächsten Dinge im Zutunhaben mit ... trägt die Auslegungsstruktur so ursprünglich in sich, daß gerade ein gleichsam *als-freies* Erfassen von etwas einer gewissen Umstellung bedarf. Das Nur-noch-vor-sich-Haben von etwas liegt vor im reinen Anstarren *als Nicht-mehr-verstehen*. Dieses als-freie Erfassen ist eine Privation des *schlicht* verstehenden Sehens, nicht ursprünglicher als dieses, sondern abgeleitet aus ihm.

(SZ: 149)

Just because the explicitness of a declaration [*Aussagen*] can be absent in a simple gazing [*Hinsehen*], we are not thereby entitled to deny that this mere looking lacks all articulating interpretation and so, too, any as-structure. The mere seeing of the closest things [in our environment] as we deal [cope] with them contains the *Auslegung*-structure in it in such a primordial way that if we were to attempt an *as-free* grasping of something this would require a certain "reconfiguration" [of our

attitude]. "Merely-having-something-in-front-of-me" occurs when I stare at something *as no-longer-understanding* it. This as-free grasping is a *privation* of the simple understanding seeing; it is not more original than it, but rather is derived from it.

Heidegger here draws a contrast between the pre-predicative everyday understanding which I identified as *nous* or perception in the broadest sense (*schlichtes Hinsehen*) and *als-freies Erfassen*, i.e. *nous aneu logou*. The former is still determined by the as-structure, which, as he maintains, is precisely the condition of possibility for a "mere [*schlicht*]" perception to be expressed in an *Aussage*. The latter condition, which is *possible* for *Dasein*, requires a certain "*Umstellung*" or "adjustment." By "adjustment" Heidegger can only mean either a self-conscious *ignoring* of the sense-connections (*Sinneszusammenhänge*), or a condition in which *Dasein* has simply lost the capacity to make sense of its percepts. In either case, the result is *not* some "higher" or "divine" insight into the nature of things, but on the contrary, a "pure gaping *as no-longer-understanding*" (emphasis added). Thus the possibility of *nous aneu logou* is not, as Aristotle thinks, an elevation of the mind, but a falling away from *Dasein*'s authentic possibilities prescribed by its existenzial structure.

Our last task is to examine if Heidegger's interpretation of *logos*, *nous*, *alêtheia*, and *dialektikê technê* admits of a reading consistent with Platonic doctrine. I will argue that his interpretation is at least consistent with the main thrust of the specific texts he examines, and that it illuminates much else besides. I do not insist that Heidegger's interpretation provides a "key" to Plato as Natorp thinks his interpretation did. For one thing, that is not Heidegger's purpose, and for another, neither he nor I assume, as Natorp does, that there exists such a doctrine to be unlocked. I will use as a test-case his analysis of the allegory of the cave.

5.12. The cave allegory.

Plato's cave as a phenomenological allegory. As we saw in Chapter Four, "evidence" for Husserl is the act in which the presumed thing and the intuited thing itself are identified. Moreover, if what is intuitively given in perception are merely fluctuating adumbrations of the actually intended *eidetic sense*, then the evidence of perceptual intuition only *partially fulfills* the initial presumption. The complete satisfaction of that presumed sense can only come about through an intuition of the eidetic sense (*eidōs*). Heidegger's interpretation of truth in the cave allegory depends materially upon these notions of partial and complete fulfillment, and the grades of evidence they imply.⁸²

To penetrate to the eidetic ground of truth and articulate isolated *eidē*, Husserl uses the so-called "phenomenological reduction,"⁸³ his method for abstracting the *eidōs* from the contingent features of a particular given object. Once an *eidōs* is determined, it can be considered in relation to other *eidē*: relationships of essences and eidetic structures can be described and elaborated, all in complete isolation from the world of empirical fact. Since it is these eidetic elements and structures which ultimately allow the empirical objects to appear *as* objects of this or that kind, they are also the ultimate ground of all true propositions about objects.⁸⁴ Only the *eidōs* can *ideally*, or *maximally* fulfill a presumptive *noesis*. As the *noema* which founds truth, its character is itself "true" in the primary (noematic) sense described in Chapter Four.

The short 1946 essay, "Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit [*PLW*]," furnishes a basis for understanding Heidegger's interpretation and critique of the cave allegory.⁸⁵ Plato's allegory aims to depict the soul's liberation from folly (*apaidēusia*), and its subsequent education (*paideia*), culminating in true insight and fitness to govern the city (*Rep.* 514a). Its primary purpose is not to lay out a theory of truth. Yet, Heidegger argues, Plato's account of *paideia* only makes sense in light of a certain understanding

⁸² On grades of evidence, see Husserl, *LI* VI: §38.

⁸³ I cannot describe this method and its varieties here; cf. Husserl, 1922: §§56-62; Husserl, 1954b: §82; Cobb-Stevens, 1990: 153; Bernet, et al., 1993, Chapter 2.

⁸⁴ I say "objects," though Husserl thinks of "essences" of colors as well. But color is immediately given, not adumbrated, as objects are.

⁸⁵ Heidegger gives a longer, more detailed reading in GA 34, *q.v.*

of the nature or essence of truth: "the essence of truth and the manner of its change makes possible 'education' in its basic structure" (*PLW*: 25). Why? Because the insight to which education leads is insight into the highest ontological truth. Thus, for Heidegger, "'education' and 'truth' form an essential unity [*Wesenseinheit*]" (*PLW*: 26). He does not say that the allegory is *about* truth; he simply examines the various stages of education for the nature of their respective kinds of truth.

Heidegger divides the allegory into four stations, each with its own peculiar sense of truth (*PLW*: 26-27).⁸⁶ The first station is that of the shackled prisoners: their truth is that of the shadows. Next, a released prisoner is turned to see the artifacts carried in front of the firelight; his truth is that of the artifacts. Third, he is dragged to the surface of the cave: truth now is of the real creatures that live here, illumined by the sun.⁸⁷ Finally, the released prisoner returns to the cave; his final "truth" is the liberation of the other prisoners. In what follows, I demonstrate how Heidegger's interpretation of these stages implicitly uses the phenomenological concepts of *eidōs*, truth, and evidence.

The various classes of entity associated with the various levels of the interior and exterior of the cave are always described *in relation to* the prisoner's vision. In other words, they symbolize different types of *intentional object--intentum* or *noema*—correlating to different types of *intentional state--intentio* or *noesis*.⁸⁸ Each *intentio* is clear and distinct (*saphês*) to the extent that its correlative *intentum* "partakes of truth [*alêtheias metechet*]" (*Rep.* 511e). Within the cave, there are two classes of entities: the various artifacts carried by the people between the fire and the small wall, and the

⁸⁶ As we will see, these *allegorical* stations are not exactly congruent with Plato's description of the various levels of the cave; the reason for this will become clear as we proceed.

⁸⁷ As the reader will have no doubt found, Heidegger seems often to discover deep significance in what strikes most as trivial (see his derivation of the *ti-genos-onoma* structure, above). By the same token, he often overlooks what may in fact hold deeper significance. His treatment of the "surface" in the cave allegory is one such instance. Surely there is symbolic import in the carefully articulated stages by which the emerging ex-prisoner adjusts his eyesight and slowly elevates its sightline towards the sun. These nuances are not discussed. (To be fair, Natorp seems to ignore the cave allegory altogether.)

⁸⁸ Heidegger rightly considers the intentional relations symbolized in the allegory to correspond to those of the Divided Line. Despite Plato's indication that this is so (*Rep.* 517bc; 532a-c), some critics are skeptical, e.g. Robinson, 1953: 180, ff.

shadows they cast against the back wall. The shadows symbolize the *intenta* of the *intentio* Plato calls *eikasia*; the artifacts those of *pistis*.

The common translation of "*eikasia*" as "conjecture" or "comparison" not only seems to credit the prisoners with an improbably theoretical attitude, but also fails to convey the term's imagic, pictic connotations. *Eikasia* literally means "*likeness*,"⁸⁹ which is why shadows appropriately symbolize this psychic *pathêma*. But what intentional state intends likenesses? In the *Logical Investigations (LI)* Husserl names the lowest, most "empty" intentional state "imag-ination" (*Bildbewußtsein*). In Husserl's view, the object of "imagination" is intended as an "analogue" *through which* another object is "represented" and thus presented to consciousness. The empty intention depicts the intended object, which is not properly fulfilled until the depicted object is given in what Husserl calls "bodily" (perceptual) intuition.⁹⁰

Not only are the prisoners condemned to view mere figments, but their ears are also filled with noise: the cave roars with confused talk. While the prisoners converse and dispute (*Rep.* 515b; 516e-517a), even the *shadows* seem to speak (*Rep.* 515bc), since the carriers' talk (515a,b) echoes back from the wall. And as some of the carriers are silent, the talk from above is transmitted as second-hand and full of gaps. It is through this shadow-talk that the shadow-things have their shadow-being:

And if they were able to converse [*dialegesthai*] with each other, don't you imagine the prisoners would think that the very things they see is being [*ta onta ... nomizein haper horôen*]?

(*Rep.* 515b)

⁸⁹ Cf. *LSJ*: "I. likeness, representation; ... IV. apprehension of or by means of images or shadows." It stems from the verb *eikazô*, "to depict, compare, conjecture." *Eikasia* and such words as *eikôn* (likeness, image), *eikasmos* (conjecturing, guessing), and *eikos* (likely) belong to the same semantic constellation as the English words *likeness*, *likely*, *like*, or the French *semblable*, *sembler*. Cf. esp. Frisk, 1960: 452-453. On relation of *eikôn* and *eidos*, cf. *Rep.* 402c; Stewart, 1909: 47-48.

⁹⁰ Cf. Tugendhat, 1970: 66-67.

In the *Sophist*-lectures, Heidegger characterizes our everyday comportment towards beings--i.e., that represented by the pre-theoretical prisoners--as determined by *legomena* (things said), which in this context can be translated as "hearsay." He explicitly describes the phenomenon of hearsay in phenomenological terms as "unfulfilled intuition." He then concludes:

I can utter and understand propositions without having an originary relationship to the beings about which I am speaking. In this peculiar dilution all propositions are repeated and understood; they gain their own peculiar existence. One orients [*richtet*] oneself in accordance with them, they become "common-sense truths" [*Richtigkeiten*], or so-called "truths," without an originary act of truth-making. ... One is held in "idle chatter" [*Gerede*]: the way we "just talk" about things has its own peculiar bindingness; one holds to this sort of talk insofar as one wants to orient oneself in the world, insofar as one cannot oneself appropriate everything originally [*nicht selbst alles ursprünglich aneignen kann*].

(GA 19: 25)

Heidegger describes our everyday situation as being *bound* to our "views"--our *doxai*--which have no direct connection to the things themselves. We are shackled to empty intentions and condemned to hearsay. While the prisoners are in chains, what they *see* (adumbrations) is determined, in its being and in its evidence, through what they *hear*; they are ruled by what "one"--the invisible voices--"says." Thus, while the cave as a whole represents the world of the senses (*PLW*: 33), the lowest level represents *how* this world presents itself to us in our everyday attitude (*PLW*: 20): we live in a home-world (*Rep.* 514a: *oikêsei*) of artifacts and utensils (*skeuê*: *Rep.* 514c), whose being as such we rarely contemplate, but take for granted as "at hand." In short, the prisoners represent

the everydayness of inauthentic Dasein which Heidegger analyzed in *Sein und Zeit* (SZ).⁹¹

Next, a prisoner is released and forced to look around, and not just to listen, but to see for himself, to peer through the firelight at the artificial objects in their "bodily presence." This stage represents the intentional state of *pistis*, "belief," or "trust." He is told that he is "closer to being [*enguterô tou ontos*]," "turned towards what has more being [*pros mallon onta tetrammenos*]," and is "looking more correctly [*orthoteron blepoi*]" (*Rep.* 515d). Plato's description of truth and being as *graded* is striking: in Husserlian terms, the *intentum* in its bodily presence has more being, is more correct and more true (*mallon onta, orthoteron*) because the degree of *evidence* (in the Husserlian sense) for beliefs is higher. Instead of a shadow, the thing itself which cast the shadow is shown (*Rep.* 515d: *deiknumena*).

Yet, torn away from his common-sense, hearsay ontology, and confronted with bodily things, he is perplexed and speechless (*Rep.* 515d: *aporein*). Because the shock of brightness makes the formerly seen shadows seem more determinate in outline, the prisoner holds them to be "truer [*alêthestera*]" (*Rep.* 515d).⁹² Though the transported artifacts are in themselves more clear and distinct than the shadows, they remain in flux and hard to see. As I discussed above, Husserl also conceives bare perception in this way: our percepts of bodily things always remain mere fragmentary, flowing adumbrations or likenesses of the truly intended *object*. The cave is therefore entirely a "realm of shades," of mere adumbrations and anticipations: on the one hand, the shadows are, *qua umbrae*, straightforwardly adumbrations of the bodily artifacts; but the bodily objects, too, remain nothing more than fragmentary anticipations of something more real:

⁹¹ Cf. esp. SZ §27, "Das alltägliche Selbstsein und das Man;" Heidegger, 1985; cf. Bernet, 1990.

⁹² Of course, the shadows of moving objects cast by flickering firelight cannot be very definite at all, growing larger and smaller, wavering, merging with each other, with the darkness.

What is presumed to be the solely and genuinely real—namely that which is immediately visible, audible, graspable, calculable—remains for Plato always only an *adumbration* [*Abschattung*] of the *ideai*, i.e., a *shadow* [*Schatten*].

(*PLW*: 20, emphasis added)

As we saw earlier, Husserl thinks that we can only penetrate through the flux to the constant eidetic structures of objective sense by means of the phenomenological reduction. The reduction brackets the "world" as I experience it in my stream of consciousness.⁹³ The *eidē* are never sighted by looking at factual, contingent things, which is what the second, doxic stage represents. Although these are "truer," more evident ("bodily-there") than the shadows,⁹⁴ the eidetic vision reveals itself to the prisoner only when he reaches the openness of the cave's exterior. Here the prisoner experiences true liberation, seeing things as *what* they are:

The look [*Anblick*] of what the things [*Dinge*] are no longer appears only in the artificial and confusing light of the fire within the cave. The things themselves [*Dinge selbst*] stand there in the concision [*Bündigkeit*] and bindingness [*Verbindlichkeit*] of their own look [*Aussehens*]. ... The looks [*Anblicke*] of what the things themselves are, the *eidē* (Ideas) constitute the essence, in whose light⁹⁵ each particular being shows itself [*sich zeigt*] as this or that being, in which self-showing the appearances first become unconcealed and accessible.

(*PLW*: 29)

The *ideai* viewed at the surface are the clearest, most apparent cognitive objects. These ideal *noemata* are no longer empty shadow, or inadequate bodily intentions: they now

⁹³ Cf. Wagner, 1953/54: 17.

⁹⁴ Heidegger, 1985: 43; Tugendhat, 1970: 66,67.

⁹⁵ Heidegger here speaks as if each *idea* is itself a light-source; his discussion of the cave allegory in GA 34 confirms that this is in fact his view. It is an incorrect view, as a careful reading of the allegory, together with the image of the sun in *Rep.* VI shows. I do not have time to criticize this reading here.

appear "as themselves immediately present" (*PLW*: 21). Here the former prisoner "gaze[s] upon the most true," namely that which is *maximally* "true-making" in the noematic sense of truth which grounds or fulfills evidence-acts.⁹⁶

We can now see how the phenomenological notion of evidence leads Heidegger to define the essence of a Platonic *idea* as lying in the manifest visibility through which it

achieves presence, viz. the presence of *what* a given being is. In the whatness [quiddity; *Was-sein*] of the being, the respective *idea* "presentiates" itself.

(*PLW*: 35)

The *eidos* or essence of an object is what makes it (re)cognizeable *as* an object of such and such a kind. Through its noematic self-showing--its "shining-forth" (*Erscheinung*),⁹⁷ its "truth"--the *essential* and *objective* sense of the object can be intended.⁹⁸ Thus, eidetic intuition is equivalent to *noesis* in the fullest sense, that which Plato, too, calls *noêsis*, the clearest and most distinct of the soul's *pathêmata*.⁹⁹

Heidegger argues that the allegory's central focus is on the "*Scheinen des Erscheinenden*" and the "*Ermöglichung seiner Sichtbarkeit*" (*PLW*: 34): the shining- or showing-forth of the evident appearances and the enabling of that visibility. The maximal fullness of the look's showing-forth is the "*idea*," which "lets us see that *as* which any given being is present" (*PLW*: 34, emphasis added).¹⁰⁰ In plain language, the *idea* makes possible our cognition of particular things--through its essential appearance, by shining-forth *as what* it is and *only as that* (*PLW*: 35). It is not an "appearance" of something else that lies "behind it," but is itself a shining-forth that is

⁹⁶ *Rep.* 484c5, ff.; cf. *PDT*, 30.

⁹⁷ "Erscheinung" is the standard German word for "appearance." In order to connect its intuitional connotations with those of *eidos* and *idea*, Heidegger exploits its literal meaning of "shining-forth [*Erscheinen*]," which is hard to render gracefully in English.

⁹⁸ *LI VI*: §39; Willard, 1972: 148.

⁹⁹ Cf. *Rep.* 511de.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. esp. Bernet, et al., 1993: 176-177; Bernet, 1990: 145-146.

sufficient in itself.¹⁰¹ This account is of course very strange: in speaking of the *eidē* or *ideai* as "appearances" that "shine-forth," Heidegger seems to conceive them as *phenomena*, precisely that which we are accustomed to contrasting the Platonic forms *against*.

As I noted earlier, when Heidegger uses phenomenal language in describing the *ideai*, he does so in order to stress the *intuitional* overtones of *eidos* and *idea*.¹⁰² His characterization is consciously, if tacitly, Husserlian, since Husserl holds that the direct evidence of *intuition* ultimately underwrites all knowledge. Heidegger's interpretation of the *eidē* is thus directed against the neo-Kantian conception of the *ideai* as "hypotheses" or "laws of thought," in which Plato's intuitional language is explained away as metaphor. Moreover, Heidegger's description of the *ideai* corresponds to the "phenomenological" sense of *phainomenon* as characterized at *Sein und Zeit*, §7.¹⁰³ Pointing out that the Greek term, *phainomenon*, stems from *phainesthai*, "to show oneself," he writes: "We must therefore cling to this meaning of the expression of 'phenomenon': *that which shows-itself-in-itself*, the self-evident, the apparent [*das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende, das Offenbare*]." ¹⁰⁴ This sense of "appearance" is posited by Heidegger as the "authentic sense of phenomenon as self-showing" (SZ: 30), which he defines as the properly *phenomenological* concept of "phenomenon" (SZ: 31). Thus, in this context, Heidegger interprets the Platonic *idea* or *eidos* as the "phenomenon" in the phenomenological sense of "showing itself in itself." This contrasts with his own *fundamental-ontological* interpretation of *eidos* as a *Simm*, for which I argued earlier.

At the same time, Heidegger's tacit assimilation of Plato and Husserl is now obvious: transcendental phenomenology seeks precisely to trace the sensible

¹⁰¹ PDT, 34; cf. SZ, 31; Heidegger, 1973: 377: "[Es ist] die Substantialität, was in seinem Nichterscheinen dem Erscheinenden das Erscheinen ermöglicht. In diesem Sinne kann man sogar sagen, daß sie erscheinender als das Erschienene selbst ist."

¹⁰² Cf. note 3, above.

¹⁰³ Cf. SZ, 31.

¹⁰⁴ SZ, 28; emphasis in the original.

"appearances" back to their essences or originary *eidē* (Heidegger: the *true* phenomena), of which the former are mere shadows (less evident adumbrations). The objects on the surface are "the symbol for that which constitutes the Being of beings," i.e., the ontological ground of the beings we encounter in our everyday sensible reality (*PLW*, 19).¹⁰⁵ This "Being of beings" is

for Plato that through which beings show themselves in their 'look' [*Aussehen*]. Plato does not take this 'look' as a mere 'aspect.' For him, the 'look' retains something of a coming-forth,¹⁰⁶ through which all things 'present' themselves. Standing in its 'look,' being [*das Seiende*] shows itself. 'Look' in Greek is '*eidōs*' or '*idea*.'"

(*PLW*: 20)¹⁰⁷

Thus Heidegger styles the climb to the outside of the cave as a phenomenological reduction à la Husserl, from "imag-ination" to "adequate noesis," from empty presumptions, through bodily perception, to complete, eidetic intuition.

As I have now shown, Heidegger implicitly interprets the cave allegory as a parable of Husserlian truth; moreover, Heidegger's own notion of truth is predicated on his rejection of Husserl's eidetics. These two facts, taken together, suggest that Heidegger does not himself endorse (what he takes to be) "Platonic" truth any more than he does Husserlian truth. Then to what end does he assimilate Plato and Husserl? It is neither to show that Plato was a phenomenologist, nor that Husserl was a Platonist, but rather, to expose archaic, *pre*-Platonic ways of thinking about truth and being, ways

¹⁰⁵ I translate the German words "Sein" and "Seiend" as "Being" and "being," respectively. "Sein" is the gerundive form of the verb "to be," while "Seiend" is a participle. The substantive form of the participle is the neuter noun, "das Seiende," which literally means "the being [thing]," i.e., "entity." This distinction between *Sein* and *Seiend* is common in many other languages; the isomorphism of the participial and gerundive forms is a peculiarity of English.

¹⁰⁶ Latin, *ap-pareo*.

¹⁰⁷ Cf. *SZ*: 219: "Das Wahrsein des *logos* als *apophansis* ist das *alêtheuein* in der Weise des *apophainesthai*: Seiendes—aus der Verborgenheit herausnehmend—in seiner Unverborgenheit (Entdecktheit) sehen lassen. Die *alêtheia*, die von Aristoteles nach den oben angeführten Stellen mit *pragma*, *phainomena* gleichgesetzt wird, bedeutet die 'Sachen selbst', das, was sich zeigt, das Seiende im Wie seiner Entdecktheit."

which, according to Heidegger, Plato's theory of forms simultaneously preserves and begins to cover up. At the same time, Heidegger's reading suggests that while Husserl begins to penetrate back to the primordial sense of truth obscured by Plato, this incipient recollection is stalled by Husserl's focus on intentionality. I will now examine how Heidegger pursues this critique.

Earlier, I showed how for both Plato and Husserl, truth is not a black-or-white affair. Rather, they can conceive of *shades* of truth because both conceive it ultimately in terms of self-showing or e-vidence: the *eidos* is maximally self-evident to immediate *noesis*, but it also may be mediately intended through perception or imagination. As the prisoner climbs the ontological rungs demarcated in the Divided Line, the truth of being becomes progressively brighter, until he finally emerges into the uneclipsed, full "'light' of truth" (*Rep.* 509a) in the place where "truth and reality shine resplendent [*katalampeî alêtheia te kai to on*] (*Rep.* 508de). As will become clear, it is crucial for understanding Heidegger's critique to see that Plato and Husserl not only both conceive truth in intuitional terms of clarity and distinctness, but that they conceive intuition itself intentionally as eidetic *vision*.

Heidegger sees in the phenomenal nature of the *ideai*--i.e., their clarity and distinctness--a *continuity* between Platonic and archaic notions of truth. This continuity is, in temporal terms, the reverse image of how Heidegger's and Husserl's respective conceptions of truth are related: Husserl now represents the (neo-)Platonic notion of truth, whereas Heidegger represents its (neo-)archaic version. On the one hand, Heidegger, like Husserl, himself conceives primordial truth as "discoveredness," "unconcealment," or "dis-closure," which we have discussed at length. To the extent that the notion of truth-as-unconcealment operates within the semantic field of light and clarity, it is continuous with Husserl's notion of truth-as-evidence. Yet, as I argued, it also radicalizes the latter, penetrating to a more primordial stratum of truth: for Heidegger, "unconcealedness" is not identical with "evidence," but rather is the

condition of possibility of evidence: it is more primordial than evidence insofar as any object, in order to be evident, must first have an "opening [*Lichtung*]" in which it can be seen.¹⁰⁸ Heidegger's radicalization of Husserl moreover has a historical dimension: he undergirds the phenomenological analysis of the universal architectonic of Dasein with an etymological description of the archaic notion of truth-as-unhiddenness purportedly encoded in *alêtheia*, the standard Greek word for "truth." It is into this nexus of transcendental and historical analyses of Dasein that Heidegger's critique in "Platons Lehre" is bound.¹⁰⁹

With respect to Plato, then, Heidegger first very plausibly argues that the fundamental tropes of the cave allegory—the darkness of illusion, the brightness of reality—depend for their structural and symbolic cogency on truth being understood as unconcealedness or revelation.

This "likeness" [allegory] can only be constructed on the image of the cave because it is codetermined by the basic experience of *alêtheia*, the unconcealedness of beings, an experience taken for granted by the Greeks. For what else is the subterranean cave than something which is open, but at the same time covered over, which despite its opening remains sealed up by walls of earth? The enclosure of the cave, which is in itself open, and that which is surrounded by it and so concealed, simultaneously indicate an external zone, the un-concealed, which during the day expands into the lighted openness. Only the essence of truth, thought in archaic Greek terms of *alêtheia*, only the unconcealedness which stands in relation to the concealed (to the dissembled and veiled)

¹⁰⁸ I repeat what I have several times said before: while Heidegger may be justified in criticizing Husserl for not conceiving truth radically enough, his critique of Plato is not justifiable on this count. Plato *does* explicitly thematize truth as *Lichtung* in the image of the sun in *Rep.* VI. I will give the details of my critique in a future paper.

¹⁰⁹ He reasons as follows: *if* phenomenological analysis shows truth primordially to mean "disclosure" or "unhiddenness," and *if* we nonetheless think of truth in a different way, viz. as "correctness," *then* there must have been a moment when the primordial conception gave way to the current one (or some precursor of the latter).

can have an essential relation to the image of a cave that lies beneath the daylight. Where truth has another essence and is not "unconcealedness," or at least is not codetermined by unconcealedness, there a "cave allegory" would have no illustrative power.

(*PLW*: 33)

Heidegger thus discerns the archaic sense of truth in the phenomenal nature of the cognitive objects at each stage: their degree of truth is proportional to the degree of their clarity, i.e., their *un*-obscurity. Heidegger also marks the disclosive, unconcealing sense of truth in the fourth phase of the allegory, the descending return into the cave. Here he again relies on *a-lêtheia*'s purported connotation of active deprivation or "wrenching away;" now, in "Platons Lehre" he writes: "'Truth' originally means that which is wrested away from the concealing obscurity" (*PLW*: 32).¹¹⁰ As daring or bizarre as this extension of truth-as-unconcealedness may seem from the philological point of view, it does explain how the allegory as a whole may be said to contain a subtext of truth. For presumably the returning ex-prisoner tries to release his comrades from their shackles (*Rep.* 517a) by "wrenching their necks around" (*Rep.* 515c), painning their eyes (*Rep.* 515c; e), and violently (*Rep.* 515e) dragging them (*Rep.* 516a) past the fire into the sun, just as he had been. The sighting of truth results from a violent conversion of the soul to light.

Now, the allegory does not thematize this conception of truth as such--i.e., as manifestness--but only insofar as some particular *object of cognition* is manifest, clear, or illumined. This is why Heidegger next argues that in addition to the "disclosive" sense of truth we may discern a new meaning in the allegory: truth as "correctness"

¹¹⁰ In *Sein und Zeit*, he wrote: "Truth (un-covering/dis-closure) must always first be wrested away from what-is. What-is is torn away from the concealing obscurity. Each concrete case of dis-covery is always a kind of *robbery*. Is it a coincidence, that the Greeks express the essence of truth with a *privative* expression (*a-letheia*)?" (*SZ*, 222). Cf. esp. *SZ*, 311: "Die Freilegung des ursprünglichen Seins des Daseins muß ihm vielmehr *im Gegenzug* zur verfallenden ontisch-ontologischen Auslegungstendenz *abgerungen* werden. ... Die *Seinsart* des Daseins *fordert* daher von einer ontologischen Interpretation, die sich die Ursprünglichkeit der phänomenalen Aufweisung zum Ziel gesetzt hat, daß sie sich das Sein dieses Seienden gegen seine eigene Verdeckungstendenz *erobert*."

(*orthotês*) (*PLW*: 33, ff.). We should not mistake Heidegger to mean "correctness of a proposition," i.e., the correspondence of a proposition's content with a fact of the matter. In Heidegger's reading of Plato, propositional correctness follows from a more primary correctness, viz. that of the direction of the "soul's eye" (cf. *Rep.* VI, 508cd). If the *ideai* are the truest objects of vision, and if that vision is most correct which is directed at them, then the correct sighting of the *ideai* becomes paramount: "everything rides on the *orthotês*, on the correctness of the sightline" (*PLW*: 41). Thus Plato's speculative or cognitive interest in truth subordinates the archaic concept of truth-as-disclosure to the *idea*: "'unhiddenness' now only signifies the unhidden insofar as it is accessible through the manifestness of the *idea*" (*PLW*: 35). The degree of correctness of the soul's gaze is at each stage determined by the degree of reality of its object, namely the degree to which the object's essence is manifest.

While the full truth of beings is only reached in a vision of the *ideai*, of the things themselves, Heidegger's critique focuses particularly on the highest of these, the Idea of the Good (*idea tou agathou*): it is here that the inescapability of the orthotic conception of truth becomes especially clear. The *idea tou agathou* is likened to the sun in *Republic* VI: as the sun is both the cause of visible things (in their growth and existence) and the cause of their visibility, so too is the Good the cause of knowable things (*ideai*) and their knowability (*Rep.* 508bc). What does "goodness" have to do with knowledge? A Kantian interpretation may point to the speculative utility of teleologically guided inquiry, but phenomenology aims not for heuristic concepts; it strives to bring *essences* to immediate view.¹¹¹ As Husserl writes, "it is not a matter of securing objectivity, but to understand it" (Husserl, 1954b: 193).¹¹²

As we have said, an *idea* or eidetic phenomenon "[as the] look of something, grants the insight into *what* a being is" (*PLW*: 38; cf. 34). Put another way, the essence

¹¹¹ Cf. Bernet, et al., 1993: 187. The similarity to Plato's description of the goal of dialectic as the discovery of the unhypothetical principle should not be ignored (*Rep.* VI).

¹¹² For a discussion of the difference between the phenomenological and (neo-) Kantian projects, see esp. Tugendhat, 1970: 180, ff.; Kern, 1964.

makes a being "fit [*tauglich*]" to appear as *what* it is, i.e., fit for us to recognize it *as* a token of a certain type. It is in view of this enabling function of the *idea* that Heidegger argues that *agathon* should be translated as "fit" or "fit-making" (*PLW*: 38). An *idea* makes each thing fit to be seen as a such-and-such; by extension, that which makes each *idea* fit *as an idea* is the *idea* of *ideai*, or "fit-as-such"—to *agathon*.

It is this which enables each shining [eidetic phenomenon] to shine forth; hence it is itself what genuinely appears [i.e., the absolutely genuine phenomenon], the most radiant in its appearance [*das in seinem Scheinen Scheinsamste*]. Therefore Plato (*Rep.* 518c9) also calls the *agathon* "*tou ontos to phanotaton*," "the most apparent (most shining-forth) of beings."

(*PLW*: 38)

The "*idea* of the Good" is the "highest" *idea* because it is the condition of possibility of the eidetic appearance of all the other eidetic phenomena (*ideai*). It is the essence of *idea tout court*, i.e., that which in the first place lets a being appear/shine *as* a being.¹¹³

What is Heidegger's objection to the *idea tou agathou* thus conceived? He claims that it represents the "domination of the *idea* over *alêtheia*" (*PLW*: 41),¹¹⁴ the subordination of truth-as-unconcealedness to the *idea*. But what does *that* mean? His objection can only be understood in light of his lifelong question, the *ontological question*: "What is the meaning of Being as such?"¹¹⁵ "Being," Heidegger writes, is "that which determines beings as beings, that with respect to which beings ... are always already understood" (*SZ*, 6). In the case of sensible beings, we have seen that the Being which determines them as beings is their *eidos*. Yet, for both Husserl and Plato, an

¹¹³ Heidegger's interpretation of the Good as the idea of ideas goes back at least to Natorp's (1921). Natorp's conception of the relationship of the Good to the other *ideai* is of similar form. But where Heidegger interprets the *ideai* as given phenomena (in the special phenomenological sense), Natorp conceives them as laws. The Good is thus the "law of laws," viz. the law that we should follow laws (in morality) and think in terms of laws (speculatively).

¹¹⁴ Cf. *PDT*, 35.

¹¹⁵ "Die einzige Frage, die Heidegger immer bewegte, ist, was wir immer wieder betonen müssen, die Frage nach dem Sein: was besagt 'Sein'?" (Heidegger, 1973: 377).

eidōs, too, is a being: what constitutes the *eidē*'s Being? Plato's answer is: the *idea tou agathou*. "The Being of beings 'is' not itself a being," Heidegger says; "[t]he first philosophical step in understanding the problem of Being is not 'to tell a story,' i.e., not to determine beings as beings by deriving them from another original being, as if Being had the character of a ... being" (SZ, 6). The *idea tou agathou* seems to satisfy this requirement for an answer to the ontological question, since Plato calls it *epekeina tēs ousias*, "beyond Being" (*Rep.* 509b9).

Still—does it in fact satisfy the requirement? The *idea tou agathou* remains an *idea*, i.e., it remains a *being*, namely one analogous to the sun: it is the brightest of beings (*tou ontos to phanotaton*). Plato thus either gives a contradictory answer to the ontological question, or else in fact exclusively conceives the Good ontically, merely calling it *epekeina* to express its supremacy among beings.¹¹⁶ He thus falls into a vicious circle: if we want to know what that Being is through which any being ultimately is a being or "has being," it does not take us one step further to define that Being as again a being. This is the core of Heidegger's criticism. Thus, when Plato calls the "*idea tou agathou*" the "cause of all that is right and good for all men" (*Rep.* VI, 517c), Heidegger translates "cause"--*aitia*--as "Ur-sache." While "Ursache" is the standard German word for "cause," Heidegger's hyphenation (*Ur-sache*) emphasizes the ultimately *ontic* status of the Good (*tou ontos to phanotaton*): "Für alle 'Sachen' und ihre Sachheit ist die höchste Idee der Ursprung, d.h. die Ur-sache"—"for all things¹¹⁷ and their thing-hood, the highest *idea* is the origin, i.e., the cause [the 'original-thing']" (*PLW*: 40).

With Plato's location of the *eidē*'s truth in the Good, and thus of the Being of beings in *a* being, Being as such is made the noematic object of a noetic subject. In

¹¹⁶ Indeed, the full phrase is *epekeina tēs ousias presbeia kai dynamei hyperechontos*: "beyond being exceeding it in dignity and power." Plato *could* merely be saying that it is "beyond" the other beings in dignity and power, but not that it is itself not a being.

¹¹⁷ Again in the sense of *Husserl's* dictum, "to the things themselves."

particular, the analogy to the sun subordinates the light of truth to an ontic source, the Good. It is thus impossible to thematize truth *as such*—as manifestness or unconcealedness; it is only thinkable insofar some particular object of cognition is manifest, clear or illumined. *Paideia*, the actual topic of the allegory, is in the *Republic* conceived as the progressive rectification of the soul's vision towards the highest truths. Though the soul's eye is always directed at something, be it shadows or artifacts or animals, yet the direction of its gaze can be more or less correct, depending on the degree of its object's truth. Its progress is measured by the degree of that rectification.¹¹⁸ The initial elenchus redirects it towards the light, and the subsequent stages of ascent fine-tune its line of vision. When it finally latches onto the *ideai*, its gaze is correct in the full sense, for "through this correctness, vision and knowledge are right vision and knowledge, so that in the end it directs itself at the highest *idea* and secures itself in this 'direction'" (*PLW*: 41-42). Thus, the ontic conception of Being is necessarily accompanied by an orthotic conception of truth: we look most *correctly* when our intentional ray has latched onto the most true *object*, the Good itself, the "most shining-forth" in its presence.¹¹⁹

This critique can be extended to Husserl as well. We already have seen how Husserl's "ontological" location of truth in the truth of the object or *intentum* undermined the conception of truth as *essentially* a correspondence relation between subject and object.¹²⁰ Heidegger's critique of Husserl's interpretation of "truth" and "being" is that whereas Husserl dislocated them from the subject, they still remain determined by the intentional relation, and therefore ontically and not ontologically

¹¹⁸ Cf. *Rep.* 515d: "*orthoteron blepoi*."

¹¹⁹ "In this orientation [towards the Good], *noësis* [*das Vernehmen*] assimilates itself to that which is to be sighted, i.e., the "look" of beings. As a result of this assimilation of *noësis* as an *idein* [looking] with the *idea* [look], a *homoiōsis*, a congruence or assimilation of cognition with the thing itself occurs. Thus, out of the priority of *idea* and *idein* over *alêtheia*, there springs a change in the essence of truth. Truth becomes *orthotês*, the correctness of *noësis* [intention] and of expression [*Aussagen*]." (*PDT*, 42)

¹²⁰ Cf. Heidegger, 1973: 377-378.

understood: "Being" and "truth" are *still* always only thought in terms of the being and truth *of a thing*, viz. the *intentum*. Thus "philosophical" thinking, insofar as it thinks of and on being at all, thinks ontically, even in its most "abstract" contemplation.

I have now shown how a Platonic *idea* can be read as a Husserlian *eidos* at almost any level of detail. I have shown how this equivalence operates as a subtext in Heidegger's interpretation of the cave allegory; indeed that interpretation only makes *full sense* once this subtext has been revealed. A relation of semantic congruence thus obtains between the Husserlian and Platonic *eidē*. For Heidegger, however, the more important point must be that the *underlying reason* for this congruence is the same. Once we have seen that Heidegger's description of the cave maps onto a schematic representation of Husserl's theory of *eidos*, we also see that Heidegger's critique of Plato applies equally to Husserl. That critique, as I have argued, focuses on the orthotic conception of truth, and the correlative ontic sense of Being. The reason why both Plato and Husserl locate the ultimate ground of truth and being in *eidē*, conceived as self-evident essences is that they conceive truth within the horizon of intentionality. In particular, they conceive of truth as a feature of the intentional act of *cognition*, as opposed to desire, anticipation, aversion, etc. Both take cognition as the baseline form of intentionality, because it is defined as intending objects with maximal or ideal *clarity*; all other forms of intending are thus defective or parasitic on this maximum.

Heidegger's critique, finally, does not try to refute this analysis of *intentionality*: indeed, he agrees with it. Rather, his aim in "Platons Lehre" is twofold: first, to show that the intentional conception of human consciousness, which we find sharply drawn in the Divided Line and the cave allegory, is but a *derivative mode* of a more primordial way of being and experiencing truth, which he attributes to the archaic Greeks. Second, he implies that Husserl's analysis of truth, in following the guiding notion of evidence, penetrates back to the edge of the conceptual horizon of intentionality drawn by Plato, to the same zone where the meaning of truth wavers between correctness and manifestness.

Yet because Husserl takes the horizon of intentionality as ultimate, and since consciousness as intentional is always di-rected at *something*, Husserl's notion of truth *remains* conceived in terms of correct di-rectedness (*Richtigkeit der Richtung*). For both Plato and Husserl, truth and Being are attained by retraining our attention upon new, higher *things* (*onta*), viz. the *eidê*, rather than considering truth and Being as the conditions of possibility of *onta*.

Heidegger, by contrast, insists that there is a more primordial level of human being than subjective consciousness. Heidegger's critique of Plato and Husserl thus serves his own propaedeutic project of the "destruction of the history of metaphysics,"¹²¹ i.e., the systematic breaking-down of the conceptual structures that block our access to the primordial. Illuminating this ultimate stratum is a most difficult enterprise, insofar our language in this sphere is thoroughly and ineluctably "intentional," hobbling, chaining down our very thinking of the non- or pre-intentional. This is why Heidegger finds it useful to show that the intentional conception has a historical origin (supposedly Plato), and to suggest that the recollection¹²² of pre-Platonic conceptions of truth as dis-closure (*alêtheia*) can help us find words to describe truth and Being *as such*. That project no longer pertains to the question of Platonism. Yet by pointing to ambiguities in Plato's notion of truth as he has in "Platons Lehre," Heidegger has at least given us cause to ask again: what *is* Platonic truth?

¹²¹ Cf. SZ, §6.

¹²² This recollection necessarily constitutes a new project centered on *hermeneutics*.

6. Epilogue.

What lessons can we draw from this study? First, I hope I have exposed several ways in which much of Heidegger's philosophy—for all its "phenomenological" commitments—owes a debt to neo-Kantianism, particularly to Natorp. As Gadamer recently put it, Heidegger scholars will come to discover that Natorp was an "even greater influence on Heidegger than was Husserl."¹ Surely Gadamer exaggerates, but I have little doubt that Natorp's importance has yet to be fully appreciated—and not merely as an "influence" on Heidegger. Second, I hope that my presentation of Natorp's and Heidegger's readings of Plato will encourage scholars of ancient philosophy to avail themselves of the interpretive possibilities of both the (neo-)Kantian and phenomenological approaches, however construed. Let me now turn to a more detailed account of these points.

From a theoretical perspective, the most important points of contact between Heidegger and Natorp is their "this-worldliness;" their interpretations of being; and their (quasi-Romantic) interpretation of philosophy's history. By "this-worldliness" I mean that they both believe philosophy analyzes and informs life in the here and now, and is not a contemplation of what one likes to call a "Platonic" realm of abstractions. Their this-worldliness is chiefly expressed in their ontologies: for both, being is a being-in-flux, a being-in-becoming, a being-in-time. These temporalized ontologies whose primary problem is mutation, moreover, lead both thinkers to a conception of philosophy as fundamentally dynamic, though again, they differ in their respective conceptions of this dynamism.

Of course, as I have tried to show, through each of these similarities there runs a *systematic* difference, a difference rooted in Heidegger's radicalization of phenomenology as he found it. To put it in the most reductive terms, Heidegger may be seen as attempting a kind of *fusion* of Natorp and Husserl, but at a *pre-theoretical* level.:

¹ In private conversation, December, 1999.

he injects the neo-Kantian view of being-as-flux into the self-described "static Platonism" of Husserlian eidetics, yet pursues the whole project at the primordial level of *Dasein*: the constitutive relation of time to being (which continues to mystify me) is constructed at the level of *Dasein's existence* in this, its world. For Natorp, "being" means something very else (though equally hard to grasp). "Being" is a function of judgement, of predication. As the ultimate condition of possibility of judgement, it is that whereby we impose order upon the flux of appearance: we bring that flux to "be" just by *judging* it to be constituted by such and such relation(s). Yet these judgements are never final verdicts; as Natorp stresses, they are made only to dissolve and reconstitute themselves again and again from new points of view.

Natorp's "ontology" is scientistic. The judgements he speaks of are those of science and mathematics, in the first place, never those of "everyday experience" or some primordial psychology. Much of Natorp's meaning here escapes me, because I am not familiar enough with mathematics or mathematical physics, but it seems clear that his scientistic being "flows" in several senses. Most obviously, the object-domain of physics is in itself that of motion and change, whether or not we understand this domain empirically or theoretically.² Further, all events may be precisely and mathematically described (i.e. judged), but each such judgement is from a point of view not in itself privileged. Thus scientific thinking can and indeed must continually alter its point of view in order to attain a richer network of relations (*Beziehungszusammenhänge*). It is this network which constitutes, for Natorp, the "interweaving of *ideai*." Hence science is itself "in motion," for it is ever judging anew; and the relations it judges to hold are also "moving," insofar as they are continually reevaluated as the system of relations expands, and as thinking attains to new vantage-points from which to survey the system. Much more should be said; but given the constraints both of time and understanding, I only mention here that Heidegger, too,

² Natorp even argues that mathematics is in flux, but I leave that aside here; cf. Natorp, 1910.

seems to subscribe to this interpretation of science, if not the meaning of being implied by it.³

Let us now turn to their respective interpretations of Plato. The striking similarity here lies in their emphasis on the concept of *logos* as a fundamental *component* of the theory of *ideai*. Since Natorp and Heidegger both (uncontroversially) read Platonic *logos* to mean primarily dialectic, it is perhaps more accurate to say that they interpret the *ideai* in terms of dialectic. Now for all their differences concerning the meaning of this term, their *focus* on dialectic is closely connected with their shared this-worldliness. Indeed, it causes both Natorp and Heidegger to interpret the *ideai* as this-worldly, i.e. not *platonistically* as transcendent substances. As I tried to explain in Chapter Three, the *ideai* are for Natorp not *goals* of reasoning, are not transcendent *things* the ultimate vision of which is merely prepared by dialectic. Rather, they are themselves the vantage points or perspectives which Plato calls *hypotheses*, and so are literally a constitutive moment of dialectic. Specifically, they are possible predicates of scientific judgements; their scientificity depends upon their coherence with other such judgements; demonstrating that coherence is what Plato calls *logon didonai*.

Of course Heidegger rejects Natorp's scientific starting-point, instead maintaining that Plato is attempting something much like his, Heidegger's, own project of fundamental ontology. While, like Natorp, he does not think of the *ideai* or *eidē* as transcendent substances, he instead conceives them as moments of Dasein's awareness of the beings it finds all around it all the time. If we are interested in the being of beings, as Heidegger insists we should be, then we must come to *see* these beings in a special way, a way that illuminates their essence. This seeing, and our capacity for it, is what Heidegger identifies with *nous*. And the way in which we see, i.e. truly penetrate to a being's being, is through *logos*. In order to see something, we have to discuss it,

³ Indeed it is, as I shall argue in a separate paper, precisely Natorp's ideal of a *Stellensystem* as the *Grundbestand* of *Sein* that informs Heidegger's analysis of technology as *Gestell* in "Die Frage nach der Technik," and other essays. Cf. esp. "Wissenschaft und Besinnung," "Die Zeit des Weltbildes."

talk it through, either with others or with ourselves. *Idea* and *eidos* are what we see and understand through this talking (*dia-legein*).

Thus, it is clear that one's interpretation of dialectic's relation to the *ideai* will have consequences for one's interpretation of *nous*. Thus, for Natorp, *nous* is not a power of intuitive seeing, but of "doing" dialectic. As I argued in Chapter Five, this is precisely Heidegger's view as well, at least formally speaking. Only here, because Heidegger operates at the primordial level of analysis, *logos* and *nous* are reinterpreted as pre-theoretical phenomena. Of course, they may express themselves in theoretical modes, and here he seems to agree with Natorp that *Plato's* dialectic just is the theoretical moment of *logos*.

Even so, Plato's "theoretical" *legein*, and therefore also theoretical *noein*, mean something apparently very different for Heidegger than for Natorp. Heidegger understands dialectic not as an activity of judging through which (scientific) objects are constituted or constructed, but rather as a kind of *speech* through which the things themselves are revealed and brought to clarity in their being. Although I know of nowhere that Heidegger discusses it, the slave-boy episode in the *Meno* illustrates his point well. Socrates and the slave-boy together confront a square (more precisely, an image of a square); that is, the square is *given*, and they "look" at it. But what they see and how they see it could not be more different. Socrates brings the boy to *see* the square which he was before *merely* looking at, to see it in a new way, gained through dialectical discourse, which reveals a true feature of its being.⁴ An *idea*, then, on Heidegger's reading is the look of the thing itself as clarified through speech: dialectic is that clarifying, "apophantic" speech. For both Natorp and Heidegger, then, there can be no final or redeeming vision, a feature of their philosophies that opens them to skeptical

⁴ Is the insight into a "truth" about squares enough to count as an "ontological" insight? Or does one have to grasp the essence of square? Put another way, is knowing how to double the area of a given square truly *ontological* knowledge? Whatever the answer, my point is that it is dialectic which allows us to *see*; here perhaps all we see is a truth of squareness, even if it is not yet the essence of square itself. But that essence, too, is to be seen through dialectical articulation.

probing. I cannot enter upon this issue here, except to say that this is the price you pay for rejecting the Husserlian quest for pure and total evidence.

Both Natorp's and Heidegger's readings prompt us, moreover, to ask what "truth" means in Plato. A Natorpian reading will have to answer the question, What does truth amount to if the *ideai* are interpreted as hypotheses, and knowledge is "in motion" and infinitely revisable? Heidegger, on the other hand, faces a different problem. We may find his phenomenological analysis of truth-as-disclosure more or less convincing, and his reading of the cave allegory provocative. But in neither case can we accept his very strange claim that Plato fails to thematize truth "as such." Although time-constraints have kept me from subjecting this aspect of his reading to the critique it deserves, his consistent misreading of the relationship of the *ideai* to the good and the "light" of truth is an interpretive distortion. I believe it is his commitment to the narrative of philosophy's decline, which tempts him so tendentiously, if unconsciously, to bend Plato's words on this matter.

Finally, I want to point out what I take to be the most important consequence of both Natorp's and Heidegger's interpretations, as much as they differ from each other, viz. the relation of *logos* to *nous*, or, to use Kantian terms once more, discourse to intuition. Kant's main criticism of Plato is that Plato believed in intellectual intuition, that is, in the mind's ability to perceive objects directly without the mediation of either sensibility or categories of the understanding. Kant holds that we simply do not have such a power. What I find so interesting about Natorp and Heidegger is that they both integrate the notion of a Platonic form *into* discourse, i.e. *logos* (or dialectic), so that Kant's objection no longer finds traction. For Natorp, the *ideai* are *logoi* or components of *logoi*, and intuition itself is conceived as having a "logical" structure. For Heidegger, Dasein's power of understanding, *nous*, is inherently "sighted," not in a passive sense of receiving impressions, but in an active sense of interpreting and thereby truly perceiving the world around it.

Bibliography.

- Adorno, T. 1966. *Negative Dialektik*. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
- Augustine. 1963. *The Confessions of St. Augustine*. Warner, R., trans. New York: Mentor (New American Library).
- Bambach, C.R. 1995. *Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Barnes, J. 1990. "Heidegger, spéléologue." *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 95: 173-195.
- Beck, L.W. 1950. Introduction to Kant, 1950.
- Becker, O. 1963. "Platonische Idee und ontologische Differenz." In *Dasein und Dawesen*. Pfullingen: Neske.
- Beierwaltes, W. 1972. *Platonismus und Idealismus*. Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann.
- Beiser, F. 1992. "Kant's Intellectual Development." In Guyer, 1992: 26-61.
- . 1987. *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Beneke, F.E. 1832. *Kant und die philosophische Aufgabe unserer Zeit: Eine Jubelendschrift auf die Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Berlin: Mittler.
- Bernet, R. 1990. "Husserl and Heidegger on Intentionality and Being." In *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (May): 136-152.
- Bernet, R., Kern, I., Marbach, E. 1993. *An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Blasche, S., Köhler, W.R., Kuhlmann, W., Rohs, P. (Forum für Philosophie Bad Homburg), eds. 1989. *Martin Heidegger: Innen- und Außenansichten*. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
- Boutot, A. 1991. "L'interprétation heideggerienne du Sophiste de Platon." In: Narcy, M., ed. *Études sur le Sophiste de Platon*. Naples: Bibliopolis.
- . 1982. *Platon et Heidegger: le problème du nihilisme*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
- Brach, M.J. 1996. *Heidegger-Platon: Vom Neukantianismus zur existentiellen Interpretation des "Sophistes"*. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann.
- Brandwood, L. 1990. *The Chronology of Plato's Dialogues*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Brommer, P. 1939/40. *ΕΙΔΟΣ et ΙΔΕΑ: Étude sémantique et chronologique des œuvres de Platon*. Assen: Van Gorcum.
- Brucker, J.J. 1819. *The History of Philosophy*. Enfield, W., trans., ed. London: W. Baynes.
- . 1767. *Historia Critica Philosophicae a Mundi incunabulis ad nostram usque aetatem deducta*. Leipzig: Breitkopf.
- . 1748. *Miscellanea historiae philosophicae literariae criticae*. Augustae Vindelicorum: typis et impensis haeredum Ioannis Iacobi Lotteri.
- Buckley, R.P. 1992. *Husserl, Heidegger and the Crisis of Philosophical Responsibility*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
- Caputo, J.D. 1982. *Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics*. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Carl, W. 1993. *Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference: Its Origins and Scope*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cassirer, E. 2000. *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff: Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik* [= *Gesammelte Werke Hamburger Ausgabe*]. Schmücker, R., ed. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
- . 1973. *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*. Vol. IV: *Von Hegels Tod bis zur Gegenwart (1832-1932)*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
- . 1953. *Substance and Function*. Swabey, W.C., and Collins Swabey, M., trans. New York: Dover. Reprint of the original 1923 English translation of Cassirer, 1910.
- . 1910. *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff: Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik*. Berlin: Bruno Cassirer. (Reprint, 1980. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.)
- Cobb-Stevens, R. 1990. *Husserl and Analytic Philosophy*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Cohen, H. 1928. *Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik*. In *Schriften zur Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte*. Görland, A., and Cassirer, E., eds. Berlin: Akademie.
- . 1916. "Der deutsche Idealismus und die Antike." In Görland, A., and Cassirer, E., eds. Vol. II.
- . 1912⁵. *Ästhetik des reinen Gefühls (System der Philosophie, Dritter Teil)*=Vols. VIII & IX of Cohen's *Werke*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms (1982).
- . 1902a. "Biographisches Vorwort." In Lange, 1902: Vol. I: v-xiii.

- . 1902b. "Einleitung mit Kritischem Nachtrag" (2nd, expanded version). In Lange, 1902, Vol. I: 435-535.
- . 1902c. *Logik der reinen Erkenntnis (System der Philosophie, Erster Teil)*=Vol. VI of Cohen's *Werke*, 2nd edition, 1914. Hildesheim: Georg Olms (1977).
- . 1878. *Platons Ideenlehre und die Mathematik*. In Görland, A., and Cassirer, E., eds. Vol. II.
- . 1871. *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*. Berlin: Dümmler.
- Collingwood, R.G. 1999. *The Principles of History*. Dray, W.H. and van der Dussen, W.J., eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cooper, J.M., and Hutchinson, D.S. 1997. *Plato: Complete Works*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Detienne, M. 1981. *Les maîtres de vérité dans la Grèce archaïque*. Paris: François Maspero.
- Diemer, A. (ed.) 1968. *Beiträge zur Entwicklung der Wissenschaftstheorie im 19. Jahrhundert*. Meisenheim am Glan: A. Hain.
- Dittenberger, W. 1861. "Sprachliche Kriterien für die Chronologie der platonischen Dialoge." In *Hermes* 16: 321-345.
- Dixsaut, M. 1991. "Ousia, Eidos and Idea in the *Phaedo*." In *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger*. Vol. 116, No. 4 (Oct-Dec): 470-500.
- Dostal, R.J. 1985. "Beyond Being: Heidegger's Plato." In *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Jan): 71-98.
- Dummett, M. 1994. *Origins of Analytic Philosophy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Dussort, H. 1963. *L'École de Marbourg*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Ebbersmeyer, S. 1995. "Spekulation." In Ritter and Gründer, eds., 1995: 1356-1372.
- Edel, G. 1994. "Die Entkräftung des Absoluten: Ursprung und Hypothese in der Philosophie Hermann Cohens." In Orth, E.W., and Holzhey, H., eds. *Neukantianismus: Perspektiven und Probleme*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
- Erdmann, B. 1907. *Logik*. Halle: Max Niemeyer.
- Falkenburg, B. 1998. "How to Save the Phenomena: Meaning and Reference in Hegel's Philosophy of Nature." In Houlgate, 1998.
- Farber, M. 1968³. *The Foundation of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy*. Albany: SUNY Press.

- . 1957/1958. "Heidegger on the Essence of Truth." In *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 18: 523-532.
- . 1943. *The Foundations of Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and the Quest for a Rigorous Science of Philosophy*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Faucci, D. 1946. "Una recente interpretazione Heideggeriana del mito della caverna." In *Leonardo*. Milan.
- Fenves, P. (ed.) *Raising the Tone of Philosophy: Late Essays by Immanuel Kant, Transformative Critique by Jacques Derrida*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Fichte, J.G. 1988. *Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre* (1794). Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
- . 1982. *The Science of Knowledge. With the First and Second Introductions*. Heath, P. and Lachs, J., trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Findlay, J.N. 1981. *Kant and the Transcendental Object*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Fistioc, M. C. 2000. *The Beautiful Shape of the Good: A Reading of Kant's Critique of Judgment in Light of Plato's Symposium and Kant's Thoughts on Pythagoras*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago.
- Føllesdal, D. 1969. "Husserl's Notion of Noema." In *Journal of Philosophy* 66: 680-687.
- Frege, G. 1976. *Logische Untersuchungen*. Patzig, G., ed. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- . 1962². *Grundgesetze der Arithmetik*, Vol. I. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
- . 1918. "Der Gedanke." In Frege, 1976.
- Friedemann, H. 1931². *Platon: Seine Gestalt*. Berlin: Georg Bondi.
- . 1914. *Platon: Seine Gestalt*. Berlin: Blätter für die Kunst.
- Friedländer, P. 1954². *Platon: Eidos, Paideia, Dialogos*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- . 1928¹. *Platon: Eidos, Paideia, Dialogos*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Friedman, M. 2000. *A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger*. Chicago/La Salle, IL: Open Court.
- . 1996. "Overcoming Metaphysics: Carnap and Heidegger." In Giere and Richardson, 1996: 45-79.
- . 1992. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Frisk, H. 1960. *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch*. Vol. I. Heidelberg: Carl Winter.

- Gadamer, H.-G. 1994. "Martin Heidegger's One Path." In Kisiel, et al., 1994.
- . 1986-1987. "Erinnerungen an Heideggers Anfänge." In *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften*, Vol. IV: 13-26.
- . 1986². *Plato: Texte zur Ideenlehre*. Translation and commentary by Gadamer. Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann.
- . 1976. *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies*. Smith, C.P., trans. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- . 1965. *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*. Second edition. Tübingen: Mohr.
- Gaiser, K. (ed.) 1969. *Das Platonbild: Zehn Beiträge zum Platonverständnis*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
- Gardiner, P.L. (ed.) 1969. *Nineteenth-Century Philosophy*. New York: Free Press.
- Gethmann, C.F. 1989. "Heideggers Wahrheitskonzeption in seinen Marburger Vorlesungen: Zur Vorgeschichte von Sein und Zeit (§44)." In Blasche, et al., 1989: 101-130.
- Giere, R.N., and Richardson, A.W., eds. 1996. *Origins of Logical Empiricism*=Vol. XVI of *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Görland, A., and Cassirer, E., eds. 1928. *Schriften zur Philosophie und Zeitgeschichte*, 2 vols. Berlin: Akademie.
- Guyer, P. 1992. *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Haack, S. 1978. *Philosophy of Logics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hackforth, R. 1961. *Phaedrus*. Translation, 1952, in Hamilton and Cairns, 1961.
- Hamilton, E., Cairns, H., eds. 1961. *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hamilton, W. 1973. *Plato's Phaedrus*. Hamilton, W., trans. and ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Heffernan, G. 1998. "Miscellaneous Lucubrations on Husserl's Answer to the Question 'was die Evidenz sei!....'" In *Husserl Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1: 1-75.
- Hegel, G.W.F. 1959⁶. *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*. Nicolin, F., and Pöggeler, O., eds. Hamburg.
- . 1955⁴. *Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts*. Hoffmeister, J., ed. Hamburg.

- Heidegger, M. 1997². *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet. Gesamtausgabe* 34 [= GA 34]. Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann.
- . 1993¹⁷. *Sein und Zeit* [= SZ]. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.
- . 1992. *Platon: Sophistes. Gesamtausgabe* 19 [= GA 19]. Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann.
- . 1988. *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit: Zu Platons Höhlengleichnis und Theätet. Gesamtausgabe* 34 [= GA 34]. Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann.
- . 1986. *Seminare. Gesamtausgabe* 15 [= GA 15]. Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann.
- . 1985. *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*. Kisiel, T., trans. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- . 1982. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Hofstadter, A., trans. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- . 1976a. *Frühe Schriften. Gesamtausgabe* 1 [= GA 1]. Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann.
- . 1976b. *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. Gesamtausgabe* 20 [= GA 20]. Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann.
- . 1973. "Seminar in Zähringen 1973." In Heidegger, 1986: 372, ff.
- . 1962. *Die Frage nach dem Ding: Zu Kants Lehre von den Transzendentalen Grundsätzen*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.
- . 1947. *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Mit einem Brief über den "Humanismus."* Bern: Francke.
- Heimsoeth, H. 1967. "Plato in Kants Werdegang." In *Studien zu Kants Philosophischer Entwicklung*: 124-143. Heimsoeth, H., Henrich, D., Tonelli, G., eds. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
- Heitsch, E. 1962. "Die nicht-philosophische ΑΛΗΘΕΙΑ." In *Hermes* 90: 24-33.
- Henrich, D. 1966. "Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht." In *Subjektivität und Metaphysik*. Frankfurt/M.: Vittorio Klostermann.
- Holzhey, H. 1991. "Hegel im Neukantianismus: Maskerade und Diskurs." In *Il Cannocchiale: Rivista di studi filosofici* 1-2: 9-27.
- . 1986. *Cohen und Natorp*. Vol. I: *Ursprung und Einheit*; Vol. II: *Der Marburger Neukantianismus in Quellen*. Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe.
- Houlgate, S., (ed.). 1998. *Hegel and the Philosophy of Nature*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Hughes, H.S. 1961. *Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-1930*. New York: Knopf.

- Husserl, E. 1993^{5a}. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie* [= reprint of 2nd edition of 1922]. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.
- 1993^{7b}. *Prolegomena zur reinen Logik* = Vol. I of *Logische Untersuchungen*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.
- 1980. *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*. Vol. I: *General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology* [= Husserl, 1913]. Kersten, F., trans. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- 1962. *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* [= Husserl, 1913]. W.R.B. Gibson, trans. New York: Collier Books.
- 1954a. *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*. Hua. Vol. VI. Biemel, W., ed. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- 1954b. *Erfahrung und Urteil*. Hamburg: Claassen.
- 1950. *Ideen Zu Einer Reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Vol. I. (Hua. Vol. III.). Biemel, W., ed. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- 1929. *Formale und transzendente Logik*. (Hua. Vol. X.) Halle: Max Niemeyer.
- 1922³. *Prolegomena zur reinen Logik* = *Logische Untersuchungen*. Vol. I, (cited as *Prolegomena*.) Halle: Max Niemeyer.
- 1913². *Logische Untersuchungen [LU]*. Vol. I: "Prolegomena zur reinen Logik." Tübingen, 1993⁷: Max Niemeyer.
- 1913. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*. Halle: Max Niemeyer.
- 1901. *Logische Untersuchungen [LU]*. Vol. II. Halle: Max Niemeyer.
- 1900¹. *Prolegomena zur reinen Logik* = Vol. I of *Logische Untersuchungen*. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.
- Kant, I. 1992. *Lectures on Logic*. Young, J.M., trans. & ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Contains the following cited texts:
Blomberg Logic (*BL*)
Vienna Logic (*VL*)
Jäsche Logic (*JL*)
Dohna-Wundlacken Logic (*DWL*)
- 1990. *Kritik der Urteilskraft (KU)*. Vorländer, K., ed. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
- 1988. *Logic*. Hartman, R.S., Schwarz, W., eds. New York: Dover Books.
(Originally published: Indianapolis, 1974: Bobbs-Merrill.)

- . 1956. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft (KrV)*. Schmidt, R., ed. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
- . 1950. *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. Carus, P., and Beck, L.W., trans. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
- . 1796. "Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie" ("VT"). In *Sämtliche Werke*, Vol. XV: 621-642. Rosenkranz, K., Schubert, F.W., eds. Leipzig, 1838: Leopold Voss.
- . *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*. Academy edition, Vol. VII.
- . *Logik*. Academy edition, Vol. IX.
- . *Reflexionen zur Metaphysik*. Academy edition, Vol. XVII.
- . 1770. *Inaugural Dissertation*.
- Kaufmann, F. 1949. "Cassirer, neo-Kantianism, and Phenomenology." In Schilpp, P.A., 1949: 801-853.
- Kern, I. 1964. *Husserl und Kant: eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Kim, H.P. 1958. "Ernst Cassirer's Concept of Symbolic Forms." Unpublished M.A. thesis, Boston University.
- Kisiel, T. 1993. *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- . 1971. Introduction to Marx, 1971.
- Kisiel, T., et al. 1994. *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Kitcher, P. 1998. "Mill, mathematics, and the naturalist tradition." In Skorupski, 1998a: 57-111.
- Kolb, D., Phillips, L. (trans.) 1981. Introduction and notes to Natorp, 1981.
- Köhnke, K.C. 1986. *Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus: Die deutsche Universitätsphilosophie zwischen Idealismus und Positivismus*. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
- Krois, J.M. 1992. "Cassirer, Neo-Kantianism and Metaphysics." In *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, Vol. 97, No. 4 (Oct-Dec): 437-453.
- Kuhn, H. 1949. "Ernst Cassirer's Philosophy of Culture." In *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*, Schilpp, P.A., ed. New York: Tudor.
- Kusch, M. 1995. *Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge*. London: Routledge.

- Laks, A. 1994. "Platon entre Cohen et Natorp: Aspects de l'interprétation néokantienne des idées platoniciennes." In *Cahiers de philosophie politique et juridique: L'École de Marbourg* 26 (15-53). Presses Universitaires de Caen.
- Lange, F.A. 1902⁷. *Geschichte des Materialismus und Kritik seiner Bedeutung in der Gegenwart*, 2 volumes. Cohen, H., ed. Leipzig: J. Baedeker.
- Laywine, A. 1998. "Problems and Postulates: Kant on Reason and Understanding." In *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Apr): 279-309.
- Lehmann, K. 1964. "Metaphysik, Transzendentalphilosophie und Phänomenologie in den ersten Schriften Martin Heideggers (1912-1916)." In *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Apr): 331-357.
- Lembeck, K.-H. 1994. *Platon in Marburg: Platon-Rezeption und Philosophiegeschichtsphilosophie bei Cohen und Natorp*. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann.
- Levin, D.M. 1970. *Reason and Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Levinas, E. 1973. *The Theory of Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology*. Orianne, A., trans. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Liddell, H.G., Scott, R., Jones, H.S. *A Greek-English Lexicon [LSJ]*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Lindheimer, F.P. 1900. *Beiträge zur Geschichte und Kritik der neukantianischen Philosophie*. 1st series: H. Cohen. Berne.
- Lotze, H. 1989a. *Logik: Erstes Buch. Vom Denken (Reine Logik)*. Gabriel, G., ed. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
- . 1989b. *Logik: Drittes Buch. Vom Erkennen (Methodologie)*. Gabriel, G., ed. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
- . 1912. *Logik*. Vol. III. Misch, G., ed. Leipzig: Felix Meiner.
- . 1888². *Logic, in Three Books, of Thought, of Investigation and of Knowledge*. Bosanquet, B., trans. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Macnamara, J. 1986. *A Border Dispute: The Place of Logic in Psychology*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Marcuse, H. 1968. "The Concept of Essence." Shapiro, J.J., trans. In *Negations: Essays in Critical Theory*: 43-87. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Marx, Werner. 1971. *Heidegger and the Tradition*. Kisiel, T., and Greene, M., trans. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Marx, Wolfgang. 1984. *Reflexionstopologie*. Tübingen: Mohr.

- . 1981. "Konstruktive und kritische Kategorienfunktion. Cohens Umbildung des Kantischen Transzendentalismus zur Forschungslogik." In *Akten des 5. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*. Funke, G., ed. Bonn: Bouvier.
- Mendelssohn, M. 1972. "Enthusiast, Visionair, Fanatiker." In *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. III/1. Bamberger, F., Strauss, L., eds. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag Günther Holzboog.
- . *Phädon; oder, über die Unsterblichkeit der Seele*. In *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. III/1. Bamberger, F., Strauss, L., eds. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag Günther Holzboog.
- Mill, James. 1967². *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, 2 volumes. Mill, J.S., ed. New York: Augustus M. Kelley (Reprints of Economic Classics). (Reprint of Mill, James, 1878.)
- . 1878². *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, 2 volumes. London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer.
- Mill, John Stuart. 1979. *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*. Vol. IX of the *Collected Works of John Stuart Mill*. Robson, J.M., ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press; London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- . 1873. *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, 2 volumes. New York: Henry Holt.
- . 1843. *System of Logic*. London: Longmans.
- Mohanty, J.N. "Husserl and Frege: A New Look at Their Relationship." In Sluga, 1993: 159-170.
- Mollowitz, G. 1935. "Kants Platoauffassung." In *Kant-Studien* 40 (1935).
- Moog, W. 1922. *Die deutsche Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts in ihren Hauptrichtungen und ihren Grundproblemen*. Stuttgart: Ferdinand Encke.
- Natorp, P.* 1994. *Platos Ideenlehre: Eine Einführung in den Idealismus*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner. (Reprint of the 1921a.)
- . 1981. "On the Objective and Subjective Grounding of Knowledge [= Natorp, 1887]." Phillips, L., Kolb, D., trans. In *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Oct): 245-266.
- . 1969². *Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften*. Wiesbaden: Martin Sändig. (Reprint of the 1921b).
- . 1921^{2a}. *Platos Ideenlehre: Eine Einführung in den Idealismus*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.

* The most extensive bibliography of Natorp's vast output is to be found in Lembeck, 1994. Inexplicably, Lembeck does not list Natorp, 1911, which gives a most useful and brief account of the core of his interpretation.

- , 1921^{2b}. *Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften*. Leipzig: Teubner.
- , 1918. "Hermann Cohens philosophische Leistung unter dem Gesichtspunkte des Systems." *Philosophische Vorträge veröffentlicht von der Kant-Gesellschaft* 21. Liebert, A., ed. Berlin: Reuther & Reichard.
- , 1917/1918. "Husserls Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie" (Review). In *Logos*, Vol. 7, No. 3: 224-246.
- , 1913. "Philosophie und Psychologie." In *Logos*, Vol. 4, No. 2: 176-202.
- , 1911. "Genesis der platonischen Philosophie." Reprinted in Gaiser, K., 1969: 58-95.
- , 1910¹. *Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften*. Leipzig: Teubner.
- , 1901. "Zur Frage der logischen Methode. Mit Beziehung auf Edm. Husserls 'Prolegomena zur reinen Logik.'" In *Kantstudien* 6.
- , 1900. "Untersuchungen über Plato's Phaedrus und Theaetet." In *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 13: 1-22.
- , 1899. "Untersuchungen über Plato's Phaedrus und Theaetet." In *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 12: 1-49; 159-86.
- , 1888. *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode*. Freiburg: Mohr.
- , 1887. "Ueber objektive und subjektive Begründung der Erkenntnis" (Erster Aufsatz), *Philosophische Monatshefte* 23: 257-286.
- Oesterreich, T.K. 1923. *Die deutsche Philosophie des XIX Jahrhunderts und der Gegenwart*. Berlin: Mittler.
- Ollig, H.-L. 1979. *Der Neukantianismus*. Stuttgart: Metzler.
- Passow, F. 1831⁴. *Handwörterbuch der Griechischen Sprache*. Vol. I: A-K. Leipzig: Vogel.
- Philonenko, A. 1989. *L'École de Marbourg: Cohen—Natorp—Cassirer*. Paris: J. Vrin.
- Pippin, R.B. 1989. *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Plato. 1997. *Sophist*. White, N.P., trans. In Cooper and Hutchinson, 1997.
- , 1995. *Platonis Opera*. Vol. I (Oxford Classical Texts [OCT]). Duke, E.A., Hicken, W.F., et al., eds. Oxford: Clarendon.
- , 1993. *Plato: Phaedo*. Rowe, C.J., ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- . 1990. *Theaetetus*. Levett, M.J., trans., revised by Burnyeat, M. Indianapolis: Hackett.
- . 1978. *Respublica*. In *Platonis Opera*, Vol. IV. Burnet, J., ed. Oxford: Clarendon.
- . 1974a. *Platon: ΦΑΙΔΩΝ, ΣΥΜΠΟΣΙΟΝ, ΚΡΑΤΥΛΟΣ*. Vol. III. German trans. by F. Schleiermacher. Kurz, D., ed. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- . 1974b. *Republic*. Grube, G.M.A., trans. Indianapolis: Hackett.
- . 1973a. *Der Staat*. Horneffer, A., trans. Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner.
- . 1973b. *Plato's Phaedrus*. Hamilton, W., trans. and ed. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- . 1967. *Platon: Œuvres complètes*, Vol. IV, Part 1: *Phédon*. Robin, L., ed. Paris: Société d'Édition "Les Belles Lettres" [Budé].
- . 1949. ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ. ΦΑΙΔΩΝ. *Platon. Phaidon*. Dirlmeier, F., ed., trans. München: Ernst Heimeran.
- Pöggeler, O. 1990. *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*. Pfullingen: Neske.
- Poma, A. 1997. *The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen*. Denton, J., tr. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Reich, K. 1939a. "Kant and Greek Ethics (I): Kant and Plato." In *Mind*, Vol. 48: 338-354. Walsh, W.H., trans.
- . 1939b. "Kant and Greek Ethics (II): Kant and Panaetius." In *Mind*, Vol. 48: 446-463. Walsh, W.H., trans.
- Rickert, H. 1902. *Die Grenzen der naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung: eine logische Einleitung in die historischen Wissenschaften*. Tübingen: Mohr.
- . 1899. *Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwissenschaft, ein Vortrag*. Freiburg: Mohr.
- Ricœur, P. 1967. *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Ritter, J., and Gründer, K., eds. 1995. *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, Vol. IX. Basel: Schwabe.
- Robinson, R. 1962². *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- . 1953². *Plato's Earlier Dialectic*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Rose, G. 1981. *Hegel Contra Sociology*. London: Athlone Press.

- Rosen, S. 1993. *The Question of Being: A Reversal of Heidegger*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- . 1989. "Anti-platonism." In *Ancients and Moderns*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- . 1988. "Heidegger's Interpretation of Plato." In *The Quarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry*. New York: Routledge.
- Rowe, C.J. 1993. *Plato, Phaedo*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ryle, G. 1971a. "Phenomenology vs. 'The Concept of Mind.'" In *Collected Papers*, Vol. I: 180-81.
- . 1971b. Review of Farber, *Foundations of Phenomenology*. In *Collected Papers*, Vol. II: 215.
- . 1929. Review of *Sein und Zeit*. *Mind*, Vol. 38, No. 151 (Jul): 355-370.
- Sartre, J.-P. 1953. *Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology*. Barnes, H.E., trans. New York: Washington Square Press.
- Scarre, G. 1998. "Mill on induction and scientific method." In Skorupski, 1998a: 112-138.
- Schelling, F. 1856-1861. *Sämtliche Werke*, Schelling, K.F.A., ed. Augsburg: J.G. Cotta.
- Schilpp, P. A. 1949. *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*. P.A. Schilpp, ed. New York: Tudor.
- Schlegel, F. 1958. *Kritische Ausgabe*, Vol. VIII. Behler, E., Anstett, J.J., Eichner, H., eds. München: Schöningh.
- . 1796. "The German Orpheus" Reprinted in Schlegel, 1958, Vol. VIII: 3-10.
- Schleiermacher, F. 1976. *Dialektik*. Odebrecht, R., ed. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- . 1969. Translation of Plato's *Sophist*. In *Platon/Sämtliche Werke*. Loewenthal, E., ed. Köln/Olten: Jakob Hegner.
- Schnädelbach, H. 1983a. *German Philosophy: 1831-1933*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1983b. *Philosophie in Deutschland: 1831-1933*. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp.
- Seung, T.K. 1994. *Kant's Platonic Revolution in Moral and Political Philosophy*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Simons, P. 1995. "Meaning and Language." In Smith and Smith, 1995: 106-137.
- Skorupski, J. (ed.) 1998a. *The Cambridge Companion to Mill*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- . 1998b. "Mill on language and logic." In Skorupski, 1998a: 35-56.
- Sloterdijk, P. 1999. "Regeln für den Menschenpark: Ein Antwortschreiben zum *Brief über den Humanismus*--die Elmauer Rede." In *Die Zeit*, No. 38 (16 Sep): 15 ff.
- Sluga, H. 1999. "Truth before Tarski." In Wolenski, J., Köhler, E., 1999: 27-42.
- . 1993a. "Frege as a Rationalist." In Sluga, 1993b: 215-235.
- . 1993b. *The Philosophy of Frege*. Vol. I. New York: Garland.
- . 1980. *Gottlob Frege*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Smith, B., Smith, D.W., eds. 1995. *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sokolowski, R. 1971. "The Structure and Content of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*." In *Inquiry* 14: 318-350.
- . 1981. "Husserl's Concept of Categorial Intuition." In *Phenomenology and the Human Sciences* 12: 127-141.
- . 1974. *Husserlian Meditations: How Words Present Things*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Stenzel, J. 1956a. "Der Begriff der Erleuchtung bei Platon." In Stenzel, 1956b: 151-170.
- . 1956b. *Kleine Schriften zur griechischen Philosophie*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
- Stewart, J.A. 1909. *Plato's Doctrine of Ideas*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Taminiaux, J. 1985. "Heidegger and Husserl's *Logical Investigations*." In *Dialectic & Difference: Finitude in Modern Thought*, Decker, J., Crease, R., eds. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press/Macmillan.
- Tannery, P. 1925. *Memoires Scientifiques*. Vol. VII. Toulouse: E. Privat.
- . 1899. "La Stylométrie: Ses origines et son présent." In Tannery, 1925: 277-292.
- Tarski, A. 1936. "Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen." In *Studia Philosophica* I (Lwow, Poland): 261-405.
- Taylor, C. 1989. *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- . 1975. *Hegel*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Teichmüller, G. 1879. *Über die Reihenfolge der platonischen Dialoge*. Leipzig: Kohler.

- Topp, C. 1982. *Philosophie als Wissenschaft: Status und Makrologik wissenschaftlichen Philosophierens bei Hegel*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Tragesser, R.S. 1984. *Husserl and Realism in Logic and Mathematics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tugendhat, E. 1988⁴. *ΤΙ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΙΝΟΣ: Eine Untersuchung zur Struktur und Ursprung Aristotelischer Grundbegriffe*. Freiburg/München: Karl Alber.
- . 1970. *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- . 1960. "Tarskis semantische Definition der Wahrheit und ihre Stellung innerhalb der Geschichte des Wahrheitsproblem im logischen Positivismus." In *Philosophische Rundschau* 8: 131-159.
- Vieillard-Baron, J.L. 1988. *Platonisme et interprétation de Platon à l'époque moderne*. Paris: J. Vrin.
- . 1979. *Platon et l'idéalisme allemand (1770-1830)*. Paris: Beauchesne.
- Vuillemin, J. 1954. *L'héritage kantien et la révolution copernicienne: Fichte-Cohen-Heidegger*. Paris: Presses universitaires de France.
- Wagner, H. 1953/54. "Kritische Betrachtungen zu Husserls Nachlass." In *Philosophische Rundschau* 1: 2-22.
- Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. v. 1920. *Platon: Sein Leben und Seine Werke*, 2 volumes. Berlin: Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung.
- Willard, D. 1972. "The Paradox of Logical Psychologism: Husserl's Way Out." In *American Philosophical Quarterly* 9: 94-100.
- Wiley, T.E. 1978. *Back to Kant: The Revival of Kantianism in German Social and Historical Thought, 1860-1914*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
- Wolenski, J., Köhler, E., eds. 1999. *Alfred Tarski and the Vienna Circle: Austro-Polish Connections in Logical Empiricism*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Wolz, H.G. 1981. *Plato and Heidegger: In Search of Selfhood*. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press.
- Wundt, M. 1932. *Die Philosophie an der Universität Jena in ihrem geschichtlichen Verlaufe dargestellt*. Jena.
- . 1924. *Kant als Metaphysiker*. Stuttgart: Friedrich Enke.
- Young, J.M. 1992. "Thought and the Synthesis of Intuitions." In Guyer, 1992: 101-122.

- Zahn, M. 1998. *Selbstvergewisserung: Studien zur klassischen Epoche der Transzendentalphilosophie*. Scherer, M, ed. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neuburg.
- Zeller, E. 1899. "Sprachstatistisches." In *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 11: 1-12.
- . 1877. "Über Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie." In *Vorträge und Abhandlungen*. Second collection. Leipzig.
- . 1862. "Über Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie." In Zeller, 1877.
- Zuckert, C.H. 1996. *Postmodern Platos: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, Strauss, Derrida*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.