BOGOTA'S SOCIAL AND SPATIAL TRANSFORMATION AND ITS LEGACY

Ellen Heshusius – McGill University – Master in Urban Planning – Supervised Research Project – Summer 2014

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ABSTRACT

Few cities have experienced major transformations as the one Bogota, the capital of Colombia, had during the mayoral administrations of Antanas Mockus and Enrique Peñalosa, form 1995 to 2003. This positioned Bogota as an example of 'best practice' in urban planning, and as a model for other cities to follow. However, more than ten years have passed and there is a lack of work on the aftermath of said period. This paper examines the changes that occurred and evaluates whether or not the policies and plans set during those eight years had continuity. The research is informed by a literature review and interviews to nine public officials, who worked for the city during these administrations. It focuses on the social and physical changes the city underwent, as well as changes in governance and the leadership styles of Mockus and Peñalosa. The report then outlines what remains from this transformation and takes a look at the future challenges for the city, concluding with a set of recommendations to ensure the continuity of successful plans and policies. From the many lessons drawn, the most relevant include the importance of government accountability, corruption control and active public involvement.

RÉSUMÉ

Peu de villes ont connu de transformations majeure telle que celle de Bogota, capitale de Colombie, au cours des mandats des maires Antanas Mockus et Enrique Peñalosa, de 1995 à 2003. Cette métamorphose a fait de Bogota un exemple en matière de « Bonnes Pratiques » en urbanisme, ainsi qu'un modèle à suivre pour d'autres villes. Plus de 10 ans se sont cependant écoulés depuis et bien peu de travail a été accompli suite à cette période. Cette étude examine les changements qui se sont opérés et évalue si les politiques et plans mis en œuvre durant les huit années de travail de ces deux maires ont eu une continuité. Les recherches s'appuient sur un examen de la documentation sur le sujet ainsi que sur les interviews de neuf responsables publics ayant servis pour la ville durant ces mandats. Le rapport expose par la suite les grandes lignes de ce qui reste de ces transformations et porte un regard prospectif sur les futurs défis qui attendent la ville, concluant avec une série de recommandations afin d'assurer la continuité et le succès des politiques et plans mis en œuvre. Parmi les multiples leçons tirées, les plus pertinentes incluent l'importance de la responsabilisation du gouvernement, des mesures de contrôle de la corruption et d'une implication active de la population.

RESUMEN

Pocas ciudades han tenido grandes transformaciones como la que tuvo Bogotá, la capital de Colombia, durante las alcaldías de Antanas Mockus y Enrique Peñalosa, desde 1995 hasta 2003. Esto posicionó a Bogotá como un ejemplo de "buenas prácticas" en materia de urbanismo, y como un modelo a seguir por otras ciudades. Sin embargo, más de diez años han pasado y hay una falta de trabajo sobre lo que ha pasado después de dicho período. Este artículo examina los cambios que ocurrieron y evalúa si las políticas y los planes establecidos durante esos ocho años tuvieron continuidad. La investigación es

apoyada por una revisión bibliográfica y entrevistas a nueve funcionarios públicos, quienes trabajaron para la ciudad durante estas administraciones. El trabajo se centra en los cambios sociales y físicos que la ciudad experimentó, así como en los cambios en el gobierno y los estilos de liderazgo de Mockus y Peñalosa. Luego, el informe describe lo que queda de esta transformación y echa un vistazo a los retos del futuro de la ciudad, concluyendo con una serie de recomendaciones para garantizar la continuidad de planes y políticas exitosas. De las muchas lecciones aprendidas, las más relevantes son la importancia de la rendición de cuentas del gobierno, el control de la corrupción y la participación activa de la población.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ACRONYMS

CAI: *Centros de Atención Inmediata* (Centers of Immediate Attention)

DANE: *Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística* (National Administrative Department of Statistics)

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

IDB: Inter-American Development Bank

PNUD: *Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo* (UNDP, United Nations Development Programme)

POT: *Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial* (Territorial Legislative Plan)

UPJ: *Unidades Permanentes de Justicia* (Permanent Units of Justice)

NOTES TO THE READER

In this text, the masculine form of articles is used to improve clarity and brevity.

All the interviews and much of the literature are originally in Spanish. Translations from this language to English are of my own.

The Research Ethics Board I of McGill University granted a Certificate of Ethical Acceptability of Research Involving Humans (REB File #: 369-0214) for the field survey and the interviews performed during the winter 2014 semester in Bogota.

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Definition of the problem

In most cases, urban planning processes – evaluation of the planning problem, public consultations, strategizing, plan proposals, implementation — take years and sometimes even several decades to produce tangible outcomes. There are, however, some outstanding cases where cities almost miraculously are transformed (PNUD, 2008). Bogotá, the capital of Colombia, is one of those extraordinary cases in which, within a period of only five years (1995-2000), the city underwent a metamorphosis, going from "the worst city in the planet"(Dalsgaard, 2009) to "a model of development"(Berney, 2010, p. 1). As a result, it has become the object of several studies that focus on the changes that occurred and on evaluating if the same strategies and practices can be applied to other cities around the world. However, as is shown in this research report, the impressive physical and social change that occurred in Bogota was possible thanks to a set of core constitutional and legislative changes made during the 1980s and 1990s (some introduced by Mayor Jaime Castro (1992-1995)) that allowed two forward-thinking mayors, Antanas Mockus (1995-1997 and 2001-2003) and Enrique Peñalosa (1998-2000), to turn Bogota around.

In 2014, Bogota continues to be an international example, but unfortunately the city itself does not seem to have continued on the same innovative path. From the moment when Mockus' successor, Luis Eduardo Garzón (2004-2007), became the mayor of Bogota, the city returned to a downward cycle, as is manifest in its crippled infrastructure and the lack of investment in any major construction projects for the last ten years (Semana, 2014).

These two sides of the story, a city that is an example of 'best practice' and one that seems to be stuck and even decaying, brings up the question of whether the changes experienced were permanent, if they left any kind of legacy, or if it was just a period of glory that is now part of the past.

1.2. Objectives of the research

The transformation of Bogota has been researched both inside and outside academia and it is viewed as a worldwide example of successful planning; however, there is a lack of work on what occurred after the third mayoral administration (2001-2003) that defined the city's metamorphosis. To learn from the case, Bogota's planning should also be considered in terms of the long term effects. As such, the main objective of my research is *to contribute to evaluating the institutional conditions for successful planning and to identify elements that ensure that successful policies and plans have continuity and longevity*.

To reach this objective, the first part of the investigation aims to identify the changes that took place and the key elements that defined the transformation. The research focuses on the administrations of Antanas Mockus and of Enrique Peñalosa, and touches upon Mayor Jaime Castro's critical role in paving the way for the city's metamorphosis. After having a clear picture of what happened between 1992 and 2003, the goal will be to evaluate what remains, with the purpose of identifying the ways in which the city has kept on

evolving in terms of urban planning and assessing if it has continued on the path that was set during those eight years of progress. With that information, the goal is to detect the challenges that the city will have to face in the future and the instruments that could help carry on the legacy of said period.

1.3. Methodology

The objectives of the investigation were reached following three approaches. First, a literature review was conducted in order to identify the work that has been done on the transformation of Bogota. This review contributed to understanding the situation of the city before 1995 and to creating an overall picture of the changes that took place during the administrations of Mockus and Peñalosa.

Following this, two main topics were identified as main factors that contributed to the radical metamorphosis of the city. These are: the changes in governance and the different styles of leadership. A literature review in these subjects was conducted in order to have background and theoretical pieces that signal the importance of these matters in successful urban planning.

In order to have a broader and more informed view on what occurred from 1995-2003, and to have a clearer assessment of the legacy of this period, nine interviews with public officials[1] who worked with Mockus and Peñalosa were conducted over a two week period during the last week of February and the first week of March of 2014. The discussions were divided into five main parts:

1. The past: description of their jobs and objectives, changes in governance, leadership and the role of citizens, and examples of strategies used to achieve their objectives and turn them into actions.
2. Difficulties and obstacles: difficulties encountered in achieving goals, weaknesses of the administration and/or the processes followed, and how to remedy or avoid the obstacles encountered.
3. The legacy: ways in which urban planning and the role of planners changed, and the main things that remain from the administrations.
4. Ensuring continuity: strategies and tools used to ensure continuity in Bogota, and how to make good urban planning policies sustainable and continuous, in any context.
5. The future of the city: views on the future of the city given the transformation it underwent and what has happened in the last ten years.

All the conversations were recorded and then transcribed into text format, and are used throughout the report in the form of quotations and citations.

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[1] As explained in chapter 5, each time a new mayor is elected all public officials are replaced. From the interviewees, only Carmenza Saldías continued to work as Planning Director after Mockus' second period was over.

1.4. Structure of the Report

The report is divided into five parts. In the first section I give a general description of Bogota's context before 1995, continuing with a look at its social and physical transformation.

This context is followed by two chapters that take a deeper look at the changes in governance before and during the administrations of Mockus and Peñalosa and their leadership styles. Each of these chapters includes a literature review of theoretical papers on each of the topics, as well as a description and analysis of what occurred in Bogota with respect to each of the subjects. The fifth chapter focuses on the legacy of these administrations and the different views of the city's future, as given by the interviewees. In the final part of the research, the report concludes with a set of recommendations and lessons learned that could be useful for policy makers and government officials of Bogota or of other cities that have a similar context, with a particular focus on changes that ensure the success of good urban policies and their longevity.

2. BOGOTA: WHAT IT WAS AND WHAT HAPPENED

Bogota, the capital of Colombia, is located in the center of the country (Figure 1), atop the Andes mountain range, at an altitude of 2640 m (Figure 2). Limited by the Eastern Hills and the Bogota River on the West, the city's growth has been naturally restricted to the North and South directions (Figure 1). With a population of almost 8 million people (DANE), the capital is the largest city in the country and a major magnet for internal immigrants (Skinner, 2004), who are adding to its rapid growth into a megalopolis (PNUD, 2008). As the nation's capital, Bogota is the country's most important administrative and financial center, making it the biggest contributor to the country's economy (Skinner, 2004).

Figure 1. Bogota's location

Source: (Whereig.com, 2011)

LEGEND
Localities
Main Streets
Airport
Bogota River
Eastern Hills

Figure 2. Bogota's downtown and the Eastern Hills (The Andes)

Source: (Montes)– Proexport Colombia

2.1. The city before the change

During the early 1990s, Bogota was a city undergoing a severe crisis. It was dominated by crime, murders, high levels of corruption, poverty, and drug cartels; the city's finances were at an all-time low; and water and electricity coverage was declining and the areas that were served had constant electrical blackouts (Berney, 2010; Gilbert, 2006). In terms of its physical aspects, the infrastructure was crumbling, there was reduced open space, the sidewalks were used for parking, people took over public land for their own purposes (for instance they would take over the land in front of their houses and claim it as private land to be used for commercial purposes) (N. Yaver, interview). The problem of the lack of public space was worsened by the fact that it is a "very dense city" (Berney, 2010, p. 542) where many people live in pirate subdivisions that are often completely disconnected from the city's networks. In addition, there is a very strong social and economic divide between the high and low *estratos* (division of economic classes). The quality of life of a rich person is very different from that of a poor one and the physical structure of the city and the lack of public space exacerbated these differences. For instance, if we look at rich people's houses they have private social areas (living room, dining room) within them and, in addition to that, they could have access to open spaces by being members of private clubs (Berney, 2010). In contrast, poor people rarely have enough space to have a living room and they had no space to exercise or relax (Dalsgaard, 2009), limiting their lives to working and sleeping, which increased the populations' inequality and the level of frustration and dissatisfaction with their lives (G. Peñalosa, interview).

This situation was the result of a series of short and unstable plans for the city. From 1923 to 1990, fifteen plans where created, giving each plan a validity of four and a half years on average. In addition, the plans focused on specific areas of Bogota, never seeing the city as a whole, which gave way to an erratic and inconsistent development of the city (Roa, 2006). This lack of comprehensive urban planning, an absence of civic culture, and a weak presence of the state, led Bogota's citizens to lose "their faith in their leaders" (Dalsgaard, 2009) leaving them to accept the burden that it was to live in the chaos that characterized Bogota. As former mayor of Bogota, and president of Colombia, Virgilio Barco put it: "Of that thriving city that I ruled, today there is only a great urban anarchy, a tremendous chaos, an immense disorder, a colossal mess. I have witnessed the degradation of its neighborhoods and the appalling quality of the services, and I'm unable to understand where the resources generated by the forty taxes that a middle class family of Bogota has to pay, end up" (Virgilio Barco, quoted in Martin, Ceballos, & Ariza, 2004, p. 65). Bogota seemed "totally hopeless" (Enrique Peñalosa, quoted in Kraul, 2006, p. 1) with no way out of that reality. However, the political campaign and the elections of 1994 would change the path the city would take for the next eight years.

During Jaime Castro's mayoral administration (1992-1995) several changes, such as an increase of the independence and power of the Mayor of Bogota as well as works towards the improvement of the city's finances, were essential in order to open the path for the transformation of the city to take place. These policies were continued by Mockus, as part of a process fully described in chapter 3. Social and physical changes were concentrated in the 1995-2000 period. As mentioned by Rafael Obregón, during an interview, the city

can be seen as a theatrical play that needs both actors and a scenery, Mockus got the actors ready (social transformation) and Peñalosa created the scenery (physical transformation); during Mockus' second administration (2001-2003) both elements continued to grow together to make the play.

2.2. A new era for Bogota

2.2.1. The social transformation

The citizens of Bogota were tired of living the consequences of an absent state that had led the city to become into chaos. Then, in 1994, the 'crazy' (as many have called him) former rector of the National University, Antanas Mockus[2], ran for office. He symbolized an alternative to the traditional political body that had ruled the city. While people saw traditional politicians as people who were just interested in achieving their private goals and obtaining personal benefits, Mockus was an academic who had never been involved in politics, had no links to any political party, and seemed genuinely interested in making the city a less "hostile" place (Dalsgaard, 2009).

Mockus came to office with the idea of changing the way people lived in the city; his objective was to create a 'civic culture' (Montezuma, 2005), for he believed that the main issue in Bogota was that people were only focused on the self and not on the community. Efraín Sánchez (interview), former Director of the Observatory of Urban Culture of Bogota, explains that the root of this 'civic culture' is based on the fact that people have obligations before rights and this was a change in the way people understood their role in the city, because they were shown that in order to obtain what they wanted they first had to give something. According to Sánchez, the first obligation is respect; respect for others and respect for the physical environment. In this way, people started to realize that for the city to be a better place to live, everyone had to contribute. Working with this rationale, Mockus came up with completely unorthodox strategies to transform the way people behaved in the city.

Having an academic background, he decided to change society through education and not repressive policies (Montezuma, 2005). A challenge that he faced was that Bogota is the capital of Colombia, a country that has been at war against drug trafficking and guerilla movements for over 60 years, and the idea that problems could only be solved through violence was a concept that many believed to be true (R. Londoño, interview). Therefore Mockus started to show that even though one could be furious there was always a way to solve problems through pacific means and agreements (E. Sánchez, interview). For example, during a political debate he threw a glass of water in another candidate's face to show that, even though he was mad, there were ways to show the anger without really hurting the person and then you could just apologize for doing that (Dalsgaard, 2009). One of the most famous strategies was when he placed playful mimes all over the

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[2] Mathematician from Dijon University (France), Master on Philosophy from the National University of Colombia, and PhD. Honoris Causa from the Paris VIII University and from the National University of Colombia (CorpoVisionarios).

city to teach people how to use crosswalks and prevent cars from blocking intersections, which usually has the effect of increasing the rage of drivers. They would "shame motorists into heeding stoplights and crosswalks" (Kraul, 2006, p. 2), and people took it humorously, initially seeing it as a game and not realizing the changes that were taking place (E. Sánchez, interview). Given the success of this campaign, Guillermo Peñalosa (interview) suggested that he could train 300 *soldados bachilleres*[3] to do what the mimes where doing in a few corners of the city. However, Mockus answered that what he needed was for every person to have a mime inside their heads telling them what to do. This made the media play a central role in the strategy, as they divulged the effects of the campaign throughout the city. The essence of these methods was to educate the inner child in everyone, for, according to the mayor, if it was done correctly, the lessons would be learned and embraced easily (C. Saldías, interview). Through these kinds of innovative means, Mockus was able to make people realize that the way they acted in the public realm affected not only their lives but society as a whole, and so simple changes, such as using crosswalks or not stopping your car in intersections, would actually make the city a more pleasant place in which to live.

However, not all policies were based on using fun ways to teach how to live in the city, as there were also some that addressed severe safety issues, such as the high crime and murder rates. Though Colombia is a country that has both a civil war and criminal gangs in its cities, Mockus argued that crime was also present within society:

> Crime is caused not only by professional criminals but by social aggression, arguments that get out of hand, often when alcohol is involved, [...] my approach was that all of us have a rude person inside of us and it's our job to regulate him (Antanas Mockus, quoted in Kraul, 2006, p. 2).

Through this vision and with policies like the *hora zanahoria*[4] (carrot hour), which prohibited selling alcohol after 1:00am, and the banning of production and sales of fireworks, he was able to significantly reduce violence, injuries and deaths within the city. As stated by Gilbert:

> In 1993, Bogota was undoubtedly a very dangerous city with 80 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, marginally above the Colombian national average. Twelve years later the rate had fallen to 23; a consequence of better policing, a disarmament policy, a public education campaign, a period of reduced opening hours for drinking spots and a general clampdown on drunkenness (Gilbert, 2006, p. 397).

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[3] *Soldados bachilleres* are young men that have just graduated from high-school and have to fulfill the requirement to serve the army for one year. The majority serve in urban areas.
[4] In Colombia to be *zanahoria* (carrot) refers to a person who is healthy, who does not drink alcohol or take drugs, and who does not "party" much.

In sum, all his actions were pointing towards teaching people that if they *self-regulate* (meaning that each person has the power to control their own actions) then the city would transform itself (Guillermo Peñalosa in Dalsgaard, 2009).

By taking the academy to the government and surrounding himself by a group of knowledgeable people who supported his ideas (Martin et al., 2004) and using an educational approach – "sixty one percent said citizen education was the administration's most important initiative" (Montezuma, 2005, p.3) – Mockus was able to transform society in Bogota and create a 'culture of citizenship' that was inexistent before his administration. Though Mockus left his position before his term was over in order to run for president, his administration had a remarkable impact on the society of Bogota. The changes he accomplished are seen as deep ones that made people modify their perspective on their leaders, who they found could be trustworthy, and showed that the city could be better (C. Escallón, interview). This experience gave the opportunity to another independent candidate with a very concrete vision of the city (N. Yaver, interview) to become its mayor, Enrique Peñalosa.

Peñalosa is more directly linked to the physical transformation of the city than to social change (see below). It is important to note, however, that Peñalosa built on the social transformation that Mockus had initiated and he continued to make it grow through the use of other methods. As said by Peñalosa in Dalsgaard's documentary, the way cities are built determines to a large extent the degree of equality, social justice and happiness for millions of people and for many generations. He used the construction and alteration of public space as a means to teach the people how to act in public spaces, promoting "correct behaviour defined as respectful and civic-oriented behaviour, such as peaceful co-existence and picking up your own trash" (Berney, 2010, p. 549). Signage was spread throughout the city, showing people how to behave. These simple signs worked because people had already seen the effect that a positive change in attitude had in their environment.

When Mockus came back to office he continued several of Peñalosa's projects but used his own unorthodox strategies to keep on educating the society of Bogota. This time Mockus' motto was *Life is Sacred*, a motto he wanted everyone to embrace (R. Londoño, interview). This campaign included things like painting a black star on the ground of every place someone had died due to being run over by a vehicle; people were made aware of the number of deaths caused by car accidents. Then, in 2003 the Club el Nogal, a high-class social club in Bogotá had a terrorist attack. The attack consisted of the explosion of car bomb that killed 33 people and injured approximately 200 people (Semana, 2003). The city was hit again by the reality of the country's war. In reaction to this, Mockus promoted a pacific march showing the citizens' resistance and pleas for peace. Everyone wore white shirts and the words 'life is sacred' invaded the streets of the city (E. Sánchez, interview). These kinds of marches, which continued to be used as a way to show opposition to violence, became a symbol of what Mockus had wanted to teach the citizens (R. Londoño, interview).

At the end, the success of the campaigns used showed that the government can influence a change in culture, not only with laws and regulations, but also through educational campaigns, which in many cases can be more effective than strategies that rely on repressive methods (E. Sánchez, interview).

2.2.2. The spatial transformation

In 1997, Enrique Peñalosa came into office with the mission to transform the physical aspect of the city. He built on what Mockus had created, but he had very different goals. As pointed out by Guillermo Peñalosa on Dalsgaard's (2009) documentary, Enrique Peñalosa wanted to develop the vision of Bogota that he had had in mind for years, which would be carried out with the help of the best executives in the country; the city was now run as if it was a company (Dalsgaard, 2009; Montezuma, 2005).

Community and collective life were the main principles that drove Peñalosa's vision. While in line with Mockus' work, Peñalosa wanted to build the space so that people could actually interact with each other, live and recreate, an important difference in orientation. As pointed out earlier, thanks to the work done by Castro and Mockus, the city's finances were in a much better state, giving the new mayor the opportunity to invest in increasing and recovering the existing public space. By improving the infrastructure he addressed the social exclusion generated by the economic disparity of the population, fulfilling the objectives to improve the quality of life as well as creating democratic and inclusive places (G. Peñalosa, interview).

Peñalosa's interventions can be divided into three different scales: the city-wide (around 270 km of bicycle lanes, Transmilenio[5]), the neighborhood (parks, 'points of encounter') and the individual (e.g. signs in parks) (G. Peñalosa, interview; Berney, 2010, p. 547). They can also be divided into three groups according to their function. The first and most recognized interventions were in terms of mobility; these included an incredible network of exclusive bike paths and Transmilenio (Figure 3), which is an efficient and comfortable mass-transit system (Berney, 2010). A second type of intervention was the 'hybrid hubs,' places that integrated cultural (libraries) and recreational spaces (plazas or parks) by placing one beside the other (Berney, 2010, p.548). These hubs were built mainly in or near poor neighborhoods, with the purpose of investing in less privileged areas, and also creating icons throughout the city that would attract people from all economic backgrounds to interact and share the same space (Dalsgaard, 2009; Gilbert, 2006). These investments had inestimable impacts. Before Peñalosa's administration the city had one metropolitan library and during his period in office three world-class libraries were built, and the construction of a forth one was started (G. Peñalosa, interview). The third type were the educational spaces, which sought to create urban areas in which people would learn how

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[5] BRT (bus rapid transit) system that consists of articulated buses that operate on exclusive lanes in main arteries of the city. It has elevated stations and it conceptually works as a metro on the ground level.

to act and interact in public spaces (Berney, 2010). As mentioned before, creative signage was the main method used to instruct people how to behave in these places[6].

Figure 3. Transmilenio BRT

Source: (TransmilenioS.A., 2007)

Source: (Vega, 2014)   Source: (Wikipedia, 2000)   Source: (Naparstek, 2007)

In addition, during his time in office, the service network improved drastically as "virtually the whole of Bogota now has access to mains electricity and there are relatively few blackouts or cuts in the service. Access to water and sewerage has improved dramatically in recent years" (Gilbert, 2006, p.394). There were also investments in the public school system, both by building more schools[7] and also working to ensure that the quality of education was better and that fewer students would drop out. Guillermo Peñalosa (interview) explains that they conducted a pilot project in which they identified the best schools of the city and asked them to administer 50 public schools. The program was a complete success, as the percentage of students who graduated from the selected public schools dramatically increased from 20% to 90%.

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[6] These interventions where financed through the use of local and government allocated national funds. This is further elaborated in chapter 3, sections 2 and 3.

[7] Funds that were supposed to be invested in the construction of highways were used to build 50 high-quality schools in the poorest neighborhoods, with facilities that were as good as the ones the most expensive private schools of the city had. (Peñalosa, 2011)

During the three years that Peñalosa was mayor of Bogota, the city went from a urban area with crippled infrastructure, to a construction site, to a city with an exemplary bus rapid transit system, world-class public libraries, cultural centers, and refurbished and reclaimed urban space giving "equity in terms of resources, amenities, and social interactions" (Berney, 2010, p. 549). This shift generated a civic pride that was unprecedented for the city and drew the attention from experts around the world, who were eager to learn from what occurred during this period, something that was completely unimaginable five years before.

As Mockus came back to office, he kept a third of Peñalosa's cabinet in order to continue with his successful programs and his vision of the city's infrastructure. These ideas were also made clear by the first *Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial*, POT (Territorial Legislative Plan), written in 2000, to promote the continuity of the construction of the city with a unified and overarching vision (Berney, 2010). For the first time, all the different systems of the city were planned to work together as a comprehensive system, giving a clear image of the future of Bogota (J. Salazar, interview). During this period, several of the construction works and projects that had been initiated during Peñalosa's administration continued to be built, including 40 *troncales* (arterials of Transmilenio), in addition to the 40 that were constructed during Peñalosa's administration (M.I. Patiño, interview), giving continuity to physical development of the city.

2.3. Conclusion

There is no question that after the administrations of Mockus and Peñalosa, Bogota was transformed into a much better city than anyone could have imagined. Observers note, for example, that: "The proof of the turnaround is in the attitudes of the residents. Polls show that citizens who once overwhelmingly saw life here as a cross to bear are hopeful about the future and happier to be here"(Kraul, 2006, p. 2). This metamorphosis was possible because for the first time both mayors had a clear vision of the changes they wanted to make. Bogota was a city where former mayors would invest in projects that "could yield fast results and visible achievements" (Berney, 2010, p. 542), instead of investing in large scale projects, because they wanted the visibility and political status of seeing them finished before their administrations were over (J. Salazar, interview). In contrast to this approach, Mockus and Peñalosa both clearly stated their vision of the city during their campaigns and they followed through with their plans, which was something that was lacking in the planning of the city before they came into office. Furthermore, the fact that there was some sort of continuity between Mockus' and Peñalosa's administrations, as they had "several aligned goals" (Berney, 2010, p. 541), was essential to the success of the process. In fact, as mentioned by Hector Riveros, the Head of Cabinet for Peñalosa's administration, when his term was almost over and other campaigns for the next election started, part of the strategy was to identify which candidate would represent continuity (Dalsgaard, 2009). As a result, Peñalosa decided to support Mockus' second period, who, in return, kept several members of Peñalosa's cabinet.

Along these lines, both mayors had an interest in how public space should be used and how people should behave within a community. Mockus modified people's attitudes

almost without spending a dime, while Peñalosa used the refurbishment of existing spaces and the construction of new ones as effective means to deliver collective resources and as an ideal instrument to reach out to citizens (Berney, 2010). However, just building new plazas and parks would not have been enough, as there would be a risk that they would become focal points for crime (city was safer but it was not perfectly safe yet). By acknowledging this risk, Peñalosa paired the infrastructure interventions with recreational programming, such as soccer tournaments and aerobics classes in parks throughout the city, which made people realize that the public space was theirs and that they had a right to use it in an adequate and respectful way: "The right to the city, which citizens nominally had, could not be exercised prior to the transformation of the city. The city streets and other public spaces were simply too unsafe to use and there was little communal spirit to draw people out" (Berney, 2010, p. 551).

Looking at the whole process, it becomes clear that without the social changes that Mockus had started the construction works would have been less successful. In fact, many agree that it seemed as if the 'stars aligned' (G. Peñalosa, J. Salazar, R. Obregón, interviews) such that the city could have a remarkable transformation. By 2006, the city's case had become an international example and its process was recognized by receiving the Golden Lion Award for Cities in the 10th Biennale di Venezia. This price was awarded to Bogota because it was identified as the "most intelligent city, which looks at the future in a serious way, in a Third World country with problems of poverty and crime, but that has been able to relaunch itself thanks to some inspired politicians" (Richard Burdett, quoted in www.bogota-dc.com, 2006).

The next sections will go through the internal changes that occurred within the government so that this transformation was possible, as well as the obstacles and difficulties that Mockus' and Peñalosa's teams had to deal with in order to be able to relaunch the city, giving a "sign of hope for other cities, whether they are rich or poor" (www.bogota-dc.com, 2006).

3. GOVERNANCE

3.1. Definition and strategies for good governance

Governance has been defined by many authors who offer varying interpretations of the term depending on the field from which it is studied. The World Bank has come up with a definition, "the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources" (Weiss, 2000, p. 797), that has been accepted by several scholars as being the base of what the term can encompass. The World Bank has also identified three aspects that must be taken into account when studying the governance of a county: first, the form of the political regime, second, the way in which authority is exercised and third, the capacity of the government to design, formulate and implement policies (Weiss, 2000). Though this definition is rather managerial and administrative, giving great importance to the processes of regulation, coordination and control in order to achieve administrative improvement (Leftwich, 1993), it is useful to keep it in mind in order to study the changes in governance in Colombia that took place before and during the administrations of Mockus and Peñalosa.

In urban planning, governance is defined in terms of the management of the city, known as 'urban governance'. Pierre (1999, p. 374) describes this concept as the process of "blending and coordinating public and private interests." Cars, de Magalhaes, Healey, and Madanipour (2002) give several interpretations of urban governance including the "process in which local political institutions implement their programs in concert with civil society actors, and within which these actors and interests gain (potential) influence over urban politics" (Cars et al., 2002, p. 5). The definition of urban governance clearly falls within the description of governance given by the World Bank; however, the difference between the two terms lies in the fact that civil society is included in the concept of urban governance, giving citizens a prime role in the development and management of cities.

Within the literature on urban governance the importance of 'mega-city-regions' is highlighted. These regions resulted from the increased growth rates of cities, creating urban areas that are "administratively separate but intensively networked, and clustered around one or more larger central cities" (Xu, 2011, p. 5). Many have become national engines of economic growth, which shows that it is imperative to understand the role of cities within their surrounding region, and analyze the existing dynamics between neighboring urban areas, in order to achieve the full potential of these regions. To understand the forces that affect the governance of urban areas, the global scale must also be taken into account. As several authors have pointed out (Cars et al., 2002; Castells, 1999; Sassen, 2004), the world's economy is becoming increasingly globalized and this has led to cities being in constant competition, for they are the physical representation of the global network. Cars et al. (2002) state that in response to this increased competition, elites should look for strategies that increase the attractiveness and competitiveness of their city, to prevent it from being pushed out of the network, which would result in the city's economic and social downfall (Castells, 1999).

In order to evaluate if the governance of a country or a city is good or bad, the World Bank has come up with six dimensions to define 'good governance'. These will be used in an evaluative manner when analyzing the case of Bogota. The six dimensions are:

1. Voice and accountability (VA), the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media
2. Political stability and absence of violence (PV), perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including political violence and terrorism
3. Government effectiveness (GE), the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies
4. Regulatory quality (RQ), the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development
5. Rule of law (RL), the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence
6. Control of corruption (CC), the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.

(Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2006, p. 4)

Clearly all of these indicators can show if the governance of a city is 'good or not'. However, within these dimensions for good governance there are no indications on how to ensure it. Leftwich (1993) notes that good governance and democracy are essential for the development of societies, and that to achieve positive outcomes, it is essential to have a competent, non-corrupt and accountable public administration. Along the same lines, Lessmann and Markwardt (2010) state that corruption is the biggest barrier to for good governance and in order to reduce the levels of corruption there is a need for independent institutions that act as a "supervisory body that strengthens accountability of bureaucrats" (Lessmann & Markwardt, 2010, p. 632); free press is considered by them as the most appropriate means to achieve a free flow of information between bureaucrats and civil society.

Faguet (2004), Gilbert (2006), and Lessmann and Markwardt (2010) concur in the idea that decentralization is a governmental structural change that can also lead to better governance, for it can influence the decrease the levels of corruption, bring greater efficiency and increase the government's accountability. Theoretically, decentralization helps to narrow the gap between government officials and the local population. Hence, it

should be used as a strategy to increase the responsiveness to local needs, because it tailors the "levels of consumption to the preferences of smaller, more homogeneous groups" (Faguet, 2004, p. 632). Moreover, neoliberal thinking has also encouraged the delegation of more power to local governments (Gilbert, 2006). Neoliberals also suggest that democratization is essential to good governance, because by giving the people the right to vote they will judge the performance of the government and they will be "thrown out if they did not deliver public goods effectively" (Leftwich, 1993, p. 609). In addition, having more political competition will also lead to more pressure against corruption, as politicians will become aware that they have higher chances of losing their position (Lessmann & Markwardt, 2010). Another benefit of democracy is that it gives the opportunity for more responsible and innovative leaders to become the driving force behind change (World Bank, 1995). Likewise, enabling re-elections can also help reduce corruption because politicians will have the incentive to be more accountable and perform well in order to maintain the support of the citizens, and therefore keep their post (Alesina, Carrasquilla, & Echavarría, 2000).

However, there are several problems to decentralization. To start, it is important to mention that that in many cases it is not enough to decentralize a country to the city level because in order to actually have a more direct contact between bureaucrats and local citizens, there is also a need to decentralize within cities. For instance, according to the DANE (*National Administrative Department of Statistics*) the population of Bogota in 2014 is close to 8 million people, showing that the city should be decentralized so that the government officials actually have closer contact with the local population. However, according to Lessmann and Markwardt (2010, p. 632) too much decentralization could have negative impacts because having close connections "allows local interest groups to have a greater impact and facilitates a higher level of corruption in decentralized countries," indicating that decentralization does not ensure a decrease in corruption levels. This shows that though decentralization can lead a country to achieve the six dimensions of good governance defined by the World Bank, it is a structural reform that is extremely dependent on the context (Faguet, 2004; Lessmann & Markwardt, 2010). For a government to be successfully decentralized it is imperative to help develop the capabilities of the staff in professional and technical terms so that they have the capacity to formulate policies that match decentralized responsibilities, to connect with citizens, and to efficiently perform at a local scale (World Bank, 1995).

Despite the governmental structure of a country, good governance can be attained by striving to achieve most of the following features:

> an efficient public service; an independent judicial system and legal framework to enforce contracts; the accountable administration of public funds; an independent public auditor, responsible to a representative legislature; respect for the law and human rights at all levels of government; a pluralistic institutional structure, and a free press (Leftwich, 1993, p. 610)

It is also essential that public officials are competent, independent, that they have strong moral values and that the "bureaucratic elite has the genuine developmental

determination and autonomous capacity to define, pursue and implement developmental goals" (Leftwich, 1993, p. 620). The government should also be accountable and transparent, which can be achieved through the constant monitoring of bureaucrats, improving the responsiveness of the government. Likewise, it is vital to have clear rules of behavior (Steinberg, 2005) that give the people the power to determine and communicate their wants and needs, and that give them the criteria to evaluate the performance of their public officials. This will allow citizens to decide if public officials should be replaced by politicians that will actually be accountable, effective and who will make good use of resources for public gain.

3.2. Fiscal and Institutional Changes

At the beginning of the 1990s, Bogota's major weaknesses were its politics and its financial standing. Leaders were unreliable and corrupt, and even if they wanted to do something, the city was bankrupt (Gilbert, 2006). However, there were several factors that helped improve the situation.

In terms of politics, up until the end of the 1980s the mayor of Bogota was appointed by the president of Colombia (Gilbert, 2006). In a country where corruption and political alliances were the rule, the mayors would usually support the vision of the party in power, even if it was not aligned with what was good for the city. In 1986, the legislation was changed; the first democratic election for City Mayor was held in 1988 (RegistraduriaNacional, 2010). Having elections opened the possibility to "compel governments to be more accountable, less corrupt and hence more efficient developmentally, for they would be judged on their performance and thrown out if they did not deliver public goods effectively" (Leftwich, 1993, p. 609). Another positive aspect of this shift is that "elected mayors are much more responsive to local needs than mayors appointed directly by the national president" (Gilbert, 2006, p. 392). Reforms like this one, and giving more power to local authorities over tax collection, were amongst the first changes towards the decentralization of the national government. The 1991 Constitution formalized the decentralization of powers by authorizing the popular election of governors and fomenting public participation (Pening, 2003). New committees and associations were used to open spaces for public participation, including the "Regional Planning Councils; spaces for participation in health like the Oversight Committees of the Subsidized Regime; User Associations; Committees of Community Participation" (Pening, 2003, p. 160)[8].

The case study of Colombia shows that satisfaction with the government and local services improved notably after decentralization (Faguet, 2004). However, there were still issues at the local level, for the political structure allowed the city council to completely overshadow city mayors; "they could not raise taxes and they had to constantly strike deals with councilors because their own position depended on their relationship with those councilors" (Gilbert, 2006, p. 403). Leftwich (1993) points out that for there to be good governance there is a need for the legislative, executive and judicial powers to be clearly

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[8] According to Maldonado (2001) these spaces for public participation have stayed at a formal level; their performance has been very poor and in many regions they are still inexistent.

separate. This division of powers at the city level was not clear until Jaime Castro came to office in 1992 and, finding himself completely powerless, advocated for the Organic Statute. This administrative reform gave the mayor the instruments that would allow him to perform his duties, promote the comprehensive development of the city, and contribute to the improvement of the quality of life of its citizens (Martin et al., 2004). As a consequence of the approval of this statute, now the position of the mayor of Bogota is considered the second most powerful in the country (Gilbert, 2006).

In addition, there were legislative changes that would give more importance to urban planning in the country (C. Escallón, R. Obregón, J. Salazar, N. Yaver, interviews). In chronological order, in 1989 Law 9 was approved and it had the objective to "achieve optimal conditions for the development of cities and their areas of influence, in the physical, economic, social and administrative aspects of municipalities with more than 100,000 people" (C. d. Colombia, 1989). Then came the Constitution of 1991 which declared that public space should be protected by the state and it must be considered a common good (G. d. Colombia, 1991, Chapter III, Article 82). The last important change was the creation of the Law 388 of 1997 which, in addition to updating some aspects of the Law 9, had the objective to establish mechanisms that allowed municipalities to promote the structuring of their territory, the ability to guarantee the establishment and defense of public space, as well as environmental protection and disaster prevention (C. d. Colombia, 1997). As a result of these changes, during his time in office, Jaime Castro elaborated the first land-use plan, helping to shift the attention of the city from private properties to the public land (Berney, 2010; Kraul, 2006).

As mentioned before, in the early 1990s the city's finances were in a terrible state. Jaime Castro contributed to the improvement of the fiscal situation by putting in place new taxes, such as a levy on gasoline, as well as a better tax collection system (Gilbert, 2006). Also, the country's constitution declared that "local governments would receive 'a specified portion of the national government's current income to municipalities – 14 percent in 1993, increasing annually until reaching 22 percent in 2002'"(Hoskin, quoted in Gilbert, 2006, p. 396), which signified a great financial boost, one which would be essential for the physical changes that would take place during Peñalosa's administration and Mockus' second period.

3.3. Governance in Bogota 1995-2003

In this section the six dimensions of 'good governance' presented by the World Bank are employed as a framework to evaluate the governance of Bogota from 1995 to 2003, using the interviews done as the main source of information. Having done this, other changes in the governance of Bogota, which do not necessarily fit into these six parameters, are analyzed.

3.3.1. The Six Dimensions for Good Governance

In terms of *voice and accountability* one of the main reforms mentioned in the preceding chapter was the fact that since 1988 people were able to voice their political support by democratically choosing the mayor of Bogota[9]. This allowed independent candidates to run for office and for new leaders to change the dynamics of power, form a government dominated by corruption and nepotism, to one where academics and the top executives of the city worked for the city without any interest in private gain (Dalsgaard, 2009).

Additionally, the Observatory of Urban Culture was created as a means to "take the pulse of the city" (R. Londoño, interview). By using surveys, the Observatory was able to monitor constantly how the city was doing, evaluate if the educational campaigns were working or not, and make the necessary changes to the chosen strategies if the results did not show that they were achieving their objectives (R. Londoño, interview). Likewise, *Bogotá Cómo Vamos* (Bogota, how are we doing) an independent surveying system was created in 1997, based on the 1991 Political Constitution's mandate that invited citizens to exercise social oversight of the public administration. This survey was also created to monitor the fulfillment of the campaign promises made by the mayor elect during his campaign (Sanchez, 2003).

Looking at the *political stability and absence of violence,* it is important to highlight that in spite of being in a country that is at war, the position of the mayors was relatively stable from 1995-2003. However, there were two cases in which there was some instability. First, following the success of his term in office, Mockus decided to resign to his position in April 1997 in order to run for president of Colombia. However, the law of Colombia states that when a mayor renounces the post he must present three candidates, of his choice, to the president who will choose one as the new mayor, who will finish the term. This procedure allowed one of his close colleagues, Paul Bromberg, to continue with the programs and policies that had been established in the preceding years (C. Saldías, interview). In the second case, there was more political instability and violence. During Peñalosa's mandate there was a moment when he found himself in a very unstable position caused by two of his most emblematic and controversial interventions, the construction of Transmilenio and the *Parque Tercer Milenio* (Third Millennium Park). In the case of Transmilenio, part of the intervention was to get rid of all the regular buses on the main roads of the city and replace them with a new, less polluting and more effective transportation system. For the *Parque Tercer Milenio*, the intervention included relocating thousands of people who lived in the center of the city in a place called *el cartucho*, which used to have the biggest concentration of drug consumption and trade in the city. Peñalosa saw the idea of rehabilitating that space as a way to integrate the city, as it was creating a barrier between the south (poor) and the north (rich). In 2000, one year after relocating the people that lived in *el cartucho,* all its former residents decided to come back and voice

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[9] In Colombia political parties and movements are financed by the state and by natural persons (up to 10%). The law has established the maximum amount of money that can be spent in electoral campaigns, depending on the position the candidate is running for, in order to control election spending (Sánchez, 2011).

their dissatisfaction with the changes that had occurred and with the way they had been treated during the relocation. The bus drivers that disagreed with Transmilenio joined the protest and the city went through a disastrous period with people setting fires in the center of the city and shooting guns as a way to demonstrate their disapproval (Dalsgaard, 2009). As Alicia Naranjo said on an interview with Dalsgaard (2009), Peñalosa wanted to change the citizen's concept of public space, but no one understood what public space was. Clearly the problem was that, while Peñalosa had a vision of what he wanted the city to become, he hardly used citizen participation in order to collaboratively build the city, and this lack of communication and public participation was what led to this massive protest that almost resulted in his removal from office. Peñalosa also had a difficult relation with the congress, which made his position at that time even more unstable (N. Yaver, interview). Luckily his dismissal did not come through, because for this to happen legally in Colombia there must be proof that the mayor has not executed what he promised during his campaign (Dalsgaard, 2009).

The first point that stands out in terms of *government effectiveness* is that the quality of public services (water, sewage, electricity) increased dramatically during the administrations of Mockus and Peñalosa, reaching a coverage of around 95% of the city (E. Sánchez, interview). This was possible in part because of the city's improved finances, which is a process that started during Jaime Castro's administration and continued in the hands of Carmenza Saldías, the Secretary of Finance of Bogota from 1995 to 1997. In addition to work done to improve methods to collect taxes[10] Saldías highlighted during an interview that one of the most important tasks they accomplished was to build a map of the city that included all the cadastral land of the city[11]. By having all this in order, City Hall could collect taxes more easily and from everyone, and also could assess the conditions people in which were living and provide services as needed.

The high quality of the civil service and of policy formulation for implementation is something that can be considered a strength of both Mockus' and Peñalosa's administrations. As we have seen, during his first time in office, Mockus focused on civic culture because he did not really know about the other aspects of the city (R. Londoño, G. Peñalosa, E. Sánchez, interviews); and though there were no tangible changes, even though tax collection increased, everyone knew that nothing was being stolen (M.I. Patiño, interview), which was a big change to what had been occurring from Castro on backwards (R. Obregón, interview). Though Mockus' policies were unorthodox, people saw their effects and changes that were taking place and, though initially everyone was very skeptical, in the end they supported him (Montezuma, 2005). As for Peñalosa's administration, though we have seen that there were some issues with the implementation of policies, there is "no doubt that he was completely committed to his policies and the vision he had of the city" (G. Peñalosa, interview, translation by author). In this case people

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[10] Including educational campaigns teaching people why it was important to pay taxes, as well as simplifying the procedure and forms to pay taxes.
[11] When Saldías got to office there were only 300 thousand properties recorded when actually there were 600 thousand properties. She states that now the city has one of the most complete property censuses of Latin America, enabling the government to tax nearly 95% of people that own land.

actually saw the physical changes of the city occurring in front of their eyes, providing evidence that their money was being spent on infrastructure that would benefit them (N. Yaver, interview). By the time Mockus became mayor again he had more knowledge about the city and had surrounded himself with experts who continued the plans set by Peñalosa; plans evolved from there, and the administration was able to complete the cycle from tax collection to execution of works. As explained by Saldías, "you first need to clarify why taxes are needed, I make you feel good for paying them and I congratulate you, of course I control you and I look at my cadastral map to verify who paid and who didn't, but at the end I give you what you need so that you can see that it's worth it to pay."

Within this dimension of good governance, the independence of political pressure is a point that is twofold. It is clear that Mockus and Peñalosa were independent when taking decisions, for neither one of them belonged to a traditional political party that dictated what they should do. On the other hand, though there were constitutional changes that state that City Hall, headed by the Mayor, is part of the executive branch (its role is to execute), and that City Council is part of the legislative branch (its role is to ensure norms are followed) (G. Peñalosa, interview), every project should be approved by City Council in order to be able to use the resources needed for its execution (M.I. Patiño, interview). City Councilors usually belong to established political parties and will vote for what the party stands. However, the issue was that since Councilors were corrupt and clientelistic, the Secretaries job was made very difficult for they would have to present projects several times because they would refuse to do any personal favors to the councilors (M.I. Patiño, G. Peñalosa, N. Yaver, interviews).

The *regulatory quality* of the governments and their ability to formulate and implement policies and regulations to promote the development of the private sector can be seen through two main strategies, financial improvement and decentralization of investment. A main goal during Mockus' first administration was to achieve a good standing of the city within the world market. Carmenza Saldías says that the work done in order to improve the tax collection system of the city was part of this bigger strategy; Saldías was preparing the city so that she could present it to the global financial system. In this way, Saldías was able to achieve the risk certification in 1995, which allowed the city to ask for international credits, and in 1996 the World Bank granted Bogota the first credit signed by a city. This positioned Bogota in the international market and made it attractive to investors. In addition to this, she worked with the Council for Region and Competitiveness on a strategic plan to increase the regional exports, as well as creating associations like *Bogotá Emprende* (Bogota Entrepreneur), where entrepreneurs are trained to make their companies more successful, and *Invest in Bogota*, an agency that focuses in attracting foreign investment. In an interview Saldías pointed out that, during Mockus' second term, there was great attention given to see the city as part of a region that could have the power to pull the economy of the whole country. As it can be seen, the financial strategies to position the city in the financial world and highlighting the importance of viewing Bogota as being part of the region, are very much in line with the concepts presented by Castells (1999), Sassen (2004) and Xu (2011).

During Peñalosa's administration there were fewer initiatives to promote the development of the private sector. As stated by Saldías (interview), when she was Planning Director, during the second administration of Mockus, one of the first changes she did to Peñalosa's POT, was to integrate the financial aspect to the plans for the development of the city. Still, the decentralized location of libraries and development of new schools, during Peñalosa's administration, enabled the empowerment and education of Bogota's lower classes (N. Yver, interview). José Salazar (interview) mentioned that before the POT was conceived, schools were built in random places without studying their impact on society or evaluating which would be the best place to build them. This decentralization of investment gave the opportunity of lower income communities to be part of the economy, by reducing the disparity between higher and lower classes. Furthermore, as Mockus had suggested during his first administration, it was important that the city would be a 'flirty city' (*ciudad coqueta*) (Dalsgaard, 2009), so that people would feel proud of their city and so that it would draw more international attention. Therefore, investing in the city's infrastructure, and consequently making the city more appealing would attract higher inflows of capital.

However, the Human Development Report presented by the PNUD (2008) suggests that although the city was able to achieve an important financial position, it is still not producing as much GDP as it should. Sixteen percent of the Colombian population lives in Bogota, and the city produces 22% of the GDP of the country. If this is compared to Sao Paulo which has 8.6% of the population of Brazil and produces 36% of the GDP, or Mexico City which has 14.2% of the population of the country and produces 33.6% of the GDP, it becomes evident that Bogota should keep on working towards incentivizing the development of the private sector (PNUD, 2008, p. 15). Still, the district has a limited set of actions it can take to improve its economic growth. For instance, strategies to deal with unemployment are still the national government's responsibility (Gilbert, 2006), which shows that the city needs to be more autonomous in financial aspects in order to actively and freely promote growth (PNUD, 2008).

In terms of the *rule of law*, corruption was pervasive at all levels of Colombian society, including the police. In Bogota the head of the police is the mayor of the city and since Mockus was completely against corruption, one of his first actions was to dismantle the corrupt Metropolitan Police. He asked 3200 officers to leave their post, and from those only 400 accepted to be trained as mimes to help organize the traffic of the city. This was not an easy task; police commissioners denied corruption and pressured Mockus to stop the program. However, he did not give in and was able to replace the police body (Dalsgaard, 2009). As mentioned before, campaigns such as the *hora zabahoria* and the disarmament policies, which were continued during Peñalosa's administration, had a major impact in reducing the levels of crime and violence.

Peñalosa's approach to dealing with conflict was based on the idea that better spaces would make people respect public space and each other. As Nadime Yaver mentioned in an interview, the impact of the improvement of public spaces could be seen in many ways. Once, Yaver and her team, observed a homeless man, who would usually throw the garbage on the floor, walk through a new park and throw the garbage in a trash can; and this kind of actions them see that changes to physical space had a direct impact on

behavior. Additionally, in order to further address issues of safety and coexistence Peñalosa established programs to strengthen the police by training them to deal with issues such as conflicts within communities, domestic violence and child abuse. To effectively deal with these problems Peñalosa placed 50 *Centros de Atención Inmediata,* CAI (Centers of Immediate Attention) throughout the city, and started building 30 more. During Peñalosa's administration they detected a lack of places where it would be easy to sanction people that had violated norms of conduct. To fill this void they created the *Unidades Permanentes de Justicia,* UPJ (Permanent Units of Justice), where people could be retained for maximum 36 hours. These places worked through the active and coordinated participation of several bodies such as the Nation Attorney General, the National Institute of Legal Medicine, Forensic Sciences, the Metropolitan Police and Social Welfare (Peñalosa, 2000).

Though all these were important efforts to reduce the likelihood of crime and violence, it is important to mention that, while Bogota has a population of nearly 8 million people, the city only has 6 thousand policemen. This high citizen-policeman ratio shows the importance of the culture of citizenship programs and the impact they had, for the decline in crimes and violence is mostly due to self-regulation (C. Saldías, interview). Along the same lines, Yaver (interview) mentions how people used to put fences around the land in front of their houses, claiming it as their own even though it was public land. This practice was accepted because people would assert that the fences were used in order to protect themselves from burglars and crimes. In the process of reclaiming public land, Yaver and other public officials working in the office for Public Space, had to deal with this misconception and teach people the importance of knowing their neighbors in order to protect each other protecting each other. In this way, people became less indifferent towards other people and to what happened in their surroundings.

The last index for good governance is *control of corruption*, which was a difficult issue for both Mockus and Peñalosa. Most of the interviewees stated that this was the biggest barrier to achieving their goals, as corruption is an accepted practice within the Colombian government (Dalsgaard, 2009); the modus operandi of most city councilors is to get jobs and do favors for friends and relatives. However, Mockus stated from the beginning that he and his term would be completely transparent without favoring anyone simply because of a recommendation (R. Londoño, interview). This created tensions and opposition from City Council, as it can be seen from statements such as that of Aida Arella (councilor) in Dalsgaard's (2009) documentary, where she says that "what the mayor cannot demand of us is that we all think exactly the way he does," showing how embedded and accepted corruption and private interests were.

Guillermo Peñalosa (interview) stated that on his first day at the office as Commissioner of Parks, Sport and Recreation everyone introduced themselves as representatives of someone or as recommended by someone. He then decided to evaluate the 20 people who were going to work for him and from 20 he only kept 2 because they were the only ones who had the competencies needed to fulfill their jobs. Every time he fired someone he received a phone call from a councilor saying that it was right to fire that person, but that the councilor had other CVs that could be of interest. When Guillermo Peñalosa

rejected them, the councilors would get furious. The experience of Maria Isabel Patiño (interview) is another example of the corrupt culture of the councilors. After going to the City Council numerous times to present the same project, Maria Isabel Patiño was approached by one of the councilors, who told her she would be heard if she took a look at some CVs. She affirms that the experience was terrible, having to go there and, after waiting for hours, having to stand up in front of people who will not listen to you. However, Mockus' and Peñalosa's government officials found unorthodox ways to deal with this, either going to City Council until the councilors got tired and heard them (G. Peñalosa, N. Yaver, interviews), by calling the councilor's homes to talk to their wives or kids so that they would know what the councilors were doing (M.I. Patiño, interview), or eventually by finding a way to achieve a consensus without damaging the spirit of the project (anonymous, interview)[12].

A remarkably strong strategy that affected the government as a whole was that once Carmenza Saldías improved Bogota's financial image in the in the international scene, and the city was granted loans by the World Bank, then city finances were monitored by foreign entities. As stated by Lessmann and Markwardt (2010) to have good governance there is a need, among other measures, to monitor bureaucrats in order to control corruption. Though they mention that the media is a good body to do this, corruption was accepted within society. However, according to Saldías, once the city had international credits it started to be constantly monitored by the World Bank, the IDB, and risk rating agencies. Though one may have reservations regarding these institutions, the fact that politicians were now being observed from the outside helped reduce the levels of corruption (C. Saldías, interview).

In the end, the efforts made to have transparent administrations resulted in the support from the population and a change in society towards intolerance of corruption (R. Londoño, interview). Without control of corruption and the improvement of the city's finances, Peñalosa could not have executed his vision of the city. People believed in both Mockus and Peñalosa because they saw the city being transformed, evidencing the honest and efficient use of resources for the improvement of the city (R. Londoño, interview).

3.3.2.Innovation and advancement in governance

The *six dimensions of good governance* provide a good guide to evaluate the governance of a country or a city, but there are still some changes in governance that do not fit into these parameters. In Bogota's case, there were another three important changes in governance that took place during Mockus' and Peñalosa's administrations.

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[12] These cases took place when the projects had been presented but not approved because they were not in line with what the councilors thought would get them more votes. For example, one of them believed that having fences around parks would get him more votes, so, at the end, they decided to give in and added railings around parks so that their project would be approved.

First, during Mockus' time in office there was a clear change in the way institutions within City Hall worked, because for the first time there was coordination between all of them (R. Londoño, interview). They were all supposed to work under the 'three systems of behavior regulators':

> There is a formal system, a system of laws, meaning that I follow the law because I admire it and not because I'm afraid of it, but without a doubt many people follow it because of fear of the law. The second regulatory system is what we call the 'social control'. This is when I act because of social admiration or because of fear of social rejection. And the third one is moral, my own, which is when I act in order to make myself feel better, or on the negative side, because of guilt. This means that when I do something it will hopefully be within the boundaries of the law, the boundaries of what society has established as permissible and obviously within my own boundaries (M.I. Patiño, interview).

Therefore everything, every decision, every action, had to be contained within these three systems. For example, if they were going to sign a contract they would have to make sure that it was legal, that it would benefit society and that the one who signed the contract would consider it as a good decision.

A second concept that was deeply ingrained during Mockus' administrations was the notion that 'resources are sacred.' As one of the objectives of the administration was to improve the city's finances, it was essential that people within the administration internalized the fact that money was not an infinite resource and that their salaries were coming from taxpayers that were expecting something in return (Caballero, 2009). To increase the awareness of the scarcity of resources, an exercise would be carried out, in which all the Secretaries and Directors working for the city would have the same number of plastic coins which they could give to one or several initiatives, or projects, they supported the most. These coins could be put towards one or several projects, but once all the coins were used the people who participated in the game would have no more power. This scared people but at the same time it made them realize that not everything can be done and that you need to prioritize (C. Escallón, interview).

A third fundamental change was the one driven by compliance to Law 399. Before passing this law Bogota had had completely disarticulated urban plans and there was no vision of what the city could become (Roa, 2006). Therefore, the first objective of the POT was to gather everything together to come up with a model of the city. This model was built based on the concepts of respecting city life and culture, while envisioning a compact city with an efficient transportation system and high quality public space (J. Salazar, interview). According to Salazar and Yaver, entities were not accustomed to planning ahead and therefore inefficiencies such as paving a road and then breaking it soon after to put in water pipes were common. When building schools the contractors would just ask how much money was available and would say how many schools could be built without any regard to where the schools should be constructed. The POT became a tool that allowed to project the future of the city and to organize all its systems in a harmonic, comprehensive and organized way, and Peñalosa gave the plan its ideological value (J.

Salazar, interview). However, the POT is only a tool that has no capacity to change the city. At present, the Development Plan, which is a document that includes the proposals made by a newly appointed mayor, is the only document that should be followed and mayors are bound to produce results depending on the objectives and goals of this plan. Still a positive outcome of having to create a realistic POT to comply with Law 399, in addition to reconstructing the cadastral map of the city, gave the opportunity to update and improve the collection of information needed to effectively plan the city (J. Salazar, interview).

3.4. Conclusion

Examining the case of Bogota, it can be argued that the political and legal reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s allowed for later improvements in, governance of the city. The legal changes and the structural reforms headed by Castro opened the path for two independent leaders to become mayors of the city without whom, it is safe to say, the quality of governance would have stayed the same.

One of the main issues with the governance of the city was the corrupt and clientelistic dynamics of the Council, which posed a great barrier for both Mockus' and Peñalosa's teams. Theoretically decentralization – one of the major structural changes that took place in Colombia – is a good strategy to help reduce corruption, however when Mockus and Peñalosa got to power they found a tremendously corrupt state. Extensive work was done in order to break these dynamics down but they were unable to achieve a thorough change[13]. The experiences of the interviewees, show that it is imperative to ensure that the relationship between the executive (City Hall) and the legislative (City Council) bodies is less corrupt, smoother and more transparent. Nevertheless, further decentralization could still be a strategy to reduce corruption, by actually strengthening the links between politicians and locals. As Clemencia Escallón pointed out in an interview, "Bogota has one city mayor and several neighborhood mayors, but who knows who their neighborhood mayor is? The answer is no one."

This last point shows that mechanisms to increase public participation and allow citizens to have a strong voice may make enhance the impact of institutional changes. As communities are empowered they can demand more accountability and force public officials to change their culture of corruption. However, for citizen involvement to be effective there must be community boards and organisms that have the interest and the decision-making power to have positive impacts (Hambleton & Howard, 2013). Only through permanent citizen participation, monitoring, feedback and supervision will there be a substantial improvement of the quality of governance, making it the efficient, open and accountable public service it should be. Still, no significant change occurs without destabilizing the status quo (Leftwich, 1993), and this requires a particular kind of leaders to institute and sustain the change, which takes us to the next chapter where we will analyze the types of leaders Mockus and Peñalosa were.

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[13] Guillermo Peñalosa and Maria Isabel Patiño had very similar experiences with the Council. Peñalosa worked during the first administration of Mockus and Patiño during the second one, showing that there was no real change in between these two periods.

4. LEADERSHIP

4.1. Leadership Styles

Literature on successful urban leadership and leadership styles is less extensive than that on urban governance. However, relevant concepts were found in literature of both city and organization leaders, which provide notions that can easily be adapted to the understanding and analysis of the way city mayors work. Still, it must be taken into account that an effort has been made to differentiate political leadership from other types of leadership by defining it as: "persons who exercise control over the behavior of others so as to move them in the desired direction" (Edinger quoted in Getimis & Hlepas, 2006, p. 178) and "the ability to inspire or persuade others to follow a course of action where there is at least some initial resistance to following it" (Leach & Wilson quoted in Getimis & Hlepas, 2006, p. 178). We can further differentiate urban leaders from other types of leaders because they must have the "ability to make choices, but within the parameters imposed both by local political arrangements and by the external forces" (Judd quoted in Getimis & Hlepas, 2006, p. 177). Successful political leadership is likely to be determined by the leader's personal traits as well as the context in which he exercises his power. It is important to take this into account because as Judd (2000) suggests, when there is a crisis it opens the door for new types of leadership styles to emerge, as citizens will start seeking leaders that can improve their situation, which is what happened in Bogota after the crisis of the early 1990s.

Hambleton and Howard (2013) argue that approaches to leadership have evolved over time and that there have been four major approaches. First there is the 'Great Man' theory of the 19th century, which places emphasis on the right personality traits that a leader must have. In the 20th century, this way of thinking was challenged by the notion of 'scientific management', which stressed the importance of leaders designing procedures to control and monitor worker's performance. A third approach took into account the motives and feelings of workers, even though they were still being exploited. The fourth approach, cuts across the other three, and it recognizes that there is a need to "tune in to the context both within and outside their organization" (Hambleton & Howard, 2013, p. 49).

These four approaches are still present in most of the literature on leadership (Hambleton & Howard, 2013). For instance, Getimis and Hlepas (2006) have identified different types of leaders based on their personality traits, making reference to the 'Great Man' theory. In their work they present two specific categories which efficiently characterize urban leaders: strategic and reproductive. The strategic leader is one who believes that municipal action should be used in order to address and resolve economic and social imbalances. He sets clear long term goals for the city, which he introduces to the municipal policy-making process, while finding ways to support and foster cooperation to achieve them. In addition, strategic leaders have a positive posture towards changes and innovation, and tend to attract resources to encourage new projects in communities. Specific terms that help to characterize a strategic leader are: change oriented, proactive, long term vision, and capacity builder.

The other type of leader described by Getimis and Hlepas (2006) are reproductive leaders, who will work to protect and keep the things the way they are, for they think that constant changes create more problems than what they can solve. These leaders stand out for their immediate and suitable response to emergencies. A reproductive leader can be summarized as someone who safeguards the status quo, who is reactive, and who focuses on short term strategies.

Getimis and Hlepas (2006) also differentiate between the ways the mayors lead, creating two other categories that focus on their attitudes: cooperative and authoritarian. Cooperative leaders are those who include others to determine the agenda, generate support from the community and play a crucial role in the mobilization of the civil society, in order to enable several actors to participate and interact in the decision making process. On the other hand, authoritarian leaders have more of a 'command and control' approach, determining the municipal agenda unilaterally.

By combining the two types of leaders and approaches to leading Getimis and Hlepas (2006) present four different styles of leaders:

1. Visionary: strategic and cooperative
2. Consensual facilitator: reproductive and cooperative
3. City boss: strategic and authoritarian
4. Protector: reproductive and authoritarian

To understand the different types of leadership, Hague, Wakely, Crespin, and Jasko (2006) argue that though aspects of the old technological knowhow and established routines and relationships are valuable, nowadays it is essential that leaders master skills that allow them to be creative, challenge assumptions and grasp the bigger picture. Likewise, good leaders are those who value communication and interaction with citizens, and who seek to integrate all stakeholders into the decision-making process (Hague et al., 2006) in order to successfully formulate projects and programs that represent the true priorities of the city and not just isolated projects or initiatives that respond to the personal interests of their leaders (Steinberg, 2005).

The literature emphasizes that one of the major challenges in leadership is to gain and retain trust from citizens (Caldwell, Hayes, & Long, 2010), and therefore they "must raise their standards, demonstrate their character, and meet the expectations of a cynical but increasingly complex world" (Caldwell et al., 2012, p. 176). Those who earn credibility do so by combining two necessary qualities: character and competence (Caldwell et al., 2012). A good character is closely related to the level of charisma a leader has, meaning that he is ethical, has a strong personal bond with his followers who he inspires to transcend their own self-interests for the good of others (Brown & Treviño in Caldwell et al., 2012), and serves as a visible model of moral values and principles. The competence of a leader is measured by his ability to design and implement programs that pursue virtuous cycles, and by his skills in establishing systems that sustain and support organizational values (Caldwell et al., 2012). In addition, by being politically committed and by having bureaucratic competence, independence and strong moral principles, an effective leader is able to remove barriers that impede the achievement of goals (Hague et al., 2006; Leftwich, 1993).

Leaders who possess these two qualities will be able to have people's trust, but in order to retain this trust it is important for them to have the capacity identify the different stakeholders, the resources available and the culture; such capacity allows the leader order to understand the context and be able to come up with goals and strategies that are rooted in the realities and constraints of a specific place (Hague et al., 2006). The importance of creating context based policies is central in the case of mayors, because as civic leaders their function is "'place based', meaning that those exercising decision-making power have a concern for the communities living in a particular 'place'" (Hambleton & Howard, 2013, p. 54).

Though the above mentioned characteristics will help to gain the trust of both the citizens and the people that work in city hall, it is also important to mention that workers need to see that the leader has integrity (meaning that he adheres to a set of principles the workers find acceptable) in order to see him as a role-model to follow (Caldwell et al., 2010). Additionally, when employees are trusted by their leader and are treated in terms of their worth value, they will feel committed to their jobs and therefore adhere to the same set of values their leader has (Caldwell et al., 2010), which may result in better outcomes.

The leadership types presented in this chapter can characterize good and effective leaders in any place of the world. However, there are moments when there is a need for leaders who will destabilize the status quo of a city, as suggested by Leftwich (1993), and these types of leaders are not within the categories given above. Caldwell et al. (2012) present the idea that *transformative leaders* are the ones able to carry out this task, for they make people rethink and question longstanding assumptions of the way cities should work. By being able to see beyond the current realities, they empower others to pursue noble purposes (Choi, J. in Caldwell et al., 2012), making them fulfill their potential to "create a better world" (Caldwell et al., 2012, p. 178). In addition, transformative leaders have a "ferocious resolve" to meet unachieved outcomes needed to transform a city (Collins, J. in Caldwell et al., 2012), while examining themselves when there are problems, and acknowledging the work of others when there are positive results. The image of mayors portrayed by Barber (2013) indicates that the mayor's post can enable transformative leaders to achieve their goals. Barber (2013) argues that city mayors occupy a privileged position because they do not have to belong to a political party and therefore they can be independent, which allows them to pursue objectives that can completely alter cities. Furthermore, since mayors are 'place-based' leaders (Hambleton & Howard, 2013), they have the duty to respond to the needs of the city and its citizens and have to be pragmatists and put ideologies, religion and ethnicity aside to draw their cities together. Ultimately, mayors have to get things done; "Mayor Nutter of Philadelphia said, we could never get away here in Philadelphia with the stuff that goes on in Washington, the paralysis, the non-action, the inaction. Why? Because potholes have to get filled, because the trains have to run, because kids have to be able to get to school" (Barber, 2013).

In sum, city mayors should be charismatic and moral leaders who have the drive, knowledge, ability and political skills to get things done. It is also imperative to have followers, from across different demographic groups of a city, who believe and support the

leader's vision, giving him the power to make the changes needed for the city as a whole to strive. Taking the presented theories on leadership into account, we will now look specifically at the characteristics of Antanas Mockus and Enrique Peñalosa as leaders, in order to see if they had the qualities, which have been pointed out as essential in the literature, to change the course of a city.

4.2. Antanas Mockus as a Leader

One of the main characteristics of Mockus was the unorthodox way in which he dealt with conflict resolution. As noted by Dalsgaard (2009) in his documentary, one day Mockus' methods would shock the entire country. While he was rector of the National University, he was trying to address the students during an assembly but they would not stop talking, shouting or whistling[14] and he decided to do something radical. He pulled down his pants and mooned the whole audience. This event was recorded and disclosed on national press. Soon after, Mockus resigned his post at the university and gave a public apology for his actions (G. Peñalosa, interview). This national scandal made him an example of honesty amongst the general public (Dalsgaard, 2009). All of a sudden Mockus was the center of attention, "he became like a god, like Madonna, he was very weird and people loved it" (G. Peñalosa, interview). Following this event and the effect it had, one of the national radio chains did a survey, as a joke, to see if people would vote for him to be the mayor of Bogota. The result was a radical 'yes', which made him decide to run for office and eventually win the campaign (G. Peñalosa, interview).

To understand and analyze the type of leader that Mockus was, it must first be taken into account that he and his whole team were pedagogues, and they took on the task of changing the city by educating its citizens. As mentioned before, the 'culture of citizenship' was essential to the improvement of the city. At the beginning of Mockus' mandate no one really understood what he was talking about, for no one knew what the concept of the 'culture of citizenship' meant or how it would help, but somehow they all trusted him and sensed that he was going somewhere with these ideas (Dalsgaard, 2009). His image of a transparent and honest man gave him the citizens' support and trust from the beginning, as described above, but observers note that reality matched the image: "he is a terribly honest person, a person with the willingness to be consistent, with an ongoing search for internal consistency" (Carlos Augusto Hernandez interview in Dalsgaard, 2009). People who worked with him saw this personal search to be a characteristic of a good and trustworthy person, and this search would make people feel ashamed of doing anything bad while working for him (M.I. Patiño, interview). Patiño mentioned that Mockus exudes something that makes you see that there are consequences to your actions, and that there is a need to do things right from the beginning. She also pointed out that meetings with Mockus were very serious and everyone would discuss very technical things; no one was worried about how the public opinion was seeing their actions, or if they would be able to get a position in the senate or the council, which is what used to happen before. This time people were

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[14] During an interview in Dalsgaard (2009) Mockus said that he had seen how in previous years students had not let the rector speak, or that they would not listen to him, and at that point he decided that if that would ever happen to him he would do something about it.

not only worried about the result (in changes in education, in housing programs, in infrastructure or in culture) but they wanted to make sure that things were being done right. Those that worked with Mockus knew that he was true to his values, and therefore no one dared to be corrupt or try to obtain any sort of personal gain, as he had zero tolerance for those kinds of actions. If someone tried to do something that was not very transparent, they would be fired immediately (M.I. Patiño, interview).

In Mockus' case it is interesting to see how his teaching vocation was present even in the work place, for he carried out similar campaigns with his workers as he did in the city. One of the main ideas, mentioned by Patiño in her interview, was that he wanted everyone to be a *sapo* (frog), which means to be a tattletale. She says that he would walk around the office with a wooden frog hanging from his neck showing everyone that he was a *sapo* and that it was good to say when something was not being done the correct way. These sorts of campaigns were very important because they made him a role-model for his workers, and it also explicitly showed them that he supported his team 100% when they were standing up against the traditional fraudulent ways of the government (G. Peñalosa, interview). This new type of leadership, where concessions with the council were not accepted also shows that Mockus was politically committed but independent from political pressures.

These campaigns also improved the image people had of City Hall and exposed that the city had not been working correctly because of the corruption in the government. Changes from within the government, which resulted in the more efficient use of time and resources (R. Londoño, interview), allowed Mockus not only to gain people's trust but to retain it, up to the point that when he launched his second campaign saying that he would increase taxes (C. Saldías, E. Sánchez, interviews), he won the election. According to Saldías, he is the only politician who has done this in Latin America, and he was able to do it because people trusted that he would not steal a penny (E. Sánchez, interview). This trust was also shown when Mockus came up with the idea of adding a 10% of voluntary tax to the amount that people had to pay. People would be free to choose if they wanted to pay this extra money, or not, and they could also choose in what domain they wanted the money to be spent. This resulted in almost everyone[15] deciding to pay 110% of their taxes (R. Obregón, interview).

Mockus had a very clear perspective of what he saw were the main problems of the city: a lack of civic culture, corruption and few resources that needed to be increased. In his mind these were the issues that needed to be addressed in order for the city to progress, which shows that he was thinking about the future of the city rather than deciding to focus on small and more immediate issues (E. Sánchez, interview). His methods also show that he liked trying new things and experimenting (G. Peñalosa, interview), and although it seemed like he was a little bit crazy most of the time, all his methods had a strong academic component, were based on efficient communication with the citizens, and were

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[15] In 2003 over 63.000 citizens voluntarily paid an extra 10% of taxes (Portafolio, 2014).

constantly monitored to see if the desired results were being achieved (R. Londoño, interview).

Mockus was not just a leader who had good and innovative ideas, but he was also open to what others had to add. As mentioned by Guillermo Peñalosa and Efrain Sánchez, during his first administration, Mockus mainly focused on the creation and promotion of the civic culture because he did not really know anything about the other problems of the city, or how to solve them. Despite this, he did not improvise in matters he did not master, as others in the past had done, and he was open to other people's contributions. For instance, Guillermo Peñalosa noticed that, during his campaign, Mockus never mentioned public space and therefore, after he was elected Mayor, Guillermo Peñalosa decided to give him a call to talk about the importance of the subject. A few days later he had a 3 hour long meeting with Mockus, which was basically a monologue about the importance of parks and public space, and as a result he was offered the position of Commissioner of Parks, Sports and Recreation for Bogota. Each time they inaugurated a new park Mockus would say in his speech that it was as if they had a telepathic communication, showing his complete approval and trust in Guillermo Peñalosa's work.

Taking an overall look at Mockus as a leader, it is clear that he was strategic in some ways, for he had long term goals like changing the social dynamics and the way citizens interact with each other, improving the city's finances and changing the way taxes were collected to support this long term goal, and he had a positive posture towards changes and innovation in Bogota. Still, during his second term, he was reproductive in some ways, for he left a third of the members of the preceding administration so that they would keep carrying out their jobs and continue the projects they had started with Peñalosa. This shows that Mockus was also a transformative leader because the prevailing practice was wholesale replacement with those linked to the winner's political and patronage network. Mockus demonstrated competence in some subjects and he had a mixed approach in between an authoritarian and cooperative leader, because, though he wanted to implement his ideas, he was open to changing strategies if they were not working as expected, and he included others to help determine his agenda in topics he did not master. Most of all, he was very charismatic because from the beginning he was able to gain the citizens' trust and he retained it by being a model of moral values and principles, which led people to trust and support him.

4.3. Enrique Peñalosa as a Leader

During the electoral campaign of 1994, Guillermo Peñalosa, Enrique Peñalosa's brother and campaign manager at the time, says that Enrique was considered the weirdest candidate for mayor: "if you had a scale from 1 to 10 and 10 was a normal politician, Enrique was a 2 or a 3" (G. Peñalosa, interview). People had this perception of Peñalosa because for the first time the pictures on the campaign posters showed a candidate who was not wearing a tie and who was smiling, seeming approachable to everyone and tearing away from the traditional image of politicians. However, when Mockus decided to run for office, Peñalosa became a 6 in the scale of weird to normal politician (G. Peñalosa, interview). In his second campaign, Peñalosa decided to run as an independent

candidate (in 1994 he was part of the Liberal party) and he continued to enhance his image of an approachable person by cycling all over the city and handing out pamphlets to people personally, sharing his ideas for the city, with everyone he encountered. In the meantime, his contender, Moreno de Caro, used tactics former candidates used to get votes, like bribing people with fridges and little ovens, but this was no longer enough, and Peñalosa won the election (G. Peñalosa, interview).

As mentioned in previous chapters, Peñalosa had a very concrete vision of what he wanted the city to become, and therefore he surrounded himself with the best executives of the country in order to accomplish his vision. Peñalosa was not only good at choosing the ideal team to transform the city physically, but he was also recognized by them as the most competent leader for he knew Bogota , its strengths and deficiencies., He had the whole picture in his head, and this amazed everyone (N. Yaver, interview).

Yaver described working with him as being one of the most exciting and demanding tasks she has ever done. She mentioned that once a month they would carry out daytrips in which they would walk through an area of intervention and look at all the aspects that need to be taken into account to modify the area. For example, they would walk from the spring of a river in the eastern mountains, through the city, until the river reached the River Bogota in the western edge of the city. As they walked Peñalosa would be surrounded by several different teams and he would ask different questions like the water flow rate at a specific point, or where the property lines of a lot were. Everyone had to be ready with all the information and if there was a problem, it needed to be solved as soon as possible in order to carry out the projects Peñalosa had in mind. After their daytrips, all the teams would go back to the office with a list of tasks and, a few days later, they would be contacted by the Voicemail. Yaver explained that this was a very efficient tool with which Peñalosa would leave every group a message asking the status of the tasks he had assigned during the daytrips, and he would follow up until the projects were finished. She highlighted that all the messages were personalized and that she never understood how he was able to coordinate everything, remember the tasks he had assigned and who was responsible for what. Her recounting of work dynamics shows that Peñalosa was "on top of everything", that he was very competent, and that he was able to establish organizational systems to make processes efficient. These daytrips through the city allowed decisions to be made based on facts.

Peñalosa was also considered a very innovative and forward-thinking person, for example no one believed in Transmilenio, including the World Bank, and 36 months later it was a complete success (G. Peñalosa, interview). However, this also showed that he was very authoritarian which, as we saw with the case of *el cartucho,* turned out to be a major problem that almost resulted in his dismissal. He had such a concrete vision of the future of the city that, at times, he made decisions that made it extremely difficult and painful to work towards the accomplishment of this vision; it was like swimming against the current and against popularity, and he did all of this because he was defending his principles and his vision (Dalsgaard, 2009). Peñalosa transcended his self-interests in the fight to build the city he had envisioned Bogota could be, because, though he lacked the citizens' support, he did not give into the pressures of the City Council to do them personal favors in

exchange for their support during the protests against the projects that were being carried out in the city (Dalsgaard, 2009). As Naranjo suggests in Dalsgaard (2009), for Peñalosa, it was more his commitment to the city than his political standing that was a guide to action. She also mentions that Peñalosa confessed to her that, if citizens did not want changes in public space, then he was not the mayor for their city. In spite of being put in a position where he was almost dismissed from his post, the combination of his knowledge of Bogota and his conviction to follow through with the plans he presented during his campaign, led the people who worked for Peñalosa to support him, even through difficult times. This situation shows the importance of being surrounded by workers that are in favor of their leader's vision, because "mayors cannot improve a city while retaining the support of all of the people all of the time" (Gilbert, 2006, p. 415). In the end, Peñalosa's confidence and stubbornness resulted in the physical transformation of the city, which was initially valued by a few and then by most of Bogota's inhabitants (Dalsgaard, 2009). Still, there are many that do not agree with what was done and the way it was done. As mentioned by Salazar in an interview, if Peñalosa would have been given the chance, he would have torn down the city completely and started from zero to create a city that fit his ideals.

In Peñalosa's case it can be seen that he was a strategic leader: he had clear long term goals and he looked for ways to ensure that they would be carried out in the future. For example, Transmilenio was projected to be completed in eight phases over the course of 33 years, meaning that it would be complete in 2031 (SuperCADE, 2012). Peñalosa can also be characterized as being an authoritarian mayor, since he ruled in a 'command and control' manner. The literature suggests that this combination is what defined a 'city boss', which is someone who is:

> A strong leader who does not anticipate capacity building in local actors but is characterized by strong determination. He determines the municipal agenda unilaterally and coordinates action using the authority vested in the mayoral position. He has a long-term strategy and tries to promote changes (Getimis & Hlepas, 2006, p. 183).

In terms of people's trust, even though citizens trusted Peñalosa at the beginning of his administration, this trust faded away because people were not part of the transformation process. While buildings were torn down and people were being displaced, Bogota's citizens were expected to believe that all that chaos eventually was going to make their city better. In spite of being very competent, the lack of a bond with the citizens created several obstacles during Peñalosa's administration, which were slowly overcome as people started seeing the results of the construction done throughout the city.

4.4. Conclusion

The literature on leadership styles makes a great effort to create simple categories to identify different types of leaders. However, these categories must be used with caution because human beings are so diverse that in the end they might have aspects of one category and some of others. This is evidenced with Mockus' case, as he fit into many, if not most, of the categories suggested in the literature. It is also interesting to see how, even

though Mockus and Peñalosa were very different leaders, they have several traits in common. For instance, they both challenged the status quo of the city and of the government, they had a long term vision for the city, and they were against any kind of personal gains while serving Bogota. At the same time, while evidently Mockus' strength was that he was perceived as the most honest and trustworthy person in the city, and Peñalosa was seen as a tenacious man with an amazing capacity to execute projects that fit within a very clear vision for the city, they were both able to break out from a pattern of weak and unreliable leaders. In their own way, each one of the mayors analyzed here came to power with forward-thinking visions that completely altered the social and physical aspects of Bogota.

However, there were some weaknesses in the leadership styles, especially taking into account that there were not many public participation processes, processes which could have generated support and trust, potentially creating a bond with the citizens (Hague et al., 2006). Gilbert (2006) describes the mayors' approaches more as technocracy than democracy, meaning that the decisions were based on what the experts considered would be the best, rather than taking into account the citizens' opinions. The consequences of this lack of connection with citizens are more evident during Peñalosa's administration; this happened because he was physically transforming the city and working on things that directly modified the places where people lived in Bogota. Still, even though Mockus' approach was less imposing – for people had the power to decide if they would be part of the change or not (E. Sánchez, interview), in many instances people doubted his methods and were uncertain about his goals (Montezuma, 2005). However, Bogota's case shows that although trust and support from citizens and public workers can help prevent and overcome barriers to change, there are times when a combination of an authoritarian and cooperative approach is needed to destabilize the status quo of a city.

At the end, we can see that the combination of both Peñalosa and Mockus made the transformative, charismatic, ethical, forward thinking leader that Bogota needed at the time. Though the short mayoral terms had been problematic before 1995 and after 2003, because every time a new mayor came everything changed (Gilbert, 2006), this time it gave the opportunity for the city to have a mix of two leaders with different qualities to work in a corresponding way.

5. WHAT REMAINS AND WHAT LIES AHEAD

The administrations of Mockus and Peñalosa resulted in the social and physical transformation of Bogota. This metamorphosis took place mainly because citizens were tired of traditional politicians and decided to vote for unconventional candidates who represented change (E. Sánchez, interview). Though the work done during those eight years put the city in the international radar and made it an example of urban change, it is important to see what remains from those years of glory, ten years after the end of Mockus' second administration. In this chapter we identify the legacy of the Mockus-Peñalosa-Mockus period and try to see what the future will bring for Bogota, based on the information recovered during the interviews. Interviews were conducted with planners and public officials involved in the administrations under study. A total of nine people were interviewed. Further details are provided in the methodology chapter.

5.1. The legacy

The current state of affairs in Bogota has made many people doubt if anything remains from the work Mockus and Peñalosa. Tables 1 and 3 summarize and illustrate the outcomes of the main changes that occurred, and show if there has been continuity or decline in terms of improvements in governance, and of the social and physical transformation of the city.

Table 1: Governance

	1980 to 1995	Mockus I	Peñalosa	Mockus II	2003 to 2014
Mayoral democratic elections	● ——	——	——	——	——
Urban planning related laws	● ——	——	——	——	——
Organic statute	● ——	——	——	——	——
Increased taxes	● ——	——	——	——	——
Improved tax collection	● ——	——	——	——	——
Updated cadastral map		● ——	——	——	——
POT			● ——	——	– – – Decline
Clampdown on corruption		● ——	——	◆ Stopped	

Legend: ● Start   —— Continues   – – · Decline   ◆ Stopped

Table 1 shows that most of the structural changes that enabled Mockus and Peñalosa to be mayors of Bogota, and that allowed them to perform their duties, are in force, which indicates that the conditions for mayors to continue the improvement of the city are still present. However, the aspects that have either declined or stopped depend on the mayor in office, as shown in previous chapters. For the POT and the clampdown in corruption to continue there is a need for a leader who puts the interest of the city first, who continues policies that have had a positive impact on the city, and who has the political independence and strength to fight against corruption in the government – see Table 2.

Table 2: Leadership

	Mockus	Peñalosa	Possible leader
Strategic	+	+	
Reproductive	+		+
Cooperative	+		+
Authoritarian		+	+
Challenges assumptions	+	+	+
Retains trust	+		+
Competent	+	+	+
Politically independent	+	+	+
Charismatic	+		+
Transformational leader	+	+	+

Though Mockus and Peñalosa were very different leaders (see Table 2), a characteristic they had in common was that they were not afraid to challenge the way the government worked and they did everything in their power to execute their jobs with integrity and protecting their moral values. These two leaders had the objective to modify the city and Mockus even showed, during his second term, that he acknowledged the importance of continuity of the projects that started during Peñalosa's administration, to ensure that Bogota would prosper. However, the three subsequent mayors did not seem to have an interest in continuing Mockus' or Peñalosa's programs. Talking with the interviewees about what remains from all the work that was done, revealed that there is a strong division between those who think that, after those three administrations, nothing is left and those that have a more positive perspective on what has happened over the past ten years.

Starting with the people that think that there is not much left, several admit that there were no real strategies put in place in order to ensure the continuity of the policies and procedures that were set up during Mockus' and Peñalosa's administrations. The truth is that "in places like this it is not profitable to keep someone else's policies in place, and so the Adam syndrome begins, when every mayor starts the world from zero. There is always a flow and reflux of ideas" (C. Saldías, interview). This shows that, in order to ensure that there was some sort of continuity and legacy, there is a need to have leaders that believe in the importance of continuity. Even when we look at the period between 1995 and 2003 we can see that, although there was some sort of continuity, this was not was very evident in between the first term of Mockus and Peñalosa's term. Although Peñalosa built on what Mockus had done, he had a very different approach to the promotion of the culture of citizenship, for Peñalosa foster culture through infrastructure works and signs that taught people how to behave in public spaces. From Peñalosa to Mockus there was more continuity, as Peñalosa chose to support Mockus' campaign because it was more in line with what he envisioned for the city. In addition, Obregón and Salazar pointed out that Mockus was much more aware of the importance of continuity and therefore he decided to keep one third of Peñalosa's cabinet to carry on with the infrastructure works that had already been launched and contracted (R. Londoño, interview). This was very different from the way transitions between two mayors were before.

According to Obregón this whole period of change was just a "hint of progress" (R. Obregón, interview) that made everyone think that the city had been saved. Unfortunately when Garzón, Moreno and Petro came into office, they completely abandoned everything, bringing the transformation of Bogota to a halt. As suggested by many of the interviewees, this abandonment was gradual and only now the real consequences are becoming evident. To illustrate this, Patiño mentioned how during Peñalosa's term 40km of arterial Transmilenio roads were completed, then during Mockus' second term another 40km were made and, in theory, they should have constructed 40km more in each of the following administrations. This meant that the three following mayors should have executed a total of 120km of arterials, and only 30km have been done, giving a deficit of 90km; therefore, it is no wonder that currently Transmilenio is in crisis[16]. Patiño also stated that, the mayors that followed changed everything, even the contracting scheme her team had established; where all the design risk was transferred to the contractor who would also provide five years of maintenance. With this scheme the Carrera 30 was made in only a year and a half, while the Calle 26, which was started by Garzón, was made in five or six years (these are two main arteries of the city). In the same line as Patiño, Salazar explained how three years after the POT was done the mayor in office was already altering it. He explains that it was a very ambitious plan that suggested many things to be done, but in the end almost nothing from that original plan was left. The goal of the POT was to bring more equality and stability, but the succeeding mayors protested against having to follow it, and now each one does what he wants (R. Obregón, interview). Furthermore, an issue in the city's legislation, as mentioned before, is that the mayor should have a Development Plan, which is presented at the beginning of his administration, and they can only be held accountable on the points they propose in their Development Plan, but not with regard to the POT (J. Salazar, interview). What makes things even more difficult is that the Development Plan does not have to be in line with the vision and objectives set out by the POT. According to Salazar, making the POT allowed increased understanding of the city and provided a tool to envision how to build it appropriately, but Garzón, as mayor, did not continue to work in line with the vision set out by the POT and there was a great setback in terms of planning the city.

According to Londoño and Sánchez, there has also been a decline in terms of citizen culture and reduction of violence. Sánchez mentioned that during Mockus' administrations the violence index was extremely low. Now Bogota's violence index is worse than other major cities in Colombia and than the index of the country as a whole. Respect for others has also dropped, as can be seen while driving through the streets of Bogota, which, as described by Sánchez, is "like being in a jungle" or "at war". Furthermore, the sense of belonging and the fact that people were proud of their city has also declined. The citizens' pride has gone down mainly because Bogota is not being well kept and, as a result, it is dirty, full of offensive graffiti and the streets are falling apart, and what is worse is that this is also happening institutionally (M.I. Patiño, interview). Escallón argues that Bogota has

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[16] The 8th of March 2014 the crisis of Transmilenio got worse because of complaints from the passengers due to the bad service (busses are not on time, they are full by the time they arrive, and the bus stations do not have the capacity needed) resulted in protests in 8 different places in Bogota. (El Tiempo, 2014b)

entered a cycle of "negative resiliency" and now the city is going back to the way things were before, which is a point that almost everyone agrees on, especially in terms of the corruption levels of the government[17] (M.I. Patiño, G. Peñalosa, R. Obregón, C. Saldías, N. Yaver, interviews).

In contrast, there were some that said that there are several things that remain. Yaver stated that people have changed the way they see the city and that they are more aware of the public space and the rights they have over it. Londoño, Sánchez and Saldías agree that several aspects that fall under the 'culture of citizenship' umbrella are also part of the legacy. For example, people continue to use seatbelts (before Mockus' educational campaign no one used seatbelts and some cars did not even have them), people became more aware of the value of water and the importance of using what is strictly necessary, there is still respect for pedestrian crosswalks (even when they are not painted), and people are very good about paying taxes (E. Sánchez, interview)[18]. This last point is very important because this has prevented the city from having an economic crisis over the last 20 years. The city collects more taxes than what they estimate[19] (C. Saldías, interview). In addition, 95% of the city is covered by public services, illegal neighborhoods have been formalized and there has been great investment in infrastructure in some of the poorest areas of the city, for example, the public libraries built during Peñalosa's administration (E. Sánchez, interview). Another aspect that has remained is that Bogota has one of the most complete cadastral censuses in Latin America; Salazar stated that there was a great leap in the information available, which can be very useful to elaborate informed plans for the future of the city. Furthermore, Bogota's transformation had an impact in several parts of the world. For instance 95 official representatives of different cities came to study Transmilenio, and similar systems have been introduced elsewhere in Colombia as well as places like Mexico City (G. Peñalosa, interview). The legacy in terms of the social and the physical transformation can be seen in Table 3, from where it can be argued that that most of the legacy is in social aspects, as pointed out by Londoño, Saldías, Sánchez and Yaver.

Guillermo Peñalosa and Carmenza Saldías asserted that the dialogue about planning in the city has been transformed. First of all, since the finances of the city are no longer an issue, more interesting debates, such as the role of Bogota within the region and its connection to it, can take place (C. Saldías, interview). Likewise, before people's main concerns for the city used to focus on the potholes and the bad state of the streets, while 1.5 million people did not have sewage system or paved streets. Since now most of the city is appropriately covered, this has allowed the dialogue on planning change to include topics such as the importance of increasing the number of cyclists or expanding the

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[17] One of the biggest and most scandalous corruption cases took place during Samuel Moreno's administration. Several people including Moreno were part of a contractual scam, known as the *Carrusel de la Contratación* (Carousel of Contracts), with which they took over 500 million dollars from the city. As a result, Moreno was imprisoned (Espectador, 2011)
[18] 90% of Bogota's citizens paid their taxes in 2012, but there was a 95% reduction in the payment of voluntary taxes (CorpoVisionarios, 2013).

cycling network, which before used to be limited to the European context (G. Peñalosa, interview).

Table 3: Social and physical transformation

	1980 to 1995	Mockus I	Peñalosa	Mockus II	2003 to 2014
Social:					
- Civic culture		● Start	Continues	Continues	Decline
- Reduction in crime		● Start	Continues	Continues	Decline
- Use of crosswalks		● Start	Continues	Continues	Continues
- Use of safety belt		● Start	Continues	Continues	Continues
- Respect for others		● Start	Continues	Continues	Decline
- Respect for public space		● Start	Continues	Continues	Decline
Built environment:					
- Transmilenio			● Start	Continues	Decline
- New Libraries			● Start	Continues	◆ Stopped
- New schools			● Start	Continues	Decline
- New or improved parks			● Start	Continues	Decline
- Bicycle network			● Start	Continues	Decline
- Public service network		● Start	Continues	Continues	Continues
Legend:	● Start	—— Continues	– – Decline	◆ Stopped	

Though some say that nothing remains and others say there is still something left, they all agreed and highlighted that it was vital for the citizens to be more vocal and protect what they had gained. All the interviewees recognize the importance of people fighting to ensure that the changes remain, and how sadly there was no social control over the decline the city has had since Garzón became mayor. Guillermo Peñalosa suggested that one of the flaws of both Mockus and Peñalosa was that neither of them promoted the advancements the city had as much as they could have. He says that there was a need to educate people so that they would really appreciate the changes that happened to their city and their lives. Escallón also points out that an issue was that their approaches were too focused on the person and that neither Mockus nor Peñalosa were able to create a movement that carried on their philosophies and vision, or to put in place institutions that would survive a change in leadership.

Many agree that a major issue was that Bogota's population was apathetic to the city decline after Mockus' second administration ended. As such, more public participation, and not just what was required by law (G. Peñalosa, interview), would likely have made people take ownership of and defend the changes that occurred. However, many of those interviewed said that in processes such as Bogota's transformation, it is very difficult to have proper and efficient public participation events. Obregón said that the efforts made during Mockus' second term to increase citizen participation were a failure, for they ended working like the Tower of Babel. Additionally, Patiño highlights that when making massive infrastructure works it is impossible to integrate everyone's opinion because each person wants the street in front of their house to be repaired. According to her, when the resources, in terms of time and money, are limited, the streets that you end up choosing

cannot respond to a public participation process, but to a technical analysis that chooses the streets that transport more people (for example streets that are part of the public bus network), to be more egalitarian, and to create continuous 'mobility corridors' and not just a patchwork of good and bad streets. Guillermo Peñalosa also pointed out that when you want to radically change a city there is a need to have more of a top-down approach, and once you have reached a level where the city is working suitably, then you can integrate the citizens into the process; in their view, Bogota was in such a terrible state that the mayors had no option but to impose their vision.

Another recurring opinion is that, for there to be continuity, there is a need to reduce turnover of administrative workers as much as possible (R. Londoño, R. Obregón, J. Salazar, E. Sánchez, interviews). Each time there is a new government everyone is replaced with a new cabinet, including the administrative staff, which means that every three years new people need to be trained to do the same job someone else was already doing before, which makes processes extremely inefficient at the beginning of each mayoral term.

In sum, there is a valuable legacy left behind and evidently the current situation of the city is not as bad as some of our interviewees stated. The fact remains that, if we compare Bogota at the beginning of the 1990s and how it is now, it is currently doing much better. Still, when the question regarding the legacy was asked, all of the interviewees mentioned that they were somewhat nostalgic of what had happened because they thought that the work they were doing and the impulse that they brought would ensure that Bogota would continue to be an example of how cities can be transformed, but now it has sadly become an example of how it can be destroyed (R. Obregón, interview).

5.2. Bogota's Future

Many interviewees argue that the weakening of the *momentum of change,* which started in 1995, began as soon as Mockus' second administration ended. This decline and the current political situation have made the future of the city incredibly uncertain, especially from now until 2015 when a new mayor will be elected. At the present time no one really knows if the current mayor will remain in office until the end of his term. Much controversy surrounded Gustavo Petro's mandate, and allegations about him not doing his job correctly resulted in his dismissal for several months from the mayor's position[20]. During this time, Petro used all the available resources to reclaim his post, which he succeeded in doing at the end of April 2014 (Tiempo, 2014a). However, this situation has led to a complete stagnation for "no one from his cabinet dares to do anything because they know that they are under a magnifying glass (monitored by the Attorney General) and no one wants to take any risks" (C. Escallón, interview). Even though Petro is once again the

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[20] Towards the end of 2012 contracts with the garbage collection company of Bogota expired and Petro decided to implement a new collection system. However, his idea was not well executed and the city was completely buried in trash for a week. This crisis put the mayor on the spotlight and it lead to his destitution because it was determined that he improvised by assigning the provision of the service to two companies that had no experience in trash collection, which led to a complete chaos in the city and he put at risk the health of the citizens. (Tiempo, 2014c)

Mayor of Bogota, there is still uncertainty if he will stay in the post because, given the whole situation, he is being carefully monitored. Given the current state of affairs, the opinions of the interviewees regarding the future of Bogota vary as they did when discussing the legacy. While some are more optimistic, others have more doubts about what can occur, however, no one considers that the city is a lost cause.

The first alternative is that, based on the fact that historically the city has had good and bad outcomes depending on its mayor, Guillermo Peñalosa and Nadime Yaver both think that Bogota's future depends on where the Mayor in office decides the city should go. Guillermo Peñalosa and Carmenza Saldías argue that the future of the city also rests on whether the country has a good president or not, for if Colombia wants to have a good international standing, the country will need a good capital city to showcase, and the president can play a crucial role in pressuring the Mayor to work for the city's development.

The position of Sánchez and Londoño is more positive and less dependent on specific leaders. They stand by the notion that not everything was lost, and that the city has reached a point where the progress is much slower than during Mockus and Peñalosa, but it is still on an "ascending, yet mediocre, curve" (E. Sánchez, interview). Although, Patiño has more of a negative point of view on the current state of the city, her view of the future of Bogota is also positive. She evokes the idea that societies have peaks and valleys, and that, even though Bogota reached a peak and has badly fallen since 2004, it is only when people reach the bottom that they take back their strength and rise again; thanks to the inertia of these up-down cycles, new leaders who will be able to take the city up again, will surge. As Saldías mentioned, Bogota is almost 500 years old and it has had innumerable crises, and it has recovered every time, so there is no reason to think that it will not be able to do it again.

However, there are several issues that may arise that could make the crisis even worse. The first problem is that even though the city has been able to continue to develop in spite of the conflict in Colombia, if the post-conflict is not managed properly it can be extremely detrimental for the city, because it is a major attractor to the country's population (C. Saldías, interview). Another issue is that currently the mobility, health, planning and, above all, education systems are in crisis and it is essential to at least have higher quality of education so that people will choose their leaders wisely (E. Sánchez, interview). In addition, as mentioned in the previous section, the POT that was done during Peñalosa's administration has been modified in so many ways that almost nothing remains of it. Actually, Gustavo Petro proposed a new POT which, according to Obregón, was just based on allowing developers to tear down houses and buildings to highly densify the city, as there would be no height limit for new buildings. If approved, this POT could result in an "urbanistic disaster" and the "destruction of the urban fabric" (R. Obregón, interview). Likewise, Salazar pointed out that now the Planning Department and the POT only focus on writing construction norms for developers, which is no way to build a city. This issue shows that there is a need to make the POT a binding document so that mayors follow it and are held accountable if they do not follow the vision and plans contained in this document. Also, even though the city has very good data, it is not being used to inform the POT,

"instead they just make random marks on the city's map and call it a plan" (J. Salazar, interview). There is evidently a lack of vision for the future of the city and this added to the political instability and to the fact that Bogota has no plan for the management of its many resources, can be terrible for the city (C. Saldías, interview). As exemplified by Saldías, it is as if you could buy a bicycle and you decide to buy a Rolls Royce. In the case of Bogota, if the mayor decides to build the metro because of political reasons, this may mean that the social investment the city needs will be disregarded and it will jeopardize the Bogota's future, without even solving the mobility problems.

5.3. Conclusion

Bogota is now in a much better position that in was in the beginning of the 1990s. However, as we have seen in the previous section, there are several obstacles to overcome if the city is to retake the place it had in the world and in its citizens' minds just a short while ago. Many interviewees are very doubtful about the future. Nonetheless, institutional changes, such as the Organic Statute, mayoral democratic elections, increased taxes and better tax collection systems, which highly contributed to the metamorphosis of Bogota, remain. These structural changes in addition to people having tasted progress and being been able to see what is good for their city, give some hope that the city will rise again (M.I. Patiño, C. Saldías, interviews). Also, it can be seen that the citizens want a change, as shown in electoral support for mayors from the left, despite widespread national conservatism; in the past elections, such support has represented the vote for alternatives to the traditional politicians (C. Saldías, E. Sánchez, interviews). The point is that the citizens of Bogota once voted for Mockus and for Peñalosa and they won in despite having all the odds against them, which gives hope that there will be a candidate who will be able to go against all the obstacles, as they did, and readjust the path the city has taken.

Taking into account the interviewees' opinions, it is evident that there is a need for a clear and powerful vision of what the city should become in the future, a competent and admired leader and a more vocal population who actively participates in the planning processes and development of Bogota. Furthermore, as pointed out by Obregón and Salazar, there is a need for the academy to play a role in the definition of the vision for the city as well; though each time Bogota produces more PhDs, they still do not form part of the dialogue and this is a resource that should be tapped (E. Sánchez, interview).

6. CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The transformation of Bogota was remarkable in many ways, however, it cannot be considered as a complete success story because, even though the administrations of Mockus and Peñalosa left a significant legacy, the city has not continued to develop or improve at the same rate as it did between 1995 and 2003. Still, this case sheds light on many aspects that should be taken into consideration when looking for ways to ensure continuity of good urban policies.

Although the case of Bogota has specific particularities, and therefore, the lessons learned and recommendations that arise may not be applicable to every city in the world, it is important to bear in mind that "the principle is that international transfer fails when detailed and prescriptive, but can be a positive force when it is suggestive and indicative , a mirror held up to enable critical reflection on what is happening in one's own city" (Hague et al., 2006, p. 14). Taking this into consideration, when we identify the difficulties that Mockus and Peñalosa had, as well as those that prevented their work from continuing to have an impact, it is evidenced that they are barriers that could arise in several international contexts. These obstacles include weak institutions, high corruption levels, constant rotation of public servants, limited resources, low levels of education, lack of public participation processes and decision-making behind closed doors, absence of political will, short-termism and lack of vision, and lack of leaders who are willing to change the status quo. Therefore, cities that have to deal with these obstacles to improve and have longstanding policies, could learn from Bogota's case.

The main lesson that can be drawn from the experience in governance of Bogota is that fighting against corruption is essential for a city to radically change. However, the efforts done to lower corruption in Bogota were not long-lasting, as in the years after 2003 corruption levels rose up to a point that led to the imprisonment of the city's mayor in 2011. As Escallón and Salazar mentioned in their interviews, the changes that took place seemed to be profound but in reality they were too weak, and as soon as the honest and transparent administrations left, the prevailing corrupt practices of the government were reestablished. This shows that even though there is a need to have leaders that confront the traditionally fraudulent practices of governments, there should be mechanisms that preserve zero or low corruption levels to allow a city to continue improving. To do this, as seen in the literature and in the city's experience, the monitoring of politician and public servants is essential. A way to make bureaucrats more accountable would be to have second terms, which would also increase continuity and reduce short-termism (Alesina et al., 2000), but this would only temporarily solve the problem. A more permanent solution would be to have media play a central role in the prevention of corruption (Lessmann & Markwardt, 2010), but in order for this to work efficiently the media must be completely independent from the political powers who rule the country and the city. Another option for this, as suggested by Saldías, is to have international bodies have interests in the city, who therefore can play the role of controllers of corruption. This strategy can work with national policies, such as the fiscal policy, however, it might not work for other policies that have more of a local character (C. Saldías, interview), it raises concerns about national

autonomy and it can be unclear about whose interests are being served in the case when national policies do not match international best practice. Local monitoring of bureaucrats can be done by institutionalizing forms of accountability. In Mockus' case, he was viewed as the most honest man alive, and during Peñalosa's term everyone saw that the city's money was being spent in infrastructure works. However, during the previous and the following administration the city's population had no idea what was happening with the collected taxes and this opened the door for corruption to increase once more. If there are ways to show the people how the money is being spent and to make the government more transparent (for example by publishing monthly reports on newspapers informing the population of the governments' investments), then corruption levels can decrease.

This research is, in a way, testing of the hypothesis that the individual leader can be the key driver of change. Although Mockus and Peñalosa did have a great impact on the course Bogota took, it must be pointed out that perhaps they would not have been mayors of the city if the institutional changes of the 1980s and 1990s had not have taken place; without those prior changes, neither mayor would have had the power to transform Bogota, socially or physically. Still, Mockus' and Peñalosa's visionary personalities and their persuasive ways made them motivate and mobilize the teams that worked with them to achieve goals and construct a city that no one would have imagined Bogota could become. This shows that competent and charismatic leaders that are able to gain and retain people's trust are imperative. In addition, it is important to point out that a city needs a reproductive leader sometimes and a visionary leader at other times. A notion that arises from Bogota's example is that a succession of strategic leaders can be a barrier for the continuity of policies, because each new mayor will bring new plans that break from the past. Obregón stated that the biggest problem the city has currently is that there is no vision, and that when the vision was established by the POT the mayors who should have followed it refused to do so. When Mockus began his second term he was aware of the importance of continuity and therefore kept on developing Peñalosa's vision. However, as argued in the literature, a leader is reproductive or strategic depending on personal traits (though this research suggests that contextual factors also play a role, and that a leader may be both); if personal traits are key, then there must be established regulations for policies to have some sort of continuity. A solution to this could be, as suggested by Escallón, to have strong political parties with a clear vision which can be carried out throughout several terms, or put in place institutions that could survive a change in leadership. Another answer to this problem could be, as Guillermo Peñalosa and Rocío Londoño suggested, leaving construction works and contracts approved during a change in government, but this would be limited to infrastructure projects. In the case of more intangible projects, Guillermo Peñalosa advised that they should be approved by referendum because it is more difficult to change something that is a law, while giving voice to the citizens.

This last point leads to the importance of the role of citizens in the development of a city, which can be illustrated with three examples taken from Bogota. First, at the beginning of the 1990s the city was such a disaster that no one could even imagine that it would become a place that people would be proud of, but everyone believed in Mockus' principles and they decided to vote for a person who had no political background

because he showed them that a change in their city was possible. The social transformation Mockus initiated made people realize that they had the power to make the city a more pleasant place, and led them to vote for Peñalosa because he had a clear vision for the city and they believed they deserved the changes he was proposing. This shows that, even in a country with a 'vicious' political machinery, Bogota's voters are independent with the power to decide who will lead them. Strong leaders able to gain people's support in spite of the political machinery of established parties were important. Second, as we saw in the case of *el cartucho* in 2000 in Bogota, not including the population in a decision making processes that affected and completely changed their lives was a mistake that almost got Peñalosa removed from his post. This indicates that without the public's support, the process of transforming a city is much more difficult. Third, although the end results of what occurred in Bogota might suggest that experts can effectively build a city, and that both academics and managers could be the perfect mix to govern and plan a city, as mentioned by all the interviewees, without the involvement of citizens, policies and plans are not sustainable because citizens are the ones that have the power to protect the changes that occur. As pointed out by Patiño, "for policies to be sustainable there is a need to have people who will sustain them. But things per se, procedures per se, regulations… no, that is not sustainable" (M.I. Patiño, interview). As citizens are the only ones that remain, policies should be universal and make people feel that the policies are theirs, so that they will defend them and ensure their longevity (C. Saldías, interview).

It is also important to point out that the interviewees acknowledge that they simply assumed the projects and the transformation of Bogota were going to continue because of momentum. The current situation has made them reevaluate what could have been done for the momentum not to fade. Their recommendations cover a broad range of topics including the importance of having good levels of education so that people can critically analyze mayoral candidates (E. Sánchez, interview), integrating the private sector and the academia to the decision-making process (J. Salazar, interview), having more social investments so that people's votes cannot be bought (C. Saldías, interview), reduce the turnover of public servants so that the government can work efficiently (instead of changing them every 4 years) (R. Londoño, E. Sánchez, interview), have more decentralization of powers so that the responsibility of managing the city does not fall on only one person and to have policies that are more adequate at a local scale (C. Escallón, interview), and have POTs that are elastic, that are binding and that adapt to the dynamic cycles of the city (R. Obregón, J. Salazar interview).

Though these recommendations can be useful for different contexts, literature makes clear that there is no exact recipe for a successful transformation of a city or for the continuity of good urban policies. Nevertheless, Bogota's case shows that even though there may be great obstacles to have profound transformations, there are ways to achieve visionary goals. At the end we can see that it is essential is to have leaders who are not afraid to stand up to traditional systems and a population that has the desire to change. Still, it would be interesting to follow up this research by studying other cases of radical urban transformations, especially cases where the changes have more of a bottom-up

approach, to get closer to determining what can be done to ensure the continuity of good urban policies.

7. INTERVIEWS

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