PIMPS, PUPILS, AND PHILOSOPHERS: ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS OF SHAME

by

Geoffrey Thomas Sigalet
McGill University, Montreal

A thesis submitted to McGill University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

Political Science

July 2011
Montreal, Quebec

Table of Contents:

Abstract: This essay seeks to (i) demonstrate Aristotle's philosophical view of shame, and (ii) explore the role of this view of shame in Aristotle's view of how we learn to be good, the relation between students and teachers, the relation of the philosopher to society, and Aristotle's own relationship to post-imperial democratic Athens. In part (i) of this essay I shall argue that Aristotle divides shame into different types according to its affective and cognitive qualities and referents: these being (1) Learner-True shame: occurrent and true; (2) Learner-Common shame: occurrent and doxastic (relating to doxa *and* nomos*); (3) Mature-True shame: conditionally dispositional and true; (4) Mature-Common shame: conditionally dispositional and doxastic but false. In part (ii-α)I shall also argue that shame impact our actions in deliberation by pushing us away from what is commonly shameful, and in changing our views (both as the subjects and participants) in intersubjective shaming situations such as that which informs the very inquiry of the Nicomachean Ethics. I argue that Aristotle must look to what is commonly shameful in order to be understood by his audience, avoid being persecuted, and to effectively inquire and shame his audience. In part (ii-β) I argue that we come to feel shame by habituation and mimetic activity and that most subjects move from shame types (2) to (1) to (3) if they are born into a city with virtuous laws and allow themselves to be pushed in the right direction. Subjects pushed in the opposite direction will usually start from false type (2) and move to type (4). In part (iii) I summarize the above arguments and suggest that Aristotle's own approach to shame is what might be call "Aristotelian Respectful Shame" which involves looking to what is commonly shameful because of and in the interest of discovering what is truly shameful. As confronting shame and what is commonly shameful forms a part of philosophy that concerns human life, and philosophy is the best life for man, confronting shame is not simply a "ladder" to virtue but a fundamental part of the human experience –even at its best.*

Résumé: Cet essai a pour but (i) d'expliquer le point de vue philosophique d'Aristote sur la honte, et (ii) d'explorer le role de cet opinion dans le cadre du point de vue qu'a Aristote de la façon dont nous apprenons à être bons, de la relation entre maîtres et disciples, la relation entre le philosophe et la société, et la relation qu'a Aristote avec l'Athènes démocratique post-impériale. Dans la partie (i) de cet essai j'argumenterai qu'Aristote divise la honte en différentes parties selon ses qualités affectives et cognitives et leurs référents: ceux-ci étants (I) la honte Étudiant-Réelle: immédiate et vraie; (2) la honte Étudiant-Commune: immédiate et doxastique (liée à doxa et nomos); (3) la honte Mature-Réelle: de disposition conditionnelle et vraie; (4) la honte Mature-Commune: de disposition conditionnelle et doxastique mais fausse. Dans la partie (ii-α) j'argumenterai aussi que la honte a un impact sur nos actions lors de leur délibération en nous poussant à éviter ce qui est communément honteux, ainsi qu'en changeant nos points de vue(à la fois en tant que sujet et participant) lors des situations où la honte se manifeste de manière intersubjective telles que celles qui informent le sujet d'investigation de l'Éthique à Nicomaque. Je défends le point de vue selon lequel Aristote doit s'attarder à ce qui est communément honteux dans le but d'être compris de son audience, d'échapper à la persécution, et afin d'analyser et jeter la honte sur son audience. Dans la partie (ii-β) j'argumente que nous en venons à ressentir de la honte par habituation et activités mimétiques et que la plupart des sujets vont des types de honte (2) à (I) à (3) si ils sont nés dans un ville vertueuse comprenant des lois vertueuses et qu'ils se laissent pousser dans la bone direction. Les sujets poussés dans la mauvaise direction iront généralement du faux type (2) et se déplaceront tranquillement vers le type de honte (4). Dans la partie (iii) j'offre une synthèse les idées susmentionées et suggère que l'approche de la honte d'Aristote constitue ce que l'on peut désigner sous le nom de "honte respectueuse Aristotélicienne," qui implique un regard vers ce qui est communément honteux dans le but de découvrir ce qui est réellement gonteux. compte tenu du fait que la confrontation de la honte à ce qui est communément honteux constitue une partie de la philosophie qui se préoccuppe de la vie humaine, et parce que la philosophei est la meilleure vie possible pour l'homme, confronter la honte n'est pas simplement une "échelle" vers la vertu mais une part fondamentale de l'expérience humaine - même à son meilleur.

For Mom and Dad

For Loving and Shaming Me Truly

And for Christina

My Teacher, My Friend

Acknowledgments: For all the shame and love of my teachers: Don Carmichael and Heidi Studer –who both nourished my love of Aristotle and the Greeks, Jason West, Paul Beach, and Martin Tweedale –who read the *De Anima* with me over cheese and Retsina. I could not have written this thesis without the financial aid of SSHRC, and so I would like to thank SSHRC and the people of Alberta for allowing their resources to be redistributed by Ottawa to fund this thesis. I would also like to thank Dr. C.W. Hyndman for the surgery, thereby saving my life and allowing me to write this thesis. I would also like to thank my Family: My grandparents (both living and dead) who are and were the great *phronimoi* of my life. My Aunts and Uncles. My cousins: Especially Liam, Connor, Shannon, Aoife, Bridget, Megan, Kiera –wrestling with you while I wrestled with this thesis was a source of joy. My sister and my brothers. My friends: especially Emma Planinc for having such a wonderful mind and sense of humour, Eli for helping me with my meagre Greek and for the *aporetic* conversation, Tony Imbrogno for working out with me, Daniel Brodie for being Daniel Brodie, Dave Tingle for listening to my rants at Pattati Patata and going to mass with me, Sarah Paulson for the country, and Caitlin Friesen for all the affection. This thesis is dedicated to my parents for all of their love and support, even in the very darkest hours: *there are some thoughts too deep for words*; and finally to Christina: For praying for me when I was sick, lovingly shaming me when I was stupid, and teaching me so much about *aletheia*, *aesthesis*, and most of all *philia*.

Man is the only animal that blushes. Or needs to.

–Mark Twain

"When," I said "Many gathered together sit down in assemblies, courts, theatres, army camps, or any other common meeting of a multitude, and, with a great deal of uproar, blame some of the things said or done, and praise others, both in excess, shouting and clapping; and, besides, the rocks and the very place surrounding them echo and redouble the uproar of blame and praise. Now in such circumstances, as the saying goes, what do you suppose is the state of the young man's heart? Or what kind of private education will hold out for him and not be swept away by such blame and praise and go, borne by the flood, wherever it tends so that he'll say the same things are noble and shameful as they do, practice what they practice and be such as they are?"

–Plato, *Republic*

Introduction:

Shame not only mediates how we treat one another; it mediates our very selves. When we feel shame we are confronted with our being, the being of others, the relation between the two, and the possibility of altering or maintaining this relation. In the experience of shame we can *hide* from ourselves, or from others. We can *question* the content of the relation between ourselves and others that shame points to, or the picture it provides of us, or that of the others. We can even *transform* our world or ourselves, as Christina Tarnopolsky puts it, "in accordance with the new other and new insights for action that come to light in the shaming situation".[1] On a similar note Bernard Williams has written that "Shame looks to what I am."[2] Feeling shame provides us with an opportunity to become ourselves, in either new or old ways. In this essay I shall turn to the ancient Greeks to uncover a conception of shame that is potentially salutary for contemporary democratic political and ethical life. In particular, I shall uncover and develop an interpretation of such a conception of shame, and a general theory of shame's relation to various character types, in the work of Aristotle.

The importance of shame in the world of the ancient Greeks has not gone unstudied. Indeed, Williams' book "Shame and Necessity" philosophically explored the role of shame in ancient Greek literature, focusing primarily on Homer's epics and the great tragedies such as Sophocles' *Ajax* and Euripides' *Hippolytus*. Williams' book disrupted the narrative that contrasted the "primitive" ethical world of the Greeks with the "progressive" state of modern moral concepts, unbinding this story by questioning not only the "primitive" category of the past using Homer and other Greek authors, but also the clarity and power of the "progressive", moral

[1] Tarnopolsky (2010), 191.
[2] Williams (1993), 93.

self-images of modernity. His work helped to begin the project of rescuing shame from the disrepute it suffers (especially as compared to the modern moral celebration of "guilt") arguing that study of the Greeks can show us that the *more* modern experience guilt is oriented in the direction of "What I have done" and that as shame allows us to "understand how a certain action or thought stands to ourselves, to what we are and to what realistically we can want ourselves to be."[3] Shame, having been derided from the "progressivist" point of view as heteronomous, egoistic, and nonmoral, becomes the more ethically interesting emotion as "shame can understand guilt, but guilt cannot understand itself."[4] Shame is a matter of the being of the actor as well as that of his actions.

Tarnopolsky has taken the project much further, finding in Plato's *Gorgias* three general forms of shame: Flattering shame, Socratic shame, and Platonic shame. Flattering shame exists in a subject whose sense of shame leads them to flatter and praise one another in order to avoid the pain of having one's identity criticized by an 'other', and fix solely on the pleasure of mutual recognition.[5] Pollus and Gorgias both try to make long speeches that avoid this pain, and Callicles is especially characterized by this sense of shame in his reluctance to give up his ostensive attachment to the life of the tyrant (until Socrates moves the argument so that this attachment would mean that he would resemble a catamite (494e)[6]). The focus is on the *pain* of transforming oneself. Socratic shame is found in the Socratic *elenchus*[7], where Socrates is radically open to the mixed pain and pleasure of the experience of shaming and being shamed by

[3] Williams, 92-93.
[4] Ibid, 93.
[5] Tarnopolsky (2004), 481.
[6] Of course, it should be noted that Callicles does feel shame with the discussion of the catamite, but it is the example of cowards running from battle that finally causes Callicles to retract the indiscriminate hedonism thesis at 499a-b.
[7] Logical and psychological refutation or shaming (the verbal form of *elenchos: elenchein* actually means to disgrace, put to shame, cross-examine, etc. (Liddell and Scott (1996), 531)).

his interlocutors. Socrates not only seeks to demonstrate the contradictions in his interlocutors' beliefs, but actively seeks to have *himself* refuted so that he might better himself. Socrates' sense of shame opens him up to the pains and pleasures of personal transformation, while Callicles' attempt to avoid criticism and to maintain his attachment to the internalized 'other' that is the life of the tyrant leads him to experience pain when confronted with the inconsistencies this love for the tyrant leads to and the equation of the tyrant with the shameful life of the catamite. Socrates' *elenchus* is like the Greek medicine (*pharmakon*) that Socrates compares the true rhetoric of justice to, in that not only could it be a cure but it often involved much pain, cutting and burning cauterization. Socrates does inspire the painful emotion of shame in others but his sense of shame is respectful in that he remains open to the painful experience of confronting the 'others' he himself has internalized and their transformation. Platonic shame involves Plato's blend of the best element of his teacher's sense of shame with that of his flattering sophist interlocutors. Socrates only engages one interlocutor at a time (though he does have an audience) and his fearsome *elenchus* often leaves them stunned or stupefied[8] and Athenians are reluctant, fearful, and even aggravated by the prospect of engaging him. As the *Gorgias* progresses Socrates gives longer speeches, the participation of the other interlocutors dropping as he moves from shaming Polus, to Gorgias, to Callicles, culminating in a very unsocratic myth that at once captures the spirit of the shaming *elenchic* arguments he has given and the pleasant images that characterized the flattering rhetoric of the sophists.[9] The myth maintains a message that shames the internalized 'others' of the audience members but it also reaches out to the commonalities that

[8] In the Meno Socrates is compared to a "torpedo fish" or "sting-ray" who "numbs" Meno's mind and tongue (*Meno*, 80b). Socrates responds that the image is only appropriate if he also numbs himself in causing others to be perplexed (*aporia*) (80c).

[9] Tarnopolsky argues that Platonic shame incorporates the pleasant images of Gorgianic rhetoric (not the impetuous speeches of Polus nor the ranting of Callicles).

exist in the audience and provide the grounds for this shaming and potential transformation.[10] Whereas Socrates' harsh ironic engagements with his interlocutors leave their worldviews upside down (481c4), Plato's conception of shame and his critique of his teacher and the tyrannical impulses of imperial Athens seeks to *seduce* as well as challenge and transform the reader. Tarnopolsky argues that it is Platonic shame that serves as an example of how shame can serve to revitalize contemporary democratic political life: we ought not to engage in shaming practices that humiliate and alienate others, nor in self-or-other-congratulating flattering praise that avoids shame, but rather in critical, respectful, shaming practices that do not lose their grounding in the "context of meaningfulness" and the "common vulnerabilities" that make the shaming experience *'other' challenging* and *comprehensible* as well as *hierarchical* but *reciprocal*.[11]

While there are some considerable differences in their accounts of shame and its role in democratic political life, I shall argue that a conception of salutary, respectful shame not entirely unlink Platonic shame is found in the works of Aristotle. Aristotle's distinction is not between Flattering, Socratic, and Platonic shame but between *True* shame and *Common* shame and *Mature* shame and *Learner* shame, and as we shall it is in Aristotle's *personal* approach to shame as an emotion that we find the "respectful" element of his conception of shame. Shame is divided according to its cognitive and affective qualities. I will explain how for Aristotle looking for what is *commonly* shameful in shaming and inquiring into what is truly shameful is the key to understanding true, salutary, respectful and comprehensible shame. I will also demonstrate how Aristotle divides shame into the affective categories of "mature" and "learner" shame –one of the most substantive things he says about shame is that it is not a virtue but a passion (*pathos*) and

[10] Tarnopolsky (2004), 485; NB. there is nothing *determined* by these three forms of shame, as reactions to shaming experience differ not merely in the content of the norms or actions involved but also in the freedom of the target.
[11] Ibid, 487.

that mature ethical subjects ought never to feel it, except as a conditional *sense* of shame, if they are to be considered mature and good (*NE* 1128b10-35). However, as we shall see, Mature shame is not necessarily distinguished by the age of those for whom it is salutary but by its affectively *conditional* status, being a very special kind of affective negative disposition. True shame is identified by its cognitive correspondence to that which violates the truly noble (*kalon*). Learner shame is to be affected by the emotion (*pathos*) of shame regularly and to be restrained from shameful action thereby. Aristotle argues that such Learner shame is becoming only to youth, although this does not mean that adults cannot experience this shame in a beneficial way (*NE* 1128b18-19). Common shame does not necessarily correspond to any true (*aletheuein)* cognitive specification of what truly violates the noble (*kalon*) but only to common opinion (*doxan/doxa/endoxa),* although it can turn out to be *false* (false Learner-Common and Mature-Common shame). Shame is always either occurrent, Learner, or conditionally dispositional, Mature. It is also either True or false and Common. Learner-Common and Mature-Common shame can turn out to be Learner-True and Mature-Common shame (what is held according to *doxa* can turn out to be true).

I shall argue that for Aristotle none of these kinds of shame are static and that all can lead to one another, for better or worse. Aristotle is also aware of the extremes of *shamelessness* (*anaischuntia*) and oversensitivity to shame (*kataplexis*) and I would like to suggest that we can classify only those who have not been habituated to feeling occurrent shame as "shameless" (*NE* 1108a31-37). It is tempting to refer to those who feel false Learner-Common shame and Mature-Common shame as "shameless" but Aristotle's comments indicate that one can indeed be habituated to feel shame towards what is not truly shameful. I shall also argue that Aristotle's attention to what is commonly shameful is in part due to a concern that a target of shame not

become a *kataplex* –paralyzed by shame and oversensitivity to the opinions of others (*Magna Moralia* 1193a1-10). Although I shall do little but speculate as to the uses of Aristotle's conception of shame for contemporary democratic life, I shall demonstrate that each kind of shame accompanies corresponding character states, and so Aristotle's view of shame is not only valuable for his general respectful approach to the subject, but for his analysis of shame's role in ethical development and degeneration. Such an analysis that looks to the kinds of shame felt by all different characters is quite appropriate for democracies that feature a vibrant mix of different characters. For as Plato has Socrates say of democracy in the *Republic*:

> "Just like a many-coloured cloak decorated in all hues, this regime, decorated with all dispositions, would also look fairest…" (557d).

Occurrent and dispositional shame for Aristotle *can* be beneficial for all of these many hued dispositions, but he is most hopeful concerning its effect on the young who can be oriented towards loving and knowing the noble (*kalon*) by feeling shame and least hopeful for those masses caught in habits and opinions that lead them astray from the noble (*kalon*).

Part (*i*) of this essay will explore the lexical problems concerning interpretations of shame in Aristotle's thought and the evidence for the distinction between occurrent Learner and dispositional Mature shame as well as that between True and Common shame. In explicating the key passage distinguishing between True and Common shame I will confront the central problem of Aristotle's *personal* sensitivity to shame in the inquiry, suggesting that the *Nicomachean Ethics itself* is a work influenced by Aristotle own conception of what is truly shameful. In part (*ii-α*) of this essay I will explain how shame exercises it "mind-to-world" direction of fit, arguing that it does this (a) by means of deliberative action and (b) in the intersubjective act of shaming itself. Continuing the questions raised concerning the nature of the *Nicomachean Ethics itself* and Aristotle's relation to its performance I shall argue that the work is itself an exercise in an

intersubjective act of shaming. Aristotle's general approach to shame is nowhere demonstrated more clearly than in the delicate way he looks to what his audience considers shameful and uses what he finds common between their conceptions of shame and his own to point out what is truly shameful –shaming those who hold to false and shameful opinions and actions. In part (*ii-β*) of this essay I shall explain how shame exercises its world-to-mind direction of fit over subjects. This will involve examining the role of shame in habituation, briefly explaining how we come to feel shame, how the different types of shame correspond to different states of character, and how we move *between* these kinds of shame as our character changes in relation to our virtuous activity. I will explain Aristotle's identification of three very general categories of character early on in the *Nicomachean Ethics,* and the development his more fine grained account of character types in relation to how the different kinds of shame factor into both categorizations. What is commonly considered shameful will also be shown to serve an essential role as *doxa* forms not only what is reputable, but also the *subject* of truth, and so inquiry into what is truly shameful must look to what is commonly shameful. Common shame is also essential in that *nomos* is required in order to habituate the many (*hoi polloi*) into learning to feel occurrent shame, and this mass facilitation of shame turns out to be key to preventing society from atomizing into barbaric units –each with its own warped conception of the good. I shall end the essay by reviewing the argument of parts (*i*) and (*ii*) and then casting them in a new light by arguing that Aristotle is himself living out what he finds to be the highest life of human flourishing: the life of the philosopher. What this means is that in looking to know human affairs Aristotle has been forced to confront the question of what shame is, and has thus looked to what is commonly shameful, feeling as well as thinking his way through the question. A question, he will come to understand, whose answer he is living in the asking. Aristotle's "respectful"

general approach to shame will thus be commented on as evident throughout the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and a result not only of Aristotle's concern for his life or the effectiveness and comprehension of the shaming this inquiry can bring, but also as a requirement of the pursuit of the life of the mind.

(i) The Structure and Forms of Aristotelian *Aidos* and *Aischune*:

For Aristotle a self-sufficient man, without need of any family, city (*polis*), nation, or friends, is either a beast or a god (*Pol*. 1253a26-30). *One* of the many reasons this man would be "either beast or a god" is that he would lack the *need* for shame, that is, the need to be socialized into a world that would provide him with love and knowledge of the noble (*kalon*), the love and knowledge of which allow man to live with others "for the sake of living well" (*Pol.* 1252b30). To lack the need for shame is to be inhuman, cut off from the goods of human flourishing that define our existence and that of our city (*polis*). The subject of this chapter will be to discuss the way in which, for Aristotle, shame allows us to be human by facilitating the pursuit of the good life: orienting the practical intellectual and appetitive parts of our souls towards the good. The focus will be on the *kinds* of shame he thinks push us both *away from* and *towards* the good, although the specifics concerning how these kinds of shame push us towards more virtuous or vice ridden characters and polities will be the subject of parts (*ii*) and (*iii*) of this essay. I shall endorse the *general* distinction David Konstan notes between Aristotle's usage of the two Greek words for shame as a *temporally* distinctive usage, but also argue that this lexical distinction picks out a very broad trend in Aristotle's thought and refers exclusively to Aristotle's *occurrent* conception of shame. After explicating and briefly qualifying Konstan's argument I shall examine Jon Elster's instructive exploration of the various aspects of Aristotelian emotions. Given my analysis, I will conclude that Konstan has not provided a sufficient explanation of

Aristotle's distinction between occurrent and pseudo-dispositional shame, and that Elster has crucially passed over a fundamental cognitive distinction Aristotle makes between kinds of shame featuring either true or doxastic references. Understanding the specific affective and cognitive differences between these kinds of shame will pave the way towards an understanding of the role these types of shame play in both private and public habituation (*ethismos*) and deliberation (*boulesis*).

There are actually two words in Atttic Greek for what we roughly refer to in English today as shame: *aidos* and *aischune*. The historical relationship of these words is quite complex and I shall not review it here except to say that scholars generally agree that by the time of Plato the words had begun to lose their distinctions.[12] Even so, David Konstan has convincingly made the case that in Aristotle both words are employed in subtly different ways.[13] This contrasts with the views of some authors who argue that there is "no discernible difference" in Aristotle's use of *aidos* and *aischune* .[14] When we use the word shame in English we are usually referring to two different psychological phenomena. We usually either refer to someone's *sense* of shame or their *occurrent* feeling of shame: "I am ashamed of my love for apricot beer" does not necessarily pick out a particular occurrence of shame in relation to apricot beer, but usually refers to a disposition of to feel shame after quaffing (or at the thought of quaffing) the deliciously effeminate contents of an apricot beer. This *sense* of shame a person has is of course closely related to the kinds of shame they can *feel*. As Douglas Cairns, using the example of anger, points out in his landmark study of *aidos*: "I can be angry at the government's education policies without jumping up and down, raising my voice, and going red in the face, but equally

[12] Cairns (1993), 415 and 455.
[13] Konstan (2006), 95; Tarnopolsky, however, notes that this is not true for Plato. See Tarnopolsky (2010), 11.
[14] Grimaldi (1988), 105. Cf. Nieuwenburg (2004), p. 466, n.12

my dispositional anger must, given the right stimuli, be liable to boil over into occurrence for it to make sense."[15] Dispositional references to emotions presuppose occurrent emotions.

Konstan does presuppose this distinction between the occurrent and the dispositional when he analyses shame in Aristotle, but he also introduces two other distinctions that *seem* to map onto these distinctions, but that actually do not, precisely because he thinks that both of these distinctions refer to the *occurrent* experience of shame. These other two distinctions are the "prospective" and "retrospective" forms of shame.[16] The former refers to the feeling or occurrent experience of shame in relation to a future event. The latter refers to the feeling or occurrent experience of shame in relation to a past event. According to Konstan, for Aristotle, *aidos* is always prospective, while *aischune* can be either prospective or retrospective, but both of them are always *occurrent*. And, indeed, in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle does seem to define shame in such a way that it refers to the occurrent experience of this emotion. In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle defines shame:

"Let shame [*aischune*] be [defined as] a sort of pain and agitation concerning the class of evils, whether present or past or future, that seem to bring a person into disrespect, and [let] shamelessness [*anaischuntia*] [be defined as] a belittling about these same things" (II.6. 1383b12-14)

The way "pain and agitation" become present in an individual is clearly stated in his earlier definition of fear, where they are said to become present to the individual *via* the imagination [*phantasia*] (1382a19-22). Imagination is a kind of "weak perception" that brings perception of painful, pleasurable, and shameful things from the present, past and future (1370a29-36; 1384a20-30). *Aidos*, then, is *prosepective* and *occurrent* because it refers to the person's imagining of a *future* action, and yet by this very imagining, one actually brings on the actual experience of or *feeling* of shame in oneself. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle calls *aidos* "a

[15] Cairns (1993). 11.
[16] Konstan (2006), 95-96

kind of fear [*phobos*] of disgrace [*adoxia*]" and in the *Rhetoric* fear is said to exclusively concern future actions (*NE* 1128b12-13; *Rh.* 1382a19-22). Insofar as *aidos* is compared to fear and fear is exclusively predicated of future actions it seems that Konstan has identified a *general* lexical trend in Aristotle. While Konstan's argument is actually to some extent opaque[17], what is clear is that he believes that Aristotle's distinction between *aidos* and *aischune* does not correspond to the English differentiation between a *sense* of shame and the occurrent/retrospective *experience* of shame, but rather to the emphasis on the timing of a shameful action.[18] I see the implicit move in his argument as being the linkage of *imagination* (*phantasia*) to both *aidos* and *aischune* such that both are linked to the *experience* of shame, leaving no room for the identification of *aidos* with a "sense of shame" that is separate from experiencing it and supporting Konstan's thesis that the difference between *aidos* and *aischune* is for the most part temporal. I can find no reason to dispute Konstan's lexographical position insofar as Aristotle's *occurrent* uses of *aidos* and *aischune* are concerned, however I shall argue that Aristotle is keen to distinguish a special kind of conditional dispositional shame which he describes using both Greek words.

For Aristotle shame (*aidos* and *aischune*) is an emotion, but what qualities does he attribute to emotions (*pathe*)? (*NE* 1128b10-12). Aristotle gives his explicit definition of emotion [*pathe*] as "those things through which, by undergoing change, people come to differ in their judgments and which are accompanied by pain and pleasure, for example, anger, pity, fear, and other such things and their opposites" (*Re.* 1378a21-22). He fails to mention other features of the emotions and defines emotions based on their impact on cognition rather than on the fact

[17] He equivocates, and moves between too many sources to give a straightforward argument, although the excursions are interesting and he does come down hard in favor of one view (what reasons convince him most remains opaque).
[18] Konstan (2006), 99.

that they are *shaped* by cognition.[19] Jon Elster has helpfully explored the specific characteristics of Aristotelian emotions passed over by the definition of the *Rhetoric,* but elaborated in other areas of his corpus. These are *arousal, physiological expression, cognitive antecedents, intentional objects, pain and pleasure,* and *action tendencies*.[20] Arousal and physiological expression refers to Arisotle's differentiation between the material and non-material causes, that is, the fact that the former can be explained by a physicist who "would define an affectation of soul differently from a dialectician; the latter would define, e.g. anger as the appetite of returning pain for pain, or something like that, while the former would define it as the boiling of the blood or warm substance surrounding the heart" (*DA* 403a17,29-32). In the *De Anima* Aristotle also refers to emotions (*pathe*) as "form in matter" (*logoi enuloi*). The matter Aristotle refers to corresponds to the physiological causes/aspects of an emotion. Taking the case of anger, the matter is the boiling of blood around the heart. This is the material cause of anger. The form refers to the psychological *aspects* of the action tendency that is "the appetite of returning pain for pain", the intentional object of this action tendency, and the cognitive antecedent that specifies it (*DA* 403a25-27). I think this action tendency that is the desire for revenge can be characterized as a *final* cause as the goal it is related to is aroused "for apparent [*phainomenes*] retaliation" (*Rh.* 1378a31-33). The action tendencies are the *final* causes of emotions. The efficient cause is the cognitive antecedent of the conspicuous slight that specifies and arouses the desire for revenge. In the case of anger as discussed in the *Rhetoric* the cognitive antecedents are that (*i*) giving pain to someone who has given insult "without justification" constitutes revenge and an end of anger and (*ii*) that someone has given insult "without justification" (which I would argue refers both to the content of the insult and the status of the person insulting in relation to

[19] Elster (1999), 55.
[20] Ibid, 55-60.

that of the insulted) (*Rh.* 1378a31-33). The action tendency of giving pain to someone who has given insult without justification is thus specified by the cognitive antecedent. Although the action tendency forms a part of the whole experience of anger and is *specified* by the cognitive antecedent, it is a logically distinct element of the experience. The imagination (*phantasia*) is key to the cognitive aspect of the emotions as it is how the intentional content of an emotion appears to us –we can note that in Aristotle's definition of anger *both* what anger is *for* and what it is *because* of are predicated by how the anger is imagined (*phainomenen*/*phainomenes*). The cognitive antecedent of an emotion is its efficient cause that specifies and arouses the action tendencies that form the final cause of the emotion. Included in the cognitive aspect of emotion is the intentional object, which Aristotle says is for the most part a person or group that is the target of the emotion (as in the case of anger), but not necessarily (it can also be reflexive, as in the case of shame) (*Rh*. 1378a22-25). The intentional object forms the specifications of the cognitive antecedent: Which persons have no justification for insult? As such it forms a part of an emotion's efficient cause. The formal aspect of an emotion is initially divided in the *De Anima* as being "by this or that cause and for this or that end [*hupo toude heneka toude*]" (403a26-27). Thus the efficient cause (the "by this") and the final cause (the "for this") as well as the intentional object of the emotion all make up the three elements of an emotion's *formal* cause. Emotions are form in matter and the *complex* formal content (formal cause) of an emotion is only made explicit once an emotion's cognitive antecedents (efficient cause), action tendencies (final cause), and intentional object (part of the efficient cause) are understood.

Pleasure and pain are *both* typically mixed into emotions for Aristotle. Elster notes that modern writers tend to think of emotions as either painful or pleasurable, and I would add that this is perhaps in part traceable to the impact of the classical utilitarianism of Bentham and James

Mill –notwithstanding the efforts of John Stuart to extricate their project from the simple calculus of pleasure/pain. Aristotle's analysis is more subtle, and is demonstrable using the case of anger. Anger is "accompanied by [mental and physical] distress" because of apparent unwarranted insult while also characterized by "a kind of pleasure" that "follows all experience of anger from the hope of getting retaliation" (*Re.* 1378a31-32). The content of the cognitive antecedents (in the case of anger the pain identified with insult and the pleasure identified with revenge) and the physiological aspects of the emotion, in addition to the character and disposition of an actor, are what determine the particular mix of pain and pleasure involved in an emotion. Elster's final aspect of Aristotelian emotions, action tendencies, is a matter of the *actions* performed in relation to a specific emotion. Of course, some emotions are not tied to any *specific* actions and Aristotle does not draw a simple line between emotions and determined actions. Emotions form a crucial part of judgement and deliberation, and the relation between judgment and deliberation and action in Aristotle's thought is neither simple nor determinist.

Aristotle uses two words for shame that distinguish the temporal target of the occurrent emotion: *aidos* (prospective) and *aischune* (prospective and retrospective), but how does he characterize shame given the above criteria? I shall argue that Aristotle posits a number of different *kinds* of shame, each with a similar physiological material cause but different cognitive antecedents, affective states, and a complex relationship to various action tendencies. I shall argue that while Konstan's argument concerning the general temporal uses of *aidos* and *aischune* is correct concerning Aristotle's treatment of *occurrent* shame, he also employs them in a distinctive dispositional way. Shame features a special *affective* distinction between shame that is felt only conditionally and occurrent shame. This special affective distinction is not found in Elster, but is evident in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. When I examine this distinction it will

become evident that it is not simply reducible to the distinction between dispositional and occurrent shame, but is a special *conditional* form of dispositional shame. I shall also argue that Elster's list of aspects of the emotions misses out on a *fundamental* cognitive distinction Aristotle makes between emotions with either true or doxastic referents. I shall explicate the nature of shame given Elster's list while elucidating these special affective and fundamentally cognitive distinctions –arguing that they result in different *kinds* of Aristotelian shame. Aristotle is quite clear on the physiological aspect of shame: it "produces an effect similar to that produced by fear of danger; for people who feel disgraced blush, and those who fear death turn pale" (*NE* 1128b12-14).[21] Aristotle is keen to emphasize that shame is more like an emotion than a state of character and thus a fully-fledged virtue, but as an emotion it has two special cognitive antecedents that differentiate between *True* shame and *Common* shame: the former is shame felt in relation to that which really leads one away from the truly noble (*kalon*) to what is shameful in truth (*aletheian aischra*); the latter is felt in relation to that which common opinion (*doxan*) or mere custom and law (*nomos*) claims is shameful.

The distinction is found in the heart of the central section on shame in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Aristotle argues that "if some actions are disgraceful in very truth (*aletheian aischra*) and others only according to common opinion (*kata doxan*)" it makes no difference as either class of actions ought not be done *as/so that* (*host*) "there is no shame (*aischunteon*)" (1128b23-25).[22] This is a strange passage and if we interpret "*host ouk aischunteon*" not literally

[21] Aquinas interprets this passage in a very strange way by using the theory of the humors, arguing that "the humors naturally rush to the place feeling the need. Now, the seat of life is the heart, and when danger of death is feared, the spirit and the humors speed to the heart. Consequently, the surface of the body, being as were deserted, grows pale. On the other hand, honor and confusion are numbered among external things. Therefore, since man fears the loss of honor by shame, he blushes as the humors and spirits stream back to the surface." (*Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* XVII. 870).

as "so that there is no shame" but as Ross does, "so that no disgrace should be felt" the passage seems to be interpretable in three ways. Either Aristotle is arguing that those who hold what is truly shameful shameful will not do actions that are held to be shameful according to common opinion (*kata doxan*) in order not to feel shame, or he is arguing that those with True shame ought to not commit actions held to be shameful by those with Common shame in order to avoid having *them* feel shame at the ostensively shameless actions of those with True shame. He also may be arguing that those with Common and True shame ought to not commit acts they hold to be shameful *themselves*, and that neither class of actions ought to be done by those whose sense of shame proscribes the set of actions shameful to *them*. The first interpretation contradicts the clause "so that no disgrace should be felt" (*host ouk aischunteon*) as those with True shame would not feel shamed themselves by doing actions of Common shame. On both the second and third interpretations Aristotle maintains a distinction between True shame and Common shame, although the second interpretation recommends that those with True shame avoid actions of Common shame.

The passage translates more literally as "for [shameful] actions should not be done; and if some actions are truly shameful and others according to common opinion, this makes no difference; for neither set of actions should be done so that there should be no shame" (*ei d'esti ta men kat'aletheian aischra ta de kata doxan, outhen diaferei oudetera gar praktea host ouk aischunteon*) (*NE* 1128b23-25). The passage is indeed ambiguous, and although it in no way indicates that someone with True shame would *feel* shame in relation to Common shame, it does seem to indicate Aristotle's hesitance to state that those with True shame may flagrantly commit actions held to be commonly shameful. *Even if* the third interpretation of the passage is correct,

and Aristotle simply intends to forbid *sets* of shameful actions exclusively to those whose conceptual schemas proscribe them, Aristotle still does not *openly* say this. I favor the second interpretation of the passage (that Aristotle cautions those with True shame against committing actions of Common shame) but above all I think it is important to note that Aristotle may be *intentionally* ambiguous due to his own conception of shame and that of his audience. If those with True shame need not care for what is commonly shameful then why not simply say this? Shame can be felt at the *sign* (*semia*) of and thus on behalf of one doing or saying something shameful, but, on the third interpretation, if this shame is common shame then why heed it at all (*Rh.* 1384b19-20)? The third interpretation also seems belied by the line "it is the mark of a bad man even to be such as to do any disgraceful action" although this "any" could be argued not to refer back to what is commonly shameful (*NE* 1128b21). Given that Aristotle conditions the passage with the clause "so that there is no shame" it seems reasonable to assume that he is concerned that those with even common shame do not feel shame and it seems to be the case that *to him* or a person with *True* shame *saying openly* that those with True shame can violate what is held to be commonly shameful with impunity *would itself be truly shameful*.[23] The ambiguity of the passage itself suggests that Aristotle considers it shameful to encourage the thought that those who possess True shame ought to freely engage in an action that is commonly shameful –even though his theory holds that the virtuous person possessing true shame will *feel* no shame with regard to such activities. This is compounded when we consider (a) his audience, and (b) his nationality.

Aristotle likely had an audience for his *Nicomachean Ethics* (and all of the ethical and political works) beyond the Lyceum –addressed not only to philosophers or students of

[23] I owe this point, in addition to much of the development of my thought concerning Aristotle, to my friend and fellow Albertan Eli Friedland.

philosophy but also to educated and leisured gentlemen who were "actual or potential wielders of political power."[24] The ambiguous passage of *NE* IV.9 is not the only point where Aristotle distinguishes between True shame and Common shame: in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle states that men are not ashamed "of the same things before acquaintances and strangers, but before acquaintances [they are ashamed] of things truly regarded [as wrong and] before those from abroad [they are ashamed] of things conventionally so regarded" (*alla tous men gnorimos ta pros aletheian dokounta tous d'apothen ta pros ton nomon*) (*Rh.* 1384b26-27). This passage is more descriptive than prescriptive, in that its purpose is to describe how shame is felt and before whom rather than when it *ought* to be felt.[25] Yet, even so the passage suggests the distinction between Common and True shame and that, as Aristotle lectured before an audience that likely included a number of men of honour who held to traditional Athenian customs and laws (*nomoi*) and opinions (*doxa*), *according* to a view of what is truly shameful it would have been improper for him to disregard their conceptual schema and violate what they held to be shameful (causing them to feel shame at the sign of his words). What is commonly shameful, what the gentlemen hold to be shameful according to *doxa* and *nomoi* is not necessarily true or false, and can turn out to be either. As we shall see in parts (*ii-β*) and (*iii*) of this essay there are reasons why Aristotle looks to what is commonly shameful that transcend the more immediate considerations of "respect" and extend to the nature of the inquiry of the *Nicomachean Ethics* itself, but for now we shall look to Aristotle's concern for his nationality and the comprehension of his audience.

The fact that Aristotle was a Macedonian (and an associate of Phillip II) likely giving the lectures that constitute the *Nicomachean Ethics* in democratic Athens during a time of

[24] Lord (1984), 10.

heightened tension (or even restricted democracy imposed by Macedon on Athens after the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C.[26]) between Imperial Macedon and democratic Athens strengthens the case for Aristotle's sensitivity to the Common shame of his potentially suspicious audience. The threat of persecution lurked over Aristotle as he spoke to the Athenian gentlemen, forcing him to choose his words carefully and eventually causing him to flee Athens "lest Athens sin a second time against philosophy".[27] His nationality served to increase his attention to what was shameful according to the opinions (*doxa*) and laws (*nomoi*) of the Athenians, not only in the interest of self-preservation but also for purposes of comprehension. Aristotle maintains his ambiguity concerning the violation of common shame not because he feels shame at the same things as the Athenians but because it is shameful to disregard what others consider shameful according to what is truly shameful. This is because such shame obviates the chaos and danger that lies in disregarding the conceptual schemas of others as a stranger, and ensures comprehensibility and the pursuit of truth. It is absurd to interpret the clause "so that no shame should be felt" as banning *any* speech that might *lead* to shame: were this Aristotle's view then he would remain silent. As we shall see in part (*ii*) of this essay, the inquiry of the *Nicomachean Ethics* itself involves the intersubjective action of shaming. Aristotle seems quite aware of the question of the relation of the city to the philosopher raised by Adeimantus in Plato's *Republic*: "Of all those who start out on philosophy –not those who take it up for the sake of getting educated when they are young and drop it, but those who linger in it for a long time –most become quite queer, not to say completely vicious; while the ones who seem perfectly decent, do nevertheless suffer at least one consequence of the practice you are praising –they become

[26] The *NE* is usually dated towards the last years of Aristotle's life (his fifties or sixties) which would place the *NE after* Chaeronea when Athens, was subject to Macedonian rule (they tolerated a restricted democracy). Ross (1998), V.
[27] Lord (1984), 6.

useless to the cities" (*Rep*. 487c6-d5). Philosophy is either subservient to what is commonly shameful or, discovering what is truly shameful, remains idle and removed from the world of the city –useless to it. It can stand useless like the stargazing true pilot who "keeps quiet and minds his own business –as a man in a storm, when dust and rain are blown about by the wind, stands aside under a little wall" (*Rep*. 496d8-9). Socrates takes up the challenge to show "how a city can take philosophy in hand without being destroyed" while cautioning Adeimantus of the stargazing philosopher's risk at stepping out from shelter: "All that is great stands in the storm" (*Rep*. 497d8-9).[28] By the very act of stepping out in front of a suspicious audience of foreigners to lecture on what constitutes the life of human flourishing (*eudaimonia*) and how to live this life Aristotle is standing in the storm. His careful attention to what is *held* to be shameful by his audience prevents him from stating outright what *he* holds to be truly shameful, but does not prevent him from working with what he and his audience *share* as shameful to respectfully challenge the various wrongheaded view of the good life that exist amongst his audience.[29] I shall return to this idea of shaming in light of *shared* conceptions of the shameful as part of the risky project of the *Nicomachean Ethics* itself in parts (*ii*) and (*iii*) of this essay. In situating this crucial passage (1128b23-25) from the *Nicomachean Ethics* in relation to this remark concerning shame before acquaintances and strangers in the *Rhetoric*, we can begin to see the respectful flavor of Aristotle's *personal* conception of true shame.

Additional evidence for the distinction between True and Common shame can be found in Aristotle's remark that men are also not ashamed "before those whose reputation of telling the

[28] This is Heidegger's translation of "*ta megala panta episphale*" which more literally translates as "All that is great risks a fall". Heidegger's translation captures the importance of the phrase in relation to the book and passage as a whole. For an incredibly interesting introduction to the differences between Heidegger and Strauss's interpretations of Aristotle with special reference to the question of the relationship between the philosopher and the city see O'Connor (2002), 162.

[29] The "many-coloured cloak… decorated with all dispositions" of democracy (*Rep*. 557d)

truth they much look down on" (*Rh.* 1384b25). The distinction is also supported by a kind of inferential necessity: were there no distinction between True and Common shame Aristotle's ethical theory would lose its clear realist stance. The three objects of pursuit are "the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant (*kalou sumferontos hedeos*)" and the three objects of avoidance are "the shameful, the injurious, the painful (*aischrou blaberou luperou*)[30]" (*NE* 1104b30-32). Were there no *truly* shameful objects of avoidance there could be no correspondingly truly noble objects of pursuit and Aristotle's project of exploring what constitutes the truly good life would be bunk. While Aristotle works through a number of other cognitive antecedents relating to *how much shame is felt* and *with whom* and in *which situation* these do not form crucial distinctions between *kinds* of shame but rather highly particular examples of shame.[31] The distinction between True and Common shame becomes more evident when we turn to Aristotle's *affective* analysis of shame.

Aristotle distinguishes between shame that is felt as an emotion in relation to any action or circumstance that appears shameful (*phainomenen*) and *conditional* shame that is not felt but *would* be felt were a man's imagination (*phantasia*) to be turned away from the noble (*kalon*) and the advantageous (*sumferontos*) to the shameful. I shall refer to shame that is felt in relation to the shameful *Learner* shame, although strictly speaking it is experienced not only by youthful eager "learners" but by all manner of people not virtuous enough to be considered only conditionally disposed to feel shame. Those in this conditional state will be said to possess *Mature* shame that can correspond to True shame or false common shame. When the conditional

[30] Though Ross translates *aischrou* as "base" I have modified it to "shameful" in order to demonstrate the necessary linkage with my argument. The shameful is of course very much what is "base" and even what is "ugly" in the same way *kalon* ought to not merely translate as noble but also as the beautiful, fine etc. To make English distinctions between Aristotle's consistent usage of these words is to foist English moral thinking onto the text and mask the *aesthetic* quality of his ethical thought.
[31] These kinds of observations are found primarily in the *Rhetoric*.

affective state of Mature shame is predicated of individuals *conditionally* shameful towards what is commonly shameful they are in a state of what we might be tempted to call "shamelessness" but it seems more appropriate to call "Mature-Common" shame as these subjects retain a *negative* disposition towards what is commonly shameful (whether it be true or false). In part (*ii*) of this essay I shall argue that this is the state of Aristotle's man who is completely gripped by vice, but Mature-Common shame can also be held in relation to *doxa* that turn out to be true. What is commonly shameful can turn out to be false or true so that Mature-Common shame can be the negative disposition *not* to commit actions that are commonly shameful but turn out to be truly shameful or *not* to commit actions that are commonly but are not truly shameful. The structure of Aristotelian ethical reasoning will make this category relatively redundant.[32] As we shall see the vice ridden man with Mature-Common shame in relation to actions that are not truly shameful is the opposite of the exemplary *phronimoi* who lead us away from what is truly shameful. I will comment further on Aristotle's use of exemplars in parts (*ii*) and (*iii*) of this essay.

Aristotle argues that virtues are not emotions because no one can be responsible for their emotions, we cannot be said to *choose* (*prohairesthai*) our emotions, and emotions are not praised or blamed, –yet shame can be the subject of praise and blame, and is *elicited* by voluntary actions (as well as involuntary actions) (*NE* 1105b20-1106a10; 1128ab18-20; *Re.* 1384a). The most extensive discussion of shame is also included in Chapter 9 of Book IV of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which concerns the virtues. Were shame an emotion *simpliciter* Aristotle could not posit the existence of conditional Mature shame for agents. It is clear that shame is a very special emotion, special enough to be grouped with the virtues and called a "mixed sort of state" but it is also clear that shame is denied the full status of a virtue as virtues are not

[32] It is more of a logical possibility than a serious category in Aristotle's conception of shame. See footnote 49.

"conditionally a good thing" as is the case with shame (*NE* 1128b30-35). Learner shame can also be either Common or True. Aristotle essentially articulates his conception of Learner shame when he argues that

"we think young people should be prone to shame because they live by passion and therefore commit many errors, but are restrained by shame; and we praise young people who are prone to this passion, but an older person no one would praise for being prone to the sense of disgrace, since we think he should not do anything that need cause this sense." (*NE* 1128b17-20)[33].

The contrast with Mature shame is marked:

"shame may be said to be conditionally a good thing; *if* a good man does such actions, he will feel disgraced; but the virtues are not subject to such a qualification." (*NE* 1128b30-35).

So Learner shame is the emotional sort of shame that springs from different circumstances according to what *appears* to be shameful while Mature shame amounts to a *pseudo*-dispositional kind of shame. The imagination (*phantasia*) is the key to understanding the distinction between Learner and Mature shame, and how mature shame can exist given the argument above that *aidos* and *aischune* refer to a uniform emotion and differ only in their *temporal* orientation. I have argued that the crux of Konstan's argument concerning the difference between *aidos* and *aischune* lies in the necessary link between imagining a shameful act and *experiencing shame*. Since *aidos* involves imagining, for the most part,[34] *prospective* shame and *aischune* past, or present (although it is also said to regard the future) shame, the distinction between *aidos* and *aischune* must be temporal rather than corresponding to a modern anglophone's distinction between a sense of shame and occurrent shame. Yet Mature shame is *conditional* and as such does *not* involve the imagination of shameful things and therefore does *not* count as occurrent shame. Mature shame amounts to a kind of dispositional "*sense of shame*" that exists in those so completely turned either *away from* or *towards* what is truly

[33] I should note that "sense of disgrace" does not correspond to any new usage of *aidos* or *aischune* (which are both used in the sentence) but is merely an unfortunate anglicism on the part of the translator (Ross).
[34] Especially given its comparison to fear.

shameful that they cease to imagine or *do* what appears to them to be shameful. Mature shame is thus the *negative*-disposition to *not* imagine or commit acts which one takes to be shameful. Where this disposition corresponds to what is truly shameful we have the most virtuous of men[35]; where this disposition corresponds to what is commonly shameful we often find the most vice ridden men, although in between these extremes lie men with Mature-Common shame in relation to what is truly shameful who do not possess full ethical knowledge to truly count as *phronimoi*. I will further explore the role of these kinds of shame in part (*ii*) of this essay, and in part (*iii*) I shall argue that the exemplar of the man with Mature-Common shame that turns out to be true can still serve a vital purpose in teaching virtue. I shall argue that Aristotle *himself* uses such exemplars as incomplete *phronimoi* to move those with Learner-Common shame towards Mature-True shame. I have used the words Learner and Mature shame in order to identify the distinction as *affective* rather than one of age, and Learner shame can indeed be an emotion that helps those who feel it learn to love the noble (*kalon*) and avoid what is shameful. Learner shame, if oriented towards what is truly shameful, restrains those who live by their emotions from committing errors, and although Aristotle says this state of emotional life is not appropriate for older persons such persons receive much attention in his profiles of ethical characters and shame can serve as a learning emotion for them (*NE*, VII). The distinction between True and Common shame can be linked to the distinction between Mature and Learner shame. Once virtuous subjects come to be characterized by conditional Mature shame they *would* feel shame in relation to acts that are truly shameful, which is the shame that leads them to be turned from what is truly shameful to what is noble and good. The virtuous man with *phronesis* knows what

[35] We also can have less virtuous men who are conditionally disposed not to imagine or do what is truly shameful but only do so under the guidance of *doxa*. These men seem like halfway exemplars that do not possess Mature-True shame, but rather Mature-Common shame that turns out to be true. See footnote 49 regarding the unlikeliness of such men.

is truly shameful and what is truly noble (*kalon*) but he has no need to imagine or do what is shameful –though *were* he to imagine and experience it it would be what is truly shameful. A Mature virtuous person who has *become* noble (*kalon*) and good, and thus serves as the measure of what is good (once they have reached the heights of virtue as a *phronimos*) no longer has a reason to imagine or commit acts which are shameful (*Pol.* 1284a5-15). Aristotle explicitly links Mature shame to True shame as it is the good man whose shame can be said to be "conditionally" a good thing (*NE* 1128b30-35). The potential link between Mature shame and Common shame is also implicit in Aristotle's conceptions of *akrasia* and shamelessness. Learner shame can involve either True shame or Common shame, while it is feeling the former that leads agents to become good. The relationship between these cognitive and affective distinctions concerning shame gives us a table of Aristotle's *kinds* of shame:

Cognitive/Affective Distinctions of Shame	True (*aletheia*)	Common (*nomos/doxa*)
Mature (*conditional*)	Mature-True	Mature-Common
Learner (*occurrent*)	Learner-True	Learner-Common

The movement from Learner-Common to Learner-True to Mature-True shame represents the journey of the ethical subject from being concealed before itself in opinion (*doxa*), lost in the sense of shame of the crowd, to being uncovered before itself by moments of Learner-True shame, and then pushed by shame from shame itself towards the virtue of the *phronimos*. Men who become *seemingly* virtuous in their actions but fail to develop a fully virtuous character that *understands* their actions *as* virtuous can develop from Learner-Common shame to Mature-Common shame that is *doxastic* but turns out to be true. Shame proves crucial on the path to becoming good. For Aristotle these shaming moments are both pleasurable and painful, and a subject can feel *too much* or *not enough* shame with regard to an action. Recall from the

introduction Aristotle's concept of *kataplexis,* the excessive feeling of shame that paralyzes its subjects (*MM* 1193a1-10). This concept gives us insight into another reason Aristotle "respectfully" looks to his audience's conception of what is commonly shameful: there remains the possibility of not only rendering one's argument incomprehensible, or insensible to an audience, but also shocking them into a state of oversensitivity. By paying careful attention to what the audience considers commonly shameful, and to what *he* holds to be shameful in common with them, Aristotle can respectfully shame his audience and hit the mean between inspiring *kataplexis* and insensitivity to what is truly shame (*NE* 1108a32-b1). Subjects who are oversensitive to shame (*kataplex*) will be overcome by the pain of shame, while subject insensitive to it will fell less pain than they should. Shame is painful in the gap it reveals between what one is (how one has acted, acting, or going to act), how one wishes to be seen and how one is perceived by the wider social world, or specific sets of it (*Rh*. 1384a25-30). Shaming moments have a variable element of pleasure in that those who are restrained from shameful acts by Learner shame are praised (*NE* 1128b19). While there is much more to be said about Aristotle's *personal* approach to shame this theme will be revisited in parts (*ii*) and (*iii*) of this essay. For now it is sufficient to note that Aristotle looks carefully to the *doxa* and *nomos* of his audience regarding what is shameful in order to render his inquiry less shocking, less politically dangerous, more comprehensible, and not insensible to the imagination of his audience.

Though shame pushes the subject towards the shameful and the noble depending on the kind of shame experienced, the outcome of any shaming situation is not determined. As I noted in my introduction, while shame mediates the self it can do this in a variety of ways that depend not only on the truth of our shame but on the variety of ways we can react to it. In her study of Plato's *Gorgias* Tarnopolsky lists these reactions, claiming that as Socrates sunders Callicles'

identification with the tyrant and the tyrannical world-view there are five ways (non-mutually exclusive) Callicles can react: "he can "(1) hide or withdraw from any further debate or discussion; (2) try to transform himself in accordance with a new other: either a less tyrannical democrat or Socratic philosophy; (3) try to transform himself in accordance with the old other, the tyrant or the Athenian democrat; (4) try to transform the world to make it fit better with either the new or the old other; (5) try to contest the standard provided by either the new or the old others."[36] All of these options seem available to the Aristotelian subject, and while Aristotle say disappointing little about the reactions of subjects to shame, he does discuss the influence of the emotions on our actions and our characters. In the background of this discussion I hope the reader will keep in mind for himself or herself that feeling shame cannot determine any outcome for us, although as we shall see it certainly can push us towards various actions. In part (*ii*) of this essay I shall examine the relation between the *kinds* of shame, or actions, and our characters, all the while keeping an eye on Aristotle's own personal approach to shame in the inquiry of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

(ii) Stepping into the Storm:

In order to help distinguish the nature of practical reasoning from theoretical reasoning Elizabeth Anscombe noted that perceptions and beliefs generally have a mind-to-world "direction of fit" and that desires have world-to-mind fit.[37] If I go the grocery store and my girlfriend gives me a list that says I am to purchase a case of Guinness (presupposing my intention to purchase what she desires) and I come back with a case of delicious apricot beer she will have every right to claim that I have made a mistake. When challenged with the discrepancy

[36] Tarnopolsky (2010), 160-61.
[37] Anscombe (1963), 53. I shall continue to use this distinction in direction of fit as it will prove quite useful for my argument. However, the term "mind" in the expressions "mind-to-world" and "world-to-mind" does not correspond to the Greek word *nous* in my usage but rather to the self (whether this be the self's soul (*psuche*) or mind (*nous*)).

between the list and the apricot beer I cannot simply take the list from her hands and cross off the word "Guinness" and write in "apricot beer". If I do this I risk being slapped or thought crazy, or both. With regards to desire I change the world (I should have purchased the Guinness!) in order to fit my[38] desire (to fulfill my intention to purchase what my girlfriend desires). However, were a detective to follow me around on my grocery voyage and keep his own list of what I buy then he would be perfectly justified in crossing out "Guinness" and writing "apricot beer" as I would have altered my behavior from what he had expected. In the former case the desire fit the world to the mind: in this case the action of buying the beer (world) must, but does not, correspond to my intention to purchase what is on my girlfriend's list (mind). In the latter case the beliefs and perceptions fit the mind to the world: in this case the detective's belief about what I have bought (mind) must correspond to what I have bought (world). Emotions generally feature *both* world-to-mind and mind-to-world fit, and shame is no exception. An emotion can be right about the world (I can feel anger because of my true belief that I have just experienced an unjustified slight) and the world can change according to my reaction to an emotion (I desire conspicuous revenge for the slight, and punch the person in the face for making me angry). In this part of the essay I shall demonstrate how Aristotle's forms of shame figure in the subject's relation to the world and the world's relation to the subject. The character of a subject is shaped by the various kinds of shame it experiences and in turn the kind of shame a subject experiences is influenced by the decisions and deliberations of a subject. The primary locus where Aristotle's sees shame's crucial influence on ethical subjects is in their habitation (*ethismos*) and development of their powers of deliberation (*boulesis*). At this stage the most relevant forms of shame are Learner-True and Learner-Common shame. As we will see, it is these forms of shame's role in learning to be good that influences what character a subject will have and

[38] What "we" desire.

whether they will develop or degenerate from these forms of shame to the *pseudo*-dispositional Mature-True or Mature-Common shame. In order to demonstrate the relation of these kinds of shame to how ethical subjects are developed or affected and how they see and interact with the world I shall (α) explicate the framework of Aristotelian ethical reasoning and the way the kinds of shame can affect the world *via* deliberative action or the intersubjective shaming that can occur in deliberation; (β) examine the role of the many kinds of shame in moral development and in the way specific character types are improved or corrupted, finally demonstrating the foregoing analysis using the special akratic case of Neoptolemus from Sophocles' play the *Philoctetes*.

(α) Shame, Deliberation, and Deliberative Action:

In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle identifies five modes of truth (*aletheia*) and identifies two intellectual parts of the soul: in the scientific intellectual part of the soul (*epistemonikon*) there is science (*episteme*) and philosophical wisdom (*sophia*) and in the calculative intellectual part of the soul (*logistikon*) there is art (*techne*) and practical reason (*phronesis*), while "mind" (*nous*) forms a strange mode of truth that apprehends the first principles (*archai*) of science (*NE* VI). The scientific modes of *aletheia* disclose the "kinds of things whose originative causes are invariable" (*ta toiauta ton onton hoson ai archai me endechontai allos echein*) while the practical-calculative modes uncover "variable things" (*en de ho ta endechomena*) (*NE* 1139a7-10). Clearly, given that our subject is shame which is a special kind of emotion concerning human affairs (which obviously admit of variability), our concern is with the practical part of the soul –especially practical reason (*phronesis*) as it is a "true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man" and shame is "not the characteristic of a good man, since it is consequent on bad actions" and "it is

the mark of a bad man even to be such as to do any disgraceful action" (1140b6; 1128b21,25). Shame and *phronesis* both have what is bad for man as their subject matter. But how are we to explicate this true "state of capacity (*dunamis*) to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man"? What does it mean to obtain truth in practical affairs? To answer this question, and the question of the mind-to-world role of the emotions, requires a brief survey of the subject and mechanics of deliberation (*boulesis*).

Deliberation (*boulesis*) involves the calculative intellectual part of the soul (*logistikos*) which Aristotle says is the same as the deliberative part of the soul (*bouleutikos*) (*NE* 1139a11-15). It will serve us well to deal with an exegetical difficulty that at first glance creates considerable problems for any coherent Aristotelian account of deliberation (*boulesis*): In Book III Ross translates Aristotle as saying that deliberation is only of means and not ends. He translates "*Bouleuometha d' ou peri ton telon, alla peri ton pros ta tele*" as "We deliberate not about ends but about means (*NE* 1112b11). This rendering of the passage gives rise to all kinds of exegetical trouble, the most significant of which is the description of deliberation put forward in Books VI and VII where deliberation does seem to be very much concerning ends. It seems fair to say that we do not deliberate concerning the generalized human end (*telos*) of happiness (*eudaimonia*), as this is what our deliberations will be for, but how can Aristotle be interpreted as saying that we do not deliberate about the *ends* (*tele*) relating to this human *telos*? Is this not exactly the kind of inquiry (and I am aware that not all inquiry is deliberation) that the *Nicomachean Ethics* consists of in itself? And isn't it absurd to say that no one deliberates regarding what *counts* as ends (*tele*) or what ends (*tele*) ought to be pursued? In my life I have certainly deliberated concerning what it would be good to become and what ends it would be good to pursue –and the beauty and relevance of the *Nicomachean Ethics* in parts stems from its

careful attention to these human questions and concerns: "What is the good for man?" Fortunately, rather than explain away the ostensively different views of deliberation held in Books III, VI and VII using a "developmental" account of how Aristotle changed his mind on the subject, David Wiggens has extracted the root of the problem by retranslating "*ton pros ta tele*" as "things which are towards ends" and thus rendering the passage "We do not deliberate about ends but about things which are towards ends".[39] This allows Aristotle to say in Book VI of the man with *phronesis* that he "be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health or strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general" (*NE* 1140a24-28), but to also hold that

> "A doctor does not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall convince, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order, nor does anyone else deliberate about his end. Having set the end, they consider how and by what means it is to be attained;" (*NE* 1112b11-18).

In the former case deliberation concerns what ends are towards happiness as their realization *constitutes* happiness while in the second case deliberation concerns what we might call means to these constitutive ends. Deliberation (*boulesis*) is an activity with a variety of objects –barring that which is invariable and eternal. The doctor, the orator and the statesmen do not deliberate on their ends of health, persuasion, or law and order because these ends are given for them insofar as *they are doctors, orators*, and *statesmen*. The ends pursued by these professionals are certainly deliberated upon in addition to the extent to which each profession's methods realize each end, and it is precisely this greater deliberative ability concerning what constitutes the good life that characterized the man with *phronesis* (*phronimos*). Aristotle elaborates on this distinction between the two subjects of deliberation when he says that

[39] Wiggins (1975), p. 33-34, no.76.

> "The man who is without qualification good at deliberating is the man who is capable of aiming in accordance with calculation at the best for man of things attainable by action. Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals only –it must also recognize the particulars; for it is practical and practice is concerned with particulars. This is why some who do not know, and especially those who have experience, are more practical than others who know; for if a man knew that light meats are digestible and wholesome, but did not know which sorts of meat are light, he would not produce health, but the man who knows that chicken is wholesome is more likely to produce health. Now practical wisdom is concerned with action; therefore one should have both forms of it, or the latter in preference to the former." (*NE* 1141b14-24).

Aristotle's argument here is very important concerning the significance of the distinction between the subject matter of deliberation: one can have *phronesis* concerning what *universals* constitute the best life, that is, what ends (*tele*) make for the best life, and/or *phronesis* concerning what *particulars* constitute the best life, and particular *phronesis* is to be preferred to that concerning universals, although *both* are ideal. So we can deliberate concerning which *particular means* realize the given ends (*tele*) of *particular activities* we think constitute the life of human flourishing (*eudaimonia*), which *universal ends* (*tele*) inhere in the *higher universal* (the ultimate end of human action and deliberation: *eudaimonia*), which *universal ends* (*tele*) inhere in *particular activities*, and which *particular activities* inhere in *universal ends* (*tele*). *Phronesis* in each of these forms of deliberation is the true recognition of the particular in the universal or the universal in the particular and Aristotle is careful to emphasize that it is better to have *phronesis* in relation to what is more particular than to what is more universal. Knowing that *this* token is chicken and that chicken is healthy is better than knowing that chicken is a light meat and that light meats are healthy but not knowing that *this* token is chicken. So the subjects of deliberation can be particular or universal but not invariable or eternal, and excellence in deliberation, *phronesis*, is the acquisition of practical truth concerning these subjects, but while this sheds light on the subject matter of *phronesis* it still sheds little light on what this excellence really is.

Before I provide a full explanation of *phronesis* I shall examine the role of *choice* (*prohairesis*) in deliberation. In order to be good and act virtuously one must act *as* a virtuous person and this involves choosing (*prohairesthai*). Aristotle puts this succinctly in Book II: an agent "must choose the acts and choose them for their own sakes" (*NE* 1105a30-35). Choice is a matter of desiring what deliberation has shown to contain the objects of choice:

> "the same thing is deliberated on and is chosen, except that the object of choice is already determinate, since it is that which has been decided upon as a result of deliberation that is the object of choice… choice will be deliberate desire of things in our own power; for when we have reached a judgment as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our deliberation" (*NE* 1113a2-10).

An exegetical controversy, related to that which Wiggens dispelled concerning deliberation of means, has been made over the apparent tension between Aristotle's statement at Book II that we choose virtuous actions for their own sake and his saying that while "wish relates to the end, choice to the means" (*NE* 1111b26). However, since we have shown that deliberation is not only of "means" but also of ends, and since choice is the desire of what the judgment of deliberation has flagged with the objects of choice, choice can be of ends. In addition, the phrase relegating choice to means is exactly the same Greek expression that was the source of the controversy concerning deliberation: *he de prohairesis ton pros to telos* (*NE* 1111b26). *Ton pros to telos* can be translated as "things which are towards the end" and this translation, although singular (*telos*) is in no way incompatible with the choosing of *constitutive* ends. So I can choose to act courageously *as* a courageous man *for the sake* of being courageous as this is a *constitutive* of the end of human flourishing (*eudaimonia*). The three *objects of choice* (already mentioned in part (*i*) of this essay) are "the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant (*kalou sumferontos hedeos*)" and three objects of avoidance "the shameful, the injurious, the painful (*aischrou blaberou luperou*)" (*NE* 1104b30-32). These form the "object of choice" in various combinations (things

can be both painful and pleasant, noble but injurious, pleasurable but shameful [though what is truly noble cannot be truly shameful]) (*NE* 1113a3). Deliberation and choice go hand in hand as choice is "deliberate desire" (*NE* 1113a8).

Imagination (*phantasia*) and emotion are directly linked to choice (*prohairesis*) in that they constitute how deliberative desire *appears* and *feels*. We do not choose our emotions, but most virtuous actions require specific emotions. These emotions are what must be *felt* "at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way" from a continuous disposition in order to act virtuously (*NE* 1106b20). Choice cannot be *reduced* to this desire or feeling, but is the *coupling* of this feeling and desire with the objects of choice that deliberation flags an action, end, or activity with. The incontinent man "acts with appetite (*epithumia*), but not with choice; while the continent man on the contrary acts with choice, but not with appetite." (*NE* 111b15). Following this line Aristotle states that "appetite relates to the pleasant and the painful, choice neither to the painful nor the pleasant" and I must confess that this seems completely at odds with Aristotle's view that pain and pleasure are objects of choice (avoidance and pursuit) (*NE* 111b16). I think this is best interpreted as a provisional attempt to distinguish choice from irrational appetite before the necessary discussion of choice's relationship to deliberation that follows and the much more sophisticated discussion of incontinence (*akrasia*) in Book VII. Appetite (*epithumea*) is *alogon* or part of the irrational soul, but emotion (*pathos*) as shown in part (*i*) of this essay is not simply *alogon*. A more full discussion of *akrasia* will occur in the argument of part (*ii*-β) of this essay, but for now it is sufficient to note that the *akratic* man *does not choose* his action. Choice requires the emotions and desire (pain and pleasure are themselves emotions) but is not reducible to them and can be vitiated by them.

So acting virtuously involves not only choosing an action but choosing it *as* that action *for the sake* of that action. Deliberation is what flags the action *as* that action, and acting *for the sake* of a virtuous action means not only properly deliberating and thus seeing the proper end in the proper action, but also *feeling* the right emotion at the right time in the right way. Let us take the example of courage: In the *Nicomachean Ethics* courage is described as the "mean with regard to feelings of fear and confidence" and the courageous man is one who "faces and who fears the right things and from the right motive, and in the right way and at the right time, and who feels confidence under the corresponding conditions" (*NE* 1115b17-20). In the *Rhetoric* the affective aspect of fear is described as "pain and agitation derived from the imagination (*phantasia*) of future destructive or painful evil" while that of confidence is the *absence* of this *phantasia* of future destruction and the *phantasia* that safety is near and that "fearful things either do not exist or are far away" (*Re.* 1382a19-22; 1383a15-30). Depending on the conditions these feelings will be required in various degrees, and *feeling* these appropriately depends on the habituation (*ethismos*) of a subject's character or disposition. It also depends on proper deliberation such that the objects of choice are properly flagged in a given situation and chosen with the appropriate desire and affectation by those with virtuous dispositions. The imagination (*phantasia*) is not what accounts for this, it is merely what is *present* to the mind (in the future, present, or past) and so can *misrepresent* the world. In the *De Anima* III.3 Aristotle famously notes that we can imagine "the sun to be a foot in diameter though we are convinced that it is larger than the inhabited part of the earth" (*DA* 428a1-5). So in order to be courageous, and even to *feel* the appropriate emotions in relation to a situation that calls for courage we must deliberate properly about the nature of the situation, and how the objects of choice and avoidance are

present. To explore this excellence in deliberation we must turn back to the question of the intellectual virtue and practical mode of truth: *phronesis*.

We are now in a better position to understand Aristotle's statement that *phronesis* is a "true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man" as we have now noted the subjects of deliberation, the objects of choice and avoidance, and the *rational* linking role of choice between the cognitive "sight" of deliberation and the conative desire or feeling of a subjects disposition (*NE* 1140b6). *Phronesis* is thus the *proper* flagging of the *true* objects of pursuit and avoidance in deliberation regarding both universals such as what ends constitute the life of human flourishing (*eudaimonia*) and particular actions or activities (*NE* 1141bI5;1142a14; 20-2; 11143a2g; 32-4) and which *presupposes* a virtuous disposition (*NE* 1144P2 2-b1) . The man of practical wisdom (*phronimos*) is in possession of a conception of the good life in general, and has the cognitive and conative resources to reflect on this conception given new experiences or activities, and to *see* what this conception requires of him in particular circumstances. This analogy with sight is particularly apt as Aristotle himself compares *phronesis* to sense-perception at least five times in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1142a27-30; 1143b14; 1144a29; 1144b1-17). It is *phronesis* that allows us to be virtuous, as it is only by seeing the universal end in the particular action that we can do a virtuous action *for its own sake* and be affected properly with regards to it. In fact it is to the true *phronimos,* the man of almost God-like wisdom, that learners who each have their own state of character and "its own ideas of the noble and the pleasant" must look to find "the truth in each class of things" as he is "the norm and measure of the noble and pleasant" (*NE* 1113a30-35; *Pol.* 1284a4-15). We even come to understand the truth of *phronesis* by "considering the *phronimos*" (*NE* 1140a24-25). *Phronesis* is the mode of uncovering the truth concerning practical action from opinion

(*doxa*), and it is called the "that part [of the soul] that forms opinions (*doxastikon*); for opinion (*doxa*) is about the variable and so is *phronesis.* But yet it is not a reasoned state; this is shown by the fact that a state of opinion (*doxa*) can be forgotten but *phronesis* cannot" (*NE* 1140b25-30). Coming to see the universal in the particular allows us to emerge from a conception of the world (what is noble, shameful, advantageous, injurious, painful, and pleasurable) veiled in *doxa*. It seems to me that Aristotle is right to say that in life once we experience what is practically and truly *kalon* –noble, fine, beautiful, we are not likely to forget it.

So given this explication of Aristotelian ethical reasoning how does an emotion such as shame manifest its *mind-to-world* direction of fit? In its various forms shame affects the world either through its influence on deliberative action or simply through deliberation *per se*. Although it is often associated with hiding shame does not have any specific action tendency, but through its potential role in deliberation can influence any number of actions in manifold ways. Aristotle does identify one *specific* instance where shame has a positive action tendency. After examining courage in relation to the emotions of fear and confidence he turns to the "so-called" courage of citizen-soldiers whose "kind of courage bears the closest resemblance to the one we described earlier [true courage], in that it is motivated by virtue (*areten*), that is, by shame (*aido*) and by desire for a noble object (namely, honour) and avoidance of shame/disgrace (*aischrou*) as something base"[40] (*NE* 1116a25-30). Aristotle says that this citizen courage of shame is what characterized Hector as he faced Achilles (1116a25). Aristotle quotes Hector[41] as he addresses his own heart at the prospect of fighting Greece's greatest warrior and imagines the shame that retreating inside the walls of Troy will bring:

[40] My translation.
[41] Aristotle quotes one line from Hector but I quote more of the speech as I am aware that unlike the ancient Greeks we do not have whole images and scenes role through our imaginations at the quoting of a meager line of the *Iliad* or *Odyssey*.

> "What do I do?
> If I go through the gates, inside that wall,
> Polydamas will be the first to blame me,
> for he told me last night to lead the Trojans
> back into the city, when many died,
> once godlike Achilles joined the fight.
> But I didn't listen. If I'd done so,
> things would have been much better. As it is,
> my own foolishness has wiped out our army.
> Trojan men will make me feel ashamed—
> so will Trojan women in their trailing gowns.
> I'm afraid someone inferior to me
> may say, 'Hector, trusting his own power,
> destroyed his people.' That's what they'll say.
> For me it would be a great deal better
> to meet Achilles man to man, kill him,
> and go home, or get killed before the city,
> dying in glory." (*Il.* XXII 90-110).

What we have here in an Aristotelian analysis is Learner-True shame. The shame Hector feels is *occurrent* because he is actively imagining the shameful future of fleeing from Achilles and it is common shame that happens to be true because it corresponds to the "laws and customs" of Hector and the Trojans and is found to be truly shameful by Aristotle and his audience. I think it is no accident that Aristotle uses this image from the *Iliad* to demonstrate his point, as it certainly formed a part of what was understood as an example of *common* shame in the *shared* consciousness of Ancient Trojans, Athenians and Macedonians (*Rh.* 1384b26-27). Yet, even though Hector feels Learner-Common shame at the thought of running away, and *chooses* the noble act of standing his ground and fighting Achilles, he still runs away. Hector is *akratic* in this scene as he sees the objects of avoidance in one choice and turns from them to desire and choose the noble action of fighting Achilles, but then runs away. Choice for Aristotle is not a matter of the Augustinian will, and it can occur before its object action and contradict an outcome.[42] *Akrasia*'s relation to shame will be further explored in part (*ii*-β) of this essay, but

[42] As G.E.M. Anscombe noted, Anscombe (1965).

for now it is enough to note that here Aristotle violates his later analysis of shame by calling a *continent* person who feels this shame *virtuous*. *Were* Hector to have had more virtuous state of character, and felt the same feeling of Learner-True shame he would have felt this shame by deliberating on the objects of avoidance in a future outcome ("I'm afraid someone inferior to me may say, 'Hector, trusting his own power, destroyed his people.'"). He might have then desired to avoid them and so chose (desiring) the universal of nobility and beauty that deliberation discerned in the particular action of fighting Achilles. On my reading Hector clearly chooses to fight Achilles (He ends his soliloquy determined to fight: "No, it's better to clash in battle right away. We'll see which one wins victory from Zeus."), but his character is not shaped enough for the yearning to avoid the great shame that awaits him inside the gates. His desire is not strong enough for the beauty of the confrontation that he *rational chooses* to overcome his fear of Achilles. Hector is excused as, after he makes his decision, Achilles walks towards him looming as though he were a god:

> "That's what Hector thought as he stood there waiting.
> But Achilles was coming closer, like Enyalius,
> the warrior god of battle with the shining helmet.
> On his right shoulder he waved his dreadful spear
> made of Pelian ash. The bronze around him glittered
> like a blazing fire or rising sun. At that moment,
> as he watched, Hector began to shake in fear.
> His courage gone, he could no longer stand there.
> Terrified, he started running, leaving the gate." (*Il.* XXII. 133-42)

The point is that given a different state of character, or perhaps a less god-like noble act (a battle with a less fearsome warrior) the choice and proper deliberation of what is truly and occurrently shameful will *push*[43] a subject towards particular actions that are noble (*kalon*).[44] And so we see

[43] In the description of the nature and origin of movement in *De Anima* III.10 Aristotle remarks that "everything is moved by pushing and pulling" –the passage suggests that this applies to the practical imagination of emotions such as those of shame (pushing us away from this) and noble/beautiful (the *kalon* pulling us towards itself) (433b25).

that shame's cognitive and affective aspects when combined with proper deliberation (when we *understand* what is truly shameful) and choice (when we *desire* to avoid what is truly shameful) can *lead* to virtuous action. It should be noted that as virtuous actions must be *done for their own sake*, that is, for the realization of their constitutive ends in a subject's conception of human flourishing, actions done solely to *avoid* shame cannot be virtuous except accidentally. What Aristotle has done, is show that by *pushing* subjects away from actions that they come to understand and desire to avoid, Learner-True shame turns them *towards* what is beautiful and that much closer to virtuous action. This pushing and turning quality of Learner-True shame is one way shame exercises its mind-to-world direction of fit.

Just as occurrent shame and deliberation can result in action in the world, so too can they *challenge* a given view of the world. Deliberation and *phronesis* concern not only the universal in the particular, but the relation between more particular universals and other universals and *vice versa*. Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is *itself* an investigation of the latter sort. Questions concerning what is the good for man, and which activities and ends *constitute* the life of human flourishing (*eudaimonia*) are questions that relate universals to other universals and form the very heart of the inquiry that is the *Nicomachean Ethics.* I have argued that Aristotle sees violating what is held to be shameful according to an audience of strangers as itself being truly shameful, but we can imagine that a member of his audience, who did share this common opinion (*doxa*) or law or custom (*nomos*) of what is shameful, having their own particular views *challenged* by Aristotle's *findings*[45] as they disrupt their *own view* of what they

[44] NB: Although in this passage Aristotle calls shame a virtue I am in agreement with Ronna Burger that the identification of shame in citizen-courage as a virtue is only made because Aristotle is speaking from "inside" the experience of ethical virtue in this case, showing how it turns one towards the noble, and not appraising shame from "outside" of it as a *kind* of disposition and emotion in IV.9. Burger (2008), 89-91.

[45] Which are drawn respectfully with consideration of what the audience considers shameful and special attention to what the speaker and audience *hold in common* (*Rh.* 1384b26-27).

hold in common with Aristotle. Aristotle's sensitivity to what can trigger occurrent shame in his audience does not mean that he cannot use what they hold to be shameful *in common* to respectfully shame wrongheaded views of the good life held by his audience. As stated in part (*i*) of this essay, by stepping before the Athenian gentlemen to lecture on the best life of human flourishing (*eudiamonia*) and how to become good, Aristotle is already stepping into the storm Socrates warns Adeimantus of (*Rep*. 497d9). It is easy to imagine them responding to the shame by either *challenging* Aristotle's conclusions, hiding from them, accepting them, or feeling paralyzed and torn by them. Take for example Aristotle's early discussion of the "three prominent types of life" in Book I, which are the *hoi polloi*'s life of sensual pleasure, the political life, and the life of contemplation (1095b16-19). Aristotle chastises the *hoi polloi*'s "slavish" taste for a pleasurable life "fit for cattle[46] (*boskema*)" and argues that they "get some ground" for their view "from the fact that many of those in high places share the tastes of Sardanapallus" (1095b20-25). Aristotle is shaming those who identify with a hedonistic lifestyle while assuring the gentlemen he is addressing that this is not a common view of their class, and a foreign Asiatic perversion at that. Sardanapallus was an Assyrian king famous for his debauchery who was reported to have had an epitaph that read "Eat, Drink, play, since all else is not worth that snap of the fingers".[47] The move not only associates the cattle-like love of sensual pleasure with the *hoi polloi* but also as *decidedly un-Greek* and foreign. Aristotle is performing a respectful act of shaming with regards to what *both* Athenian and Macedonian gentlemen would consider shameful, looking to what they hold in common: *we* are not *cattle*, nor the *hoi polloi* and *we* are certainly not sybaritic Asian despots. The move is not entirely unlike the moment in

[46] My translation.
[47] Rackham (1934), 14-15. The other version of his epitaph reported in the Greek world was "I have what I ate; and the delightful deeds of wantonness and love which I did and suffered; whereas all of my wealth is vanished". If this is the true epitaph then Sardanapallus and Aristotle agreed that wealth ought not be an end in itself.

Plato's *Gorgias* where Socrates shames Callicles for professing to subscribe to indiscriminate hedonism, even using the tactic of forcing the argument so that attachment to this thesis would mean that Callicles would resemble a catamite (494e). Callicles is torn between the Athenian sensibilities he has in common with Socrates, and which view being a catamite as a vile and shameful thing, and his attachment to the life of tyrannical hedonism that seems to embrace even this shameful act. The point is that Aristotle employs Socrates' strategy of looking to what he and his audience have in common, but with the delicacy of a foreigner with links to menacing Imperial power and without *shocking* his audience or singling them out with shame (making them *kataplex*). When Socrates brings up the catamite as the result of the indiscriminate hedonism thesis Callicles is completely shocked and shamed that Socrates would even dare to bring up such a shameful subject: "Aren't you ashamed, Socrates, to bring our discussion to such matters?" (494e). And although in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle notes that people feel shame for doing things that "include providing services of the body, or engaging in shameful actions, of which being physically violated is one… for submission and lack of resistance comes from effeminacy or cowardice" and thus recognized the category of the catamite as a valid example of what is shameful (and would presumably follow Socrates' claim that indiscriminate hedonism embraces this kind of activity) he *does not* single out audience members for Learner-True shame by using such a violently shameful *domestic* example but instead reaches out to the common prejudice of his fellow Greeks against the *Asianess* of hedonism. No one could stand up in the crowd and say "Aren't you ashamed, Aristotle, to have brought up the debauchery of Sardanapallus?" without aligning themselves against the crowd *and* Aristotle, and yet *challenging* Aristotle's deliberations is as much a possibility for one who feels this Learner-True shame as is accepting his shaming critique or being stunned and torn by it. A challenger would presumably construe

the shame they felt as Learner-Common shame and be forced to shed their attachment to views that validate their feelings of shame. However, this shaming act, I believe, is an example of Aristotelian Learner-True shaming as Aristotle thinks that the indiscriminate hedonism thesis is false on *philosophic* as well as *patriotic* grounds (*NE* X.1-5). So, although Aristotle has reached for *doxa* and *nomos* that is *common* to himself and the Athenian gentlemen, he has reached for what is *truly shameful* in common *doxa* and *nomos*.

Aristotle moves on to respectfully shame those who live the "political life" and who identify the end of this life with honour, suggesting that the *phronimoi* know that "virtue is better" and that it may be virtue that redeems the status of the political life. The effect of this move is to critique a certain view of the political life while affirming its real value. Those who hold honour as the end of political life are shamed in their identification of human flourishing (*eudaimonia*) as honour depends "on those who bestow honour rather than on him who receives it, but the good we divine to be something of one's own and not easily taken from one" (*NE* 1095b25-30). Not only does honour depend on the opinions of others for its content but those who seek it ultimately seek the good opinion of *phronimoi*, who as we have seen are the very *measure* for what is virtuous and good. So by looking to the opinion of others in one's action and locating the *end* of political life in such opinion one is not only shamefully left with nothing of "ones own" but one has missed the point that the opinions one is really looking for will concern what is truly good and virtuous as the *end* of such a life. In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle argues that being shamed "applies to such evils as seem [in the eyes of others] to be shameful to a person or one about whom he cares" and when we consider Aristotle's critique of honour, those who look to honour rather than virtue are ashamed simply before the opinion of others, while those who look to virtue as the end of political life are ashamed before *phronimoi* (*Re.* 1383b20).

Those who find the end of political life in honour feel Learner-Common shame in relation to *doxa*, and those who find the end of political life in virtue feel Learner-True shame. While this passage shames those gentlemen who have mistaken the end of political life (they almost seem childlike in their description as looking to others) the passage is remarkably cautious and respectful. Aristotle begins by saying of those who identify human flourishing with the political life that they are of "superior refinement (*charientes*)" and seems careful not to shame their mode of life but rather their *view* of this mode of life. I find it difficult to imagine an Athenian gentlemen not feeling intrigued and somewhat shamed by Aristotle's distinction between what is honourable and what is virtuous. *I* even feel intrigued and shamed by this passage and this is with regard to the extent to which I have examined the quality of the opinions I look to in my own rather *unpublic life*. A statesman in democratic Athens might simply be awed by Aristotle's ability to simultaneously shame and praise the political life, and, although their reaction might simply be to identify themselves as amongst those looking to the virtuous, this simple self-identification might certainly be challenged if the statesman was to hear the remainder of the *Nicomachean Ethics.*[48] In speaking of the contemplative life he simply refers forward to Book X, where he does reveal that it is happiest life as in it a man *becomes* the most divine and authoritative part of himself (*NE* 1117a). Aristotle saves the contemplative life for last because most of his audience will not be fit to hear it until they have been exposed to the Learner-True shame that most well brought up men will still feel at the lessons concerning virtue in Books I to IX.

[48] I dearly love Winston Churchill, however it does worry me that he "was once given a copy of the *Ethics* by an enthusiastic admirer of Aristotle. After reading it, 'Churchill returned it with an expression of his delight, adding simply, 'but it is extraordinary how much of it I had already thought out for myself'" Burger (2008), 233. Perhaps he did not identify his "thinking" so much with what he thought were the obvious conclusions but with Aristotle's *way* of thinking. In any case I think this historical example playfully reinforces the extent to which Aristotle's *Ethics* are aimed at an audience of gentlemen.

Shame in its occurrent forms can exercise its mind-to-world direction of fit either by affecting how one understands the world through its significant role in deliberative action or in the intersubjective act of shaming that can take place in deliberation. Aristotle is clear that the emotions have a significant role to play in determining the actions of a subject, and shame is so significant that it is one of the three "objects of avoidance" that we are always "choosing" to avoid by desiring particulars not inhering in shameful universals. Shame is always in the "*do not buy*" column of our grocery list. Deliberation itself can constitute an intersubjective act of shaming, and the *Nicomachean Ethics* engages what Aristotle holds to be *truly* shameful *in common* with his Athenian audience to respectfully shame those with wrongheaded or even dangerous views of the life of human flourishing (*eudaimonia*). Aristotle changes himself and his audiences views of what is shameful as he is forced to consider what triggers Learner-True shame for both. The world of his audience changes as they react to his Learner-True shame by challenging it as being Learner-Common, hiding from Aristotle's words, accepting his conclusions, or entering a state of *aporia* at the distance between their own views and those he lays out in terms congruent with the foundational principles (*arche*) of their world-view. While Aristotle does not spellbind his audience with the kind of wonderful images and myths found in Plato's dialogues, by giving the lectures that constitute the *Nicomachean Ethics* and refuting and respectfully shaming various life-views he steps *carefully* into the storm, being keen not to be blown away. Aristotle was a stranger practicing a strange art in a hostile democratic city, and when the storm grew too powerful he fled rather than let it execute him. This seems to indicate that his understanding of shame (in all its forms) was different from that of the Socrates who points out to those with the power to kill him at his trial that it is his accusers who are not

ashamed by what is truly shameful (*Apol* 17b). The Socrates who upon being sentenced to death says to those who have condemned him to death:

> "I was convicted because I lacked not words but boldness and shamelessness and the willingness to say to you what you most gladly have heard from me, lamentations and tears and my saying and doing many things that I say are unworthy of me but that you are accustomed to hear from others." (*Apol*. 38e).

Socrates is publicly pointing out that he has a sense of what is truly shameful and that unlike his shameless accusers he will not violate this in the interest of preserving his life. Perhaps, even Aristotle would have been driven to point out what was truly shameful and commonly but falsely shameful if he was sentenced to death by the very gentlemen he lectured.

(*β*) *The Path of Shame:*

The occurrent Learner-True and Learner-Common forms of shame have a direct impact on our world in deliberative action and in intersubjective deliberative shaming situations, but each of these situations presupposes an *emotional* world within the soul of the deliberative subject that is not a given. Shame not only influences how our minds change the world but is critical in shaping our very mind or soul (*psuche*), and from Aristotle's account of habituation we can track the movement from Leaner-True to Mature-True and Learner-Common to Mature-Common shame with the general trend in a subject's movement from proper youthful passion to mature virtue, and from improper passion to mature vice.[49] As we track Aristotle's view of

[49] Or, in some circumstances where repetition and mimesis of exemplars' truly virtuous actions does not stir the development of *logos* and *phronesis*, from Learner-Common to Mature-Common shame that is doxastic but true. When learners come to avoid what they take to be shameful according to *doxa* (which happens to be truly shameful) but lack the powers of reasoning to see such actions *as* shameful. Those with characters featuring Mature-Common that turns out to be true is not a concern of this essay because in order to avoid what is Learner-Common shameful one is forced to develop the capacity for proper feeling and recognition of such shameful objects that (given the right objects) develops into Learner-True shame and then Mature-True shame. Avoidance of the shameful, even the commonly shameful requires ethical knowledge, which is why those with *true* Learner-Common shame generally develop Learner-True shame and those with *false* Learner-Common shame degenerate into those with *false* Mature-Common shame.

habituation in relation to these kinds of shame and his typology of ethical characters we can come to understand the kinds of shame as being linked to the cognitive reference and conative state relating to specific *actions* and as such not being simply predicable of given *characters*. Aristotle will be shown to have on the one hand given us a general template for understanding occurrent shame's role in the movement towards the mature shame of virtue and vice, while with the other demonstrating a certain pessimism regarding our ability to step completely from the shame tinged world of the learner. It turns out that because our virtue is to some extent hostage to the virtue of our city, we are always hostage to occurrent shame. As all ethical deliberation begins from first principles (*arche*) evident to *us*, ethical deliberation involves the continual possibility of being brought back to this *us*, brought back to what is common and within the domain of occurrent shame in order to retain an orientation away from what is truly shameful. Shame is a fundamental element in the way the world shapes the mind, and a function of our ethical incompleteness.

Aristotle's account of deliberative action has already given us great insight into the crucial role of habituation in ethical action. In order to count as a virtuous action an action must be done for the right cognitive reasons, seen properly as an instance of the correct universal in the right particular, and with the right conative disposition –a person must choose an action in the sense of *desiring* the correct universal identified by *phronesis* in the correct particular. How a person is affected in relation to an action is crucial for virtuous action, and the habituation of a person's emotional being is a necessary step to being properly affected. Shame not only can play a role in deliberation with regards to action and intersubjective deliberative situations, but also plays a crucial role in the formation of a constant disposition that is properly affected in relation to good actions. Persons become habituated to being properly affected not simply by experience,

but by specialized experience in virtuous action itself. Aristotle is clear that "the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyre-players by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts" (*NE* 1103b1-3). Yet this does not explain how a person's affective faculty is "trained" to be properly affected such that a virtuous person *desires* to do an act properly seen as brave at the right time, place etc. In Book X Aristotle introduces the problem of understanding how men are made good as follows:

> "Now some think that we are made good by nature, others by habituation, others by teaching. Nature's part evidently does not depend on us, but as a result of some divine causes is present in those who are truly fortunate; while argument and teaching, we may suspect are not powerful with all men, but the soul of the student must first have been cultivated by means of habits for noble (*kalos*)[50] joy and hatred, like earth which is to nourish the seed. For he who lives as emotion directs will not hear argument that dissuades him, nor understand it if he does; and how can we persuade one in such a state to change his ways? And in general emotion seems to yield not to argument but to force. The character, then, must somehow be there already with a kinship to virtue, loving what is noble (*kalos*) and hating what is shameful (*aischron*)." (*NE* 1179b20-31).

Man's natural appetites (*epithumia*) can somehow be naturally attuned to what is beautiful as when some savants find that not only do they have a natural talent for music but an overwhelming drive to play it, while most men require *habituation* to shape their emotional dispositions and sow the seeds of desire for what is noble and beautiful (*kalon*), and a few of those habituated are blessed with the right training and habituation such that they can be persuaded by *reason* and speech (*logos*) concerning what is shameful and ugly, and what is noble and beautiful. It is quite important that the role of shame so far does not seem to be primarily concerned with the brute habituation and taming of the emotions by *force* but rather seems to concern those with some measure of a correct emotional disposition towards what is noble (*kalon*) and shameful (*aischron*). Those who live their lives according to the hedonistic doctrine

[50] I think it is important to keep in mind the aesthetic sense of the *kalon* in this passage. Translation's, such as Ross' that translate it as the "noble" almost seem to give the concept a distorted Kantian feel.

of Sardanapallus will invert these levels of teaching and seek to *unbind* the habituation and teaching of gentlemen in the interest of serving our goodness by nature, and thus such persons count among those who think we are made "good by nature". We can also appreciate that Aristotle's suggestion in IV.9 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that shame is appropriate to the youth indicates a *two-stage* experience of the student with regards to occurrent learner shame: (1) a stage of habituation where the soil of the students soul is cultivated by means of *force* in the form of sanctions and "nurture and occupations fixed by law" which necessitate the practice of virtuous activities so that "they will not be painful" (*NE* 1180a1-5); and (2) a stage of teaching where souls that already love what is truly noble (*kalon*) and hate what is shameful can be taught virtue *using* their habituated true conception of what is truly noble (*kalon*) and shameful. This division in the stages of the student's experience is strengthened when Aristotle gives his view of the student and the *hoi polloi*'s relation to argument (*logos*) and shame:

> "Now if arguments were in themselves enough to make men good, they would justly, as Theognis says, have won very great rewards, and such rewards should have been provided; but as things are, while they seem to have power to encourage and stimulate the generous minded among our youth, and to make a character which is gently born, and a true lover of what is noble, ready to be possessed by virtue, they are not able to encourage the *hoi polloi* to nobility and goodness. For these do not by nature obey shame, but only fear, and do not abstain from bad acts because of their shamefulness but through fear of punishment; living by passion they pursue their own pleasures and the means to them, and avoid the opposite pains, and have no conception of what is noble and truly pleasant, since they have never tasted it. What argument would remould such people? It is hard, if not impossible, to remove by argument the traits that have long since been incorporated in the character; and perhaps we must be content if, when all the influences by which we are thought to become good are present, we get some tincture of virtue." (*NE* 1179b5-20).

This is a long but important passage. Students (and youth) in both stages obey their passions, while only those in the second stage of learning have a conception of what is truly noble and are amenable to reason, and the passage indicates that *this is in part because* they feel strong feeling of shame. The *hoi polloi* are *not* amenable to reason precisely because they lack such a strong

feelings of shame (Learner-True or Learner-Common) and are guided by stronger feelings of fear.[51] They are also not amenable to reason because they do not love the noble, but it is *shame* that is mentioned first in a way that suggests that true shame often comes before true love of the beautiful. Students in the first stage of learning and the *hoi polloi* live according to the unhabituated desire for what seems pleasurable according to their natural, uncultivated natures and feel either very weak or no occurrent shame. They are subjected to habituation *by force* and laws necessitating virtuous action, which we can infer act to create the specific conditions in which their ability to feel shame is developed in relation to its appropriate action tendencies and cognitive antecedents. Perhaps soldiers of the *hoi polloi* who run away from battle are killed such that *fear/force* is what keeps them in the fight, and occurrent shame only enters their soul once they understand the end and rules of soldiering and notice the disapproving gaze of their fellow virtuous soldiers when they violate the end/rules. In this way the soldiers of the *hoi polloi* would move from being ruled by fear and force, to being ruled by occurrent shame. They would not yet *love* the beautiful (*kalon*) end of courageous actions in soldiering, but they would have emerged from the unhabituated natural state of the *hoi polloi* to that of the soldier who possesses the civic-courage Aristotle approves of in III.8 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

The questions remains: how is it that occurrent shame replaces fear as the emotion of the learner? There seems to be a mysterious moment where habituation through sanctions gives way to shame as the subject "notices" the disapproving gaze of his peers. Aristotle does not shed much light on the content of this transition, and once we begin to unravel his summary that we become virtuous by doing virtuous actions and coming to know and desire them as virtuous, we find the still very modern psychological and philosophical problem of accounting for the *emergence* of reason. Constructing a proper take on this problem would involve taking a very

[51] The passage does *not* say that they have no shame, but that they are not ruled by it.

close look at Aristotle's *De Anima*, *De Motu Animalium* and his more scientific and metaphysical treatises, and this would exceed the scope of this essay. However, I will do my best to provide a brief sketch of Aristotle's view of how shame emerges from habituation in the soul.

Aristotle thinks that because shame is an emotion, all human beings have the natural capacity (*dunamis*) for it, even if it requires habituation to develop. A hint of Aristotle's view is, perhaps surprisingly, found in the discussion of music in the *Politics*:

> "Furthermore, all who listen to imitations come to experience similar passions, even apart from rhythms and tunes themselves. Since music belongs accidentally among pleasant things, and virtue is connected with enjoying in correct fashion and feeling affection and hatred, it is therefore clear that one should learn and become habituated to nothing so much as to judging in correct fashion of, and enjoying respectable characters and noble actions. For in rhythms and tunes there are likenesses particularly close to the genuine natures of anger and gentleness, and further courage and moderation and of all the things opposite to these and of the others things pertaining to character" (*Pol.* 1340a15-23).

The passage indicates that it is not only in acting but also in being an *audience* to images of what is truly shameful that we come to feel shame at what is truly shameful at the right times, and perhaps how we degenerate from Learner-Common to Mature-Common shame or develop from Learner-Common to Learner-True to Mature-True shame. Unfortunately, Aristotle discusses shame very little in his account of education (*paideia*), but if listening to "likenesses" of the appropriate emotions of exemplary characters can lead to being properly affected in our own judgments and actions then surely this applies to occurrent shame. This interpretation of Aristotle's view of the emergence of shame is supported by his understanding of imitation and representation (*mimesis*) in the *Poetics*:

> "Imitation is natural to man from his childhood, one of the advantages over the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation. And it is also natural for all to delight in works of imitation. The truth of this second point is shown by experience: though the objects themselves may be painful to see, we delight to view the most realistic representations of them in art, the forms for

> example of the lowest animals and of dead bodies. The explanation is to be found in the further fact: to be learning something is the greatest of pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind, however small their capacity for it; the reason for the delight in seeing the picture is that one is at the same time learning –gathering the meaning of things" (*Poet.* 1448b4-17).[52]

I have argued that for Aristotle shame has various cognitive antecedents that can either be *true* or *common* and two affective forms, one which is occurrent and one that is *negatively* dispositional in that it involves a sense of what is *not* imagined or felt. If Learner-True shame can be said to be developed by the mimetic imagining of what is shameful in relation to what virtuous characters consider shameful then Learner-True shame will emerge from Learner-Common shame. One of the Greek words I am grouping under "common" is *doxa* and this word refers to both what is not necessarily true or revealed in the form of *common opinions* and what is *reputable*. *Doxa* has both senses for Aristotle. *Phronesis* is the mode of practical truth (*aletheia*) relating to the *doxa* forming part of the soul (*doxastikou*), and it discerns what *doxa* are true with regards to right action and which are false (*NE* 1140b6-8). And as Paul Nieuwenburg argues *doxa* and *kata doxan* are often substituted with *endoxos* in the logical works, the latter translating as "reputable things" (*ta endoxa*) and is less clearly epistemic in its usage.[53] I am unsure if I follow the argument correctly because Nieuwenburg seems to want to de-epistemologize *doxa*, while it would never have occurred to me that anyone might read the practical uses of *doxa* "epistemologically" in the *Nicomachean Ethics* as it is clearly linked to the *practical* truth revealed with the acquisition of *phronesis* and excellence in deliberation rather than the invariable truths of *episteme*. If by "epistemic" Nieuwenburg means anything to do with knowledge, practical or theoretical, then there is simply no denying the "epistemic" aspect of *doxa*. There is no exclusivity between common opinion and what is reputable, and reputable-

[52] For a very interesting discussion of this passage in relation to habituation and the first passage from the Metaphysics "All men desire to know." see Sherman (1999), 239-240.
[53] Nieuwenburg (2004), 454-455.

opinion can be true or false. The *Nicomachean Ethics* itself begins with the methodological disclaimer to "look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits" and Aristotle in asking "what is the good for man?" looks to the *hoi polloi* and dismisses their view, along with that of Sardanapallus and men who do not understand the end of honour (those who do not know it is virtue rather than recognition) (*NE* 1094b12; I.4). I examined this initial survey in part (*ii-α*) of this essay, and I think it is a clear case of Aristotle looking to *doxa* as both opinion and what is reputable.[54] So how does this distinction explain how Learner-True emerges from Learner-Common shame? Inquiry can reveal that shame that is felt according to *doxa* or *nomos* is truly shameful. Shame elicited by what is shameful according to *doxa* and *nomos* is shame according to what is reputable but the opinion (*doxa*) or custom (*nomos*) that is reputable can also turn out to be true. This is why Aristotle sets out to survey the various opinions concerning what is good for man when looking for the true and self-sufficient end of life.

When subjects act as a mimetic audience and actor, representing and mimicking the emotions and actions of exemplary figures they are liable to simply represent and mimic what is reputable rather than what is true (what is reputable is not always true). As such the movement towards what is true will only come for most once they have become habituated to feeling what is reputable –barring habituation by exceptionally virtuous people or the existence of some rare *natural* love for what is truly noble and shameful in one's soul. So not only do most of us begin as the *hoi polloi,* requiring customs and law (*nomoi*) to habituate us to what is shameful, unless we are very lucky we also emerge from this state with a sense of Learner-Common shame that only develops into Learner-True shame with the representation and mimicking of what is *truly* shameful. Subjects with Learner-True shame can then begin to be "remoulded" into the negative

[54] Recall that the view of Sardanapallus is only reputable because certain gentlemen have taken a liking to it.

disposition of Mature-True shame by means of teaching. In part (*i*) of this essay I argued that common shame looks to what is shameful according to reputation and common opinion (*doxa*) and custom and law (*nomos*) and as Aristotle prescribes habituation for *hoi polloi* by means of laws (*nomoi*) it could be argued that he *expects* most subjects move from the state of the *hoi polloi* (where shame is weak or non-existent) to stronger feelings of Learner-Common rather than to Learner-True shame. Aristotle also thinks that laws are quite insufficient guides to virtuous action, remarking that human decency or fairness (*epieikeia*) is required as a "correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality" (*NE* 1137b26-28). Law and custom will often lead to Learner-Common shame as those required to imitate its dictates will learn to feel shame (if they learn to feel shame at all) in the form of the incomplete and rigid image of what is truly shameful that it provides. Those expected to learn shame by these incomplete images will be representing what has already been inaccurately represented and watered down to the form of inaccurate generalities. It is no coincidence that Aristotle uses the word *epieikes*, the man who demonstrates goodness or fairness (*epieikeia*), to describe the man who possesses Mature-True shame, and who is amenable to reason because of his awareness of what is truly shameful (*NE* 1128b30; 1180a15-17). Without these virtuous men as teachers, exemplars, enforcers, and interpreters of law and what is truly shameful there is little hope of escaping the indeterminacy of Learner-Common shame,[55] much less the necessity of *force* in determining the behavior of the *hoi polloi*. Aristotle himself is providing this exemplary teaching service, but restricting the use of his deliberative shame in his lectures to those already habituated to truly loving the beautiful and hating the shameful and excluding the youth (*NE* 1095a2-4). He steps into the storm as the *exemplar* of the philosopher engaging and respectfully shaming the city.

[55] Which is reputable but *can* be dangerously false in circumstances the law cannot codify

Although the enforced habituation of the law is not complete without *epieikes*, Aristotle argues that in the majority of states where this is neglected each man "lives as he pleases, Cyclops-fashion, 'to his own wife and children dealing law'" (*NE* 1180a26-30). This warning forms a manifestation of Aristotle's emphasis on looking to what is common in order to foster Learner-True shame. Without this common habituation not only will there be no chance of instilling the emotion of Learner-True shame by *mimesis*, but the social emotion of shame will cease to make sense outside of atomized units. Aristotle cites from the *Odyssey* comparing this atomized society to that of Cyclops, who are described more fully as follows:

> "The land of the high and mighty Cyclops,
> Lawless brutes, who trust so to the everlasting gods,
> They never plant with their own hands or plow the soil.
> Unsown, unplowed, the earth teems with all they need…
> They have no meeting place for council, no laws either,
> No, up on the mountain peaks they live in arching caverns–
> Each a law to himself, ruling his wives and children,
> Not a care in the world for any neighbor." (*Od.* IX 120-129).

Without having the soil of their souls cultivated by habituation towards noble joy and noble hatred the souls of those not born with a natural love for what is truly beautiful will be as "Unsown" as the fields of the Cyclops, without the fruit that grows naturally. Learner-True shame springs from Learner-Common shame which in turn develops from the forced habituation of the *hoi polloi* because without looking to what is *common* in *doxa* and *nomos* deliberation concerning what is true will have no subject matter. *Phronesis* is the virtue of deliberation seeing the universal in the particular or higher universals in universals *by the doxastic* part of the soul. How could opinions be investigated as true in relation to our ethical experience in a society where each is a "law to himself" and there are no social relation of which to opine. I have already mentioned above that in the *Politics* Aristotle states that those who are "incapable of participating or who is in need of nothing… is no part of the city, and so is either a beast or a

god" and Aristotle's warning with regards to the Cyclops is that without common laws to enforce habituation to loving the noble and hating the shameful society will atomize into domestic clusters of beasts, capable of cannibalism or worse (*Pol.* 1253a27-29)[56]. The *hoi polloi* are not beasts or gods, and so can have a weak sense of shame and are not identifiable with the Cyclops. However, the Cylops serves as a grim reminder of the danger of abandoning a view to what is commonly shameful.

We can now better analyze the different stages of ethical development and the kinds of shame appropriate to them. The first more general stages of ethical development are set out at the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics* where Aristotle is restricting his audience to those already habituated to truly love the good and hate the shameful:

> "For while we must begin with what is evident, things are evident in two ways –some to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, *we* must begin with things evident to *us*. Hence anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the fact (*to hoti*) is the starting point (*arche*), and if this is sufficiently plain to him he will not need the reason (*tou dioti*) as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting points (*arche*). And as for him who neither has nor can get them, let him hear the words of Hesiod:
>
> Far best is he who knows all things himself;
> Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;
> But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart
> Another's wisdom is a useless wight." (*NE* 1095b5-14).

Not only does this passage reflect Aristotle's characteristic move of looking to what is common ("*we* must begin with things evident to *us"*) it outlines three general stages of ethical character: those with "the fact" (*to hoti*) who have the right starting points (*arche*) and have no need of "the reason" (*tou dioti*); those with "the fact" (*to hoti*) and "the reason" (*tou dioti*); and those with neither. When I first read this passage I thought that I had stumbled on a new reading of it.

[56] In the *Politics* (1253a3-5) Aristotle also quotes the *Iliad* with regards to the man "who is without a city" and the full quote is "Without clan, without law, without hearth is the man/ who longs for chilling war among his people." (*Il.* IX. 63-64). Aristotle also quotes Homer's passage describing the Cyclops from the *Odyssey* but in a more domestic context.

Most readers group those with "the fact" (*to hoti*) but without "the reason" (*tou dioti*) in with Hesiod's man who "hearkens when men counsel right". I thought that the clause specifying that those with "the fact" (*to hoti*) have no need of "the reason" (*tou dioti*) meant that because Aristotelian subjects must understand and desire the particular action or end they are pursuing with proper affection *as* that act or end then "the fact" must include those with *phronesis* in relation to low level universals in particulars but not universals in universals (the two "forms" of *phronesis*) (*NE* 1141b21). Thus I initially read "the fact" (*to hoti*) and "the reason" (*to dioti*) as *both* cognitive motives involving the acquisition of *phronesis*, the former with regards to particulars and the latter with universals. How else could those with "the fact" (*to hoti*) not be said to need "the reason" (*tou dioti*) given Aristotle's stringent conditions for virtuous action? The answer is that Learner-True shame allows those with "the fact" (*to hoti*) to not possess *phronesis* with regards to seeing noble (*kalon*) universal ends in particular actions. This gives us a much cleaner reading of the passage as recognition (*phantasia*) of what particular actions are shameful involves *feeling* shame and this Learner-True shame can steer a subject towards what is virtuous without their knowing "the reason" (*tou dioti*) for which noble (*kalon*) action ought to be done.[57] The line from Hesiod that corresponds to "the fact" (*to hoti*) reads "Good, he that hearkens when men council right" which would not match "the fact" (*to hoti*) if we interpreted it as someone phronetically detecting universals in particulars. On the other hand it does match very well the subject who has learned to hate what is truly shameful, as this *emotion* allows the subject to *listen* to reason as (while they may lack the knowledge and desire for what is truly noble) they have the proper desire to avoid what is truly shame and do so when a *phronimos*

[57] They can act virtuously without *phronetic* recognition and desire of the noble (*kalon*) in the particular actions they do. I have difficulty deciding whether it is possible to say that one has "*phronetic*" knowledge of what is shameful, but insofar as this knowledge corresponds with desire as to what *not* to do upon recognition of the shameful universals in particulars then this seems to make some sense.

points out such an action to them. So we are left with three levels of ethical habituation: (1) those with either particular or universal oriented *phronesis*, or both, who thus have a trained disposition to be properly affected with regards to correctly recognized virtuous activities; (2) those who are properly affected insofar as they feel occurrent shame at what is truly shameful and are led by this feeling to listen to argument pointing them towards virtuous action; and (3) those with bestial affections or overly weak feelings of shame who lack habituation and as such any love for the noble (*kalon*) or sufficiently strong hatred for the shameful, and cannot heed argument. The full realization of (1) in the *phronimos* has "the fact" (*to hoti*) and "the reason" (*tou dioti*), is "he who knows all things himself", and possesses Mature-True shame; (2) is he who has "the fact" without, and without "need" of, "the reason" (*tou dioti*), is "he that hearkens when men counsel right", and feels Learner-True shame; (3) has neither "the fact" (*to hoti*), nor "the reason" (*tou dioti*), is the "useless wight" "who neither knows, nor lays to heart", and possesses Mature-Common shame. Learner-Common shame can turn out to be reputable and false, or reputable and true and so can turn out to *be* Learner-True shame or *become* Mature-Common shame. In the latter case subjects become habituated such that they gain a disposition to *not feel* what is falsely shameful though this constitutes what they *would* feel shame for were they to engage in such falsely shameful actions. The bestial or weak *hoi polloi* thus have neither "the fact" (*to hoti*) nor "the reason" (*tou dioti*), but are subject to laws that will instill Learner-Common and hopefully Learner-True shame as they are *forced* into the mimetic activity of virtuous actions.

Students who have been well brought up, properly habituated, or naturally hate the shameful have "the fact" (*to hoti*) and can gain "the reason" (*tou dioti*) even without a love for the beautiful (*kalon*) –provided they are taught by exemplary *phonimoi* or *epieikes* and "lay to

heart" their teachings. Properly habituated students can make do without "the reason" (*tou dioti*) even without a love of the noble (*kalon*) if much of the Learner-Common shame they feel is actually Learner-True shame. This is because such occurrent shame will make them amenable not only to teaching and direction but to the laws themselves. Those with a love of the noble and a hatred of the shameful have "the fact" (*to hoti*) and *must* have some degree of "the reason" (*tou dioti*) in the form of particular oriented *phronesis* if they are to recognize the virtuous universal end in the particular action and desire it properly. Such persons are turned away from Learner-True shame to the negative disposition of Mature-True shame regarding those actions with regards to which they have particular *phronesis*. Those with love of the noble (*kalon*), hatred of the shameful and both forms of *phronesis* engage in deliberation turned away not only from the shameful towards what is beautiful (*kalon*), but also towards the *second* object of choice –the advantageous (*sumferontos*) which is acquired by deliberation that not only locates universal ends in particulars but relates such lower level universal ends to higher ends –for example relating virtuous activities as *constitutive* ends of the highest end for human life: human flourishing (*eudaimonia*). Aristotle's lectures can have *some* impact on those, such as the young, with Learner-True shame, but he restricts the real usefulness of his lectures to those with both "the fact" (*to hoti*) and "the reason" (*tou dioti*) because his lectures concern not only lower level universals in relation to the particulars of life, but the relation between these universals and the highest ends of human life. Myles Burnyeat has claimed that this higher knowledge of "the reason" relating universals to universals in order to understand the advantageous is the "unqualified" knowledge Aristotle discusses in 1.4, but as we have seen all *phronetic* knowledge is tied to what is variable and for the most part (*en de o ta endechomena*) and is always *qualified* in this sense (*NE* 1139a7-10).[58]

[58] Burnyeat (1980), 74; The ethical discussion is always tied to the shifting particulars of life, and Aristotle is clear

This set of distinctions maps on nicely to Aristotle's general, but *more* fine grained schema of ethical characters and their dispositional and cognitive levels of virtue and vice found primarily in Book VII of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. At the extremes of ethical virtue are the godlike and those with superhuman virtue (*NE* 1145a17-24) and those whose subhuman ends are so bestial that they include cannibalism and eating coal (*NE* 1148b26-29). These extremes exceed what is human and are beyond human virtue and vice. Aristotle's warning of the Cyclops in book X is thus meant as a cautionary extreme of what the *hoi polloi* might devolve into if they are not instilled with shame and regulated by the habituation of the laws. Between these two extremes Aristotle identifies four common types of ethical character: virtue (*arête*), continence (*enkrateia*), incontinence (*akrasia*) and vice (*kakia*). The typology is composed by considering both the affective and conative state of each character and the nature of their action. As demonstrated in part (*ii-α*) of this essay the affective and cognitive parts of the soul are closely related for Aristotle. What one chooses (*prohairesthai*) to do is a matter of desiring what deliberation has flagged with the objects of pursuit, and in order to be fully virtuous one must possess both affective and cognitive excellence in *phronesis*, which is the "true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man" (*NE* 1140b4-6). One cannot be virtuous unless one has the cognitive excellence to both identify virtuous universal ends in particular actions and the affective excellence to properly desire these actions *as* the virtuous actions they are (inhering in the noble (*kalon*), advantageous (*sumferontos*), and pleasant (*hedeos*)). The virtuous subject's (*phronimos*) cognitive and affective states are in sync and his actions are good. The continent subject (*enkrates*) obeys *logos* in the sense that he deliberates properly as to what is good, but his desire is split such that even though he still ultimately desires this good, he also has "bad appetites" and "is such as to feel pleasure [contrary

that it is better to have particular focused *phronesis* than to only have the *universal* focused form (*NE* 1141b15-23).

to *logos*] but not to be led by it" (*NE* 1102b4, 1151b33). The *enkratic* subject ultimately commits good actions, but his desires for the goods flagged by his *logos* are disordered such that it is a struggle for him to do what is good. The *akratic* subject similarly deliberates properly concerning what actions participate in the good and contain the objects of choice –which the *akrates* still desires and chooses. However, although the *akratic* subject possesses a disposition featuring emotions that cause him to desire the good ends flagged by deliberation, his contrary appetites (*epithumia*) overwhelm him so that he acts *against* his choice (*NE* 111b14). The *akratic* subject acts badly. The licentious (*akolasia*) or vice ridden subject (*akolastos*) is "unconscious" of himself and *chooses* vice according to deliberation that locates a twisted version of the objects of choice in an action, and desires the objects and the action without conflict in his soul (*NE* 1151a1; 1150b29-30). In his book *Aristotle's Ethics* J.O. Urmson placed this typology of the soul in the following chart:[59]

Character Type	Cognitive Motive	Affective Motive	Action
Virtuous (*phronimos*)	Good	Good	Good
Continent (*enkrates*)	Good	Bad	Good
Incontinent (*akrates*)	Good	Bad	Bad
Vicious (*akolastes*)	Bad	Bad	Bad

We can expand Aristotle's initial typology of the levels of habituation between those with just "the fact" (*to hoti*), "the fact" (*to hoti*) and "the reason" (*tou dioti*), and neither, to include another type of person that accounts for the *enkratic* and *akratic* personalities. The virtuous, *enkratic*, and *akratic* subjects all have "the reason" (*tou dioti*) although the *enkratic* and *akratic* subjects do not fully possess it precisely because they lack full possession of "the fact" (*to dioti*).

[59] Urmson, (1988). 32.

The vicious man is like the *hoi polloi* in that he does not take either of these to heart. Instead he chooses vice (*kakia*) according to a twisted conception of what is good; usually subordinating what is noble and good to what is pleasurable in the fashion of Sardanapallus. However, he is unlike the *hoi polloi* in that he does have a negative disposition towards what is shameful, and for him what is shameful is both common and false. Hesiod's categories have been expanded with reason's role in ethical activity, and the developed conception of the dyadic soul. Hesiod does not account for those who have "the reason" (*tou dioti*) but lack a properly ordered disposition that is "the fact" (*to hoti*). The *enkratic* and *akratic* men account for Aristotle's recognition that without a full possession of "the fact" (*to hoti*) "the reason" (*tou dioti*) is worthless and unfulfilled. The *enkratic* and *akratic* men deliberate well and choose what they deliberate well with regards to, but their souls are wrought with conflicting desires because they have not been properly habituated such that their *whole* souls desire what they choose. They have something of "the fact" (*to hoti*) because without it they would not be able to choose what is good at all, but it is the incompleteness of their habituation to loving what is beautiful (*kalon*) and hating what is shameful that undermines the effectiveness of their ethical knowledge.

And so the (1) virtuous man possessing "the fact" (*to hoti*) and "the reason" (*tou dioti*) is characterized by Mature-True shame and *phronesis*; (2) the *enkratic* man is characterized by Learner-True shame because despite the fact that he resists temptation he will be ashamed of his very desire for what is wrong; (3) the *akratic* man feels Learner-True shame as he "regrets" his both his shameful actions and desires according to his correct deliberation concerning what is good; and (4) the vicious (*akolastes*) man possesses the negative disposition of *false* Mature-Common shame as he feels no shame with regards to his actions because they align with his soul's desires, choices, and vision of the good. We can thus revise Urmson's table of Aristotle's

character typology including the initial distinctions of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the kinds of shame:

To hoti kai Tou dioti	Character Type	Cognitive Motive	Affective Motive	Action	Shame Type
"the fact" "the reason"	Virtuous	Good	Good	Good	Mature-True
"the reason" (partial)	Continent	Good	Bad	Good	Learner-True
"the reason" (partial)	Incontinent	Good	Bad	Bad	Learner-True
Neither	Vicious	Bad	Bad	Bad	Mature-Common

Yet what is the role of Learner-Common shame in this table? And what happens when a subject has a corrupt conception of the good and poor deliberation but a good affective motive and good action? Both of these questions are answered by looking to the case of Neoptolemus from Sophocles' play the *Philoctetes*.

Neoptolemus is mentioned twice by Aristotle in Book VII of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and it is clear that he serves as a crucial addition to the table above. In the *Iliad*, Philoctetes, who possesses the magic bow of Herakles, is bitten in the foot by a snake on the way to Troy, and as the wound begins to fester and his cries of pain interrupt the prayers of the Greeks, he is left abandoned on the island of Lemnos. In Sophocles' *Philoctetes* Neoptolemus, the son of Achilles, and Odysseus return to Lemnos where Neoptolemus is convinced by Odysseus to lie to Philoctetes in order to steal his bow –which is required to win the Trojan war. Neoptolemus, after some protestation about the shame of lying, agrees but soon comes to sympathize with Philoctetes' pathetic situation, and after stealing the bow he is overcome by shame and returns it despite the protestations of Odysseus. Odysseus first convinces him of the nobility of lying to Philoctetes by reasoning with and shaming him. First he tries to convince Neoptolemus to forget

his principles just for a day, and when this doesn't work he attempts to convince him that it is not shameful to lie for certain ends:

> "Od. I am telling you to trick Philoctetes.
> Neo. Why must I trick him? Why can't I use persuasion?
> Od. He will never be persuaded. And you won't take him by force…
> Neo. No one dares go near him?
> Od. I've told you: your only chance is to trick him.
> Neo. And don't you think it shameful to lie?
> Od. Not if that lie means safety.
> Neo. How can anyone have the face to say such things?
> Od. When what you are doing is for a profitable end, there's no need to hesitate."
> (*Ph.* 95-110).

And so Neoptolemus *chooses* to steal the bow in the interest of ending the Trojan war, and manages to overcome his feelings of shame as Odysseus acts as an exemplar offering him a new opinion of what is shameful and pushing him towards the full pursuit of a noble end he already desires: victory. It is because Neoptolemus *chooses* to steal the bow that we can say his rational desire is for the noble (*kalon*) end of victory, which his intellect finds in the particular act of stealing the bow, and which his desire to avoid the shame of lying to an honourable man does not *initially* overcome. After taking the bow using his lies, Neoptolemus is clear that his former shame at lying, which Odysseus helped him overcome, is what motivates him to give the bow back. He says that "I used shameful deception and trickery in catching him" and "I made a shameful mistake. I am going to try to put it right" (*Ph.* 1279; 1307). Aristotle analyses Neoptolemus' situation as follows:

> "There are some who fail to abide by their resolutions, not as a result of incontinence, e.g. Neoptolemus in Sophocles' *Philoctetes*; yet it was for the sake of pleasure that he did not stand fast –but a noble (*kalon*) pleasure; for telling the truth was noble (*kalon*) to him, but he had been persuaded by Odysseus to tell the lie. For not everyone who does anything for the sake of pleasure is either self-indulgent or bad or incontinent, but he who does it for a shameful pleasure." (*NE* 1151b16-23).

Aristotle thus effectively argues that Neoptolemus sufferd from what seems to almost be a good form of *akrasia*, although Aristotle specifically says that Neoptolemus is not *akratic* because his weakness is a good thing. The Learner-Common shame that Odysseus uses on Neoptolemus holds that it is ethical to lie given certain virtuous ends, but it is Neoptolemus' feelings of True-Shame that drive him towards the noble (*kalon*) act of telling the truth and giving back the bow. The latter occurrent feeling of shame is helped by Neoptolemus' love for the noble, which makes the pull of the right action harder to resist once his soul is turned towards it by his shame. This is why Aristotle also says that Neoptolemus "is to be praised for not standing by what Odysseus persuaded him to do, because he is pained at telling [Philoctetes] a lie" –the pain mentioned being the pain of occurrent shame (*NE* 1146a18-21).

Neoptolemus is young and inexperienced, and as such is undergoing habituation and is prone to occurrent shame. According to Aristotle's views we can infer that the shame he feels and which turns him towards what is noble (*kalon*) is Learner-Common shame *and* Learner-True shame. This is because for Aristotle it is truly shameful to lie for "disgraceful pleasure" and truthfulness, especially to those who are virtuous, is a virtue and truth is a noble (*kalon*) good in and of itself (*NE* 1127a28-31). The occurrent shame Neoptolemus feels is also Learner-Common shame in that it was certainly a matter of Greek *doxa* and *nomos* (custom) that deception and trickery were shameful and beneath an honourable and virtuous warrior. In this case *doxa* happens to coincide with truth. Aristotle doubtlessly uses the story of Neoptolemus to remind his audience that sometimes those men who seem exemplary can turn us away from what is reputed to be noble, and not towards what is truly noble but to what is truly shameful. Odysseus is the man of "twists and turns" and the paradigm of the Greek trickster (*Od.* I. 1). One's habituation to love what is noble (*kalon*) and hate what is shameful, though it is contingent

on the laws of the city and the examples one grows up with, can save one from being led astray. To paraphrase George Bush: "sometimes it can help to follow your gut". We can thus add Neoptolemus to our more detailed table:

To hoti kai Tou dioti	Character Type:	Cognitive Motive:	Affective Motive:	Action:	Shame Type:
"the fact"	Neoptolemus	Bad	Good	Good	Learner-True and Learner-Common

Just as Neoptolemus could look back on his actions and feel Learner-True shame for what he had done it is possible to imagine a different scenario where he had been more fully habituated to Odysseus' new conception of what is shameful rather than merely convinced. In this case it would be possible for Neoptolemus to still give in to his feeling of Learner-True shame, but to regard *this akratic* act with *regret* as a step backwards on his new path to a more consequentialist conception of virtuous action. This even more affectively conflicted Neoptolemus might feel retrospective Learner-Common shame at his *akrasia*. The shame type for *this* Neoptolemus would be *false* Learner-Common shame.

These examples demonstrate that Learner-Common shame, as what is shameful according to *doxa* and *nomos*, can turn out false or true, but acts as a lynchpin for the acquisition of occurrent shame[60] and for respectful acts of shaming. In order for most subjects to acquire Learner-True or Mature-True shame they must feel Learner-Common shame through the *mimetic* action and representation of forced habituation. Although subjects who are raised by especially virtuous persons may not run the risk of feeling false Learner-Common shame early on, in order to engage in public acts of deliberative shaming one must engage it. As I will explain in the conclusion of this essay, Learner-Common shame is what prevents shame from becoming too hierarchical, what helps keep society from atomizing, and allows for the possibility of occurrent

[60] Barring those strange persons with a natural love of the *kalon* and hatred for the truly shameful.

shame in public deliberation and political friendship. Aristotle's view of the way the various kinds of shame shape the *souls* of various character types has been explored, but it must be noted that the kinds of shame and the virtue of a character remained tied to *actions* (as discussed in part (*ii-α*) of this essay). As such the general typologies of shame and character are not absolute in the sense that if I am *akratic* when I *choose* to be courageous and run away from battle, but am continent with regards to all of the other virtues and their actions, I am (as a whole) "*akratic*". Aristotle's character types are modeled on our dispositions *in* actions. The same holds for shame: one may feel Mature-Common shame with regards to cowardly actions, feeling no shame for such actions and not considering them shameful, but also feel Learner-True shame for lying to one's peers. Thus the typology of characters and shame serves a general purpose for understanding the different levels of vice and virtue in relation to the kinds of shame, but the reality it represents is far more blurred and the lines dividing subjects' characters are never so sharp. The exception to this concerns Mature-True shame and the virtue of the *phronimos*. The true *phronimos* is so out of place, god-like and can be beyond the laws and the city (*Pol.* 1284a4-11) because he does not commit acts of vice nor desire to commit them. He will not feel shame because his imagination is turned from what is truly shameful to what is truly (and pleasantly) noble (*kalon*) and advantageous (*sumferontos*). The conditions for being a *phronimos* are strict, and once they are noted Aristotle's comment that "good action is itself is [action's] end. It is for this reason that we think Pericles and men like him have *phronesis*, viz. because they can see what is good for themselves and what is good for men in general" can be seen not to offer a true exemplar of the *phronimos* to the gentlemen, but someone whose general *orientation* begins to *approach* that of the *phronimos* but is still much more comprehensible to the ordinary Athenian gentlemen (*NE* 1140b6-10).[61] When a much truer exemplar of *phronesis*, Socrates, stood before

[61] Aristotle's comment is carefully put: "It is for this reason [the general action oriented nature of *phronesis*] that *we*

the Athenian assembly he was so strange, his Mature-True shame so at odds with the Learner-Common and Mature-Common shame of Athens, that he was called shameless and forced to drink the hemlock. In saying this I am not suggesting that Socratic shame is not respectful, nor that it does not look to what is common, but I am proposing that Aristotle was more likely to *initially* focus on what he shared in common with his interlocutors rather than the *coherence* of their beliefs and actions. I shall now conclude this essay by examining what we are to make of *Aristotle*'s shame and shaming in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and by speculating on the lessons that might be drawn from this and from his overall theory of the kinds of shame for contemporary democratic life.

(iii) Conclusion: Pimps, Pupils, and Philosophers:

Shame is generally considered a negative emotion, and a cursory reading of Aristotle's teachings concerning shame might give the impression that he takes this view. Reading or listening to the claim in IV.9 that "shame may be said to be conditionally a good thing: *if* a good man does such actions, he will feel disgraced; but the virtues are not subject to such a qualification" might leave the audience or reader of the *Nicomachean Ethics* with the impression that Aristotle conceives of shame as an emotion that works like a ladder, useful for climbing to the heights of virtue, but meant to be kicked away once one has reached a comfortable perch. From this perspective shame is an emotion positive only in its uses. Presumably this perch is the life of the contemplative philosopher and the *phronimos*. Paradoxically, when this view is juxtaposed against the passage "if some actions are shameful in very truth (*aleutheia*) and others only according to opinion (*doxa*), this makes no difference; for neither class of actions should be done, so that there is no shame (*host ouk aischunteon*)" the reader or audience might be led to wonder why Aristotle might care if his audience feels shame before what is not truly shameful

---

[Aristotle's gentlemen] *think* (*oiometha* –think, imagine, suppose) Pericles was a *phronimos*".

(*NE* 1128b23-26). Why suggest that shame's only use lies in leading us towards the true life of human flourishing (*eudaimonia*) but also advise that those in pursuit of this end feel shame before actions that do not turn us away from this end?

The solution to this paradox is to note that Aristotle does indeed see various kinds of shame that can form a ladder to virtue (or vice), but that as what is truly shameful is not evident to most of us except through examination of and *mimesis* of views of what is commonly shameful; we must take care not to trigger what is commonly shameful as we emerge into our social world and search our lives for the good. The search for and *mimesis* of what is truly beautiful (*kalon*) requires that we look to what is held to be beautiful (*kalon*) according to *doxa* and *nomos*. The true shame that is the emotional ladder that aids us in seeing what is truly beautiful (*kalon*) thus requires that we *look* to what is commonly shameful, not because we should *feel* shame before all that is considered shameful according to *doxa* and *nomos*, but because what is considered commonly shameful might turn out to be truly shameful and another step on the ladder to virtue. We look and are aware of what others feel in relation to *doxa* and *nomos* because we are looking for what is true and what it would be good for us to feel. If we shame another it must be respectful of what is held to be shameful in common because without an understanding of what is held to be shameful according to the *doxa* and *nomos* of another or another city we cannot communicate shame. This respectful look to what is commonly shameful does not prevent the shaming of those who have violated what is truly shameful. However, communicating such shame will force one to consider the views of others, and potentially expand the horizons of what one sees as shameful, thereby expanding one's chances of knowing and loving what is truly beautiful (*kalon*) and constitutive of a flourishing life. Aristotle's

general approach to common and true shame is therefore justified in relation to the search for the truly good life.

Aristotle hints that the emotions are awakened and shaped in us by active *mimesis* of law (*nomos*) and exemplars, and he himself provides the exemplar of a respectful approach to shame and shaming in addition to a typology of different kinds of shame, their corresponding characters, and an account of the role these kinds of shame play in learning to be good. If we were to look for "Aristotelian respectful shame" in the sense that Tarnopolsky has found respectful Socratic and Platonic shame in Plato's *Gorgias*, we would not locate it in his general theory and typology of shame and its relation to ethical development, but would likely say that this "Aristotelian" shame is found in Aristotle's *personal* approach to shame and shaming. The very action of public deliberation on shame, consideration of what is good or shameful or *shaming* itself, must feature this personal approach which leaves its mark on speakers, audiences, and partners in conversation.

Aristotle's *theory* of shame does indicate the positive role of shame in allowing for the teaching of students, the shaping of their world, and the way shame shapes our actions by constituting a constant object of avoidance in our deliberations. The occurrent forms of shame, Learner-True and Learner-Common shame, can push an actor away from what is truly shameful or towards it depending on the kind of shame felt. Learner-Common shame that happens to be true, and Learner-True shame both push subjects away from what is truly shameful while false Learner-Common shame often pushes us towards it. Which occurrent forms of shame we learn to feel depends on the virtue of our city, its *nomoi* and *doxa*, and the exemplars we mimic. To a certain extent we are hostage to our family, city, and nation. Aristotle is clear that the *hoi polloi* and those in the grip of vice are not teachable until they have been habituated towards

sufficiently strong feelings of Learner-True shame, often by way of Learner-Common shame, and this occurs by way of exemplary good men (*epieikes*) and law (*nomos*). Aristotle is generally pessimistic concerning those who are part of the *hoi polloi* or vicious but not youth, but he insists that habituating these to love what is noble (*kalon*) and hate what is shameful *by force* can render them amenable to teaching and the pursuit of the higher ends of life. He tempers this policy proposal by recommending that we ought to only expect to get a "tincture of virtue" from this. Aristotle's theory of shame is hierarchical, and if you are caught up in the feeling of false Learner-Common shame, being pushed towards a state of completely vicious and false Mature-Common shame and even the rescue line of *forced* habituation. In contemporary society most civilized people would say that only persons of grotesque vice such as pimps belong in this category of characters that are difficult to salvage. The Pimp is the modern Cyclops, cut off from neighbors, lawless, and dealing out his own "law" to a "family" based on a depraved conception of what is good. As in Aristotle's time contemporary western democratic societies highly feature the indiscriminate hedonist thesis in their popular culture (what does gangsta rap sometimes celebrate?) and like the approval of Sardanapallus amongst a few of the gentlemen of Athens, the thesis is supported by a handful of academics, celebrities, and politicians. Aristotle's analysis shows us that it is useless to shame those who are *radically* gripped by Mature-Common shame not just in a few facets of life, and who are thoroughly vicious in most of their actions.

We can take heart from the prevalence of occurrent shame. The fact that all but the most vicious of persons feel either Learner-Common or Learner-True shame means that most of us will have some shame in common that happens to be true. Pupils who are brought up with laws and exemplars will for the most part be exposed to Learner-Common shame, but not all of this shame will turn out to be true. Aristotle's point is that provided we do come to feel shame at

some common *doxa* or *nomos* we can be taught and "take to heart" the true lessons concerning virtue that are discovered in teaching, public deliberation, and conversation with friends. Learner-True shame is the emotion that actually works to push us towards the good, but Learner-Common shame is the ground from which it springs for most of us. We feel shamed before laws, opinions, and customs that we later come to think are not shameful at all, but we also feel shame before *doxa* and *nomos* that turn out to be true, and for most of us both of these emotions will form the background of our experience once we begin to learn from our teachers, speak to our friends, and look to what is common in order to find what is true. If the reader or audience feels a mild form of shame at the thought of embracing the indiscriminate hedonism thesis, or the honour that merely "looks to what others think" thesis, then they are undoubtedly a pupil being shamed and taught as Aristotle looks, probes, and shames what he has in common with them in the interest of living a life of true flourishing.

The ladder that moves from Learner-Common to Learner-True to Mature-True shame is not kicked away except perhaps by a kind of god-like ideal, the *phronimos* or the philosopher (who *becomes* the most divine part of himself through contemplation), but the content of these ideals are never fully fleshed out, and even they do not escape shame. Shame looms over those of supreme virtue as what they *would* feel, *were* they to commit sordid actions. Mature-True shame itself seems to point to ideals of others one has lived up to in specific ways. When Aristotle describes the *phronimos* he does not specify any particular persons who *are phronimoi* but says that we define the *phronimos* by considering *whom* we *call phronimoi* (*NE* 1140a24). Then using the example of Pericles he says that we *think* of men like Pericles as virtuous not because of their specific virtues *but the general way* they know what is good for themselves and for mankind. Pericles was a great statesmen whom most of the gentlemen in Aristotle's audience

would recognize and potentially admire, but his reputation was not so free of fault, especially amongst philosophers. Aristotle's teacher Plato, sharply criticized Pericles's for feeding the Imperialist ambitions of Athens and inciting the *demos* to wildness such that they eventually turned on him like "animals kicking, butting, and biting him" (*Gorgias,* 516b). Rather than being a *phronimos* who looks to what is good for man and for himself Pericles is criticized for merely being "clever" in serving the appetites of the city rather than directing them towards what was good, and not knowing what was good for himself but turning the wildness of the *demos* on himself (*Gor*. 517c; 516b). In the *Politics* Aristotle is not so sharply critical, but does note that it is the reforms of Pericles, Solon, and Ephialtes that contributed to the power of the *demos* which then led to a powerful class that manned the navy and which subsequently "began to have high thoughts and to obtain mean persons as popular leaders, when they were opposed politically by the respectable" (*Pol*. 1274a6-15). As Lord comments in the footnotes to his translation, Pericles was himself one of the mean popular leaders Aristotle refers to.[62] So Aristotle is using Pericles not as a true exemplar of the *phronimos* but to communicate the *way* a *phronimos* orients himself towards life using an example many in the political class will be familiar with.[63] Who we think of as *phronimoi* will change as we move up the ladder in such a way that unless we become quite godlike we will always be looking to *who* we admire and examining what this says about us and how we can become more like them. The *phronimos* is generally but not necessarily an *empty set* because we must constantly question what we hold in common with others and how this influences who we admire. Our view of the best life can be determined by examining who we look to, but the question of what the best life is is not a given, and requires that as pupils of Aristotle we examine what we have in common with him and others, and what others hold and

[62] Lord (1984), 253.
[63] They will understand the *way* Pericles is admired, even if (as is likely for many of the aristocrats attending Aristotle's lectures) they despise him as a populist leader.

who they look to all in the search for the best life. Aristotle does not offer Socrates as an exemplar to his audience of gentlemen because to them Socrates' life is far too alien, and shaming their lives and conceptions of the good in relation to him would have little effect on them, potentially angering them and endangering Aristotle's delicate political position in Athens.[64] Instead Aristotle offers an exemplar of a *phronimos* but does not look to the substantive content of his life, but to the general *reasons* for which his *way* of life is admired by some. Pericles is offered as a *phronimos* not for being Pericles, but insofar as what is *thought* to be good in Pericles' life (and which some mistakenly find there) is what characterizes the ideal of the *phronimos*.

Aristotle ends his survey and analysis of the views concerning the best life by concluding that the life of the philosopher is the end of happiness (*teleia eudaimonia*). As Burger remarks, this is paradoxical in that it is a theoretical answer to a practical question.[65] The philosophical life of contemplation is not the realization of *human* happiness as "it is not insofar as he is man that he will live so, but insofar as something divine is present in him" and "this would seem to actually *be* each man, since it is the authoritative and better part of him" (*NE* 1177b26-27;1178a1-5). The answer to the search for the most useful end to human life turns out to be useless in its complete self-sufficiency and transcendence of the human. Aristotle has redefined what is the true human end using religious language external to the standards of contemplation, finally describing the value of the transcendent end as lying in its value to the gods (*NE*

[64] Aristotle does use Socrates as a dialectical partner throughout the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which is a very different use from that of Plato who uses him as an exemplar. See Burger (2008). Socrates is generally characterized by Mature-True shame in the Platonic dialogues, *he would feel shame* were he to engage in the silly mistakes or antics of those around him. In the *Gorgias* Socrates says *he would* feel shame of not being able to help himself, his friends, or his relatives from escaping injustice (*Gor*. 509b-c, 522d). The exception to this is in Book X of the Republic where Socrates says he feels shame before Homer (*Rep.* 10.5b), and in the *Phaedrus* where Socrates says that he must recant the shameless speeches of his youth before a gentle person of noble breeding and before whom he feels shame (*Phdr*. 243d). It seems even Socrates has his ideal *phronimos*. Many thanks to my supervisor Christina Tarnopolsky for pointing out these platonic passages for me.

[65] Burger, (2008), 213.

1179a25-32). Aristotle cites the example of Anaxagoras, a pre-Socratic philosopher who devoted himself to the life of contemplation, as proof of his thesis concerning the life of contemplation:

> "Anaxagoras also seems to have supposed the happy not to be rich nor a despot, when he said that he would not be surprised if the happy man were to seem to most people a strange person; for they judge by externals, since these are all they perceive. The opinions of the wise seem, then, to harmonize with our arguments. But while even such things carry some conviction, the truth in practical matters is discerned from the facts of life; for these are the decisive factor" (*NE* 1179a12-24).

The pre-Socratics were generally considered strange and out of touch themselves (falling into wells and such) and Aristotle is himself using the external *examples* of the wise and religious language of the gods to describe the life of the mind, which if seen from the inside by the Athenian gentlemen would seem extraordinarily strange and out of place. Having shamed the gentlemen regarding those who hold pleasure and simplistic honour to be the highest good, Aristotle moves from a discussion of virtue that engages the gentlemen's Learner-Common shame to describing a view that for the most part escapes the facts of life that these men have been habituated in. "The fact" (*to hoti*) that the gentlemen possess might even consider the life of the philosopher quite shameful in its uselessness, and so the only hope of persuading them to feel shame at not "straining every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us" is to *mimetically* represent the life of the mind in language that still appeals to parts of what his audience holds to be shameful according to shared *doxa* and *nomos* –pointing beyond what is commonly shameful to what is truly shameful (*NE* 1178a1-2). Aristotle's personal approach of respectful shame is motivated not only by a concern that his life be preserved, and his audience not be rendered oversensitive or insensitive by his shaming reasoning, but also by the need to live and communicate the highest life for man. Aristotelian respectful shame, modeled on the way Aristotle conducts himself, is the answer to the *way* shame should be woven into the

teaching and inquiry that constitutes the living answer to its own question: what is the best life for man?

One of the central consequences of this essay's interpretation of Aristotle's conception of shame is that it is not simply a ladder we kick away. We have seen that this is because (1) most of us come to feel Mature-True shame with regards to *some* activities only by way of *forced habituation* by which we come to feel Learner-Common and Learner-True shame; (2) habituation does not end with learning to feel shame and heed reason, as for some habituation by force is a necessity throughout life, and for others shame is itself a part of the process of practicing the virtues and *maintaining* this habituation towards avoiding what is shameful and loving what is noble (*kalon*) throughout life[66]–by acting *as* virtuous and deliberating we are continually habituating ourselves to right action by avoiding what we feel is shameful; (3) the more one grasps what is truly shameful the more one must look to engage with what is commonly shameful in the interest of changing common *doxa* and *nomos* so that our societies remain oriented away from what is truly shameful and do not degenerate into the atomized worlds of the Cyclops; (4) the search for the best life and what is truly shameful requires us to look to what is commonly shameful and good, and even those who have Mature-True shame must look to what they consider commonly shameful with others, often expanding their conceptions of what is truly shameful; (5) shame exists as a kind of negative disposition for those with Mature-True shame, even those who somehow achieve this kind of shame in the *whole* of their life, with regards to all virtuous activity –an unlikely ideal; (6) If the best life is that of the philosopher, who is like Hesiod's man who "knows all things for himself", then knowing human things necessarily involves the search for the best life, which is the activity that Aristotle has

[66] Aristotle notes that "it is surely not enough that when they [citizens] are young they should get the right nurture and attention: since they must, even when they are grown up, practice and be habituated to them" (*NE* 1180a2-5).

been engaging in with his audience throughout the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The best life *itself* therefore requires that we turn to what is considered shameful according to *doxa* and *nomos*. When the philosopher turns to know human things he begins from what is common according to *doxa* and *nomoi*, and in doing so is forced to consider what is truly shameful and noble according to this. The wider the scope of the audience the more *doxa* and *nomoi* there are to look to.[67] Aristotle's general "respectful" approach to shame is therefore not only a matter of seeking to avoid persecution, and attempting to weave a respectful, comprehensible shame that avoids *kataplexis* into his inquiry, but is also required by philosophy itself. Even when one achieves the highest life, the life of the mind, one is reliant on habituation and shame to *get* to this point and is forced to confront what is truly shameful in *doxa* and *nomoi* because these opinions and laws form the starting points (*arche*) by which we discern the "facts of life" and are the points with which our inquiry must begin (*NE* 1179a24). It is above all Aristotle's personal *example* as a philosopher who is *himself* confronting the question of what is shameful *with* his audience that shows shame to be less of a ladder than an emotion that persistently mediates our very selves in our natural pursuit of knowledge.[68]

[67] This is why friends and acquaintances are more likely to feel true shame before one another (*Rh.* 1384b26-27).
[68] "All men by nature desire to know" (*Met.* 980a).

Bibliography:

Anscombe, G.E.M. 1963. *Intention*. Oxford: Blackwell

Aquinas, St. Thomas. 1993. *Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. Translated by C.I. Litzinger. Notre Dame: Dumb Ox Books

Aristotle. 1926. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge MA: Harvard UP.

Aristotle. 1984. *The Politics*. Translated by C. Lord. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Aristotle. 1998. *Nicomachean Ethics*. Translated by W.D. Ross. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Aristotle. 2007. *On Rhetoric*. Translated by G.A. Kennedy. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Aristotle. *De Anima, Magna Moralia, Metaphysics Poetics*. Private Translations by Martin Tweedale. Used with the Translator's Permission.

Burger, Ronna. 2008. *Aristotle's Dialogue with Socrates*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Burnyeat, Myles. 1980. "Aristotle on Learning to be Good." In *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty. Berkeley: University of California Press: 69- 93.

Cairns, Douglas L. 1993. *Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Elster, Jon. 1999. *Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Grimaldi, William. 1988. *Aristotle, "Rhetoric": A Commentary. 2 vols.* Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag.

Homer. 1990. *The Iliad*. Translated by Robert Fagles. New York: Penguin Books.

Homer. 1996. *The Odyssey*. Translated by Robert Fagles. New York: Penguin Books.

Konstan. 2006. *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks: Studies in Aristotle and Classical Literature*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Liddle H.G. and Robert Scott. 1996. *A Greek-English Lexicon*. Oxford: Oxford UP.

Niewenburg. Paul. 2004. "Learning to Deliberate: Aristotle on Truthfulness and Public Deliberation." *Political Theory* 32 (4): 449-67.

O'Connor, David. 2002. "Leo Strauss' Aristotle and Martin Heidegger's Politics." In *Aristotle and Modern Politics: The Persistence of Political Philosophy*. ed. Aristide Tessitore. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Plato. 1968. *The Republic*. Translated by Allan Bloom. Second Edition. New York: Basic Books.

Plato. 1997. *Gorgias*. Translated by Donald Zeyl. In *Plato: Complete Works* ed. John Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Plato. 1997. *Meno*. Translated by G.M.A. Grube. In *Plato: Complete Works* ed. John Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.

Sherman, Nancy. 1999. "The Habituation of Character." In *Aristotle's Ethics: Critical Essays*. ed. Nancy Sherman. Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Sophocles. 2001. *Philoctetes*. Translated by Judith Affleck. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.

Tarnopolsky, Christina. 2010. *Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants: Plato's Gorgias and the Politics of Shame.* Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP.

Wiggins, David. 1975. "Deliberation and Practical Reasoning." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 76: 29-51.

Williams, Bernard. 1993. *Shame and Necessity*. Berkeley: University of California Press.