A Democratic Disconnect?

Looking at age, period, and cohort effects in support for democracy

Rosalie Nadeau

Department of Political Science*

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Abstract In two widely discussed articles published in the *Journal of Democracy* over the last two years, Foa and Mounk (2016, 2017) argue that mass rates of support for democracy have been decreasing across Western democracies, pointing to a general but also a generational decline: this "democratic disconnect" is most visible among the youngest generations. This thesis investigates whether such a decline is really happening across consolidated democracies, using multilevel models to distinguish between age, period, and cohort effects. It also seeks to go beyond overt support for democracy by disaggregating that concept into different components: opposition to non-democratic rule, support for participatory democracy, and support for liberal democracy. We find no evidence of a cross-country generational or period decline in support for democracy, refuting Foa and Mounk's alarming claims; in some countries, however, there are signs of a period decline in support for democracy. Additionally, we find no clear evidence of period or generational change in different conceptions of democracy, which goes against more optimistic perspectives on the younger generations' political attitudes.

Résumé Deux articles publiés par Foa et Mounk (2016, 2017) dans le *Journal of Democracy* avancent la thèse d'un déclin démocratique sévissant dans les démocraties occidentales. Ce déclin s'opère par le biais d'un détachement général des citoyens de leur démocratie, mais aussi par un changement générationnel: ce sont les plus récentes générations qui afficheraient particulièrement de faibles taux de support envers la démocratie. Ce mémoire s'insère dans le débat provoqué par la parution de ces articles en évaluant cet argument par l'utilisation de modèles multi-niveaux visant à distinguer les effets combinés de l'âge, de la génération, et du temps. De plus, il vise à approfondir le concept de support envers la démocratie en explorant également diverses dimensions distinctes de ce support: l'opposition à des régimes non-démocratiques, le support à une démocratie participative et le support à une démocratie libérale. Nos résultats réfutent l'argument proposé par Foa et Mounk, démontrant qu'il n'y a pas de déclin périodique ou générationnel s'appliquant à l'ensemble des démocraties dites consolidées. Toutefois, nous montrons également qu'un déclin périodique est visible dans certains pays et réfutons les perspectives plus optimistes voulant qu'il y ait en fait eu une hausse dans le support à une démocratie participative ou libérale.

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Contributions

All sections of this thesis have been written by the student.

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1. Introduction

In two widely discussed articles published in the Journal of Democracy over the last two years, Foa and Mounk (2016, 2017b) drew attention to the fact that levels of self-expressed support for democracy had been decreasing markedly in longstanding Western democracies. Even more alarming was the 'reversal of the roles' they identified between generations: contrary to postwar birth cohorts, it is today's youth that seems less enthusiastic about the concept of democracy and that is driving down overall levels of support. Their call for the political science community to re-think its assumptions about the widely accepted paradigm of democratic consolidation quickly sparked debate in the academic world and beyond (Norris 2017; Voeten 2016).

Interestingly, Foa and Mounk explain these changes in attitudes within a broader narrative about recent challenges to liberal democracy in Western democracies and especially the rise of many populist parties, but they fail to acknowledge a puzzle that stems from their argument. On one side, they identify changes in attitudes and a "striking generational gap"; on the other, they associate it to the successes of Trump, Kaczynski, Orban, and other "anti-system" movements. However, this contradicts previous studies of populism that identified the older generations as the support base for populists (Inglehart and Norris 2016), not the youth. There is thus a missing link in their argument that warrants further investigation into the attitudes of the youth towards their democratic systems.

This thesis seeks to contribute to this debate in three main ways. Responses to Foa and Mounk mostly left aside the intergenerational dimension of the argument to focus on the general implications of their claim. We first fill this gap by applying methods devised to grasp age, period, and cohort effects to longitudinal data from the World Values Survey and the European Values Study, making this intergenerational dimension the main focus of this analysis. Second, this dataset allows us to test if this decline in support for democracy holds across a number of consolidated democracies in a multivariate model, moving away from Foa, Mounk, and others' overreliance on a few irregular cases. Third, this analysis goes beyond the sole concept of overt support for democracy and

disaggregates that concept to explore how support for different conceptions of democracy might bring nuance to, or defeat claims about a period or generational decline in support for democracy. Therefore, it adopts a multidimensional conception of democracy to deliver a better understanding of the relationship younger generations harbor towards their political systems in longstanding democracies.

Our findings invalidate Foa and Mounk's conclusions that generational and period declines in support for democracy are happening across consolidated democracies. Instead, there is no indication that generational change is driving down levels of support for democracy: this phenomenon is unseen in all consolidated democracies composing our sample. A period effect, however, is visible in some countries: in particular, mass levels of support for democracy have declined markedly after 2009 in the United Kingdom and the United States. We find mixed evidence when we decompose support for democracy. Younger generations are less likely to oppose army rule but this does not extend to another non-democratic option, namely rule by a strong leader unbothered by parliament or elections. Moreover, a life-cycle effect is visible for support for participatory democracy, with younger generations more likely to prioritize opening up channels of political participation, but this does not translate into a generational increase. Finally, there is some evidence of a period decline in support for liberal democracy happening in some countries. In sum, while we are able to reject Foa and Mounk's central claims, more optimistic counterarguments do not hold either across all consolidated democracies.

This thesis is structured as follows. First, we review the existing literature on support for democracy in consolidated regimes and explain how Foa and Mounk's argument threatens a key assumption of that literature. We then explore three alternative explanations to a generational decline in support for democracy: that this pattern has not been matched by a generational increase in support for nondemocratic alternatives; that there has been no generational decline in support for the participatory rationale behind a democratic system; and that there has been a generational increase in support for democratic systems in which liberal values are embodied. Methods seized by social science researchers in order to grasp age, period, and cohort effects are also explained, as well

as the challenges they pose. In a second section, the datasets, cases, concepts, and statistical models used to test the hypotheses are presented. Next, the multivariate models are shown and analyzed for each hypothesis, alongside descriptive statistics and visual representations of the results. A discussion of the findings and their implications for our understanding of the idea of a "democratic disconnect" in consolidated democracies completes the thesis.

2. Literature review

2.1. Support for democracy

2.1.1. The significance of support for democracy in established democracies

Competing definitions of democracy differ in the elements they include and the ones they omit. Among them, mass support for democracy is often thought of as something that does not identify a nascent democracy but that further strengthens existing regimes. Linz and Stepan's (1996a) seminal works coined the term "consolidated democracies" to describe those political systems in which the institutional changes have gone hand in hand with social transformation up to a point where democracy had become, as per their famous phrasing, "the only game in town". Their definition has behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional dimensions and thus relied not only on norms and expectations of elites or key political figures but also of the population at large. Central to their definition of a consolidated democracy is the idea that even in times of crises, support for democracy is strong enough so that a majority of the people still believes that democracy is the most appropriate form of government and rejects anti-system alternatives (Linz and Stepan 1996b, 16). Various scholars since then have also acknowledged shared democratic norms in the mass public as a key feature of consolidated democracies and of their stability (Diamond 1999; Schedler 2001).

The significance of self-expressed support for democracy in consolidated democracies has to be conceptually distinguished from a democratic institutional framework. Indeed, many authors have contested the idea that mass support for democracy leads to democratization or to an improvement of democratic institutions (Inglehart and Welzel 2003; Hadenius and Teorell 2005) as well as stressing the loose relationship between levels of overt support for democracy in a country and its actual level of democracy (Inglehart 2003). At the individual level, scholars have also differentiated between the attitudinal and behavioral dimensions of support for democracy, stressing the gap between one's

embracement of democracy-in-principle as the legitimate basis for a political regime, and one's engagement to push for democratization or demand higher democratic norms (Qi and Shin 2011).

The focus of this research is on the former definition. It uses 'support for democracy' as an indication of one's belief in the legitimacy of democracy as the principle structuring a political system, thus endorsing it as a concept which others have called legitimation of the regime principle (Dalton 1999; Norris 1999), diffuse legitimacy of a democratic regime (Morlino and Montero 1995) or simply democratic legitimacy (Wagner, Schneider, and Halla 2009). As in earlier works, it is theoretically distinct from satisfaction with democracy, understood as an assessment of the benefits democracy produces and which moves away from a normative, philosophical commitment to the rationale of democracy as a political system (Wagner, Schneider, and Halla 2009), even though the two concepts have been found to correlate in most consolidated democracies (Huang, Chang, and Chu 2008, 47). However, our main focus is not on *why* but on *if* – regardless of whether this support stems from personal satisfaction or strong ideological commitment – people are overtly supportive of democracy.

Indeed, as previously stated, the concept of support for democracy in itself has generated substantial academic interest as a key component of established democratic regimes. Building on the claim that the institutional framework must be matched by a congruent political culture for a regime to endure (Almond 1980), scholars have generally shared the idea that support for democracy matters and that as a last layer of consolidation, attitudinal mass support for democracy contributes to a democracy's legitimacy and its stability (Merkel 1998; Fuchs 1999). In that sense, support for the regime matters in the long run because it helps democracies prevent and deal with crises (Diamond 1999).

2.1.2. Is support for democracy stable in longstanding democracies?

Next to the dense literature examining support for democracy in non-democracies or developing democracies (Bratton and Mattes 2001; Sing 2005; Fuchs and Roller 2006), few works have looked specifically at and rigorously tested cases of longstanding democ-

racies. Without necessarily affirming that democratic consolidation is a one-way street, the literature has generally assumed that popular commitment to a democratic regime would remain quite positive and stable after a successful democratic consolidation because democracy would be evaluated positively in comparison to other types of regimes (Mishler and Rose 1996). The possibility of a variation in support for democracy has not been completely overlooked: a few factors such as government effectiveness (Magalhães 2014) and constant economic growth (Kotzian 2011) have been identified as exerting an influence on the level of support for democracy in consolidated regimes. Nevertheless, this line of work remains marginal and generally sides with the consensus that support for democracy, despite some slight deviations, is persistently very high in longstanding democracies.

Instead, the growing narrative around the idea of a "crisis of democracy" in the 1990s focused on low levels of satisfaction with democracy in advanced industrialized societies, reviving earlier claims about plummeting levels of confidence in political institutions (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975). Scholars built on Easton's argument that political support could be either diffuse or specific (Easton 1975) to make a distinction between support for and satisfaction with democracy. Assuming that popular trust and belief in the legitimacy of a regime are generally stable throughout time[1], they focused on citizens' evaluations of the current authorities and authoritative institutions – which, according to Easton, could more easily fluctuate. Looking primarily at Western Europe and the United States, academics found that voter turnout (Teixeira 1987; Wattenberg 2002), partisan attachments to parties (Schmitt and Holmberg 1995; Dalton 2002) and civic engagement (Putnam 2000) were declining. Additionally, people were increasingly distrusting of governments (Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997) and disinterested in or disenchanted with politics altogether (Dionne 1991; Hay 2007). Taken together, these various developments contributed to the urgency of the debate about the crisis of legitimacy in established democracies.

Even then, however, some interpreted these developments in a positive light for democracy itself. The changes were thought to be the result of the emergence of a new class of

'critical' or 'dissatisfied' citizens that could potentially help reinforce the democratic core of their regimes (Inglehart and Abramson 1999; Norris 1999). While a pessimistic perspective also upheld that these citizens' criticisms were detrimental to established democracies (Stoker 2006), the optimistic argument was rooted in the idea that dissatisfied citizens in consolidated democracies had rising expectations towards their governments, which could eventually lead to a shift to higher democratic norms (Dalton 2004). More importantly, a distinction was clearly established between these changes in citizens' evaluations of their governments and institutions and their attachment to democratic principles. Despite changes in indicators of satisfaction with democracy, support for democracy as a political system remained very strong in established democracies and showed no true sign of decline (Pharr, Putnam, and Dalton 2000; Norris 2011). Summing up results from public-opinion surveys worldwide, Diamond (2008, xi) writes that the belief in democracy as the best system of government is "overwhelming and universal." The assumption that commitment to democratic principles is deeply rooted in advanced industrialized democracies and that they are "highly unlikely" to experience a major legitimacy crisis (Norris 2011, 84) represents a major consensus in the political science community.

2.1.3. The decline thesis

Foa and Mounk's (2016) "The Democratic Disconnect" directly challenges this assumption of the literature. Using data from multiple waves of the World Values Survey, they show that levels of support for democracy have been decreasing in longstanding democracies and that this decline has been even more dramatic among younger birth cohorts, indicating an alarming generational change. According to them, younger generations are increasingly less likely to rate it "essential" to live in a democracy, while overall trends show growing rates of support for authoritarian alternatives such as army rule. In a following publication (Foa and Mounk 2017b), they pick up their argument and bring it even farther. Briefly exploring the cases of Venezuela and Poland's democratic backslidings, they posit that survey data revealing a decrease in mass support for democracy suggests similar developments in established democracies in a possibly near future, especially with

the advent of many populist and radical right political parties.

Foa and Mounk's articles quickly sparked a broad debate: they pointed to alarming trends in survey data that had passed under the radar of the academic literature and argued that it was undeniable that a process of deconsolidation was taking place across "most liberal democracies" (Foa and Mounk 2017b, 14). Despite acknowledging that when entrenched, democracy might be able to sustain a large degree of disapproval (2017b, 13), Foa and Mounk's reading of the decline in overt support for democracy hinted that one of the key findings of comparative politics – the surprising stability of consolidated democracies – might not hold much longer.

These articles quickly met a large echo among political scientists and the media alike, provoking many responses. A first line of criticism targets directly the methods employed by the two authors. Figure 1 reproduces two main graphs from Foa and Mounk (2016) that convey a clear argument about a generational decline in support for democracy but as Norris remarks (2017, 5), these generational gaps are exaggerated by "cherry-picking cases and by the visual presentation and treatment of the survey data." Indeed, Foa and Mounk rely on a varying sample of cases in their different graphs and often use the United States as a key example throughout their analysis. In contrast, Norris (2017) and Voeten (2016) both show that the trends of support for democracy fluctuate country-by-country and conclude that speaking of a broad cross-national phenomenon is an exaggeration because there is no evidence of a significant decline in most longstanding democracies. Hence, in most countries, almost 90% of the respondents give positive ratings of democracy[2]. In addition, graphs in Figure 1 display lines that are not weighted either to account for the population sizes of the countries included nor to treat the different countries as equal within the sample, which adds to the visual misrepresentation of the trimmed axes they chose[3]. Voeten (2016) also raises the issue that Foa and Mounk deliberately limit their analysis to respondents who thought that it was absolutely essential (10 on a 10-point scale) to live in a democracy, thus adopting a very restrictive perspective of who "supports" democracy and ignoring another insight at the same time: that almost no one, less than one percent of the respondents, thinks that democracy is "not at all important."

Figure 1: Graphs reproduced from Foa and Mounk (2016)

(a) Support for democracy by birth cohort



(b) Support for democracy by age group and wave



Aside from these methodological considerations, various substantive explanations refuting or explaining the aforementioned decline in support for democracy have been brought forth. Among them, some have upheld an optimistic perspective and argued that the decline was not as dramatic as what Foa and Mounk implied and that in a long-term perspective, support for democracy remains quite steady. For Inglehart (2016), the mass basis of support for democracy is slowly growing and post-modernization will progressively create the conditions that favour democracy. Norris' (2017) answer focuses on the historical resilience of consolidated democracies against threats such as populist leaders or terrorist groups, breaking the link Foa and Mounk make between support for democracy and democratic consolidation. Extending the analysis to confidence in democratic institutions, Voeten (2016) argues instead that it is older people who have grown more skeptical and are disconnected from democracy. More recently, Howe (2017) has explained the rise of antidemocratic sentiments as one among many consequences of changes in the social realm rather than strictly the political that has led to the rise of a significant minority that displays a general lack of respect for social norms and the rule of law.

Despite these varied responses, there has been no rigorous test of the period and generational changes posited by Foa and Mounk. The generational argument was quickly rejected by Norris (2017), who simply pointed to low levels of support for anti-system parties by the youth, and by Alexander and Welzel (2017), who hypothesized that support for liberal democracy was actually increasing among younger birth cohorts. In order

to make claims about generational change in support for democracy, one must test for cohort effects while also controlling for age and period, a step which Foa, Mouk, and their critics, who stayed strictly in the realm of descriptive statistics, have yet to undertake. Clearly, our understanding of the legitimacy and stability of consolidated democracies deserves a more thorough investigation. The first step of this analysis tests the two dimensions of Foa and Mounk's original argument in a fuller model that tests for age, period, and cohort effects while accounting for socio-demographic variables:

> *H1: There has been a general decline in support for democracy affecting all birth cohorts, pointing to a period effect.*
> *H2: In addition to a general decline, there has been a generational decline in support for democracy as most recent birth cohorts exhibit lower levels of support for democracy than earlier cohorts at the same age.*

2.1.4. Cross-country variation in support for democracy

However, there are strong reasons to believe that these hypotheses might not hold uniformly across all democracies. This is supported by Norris (2017) and Voeten's (2016) analyses, as well as their claim that Foa and Mounk are relying on select countries in order to make broad comparative statements while ignoring other cases where the decline has been less dramatic or absent. Even Foa and Mounk acknowledge, in a subsequent publication, that all countries might not experience the same story, but they argue that evidence from some countries is enough for the need to revisit our assumptions about the stability of consolidated democracies (Foa and Mounk 2017a, 5). From a methodological standpoint, there is a need to test the universality of the theory.

Even when narrowing down our focus to countries that are largely considered as 'long-standing democracies' so that the scope of the analysis truly matches that of the argument about challenges to consolidated democracies, excluding cases such as those from the post-communist region, there are theoretical reasons to anticipate variation in the attitudes of citizens toward democracy. While recent cross-national differences in support for democracy have yet to be explained, other indicators often linked to the relationship of citizens toward their democratic systems have been singled out for their varying

performance across countries. For instance, Wagner et al. (2009) show that time-series trends of satisfaction with democracy fluctuate across Western Europe and across time, partly due to the quality of the national institutions[4]. These trends reach high levels in countries such as Denmark or Norway, but score much lower in Italy or Greece. Other factors that vary at the country-level such as the representativeness of the institutional features (Anderson and Guillory 1997) have also been shown to matter for satisfaction for democracy. Looking at different indicators, research has shown that economic conditions exert an influence on political support (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000), as does perceived performance of the institutions (Criado and Herreros 2007). Inversely, government performance can also impact one's evaluations of the institutions themselves (Karp and Bowler 2003). Hence, an array of indicators has been singled out by the literature as shaping different dimensions of specific support in consolidated democracies and these indicators may vary considerably across longstanding democracies. While the bulk of this thesis seeks to stress the gap between elements such as satisfaction with democracy and support for democracy, the latter being considered as more resilient to short-term perturbations, we acknowledge that types of specific support may also impact citizens' support for democracy over a longer time period (Pharr, Putnam, and Dalton 2000). Beyond citizens' convictions in a democratic ideal, the context in which they may interact or perceive democratic institutions and actors can induce variation cross-nationally.

Further, we must acknowledge differences in the recent political environments of longstanding democracies that could have impacted citizens' and especially the youngest generations' attachment to their democratic systems. Many European countries underwent the process of political and economic integration in recent decades, experiencing multiple changes in their legal and economic frameworks and the transfer of part of their national sovereignty to the European Union (EU). The supranational structure of the EU has notably been criticized by political scientists for its "democratic deficit" (Follesdal and Hix 2006), but has also generated substantial backlash at the popular level as exemplified by the rise of many Eurosceptic political parties (Taggart 1998). Academics and pundits alike have referenced the 2016 Brexit vote as the most recent populist victory in

this disruption of Western Europe politics (Inglehart and Norris 2016; Foa and Mounk 2017b).

Elsewhere, the 9/11 attacks in New York represent a turning point in American and international politics that has brought an increased focus on security, significant racial discrimination, in particular against Muslims, as well as longtime oversea engagements that were marked by harsh contestation both at the national and international levels. This shaped the context in which newest generations of Americans learned about politics and formed their thoughts about it. While this undoubtedly had international ramifications outside the United States, there are mixed findings about the extent to which the same narratives of securitization and migration control invaded the political discourses abroad (Boswell 2007).

Finally, the political climate from 2008 and onwards in many countries has been characterized by recession, austerity policies, and mass mobilization against those and more broadly capitalism itself (Della Porta 2015). This atmosphere of global crisis was especially dramatic in some countries, such as the United States in which it initiated or in EU members including Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, or Cyprus that faced bailout crises. In some countries, the political salience of these issues reached extremely high levels with the widespread attention received by the Occupy movement, especially in the United States, or the pickup of these platforms by political parties such as Podemos in Spain or Syriza in Greece (at least initially).

These different and often traumatic events have impacted at varying levels the political context of consolidated democracies and have shaped the different environments in which newest generations have learned to form, and citizens more generally to adapt, their opinions about the value of their democratic systems. While we do not speculate about causal mechanisms connecting these specific periods to citizens' support for democracy, we must acknowledge that the diversity of societies and of political contexts within the ensemble of longstanding democracies may impact differently the attitudes of their populations and induce different patterns of generational changes across these countries. In particular, given the aforementioned contexts, we might expect to see a sharper decrease

in support for democracy in countries in which politics have been severely shaken over these years, in particular the United States.

Therefore, before digging deeper into the attitudes of most recent generations towards their democratic systems, we test whether Foa and Mounk's claims about a general and a generational decline in support for democracy hold across our sample of consolidated democracies. Our third hypothesis thus states that:

> *H3: There has been a general and / or generational decline in some countries, but not across all consolidated democracies.*

In the next section, we move beyond 'self-expressed support for democracy' to sophisticate our understanding of the citizens' conceptions of the worth and the characteristics of their democratic systems.

2.2. Beyond overt support for democracy

However, there are limitations with the use of self-expressed support for democracy as a main variable of interest that raise methodological and theoretical concerns, both tightly linked to the possibly varying interpretations of that concept. First, Schedler and Sarsfield (2007) have raised important doubts about the validity of indicators meant to capture support for democracy, arguing that these abstract measures often carry vague meanings, especially in a comparative study, and that the almost universal acceptance of democracy biases results because respondents pay "lip service" to it without truly understanding its content or by social desirability. While this adds to questions raised in works on other topics, such as the comparability of survey questions across cultures and languages (Heath, Fisher, and Smith 2005), democracy has especially been studied as a concept that can endorse a distinct political meaning across cultures (Schaffer 2000). Methodologically, there is a thus a need not only for questions to be as precise as possible and to avoid broad meanings, but also for robustness checks to be held using more than a single set of questions.

Second, theoretical concerns about the sole use of overt support for democracy are even more substantial. Delving further into definitions of democracy itself, Welzel and

Alvarez (2014, 75) state that "democratic desires are quite meaningless" unless we qualify them. Indeed, there are reasons to doubt that self-expressed support for democracy is truly representative of the support for the different elements that underlie the general concept: it might rely on interpretations of the concept itself or might be influenced by one's assessment of current governments or practices (Bratton and Mattes 2001). In addition, general support for democracy does not highlight which specific elements of democracy one supports, such as the protection of human rights, of civil liberties, of free and fair elections, and other elements which are often included in a definition of liberal democracy (Schedler and Sarsfield 2007). Having in mind this multidimensional conception of democracy, we might expect that findings about intergenerational differences in self-expressed support for democracy vary or do not hold when looking at different specifications of democracy.

Therefore, we examine three potential explanations that probe further into Foa and Mounk's pessimistic take on the relationship of the youth towards democracy by nuancing claims about an intergenerational decline in overt support for democracy. While these hypotheses are all rooted in existing scholarly perspectives, the novelty of our approach is to apply them specifically to our investigation of age, period, and cohort effects in support for democracy. We investigate whether lower rates of support for democracy among younger generations might be compensated by the fact that these cohorts do not show higher rates of support for nondemocratic alternatives; whether recent generations might have a different conception of citizenship norms and thus support a distinct version of participatory democracy; and finally whether they might embrace liberal values more than previous generations and endorse a specific understanding of liberal democracy.

Figure 2: Outline of the hypotheses



2.2.1. Opposition to nondemocratic alternatives

First, lower rates of support for democracy among younger generations may be coming from a different process of evaluation of the necessity and utility of democracy than that used by previous generations. Easton (1975, 446) refutes the idea that diffuse support for political objects – may they be systems, principles, or else – is acquired solely through socialization and the influence of peers, but rather that individuals come to form their own mind about them based on their personal experiences. This goes against expectations about how support for democracy would grow across generations simply because of changes in political culture and socialization into democratic norms: instead, younger cohorts should develop their own thoughts about the value of democracy as a political system in relation to their own experiences.

Based off a famous Winston Churchill quote, the "Churchill hypothesis" posits that if given the choice, citizens should come to choose democracy over other types of govern-

ments: it needs only to be the "lesser evil" of political systems. Shortly after the end of the Cold War, Rose and Mishler (1996) confirmed that in most post-communist regimes in which political elites tried to introduce democracy, citizens would show a preference for democratic governance – even if imperfect – over past types of regimes. This preference, which they later specified as "popular support for competing regimes" (Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998), is thus based on comparison rather than pure principled affiliation.

However, today's youth in advanced industrialized democracies has been raised in societies where democracy had been said to have won all ideological battles to attain a quasi-universal legitimacy as the basis for government (Fukuyama 1989), leaving no space for alternative political options. Aside from information that they might possess about nondemocratic regimes abroad, the younger generations in established democracies have no practical experience of living under a regime else than a democracy. Without really delving into it, Foa and Mounk (2016, 12) suggest an explanation along these lines: recent generations may seem indifferent to democracy because they have experienced no threat to their political way of life and are now taking it for granted.

Considering this, it can be argued that lower rates of support for democracy among younger generations are not very revealing if they are not matched by increased support for non-democratic alternatives.

> *H4: Younger generations are not more likely than previous generations to support non-democratic alternatives*

Our second and third arguments delve further into definitions of democracy itself by suggesting that younger generations may disapprove or reject "formal politics", even in a democratic system, while still holding values compatible with the democratic principles underlying the systems. These arguments operate in overlapping but slightly distinct realms: we first look at how citizens may conceive of the participatory channels of electoral democracies – the role citizens should come to play in a democracy – and in a second place, we examine the values they wish to see embodied in a democratic system – the way they expect governments to treat citizens.

2.2.2. Support for participatory democracy

On one hand, our second hypothesis explains intergenerational differences in support for democracy by changes in citizenship norms and associated patterns of political behavior for most recent generations in longstanding democracies.

Even since Putnam's bestseller *Bowling Alone* (2000), the idea of a decline in traditional forms of political participation and civic engagement in the United States and in other Western democracies has been at the forefront of many academic debates (see Stolle and Hooghe 2005). The focus has often been put on younger generations who are said to be especially withdrawing from electoral politics (Blais et al. 2002; Martin 2012; Manning and Edwards 2014, among others), often disengaged from politics altogether (Milner 2010) and to display alarmingly high levels of apathy and little political interest (Wattenberg 2002). Putnam's argument itself is rooted in the idea of generational replacement as driving down the level of civic engagement in American society at large: new birth cohorts are less politicized and less likely to become active members of their civic communities (Putnam 2000).

However, a critique to Putnam's decline thesis offers a different interpretation of these changes in patterns of political participation, implicating generational change at the heart of its argument. The newest generations in particular have been associated with a tendency to develop and use new repertoires of political action (Quintelier 2007; Loader 2007), distinguishing themselves from previous cohorts. In parallel, younger cohorts have also been said to be more likely to focus on elite-challenging rather than elite-directed forms of participation (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002) and to push for inclusion in the political sphere through direct democracy (Donovan and Karp 2006). Dalton (2017, 84) observes that over the period 1967-2014, there has a been a generational decline in voting and other partisan-related activities, but that there has also been a generational increase in activities such as direct action and protest.

These works paint a picture in which younger generations search for new means to participate politically and are dissatisfied with the traditional channels of political participation, but not necessarily one in which they reject politics altogether. Apart from

Foa and Mounk (2016), who linked high levels of political apathy amongst the youth to patterns of disengagement from democracy, scholars have often understood this as a generational decline in approval of formal politics and participation in electoral politics rather than a generational change in support for democracy. Indeed, Inglehart (1999) shows that youngest generations contribute to the decline in respect for authority, but show a deeper attachment to democratic values. Further, evidence shows that younger generations do express interest for politics and a desire to participate in political activities but are unlikely to envision a meaningful participation in existing political spheres and institutions: they remain dubious of formal politics (Henn, Weinstein, and Wring 2002; Henn and Foard 2012; Cammaerts et al. 2014).

Bang (2009, 131) argues that "participation and support are not solely a matter of being for or against the system", but that nowadays citizens can combine both positions, supporting key principles while rejecting an idea of mainstream politics in which ordinary people retain little capacity of enacting change. Extending this analysis to support for democracy, we might suspect that the younger generations will not necessarily endorse a system that they associate with the status quo and in which meaningful political participation is thought to be minimal. On the other side, they should regain enthusiasm when asked specifically about a system in which citizens play a key role. Therefore, our fourth hypothesis suggests that:

> *H5: There has been a generational change with younger generations exhibiting higher levels of support for the participatory mechanisms of a democracy.*

2.2.3. Support for liberal democracy

Finally, a third line of argument suggests that comparing rates of self-expressed support for democracy across generations is hardly meaningful because the conception of democracy itself has changed, with an increased share of the younger generations transitioning to a liberal conception of democracy (Alexander and Welzel 2017).

Inglehart (1971) has famously argued that intergenerational change has transformed the political culture of advanced industrial societies with a shift to post-materialist values

among younger generations. He substantiated his claim of value change in Western societies over the last decades with an array of evidence (1990, 1997), as did many others (Scarbrough 1995; Kaase and Newton 1995; Abramson 2014). While the post-materialism thesis has been subject to a great deal of debate and criticism (notably Ike 1973; Dalton 1977; Flanagan 1979), the basis of the argument is not only that the rise of self-expression values will eventually lead to democratic institutions but truly that a move away from survival values has led to a shift among younger birth cohorts to values that constitute the seedbed of effective democracy, such as tolerance of ethnic and sexual minorities and the desire for secular forms of government (Norris and Inglehart 2011; Inglehart and Welzel 2010).

Aside from the post-materialist literature looking directly at the political ramifications of the spark of liberal or "emancipative" values in Western democracies(Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel and Alvarez 2014), a large and multidisciplinary body of scholars has studied changes in attitudes driven by generational replacement during the last decades. They have stressed cultural shifts in gender roles and feelings toward gender equality, showing how attitudes towards women's rights have become increasingly feminist in the U.S. throughout the 1980s and 1990s among both sexes, mostly lifted by cohort succession (Twenge 1997). Discriminatory attitudes towards women's place and employment were also shown to be less prevalent among younger cohorts across OECD countries (Fortin 2005). Rooted in a narrative about the socializing consequences of the "sexual revolution", these changes extend beyond strictly women's rights to include attitudes toward different sexual behaviours: rates of disapproval toward elements such as premarital, homosexual, and teenage sex dropped sharply in the last quarter of the 20th century through cohort and period changes (Treas 2002). In particular, works since the 1990s and the 2000s have repeatedly associated younger cohorts to a higher tolerance of homosexuality in Canada and the U.S. (Andersen and Fetner 2008), in the U.S. only (Twenge, Carter, and Campbell 2015), or in a broader comparative perspective (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009).

While the growth of liberal sexual values is a striking example, especially in some

countries, generational change was shown in other cases to pave the way for increasing tolerance of outgroups or minority groups. Racial tolerance seemed to be on the rise: among other examples, Firebaugh and Davis (1988) argue that the decline of antiblack prejudice in the United States was mostly driven through cohort replacement from 1972 to 1984; Nteta and Greenlee (2013) argue that this trend has continued, with recent generations born under the Obama presidency opposing racial resentment even more fiercely than prior cohorts; and Ford (2008) shows that racial prejudice against Blacks and Asians decreases across generations in Britain[5]. Tolerance for difference also seems to have grown for attitudes towards ideological counterparts, with younger cohorts exhibiting a higher openness to ideological nonconformity (Cutler and Kaufman 1975; Wilson 1994), as well as "controversial outgroups more broadly" (Twenge, Carter, and Campbell 2015) ranging from Communists to the anti-religious.

In addition, Inglehart's (1990) argument that the younger generations held increasingly secular worldviews was substantiated by works that pointed to the fact that younger cohorts were becoming less religious (Chaves 1989; Stolzenberg, Blair-Loy, and Waite 1995). While cross-cultural differences persist in the propensity of religious beliefs, consolidated democracies generally stand out as countries in which younger generations are the least religious (Tilley 2002)[6], pointing to another area in which there is transition to liberal values, a process driven at least partly through cohort replacement.

Despite some contradictory cases and evidence of setbacks, this literature paints a picture in which one can observe a trend toward increasingly liberal values across generations. Whether this translates into political attitudes with younger generations projecting their increasingly liberal values onto their idea of an ideal political system remains to be proven. Alexander and Welzel (2017) build on this trend to argue that a gap in liberal values is growing between generations in advanced industrialized societies, rendering the testing of 'overt support for democracy' obsolete because citizens are better defined by their allegiance to either a liberal or an illiberal vision of democracy. Through their reading, the decrease in overall support for democracy is a temporary setback driven by illiberal supporters of democracy whose views have been discarded by mainstream po-

litical parties that advocate a liberal model of democracy. Their argument suggests a positive outcome, as the ranks of "liberal" supporters of democracy will eventually grow and today's shrinking base of overall supporters for democracy will be solidified through generational change.

Alexander and Welzel's (2017) response to Foa and Mounk focuses on this relationship between holding liberal values, supporting a democratic system, and supporting a liberal conception of democracy. However, they adopt a very narrow conception of liberal values understood strictly as liberal sexual values (defined as support for abortion, divorce, and homosexuality), ignoring other liberal values such as support for equal rights across all groups or for a secular government. Further, after examining the share of supporters of democracy endorsing liberal sexual values in each birth cohort, Alexander and Welzel abandon the intergenerational investigation of their research question, stopping short of proving that there would truly be, as they imply, intergenerational differences in support for liberal democracy. Whether there has been generational change at play - with younger generations exhibiting higher levels of support for democratic systems in which liberal values are clearly embodied - remains to be rigorously tested. Therefore, a third response to the idea of a "democratic disconnect" between generations is that intergenerational differences in support for democracy might not match those in support for liberal democracy. Our last hypothesis posits that:

> *H6: There has been a generational change with younger generations exhibiting higher levels of support for democratic systems endorsing liberal values.*

2.3. Age, period, and cohort effects

The focus of our hypotheses is on period and cohort effects[7] in support for democracy, while also controlling for life-cycle effects. The attempts to capture these effects in the political science literature rest on distinct and much debated sets of assumptions.

First, the literature has understood period effects as resulting from the strong influence of the characteristics of a specific time period on the direction and strength of various attitudes (Neundorf and Niemi 2014, 3). Beyond instances in which people adapt to

changing times and update their prior beliefs and attitudes, period effects are identified when significant shifts in political attitudes affecting all age groups can be traced back to specific disruptions in the social, economic or cultural environment (Yang and Land 2006, 76). Moreover, one can distinguish between changes in attitudes that are short-lived or fade quickly after the influential time period (Margalit 2013) and shifts that have substantial long-term consequences and induce lasting social change (Dassonneville 2013).

In contrast, life-cycle effects result from the expectation that individuals evolve biologically and socially as they age and that gradual changes in political attitudes or behaviour will follow a similar pattern repeated across different generations (Neundorf and Niemi 2014, 2). Age is widely seen to exert some influence on most concepts central to political science and thus represents a standard demographic control variable in studies; but studies of age, period, and cohort effects go beyond that in examining age groups at multiple points in time to observe consistent patterns across cohorts, thereby isolating life-cycle effects and providing causal mechanisms to explain the consequences of the ageing process (Tilley and Evans 2014).

Finally, the third and maybe most problematic type of effect relies on the idea of political attitudes being a function of one's generation or birth cohort. A first hurdle appears in the identification of generations themselves. Mannheim's (1928) classic theory posits that generations, not unlike social classes, are historically, socially and spatially defined: they are better understood not by a strict interval in birth years but by their sharing of common issues and frameworks. This conceptualization of generations is problematic for any study attempting to grasp generational differences as it implies that individuals born in the same years do not necessarily make sense as generations but can rather be part of different generational units. However, scholars since then have often adopted a somewhat looser definition and have been able to identify generations in birth cohorts that shared common experiences or characteristics beyond local communities. Therefore, various categorizations of generations have been proposed based on different assumptions of what "makes" a generation, such as a common formative political experience (Jennings

1987) or more simply common characteristics and historical settings (Becker 1990). The significance of generations is that these distinct shared experiences generate differences in political attitudes or behaviours across generations, and can incrementally provoke social change in society at large through cohort replacement (Ryder 1965).

However, identifying generational change in attitudes across cohorts is a particularly tricky exercise, especially seeing how life-cycle and generational effects are hard to distinguish from one another and as they may overlap (Clark 2015). Cohort effects are rooted in the idea that different generations are born in different times and that they have distinct formative experiences that impact their attitudes throughout the life-cycle, in addition to the effects of aging (Glenn 2003, 465). Therefore, theories of generational change build on the idea that individuals are politically socialized during their formative years, generally comprised within childhood up to early adulthood (Russo and Stattin 2017; Healy and Malhotra 2013) and that these different experiences will come to define cohorts in their political attitudes and behaviour. However, the extent to which attitudes crystallized during formative years are carried throughout one's adult life is subject to debate (Marsh 1971), and scholars have generally admitted that although with decreasing rates of change, political learning continues beyond these years (Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Niemi and Jennings 1991). Using various methods, the literature has successfully disentangled these effects and pointed to many examples of generational change nationally or cross-nationally ranging from attitudes toward welfare, redistribution and crime (Grasso et al. 2017) to support to communist rule (Rose and Carnaghan 1995).

With these theoretical distinctions between age, period, and cohort effects in mind, the next section details the data and methods used in order to identify these effects in a comparative scope.

3. Data and methods

3.1. The World Values Survey and the European Values Study

The study of APC effects requires longitudinal data in order to detect changes in attitudes over time and proceed to a comparison of life-cycle and generational effects (Scappini 2006). The testing of our hypotheses thus requires cross-sectional, time-series data spanning over multiple years and including good measures for dependent and independent variables.

Hence, this project relies on longitudinal cross-sectional data from different waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Study (EVS). The main method of data collection is face-to-face interviews for both surveys, although the WVS was sometimes administered through phone interviews for remote areas. The WVS was first carried out in 1981 to collect information about values and motivations of populations of developed societies. Throughout its six currently completed waves, it expanded beyond its original European focus to adopt a decentralized structure in which scientists in a large number of countries (57 countries for wave 6) conduct nationally representative surveys based on a common questionnaire. The WVS includes questions structured along different sections that vary through the waves but have included more systematically since wave 3 items about respondents' attitudes towards politics and different political systems ("WVS Database"). Similarly, the EVS started in 1981 but has been administered every nine years since then, for a total of four completed waves. A total of 47 European countries and regions were included in the last wave in 2008. The standardized EVS questionnaires have focused on themes similar to those of the WVS, including questions mostly about Europeans' attitudes toward "life, family, work, religion, politics and society" ("EVS").

3.2. Case selection

In their various graphs, Foa and Mounk use different samples of countries varying from a limited subset of five "longstanding democracies" – Australia, Great Britain, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States – to all countries included in specific EVS

and WVS waves (2017b). However, such a loose case selection does not follow the logic of their argument: that contrary to prior assumptions about democratic consolidation, people who have continuously experienced democratic rule might in fact develop growing preferences for other types of systems. In contrast, this thesis puts the hypotheses at hand to a strong test because it restricts the case selection to countries that have experienced stable democratic rule since at least 1990, thus eliminating the possibility that some countries were still in the midst of a democratic transition in the third waves of the EVS and the WVS (the oldest waves employed).

We adopt Voeten's (2016) classification of consolidated democracies but extend the analysis beyond Western democracies to include Japan. The sample is thus composed of "old" liberal democracies, following Norris' (2011) classification of countries based on their democratic scores in 2006 (Gastil 14-point index of civil liberties and political rights by Freedom House) as well as their historical experience of democracy. Israel is excluded due to lack of data over the time period. This notably allows us to exclude post-communist countries from the analysis, even countries that are now members of the European Union. This follows scholarly insights on how the specificity of that region's past diminishes the value of cross-regional comparisons (Bunce 1995) at the same time that it recognizes the possible impact of the socialist upbringing of older generations on attitudes toward democracy (Neundorf 2010). Our final sample thus consists of advanced industrialized democracies that are all members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) with an over-representation of West European countries. These twenty-three countries are (listed in alphabetical order) Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. Appendix A presents the survey data which is available for each of these countries.

3.3. Conceptualization of variables

3.3.1. Dependent variables: overt support for democracy

Our first set of hypotheses examines the possibility of a period and a generational decline in overt support for democracy. The survey question we use for this first dependent variable asks whether people think different types of political systems are a "very good", "fairly good", "fairly bad" or "very bad" way to govern their country. Options listed include "Having a democratic system", "Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections", "Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is the best for this country", and "Having the army rule". It has been used in different works either showing the distribution of the different responses (Voeten 2016) or the responses compiled into a 0-1 scale of the average of each respondent's answers on the four items (Alexander and Welzel 2017).

For the first three hypotheses, the item "Having a democratic system" is used as the main dependent variable: "support for democracy." This item has been used repeatedly in the literature as an indicator of citizens' evaluation of a democratic system (Inglehart 2003; Norris 2011), partly because contrary to other alternatives, it allows for time-series analysis as it has been included consistently since wave 3 of both the WVS and the EVS (around 1995). We must, however, acknowledge the shortcomings of this question. The four-point scale of that question and the social desirability of democracy, especially in countries in which democracy is historically well-entrenched, can possibly induce a lack of variation in the responses collected. This is what Schedler and Sarsfield (2007) suggest, using this specific question to point at the reported almost-unanimous approval of democracy cross-culturally. Indeed, the number of respondents giving positive assessments of democracy far surpasses those who give negative reviews (for a complete overview of the distribution of the responses of the dependent variables, see Appendix B.3). While taking into consideration these issues, this item remains our best possible measure of support for democracy for the purpose of our analysis, spanning many decades and surveying many generations at different points in time[8].

3.3.2. Dependent variables: beyond overt support for democracy

The second section of the analysis, testing hypotheses 4 through 6, explores different dimensions of support for democracy. The third hypothesis posits that younger generations are not more likely than other generations to support nondemocratic alternatives, and thus our dependent variable is "rejection of nondemocratic alternatives". To evaluate this, we use two other items from the question about respondents' evaluations of different types of political systems, namely "Having the army rule" and "Having a strong leader who does not bother with parliament or elections"[9]. In contrast to the item "Having a democratic system", these questions are reverse-scaled.

These elements have commonly been used to assess support for political alternatives that are clearly nondemocratic in nature, as well as within a democratic-autocratic values scale (Norris 2011). Our theoretical interest lies in assessing one's rejection of autocratic alternatives independently from one's approval of a democratic system and therefore we use these items separately instead of within a scale. A problem arising with this question and that can potentially distort our results is its peculiar phrasing. The question itself asks about citizens' evaluations of different "political systems", but among the list of choices, only the option of a "democratic system" clearly fits within that category, while other items focus on who decides or rules – an incomplete assessment of a system. Nevertheless, respondents are faced with choices that are relatively straightforward, and clearly associated with nondemocratic regimes: an unelected body ruling (the army) or a blatant disrespect of institutional checks and balances (a strong leader unbothered by parliament or elections). Therefore, the use of these questions would be dubious if one were to evaluate support for specific forms of autocratic governments, but is appropriate when, as in our case, one simply wishes to estimate opposition to nondemocratic alternatives.

The following hypothesis focuses on whether a generational decline is still noticeable when looking at the participatory dimension of democracy. To evaluate this idea, we use a question asking which first and second priorities respondents would choose as "most important" among maintaining order in the nation, fighting rising prices, giving people

more say in important government decisions, and protecting freedom of speech. The last two elements can be understood as a desire for a more open political system in which citizens play an active role and can voice their concerns. Therefore, choosing them as first or second priority will be understood as the aforementioned desire for a more participatory form of democracy. Hence, we compile these responses to obtain two dummy variables indicating if respondents have identified "giving people more say" or "protecting freedom of speech" as a priority - regardless of the order - or not.

Unlike many questions trying to collect information about respondents' recent political actions or general political behavior, this question does not survey whether respondents themselves participate or how, but the importance they attach to possibilities of participation within a society. Further, it has been used in all waves of the WVS and the EVS and thus allows us to investigate for life-cycle, generational, and period effects. This question represents our best option here to test this dimension of respondents' conception of the participatory channels of a democratic system, but our use of it is different from its original purpose. Indeed, it has been used repeatedly by Inglehart and others as part of the postmaterialism scale: individuals ranking "giving people more say in important government decisions" and "protecting freedom of speech" as their two priorities – regardless of which was ranked first – score the highest on that scale because they are said to express "postmaterialistic" rather than "materialistic" values (Inglehart 2008). However, we argue that the two chosen items can also be used as a measure of respondents' desire for participatory democracy because they refer specifically to a system in which participatory channels are protected and enhanced. In comparison, in the other question used to construct the postmaterialism scale, postmaterialistic values are either progress towards a "less impersonal and more humane society" or "a society in which ideas count more than money", referencing the role citizens may come to play in society in general rather than as political actors more precisely and is less relevant to our subject of analysis.

Finally, our last hypothesis posits that younger generations are in fact more likely to exhibit support for a democratic system endorsing liberal values. We test this using a question that gets not at how people personally embrace liberal and secular values, but

at how they feel a democratic system should embrace these values. Therefore, we use a question in the World Values Survey that asks whether people identify different items as "essential characteristics of democracy." From these elements, some represent agreement with core principles and normative values of liberal democracy, such as protection of civil rights, equality of rights, and a secular state (Norris 2011, 27). We use three of these essential characteristics of democracy: "civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression", "women have the same rights as men", and "religious liberties interpret the law". This last question is reverse-scaled to test whether respondents show support for a secular democratic system, which was one of our components of liberal values. Unfortunately, this question does not include specific items about the treatment of ethnic or sexual outgroups in society, but the item asking about gender equality does tap into whether people think all individuals deserve equal rights.

The complete wording of the dependent variables and of all other variables used in this thesis is shown in Appendix B.

3.3.3. Independent variables: age, period, and generation

Models testing age, period, and cohort effects in social sciences are derived from the idea that a political behaviour or attitude varies for an individual i depending on the cohort j to which that individual belongs, the age of that individual and the time period t (Neundorf and Niemi 2014):

$$Y_{i,j\,,t} = f(A_{i,t}\,, C_j, P_t)$$

A central methodological challenge arises from the linear relationship between age, time period, and cohort. Logically, age and birth year are perfectly correlated and when added they result in the survey year. This implies that one needs to "break" the linearity between age, time, and birth cohort through different categorizations of either age or birth cohort into groups (Grasso 2014, 63). Before specifying the methodological tools appropriate to estimate their effects, one must thus establish categorizations of the age, cohort, and period variables that make theoretical and statistical sense.

All the waves in both surveys include birth year of a respondent as well as the year in which the survey was executed, allowing us to get at the exact age of the respondent. First, we divide age into age groups in order to obtain more information about the attitudes of the different age groups, contrary to other studies that were solely focused on generational and period patterns and used age as a continuous variable (Yang 2008; Neundorf 2010; Grasso 2014). Many possibilities are available to categorize age but it must not reproduce perfectly the intervals used for generation in order to avoid multicollinearity, even if for one survey year. Since our analysis wishes to respond to Foa and Mounk's claims, we reproduce their age categories. This categorization divides respondents into six age groups, enough so that we avoid excessively vague categorization of respondents (for instance Putnam (2000) often uses only three age groups) but avoiding small categories in which the number of observations would be very low and would reduce the accuracy of our findings (as would be the case is we opted for narrow categories such as the "70-79" years old category by Dalton (2017)).

To conceptualize generations, we use the classification proposed by Grasso (2014, 66), which is very close to reproducing the categorization used by Becker (1990) and van Deth and Elff (2000) but calls generations according to decades (i.e. "60s-70s", "the 80s") rather than historical names (i.e. "silent generation", "protest generations"). This choice is justified by the fact that our theoretical expectations are about recent generational changes, not about historical arguments about the attitudes of earlier generations. Since our dataset goes beyond that used in Grasso's analysis, we extend her classification to include a last generation, "the 2000s", who were born after 1982.

Grasso's categorization was originally used in the context of Western Europe, but its ahistorical perspective makes it a good categorization of generations to apply for a comparative study including North American and European countries and Japan. While specific historical events can shape cohorts differently across countries, studies looking at age, period, and cohort effects have also defined generations according to their research focus. For instance, a study looking at the effect of different American presidencies divided the population into as many cohorts as presidents (Smets and Neundorf 2014)

while another used broader categories to investigate value changes in comparison to China (Egri and Ralston 2004). Since the focus of this analysis is on changes happening in the latest generations, the priority is to be able to isolate cohorts from the 80s and the 90s and thus Grasso's categorization fits our hypotheses well.

Finally, the different waves of the surveys employed in this analysis span from 1993 up to 2013, with 1999 and 2008 as the years in which the most countries were surveyed. Since all countries were not surveyed exactly in the same years and considering the large number of survey years (a total of 16) across the six waves of the WVS and the EVS combined, we cannot use directly each survey year as a dummy variable. Therefore, we categorize survey year into four "periods" for which we use dummy variables, considering that a sufficient number of observations must be found within each time period. The table below presents the categorization of age, generation, and period used in the multilevel models of this paper.

Table 1: Categorization of age, generation, and period

Age categories	Less than 25	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and more
N	10534	16596	18518	17325	15417	19240
Generations	Pre-WWII	Post-WWII	60s-70s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Era/period	1929 - 1945	1946 - 1965	1966 - 1977	1978 - 1988	1989 - 2001	2002 - ...
Year of birth	1909 - 1925	1926 - 1945	1946 - 1957	1958 - 1968	1969 - 1981	1982-1996
N	4182	23279	21104	21012	20823	7309
Survey period		1995 - 1998	1999 - 2000	2001 - 2008	2009 - 2013	
N		14510	26399	36220	21054	

3.3.4. Control variables

Finally, the analysis includes a range of control variables that could exert influence on support for democracy and induce omitted variable bias in the analysis. Control variables will notably be included for the basic socio-demographic variables of sex, level of education attained, and political interest. We also account for ideology, using a self-positioning measure by the respondent on a 1-10 scale where 1 represents the left and 10 represents the right. A dummy for unemployed individuals is also included in order to account for economic deprivation at the individual-level (Neundorf 2010).

As per Kotzian (2011), we use life satisfaction as a proxy for general satisfaction with the state of affairs, which had been said to increase the level of support for the status quo. For citizens living in longstanding democracies, a democratic political system represents that status quo. Finally, we also control for religious affiliation in order to see if the relationship between religion and democracy found at the aggregate level (Barro 2018) is also replicated at the individual-level.

While variables such as income or size of the town of the respondent have been used in other analyses looking at support for democracy (i.e. Neundorf 2010), the use of longitudinal data makes it difficult to integrate many variables due to the changes in the questions asked between surveys and waves over a long period of time. Therefore, despite our best effort to identify relevant variables, we are restricted in our ability to test all possible hypotheses and must acknowledge that our analysis might be missing some pieces of information. Appendix B.2 presents descriptive statistics for all the variables included in this survey.

3.4. Methods: testing age, period, and cohort effects

As previously stated, some inevitable mixture of life-cycle and generational effects in studies looking at age, period, and cohort effects has incentivized scholars to devise and perfect methodological tools to disentangle these effects. While dealing with this fundamental linearity of age, birth year, and time period, our analysis also presents the added complexity of estimating their effects in a comparative study and must take country effects seriously.

First, in order to identify if there has been, as claimed, period and cohort effects, this paper uses a multivariate model that accounts for these three variables simultaneously. We follow advice from Yang and her colleagues (2008, 2013), who suggest the use of cross-classified hierarchical models to represent variations in individual-level responses while accounting for age, period, and cohort effects. Hierarchical models are useful for studies using data that observes a nested structure (i.e. individuals within countries, students within schools) and where we expect variation at the different levels. They allow for

varying-intercepts for the group indicators that are the higher level of the analysis, as well as for varying slopes within groups that can be considered as interactions between group indicators and individual-level predictors (Gelman and Hill 2007). This type of model is often referred to as either multilevel or "mixed effects" model because it combines "fixed effects" – coefficients that do not vary by groups – and "random effects" that vary by group[10].

Our models employ random effects for cohort and period because in individual-level data, respondents are nested within two social contexts: a birth cohort as well as a survey year (Yang and Land 2006, 86). However, only varying the intercepts according to these two predictors is best suited for an analysis in a single country. Grasso (2014) adapts this method to a comparative context, using country as the higher level of the analysis for which random intercepts are applied and random slopes for variables which may vary at the country-level (generation and survey year). From a methodological standpoint, this type of multilevel modelling fits our hypotheses #1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 positing period or cohort effects in support for different dimensions of democracy in a cross-cultural setting. Indeed, it allows us to locate precisely where most variation occurs, between or within countries, as well as the share of variance explained by cohort membership or time period. In terms of our assumptions, this also has the benefit of representing how individuals are nested in social units, both in the geographical and temporal dimensions: individuals are born as members of a specific cohort and surveyed at a particular point in time, but are also respondents from a particular country.

For hypothesis #5, our dependent variable, support for participatory democracy, is conceptualized through two measures coded as dummy variables: choosing or not "freedom of speech" or "giving people more say in government decisions" as priorities. Therefore, instead of a multilevel linear regression, we use a multilevel logistic regression. For hypothesis #3, which examines more specifically how the period and generational changes occur within each country, we resort to a simpler model in which there are varying intercepts for period and generation.

While the reasons outlined above explain our choice of multilevel modelling, we must

also acknowledge criticisms that have been directed at this tool of statistical analysis. Our theoretical framework about established democracies and the scarcity of longitudinal data for these countries limit our multilevel analysis to a higher level of N = 23. Grasso remarks (2014, 68) that having less 30 units at the higher level is not ideal but that an alternative use of classical regression with country-fixed effects and interactions by country would have "erroneously ignored the random variability at the country level." However, while it is true that with a small number of groups, multilevel modelling might add little to the no-pooling of classical regression, Gelman and Hill (2007) show that when performed with specific packages in stastistical software[11], multilevel models will resort to classical regression as a limiting case, depending on the group-level variance: therefore, they should "work at least as well" as the other alternative.

Another line of criticism, however, has targeted specifically the choice of multilevel modelling to detect age, period, and cohort effects. Multiple scholars have attempted to demonstrate, mostly with the help of simulations, that hierarchical models fail to capture true effects in real life data, especially in the presence of linear effects (O'Brien 2017; Bell and Jones 2018), an argument that has been rejected by others stressing notably the flaws of simulation techniques (Reither et al. 2015). In particular, Bell and Jones (2018) warn that hierarchical models have a tendency to identify period effects over cohort effects due to the logic of the model: the model tries to minimize the amount of unexplained variance and cohort effect tend to increase the unexplained variance due to the fact that cohorts usually span a wider range of years than periods. This is true in the case at hand: periods span over slightly less than 20 years, and generations, slightly less than 100 years. However, while we must acknowledge this problem, Bell, Jones, and other critiques of hierarchical models do not necessarily present a better identification solution nor recommend abandoning that strategy altogether. Rather, they demonstrate its flaws and recall the need for models and classifications to be informed by social theory (Luo and Hodges 2016; Bell and Jones 2018), which is what has been undertaken in this thesis. In future steps, we could complement our methodological approach by new tools that researchers have developed along hierarchical models to identify APC effects; we discuss

other options at the end of this thesis.

Further, one issue arising from the choice of our dependent variables is that three of them, namely support for democracy, opposition to non-democratic alternatives, and support for liberal democracy, are ordinal variables. Indeed, the choices offered to respondents correspond to a Likert scale along which respondents have to define how much they agree with the statement they are presented with (e.g. "Having a democratic system is a very good way to govern this country"). These scales try to capture respondents' attitudes based on fixed categories, but are an approximation of the true measure of the respondent's position according to a latent variable (e.g. the exact rating of a democratic system by a respondent). Further, we cannot be certain that the gaps between the categories of the scale (e.g. "very good", "fairly good") mean the same thing for every respondent. Ordered probit models are best suited for this type of dependent variable, but estimating a multilevel ordered probit model in R is not recommended[12]. Therefore, as robustness checks, we use two binary splits for each dependent variable (except for support for participatory democracy which is already represented by dummies). Results for these tables are displayed in Appendix D.

We test for multicollinearity to verify that our variables are not correlated, thus proofing our technique of breaking the age, period, and cohort linearity[13]. Further, we also test our models by performing likelihood ratio tests to compare them to null models and verify our choice of multilevel modelling.

4. Analysis

4.1. Support for democracy

Before proceeding with the estimation of our models, we look at descriptive statistics of overt support for democracy. Figure 1 reproduced graphs by Foa and Mounk (2016), but the way they conveyed results is visually misleading: both graphs select only a handful of countries and stress the case of the United States without differentiating the weights of the different countries, and in addition, Figure 1a only displays results for respondents who gave a rating of 10/10 to the question about the importance to live in a democracy.

Therefore, we present some descriptive statistics[14] of the dependent variable used in the first section of our analysis, support for democracy, understood as the rating of a democratic system as a way to govern one's country. Figure 3 shows rates of support for democracy according to age, birth year, and time of survey.

Figure 3: Support for democracy by age, birth year, and period



First, support for democracy remains very high for all the variables it is mapped against: the mean rating never drops below 3 on a 4-point scale. Respondents usually classify a democratic system as either a "fairly good" or "very good" type of political system, regardless of their age, cohort, or of the year in which they are being surveyed.

Second, although there is little variation for the age and birth year variables, there is nevertheless a constant positive slope for age – support for democracy increases slightly with age – and a constant negative slope for birth year. This variation is very limited but could potentially indicate a decline in support for democracy among today's most recent generations, as they are among the least supportive of democracy both according to their age and birth year. The period variable displays more variation: the variable is discrete rather than continuous, has irregular intervals and a shorter span than the other two, partly explaining the greater variation, but it remains that the differences between some of the survey years are almost of a half-point. The ratings are especially low for the year 2010, which could potentially be linked to a reaction to the global economic recession, but the decline is shortly after compensated by an upward trend. Considering the overall positive slope of the period variable, there is no evidence thus far of a general decline.

These descriptive statistics may be seen as a first rebuttal of Foa and Mounk's claims of any large period or generational decline in support for democracy, but they do not allow us to evaluate simultaneously the effects of age, period, and cohort on support for democracy. Therefore, we estimate these effects with a cross-classified multilevel model displayed in Table 2 with country as the higher unit of analysis and random coefficients for period and cohort. We use fixed effects for age, thus completing our model.

The model in Table 2 confirms the relationship of age and support for democracy hinted at by the descriptive statistics. Indeed, while respondents under 35 years old are less likely to support democracy than the 35-44 years old category, respondents older than the reference category are associated to a higher likelihood of support for democracy. All the coefficients associated to the age categories are statistically significant, but they are also extremely small in magnitude even when considering that our variable follows a four-point scale. Age does seem to exert a positive influence on support for democracy but this influence is limited.

In fact, the variables exerting the most influence on support for democracy at the individual-level are the socio-demographic variables. Education has a positive influence on support for democracy, with holders of a college degree and people who attended

Table 2: Cross-classified multilevel model of support for democracy

	This is a very good way to govern a country: Having a democratic political system
Fixed effects	
Constant	3.06 (0.03)*
Age categories (ref = 35-44 years old)	
Less than 25 years old	−0.05 (0.01)*
25-34 years old	−0.03 (0.01)*
45-54 years old	0.03 (0.01)*
55-64 years old	0.03 (0.01)*
65 years old and more	0.04 (0.01)*
Female	−0.03 (0.00)*
Educational level attained (ref = No college)	
Some college education	0.14 (0.01)*
College degree	0.20 (0.01)*
Interest in politics	0.12 (0.00)*
Unemployed	−0.07 (0.01)*
Ideology (ref = center)	
Left	0.05 (0.01)*
Right	−0.04 (0.01)*
Life satisfaction	0.02 (0.00)*
Religious affiliation	0.03 (0.01)*
Random effects: variance (std. dev.)	
Between-country variance	0.05 (0.21)
Generations (ref. = Post-WWII)	
Pre-WWII	0.00 (0.03)
1960s-70s	0.00 (0.04)
1980s	0.00 (0.06)
1990s	0.01 (0.10)
2000s	0.01 (0.12)
Survey periods (ref. = 1995-1998)	
1999-2000	0.01 (0.11)
2001-2008	0.01 (0.09)
2009-2013	0.02 (0.15)
AIC	144703.02
BIC	145265.35
Log Likelihood	−72290.51
Num. obs.	74498
Num. groups: country	23

*$p < 0.05$

college without graduating being stronger supporters of democracy than respondents who did not attend college by respectively 0.14 and 0.20 points. Interest in politics also has a positive effect on support for democracy. These two relationships are quite logical with assumptions about determinants of support for democracy, as interested and highly educated individuals would tend to value democratic norms more than other individuals.

Similarly, being unemployed exerts a negative effect on the propensity of respondents to support democracy and ideology also plays an effect, with left-leaning individuals being stronger supporters of democracy than right-leaning ones. The behaviour of those socio-demographic variables conforms to previous expectations and findings in the literature (Neundorf 2010). Life satisfaction and religious affiliation both exert a positive effect on support for democracy.

The results of our random effects at the bottom of Table 2 suggest that after controlling for our individual-level variables, there remains a variation between countries (variance = 0.05) but that the residual variation associated with the different generations is much smaller[15]. However, we do see that there is some residual variation associated with the two latest generations, but the variances are very small (0.01) and smaller than the standard deviations. There is a greater variation associated with survey years and especially the years 2009-2013 that may indicate a period effect. In order to understand the way the random effects applied to generation and period behave, we look at the sign of the slopes per generation. Here, we see that there is no uniform direction across countries as the sign of the slopes varies either for each generation or for each survey period, indicating no sign of a cohort or period decline (or increase) across countries within our sample.

Therefore, we find no evidence allowing us to confirm either Hypothesis 1 or Hypothesis 2. The variance mostly happens within countries: generations or periods are not good explanatory units of overt support for democracy in a cross-sectional analysis. As Figure 4 shows, there are some significant differences between the random intercepts modelled for the countries in our sample.

These random effects indicate how much the average intercept (3.06) is shifted up and down in the different countries of our sample (Gelman and Hill 2007, 260). The variation is important, ranging from an intercept of 2.54 for Finland to 3.42 for Greece: this is almost a full point on a four-points scale on support for democracy. We find that the United Kingdom, Norway, Italy, Iceland, Denmark and Greece are significantly higher than the average in terms of support for democracy after controlling for age, period, cohort, and other socio-demographic variables. Inversely, the intercepts for all countries

Figure 4: Multilevel model of support for democracy



except for Canada, New Zealand, and Sweden are significantly lower than the average.

While there is, at first sight, no clear explanation explaining this ranking of countries in comparison to the average intercept, Figure 4 does not show the most interesting element for our analysis: how support for democracy may vary by generation or by period across countries.

4.1.1. Cross-country variation

In order to test our third hypothesis more rigorously, we move to country-by-country multilevel regressions. Therefore, instead of varying-intercepts for country, we use varying-intercepts for period and cohort, as recommended for a single-country analysis (Yang and Land 2006). These two variables become our highest units of analysis, capturing the variance that happens within these two social contexts in which individuals are nested in each national setting. Apart from that change in random effects, these models control for the same variables as the multilevel model displayed in Table 2, including age as a fixed effect.

This simpler modelling form first confirms the results of our cross-sectional multilevel model in support for democracy: there is no evidence of a clear generational or period

decline that would be replicated across countries or even across most countries. In fact, no single country displays any sign of generational decline when we control for the effects of age and period. Figure 5 displays those countries in which we do see a decrease for the random effects for the latest generations (Appendix C shows the random effects associated to generation and period for each country). Few random effects for generations are significantly different from the average intercept for that country (the 1960-70s generation in Australia is above the national average, as is the 1980s generation in Japan), the most recent generations are never significantly lower, and the confidence intervals are always overlapping. Hence, we confirm that there is no evidence of a decline in support for democracy that is specifically associated with the birth cohort of respondents in any democracy comprised within our sample.

Figure 5: Random effects for generation taken from country-by-country multilevel models



The same exercise for period effects, however, yields more conclusive results. We observe a significant period decline in six countries in our sample for the latest year in which they are being surveyed. In Austria, Greece, and Ireland, the levels of support for democracy showed by respondents, after controlling for age and birth cohort, are significantly lower in 2008 than in the previous survey. In Ireland and the United Kingdom, the same pattern appears for 2009. The most important deviation from the average appears in

the United States, where we see that respondents were less likely by 0.15 point in 2011 than in general to give positive ratings to a democratic system. Further, if we consider the drop in comparison to the previous survey in 2006, this represents an overall drop of 0.20 point on a four-point scale. In Iceland, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, the gaps between the two most recent surveys also range between 0.17 and 0.20 point.

Finally, an increase in support for democracy by around 0.13 point in contrast to earlier periods is visible for Germany. While we could be tempted to explain this by pointing to factors such as the relative health of the German economy that fuels good feelings towards its political system, this would not explain how this mirrors a drop of almost equal magnitude in 2008. This is a puzzling finding that could potentially point to a measurement error and that would deserve a more thorough investigation.

Figure 6: Random effects for period taken from country-by-country multilevel models



Applying random effects for generation and period in country-by-country regressions has allowed us to partly confirm our third hypothesis, which suggested that there were generational and / or period declines at play in some countries, but not across all consolidated democracies. Indeed, we find evidence of a period decline in six our of the 23 countries in our sample after controlling for age, birth cohort, and socio-demographic variables. In four of these countries, all except for the United Kingdom and the United

States, the period declines that were identified should be interpreted cautiously as these countries have only been tested at two points in time. In the United Kingdom and the United States, the range of our data allows us to draw more precise conclusions. Therefore, our findings of a general decline in support for democracy indicating a period effect resist to the inclusion of age and generation in our models for these countries, allowing us to discard our hypothesis about cohort effects.

4.2. Beyond overt support for democracy

As a second step of this analysis, we go beyond the sole measure of 'overt support for democracy' to evaluate three hypotheses examining different dimensions of support for democracy, namely opposition to nondemocratic alternatives, support for participatory democracy, and support for liberal democracy.

4.2.1. Support for nondemocratic alternatives

Our fourth hypothesis suggested that there had not been a generational decline when we considered opposition to nondemocratic political systems: rule by the army and rule by a strong leader unrestricted by a parliament or by elections.

Descriptive statistics shown in Figure 7 map opposition to these two non-democratic alternatives against our independent variables of age, cohort, and period and give us a first overview of the behaviour of these variables. Again, the ratings are on average very high: rule by the army or rule by a strong leader are consistently evaluated between being "fairly bad" or "very bad" ways to govern a country. First, we suspect a curvilinear relationship between these two variables and both age and birth year. Youngest respondents are on average those who oppose army rule the least, while this opposition slowly increases with age until we reach respondents of 60-70 years old, after which there is a slight decrease in opposition to army rule. Opposition to a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament or elections follows a very similar relationship with age, safe for the fact that levels of opposition are on average lower (only slightly higher than "Fairly bad") and that the decrease for respondents older than 60 years old is sharper, plunging to levels of

opposition lower than those exhibited by the youngest age categories.

Figure 7: Descriptive statistics of support for non-democratic political systems



As for birth year, the relationship is the opposite. The relative levels of opposition to army rule and to a strong leader remain the same, but for respondents born after 1960, a downward trend slowly begins for both dependent variables and sharpens after 1980. This corresponds to our last generation category, the 2000s as per their socialization period or those born after 1982. Combined with the descriptive statistics on age, we might suspect a slight generational decline in opposition to nondemocratic alternatives; but again, these variables need to be estimated simultaneously. Finally, there is more variation when these variables are mapped against the survey years. We see small peaks for the years 1997 and 2004, and lower levels are hit in 2000 and 2010. The lower ratings for 2010 are especially interesting since we saw the same pattern in support for democracy, which led us to consider the repercussions of the global recession. This might have affected many dimensions of respondents' preferred political systems and should be investigated further in a near future.

A possibility we must consider here, especially seeing how the lines for army rule and strong leader follow each other, is that of a measurement error affecting these variables. These items are part of a set of questions and are thus asked closely followed by one another during the survey[16]. Hence, we cannot assume that respondents are necessarily evaluating these two nondemocratic alternatives independently from one another but we have to consider that they may be adjusting the ratings they give to one item relatively

to how they evaluated the preceding items.

We now estimate our multivariate multilevel model and show the results in Table 3. First, looking at our fixed effects, we find that younger respondents (less than 25 years old and 25-34 years old) are less likely to oppose the army ruling in comparison to our reference category of 35-44 years old. The coefficients are mostly not significant for support for a strong leader, but there we do find that respondents older than 65 years old are less likely to disapprove this type of rule. We also find that women are less likely to oppose the army ruling than men, but more likely than them to oppose a strong leader acting without institutional constraints. A college education increases for both variables a respondent's opposition to nondemocratic alternatives, and that difference is heightened for holders of a degree in comparison to attendees without degree. Although with a smaller coefficient, interest in politics also increases one's level of opposition, as does being left-leaning and being generally satisfied with life. In contrast to the way this variable performed towards support for democracy, religious affiliation decreases one's likelihood to oppose a nondemocratic alternative. This is a first indication that although these variables perform similarly in many ways, respondents might still evaluate them independently in function of their own beliefs or prior attitudes.

Looking at our random effects, we see that once we control for age as well as other individual-level covariates, the group-level errors associated with country, cohort, and period are quite small, indicating that most variation does not occur at that level. Nevertheless, there is some between-country variance for opposition to the army ruling (variance = 0.02) and a larger variance for opposition to a strong leader (variance = 0.24). However, the standard deviations are larger than the variance, greatly diminishing the reliability of these results. Nevertheless, one interesting finding is that the share of variance explained by generations increases for both variables for the generation 2000s. Further, digging into the coefficients associated with the random slopes for these variables, we find that almost all coefficients are negative for the 2000s generation[17] for the item "Having the army rule." This indicates that the youngest generation, after controlling for age, period, and other variables, still indicates a lower likelihood to oppose army rule than

Table 3: Cross-classified multilevel model of opposition to nondemocratic alternatives

	This is a very bad way to govern a country:	
	Army rule	Strong leader
Fixed effects)		
Constant	3.49 (0.02)*	2.82 (0.03)*
Age categories (ref = 35-44 years old)		
Less than 25 years old	−0.04 (0.01)*	0.01 (0.02)
25-34 years old	−0.02 (0.01)*	−0.02 (0.01)
45-54 years old	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
55-64 years old	0.01 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.01)
65 years old and more	−0.02 (0.01)	−0.09 (0.02)*
Female	−0.04 (0.00)*	0.04 (0.01)*
Educational level attained (ref = No college)		
Some college education	0.12 (0.01)*	0.20 (0.01)*
College degree	0.15 (0.01)*	0.29 (0.01)*
Interest in politics	0.05 (0.00)*	0.11 (0.00)*
Unemployed	−0.05 (0.01)*	−0.08 (0.01)*
Ideology (ref = center)		
Left	0.08 (0.01)*	0.14 (0.01)*
Right	−0.08 (0.01)*	−0.14 (0.01)*
Life satisfaction	0.01 (0.00)*	0.01 (0.00)*
Religious affiliation	−0.03 (0.01)*	−0.05 (0.01)*
Random effects: variance (std. dev.)		
Between-country variance	0.02 (0.14)	0.24 (0.49)
Generations (ref. = Post-WWII)		
Pre-WWII	0.01 (0.08)	0.00 (0.00)
1960s-70s	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.06)
1980s	0.00 (0.06)	0.01 (0.08)
1990s	0.01 (0.11)	0.01 (0.13)
2000s	0.03 (0.16)	0.03 (0.19)
Survey periods (ref. = 1995-1998)		
1999 - 2000	0.01 (0.10)	0.10 (0.32)
2001 - 2008	0.02 (0.14)	0.06 (0.25)
2009 - 2013	0.02 (0.14)	0.17 (0.41)
AIC	130550.43	188438.67
BIC	131113.08	189000.19
Log Likelihood	−65214.22	−94158.33
Num. obs.	74879	73516
Num. groups: country	23	23

*$p < 0.05$

other generations across countries within our sample.

This partly disconfirms our fourth hypothesis, because we suggested that youngest cohorts would not oppose more weakly than other generations this type of system. However, when we look at survey years, where again we find a higher share of variance explained by later surveys, slopes go in all directions across our different categories, pointing to

no clear period effect. The picture for opposition to a strong leader is more mixed. Coefficients associated with random slopes for generations are both positive and negative across generations and across survey years, showing no clear indication of cohort or period effect.

Therefore, we find mixed evidence regarding our fourth hypothesis. In fact, there seems to be a generational decline with younger generations, and especially the 2000s, opposing rule by the army less fiercely than their predecessors. On the other end, no such relationship is visible for rule by a strong leader ignoring parliament or electoral constraints. This contradictory evidence warrants the need for further investigation, especially in a few years in order to see if the higher openness of Millenials to rule by army endures throughout their aging.

4.2.2. Support for participatory democracy

Our fourth hypothesis examines whether we might expect to see no generational decline when looking at support for the participatory mechanisms of a democracy. We examine here two dimensions of those: choosing to protect freedom of speech or to give people more say in government decisions as a priority for one's country among a list of four priorities, the two other being what Inglehart labelled "materialist" issues. We transform these questions into binary variables, resulting in dummy variables coded 1 if people identified these items as priorities (regardless of the order) and 0 if they did not. Consequently, we must acknowledge the interdependence that these responses share: a choice of one of these items at a specific question automatically excludes choosing the other item. This is already visible by the descriptive statistics mapped in Figure 8: when looking at our dependent variables mapped against year of survey, we see that the peak in 2010 in choosing "giving people more say in government decisions" is mirrored by a decrease in choosing "protecting freedom of speech". This might also indicate that within the four choices offered to them, respondents are probably going to choose "giving people more say" or "protecting freedom of speech" as one of their priorities – but not both. This is also intuitive seeing how the results for these variables average 0.5 regardless of how it is

displayed.

Figure 8: Descriptive statistics of support for participatory democracy



While acknowledging the implications of the nature of these two measures, we can see in Figure 8 that age seems to have a negative effect on the propensity of individuals to choose either one of these elements as one of their priorities. Indeed, the average for both items for respondents aged 20 is slightly over 0.5 out of 1, while it decreases until it reaches around 0.4 for respondents over 80 years old. On the other hand, the relationship with birth year is positive for the choice of "freedom of speech" as a priority," but follows a curvilinear pattern for "giving people more say in government decisions" with respondents born in the 1950s showing the highest propensity of choosing that item while the average decreases for both oldest and most recent birth cohorts. Finally, there is important variation when we look at the two items mapped against year of survey: there are peaks in the preferences for "giving people more say in government decisions" in 1996 and 2010. However, over the timeline of our data, no clear trend appears for either one of these items.

Because of the nature of our binary dependent variables, we perform a multilevel logistic regression that produces log odds, which are less directly interpretable than linear regressions coefficients[18]. Looking at the fixed effects, we confirm expectations derived by the descriptive statistics: younger people do indeed exhibit a higher likelihood of choosing "protecting freedom of speech" or "giving people more say" as a priority by respectively 8% and 2.25% for respondents of less than 25 years old. Being a woman has

a negative influence on the probability of choosing to protect freedom of speech (-4.25%) while it very slightly increases that of opting for "giving people more say" (1.5%). Being more educated also increases the likelihood of choosing both items, although the effect is stronger for the item "protecting freedom of speech."; being interested in politics also has a positive influence. Interestingly, being unemployed decreases the likelihood of prioritizing the protection of freedom of speech by around 1%, but increases the probability that a respondent wishes to see people having more say in government decisions. This is not completely counter-intuitive, as we might suspect that unemployed people might feel excluded from decision-making channels and powerless towards their own situations. However, it is important to stress that this is the only positive influence that the dummy covariate for unemployment has on any conceptualization of support for democracy so far. Finally, life satisfaction has very small effects on both items while religious affiliation decreases by around 4% to 5% the probability of choosing either item.

Looking at random effects, the group-level errors associated to countries have an estimated standard deviation of 0.59 on the logit scale, which means that the countries differed by around +/- 15% on the probability scale. Further, these standard deviations for country for both items are greater than the variances associated to generations. In this case, we also find that survey periods are associated to more variation that generations for both "protecting freedom of speech" and "giving people more say in government decisions": for the latter, the variance associated to survey periods within countries surpasses the variance between-countries. This is interesting because it points to the fact that there are differences throughout time in the likelihood of choosing to prioritize these participatory mechanisms over other issues. However, looking more closely at the group-level errors associated with these random slopes shows that there is no uniform direction in the variation associated either with generations or survey year. For instance, belonging to the "2000s" generation in Denmark has a negative slope for the likelihood of choosing "freedom of speech", while the same cohort membership has a positive slope in Belgium. This pattern is found both for survey period and for generations, for our two measures of support for participatory democracy.

Table 4: Cross-classified multilevel logistic regression of support for participatory democracy

	Priority chosen as the most important (log odds)	
	Protecting freedom of speech	Giving people a say
Fixed effects		
Constant	−1.17 (0.13)*	−0.26 (0.15)
Age categories (ref = 35-44 years old)		
Less than 25 years old	0.32 (0.04)*	0.09 (0.04)*
25-34 years old	0.07 (0.03)*	0.08 (0.03)*
45-54 years old	0.01 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.03)
55-64 years old	0.01 (0.03)	−0.07 (0.04)
65 years old and more	−0.06 (0.04)	−0.14 (0.05)*
Female	−0.13 (0.02)*	0.06 (0.02)*
Educational level attained (ref = No college)		
Some college education	0.31 (0.02)*	0.12 (0.02)*
College degree	0.54 (0.02)*	0.11 (0.02)*
Interest in politics	0.20 (0.01)*	0.24 (0.01)*
Unemployed	−0.04 (0.04)	0.07 (0.04)*
Ideology (ref = center)		
Left	0.33 (0.02)*	0.32 (0.02)*
Right	−0.12 (0.02)*	−0.23 (0.02)*
Life satisfaction	0.04 (0.00)*	−0.02 (0.00)*
Religious affiliation	−0.15 (0.02)*	−0.20 (0.02)*
Random effects: variance (std. dev.)		
Between-country variance	0.35 (0.59)	0.25 (0.50)
Generations (ref. = Post-WWII)		
Pre-WWII	0.02 (0.13)	0.07 (0.26)
1960s-70s	0.03 (0.17)	0.04 (0.19)
1980s	0.06 (0.24)	0.06 (0.24)
1990s	0.04 (0.21)	0.05 (0.23)
2000s	0.05 (0.23)	0.06 (0.24)
Survey periods (ref. = 1995-1998)		
1999-2001	0.28 (0.53)	0.11 (0.33)
2001-2009	0.16 (0.40)	0.26 (0.51)
2009-2014	0.33 (0.57)	0.37 (0.61)
AIC	94102.92	96633.43
BIC	94655.41	97185.92
Log Likelihood	−46991.46	−48256.72
Num. obs.	73725	73725
Num. groups: country	23	23

*$p < 0.05$

In conclusion, when we estimate simultaneously the effects of age, period, and cohort, we find no evidence that of a generational increase in support for participatory democracy. This goes against our prior expectations about the younger generations' preferences for democratic systems in which participatory opportunities are protected and enhanced. We

cannot confirm our fifth hypothesis, and should thus revisit our assumptions about the intergenerational differences in support for participatory democracy. However, we do find that younger people, regardless of cohort membership, are more likely to prioritize these items over other issues, indicating that this might be a life-cycle rather than a generational effect. Finally, we find no evidence of a period effect either: despite important variation throughout time, there is no general decline or increase in support for participatory democracy in a comparative perspective, a finding that was already visible by the stage of descriptive statistics.

4.2.3. Support for liberal democracy

Our last hypothesis suggests that we might expect a generational increase in support for a democracy endorsing liberal values, along the argument that generations have different expectations toward the values they wish to see embodied in their political regimes. We test three dimensions of this liberalness: support for civil rights, support for equality of rights (represented by women rights), and support for a secular democracy (where religious authorities do not interpret the laws). More specifically, the surveys ask respondents whether they consider these three elements (among a list of other elements, ranging from economic orientations to authoritarian features) as "essential characteristics of democracy" on a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 represents "an essential characteristic of democracy."

An important issue with the use of this question is that it only began to appear in the waves 5 and 6 of the World Values Survey. Consequently, our sample is reduced to 14 countries: Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Most importantly still, the longitudinal range for which we have data is shortened to years between 2005 and 2013. This limits considerably our ability to draw conclusions about period, generational, or life-cycle effects because most generations will only be tested once or twice throughout their life-cycle. Nevertheless, our approach still goes beyond what has been done to test generations' support for specifically liberal forms of

democracy because we estimate the effects of age, generation, and period simultaneously and thus propose a framework of analysis that can be extended and enriched once more data is collected. Hence, findings from this last section should be considered as preliminary results. Figure 9 shows descriptive statistics of responses to the three chosen questions mapped against age, birth cohort, and time of survey.

Figure 9: Descriptive statistics of support for liberal democracy



These descriptive statistics indicate that rates of support for these liberal conceptions of democracy are generally quite high: the average rating by age or birth year is approximately 8 out of 10 for "civil rights protect people's liberties from oppression," 8.5 out of 10 for "religious leaders do not interpret the law," and 9 out of 10 for "women have the same rights as men" where 10 means that these are considered essential characteristics of a democracy. While the blue lines representing respondents' view of the need for gender equality in a democracy are quite flat, others indicate a slight curvilinear effect. Indeed, it seems that younger and older people, and oldest and newest generations, are less numerous to think that religious leaders should not interpret the law in a democracy in comparison to middle-aged respondents or those born between the 1940s and the 1980s. Although less pronounced, a similar trend shapes the lines for respondents' views of whether civil rights protecting people's liberties from oppression is emblematic of a democracy. These could potentially point to a generational and / or life-cycle effect when these variables are estimated simultaneously. Finally, the graph to the right shows more variation when support for these conceptions of democracy is mapped against year

of survey. There seems to be an overall increase in the ratings of these items throughout time, although we see drops in feelings of necessity of gender equality and civil rights in a democracy (but a spike in secular conceptions of democracy) around the year 2010. This adds to our previous findings and hints that there might indeed be mass changes in attitudes that appeared or began to appear in 2010, or at least special circumstances that induced measurement errors in survey answers collected that year.

Results of our multilevel model of support for liberal democracy are displayed in Table 5. Looking at our fixed effects first, we find that being less than 25 years old decreases by 0.37 points, while being between 25 and 34 years old decreases by 0.20 points, one's likelihood to think that religious leaders should not interpret the law in a democracy in comparison to respondents between 35 and 44 years old (the reference category). Younger respondents are also less likely to think that civil rights are a central component of democracy, but the gap is smaller: it represents 0.18 points less for the 16-24 years old, and 0.11 points less for the 25-34 years old in comparison to our reference category. The age categories exert no statistically significant influence on views about whether women having equal rights to men is an essential characteristic of democracy.

Our socio-demographic variables do not reveal any surprising pattern. Being a woman has a very small, almost indistinguishable from 0 (0.07), negative effect on thinking that religious authorities should not interpret the law. Quite logically, it is associated with one's propensity to think that women should have the same rights as men, but that increase is still limited to 0.12 point on a ten-points scale. In contrast, among our individual-level predictors, the level of education attained by respondents is what matters the most in determining their support for liberal conceptions of conception. The positive effect of holding a college degree varies from slightly less than a half-point (0.43) for thinking that rights of both sexes should be equal in a democracy, to more than three-quarters of a point (0.77) for believing that having civil rights to protect people's liberties from oppression is an essential characteristic of democracy. Ideology also plays a role, with left-leaning individuals showing higher levels of support for our three dimensions of a liberal democracy than individuals who identify more as centrists. The strongest

Table 5: Cross-classified multilevel model of support for liberal democracy

	This is an essential characteristic of democracy		
	Secular legal interpretation	Civil rights	Women rights
Fixed effects			
Constant	8.08 (0.14)*	6.86 (0.14)*	8.09 (0.11)*
Age categories (ref = 35-44 years old)			
Less than 25 years old	−0.37 (0.06)*	−0.18 (0.07)*	−0.08 (0.06)
25-34 years old	−0.20 (0.05)*	−0.11 (0.05)*	−0.06 (0.04)
45-54 years old	−0.02 (0.05)	0.09 (0.05)*	0.07 (0.04)
55-64 years old	0.03 (0.05)	−0.04 (0.05)	−0.03 (0.05)
65 years old and more	−0.09 (0.07)	−0.06 (0.06)	−0.05 (0.05)
Female	−0.07 (0.03)*	−0.02 (0.03)	0.12 (0.02)*
Educational level attained (ref = No college)			
Some college education	0.37 (0.04)*	0.45 (0.05)*	0.32 (0.04)*
College degree	0.60 (0.03)*	0.77 (0.04)*	0.43 (0.03)*
Interest in politics	0.18 (0.02)*	0.28 (0.02)*	0.16 (0.01)*
Unemployed	0.02 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	−0.03 (0.05)
Ideology (ref = center)			
Left	0.29 (0.04)*	0.40 (0.04)*	0.24 (0.03)*
Right	−0.12 (0.04)*	−0.17 (0.04)*	−0.03 (0.03)
Life satisfaction	0.02 (0.01)*	0.03 (0.01)*	0.07 (0.01)*
Religious affiliation	−0.50 (0.03)*	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.09 (0.03)*
Random effects: variance (std. dev.)			
Between-country variance	0.18 (0.42)	0.27 (0.52)	0.13 (0.36)
Generations (ref. = Post-WWII)			
Pre-WWII	0.02 (0.16)	0.15 (0.38)	0.03 (0.18)
1960s-70s	0.02 (0.14)	0.03 (0.18)	0.01 (0.12)
1980s	0.06 (0.25)	0.05 (0.22)	0.01 (0.10)
1990s	0.09 (0.31)	0.02 (0.15)	0.04 (0.19)
2000s	0.13 (0.36)	0.02 (0.13)	0.08 (0.29)
Survey periods (ref. = 2001-2008)			
2009 - 2013	0.25 (0.36)	0.23 (0.48)	0.05 (0.22)
AIC	101039.92	103809.41	97120.01
BIC	101395.11	104164.78	97476.25
Log Likelihood	−50475.96	−51860.70	−48516.00
Num. obs.	23678	23783	24256
Num. groups: country	14	14	14

*$p < 0.05$

impact of self-positioning to the left of the political spectrum appears for support for civil rights as an essential feature of a democracy, where it brings an increase of 0.40 points. Life satisfaction also has a positive, although extremely small, influence across all measures of support for liberal democracy. Finally, while it behaves in the same direction for support for civil rights and women rights as essential characteristics of democracy, belonging to a religion has a stronger negative influence on the propensity of individuals to say that religious authorities interpreting the law can be an important characteristic of democracy, decreasing it by a half-point. This is quite intuitive as both independent and dependent variables tap into one's attitudes toward religion, but it can be noted that it is the largest substantive effect appearing for religious affiliation throughout our models: it usually exerts very little to no influence on our other dependent variables.

As for the random effects, we find that for both "secular legal interpretation" and "civil rights," the most variance appears between survey periods within countries. However, we do have to nuance this because of the very large standard deviations associated with these variances and also the fact that we only have two survey periods here, 2001-2008 and 2009-2013, in contrast with our previous models in which we had four survey periods. The variance between-countries is also quite large, more than that associated between generations for the three items as well as more than the variance located between survey periods for the item "women rights". Looking more closely at the coefficients associated for the random slopes for generation and survey period within each country, we find no evidence of a generational increase that could allow us to confirm our last hypothesis. Indeed, considering that our variables follow a ten-points scale, the positive effect of belonging to the latest generations always remains very small within a country.

In contrast, although once again we find no evidence of a uniform direction of these effects across countries, the period declines are larger for some countries: the coefficients are -0.79 for the United States and -0.75 point in Germany. This is interesting because it indicates that at first sight, while in some countries such as the United States and Germany, the period decline in support for democracy as shown in Figure 6 might be paralleled by a period decline in respondents' tendency to rate highly liberal conceptions

of democracy, this does not happen in another country in which a decline in overt support for democracy had been identified, the United Kingdom.

In sum, we find no evidence of a generational increase in support for liberal dimensions of democracy that could allow us to confirm our last hypothesis. The next section discusses the implications of our findings, examines shortcomings of this research and proposes promising new avenues of research to deepen our understanding of citizens' attitudes toward their democratic systems in consolidated democracies.

5. Discussion and conclusion

Foa and Mounk's (2016, 2017b) claims that a general and generational decline in support for democracy is happening in most Western democracies have reignited concerns about the attitudes of citizens toward their democratic regimes. Various responses to Foa and Mounk were praiseworthy by their comparative or methodological criticisms and the argument they brought forth (Voeten 2016; Norris 2017; Alexander and Welzel 2017). However, scholars discussed generational and period changes in support for democracy without really considering a rich literature that has alerted researchers to the challenges of distinguishing the effects of age, period, and cohort in changes in attitudes.

The argument suggesting that citizens of consolidated democracies, and especially younger generations of these countries, are increasingly "disconnected" from their political systems and are revisiting their evaluations of the worth of democracy has tremendous implications for our understanding of the stability of longstanding democracies. This goes against optimistic expectations that citizens would be increasingly socialized into democratic norms and would grow to believe that democracy is the only legitimate form of governance, as well as other hypotheses that proposed that democracy would simply be preferred over other types of political systems.

Considering the vital importance of this question for our study of politics, this thesis proposed a new response in the debate sparked by Foa and Mounk's articles that goes beyond both the methodological and theoretical scope of previous attempts. More specifically, it has applied methods devised to distinguish between age, period, and cohort effects to three central questions: is a generational or period decline truly happening in consolidated democracies? Is this decline so visible across countries that we can truly speak of a challenge to consolidated democracies at large? And does this also extend to specific conceptions of democracy?

Our findings suggest that although some countries seem to be experiencing a general decline in support for democracy, the trend is far from being as alarming as what Foa and Mounk suggest. First, using a multilevel model of support for democracy with country as the higher unit of analysis and random effects for generation and period, we find no

evidence of a generational or period decline visible in a cross-national setting. However, when specifying this model for each country, we find evidence of a period decline in some countries, including in the United States and the United Kingdom. Austria, Iceland, Ireland, and Greece also exhibit significantly lower average rates of support for the period 2009-2013 than for earlier surveys, but our findings are less conclusive here because we only rely on two waves of survey to try to identify period effects: the collection of more data in future waves of the WVS and the EVS will allow us to see if this trend represents a momentary fluctuation or the beginning of major changes.

In a second step, we move beyond the concept of overt support for democracy to look at three of its dimensions: opposition to non-democratic rule, support for participatory democracy, and support for liberal democracy. More specifically, the literature suggested that instead of a decline, we could expect a generational increase in these two last conceptions of democracy. Hence, our second key finding is that we find that the generation that was born after 1982 decreases the average rating of opposition to non-democratic rules in comparison to other generations within their countries. This goes against our expectations that even if younger generations could be less likely be enthusiastic about democracy due to their lack of lived experience of an alternative system, their true attachment for the democratic context in which they grew would show when looking at their ratings of non-democratic regimes. It also brings to questioning Howe's (2017, 24) recent conclusions that the trend of decline in support for democracy does not mean that people are embracing authoritarian regimes. In fact, our results do suggest that younger generations might really be more open to army rule than their predecessors. However, the finding does not extent to opposition to a strong leader who does not bother with parliament or elections.

Third, contrary to our fifth and sixth hypotheses, we do not find any evidence of a generational increase in support for participatory democracy or support for liberal democracy. When we control for the effects of age, period, and cohort, we find no generational effects of prioritizing "freedom of speech" or "giving people more say in government decisions but we do find a life-cycle effect, with younger people associated

to a higher likelihood of choosing these items as priorities. In contrast, younger people are associated to a lower propensity to identify a secular interpretation of the law or the presence of civil rights as essential characteristics of democracy. Finally, we find that a period decline might be happening in some countries with respect to support for liberal democracy: this is especially visible in the case of the United States and the United Kingdom.

Shortcomings of this research must be acknowledged. We rely on only one measure of overt support for democracy because our longitudinal approach dictates that we discard other questions that could have been relevant. In particular, a question asking how essential do respondents feel it is to live in a democracy would have been a useful tool and probably would have induced greater variation among our first dependent variable. If this question continues to be included in next waves of the World Values Survey and the European Values Study, it could be the central variable of interest for future research looking at similar topics. Our other measures are also imperfect. However, one key aspect of this study is that most of the variables that we look at - and that can be criticized in a variety of ways - are also those invoked by Foa and Mounk to justify their arguments. While limiting our capacity to go beyond their research, this adds to the credibility of our response to their thesis. We also experience missing data problems in the sense that not all countries were surveyed at equal points in time. This allows us to draw conclusions that bear more credibility for some cases than others, and limits our ability to speak from a comparative scope.

This thesis has also highlighted promising new areas of research. We have shown that cross-country variation matters in support for democracy, and identified cases in which the decline is striking. Among these cases, the United States and the United Kingdom have both experienced a drop in support for democracy in latest years, but only the former sees a period decline in support for liberal conception of democracy. Such a distinction must be investigated further. The changes occurring around 2010 are also puzzling in many respects. While it could potentially be linked to the consequences of the global recession, Figure 6 showed that in many countries, the period decline preceded by a year

or two the crisis in these countries.

Ideally, pinpointing the link that connect citizens of different generations to their democratic systems should be the aim of researchers seeking to explain support for democracy. For instance, recent findings have showed that socialization matters in support for democracy by showing how immigrant populations from non-democratic countries tend to lag behind in support for democracy in comparison to the local population (Bilodeau, McAllister, and Kanji 2010). While this topic is controversial in nature, the origin of respondents could be taken in consideration in future studies to see if that affects intergenerational differences in support for democracy, especially looking at the larger share of immigrant population among most recent generations in consolidated democracies. Similarly, our models could also be extended by adding predictors at the country-level. Hence, factors that were left behind such as the quality of the rule of law or the longevity of democracies could be added to individual-level variables to see if it improves our ability to explain support for democracy.

In sum, this thesis has proposed an answer to Foa and Mounk and a theoretical and methodological framework to deepen our understanding of support for democracy in consolidated democracies. Hopefully, upcoming waves of surveys will allow us to distinguish with increased precision between life-cycle, generational, and period effects in changes in attitudes. Until then, scholars should be wary of pointing to alarming trends in support for democracy and make diagnostics of generational change.

Notes

1. Support for democracy falls into what Easton calls "diffuse support" because democracy is the latent idea structuring other elements – political institutions, political actors, a current government, etc. – for which citizens can come to develop "specific support".

2. Voeten (2016) considers as positive assessments of democracy the choice of either "Very good" or "Fairly good" as responses to the question "I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For [Having a democratic system], would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?". He then examines the percent of respondents who chose these categories for each country.

3. We used the same trimmed axes for the purpose of replication

4. Wagner et al. (Wagner, Schneider, and Halla 2009) also find that inequality has a positive effect on satisfaction with democracy across Europe in the 1990s. However, this finding is not reported in the main text as they have themselves expressed doubts about the measure of inequality they employ in their analysis, namely standard deviation of income categories in the Eurobarometer.

5. Cross-national differences also seem to matter here: generational change is not so linear in some cases, such as in the Netherlands where socio-economic characteristics of the formative years of a generation are shown to influence that generation's support for ethnic discrimination (Coenders and Scheepers 1998).

6. Tilley broadly differentiates between Western (secularized) and Eastern (religious) Europe, and English-speaking (secularized) and Hispanic (religious) countries as clusters along which the levels of religious beliefs of the youth vary. However, within the Hispanic cluster, he also notes that we must distinguish Portugal and Spain as some of the most liberal countries of the overall sample.

7. We use the pairs of terms life-cycle/age effects and generational/cohort effects as referring to the same phenomena.

8. Other questions commonly used to test "support for democracy" include one asking whether respondents strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the statement that "democracy may have problems but it's better than any form of government", as well as one asking how essential it is – on a scale of 10 points – for them to live in a democracy. The latter question is used for one of the graphs by Foa and Mounk which we replicated in this thesis. These questions would be useful as robustness checks but they have not been used consistently in multiple waves of either survey, thus rendering the testing of age, period, and cohort effects obsolete.

9. We do not use a fourth item that is included in that question, namely "Having experts, not governments, make decisions". We choose to exclude this question because it is less clearly anti-democratic that the other two, but could have included it as a robustness check to see the extent to which generations make the difference between a democracy and non-democratic regimes. I thank Alexandre Fortier-Chouinard from Université Laval for this remark.

10. Gelman and Hill (2007, 245) prefer to avoid the terms "fixed" and "random" effects altogether and instead refer to coefficients as "modeled" and "unmodeled" to represent the fact that fixed-effects are estimated average coefficients and do not vary by group, while random effects are estimated group-level errors and vary by group. While this choice is praisable for a methodological textbook, we do use the terms random and fixed effects to side with the vocabulary most often employed in the political science literature.

11. The statistical software that they recommend and which we use for this analysis is the package "lme4" in R.

12. As Andrew Gelman indicates, using Bugs is better to fit this type of model (see `<http://andrewgelman.com/2010/03/03/fitting_a_mulit.>`).This goes beyond the statistical scope of this analysis, and so we follow his recommendation to model the variable as continuous and verify our results using different binary splits.

13. We tested for multicollinearity following the advice of Zuur et al. (2009) for mixed effects models to calculate variance inflation factors (VIF) and reject predictors that display VIF superior to the threshold of 3. When we include age as a fixed effect and cohort and period as random effects, all of our models pass that threshold for each of the variables. Since the AED package they used to run the necessary functions in R has been discontinued, we can find the R code to re-create the 'corvif' function here: <http://highstat.com/Books/Book2/HighstatLibV10.R>

14. For all graphs of descriptive statistics, the independent variables are mapped as continuous variables instead of as the categories we use in the multilevel analysis. The reason for that is that it allows us to verify if the categories established before this step of the analysis also fit the trends displayed by the data.

15. The intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) is usually reported in multilevel modelling using a random intercepts. However, once we add random slopes, the ICC differs at each unit of the predictors and is thus no longer uniquely defined. For this reason, we do not report here but instead look at the variance explained by each generational and period unit as well as the direction of the slopes.

16. The exact order used is 1) Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament or elections; 2) Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for this country (a question which we do not use); 3) Having the army rule; and 4) Having a democratic political system.

17. These coefficients are null for Portugal and Switzerland. The only outlier is Spain, in which the "2000s" generation increases the slope by 0.10 point in comparison to the average opposition to army rule within that country.

18. We follow the rule of conveniance set by Gelman and Hill (2007, 82) that we can "take logistic regression coefficients (other than the constant term) and divide them by 4 to get an upper bound of the predictive difference corresponding to a unit difference in x. This upper bound is a reasonable approximation near the midpoint of the logistic curve, where probabilities are close to 0.5."

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A. Structure of the data

Table 6: Data available by country, year, and survey wave

	1995-WVS	1996-WVS	1997-WVS	1998-WVS	1999-EVS	1999-WVS	2000-EVS	2000-WVS	2004-WVS	2005-WVS	2006-WVS	2007-WVS	2008-EVS	2009-EVS	2010-WVS	2011-WVS	2012-WVS	2013-WVS
Australia	2048	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1421	0	0	0	0	0	0	1477	0
Austria	0	0	0	0	1522	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1510	0	0	0	0	0
Belgium	0	0	0	0	1912	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1509	0	0	0	0
Canada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1931	0	0	2164	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Denmark	0	0	0	0	1023	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1507	0	0	0	0	0
Finland	0	987	0	0	0	0	1038	0	0	1014	0	0	0	1134	0	0	0	0
France	0	0	0	0	1615	0	0	0	0	0	1001	0	1501	0	0	0	0	0
Germany	0	0	2026	0	2036	0	0	0	0	0	2064	0	2075	0	0	0	0	2046
Greece	0	0	0	0	1142	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1500	0	0	0	0	0
Iceland	0	0	0	0	968	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	808	0	0	0	0
Ireland	0	0	0	0	1012	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1013	0	0	0	0	0
Italy	0	0	0	0	2000	0	0	0	0	1012	0	0	0	1519	0	0	0	0
Japan	1054	0	0	0	0	0	0	1362	0	1096	0	0	0	0	2443	0	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	1211	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1610	0	0	0	0	0
Netherlands	0	0	0	0	1003	0	0	0	0	0	1050	0	1554	0	0	0	1902	0
New Zealand	0	0	0	1201	0	0	0	0	954	0	0	0	0	0	0	841	0	0
Norway	0	1127	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1025	1090	0	0	0	0	0
Portugal	0	0	0	0	1000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1553	0	0	0	0	0
Spain	1211	0	0	0	1200	0	0	1209	0	0	0	1200	1500	0	0	1189	0	0
Sweden	0	1009	0	0	1015	0	0	0	0	0	1003	0	0	1187	0	1206	0	0
Switzerland	0	1212	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1241	1272	0	0	0	0	0
United Kingdom	0	0	0	1093	1000	0	0	0	0	1041	0	0	0	1561	0	0	0	0
United States	1542	0	0	0	0	1200	0	0	0	0	1249	0	0	0	0	2232	0	0

B. Variables used in the analysis

B.1. Wording of the variables

Table 7: Concepts and measures used in the analysis

Concept	Measurement	Code
Support for democracy	"I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?" • "Having a democratic system"	The scale is: 1. Very bad 2. Fairly bad 3. Fairly good 4. Very good
Opposition to non-democratic alternatives	"I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country?" • "Having the army rule" • "Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament or elections"	The scale is reverse-scaled so that: 1. Very good 2. Fairly good 3. Fairly bad 4. Very bad
Support for participatory democracy	If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important? And which would be the next most important? • "Maintaining order in the nation" • "Giving people more say in important government decisions" • "Fighting rising prices" • "Protecting freedom of speech"	The items "Giving people more say in important government decisions" and "Protecting freedom of speech" are used as two separate dummy variables coded as follows: 0. Did not choose Giving people more say in important government decisions/Protecting freedom of speech as first or second priority 1. Chose Giving people more say in important government decisions/Protecting freedom of speech as first or second priority
Support for liberal democracy	"Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. Please tell me for each of the following things how essential you think it is as a characteristic of democracy. Use this scale where 1 means "not at all an essential characteristic of democracy" and 10 means it definitely is "an essential characteristic of democracy" • "Religious authorities interpret the laws" • "Civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression" • "Women have the same rights as men"	The scale is left untouched (1-10, 10 = "an essential characteristic of democracy") for the items asking about civil rights and women rights, but is reversed for religious interpretation of the law (10 = "not an essential characteristic of democracy"; 1 = "an essential"

Age category	"Can you tell me your year of birth, please?"	The age variable is first computed by subtracting the birth year from the year of survey. It is then categorized as : • Less than 25 years old (16-24) • 25-34 years old • 35-44 years old • 45-54 years old • 55-64 years old • More than 65 years old
Generation	"Can you tell me your year of birth, please?"	The year of birth is categorized into generations as follows: • Pre-WWII = 1909 - 1925 • Post-WWII = 1926 - 1945 • 1960s-1970s = 1946 - 1957 • 1980s = 1958 - 1968 • 1990s = 1969 - 1981 • 2000s = 1982 - 1996
Period	*The year of survey is coded by observation.*	The year of survey is categorized into periods as follows: • 1995 - 1998 • 1999 - 2000 • 2001 - 2008 • 2009 - 201
Gender	*The sex of the respondent is coded by observation.*	The variable is recoded 1: Female, 0: Male. Other answers were not available at the time of the survey.
Education	What is the highest educational level that you have attained?	We recode it as a categorical variable where: 1. No college education (No formal education ... to Complete secondary: university - preparatory type) 2. Some college education (Some university-level education, without degree) 3. College degree (University-level education, with degree)
Interest in politics	How interested would you say you are in politics? [on a scale of 1 = very interested to 4 = not at all interested]	We reverse-scale the answers to obtain: 1. Not at all interested 2. Not very interested 3. Somewhat interested 4. Very interested

Unemployed	Are you employed now or not?	The question is recoded as a dummy variable so that: 0. All other categories (Yes, has paid employment or No, no paid employment but either retired / pensioned housewife / student / other) 1. 1 = Unemployed (No, no paid employment *and* unemployed)
Ideology	In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? [on a scale of 1 to 10 where 1 is the left and 10 is the right]	This variable is recoded so that 1. Left (self-positions of 1, 2, and 3) 2. Center (self-positions of 4, 5, 6, and 7) 3. Right (self-positions of 8, 9, and 10)
Life satisfaction	"All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?"	The scale is from 1 ("Completely dissatisfied") to 10 ("Completely satisfied").
Religious affiliation	"Do you belong to a religion or religious denomination?"	This variable is recoded 1 = Yes, 0 = No to indicate a religious affiliation, regardless of the religion of the respondent.

B.2. Descriptive statistics of the variables

Table 9: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis

	N	Mean	Standard dev.	Min	Max
Rating of political systems					
Having a democratic system	90663	3.45	0.69	1	4
Having the army rule as a political system	92670	1.33	0.61	1	4
Having a strong leader who doesn't have to bother with parliament or elections	90312	1.84	0.93	1	4
First or second priority					
Giving people more say in government decisions	92069	0.53	0.50	0	1
Protecting freedom of speech	92069	0.46	0.50	0	1
Essential characteristics of democracy					
Religious authorities interpreting the law	27894	2.52	2.18	1	10
Women have the same rights as men	28863	8.94	1.93	1	10
Civil rights protect people's liberty against oppression	27915	8.04	2.29	1	10
Birth year	97709	1956.69	17.74	1900	1996
Age	97709	47.30	17.54	14	108
Survey year	98183	2003.90	5.37	1995	2013
Female	98105	0.53	0.50	0	1
Level of education attained	95129	1.42	0.73	1	3
Interest in politics	95391	2.47	0.94	1	4
Ideological self-positioning	82501	1.48	0.74	1	3
Religious affiliation	95590	0.71	0.45	0	1
Life satisfaction	97519	7.44	1.93	1	10

B.3. Distribution of the dependent variables

Figure 10: Distribution of the dependent variables for support for democracy and opposition to non-democratic alternatives



Figure 11: Distribution of the dependent variables for support for participatory democracy

(a) Original question



(b) Dummy variables used in the analysis for support for participatory democracy



Figure 12: Distribution of the dependent variables for support for liberal democracy



C. Random effects taken from country-by-country multilevel regressions

Figure 13: Random effects taken from country-by-country multilevel models



Figure 13 (continued): Random effects taken from country-by-country multilevel models



Note: flat lines indicate that there was not enough variation for R to compute group-level errors for these countries. In contrast to Stata, R does evaluate group-level of exactly zero in cases where these errors would be infinitesimal.

D. Tests of robustness

All the tables below show reports from multilevel logistic regressions used as robustness checks in this analysis. We find no significant difference from our main findings by looking at these tests. The coefficients are not interpreted in the same way because they are log odds, but their behaviour is the same.

Table 10 shows logistic regressions for two binary variables recoded from the question "Having a democratic system." The column to the left uses a variable that counts a 1 only those that said that a democratic system is a very good system, while the column to the right uses a variable that counts as 1 those that said that it is a "very good" and "fairly good" system.

Table 10: Multilevel logistic regressions of support for democracy

	Coding of support for democracy as binary variables	
	1 = A very good	1 = A fairly good or very good
Fixed effects		
Constant	−0.96 (0.12)*	1.05 (0.15)*
Age categories (ref = 35-44 years old)		
Less than 25 years old	−0.17 (0.04)*	−0.21 (0.07)*
25-34 years old	−0.13 (0.03)*	−0.12 (0.05)*
45-54 years old	0.06 (0.03)*	0.17 (0.05)*
55-64 years old	0.04 (0.04)	0.21 (0.07)*
65 years old and more	0.06 (0.04)	0.29 (0.07)*
Female	−0.10 (0.02)*	−0.09 (0.03)*
Educational level attained (ref = No college)		
Some college education	0.45 (0.03)*	0.70 (0.05)*
College degree	0.61 (0.02)*	1.22 (0.06)*
Interest in politics	0.36 (0.01)*	0.46 (0.02)*
Unemployed	−0.16 (0.04)*	−0.29 (0.06)*
Ideology (ref = center)		
Left	0.23 (0.02)*	0.14 (0.04)*
Right	−0.08 (0.02)*	−0.24 (0.04)*
Life satisfaction	0.05 (0.00)*	0.06 (0.01)*
Religious affiliation	0.09 (0.02)*	0.11 (0.03)*
Random effects: variance (std. dev.)		
Between-country variance	0.44 (0.66)	0.60 (0.77)
Generations (ref. = Post-WWII)		
Pre-WWII	0.03 (0.17)	0.12 (0.35)
1960s-70s	0.01 (0.10)	0.02 (0.12)
1980s	0.03 (0.18)	0.06 (0.24)
1990s	0.09 (0.30)	0.13 (0.35)
2000s	0.16 (0.40)	0.16 (0.40)
Survey period (ref. = 1995-1998)		
1999-2000	0.08 (0.29)	0.13 (0.36)
2001-2008	0.07 (0.27)	0.21 (0.46)
2009-2013	0.28 (0.52)	0.20 (0.45)
AIC	94008.40	34165.33
BIC	94561.52	34718.44
Log Likelihood	−46944.20	−17022.67
Num. obs.	74498	74498
Num. groups: country	23	23

*$p < 0.05$

Table 11 shows logistic regressions for two binary variables recoded from the question "Having the army rule." The column to the left uses a variable that counts a 1 only those that said that a democratic system is a very bad system, while the column to the right uses a variable that counts as 1 those that said that it is a "very bad" and "fairly bad" system.

Table 11: Multilevel logistic regressions of opposition to army rule

	A very bad	A fairly bad or very bad
Fixed effects		
Constant	−0.21 (0.21)	1.63 (0.27)*
Age categories (ref = 35-44 years old)		
Less than 25 years old	−0.18 (0.05)*	−0.26 (0.08)*
25-34 years old	−0.09 (0.03)*	−0.13 (0.06)*
45-54 years old	0.02 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.07)
55-64 years old	0.06 (0.04)	0.00 (0.09)
65 years old and more	−0.10 (0.05)	−0.21 (0.10)*
Female	−0.21 (0.02)*	−0.10 (0.03)*
Educational level attained (ref = No college)		
Some college education	0.51 (0.03)*	0.80 (0.06)*
College degree	0.75 (0.03)*	1.00 (0.06)*
Interest in politics	0.24 (0.01)*	0.21 (0.02)*
Unemployed	−0.12 (0.04)*	−0.32 (0.06)*
Ideology (ref = center)		
Left	0.45 (0.03)*	0.28 (0.05)*
Right	−0.28 (0.03)*	−0.46 (0.04)*
Life satisfaction	0.03 (0.00)*	0.06 (0.01)*
Religious affiliation	−0.17 (0.02)*	−0.08 (0.04)
Random effects: variance (std.dev.)		
Between-country variance	0.90 (0.95)	0.79 (0.89)
Generations (ref. = Post-WWII)		
Pre-WWII	0.04 (0.21)	0.11 (0.33)
1960s-70s	0.02 (0.16)	0.12 (0.34)
1980s	0.06 (0.23)	0.17 (0.41)
1990s	0.25 (0.50)	0.21 (0.46)
2000s	0.49 (0.70)	0.33 (0.58)
Survey period (ref. = 1995-1998)		
1999-2000	0.33 (0.57)	0.66 (0.81)
2001-2008	0.19 (0.44)	0.09 (0.30)
2009-2013	0.24 (0.49)	0.50 (0.71)
AIC	76753.93	29414.36
BIC	77307.35	29967.78
Log Likelihood	−38316.96	−14647.18
Num. obs.	74879	74879
Num. groups: country	23	23

*$p < 0.05$

Table 12 shows logistic regressions for two binary variables recoded from the question "Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament or elections." The column to the left uses a variable that counts a 1 only those that said that a democratic system is a very bad system, while the column to the right uses a variable that counts as 1 those that said that it is a "very bad" and "fairly bad" system.

Table 12: Multilevel logistic regressions of support for a strong leader who does not bother with parliament or elections

	A very bad	A fairly bad or very bad
Fixed effects		
Constant	−1.13 (0.18)*	0.39 (0.16)*
Age categories (ref = 35-44 years old)		
Less than 25 years old	−0.04 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
25-34 years old	−0.07 (0.03)*	−0.04 (0.03)
45-54 years old	0.03 (0.03)	−0.01 (0.03)
55-64 years old	0.00 (0.04)	−0.07 (0.04)
65 years old and more	−0.10 (0.05)*	−0.29 (0.05)*
Female	0.04 (0.02)*	0.11 (0.02)*
Educational level attained (ref = No college)		
Some college education	0.43 (0.02)*	0.50 (0.03)*
College degree	0.61 (0.02)*	0.81 (0.03)*
Interest in politics	0.29 (0.01)*	0.26 (0.01)*
Unemployed	−0.14 (0.04)*	−0.20 (0.04)*
Ideology (ref = center)		
Left	0.40 (0.02)*	0.31 (0.03)*
Right	−0.22 (0.02)*	−0.34 (0.03)*
Life satisfaction	0.03 (0.00)*	0.02 (0.00)*
Religious affiliation	−0.12 (0.02)*	−0.10 (0.02)*
Random effects: variance (std.dev.)		
Between-country variance	0.14 (0.38)	0.79 (0.89)
Generations (ref. = Post-WWII)		
Pre-WWII	0.02 (0.14)	0.02 (0.15)
1960s-70s	0.01 (0.12)	0.03 (0.16)
1980s	0.03 (0.18)	0.04 (0.20)
1990s	0.08 (0.29)	0.09 (0.29)
2000s	0.16 (0.40)	0.18 (0.43)
Survey period (ref. = 1995-1998)		
1999-2000	0.20 (0.45)	0.35 (0.59)
2001-2008	0.24 (0.49)	0.13 (0.36)
2009-2013	0.38 (0.61)	0.42 (0.65)
AIC	93847.63	75150.24
BIC	94399.94	75702.56
Log Likelihood	−46863.81	−37515.12
Num. obs.	73516	73516
Num. groups: country	23	23

*$p < 0.05$

Table 13 shows logistic regressions for two binary variables recoded from the question "Do you think that religious leaders [not] interpreting the law is an essential characteristic of democracy." The column to the left uses a variable that counts a 1 for those that gave ratings ranging from 6 to 10, where 10 means "an essential characteristic" and 1 "not an essential characteristic". The column to the left compiles as a 1 those who gave ratings only equal or superior to 8/10.

Table 13: Multilevel logistic regressions of support for secularism as an essential characteristic of democracy

	1 = 6-10	1 = 8-10
Fixed effects		
Constant	2.10 (0.21)*	0.64 (0.18)*
Age categories (ref = 35-44 years old)		
Less than 25 years old	−0.41 (0.10)*	−0.40 (0.09)*
25-34 years old	−0.15 (0.08)	−0.29 (0.06)*
45-54 years old	−0.04 (0.08)	−0.05 (0.06)
55-64 years old	0.13 (0.09)	0.05 (0.07)
65 years old and more	0.03 (0.11)	−0.14 (0.09)
Female	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.11 (0.03)*
Educational level attained (ref = No college)		
Some college education	0.35 (0.08)*	0.43 (0.05)*
College degree	0.54 (0.07)*	0.79 (0.05)*
Interest in politics	0.13 (0.03)*	0.22 (0.02)*
Unemployed	−0.08 (0.09)	0.06 (0.07)
Ideology (ref = center)		
Left	0.16 (0.06)*	0.46 (0.05)*
Right	−0.38 (0.06)*	−0.00 (0.05)
Life satisfaction	0.01 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)*
Religious affiliation	−0.50 (0.05)*	−0.56 (0.04)*
Random effects: variance (std. dev.)		
Between-country variance	1.28 (1.13)	0.14 (0.37)
Generations (ref. = Post-WWII)		
Pre-WWII	0.32 (0.56)	0.08 (0.28)
1960s-70s	0.04 (0.20)	0.04 (0.21)
1980s	0.08 (0.28)	0.09 (0.29)
1990s	0.08 (0.28)	0.12 (0.35)
2000s	0.10 (0.31)	0.21 (0.46)
Survey period (ref. = 2001-2008)		
2009-2013	1.03 (1.02)	0.33 (0.57)
AIC	14698.82	24154.66
BIC	15045.93	24501.77
Log Likelihood	−7306.41	−12034.33
Num. obs.	23678	23678
Num. groups: country	14	14

*$p < 0.05$

Table 14 shows logistic regressions for two binary variables recoded from the question "Do you think that women having the same rights as men is an essential characteristic of democracy." The column to the left uses a variable that counts a 1 for those that gave ratings ranging from 6 to 10, where 10 means "an essential characteristic" and 1 "not an essential characteristic". The column to the left compiles as a 1 those who gave ratings only equal or superior to 8/10.

Table 14: Multilevel logistic regressions of support for women rights as an essential characteristic of democracy

	1 = 6-10	1 = 8-10
Fixed effects		
Constant	0.91 (0.32)*	0.35 (0.24)
Age categories (ref = 35-44 years old)		
Less than 25 years old	−0.37 (0.15)*	−0.08 (0.10)
25-34 years old	−0.20 (0.10)*	−0.14 (0.07)*
45-54 years old	0.10 (0.10)	0.10 (0.08)
55-64 years old	−0.11 (0.12)	0.02 (0.09)
65 years old and more	−0.12 (0.14)	−0.02 (0.09)
Female	0.10 (0.05)*	0.12 (0.04)*
Educational level attained (ref = No college)		
Some college education	0.52 (0.09)*	0.49 (0.07)*
College degree	0.76 (0.07)*	0.72 (0.06)*
Interest in politics	0.23 (0.03)*	0.23 (0.02)*
Unemployed	−0.06 (0.10)	−0.07 (0.08)
Ideology (ref = center)		
Left	0.37 (0.08)*	0.52 (0.06)*
Right	−0.03 (0.07)	0.04 (0.05)
Life satisfaction	0.10 (0.01)*	0.09 (0.01)*
Religious affiliation	−0.04 (0.05)	−0.14 (0.04)*
Random effects: variance (std. dev.)		
Between-country variance	1.37 (1.17)	1.60 (1.26)
Generations (ref = Post-WWII)		
Pre-WWII	0.60 (0.77)	0.37 (0.61)
1960s-70s	0.05 (0.23)	0.03 (0.16)
1980s	0.09 (0.29)	0.02 (0.16)
1990s	0.19 (0.43)	0.13 (0.36)
2000s	0.21 (0.46)	0.20 (0.44)
Survey period (ref. = 2001-2008)		
2009-2013	0.87 (0.93)	0.87 (0.93)
AIC	12384.22	18443.01
BIC	12732.36	18791.16
Log Likelihood	−6149.11	−9178.51
Num. obs.	24256	24256
Num. groups: country	14	14

*$p < 0.05$

Table 15: Multilevel logistic regressions of support for civil rights as an essential characteristic of democracy

	1 = 6-10	1 = 8-10
Fixed effects		
Constant	0.59 (0.23)*	−0.62 (0.21)*
Age categories (ref = 35-44 years old)		
Less than 25 years old	−0.10 (0.09)	−0.20 (0.08)*
25-34 years old	−0.08 (0.07)	−0.19 (0.06)*
45-54 years old	0.05 (0.07)	0.09 (0.06)
55-64 years old	−0.07 (0.08)	0.03 (0.06)
65 years old and more	−0.11 (0.09)	0.03 (0.06)
Female	−0.03 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.03)
Educational level attained (ref = No college)		
Some college education	0.45 (0.06)*	0.47 (0.05)*
College degree	0.92 (0.06)*	0.82 (0.04)*
Interest in politics	0.25 (0.02)*	0.30 (0.02)*
Unemployed	−0.07 (0.08)	0.12 (0.07)
Ideology (ref = center)		
Left	0.37 (0.06)*	0.46 (0.04)*
Right	−0.13 (0.05)*	−0.07 (0.04)
Life satisfaction	0.03 (0.01)*	0.04 (0.01)*
Religious affiliation	0.07 (0.04)	0.02 (0.03)
Random effects: variance (std. dev.)		
Between-country variance	1.82	0.31
Generations (ref. = Post-WWII		
Pre-WWII	0.31	0.05
1960s-70s	0.03	0.05
1980s	0.04	0.05
1990s	0.04	0.02
2000s	0.04	0.02
Survey period (ref. = 2001-2008		
2009-2013	1.62	0.23
AIC	18963.73	27124.55
BIC	19311.03	27471.85
Log Likelihood	−9438.86	−13519.28
Num. obs.	23783	23783
Num. groups: country	14	14

*$p < 0.05$

Table 15 shows logistic regressions for two binary variables recoded from the question "Do you think that civil rights protecting people's liberties from oppression is an essential characteristic of democracy." The column to the left uses a variable that counts a 1 for those that gave ratings ranging from 6 to 10, where 10 means "an essential characteristic" and 1 "not an essential characteristic". The column to the left compiles as a 1 those who gave ratings only equal or superior to 8/10.