Independence Under Aid: Pakistan and the Colombo Plan, 1947-58

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Abstract

The 1951 Colombo Plan exemplifies how development aid was instrumentalized by Western donors to bring Asian countries into alliances to expand the reach of Western capitalism into the decolonizing world. While existing literature examines how Western leaders sought to win the support of former colonies as a form of communist containment, the ways in which West Pakistani leaders themselves invited this presence are much less explored. Government correspondence demonstrates how the Plan was designed to largely benefit the West and Pakistan's political class, rather than deliver aid to address gross levels of inequality inherited from colonial rule. The political class, previously intermediaries during British colonial rule, accrued the benefits of a Western-led capitalist aid regime. These actions during the early years of the country's independence hardened social stratification and ensured economic dependence on the West. The Colombo Plan represents a critical juncture when patterns of inequality and stratification were solidified.

Résumé

Le plan de Colombo de 1951 illustre la manière dont l'aide au développement a été instrumentalisée par les donateurs occidentaux pour amener les pays asiatiques à conclure des alliances afin d'étendre la portée du capitalisme occidental dans le monde en voie de décolonisation. Si la littérature existante examine la manière dont les dirigeants occidentaux ont cherché à gagner le soutien des anciennes colonies pour endiguer le communisme, la manière dont les dirigeants pakistanais de l'Ouest ont eux-mêmes sollicité cette présence est beaucoup moins étudiée. La correspondance gouvernementale montre que le plan a été conçu pour bénéficier largement à l'Occident et à la classe politique pakistanaise, plutôt que pour fournir une aide destinée à remédier aux inégalités flagrantes héritées de la domination coloniale. La classe politique, auparavant intermédiaire sous le régime colonial britannique, a bénéficié des avantages d'un régime d'aide capitaliste dirigé par l'Occident. Ces actions menées au cours des premières années de l'indépendance du pays ont renforcé la stratification sociale et assuré la dépendance économique à l'égard de l'Occident. Le plan de Colombo représente un moment critique où les modèles d'inégalité et de stratification ont été renforcés.

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This work would not have been possible without the guidance of my supervisor, Professor Lorenz Lüthi. Reading his book, *Cold Wars,* during my undergraduate degree profoundly shaped my understanding of the history of international relations and broadened my perspectives on the role of decolonization in the Cold War. In addition to supervising my work and providing me with constant feedback, I spent part of my time at McGill pursuing an independent study course with him. This gave me the opportunity to explore countless research topics and deepened my understanding of historiography. From encouraging me to pursue an Urdu language class to supporting me in graduating early, I am very grateful for his supervision.

I am incredibly lucky to have had a strong support system in my personal life while working on this project. My parents and younger brother, who have been my biggest cheerleaders since the day I learned how to write, and my roommate, Aya, who helped me through the most challenging parts of my degree.

Finally, my biggest inspiration comes from student activists both on Turtle Island and abroad. While I completed my degree many universities worldwide engaged in violent repression tactics against students who exercised their freedom of speech to protest institutional complicity in colonialism. These students demonstrated the importance of continuing to speak up against systemic violence and showed the world what it means to be on the right side of history. As a historian studying the impacts of colonialism on marginalized peoples, the steadfastness of activists has always been my reminder to continue to tell the stories I am passionate about.

List of Abbreviations

All-India Muslim League (AIML)
Basic Democracies System (BDS)
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
Defence Construction (1951) Limited (DCL)
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE)
Middle Eastern Defence Organization (MEDO)
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP)
Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case (RCC)
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)
The People's Republic of China (PRC)
United Nations (UN)
United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (NSC 68)
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
United States of America (US)
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
Village Agriculture and Industrial Development (Village AID)

Introduction

The process of decolonization in much of the so-called "Third World" cannot be understood without considering the larger international system, profoundly shaped by the Cold War, in which newly independent states entered. My site of exploration is Pakistan's independence in 1947, and the subsequent nation-building during the tumultuous years in West Pakistan leading up to 1958, the beginning of the state's first period of martial law. Pakistan as an independent state existed between two profoundly different worlds, one of Muslim unity, and the other of Commonwealth alliance. This dichotomy challenged the establishment of a stable foreign policy. While ideological conflicts raged both in and outside of Asia, the country struggled to establish a national identity due to domestic strife, in large part because of the colonial legacy left by the British Empire.

Analyzing Western foreign policy and communist containment strategy at this time shows a shift in diplomacy, namely in the normalization of "aid".[1] Countries were linked together with this tool, reestablishing a form of dependency between former colonies and Western powers through finances, trade and technical expertise. Aid became a means of neocolonialism, utilized to control populations and influence foreign policy as it led to a concentration of resources amongst leaders who failed to evenly distribute it throughout the country. Though this idea is articulated in some scholarly works, less documented is the close connection between the elites of West Pakistan and Western aid. The vacuum of power left by the British Empire in Pakistan was filled by those who had acted as intermediaries between colonizers and Indigenous peoples, leading to a small group of landowning elites controlling the country through intergenerational wealth. Through a close analysis of the Colombo Plan, a 1951

[1] Stephen Macekura, "The Point Four Program and U.S. International Development Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 128, no. 1 (2013), 127.

Commonwealth development initiative, this thesis documents the ways in which multilateral funding and development aid were captured and weaponized by the Pakistani political class to work in conjunction with Western leaders to establish monopoly capitalism in Asia. While the political class in both countries gained immensely from this process, the Pakistani public lost the most, and existed in a system nearly identical to that of the British Empire, this time governed by local leaders.

This work is divided into three chapters. The first is an examination of the post-war international order, to set the stage on which Cold War ideological conflicts played out. In this, I contextualize the Colombo Plan and the impacts of utilizing aid as diplomacy. Post-colonialism became an important factor in American foreign policy, as it left much of the de-colonizing world "vulnerable" to communism.[2] The Soviet Union however until the death of Joseph Stalin took little interest in decolonizing countries.[3] This greatly contrasted with American policy, in which newly independent states became the perimeter of the socialist world and thus integral to defence and containment policy. To prevent these countries from turning to communist ideology Western states joined together to provide aid advertised as intending to improve living conditions and link recipient countries to the capitalist world. The Korean War was an important watershed for the urgency of these plans, stressing that despite local discontent with Western ideologies, leaders in Asia would have to be won over in order for containment to be successful.[4] This chapter describes the global ideological war unfolding in the mid-twentieth century, which became greatly relevant to tensions in Pakistan, a recipient country under the Colombo Plan.

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[2] Thomas G. Patterson, "Foreign Aid under Wraps: The Point Four Program," *The Wisconsin Magazine of History* 56, no. 2 (1972): 122.
[3] Paul M McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 30.
[4] Paterson, "Foreign Aid under Wraps: The Point Four Program," 119-120.

Chapter Two examines the campaigning for an independent Pakistani state and the years post-independence, specifically how local political and ethnolinguistic tensions shaped governance. The country struggled to establish itself, battling tensions between the possibility of alliance with the Muslim world and the need to be a recipient of aid from the West for the country to survive. Pakistan was left with few administrative and defence resources, increasing the urgency with which political leaders had to join alliances. Domestically, class and ethnicity-based tensions divided the country. Many hierarchies came from British colonial actors who utilized land ownership titles and systems to create an intermediary class. The All-India Muslim League's (AIML) campaign for Pakistan relied on these land-owning elites which created a Western sympathetic government, uneager to lead decolonization in the country.[5] The result was a state led by a government without popular support, relying on aid from Western countries. While the Pakistani political class networked with Western elites and utilized aid to advance foreign policy, the state grew further from its original goals of Muslim unity. Though the Colombo Plan was ambitious, the average Pakistani reaped little benefit from the aid intended to secure the country and improve living conditions.

Finally, Chapters One and Two are brought together in Chapter Three for an analysis of how the two parties, Pakistani and Western leaders, liaised and benefited from the political and economic subjugation of the Pakistani population. This chapter illustrates how the Colombo Plan was intended, in large part, to politically benefit Western states. Development initiatives by design empowered Western states to exercise control over recipient countries while building trade and labour networks.[6] By providing labour and resources Western economies became

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[5] I. A. Talbot, "The Growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab, 1937–1946," *The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 20, no. 1 (March 1982): 15.

[6] Memorandum by Assistant Secretary to Cabinet, "Colombo Plan Operations," 25 February 1957, Documents on Canadian External Relations [*DCER], Volume22:1956-57, Part I,* Greg Donaghy, ed, (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2001), 1217.

linked with Asia in inseparable manners.[7] Further, Pakistani leaders enjoyed these benefits and began a long-standing pattern of utilizing development aid to maintain power.[8]

This project relies on a number of valuable primary sources, including Commonwealth correspondences, Canadian and American foreign relations archives, reports from Colombo Plan committees, political memoirs, and Pakistani newspapers. Western primary sources articulate the growing urgency with which foreign policy was shaped to maintain dominance over Asia, preventing the rise of communism. Meanwhile, sources from Pakistan describe a growing discontent and civil unrest on the ground as working class needs and political views were disregarded. West Pakistani elites, although aware of this perspective, continued to depend on the West and militarize the country despite the tensions it created amongst regional leaders, the Arab League in particular. These primary sources were used in conjunction with work from a variety of scholarly disciplines including, economics, agriculture, and political science. This work is used to provide a detailed analysis of Colombo Plan reports and the many flaws of the plan, in leadership, infrastructure development and finances. Throughout this breadth of material, the central idea to be addressed is the problematization of the term "post-colonial."

As I write I bring into question the idea of a state achieving "post-colonialism" while embracing liberal capitalism. Though Pakistan may have won independence in 1947 I argue the state was not decolonized, and through the weaponization of Western aid, the local political class maintained a role similar to that which they had under British colonialism, intermediaries that linked South Asia to the West.

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[7] Jeffrey David Noakes, "Under the Radar: Defence Construction (1951) Limited and Military Infrastructure in Canada, 1950-1965" (PhD diss., Carleton University, 2005). 531.
[8] R.L. Mellema, "The Basic Democracies System in Pakistan," *Asian Survey* 1, no. 6 (1961): 11.

Language plays an important role in this thesis. The term “Third World” has been a controversial term in academia. Emerging in the 1950s it was used alongside the “First World” (capitalist countries or the West) and the “Second World” (the socialist camp). Despite the historical connotation I have opted to use terms such as “decolonizing world” to describe countries that are often included in the so called “Third World”. This was intentionally done to avoid the use of terminology that describes former colonies in relation to Cold War hierarchies. Additionally, this project frequently references the term “aid”, which can be varyingly defined. In the context of this thesis aid refers to technology, training, loans and economic resources that were given by Western countries to the decolonizing world, often with the publicized intent of aiding in democratization.

Chapter One

In 1947, independent Pakistan entered an international system on the verge of being dominated by ideological tensions between Soviet communism and liberal capitalism. Asia was no exception to the political currents. In the years that followed, some newly independent states aligned themselves with the West's capitalist ideology, while others attempted to build economic and political systems independent from it. The People's Republic of China (PRC) became a member of the communist world in 1949, which was perceived as a threat resulting in Western intervention on the continent. Thus, South Asian leaders balanced the tensions between winning independence from the British and joining a global community that necessitated an alliance with the former colonial power that had ruled over them for so many years. As the British Empire diminished, the American Empire and its zero-sum ideologies profoundly impacted Western foreign policy. When faced with ideological confrontation in a country the United States (US) often became involved in domestic policy, which became increasingly relevant in Asia.[9]

Resistance to the communist influence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its allies defined American foreign policy in the 1950s. This manifested in two key priorities: a flourishing international community that could oppose Soviet hegemony, and communist containment in enemy states.[10] Containment strategies included blocking the expansion of Soviet power and communism across borders, a dynamic which was increasingly relevant in Asia.[11] The drive to expand capitalist democracy and inhibit communism shaped American foreign security, aid and development policy. Pakistan was an important target within this context; both for

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[9] Douglas J Macdonald, *Adventures in Chaos: American Intervention for Reform in the Third World,* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 51.

[10] "National Security Council Report, NSC 68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,'" April 14, 1950, Wilson Center Digital Archive, US National Archives, pp. 21.

[11] "National Security Council Report, NSC 68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,'" April 14, 1950, US National Archives, pp. 21.

containment and for the expansion of Western influence. In order to account for the heightened urgency brought by the Cold War, the identification of the country as a strategic ally warranted a revamping of diplomatic tactics.

"A bold new program"

In his 1949 inaugural address, American President Harry S. Turman announced his intentions for a "bold new program" to deal with political instability and economic issues in "underdeveloped" regions.[12] This initiative became known as the Point Four Program. It aimed to foster free trade and democratization in developing countries through strategic allegiances with the United States.[13] Point Four drew on ideology with a positive correlation between economic modernization and political development.[14] This was predicated on modernization theory and centred American technical expertise as a leading force for global development policy.[15] Western Europe alone would not be enough to sustain ideological and political domination over the Soviet Union. To policymakers, it was increasingly clear that developing countries could not be taken for granted. The interests of the United States became linked to the post-colonial world's political development and national security.[16] The result: foreign aid became both a tool and a weapon of the Cold War.[17] Similar to the 1948 Marshall Plan, Point Four countered political instability with economic development and communist containment, while also securing trade and raw materials from former colonies to the US to counter supply shortages.[18] Point Four, and similar plans, functioned under the understanding that recipient

[12] Macekura, "The Point Four Program and U.S. International Development Policy," 127.
[13] Macekura, "The Point Four Program and U.S. International Development Policy," 129.
[14] Macekura, "The Point Four Program and U.S. International Development Policy," 131.
[15] Macekura, "The Point Four Program and U.S. International Development Policy," 131.
[16] Macekura, "The Point Four Program and U.S. International Development Policy," 140.
[17] Paterson, "Foreign Aid under Wraps," 119.
[18] Paterson, "Foreign Aid under Wraps," 119.

countries would carry out the work relevant to development while Western leaders offered "know-how".[19]

George Kennan, Director of Policy Planning for the American State Department (1947-49), had introduced the world to the idea of containment even earlier.[20] His writing stressed that the drive for power amongst most countries could only be controlled by counterforce.[21] Additionally, he emphasized that not all parts of the world were of equal importance to American containment policy, thus introducing the idea of strong point defence.[22] Rather than placing equal value on every perimeter of the socialist world, strong point defence concentrated resources on regions assessed as important in preventing Soviet takeover.[23] Certain areas were calculated as tolerable losses, while in essential zones Americans could establish influence and choose the terrain on which they would clash with the USSR.[24] This method of containment did not strive to control states, *per se*, but rather prevent others from controlling them. The focus, then was on establishing a degree of self-sufficiency to defend against a Soviet attack.[25]

In April 1950, the U.S. Department of State internally released a top-secret report entitled "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security", also known as "NSC 68". Paul Nitze, Kennan's successor, oversaw the report. Though the two shared some common ground, NSC 68 came together in the context of the PRC's adoption of communism and the Soviet Union's atomic bomb test.[26] Nitze, with this increased pressure, stressed that strong point

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[19] Paterson, "Foreign Aid under Wraps," 120.
[20] John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (Oxford University Press, 2005), 24.
[21] Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 26.
[22] Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 28.
[23] Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 56. George F. Kennan, Memoirs*, 1925-1950,* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), 486-88.
[24] Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 56.
[25] Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 63.
[26] Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 88. "National Security Council Report, NSC 68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,'" April 14, 1950, US National Archives, pp. 19.

defence was no longer satisfactory and a return to a perimeter focus was necessary.[27] He articulated in NSC 68 that balances of power could be held not only through the hard power of military aggression but also through intangible forms of soft power and intimidation or loss of credibility in local leadership.[28] American media used such tactics to portray leaders as violent or naive when refusing to side with the US in international conflicts like the Korean War.[29] The document noted that world order depended on the *perception* of power as much as the actual balance of power.[30] The American government attempted to demonstrate to the de-colonizing world that Western leaders were the only powers that could effectively meet the needs of post-colonial states. NSC 68 stated that "military victory alone would only partially and perhaps only temporarily affect the fundamental conflict," meaning that force and weapons could only be effective to a certain degree.[31] Influence, persuasion and a linking of economic interests to the West were also necessary for success.[32] This report became one of the foundational policy documents of the Cold War, providing a "blueprint for Cold War defence." [33]

The Cold War necessitated alternative, and far more creative, methods of domination and containment than previous conflicts.[34] Post-colonial states were no longer bound to European metropoles which gave them a new level of agency in choosing how they aligned themselves. As a result, countries like the US had to articulate not only their national security

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[27] Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 89.
[28] John Lewis Gaddis, and Paul Nitze, "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered," *International Security* 4, no. 4 (1980): 165. "National Security Council Report, NSC 68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,'" April 14, 1950, US National Archives, pp. 39.
[29] "In the Nation: An Example of Diplomacy at Its Best" *New York Times,* July 4, 1950.
[30] Gaddis and Nitze, "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered," 166.
[31] "National Security Council Report, NSC 68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,'" April 14, 1950, US National Archives, pp. 11.
[32] "National Security Council Report, NSC 68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,'" April 14, 1950, US National Archives, pp. 11.
[33] Ken Young, "Revisiting NSC 68," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Volume 15, Number 1, (Winter 2013): 3.
[34] "National Security Council Report, NSC 68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,'" April 14, 1950, US National Archives, pp. 11.

policies but also how these decisions could positively impact decolonizing countries. For Asia, the communist containment strategy was often marketed as a means to uplift living standards, a growing challenge in many states.

Post-colonialism and Aid

Post-colonial nation-building in the decolonizing world was a complimentary tool for American security policy. It impacted the perceived stability of a state, and its ability to negotiate international relations and gravitate toward incompatible ideologies like communism. The process of "modernization" created a transition period often triggered by addressing the impacts of years of systemic injustice.[35] The ideology of the political left and the Communist Party often best articulated the pathways to addressing these systemic issues.[36] Americans, as a result, had to factor in regime change to achieve their policy objectives, deciding which governments were worth supporting. To American leaders, the decolonizing world was not an afterthought but a responsibility they were taking from Europeans.[37] Both the American left and right supported intervention, with their biggest point of contention being the degree to which communist containment was necessitated.[38]

American President Dwight D. Eisenhower declared the United States would essentially back governments that were neither communist nor considered "radical", noting that supporting a regime change might create a risky transition process that could lead to loss of control.[39] In post-colonial countries, these decisions were made based on government positionality, rather

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[35] Macdonald, *Adventures in Chaos,* 33.
[36] Macdonald, *Adventures in Chaos,* 34.
[37] Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 25.
[38] Westad, *The Global Cold War,* 27.
[39] Macdonald, *Adventures in Chaos,* 35.

than popular support, which, in the case of Pakistan, resulted in internal disagreement.[40] Those in power were often Western-educated and relied on multilateral support, which was at odds with the large percentage of the population that favoured moving away from the West.[41] This came from a desire to maintain total independence from the West and establish closer ties with countries in the Islamic world, many of which harboured anti-Western sentiment.[42]

To the West, Soviet ideology was understood as appealing to those in "vulnerable positions" such as poverty, which was an issue in many post-colonial states.[43] For some newly independent countries, communism was an ideology that provided a framework of analysis for suffering. Capitalism, on the contrary, reinforced the structures that had led to their subjugation and exploitation under colonial rule, particularly regarding raw material and resource extraction. Western leaders, however, saw communist sympathy as a consequence of hardship and, broadly put, claimed: "hungry people might turn to 'false doctrines' unless they received help."[44] It was understood that the USSR had found an audience in Asia and Asian people would see it as an example of how to grow into a great power.[45] This dynamic reinforced the new form of diplomacy that had moved to the forefront of American foreign policy: development assistance.

Improving the living conditions in South and Southeast Asia became a relevant containment strategy to combat communism. It manifested in both discreet and overt tactics depending on the country and the potential for communist influence.[46] Foreign aid was

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[40] "Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan has asked for the impossible says daily telegraph". *The Dawn*. January 3, 1951, 5.
[41] Talbot, I. A. "The Growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab, 1937–1946." The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 20, no. 1 (March 1982): 15.
[42] "Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan has asked for the impossible says daily telegraph". *The Dawn*. January 3, 1951, 5.
[43] "National Security Council Report, NSC 68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,'" April 14, 1950, US National Archives, pp. 15.
[44] Paterson, "Foreign Aid under Wraps," 122.
[45] "National Security Council Report, NSC 68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,'" April 14, 1950, US National Archives, pp. 15.
[46] Daniel Oakman, "The Politics of Foreign Aid: Counter-Subversion and the Colombo Plan, 1950-1970," *Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change* 13, no. 3 (2001): 263.

knowingly used as a form of intervention regardless of the degree of influence. Through an outside power controlling the development resources flowing into an impoverished nation, internal politics were influenced.[47] Additionally, economic aid in many contexts had a better per-dollar benefit than military force, thus economic and technological resources became the tactic of choice to maintain the balance of power overseas.[48] Washington encouraged American investment in developing economies to link post-colonial countries to the capitalist world.[49] Both direct and indirect aid made up gaps in funding, to necessitate the importance of the American economy to the rest of the world.[50] The development that came from foreign aid initiatives also served the objective of creating a system of "free nations" around the world. These would, in turn, overwhelm the USSR to the point of exposing the "falsity of its assumptions" as a viable political system, after which workable agreements could be created.[51]

Economic Goals

There is a degree of scholarly debate surrounding the prioritization of security over economic relations, and which was the most important. American foreign policy, at its core, is based on capitalism and the protection of capitalist interests.[52] Parts of Asia and the Middle East produced raw materials that were important for western Europe.[53] In this way, security concerns can be seen as interwoven, underlying economic motivations. National security policy often

[47] Macdonald, *Adventures in Chaos,* 50.
[48] Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 60.
[49] Westad, *The Global Cold War,* 30.
[50] Westad, *The Global Cold War,* 30.
[51] "National Security Council Report, NSC 68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,'" April 14, 1950, US National Archives, pp. 10.
[52] Macdonald, *Adventures in Chaos,* 23.
[53] Macdonald, *Adventures in Chaos,* 23.

reinforced the idea of "leaving the door open" to trade and other economic opportunities that worked in conjunction with political aspirations of communist containment.[54]

Washington's security plans were coupled with a drive for economic relations that could integrate post-colonial countries into the capitalist economy. Establishing a solid trade network with the decolonizing world would not only help the West but also frustrate the aspirations of the Kremlin, cutting them off from raw materials.[55] In South Asia, India and Pakistan's fraught relations, in part, manifested in a trade war.[56] This was usefully leveraged as a means to provide aid to the two countries, through the creation of mills for resources like jute and cotton that they usually would have gotten from the other but, post-partition had to produce internally.[57]

Furthermore, the West had incentives to ensure that former colonies produced raw materials for export. Countries like Pakistan, replicating colonial relationships, sent raw materials to the West (such as jute and cotton) which were manufactured into finished items and sold back to Asia in the form of textiles and other finished goods.[58] Western leaders encouraged higher consumption from the exporting countries in order to build and maintain their captive markets.[59] The relationship of importing, manufacturing and exporting sustained jobs in the West, while shaping a global economy which kept Asian countries on the periphery rather than

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[54] Macdonald, *Adventures in Chaos,* 23.
[55] "National Security Council Report, NSC 68, 'United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,'" April 14, 1950, US National Archives, pp. 49.
[56] "Feuding is Hurting India and Pakistan", *New York Times,* January 3, 1951.
[57] "Feuding is Hurting India and Pakistan", *New York Times,* January 3, 1951.
[58] "Final Report of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee on South and South-East Asia about Co-operative Economic Development," CAB 134/226, EPC(50)105, October, 1950, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1945-1951, VII (HMSO 1992, 168.
[59] "Final Report of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee on South and South-East Asia about Co-operative Economic Development," CAB 134/226, EPC(50)105, October, 1950, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1945-1951, VII (HMSO 1992, 167.

aiding in their industrialization.[60] As Washington joined development initiatives like the Colombo Plan, a large emphasis was placed on continuing to build agricultural industries that directly benefit Western manufacturers and protected trade interests.

The Origins of the Colombo Plan

The Colombo Plan began as a Commonwealth initiative, put forward by Percy Spender, the Australian Minister for External Affairs (1949-51). The plan originated from talks of economic hardship during the January 1950 Colombo Conference and a growing desire from Australians for security in the Pacific, between Southeast Asia.[61] Spender saw economic aid and political stability as two sides of the same coin and proposed improving the global economy through the development of raw material production in South and Southeast Asia.[62] Following this was improving living conditions with the hope that poverty reduction would curb the spread of communism.[63] Asian political structures were depicted in propaganda as naturally authoritarian, putting them at risk of corruption, with populations which were seen as generally accepting of this fate.[64]

Spender called on other Commonwealth countries to follow his lead in designing relevant aid strategies while also encouraging the US to join and support.[65] Eventually what was known as the "Spender Plan" became the Colombo Plan, and launched in July of 1951.[66] It was a

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[60] "Final Report of the Commonwealth Consultative Committee on South and South-East Asia about Co-operative Economic Development," CAB 134/226, EPC(50)105, October, 1950, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1945-1951, VII (HMSO 1992, 168.

[61] David Lowe, "Percy Spender and the Colombo Plan 1950," *Australian Journal of Politics & History* 40, no. 2 (August 1994): 163.

[62] Percy Spender, *Exercises in Diplomacy; the ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan* (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1969), 196. 14 Nations to open Asia Parley today: Financing of Colombo Plan to Help South and Southeast Regions is Key issue", *New York Times,* February 13, 1951.

[63] "14 Nations to open Asia Parley today: Financing of Colombo Plan to Help South and Southeast Regions is Key issue", *New York Times,* February 13, 1951.

[64] Oakman, "The Politics of Foreign Aid," 263.

[65] Lowe, "Percy Spender and the Colombo Plan 1950", 164.

[66] Charles S Blackton, "The Colombo Plan," *Far Eastern Survey* 20, no. 3 (1951): 28.

commitment to a variety of six-year Asian development plans devised in London and backed by Commonwealth nations.[67] Though the initiative was dubbed a "plan", its execution was not unified under one particular project and gave donor and recipient countries the agency to negotiate with each other fairly independently.[68] Aid recipients included India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo and Sarawak, with East Asian states identified as observers.[69] Countries that were "recipients" were also encouraged to eventually become donors as the plan promoted "national self-confidence." [70] Though Commonwealth countries took on a leadership role in originating the initiative, the Plan was not feasible without American support.[71]

Large deficits in Britain and the sterling area fueled disparity that hindered economic development, raw material production and the ability to contribute to multilateral initiatives.[72] Without funding from the United States, this could not be remedied, and it was ever-pressing in South and Southeast Asia given the perceived vulnerability to communism.[73] Britain articulated to the United States that it did not have the funds to support Asia alone and it would be challenging for other Commonwealth countries to do it.[74] If the US did not answer the call to support Asian development and help manage sterling area debts with Britain, it seemed the

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[67] Blackton, "The Colombo Plan," 28.
[68] Spender, *Exercises in Diplomacy,* 196.
[69] Blackton, "The Colombo Plan," 28.
[70] Spender, *Exercises in Diplomacy,* 276
[71] Spender, *Exercises in Diplomacy,* 209.
[72] "'Sterling balances and South-East Asia': Joint Memorandum for Cabinet Economic Policy Committee by the Working Parties on the Sterling Area and on Development in South and South-East Asia. *Annexes:* A and B," CAB 134/225, EPC(50)40. March 1950, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1945-1951, VII (HMSO 1992) 143.
[73] "'Sterling balances and South-East Asia': Joint Memorandum for Cabinet Economic Policy Committee by the Working Parties on the Sterling Area and on Development in South and South-East Asia. *Annexes:* A and B," CAB 134/225, EPC(50)40. March 1950, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1945-1951, VII (HMSO 1992) 143.
[74] "'Sterling balances and South-East Asia': Joint Memorandum for Cabinet Economic Policy Committee by the Working Parties on the Sterling Area and on Development in South and South-East Asia. *Annexes:* A and B," CAB 134/225, EPC(50)40. March 1950, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1945-1951, VII (HMSO 1992) 143.

chances of the region turning to the USSR could greatly increase.[75] Commonwealth unity and organization were successfully used as a tactic to attract American investment, which eventually came in November of 1950.[76] This made the Colombo Plan one of the largest development plans at the time, even dwarfing the American Point Four Program.[77] The material investment was also used to offset debts that were owed to India and Pakistan by other Commonwealth countries, making many leaders willing to tailor the plan to American foreign policy if it meant securing funding.[78]

The outbreak of the Korean War shifted the context of the plan to become much more about communist containment.[79] The Colombo Plan became important in this regard as it revamped global alliances, though on a largely unsustainable scale. A 1951 *New York Times* report stated that the developing countries involved would "have to import approximately one billion, eighty-four million pounds of goods and services beyond what they [could] pay for with their own exports during the six-year period."[80] Asian states were not only tied to the West through the funding they were given but also the debt and economic instability that was incurred through these initiatives. The Colombo Plan established stronger Commonwealth ties to contain communism in Asia while also spreading soft power in the form of Western ideology and technical assistance, further countering Soviet imperialism.

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[75] "'Sterling balances and South-East Asia': Joint Memorandum for Cabinet Economic Policy Committee by the Working Parties on the Sterling Area and on Development in South and South-East Asia. *Annexes:* A and B," CAB 134/225, EPC(50)40. March 1950, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1945-1951, VII (HMSO 1992) 144.
[76] Lowe, "Percy Spender and the Colombo Plan 1950", 165.
[77] "$5 Billion Plan to Develop Asia Detailed by British Commonwealth", *New York Times,* November 29, 1951.
[78] Daniel Oakman, *Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan,* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2010), 48.
[79] Paterson, "Foreign Aid under Wraps," 119-120.
[80] "$5 Billion Plan to Develop Asia Detailed by British Commonwealth", *New York Times,* November 29, 1951.

The Cold War in Asia

The urgency for containment by Americans greatly increased in June of 1950 when North Korea invaded the 38th parallel. The People's Republic of China had become communist the year before, which meant that South Asia was rapidly becoming the periphery of the socialist world. For Western leaders, the Korean War was a deciding factor in the choice to build an alliance with Pakistan over India. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Prime Minister, advocated for having the PRC in the United Nations (UN) to foster dialogue, which was perceived as a reward for North Korean aggression by Americans.[81] Nehru also delayed sending word to the Security Council about voting on a resolution to condemn the attack, which grew into an unfriendly American media narrative, painting the leader as unconvinced of the need for peace in Asia.[82] To Americans, this seemingly confirmed that Nehru could not be a secure ally.[83] Once the Korean War had begun, it took a short amount of time for American leaders to realize Pakistan would be a better investment than India. Pakistan was more decisive about supporting the West and had valuable air and naval bases.[84] Thus, Americans deliberately brought the Cold War to South Asia to curb perceived communist threats.[85] In addition to the reach the country could have in Asia, Pakistan was an entry point to the Middle East, important for building relationships in the Muslim world.[86]

Americans embarked on many initiatives with Pakistan as an ally, to foster relations with the Arab world including joint military pacts like the 1955 Middle Eastern Defence Organization

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[81] Robert J McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan*, (Columbia University Press, 1994), 84.
[82] "In the Nation: An Example of Diplomacy at Its Best" *New York Times,* July 4, 1950.
[83] "The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State." July 5, 1950. United States. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950, VII (US Government Printing Office, 2013), 304.
[84] McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery* ,132.
[85] McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery,* 132.
[86] McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 133.

(MEDO).[87] The Middle East had many important raw materials that the United States wanted to keep out of the hands of the USSR.[88] Pakistan was seen as an asset which could potentially help if the state became further integrated with Arab countries. These affiliations, however, often presented many challenges. Arab countries grew hostile to Pakistan, the closer the state became to the American Empire, seeing this partnership as a betrayal.[89] While the partnership strained relationships with the Muslim world, Pakistani leaders were also motivated by the need to distance and protect themselves from India.[90]

Pakistan fell into a carefully calculated category of states that had already built a positive rapport with the West which was expected to be solidified with economic aid.[91] Thailand, the Philippines and Burma were considered potential allies through aid if a political relationship could be fostered, and Indochina fell into a group that could only be allied through military intervention.[92] Pakistan prioritized building a strong military force that very few other allies could match, and power was consolidated by British-trained administrators and military leaders.[93] The regimes favoured a strong central government developed through austerity measures and alignment with the United States.[94] The American government's official position since World War II had been that post-war security could only be achieved through restructuring

[87] McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 149.
[88] Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 50.
[89] McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 135.
[90] McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery*, 149.
[91] Oakman, *Facing Asia,* 79.
[92] Oakman, *Facing Asia,* 79.
[93] "Memorandum on the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State- Join Chiefs of Staff Meeting," January 14, 1955, United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1955, VIII (US Government Printing Office, 2013), 412.
[94] "National Intelligence Estimate," March 15, 1955. United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1955, VIII (US Government Printing Office, 2013), 423.

the international system, which by default necessitated allies in newly independent former colonies.[95]

In some ways, the Colombo Plan in Asia was intended as a laboratory of containment to be exported to other parts of the world. In 1956 British officials discussed bringing it to West Africa should the region be liberated in order to maintain a presence.[96] It became clear to Western leaders as the ideological warfare of the twentieth century continued that battles were being carried out in the de-colonizing world and the more sympathetic, they could make leaders the better. Former colonies needed to establish themselves and required material support to do so. By offering this, the West created a new system that tied these countries to their interests through dependency and debt, mostly favouring colonial hierarchies. Asia was a focus for development because of the growing potential for a communist revolution. The United States saw this as a reason to use its power to support relevant countries with containment.[97] Varying American leaders had different opinions on supporting existing governments in the decolonizing world. Some did not have popular support but articulated they were in opposition to communism.[98] The conservative view was often that there was potential to destabilize a country if they helped advocate for political and social change.[99] Asia served as a testing ground for these varying strategies and their outcomes.

The early 1950s was an important period for aid and development all over the world. Important decolonizing countries won independence and began to drift away from the colonial

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[95] Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 55.
[96] "Colombo Plan for West Africa: Inward Savingram no 1582 from Sir J Robertson (Nigeria) to Mr. Lennox Boyd" September 20, 1956. CO 544/1428, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, 1951-1957, III (HMSO 1994), 249.
[97] Macdonald, *Adventures in Chaos,* 12.
[98] Macdonald, *Adventures in Chaos,* 12.
[99] Macdonald, *Adventures in Chaos,* 16.

powers that had dominated them for years. These changes to the global order necessitated a shift in diplomacy, as armed conflict became less effective as a means to subjugate populations and win support in the context of ideological warfare. American actors upon reevaluating diplomacy strategies within the context of Asia, chose to adopt policies of development and multilateral aid to influence populations to subscribe to their Western sympathetic leaders.

These policy instruments attempted to develop Asia out of poverty so that capitalism and Western political ideology could be favoured. This was done by helping relevant leaders stay in power even during times with lack of popular support. In addition to national security and the establishment of a new international system, Western leaders protected their economic interests to ensure that Asian countries could continue to produce the raw materials. This peripheral relationship mimicked that of the colonial era and prevented these countries from manufacturing and adopting other sources of revenue beyond trade with the West. Many aid plans such as the Colombo Plan, though ambitious, lacked the follow-through to ensure that countries could maintain the amount of spending needed. Asian participants as a result often found themselves dependent on the West for funding. Western leaders, by maintaining this dynamic, ensured they could protect their own interests, and eventually build support locally in South Asia to contain communism.

Chapter Two

The violence of the partition of the Indian subcontinent cannot be understated. Though it was one of the largest forced migrations in human history, it is nearly impossible to establish the exact number of those killed and displaced. Research from the Harvard Lakshmi Mittal South Asian Institute suggests that from 1947 to 1951 up to 18 million people were displaced across the Punjab border, and as many as 3 million were killed.[100] Gender-based violence was rampant, with some sources suggesting the number of women abducted could be as high as 200,000.[101] Many forms of demographic data such as police records were destroyed during the upheaval, making it difficult to assess not only deaths by direct violence but also those from starvation, disease and other similar causes.[102]

Pakistan's post-colonial nation-building in the early 1950s was greatly entangled with economic diplomacy and international relations, the consequences of which took the state from a trajectory of independence to one of neocolonialism. American representatives used the economic and political elites in the country to serve as intermediaries between Western politicians and the majority of the Pakistani population. The Muslim League, the dominant party in the country, helped lay the groundwork by campaigning through the elite class that had been created and maintained through British colonialism. The effects of this on the country were

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[100] Jennifer Leaning, ed. and Bhadada Shubhangi, ed., *The 1947 Partition of British India: Forced Migration and Its Reverberations*, (New Delhi: SAGE Publishing India, 2022), 2. Alvin Powell, "Harvard Scholars Take Fresh Look at the Partition of British India, which Killed Millions," *Harvard Gazette*, April 6, 2018, news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2018/04/harvard-scholars-take-fresh-look-at-the-partition-of-british-india-which-killed-millions/.These numbers are corroborated by a 2008 Princeton University study: Atif Mian, Prashant Bharadwaj, and Asim Khwaja, "The Partition of India: Demographic Consequence," (*International Migration*, 2008).

[101] Pippa Virdee, *From the Ashes of 1947: Reimagining Punjab*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 60.

[102] Virdee, *From the Ashes of 1947,* 60.

drastic and perpetuated mass inequality in land ownership resulting in poverty for many in the country.

By examining the nexus of post-colonial nation-building and international development initiatives through the lens of Cold War diplomacy, it becomes apparent that Western initiatives in Pakistan were conducted with the intent to build support for liberal capitalism and communist containment rather than to aid in the development of the country. Pakistani leaders encouraged this effort and used American support as a means of national defence, perpetuating a lack of prioritization of economic and structural decolonization in the country upon independence. This reinforced British-imposed hierarchies rather than creating a new, unified national identity, impacting not only how Pakistan interacted with the West but also with its neighbouring Asian states. Thus, it is essential to question the differentiation between the post-colonial and neocolonial through an analysis of the collaboration between the Pakistani political class and Western leaders. The fraught relationship bi-territorial Pakistan maintained with its neighbours, India and Afghanistan, only grew more tense as the countries found themselves on opposing ideological lines throughout the Cold War. The Pakistani government at this time often went against popular sentiment in the country, joining coalitions and development initiatives such as the Colombo Plan which asymmetrically developed the country, channelling wealth into the hands of agricultural elites rather than engaging in regional collaboration. The theatre of Cold War international relations in Pakistan resulted in a reinstating of a colonial-style exploitative regime, this time under local leadership.

Early Independence:

The Muslim League party and its leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, were the driving force behind the idea of Pakistan. Jinnah was a British-educated lawyer before he rose to prominence

in Indian politics. His primary objective was securing Muslim rights in the face of Hindu hegemony.[103] Punjab was the league's stronghold; it had a prominent Muslim majority, a strategic location in the subcontinent, and as a result, a concentration of agricultural wealth to anchor the country's economy. By networking with rural landowners and adapting policy to better suit their needs, the AIML gained the support of the necessary demographic groups to campaign and make Pakistan a reality.[104]

In the colony's 1937 elections, the league failed to win important strategic Muslim-majority provinces including Punjab and Bengal without which they could not have a strong claim to statehood.[105] This blow led to a revaluation of campaigning, in particular shifting policy to be much vaguer in regards to religion, with the hopes of meeting a diverse set of needs in both the minority and majority provinces.[106] The league, despite the Muslim majority. struggled to build a supporter base in Punjab, which was largely associated with their lack of connection to local kinship networks.[107] *Biradari*, roughly translating to "brotherhood", denotes a system of nearly unbreakable family ties with a large presence amongst Punjabi peasant proprietors.[108] These groups formed tight-knit clans to advocate for their rights due to the lack of political representation and were a voter group often tapped into by the British through patronage, to win over leaders and influence the rest of the group.[109] By networking with the rural elite and adapting policy to better suit their needs relating to land ownership rather than religion, Jinnah

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[103] "'Architect and Champion of Pakistan State': Mr. Jinnah's Ceaseless Service in Muslim Cause," *The Times of India,* September 13, 1948.
[104]Talbot, "The Growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab, 1937–1946," 15.
[105] Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 35.
[106] Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*, 50.
[107] Talbot, "The Growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab, 1937–1946," 6.
[108] Talbot, "The Growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab, 1937–1946," 9.
[109] Talbot, "The Growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab, 1937–1946," 9.

gained the necessary demographics to make Pakistan a reality and formed a relationship the League would continue to depend on in the coming years.[110] The country operated in a feudalistic manner, upholding systems that had been exploited and in part created by the British (*Zamindar* and *Ryotwari* settlements), which had been used to create an intermediary class of Western sympathetic Indian landlords, liaising between Indigenous people and Europeans.[111] The relationship between the league, landlords and their provincial assemblies was such that the political economy could not be transformed without addressing the agrarian question. This was exacerbated by the lack of democratic process within the country.

Despite many defence resources remaining in India after partition, Pakistan, especially the Punjab, was highly militarized. British administrators, as part of divide-and-rule tactics, relied on invented racial characteristics to categorize ethnic groups based on their perceived biological ability to be a so-called "martial race".[112] "Martiality" declined the further south and east one travelled in the subcontinent, exhibiting a British preference for groups in Punjab and Rajasthan (Sikhs, Pathans and Muslims), with fairer complexions and other traits that made them appear more Aryan.[113] Over half of the British Indian army was Punjabi by the end of the 19th century.[114] Punjabi *Zamindars* in particular were emphasized by the British as being masculine through their militarization, linking desirable traits such as honour and loyalty to martial capability and physical strength.[115] This created a culture of defence and security, especially against neighbouring India, which was integrated into Pakistani nationalism.

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[110] Talbot, "The Growth of the Muslim League in the Punjab, 1937–1946," 15.
[111] Ahmad, Mushtaq, "Land Reforms in Pakistan." Pakistan Horizon 12, no. 1 (1959): 30.
[112] Amar Farooqui, "Divide and Rule'? Race, Military Recruitment and Society in Late Nineteenth Century Colonial India," *Social Scientist* 43, no. 3/4 (2015): 53.
[113] Farooqui, "Divide and Rule'?", 53.
[114] Farooqui, "Divide and Rule'?", 54.
[115] Prem Chowdhry, "Militarized Masculinities: Shaped and Reshaped in Colonial South-East Punjab," *Modern Asian Studies* 47, no. 3 (2013): 718, 729-30.

Jinnah's untimely death in 1948, a mere year after the state's founding, was a catalyst for internal disarray. In addition to fresh regional tensions, Pakistan's existing land tenure systems continued to perpetuate colonial hierarchies. A small group of families with disproportionate control of productive land dominated the agrarian economy which became essential to economic development. Political leaders, who utilized religion as a means to justify their positions in the state, dominated the nationalist arena and went as far as to associate poverty with divinity rather than a result of exploitative economic systems from which they directly benefitted.[116] These problems of bureaucracy, feudalism, militancy and eventually monopoly capitalism laid the groundwork for Pakistan's complicated negotiations in regard to aid as a means to advance regional foreign policy in the 1950s.

Nation-building and Separatism

Nation-building in Pakistan occurred as a means to shape a distinct identity separate from India and the British Empire. Britain's hasty partition of the Indian sub-continent splintered Pakistani relationships both with the dwindling empire and India. Tensions rose in the disputed territory of Kashmir culminating in armed conflict, and the last Viceroy and Governor General of British India, Louis Mountbatten, had maintained a close friendship with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru which bred resentment in Pakistan.[117] It was a widespread belief that the country had been slighted in the territorial split he had overseen.[118] India also retained the bureaucracy and military resources left by the British in the subcontinent.[119]

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[116] Hassan Nawaz Gerdezi, and Jamil Rashid. *Pakistan: The Unstable State*, (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1983), 316.
[117] McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, 17. "Policy of the United States with Respect to Pakistan," April 3, 1950, United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950, V (US Government Printing Office 2013), pp. 1498.
[118] McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia*, 17.
[119] "Policy of the United States with Respect to Pakistan," April 3, 1950, United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950, V (US Government Printing Office 2013), pp. 1498.

India was not the only bordering country to have fraught relations with Pakistan. The Durand Line, the 2,640-kilometer Northwestern border with Afghanistan, divided ethnic groups between the two states, creating international and domestic turmoil. The border was drawn during British colonial rule as a means to separate its empire from the Soviet Union.[120] The ethnic identities of the nomadic groups in the area, primarily the Pashtuns, were not a consideration.[121] Many Pashtuns maintained limited interactions with either of the two nation-states and lived amongst other ethnic groups like the Baloch.[122] A referendum in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) upon the partition of the Indian subcontinent, showed a majority choosing Pakistan over India, however only half the population voted, bringing to question the legitimacy of the decision.[123]

Afghanistan, India and the USSR supported the independent Pashtun state incorporating the NWFP and Baluchistan (referred to as Pashtunistan).[124] Afghanistan's advocacy for the state led to it initially being the only country to oppose Pakistan joining the UN in 1947.[125] Afghanistan argued that, as a British creation, the Durand Line had little validity and that the Indus River was the natural historical frontier of Pakistan.[126] No formal water agreements existed between Afghanistan and Pakistan despite sharing nine rivers.[127] The 1921 Treaty of Kabul

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[120] Imrana Begum, "Durand Line: A Legacy of Colonial Rule (1893-1970), "*Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society* 63, no. 4 (October-December 2015): 36.
[121] Imrana Begum, "Durand Line: A Legacy of Colonial Rule (1893-1970)," *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society* 63, no. 4 (October-December 2015): 36
[122] Elisabeth Leake, "The Great Game Anew: US Cold-War Policy and Pakistan's North-West Frontier, 1947–65," *The International History Review* 35, no. 4 (2013): 784.
[123] Begum, "Durand Line," 46.
[124] Begum, "Durand Line," 48.
[125] Farooq Naseem Bajwa, "Pakistan and the Birth of the Regional Pacts in Asia" (PhD diss., London School of Economics and Political Science, 1990), 16.
[126] Qureshi, S. M. M, "Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute Between Afghanistan and Pakistan," *Pacific Affairs* 39, no. 1/2 (1966): 109.
[127] Amit Rajan, and Dromrima Chatterjee, "Cutting across the Durand: Water Dispute Between Pakistan and Afghanistan on River Kabul," *World Water Policy* 6, no. 2 (December 2020): 246.

between Afghanistan and British India allowed the British to use the river for navigation and maintenance of existing irrigation, but the Afghan government disputed Pakistan's position as a successor state, arguing the country should not enjoy the same rights as the British.[128] The Pashtun tribes of Afghanistan became pawns of the state and a tool to incite action in Pakistan when deemed necessary by political leaders.[129] While the calls for an independent state seemed, for the most part, to come from the Afghan government, the disputes over the border attracted some international attention, because of the two countries diverging diplomatic alliances, one with the US and the other with the USSR. However, Pakistan was eventually able to draw on aid from Canada under the Colombo Plan to establish infrastructure near the border, asserting dominance over Afghanistan through symbols of capitalist modernity in Asia.

Though Pakistan's strategic value increased after the outbreak of the Korean War, the US remained hesitant to take a stance on NWFP disputes.[130] The NWFP was a bridge for the USSR to the Middle East and South and Central Asia, one to which Afghanistan provided an important connection.[131] While the American alliance with Pakistan did strengthen their position in South Asia, it heightened other regional tensions.[132] Americans were not willing to take action against Afghanistan as it could be perceived as a provocation by the USSR.[133] Britain attempted to pursue a policy of equidistance from Pakistan and India, thus limiting its involvement in disputes in either state, a point of frustration for the wider public in Pakistan .[134]

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[128] Rajan and Chatterjee, "Cutting across the Durand," 247.
[129] Begum, "Durand Line," 44.
[130] Leake, "The Great Game Anew," 788.
[131] Leake, "The Great Game Anew," 783.
[132] Leake, "The Great Game Anew," 800.
[133] Leake, "The Great Game Anew," 784.
[134] Bajwa, "Pakistan and the Birth of the Regional Pacts in Asia," 16.

Conflicting Public Opinion

The Commonwealth's failure to address issues of time-sensitive importance to regional security built strong resentment amongst the Pakistani public. It was becoming increasingly clear that the government was catering international policy to a select few, rather than engaging in large-scale development as it claimed. The possibility of international discussion regarding Kashmir in January 1951 marked a clear breaking point in Pakistani public opinion away from an alliance with the West. The year began with rising tensions between Pakistan and the United Kingdom. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan (in office 1947-51), noting the opportunity of the upcoming Commonwealth Conference from January 2nd to12th, issued an ultimatum to Britain's Labour Prime Minister Clement Atlee: Pakistan would not attend if the topic of Kashmir was not on the agenda.[135] The Pakistani public met this sentiment with overwhelming support as the British-influenced group was perceived not as "neutral" in this conflict, but rather unjustly leaning towards India.[136] Those advocating for separation from the West felt the current leaders in the country had spent too long being "tied down to the chariot wheel of the Commonwealth."[137] Though the conference did eventually receive a Pakistani delegation, the *Lahore Press* and Awami League, a Bengali nationalist party, both went as far as to say the country should quit the Commonwealth altogether and "find new friends" who better represented its interests and Muslim identity.[138] Liaquat's support from the public as a result of his posture created a domestic perception amongst diverse groups that Pakistan was in fact on a path to sever ties with Western leaders and instead focus on building alliances with other newly independent states in the region or Muslim allies.

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[135] "C'Wealth Talks: Nation Supports PM's Stand". *The Dawn*. January 1, 1951, pg. 1.
[136] "Lahore Press backs up PM: Call to quit Commonwealth". *The Dawn*. January 3, 1951, pg. 6.
[137] "Lahore Press backs up PM: Call to quit Commonwealth". *The Dawn*. January 3, 1951, pg. 6.
[138] "Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan has asked for the impossible says daily telegraph". *The Dawn*. January 3, 1951, pg. 5.

However, despite public perception, Liaquat's decision may have been little more than a bluff. The country was not strong enough to survive without international aid, and the USSR was not seriously engaged in the development of decolonizing countries at this point.[139] Joseph Stalin's perception that newly post-colonial states would remain imperialist and loyal to the West shaped the basic outlines of Soviet foreign policy at the time.[140] Until Nikita Khrushchev came into power in 1953, there was little Soviet interest in the former British colonies, and the eventual interest came in the form of $100 million in aid for Afghanistan.[141] Liaquat's Commonwealth posturing was significant in showing how the public was positioned and that a commitment to Pakistan over India would bring Pakistan into the fold of the Cold War West.

Liaquat's near boycott of the 1951 Commonwealth Conference was an important strategic move that forced the United States to bolster aid to the country. Without Pakistan at the conference, the Commonwealth countries and, to an extent, the US, lost a vital link to the Middle East and Asian anti-communist fronts. As much as Pakistan needed aid, the West needed a strong ally for communist containment in Asia. The United States was forced to demonstrate to Pakistan why a capitalist vision for the international order should be considered essential to its statehood. This required strengthening the coalition it formed with Britain, filling gaps in its policy, and going as far as to end the provision of food grains to India amidst an ongoing famine.[142]

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[139] Robert McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan*. (Columbia University Press, 1994), 128.
[140] McGarr, *The Cold War in South Asia,* 30.
[141] Leake, "The Great Game Anew," 792.
[142] All-India Muslim League. "No American Foodgrains for Bharat". *The Dawn.* January 4, 1951, 1.

Communist Critique

While the country's leaders were becoming consistently Western leaning, the Communist Party of Pakistan, led by Sajjad Zaheer, presented alternative visions for state development that opposed the impending capitalist Western hegemony. American and British analysts noted that though they may have gained traction amongst discontented members of civil society, leadership in the country remained "British educated, secular and Western-oriented."[143] The general public was largely in opposition to the elite perspective, but even upon Liaquat's assassination in October of 1951, the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) noted little cause for concern over the country's next leader sharing a perspective that appealed to the West.[144] The Communist Party of Pakistan was not a legitimate threat to Western leaders, with only roughly three thousand members.[145] It was also clear that the country could not afford to sever its ties with the United States due to the economic assistance it relied on, and aid in defence against India.[146] A small group of British-educated administrators and military leaders generally assumed power in a strong central government that would be a challenge to remove.[147] Regardless of the strength of opposition that the Communist Party may have presented, its ideology remains important in encapsulating the diversity of opinion in Pakistan's early post-colonial years, especially in its recognition of addressing the legacies of British colonial policy. The ideology presented an

[143] McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery,* 129.
[144] McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery,* 141.
[145] "Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs (Hensel)" February 17 1955, United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950, VII (US Government Printing Office, 2013), pp. 424.
[146] "Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs (Hensel)" February 17 1955, United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950, VII (US Government Printing Office, 2013), pp. 424.
[147] "Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs (Hensel)" February 17 1955, United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950, VII (US Government Printing Office, 2013), pp. 423.

alternative future for the state and is illustrative of how communism countered Western-influenced post-colonial regimes established by Europeans to act as intermediaries.

Pakistani communists argued that the only way forward for the state was to break up large estates associated with *Jagirdars* and *Zamindars,* feudal landholders, and provide them with no compensation.[148] They cited this as the most secure way to ensure democracy and develop a political class distinct from landowners.[149] They articulated a need for better protection of human rights, in line with the United Nations, and further acknowledgment of the country's diversity through the recognition of Bengali, Punjabi, Sindhi, Pushto, and Baluchi as official languages in addition to Urdu, contrasting the hegemonic political position.[150] In addition, they argued the state needed to develop on its own, away from Western countries, beginning with leaving the Commonwealth and the British economic zone, the sterling bloc.[151] Liaquat's government, like Nehru's India, attempted early on to promote a public perception of the country as acting independently of Western ideological camps. He stated that it should "be clearly known abroad that Pakistan starts on its career without any special commitments and without prejudices in the international sphere".[152] He further explained that this position came from the fact that Pakistan was not dependent on any other states and could therefore act independently from ideological camps.[153]

Events on March 9th, 1951, however, shifted this outward public messaging. A group of military personnel and Faiz Ahmad Faiz, the renowned editor of the *Pakistan Times,* came

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[148] "Communist Party Details out Fundamentals of Pakistan Constitution" *The Pakistan Times*, February 2, 1951.
[149] "Communist Party Details out Fundamentals of Pakistan Constitution" *The Pakistan Times*, February 2, 1951.
[150] "Communist Party Details out Fundamentals of Pakistan Constitution" *The Pakistan Times*, February 2, 1951.
[151] "Communist Party Details out Fundamentals of Pakistan Constitution" *The Pakistan Times*, February 2, 1951.
[152] Rais A Khan, "Pakistan-United States Relations: An Appraisal," *American Studies International* 23, no. 1 (1985): 87.
[153] Khan, "Pakistan-United States Relations: An Appraisal," 87.

together to overthrow Liaquat in what became known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case (RCC). Despite its failure, the RCC brought to light significant threats to internal stability. First, an indication that there was a level of corruption and resentment within the army that could cause them to engage in conspiracy. Second, the conspirators came together not as a separatist movement, which had been on the government's radar as a potential threat to unity, but rather as an ethnically and linguistically mixed group critiquing the country's Western-leaning policy decisions.[154] This critique included initiatives such as the Commonwealth Colombo Plan, and growing fears that American defence money could be used to construct a military base in Pakistan making it vulnerable to attacks from the USSR.[155] The RCC plot was quickly denounced by Pakistani leaders as an effort by a group of communists to shake the foundations of the country's democracy.[156] Media attention on the events focused on the punishment of conspirators rather than an investigation of their motives.

The suggestion that communist sympathies were the backbone of the plot against democracy demonstrated a dramatic shift from claiming neutrality in Cold War conflicts. Liaquat Ali Khan's perspectives on Cold War alignment fluctuated throughout his years in office. In 1948 he affirmed that the country would have no independent future if left to be exploited by capitalism, citing Islam as the only relevant overarching domestic identity.[157] By 1950 however, he used Muslim homogeneity as a way to attract foreign investment from the West claiming that it would be a source of stability and a method of maintaining democracy, recognizing the country

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[154] Estelle Dryland, "Faiz Ahmed Faiz and The Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case," *Journal of South Asian Literature* 27, No. 2 (1992): 182.
[155] Dryland, "Faiz Ahmed Faiz and The Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case," 182.
[156] "Communist Hand in Conspiracy". *The Dawn*. March 10, 1951, pg 1.
[157] Liaquat Ali Khan, Speeches *and Statements of Quaid-I-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan, 1941-51,* Edited by M. Rafique Afzal (Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Panjab, 1967), 188.

could only go so far without contributions from foreign powers.[158] In the late 1940s and early 50s, Pakistan searched for its position in the wider world. The critiques of the local communist party articulated that the current government needed to undergo major economic and structural decolonization. Should this be the case, the political class as it existed would not remain intact due to their reliance on intergenerational colonial wealth and increasing military force. The 1951 coup against Liaquat and growing discontent towards the West emphasized that the government would have to be much more careful about its public-facing policies and alliances. Following the conspirator's arrest, the *Pakistan Times* became much more sympathetic to Liaquat, and the government became further entangled in the Western economy through aid.

Leadership Policy

Pakistan's leaders at independence repeatedly promised equidistance to both the United States and the Soviet Union. However, as living conditions in the country decreased, conditional foreign investment and alignment with anti-communist and anti-Indian powers became the only financially realistic path forward for state development. As Pakistan became more involved in American foreign policy, India grew closer to the USSR.[159] In 1955 Nehru was the first "Third World" Prime Minister to tour the Soviet Union in the post-war era, where he connected with Khrushchev on agricultural development and aspirations for industrialization.[160]

Pakistan's turn to the US can be attributed to a number of factors. The most obvious was support from the American military in defence of the borders. However, the country's relationship with other Muslim countries and the broader Middle East was also important, as it caused alienation from what could have been like-minded states. The Middle East appeared as a

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[158] Khan, Speeches *and Statements of Quaid-I-Millat Liaquat Ali Khan, 1941-51,* 410.
[159] Alessandro Iandolo, *Arrested Development: The Soviet Union in Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, 1955–1968*, (Cornell University Press, 2022), 46.
[160] Iandolo, *Arrested Development*, 46.

natural ally to the South Asian Muslim homeland, given its geographic proximity and shared culture. Though this may have been true, Pakistan's early years were marked by political turmoil and financial issues that did not make it an attractive partnership. Where the West saw an investment that could become a strategic ally in an area with enemies, the Middle East saw instability.[161] Many in Pakistan also felt the country was a natural leader of the Muslim world due to its population.[162] This was not accepted by Middle Eastern countries and was seen as a threat to the already established leadership of groups like the Arab League.[163]

The 1956 Suez Crisis was an important geopolitical event that highlighted the divides between Pakistan's leadership and the civilian population. The country had joined the Baghdad Pact a mere year earlier, which allied it with Great Britain, a country leading the aggression against Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt.[164] Both the Pakistani public and press overwhelmingly supported the nationalization of the Suez.[165] Prime Minister Hussain Shaheed Suharwardi attempted to maintain the country's delicate democracy by appeasing the left, stating Pakistan would not condone aggression against Egypt.[166] At the same, time Foreign Minister Malik Firoz Khan Noon emphasized that the crisis in the Suez did not undermine their commitment to the Baghdad Pact, a sentiment not met well by Nasser, who condemned the alliance and strengthened ties with Nehru.[167]

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[161] Khan, "Pakistan-United States Relations: An Appraisal," 88.
[162] "Policy of the United States with Respect to Pakistan," April 3, 1950, United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950, V (US Government Printing Office 2013), pp. 1498.
[163] Rais A Khan, "Pakistan-United States Relations: An Appraisal." *American Studies International* 23, no. 1 (1985): 88.
[164] Sohail H. Hashmi, "'Zero Plus Zero Plus Zero': Pakistan, the Baghdad Pact, and the Suez Crisis," *The International History Review* 33, no. 3 (2011): 525.
[165] Hashmi, "'Zero Plus Zero Plus Zero,'" 529.
[166] Hashmi, "'Zero Plus Zero Plus Zero,'" 530.
[167] Hashmi, "'Zero Plus Zero Plus Zero,'" 528-29.

Despite Pakistan's diplomatic support at the United Nations for Middle Eastern causes including Palestinian statehood, the country continued to trade and maintain economic relationships with the West.[168] This bred hostility among Arab leaders, who saw no room for partnership with states they deemed oppressors.[169] As Pakistan's dependence on the West grew, it drifted further from an alliance with the Middle East. This was perhaps used to the benefit of Western actors, who were aware that as long as aid was given to the country in a manner that could not be sustained independently, Pakistan would have no choice but to remain a capitalist ally.

Iran was an early friend to Pakistan and acted as a mediator between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir territorial disputes.[170] Drawing on shared cultural and linguistic heritage Iran even aided in resolving the Pashtunistan separatist movements in Pakistan.[171] As the Cold War progressed Pakistan became further aligned with Gulf Arab states, and Iran through Saudi Arabian promoted Muslim unity, an alternative to the Arab League.[172] Iranian Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's return to power after the overthrow of Mohammad Mossaddeq in 1953 made the country more Western-oriented, further strengthening the close relationship with Pakistan.[173]

Pakistan's fate with the Middle East seemed to be sealed once it joined Western defence pacts a few years after the Colombo Plan (the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization in 1954 and the Middle East Defence Treaty Organization in 1955). There were some concerns about how effective pacts could be, and concerns that defence alliances with the US might serve to further

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[168] Khalida Qureshi, "Pakistan and the Middle East" *Pakistan Horizon* 19, no. 2 (1966): 159.
[169] Qureshi, "Pakistan and the Middle East," 159.
[170] Sepehr Zabih and Shahram Chubin, *The Foreign Relations of Iran*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 21.
[171] Zabih and Chubin, *The Foreign Relations of Iran*, 309.
[172] Lorenz M. Lüthi, *Cold Wars: Asia, the Middle East, Europe*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 323.
[173] Lüthi, *Cold Wars,* 325.

the rift between Pakistan and other countries in the Muslim world.[174] This sentiment was eventually articulated by Gamal Abdel Nasser who saw treaties and pacts with the West as agreements in bad faith and a betrayal of the Middle East.[175] These tensions reached a breaking point during the Suez crisis when Nasser refused to accept any troops from Pakistan and instead accepted Indian troops despite the country's ongoing trade with Israel.[176] This made it clear where the region stood on the country, and that Pakistan could not maintain ties to both the West and the Arab League.

While Pakistan remained the largest non-communist country in Asia, a slew of ineffective leadership changes deepened the divides between the state and its citizens. Liaquat was unable to create movement in Kashmir and eventually was assassinated by an Afghan national on the Pakistani government payroll, worsening already tense relations.[177] Prime Minister Ali Borga's (in office 1953-55) reliance on the military and steadfast relationship with the US made him a puppet for the army and was understood to be pushing the policy of General Mohammad Ayub Khan who eventually came to power in 1958.[178] British-trained administrators and military leaders favouring development through austerity measures were disproportionately represented in the central government.[179] This political class exercised force to close avenues of political activism that might oppose them.[180] Increasing amounts of money were diverted to the military while communicating with the United States suggesting there was some level of

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[174] McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery,* 135.
[175] Qureshi, "Pakistan and the Middle East," 159.
[176] Qureshi, "Pakistan and the Middle East," 163.
[177] Bajwa, "Pakistan and the Birth of the Regional Pacts in Asia," 50.
[178] Leake, "The Great Game Anew," 792.
[179] "National Intelligence Estimate, Probable Developments in Pakistan March." March 15, 1955. United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United Sates [FRUS], 1955, VII (US Government Printing Office, 2013), 423.
[180] "National Intelligence Estimate, Probable Developments in Pakistan March." March 15, 1955. United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United Sates [FRUS], 1955, VII (US Government Printing Office, 2013), 423.

corruption preventing the army from operating effectively, leading to the outsourcing of administrative tasks.

The United States brought the Cold War to South Asia in an attempt to strengthen the country's reach in the de-colonizing world, particularly in relation to communist China and rising tensions in the Middle East. Western efforts at communist containment were negotiated through agreements with Pakistan that provided material support in the form of monetary aid, famine relief and defence, by capitalizing on systems that had been put in place by the British Empire. Through negotiations with Western sympathetic elites, many of whom had acted as an intermediary class during the years of British colonization, Western officials exercised indirect rule over the country. This relationship developing so soon after independence played a key role in the state's post-colonial nation-building, as the country experienced greater influence from elites and foreign powers than from internal civil society. Pakistan's militarization through American investment in defence contributed to the polarization of South Asia, leading India to become involved with the Soviet Union to counter Pakistan's American alliance, and escalating tensions with Afghanistan.

The early years of independence and American allyship with Pakistan through aid laid the groundwork for future multilateral alliances including the 1954 Southeast Asian Treaty Organization and the 1955 Baghdad Pact. These agreements drove the country away from Arab countries, de facto aligning it with the West. Pakistan's interactions with other countries in Asia and the Muslim world were greatly shaped by their early dependence on the American Empire. The agreements forged with the West meant isolation from the rest of the region and indirectly allowed capitalist leaders to control how the country would interact with other multilateral blocs. The large amount of defence infrastructure that was invested in the country shaped how the rest

of the twentieth century played out in Pakistan, namely through an emphasis on militarism rather than restoring the democracy promised by Jinnah.[181]

[181] Khan, "Pakistan-United States Relations: An Appraisal," 90.

Chapter Three

The Colombo Plan's triumphs and failures greatly complicated the relationships among all countries involved. The leaders of Western donor countries strengthened their alliances and developed contracts that linked them to Asia, through the purchase of goods and services that delivered aid. For the first time, leaders in South Asia were able to make requests to the West on behalf of their countries in the spirit of development. Western members of the Commonwealth saw themselves connected to South Asia through their former colonial ties and were generally in approval of sending aid overseas.[182] However, leaders on both sides of the agreement made decisions in their own self-interest, which was reflected in the plans they drew up and the contracts they agreed to. The West pushed agreements that brought large, important infrastructure projects. In Pakistan, leaders neglected rural populations and strove to appease Western capitalist ideology. The two groups worked together to enrich themselves in a complex form of negotiations which, more often than not resulted in the marginalization of the vast majority of working-class and rural Pakistani people.

Colombo Plan Operations

The shift in Pakistan's political class from neutrality to bloc alignment in the 1950s had a great effect on the way aid was delivered to the region.[183] It was clear to Western officials that leaders in Pakistan were ready to maximize the benefits their alignment could bring. The Colombo Plan became an ideal vehicle to do so, and for the West meant tailoring aid to better

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[182] Keith Spicer, "Clubmanship Upstaged: Canada's Twenty Years in the Colombo Plan." *International Journal* 25, no. 1 (Winter 1969): 25.

[183] Robert J. McMahon, "Development Assistance as a Cold War Tool," in *The Transformation of the International Order of Asia: Decolonization, the Cold War, and the Colombo Plan,* ed. Shigeru Akita, Gerald Krozewski, and Shoichi Watanabe (London: Routledge, 2014), 220.

meet the needs of the Asian political class, as was articulated in a 1957 Canadian memorandum to the Cabinet:

> "the primary objective of the Canadian government in contributing to the Colombo Plan is political. Basically it is to offer some hope, and to provide a sense of international cooperation, to the ruling and politically effective groups in the Asian countries concerned by assisting governments in sensible projects for economic development that seem likely to show results in the next few years."[184]

The Canadian government made clear that the primary objective of its involvement was to appeal to politically relevant groups in Asia and dissuade them from communism. Percy Spender, Australia's Minister for External Affairs noted that with decolonization Asia was rapidly growing in importance, and global security could not be achieved without taking the intentions and development of these countries into account.[185] Delivering aid to the general public was a tactic for doing this, but not the focus of the work. The Colombo Plan administration itself enabled this position as countries were allowed to operate independently of the Plan with little regulation. Donor nations by design exercised their strategic needs. Close to 90% of assistance went to India and Pakistan, with a large part being used for mutual deterrence.[186] Although the Colombo Plan had some central organization, technical assistance was conducted bilaterally with no pool of multilateral resources.[187] Plans were reviewed and assessed by the Consultative Committee, and members could also discuss their plans in a council for technical cooperation.[188]

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[184] Memorandum by Assistant Secretary to Cabinet, "Colombo Plan Operations," 25 February 1957, Documents on Canadian External Relations [*DCER], Volume22:1956-57, Part I,* Greg Donaghy, ed, (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2001), 1217.
[185] Spender, *Exercises in Diplomacy,* 206.
[186] Geoffrey Pearson, *Seize the Day: Lester B. Person and Crisis Diplomacy,* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1993), 56.
[187] "The Colombo Plan: What it is, how it works," September, 1958, Department of State Publication, Hathi Trust, 4.
[188] "The Colombo Plan: What it is, how it works," 3.

However, no Commonwealth office instructed donor countries on how to run their aid policies or who to distribute them to.[189]

The plan focused on reforming "primitive" agricultural practices in Asia through bilateral aid, but responsibilities in projects were not always clear.[190] Although Western officials took the lead on resources and training, failures in executing plans were attributed to Asian countries for not anticipating and requesting resources needed to implement new technical strategies.[191] Successes were attributed to Western organizations and leadership while Asians were chided for not using infrastructure correctly.[192] Funding was given to projects with the most "national effort", a rather vague criterion.[193] Projects were not always aligned with the local labour market and as a result, acted as a means to exercise Western control over various parts of the economy.

Agriculture was a priority area for reform, though there was little prospect of financial security in this field.[194] A country or institution's ability to secure funding was dependent on how it fit into relationships with other states involved in the plan and their economies, rather than the recipient country's own assessment of what it needed. The plan relied on forms of national mobilization and common nation-building goals, thus linking the Asian nationalist movement with economic reconstruction and development plans.[195] The Colombo Plan had a profound impact on post-colonial nation-building in Asia, creating a precedent that favoured the political

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[189] Pearson, *Seize the Day*, 57.
[190] "Training Awards and Scholarship Applications," November 12, 1952, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], RG25, box 6600, 11038-F-3-40 (PT.1.2).
[191] "The Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme, Report for 1956-57 by the Council for Technical Co-operation in South and Southeast Asia," Colombo, August, 1957, 15.
[192] "The Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme, Report for 1956-57 by the Council for Technical Co-operation in South and Southeast Asia," 15.
[193] "The Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme, Report for 1956-57 by the Council for Technical Co-operation in South and Southeast Asia," 14.
[194] "The Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme, Report for 1956-57 by the Council for Technical Co-operation in South and Southeast Asia," 14.
[195] "The Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme, Report for 1956-57 by the Council for Technical Co-operation in South and Southeast Asia," 4.

class and their relationships with the West. This prioritization neglected the far larger number of individuals that made up labourers and intended recipients of aid.

Colombo Plan Diplomacy

Western leaders saw Asia as a strategic battleground for the rapidly advancing ideological war, which could potentially be won through allyship with key states. They could also rebuild the former colonial raw material export economy to their own benefit and engage in technical assistance trade to strengthen their relationship with former colonies. The United States understood that Pakistan had reached a critical juncture by the early 1950s. An internal government assessment acknowledged that "there [was] increasing evidence that Pakistan [was] a viable state" but warned "that it [may] continue to develop independently if not interfered with."[196] The Colombo Plan became an important way to "interfere" with development, as it was an initiative to alleviate poverty associated with rising communism in the continent. Linking Asia to the Western capitalist world through trade, technical assistance and the modernization of agriculture was an attempt to jumpstart development, and as a result, living standards.[197]

In the early years of statehood, Pakistan was a wild card to the Western world. The state continued to be fairly dependent on Britain after independence, but identity politics presented a threat to its loyalty.[198] American officials noted the country had the potential for internal stability and stated: "Pakistan [would] emerge after India as the strongest power between Turkey and Japan on the periphery of Asia".[199] However, Pakistan's emergence as a strong power was

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[196] "Policy of the United States with Respect to Pakistan," April 3, 1950, United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950, V (US Government Printing Office 2013), pp. 1498.
[197] "The Colombo Plan gets under way," *The Children's Newspaper* (London), July 21, 1951.
[198] "Policy of the United States with Respect to Pakistan," April 3, 1950, United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950, V (US Government Printing Office 2013), pp. 1490.
[199] "Policy of the United States with Respect to Pakistan," April 3, 1950, United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950, V (US Government Printing Office 2013), pp. 1491.

dependent on the Muslim League, which was greatly diminished by West Punjabi and East Bengali separatism.[200] It was vital for the party to win the favour of land-owning elites, which could, in theory, be done by signing onto development initiatives like the Colombo Plan which provided funding and resources for agriculture. Although it offered little structural reform, it quelled some of the internal leadership disputes and class loyalty that threatened security. In addition, the AIML, to some degree, served as an intermediary class of Western-educated elites, with the potential to spread Western sympathy. As Britain and the United States continued to spread capitalist ideology throughout the decolonizing world in the countries where they maintained influence, it was deemed most effective for Pakistan to remain in the Commonwealth, developing a healthy relationship with Britain.[201] As a result, the United States continued to make up funding gaps in Commonwealth initiatives to ensure the country did not seek aid from the Soviet Union.[202]

Many initiatives that were part of the Colombo Plan involved bringing Western practices and techniques to Pakistan that were alien to a country with traditional economic and rural structures.[203] Farmers did not know how to use the modern farming equipment that the Colombo Plan bestowed on them, and many of the complex projects, such as dams, took far longer than originally planned to be completed, bringing into question the efficiency of the plan.[204] Some training initiatives, such as those orchestrated by Canada, were managed under the assumption

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[200] "Policy of the United States with Respect to Pakistan," April 3, 1950, United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950, V (US Government Printing Office 2013), pp. 1491.
[201] "Policy of the United States with Respect to Pakistan," April 3, 1950, United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950, V (US Government Printing Office 2013), pp. 1496.
[202] "Policy of the United States with Respect to Pakistan," April 3, 1950, United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1950, V (US Government Printing Office 2013), pp. 1496.
[203] International Economic and Technical Co-operation Division: Department of Trade and Commerce, "Colombo Plan Administration in Canada, May 9 1957, Library and Archives Canda [LAC], RG 68, Volume 156, Folder 5 The Colombo Plan-Pakistan.
[204] "Trouble Bests Project" / "Canadian-Backed Dam in Pakistan Behind Schedule", May 1957, Library and Archives Canda, RG 58, Volume 156, Folder 5 The Colombo Plan-Pakistan.

that training was necessary due to the primitive nature of agriculture in the country and the lack of capacity to run such projects without help from external funders and leaders.[205]

In addition, the plan fuelled trade wars between Pakistan and India, exacerbating regional tensions. The Colombo Plan opened up third-party raw material providers that undermined bilateral trade.[206] The collapse of Indo-Pakistani relations triggered militarization and an increase in the defence budget in both countries.[207] As a result, in 1951, 65% of Pakistan's national budget was spent on defence while amassing foreign debt to finance further arms imports.[208] Unsurprisingly, at the 1951 meeting in Lahore of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), the Soviet representative S.S. Nemtchina asserted that aid from the United States and Britain was given with malicious intent to slow industrial development in the country.[209] Mirroring the local Communist Party's criticisms, he advocated for the abolition of landlordism and stressed the importance of developing an independent national economy.[210] However, Western economic aid favoured the elite class, further exacerbated wealth disparities in the country, and challenged any attempts at reforming systems of structural inequality.

The broader South Asian perspective on these matters was diverse and diverged sharply along class lines. In Pakistan, where a strong independent democracy had yet to be established, leaders often vied for political dominance using whatever means necessary even if it meant disregarding the popular views of the population and furthering regional tensions. Development funding from the Colombo Plan accelerated internal tensions and public debate on how the

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[205] "Council for Technical Cooperation in South and Southeast Asia," 12 November 1952, Library and Archives Canada, RG 25, Volume 6600, Folder 11038-F-3-40 (Pt.1.2).
[206] "Feuding is Hurting India and Pakistan", *New York Times,* January 3, 1951.
[207] "Feuding is Hurting India and Pakistan", *New York Times,* January 3, 1951.
[208] "Feuding is Hurting India and Pakistan", *New York Times,* January 3, 1951.
[209] "UK and USA Hampering Asia's Development", *The Pakistan Times,* March 3, 1951.
[210] "UK and USA Hampering Asia's Development", *The Pakistan Times,* March 3, 1951.

country should align itself not only as an independent state in Asia but also due to growing tensions between the US and the USSR. Thus, American involvement in the Colombo Plan and Commonwealth development projects began a complicated relationship in the decolonizing world. Newly independent Pakistan was one of its paramount allies, because of the, perhaps misguided, hope that it would aid in the extension of Western foreign policy in Asia and the Middle East. Pakistan's acceptance of the American invitation brought the country into the international system as a Western ally distinct from its South Asian and Muslim counterparts. This formative policy decision during the Cold War drastically impacted the trajectory of the Pakistani state both internally and externally.

Technical Assistance

Aid under the Colombo Plan was primarily offered in the form of "technical assistance". This involved knowledge transfers and infrastructure from the West to Asian countries, in the form of "expert" trainers sent to the country or providing pathways for Asians to receive training in the West. As a result, negotiations were transacted between governments and those deemed "technically competent" by donors.[211] These experts were trained in their home countries to go abroad and educate others. Application numbers for this role were often low, bringing into question the skill level and diversity of candidates passing on Western "expertise".[212] A technical cooperation scheme report articulated that soft skills were also prioritized, "experts [had] to build international friendships and in addition to their technical functions experts and their wives [needed] to be missionaries of international understanding if the fullest benefit [was] to be

[211] "The Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme, Report for 1956-57 by the Council for Technical Co-operation in South and Southeast Asia," 17.

[212] "Council for Technical Co-operation in South and Southeast Asia - Press Communique," April 9 1954, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], Rg25, box 6600, 11038-G-40 (Pt.2).

obtained from technical assistance programmes."[213] Trainers of aid recipients did not function exclusively as "experts", they often served the diplomatic interests of their home countries. This dual role meant that the quality of training was at times low, and not sufficient for the skill building needed to operate equipment and facilities being built in Asia under the Plan, inhibiting development.

Officials in donor countries eventually noted concerns with the level of skill of those being trained, many of whom didn't seem to be able to maintain the facilities that were being built. Some even expressed a need to hire foreign consultants to maintain infrastructure once representatives from donor countries had left.[214] Donor countries often had to urge diplomats to engage with local officials to facilitate further technical assistance.[215] The training was not done in a way that promoted long-term sustainability for these projects, and rather a dependence was formed to maintain their functionality. This was the case in Pakistan, where a three-million-dollar photography lab for surveying in Quetta risked damages simply due to incorrect use of storage and equipment.[216] Other forms of training involved technical education and sending workers from aid-recipient countries to the West in the hopes of increasing skilled labour and supervisory capacity.[217] While the objective was for Asian workers to learn from their Western counterparts, the skills they were exposed to did not always translate well in their own countries. In one case, Burmese coal miners were sent to Australia to dig in mines, which led to a degree of

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[213] "The Colombo Plan, Report of the Council for Technical Co-operation in South and South-East Asia for 1957-1958," Ceylon: Government Press, October 1958, 32.
[214] "Colombo Plan Administration in Canada, letter from Capt. R.G. Nik Cavell," May 9, 1956, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], RG58, box 156, Folder 5, Colombo Plan- Pakistan.
[215] "Colombo Plan Administration in Canada, letter from Capt. R.G. Nik Cavell," May 9, 1956, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], RG58, box 156, Folder 5, Colombo Plan- Pakistan.
[216] "Colombo Plan Administration in Canada, letter from Capt. R.G. Nik Cavell," July 11, 1956, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], RG58, box 156, Folder 5, Colombo Plan- Pakistan.
[217] B.R. Tomlinson, "Weapons of the Weakened," in *The Transformation of the International Order of Asia: Decolonization, the Cold War, and the Colombo Plan,* ed. Shigeru Akita, Gerald Krozewski, and Shoichi Watanabe (London: Routledge, 2014), 35.

"culture shock" due to the vastly different conditions, hindering the ability to make their skills transferable upon return.[218]

Academic scholarships were another pathway for training. These generally emphasized sciences, in particular engineering, with a focus on specific infrastructure projects like railway operation.[219] After receiving the award and moving to a host country some programs stated students had to refrain from engaging in political activities as well as any form of employment for profit or gain, stressing that their role was exclusively to be a foreign labourer in training.[220] It is unclear what support systems were put in place to aid students with the adjustment process of studying in another country. One Pakistani student in Canada at McGill University, previously assessed as mentally and physically well was hospitalized due to anxiety and depression, resulting in a reduced course load.[221] Technical assistance programs treated young students as employees rather than empowering them, and forming long-lasting cultural exchanges. Training whether in Asia or the West was haphazard and ineffective despite the fact that the plan was intended to improve living conditions for those on the ground living in Asia.

Internal Separatism

In addition to class divides, Pakistan faced a large degree of internal separatism and conflict along ethnic lines. The division between East and West Pakistan created a crisis of leadership, which was only furthered by colonially imposed ethnic and linguistic hierarchies. West Punjab was a "stronghold of landed oligarchs" with upper and middle-class Punjabis

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[218] "The Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme, Report for 1956-57 by the Council for Technical Co-operation in South and Southeast Asia," 19.

[219] **"**The Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme, Report for 1955-56 by the Council for Technical Co-operation in South and South-East Asia," Colombo, September 1956, 19.

[220] "Training Awards and Scholarship Applications," November 12, 1952, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], RG25, box 6600, 11038-F-3-40 (PT.1.2).

[221] "Training Awards and Scholarship Applications," November 12, 1952, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], RG25, box 6600, 11038-F-3-40 (PT.1.2).

occupying many important civil and military positions.[222] This created the perception that the group was attempting to "take over" the state.[223] All levels of government, regardless of locality, relied on the (predominantly Punjabi) army to maintain order, a normalized and accepted policy disincentivizing local representation and participation in politics.[224] The Pakistani political class, as a result of the close relationships formed with Western leaders, was to some degree able to control Colombo Plan funds to advance its foreign policy rather than provide aid to those who needed it. The large sums of money available through partnerships with donor countries became an avenue to exercise regional control and assert capitalist visions of modernity, better established through centralized leadership.

In order to remedy administrative issues, the notion of creating "one unit" and incorporating West Pakistan into one province was brought forward to the Constituent Assembly in the early 1950s.[225] Initially, the idea did not get traction, but in October 1954, Governor General Gulham Mohamad instructed Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Borga to form a cabinet without Parliament, resulting in a November 22nd radio announcement to the whole country that the existing provinces would be merged into one unit.[226] Despite great opposition, the merged West Pakistani province came into existence a year later on October 14th, 1955.[227] Ironically, the scheme forged unity under an anti-one-unit coalition. Pashtun people suffered from a lack of political and economic representation and were given no clarity on how tribal areas would be

[222]Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 78.
[223] Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule,* 222.
[224] Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule,* 224-5.
[225]Stanley Maron, "A New Phase in Pakistan Politics." *Far Eastern Survey* 24, no. 11 (1955):164.
[226] Asma Gul and Syed Minhaj ul Hassan, "One Unit Scheme: the Role of Opposition focusing on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa," *Journal of the Research Society of Pakistan* 55, no. 1 (January-June 2019): 303.
[227] Gul and Minhaj ul Hassan, "One Unit Scheme," 304.

included.[228] The political class made little effort to incorporate local leaders into governance under the new unit scheme, and any opposition was considered treason.[229] Eventually, with the 1958 imposition of martial law, political activity was banned, preventing further debates on the issue.[230]

While both the United States and Britain had communicated hesitancy in taking a stance on Pashtun integration into the country (seen as a provocation of Afghanistan and the USSR), the Colombo Plan provided Pakistani leaders with access to an alliance with Canada, a country with less stake in the dispute. Together the two states produced the Warsak Dam Hydropower Project, an ineffective infrastructure project but an important symbol of capitalist technology in Asia. This development intended to stimulate the economy in a region of the country prone to separatism, while also establishing hegemony over the region in anticipation of an Afghan threat.[231] While the project provoked Soviet aid in Afghanistan, it created jobs for Canadian workers overseas and control of parts of the Kabul River that Pakistan had not been able to achieve through treaty.[232] The Western involvement in this project made it clear to Soviet leaders that Pakistan was allied against them.

During the 1950s many of Pakistan's significant policy decisions were based on protecting the state from Afghanistan and India.[233] This choice neglected pressing issues in the country. While civilians migrated from rural areas to cities in search of work, funds were

[228] Gul and Minhaj ul Hassan, "One Unit Scheme," 304.
[229] Gul and Minhaj ul Hassan, "One Unit Scheme," 312.
[230] Gul and Minhaj ul Hassan, "One Unit Scheme," 311.
[231] "Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Karachi," November 22, 1956, Library and Archives Canada [LAC]. RG25, box 7347, 11038-2-2-B-40 (Pt.6.2), 2.
[232] "Office of the High Commissioner for Canada, Karachi," December 3, 1956, Library and Archives Canada [LAC]. RG25, box 7347, 11038-2-2-B-40 (Pt.6.2), 1.
[233] Leake, "The Great Game Anew," 796.

invested into projects like dams to compete with Afghan neighbours.[234] This did not change the fact that migration was driven by the inability to purchase land and engage in effective agriculture.[235] The Pakistani and Western political classes benefited greatly from this project, those living in the NWFP reaped little benefit. The timeline of the dam was repeatedly extended, but utilized Canadian labour and materials over that which could be provided locally. At completion, the dam quickly became damaged from silt, making it difficult to use and rendering it essentially expensive and ineffective.[236]

Defence Construction Limited and the Warsak Dam

Canada was an early adopter of the Colombo Plan, and as a member of the Commonwealth played an important role in technical assistance. A large percentage of the country's overseas infrastructure projects were maintained and handled by one Crown Corporation, Defence Construction Limited (DCL). DCL began operating in 1951 as the main builder of Cold War military infrastructure in Canada including the Distant Early Warning Line radar system.[237] Though the company was only supposed to be in existence for a few years, in 1953 it became the contractor for Canadian foreign aid in the Colombo Plan, and by 1955 handled 40% of government construction expenditures outside of housing.[238] The corporation's involvement in the plan is critiqued due to its nature as a tool for furthering government policy, rather than acting independently to build much-needed infrastructure in post-colonial countries. DCL's close relationship with construction companies allowed the state to use the corporation on

[234] Spender, *Exercises in Diplomacy,* 198.
[235] Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule* 98.
[236] Muhammad Iqbal, "Hydro-Diplomacy in Kabul River Basin (2001-2014): The Conflict and Cooperation Potential of Water in Pakistan-Afghanistan Relation" (PhD diss., University of the Punjab, 2020), 148.
[237] Noakes, "Under the Radar," 1-2.
[238] Noakes, "Under the Radar," 524.

behalf of the private sector.[239] Furthermore, DCL specialized in pipelines and defence expenditure, not the civilian projects being built in Asia, which created administrative issues. The independence of DCL meant that members of the Colombo Plan committees had little control over the corporation and how it operated, even though it was involved in negotiation, advising, and contracting.[240] The breakdown of cooperation in projects with DCL reached a level so severe that officials even began putting forward the idea of establishing individual cost committees, for particularly problematic projects.[241]

The 1952 Warsak Dam project was one of Canada's largest and most cumbersome infrastructure projects in Pakistan, with heavy involvement from DCL. Dams were a popular form of infrastructure development during the Cold War years due to their potential to act as a visible sign of dependence in client states.[242] Additionally, they were seen as a symbol of technological advancement, attributed to capitalist successes and a way to integrate "underdeveloped areas into the national economy.[243] 30% of the aid given to India and Pakistan took the form of dams.[244] However, "modern outlook" intended to be advertised by dams was rarely felt in villages and rural areas where the majority of Pakistanis lived.[245] These projects often had negative impacts fueling political instability due to the perceived widening gap between "governors and the governed."[246] The Warsak Dam was meant to double the electrical

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[239] Noakes, "Under the Radar," 7.
[240] Noakes, "Under the Radar," 529. "Colombo Plan Administration in Canada, letter from Capt. R.G. Nik Cavell," July 11, 1956, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], RG58, box 156, Folder 5, Colombo Plan- Pakistan.
[241] "Extract from External Affairs File to Colombo Plan Capital Group Policy Committee," July 15, 1956, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], RG58, box 156, Folder 5, Colombo Plan- Pakistan.
[242] Patrick McCully, *Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams* (Enlarged and Updated Edition), (London: Zed Books, 2001), 225.
[243] McCully, *Silenced Rivers,* 225.
[244] Noakes, "Under the Radar," 526.
[245] L.F. Rushbrook Williams, "The Renaissance of Rural Life in Pakistan," *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts* 11, no. 5087 (1963): 884.
[246] Williams, "The Renaissance of Rural Life in Pakistan," 884.

capacity of West Pakistan, despite the fact that the country had already been in the process of building a power plant in the city of Multan on the same grid.[247] The dam was built in a rural area on the Kabul River roughly thirty kilometres from the city of Peshawar. For both the Pakistani and Canadian governments, this location was important as it allowed the country to build infrastructure in an area of the country that was in danger of being seized by Soviet-backed Afghans.[248]

The project aimed to stimulate industrial growth in "backwards" areas, irrigate dry land, and train up to ten thousand nomadic Pashtun people to create a semi-skilled labour force that took up "fruitful sedentary occupations."[249] Canada's involvement in the project mandated Canadian equipment, engineers and contractors making the project increasingly complicated, stalling the eventual finish.[250] The project commenced before a contract was actually signed, and as work went on it became clear more Canadian workers would have to be sent to complete it.[251] These workers often came into conflict with their Pakistani counterparts due to a combination of social and linguistic challenges.[252] A Canadian involved in the project stated that "nobody [knew] when Warsak [would] be finished or how much it [would] cost. And if the thing had been properly examined in the first place it would never have been started at all."[253] The planning stages of the projects were rushed with DCL doing both the feasibility study and the engineering

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[247] "Window on Asia - Warsak Can be Built but Should it?" Douglas Leiterman, Southham News Services, 1956, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], RG58, box 156, Folder 5, Colombo Plan-Pakistan.
[248] Keith Spicer, *A Samaritan State? External Aid in Canada's Foreign Policy,* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 127.
[249]Spicer, *A Samaritan State?,* 127.
[250] "Window on Asia - Warsak Can be Built but Should it?" Douglas Leiterman, Southham News Services, 1956, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], RG58, box 156, Folder 5, Colombo Plan-Pakistan.
[251] Spicer, *A Samaritan State?,* 128-130.
[252] Spicer, *A Samaritan State?,* 139.
[253] "Window on Asia - Warsak Can be Built but Should it?" Douglas Leiterman, Southham News Services, 1956, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], RG58, box 156, Folder 5, Colombo Plan-Pakistan.

contract, rather than having an independent firm step in.[254] For these reasons, the dam was viewed by some as a "political bribe" meant to irrigate only strategic land and provide select jobs to relevant rural leaders.[255]

The project was originally estimated at 13 million dollars but, at the completion, cost 60 million.[256] Despite all the challenges, the project was conducted in a manner that benefitted Canadian construction and engineering firms. The Colombo Plan as a whole, allowed DCL to retain skilled employees because of the ongoing projects. If business was slow in Canada there was almost always work overseas.[257] The Warsak project relied on Canadian equipment and manufacturing, allowing the country to build their export markets in Pakistan.[258] Canada and other donor countries favoured large projects like Warsak, as it allowed them to be linked to recipient countries through the purchase of goods and services for several years despite administrative challenges, and evidence that aid was more successful in smaller-scale projects.[259]

Village AID

The 1952 Village Agriculture and Industrial Development (AID) program was an attempt by the Pakistani state to mitigate the post-independence economic fragmentation that came from the remnants of the British *Raj* system.[260] There was a large gap between political leaders and rural populations who made up the vast majority of the country.[261] Many felt their government

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254 "Window on Asia - Warsak Can be Built but Should it?" Douglas Leiterman, Southham News Services, 1956, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], RG58, box 156, Folder 5, Colombo Plan-Pakistan.
255 "Window on Asia - Warsak Can be Built but Should it?" Douglas Leiterman, Southham News Services, 1956, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], RG58, box 156, Folder 5, Colombo Plan-Pakistan.
256 Noakes, "Under the Radar: Defence Construction (1951) Limited and Military Infrastructure in Canada," 534.
257 Noakes, "Under the Radar: Defence Construction (1951) Limited and Military Infrastructure in Canada," 531.
258 Memorandum, Acting SSEA to Canada, "The Colombo Plan: Pattern of Canadian Aid in 1959-60," Cabinet Document 126/59, April 16 1959, Library and Archives Canda [LAC], RG2, box 2742, series B2, file C-20-5, (1959), Cabinet Documents 101-150.
259 Spicer, *A Samaritan State?,* 125.
260 Williams, "The Renaissance of Rural Life in Pakistan," 885.
261 Williams, "The Renaissance of Rural Life in Pakistan," 891.

was not doing enough for them and only came to villages in search of votes.[262] The program began as a well-received education and training plan but was eventually funded in part by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Ford Foundation under the banner of the Colombo Plan which shifted the mandate.[263]

In addition to improving the quality of life at the rural level, they pushed to have villages be "catalysts" for development and work.[264] This scheme involved assigning a "development officer" to be a leader for technical and social change in villages.[265] They then pushed education under the assumption that villagers were under-skilled and underemployed rather than exploited agrarian workers with unequal tenant status on land.[266] Development officers were often Western-educated and given permanent civil service positions while village workers stayed in low-paying agrarian jobs, no more integrated into cities than previously.[267] Rural landowners opposed the scheme, as it empowered tenants that were under their control.[268] Without land reform, little could be done. Eventually, in 1959 leadership frameworks that were created by the Village AID system were built on by President Muhamad Ayub Khan to form the Basic Democracies System (BDS).[269]

The Basic Democracies System was intended to be part of a fulfilment of Ayub Khan's promise to bring back democracy after imposing martial law.[270] BDS returned very little power

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[262] Williams, "The Renaissance of Rural Life in Pakistan," 887.
[263] "The Village Agricultural and Industrial Development Program (Village-AID)," Directorate General Agriculture, https://ext.agripunjab.gov.pk/background.
[264] **"**The Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme, Report for 1955-56 by the Council for Technical Co-operation in South and South-East Asia," 24.
[265] John J. Honigmann, "A Case Study of Community Development in Pakistan," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 8, no. 3 (1960): 293.
[266] Honigmann, "A Case Study of Community Development in Pakistan," 292.
[267] Honigmann, "A Case Study of Community Development in Pakistan," 292.
[268] Williams, "The Renaissance of Rural Life in Pakistan," 889.
[269] R.L. Mellema, "The Basic Democracies System in Pakistan," *Asian Survey* 1, no. 6 (1961): 11.
[270] Harry J. Friedman, "Pakistan's Experiment in Basic Democracies", *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 33, no. 2 (1960): 113.

to the people of Pakistan and instead used the Village AID development officers and training from the Ford Foundation to feign rural representation in the government despite the imposition of martial law.[271] While Ayub Khan noted that lack of education and literacy were large inhibiting democratic participation in rural areas, he argued that Pakistan did not have the time to establish what other countries had considered "prerequisites" for democracy.[272] Though the system may have been aimed at providing representation for rural peoples, it became top-down and hierarchical.[273] Local autonomy was not emphasized, and the program lacked funds.[274] Leaders in villages had little impact on the national bureaucracy. In fact, the country's first general election did not happen until 1970, and Pakistan has yet to have a Prime Minister carry out a full five-year term.[275]

For Pakistan's political class, the Colombo Plan was the beginning of what became a long relationship with Western aid. This relationship began a decades-long struggle between the working class and political leaders, which not only furthered divides in the state but also cemented the position of reliance Pakistan had on the West. Village administrators were given training in the US because there was no institution in Pakistan considered adequate.[276] The country in many ways remained bound through not only aid but also military pacts, ensuring a Western sympathetic outpost in South Asia.

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[271] Friedman, "Pakistan's Experiment in Basic Democracies", 113.
[272] Khan, Mohammad Ayub, *Friends Not Masters, a Political Autobiography,* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 208.
[273] Mazher Abbas et al., "Agricultural Extension Programs in Punjab, Pakistan," *Pakistan Journal of Life and Social Sciences* 7, no. 1 (2009): 3.
[274] Abbas et al., "Agricultural Extension Programs in Punjab, Pakistan," 3.
[275] Mujahid Al Sharif, "Pakistan: First General Elections," *Asian Survey* 11, no. 2 (1971): 159.
[276] Schuler, Edgar, "The Origin and Nature of the Pakistan Academies for Village Development," *Rural Sociology* 29, no. 3 (September 1964): 305.

Conclusion

From 1949-89 it is estimated that one-third of aid served the donors' commercial, colonial or strategic goals.[277] The realist international relations perspective articulates that moral values are used to facilitate the attainment of power and that states act nearly exclusively in their own self-interest.[278] For other scholars, this is a gross oversimplification of diplomacy and fails to acknowledge the negotiations that occur with a country receiving aid. As much as actors in the West chose to behave selfishly, collaborations with other states, like Pakistan, required an establishment of norms and procedures, many of which were agreed upon by a political class that, itself, did not act to preserve the well-being and interests of the population it served.

Though the United States may have dominated the international system at times, it was not always a guaranteed secure spot. Joining development initiatives became a diplomatic norm to advance ideology and stop the spread of Soviet influence. The US promoted the concept of "burden sharing" to encourage their allies to help offset the cost of aid and often looked to Britain for guidance on involvement in South Asia.[279] As much as the US built alliances with Asian countries under the Colombo Plan, it also strengthened its own ties with other donor countries. While both Western and Pakistani leaders benefited in many ways from aid, it was the large percentage of already disenfranchised working-class people who faced the brunt of consequences from mishaps when projects intended to help them went awry. In some cases, miscalculations and unpredictable errors lead to issues, but in others, by design, projects were intended to benefit donor countries and local elites.

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[277] David Halloran Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020), 4.
[278] Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989,* 7.
[279] Lumsdaine, *Moral Vision in International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989,* 53.

This project demonstrated first; how American foreign policy was written with the intent to contain communism. Kennan and Nitze articulated the need to look to the decolonizing world in order to keep the Soviet Union contained and, in extension, maintain US control over the international system.[280] The switch from strong point to perimeter defence and the escalation of the Korean War necessitated an increase in resources to Asia in order to develop strategic alliances.[281] The Colombo Plan became a perfect vehicle for aid as it provided a framework with relative freedom for Western donors to utilize for funding.

To donor members of the Colombo Plan, Asia was a Cold War battleground. Pakistan was one of many working pieces in a broader strategy and was treated as such rather than an individual state with unique needs. Aid was delivered in a manner that linked Pakistan to the West and often alienated it from other Muslim countries. The focus of the plan was establishing diplomatic ties through initiatives such as technological exchange rather than doing essential work like facilitating skill building amongst rural working-class groups. British colonial rule laid the groundwork for hierarchical systems that were easily exploited by West Pakistani elites. On the ground in Pakistan, the Colombo Plan catered to allies of the political class, such as landowners, who aided in securing their positions. Pakistani people were considered deserving of aid only to the extent that their country cooperated with Western political interests.

Technical education and infrastructure development were structured to provide jobs for donor countries, as well as a reliance on their resources.[282] The Warsak Dam is a prime example of this, as delays in the project allowed Canada to remain involved in Pakistan's economy for years beyond originally anticipated. At the same time, Pakistan's political class used this

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[280] Westad, *The Global Cold War,* 25.
[281] Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, 89.
[282] "Colombo Plan Administration in Canada, letter from Capt. R.G. Nik Cavell," May 9, 1956, Library and Archives Canada [LAC], RG58, box 156, Folder 5, Colombo Plan- Pakistan.

infrastructure to assert dominance in the region and exercise control over water resources. The networks created by the Colombo Plan linking the Western world to Asia allowed for countries to only engage in projects relevant to them. In the case of the Warsak Dam Canada's involvement meant that the United States and Britain did not have to compromise their own stability and potentially provoke the Soviet Union.[283] Western states drew on each other's resources to burden share and build a strong perimeter defence that protected shared values of liberal capitalism.

Pakistani leaders were not powerless during this time. They exercised agency to maintain relationships with Western leaders, regardless of the expense. Through this process, the colonial intermediaries that had been created by the British were solidified in the new independent state of Pakistan. Inequality and internal divisions present during the British Empire continued, as leaders maintained social stratification to hold power. In these ways, Pakistan's independence was a changing of the guard, moving from colonial actors to local elites with the same values.

[283] Bajwa, "Pakistan and the Birth of the Regional Pacts in Asia," 16.

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