

**MUSLIM WOMEN IN INDONESIA'S POLITICS:  
AN HISTORICAL EXAMINATION OF  
THE POLITICAL CAREER OF AISYAH AMINY**

**by  
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**A Thesis submitted to  
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The shortened title of thesis:

MUSLIM WOMEN AND POLITICS IN INDONESIA

## ABSTRACT

Author : Nurlena Rifai  
Title : Muslim Women in Indonesia's Politics  
An Historical Examination of  
the Political Career of Aisyah Aminy  
Department : Institute of Islamic Studies,  
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This thesis deals with the political participation of Muslim women since the colonial period into the New Order period. It is a study of the Indonesian women's movement in its different trends the roles of women in gaining and defending Indonesian independence as well as in Indonesia's politics in the Liberal Democracy, Guided Democracy, and New Order periods. It investigates the reasons for the relatively limited participation of women in politics. This low level of political participation is indicated by the ratio of women membership in the House of People's Representatives (DPR, *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*), in the Consultative Assembly (MPR, *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*), and in the central boards of political organizations. This thesis also focuses on the political career and discourse of Aisyah Aminy, and examines her involvement as a case study. The prominence of Aisyah Aminy lies in her ability to transcend the barriers which usually obstruct Muslim women from getting involved in politics.



## RÉSUMÉ

Auteur : Nurlena Rifai  
Titre : Les musulmanes dans la politique  
indonésienne: étude historique de la carrière  
politique de Aisyah Aminy  
Département : Institut d'études islamiques,  
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Ce mémoire porte sur la participation politique des musulmanes, de l'époque coloniale à l'Ordre Nouveau. Les différentes tendances du mouvement des femmes indonésiennes et le rôle que celles-ci ont joué dans l'obtention et la défense de l'indépendance nationale, ainsi que dans la vie politique des régimes successifs de la Démocratie Parlementaire, la Démocratie Dirigée, et de l'Ordre Nouveau, y sont étudiés. Les raisons de la relativement faible participation des femmes à la vie politique y sont aussi examinées. Un indice de cette faible participation est la proportion des femmes au sein de l'Assemblée des représentants du peuple (D P R., Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat), de l'Assemblée consultative (M.P.R., Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat), et des bureaux de direction des organisations politiques. Notre étude historique met l'accent sur la carrière politique et le discours de Aisyah Aminy, dont l'importance réside dans sa capacité à surmonter les obstacles empêchant généralement les musulmanes de s'engager dans la vie politique.

## Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to Prof Charles J Adams, the former Director of the McGill-Indonesia IAIN Development Project, and Prof Issa J Boullata, the present Director of the McGill-Indonesia IAIN Development Project, and Prof A Uner Turgay, Director of the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, who gave me the opportunity to study at the Institute. I would also like to express my deepest gratitude to my academic advisor and thesis supervisor, Prof A Uner Turgay, for his valuable advise in determining the ultimate direction and scope of this thesis. Thanks are also due to Prof Taufik Abdullah for his advise and supervision and to Prof Karel A. Steenbrink who kindly gave of his valuable time to read this thesis.

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know her opinions, to my beloved brother, Muhammad Abduh, who assisted me by collecting valuable sources for this thesis. To those who are not mentioned by name, I wish to express my deepest thanks for all their contributions. Without their help, this work could hardly have been completed.

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Montreal, July 1993

NRR

## Spelling and Transliteration

In transliterating the Arabic names and terms in this thesis, I have used the transliteration scheme employed at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University. However, the Indonesian names of persons, organizations, books, and magazines which are originally from Arabic, have not been transliterated.

The Indonesian names and terms are written according to the new Indonesian spelling used since 1972. However, certain names of persons and places written in the old spelling will still appear, especially in quotations. Some examples of the differences between the old and the new Indonesian spelling are *ch, dj, j, sj, tj* which become respectively: *kh, j, y, sy, c*.

Examples of transliteration from Arabic to English to Indonesian are

<i>Arabic</i>	<i>English</i>	<i>Indonesian</i>	<i>Arabic</i>	<i>English</i>	<i>Indonesian</i>
ث	th	ts	د	d	dh/dl
ح	h	h	ط	t	th
ذ	dh	dz	ظ	z	zh
ش	sh	sy	ع	'	l
ص	s	sh	ء	,	,

Since this thesis has been typed using a word processor, there are several technical areas which could not be mechanically resolved. The *ayn* has been represented by reserved apostrophe ('). The *hamza* is denoted by the apostrophe (')

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## INTRODUCTION

Indonesia, which is situated in Southeast Asia, is the largest Muslim country in the world. According to the 1988 statistics, Indonesia's population was 175 million. With an annual growth rate of 2.1%,<sup>1</sup> Indonesia's population is now about 193.375 million. In 1988, Indonesian Muslims constituted 88% of the total population,<sup>2</sup> or about 134 million people. In 1980, the ratio of males to females of the Indonesian population was 98:100, and between 1985 and 1990 it was 99:100.<sup>3</sup>

From the point of view of cultural geography, Indonesian Islam is located at the periphery of the Islamic world. It is located far from the Middle East and its relatively late Islamization compared to other Islamic regions such as Iran, North Africa, Turkey, and India caused it to be ignored in Islamic discourse.

Islam came to and spread in the Indonesian archipelago between the twelfth and seventeenth centuries. At that time, the dominant religious pattern in the area was a mixture of pagan animism and a mysticism superimposed on it during the Buddhist and Hindu periods.<sup>4</sup>

Islam was acceptable to the Indonesians only in so far as it was able to accept the old religious patterns and associate itself with existing practices and beliefs. In this respect, Islam was fortunate, for it was introduced into the Malay area by traders.

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<sup>1</sup> United States Department of State, "Indonesia," *Bureau of Public Affairs*, (April 1989), 1.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS), *Indikator Sosial Wanita Indonesia* (Jakarta: BPS, 1991), v.

<sup>4</sup> Howard M. Federspiel, "The Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union)," (Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, 1966), 1. see also Taufik Abdullah, *Sejarah dan Masyarakat Lintasan Historis Islam di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1987).

from Gujarat, on the West Coast of India, where Islam had been subject to influences from both Hindus and the Isma'īlī Shī'ahs and consequently also gave considerable stress to mysticism. This Gujarati version of Islam struck a responsive chord among the Indonesians, and it was easy for the Indonesians to understand it, appreciate it, and use it.<sup>5</sup>

Many indigenous religious practices continued after the arrival of Islam, some openly, but most under the guise of being part of Islam itself. In other words, the coming of Islam to Indonesia, on the one hand, brought changes to the values and traditions of Indonesian society, and on the other hand, the implementation of Islamic teachings in society was influenced by pre-Islamic traditions.

The interaction between Islam and the local traditions in Indonesia is reflected in the three principal systems of *adat* in use in Indonesia. The position of women in these three systems - the matrilineal, patrilineal, and bilineal systems - is generally equal to that of men.

The position of women in Indonesian society and in Southeast Asia, in general, has a distinct character compared to other regions such as China, India and the Middle East. The position of women in pre-colonial Indonesia has always been very prominent in the family and in society. However, some systems of *adat* in use in Indonesia have discriminated against women such as forced marriages, polygamy, and the one-sided right of repudiation (*talāq*). The position of Indonesian women was further weakened by colonial exploitation in the nineteenth century which caused the position of Indonesian males and females alike to deteriorate.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 2, see also Marshal G. S. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974), 546-551.

<sup>6</sup> Cora Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian woman: Struggles and Achievements* (Netherlands: Mouton & C.O. - 's-Gravenhage the Hague, 1960), 47-48.

The struggle of Indonesian women to improve their position and free themselves from *adat* was fought along side the struggle to gain independence from colonialism. The women's movement was also involved in the debate on Islamic reform. The pioneers of Islamic reform, who, at the turn of the century, brought to the Indonesian scene new ideas and thoughts realized that Indonesian Muslims would not be able to deal with the challenges of Dutch colonialism, Christian penetration and the struggle for progress in other parts of Asia, if they continued to pursue their traditional activities to uphold Islam.<sup>7</sup>

Indonesian Muslim women have been continuously struggling to seek proper roles and positions for themselves in the changing modern social life. On the one hand, they wish to hold on to Islamic teachings and traditional values. On the other hand, they want to have active roles in the social, cultural, economic, and political life. Meanwhile, the role of Muslim women in various fields has been increasing in line with the increase in educational opportunities, mainly in the New Order period.

Only few women, however, participate in politics. This phenomenon can be observed in the membership of the DPR ( *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, The House of People's Representatives), of the MPR ( *Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*, The Consultative Assembly), and of the central boards of political organizations. This is reason for concern given the fact that the number of Indonesian women is larger than that of men and that they have important positions in Indonesian society. Indonesian women have also made important contributions to the national struggle for gaining and defending independence.

Some writers have studied the Indonesian women's movement since its early stages up to the period after independence. Cora Vreede-de Stuers, for example, has

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<sup>7</sup> Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement 1900-1942* (London : Oxford University Press, 1973)



written about the struggle of Indonesian women to gain emancipation. She discusses women's position in Indonesian traditional society and the growth of the Indonesian women's movement both in the colonial period and in the post-independence period.<sup>8</sup>

Nani Soewondo SH studied Indonesian women's position in law and society. She discusses various problems related to women's position such as population, Indonesian legal system, *adat* (traditional custom), women's position in the marriage acts, women's position in inheritance law, children welfare, etc.<sup>9</sup>

Sukanti Suryochondro analyzes the purposes, activities, and ways of work, leadership, as well as the social groups from which the members of Indonesian women's organizations are recruited. She studies the Indonesian women's organizations both as a social movement and as a set of formal groupings which grow from one period to another in conjunction with social development's.<sup>10</sup> Hajjah Ani Idrus describes the Indonesian women's organizations since its early stages in the early twentieth century until the 1950s. She also discusses the role of prominent Indonesian women warriors in the colonial period.<sup>11</sup>

This thesis studies the political participation of Muslim women in Indonesia since the early stages of the Indonesian women's movement until the New Order period in the present time. This study emphasizes the political career and discourse of Aisyah Aminy whom the present writer considers to be a prominent woman politician in Indonesia who represents Indonesian Muslim women.

<sup>8</sup> Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*.

<sup>9</sup> Nani Soewondo SH., *Kedudukan Wanita Indonesia dalam Hukum dan Masyarakat* (Jakarta: Ghalia Indonesia, 1984).

<sup>10</sup> Sukanti Suryochondro, *Potret Pergerakan Wanita Indonesia* (Jakarta: C.V. Rajawali, 1984).

<sup>11</sup> Hajjah Ani Idrus, *Wanita Dulu Sekarang dan Esok* (Medan: Waspada, 1980).

This thesis comprises four chapters. The first chapter is divided into three parts. Part one deals with women's portrayal and position in the literary and anthropological traditions of Indonesian society. This includes a discussion of the prominent position of women in the domains of art, literature and education, and of the position of women in the three systems of kinship; part two focuses on women and traditional political legitimacy by describing the historically important role of women as sources of political legitimacy; part three discusses women as political and military leaders.

The second chapter concentrates on Indonesian Muslim women in the political movement. This chapter is divided into two parts. Part one deals with the historical background of the Indonesian women's movement since the beginning of the twentieth century until the proclamation of independence. Part two concentrates on the women's movement and ideological conflicts within it since the transfer of full sovereignty from the Dutch to the Indonesian government until the Constitutional (Liberal) Democracy and Guided Democracy periods.

The third chapter, comprised of three parts, focuses on the women's movement in the New Order period. Part one deals with the political and economic restructuring which, among other influences, served to increase women's activities. In the New Order period, women's organizations have paid attention in their activities towards economic programs, in line with the government policy which stressed economic development. Part two analyzes the General Elections which were held in Indonesia since its independence until the 1992 General Elections. It describes the two different political systems which carried out six General Elections. The first General Election was held in 1955 under the political system of Constitutional (Liberal) Democracy. The following General Elections were held in 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992 under the political system of Pancasila Democracy. Part three analyzes the role of Muslim women in the Legislative Assembly. It discusses some of the factors which

account for the very small number of women who became members of DPR/MPR and members of the central boards of political organizations

The fourth chapter concentrates on the political career and discourse of Aisyah Aminy. It surveys the social conditions of Minangkabau society where she grew up. It discusses her personal and educational background, as well as her social and organizational activities and political career since her youth period until she became a prominent politician. The last part of this chapter presents the view of Aisyah Aminy on various social, educational, political, and religious issues.

Aisyah talks about Islamic political parties, state ideology, the political systems of Constitutional (Liberal) Democracy, Guided Democracy, and Pancasila Democracy. She also talks about *Dwifungsi ABRI* (The Military's Dual Function) its practices, and the reasons which led her to choose Parmusi and then the PPP (The United Development Party) as the forums for her political struggle. She also explains her motivation to be active in politics and her understanding of politics. She discusses the political role of women in Indonesia and the opportunities for women to participate in politics. She gives her impressions about her experience as a DPR member and relates the most crucial affair she has experienced as a member of DPR/MPR.

Aisyah also describes the struggle of the PPP for economic and political democratization, for changes in the political party structure and its proposal to include members of the political parties in the cabinet.

She presents her opinions on science and technological developments and on the need for religious education in the face of the trend towards globalization.

This thesis proposes that the political participation of Muslim women in Indonesia can only be improved if the prevalent social perception about the main duty and obligation of women is changed. The change should be accompanied and supported

by adopting a more open and democratic political system, and by developing an Islamic interpretation which will give more opportunities for women to participate in politics. Besides, women have to show their potentialities and their determination to participate in the political sphere, which requires education and professionalism

The Data for this study came from primary sources and secondary sources. The primary sources include the interview with Aisyah Aminy, the materials on Indonesian women's organizations; their programs and activities, written by Indonesian and foreign writers, and by the Indonesian government. The secondary sources are studies of Indonesian politics, history, culture, and Islamic organizations written by Indonesian and foreign writers

## CHAPTER ONE

### INDONESIAN WOMEN IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

#### 1. Women in Literary and Antropological Tradition

The Southeast Asian region has a distinct character especially with respect to the position of women compared to other regions such as China, India, and the Middle East. The influences of Hinduism, Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, and Confucianism in their respective spheres have by no means eliminated the pattern of high female autonomy and the importance of the economic role of women in Southeast Asia. Like in the other Southeast Asian countries, the position of women in pre-colonial Indonesia<sup>12</sup> has always been very prominent in the family and in society. In addition, the contribution of Muslim women to present day Indonesia is deemed more important than that in other Muslim countries.

The important role of Indonesian women in the realms of literature and mythology, art, education, politics, the military, and the economy is attested to by historical and anthropological evidence in Indonesian society.

The important role of women in Minangkabau society can be seen in some Minangkabau traditional literatures such as *Kaba Tjindua Mato*, *Kaba Rantjak di Labueh*, and *Kaba Saba nan Aluih*, the story of a daring young woman. In the *Tjindua Mato* epic, the woman is the source of wisdom, whereas in the later kaba she is more of a doer than a thinker.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> The term of Indonesia here is used to refer to the archipelago which, under Dutch administration, was called the East Indies. Later, after the proclamation of independence, it was named Indonesia. Indonesia and Malaysia are jointly referred to as Nusantara.

<sup>13</sup> Taufik Abdullah, "Some Notes on the Kaba Tjindua Mato: An Example of Minangkabau Traditional Literature," *Indonesia*, 9 (April 1970), 1.

The *Kaba Tjindua Mato* is a famous epic about Minangkabau royalty which has as two of its primary characters a "queen mother," Bundo Kanduang who stood by herself, who was created together with the universe, and her son, Dang Tuanku. In this tale, Bundo Kanduang is portrayed as wise, and she has definite opinions which she puts forth. She consults with both the "Council of Ministers" (Mkb, *Basa Ampek Balai*) and with her son who counsels temperance before action.<sup>14</sup> "Again and again Dang Tuanku reminds his mother, Bundo Kanduang, of her own advice to use *akal* (the ability to reason) in directing nafsu (impulse) "<sup>15</sup>

At one point in the *kaba*, "Bundo Kanduang with her strong sense of justice almost followed her nafsu and punished Tjindua Mato. Again Dang Tuanku proposed that she used *akal* to consider the matter more thoroughly."<sup>16</sup>

The *Kaba Tjindua Mato* is devoted to the exaltation of Bundo Kanduang. She was the queen whose position "was neither purchased nor asked for," the original queen (*raja usali*) who "stood by herself, created together with the universe" (Minangkabau). She gave Dang Tuanku his adat education. Yet, in spite of her function as a source of wisdom, Bundo Kanduang could not make any decisions. By herself, Bundo Kanduang was only a potentiality which had to be manifested through the men of wisdom. She stood by herself and when she left the profane world and ascended to the Seventh Heaven, she had already given the ancestral wisdom and was, in fact, the symbol of truth itself.<sup>17</sup>

Bundo Kanduang's importance stems especially from her function as the

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 15-16.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

"intermediary" between the concept of truth itself and Dang Tuanku who had the ability to manifest that concept, or rather between the divine conception and the royal house of Minangkabau. At one point, Bundo Kanduang told Dang Tuanku and *Tjindua Mato* that she had acquired her unchallenged wisdom only after she had given birth to Dang Tuanku. She began to conceive her son because of her excessive *hawa nafsu* (impulse) which yearned after the impossible.<sup>18</sup>

In the *Kaba Tjindua Mato*, Bundo Kanduang as the mother figure is not only interpreted as the persistent symbol of Minangkabau matrilineal society within the patriarchal royal family, but also can be considered as the more general basis of legitimacy for the Kingdom.<sup>19</sup>

Another example of Minangkabau traditional literature is the *Kaba Rantjak di Labueh*, which offers some insights into the ideal functioning of male and female roles in the matrilineal group. In this tale, the mother, Siti Djuhari, is both a teacher and an actor. She recommends aspects of both her daughter's and her son's general behavior and initiates specific matters, such as searching for a good man to become her daughter's husband. She asks her son to carry out this task. In certain instances, he thinks it is better that she carry out important inter-kin group negotiations, such as those regarding her daughter's marriage, and she agrees to his recommendation and does so.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 19.

<sup>20</sup> Anthony H. Johns, ed. and transl., *Rantjak di Labueh: A Minangkabau Kaba*, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1958), cited by Nancy M. Tanner and Lynn L. Thomas, "Rethinking Matriliney: Decision-Making and Sex Roles in Minangkabau," in Lynn L. Thomas and Franz von Benda-Beckmann, eds., *Change and Continuity in Minangkabau. Local, Regional, and Historical Perspectives on West Sumatra*, (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), 65.

In other instances, she initiates actions such as changing her son's title and, later, arranging for his elevation to the status of *penghulu*<sup>21</sup> by holding a feast so that the matter of his initial title change to Sutan Sampurna could be discussed and an agreement reached on the title change.<sup>22</sup>

In this kaba, like the previous one, an important male-female kin role model is also that of mother-son; and consultation, not only between mother and son but also with the council of the kingdom is considered important. Whether regarding the woman as a senior figure in a matrilineal kin unit or as a queen mother in the Kerajaan Minangkabau, both Kabas stress motherly wisdom, initiative, assertiveness, stability, integrity, and practicality. In both kabas, the mother is the central figure. The role of men is also important and discussions are a central dynamic in the decision making process.<sup>23</sup>

The prominent position of women is also seen in the domains of art, literature, and education. Women were strongly represented in the dance, music, and drama groups in the traditional communities of Indonesia. In Banten, there was a mixed group of jugglers and actors on hand for royal circumcisions. The female singer has continued to be almost as central a figure in the Javanese *wayang kulit* traditions as the male puppeteer.<sup>24</sup>

There was also a tradition of literacy among both sexes which survived longer in

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<sup>21</sup> The status and function of *penghulu* during Dutch rule, see Taufik Abdullah, "The Making of a Schakel Society: the Minangkabau Region in the Late 19th Century," *Majalah Ilmu-ilmu Sastra Indonesia*, 6 (3) 1976, 13-29.

<sup>22</sup> Tanner and Thomas, "Rethinking Matriliney," 65.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 67.

<sup>24</sup> Anthony Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1988), 168.



some places than in others.<sup>25</sup> According to Zollinger, for example, most Balinese women could still read in the nineteenth-century.<sup>26</sup> Siti Aisah We Teunialle, who was queen of Tanete as mentioned above, composed a 7 000- page epic called *I La-Galigo* and founded the first school in Tanete which gave an opportunity for both men and women to study.<sup>27</sup>

There were *pesantren*, *surau*, and *dayah* (Islamic schools) where Indonesians acquired their education which focused on religious instruction. In this educational system, both men and women learned Arabic to enable them to read Islamic books written in Arabic, or at least, the Qur'ān.<sup>28</sup>

It can be concluded from the above overview that Indonesian women have played an important role in Indonesia's pre-colonial period. The important role of Indonesian women is also enhanced by the system of kinship in Indonesia.

The important role of Indonesian women has also been reflected in three principal systems of kinship in use in Indonesia i.e. the matrilineal system, the patrilineal system, and the bilineal system. Concerning the matrilineal system-- which exists in Minangkabau and parts of Aceh and Southern Sumatra--, Tsuyoshi Kato identifies its basic characteristics. After identifying descent and descent group formation, properties, residential patterns and authority, he concludes that the

<sup>25</sup> Ibid

<sup>26</sup> H. Zollinger, "The Island of Lombok," *JIAEA*, 5 (1851), 323-344, cited by Reid, "Female Roles," 638-639.

<sup>27</sup> Baroroh Baried, "Islam and the Modernization of Indonesian Women," in Taufik Abdullah and Sharon Shiddique, eds., *Islam and Society in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), 142.

<sup>28</sup> A. Mu'ti Ali, "The Muhammadiyah Movement: A Bibliographical Introduction," (M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1957), 16-17, see also Paul W. van der Veur, *Education and Social Change in Colonial Indonesia (I)* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies Southeast Asia Program, 1969), 1.

women's position in Indonesian society is very important.<sup>29</sup> For example, in family gatherings, the wife has a say in the matter under discussion, no law can prevent her from becoming *mamak* (brother from female line) and she is often *kepala waris*. She manages her own possessions, those she brought with her (*harta pendapatan*), as well as those acquired during the marriage (*harta pencaharian*), which is in complete agreement with the *fikih* (jurisprudence). She is greatly respected, especially when she is old, but this esteem and this independence must be seen against the background of communal life.<sup>30</sup>

Under the patrilineal system which can be found, among other places, in the Batak country, on the Nias, in the South of Sumatra, Bali, Lombok, as well as on several of the Maluku islands, the wife generally follows the husband into the husband's family. But the wife may manage her own property, and she has the right to ask for a divorce. Whether or not she can easily avail herself of these rights in practice is another, more difficult, question.<sup>31</sup>

Under the bilineal system, which is found in Java, among the Toraja of central Sulawesi, in Minahasa, among the Dayak of Kalimantan, and in other regions, the children belong to both families, to the husband's as well as to the wife's. Sons and daughters inherit the family possessions and the household goods. The children, that is, the boys regularly and the girls in exceptional cases, have access to the dignities which come to them from both sides, the maternal and the paternal. No legal incapacity can touch the married woman.

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<sup>29</sup> Tsuyoshi Kato, *Matriliney and Migration Evolving Minangkabau Traditions in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982), 51-52.

<sup>30</sup> Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, 28.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 28-29.

Economically, the matrimonial system is that of the community reduced to acquests. The widow manages her own property, which she holds entirely without sharing with her children. She also has a share of the acquests, often half, sometimes less, decided by the Islamic regulations on the partition of inheritance. When there are children of minor age, she manages the estate as a whole. Therefore, she becomes head of the household and trustee of the children. In Java, custom demands that possessions inherited or acquired by either partner during the marriage, the *gana-gini*, become common property, therefore giving husband and wife equal rights. Together the couple decides what use will be made of this property (*mufakat*). Even among the families of the *priyayi* (noble civil servants) where the wife cannot obtain property by earning her living (but here conceptions are changing), the idea that she has a right to the *gana-gini* has remained widespread, since by running the home, she helps her husband earn his living.<sup>32</sup>

## 2. Women in Traditional Political Legitimacy

In politics, Indonesian women played an important role as the source of legitimacy of political power. The example of Sumbadra, the quintessential female vessel of *kasekten* (supernatural power) and the possessor of potent hereditary powers underlines the vital legitimating and dynastic role played by women in Javanese history.<sup>33</sup> Two famous examples of women of royal descent who combined

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., 30

<sup>33</sup> In the historical tradition, the ruler emerged typically in one of two ways. If he represented the first ruler of a new dynasty, he emerged as the man believed to have received the *wahyu*, the divine radiance which passed from the disintegrating Power of one kingdom to the founder of its successor. Very often, the new ruler would be a female of relatively humble origins and thus considered a parvenue e.g. Ken Angrok, and Panembahan Senapati coming to power after a period of turmoil and bloodshed usually instigated by the new ruler himself. See Benedict R O'G. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Claire Holt, ed., *Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), 25-28.

legitimacy and *kasekten* were Ken Dedes, queen of Singasari and spouse of the Ken Angrok, ruler of the East Javanese Kingdom of Tumapel Singasari in early thirteenth century, and the Princess of Pajajaran, who, according to the '*Serat Sakondhar*', was the mother of the Dutch Governor-General Jan Pieterszoon Coen.<sup>34</sup>

Both these women were so 'hot' in the magical sense that flames issued forth from their wombs, and only men of unusual potency were able to possess them.<sup>35</sup> According to the '*Pararaton*' (Book of Kings), a chronicle which deals with Ken Dedes and the rulers of Tumapel-Singasari and Majapahit, such a woman was an 'Ardhanariswari'. She was the very pick of women. Even the poorest man who could make her his own would become supreme ruler (Ratu Anakrawarti).<sup>36</sup> Therefore the succession of the Tumapel-Singasari Dynasty was determined by descent from Dedes, not from Angrok. It should not be forgotten that Angrok himself became Lord of Tumapel only by virtue of his union with Dedes. And even in the case of Ayam Wuruk, descent from the daughter of Kertanagara (the great-grandson of Dedes and the Lord of Tumapel) was considered more important than descent from Kertarajasa, the great-great grandson of Angrok himself, whose burial temple was neglected during Ayam-Wuruk's reign.<sup>37</sup>

As for the Princess of Pajajaran in the '*Baron Sakondhar's tale*', no Javanese ruler was magically potent enough to have sexual intercourse with her and she was

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<sup>34</sup> Peter Carey and Vincent Houben, "Spirited Srikandhis and Sly Sumbadras: The Social, Political and Economic Role of Women at the Central Javanese Courts in the 18th and early 19th centuries," in Elsbeth Locher-Scholten and Anke Niehof, eds., *Indonesian Women in Focus* (Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1987), 15.

<sup>35</sup> Brandes J, "Pararaton (Ken Arok) of het Boek der koningen van Tumapel en van Majapahit," (Batavia: Martinus Nijhoff, 1897), 35, cited by Carey and Houben, "Spirited Srikandhis," 15.

<sup>36</sup> B.J.O. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies* (The Hague, Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1957), 72.

<sup>37</sup> Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological*, 71.

eventually sold to the Dutch for the suitably phallic brideprice of three cannons. The Dutch, in the person of the mythical *Baron Sukmul* (father of Mur Jangkung/Jan Pieterszoon Coen) were then able to possess her, thus establishing a new dynasty in West Java/Batavia which was viewed by the Javanese as the legitimate successor of the Kingdom of Pajajaran <sup>38</sup>

The basic concept behind the stories of both these women is that their superabundant power enabled them to confer suzerainty on suitably potent partners and thus to guarantee the legitimacy of succeeding generations <sup>39</sup> At the same time, the ability of their spouses to tame the uncontrolled and excessive procreative powers symbolized by their flaming wombs meant that their destructive energies could be transformed into a fertile and beneficial influence crucial to the cosmic harmony of the universe <sup>40</sup> Schrieke noted that this legitimizing role was the most normal type of justification by which unbroken continuity of lineage was guaranteed. Descent was the proof of legitimacy par excellence. The weaker the justification on the basis of heredity, the greater the effort that would have to be made to adduce supernatural proofs <sup>41</sup>

Schrieke then gives many instances of this type of justification: the first ruler of Demak, Raden Patah, was said to have been a son of the last ruler of Majapahit. The third sultan of Demak, Trenggana, the son of Sultan Demak I, is reputed to have married a daughter of Arya Damar, Bra-Wijaya's eldest son. Andayaningrat (Kyai

<sup>38</sup> M.C. Ricklefs, *Jogjakarta under Sultan Mangkubumi 1749-1792; a History of the Division of Java* (London: Oxford University Press, 1974), 400, 410, cited in Carey and Houben, "Spirited Srikandhis," 15

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 71-72

<sup>40</sup> E. Lind, "The Ideal Equilibrium, Balanced Oppositions in Javanese Symbolic Structure," (M.A. thesis, University of Stockholm, 1975), 116-117, cited by Carey and Houben, "Spirited Srikandhis," 15.

<sup>41</sup> Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological*, 13

Gede Pengging), according to historical tradition, was a mighty general in the later days of the Majapahit period who finally fell in the struggle against Demak. He was also the grandfather of the first and only sultan of Pajang through his marriage with one of Bra-Wijaya's daughters. The sultan of Pajang himself married a daughter of the third and last ruler of Demak. The official genealogy makes the rulers of Mataram descendents of Bra-Wijaya as well. Senapati, the founder of the Mataram dynasty, married Retna Jumilah, a granddaughter of the last sultan of Demak.<sup>42</sup>

According to Schrieke, it is remarkable that, in all these cases, such great importance was attached to descent along the female line. Even Sunan Gunung Jati, the founder of the Banten and Cirebon dynasties, married, according to traditional accounts, a princess of Majapahit. As Djajadiningrat has stated:

The view that all royal authority must be based on hereditary rights is found even more clearly expressed in certain traditions which, furthermore, have this remarkable characteristic in common—that the justifications they adduce for the legitimacy of rule are all of a piece, that is to say, in every case the royal authority is represented as based on a heritage in the female line.<sup>43</sup>

Djajadiningrat further calls attention to certain traditions tending to justify the power of Cirebon and Banten in Western Java by making both Sunan Gunung Jati, the founder of the Cirebon dynasty, and his eldest son, Hasanuddin, who raised Banten to the position of an independent realm, marry a princess of pre Moslem Pajajaran.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 13-14.

<sup>43</sup> Hoesein Djajadiningrat, "Critische Beschouwing van de Sadjarah Banten Bijdrage ter kenscheting van de Javaansche geschiedshrijving (Critical Appraisal of the Sejarah Banten: Contribution to the Characterization of Javanese Historiography), (Ph.D. diss., University of Leiden, 1913), cited by Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological*, 14.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

### 3. Women as the Political and Military Leaders

Women also played an important role in the military field and were actively involved in the planning and implementation of policies. After describing the dispatchment of an old woman named Nyai Pombaya by the ruler of Demak to Banten, Pinto, while he was in the latter port in 1540, explained that the rulers of Java had always been accustomed to handle the most important matters of their state through the mediation of women, especially when it concerned peace.<sup>45</sup> Women frequently appeared as negotiators or witnesses on earlier Javanese inscriptions.<sup>46</sup> Elsewhere, in Sulawesi, the Torajans sent an old, blind, aristocratic lady to negotiate for peace with the attacking Bugis forces of Aru Palaka in 1683.<sup>47</sup> Of course, men were also used as envoys and overwhelmingly so as the International norms of Muslim and Christian states took greater effect in the seventeenth-century. What Pinto's comment suggests is that the pre-occupation of the male elites with the ordering of the political system in terms of hierarchies of status, and the obligation for them (especially in Java)<sup>48</sup> to avenge any infraction of that status, made them dangerous emissaries for those who really sought peace. Men could not bargain as women were expected to, nor could they subordinate their own sense of honour to the need for a settlement.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>45</sup> F. M. Pinto, *The Travel of Mendes Pinto* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 177.

<sup>46</sup> J. G. de Casparis, "Pour une histoire sociale de l'ancienne Java principalement au xème s., Archipel 21 (1981), 147, cited by Reid, "Female Roles," 636.

<sup>47</sup> L. Andaya, *The Heritage of Arung Palakka: A History of South Sulawesi (Celebes) in the seventeenth Century* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 260.

<sup>48</sup> Tome Pires, *The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires*, Trans. by A. Cortesao, (London: Hakluyt Society, 1944), vol.1, 176.

<sup>49</sup> Reid, *Southeast Asia in the Age*, 166.

While in Java women were considered the source of legitimacy, in Aceh women played a more actual and important role as the rulers<sup>50</sup>

During an uninterrupted period of fifty eight years (1641-1699), the throne of Aceh was occupied by women. There were four queens who governed Aceh: Safiyatuddin Taj al-Alam (1641-1675), Naqiyatuddin Nur al-Alam (1675-1678), Zakiyatuddin Inayat Svah (1678-1688), and Kamalat Shah Zinatuddin (1688-1699)<sup>51</sup>

Unfortunately in 1699, a *fatwa* (legal recommendation) was issued in Mecca condemning rule by a woman as contrary to Muslim law. As a result, the fourth sultana, Kamalat Shah, was deposed after her opponents invoked the *fatwa* to justify this action. Authority then passed into the hands of an Arab dynasty of sayyids<sup>52</sup>

In addition, according to A. Hasjmy, a famous Muslim scholar in Aceh, members of parliament (*Majlis Mahkamah Rakyat*) in the time of Ratu Safiyatuddin consisted of seventy-three persons, eighteen of whom were women. Among the women's

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<sup>50</sup> We have to refer in this case to *Tāj al-salātīn* (The Crown of the Kings), a purely 'theoretical' treatise composed by Bukhārī al-Jawhārī in 1603. According to the text, one of the pre-requisites to become a ruler is being male because women lack good character. A woman should be allowed to ascend the throne only if the king dies without having a male relation to succeed him. The text also delineates a differential code of behaviour for male and female rulers. A man must be visible to his royal subjects because his royal self must be seen by the people. On the other hand, a woman must not be seen, she must cover her whole body with the exception perhaps of the face and the hands when she is in privacy. When a queen wants to meet with her ministers, she must do so behind a barrier. According to the text, on holidays and Fridays, the king must go out in public, accompanied by his ministers to pray at the mosque and demonstrate his grandeur and majestic power. A queen can not do this since she is not to be seen by men. She can only meet with women and female ministers. A woman is permitted to meet with men to discuss governmental affairs, but she must heed their advice since the intelligence of a woman can never equal a man's ability to deal with difficult problems. These are the inherent differences between a man and a woman. See Bokhari De Djohore, *Makota radja-radja ou la couronne des rois*, Edited by Aristide Marre, (Paris. Maisonneuve et cie, 1817), 104-106.

<sup>51</sup> D.J.M. Tate, *The Making of Modern South-East Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 225, 238.

<sup>52</sup> Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological*, 244.



members of parliament were Siti Cahaya Sinyak Bunga, Nyak Puwan, Sinyak Ukah, Sinyak Habibah, Uli Puwan, Siti Awam, and Sinyak Tampli.<sup>53</sup>

Other examples also demonstrate the important role of women in Acehnese society. There were some female chiefs (*uleehalang*) such as Cut Nyak Asiah, Pocut Meuligoe, Cut Nyak Keureunto and Cutma Fatimah. Aceh was also well known for its heroines such as Laksamana Malahayati, the lady admiral of the sultanate of Aceh. She was perhaps the first woman in Nusantara who truly embodied women's emancipation long before the consciousness of emancipation came into realization amongst Indonesian women. There were also female military leaders such as Laksamana Meurah Ganti and Laksamana Muda Cut Meurah Inseuen.<sup>54</sup>

The important role of women in politics and in the military field is illustrated in the 'Babad Bedhah ing Ngayogyakarta' (Chronicle of the Fall of Yogyakarta), an account of events in Yogyakarta during the British occupation of Java (1811-1816). The principal wife of Sultan Hamengkubuwono III (reigned 1812-1814), Ratu Kencana is referred to repeatedly as having behaved 'like a man', indeed in a more manly fashion than the Javanese males themselves. She is praised for having been one of the very few to stick by her husband (then Yogyakarta crown prince) despite a flesh wound in the foot due to Sepoy sniper fire. Later, after the third sultan's untimely death in November 1814, she is described as having manfully tried to control her grief and as having taken the necessary actions to ensure the security of the inner kraton.<sup>55</sup>

Another female heroine described in the 'Babad Bedhah' is Raden Ayu Yudakusuma, a daughter of the first sultan (reigned 1746-1792), who was married to

<sup>53</sup> Hasjmy, *Kebudayaan Aceh dalam Sejarah* (Jakarta: Beuna, 1983), 141.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, 142

<sup>55</sup> Carey and Houben, "Spirited Srikanthis," 20.

the sickly Yogya *bupati* (regent) of Grobogan-Wirasari. In July 1812, at the time of British annexation of the outlying territories of the sultanate, she is said to have refused to depart from her *kabupaten* (regency) without express instructions from the third sultan. She resolutely stood her ground against the British officer who was dispatched by Raffles to take over the administration of the province. After the arrival of a royal messenger from Yogyakarta confirming the annexation, she reluctantly agreed to depart. She had to take charge of all the removal arrangements for her household because of the indisposition of her husband. This she was able to do with great resourcefulness because, in the words of the '*Babad Bedhah*'s author, she was a lady of 'shrewd intelligence, outstanding ability and manly ingenuity' <sup>56</sup>

These qualities were subsequently much in evidence during the Java War when she masterminded the massacre of the Chinese community at Ngawi on September seventeenth, 1825, and became one of Dipanagara's most feared cavalry commanders. At the time of her eventual surrender to the Dutch in October 1828, it was noticed that, like any of Dipanagara's male commanders, she had shaved off her hair as a sign of her dedication to the 'Holy War' against the Dutch and the 'apostate' Javanese <sup>57</sup>

An even better known example of such a well born lady who played an active role in the military struggle against the Dutch during these years was Raden Ayu Serang (1766-1855). A scion of the prestigious Sunan Kalijaga wali (apostle of Islam) family and an ex-official of the Yogyakarta court, she is mentioned in the Dutch sources as having led a cavalry squadron in the Serang-Demak area in the first months of the war. Her fame as a lady of unusual *kasekten* acquired through meditation in isolated caves on the south coast, enabled her to continue to exercise

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 20-21.

an influence over the population of her home region of Serang-Demak long after formal hostilities had ended in March 1830.<sup>58</sup>

Siti Aisyah We Teurialle is another example of an Indonesian woman who held an important position as a ruler. She came from South Celebes, in eastern Indonesia. She was an intelligent woman with a strong will and much experience. She became the queen of Tanete in 1856, and was called the *Dai Datu Tanete*. She inherited power from her grandfather, *La Rumpang Megga Matenro Eri Mutiara*, who recommended to the governor of Celebes that his granddaughter should inherit his position. During her rule, she united several regions which had formerly been autonomous. Her three daughters were appointed *arus* (chief of administration) in *Pancana*, *Lololang*, and *Pao-pao*.<sup>59</sup>

Concerning marriage, Anthony Reid relates that the court diary of seventeenth-century Makassar provides a glimpse of the pattern of frequent divorce as it operated at the very top ranks of society, where political and property calculations cannot have been absent. Even here, according to Reid, where it might have been expected, we do not find that divorce is described as a decision by powerful male 'X' to exchange his marriage partner, but rather 'X' and 'Y' separated from each other ( *sikattoi*, from root *katto*, cut off). A female career in this elite group which could not be deemed untypical is that of Kraeng Balla-Jawaya, who was born in 1634 to one of the highest Makassar lineages. At the age of 13 she married Kraeng Bonto-marannu, later to be one of the great Makassar war-leaders. At 25 she separated from him, and soon after married his rival Kraeng Karunrung, the effective Prime Minister. At 31 (1666) she separated from him, perhaps because he was in exile, and two years later married Arung Palakka, who was in the process of conquering her country with Dutch help. At

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 21

<sup>59</sup> Baried, "Islam and the Modernization," 142.

36 she separated from him, and eventually died at the age of 86.<sup>60</sup>

Another aristocratic lady, Kraeng Tangngalia, who was betrothed as a child to the future Sultan Muhammad Said, separated from him, and then at the age of 17 she married him. At the age of 28, she separated from him again. She next appears in this court diary in 1649 after marrying Kraeng Leengkese, the brother of the Balla Jawaya mentioned above. Six years later, she separated from him, but in 1657, at the age of 43, she returned to him until her death in 1661.<sup>61</sup>

In describing female roles in trade,<sup>62</sup> Anthony Reid mentions that the prominence of foreigners and the ruling circle in the trade of most Southeast Asian cities ensured that most of the larger-scale merchants and shipowners were male. A significant number of local women did, however, join this circle. A famous one was Nyai Gede Pinateh, whose tomb is still honoured at Gresik as a promoter of Islam and as the 'foster mother' of Sunan Giri. She was a foreign-born Muslim whose origins are placed by different traditions in Palembang, China, or Cambodia. Around 1500, she appears to have been acting as *shahbandar* (harbour master) of Gresik and reportedly sent her ships to trade in Bali, the Moluccas and Cambodia. Also some royal women put their access to capital to good use. In the 1660s, the wife of Sultan Hasanuddin of Makassar, Lomo' Tombo, owned ships which she sent on very

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<sup>60</sup> Lontara'-bilang Gowa, "Transcriptie van het dagboek der vorsten van Gowa en Tello, met vertaling en aantekeningen," Trans. by A. Ligtoet, BKI, 4 (1880), 87-119, and G.J. Wolhoff and Abdurrahim, eds., *Sejarah Goa* (Makassar: Jajasan Kebudayaan Sulawesi Selatan dan Tenggara, nd), 66, cited by Reid "Female Roles," 630.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> The comparative statistics estimated by Ester Boserup for female participation in trade and marketing in Southeast Asian countries indicate this important role: 56 % of those listed in Thailand were women, 51 % in the Philippines, 47 % in Burma, and 46 % in Cambodia. Although Indonesia had a lower rate of 31 %, this still contrasted sharply with other Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East (1 % to 5 %). See Ester Boserup, *Woman's role in Economic Development* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970), 87-89.

profitable trade missions to Johor. The women who occupied the thrones of Aceh, Jambi, and Indragiri in the seventeenth century similarly traded and speculated at least as vigorously as their male counterparts.<sup>63</sup> Meanwhile a famous Minangkabau poem first written down in the 1820s exhorts mothers to teach their daughters how to judge the rise and fall of prices.<sup>64</sup>

From the above description, it is clear that Indonesian women have always been very prominent in the realms of literature and mythology, art, education, politics, the military, and the economy as is demonstrated by historical and anthropological evidence in Indonesian society. The important role of Indonesian women is also reflected in the system of kinship in Indonesia which allowed women to have an equal position in the field of social, education, economics, and politics.

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<sup>63</sup> For further discussions on the females' role in economy and trade, see Reid, "Female Roles," 635; and also M.A.P. Meilink-Roelofs, *Asian Trade and European Influence in the Indonesian Archipelago between 1500 and about 1630* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 108.

<sup>64</sup> Christine Dobbin, *Islamic Revivalism in a Changing Peasant Economy (Central Sumatra) 1784-1847* (London: Curzon Press, 1983), 50.

## CHAPTER TWO

### INDONESIAN MUSLIM WOMEN IN THE POLITICAL MOVEMENT

#### 1. Muslim Women in the Politics of Independence

The women's movement in Indonesia which emerged in the beginning of the twentieth-century could not be separated from three factors which constituted the background of the movement . nationalism, adat, and religion, i.e. the Islamic reformist movement. With this background, it is not surprising that the women's movement has been actively involved in politics since its earliest stages. In order to describe women's roles in the politics of independence, it is important to give an overview of the Dutch colonial policy toward the Indonesian people to show how the way it evolved since the end of the nineteenth-century had a considerable impact on the rise of the women's movement in Indonesia.

Until the end of the nineteenth-century, cultural contact between Europeans and Indonesians was very limited. It was confined to a few scholars and other interested men on the Dutch side, as well as few high dignitaries on the Indonesian side. The Indonesians, to whom the Dutch gave education, were only a very small group of future officials; the rest of the Indonesian youth were educated by their parents or in the Muslim environment of the *pesantren*. While in the aristocratic milieu, the education of the Indonesian boys was intended mainly to develop the character and the social abilities honoured in the community such as delicacy, courtesy, modesty, self confidence and the like, which embodied the Indonesian (and especially Javanese) ideal of nobility. In addition, they were expected to be acquainted with ancestral manners, customs, and family traditions, as these were the moral pillars of Indonesian society. A girl, on the other hand, did not need to learn more than how to

be a good wife, as understood by the Indonesians at that time.<sup>65</sup>

Dutch education did not spread widely among the Indonesians, however, until after the introduction of the so-called "Ethical Policy" in 1901. The change in Dutch colonial policy was introduced by the Queen's speech in 1901, in reaction to the deterioration of the economic conditions of the Javanese people. C.T.H. Van Deventer, a lawyer in Semarang, had blamed the colonial government for this deterioration in an article which has become famous under the title "*Debt of Honor*". The *Ethische Politiek* (Ethical Policy), adopted as a guiding philosophy of Dutch colonial rule, emphasized the need to uplift the Indonesian people through education and closer cultural association with the Netherlands.<sup>66</sup> Between the years 1904 and 1914, more changes had taken place than during the preceding centuries.<sup>67</sup> The ethical policy also had utilitarian, economic, and bureaucratic aims.<sup>68</sup>

The investigation announced by the Queen's speech was carried out by a Commission appointed to find out the causes of the deplorable economic situation. The Report of the Commission dealt in part with the improvement of the position of the Indonesian woman. The drawing up of a new educational program was entrusted to J.H. Abendanon, whose name will always be associated with that of a young Javanese who is generally looked upon as one of the foremost pioneers of the feminist movement in Indonesia, Kartini, daughter of the regent of Jepara.<sup>69</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Mu'ti Ali, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," 16-17.

<sup>66</sup> van der Veur, *Education and Social Change*, 3.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., 3-4, see also Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, 48.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., see also W.F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change* (The Hague, The Netherlands, W. van Hoeve, 1953), 147.

<sup>69</sup> Kartini was born in April 21, 1879 and died in childbirth in 1904. She wrote dozens of letters and their publication, after her death, gave rise to waves of enthusiasm among the young men and women of her country and aroused sympathy for the feminist cause in Indonesia and in other countries. Kartini's

After Kartini, Dewi Sartika established in 1904 in Bandung her first school which she called *Keutamaan Istri* (Women's Virtues). When she married B. A. Suryawinata in 1906, she did not give up her work. Her husband actively collaborated with her until his death. By 1912, Dewi Sartika had succeeded in founding nine schools for girls. It is a remarkable number since it represented 50 per cent of all the girls' schools in Sundanese country.<sup>70</sup>

Besides Kartini and Dewi Sartika, there were some other women leaders of the Indonesian women's emancipation who expressed many ideas such as Maria Walandow Maramis from North Sulawesi, Nyi Hajar Dewantara and Nyai Ahmad Dahlan from Yogyakarta, Rahmah El-Yunusiyah and Rasuna Said from West Sumatra. They expressed the need for modernizing mental attitudes because there was no equality between men's and women's rights and duties. This persisted in spite of the fact that women, particularly in rural areas, contributed significantly to the economy.<sup>71</sup>

The initiative of these individual women was followed by a clear and purposeful continuation of their struggles through the growth of several women's organizations. Although they had different immediate purposes and programs, they were all committed to the advancement of the position of Indonesian women. Being full of sincerity, they guided women persistently, showing them their rights, duties and positive roles in maintaining their families and societies.<sup>72</sup>

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letters expressed her feelings, her experiences, her observations of her own social milieu and her aspirations for the future. According to Kartini, education was the key to progress for women. See Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, 49-50; see also Baried, "Islam and the Modernization," 142.

<sup>70</sup> Soewondo, *Kedudukan Wanita Indonesia*, 192-196.

<sup>71</sup> Baried, "Islam and the Modernization," 144.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.



It should be noted, however, that the successful women leaders were quite often supported by their male relatives. Kartini, for example, was supported by her father and her husband. Their struggle was part of the burgeoning nationalist movement, which continued to aim for social emancipation which would naturally include that of women.<sup>73</sup>

A close relationship between the women's movement and nationalism has been forged from the beginning. In 1912 *Putri Mardika* (The Independent Women's Association) was founded in Jakarta with the support of the men's group known as *Budi Utomo* (Noble Aspiration). *Budi Utomo* was founded in 1908 by Sutomo, while he was a student at the STOVIA, or medical school. Its members were intellectuals, physicians, as well as civil servants. Its objectives were chiefly educational and cultural. The chief aims of *Putri Mardika* were to grant financial help to intelligent girls so that they could continue their studies; to advise and give information to girls desirous of instruction, to render women less timid and to give them the chance to participate in public life.<sup>74</sup>

After the establishment of *Putri Mardika*, other women's associations were founded such as *Kautamaan Istri* (The Virtues of Women) in Bandung, *Pawiyatan Wanito* (The Educated Woman) in Magelang (1915), *Aisyiyah* in Yogyakarta (1917); *Wanito Susilo* (The Well-Bred Woman) in Pemalang (1908); *Putri Budi Sejati* (The True Girl) in Surabaya (1918), *Kerajinan Amai Setia* (Activity of The Faithful Woman) at Kota Gadang (1914), *Pengasih Ibu kepada Beta* (Pikat, The Mother's Love for Her Offspring) in Minahasa (1917), *Sarekat Kaum Ibu Sumatra* (The Association of Sumatranese Mother) in Bukit Tinggi, and *Wanodya Utomo*, which later became

<sup>73</sup> Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, 61.

<sup>74</sup> See Suryochondro, *Potret Pergerakan*, 85; Idrus, *Wanita Dulu*, 46.

*Sarekat Perempuan Indonesia* (SPII) of *Sarekat Islam*.<sup>75</sup> Some religious organizations also formed women's sections such as *Persatuan Islam Istri* (Persistri, the Women's Section of Persis) and the *Women's Section of Jong Islamieten Bond* (JIBDA).

Some women's organizations issued newspapers or periodicals to spread their ideas about progress and modernization. These also served as vehicles for educating and teaching. Examples of such publications are *Putri Mardika* (Jakarta, 1914), *Wanita Suara* (Pacitan, 1913), *Panuntun Istri* (Bandung, 1918), *al Sarq of Sarekat Kaum Ibu Sumatra* (The East of Sumatranese Mothers Association) (Bukit Tinggi), *Suara Perempuan* (The Voice of Woman) of Padang, *Perempuan Bergerak* (The Active Woman) of Medan, *Putri Hindia* of Bandung, *Sunting Melayu* of Padang (1915), and *Suara Aisyiyah* in Yogyakarta, which first appeared in 1920 and still survives today.<sup>76</sup>

Besides social activities and education, another area in which women became interested was politics. There were women who participated as candidates in the elections of the members of the city councils in 1938.<sup>77</sup> However satisfactory the achievements were, they still reached only a small proportion of the Indonesian women, mostly members of the aristocracy. There was not much impact amongst women of the lower social and economic strata.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Suryochondro, *Potret Pergerakan*, 85, Baried, "Islam and the Modernization," 145.

<sup>76</sup> Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, 64, Suryochondro, *Potret Pergerakan*, 87.

<sup>77</sup> Four women were elected to their local councils: Mrs. Emma Puradiredja in Bandung, Mrs. Soenaryo Mangoenpoespito in Semarang, Mrs. Soedirman in Surabaya, and Mrs. Sumiyati in Cirebon. See Idrus, *Wanita*, 53.

<sup>78</sup> Baried, "Islam and the Modernization," 145.

The spirit of nationalism spread further among the women's movement after the Oath of Youth of October 28, 1928. The first Indonesian Women's Congress was held in Yogyakarta from December 22 to 26, 1928. Some women's organizations which initiated the congress were *Wanita Utomo*, *Putri Indonesia*, *Wanita Katolik*, *Wanita Mulya*, *Aisyiyah*, *The Women's section of Sarekat Islam*, *The Women's Sections of Jong Islamieten Bond (JIBDA)*, *Wanita Taman Siswa*, and *The Women's Section of Jong Java (JJ)*. The *Perikatan Perikumpulan Perempuan Indonesia* (The Bond for the Indonesian Women's Associations) was formed as a result of a decree issued by the congress.<sup>79</sup> Through this federation, the Indonesian women's struggles in education, social activities, health and economic improvement were given a more effective framework.

The federation had a nationalist stance and it was representative of the emerging sense of the Indonesian nation. The name of the organization was changed to *Perikatan Perhimpunan Istri Indonesia* (PPII, Federation of Indonesian Women's Associations) in the second congress which took place in Jakarta from 26 to 31 December, 1929. The federation prohibited the use of the Dutch language.<sup>80</sup> The further development of the women's movement indicates that the national struggle had been given priority over feminist aims.<sup>81</sup> Its aims as a women's movement was to

<sup>79</sup> Soewondo, *Kedudukan Wanita*, 134.

<sup>80</sup> Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, 90-91.

<sup>81</sup> The Dutch government submitted in 1937 to the various associations a draft entitled "*Ordinance Project for the Regulation of the Matrimonial Legislation of the Muslim Population*". This Marriage Ordinance Project was rejected by all women's organizations. The Islamic Organizations and their women's sections rejected it because the Marriage Ordinance Project prohibited the practice of polygamy to those whose marriage would be registered in a civil court. Meanwhile the nationalist women's movement refused it because they feared that it would cause great divisions not only within women's circles but also among those engaged in the nationalist struggle for the freedom of the nation. See Suyatin Kartowiyono, "The Awakening of the Women's Movement of Indonesia," in B. B. Heering, ed., *Indonesian Women, Some Past and Current Perspectives* (Btuyelles: Centre d'etude du sud-est Asiatique et de l'extra line orient, 1976), 5.

co-operate with men not only to raise the status of Indonesian women, but also to face the colonial regime. It realized that achieving independence required unity in all fields, including the unity of Indonesian men and women.<sup>82</sup>

The second factor which the women's movement had to deal with was *adat*. Although Indonesian women enjoyed an elevated position as mentioned above, yet the *adat*<sup>83</sup> enforced discriminatory practices such as forced marriages, child marriages, polygamy, and the one sided right of repudiation. The spread of Islam further enforced these customs.<sup>84</sup> Therefore, it is not surprising that such customs became the focus of the women's movement in Indonesia since the very beginning. Besides advocating education and instruction for girls, they also sought to bring an end to some customs related to matrimonial matters like forced marriage, polygamy, and *talāq* (repudiation). For example, Kartini, the precursor of the Indonesian women's movement condemned forced-marriages and polygamy.<sup>85</sup> Dewi Sartika spoke out against the injustice of unequal pay for women.<sup>86</sup>

The first Indonesian women's congress was held in Yogyakarta from December 22 to 26, 1928. They sent the Dutch government the text of the three approved motions which contained requests which Kartini had voiced earlier: that the number of girls' schools be increased; that an official explanation of the meaning of a *talīq* (conditional or suspended repudiation) be given to the bride at the moment of the

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<sup>82</sup> Baried, "Islam and the Modernization," 145.

<sup>83</sup> Adat is usually defined as that local custom which regulates the interaction of the members of a society, and by this definition we would expect adat in Minangkabau to be a system in opposition to the *sharī'ah*, Islamic law. See Taufik Abdullah, "Adat and Islam. An Examination of Conflict in Minangkabau," *Indonesia*, 2 (October 1966), 1.

<sup>84</sup> Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, 53.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., 58.

marriage settlement and that a regulation granting assistance to widows and orphans of Indonesian civil servants be established.<sup>87</sup>

The female section of *Jong Java, Puteri Indonesia* with the help of the associations *Persaudaraan Isteri*, *Persatuan Ibu*, and *Wanita Sejati*, organized a public meeting in Bandung on October 13, 1929. The subjects dealt with at this particular meeting were polygamy and prostitution. Another women's organization, *Isteri Sedar*, held its first congress at Jakarta in June, 1931 and adopted resolutions that amounted to a call for the abolition of polygamy.

It is important to note that, contrary to other women's organizations, the policy of Islamic women's organizations was generally in favor of polygamy. For example, an association of Muslim women, *Sarekat Isteri Jakarta*, organized a meeting one week after *Isteri Sedar's* congress to protest the resolutions adopted by *Isteri Sedar* about polygamy.<sup>88</sup> Another example, in the second all-Indonesia women's congress held in Jakarta, 1935, Ratna Sari, the prominent leader of the radical Muslim modernist organization, PERMI, indirectly accused Soewarni and her *Isteri Sedar* of having caused an unnecessary division among the Indonesian women by their criticism of polygamy three years earlier. Ratna Sari then eloquently defended polygamy, rejecting the argument of those who opposed the institution of polygamy on the grounds that it was an indication of the lower status the Indonesian women had vis a' vis men. First, Ratna Sari argued that Islam only allows polygamy, but does not encourage it. Even though it allows polygamy, the religious conditions to practice it are very hard since, among other things, Islam requires that the husband should be impartial to all his four wives. Then she explained why Islam allows polygamy. For one thing, she argued, polygamy would significantly reduce, if not totally abolish, one

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid., 88

<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 90-91, and Idrus, *Wanita Dulu*, 50.

of the serious ills of the society, prostitution or having mistresses. Thus she insisted that, by allowing men to have more than one wife, Islam in fact gives the best possible answer to this serious ill of society. Becoming a religiously legal second, or third, or fourth wife of a man was to Ratna Sari a better and higher position than becoming a prostitute or a mistress. For her, Islam regulates the naturally higher sexual urge of the male sex for the best interest of the women.<sup>89</sup>

Soewarni was offended by Ratna Sari's blatant, though indirect, criticism of her, and *Isteri Sedar* demanded that Ratna Sari publicly retract that portion of her speech. In other words, Soewarni wanted Ratna Sari to make a public apology to her and to *Isteri Sedar*. This demand was strengthened by Soewarni's threat to leave the Congress with her *Isteri Sedar*. Unperturbed, the strong-willed Ratna Sari refused to meet Soewarni's demand on the grounds that she did not even mention any names or organizations in her speech. So why, she asked, should she make such an apology to Soewarni and *Isteri Sedar*?<sup>90</sup>

The reaction of Islamic women, concerning polygamy, points out the high sensitivity of Muslim men and women if their religious teachings are misunderstood by other people. The institution of polygyny (polygamy) is probably the Islamic tradition most misunderstood and most vehemently condemned by non Muslims. The first image conjured up in the mind of the Westerner (or Westernized people) when the subject of Islam and marriage is approached is that of a religion which advocates the sexual indulgence of the male members of the society and the subjugation of its females through this institution. Islamic tradition does indeed allow a man to marry more than one woman at a time. This leniency is even established by the Qur'ân (4:3)

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<sup>89</sup> Alfian, *Muhammadiyah: The Political Behaviour of a Muslim Modernist Organization under Dutch Colonialism* (Yogyakarta-Indonesia: Gajahmada University Press, 1989), 324.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 325.

But the use and perception of that institution is different from the popular stereotype. Polygyny is certainly not imposed by Islam; nor it is a universal practice. It is instead regarded as the exception to the norm of monogamy and its exercise is strongly controlled by social pressures <sup>91</sup>

The Indonesian women's movement of the early twentieth-century must also be seen within the context of the Islamic reform movement in the twentieth-century. Islam spread throughout the Indonesian archipelago in a long process which lasted for centuries. One conspicuous characteristic of Indonesian Islam was its inclination towards mysticism. This kind of Islam can be better understood if we observe the process of Islamization in the Indonesian archipelago.

At the time Islam entered the Indonesian archipelago, the dominant religious pattern there was a mixture of pagan Animism and Mysticism super-imposed during the Buddhist and Hindu periods.<sup>92</sup> Islam was acceptable to the Indonesians only in so far as it was able to accept the old religious patterns and to associate itself with existing practices and beliefs. Taking over where Buddhism had left off, Islamic mysticism (*tasawwuf*) was able to make a considerable impact on the Indonesians. In the early period, the Muslim mystic (*sūfī*) was highly honored. During the last half of the seventeenth-century in North Sumatra, the most highly respected religious leaders were all mystics,<sup>93</sup> and on Java, the nine *Walis*, (Saints) who, according to Javanese tradition, were responsible for the spread of Islam on that island, were also

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<sup>91</sup> Lois Lamyā' al- Farūqī, "Islamic Traditions and the Feminist Movement: Confrontation or Cooperation?," *The Islamic Quarterly*, 27 (Third Quarter, 1983), 136

<sup>92</sup> Federspiel, "The Persatuan Islam," 1.

<sup>93</sup> G.W J Drewes, "Indonesia: Mysticism and Activism," in Gustav E. Von Grunebaum, *unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1955), 287-290

mystics.<sup>94</sup> The theologians and jurists took second place to the *sūfīs* in the early period, and up until the twentieth-century the Indonesian '*Ulama*' noted for legal or theological knowledge were also *sūfīs*<sup>95</sup>

After the advent of the steamship, more Indonesians made the pilgrimage to Mecca. As a result, Indonesian Muslims were able to meet with Muslims from other parts of the Muslim world. In time, the Malayo-Indonesian community became the largest foreign delegation in the holy city, and many who travelled to Mecca went on to study in Cairo. By the early twentieth-century, several Malay, Indonesian, Arab, and Indian citizens of the Malayo-Indonesian Muslim world had come under the influence of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muhammad 'Abduh, and Rashīd Ridā. These students returned to Singapore, at that time the center of the Southeast Asian Muslim world. They founded schools, journals, and organizations that spread the doctrine of Islamic modernism into Malaysia and the Indies. They became known as the *Kaum Muda* of Malayo-Indonesian Islam.<sup>96</sup>

A few copies of the periodical *al-Manār* (light) slipped through Dutch customs into the hands of young Indonesians.<sup>97</sup> Another periodical which spread reformist ideas among Indonesian Muslims was *al-'Urwat al-Wuthqā* (The Indissoluble Bond). This publication was issued and edited by Jamāl al-Dīn Asadabādī al-Afghānī and Muhammad 'Abduh in Paris during 1884. It was banned by the Dutch in Indonesia, and could reach K.H. Ahmad Dahlan of the Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta only.

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<sup>94</sup> C.C. Berg, "The Islamization of Java," *Studia Islamica*, 4 (1950), 111-142.

<sup>95</sup> Federspiel, "The Persatuan," 3.

<sup>96</sup> See James L. Peacock, *The Purifying the Faith. The muhammadiyah Movement in Indonesian Islam* (Menlo Park, California: The Benyamin/Cummings publishing Company, 1978), 23-24.

<sup>97</sup> Mu'ti Ali, "The Muhammadiyah Movement," 14.



through Tuban, a small port in East Java.<sup>98</sup>

The reformists or modernists pressed for a return to the fundamental truth of the Islamic texts and tradition, as articulated in the Qur'ān and Hadīth<sup>99</sup> They also maintained that religious reform would revitalize Islam, and called for Muslims to unite in a single community (ummah).<sup>100</sup> These reformist ideas can generally be divided into two large divisions: the educational/social movement and the political movement. The first was strongly represented in the Minangkabau area and the Arab community, as well as in organizations, such as the *Persarikatan ulama* (The Association of ulama), *Muhammadiyah*, and *Persatuan Islam*. The second group was represented by the *Sarekat Islam* (Islamic Association) and the *Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia* (PMI or PERMI, The Association of Indonesian Muslim).<sup>101</sup> It is pivotal to note that the appearance of modernist Islam in Indonesia corresponded with the rise of a nationalist feeling among the Indonesians and contributed to the growth of that feeling into the nationalist movement of the 1920s and 1930s.<sup>102</sup>

The reformist or modernist Islamic organizations also spearheaded the foundation of Islamic women's organizations. K.H. Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah, among others had a serious concern about the backward social status of the Muslim women. For that reason, he initiated the establishment of *Aisyiyah* in order to promote their position. He started his work by recruiting six girls and giving them the necessary training and education to become the first leaders of their forthcoming organization. The six girls were Siti Bariyah, Siti Dawimah, Siti

<sup>98</sup> Deliar Noer, *The Modernist*, 177.

<sup>99</sup> Peacock, *The Purifying*, 24.

<sup>100</sup> Federspiel, "The Persatuan," 10.

<sup>101</sup> Noer, *The Modernist*, 32-35.

<sup>102</sup> See Federspiel, "The Persatuan," 11-12.

Dalalah, Siti Busro, Siti Wadingah and Siti Badilah.<sup>103</sup>

On April 22, 1917 Aisyiyah was formally born, with the six girls as the core of its first leadership, in which Siti Bariyah and Siti Badilah were to become its chairperson and secretary, respectively.<sup>104</sup> Dahlan's serious interest in Aisyiyah led him to do more for it, as could be seen from his action in sending three girls to public Kweekschool to obtain knowledge of secular subjects, after having had their religious training. These girls were groomed and recruited by Dahlan to make them the cadres for the establishment of Aisyiyah's own Kweekschool for girls (known as *Muallimat*). The goal was successfully achieved in 1924 with the opening of that school.

Like Muhammadiyah, Aisyiyah was to concentrate on similar religious, educational, and social activities among the Muslim women. It was to have its own *muballighāt* (women propagators), religious training courses, and a cadre school, *Wa al-'Asri*. One interesting aspect of Aisyiyah activities was its involvement in giving basic religious training to the women workers in the various cottage *batik* industries in Yogyakarta. This appears to indicate that Muhammadiyah/Aisyiyah had a very strong following among those *batik* entrepreneurs/traders.<sup>105</sup>

Aisyiyah stressed in this period the importance of the position of women as mothers. It argued that since the first education a child receives is at home, the women as mothers had the greatest responsibility for the advancement of society through the child's upbringing. A girl could easily be sent to school for her training and

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<sup>103</sup> See Alfian, *Muhammadiyah*, 171-172; and Kuntowijoo, "Arah Pengembangan Organisasi Wanita Islam Indonesia: Kemungkinan-kemungkinan)," Paper presented in seminar Indonesian Islamic Women in the Textual and Contextual Studies, held by INIS, Indonesian Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies, in Jakarta (December 2-5, 1991), 2.

<sup>104</sup> Alfian, *Muhammadiyah*, 172.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

education, but adult women, especially at the time of the establishment of the Aisyiyah, could only be trained through the willingness of their Muslim sisters to give information on anything of value to the mother. Aisyiyah also paid attention to younger as well as older girls, and a section called Nasyiyatul Aisyiyah was founded for them.<sup>106</sup>

Probably the most noteworthy achievement of Aisyiyah was the building of women's mosques and prayerhouses - institutions allegedly unique to Indonesia. The first such mosque was built by Aisyiyah in the Kauman of Yogyakarta in 1922 (some say 1919), another was built in Garut, West Java in 1927. Subsequently, many such buildings were constructed throughout Java and Indonesia. Aisyiyah also built numerous kindergardens, women's Islamic schools, and by 1938, had mobilized some two thousand female missionaries.<sup>107</sup> It is reasonable to conclude that, during the colonial period, Aisyiyah, which endured until 1972, embodied the confirmation of women's position in the world of men.<sup>108</sup>

Another Islamic women's association which was formed in December 25, 1936 in Bandung was *Persistri* (Persatuan Islam Puteri, the Women Section of Persatuan Islam). *Persatuan Islam* (Persis, Islamic Union) itself was founded earlier on September 12, 1923 also in Bandung. It is one of the reformist Muslim organizations. This organization played an important role in the debate between the traditionalist and modernist view points in the religious field. It also played a significant role in the struggle between the secular nationalists and the Muslim nationalists in the political field.<sup>109</sup>

<sup>106</sup> Noer, *The Modernist*, 79.

<sup>107</sup> Peacock, *The Purifying*, 51.

<sup>108</sup> Kuntowijoyo, "Arah Pengembangan," 5

<sup>109</sup> See Federspiel, "The Persatuan," 31-32; Lies M. Marcoes-Natsir, "Profil

According to the statutes of *Persatuan Islam*, *Persistri* is an autonomous body of *Persis*. Its aim, similar to *Persis*, is to strive for returning Indonesian Muslim women (*Muslimāt*) to the teachings of al-Qur'ān and Hadīth, and to conduct activities to improve Muslim women's conditions. Similar to *Persis*, *Persistri* was initially founded by the wives of the traders who originally came from Palembang, but who regarded themselves as Sundanese. The first chairman of *Persistri* was Mrs. Raden Maryam Abdurrahman who came from a Sundanese aristocratic family (*menak*). She, together with others, introduced and laid the foundations of the organization.<sup>110</sup>

There were at least two factors which motivated the genesis of *Persistri*. The first factor was the challenge faced by the female members of *Persis*. *Persis*'s attitude of non-compromise alienated many people, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, as well as many groups, thus raising much hostility against the organization. The hostilities from people associated with other Indonesian Muslim movements were frequently directed at the women members of *Persis*. In 1934 in Pameungpeuk, Bandung, for example, a house occupied by a family among whom there were women members of *Persis* was destroyed.<sup>111</sup>

The second factor is that the male leaders of *Persis* felt uncomfortable about having women in their audience when lecturing about issues like how to clean a female corpse, *junūb* (ritual impurity), methods of purification, Islamic regulations of sexual intercourse, menstruation, etc. Meanwhile, those matters had to be explained clearly and openly in order to abide by the regulations of al-Qur'ān and the Sunnah.

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Organisasi Wanita Islam Indonesia. Studi Kasus *Persistri*," Paper presented in seminar Indonesian Islamic Women in the Textual and Contextual Studies, held by INIS, Indonesian Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies, in Jakarta (December 2-5, 1991), 9.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., 17-18; also *ibid.*, 9-10.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., 291-292; also *ibid.*, 10.

The leaders of Persis thus thought it would be better if those matters were explained by women who had been acquainted with the religious teachings to other women. Persistri was founded to handle this task <sup>112</sup>

Persistri was to take further responsibilities for performing *Da'wah* and *tablīgh* (propagation) inside and outside the organization. *Da'wah* and *tablīgh* were aimed at revealing religious regulations mainly related to women's affairs as mentioned above. These kinds of activities later become part of *Rencana Jihād* (Jihad Plan or long term program).<sup>113</sup>

It was clear from this *Rencana Jihād* that the area of Persistri's activities was limited to women's affairs, the so-called "welfare oriented activities". It held some courses for its members on subjects such as sewing, embroidery, and cake making. It also held *tablīgh* courses to improve the quality of *muballighāt* (women propagators) and offer religious knowledge to women. It can be concluded that, during the colonial period, Persistri stressed in its program the importance of the position of women as mothers and as teachers of religion.

The *Sarekat Islam* (SI, Islamic Association), The first politically oriented Indonesian nationalist organization,<sup>114</sup> had a section for women. It was first called *Wanudyo Utomo*, and later, *Sarekat Perempuan Islam Indonesia* (SPII, Federation of the Muslim Women of Indonesia). Moreover, various regional organizations had their female sections, e.g. the Association of *Sarekat Ambon* and its section *Ina Tunu* (The

<sup>112</sup> See Marcoes-Natsir, "Profil Organisasi," 10.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., 11.

<sup>114</sup> Sarekat Islam (SI, Islamic Association) was founded in September 1912 under the leadership of Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto. See George Mcturman Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), 68.

Pure Woman), which had its headquarters in Ambon.<sup>115</sup>

It is important to mention here that the *Women's Section of Jong Islamieten Bond* (JIBDA) was among the organizations which initiated the first Indonesian women's congress held in 1928. The Association of Muslim Youth (JIB, *Jong Islamieten Bond*) was itself the first Islamic intellectual organization in Indonesia. It was founded on January 1, 1925, and was initiated by Raden Syamsuridjal.<sup>116</sup> It is noteworthy to mention the influence of H. Agus Salim, who was a prominent leader of Sarekat Islam at the time, on the character of JIB.<sup>117</sup> Salim, for example, rejected the separation between men and women in any meeting, strongly supported the idea of the emancipation of women and oriented the JIB towards the implementation of these ideas.<sup>118</sup>

Another organization which had a women's section was *Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia* (PERMI, The Union of Indonesian Muslim), which was founded in May 1930 in West Sumatra and advocated Islam and nationalism. PERMI was formed as a climax to the internal developments in the *Sumatra Thawalib Union* (Persatuan Sumatra Thawalib).<sup>119</sup> The importance of PERMI in the context of the Muslim women's movement in general lies in the fact that its female leaders had held important positions in the organization. When in 1933 PERMI suffered from government suppression and its leaders were exiled, this non-cooperative

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<sup>115</sup> Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, 66

<sup>116</sup> Ridwan Saidi, *Cendekiawan Islam Zaman Belanda Studi Pergerakan Intelektual JIB dan SIS* (Jakarta: Piranti Ilmu, 1990), 13

<sup>117</sup> Hazil Tanzil, *Seratus Tahun Haji Agus Salim* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1984), 247.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., 224

<sup>119</sup> See Taufik Abdullah, *Schools and Politics The Kaum Muda Movement in West Sumatra* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Modern Indonesia Project Cornell University, 1971), 125-135.

organization elected Ratna Sari as its general chairman <sup>120</sup> Among the leaders of PERMI who were imprisoned were Rangkayo Rasuna Said, who was a teacher of *Diniyah Putri* (School of Girl's Diniyah) in Padang Panjang, and Rasimah Ismail, who, at the time, was 18 years old <sup>121</sup>

Aisyiyah, Persistri, Wanudyo Utomo which later became *Sarekat Perempuan Islam Indonesia* (SPII, The Federation of the Indonesian Muslim Women). JIBDA, and the women's section of Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia (PERMI, The Union of Indonesian Muslim) were categorized as the Islamic women's organizations which are part of Islamic organizations

The second important category of the Muslim women's movement was *al-Madrasah al-Diniyah* (Religious School), better known as *Madrasah* (sekolah) *Diniyah Putri* in Padang Panjang, West Sumatra. The foundation of Diniyah Putri was considered a decisive step in the history of the Indonesian women's movement, as decisive as the publication of Kartini's letters and the founding of Dewi Sartika's schools had been <sup>122</sup> The school was founded by Rahmah el-Yunusiyah, a sister of Zainuddin Labai who established the Diniyah school in 1915 Rahmah was born in Padang Panjang on December 31, 1900 and was trained by her own brother until 1923 <sup>123</sup> Her interest in working among girls was motivated by the conviction that, on some questions, instruction to girls could only be given by women With the

<sup>120</sup> Taufik Abdullah, "Pergerakan Wanita Islam dalam Perspektif Sejarah." Paper presented in Seminar Indonesian Islamic Women in the Textual and Contextual Studies, held by INIS, Indonesian Netherlands Cooperation in Islamic Studies, in Jakarta (December 25, 1991), 9.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid, see also Noer, *The Modernist*, 55

<sup>122</sup> See Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, 73

<sup>123</sup> According to Aminuddin Rasyad, Rahmah was born on the 1st day of Rajab, 1318 of the Hegira calendar, coinciding with December 29, 1900. See Aminuddin Rasyad, "Rahmah El Yunusiyah Educational Pioneer for Girls," *Mizan*, 2, 2 (1985), 48

assistance of *Persatuan Murid-murid Diniyah School* (The Students Association of Diniyah) which had been set up on the suggestion of Labai, Rahmah founded a girl's school on November 1, 1923, *al-Madrasah al-Diniyah* with seventy-one pupils, mostly young house-wives, as a start <sup>124</sup>

Instruction, given daily for three hours at a mosque in Pasar Usang (Padang Panjang), was concerned with religion and *ilmu alat* (Arabic grammar). In 1924 the school was moved to a private house in the same quarter, and classrooms were equipped with desks and blackboards. The second floor of this house was used as a dormitory which, in 1925, was occupied by about sixty pupils <sup>125</sup>

In addition, Rahmah also started an anti-illiteracy campaign among older women. This activity, in which some 125 women participated in the beginning, was terminated because her school, which was destroyed by an earthquake in 1926, needed Rahmah's full attention. As a result of the earthquakes, Rahmah planned to construct a few permanent buildings <sup>126</sup> In order to advertise her plan, she accompanied an uncle who was a merchant on a trip to North Sumatra, Aceh, and to the Malay peninsula in 1927. There, she explained her aspirations and achievements to women. She gave lectures in Malay and taught the Sultans' daughters at the various Malay courts.<sup>127</sup> She succeeded in collecting contributions for the construction of a new permanent building which was completed during the next year <sup>128</sup>

In 1936, *Diniyah Putera* (the Boys Diniyah), which had been deteriorating since

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<sup>124</sup> See Noer, *The Modernist*, 52-53.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid., 53.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Rasyad, "Rahmah El Yunusiyah," 53.

<sup>128</sup> Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, 73



Labai's demise, was joined to Rahmah's *madrasah* but mixed classes were no longer maintained. Separate classes were held for boys and girls. The development of both sections of Diniyah proceeded smoothly and in 1937, a school for training female teachers (*al Kulliyāt al-Mu'allimāt al-Islāmiyāt*) was established. This was followed by the opening of another one for male teachers (*al-Kulliyāt al-Mu'allimīn al-Islāmiyāt*) some time later.<sup>129</sup>

During the Dutch colonial days, Rahmah El Yunusiyah pursued a policy of non-cooperation on educational matters. She refused to cooperate with the Dutch authorities, and she therefore refused any grants or aid of a binding nature. She was often offered subsidies but, unlike most Muslim institutions of the time, she consistently refused to allow the government's interference with the curricula. Unlike PERMI, for example, she also resisted the interference of religious organizations like Muhammadiyah. She regarded her school as being the property of the nation, and refused any association with any political party or ideology. She held to this principle to the end.<sup>130</sup> Her firm position saved Diniyah from the effects which resulted from the suppression of PERMI by the government later on.

## **2. Muslim Women's Movement and Ideological Conflict.**

After the proclamation of sovereignty on August 17, 1945, the activities of the Indonesian women's movement focused on defending freedom from the Dutch and helping the revolutionary government. Women rallied in large numbers to help the guerrillas behind the fighting line. The Indonesian Red Cross was founded as early as the day of the proclamation.

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<sup>129</sup> Noer, *The Modernist Muslim*, 54.

<sup>130</sup> Rasyad, "Rahmah El Yunusiyah," 57.

In 1945, President Soekarno authorized Mrs Soewarni Pringgogido to lead the Indonesian women's movement <sup>131</sup> *Wanita Negara Indonesia* (WANI, Women of Indonesian State), which was formed in Jakarta, established *Dapur Umum* (Common/General Kitchen) under the leadership of Miss Erna Djajadiningrat. These *dapurs* functioned as centres of defence and protection for the freedom fighters as well. Several buildings in the town were handed over to women from out of town. *Laskar Wanita* (The Women's Army) was founded in West Java and Sumatra. It can be said that the whole populace, including the women, was rallied behind the banner of the 'Aksi Kemerdekaan' (Independence Action) in opposition to the Dutch and allied armies. *Persatuan Wanita Indonesia* (PERWANI, The Union of Indonesian Women) founded sections in the provinces <sup>132</sup>

Taking into account the importance of the spirit of unity in confronting the Dutch army, the first women's congress was held at Klaten, central Java, from December 15 to 17, 1945, on the initiative of Yogyakarta Section of PERWANI led by Mrs D D Susanto. The congress which was presided over by Mrs. Maria Ulfah Santoso and Mrs. Kartowijono produced a decision to form an organization called *Persatuan Wanita Republik Indonesia* (PERWARI, Union of the Women of the Indonesian Republic). The stated goal of the union was, *menjadi garis belakang membela kemerdekaan Negara* (to form the rear-guard in defence of the country's liberty) <sup>133</sup>. The attempt to unite women's organizations in the form of a federation was confirmed, and a conference was held at Solo from February 24 to 26, 1946. It was decided to form a permanent organization called *Badan Kongres Wanita Indonesia*

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<sup>131</sup> Kartowijono, "The awakening," 6

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

<sup>133</sup> Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, 114; see also Kartowijono, "The Awakening," 6.

(KOWANI) <sup>134</sup>

The second post-war congress of Indonesian women took place from June 14 to 16, 1946 at Madiun (East Java) KOWANI, under the chairmanship of Mrs. Kartowijono, came to the decision that it would help the republican army in every possible way against the Dutch <sup>135</sup>

Meanwhile, hostilities between the Republic of Indonesia and the Netherlands continued. Gradually, both sides were willing to avoid the hardest questions in order to achieve a compromise. Finally, negotiations between them concerning the future of Indonesia were successfully concluded on November 12, 1948 at the hill resort of Linggajati (near Cirebon). The Netherlands recognized de facto republican authority over Java, Madura, and Sumatra, including the allied enclaves <sup>136</sup>

Eight months after the agreement, the third congress took place at Magelang, Central Java from July 14 to 16, 1947 under the leadership of Mrs. Soenaryo Mangoenpoespito. It was decided to send an appreciative letter to a progressive women's association in Holland which had deplored the sending of military reinforcements to Indonesia. The fourth KOWANI congress was held at Solo from August 26 to 28, 1948 set up a body to examine successional and matrimonial law under the leadership of Mrs. Maria Ulfah Santoso. It also set up a group under the leadership of Mrs. S.K. Trimurti to deal with the question of female employment, and another body under the leadership of Mrs. J. Suliyanti, M.D, to undertake the study of socio-hygienic problems.<sup>137</sup>

<sup>134</sup> Kartowijono, "The Awakening," 7.

<sup>135</sup> Vreede-De Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, 115.

<sup>136</sup> Anthony Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution 1945-1950* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1974), 98.

<sup>137</sup> Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, 115-116; Kartowijono, "The

A full-scale assault by Dutch military forces on the Republic of Indonesia took place on December 18, 1948. It had disastrous effects on the development of the women's movement. The military operations threatened to completely disrupt the contact between the various women's associations. Despite practically insurmountable material difficulties, KOWANI held a conference in Yogyakarta from August 26 to September 2, 1949. This Indonesian women's conference of 1949 is known under the name of *Permusyawaratan Wanita Indonesia*. It met with tremendous success: from all over free and occupied Indonesia, delegates were sent, eighty-two women's organizations from all the larger islands of the archipelago were represented.<sup>138</sup>

On December 27, 1949, the Netherlands transferred full sovereignty over the former Netherlands Indies to a federal state known officially as the Republic Indonesia Serikat (Federal Indonesian Republic) or RIS.<sup>139</sup> In order to cope with the new situation, the fifth KOWANI Congress was held at Jakarta from November 28, 1950. In the course of this Congress, KOWANI was dissolved and a new organization called Kongres Wanita Indonesia (unabbreviated) took its place. Among the decisions taken were: first, women's organizations should study thoroughly the status of women in marriage; second, women should actively use their rights in the general

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Awakening," 10.

<sup>138</sup> Kartowijono, "The Awakening," 10, Anthony Reid, *The Indonesian National*, 151. The important decisions of the conference were

1. to reinforce the resolution of the Indonesian Youth Congress which had been delivered to the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia at the Round Table Conference:

(a) Demanding the withdrawal of the Dutch army from the whole of Indonesia, which would have to be completed at the time of transfer of full sovereignty to the government of the Republic of Indonesia

(b) Recognizing only the Red and White Flag and the national authority, Indonesia Raya.

2. to protest in the strongest possible terms against the ruthless killing of 40,000 people in South Celebes.

<sup>139</sup> Anthony Reid, *The Indonesian National*, 162.

elections <sup>140</sup>

Thus between 1945-1950 the Indonesian women's movement was actively involved in defending the independence of Indonesia. This period also witnessed the foundation of several new women's associations. Among those associations were: *Angkatan Muda Katolik Republik Indonesia* (Catholic Youth of the Republic of Indonesia), *Kebaktian Rakyat Indonesia Bagian Puteri* (The Girls Section of Indonesian People Loyalty), *Wanita Indonesia Raya* (Women of the Great Indonesia), *Perjuangan Puteri Republik Indonesia* (PRRI, Girls Struggle of Republic of Indonesia), *Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia Bagian Puteri* (Girl's Section of Islamic Youth Movement), *Barisan Buruh Wanita* (The Association of Women Labor Guard), etc.<sup>141</sup>

In 1955 forty-five associations joined *Kongres Wanita Indonesia*. They were organized into two groups, according to the interest, political or non-political, of their members. The first group was made up chiefly of women's organizations that belonged to political parties such as *Muslimat*, *The Women's Section of the Masyumi Party*, *Wanita Demokrat*, *the Women's Section of the PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia)*; *Wanita Indonesia*, *the Women's Section of PIR (Persatuan Indonesia Raya)*; *Persatuan Wanita Kristen Indonesia of Partai Kristen (Christian Party)*, *PARKIWA*, (*Partai Kebangsaan Indonesia bagian Wanita*, *the Women's Section of Indonesian National Party*) which was founded during 1950 in Bandung. *GERWIS*, (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia Sedar*, *the Women's Movement of Indonesia Sedar*) which was affiliated with the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI*) founded in 1950 (later *GERWIS* changed its name to *GERWANI (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, Indonesian Women's Movement)*; *PERWAMI (Persatuan Wanita Murba*,

<sup>140</sup> Kartowijono, "The Awakening," 11.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., 9.

Union of Murba's Women) of the Murba Party. The only political party run entirely by women was the *Partai Wanita Rakyat* (Party of the Women of the People) founded in 1945 by Mrs. Mangunsarkoro.<sup>142</sup> In the case of this latter group, the political parties sought to consolidate their power by setting up women's associations which had ideological commitments because in the then coming general elections they hoped to win a majority vote. This political orientation had its impact on the functioning of the women's organizations in this group.

The second group, non-political in character, was comprised of professional organizations, such as the midwives association (*Ikatan Bidan Indonesia*) and of associations of women whose husbands belonged to the same profession, such as *Persatuan Istri Tentara* (PERSIT, Union of Army Personnel Wives) and *Bhayangkari*, founded by Mrs. Soetanto Mokoginta for the wives of police force personnel.<sup>143</sup>

After the declaration of sovereignty on December 27, 1949, Indonesia entered a new period known as the period of liberal democracy. This period, which lasted until 1957, was an important phase in the political history of Indonesia since it was the glorious time of political parties in Indonesia.

Within this system of politics,<sup>144</sup> we frequently witnessed the rise and fall of

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<sup>142</sup> Nursyahbani Katjasungkana, S.H., "Ideologi Gender dalam Pergerakan Perempuan," paper presented in seminar sehari *Pendidikan Alternatif dengan Perspektif Perempuan Menuju Masyarakat Egaliter*, held by Kompas, Kalyanamitra, and LBH Jakarta, in Jakarta (March 8, 1989); 12; Idrus, *Wanita Dulu*, 130-136; Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, 121-122.

<sup>143</sup> Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, 122; Suryochondro, *Potret Pergerakan*, 137.

<sup>144</sup> According to Feith, the system of politics which operated in those years had six distinct features characteristic of constitutional democracy. Civilians played a dominant role. Parties were of very great importance. The contenders for power showed respect for the "rules of the game" which were closely related to the existing constitution. Most members of the political elite had some sort of

various cabinets, which failed to solve administrative, economic, and political problems.<sup>145</sup> Although the cabinets of Hatta, Natsir, Sukiman, and Wilopo had some success in implementing their policies, they failed to deal adequately with particular policy tasks which called for a strong government.<sup>146</sup> These governments were caught in a scramble for power from which no aspect of governmental functioning was exempt. The bureaucracy was a mediating instrument, and, by the same token, a force for immobilization of active government.<sup>147</sup> But as Feith noted, these governments made strong efforts to maintain a functioning system of constitutional democracy. This attempt was partially successful, although it operated under conditions of permanent threat posed by a number of groups which accepted the terms of functional democracy only reluctantly or not at all.<sup>148</sup>

There were seven cabinets during the period of liberal democracy: the Cabinets of Hatta, Natsir, Sukiman, Wilopo, Ali Sastroamijoyo, and Burhanuddin Harahap. There were conflicts between the cabinets of Hatta, Natsir, Sukiman, Wilopo and those of Ali Sastroamijoyo and Burhanuddin Harahap. The latter two cabinets of Ali Sastroamijoyo and Burhanuddin Harahap (1953-1957) had the same weaknesses as experienced during the first half of the period, but with several additional factors aggravating the problem. One of the major new factors was the greater importance given to ideological antagonisms as a result of the election campaign. Secondly,

commitment to symbols. Civil liberties were rarely infringed. Finally, the government used coercion sparingly. This represented, at the very least, an attempt to maintain and develop constitutional democracy. See Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy* (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1962), xi.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., 556 and 570

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., 556.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., 570.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., 556.

cabinets were weaker in this second period because certain interests became more organized than before. Thirdly, cabinets were in some respects weakened by changes in the pattern of military/civilian relations. Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the weakness of these later cabinets was a consequence of their shortage of disposable rewards.<sup>149</sup>

During this period, women's associations played a political role, especially in the field of political socialization. Women participated in the political process as the whole society became highly politicized. Electioneering, in fact, gave rise to a circular effect: party leaders had to emphasize their ideological positions in order to appeal to communal segments of the electorate. However, by doing so, they aggravated the divisions between these segments. As a result of these ideologically reinforced divisions in society at large, including women, newly sharpened cleavages were sustained by the political elite.<sup>150</sup> To prevent *Kongres Wanita Indonesia* from being politically oriented in any direction which would endanger the spirit of unity, a regulation was made that it was necessary to have a unanimous vote for taking a decision on a matter of principle.<sup>151</sup>

Political participation of women during the period of constitutional democracy could be observed in their participation as members of the parliament and constituent assembly. They were 18 female members (7 % of the members) in the first parliament of the Republic of Indonesia.<sup>152</sup> Among Eighteen female members of the

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<sup>149</sup> Ibid., 570-571.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., 570-571.

<sup>151</sup> Kartowijono, "The Awakening," 12

<sup>152</sup> The Eighteen members of the first parliament were: Mrs. Sundari Abdulrachman (PKI), Mrs. Hafni Zahra Abu Hanifah (Masyumi), Mrs. Marijah Djoenaidie (NU), Mrs. H. Mariam Kanta Sumpena (NU), Mrs. Suzanna Hamdani (PSI), Mrs. Mahmudah Mawardi (NU), Mrs. Soenarjo Mangoenpoespito (Masyumi), Mrs. Moedikdio (PKI), Mrs. Djajah Pardjaman (Masyumi), Mrs.



first parliament were 5 members who came from PKI, 4 members from Masyumi, 4 members from NU, 1 member from PSI, and 4 member from PNI. A number of women also became members of the Constituent Assembly, e.g. N. Sulasmi Mudjiyati, Ny Ratu Aminah Hidayat, N Rasuna Said, Ny Emma Puradiredja, Ny. Sudirman, and Ny Fatimah H Abdulrachman Ridwan.<sup>153</sup>

The political participation of women's organizations during the constitutional democracy period could be also seen in their efforts to improve the position of women in legal, social, economic, and educational domains. The congress of Kongres Wanita Indonesia which was held in Bandung from December 22 to 24, 1952, produced programs dealing with these domains. Some programs dealt with the political rights of women. They sought to urge women to perform their duty by voting in the general elections; to get in touch with various ministries in order to obtain statistics about the percentage of posts held by female civil servants; to appoint women to work in the offices preparing for general elections; to increase the number of women members on the advisory committee for nominations to the Ministry of Labor.<sup>154</sup>

In 1952, women's organizations demonstrated to oppose the government's Act number 19 of 1952, which regulated widows' pensions. The objections raised against this act were that it favoured polygamy, and that because of it, not only those concerned, but all civil servants without exception, and even the state itself would have to pay the additional expenses which this ruling entailed. Muslim women's organizations were in agreement with this proposal, while nineteen women's

Rahma El Junusiyah (Masyumi), Mrs Ch. Salawati Daud (PKI), Mrs. Umi Sardjono (PKI), Mrs Asmah Sachrunie (NU), Mrs Soemari (PNI), Mrs. Soepeni (PNI), Mrs. Lastri Soetrasno (PNI), Mrs. Sutijah Suriya Hadi (PNI), and Mrs. Suharti Suwanto (PKI). See Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, Appendix H.

<sup>153</sup> Idrus, *Wanita Dulu*, 191-199.

<sup>154</sup> Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, 120-121.

association's were against it <sup>155</sup>

The political system of constitutional democracy finally came to an end in 1957. It was replaced by the "Guided Democracy" political system of President Soekarno. In this new political system, parliamentary institutions were largely peripheral to politics, not only to the making of decisions, but also to their legitimization. Parties were severely restricted in their activities and were subjected to a great variety of army implemented controls <sup>156</sup>

In the Guided Democracy political system, a national forum was established which took over some of the parties' functions and women were categorized as one of its functional groups. Formally, the Guided Democracy government came to power on July 5, 1959, when President Soekarno put the Constitution of 1945 into effect. Also the elected Constituent Assembly and the Parliament were dissolved in July, 1959, after the latter failed to have a two-thirds majority vote. President Soekarno's decision was supported by the army. The Masyumi and PSI were banned in August 1960, and in April 1961 the dissolution of all except ten parties - PNI, NU, PKI, Murba, the two Christian Parties, PSII, PERTI, IPKI, and PARTINDO - was ordered <sup>157</sup>

Guided Democracy was initially a means of overcoming the disarray that had become apparent in Indonesian politics in the mid 1950s. It was a more authoritarian system in which the central role was played by President Soekarno to replace the parliamentary struggle between parties <sup>158</sup>. However, the Guided Democracy policy

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<sup>155</sup> Suwarni Salyo, "Wanita dan Politik di Indonesia." Paper presented in seminar *Wanita, Generasi Muda dan Politik*, held by Central Board of Development Party, in Jakarta (January 25, 1986), 4, see also Vreede-de Stuers, *The Indonesian Woman*, 127.

<sup>156</sup> Feith, *The Decline*, 592-593.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell

failed to gain its aims. On one hand, the Guided Democracy succeeded to form a strong government supported by the army. But on the other hand, by 1959 bureaucratic norms had atrophied as the rate of inflation went out of control and political competition reached a point where the polarization of rival forces made administrative reform impossible.<sup>159</sup> Ideological antagonisms continued to operate as they had during the constitutional democracy period.

In this context, women's organizations were involved in the political ideological campaigns. Bitter competitions took place among women's organizations such as the competition between Kongres Wanita Indonesia and Gerwani. Political and ideological conflicts in the period of Guided Democracy reached their apex with the aborted coup launched on the night of September 30, 1965. The coup attempt set in motion a series of developments that culminated in the disintegration of the Guided Democracy system and in the dismissal of President Soekarno one and a half years later

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University Press, 1978), 43

<sup>159</sup> Ibid., 304.

## CHAPTER THREE

### THE MUSLIM WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN THE NEW ORDER PERIOD

#### 1. Politics in the New Order and the Women's Movement

The unsuccessfully attempted coup launched on the night of September 30, 1965 set in motion a process which rapidly destroyed the regime of Guided Democracy and gave the army control over the succeeding political order. First, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was physically eliminated as a contender for power. Subsequently, President Soekarno, deprived of his ability to limit the army's political strength, was gradually driven from the political arena. In March 1966, he was forced to sign over his power to the army's leader, General Suharto. In March 1967, he was removed from the presidential office for his continued refusal to submit abjectly to military control.<sup>1</sup> The dismissal of Soekarno as president marked the end of the Old Order of Guided Democracy and the emergence of the New Order of army-dominated government.

The New Order government now faced the legacy of the Guided Democracy regime; namely the enormous economic and political problems. To solve the economic problems, the New Order government adopted the "development strategy" propounded by arch-technocrat, Professor Wijoyo Nitisastro and his entourage. The strategy depended on massive external (foreign) support which came especially from the Western capitalist countries and Japan. Because the state was then still too weak and chaotic to undertake measures to raise the necessary resources domestically, Wijoyo had little difficulty in showing the New Order government that massive external support was essential and that gaining this support required policies designed to win the sympathy of the Western capitalist powers and Japan. The strategy succeeded in

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<sup>1</sup> Harold Crouch, "The Army, The Parties and Elections," *Indonesia*, 11 (April 1971), 177

solving a number of economic problems such as the end of formal price controls in 1966, the return of many nationalized enterprises to their former owners and the promulgation of an easy-going Foreign Investment Law in 1967, the rationalization of banking and interest rates between 1968 and 1971; and so on. In brief, an impressive economic growth was achieved by the New Order government's economic strategy.<sup>2</sup>

There were also political problems faced by the army, which, by March 1966, had effectively dominated Indonesian politics and government. It soon became apparent that two schools of thought existed within the military leadership, one of which proposed using the army's power to undertake a drastic overhaul of the entire political system, while the other believed that the top priorities should be stabilization and consolidation.<sup>3</sup> Herbert Feith has noted that the second faction, the "New Order-laggards" (as distinguished from the first, the New Order Militants), advocated a multiparty system, and its supporters saw Suharto as a centrist or balancer in the process of arriving at a desirable political system.<sup>4</sup> Both groups disliked the Islamic political groups, the second for cultural reasons and the first out of rational or intellectual considerations. It seemed to them that the Islamic political groups were fond of dealing with ideological issues, and this, in their view, could inhibit development. Another side of the dichotomy was also evident. There were those in the army who supported the Islamic cause, such as General Abdul Haris Nasution, the former ABRI commander-in-chief, and Lt. General Sudirman.

<sup>2</sup> Benedict R.O'G. Anderson, "Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order in Comparative Historical Perspectives," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 42, 3 (May 1983), 488-489.

<sup>3</sup> Harold Crouch, "The Army," 177.

<sup>4</sup> Herbert Feith, "Suharto's Search for a Political Format," *Indonesia*, 6 (October 1968), 88-105.

Political development in the New Order Indonesia has witnessed a tendency towards the concentration of power within the ruling elites, more specifically within the presidency and its "core groups". This development meant that military authoritarianism has, in the name of national stabilization, restricted political participation on the one hand, and on the other, the leaders of civilian political parties have been unable to gain mass support in order to secure influence and power. This led these leaders to depend on the support of the ruling elites to secure their own positions within their parties, rather than seeking to increase their power through their followers<sup>5</sup>

The political engineering launched by the government took the form of institutionalization through the restructuring of the political parties, maintaining a floating mass population, and controlling every sort of political agency. These included intellectuals, youth, women's associations, students and the mass media. This was conceived by the government as a must because political stability would guarantee the implementation of the new "ideology" the government had adopted: development (*pembangunan*), with an accent on economic development. In the case of national stability, the military regime chose to reject any kind of civil politics. It was civil politics with its ideological rivalries in the Old Order period that had prevented the government from launching nation-building. The military's rejection of the principle of "civilian supremacy" can be discerned as having two interrelated directions. First, it is through such a policy that the military would accumulate power, and second, the military would, thereby, reduce the power of the two major civilian groups, namely, the nationalists and the modernists Muslims. In this context, the military regime's reluctance to allow Masyumi's rehabilitation can be explained. In the same light, the

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<sup>5</sup> M. Sirajuddin Samsuddin, "Religion and Politics in Islam: The Case of Muhammadiyah In Indonesia's New Order," (Ph.D. diss., University of California, 1991), 55.

Golongan Karya (Golkar, Functional Groups)<sup>6</sup> was created by the army. This organization consisted of several groups concerned with matters of religion, youth, women, trade unions, business and the corporate assemblage of the military. These were all "non-ideological" groups. The inclusion of elements from the military, the professional groups and non-party politicians can be considered as an attempt to counter both the Muslim and the nationalist groups.<sup>7</sup>

In the 1971 General Elections, Golkar won 62.80% of the vote and got 226 seats in the DPR. The inclusion of 100 seats by appointment was permitted by law in the general session of the MPR for the purpose of protecting the Pancasila and 1945 Constitution. Because members of DPR are also members of MPR, Golkar gained 336 (73.0%) of the total 460 seats in the DPR.<sup>8</sup>

Emboldened by Golkar's great victory, the government, through its "Special Operations" body (called Operasi Khusus, or Opsus) accelerated the streamlining of political parties by urging the nine existing political parties that had competed in the 1971 General Election to merge into two parties. These are: The Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) -- an amalgamation of four Islamic parties -- and the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI, The Indonesian Democratic Party), the union of the

<sup>6</sup> Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya (Sekber-Golkar, Joint Secretariat of Functional Groups) was founded in 1964 as an alliance of Functional Groups under army influence for the purpose of opposing the Communists within the National Front. After the coup, it lost its *raison d'être*, but with the decision to hold elections, it found a new one. Its main leaders today are army officers who, by the terms of the election laws, may not contest the elections or take part in the campaign. However, as leaders of Sekber-Golkar, they are able to influence the selection of the candidates. In many areas, it can be expected that the Sekber-Golkar candidates will obtain the backing of local military commanders. It is generally believed therefore that the Sekber-Golkar will be among the "big four" when the election results are announced.

<sup>7</sup> Crouch, "The Army," 185-191.

<sup>8</sup> Masashi Nishihara, *Golkar and the Indonesian Election of 1971*, Monograph series No. 56 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1972), 42-43.

nationalist and Christian parties. Many observers have held that this policy was in fact aimed at the depoliticization of society, it was meant to render independent political activity impossible either by eliminating autonomous organizations with political potential or by coopting them into government-controlled umbrella bodies.<sup>9</sup>

The collapse of the political parties was accompanied by the coining of a new concept, the "floating mass." In September 1971 the Central Java commander, Major General Widodo, apparently prompted by Ali Murtopo, suggested that the political parties be banned from carrying out activities in the villages. Soon after, the concept of the floating mass was widely disseminated by Ali Moertopo's colleagues from the Golkar. According to the floating mass concept, the mass of the people would be "floating" voters permitted to express their political preferences in general elections once every five years. Between elections, they would have no political role and therefore, in theory, would be able to devote all their efforts to economic development. Unable to organize their supporters in the rural areas, the parties would eventually wither away. Although the Golkar, too, would not be permitted to organize in the villages, it in fact had relied on the local administration and the military to mobilize its votes in the previous elections and could expect to do so again in future elections.<sup>10</sup>

The floating mass concept was never officially endorsed by the government and, in deference to civilian feeling, was excluded from the "General Outline of State Policy" adopted by MPR in 1973. Further, in 1975 legislation banning the parties and the Golkar from establishing branches in the rural area was amended to permit all three organizations to place representatives in each village. Although the floating

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<sup>9</sup> David Bouchier, *Dynamics of Dissent in Indonesia: Sawito and the Phantom Coup* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), 13.

<sup>10</sup> Crouch, *The Army*, 271-272.



mass concept was no longer emphasized, the roles of the army and the parties remained much the same. The army leaders introduced a new formulation -"*tut wuri handayani*"- to describe their relationship with non-military organizations and the people in general. The Javanese phrase refers to the guidance given by a parent to a child learning to walk, where the parent does not actually support the child but is always ready to save him from falling.<sup>11</sup>

The same policy applied to mass organizations e.g. labor, youth, fishermen, peasants and women's groups. All labor organizations merged into *Federasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia* (FBSI, Indonesian Labor Federation), the fishermen organizations merged into *Himpunan Nelayan Seluruh Indonesia* (HNSI, Indonesian Fishermen Association); and peasant organizations merged into *Himpunan Kerukunan Tani Indonesia* (HKTI, Indonesian Peasant Association). While the government succeeded in merging the organizations mentioned above into one single organization, it didn't fully succeed in merging the youth and student organizations due to their strong resistance. The youth and student organizations considered *Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia* (KNPI, The National Committee of Indonesian youth) as a forum and not as a super organization.

In the case of the women's organizations, it seems that the government did not strive to create one single organization which would supervise all women's organizations. KOWANI functions only as a coordinative organization. Every women's organization acts and holds its activities independently and each has its own constitution. KOWANI was asked by the government to cooperate with *Dharma Wanita* (Women's Charity), *Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga* (PKK, Family Welfare Guidance), and the Minister of Women's Affairs.

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 72

However, some arrangements were also carried out to enable the government to easily control the activities of women's associations. The women's organizations in government institutions were merged into one organization, *Dharma Wanita*, in 1974. Meanwhile, women's organizations in the armed forces merged into *Dharma Pertiwi*. There is also *Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga* (PKK, Family Welfare Guidance), an organization set up for house-wives who belonged neither to government institutions nor to the armed forces. This organization was headed by the wife of the Minister of Interior.

In line with the government policy which stressed economic development, women's organizations in the New Order period paid attention to economic programs. From the second half of the 1970s until now, most writings about women have focused on the imbalance of job opportunities, the rate of payment, family planning, and economic welfare.<sup>12</sup>

Since the early 1970s, the Indonesian government has paid much more attention to women's affairs. For example in 1978, the President of the Republic of Indonesia formed a new ministry in the cabinet to deal with women affairs.<sup>13</sup> The government also made efforts to bring women's activities in line with the government's programs of development. The minister of State of Community Welfare arranged a workshop to develop "A National Plan of Action for Indonesian Women". The workshop was held on December 13-18, 1976 and was attended by various women's associations. The objective of the National Plan of Action was to increase female participation and integration in national development, to ensure equal opportunities, rights,

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<sup>12</sup> Kartini Syahrir, "Wanita: Beberapa Catatan Antropologis," *Prisma* 10 (1985), 14, and see Secretariat Minister of State of Community Welfare, "A National Plan of Action for Indonesian Women," Jakarta (December 13-18, 1976).

<sup>13</sup> Secretariat Minister of State of Community Welfare, "A National Plan," 3, 26, 29, 32.

responsibilities and duties for men and women in order to guarantee a better and more peaceful living <sup>14</sup>

There were four general points in the plan. For effective and efficient activities, the plan suggested interventions to upgrade the research and development sector. The plan also stressed the importance of mass media communication and the implementation and supervision of the National Plan <sup>15</sup> Two years after the workshop of the National Plan of Action for Indonesian Women, the President of the Republic of Indonesia appointed, for the first time, a minister in the cabinet to deal with women's role affairs <sup>16</sup> In 1978 the MPR adopted a section in the Guidelines of State Policy which required the full and active participation of women in all development activities.<sup>17</sup>

The world conference held in Mexico City in 1975 and the United Nations Resolution 3520 (XXX) of 15 December 1975 which proclaimed the years 1976 - 1985 as the United Nations Decade for Women motivated international institutions and bodies or donor countries which gave aid to Indonesia to include women's programs in their aid packages. In other words, women's programmes became an impetus for them to give aid to developing countries including Indonesia.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> The first minister of women's role was Mrs. Lasiyah Sutanto (1978-1987) and the second Mrs. Sulasikin Moerpratomo (1987-present)

<sup>15</sup> KOWANI (Indonesian Women's Congress), "The Role of Women in Development The Indonesian Experience," paper prepared for the *9th Conference of the General Federation of Iraqi Women*, in Bagdad (11-15 March 1980), 4

<sup>16</sup> KOWANI, "The Role of Women", 4; Secretariat, "A National Plan," 2.

<sup>17</sup> M M Billah, "Aktifitas Pengembangan Alternatif Organisasi Perempuan Islam," Paper presented in seminar Indonesian Muslim Women in the Textual and Contextual Studies, held by INIS, Indonesia Netherlands Cooperation Studies, in Jakarta (December 2-5, 1991), 14-16.

<sup>18</sup> See KOWANI, "The Role of Women," 5.

For these political and financial reasons, the Indonesian government has launched many women's programs. The programs were heavily influenced by the World Women's Conference in Mexico and the motto of the United Nations Decade for Women which was "equality, development, and peace". The government budget for women's programs was 21,832 billion rupiahs in the year of 1982/1983 and 22,237 billion rupiahs in the year of 1983/1984.<sup>19</sup>

Since the second half of the 1970s many research institutes were founded to study women's affairs. Also, many universities such as the University of Indonesia, Bogor Institute of Agriculture, Brawijaya University of Malang, etc., have conducted research on women's issues. In 1979 the Indonesian Institute of Science opened a "Center for Documentation and Information of Women in Development".<sup>20</sup>

Women's programs were carried out by various government institutions as well as private or non-government organizations (NGO). Many women's programs were implemented by government institutions through the coordination of the Minister of State for Women's Affairs. Meanwhile, NGO's or LSM/PSM (Institutes for Developing Community Self-Reliance) have received aid from international donor institutions and from the government. Among the NGO's which engage specifically in women's development programs are *An-Nisa' Swasti Foundation* in Yogyakarta (1983), *Srikandi Foundation* in Jakarta (1983), *Melati Foundation* in Jakarta (1983), and *Pusat Pengembangan Sumber Daya Wanita* (PPSW, Center for Women's Resources Development) in Jakarta (1986). Compared to women's organizations, these women's LSM/PSM are more professional and political in their programs. They are also more populist in their orientation while being less hierarchical in their organization's

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<sup>19</sup> Billah, "Aktifitas Pengembangan," 16; Toeti Heraty Noerhadi and Aida Vitalaya S Lubis, eds., *Dinamika Wanita Indonesia*, Seri 01 Multi dimensional, (Jakarta. Pusat Pengembangan Sumber Daya Wanita, 1990), 126-128

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., 128

structure.

The themes and areas of women's programs in this period are equal opportunity, family planning, community health, social and economic welfare, environment, cooperation, and entrepreneurship <sup>21</sup>

## 2. The General Elections

Since its independence on August 17, 1945, Indonesia has held six General Elections. The first General Elections were held in 1955 under the political system of Constitutional (Liberal) Democracy. The following General Elections were held in 1971, 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992 under the New Order government.

The General Elections of 1955 were the country's first nation-wide election. There were more than thirty parties which participated in the elections, of which only four performed well. the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) won 57 seats (22.3 per cent of the votes); Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi, the Modernist Muslim Party) won 57 seats (20.9 per cent of the votes); Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) won 45 seats (18.4 per cent of the votes), and the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) won 39 seats (16.4 per cent of the votes). The influential intellectual party, Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) won only 2.0 per cent of the votes. This clearly showed that it had no grass-roots support. The election results indicated that the PNI, NU, and PKI were largely supported by the Javanese (especially in Central and East Java where most of the Javanese live), while Masyumi was an outer islands and West Java - based party.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> Billah, "Aktifitas Pengembangan," 16.

<sup>22</sup> Herbert Feith, *The Indonesian Elections of 1955*, Interim Report Series (Ithaca, N.Y.: Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program Cornell University, 1971), 58; see also Leo Suryadinata, *Political Parties and 1982 General Election in Indonesia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), 1

The General Elections of 1955 were held under the political system of constitutional democracy. The system was characterized by the competition of various political parties for power, but their diversified interests made their co-operation short-lived. The military was outside the parliamentary system, and its interests were not looked after under the system. Soekarno was considered only a figure-head president, and the PKI was excluded from the cabinet. These three political forces found that they were not benefiting from the system. Not surprisingly, therefore, President Soekarno, supported by the army, played a major role in weakening the constitutional democratic system. He was dissatisfied with the political parties and intended to dissolve them all. However, because of persistent resistance from the parties, he could only reduce their number, not dissolve them completely. By 1961, he had managed to reduce the parties to ten (PNI, NU, Partai Katolik, Parkindo, Partai Murba, PSII, IPKI, PKI, PARMUSI, and PERTI), after banning Masyumi and the PSI.<sup>23</sup>

Prior to this, Soekarno backed by the army, had introduced his "Guided Democracy" system aimed at further undermining the strength of political parties, and had assumed a bigger political role for himself. He also intended to bring the PKI into the cabinet since it had been excluded from all coalition governments prior to the guided democracy period. Soekarno, the army, and the PKI were the three major actors in this political phase. Soekarno used his skills to play a balancing game between the PKI on the one hand, and the army on the other. However, he was unable to solve the basic problems in Indonesian society and politics. Ethnic division, ideological conflict, and economic difficulty remained serious. Soekarno's balancing

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<sup>23</sup> Soekarno believed that these two parties failed to satisfactorily denounce their members who were involved in the PRRI rebellion. See Suryadinata, *Political Parties*, 2-3; see also K.E. Ward, *The Foundation of Partai Masyumi Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Modern Indonesia Project, South Asia Program Cornell University, 1970), 16.

game only prolonged the showdown between the army and the PKI. When the 1965 coup occurred, the power configuration also changed. The coup resulted in the fall of Soekarno, the liquidation of the PKI, and the triumph of the army. This was the beginning of the Suharto era, more commonly known at that time as the era of the "New Order" <sup>24</sup>

Once the army came to power, it wanted to legitimize its presence through constitutional means in order to prevent the creation of a "parliament in the street". General Suharto and his associates decided to use the MPR (Assembly) and the DPR (Parliament) as legitimizers of their government. Efforts were made to control the MPR and DPR, and a General Election was planned for 1968. Although there was an agreement to preserve the MPR and DPR and to hold a general election, there was no consensus in the army as to the nature of the political system and the implementation of the elections <sup>25</sup>

After three preparatory stages of the general elections (the making of the election laws, the technical preparations, and the administration of the elections) the first General Elections in the New Order era were held on July 5, 1971. Golkar, NU, Parmusi, PNI, PSII, Parkindo, Catholic, Perti, Murba, and IPKI participated in the General Elections of 1971. In these elections, Golkar attracted over 34 million votes, or 62.80 % of the total valid votes; the NU, 10.2 million votes or 18.67 %; the PNI, 3.8 million votes, or 6.94 %, and Parmusi, 2.9 million votes or 5.36 %. The balance, 6.21 %, was divided among the remaining six parties. The distribution of the 351 seats was Golkar 227, NU 58, Parmusi 24, PNI 20, PSII 10; Parkindo 7; Catholic Party 3; and Perti 2. Murba and IPKI suffered total failure.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Suryadinata, *Political Parties*, 3.

<sup>25</sup> Feith, "Suharto's Search," 90

<sup>26</sup> Masashi Nishihara, *Golkar and The Indonesian Elections of 1971*, Monograph

Thus Golkar won a land-slide victory, the once major parties, the NU, the PNI, and Parmusi, were demoted, and minor parties came to doubt their very survival. Ali Mustopo's pre-election prediction that there would be a new political structure after the General Elections which would not result in the dissolution of the parties indeed came true. Golkar's total parliamentary strength is now 336, combining 227 by election, 100 by appointment, plus 9 more by indirect election in West Irian.<sup>27</sup> It occupies 73 per cent of the total 460 seats.

One aspect of the political significance of the 1971 General Elections was the emergence of Golkar as the largest political party. With regard to the victory of Golkar in the 1971 General Elections, there were many interpretations. Golkar's electoral success was in part a popular endorsement of Suharto's effective halting of inflation, and his relatively successful economic rehabilitation program. Golkar was also a party based on the organizational support of the government bureaucracy, particularly of the Departments of Home Affairs and of Defense and Security. After all, Golkar was supported by the military which used Golkar for its political goals. The military's success in weakening political parties and finally discrediting them was also part of Golkar's victory.<sup>28</sup>

The other significance of the 1971 General Elections was that through Golkar, the military has entered into the central arena of parliamentary politics. As the real power-holders in contemporary Indonesia, they have nonetheless sought some popular sanctions for their control, which is the most important aspect of the election. In 1955, the military stayed out of the parliamentary electoral process. As a result,

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Series (Ithaca, N.Y. Modern Indonesia Project Cornell University, 1972), 42

<sup>27</sup> Lembaga Pemilihan Umum Press Release of August 19, 1971, cited by Nishihara, *Golkar and The Indonesian*, 42

<sup>28</sup> Nishihara, *Golkar and the Indonesian*, 51, see also Suryadinata, *Political Parties*, 17.



parliament was never stable and never functioned productively, since the military exerted its influence over the parliament from outside. Now that a military-dominated government party controlled parliament, this increased the chance for greater legislative productivity. In this way, according to Nishihara, the functioning of the Indonesian parliament could be improved after these elections.<sup>29</sup>

However, the most significant development in the political field after the 1971 elections was the restructuring of political parties by reducing their number. In retrospect, the restructuring of political parties did not begin during the Suharto period. Soekarno was the one who first reduced the thirty old parties to ten during his "Guided Democracy" period.<sup>30</sup> In the New Order era, the existing political parties after the election of 1971 were reduced to three. In January 1973, PNI, IPKI, Parkindo, Partai Murba, and Partai Katholik (Catholic Party) were fused into the PDI. Moreover, four Islamic parties, namely, Nahdhatul Ulama (NU, Traditional Muslim Party), the Parmusi (Reformist Muslim Party), the PSII (Islamic Association Party of Indonesia), and the PERTI (Islamic Educational Movement), were fused into the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP).<sup>31</sup> Thus, since January 1973, there have been three political parties in the political system of the New Order, namely, Golkar, PPP, and PDI.

The merging of parties which sometimes differed on basic principles and political strategies did not exactly contribute to creating internal cohesion. Although their great rival, the government-sponsored Golkar, is not free from internal disputes and struggles for power, the PPP and PDI have been particularly weakened by internal rifts and problems since their foundation. In the PDI, these usually revolved around factions within the old PNI. In the PPP it was leaders of the former Parmusi and

<sup>29</sup> Nishihara, *Golkar and the Indonesian*, 52.

<sup>30</sup> Suryadinata, *Political Parties*, 20-21.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., 23.

Nahdhatul Ulama who contested the leadership of the party. As parties had to be "programme-oriented" and not "ideology-oriented," it became more difficult for the PPP and PDI to stress their own distinct backgrounds and to capitalize upon their own ideological and religious principles during the election campaign. For the PPP, this meant that the opportunity of presenting itself as the Islamic party par excellence has decreased over the years. Golkar, on the other hand, in its effort to counter such claims by the PPP could, by referring to a common basis shared by all, stress the fact that it also is a party for Muslims.<sup>32</sup>

In the course of years the government and Golkar seem to have succeeded in weakening the claim of the PPP to be the party for which a devout Muslim had to vote. During past campaigns, politicians of the PPP did stress the Islamic background of the party. In 1977, it was suggested that a good Muslim should vote PPP. For instance, when the PPP still had the *Ka'bah* as its election symbol, it was suggested on a number of occasions that a true Muslim was expected to vote "*Ka'bah*" and even that Muslims not voting PPP were in fact *kāfirs*, infidels. To counter such claims, Golkar leaders argued that they were good Muslims too, and that nowhere in Islam was it said that people could not vote Golkar or PDI.<sup>33</sup>

Clashes between PPP and Golkar supporters were reported. In many areas where the PPP was strong, Golkar, especially its youth organization, used bulldozer tactics to defer the PPP supporters. In an interview with *Tempo*, some Golkar youth leaders in Bandung revealed that they had served as a "bulldozer" for Golkar during the 1977 election campaign.<sup>34</sup> Some of the Golkar leaders disapproved of these

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<sup>32</sup> C. van Dijk, "The Indonesian General Election 1971-1992," *Indonesia Circle*, 58 (June 1992), 55.

<sup>33</sup> See van Dijk, "The Indonesian," 55.

<sup>34</sup> "Pemilu 1977," *Tempo*, (6 March 1982), 17-18.

tactics and General Widodo, who later became a critic of the Suharto government, also commented after the election that there was ~~was~~ intimidation and force used during the election campaign which should not have been condoned.<sup>35</sup>

However, Golkar's victory in the election should be explained more in terms of the political structure rather than the means employed by some individual Golkar leaders. The fact that the government bureaucracy, KORPRI, was part of Golkar, and that the military sided with the "functional group", guaranteed victory for the organization in the 1977 elections.<sup>36</sup> Golkar obtained 62.11 per cent of the votes, 0.69 per cent less than in 1971. The PPP, however, won more votes in 1977 (29.29 per cent), in 1971 (27.11 per cent), while the PDI, as expected, continued to decline (from 10.09 per cent in 1971 to 8.60 per cent in 1977).<sup>37</sup>

The fourth General Elections were conducted on May 4, 1982. The purpose of the General Elections was to elect 364 candidates for the DPR, and a larger number of candidates in Regional Legislative Assemblies (DPRD). The DPR's total membership is 460, of which the remaining 96 seats are filled by presidential appointment: 75 seats for the Armed Forces (ABRI) who do not have legal voting rights, and 21 seats for non-ABRI functional groups.<sup>38</sup>

The MPR, the state's highest policy-making body, is made up of the 460 DPR members augmented by 460 delegates comprising: (1) delegates from regional territories (140), (2) politicians and functionaries (113), (3) ABRI and non-ABRI

<sup>35</sup> Suryadinata, *Political Parties*, 29-30.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, 30.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid

<sup>38</sup> Soeroso, "The Outcome of the 1982 General Election," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, 10, 3 (July 1982), 9.

functional groups (207).<sup>39</sup> For the first time, more than 300 000 eligible voters of East Timor elected their four DPR members.<sup>40</sup>

On June 14, 1982, the General Elections Board (LPU Lembaga Pemilihan Umum) announced the final tallies for the 1982 elections. Golkar gathered 64.34 per cent of the total vote, the PPP 27.28 per cent, and the PDI 7.88 per cent. The figures also show the distribution of the 364 elected seats in the DPR: 246 for Golkar, 94 for PPP and the remaining 24 seats for PDI.<sup>41</sup> Thus Golkar won fourteen additional seats in this election, and had representatives in all the provinces. It succeeded in defeating the two parties in all the provinces (including Jakarta) except Aceh where the PPP remained paramount. (In Aceh, the PPP gained 59.08 per cent of the votes while Golkar got only 36.97 per cent).<sup>42</sup>

Compared with the 1977 election results, the PDI won two additional seats in West Java, but lost seven seats elsewhere, making a net loss of five seats. The areas in which the PDI has no representation increased from 12 to 15 provinces: Aceh, West Sumatra, Riau, Jambi, Bengkulu, Central Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, Southeast Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, South Sulawesi, West Nusa Tenggara, East Kalimantan, North Sumatra, Southeast Nusa Tenggara, and East Timor.<sup>43</sup>

The PPP won one additional seat in West Sumatra (from Golkar) but lost in the following areas: East Java (1 seat), Central Kalimantan (2 seats), South Kalimantan (1 seat), and South Sulawesi (1 seat). The PPP had no representation in four

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> Soeroso, "The Outcome," 9.

<sup>42</sup> Suryadinata, *Political Parties*, 57.

<sup>43</sup> "PDI dan Pemilu 1977," *Kompas*, (15 June 1982), 4.

provinces. East Nusa Tenggara, Bali, Southeast Sulawesi and Irian Jaya. This situation is identical with the 1977 election.<sup>44</sup>

It is generally argued that Golkar was bound to perform well in most of the areas because of the support of KORPRI, the government, and ABRI. The pressure was so great that many voters felt obliged to vote for Golkar. However, Jakarta was regarded as a place where pressures were relatively less and where the voters were more sophisticated. Hence the voting results in Jakarta can be seen as a measurement of Golkar's popularity. The PPP won more votes than Golkar in the 1977 election in Jakarta, Golkar won 39.3 % while the PPP gained 43.5 %.<sup>45</sup>

The fourth General Elections during the period of the New Order government were held simultaneously throughout Indonesia on the 23rd of April 1987 to elect members for the DPR and for The MPR for the period of 1987-1992.<sup>46</sup>

The results of the ballot counting showed that the PPP experienced a set-back, with only 61 DPR seats, Golkar was again the victor having succeeded in augmenting the number of seats obtained from 264 to 299 DPR seats. PDI has also succeeded in increasing the number of seats obtained, though still less in number than those of PPP. This party obtained 40 DPR seats.<sup>47</sup>

These 1987 General Elections were held in a peaceful atmosphere as compared with the previous general elections, especially those held in 1977 and 1982. Social upheavals which often coloured the previous elections had very much diminished in

<sup>44</sup> Suryadinata, *Political Parties*, 57.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, 59-60

<sup>46</sup> M. Sudibyo, "The 1987 General Election," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, 15, 3 (July 1987), 315

<sup>47</sup> Ibid

their intensity.<sup>48</sup> Such a situation has been made possible by some supportive factors. Pancasila was accepted by the organizations as the sole principle in social, national, and state life, and ABRI (the Indonesian Armed Forces) acted justly and correctly in the last general elections. The acceptance of Pancasila as the sole principle of the organizations rendered irrelevant the specific characteristics of a political party, which reflected its explicit form of ideology. Pancasila as the sole principle - which among other things became the foundation for the development of a political culture in line with the basis and ideology of the state - aside from serving the purpose of terminating the phase of ideological conflicts and achieving a more realistic national integration, has brought about initial encouraging results. Ideological conflicts which are, among other things, caused by the still prevailing identity principles used in the previous general elections have to a large extent diminished.<sup>49</sup>

One of the significant results of the 1987 elections was the thirty three per cent decline in the PPP national vote. This bad election result can only partially be attributed to the NU's neutrality. The PPP lost support not only in the NU strongholds of Central and East Java, but also in strong non-NU regions such as West Sumatra and Aceh.<sup>50</sup>

Another significant result of the 1987 General Elections was the PDI reorganization and revitalization. This development was due to the new members who were described as managers who would be able to administer the party in a more rational way.<sup>51</sup> The PDI concentrated on recruiting new members from two

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<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid., 315-316.

<sup>50</sup> Jean van de Kok and Michael van Landenberg, "Political Development in Indonesia in the First Half of 1987: Electoral Politics and Comment," *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs*, 22, 1 (Winter 1988), 171-172.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid., 164.

social sectors -- women and youth. The new PDI leadership also formulated a political program for the future aimed at making the party more representative of the lower and middle classes.<sup>52</sup>

There was also some progress shown in the patterns and themes of the campaigns. Religious issues and old patterns which could arouse the emotions of the masses and which could arouse racist sentiments were not noticeable. However, remnants of old practices of political life still occurred frequently amongst certain circles in society. This was quite natural since old practices, which certain circles strongly adhered to, needed quite a long time to change. It would be difficult to make extravagant changes in such a short time, as the old patterns had been entrenched for such a long time in society.

The fifth General Election during the period of the New Order government was held simultaneously throughout Indonesia on June 9, 1992. The purpose of these elections was to elect candidates to the DPR, DPRD, and MPR, the state's highest policy-making body, for the period of 1992-1997.<sup>53</sup>

Like the previous General Elections, the 1992 General Elections were based on a proportional representation and register system i.e. the number of representatives of the organization in the DPR and DPRD is supposed to be in proportion to the amount of support in society. To this end, an organization whose candidates are in a list of candidates will obtain a number of seats based on a certain electoral quotient, i.e., a certain number obtained by dividing the total number of votes by the number of seats available. The register system as well as the system of general elections reflect an acknowledgment of the system of organization taking part in political life. Each

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 164-165

<sup>53</sup> Al Baroto "Indonesia's 1992 General Election: Changes and Continuity," *The Indonesian Quarterly*, 20, 3 (Third Quarter 1992), 244.

Second Level Region - sub-provincial Region: "*Kabupaten*" for rural areas and "*Kota Madya*" for urban areas - gets at least one representative, based on the proportional representation system regulated by government <sup>54</sup>

The outcome of the 1992 General Elections was significant for four reasons. First, Indonesia had entered the fourth year of the fifth five-year Development Plan (*Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun, Repelita*). The fifth *repelita* is the last phase of a series of *repelitas* which constitute the first twenty-five year long-term development programme. It is also the final stage of preparations before entering the "take off" era, i.e., the period where development in the field of economy is given top priority with emphasis on development in the industrial sector supported by sustainable growth in the agricultural sector. Hence, one important task facing the nation during this period is how to strengthen, consolidate, and improve development in every sector of the nation's life to prepare for the Sixth Five-Year Development Plan (*Repelita VI*), as the first stage of the second twenty-five year long-term development programme <sup>55</sup>

Second, the 1992 General Elections signified the process of a generational change in Indonesia. More than fifty per cent of the over 100 million voters in this election were under forty years of age. They are seen as the "new breed" in society, since they did not experience the pre-independence era. The OPPs, especially Golkar, which has been the "dominant ruling party" in Indonesia since 1991, recruited new candidates from among the younger generation.<sup>56</sup>

Third, society was increasingly aware of the importance of justice and democracy

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<sup>54</sup> "Indonesia 1992," *Directorat of Foreign Information Service, Department of Information of Republic of Indonesia*, (Jakarta, 1992) 34-35, cited by Baroto, "Indonesia's 1992," 245-246

<sup>55</sup> Al Baroto, "Indonesia's 1992," 245-246

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 246.



as a result of the developments in education, economy, technology, and the rapid flow of information. Hence, it was the main objective of the 1992 General Election to realize the aspirations and interests of society by implementing the second Long-Term Development Programme.<sup>57</sup>

Fourth, presently the world is undergoing fundamental changes in the political-security and economic realms, at global, regional, and national levels. The politico-strategic environment today is marked by the end of the post-World War II era. Other systemic changes include the growing importance of economics and international relations, although, as demonstrated in the Gulf War, military capabilities are still relevant. Economic progress, technological development, and telecommunications have all spread the influence of democratic values and market forces. At the same time, they have weakened national sovereignty and aroused greater nationalist sentiments, as well as racial and ethnic feelings.<sup>58</sup>

On June 29, 1992, the Indonesian Election Committee (Panitia Pemilihan Indonesia or PPI) announced the result of the 1992 elections. The total number of valid votes stood at 97,789,534 (90.90 per cent of the registered voters). The distribution of votes obtained by the OPPs was as follows: Golkar got 66,599,331 votes (68.10 per cent), PPP got 16,624,647 votes (17 per cent), and PDI got 14,565,556 votes (14.90 per cent). The figures also show the distribution of the 400 seats in the DPR: 282 seats went to Golkar, sixty-two seats went to PPP, and the remaining fifty-six seats went to PDI.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 246.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

### 3. Muslim Women in the Legislative Assembly

The political rights of Indonesian women are stated in section 27 article 1 of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945 which states that every citizen has equal status in law and government. Therefore, the right to vote and the right to be elected have never been a controversial issue since independence. There was an active struggle for national independence in the social and political life after Indonesia achieved its full sovereignty in 1949. It is worth noting that, during elections, approximately 80 % of the women exercised their right to vote <sup>60</sup>

Political participation of Indonesian women has always been considered high <sup>61</sup>. However, few women sit in the DPR and MPR. For example, there were 17 women compared to 155 men in the parliament and 30 women compared to 490 men in the parliament as a result of the 1955 General Election. Meanwhile, there were 33 women compared to 427 men in DPR (the House of People's Representatives) and 51 women compared to 869 men in the MPR as a result of the 1971 General Election. In the 1977 General Election, 39 women and 421 men were elected as members of DPR and there were 27 women compared to 863 men in the MPR <sup>62</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Kowani, "The Role of Women in Development," 26

<sup>61</sup> Political participation is a process in which people try to affect the government by taking part in the voting process, by persuading others to vote, by becoming members of any political campaign, by keeping oneself informed about politics or by discussing politics with friends, colleagues or any family member, by attending political meetings, political rallies or protest meetings, by joining public or street demonstrations; by agitating to get public officials to correct political wrongs, by becoming an active member of an organization engaged in solving community problems, by giving money for a political cause, by working with others in the city in trying to solve some of the problems, by becoming a party workers, legislators, and bureaucrats. See Sumana Pandey, *Women and Politics* (Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 1990), 5, see also Jane S Jaquette, "Introduction: Women in American Politics," in Jane S Jaquette, ed., *Women in Politics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974), xiii

<sup>62</sup> Soewondo, *Kedudukan Wanita*, 160

Still, a few women sat in the DPR and MPR as a result of the 1982 General Elections. There were 42 women compared to 418 men in the DPR and 69 women and 850 men in the MPR. There was a slight increase of women who became DPR and MPR members: 57 women were elected compared to 443 men in the DPR; and 104 women were elected compared to 896 men in the MPR, as a result of the 1987 General Elections.<sup>63</sup> Also, only a small number of women had been elected to the central boards of political organizations. Only one woman (5.88 %) was elected as a member of the central board of PPP, PDI has two women (10.0 %) in its central board, while Golkar has 5 women (11.11 %) on its central board.<sup>64</sup>

The number of Muslim women who became members of the DPR in the period 1987-1992 was only 51 seats (10.2 %) out of 500 seats. Six out of these 51 DPR members were from the PPP constituting 12 % of all DPR members. Golkar, as the biggest political organization, had 43 Muslim women as members (86 % of all DPR members). Meanwhile, the PDI, as the smallest political organization, had 2 Muslim women (0.4 % of all DPR members).<sup>65</sup>

Among the Muslim women who became members of the DPR in the period of 1987-1992, 6 (9.8 %) were from the PPP; 43 (11.3 %) from Golkar, and 2 (5 %) from the PDI.<sup>66</sup> The number of non-Muslim women among them was 6 (10.5 % of all women members of the DPR).<sup>67</sup> In the years 1987/1992, the number of Muslim women who became members of the MPR was 92 (87 %) while that of non-Muslim

<sup>63</sup> BPS, *Indikator Sosial Wanita*, 144.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Lembaga Pemilihan Umum (LPU), *Daftar Nama Para Anggota DPR Terpilih 1987-1992* (Jakarta: Departemen Dalam Negeri, 1987), ix-xxiv.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

women was 12 (13 %) In total, the number of Muslim women was 92 (9.2 % of all MPR 1000 members) <sup>68</sup> Moreover, we can see that among the Muslim women who became members of the MPR in the period of 1987/1992, 9 (9.8 %) came from the PPP, 80 (9.4 %) from Golkar, and 3 (5 %) from the PDI <sup>69</sup>

The figures above show that a comparatively small number of women are being elected to the House of People's Representatives, the Consultative Assembly, and political parties. Meanwhile, the number of women in Indonesia is larger than that of men. In 1980, the ratio of men to women was 98:100, and between 1985 and 1990 it was 99:100.<sup>70</sup> It is worth noting that during elections approximately 81 % of the women exercised their right to vote <sup>71</sup> Therefore, the small number of women who became members of the House of People's Representatives, the Consultative Assembly, and the central boards of political organizations seems to be unrepresentative and unfair.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Lembaga Pemilihan Umum (LPU), *Daftar Nama Para Anggota MPR Terpilih 1987-1992* (Jakarta: Departemen Dalam Negeri, 1987), ix-xxvi

<sup>69</sup> Ibid.

<sup>70</sup> BPS, *Indikator Sosial Wanita*, v.

<sup>71</sup> Kowani, "The Role of Indonesian Women," 26.

<sup>72</sup> Political participation of Indonesian women, if measured from the quantity of women who become members of DPR/MPR, is not much lower than the political participation of women in the United States. For example, in 1991, 28 (6.4 %) women in the US were elected to the House of Representatives, and there were 2 (2 %) female senators by 1991. This is in spite of the fact that the West is generally considered to give more opportunity to women in the socio-political field. See US Department of Commerce, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1992*, 112th edition, (United States Bureau of the Census, 1992), 264. Also, few women have important positions such as cabinet members. For example, in 1991, for the first time in the US history, a woman, Janet Reno, is the only woman to become attorney general. The presence of women in politics or in jobs related to politics is still considered strange; women are considered as outsiders and intruders. See Richard Morin, "Jack and Jill Went Up the Hill But Jill Gets Harrased More and Paid Less," *The Washington Post*, 10, 18 (March 1-7, 1993), 37.

If we compare the three political organizations, we can see that Golkar is more inclined to include Muslim women both as the DPR and MPR members than the PPP and PDI. We can also note that the number of non-Muslim women who became MPR members was higher than that of Muslim women who became members of DPR. Accordingly, non-Muslim women's members of the MPR were smaller than Muslim women's members of the DPR.

However, the percentage of political participation of Indonesian women in the Supreme Court is higher than their political participation in the House of People's Representatives and House of People's Consultatives. There were 7 women (12.05 %) out of 56 members in 1990.<sup>73</sup>

The Indonesian political system and culture have also obstructed women to become involved in politics. There are some factors which explain why the number of women who became members of the DPR, MPR, and of the central boards of the political organizations is very unproportional given the number and position of women in Indonesian society. One of the factors is the social values which generated rigid stereotypes and hierarchy.<sup>74</sup> Women are indeed exalted as wives and mothers, but this social cult of motherhood is combined with their socio-economic powerlessness. Thus the "naturally" weak and docile women are marginalized in society.<sup>75</sup> Women are expected to stay at home to take care of domestic affairs and children. Therefore, although now women are allowed to work, they still have guilty feelings about leaving their families and household. They feel that they are abandoning a traditional custom. The majority of women couldn't free themselves from their husbands, other people, or

<sup>73</sup> BPS, *Indikator Sosial Wanita*, 144.

<sup>74</sup> See Julia I. Suryakusuma, "Wanita dalam Mitos Realitas dan Emansipasi," *Prisma* (July 7, 1981), 3-14.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

society, to develop their own capacity as the men do.<sup>76</sup> Many other hierarchies and stereotypes were created to place women in inferior and dependent positions, such as contrasting between the world of women and the world of men. Women are considered less critical, less capable of making judgements and of making decisions for themselves. They are also considered to be less curious, weak, and as a result are in need of protection.<sup>77</sup>

The low political participation of women is also attributed to the standard image of women as representing motherhood, dedication, and sacrifice which are absolutely required for family and household prosperity. The woman is supposed to enhance her husband's career and status.<sup>78</sup> Her biological nature is adduced to argue that women's duties should be limited to the sphere of the family.<sup>79</sup> The lack of women's political participation is also attributed to the lack of political professionalism among women.<sup>80</sup>

The Indonesian political system after the failure of constitutional democracy has steered away from popular participation towards an increasingly limited decision making system.<sup>81</sup> This political system is a bureaucratic polity where political power and participation are monopolized by the highest levels of the civil and military

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 7.

<sup>78</sup> Toety Heraty Nurhadi, "Wanita dan Politik di Indonesia," Paper presented in seminar Wanita, Generasi Muda dan Politik, held by DPP PPP, in Jakarta (January 25, 1986), 34.

<sup>79</sup> Maftuchah Yusuf, "Wanita dan Politik," Paper presented in seminar Wanita, Generasi Muda dan Politik, held by DPP PPP, in Jakarta (January 25, 1986), 6.

<sup>80</sup> Suwarni Salyo, "Wanita dan Politik," Paper presented in Seminar Wanita, Generasi Muda dan Politik, held by DPP PPP, in Jakarta (January 25, 1986), 6.

<sup>81</sup> R. William Liddle, "Introduction," in R. William Liddle, ed., *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia*, Monograph Series No. 19 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1973), 1.

bureaucracies. Political life revolves around a small number of key decision-makers who respond primarily, although not exclusively, to the values and interests of the small, capital-city elite. The system is termed a bureaucratic polity because successive regimes have been products of internal competition within the civil and military bureaucracies rather than responses to mass movements mobilized by ideology, class, or primordial sentiments. Interest groups, political parties, and horizontal groupings of all kinds remain weak and incapable of consistently influencing the basic political decisions determining Indonesian domestic and foreign policies.<sup>82</sup>

The main arena for political competition is not the country at large, but the bureaucratic, technocratic, and military elite circle in closest proximity to the president of the republic. Political parties exist and elections are held, but both serve to legitimize, through democratic symbolism, the power arrangements already determined through the maneuvering of competing elite circles in Jakarta. The Indonesian political bureaucracy favors neither democratic nor totalitarian forms of mass participation, and parties are incapable of either controlling the central bureaucracy or mobilizing the masses behind a single set of ideologically defined social goals. Neither the very substantial gap between the rich and the miserably poor villagers of Java nor the primordial differences found among Indonesian Muslims have been effectively mobilized into politics. With the partial exception of the PKI, class differences have not supplied a compelling principle for mobilizing the masses into politics. Similarly, the religious beliefs of the masses have not been translated into organizations capable of enforcing the wishes of the ummat Islam on the Jakarta elite.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Karl D. Jackson, "The Prospect for Bureaucratic Polity in Indonesia," in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye, eds., *Political Power and Communications in Indonesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 395.

In such a political system, one's political achievement and professionalism do not insure a political career. A woman who has political influence and capacity will not necessarily become a member of a political party board or a member of DPR/MPR. If she can adjust herself to the political bureaucracy system, she is expected to have an important political position. However, if she has no special relationship with elites in the political bureaucracy and cannot adjust herself to it, she cannot expect to have a political position.

Women in the political system today are obliged to adopt political doctrines which are in line with their husbands's if the latter are part of the bureaucratic polity. Therefore it is difficult for women to develop their political capabilities freely and fully in the system of bureaucratic polity as it exists in Indonesia today.



## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE POLITICAL CAREER AND DISCOURSE OF AISYAH AMINY

Before discussing her education, social and organizational experiences, political career and opinions, the socio-cultural aspect of Minangkabau society in which Aisyah lived will be discussed

#### 1. The Minangkabau Society

The Minangkabau are the world's largest matrilineal people, their social and political organization coming very close to the state of "pure matriliney" in some anthropologists' interpretations. But they are equally well-known for a strong adherence to Islam and for a markedly modern and forward looking orientation. The Minangkabau have a long tradition of voluntary, temporary migration (*merantau*). It is estimated that approximately two and a half million Minangkabau live in West Sumatra, most of them (86 %) in villages, living off agriculture and related activities. Nearly the same number of people live in the *rantau* (migration) areas outside the West-Sumatran heartland of the Minangkabau working as traders, proprietors of restaurants, and administrative officials. In proportion to the Indonesian population, an impressive number of Minangkabau have become prominent scholars and politicians.<sup>84</sup>

Because the Minangkabau have a highly developed verbal culture, manifested in historical legends, myths, epics, and stories and as well as a complex systems of *adat* (law, morals, customs, practices), it is easy to see why foreign scholars in

<sup>84</sup> Lynn L. Thomas and Franz von Benda-beckmann, "Themes and Issues," in Lynn L. Thomas and Franz von Benda-Beckmann, eds., *Change and Continuity in Minangkabau: Local, Regional, and Historical Perspectives on West Sumatra* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies for Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), 1.

particular should have taken such a great interest in this society <sup>85</sup>

Islam was introduced into Minangkabau in the second decade of the sixteenth century and spread only gradually. As late as 1761, Islam was largely confined to the leading brother families of the ports. Islamic law, particularly the law of inheritance, proved to be suitable to their needs providing them with an alternative to the matrilineal system of inheritance of the uplands. The coastal peasants, however, remained attached to their animistic beliefs and to their own religious specialists <sup>86</sup>

Although *adat* has commonly been opposed to Islamic law, there have been efforts to integrate them. The effort to reconcile Islam with *adat* was manifested in the traditional Minangkabau social structure. In explaining this matter, Taufik Abdullah writes that

According to tradition, the *alam* Minangkabau is a harmonious world of Islam and *adat*. This harmony was expressed in the traditional concept of three kings: the King of Adat (*Radjo Adat*), the King of Religion, (*Radjo Ibadat*), and the King of the World (*Radjo Alam*) <sup>87</sup>

However, the nature of Islam in Minangkabau has been a source of serious conflict during the nineteenth century as well as a basis for disagreement throughout the twentieth century. According to Abdullah, the notion of a harmonious world was attacked in the early nineteenth century by the Padri movement. This movement was instigated by three Minangkabau *haji* (pilgrims who had returned from Mecca) who had been influenced by Wahhabism. They rejected the whole notion of a balance between *adat* and religion and of harmony between the self and the cosmic order. The Padri stressed the outward manifestation of religiously correct behaviour rather

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid., 2.

<sup>86</sup> Dobbin, *Islamic Revivalism*, 119

<sup>87</sup> Abdullah, "Modernization in the Minangkabau World: West Sumatra in the Early Decades of the Twentieth Century," in Claire Holt, ed., *Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), 198

than simply "purity of heart." In several of the *nagari*, conquered during the Padri war, traditional political institutions were abolished, and the *nagari* were ruled jointly by an *Imām* as the political chief and a *kādī* (judge) in charge of religious matters.<sup>88</sup>

But when the war ended in 1837, the Padri leaders failed to substantially change Minangkabau political and social structure. According to Abdullah,

They (Padri leaders) did not completely reform the heterodoxy of the Minangkabau religious system. They did, however, strengthen the social force of religion and enlarge its scope throughout the social system. A new *adat* formulation was introduced; the contrast between *adat jahiliah* (syncretic unenlightened adat) and *adat Islamiah*, which was in accord with religious law, was emphasized. The highest *adat* category, "adat which is truly adat," was now taken to be the Koran and *Hadīth* (the traditions of the Prophet). A new aphorism on the relation between adat and religion was also introduced: "adat is based on *sjarak*, *sjarak* is based on *Kitabullah* (the book of God)." The subordination of adat to religious law was expressed in a saying that "*sjarak* designs, adat applies." Ideally then, adat was the correct manifestation of religious law.<sup>89</sup>

Debates on the nature of Islam in Minangkabau continued in the twentieth century when:

In the beginning of the 1900's, the Islamic modernist movement began spreading its influence in West Sumatra. Launched by religious ('*Ulamā*') who had been influenced by new intellectual trends in the Middle East, the movement was directed at the purification of prevailing religious practices and also at using Islam as a basis for social change. In the process, the movement generated religious and social conflicts which lasted for almost two decades. The Islamic modernist scholars, known as the *Kaum Muda 'Ulamā* eventually dominated Minangkabau social and political movements. The religious and educational activities of the *Kaum Muda 'Ulamā* and their students and followers brought about an expansion and modernization of religious schools. By using Islam as the basis of their programmes, the Islamic modernists could claim religious sanction for their activities.<sup>90</sup>

In the critical situation which was caused by the tightening grip of Dutch political and economic power and the onslaught of a new religious reform movement, Aisyah's

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid., 199.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., 200.

<sup>90</sup> Abdullah, *Schools and Politics*, 1.

parents lived. Apparently, Aisyah's father, a successful trader, had a positive response to the new economic opportunities which were introduced by the Dutch government. He joined the *Kaum Muda* movement, although it is not clear which Islamic modernist organization he joined. The first organization which Aisyah joined was the *Nasyiatul Aisyiyah*. This organization is the girls' Section of Muhammadiyah, one of the Islamic modernist organizations. Besides, Aisyah was educated in *madrasah Diniyah Putri* Padang Panjang, the first modern Islamic school for girls.

## 2. Personal and Educational Background

Aisyah Aminy was born on December 1, 1931 in Padang Panjang, West Sumatra.<sup>91</sup> Her father was Haji Muhammad Amin and her mother was Hajjah Jalisah who originally came from Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatra. Muhammad Amin was one of the big traders at that time in Padang Panjang. Aisyah was the sixth of his seven children. Apparently Aisyah Aminy was from a family of traders: most of her brothers followed their father's footsteps and became traders.<sup>92</sup>

Aisyah's parents came from a religious family. Religious circumstances in this family would influence Aisyah's activities and her orientation in the future. Her Islamic orientation is apparent in the fact that she admires Rahmah El Yunusiyah, the founder and chairwoman of Diniyah Puteri School in Padang Panjang. Actually Aisyah admires all prominent national leaders.<sup>93</sup>

Aisyah's family was rich. Hence, she was able to continue her education up to

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<sup>91</sup> LPU, *Daftar Nama*, 23.

<sup>92</sup> "Wanita I yang Memimpin Komisi I DPR," *Kartini*, Edisi Khusus, 471 (December 7-20, 1992), 101.

<sup>93</sup> Mrs. Aisyah Aminy, S.H., interview by writer, Tape recording, Jakarta, 2 February 1993.

the university level. She was supported by her parents and brothers.<sup>94</sup> Initially, Aisyah attended class in *Hollandsch Inlandsche School* (HIS) until 1942.<sup>95</sup> She did not complete her education at HIS, probably because in that year Japan took over Indonesia from the Dutch. Aisyah continued her education in Diniyah Puteri School in Padang Panjang where she completed her studies in 1946.<sup>96</sup>

With its modern system, Diniyah Puteri School was a pioneer in Islamic education, especially for girls in Indonesia. The school has had a high reputation because of its success in attracting students who came not only from Padang Panjang or West Sumatra, but also from other regions in Indonesia and neighbouring countries, such as Malaysia and Singapore.

After graduating from Diniyah Puteri School, Aisyah continued her education at *Sekolah Guru Agama Atas* (SGAA, High School for Religious Teachers) in West Sumatra where she completed a degree in 1950. In early 1950, Aisyah left her home town for Yogyakarta which, at that time, was well-known as "knowledge town". She intended to continue her studies at the university level. Unfortunately, her SGAA's certificate was not accepted and she had to complete the high school examination to be able to register in university.<sup>97</sup> In 1951, she completed the high school examination. Then she was admitted to the Faculty of Law at Indonesian Islamic University (UII, Universitas Islam Indonesia) in Yogyakarta. UII is one of the oldest private universities in Indonesia. Its founding was pioneered by prominent national leaders, such as Muhammad Hatta, Muhammad Natsir,<sup>98</sup> etc.

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<sup>94</sup> "Wanita I," *Kartini*, 101.

<sup>95</sup> LPU., *Daftar Nama*, 23.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid*; see also "Wanita I," *Kartini*, 102.

<sup>98</sup> Muhammad Hatta was the first Vice President of the Republic of Indonesia from

Aisyah had no difficulties in completing her education and graduated from the university in 1957.<sup>99</sup> When she was a student at UII, Aisyah was also active in various organizations such as PII (*Pelajar Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Islamic Students),<sup>100</sup> HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*, The Association of Islamic University Students),<sup>101</sup> and GPII (*Gerakan Pemuda Islam*, Islamic Youth Movement).<sup>102</sup> Her activities in these organizations did not distract her from her studies and she completed them in a relatively short time frame of six years. Apparently her activities in these organizations were part of her life which couldn't be separated from her.

She was married to Desril Kamal, a businessman who came from West Sumatra in 1961, after finishing her studies at *Universitas Islam Indonesia* (UII, Indonesian Islamic University) in Yogyakarta. She has two children, Hilman and Yura. Hilman has finished his university studies. Aisyah's husband always supports her in various things. According to her, thanks to his support, she can retain her political reputation

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1945 until 1956. For Muhammad Natsir, see Chapter Two, pp. 49-51 in this thesis.

<sup>99</sup> Kawiyan, "Profil: Ny. Aisyah Aminy, S.H.," *Panji Masyarakat*, 725 (July 11-20, 1992), 38.

<sup>100</sup> PII was an Islamic student organization which was founded in May 1947 as an institution for Muslim students. Although organizationally it was not part of Masyumi, generally PII was influenced in many its points of view by Masyumi's leaders, especially by the modernist and fundamentalist wings of the party. PII was banned by the Indonesian government in 1986 after it declined to accept Act number 3 of 1985.

<sup>101</sup> HMI is an Islamic student organization which was founded on February 5, 1947 in Yogyakarta. The foundation of HMI was different from the foundation of PII, because the HMI foundation was not under the Masyumi leader's control and influence. Many of the founders of HMI were not people who had close relations with Islamic organizations, such as Lapran Pane (who initially proposed the foundation of HMI) whose father was a member of Partindo (Partai Indonesia, Indonesian Party). The same is true of other founders of HMI and the first HMI's board such as Mintareja and Ahmad Tirtosudiro.

<sup>102</sup> GPII was an Islamic youth organization which was closely associated with Masyumi. It was banned in 1963 because of its opposition to *Manipol Usdek* (the Soekarno Conception of politics and economic) and its suspected involvement in the 1957 attempt on Soekarno's life.

that she enjoys now. Aisyah says she will obey her husband because it is the obligation of a wife, as long as it is reasonable to abide by her husband's request.<sup>103</sup>

### 3. Social and Organizational Activities

Aisyah's activities and involvement in these organizations and her social life were encouraged by her family and her socio-cultural environment. Since her childhood, these two factors exposed her to Islamic teachings. Her religiosity is by no means short sighted religious understanding. Rather, it is in the sense of a strong religious devotion in the broad meaning. Thus, social and organizational activities were part of an effort to respond to social interests and needs and to improve the quality of life of society. For her, paying attention to social interests and needs is an Islamic duty which should be carried out by Muslims. The struggle to overcome social problems and to work for the common interest is a pious deed from the Islamic point of view which will be rewarded by God.<sup>104</sup>

Aisyah's first social involvement was in the struggle for national independence in 1948 in Tilatang Kamang, Bukit Tinggi. Because she was an energetic and actively cautious girl, she was easily admitted to the freedom fighters corps organized to resist "Second Dutch Agression" (*Agresi II Belanda*) of 1948.<sup>105</sup> At that time she had just completed her education in Diniyah Puteri Padang Panjang. About 20 women joined the struggle to fight against the Dutch. The main tasks of these women were preparing *dapur umum* (general kitchen) and supplying food to the troops. Aisyah became a member of *Palang Merah Indonesia* (Indonesian Red Cross) at the time of

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<sup>103</sup> "Wanita I, *Kartini*, 102.

<sup>104</sup> "Whosoever performs good deeds, whether male or female, and is a believer, we shall surely make them live a good life and we will certainly reward them for the best of what they did". (Qur'an 16: 97).

<sup>105</sup> "Wanita I," *Kartini*, 102.

this national struggle. She also worked as a spy because of her ability to speak Dutch. She would disguise herself as a food vendor or a peasant wearing dirty clothes in performing her tasks. In mid-1948, thanks to her information, the Indonesian troops destroyed a Dutch military convoy between Padang Panjang and Bukit Tinggi, and seized its arms.<sup>106</sup>

Besides her involvement in the independence struggle, Aisyah was active in the Nasyiatul Aisyiyah, the young women's organization of Muhammadiyah, (1943-1945) and PII organizations (1946-1949) when she was studying at junior and senior high schools in West Sumatra. When she moved to Yogyakarta to continue her studies, she remained active in some organizations. She was elected as chairwoman of the central board of PII for the female section in the period of 1951-1953.<sup>107</sup>

Aisyah was not only active in PII, but as a university student, she was also active in HMI. Because of her activities, she was elected as a member of HMI's Board, Yogyakarta Branch. She was even elected as chairwoman of the social section of the HMI Yogyakarta Branch.

After finishing her studies at UII, Aisyah became active in GPPI and was elected to become a member of the central board of GPPI for the female section in 1958-1961. In 1960, she became a member of the Central Board of HSBHI (Himpunan Seni Budaya Islam, The Association of Islamic Culture and Art), an Islamic organization which has made efforts to spread culture and art inspired by Islamic teachings.<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>107</sup> "Profil: Aisyah Aminy," *Media Indonesia* (December 20, 1992), 5; see also "Wanita I," *Kartini*, 102.

<sup>108</sup> LPU. *Daftar Nama*, 24; see also "Wanita I," *Kartini*, 101.



In the course of time, Aisyah's activities increased. In the wake of the failed 1965 coup attempt, she became coordinator chairwoman of *Kesatuan Aksi Wanita Indonesia* (KAWI, The Action Unit of Indonesian Women) which was founded to confront the Indonesian Communist Party. The latter supported the abortive "Coup Attempt of September 30, 1965", carried out by some military officers.<sup>109</sup> She has also been active in *Wanita Islam* (WI, Islamic Women)<sup>110</sup> and was elected as the general chairwoman of its central board from 1968 to 1985.<sup>111</sup>

Aisyah has not only been active in Islamic organizations but also in various professional, political and cultural organizations at the national level. Besides KAWI which was mentioned above, she also became a member of *Pengabdil Hukum* (Servant of Law) from 1967 to 1969, secretary of the central board of *Peradin* (Persatuan Advokat Indonesia, the Union of Indonesian Lawyers) from 1967 to 1968, chairwoman for law affairs of the central board of KOWANI from 1978 to 1986; member of the National Film Council from 1979 to 1984; member of the central board of *Parmusi*<sup>112</sup> from 1967 to 1970; Chairwoman of PPP from 1985 to 1987; and Vice

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<sup>109</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>110</sup> *Wanita Islam* (WI, Islamic Women) is a women's organization which was founded in Yogyakarta in April 29, 1962. The organization is independent in nature although its founder and most of its initial members came from families of the Masyumi's board and members. In the further development, *Wanita Islam* recruited most of its member from former GPII, HMI, PII activists.

<sup>111</sup> LPU., *Daftar Nama*, 24; see also "Profil," *Media Indonesia*, 5.

<sup>112</sup> *Parmusi* was founded in February 20, 1968 to accommodate Islamic social organizations which did not join any existing political party. These organizations had set up *Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin* (BKAM, the Body of Muslim Deed Coordinator) in December 1965 to unite a variety of Islamic social and educational groups, of which many had formally been constituent members of Masyumi, such as Muhammadiyah, Jami'atul Washliyah, GASBIINDO, Persatuan Islam, Persatuan Ummat Islam, etc. This front originally had both socio-cultural and political aims, but by early 1966 it became increasingly interested in the rehabilitation of Masyumi. During that year, discussions were held between representatives of the BKAM and Syarif Usman's Rehabilitation Committee. *Parmusi* was legalized by the President's Decision number 70 in February 20, 1968, after crucial negotiations between BKAM and the

Chairwoman of the Advisory Council of the central board of PPP.<sup>113</sup>

As a law expert, Aisyah has not only been involved in law affairs in the narrow scope, but also with wider social and human problems that lie at the root of legal issues. She also led *Lembaga Hak-hak Asasi Manusia* (Institute of Human Rights) from 1966 to 1968 and was a member of *Komisi Kedudukan Wanita Indonesia* (KKWI, the Commission of Indonesian Women Status) from 1977 to 1984.<sup>114</sup>

If we observe Aisyah's work experience, we will be able to conclude that she has always been ready to practice her knowledge. She is a woman who has a "learning by doing" principle. We can see this kind of principle since her student days at UII, when, at the same time, she was active in several organizations and working as a teacher in *Pendidikan Guru Agama Atas* (PGAA, High School for Religious Teachers) and *Sekolah Menengah Atas Puteri* (SMA Puteri, Girls High School) in Yogyakarta from 1954 to 1957.<sup>115</sup>

Aisyah continued to work in the field of education at the university level. Before she completed her studies, she worked as a teaching assistant at Tjokroaminoto University. She continued to teach at that university after she graduated from UII. She also taught at Ibnu Khaldun University in Jakarta. She had a teaching career at the university level from 1956 to 1961.<sup>116</sup>

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government. In the formation of the central board of Parmusi, Aisyah became a member from HSBI. Four out of 35 members of the central board of Parmusi were women including Aisyah Aminy. In January 5, 1973 Parmusi, along with three other Islamic political parties, namely: NU, SI, and PERTI, fused to form a new political party, called Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, The United Development Party).

<sup>113</sup> LPU., *Daftar Nama*, 24; "Wanita I," *Kartini*, 102.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid; "Profil," *Media Indonesia*, 5.

<sup>115</sup> LPU., *Daftar Nama*, 23.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid; "Profil," *Media Indonesia*, 5.

After completing her studies at UII in 1957, Aisyah began to practice in the field of law. She initially joined Muhammad Roem, who at that time was a member of the central board of the Masyumi Party. He had also once served as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice Prime Minister. Roem, who at that time was an advocate, did not lose any time in including Aisyah in the legal team which defended Kasman Singodimedjo who was then a member of the central board of the Masyumi Party. Since that time, Aisyah continued to be included in many law cases which were handled by Muhammad Roem. In 1959, she became an independent advocate, and she continued to work in that field until 1987.<sup>117</sup>

Organizational activities and her profession brought her to the political field. From 1967 to 1968, she was a member of DPRGR RI (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Gotong Royong, People's Representative Council of Mutual Cooperation of the Republic of Indonesia).<sup>118</sup> Since 1969, Aisyah had been on the special staff for law affairs in *Pekan Raya Jakarta* (PRJ, Jakarta Fair). Then from 1977 to 1987, she was elected as a member of MPR of the Republic of Indonesia as a representative of the PPP. Although Aisyah held several positions as mentioned above, she never left her profession as a lawyer until 1987 when she was elected as member of DPR of the Republic of Indonesia.<sup>119</sup>

Aisyah used her law profession to defend women who were victims in marriage cases and other cases related to family affairs. She, along with her colleagues such as Nani Razak, Saparinah Sadli, Nani Yamin, etc, founded *Lembaga Konsultasi dan Bantuan Hukum untuk Wanita dan Keluarga* (LKBHUKW, Institute of Legal Consultation for Women and Family). The foundation of this institute was supported

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<sup>117</sup> Kawiyan, "Profil," 38.

<sup>118</sup> LPU., *Daftar Nama*, 24.

<sup>119</sup> LPU., *Daftar Nama*, 24; see also "Profil," *Media Indonesia*, 5.

by *Majelis Ulama Indonesia* (MUI, Indonesian Ulama Council) which at that time was led by Hamka. Aisyah was director of LKBHUWK from 1980 to 1982. She was also senior advisor of *Badan Penasehat Perkawinan dan Penyelesaian Perceraian* (BP4, The Body of Guidance and Counseling Marriage and Divorce).<sup>120</sup> Aisyah's activities and her persistence to elevate women's position have been widely acknowledged by government and society. Not surprisingly, she was appointed to become a member of KKWI from 1977 to 1984.<sup>121</sup>

Since 1987, Aisyah has become a member of DPR as a representative of PPP. Although she had abstained from the position for 19 years, she was not unfamiliar with political affairs because, during that time, she had always been an active member of the central board of Parmusi and PPP and a member of MPR. Indeed, her activities and involvement in political, social, and professional affairs made her a member of DPR.

During her tenure as a member of DPR in the period of 1987 to 1992, Aisyah became a member of *Komisi II* (Second Commission) which handled internal political affairs. In this position, Aisyah met and discussed issues several times with the Minister of Interior, the Head of *Badan Administrasi dan Kepegawaian Negara* (BAKN, Office of State Administration and Civil Service), The Minister of State Secretary (*Menteri Sekretaris Negara*), the Chairman of LAN (*Lembaga Administrasi Negara*, Institute of State Administration), the Office of State Archives, and the Head of *Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan dan Pembangunan* (BPKP, Office of the Inspector for Finance and Development). She is also member of BKSAP (*Badan Kerjasama antar Parlemen*, Interparliamentary Cooperation Body) which carries out international activities since it is member of IPU (*International Parliamentary Union*). Meanwhile, in

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<sup>120</sup> "Profil," *Media Indonesia*, 5.

<sup>121</sup> LPU., *Daftar Nama*, 24.

MPR, she was member of the Adhoc Committee II which handled political affairs.<sup>122</sup>

Aisyah has played a prominent role both in DPR and PPP which has led her to become DPR's nominee for 1992-1997 from the West Sumatra constituency. She has been re-elected as a member of DPR, although her party, PPP, lost many votes in the 1992 election.<sup>123</sup>

In the DPR for the 1992-1997 period, Aisyah has a very important and strategic position, namely Chairwoman of *Komisi I DPR* (DPR First Commission). The commission has never been led by a woman before. Therefore, Aisyah is the first woman elected to lead the commission. The First Commission includes defence and security affairs and in effect she has to meet and summon the Minister of Defence and Security Affairs, the Commander of Armed Forces, and the Chief of Army Staff, Chief of Navy Staff, Chief of Air Force Staff, and the Chief of State Police. She has also to invite the Minister of Information and Foreign Affairs.<sup>124</sup>

In the MPR, she has also been elected as Chairwoman of the GBHN (Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara, National Guidelines Policy) team from PPP. The important positions held by Aisyah are earned by the integrity, dedication, consistency, vision and ability which she has demonstrated as a politician in the course of time.

#### **4. The Political Discourse of Aisyah Aminy**

Aisyah's political points of views apparently represent a new perception among Muslims in Indonesia which differ from old perceptions. This perception can be observed in her point of view about whether an Islamic party is really needed or not.

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<sup>122</sup> Aisyah Aminy, interview by writer.

<sup>123</sup> Kawayah, "Profil," 38.

<sup>124</sup> Aisyah Aminy, interview by writer.

The old perception of Muslims, at least most of them, was that an Islamic party or formal Islamic political force must exist. This old perception had a tendency to make religion (Islam) a political ideology. The old perception, however, has been questioned and rejected mainly by some groups of the younger Muslim generation since the early part of the New Order period. Nurcholish Madjid who in the 1970s was the general chairman of HMI called for the renewal of Islamic thought including the question of an Islamic political party. He was of the opinion that the Islamic *ummah* or Muslims do not need an Islamic party anymore. His ideas regarding the problem of an Islamic party have been formulated in the famous saying: "Islam yes, partai Islam no." In the early years of their pronouncement, these opinions have been harshly criticized by many Islamic leaders and thinkers, but have also gained support from others.<sup>125</sup>

The ideas of Nurcholish Madjid, however, gradually became a reality given the restructuring of political parties which reduced the number of political parties from ten to three, namely PPP, Golkar, and PDI. PPP which is a fusion of four Islamic parties has not been formally recognized as an Islamic party since 1973 and has not advocated an Islamic ideology although all of its supporters are Muslims who formerly were members of the four Islamic political parties.

The new perception refrains from reducing religion to its political and ideological meanings and urges for a wider and more comprehensive understanding. In this new perception, the political and ideological meanings of religion are fulfilled in the common ideology and constitution, namely Pancasila and UUD 1945.<sup>126</sup> The new

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<sup>125</sup> See HM. Rasyidi, *Koreksi Terhadap Drs. Nurcholish Madjid tentang Sekularisasi* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1972; see also Endang Saifuddin Anshary, *Kritik atas Faham dan Gerakan "Pembaharuan" Drs. Nurcholish Madjid* (Bandung: Bulan Sabit, 1973).

<sup>126</sup> Alfian, "Ulama, Umat Islam, Dan Pemilihan Umum," *Jurnal Ilmu Politik*, 3 (Jakarta: PT. Gramedia, 1988), 30-31.

perception has been strengthened by Act number 3 of 1985 which obliged all political parties to make Pancasila the sole principle in social, national, and state life. The pronouncement of the act has negated other political ideologies which contradict religious values.<sup>127</sup>

Aisyah, as mentioned above, can be included amongst Indonesian Muslims who embrace the new perception of political reality in Indonesia. Aisyah believes that it is not the name or the predicate which make an organization Islamic. According to her, the most important thing is the activity which gives a decision maker the opportunity to realize religious teachings. She points out that the party which she has joined, PPP, does not mention Islam in its constitution. She also argues that the PPP has supported the national consensus of making all political and social organizations in Indonesia have Pancasila as the sole principle of their organizations.<sup>128</sup> She adds that with the Pancasila principle, there will be no more ideological conflicts, and thus every group will have the opportunity to actualize its organization in the interests of the nation and the state. According to Aisyah, since the PPP was given birth to by the merging of four Islamic parties (NU, Parmusi, PSII, and PERTI), the first aspirations which will be voiced by the PPP are the Muslims' aspirations. She argues that it is very appropriate that the PPP now pays enough attention to Muslims' aspirations because the majority of Indonesian people are Muslim.

Aisyah, through her opinions mentioned above, along with her colleagues in PPP, gave a new interpretation to Muslims' aspirations. Voicing Muslims' aspirations is no longer seen in the narrow context but in the wider context, namely as part of contributing to the Indonesian people's aspirations at large. Thus, voicing Muslims' aspirations is a matter of priority in line with the background of PPP as a party which

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<sup>127</sup> Ibid., 31.

<sup>128</sup> Aisyah Aminy, interview by writer.

was formed by four Islamic parties, but not in the sense of exclusion of other religious or social groups. Indonesia is a big country, its people have different cultures and languages and they live on various islands. However, the majority of them are Muslim, and Islam is the strong unifying force which played an important role in Indonesian nationalism. Because of this, the PPP, out of practical considerations, has to choose target groups in line with its background and reputation.

Aisyah has chosen Parmusi as a medium for her political struggle. This choice is not strange because she came from a family influenced by modern Islamic thought. In line with her family's trend, Aisyah joined for the first time Nasyiatul Aisyiyah, PII, HMI, and GPPI which are categorized as reformist Muslim organizations. PII and GPPI, although structurally not part of Masyumi the modernist Muslim party -- have a close relationship with it. Meanwhile, HMI, although at the time of its foundation less welcomed by Masyumi's leaders, was strongly inspired by them.<sup>129</sup>

Although Aisyah has a close relationship with Masyumi's leaders having received her political education from them<sup>130</sup> through her activities in these organizations, she has a flexible stand vis a' vis the political reality in Indonesia. Masyumi's leaders and their supporters from both the reformist and fundamentalist wings were eventually set aside from Parmusi because of disagreements concerning their political comeback which arose among military leaders who dominated power after the fall of Sukarno.

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<sup>129</sup> Allan S. Samson, "Religious Belief and Political Action in Indonesia Islamic Modernism," in R. William Liddle, ed., *Political Participation in Modern Indonesia*, Monograph Series No. 19 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1973), 124; see also Nurcholish Madjid, "The Issue of Modernization Among Muslims in Indonesia: From A Participant's Point of View," in Gloria Davis, *What is Modern Indonesian Culture?* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies Southeast Asia Program, 1979), 152.

<sup>130</sup> As was mentioned above, Aisyah worked in the field of law for the first time in an advocate's office which was led by Muhammad Roem, one of Masyumi's leaders from the reformist wing.



Aisyah, along with other Parmusi leaders who were categorized as the accommodationist group,<sup>131</sup> were able to accept new political realities in which military groups played important roles. With this attitude, the accommodationist group was well accepted by the military. The military dominated government could not accept the role of reformist and fundamentalist groups in Parmusi because they still suspected them of having the idea of an Islamic state.

Explaining her choice to join Parmusi, Aisyah relates that Islam is a religion which gives its adherents an opportunity to develop themselves to have prosperity in the world, and at the same time to invest for the hereafter. In this sense, people are encouraged to think about themselves, family, society, and nation, not only for their happiness in this world but also in the hereafter. Therefore, people have signs which guide them to choose between good and evil in line with religious teachings.<sup>132</sup>

Aisyah has been attracted to politics since she was active in student and youth organizations and was of the opinion that politics is a good thing. According to her, in line with the Islamic point of view, politics is not dirty. She relates that if politics is dirty, it is because of the ideas which manipulate political activities.<sup>133</sup>

Aisyah explains that she was motivated to be active in politics because of her will to serve the interests of the nation and state through political means through which the fate of the nation and the state is decided. She sees that political decisions which determine the direction and the course of the nation will benefit the country and the

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<sup>131</sup> The accommodationist group members were HMI alumni such as H.M.S. Mintareja, Ismail Hasan Metareum, Sulastomo, Yusuf Syakir; and some of them were from GASBIINDO (Gabungan Serikat Buruh Islam Indonesia, Federation of Indonesian Islamic Labor Union) like Agus Sudono, others were from PII alumni such as Hartono Mardjono and Husni Thamrin. See Samson, "Religious Belief," 133-134.

<sup>132</sup> Aisyah Aminy, interview by writer.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid.

nation.<sup>134</sup>

Speaking on the political role of women in Indonesia, she notes that according to both the constitution of 1945 and other acts, there is no limitation for women to be active in politics. According to her, the political field for women was opened before independence and has been open since the declaration of independence of Indonesia.<sup>135</sup>

In her opinion, women's involvement in political activities has increased compared to past times. This is partly due to the dedication of national leaders. It was also enhanced by the MPR's decisions in 1978 which specifically included an article on women's role in GBHN. This inclusion, she explained, was also inspired by "United Nations's Decisions" which made the year of 1975 "International Woman Year" and the decade after 1975 the "Decade of Women's Role".<sup>136</sup>

According to Aisyah, there is no unequal treatment of women who participate in politics. She admits, however, that for strategic positions such as general director, *bupati* (regent), governor, etc. in government, men have more opportunities than women. Thus, according to Aisyah, although article 27 of the 1945 Constitution says that every citizen has an equal position and right in government, in reality men have more opportunity than women to get certain important positions. She adds that the opportunity for women to get an important position in government is unequal to that of men because the opportunity itself is limited.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

In discussing unequal opportunity between men and women, Aisyah does not mention other basic factors which caused the situation. For example, she does not mention religious and socio-cultural norms which make women have less opportunity than men do to gain important positions. She does not mention the perception which still prevails among Indonesian parents who give priority to the son rather than the daughter to have the higher education which is required to get those positions. As a consequence, only a small number of women compared to men get these positions.

Giving her impressions about her experience as a DPR member, Aisyah says that women who become DPR members are generally vocal. According to her, women members in DPR have not only voiced matters related to women's interests, but also to people's aspirations as a whole.<sup>138</sup>

Aisyah indirectly argues that the "Liberal Democracy System" which existed in Indonesia during the 1950s was not compatible with the conditions of Indonesia as a developing country. According to her, the cabinet replacements which happened frequently during that period resulted in the fact that governments did not have the opportunity to implement their well-planned programs continuously. The frequent cabinet replacements, according to Aisyah, changed the government's policies in politics, economics, society, etc.<sup>139</sup>

Aisyah, however, does not point out the positive aspects of "Liberal Democracy". These positive aspects were, for example, that parties were of very great importance, that the contenders showed respect for the "rules of the game" which were closely related to the existing constitution, that civil liberties were rarely infringed, and that the government used coercion sparingly.<sup>140</sup> But Aisyah's opinion can be understood

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<sup>138</sup> Kawiyan, "Profil," 39.

<sup>139</sup> Aisyah Aminy, interview by writer.

because the political system of "Pancasila Democracy" which exists now in Indonesia considers "Liberal Democracy" to be a deviation from the Constitution of 1945. The military frequently highlights the negative aspects of the Liberal/Parliamentary Democracy, such as the highly frequent rise and fall of cabinets, the neglected economic development and the situation of disarray which was caused by various regional rebellions, to justify the new order government's policies, such as restricting the autonomy of political parties, the freedom of the press and academics to some extent, and prohibiting the existence of opposition in the political system of Pancasila Democracy.

The New Order government, through the political system of Pancasila Democracy, gives priority to political stability and economic development rather than other aspects such as the freedom of the press and academics, and human rights. Therefore, it can be understood why Aisyah, a politician in the political system of Pancasila Democracy, follows this line of policy.<sup>141</sup>

Aisyah criticized the Guided Democracy created by Soekarno, the first President of the Republic of Indonesia, which restricted political freedom, censored mass media and violated democracy. According to her, these conditions motivated her and her friends in 1966 to found *Lembaga Hak-hak Asasi Manusia* (Institute of Human Rights) to restore democracy in line with the Constitution of 1945.

In her criticism of "Guided Democracy", Aisyah did not note that the crucial element which supported the Guided Democracy System was the army which gradually participated in determining the course of power. The military felt that it was being neglected in the system of Liberal Democracy. The military, especially the

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<sup>140</sup> Feith, *The Decline*, xi.

<sup>141</sup> Concerning the political system of Pancasila Democracy, see Chapter Three, pp. 55-58 in this thesis.

army, supported Soekarno's declaration of a state of emergency, the dissolution of political parties, and the shutting down of newspapers in order to restrict freedom of thinking under the Guided Democracy System.

Speaking about Pancasila Democracy, Aisyah relates that the idea that the Indonesian nation has to develop togetherness is based on the principles of Pancasila. According to her, there is a certain kind of consensus that there should be no opposition in the system of Pancasila Democracy. Thus, Pancasila Democracy emphasizes togetherness more. She also says that if Pancasila Democracy is implemented, then the togetherness would be realized since opposition would not be allowed.<sup>142</sup>

Aisyah seems to think that there is a certain kind of contradiction or confusion in the implementation of the political system of Pancasila Democracy. On one hand, the political system of Pancasila Democracy does not allow opposition, but on the other hand the togetherness which is wished to be implemented has not yet been realized in political life.

Aisyah's opinion implies that the togetherness of the Pancasila Democracy system functions more as a means for the government to force political parties to follow its aims. Frequently, the government suspects political parties of developing the culture of an opposition if a party has a critical attitude and differs with the government's policies. The political parties also feel a lack of togetherness when it is clear to them that they are no longer included in the cabinets.

Therefore, it is not surprising that Aisyah argues that the value of both Pancasila or Guided Democracy depends on their implementation. Pancasila Democracy is theoretically good but the problem, according to her, is its implementation. People will

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<sup>142</sup> Aisyah Aminy, interview by writer.

believe in Pancasila Democracy if it fulfills the needs of society and if its implementation does not deviate from the principles of Pancasila itself. No doubt, Aisyah's explanation is based on her experience as a politician who saw discrepancy between the principle and the reality in politics.<sup>143</sup>

Aisyah's view is that *Dwi Fungsi ABRI*<sup>144</sup> (The Military's Dual Function) has already become a national consensus, and that the political participation of the military has a long history. The problem, Aisyah argues, is not in *Dwi Fungsi ABRI* but in creating a balance between the role the military and that of civilians. She questions why DPR members of the military faction should represent 20 % of the total members of DPR. She explains that this was based on a national consensus to keep a political balance which would prevent the change of the Constitution of 1945 and Pancasila. But according to Aisyah, all political and social organizations have already accepted Pancasila as their principle. Referring to this new development, she questions whether military representatives in DPR still have to be as many as before.<sup>145</sup>

Aisyah argues that the military's dual function can be changed without changing the essence of the dual function itself. According to her, there is a certain kind of consensus that if the position of governor were in the hands of a civilian, the position

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<sup>143</sup> Aisyah Aminy, interview by writer.

<sup>144</sup> *Dwi Fungsi ABRI* (Military's Dual Function) is a concept which was formulated by the chief of the army staff, Major General Abdul Haris Nasution, as a middle way policy in which the army would neither seek to take over the government nor remain politically inactive. Instead, the military claimed the right to continuous representation in the government legislature and administration. In its seminar held in April 1965, the army produced a doctrine that declared that the armed forces had a dual role as both a "military force" and a "socio-political force." As a "socio-political force", the army's activities covered "the ideological, political, social, economic, cultural and religious fields." See Crouch, *The Army and Politics*, 24; Ulf Sundhaussen, "the Political Orientation and Political involvement of the Indonesian Officer Corps, 1945-1966: The Siliwangi Division and the Army Headquarters," Ph.D. Thesis, (Monash University, 1971), 398, cited in Crouch, *The Army and Politics*, 24.

<sup>145</sup> Aisyah Aminy, interview by writer.

should not be given to the military anymore. She gives an example that in the early new order, many governors came from the military, but currently, their number has been gradually reduced. She notes that the question of the military's dual function needs political dialogue, so as to counter the impression that the military's dual function is a certain kind of domination over all functions, especially the political function.<sup>146</sup>

Aisyah's views reflect the political opinion which is prevailing in Indonesia which considers the military's dual function an inseparable element in the Pancasila Democracy system. The changing implementation of the military dual function from time to time has been made possible by the application of the concept itself in past times. Crouch, for example, mentions the lack of limitations on the army's political role, which in contrast with the earlier middle way concept, was even more marked at the army's second seminar, in August 1966. In that seminar, the army leaders were stepping up pressure on President Soekarno to resign himself to the fact of military domination of the government.<sup>147</sup>

The most crucial affair which Aisyah has experienced as a member of DPR/MPR was the question of *P4* (Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, The Guidance Comprehension and Implementation of Pancasila) and *Aliran Kepercayaan*<sup>148</sup> (Spiritual Sect) in 1978's MPR sessions. At that time, according to her, there were worries which emerged among PPP members and Muslims in general

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<sup>146</sup> Interview.

<sup>147</sup> Crouch, *The Army and Politics*, 345.

<sup>148</sup> *Aliran Kepercayaan* (Spiritual Sect) is a term used to refer to spiritual groups which consider themselves holders of the Indonesian original belief. They exist in Indonesia, especially in Java, which was heavily influenced by Animistic-Dynamistic, Hindu-Buddhist elements, besides Islamic teachings. Another term applied for *Aliran Kepercayaan* is *Aliran Kebatinan* (Spiritual Sect). Most of the *Kebatinan*'s followers nominally confess themselves as Muslims.

that *Aliran Kepercayaan* would become a certain kind of religion. She thanked God about the firm position of the PPP faction at that time which produced a consensus that *Aliran Kepercayaan* would not become a certain kind of religion. According to her, at that time, there were efforts from certain groups to equate religion with *Aliran Kepercayaan*. In Aisyah's view, *Aliran Kepercayaan* belonged to the domain of culture rather than religion. Eventually, the Indonesian government decided that *Aliran Kepercayaan* was to be included under the Ministry of Education and Culture rather than that of Religious Affairs.<sup>149</sup>

Aisyah argues that the PPP strives to realize economic and political democratization. The meaning of economic democratization, according to her, is that even distribution should be implemented, so that economic development ceases to benefit only a minority, while the majority of people still live in economic backwardness. Aisyah points out that the development process has given rise to several tycoon business conglomerates with international reputation. She also points out that the majority of Indonesian people still live under the poverty line. Aisyah comments that in a state which is based on Pancasila there should be no wide gap between a small number of rich people privileged by decision makers in the government and a large number of people who live in poverty. Therefore, according to Aisyah, the PPP faction in the last MPR sessions stressed the notion of even distribution in economic development.<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> The 1978 GBHN draft which was discussed in the MPR session planned to include *Aliran Kepercayaan* as a special group separated from existing religions which were officially admitted by the state. The PPP was worried that the plan would legalize the *santri-abangan* (devout Muslim - non-devout Muslim) dichotomy. Based on PPP's efforts, Muslim reactions, persistence, and the suggestion proposed by Haji Alamsyah Ratu Perwiranegara, then Minister of Religious Affairs, *Aliran Kepercayaan* was not classified as a separate religion. The followers of *Aliran Kepercayaan* were urged to return to their respective religions.

<sup>150</sup> Aisyah Aminy, interview by writer.



On the question of political democracy, Aisyah points out that there were many factors which caused the elections to be held unfairly and dishonestly. The fair and honest elections, she said, are a logical consequence of the unclear relationship between bureaucracy and Golkar to overcome these problems. She proposes that elections be carried out through the government's cooperation with the three political parties. Also, according to Aisyah, PPP proposed to support *Rancangan Ketetapan MPR* (MPR's Draft Plan) concerning the status and sphere of political parties' activities. In the PPP's draft plan, it was proposed that the party's board be formed even at the village level. The objective of the proposal was to enable parties to absorb people's aspirations and to have better communication with society. In addition, it could influence the party's leadership recruitment which would emerge from the grassroots level.<sup>151</sup>

Aisyah explains that for a long time it had been only the party's commissioner at the level of *desa* (village) and *kecamatan* (subdistrict) who was appointed by the board of the political party at the level of *kabupaten* (regency) or *kotamadya* (municipality). In her opinion this situation was less democratic because the board of a political party at the level of regency and municipality should be elected by the party's members. The same process, according to Aisyah, should be implemented at the level of village where the board of a party should be elected by members of the cadre.<sup>152</sup>

The obstruction of the political channels of political parties at the grassroots level of village, and subdistrict, according to Aisyah, is a matter which should be questioned. This is because Golkar placed Government officials at all levels as

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<sup>151</sup> Aisyah Aminy, Interview by writer; Kawiyan, "Profil," 39; "Profil," *Media Indonesia*, 6.

<sup>152</sup> Aisyah Aminy, interview by writer.

cadres or elder members. Aisyah evaluates this as being incompatible with article 27 of the Constitution of 1945. According to the spirit of this article, all Indonesian citizens have the same status and right in government. She questions the fact that there are no political parties' representatives who became members of cabinets.<sup>153</sup>

Aisyah believes this is inconsistent with the implementation of Pancasila Democracy and the Constitution of 1945. In her opinion, Indonesian people are determined to implement Pancasila and the Constitution of 1945 "*secara murni dan konsekwen*" (purely and consequently). The question of balance between legislative and executive, she says, has been discussed in the central board of PPP which also proposed to include the representatives of political parties in the cabinet.

Aisyah's proposal to build the party's structure at the sub-district and village levels is the will of PDI and PPP. Without having a party's structure at the grassroots level, political parties have difficulties in supporting their activities and in mobilizing people effectively.

Since the military played a decisive role in government after 1966, the political party's role was restricted by the military which sought to prevent parties from gaining influence in local and national politics. The military was worried that if political parties had had the opportunity to play all their roles, this would have obstructed the political and economic reform which had been planned by the military and its allies, the technocrats. In 1975, the parties and Golkar were allowed to build their branches but were only allowed to have a commissioner at the subdistrict and village levels. What made political parties feel they were treated unfairly was that Golkar could use the subdistrict and village bureaucracy to mobilize people and to hold its activities.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> Aisyah Aminy, Interview by writer; Kawiyan, "Profil," 39. "Profil", *Media Indonesia*, 6.

<sup>154</sup> For further explanation see, Crouch, *The Army and Politics*, 243, 271-272.

According to Aisyah, the PPP's proposal to involve the political party's representatives in the cabinet reflected the dissatisfaction of political parties with the government policy since 1978 which no longer included political parties' representatives in the cabinet. Through this policy, the government, along with the military and Golkar, developed self-confidence about its political strength and no longer needed political parties to gain people's support. Golkar as a means for the military has succeeded in rallying people's support.

Through his policy, President Suharto was able to implement modernization and economic development programmes in the early new order until 1978. President Suharto had always included the political parties' leaders in his cabinet, although not in important positions. This policy was aimed at gaining the support of the parties' supporters who were still numerous, especially in the early period of the New Order.

The policy of excluding political parties' leaders from the cabinet can be interpreted as contradictory with the prohibition of opposition in the political system of Pancasila Democracy. The government, however, may argue that the policy is not aimed at abandoning togetherness and cooperation in the political process.

The issue of economic democratization and efforts to narrow and bridge the discrepancy between the rich and the poor is an old one. Many social scientists who have critical opinions of the government have discussed and warned the government about these issues. Now the issues are raised by political parties and even by the government's people. This is probably a reflection of the increased openness of the government.

Regarding the small number of women who are active in politics, Aisyah mentions several factors. The first is education. According to statistics, the level of

education among women is lower than it is among men.<sup>155</sup> Second, there is a misperception which considers politics a dirty world and thus many people believe that women should not participate in politics. Politics is a violent world which is unfit for women who are graceful. Economic problems also shift women from politics towards solving economic problems.<sup>156</sup> However, she does not discuss the socio-cultural background which engenders these conditions. For example, she does not explain why the educational level of women in general is lower than that men.

Aisyah proposes ways for elevating the political participation of women. The first is to correct the perception that politics is not in line with women's nature. The second is that women must show their strong dedication and capability. Education plays an important role in this case. The third is that women have to fulfill their potentialities through education, experience and dedication. They also have to demonstrate achievement if they are to be trusted to perform a duty.<sup>157</sup>

Aisyah sees no special aspirations for Muslim women. She adds, however, that they should seek to show their abilities in all fields so as to correct the impression that Islam places women in a backward position. According to her, there is no Islamic teaching which stipulates that women have no good position in social life.<sup>158</sup>

According to Aisyah, the father or husband is responsible for the material side of the household, and the mother or wife is the head of the household. The balance

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<sup>155</sup> In 1988/1989 among 26.7 million elementary school students, 48.3 % were women and 51.7 % were men. At the national level, women above ten years old who had never been to school and did not complete elementary school reached 56.9 % out of 62.2 million women in 1986. See BPS, *Indikator Sosial Wanita*, vii.

<sup>156</sup> Aisyah Aminy, interview by writer.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*

between them should be maintained so as not to create conflict. By this, Aisyah means that women cannot neglect their nature. For example, they can give birth which men cannot. Thus, according to her, women can develop their potential without abandoning their nature. Women are also the main and first educators in the family. The role of women in the family cannot be neglected, although it is not only the mother who is responsible for the family but also the father or husband.<sup>159</sup> Aisyah also stresses the important role that parents and husbands should play in enabling women to develop themselves in every aspect of life, such as social and economic aspects. From the above survey, it can be seen that Aisyah is a woman who embraces a progressive but moderate view about the role and position of women in the social field. She is not among the women who believe that women should leave their domestic roles completely. Neither is she one of those who believe that women must only stay at home to take care of the children and the husband. Her opinion reflects on the one hand the general view of Muslim women in the present time, who aspire for a bigger social role for women. On the other hand, these women do not wish to adopt the Western feminist point of view (as represented in Western society) which has generally denied the difference between male and female roles and responsibilities in society and has demanded a move towards a unisex society in order to achieve equal rights for women.<sup>160</sup>

It seems to me that Aisyah holds an Islamic point of view which maintains that the rights and responsibilities of a woman are equal to those of a man, but that they are not necessarily identical with them. Equality and identity are two different things. Islamic traditions maintain that the former is desirable while the latter is not. Men and women should therefore be complementary to each other in a multi-functional

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<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

<sup>160</sup> See Lamyā' al-Farūqī, "Islamic Traditions and the Feminist," 134.

organization rather than competitive with each other in a uni-functional society.<sup>161</sup>

Aisyah, like other '*Ulamā*' and Islamic thinkers, feels apprehensive about the treatment of woman as a commodity. She points out that, in advertisements, women are portrayed simply as physical objects. According to her, a woman's personality is important. She criticizes the sending of women abroad to work (mostly) as servants who have to suffer being treated as commodities to get foreign exchange. She admits that women have the same rights to work as men have, but Aisyah suggests that the Indonesian women who are being sent abroad to work have high enough qualities to get important positions and not only work as servants in households.<sup>162</sup>

Discussing science and technology in Indonesia, Aisyah suggests that science and technology should not only be imported but also mastered at home. Aisyah here stresses the importance of education, skill and science. In order to master technology smoothly, the relaxed life style must be eliminated among the young generation. Also policies should be developed to eradicate foreign cultural values which are incompatible with the efforts to achieve advancement, such as living together, free sex, and other negative Western forms of life style.<sup>163</sup>

To face globalization, Aisyah believes that we need the spiritual endurance which is acquired through religious education. Religion plays important roles in giving guidance in life and religious education needs a model which is provided by parents

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<sup>161</sup> Ibid., 135.

<sup>162</sup> Aisyah Aminy, interview by writer. The discussion of how women in the west become sexual commodities and work as a means of production in the capitalist system can be read in the books of 'Alī Shari'atī. *Fatima is Fatima*, Translated by Laleh Bakhtiar (Tehran: The Shari'atī Foundation, 1980). and of Murtadā Mutahharī, *The Rights of Women in Islam* (Tehran: WOFIS, 1981).

<sup>163</sup> Aisyah Aminy, "Teknologi dalam Kabinet Pembangunan VI," *Panji Masyarakat*, 750, (March 21-30, 1993), 75.

and religious leaders.<sup>164</sup> The main task of the national development programme is to develop a socially committed man and create a balance between material and spiritual orientations. Religion is the source of inspiration and motivation. Aisyah stresses the importance of education and adds that the PPP has succeeded to include the *pesantren* (Islamic Traditional School) in the "Education Act". According to her, the *pesantren* is not only involved in education but also in the national struggle.<sup>165</sup>

Aisyah adds that children should be familiarized with science and technology at an early age. The meaning of technology should be perceived by family, society, and educational institutions. Science and technology will play a decisive role in the future and thus, *Badan Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Teknologi* (BPPT, the Body of Technology Research and Development) was formed as a ministry having provincial, municipal, and regency subdivisions. It can be expected that technology in the future will be more widespread and that people will feel it as a need.<sup>166</sup>

Aisyah believes the political prospects in Indonesia in the future are promising.<sup>167</sup> But she does not explain the reasons for her optimism. She only offers several suppositions and expectations. For example, she argues that the PPP will get better opportunities if what it strives for now is accepted by all parties. She has several suggestions: the first is that political parties should have opportunities to grow not only in the capital city, regency, and city, but also at the village level. The second is that leadership recruitment of a party should happen naturally without restriction. The

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<sup>164</sup> Ibid.

<sup>165</sup> Bambang Supatah, "Peranan Parpol Perlu Ditingkatkan," *Amanah*, 163 (5-18 October, 1992), 36.

<sup>166</sup> Aminy, "Teknologi dalam Kabinet," 75.

<sup>167</sup> Aisyah Aminy, Interview by writer.

third is that the policy which does not allow civil servants and their wives to join political parties should be lifted. The fourth is that the political practice which recruits bureaucratic figures to become elder members of Golkar should be removed. These, according to Aisyah, constitute the obstacles faced by the political parties.<sup>168</sup>

On the political prospects for women in the future, Aisyah believes that women have to be more active in politics. According to her, there should be changes in the political culture, so that, for example, university lecturers who want to be active in a political party can realize this without bureaucratic obstruction. Aisyah admits that the present condition is still hard because the existing political system and laws restrict the freedom of civil servants to be active in politics. But the important challenge, she adds, is to initiate changes gradually so that women would have greater chances to play a role in politics.<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> Aisyah Aminy, Interview by writer. These problems were explained by Aisyah before when she related her views concerning the PPP's proposals.

<sup>169</sup> Aisyah Aminy, interview by writer. In the elections of 1992, several state university lecturers could become candidate members of the DPR as representatives of political parties without being punished by their superiors. This was possible because of the Minister of Interior's Policy (Rudini) which lifted the prohibition on civil servants from becoming either members and candidates of the DPR or active in political parties. Rudini's policy as Minister of Interior is different from that of the former Minister of Interior (Amir Mahmud) which obliged government officials as KORPRI's (Korp Pegawai Republik Indonesia, Corps of Indonesian Civil Servants) members to become only members of Golkar.



## CONCLUSION

The Indonesian women's movement has been actively involved, indirectly, in politics since its early stages. This political involvement manifested itself in the Indonesian women's struggle for national awakening, liberation from adat, and Islamic reformism. The political involvement of Indonesian women in the politics of independence took various forms of political participation such as holding general meetings, presenting petitions, becoming active members of organizations engaged in solving social problems, and becoming members of *Volksraad* (The People's Council).

Indonesian Muslim women's activities can be divided into two categories of organizations: the first is the reformist Islamic women's organizations; and the second is non-Islamic oriented organizations such as nationalist, socialist, and regional women's organizations. The Muslim women who joined the latter organizations considered themselves Muslims and meant to improve their lot in so far as they are Muslim.

After Indonesian independence, the involvement of Indonesian women, in general, continued in the form of various political activities such as their participation in defending Indonesian independence. Their political participation continued to increase in the Liberal Democracy and Guided Democracy periods as seen in the efforts to improve the position of women in the legal, social, economic, and educational domains. They also became involved in the political ideological conflicts.

In the New Order period, women's activities tremendously increased due to the development process which emphasized economic development. Besides, political organizations in the New Order period were reduced from ten to two political parties

and one Golkar (Golongan Karya, Functional Group). Meanwhile, social organizations such as those of labor, fishermen, peasants, teachers, were restructured so as to have a single organization for each occupation. However, the New Order government did not strive to create one single organization which would supervise all women's organizations. KOWANI has functioned only as a coordinative organization. Every women's organization acts and holds its activities independently.

Furthermore, due to the intensification of Indonesia's cooperation with Western countries, Japan, and the United Nations on various aspects, mainly economic development, Indonesian women's participation has increased at the international level. Also the political participation of Indonesian women in political meetings, election campaigns, social activities, presenting resolutions, has been prominent. However, only few women sit on the DPR, the MPR, or on the central boards of political organizations.

The factors which account for these low ratios are: 1. The socio-cultural values which confine women to the domestic domain. Politics is traditionally viewed as a male field and is considered to be a dirty and violent world which is unfit for women who are graceful. 2. Religious (Islamic) interpretations which enhance this traditional view of women. Women are allowed to participate in social and political activities as long as they fulfill their family duties. 3. The lower rate of education and lack of professionalism among women. 4. The current political system and culture in Indonesia. Women are obliged to adopt the political doctrines of their husbands if the latter are part of the bureaucratic polity. This makes it difficult for women to develop their political agendas freely and independently.

Therefore, the political participation of muslim women in Indonesia can only be improved if the social perceptions which consider that the main duty and obligation of women is to take care of domestic affairs changed. If the society comes to

acknowledge that women also have rights and responsibilities in social and political life, it can be expected that the political participation of Muslim women in Indonesia can be highly improved.

Moreover, the political system and culture which exist in Indonesia today hardly encourage a fair competition in the political field. It is also difficult for the women who are obliged to adopt the political doctrines of their husbands if the latter are part of the bureaucratic polity to freely to voice their aspirations. Hence, the strong commitment of the political elite to struggle to make the current political system and culture more open and democratic is necessary. This would enable women to voice their political aspirations independently.

Besides, women have to show their potentialities and determinations to participate in the political sphere. Education and professionalism are important qualifications for success in politics. The case of Aisyah Aminy illustrates that seriousness and persistence along with education and professionalism can break obstacles which usually obstruct women from becoming politicians.

Religion also can play an important role in promoting women's participation in the political arena, given the important role of religion in Indonesian society. The interpretation of Islamic teachings on the role, status and duty of women could influence the perception of Indonesian Muslim on that issue.

An Islamic interpretation which considers the main duty and obligation of women to be in the domestic and family domains and allows women to participate in social and political activities as long as they fulfill their main duties, obstruct the involvement of women in politics. There is probably a need to have another Islamic interpretation which will give more opportunities for women to participate in politics. Murtadā Mutahhari acknowledges the special status of the familial sphere in society, the latter

including all aspects of economic, social and political life. Civil society is the product of the arena for human activity. According to him, Islam has always acknowledged that, in civil society, men and women are of completely equal value.<sup>1</sup>

Aisyah Aminy has a special position as a firm politician and an important figure in Indonesia's politics because, unlike the majority of women politicians in Indonesia who made their political careers because of their husbands' or parents' influence, she depended on her own skills. She succeeded in passing through barriers which usually obstruct Indonesian women from becoming politicians.

There are three factors which contributed to Aisyah Aminy's success as a politician. The first is her family's (parents, brothers, and husband) support; the second is the nature of Minangkabau society where Aisyah comes from. Minangkabau is the world's largest matrilineal people and it accords women a very important position; the third is that Aisyah is flexible in dealing with the political reality in Indonesia which is dominated by the military.

Aisyah Aminy is also a Muslim woman who is able to implement the Islamic teachings which are related to family life. She has even succeeded in realizing Islamic teachings which, in her opinion, place man and woman in equal positions.

Aisyah can be included amongst the Indonesian Muslims who embrace the new perception of the political reality in Indonesia. They believe that religion should not be reduced to its political and ideological meanings, but should be given a wider and comprehensive understanding. In their view, the political and ideological meanings of religion have been fulfilled in the state ideology and constitution, namely Pancasila

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<sup>1</sup> See William R. Darrow, "Woman's Place and the Place of Woman in the Iranian Revolution," in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and Ellison Banks Findly, eds., *Women, Religion, and Social Change* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 312; see also Murtadā Mutahharī, *The Rights of Women in Islam* (Tehran: WOFIS, 1981), 151-153.

and UUD 1945 (the Constitution of 1945).

The flexibility of Aisyah as a politician operating within the political system of Pancasila Democracy, also appeared in her opinions on the Liberal Democracy system which existed in Indonesia during the 1950s. She did not point out the positive aspects of Liberal Democracy such as respect for the rules of the game, civil liberties, and the sparing use of coercion by government. This opinion is in line with the New Order government stance which considers Liberal Democracy to be a deviation from the Constitution of 1945. The government frequently highlights the negative aspects of Liberal/Parliamentary Democracy - such as the frequency of the rise and fall of cabinets, the neglected economic development, and the disarray caused by various regional rebellions - to justify giving priority to political stability and economic development over other aspects such as the freedom of the press and academics, and human rights.

Though flexible, Aisyah, however, is also critical of the New Order government. She states that there is a certain degree of contradiction and confusion in the implementation of the political system of Pancasila Democracy. Aisyah's opinion implies that the togetherness of the Pancasila Democracy system functions more as a means for the government to force political parties to follow its aims. She argues that the value of either Pancasila or Guided Democracy would depend on the ways in which they are implemented.

Aisyah's view on the military's dual function, a key element in the political system of Pancasila Democracy, reflects the prevalent attitude which views the concept as an integral element in the Pancasila Democracy system.

Aisyah also speaks about the political party structure, political democracy, and economic democracy. She calls for a more democratic process through changes in

the structure of political organizations, and seeks to promote social justice.

Aisyah also proposes ways for improving the political participation of women. She maintains that, in Islam, the rights and responsibilities of a woman are equal to those of a man, but that they are not necessarily identical with them. She suggests the need to correct the perception that politics is not in line with women's nature. Also women must demonstrate their strong dedication and capabilities. Education plays an important role in this case. They have to fulfill their potentialities through education, experience and dedication. They also have to demonstrate achievement if they are to be trusted to perform a duty.

Aisyah is a woman who embraces a progressive but moderate view about the role and position of women in the social field. She is not among those believe that women should abandon their domestic roles completely. Neither is she one of those who believe that women must only stay at home to take care of the children and the husband.

Aisyah's opinions reflect the general view of contemporary Muslim women who aspire for a bigger social role for women. These women do not wish to adopt the Western feminist point of view, which has generally denied the differences between male and female roles and responsibilities in society and has advocated a unisex society in the struggle to achieve equal rights for women.

## GLOSSARY

*abangan* = Sociological term used to denote an Indonesian cultural group of Central Java. According to Clifford Geertz, the abangan are superficial Muslims who follow religious practices popular before the arrival of Islam and consist of Old Javanese, Hindu and Buddhist forms. Most of them nominally confess themselves as Muslim.

*adat* = Cultural term used to indicate the mores and behavior of various cultural groups throughout the Indonesian island groups.

*Aisyiyah* = The Female Section of Muhammadiyah founded in April 22, 1917. It concentrates on religious, educational, and social activities among the Muslim women.

*aliran* = Sociological term used to denote major Indonesian cultural and political groupings. According to Geertz, Javanese society consists of three broad groupings known as abangan, priyayi and santri, which is accepted, with qualifications, by most observers of Indonesia society.

*Aliran Kebatinan* = Spiritual Sects is a term used to refer to spiritual groups which consider themselves holders of the Indonesian original belief. They exist in Indonesia, especially in Java, which was heavily influenced by Animistic-Dynamistic, Hindu-Buddhist elements, besides Islamic teachings. Most of the Kebatinan's followers nominally confess themselves as Muslim.

*Aliran Kepercayaan* = See Aliran Kebatinan.

*Allah* = Islamic term for the concept of God. See also tauhīd and taqwā

*Da'wah* = Islamic term, from Arabic, connoting the activity of renewing the faith of individuals and groups of people already in the religion by generally propagating the faith. The person who promotes such activities is known as a dā'ī

*dayah* = Batak and Aceh (ethnic groups) term for Islamic religious school.

*batik* = Beautiful printed (sometimes done manually by hand) cloth manufactured in Indonesia.

*Budi Utomo* (The Noble Aspiration) = A Javanese association was founded in 1908 by Sutomo, while he was a student at Stovia, or medical school.

*Demokrasi Liberal* (Liberal Democracy) = Indonesian term applied to the period of political history from 1950 to 1957 when the governmental system was based on a multi-party parliament with cabinet coalitions. It is generally regarded by Indonesians as a period of political weakness and disarray.

*Demokrasi Terpimpin* (Guided Democracy) = Indonesian term applied to the period of political history from 1958 to 1966, when President Soekarno ruled the country as chief arbiter of the political factions. Also called Orde Lama (Old Order).

*desa* = Malay term for village. The term has many variations of meaning, including the sense of ruralness, with a rustic life style that marks the inhabitants as pre-modern.

*DPR* = Indonesian acronym for Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, The House of People's Representatives. It is elected in the General Elections every five years.

*Dwifungsi* = Acronym for the concept of the two functions of the Indonesian Armed Forces, indicating the regular military duties and also involvement in the operation of the Indonesian state. The presence of army officers in parliament, the cabinet and other state bodies is justified on the basis of this concept.

*Ethical Policy* = Dutch Government policy of the late 1800's aimed at correcting exploitative policies of earlier colonial days in regard to the indies, as Indonesia was then called. The Ethical Policy altered some practices, but changing economic conditions led to the institution of the culture system, which extended economic exploitation rather than limiting it.

*fikih* = Islamic legal term, indicating the codes of Islamic jurisprudence assembled by the various legalist schools.

*Golkar* = Indonesian acronym for Golongan Karya or Functional Groups, the political party associated with the Suharto government, gathering its primary strength from administrators and the military. Its strength has increased dramatically throughout the contemporary political era to the point where it dominates elections.

*Hadīth* (The Prophet Traditions) = Islamic term from Arabic, are the individual records of the memories of Muhammad by his contemporaries.

*Haji* = Popular Islamic term from Arabic, indicating a person who has undertaken the pilgrimage to Mecca and participated in the rites of pilgrimage prescribed for all Muslims.

*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI)* = Indonesian University Students' Association. Title of the leading Islamic university students' movement, most noted for its activism during the 1960's and 1970's. It was a supporter of the Suharto government in its crucial first years and rallied other Muslims to its support.

*'ibādah* = Islamic term, from Arabic, indicating the general category of rites, actions and behaviors worship.

*ijtihād* = Islamic legal term indicating the practice of a juristic thinker to apply his reason to the case before him. The concept is popular among Modernist Muslims, where it is contrasted to the practice of *taqlīd*, the doctrine of accepting an older jurist's thinking.

*Al-Irsyad* (The Guide) = Associations of Arabs born in Indonesia, famous in the 1920's and 1930's for its attempts to revitalize religious life.

*Isteri Sedar* (The Alert Woman) = An association of the Indonesian women, led by Soewarni Djojoseputro (later Mrs. Pringgodigdo), which was established in Bandung in August 1930.



*Jong Islamieten Bond* (Young Muslims' Association) = Islamic Youth Association active in the Netherlands Indies in the 1920's and 1930's, composed of Indonesians who most of them studied in educational institutions founded by the Dutch colonial government or studied in the Netherlands.

*JIBDA* = The Female Section of Jong Islamieten Bond. JIB was founded on January 1, 1925, and was initiated by Raden Syamsuridjal.

*junūb* = Islamic term, from Arabic, for ritual impurity.

*Ka'bah* = The name of the shrine at Makkah which is the center of the rites of the pilgrimage. The symbol of the Ka'bah was used by the PPP in two election campaigns, but denied in the third campaign as inflammatory and divisive.

*kādī* = Islamic term, from Arabic, indicating a judge of a religious court.

*Khutbah* = Islamic name, from Arabic, for the message delivered at the communal worship on Friday.

*KORPRI* = Indonesian acronym for Korps Pegawai Republik Indonesia, the Civil Service Corps of the Republic of Indonesia, that looks after the career interests of its members, organizes them politically and administers many leisure activities, particularly sports and entertainment.

*kota* = Indonesian word for city or urban area. As a cultural term, it connotes the life style associated with urban areas, in contrast to *desa*, or village.

*KOWANI* = Indonesian acronym for Kongres Wanita Indonesia, Indonesian Women Congress. It is a coordinative organization for all women's organizations.

*kyai* = Title of a traditional Islamic scholar, usually connected with teaching at a religious boarding school, or *pesantren*. The title generates great respect in rural Java.

*madrasah* = Islamic religious term, from Arabic, referring to general Islamic schools. Used in Indonesia to identify schools at the primary level operated by a number of religious associations, such as the Muhammadiyah.

*Marriage Law of 1973* = An enactment of the Indonesian Parliament that placed restrictions on the number of wives a Muslim male could marry. The law has been opposed by many Muslims as an unwarranted interference by the Indonesian Government in Muslim affairs, even while they agree with the law's intent.

*masjid* = Islamic name, from Arabic, for the primary place of worship. It includes a Friday communal service with a sermon and often has many other activities. This contrast with a prayer house (*musallā*) which is intended for prayer by individuals and small groups and is less formal.

*Masyumi* = Indonesian acronym for Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia, the Consultative Council for Indonesian Muslims. The primary Muslim political party of the 1950's, it was outlawed in 1960 for the association of its leadership with an armed confrontation against with the Soekarno government.

*Modernist Muslim* = Title of one major grouping of Muslims in Indonesia, known as kaum muda. This group advocates the importance of the access of the believer to the dictates of the Qur'an and Sunnah as the primary guide of life.

*MPR* = Indonesian acronym for Majelis Permusyawaratan rakyat, The Consultative Assembly. It is elected in the General Elections every five years.

*Muballigh* = Islamic name, from Arabic, for a male preacher or missionary.

*Muballighāt* = Islamic name, from Arabic, for a woman preacher or missionary.

*Muhammadiyah* = Title of the major Indonesian Muslim association representing Modernist Islam in Indonesia.

*mus allā* = Islamic name, from Arabic, for prayer house. See masjid.

*Nahdlatul Ulama* = Title of the major Indonesian Muslim association representing Traditionalist Islam in Indonesia.

*Orde Baru* = Indonesian political period beginning in 1966 and continuing until the present. The term means "New Order" and is often used in contrast to "Old Order" referring to the period preceding it during which President Sukarno ruled.

*Orde Lama* = See Demokrasi Terpimpin.

*Padri* = Name assigned to a group of Islamic activists in the early 1800's in the Minangkabau area of Sumatra, modelling themselves on the Wahhabi Movement of Arabia, who wished to purify the society there of non-Islamic practices and strengthen the practice of Islam.

*Pancasila* = The official national slogan of the Republic of Indonesia that is the basis for all political parties and mass organizations. The term is from Sanskrit, meaning Five Principles. The principles are belief in God, nationalism, democracy, humanitarianism and social justice.

*Parmusi* = Indonesian acronym for Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Party, was founded in February 20, 1968 to accommodate Islamic social organizations which did not join any existing political party.

*PDI* = Indonesian acronym for Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, the Indonesian Democratic Party. A political party of the contemporary era composed of old line nationalists, Soekarnoists, Christians and many university students.

*Pemikiran Baru* = Indonesian title of a group of Islamic thinkers active in the 1970's, characterized by their attention to political and economic issues.

*PERMI* = Indonesian acronym for Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia, The Union of Indonesian Muslims. It was founded in May 1930 in West Sumatra

*Persis* = Indonesian acronym for Persatuan Islam, Islamic Union, which promoted Islamic fundamentalism in 1920 to 1960's period.

*Persistri* Indonesian acronym for Persatuan Islam isteri, Women's Section of Islamic

Union, founded in December 25, 1936 in Bandung.

*Perti* = Indonesian acronym for Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamijah, Islamic Education Union, which was a political party in 1950's representing the interests of traditionalist Muslims located on Sumatra.

*Pesantren* = Indonesian name, from Sanskrit, applied to Islamic boarding schools, found primarily on Java. Pesantren have a high reputation in the Indonesian Muslim community for producing able graduates with a good grounding in moral values.

*PII* = Indonesian acronym for Pelajar Islam Indonesia, Islamic Student Organization, founded in May 1947. It was generally influenced by Masyumi's leaders, especially from modernist and fundamentalist wings of the party. PII was banned by the Indonesian government in 1986

*PKI* = Indonesian acronym for Partai Komunis Indonesia, The Indonesia Communist Party. Prominent during the 1960's as a principal political force in the Sukarno Era, it became involved in a power move against the military, after which it was outlawed.

*PPP* = Indonesian abbreviation for Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, The United Development Party. The Political Party in the contemporary political era which has represented Muslim interests, but has not necessarily drawn the support of Muslims. Once a powerful opposition party, it enjoyed less than 20% of the seats of parliament in the late 1980's.

Putri Mardika = The Independent Women's Association was founded in 1912 in Jakarta with the support of the men's group known as Budi Utomo.

*Qur'ān* = Primary scripture of Islam representing the words of God in precise form, revealed to the prophet Muhammad

*raja* = Indonesian title, from Sanskrit, for ruler of a petty Kingdom of the Malay-Indonesian world in the pre-colonial era.

*santri* = Indonesian word, from Sanskrit, indicating the Indonesian grouping that adheres to the tenets of classical Sunni Islam.

*Sarekat Islam* = Indonesian Muslim Association prominent from 1912 until 1926 and in existence until the early 1970's. It served as an umbrella association for most Indonesian nationalist activity, including that by some non-Muslims. After its political decline, Indonesian Muslim writers idealized it into a political model for Indonesians to emulate.

*sunan* = Indonesian title, from Sanskrit, designating holiness, given to the original propagators of Islam in Indonesia.

*sunnah* = Islamic term from Arabic indicating the second scripture of Sunni Islam consisting of the words and actions of the Prophet Muhammad.

*sharī'ah* = Islamic legal concept for divine law. Traditionalists hold that existing jurisprudential canons (fiqh/fikih) are sufficient, while modernists hold that such principles of law should be distilled from Islamic scriptures.

*tablīgh* = Islamic concept, from Arabic, for deepening the understanding of Islamic teachings among Muslims through instruction. see Da'wah

*Taman Siswa* = Title of a noted Indonesian educational association, famous in the first quarter of the century for its efforts in developing schools that combined traditional Javanese values with modern concepts of learning.

*tas awwuf* = Islamic mystical term, from Arabic, denoting the mystical practice itself.

*Traditionalist Muslim* = One group of Indonesian Muslims who see the jurisprudential codes of early Islam as the important guide for human behavior.

'Ulamā' = Islamic term, from Arabic, for religious scholars who teach religious lessons and minister to the community of believers.

*ummat* = Islamic term, from Arabic, for the community of believers.

*wali* = Title of respect given to certain propagators of the Islamic religion, such as those who brought Islam to Indonesia. See also sunan.

*WI* = Indonesian acronym for Wanita Islam, Islamic Women, is a woman organization which was founded in Yogyakarta in April 29, 1962. The organization is independent although its founder and most of its initial members came from families of the Masyumi's board

*UUD 1945* = Indonesian acronym for Undang-undang Dasar 1945, The Indonesian Constitution of 1945.

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