Authors as Others
and
Others as Authors

Mikhail Bakhtin's Early Theories
of the Relationship
Between the Author and the Hero

James Nielson
Department of English
McGill University
Montréal, Québec
November, 1985

A thesis submitted to the Faculty
of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master of Arts

Abstract

The soviet thinker Mikhail Bakhtin, whose works, belatedly published and translated, have recently come to have a considerable influence on Western literary theory, devoted his most provocative early essays to questions of the relationship between the author and the character. The theories contained in these essays attempt not only to give an account of the artist's act of creation, but also to establish analogies between the aesthetic activity of "authorship" and the everyday activity of interpersonal perception, between the author's relations to the hero in art and the self's relations to the other in life. This thesis offers an exposition of the two main texts in which Bakhtin deals with these questions, "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," and Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics, and an examination of Bakhtin's theories both from the point of view of their accuracy as descriptions of the creative act and from that of their analogical applicability to the domain of interpersonal relationships.

Acknowledgements

I would like to take this opportunity to thank three professors without whose friendship and interest I might not have made it this far: Joe Butwin, Malcolm Griffith, and Leroy Searle.

This essay was written while I was a Mellon Fellow in the Humanities. Had it not been for this fellowship, I would never have had the opportunity to do work at McGill. It was also thanks to the generosity of the fellowship administrators that I was able to study the Russian language, which proved to be indispensable in my researches.

Finally I am very grateful for their support and encouragement to Paisley Livingston and Susan Van Deventer.

One cannot deny that twentieth-century literary theory has displayed a certain audacity in its attempts to detrivialize the literary by repositioning it in an *analogical* rather than a *mimetic* relationship to "real life." These moves, often originating outside of the critical community, have sought to establish some aspect of literary experience as the mastertrope at least of cultural activity and perhaps of existence itself. I am thinking of such innovations as the discovery of Homo narrans and of the underlying narrative structure of historical "reality" (perhaps of all cognitive reality). The search for an epistemological "mastertrope" itself presupposes the figural constellation which has led recent explorers to look for the Northwest Passage of knowledge in the tropics (Hayden White, et al.). Thus the conflicting narratives of historical science further break down into a series of figural constructs, perhaps forged by "strong poets." Our linguistic tools themselves may be seen as mere "fossil poetry" (Emerson, cited by Barfield 1928, 179), the generation of all "texts" is largely dependent on the

same figural possibilities, "a great deal - perhaps most - of the technical vocabulary of philosophy and science may be shown to be not merely figurative, but actually metaphorical" (Barfield 1928, 135): *science e(s)t poésie* (as we today would abbreviate Barfield's quibble with I. A. Richards) and from the Romantic proclamation that any metalanguage is really only a metaphorical language it is but a short trip in a space capsule to the realization that there *is* no metalanguage, and from there to the happy scenario that *all* language is in fact *metaleptic* (i.e., evolves through the metaphoric substitution of figurative terms for other equally figurative terms with no final nonfigurative reference point (Kofman 1971, and other deconstructive rhetoricians following Nietzsche)).

The reduction of the whole world to a confluence of texts, or a nexus of intertextuality, and the further decomposition of all meaningful experience into "Writing" thus actually constitute only the most venturesome, doubtless because the most "belated," bids for the recovery, or rather the uncovering of the crucialness of an understanding of literary activity as the *passe-partout* to the *roman à clef* of life on earth.

One of the most glaring imperfections of these various metaphors of textuality has been the absence of a "real-world" correlate of the authorial function in literary activity. After Nietzsche, perhaps after Diderot, the world can no longer be a book in the medieval sense of a text scripted by God; textuality had to be redefined, and the last remnants of the intentionalist fallacy disproved by algebra. The great purges of the late sixties (Barthes 1968, Foucault 1969, etc.) left only empty

ambries where the graven images of authors had once stood. Nevertheless, in the subsequent vacuum there has arisen a kind of *als-ob* philosophy which permits the continued reference to "biographical fictions" by the nostalgic and the nasty (The Author is dead. - Barthes. Barthes is dead. - The Author).

It is perhaps not surprising that the metaphor of intertextuality should find itself receiving supplemental refinement from Mikhail Bakhtin, the man, if I may be allowed thus to express myself, by whom the concept was "engendered," as Julia Kristeva, who - excuse me again - actually coined the term (Kristeva 1967), might phrase it. One may recall that Bakhtin himself, though often slapped with its paternity, never employed this term, and that much of its current usage, clogged as it is with a decade and a half of Parisian materialist mentalism, is hardly calibrated with his *Weltanschauung*. As Ann Shukman puts it: "...Kristeva's epistemological void is alien to Bakhtin's personalism, steeped as it is in Western humanist values" (Shukman 1980, 223) [1]. There *is* in fact one curious essay of Bakhtin's in which at least his language is close to that of theoreticians of "intertextuality" in its received sense (1979a, 281-307; 1978c), but the essay only appeared in Russian in 1976, long after Kristeva had grown bored with her plaything. In his major works, Bakhtin's mature theory of dialogical inter-relationship demands that texts be *embodied* in flesh and blood material *points of view:*

> In language as the object of linguistics, there are not and cannot be any dialogical relationships: they are impossible both among elements in a system of language (for

> example, among words in a dictionary, among morphemes, and so forth), and among elements of a "text" when approached in a strictly linguistic way. [...]
>
> Nor can there be any dialogic relationships among texts when approached in a strictly linguistic way. Any purely linguistic juxtaposition and grouping of given texts must necessarily abstract itself from any dialogic relationships that might be possible among them as whole utterances. (1984b, 182)

The hearsay attribution of the concept of intertextuality to Bakhtin was on its way to being cleared up (Angenot 1983), but unfortunately Tzvetan Todorov, eager to credit Bakhtin with the encompassing anticipation of the welter of contemporary literary theory (a bit like the conviction of Blake scholars that the poet proleptically corrects all subsequent schools of thought), has naughtily slipped the term back into Bakhtin's manilla file folder, using it (Todorov 1981, 95) to designate Bakhtin's "dialogism" in its "most inclusive sense" and "reserving the term *dialogic* for certain particular instances of intertextuality, such as the exchange of rejoinders between two interlocutors or the conception of human personality which Bakhtin worked out."

Todorov may seem to have performed a perverse terminological switcheroo here, but Bakhtin's writings could in fact be considered as contributions to a theory of what might, if we gave it a little more figurative english than the French school would approve, be termed *intertextuality*. But if the semanalytical faction applies the image of a self-generating, autotelic universe at large to the theory of text production, Bakhtin would seem conversely to look for parallels precisely of the authorial act in our most basic forms of experience, in our relationships to others and to reality.

These parallels have recently been rendered explicit for students of Bakhtin's thought in a series of formulations by his American editor and biographer, Michael Holquist. In an article entitled "Answering as Authoring," Holquist has summarized Bakhtin as follows:

> Insofar as we wrest particular meaning out of general systems, we are all creators: a speaker is to his utterance what an author is to his text. (Holquist 1983a, 315)
>
> The suggestion of Bakhtin's total oeuvre, conceived as a single utterance, is that our ultimate act of authorship results in the text we call our self. (Ibid.)
>
> The body is seen as a system by which the individual answers the physical world; in order to do so coherently it must model its environment, track and map it, and then translate its data into a biological representation of it - the body answers the world by authoring it. (Ibid., 317)
>
> Bakhtin is remarkable for the comprehensiveness of his vision of dialogue and the central role he assigns utterance in shaping the world. His insistence on authorship as the distinctive feature of consciousness is a particularly powerful way of giving meaning to the definition of man as a sign. (Ibid., 318)

These comparisons are taken up again in the booklength biography of Bakhtin by Holquist and Katerina Clark. There the authors present themselves as explictly outlining the philosophy which underlies Bakhtin's unfinished early study *The Architectonics of Answerability:*

> It is a treatise on ethics in the world of everyday experience, a kind of pragmatic axiology. Ethical activity is conceived as a deed (postupok). The emphasis is not on what the action results in, the end product of action, but rather on the ethical deed in its making, as an act in the

> process of creating or authoring an event that can be called a deed, whether the deed be a physical action, a thought, an utterance, or a written text - the last two being viewed as co-extensive. Bakhtin arrives at this process by meditating on the form of authorial activity that is most paradigmatic, namely the creation of literary texts. In order to study the means by which relations between self and other are crafted, he examines the ways in which literary authors mold their relation to characters and the relation of those characters to each other in the fiction of a unified art work. (Clark and Holquist 1985, 63)

The "richness" of the metaphorical import of "authoring" can be seen in the following cento of pertinent reformulations from Clark and Holquist's commentary:

> To be successful, the relation between me and the other must be shaped into a coherent performance, and thus the architectonic activity of authorship, which is the building of a text, parallels the activity of human existence, which is the building of a self. (Ibid., 64)

> As the world needs my alterity to give it meaning, I need the authority of others to define, or author, my self. (Ibid., 65)

> In Bakhtin, the difference between humans and other forms of life is a form of authorship, since the means by which a specific ratio of self-to-other responsibility is achieved in any given action - a deed being understood as an answer - comes about as the result of efforts by the self to shape a meaning out of the encounter between them. (Ibid., 67-68)

> An author's attempt to visualize a character parallels my attempt to make sense of this world, in effect to make a coherent story of my role in it. The self is "the main character who is on a different plane from all other characters I imagine." (Ibid., 71 [citation from Bakhtin 1979a, 27])

> Bakhtin's concern is to understand the mysteries of authorship not just of literary texts but of the texts constituted by speech in everyday life. This driving force leads him to take up questions of the relation between the self and the other (who is authoring whom?) and of language

and literature. (Ibid., 82)

> Authoring is the particular deed whereby Bakhtin shows the various ways in which meaning can take on flesh. That which in his epistemology is modeled on the I/other distinction becomes in his aesthetics the distinction between the author, who occupies a position analogous to the self, and the hero, who occupies a position analogous to the other. (Ibid., 88)

> Authorship is extendable to extraliterary categories because it is an architectonics of consciousness. Authorship is the primary activity of selves in a world dominated by the self/other distinction. (Ibid., 94)

For the moment it is still to Bakhtin's spokespeople, and particularly to Michael Holquist, that most readers in the English-speaking world must turn for a global understanding of Bakhtin's thought. It is Clark and Holquist who inform us that:

> The act of authorship dealt with in *The Architectonics* is the master trope of all Bakhtin's work. The encounter of authors with the heroes they weave into the world of their texts proves a successful form for bringing together and modeling all Bakhtin's other categories. (Clark and Holquist 1985, 80)

We may note that Clark and Holquist's representation here of Bakhtin's "master trope" is not without a certain transumptive indeterminacy. Specifically, their exegesis hesitates in the distribution of the literal signification of the author and character figures. In the first excerpt of the foregoing cento, for example, Clark and Holquist have kept the comparison broad: authorship is analogous to the "building of a self." In the second passage, however, they move to a reassignment of "authority" to the other: it is the other who defines the self.

In the third passage the sense of ambiguity is heightened through a characteristic synesis (the final shifty shifter, "them," has no grammatical antecedent). This trend toward the dissolution of difference in undecidability is reversed in the next passage, however, where an attempt is made to reattribute to the self the roles of both author and character. The moment of maximum tension is reached in the fifth excerpt, where a restatement of Bakhtin's overall concern with "the mysteries of authorship" is suddenly interrupted with the parenthetical perplex: "who is authoring whom?" On the heels of such an aporia, it seems we must take with a grain of salt the blunt reassertion closing the sixth excerpt that the distinction is "between the author, who occupies a position analogous to the self, and the hero, who occupies a position analogous to the other." The cozy final recapitulation really in no way resolves the finely sustained dispersal of Bakhtin's metaphor effected here by the authors.

A few words must now be said about the text from which Clark and Holquist have derived Bakhtin's authorial similitude(s). In an article with the suggestive title, "The Politics of Representation" (1981b), Michael Holquist argues that Bakhtin was outlining a grand philosophical project in the 1920's, and that he subsequently found it prudent to abandon it, and instead to "ventriloquize" most its major tenets in the Marxist voices of his friends P. N. Medvedev and V. N. Vološinov, under whose names a number of Bakhtin's works, as it is now generally acknowledged, were published [2]. This long *chef d'oeuvre inconnu* has become a pet subject of Holquist's, for he feels it was the most important project Bakhtin ever undertook, and that

"it contains, in embryonic form, every major idea Bakhtin was to have for the rest of his long life" (1981b, 171). Holquist calls the work *The Architectonics of Answerability,* admitting somewhat hazily that it is his own title, but, at least twice, with the additional cryptic remark that the title is suggested by "internal evidence" (Ibid.; Holquist and Clark 1984, 300). What has been published of this hushed-up magnum opus - most of the extant manuscript it would seem - appeared in the posthumous Russian collection of essays (1979a) under the editors' title (perhaps suggested by internal evidence) "The author and hero in aesthetic activity." Although Holquist sometimes talks as though the manuscripts are more extensive, he and Clark restrict their own discussion to references to this essay, and while Holquist tends to speak as though familiar with the total work, he admits that "most of the manuscript is now lost" (Holquist 1983a, 318) [3].

The text has not yet been published in English, but a translation, to which proleptic references are already annoyingly made, is in the works. It would seem (Clark and Holquist 1985, 353) that it will appear, together with another early essay, "The problem of content, material, and form in verbal artistic creation," under Holquist's title, *The Architectonics of Answerability*. Meanwhile, one may, if one wishes, refer to the French, Italian, German and Spanish translations. Since the essay is crucial to an understanding of Bakhtin's version of the author-character dynamic, we will be abstracting it - though it is scarcely in need of additional abstraction - shortly, at length.

English-reading speakers may be more familiar with the view of the relationship between the author and his characters implied in the provocative and influential study, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, a work ostensibly more squarely founded in literary scholarship and concerns than "Author and Hero," and the axiological and aesthetic presuppositions of which may seem in many ways at odds with those in the latter, actually the earlier, essay. Together these two works from the 1920's contain perhaps the strongest comparisons ever drawn between an author's relationships to his characters and our relationships to the characters who are our others and to the others who are our authors.

*

According to Bakhtin's Russian editors, the manuscript published as "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity" dates from the early or mid-1920's (1979a, 384). Holquist favors the earlier dating. In any case, it would seem [4] that Bakhtin was writing on questions of alterity, ethics and aesthetics as early as 1921, and that these interests extended back at least as far as 1919, when his first published work, the brief article "Art and Answerability" (1979a, 5-6) appeared in the daily literary miscellany [*almanax*] *The Day of Art* [*Den' iskusstva*]. The "first chapter" (according to the reconstruction by the Soviet editors) of "Author and Hero" is missing, and the manuscript breaks off

immediately after a heading which was presumably intended for a subsequent chapter: "The Problem of the Author and the Hero in Russian Literature" (Ibid., 384).

The text as published opens with a chapter devoted to "The Problem of the Relationship of the Author to the Hero." Bakhtin begins with a rather disarming analepsis:

> We have already said enough about the fact that all of the elements of a work are given to us through the author's reaction to them, which encompasses both the object and the hero's reaction to it (a reaction to a reaction); in this sense, the author gives an intonation to each of his hero's particulars, each of his characteristics, each of the events of his life, each of his actions, thoughts, and feelings, just as in life we react to every manifestation of the people around us with a value judgment. (1979a, 7; 1984a, 27) [5]

Bakhtin will thus be *taking for granted* in the subsequent discussion two fundamental presuppositions: (1) that a work of art is available to us only as an author's reactions to the objects and characters in that work, and consequently that the attitudes of the characters themselves toward each other and toward objects are also available to us only as reflected in the position of the author, and (2) that the responses of an author to the world he creates parallel the reactions of each of us to the world in which we live and to the others with whom we share it.

The complicity of the author and the reader in the "co-creation" of the work will be alluded to throughout, at times in a manner that may be upsetting for intentional and affective fallacy phobiacs, but ultimately with considerable finesse. It

must always be kept in mind, however, that what we as readers experience in a work we experience through the unique spatial, temporal and semantic perspective of the author. To the extent that this point of view fails, the *aesthetic* quality is diminished. We do not, in the aesthetic act, experience characters from within, from their own centers of vision, through the author's empathy with them, but rather from without, through the (valorizing) responses of the author to their (external) spacial, temporal and "semantic" [6] manifestations.

To describe this position of the author outside of the characters he creates and responding to the characters in the very creative act which authors them, Bakhtin coins the term *vnenaxodimost'*, signifying the fact of being outside, "outsidedness," "extralocality," or, as Todorov and Aucouturier (1984a) render it, "exotopy" [7].

Since the extralocality of an author is the defining characteristic of the *aesthetic* relationship, it may be surprising that Bakhtin's other major assumption is that this extralocal position parallels the position of the self with regard to other selves in everyday interpersonal affairs. Are we to conclude that our usual relationship to the other is an aesthetic one?

One difference between the aesthetic act and our real life reactions to others is, however, immediately remarked upon: in real life we do not react to the totality of a person but only to isolated manifestations of people as they impinge on us pragmatically. In the work of art, on the other hand, what we have, according to Bakhtin, is a global reaction by the author to

the totality of the hero. This totalizing reaction is precisely what is specific to the aesthetic act; an author completes the hero from his position of extralocal transcendence. But this position constitutes a "transcendence" only in the sense that it is an outsidedness. To express this sense of what is transcendent in the aesthetic event Bakhtin introduces a term which he has borrowed from the German aesthetician Jonas Cohn: "transgredient."

Cohn's term (Cohn 1901, 27) is used by Bakhtin "to denote elements of consciousness which are external to it, but are nevertheless crucial to its completion and totalization" (Todorov 1981, 146). An author's creative reflection of a character is transgredient to that character's consciousness, and in everyday life our own cognitive, sensual, spatio-temporal, and moral views of others are transgredient to those others. A person, like a character in a book, is not complete within his or her own consciousness, but is only completed from without, from the extralocality and transgredience of another.

Bakhtin may seem to be granting a Godlike power, a transcendent "authority," to the author. It should be kept in mind that he assigns this authority only to the authorial *position*, which is inevitably the agency through which the reader experiences the created world in the aesthetic event:

> The author is authoritative and necessary for the reader, who treats him not as a person, not as another human being, not as a hero, not as a determinateness of being, but as a *principle* which must be adhered to. (1979a, 179; 1984a, 209)

The actual flesh and blood author, once he has completed the creative act, has no more privileged a position vis-à-vis his character than anyone else. We are cautioned to pay no attention to the author's own account of his act of creation, nor to his *nachträglich* attitudes toward the character - the expression of the creative act is to be found in the work itself, and the character is there as well, and not in the author's further reactions to *the completed hero* (Bakhtin offers the example of Gogol (1979a, 10; 1984a, 30), presumably alluding to his notorious change of perspective regarding Chichikov, the hero of *Dead Souls,* as he worked out the sequel).

Biographical criticism is similarly dismissed as impertinent where problems of aesthetics are concerned. In spite of an author's intentions, his own views will, if he gives them to his hero, be realigned in conformity with the totality of that hero: an author cannot recreate himself in the hero (and this, as will become clearer, first of all because he cannot rig up an extralocal relationship to himself, he cannot know himself as a totality, but can only know the other, the character, as such).

It is from the author, then, that the hero receives, as a gift, his completion; it is the author who makes the hero whole. But it is also the author who "finishes the hero off." Here (1979a, 14; 1984a, 35) we already have a darkling anticipation of the equation of completedness with existential death which will come to the fore in the Dostoevsky book.

The author completes the hero with the *surplus* of vision which is available to him in his extralocal position in relation to the character. Consequently,

> Where there is only a single sole participant there can be no aesthetic event; an absolute consciousness with nothing transgredient to it, nothing extralocal and rendering it organic from without, can have no aesthetic effect; one can only commune [*priobščit'sja*] with it, one cannot see it as a finished whole. (1979a, 22; 1984a, 43)

Bakhtin divides up the author's extralocal act of totalization into three basic categories: the determination of the hero as (1) a spacial totality, (2) a temporal totality, and (3) a totality of meaning [*smyslovoe celoe,* a "semantic whole"]. A separate chapter is ostensibly devoted to each of these categories, but in fact the orderliness of Bakhtin's presentation is more in the framework than in the wayward fresco held within it.

*

In examining the author's spatial relationship to the hero, Bakhtin reverts to the conditions of perception in the real world for his model. If I am looking at someone, our horizons, and hence our persepctives, can never coincide. However close that person may be to me there will always be something which I from my peculiar position can perceive, but which he cannot. Most strikingly, of course, I can see the external manifestations of the person himself, manifestations which he can only know *through me;* from within himself he cannot see himself as I can see him from the vantage point of extralocation. From my unique

perspective I can see not only his external manifestations but also what surrounds him and what is behind him, utterly absent from his purview. It is this *surplus* of vision which makes possible the transgredient finishing touches which complete the other as a closed totality. The other cannot see himself as a totality; the completedness which comes from an extralocal position is lacking in his own experience of himself from within. The self can perceive a minimum of its exterior expressivity (I may notice my hand as I write), only the other can be perceived as a totality. Consequently, it is impossible for the self to make *of itself* a satisfactorily *aesthetic* hero, since it lacks the position of extralocality with regard to itself which is necessary for the aesthetic relationship to occur. The self is experienced entirely from within, only an other can be experienced from the outside as a physical and sensual totality. In erotic daydreams, as Bakhtin remarks, the polarity of these positions is very obvious:

> The desired heroine attains an extreme degree of external distinctness, such as only a representation is capable of; the hero - himself dreaming - in his desire and love, experiences himself from within and is not expressed in an externally totalized way. (1979a, 28; 1984a, 49)

Of course a vulgar reader might wish to empathize with such a perspective, and see the other characters in a literary work through one particular character's point of view, "identify" with the character. "In unartistic reading of novels by the unsophisticated, daydreaming is sometimes substituted for artistic perception" (1979a, 28; 1984a, 50). Bakhtin, as will be

seen, always comes down heavily against any attempt to make *empathy* the main feature of the aesthetic event. Aesthetic cognition involves the extralocal totalizing perspective of the author. Such a perspective with regard to *oneself* is not possible. Should we try to achieve this perspective, for example by viewing ourselves in a mirror, we shall find ourselves inevitably posing for a fictive other. We are always assessing ourselves with the effect we would have on an imagined other in mind; we always already have a mirror "stage presence," we are always viewing ourselves through the fictive agency of an implied author (this is not so much a superego, as an *alter* ego). "Self-reflection" is an attempt to see oneself through another's perspective. But such attempts are always wrongheaded, for one can never attain the position of true alterity with regard to oneself which is necessary for the grasping of the totality of one's external expression. Only a true other can see us as a whole, as a total personality. "This personality will not exist if another does not create it" (1979a, 34; 1984a, 55).

One's actions, as well as one's physical aspect, and one's spatial coordination, are perceived differently from within the self than they are perceived from the extralocality of another's perspective. When I reach for something, I don't follow the course of my hand, noting its compositional relationship as regards the object and its surroundings, and taking in all the visual components that make up the act; rather I concentrate on the object itself. My act is only seen as a totality from without, by another for whom the meaning of the act is not entirely concentrated on the goal of the act. My attention is

focused in this goal; paying too much attention to my body's external expression is even ill-advised. (Keep your eye on the ball.) It could actually prove fatal: "When one must accomplish a difficult and risky jump it is extremely dangerous to watch the movement of one's own legs" (1979a, 41; 1984a, 63).

It is only from an extralocal and disinterested perspective - disinterested, that is, as regards the goal of the act as it is subjectively perceived by the performer - that an act can be seen as a totality, perceived in its relation to and harmony with the rest of the world, the context which encloses it, and not from the teleocentric perspective of the person performing the act.

Bakhtin's critique of self-consciousness does not stop at the assertion that we cannot know ourselves as externally expressive totalities. One is also incapable of responding emotionally to oneself in the same way one responds to the totalized other. The "emotional-volitional" attitudes one can have toward the externally expressed other are not available in one's experience of oneself. One can never love oneself as one loves another. One may appear to love, hate, admire, scorn oneself, but one cannot actually have these emotional-volitional responses to one's self, because for itself the self lacks the external completeness and definition which belongs to the other; or rather, which the other is given by the self.

At this point in his argument Bakhtin transfers, via the node of love, to an examination of the origins of one's own internal perception of one's self. Not only can the self be perceived and determined only from without, by another, but one's inner perception of oneself is only the cumulative ratio of the

perceptions of ourselves which we have seen reflected in others. It is from others, and first of all from the mother (the language here grows very neofreudian, or rather proto-Vygotskian [8]), that we learn the names and the meanings of the parts of our bodies, the accentations which we should give to each of them, the distributive valorization of our externally manifested self. Our self is a story told to us at our mother's breast; our selves are a ratio of the reflected perceptions of others.

> The child first sees himself as through his mother's eyes, and he begins to speak of himself as in her emotional-volitional tonalities. [...] His values are shaped, as it were, by her embraces. (1979a, 46; 1984a, 67-68)

The body and the self are not self-sufficient; on the contrary, they have a crucial need of an other to recognize them and give them form and meaning.

Bakhtin moves on from these considerations - "so close for us," says Todorov (1981, 148), "to advances in contemporary psychology" - to develop fully the critique of "expressivist aesthetics" at which he has been hinting along the way [9]. The "expressivist" view holds that works of art express inner states of being and that the aesthetic event involves the experience of those inner states. What would be called for in the act of creation, if that were the case, might be termed "empathy."

But Bakhtin contends that "The pure moment of identification [*vživanija*] and empathy (sympathy) is essentially extra-aesthetic" (1979a, 58; 1984a, 80). Earlier Bakhtin had granted a two-stage model of the creative act: *first* the author

may identify with the character, experience the world through his eyes, but *then* he must return to an extralocal vantage point in order to complete the character with the *surplus* of vision available to him from without (1979a, 24ff; 1984a, 46ff).

> Strictly speaking, the aesthetic activity begins only when we return to ourselves and to our place outside the person suffering, when we shape and complete the material gathered in our identification with him. (1979a, 26; 1984a, 47)

The act of empathy, conceived as an identification with the hero and his point of view, is insufficient to an aesthetic response to the character and his world, defined - as Bakhtin defines it - as a reaction to a whole from without. By identifying with a position *within* the work - this is the "naive reading" mentioned earlier - we abrogate the aesthetic totality of vision.

Empathy in itself cannot lead to an aesthetic event, though it may be necessary and sufficient where other kinds of events are concerned, for instance, ethical events [10]. Bakhtin gives the example of the brave young man who identifies so closely with the scenic representation that he attempts to warn the hero of dangers in store for him, and is ready to rush up onto the stage to his aid (1979a, 71; 1984a, 92). Empathy does not permit the totality of form necessary to the aesthetic event; there is no aesthetic resolution in empathy. Life itself does not manifest this formal finalization, and consequently a formal totality is not to be arrived at by *living* an other, by *living* a character's viewpoint.

> A living event is infinite: from within, life can express itself in an act, a penitential confession, a cry, but absolution and bliss [*blagodat'*] descend from the Author.(1979a, 71; 1984a, 93)

The religiosity of Bakhtin's image here is not ironic (although the capitalization may be), but we are largely leaving the question of his spiritual views to be resolved by other authors. We may note, however, in case it is not sufficiently clear, that the godlike transcendence of the author should be seen against the background of what is by no means a monotheistically focused constellation. The Absolute Other in Bakhtin can be the girl next door. We as selves - that is, as others - are not created from a single center of authority; rather, to paraphrase Dostoevsky, "You will be as authors each to the other." And it would be erroneous in the extreme to imagine that the "author" creates the other *ex nihilo* in a demiurgic act of self-sufficient subjective will.

> Form expresses the activity of the author with regard to the hero - to another human being; in this sense, we may say that it is the result of an interaction between the hero and the author. But the hero is passive in this interaction, he is not *expressive*, he is *expressed*; yet he nevertheless as such determines his form, since it is precisely to him that it must correspond - and precisely *his* external, objective, living trend that it must complete. (1979a, 75; 1984a, 97)

Should one ignore the author's role as transgredient other, one is the dupe of the "expressivist" fallacy; should one ignore the hero's role as an autonomous element in the aesthetic event, one falls into the error rubricized by Bakhtin as "impressivist

aesthetics," an aesthetics associated with the Formalists [11]. Having exhausted himself in over twenty pages of diatribe against "expressivist aesthetics," Bakhtin devotes a scant page (1979a, 81-82; 1984a, 104) to the complementary extremism which he calls the "impressivist" view. If the former view sees the hero's vision as preeminent, and demotes the authorial agency to a channel into the consciousness of the hero, the latter view ignores the hero, who becomes merely a by-product of the "material" [12] with which the author works, or rather plays.

Neither of these views recognizes the aesthetic event as an interrelationship of two consciousnesses in which one is given fullness of expression and "semantic" wholeness through the extralocal transgredient viewpoint of the other.

Just in case someone has still failed to grasp the situation of author and hero as Bakhtin has determined it, he closes his discussion of the spatial relationships between the author and the hero with the introduction of two further concepts, those of *horizon* and *surroundings*.

The hero's *horizon* is the world as it is perceived by him from within his own perspective. It is only possible to orient oneself in the world thus viewed by means of cognitive ethical and practical categories, the world appears to one in terms of axiologically and pragmatically loaded concepts [13].

Such is not the world viewed from the extralocality which defines the aesthetic event. In this world view the hero is seen within his *surroundings*, and the totality of his relationships to the world around him is visible, a totality which is unavailable within his own horizon. In the work of art what strike us most

are the purely symmetrical, formal, *nonsignificant* unities of total vision, in which the hero is a whole defined by and in relation to his *surroundings*. The vision is *nonsignificant*, or non-semantic [*nesmyslovoj*] in the sense that it is not focused, as is the meaningful or pragmatic activity of the hero, within a conceptual horizon, but can see the hero within a larger picture which is transcendent to, or *transgredient* to, his activity. Just as in real life, because of our surplus of vision, each of us can see others within the framework of a larger picture than they themselves can see.

*

Bakhtin's chapter on "The Temporal Totality of the Hero" is subtitled "The Problem of the Inner Person, or the Soul." Having shown that the outer person is given wholeness from the author-other, and consequently that the outwardly manifested person is transcendent to his own consciousness of himself, Bakhtin now proposes to demonstrate that the same is true of the "inner person."

> We are convinced that the soul as an inner whole existing *in time*, a *given*, *present* whole, is constructed in aesthetic categories; it is spirit, as it looks from *without*, in an other.(1979a, 89; 1984a, 111)

We have no souls from within; rather, the soul is the

individual valorized totality of an inner life *as experienced by us in another*. As such it is a "gift from without." The mind, or spirit [*dux*], on its own, from within, is incapable of completion and self-valorization. "In spirit I am only able and bound to lose my soul; it can be saved [*uberežena*] only by powers that are *not my own*" (1979a, 90; 1984a, 112) [14].

The inner self then, or the soul, is only made whole from without. As the outer person was completed from the author-other's *surplus* of *spatial vision*, so the inner self is totalized from an extralocal surplus of *temporal vision*.

That others possess a surplus of temporal vision as compared with my own perspective is proven most dramatically by the fact that I am incapable of perceiving the two frontiers of my own life - I cannot see myself in terms of my temporal "surroundings" - I cannot experience my own *birth* and *death*. Only an other can be gained or lost; I cannot experience my own death as I can experience another's. Of course I can *imagine* what it will be like after my death, but the bottom line is that I cannot actually experience the end of my life from within (an idea as paradoxical as "The End of History"), in that the *end* of a life can only be experienced within a continuation of life, i.e., the life of another.

I may imagine what my life will have *meant* when I am no more - but the actual semantic totality is denied to my perspective. "The whole of my life does not have significance within the axiological context of my life itself" (1979a, 93; 1984a, 116).

Only an other, according to Bakhtin, can be experienced in terms of loss. I can only *miss* another, regret the loss of

another. I am always with myself; my death cannot be the loss of my self from within because the self will not survive the death to feel that loss. I cannot *lose myself* [15].

Because I cannot experience myself as a temporal whole, because I cannot see myself framed by the temporal frontiers of birth and death, and the temporal surroundings lying beyond them, I am only "the condition under which my life is possible, but I am not its valorized hero" (1979a, 94; 1984a, 116-117).

> My time and space are the time and space of an author and not those of a hero. Within them there can take place an aesthetic activity only with regard to another. (1979a, 94; 1984a, 117)

It is only after another is dead, and futurity, with its objectives, imperatives and possibilities, has been severed from the whole of his life, leaving it temporally complete, that the aesthetic event can occur, finalizing his life. The lives of the dead, as wholes, are authored by the living.

From within, meaning (life) has no beginning and no end; death cannot finalize consciousness from within. One can never write one's own life story. One can never see oneself as a spatial and temporal whole; in the very act of attempting to make oneself both subject and object one *fails to coincide with oneself* (from within, that is, from without, of course, one is still totalized). It is impossible *not* to be oneself *for others;* but for oneself the Socratic imperative is impossible. One cannot "know oneself"; one can only *be oneself* for another. Precisely because one's temporal *horizon* is infinite, from within

one cannot be determined. Only frontiers which the self itself cannot experience, physical frontiers and temporal frontiers, esepecially death, can provide the "semantic" closure which makes our "souls" complete.

My inner emotional states themselves are not *experienced* by me from within. I fear, love, hurt - but I do not *experience* my fear, love, and hurt. At first this seems a particularly farfetched proposition, but in fact to *experience* the inner totality of my fear, I would first have to stop being afraid, and I would no longer coincide with my fear: consequently, it would be too late to experience it. "It is not in the axiological context of my own life that my experience finds its significance as a spiritual determinateness" (1979a, 100; 1984a, 123).

Bakhtin's predilection for musical metaphors is well known (Wall 1984a). Here he introduces two more: *rhythm* and *chorus*. By rhythm Bakhtin seems to mean a formal ordering, "a valuational ordering of an inner given-ness, a presence." It is the transgredient determination and "loving condensation and measurement" of the actions and experience of others. "It is not an emotional-volitional reaction to the object and to meaning, but a reaction to that reaction" (1979a, 103; 1984a, 126), i.e., a metareaction. From within consciousness life coheres in meaningful and valorized concepts, but "rhythm" presupposes a *predetermination* of meaning, a finishedness, and hence a kind of "semantic despair" (1979a, 103; 1984a, 127). From within consciousness there is always a "future of meaning" on the horizon, meaning is open in the direction of the future, and it only becomes fixed once it can be located in the past. The author

is always positioned vis-à-vis the hero *"later in time,* and also *later in meaning"* (1979a, 104; 1984a, 127). Of course a single consciousness can have no perception of its own rhythm, since it cannot get out of its own meaning-full horizon. "Rhythm is possible as a form of relationship to another, but not to oneself [...] Rhythm is an embrace and kiss of value given to the condensed temporality of the mortal life of another" (1979a, 106; 1984a, 129). By focusing on another and giving totality to that being, Bakhtin seems to suggest, I can for a moment contribute my own unforeclosed horizon to the completion of another, lending myself to the "chorus of others." This does not constitute a transcendence of my own participation in life and of my pragmatic "semantic" activity, but it *is* a way to "get into the rhythm" - not my own rhythm, of course, but the rhythm of another.

> In the chorus I do not sing for myself; I am active only in relation to another, and passive in the other's relation to me; I exchange gifts, but I do so unselfishly; I feel within me the body and soul of another. (1979a, 106; 1984a, 130)

It is precisely in attempting to "be for oneself" that one remains "still to come" [*eščë predstojat'*], unclosed, undefined. "At no time is my reflecting on myself realistic; I cannot know the form of what is there [of the given-ness, *dannosti*] with regard to myself" (1979a, 108; 1984a, 132).

> Once I try to determine myself *for myself* (and not for another and from another), I find myself in the world of concepts [*v mire zadannosti*], outside of the time in which I am already-present, as something still forthcoming as far as its meaning and values are concerned. (Ibid.; Ibid.)

One cannot and should not wish to escape one's life, in which one is always still in the making, in which the meaning of one's life is always still to come, in which one always has an *horizon,* and one is not yet totalized. But another can be fixed in a semantic whole.

> For me, an other coincides with himself, and by virtue of this coincidence and integrity, positively completing him, I enrich him from without, and he becomes aesthetically significant, a hero. (1979a, 114; 1984a, 137)

Sense comes to rest in the aesthetically totalizing event; meaning arrives at formal closure.

> In this sense we may say that death is a form of aesthetic completion of a personality. [...] Rhythm envelops the life that has been lived [perežituju *žizn'*]; the tonalities of the final requiem could already be heard in the cradlesong. But in art the life that has been lived is preserved, justified and made complete in everlasting memory; this is the kind and merciful hopelessness of rhythm. (1979a, 115-116; 1984a, 139)

We see that what Bakhtin means by the "semantic despair" of "rhythm" is a thousand miles from what Kierkegaard meant by "despair" (despite certain echoes elsewhere). "Despair of meaning" is precisely the completion of meaning, and hence the closure of hope, the severance of a relationship to the future of meaning. An end, but also a fulfillment. This "hopelessness" is precisely coincidence with oneself, identity, and hence death - but only in this death can we talk of a "soul." Spirit and soul [16] are two sides of a coin; spirit is alive but incomplete, soul is complete but dead. Although Bakhtin seems to valorize

"soul" here, as the crowning mercy and fulfillment from above (from outside), freedom and life are on the side of "spirit." (This distribution, as we shall see, will have repercussions in Bakhtin's subsequent writings.)

> The soul is the self-coincident, self-equivalent, closed whole of inner life, which postulates the extralocal loving activity of another. The soul is my spirit's gift to an *other*. (1979a, 116; 1984a, 140)

Actual existence, *being there*, pure presence, can only be justified without reference to an open field of meaning, "in an extra-semantic justification" [*vo vnesmyslovom opravdanii*]," since what already exists "is only *factual* (persistently actual) compared to the conceptual plenitude of developing [*sobytijnogo*] meaning" (Ibid.; Ibid.). But to be in meaning is to exist in the conceptual world of becoming, unable to get outside of one's horizon of meaning-to-come, to exist not *in* time, but *as* time. Bakhtin closes his discussion of the temporal wholeness of the hero with a rather Romantic celebration of the joys of passivity. To "already be", to just *be there*, to exist for another, means to need: to need approval, tenderness and safeguarding like a helpless child, "to be feminine toward the pure affirmative activity of an *I*. But if existence is to open wide before me in its feminine passivity I myself must be absolutely outside of it and absolutely active" (1979a, 119; 1984a, 143). This activeness is the prerequisite for aesthetic beauty, but the end of pure joy. Joy is the most defenseless and passive state there is; it does not come from within but is the passive state of

"already being" [*uže byt'*] which is the gift of the other to me. This is the death of the spirit and the birth of the soul.

*

Bakhtin opens his discussion of the "semantic" totality of the hero with a further discussion of acts [*postupki*; Holquist prefers the translation "deeds"]. In life we are active, we live in acts, but our actions are not the immediate expressions of our selves. One might say that from within we are too busy living to "be." To be for Bakhtin is to "already be," to be determined and whole, while active consciousness is always still becoming; acts are future-oriented, they are openended; what defines an act is its "not-yet-being" [*ne-bytie-ešče*]. Thus, according to Bakhtin's usage, one can only *be* for another; in acts experienced from within one is still becoming. Action is becoming, being is passion.

Bakhtin devotes the rest of the chapter to one of his rather formalistic typological rundowns, discussing author-hero relationships as they are manifested in the confession, the autobiography, the lyric, and in the cases of the classical character, the type, and the hagiographic subject.

The penitential confession is an attempt at an auto-objectification which would exclude the other. This confession can only be made up of what I myself in my active consciousness can say about myself; "any elements transgredient to

self-consciousness are excluded" (1979a, 124; 1984a, 149). The confession is an attempt at an axiological relationship toward oneself, but "a pure self-accounting is impossible; the closer one approaches this extreme, the clearer the other extreme becomes" (1979a, 126; 1984a, 151), namely, the more one tries to coincide with oneself, the more certain is one's *décalage,* one's lack of self-identity. And the more obvious becomes the necessity of God's position as transgredient Absolute Other.

> In the penitential confession there is no hero and no author, since there is no disposition to allow their interrelationship to be realized, no extralocal value position; the author and hero are stuck together: this is spirit, in its becoming, winning out over soul. (1979a, 128; 1984a, 154)

When such is the situation it is the reader who must provide the position of extralocality. The confession provides raw material for a potential aesthetic event which would have to be found in the reader's valuational and meaning-framing response. In a sense, then, the confession is an open work which can only be closed in a reader's response. From our extralocality in space and time we as readers can provide the backdrop which totalizes the *act* of confession and the axiological transgredients which would make the confessing spirit a soul.

> The contemplator begins to be drawn into authorship, the subject of the confession becomes the hero (needless to say, the spectator here is not co-creator with the author as he is in the perception of a work of art, but accomplishes a primary, though of course primitive, creative act). (1979a, 129; 1984a, 155)

But such an approach does not correspond to the *non-artistic intent* of the confession. There is a problem in attempting to make a confession the material of an aesthetic event. There is no author with whom we might join in creation, and there is no real hero whom we might complete together with the author. Instead, the subject is right there directly addressing us, so that what seems appropriate is a response, an answering act, a reaction. I am brought into activity by the moral directness of the confessor's address. Of course I still maintain an extralocal perspective vis-à-vis his own activity, but it takes on a moral and religious, rather than an aesthetic, quality. The act of confession may still be approached "cognitively from an aesthetic or theoretical point of view, but these approaches do not in essence carry out its task" (1979a, 131; 1984a, 156).

Bakhtin moves from the confession to the autobiography. It may be remarked that as the chapter has been progressing the stridency of Bakhtin's position on the absolute extralocality of the authorial point of view, which seemed at first to approximate a kind of "solalterism," has begun to flag; extralocality is seen to be a dynamic function. Still, what had appeared to be almost a temptation in the discussion of the confession to admit that author and hero might coincide was quickly and violently suppressed. The possibility continues to reemerge, but with many qualifications. What Bakhtin is now happily able to discern in the autobiographical act is a kind of posterior position of extralocality vis-à-vis oneself, admittedly finally involving recourse to actual alterity.

At the same time "finishedness" seems to have become a more

ambiguous term. "The biographical form," we are told, "is the most 'realistic' form" (1979a, 133; 1984a, 159), since the extralocality of the author is more or less limited to a partial spatio-temporal exteriority, while the field of meaning remains fairly open, "life"-like.

The author in the autobiographical relationship is not really the self but rather the introjected other. Recalling one's past can be seen as a kind of narrative fabulation, in which the transgredient elements come from others. And if our past selves are completed by past and present others, they are also completed in part by fantasized future others (posterity).

The narrative of one's own life extends into the unseeable past: who can distinguish the others that have authored various episodes of our lives?

> Without these narratives of others my life would not only be deprived of fullness and clarity of substance, but would also remain inwardly uncoordinated, devoid of axiological *biographical integrity*. (1979a, 135; 1984a, 161)

It is futile to attempt a biography from within; rather one must make use of the value-defining positions of others, positions as close to oneself as possible; in other words one must participate in the extralocality of the heroes (who are also the authors) of one's life, and experience one's biography *"through its narrators"* (Ibid.; Ibid.), through others.

Thus, a split occurs in autobiography. "Needless to say, the author as an element of the work of art never coincides with the hero: they are *two*, but there is no fundamental opposition

between them, they have homogenous axiological contexts [...] They are both others" (1979a, 143; 1984a, 170).

Deep down the author still lives out of sync [*nesovpadeniem*] with himself. Thus the work still remains open at some level, and, as was the case with the confession, the reader may be called upon to flesh it out into a finished aesthetic whole. The value of openness, however, is beginning to suggest itself with great force. Bakhtin's discussion of autobiography contains much that will sound familiar to readers of his later work on the evolution of novelistic discourse (and particularly the typological surveys in "Forms of Time and of the Chronotope in the Novel").

If in the autobiography the self is assimilated totally by the world of others, so that the authorial position is weakened by the necessity of constant recourse to extra-authorial extralocal positions (those of the others who have been the heroes and authors of our lives), in the lyric we see an inverse situation: the hero loses all "authority" and has only a kind of potential autonomy; the author completely dominates.

In part this is due to the nature of extralocality in the lyrical activity. The hero of the lyric *appears* to exist autonomously and even without spatio-temporal surroundings, but this only means that the author's extralocality is concentrated in purely value-oriented reflection. The author's semantic surplus overcomes the hero, who, so to speak, can offer no resistance. At the same time, "the voice of authority" is the voice of the *chorus*, and the hero can only be heard in that voice, "the spirit of music" (and remember what "spirit" implies)

takes hold of him. The hero "barely *lives at all,* but is only *reflected* in the soul of the active author, the other who dominates him" (1979a, 150; 1984a, 177).

The most paradigmatic example of proper author-hero relations, at least in terms of extralocality, would seem to be found in the creation of a *character.* Here the hero is an autonomous element while the author for his part makes use of the full range of his extralocal surplus of vision to complete the hero as a total, determined character. Bakhtin distinguishes two main tendencies in characterization: the classical (or rather romantic) dichotomy of *Classical* and *Romantic.* The classical approach sees the character as a whole in terms of his "destiny," inscribing the hero within a genealogy and a tradition. In Romanticism the hero takes on more "responsibility" for his destiny. This already destabilizes the authorial position; the hero becomes an "infinite" character. The results of the degeneration of the classical approach are sentimentalism and realism. In the former, the extralocal position is used for moral as well as aesthetic response to a hero. This vitiates the aesthetic quality, and we begin to react toward the hero as we would react toward a real person. Realism, on the other hand, makes of the character an example to be adduced in an author's social (or otherwise) theorizing. The surplus here is theoretical. Both of these modes of characterization reduce the autonomy and aesthetic wholeness of the hero.

"A type represents the *passive* position of a collective identity" (1979a, 159; 1984a, 187). Such a position is an apparent given-ness, the author completes it with a "cognitive

surplus," the character of a collectivity stands before the author, transparent to his scrutiny. The subject of his perception becomes more and more objectified. It does not reach the extreme and become simply an object, however. This would remove it from the artistic realm of perception altogether. But the position of the type is the most objectified position which the subject of an aesthetic event can occupy. This is the position of the character in a satire. The type presupposes the superiority of the author, even allowing him to uncover the contextual factors *determining* the hero, whose independence, obviously, is greatly reduced.

The hagiographic hero occupies exactly the opposite position. The author's extralocality assumes a humility; everything that is typical or determined by spatio-temporal context in the hero is eschewed. The author *renounces* his extralocality, and gives authority over to "traditional sanctified forms" (1979a, 161; 1984a, 190). Aesthetic significance is presumably very close to its low water mark here.

The modes of characterization which Bakhtin has discussed are obviously generalizations, abstractions. The actual aesthetic activity is dynamic and includes many different degrees of approximation between author and hero.

> The hero and the author are engaged in combat; sometimes they move closer together, sometimes they fly apart. But the fullness of the work as a completed whole presupposes their sharp divergence and the victory of the author. (1979a, 162; 1984a, 191)

The last chapter of Bakhtin's essay is called "The Problem

of the Author." Bakhtin summarizes the points he has made about spatial, temporal and "semantic" completion from an extralocal vantage point, about the difference between "living" (from within) and (already) "being" (from without), and about the impossibility of true self-reflection, of knowledge of oneself as a totality. He proceeds to a restatement of his views on the limitations of formal linguistic analysis and reveals that he is diametrically opposed to the Mallarméan insight that literary works of art are made of words. For Bakhtin the verbal material is shaped by the dispositions of the created world, by the "content," and not vice-versa [17].

Bakhtin comments on three *crises* which may constitute revolutions in the realm of author and hero relations. The first of these would seem to involve a kind of *Selbstaufhebung* whereby the artist himself becomes *determined* as to being, the authorial position reveals its own "authored" determinateness and deadness, and "spirit" feels an aversion to this definition, so that art itself becomes something to be surpassed by spirit as it evolves into the future.

A second crisis is the suspicion of extralocal positions in general, the moral accusation of the author's situation outside of life and working at finishing it off. "Vantage points" of surplus perception are called into question, extralocality becomes a failed and fallacious mode of "knowledge"; knowledge of an other can and should only be realized through identification, communion, empathy. Interiority becomes important as the true center of "being" and identity. An extralocal, aesthetic, "extra-semantic" (that is, what *we* would loosely call an

"objective" or "disinterested") point of view is proclaimed a wrongheaded and deadly humbug.

Finally there can occur a crisis in which the extralocal surplus is put to purely and radically *ethical* uses, rejecting the aesthetic event. This procedure manifests no "aesthetic tranquility"; what is "present" and "already exists" can only be seen in the light of a potential future of meaning and values.

Obviously, these three crises are what we would more or less call Romanticism, with its sense of a need to surpass the limitations of the artistic role as classically defined, its recognition of the cognitive and moral questionability of "objectivity," and its revolutionary desires not merely to interpret the world, but to change it. Bakhtin's attitude toward these crises is not really to be discerned, though one apprehends a gentle whiff of censure from the point of view of the aesthetician. The progressive demolition of exteriority over the last five centuries may have had definite and positive political, social and ethical ramifications, but from an aesthetic (and, I think we may add, at this stage in his development, from a religious) point of view, it would seem to have been a disaster.

Bakhtin's study concludes modestly with reference to the reader's position with regard to the author. The reader, as Bakhtin has said, does not perceive the author himself, but *through* the author. If the reader begins to regard the author, he sets up an extralocal position of his own, and performs his own act of transgredient creation, or authoring. The author's

individuation as a human being is already a secondary

> creative act of the reader, critic or historian, independent of the author as an active principle of vision - an act, making him passive himself. (1979a, 180; 1984a, 210)

*

If we return now to the cento of statements from Clark and Holquist with which we opened our discussion, we may note that Bakhtin's biographers seem to have completed his early views from their own historically extralocal vantage point. Particularly jarring in reference to Bakhtin's essay is the intimation that the self authors itself (Clark and Holquist 1985, 65), boldly asserted by Holquist to be "the suggestion of Bakhtin's total oeuvre, conceived as a single utterance" (Holquist 1983a, 315). On this topic, the only other extensive discussion of "Author and Hero," Todorov's rather neatly tied-up package (Todorov 1979; revised version in 1981) proves more faithful in its relentless celebration of alterity. What we take exception to in Holquist's presentation is the vagueness of his application of the authorial metaphor, a vagueness which comes close to reducing Bakhtin's radical decentering of the location of personality to the cozy "self"-perpetuation of some such figure as *Je est un auteur*. The following recapitulation should square for the reader the situation of author-self parallels as they are conceived of by Bakhtin in this early essay: (1) self authors other, (2) the relationship is symmetrical - other authors self, (3) self does

not author self - self is not and cannot be the "hero" of self's own life.

Readers familiar with Bakhtin's subsequent work may find some of his views, particularly his aesthetic presuppositions, in "Author and Hero" a little disappointing, however provocative his deconstruction of interiority and privileging of alterity may be. The authorial position as conceived here by Bakhtin, with its attendant "axiological tranquility," is a rather exploded notion, and perhaps seems to betray rather little psychological or sociological wit.

But Bakhtin has promises to break, and miles to go before he wakes. The proposed examination of author-hero relations in Russian literature will never be realized because Dostoevsky is about to effect a "Copernican Revolution" in Bakhtin's conceptual universe. Reading "Author and Hero" we may suppose that we can see this revolution on the horizon, but we have tried to resist the proleptic urge to summarize Bakhtin as though it had already occured. After all, we may be perfectly aware that the earth is rotating on its axis and still be able to enjoy the wonder of dawn as the rising of the sun.

Although Bakhtin already planned in "Author and Hero" to deal in depth with Dostoevsky when he examined authorial positions as manifested in Russian literature (1979a, 7; 128; 1984a, 27; 154), he seems in that early essay to have presupposed Dostoevsky's position to be inappropriate to the achievement of an aesthetic unity (e.g., 1979a, 20; 1984a, 41) and tends to class him together with various chiefly romantic deviations (1979a, 128; 1984a, 153). There is nothing which, in a naive

reading of the text, would foreshadow the eventual appearance in 1929 of the first major work to be published under Bakhtin's own name, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Creative Work* [18].

We shall not spend so much space summarizing the argument of this book, since it will already be familiar to very many readers and since there exist two translations into English (1973 and 1984b) of the revised Russian edition (1963). Briefly, Bakhtin credits Dostoevsky with the creation of an essentially new form of verbal art, the "polyphonic novel." What is characteristic of this form is the renunciation of a monological discourse emanating from a center of authority, and in its place the maintenance in co-existence, on a shared plane, of diverse voices, or points of view, those of the various characters in the novel and that of the author himself, engaged in a perpetual dialogue. This dialogue is not to be resolved, it is essentially, or at least potentially, endless, in fact timeless, and the consciousnesses engaged in it are not to be fixed from without; rather, the aesthetic unity of Dostoevsky's work is found precisely within an eternally unfinished dialogue.

Now despite the evident persistence of many of Bakhtin's fundamental presuppositions (for instance, that completion comes from without, or that consciousness from within is infinite) the world of "Author and Hero" seems here to have been more or less completely turned upside down. In the earlier essay, for instance, Bakhtin assumed that any time author and hero occupied the same plane or came into opposition, the *aesthetic* event was over, and an *ethical* event took its place (1979a, 22; 1984a, 43). Only as the subject of an extralocal *finalizing* vision - such as

would seem to be out of the question in Dostoevsky's design - could the hero become an aesthetic whole. The opening paragraphs of Bakhtin's chapter on Dostoevsky's relationship to his heroes thus look much like his descriptions in "Author and Hero" of situations which were assumed to be aesthetically sterile, into which some pranking editor has inserted new positively valorized twists.

> What is important to Dostoevsky is not how his hero appears in the world but first and foremost how the world appears to his hero, and how the hero appears to himself. (1984b, 47)

> [...] what must be discovered and characterized here is not the specific existence of the hero, not his fixed image, but the *sum total of his consciousness and self-consciousness*, ultimately *the hero's final word on himself and his world*. (Ibid., 48)

> [...] everything that usually serves an author in creating a fixed and stable image of the hero, "who he is," becomes in Dostoevsky the object of the hero's own introspection, the subject of his self-consciousness; and the subject of the author's visualization and representation turns out to be in fact a *function* of this self-consciousness. (Ibid.)

In "Author and Hero" consciousness was consciousness of another, and was engaged in activity of some semantic (pragmatic) and ethical kind. This excluded it from an aesthetic perspective. The concerns of active consciousness were pragmatic and never revolved around questions such as "who am I?, what am I?, or what am I like?" (1979a, 122; 1984a, 147). On the contrary, self-consciousness was seen as impossible, or rather paradoxical and futile in that any attempt at self-reflection invariably split the self and *foreclosed* the possibility of an accurate

vision by the self of the self as a finished, hence aesthetically satisfactory, whole. Now it would seem that it is precisely this crazy and impracticable self-reflection which is the key to the unity of Dostoevsky's novels. What's more, Bakhtin's conception of self-consciousness is nevertheless virtually unchanged; thus "Dostoevsky's hero is an infinite function. [...] [He] never for an instant coincides with himself." (1984b, 51). But in Bakhtin's earlier work the "infinite hero" was a biproduct of Romanticism, the result of an aesthetically risky "attempt to squeeze out of one's own self-consciousness the recognition which is possible only through another, to do without God, audience or author" (1979a, 157; 1984a, 185).

Yet Bakhtin has not renounced his earlier view of author-hero relations. On the contrary, this view still holds true for ordinary literature and these traditional author-hero relations can easily be perceived in Tolstoy's work. Tolstoy (who is established here within an oppositional relationship to Dostoevsky which will persist in Bakhtin's subsequent theorizing) maintains his ousidedness and "takes advantage of his *external position* to give [his heroes] a definitive meaning, to finalize them" (1984b, 70).

> Thus the total finalizing meaning of the life and death of each character is revealed only in the author's field of vision, and thanks solely to the advantageous "surplus" which that field enjoys over every character, that is, thanks to that which the character cannot himself see or understand. This is the finalizing, monologic function of the author's "surplus" field of vision. (Ibid.)

One is impressed by how shallow and inadequate Tolstoy's

mode of representation is now made to sound beside the complex vitality of Dostoevsky's polyphonic novel, despite no overt devalorization on Bakhtin's part of the former author's method, which after all is essentially that endorsed in "Author and Hero."

The "monologic" and "dialogic" modes, it should be pointed out, are not here seen as mutually exclusive rivals for aesthetic dominance. Interestingly, this may depend to some extent on the fact that they are of different logical types, metaphorically founded, as they are, in different sense perceptions, and on parallel aesthetic presuppositions from, respectively, the visual and the musical arts. Tolstoy's "monologic" mode is the result of a "surplus" of *vision,* the character is an *image,* completed from an exteriority that is most noticeably *spatial,* by means of the essentially *optical* bonuses avalailable to an *other*. In Dostoevsky's polyphonic novel the persepctive is, or the perspectives are, auditory. We might follow and supplement Bakhtin's earlier concrete images by pointing out that extralocality provides no real surplus or evident vantage point in terms of *auditory* perception. This alone implies that the two modes of characterization are not really rival methods of representing the same "reality," but rather two discrete artforms, one of which has to do with the representation of being, or concrete existence, and the other of which has to do with the representation of consciousness. However, they would seem to be mutually exclusive *within a single work*. A free dialogism of discourse is foreclosed by an authorial extralocal surplus. The discourse of the hero of Pushkin's "The Captain's

Daughter," Ginev, for example, is *determined* within an authorial *field of vision*.

> As a result *the fixed image of Grinev* is an image, and not a *discourse;* Grinev's discourse is an element of his image, that is, it is fully exhausted by functions of characterization and pragmatic development of the plot. (1984b, 57)

So Bakhtin still assumes that *the image* of a hero from without is resolved and finalized [19], but he now congratulates Dostoevsky precisely for avoiding any such completed image. We don't *view* the character at all: "Dostoevsky's hero is not an objectified image but an autonomous discourse, *pure voice;* we do not see him, we hear him" (1984b, 53). Bakhtin seems now to have arrived at the realization that while our physical selves, just as he had thought, may indeed be determined from without, our spiritual selves cannot be determined at all, or rather *should not be*. As has been well recognized, Dostoevsky's characters often rebel against definition from without, against the deadly psychic determination coming from an other. Now Bakhtin seems to acknowledge this darker side of the other and even to join in this rebellion.

> The serious and deeper meaning of this revolt might be expressed this way: a living human being cannot be turned into the voiceless object of some secondhand, finalizing cognitive process. *In a human being there is always something that only he himself can reveal, in a free act of self-consciousness and discourse, something that does not submit to an externalizing secondhand definition.* (1984b, 58)

Is this merely Bakhtin's paraphrase of the position of the hero of *Notes from Underground,* or of Dostoevsky's authorial imperative, or has Bakhtin seen the light - or rather, *heard a voice? Notes from Underground* seems as good a text as any to illustrate Bakhtin's new emphasis on *not* "finishing the other off," since preeminently among Dostoevsky's novels it brings out the potential terribleness of being defined by another, while at the same time calling into question any possibility of an *escape* from alterity. As we know, the "freedom" of the Underground Man not to be defined is freedom of a peculiar kind. It consists largely in the fact that because he is so desperately hyperconscious, as Bakhtin puts it: "There is literally nothing we can say about the hero of 'Notes from Underground' that he does not already know himself" (1984b, 52). (This is precisely what Hegel said about Rameau's nephew, that other radically other-oriented, radically self-centered sophist.) But as Bakhtin himself is willing to recognize, in the Underground Man's constant attempts to anticipate and defuse the words of others about himself, to remain independent of their finalizing pronouncement upon him,

> he again demonstrates to the other (and to himself) his own dependence on this other. He *fears* the other's opinion. But through this fear he immediately demonstrates his own dependence on the other's consciousness, his own inability to be at peace with his own definition of self. (1984, 229)

Bakhtin has no illusions about the pervasiveness of the other's mediation of the hero, yet he seems ready to celebrate the vicious circles of the hero's hyperselfconsciousness, since

"Self-consciousness [...] is by itself sufficient to break down the monologic unity of an artistic world - but only on the condition that the hero, as self-consciousness, is really represented and not merely expressed" (1984b, 51).

> Thanks to this attitude toward the other's consciousness, a peculiar *perpetuum mobile* is achieved, made up of his internal polemic with another and with himself, an endless dialogue where one reply begets another, which begets a third, and so on to infinity, and all of this without any forward motion. (1984b, 230)

Faced with Bakhtin's delight in this endless dialogue we may be inclined to respond with a prayer for psychotic closure, the serenity of the monolgue, to respond with the sentiments of the Underground Man himself, who at one point remarks that

> to be conscious is an illness - a real thoroughgoing illness. For man's everyday needs, it would have been quite enough to have the ordinary human consciousness, that is, half or a quarter the amount which falls to the lot of a cultivated man of our unhappy nineteenth century [...] (Dostoevsky 1945, 132)

To talk of the Underground Man's "freedom" and lack of "secondhand" definition as an object of others is anything but unproblematical. If he is "free" from authorial determination we may certainly say that he has been "condemned to be free." He is obviously not free with regard to the other characters, but forsaking a claim for his absolute freedom, we might still insist that he is "autonomous": at least his hellish hyperconsciousness is *his* hellish hyperconsciousness - and not some secondhand definition. Even this supposition, however, is open to question:

is one autonomous if one says that one is, or is it not precisely another's recognition of our autonomy which constitutes it? Can one be autonomous from within? In any case, can "autonomy" [20] exist as anything but a response to an other? Earlier Bakhtin has argued forcefully that it cannot. It is daring of him now to take *Notes from Underground* as a prime example of the new found autonomy of Dostoevsky's characters, since we may be inclined to agree with the hero's own position, and that of the frame narrator, that his hyperconsciousness is a disease, a paranoia, R. D. Laing's "ontological insecurity": psychic death anxiety, the terror of ceasing to exist in being defined by another's consciousness. It is as though Bakhtin's earlier metaphors of identity and definition as "death" have come back to haunt him, to be taken literally. Now *life itself* depends on irresolution, what is essential is the eternal persistance of alterity, of dialogically opposed consciousnesses: "To be means to communicate dialogically. When dialogue ends, everything ends" (1984b, 252). No longer is one's existence as a whole and complete identity, viewed from without, any kind of existence at all. It is death.

It is futile - and aesthetically irrelevant - to argue with the irrationality of such an equation of psychic definition from without with death. Identification of this sort is of course rather prevalent in the contemporary Western world. To objectify it and sort out its logical and metaphorical confusions is, after all, to "kill it." Instead of diagnosis what is needed is dialogics; for Bakhtin, as for the "ego pyschologists" or for "existentialists" in general, the "clinical" approach is entirely unsatisfactory. Of the two readerly response options to which

Jacques Derrida gave the timely tags of the "critical" and the "clinical" in 1967, Bakhtin may be said to have taken the former path (cf., Derrida 1967, 253). And we may, I think, assume that such a choice is symptomatic of a revolution in Bakhtin's own views as to the seat of personality and human value, indicative of a heightened appreciation on his part of the self as subject. Todorov has described the Bakhtin of the early period as "a phenomenolgist and perhaps an 'existentialist'" (Todorov 1984b, 8). These terms may be too imprecise to be of much help, but if we accept them we may in any case distinguish between the quasi-phenomenological thinking in "Author and Hero" and what seems a largely existentialist outlook in the Dostoevsky book.

One senses that at the very least Dostoevsky has redefined "personality" for Bakhtin. As we may recall, in "Author and Hero" personality was the same as identity and was a gift of finalization and definition from without. For oneself, one had no identity (since one was never from within identical to oneself) and, consequently, no personality. But now a different meaning for personality, one that sharply distinguishes it from identity, has revealed itself [21].

> In Dostoevsky's artistic thinking, the genuine life of the personality takes place at the point of non-coincidence between a man and himself, at his point of departure beyond the limits of all that he is as a material being, a being that can be spied on, defined, predicted apart from its own will, "at second hand." The genuine life of the personality is made available only through a *dialogic* penetration of that personality, during which it freely and reciprocally reveals itself. (1984b, 59)

It is this "dialogic penetration" of personality which

Dostoevsky achieves. Once he has renounced a transcendent vantage point, so that, in effect, he no longer provides the transgredient elements of his characters' identities, those characters gain autonomy, they are no longer "finished off" by the (presumably inimical) alterity of an imposing author.

> The hero becomes relatively free and independent, because everything in the author's design that had defined him and, as it were, sentenced him, everything that had qualified him to be once and for all a completed image of reality, now no longer functions as a form for finalizing him, but as the material of his self-consciousness. (1984b, 52)

Bakhtin locates the "freedom" of Dostoevsky's characters in the unique position of the author with regard to the hero, the author's assumption of an "I-thou" attitude, rather than the objectivity of a "third person" observer. The character is treated as though he were present and capable of responding to the author's words about him, actually the author's words *addressed to him*. To make explicit what is only lurking around in Bakhtin's way of putting it: Dostoevsky treats the consciousnesses of his characters like consciousnesses of real, living people. "Dostoevsky, like Goethe's Prometheus, creates not voiceless slaves (as does Zeus), but *free* people, capable of standing *alongside* their creator, capable of not agreeing with him and even of rebelling against him" (1984b, 6).

> It might seem that the independence of a character contradicts the fact that he exists, entirely and solely, as an aspect of a work of art, and consequently is wholly created from beginning to end by the author. In fact there is no such contradiction. The characters' freedom we speak of here exists within the limits of the artistic design, and

> in that sense is just as much a created thing as is the unfreedom of the objectivized hero. But to create does not mean to invent. Every creative act is bound by its own special laws, as well as by the laws of the material with which it works. Every creative act is determined by its object and by the structure of its object, and therefore permits no arbitrariness; in essence it invents nothing, but only reveals what is already present in the object itself. It is possible to arrive at a correct thought, but this thought has its own logic and therefore cannot be invented, that is, it cannot be fabricated from beginning to end. Likewise an artistic image, of whatever sort, cannot be invented, since it has its own artistic logic, its own norm-generating order. Having set a specific task for himself, the creator must subordinate himself to this order. [...]
>
> Thus the freedom of a character is an aspect of the author's design. A character's discourse is created by an author, but created in such a way that it can develop to the full its inner logic and independence as *someone else's discourse,* the word of the *character himself.* As a result it does not fall out of the author's design, but only out of a monological authorial field of vision. And the destruction of vision is precisely a part of Dostoevsky's design. (1984b, 64-65)

In Bakhtin's attempt to distinguish between "creation" and "invention" we notice once again his fundamental belief in a preconceived creative world. Thus, apparently, the subject of the work of art preexists its inditing by the author, and its preestablished internal logic or configuration determines the creative responses of the author. This is not, however, the internal logic of literary conventions, but the logic of an autonomous "world."

Such assumptions, one may notice, are surprisingly close to some of the wilder suppositions of an Emile Zola, an author diametrically opposed to Dostoevsky's design for freedom. Zola, the champion of a physio-social determinism for which Bakhtin evidently has nothing but scorn, nevertheless shares with the Soviet thinker a marginalizing tendency where questions of

authorial determinism are concerned. For him too, in his notorious essay on *Le roman expérimental,* the world of the novelist's creation is independent of that creation, but for Zola it is the *real* world, into whose machinations the author only introduces free variables, so that the novel is an experiment upon subjects who are not ultimately *free,* but who *are* free of authorial determination. The author merely experiments with his characters in order to discover the mechanisms governing real-life human behavior. (Hilariously, Zola proves that this is the case by adducing the richness of sociological data available in the chain of events in Balzac's *Cousine Bette,* thus begging the question all the more needily and displaying his utter inability to distinguish any difference between reality represented in a book and reality *überhaupt.)*

Such nineteenth century assumptions of an ontologically autonomous created world independent and determinant of its verbal artistic instantiation allow Bakhtin to class Dostoevsky as a "psychological realist" because of his unique ability to represent points of view without doing violence to their full-voiced integrity and internal logic. Dostoevsky, unlike the monological novelist, does not "murder to dissect." But whom, we may still wonder, might he murder? His hero, *created* by him, yet nonetheless *not* his invention, and hence ontologically independent of Dostoevsky just as Zola's characters were only "real people" with whom the novelist was experimenting?

*

The idea of a character having a degree of freedom with regard to the author seems to stem from Romanticism, with its desire to dramatize man's new found liberty from the tyranny of God and society. In Ludwig Tieck's *Die verkehrte Welt,* for example, Scaramouche revolts against his situation in a predetermined role and seizes the part of Apollo, and the poet can only throw up his arms in frustration. The idea of characters existing independently of the author's fabrication of them, however, seems much less fantastic and belongs to the "realist" tradition, in which it was not at all unusual for an author to adopt personal sentiments or moralizing attitudes toward the hero, to speak of the hero very much as though he were a real person by whose activities and attributes the author was pleased, displeased, amused, outraged, and so on (this is true, as Robert Alter has shown (Alter 1975, 117ff) even of the self-proclaimed puppetmaster Thackeray's behavior - at least toward the ladies). Such motions were in line with the realist theory of art and representation; indeed, one may say that Zola's simple *assumption* of a continuity between the real world and a novelistic world was only a slightly more outspoken version of a presupposition taken pretty much for granted by most novelits, and particularly in the nineteenth century. Only rarely does the unconsciousness of this assumption seem potentially to betray a repression. In general we may say that it simply never occurred to the realistic novelist to feel any responsibility for the world he created, because, as Bakhtin would say, he didn't, after all, *invent* the world; he merely "called it as he saw it." And it certainly never occurred to him that perception might already

be a form of "authorship," a fundamentally creative act, an aesthetic imposition of "rhythm" onto a brute reality which had no plot, no heroes, and no moral. But of course this had occurred to Bakhtin, which was part of the reason why the monologic novelist, a Tolstoy or a Zola, in order to become a Dostoevsky, had to join his belief in the ontological status of his characters together with the Romantic imperative for freedom. The sense of responsibilty that comes with Romantic self-consciousness and the sense of the ontological independence of characters as real people which is typical of realism collide in Dostoevsky. His may in fact be the first great attempt to discharge authorial guilt.

Yet the essentially lighthearted parabasis of a Gogol, by the middle of the nineteenth century, already belies a certain anxiety of authorship.

> And so the reader must not wax indignant if the personae that have appeared up to now haven't proven to his, the reader's, taste: it's all Chichikov's [the hero's] fault; he is full master here, and wherever he may get a notion of going thither must we, too, drag ourselves. (Gogol 1948, 246)

This basically self-subverting performance nevertheless witnesses the growing burdensomeness of narrative responsibility which will eventually help to crush the realist tradition and bring about the modern, or postmodern, conception of plot and character.

For in our own time, of course, such authorial self-consciousness has become de rigueur, and led to the essential

inconsistency of the authorial position in postmodern fiction, with the narrator shuttling back and forth between shrill almightiness and disclaimers of impotence. Thus Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. can sorrowfully boast at one moment of his ability to make his hero a millionaire, to send him to prison, to kill him, and so on (Vonnegut 1973, 192) and a few pages further on complain that his control is unstable, it is though he were "connected to them by stale rubberbands" (Ibid., 202). And typical of "metafiction" in general is the author's appearance in the work as a character, his attempt to situate himself on a single plane with his heroes, their equal, blameless like them, victim of the same aleatory forces, not responsible for their fates, indeed to some extent at their mercy. "Kurt Vonnegut" has his toe broken by a character in a cocktail bar of his own devising in *Breakfast of Champions,* "John Fowles" in *The French Lieutenant's Woman* says he is "haunted" by Sarah - even if another character named "John Fowles" tells an interviewer that "pretending your characters are free can only be a game" (Fowles 1976, 456). But the self-consciousness of contemporary metafiction helps us to realize that this is precisely the game in which *every* novelist is engaging. Most, however, are not as aboveboard as a John Fowles. On the contrary this game can look pretty nasty when we recognize the central repression and dissimulation of the unfreedom of characters which has been used to maintain it in the narrative tradition. If we forsake the convention whereby characters are, at least to the extent that real people are, *free agents* - and assuming we don't at the same time reject the possibility of *any* ontological status for the "people" in a book,

there are certain interesting unforeseen *ethical* ramifications.

For example, it is no longer reasonable to join in with Sinclair Lewis in his high-spirited supercilious mockery of a Babbitt. Suddenly we may be a little annoyed by that little blamefest: Babbitt's every little indiscretionis catalogued and judged, he throws his used razor blades up on top of the medicine cabinet and is promptly apprehended by his jeering progenitor. Surely this is a pettier God than even Oscar Wilde dreamed of. And if the author lovingly *forgives,* misericordially *absolves* his creation in the end? -- What gall! What presumption! If characters are not free with regard to their authors then they occupy a position in the created world ånalogous to that of man created sin-prone by an angry, yet merciful God and then judged for predestined good works or transgressions. The author thus crucially needs to *dissimulate* his characters' lack of freedom, or else he will seem to have no ethical business taking any sort of valorizing or emotional-volitional attitude toward them at all.

Once this is revealed the author becomes an extremely sinister and intrusive figure, like Nietzsche's God, "that importunity of the heavens, that unavoidable supernatural neighbor," and the character would seem to have every reason to fear him and attempt to wrest his fate from his clutches. This very situation is dramatized in a number of metafictional works, such as Flann O'Brien's *At Swim-Two-Birds,* but perhaps most richly in Miguel de Unamuno's 1914 novel, or "nivola," *Mist.*

In an absurdist vein, "Unamuno" treats his characters half the time as though they are equals - real people capable of

suggesting ideas to him, for instance - and half the time as though they are pure determinatenesses of his authorial will. Not surprisingly, one of his characters, Víctor Goti, is himself writing a novel whose design is as follows:

> "My fictional characters will create themselves by the way they act and talk, especially in the way they talk. Their personalities will develop gradually. And sometimes their personalities will be to not have any personality at all." (Unamuno 1976, 128-129)

The character points out that dialogue in books is choicest

> when it doesn't seem as if the author is saying things just to say them, not imposing his personality on us, his devilish ego. Even though everything my characters say I'm really saying myself..."

He is interrupted by the hero:

> "Up to a certain point..."
> "What do you mean by that?"
> "Well, you start by thinking you're leading the characters around with your own hand, when you suddenly discover that you're being led around by them instead. Often enough, it's the author who becomes the toy of his own creations..." (Ibid., 129-130)

The author "himself" intervenes during another such conversation:

> While Augosto and Víctor were carrying on this "nivolistic" conversation, I, the author of this *nivola*, that you have in hand and are reading, dear reader, I was smiling enigmatically as I watched my "nivolistic" characters pleading my case and justifying my method. Meanwhile I told myself: "How far these unhappy creatures are from suspecting that all they are doing is justifying my manipulation of them! Just as when a man searches for reasons to justify

> himself he is, in actual fact, only searching to justify God. And I am the God of these two wretched 'nivolistic' devils." (Ibid., 189-190)

The hero of the "nivola," Augosto, sometimes doubts his own existence. Having decided to commit suicide, he confronts, in Chapter 31, his author, who verifies his suspicions that he exists only in Unamuno's imagination, and then denies his freedom to kill himself.

> "I repeat, you shouldn't - nor can you, for that matter - do anything except what I'll have you do, and I'll be damned if I'll let you die that way, I simply will not have it! And that's that!"
>
> "All this about 'I'll be damned if I'll let you die that way,' Señor de Unamuno, is very Spanish of you, but very offensive. And besides, even supposing your peculiar theory that I do not exist - and that *you do* exist - and that I am no more than a creature out of fiction, a figment of your novelistic imagination, or 'nivolistic' imagination, even then I should not succumb to your 'I'll be damned if I'll let you die that way,' which is your special quirk. For even those so-called creatures out of fiction have their own inherent logic...."(Ibid., 221)

Eventually "Unamuno himself" (at least if we are to believe his own admission - there is a dissenting opinion) does away with the hero. The suspicion is voiced by someone that Augosto must have gone insane, since he was saying crazy things before he died, for instance that he didn't really exist. Not the least striking coincidence of the philosophies of Unamuno's characters with Bakhtin's theorizing is the rejoinder of the hero's doctor:

> "Insane?" the doctor muttered, as if he were talking to himself. "Who knows if he existed or not? Certainly he himself didn't. Each one of us knows less than anyone else

> about our own existence.... We only exist for others...." (Ibid., 236)

The "Prologue" to *Mist* is by "Víctor Goti," the character whose discussion with the hero was quoted earlier. Goti insists that Augosto Pérez did in fact commit suicide. But the author has a sort of last word in a "Post-Prologue" where he denies Goti's claims and adds in a deadpan:

> My friend and prologuist Goti would do well to tread softly when it comes to questioning my decisions, because if he makes a nuisance of himself I will do with him what I did with his friend Pérez: I'll let him die or I'll kill him [...] (Ibid., 13-14)

Although Unamuno aims for a disorienting effect of the unreal and wishes to lightly disrupt our ontological presumptions, the overall import of *Mist* can only be a reentrenchment of the omnipotence of the authorial ego - characters simply do not exist in the way real people (authors) do, even if we ourselves exist only as characters in other people's narratives (and vice-versa).

The latter supposition of course leads to the grim distrust of narrative which Kurt Vonnegut, Jr. picks up from Céline, where narrative structures are seen as reality-warping delusions which make us perceive some people as "protagonists," others as minor characters, and others still - the victims of far-off earthquakes and atomic bombings - as mere "extras." This is also the menace of the other as author in existentialism, his irresponsable reifications of self as hero, his tendency to

resort to the "economy" of narrative with its character hierarchies. But we may just as well turn the metaphor around and note that rarely in real life can anyone be as cruel to an other as the author can be to his character. Gloucester should have addressed Shakespeare. "As flies to wanton boys are we to our authors, they kill us for their plots" (Carroll 1974, 203).

Unamuno's novel would seem to seek to dissimulate the author's position of ultimate power (it could be argued that *this* is the naive reading, but then we can afford a little naiveté). It would appear to present the author's lack of transcendence by dramatizing his "characterness," his ability to be annoyed and even driven to acts of violence by his characters; it feigns his *ressentiment* toward his heroes in his preposterous murder of Augosto and his threats toward Víctor. All this seems to place Miguel de Unamuno on an existential par with his characters, capable of responding to them not as aesthetic objects but as emotionally volitionally scoped others. But when an author begins to act like a character our typological teeth should tingle. To solve the mystery of an author who turns out to be a murderer in his own novel we will need to resort to modern methods of ratiocination.

We may remind the reader of a situtation somewhat (very) similar in a perhaps more familiar work, the nefarious misuse of narrative control in Agatha Christie's famous *Murder of Roger Ackroyd,* a book which gave a new meaning to the expression "unreliable narrator." If we consider the set-up in that book the mystery of *Mist* clears right up, and we find one possible way of addressing Bakhtin's claims that Dostoevsky is on an equal par

with his heroes. For if we were to say too loudly that the *author* is the killer in *The Murder of Roger Ackroyd,* or even that Miguel de Unamuno does away with Augosto and threatens Víctor in *Mist,* a Gérard Genette would doubtless have a few sharp words of reproof to fillip our direction. Modern narratologists can distinguish any number of textual "agencies," usually at least three: author, implied author, and narrator. Genette, it is true, has recently made a parsimonious attempt to delete the "implied author" (Genette 1983, 93-107) from a system that is not one whit overcomplicated, but even so a crucial difference between author and narrator is today universally - or at least universitily - recognized. One can easily show that "Miguel de Unamuno," the narrator of *Mist* isn't just on a par with the other characters, he *is* one of those characters, and as such is just as much a plaything of the actual transcendent author, the *real* Miguel de Unamuno, as poor "Marcel" is at the mercies of that extradiegetical Proust in his padded cell, or "Proust" is at the mercy of me, since we're having a bit of fun. "Real people" can be literally and not just figuratively converted into characters (see the final lines of "Author and Hero," quoted above).

Perhaps, then (we might argue), what Bakhtin means to say is that the voice of the *narrator* in Dostoevsky's novels is given weight equal to that of the voices of all the other characters. This would already be quite a claim, but would still strike us as considerably less provocative than the assertion that the *author himself* is on an existential par with his heroes.

Now in fact Bakhtin shows some appreciation for distinctions such as we have been making [22]. In his chapter on "Discourse

in Dostoevsky," he recognizes, indeed insists upon, the divergence between a narrator's voice and the author; in fact, the author *makes use* of the narrator's discursive peculiarities for his own ends, although in most cases the narratory voice will have been chosen because its own inherent intentionality is not inconsistent with those ends. The uniqueness of Dostoevsky's polyphonic novel would seem to depend, at least in part, on a special disposition of the narrative agency. Bakhtin specifically states that

> the very orientation of the narrative - and this is equally true of narration by the author, by a narrator, or by one of the characters - must necessarily be quite different than in novels of the monologic type. The position from which a story is told, a portrayal built, or information provided must be oriented in a new way to this new world - a world of autonomous subjects, not objects. (1984b, 7)

The new narrative orientation as manifested in Dostoevsky's *The Double* is described eventually in terms which are neatly antithetical to those which depicted the aesthetically correct *authorial* attitude in "Author and Hero."

> The narrator is literally fettered to his hero; he cannot back off from him sufficiently to give a summarizing and integrated image of his deeds and actions. Such a generalizing image would already lie outside the hero's own field of vision, and on the whole such images presume some stable position on the outside. The narrator does not have access to such a position, he has none of the perspective necessary for an artistically finalizing summation of the hero's image or of his acts as a whole.
>
> [...] Narration in Dostoevsky is always narration without perspective. [...] Narration in Dostoevsky's later period is brief, dry, and even abstract [...] But this brevity and dryness of narration [...] results not from perspective, but on the contrary from a lack of perspective. (1984b, 225-226)

Instead of an exterior and totalizing perspective the narration in Dostoevsky actually only reflects the self-consciousness of the characters themselves. In fact, there is a continuity between the characters' self-consciousness and the narration, so that it is not always easy or meaningful to attempt to demarcate the bounds between the one and the other. The narration is merely one more voice in the unresolved inter- and intra-personal dialogue of the polyphonic novel.

Thus there seems to be some evidence to support an assumption that Bakhtin was merely being careless when he stated that "Dostoevsky" occupies the same plane as his heroes; what he meant of course was that the narrative agency in Dostoevsky is denied an overriding perspective, so that we have only the various dialogically interconnected perspectives of the heroes with which to orient ourselves in the diegetical context. We would thus seem to be back to a point at which we can speak of *authorial* intentionality; indeed, Bakhtin promptly does so. *Notes from Underground,* we are told, is a "confession," but not, of course, a confession in the personal sense: "The author's intention is refracted here, as in any *Ich-Erzählung;* this is not a personal document but a work of art" (1984b, 227). Unfortunately, however, Bakhtin's earlier claims for the freedom and autonomy of Dostoevsky's characters must necessarily return to a position of dubiety if he is going to bring authorial intentionality back into his discussion. Now we may well (for the sake of argument) grant that the hero is independent and autonomous with regard to the discourse of the *narrator,* but where Bakhtin's crucial (from our point of view) larger claims of

freedom from *authorial* determination are concerned we have gotten no further than the argument of creation vs. invention, a dilemma as paradoxical as any creature of an angry God ever had to face.

*

In fact Bakhtin's more idealistic pretensions of Dostoevsky's uniqueness seem at times to relocate him (Dostoevsky? Bakhtin?) within that modern tradition with the double-backed denomination (oxymoron or tautology?) of *"Christian* existentialism." We may quote a relevant jotting from his 1961 notes "Toward a Reworking of the Dostoevsky Book":

> Dostoevsky frequently interrupts, but he never drowns out the other's voice, never finishes it off "from himself," that is, out of his own and alien consciousness. This is, so to speak, the activity of God in His relation to man, a relation allowing man to reveal himself utterly (in his immanent development), to judge himself, to refute himself. This is activity of a higher quality. (1984d, 285)

In a brilliant passage, Bakhtin's biographers compare the transgredient author in the early essay to the Old Testament God; but there is the suggestion in the Dostoevsky book that the God-Author can become a Christ-Author,

> a loving deity, who is silent so that others may speak, and, in speaking, enact their freedom. In the best kenotic tradition, Dostoevsky gives up the privilege of a distinct and higher being to descend into his text, to be among his creatures. (Clark and Holquist 1985, 249)

The importance of Christ in Dostoevsky's world view and even in his artistic values is well documented. The question, however, is the status of the alterity of some kind of Christ-Author. For it has been suggested (Rolland 1983) that a Christ function necessarily overrides the finely balanced reciprocal alterity of the *characters* in Dostoevsky's novels, in that a Christ can *only* be transcendent, a third term, mediating, sythesizing, and destroying difference. Such a third term would seem to be totally inimical to Bakhtin's "system," in which there is to be no synthesis: dialogic must not be confused with dialectic, and what distinguishes them is precisely that the dialogue is not to be resolved, the characters *and the author* must maintain their positions of dialogic otherness *forever*.

But we have now glimpsed the contradiction, almost tedious to rehearse, found in Bakhtin's presentation. Dostoevsky's world, we have been told, is profoundly *pluralistic;* such an image of the world is "in the style of his ideology" (1984b, 27), but that is only to say that Dostoevsky, like a number of modern critical theorists, and with about as much chance of escaping censure, is *monistically pluralistic*. The authorial position can thus still always be seen as transcendent to the positions of the "other characters" at least in this: that Dostoevsky's *pluralism* carries the day, ultimately, his ideology of pluralism overrides any secondary ideologies which are included under it. His heroes can argue with anything - except his pluralistic authorial design.

This may well be the unity of the polyphonic, so strange and inexpressible, the happy metaunity of the learning of the

contexts of ideologies, the metalesson that a plurality of points of view coexist on a single plane, and no objective truth in sight. But this pluralism is itself, as we all know and love, an ideology assuming the position of objective truth, a point of view, and Bakhtin's own assumption of a privileged position (he often insists on the necessity in theory of an *objective* analysis of Dostoevsky's novels), able to perceive the objective reality of this radical pluralism, is not the least reason for there being some justice in Gary Saul Morson's application to him of the Frank Herbertesque sobriquet "The Heresiarch of *Meta*" (Morson 1978).

Thus there may really be no contradiction between the aesthetic event as conceived in "Author and Hero" and that found in Dostoevsky's novels. In both cases we arrive at the special brand of contemplative "objectivity" which is "despair of meaning": in the former case because meaning is already over and dead, meaningless, and in the latter case because the pervasiveness of noncompossible meaningful perspectives leads to semantic overload, renders one's perspective "nonsemantic," and brings about a realization of the irresoluteness and contextually perspectival nature of *all* meaning. Thus meaning is over and dead again, or rather the only meaning possible is precisely this insight into the relativity and contextuality of all meaning.

Bakhtin, of course, would never use the word "objectivity," or would use it only rarely (it is somewhat more frequent in the 1929 version, for instance at the end of the chapter on "The Functions of the Adventure Plot in Dostoevsky's Works" which was omitted in the second edition (see 1929, 101ff; 1984c, 277-278)).

The nuance it carries in the Dostoevsky book is of course not one of reification, but one of impartiality.

> Dostoevsky's works are in this sense profoundly objective - because the hero's self-consciousness, once it becomes the dominant, breaks down the monologic unity of the work (without, of course, violating artistic unity of a new and nonmonological type). (1984b, 51)

Bakhtin is careful not to allow any association of Dostoevsky's "objectivity" with a transcendent "monologicity," but from our own extralocal perspective this notion of "metaobjectivity" may seem to be one way of reconciling Bakhtin's earlier aesthetic assumptions with those in the Dostoevsky book. The unity in Dostoevsky's books, at least the unity that depends upon polyphony, is that of a more throughgoing objectivity, a metamonologue, precisely that metaunity of the blissful disciple who has been clubbed over the head too many times by the Zen master for trying to make sense of the world, and whose own "objective reality" now seems to be only one more point of view in a meta-objective unresolvable communion of meaningoverfulness.

But the transcending meaning of the Christ-Author goes beyond a mere levelling of semantic perspectives. Indeed, immediately a new context imposes itself, and with it new meaning, a new point of view, and a new imperative: *not* to transcend, not to attempt to objectify, since every position after all is equal; but it is precisely here that *one* position is inevitably a little more equal than the others: one's own position from whose surplus of vision the realization of the equality of all positions was derived. We may suppose that in

this double bind, where metaobjectivity brings one's own (meta)objectivity (i.e., itself) into the ticklish pickle of being only one more subjective point of view of equal weight among others, we recognize the peculiar predicament of Dostoevsky as Christ-Author. For before he can humbly recognize his own lack of transcendence, the relativism of his own semantic position, and so descend into the world of equal others, he must *first* assume precisely *his own transcendence* and a metaobjective *surplus* of vision. Thus the metaunity of Dostoevsky's world seems to demand precisely what is anathema to it, that is, a transcendent position of mediation, a sythesis of sorts, in a Christ who cannot be incarnated into the world without destroying the very metaposition which makes the world possible. For Dostoevsky actually to be "incarnated" into his created world, along with his pluralistic perspective, would deprivilege that perspective and destroy the particular unity of that world. Consequently Dostoevsky is left in the same position as God, who must do the completely unthinkable (or rather the *only* thinkable) - namely, split into two so that he is incarnated as an equal among his creations while at the same time retaining ultimate authority over the disposition and unity of the world. In other words, his "sacrifice" and renunciation of authority can only be a chicane.

*

With Dostoevsky's endeavors to become a Christ for his characters we can now profitably compare the despotic desporting of his remarkably arch nemesis and com-partial-patriot, Vladimir Nabokov. The latter has gaily observed: "My characters are galley slaves" (Nabokov 1967a, 96).

> Q. One often hears from writers talk of how a character takes hold of them and in a sense dictates the course of the action. Has this ever been your experience?
>
> A. I have never experienced this. What a preposterous experience! Writers who have had it must be very minor or insane. No, the design of my novel is fixed in my imagination and every character follows the course I imagine for him. I am the perfect dictator in that private world insofar as I alone am responsible for its stability and truth. (Nabokov 1967b, 25)

Confronted with one critic's accusation that he "diminished" his characters "to the point where they became ciphers in a cosmic farce," Nabokov retorted with laughter:

> [...] how can I "diminish" to the level of ciphers, etcetera, characters that I have myself invented? One can "diminish" a biographee, but not an eidolon. (Nabokov 1967a, 96)

Of course, we might today take exception from other than an existential point of view to Nabokov's classical faith in the omnipotence of the unmediated subject of invention, but that is not the point. The point is precisely that the cosmic complexion of Nabokov's created world, from the point of view of a character, empathized with by some fretful "suctorialist" [23], could well be Paris-phrased: *"L'enfer c'est les auteurs."*

Nabokov is a self-proclaimed Almighty, who takes full responsibility for the characters he has created, and thus provides a first-rate antithesis for Dostoevsky (whom he called "Dusty" and thought silly, of course).

Most of Nabokov's critics can be said more or less to share his belief in the author's ability to impose his will upon the void without interference or feedback, creating a world and its people out of nothing but his own ego. Some of them, however, have had the wit to take his authorial responsibility a little more seriously than he himself tends to, and to approach his creation of "galley slaves" from an ethical point of view. This has been especially true of critics responding to the novel *Pnin*, not without provocation.

In *Pnin* we find a unique narratorial situation. The novel tells the story of Timofey Pnin, expatriate professor of Russian at a small New England college, a loveable but exasperating incompetent where life is concerned, but a talented if somewhat pedantic scholar. Though his English and his comprehension of the workings of the world in his land of exile are comically imperfect, he charmingly "bargains in good faith with destiny."

Destiny of course is ultimately Nabokov himself, with whom bargaining is out of the question. But it is more immediately available in the figure of a third person omniscient narrator who occasionally reveals that he is a character himself, and one bearing striking resemblences - *too* striking, don't bite that worm, buster - to Nabokov. Through most of the novel this strange narrator remains impersonal and omniscient, revealing the thoughts and perspectives of various characters, peeking in on

private conversations, only occasionally inserting a personal aside, or an anecdote which concerned both Pnin and himself, or calling Pnin "my friend" and "poor Pnin." By the time we reach the final chapter, however, where the narrator suddenly takes center stage in the narrative, his own status as an intradiegetical personage cannot be ignored. Indeed, in flashbacks we learn that this narrator has had a premarital affair with Pnin's beloved wife, as a consequence of which she even attempted suicide, and only *then* married Pnin, on the advice of doctors (he was not destined to hold onto her for long). The more we read the clearer it becomes that the narrator has been a baneful influence in Pnin's life. This narrator describes with sado-sympathetic tenderness the various misfortunes which befall Pnin: a painful visit from his shallow and callous ex-wife, for instance, or Pnin's loss of his teaching position at the end of the book. It even becomes apparent that it is the narrator who will be replacing Pnin. "I will never work under him," Pnin proudly avers (Nabokov 1957, 168). Although Pnin does not know that the narrator has had an affair with his wife, he senses his maleficence, is wary, and at one point when he happens to be present as the narrator tells someone about a relative of Pnin's, he erupts: "Now, don't believe a word he says, Georgiy Aramovich. He makes up everything. [...] He is a dreadful inventor *(on uzhasniy vïdumshchik)*" (Ibid., 183).

Such moments are gravid with ironic multiple litters, since Pnin seems to be referring at once to the narrator's character, who is responsible for only *some* of Pnin's misfortunes, and to the ultimate narrator, Nabokov the author. Indeed, Pnin would

seem to have some right to see in the narrator "the author of his misery," as Mrs. Gascliff or Mrs. Radekill would have put it. We are invited (do not accept that invitation) to identify the narrator with Nabokov: both are expatriate Russian littérateurs, university lecturers and entomologists; the narrator is related to "General N---," and so on. We have, then, an intradiegetical narrator who is nevertheless most of the time capable of im- or interpersonal omnisicent narration, and whom we are all but given permission to take for Nabokov himself.

The narrative situation in *Pnin* is so unique that I am afraid it has led some critics simply to trash the helpful categories of narratology and treat the situation as though it *could* exist as something other than a betrayal of real-world possible logic. As Paul Grams puts it: "The truth of the matter may be impossible to riddle out, but the ethics of that author-character relationship (if such things can be considered) are both accessible and important" (Grams 1974, 195). Grams seems to draw the conclusion (which I too would draw, if I were forced to pick a card) that Nabokov is intentionally dramatizing the ethical questionability of making someone the "hero" of your narrative, the questionability, that is, of precisely what Bakhtin calls "some secondhand, finalizing cognitive process."

> In other words, the liberties "Nabokov" takes in order to fictionalize Pnin's biography, the esthetic of "fantastic recurrence" itself [Nabokov's imposition of repetitive patterns by way of narrative structuration - J.N.] are indiscretions perpetrated on Pnin's life and take away his privacy. (Ibid., 198)

Grams, however, sees this *narrative* "indiscretion" as part of Nabokov's *authorial* self-subverting performance.

> But this autocratic authority ultimately falls victim to its own obsessive ridicule, for its persistent and artificial belittling finally reduces that superior consciousness ["Nabokov's" narratorial voice - J.N.] to petty-mindedness [...] (Ibid., 199)

Thus, Nabokov would be seen to be denouncing the practice of making people into our characters, of making them the subject, i.e., the object, of our narratives. There appears to be some textual support for this reading. The narrator's representation of Pnin begins to seem like a very elaborate version of the various campus wags' "Pnin stories" and impersonations. Indeed, at the end of the novel the narrator has been reduced to a drunken prankster trying to harass Pnin telephonically along with his most notorious campus impersonator, Jack Cockerell, whose irrepressive mimicking of Pnin for the narrator's amusement finally

> grew to be such a bore that I fell to wondering if by some poetical vengeance this Pnin business had not become with Cockerell the kind of fatal obsession which substitutes its own victim for that of the initial ridicule. (Nabokov 1957, 187)

Analogously, the ridiculous figure of Pnin may seem by the end of the book to have a certain nobility, in any case a certain likeableness, while for the narrator we as readers are likely to have nothing but despication.

If Nabokov is dramatizing anything it must be the

inimicalness of another's narration, another's version of me, to my freedom and dignity. Yet at the same time, as an early Bakhtin might have countered, it is precisely this narration which gives a character personality (or a person character), makes him a loveable (or otherwise) whole toward whom one can have an emotional volitional reaction [24]. We need a *perspective* in order to experience a character as an other. Without the creative power of an author, there would *be no* Pnin to feel sorry for at all. "Yet," as William Carroll puts it,

> Nabokov has manoeuvred us into the curious position of condemning the same power in the narrator (who is necessarily distinguished from Nabokov himself). We *do* believe, with Pnin, that the narrator is "dreadful." The suffering and pain in Pnin's life have been made so powerful, so convincing, so "real," that we resent the narrator's intrusion. Vertigo sets in again when we remind ourselves that the narrator is also a fiction, and that our feelings against a narrator's inventions are, in a way, a condemnation of Nabokov's similar power of invention, the power which has convinced us of the "reality" of these figures in the first place. (Carroll 1974, 206)

Nabokov might well have frounced or fleered at our drawing a *lesson* from his novel about the dreadfulness, but unavoidability and ultimate existential benefit of being the subject of another person's narrative. As we know, he disliked satire precisely because it was a "lesson": "Satire is a lesson, parody is a game" (Nabokov 1967b, 30). He wished his novels to be classed as the latter, if classed they must be. Doubtless he would have preferred critical approaches which left Pnin pinned in the painful punful punt of a "galley" (both a slave ship and a printer's proof, as someone has noted (Carroll 1974, 208)) and

concentrated on other wonders of his "most approachable" novel, for example the chronological inconsistencies (someone, the narrator or Pnin, has his dates screwed up - synoptic tabulations would be helpful), or a Cinderella subtheme which keeps turning back into a big pumpkin. But, as *we* know, the author's intentionality is not omnipotent. This is yet another lesson available in *Pnin* - either intended by Nabokov or which we as readers may extract - for the attitude of the reader in Nabokov's novel is elegantly demonstrated *not* to be entirely subjected to that of the narrator. On the contrary, the narrator's nastiness practically *forces* us to side with Pnin against him (I did say "practically," for no doubt somewhere there is some wretch who has done the opposite), and to hold Pnin in higher esteem than he is held within any perspective immediately available in the narration. This may ultimately be the author's design (who knows and who cares? as they say nowadays), but it *could* be due to the fact that we as readers don't come to narratives as empty recepticles waiting to be filled, but with our own previous values and meanings which can come into conflict with those of the author. In other words, we can ourselves enter into a "dialogue" with the narrator (or presumably with the author, who however is theoretically unavailable) and view the character differently than he does, and this whether the author has consciously provided for such an alternative viewpoint, attempted to leave the hero undefined, or actually tried to define him to death. In fact, we may see dialogic relationships which the author never bargained for; a kind of Gestalt shift may reorchestrate the dialogue for successive generations - or,

indeed, for individual readers - and what's more, as readers we may (in fact, I would say that we inevitably *do)* provide semantic closure and the determination of characters whether or not they have already been determined by the author. The fact is that what Bakhtin has said, for instance, about the hero of *Notes from Underground,* that there is "literally nothing" we can say about him that he does not already know himself, is false. As an historically and textually extralocal audience we have definitions which are denied to his consciousness, for example, "existentialist," or for that matter "paranoid schizoid type." But even if we were contemporaneous with him and present within a shared ideological context, there would still be things which we, as readers or as real-life others, could know or think or say about him that he himself did not already know, precisely because *we* are *not* subjected to the limitations of consciousness imposed by Dostoevsky on his created world.

This is another point to which Bakhtin devotes too little attention in these early works, the reader's role in shaping the hero. Readers are not entirely passive, and while the initial definitions upon which our versions of the hero must be constructed do indeed come from the narratorial perspective, this perspective does not necessarily wholly *determine* (or for that matter render indeterminable) our conception of the hero, as Bakhtin himself was eager enough to recognize elsewhere [25]. I can never forget in this connection that anti-relativist argument of Cleanth Brooks in which he insists that

A person for whom the word "idiot" carried the connotations

> of, say, "wood-nymph" would have great difficulty with Macbeth's speech in which he says "Life is a tale / Told by an idiot" just as a person who regarded murder as generally delightful would have difficulty with the play as a whole. (Brooks 1947, 252)

What is funny is that Nietzsche actually had a view of Macbeth not so very far from the one which Brooks thinks would give a reader difficulty, and even attributed his own perspective to Shakespeare.

> Whoever thinks Shakespeare's theater has a moral effect and the sight of Macbeth repels one irresistibly from the evils of ambition is mistaken: and he is mistaken once again if he thinks Shakespeare himself felt the way he feels. Whoever is really possessed by raging ambition delights in this image of himself; and if the hero perishes in his passion, then this is precisely the most pungent spice in the hot toddy of that delight. Can the poet have felt otherwise? (Nietzsche 1971, 203)

If Brooks would claim that Nietzsche was ill-equipped to understand Shakespeare's character, Nietzsche would doubtless say the same of Brooks. Which one of them is seeing Macbeth through the author's perspective? Or is neither?

Nabokov can thus protest all he wants; readers may still see Pnin from their own particular points of view, "close" or "open" this or that parameter of his character, *co-create* him - though I think that in the present case this has been consciously planned for by Nabokov. He has gone out of his way to undermine the narrator's privileged perspective so that the hero transcends his diegetical determinations. In any case this is what he has accomplished, at least for a great many readers. But Nabokov's recourse to a paradoxical narrative situation which subverts

itself can be sharply distinguished from Dostoevsky's attempt to hold his authorial tongue. For I see in Nabokov a much different tradition from Dostoevsky's dialogism: that of the sophisticated lyricism which tries to evacuate meaning from whatever source by relativizing it and trivializing it out of existence, in a (futile?) attempt to regain direct contact with the object. Any dialogism set up by Nabokov is meant not to perpetuate itself in irresolution, but to chase its tail offstage. The truth of artistic discourse is that artistic discourse is not true, because it is discourse. Words are best used to defuse each other from having any "real" significance, because the "truth" is not in words but in things. In Nietzsche's neat summary of both metafictional and deconstructive aesthetics: "Art treats *illusion* as *illusion*, and thus wishes precsiely *not* to deceive, is *true*" (Nietzsche 1978, 240). Nabokov, we may suppose, would give yet another nihilistic twist to the screw and strip the threads (this is his brand of honesty): all our worries about narrators and authors are for nought: it's only a work of fiction, after all (as if life, if we mean the *narrative* of life, were anything else). Oddly, it seems to be the existentialist Dostoevsky and not the lexiphanic Nabokov who gives too much weight to "mere words." Nabokov recognizes, I think, the nonplus constituted by the fact that a narrative such as *Pnin*, warning us against the evil of narrative, can only further "enslave" us to - the narrative. Consequently, in the end Nabokov need not worry about any of it (or would prefer not to) - it's all a fiction out of his own head, it's all only words, and this is why he can so blithely take responsibility for the joys and sorrows of the

heroes he has created: precisely because, in Hölderlin's well worn incipit, *"Ein Zeichen sind wir, deutungslos,"* because they are signs, signifying nothing.

But this last step which Nabokov takes, or which we have taken for him, is one for which Bakhtin (let alone Dostoevsky) is certainly not ready. For Bakhtin, some kinds of discourse are less deceitful, less illusory than others, and more specifically the artistic discourse of the novel. But this is not, as Nietzsche had it, because art *admits* its illusory quality; on the contrary, it is because it really provides a more faithful representation of reality than more "monological" modes of discourse, as well as a more emancipatory effect on human consciousness. Indeed, Bakhtin will go on to write in the thirties of the emancipatory powers of not just Dostoevsky's novel, but of what will broadly be termed "the novel" in general, of dialogic discourse, which slowly but surely will come to include works whose dialogic nature at first went unnoticed: *Eugene Onegin,* Dickens, even, in certain respects, Tolstoy. Bakhtin will shape a countercanon of "novelistic" and "proto-novelistic" texts whose dialogic forces will be seen to break up the monologically foreclosed prison walls of human consciousness, so that the hero "ceases to coincide with himself" and men cease "to be exhausted by the plots that contain them" (1981a, 35).

Bakhtin thus never learns a paranoid distrust of the word as such; on the contrary, in the Word lies salvation. He has faith that the ultimately openended discourse of the novel can free us from the narrative monologues which otherwise would define and dispose of us. We may recall Walter Benjamin's similarly

romantic celebration of the fairy tale, whose "moral" he more or less abstracted to be that "with sly spirits (cunning) and high spirits [*in Untermut (d.i. List) und Uebermut*]" one could escape from "the myth" (Benjamin 1936, 458). The subsequent problem of escaping from *the fairy tale* had not yet posed itself, just as for Bakhtin the novel seems an altogether different order of discourse from the monological genres, and not just one more "prisonhouse of language."

Our concern is not to question the emancipatory powers of novelistic discourse, however, but to sort out the ethics and indeed the very possibility of an author renouncing his transcendence, as Bakhtin claims that Dostoevsky does. In fact, I think we could make an argument that Nabokov's renunciation is even greater than Dostoevsky's. After all, Dostoevsky only gives up the opportunity of being a god in his books, while Nabokov gives up the chance to be a human being in his. And in the end, Dostoevsky is still, in fact, a god (we won't speculate as to whether Nabokov is still human). As Bertrand Russel said, "Man is more moral than God," and surprisingly Nabokov may ultimately prove more moral, or perhaps we should say more ethical, than Dostoevsky. Dostoevsky's renunciation is a self-negation intended to free the serfs, to abolish the galleys. But it is also, inevitably, the transcendent discourse of an author, something which Dostoevsky, or Bakhtin, might like to think had been levelled, but which in fact is the one thing that the author cannot abandon. I do not believe that the author can transcend his transcendence. Nabokov acknowledges this fact, and leaves it to the reader to judge him as a god, he maintains his stance of

transcendent alterity vis-à-vis the reader and the hero. Dostoevsky attempts to avoid responsibility by sacrificing his authorial position, which turns out to be no sacrifice at all, since what he sacrifices he gains back in the very act of sacrifice. True sacrifice of self, as everyone has come to object, and as Dostoevsky himself reveals in his notebooks (Todorov 1984b, 16; Catteau 1978, 427ff) is totally impossible, at least in the authoring of a text.

*

In artistic creation, and in fact in any *verbalization,* or *textualization,* any "narrative," fictional or otherwise, we cannot *avoid* making another's consciousness the subject of "some secondhand, finalizing cognitive process." This process is what creates the communicable aesthetic existence of the other, and of the other's consciousness. Also in *real life, subjectively,* we cannot *help* but turn people into characters and define them from without, we are "condemned" to an extralocality and a radical alterity whereby we see the other as a "whole," a definitivenes. Bakhtin has rebelled against this early view of his, because of the psychic violence it seems to involve, and has come to believe that the author should adopt toward his hero the attitude which R. D. Laing feels the psychiatrist should adopt toward the "ontologically insecure" schizophrenic patient (Laing 1960), that is, an I-thou relationship which recognizes the other as a free

subject and not merely a function of an authoritative definition. No doubt these sentiments are praiseworthy in their motivation, but I cannot fail to remark that Bakhtin's imperatives ultimately demand of the author as other what on the one hand does not seem to be *objectively* possible and what on the other hand may *subjectively* be precisely the cause of the existential malaise of the modern schizoid self - namely, a renunciation of the authoritative status of one's own point of view and of one's meaningful transgredient contribution as an other. At the same time the moves of both Bakhtin and Laing, however humane are their desires to take seriously our existential anxieties, may in the end only serve to perpetuate the very worries they wish to assuage - worries arising precisely from an irrational and viciously self-perpetuating equation of "existing for others" (as an object) with "death" pure and simple. For, *objectively* in real life, one cannot *really* define (destroy) another's personality by pure incantation. We each define a given other *for ourselves* in our own way, but to see this as an act of violence which *literally* deprives the other of freedom and life is to suppose, as do the heroes of Geza Róheim's *Magic and Schizophrenia*, that thoughts are omnipotent, and that I can *actually* be turned into some "dead" finalized thing by the thoughts or words of another. Such may be the existential reality of certain severely schizoid people, but if one is interested in returning existential "freedom" to these people, I would suggest that this could perhaps better be done even Nabokovianly, by attempting to deconstruct their delusions about the power of mere words. For to believe that another's word

about me has a real and not merely a (persuasive, I admit) psychological and intersubjectively conventional effect on my ontological status is to give just a little too much power to words. In an orphic parenthesis of Jacques Lacan's: "The letter killeth, but we learn this from the letter itself" (Lacan 1966, 848). Words are very powerful, no doubt, but they are only as powerful as we admit them to be. What's more they are perfidious by nature: they are, whether we artistically strive to make them so or not, intersections of dialogically contradictory meanings and intentions [26]. And we may add that in real life a single author does not obtain, there is no *one* author whose words can fix our being; we have an infinity of authors, past and present. Those who come to read our selves rewrite them as well, and meanwhile, as these "texts we call our selves" are reproduced each day, typos can slip in, here a deletion, there a mantissa. There is no established text; even a variorum is soon superceded.

For the most part, then, I consider Bakhtin to have made a false move in his transition from his earlier, more conventional views in "Author and Hero" to the existential sensitivity of the Dostoevsky book. This is the case first of all because I think it is foolish to suppose that the author of a text can have anything but a transcendent finalizing position with regard to his characters, however much those authorial definitions may be altered in the various perspectives of different *readers*. The "characters themselves" can have no hand in their definition because, just as Bakhtin believed early on, definition can only come from without, and "characters," in any case, really don't exist as anything but finalized natures. If from within there

can be no finalization, from without there can be no *lack* of it.

We have attempted to deal with Bakhtin's theories on their own terms and not to critique cavalierly his carefree hypostasis of characters, his assignment to them of an ontological status similar to our own, but obviously it would be possible to trivialize the entire problem by exposing the "literary superstitions" (Valéry) upon which it is largely articulated, superstitions which would seem to be merely more abstract versions of "vulgar" readings (How much self-consciousness had Lady Macbeth?): "You might as well talk about the Mona Lisa's nervous system or the Venus de Milo's liver" (Valéry 1960, 639). I assume that Bakhtin's meditations have extratextual, or at least extraliterary applications and aims, an assumption, however, for which it would be virtually impossible to adduce substantiation from the Dostoevsky book itself.

I also think that Bakhtin was much closer to the truth when he assumed that the seat of the self in real life is - other people. "We only exist for others," and consequently if those others try to renounce their extralocal transgredience, we are not *emancipated*, we are *nothing*. Clark and Holquist compare the later Bakhtin to Sartre, who

> similarly argues that when the world says of me, "He is a waiter," I must hold back, I must insist that I have not become a waiter, for I am still in the process of becoming me. (Clark and Holquist 1985, 72)

I disagree with this. You are still in the process of "becoming," perhaps, but to be a "me" you *must* be defined, even

as "a waiter," and these definitions come from others. If those others keep quiet, if they forego their definition of you, you will only gaze at them the more imploringly for a hint as to your identity. Being turned into "a waiter" is not just the hell it would be for the hero of *Notes from Underground,* it is also the blessed recognition by an other of one's "self," which helps to render that self whole and make one feel at home in the world. One would think that being "a waiter" was equivalent to oblivion! On the contrary, it is precisely being undefined which is the hell of the "ontologically insecure." Like the Underground Man they fear the word of the other, because for them it has been a terrible word - but without that word our lives can have no integrity at all. I suspect that the last thing such people need is an author who is willing to let them go on like that forever, because he doesn't want to be responsible for "killing" them. A truly merciful author would take onto himself the responsibility for the definition of his creatures, and not try to throw it back onto them in an attempt to make a *present* to them of their indeterminacy, and put them in the impossible position of constantly having to try to define themselves from within, and thus, since one cannot coincide with oneself from within, never being a person at all. Of course sensitivity is called for, a willingness not to wound with a definition which is simply a dismissal and a reification, but this sensitivity is not the same as declining to define the other at all, which leaves the other in an untenable position; we should not even *encourage* other people to author themselves a self out of thin air, much less "kindly" oblige them to do so. For the situation is impossible.

Being a person means being a person for others, and sometimes that may mean being "a waiter." Why not?

If Dostoevsky actually succeeded in abjuring his authority so that his heroes had no fixed characters and persisted only as verbal counters and swerves, I think it would be bad enough as a model of the proper way of treating the other, but in fact Dostoevsky has not even done that; instead, as a literal author and not just an "other" he has *created* characters, many of whom are locked in a hell of self-consciousness for which he, I would suggest, is responsible. If these characters *are* only characters, that is, paper and ink entities, no harm is done, but if we try to be self-negating Dostoevskyesque Christ-Authors to the others in our own lives, I think we may actually do them more violence than ever we would do them by saddling them with a "secondhand" identity.

The metaphor of "authorship," upon which Bakhtin and especially his epigones place so much emphasis, applied to real life seems to me to be "objectively" inaccurate (i.e., that is *my* point of view), but nevertheless useful within limits. It is inaccurate because the relationship of a textual author with regard to a hero is precisely the relationship which we cannot *really* have to another person in real life, but it is useful because it is nevertheless a relationship which bears similarities to that which we *always* have to others in our individual subjective fantasy, and in our interdividual conventional fantasy, that is, in our conceptual *versions* of real life. It is the God relationship, the relationship of an omnipotent creator toward others, and only in a *text* (if there)

can the God relationship *literally* exist. Indeed, it would seem to be precisely the realization that in real life there are no extradiegetical narrators, much less actually transcendent authors, which necessitates the revision of nineteenth century theories of mimesis - it is precisely the author's overarching creativity and omniscient perspective which are *not* mimetically faithful to or "motivated" by reality, and which can only "represent" or "correspond to" (i.e., be another example of) our various and partial perspectives as subjects in the real world.

But, on the other hand, we cannot, as subjects and "authors," *not* have a point of view, which is our own, and which must always *for us* preempt the points of view of others. So *in our own consciousness* we cannot help but assume this Godlike transcendence, which is only to say that we cannot get rid of our extralocal transgredient perspective vis-à-vis others. We are not free to let them have the last word in our own consciousness, to leave them undefined for ourselves; but what is more, our "authorship," verbalized in our day to day narrative exchanges with others, is the intersubjective source of their conventional identities, and to the extent that we deny them our definitions by opting for a "Christly" silence so that they can be free to author themselves, we in fact are damning them to a lack of integrity as characters. And it is only as characters that we can have any sort of a life at all, in this textual world of authors and others.

[1] I presume that it is "Bakhtin's personalism" which is steeped in "Western humanist values," but Shukman's construction is finely amphibological; one should be aware that many Bakhtin-niks (e.g., Hirschkop 1985) would find such a value assignment to Bakhtin just as offensive as Kristevites surely would, had Shukman been referring to Kristeva. Kristeva's seminal essays on Bakhtin (see especially 1970b) have come in for their share of flak (Frioux 1971, 113; Malcuzynski 1984), but if her version of the Soviet thinker errs on the side of the objective and the materialist, other representatives may be too eager to locate Bakhtin's "personalism" in the Western "humanist" tradition.

[2] The question of Bakhtin's role in the composition of the so-called "pseudonymous" works (see Clark and Holquist 1985, 356-357) is still by no means resolved, and it seems rather unlikely that it shall be, at least to everyone's satisfaction. Most pieces that have attempted to deal with this question (e.g., Gardin 1978) suffer from a paucity of factual evidence and have already been superceded. Attempts to resolve the question on the basis of Bakhtin's stylistic or intellectual competence, or his *prête-noms'* lack thereof (a test from which more informed critics have not always shied), are of course vulnerable to charges of self-substantiation (naturally if you don't allow that Vološinov might have had in him the stuff of a "Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art" you are not going to grant that he could have written the "magisterial" (a favored adjective of Holquist's) *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language)*.

The last word on the subject, at least for the moment, would appear to belong jointly to Perlina (1983) and to Clark and Holquist (1984; 1985, 146-170). Yet there is still a certain dissonance between the two, particularly where "Medvedev's" book on formalism (1928) is concerned, and this despite the fact that Perlina's work is based largely on evidence unearthed by Clark and Holquist. Their researches in the Soviet Union, which included an interview with Vološinov's widow, have led them to conclude that Vološinov "played only a minor role in the composition of the article "Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art" and of the book *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (he is certainly the author of the title). He played a somewhat larger role in *Freudianism: A Critical Sketch."* (Clark and Holquist 1984, 121-122) They do not hesitate (Ibid., 125), or hesitate only fatally (1985, 158), in attributing the whole of Medvedev's *Formal Method in Literary Scholarship* to

Bakhtin, although the matter is somewhat more complex if we are to believe Perlina.

[3] In a note (Clark and Holquist 1985, 365) *The Architectonics of Answerability* is defined as encompassing

> the works published as 'Art and Answerability' and 'Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity,' lost or unpublished works such as 'The Aesthetics of Verbal Creativity' (not the 1979 book with that title, edited by Bočarov and Averincev) and an untitled text on moral philosophy, and other work Bakhtin was doing on the philosophy of religion during 1918-1924.

[4] See Clark and Holquist 1985, 53ff; letter of 20 February, 1921 to I. M. Kagan, quoted in 1979a, 384.

[5] Translations from this work are necessarily my own, although I have consulted English versions of excerpts whenever they were available. I have also made use of translations into other languages, and in particular of the recent French version by Alfreda Aucouturier (in 1984a, 25-210). In spite of certain defects (it eschews the helpful notes and documentation of Bakhtin's Russian editors, is sometimes injudicious in the rendering of technical terms and neologisms, and, like many Bakhtin translations (most egregiously the English version (1968b) of the Rabelais book) contains - as we paradoxically say - numerous omissions), I have included page references to the French edition, following the references to the Russian edition, in hopes that it will be of some use to those who cannot read Russian. My own knowledge of that language is not as deep as I might wish, but I have tried to compensate for a lack of sophistication by being especially painstaking in my handling of Bakhtin's texts.

[6] I will at times, for the sake of elegance, be translating the Russian *"smyslovoj,"* from *"smysl"* (= "sense, meaning") as "semantic," but it should be kept in mind *(d'où les griffes de ces guillemets,* as Nabokov more or less quips someplace) that it is intended as an adjective signifying "of or related to meaning, sense" with as few purely linguistic overtones as possible. Similarly, "axiological" has been used, along with "valuational," as a compromise in the translation of the Russian *"cennostnyj,"* from *"cennost'"* (= "value"), in an attempt to avoid circumlocutions, but it should be kept in mind that Bakhtin's term is best thought of as signifying "of or related to the assignment of values, value-judgments."

[7] "Extralocality" would seem to be the favored translation among Bakhtin's American enclave (Clark and Holquist 1985; Emerson in her translation of Bakhtin 1984b), and as I have no objections to it, this will be the term I employ. Todorov's term, "exotopy," however, would have been more in conformity with the Greco-arcane vocabulary forged by Emerson and Holquist in their translation of *The Dialogic Imagination* (1981a). I refer, of course, to the rendering of Bakhtin's rather homely terms *raznorečie, raznojazyčie* and *mnogojazyčie* by the Greek-root neologisms "heteroglossia" and "polyglossia." Despite the technical lustre such terms possess, I am not sure how faithful they are to Bakhtin's tone, among other things. The strategy seems to have been suggested to them by I. R. Titunik, who used "polyglossia" to translate (presumably) *mnogojazyčie* as early as 1976 (Titunik 1976a, 336). It seems worth pointing out that the Russian words Bakhtin employs are not terribly unusual looking (in Russian, of course). *Raznorečie* and *raznojazyčie* are both to be found, though with different meanings than they have in Bakhtin's system, in the large dictionary, *Slovar' sovremennogo russkogo literaturnogo jazyka* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950), and forms of all three words can be found in even small dictionaries.

Apart from its rather *unheimlich* appearance, however, "heteroglossia" conveys well enough the sense of Bakhtin's *raznorečie* and *raznojazyčie* forged from the not very radical radicles *"razno-"* [= "diverse"] and *rech'* ["speech"] and *jazyk* ["language"]. *Raznojazyčnyj* would normally be translated as "polyglot" (as in dictionaries, amateur scholars), while *mnogojazyčie* is a noun related to the adjective *mnogojazyčnyj,* "multilingual."

It might be remarked that Emerson and Holquist have not been as consistent in their translations as one might expect. In Bakhtin's system, these terms may be distributed as follows:

raznorečie = diversity of speech and speech types

raznojazyčie = diversity of languages

mnogojazyčie = multiplicity of languages

But Emerson and Holquist as a rule translate both *raznorečie* and *raznojazyčie* as "heteroglossia." They translate *mnogojazyčie* as "polyglossia," and here and there (1981a, 285: 27; 370: 37-38 [=1975, 98: 25-26; 182: 13-14]) *raznorečie* is also thus translated, which seems clearly incorrect. I admit that Bakhtin's terms are closely enough allied in meaning so that it is hard to say what violence is done to his argument by these inconsistencies, but it seems silly to go to the trouble of coining fifty cent neologisms, presumably in the hopes of capturing an author's precise meaning, and then to be careless about rendering them consistently.

[8] Caryl Emerson (1983a) has shown how Bakhtin shares with the Soviet psychologist L. S. Vygotsky a conviction that our "inner speech", or consciousness, comes originally from our "outer speech," which in turn comes, inevitably, from others.

[9] We are skipping an interesting, but unscheduled, sidetrip through the history of man's conceptions of the body and what Bakhtin's editors call "the genesis and ideological make-up of early Christian anthropology" (1979a, 388). Bakhtin's anti-"expressivist" polemic is chiefly directed against a handful of German aestheticians: Theodor Lipps, Johannes Volkelt, Karl Groos and Hermann Cohen, of whom I daresay only the latter is likely to be even vaguely familiar to the modern Anglo-American nonspecialist.

[10] *"Sobytie* (event) and its adjective *sobytiinyi* (full of event potential) are crucial terms in Bakhtin. At their root lies the Russian word for "existence" or "being" *(bytie)*, and - although the etymology here can be disputed - *so-bytie* can be read both in its ordinary meaning of "event," and in a more literal rendering as "co-existing, co-being, shared existence or being *with* another." An event can occur only among interacting consciousnesses; there can be no isolated or solipsitic events. See the long discussion of Bakhtin's use of *sobytie* by S. S. Averintsev and S. G. Bocharov, editors of the posthumous volume of Bakhtin's essays and fragments, M. M. Bakhtin, *Estetika slovesnogo tvorčestva* (Moscow, 1979), pp. 384-85. In English, see Michael Holquist, "The Politics of Representation," in *Allegory and Representation: Selected Papers from the English Institute, 1979-1980* [New Series, no. 5], ed. Stephen J. Greenblatt (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1981), pp. 172-73." (Footnote by Emerson in 1984b, 6.)

[11] The representatives of the "impressivist" school named by Bakhtin are Konrad Fiedler, Adolf von Hildebrand, Eduard Hanslick, Alois Riehl and Stephan Witasek. "Kant," we are told, "occupies an ambivalent position" (1979a, 81; 1984a, 104). Bakhtin's discussion is doubtless so brief because a more or less contemporaneous manuscript, "The problem of content, material and form in verbal artistic creation" (in 1975), deals extensively with this "problem" as it is manifested in the aesthetics of the Russian formalists (see also note 12 below), as does "Medvedev's" 1928 book *The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship*.

[12] Bakhtin's critique of the formalists is largely to do with their emphasis on the material out of which the work of art is fashioned, in other words, their emphasis on the *linguistic* material of literature itself. In the 1924 essay

"The problem of content, material and form in verbal artistic creation," Bakhtin argues more or less that "form" is a creative reaction to "content" through the medium of the "material." Form is thus apparently more or less equivalent to what Bakhtin will call "rhythm" in the essay on "Author and Hero," it is "the expression of the active axiological attitude of an author/creator and an interpreter (the co-creator) toward a content" (1975, 59). The aesthetic event cannot be understood through the analysis of the material because, as Bakhtin sees it, the material has a minimal determining influence on the form, it is merely the vehicle for the formal reaction to the content.

[13] The limitations of the hero's *horizon* of vision is assumed in conformity with Bakhtin's post-Kantian "two worlds" doctrine, "the distinction between matter, which is simply *there*, given *(das Gegebene, dan)*, and, consciousness, all that which is created by the mind, conceived *(das Aufgegebene, zadan)"* (Holquist 1983a, 309). The hero's horizon necessarily falls into the latter category, and hence, perhaps (I will leave it to the reader to locate my own horizon within an appropriate aesthetico-cognitive totality), falls short of the author's less "processed" perspective, but it is not always clear if Bakhtin seriously means to classify the world the author perceives in the aesthetic event as *"dan, gegeben,"* simply *there*. The problem is glimpsed here of the seeming pervasiveness of "horizon" and of the aesthetic event as nothing more than the axio-pragmatic doings of a second order "horizon," that of the author. Needless to say, Bakhtin will not be unaware of this problem in subsequent writings on authorial "monologism," but one may wonder if this paradox does not undercut his whole dichotomy, by evacuating the very possibility of a totalizing objective - or in his terms aesthetic - vision of anybody or anything. Happily, stated in terms of neo-Kantianism, this problem does not concern us, though we will certainly be returning to it in other terms. Those interested in Bakhtin's appropriation of German neo-Kantianism may, if still living, consult Clark and Holquist 1985, 57ff, and Holquist and Clark 1984. The latter, be forewarned, is strictly a little synopsis of the associations which brought Bakhtin into contact with German philosophy and a kind of roster of major figures in German and Russian neo-Kantianism after the war. (It is also not without editorial peculiarities, such as Michael Holquist's identification as "James M. Holquist" and the bizarre use by the joint authors of the first person singular (a comical switch on the prevalent "wegotism" in scholarly discourse); the article is also referred to (proleptically) under a different title and appearing in a differently titled *Festschrift* on page 364 of Clark and Holquist 1985.)

[14] The postfreudian Norman O. Brown, though more radically

opposed to personality than Bakhtin is here, echoes much of his sentiment and provides a considerably closer paraphrase of scripture (Matthew X, 39):

> The soul that we call our own is not a real one. The solution to the problem of identity is, get lost. Or as it says in the New Testament: "He that findeth his own psyche shall lose it, and he that loseth his psyche for my sake shall find it." (Brown 1966, 161)

[15] We may agree with Bakhtin's logic and yet regret his unwillingness to recognize psychological states involving an *anticipated* loss of "oneself" - death anxiety as that anxiety we feel at the loss of others, "misapplied" to the "self" - i.e., applied by one part of a splintered ego to the rest of it. In schizophrenia, too, or "ontological insecurity," the self may fear or sense "its own" loss, however unreasonable such fears or feelings may be "from an objective (outside) point of view." Whatever Bakhtin may say about the reality of death and ego-death, in fantasy (as we all know) the self can indeed split so that (one part of) it fears the loss of (another part of) itself. As we shall see, Bakhtin will make up for his insouciance here by going overboard without a life preserver in the book on Dostoevsky.

[16] Bakhtin's usage of "spirit" *(dux)* and "soul" *(duša)* does not seem especially eccentric. "Spirit" in Russian can also mean "breath" *(dyxanie)* and seems less concrete and more universal and impersonal than "soul," which, as in our own language, is individualized, and is often used to refer to the person in his material (temporal) manifestation ("Not a soul was in sight"), or to what Nietzsche called the "psychic pseudo-body," a hypostasized replacement sign for the physical reality of someone who, physically, is no longer there, though he is still extant in memory, as in Gogol's title.

[17] > Artistic style does not work with words but with elements of the world, with the world's and life's values. (1979a, 169; 1984a, 199) The architectonics of the artistic world determines the composition of the work (order, distribution and completeness, the cohesion of the verbal masses), and not vice-versa. (1979a, 171; 1984a, 201)

Bakhtin is thus seen to conceive of the "artistic world" as an autonomous world, existing independently of its actualization in verbal material. The material which has an effect on the artist is not material in the technical sense, but the material of the world, real or artistic (we might say, conceptual or aesthetic, since the "real" world,

unprocessed either by concepts or by "rhythm," at times appears as inaccessible in Bakhtin as it is for Lacan). The world is not determined by the material (linguistic in this case) but vice-versa. Bakhtin thus is sharply at odds here with some of the basic tenets of structuralism, including, and specifically, "intertextuality," if it is thought to imply artistic evolution occuring purely through mutation of linguistic, rhetorical, narrative - in short *textual*, pressures. (See also note 12 above.)

[18] English-language readers, and indeed most readers in general, will be familiar only with the 1963 second edition, extensively revised, *Problemy poètiki Dostoevskogo*. What was new in this edition was basically the fourth chapter, which is a kind of abridged version of Bakhtin's diachronic surveys of "carnivalesque discourse" in the Rabelais book and elsewhere, somewhat artificially spatchcocked in between the discussion of the idea in Dostoevsky and the discussion of Dostoevsky's discourse. The latter discussion is also largely rewritten and expanded. Most of the 1929 text has been retained with only a few minor rewordings, but supplemented by a certain amount of additional material. A chapter devoted to "The Functions of the Adventure Plot in Dostoevsky's Works" has been deleted entirely. The argument of the book, at least if we ignore the intercalcated carnivalesque material, is essentially unchanged. For those curious we may note that the text corresponding to that on pages 47-57 of Caryl Emerson's English translation (1984b) of the chapter on the position of the author with regard to the hero from the second edition is all text essentially straight out of the first edition, as is the text which begins at the bottom of page 63 and continues to the break on page 65. The rest of the chapter was added in 1963. There is no noticeable discontinuity between the text which comes from the first edition and that which was added over thirty years later. It seems unlikely that a complete translation into English of the original 1929 version will ever be made, but three short excerpts which were reprinted in the posthumous Russian collection *Estetika slovesnogo tvorčestva* (1979a, 181-187) have been included in English as an appendix to Emerson's translation of the second edition (1984c).

[19] We might, by the way, take exception to this very presupposition, since in fact, concretely, we *don't* see even the *physical* totality of another, at least at any given moment, even from the most surveillant of extralocal vantage points.

[20] As many modern thinkers have come to realize, our Western conception of autonomy is mostly based on false notions of conscious mastery, notions which wrench the subject from his

socio-physical context. Modern theories coming out of biology and physics have allowed a rethinking of autonomy in which the subject's isolation is *not* supposed. One may consult Jean-Pierre Dupuy's discussion (Dupuy 1982, 232-233) of the synthesizing work of Douglas Hofstadter and Edgar Morin. Dupuy explores an "autonomy" which would not be independence from others, or intransitivity with regard to context. His insistance on the unavoidability of a metalevel transcendence, at least in cognition, is also in accord with our own later conclusions.

[21] In the 1961 notes "Toward a Reworking of the Dostoevsky Book," Bakhtin distinguishes between "character" and "personality":

> Even character is to some extent independent of the author (Tatyana's marriage, which Pushkin did not expect), but this independence (its own logic) has an objectified character. The independence of personality is of a qualitatively different nature: personality is not subordinate to (that is, it resists) objectified cognition and reveals itself only freely and dialogically (as *thou* for *I*). (1984d, 298)

[22] Bakhtin is more concerned to slice up the author than he is to distinguish, for example, between the author, the narrator and so-called "authorial narration." In his early writings he is fond of the received distinction between the author as a real or historical person and the author as the agency of literary creation. Later, in one of his notebook jottings from 1970-1971 he ignores the narrator altogether and makes one of his habitual attempts to set up an analogy between the author-hero dynamic and an animistic Creator-creation configuration, this time borrowing his categories from of all places the ninth century neoplatonic theologian Joannes Scotus Eriugena's *Periphyseon (De divisione naturae)* (1979a, 353f; 1984a, 369f; cf., 1979a, 288; 1984a, 318; 1978c, 11-12). Eriugena, we may recall, distinguishes four species of nature: (1) *quae creat non creatur* [which creates but is not created] - i.e., God,(2) *quae creatur et creat* [which is created and creates] - the Platonic world of ideal and universal first causes, (3) *quae creatur et non creat* [which is created and does not create] - the world manifested in concrete reality, and (4) *quae nec creat nec creatur* [which neither creates nor is created] - again God, as the end of all things. Throwing out the final category, Bakhtin assigns to the first three the textual functions of, respectively, "primary author," "secondary author" and hero. The primary author, or, as Bakhtin calls it elsewhere, the "pure" author (1979a, 288), cannot be conceived or imaged because his own direct discourse is precisely what creates any image, and this image of the

author created for the reader is thus always already the "secondary author," which is both created (by the discourse of the primary author) and creates (the hero and his "world"). Clearly what Bakhtin calls the "secondary author" is what is today more or less referred to as the "implied author," but if Genette is tempted (Genette 1983, 96ff) to jettison the "implied author" as essentially equivalent to the "real author" (as real as the real author can ever get), we might in turn be tempted to ignore the "primary author," in other words, to consider the conceived author as the only author, and, as Genette would put it: "Exit 'Primary Author.'" Of course, since Bakhtin has already discarded the fourth of Eriugena's categories, if we were to get rid of the primary author as well, because of its essential unavailability to cognition, indeed its inconceivability, we would have no "God" at all, but only a created world, recreated by the already created. This "co-creation" [*so-tvorčestvo*] is the ultimately unresolved perpetual dialogical process of "macro-temporality" [*bolšoe vremja*] in which transcendence can only be local, relative and evanescent, and in which all of us are "implied" as authors, narrators, characters and readers (see 1979a, 369-370; 373; 1984a, 390; 393).

[23]

> *Suctorialist* was first and last used (by Nabokov) in an April 24, 1949, review of a French novel for one who "reads and admires such remarkably silly nonsense as the 'existentialists' rig up." An ugly word, an ugly idea, and we may leave it, along with that novel, back in 1949.

Thus Peter Lubin in his dress-up-like-dad article "Kickshaws and Motley" (Lubin 1970, 192). The 1949 review was of a translation of Sartre's *Nausea*, and contained the following sentence: "When an author inflicts his idle and arbitrary philosophical fancy on a helpless person he has created for that purpose, a lot of talent is needed to have the trick work" (Nabokov 1949, 19).

[24] In fact the meaning of *Pnin*, according to Paul Bruss, is to be found in the ambiguity of value assigned to a finalization of one's identity. Pnin is doomed to a makeshift and transient existence, "The narrator, for example, in the process of appropriating Pnin's life for himself, has given Pnin's life a shape that Pnin himself could not muster" (Bruss 1981, 40), but in Nabokov's scheme, as Bruss sees it, a character with an established "text," like Humbert Humbert, is "suspect": "In Nabokov the lack of a secure text leads to vitality and originality" (Ibid.).

[25] The role of the reader in the creation of the hero is nicely

brought out by Anthony Wall in his gentle moves to supplement Bakhtin's surprisingly frequent disregard for readerly perspective (Wall 1984b, 50ff). For the most part, in his major writings Bakhtin finds himself in the position of taking for granted the power of the author to establish the perspective (or lack of perspective) from which the world of the text and its people will be perceived, although throughout his careeer he acknowledges a "co-creation" of the *meaning* of a work, or of its "form" (1975, 59, etc.). In his later writings he comes to reverse his earlier conception of the author-reader relationship, according to which as we may recall, the reader can only comprehend the world and the hero through the author's totalizing point of view. In a by no means uncharacteristically battological (these translators always tidy everything up!) note from 1970-1971 his lifelong belief in "co-creation" has completely occluded his earlier privileging of authorial vantage points:

> To understand a given text as the author of the text understood it. But understanding can and should be better. A powerful and profound work is in many ways unconscious and multi-meaninged. In the act of understanding it is filled out by consciousness and reveals the diversity of its meaning. In its images of the meaning of the text, creative understanding fills out the text: it is active and has a creative character. Creative understanding continues the act of creation and increases the artistic wealth of humanity. The co-creation of understandings. (1979a, 346; 1984a, 362)

In the last piece he wrote before he died, Bakhtin wished to expose the very sterility of a "scientific" comprehension of a work, that is, a comprehension in which the "true" meaning (the author's meaning) was unearthed and established. This is purely deadly from the point of view of the continued life of meaning; to reproduce or coincide with the author's perspective (or, we might add, with any other perspective) is the end of com-prehension. The dialogue is over, meaning has come to a standstill: "Here there can only be mechanical or mathematical, empty tautological abstractions. Here there is not a grain of personalization [*personifikacii*]" (1979a, 368; 1984a, 388). Although this strong view of "co-creation" is only made explicit in Bakhtin's late period, we can already find an open statement of it in the 1926 article, "Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art," signed Vološinov:

> In what way can the listener determine the style of a poetic utterance? Here, too, we must distinguish two basic factors: first, the listener's proximity to the author and, second, his relation to the hero. Nothing is more perilous for aesthetics than to ignore the autonomous role of the listener. A very commonly

> held opinion is that the listener is to be regarded as equal to the author, excepting the latter's technical performance, and that the position of a competant listener is supposed to be a simple reproduction of the author's position. In actual fact this is not so. Indeed, the opposite may sooner be said to be true: The listener never equals the author. The listener has *his own independent place* in the event of artistic creation; he must occupy a special, and, what is more, a *two-sided* position in it - with respect to the author and with respect to the hero - and it is this position that has determinative effect on the style of an utterance. (Vološinov 1976a, 112)

[26] It seems worth pointing out that the wider Bakhtin wandered in the retrohistorical accumulation of dialogic texts the more pervasive and unconscious became the phenomenon of dialogicity in his conception of it. By the time he is drafting the novel-oriented essays of the thirties, we have the impression that dialogicity is not just the quality of the texts of one or of a few rare authors but is in fact an inevitable feature of discourse as such. The imperative to engage other subjects dialogically never disappears from Bakhtin's thinking, of course, but it becomes somewhat de-crucialized by his own growing faith that the dialogical "centrifugal" forces of language will always eventually break up any deadening monlogical perspective. What's more, one is always at some level, dialogically attuned to some other's word; even the most delusionally psychotic monologues cannot take place in a vacuum. Thus we may find that a number of recent Bakhtin studies overemphasize the purely ethical bent of his theory of dialogics, dishing us up a kind of soviet Wayne Booth, the existentialist Bakhtin, "steeped in Western humanist values," and rarely the formalist Bakhtin who could find dialogigism in any word whatsoever, or for that matter the subversive Bakhtin, who saw "carnivalized discourse" as a violent political weapon of the collectivity for perpetual ideological revolution. Dialogicity is not an imperative (pace Todorov, et al.), but an inevitability, perhaps even a regrettable one.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bibliography is divided into three sections. The first section is a listing of Bakhtin's works as they have appeared in various languages. It should be noted that only the first appearance of a work in Russian is entered while essays which have subsequently been collected in the Russian collections *Voprosy literatury i èstetiki* (1975) and*Estetika slovesnogo tvorčestva* (1979a) have not been entered separately, regardless of their date of composition. I have not listed most of the allonymous writings published under the names of Kanaev, Medvedev and Vološinov since I have made no reference to these alleged works of Bakhtin's in my essay, but a few of the translations are entered in the bibliography, particularly when they have been republished under Bakhtin's own name, and for convenience of cross-referencing. A more complete listing of works in Russian by or sometimes attributed to Bakhtin will be found in Clark and Holquist 1985, 353-358.

Section two consists of secondary literature which has appeared on Bakhtin in English and French, and some items in other languages. I have taken the opportunity to compile a bibliography of Bakhtin literature which is more comprehensive than any presently in print, but obviously I have not referred to all of this literature, nor can I even claim to have read absolutely every item listed.

The third section contains miscellaneous works which have been cited or mentioned in the course of the essay.

I: WORKS BY BAKHTIN

Bakhtin, Mikhail. (1929) *Problemy tvorčestva Dostoevskogo.* Leningrad: Priboj.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. (1963) *Problemy poètiki Dostoevskogo.* Moscow: Sovetskij pisatel'. (2nd Ed.)

Bakhtin, Mikhail. (1965) *Tvorčestvo Fransua Rable i narodnaja kul'tura srednevekov'ja i Renessansa.* Moscow: "Xudožestvennoja literatura".

Bakhtine, Mikhail. (1968a) "L'énoncé dans le roman." *Langages* 12: 126-132.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. (1968b) *Rabelais and his World.* [tr. Hélène Iswolsky] Cambridge: M.I.T. Press.

Bakhtine, Mikhail. (1970a) *L'Oeuvre de François Rabelais et la Culture populaire au Moyen Age et sous la Renaissance.* [tr. Andrée Robel] Paris: Gallimard.

Bakhtine, Mikhail. (1970b) *La Poétique de Dostoïevski.* [tr. Isabelle Kolticheff] Paris: Seuil.

Bakhtine, Mikhail. (1970c) *Problèmes de la poétique de Dostoïevski.* [tr. Guy Verret] Lausanne: L'Age d'Homme.

Baxtin, Mixail. (1971a) "Discourse Typology in Prose." [tr. Richard Balthazar and I. R. Titunik] in *Readings in Russian Poetics: Formalist and Structuralist Views.* Ed. Ladislav Matejka and Krystyna Pomorska. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press. 176-196.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. (1971b) "Dostoevsky's Dialogue." [tr. Avril Pyman] *Soviet Literature* 1971 (2): 127-140.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. (1973) *Problems of Dostoevski's Poetics.* [tr. R. W. Rotsel] Ann Arbor: Ardis.

Bakhtin, M. (1975) *Voprosy literatury i èstetiki.* Moscow: "Xudožectvennaja literatura".

Bakhtin, M. M. (1976) "The Art of the Word and the Culture of Folk Humor (Rabelais and Gogol')." [tr. William Mandel] *Soviet Studies in Literature* 12 (2): 27-39. (Now in *Semiotics and Structuralism: Readings from the Soviet Union.* Ed. Henryk Baran. White Plains, N. Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1976. 284-296.)

Bakhtine, Mikhail (V. N. Volochinov). (1977) *Le Marxisme et la philosophie du langage.* [tr. Marina Yaguello] Paris: Minuit.

Bakhtine, Mikhail. (1978a) *Esthétique et théorie du roman.* [tr. Daria Olivier] Paris: Gallimard.

Baxtin, M. M. (1978b) "Forms of Time and the Chronotopos in the Novel." [tr. Wendy Rosslyn] *PTL* 3 (3): 493-528.

Bakhtin, M. (1978c) "The Problem of the Text (An Essay in Philosophical Analysis)." [tr. William Mandel] *Soviet Studies in Literature* 14 (1): 3-33.

Bakhtin, M. M. (1979a) *Estetika slovesnogo tvorčestva.* Moscow: "Iskusstvo".

Bachtin, Michail. (1979b,c) "Autor und Held in der ästhetischen Tätigkeit." *Kunst und Literatur*6: 589-601; 7:760-779.

Bachtin, Michail. (1979d) "Riposta a una demanda della redazione di 'Novyj mir'." [tr. Simonetta Salvestroni] *Il Ponte* 35 (11-12): 1385-1390.

Bachtin, Michail. (1979e) "Sulla metadologia delle scienze umanistiche." [tr. Simonetta Salvestroni. *Il Ponte* 35 (11-12): 1391-1395.

Bakhtin, Mikhayl Mikhaylovich. (1979f) "Toward the Aesthetics of the Word." [tr. Kenneth N. Brostrom] *Dispositio* 4 (11-12):

299-315.

Bakhtine, M. M. (V. N. Volochinov). (1980a) *Ecrits sur le freudisme.* [tr. Guy Verret] Lausanne: L'Age de l'Homme.

Bachtin, Michail Michajlovič. (1980b) "Riposta ad una domanda della redazione del 'Novyj mir'." [tr. Clara Strada Janovič] *Strumenti critici*42/43: 323-330.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. (1980c) "The Word in the Novel." [tr. Ann Shukman] *Comparative Criticism: A Yearbook.* Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 213-220.

Bakhtin, M. M. (1981a) *The Dialogic Imagination.* [tr. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist] Ed. Michael Holquist. Austin: University of Texas Press.

Bakhtine, Mikhail. (1981b) "Préface à *Résurrection.*" [tr. Georges Philippenko and Monique Canto] in Todorov 1981: 217-241.

Bajtín, M. M. (1982) *Estética de la creación verbal.* [tr. Tatiana Bubnova] Mexico City: Siglo veintiuno editores.

Bakhtine, Mikhail. (1984a) *Esthétique de la création verbale.* [tr. Alfreda Aucouturier] Paris: Gallimard.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. (1984b) *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics.* [tr. Caryl Emerson] Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. (1984c) [Three Fragments from the 1929 Edition *Problems of Dostoevsky's Art*] [tr. Caryl Emerson] in Bakhtin 1984b: 275-282.

Bakhtin, Mikhail. (1984d) "Toward a Reworking of the Dostoevsky Book." [tr. Caryl Emerson] in Bakhtin 1984b: 283-302.

Medvedev, P. N. and M. M. Bakhtin. (1978) *The Formalist Method in Literary Scholarship.* [tr. Albert J. Wehrle] Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Vološinov, V. N. (1973) *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language.* [tr. Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik] New York: Seminar Press.

Vološinov, V. N. (1976a) "Discourse in Life and Discourse in Art (Concerning Sociological Poetics)." in Vološinov 1976b: 93-116.

Vološinov, V. N. (1976b) *Freudianism: A Marxist Critique.* [tr. I. R. Titunik] Ed. I. R. Titunik in collaboration with Neal H. Bruss. New York: Academic Press.

II: LITERATURE DEALING WITH BAKHTIN

Ahmed, Maroussia. (1984) "The relevance of the Carnivalesque in the Québec Novel." *Studies in Twentieth Century Literature* 9 (1): 119-134.

Angenot, Marc. (1984) "Bakhtine, sa critique de Saussure et la recherche contemporaine." *Etudes françaises* 20 (1): 7-20.

Aron, Thomas. (1983) "Le roman comme représentation de langages, ou Raymond Queneau à la lumière de Bakhtine." *Europe 61* (650/651): 46-58.

Aucouturier, Michel. (1978) "Préface" in Bakhtine 1978a: 9-19.

Audet, Noël. (1984) "Vers une nouvelle poétique." *Etudes françaises* 20 (1): 57-64.

Averintsev, Sergei. (1977) "The World of Mikhail Bakhtin." [tr. John Gordon] *Soviet Literature* 1977 (1): 145-151.

Bagby, Lewis. (1982) "Mikhail Bakhtin's Discourse Typologies: Theoretical and Practical Considerations." *Slavic Review* 41 (1): 35-58.

Beaujour, Elizabeth K. (1969) (Review of Bakhtin 1968b) *French Review* 43 (1): 190-191.

Beaujour, Michel. (1969) *Le Jeu de Rabelais*. Paris: Herne.

Belknap, Robert L. (1982) (Review of Bakhtin 1981a) *Slavic Review* 41 (3): 580-581.

Belleau, André. (1984) "Carnivalesque pas mort?" *Etudes françaises* 20 (1): 37-44.

Bennett, Tony. (1979) *Formalism and Marxism*. London: Metheun.

Benot, Yves. (1972) "Le 'Rabelais' de Bakhtine ou l'éloge du rire." *La Pensée* 162: 113-125.

Bernstein, Michael André. (1983) "When the Carnival Turns Bitter: Preliminary Reflections Upon the Abject Hero." *Critical Inquiry* 10 (2): 283-305.

Berrong, Richard M. (1985) "Finding Antifeminism in Rabelais; or, A Response to Wayne Booth's Call for an Ethical Criticism." *Critical Inquiry* 11 (4): 687-696.

Bialostosky, Don. (1983) "Bakhtin Versus Chatman on Narrative: The Habilitation of the Hero." *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 53 (1):109-116.

Booth, Wayne C. (1982) "Freedom of Interpretation: Bakhtin and

the Challenge of Feminist Criticism." *Critical Inquiry* 9 (1): 45-76.

Booth, Wayne C. (1984) "Introduction." in Bakhtin 1984b: xii-xxvii.

Booth, Wayne C. (1985) "Reply to Richard Berrong." *Critical Inquiry* 11 (4): 697-701.

Bové, Carol Mastrangelo. (1982) (Review of Bakhtin 1981a) *Minnesota Review* 18: 158-162.

Bové, Carol Mastrangelo. (1983) "The Text as Dialogue in Bakhtin and Kristeva." *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 53 (1): 117-124.

Bruss, Neal H. (1976) "V. N. Vološinov and the Structure of Language in Freudianism." in Vološinov 1976b: 117-148.

Carroll, David. (1983) "The Alterity of Discourse: Form, History, and the Question of the Political in M. M. Bakhtin." *Diacritics* 13 (2): 65-83.

Chvatík, Květoslav. (1982) "Bachtins Aesthetik des Wortes und seine Dostoevskij-Interpretation." in *The Structure of the Literary Process: Studies Dedicated to the Memory of Felix Vodička.* Ed. P. Steiner, M. Cervenka and R. Vroon. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 45-62.

Clark, Katerina and Michael Holquist. (1984) "Les cercles de Bakhtine." *Esprit* 7/8: 120-127.

Clark, Katerina and Michael Holquist. (1985) *Mikhail Bakhtin.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Corredor, Eva. (1983) "Lukács and Bakhtin: A Dialogue on Fiction." *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 53 (1): 97-108.

Crépu, Michel. (1984) "Dostoïevski lu et relu." *Esprit* 7/8: 115-119.

Czaplewicz, Eugeniusz. (1977) "Dialogue Theory of a Literary Work." *Zagadnienia Rodzajów Literackich* 20 (1): 49-66.

de Man, Paul. (1983) "Dialogue and Dialogism." *Poetics Today* 4 (1): 99-107.

Dorst, John D. (1983) "Neck-riddle as a Dialogue of Genres: Applying Bakhtin's Genre Theory." *Journal of American Folklore* 96 (382): 413-433.

Ehre, Milton. (1984) (Review of Bakhtin 1981a) *Poetics Today* 5 (1): 172-176.

Emerson, Caryl. (1983a) "The Outer Word and Inner Speech:

Bakhtin, Vygotsky, and the Internalization of Language." *Critical Inquiry* 10 (2): 245-264.

Emerson, Caryl. (1983b) "Translating Bakhtin: Does His Theory of Discourse Contain a Theory of Translation?" *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 53 (1): 23-32.

Emerson, Caryl. (1984a) "Bakhtin and Intergeneric Shift: The Case of Boris Godunov." *Studies in Twentieth Century Literature* 9 (1): 145-168.

Emerson, Caryl. (1984b) "Editor's Preface." in Bakhtin 1984b: xxix-xliii.

Eslin, Jean-Claude. (1984) "Apprendre à lire." *Esprit*7/8: 95-97.

Faccani, Remo. (1981) "Michail Bachtin." *Belfagor* 36 (6): 667-676.

Faccani, Remo. (1982) (Review of Todorov 1981) *Belfagor* 37 (3): 368-370.

Frame, Donald M. (1969) (Review of Bakhtin 1968b) *Modern Language Quarterly* 30 (4): 605-607.

Frioux, Claude. (1971) "Bakhtine devant ou derrière nous." *Littérature* 1 (1): 108-115.

Gabay, Simone. (1971) "Rabelais: Des années 30 à 1970." *Littérature* 1 (1): 116-119.

Gardin, Bernard. (1978) "Volochinov ou Bakhtine?" *La Pensée* 197: 87-100.

Gasparov, M. L. (1984) "M. M. Bakhtin in Russian Culture of the Twentieth Century." [tr. Ann Shukman] *Studies in Twentieth Century Literature* 9 (1): 169-176.

Günther, Hans. (1981) "Michail Bachtins Konzeption als Alternative zum Sozialisischen Realismus." in *Semiotics and Dialectics: Ideology and the Text.* Ed. Peter V. Zima. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 137-177.

Haas, Wilbur A. (1976) "The Repored Speech of Valentin N. Vološinov." *Dispositiol* (3): 3-356.

Hayman, David. (1983) "Toward a Mechanics of Mode: Beyond Bakhtin." *Novel* 16 (2): 101-120.

Hirschkop, Ken. (1985) "A Response to the Forum on Bakhtin." *Critical Inquiry* 11: 672-678.

Holquist, Michael. (1978) "Bakhtin, Mikhail Mikhailovich." in *Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet Literaure.* Ed.

Harry B. Weber. Gulf Breeze, Fl.: Academic Inernational Press. 52-59.

Holquist, Michael. (1981a) "Introduction." in Bakhtin 1981a: xv-xxxiv.

Holquist, Michael. (1981b) "The Politics of Representation." in *Allegory and Representation.* Ed. Stephen J. Greenblatt. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Holquist, Michael. (1983a) "Answering as Authoring: Mikhail Bakhtin's Trans-linguistics." *Critical Inquiry* 10 (2): 307-319.

Holquist, Michael. (1983b) "Bakhtin and Rabelais: Theory as Praxis." *Boundary Two* 11 (1/2): 5-19.

Holquist, Michael. (1984) "Introduction." *Studies in Twentieth Century Literature* 9 (1): 7-12.

Holquist, James M. and Katerina Clark. (1984) "The Influence of Kant in the Early Work of M. M. Bakhtin." in *Literary Theory and Criticism. Part I: Theory.* Ed. Joseph P. Strelka. Bern: Peter Lang. 1984. 299-314.

Hutcheon, Linda. (1983) "The Carnivalesque and Contemporary Narrative: Popular Culture and the Erotic." *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 53 (1): 83-94.

Ivanov, Viach Vs. (1975) "The Significance of M. M. Bakhtin's Ideas on Sign, Utterance, and Dialogue for Modern Semiotics." *Soviet Studies in Literature* 11 (2/3): 186-243.

Jakobson, Roman. (1977) "Préface." in Bakhtine (Volchinov) 1977: 7-8.

Jameson, Frederic. (1974) (Review of Vološinov 1973) *Style*8 (3): 535-543.

Janovič, Clara Strada. (1980) "Michail Michajlovič Bachtin." *Strumenti critici* 42/43: 589-590.

Jefferson, Ann. (1980) "Intertextuality and the Poetics of Fiction." *Comparative Criticism: A Yearbook.* Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 235-250.

Keller, Abraham C. (1971) (Review of Bakhtin 1968b) *Romanic Review* 62: 41-43.

Kibler, William W. (1970) (Review of Bakhtin 1968b) *Style* 4 (1): 73-75.

Kloepfer, Rolf. (1980) "Dynamic Structures in Narrative Literature: The Dialogic Principle." *Poetics Today* 1 (4): 115-134.

Kozhinov, Vadim. (1977) "The World of Mikhail Bakhtin." *Soviet Literature* 1977 (1): 143-144.

Kristeva, Julia. (1967) "Bakhtine, le mot, le dialogue et le roman." *Critique* 239: 438-465. [Now in Kristeva 1969]

Kristeva, Julia. (1969) *Sémeiotikè: Recherches pour une sémanalyse.* Paris: Seuil.

Kristeva, Julia. (1970a) *Le texte du roman: approche sémiologique d'une structure discursive et transformationelle.* The Hague: Mouton.

Kristeva, Julia. (1970b) "Une Poétique Ruinée." in Bakhtine 1970b: 5-27.

Krysinksi, Wladimir. (1984) "Bakhtine et la question de l'idéologie." *Etudes françaises* 20 (1): 21-36.

Lotman, Iu. M. (1976) "Gogol' and the Correlation of 'The Culture of Humor' with the Comic and Serious in the Russian National Traditional." in *Semiotics and Structuralism: Readings from the Soviet Union.* Ed. Henryk Baran. White Plains, N. Y.: International Arts and Sciences Press. 297-300.

Malcuzynski, M.-Pierrette. (1983) "Mikhail Bakhtin and Contemporary Narrative Theory." *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 53 (1): 51-66.

Malcuzynski, M.-Pierrette. (1984a) "Critique de la (dé)raison polyphonique." *Etudes françaises* 20 (1): 45-56.

Malcuzynski, M.-Pierrette. (1984b) "Polyphonic Theory and Contemporary Literary Practices." *Studies in Twentieth Century Literature* 9 (1): 75-88.

Mari, Pierre. (1984) "Du roman au carnaval: le corps introuvable." *Esprit* 7/8: 104-114.

Matejka, Ladislav. (1973) "On the First Russian Prologomena to Semiotics." in Vološinov 1973: 161-174.

Matejka, Ladislav and I. R. Titunik. (1973) "Translator's Introduction." in Vološinov 1973: 1-6.

McHale, Brian. (1978) "Free Indirect Discourse: A Survey of Recent Accounts." *PTL* 3 (2): 249-287.

McKenna, Andrew J. (1983) "After Bakhtin: On the Future of Laughter and its History in France." *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 53 (1): 67-82.

Méndez, Javier García. (1984) "Pour une écoute bakhtinienne du roman latino-américain." *Etudes françaises* 20 (1): 101-136.

Michaud, Ginette. (1984) "Bakhtine lecteur de Bakhtine." *Etudes françaises* 20 (1): 137-151.

Monegal, Emir Rodríguez. (1979) "Carnaval/Antropofagia/Parodia." *Revista iberoamericana* 45 (108/109): 401-412.

Morson, Gary Saul. (1978) "The Heresiarch of *Meta*." *PTL* 3 (3): 407-427.

Morson, Gary Saul. (1981) "Tolstoy's Absolute Language." *Critical Inquiry* 7 (4): 667-687.

Morson, Gary Saul. (1983) "Who Speaks for Bakhtin?: A Dialogic Introduction." *Critical Inquiry* 10 (2): 225-243.

Morson, Gary Saul. (1985) "Dialogue, Monologue, and the Social: A Reply to Ken Hirschkop." *Critical Inquiry* 11 (4): 679-686.

Paolella, A. (1982) (Review of Todorov 1981) *Lingua e stile* 17 (4): 611-613.

Pedersen, John. (1982) (Review of Todorov 1981) *Revue romane* 17 (2): 164-166.

Perlina, Nina. (1983) "Bakhtin-Medvedev-Vološinov: An Apple of Discourse." *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 53 (1): 33-47.

Perlina, Nina. (1984) "Bakhtin and Buber: Problems of Dialogic Imagination." *Studies in Twentieth Century Literature* 9 (1): 13-28.

Peytard, Jean. (1980) "Sur quelques relations de la linguistique à la sémiotique littéraire." *La Pensée* 215: 19-44.

Polan, Dana B. (1983) "The Text Between Monologue and Dialogue." [Review of Todorov 1981] *Poetics Today* 4 (1): 145-152.

Polzin, Robert. (1984) "Dialogic Imagination in the Book of Deuteronomy." *Studies in Twentieth Century Literature* 9 (1): 135-144.

Pomorska, Krystyna. (1968) "Foreword." in Bakhtin 1968b: v-x.

Pomorska, Krystyna.(1978) "Mixail Baxtin and his Verbal Universe: M. M. Baxtin, *Questions of Literature and Esthetics*." [Review of Bakhtin 1975] *PTL* 3 (2): 379-386.

Raskin, Marina. (1982) (Review of Bakhtin 1981a) *Modern Fiction Studies* 27 (4): 667-669.

Rivas, Daniel E. (1983) (Review of Bakhtin 1981a and Bennett 1979) *Southern Humanities Review* 17 (2): 189-190.

Sabo, Katy and Greg Marc Nielsen. (1984) "Critique dialogique et postmodernisme." *Etudes françaises* 20 (1): 75-86.

Sallenave, Danièle. (1970) "Pour une poétique historique." (Review of Bakhtine 1970b and 1970c) *Critique* Dec. 1970: 1008-1013.

Salvestroni, Simonetta. (1979) "La scienza della litteratura nel pensiero dialogico di Michail Bachtin." *Il Ponte* 35 (11): 1374-1384.

Séquin, Louis. (1979) (Review of Bakhtine 1978a) *La Quinzaine littéraire* 293: 17-18.

Shukman, Ann. (1979) (Review of Vološinov 1973) *Language and Style* 12 (1): 54-55.

Shukman, Ann. (1980) "Between Marxism and Formalism: the Stylistics of Mikhail Bakhtin." *Comparative Criticism: A Yearbook*. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 221-234.

Shukman, Ann. (1982) (Review of Bakhtin 1981a and Todorov 1981) *Slavonic and East European Review* 60 (4): 619-621.

Shukman, Ann. (1984) "Bakhtin and Tolstoy." *Studies in Twentieth Century Literature* 9 (1): 57-74.

Stewart, Susan. (1983) "Shouts on the Street: Bakhtin's Anti-Linguistics." *Critical Inquiry* 10 (2): 265-281.

Sturrock, John. (1982) (Review of Bakhtin 1981a and Todorov 1981) *Modern Language Review 77 (2): 398-402.*

Thibault, Paul. (1984) "Narrative Discourse as a Multi-level System of Communication: Some Theoretical Proposals Concerning Bakhtin's Dialogic Principle." *Studies in Twentieth Century Literature* 9 (1): 89-118.

Thomson, Clive. (1983a) "Preface." *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 53 (1): 5-8.

Thomson, Clive. (1983) "The Semiotics of M. M. Bakhtin." *Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa* 53 (1): 11-22.

Thomson, Clive. (1984) "Bakhtin's 'Theory of Genre'." *Studies in Twentieth Century Literature* 9 (1): 29-40.

Titunik, I. R. (1973) "The Formal Method and the Sociological Method (M. M. Baxtin, P. N. Medvedev, V. N. Vološinov) in Russian Theory and the Study of Literature." in Vološinov 1973: 175-200.

Titunik, Irwin R. (1976a) "M. M. Baxtin (The Baxtin School) and Soviet Semiotics." *Dispositio* 1 (3): 327-338.

Titunik, I. R. (1976b) "Translator's Introduction." in Vološinov 1976b: 1-4.

Titunik, I. R. (1981) "Bachtin and Soviet Semiotics (A Case Study: Boris Uspenskij's *Poètika kompozicii).*" *Russian Literature* 10 (1): 1-16.

Titunik, I. R. and Neal H. Bruss. (1976) "Preface." in Vološinov 1976b: vii-xiv.

Todorov, Tzvetan. (1979) "Bakhtine et l'alterité." *Poétique* 40: 502-513.

Todorov, Tzvetan. (1981) *Mikhaïl Bakhtine: le principe dialogique. (Suivi de Ecrits du cercle de Bakhtine)* Paris: Seuil.

Todorov, Tzvetan. (1984a) *Critique de la critique.* Paris: Seuil.

Todorov, Tzvetan. (1984b) "Préface." in Bakhtine 1984a: 7-23.

Todorov, Tzvetan. (1984c) "Vers une tradition dialogique: Entretien avec Tzvetan Todorov." *Esprit* 7/8: 99-103.

van Buuren, Maarten. (1981) "Quelques aspects du dialogisme: Pouchekine, Dostoievski, Joyce." *Degrés* 8 (24/25): f-f18.

Wall, Anthony. (1984a) "Apprendre à écouter: le problème des métaphores musicales dans la critique bakhtinienne." *Etudes françaises* 20 (1): 65-74.

Wall, Anthony. (1984b) "Characters in Bakhtin's Theory." *Studies in Twentieth Century Literature* 9 (1): 41-56.

Walton, William Garrett. (1981) "V. N. Voloshinov: A Marriage of Formalism and Marxism." in *Semiotics and Dialectics: Ideology and the Text.* Ed. Peter V. Zima. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 39-102.

Warner, Christiane. (1984) "Quoi faire avec les mots dans le roman." *Etudes françaises* 20 (1): 87-100.

Wehrle, Albert J. (1978) "Introduction: M. M. Bakhtin/P. N. Medvedev." in Medvedev and Bakhtin 1978: ix-xxiii.

Wehrle, Albert J. (1982) (Review of Bakhtin 1981a) *Slavic and East European Journal* 26 (1): 106-107.

Yaguello, Marina. (1977) "Introduction." in Bakhtine (Volochinov) 1977: 9-18.

III: MISCELLANEOUS WORKS

Alter, Robert. (1975) *Partial Magic.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Angenot, Marc. (1983) "Lintertextualité : enquête sur l'émergence et la diffusion d'un champ notionnel." *Revue des sciences humaines* 40: 121-135.

Barfield, Owen. (1928) *Poetic Diction.* London: Faber and Faber. (Second Edition, 1952)

Barthes, Roland. (1968) "La mort de l'auteur." In *Le bruissement de la langue.* Paris: Seuil. 1984.

Benjamin, Walter. (1936) "Der Erzähler." In *Gesammelte Schriften* II:2. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 1977.

Brooks, Cleanth. (1947) *The Well Wrought Urn.* New York: Random House.

Brown, Norman O. (1966) *Love's Body.* New York: Random House.

Bruss, Paul. (1981) *Victims: Textual Strategies in Recent American Fiction.* Lewisville: Bucknell University Press.

Carroll, William. (1974) "Nabokov's Signs and Symbols." In *A Book of Things About Vladimir Nabokov.* Ed. Carl Proffer. AnnArbor: Ardis.

Catteau, Jacques. (1978) *La Création littéraire chez Dostoïevski.* Paris: Institut d'Etudes Slaves.

Cohn, Jonas. (1901) *Allgemeine ästhetik.* Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann.

Derrida, Jacques. (1967) *L'Ecriture et la différence.* Paris: Seuil.

Dostoevsky, Fyodor. (1945) *The Short Novels of Dostoevsky.* New York: Dial Press.

Dupuy, Jean-Pierre. (1982) *Ordres et Désordres.* Paris: Seuil.

Foucault, Michel. (1969) "Qu'est-ce qu'un auteur?" *Bulletin de la Societé Française de Philosophie* 63 (3): 73-104.

Fowles, John. (1976) "An Interview with John Fowles." [Conducted by James Campbell] *Contemporary Literature* 17 (4): 454-469.

Genette, Gérard. (1983) *Nouveau discours du récit.* Paris: Seuil.

Gogol, Nikolai. (1948) *Dead Souls*. [tr. Bernard Guilbert Guerney] New York: Rinehart.

Grams, Paul. (1974) *"Pnin:* The Biographer as Meddler." In *A Book of Things About Vladimir Nabokov*. Ed. Carl Proffer. Ann Arbor: Ardis.

Kofman, Sarah. (1971) "Nietzsche et la métaphore." *Poétique* 5: 77-98.

Lacan, Jacques. (1966) *Ecrits*. Paris: Seuil.

Laing, R. D. (1960) *The Divided Self*. New York: Random House.

Lubin, Peter. (1970) "Kickshaws and Motley." In *Nabokov: Criticism, reminiscences, translations and tributes*. Ed. Alfred Appel, Jr. and Charles Newman. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

Nabokov, Vladimir. (1949) "Sartre's First Try." *New York Times Book Review* 24 April 1949: 3, 19.

Nabokov, Vladimir. (1957) *Pnin*. New York: Avon. 1969.

Nabokov, Vladimir. (1967a) "Vladimir Nabokov: An Interview." [Conducted by Herbert Gold] *Paris Review* 41: 99-111.

Nabokov, Vladimir. (1967b) "An Interview with Vladimir Nabokov." [Conducted by Alfred Appel, Jr.] In *Nabokov: The Man and His Work*. Ed. L.S. Dembo. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1967. 19-44.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. (1971) *Werke Kritische Gesamtausgabe*. V:1. Ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. (1978) *Werke Kritische Gesamtausgabe*. III:4. Ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Rolland, Jacques. (1983) *Dostoïevski : la question de l'autre*. Lagrasse: Verdier.

Unamuno, Miguel de. (1976) *Novela/Nivola*. [tr. Anthony Kerrigan] Princeton University Press.

Valéry, Paul. (1960) *Oeuvres*,t. 2. Paris: Gallimard.

Vonnegut, Kurt, Jr. (1973) *Breakfast of Champions*. New York: Delacorte.