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MENOZ IN EARLY GREEK

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## Abstract

This thesis proposes that the reference of μένος in early Greek involves a notion of 'will' in the sense of 'dynamic power' or 'energy', the power to do or produce something. This interpretation explains the apparent semantic range of μένος in terms of a unified concept; it also clarifies the semantic link between μένος and its etymon, IE \*men-.

The approach to Homeric psychology on which this interpretation of μένος depends is at variance with both the 'intellectualist' view of the Greek mind propounded by E. R. Dodds and others and with the view advanced by Bruno Snell and his followers, who attribute to Homeric man an implicit 'process' theory of behaviour. It is here argued that, on the contrary, Homer's representation of his characters' actions and attitudes presupposes a conception of individual responsibility.

## Résumé

Dans cette thèse, nous nous proposons de démontrer que le terme μένος en grec archaïque sous-entend la notion de "volonté" dans le sens de "pouvoir dynamique" ou d'"énergie", le pouvoir de faire ou de produire quelque chose. Cette interprétation rend compte de l'étendue sémantique apparente de μένος en fonction d'un concept unifié; elle clarifie de plus le lien sémantique qui existe entre μένος et son étymon, IE \*men-.

L'étude de la psychologie d'Homère dont dépend cette interprétation ne s'accorde ni avec la conception "intellectualiste" de la pensée grecque proposée par E. R. Dodds et d'autres, ni avec l'opinion émise par Bruno Snell et ses disciples qui attribuent à l'homme homérique une théorie behavioriste implicite du processus de l'action. Nous soutenons ici, au contraire, que la représentation que donne Homère des actions et des attitudes de ses personnages présuppose une conception de la responsabilité individuelle.



## Preface

The present thesis developed out of an earlier study concerned with moral values in the Homeric poems. In the course of that work and subsequent research, it became increasingly evident that the generally accepted model of Homeric psychology, based on the views of Bruno Snell, was not consistent with the notion of individual responsibility that I perceived in the Homeric representation of actions and attitudes. It seemed that a new model of Homeric psychology was needed, one that would account for personal responsibility for action; an examination of the 'organs' or 'faculties' responsible for Homeric man's psychic life resulted in the model proposed here.

The establishment of this model, which attributes agency to Homeric man, made possible the interpretation of  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$  as 'will' in the sense of psychic energy (what is meant when we speak of 'will-power'). This interpretation had recommended itself to previous scholars for the excellent reason that such a sense

is often patent in Homer's use of the word, but an interpretation of μένος as 'will' could not be systematically advanced within the framework of the accepted model of Homeric psychology, which assigns responsibility for Homeric man's actions not to the man himself but to some external agency. It is hoped that the interpretation of μένος proposed here, and the model of Homeric psychology which makes that interpretation possible, will be seen to be consistent with the representation of action in the Homeric poems.

I have developed this new model not in isolation but within the framework of the philosophical debate on the issues of will, personal identity and action theory, and I have provided in Appendices I and II some account of these issues. Appendix I offers a brief account of various conceptions of 'will' in order to identify the particular conception involved in my interpretation of μένος; Appendix II is a discussion of the philosophical debate on personal identity and action theory. These accounts make no claim to originality; they are intended merely to provide the necessary background to the development of my argument.

In Chapter II I discuss Bruno Snell's view of Homeric psychology and present my objections to that view; Appendix III offers an elaboration of my objections to Snell's general position on the absence of concepts in Homer.

Appendix V, on Archilochos' use of μένος in P. Colon. 7511, provides an example of how my interpretation can be extended and applied to the elucidation of a recently discovered text.

I am indebted to a number of people for help in the preparation of this thesis, above all to my supervisor, Professor Albert Schachter, who saved me from many infelicities of both argument and style. Professor Michael J. Silverthorne discussed with me the philosophical issues involved in the argument and Professor Charles R. Barton provided assistance with the linguistic aspects. Professor Leonard Woodbury very kindly took the time to discuss with me some of the issues involved in my account of Homeric psychology. I have benefited from all of these discussions and I am very grateful for the helpful suggestions offered me. Mme. Marie-

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## CONTENTS

Chapter I: Introduction	1
Statement of the problem and proposed solution	1
Survey of scholarly views of μένος	5
Chapter II: Homeric psychology: A critical examination of current schools of thought	11
Bruno Snell's view of Homeric man: the 'process' theory of behaviour	11
Homeric psychology as bipartite: the 'intellectualist' view of the Greek mind	35
Chapter III: Towards a new model of Homeric psychology	41
Chapter IV: μένος as 'will' in early Greek	58
μένος in Homer	60
μένος in Hesiod and the lyric poets	108
Conclusion	110
Appendix I: The concept of will in Western thought	113
Appendix II: Personal identity and action theory	126
Appendix III: On Bruno Snell's view of the absence of concepts in Homer	140

Appendix IV: μένος in Homer, Hesiod and the lyric poets: list of passages	145
Appendix V: The μένος of Archilochos: <u>P. Colon.</u> 7511:35	151
Notes	166
Bibliography	207

## Chapter I: Introduction

### Statement of the problem and proposed solution

μῆνος in early Greek<sup>1</sup> occurs in a wide range of contexts: it is something possessed by men and women, gods and goddesses, mules, horses and lambs, fire and sun, wind and rivers. It is breathed into warriors; it is loosed at death; it is released from spears. But μῆνος has proved difficult to interpret; it is variously rendered by lexicographers and commentators as, for example, 'strength, energy, anger, impulse, will, design, life'.<sup>2</sup> Common to all these terms is a conception of force or power. The word μῆνος itself is one of a rich complex of words denoting mental activity, derived from Indo-European \*men-;<sup>3</sup> the problem is to reconcile the etymon with the use of μῆνος as physical 'force' or 'power'.

The solution I propose is that, while μῆνος is typically manifested in physical activity, it is conceived of as essentially a 'mental' or 'psychic' faculty, and one which it is legitimate to define rather more rigorously than its accepted semantic sphere would indicate. In order to delineate the

position held by μένος in the psychic life of Homeric man it will be necessary to consider the subject of Homeric psychology<sup>4</sup> in general, with particular attention to those faculties (mental or psychic 'organs', as Bruno Snell termed them)<sup>5</sup> which bear the main burden of Homeric man's psychic activity: νόος, θυμός, φρήν / φρένες.

It is often said of the Homeric world-view, as of early Greek thought in general, that it is 'pre-dualistic' and by this it is meant that Homer is innocent of the conception of 'mental' or 'spiritual' activity as radically distinct from and fundamentally opposed to the 'physical' or 'material' world. Metaphysical dualism as a philosophical position is traditionally ascribed first to Plato, although tendencies in the direction of a dualistic outlook may be discerned in prior Greek thought. Nevertheless, it is Plato who first articulates the view of mind or soul as different in kind from and imprisoned in the body, from which it is released at death to return to its proper sphere, an immaterial, incorporeal world beyond the senses. This classic position of mind-body dualism, the so-called 'sōma-sēma' view (body=tomb), is the fountainhead of a long and rich tradition of dualistic thought which reached



its apogee in the radical dualism of Descartes, whose cogito implies that one can have knowledge only of mind.

Although Homer does not make a radical distinction between 'mental' and 'physical' faculties in man, it would be incorrect to conclude that he makes no distinction whatever between these two aspects of being. Indeed, it may be demonstrated that the Homeric conception of human activity does recognize a distinction between 'mental' and 'physical' faculties inasmuch as the reference of certain key words clearly pertains to one or other of these two realms. A prime example is the  $\mu\eta\tau\iota\varsigma/\beta\acute{\iota}\eta$  contrast, which explicitly opposes physical and mental qualities;<sup>6</sup> as I hope to demonstrate in Chapter II, this is by no means an isolated example. Although mental and spiritual activity, as represented in Homer, originates in physical organs of the body, it is not simply identified with physical processes but is recognized to be somehow different in kind. Homeric man, to use Cartesian language, is not concerned with the problem of mutual exclusiveness of res cogitans and res extensa because he sees no incompatibility between them; but he does not simply reduce the former to the latter.

My thesis is that in the Homeric conception of psychic activity  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$  occupies a place alongside the

other psychic 'organs' νόος, θυμός and φρένες<sup>7</sup> inasmuch as μένος is itself conceived of as an 'organ' par excellence (although not in the sense of a 'location' for other organs or activities); it is in fact the organ in the service of the other psychic faculties, particularly θυμός. Moreover, the reference of μένος in early Greek is best understood as corresponding to the later conception in the Western philosophical tradition of will as dynamic power.<sup>8</sup> This interpretation has the advantage of explaining the apparent semantic range of μένος in terms of a unified concept; it also clarifies the semantic link between μένος and its etymon, IE \*men-. Above all, it appears to yield very satisfactory results for an understanding of the use of μένος in early Greek.

The approach to Homeric psychology on which this interpretation of μένος depends is at variance with both the 'intellectualist' view of the Greek mind propounded by E. R. Dodds and others and to the view advanced by Bruno Snell and his followers, who attribute to Homeric man what might be called an implicit 'process' theory of behaviour.<sup>9</sup> On the contrary, Homeric man, as I shall attempt to demonstrate, is very much aware of himself as an agent responsible for action and is conscious of his capacity for both intellectual and volitional activity.

A survey of scholarly views of μένος

A number of scholars have remarked a volitional element in the use of μένος in Homer; however, there has been no systematic effort to follow this interpretation to its logical conclusion or to define the particular conception of 'will' in question. Moreover, discussions of μένος are often affected by preconceived notions of Homeric psychology on the part of commentators which on occasion conflict with their own observations of the use of μένος in the Homeric texts; thus, even when μένος is understood as 'will' this is often at the cost of a contradiction of the entire framework within which the commentator is working.

Hermann Fränkel, for example, understands μένος as "will and purposeful energy";<sup>10</sup> but it is not clear what role will, as traditionally conceived, would have in his conception of Homeric man as "an open force field" or "field of energy, whose lines extend into space and time without limit or restraint [so that] external forces [may] operate in him without hindrance, and it is meaningless to ask where his own force begins and that from outside ends."<sup>11</sup>

In his Sather lectures on The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity, Albrecht Dihle, a proponent of

the 'intellectualist' view of Greek psychology,<sup>12</sup> explicitly denies to Homer a concept of will<sup>13</sup> (he regards the modern notion of will as having originated with Augustine); yet Dihle's own observations of the functioning of μένος in the Homeric texts lead him to remark that μένος "comes indeed very near to the modern notion of will."<sup>14</sup>

E. R. Dodds had earlier connected μένος with "the sphere of volition", citing related words such as μενοινᾶν 'to be eager' and δυσμενής 'wishing ill'.<sup>15</sup> However, Dodds' view of Greek psychology, which Dihle shares, precludes a role for will;<sup>16</sup> consequently, he reduces μένος to "the vital energy, the 'spunk', which is not always there at call, but comes and goes mysteriously and (as we should say) capriciously."<sup>17</sup> On the communication of μένος from god to man during a battle, Dodds remarks, "This menos is not primarily physical strength; nor is it a permanent organ of mental life like thumos or noos. Rather it is, like ate, a state of mind."<sup>18</sup>

Emmet Robbins, in an unpublished dissertation which treats μένος in the context of a discussion of μνημοσύνη,<sup>19</sup> objects to Dodds' view of μένος as a "state of mind", maintaining that such a view creates

"a non-Homeric dichotomy between psychic and physical...

It cannot be overemphasized that any 'mental' organ in early Greek thought is to a certain extent a 'physical' organ as well."<sup>20</sup>

Robbins' view of the material nature of μένος reiterates that of R. B. Onians: "Μένος is apparently not an abstraction or a mere state of something else, but conceived as itself something, fluid or gaseous, which for convenience we may translate 'energy' and which was felt inwardly much as we feel what we so name. It was thought to be more particularly with the θυμός in the φρένες."<sup>21</sup>

Onians' view represents an advance on the model proposed by Bruno Snell, who first suggested that the Homeric mentality conceived of psychic functions as functions of material organs of the body.<sup>22</sup> Snell, however, limits the psychic 'organs' to θυμός, ψυχή and νόος,<sup>23</sup> and considers μένος to be not a psychic organ but merely a function of the θυμός.<sup>24</sup> Robbins points out that such a view contradicts Snell's own model (which Robbins accepts), "for the function of the organ θυμός is properly θυμός: that is, the word θυμός has two facets, for it is both an organ in which an impulse is generated and also the impulse or function generated in that organ."<sup>25</sup>

Robbins lists as various meanings for μένος in Homer: 'design, anger, strength, courage, life', and comments: "The basic content of μένος appears to be passionate or, to a certain extent, volitional, rather than intellectual."<sup>25</sup> Despite this observation, however, Robbins maintains that "The idea of will is not so primary to \*men- [in contrast to \*mē-, etymon of μαμάω] ... The idea of intention or purpose is carried in the Homeric psychology chiefly by νόος."<sup>27</sup>

The volitional aspect of μένος is accepted by Anne Giacomelli in a recent study which is perhaps the most extensive to date and certainly the most controversial. Giacomelli observes that "μένος is not just blind energy but a dynamic force with a definite aim."<sup>28</sup> However, her principal concern is to connect μένος with "shooting fluid" in general and the male seed in particular.<sup>29</sup> Emphasizing the "suddenness, forward thrust, and fluidity" which she sees as the essential characteristics of μένος,<sup>30</sup> Giacomelli regards μένος as an 'organ' which furnishes "the particular vital 'energy' which is the essence, physiologically and psychologically, of manliness. Μένος is both the matter and the activity of this energy. As matter it is a fluid, as activity it is a shooting or

thrusting force. Beginning from the image of the movement of the male seed, the Greeks characterize as μένος that which moves as shooting fluid in nature, in the human body, or in the spirit."<sup>31</sup>

Giacomelli regards the apparent semantic range of μένος in its attested usages as a natural semantic development from this original situation in which "the image of male seed is at the root of μένος and its cognates":<sup>32</sup> "Μένος developed the meaning 'strength, force, might'...because it originally designated that which impresses the senses and the imagination by running, pouring, shooting, flooding, streaming, by dramatic fluid movement."<sup>33</sup> Her suggested definition of μένος emphasizes the 'forward drive' which Adkins sees in the reference of the related verb μενεαίνεσθαι:<sup>34</sup> "To throw the essential force of oneself forward is to exhibit μένος."<sup>35</sup>

Gregory Nagy, on the other hand, connects μένος with the mental activity of reminding; in a discussion of the Indic cognate of μένος, mānas-, he observes that both Indic mānas- and archaic Greek μένος may designate "the realm of consciousness, of both rational and emotional functions."<sup>36</sup> Vedic mānas- Nagy understands as referring to 'thought' or 'power of thought' and notes that it is derived from the verbal root man-,

meaning 'to have in mind'. Greek μένος Nagy interprets as "not 'thought' or 'power of thought' but 'power,' by way of an original meaning 'having in mind, reminding' common to both Indic mānas- and Greek μένος."<sup>37</sup> (Nagy, however, is primarily concerned with demonstrating what he sees as the synonymity in Homeric diction of μένος with θυμός and ψυχή "at the moment of death in particular and of losing consciousness in general.")<sup>38</sup>

This brief summary of scholarly views will, it is hoped, give some idea of the wide range of interpretations that have been put forward for μένος, as well as some indication why none of them has proved satisfactory. The present study attempts not only to provide an interpretation of μένος that is everywhere compatible with its range of usage but also to offer a new model of Homeric psychology which incorporates μένος in the interpretation here proposed.



## Chapter II: Homeric psychology: A critical examination of current schools of thought

The contemporary study of Homeric psychology received its major impetus from Bruno Snell's Die Entdeckung des Geistes (referred to here in T. G. Rosenmeyer's English translation, The Discovery of the Mind).<sup>1</sup> In his opening essay on Homer's view of man Snell argues that in the Homeric vocabulary and, therefore, in the Homeric mentality, abstractions are as yet undeveloped.<sup>2</sup> For example, Snell maintains that, in contrast to later Greek, Homer has no word for the abstract concept of sight, the essential function; we find rather a group of words each expressing a particular aspect of the operation of sight: for example,  $\delta\epsilon\rho\kappa\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$  'to have a particular look in one's eyes',  $\pi\alpha\pi\tau\alpha\acute{\iota}\nu\epsilon\iota\nu$  'to look about inquisitively, carefully or with fear',  $\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\sigma\epsilon\iota\nu$  'to see something bright'.<sup>3</sup> "It seems, then," Snell concludes, "as if language aims progressively to express the essence of an act, but is at first unable to comprehend it because it is a function, and as such neither tangibly apparent nor associated with certain unambiguous emotions. As soon, however, as

it is recognized and has received a name, it has come into existence."<sup>4</sup> Not having yet received a name, 'sight' simply did not exist for Homeric man.<sup>5</sup>

Snell takes a similar view of the Homeric conception of the physical body. The Homeric mentality, he maintains, makes no provision for the body as such; what we call 'body' Homer refers to only as 'limbs': γούνα, μέλεα.<sup>6</sup> Thus, although Homeric man of course "had a body exactly like the later Greeks...he did not know it qua body, but merely as the sum total of his limbs. This is another way of saying that the Homeric Greeks did not yet have a body in the modern sense of the word."<sup>7</sup>

And just as, in modern terms, Homeric man did not have a body, neither did he have a soul. As in the case of body and sight, so too in the sphere of intellect and soul, there is no one word to designate the entity conceived of as a whole; we find instead a cluster of words, each designating a specific aspect (or specific aspects) of man's psychic life. Snell selects for discussion the three words he considers most important: ψυχή, θυμός and νόος.<sup>8</sup> The entities denoted by these words Snell characterizes as mental or psychic 'organs', each having its own

particular function.<sup>9</sup>  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  he takes to be the "'organ' of life", identified with the vital breath, an 'organ' whose location and function Homer passes over in silence;  $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$  in Homer Snell sees as "the generator of motion or agitation, while noos is the cause of ideas and images."<sup>10</sup>

Snell takes care to point out that these three organs or functions are not to be identified with the Platonic tripartite soul: "At first it might be suspected that thymos and noos are nothing more than the parts of the soul, such as we know from Plato's psychology. But those parts presuppose a psychic whole of which Homer has no cognizance."<sup>11</sup>

Homeric man, then, lacking an integral psyche, is (on this view) incapable of the mental activities of reflection and decision. Instead of a 'soul' engaged in dialogue, we find only a fragmented self, its parts in conflict one with another: "There are no divided feelings in Homer. ...Homer is unable to say: 'half-willing, half-unwilling'; instead he says, 'he was willing, but his thymos was not'. ...there is in Homer no genuine reflexion, no dialogue of the soul with itself."<sup>12</sup> Instead of a process of deliberation resulting in reasoned decision, we find a situation

in which external influences serve as the direct impetus to action: "Homer does not know genuine personal decisions...The thymos and the noos are so very little different from other physical organs that they cannot very well be looked upon as a genuine source of impulses....Mental and spiritual acts are due to the impact of external factors, and man is the open target of a great many forces which impinge on him, and penetrate his very core."<sup>13</sup>

What results from Snell's model is a Homeric man who is not a 'person' or coherent 'self' in that he is incapable of personal decision and of initiating action; all action originates from some external influence ('psychic intervention') or (in a variant of Snell's view) from the prompting of some part of the man--θυμός, ἦτορ, etc.--externalized and regarded as itself the agent of the action.<sup>14</sup> If there is no person originating action, there can be no scope for will to serve as the agency by which he effects that action.

The contemporary philosophical debate on the issues of personal identity and action theory is concerned with the question of whether or not we are ever justified in postulating a 'self' as the agent of action. Those who deny the existence (or the

coherence of the concept) of a 'self' hold what is sometimes called a 'no-agent' theory of action; that is, they consider all action to be pure activity, with no separate agent over and above the activity itself. Some among them go so far as to reduce all activity to mere process; that is, all behaviour is considered to result from, as it were, automatic processes occurring in response to external stimuli. These people are sometimes said to hold a 'process' theory of behaviour.<sup>15</sup>

It is evident in the account of Homeric psychology offered by Snell and his followers that they themselves subscribe in general to a self-as-agent theory of action.<sup>16</sup> Although they do not discuss the problem in the language of philosophical psychology, what they remark as noteworthy and unique in the Homeric representation of action is precisely the absence of such an underlying theory; their view of Homeric man as incapable of originating action attributes to him (or at any rate to Homer) an implicit 'process' theory of behaviour.

Since the general validity of a self-as-agent theory of action is not at issue in the debate concerning Homeric psychology, I will not concern myself

here with the deeper philosophical question of whether a self-as-agent theory is tenable; I will address only the question of whether, within the framework of that theory, Homer may be denied a conception of a 'self' which functions as the agent of action. I hope to show that an implicit self-as-agent theory is evident in the Homeric representation of action, and that notwithstanding the role of the gods in human action (a point discussed below), Homeric man manifests a conception of himself as an agent responsible for his own mental or psychic activity.

\* \* \* \* \*

Snell's view of the Homeric psychè as a fragmented target for external influences is shared by other scholars concerned with Homeric psychology. E. R. Dodds, in his study of the role of irrational forces in Greek society, also emphasizes the autonomy of the various psychic organs, the lack of a unified concept of 'soul' or 'personality' and the importance of 'psychic intervention' in Homeric man's mental life;<sup>17</sup> Dodds, however, grants to Homeric man some awareness of an 'ego' which can originate action. Although he

denies to Homeric man the concept of 'free will', Dodds still maintains that "that does not prevent him from distinguishing in practice between actions originated by the ego and those which he attributes to psychic intervention....And [Dodds goes on to say] it seems a little artificial to deny that what is described in passages like Il. 11.403ff. [Odysseus' debate with ~~his~~  $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$  on the battlefield] or Od. 5. 355ff. [Odysseus' deliberations about abandoning his raft in the storm off Scheria] is in effect a reasoned decision taken after consideration of possible alternatives."<sup>18</sup>

Hermann Fränkel, too, regards Homeric man as an "open force field" or "field of energy [ein offenes Kraftfeld], whose lines extend into space and time without limit or restraint" so that "external forces [may] operate in him without hindrance."<sup>19</sup> As a consequence of this interpenetration of person and external world, "our own basic antithesis between self and not-self does not yet exist in Homeric consciousness."<sup>20</sup> Fränkel thus concurs with the views of Snell and Dodds regarding the role of 'psychic intervention' in the life of Homeric man; however, on the correlated issue of personal decision, he, like Dodds, appears unwilling to adopt the extreme position advanced by

Snell. Although Fränkel recognizes the lack of a word for 'soul' in the Homeric language and consequently the lack of the concept in Homeric thought, he sees this lack as due not to "imperfect observation or undeveloped power of discrimination" but rather to Homeric man's perception of himself as a unitary being, not a cloven duality consisting of body on the one hand and soul on the other.<sup>21</sup> As a consequence of his psycho-physical unity, all of Homeric man's individual organs--whether they are, in our terms, 'mental' or 'physical'--"appertain directly to the person. Arms are as much an organ of the man himself, rather than of his body, as thymos (the organ of excitement) is an organ of the man, himself, rather than of his soul."<sup>22</sup>

Moreover, Fränkel recognizes in this unified person the existence of an 'ego' to which the various organs are subservient. The 'ego' can prevent an organ "from achieving what it wants. Homeric man can 'master' (δαμάσαι) his impulse (θυμός or μένος) or 'hold it back' (ἐρητύειν). Here also the unity of the person is preserved."<sup>23</sup> Furthermore, soliloquies cast in the form of addresses to the θυμός Fränkel regards as "not a real splitting of the ego but only discursive thinking."<sup>24</sup>



I would like to expand on the significance of this 'ego' which has been somewhat tentatively recognized by Dodds and Fränkel. A. W. H. Adkins, referring, like Fränkel, to the inhibition of impulses by the 'ego' (which Adkins calls 'the whole personality'), observes that "where there is to be restraint, the personality as a whole must restrain." Adkins points out that when Achilles is faced with the choice of killing Agamemnon or restraining his θυμός, "the etor may have debated, but Achilles himself, not his etor or any other part of him, must control his thumos." And, one might add, when Zeus acknowledges that he will give up his beloved Troy to Hera's wrath, he draws an explicit contrast between his θυμός, which is unwilling to relinquish Troy and his self (ἐγώ) which performs the action 'of its own free will' (ἐκῶν).

But the conception of an 'ego' or a 'whole personality' which may itself serve as the originator of action is by no means limited to contexts in which it is called upon to restrain or override various 'organs' or 'impulses'. Dodds points out the significance of Agamemnon's disclaimer, ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ αἰτιός εἰμι, ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς, 'I am not the cause, but Zeus', in

which Agamemnon recognizes himself (that is, his self) as a possible agent of the action in question, no less than Zeus.<sup>28</sup>

Homeric man is open to influence, certainly, from the gods and from his fellow men, as well as from his own θυμός. But it is ultimately the man himself who perceives and ponders and plans. It is true that Homer sometimes refers to these activities as being carried out by the psychic organs considered proximately responsible for them, e.g. 'his ἦτορ pondered two ways' (e.g. Il. 1.188-9). But a distorted picture results from considering only such passages as these and ignoring the multitude of passages in which action is predicated of a person, whether explicitly named or referred to by a personal pronoun or even merely by the personal ending of the verb. Adkins, having drawn attention to the existence of passages in which the person as a unity is said to initiate action, proceeds to play down their significance: "In such usages<sup>29</sup> it is the whole personality, even if this can be expressed only by the personal pronoun, that inhibits impulses. This, as we have seen, is not the most usual picture in Homer: the parts appear more frequently than the whole, the

relation to the whole is not clear, and there is no word for the whole, apart from the implications of the personal pronouns"<sup>30</sup> (my emphasis).

I would argue, against this view, that the "implications of the personal pronouns" are of vital significance for an adequate understanding of Homeric psychology. For if we grant that the pronominal reference implicit in the finite verbs incorporates reference to the 'person' as the agent of the action expressed (and in any case the point is not whether we are justified in doing so--a debate we may leave to the philosophers--but whether Homeric man, like most of the rest of us, did so)<sup>31</sup> then it is most emphatically not the case that (as Adkins alleges) "the parts appear more frequently than the whole"; indeed we must then take into account the innumerable occasions on which it is said that someone does such-and-such. Just as Homer can say 'he saw', not 'his eyes saw' and 'he struck', not 'his hand struck', so too does he say 'he realized', not 'his νόος realized', 'he pondered', 'he planned' and his characters themselves can say of themselves 'I did such-and-such': 'I pondered', 'I planned', etc.

In passages such as these, the person as a whole, as a unity, is recognized; he is named (explicitly or implicitly) and made the subject of verbs denoting mental or psychic activity and is thereby recognized as the agent, the originator, the auteur of that activity. Moreover, he reveals in his very language an awareness of himself (ἐγώ) as an agent responsible for action. It is true that the Homeric language has no one word corresponding to our word 'soul'; but the Homeric mentality does possess the concept of a self, a psycho-physical entity as capable of 'mental acts' as he is of physical action.<sup>33</sup> The lack of a single term denoting a man's psychic self as opposed to his physical self does not preclude an awareness on the part of Homeric man of individual selfhood. Indeed, the very existence of the traditions of praise and blame poetry is proof of a consciousness of a praiseworthy and blameworthy agent of action. And, within the epic itself, Homeric characters show no hesitation in making value judgments of their fellows predicated on an assumption of personal responsibility on the part of the agent in question: Hephaistos' complaint, for instance, that his promiscuous wife Aphrodite is not ἐχέθυμος;<sup>34</sup> Athene's incisive appraisal of Odysseus:

ἐπητής ἐσσι καὶ ἀγχίνοος καὶ ἐχέφρων,<sup>35</sup> and Helen's characterization of him as εἰδὼς παντοίους τε δόλους καὶ μῆδεα πυκνά;<sup>36</sup> the ubiquitous epithets such as περίφρων, πεπνυμένος, πολύμητις,<sup>37</sup> referring to intellectual and moral qualities; compliments for skill at weaving words and counsel<sup>38</sup> or reproach for unbecoming words or actions;<sup>39</sup> the charge that someone who is being, as we should say, 'short-sighted' 'does not know to look at once before and behind': οὐδέ τι οἶδε νοῆσαι ἅμα πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω,<sup>40</sup> the formulaic phrase used in the Homeric texts to refer to what contemporary moral philosophers call an 'all-things-considered' judgment. These few examples should indicate that the catalogue of evidence for Homeric man's assumption of personal responsibility for his actions could be extended to great length. But it is, I hope, sufficiently clear from the evidence cited that Homeric man does in fact operate within the framework of an implicit self-as-agent theory of action. Whether he is justified on philosophical grounds in doing so is, as I have remarked earlier, another question entirely and one not at issue here.

\* \* \* \* \*

We must now consider in more detail the disputed question of deliberation and decision in the Homeric poems and the related question of the role of the gods in instigating action.

In a study of Homeric scenes of deliberation, focussing on the verbs *μερμηρίζειν* and *ὀρμαίνειν* and on formulaic phrases such as *ὦδε δέ οἱ φρονέοντι δοῦσσοτο κερδίον εἶναι* and *ἥδε δέ οἱ κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνεται βουλή*, Christian Voigt concluded that there is no such thing as personal decision in Homer.<sup>41</sup> In Voigt's view, what is involved in such passages is something quite different from contemporary notions of personal responsibility.

Bruno Snell, likewise, in his discussion of 'Homer's View of Man', states explicitly that "Homer does not know genuine personal decisions; even where a hero is shown pondering two alternatives the intervention of the gods plays the key role."<sup>42</sup>

The significance of the intervention of the gods in human action is also stressed in E. R. Dodds' work on the Homeric conception of mental life,<sup>43</sup> a work rivalled only by Snell's writings in the impact it has had on subsequent study of Homeric psychology. Dodds emphasizes the importance in the Homeric 'shame-culture' of projection onto external sources of

unacceptable behaviour and impulses. Nevertheless, he allows to Homeric man, as we noted above, some power of personal decision and of "distinguishing in practice between actions originated by the ego and those which he attributes to psychic intervention."<sup>44</sup> The thrust of Dodds' work, however--his emphasis on divine intervention in human affairs, on the relative autonomy of Homeric man's psychic organs and on what he calls the "intellectualist approach" to the explanation of behaviour, which he sees as due to the lack of a concept of will in the Homeric mentality<sup>45</sup>--has led subsequent commentators to assimilate his view to that of Snell, namely, that mental activity originates from outside the person.<sup>46</sup>

Hermann Fränkel recognizes the existence of an 'ego' in Homeric man which is capable of restraining the various psychic organs.<sup>47</sup> Yet this view seems inconsistent with, and its influence is heavily outweighed by, his view of the Homeric 'self' as an "open force field", lacking structure and subject to frequent and indeed often trivial intervention from without.<sup>48</sup> Russo and Simon, for example, understand Fränkel's view as meaning "that the Homeric self or ego is simply not clearly conceived of or defined, either with regard to its component parts, or to those forces

that impinge upon it from without."<sup>49</sup> Fränkel's view thus implicitly denies to Homeric man an awareness of personal responsibility.

As we have seen, A. W. H. Adkins also allows to Homeric man a 'personality' which may override various impulses.<sup>50</sup> However, he considers this situation not typical of the Homeric conception of mental activity; in common with Snell and Voigt, Adkins would deny to Homeric man any real sense of personal responsibility. Reiterating Voigt's view of impersonal constructions such as ἤδε δέ μοι κατὰ θυμὸν ἀρίστη φαίνεται βουλή, Adkins claims that "there is a distinct difference in model...between 'I decided' and 'it seemed best to me'. The latter suggests a kind of spectral balance into which the reasons on one side or the other are poured until at length, after due consideration, the balance goes down by itself and action ensues. The model is quite different from one involving the idea of decision."<sup>51</sup> But, as E. L. Harrison had already pointed out (in response to Voigt's similar claim), in passages where impersonal constructions such as this are used, "we know already who is involved on each occasion: all we wish to be told at this point is what he decides to do. And the conclusion that through this shift of emphasis



the situation in some odd way does the deciding, rather than the man himself is surely wide of the mark."<sup>52</sup>

In support of Harrison's point we may cite Od. 11.225ff. When Odysseus in the Underworld wishes to question separately the shades of the women he ponders how best to proceed and announces his plan of action as 'this βουλή appeared best to me...' (Od. 11.230). But immediately prior to his announcement of the βουλή he intends to carry out, he states explicitly his own part in the process: αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ βούλευον ὅπως ἐρέοιμι ἐκάστην (229). The significance of Odysseus' awareness that he himself is responsible for the considering and planning cannot be overemphasized. And even in the ensuing impersonal construction the standard is still μοι: 'this βουλή appeared best to me'. (The juxtaposition of δοκεῖ and νοέω at Il. 9.103-5 indicates that use of the impersonal construction implies no abnegation of responsibility: what seems best to Nestor is precisely the νόος which he has himself devised: αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ἐρέω ὥς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἄριστα. / οὐ γὰρ τις νόον ἄλλος ἀμείνονα τοῦδε νοήσει, / οἷόν ἐγὼ νοέω.)

Another type of formulaic passage in which personal decision is denied on the Snell-Voigt view involves

what we would call 'soliloquies', in which a man speaks to his θυμός, pondering alternatives. It is claimed that the man does not actually choose one alternative or the other but rather he is overtaken by events originating from some agency external to himself while he is still in the midst of deliberating.<sup>53</sup> For example, Il. 11.403ff., Odysseus' debate with his θυμός whether to stand or flee on the battlefield, or Od. 5.355ff., Odysseus' debate whether to abandon his raft in the storm off Scheria. In such passages the ensuing action, following the debate, is introduced with the formulaic phrase Ἦος ὁ ταῦθ' ὄρμαίνε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν... But such a phrase is not to be taken as indicating an interruption of the process of deliberation; it is merely a vivid way of expressing the immediacy of the ensuing action. And in fact in the two passages cited Odysseus has quite clearly already made his decision before the action proceeds,<sup>54</sup> in the first to stand and fight, for better or for worse, and in the second to cling to his raft, even against the advice of the goddess Ino Leukothea.

The latter passage is clearly significant with regard to the question of Homeric man's dependence on external agency for the instigating of action. But

equally interesting is the fact that this passage is by no means unique in this respect. E. L.

Harrison points out that in addition to many passages in which "divine influence and human spontaneity stand together as two aspects of the same thing" (a situation Dodds refers to as "overdetermination"),<sup>55</sup> there are also passages in which "spontaneity is separated from divine intervention, and even set in antithesis with it."<sup>56</sup>

It is true that the characters in the Homeric poems sometimes refer to their own past actions as having been determined by the intervention of a god, e.g. 'Zeus robbed me/him of my/his wits'. But such statements, when considered in their contexts, may be seen for what they are, namely, excuses for otherwise inexcusable behaviour. These statements constitute a special type of abnegation of responsibility and we are not justified in extrapolating from this specific situation to Homeric man's general conception of personal responsibility. Harrison has a very perceptive comment on this type of statement: "the phrases involved belong to a universal human tendency of the 'I don't know what made me do it' type: and they constitute a convenient method of disclaiming guilt in the past, rather than a surrender of personal

freedom in the present."<sup>57</sup> A similar device occurs in the use of the vocative δαίμονιε/δαίμονιη, a term used only by one character to another, never by the poet as an 'objective' judgment on a character's actions or nature, and indicating that the speaker finds (or purports to find) the behaviour of the person so addressed incomprehensible and therefore to be attributed to an influence external to the person himself.<sup>58</sup> We may compare phrases of the sort often heard in contemporary society: 'He wasn't himself when he did that', 'I don't know what got into me', 'It's her medication, you know'. It appears to be a natural human tendency to attribute to a source external to ourselves behaviour which we regard as inexplicable given our conception of ourselves. (This situation extends on occasion to favourable influence as well, e.g. 'The solution to the problem came to me as I awoke'.) Homeric man was simply more fortunate than we in having a pantheon of gods ready to hand for the purpose.

As for those passages in which a man ponders two alternatives and a god intervenes to suggest a course of action which the man adopts, the claim is made that these scenes present paradigmatic instances of Homeric man's incapacity for decision-making, that the god

makes a choice for him which he then blindly follows.<sup>59</sup>

However, an examination of these passages reveals that the typical situation is one in which the god does not in fact choose one of the alternatives under debate; rather he suggests a way out of the quandary, a course of action altogether different from the choices under debate by the person deliberating. The person then chooses to adopt the suggested course, in at least one instance with a comment on the advisability of so doing. For example, in the famous Quarrel in Book 1 of the Iliad, Achilles ponders two courses of action only, whether to kill Agamemnon there and then or to forego his anger entirely. Athene intervenes, at Hera's instigation, not to choose either of the alternatives Achilles is debating but to suggest a middle course,<sup>60</sup> not one Achilles would normally have considered, namely, to attack Agamemnon with words. Achilles acquiesces, commenting that it is prudent for a man to heed the suggestions of the gods. Again, at Il. 10.503ff. Diomedes in the Thracian camp ponders whether to make off with Rhesos' chariot or to continue his slaughter of the Thracians, whereupon Athene intervenes to suggest instead a hasty retreat while time permits. Even Zeus himself, the ὕπατος μῆστορ, receives this type

of advice, Il. 16.431ff.: when Sarpedon faces his doom in the person of Patroklos, Zeus in pity for his son debates whether to allow his death or to rescue him from the battle and transport him to his home in Lycia. Outraged at this threat to the appointed way, Hera proposes by way of compromise that Zeus allow Sarpedon's death indeed but send his body to Lycia for proper burial. 'Nor did the father of men and gods fail to heed her.'

In situations of this type, the god's suggestion represents the sudden realization that there is a way out of an apparent quandary, that one is not in fact bound by the choices one has been debating. The appearance of the god is a dramatization of this flash of insight that seems to come to one from outside.<sup>61</sup>

In addition to those occasional passages in which a process of deliberation is explicitly represented, there are numerous passages in Homer in which consideration of alternative courses of action is implied.<sup>62</sup> The following is a brief survey taken from Books 1 and 2 of the Iliad: 1.83, Calchas bids Achilles swear that he will defend him if he speaks out against Agamemnon; 'consider' (φράσαι), he concludes, 'if you will keep me safe'. 1.140,

Agamemnon, having agreed to give up Chryseis, demands suitable recompense following her return, saying, 'We will consider this matter later' (μεταφρασόμεσθα). 1.188-9, Achilles is provoked beyond bearing by Agamemnon's insults and threats and his ἦτορ 'pondered two ways' (διδάνδωχα μερμήριξεν) whether to kill Agamemnon or to check his anger. 1.193, While Achilles pondered (ᾤομαι) the matter in (or perhaps in accordance with) his φρήν and θυμός, Athene appeared. 1.343, Achilles remarks on Agamemnon's shortsightedness: 'he does not at all know to look at once before and behind'. As mentioned above,<sup>63</sup> this is the Homeric way of saying that Agamemnon is not making an 'all-things-considered' judgment. 1.542, Hera reproaches Zeus for always giving judgments which he has been considering (φρονέοντα) in secret. 1.554, In response to Zeus' sharp retort, Hera protests that she is not in the habit of questioning him, but 'at your ease do you consider (φράζεσθε) whatever you wish'. 2.3, Zeus did not sleep but pondered (μερμήριξε) κατὰ φρένα how to honour Achilles. 2.13-14, Zeus bids the Dream tell Agamemnon that the immortals are no longer divided in counsel (οὐ...ἔτ' ἀμφις...φράζονται). 2.23, The Dream reproaches Agamemnon for sleeping in the midst of crisis: 'it is not fitting for a man who

is a counsellor (βουλευφόρον ἄνδρα) to sleep the whole night through'.<sup>64</sup> 2.55, Even Agamemnon, whose solution to his dilemma at Il. 10.1ff. is to go ask Nestor, is on occasion capable of planning: when he had convened the council of elders<sup>65</sup> he 'contrived a cunning plan (πυκινὴν ἀρτύνετο βουλήν)--although, given the repercussions of his 'cunning plan' this may indeed be a touch of irony on Homer's part.

Harrison, who sees Homeric man as "an independent agent capable of spontaneous acts,"<sup>66</sup> questions Voigt's method: "Voigt examines some three dozen passages, leaves untouched the general pattern of Homeric behaviour, and comes to the conclusion that there is no notion of responsibility in Homer."<sup>67</sup> It is in this 'general pattern' that we may clearly see Homeric man's conception of himself as a responsible agent. Moreover, if Homer is incapable of conceiving of action originating other than through external agency where does this leave his portrayal of the actions of the gods? Where, for example, does the βουλή of Zeus come from? If Homeric man relies on the gods to make his decisions, on whom does Zeus rely?<sup>68</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*



My approach to Homeric psychology is also at variance with the so-called 'intellectualist' view of the Greek mind, notably represented by E. R. Dodds, which, as M. J. O'Brien observes, has become, in one form or other, a commonplace of scholarship.<sup>69</sup> This view, most recently in evidence in Albrecht Dihle's study of The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity, attributes to the Greeks in general and to Homer in particular a bipartite psychology based on the interaction of rational and irrational factors, reason and emotion, with, as Dihle remarks, "no room for the concept of will."<sup>70</sup> Yet Dihle's own observations of Homeric usage oblige him to concede that μένος in Homer "comes indeed very near to the modern notion of will."<sup>71</sup> Faced, however, with this potentially devastating threat to his theory, Dihle takes refuge in the conventional view that μένος depends for its existence on psychic intervention: "μένος...does not belong to the normal or natural equipment of man according to Homeric psychology. ...μένος is an additional gift [from the gods], provided only on a special occasion and not supposed to become a lasting part of the person in question. ...It is something numinous which only appears where the gods unpredictably interfere with human affairs, thus

disturbing the calculable sequence of events."<sup>72</sup>

This view of μένος (an extreme version of Dodds' more moderate view) does not survive a close scrutiny of the Homeric text.

E. R. Dodds had earlier seen a volitional element in μένος: "The connection of menos with the sphere of volition comes out clearly in the related words μενοινᾶν, 'to be eager', and δυσμενής, 'wishing ill'."<sup>73</sup> However, Dodds, like Dihle, regards Homeric man as not possessing the concept of will;<sup>74</sup> indeed he considers the absence of the concept of will to be responsible for the "habitual 'intellectualism'"<sup>75</sup> which he sees in the Homeric (and later) account of character and behaviour, and on which his theory is based. He thus attempts to relegate μένος to the realm of psychic intervention: "The temporary possession of a heightened menos is...an abnormal state which demands a supernatural explanation. ...It is an abnormal experience. ...the act of a god."<sup>76</sup>

It is not clear to me whether Dodds would accept the premise implicit in the wording of this claim, namely, that there is a normal state of Homeric man that involves the lasting possession of an ordinary amount of μένος. If this is in fact the normal state of affairs, what would this ordinary μένος be?

Dodds observes that "in man [ $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$ ] is the vital energy, the 'spunk'."<sup>77</sup> But if we concede that  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$  is 'vital energy' or 'spunk' and that it is connected with the sphere of volition, we might as well simply call it 'will'--or the conative agency in man, or whatever term we prefer from the traditional vocabulary of 'willing'. The problem now is that we are in danger of contradicting the claim that there is no concept of will in Homer.

It is of course the accepted view to regard Homer as being pre-conceptual. M. J. O'Brien, in his effort to show that the Socratic paradoxes (that 'virtue is knowledge' and that 'no one does wrong on purpose') were indeed paradoxes, presents a strong case for his view that "the supposed intellectualist bias of the Greek mind...does not exist."<sup>78</sup> Through a detailed study of words denoting mental activity from Homer on, O'Brien demonstrates that the Homeric (and later) language defies classification by our theoretical categories; it often happens that the same word has both intellectual and volitional reference, a phenomenon O'Brien finds in ordinary and poetical language of all periods, in contrast to the precisions of philosophical terminology.<sup>79</sup> Yet O'Brien concurs with Dodds in seeing the lack of a formal

concept of will in Homer; he would likewise deny to Homer a formal concept of intellect, which he regards Dodds as implying.<sup>80</sup> We may ask, however, what exactly it is that is being denied to Homer in this claim. If by a formal concept we mean a topic of theoretical reflection, something for which an adequate definition or account of its essence may be given, then indeed Homer has no formal concepts since explicit theoretical reflection is not part of the Homeric subject matter. However, it has been recognized at least since the later Wittgenstein that it is entirely possible to have a concept in a meaningful sense of the term without being able to give an adequate definition or account of the essence of whatever is involved in the concept.<sup>81</sup> Concepts in this less rigorous sense are unquestionably present in Homer. Homeric descriptions of psychic activity, for example, clearly indicate the presence of a concept of cognition, a concept of emotion and impulse, a concept of rational deliberation.<sup>82</sup> Why not, then, a concept of will?

The issue is complicated by the variety of conceptions to which the term 'will' has been attached in the Western philosophical tradition.<sup>83</sup>

Will may be taken to include desire, feeling, emotion, and whatever else in human experience is not treated as knowledge; or it may be given any one of a number of specialized interpretations such as, for example, the notion of 'free will'. I believe (and I hope to demonstrate elsewhere) that many of our traditional conceptions of will were present in early Greek thought but were conceived of as distinct agencies or powers and referred to by distinctive language.<sup>84</sup> Thus, as in the case of 'soul', early Greek has no single word corresponding to our word 'will'; we find instead a cluster of words, each denoting some particular aspect of what we designate by the one word 'will'. It would appear to be just this circumstance that leads commentators to feel justified in denying the concept to Homer, but in fact the inadequacy of a single term to denote the manifold conceptions subsumed under 'willing' is indicated by the extensive debate regarding the nature of the will throughout the philosophical tradition. We are not justified in denying a concept (or concepts) of will to Homer simply because he has no single word corresponding to our (by no means unproblematical) word 'will'.<sup>85</sup>

In this connection Hermann Fränkel's comment pertaining to his discussion of Hesiod is worth citing: —

I do not adhere to the doctrine that we have no right to ascribe to a thinker a notion for the unequivocal expression of which he possessed and used no specific tool. Quite to the contrary: it is perfectly normal for this or that concept to have existed in a person's mind, in a less definitive form, long before someone else couched it in dry and set philosophical phraseology. ...A realization that it is easy to mistranslate, foisting upon the ancient thinker concepts alien to him, must not prevent us from following up clues where we see them clearly pointed in a definite direction.<sup>86</sup>

I would like to enter the same plea for the study of Homeric psychology.

### Chapter III: Towards a new model of Homeric psychology

The model of Homeric psychology which I propose here differs from Snell's 'process' theory as well as from the bipartite theory of the 'intellectualists' in that it accounts for the initiating of action in an ordered sequence of functions of the major psychic faculties νόος, θυμός, φρένες and, I suggest, μένος.

I will first briefly discuss Homeric man's psychic faculties (excepting μένος) and their functions, beginning with a discussion of ψυχή although, as indicated below, the Homeric ψυχή is not responsible for any specific psychic activity, as are the four faculties just mentioned. The following discussion of the Homeric νόος, θυμός and φρένες is based on accepted views of these faculties already established in the scholarly literature; if my account offers any original contribution, it lies primarily in the use I make of these accepted interpretations in my proposed model of Homeric psychology.

ψυχή

As we have seen, Snell considers ψυχή, θυμός and νόος the three 'organs' responsible for Homeric man's psychic life. ψυχή he sees as "the force which keeps the human being alive."<sup>1</sup> Identified with the breath of life, it is "a semi-concrete organ which exists in a man as long as he lives";<sup>2</sup> it is the "'organ' of life."<sup>3</sup> "As for its location, and its function, Homer passes them over in silence";<sup>4</sup> Homer says only that the ψυχή "leaves its owner when he is dying, or when he loses consciousness...the psyche is risked in battle, a battle is fought for it, one wishes to save his psyche, and so forth."<sup>5</sup> "It appears [Snell concludes] as if in Homeric times the term psyche chiefly evoked the notion of an eschatological soul."<sup>6</sup>

Subsequent studies have pointed out that the Homeric ψυχή, having in fact no specific mental or emotional functions in the living man, is not to be grouped with θυμός and νόος as a psychic 'organ'; "its 'esse'," Dodds observes, "appears to be 'super-esse' and nothing more."<sup>7</sup>



In her survey of the role of  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  in the Homeric poems, Shirley Darcus observes that the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  is "something within man that can be fought for, removed, destroyed, or lost";<sup>8</sup> the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  can be risked, given up, or won;<sup>9</sup> it is loosed at death or breathed out in a swoon; it leaves the dying man through the mouth or through a wound. After death the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  exists in Hades as an  $\epsilon\lambda\delta\omega\lambda\omicron\nu$  of the person who in life had possessed it. During life the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  is the object of attention only when it is threatened or when it leaves the body at death or at the onset of a swoon.<sup>10</sup>

On the basis of Homeric man's apparent attitude to his  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ , it has been claimed that the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  is "the force which keeps the human being alive";<sup>11</sup> "the breath-soul endowing [man] with life";<sup>12</sup> "that whose presence ensures that the individual is alive."<sup>13</sup> Yet there is no evidence in Homer that a causal relation exists between  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  and 'life'; all we can say is that  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  is normally a concomitant of 'life'. Clearly, a man's  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  leaves him (or his body) forever when he dies. But equally clearly it leaves him temporarily when he faints<sup>14</sup> and, upon recovery, it will

have been obvious to him, as well as to any bystander, that he was not actually dead while in his  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ -less swoon; that is, his  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  can be temporarily absent from a living man--although, admittedly, a swooning or a sleeping man may not be thought to be 'alive' in the fullest sense of the word. Nevertheless, the fact remains that while the presence of the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  may guarantee life its absence does not guarantee death. (Death involves the permanent loss not only of the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  but of the  $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$  and  $\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$  as well.)<sup>15</sup>

It would appear then, that what is dependent on the presence of the  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  is not 'life' itself but rather 'consciousness', in the sense of an awareness of oneself and one's surroundings, a necessary condition for psychic activity. And just as consciousness is today commonly remarked upon<sup>16</sup> only as leaving and returning to a person, so the Homeric  $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$  is noticed only in its absence or threatened absence. Moreover, the dependence of consciousness upon something that is identified with the material breath<sup>17</sup> is, in Homeric terms, entirely understandable since consciousness leaves a man when he 'breathes his last' or 'has the wind knocked out of him'.

It has been observed that while ψυχή figures prominently in Homeric descriptions of the onset of a swoon, it does not appear in descriptions of revival.<sup>18</sup> Böhme argues that ψυχή is excluded from such contexts precisely because it does not denote consciousness, whereas θυμός and μένος regularly do. Böhme concludes, therefore, that the Homeric ψυχή is not a "Psyche-seele" but a mere "Totengeist".<sup>19</sup> Nagy likewise notes that while the ψυχή commonly leaves the body at the onset of a swoon, "only the thūmós or ménos are mentioned as returning to the hero when he is revived."<sup>20</sup> He claims further that "before death, the word psūkhē is as a rule excluded from designating the realm of consciousness, of rational and emotional functions," whereas "both thūmós and ménos may designate consciousness and the faculties."<sup>21</sup>

In suggesting that ψυχή might best be understood as that on which the consciousness depends, I do not claim that it refers to "the realm of consciousness" in the sense of a location where "rational and emotional" activity takes place. Psychic activity in Homer takes place in the φρένες, which contain the νόος and θυμός and surround the ἥτορ/κῆρ/κραδίη.<sup>22</sup> The presence of the

ψυχή, I repeat, appears to be a necessary condition for this psychic activity.

As for the exclusion of ψυχή in descriptions of revival from swoons, there are two points which would appear to invalidate the conclusions of Böhme and others based on this observation. First, Nehring, in his analysis of Homeric descriptions of swoons, points out the regular occurrence in descriptions of recovery of the verbs ἀμυντο/ἀμυνθή, signifying the revival of the respiration.<sup>23</sup> Implicit in these expressions is the return of the ψυχή, which is identified with the breath;<sup>24</sup> thus, only the word ψυχή is missing from these formulaic descriptions, not the concept.<sup>25</sup> Second, it is appropriate that θυμός and μένος should figure prominently in recovery from a swoon (and particularly so in the case of Homeric heroes) since what is noteworthy about revival is not the return of mere consciousness but the resurgence of the victim's 'spirit', his capacity for physical and emotional activity; only when this capacity is no longer impaired is his recovery considered complete.<sup>26</sup>

νόος

Our understanding of the Homeric conception of νόος we owe principally to Kurt von Fritz, whose conclusions concerning "νόος and νοεῖν in the Homeric Poems" remain essentially unchallenged.<sup>27</sup> Von Fritz showed that νόος in Homer is conceived of as exercising a "kind of mental perception," which is to be distinguished from "purely sensual perception" on the one hand and from a process of reasoning on the other.<sup>28</sup> Its derivative verb νοεῖν means "to realize [the full meaning of] a situation and to plan or to have an intention" with regard to that situation.<sup>29</sup> "This plan [also designated νόος] appears in the form of a vision which, so to speak, extends the present situation into the future."<sup>30</sup> That is, "where νόος means planning, it is the visualization of the plan which we see unfold, not a process of reasoning by which its usefulness or the necessary interdependence of its different parts might be demonstrated"<sup>31</sup> (my emphasis). Von Fritz points out that "the same is true of the passages in which νόος means 'to have an intention'. In these cases also it is very easy

to see that the vision of the intended action is stressed and not the process of reasoning by which a person may arrive at his resolution. Where, on the other hand, a person deliberates concerning his future course of action, this process of deliberation is never described by the word  $\nu\omicron\epsilon\iota\nu$  but by a number of different words, most of them derived from the root  $\phi\rho\epsilon\nu$ .<sup>32</sup>

Snell, following von Fritz, sees  $\nu\omicron\omicron\varsigma$  as "the organ of clear images," "the mental eye which exercises an unclouded vision," and  $\nu\omicron\epsilon\iota\nu$  as meaning "to acquire a clear image of something," particularly of a situation; "it stands for a type of seeing which involves not merely visual activity but the mental act which goes with the vision."<sup>33</sup>

E. L. Harrison shares this view of  $\nu\omicron\omicron\varsigma$  as "the mental organ that 'takes in' a situation as it is presented to the senses"; he cautions, however, that the frequent (and natural) connection of  $\nu\omicron\omicron\varsigma$  with the faculty of sight "should not lead us to over-emphasise the connection with vision to the exclusion of the other senses."<sup>34</sup> The activity designated by  $\nu\omicron\epsilon\iota\nu$  could presumably be connected with any one of

the five senses; indeed, it may itself be regarded, as von Fritz suggested, as "a kind of sixth sense which penetrates deeper into the nature of the objects perceived than the other senses."<sup>35</sup>

Harrison stresses a point made earlier by Böhme<sup>36</sup> and contested to some extent by von Fritz,<sup>37</sup> namely, the non-emotional nature of νόος, which he sees as "the direct consequence of the job it does" of 'taking in' a situation.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, he claims, with Böhme, that "there is actual antagonism in Homer between emotion and the νόος,"<sup>39</sup> and that, unlike the situation with Homeric man's emotions (his θυμός) "the question of controlling [his νόος], or acting against it, or indeed of any sort of opposition between it and the ego, does not of course arise."<sup>40</sup> In contrast to von Fritz, Harrison sees no volitional element in νόος understood as 'intention' or 'plan'; "it is simply [a man's] mental image of what he is about to do."<sup>41</sup>

θυμός

θυμός, as Harrison notes, "plays a dominant role" in Homeric man's psychic life. Snell defines θυμός as "the generator of motion or agitation," observing that it "determines physical motion"<sup>42</sup> and "is customarily the abode of joy, pleasure, love, sympathy, anger and all mental agitation";<sup>43</sup> moreover, "occasionally we also find knowledge residing in it"<sup>44</sup> (albeit knowledge of a particular kind, namely, knowledge which has an explicitly emotional element or basis). Snell observes that θυμός may refer to (1) the organ which serves as the seat of (e)motions;<sup>45</sup> (2) the function of that organ, in which capacity θυμός may be rendered (he suggests) as 'will' or 'character'; or (3) a single act, each individual impulse being termed a θυμός.<sup>46</sup>

Whereas Snell emphasizes the emotional activity of θυμός, Böhme considers θυμός to be responsible for both rational and emotional functions.<sup>47</sup> He is followed in this view by Harrison, who sees θυμός as "the main locus of Homeric man's deliberation and decision" and considers it "quite wrong to see the key to its Homeric



usage in terms of the emotional to the exclusion of the rational."<sup>48</sup> This view is also accepted by Nagy, who takes θυμός as designating "the realm of consciousness, of rational and emotional functions"<sup>49</sup> (νόος, being concerned with "rational functions only," Nagy considers to be "a mere subcategory of thūmós in the living Homeric hero.").<sup>50</sup>

However, as Snell intimates<sup>51</sup> and as Harrison recognizes<sup>52</sup> (although he appears unaware of the implications), much so-called 'thought' in Homer has a pronounced emotional element: "thought," Harrison observes, "tends to be worried thought, angry thought, and so on."<sup>53</sup> But, one may ask, is "worried thought, angry thought," etc., thought at all, in the sense, that is, of a rational process? Is it not rather a being impelled to action by desire (emotion)--desire to accomplish something, to avoid something, and so on? One's desires may of course come into conflict one with another, in which case there ensues, so to speak, a tug of war, in which the stronger desire prevails, or a balancing of the conflicting desires, from which the weightier emerges victorious. But this sort of process is to be entirely distinguished from rational deliberation.

Harrison uses the terms "the rational," "the rational element," "rational activity" to refer to thought-processes in general and opposes these to "the emotional."<sup>54</sup> It would appear to be more useful, in discussing Homeric mental activity, to distinguish different types of thought-processes: cognition conceived of as a passive process and located in the νόος, 'emotional thought' in the θυμός, and (to anticipate the next section) rational deliberation in the φρένες. Fränkel implicitly draws a similar distinction in understanding θυμός as the seat of "intimations which have no rational certainty and deliberations which have an emotional element"; φρήν, on the other hand, "works over things and ideas...it is the thinking, reflecting, and knowing reason."<sup>55</sup>

φρήν/φρένες

As I have just indicated, φρήν/φρένες functions for Homeric man as the seat of rational deliberation. The activities denoted by the verbs βυσσοδομεῖω, μερμηρίζω, μῆδομαι and ὀρμαίνω take place in the φρένες.<sup>56</sup> The φρένες are also involved in the experience of certain emotions--although whether the φρένες serve<sup>41</sup> as the location for these emotions or as the means by which a person experiences them is a disputed question.<sup>57</sup> In any case, as Harrison notes, there is, on the whole, a marked difference between emotions associated with the φρένες and those associated with the θυμός. For example, "the impulsiveness of anger and courage is much less frequently seated in [the φρένες]: instead we find most commonly the introspection of grief and of fear." Moreover there is a "pronounced tendency for the φρήν to be concerned with things of the mind rather than of the body."<sup>58</sup> Thus, whereas the θυμός is commonly the seat of physical desire (for food, drink, etc.), the φρένες are involved in "such feelings as the contentment of the shepherd as he watches his flock, or the joy

produced by the lyre, a song, or the sight of beautiful things."<sup>59</sup> That is, what we might term aesthetic pleasure is experienced 'in' or 'with' the φρόνες, physical desire in the θυμός.

Harrison observes further that "the irrational impulses of the θυμός are regularly conceived as being in opposition to a man, so that they impel him, and he yields to them or overcomes them. But such interaction between man and his φρήν is lacking." In the use of φρήν "the rational element is in fact dominant."<sup>60</sup>

In the rational sphere, φρήν is distinguished from νόος by virtue of its reflective and deliberative capacities while νόος is limited to cognition and intuitive planning.<sup>61</sup> Harrison observes that "where thought about future action is involved, the φρήν calculates whereas...the νόος visualises" (my emphasis) and he illustrates the point by a contrast in verbal usage: in such contexts νοεῖν appears most often in aorist forms, never in the imperfect, whereas verbs with φρήν are regularly imperfects, seldom aorists.<sup>62</sup>

The much disputed question of the location of the φρόνες and their identification with a physical

organ (or organs) has yet to be satisfactorily resolved. The major interpretations are 'diaphragm', 'lungs', or, more vaguely, 'a group of organs within the chest region'.<sup>63</sup> The most recent extensive treatment concludes that the case must be left open: The "range of occurrence [of φρένες] suggests not a single organ but a group situated within a vaguely defined area extending from the upper chest to the mid-abdomen."<sup>64</sup>

However, it would seem that R. B. Onians' interpretation of φρένες as lungs<sup>65</sup> (despite occasional overstatement) has so much to recommend it and so comparatively little against it--as well as being unquestionably the most thoroughly and convincingly documented interpretation yet advanced--that a very strong case indeed would be required to justify rejecting it. I am therefore inclined to favour Onians' identification of φρένες with the lungs (perhaps including the diaphragm also, as Onians suggests).<sup>66</sup>

Finally, since the φρένες are said to 'contain' or 'hold' or 'surround' the other psychic organs, νόος, θυμός, ἥτορ/κῆρ/κραδίη, they are generalized as the seat of psychic activity, encompassing the

more specific activities of the other organs. This situation would account for many of the apparent 'confusions' of psychic activity, as when νοεῖν, for instance, properly a function of the νόος is said to take place in the φρένες.<sup>67</sup> Given that the νόος is itself in the φρένες such an extension is entirely natural. Indeed, the very fact that the φρένες serve as the seat of general psychic activity and that the other psychic organs may be regarded as parts of them (or at least as located within them) brings them very close to being the single term or concept designating the capacity for general psychic activity which Snell looked for in Homer and found wanting.<sup>68</sup>

To conclude:  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  appears to be a necessary condition for psychic activity in that it determines the presence of consciousness.  $\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$  refers to the faculty and function of cognition, in a limited, 'passive' sense.  $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$  is the source of emotion, particularly of the more 'active' emotions, those which serve as impetus to action, such as anger and fear, and of physical desire; it is thus the source of impulse.  $\phi\rho\acute{\eta}\nu/\phi\rho\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\varsigma$  is the seat of deliberation and of the more 'passive' emotions of 'intellectual' or aesthetic pleasure; it is also used in a general way as the seat of psychic activity, encompassing the activities of the  $\nu\acute{o}\varsigma$  and  $\theta\upsilon\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$ .

#### Chapter IV: μένος as 'will' in early Greek

In the preceding chapter I have described Homeric man's capacities for the mental activities involved in cognition, impulse, and deliberation and decision; these activities constitute the functions, respectively, of the psychic faculties νόος, θυμός and φρένες. The sequential order of these activities in the originating of action is indicated below;<sup>1</sup> they form the first three steps in a four-step analysis of the activity known as 'willing', as it has been treated in the Western philosophical tradition:<sup>2</sup>

Step 1: The apprehension of a situation or state of affairs: an activity of the Homeric νόος.

Step 2: Impulses arising in response to this situation: an activity of the θυμός.

Conflicting impulses may arise, in which case we have:

Step 3: The personal effort to resolve the conflict of impulses in terms of some reflective objective (the process of deliberation): an activity of the φρένες, resulting in a decision or choice: βουλή.



(Step 3 may be omitted in instances of instinctive as opposed to reflective choice, a distinction recognized by Avicenna but largely disregarded by theorists in the Western tradition.)<sup>3</sup>

Step 4: Controlled execution of the decision (or of the instinctive choice) in volitionally directed activity or omission of activity.

The activity involved in Step 4 (and the faculty of which this activity is the function) represents one particular conception of 'will' as it has been understood by various thinkers throughout the tradition. This specific aspect of the activity of 'willing' involves a conception of will as energy, the power to do or produce something; it is that which is responsible for the carrying out of one's choices or decisions, either by an external process involving bodily activity or by an internal process involving a psychic effort to refrain from acting.<sup>4</sup> I suggest that the activity involved in Step 4 is an activity that was recognized by the early Greek mentality and that the agency or faculty considered proximately responsible for it was μένος. Μένος, on this view, is (in modern terms) the capacity of

the mind to act; it performs the functions to which it is directed by the other psychic faculties. (As we shall see, μένος is also intimately bound up with physical processes, just as nowadays we link performance to, for example, blood sugar level or adrenalin production.)

I will now present a discussion of selected passages in which μένος occurs in an effort to demonstrate that the interpretation proposed here is applicable in every instance and is, in many instances, preferable to the various interpretations of μένος commonly accepted for these contexts.

\* \* \* \* \*

1. Il. 1.188-224

ὣς φάτο· Πηλεΐωνι δ' ἄχος γένετ', ἐν δέ οἱ ἦτορ  
στήθεσσιν ασπίδι διάνδιχα μερμήριζεν,  
ἦ δ' ὅ γε φάσγανον ὄξυ ἐρυσσάμενος παρὰ μηροῦ  
τοὺς μὲν ἀναστήσειεν, ὃ δ' Ἀτρεΐδην ἐναρίζοι,

190

ἦε χόλον παύσειεν ἐρητύσειέ τε θυμόν.  
ἦος δ' ταῦθ' ὄρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,  
ἔλκετο δ' ἐκ κολεοῦ μέγα ξίφος, ἦλθε δ' Ἀθήνη  
οὐρανόθεν· πρὸ γὰρ ἦκε θεὰ λευκώλενος Ἥρη,  
ἄμφω ὁμῶς θυμῷ φιλέουσά τε κηδομένη τε·  
στή δ' ὄπιθεν, ξανθῆς δὲ κόμης ἔλε Πηλεΐωνα  
οἷφ φαινομένη· τῶν δ' ἄλλων οὐ τις δρᾷτο·  
θάμβησεν δ' Ἀχιλεὺς, μετὰ δ' ἐτράπετ', αὐτίκα δ' ἔγνω

195

Παλλὰδ' Ἀθηναίην· δειῶν δέ οἱ ὄσσε φάανθεν·  
καί μιν φωνήσας ἔπεα πτερόεντα προσηύδα·  
"τίπτ' αὐτ', αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς τέκος, εἰλήλουθας;  
ἦ ἴνα ὕβρυν ἴδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρεΐδαο;  
ἀλλ' ἔκ τοι ἔρῳ, τὸ δὲ καὶ τελέεσθαι οἶω·  
ἦε ὑπεροπλήσῃ τάχ' ἂν ποτε θυμόν ὀλέσση."

200

205

Τὸν δ' αὖτε προσέειπε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη·  
 "ἦλθον ἐγὼ παύσουσα τὸ σὸν μένος, αἶ κε πίθῃαι,  
 οὐρανόθεν· πρὸ δέ μ' ἦκε θεὰ λευκώλενος Ἥρη  
 ἄμφω δμῶς θυμῷ φιλέουσά τε κηδομένη τε·  
 ἀλλ' ἄγε λῆγ' ἔριδος, μηδὲ ξίφος ἔλκεο χειρὶ·  
 ἀλλ' ἦτοι ἔπεσιν μὲν ὀνειδίσον ὥς ἔσεται περ·  
 ὦδε γὰρ ἐξερέω, τὸ δὲ καὶ τετελεσμένον ἔσται·  
 καὶ ποτέ τοι τρίς τόσσα παρέσσεται ἀγλαὰ δῶρα  
 ὕβριος εἴνεκα τῆσδε· σὺ δ' ἴσχεο, πείθεο δ' ἡμῶν."  
 Τὴν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη πόδας ὠκὺς Ἀχιλλεύς·  
 "χρὴ μὲν σφωίτερόν γε, θεά, ἔπος εἰρύσασθαι  
 καὶ μάλα περ θυμῷ κεχαλωμένον· ὧς γὰρ δμεινόν·  
 ὅς κε θεοῖς ἐπιπείθεται, μάλα τ' ἔκλυον αὐτοῦ."  
 Ἦ καὶ ἐπ' ἀργυρῇ κώπῃ σχέθε χεῖρα βαρεῖαν,  
 ἀψ' δ' ἐς κουλεὸν ὥσε μέγα ξίφος, οὐδ' ἀπίθησε·  
 μύθοφ' Ἀθηναίης· ἣ δ' Οὐλυμπόνδε βεβήκει  
 δώματ' ἐς αἰγιόχοιο Διὸς μετὰ δαίμονας ἄλλους.  
 Πηλεΐδης δ' ἐξαυτίς ἀταρτηροῖς ἐπέεσσιν  
 Ἀτρεΐδην προσέειπε, καὶ οὐ πῶ λῆγε χόλοιο·

Μένος in this passage is commonly translated  
 'anger', but Athene's intervention does not in any  
 way result in the checking of Achilles' anger (καὶ  
 οὐ πῶ λῆγε χόλοιο, 224) nor does she indicate any  
 intention of doing so; we are expressly told that  
 Achilles did not act against Athene's advice (οὐδ'  
 ἀπίθησε / μύθοφ' Ἀθηναίης, 220-1), and her advice  
 was quite specific: 'Cease from strife and do not  
 draw your sword but taunt him with words' (ἀλλ' ἄγε  
 λῆγ' ἔριδος, μηδὲ ξίφος ἔλκεο χειρὶ / ἀλλ' ἦτοι  
 ἔπεσιν μὲν ὀνειδίσον ὥς ἔσεται περ, 210-11).

This passage presents a paradigmatic case for  
 the interpretation of μένος proposed here; Achilles'

activities up to the appearance of Athene correspond point by point to the first three steps of the schema presented above:

1) Achilles' apprehension of the situation: he realizes the import of Agamemnon's insults and threats.

2) Conflicting impulses in response:

a) To kill Agamemnon there and then;

b) To restrain his anger (χόλος) and curb his θυμός.

3) His effort to resolve the conflict of these impulses in deliberation: ὁ ταῦθ' ὀρμαίνει κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν. It is at this point that Achilles begins to draw his sword, clearly indicating his imminent choice of alternative (a) To kill Agamemnon. The next step would have been our Step 4: Controlled execution of the decision in volitionally directed activity, namely, killing Agamemnon. And, as we have seen, it is this execution of his (imminent) decision that Athene comes to stop: not the process of deliberation, nor his impulse, certainly not his anger, but his 'volitionally directed activity'.

2. Il. 19.34-37, 67-68

ἀλλὰ σύ γ' εἰς ἄγορην καλέσας ἦρως Ἀχαιοῖς,  
 μῆνιν ὑποειπὼν Ἀγαμέμνονι, ποιμένι λαῶν, 35  
 αἶψα μάλ' ἐς πόλεμον θωρήσσοιο, δύσσοο δ' ἀλκίῃν."  
 \*Ὡς ἄρα φωνήσασα μένος πολυθαρσέες ἐνήκε,

νῦν δ' ἦτοι μὲν ἐγὼ παύω χόλον, οὐδέ τί με χρὴ  
 ἀσκελέως αἰεὶ μενέαινέμεν· ἀλλ' ἄγε θᾶσσον

This passage also indicates that μένος is not equated with χόλος. Achilles, having had μένος πολυθαρσέες placed in him by Thetis, calls an assembly and announces an end of his χόλος. What Achilles receives from Thetis is the will to act, after his long period of inactivity. (Cf. the discussion of Il. 17.456 below, no. 15.) The μένος implicit in the reference of μενεαίνεμεν in 68 is a function of the χόλος (see the discussion of μενεαίνειν below, on Od. 21.426, no. 7).

3. Il. 9.672-679

πρῶτος δ' ἐξερέεινεν ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνων  
 "εἴπ' ἄγε μ', ὦ πολύτῳ Ὀδυσσεῦ, μέγα κῆδος Ἀχαιῶν,  
 ἢ β' ἐθέλει νήεσσιν ἀλεξέμεναι δῆϊον πῦρ,  
 ἢ ἀπέειπε, χόλος δ' ἐπ' ἔχει μεγαλήτορα θυμόν;" 675  
 Τὸν δ' αὖτε προσέειπε πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς·  
 "Ἀτρεΐδῃ κῆδιστε, ἀναξ ἀνδρῶν Ἀγαμέμνον,  
 κείνός γ' οὐκ ἐθέλει σβέσσαι χόλον, ἀλλ' ἔτι μᾶλλον  
 τιμπλάνεται μένεος, σὲ δ' ἀναίεται ἡδὲ σὰ δῶρα.

In reply to Agamemnon's query whether χόλος still holds Achilles' θυμός, Odysseus says, 'he is

not willing to quench his *χόλος* but is filled still more with *μένος* and spurns both you and your gifts'. *Μένος* here is Achilles' ever-increasing determination not to be placated, stemming from his *ἄλληκτος θυμός* for which Aias reproaches him at 636-7.

4. Il. 1.101-104

Ἦτοι ὃ γ' ὡς εἰπὼν κατ' ἄρ' ἔζετο· τοῖσι δ' ἀνέστη  
ἦρως Ἀτρεΐδης εὐρὺ κρείων Ἀγαμέμνων

ἀχνομένοσ' μένος δὲ μέγα φρένες ἀμφὶ μέλαινα  
πίμπλυντ', ὅσσε δὲ οἱ πυρὶ λαμπετόωντι ἔκτεν'

The use of *μένος* that most nearly approaches 'anger' occurs here in Agamemnon's reaction to Calchas' allegations that he is responsible for the pestilence visited upon the Achaeans by Apollo. However, it is clear that Agamemnon's response goes beyond mere anger to what we may call willful purpose. He does indeed first express angry dissatisfaction with Calchas but he goes on at once to avow his intention to be recompensed forthwith for giving up his original *γέρας*. The *μένος* which fills his *φρένες* may thus be readily understood as purpose--angry purpose indeed--but purpose or intention nonetheless and not simply anger.<sup>5</sup> (Contrast the *ἥπιον μένος* of Persephone: H. Cer. 361.)

5. Il. 5.251-256

Τὸν δ' ἄρ' ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν προσέφη κρατερὸς Διομήδης·  
 "μή τι φόβονδ' ἀγόρευ', ἐπεὶ οὐδέ σε πεισέμεν οἶω.  
 οὐ γάρ μοι γενναῖον ἀλυσκάζοντι μάχεσθαι  
 οὐδὲ καταπτώσσειν· ἔτι μοι μένος ἐμπεδόν ἐστιν·  
 ὀκνεῖω δ' ἱππων ἐπιβαινέμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῶς 255  
 ἀντίον εἴμ' αὐτῶν· τρεῖν μ' οὐκ ἐξ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη.

This is one of many passages in Homer in which μένος is commonly translated as 'strength' or 'might';<sup>6</sup> however, the context here, as in similar passages, clearly indicates a volitional reference in the use of μένος. In the present passage, Diomedes' physical strength is not in question; what he boasts of, what he is concerned with proving, is his steadfast will to withstand the enemy, however formidable. And his boast is justified by his ensuing aristeia, in the course of which he attacks and wounds both Ares and Aphrodite, who, in her suffering, gives him the epithet ἐπέρθυμος (5.376).

6. Od. 22.226-235

"οὐκέτι σοί γ', Ὀδυσσεῦ, μένος ἐμπεδον οὐδέ τις ἀλκή,  
 οἷη δ' ἄμφ' Ἑλένη λευκωλένῃ εὐπατερεῖη  
 εἰνάετες Τρώεσσιν ἐμάρναο νωλεμὲς αἰεὶ,  
 πολλοὺς δ' ἄνδρας ἐπέφνες ἐν αἰνῇ δηϊοτήτι,  
 σῇ δ' ἥλω βουλῇ Πριάμου πόλις εὐρυάγυια. 230  
 πῶς δὴ νῦν, ὅτε σὸν γε δόμον καὶ κτήμαθ' ἱκάνεις,  
 ἄντα μνηστήρων ὀλοφύρεαι ἄλκιμος εἶναι;  
 ἀλλ' ἄγε δεῦρο, πέπον, παρ' ἐμ' ἴσταο καὶ ἴδε ἔργον,  
 ὅφρα ἰδῇς οἷός τοι ἐν ἀνδράσι δυσμενέεσσι  
 Μέντωρ Ἀλκιμίδης εὐεργεσίας ἀποτίνειν." 235

Athene spurs on Odysseus with the taunt that he no longer has the μένος ἔμπεδον that kept him fighting for nine years at Troy; in his own home, she says, he wails (όλοφύρεαι) at having to stand up to the suitors. Again, it is not physical strength that is in question but the will to fight.

7. Od. 21.424-427

“Τηλέμαχ', οὐ σ' ὁ ξείνος ἐνὶ μεγάροισιν ἐλέγχει  
 ἤμενος, οὐδέ τι τοῦ σκοποῦ ἤμβροτον οὐδέ τι τόξον 425  
 δὴν ἔκαμον τανύων· ἔτι μοι μένος ἔμπεδόν ἐστιν,  
 οὐχ ὥς με μνηστήρες ἀτμιάζοντες ὄνουνται.

Odysseus attributes his success in stringing the bow to his μένος ἔμπεδον. It might seem that physical strength is indeed the issue here but a comparison of this passage with Telemachos' effort is illuminating. Telemachos was first to try the bow (21.124ff.) 'and three times he made it quiver, μενεαίνων to string it'. His effort to string the bow is described by a verb that is (to Homer's audience as to us) an obvious derivative of μένος, μενεαίνειν. This verb is discussed by Adkins in his examination of Homer's emotional vocabulary. He observes that we must translate the verb in one context as 'to be eager', in another as 'to be angry',



although Homer uses the same word. "The psychological phenomenon which links the usages," Adkins says, "is a powerful forward drive."<sup>7</sup>

In fact the apparent variety of meanings may be reduced to a unified concept if we understand *μενεαίνεῖν* as 'to exercise one's *μένος*' (i.e. one's psychic power, one's 'will') in the service of whatever impulse holds sway in the particular situation. Thus, when we hear that 'all the gods pitied [Odysseus] except Poseidon [who] *μενεαίνεν* continually against [him] until he reached his native land' (*Od.* 1.19-21), we understand that Poseidon continued to exercise his *μένος* (his will) to Odysseus' harm and we assume that his motive is anger although we have not yet been given an account of it. Likewise, when we are told that Telemachos 'three times made [the bow] quiver, *μενεαίνων* to string it' (*Od.* 21.125), we understand that he is exercising his *μένος* to the end of stringing the bow (*ἐπιελπόμενος τό γε θυμῷ / νευρὴν ἐντανύειν*, 126-7). And in fact his *μένος* would at last have brought him success had not Odysseus stopped him. It is, then, *μένος* that is exercised by Telemachos

in his effort to string the bow and it is his own μένος ἔμπεδον that Odysseus boasts of as being responsible for his success. Μένος in both passages (explicit in the latter, implicit in the former) has the same reference: determination or 'will-power'.

8. Od. 19.491-494

Τὸν δ' αὖτε προσέειπε περίφρων Εὐρύκλεια·  
 " τέκνον ἐμόν, ποῖόν σε ἔπος φύγεν ἕρκος ὀδόντων.  
 οἶσθα μὲν ἔμῳ μένῳ ἔμπεδον οὐδ' ἐπικεκτόν,  
 ἔξω δ' ὥς ὅτε τις στερεὴ λίθος ἡδὲ σιδήρεος.

As we have seen, the μένος ἔμπεδον of Odysseus and Diomedes is commonly taken to refer to their physical strength; however, the μένος ἔμπεδον of which Eurykleia boasts cannot possibly be understood as referring to physical strength and so is translated by such phrases as 'firm spirit'. It is evident from the context that by μένος ἔμπεδον Eurykleia means an unflinching resolution of which she boasts herself to be possessed, so that Odysseus need have no fear that she will betray him. In other words, we have here a case of volitionally directed omission of activity, a function of the will no less than angry action or eager action.

9. Il. 5.888-893

Τὸν δ' ἄρ' ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν προέφη νεφεληγερέτα Ζεὺς·  
 "μή τί μοι, ἄλλοπρόσαλλε, παρεζόμενος μινύριζε.  
 ἔχθιστος δέ μοι ἔσσι θεῶν οἱ Ὀλυμπον ἔχουσιν."  
 αἰεὶ γάρ τοι ἔρις τε φίλη πόλεμοί τε μάχαι τε.  
 μητρός τοι μένος ἔστιν ἀάσχετον, οὐκ ἐπιεικτόν,  
 Ἥρης· τὴν μὲν ἐγὼ σπουδῇ δάμνημ' ἐπέεσσιν."

890

In contrast to Eurykleia, whose μένος is  
 ἔμπεδον--a positive quality--Hera has μένος that  
 is not just firm or steadfast but unrestrainable,  
 unyielding:

10. Il. 5.892-893

μητρός τοι μένος ἔστιν ἀάσχετον, οὐκ ἐπιεικτόν,  
 Ἥρης· τὴν μὲν ἐγὼ σπουδῇ δάμνημ' ἐπέεσσιν."

Zeus' complaint is significant: he can hardly  
 restrain her with words--a means of restraint  
 applicable only to an incorporeal force. (μένος  
 can also be roused with words; see the discussion  
 below, p. 71.)

11. Il. 17.501-506

"Ἀλκίμεδον, μὴ δὴ μοι ἀπόπροθεν ἰσχέμεν ἵππους,  
 ἀλλὰ μάλ' ἐμπνέοντε μεταφρένῃ· οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε  
 Ἑκτορα Πριαμίδην μένεος σχήσεσθαι οἶω,  
 πρὶν γ' ἐπ' Ἀχιλλῆος καλλίτριχε βήμεναι ἵππῳ  
 νῶϊ κατακτείναντα, φοβῆσθαι τε στίχας ἀνδρῶν  
 Ἀργείων, ἢ κ' αὐτὸς ἐνὶ πρώτοισιν ἀλόῃη."

505

Hera's μένος cannot be restrained. Similarly, Automedon observes that Hector will not restrain (σχήσεσθαι) his μένος until he possesses the horses of Achilles; that is, he will continue to exercise his will until he has achieved his purpose.

12. Il. 10.479-481

ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ πρόφερε κρατερὸν μένος· οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ  
ἑστάμεναι μέλεον σὺν τεύχεσιν, ἀλλὰ λύ' ἵππους· 480  
ἦε σὺ γ' ἄνδρας ἔναιρε, μελήσουσιν δ' ἐμοὶ ἵπποι."

The exercise of μένος is contrasted with idle inactivity in Odysseus' exhortation to Diomedes: 'put forth κρατερὸν μένος; you ought not to stand idly by...' Thereupon Athene breathes μένος into Diomedes and he begins slaying on all sides.

13. Il. 5.471-486

ἐνθ' αὖ Σαρπηδὼν μάλα νείκεσεν Ἑκτορα δῖον·  
"Ἑκτόρ, πῇ δὴ τοι μένος οἴχεται δὲ πρὶν ἔχεσκες;  
φῆς που ἄτερ λαῶν πόλιν ἐξέμεν ἠδ' ἐπικούρων  
οἶος, σὺν γαμβροῖσι κασιγνήτοισι τε σοῖσι.  
τῶν νῦν οὐ τίς ἐγὼ ἰδέω δύναμ' οὐδὲ νοῆσαι, 475  
ἀλλὰ καταπτώσσουσι κύνες ὡς ἀμφὶ λείοντα·  
ἡμεῖς δὲ μαχόμεσθ', οἳ πέρ τ' ἐπικούροι ἐνεμμεν.  
καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼν ἐπικούρος ἔδην μάλα τηλόθεν ἦκω·  
τηλοῦ γὰρ Λυκίῃ, Ξάνθῳ ἐπὶ δινήμενι,  
ἐνθ' Ἀλοχόν τε φίλην ἔλιπον καὶ νήπιον υἱόν, 480  
καὶ δὲ κτήματα πολλὰ, τὰ ἔλδεται ὅς κ' ἐπιδευής.  
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὥς Λυκίους δτρύνω καὶ μέμον' αὐτὸς  
ἄνδρϊ μαχήσασθαι· ἀτὰρ οὐ τί μοι ἐνθάδε τοῖον  
οἶόν κ' ἦε φέροιεν Ἀχαιοὶ ἢ κεν ἄγοιεν·  
τῦνη δ' ἑστήκας, ἀτὰρ οὐδ' ἄλλοισι κελεύεις 485  
λαοῖσιν μενέμεν καὶ ἀμυνέμεναι ὥρεσσι.

Μένος, is opposed to standing inactive in Sarpedon's rebuke of Hector: 'you stand immobile (ἔστηκας) and do not even bid your hosts abide and defend their wives'. Hector is affected by the rebuke and moves to act, urging his men to battle.

14. Od. 1.319-322

Ἡ μὲν ἄρ' ὥς εἰποῦσ' ἀπέβη γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,  
 ὄρνις δ' ὥς ἀνοπαῖα διέπτατο· τῷ δ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ 320  
 θῆκε μένος καὶ θάρσος, ὑπέμνησέν τέ εἰ πατρός  
 μᾶλλον ἔτ' ἢ τὸ πάροιθεν.

Just as the μένος πολυθαρσές that Achilles receives from Thetis (Il. 19.37) enables him to act once more and call the Achaeans to assembly, so too Telemachos is impelled to act by the μένος and θάρσος placed in him by Athene. His masterful tone in his ensuing speeches to his mother and to the suitors amazes everyone (θαμβήσασα, 1.360; θαύμαζον, 1.382). He calls the Achaeans to assembly (their first since his father's departure) and boldly addresses the suitors, thereby fulfilling Athene's purpose, her expressly stated intention in providing him with μένος (1.88-91).<sup>8</sup>

## 15. Il. 17.426-458

ἵπποι δ' Αἰακίδαο μάχης ἀπάνευθεν ἐόντες  
 κλαῖον, ἐπεὶ δὴ πρῶτα πυθέσθην ἡνιόχοιο  
 ἐν κονίῃσι πεσόντος ὑφ' Ἑκτορος ἀνδροφόνου.  
 ἦ μὰν Αὐτομέδων, Διώρεος ἄλκιμος υἱός,  
 πολλὰ μὲν ἄρ μάλιστα θοῇ ἐπεμαλετο θείων, 430  
 πολλὰ δὲ μειλιχοῖσι προσήυδα, πολλὰ δ' ἄρειψ'  
 τῷ δ' οὐτ' ἄψ' ἐπὶ νῆας ἐπὶ πλατὺν Ἑλλήσποντον  
 ἠθελέτην ἵναι οὐτ' ἐς πόλεμον μετ' Ἀχαιοὺς,  
 ἀλλ' ὥς τε στήλη μένει ἔμπεδον, ἦ τ' ἐπὶ τύμβῳ  
 ἀνέρος ἐστήκη τεθνηὸς ἢ γυναικός, 435  
 ὥς μένου ἀσφαλῶς περικαλλέα δίφρου ἔχοντες,  
 οὔδ' ἐνισκίμψαντε καρήατα· δάκρυα δέ σφι  
 θερμὰ κατὰ βλεφάρων χαμάδις ῥέε μυρομένοισιν  
 ἡνιόχοιο πόθῳ· θαλερῇ δ' ἐμιαίνετο χαίτη  
 ζεύγλης ἐξεριποῦσα παρὰ ζυγὸν ἀμφοτέρωθεν. 440  
 Μυρομένῳ δ' ἄρα τῷ γε ἰδὼν ἐλέησε Κρονίων,  
 κωήσας δὲ κάρη προτὶ δὺν μυθήσατο θυμὸν·  
 "ὦ δειλῷ, τί σφωὶ δόμεν Πηλεΐ ἄνακτι  
 θνητῷ, ὑμεῖς δ' ἐστὸν ἀγῆρω τ' ἀθανάτῳ τε.  
 ἦ ἴνα δυστήνοισι μετ' ἀνδράσιν ἄλγε' ἔχητον; 445  
 οὐ μὲν γὰρ τί πού ἐστιν οἰζυρώτερον ἀνδρὸς  
 πάντων ὅσσα τε γαῖαν ἐπι πνέει τε καὶ ἔρπει.  
 ἀλλ' οὐ μὰν ὑμῖν γε καὶ ἄρμασι δαιδαλέοισιν  
 Ἑκτωρ Πριαμίδης ἐποχίσεται· οὐ γὰρ ἔάσω.  
 ἦ οὐχ ἄλλ' ὥς καὶ τεύχε' ἔχει καὶ ἐπεύχεται αὐτῶς; 450  
 σφῶϊν δ' ἐν γούνεσσι βαλῶ μένος ἠδ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ,  
 ὄφρα καὶ Αὐτομέδοντα σαώσεται ἐκ πολέμοιο  
 νῆας ἐπὶ γλαφυράς· ἔτι γὰρ σφισι κῦδος ὀρέξω,  
 κτείνω, εἰς ὃ κε νῆας ἐϋστέλμους ἀφίκωνται  
 δύη τ' ἥελιος καὶ ἐπὶ κνέφας ἱερὸν ἔλθῃ." 455  
 Ὡς εἰπὼν ἵπποισιν ἐνέπνευσεν μένος ἦθ.  
 τῷ δ' ἀπὸ χαιτῶν κονίην οὐδάσδε βαλόντε  
 ῥίμφα φέρον θοδὺν ἄρμα μετὰ Τρῶας καὶ Ἀχαιοὺς.

Ménos as the will to act is breathed by Zeus

into the horses of Achilles as they stand unmoving,  
 like a grave-stele, mourning for Patroklos. Despite  
 the efforts of Automedon, with the lash and gentle  
 words and threats, they were not willing (ἠθελέτην)  
 to go either back to the ships or into battle, until

Zeus put μένος in their knees and θυμός. Then they shook the dust from their manes and swiftly drew the chariot across the battlefield.<sup>9</sup>

16. Il. 17.742-746

οἱ δ' ὥς θ' ἡμίονοι κρατερὸν μένος ἀμφιβαλόντες  
 ἔλκωσ' ἐξ ὄρεος κατὰ παιπαλοέσσαν ἀταρπὸν  
 ἢ δοκὸν ἢ δόρυ μέγα νήϊον· ἐν δέ τε θυμός  
 τεύρεθ' ὁμοῦ καμάτῳ τε καὶ ἰδρὶ σπενδόντεσσιν· 745  
 ὥς σιγ' ἐμμεμαῶτε νέκυν φέρον.

It is κρατερὸν μένος that enables mules to drag a heavy log down a rugged mountain path, despite the sweat and toil that wears away their θυμός. (Fränkel sees in this simile a reference to the "soul's power of will", which enables a man to overcome weariness in accomplishing his purpose.)<sup>10</sup>

17. Il. 23.524-525

ἀλλὰ μιν αἶψα κίχανεν· ὀφέλλετο γὰρ μένος ἥδ'  
 ἵππου τῆς Ἀγαμεμνονέης, καλλίτριχος Αἰθῆς· 525

An increase of μένος enables horses to run faster. As they near the finish-line of the chariot-race Menelaos is quickly overtaking Antilochos because the μένος of his mare suddenly increases.

18. Il. 23.467-468

ἐνθα μιν ἐκπεσέειν ὅτω σὺν θ' ἄρματα ἄξαι,  
αἱ δ' ἐξηρώησαν, ἐπεὶ μένος ἔλλαβε θυμόν.

Ménos out of control can make horses go astray.  
When Idomeneus is unable to see Eumelos rounding  
the turn in the chariot race he conjectures that  
Eumelos must have been wrecked and the mares bolted  
off-course 'when μένος laid hold of their θυμός.'  
This is a case of the horses' 'will' overruling  
that of their charioteer.

The will of immortal horses is especially hard  
to hold:

19. Il. 17.475-477

"Ἀλκίμεδον, τίς γάρ τοι Ἀχαιῶν ἄλλος ὁμοῖος 475  
ἵππων ἀθανάτων ἐχέμεν δμῆσιν τε μένος τε,  
εἰ μὴ Πάτροκλος, θεόφω μῆστορ ἀτάλαντος,

20. Il. 7.37-40

Τὴν δ' αὖτε προσέειπεν ἄναξ Διὸς υἱὸς Ἀπόλλων  
"Ἐκτορος ὄρωμεν κρατερὸν μένος ἵπποδάμοιο,  
ἦν τινά που Δαναῶν προκαλέσsetαι οἰόθεν οἶος  
ἀντίβιον μαχέσασθαι ἐν αἰνῇ δηϊότητι, 40

21. Il. 21.144-146

τῷ ῥ' Ἀχιλεὺς ἐπόρουσεν, ὃ δ' ἀντίος ἐκ ποταμοῖο  
ἔστη ἔχων δύο δοῦρε· μένος δέ οἱ ἐν φρεσὶ θῆκε 145  
Ξάνθος, ἐπεὶ κεχόλωτο δαΐκταμένων αἰζήων,



22. Il. 5.561-564

Τὸ δὲ πεσόντ' ἐλέησεν ἀρηϊφίλος Μενέλαος,  
βῆ δὲ διὰ προμάχων κεκορυθμένος αἰδοπι χάλκῳ,  
σεύων ἐγχείην τοῦ δ' ὄτρυνεν μένος Ἄρης,  
τὰ φρονέων, ἵνα χερσὶν ὑπ' Αἰνείαο δαμείη.

The gods rouse a man's μένος so that he challenges another to single combat. In the first passage, Athene and Apollo agree to rouse the κρατερὸν μένος of Hector so that he may challenge one of the Danaans. In the second, Xanthos puts μένος in the φρένες of Asteropaios so that he stands forth to face Achilles. That μένος in these instances is not 'might' is made clear by the third passage in which it is expressly stated that Ares roused Menelaos' μένος so that he might be vanquished at the hands of Aeneas. When Ares rouses a man's 'might' the latter would surely be expected to prevail. What Ares rouses here is Menelaos' will to fight so that he will be foolhardy enough to enter a duel with a mightier opponent.

23. Il. 15.262-270

\*Ὡς εἰπὼν ἔμπνευσε μένος μέγα ποιμένι λαῶν.  
ὥς δ' ὅτε τις στατὸς ἵππος, ἀκοστήσας ἐπὶ φάτῃ,  
δεσμὸν ἀπορρήξας θελῇ πεδίοιο κροαίνων,  
εἰωθὼς λούεσθαι ἑὺρρείος ποταμοῖο,  
κυδιῶων· ὑψοῦ δὲ κάρη ἔχει, ἀμφὶ δὲ χαῖται  
ὥμοις ἀττουσονται· ὁ δ' ἀγλαΐῃ πεποιθὼς,  
ρίμφα ἔγούνα φέρει μετὰ τ' ἤθεα καὶ νομὸν ἵππων·  
ὧς Ἐκτωρ λαιψήρᾳ πόδας καὶ γούνατ' ἐνώμα  
ὀτρύνων ἱππῆας, ἐπεὶ θεοῦ ἔκλυεν αὐδὴν.

265

270

The effect of Apollo's infusion of μένος into the reviving Hector is described in a simile in which Hector's demeanour is compared to that of a well-fed, stall-bound horse that breaks his halter and runs stamping over the plain with head held high, exulting in his splendour, as he seeks the pastures of mares. What is conveyed by the simile is an impression not of physical strength but of that aspect of will referred to in expressions of the type 'a spirited horse'; it is this 'spirit' (or 'spirits'), this manifestation of will, that Apollo gives back to Hector.

\* \* \* \* \*

Μένος is often associated with the verbs μέμονα, μενοινάω, μενεαίνω, and μαίμᾳ, which are traditionally translated in language based on 'eagerness'. μενοινάω and μενεαίνω are transparent derivatives of μένος;<sup>11</sup> μαίμᾳ is a reduplicated

form of \*μάω, a reflex of the Indo-European root \*mē-, which Pokorny glosses as "heftigen und kräftigen Willens sein."<sup>12</sup> Robbins observes that, in contrast to \*mē-, "the idea of will is not so primary to \*men-."<sup>13</sup> However, these two forms may well be variant forms of a single root (\*men-/ \*meH<sub>1</sub>-) rather than distinct roots; variation in root-final consonant is attested elsewhere in Indo-European, e.g. \*g<sup>u</sup>em-/ \*g<sup>u</sup>eH<sub>2</sub>-, \*wen-/ \*weH<sub>2</sub>-, \*me<sub>1</sub>-/ \*meH<sub>1</sub>-.<sup>14</sup> μέμονα is derived from \*mē- (μάω) by Cunliffe but Meillet derives this form from \*men- and glosses it as "μένος habeo".<sup>15</sup> (μένος itself Meillet understands as referring to "impulsionem quamdam interiorem".)<sup>16</sup>

24. Il. 13.39-80

Τρῶες δὲ φλογὶ ἴσοι ἀολλέες ἢ ἐνέλλῃ  
 Ἑκτορι Πριαμίδῃ ἄμοτον μεμαῶτες ἔποντο, 40  
 ἄβρομοι αὐτᾶχοι· ἔλποντο δὲ νῆας Ἀχαιῶν  
 αἰρήσειω, κενέειω δὲ παρ' αὐτόθι πάντας ἀρίστους.  
 ἀλλὰ Ποσειδάων γαῖήοχος ἐννοσίγαιος  
 Ἀργείους ὤτρυνε, βαθείης ἐξ ἁλὸς ἐλθῶν,  
 εἰσάμενος Κάλχαντι δέμας καὶ ἀτειρέα φωνήν 45  
 Αἰαντε πρώτῳ προσέφη, μεμαῶτε καὶ αὐτῷ·  
 "Αἰαντε, σφδὲ μὲν τε σωῶσθε λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν

ἀλλῆς μνησαμένω, μηδὲ κρυεροῖο φόβοιο.  
 ἄλλῃ μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγ' οὐ δειδία χεῖρας ἀάπτους  
 Τρώων, οἳ μέγα τείχος ὑπερκατέβησαν ὁμίλῳ 50  
 ἔξουσιν γὰρ πάντας ἐϋκνήμιδες Ἀχαιοί·  
 τῇ δὲ δὴ αἰνότατον περιδείδια μή τι πάθωμεν,  
 ἦ ῥ' ὃ γ' ὁ λυσσώδης φλογὶ εἵκελος ἡγεμονεύει,  
 Ἐκτώρ, ὃς Διὸς εὖχετ' ἐρισθενέος παῖς εἶναι.  
 σφῶϊν δ' ὠδε θεῶν τις ἐνὶ φρεσὶ ποιήσειεν 55  
 αὐτῷ θ' ἐστάμεναι κρατερῶς καὶ ἀνωγέμεν ἄλλους·  
 τῷ κε καὶ ἐσσύμενον περ ἐρωήσασιν ἀπὸ νηῶν  
 ὠκυπόρων, εἰ καὶ μιν Ὀλύμπιος αὐτὸς ἐγείρει."  
 Ἦ, καὶ σκηπανίῳ γαιήοχος ἐννοσίγαιος  
 ἀμφοτέρω κεκόπων πλήσεν μένεος κρατεροῖο, 60  
 γυῖα δὲ θῆκεν ἐλαφρά, πόδας καὶ χεῖρας ὑπερθεν.  
 αὐτὸς δ' ὥς τ' ἱρηξ ὠκύπτερος ὦρτο πέτεσθαι,  
 ὃς ῥά τ' ἀπ' αἰγίλιπος πέτρης περιμήκεος ἀρθεῖς  
 ὁρμήσῃ πεδίῳ διώκειν ὄρνειν ἄλλο,  
 ὥς ἀπὸ τῶν ἦϊξε Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων. 65  
 τοῖν δ' ἔγνω πρόσθεν Ὀϊλῆος ταχὺς Αἴας,  
 αἶψα δ' ἄρ' Αἴαντα προσέφη Τελαμώνιον υἱόν·  
 "Αἴαν, ἐπεὶ τις νῶϊ θεῶν, οἳ Ὀλυμπον ἔχουσι,  
 μάντεϊ εἰδόμενος κέλεται παρὰ νηυσὶ μάχεσθαι,  
 οὐδ' ὃ γε Κάλχας ἐστὶ θεοπρόπος οἰωνιστής· 70  
 ἔχνια γὰρ μετόπισθε ποδῶν ἡδὲ κνημῶν  
 ῥεῖ' ἔγνω ἀπίοντος· ἀρίγνωτοι δὲ θεοὶ περ·  
 καὶ δ' ἐμοὶ αὐτῷ θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φλοῖσι  
 μᾶλλον ἐφορμάται πολεμίζειν ἡδὲ μάχεσθαι,  
 μαιμῶωσι δ' ἐνερθε πόδες καὶ χεῖρες ὑπερθε." 75  
 Τὸν δ' ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη Τελαμώνιος Αἴας·  
 "οὔτω νῦν καὶ ἐμοὶ περὶ δούρατι χεῖρες ἄπτοι  
 μαιμῶωσιν, καὶ μοι μένος ὥρορε, ἀέρθε δὲ ποσσὶν  
 ἐσσυμαι ἀμφοτέροισι· μενοιῶω δὲ καὶ οἶος  
 Ἐκτορι Πριαμίδῃ ἄμοτον μεμαῶτι μάχεσθαι." 80

This passage abounds with references to the exercising of μένος, both explicit in the noun form and implicit in cognate verbal forms. It is worth considering in some detail the contexts in which these forms appear.

The Trojans are following Hector, μεμαῶτες (40); against them Poseidon urges on the two Aiantes,

μεμαῶτε καὶ αὐτῷ (46), filling them with μένος  
 (μένεος κρατεροῦ, 60).—Aias, son of Oïleus,  
 remarking on the effect of the god's intervention,  
 observes *μαιμῶσι δ' ἔνερθε πόδες καὶ χεῖρες ὑπερθε*  
 (75). Telamonian Aias in turn declares, *οὕτω νῦν  
 καὶ ἐμοὶ περὶ δοῦρατι χεῖρες ἀάπτοι / μαιμῶσιν,  
 καὶ μοι μένος ὄρορε, νέρθε δὲ ποσσὶν / ἔσσυμαι  
 ἀμφοτέροισι· μενοινάω δὲ καὶ οἶος / Ἑκτορι Πριαμίδῃ  
 ἄμοτον μεμαῶτι μάχεσθαι* (77-80). Poseidon proceeds  
 to rouse the ranks of the Achaeans, reminding them  
 of their former, invincible μένος (105), so that  
 they rally: *οἱ δ' ἰθὺς φρόνεον, μέμασαν δὲ μάχεσθαι*  
 (135).

The clash of Trojan and Achaean μένος implicit  
 in the previous passage is explicitly referred to  
 in the formulaic phrase:

25. I1, 4.447=8.61 (cf. I1. 20.374)

*σὺν ῥ' ἔβαλον ῥινούς, σὺν δ' ἔγχεα καὶ μένε' ἀνδρῶν*

In the following passages, as in the two preceding,  
 μένος and its related verbs refer to psychic energy  
 directed towards battle.

Ares breathes this psychic energy into the warriors:

26. Il. 19.156-159 (see no. 37 below for the extended passage)

νήστιας ὄρουσε προτὶ Ἴλιον νῆας Ἀχαιῶν  
Τρωσὶ μαχησομένους, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ὀλίγον χρόνον ἔσται  
φύλοπις, εὖτ' ἂν πρῶτον ὁμιλήσωσι φάλαγγες  
ἀνδρῶν, ἐν δὲ θεὸς πνεύσῃ μένος ἀμφοτέρωσιν.

Athene breathes it into Laertes:

27. Od. 24.520

ὦς φάτο, καὶ ῥ' ἔμπνευσε μένος μέγα Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη.

It is shared by both Trojans and Achaeans:

28. Il. 18.263-264

μήμωεν ἐν πεδίῳ, ὅθι περ Τρῶες καὶ Ἀχαιοὶ  
ἐν μέσῳ ἀμφοτέροι μένος Ἄρης δατέονται,

29. Od. 16.266-269

Τὸν δ' αὖτε προσέειπε πολύτλας δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς·  
"οὐ μὲν τοι κείνω γε πολὺν χρόνον ἀμφὶς ἔσσεσθον  
φυλόπιδος κρατερῆς, ὅπote μνηστήρσι καὶ ἡμῖν  
ἐν μεγάροις ἐμοῖσι μένος κρίνηται Ἄρης.

It is roused or diminished or bound by Zeus:

30. Il. 8.335

Ἀψ' δ' αὖτις Τρῶεσσιν Ὀλύμπιος ἐν μένος ὥρσεν 335

31. Il. 15.490-493

κεία δ' ἀρίγνωτος Διὸς ἀνδράσι γίνεται ἀλκή,  
 ἡμῶν ὅτεοισιν κῦδος ὑπέρτερον ἐγγυαλίζει,  
 ἥδ' ὅτῳας μινύθῃ τε καὶ σὺκ ἐθέλῃσιν ἀμύνειν,  
 ὥς νῦν Ἀργείων μινύθει μένος, ἅμμι δ' ἀρήγει.

490

32. Il. 14.72-73

οἶδα δὲ νῦν ὅτε τοὺς μὲν ὁμῶς μακάρεσσιν θεοῖσιν  
 κυδάνει, ἡμέτερον δὲ μένος καὶ χεῖρας ἔδησεν.

It is stayed by enemy warriors but not by walls:

33. Il. 12.165-166

οὐ γὰρ ἐγωγ' ἐφάμην ἦρωας Ἀχαιοὺς  
 σχήσειν ἡμέτερόν γε μένος καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους.

165

34. Il. 8.177-178

νήπιοι, οἳ ἄρα δὴ τάδε τείχεα μηχανώωντο  
 ἀβλήχρ' οὐδενόσωρα· τὰ δ' οὐ μένος ἀμὸν ἐρύξει·

It is parted from warriors by the onset of night:

35. Il. 2.386-387

οὐ γὰρ παυσωλὴ γε μετέσσεται, οὐδ' ἡβαιὸν,  
 εἰ μὴ νύξ ἐλθοῦσα διακρινέει μένος ἀνδρῶν.

36. Il. 5.124-126...133-143

"θαρσῶν νῦν, Διόμηδες, ἐπὶ Τρῳέεσσι μάχεσθαι·  
 ἐν γάρ τοι στήθεσσι μένος πατρώϊον ἦκα  
 ἄτρομον, οἷον ἔχεσκε σακέσπαλος ἱππότα Τυδεύς·"

135

'Η μὲν ἄρ' ὧς εἰποῦσ' ἀπέβη γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη,  
 Τυδείδης δ' ἐξαυτίς ἰὼν προμάχοισιν ἐμίχθη,  
 καὶ πρὶν περ θυμῷ μεμαῶς Τρώεσσι μάχεσθαι 135  
 δὴ τότε μιν τρίς τόσσον ἔλεν μένος, ὥς τε λέοντα,  
 ὃν ῥά τε ποιμὴν ἀγρῷ ἐπ' εἰροπόκοις ὀϊστοῖς  
 χραύσῃ μὲν τ' αὐλῆς ὑπεράλμενον οὐδὲ δαμάσῃ·  
 τοῦ μὲν τε σθένος ὤρσεν, ἔπειτα δέ τ' οὐ προσαμύνει,  
 ἀλλὰ κατὰ σταθμούς δύνεται, τὰ δ' ἐρήμα φοβεῖται 140  
 αἱ μὲν τ' ἀγχιστῖναι ἐπ' ἀλλήλησι κέχυνται,  
 αὐτὰρ ὁ ἐμμεμαῶς βαθέης ἐξάλλεται αὐλῆς·  
 ὧς μεμαῶς Τρώεσσι μίγῃ κρατερὸς Διομήδης.

Athene puts into Diomedes' breast the μένος  
 ἄτρομον of his father Tydeus and while he had already  
 had μένος for fighting the Trojans (μεμαῶς Τρώεσσι  
 μάχεσθαι, 135), now three times as much μένος took  
 hold of him, like a wounded lion that wreaks havoc  
 among the sheep and then leaps from the fold ἐμμεμαῶς  
 (142). With comparable μένος (ὧς μεμαῶς, 143),  
 Diomedes resumes his aristeia.

\* \* \* \*

37. Il. 19.154-170 (cf. 9.705-706)

νήστιας ὄτρυνε προτὶ Ἴλιον νῆας Ἀχαιῶν  
 Τρωσὶ μάχηςσόμενους, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ὀλίγον χρόνον ἔσται  
 φύλοπις, εὐτ' ἂν πρῶτον ὁμιλήσωσι φάλαγγες  
 ἀνδρῶν, ἐν δὲ θεὸς πνεύσῃ μένος ἀμφοτέροισιν.  
 ἀλλὰ πάσασθαι ἀνωχθεὶ βοῆς ἐπὶ νηυσὶν Ἀχαιοῦς 160  
 σίτου καὶ οἰνοῖο· τὸ γὰρ μένος ἐστὶ καὶ ἀλκή.



οὐ γὰρ ἀνὴρ πρόπαν ἡμᾶρ ἐς ἡέλιον καταδύτα  
 ἄκμητος σίτοις δυνήσεται ἅντα μάχεσθαι·  
 εἰ περ γὰρ θυμῷ γε μενοιάει πολεμίζειν,  
 ἀλλὰ τε λάθρη γυῖα βαρύνεται, ἥδ' ἐκίχνηται  
 δίψα τε καὶ λιμός, βλάβεται δέ τε γούνατ' ἰόντι.  
 δὲ δέ κ' ἀνὴρ οἶνοιο κορεσσάμενος καὶ ἐδωδῆς  
 ἀνδράσι δυσμενέεσσι πανημέριος πολεμίζει,  
 θαρσαλέον νύ οἱ ἦτορ ἐνὶ φρεσὶν, οὐδέ τι γυῖα  
 πρὶν κάμνει, πρὶν πάντας ἐρωῆσαι πολέμοιο.

165

170

Apparently the mere presence of μένος in the θυμός is not necessarily sufficient for a warrior's optimum performance. In the passage previously cited, Diomedes had in his θυμός μένος for fighting (5.135) but it is the triple portion of μένος provided by Athene that gives him the power to perform his aristeia. In the present passage, Odysseus advises feeding the men before battle to provide them with the requisite μένος and αλκή (161); for although a man may have in his θυμός μένος for warring (θυμῷ γε μενοιάει πολεμίζειν, 164), without food his limbs grow weary and he is troubled by hunger and thirst.

Μένος is here closely associated with food and wine; but μένος is not identified with these substances, as, for example, Giacomelli understands it to be: "Diomedes and Odysseus assert that μένος is food and wine."<sup>17</sup> What the Homeric phrase expresses is

that the functioning of a man's μένος may be impaired by the lack of sustenance for his body; the same observation occurs in Menelaos' comment that, had he been longer becalmed on Pharos, his supplies would have been exhausted and (consequently) the μένος of his men:

38. Od. 4.363-364

καί νύ κεν ἦναι πάντα κατέφθιτο καὶ μένε' ἀνδρῶν,  
εἰ μή τίς με θεῶν δλοφύρατο καὶ μ' ἐλέησε,

That performance--mental as well as physical--is ultimately dependent upon physical well-being is simply an observable fact; a modern parallel to the Homeric linking of food and μένος is the recognition that mental performance is affected by physical factors such as blood-sugar level but the recognition of a relation of dependence does not constitute a reduction of the former to the latter.

The comments of Hecuba and Hector regarding the efficacy of wine show that μένος is not identified with food and drink; while Hecuba observes that the μένος of a weary man may be increased by wine, Hector recognizes that, on the contrary, his μένος may actually be impaired by wine:

39. Il. 6.261

ἄνδρϊ δὲ κεκμηῶτι μένος μέγα οἶνος ἀέξει,

40. Il. 6.264-265

“ μή μοι οἶνον ᾄειρε μελίσφρονα, πότνια μήτηρ,  
μή μ' ἀπογνώσῃς μένεος, ἀλκῆς τε λάθωμαι”

265

\* \* \* \* \*

As we have seen, a man's μένος may on occasion be increased or diminished by a god; but certain individuals have a constant supply of exceptional μένος. Eurylochos complains that Odysseus has μένος beyond other men:

41. Od. 12.279-80

“ Σχέτλιός εἰς, Ὀδυσσεῦ, πέρι τοι μένος οὐδέ τι γνῖα  
κάμνεις· ἦ ῥά νυ σοί γε σιδήρεα πάντα τέτυκται,”

280

Herakles has μένος that is never worn away:

42. Od. 11.270

τὴν ἔχεν Ἀμφιτρύωνος υἱὸς μένος αἰὲν ἀτειρής.

270

Zeus is ὑπερμενής:

43. Il. 2.116, etc.

οὕτω που Διὶ μέλλει ὑπερμενέϊ φίλον εἶναι,

Kings are υπερμενής:

44. Il. 8.236, etc.

*Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἡ ῥά τω' ἤδη ὑπερμενέων βασιλῆων*

The Trojan allies are υπερμενής:

45. Il. 17.362

*νεκροὶ δμοῦ Τρώων καὶ ὑπερμενέων ἐπικούρων*

\* \* \* \* \*

An increase of μένος is not always dependent upon food or the breath of a god; μένος can be roused with words:

46. Il. 12.265-268

*Ἄμφοτέρω δ' Αἴαντε κελευτιόωντ' ἐπὶ πύργων . 265  
πάντοσε φοιτήτην, μένος ὀτρύνοντες Ἀχαιῶν.  
ἄλλον μελιχίοις, ἄλλον στερεοῖς ἐπέεσσι  
νείκεον, ὃν τινα πάγχυ μάχης μεθιέντα ἴδοιεν*

The two Aiantes urge the men on, rousing the μένος of some with gentle words, of others with harsh ones.

47. Il. 17.423

*Ὡς ἄρα τις εἶπεσκε, μένος δ' ὄρσασκεν ἑκάστου.*

Both Achaeans and Trojans, with words of exhortation, rouse the μένος of their men.

In a number of passages, the efficacy of an exhortation to battle is remarked in the narrative by the formulaic line:

48. Il. 5.470, etc.

\*Ως εἰπὼν ὄτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἐκάστων. 470

θυμός here is the desire to fight and μένος the will to accomplish that desire.

\* \* \* \* \*

The collocation of μένος and θυμός occurs in additional passages, again denoting impulse toward a specified action and the will to accomplish that action:

49. Il. 24.198-199

αἰὼς γὰρ μ' αὐτόν γε μένος καὶ θυμὸς ἄνωγε  
κεῖσ' ἵεναι ἐπὶ νῆας ἔσω στρατὸν εὐρὺν Ἀχαιῶν."

50. Il. 22.344-347

Τὸν δ' ἄρ' ὑπόδρα ἰδὼν προσέφη πᾶδας ὦκ' Ἀχιλλεύς·  
"μή με, κύον, γούνων γυνάξω μηδὲ τοκίων" 345  
αἱ γὰρ πῶς αὐτόν με μένος καὶ θυμὸς ἀνείη  
ὥμ' ἀποταμνόμενον κρέα ἔδμεναι, οἷα ἔοργας,

51. Il. 20.174-175

ὥς Ἀχιλῆϊ ὄτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸς ἀγήνωρ  
 ἀντίον ἐλθέμεναι μεγαλήτορος Αἰνείαο.

175

52. Od. 8.15

ᾧ εἰποῦσ' ὄτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἐκάστου.

15

53. Od. 11.562

δάμασον δὲ μένος καὶ ἀγήνορα θυμόν."

\* \* \* \* \*

The loss of μένος at death is referred to in a number of passages. Athene links μένος and θυμός in her wish for Hector's death:

54. Il. 8.358-359

"καὶ λίην οὗτός γε μένος θυμόν τ' ὀλέσειε,  
 χερσὶν ὑπ' Ἀργείων φθίμενος ἐν πατρίδι γαίῃ."

The collocation of μένος and ψυχή occurs in a formulaic phrase in death scenes:

55. Il. 5.296 (=8.123=8.315)

τοῦ δ' αὖθις λυθὴ ψυχὴ τε μένος τε.

An abbreviated version of the same formula appears at

56. Il. 17.298

τοῦ δ' αὖθι λύθη μένος, ἐκ δ' ἄρα χειρῶν

μένος is loosed along with γυῖα at the moment of death:

57. Il. 6.27-28

καὶ μὲν τῶν ὑπέλυσε μένος καὶ φαίδιμα γυῖα  
Μηκιστηιάδης καὶ ἀπ' ὤμων τεύχε' ἐσύλα.

The μένος of Kleoboulos is loosed by Aias son of Oīleus:

58. Il. 16.331-332

ζῶν ἐλε, βλαφθέντα κατὰ κλόνον· ἀλλὰ οἱ αὖθι  
λύσε μένος, πλήξας ξίφει ἀνχένα κωπήεντι.

Menelaos threatens that he will loose the μένος of Euphorbos:

59. Il. 17.29-30

ὥς θην' καὶ σὸν ἐγὼ λύσω μένος, εἴ κέ μεν ἄντα  
στήῃς· ἀλλὰ σ' ἐγὼγ' ἀναχωρήσαντα κελεύω

The μένος of lambs is taken away by the sacrificial knife:

60. Il. 3.292-294

Ἡ, καὶ ἀπὸ στομάχου ἀνῶν τάμε νηλεῖ χαλκῷ·  
καὶ τοὺς μὲν κατέθηκεν ἐπὶ χθονὸς ἀσπαίροντας,  
θυμοῦ δεινομένους· ἀπὸ γὰρ μένος εἴλετο χαλκός.

The μένος of a heifer is loosed by the axe:

61. Od. 3.449-450

ἤλασεν ἄγχι στάς· πέλεκυς δ' ἀπέκοψε τένοντας  
αὐχενίους, λῦσεν δὲ βοὸς μένος·

450

The fact that μένος is said to be loosed at death and, further, that in such contexts it is paired with θυμός and more especially with ψυχή has led some commentators to conclude that μένος in these contexts means 'life'.<sup>18</sup> However, this conclusion is by no means required by the evidence. μένος and θυμός are psychic 'organs' or faculties; they function in a man (and, by extension, in an animal) while he is alive and they cease to function (because they cease to exist) when he dies; but they are not thereby equated with life itself.



The status of ψυχή is more problematical (see the discussion above, pp.42-46) but whatever the ψυχή is it is not simply 'life'; it is something that leaves a man's body when he dies. The ψυχή continues to enjoy an existence of sorts in Hades but the man's 'life' is finished.

\* \* \* \* \*

Μένος is often paired with χεῖρες (μένος καὶ χεῖρες, μένος καὶ χεῖρας, χεῖράς τε μένος τε and, in one instance, μένος χειρῶν) to denote the totality of a warrior's force, in both i.e. mental and physical aspects:

62. Il. 8.450-451

πάντως, ὅλον ἐμόν γε μένος καὶ χεῖρες ἄπποιοι,  
οὐκ ἂν με τρέψειαν ὅσοι θεοὶ εἰς' ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ.

450

63. Il. 5.506

οἱ δὲ μένος χειρῶν ἰθὺς φέρου'

64. Il. 6.500-502

αἱ μὲν ἔτι ζῶν γόον Ἑκτορα ᾧ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ  
οὐ γάρ μιν ἔτ' ἔφαιτο ὑπότροπον ἐκ πολέμοιο  
ἔλκεσθαι, προφυγόντα μένος καὶ χεῖρας Ἀχαιῶν.

500

65. Il. 7.307-309

ἦϊ, ὃ δ' ἐς Τρώων θμαδον κλέ· τοὶ δ' ἐχάρησαν,  
ὥς εἶδον ζῶν τε καὶ ἀρτεμέα προσιόντα,  
Αἴαντος προφυγόντα μένος καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους·

66. Il. 7.456-457

ἄλλος κέν τις τοῦτο θεῶν δέισειε νόημα,  
ὃς σέο πολλὸν ἀφαιρότερος χεῖράς τε μένος τε·

67. Il. 12.164-166

“Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἡ ρά νυ καὶ σὺ φιλοψευδὴς ἐτέτυξο  
πάγχυ μάλ'· οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγ' ἐφάμην ἥρωας Ἀχαιοὺς 165  
σχήσειν ἡμέτερόν γε μένος καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους.

68. Il. 13.105-106

ὃς Τρῶες τὸ πρῶν γε μένος καὶ χεῖρας Ἀχαιῶν 105  
μίμνῃ οὐκ ἐθέλεσκον ἐναντίον, οὐδ' ἠβαιόν·

69. Il. 13.287-291

οὐδέ κεν ἐνθα τεόν γε μένος καὶ χεῖρας ὄνοιτο.  
εἷ περ γάρ κε βλεῖο πονεύμενος ἢ τυπείης,  
οὐκ ἂν ἐν αὐχέν' ὀπισθε πέσοι βέλος οὐδ' ἐνὶ νώτῃ.  
ἀλλὰ κεν ἡ στέρνων ἢ νηδύος ἀντιάσειε 290  
πρόσσω λεμένιοι μετὰ προμάχων δαριδύν.

70. Il. 13.315-320

οἳ μιν ἄδην ἐλόωσι καὶ ἐσσύμενον πολέμοιο, 315  
Ἔκτορα Πριαμίδην, καὶ εἰ μάλα καρτερός ἐστω.  
αἰπὺ οἱ ἐσσεῖται μάλα περ μεμαῶτι μάχεσθαι  
κείνων νικήσαντι μένος καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους  
νῆας ἐνιπρήσαι, ὅτε μὴ αὐτὸς γε Κρονίων  
ἐμβάλοι αἰθόμενον δαλὸν νήεσσι θοῆσιν. 320

71. I1. 14.69-73

οὕτω που Διὶ μέλλει ὑπερμενέϊ φίλον εἶναι,  
 νωνύμους ἀπολέσθαι ἀπ' Ἄργεος ἐνθάδ' Ἀλχαιούς.  
 ἦδεα μὲν γὰρ ὅτε πρόφρων Δαναοῖσιν ἄμυνεν,  
 οἶδα δὲ νῦν ὅτε τοὺς μὲν ὁμῶς μακάρεσσι θεοῖσι  
 κυδάνει, ἡμέτερον δὲ μένος καὶ χεῖρας ἔδησεν.

70

72. I1. 15.509-510

ἡμῶν δ' οὐ τις τοῦδε νόος καὶ μήτις ἀμύνων,  
 ἢ αὐτοσχεδίῃ μίξαι χεῖρας τε μένος τε.

310

73. I1. 17.634-639

ἀλλ' ἄγετ' αὐτοὶ περ φραζόμεθα μῆτιν ἀρίστην,  
 ἡμὲν ὅπως τὸν νεκρὸν ἐρύσσομεν, ἦδὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ  
 χάρμα φίλοις ἐτάροισι γενώμεθα νοστήσαντες,  
 οἳ που δεῦρ' ὀρόωντες ἀκηχέδατ', οὐδ' ἔτι φασὶν  
 "Ἐκτορος ἀνδροφόνουιο μένος καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους  
 σχήσεσθ', ἀλλ' ἐν νηυσὶ μελαίνῃσιν πεσέεσθαι.

635

74. Od. 11.501-503

εἰ τοῖσδ' ἔλθοιμι μίνυνθά περ ἐς πατέρος δῶ,  
 τῷ κέ τεω στύξαιμι μένος καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους,  
 οἳ κείνον βιῶνται ἔεργουσὼ τ' ἀπὸ τιμῆς."

\* \* \* \*

The totality of a warrior's mental and physical  
 force is expressed also by the pairing of μένος and  
 ἀλκή:

75. Il. 9.705-706

νῦν μὲν κοιμήσασθε τεταρπόμενοι φίλον ἦτορ  
σίτου καὶ οἴνοιο· τὸ γὰρ μένος ἐστὶ καὶ ἀλκή·

705

76. Il. 19.160-161

ἀλλὰ πάσασθαι ἀνωχθὶ θεῶς ἐπὶ νηυσὶν Ἀχαιοὺς  
σίτου καὶ οἴνοιο· τὸ γὰρ μένος ἐστὶ καὶ ἀλκή.

160

77. Il. 6.264-265

“ μὴ μοι οἶνον ἄερε μελίφρονα, πότνια μήτηρ,  
μὴ μ’ ἀπογνώσῃς μένεος, ἀλκῆς τε λάθωμαι·

265

78. Il. 22.281-282

ἀλλὰ τις ἀρτιεπὶς καὶ ἐπὶ κλοπῆς ἐπλεο μύθων,  
ᾧ φρα σ’ ὑποδείσας μένεος ἀλκῆς τε λάθωμαι.

Paris does not reach the heroic ideal because while he has ἀλκή he lacks μένος; Hector is saddened and somewhat baffled by Paris' evident lack of will to accomplish the action of which he is physically capable:

79. Il. 6.520-523

Τὸν δ’ ἀπαμειβόμενος προσέφη κορυθαίολος Ἑκτωρ·  
“ δαιμόνι’, οὐκ ἂν τίς τοι ἀνὴρ, ὃς ἐναΐσιμος εἴη,  
ἔργον ἀτιμῆσαι μάχης, ἐπεὶ ἀλκιμὸς ἐσσι·  
ἀλλὰ ἐκὼν μεθείς τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλεις·

521

Μένος is associated with breath in the formulaic phrase μένεα πνείοντες, used (with minor variations) of the Achaeans, the Abantes, and Odysseus and his supporters as they face the suitors:

80. Il. 2.536...543-544

Οἱ δ' Εὐβοίαν ἔχον μένεα πνείοντες Ἀβάντες,

αἰχμηταὶ μεμαῶτες ὀρεκτῆσιν μελήσιν  
θώρηκας ῥήξιν δῆλων ἀμφὶ στήθεσσι·

81. Il. 3.8-9

οἱ δ' ἄρ' ἴσαν σιγῇ μένεα πνείοντες Ἀχαιοί,  
ἐν θυμῷ μεμαῶτες ἀλεξέμεν ἀλλήλοισιν.

82. Il. 11.508

τῷ ῥα περιδωσαν μένεα πνείοντες Ἀχαιοί,

83. Il. 24.364-365

οὐδὲ σὺ γ' ἔδεικας μένεα πνείοντας Ἀχαιούς,  
οἱ τοι δυσμενέες καὶ ἀνάρσιοι ἐγγὺς ἔασι;

365

84. Od. 22.203

ἐνθα μένος πνείοντες ἐφέστασαν, οἱ μὲν ἐπ' οὐδοῦ

It is difficult to determine whether this phrase refers to the phenomenon of 'snorting' with eagerness, as does, for example, a wrought-up horse, or, on the other hand, to being filled with μένος, as are the φρένες of Agamemnon in the Quarrel (Il. 1.103-4). The latter interpretation might help to make sense of the difficult passage at Od. 24.319:

85. Od. 24.318-320

τοῦ δ' ὠρίνετο θυμός, ἀνὰ βῦνας δέ οἱ ἤδη  
 δριμύν μένος προὔτυψε φίλον πατέρ' εἰσορόωντι.  
 κύσσε δέ μιν περιφύς ἐπιάλμενος ἤδ' ἐπ' αἰσιν ἔπειθε

320

As Odysseus looks upon his father mourning for him, his θυμός is stirred (ὠρίνετο is a strong verb, conveying the sense of 'agitated', 'thrown into confusion') and springing (again, an emphatic verb) toward his father, he embraces and kisses him. This is clearly an intensely emotional moment but no tears are said to fall. Odysseus has already done his weeping, alone and unobserved (232-4); now he gives rein to the overpowering impulse to embrace his father and reveal his identity. The 'agitated' θυμός and δριμύν μένος refer to Odysseus' strongly felt impulse and keen urge to implement it in action.

As we have seen above (no.40), Hector expresses reservations regarding the efficacy of wine; it might well make him forget his μένος:

86. Il. 6.264-265

"μή μοι οἶνον ἄειρε μελίφρονα, πότνια μήτηρ,  
μή μ' ἀπογνῶσθης μένεος, ἀλκῆς τε λάθωμαι."

265

Fear, as well as wine, can make a man forget his μένος:

87. Il. 22.281-282

ἀλλά τις ἀρτιεπὶς καὶ ἐπὶ κλοπῆς ἔπλεο μύθων,  
ὄφρα σ' ὑποδείσας μένεος ἀλκῆς τε λάθωμαι."

Emmet Robbins notes "the connection that seems to be made between μένος and λάθωμαι,"<sup>19</sup> as in Il. 6.264-265 (no. 86 above) and

88. Il. 16.601-602

στὰν δ' ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ὄντες ἀολλέες· οὐδ' ἄρ' Ἀχαιοὶ  
ἀλκῆς ἐξελάθοντο, μένος δ' ἰθὺς φέρον αὐτῶν.

89. Il. 15.60

αὐτὶς δ' ἐμπνεύσῃσι μένος, λελάθῃ δ' ὀδυνῶν

60

Contrarily, a man remembers μένος through being reminded of it; both Robbins and Nagy point out the etymological and semantic connections between μένος

and *μεινῆσκω* (in both active and middle forms),  
adducing passages in which the two words occur  
together,<sup>20</sup> e.g.:

90. Od. 1.320-322

ἄρνις δ' ὥς ἀνοπαῖα διέπτατο· τῷ δ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ 320  
οἴκε μένος καὶ θάρσος, ὑπέμνησέν τέ ἐ πατρός  
μᾶλλον ἔτ' ἢ τὸ πάροιθεν.

91. Il. 11.287-291

ἀνέρες ἔστε, φίλοι, μνήσασθε δὲ θούριδος ἀλκῆς.  
οἴχετ' ἀνὴρ ὤριστος, ἐμοὶ δὲ μέγ' εὖχος ἔδωκε  
Ζεὺς Κρονίδης· ἀλλ' ἰθύς ἐλαύνετε μώνυχας ἵππους  
ἰφθίμων Δαναῶν, ἵν' ὑπέρτερον εὖχος ἄρησθε." 290  
Ὡς εἰπὼν ὄτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἐκάστου.

Remembering is apparently conceived of as an act of  
'will'.

Robbins notes, too, the connection between μένος  
and μανία/μαίνομαι.<sup>21</sup> At Il. 8.360-1, Athene complains  
that Zeus μαίνεται and thwarts her μένος:

92. Il. 8.360-361

ἀλλὰ πατὴρ σύμῳς φρεσὶ μαίνεται οὐκ ἀγαθῇσι, 360  
σχέτλιος, αἰὲν ἀλιτρός, ἐμῶν μενέων ὑπερρωεύς·

\* \* \* \* \*



\* \* \* \* \*

It is generally agreed that μένος and μένειν are derived each from an Indo-European root \*men-, the two roots being formally identical but semantically distinct. Pokorny, however, has suggested that the two roots may in fact be one and the same.<sup>22</sup> His suggestion has not, to my knowledge, been pursued, but it is intriguing, especially in view of the fact that μένειν in Homer does not denote idle waiting but determined remaining, directed toward some purpose; it conveys a sense similar to that of the archaic English verb 'abide'. Moreover, μένειν can be used transitively, in contexts where it means 'to withstand' the foe.<sup>23</sup>

In any case, whatever the historical situation with respect to the etymology of μένος and μένειν, there is evident wordplay in the Homeric texts, exploiting the similarities in form if not in meaning of the two words:

93. Il. 5.527 (=15.622, cf. 15.406)

ὧς Δαναοὶ Τρῶας μένον ἔμπεδον οὐδὲ φέβοντο.

The verbal phrase μένον ἔμπεδον recalls the μένος ἔμπεδον of 5.254 and elsewhere, the force (the 'staying power') that enables a warrior to withstand the foe.

The verb occurs with ἔμπεδον again at 17.434:

94. Il. 17.434-437

ἀλλ' ὥς τε στήλη μένει ἔμπεδον, ἢ τ' ἐπὶ τύμβῳ  
ἀνέρος ἐστήκη τεθυγός, ἢ γυναικός, 435  
ὥς μένον ἀσφαλῶς περικαλλέα δίφρον ἔχοντες,  
οὔδ' ἐνισκίψαντε κρήατα·

(This passage has bearing on Simonides' use of μένος; see the discussion below, pp.108-9.)

μένειν is associated with verbs incorporating reference to μένος:

95. Il. 14.374-375

ἴομεν· αὐτὰρ ἐγὼν ἡγήσομαι, οὐδ' ἔτι φημί  
Ἕκτορα Πριαμίδην μένειν μάλα περ μεμαῶτα. 375

96. Il. 22.384, Achilles proposes to test the purpose of the Trojans, whether they will leave the city now that Hector is fallen,

ἢε μένειν μεμᾶσι καὶ Ἕκτορος οὐκέτ' εἶντος.

These passages indicate that Homer consciously associates μένος and μένειν, regardless of whether he considers the two forms cognates or merely homographs.

\* \* \* \* \*

Μένος in the Homeric poems most often appears as a power in human beings (and gods) although, as we have seen, animals may have μένος too. But in addition to men and animals, μένος is attributed also to things which are now considered inanimate: natural phenomena such as fire, sun, wind and rivers and even in one instance a man-made object, a spear. The ascribing of psychic power to non-human beings and especially to inanimate entities involves what we regard as anthropomorphism, but Homer sees the working of 'spirit' everywhere, in a wind or in a spear just as much as in a warrior:  
Wind:

97. Il. 5.524-525

ἀτρέμας, ὅφρ' εὐδῇσι μένος βορέας καὶ ἄλλων  
 λαχρεῖων ἀνέμων, οἳ τε νέφεα σκιάοντα

325

98. Od. 5.478 (cf. 19.440)

τοὺς μὲν ἄρ' οὗτ' ἀνέμων διὰ μένος ὑγρὸν ἀέντων,

As we have seen, in human beings μένος is in the service primarily of the θυμός; in non-human 'agents' μένος is in the service of the essential nature of the entity in question and therefore μένος may be qualified by an adjective appropriate to the phenomenon itself. Thus the μένος of a chill wind is itself said to be 'damp'.

## Sun:

99. Il. 23.190-191 (cf. H. Apoll. 371, 374)

ὅσσον ἐπεῖχε νέκυς, μὴ πρῶν μένος ἡελίοιο  
σκήλει' ἀμφὶ περὶ χροῖα ἔνεσιν ἡδὲ μέλεσσιν.

190

100. Od. 10.159-160

ἦκεν· ὁ μὲν ποταμόνδε κατήϊεν ἐκ νομοῦ ὕλης  
πτόμενος· δὴ γάρ μιν ἔχεν μένος ἡελίοιο.

160

## Rivers:

101. Il. 12.17-19

δὴ τότε μητιόωντο Ποσειδάων καὶ Ἀπόλλων  
τείχος ἀμαλδύναι, ποταμῶν μένος εἰσαγαγόντες.  
ὅσσοι ἀπ' Ἰδαίων ὀρέων ἄλαδε προρέουσι,

## Fire:

102. Il. 23.237-238 (cf. 24.792)

πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ πυρκαϊῇν σβέσαι' αἴθοπι οἴνῳ  
πᾶσαν, ὅπόσσον ἐπέσχε πυρὸς μένος.

103. Il. 6.182 (of the Chimaera)

δεμὸν ἀποπνέουσα πυρὸς μένος αἰθομένοιο.

104. Il. 17.565

ἀλλ' Ἐκτωρ πυρὸς αἰνὸν ἔχει μένος, οὐδ' ἀπολήγει 565

105. Il. 23.177

ἐν δὲ πυρὸς μένος ἦκε σιδήρεον, ὄφρα νέμοιτο.

106. Od. 11.219-221

οὐ γὰρ ἔτι σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα ἴνες ἔχουσιν,  
ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τε πυρὸς κρατερὸν μένος αἰθομένοιο 220  
δαμνᾷ, ἐπεὶ κε πρῶτα λίπη λευκ' ὀστέα θυμός,

These forces of nature are conceived of as possessing 'will', by means of which they accomplish their purpose. This conception is extended to, and elaborated in, the Homeric warrior's spear, in a formulaic line in which Ares is said to release the μένος of the spear:<sup>24</sup>

107. Il. 13.437-444, Poseidon casts a spell upon Alkathoos, so that he stands unmoving, unable to avoid the spear-thrust of Idomeneus:

ἀλλ' ὥς τε στήλην ἢ δένδρεον ὑψιπέτηλον  
ἀτρέμας ἑσταότα στήθος μέσον οὔτασε δουρὶ  
ἦρως Ἰδομενεύς, ῥῆξεν δέ οἱ ἀμφὶ χιτῶνα  
χάλκεον, ὅς οἱ πρόσθεν ἀπὸ χροῶς ἦρκει ὀλεθρον· 440  
δὴ τότε γ' αὖτον αὔσεν ἐρεικόμενος περὶ δουρί.  
δούπησεν δὲ πεσών, δόρυ δ' ἐν κραδίῳ ἐπεπήγει,  
ἢ ῥά οἱ ἀσπαίρουσα καὶ οὐρίαχον πελέμιζεν  
ἔγχος· ἔνθα δ' ἔπειτ' ἀφίει μένος ὄβριμος Ἄρης·

108. Il. 16.608-613

Αἰνείας δ' ἐπὶ Μηριόνη δόρυ χάλκεον ἦκεν·  
ἔλπετο γὰρ τεύξεσθαι ὑπασπίδια προβιβῶντος.  
ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν αὐτὰ ἰδὼν ἠλεύατο χάλκεον ἔγχος· 610  
πρόσσω γὰρ κατέκνυε, τὸ δ' ἐξόπιθεν δόρυ μακρὸν  
οὔδεις ἐνισκίμθη, ἐπὶ δ' οὐρίαχος πελεμίχθη  
ἔγχος· ἔνθα δ' ἔπειτ' ἀφίει μένος ὄβριμος Ἄρης·

109. Il. 17.525-529

Ἔκτωρ δ' Αὐτομέδοντος ἀκόντισε δουρὶ φαεινῷ· 525  
ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν αὐτὰ ἰδὼν ἠλεύατο χάλκεον ἔγχος·  
πρόσσω γὰρ κατέκνυε, τὸ δ' ἐξόπιθεν δόρυ μακρὸν  
οὔδεις ἐνισκίμθη, ἐπὶ δ' οὐρίαχος πελεμίχθη  
ἔγχος· ἔνθα δ' ἔπειτ' ἀφίει μένος ὄβριμος Ἄρης·

The spear is conceived of as possessing μένος, which impels the spear to seek its target and fulfill its function. When the spear fixes itself in its target or, failing that, in the ground, the force of the μένος causes it to quiver until the μένος is released by Ares.

Elsewhere the action of weapons (spears and arrows) is described by verbs associated with μένος (μενεαίνω, μαιμάω, and, in one instance, λιλαιόμαι, a verb of similar meaning to the first two):

110. Il. 4.125-126

λίγξε βιός, νευρή δὲ μέγ' ἴαχεν, ἄλτο δ' οἰστός  
δξυβελής, καθ' ὄμιλον ἐπιπτέσθαι μενεαίνων.

125

111. Il. 11.571...573-574

ἰστάμενος· τὰ δὲ δοῦρα θρασειᾶν ἀπὸ χειρῶν

πολλὰ δὲ καὶ μεσσηγύ, πάρος χροῖα λευκὸν ἐπαυρεῖν,  
ἐν γαίῃ ἴσταντο, λιλαιόμενα χροὸς ἤσαι.

112. Il. 15.541-543

στή δ' εὐράξ σὺν δουρὶ λαθών, βάλε δ' ὦμον ὀπισθεν·  
αἰχμὴ δὲ στέρνοιο διέσσυτο μαιμώωσα,  
πρόσσω ἱεμένη· ὃ δ' ἄρα πρηνὴς ἐλιάσθη.

The weapons are regarded as manifesting will  
to carry out their work.

\* \* \* \* \*

The use of μένος in the periphrastic construction  
λερὸν μένος + genitive of a proper name, e.g.

113. Od. 7.167

ἔπει τό γ' ἄκουσ' λερὸν μένος Ἀλκινόοιο,

which, as Householder and Nagy observe, seems at  
first to be stylistically motivated, has been explained  
by them as a reflex from a prehistoric period, dictated  
by the morphophonemic change known as Caland's rule:<sup>25</sup>

This rule is of Indo-European origin and  
essentially entails the following distri-  
bution: suffix \*-i- for adjective-root  
when it is the first constituent of a  
compound, vs. suffix \*-ro- replacing  
\*-i- when the root forms a simplex  
adjective and is not in compound form-  
ation. Thus \*λερο-μενο- or \*λερο-φι-  
would be violations of Caland's rule,  
since λε-ρῶ- is the non-compound  
variant; on the other hand, the



phonological reflexes of the morphologically predictable \*isθi-(meno-) or \*isθi-(wi-) would disrupt any overt synchronic formal connection with non-compound τερός (i.e. \*τελ- or the like could no longer be perceived as related to τερό-). Hence the circumvention resulting in τερόν μένος or τερή ζς + genitive.

\*τελ-μενής would presumably have a sense similar to ζαμενής (e.g. Pindar, P.4.10, 9.38), corresponding in form and function to the English compound adjective 'strong-willed'.<sup>26</sup>

The periphrastic constructions of μένος, unqualified + genitive<sup>27</sup> would appear to be reduced versions of the original formula τερόν μένος, a reduction made possible once the full formula had become firmly established in Epic diction.

\* \* \* \* \*

μένος in Hesiod and the lyric poets

The use of μένος in Hesiod and the lyric poets mainly echoes Homeric usage; in Hesiod we find references to the μένος of fire and sun, the μένος βγρόν of winds, the μένος of Zeus and Athene, the μένος of a bellowing bull, μένος put into horses by a god, μένος linked with χεῖρες and γυῖα, μένος filling φρένες and ἦτορ.<sup>28</sup> Mimnermos has the Homeric phrase μένος καὶ ἀγήνορα θυμόν (13.1), and δριμύ μένος κραδίης (13.6). Pindar speaks of the 'resistless μένος' of Artemis (P.3.32) and of μένος 'that wrestles with old age', inspired by a grandson's victory in the Games (O.8.70), implying a resurgence of that spiritual energy referred to in the phrase 'the will to live'.

Simonides' poem (581) on the epitaph of Kleoboulos on Midas' tomb comments on the foolishness of setting against the powerful forces of nature the μένος of a gravestone:

114. Simonides 581 PMG

τίς κεν αἰνήσειε νόφ' πίονος Λίνδου ναέταν Κλεόβουλον,  
 ἀεναοῖς ποταμοῖς ἀνθεσὶ τ' εἰαρινοῖς  
 αἰλίου τε φλογὶ χρυσέας τε σελάνας  
 καὶ θαλασσαιῶν δύναις ἀντιθέντα μένος στάλας;  
 ἅπαντα γάρ ἐστι θεῶν ἥσσω· λίθον δὲ  
 καὶ βρότεοι παλάμαι θραύοντι· μωροῦ  
 φωτὸς ἄδε βούλα.

The stone has μένος to endure for all time. Simonides is not disputing the existence of the stone's μένος;<sup>29</sup> his point is that the μένος (the 'will') of a stone can be thwarted even by a mortal whereas the timeless forces of nature exhibit a 'will' that is subject only to the gods.

The unparalleled use of μένος in the recently-discovered fragment of Archilochos (P. Colon. 7511) is discussed at length in Appendix V.

### Conclusion

Modern Homeric scholarship has operated on tacitly accepted assumptions which at times contradict the conclusions reached or the preconceptions held by individual scholars. I have tried to counteract this by bringing the underlying assumptions to the fore and applying them consciously to the argument. The result has been, I hope, a definition of μένος and a model of Homeric psychology which are consistent with both the text and the context.

Among the many definitions of will in the Western philosophical tradition, there is one (the conception of will as dynamic power) which can be applied to μένος in early Greek in a way that satisfies my criteria; this definition is set forth in the first Appendix. In the second Appendix, I discuss the question of agency, which is normally considered a corollary of will; among the various theories of action, the view that attributes agency to the 'self' most closely suits the Homeric context. Although

the poet does not himself discuss will and agency (it would be odd, given the nature of the work, if he did), it is enough that his characters can be shown, in their actions and attitudes, to presuppose these notions.

As I remarked in the Introduction, μένος occurs, in early Greek, in a wide range of contexts and the word has been assigned a comparably wide range of meanings by commentators. Through a discussion of representative passages, I have tried to show how a common notion may be seen at work in all the occurrences of μένος in Homer, Hesiod and the lyric poets. Some of these passages, when considered in isolation, might seem to admit of a sense for μένος other than the one proposed here; this I do not dispute but if we are to inquire into the meaning of a word we must consider all its uses and look for a sense that fits any given context as well as another. The interpretation of μένος as psychic energy, responsible for the effecting of action, gives the word a sense that appears to be appropriate for all its multifarious uses.

The notion of psychic energy that I see in the reference of μένος corresponds, as I have tried to show, to a conception of will that has been held by a number of theorists in the Western philosophical tradition; this conception takes will to be energy or dynamic power, the power to do or produce something. As the 'faculty' responsible for the effecting of action, μένος takes its place alongside the 'organs' νόος, θυμός and φρένες, which others have seen as the organs responsible for Homeric man's psychic life.

As I have attempted to show in Chapter II, I see Homeric man as assuming personal responsibility for his actions. I have therefore proposed a new model of Homeric psychology, which incorporates μένος and accounts for the initiating of action in an ordered sequence of the functions of these four psychic organs. This model differs from the generally accepted model of Homeric psychology in that it attributes agency to Homeric man. If this model is valid, it may prove a useful tool in the search for a better understanding of the mind of man in archaic Greece.

## Appendix I: The Concept of Will in Western Thought

As stated in the Introduction, I advance in this thesis an interpretation of μένος in early Greek which corresponds, to a greater or lesser degree, to the later conception in the Western philosophical tradition of will as dynamic power.<sup>1</sup> In other words, I argue that early Greek--and by extension, early Greeks--anticipated this later conception of will. In order to define the particular conception of will in question, it is necessary briefly to consider other (sometimes overlapping) conceptions to which the term 'will' has also been applied.

Godfrey Vesey, in a discussion of Descartes' position on mind-body dualism, notes the difficulties involved in the application of philosophical terminology: "Wittgenstein, in the Blue Book, remarks that 'meaning' is a philosopher's odd-job word. The same is undoubtedly true of the word 'substance'. There is not one concept of substance common to, say, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz, Locke and Kant."<sup>2</sup>

Similar difficulties arise in the treatment of 'will' in Western thought, with profound consequences for mutual understanding or misunderstanding. The word 'will' and related terminology (what may be called generally 'will-language')<sup>3</sup> has been applied by various thinkers to various conceptions throughout the philosophical tradition. The resulting confusions affect not only original thought but also critical analysis of the positions adopted by previous thinkers. For instance, Michael J. O'Brien, in an inquiry into Plato's position on the question of freedom of the will, observes that "When Wilamowitz uses 'Wille' to translate θυμοειδής, and A. E. Taylor declares that 'will' has nothing at all to do with θυμοειδής, but belongs in the λογιστικόν, the reader is warned that there are profound ambiguities to be overcome. But Wilamowitz evidently means by 'will' an abiding capacity to overcome temptation, and Taylor means a source of rational choice, and each is a legitimate application of the modern word."<sup>4</sup> O'Brien adds that neither of these senses pertains to what we mean by 'free will'.



### The Conception of Will as Free

By 'free will' is meant "that power or condition of an agent which enables him to act, or refuse to act, and to do so in ways which he determines, without compelling restraints from forces external to, or internal to, his own personality."<sup>5</sup> The presence of this power, giving rise to spontaneous action and moral choice, is the source of personal responsibility in man. This conception is opposed to 'determinism', the view that human action is necessitated either by external factors or by the individual's own nature.

As we have seen in Chapter II above, it is commonly held that Homer in particular and the Greeks in general had no notion of freedom of the will, indeed no concept of will at all.<sup>6</sup> The modern conception of 'free will' is usually traced to Augustine,<sup>7</sup> whose treatise De libero arbitrio is the earliest systematic treatment of the subject. Augustine defines will in terms of freedom: will is "a movement of the soul, with no compulsion, toward something that is not to be given up, or that is to be attained."<sup>8</sup> (It is to be noted that for Augustine will is not a

'part' of the soul; it is rather the whole soul as freely acting.)<sup>9</sup>

This view of will was held by various medieval thinkers down to fourteenth-century (and later) Scholasticism, where it found notable representatives in Duns Scotus and William of Ockham. Through the intermediary of Suarezian thought, the view reached Descartes, who, in turn, affirmed will as the faculty of freedom: "La volonté est tellement libre de sa nature, qu'elle ne peut jamais être contrainte."<sup>10</sup> Variations on a conception of the will as free may be seen in Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer and the French existentialists.<sup>11</sup>

### The Conception of Will as Intellectual Preference

When A. E. Taylor attributes will to Plato's λογιστικόν, taking will to be a "source of rational choice,"<sup>12</sup> he is relying on an entirely different conception which understands willing as an act of intellectual preference, a "cognitive function of judging that one object of consideration is to be set above others."<sup>13</sup> This 'intellectualist' theory

of will reduces the making of a personal decision to the problem of understanding the greater good; it is the view expressed in the famous Socratic paradox that virtue is knowledge. Plato and Aristotle were very much concerned with the problem of personal decision, discussing it in language based on βουλή (βουλέσθαι, βούλησις, βούλημα), the cognate of Latin voluntas, which is in turn the etymon of English 'volition'. Acts of 'willing' (βούλησις) Plato attributes to the rational part of his tripartite soul; acts of desire, below the level of reason, lie outside the province of βούλησις: the tyrants of the Gorgias, for instance, whose souls are taken over by desire for power, 'do nothing which they will' (οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὃν βούλονται, 466d).

Aristotle's position on the question of choice is rather more complex. Although his account of choosing does involve a cognitive judgment, it also brings in the element of desire (see the discussion below of the conception of will as desire or appetency). One deliberates regarding several possible means to an end; one chooses by desiring the means judged best. Choice (προαίρεσις) and wishing or willing (βούλησις)

are thus rational desires. Aristotle in fact declines to decide the issue in favour of reason or appetite: "choice is either desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire."<sup>14</sup>

The conception of will as intellectual preference continued to find advocates throughout the Middle Ages and into the modern era, where it achieves its purest formulation in the thought of Spinoza, for whom will is the intellectual function of affirmation or denial: "In the mind there is no volition or affirmation and negation excepting that which the idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves. ...Corollary. - The will and the intellect are one and the same."<sup>15</sup> J. Collins remarks on Spinoza's intellectual reduction of volition: "There is [for Spinoza] no real distinction between acts of knowing and willing. ...Descartes had defended freedom by making judgment an act of will. Spinoza reduces the will to the cognitive function of judgment, making it subject to the same determinism governing all our cognitive operations."<sup>16</sup>

Proponents of an 'intellectualist' theory of will are always subject to the charge that they are advocates of determinism. A case in point is that of Jonathan

Edwards, an early American theorist who conceived of the will as "that faculty or power or principle of mind by which it is capable of choosing."<sup>17</sup> Edwards considered the will to be always determined in its choice by the strongest motive<sup>18</sup> and on this point he was vigorously opposed by the Faculty Psychologists<sup>19</sup> of the nineteenth century, who emphasized the active power of will.

#### The Conception of Will as Rational Appetite

As we have seen, Aristotle introduces into his account of choice the notion of desire. This is an instance of the conception of will as "appetency or conation in general, whether rational or not."<sup>20</sup> M. J. O'Brien observes that "the Platonic conception which most nearly approximates this is Eros, 'love'," elaborated in the Symposium and the Phaedrus. Plato's theory of Eros, O'Brien writes, "cannot be divorced from the ethical principle that no man wishes evil and all wish the good. Eros is this same universal wish, conceived as the vital energy of our conscious and unconscious lives, extended to the animal kingdom,

and touched with passion."<sup>21</sup> That portion of Eros which pertains to the highest part of the soul would thus correspond to a conception of will as rational appetite.

Aristotle, in De Anima, also posits a general power of desire or appetite ( $\delta\rho\epsilon\zeta\iota\varsigma$ ) in the soul. Wishing or willing ( $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ) he conceives of as a function of this one power which comprises all appetitive functions both sensory and rational: "It is absurd to break up [the appetitive faculty] for  $\beta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$  is found in the calculative part and desire and passion in the irrational; and if the soul is tripartite appetite will be found in all three parts."<sup>22</sup>

V. J. Bourke points out that a conception of will as rational appetite is based on a teleological interpretation of the functions of the will.<sup>23</sup> The various appetitive functions in man are considered to be directed toward ends on their corresponding levels. And since teleological metaphysics has lost favour in the modern era, appetite theories of will have been relinquished along with it. But before its demise, the theory of will as rational appetite received a detailed analysis at the hands of St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Thomas makes a sharp distinction between cognition

and appetite and distinguishes three types or levels of appetite, physical, sensory and intellectual (the last being identical with volition). The human will he regards as "the psychic power enabling a person to tend toward or away from something apprehended intellectually as good or evil."<sup>24</sup> The ultimate good, the ultimate end for all men, desired for its own sake alone, is the Perfect Good, or God.

#### The Conception of Will as Dynamic Power

The conception of will as dynamic power involves a notion of will as energy, the power to do or produce something; will is that which is responsible for the effecting of one's choices or decisions, either by an external process involving bodily activity or by an internal process involving a psychic effort to refrain from acting. In the words of V. J. Bourke, this conception "identifies will with the soul or mind of man as acting. Sometimes the results of such volitional activity are purely immaterial; sometimes they are

physical. Will is thus understood as energy, activity itself, personal dynamism or power."<sup>25</sup>

Variations on a dynamic power theory of will cover a wide spectrum from Augustine, who in his early work conceived of the human will as "a strength in the soul whereby all of man's activities may be produced,"<sup>26</sup> to Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, who take the conception of will as dynamic power to its furthest limit in regarding will as the power which produces all psychic and physical events.<sup>27</sup>

Bourke presents a survey of various dynamic power theories of will in British thought from the thirteenth to the nineteenth centuries, in German Post-Kantian philosophy, in certain modern French and Italian philosophers and in nineteenth and twentieth-century American thought, notably that of William James, whose emphasis on effort in his conception of will Bourke notes also in recent Soviet psychology.<sup>28</sup>

Among the various dynamic power conceptions of will in Western thought, one of the most interesting and, for our present purposes, perhaps the most revealing, is that of the American Faculty Psychologists of the nineteenth century. In response to the determinism



they saw in the 'intellectualist' views of Jonathan Edwards, the Faculty Psychologists emphasized the active nature of will. They posited three powers or faculties in man: "The first was called perception, understanding, or the power of thought: it was the knowing faculty. The second was called sensibility, affection, heart, or taste: it was the faculty of feeling, of suffering agreeable or disagreeable emotions. The third was named will or the power of volition: it was the faculty of action."<sup>29</sup>

The active nature of the will, in contrast to the passive nature of the sensibility, was emphasized by Albert T. Bledsoe, a leading exponent of the view: "The truth is, that in feeling the mind is passive; and it is absurd to make a passive impression the active cause of any thing. The sensibility does not act, it merely suffers. The appetites and passions, which have always been called the 'active powers', the 'moving principles,' and so forth, should be called the passive susceptibilities...the will [is] the active power."<sup>30</sup>

The will manifests itself in physical activity; Asa Burton, the 'Father' of the school, maintained

that "the immediate object of volition is generally the motion of the whole body, or some one of its members."<sup>31</sup>

For the Faculty Psychologists, then, will is "the capacity of the mind to act, to perform the functions to which it is directed by the sensibility";<sup>32</sup> it is conceived of as an 'executive faculty' which carries out the desires of the agent, under the guidance of the heart or faculty of feeling. As Burton put it: "The will is only an executive faculty. It is no more than a servant of the heart, to execute its pleasure. The will is no primary principle of action; its office is to obey the commands of the heart."<sup>33</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

The role of μένος in Homeric psychology appears to involve a conception of 'will' similar to the 'dynamic power' theories described here. In other words, when we look at the Homeric texts we see certain psychological phenomena covered by the use of the word μένος in the Homeric representation of

action; when we look at the account of human action in later Western thought we see the same sort of phenomena covered by the use of the word 'will' (and corresponding words in other languages), whenever by 'will' is meant a conception of the sort discussed in this last section, namely, the conception of will as dynamic power.

## Appendix II: Personal identity and action theory

The philosophical problem of personal identity is concerned with identifying persons through time, that is, with judging that this person at this time is the same person as that at that time. The two main criteria for personal identity are bodily identity and memory. The former involves physical means of identifying individuals, such as physical appearance, voice, and fingerprints; the latter accepts as a criterion for personal identity the set of memories which a person has. The memory criterion poses the problem of the 'self'; Godfrey Vesey terms this 'the unity question', asking,

What unites a person's present experiences with his past experiences? Is it a matter of their all being related to one and the same self-conscious self, or of their all being related to one and the same continuing experience which acts as a sort of background to them, or of their all being related to each other in some way, or what? What is the principle of unity?<sup>1</sup>

Classical discussions of the problem of unity are those of the British philosophers David Hume and John Locke. Hume rejects the notion that (in

Vesey's words) "the unity of experiences consists in their all being related to one and the same 'self-conscious self';<sup>2</sup> arguing against the views of those philosophers "who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our SELF," Hume objects that "self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions are suppos'd to have a reference."<sup>3</sup> Hume's predecessor, John Locke, on the other hand, had held that a self may be said to be the same "as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come."<sup>4</sup>

The ensuing debate on the problem of personal identity suffers, in the view of H. D. Lewis, from a confusion which he attempts to rectify by a distinction between two senses of 'identity', one of which he considers to be 'basic', 'primary', 'fundamental', or 'radical', the other 'subsidiary or secondary'. "The consciousness of oneself as a unique and irreducible being," Lewis writes, is "self-identity in its most basic sense."<sup>5</sup> The other sense of identity, which Lewis considers secondary, is the familiar one, that, for example, the President of the United States is identical with the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

Vesey terms Lewis' 'primary sense' 'self-identity', and his 'secondary sense' 'personal identity'.<sup>6</sup> It is the lack of recognition of 'self-identity', of "one's own inner consciousness of the unique being one finds oneself to be in any experience,"<sup>7</sup> that Lewis regards as the source of confusion in discussions of personal identity:

The philosophical discussion of the problem of self-identity has, in my opinion, been much bedevilled by the fact that philosophers have had this sense of their own ultimate indivisible identity at the back of their minds but, not properly grasping just how peculiar and irreducible it is, they have sought, with varying degrees of ingenuity, to account for it in terms of other senses of 'being the same person', such as the ones instanced above.<sup>8</sup>

One knows one's personal identity if one knows who one is, for example, if the President of the United States knows that he is the President and also the Commander-in-Chief, etc. If one loses one's memory, one does not know one's personal identity, but, according to Lewis, it is still the case that "I would know myself to be myself,"<sup>9</sup> that is, one would still know one's self-identity:

When I lose my memory I am no longer aware of who I am--in one sense, namely that I do not remember my name, where I live, what I have been doing in the past, and so on. I cannot place myself in the sense in which the outside observer would place me on the basis of what is known about me. But I do all the same recognize myself as the unique person I am. It is particulars of my past history and situation that I cannot recover. In a more basic sense I have no doubt who I am--I am myself, the being I expressly recognize myself to be in a way which is not possible for knowledge of any other.<sup>10</sup>

A sense of 'self' such as that identified by Lewis is clearly crucial to a theory of action which posits a 'self' as agent; it is not, however, sufficient in itself; in order for an agent to be held accountable for his actions, and thereby to be an agent properly speaking, he must be a 'person' in the sense of "a being conscious of its identity through time."<sup>11</sup> Leibniz's characterization of a person, for instance, is that which conserves "the consciousness, or the reflective inward feeling of what it is: thus it is rendered liable to reward and punishment."<sup>12</sup> Moreover, responsible agents must be rational; they "must know what they are doing" and

must be able to give reasons for their having chosen to act so."<sup>13</sup>

The emphasis on self-awareness and rationality in the philosophical characterization of a person results in a deviation from common usage in which the term is used of the corporeal form as well as of the incorporeal 'self'; John Locke, for instance, used 'person' to refer to a rational self and 'man' to refer to a certain physical shape.<sup>14</sup> A recent theory of 'personhood' which brings philosophical usage closer to common usage is that of P. F. Strawson.<sup>15</sup> For Strawson, persons are distinct from (mere) material bodies but they are not therefore disembodied spirits; a 'person' is a type of entity different from and not reducible to these other things. Strawson suggests that 'person' is a logically primitive concept "such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics...are equally applicable to a single individual of that single type."<sup>16</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*



Action theory is concerned with the movements of human beings which are performed intentionally by an agent, that is, with things which a person actively does as opposed to things which happen to him;<sup>17</sup> it attempts to determine the difference between, for instance, a physical movement of a person's arm (which could result from a muscular spasm or a push from another person) and that person's intentional action of moving his arm. A classic formulation of the problem is provided by Wittgenstein's question: "What is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?"<sup>18</sup>

The contemporary discussion of actions involves several theories as to what makes an action intentional; I shall mention five theories of contemporary interest and give a brief account of the first two, followed by a discussion of the problem of responsibility.<sup>19</sup>

1) The mental cause theory holds that actions are caused by mental events such as decision-making or deliberate choosing.

2) The theory of agency holds that actions are caused not by events but simply by the agent himself.

- 3) A performative theory holds that to say of an action that it is intentional is not to describe something about the action but to perform the act of assigning responsibility to an agent for the action.
- 4) A teleological explanation of action appeals to the goal aimed at rather than to a prior cause such as an event or an agent.
- 5) Contextual accounts of action hold that an action is described and evaluated with reference to some set of rules, norms, or practices.

#### The mental cause theory

The theory advocated by Descartes and supported by many subsequent theorists is that intentional actions are caused by mental events, for example, intention, decision, choice, resolve, or determination, or simply having certain reasons for doing the act. Criticism of this theory is based on the objection that many of our intentional actions occur without any apparent prior mental event, such as deliberate choosing or decision-making, for example, lighting a cigarette, scratching an itch, turning the page of a book. Some philosophers have attempted to

counter this objection by maintaining that every intentional action<sup>2</sup> is preceded and caused by an 'act of will' or 'volition', which need not be a conscious decision or deliberate choice. Criticism of the doctrine of volitions<sup>20</sup> rests on the objections that (1) in many cases of actions, no prior volition can be detected; (2) knowledge of the existence and causal efficacy of volitions rests on inference; and (3) if volitions are themselves acts requiring prior volitions in order to occur, we are faced with an infinite regress of volitions. Finally, there is the criticism<sup>21</sup> that the appeal to volitions is not causally explanatory, since the doctrine claims on the one hand that the cause of an action is a prior 'volition' and on the other hand defines the 'volition' as that prior mental event which causes the action. The doctrine, it is claimed, thus 'explains' an action by saying it was caused by what causes such an action, and this account hardly constitutes an informative causal explanation.

#### The theory of agency

The theory of agency holds that the cause of intentional actions is simply the agent himself,

and not some event, even an event within the agent.<sup>22</sup>

The theory of agency, in the words of Richard Taylor, thus

avoids the absurdities of simple indeterminism by conceding that human behavior is caused, while at the same time avoiding the difficulties of determinism by denying that every chain of causes and effects is infinite. Some such causal chains, on this view, have beginnings, and they begin with agents themselves. ...Deliberation becomes, on this view, something that is not only possible but quite rational, for it does make sense to deliberate about activity that is truly my own and that depends in its outcome upon me as its author, and not merely upon something more or less esoteric that is supposed to be intimately associated with me, such as my thoughts, volitions, choices, or whatnot.<sup>23</sup>

Taylor observes that the conception of causation involved in the theory of agency is so different from the usual philosophical conception of a cause as "an antecedent sufficient condition or set of conditions" that it would be preferable to use a different term to designate the role of the agent: "Instead, then, of speaking of agents as causing

their own acts, it would perhaps be better to use another word entirely, and say, for instance, that they originate them, initiate them, or simply that they perform them."<sup>24</sup>

### The problem of responsibility

Shaffer points out that an important motive for holding the theory of agency is to allow for the assigning of moral responsibility.<sup>25</sup> Some defenders of the theory of agency maintain that if an action either has no cause or is caused by events which themselves were not caused by the person who does the action, then the person is not responsible for that action.

The same objection applies to the view that reasons are causes of our decisions and actions; this view is a variation of the mental cause theory, which incorporates to some extent a teleological explanation of action in terms of the end, result, or goal aimed at. A person's reasons are constituted by his set of wants and beliefs; Shaffer writes, "To give reasons is to show how things will be better for the action's having occurred. What one thinks of as 'things being better' will, of course, depend

upon what one wants; and the choice of the action will depend upon one's belief that the action will satisfy one's wants."<sup>26</sup> If one holds that reasons are causes of our decisions and actions, one must then confront the question 'What causes the wants and beliefs that constitute reasons?' Shaffer offers a twofold answer to this question:

Either (1) the wants and beliefs themselves have no causes, arising spontaneously and randomly, or else (2) they themselves are caused by yet other factors which, if traced back long enough, lie outside the agent's control. But in either case, it would appear, the agent cannot act of his own free will, for if (1) the wants and beliefs arise spontaneously and randomly (which is what it is to say they have no causes), then the agent is at the helpless mercy of these eruptions within him which control his behavior, or if (2) the wants and beliefs are caused by other factors outside the agent's control, then the agent is at the helpless mercy of events over which he has no control. In either case, since he cannot act of his own free will, he should never be held morally responsible for what he does, and never deserves praise or blame, credit or discredit for his actions.<sup>27</sup>

Defenders of a reason-causation theory of action attempt to retain moral responsibility for actions by holding that, while our wants and beliefs are caused by events beyond our control, our actions caused by those wants and beliefs are nevertheless under our control.<sup>28</sup> Whether or not their efforts are considered successful, the fact remains that mental cause theorists (like agency theorists, performative theorists, goal theorists, and contextualists) are attempting to provide an account of human action which may be said to be voluntary, done of the agent's own free will, and for which the agent may therefore be held morally responsible.

In contrast to these theorists, some philosophers (and psychologists) deny that there is any difference --or any important difference--between intentional actions and nonintentional movements. This view has great consequences for philosophical psychology as well as for the application of moral concepts. If it is an accurate account, then there is no (important) difference between creatures with minds and mindless things which are merely acted upon; furthermore, if human beings have no more intentional control of their movements than have plants and inanimate

objects, they cannot be held morally responsible for their actions and consequently can be neither praised nor blamed for what they do.

The distinction between intentional actions and nonintentional movements is discussed by A. Castell in terms of a distinction between 'activity' and 'process'.<sup>29</sup> Castell observes that, according to the traditional conception of action, "some human behavior is activity performed by an agent, voluntarily, for a purpose, for a reason";<sup>30</sup> the opposing view Castell terms the 'Process View of human behavior':

One arrives at this view by stripping from the notion of activity its essential ingredients. Thus, activity is said to be performed by an agent; so this view denies that there is an agent who performs the activity. This results in a no-agent view. Again, activity is said to be performed voluntarily; so the view denies that there is any free will, any essential difference between voluntary and involuntary. This results in a no-alternative view: the agent who performs the activity is never confronted with any alternatives between which he chooses. Again, activity is said to be performed for a purpose; so the view denies that there are any purposes or, if



there are, that they are operative. This presents a no-purpose view. Again, activity is said to be performed for a reason; so the view denies that there are any reasons or, if there are, that they are operative. This gives you a no-reason view. These denials are representative; no doubt there are others. Taken as a set they constitute the Process View of human behavior. ... This Process View of human behavior is the result if one elaborates the traditional conception of man as a rational animal and then repudiates the entire notion.<sup>31</sup>

This 'process' view of human behaviour is the view (implicitly) attributed to Homeric man by Bruno Snell and his followers. When they represent Homeric man as acting, or rather reacting, at the helpless mercy of the gods, of external events, or of his own spontaneous and random wants and beliefs, they paint a picture of behaviour that is not rational, not purposive, not voluntary, not performed by an agent. In Chapter II of the present study I have attempted to show that, on the contrary, Homer's representation of his characters' actions and attitudes presupposes a conception of individual responsibility.

Appendix III: On Bruno Snell's view of the absence  
of concepts in Homer

Snell's claim is that Homeric Greek has no word for the 'essence' of the act of seeing, the basic function; no word for the body conceived of as a whole; no word for 'soul'.<sup>1</sup> He makes the further, more fundamental claim that Homer has no word for 'sight' for the reason that the early language is incapable of expressing a 'function'.<sup>2</sup>

These claims, if true, would be very significant for our understanding of the Homeric mentality; however, we must ask ourselves if they are in fact supported by the text. The answer to that question suggested here is that these claims as presented by Snell are at best overstated on the basis of the evidence. I have discussed in Chapter II above the problem of 'soul' in Homer and the questionable method of equating concepts with words; I want here to consider the specific claims that Homeric Greek has no word for 'body', no word for 'sight', and no capacity for expressing 'functions'.

According to Snell, the Homeric mentality "made no provision for the body as such. Among the early expressions designating what was later rendered as soma or 'body', only the plurals γυῖα, μέλεα, etc. refer to the physical nature of the body;<sup>3</sup> for chros is merely the limit of the body, and demas represents the frame, the structure, and occurs only in the accusative of specification."<sup>4</sup> Homeric σῶμα Snell, following Aristarchus, understands as restricted to 'dead body': "in Homer the word σῶμα which subsequently came to mean 'body' is never used with reference to a living being; soma is the corpse."<sup>5</sup>

This view has subsequently been challenged, notably by H. Koller, who has demonstrated that in some passages in Homer the σῶμα is in fact alive;<sup>6</sup> as E. L. Harrison observes, the "precise meaning [of σῶμα] is simply 'body', the physical mass of which a particular man or animal is made up: and the presence or absence of life is irrelevant to the word's meaning."<sup>7</sup> Harrison goes on to point out that Snell's view "that the idea of 'living body' is lacking in Homeric epic, which concentrates

instead on the body's parts--the skin is washed, the limbs tremble, and so on--remains valid. σῶμα is not 'living body' any more than it is 'dead body'--it is simply 'body'."<sup>8</sup>

Thus we see that Homer does indeed have a word for the body conceived of as a unit; moreover, the fact that Homer is specific in his references to the various parts of the body cannot legitimately be used as an argument for his incapacity to conceive of the body as a whole.

Snell applies the same method to the Homeric representation of the act of seeing; he surveys a number of verbs used by Homer to denote the operation of sight (δέρκεσθαι, παπταίνειν, λεύσσειν, ὀσσεσθαι, θεᾶσθαι)<sup>9</sup> and concludes that each of them "derives its special significance from a mode of seeing; not the function of sight, but the object seen, and the sentiments associated with the sight, give the word its peculiar quality."<sup>10</sup>

It is undeniable that Homer has a rich and varied vocabulary for expressing different ways of 'looking';<sup>11</sup> yet when the Cyclops wants a word to express what he has lost at the hands of Odysseus--

which is not the power of 'gazing' or 'glaring' or 'glancing' or 'staring' but the power of 'seeing'-- he has a word ready to hand:  $\delta\pi\omega\pi\eta$  (Od. 9.512), an abstract noun in  $-\bar{\alpha}$ , formed on the  $\delta\pi$ - root, the root used elsewhere in Homer in finite verb forms to express the basic operation of sight, e.g.  $\delta\pi\omega\pi\alpha$ , Il. 2.799, etc.<sup>12</sup>

Of equal interest, not only for Snell's specific claim of Homer's lack of a word for 'seeing' but also for his more general claim of the lack of words denoting 'functions' in Homeric Greek, is the occurrence in Homer of an agent noun in  $-\tau\eta\rho$ , formed on the  $\delta\pi$ - root:  $\delta\pi\tau\eta\rho$ , with the specialized sense of 'scout' (Od. 14.261=17.430). Given the existence of  $\delta\pi\tau\eta\rho$ , we may infer the corresponding action noun in  $-\tau\upsilon\varsigma$  ( $*\delta\pi\tau\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ ), on the evidence of the attested pairs  $\mu\nu\eta\sigma\tau\eta\rho/\mu\nu\eta\sigma\tau\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ ,<sup>13</sup>  $\delta\rho\chi\eta\sigma\tau\eta\rho/\delta\rho\chi\eta\sigma\tau\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ ,<sup>14</sup>  $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\omicron\rho\eta\tau\eta\varsigma/\acute{\alpha}\gamma\omicron\rho\eta\tau\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ ,<sup>15</sup>  $\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\nu\tau\iota\sigma\tau\eta\varsigma/\acute{\alpha}\kappa\omicron\nu\tau\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ ,<sup>16</sup>  $\delta\alpha\rho\iota\sigma\tau\eta\varsigma/\delta\alpha\rho\iota\sigma\tau\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$ .<sup>17</sup>

Greek  $-\tau\upsilon\varsigma$  nouns are old verbal nouns used in the same way as modern English gerunds, to name the action referred to by the root:  $\epsilon\delta\eta\tau\acute{\upsilon}\varsigma$  (e.g. Il. 11. 780), for example, formed on the  $(H)\epsilon\delta$ - root: 'eating';

ἐπητός (Od. 21.306), formed (as I have argued elsewhere)<sup>18</sup> on the *ῥεπ-* 'root: 'speaking', etc.<sup>19</sup> Although \*ὀπτός is not attested in Greek, Snell goes too far flatly to deny that the early language is incapable of expressing the 'essence' of the act of seeing, since this is precisely what \*ὀπτός would express. Since, then, Homeric Greek is capable of expressing the basic operation of sight by hypothetical \*ὀπτός as well as attested ὀπωπή, Snell's claim that the early language is unable to express 'functions' is not supported by the evidence.

Appendix IV: μένος in Homer, Hesiod and the lyric  
poets: list of passages

Homer. Iliad:

(From Prendergast, G. L. A Complete Concordance  
to the Iliad of Homer. Rev. ed. by Benedetto  
Marzullo. Hildesheim 1962)

μένα. {4(δ). 447.} σὺν β' ἔβαλον βίοντες, σὺν δ' ἔγχεα, καὶ μ. ἀνδρῶν.  
8(θ). 61.  
μένα. 2(β). 536. οἱ δ' Ἑβόαιον ἔχον μ. πνείοντες Ἀβαντες,  
3(γ). 8. οἱ δ' ἄρ' ἴσαν σιγῇ μ. πνείοντες Ἀχαιοί,  
11(λ). 508. τῷ βα περιβόησαν μ. πνείοντες Ἀχαιοί,  
24(ω). 364. οὐδὲ σὺ γ' ἴδδειςας μ. πνείοντας Ἀχαιοὺς,

μένα. 6(ζ). 127. δυστήνων δέ τε παῖδες ἑμῷ μ. ἀντιώσιν.  
20(υ). 172. γλαυκιδῶν δ' ἰδὺς φέρεται μ., ἦν τινα πέφυκ  
21(φ). 151. δυστήνων δέ τε παῖδες ἑμῷ μ. ἀντιώσιν.  
21(φ). 431. ἦλθεν Ἀρεὶ ἐπίκουρος, ἑμῷ μ. ἀντιώσιν.  
μένα. 7(η). 210. θυμοβόρου ἔριδος μ. ζυγίηκε μάχεσθαι.

μένεος. 1(α). 103. ἀχνόμενος. μ. δὲ μέγα φρένες ἑμφί μέλαινα  
6(ζ). 265. μή μ' ἀπογνώσῃς, μ. δ' ἀλκῆς τε λάθωμαι  
9(ι). 675. πιμπλάνεται μ. σὲ δ' ἀναιρέται, ἥδὲ σὺ δῶρα  
13(ρ). 60. ἀμφοτέρω κικεπῶς πλῆσσε μ. κρατεροῖο,  
17(ρ). 503. Ἑκτορα Πριαμίδην μ. στήσεσθαι οὐκ  
22(χ). 182. ὄφρα σ' ὑποβείσας μ. ἀλκῆς τε λάθωμαι.  
22(χ). 312. ὠμήθη δ' Ἀχιλεὺς, μ. δ' ἐμπλήσατο θυμὸν

μενέων. 8(θ). 361. σχήτλιος, αἰὲν ἀλιτρός, ἐμῶν μ. ἀπερσεύε.

μένος. 5(ε). 136. δὴ τότε μιν ἄρτι τόσσον ἔλα μ. ὥστε λείοντα,  
5(ε). 254. οὐδὲ καταπύσσειν. ἔτι μοι μ. ἔμπεδόν ἐστιν.  
5(ε). 296.  
8(θ). 123. ὠκύποδες· τοῦ δ' αἰθεὶ λυθὴ ψυχὴ τε, μ. τε.  
8(θ). 315.  
5(ε). 472. Ἑκτορ, πῇ δὴ τοι μ. οἴχεται, ὃ πρὶν ἔχεσθαι;  
5(ε). 524. ἀτρέμας, ὅφρ' εὐδῇσι μ. Βορέας, καὶ ἄλλων  
5(ε). 892. μητρός τοι μ. ἐστὶν ἀσχετος, οὐκ ἐπιεικὴν,  
6(ζ). 407. δαιμόνια, φέσσι σε τὸ σὺν μ., οὐδ' ἐλευθερίαι  
8(θ). 450. πάντας, οἷον ἑμὸν· γὰρ μ. καὶ χεῖρας ἅπτοιο,  
9(ι). 702. } σίτου καὶ οἰνοῦ· τὸ γὰρ μ. ἐστὶ καὶ ἀλκή·  
19(τ). 161.  
13(ρ). 78. μαίμῳσι, καὶ μοι μ. ἔρορε· γέρε δὲ ποσσὶν  
13(ρ). 634. Τρῶσιν, τὸν μ. αἰὲν ἀτάσθαλος, οὐδὲ δύνανται  
14(ξ). 418. ὡς ἔπει· Ἑκτορος ὅσα χαμαὶ μ. ἐν κοίρῃσι·  
16(ρ). 189. τὴν μὲν Ἐχιμλῆος κρατερὴν μ. Ἀκτορίδαο  
17(ρ). 20. οὐτ' οὐκ πορόδωκες τόσσον μ., οὐτε λείοντος,  
17(ρ). 156. εἰ γὰρ νῦν Τρῶεσσι μ. πολυδάροσς ἐνείη  
17(ρ). 298. αἱματόεις, τοῦ δ' αἰθεὶ λυθὴ μ.· ἐκ δ' ἄρα χειρῶν  
19(τ). 202. καὶ μ. οὐ τόσον ᾗσιν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι μ. οἰαίαι,

Homer. Iliad:

- 20(υ). 174. ὅς 'Αχιλῆϊ' ἔτρυνε μ. καὶ θυμὸς ἀγένητορ  
 20(υ). 374. Τρῶες. τῶν δ' ἑμὶς μίχθη μ. ὄρτο δ' αὐτῇ  
 21(φ). 383. αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ Ἑκτόριος δάμη μ. οἱ μὲν ἔπειτα  
 22(χ). 346. εἰ γὰρ πως αὐτὸν με μ. καὶ θυμὸς ἀνήη  
 23(ψ). 190. ὅσσον ἐπείχεται νέκυι, μὴ πρὶν μ. ἡέλλοιο  
 23(ψ). 238. } πᾶσαν, ὁπόσσον ἐτίσχε πυρὸς μ. αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα  
 24(ω). 792. }  
 23(ψ). 468. εἰ δ' ἐξηρώησαν, ἔπει μ. ἔλλαβε θυμὸν.  
 23(ψ). 524. ἀλλὰ μιν αἶψα κίχωνεν· ὀφέλλετο γὰρ μ. ἦδ  
 23(ψ). 837. ἂν δὲ Λεοντήης κρατέρων μ. ἀντιόχοιο,  
 24(ω). 198. αὐτὸς γὰρ μ' αὐτὸν γε μ. καὶ θυμὸς ἀνέγει,  
 μένος. 1(α). 207. ἦλθον ἐγὼ καίσσοισα τέον μ., αἶ κε πύθῃαι,  
 1(α). 282. Ἀτρεΐδῃ, σὸ δὲ παῖς τέον μ. αὐτὰρ ἐγώ γε  
 2(β). 387. εἰ μὴ νύξ ἔλθοις διακρινέει μ. ἀνδρῶν.  
 3(γ). 294. θυμὸν δυνάμενος· ἐπεὶ γὰρ μ. εἴλετο χαλκός·  
 5(ε). 2. δῶκε μ. καὶ θάρσος, ἵ' ἐκδήλος μετὰ πᾶσιν  
 5(ε). 125. ἐν γὰρ τοι στήθεσσι μ. πατρίων ἦκα  
 6(ε). 470. }  
 6(ε). 72. } ὡς εἰπὼν, ἔτρυνε μ. καὶ θυμὸν ἐκάστου,  
 11(λ). 291. }  
 13(ν). 155. }  
 13(ο). 500. }  
 13(ο). 514. }  
 13(ο). 667. } ὡς εἰπὼν, ἔτρυνε μ. καὶ θυμὸν ἐκάστου.  
 16(π). 219. }  
 16(π). 275. }  
 5(ε). 506. οἱ δὲ μ. χειρῶν ἰδοὺ φέρον. ἀμφὶ δὲ νύκτα  
 5(ε). 513. ἦκε, καὶ ἐν στήθεσσι μ. βάλε πομίνι λαῶν.  
 5(ε). 516. καὶ μ. ἰσθλὸν ἔχοντα· μετὰλλασεν γε μὲν οὐ τι·  
 5(ε). 563. σείων ἐγχείη· τοῦ δ' ἔτρυνε μ. Ἄρης,  
 5(ε). 792. ὡς εἰπὼν, ἔτρυνε μ. καὶ θυμὸν ἐκάστου.  
 6(ζ). 27. καὶ μὲν τῶν ὑπέλυσε μ. καὶ φάιδμα γυῖα  
 6(ζ). 101. μάλιστα, οὐδέ τίς οἱ οὐκαστα μ. ἰσοφάρειν.  
 6(ζ). 182. δεινὸν ἀποπνεύουσα πυρὸς μ. αἰδομένοιο.  
 6(ζ). 261. ἀνδρὶ δὲ κακμηῶτι μ. μέγα οἶσος ἀέξει.  
 6(ζ). 502. ἔξοθι, προφυγόντα μ. καὶ χεῖρας Ἀχαιῶν.  
 7(η). 38. Ἐκτορος βρωμὴν κρατερὸν μ. ἰκνομένοιο,  
 7(η). 309. Αἰάντος προφυγόντα μ. καὶ χεῖρας Ἀπτόντος·  
 7(η). 457. δι' οὗ πολλὸν ἀφαιρότερος χεῖρας τε μ. τε·  
 8(θ). 178. ἀβλήχρ', οὐδενόσσυρα· τὰ δ' οὐ μ. ἑμὲν ἐρύξει·  
 8(θ). 335. ἂψ δ' αὖτις Τρῳέσσιν Ὀλύμπιος ἐν μ. ὤρσεν·  
 8(θ). 358. καὶ λίην οὐτός γε μ. θυμὸν τ' ἄλλοισι,  
 10(κ). 366. φεύγων ἐς νῆας, τότε δὴ μ. ἐμβαλ' Ἀθήνη  
 10(κ). 479. ἀλλ' ἔγω δὴ, πρόφρε κρατερὸν μ. οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ  
 10(κ). 482. ὡς φάτο· τῷ δ' ἔμπνευσε μ. γλαυκῶπις Ἀθήνη·  
 11(λ). 268. δέξαι δύναι δύνον μ. Ἀτρεΐδαν.  
 11(λ). 272. ὡς δέει' δύναι δύνον μ. Ἀτρεΐδαν.  
 12(μ). 13. τεῖχος ἀμαλδύναι, ποταμῶν μ. εἰσαγέγοντες,  
 12(μ). 166. στήθεσιν ἡμέτερον γε μ. καὶ χεῖρας Ἀπτόντος·  
 12(μ). 266. πάντοσε φοιτήτην, μ. ἐτρύναντες Ἀχαιῶν·  
 13(ν). 105. ὡς Τρῶες τὸ πρὶν γε μ. καὶ χεῖρας Ἀχαιῶν  
 13(ν). 287. οὐδέ κεν ἔνθα τέον γε μ. καὶ χεῖρας ἔνοϊτο·  
 13(ν). 318. κείνων νικήσαντι μ. καὶ χεῖρας Ἀπτόντος,  
 13(ν). 424. Ἰδομένοος δ' οὐ λῆγε μ. μέγα· ἴετο δ' αἶε  
 13(ν). 444. }  
 16(π). 613. } ἔγχιος· ἔνθα δ' ἔπειτ' ἀφίει μ. ὄβριμος Ἄρης.  
 17(ρ). 529. }  
 14(ξ). 73. πυδάνει, ἡμέτερον δὲ μ. καὶ χεῖρας ἔθισεν.  
 15(ο). 60. αἶψα δ' ἔμπνευσεν μ. λαλῶν δ' ὀδυνῶν,  
 15(ο). 232. τόσσα γὰρ οὖν οἱ ἔγειρε μ. μέγα, ὅρ' ἂν Ἀχαιοὶ  
 15(ο). 262. } ὡς εἰπὼν, ἔμπνευσε μ. μέγα πομίνι λαῶν.  
 20(υ). 110. }  
 15(ο). 493. ὡς νῦν Ἀργείων μινθεῖ μ., ἔμμι δ' ἀρήγαι  
 15(ο). 510. ἢ αὐτοσχάδιρ μίξαι χεῖρας τε μ. τε.  
 15(ο). 594. ὡς σφισιν αἶδ' ἔγειρε μ. μέγα, θέλγε δὲ θυμὸν



Homer. Iliad:

- 16(π). 332. λύσε μ., πλήξας ξίφει αὐχένα κοπήντι.  
 16(π). 329. αἷμα μέλαν τέρσῃσι, μ. δέ οἱ ἐμβαλε θυμῷ.  
 16(π). 602. ἀλκῆς ἐλάνθαντο, μ. δ' ἴδ'ος φέρον αὐτῶν.  
 16(π). 621. πάντων ἀνθρώπων σβίσσαι μ., ὅς κ' ἐσεν ἄντα  
 17(ρ). 29. ὅς θ' ἦν καὶ σὸν ἐγὼ λύσω μ., εἴ κε μεῦ ἄντα  
 17(ρ). 423. ὅς ἦρα τίς εἴπασκε, μ. δ' ὄρσασκεν ἑκάστου.  
 17(ρ). 451. σφῶν δ' ἐν γούνευσι βαλῶ μ., ᾗδ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ,  
 17(ρ). 456. ὅς εἰπὼν, ἱπποῖσιν ἐρέπνευσε μ. ἦθ.  
 17(ρ). 476. ἱππῶν ἀθανάτων ἐχέμεν διμήσιν τε μ. τε,  
 17(ρ). 565. ἀλλ' ἔκτωρ πυρὸς αἰὼν ἔχει μ., οὐδ' ἀπολήγει  
 17(ρ). 638. ἔκτορος ἀνδροφάνει μ. καὶ χεῖραι δά. τους  
 17(ρ). 742. οἱ δ' ὅσθ' ἡμίονοι, κριτέρῳ μ. ἀμφιβαλόντες,  
 18(σ). 264. ἐν μίσῳ ἀμφοτέροι μ. Ἄρηος δατίονται,  
 19(τ). 37. ὅς ἦρα φωνήσασα, μ. πολυδαρσέτι ἐνῆκε·  
 19(τ). 159. ἀνδρῶν, ἐν δὲ θεῶς πνέουσι μ. ἀμφοτέροισιν·  
 20(υ). 80. ἀντία Πηλείωνος, ἐνῆκε δέ οἱ μ. ἦθ.  
 20(υ). 93. εἰρύσασθ', ὅς μοι ἐπῶρε μ. λαίψηρά τε γούνα.  
 20(υ). 372. εἰ πυρὶ χεῖρας ἔοικε, μ. δ' αἰῶσι σιδήρῳ.  
 21(φ). 145. ἔστη, ἔχων δύο δοῦρε· μ. δέ οἱ ἐν φρεσὶ θῆκε  
 21(φ). 305. οὐδὲ Λαέρτιος υἱὸς ἐστὶν ἄλλος, ἀλλ' ἐτι μάλλον  
 21(φ). 340. μηδὲ πρὶν ἀπόπαιε τὸν μ., ἀλλ' ἐπὶ δότῳ δῆ  
 21(φ). 411. εὐχομ' ἐγὼν ἔμεναι, ὅτι μοι μ. ἀντιφείσεις;  
 21(φ). 482. στήθεσσι; χαλεπὴ τοι ἐγὼ μ. ἀντιφείρεσθαι,  
 21(φ). 488. ὅσον φερτέρη εἰμ', ὅτι μοι μ. ἀντιφείσεις.  
 22(χ). 96. ὅς ἔκτωρ, ἄσβεστον ἔχων μ., οὐχ ὑπεχώρει,  
 22(χ). 204. ἐγγύθεν, ὅς οἱ ἐπῶρε μ. λαίψηρά τε γούνα;  
 22(χ). 459. ἀλλὰ καλὸν προθέεσκε, τὸ δ' οὐ μ. οὐδενὶ εἴκων.  
 23(ψ). 177. ἐν δὲ πυρὶ μ. ἦκε σιδήρεον, δόφρα νείμωτα.  
 23(ψ). 390. δῶκε δέ οἱ μέσσην, μ. δ' ἱπποῖσιν ἐνῆκεν.  
 23(ψ). 400. ἱπποῖς ἦκε μ., καὶ ἐπ' αὐτῷ κῆδος ἴσκει.  
 24(ω). 6. Πατρίκλου παθῶν ἀνδρείητά τε καὶ μ. ἦθ.  
 24(ω). 442. ἐν δ' ἔπνευσε ἱπποῖσι καὶ ἡμιόνοις μ. ἦθ.

Homer. Odyssey; Hymns:

(From Dunbar, H. A Complete Concordance to  
the Odyssey of Homer. Rev. ed. by Benedetto  
 Marzullo. Hildesheim 1962)

μένε'. (δ) 363. καί νύ κεν ήια πάντα κατέφθιτο καὶ μ. ἀνδρῶν,

μίνε. (H. Cer.) 239. τόκτας δι' κρύπτεσκε πυρὸς μ., ἥδε δαλόν,  
 μένε. { (ε) 262. } οἱ δ' ὕβρει εἴσαντες, ἐπιστόμενοι μ. σφῶ,  
 { (ρ) 481. }  
 (ω) 188. αὐτίκα γὰρ κατὰ δόματ' ἐπιστόμενοι μ. σφῶ

μένεος. (δ) 681. δχνύμενος μ. δι' μέγα φράνας ἀμφιμέλαινα

- \* μένος. (α) 89. μάλλον ἰποτρύνω, καὶ οἱ μ. ἐν φρεσὶ θεῶν,  
 (α) 321. θῆκε μ. καὶ θάρσος, ἐνέμνησέν τέ ἐ πατρός  
 (β) 85. } Τηλέμαχ' ὑπαγόρη, μ. ἄσχετε, ποῖον εἰπες  
 (ρ) 406. }  
 (β) 271. εἰ δὴ τοι σοῦ πατρός ἐνίσταται μ. ἦδ,  
 (β) 303. Τηλέμαχ' ὑπαγόρη, μ. ἄσχετε, μή τί τοι ἄλλο  
 (γ) 104. δῆμω ἀνέτλημεν μ. ἄσχετοι νῆες Ἀχαιῶν,  
 (γ) 450. αὐχενίου, λῦσεν δὲ βοὸς μ. αἰ δ' ὀλόλυξαν  
 (ε) 478. τοὺς μὲν δρ' οὐτ' ἀνέμων διάη μ. ὕγρον δένταν.  
 (η) 2. κούρην δὲ προτὶ δασυ φέρον μ. ἡμύνουν  
 (η) 167. αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἄκουσ' ἱερὸν μ. Ἀλκινόοιο,  
 (η) 178. } καὶ τότε κήρυκα προσέφη μ. Ἀλκινόοιο  
 (ρ) 49. }  
 (θ) 2. ὄρνυτ' ἀρ' ἐξ εὐνῆς ἱερὸν μ. Ἀλκινόοιο,  
 (θ) 4. } τοῖσιν δ' ἡγεμόνευ' ἱερὸν μ. Ἀλκινόοιο  
 (θ) 421. }  
 (θ) 15. ὥτ' εἰκούσ' ὄτρυνε μ. καὶ θυμὸν ἐκάσταν.  
 (θ) 359. ὥτ' εἰκὼν δεισμὸν ἀνίει μ. Ἡφαίστιοιο.  
 (θ) 385. ὥτ' φάτο, γῆθήσαν δ' ἱερὸν μ. Ἀλκινόοιο,  
 (θ) 423. δὴ βα τότ' Ἀρήτην προσέφη μ. Ἀλκινόοιο  
 (ι) 457. εἰπὲν δ' ἔπει κείνος ἐμὸν μ. ἡλασπάζει·  
 (κ) 180. πύμενος δὴ γάρ μιν ἔχεν μ. ἡελίοιο  
 (λ) 220. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν τε πυρὸς κρατερὸν μ. αἰθομένοιο  
 (λ) 270. τὴν ἔγεν' Ἀμφιτρύωνος νῆδ' μ. αἰὲν ἀτειρήτ.  
 (λ) 502. τῷ δὲ τερ στήθεσσι μ. καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους,  
 (λ) 515. ἀλλὰ πολὺ προσέεσκε, τὸ δὲ μ. οὐδενὶ εἰκόν,  
 (λ) 582. ἡμέτερον δάμασον δὲ μ. καὶ ἀγήνορα θυμὸν.  
 (μ) 279. σχετλιότ' εἰς, Ὀδυσσεύ' περὶ τοι μ., οὐδέ τι γυνῆ  
 (ν) 20. καὶ τὰ μὲν εὖ κατέθηχ' ἱερὸν μ. Ἀλκινόοιο  
 (ν) 24. τοῖσι δὲ βοῦν ἱέρεσ' ἱερὸν μ. Ἀλκινόοιο,  
 (ν) 64. τῷ δ' ἅμα κήρυκα προίει μ. Ἀλκινόοιο,  
 (π) 269. ἐν μεγάροισιν ἐμοῖσι μ. κρίνηται Ἀρηῶς  
 (ρ) 34. τοῖσιν δὲ ἐνέηχ' ἱερὸν μ. Ἀντινόοιο,  
 (ρ) 440. τὴν μὲν δρ' οὐτ' ἀνέμων διάη μ. ὕγρον δένταν,  
 (ρ) 493. οἶσθα μὲν, οἷον ἐμὸν μ. ἐμπεδον οὐδ' ἐπικτόν,  
 (ω) 19. ἡματι τῷ δτε μοι μ. ἄσχετος ἦσθις Κύκλαψ  
 (φ) 428. δὴν ἔκαμον ταύωσ' ἔτι μοι μ. ἐμπεδον ἰστίν,  
 (χ) 203. ἐνθα μ. πνέοντες ἐφέστασαν, οἱ μὲν ἐν οὐδοῦ  
 (χ) 226. σκέτι σοί γ' Ὀδυσσεύ' μ. ἐμπεδον, οὐδέ τις ἀλλή,  
 (ω) 319. θεμὸν μ. προέτιθε φίλον πατέρ' εἰσορόωντι.  
 (ω) 520. ὥτ' φάτο, καὶ β' ἐμπνευσε μ. μέγα Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη  
 (H. Apoll.) 371. τὴν δ' αὐτοῦ κατέπυσ' ἱερὸν μ. Ἡελίοιο,  
 (H. Apoll.) 374. αὐτοῦ πῦσε πῆλιν μ. ὀξίος Ἡελίοιο.  
 (H. Cer.) 361. ἦιον ἐν στήθεσσι μ. καὶ θυμὸν ἔχουσα,  
 (H. Cer.) 368. οἱ κεν μὴ θυσίσαι τεδν μ. Ἰάσκαπται,  
 (H. viii.) 14. θυμοῦ τ' αὖ μ. δὲ κατισχέμεν, δε μ' ἐρεθισι

## Hesiod:

(From Minton, W. W. Concordance to the  
Hesiodic Corpus. Leiden 1976)

## μένει

- Sc. 235. λίχμαζον δ' ἄρα τῷ γε· μ. δ' ἐχάρασσον ὀδόντας  
364. παντί μ. σπείδων, διὰ δὲ μέγα σαρκὸς ἄραξα·

## μένεος

- Th. 688. εἶθαρ μὲν μ. πλῆντο φρένες, ἐκ δὲ τε πᾶσαν  
Sc. 429. ἐμ μ. δ' ἄρα τοῦ γε κελαινὸν πίμπλαται ἥτορ·

## μένος

- Th. 324. δεινὸν ἀποπνείουσα πυρὸς μ. αἶθομένοιο.  
492. καρπαλίμως δ' ἄρ'· ἔπειτα μ. καὶ σαιδιμα γυῖα  
563. οὐκ ἐίδου μελίησι πυρὸς μ. ἀκάματοιο  
687. οὐδ' ἄρ' ἐπὶ Ζεὺς ἴσχεν ἐὼν μ., ἀλλὰ νῦ τοῦ γε  
832. ταύρου ἐριβρύχεω. μ. ἀσχετοῦ, ὅσσαν ἀγᾶϊρου,  
853. Ζεὺς δ' ἐπεὶ οὖν κορθύνει ἐὼν μ., εὐλετο δ' ὄπλα,  
869. ἐκ δὲ Τυφώος ἔστ' ἀνέμων μ. ὑγρὸν ἀέντων.  
896. ἴσον ἔχουσιν πατρί μ. καὶ ἐπίφρονα βουλὴν.  
Op. 414. ἦμος δὲ λήγει μ. ὄξeos ἡέλιοιο  
625. πάντοθεν, ὄφρ' ἴσχωσ' ἀνέμων μ. ὑγρὸν ἀέντων,  
Sc. 343. ἐν γάρ σφιν μ. ἦκε θεὰ γλαυκῶπις Ἀθηνῆ  
446. Ἄρες, ἔπισχε μ. κρατερὸν καὶ χεῖρας ἀάπτους·  
Fr. 14.4. — υ υ — υ υ — υ υ — ]ν μ. ἀντιθέοιο  
16.9. τὴν δ[ αὖ] Μυρμιδόνος κρατερὸν μ. ἀντιθέοιο  
33(a).27. φ]η θ' Ἡρακλῆος στησεῖν μ. ἱπποδάμοιο·  
33(a).34. — υ υ — υ υ ]κεν κρατερὸν μ. α...[  
204.128. τρύχεσκεν δὲ μ. βρότεον, μινύθεσκε δὲ καρπός,  
252.6. γείνατο Χαίρωνος κρατερὸν μ. ἱπποδάμοιο  
294.3. ἀκάματον δὲ οἱ ὥρσε θεα μ., οὐδὲ οἱ ὕπνος

Lyric poets:

(From Fatouros, G. Index Verborum zur

Frühgriechischen Lyrik. Heidelberg 1966)

μένος, τό (10) Ba. 3, 54 (Sn. : ]νος mss.); Pl. Fgm. 129, 1; So. 1, 23; 10, 1  
 μένοι Pl. P. III 32 acc. μένος Mi. 13, 1; 6; Pl. O. VIII 70; Fgm. 52f, 88; Sim. 31, 4.

Appendix V: The μένος of Archilochos: P. Colon. 7511:35\*

Archilochos' use of μένος to refer to semen in the so-called Cologne Epode (P. Colon. 7511) is unique in extant Greek literature save for the apparent echo of Archilochos' phrase in the Hellenistic poet Dioscorides.<sup>1</sup> The discovery of the Archilochos fragment and of the unparalleled reference of μένος therein has prompted an apparently unquestioned extension of the accepted semantic sphere of μένος to include Archilochos' sexual sense. Indeed, the suggestion has been made by Giacomelli that the image of the male seed may be "at the root of μένος and its cognates."<sup>2</sup> This is admittedly an extreme view but the consensus among commentators is represented by Van Sickle's judgment that "the meaning which menos assumes here is a natural extension of its semantic range."<sup>3</sup> Van Sickle refers to Nagy for the view that μένος in Homer means "the power or essential

\* This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Classical Association of Canada in Guelph, Ontario, June 3, 1984. In order not to interrupt the argument, I have largely retained the original form, although this entails some repetition of material presented elsewhere in the thesis. (See p. 165 for the text of the fragment.)

force of the Homeric hero, something which fluctuates in him, often a mental faculty which temporarily may diminish, but which a god may prompt or instill";<sup>4</sup> and Van Sickle goes on to observe that "the range of meanings which we now have [for μένος], from a mental to a sexual manifestation, recalls other cases of what Nagy terms 'semantic ambivalence', for instance in Greek mēdea meaning both 'thoughts' and 'genitals'."<sup>5</sup>

We must ask, however, what constitutes genuine 'semantic ambivalence'; what counts as a genuine 'range of meanings'? For instance, when, in fr. 189,<sup>6</sup> Archilochos pillories his victim with the taunt πολλὰς δὲ τυφλὰς ἐγχείλους ἐδέξω, which Davenport renders 'that diner on eyeless eels',<sup>7</sup> are we to say that the word ἐγχείλους exhibits 'semantic ambivalence', that it has a 'range of meanings' from 'a snakelike fish' to 'the membrum virile'? Similarly, when James Michie, in a rather free rendering of Catullus 80<sup>8</sup> (a poem on the same theme) uses the image of asparagus and white sauce we know at once what he means to convey and that is of course because of the context. In these matters context is everything; we don't have to postulate a 'range of meanings' for 'asparagus' which

includes its use here; it won't make it into our dictionaries, not even the glossaries of slang. It is, so to speak, a 'nonce' slang term. What we have in these instances is metaphor; and, as I have just implied, we may recognize a distinction between metaphorical usage which is common to a group of speakers (their corpus of slang terms) and, so to speak, ad hoc metaphorical usage, such as Michie's 'asparagus' or (as far as we know) Archilochos' 'eels'.

Early Greek alone provides some 220 occurrences of μένος; in the later period it is less frequent but still in use in both poetry and prose. In two of its occurrences in extant Greek μένος clearly has a sexual sense: it refers specifically to semen. In no other occurrence of μένος (as far as I can determine) is there any possibility of a sexual sense; and indeed, as I remarked earlier, the second use of μένος with sexual reference may be merely a self-conscious echo of the first. (It is worth noting, too, that nowhere in the medical writers is μένος used to refer to semen.) Given these figures, it seems reasonable to consider the possibility that the use of μένος in the two sexual contexts is expli-

citly metaphorical, especially since sexual contexts are--apparently universally--replete with metaphor. Dover, in his discussion of preliterate song in connection with Archilochos' language, observes that "sexual relationships form the context of a very high proportion of preliterate song, and precise physical reference is normal, though the language in which such reference is made is oblique and symbolic."<sup>9</sup>

Sex is of course the quintessentially tabu subject; we talk a lot about it but we go to any lengths not to use the official terminology, and this predilection appears to know no cultural or temporal bounds. But in addition to this negative motive for metaphorical language in sexual matters there is also the important positive motive (and I suspect that this one is a good deal more important than tabu) that this is a language game we especially enjoy; for some reason we find phrases like 'eyeless eels' very amusing, and the more ingenuity involved the better we like it. Ward regards Archilochos' reference to 'eels' as "veiling the accusation in discreetly metaphorical terms."<sup>10</sup> I should think discretion had very little to do with it; Archilochos



is interested in the joke--in the incongruous mental image of the membrum virile seen as 'a snakelike fish' (with the additional and felicitous connotation of edibleness). For other sexual metaphors in Archilochos see, for example, the mushroom of 252, the tumors of 66 and perhaps 67, the jutting rock of 41, etc., and in our own poem the gates and cornice and grassy gardens and the nautical metaphor of putting in to harbour (14-16), and perhaps θυμός as well, in line 2.

Marcovich takes strong exception to Merkelbach and West's suggestion of a Wortspiel in the use of θυμός in line 2, maintaining that "it does not seem likely---that Archilochos would put such a pun in the mouth of an innocent young girl whom he opposes at length to the licentious Neobule in lines 16-27";<sup>11</sup> but if there is a pun in θυμός here (or, more accurately, a double entendre), it is surely to be seen as inadvertent on the part of the speaker. It would appear that this poem was intended for the titillation of a male audience (Archilochos' φίλοι, to use Aristotle's term);<sup>12</sup> the whole tone as well as the content seems to me to support such a view. And in

this sort of context an inadvertent sensus obscenus, particularly from the lips of an 'innocent young girl', would have twice the appeal of a deliberate one.

θυμός clearly has sexual reference in Hipponax fr. 10, and Archilochos' choice of verb (τῶκεν) certainly favours taking θυμός as a sexual double entendre here.<sup>13</sup>

As Gregory Nagy has pointed out, in at least three Indo-European languages we find words denoting mental concepts used with sexual reference, specifically with reference to the male genitalia: Greek μήδεα, Hittite ištanza, Latin mentula, a diminutive of mens.<sup>14</sup> In θυμός, too, we find a word denoting a psychic faculty and function being used with sexual reference. In Homeric psychology θυμός is the 'organ' of impulse, often spoken of as being 'roused' by some word or event, or of 'urging' a man to some action.<sup>15</sup> This kind of language fairly invites the use of θυμός as a sexual double entendre, particularly when there is so obvious a parallel to be drawn between a generic 'organ' of impulse and a specific organ of (sexual) impulse.<sup>16</sup>

Given this situation with θυμός, there are several Homeric contexts which would favour the use

of μένος as well as a sexual double entendre (whether current or ad hoc). First, in a number of passages μένος is said to be in the θυμός.<sup>17</sup> Once θυμός comes to be used for penis, the extension to μένος is obvious enough.

I have argued in this thesis that in the Homeric poems μένος refers to mental or psychic power or force, a conception corresponding to the later conception in the Western philosophical tradition of will as dynamic power. However, this psychic force is typically manifested through physical activity; when this force is diminished, the 'will to action' is lost. For example, the horses of Achilles, mourning for Patroklos (Il. 17. 426ff.) stand unmoving, like a grave-stele; despite the efforts of Automedon, with the lash and gentle words and threats, they were not willing (ἡθελέτην) to go either back to the ships or into battle, until Zeus put μένος in their knees and θυμός. Then they shook the dust from their manes and swiftly drew the chariot across the battlefield. The word denoting such a psychic force could readily lend itself to metaphorical use with reference to semen (and also blood, as in

Sophocles' Ajax 1413, μέλαν μένος) since it is an observable fact that a man deprived of his 'vital fluids' (and the Greeks did not make our precise distinctions among the various bodily fluids) loses the 'will to action'. This is not to say that μένος is identified with these fluids; it is linked to them, so that Hecuba can urge wine on Hector to increase his μένος and Hector can decline for fear of impairing his μένος (Il. 6.261-265), but it is not reduced to them. Even today we link various types of performance to blood-sugar level or adrenalin production or, indeed, alcohol consumption, but we do not (at least most of us do not) reduce performance to these substances; as for the specifically sexual link, it may be observed, now as then, that a gelding loses not only his sexual capacity, but that indefinable something we call 'spirit'.

In Homer, μένος is paired with θυμός as an agency which may impel a man to action, e.g. Il. 22.346-7, Achilles in blind rage says to the dying Hector, αἶ γάρ πως αὐτόν με μένος καὶ θυμός ἀνείη / ὧμ' ἀποταμνόμενον κρέα ἐδμεῖναι, 'Would that μένος and θυμός might impel me to carve your flesh and eat it

raw'. Again, μένος together with θυμός, may be roused by words or events, e.g. Od. 8.15, "Ὡς εἰποῖσ' ἄτρυνε μένος καὶ θυμὸν ἐκάστου, Athene in the guise of a herald rouses the μένος and θυμός of the Phaeacians. Finally, the Homeric usage of most relevance for our topic is the formulaic line in which μένος is said to be released from a spear: ἔγχεος ἐνθα δ' ἔπειτ' ἀφίει μένος ὀβριμὸς Ἄρης, Il. 13.444, 16.613, 17.529. (It is significant that the same verb is used: ἀφίημι, imperfect in Homer, aorist in Archilochos.)

The sexual imagery of weapons is perhaps the most universally attested subspecies of sexual metaphor; we may trace it from the thunderbolt of Zeus to the Homeric warrior's spear to the modern army jingle: 'This is a rifle, this is a gun; This is for shootin', this is for fun.' Thomas Gould, in his discussion of the sexual imagery of weapons in Oedipus Tyrannus, draws attention to Iliad 22, "where the actions of Achilles, pursuing Hector and then thrusting his spear through Hector's soft flesh, are depicted in distinctly sexual terms."<sup>18</sup> In fact, Homer is rife with references to quivering spears fixed in entrails loosing limbs (e.g. Il. 17.524) and such like. War itself is spoken

of in the language of love--an interesting reversal of the apparently universal equating of sex and death, from the French le petit mort to Dioscorides' phrase ἀθάνατος γέγονα, 'I became a god'<sup>12</sup>--the standard phrase for the death of a king in the Hittite annals. And the first time we encounter Homer's formulaic line in Iliad 13 it is in a context in which the sexual overtones are very marked. Alkathoos is slain by Idomeneus with a spear-thrust to the breast; the spear pierces his armor, he falls on his back and the spear is fixed in his heart which, still beating, causes the butt-end of the spear to quiver--until at last Ares releases its μένος (Il. 13.434-44).

The μένος of the spear is seen as the force that impels the spear to seek and plunge into its target, whereupon the μένος of the spear is released and the spear comes to rest; in the sexual sphere, it is the semen that is regarded as the direct physical cause of the erection of the penis. We, with our more sophisticated knowledge of anatomical processes, know that the physical cause is actually the distention with blood of the erectile tissue; the ancients had only opinion--false as it turns out--but what more natural

than the belief that the physical cause is not blood but the semen itself, since it is following the ejaculation of the semen that the erectile tissue becomes flaccid once again. The semen, then, like the μένος of the spear, is considered responsible for the penis's seeking and transfixing the object of its desire, whereupon the semen, like the μένος of the spear, is released into its target and the penis, like the spear, withdrawn, having dissipated its impelling force.

Of course, in the Archilochos fragment the spear falls somewhat short of its desired target. The precise location for the releasing of the μένος and the precise nature of the prior activity have occasioned a good deal of debate, the phrase ἥβης ἐπήλυσιν in particular having proved difficult for commentators. At the appropriate moment the girl's νέον χρῶα is revealed and characterized as ἥβης ἐπήλυσιν. Marcovich translates, 'the harbinger of her prime',<sup>20</sup> and West suggests 'das Aufkommen', which Van Sickle renders "'the on-coming' of her maturity as a woman."<sup>21</sup> Van Sickle himself has a rather lengthy discussion, dealing with the function of -σις nouns and possible magical

associations, and offers what he calls a "literal" translation: 'charm of womanhood'.<sup>22</sup> Segal, on the other hand, takes the phrase to mean the 'approach to her womanhood', understanding ἡβης as an objective genitive, with the explicitly sexual sense of pubes.<sup>23</sup> This concrete sense for the phrase seems best, since the narrator of the poem is interested only in things eminently physical; his attention has shifted progressively from the girl's neck<sup>24</sup> to her breasts;<sup>25</sup> now he focuses attention on her lower belly, contenting himself with the 'approach' to her 'womanhood'; as Degani discreetly puts it, he deposits semen ante ianuam.<sup>26</sup>

There remains the problem of the missing epithet of μένος. Merkelbach, Degani and Page, all working independently, found an epigram of Dioscorides which mentions pouring out the λευκὸν μένος at the climax of lovemaking.<sup>27</sup> Since Dioscorides elsewhere refers explicitly to Archilochos<sup>28</sup> it seems a reasonable conjecture that he might have taken this striking phrase from our epode, and this supplement appears to have gained general acceptance. There have been other suggestions: West's θερμὸν μένος,<sup>29</sup> which



Parmenides uses of the stars, and Van Sickle's τοῦτον.<sup>30</sup> This last proposal seems to me somewhat weak poetically and based on a rather weak argument. Looking for what he calls "less subjective criteria" Van Sickle surveys the attributes of μένος in what we have left of archaic Greek poetry and concludes that "the largest single group of attributes comprises personal adjectives,"<sup>31</sup> while on the other hand μένος is never assigned a colour, and he takes this as an argument against colour here despite his own recognition that the very use of μένος here is unique: "nowhere else in archaic literature does menos have an expressly sexual sense."<sup>32</sup> If the noun has a reference not found elsewhere in archaic literature, why should it not have an attribute unique in archaic literature?

Indeed, the view of μένος as explicitly metaphorical favours λευκόν as its epithet. In a metaphorical context the adjective is not merely descriptive; it functions as a kind of semantic marker. It serves to emphasize the concrete nature of the actual referent, thereby heightening the effect of the conceit involved in the metaphor itself. A similar effect may be seen in the phrase 'blind eels'. In the context in which

Archilochos uses it, the word 'eels' standing alone, without its epithet, would be flat and without effect; it takes its effect from its attribute, which serves to mark the word in its metaphorical use.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, the use of a colour term as the attribute of μένος is singularly appropriate both to the specific nature of the sexual encounter and to the overall context of the episode. Throughout the seduction itself, the audience has been encouraged to visualize the course of events; at the culmination of the narrator's progress, the audience is offered an actual view of the results: the glancing brightness of the semen contrasting with the tawny hair of the ἥρως.<sup>34</sup>

## Archilochos. ' P. Colon. 7511

(Text printed by Marcovich 1975)

- "... πάμπαν ἀποσχόμενος· ἴσον δὲ τόλμῃ[ησον ποθεῖν.]  
 εἰ δ' ὦν ἐπείγεται καὶ σὲ θυμὸς ἰθύει,  
 ἔστιν ἐν ἡμετέρου, ἡ νῦν μέγ' ὑμείρ[ει σέθεν,]  
 καλὴ τέρευνα παρθένος· δοκέω δέ μιν[  
 5 εἶδος ἄμωμον ἔχειν· τὴν δὴ σὺ πρῆ[σαι φίλην.]" ]  
 τοσαύτ' ἐφώνει· τὴν δ' ἐγώνταμει[βόμεν·]  
 "Ἀμφιμεδοῦς θύγατερ, ἐσθλῆς τε καὶ [σασφρονος]  
 γυναικός, ἥν νῦν γῆ κατ' εὐρώεσσ' ἔ[χει,]  
 [τ]έρψιμός εἰσι θεῆς πολλὰ νέοισιν ἀνδ[ράειν]  
 10 παρὲξ [ε] τὸ θεῖον χρῆμα· τῶν τις ἀρκέσει[·]  
 [τ]αῦτα δ' ἐφ' ἡσυχίης, εὐτ' ἂν μελανθῇ[μοι γένος,]  
 [ἐ]γὼ τε καὶ σὺ σὺν θεῶι βουλευόμε[ν·]  
 [π]είσομαι ὥς με κέλεαι· πολλόν μ' ἐ[ποτρύνει δ' ἔρω]  
 [θρ]ιγκοῦ τ' ἔνερθε καὶ πυλέων ὑποφ[θάνειν·]  
 15 [μ]ή τι μέγαίρε, φίλη· στήθεα γὰρ ἐς ποτ[φόρους]  
 [κ]ήπουκ· τὸ δὴ νῦν γινώθι· Νεοβούλῃ[ν μὲν ὦν]  
 [ἄ]λλος ἀνὴρ ἐχέτω· αἰαὶ πέπειρα δ[ὲ] πέλει·  
 [ἄν]θος δ' ἀπερρύηκε παρθενίον  
 [κ]αὶ χάρις, ἡ πρὶν ἐπὶν· κόρον γὰρ οὐκ [ἡρύκακεν,]  
 20 [ἄ]της δὲ μέτρ' ἔφηγε μαινόλις γυνή·  
 [ἐ]ς κόρακάς (ἐ) ἄπεχε· μὴ τοῦτ' ἐφέξ[τ' ἄν] (αἶθε ὦν,]  
 [ὁ]πως ἐγὼ γυναῖκα τ[ο]ιαύτην ἔχω  
 [γυ]ίτοσι χάρις· ἔσομαι· πολλὸν σὲ βούλο[μαι, φίλη·]  
 [σὺ] μὲν γὰρ οὐτ' ἄπιστος οὔτε διπλόη,  
 25 [ἡ] δὲ μάλ' ὀξυτέρη, πολλούς τε ποιεῖται[φίλους·]  
 [δὲ]φοιχ' ὅπως μὴ τυφλὰ κἀλιτήμερα  
 [σπ]ρυδῇ ἐπειγόμενος τὼς ὥσπερ ἡ κ[ύων τέκω.]" ]  
 [το]σαῦτ' ἐφώνειν· παρθένον δ' ἐν ἄνθε[σιν]  
 [τ]ηλ[ε]θάεσσι λδβὼν ἔκλινα, μαλθακῇ δ[έ]μας  
 30 [χ]λαί[ν]η καλύψας, αὐχέν' ἀγκάλησ' ἔχω[ν]  
 [δ]είματι παυ[σ]αμένης τὼς ὥστε νεβρ[ός - υ - δ·]  
 [μα]ζ[ω]ν τε χερσὶν ἡπίως ἐφηψάμην,  
 [ἡ] δ' ὑπ[ε]θήγης [·] νέον, ἡβης ἐπὶ λυγρῶν, χροά·  
 [ἄ]παν τ[ε] σῶμα καλὸν ἀμφαφώμενος,  
 35 [λ]ευκ[ό]ν ἄφῃκα μένος ξωθήης ἐπιπαύ[ων τριχός·]

## NOTES TO CHAPTER I

1. By 'early Greek' I mean the Iliad and Odyssey, the Homeric Hymns, Hesiod and the lyric poets down to Pindar and Bacchylides. (There does not seem to be any epigraphical evidence of moment.) Any study of early Greek must of course be based in the first instance on Homer; thus the present thesis is concerned first and foremost with the Homeric poems, with Hesiod and the lyric poets considered primarily in terms of their faithfulness to or divergence from the Homeric model.

2. E. g. Robbins 1968:137: 'design, anger, strength, courage, life'; Fränkel 1975:77: 'energy, will'; Autenrieth: 'impulse', will, spirit, might, courage, martial fury, rage; Cunliffe: 'passion, spirit, fury, rage, distraction, frenzy, courage, stoutness, might, vigour, power, strength, the animating principle, the vital spirit, the soul, life'; LSJ<sup>9</sup>: 'might, force, strength, fierceness, spirit, force, life, passion, intent, purpose'; Chantraine DELG, sv μέμνα: 'l'intention, la volonté, la passion, l'ardeur au combat, la force qui anime les membres'; Frisk: 'Geist, Mut, Wut, Kraft, Drang'.

3. Pokorny 1959:726-728; cf. Meillet 1942. μένος is the reflex of an s-stem neuter noun (\*menes-) formed directly from the verbal root.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER I

4. Russo and Simon 1968:483 define 'Homeric psychology' as "the modes of representing mental states, both ordinary and unusual, in the Homeric poems." I would prefer to substitute 'activity' for their 'states'.
5. Snell 1953:15; cf. Onians 1954:23-65.
6. Most notably at Il. 23.315.
7. Robbins 1968:135 suggests "that μένος is as much an organ as the θυμός or the ψυχή and that it deserves to be promoted to join the trinity of organs that Snell posits as going to make up psychic or mental life." Robbins' interpretation of μένος, however, differs from that proposed here; see below, pp. 6-8.
8. See Appendix I for a discussion of ~~various~~ conceptions to which the word 'will' has been attached in the Western philosophical tradition.
9. The views of Snell and Dodds are discussed in Chapter I.
10. Fränkel 1975:78n8.
11. Fränkel 1975:80. "An open force field" is the translation offered by Russo and Simon 1968:485 of Fränkel's term ein offenes Kraftfeld.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER I

12. The 'intellectualist' view is discussed in Chapter II, pp. 35-40.

13. Dihle 1982:27.

14. Dihle 1982:34.

15. Dodds 1951:8-9.

16. Dodds 1951:26n105.

17. Dodds 1951:9.

18. Dodds 1951:8.

19. Robbins 1968.

20. Robbins 1968:174n18; 178n24.

21. Onians 1954:52.

22. Snell 1953:9-22 passim, esp. 15.

23. Snell 1953:8.

24. Robbins 1968:133.

25. Robbins 1968:133-134.

26. Robbins 1968:137.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER I

27. Robbins 1968:137-38. (On νόος as 'purpose' see below, pp. 47-49.)

28. Giacomelli 1980:16.

29. Giacomelli 1980:4.

30. Giacomelli 1980:6.

31. Giacomelli 1980:4.

32. Giacomelli 1980:9.

33. Giacomelli 1980:4.

34. Adkins 1970:41.

35. Giacomelli 1980:9.

36. Nagy 1980:161, cf. 162.

37. Nagy 1980:181-82; cf. Nagy 1974:266-69. The connection between 'reminding' and 'power' is apparently the exerting of influence upon the one reminded.

38. Nagy 1980:183. See also the convenient summary of views of μένος in Schmitt 1967:103-23.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. Bruno Snell, Die Entdeckung des Geistes (Hamburg 1948; English translation by T. G. Rosenmeyer: The Discovery of the Mind, Cambridge, Mass. 1953). Snell's book was closely followed, in time and influence, by E. R. Dodds' The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley 1951). Important contributions had been made previously by Joachim Böhme, Die Seele und das Ich im Homerischen Epos (Berlin 1929); Christian Voigt, Überlegung und Entscheidung (Berlin 1933); Kurt von Fritz, "NOOZ and NOEIN in the Homeric Poems," Classical Philology 38 (1943) 79-93; and Snell himself, in his earlier work, anticipating his later synthesis: "Aischylos und das Handeln im Drama," Philologus Suppl. 20 (1928); "Das Bewusstsein von eigenen Entscheidungen in frühen Griechentum," Philologus 85 (1930) 141ff.; and his review of Böhme in Gnomon 7 (1931) 74-86. See also his later Scenes from Greek Drama (Berkeley 1964.) Subsequent works of major importance include R. B. Onians, Origins of European Thought (Cambridge 1951); E. L. Harrison, "Notes on Homeric Psychology," Phoenix 14 (1960) 63-80; Albán Lesky, Göttliche und menschliche Motivation im Homerischen Epos (Heidelberg 1961); Hermann Fränkel, Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums, 2nd ed. (Munich 1962; English translation by Moses Hadas and James Willis: Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, Oxford 1975); A. W. H.



## . NOTES TO CHAPTER II

Adkins, From the Many to the One (London 1970).  
See also Russo and Simon 1968, Darcus, especially 1972:12-118, 1979A, 1979B, 1980, and Robbins 1968; for additional references see the Bibliography at the end of this thesis.

2. See Appendix III for a discussion of Snell's general position on the lack of abstract concepts in Homer.

3. Snell 1953:1-5.

4. Snell 1953:7.

5. Snell 1953:5: "if they had no word for it, it follows that as far as they were concerned it did not exist."

6. Snell 1953:6.

7. Snell 1953:8.

8. Snell 1953:8.

9. Snell 1953:9-22, esp. 14-15.

10. Snell 1953:9.

11. Snell 1953:14.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER II

12. Snell 1953:19.

13. Snell 1953:20; cf. Snell 1930 and Voigt 1933 passim and esp. 103: "man still possesses no consciousness of personal freedom and of deciding for himself." Hugh Lloyd-Jones (1971:168n38) observes that "A particularly paradoxical result of Snell's belief may be seen in his Scenes from Greek Drama (1964), 1f., where he argues that in choosing to avenge Patroclus and die young Achilles did not really make a choice, or a decision. Such an opinion is inconsistent with a proper understanding of an important, and by no means difficult, factor in the plot of the Iliad." Cf. Pearson 1962:208n3; Pearson observes that if Snell's thesis is accepted, "it means that no judgment of man's moral worth is possible in the language of Homer, that no Homeric character is better than another, but only luckier or more cunning."

14. Adkins and others do not accept the radically behavioristic view proposed by Snell; they allow action to originate within the person but they deny agency to the person himself. (Adkins' view is discussed below, pp. 19-21 and 26-27.)

15. See Appendix II for a discussion of the philosophical issues of personal identity and action theory.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER II

16. When Snell says, for example, "Homer does not know genuine personal decisions," (1953:20) this implies that 'modern' man does. Similarly, when he says that for Homeric man "mental and spiritual acts are due to the impact of external factors" (20), the implication again is that 'modern' man is responsible for his mental acts.

17. Dodds 1951 passim.

18. Dodds 1951:20n31.

19. Fränkel 1975:80.

20. Fränkel 1975:80.

21. Fränkel 1975:76.

22. Fränkel 1975:77.

23. Fränkel 1975:79.

24. Fränkel 1975:78.

25. Adkins 1970:22.

26. Adkins 1970:22. Cf. Harrison 1960:78: "however wide open he may be to [external] influences, Homeric man is not at the mercy of them. He frequently recognizes the need to control them, and he frequently displays the ability to do so."

## NOTES TO CHAPTER II

27. Il. 4.43. For other instances of Homeric man controlling his θυμός see Il. 9.255, 18.113, 19.66, Od. 11.105; he may also on occasion yield to his θυμός, e.g. Il. 9.109.

28. Il. 19.86-87; Dodds 1951:20n31.

29. Sc. Il. 19.65.

30. Adkins 1970:22.

31. Bertrand Russell and others have held that our concept of a 'self' based on pronominal reference is at best a grammatical fiction, at worst a grammatical mistake (see Appendix II); but Homeric man did not engage in philosophical speculation on these matters.

32. Hugh Lloyd-Jones (1971:168n42) quotes G. Devereux on the significance of the first-person pronoun: "once Odysseus says 'I,' this establishes at least a general sense of psychic coherence."

33. It is sometimes claimed, on the basis of Il. 1.3-4, where αὐτός refers to the physical body in contrast to the ψυχή, that the body is generally identified with the 'self' (e.g. Nagy 1980:162; Rénéhan 1980:106). But αὐτός in this passage serves merely to designate the unmarked member of a contrasted pair: the heroes' ψυχαί were sent to Hades, but they

## NOTES TO CHAPTER II

themselves (i.e. the rest of them) were made prey for dogs. We might equally well expect to find 'his θυμός did this, but αὐτός that (cf. Zeus' contrasting of θυμός and ἐγώ, Il. 4.43); or 'his tongue did this, but αὐτός that'.

34. Od. 8.320.

35. Od. 13.332.

36. Il. 3.202.

37. περίφρων, Od. 1.329, etc.; πεπνυμένος, Il. 3.148, Od. 1.213, etc.; πολύμητις, Il. 1.311, etc.

38. E.g. Il. 3.212-224.

39. E.g. Od. 8.165ff., Il. 2.243ff., 23.566ff.

40. E.g. Il. 1.343.

41. Voigt 1933 passim, esp. 103.

42. Snell 1953:20.

43. Dodds 1951:Chpt. 1.

44. Dodds 1951:20n31.

45. Dodds 1951:7 and 20n31.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER II

46. E.g. Russo and Simon 1968:484-85.

47. Fränkel 1975:79.

48. Fränkel 1975:80.

49. Russo and Simon 1968:485.

50. Adkins 1970:22.

51. Adkins 1970:24.

52. Harrison 1960:79-80.

53. Voigt 1933:esp. 103; Snell 1930:141ff.

54. Cf. Dodds 1951:20n31. Odysseus' statement that he knows it is better to stand and die than to flee is not a case of reducing decision to knowledge and thereby foregoing the act of decision; it is rather a way of expressing an all-things-considered judgment. Odysseus judges that it would be good to flee in order to save his life; that is a judgment simpliciter (i.e. not an all-things-considered judgment). On the other hand, he reminds himself that, according to the heroic code by which he lives, it is better to die and preserve one's κλέος than to live and preserve one's life; that is an all-things-considered judgment and it wins out over his immediate impulse. A similar judgment leads to Achilles' choice of death and κλέος despite his eloquent statement to the contrary in the Embassy scene.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER II

55. Dodds 1951;7. Lloyd-Jones (1971:10) observes that "when a human action, whether right or wrong, is put down to the action of a god, that does not mean that the human actor is not held to be responsible for his decisions. ...the divinely motivated act can also be fully motivated in human terms; the part played by the god can always be subtracted without making nonsense of the action."

56. Harrison 1960:78 and n88; he cites Od. 3.26, 4.712, 7.263, 16.356. A striking instance of human will set against the will of the gods is Il. 12.8-9: the Danaans' defensive wall 'was built against the will of the immortal gods': θεῶν δ' ἀέκητι τέτυκτο / ἀθανάτων.

57. Harrison 1960:78-9.

58. Teffeteller Dale 1979:26n25.

59. E.g. Snell 1953:20. On this view, Homeric man, denied the benefit of external intervention, would remain forever in the lamentable predicament of Buridan's Ass, that unfortunate creature poised midway between two equally luscious piles of hay and unable to make a choice.

60. She does not command, she suggests, adding αἴ κε .  
πίθηται.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER II.

61. This observation is not intended to reduce the gods to mere dramatic devices. The role of the gods in Homer is extremely complex and it is far beyond the scope of the present study to attempt an account of it.

62. Deliberation, it might be claimed, is undoubted in Homer; what is lacking is the notion of decision. This would presumably be Voigt's view and it has been suggested to me by Professor L. Woodbury in conversation. But is it coherent to attribute to a given mentality the conception of a deliberative process and at the same time deny to it a conception of the outcome of that process, namely, decision?

63. P.23.

64. Stevens 1933:109-10 notes that both Libanius and Eustathius consider Homer's line to be an instance of the proverbial association of counsel and night. Agamemnon's negligent somnolence of course contrasts with Zeus' wakeful deliberation.

65. Indeed, why does the council of elders exist if not for the express purpose of making decisions for future action?

66. Harrison 1960:78.

67. Harrison 1960:80. On Homeric man's capacity for decision-making see also Sharples 1983 and O'Brien 1967:210n8.



## NOTES TO CHAPTER II

68. Professor Woodbury, in conversation, has pointed out that this is merely one instance of a general problem in the Greek notion of the gods, another being that the gods are made to offer prayers, libations, etc.

69. Dodds 1951:16-17 and 26n105; cf. Frankel 1975:  
82. For a critical discussion of the 'intellectualist' view of the Greek mind, see O'Brien 1967:Chpt. 1: "The Paradoxes and Greek 'Intellectualism'," esp. 23n3 and 42n49.

70. Dihle 1982:27.

71. Dihle 1982:34.

72. Dihle 1982:34-5.

73. Dodds 1951:8-9.

74. Dodds 1951:20n31 and 26n105.

75. Dodds 1951:17 and 26n105.

76. Dodds 1951:9.

77. Dodds 1951:9.

78. O'Brien 1967:53.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER II

79. O'Brien 1967:49-53.

80. O'Brien 1967:53n74. O'Brien presumably means to deny to Homer only formal concepts in the strict sense, not concepts in the less rigorous sense discussed below; cf. his perceptive objection to the claim that Plato lacks the concept of 'free will', quoted in note 85 below.

81. Wittgenstein 1953: esp. sections 71 and 75, cf. Wittgenstein 1974:120. John Searle (in discussion) makes a similar distinction in terms of 'applying' and 'explicating' a concept.

82. On the concepts implicit in Homeric descriptions of psychic activity, see the discussion in Chapter III below of the functions of νόος, θυμός and φρένες.

83. See Appendix I for a discussion of various conceptions of 'will' in Western thought.

84. For example, the notion of 'free will' is implicit in the use of the adjective ἐκών; the conception of will as intellectual preference or choice is conveyed in language based on βουλή; etc.

85. Indeed some commentators maintain that the concept of will is lacking even in Aristotle, despite his profound concern with the ethical problem termed akrasia,

## NOTES TO CHAPTER II

which is typically designated in contemporary discussions 'weakness of the will'; cf. Walsh 1963: 173-81. O'Brien 1967:217, in his discussion of Plato's thought on these issues, offers a useful caveat on confusing words with concepts. He observes that there is "no Platonic term equivalent to the modern term 'will'"; but, he points out, "what we really want to know is how Plāto conceived of those phenomena which we cover by the term in question. ...No Platonic word denotes individual responsibility conceived as a faculty, which is what we mean by the 'free will'. Yet Plato evidently believed in such responsibility."

86. Fränkel 1975:xi. (One could wish that Fränkel had applied this sound principle to his study of Homeric psychology.) Cf. Hugh Lloyd-Jones' comment on the danger of restricting investigation to terminology (1971:2-3):

One of the most damaging sources of error about early Greek morality has been the assumption that in order to study the moral notions found in a work of art or in a society it is enough to list and analyse the words indicating moral concepts which occur in it. The scrutiny of such words is certainly an important part of such an investigation; but the investigation will not be complete until the study of moral terminology has been supplemented by a study of the actions performed in the book or the society in question and the attitudes shown toward them by those who have performed and those who have described them."

## NOTES TO CHAPTER II

Elsewhere (26), he remarks that "It may be hard to name an equivalent of 'duty' or 'loyalty' in Homeric Greek, but if the word is lacking the thing is not."

## NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. Snell 1953:8.
2. Snell 1953:9.
3. Snell 1953:15.
4. Snell 1953:9.
5. Snell 1953:8.
6. Snell 1953:9.
7. Dodds 1951:138; cf. Harrison 1960:75: "ψυχή in Homer can scarcely be called a mental organ"; Darcus 1979:30-32: "In Homer ψυχή does not function as a psychic organ in man"; Adkins 1970:14-15. In the lyric poets ψυχή begins to function as a psychic organ, taking over the appetitive functions of the Homeric θυμός, a usage it retained down to the time of Plato, who bestowed upon it a new role as the seat of reason. Cf. Darcus 1979:34-34; Dodds 1951:138-39; Burnet 1916; Webster 1957; Furley 1956.
8. Darcus 1979:31.
9. Darcus 1979:33.
10. Cf. Darcus 1979 passim.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER III

11. Snell 1953:8.
12. Darcus 1979:31.
13. Adkins 1970:15; cf. also Warden 1971:95: "ψυχή ...means nothing more than that which is lost to man at death, i.e. life." Rohde's view of the Homeric ψυχή as a 'double' in man (Rohde 1925) has been superseded by subsequent studies.
14. Nehring 1947:108 points out that the classic terms for 'syncope' or 'swoon' are λ(ε)ποψυχία and λ(ε)ποψυχεῖν.
15. Cf. Nagy 1980.
16. Theorists--philosophers, psychologists, etc.--excepted.
17. Cf. Nagy 1980:164; Böhme 1929:22 and 124; Schnaufer 1970:198-201.
18. Böhme 1929:111, 124; Nagy 1980:163, Schnaufer 1970:194-95.
19. Böhme 1929:111, 124; cf. Onians 1954:103 and n4.
20. Nagy 1980:163. Nagy maintains, however (165), that "the avoidance of the word psūkhē in descriptions of a hero's revival from a swoon would be motivated

## NOTES TO CHAPTER III

by a need to keep this theme distinct from the theme of a hero's revival from death," this revival involving the eventual reintegration of ψυχή and body.

21. Nagy 1980:162-63.

22. See the discussion of φρένες below.

23. Nehring 1947:108, 116.

24. Cf. Nehring 1947:108.

25. Nagy 1980:164 and n28 takes the verbs ἀμπνυτο/ἀμπνύθη to refer to the regaining of the θυμός and μένος but Nehring's distinction between the θυμός and the respiration (116-17) would appear to be supported by the text.

26. Cf. Nehring's discussion of descriptions of partial recovery (1947:113-18): "the behavior of the θυμός is depicted as a persisting symptom of the syncope itself" (113).

27. Von Fritz 1943. Even Douglas Frame, who proposes a derivation that connects νόος with νέομαι and proposes an original meaning of a return from death and darkness to life and light, implies that, despite the apparent semantic

## NOTES TO CHAPTER III

divergence, his conclusions are not essentially at variance with those of von Fritz (Frame 1978: 30n27).

28. von Fritz 1943:90.

29. von Fritz 1943:85.

30. von Fritz 1943:86.

31. von Fritz 1943:90.

32. von Fritz 1943:90n83.

33. Snell 1953:13. As early as 1931 Snell had observed that "Das vor ist ein 'Sehen,' aber ein 'geistiges' Sehen" (Snell 1931:77).

34. Harrison 1960:72.

35. Harrison 1960:90.

36. Böhme 1929:52.

37. von Fritz 1943:83-4.

38. Harrison 1960:73.

39. Harrison 1960:73.

40. Harrison 1960:74.



## NOTES TO CHAPTER III

41. Harrison 1960:74; cf. 72n51 and von Fritz 1943:82 (but cf. also 86). On νόος generally cf. Böhme 1929:75; Adkins 1970:20; Fränkel 1975:78; Darcus 1980; Warden 1971.

42. Snell 1953:9.

43. Snell 1953:13. (We may note here that the organ variously termed ἥτορ/κῆρ/κρᾶδίνη shares many of the emotional functions of the θυμός.)

44. Snell 1953:13.

45. Cf. Nehring 1947 for an account of the role of the θυμός ("a principle of motion and impulse," 121) in Homeric descriptions of swoons.

46. Snell 1953:14.

47. Böhme 1929:69-74; see especially 72n1 for a list of passages in which he sees θυμός as responsible for rational functions.

48. Harrison 1960:71.

49. Nagy 1980:162. Cf. Onians 1954:23 and 44ff.; Onians understands θυμός as the 'breath-soul', closely connected with the blood. Cf. Harrison 1960:66.

50. Nagy 1980:165.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER III

51. Snell 1953:13.
52. Harrison 1960:67, 71.
53. Harrison 1960:71.
54. Harrison 1960:67, 71.
55. Fränkel 1975:78.
56. Cf. Darcus 1979:161.
57. Cf. Darcus 1971:161<sup>6</sup>
58. Harrison 1960:75.
59. Harrison 1960:75.
60. Harrison 1960:74.
61. Cf. Furley's distinction (1956:8) between "the momentary insight, the flash of 'vision'" (νόος) and "prolonged deliberation, calculation or 'pondering'" (φρόνη).
62. Harrison 1960:75.
63. The ancient interpretation of φρόνη in Homer as 'diaphragm' has recently been reaffirmed by Snell 1977; this is unquestionably its use in the fifth-

## NOTES TO CHAPTER III

century medical writers. For Homeric  $\phi\rho\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\varsigma$  as 'lungs' see Onians 1954:23ff.; for  $\phi\rho\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\varsigma$  as imprecisely defined organs of the chest see Ireland and Steel 1975, followed by Darcus 1979.

64. Ireland and Steel 1975:195.

65. Onians 1954:23ff.

66. Onians 1954:24n5. The identification of lungs and diaphragm as a unit would be facilitated by their actual physical connection and, perhaps more significantly, by the external appearance of the diaphragm as it--like the lungs--expands and contracts with the breath. The inclusion of the diaphragm as a part of the  $\phi\rho\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\varsigma$  or  $\phi\rho\acute{\eta}\nu$  (the use of the grammatically singular collective noun presents no difficulty) would account not only for the later interpretation of  $\phi\rho\acute{\eta}\nu$  as diaphragm but also for what would otherwise be an occasional problematical passage in Homer.

67. Cf. Darcus 1979:161 and n13.

68. A circumstance that renders all the more puzzling Snell's omission of  $\phi\rho\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\varsigma$  from his discussion of psychic 'organs' (Snell 1953:8-22).

## NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. In providing a systematic account of Homeric psychology, I do not mean to imply that Homer or 'Homeric man' was necessarily aware of functioning within the framework of such a system. The situation is somewhat analogous to the description of a language; the linguist concerned with describing a language discerns a system of rules operating within the language whereas the ordinary native speaker is notoriously unaware of the set of rules which operate on his every utterance. My claim is that Homeric man acts within the framework of the system here described, not that he exhibits a reflective awareness of it as a system.

2. The following analysis of 'willing' is based on Bourke 1964:235.

3. See A. M. Goichon, Lexique de la langue philosophique d'Ibn Sīnā (Paris 1938), p. 146 (on sensory and intellectual will) and p. 115 (on the two kinds of choice). Bourke (1964:60) observes that the distinctions recognized by Avicenna "were not influential in the general development of Western thinking on will". This is true of discussions of 'willing' throughout most of the tradition; however, something similar to Avicenna's distinction seems to be involved in contemporary discussions of choice as opposed to decision; see the article (with bibliography) by Andrew Oldenquist, entitled "Choosing, Deciding, and Doing," in The

## NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London 1967), vol. 2, pp. 96-104, and Shaffer's brief but lucid account of intentional action which is not preceded by decision-making or deliberate choosing (Shaffer 1968:82-84).

4. See Appendix I for an account of the conception of will as dynamic power.

5. See Robbins 1968:180n38 for a possible connection between μένος and μῆνις.

6. E.g. Il. 5.2, 125, 470, 513, 563; 6.27, 261; 7.38; 8.335, 358; 10.366, 482, etc.

7. Adkins 1970:41.

8. Dodds seems to miss the point and the connection with the Iliadic assembly (no. 2 above) when he takes μένος here as "the moral courage which will enable the boy to face the overbearing suitors" and dismisses its use by the poet of the 'Telemachy' as "literary adaptation."

9. Austin 1975:106 recognizes the volitional aspect of μένος in this passage: "when Zeus breathes menos into Achilles' horses to make them leave the corpse of Patroklos it is not strength he gives them. ... The menos they receive from Zeus makes them willing to move. Menos here is a redirection of their will, a channeling of their energy into movement." Cf. Austin 1973/74:244: "In a word like menos the idea of mental orientation and of a governing principle emerges clearly."

## NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

10. Fränkel 1975:78.
11. Cf. Chantraine DELG sv μέμονα. See the discussion of μενεαίνω above, pp. 66-68; cf. 76-79.
12. Pokorny 1959:704.
13. Robbins 1968:137.
14. Cf. Benveniste 1935:147ff.; Lane 1939:199.
15. Meillet 1942:38. Cf. Chantraine DELG sv μέμονα.
16. Meillet 1942:46.
17. Giacomelli 1980:7.
18. E.g. Robbins 1968:137; cf. Cunliffe, LSJ<sup>9</sup>, etc.
19. Robbins 1968:145. Robbins remarks (183n39) that "λάθεσθαι does not mean 'to forget', but rather, as the middle of λήθω, 'to be unaware of'."
20. Robbins 1968:143-48; Nagy 1974:266-68. Nagy points out that at Od. 1.89, "μῆν-ος is actually being infused by Μῆν-της" ('he who reminds') and that later Athene encourages first Telemachos (Od. 2.268) and then Odysseus (Od. 22.226) by reminding them of their μένος, while in the form of Μῆν-τωρ.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

21. Robbins 1968:139-41, 144. μήνις, too, may belong to the same group; cf. Robbins 180n38.
22. Pokorny 1959:729.
23. E.g. Il. 3.52; 5.527.
24. Cf. the discussion below, in Appendix V, of the μένος of a spear in relation to the sexual imagery of weapons.
25. Cf. Watkins 1971:64-65 and n13.
26. Similarly, the adjectival forms εὐμενής and δυσμενής convey respectively the senses of 'good-willed' and 'ill-willed'; that is, they refer to the exercising of will that is favorable or unfavorable from the point of view of the object toward whom it is directed.
27. E.g. Od. 7.178, μένος Ἀλκινόοιο, etc.
28. Fire: Th. 324, 563; sun: Op. 414; winds: Th. 869, Op. 625; Zeus: Th. 687, 853; Athene: Th. 896; bull: Th. 832; horses: Sc. 343; χεῦρες: Sc. 446; γυῖα: Th. 492; φρένες: Th. 688; ἥτορ: Sc. 429, Dindorf.
29. Contra Giacomelli 1980:10.

## NOTES TO APPENDIX I

1. It is convenient to refer to "the later conception" although there is of course no single theory; variations on this conception will be discussed below.
2. Vesey 1965:12.
3. Cf. Bourke 1964:8 and passim.
4. O'Brien 1967:212.
5. Bourke 1964:79.
6. E.g. Dodds 1951:20n31; Dihle 1982:27.
7. E.g. Dihle 1982:123-144.
8. Retractiones I, 15,3: "Quae voluntas utique, sicut definita est, animi motus fuit, nullo cogente, ad aliquid vel non amittendum vel adipiscendum."
9. Cf. Bourke 1964:82 and 96n15.
10. Descartes, Les Passions de l'âme, I. art. 41 (ed. Adam-Tannery, Paris 1904, t. IX); quoted in Bourke 1964:99n54.
11. See Bourke 1964:90-94.



## NOTES TO APPENDIX I

12. O'Brien 1967:212; Taylor 1937:38.

13. Bourke 1964:29.

14. NE VI. 2, 1139b3: διὸ ἡ ὁρεκτικὸς νοῦς ἡ  
προαίρεσις ἡ ὄρεξις διανοητικὴ.

15. Ethics II, prop. 49; quoted in Bourke 1964:39.

16. Collins 1954:234-5.

17. Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will, edited  
by Paul Ramsey (New Haven 1957; originally published  
1754), p. 137.

18. Edwards 141.

19. See below, pp.122-4 for an account of Faculty  
Psychology.

20. O'Brien 1967:219.

21. O'Brien 1967:224-5.

22. De Anima 9.432b4-7: καὶ ἀποπον δὴ [τὸ ὁρεκτικὸν]  
διασπᾶν· ἐν τε τῷ λογιστικῷ γὰρ ἡ βούλησις γίνεσθαι,  
καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμὸς· εἰ δὲ τρεῖς  
ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔσται ὄρεξις.

23. Bourke 1964:55, 71.

## NOTES TO APPENDIX I

24. Bourke 1964:64; he cites S. T. I-II 1,5,c; 7,c; 8,c.
25. Bourke 1964:120.
26. Bourke 1964:105; he quotes Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus, q. VIII and De quantitate animae, 21, etc.
27. Bourke 1964:110-11; he quotes A. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, trans. Haldane and Kemp (London 1907-1909), vol. I.143, and F. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse, Ch. 36.
28. Bourke 1964:103-121.
29. Bourke 1964:112.
30. A. T. Bledsoe, An Examination of President Edwards' Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will (Philadelphia 1845), pp. 101-2.
31. Asa Burton, Essays on Some of the First Principles of Metaphysics, Ethicks, and Theology (Portland 1824), p. 85.
32. Bourke 1964:113.
33. Burton 91.

## NOTES TO APPENDIX II

1. Vesey 1974:7.
2. Vesey 1974:14.
3. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford 1888), p. 251.
4. J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, edited by A. S. Pringle-Pattison (Oxford 1924), Bk II. Ch. 27, para. 10.
5. Lewis 1969:234.
6. Vesey 1974:34.
7. Lewis 1969:243.
8. Lewis 1969:237.
9. Lewis 1969:244.
10. Lewis 1969:235.
11. Danto 1967:111.
12. Quoted by Danto 1967:111.
13. Danto 1967:111.

## NOTES TO APPENDIX II

14. Locke, Bk II, Ch. 27, para. 9.
15. Strawson 1959:87-116 and passim.
16. Strawson 1959:102. Interestingly, Strawson's psychophysical 'person' bears a close resemblance to (what appears to be) the Homeric conception; cf. pp. 18-22 above.
17. The latter category applies also to the behaviour of plants and inanimate objects.
18. Wittgenstein 1953:sec. 621.
19. The following account is based on Shaffer 1968: 80-106. See also Davis 1979.
20. Notably by Gilbert Ryle 1949: Chpt. III, sec. 2.
21. E.g. A. I. Melden 1961:Chpt. 5.
22. See Taylor 1983:48-50 and Taylor 1966, esp. Chpt. 8; also Chisholm 1964.
23. Taylor 1983:49.
24. Taylor 1983:49.
25. Shaffer 1968:86.

## NOTES TO APPENDIX II

26. Shaffer 1968:96.
27. Shaffer 1968:106.
28. Shaffer 1968:106-110.
29. Castell 1965:21 and passim.
30. Castell 1965:7.
31. Castell 1965:7-8.

## NOTES TO APPENDIX III

1. Snell 1953:1-8ff.
2. Snell 1953:7: "It seems, then, as if language aims progressively to express the essence of an act, but is at first unable to comprehend it because it is a function, and as such neither tangibly apparent nor associated with certain unambiguous emotions."
3. Of Homer's use of γυῖα and μέλεα Snell observes: "Here we have plurals where our linguistic tradition would lead us to expect the singular. Instead of 'body' Homer says 'limbs'." But these words are not 'plurals' properly speaking; they are 'collectives' or, perhaps better, 'mass-nouns', such as English 'skin' and 'flesh'. On Greek mass-nouns in -α see my article, with references cited therein, on ἀνὰ τὰ ῥα, Phaedo 74c1, forthcoming in The American Journal of Philology.
4. Snell 1953:6.
5. Snell 1953:5; cf. 16-17.
6. Koller 1958:280ff.
7. Harrison 1960:64.
8. Harrison 1960:64. Moreover, if σῶμα in Homer had meant only 'corpse', Archilochos' use of the word in

## NOTES TO APPENDIX III

the so-called Cologne Epode (P. Colon. 7511:34) would be very shocking indeed; the narrator of Archilochos' poem reaches the climax of his erotic progress while σῶμα καλὸν ἀμπαφώμενος, 'caressing [the girl's] beautiful σῶμα all round'. (Harrison comments (64n8) that Koller's connection of σῶμα "with σίνεσθαι ('to plunder': cf. πίνω>πῶμα) is attractive, since it is precisely the physical mass of his quarry that is the objective of the hungry hunter." In a sexual context such as that of Archilochos' poem, this sense for σῶμα would lend additional force to the use of the word.) On σῶμα see also Austin 1973/1974:252-53.

9. Snell 1953:1-4.

10. Snell 1953:3-4.

11. As indeed have most languages, modern English not excepted.

12. We find also a word that expresses the depriving of the basic operation of sight: ἀλαωτός, Od. 9.503.

13. Od. 1.91, etc./Od. 2.199, etc.

14. Il. 18.494/Il. 16.617, etc./Od. 1.152, etc.

15. Il. 1.248, etc./Od. 8.168.

## NOTES TO APPENDIX III

16. Il. 16.328, etc./Il. 23.622.

17. Od. 19.179/Il. 14.216, etc.

18. Teffeteller Dale 1982.

19. Unlike the infinitive, which shows the syntax of a verb in governing an object in the same case as its finite counterpart (commonly the accusative), -tus nouns regularly govern an objective genitive, e.g. ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀλαωτόν, Od. 9.503. These forms are more common in early than in later Greek, where their function is taken over by the articular infinitive; Homer has 17 on a conservative count and after Homer they are rare outside the grammarians. Interestingly, the reverse situation is found in Sanskrit, where -tus nouns are incorporated into the infinitive system. In Vedic, -tus forms are in competition with a number of alternative forms, whereas later they become productive, eventually ousting their rivals to become the only infinitive form in use in Classical Sanskrit (see Jeffers 1972:17). A detailed analysis of -tus nouns is not feasible in the present work; I hope to provide such an analysis in a future study.



## NOTES TO APPENDIX V

1. A.P. 5.55=Gow-Page 1483ff.
2. Giacomelli 1980:9.
3. Van Sickle 1975A:148.
4. Van Sickle 1975A:148; Nagy 1974:266-67.
5. Van Sickle 1975A:148.
6. Textual references are to West 1971.
7. Carmina Archilochi: The Fragments of Archilochos, translated from the Greek by Guy Davenport. (Berkeley 1963), Fr. 209. On this fragment see also Gerber 1973.
8. The Poems of Catullus, translated by James Michie. (London 1969).
9. Dover 1964:202.
10. Ward 1973:129.
11. Marcovich 1975:7; Merkelbach/West 1974:103.
12. Pol. H7.1324a1.
13. Cf. Merkelbach/West 1974:103.

## NOTES TO APPENDIX V

14. Nagy 1974:265.

15. E.g. Il. 5.470, Od. 8.15; Il. 7.74, 24.198.

16. E.g. Il. 11.403.

17. E.g. Il. 16.529, Od. 1321. Cf. H. viii.14

18. Sophocles, Oedipus the King, translated by Thomas Gould (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1970), p. 143, note on line 1255.

19. A.P. 5.55=Gow-Page 1483ff.

20. Marcovich 1975:7.

21. Merkelbach/West 1974:110; Van Sickle 1975A:146.

22. Van Sickle 1975A:145-6.

23. Segal "in conversation", Van Sickle 1975A:146.

It is possible that ἐπὶ λυσιν ought to be taken as implying a larger context of sexual metaphor, namely, the approach or access road to the gates of a fortified city. A common image in ancient erotic poetry likens sexual intercourse to the taking of a fortified city (and the image of a battering-ram at the gates is obvious enough). This would of course recall the gates and cornice of line 14.

## NOTES TO APPENDIX V

24. Van Sickle 1975A:143.
25. Merkelbach/West 1974:110.
26. Degani 1974:121.
27. Merkelbach/West 1974:97f.; Merkelbach 1975:220f.;  
Degani 1974:113f., 1975:229f.; Page 1974:154.  
Dioscorides A.P. 5.55.7=1489 Gow-Page.
28. A. P. 7.351.
29. Merkelbach/West 1974:111.
30. Van Sickle 1975A:150.
31. Van Sickle 1975A:150.
32. Van Sickle 1975A:148.
33. What is interesting about this type of metaphorical complex is that the metaphorical referent does not, from an ontological point of view, instantiate the universal denoted by the attribute whereas the literal referent does; that is, μένος is not white but semen is; eels are not eyeless but penises are. So that while the adjective is literally true of the actual referent it is only metaphorically true of the

## NOTES TO APPENDIX V

metaphorical referent. The two parts of the complex thus have different functions with respect to the actual referent: while the adjective has literal application to the actual referent the noun of course does not; that is, this stuff is white but it is not μένος; these things are eyeless but they are not eels.

34. Ejaculation is apparently achieved through masturbation, accompanied by the fondling of the girl's σῶμα καλόν in general and her pubes in particular.

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