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SOCIAL CREDIT AND THE JEWS
ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE
ALBERTA SOCIAL CREDIT MOVEMENT
AND THE RESPONSE OF
THE CANADIAN JEWISH CONGRESS, 1935-1949

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A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
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Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the anti-Semitic propaganda of the Social Credit movement in the 1930s and 1940s and its impact on organized Canadian Jewry. During World War Two, the Alberta Social Credit government and its provincial and national parties engaged in the dissemination of anti-Semitic propaganda, which greatly concerned the Canadian Jewish Congress, the national representative organization for Canadian Jewry. The Canadian Jewish Congress responded by attempting to confront and end this propaganda; however, it lacked a public relations philosophy effective and assertive enough to do so. Eventually the Social Credit movement realized the political liabilities of engaging in anti-Semitic propaganda; yet despite Congress's years of efforts, it could take little credit for Social Credit's purge of anti-Semitism. An examination of the relationship between the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Social Credit movement adds a new perspective on the history of both organizations, and reveals much about ethnic organization in Canada and the nation's political culture of intolerance.

The sources for this thesis come from the Canadian Jewish Congress National Archives in Montreal, the National Archives of Canada in Ottawa, the Provincial Archives of Manitoba in Winnipeg, the Glenbow Archives-Institute in Calgary, and the Provincial Archives of Alberta in Edmonton. The *Canadian Social Crediter*, *Vers Demain*, and other Canadian newspapers were used extensively. The sources on the Social Credit movement held at the Canadian Jewish Congress National Archives have not been used before, which makes this thesis a significant departure from previous works.

RÉSUMÉ

Cette étude examine la propagande anti-sémitique du mouvement du Crédit social pendant les années 1930 et 1940 ainsi que son impact sur la population juive canadienne. Durant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, le gouvernement du Crédit social en Alberta ainsi que ses partis provincial et national ont diffusé de la propagande anti-sémitique, ce qui a vivement inquiété le Congrès juif canadien, l'organisation qui représente les juifs canadiens. Malgré ses efforts, le Congrès juif canadien n'a pu répondre efficacement à cette propagande car il n'avait pas de stratégie efficace de relations publiques pouvant la neutraliser. Eventuellement le parti du Crédit social s'est rendu compte des coûts politiques de sa propagande anti-sémitique; malgré des années d'efforts de la part du Congrès juif canadien, on ne peut lui attribuer le mérite de l'épuration de l'antisémitisme au sein du parti du Crédit social. Un approfondissement de la question des relations entre le Congrès juif canadien et le mouvement du Crédit social éclaire d'un jour nouveau l'histoire des deux organisations ainsi que l'organisation des groupes ethniques au Canada et la culture politique d'intolérance dans ce pays.

Les sources d'information de cette thèse sont les archives nationales du Congrès juif canadien à Montréal, les archives nationales du Canada à Ottawa, les archives provinciales du Manitoba à Winnipeg, les archives Glenbow à Calgary et les archives provinciales de l'Alberta à Edmonton. De plus, nous avons fait grand usage de plusieurs journaux canadiens, dont le *Canadian Social Crediter* et *Vers Demain*. Les documents sur le mouvement du Crédit social aux archives nationales du Congrès juif canadien n'ont jamais été utilisés au préalable ce qui fait de cette thèse un travail innovateur.

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INTRODUCTION

In 1935, William “Bible Bill” Aberhart and his religious-political crusade swept the Alberta provincial election, winning fifty-six out of a total of sixty-three seats. Nearly two generations later, the Social Credit era came to an end in 1971 with the ascension of Peter Lougheed and the Conservatives. The Social Credit years form a large part of Alberta history and greatly influenced the province’s political and economic development. Indeed, Social Credit’s thirty-six year rule created a special political culture in Alberta, based on individualism, free enterprise, relative abundance, and a commitment to “good government.” While William Aberhart lifted the hopes of desperate Albertans during the Great Depression, Ernest Manning, Aberhart’s successor after 1943, helped established the province on a firm footing based on conservative politics and successful venture capitalism. In retrospect, the Manning years are viewed as the halcyon days of Alberta, when the oil flowed and postwar prosperity made Alberta the richest province in Canada. Albertans took (and take) great pride in their province’s transformation from a “have-not” province to a seemingly powerful force on the Canadian economic and political scene. In many ways, the Social Credit regime, in keeping with the province’s tradition of third-party prairie protest, helped build Alberta into the economically independent and politically rambunctious province that it is today.

There is a part of Social Credit history, however, which is less admirable. It is the continuous thread of anti-Semitism woven into Social Credit philosophy, which manifested itself in the form of government and party propaganda during World War Two and in the early postwar period. Social Credit philosophy was based on the economic and

political theories of Major C.H. Douglas, a Scottish electrical engineer and founder of the Social Credit movement in England. Douglas embraced a conspiratorial philosophy which blamed the “international Jewish financier” for the world’s economic and political ills. At times, Douglas named specific Jews as part of the conspiracy, but for the most part his anti-Semitism was ideological rather than personal.

When the Alberta Social Credit movement was formed in the early 1930s under William Aberhart, it absorbed Douglas’s theories about the “Jewish world plot” and conveyed those theories through its propaganda. The nature of this propaganda was also highly ideological, and was never translated into party policy or a system of discrimination. Consequently, it can be said that the Social Credit movement in Alberta did not possess an organized, anti-Semitic programme. It was anti-Semitic in that it insisted that “the international Jewish financier” had too much wealth and power, but it never suggested that any specific Jew be stripped of that power.¹

This absence of a policy of anti-Semitism has led several scholars to assume that the Social Credit movement was not anti-Semitic. In many ways, this is not misguided. Social Credit propaganda vilified Jews but did not translate these attitudes into action. Thus, its anti-Semitism, if it can be defined as such, was attitudinal and confined to an abstract level. As Henry Feingold notes, “attitudes do not leave a tell-tale fingerprint on the historical canvas. That occurs only when attitudes are transmuted into concrete actions ... Attitudes and incidents have entirely different historical valences. Grouping them together poses the danger of creating a new historical datum where there may be little evidence of it.”² Kenneth Minogue similarly cautions that “we must distinguish carefully between the *rhetoric* used by members of a movement - which may be randomly

plagiarized from anywhere according to the needs of the moment, and the *ideology* which expresses the deeper currents of the movement.”³

Yet the anti-Semitic attitudes, rhetoric, and propaganda of the Social Credit movement are of themselves significant, since they *were* the manifestations of the movement’s philosophy. Indeed, rhetoric is no less a legitimate subject of study than actions, especially given the rhetorical nature of Social Credit’s anti-Semitism. Richard Hofstadter’s comments about nineteenth-century American populism are valuable in this respect: “[i]t would be easy to misstate the character of Populist anti-Semitism or to exaggerate its intensity. For Populist anti-Semitism was entirely verbal. It was a mode of expression, a rhetorical style, not a tactic or a program ... It is one thing, however, to say that this prejudice did not go beyond a certain symbolic usage, quite another to say that a people’s choice of symbols is of no significance.”⁴ It is worthwhile, then, to examine Social Credit’s rhetoric and propaganda in order to understand its underlying philosophy of anti-Semitism.

Obviously, Social Credit’s “choice of symbols” was a result of its anti-Semitic philosophy, but any understanding of this philosophy requires an examination of the broader conceptual framework of anti-Semitism. If anti-Semitism is interpreted as a religious construct; that is, as anti-Judaic prejudice, Social Credit philosophy was certainly anti-Semitic. Social Credit philosophy was based on early Christian anti-Semitism, harkening back to the ancient world when the Christian religion, emanating from Judaism itself, gained ascendancy and denigrated the faith from which it sprang.⁵ The Jewish religion was deemed inferior and subhuman - Jews were initially the “Chosen People,” but had turned their backs on the Messiah and become Christ-killers.⁶

Persecution of the Jews, from the second century throughout the Middle Ages, was justified solely on religious grounds since Jews were considered “children of the Devil, agents employed by Satan for the express purpose of combating Christianity and harming Christians.”⁷ Social Credit philosophy embraced a similar kind of medieval conception of good and evil, with its strong Christian emphasis defining the spiritual world in Manichean terms. When Social Credit propaganda condemned the “international Jewish financier” for the world’s ills, it also condemned him for his religion, which was deemed not merely anti-Christian, but demonic and Satanic.

Scholars of the Social Credit movement have noted the religious basis of its anti-Semitism. David Elliott and Iris Miller, in *Bible Bill: A Biography of William Aberhart*, connect William Aberhart’s religious theology and his political ideology. They show how his eschatology about Armageddon and the Antichrist combined with C.H. Douglas’s conspiratorial views to create a mentality susceptible to anti-Semitism, and conclude that “there was a strange connection between Aberhart’s theology and his political ideology; both were dominated by conspiracy theories. The devil and the fascist machinations of the Antichrist played inordinately important roles in Aberhart’s theology. It was not too difficult for him to move from these fantasies to fantasies about the ‘international Jewish conspiracy’ as taught by Major Douglas.”⁸

Alan Davies also discusses the connection between Social Credit’s Christian emphasis and its prevailing anti-Semitism. He explains how Social Credit’s tendency to identify itself with Christian values and Christian civilization was congruent with “a homogeneous view of society opposed to all religious, cultural and ethnic pluralism. This in turn was consistent with the prevailing racial ideology of Anglo-Saxondom in English-speaking

Canada, which had its own reasons for distrusting Jewish immigrants and other strangers.”⁹

C.B. Macpherson also refers to the links between Social Credit’s Christian philosophy and anti-Semitism. He notes how “[t]here was some unwillingness within the movement to accept the theory of the Jewish world plot, but Douglas insisted that it was an integral part of social creditism.” In one instance, Douglas declared: “[b]oth Judaism and Social Credit are rooted in philosophies ... Social Credit is Christian ... Judaism is implacably anti-Christian ... both philosophies have a policy and these policies cannot live together.” Macpherson argues that Douglas’s anti-Semitism was not a necessary consequence of his economic and political theories, “but Douglas’s choice of the main plotters was the obvious one in view of their tried and tested serviceability as scapegoats.”¹⁰

Other scholars have debated whether the religious anti-Semitism of the Social Credit movement can be linked to Christian fundamentalism. Howard Palmer argues that, contrary to W.E. Mann’s thesis,¹¹ Christian fundamentalism had little to do with either Alberta’s or Social Credit’s legacy of anti-Semitism. In fact, “Alberta’s most important fundamentalist leaders in the political arena, Aberhart and Manning, eschewed antisemitism.”¹² Palmer adds that the “two national leaders of the Social Credit party during the 1940s and 1950s, John Blackmore and Solon Low, were both Mormons, and their pro-Jewish Mormon religious views seem to have restrained their support for orthodox Douglasite anti-semitism.”¹³

Elliott and Miller similarly argue that “it is a mistake to see Aberhart’s Social Credit movement as typical of religious fundamentalism. Aberhart’s unique theology and his political ideology brought him opposition from Pentecostals, Plymouth Brethren, Regular

Baptists, Prairie Bible Institute, and even from within his own sect. Most of his political support seems not to have come from members of other religious sects, but from people who belonged to mainline churches or who had only marginal religious commitment.”¹⁴

Another conceptual framework in which to understand Social Credit’s anti-Semitic philosophy is that of historical “non-religious” anti-Semitism. If anti-Semitism is interpreted as a racial rather than a religious construct, Social Credit philosophy also fits this paradigm. It can be argued that Social Credit’s focus on the Jewish world plot stemmed from the “modern anti-Semitism”¹⁵ of late nineteenth-century Germany and Europe, which attempted to reverse Jewish legal emancipation of decades earlier. Scholars have noted that this new “political” form of anti-Semitism¹⁶ was a consequence of modern economic and political anxieties superseding traditional religious animosity. In the wake of the intellectual ferment of the Enlightenment with its rationalism, liberalism, and humanism, religious antipathy was replaced by fears of modernity, urbanism, and economic and political change. In some cases these fears were manifested in the form of a Jewish world conspiracy theory. As Norman Cohn notes, “[t]he myth of the Jewish world-conspiracy is in fact a particularly degraded and distorted expression of the new social tensions which arose when, with the French Revolution and the coming of the nineteenth century, Europe entered on a period of exceptionally rapid and deep-going change.”¹⁷ While this modern anti-Semitism no longer excluded Jews because of their religion, it resurrected earlier notions of Jewish inequality and marginalized them as a political, economic, and social group. Further, because it resented what it perceived as Jewish economic, political, and social acquisitiveness, late nineteenth-century anti-

Semitism attempted to re-ghettoize Jews on the basis of their race, relying on theories of racial hierarchy such as those advocated by Houston Stewart Chamberlain.¹⁸

Although the myth of the Jewish world plot was not invented by late nineteenth-century anti-Semites, it experienced its own renaissance during this period. Thus, Social Credit's theory of an "international financial Jewish world plot," in which Alberta's economic and political powerlessness was blamed on a group of Jews, was congruent with late nineteenth-century "modern" anti-Semitism. While Social Credit's anti-Semitic philosophy relied less on arguments of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority to prove the inferiority of Jews, it nonetheless attempted to show that Jewish financiers as a racial group were political, economic, and social pariahs. Moreover, while this condemnation was mostly ideological in nature and did not extend to the broader population of "unwitting Jews" not involved in the conspiracy, Social Credit philosophy, at least in theory, emulated earlier attempts at Jewish exclusion.

Social Credit's anti-Semitic philosophy thus condemned Jews as both a religious and racial group. It was a hybrid prejudice, recapitulating traditional Christian anti-Semitism in which the Jewish religion was denigrated and demonized, and reflecting modern (late nineteenth-century) notions of anti-Semitism which desired to keep Jews as a marginalized group not worthy of equal political, economic, or social treatment. Seen in this light, Social Credit's concept of a Jewish world plot was not unlike earlier manifestations of anti-Semitism: it simultaneously gave Jews more and less power than they had by categorizing them as a superhuman powerful force which was also subhuman and demonic.

Another useful framework in which to understand Social Credit's conspiratorial philosophy is provided by scholars of nineteenth-century American populism. They conclude that American populists in the late nineteenth century perceived the emerging urban-industrial society as a threat to their agricultural livelihood and "producer" status. Richard Hofstadter notes that American populists reflected on an earlier, more harmonious and pastoral period, while simultaneously focussing on present issues of money and credit, eastern financial domination, and a conspiratorial view of history.¹⁹ Hyman Berman notes that "[t]he populists ... used antisemitism ... as a weapon to combat monopoly capitalism and return to the supposedly free market conditions, especially in agriculture which they believed had existed in the golden age of individual enterprise."²⁰

Seymour Martin Lipset compares various populist movements in North America, from the nineteenth-century American populists to the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and the Social Credit movement. He argues that "the economic and climatically vulnerable wheat belt ... formed the backbone of all the protest movements" and that each interpreted economic hardship and depression as the result of eastern "capitalism," "vested interests," and "financiers." This conspiratorial thinking provided a context in which money problems could be linked to an age-old scapegoat - the Jew. With respect to the Social Credit movement, Lipset writes: "large sections of it accepted many of the anti-Semitic and semi-Fascist ideas of Major Douglas ... Anti-Semitism - specifically, opposition to Jewish financial interests - could be linked to the opposition of western agrarians to eastern bankers."²¹

Scholars of the Alberta Social Credit movement have used interpretations of American populism to help explain the Alberta movement's anti-Semitism. Howard Palmer

compares Social Credit philosophy to nineteenth-century American populism and shows how both facilitated anti-Semitic thinking: “[t]raditionally, among many farmers in western North America, there was a connection between a dislike for banks and Jews. Social Credit was in many ways a descendant of the populist farmers’ movement in the midwestern United States with their joint emphasis on the essential goodness of the common man and their belief in a dualistic theory of social struggle, a conspiracy theory of history, and the doctrine of the primacy of money. There was undoubtedly a strain of anti-Semitism within populism, and this emerged within the Social Credit movement.”²²

David Laycock also examines Social Credit’s populist heritage and argues that “Aberhart was not alone among North American populist leaders in counterposing [sic] ‘the people’ and large, distant institutions symbolic of average people’s powerlessness.” Laycock uses Alan Brinkley’s study of Huey Long and Father Charles Coughlin²³ to show parallels between these “Depression demagogues” and Aberhart: “[l]ike Aberhart, Long and Coughlin were promoting contradictory measures. State power was to be expanded into civil society to defend the middle class, while the power of corporations, central state institutions, and bureaucracies was to be reduced. All three portrayed a sinister entente between a centralizing federal government and a parasitic, exploitive financial sector.”²⁴

Laycock’s comparison of the Social Credit movement with contemporary populist movements in the United States suggests the significant role the Depression played in facilitating anti-Semitic thinking. In this respect, Social Credit’s anti-Semitic philosophy can be understood within a temporal context. Like other Depression movements which relied on anti-Semitism, Social Credit’s anti-Semitism was largely economic, in that the international financial Jew was vilified as the architect of the world-wide Depression.

Social Credit scholars have noted the impact of the Depression on the movement's conspiracy theories. John Irving, for example, discusses Social Credit philosophy in the 1930s and its basis in economic privation. He notes how the movement condemned the "unscrupulous financier" in Montreal and New York for the world's ills and denounced the Eastern bankers, financiers, or "Fifty Big Shots."²⁵ Interestingly, however, Irving does not refer to the Jewish identification inherent in Social Credit's denunciations.

Alan Davies examines how Douglas's "antisemitic myths" complemented Alberta Social Crediters' world view of economic privation and financial domination: "[t]he dreaded bankers ... were largely easterners from Toronto and Montreal, and both of these cities, as everyone knew, were home to substantial Jewish immigrant communities. In this way, anti-eastern, anti-immigrant and anti-Jewish feelings were employed as a means of mutual enhancement, each inflaming the other."²⁶

Howard Palmer also examines how economic circumstances in Alberta in the 1930s and traditional anti-Jewish prejudices worked together to create anti-Semitism: "[t]he economic devastation of the depression, the need for scapegoats, the mythological link between Jews and money, and the virtual absence of 'real' Jews in much of rural Alberta were all conducive to the development of anti-Semitism ... for many Albertans, Douglas provided the key to unlock the mysteries of what had gone wrong with the world economic system."²⁷

Other scholars have noted that Social Credit's condemnation of the economic system and its corollary, international Jewish finance, was not a criticism of the capitalist system. This, they argue, makes Social Credit a right-wing, rather than a left-wing movement. Maurice Pinard notes that one of Social Credit's core doctrines in the 1930s was that

“[t]he ills of capitalist society ... cannot be traced to the system of private ownership, but to the control of the financiers over the economic system, and to their restriction of credit and production. The financiers - and then the Jews - could, therefore, easily become the scapegoats of the movement.” Accordingly, the early Social Credit movement “characteristically appeal[ed] to the protest dispositions of large segments of the electorate, in a truly populist tradition; like Poujadism, it constituted a right-wing protest movement offering an outlet for the resentment of those who were affected by economic adversity.” Thus, concludes Pinard, Social Credit’s “tradition of anti-Semitism, as well as a tradition of strong, autocratic leadership” places it on the “extreme right of the political spectrum.”²⁸

Michael Stein, in his discussion of the early Quebec Social Credit movement, also describes it as a right-wing populist movement, whose characteristics are shared by most right-wing protest movements: “opposition to high taxes and heavy government spending, fear of statism and government intervention, dislike of welfare legislation and socialism, stress on individual initiative and private enterprise, and susceptibility to racial prejudice and anti-Semitism.” Stein conjectures whether the Quebec movement would have included overt anti-Semitism in its programme if Douglas had not expounded it, and concludes that it would have, for several reasons: “[i]n the first place, anti-Semitism, at least in mild form, has manifested itself in most right-wing movements of the populist variety. Secondly, there was a long tradition of anti-Semitism in Quebec, which ‘was more generally and openly expressed than in English Canada’ ... Thirdly, anti-Semitism had also crept into the western Social Credit movement (whose ideas strongly influenced the Cr ditistes) after 1938. Here, as well, anti-Semitism had been part of an indigenous

political culture and had appeared in earlier agrarian movements such as the United Farmers of Alberta and the Non-Partisan Leagues.”²⁹

Social Credit’s allegedly right-wing orientation has led scholars to interpret its anti-Semitism in terms of fascism and even Nazism. In certain ways, the Social Credit movement’s focus on the international Jewish financial conspiracy in the 1930s was, like its more sinister counterpart in Nazi Germany, a projection of its own social, economic, and political fears. Social Credit’s anti-Semitic philosophy reflected a fundamental inability on the part of the Alberta movement to deal rationally with the Great Depression and its province’s political and economic inequalities. The crucial difference between Alberta and Nazi Germany, however, was that Social Credit’s anti-Semitic philosophy remained theoretical - it confined its prejudice to propaganda and never translated it into discrimination or policy.

Scholars have grappled with this ambiguity in their assessment of Social Credit’s “fascistic” tendencies. Elliott and Miller discuss the “latent fascism” within the Social Credit movement and conclude that Aberhart could be classified as a left-wing fascist because he was a charismatic leader, used propaganda effectively, and embraced an authoritarian theory of the state. Further, “[h]e obliterated the distinction between party and government, issued much order-in-council legislation, used repressive legislation and boycotts against the press and dissenters, employed anti-capitalistic rhetoric, and promoted financial conspiracy theories that were laden with anti-Semitic overtones. Only the violent element of fascism was missing; Douglas advocated a military *coup* but Aberhart refused that option.”³⁰

In contrast, Peter Wiles, in his discussion of the differences between fascism and “true populism,” argues that Aberhart cannot be labelled a fascist because he lacked key criteria. Fascism, states Wiles, is distinguished by “elitism, the cult of violence, the rejection of religion and the demand for obedience to the leader ... William Aberhart was a thoroughly authoritarian personality, but too deeply steeped in parliamentarianism, non-violence and above all religion to be called even a proto-fascist. But the same cannot be said of his followers in the 1935 election: the *Führerprinzip*, the closed mind and the violence were frighteningly present among them.”³¹

John Finlay discusses the nature of Douglas’s anti-Semitism and concludes that it cannot be compared to anti-Semitism of the Third Reich: “to Douglas, the Jews were the unwilling and unknowing dupes of a conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself; some, but not all, of the leaders of this conspiracy would be Jewish.” Moreover, Douglas himself asserted that “[t]he very last thing which I should desire ... would be the association of the Social Credit movement with Jew-baiting.” Thus, Finlay concludes, “[a]nti-Semitism of the Douglas kind, if it can be called anti-Semitism at all, may be fantastic, may be dangerous even, in that it may be twisted into a dreadful form, but it is not in itself vicious nor evil. It is merely an extreme form of religio-philosophic propaganda ... it must not be forgotten that Douglas did not seek to discriminate against Jews as people; it was never suggested that the National Dividend be withheld from them.”³²

Finlay also makes an important comment about Social Credit’s alleged fascism. He states that there is a tendency in the post-Holocaust world to identify anything advocated by fascism or totalitarianism as inherently evil and to identify its characteristics with previous philosophies. “Too often this identification rests upon surface manifestations

only; to take but one example - the too-easy identification of nineteenth-century anti-Semitism with that of Hitler. It is slowly being realized that the supreme evil of totalitarianism is not its content, but its execution. The thoroughness of totalitarianism, its utter ruthlessness - these are what are to be feared. It is the cult of efficiency." Thus, argues Finlay, because Social Credit philosophy did not execute a policy of totalitarianism, "it is possible to minimize the anti-Semitism and the nationalism which, superficially considered, make Social Credit a frightening proposition."³³

Scholars have also examined the nature of Social Credit's anti-Semitism during the Second World War and note how the changing role of government in society also triggered conspiratorial thinking. Social Credit propaganda blamed increased state regimentation on the international Jewish conspiracy, which it also labelled communistic and totalitarian. This anti-communist trend increased throughout the war and reflected not only early Cold War antipathies, but more domestic anxieties about governmental wartime control. David Laycock notes that "[b]y 1943, Social Credit rhetoric of 'the people' and its antagonists presented a paranoid vision of financiers, central planners, the federal government, and state socialists creating a 'general scheme of State-dominated bureaucracy - an autocratic control over the lives of every citizen.'" Meanwhile, "[m]uch the same analysis, with even grander conspiracies (involving Jewish bankers), was found in the annual reports and other publications of the Social Credit Board."³⁴

Howard Palmer also notes that during World War Two, anti-Semitic attitudes increased among certain Social Credit politicians. He interprets their behaviour as a response to heightened nationalism and to Douglas's increasing paranoia about the international Jewish financial conspiracy. As Douglas became increasingly alarmed by

the growth of state regimentation, he described with “paranoid clarity” how Jewish plotters were using the war as a tool to gain complete world power and undermine freedom. In Alberta, “[o]ne wing of the Social Credit movement ... followed Major Douglas in these antisemitic fantasies, convincing itself that there was indeed a perennial conspiracy against economic freedom, national sovereignty and Christianity.”³⁵

Michael Stein, in his discussion of the Quebec Social Credit movement during the 1930s and 1940s, notes that Douglas’s anti-communist views were reinforced by the stance of the Roman Catholic Church, and that Social Credit’s anti-Semitism was closely linked to anti-communism. According to Stein, the movement’s anti-Semitic rhetoric generally “took the form of linking the Jews to the Freemasons, communists, and financiers, and therefore to the forces of collectivism and internationalism.”³⁶

Social Credit’s anti-communist, conspiratorial Cold War mentality suggests connections with the McCarthy era in the United States. Indeed, such comparisons offer a further conceptual framework in which to understand Social Credit’s anti-Semitic philosophy. Scholars of the American “radical right,” conducting most of their work during the height of the McCarthy era in the 1950s, used a socio-psychological paradigm to understand the history of right-wing movements in the United States, from the nineteenth-century American populists to the Ku Klux Klan to the McCarthyites. Social Credit’s conspiratorial philosophy was similar to these movements in that it attempted to explain how the people had lost control over large events affecting them. In the case of Alberta, perceptions of economic and political powerlessness were projected onto a shadowy force of international Jewish financiers. The function which caused this projection has been given various labels - Richard Hofstadter called it “the paranoid

style;³⁷ Seymour Martin Lipset termed it “status anxiety;”³⁸ while Daniel Bell called it the “rear-guard action” of the “dispossessed.”³⁹ Whatever its label, the general theme was that the middle classes of society (in this case, Alberta’s farmers and small businessmen) perceived a weakening of their social, economic and political status and feared for their place in the socio-economic-political hierarchy. In the case of Alberta, Social Credit philosophy projected this anxiety outwards and placed it squarely on a millennia-old scapegoat: the parasitic, international, financial Jew.

Although now considered passé in most academic circles, theories of the “radical right” nonetheless help explain movements which embrace conspiratorial thinking. Perhaps the greatest criticism waged against these interpretations, however, is that they dismiss such movements as marginal, reactionary, and extremist elements in society.⁴⁰ Certainly this description cannot be applied to the Social Credit movement, which retained political power in Alberta for nearly four decades and built a dominant, mainstream political culture. Scholars of the “radical right” have also been criticized for their preponderant focus on socio-psychological analyses at the expense of socio-economic analyses. As Hyman Berman notes, “[s]ocio-psychological studies have their value in helping to explain and predict individual and group behavior; the historical use to which this behavior is put requires political and socioeconomic study.”⁴¹

From the foregoing, it is clear that scholars of the Social Credit movement have attempted to interpret its anti-Semitic philosophy through several conceptual frameworks. Yet there is continued adherence to the notion that because the Social Credit movement did not employ anti-Semitic policies, it was not anti-Semitic. This is seen in the numerous qualifications made by the same scholars which discuss Social Credit’s anti-

Semitic tendencies. C.B. Macpherson, for example, addresses the anti-Semitism in the Social Credit movement and specifically, the anti-Semitic views of Social Credit's founder, C.H. Douglas. Yet he argues that anti-Semitism arose in Social Credit circles because of embitterment with the Alberta government's inability to implement Social Credit theories, not because it was an integral part of Social Credit philosophy. In other words, Macpherson maintains that Alberta Social Credit politicians accepted Douglas's world plot theories only *after* all efforts to introduce Social Credit measures in Alberta proved fruitless. Further, he argues that although Premier Aberhart espoused Douglas's conspiracy theories, "Aberhart took only what he needed; neither he nor Manning believed in or would propagate the Douglas theory of a Jewish world plot."⁴²

Howard Palmer also examines the anti-Semitic tendencies of the Alberta Social Credit movement, yet maintains that ethnic tensions actually lessened under the Social Credit regime. In assessing Aberhart's views on anti-Semitism, he concedes that Aberhart expressed ambivalence towards Jews, but unequivocally opposed anti-Semitism and publicly denounced it. Palmer concludes that "[i]n the final analysis, perhaps the important thing is that Aberhart publicly repudiated anti-Semitism ... Aberhart played no part in the federal government's determination to keep the number of Jewish refugees who came to Canada during the 1930's to an absolute minimum. Also, he largely muffled the anti-Semitism in the Alberta Social Credit movement and refused to join those federal Social Credit MP's such as Norman Jaques and John Blackmore who followed Major Douglas down the path of open and blatant anti-Semitism."⁴³

Alvin Finkel also assesses Social Credit's anti-Semitism and agrees that the movement contained an anti-Semitic element, but dismisses it as an ideological aberration and the

result of an extreme, fanatical wing of the Party.⁴⁴ He concedes that Douglas's conspiracy theories about Jews and financiers "found a welcome reception among his Alberta followers, including Aberhart and his successor, Ernest Manning," but insists that they did not espouse blatant anti-Semitism: "[n]either Aberhart nor Manning appears to have subscribed to Douglas's notion that the conspiracy had an ethnic character, but both accepted the view that there was an international conspiracy to fool people into not adopting the social credit solution to their woes."⁴⁵

In a similar vein, Elliott and Miller admit that Aberhart's "acceptance of Douglas's conspiracy theories often led to the suggestion that he was anti-Semitic. Aberhart added to that misunderstanding by employing anti-Semitic jargon used by Douglas." Yet the two authors insist that Aberhart in fact did not embrace Douglas's Jewish world plot theories: "Aberhart disassociated himself from anti-Semitism and pronounced the controversial *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* a forgery."⁴⁶ Aberhart's successor is also vindicated. Alan Davies comments that, notwithstanding its anti-Semitic tendencies, the Social Credit Party "never adopted an antisemitic plan in its platform, and its leaders, especially Aberhart's successor Ernest Manning, bore down hard on the antisemites."⁴⁷

Other scholars are more critical of Social Credit's anti-Semitic philosophy. Bob Hesketh analyses Douglas's economic and political ideas and their concomitant anti-Semitism and concludes that Douglas was indeed anti-Semitic. In his discussion of Premier Manning's purge of the anti-Semitic Douglasites from the movement in 1947-48, Hesketh suggests that because Jewish conspiracy theorizing was such an integral part of Social Credit philosophy, leaders like Premier Manning who proclaimed their religious and ethnic tolerance found it difficult to distinguish party philosophy from anti-Semitism:

“[g]iven the shared conspiratorial extremism of the Manning mainstream of the party and the Douglasite faction, excising anti-Semitism would prove difficult for Manning.”⁴⁸

David Bercuson and Douglas Wertheimer provide a comprehensive overview of the anti-Semitic climate created by the Social Credit movement. They argue that Social Credit’s anti-Semitic philosophy was so pervasive that it was likely embraced by an entire generation of Albertans: “there can be little doubt that the anti-Semitism which was so much a part of Social Credit had a significant impact on ... many ... Albertans. For more than a decade an official governmental agency poured its anti-Semitism into the Alberta political stream. Officials connected with the party, from Social Credit Board members to Members of Parliament, openly expressed the most virulent anti-Jewish views. When such views receive the official imprimatur of a government and highly visible political figures, they can become acceptable to many ordinary citizens.”⁴⁹

Thus, it appears that Social Credit’s anti-Semitic philosophy is an accepted facet of the movement’s history, but defining the movement as “anti-Semitic” is more problematic. Perhaps this ambiguity is merited. Certainly, the purpose of this thesis is not to prove that the Social Credit movement was anti-Semitic; rather, its intention is merely to examine *perceptions* of Social Credit’s anti-Semitism. This thesis examines the response of organized Canadian Jewry, and specifically, the Canadian Jewish Congress to Social Credit’s anti-Semitic propaganda. The Canadian Jewish Congress, established in 1919 and re-organized in 1934, was the national representative organization for Canadian Jewry. It became uniquely involved with the Social Credit movement from the time of the Party’s ascension in 1935 until the late 1940s. During this period, Congress observed Social Credit’s dissemination of anti-Semitic propaganda with increasing alarm. Through

a variety of measures, most of them unsuccessful, it attempted to end what it perceived to be a real threat to Canadian Jewry. An examination of Congress's response reveals the impact of Social Credit's propaganda on that ethnic group most directly affected and potentially threatened. Thus, the perspective of the Canadian Jewish Congress is a key aspect of Social Credit history which has not been examined before.

While the relationship between Congress and Social Credit is a previously unexplored aspect of Social Credit history, scholars of Canadian Jewry have not addressed this facet of Canadian Jewish history either. Although there are some excellent monographs on the history of Canada's Jews,⁵⁰ and the Canadian Jewish Congress itself has published several works,⁵¹ there are few studies which discuss the impact of Canadian politics on organized Jewry and certainly none which examines the impact of the Social Credit movement on the Canadian Jewish Congress.

The sources upon which this thesis relies also separate it from other works on Social Credit and Canadian Jewry. They come predominantly from the Canadian Jewish Congress National Archives in Montreal, which contain previously unexploited sources on both organizations. These sources exist thanks to the meticulous work of Louis Rosenberg, national research director of the Canadian Jewish Congress from 1945 until his retirement in 1968.⁵² In 1966, Rosenberg presented his collection of over 300 books, numerous manuscripts and files to Congress, which was incorporated into Congress's national library and archives and made available to researchers and scholars. One of the most comprehensive sections of his collection dealt with the anti-Semitic propaganda of the Social Credit Party in Alberta and Canada.⁵³

Thus, this study fills a lacuna in both Social Credit and Canadian Jewish historiography. It describes the relationship between the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Social Credit movement during the 1930s and 1940s, and examines how a minority ethnic group in Canada attempted to eradicate the defamatory propaganda of a democratically-elected provincial government and mainstream political party. The purpose of this thesis is two-fold: to revise existing Social Credit historiography to include the perspective of the Canadian Jewish Congress, and specifically, to show that Social Credit's promotion of anti-Semitic propaganda concerned and alarmed that ethnic group most threatened by it; and second, to show how the Canadian Jewish Congress attempted to end Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda by adopting a coherent and workable public relations philosophy.

Yet several questions arise regarding the Social Credit-Congress relationship. Of primary importance is the extent of anti-Semitism within the Social Credit movement. Several scholars have argued that anti-Semitism in the Social Credit movement was confined to a marginal wing and that the Party as a whole was not anti-Semitic. If this is accepted, then the potential damage of Social Credit's anti-Semitism on organized Canadian Jewry is questionable. It can be argued that even if a political party contains an anti-Semitic element, it does not necessarily follow that the party itself is anti-Semitic or that anti-Semitism has been fomented among its supporters. Thus, if Social Credit's anti-Semitism was minimal, its potential damage to Canadian Jewry must also be minimal. Moreover, during the period under study, anti-Semitism was not confined to Social Credit party circles; indeed, Canadian politicians from other mainstream parties expressed equally anti-Semitic views. Perhaps most importantly, the Alberta Social Credit

government never implemented an anti-Semitic policy and in this respect, was certainly less culpable than the contemporary federal government which closed its doors to European Jewish refugees. Accordingly, determining the actual harm extended to Canadian Jewry by Social Credit's propaganda, or even identifying the Social Credit movement as "anti-Semitic," raises serious questions.

There is also the question of responsibility and culpability. This thesis places partial responsibility on Premiers Aberhart and Manning for Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda. Yet several scholars have argued that neither Aberhart nor Manning was anti-Semitic and neither had control over renegade members who spouted anti-Semitic statements. This raises doubts whether Social Credit leaders should be culpable for the rantings of a fringe group over which they had little control.

Other questions arise regarding the role of the Canadian Jewish Congress. Throughout the Second World War, certain Congress members, especially national research director Louis Rosenberg, took Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda very seriously. Yet it can be argued that Rosenberg's reactions were personally motivated and did not reflect the opinion of the entire Congress. It is possible that Congress leadership considered Social Credit's propaganda to be a minor problem which did not command direct attention. Thus, it can be conjectured that the reason Congress never adequately confronted the Social Credit movement was because its propaganda was not serious enough to merit direct confrontation. Similarly, if one assumes that Social Credit's anti-Semitism was only marginal, the concern which did exist within Congress may be explained as typical ethnic group anxiety operating in a dominant, majority culture.

These are questions which demand definitive answers. As one historian stated to this author: “[y]ou can demonstrate that the Social Credit philosophy was, at root, among other things, anti-semitic. But to demonstrate that a government [which] espoused that philosophy was therefore anti-semitic requires just that: demonstration--not inferences but hard evidence. You don’t have it (Canadian Jewish Congress suspicions are not evidence in themselves); it may not exist.”⁵⁴

These comments are valuable if I intend to prove that the Social Credit movement was “anti-Semitic.” However, this is not the purpose of this thesis. It does not attempt to prove that the movement was anti-Semitic in the Third-Reichian sense of adopting a philosophy of anti-Semitism, transforming the philosophy into a policy of discrimination, and executing the policy by a system of aggression. Similarly, it does not attempt to prove that Premiers Aberhart or Manning were anti-Semites. Indeed, pursuing such a course would be of little value, considering anti-Semitism was an acceptable attitude in political and public circles during this period, even using the “polite company rule” - which states that the barometer of a society’s prejudice is what slanderous statements may be made in the presence of polite company.

What this thesis does attempt to prove, however, is that the Social Credit movement promoted anti-Semitic propaganda to such an extent that its actions far surpassed that typical of a “fringe” group, and that core sections of the Alberta government and Social Credit Party were involved in the dissemination of anti-Semitic propaganda. Further, this thesis argues that Premiers Aberhart and Manning were leaders of the provincial Social Credit Party and heads of the Alberta government and were ultimately responsible for the actions of their provincial party and government. When the national Social Credit Party

was created in 1944, Premier Manning did not have official control over the Social Credit members in the House of Commons. However, Social Credit members of parliament operated under the direction of the Social Credit Association of Canada (the national party organization), which ultimately took its direction from the Alberta premier. Manning controlled Solon Low, leader of the national Social Credit Party, and in late 1947 when Manning directed Low to end the anti-Semitic statements by certain Social Credit members of parliament, Low did so. Similarly, when Manning decided that the national party paper, the *Canadian Social Crediter*, needed to be purged of its anti-Semitic propaganda, he ensured that the editor of the paper, John Patrick Gillese, was fired and that the paper adopted a more sanitized version of the international Jewish financial conspiracy theory.

Thus, Manning was in control of both the Alberta Social Credit Party and government *and* the national Social Credit Party, and as will be shown, the distinction between the two was often blurred - for both the public and party members themselves. Thus, responsibility can be placed on Manning for failing to quell the anti-Semitism within his movement, just as credit can be given to him for finally conducting a purge of the anti-Semites.

Further, it is very difficult to prove that the Social Credit movement fomented anti-Semitism and that the electors of Alberta, at either the provincial or federal levels, voted for Social Credit because of its anti-Semitic propaganda. At a time when anti-Semitism retained a substantive amount of respectability and political leaders such as Prime Minister Mackenzie King expressed equally anti-Semitic statements, it is perhaps difficult to point to Social Credit leaders as being any more overtly anti-Semitic. However, the

Social Credit Party was the only mainstream political party whose philosophy rested on the theory of an international financial Jewish conspiracy, and which published a propaganda organ which competed easily with contemporary anti-Semitic publications in Europe and the United States. Moreover, whether anti-Semitic sentiment was fomented as a result of Social Credit's propaganda should not be the measuring stick by which the movement is judged. This is akin to arguing that the Third Reich was not anti-Semitic until the German people began to believe its propaganda.

With respect to "Congress suspicions" about Social Credit's anti-Semitism, this thesis will show that the leadership and rank-and-file members of the Canadian Jewish Congress - not just national research director Louis Rosenberg - considered Social Credit's dissemination of anti-Semitic propaganda to be their "number one" public relations problem. Further, given the virulent nature of this propaganda and the wartime context in which it was disseminated, Congress's response was neither hyper-sensitive nor alarmist. The Canadian Jewish Congress perceived the Social Credit Party, both in its provincial and national forms, to be a menace to the welfare of Canadian Jewry. Whether this anxiety was based entirely in reality or partially informed by events in Europe is quite irrelevant. Canadian Jewry felt threatened by the Social Credit movement, and in the context of this fear attempted to end what it perceived to be blatant and virulent anti-Semitism. Given the experience of European Jewry during World War Two, it was not unreasonable for Canadian Jewry to respond with alarm to the anti-Semitic rhetoric of a mainstream party and provincial government in its own country.

Thus, the focus of this thesis is not whether the Social Credit movement was anti-Semitic or whether Canadian Jews suffered from Social Credit's propaganda. The first

cannot be proven adequately and the second is too subjective for the nature of this study. What the evidence shows is that the Social Credit movement consistently promoted anti-Semitic propaganda, and organized Canadian Jewry perceived this propaganda to be anathema to its welfare. This action and reaction created a dialogue, or relationship, between the Social Credit movement and the Canadian Jewish Congress. It is this relationship which forms the basis of this study.

This thesis concludes that the story of the Social Credit movement in Alberta and Canada cannot be told adequately without telling the story of Canadian Jewry's response to Social Credit. An examination of "Congress suspicions" will tell us more about the Social Credit movement than ever before realized. The Social Credit story is not solely about anti-Semitism, but it is a part of Social Credit history which has heretofore been inadequately addressed.

Secondly, this thesis concludes that while the Social Credit movement eventually realized the political liabilities of engaging in anti-Semitic propaganda in the postwar, post-Holocaust period, the Canadian Jewish Congress also realized the necessity of ensuring that anti-Semitic prejudice would never again be allowed to turn into propaganda, then policy, then annihilation. Thus, the Jewish Holocaust had a determining influence on both organizations, although their responses followed parallel rather than intersecting courses. Before the Canadian Jewish Congress could adopt an assertive enough public relations philosophy to effectively end Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda, the Party had conducted its own purge. Thus, when Premier Manning ousted the anti-Semites from the movement in late 1947 and early 1948, the Canadian Jewish

Congress, notwithstanding its years of effort, could take little credit for these turn of events.

Finally, this thesis concludes that in studies of racism and anti-Semitism, it is helpful to adopt a methodological approach which demands that the objectified party, often dehumanized and lacking voice, become the “subject of its own discourse.”⁵⁵ Although there are dozens of monographs focussing on the history of racism and discrimination in Canada,⁵⁶ and several studies on theories of race and ethnic hierarchy in the Canadian context,⁵⁷ studies which discuss racism and discrimination from the perspective of the objectified party - that is, the group under attack - are much fewer.⁵⁸ Yet giving voice to organized Canadian Jewry during the Social Credit years offers a necessary, subjective view of Social Credit’s anti-Semitism; at the same time it clarifies the nature of the Canadian Jewish Congress as a minority ethnic organization operating within a dominant political culture.

An examination of the Canadian Jewish perspective tells us as much about organized Canadian Jewry as it does about the Social Credit movement. Importantly, it shows how the Canadian Jewish Congress experienced an evolution in its public relations philosophy which determined the manner in which it fought the Social Credit “Goliath.” From a traditional public relations approach focussing on educational anti-defamation work to a more rights-oriented, legislative-directed approach, Congress gradually realized the futility of attempting to alter age-old prejudices and the importance of ensuring that prejudice was not translated into discrimination. This evolution not only influenced the outcome of Congress’s relationship with the Social Credit movement, but affected the development of Congress itself. Thus, the Social Credit-Congress relationship is both the

story of a national ethnic minority organization attempting to confront a provincial government and political party, and the story of an ethnic group evolving into a strong and politically powerful voice in the Canadian polity. An examination of the interaction between the two organizations helps explain the nation's political culture of intolerance, as well as the development of ethnic organization and strength in Canada.

The organization of this thesis is in two parts. Part One, covering Chapters One to Three, provides a context in which to understand the relationship between the Social Credit movement and the Canadian Jewish Congress. It gives an overview of the Social Credit movement in Alberta and Canada, an assessment of Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda, and a general history of Canadian Jewry and the Canadian Jewish Congress. Chapter One provides a brief history of the Social Credit movement in Alberta and Canada, with a specific emphasis on the movement's organizational structure and propaganda machinery. It reviews the nature of Social Credit's anti-Semitic philosophy and provides examples of its anti-Semitic propaganda, including the writings of C.H. Douglas, Nesta Webster, and others. Manning's purge of the anti-Semitic "Douglasites" in 1947-48 is reviewed, and the activities of the three Social Credit splinter groups - the Quebec Union des Electeurs, the Ontario Union of Electors, and the Alberta Douglas Social Credit Council - are discussed to show how the issue of anti-Semitism divided the movement. In short, this chapter offers the necessary contextualization of the Social Credit movement so that its relationship with the Canadian Jewish Congress is comprehensible.

Chapter Two offers a detailed examination of Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda. It argues that at the base of Social Credit philosophy lay a conspiracy theory which

blamed the “international Jewish financier” for the world’s ills. This conspiratorial paradigm shaped the movement’s perception of contemporary world events, and was reflected in the propaganda promoted by leading Social Credit members and the party organ. The chapter provides numerous examples of Social Credit’s anti-Semitic propaganda during and immediately following World War Two, including its allegations against “international finance,” the Bank of England, the London School of Economics (LSE), the Bank of Canada, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), the Federal Reserve Board, the Union Now movement, the Political and Economic Planning organization, the Canadian government’s wartime planning, the Beveridge and Marsh Reports, the Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks conferences, the World Bank and the gold standard, the United Nations (UN) and its affiliated organizations, the Jewish Holocaust, and the State of Israel. The chapter concludes that, given the nature and extent of its anti-Semitic propaganda during World War Two, the Social Credit movement contributed in its own way to Canada’s climate of intolerance and refusal to assist the Jews of Europe.

Chapter Three provides a context in which to understand the nature of Canadian Jewry and the Canadian Jewish Congress during the Social Credit years. It discusses the history of the Canadian Jewish community and the Canadian Jewish Congress, with a particular emphasis on Congress’s evolving public relations philosophy from the time of its reorganization in 1934 until the early postwar period. Congress’s public relations philosophy experienced a “tripartite metamorphosis” in which its earliest public relations philosophy focussed on educational, goodwill, anti-defamation work, with a concomitant assumption that anti-Semitism could be combatted by altering the attitudes of non-Jews.

The second phase of its public relations philosophy, beginning during World War Two, focussed on broadly-based social appeals emphasizing the universality of race hatred and the perils posed to society by all prejudice, not just anti-Semitism. The third and final phase, coinciding roughly with the early postwar period, emphasized a rights-oriented, legislative-directed approach to Jewish protection. This last phase of Congress's public relations philosophy abandoned the assumption that non-Jewish attitudes toward Jews could be altered; instead, it focussed on ensuring that prejudice was not translated into discrimination. In many ways, this evolution helps explain Congress's relationship with the Social Credit movement. While Congress was attempting to construct a coherent public relations philosophy, it was simultaneously trying to solve its most serious public relations problem - Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda. Congress would soon discover that it was much easier to adopt a coherent public relations philosophy than it was to execute a workable policy.

Part Two, covering Chapters Four to Seven, examines the relationship between the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Social Credit movement - the story of David's response to the Social Credit Goliath. Chapter Four examines Congress's response to Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda from the time of Social Credit's ascension in Alberta in 1935 to the end of the Second World War. This period of Congress's response was distinguished by a traditional public relations philosophy based on educational, Jewish-focussed anti-defamation work, and a concomitant frustration with its inability to quell Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda. The chapter describes several instances in which Congress attempted to adopt a concerted policy of action against the Social Credit problem, but because of the nature of its public relations philosophy, often found itself

powerless to undertake any action. The chapter highlights the important work done by Congress's Louis Rosenberg; yet despite his and others' efforts, this period is characterized by Congress's inability to adequately confront the Social Credit problem.

Chapter Five continues the story of Congress's attempts to confront Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda, covering the immediate postwar period to early 1947. It discusses how Congress attempted to adopt a more pro-active and forthright public relations philosophy, especially in the face of Social Credit's increasing anti-Semitic propaganda. However, Congress faced many obstacles: from the reality of Jewish implication in the Gouzenko affair, to the intransigence and empty promises of Social Credit leaders, to the transboundary antics of Social Credit member of parliament Norman Jaques. This chapter shows that the Social Credit problem was not dissipating; in fact, while the rest of Canadian society gradually acknowledged the perils of race hatred in the wake of the Holocaust, the Social Credit movement marched to the tune of a previous drummer. As Congress became increasingly frustrated with Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda, it also became more determined to end it. The chapter concludes that Congress's limited success with the Social Credit problem compelled it to adopt a more aggressive public relations philosophy. However, the Social Credit movement was also beginning a period of change, over which the Canadian Jewish Congress ultimately had little control.

Chapter Six covers the period from early 1947 to 1948, during which time the Canadian Jewish Congress entertained more confrontational actions against the Social Credit movement, but still found it difficult to convert philosophy into action. However, beginning in March 1947 the Social Credit movement experienced a backlash from its

own propaganda which eventually resulted in a split in party ranks. By late 1947 Premier Manning had begun his “purge” of the anti-Semitic, Douglasite purists, which shook the movement to its ideological core. The Canadian Jewish Congress observed these turn of events with both interest and wariness. Although it appeared that Manning was doing a housecleaning of the anti-Semites, leading Congress members, especially Louis Rosenberg, were skeptical that the premier’s actions were little more than cosmetic and driven by political expediency. The chapter examines the twists and turns in Social Credit party fortunes, focussing specifically on Congress’s reaction to these changes. It concludes that despite Congress’s continued efforts, it in fact had little control over the changes in the Social Credit movement and could only hope that the party split would end the years of anti-Semitic propaganda.

Chapter Seven concludes the Social Credit-Congress dialogue, covering the period from early 1948 until early 1949, when the relationship between the Social Credit movement and the Canadian Jewish Congress largely came to an end. It describes how the Social Credit movement underwent a major rift and how Premier Manning was forced to deal with three splinter groups, the Alberta Douglas Social Credit League, the Ontario Union of Electors, and the Quebec Union des Electeurs. In the end, Manning’s repudiation of anti-Semitism prevailed and the Social Credit movement was (for the most part) purged of its anti-Semitic propaganda. The chapter explores Congress’s reactions, with a specific emphasis on the more aggressive public relations approach of the Alberta branch of Congress. What becomes clear is the extent to which Congress’s public relations policy had impeded its ability to confront the Social Credit problem in the past, and continued to impede its chances to capitalize on the gains handed to it by the

movement itself. The chapter concludes that although the Social Credit Goliath was ultimately slain, Congress's David had much less to do with this turn of events than Goliath himself. In short, despite its evolving public relations philosophy, Congress was never able to deal effectively with Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda. Consequently, Congress's handling of the Social Credit problem must be seen as a failure in the history of its public relations work.

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

¹ Henry L. Feingold, "Finding a Conceptual Framework for the Study of American Antisemitism," Jewish Social Studies 47 (1985), 322.

² *Ibid.*, 321.

³ Kenneth Minogue, "Populism as a Political Movement," chap. in Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, eds., Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 198.

⁴ Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), 80.

⁵ Jacob Katz, From Prejudice to Destruction: Anti-Semitism, 1700-1933 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 7.

⁶ For sources which discuss the Christian basis of anti-Semitism, see footnote 15; also Horace Kallen, "Christianity and Antisemitism," in Leonard Dinnerstein, ed., Antisemitism in the United States (Montreal: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 17-23; Charles Y. Glock and Rodney Stark, Christian Beliefs and Anti-Semitism (New York: Harper and Row, 1966); Isaacque Graeber and Stewart Henderson Britt, Jews in a Gentile World: The Problem of Anti-Semitism (New York: MacMillan, 1942).

⁷ Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World-Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 22.

⁸ David R. Elliott and Iris Miller, Bible Bill: A Biography of William Aberhart (Edmonton: Reidmore Books, 1987), 319.

⁹ Alan Davies, "The Keegstra Affair," chap. in Alan Davies, ed., Antisemitism in Canada: History and Interpretation (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1992), 237-8.

¹⁰ C.B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962), 184-5.

¹¹ In the 1950s W.E. Mann examined the religious conditions in Alberta out of which the Social Credit movement grew. He concluded that rural and urban lower classes provided the bulk of support for the evangelical Protestant sects and that Aberhart's political movement was a direct outgrowth of his religious movement. His argument, similar to that of S.D. Clark and John Irving, perpetuated the belief that the vast proportion of Social Credit supporters were evangelical, fundamentalist Christians. Yet later studies by Grayson, Bell, and others contradict these earlier assumptions and show that in fact, Aberhart's support crossed denominational lines and was concentrated in mainstream Protestant denominations like the United Church. W.E. Mann, Sect, Cult and Church in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955); John A. Irving, "Psychological Aspects of the Social Credit Movement in Alberta," Canadian Journal of Psychology 1 (1947), 17-27, 75-86, 127-40; S.D. Clark, "The Religious Sect in Canadian Politics," American Journal of Sociology 51(3) (November 1945), 207-16; J. Paul Grayson and L.M. Grayson, "The Social Base of Interwar Political Unrest in Urban Alberta," Canadian Journal of Political Science 7(2) (June 1974), 289-313; Edward Bell, "The Petite Bourgeoisie and Social Credit: A Reconsideration," Canadian Journal of Sociology 14(1) (Winter 1989), 45-65; H.L. Malliah, "A Socio-Historical Study of the Legislators of Alberta, 1905-1967" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Alberta, 1970); Owen Anderson, "The Alberta Social Credit Party: An Empirical Analysis of Membership, Characteristics, Participation and Opinion" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Alberta, 1972).

¹² Howard Palmer, "Politics, Religion and Antisemitism in Alberta, 1880-1950," chap. in Davies, Antisemitism in Canada, 185. In a separate work, Palmer argues that religious fundamentalism did not contribute to anti-Semitism in Alberta: "[f]undamentalist sects (which in any case captured the loyalty of only a small percentage of Albertans) played ... little, if any, role in fostering anti-Semitism. Fundamentalism was not the source of the Social Credit movement's anti-Semitism; fundamentalists had ambivalent rather than negative attitudes toward Jews." Howard Palmer, Patterns of Prejudice: A History of Nativism in Alberta (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), 180.

¹³ Palmer, "Politics, Religion and Antisemitism in Alberta," 185. Palmer's statement requires substantive revision; as will be shown in this study, neither Blackmore nor Low were very pro-Jewish in their dealings with the Canadian Jewish Congress.

¹⁴ Elliott and Miller, Bible Bill, 319.

¹⁵ For a discussion of the history of modern anti-Semitism, see Hanna Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1941); Cohn, Warrant for Genocide; Arthur Hertzberg, The French Enlightenment and the Jews: The Origins of Modern Anti-Semitism (New York: Schocken Books, 1968);

Dinnerstein, Antisemitism in the United States; Frederic Cople Jaher, A Scapegoat in the New Wilderness: The Origins and Rise of Anti-Semitism in America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); Katz, From Prejudice to Destruction; James Parkes, Anti-Semitism (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1963), and The Emergence of the Jewish Problem, 1879-1939 (Westport: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1970); Koppel Pinson, ed., Essays on Antisemitism (New York: Conference on Jewish Relations, 1946); Joshua Trachtenberg, The Devil and the Jew: The Medieval Conception of the Jew and its Relation to Modern Anti-Semitism (Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books and the Jewish Publication Society of America, 1963); Hugo Valentin, Antisemitism Historically and Critically Examined (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1936); Robert S. Wistrich, Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred (London: Methuen London, 1991).

¹⁶ Cohn, Warrant for Genocide, 25.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

¹⁸ In categories of "race," which have become increasingly suspect in recent decades, Jews are not of any "race" per se. It is more accurate to define them as a religious-ethnic group. For sources on theories of race and racial categorization in the Canadian context, see footnote 57.

¹⁹ Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, Chapter Two.

²⁰ Hyman Berman, "Political Antisemitism in Minnesota during the Great Depression," Jewish Social Studies 38 (1976), 264.

²¹ Seymour Martin Lipset, Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), 24, 156.

²² Palmer, Patterns of Prejudice, 152-3. In another study, Palmer argues that the American populists' conspiratorial view of history, their emphasis on egalitarianism, and their opposition to the "money powers" were characteristics shared by Social Crediters. He uses Richard Hofstadter's five characteristics of American populism - the idea of a golden age, which appealed to popular nostalgia; the concept of natural harmonies, in which harmony would reign among the producers once the exploiters had been removed; a dualistic vision of social struggles; a conspiracy theory of history; and the doctrine of the primacy of money - to show populism's striking parallels with the principles of Social Credit. Howard Palmer, "Ethnic Relations and the Paranoid Style: Nativism, Nationalism & Populism in Alberta, 1945-50," Canadian Ethnic Studies 23(3) (1991), 26; Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, 62; Minogue, "Populism as a Political Movement," 206.

²³ Alan Brinkley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father Coughlin and the Great Depression (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982).

²⁴ David Laycock, Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies, 1910 to 1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 209.

²⁵ John A. Irving, The Social Credit Movement in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959), 234, 327.

²⁶ Davies, "The Keegstra Affair," 237.

²⁷ Palmer, Patterns of Prejudice, 153.

²⁸ Maurice Pinard, The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975), 11-13, 227.

²⁹ Michael B. Stein, The Dynamics of Right-Wing Protest: A Political Analysis of Social Credit in Quebec (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 49, 236.

³⁰ Elliott and Miller, Bible Bill, 320.

³¹ Peter Wiles, "A Syndrome, Not a Doctrine: Some Elementary Theses on Populism," chap. in Ionescu and Gellner, Populism, 176.

³² John L. Finlay, Social Credit: The English Origins (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972), 103-5

³³ *Ibid.*, 256-8.

³⁴ Laycock, Populism and Democratic Thought, 209.

³⁵ Palmer, "Politics, Religion and Antisemitism in Alberta," 177.

³⁶ Stein, The Dynamics of Right-Wing Protest, 49.

³⁷ Hofstadter states: "[t]he distinguishing thing about the paranoid style is not that its exponents see conspiracies or plots here and there in history, but that they regard a 'vast' or 'gigantic' conspiracy as *the motive force* in historical events. History *is* a conspiracy, set in motion by demonic forces of almost transcendent power, and what is felt to be needed to defeat it is not the usual methods of political give-and-

take, but an all-out crusade." Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, and Other Essays (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 29.

³⁸ Lipset notes that although "status anxieties" are most common in periods of prosperity when different classes desire to maintain or improve their class or social status, periods of economic depression have also created movements which employ "scapegoat and ethnic prejudice politics." Specifically, Lipset states that "[a]nti-Semitic movements, in particular, have also emerged during depressions. The Populist movement and Father Coughlin's National Union for Social Justice are perhaps two of the most significant ones ... It is interesting to note that many movements which center their explanation of the cause for depressions on the credit system often wind up attacking the Jews. The Social Credit movement is the most recent example of this pattern. Apparently the underlying cultural identification of the international financier with the international Jew is too strong for these groups to resist. In each case, however, Populism, Coughlinism, and Social Credit, the economic program preceded anti-Semitism." Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Sources of the 'Radical Right,'" chap. in Daniel Bell, ed., The Radical Right: The New American Right Expanded and Updated (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964), 308-10.

³⁹ Daniel Bell states: "[s]ocial groups that are dispossessed invariably seek targets on whom they can vent their resentments, targets whose power can serve to explain their dispossession. In this respect, the radical right of the early 1960s is in no way different from the Populists of the 1890s, who for years traded successfully on such simple formulas as 'Wall Street,' 'international bankers,' and 'the Trusts,' in order to have not only targets but 'explanations' for politics." Daniel Bell, "The Dispossessed," chap. in *Ibid.*, 2-3.

⁴⁰ For a comprehensive critique of earlier interpretations of the "radical right," see William B. Hixson, Search for the American Right Wing: An Analysis of the Social Science Record, 1955-1987 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

⁴¹ Berman, "Political Antisemitism in Minnesota," 264.

⁴² Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, 193, 203.

⁴³ Palmer, Patterns of Prejudice, 143, 158.

⁴⁴ In his study of the evolution of the Social Credit Party in Alberta, Finkel argues that Social Credit gradually shifted from a broadly-based, secular reform party to a "narrowly based party of rural religious fundamentalists." He claims that the Party started out as a left-wing, social-democratic, labour-oriented party, but eventually "collapsed bit by bit until right-wing extremists claimed it for their own in the 1980s and thereby sealed its doom." In short, Finkel argues that in the late 1940s, there was a right-ward shift in the movement's religious and political ideology concurrent with an abandonment of Douglas's economic theories. The result of this right-ward shift was an increasing extremism, manifesting itself in a heightened anti-Semitism. What Finkel fails to address, however, is how Douglas's economic theories provided the backbone for the movement's "right-ward" ideology - namely, its anti-Semitism - from the movement's inception. Alvin Finkel, The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), xii.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 82-3.

⁴⁶ Elliott and Miller, Bible Bill, 301.

⁴⁷ Davies, "The Keegstra Affair," 237-8.

⁴⁸ Bob Hesketh, "Major Douglas and Alberta Social Credit Ideology, 1932-1948" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Alberta, 1993), 309. Interestingly, although Hesketh focuses on Douglas's ideology, some of Douglas's writings are overlooked, including anti-Semitic booklets like The Realistic Position of the Church of England (Liverpool: K.R.P. Publications, 1948); The Policy of a Philosophy (London: K.R.P. Publications, c. 1937); and The Land for the (Chosen) People Racket (Liverpool: K.R.P. Publications, c. 1943). For a description of these works see Chapter One.

⁴⁹ David Bercuson and Douglas Wertheimer, A Trust Betrayed: The Keegstra Affair (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1985), 38.

⁵⁰ See, for example, Irving Abella, A Coat of Many Colours: Two Centuries of Jewish Life in Canada (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1990); Simon Belkin, Through Narrow Gates: A Review of Jewish Immigration, Colonization and Immigrant Aid Work in Canada, 1840-1940 (Montreal: Canadian Jewish Congress and the Jewish Colonization Association, 1966); Michael G. Brown, Jew or Juif? Jews, French Canadians, and Anglo-Canadians, 1759-1914 (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1986); Robert J. Brym, William Shaffir, and Morton Weinfeld, eds., The Jews in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993); Arthur A. Chiel, The Jews of Manitoba: A Social History (Toronto: University of Toronto

Press, 1964); Daniel J. Elazar and Harold M. Waller, Maintaining Consensus: The Canadian Jewish Polity in the Postwar World (Lanham: The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and the University Press of America, 1990); Ruth A. Frager, Sweatshop Strife: Class, Ethnicity, and Gender in the Jewish Labour Movement of Toronto, 1900-1939 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); Sheldon J. Godfrey and Judith C. Godfrey, Search Out the Land: The Jews and the Growth of Equality in British Colonial America, 1740-1867 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995); Harry Gutkin, Journey Into Our Heritage: The Story of the Jewish People in the Canadian West (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1980); Arthur Daniel Hart, ed., The Jew in Canada: A Complete Record of Canadian Jewry from the Days of the French Regime to the Present Time (Montreal: Jewish Publications, 1926); Aron Horowitz, Striking Roots: Reflections on Five Decades of Jewish Life (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 1979); Joseph Kage, With Faith and Thanksgiving: The Story of Two Hundred Years of Jewish Immigration and Immigrant Aid Effort in Canada, 1760-1960 (Montreal: Eagle Publishing, 1962); Erna Paris, Jews: An Account of Their Experience in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1980); Abraham Rhinewine, Looking Back a Century: On the Centennial of Jewish Political Equality in Canada (Toronto: Kraft Press, 1932); B.G. Sack, History of the Jews in Canada (Montreal: Harvest House, 1965); Stuart E. Rosenberg, The Jewish Community in Canada, 2 vols. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970-71); Stephen A. Speisman, The Jews of Toronto: A History to 1937 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979); Gerald Tulchinsky, Taking Root: The Origins of the Canadian Jewish Community (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992); Morton Weinfeld, William Shaffir, and Irwin Cotler, eds., The Canadian Jewish Mosaic (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1981); Martin Wolff, The Jews of Canada (New York: The American Jewish Committee, 1926).

⁵¹ Congress has published dozens of studies on Canadian Jewry, including brief histories of its own. See, for example, Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present: Canadian Jewry and the Canadian Jewish Congress (Toronto: Canadian Jewish Congress, 1986) and Seventy Years of Canadian Jewish Life (Montreal: Canadian Jewish Congress, 1989).

⁵² Louis Rosenberg was one of Congress's most prominent and valued members. He was born in Poland in 1893 and came to Canada in 1915 where he started out in the field of education, first as a teacher and then as principal, and from 1938 to 1939, as chairman of the Regina School Board. From 1919 to 1940 Rosenberg served as manager for Western Canada of Jewish Farm Settlements for the Jewish Colonization Association. He was also a member of the executive committee of the Western Division of Congress from 1934 to 1940; member of the national executive council of the Canadian Jewish Congress in 1936; chairman of the Bureau of Social and Economic Research, Western Division, in 1936; vice-president of the Western Division of Congress from 1937 to 1939; executive director of the Western Division of Congress from 1940 to 1945 as well as secretary of the Western Division's Joint Public Relations Committee; and in 1945 he was appointed national research director of Congress's Bureau of Social and Economic Research. Rosenberg authored hundreds of publications, the most famous of which were Canada's Jews: A Social and Economic Study of Jews in Canada, ed. Morton Weinfeld (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), and a series of booklets published as Canadian Jewish Population Studies. Rosenberg played an important part in the studies of Jewish demography in Canada and was one of the world's most prominent Jewish sociologists. "Biography of Louis Rosenberg," 1 May 1969 (PAM, JHSWC Collection, P58, File 21); Congress Bulletin, March 1966 (PAM, JHSWC Collection, MG8 D3; MG10 F3); Paris, Jews, 241.

⁵³ Congress Bulletin, March 1966 (PAM, MG8 D3; MG10 F3).

⁵⁴ Letter, Finkel to Stingel, 10 August 1996 (possession of author).

⁵⁵ Theories of deconstruction, poststructuralism, and postmodernism, although jargon-laden and exclusionist, can be helpful in determining the nature of ethnic groups' dialogues within dominant, majority cultures. For a discussion of these theories in the historical discipline, see Harold Bloom, Deconstruction and Criticism (New York: Continuum, 1988); Tejaswini Niranjana, Siting Translation: History, Post-Structuralism, and the Colonial Context (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1992); Jerzy Topolski, ed., Historiography Between Modernism and Postmodernism: Contributions to the Methodology of the Historical Research (Atlanta: Amsterdam, 1994).

⁵⁶ For historical studies of racism and discrimination in Canada, see Irving Abella and Harold Troper, None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948 (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1991); Pierre Anctil, Le Devoir, les Juifs et l'immigration: De Bourassa à Laurendeau (Québec: Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1988); Pierre Anctil and Gary Caldwell, Juifs et réalités juives au Québec (Québec: Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1984); B. Singh Bolaria and Peter S. Li, Racial Oppression in

Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988); Lita-Rose Betcherman, The Swastika and the Maple Leaf: Fascist Movements in Canada in the Thirties (Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1975); Davies, Antisemitism in Canada; Esther Delisle, The Traitor and the Jew: Anti-Semitism and Extremist Right-Wing Nationalism in Quebec from 1929 to 1939 (Montreal and Toronto: Robert Davies Publishing, 1993); Ted Ferguson, A White Man's Country: An Exercise in Canadian Prejudice (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1975); Norman Hillmer, Bohdan Kordan, and Lubomyr Luciuk, eds., On Guard For Thee: War, Ethnicity, and the Canadian State, 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Canadian Committee for the History of the Second World War and Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1988); Robert Huttenback, Racism and Empire: White Settlers and Colored Immigrants in the British Self-Governing Colonies, 1830-1910 (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1976); Evelyn Kallen, Label Me Human: Minority Rights of Stigmatized Canadians (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989); Angus McLaren, Our Own Master Race: Eugenics in Canada, 1885-1945 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1990); Palmer, Patterns of Prejudice; Martin Robin, Shades of Right: Nativist and Fascist Politics in Canada, 1920-1940 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); Patricia E. Roy, A White Man's Province: British Columbia Politicians and Chinese and Japanese Immigrants, 1858-1914 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1989); John Herd Thompson, Ethnic Minorities During Two World Wars (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1991); Harold Troper, Only Farmers Need Apply (Toronto: Griffin House, 1972); James W. St. G. Walker, Racial Discrimination in Canada: The Black Experience (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1985); Peter Ward, White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes and Public Policy Toward Orientals in British Columbia (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1978).

⁵⁷ For studies on theories of race and ethnic hierarchy in Canada, see Alan B. Anderson and James S. Frideres, Ethnicity in Canada: Theoretical Perspectives (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981); Kay J. Anderson, Vancouver's Chinatown: Racial Discourse in Canada, 1875-1980 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1991); Carl Berger, The Sense of Power: Studies in the Ideas of Canadian Imperialism, 1867-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970); Harold Coward and Leslie Kawamura, Religion and Ethnicity (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1978); Jean Leonard Elliott and Augie Fleras, Unequal Relations: An Introduction to Race and Ethnic Dynamics in Canada (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1992); Daniel G. Hill, Human Rights in Canada: A Focus on Racism (Ottawa: Canadian Labour Congress, 1977); David R. Hughes and Evelyn Kallen, The Anatomy of Racism: Canadian Dimensions (Montreal: Harvest House, 1976); Peter S. Li, ed., Race and Ethnic Relations in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1990); John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965); Subhas Ramcharan, Racism: Nonwhites in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1982); Ann Sunahara, The Politics of Racism (Toronto: Lorimer, 1981); Walter Tarnopolsky, Discrimination and the Law in Canada (Toronto: R. De Boo, 1982).

⁵⁸ For discussions of racism and discrimination in Canada from the perspective of the "objectified party" see Howard Adams, Prison of Grass: Canada from a Native Point of View (Saskatoon: Fifth House Publishers, 1989); Wilson Head, Adaption of Immigrants in Metro Toronto: Perceptions of Ethnic and Racial Discrimination (Downsview: York University, 1980), and The Black Presence in the Canadian Mosaic: A Study of Perception and the Practice of Discrimination against Blacks in Metropolitan Toronto (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 1975); Rudolf Helling, The Position of Negroes, Chinese and Italians in the Social Structure of Windsor, Ontario (Windsor: n.p., 1965); Frances Henry, The Caribbean Diaspora in Toronto: Learning to Live with Racism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994); Franklin Henry, Perception of Discrimination Among Negroes and Japanese-Canadians in Hamilton (Hamilton: McMaster University, 1965).

PART ONE

PRELUDE TO CONFLICT: AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOCIAL CREDIT MOVEMENT AND THE CANADIAN JEWISH CONGRESS

When the Social Credit movement came to power in Alberta in 1935, the Canadian Jewish Congress was a newly re-organized entity headquartered in Montreal. At first glance, the two organizations shared little in common. The number of Jews in Alberta was minimal, and most Albertans had never met a Jewish person or could even recognize one. Similarly, the Canadian Jewish Congress, although it had a Western Division which included the Alberta Jewish community, focussed its attention on Montreal and Toronto, where most Canadian Jews lived. The two organizations also had different priorities: the newly-formed Social Credit government was attempting to bring Albertans out of a serious economic depression by implementing a radical economic programme, while the Canadian Jewish Congress was attempting to quell the increasing anti-Semitic agitation of fascist groups like Adrien Arcand's Parti National Social Chrétien. In a depressed economic climate marked by political extremism, the Social Credit movement and the Canadian Jewish Congress were occupied with their respective concerns.

What brought the two organizations together, however, was the very conjuncture of economic depression and political extremism. Social Credit philosophy embraced a strong conspiratorial element which blamed Canada's economic ills on the "international Jewish financier." This extremist philosophy was manifested in the movement's anti-Semitic propaganda, which compelled the Canadian Jewish Congress to respond. It was this "act of aggression" by the Social Credit movement and the defensive reaction of the

Canadian Jewish Congress which formed the basis of their relationship. An examination of the history and organizational structure of the Social Credit movement, as well as its anti-Semitic propaganda, will help contextualize the nature of Social Credit's actions.

Similarly, an examination of the history and organization of the Canadian Jewish Congress will help explain the nature of its reaction. By providing the context for both organizations, the strange, unlikely relationship between the Social Credit movement and the Canadian Jewish Congress will become comprehensible.

CHAPTER ONE

A HISTORY OF THE SOCIAL CREDIT MOVEMENT IN ALBERTA AND CANADA

The relationship between the Social Credit movement and the Canadian Jewish Congress cannot be fully understood without examining the background and organizational structure of the Social Credit movement in Alberta and Canada. The promotion of anti-Semitic propaganda was a mainstay of the movement's activities, and it is necessary to explain why this was so. The secondary literature on the Social Credit movement is extensive and several scholars have discussed its political, economic, and social background. Accordingly, this chapter will provide only a brief history of the Social Credit movement, but will examine more closely the persons, party organs, and agencies responsible for dissemination of anti-Semitic literature. The factors which led to the movement's split over anti-Semitism in 1947-48 will be examined, as well as the three splinter groups which broke away from the mainstream movement. In essence, the purpose of this chapter is to show how Social Credit's philosophy, propaganda machinery, and organizational apparatus facilitated the promotion of anti-Semitic propaganda.

The story of Social Credit's rise to power is well known and has been covered extensively in the secondary literature. However, even a brief review of the movement's history must discuss the province from which it came. Indeed, the history of the Social Credit movement in Alberta is inextricably linked to the history of the province. Alberta attained provincehood in 1905, having been formerly part of the Northwest Territories which was demarcated from the rest of Canada in 1875. Composed mostly of American farmers,¹ British and European immigrants (including pacifist sects like the Hutterites,

Doukhobors and Mennonites),² and Ontario “expansionists,”³ Alberta entered the Dominion of Canada already with a long history.⁴ Shortly after its ascension to provincehood, it elected a Liberal government under Alexander Rutherford, which most Albertans believed did not adequately protect or promote their interests vis à vis “eastern Canada,”⁵ especially with respect to the economic discrimination inherent in western grain marketing and the CPR freight rates.⁶ Similarly, on the federal level, Albertans were unimpressed with Ottawa’s continual control over their natural resources and their weak political representation in the House of Commons.⁷ Accordingly, as part of that broader prairie farmer protest which reached its height in 1921 with the election of the Progressives to the House of Commons,⁸ that same year Alberta elected a government of the United Farmers of Alberta.⁹ For most Albertans, coming from a predominantly rural, mixed-farming environment, the UFA was seen as the best representative of their interests. However, the postwar depression, together with the Great Depression of the 1930s and political scandal within the Brownlee government,¹⁰ caused the Alberta electorate by the mid-1930s to look for a stronger panacea. In 1935 Albertans found their saviour in the radio preacher William “Bible Bill” Aberhart.

Certainly, Alberta’s tradition of prairie protest and support of third parties was well entrenched before 1935. American populist ideas had had a great impact on Alberta’s emerging political culture, and with the economic depressions and political inequities of the early decades of the twentieth century, traditional populist grievances against the “eastern capitalists,” “vested interests,” and “financiers” helped focus Albertans’ discontent on what they perceived to be unfair and unequal treatment at the hands of Ottawa.

In both ideology and organization, the United Farmers of Alberta and the Social Credit Party shared many of the characteristics of American populism.¹¹ Unlike the UFA, however, the Social Credit Party adopted that darker side of populism which included a conspiratorial view of history and a preponderant focus on monetary powers, with a concomitant vilification of “international Jewish finance.”¹² When the UFA proved to be politically conservative and powerless against the Great Depression, the Social Credit theories of C.H. Douglas, offering similar ideas about the “vested interests,” held resonance for an electorate facing economic devastation, political powerlessness, and imminent starvation. Accordingly, when William Aberhart adopted Douglas’s views and began mixing his religious programmes with Social Credit theories, Albertans believed that the Social Credit crusade offered them a way out of their desperate circumstances. When Aberhart additionally promised twenty-five dollars a month to each adult, “voting with one’s pocketbook” took on a whole new meaning, and in 1935 “Bible Bill” won the Alberta provincial election with a resounding victory.

Suddenly, Aberhart’s radio programme *cum* religious-political crusade landed fifty-six Social Credit candidates in the Alberta legislature, facing five Liberals and two Conservatives.¹³ Composed of farmers, workers, and small businessmen,¹⁴ the Social Credit Party took control of the Alberta government somewhat shakily, with the authoritarian Aberhart passing outrageous legislation and not giving an address in the Alberta legislature until four years into his premiership.¹⁵ Yet the Party grew in confidence, based on a mixture of faith in Aberhart, in Social Credit theories, and in the strength of its numbers. Aberhart’s successor, Ernest Manning, took over his master’s mantle and led Albertans into the province’s greatest economic boom. Thirty-six years

later, the Social Credit years came to an end, with nearly two generations of Albertans having known only a Social Credit government.

The story of the Social Credit years is, in many ways, a story of success - how the teacher-preacher-premier and his disciple-protégé led the province of Alberta into the most prosperous years it had ever experienced.¹⁶ Yet the Social Credit Party's thirty-six year reign is also a story of intolerance, provincialism, and duplicity. This facet of Social Credit's history forms the backbone of this study, and while it is important to remember that the Social Credit government of Alberta ultimately served its electorate well, it is the scaliier side¹⁷ of Social Credit's history which will be examined. The anti-Semitic ideology of Social Credit's founder, C.H. Douglas, was absorbed and perpetuated in varying degrees by leading party members, including William Aberhart and Ernest Manning. Further, the organizational apparatus of the Social Credit movement, at both the provincial and federal levels, included agencies and organs which regularly disseminated anti-Semitic propaganda. Consequently, for those Social Credit members who believed in the "international Jewish financial conspiracy," their views were supported by the movement's propaganda machinery. An examination of the theories upon which Social Credit philosophy was based will show why the movement's propaganda adopted an anti-Semitic bias.

Social Credit philosophy was based largely on the theories of Major C.H. Douglas, a Scottish electrical engineer and founder of the Social Credit movement in England. Social Credit was thus a British import - Douglas established the movement in the 1920s when he created the Social Credit Secretariat in Liverpool. The Social Credit Secretariat was a voluntary organization composed of Douglas's followers and described itself as a non-

party, non-class organization neither connected with nor supporting any political party, Social Credit or otherwise. Douglas was the Secretariat's advisory chairman, and Dr Tudor Jones was its deputy chairman. One of the functions of the Social Credit Secretariat was the "organisation and supervision of the study of Social Credit by those who desire to undertake it seriously."¹⁸

In 1938, in conjunction with the Social Credit Secretariat, Douglas founded a weekly journal called the *Social Crediter*. The mandate of the *Social Crediter* was to express and support the policy of the Social Credit Secretariat.¹⁹ Indeed, the publishers for the *Social Crediter*, K.R.P. Publications, were housed in the same offices as the Social Credit Secretariat.²⁰ As other Social Credit organizations were created in Commonwealth countries such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, they too began to publish their own Social Credit publications, such as the *Australian Social Crediter*, the *New Times* (Melbourne), the *New Era* (Sydney), the *New Zealand Social Crediter*, the *Canadian Social Crediter*, and *Vers Demain* (Quebec). Depending on their relationship to Douglas's Social Credit Secretariat, these umbrella publications carried articles which were published by the *Social Crediter*. Certainly in Canada, the *Canadian Social Crediter* and *Vers Demain* quoted extensively from the English *Social Crediter*.²¹ In turn, the Social Credit Secretariat in England supported in varying degrees its umbrella Social Credit publications. As the Social Credit Secretariat stated in 1946: "*The Australian Social Crediter*, and *To-day and To-morrow*, (now renamed *The Canadian Social Crediter*), in different circumstances and degree reflect the intention of Social Credit journalism at headquarters, and loyal allies are the newspaper of the French Canadian movement for Social Credit, *Vers Demain*, and *The New Times* of Melbourne."²²

In various studies of Douglas's Social Credit theories, economists, historians, and other scholars have shown that Douglas's theories were economically unsound and based on a blind blaming of the banking system.²³ As one critic of Social Credit stated in 1937, "those who have sincerely studied the writings of Major Douglas will agree that it is an exasperating task. His mind evidently functions according to the advice of a famous cynic: 'If you would make your doctrine immortal, make it incomprehensible, for then no one can prove that it is wrong.'"²⁴

Yet Douglas's economic theories were also considered avant-garde and even John Maynard Keynes agreed that Douglas's criticisms of the banking and credit system had merit.²⁵ Douglas's theories were, in essence, a programme for economic and political reform. His goal was to reform the economic system so that the evils of capitalism would be eradicated while retaining the capitalist framework;²⁶ and reform the political system so that control of the general will of the people would be held by the people and not by "government."²⁷ Significantly, at the base of both reforms lay the assumption that a group of international Jewish financiers manipulated the world's economic and political systems in its bid for world domination. By reforming the economic and political systems, Douglas believed that power could be usurped from the international Jewish financiers. This conspiratorial underpinning to Douglas's programme of economic and political reform caused Social Credit philosophy to embrace a strong anti-Jewish element.

Evidence suggests that Douglas suffered from paranoia; indeed, near the end of his life, he was hospitalized and diagnosed as certifiably insane.²⁸ Long before, however, critics accused him of harbouring a "highly developed persecution complex" which cause him to see "a 'financier' with a false beard watching him behind every bush and conspiracies

hatched by statesmen and bank governors (who probably do not even know his name) to encompass his destruction.”²⁹ Certainly, Douglas’s conspiratorial philosophy about Jews informed much of his theories on Social Credit. His anti-Semitic theories were absorbed and perpetuated by the Alberta movement, primarily through the distribution of books and pamphlets written by Douglas himself. These treatises were available at all Social Credit meetings and were advertised for sale by the movement’s party organs and government and party agencies. A brief review of Douglas’s treatises will reveal the type of literature the Alberta Social Credit movement disseminated.³⁰

Social Credit was written by Douglas and first published in 1924 in London, England. Revised twice and reprinted four times, its final version was published in 1937. *Social Credit* was the basic and official handbook of the Social Credit movement as outlined by Douglas himself.³¹ In it, he accused the Jewish religion of being the foundation upon which “monopoly capitalism” was based, and argued that pre-war Germany and post-war Russia were under the direct influence of Jewish leaders. He also regarded the Jews as protagonists of “collectivism,” which included socialism, communism, and big business.³² The remedy for such a situation, Douglas suggested, was the breaking up of Jewish group activity.³³ Further, he expressed his belief in the spurious *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*³⁴ and considered the question of whether the *Protocols* were a forgery to be of little importance.³⁵

The Policy of a Philosophy was a reprint of an address Douglas gave to a conference of Social Crediters in London in June 1937. Although supposedly a summary of the Social Credit movement, it was predominantly a criticism of the money system, which Douglas described as an “abstraction.”³⁶ He outlined the perils of “abstractionism,” which he

linked to Whiggism and Jewish emancipation under Oliver Cromwell. Stated Douglas: “[t]he rise of the Protectorate ... was financed by Manasseh ben Israel; and the first Act of the Protectorate was to readmit the Jews into England ... but it had the undoubted effect of elevating Whiggism, which ... has been dominant in this country ever since; and Whiggism is abstractionism.” For Douglas, “abstractionism” was antithetical to both Social Credit and Christianity.³⁷

The Big Idea was a sixty-four page pamphlet compiled from articles appearing in the *Social Crediter* from January to May 1942.³⁸ In short, the purpose of the pamphlet was to launch an attack on Jews. As Louis Rosenberg of the Canadian Jewish Congress noted, “although the pamphlet purported to be an explanation of Social Credit theory, it was almost entirely devoted to anti-Semitic attacks.”³⁹ Douglas waged numerous accusations, including the following: that the Second World War was caused by Jews and their non-Jewish friends; that Jews, Freemasons, the Old Testament, and the anti-Christ were working in tandem against the forces of the New Testament and Christianity; that German Jewish bankers, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States, the London School of Economics, the Bank of England, B’nai B’rith, and Freemasons were part of the “conspiracy of international Jewish bankers;” and that Hitler was a grandson of an illegitimate daughter of Baron Rothschild.⁴⁰ In one instance Douglas declared that “while all international Financiers are not Jews, many are, and the observable policy of these Jews and of Freemasonry is that of the Talmud. This group can be identified first with Pan-Germanism, and secondly with Pan-Americanism, both of which aim at the destruction of British culture and prestige either by conquest or absorption.”⁴¹ Douglas also remarked that “the Jew” was “the most undesirable Oriental the world has produced.”⁴²

The Land for the (Chosen) People Racket was a pamphlet which first appeared serially in the *Social Crediter* between December 1942 and March 1943.⁴³ Douglas did not deal with Social Credit theories but discussed the land tenure system in England and the question of nationalizing farm land in that country.⁴⁴ His discussion included numerous anti-Semitic attacks, as well as quotations from the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*.⁴⁵ He blamed the promotion of land nationalization in England on several Jews, including Ernest Cassel, Jacob Schiff, Israel Moses Sieff of the Political and Economic Planning organization, and the German banking firm of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company.⁴⁶ He also argued that a Jewish conspiracy was behind the push for nationalization of mineral rights ownership in England.⁴⁷ Regarding the British government's attempts to combat foot-and-mouth disease by slaughtering all cattle suspected of being infected, Douglas declared that this was actually a Jewish-socialist plot against English cattle owners.⁴⁸ Upon reading this pamphlet, Congress's Louis Rosenberg noted that Douglas had changed the popular English political slogan, "The Land for the People," into "The Land for the (Chosen) People," thus implying that Jewish plotters were attempting to hand over Britain's land to Jews as the "chosen people."⁴⁹

Programme for the Third World War was a sixty-page pamphlet comprised of articles written by Douglas in the *Social Crediter* between April and August 1943. Douglas argued that a third world war was imminent and, like the second, would be deliberately planned by a secret group of international Jewish conspirators intending to dominate the world through control of the banking system, the Communist Party, and the Socialist Parties of various countries. Douglas made numerous allegations, including the following: that German Jewish bankers conducted the political and economic policies of Germany,

Great Britain, and the United States; that German-Jewish international bankers invented the concept of the separation of control from ownership and responsibility; that Jewish bankers were instrumental in the rise of Japanese power; that Freemasonry was part of the international Jewish conspiracy for world control; that Hitler was a Jew and a member of the Rothschild family; that Hitler's anti-Semitism was not genuine and that Jews were fabricating their persecution in Germany in order to infiltrate Great Britain to act as spies for Germany;⁵⁰ that Jews crucified Jesus because Jesus said that "man is not born to be ruled nor to rule over other people;" and that Jews were Orientals who could not understand European concepts.⁵¹

The Brief for the Prosecution,⁵² published in 1946, was a further condemnation of the "Jewish world plot." Here Douglas claimed that he had uncovered evidence of an international Jewish financial conspiracy which planned to impose an "alien culture"⁵³ on the world by first destroying the British Empire and then creating a totalitarian government in every state. Specifically, the conspirators wanted to impose an "international financial authority" and "international police force" on Britain in their bid for world control.⁵⁴ They would use their manipulation of the Communist Party in England, the London School of Economics, the Political and Economic Planning organization, the Bank of England, and the American Federal Reserve Board to help implement their alien policy.⁵⁵ According to Douglas, the conspirators were also responsible for the financing of Hitler, "an illegitimate descendant of a Viennese Baron Rothschild." He added that rumours of a German policy of Jewish persecution were "patently absurd" since "there is abundant evidence that Hitler received exactly the same kind of support from powerful Jews as did the Kaiser."⁵⁶

The Realistic Position of the Church of England was a compilation of articles published in the *Social Crediter* from 25 October to 22 November 1947.⁵⁷ Again, Douglas focussed on the impact of the Jewish conspiracy on Britain. According to Louis Rosenberg, the purpose of this pamphlet was to argue that the Church of England, as the state church, was not asserting itself enough in the political life of the country and was too favourably inclined towards Jews and others who supported Jewish causes.⁵⁸ Douglas relied heavily on the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*,⁵⁹ argued that the Old Testament should be rejected for its adherence to the “Chosen People” myth, and attacked Zionism for its “vicious effects.”⁶⁰ In one instance, he declared that “[t]he Jewish question is a mass of untruths, half-truths, and false materialism, and one of the essentials of any solution is to strip it of the occultism which is its chief ally.”⁶¹

Even a cursory review of these treatises shows that Douglas was a blatant anti-Semite. Significantly, these treatises were advertised for sale by the various agencies and organs of the Alberta Social Credit movement. More seriously, the ideas expressed therein were absorbed and perpetuated by leading Social Credit members, including William Aberhart and Ernest Manning.

When Aberhart became a follower of Douglas’s economic theories in 1932, he clearly did not understand them. Indeed, there is the well-worn story of Aberhart in 1937 asking John Hargrave, a Social Credit expert from England: “[i]f I issue a dividend, how do I get it back?”⁶² Perhaps this story reveals less about Aberhart’s inability to understand Social Credit theories than it does about their intrinsic fallacy. Nonetheless, Aberhart’s faith in Douglas’s theories superseded his understanding of them, and this was emulated by other Social Credit supporters. When his religious-political crusade resulted in an election

landslide, a group of very surprised and somewhat scared Social Credit MLAs, including Aberhart, argued that what was important was *not* a detailed and intricate explanation of Douglas's theories and how they could be implemented, but a strong faith that such theories would produce the necessary results. Aberhart often used the example of electricity to explain Social Credit theory - the idea that one did not need to understand the theory of electricity (or Social Credit) in order to benefit from its application.⁶³ He and other Social Credit members concluded that Social Credit theories were so simple and obvious that the only possible explanation why they had not yet been implemented throughout the world was opposition from the international financial conspiracy.⁶⁴ If Aberhart was unable to understand Douglas's economic and political theories, he seemed clear about the international financial conspiracy.

During his tenure as premier from 1935 to 1943, Aberhart did nearly everything but implement Social Credit. He promised Albertans twenty-five dollars a month; when that did not materialize, he refused to pay interest on maturing government bonds, defaulted on the province's bond payments, issued government scrip called "prosperity certificates," and attempted to cancel farm debts, prevent farm foreclosures, and muzzle the Alberta press.⁶⁵ When the federal government declared each of Aberhart's actions *ultra vires*, Social Credit politicians interpreted this as further proof of the existence of an international conspiracy which was puppeteering the federal government.

Yet Aberhart's views about the international financial conspiracy were not as explicit as those of Douglas. The existing literature generally accepts the notion that Aberhart believed in the international financial conspiracy theory, but did not accept that it was Jewish-controlled. Certainly, a review of the evidence shows that Aberhart embraced

contradictory views about Jews and Judaism.⁶⁶ At various times, Aberhart stated that the Social Credit Party not only opposed anti-Semitism, but condemned anti-Semitism in the strongest possible terms.⁶⁷ When the Alberta Jewish community solicited Aberhart's greetings for various Jewish holidays, he gave them freely.⁶⁸ When the Western Division of the Canadian Jewish Congress asked Aberhart to speak at its conference in Calgary in 1939, he attended and expressed sympathy with the plight of European Jews, stating: "[t]here will never be more than a temporary solution to the problems facing the Jewish race until you find a place to seek your destiny in freedom."⁶⁹ In an interview for the *Jewish Post* in the autumn of 1939, when asked about the possibilities of permitting and assisting Jewish refugees to settle in Alberta, Aberhart responded that if Ottawa permitted it, and if they were supported independently "so as not to become a burden on the government," then "we would gladly open the doors to Jewish sufferers ... As to refugees with any capital of their own, they are certainly welcome."⁷⁰ He also expressed hope that a solution would be found to the grave refugee problem, and that Jewish aspirations for a homeland in Palestine would be realized along with a definite improvement in world conditions.⁷¹

These statements have led one historian of Social Credit to conclude that "[w]hile he was Premier, Aberhart was perceived by the Jewish community in Alberta and western Canada as a friend."⁷² Yet Aberhart's positive statements about Jews were balanced by equally negative statements. During a lecture given at the Calgary Prophetic Bible Conference in 1922, Aberhart explicitly opposed Zionism and argued that because Jews had not accepted Christ they would never succeed in regaining the Promised Land of Zion: "the JEWISH RACE must yet acknowledge that the CHRIST who was crucified to the

CROSS of Calvary was the SON of GOD, their MESSIAH. Until they will acknowledge that they must expect the curses of the world and can not expect the Blessings of GOD.”⁷³ In other sermons, Aberhart criticized the Jewish nation for its sinfulness, including the sins of selfishness, hypocrisy, usury, violence, injustice, and discontent with wages.⁷⁴ He viewed Christianity as a war against the anti-Christ, and suggested that when Armageddon came, most Jews would be duped by the Antichrist, believing him to be their Messiah.⁷⁵

Regarding the international financial conspiracy, Aberhart also appeared to embrace Douglas’s theories. In a vitriolic condemnation of the “bankers” in 1943, Aberhart declared: “[d]o you not realize that unless we make definite plans for dealing with this slimy octopus which is wrapping its clammy blood-sucking tentacles around every man, woman and child in this Canada of ours, we shall find ourselves bound in abject slavery to the lords of finance who, by this iniquitous swindle have gained such power that they are virtually super-dictators to whom democratically elected governments have to go cringingly, cap-in-hand, to obtain permission to carry on?”⁷⁶ In another instance, he repeated Douglas’s claim that in Germany, there existed a Jewish group of financiers who were responsible for the persecution of Jews in that country while they themselves remained unscathed and prospered economically.⁷⁷

Thus, Aberhart’s views on Jews and their relationship to the so-called international financial conspiracy were ambivalent, and it is possible that he embraced positive feelings toward Jews while still accepting that part of Douglas’s theories which blamed the shadowy “international Jewish financier” for the world’s economic and political ills. Yet whether Aberhart was an anti-Semite or not is somewhat irrelevant; what is more important is that as leader and interpreter of Douglas’s Social Credit theories in Alberta,

Aberhart embraced views which were ambivalent enough to allow the anti-Semitic facet of Douglas's ideology to permeate the Alberta movement's ideology. As the following chapters will show, Aberhart did not repudiate anti-Semitism in the Alberta Social Credit movement, and did not prevent other more vocal Social Credit members from expressing the anti-Semitic component of the international financial conspiracy theory.⁷⁸

When Ernest Manning took over the premiership after Aberhart's death in May 1943, this former student-disciple-protégé appeared to deviate little from Aberhart's principles.⁷⁹ Yet three major changes occurred under the Manning regime. The first was the extension of the Social Credit movement to the national arena in 1944; the second was Manning's abandonment of Social Credit theories and attempts at implementation; and the third was his repudiation of anti-Semitism within the Social Credit movement. These actions were closely connected: the creation of the national Social Credit Party and Social Credit organizations in other provinces increased the amount of anti-Semitic propaganda; yet when Manning attempted to abandon Douglas's economic and political theories, he also was forced to abandon their concomitant anti-Semitism. This necessarily brought him into conflict with those members of the national Party and other provincial party members who believed in Douglas's economic, political, anti-Semitic theories. Indeed, Douglas's economic and political theories were so entrenched in the idea of an international Jewish financial conspiracy that when Manning discarded Social Credit principles, he was also compelled to purge the anti-Semitic purists, or Douglasites, from the movement.

However, because Manning was responsible for purging the anti-Semitic Douglasites, he has since been idealized as a leader who refused to tolerate anti-Semitism in the Social Credit Party, as well as vindicated of any responsibility for the anti-Semitic propaganda

promoted during his premiership. As will be shown in the following chapters, these interpretations overlook Manning's own ambivalent views on the "international Jewish financial conspiracy" and tend to obscure the complex motives which caused him to repudiate Social Credit's anti-Semitism when he did.

In order to understand the factors which led to Manning's purge of the Douglasites in 1947-48, the organizational structure of the movement, including its provincial and national wings, party organs, and propaganda agencies, must be understood. It can be argued that one of the reasons for Social Credit's increased anti-Semitic propaganda and its later split over the issue of anti-Semitism was its extension beyond Alberta borders. The creation of the national Social Credit Party in 1944 was only part of a broadening out of the Alberta Social Credit movement throughout the Dominion. This extension was important - it signified a renewed commitment to implementing Social Credit on a national, not just provincial basis - but it also encouraged further promotion of Douglas's anti-Semitic theories.

When the national Social Credit Party was established, it was officially independent from the Alberta Social Credit Party⁸⁰ and operated under the jurisdiction of the national Social Credit organization, the Social Credit Association of Canada. Other provincial Social Credit organizations which had been operating in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec, as well as the Alberta Social Credit organization, were brought under the jurisdiction of the Social Credit Association of Canada.⁸¹ Thus, the national organization became responsible for both the provincial Social Credit movements and the newly-created national Social Credit Party. It was comprised of a national executive (made up of a national leader and president, a deputy national leader and vice-

president, and a second vice-president)⁸² and a national council.⁸³ Significantly, the national council included members from this national executive as well as the heads of each provincial organization. Thus, all heads of the provincial organizations held a seat on the national council, with the notable exception of Ernest Manning. Yet as later events will show, Manning held much sway over the policies of the Social Credit Association of Canada, notwithstanding that he did not hold an official position on the national council.

Although the national Social Credit Party was officially independent of the Alberta movement, in practice this simply was not so. After the national Party's creation in 1944, the Alberta Social Credit party organ, *Today and Tomorrow*,⁸⁴ became the movement's national paper. It changed its name to the *Canadian Social Crediter* and was designated the official organ for the Social Credit Association of Canada. Yet the *Canadian Social Crediter* maintained its headquarters in Edmonton⁸⁵ and continued to focus much of its attention on Social Credit affairs in Alberta.⁸⁶ Its editor, John Patrick Gillese, was part of the Alberta movement, and ultimately took his orders (and his separation slip) from Premier Manning. As will be seen, the *Canadian Social Crediter* became a main forum for the dissemination of anti-Semitic propaganda and was the first organ to be sanitized when Manning conducted his purge of the anti-Semites in 1947-48.

The Social Credit movement also had another party organ, *Vers Demain*. This fortnightly, French-language paper was the official organ of the Union des Electeurs, the Quebec provincial Social Credit organization. The editor of *Vers Demain* was Louis Even, head of the Union des Electeurs and member of the national council of the Social Credit Association of Canada.⁸⁷ Established in 1939, *Vers Demain* agreed to accept the policy laid down by the Social Credit Association of Canada⁸⁸ when the national organization

was created in 1944. As will be seen, however, the policy of *Vers Demain* changed dramatically during Manning's purge of the Douglasites.

Both the *Canadian Social Crediter* and *Vers Demain* regularly disseminated anti-Semitic propaganda. The *New Voice*, the monthly journal of the *Canadian Jewish Weekly*, described the *Canadian Social Crediter* as follows: "[n]ot a week goes by without an attack on the trade unions, organized farmers, the CIO [Congress of Industrial Organizations], the Jews, the United Nations, and the Soviet Union. Sometimes the attacks are dispersed in several articles, sometimes they are bundled up in one grotesque broadsheet." *Vers Demain* received even harsher criticism: "*Vers Demain* can only be described as a fascist sheet ... Aping Streicher's *Stürmer*, it publishes cartoons demeaning, caricaturing, and slandering the Jews ... To *Vers Demain* ... [t]he 'international Jew' is responsible for everything wrong; the UN is a fiendish Jewish plot; UNRRA was a vehicle for Jewish domination of Europe; and the impeccably conservative B'nai Brith becomes ... a diabolical international network of Jewish freemasons plotting to destroy the Roman Catholic [sic] Church, the sanctity of marriage, [and] the sacred right of private enterprise to exploitation and profit."⁸⁹ These criticisms were not exaggerated. Perhaps the most grievous action committed by *Vers Demain* was its publication of the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* in serial form from 1 January to 15 August 1946.⁹⁰

The fact that *Vers Demain* published the *Protocols* is significant and requires explanation. The *Protocols* were a spurious forgery, purporting to be a report of twenty-four (in some versions, twenty-seven) meetings held in Basle, Switzerland in 1897 by the First Zionist Congress under the presidency of Theodore Herzl, the "father of modern Zionism." The purpose of these meetings was supposedly to draft plans to subvert

Christianity and gain world control. The *Protocols* were published throughout Europe and North America at different times and under different titles. They were first published in Russia in 1905 under the title, *Secrets of the Wise Men of Zion* by Sergei Nilus, a tsarist civil servant.⁹¹ In 1920, the *Protocols* were translated into English and published by Eyre and Spottiswoode of London under the title, *The Jewish Peril*.⁹² They had also been translated into several European languages and become a staple of anti-Semitic propaganda. In the United States, Henry Ford's *Dearborn Independent* reprinted the *Protocols* and pointed to them as evidence of a Jewish conspiracy.⁹³

The spurious nature of the *Protocols* was first revealed in 1921 by *The Times* in London,⁹⁴ which demonstrated their obvious resemblance to a book published in Brussels in 1864 entitled, *Dialogue aux Enfers entre Machiavel et Montesquieu, ou la Politique de Machiavel au XIX Siècle, par un Contemporain*. Its author, a Parisian lawyer and publicist named Maurice Joly, had intended to satirize Napoleon III. Shortly after its publication, Joly was arrested by Napoleon's police and sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment.⁹⁵ Subsequent investigations revealed that the *Protocols* were a forgery prepared by the Russian Black Hundred, the secret police of Tsarist Russia under General Rachowsky, to support the Tsar's pogroms against Jews.⁹⁶ The Russian forgers had lifted no less than 1,040 lines directly from Joly's book.⁹⁷ In 1934 the Union of Jewish Communities in Switzerland sued the leaders of the Swiss National Socialist Party for publishing the *Protocols*. On 14 May 1935, a Swiss court determined at the famous "Berne trial" that the *Protocols* were a forgery, terming them "ridiculous nonsense."⁹⁸ However, in 1937 a Berne appeal court overturned the guilt of the accused on the grounds that "as the *Protocols* were not salacious, the law concerning indecent literature could not be applied

to them.”⁹⁹ Accordingly, the sentence was quashed. Notwithstanding its verdict, the appeal court maintained that the question of the authenticity or non-authenticity of the *Protocols* was entirely irrelevant to its decision,¹⁰⁰ and ruled that “this scurrilous work contains unheard-of and unjustified attacks against the Jews and must without reservation to be judged to be immoral literature.”¹⁰¹

Thus, when *Vers Demain* published the *Protocols*, this constituted a deliberate promotion of anti-Semitic propaganda. Yet the *Canadian Social Crediter* was only slightly less culpable - while it never reprinted the *Protocols* in full, it nonetheless published articles which quoted from them.¹⁰² Indeed, although *Vers Demain* had reprinted the *Protocols* in serial form, the total amount of anti-Semitic propaganda was much greater in the *Canadian Social Crediter*.¹⁰³ From the time of its inception as *Today and Tomorrow*, anti-Semitic propaganda in the *Canadian Social Crediter* increased in both degree and extent, with the greatest increase occurring between 1945 and 1947.¹⁰⁴ In contrast, after 1946 the amount of anti-Semitic propaganda in *Vers Demain* decreased.¹⁰⁵ Therefore, in relative terms, although *Vers Demain* was viewed by its critics as an anti-Semitic propaganda organ, the *Canadian Social Crediter* was the largest disseminator of anti-Semitic propaganda for the Social Credit movement. The *Canadian Social Crediter* also distinguished itself by establishing connections with British fascists, when in 1946 it opened an office in London, England with the Holborn Publishing and Distributing Company, the same publishers of Sir Oswald Mosley’s fascist propaganda.¹⁰⁶

Thus the Social Credit movement’s two party organs, the *Canadian Social Crediter* and *Vers Demain*, disseminated anti-Semitic propaganda, the nature and extent of which will be examined in the next chapter. Yet the party organs were not the only media through

which the Social Credit movement promoted anti-Semitic propaganda. The Alberta Social Credit Board, set up in 1937 ostensibly to help Aberhart implement Social Credit policies, became the propaganda arm of the Alberta Social Credit government whose sole purview was the stocking, advertising, and distribution of Social Credit literature.¹⁰⁷ However, the vast majority of this literature was blatantly anti-Semitic, and a substantive proportion of the literature did not even refer to Social Credit theories. Significantly, the Alberta Social Credit Board was part of the Alberta civil service, with its offices in the Alberta legislative buildings. Several Social Credit members served on the Board throughout its mandate, including L.D. Byrne as technical adviser to the Board,¹⁰⁸ A.J. Hooke,¹⁰⁹ Norman B. James,¹¹⁰ R.E. Ansley,¹¹¹ Floyd M. Baker,¹¹² William Tomin,¹¹³ and A.V. Bourcier.¹¹⁴

The Social Credit Board regularly advertised a large number of books and pamphlets in the *Canadian Social Crediter*.¹¹⁵ As Congress's Louis Rosenberg noted, much of this literature did not advocate Social Credit theories, but all included varying degrees of anti-Semitism.¹¹⁶ For example, the Social Credit Board advertised many of Douglas's books, including *The Brief for the Prosecution*, *Programme for the Third World War*, *The Land For the (Chosen) People Racket*, *Social Credit*, and *The Big Idea*. Given the nature of Douglas's treatises, the Social Credit Board was clearly advertising and distributing anti-Semitic literature.

The Social Credit Board also advertised for sale the writings of Nesta Webster,¹¹⁷ a notorious anti-Semite from England who wrote such books as *Secret Societies and Subversive Movements*, *The Surrender of an Empire*, *Socialist Network*, and *World Revolution*. After Louis Rosenberg had read Webster's works, he concluded that none of them had to do with Social Credit theories, but all focussed preponderantly on anti-Jewish

propaganda.¹¹⁸ Rosenberg was correct. *Secret Societies and Subversive Movements*¹¹⁹ purported to examine such “secret societies” as the Knights Templars, Freemasonry, German Templarism, French Illuminism, Jewish Cabalists, Bavarian Illuminati, Pan-Germanism, Communism, and what Webster described as “the real Jewish peril.”¹²⁰ According to Webster, these movements were all Jewish-controlled, which was proof of “the immense problem of the Jewish Power, perhaps the most important problem with which the modern world is confronted.” Nonetheless, she cautioned that “it is necessary to divest oneself of all prejudices and to enquire in a spirit of scientific detachment whether any definite proof exists that a concerted attempt is being made by Jewry to achieve world-domination and to obliterate the Christian faith.”¹²¹

The Surrender of an Empire also focussed its attack on Jews, describing how the British Empire had been undermined and dismembered since 1914. According to Louis Rosenberg, the purpose of this book was to argue that a secret group of international-Jewish-German-financial-capitalist-communist-revolutionary-political-Zionist plotters was the governing force behind the German imperialists before the First World War, the Bolsheviks, the Irish revolutionaries, the Indian nationalist Swaraj, the Egyptian Wafd, the Kuomintang in China, and the Zionists in Palestine.¹²² As Webster herself argued: “[f]or the purpose of weakening England, the German Nationalists pursued their usual policy of co-operation with the International Communists. This was carried out mainly through the Fraina-Ruthenberg group of American-Jewish Communists, who were in touch with Moscow on one hand and with the revolutionary elements in England and Ireland on the other.”¹²³

The Socialist Network,¹²⁴ according to its book jacket, was “a permanent work of reference for all who believe that the British Empire is worth saving from the destruction now so evidently planned by enemies - home and foreign - assisted by numberless well-meaning people ignorant of the way in which they are being used - through apparently humanitarian or harmless associations - in the steady weakening of this country’s powers of resistance.”¹²⁵ Rosenberg concluded that although Webster’s purported intention was to discuss the various communist, socialist, trade union, and peace organizations in the modern world, from the America Civil Liberties Union to the Nudity Movement,¹²⁶ she included as many Jewish names as possible in her denunciation of the destructive forces at work in the world.¹²⁷ There was also a twelve-page “Index of Persons” listing the names of all persons whom she believed formed part of the socialist network.¹²⁸

Lastly, in *World Revolution*, Webster attempted to explain the hidden force behind all the revolutions in the world, from the French Revolution of 1789 to the Russian Revolution of 1917, concluding, in Rosenberg’s words, that all were the result of a Jewish conspiracy to attack Christianity and the social and moral order.¹²⁹ For the most part, she blamed the “Jewish-controlled Illuminati” for the revolutions, and warned that this same conspiracy was now threatening British civilization. As an appendix, Webster included a large and complicated chart of all the world revolutions, showing the connections between the “open revolutionary forces” and the co-operating “hidden forces” of numerous secret societies.¹³⁰

In sum, the Alberta Social Credit Board disseminated a wide variety of anti-Semitic literature, including treatises by C.H. Douglas and Nesta Webster. This literature was available at the Board’s offices in the Alberta legislative buildings; it could be purchased

from the Board via the *Canadian Social Crediter*; and it was available at all Social Credit meetings. The Social Credit Board also published pamphlets by Social Credit members which included anti-Semitic references. For example, it published the pamphlet *Battle for Freedom*, reprinted from an address made by L.D. Byrne, technical advisor to the Social Credit Board. In his address, made before the Rocky Mountain House Board of Trade in 1943, Byrne alleged that there was an international financial conspiracy attempting to gain world control. As Louis Rosenberg noted, Byrne invoked several Jewish names “as well as some non-Jewish names which sounded Jewish” in order to lend credence to his argument that the international conspirators were of Jewish origin.¹³¹ Like many other Social Credit publications, *Battle for Freedom* was an official Alberta government publication published by the Alberta Social Credit Board at the legislative buildings in Edmonton and printed by the King’s Printer, the official printer of the Alberta government.¹³²

The Social Credit movement’s national organization, the Social Credit Association of Canada, also published pamphlets with anti-Semitic references. One example was *The Hand that Rocks the Cradle*, by Ernest G. Hansell, MP for Macleod. Hansell argued that “the hand that rocks the cradle rules the world” and that the hidden hand of finance ruled the world, powered by men like Baron Rothschild.¹³³ The Social Credit Association of Canada published a similar pamphlet by Solon Low, national leader of the Social Credit Party and MP for Lethbridge, entitled *Men or Money?* which also invoked the Rothschilds in its discussion of the “financial octopus that had its tentacles wound tightly around everything of any value in our country.”¹³⁴ This literature was also available through regular Social Credit channels. Thus, both the Alberta Social Credit Board and the Social

Credit Association of Canada were responsible for publishing and distributing anti-Semitic propaganda.

The Social Credit movement had another agency which advertised and distributed anti-Semitic propaganda on its behalf. In 1947, Roy Ashby, son of Patrick Ashby,¹³⁵ established the Basic Book Club, a mail-order business which was officially independent of the Social Credit movement. However, orders for the Basic Book Club initially went to the Social Credit Board¹³⁶ and the Club advertised regularly in the *Canadian Social Crediter*. According to Louis Rosenberg, the mandate of the Basic Book Club was ostensibly to spread a knowledge of Social Credit theory and principles and to distribute Social Credit literature; however, the Club rarely advertised books which dealt with the theory or practice of Social Credit, instead devoting itself to advertising anti-Semitic propaganda.¹³⁷ For example, the Basic Book Club offered for sale such anti-Semitic pamphlets and books as *Know Your Enemy: The "UNRRA" Infiltra(i)tors; An Editor on Trial, The 'Palestine' Plot, and Father of Lies*.

Know Your Enemy: The 'UNRRA' Infiltra(i)tors was published by Tidal Publications of Sydney, Australia, the official publishers of the Social Credit movement in that country, and was imported into Canada by the Basic Book Club. The author or compiler of this twenty-eight page pamphlet was not given, but it was known to be a reprint of a pamphlet first published in Scotland by W.L. Richardson of Aberfeldy. The pamphlet claimed to be an exposé of alleged Jewish and communist control of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), and was documented with quotations from various writers on the subject.¹³⁸

An Editor on Trial described the seditious libel case, “Rex vs Caunt” held in Liverpool, England in November 1947.¹³⁹ On 6 August 1947, James Caunt, editor of the *Morecambe and Heysham Visitor* in the County of Lancaster, had written an article condemning Zionist terrorism in Palestine, attacking British Jews for their “face-saving propaganda” about peace in Palestine, and declaring that Britain’s economic and political life was controlled by Jews. At one point Caunt declared: “[British Jews] should disgorge their ill-gotten wealth in trying to dissuade their brothers in the United States from pouring out dollars to facilitate the entrance into Palestine of European Jewish scum, a proportion of whom will swell the ranks of the terrorist organisation and thus carry on the murderous work which British Jewry professes to abhor.”¹⁴⁰ *An Editor on Trial* contained the reprint of Caunt’s article, a second article in which he defended his earlier statements, and the transcript of the trial in which he was acquitted of seditious libel. Suffice to say, the pamphlet had nothing to do with Social Credit theories.

The ‘Palestine’ Plot, a vicious attack on Jews and Zionism, was given the following description by the Basic Book Club: “[t]he ‘Palestine’ Plot ... throws a new light on the Palestine question. Are the Khazars in control of World Jewry through the Zionist Organization? This and many other questions will be answered when you read this book. It is documented.”¹⁴¹ The book was filled with excerpts like the following: “[y]e are of Your Father the Devil” said Jesus of Nazareth to ‘the Jews’ of his own time. They were city dwellers and money-lenders, then as now, and their slum-world was, then as now, built on false and anti-natural (ungodly) foundations. For thousands of years the Father of Lies has raised his children, ‘the Jews,’ on the inverted and Satanic principles of the Talmud.”¹⁴²

Father of Lies by Warren Weston was published in London by M.C.P. Publications (the initials which stood for the Militant Christian Patriots) which, according to Louis Rosenberg, was an organization composed of “bitter anti-Semitic and Fascistic propagandists.” According to the Basic Book Club, *Father of Lies* was “a treatise on Judaism, Occultism, Freemasonry, and the Old Testament, Illustrated and complete with a wallet of charts and symbolism.”¹⁴³ It dealt with such matters as “The Character of Magic,” “The Kabbalah, Key to Judaism,” “A Glance at Jewish Origin,” “Moses The Magican [sic],” “The Law of Judaism,” and “Freemasonry.” The book’s thesis was that a score of pagan and occult religions, Judaism included, were working towards “world theocracy.” Its preponderant focus, however, was on Judaism’s magical and occult characteristics, especially its perverse sexuality or “phallic cult.”¹⁴⁴ Louis Rosenberg noted that the book’s jacketcover and frontispiece had a picture of the “Father of Lies,” a snake whose skin was decorated by a series of Jewish symbols known as the Mogen David, together with a picture of the apple from the Tree of Knowledge.¹⁴⁵

In sum, the Basic Book Club advertised extremely anti-Semitic literature. It advertised these books in the *Canadian Social Crediter*, and orders were initially sent to the Alberta Social Credit Board at the legislative buildings in Edmonton.¹⁴⁶ Louis Rosenberg noted that most of the books advertised by the Basic Book Club were published in England and were imported by the Alberta Social Credit Party for distribution and sale in Canada.¹⁴⁷ Thus, although the Basic Book Club was officially independent of the Social Credit movement, its mailing address, advertising, and means of acquiring literature were directly connected to the Alberta Social Credit Party and government.

Nonetheless, the Basic Book Club differed from other agencies like the Alberta Social Credit Board because it was not tied officially to the Alberta Social Credit Party or government. Accordingly, this additional freedom allowed it to advertise more blatantly anti-Semitic literature. The most striking example is that unlike the Alberta Social Credit Board, the Basic Book Club engaged in the importation and sale of the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*.¹⁴⁸ Indeed, the Basic Book Club was the only propaganda agency affiliated with the Social Credit movement to advertise the *Protocols* for sale. Yet it is questionable whether the Club's activities were any worse than Social Credit's other propaganda agencies. As Louis Rosenberg noted, while neither the *Canadian Social Crediter* nor the Alberta Social Credit Board ever advertised the *Protocols* for sale, they nonetheless advertised and sold a considerable number of books and pamphlets which were blatantly anti-Semitic and which quoted extensively from the *Protocols*.¹⁴⁹

In sum, the Social Credit movement had an organizational apparatus which promoted anti-Semitic literature. Propaganda organs and agencies like the *Canadian Social Crediter*, *Vers Demain*, the Alberta Social Credit Board, the Social Credit Association of Canada, and the Basic Book Club all engaged in the dissemination of anti-Semitic propaganda. Yet they were not alone in their activities. As will be shown in the following chapters, leading Social Credit members also spouted anti-Semitic rhetoric. When Ernest Manning decided to purge the anti-Semitic Douglasites from the movement in 1947-48, he was attempting to end a long history of anti-Semitic propagandizing. Although some wings of the movement maintained their loyalty to Manning, others became splinter groups which engaged in more blatantly anti-Semitic polemics. It is important to examine the history of these splinter groups, since it was their activities before 1947 which

compelled Manning to undertake his purge. An examination of the development of the Union des Electeurs, the Union of Electors, and the Douglas Social Credit Council will show how loyal adherents to Social Credit's anti-Semitic philosophy were ultimately ejected from the movement.

When Manning conducted his purge of the anti-Semitic Douglasites in late 1947 and early 1948, three dissident groups challenged his authority as the "true" leader of the Social Credit movement in Canada. However, these groups did not materialize overnight; in fact, two of the three had existed long before Manning's purge and had operated within the mainstream movement for some time. The Union des Electeurs¹⁵⁰ was formed in Quebec in 1946 to act as a "political pressure-action group" committed to electing Social Credit members to power.¹⁵¹ It began as part of the mainstream Social Credit movement, acting as the grassroots organizational body for the Institut d'Action Politique, at that time the provincial Social Credit organization in Quebec. However, both the Union des Electeurs and Institut d'Action Politique were led by Louis Even, editor of *Vers Demain*, and soon the Union des Electeurs was accepted as *the* official Social Credit organization for Quebec.¹⁵² It will be remembered that *Vers Demain* had agreed to follow the policy set down by the Social Credit Association of Canada in 1944. However, Even did not agree with the tactics or policy of the national party organization. He believed party politics were corrupt and that the only way to ensure the government reflected the needs of the electorate was to abolish the party system and all political parties and replace them with a "union of electors." Within this union, elected members would be merely mouth-pieces of local unions of electors, reporting back to their electorate from time to time but making no decisions of their own. Party discipline and modern party politics would be abandoned.¹⁵³

While Even's ideas resonated with many Social Crediters, his non-democratic, authoritarian organizational methods, together with his anti-Semitic propaganda in *Vers Demain*, caused other Social Crediters to view him as an ambitious man who did not hesitate to use "communistic methods and morality and fascist propaganda."¹⁵⁴ The Social Credit Association of Canada did not approve of Even's actions and resented that he had sent several of his organizers into Ontario to establish an Ontario Union of Electors, notwithstanding the officially-sanctioned Ontario Social Credit League already existed. Yet Even's organizational efforts were relatively more effective than those of the Ontario Social Credit League, and in the 1948 Ontario provincial election, the Ontario Social Credit League fielded only three candidates compared to the Union of Electors' twelve.¹⁵⁵ During the New Brunswick provincial election in June 1948,¹⁵⁶ Even again sent in several of his organizers without the approval of the Social Credit Association of Canada. Yet in both the Ontario and New Brunswick provincial elections, the results were a fiasco.¹⁵⁷

Certain members of the Canadian Jewish Congress conjectured that if Even's Union of Electors had been successful in Ontario and New Brunswick, the Social Credit Association of Canada might have condoned his actions. However, Even's failure made his Social Credit critics that more determined to discipline him. It was then that Even's opponents accused the Union des Electeurs of being an anti-Semitic, authoritarian, "one-party idea" with Even as self-appointed leader. To lend credence to their charges, opponents pointed out that the Union des Electeurs had issued a statement regarding the selection of candidates in Quebec, declaring that all Quebec candidates had to be French-Canadian and Catholic, since Quebec was predominantly French-Canadian and Catholic. Even's

opponents used this statement to argue that the Union des Electeurs was religiously and racially chauvinist.¹⁵⁸

Accordingly, the national council of the Social Credit Association decided to rein in the Union des Electeurs. The national council ruled that delegates to the next national convention of the Social Credit Association of Canada had to be elected by their provincial Social Credit organization, which meant that members of the Union des Electeurs would have to elect Even to attend the Social Credit national convention. Although this was in keeping with Even's concept of a "union of electors," apparently he did not agree with this turn of events and subsequently resigned as the Quebec representative of the Social Credit Association of Canada.¹⁵⁹ Accordingly, when the Social Credit Association of Canada held its convention in November 1947, there were no representatives from the Union des Electeurs.¹⁶⁰ Shortly thereafter, J. Ernest Gregoire, who was sympathetic with Louis Even and the Union des Electeurs, also resigned as deputy national leader and vice-president of the national executive of the Social Credit Association of Canada.¹⁶¹ Yet R  al Caouette, the only Union des Electeurs member to be elected in the House of Commons, still sat in the Social Credit section.¹⁶² By the end of 1948, however, after Manning had completed his purge of the Douglasites, the Social Credit Association of Canada had completely disavowed the Union des Electeurs.¹⁶³

Thus, a split had been created within the national Social Credit movement, between the Union des Electeurs and the other organizations operating under the Social Credit Association of Canada. Present-day sensibilities may be quick to assume that the split was a result of cultural and linguistic differences. Yet for the most part this was not the case. Certainly, there had been friction between the Union des Electeurs and the rest of the

Social Credit movement on linguistic-cultural issues. For example, the Alberta Social Credit government submitted a brief to the Board of Governors of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) in October 1947 protesting against the setting up of a French-language broadcasting station in Edmonton, which perturbed the Quebec Social Credit wing.¹⁶⁴ That same month, the Union des Electeurs petitioned 30,000 signatures for a Union "demand" which asked for *inter alia*, "the rejection of all schemes of compulsory military service." This was not viewed kindly by English-Canadian Social Credit leaders.¹⁶⁵ Further, when J. Ernest Gregoire resigned as vice-president of the Social Credit Association of Canada in early 1948, he stated his resignation was on account of "the intransigence of the English speaking majority on the executive."¹⁶⁶ Nonetheless, it was the Union des Electeurs' undemocratic and authoritarian organizing techniques conducted without the approval of the Social Credit Association of Canada, combined with criticisms about the anti-Semitism of *Vers Demain*, which ultimately caused the split between the Quebec wing and the rest of the Social Credit movement. Indeed, an examination of contemporaneous events in Ontario between the Union of Electors and the Ontario Social Credit League, as well as subsequent events in Alberta, will show that the emerging split in the Social Credit movement transcended linguistic and cultural boundaries.

It will be remembered that the Ontario Social Credit League had been set up as the official Social Credit provincial organization for Ontario under the umbrella of the Social Credit Association of Canada. The Ontario League, headed by John J. Fitzgerald and William Ovens,¹⁶⁷ did not have its own publication but there was a section in the *Canadian Social Crediter* reserved for Ontario news. However, in late 1946 another League member, Ronald Gostick,¹⁶⁸ established his own Union of Electors in Ontario, in

emulation of Even's Union des Electeurs in Quebec. Gostick appointed himself president of the Union of Electors and founded the *Voice of the Electors*, which he designated the official organ of the new organization.

Thus, by early 1947 two Social Credit organizations in Ontario were co-existing uneasily. While the Ontario Social Credit League remained part of the official Social Credit movement, the Union of Electors believed greater success would come from following the example of Quebec and the Union des Electeurs. At a meeting in July 1947, an attempt was made to reconcile differences between the two Ontario groups. It was decided that they would operate separately but each would still work for the Social Credit cause. In addition, the *Voice of the Electors* would remain the official organ of the Union of Electors of Ontario, but would be sponsored by the Ontario Social Credit League.¹⁶⁹

This *modus vivendi* did not last long. At an emergency convention called by the Ontario Social Credit League in October 1947,¹⁷⁰ the activities of the Union of Electors were discussed. Three major grievances were waged against the Union of Electors: first, that the Union of Electors had been doing organizational work in Ontario without the sanction of the Ontario Social Credit League; second, that Louis Even, leader of the Union des Electeurs in Quebec, had been supplying the Union of Electors with organizers and field workers without having cleared the matter with the Ontario Social Credit League; and third, that Even had sent out a letter to *Vers Demain* readers urging them to reject the Ontario Social Credit League and support the Union of Electors.¹⁷¹ As a result of these activities, the Ontario Social Credit League viewed the actions of the Union of Electors and the Union des Electeurs to be an infringement of its provincial autonomy.¹⁷² John J. Fitzgerald, president of the Ontario Social Credit League, also described the clash between

himself and Ron Gostick, leader of the Union of Electors. During the summer of 1947, Gostick had agreed to a reconciliation and unity of purpose, but then refused to sign the document outlining the new requirements, and proceeded to organize the Union of Electors with even greater zeal.¹⁷³ Accordingly, a new constitution was adopted at the convention in which the Ontario Social Credit League, with the backing of the national executive of the Social Credit Association of Canada,¹⁷⁴ repudiated Ron Gostick and the Union of Electors.¹⁷⁵ The break between the Ontario Social Credit League and the Union of Electors was part of a wider split within the Social Credit movement which culminated in Manning's purge of the Douglasites. After the split between the Ontario Social Credit League and the Union of Electors, Gostick's group worked closely with Louis Even's Union des Electeurs in Quebec.

The third split occurred in Alberta with the creation of the Douglas Social Credit Council. Clearly, a split in Alberta Social Credit ranks was in the offing long before Manning decided to purge the movement of its anti-Semitic elements. Ever since the inception of the national Social Credit Party in 1944, there had been considerable friction between the Alberta Social Credit League, the official Social Credit provincial organization for Alberta, and the national party, operating under the Social Credit Association of Canada. Louis Rosenberg argued that there were several reasons for this friction. First, the Alberta Social Credit League, with Manning at its head, considered itself to be the real centre of Social Credit in Canada. This was understandable since the Alberta Social Credit League had existed long before the Social Credit Association of Canada; indeed, the latter owed its very existence to the successes of the Alberta Social Credit League. Moreover, the Alberta Social Credit League was head of the only Social

Credit government in Canada. Accordingly, the Alberta Social Credit League believed that the Social Credit Association of Canada and its national party members (that is, Social Credit MPs) should take their direction from Manning and the Alberta provincial organization. In contrast, national party members such as Solon Low believed that the Social Credit Association of Canada should take its orders directly from Douglas's Social Credit Secretariat in England.¹⁷⁶

The second cause for friction was that the Alberta Social Credit League believed it was the originator of Social Credit theory in Canada and saw the affiliation between the Social Credit Association of Canada and the Union of Electors in Ontario and the Union des Electeurs in Quebec as an attempt by "eastern Canada" to usurp control of the Social Credit movement. In addition, there were many members in the Alberta Social Credit League who, with their Protestant and English-Canadian background, were opposed to the Catholic and French-Canadian character of the Union des Electeurs. Often, English-speaking Social Credit members opposed the Union des Electeurs on the grounds that the Quebec wing was "typically" fascist and anti-Semitic, all the while ignoring the anti-Semitic propagandizing within their own English-speaking faction.¹⁷⁷

The third reason for the friction between the national Social Credit Party and the Alberta Social Credit League was that the more "moderate" elements, including Premier Manning, believed that anti-Semitic propaganda was neither advisable nor necessary.¹⁷⁸ It is debatable whether these moderate elements believed in the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* or the international financial Jewish conspiracy theory; what is clear is that they did not consider it politically expedient to advertise such theories. However, members of the national party, including MPs Norman Jaques,¹⁷⁹ John Blackmore,¹⁸⁰ Solon Low,¹⁸¹ and

Anthony Hlynka,¹⁸² were much less discrete in their condemnations of “international finance” and more vocal in their support of the “predictions” outlined in the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*.¹⁸³ A glance at these members’ views offers evidence why Premier Manning was compelled to repudiate anti-Semitism from the Social Credit movement.

Norman Jaques, MP for Wetaskiwin and long considered to be the most notorious anti-Semite in the Social Credit movement, used the pages of the *Canadian Social Crediter* and his parliamentary privilege in the House of Commons to vent his spleen about the international financial Jewish conspiracy. Jaques’s activities became even more suspicious in 1946 when he became involved with the Christian Nationalist Crusade, an American right-wing group led by Gerald L.K. Smith. Smith, the “dean of American anti-Semites,” had associations with Henry Ford and Huey Long, the “Kingfish” of Louisiana. For a time Jaques shared the same platform with Smith at meetings across the United States. In many ways, Jaques emulated the sentiments of many of Smith’s American right-wing contemporaries such as William Dudley Pelley, founder of the Silver Shirts, and Gerald B. Winrod, a leading figure of organized anti-Semitism in the United States.¹⁸⁴

John Blackmore, MP for Lethbridge, also promoted the view that Jews were connected to a world financial, and later, communist conspiracy. However, as a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, Blackmore denied that he was anti-Semitic and held up his denominational affiliation as proof of his pro-Jewish, pro-Zionist stance: “I am not anti-semitic, neither is any Social Crediter ... I and all Latter Day Saints believe that the Jews are to go back to Palestine - that is far from being anti-Jewish. Many passages in the Bible clearly promise that the Jews are to go back to Palestine, the

Promised Land; certainly I will not be entertaining any beliefs contrary to the Scriptures.”¹⁸⁵ It is of passing interest that Blackmore was excommunicated from the Mormon Church in December 1947 for advocating the doctrine of plural marriage.¹⁸⁶

Anthony Hlynka, MP for Vegreville, was a journalist and editor of a Ukrainian-language paper entitled, *Klych (The Call)*. Canadian Jewish Congress members had been observing Hlynka’s activities for some time and noted that he appealed to his Ukrainian voters through anti-Semitic propaganda, and that his paper was filled with traditional Ukrainian antipathies against Jews.¹⁸⁷

National leader Solon Low, MP for Peace River, expressed extremely anti-Semitic statements throughout his career, yet when Premier Manning conducted his purge of the anti-Semitic Douglasites in 1947-48, Low “toed the line” and followed Manning’s directive. Yet Low was closer in views to the dissident Douglasites than he was to Manning. In an interview conducted years later by the Dominion Network, Low continued to defend his view that there was a “close tie-up between international communism, international finance, and international political Zionism.” He added that he did not consider this to be anti-Semitic, since “international political Zionism was not a movement composed entirely of Jewish people. They had a policy just the same as international communism had a policy.” When asked point-blank if he was anti-Semitic, Low replied: “[n]ot at all. As a matter of fact, I personally have a tolerant mind and attitude toward all groups and races of people. I have no prejudice in my mind against any particular racial group.”¹⁸⁸ As the following chapters will show, if Low believed he was being honest in this interview, he was very adept at holding diametrically opposite views simultaneously.

Yet Low was not such an anomaly in the Social Credit movement. In the years before Manning's purge, all Social Credit politicians parroted the official Social Credit party line - that the Social Credit movement was not anti-Semitic. Meanwhile, key Social Credit members defended their views by arguing that it was not their fault that most, if not all, "international bankers" who were responsible for the financial conspiracy happened to be Jewish.¹⁸⁹ It was the expression of these kinds of views which compelled Premier Manning to purge the movement of its anti-Semitic components.

A further reason for the cleavage between the Manning "moderates" and the emerging splinter groups was disagreement over methods of political action. The Union des Electeurs, Union of Electors, and Douglas Social Credit Council, following the lead of C.H. Douglas, supported the idea of direct control of government representatives by the electorate. They were joined by the Alberta Social Credit Board, which also supported Douglas's idea of abolishing the secret ballot.¹⁹⁰ However, Manning's group opposed these methods of political action. Given its electoral success since 1935, the Social Credit government in Alberta was quite comfortable with the party system and did not support the idea of group government or a union of electors, nor the abolition of the secret ballot. This brought Manning into direct conflict with several key Social Credit members.

In sum, it was the simon-pure "Douglasites," with their advocacy of a union of electors, the abolition of the secret ballot, and a strong impetus for continued anti-Semitic attacks, which caused a break not only within the national Social Credit organization, but within the Alberta movement itself. When Manning decided to purge the Social Credit purists in late 1947, it was an action based on several motives: remove the anti-Semitic propaganda from the Social Credit movement; repudiate the Douglasites with their theories of union of

electors, open ballots, and emphasis on anti-Semitism; and finally, bring the national Social Credit Party into line. In achieving his objectives, Manning ended up repudiating members from both the Social Credit Association of Canada and the Alberta Social Credit movement.

When Manning undertook his purge in late 1947, he began with a housecleaning of the editorial board of the *Canadian Social Crediter*. The previous April, Manning had issued a statement repudiating anti-Semitism within the Alberta Social Credit Party. However, the *Canadian Social Crediter* had continued to publish anti-Semitic articles and advertise anti-Semitic literature. Accordingly, when the Alberta Social Credit League and the Social Credit Association of Canada held their respective conventions in November 1947, Manning ensured that a new editorial policy was passed for the *Canadian Social Crediter*. It was decided that the paper's editor, John Patrick Gillese, would be replaced by Gordon Taylor, MP for Drumheller.¹⁹¹ It was also agreed that all writings by C.H. Douglas, MP Norman Jaques, and any other writers advocating "anti-isms" would be barred from the party organ.¹⁹² Jaques's main forum for anti-Semitism was thereby cut off, and he was increasingly marginalized from the Social Credit movement until his death in January 1949.

Yet Jaques was never fully repudiated by his Social Credit colleagues. As Louis Rosenberg noted, Social Credit members had consistently claimed that their party was not anti-Semitic and that they were not responsible for Jaques's remarks; nonetheless, before Manning conducted his purge, Jaques had regularly received front-page billing in the *Canadian Social Crediter* for his attacks on international finance, Zionism, socialism, and terrorism. Indeed, the party organ had been second only to *Hansard* as a forum for

Jaques's anti-Semitic diatribes. Moreover, even after his banishment from the *Canadian Social Crediter*, the 1947-49 records of *Hansard* showed no repudiation of Jaques by leading Social Credit members such as Solon Low and John Blackmore.¹⁹³

The Alberta Social Credit Board was another casualty of Manning's purge. During the annual conventions of the Alberta Social Credit League and the Social Credit Association of Canada in November 1947, Manning decreed that the Alberta Social Credit Board would be abolished at the end of its fiscal year on 31 March 1948.¹⁹⁴ In February 1948 he announced that L.D. Byrne, technical adviser to the Board, had been fired.¹⁹⁵ However, Manning's attempt to stop the spread of anti-Semitic propaganda by abolishing the Social Credit Board was nullified, because immediately upon the Board's dissolution, the Alberta Social Credit League took over its duties, including the advertisement and distribution of the same anti-Semitic literature. Accordingly, after 31 March 1948, the *Canadian Social Crediter* continued to publish advertisements for anti-Semitic literature, but now through the offices of the Alberta Social Credit League.

Roy Ashby, director of the Basic Book Club, was also swept up in Manning's purge. Yet even after he seceded from Manning's movement, Ashby continued to operate the Basic Book Club, advertising and distributing an even greater number of anti-Semitic treatises, albeit no longer through the *Canadian Social Crediter*.¹⁹⁶ The Club continued advertising books and pamphlets by C.H. Douglas and Nesta Webster, but added other anti-Semitic treatises such as Gerald L.K. Smith's, *Is Communism Jewish?*, which argued that nearly all communist leaders in Russia and the United States were Jewish, and a pamphlet entitled, *Does it Fit the Facts?*, which was a reprint of correspondence between C.H. Douglas and a Reverend Salis Daiches discussing the authenticity of the *Protocols of*

the Learned Elders of Zion.¹⁹⁷ Moreover, Ashby's repudiation, like the abolition of the Social Credit Board, was undermined by the fact that the Alberta Social Credit League continued to advertise in the *Canadian Social Crediter* much the same anti-Semitic literature as the Basic Book Club had previously advertised. Thus, as Louis Rosenberg noted, in the wake of Manning's purge, the Alberta Social Credit League and the Basic Book Club operated in direct competition with each other for the sale of anti-Semitic literature.¹⁹⁸

While Manning was undertaking his purge, dissident Douglasites in Alberta were planning their own counterattack. After his "resignation" from the *Canadian Social Crediter*, John Patrick Gillese, who had been impressed with the Union des Electeurs as an electoral machine, decided to form his own union of electors. Called the Douglas Social Credit Council, its mandate was to copy of the organization of Even's Union des Electeurs.¹⁹⁹ On the executive of the Douglas Social Credit Council was A.V. Bourcier (former chairman of the Alberta Social Credit Board) as chairman; Gillese as vice-chairman; and Kenneth Burton as secretary-treasurer.²⁰⁰ Roy Ashby of the Basic Book Club joined Gillese²⁰¹ and the Club became the official distributing agency for the Douglas Social Credit Council.²⁰² Norman B. James, feature writer of "Main Street" in the *Canadian Social Crediter* and member of the Alberta Social Credit Board, quit writing for the party organ and also joined the Douglasite dissidents.²⁰³ Other Alberta Social Credit members who broke with Manning included MP Norman Jaques (whose writings had been banned from the *Canadian Social Crediter*), former minister of education R.E. Ansley, whom Manning had fired,²⁰⁴ and MP Patrick Ashby, a stolid defender of the Douglasite faith who refused to go along with Manning's "apostasy."²⁰⁵

The Douglas Social Credit Council quickly became the opposing organization to Manning's Alberta Social Credit League. It published two publications: a bulletin entitled *DSCC Information Service* and a journal called *The Social Credit Challenge*, headed by Gillese and Burton.²⁰⁶ These publications criticized the Manning regime for its recent actions, arguing that the premier had fallen prey to the machinations of the international financial conspirators. Shortly after the Douglasites broke from Manning's group, C.H. Douglas also openly criticized the Manning administration for its refusal to implement Social Credit policies and for its support of Zionism.²⁰⁷ In Quebec, the Union des Electeurs charged that the faction which had ousted Gillese and Burton from the *Canadian Social Crediter* was the same which had been won over to the cause of Zionism. *Vers Demain*, having broken away from the Social Credit Association of Canada by this time, postulated the theory of a "shadow government" which had taken over the Manning administration, with Jews and Freemasons at its head.²⁰⁸

In sum, once Manning had completed his purge, the Union des Electeurs, the Union of Electors, and the Douglas Social Credit Council acted as the opposing force to Manning's regime, each declaring that the premier had departed from the true Social Credit faith. These organizations shared three common characteristics which placed them in diametric opposition to the "Manningites:" their emphasis on non-party political action; their emphasis on simon-pure social credit monetary reform; and their unwillingness to discard anti-Semitic propaganda.²⁰⁹ These combined characteristics made their activities obnoxious enough to Manning and the mainstream Social Credit movement to cause a major party split. Ultimately, Manning and the moderate Social Crediters would prevail over the anti-Semitic, Douglasite purists.

This overview of the history of the Social Credit movement reveals several things about the role of anti-Semitism in Social Credit philosophy and party activities. Anti-Semitism formed an integral part of C.H. Douglas's economic and political theories. These theories were absorbed and perpetuated by the Alberta Social Credit movement, in part because of the contradictory statements of William Aberhart and the inaction of Ernest Manning, but mostly because both premiers allowed anti-Semitic propaganda to be advertised, distributed and sold as Social Credit literature. Anti-Semitic treatises by Douglas, Nesta Webster and lesser-known anti-Semites formed a central component of Social Credit propaganda, and were disseminated through the movement's party organs and government and party agencies. The extension of the Social Credit movement into other provinces and the federal field only encouraged further distribution of this propaganda. National Social Credit Party members like Solon Low, John Blackmore, and Norman Jaques became leading spokesmen for Social Credit's anti-Semitic theories. Louis Even, Ron Gostick, and Social Credit members from other provincial organizations also became leading proponents of anti-Semitism. As will be shown in later chapters, when Manning finally decided to end the legacy of anti-Semitic propagandizing in the Social Credit movement, it tore the movement apart. Anti-Semitism was too much a part of Social Credit philosophy for its removal to be conducted painlessly. A careful examination of the nature and extent of this anti-Semitic propaganda will show how deeply entrenched it was within the Social Credit movement.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

¹ In 1914, Canadian officials estimated that 925,000 Americans had moved, chiefly within the last sixteen years, across the border into Alberta and Saskatchewan. In 1922, twenty-two percent of the Alberta population was American-born. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), 53; Howard Palmer, "Ethnic Relations and the Paranoid Style: Nativism, Nationalism & Populism in Alberta, 1945-50," Canadian Ethnic Studies 23(3) (1991), 26. For a discussion of American immigration to the Canadian prairie provinces, see Karel Bicha, The American Farmer and the Canadian West, 1896-1914 (Lawrence, Kansas: Coronado Press, 1972); Harold Troper, Only Farmers Need Apply (Toronto: Griffin House, 1972).

² For a discussion of the various ethnic groups which immigrated to Alberta in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Gerald Friesen, The Canadian Prairies: A History (Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press, 1984); Howard and Tamara Palmer, eds., Peoples of Alberta: Portraits of Cultural Diversity (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1985). For a discussion of the experiences of pacifist sects in Alberta, see Howard Palmer, Patterns of Prejudice: A History of Nativism in Alberta (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982).

³ Ontario immigrants formed a large part of the prairie population in the late 19th century. Comprising part of that broader "expansionist" movement in which Ontario saw the Northwest Territories as its manifest destiny, Ontarian farmers came to the prairie provinces and quickly emerged as community boosters and political leaders. See Doug Owsram, Promise of Eden: The Canadian Expansionist Movement and the Idea of the West, 1856-1900 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980).

⁴ Several monographs have been written about Alberta's early history. See, for example, James G. MacGregor, A History of Alberta (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1981); Howard Palmer with Tamara Palmer, Alberta: A New History (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1990); and Anthony W. Rasporich, ed., Western Canada: Past and Present (Calgary: University of Calgary and McClelland and Stewart West, 1975).

⁵ For an excellent exposition of how Alberta's tradition of non-party protest caused the eventual collapse of the Liberal Party in the province, see L.G. Thomas, The Liberal Party in Alberta: A History of Politics in the Province of Alberta, 1905-1921 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1959).

⁶ The story of western Canadian opposition to the Canadian Pacific Railway and the creation of the wheat pool system is covered extensively in V.C. Fowke, The National Policy and the Wheat Economy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957). See also W.L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950); Robert Chodos, The CPR: A Century of Corporate Welfare (Toronto: James Lewis & Samuel, 1973); Howard Darling, The Politics of Freight Rates: The Railway Freight Rate Issue in Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982).

⁷ A good summary of Alberta's relationship to the federal government and specifically, the devolution of natural resources to the province in 1930 is seen in MacGregor, A History of Alberta; Palmer, Alberta: A New History.

⁸ The best study of the Progressives in Canada is still Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada.

⁹ The history of the United Farmers of Alberta is covered in Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada; C.B. Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962); David Laycock, Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies, 1910 to 1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990). For a study of the United Farmers of Alberta from a biographical perspective, see W.K. Rolph, Henry Wise Wood of Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1950).

¹⁰ In 1933 the minister of public works in the UFA government was involved in a divorce trial in which there was evidence of "wife-swapping." Shortly thereafter, Premier Brownlee was charged with having hired, seduced, and forcibly engaged in sexual relations a female government stenographer. Brownlee was convicted in 1934 and resigned as premier. Palmer, Alberta: A New History, 255-6.

¹¹ For a comparison between American and Canadian agrarian protest movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Palmer, "Ethnic Relations and the Paranoid Style," 7-31; Paul Sharp, The Agrarian Revolt in Western Canada: A Survey Showing American Parallels (New York: Octagon Books, 1971). For a review of the literature on American populism and its connections to the Social Credit

movement, see Janine Stingel, "In the Presence of Mine Enemies: Anti-Semitism in the Alberta Social Credit Party" (M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1993).

¹² For a discussion of the anti-Semitic basis within American and Canadian populist movements, see Seymour Martin Lipset, Agrarian Socialism: The Cooperative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Palmer, "Ethnic Relations and the Paranoid Style;" John Richards and Larry Pratt, Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979); Walter D. Young, Democracy and Discontent: Progressivism, Socialism and Social Credit in the Canadian West (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1969).

¹³ In the 1935 Alberta provincial election, the Social Credit Party won 54.25 percent of the popular vote; the Liberals 23.14 percent, the United Farmers of Alberta 11 percent, the Conservatives 6.41 percent, and other parties, including the Labour and Communist Parties, 5.2 percent. Alberta, A Report on Alberta Elections, 1905-1982 (Edmonton: Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1983), 13.

¹⁴ Several scholars have commented on the class composition of the Social Credit movement. W.E. Mann argues that rural and urban lower classes provided the bulk of Social Credit support; C.B. Macpherson emphasizes that the Social Credit movement was based on the support of a petite-bourgeoisie class; other scholars such as Edward Bell and Paul and Linda Grayson have shown that Social Credit support came from the lower-middle and working class elements. H.L. Malliah and Owen Anderson examine the class composition of Social Credit leadership and membership and also conclude that the party's leaders and adherents came from the middle and working classes, with the strongest representation being small businessmen, school teachers, and farmers. W.E. Mann, Sect, Cult, and Church in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1955); Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta; Edward Bell, "The Petite Bourgeoisie and Social Credit: A Reconsideration," Canadian Journal of Sociology 14(1) (Winter 1989), 45-65, and Social Classes and Social Credit in Alberta (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993); J. Paul Grayson and L.M. Grayson, "The Social Base of Interwar Political Unrest in Urban Alberta," Canadian Journal of Political Science 7(2) (June 1974), 289-313; H.L. Malliah, "A Socio-Historical Study of the Legislators of Alberta, 1905-1967" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Alberta, 1970); Owen Anderson, "The Alberta Social Credit Party: An Empirical Analysis of Membership, Characteristics, Participation and Opinion" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Alberta, 1972).

¹⁵ As David Elliott and Iris Miller note, "Aberhart did not deliver a single speech in the Legislature until 1939. As always, he feared open debate, and he depended on this [sic] radio broadcasts to communicate with the public." David R. Elliott and Iris Miller, Bible Bill: A Biography of William Aberhart (Edmonton: Reidmore Books, 1987), 282.

¹⁶ Under William Aberhart, the Alberta Social Credit government achieved many reforms, especially in the fields of education, health, and labour. Indeed, one historian has argued that it was Aberhart who began laying the foundation for a social welfare state in Alberta. Palmer, Alberta: A New History, 269. After Aberhart's death in 1943, his successor, Ernest Manning, governed conservatively while the province experienced an oil boom unsurpassed by any other province in Canada. Manning's intensive wooing of big business (much of it American) after the Leduc oil strike of 1947 helped launch Alberta into an era of prosperity which made it the envy of the other provinces. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of Alberta's oil and gas policies, see Richards and Pratt, Prairie Capitalism.

¹⁷ In the 1950s, Richard Hofstadter offered a revisionist interpretation of American populism which showed its "scalier side;" that is, populism's anti-Semitic, nativistic, and anti-democratic tendencies. In many ways, the Social Credit Party in Alberta was reminiscent of the American populist movement of the late nineteenth century and could trace the roots of its reforms to American populist reformers. For a discussion of the linkages between the Social Credit Party in Alberta and American populism, see Stingel, "Anti-Semitism in the Alberta Social Credit Party," 14-21. For an overview of American populist historiography, see Peter H. Argersinger, Populism and Politics: William Alfred Pepper and the People's Party (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1974), 58. For Hofstadter's revisionist interpretation of American populism, see his Age of Reform.

¹⁸ "Social Credit: An Explanation for New Readers," article appearing *mutatis mutandis* in the *Australian Social Crediter* and the *Social Crediter* (England) during 1946 (Liverpool: K.R.P. Publications, n.d.) (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ The Social Credit Secretariat and K.R.P. Publications were located at 7 Victoria Street, Liverpool, England. Congress members described K.R.P. Publications as a publishing house devoted to anti-Jewish and

fascist propaganda, which was responsible for much of the Social Credit material distributed in England and Canada. Memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 5 April 1948 (CJCNA, CD, Box 7, File 11P).

²¹ Ibid.

²² "Social Credit: An Explanation for New Readers."

²³ For an exposition of Douglas's economic views and the English origins of the Social Credit movement, see John L. Finlay, Social Credit: The English Origins (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1972); Bob Hesketh, "Major Douglas and Alberta Social Credit Ideology, 1932-1948" (Ph.D. thesis, University of Alberta, 1993).

²⁴ C.W. Peterson, "Social Credit: A Critical Analysis" (Calgary: C.W. Peterson, 1937) (PAM, JHSWC Collection, MG14, B44, Box 15, File 2).

²⁵ Keynes, cited in Michael B. Stein, The Dynamics of Right-Wing Protest: A Political Analysis of Social Credit in Quebec (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1973), 33; Keynes, cited in Richards and Pratt, Prairie Capitalism, 33.

²⁶ Douglas's A + B theorem has been studied and refuted by many scholars of Social Credit. However, it is useful to know the essence of Douglas's economic theories. C.B. Macpherson summarizes Douglas's theories as follows: "[t]he gist of the social credit theory was that modern technology had made possible an era of great plenty and leisure both of which could and should be distributed throughout the community as unearned income, and that this could be done by some comparatively simple monetary devices which would not interfere with the structure of ownership and private enterprise." Maurice Pinard adds that Douglas's doctrine "rested on a basic fallacy stemming from the ambiguous statement that total money incomes were not sufficient to buy all that was produced. This was stated in the well-known and simplistic 'A plus B theorem,' which can be briefly summarized: Since 'all payments made to individuals (wages, salaries, and dividends)' (A) and 'all payments made to other organizations (raw materials, bank charges, and other external costs)' (B) 'go into prices, the rate of flow of prices cannot be less than A plus B.' But 'the rate of flow of purchasing-power to individuals is represented by A' only, and obviously, 'A will not purchase A plus B.' Hence the necessity to create money to distribute as social credit dividends to consumers to cover B, or as subsidies to producers to permit them to fix prices at A." Macpherson, Democracy in Alberta, 94; Maurice Pinard, The Rise of a Third Party: A Study in Crisis Politics (Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1975), 10-11.

²⁷ Douglas advocated the idea of a "union of electors" in which electors would elect government representatives to carry out their wishes and not be bound by party discipline or other trappings of the party system. Douglas also advocated the abolition of the secret ballot, arguing that it led to electoral irresponsibility and was a "Jewish" technique first used by the murderers of Christ to ensure that the robber Barabbas was freed and that Christ was crucified. C.H. Douglas, The Realistic Position of the Church of England (Liverpool: K.R.P. Publications, 1948), 14; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 19 July 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

²⁸ *Financial Post*, 23 June 1962. David Elliott describes Douglas's paranoia in the following way: "Douglas was extremely anti-Judaic in the tradition of Houston Stewart Chamberlain. His conspiracy ideas became more pronouncedly paranoid as time progressed and there developed a great similarity between Douglas's and Hitler's analysis of economics and banking ... He further claimed that no politician could 'hope to attain office except by permission of Finance,' finance being a common epithet in anti-Semitic literature, referring to international Jewish bankers, whose power was more imagined than real." David R. Elliott, "Anti-Semitism and the Social Credit Movement: The Intellectual Roots of the Keegstra Affair," Canadian Ethnic Studies 17(1) (1985), 80.

²⁹ Peterson, "Social Credit: A Critical Analysis."

³⁰ Several of the following comments on Douglas's writings and other pieces of Social Credit literature are based on the reports of Louis Rosenberg of the Canadian Jewish Congress. Rosenberg reviewed and wrote extensive memoranda on nearly every piece of Social Credit literature which contained anti-Semitic references. His analysis of Social Credit propaganda was comprehensive and based on a full reading of the sources, and often he reprinted long passages or even entire pamphlets so that Congress's headquarters would be aware of Social Credit's propaganda. Naturally, Rosenberg's concern was on the anti-Semitic passages in the literature, but a comparison of his comments and quotations with original sources indicates that he was meticulous in source citation and contextualization.

³¹ C.H. Douglas, Social Credit (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1937); "Social Credit and Anti-Semitism," n.d., c. 1941 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

³² "Social Credit and Anti-Semitism;" memo, Rosenberg to Cohen et al., n.d., c. 1941 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

³³ Ibid. Specifically, Douglas stated: "the Jews are the protagonists of collectivism in all its forms, whether it is camouflaged under the name of Socialism, Fabianism, or 'big business,' and that the opponents of collectivism must look to the Jews for an answer to the indictment of the theory itself. It should in any case be emphasized that it is the Jews as a group, and not as individuals, who are on trial, and that the remedy, if one is required, is to break up the group activity." Douglas, Social Credit, 30.

³⁴ A detailed description of the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* is provided later in this chapter.

³⁵ Douglas, Social Credit, 146; "Social Credit and Anti-Semitism;" memo, Rosenberg to Cohen et al., n.d., c. 1941.

³⁶ Stated Douglas: "[m]oney is an abstraction. Money is a thing of no value whatever. Money is nothing but an accounting system. Money is nothing worthy of any attention at all, but we base the whole of our actions, the whole of our policy, on the pursuit of money; and the consequence, of course, is that we become the prey of mere abstractions like the necessity for providing employment." C.H. Douglas, The Policy of a Philosophy (London: K.R.P. Publications, c. 1937), 6.

³⁷ Ibid., 5-6; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 10 June 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

³⁸ C. H. Douglas, The Big Idea (London: K.R.P. Publications, c. 1942); memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 1 April 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

³⁹ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 1 April 1948.

⁴⁰ Ibid.; Douglas, The Big Idea, 6-7, 12, 14, 20, 42, 45, 48-50, 54, 63.

⁴¹ Douglas, The Big Idea, 49.

⁴² Ibid., 64; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 1 April 1948.

⁴³ C.H. Douglas, The Land for the (Chosen) People Racket (Liverpool: K.R.P. Publications, c. 1943); memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 28 May 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁴⁴ Louis Rosenberg made this remark about *The Land for the (Chosen) People Racket*: "it is curious to say the least to find the Social Credit Movement in Canada, importing, advertising and distributing a pamphlet published in England which does not deal with Social Credit in any of its general aspects, which has no immediate application to conditions in Canada and which deals with the proposal for land nationalization and nationalization of mineral rights in England, but which quotes from the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and drags anti-Semitic remarks into every chapter." Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 28 May 1947.

⁴⁵ Douglas, The Land for the (Chosen) People Racket, 38.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 7, 21-2; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 28 May 1947. See Chapter Two for a complete discussion of the various men and organizations to whom Douglas referred, and the way in which Social Credit party literature attempted to show how they were part of an "international, financial, Jewish conspiracy."

⁴⁷ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 28 May 1947; Douglas, The Land for the (Chosen) People Racket, 8-10.

⁴⁸ Douglas, The Land for the (Chosen) People Racket, 27-8.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 10; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 28 May 1947.

⁵⁰ Specifically, Douglas stated: "[i]f the Germans are to be credited with elementary intelligence, they must see that nothing could ensure the safety of the Jews so effectively in a European War as a ferocious display of anti-Semitism ... It immediately establishes the 'persecuted' as non-combatants; it provides a mass of 'refugees,' many of whom are perfect spies and propagandists, and it puts them in the well-known position of backing every horse in the race. I am completely agnostic as to the extent of genuine barbarity by Germans to Jews. Some of the atrocity stories, such as the use of Jewish babies as footballs, are merely idiotic. But even if I were convinced that it is considerable in extent, my comment would be that it is not a tithe of the suffering endured by the fighting troops, and is an example of using an army, not without loss, but with a minimum of loss, and the minimum of risk of final defeat. I am convinced that the Jewish High Command desires the ultimate victory of Germany, and will fight tooth-and-nail, *not to end the war*, but to see that Germany is not defeated in the peace." C.H. Douglas, Programme for the Third World War (Liverpool: K.R.P. Publications, c. 1943), 27-8; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 20 May 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² *The Brief for the Prosecution* was for the most part an amalgam of articles written by Douglas and published in the England *Social Crediter* between May and September 1944.

⁵³ C.H. Douglas, The Brief for the Prosecution (London: K.R.P. Publications, 1946), 158.

⁵⁴ Douglas, The Brief for the Prosecution, cited in "Social Credit: An Explanation for New Readers."

⁵⁵ Douglas, The Brief for the Prosecution, 8, 17, 20-1, 57, 62-3, 67 *passim*. For a complete discussion of the Social Credit Party's conspiracy theorizing on these organizations, see Chapter Two.

⁵⁶ Douglas also relied on the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* to "prove" his theory of an alien Jewish culture of conspiracy. *Ibid.*, 65, 81; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 12 December 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁵⁷ Douglas, The Realistic Position of the Church of England; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 19 July 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁵⁸ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 19 July 1948.

⁵⁹ Douglas, The Realistic Position of the Church of England, 8-11.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 19 July 1948.

⁶² Aberhart, cited in Elliott and Miller, Bible Bill, 252.

⁶³ On 15 August 1935, Aberhart stated: "[y]ou don't have to know all about Social Credit before you vote for it. You don't have to understand electricity to make use of it, for you know that experts have put the system in and all you have to do about Social Credit is to cast your ballot for it, and we'll get experts to put the system in." *Ibid.*, 201.

⁶⁴ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 6 February 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit; CJCNA, CA, Box 33, File 306).

⁶⁵ Palmer, Alberta: A New History, 269-70; *Time* (Canada), 8 March 1948; *Maclean's Magazine*, 15 October 1944.

⁶⁶ Howard Palmer has best summarized Aberhart's views toward Jews and Judaism: "Aberhart's beliefs about Jews were so ambivalent and complex that they are difficult to characterize; one might even argue that his attitudes were not simply ambivalent but were, on this question as in many other cases, simply a bundle of contradictions." Palmer, Patterns of Prejudice, 155.

⁶⁷ Elliott and Miller, Bible Bill, 301.

⁶⁸ Elliott, "Anti-Semitism and the Social Credit Movement," 83.

⁶⁹ Howard Palmer, "Politics, Religion and Anti-Semitism in Alberta, 1880-1950," chap. in Alan Davies, ed., Antisemitism in Canada: History and Interpretation (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1992), 175.

⁷⁰ "The Province of Alberta and The Social Credit Government: An Interview with Premier Aberhart," n.d. (PAM, JHSWC Collection, P4428, File 1).

⁷¹ *Ibid.* After Aberhart's interview, the journalist for the *Jewish Post* stated that "rumors of fascist and dictatorial tendencies as regards Mr. Aberhart can be discounted. At any rate I could not detect anything of this nature during his conversation with me, nor was this apparent in his greeting, address, at the Jewish Congress Conference held in Calgary last August [1939]."

⁷² Elliott, "Anti-Semitism and the Social Credit Movement," 83. Later chapters will show that the Albertan and western Canadian Jewish communities did not consider Aberhart a "friend," and that such an interpretation demands substantive revision.

⁷³ Aberhart, cited in *Ibid.*

⁷⁴ Elliott and Miller, Bible Bill, 117.

⁷⁵ Elliott, "Anti-Semitism and the Social Credit Movement," 82.

⁷⁶ Aberhart, cited in Laycock, Populism and Democratic Thought in the Canadian Prairies, 206.

⁷⁷ Elliott and Miller, Bible Bill, 301.

⁷⁸ This interpretation is in direct contrast with that which was commonly held after Aberhart's death. When Ernest Manning purged the anti-Semites from the Social Credit Party in 1947-48, it was popularly believed that the anti-Semites had come to the fore after Aberhart's death, and that the Party had not suffered from anti-Semitism while Aberhart had been in charge. This view was even reflected in the *Canadian Jewish Weekly's* monthly journal, *New Voice*, which stated in March 1947: "[t]he transition of Social Credit to a potential fascist centre became evident with the death of its Canadian founder, William Aberhart. Aberhart, a man of strong personality and confused ideals, had held the reactionary elements in check. Upon his death, however, they swiftly took over so that, by the time Social Credit became national in its pretensions, the membership found itself led and directed by the very persons and for the very purposes against which Social Credit was first founded." *New Voice*, March 1947.

⁷⁹ In 1929 Ernest Manning was Aberhart's first graduate at the Prophetic Bible Institute in Calgary, the seed from which the Social Credit Party grew. When Aberhart won the 1935 Alberta provincial election, he made

Manning provincial secretary. Shortly thereafter, Manning was appointed minister of Trades and Industry, the youngest cabinet minister in the British Commonwealth. *Maclean's Magazine*, 15 October 1944; *Saturday Night*, 28 February 1948.

⁸⁰ Social Credit MPs had been elected as early as 1935, organizing under the banner of the New Democracy Movement in 1939 and later the Democratic Monetary Reform Organization of Canada in 1941. But it was not until 1944 that the Social Credit group was formally organized into the national Social Credit Party. That year, John Blackmore, MP for Lethbridge and Social Credit house leader since 1935, was replaced by Solon Low as national party leader. For a discussion of the New Democracy Movement and the Democratic Monetary Reform Organization, see Alvin Finkel, *The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 65-6, 74-5.

⁸¹ Although the provincial organizations were now considered to be provincial branches of the national Social Credit Party, they in fact continued to work towards electing members to their respective legislative assemblies, as well as the House of Commons. The provincial organizations included the Social Credit Association of Canada in British Columbia, whose president was Major A.H. Jukes; the Alberta Social Credit League, whose provincial leader was Premier Manning and whose president was R.D. Jorgenson, MLA for Pembina; the Saskatchewan Social Credit League, whose president was Dr Joshua N. Haldeman (also chairman of the national council); the Manitoba Social Credit League, whose president was Emil Johnson; the Ontario Social Credit League, whose president was John J. Fitzgerald; and the Institut d'Action Politique, later superseded by the Union des Electeurs, both led by Louis Even. *Calgary Herald*, 24 January 1948; *Canadian Social Crediter*, 17 July 1947.

⁸² In 1947, the national executive was composed of Solon Low, as national leader and president; J. Ernest Gregoire as deputy national leader and vice-president; and Major A.H. Jukes, as second vice-president. *Canadian Social Crediter*, 17 July 1947.

⁸³ The national council was also known as the national board of management. *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ Shortly after its ascension to power in 1935, the Alberta Social Credit Party established a semi-official paper called *Today and Tomorrow*, which was owned and edited by Lucien Maynard (Social Credit MLA for Beaver River from 1935 to 1948, MLA for St Albert from 1948 to 1955, minister of municipal affairs from 1936 to 1943, and Attorney-General from 1943 to 1955). In June 1943, the Alberta Social Credit League took over *Today and Tomorrow*, and the paper became the official organ of the Alberta Social Credit Party, with its offices at party headquarters in Edmonton. At that time a new editor, Reverend F.W. Williams, was hired. Williams had been a missionary with the Christian Missionary Alliance in the 1920s and was ordained in 1928 after graduating from the Great West Bible Institute in Calgary. He retired from active ministry in 1932 due to ill health. *Today and Tomorrow*, 17 June 1943; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 5 February 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit; CJCNA, CA, Box 33, File 306).

⁸⁵ *New Voice*, March 1947. The offices for the *Canadian Social Crediter* were the same as those of the Alberta Social Credit League and its propaganda arm, the Alberta Social Credit Board - 9974 Jasper Avenue, Edmonton.

⁸⁶ *Today and Tomorrow*, 5 October 1944. At the same time as *Today and Tomorrow* became the movement's national paper, John Patrick Gillese replaced Reverend F.W. Williams as editor. Gillese held this position until he was fired during Manning's purge of the anti-Semitic Douglasites in late 1947.

⁸⁷ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 17 July 1947; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 4 August 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7).

⁸⁸ At the annual meeting of the national council of the Social Credit Association of Canada, held in Winnipeg from 18-20 October 1946, the policy of the two papers was carefully laid out. *Canadian Social Crediter*, 14 November 1946; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 16 December 1946 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁸⁹ *New Voice*, March 1947.

⁹⁰ In February 1947 *Vers Demain* defended its publication of the *Protocols* and offered evidence to prove their authenticity. *Vers Demain*, 1 janvier-15 avril; 15 mai; 15 juin-15 août 1946; 1 février 1947; memo, Kirshnblatt, 25 June 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 31); *People's Weekly*, 29 March 1947; "News Release From the Press Office of the Canadian Jewish Congress, United Jewish Relief Agencies of Canada," n.d. (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁹¹ *The Times* (London), *The Truth About 'The Protocols': A Literary Forgery* (London: Printing House Square, 1921); *Winnipeg Free Press*, 21 April 1934.

⁹² *Ibid.*; "Protocols Decision Washed Out," n.d. (PAM, JHSWC Collection, P4428, File 17). The *Protocols* were also published in the United States in 1920. See *The Protocols and World Revolution, Including a*

Translation and Analysis of the 'Protocols of the Meetings of the Zionist Men of Wisdom' (Boston: Small, Maynard, 1920).

⁹³ From 22 May to 2 October 1920, the *Dearborn Independent* published a series of articles which included extensive references to the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*. The articles were then published as a book entitled *The International Jew*, five hundred thousand copies of which were circulated in the United States. Eventually, the book was translated into sixteen languages. As Norman Cohn writes: "[a]ll in all *The International Jew* probably did more than any other work to make the *Protocols* world-famous." Norman Cohn, *Warrant For Genocide: The Myth of the Jewish World-Conspiracy and the Protocols of the Elders of Zion* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 158-62. It is interesting to note that Gerald L.K. Smith of the Christian Nationalist Crusade in California prepared and abridged the *Dearborn Independent* articles for publication as *The International Jew*. Henry Ford, *The International Jew* (n.p.: n.p., 1920); memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 5 February 1947; "Protocols Decision Washed Out."

⁹⁴ *The Times* (London), *The Truth About 'The Protocols'*; *Winnipeg Free Press*, 21 April 1934.

⁹⁵ *Winnipeg Free Press*, 21 April 1934.

⁹⁶ Sigmund Livingston, "Protocols of the Wise Men of Zion, a spurious and fraudulent document manufactured to deceive and to engender religious and racial hatred," n.d. (PAM, JHSWC Collection, P4428, File 17).

⁹⁷ *Manitoba Commonwealth*, 8 January 1947; *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, 6 December 1946; *Regina Leader-Post*, 3 January 1947.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*; Cohn, *Warrant For Genocide*, 230.

⁹⁹ Cohn, *Warrant For Genocide*, 230-1; "Protocols Decision Washed Out."

¹⁰⁰ "Protocols Decision Washed Out."

¹⁰¹ Cohn, *Warrant For Genocide*, 231.

¹⁰² In its 5 December 1946 issue, the *Canadian Social Crediter* published a reprint from the *Protocols*, and its issues of 9 May to 4 July 1946 published a series entitled, "Startling Facts of Recent History," which was a rehash of much of the material originally published in *The International Jew* by Henry Ford's *Dearborn Independent*. Yet the *Canadian Social Crediter* and *Vers Demain* were not the only mouthpieces to promote the spurious *Protocols*. As the following chapters will show, several Social Credit politicians quoted from or pointed to the *Protocols* in their attempts to prove the existence of an international, financial, Jewish conspiracy. As to the *Protocols*' authenticity, these Social Credit members argued that it was irrelevant whether the *Protocols* were authentic or forged, since their uncanny prediction of world events ultimately proved their veracity. Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 5 February 1947; *Canadian Social Crediter*, 9 May-4 July, 5 December 1946.

¹⁰³ David Kirshnblatt of the Canadian Jewish Congress noted in September 1947 that, "although *Vers Demain* reprinted serially the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, it has of late been less anti-semitic than [t]he *Canadian Social Crediter*. Whereas *Vers Demain* may appear for several issues without mentioning anything about Jews, [t]he [*Canadian*] *Social Crediter* is more consistent in this respect, issue after issue pouting about 'international finance' and whenever convenient, making use of very Jewish sounding names." David Kirshnblatt, "Report on Anti-Semitism," 15 September 1947 (CJCNA, CD, Box 7, File 11P; CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 1, File 3).

¹⁰⁴ Louis Rosenberg tracked the *Canadian Social Crediter* over a period of several years, collecting and analyzing its anti-Semitic articles. Letter, Rosenberg to Schaffer, 28 April 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit; CJCNA, CD, Box 7, File 11P).

¹⁰⁵ David Kirshnblatt noted that after the by-election of R  al Caouette, Union des Electeurs MP for Pontiac, Quebec in 1946, anti-Semitic references in *Vers Demain* decreased considerably. Yet Kirshnblatt remained convinced that Louis Even, editor of *Vers Demain* and leader of the Union des Electeurs, was a "confirmed anti-Semite." Memo, Kirshnblatt, 25 June 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 31).

¹⁰⁶ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 14 November 1946; *Manitoba Commonwealth*, 18 January 1947; *People's Weekly*, 4 January 1947; memo, n.d. (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7B); memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 16 December 1946 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁰⁷ The Social Credit Board was set up in 1937 in an attempt to quash an imminent party revolt between the earlier Douglasite purists and William Aberhart. In June 1937 Douglas sent two emissaries, G.F. Powell and L.D. Byrne to establish the Social Credit Board and to help Aberhart implement social credit theories. For a review of the literature concerning the Social Credit Board, see Stingel, "Anti-Semitism in the Alberta Social Credit Party," 92-7.

¹⁰⁸ In 1937, Leslie Denis Byrne was sent to Canada by C.H. Douglas to help Aberhart implement social credit principles. Byrne was made technical adviser to the Alberta Social Credit Board, which was initially set up to help implement social credit principles. When Manning decided to purge the Douglasites and abolish the Social Credit Board in 1948, he fired Byrne. Byrne then joined other dissident Douglasites to help create the Douglas Social Credit Council, which operated out of Edmonton.

¹⁰⁹ Alfred J. Hooke was Social Credit MLA for Red Deer from 1935 to 1940 and MLA for Rocky Mountain House from 1940 to 1971. Hooke was chairman of the Alberta Social Credit Board in 1942; provincial secretary from 1943 to 1948 and from 1955 to 1959; minister of economic affairs from 1945 to 1955; minister of public works from 1952 to 1955; minister of municipal affairs from 1955 to 1967; and minister of public welfare from 1967 to 1971. Although Hooke was part of the group of original Douglasites who had attempted a party revolt under Aberhart in 1937, when Manning did his purge of the Douglasites in 1947-48, Hooke was not among those who were repudiated. He wrote a book on his career in the Social Credit government entitled, 30 + 5: I Know, I was There (Edmonton: Institute of Applied Art, 1971).

¹¹⁰ Norman B. James was Social Credit MLA for Acadia from 1935 to 1940; one of five MLAs for Edmonton from 1940 to 1948; and secretary of the Alberta Social Credit Board from 1942 to 1946. James contributed weekly to the *Canadian Social Crediter* with the column, "Main Street" until Manning's purge of the Douglasites in December 1947. He also wrote his autobiography in 1947 entitled, The Autobiography of a Nobody (Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1947).

¹¹¹ Ronald Earl Ansley served as Social Credit MLA for Leduc from 1935 to 1952 and as an Independent Social Credit MLA from 1952 to 1963. Ansley was chairman of the Alberta Social Credit Board in 1943; and minister of education from 1944 until Manning's purge in 1948, when he was fired from the cabinet. Thereafter Ansley joined the dissident Douglas Social Credit Council and ran as an Independent Social Crediter.

¹¹² Floyd M. Baker was Social Credit MLA for Clover Bar from 1935 to 1967 and former editor of *Today and Tomorrow*. Baker also served as member of the Alberta Social Credit Board from 1942 to 1946.

¹¹³ William Tomyne was Social Credit MLA for Whitford from 1935 to 1940, MLA for Willingdon from 1940 to 1952, and MLA for Edmonton-Norwood from 1959 to 1971. Tomyne also served as member of the Alberta Social Credit Board from 1944 to 1946.

¹¹⁴ A.V. Bourcier was Social Credit MLA for Lac Ste Anne from 1930 to 1952 and chairman of the Alberta Social Credit Board from 1944 to 1946. Bourcier was one of the Douglasite dissidents who broke from Manning during the purge of 1947-48 and became chairman of the Douglas Social Credit Council.

¹¹⁵ The *Canadian Social Crediter* published a weekly advertisement on behalf of the Social Credit Board for numerous Social Credit and/or anti-Semitic books and pamphlets; readers were instructed to send their orders to the Social Credit Board at the Alberta legislative buildings.

¹¹⁶ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 31 March 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 1, File 7).

¹¹⁷ Louis Rosenberg described Nesta Webster as follows: "Nesta Webster has been for many years a notorious fascist and anti-Semitic writer, whose books and pamphlets form a major part of the stock in trade of subversive movements in the United States, and who was mentioned frequently in the American government's investigations and trials of persons suspected of subversive activities during the war." He later added that Webster's books "form a stock in trade of the American anti-Semites Gerald K. Smith, Pelley of the Silver Shirts, Father Coughlin and Norman Jaques." Memos, Rosenberg to Hayes, 20 May 1947, 1 April 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹¹⁸ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 31 March 1948.

¹¹⁹ According to Louis Rosenberg, the book jacket of *Secret Societies and Subversive Movements* carried the following blurb: "This book comes at a time when all must recognise that there are organised movements against Civilisation and Christianity of a most threatening character ... The book treats very fully of the [sic] disputed origins of Freemasonry ... also of the history of the Jewish Cabala and its influence on European Societies and Western Occult groups. The war on Christianity since its birth is described, and the Jewish world-problem is treated from a new angle commanding consideration." The Basic Book Club also advertised *Secret Societies and Subversive Movements* for sale, and used a similar blurb in its advertisement. Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 17 June 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7); Basic Books advertisement, 3 May 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹²⁰ Nesta H. Webster, Secret Societies and Subversive Movements, 5th ed. (London: Boswell Publishing, 1936), xiii; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 17 June 1947.

¹²¹ Webster, Secret Societies, 369.

¹²² Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 17 June 1947; Nesta H. Webster, The Surrender of an Empire (London: Boswell Printing & Publishing, 1931).

¹²³ Webster, The Surrender of an Empire, 137.

¹²⁴ *The Socialist Network* figured prominently in the propaganda distributed and offered for sale by both the Social Credit Board and the Alberta Social Credit League, although as Louis Rosenberg noted, "[t]here is not the slightest mention of monetary theories, Social Credit, or farmers' problems in the book and at first glance the book would appear most unsuitable for distribution by a Canadian political party which forms the government of a predominantly agricultural Canadian province." Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 25 June 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7).

¹²⁵ *The Socialist Network*, cited in *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ Webster discussed hundreds of organizations and movements in the United States, Great Britain, Sweden, France, Germany, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, Austria, and Russia which comprised the "socialist network." Nesta H. Webster, The Socialist Network (London: Boswell Printing & Publishing, 1926).

¹²⁷ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 25 June 1947.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*; Webster, The Socialist Network, 145-57.

¹²⁹ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 7 August 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹³⁰ Nesta H. Webster, World Revolution: The Plot Against Civilization (Boston: Small, Maynard, 1921).

¹³¹ *Today and Tomorrow*, 13 May 1943; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 27 June 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7).

¹³² It is interesting to note that the King's printer was Abe Shnitka, a Jew. The Canadian Jewish Congress was not pleased that a Jew was printing anti-Semitic pamphlets on behalf of the Alberta Social Credit government. As Louis Rosenberg explained: "Shnitka is a Jew, formerly a poor and struggling job printer of the city of Calgary, who was one of W[illiam] Aberhart's early disciples, and was rewarded by being appointed King's Printer. In spite of the rank anti-Semitism displayed by the Social Credit Party, Shnitka has no scruples about printing these anti-Semitic pamphlets and allowing his name to be used as alleged proof that the Social Credit Movement is not anti-Semitic, since the Social Credit Party has appointed a Jew as its King's Printer." Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 27 June 1947.

¹³³ Ernest G. Hansell, "The Hand that Rocks the Cradle." n.d. (PAM, JHSWC Collection, P5128, File 20.5).

¹³⁴ Solon E. Low, "Men or Money?" n.d. (PAM, JHSWC Collection, P5128, File 20.5).

¹³⁵ Patrick Ashby served as Social Credit MP for Edmonton East from 1945 to 1949. Ashby split from Manning during the purge of 1947-48 over Manning's refusal to adhere to pure Douglasite principles and his firing of R.E. Ansley and L.D. Byrne.

¹³⁶ It will be remembered that the Social Credit Board had its office in the legislative buildings in Edmonton and distributed its own anti-Semitic literature from that office.

¹³⁷ Memos, Rosenberg to Hayes, 10 June, 14 October 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit; CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 28).

¹³⁸ Louis Rosenberg gave this appraisal of *Know Your Enemy*: "[i]n actual fact, it consists of a series of extracts from an alleged memorandum written by an anonymous 'Former UNRRA Greece Mission Embassy-Passport Officer in 1946,' interlarded with quotations from anti-Semitic sheets published in Great Britain, and Canada, such as *Tidings* (Douglas Reed), *Housewives Voice*, and the annual report of the Alberta Social Credit Board." Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 15 July 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 7, File 83; CJCNA, DA2, Box 3, File 4).

¹³⁹ Basic Books advertisement, September 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit; CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 28); memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 14 October 1948; James Caunt, An Editor on Trial: Rex v. Caunt, Alleged Seditious Libel (Morecambe and Heysham, England: Morecambe Press, c. 1947).

¹⁴⁰ Caunt, An Editor on Trial, 3-4.

¹⁴¹ Basic Books advertisement, September 1948; memo Rosenberg to Hayes, 14 October 1948.

¹⁴² B. Jensen, The 'Palestine' Plot (Aberfeldy, Scotland: W.L. Richardson, 1948), 7.

¹⁴³ Basic Books advertisement, 30 July 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit); memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 7 August 1947.

¹⁴⁴ Warren Weston, Father of Lies (London: M.C.P. Publication, c. 1938), 12, 14, 143.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, frontispiece; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 29 October 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7).

¹⁴⁶ It is interesting to note the numerous changes in address which the Basic Book Club underwent from the time of its inception in 1947. Originally, all orders for the Basic Book Club were to be addressed to the

Alberta Social Credit Board in the legislative buildings in Edmonton. Subsequently, book orders for the Club were to be sent to the offices of the *Canadian Social Crediter*. But this was no less implicating, since the address of the *Canadian Social Crediter* was 9974 Jasper Avenue, Edmonton - the same address as the Social Credit Association of Canada and the Alberta Social Credit League. By late spring 1947 all orders were to be sent directly to Roy Ashby, director of the Basic Book Club, at a private post-office box in Edmonton. Thus, it appeared that the Social Credit movement was attempting to distance itself from the Basic Book Club. As Louis Rosenberg remarked, "while the Basic Book Club had been set up ostensibly to sell Social Credit literature, its real purpose was to sell literature which the Social Credit Party wanted distributed without having to accept responsibility for doing so." Memos, Rosenberg to Hayes, 7 August, 2 December 1947; Basic Books advertisement, 3 May 1947.

¹⁴⁷ As Rosenberg noted: "[i]t is interesting, to say the least, to find a Canadian political party which forms the government of a Canadian province importing directly or through its officials expensive anti-Semitic books for sale and distribution in Canada." Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 7 August 1947.

¹⁴⁸ It should be noted that the advertisement for the *Protocols* was a mail-order advertisement sent out by the Basic Book Club itself, and not an advertisement in the *Canadian Social Crediter*. In its advertisement, the Basic Book Club described the *Protocols* as follows: "The *Protocols*, claimed by the originators to be a forgery, is the best book on the policy of evil prevalent in the world today. Forgery means the act of fabricating an original document. No original document has been forthcoming to prove the fabrication of the *Protocols*." Basic Books advertisement, n.d., c. November 1947; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 2 December 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7A; CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit); memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 12 December 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁴⁹ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 20 May 1947.

¹⁵⁰ For a discussion of the Union des Electeurs and the Social Credit movement in Quebec, see Michael B. Stein, "Social Credit in the Province of Quebec: Summary and Developments," in Samuel D. Clark, J. Paul Grayson, and Linda M. Grayson, eds., *Prophecy and Protest: Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Canada* (Toronto: Gage Educational Publishing, 1975), 347-65; Stein, *The Dynamics of Right-Wing Protest*; Maurice Pinard, "One-Party Dominance and Third Parties," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science* 33(3) (August 1967), 358-73; Pinard, *The Rise of a Third Party*.

¹⁵¹ *Calgary Herald*, 24 January 1948.

¹⁵² *Canadian Social Crediter*, 20 February 1947; memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 3 November 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 31).

¹⁵³ In many ways, the idea of a "union of electors" was reminiscent of the idealistic attempts of the National Progressive Party of the 1920s, and specifically its Manitoba wing, to do away with the party system while still remaining within it. Like the Progressives, the Union des Electeurs and the Union of Electors believed in the theory of control by the electorate, in which party discipline was discarded and representatives were responsible solely to their constituents. For a discussion of the National Progressive Party, see Morton, *The Progressive Party in Canada*; Young, *Democracy and Discontent*.

¹⁵⁴ Letter, Kirshnblatt to Aronsfeld, 3 September 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 1, File 7); *Le Soleil*, 10 December 1948; *Montreal Herald*, 12 March, 10 December 1948; *Winnipeg Citizen*, 13 March 1948.

¹⁵⁵ Neither group fared well in the 1948 Ontario election. The Union of Electors polled approximately 9,000 votes while the Social Crediters polled approximately 1,000 votes out of a total of over 1.7 million votes. Ontario, *Electoral History of Ontario* (Toronto: Office of the Chief Election Officer, 1984), J9.

¹⁵⁶ Five Social Credit candidates ran in the 1948 New Brunswick election, three in the multi-member constituency of Madawaska, one in Restigouche, and one in the multi-member constituency of Victoria. Together, the Social Credit candidates polled just over 3,000 votes, out of a total of 540,500. Suffice to say, no Social Credit MLAs were elected. *Canadian Parliamentary Guide*, 1949 ed. (Toronto: Info Globe, 1949), 516-18.

¹⁵⁷ Letter, Kirshnblatt to Aronsfeld, 3 September 1948.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁰ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 4 December 1947.

¹⁶¹ Memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 19 February 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 31).

¹⁶² The fact that Caouette remained with the federal Social Crediters in the House of Commons raised suspicion among Congress leaders that the verbal split between the Union des Electeurs and the national Social Credit Association was merely a public relations scheme, intended to silence charges of

authoritarianism and anti-Semitism against the Union des Electeurs and by extension, the Social Credit Party. Letter, Kirshnblatt to Aronsfeld, 3 September 1948.

¹⁶³ Memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 19 February 1948; *Montreal Daily Star*, 9 December 1948.

¹⁶⁴ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 2 October 1947.

¹⁶⁵ *Calgary Herald*, 4 November 1947.

¹⁶⁶ *Western Producer*, 4 March 1948.

¹⁶⁷ Letter, Wax to Kirshnblatt, 11 June 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7D).

¹⁶⁸ Ronald Gostick was a former high school student of William Aberhart and son of Edith Gostick, former Social Credit MLA for Calgary (from 1935 to 1940) and later provincial librarian. Ron Gostick would eventually become one of Canada's most notorious anti-Semites, leader of the Canadian League of Rights and publisher of a libellous broadsheet called the *Canadian Intelligence Service*. For a discussion of Gostick's activities, see Stanley R. Barrett, *Is God a Racist? The Right Wing in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).

¹⁶⁹ Shortly after this meeting, the *Canadian Social Crediter* reported cheerfully that a mutually beneficial arrangement had been agreed upon: "[u]nder this new arrangement, everyone should be superbly happy. Those who favour the Social Credit party idea have open to them the Ontario Social Credit League. Those who believe in non-party action can support the Union of Electors, which seeks ... to restore, and maintain, power in the hands of the electors - power that will make elected representatives of the people hard-working and obedient servants of the people, rather than (as in Ottawa today) tools of a party machine which does not consult the people as to results they want." *Canadian Social Crediter*, 17 July 1947; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 4 August 1947.

¹⁷⁰ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 9, 16 October 1947.

¹⁷¹ The reverse was also true. When Even and his Union des Electeurs organizers canvassed in Quebec, they offered English-speaking Quebecers membership forms for the Union of Electors. Letter, Kirshnblatt to Wax, 4 June 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7D).

¹⁷² Ben Kayfetz of the Central Division of Congress attended the conference of the Ontario Social Credit League, which was held at the King Edward Hotel in Toronto on 1-2 October 1947. He attended the conference *in cognito*, and reported what he believed was a "faithful, if abbreviated, account of as much of the proceedings as I witnessed." Memo, Kayfetz to Kirshnblatt, 3 October 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7C).

¹⁷³ Letter, Wax to Kirshnblatt, 11 June 1948.

¹⁷⁴ It should be noted that it was the national leaders of the Social Credit Party who had called this emergency meeting. In attendance were Orvis Kennedy, acting national organizer of the Social Credit Association and chairman of the emergency meeting; J.N. Haldeman, chairman of the national Social Credit Association; R.D. Jorgenson, president of the Alberta Social Credit League; and Solon Low, president of the Social Credit Association of Canada and national leader of the Social Credit Party. Memo, Kayfetz to Kirshnblatt, 3 October 1947.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*; *Canadian Social Crediter*, 9 October 1947.

¹⁷⁶ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 16 December 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁹ Norman Jaques was Social Credit MP for Wetaskiwin from 1935 until his death in 1949.

¹⁸⁰ John Blackmore was Social Credit MP for Lethbridge from 1935 to 1958 and was the first house leader of the Social Credit group in parliament in 1935.

¹⁸¹ Solon Low was Social Credit MLA for Warner from 1935 to 1940, MLA for Vegreville from 1940 to 1944, and MLA for Warner from 1944 to 1945. He was provincial treasurer from February 1937 to June 1943, provincial treasurer and minister of education from June 1943 to September 1944, and minister without portfolio from September 1944 to May 1945. In 1944, Low was elected president and national leader of the Social Credit Association of Canada; he resigned as MLA for Warner in May 1945 and served as Social Credit MP for Peace River from 1945 to 1958.

¹⁸² Anthony Hlynka was Social Credit MP for Vegreville from 1940 to 1949.

¹⁸³ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 16 December 1947.

¹⁸⁴ For an excellent biographical exposition of William Dudley Pelley, Gerald B. Winrod, and Gerald L.K. Smith, see Leo P. Ribuffo, *The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Depression to the Cold War* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983).

¹⁸⁵ Blackmore, cited in Palmer, "Politics, Religion and Antisemitism in Alberta," 186.

¹⁸⁶ In his own defense, Blackmore stated: "I was charged with ... teaching and advocating the doctrine of plural marriage which is contrary to the present teaching of the church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. (Notice that I was not charged with advocating the practice of plural marriage; neither was I charged with practising plural marriage.) I deny the charge. I maintain that I have merely discussed and defended the doctrine of plural marriage as a biblical principle, not as a present-day practice." *Lethbridge Herald*, 27 December 1947; *Montreal Daily Star*, 29 December 1947; *Montreal Gazette*, 29 December 1947; *Montreal Standard*, 27 December 1947.

¹⁸⁷ Memo, Rosenberg to Fine et al., 17 August 1943 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit). For an excellent synthesis of how "old world antipathies" between Jews and Ukrainians were played out in the new world, see Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld, *Old Wounds: Jews, Ukrainians and the Hunt for Nazi War Criminals in Canada* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1989).

¹⁸⁸ Dominion Network, "Extract from Press Conference Interviewing Solon E. Low," 19 November 1951 (PAM, JHSWC Collection, MG6 B3).

¹⁸⁹ Howard Palmer has written that Solon Low "reasoned that he would be opposed to the world plotters no matter what their race or religion, but the majority of them just happened to be Jewish." Palmer, cited in Finkel, *The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta*, 104; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 5 February 1947.

¹⁹⁰ It will be remembered that Douglas had dismissed the secret ballot as a "Jewish technique" for electoral manipulation (see footnote 27). In its 1946 annual report, the Alberta Social Credit Board advocated the abolition of the secret ballot on the grounds that it was a threat to real democracy and bred electoral irresponsibility. For a further discussion of the Board's opposition to the secret ballot, see Chapter Five.

¹⁹¹ Even after Taylor's appointment to the editorship, issues of the *Canadian Social Crediter* continued to advertise anti-Semitic literature by the Alberta Social Credit Board. On 4 March 1948, Taylor ran a front-page notice denying that the Social Credit Association of Canada was anti-Semitic and outlined the *Canadian Social Crediter's* editorial policy against anti-Semitism. Yet the same issue published an advertisement for the Social Credit Board's anti-Semitic literature. *Canadian Social Crediter*, 18, 25 December 1947, 1, 8 January, 4 March 1948; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 12 January 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁹² *Edmonton Journal*, 15 December 1947.

¹⁹³ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 23 October 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7A); Bert Marcuse, "Is the Social Credit Movement Anti-Semitic?" n.d., c. 1949 (PAM, JHSWC Collection, P5128, file 20.5); Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, *Debates* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1947-49).

¹⁹⁴ World News Services, "Anti-Semites Curbed In Social Credit Appeal For Support of Electors," n.d., c. December 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁹⁵ Because Premier Manning had already decided to abolish the Social Credit Board in the autumn of 1947, Byrne's position as technical advisor to the Board had become obsolete. Before "retiring," Byrne was responsible for writing a final report on behalf of the Alberta Social Credit Board. In January 1948 he submitted his report which was more overtly anti-Semitic than the Board's 1946 annual report. When the provincial cabinet met to discuss the contents of the report, education minister R.E. Ansley supported Byrne. Manning responded by asking for the resignations of both Byrne and Ansley. See Chapter Six for further discussion of these events.

¹⁹⁶ Memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 16 December 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7B). After Manning's purge, the Basic Book Club became the distributing agency for the Douglas Social Credit Council, which was composed of dissident Alberta Social Credit members who had broken with Ernest Manning and Solon Low.

¹⁹⁷ Basic Books advertisement, 3 May 1948, June 1948; "Does it Fit the Facts?" n.d.; memos, Rosenberg to Hayes, 12 April, 10 June 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit); Gerald L.K. Smith, *Is Communism Jewish?* n.d. (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 7, File 83).

¹⁹⁸ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 31 March 1948.

¹⁹⁹ Letter, Kirshnblatt to Aronsfeld, 3 September 1948.

²⁰⁰ *Canadian Jewish Weekly*, 25 December 1947; letter, Wax to Kirshnblatt, 11 June 1948; *DSCC Information Service*, September 1948; memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 24 September 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 28). Kenneth Burton had formerly worked with Gillese as associate editor of the *Canadian Social Crediter*. When Gillese resigned (or actually, was forced to resign) from the paper, Burton also resigned and joined Gillese on the Douglas Social Credit Council.

²⁰¹ It is of passing interest that Roy Ashby was the son of MP Pat Ashby, and John Patrick Gillese was the son-in-law of Pat Ashby. Letter, Kirshnblatt to Sheinberg, 16 July 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 28).

²⁰² When Roy Ashby joined the Douglas Social Credit Council, he described it as a union of electors, stating that formation of the union was in line with the principles of Social Credit as expounded by the movement's founder, Major C.H. Douglas. According to Ashby, the proposed Alberta union of electors would endeavor to "make Members of Parliament and the Legislature our servants ... the same fight the French-language Union d'électeurs [sic] of Quebec is involved in." *Montreal Daily Star*, 11 December 1947; *Victoria Daily Times*, 11 December 1947.

²⁰³ The 4 December 1947 issue of the *Canadian Social Crediter* was the last one to publish Norman James's "Main Street." James did not resume his column and in March 1948 the *Canadian Social Crediter* reported that James had been ordered by his doctors "to refrain from attending further sessions of the Legislature." Notwithstanding James's departure, the *Canadian Social Crediter* continued advertising his book, *The Autobiography of a Nobody*. *Canadian Social Crediter*, 4 December 1947, 25 March 1948; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 15 January 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

²⁰⁴ It will be remembered that Ansley had supported Byrne's final report to the Social Credit Board in January 1948 which was blatantly anti-Semitic. This caused Manning to ask for both Ansley's and Byrne's resignations.

²⁰⁵ Patrick Ashby, father of Roy Ashby, was MP for Edmonton East. Ashby broke with Manning over the latter's refusal to implement Douglas's Social Credit policies and his firings of Ansley and Byrne. In his defence of the pure Social Credit principles as expounded by Douglas, Ashby declared: "Major Douglas is another Christ. He has the most remarkable brain we have known in 2,000 years. He is always right." *Time* (Canada), 8 March 1948; *Lethbridge Herald*, 23 February 1948.

²⁰⁶ Letter, Kirshnblatt to Frank, 15 July 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 28).

²⁰⁷ In a pamphlet written in 1948, C.H. Douglas stated: "To the extent that 'Social Credit has failed in Alberta,' i.e., has not been tried, the root cause has always been evident - a persistent determination not to recognise that when Mr. Aberhart won his first electoral victory, all he did was to recruit an army for A WAR. That war has not been fought; and Mr. Manning declares in the plainest terms that he will not lead that army into a fight. Perhaps reasonably, he prefers to ride at its head in ceremonial parades." C.H. Douglas, "Social Credit in Alberta," cited in *DSCC Information Service*, September 1948; memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 24 September 1948.

²⁰⁸ *Vers Demain*, 15 février 1948; memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 19 February 1948.

²⁰⁹ Memo, Kayfetz to Feinberg, 11 May 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7D).

CHAPTER TWO

AN ASSESSMENT OF SOCIAL CREDIT'S ANTI-SEMITIC PROPAGANDA

The issue of whether the Social Credit movement was anti-Semitic is problematic. The Social Credit Party did not meet one of the most important criterion for determining whether a political party is anti-Semitic: neither it nor the Alberta government adopted an anti-Semitic policy. Further, it is nearly impossible to show that anti-Semitism was fomented among Social Credit supporters. Indeed, in a province where Jews formed less than one-half of one percent of the total population, most Albertans had little contact with Jews, and thus had little opportunity to translate possible anti-Semitic prejudice into discrimination.¹ The purpose of this chapter is not to argue that the Social Credit movement created or fomented anti-Semitism among its followers, nor to suggest that it translated its anti-Semitic philosophy into official party policy. This chapter will argue, however, that because of the movement's continuous promotion of anti-Semitic propaganda, it must share responsibility for the general climate of anti-Semitism during World War Two, in which little refuge or security was offered to the Jews of Europe or Canada. By examining Social Credit's propaganda during and immediately following the Second World War, it will become clear how deeply entrenched was its theory of an international financial Jewish conspiracy. Indeed, anti-Semitic conspiracy theorizing was so pervasive that it impinged on a number of issues, events, persons, and organizations.

Social Credit's conspiratorial philosophy can be divided into several categories. As a whole, it relied on the theory that Jews were the governing force behind an international,

financial, socialist, communist, fascist, anti-Christian conspiracy. The conspiracy could take on any or all of these characteristics, but at its core was a negative Jewish identification. The first and central component of Social Credit's conspiracy theory was the concept of "international finance." From C.H. Douglas to Ernest Manning, the concept of an international financial conspiracy dominated Social Credit philosophy. According to Social Credit members and the party organs, international finance was comprised of a small group of men, mostly of Jewish origin, which operated behind the scenes to manipulate the world money system in order to establish a world slave state under its control. Social Credit propaganda blamed international finance for any adverse international event and often used the "international financier" as a bogeyman for the movement's economic, political, and social concerns.

The Social Credit party organ, *Today and Tomorrow*, later renamed the *Canadian Social Crediter*, was the largest forum for discussions on international finance. It published articles by leading Social Credit members as well as anonymous articles. Throughout the Second World War, the party organ consistently identified international finance as the largest threat facing the Western democracies. According to *Today and Tomorrow*, international finance was responsible for a variety of evils, including the world-wide Depression of the 1930s, the totalitarianism of Germany and Russia, the Second World War, and the increasing socialism permeating European and North American democracies.

In December 1944, for example, the *Canadian Social Crediter* discussed the nature of the international financial conspiracy and concluded that it was Jewish-controlled: "let us have a look at the names of the key personalities in the Great Conspiracy against

humanity, perpetrated through International Finance. Rothschild, Schiff, Warburg, Kahn, Cassel, Morgan, Goschen, Schuster, Samuels, Rathenau, Strakosch, Deutche, Ballin, Mendel, Sassoon, Niemeyer, Gugenheim, Baruch ... they are or were all either German or of German origin. They are almost exclusively Jews racially, with one or two exceptions.”² Significantly, the name “Rothschild” usually headed the list of conspirators in Social Credit propaganda. Over the years, the party organ and leading Social Credit members repeated the following statement, allegedly made by Meyer Amschel Rothschild in 1790: “[p]ermit me to issue and control the money of a nation and I care not who makes its laws.”³

John Patrick Gillese, editor of *Today and Tomorrow* and the *Canadian Social Crediter* from 1944 to 1947, used the party organ to make statements about international finance and specifically, the Rothschilds. More than once Gillese published a series of letters alleging to be correspondence dated 1863 between the Rothschild brothers in England and a banking house in the United States, Ikleheimer, Morton, and Vandergould.⁴ According to Gillese, the Rothschild brothers, then the “Money Kings of Great Britain,” had decided “to become more international and began conspiring with their allies in the United States” in order to achieve financial domination. Ikleheimer, Morton, and Vandergould encouraged the Rothschild brothers to quickly establish a national bank in the United States, as the profits of such an investment were very promising for such “moneyed interests” as themselves.⁵ As Louis Rosenberg of the Canadian Jewish Congress noted, Gillese’s intention in publishing these letters (which contained no evidence of authenticity) was to show that international finance, headed by Jews in Britain and the United States, was conspiring for world financial domination.⁶

Other Social Credit members also believed that the international financial conspiracy was headed by the Rothschilds. Major A.H. Jukes, president of the British Columbia Social Credit Association, wrote an article in the *Canadian Social Crediter* attributing to Benjamin Franklin the belief that the American Revolution was caused by the machinations of the Rothschilds in England. According to Jukes, Franklin knew that the Rothschilds resented the fact that the English colonies in America were issuing their own currency, which was why the Rothschilds introduced a bill in the English parliament “prohibiting any English colony from issuing its own money.” As Jukes explained, “[t]his deliberate act of the Rothchilds [sic] and their dupes brought on the war which separates the American colonies from England.” He added that the obscured origins of the American Revolution “is only one of the many accounts in history which have been distorted to cover up the underlying power of finance to shape and control the destinies of man.”⁷

Solon Low, Aberhart’s provincial treasurer and later leader of the national Social Credit Party, also invoked the quotation allegedly made by Rothschild in 1790: “[p]ermit me to issue and control the money of a nation, and I care not who makes its laws.” In a nation-wide radio address in September 1947, Low explained how “[Rothschild] and his henchmen set out to control the money of the globe. They succeeded even beyond their own fondest dreams. As a result, world or international finance has become a means of tyranny. Imperialism is its tool, the kind of imperialism which we now see emanating from Wall Street in New York City.”⁸

Lesser-known Social Credit members also invoked the Rothschild name. At a Social Credit meeting in Winnipeg in 1945, Charles Bailey, vice-president of the Manitoba

Social Credit League and Social Credit candidate for St Boniface, used the example of the Rothschilds and other prominent Jews in his description of the influence of international finance. In his introduction of Solon Low, the meeting's key-note speaker, Bailey stated: "[p]rivileged interests calculate again ever increasing power through money control. Consider these robber barons who control their respective governments, the Warburgs, Rothchilds [sic], Morgenthau, Schiffs, Sterns and here in Canada the Bronfmans. How can we enjoy freedom with such people in control of economic affairs?"⁹

The Social Credit party organ regularly published articles on international finance. Depending on the author, some articles referred explicitly to "Jewish" international finance while others only alluded to it. In one instance, the *Canadian Social Crediter* reprinted an article from the *Australian Social Crediter* which charged that international Jewry formed a secret world power based on financial control.¹⁰ It explained that there were four powers in the world: the "Big Three" (presumably, Britain, the United States, and Russia) and a fourth - the Jewish nation. According to this source, the Jewish nation "has a Government, which is largely secret, and [whose] policy ... [is] derived from the mystic philosophy of the Jews - the belief that they are the Chosen People ... since this Power has no country, and no army ... [i]ts most important weapon is Finance - money-power. Thus at the centre is Jewish State policy. Outside this ... is the organization of International Finance, which is predominantly, though not entirely, Jewish."¹¹

Social Credit propaganda about the international financial conspiracy also included an anti-Christian component. Reverend F.W. Williams, editor of *Today and Tomorrow* from 1943 to 1944, discussed how international finance was an affront to Christian ethics: "when we come to the Christian attitude to the usurious money system we find that Christ

condemned it outright ... The word for usurer in Hebrew, was the same as the word for viper, and the figure of speech is not too strong, for the taking of usury is a poisonous snake that kills. It is significant that International Finance has chosen the snake as its symbol.”¹²

John Patrick Gillese also criticized international finance for being anti-Christian. In a article discussing the history of finance, Gillese explained how usury was the sole purview of Jews: “[i]n common law the practice of taking increase was classed among the lowest crimes against public morals. So odious was it among Christians that the PRACTICE WAS CONFINED ALMOST WHOLLY TO THE JEWS, WHO DID NOT EXACT USURY OF THE JEWS, BUT OF CHRISTIANS.”¹³

In another instance, Premier Manning described the anti-Christian nature of international finance. In a Canada-wide radio broadcast in December 1943, Manning spoke on the “philosophy of life” embraced by international financiers, which was “if men must have life they shall have it less abundantly, and we shall do everything possible to make them as miserable as we can.” According to Manning, this philosophy was “the supreme blasphemy with which our present Social system is cursed,” and that an “organized sabotage ... [is] imposed upon the nations of the world by those who control and manipulate our financial system.” The “manipulators” were ostensibly part of an anti-Christian conspiracy: “what we are up against is a system which has been organized ... in methodical opposition to every fundamental principle of our Christian faith ... somewhere behind the scenes there is a deliberate conspiracy to prevent the principles of Christianity ... [from] being put into operation and made the basis of our social life ... we have to deal

not merely with an un-Christian system, but a positive anti-Christian conspiracy, seeking to destroy everything which can be identified with the true Christian way of life.”¹⁴

Significantly, Manning did not invoke the word “Jew” in his condemnation of international finance or the anti-Christian conspiracy. However, a few days later *Today and Tomorrow* published an article congratulating the premier on his “courageous broadcast.” According to *Today and Tomorrow*, the crux of Manning’s message was that “‘it is high time’ we brought Christianity into the arena of our national life” and that the issue was whether Christianity was to be the basis of civilization, or whether anti-Christian forces with their “materialistic concept of society” would take control. In other words, stated the party organ, the choice was between Christianity and the anti-Christ: “[t]he issue [sic] is identical with that which arose in Palestine nearly two thousand years ago to become the pre-eminent event in history ... just as the criminals, who remained in the background manipulating the popular clamour for Our Lord’s crucifixion, were forced to reveal themselves as the perpetrators of the crime, so the arch-enemies of Christianity today will be forced more and more into the open until they, too, stand revealed before the world.”¹⁵ Manning’s rhetoric was clearly less polemical than that of *Today and Tomorrow*. While he had refrained from stating that the anti-Christian conspiracy was Jewish-controlled, the party organ used his statements as a springboard for its own diatribe against Jews as Christ-killers. If Manning did not want such anti-Semitic rhetoric to be attached to his words, he certainly did not make this known to the editorship of *Today and Tomorrow*.

Thus, the international financial conspiracy, according to Social Credit propaganda, was both Jewish and anti-Christian. However, the international conspiracy was much

more: it had the power to manipulate world events and had been doing so for millennia, but especially since the beginning of the twentieth century. Indeed, Social Credit conspiracy theorizing focussed predominantly on recent world events. One of the most vocal critics of recent world events was MP Norman Jaques.

In one instance, Jaques argued that international financial conspirators were behind the rise of socialism and totalitarianism in Europe and had manipulated the Great Depression of the 1930s: “[s]ince [World War One] most of the European countries have been ‘socialized’ and the people collectivized into Masses, armed to the teeth, and all control centralized in ruthless dictators. This ‘New Order’ was lavishly subsidized by international finance ... Those countries remaining democratic became the victims of ... financial crises and depressions ... imposed by International Finance for the purpose of destroying people’s faith in democracy.”¹⁶ *Today and Tomorrow* shared Jaques’s views, stating that the economic and political ills of the interwar period were the consequence of the machinations of international finance: “[t]he last war was fought and won by the Allied powers, but the so-called peace which followed was won by International Finance - a gang of arch-criminals whose treachery, slimy intrigue, brutality and lust for power has all but reduced civilization to a shambles. No sooner had the last shot been fired in 1918 than these evil persons were scheming and plotting to further their fantastic goal of world tyranny.”¹⁷

Other Social Credit members theorized about the impact of international finance on recent world events. In 1943, L.D. Byrne, technical adviser to the Alberta Social Credit Board, addressed the Rocky Mountain House Board of Trade, where he explained that the “deplorable pre-war conditions” of the 1930s were the result of an international financial

conspiracy which was wreaking havoc in all democratic countries. Behind this conspiracy was the “Money system ... a highly centralized private monopoly concentrated in the hands of a small group of men who constitute a super-government that can over-ride all politically elected governments.”¹⁸ In Byrne’s view, the rise of Nazism in Germany and socialism in Russia and other European countries was proof of “a deliberate world plan to establish totalitarianism and the enslavement of the individual.” He added that the same international financiers responsible for implementing Nazism in Germany were linked to Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, both of whom were “of the same racial origin and philosophy” and whose “concept of society is essentially totalitarian and materialistic.” Although Byrne did not state that the international financiers were Jewish, he referred to “Schiff, Warburg, Kuhn, Loeb, Baruch, Schuster, Schroeder, Niemeyer, Siepmann, Rothschild, Mendelssohn, Mandel, Sassoon, Harriman, Goschen, Cassel, Melchior” and noted that “they are almost exclusively of Germanic origin.”¹⁹ On a separate occasion, Byrne described the international financiers as “[a] group of men, predominantly of the same racial origin, emanating from Germany and associated with the Rothschilds, [who] have gained fantastic power by acquiring control of the mechanisms of finance.”²⁰

The Social Credit party organ also blamed Jews for the rise of socialism in Europe. In 1944, the *Canadian Social Crediter* stated that Karl Marx and Frederick Engels were the forces behind the success of socialism and communism, and condemned the two men for their atheistic and anti-Christian bias: “[t]he ‘high priest’ of Socialism was Karl Marx. The ‘high priest’ of Communism was Frederick Engels. They were both German Jews ... Engels was a wealthy man, and Marx found plenty of financial aid to carry out his activities. They both attacked religion in general and Christianity in particular.”²¹ In

another piece, the party organ pointed to the racial origin of Lenin and Trotsky in order to explain the forces behind the spread of communism: “[b]oth Lenin and Trotsky were racially Jews, as were the overwhelming majority of the first Soviet hierarchy ... a disproportionate number of active Communist leaders are racially Jews, though most of them being atheists, are not Jews by religion ... Now we must wait for a time for the screams of ‘Jew-baiter!’ ‘Fascist’ ‘Hate-monger!’ - and so on - to die down. But in the interim, it is worth pondering whether all this can be coincidence.”²² In a third instance, the *Canadian Social Crediter* argued that it was Jews’ handiwork which had ensured the success of the Russian Revolution: “[t]he leading roles in the promotion of the Russian Revolution were played by Jacob Schiff, of Kuhn, Loeb and Co. who financed Trotsky’s journey to Russia ... and the German High Command, the German Imperial Bank and M. Warburg and Co. - who took Lenin from Switzerland through Germany ... And so the story goes on - International Finance, Communism and Socialism working hand-in-hand.”²³

Thus, according to Social Credit propaganda, the same forces of international finance which had enabled Nazism to come to Germany were also responsible for the rise of communism and socialism in Russia and Europe. At times, the men behind this conspiracy were identified - they were Jews, or more specifically, German Jews. In other cases, their identity was only alluded to. Premier Manning, who never explicitly stated the word “Jewish,” made other references to the international financial conspiracy. For example, when Manning won the 1944 Alberta provincial election,²⁴ he gave a radio address in which he stated: “[t]he task which you have entrusted to your Social Credit Government is nothing less than establishing ... a properly functioning democracy, in

which government in obedience to the will of the people will replace the growing threat of bureaucracy, and social justice will sweep away the evils of our present finance dominated economic system. Powerful forces consistently have barred the way to that goal - anti-democratic and anti-Christian forces that seek to establish a ruthless and pagan dictatorship over the lives of men.”²⁵ In Manning’s view, there was a war to be won against the international financial conspirators. He called the conspirators “anti-Christian” and “pagan,” but never “Jewish.” Consequently, the argument can be made that Manning did not believe that the international financial conspiracy was Jewish-controlled. However, it could also be argued that he simply chose to leave the dirtier rhetoric to less scrupulous Social Credit members. What is significant is that Manning’s rhetoric was consistent with that of other Social Credit members, which regularly labelled the international financial conspiracy in Jewish terms.

It was this kind of conspiracy theorizing which allowed the Social Credit movement to interpret recent events in anti-Semitic terms. Social Credit propaganda interpreted numerous events and organizations through a prism of anti-Semitism, but it took particular interest in banking and other related institutions, especially in Britain and North America. For example, the Bank of England was ostensibly a major player in the international financial conspiracy. In July 1943, *Today and Tomorrow* used the comments of E.T. Hargraves, a member of the Court of Directors of the Bank of England, to argue that the Bank was deeply involved in the international financial conspiracy. At the Bank’s semi-annual meeting in 1930, Hargraves stated that it and specifically its Governor and the Board of Directors, “held the hegemony so far as this country was concerned in finance [and] ... considering the way in which they were regarded in foreign countries, that

they also held the hegemony of the world.”²⁶ *Today and Tomorrow* used these remarks to argue that the Bank of England had been under the control of the Rothschilds and other conspirators since its inception: “[t]his private international money monopoly has wrought [sic] havoc on humanity for centuries. It has caused disintegration of nations, destroyed domestic prosperity and hindered international co-operation. ‘Give me control of a nation’s credit,’ said Meyer Amschiel Rothschild [sic] the founder of the present Banking System, ‘and I care not who make its laws.[.]’”²⁷

In a later piece, *Today and Tomorrow* made the Bank of England culpable for the Depression of the 1930s: “[t]here is no record in all history of such universal monetary chaos, stagnation of trade, unemployment and human suffering as under the regime of ... Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of England ... As a result of [his] policy two and a half million people committed suicide ... Hospitals were full of men and women suffering from illness and insanity brought on by the feverish fight for a living ... men and women were imprisoned, not because they were wicked but because they were poor.”²⁸

The implication was that the sadistic banking conspiracy, led by the Bank of England, had and would continue to wreak failure and destitution upon the victimized masses. Perhaps the party organ was saying more about the movement’s own perception of economic and political weakness than about the purported evils of the British banking system. It is conceivable that within such a context of perceived economic and political weakness, combined with great fear of economic privation, Social Credit propaganda would turn, perhaps inevitably, to scapegoatism. Certainly, millennia of historical prejudice gave a wide precedent for the connection of money evils with Jews.

The Social Credit party organ made other references to the Bank of England and its manipulation by the “notorious House of Rothschild.”²⁹ In an article published in January 1946, the *Canadian Social Crediter* discussed Lord Rothschild’s entry into the British Labour Party and his immediate appointment as party leader in the House of Lords.³⁰ It explained that these events “followed the nationalization of the Bank of England, the shameful deal negotiated by the Labor Government under which the future of Great Britain was pawned to the Wall Street moneylenders and the abject surrender of that country to International Finance under the Bretton Woods agreement.”³¹ In short, the paper took several complex events and conflated them into a conspiracy headed by the Rothschilds. This excerpt reveals the extent to which Social Credit propaganda was determined to connect Jews - the Rothschilds - with a financial conspiracy headed by the Bank of England and lending institutions in the United States. Yet it also reveals Social Credit’s anxieties about changing economic trends. For the *Canadian Social Crediter*, perhaps an international Jewish financial conspiracy theory would help explain why the United States had superseded the mother country as the financial centre of the world.

Thus, according to Social Credit “demonology,” the Bank of England was part of an international financial conspiracy which greatly undermined the mother country. But Britain was guilty on another count - for housing international financial conspirators in the London School of Economics (LSE). Social Credit propaganda stated that the LSE was “founded by Fabian Socialists ‘to train the bureaucracy of the future world Socialist State,’ and endowed, for that purpose, with a million sterling by the late Ernest Cassel - of the same Germanic racial origin as most other international financiers.”³² In other words, the LSE was the centre of training for socialistic international financiers. As MP Norman

Jaques stated: “the international financiers were (and still are) ably assisted by the ‘Alumnae’ of the London School of Economics (endowed for Socialists by international financiers) who formed the ‘brain trust’ of Socialist Governments of Great Britain.”³³

Social Credit propaganda pointed to several key figures who were supposedly part of the international conspiracy because of their connection with the LSE. For example, *Today and Tomorrow* named “Sir [William] Beveridge ... formerly head of the London School of Economics which was founded and endowed by Sir Ernest Cassel, international financier.”³⁴ The Social Credit Board similarly reported that “[t]he London School of Economics was founded and richly endowed by Sir Ernest Cassel, a great power in the financial world.”³⁵ Other figures associated with the LSE included Leonard Marsh, “entrusted with the adaption of the Beveridge Plan to Canada”³⁶ and Dr Cyril James, principal of McGill University, whom the “Federal Government [has] placed at the head of the Reconstruction Council.”³⁷ Social Credit propaganda also noted that the “‘experts’ at Bretton Woods [and] Dunbarton [sic] Oaks”³⁸ had been trained at the LSE. The fact that all these men had been trained at the LSE automatically implicated them in an international financial conspiracy. Consequently, the LSE was merely a front for plotting socialists and international financiers, most of whom were Jewish.

To summarize, Social Credit propaganda wove an intricate conspiracy in which many persons and institutions were implicated: Ernest Cassel was an international German Jewish banker who, along with the Rothschilds, controlled the Bank of England. Their purpose was two-fold: to train the staff for the future communist world, and to bring about a communist revolution. To this end, Cassel and other Jewish bankers financed the Russian Revolution and also founded and endowed the LSE. Any Jew who was a

graduate or member of the staff at the LSE was proof of the conspiracy. Non-Jewish graduates of the School such as McGill principal Cyril James, or Leonard Marsh and William Beveridge, simply pointed to the far-reaching nature of the conspiracy.³⁹

Social Credit conspiracy theorizing went beyond the Bank of England and the London School of Economics, however. Two Canadian institutions were also included - the Bank of Canada and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). With respect to the Bank of Canada, the Social Credit party organ focussed on the fact that one of its leading men, Louis Rasminsky, was a Jew. In the summer of 1943, *Saturday Night* magazine published an article on Rasminsky, who had recently been appointed executive assistant to the governors of the Bank of Canada and chief executive officer of the Foreign Exchange Control Board. It reported that Rasminsky was Montreal-born and was the grandson of a Jewish refugee from Poland.⁴⁰ In response to this article, *Today and Tomorrow* remarked: “who would not dare to suggest that Canada is not ‘a land of opportunity?’ And who would dispute that Louis Rasminsky - product of the London School of Economics (founded by Ernest Cassel ‘to train the socialist bureaucrats of the future’) and the League of Nations (incubator of World War II) - has all the qualifications of ‘controller’ in ‘the New Order’ for which we are being prepared? And how ‘British’ the whole thing sounds - or does it?”⁴¹ In a separate piece, *Today and Tomorrow* translated an excerpt from its French-language counterpart, *Vers Demain*, which stated: “[w]ho is the right-hand man of Graham Towers (Governor of the Bank of Canada) and the inspirer of Ottawa financial policy? Louis Rasminsky, grandson of a Jewish refugee, and trained at the London School of Economics.” *Today and Tomorrow* added that the LSE “was the school that Sir

Ernest Cassell [sic] endowed with £1,000,000, for the express purpose of propagating socialistic theory.”⁴²

In addition to the Bank of Canada, Social Credit propaganda also attacked the CBC for its “socialist” aims and its alleged attempts to build a totalitarian state within Canada. In early 1945, for example, Social Credit national leader Solon Low declared that the CBC was part of the “force of ‘power maniacs’” which was “at work to take away the freedom of men.” He also criticized the federal government for its lax handling of the CBC: “I would never had [sic] believed that the Canadian government would have allowed the CBC to become so completely dominated by those advocating a doctrine of the supreme state.”⁴³ In another instance, MP Norman Jaques attacked the CBC for allowing “a Communist social control of radio in this country.” He noted that Raymond Arthur Davies, CBC’s Russian correspondent, was prominent in communist activities in Canada and was a “popular leader of the Young Communist League.”⁴⁴

Thus, according to Social Credit propaganda, the international financial communist conspiracy, often Jewish-controlled, included institutions both at home and abroad. Other organizations, such as the United States Federal Reserve Board,⁴⁵ also came under attack for their connections with international finance. Party propaganda declared that the American Federal Reserve Board was a totalitarian, international financial institution controlled by German Jews. The party organ pointed to the Warburgs, a German Jewish family whose members were eminent in banking, philanthropy, and scholarship in Europe and America, as proof that the Federal Reserve Board was controlled by an international financial Jewish conspiracy. Specifically, the party organ indicted Paul Warburg, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board; his brother Max; and Paul’s son James as the

ringleaders of the conspiracy.⁴⁶ In April 1944, *Today and Tomorrow* stated: “[s]ome idea of the extent to which this international money power had its tentacles spread ... is indicated by the fact that during the last war Max Warburg, head of the powerful German banking house of Warburg and Co., was the trusted financial adviser of the German Emperor, while his brother, Paul Warburg, Director of the even more powerful banking house of Kuhn, Loeb and Co. and founder of the U.S. Federal Reserve System was playing a similar role to President Wilson.”⁴⁷ The implication was that Paul Warburg was working toward the same aims in the United States as his brother Max in Germany - both were international financiers bent on world control.

MP Norman Jaques made similar comments about Max and Paul Warburg: “Paul Warburg (of Hamburg, Germany), was naturalized and appointed head of the federal reserve board in 1914, while his brother Max and his firm in Germany, of which Paul had been a director before coming to the States, financed the espionage and sabotage against the allies ... While Paul controlled the federal reserve board of the U.S.A., brother Max was financial adviser to the Kaiser.”⁴⁸ In a separate article, Jaques condemned “the Warburgs and other international financiers of the same Germanic racial origin” for their creation and manipulation of the Federal Reserve Board. Jaques recalled that in May 1920 the Federal Reserve Board had “ordered the commercial banks of the U.S.A. to call loans, to restrict the making of new loans, to deflate the volume of money in circulation in every way possible ... The effects were disastrous to producers ... Prices of farm produce were slashed and farmers ruined. From that disaster, deliberately engineered by international financiers, agriculture never recovered until the present world war ended the policy of deflation (for the time being).”⁴⁹ In short, Jaques argued that international

financiers, most of whom were Jewish, operated behind the Federal Reserve Board and had organized the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Social Credit propaganda also used the statements of American Congressman Louis T. McFadden,⁵⁰ then chairman of the House of Representatives Banking and Currency Committee and former president of the Pennsylvania Bankers' Association, to corroborate claims about the influence of the Warburgs and Kuhn, Loeb & Company on the American federal banking system. For example, in January 1944, *Today and Tomorrow* quoted from McFadden's 1931 speech in Congress: "[t]he German International Bankers, Warburg Kuhn, & Co. ... have been engaged in bleeding this country white for the benefit of Germany and themselves ... Paul M. Warburg [is] the man who engineered the great depression, the man who is the chief beneficiary of the losses sustained by the farmers and the wage earners of this country, the man who has stuffed this country full of worthless German acceptances."⁵¹ Regarding the Federal Reserve Bank, McFadden described it as "one of the most corrupt institutions the world has ever known ... This evil institution has impoverished and ruined the people of the United States; has bankrupted itself; and has practically bankrupted our Government."⁵² *Today and Tomorrow* declared McFadden's statements to be "an important Banker's statement; the words of a man of integrity and courage!"⁵³ The party organ added that the Warburgs were "ruthless ... international bankers."⁵⁴

In a later piece, the *Canadian Social Crediter* described the Warburg's firm, Kuhn, Loeb & Company, as "the headquarters of international finance" whose former head, the late Jacob Schiff, was ostensibly one of the first persons to congratulate Kerensky on the success of the Russian Revolution.⁵⁵ In another instance, the party organ described Jacob

Schiff and Paul Warburg as “immigrant[s] from the homeland of Prussionism [sic], Nazism, Socialism, Communism and other evil doctrines [who] succeeded in establishing the Headquarters of International Finance in [the United States].”⁵⁶

Norman Jaques also criticized the Federal Reserve Board for its anti-British, pro-German leanings. He used the statements of Ludwell Denny, author of *America Conquers Britain*,⁵⁷ to show that the Federal Reserve Board was an anti-British institution which manipulated the Great Depression at the expense of British workers in America: “[a]ll nations must tremble before our federal reserve board. High money rates imposed by it in 1929 brought suffering to millions of foreign workers. That blow hit Britain hardest of all.”⁵⁸ In the same piece, Jaques used Congressman McFadden’s 1931 speech to prove the connection between the Federal Reserve Board and German-Russian international control: “[t]hrough the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve banks over \$30,000,000,000 over and above the German bonds that have been sold here have been pumped into Germany ... The Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Banks have pumped so many million dollars into Germany that they dare not name the total. Do you know that Germany has been lending out money to Soviet Russia ... from the Federal Reserve Board banks? ... Do you know that Germany and Soviet Russia are one in military and industrial matters?”⁵⁹

In sum, Social Credit propaganda considered the Federal Reserve Board to be a scheme for totalitarianism, puppeteered by Kuhn Loeb & Company, the Warburgs, and other German Jews. This group of international German-Jewish financiers, which commiserated with and assisted communist Russia, was the real “invisible government” that the American Congress and the Canadian Parliament were afraid to fight.⁶⁰

Related to its suspicions about the Federal Reserve Board, Social Credit propaganda used the American-based Union Now Movement as evidence of the attempts by international finance to impose a “new world order.” The Union Now Movement, led by Clarence Streit, was formed in the United States in the early 1930s, largely in response to the autocratic ambitions of Hitler and Mussolini. Union Now advocated a union of the western democracies in which a central world government would preside over a union citizenship, union defence force, union customs-free economy, union money, and a union postal and communications system.⁶¹ Simply put, the idea of “Union Now” was an attempt to create a “democracy composed of democracies” in which all participating countries would share in the responsibilities of maintaining an equitable and peaceful world order - economically, socially, politically, and militarily. The Social Credit movement was adamantly opposed to the Union Now Movement, mostly because it proposed an international order in which nations would be required to share government power for a greater purpose. In Social Credit thinking, this smacked of surrendering complete national sovereignty to a totalitarian international power; consequently, Social Credit’s denunciation of the Union Now Movement fitted neatly with its paradigm of an international conspiracy to achieve world control.

Often, Social Credit propaganda linked the aims of the Union Now Movement with the Federal Reserve Board. *Today and Tomorrow* used James Warburg, son of Paul Warburg, as proof of the forces operating behind both the Federal Reserve Board and the Union Now Movement. James Warburg had written a book entitled, *Peace in Our Time?*, which offered proposals for world peace similar to those in Clarence Streit’s book, *Union Now*. *Peace in Our Time?* advocated a “union of peoples” which would work toward

world-wide disarmament and world free trade in order to ensure peace in the postwar period.⁶² *Today and Tomorrow* described both books as “scheme[s] for the World Slave State,” adding that Clarence Streit and the Union Now Movement were under the control of Paul Warburg and Kuhn, Loeb, and Company, which also controlled the *New York Times*.⁶³ In a separate piece, *Today and Tomorrow* asked: “[i]s it just a curious coincidence ... that these same bankers Warburg, Kuhn, Loeb & Co. - whom we know financed Von Papen, Germany’s No. 1 Saboteur, and also Hitler’s rise to power - should be sponsoring World Federal Union? ... Under a cloak of international brotherhood this book [*Peace in Our Time?*], and ‘Union Now’ are calling on all nations to relinquish their democratic rights, to surrender their sovereignty!”⁶⁴

Premier Manning also connected the Federal Reserve Board with the “totalitarian schemes” proposed by the Union Now Movement. In his discussion of *Peace in Our Time?*, Manning described James Warburg as “the son of the founder of the American Federal Reserve Banking System [Paul Warburg] and ... closely associated with the same group of International financiers. There can be no doubt about the source from which these schemes originated.”⁶⁵

Thus, according to party propaganda the Union Now Movement, as part of the international financial conspiracy, was attempting to gain world control by advocating a federal union of democracies under a central authority. As *Today and Tomorrow* stated: “[t]his ‘authority’ would have control over finance, international trade, citizenship rights and the armed forces of all nations. That was the International Money Power’s blueprint for world dictatorship. Control of finance would give them control over every aspect of

the economic life of the peoples in the 'union.' Control of citizenship rights and the armed forces would ensure that they could enforce their dictates."⁶⁶

Norman Jaques similarly declared that Union Now had one diabolical purpose, to place international finance in a position of world control: "'Union Now' is pledged to destroy the sovereignty of the crown, and with it, the sovereignty of Canada and of the Empire, also that of the U.S.A., and to set up in their place the gold standard - the sovereignty of international finance."⁶⁷ He added that Union Now and any other scheme for disarmament or international government were the plots of "financial racketeers" who "hope to succeed when Nazi gangsters fail in making themselves dictators of the world."⁶⁸

Jaques also argued that the international financiers behind the Union Now Movement were predominantly Jewish. On one occasion, he stated obliquely that "'Union Now' originally was sponsored by international financiers - neither Christian nor British - whose policies in the past have been ruinous to the democracies - including the U.S.A."⁶⁹ On another occasion, he bluntly stated that the Union Now Movement was run by "German Jewish international bankers" whose intention was to achieve world control.⁷⁰ To substantiate his claim, he cited Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, former British Ambassador to Germany, Czarist Russia, and the United States,⁷¹ who stated in 1914: "the German Jewish bankers are toiling in a solid phalanx to compass our destruction."⁷² Jaques thus concluded that the Union Now Movement was attempting to surrender democratic sovereignty to German-Jewish totalitarian control.⁷³ Although Union Now appeared to be proposing a plan for postwar world peace, "the real purpose of 'Union Now' is to unify and impose this financial racket on the world, by the surrender of national sovereignty, so

as to render all peoples and all nations powerless and helpless to resist this accursed slavery of gold - the crown of Midas, Judas and Shylock.”⁷⁴

Premier Manning similarly criticized the Union Now Movement and its leader, Clarence Streit, who Manning alleged “was connected with a New York paper [*New York Times*], which, on the evidence of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, British Ambassador to Washington during the last war, was controlled by a banking house [Kuhn, Loeb and Company] that is an integral part of International Finance.” Manning argued that the scheme of Union Now was the “blue print of ‘the New Order’ which International Finance has had in readiness since the outbreak of the war.” The “big idea” behind such a scheme, he stated, “was to remove the people’s constitutional right to control ... the monetary system - and to place this in the hands of some supreme international authority who ... would not be responsible to anyone, because their control of finance would make their power absolute. They would have the power to manipulate the money systems of the countries in the Union ... and the supreme central authority would have control of the armed forces.”⁷⁵

Yet Manning vowed that his government would declare war against the conspiracy of international financiers who were attempting “to use the conditions created by the war to put [their scheme] over, so that when the war was won by the democratic nations the fruits of victory would be their complete enslavement to a supreme international dictatorship - the very thing our boys are dying to prevent.”⁷⁶ In a similar vein, Norman Jaques asked: “[a]re we to purchase physical freedom from Hitler at the price of financial slavery? ... the answer to German Nazi-ism is not German controlled International Finance ... Not only German military totalitarianism, but its evil twin, German-Jewish financial totalitarianism,

must be destroyed ... 'Union Now' would bind ... us, to financial slavery with chains of gold, forged by Financial Hitlers."⁷⁷

The Social Credit movement's antagonism to the Federal Reserve Board and the Union Now Movement was similarly applied to the British organization, Political and Economic Planning, a non-partisan research agency created in 1933 to help deal with Britain's social and economic problems.⁷⁸ *Today and Tomorrow* regularly accused Political and Economic Planning and its publication *P.E.P.* of being the vehicle for the schemes of international finance. In one instance, *Today and Tomorrow* referred to the October 1938 issue of *P.E.P.* which read: "We have started from the position that only in war or under threat of war will a British government embark on large scale planning."⁷⁹ *Today and Tomorrow* used this statement to conclude that "wartime is harvesttime for the planners ... Is it possible that the real 'plan' is to covertly forge chains for us while we're busy forging war[?]" The paper also expressed its uneasiness with any kind of economic planning: "[t]his planning business is an obsession, a disease, and those affected - the planners - those who suffer from the hallucinations from the planned economy virus - would turn us all into guinea pigs. They'd willingly put us into test tubes to experiment with us in the hope that they could thereby bring into being their special brand of regimented utopia."⁸⁰

L.D. Byrne, technical adviser to the Social Credit government, also criticized Political and Economic Planning for its "large scale plans for the centralization of industry and commerce in accordance with principles common to both socialism and big business." He also noted that Political and Economic Planning was headed by a Jew: "[u]nder the chairmanship and guiding inspiration of Israel Moses Sieff, this group has had a powerful influence in public affairs in Great Britain and somehow its members seem to have been

pushed into controlling positions.”⁸¹ That Sieff was Jewish was also duly noted by *Today and Tomorrow*: “New York sources associate Mr. Sieff with the group of Jews which includes Mr. Felix Frankfurter and Mr. Bernard Baruch, both of Mr. Roosevelt’s ‘Brains Trust,’ and has included the late Justice Louis Brandeis, and the late Mr. Jacob Schiff, of Kuhn Loeb and Company, who were interested, financially and otherwise, in the establishment of that object of P.E.P.’s emulation, the Soviet State in Russia.”⁸²

In a separate article, *Today and Tomorrow* blamed Max, Paul, and James Warburg “and others of the same breed” for creating a variety of evil organizations, including Political and Economic Planning. According to the paper, the “dominating position” of these international financiers enabled them to “provide ... unrestricted scope for the intrigue which plunged the democratic nations into poverty, unemployment and economic stress, built up the dictatorships, propagated revolution and socialism in this fertile soil, set up the machinery for the coming tyranny - as for example the sinister organization in England known as P.E.P. under the direction of Israel Moses Sief - and entrenched a vast network of cartels dominated by Nazi Germany, and set the stage for the present war.”⁸³ In short, Social Credit propaganda argued that a Jewish conspiracy was behind a variety of institutions and events, and that Political and Economic Planning was one more example of this far-reaching conspiracy.

Related to Social Credit’s antagonism toward the Federal Reserve Board, the Union Now Movement, and the Political and Economic Planning organization was its opposition to any kind of centralized government planning, either during the war or for the post-war period. Social Credit members warned that the federal government’s war-time planning was another example of the ubiquitous international conspiracy. MP Norman Jaques

declared that the Rowell-Sirois Commission Report was part of the international conspiracy which was connected to the Union Now Movement: “the Sirois Report is but a step to international ‘Federal Union,’ alias ‘Union Now’ under which the Dominion parliament itself would be reduced to a parish council.”⁸⁴

Today and Tomorrow similarly criticized government efforts to centralize industry and introduce price controls during the Second World War. In its discussion of Canada’s adoption of wages and price controls in 1941, *Today and Tomorrow* blamed Bernard Baruch, American financier and presidential adviser⁸⁵ for their implementation. It stated that the “Baruch proposals for the enforcement of a rigid price ceiling and control of wages [are] identical with those adopted by the Canadian Government,” and declared that “Bernard M. Baruch is one of the most sinister figures in the orbit of International Finance.” It noted that Baruch had been “President Wilson’s right hand adviser” during World War One, and now, through his control of industry, wages, and prices, had become “virtually dictator of the U.S.A.” The party organ concluded that implementation of the Baruch proposals, which would result in a similar dictatorship north of the border, would be “entirely in accordance [sic] with the plans of International [sic] Finance for setting up a World Slave State, under a world police force controlled by them, as the fitting outcome of a war to save democracy from totalitarianism.”⁸⁶

Thus, according to Social Credit propaganda, the “new world order” proposed by the Mackenzie King government was one of economic and political totalitarianism akin to the dictatorships in Germany and Russia. Any attempts at wartime centralization were proof of the conspiracy. Accordingly, when the Allied powers began to plan for the post-war world in 1944, the Social Credit movement viewed this as further proof of the

conspiracy's machinations. The Social Credit movement was immediately opposed to the Beveridge and Marsh Reports,⁸⁷ published in 1942 and 1943 respectively, which helped construct frameworks for the social welfare state in Britain and Canada during the postwar period. In its annual report for 1943, the Social Credit Board labelled the Beveridge and Marsh Reports products of a socialist conspiracy which was directly connected to international finance. The Board called William Beveridge "an avowed socialist [who] was for several years director of the London School of Economics. His Plan for Social Security is clearly socialistic in nature and is acclaimed by socialists everywhere. His plan has also been acclaimed by that section of the press most closely linked with the financial interests." Regarding Leonard Marsh, the Board noted that he was "also a product of the London School of Economics ... and was associated with Sir William Beveridge as his assistant, before he came to Canada. He was made research advisor to the Canadian government's advisory committee on reconstruction in July 1941."⁸⁸

Theoretically, the Social Credit Board had correctly described the positions held by Beveridge and Marsh. However, its implication was that they were part of a larger socialist-financial conspiracy. As the Board stated: "[o]n every side we are deluged with propaganda from both socialist and financial sources advocating the surrender of sovereignty to some international authority ... men's minds are being conditioned to accept a world slave state." The Board also criticized the Marsh Report for recommending that the Dominion government possess greater centralizing powers,⁸⁹ and concluded that the Marsh Report was also part of the socialist-financial conspiracy: "[i]t would appear that the exigencies of war are being used as a pretext to invade the sphere of

provincial autonomy ... Socialists and the vested financial interests alike are urging the continuance and extension of this policy into the post-war period.”⁹⁰

The *Canadian Social Crediter* similarly declared that the Beveridge and Marsh Reports were part of the schemes of international finance. It described Beveridge as a “known socialist” and stated that the Beveridge Report was “based on the tenets of Socialism and the Bismarckian proposals for *compulsory* state insurance.” The paper described Marsh as “a Socialist and a member of the C.C.F. brain trust [who] curiously ... produced an identical scheme to that brought about by Sir William Beveridge.” The paper also pointed out that both men were “products of the London School of Economics.”⁹¹ For the *Canadian Social Crediter*, this last piece of evidence was additional proof that Marsh and Beveridge were part of an international conspiracy.

It should be noted that the Social Credit movement was not the only group to criticize the federal government’s increased powers during World War Two, and other groups similarly criticized the “socialistic” plans of the Marsh Report. However, Social Credit propaganda consistently connected the “schemes” of socialists such as Marsh with those of an international financial conspiracy. As the Social Credit Board postulated: “[i]f international finance and socialism are travelling in the same direction is it possible that socialism is promoted by the money power to hasten the completion of their plot for world domination? Not only is it possible but there is a fund of evidence which leads to the inevitable conclusion that there is a plot, world-wide in scope, deliberately engineered by a small number of ruthless international financiers, to accomplish their objective.”⁹² It appears that the Social Credit Board was as concerned about the international conspiracy as the socialist conspiracy, and believed that the two were connected. Indeed, with the

onset of the Cold War in the early postwar period, the Board's denunciations of international finance were equalled only by its obsession with the world communist plot.

The most striking difference between Social Credit's criticisms of postwar planning and those of other mainstream parties, was its consistent identification of the "ruthless international financiers" in Jewish terms. Anti-Semitic conspiracy theorizing was the trademark of the Social Credit movement - no other political party engaged in such anti-Jewish rhetoric. It was this dubious distinction which separated the Social Credit Party from all other mainstream parties in Canada.

Thus, throughout the war, not only was the Social Credit movement adamantly opposed to any kind of centralized planning, it was equally opposed to attempts to create international organizations for the post-war period. While the Allied nations were discussing plans for a postwar international organization to replace the impotent League of Nations, alarmed Social Crediters were declaring that such an organization would be run by international financiers bent on world control.⁹³ Their opposition revealed a deep skepticism that an international postwar organization would do little for Canada; instead, it was likely to throw Canada into a state of political subservience and an economic depression reminiscent of the 1930s. Most importantly, however, Social Crediters were convinced that such subservience would be the direct result of a deliberate international conspiracy, one which transcended both world wars.

Thus, Social Credit propaganda harshly criticized the conferences at Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks, held in the United States in 1944, in which the Allied powers discussed proposals for a post-war international monetary organization and military peace-keeping organization.⁹⁴ Social Credit propaganda dismissed the conferences and their

participants as being controlled by an international conspiracy. The *Canadian Social Creditor* stated that the conferences' proposals would ensure that an anonymous international authority would gain absolute power of the monetary systems and the armed forces of every country. In language rivalling predictions of the Armageddon, the *Canadian Social Creditor* warned: "[t]he World Slave State is taking shape rapidly. The predominantly Germanic and atheistic gang who constitute International Finance, have all but got control of the instruments for establishing an absolute World Dictatorship after this war ... If you value your freedom ... you will take off your coat and fight this threatening tyranny as though your life depends upon it. BECAUSE IT DOES."⁹⁵

MP Norman Jaques was also convinced that the Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks conferences were assembled by international conspirators. He argued that "International Finance and International Control - world government by Shylock & Marx" were responsible for planning Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks.⁹⁶ Jaques's meaning, albeit implicit, was that Jews and communists were the forces behind "International Finance and International Control."

Norman James, MP and columnist for the *Canadian Social Creditor*, also discussed the Bretton Woods Conference, asking, "why they always have to hide in the bush to talk[?]" His interpretation of Bretton Woods was that "experts" from forty-four countries were sent to draw up plans for the future government of the world, which entailed "each of us surrendering a big slice of our freedom and sovereignty to a kind of Super-State, composed of - to put it politely - eminent Banking Authorities, who will have at their disposal an army, a navy, an air force and, of course, an international police force ... These Financial Dictators, recognizing that he who holds the purse strings governs the world,

have also arranged an international financial system of usury and debt, (of course on the Gold Standard) through which they can make our subjection doubly sure.” James concluded that the purpose of these plans was simply “[t]he final Sovietisation of all democratic countries.”⁹⁷

In a later column, James argued that the real objective behind the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the Bretton Woods Conference, and the “machinations” of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was “the absolute Sovietisation of ...NATIONS,” and that “International Socialism under complete domination of International Finance is what they are all after.”⁹⁸ James also wrote an article entitled, “The Dumbarton Hoax!” in which he argued that the “self-important and self-appointed gentleman who arranged the Dumbarton Hoax conference” intended to “take away our sovereignty and transfer our loyalty and hope of freedom to this super-State under the BIG FOUR - who are themselves under the thumb of International Finance.”⁹⁹ The consequence, he warned, would be “the complete overthrow of Christianity and Democracy.”¹⁰⁰

MP John Blackmore offered similar warnings about the proposals put forward at the Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks conferences. According to Blackmore, if these proposals were implemented, Canada would be forced to “surrender ... every vestige of effective national sovereignty” and would be subjected to “an armed world dictatorship wielding absolute power.” He added that the conferences were proof “that there is operating in the world today a gang of ... international financiers ... they are seeking through the peace treaty conferences to attain the objective for which they engineered the war.”¹⁰¹

Social Credit's antagonism towards postwar planning was equalled only by its opposition to a world bank based on the gold standard. MP Norman Jaques often led the attack against these proposals. For example, in July 1943 the House of Commons debated proposals for an international stabilization of national currencies based on gold. Jaques vehemently opposed the idea, stating that control over such a body "would be vested neither in parliament, nor Congress, but in a bank, and would be backed by an international police force."¹⁰² He quoted from the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* to prove the inherent evilness of the gold standard: "[w]e shall stabilize foreign exchange by which we can fix industrial values (and wages) to suit ourselves. In our hands will be the greatest power on earth - gold."¹⁰³ In short, Jaques relied on the predictions of the *Protocols* to argue that re-implementation of the gold standard would play into the hands of international Jewish financial conspirators.

In a separate instance, Jaques outlined the horrific state of affairs in Britain after the restoration of the gold standard in 1925, and hypothesized that the same forces advocating adoption of the gold standard were plotting for world control in the postwar period: "[t]he gold standard was restored in Great Britain by Mr. Churchill in 1925, who repented his action years afterwards ... By drastic credit restrictions, recalling loans, by 'deflation' and by increasing the price of gold by 70% they collected twice as much as they lent ... The same Shylocks now plan to repeat their gigantic international racket. And the nations are to disarm and surrender their sovereignty to these international 'racketeers,' backed by their international police force."¹⁰⁴

Reverend F.W. Williams, former editor of *Today and Tomorrow*, also criticized attempts to restore the "obsolete, outworn gold standard" and impose it on the western

democracies. Calling it “this diabolical gold standard which a few men control and use for the enslavement of humanity,” Williams exhorted his fellow citizens to “refuse to bow before this false worship of mammon or else future civilization will be far worse than mankind has ever experienced.”¹⁰⁵

The Social Credit party organ also attacked the Allies’ plans for a world bank and a return to the gold standard. In 1942, *Today and Tomorrow* predicted that the term “dollar” would be abandoned when the new international currency was introduced; in its place, “[b]oth saints and cynics claim ‘shekel’ will be used.”¹⁰⁶ In a later issue, *Today and Tomorrow* vowed that schemes advocating international organizations like Union Now or “World Federal Union” meant a return to the gold standard, “and it means BACK - DOWN - AND OUT: It means a world of beggars!”¹⁰⁷ When the World Bank was finally established as part of the United Nations Organization in 1946, the *Canadian Social Crediter* snidely described its president, Eugene Meyer, as a “son of an immigrant Jewish safe-owner.”¹⁰⁸

If the Social Credit movement disliked the proposals put forward at Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks, it was openly antagonistic towards the proposed United Nations Organization (UN). Many Social Credit members viewed the UN as the most dangerous of the post-war plans, and were convinced that it was driven by an international financial conspiracy. In 1944, Norman Jaques, commenting on the Allies’ attempts to create a more viable post-war organization than the former League of Nations, predicted that “the setting up of this union would mean ... surrender of the sovereign rights and freedoms of the people ... [t]o an alien anonymous organization of international government which would have absolute control of the people’s money, food, industry, farming, [and]

employment.” He invoked the *Protocols* to support his argument, since they were “an exact blueprint of the plans for a new world order which have been, and now are preparing behind closed doors.” This new order included “[d]isarmament, surrender of national sovereignty to an International Union, which means a world bank, a world gold standard, and a world police force ... the new world order [is] obviously the ‘union’ of ‘Shylock and Marx’ - the ‘chosen ones’ instead of Hitler’s ‘superman.’”¹⁰⁹

In a separate piece, Jaques argued that any attempt to organize an international peacekeeping organization such as the UN would destroy democracy and individual freedom: “[e]very Allied leader declares we are fighting to preserve our democratic freedoms and way of life. At the same time there is a promise, or a threat of a ‘new Order,’ a transformation from National Democracy to International Socialism. And who is to be the controller of the new order? A Hitler or a Shylock? Gangster or Racketeer?”¹¹⁰

Social Credit columnist Norman James also condemned the creation of a postwar international peacekeeping organization such as the UN. In June 1943, he criticized Canadian government leaders for their willingness to sacrifice Canadian democracy and sovereignty at the feet of an international organization. Recalling the 1939 British royal visit to Canada, James remembered how “the whole country went wild with delight, at having [the King and Queen] with us ... Some of the higher ups even toured the country with them basking in reflected glory.” Now, however, “these same people are suggesting ... that we no longer need our King and Queen, our Crown, our Constitution and the British Empire, and that we should transfer our loyalty to a mysterious, nondescript INTERNATIONAL POWER, composed of some off-colour individuals of no particular

country, and who are incapable of loyalty except to Gold or its equivalent.” He added that “if these saboteurs have their way,” the National Socialism of Germany would develop into an “International Socialism with a gang of INTERNATIONAL FINANCIERS on top.”¹¹¹

Premier Manning similarly condemned plans to establish the UN, stating that they had been carefully laid by the international conspirators as early as 1939: “[e]ver since the first gun was fired in the war, a carefully laid conspiracy has been at work using the conditions created by the war in an effort to rob nations of their national sovereignty, to eliminate true democracy, to undermine the British Empire ... and to set up a World Dictatorship under a supreme international authority which would be able to dominate the economic life of every nation by controlling its money system, and its armed forces.”¹¹²

As a corollary of its antagonism towards the UN, Social Credit propaganda also attacked the UN’s umbrella organizations. For example, party propaganda attacked financier and American presidential adviser Bernard Baruch for his alleged manipulation of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). It used the fact that Baruch was a financier, a Jew, and a presidential adviser, as proof of his involvement in the international financial conspiracy. Regarding the appointment of chairman of UNRRA, the *Canadian Social Crediter* complained that “the Chairman was nominated by the [American] President on the recommendation of his adviser - the adviser of all Presidents of the U.S.A. since away [sic] back, and that is none other than Bernard Baruch.” Consequently, “it is not remarkable that the first Chairman of U.N.R.R.A. should have been Herbert H. Lehman, one time Governor of New York and connected with the Old Gang.”¹¹³ The label “old gang” may be somewhat cryptic, but the

paper's intention was to connect Baruch and Lehman - both Jews - to the ubiquitous international conspiracy.

In another instance, the *Canadian Social Crediter* criticized the UN's plans for controlling atomic energy, and specifically Bernard Baruch's involvement in formulating the United States' policy: "[i]t will be so reassuring to know that a group of men representing and controlled by the very international crooks and gangsters who promoted two world wars, plunged the world into economic chaos and have brought us to the brink of universal catastrophe, will have the sole monopoly of not only bombing us out of existence, but will be able to control atomic energy in the industrial field so that there will be plenty of hard labour for the slaves of the glorious World State."¹¹⁴

The *Canadian Social Crediter* also reprinted excerpts from its Australian counterpart to prove that Baruch and others were plotting to achieve world domination through their control of atomic energy. The *Australian Social Crediter* quoted the following excerpt from the *Protocols*: "[y]ou may say that the goyim will rise upon us, arms in hand, if they guess what is going on before the time comes; but in the West we have against this a manoeuvre of such appalling terror that the very stoutest hearts quail." The Australian paper explained that "[t]he terror contemplated [in the *Protocols*] was the mining of capital cities; but the advance of science has provided the atomic bomb, control of which has been assumed by Messrs. Baruch and Lilienthal."¹¹⁵

In another article, the *Canadian Social Crediter* blamed Baruch and other "international German Jewish financiers" for the post-war world food shortage, claiming that Baruch and his kind manipulated international agencies and national governments through their control of finance: "[t]he ... world food shortage ... must be seen, however,

in conjunction with other major developments ... [such as] [t]he association of Mr. Bernard Baruch and other international financiers, predominantly German Jews, with the various international authorities ... [and] [t]he idea that the Jews are a Chosen People whose destiny it is to form the 'brain' of a collectivised world. The practical background is the power of International Finance, which is dominated by German Jews, operating at the moment from America.”¹¹⁶

In sum, Social Credit propaganda considered any post-war international planning, including establishment of the United Nations and its related agencies, as proof of a international Jewish financial conspiracy. Its anti-Semitism aside, Social Credit rhetoric revealed a deep skepticism that postwar international organizations such as the UN would prevent a postwar depression as in the previous world war. Most importantly, however, Social Credit propaganda viewed the architects of postwar planning as part of a maniacal international force bent on creating a world slave state. As Norman Jaques warned: “[d]o not believe any leader ... who advocates surrender to world government, and ‘police force’ ... We are not pouring out blood and treasure to save the world from slavery by Hitler and Hirohito in order to hand it over to Shylock and Marx.”¹¹⁷

Norman James similarly warned that “this international gang, with their sanctimonious hypocritical yap for international unity, have only one objective, and that is the ‘Unity’ of Slavery. They are out for international power at any price ... and that is the gang responsible for the slaughters of the past thirty odd years, and they are the gang who are still planning the subjugation of the world to their will, and they are the gang who should be hanged or shot, or drawn and quartered or boiled in oil.” In describing this “gang,” James noted that even though “[s]ome of the them are Jewish and some of them aren’t ...

the majority of these international criminals just happen to be Jews.” He innocently added: “I’m not interested in their race or creed, but if their names happen to be Rothschild, Cohen, Loeb, or Baruch, am I to blame?”¹¹⁸

Thus, Social Credit propaganda revealed a deep fear of the changing world ushered in by the Second World War. The UN and its related agencies was only one aspect of the changing state of affairs which the Social Credit movement attempted to understand and perhaps contain. The prism through which these affairs were understood was that of an international, financial, Jewish conspiracy. Indeed, Social Credit propaganda interpreted most recent world events within this conspiratorial paradigm, and took special interest in the Jewish Holocaust in Europe and the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Its sole purpose in discussing these specific “Jewish concerns” was to offer further proof of the international financial Jewish conspiracy.

During World War Two, at the height of Nazi destruction of European Jewry, Social Credit propaganda actively discouraged any attempts to assist the Jews of Europe. During the latter part of the war, when tensions were heightening with the Soviet Union and communism was becoming increasingly unpopular and illegal in North America, Social Credit propaganda waged a number of charges against the Jews, including the following: that Jews were communist conspirators attempting to extend their activities in North America under the guise of refugee status; that Jews were behind Germany’s war against the Allies; that Jews themselves were to blame for the Holocaust; and that the Holocaust was, in fact, a Jewish fabrication.

Ironically, this more virulently anti-Semitic component of Social Credit conspiracy theorizing was an attempt by the movement to deflect charges of anti-Semitism. In late

1944, *Today and Tomorrow* confronted the *Canadian Tribune* over the latter's criticism of anti-Semitism in the Social Credit Party.¹¹⁹ *Today and Tomorrow* argued that the *Canadian Tribune*'s insistence on labelling "the Social Credit attack on so-called Communism and other totalitarian doctrines as being anti-Semitic" was a ploy to protect the real conspirators - the "gang of German Jews." *Today and Tomorrow* noted that this same gang backed Adolf Hitler: "Hitler would never have gained power unless he had been well-financed. Who was able to finance him? And is it an accident that Hitler, reputed to be an illegitimate grandson of a Rothschild, should have been chosen? ... Is it an accident that his '*Mein Kampf*' was inspired ... by the notorious *Protocols of Zion*? Is it an accident that as a result of his persecution of Jews, any enemy alien refugees from Germany and occupied Europe gained key positions at the expense of nationals in Great Britain, the U.S.A. and elsewhere during the war?"¹²⁰

In another case, national leader Solon Low was severely criticized in a series of letters to the *Toronto Daily Star*. One letter gave several examples of anti-Semitic statements by leading Social Credit politicians and the party organ, and charged Low and others with "embark[ing] on a program of Jew-baiting and anti-United Nations propaganda."¹²¹ Low denied these charges in a published letter to the *Toronto Daily Star*. He accused the Toronto Jewish monthly, *Today*, of being part of that "powerful section of Canadian Jewry [which] is backing the mischievous activities of the Communist organization in the country, and I have yet to see a single repudiation by any official Jewish paper of the vicious propaganda of these friends of communism."¹²² The editor of *Today*, R.S. Gordon, wrote his own letter to the *Toronto Daily Star* and charged Low with deliberately attempting to sow anti-Semitism and using the spurious *Protocols of the Learned Elders*

of Zion to attempt to make his case.¹²³ Low wrote another letter to the *Toronto Daily Star*, denying charges that he had invoked the *Protocols* to prove the existence of an international Jewish conspiracy. Yet he added that the *Protocols* were “an exact blueprint of what is [sic] been going on in the world since. To state that it is a forgery, is irrelevant - for its devilish predictions are being carried out to the letter.” Low also criticized Gordon for editing “a paper which is violently pro-Jewish to the exclusion of all non-Jews ... its pages are full of pro-Communist propaganda.” He remarked that some Jews (including the *Today* editor) believed that simply because he pointed out that “certain German Jewish bankers financed Hitler’s advent to power[, this] constitutes an attack on all Jews.” However, stated Low, “I cannot believe that this reflects the attitude of Canadian Jewry. If it did, then not only I but many other people in Canada would be forced to revise our views on this question, for it would have some very ugly implications.”¹²⁴ Low’s own implication was that if Canadian Jewry took exception to the “known fact” that German Jewish bankers were behind Hitler, this would be proof that all Jews in Canada were part of the international conspiracy. Thus, in a bizarre way, Low attempted to refute charges of anti-Semitism against himself and his party, only to succeed in confirming them by declaring that German Jews were behind the rise of Nazism and that Canadian Jews might also be part of this conspiracy.

A.V. Bourcier, MLA for Lac Ste Anne and chairman of the Social Credit Board, also felt compelled to deny charges of anti-Semitism made by the *Canadian Tribune* against the Social Credit Party.¹²⁵ In response to the *Canadian Tribune*’s allegations, Bourcier declared at a Social Credit meeting in Edmonton: “I have never at any time attacked the Jewish people. I have no hatred for any race or any religion.” He assured his audience

that "I have always attacked the group of men whom we call International Finance - and I will continue to attack them, whether their names be Finklestein or MacGregor!" In response to his remarks, the audience broke into cheers.¹²⁶

In a similar attempt to deflect charges of anti-Semitism published in the *Edmonton Bulletin*,¹²⁷ MP Norman Jaques argued that because nearly all Jews were communists, their attempts to raise the "bogey" of anti-Semitism was really a "communist smokescreen." Jaques's view was that "according to the 'Commu-Socialists,' those who opposed them must be Fascists ... anyone who publicly denounces the surrender of our national loyalties to international control is accused of 'anti-semitism;' (pro-fascism, anti-communism and anti-semitism - these terms mean the same to the communists.)" Jaques postulated that it was only when Germany invaded Russia in 1941 that the "Commu-Socialists" regarded the Nazis as their enemies. Before 1941, although Jews "presumably ... suffered with the Gentiles," they were of no concern to these Commu-Socialists who "today are so alarmed about anti-semitism."¹²⁸ Jaques's implication was that Jews, as Communists, were more concerned with supporting Russia than with protecting their fellow Jews from Hitler; and since all Communists were Jews, Hitler must not have been persecuting Jews after all - otherwise the Communists would have opposed him from the beginning, and not merely after the 1941 invasion.

In a separate instance, a private Jewish citizen from Vancouver had written to Jaques in the hopes of persuading him to end his anti-Semitic attacks.¹²⁹ In response, Jaques asked: "[y]our people complain of the way they are regarded - and treated by others, but do they not regard themselves as different - set apart from all other races and creeds? Are they not the 'Chosen people?'" He stated that the percentage of Jews among communists was

much higher than the percentage of Jews among the entire population, and although he was not “complaining” about this fact, he wanted to know: “[w]hy did the Communists violently oppose any armed resistance to Hitler until he invaded Russia in 1941? Are we to suppose that Hitler was neither a Jew-baiter, nor a ‘Fascist,’ until that time? Or was it that the ‘Communists’ thought it more worth-while to destroy the capitalists than to rescue the Jews of Europe? Why do the Jews and the Communists continue to support one another after this callous treatment?”¹³⁰

Jaques also referred to the millions of Russian peasants who had been liquidated in bloody purges since the Russian Revolution, asking, “[w]hy is there no propaganda on their behalf? Is it because these unfortunate people are non Jewish, and because Jews engineered the revolution and have since controlled the communist party in Russia[?] To whom are Jews loyal? To Canada or to Jewry?” Regarding Canada’s non-admittance of Jewish refugees during the war, Jaques was skeptical that such refugees actually existed: “[i]f Jews are under the control of Hitler, how can they be free to leave Europe? If they are so free how can they be persecuted?” He concluded that “if you call anyone a Jew you will be denounced as a Jew-baiter - and I think that is poor propaganda for the Jews.”¹³¹

Jaques’s views on European refugees were also published in the *Canadian Social Crediter*. In one issue, he criticized Anna Louise Strong, contributor to *Maclean’s Magazine*, for her article describing the horrors of Nazi persecution of European Jews.¹³² Jaques called her a “Communist” and implied that she was working with other communists to spread propaganda “the purpose of which is so to harrow our sympathies that Canada will open her gates to an invasion army of Communist party workers.” Moreover, he declared, Jewish refugees were not “refugees” at all, and he questioned why

there was such a “determination” to bring them to Canada: “[w]hy not compensate these victims by sending them to the Communist Paradise - Soviet Russia?” Jaques also asked whether Jews were “the only, or even the chief, victims of Nazi persecution ... Is it not a fact that the Nazis persecute all their opponents? Do not the Jews form but a small percentage of these victims?”¹³³

The Social Credit party organ also published articles about “fraudulent” Jewish refugees. In late 1943, *Today and Tomorrow* discussed “the carefully organized campaign which is in full swing to win support for bringing tens of thousands of refugees to this country” and noted that “those who are most vocal in demanding a haven for the refugees are persons known to hold communist or extreme socialist views.” The paper asked why the communists were now appealing for Canada to accept tens of thousands of refugees and wanted to know how these “refugees” were able to escape: “if the refugees for which this plea is being made are the victims of Nazi persecution, how can they get away? Are the Nazis permitting them to leave? ... If the Nazis are allowing them to leave, then can they be described as victims of persecution? Unless it served the purpose of the Nazis, would they permit these refugees to leave? Is it probable that in the main these refugees are active communists whom the Nazis are only too glad to export in order that they may attack us from within? Can they be the spearhead of the Red Revolution?” *Today and Tomorrow* concluded that the Canadian economy was in a greater state of emergency than were the Jews of Europe: “why this compassion and concern about the victims of Nazi persecution in Europe, and the callous indifference to the tens of thousands of Canadians who are the victims of financial persecution right here in our own country?” Indeed, Canada’s “victims of financial persecution” were even worse off than the European

refugees, because “they cannot escape anywhere.” Accordingly, judged the paper, “[c]harity should begin at home.”¹³⁴

In a separate attempt to undermine the extent of the Jewish Holocaust, the *Canadian Social Crediter* referred to the activities of Henry Morgenthau, a Jew, secretary of the treasury under Franklin Roosevelt, and architect of the Morgenthau Plan. Originally, the intention of the Morgenthau Plan was to cripple Germany’s industrial potential by turning it into an agricultural country at the end of the war.¹³⁵ Although the Morgenthau Plan was never put into effect, as late as 1946 the *Canadian Social Crediter* was still accusing Morgenthau and others of wreaking more havoc in Germany than the Nazis ever did: “[t]hey (the executors of the Morgenthau plan) have abused and starved to death more German babies than there ever were Jews in Germany; and finally they raped and debauched hundreds of thousands of German, Austrian, and Hungarian girls and women from eight to eighty. They brought to their death five times as many Germans in one year of peace as died during the five years of war!” The paper asked: “[w]hose policy is responsible for the mass raping, looting, starvation and murder now rampant in Germany?” The answer: “[t]he Morgenthau policy, the direct brain child of the financiers and particularly of Morgenthau - a policy so brutal that it is rarely mentioned, because we at home could not eat or sleep if we knew of it.”¹³⁶ Yet what the *Canadian Social Crediter* overlooked was that the reason the Morgenthau Plan was “rarely mentioned” was it had become a dead letter, for reasons which had little to do with an international financial Jewish conspiracy.

Throughout the postwar period, when reports of the conditions in European concentration camps were widely publicized,¹³⁷ Social Credit propaganda continued to

question the extent of European Jewish destruction. In early 1946 the *Canadian Social Crediter* used the case of Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Morgan,¹³⁸ then chief of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) in Germany, as a way of undermining the severity of the Jewish Holocaust. In late 1945, Morgan had made some extremely insensitive and incorrect statements regarding the extent of Jewish destruction in Poland and had suggested that European Jews were using the rationale of the Holocaust to leave Europe under refugee status.¹³⁹ As a result, Morgan was recalled and ordered to resign as UNRRA chief. The *Canadian Social Crediter* commended Morgan for his fearless reporting of the “facts” and stated that his statements should have at least been verified before he was forced to resign, since not verifying them would “serve only to convince anti-Semites all over the world that their beliefs are right.”¹⁴⁰

After several months’ delay, Morgan was finally replaced by Meyer Cohen as UNRRA chief.¹⁴¹ For the *Canadian Social Crediter*, the fact that Cohen was a Jew was proof that UNRRA was controlled by the international Jewish conspiracy: “General Sir Frederick Morgan has been relieved of his position and Mr. La Guardia [chairman of UNRRA] has appointed in his place none other than one Meyer Cohen. Operations seem to be proceeding to plan.”¹⁴² Significantly, the *Canadian Social Crediter*’s sole interest in Morgan’s case rested on a desire to question the nature and extent of the Jewish Holocaust in Europe and to suggest that the Jewish refugee situation and UNRRA itself were part of a broader international Jewish conspiracy.

Social Credit propaganda on the Jewish Holocaust is noteworthy for its radical deviance from mainstream political parties’ interpretations of the Second World War. Before the Second World War and certainly throughout the war, the Allies were fully

aware of the nature and extent of Nazi persecution of European Jewry, and every political party in Canada paid lip service to the horrors of Jewish destruction, although few politicians did anything to alleviate it. Yet for months and years following, the Social Credit movement, through its party organ and its leading members, distinguished itself by questioning whether Jews were being persecuted under the Nazi regime and suggesting that Jewish refugees were the vanguard of an attempted communist revolution in Canada. This gave the Social Credit movement the dubious distinction of being the only mainstream Canadian political party to engage in Holocaust denial.

Thus, Social Credit propaganda attempted to indict Jews on a number of counts, the fabrication of their own destruction being perhaps the most offensive. However, Social Credit propaganda focussed on another issue of deep concern to world Jewry in the immediate post-war period - the creation of the State of Israel. In conjunction with its reluctance to assist European Jews both during and after the Second World War, the Social Credit movement consistently opposed the Zionist cause and spoke strongly against the creation of the State of Israel. As the following examples will show, Social Credit propaganda was anti-Zionist as well as anti-Semitic. Certainly, the Social Credit movement was not alone in its opposition to Zionism; however, it used its anti-Zionist stance to rationalize its anti-Semitism.

In the summer of 1947 the *Regina Leader-Post* harshly criticized the Social Credit Party for being anti-Semitic and remarked that "Social Crediters are still the only people to prate about those undoubted anti-Semitic forgeries known as the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*."¹⁴³ The *Canadian Social Creditor* responded that neither the Social Credit Party nor the *Protocols* could be considered anti-Semitic because "if the *Protocols* are

anything, they are anti-Judaic, not anti-Semitic - since they make no reference to the other Semite people of the world. If they are a forgery it would be interesting to read the original document ... Social Crediters have only referred to them as an exact blueprint of what is happening in the world today.” The party organ simultaneously defended its anti-Zionist stance: “Social Crediters have ... taken a stand against political Zionism. Is this a sin? If so, one had better take the British government to task.”¹⁴⁴

In another piece, the *Canadian Social Crediter* invoked the *Protocols* in its defence of anti-Zionism. It argued that “Communism is the instrument of Zionism and Zionism is Communist. The policy and the technique are identical.” It noted that the *Protocols* had “been repudiated by Zionists and denounced as a forgery,” but they were “a faithful blueprint of what has happened in the world since then, with particular reference to the activities of Zionism.”¹⁴⁵

In a separate instance, the *Canadian Social Crediter* emphasized that the Social Credit Party was not, in fact, anti-Semitic, because Social Crediters supported the Arabs’ cause in Palestine: “[t]he Label anti-Semitic was unfounded in view of the fact that [Social Crediters] are interested in the Arab’s cause and Arabs are predominantly a semitic people.” The paper pointed to the fact that it had published a list of international financiers who were not solely Jewish, thus proving that Social Credit was not anti-Semitic: “those people who go yapping anti-Semitism at us will take the time to read this article.”¹⁴⁶ In another attempt to deny charges of anti-Semitism, the paper defended its stance on Jews and Zionism: “[w]e have tried repeatedly, when the subject was forbidden, to segregate the handful of international financiers and the political Zionists from Jewry as a whole, to fix a spotlight on them, without hate and certainly without

rancor. We have asked: why do the Jews not denounce Communism, when so many of their names appear on the lists of organizations now known as the Canadian Fifth Column?"¹⁴⁷

On a separate occasion the *Canadian Social Crediter* reprinted an article from the *Australian Social Crediter*, which had taken a similar stance on international finance and Zionism: "[a]n alien policy is being imposed on the British Empire from the United States of America ...[which] proceeds, not from the American people, but from the International Financiers, who are predominantly Zionist Jews, and who have their headquarters in the U.S.A. at the moment, and dominate its government."¹⁴⁸ This would not be the last time the *Canadian Social Crediter* would borrow from its Australian counterpart to support its own prejudices about Jews and Zionism.

The *Canadian Social Crediter* also used other published material to corroborate its own anti-Zionist, anti-Semitic stance. An example is that of Arthur Hays Sulzberger, publisher of the *New York Times* and a Jew, who had made some anti-Zionist statements in 1946, which the *Canadian Social Crediter* used nearly a year later. Sulzberger had accused Zionist Jews of making political capital out of the misery of Jewish displaced persons, and the *Canadian Social Crediter* reprinted that portion of his statement which read: "I believe that one could find countless Arabs who would admit that there is room at the moment in Palestine for 350,000 Jewish refugees, but not room for a Jewish state ... The political aims have obscured the human problem. By putting statehood first and refuge last, the Zionists, in my judgment, have jeopardized both." The party organ reprinted Sulzberger's statements under the heading, "Noted American Jewish Editor Rebukes Zionist Political Aims - Deplores Terror, Hate and Lack of Human Values."¹⁴⁹

In another instance, the *Canadian Social Crediter* published an article written by one A. Homer, who had submitted a memorandum to the United Nations Committee on Palestine arguing against Jewish claims to Palestine.¹⁵⁰ Homer had examined the economic potential of Palestine and argued that the reason the Zionists were pushing for a Jewish state in Palestine was to achieve world domination through control of Palestine's oil and mineral resources: "[l]ong ago, I came to the conclusion that Financial Jewry (both Zionist and non-Zionist) was furthering the aspirations of fanatical Zionism ... in order to gain possession of the colossal Oil and Mineral resources of Palestine ... Financial Jewry has undoubtedly supported the aims of Zionists, moderate, political and fanatics, because it seeks the political and economic advantages in the struggle for World Domination which a Jewish-controlled Palestine would afford."¹⁵¹ The only reason the *Canadian Social Crediter* printed Homer's brief on the Palestine question was to bolster its own anti-Zionist stance and corroborate its theory about the international Jewish conspiracy.

Social Credit politicians also gave their own interpretations of the Zionist cause. In 1947, when presentations were made by both the Jewish and Arab side to the United Nations Organization, Social Credit national leader Solon Low consistently attacked the Jewish brief and quoted with approval long extracts from the Arab brief.¹⁵² His statements were published in a series of articles in the *Canadian Social Crediter*. In one article, he accused the Jews of using the miserable situation of Jews in displaced persons camps as a means of forcing the acceptance of the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.¹⁵³ "if the nations of the world would get all of the refugees out of those camps and into places where they can live in freedom and at peace, it would reduce the Palestine

problem ... However, a good many Zionists in the United States claim that this is a diversionary move and do not favour removing the pressures because they depend to a considerable extent on the distress of the Jews in the D.P. Camps to bring sympathetic support for their drive to attain statehood in the Holy Land.”¹⁵⁴ The intricacies of the Palestine Question will not be dealt with here, but suffice to say that it was very complex and Low’s comments, although anti-Zionist, were not necessarily anti-Semitic. However, given the medium through which his comments were conveyed (that is, the *Canadian Social Crediter*, which had proven itself to be blatantly anti-Semitic); his consistent condemnation of the Jewish cause in Palestine; and his previous anti-Semitic comments, it can be safely argued that Low’s stance was not inconsistent with other anti-Zionist, anti-Semitic Social Credit propaganda.

Other politicians who commented on the Palestine question included Norman Jaques, one of the most vocal opponents of the creation of the state of Israel. For his part, Jaques argued that Zionism and communism were twin schemes of international conspirators. In an address to the Canadian Arab Friendship League in the spring of 1946, Jaques stated: “[t]he peace of the world is deliberately threatened in Palestine by the demands of Zionists and their gentile backers ... In Canada the Zionists are able to mold public opinion through their control of the means of propaganda ... The truth is that organized Zionism is the most violent source of anti-British agitation in the world, in which they make common cause with the Communists.” He warned that Canadians, as part of the United Nations Organization, would be “obliged to shed their blood to enforce Zionist policies” and concluded that the “evil twins” of Political Zionism and Communism were the “only real threat to the peace of the world.”¹⁵⁵

In other addresses, Jaques discussed the nature of Zionist terrorism, noting that hundreds of British soldiers, sailors, police, and civil servants had been murdered and held hostage by Jewish terrorists in Palestine. According to Jaques, although Zionist officials and sympathizers denounced the terrorists, the latter nonetheless “always find a safe refuge among their fellow Zionists.” In addition, these “gangsters” were not denounced because of the “fear of being ‘crucified’ by Zionist ‘terrorists’ outside Palestine, by such agencies as the anti-Defamation League, who ‘smear’ with anti-Semitism anybody who ventures even the mildest criticism of Zionism. Everywhere Zionists and their Communist-Marxian Socialist comrades stir hatred against Britain and the British - the best friends the Jews had ever had.”¹⁵⁶ Jaques pointed to the bombing of Jerusalem’s King David Hotel by Zionist terrorists in July 1946¹⁵⁷ as proof of an international conspiracy theory: “[t]he terrorist outrages leading up to the David Hotel bombing were not the acts of a few fanatics, but the deliberate policy of the responsible Jewish agency ... Zionism is a political movement ... to dominate the world.”¹⁵⁸

Certainly, Jaques’s condemnation of Zionist terrorism, given the activities of the Stern gang and the bombing of the King David Hotel, was neither unique nor perhaps unjustified. However, within the context of Social Credit propaganda, the most salient aspect of Jaques’s rhetoric was his insistence on fitting Zionism into the paradigm of an international Jewish conspiracy.

What is clear from the foregoing examples is that the Social Credit movement promoted anti-Semitic propaganda, through its members and its party organ, the *Canadian Social Crediter*. It is revealing that the party organ more than once felt compelled to answer the question: “[w]here do Social Crediters stand on the so-called Jewish

question?” In one instance, it denied all charges of anti-Semitism, especially against leading Social Credit politicians: “[d]espite what enemies of political democracy have charged in the past, Solon E. Low, national leader of the Social Credit Association of Canada, Premier E.C. Manning, of the provincial government, and various other Social Credit authorities have made their stand clear on this matter. We reiterate it - we recognize no intolerance of race or religion.”¹⁵⁹ However, as the previous pages have shown, the Social Credit movement embraced and promoted numerous anti-Semitic views.

Perhaps the most illuminating evidence of the extent of Social Credit’s anti-Semitic propaganda came from the party organ’s readership. In 1944, a Social Credit supporter from Bowden, Alberta wrote to the editor of the *Canadian Social Crediter* to complain about the “ugly sarcasm ... mudslinging and calling of names” in which the party organ engaged. “Your paper is the official organ of the Social Credit Association of Canada,” he wrote, “and must therefore be sanctioned by members of the Social Credit Party in Alberta, the elected representatives of the people of this Province, of whom I am one.” Yet he stated that he felt ashamed of his provincial government and did not show the *Canadian Social Crediter* to his friends, although he wanted them to learn about the Party’s principles. “Many of you like to call yourselves Christian gentlemen and your party a Christian party ... [y]et it seems you are noting a splinter in your brother’s eye and overlooking that you may have a plank in your own.”¹⁶⁰

To its credit, the *Canadian Social Crediter* responded to the man’s letter, although for the purpose of defending itself: “[s]ometimes - often, in fact - we do use sarcastic language. More often, we use strong, destructive language. Here’s why. When men go

into battle they do not play checkers with the enemy. We're in a battle - how great, many people do not realize. Right now the issue is our way of life, the free, Christian way - as opposed to the godless, regimented way ... and we're fighting against groups of international financiers who would blow us to atoms if they dared ... If we sound rough, remember we're fighting. And if a cause isn't worth fighting for - Well, it's a poor cause."¹⁶¹

In another case, a Social Crediter supporter from Malartic, Quebec, criticized the *Canadian Social Crediter* for its attacks on labour, socialism, communism, and Jews: "[y]ou show your true colours too often to fool even poor workers. You believe in tolerance? Then why does the Union des Electeurs and Jaques go up and down the country screeching at the Jews? ... There is much about Social Credit that I admire, but racial discrimination and disrespect for either Socialism or Communism is a poor way to advance your own cause." In response, the *Canadian Social Crediter* denied that the Union des Electeurs or Norman Jaques went "up and down the country screeching at the Jews." It admitted that it condemned political Zionism, "but so have many prominent Jews." Then, in a revealing statement, the party organ denied its anti-Semitism and simultaneously admonished the complainant for having been duped by the international conspirators: "[s]urely our correspondent knows that if we were anti-Semitic we would have courage enough to say so - and material enough to fill every edition of [t]he *Canadian Social Crediter* for years to come. It is too bad that people will fall for the 'smear campaign.' We condemn anti-Semitism if for no other reason than that it has been used as an instrument against the people of the western world. If our correspondent is a thinker, let him think that one out."¹⁶²

In summary, contrary to its refutations and assertions, the Social Credit movement, through its members and through its party organ, promoted anti-Semitic propaganda. Although leading Social Credit members were not the only Canadian politicians to espouse anti-Semitic views, their Party distinguished itself by consistently promoting anti-Semitic propaganda - propaganda which formed an integral part of the movement's philosophy. As will be shown in later chapters, Social Credit leaders such as Ernest Manning and Solon Low did little to curb the anti-Semitic propaganda until it proved politically expedient to do so. More importantly, throughout the war, Social Credit's stance on the "Jewish question" certainly did nothing to persuade the Canadian government to adopt a more humanitarian approach toward Jewish refugees. Accordingly, the Social Credit movement must share responsibility for Canada's poor human rights record during the Second World War.

Any assessment of the impact of Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda is fraught with difficulties. It is difficult to prove that it fomented anti-Semitism, or that Alberta's electors voted for Social Credit because of its anti-Semitic philosophy. However, these should not be the only standards by which political anti-Semitic propaganda is judged. A significant and valid way in which to assess Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda is to examine the perspective of that group most directly affected and potentially threatened. The response of Canadian Jewry, and specifically, the Canadian Jewish Congress, will help crystallize in human, subjective terms that more ideological, abstract battle which pitted the Social Credit movement against the shadowy "international Jewish financier." Indeed, the Canadian Jewish Congress, the watchdog of the Canadian Jewish community, was negatively impacted by this propaganda and spent several years attempting to end it.

The Canadian Jewish Congress's involvement with the Social Credit movement would prove to be long, frustrating, and in many ways, unsuccessful. Before this relationship can be analysed, however, the history and structure of organized Canadian Jewry must be examined.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

¹ Howard Palmer notes that between 1911 and 1941, the number of Jews in Alberta hovered around one-half per cent of the population and that "[c]learly, the anti-Semitism in rural Alberta was ideological rather than personal. Since only a handful of the 4,000 Jews in Alberta at this time lived in rural areas, the Jewish presence there was primarily figurative. For most people the Jew was a character from the Bible and from folklore, not a real person." Howard Palmer, Patterns of Prejudice: A History of Nativism in Alberta (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), 10, 153.

² *Canadian Social Crediter*, 14 December 1944.

³ Solon Low, "Men or Money?" n.d. (PAM, JHSWC Collection, P5128, File 20.5). Rothschild's comment was often used in Social Credit propaganda, although there is no record of him ever making such a statement. Significantly, Social Credit propaganda did not provide the source for this quote nor indicate to whom Rothschild had allegedly made this statement. For an overview of the life and career of Meyer Amschel Rothschild, see John Reeves, The Rothschilds: The Financial Rulers of Nations (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivingston, 1887); Egon Caesar Corti, The Rise of the House of Rothschild (London: Victor Gollancz, 1928).

⁴ *Today and Tomorrow*, 31 August 1944; *Canadian Social Crediter*, 17 July 1947.

⁵ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 17 July 1947; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 7 August 1947 (CJCNA, DA2, Box 3, File 4).

⁶ Rosenberg called the correspondence "fiction and foolish fiction at that" and argued that the *Canadian Social Crediter* was attempting "to give the impression that international Jews ... are engaged in a conspiracy against the people." Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 7 August 1947.

⁷ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 10 October 1946; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes et al., 25 October 1946 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁸ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 18 September 1947; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 20 October 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7A).

⁹ "Address by Solon Low on Monday evening, February 19, 1945 at the Playhouse Theatre [Winnipeg]," n.d. (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁰ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 21 November 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7).

¹¹ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 13 November 1947; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 21 November 1947.

¹² *Today and Tomorrow*, 30 September 1943.

¹³ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 13 November 1947; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 21 November 1947.

¹⁴ *Today and Tomorrow*, 9 December 1943.

¹⁵ *Today and Tomorrow*, 16 December 1943.

¹⁶ *Today and Tomorrow*, 8 October 1942.

¹⁷ *Today and Tomorrow*, 27 April 1944.

¹⁸ The Alberta Social Credit Board published Byrne's address as a pamphlet entitled, "Battle for Freedom" which was available at the Legislative Buildings in Edmonton. *Today and Tomorrow*, 13 May 1943; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 27 June 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7).

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Other Social Credit members were less circumspect in their identification of the international conspirators. Louis Even, head of the Quebec wing of the Social Credit Party, argued that the forces responsible for the success and financing of the 1917 Russian Revolution were "[w]orld Jewish capitalists." Memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 25 June 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 31); *Regina Leader-Post*, 22 November 1944; memo, 1 February 1945 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

²¹ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 14 December 1944.

²² *Canadian Social Crediter*, 4 July 1946; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*," n.d., c. 29 January 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

²³ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 14 December 1944.

²⁴ The Social Credit government won the 8 August 1944 provincial election with a total of fifty-one out of fifty-seven seats. Following the election, Manning gave a radio broadcast over the CBC Alberta network on 13 September 1944. *Today and Tomorrow*, 14 September 1944.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ *The Times* (London), 21 March 1930; *Today and Tomorrow*, 22 July 1943.

²⁷ *Today and Tomorrow*, 22 July 1943.

²⁸ *Today and Tomorrow*, 27 January 1944.

²⁹ *Canadian Social Creditor*, 3 January 1946; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Creditor*."

³⁰ "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Creditor*."

³¹ *Ibid.*; *Canadian Social Creditor*, 3 January 1946.

³² *Today and Tomorrow*, 21 September 1944.

³³ *Today and Tomorrow*, 8 October 1942.

³⁴ *Today and Tomorrow*, 1 April 1943.

³⁵ *Today and Tomorrow*, 4 May 1944.

³⁶ *Today and Tomorrow*, 31 August 1944.

³⁷ Regarding Principal James's involvement with the Reconstruction Council, *Today and Tomorrow* noted that he had been appointed chairman of the seven-man Committee on Reconstruction which went to Britain in early 1942 to consult with its authorities regarding post-war reconstruction, and added: "[e]verybody realizes the disaster of losing the war, now we had better understand the penalties of winning it if the arch-intriguers of International Finance have their way. Our choice is between German gangsters, and International racketeers. Nearly everyone believed we are fighting to save democracy, but, according to Dr. James, democracy is to be replaced by world dictatorship and the rule of gold." *Ibid.*; *Today and Tomorrow*, 12 March 1942.

³⁸ "Bretton Woods" was the informal name for the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference which met at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire from 1 July to 22 July 1944. The purpose of the Conference was to make financial arrangements for the postwar world. It was attended by experts representing 44 states or governments, who drew up proposals for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), both of which were ratified and constituted in 1945 and 1946 respectively. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference was held at the Dumbarton Oaks mansion in Georgetown, Washington, DC from 21 August to 7 October 1944 and was attended by representatives from China, the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom. There proposals were formulated for a world organization which became the United Nations. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals, called the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, together with the agreements reached at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, formed the basis of the negotiations at the San Francisco Conference in 1945, out of which came the Charter of the United Nations. George Schild, *Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks: American Economic and Political Postwar Planning in the Summer of 1944* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); *Edmonton Bulletin*, 14 October 1944.

³⁹ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 5 February 1947.

⁴⁰ *Saturday Night*, 17 July 1943

⁴¹ *Today and Tomorrow*, 23 September 1943.

⁴² *Today and Tomorrow*, 31 August 1944.

⁴³ *Lethbridge Herald*, 10 January 1945.

⁴⁴ *Montreal Daily Star*, 14 July 1947.

⁴⁵ The Federal Reserve Board, organized in 1913 under the terms of the Federal Reserve Act, acts as the governing board of the US Federal Reserve System, the central banking authority of the United States. After 1935, the Federal Reserve Board was known as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Carl H. Moore, *The Federal Reserve System: A History of the First 75 Years* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 1990).

⁴⁶ Paul Warburg (1868-1932) was a member of the US bank of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company, and also chairman of the Federal Reserve Board; Max Warburg (1867-1946) was a financial adviser to the German delegation to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919; and James Warburg (1896-1969), son of Paul Warburg, was a banker and economist, a member of Franklin Roosevelt's original "brain trust," and author of several books. Ron Chernow, *The Warburgs: The Twentieth-Century Odyssey of a Remarkable Jewish Family* (New York: Random House, 1993).

⁴⁷ *Today and Tomorrow*, 27 April 1944.

⁴⁸ *Western Producer*, 9 October 1941.

⁴⁹ *Today and Tomorrow*, 21 September 1944.

⁵⁰ McFadden was a Republican Congressman from Pennsylvania, representing the fifteenth congressional district. He was known for his long-winded diatribes against the "international financiers" and his dropping

of Jewish names in the *Congressional Record*. Other representatives accused him of being pro-Hitler and fascistic. United States, Congress, House of Representatives, *Congressional Record* (15 December 1931), 579.

⁵¹ Ibid., 571, 574; *Today and Tomorrow*, 27 January 1944.

⁵² *Today and Tomorrow*, 27 April 1944. The party organ reported that McFadden made this statement during a speech in Congress on 19 June 1932, which was a Sunday - the House of Representatives did not meet that day. The *Congressional Record* for the days before and after 19 June does not record any such statement by McFadden. United States, *Congressional Record* (16-21 June 1932).

⁵³ *Today and Tomorrow*, 27 January 1944. The party organ was referring specifically to McFadden's statements on 15 December 1931.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 3 January 1946; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."

⁵⁶ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 19 October 1944.

⁵⁷ In *America Conquers Britain*, Denny argued that the United States was usurping Britain's place as ruler of the world through its financial hegemony and its "Americanisation of Europe." Ludwell Denny, *America Conquers Britain* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930); *Western Producer*, 9 October 1941; *Today and Tomorrow*, 6 March 1941.

⁵⁸ *Western Producer*, 9 October 1941; *Today and Tomorrow*, 6 March 1941.

⁵⁹ United States, *Congressional Record* (15 December 1931), 575-6; *Western Producer*, 30 January 1941; *Today and Tomorrow*, 6 March 1941.

⁶⁰ *Western Producer*, 9 October 1941.

⁶¹ The Union Now Movement, also known as Federal Union, was headquartered in New York and run by Clarence K. Streit and E.W. Balduf, as chairman and director respectively. The Movement described itself as a "non-profit membership association" with chapters in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ireland, India, and Argentina. Through its several publications, including *Federal Union World* (New York), *The Student Federalist* (New York), *Federal Union News* (London), *Federal Union News Bulletin* (Auckland, New Zealand), and *Federal Union Bulletin* (Edinburgh, Scotland), Union Now worked actively toward a world union of democracies. In many ways, Union Now was an idealistic prototype of what would become the United Nations Organization. Clarence K. Streit, *Union Now* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1939), and *Union Now With Britain* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941).

⁶² James P. Warburg, *Peace in Our Time?* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1940).

⁶³ *Today and Tomorrow*, 27 April 1944.

⁶⁴ *Today and Tomorrow*, 27 January 1944.

⁶⁵ *Today and Tomorrow*, 18 November 1943.

⁶⁶ *Today and Tomorrow*, 27 April 1944.

⁶⁷ *Western Producer*, 9 October 1941.

⁶⁸ *Today and Tomorrow*, 19 November 1942.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ *Western Producer*, 30 January 1941.

⁷¹ Cecil Spring-Rice was replaced by Lord Reading as ambassador to the US during the First World War. Louis Rosenberg of the Canadian Jewish Congress described Spring-Rice as a "pathological anti-Semite." Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 5 February 1947; David H. Burton, *Cecil Spring Rice: A Diplomat's Life* (Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1990); Valentine Chirol, *Cecil Spring Rice In Memoriam* (London: John Murray, 1919).

⁷² *Western Producer*, 30 January 1941.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ *Western Producer*, 9 October 1941.

⁷⁵ *Today and Tomorrow*, 18 November 1943.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ *Western Producer*, 30 January 1941.

⁷⁸ Beginning in 1933, Political and Economic Planning issued a series of influential reports dealing with industry, economic development, and other issues of social concern. It published studies on coal-mining, iron and steel industry, building and agriculture, transportation, electricity and gas supply, international

trade, population trends, the location of new industries, regional development, and nutrition. Political and Economic Planning was part of the broader trend toward state planning and nationalization of industry which reached its apex under Neville Chamberlain in the late 1930s. John Pinder, ed., Fifty Years of Political and Economic Planning: Looking Forward, 1931-1981 (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1981).

⁷⁹ *Today and Tomorrow*, 1 April 1943; *Planning* (P.E.P.) (4 October 1938), 2; *Canadian Social Creditor*, 16 November 1944.

⁸⁰ *Today and Tomorrow*, 1 April 1943.

⁸¹ *Today and Tomorrow*, 13 May 1943; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 27 June 1947.

⁸² *Today and Tomorrow*, 31 August 1944.

⁸³ *Today and Tomorrow*, 27 April 1944.

⁸⁴ *Today and Tomorrow*, 2 January 1941.

⁸⁵ Bernard Baruch (1870-1965) had a lengthy and prominent career, serving as a member of the Supreme Economic Council at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 and also as personal advisor to Woodrow Wilson on the terms of the peace. He served as an adviser to Franklin Roosevelt on wartime economic mobilization during World War II, although he did not hold an administrative position. After World War II, Baruch was instrumental in the formulation of US policy at the United Nations regarding international control of nuclear weapons. Bernard M. Baruch, Baruch: My Own Story (New York: Henry Holt, 1957); Margaret L. Coit, Mr. Baruch (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957); James Grant, Bernard M. Baruch: The Adventures of a Wall Street Legend (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983).

⁸⁶ *Today and Tomorrow*, 29 January 1942.

⁸⁷ The Beveridge Report was named after Sir William Beveridge (1879-1963), one of Great Britain's foremost economists who directed the London School of Economics from 1919 to 1937. Beveridge was responsible for helping shape Britain's postwar welfare state policies and institutions through his 1942 report entitled, Social Insurance and Allied Services, also known as the Beveridge Report or Beveridge Plan. Sir William Beveridge, Social Insurance and Allied Services (New York: MacMillan, 1942); Janet Beveridge, Beveridge and His Plan (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1954); José Harris, William Beveridge: A Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). Similarly, the Marsh Report was named after Dr Leonard Marsh (1906-1982), a Canadian economist who studied at the London School of Economics and became director of an interdisciplinary social-science research programme at McGill University from 1930 to 1941. Marsh was an early member of the group of social reformers who eventually formed the League for Social Reconstruction. He was a major contributor to the League's influential book, Social Planning for Canada, published in 1935. He was also research advisor for the federal Committee on Postwar Reconstruction from 1941 to 1944, and published his influential Report on Social Security for Canada in 1943, also known as the Marsh Report. Leonard Marsh, Report on Social Security for Canada (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1943; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975); Research Committee of the League for Social Reconstruction, Social Planning for Canada (Toronto: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1935; Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1975) and Democracy Needs Socialism (Toronto: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1938).

⁸⁸ Alberta Social Credit Board, Annual Report, 1943 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2, File 8A); *Today and Tomorrow*, 4 May 1944.

⁸⁹ Ibid.; League for Social Reconstruction, Social Planning for Canada, 506-7.

⁹⁰ Alberta Social Credit Board, Annual Report, 1943; *Today and Tomorrow*, 4 May 1944.

⁹¹ *Canadian Social Creditor*, 19 October 1944.

⁹² Alberta Social Credit Board, Annual Report, 1943; *Today and Tomorrow*, 4 May 1944.

⁹³ MP Norman Jaques often led the attack against the proposed United Nations, and in debates in the House of Commons regarding the UN Charter, Jaques warned that the UN was a front for international conspirators. In one discussion of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Jaques complained that this agency was fulfilling the UN's intention to "reeducate the world" by teaching "that [the world] no longer needs religion as a basis of its moral code." Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Debates (Ottawa: King's Printer, 24 June 1947), 4569; *Canadian Social Creditor*, 3 July 1947; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 14 July 1947 (CJCNA, DA2, Box 3, File 4).

⁹⁴ See footnote 38 for an overview of the Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks conferences.

⁹⁵ *Canadian Social Creditor*, 19 October 1944.

- ⁹⁶ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 18 July 1946; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."
- ⁹⁷ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 12 October 1944.
- ⁹⁸ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 19 October 1944.
- ⁹⁹ *Ibid.* The "big four" were presumably Great Britain, China, United States, and Russia.
- ¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁰¹ *Montreal Herald*, 6 April 1945; Canada, *Debates* (23 March 1945), 152-3.
- ¹⁰² *Today and Tomorrow*, 19 August 1943. Although this exact quote cannot be located in *Hansard*, Jaques makes similar statements throughout the debate. Canada, *Debates* (24 July 1943), 5396-401.
- ¹⁰³ Canada, *Debates* (24 July 1943), 5398; *Today and Tomorrow*, 19 August 1943; *The Protocols and World Revolution, Including a Translation and Analysis of the 'Protocols of the Meetings of the Zionist Men of Wisdom'* (Boston: Small, Maynard, 1920), 27, 69.
- ¹⁰⁴ *Today and Tomorrow*, 21 September 1944.
- ¹⁰⁵ *Today and Tomorrow*, 21 May 1942.
- ¹⁰⁶ *Today and Tomorrow*, 29 January 1942.
- ¹⁰⁷ *Today and Tomorrow*, 27 January 1944.
- ¹⁰⁸ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 1 August 1946; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."
- ¹⁰⁹ *Today and Tomorrow*, 21 September 1944.
- ¹¹⁰ *Today and Tomorrow*, 8 October 1942.
- ¹¹¹ *Today and Tomorrow*, 3 June 1943.
- ¹¹² *Today and Tomorrow*, 18 November 1943.
- ¹¹³ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 29 August 1946.
- ¹¹⁴ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 8 August 1946; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."
- ¹¹⁵ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 5 December 1946; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."
- ¹¹⁶ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 26 September 1946; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."
- ¹¹⁷ *Today and Tomorrow*, 21 September 1944.
- ¹¹⁸ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 10 October 1946; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."
- ¹¹⁹ The *Canadian Tribune* had published an article, "Social Credit Mask for Nazi Propaganda Exposed in Alberta" which severely criticized the Social Credit Party for its transparent attack on Jews and its "double-talk" about international finance and the "hidden hand of Satan." In response, the *Canadian Social Crediter* reprinted the *Canadian Tribune* article, along with a denial of Social Credit's anti-Semitism. *Canadian Tribune*, 2 December 1944; *Canadian Social Crediter*, 14 December 1944.
- ¹²⁰ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 14 December 1944.
- ¹²¹ *Toronto Daily Star*, 24 February 1945.
- ¹²² *Toronto Daily Star*, 13 March 1945.
- ¹²³ *Toronto Daily Star*, 22 March 1945.
- ¹²⁴ *Toronto Daily Star*, 2 April 1945; *Canadian Social Crediter*, 5 April 1945; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."
- ¹²⁵ It will be remembered that earlier, the *Canadian Tribune* severely criticized the Social Credit Party for its anti-Semitic rhetoric. The *Tribune* at the same time referred derisively to Bourcier's comments that "millions are looking to Alberta and Social Credit as a guiding light." *Canadian Tribune*, 2 December 1944.
- ¹²⁶ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 14 December 1944.
- ¹²⁷ James A. MacPherson, leader of the Labour-Progressive Party in Alberta, had criticized national Social Credit leader Solon Low for championing the same "anti-Soviet, Jew-baiting policies [as those of] ... Social Credit members Norman Jacques [sic] and Anthony Hlynka." *Edmonton Bulletin*, 7 October 1944.
- ¹²⁸ *Edmonton Bulletin*, 14 October 1944.
- ¹²⁹ The person was one William Steiner of Vancouver, who had written to Norman Jaques some time in 1943 to attempt to persuade the latter to abandon his anti-Semitic views. Steiner also sent Jaques a copy of the magazine, *Jewish Monthly* at that time. Jaques wrote back to Steiner on House of Commons stationery. Steiner forwarded a copy of Jaques's letter to the Canadian Jewish Congress in Montreal for its edification; unfortunately, there is no record of Steiner's original letter to Jaques. Letter, Jaques to Steiner, 13 September 1943 (CJCNA, CA Box 33, File 306).
- ¹³⁰ *Ibid.*
- ¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² *Maclean's Magazine*, 1 September 1944.

¹³³ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 12 October 1944.

¹³⁴ *Today and Tomorrow*, 9 December 1943.

¹³⁵ The purpose of the Morgenthau Plan was to eliminate for good Germany's capacity for making war. It was not executed mostly because the Allied powers believed German military strength was needed to counter the "totalitarian" impulses of the Soviet Union. For a detailed examination of Henry Morgenthau and the Morgenthau Plan, see John Morton Blum, *From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of War, 1941-1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), and *Roosevelt and Morgenthau* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970).

¹³⁶ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 22 August 1946; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."

¹³⁷ During the immediate postwar period, every major newspaper in Canada detailed the discoveries of death camps by Allied forces, and when the Nuremberg war crimes trials took place in 1945-46, the press often gave these events front page coverage. Accordingly, it can be stated conservatively that the Jewish Holocaust was common knowledge throughout Canada by 1945.

¹³⁸ Lieutenant-General Morgan served as Chief of Operations for Displaced Persons, Germany, under the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) from October 1945 to August 1946. He was replaced in August 1946 by Meyer Cohen as Acting Chief. In the official history of UNRRA, the reasons for Morgan's replacement is alluded to in the discussion on termination of UNRRA personnel: "One mission chief was himself dismissed both for 'unsatisfactory performance' and 'misconduct.'" George Woodbridge, *UNRRA: The History of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration*, vol. 1 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), 265. For a hagiographical discussion of Lieutenant-General Morgan's career, see Sir Frederick Morgan, *Overture to Overlord* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1950).

¹³⁹ Lieutenant-General Morgan was quoted as follows: "[t]rainloads of Jews were arriving in Berlin Alshost [sic] daily from Poland ... the pockets of most of the Jews were well lined with money, and they were well fed and well clothed. Their stories of persecution of Jews in Poland ... were notable for their similarity ... The stories invariably were that the atrocities [sic] 'occurred in the next town' ... Some motivating force or promise ... is influencing the Jews to give up comfortable living in Poland, as evidenced by their physical condition, dress and money when they reach Berlin." The *Edmonton Bulletin* stated that "Morgan said he was becoming more and more convinced that reports of pogroms and atrocities against the Jews in Poland were based less and less on fact." *Edmonton Bulletin*, 2 January 1946; *Canadian Social Crediter*, 10 January 1946; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."

¹⁴⁰ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 10 January 1946.

¹⁴¹ Meyer Cohen served as Acting Chief of Displaced Persons Operations, Germany from August 1946 to June 1947.

¹⁴² *Canadian Social Crediter*, 29 August 1946. It is of passing interest that La Guardia was half-Jewish, on his mother's side. Social Credit propagandists apparently did not know this, by virtue that they never mentioned La Guardia's "Jewishness."

¹⁴³ *Regina Leader-Post*, 11 June 1947.

¹⁴⁴ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 19 June 1947; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 27 June 1947.

¹⁴⁵ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 8 August 1946; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."

¹⁴⁶ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 16 May 1946; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."

¹⁴⁷ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 8 August 1946; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."

¹⁴⁸ *Australian Social Crediter*, 23 March 1946, cited in *Canadian Social Crediter*, May 16, 1946; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."

¹⁴⁹ Sulzberger had made these comments before the Mizpah Congregation in Chattanooga, Tennessee on 26 October 1946. *Canadian Social Crediter*, 30 October 1947; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 6 November 1947 (CJCNA, DA2, Box 3, File 4).

¹⁵⁰ The *Canadian Social Crediter* reported that in January 1947, A. Homer had submitted his "Memorandum on the Development of Industries as the means to the future prosperity of Palestine" to the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry on the Jewish Problem in Europe and the Future of Palestine. However, the Anglo-American Committee met in January 1946 and submitted its Report in April 1946. There is no record of any such memo being submitted to the Anglo-American Committee. Howard M. Sachar, ed., *The Rise of Israel: A Documentary Record from the Nineteenth Century to 1948*, 39 vols. (New York: Garland Series, 1987); *Canadian Social Crediter*, 11 December 1947; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 19 December 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁵¹ This article was part one of a two-part article; however, the *Canadian Social Crediter* never published the second part due to its changed editorial policy on anti-Semitism. *Canadian Social Crediter*, 11, 18 December 1947.

¹⁵² *Canadian Social Crediter*, 23, 30 October 1947; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 6 November 1947.

¹⁵³ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 6 November 1947.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.; *Canadian Social Crediter*, 23, 30 October 1947.

¹⁵⁵ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 6 June 1946; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."

¹⁵⁶ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 18 September 1947; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 21 October 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7A).

¹⁵⁷ The details of the Palestine Question, the settlement of Jewish refugees in the postwar period, and the creation of the State of Israel are extremely complex; suffice to say, in September 1945 three Jewish underground groups in Palestine - the Haganah (Defence), the LEHI (Stern Gang), and the Irgun Zvai Leumi (National Military Organization) - all commanded by Menahem Begin, put aside their differences and joined together in a rebellion against British rule. They sabotaged railway lines, police stations, and radar traps attempting to capture illegal Jewish immigrants. On 22 July 1946, they bombed the King David Hotel, which housed Britain's military and government offices in Jerusalem. The bombing left ninety-one dead and forty-six injured. Of the dead, there were twenty-one first-rank government officials, thirteen soldiers, three policemen, and five members of the public. The remaining forty-nine were secretarial workers, hotel employees, and other service workers. By nationality, twenty-eight Britons, forty-one Arabs, seventeen Jews, two Armenians, and one Russian, Greek, and Egyptian were killed. Thurston Clarke, *By Blood and Fire: The Attack on the King David Hotel* (Toronto: Academic Press Canada, 1981).

¹⁵⁸ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 26 September 1946; "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."

¹⁵⁹ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 10 January 1946.

¹⁶⁰ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 2 November 1944.

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² *Canadian Social Crediter*, 30 October 1947; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 7 November 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7).

CHAPTER THREE

A HISTORY OF CANADIAN JEWRY AND THE CANADIAN JEWISH CONGRESS

In order to comprehend fully the response of the Canadian Jewish Congress to the anti-Semitic propaganda of the Social Credit movement, it is necessary to have a sense of the Canadian Jewish community and the aims of the Canadian Jewish Congress during this period. Accordingly, what follows is a brief history of Canadian Jewry and the Canadian Jewish Congress, with a specific emphasis on the nature of Congress's public relations work from the time of its re-organization in 1934 until the early postwar period. An examination of Congress's evolving public relations philosophy, especially as it pertained to anti-defamation work, will help explain the difficulties Congress experienced in its relationship with the Social Credit movement.

Any assessment of the aims and achievements of the Canadian Jewish Congress must begin with an understanding of Canadian Jewish history. For the purpose of this study, Canadian Jewish history can be divided into three periods: 1760 to 1880; 1880 to 1919; and 1919 to the early postwar period.¹ The first phase of Canadian Jewish history, 1760 to 1880, is a story of establishment and immigration. After the British Conquest of Quebec in 1759,² several families, mostly of Sephardic background and Spanish and Portuguese origin, established themselves in Lower Canada, although there is also evidence of a small number Ashkenazi German Jews.³ The Jewish community in Quebec, although small, soon came to be recognized as the heart of British North American Jewry.⁴ Aaron Hart, one of the earliest Jews to settle in Trois-Rivières, Québec in 1760,⁵

together with his sons Moses, Ezekiel⁶ and Benjamin, played a prominent part in early Canadian Jewish history.⁷

In 1769 the Jewish population of Canada was about fifty, nearly all of whom lived in Quebec.⁸ The centre of Canadian Jewish life during these early years was Montreal; by 1831 there were still only 107 Jews in all of Canada, fifty of whom lived in Montreal.⁹ In 1847, twenty-one year old Reverend Abraham de Sola¹⁰ was appointed to lead the Sephardic congregation of Montreal (Shearith Israel), and for several decades he was the only Jewish spiritual leader in British North America. Not surprisingly, de Sola played a major role in the establishment of Canadian Jewish religious life¹¹ and acted as the sole source of indisputable authority.¹² He was succeeded by his two sons, Clarence and Meldola, who provided strong leadership for the Canadian Jewish community for several more decades.¹³

By 1869, the Jewish population of Canada had increased to approximately 1,330 and congregations had been established in Montreal, Quebec, Toronto, and Victoria, but there was still no real active Jewish community life in any of these cities.¹⁴ The majority of settlers were English Jews of Spanish and Portuguese ancestry, although a number of English, German, Alsatian, and Polish Ashkenazi Jews arrived in the 1840s and 1850s.¹⁵ These groups, however, were soon outnumbered by Jewish immigrants from Russia, Poland, Lithuania and Romania, who came to Canada after 1880.¹⁶

The second period of Canadian Jewish history, from 1880 to 1919, witnessed a great increase in the Jewish population, from approximately 2,400 in 1881 to 6,500 in 1891, to 16,000 in 1901, to 75,000 in 1911, to approximately 125,000 in 1921.¹⁷ This dramatic increase was caused by the immigration of large numbers of refugees fleeing from

pogroms in Eastern Europe and immigrants seeking increased economic and social mobility.¹⁸ Beginning in 1880, a mass exodus of Eastern European Jewish immigrants arrived in Canada.¹⁹ This proportionately large number of immigrants placed a heavy burden on the small and unprepared Canadian Jewish community, which discovered that it lacked adequate resources to cope with the immigrants' arrival.²⁰

Consequently, to deal with this large influx, Montreal Jewry appealed to Baron Maurice de Hirsch, a German Jewish businessman, philanthropist, and founder of the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA).²¹ When the Baron heard of the problems of the Montreal Jewish community, he allocated a fund of twenty thousand dollars for relief work among Jewish immigrants in Canada.²² In the following years, Hirsch became, in effect, the patron of the Montreal Jewish community, providing extensive financial support and encouraging Montreal Jewry to take the immigrant Jews under its charge.²³ The Young Men's Hebrew Benevolent Society, established in Montreal in 1863 and renamed the Baron de Hirsch Institute in 1890,²⁴ received much of the financial assistance. With the help of the Jewish Colonization Association, the Baron de Hirsch Institute settled and integrated a large number of Jewish immigrants in the Canadian Northwest.²⁵ These Jewish agricultural settlements would not have existed without Hirsch's philanthropy.²⁶

In sum, in the decade following 1880 the Canadian Jewish population nearly tripled, from 2,500 to 6,500. Thousands more Jewish immigrants had arrived in Canada, but proceeded onward to the United States.²⁷ During this period, the Canadian prairies took a proportionately large percentage of the East European Jews who arrived after 1880. For example, in 1881 there were thirty-one Jews in Manitoba. By 1901 there were 13,965

Jews in the three prairie provinces, and by 1919 the prairie Jewish population had increased to approximately 25,000, of whom nearly 15,000 lived in Winnipeg.²⁸

The third period in Canadian Jewish history from 1919 to the postwar period is most distinguished by a decrease in Jewish immigration beginning in the 1920s and reaching its nadir during the Second World War. While the total Jewish population in Canada in 1919 was 124,000, the 1941 Census recorded 170,000 Jews or approximately 1.5 percent of the total population.²⁹ Because the number of Jewish immigrants between 1920 and 1945 was practically nil, nearly all Jews in Canada at the end of the war had been born in Canada or had resided there at least twenty years.³⁰

In 1941 Jews resided in every major city in the Dominion, and approximately 77 percent of them lived in Montreal and Toronto.³¹ Proportionately, however, the number of Jews in Canada was extremely small. Only Ontario, Quebec, and Manitoba had Jewish populations of around 2.0 percent of their respective provincial populations. The remaining provinces had less than 0.5 percent Jews in their populations.³² In Alberta in 1941, Jews were present in the following numbers: Calgary - 1,794 (2.0 percent of the city's population); Edmonton, 1,449 (1.5 percent); Lethbridge, 153 (1.1 percent); Medicine Hat, 93 (0.9 percent); Drumheller, 29 (1.1 percent). In sixty-four other communities throughout the province less than twenty Jews resided in each, never forming more than 2.0 percent of the population.³³ The notable exception was Rumsey, a tiny farming community which had previously been the site of an attempted Jewish farming settlement.³⁴ In 1941, three resident Jews formed 3.3 percent of the total population.³⁵

Thus, the third period of Canadian Jewish history from 1919 to the postwar period was characterized by a dearth of immigration, which is striking given the plight of European Jewish refugees at that time. This period was also characterized by a changing relationship between the established “old guard” of Canadian Jewry and the recently-arrived East European immigrants, who began to exert their influence against the hegemony of the established “uptowners.” In Montreal especially, the “downtowners” increasing influence helped alter the community’s power relationships and facilitated the establishment of the Canadian Jewish Congress.

Certainly by 1919, the Montreal Jewish community had long been the leading Jewish community in Canada. It had developed a Canadian and Jewish political and social ideology grounded in British ideals³⁶ and distinct from American Jewish culture by its maintenance of Orthodox Judaism and indifference to Reformism. But the arrival of the East European immigrants in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century altered community dynamics and changed the face of Canadian Jewry. While the East Europeans initially put heavy demands on the established community’s philanthropic societies, specifically the Young Men’s Hebrew Benevolent Society,³⁷ they quickly began to contribute to the community infrastructure of Canadian Jewish life through their own Zionist societies, congregations, educational institutions, *landsmanshaften*, sick benefit societies, and social service organizations. Moreover, it was the East Europeans who persuaded the more established and conservative element of Montreal Jewry that a nationwide representative organization like the Canadian Jewish Congress was necessary.³⁸

Indisputably, the establishment of the Canadian Jewish Congress in 1919 was a watershed in Canadian Jewish history. It was created largely in response to problems arising from World War One, specifically the oppression of Jews overseas, immigration of Jewish refugees, and renewed hopes for a Jewish homeland in Palestine brought about by the 1917 Balfour Declaration. The Canadian Jewish Congress had a broader purpose, however: to act as *the* representative body of the Canadian Jewish community³⁹ and broker for Jewish interests in the broader Canadian polity.

The origins of the Canadian Jewish Congress date back to the creation of the American Jewish Congress during World War One. The American Jewish Congress, like its later Canadian counterpart, began as a “grassroots” movement of the Jewish masses. The idea of a Jewish congress found its most ardent supporters among the Jewish working class, the *landsmanshaften*, the Labour Zionist and Jewish trade union movements, and those who had arrived from Eastern Europe during the period 1905 to 1914.⁴⁰ The strongest advocates were those Jews who had personal experience of pogroms, repression, and anti-Semitic discrimination in the old country, as well as the economic and cultural problems facing them in the United States.⁴¹

The idea of an American Jewish Congress was first formally proposed in 1914 and its first organization committee was formed in 1915. Its establishment was received enthusiastically by Canadian Jews, and the American Jewish Congress strongly encouraged the Canadians’ efforts to establish a similar congress.⁴² However, the Canadian Jewish Congress was to have a delayed and difficult birth, mostly due to the opposition of the Federation of Zionist Societies of Canada, a nation-wide movement established in 1898 under the leadership of Clarence de Sola. De Sola, a member of the

Spanish-Portuguese “aristocracy” of Montreal Jewry, believed that the Zionist Federation was an adequate national Jewish congress, even though it did not have the support of all Canadian Jewry.⁴³ According to Gerald Tulchinsky, “Clarence de Sola would have no congress as long as he controlled the federation [of Zionist Societies].”⁴⁴ In contrast, the quickly-maturing immigrant community of Montreal pushed for a more representative organization - one consisting of democratically-elected representatives, not leaders chosen through deference; one supported by labour unions and popular Jewish organizations, not just the aristocracy. In short, the East European downtowners wanted an organization which would be representative of all Canadian Jewry, not just the established elite.⁴⁵

The idea of a nation-wide congress gradually crystallized into a conflict between the established old guard and the newly-arrived East European immigrants. By World War One, the differences between the two groups had reached a crisis point. In 1915 the East European downtowners of Montreal cooperated with the established Spanish-Portuguese uptowners to create an Assistance Fund for war relief of European Jews. However, the uptowners took over the campaign and allocated most of the funds raised for local welfare.⁴⁶ In response, the disgruntled East Europeans created their own War Relief Conference to ensure that priority would be given to overseas relief funding.⁴⁷ In March 1915, the downtowners convened a conference of seventy-one Jewish organizations⁴⁸ in Montreal which emphasized overseas relief and called for the establishment of a nation-wide democratically-elected representative Jewish organization. The conference, calling itself the Canadian Jewish Alliance, resolved that “a Canadian Jewish organization be formed to represent and defend all Jewish interests,”⁴⁹ and that its focus should be the immediate mobilization of relief for war-stricken European Jews, the affirmation of

democratic principles, and a concern with immigration problems.⁵⁰ It was also hoped that this organization would represent Canadian Jewry at the eventual peace conference held at the end of the war.

Thus, the downtowners wanted the Canadian Jewish Alliance to act as a national organization representative of all Canadian Jewry. The Alliance elected as its president Reuben Brainin, a celebrated Hebrew and Yiddish author and editor of the *Kanader Adler*.⁵¹ Immediately following the conference, Brainin elicited nationwide support for the Alliance.⁵² Committees were organized in Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, Hamilton, Ottawa, Calgary, and other centres for the purpose of adopting similar resolutions, but little was accomplished until January 1919.⁵³ Yet the resolutions adopted at the 1915 conference and upheld by the Canadian Jewish Alliance would be the same ones upon which the Canadian Jewish Congress would be founded in 1919.

Notwithstanding the creation of the Canadian Jewish Alliance, between 1915 and 1919 there was delay and opposition from the Federation of Zionist Societies. The Federation refused to co-operate with the Canadian Jewish Alliance, because it considered itself to be *the* national Jewish voice and believed that it alone should represent Canadian Jewry at the eventual peace conference. To this end, in November 1915, the Zionist Federation convened a "counter-conference"⁵⁴ in Montreal, called the Conference of Canadian Jews. It brought together Zionist delegates from across Canada⁵⁵ in the hopes of fortifying the Federation's position as the representative organization for Canadian Jewry.

Yet the Canadian Jewish Alliance and the Conference of Canadian Jews were pursuing the same objectives: a national Jewish assembly, the promotion of Jewish rights at the peace conference, and the relief of Jewish war victims. As Stephen Speisman notes:

“[t]he real issue underlying the division ... concerned who should comprise the new organization and by what means the representatives should be chosen. The movement which had begun as an attempt to support Jewish interests abroad had become a dispute over who should dominate at home, a struggle between the old community and the new.”⁵⁶ Tulchinsky makes a similar observation: “[t]he difference between the two sides reflected the divided state of Canadian Jewry at this critical juncture of its history; the [Canadian Jewish] alliance was eclectic and feisty, democratic and socialist, while the [Zionist] federation was cautious and conservative, paternalistic and traditional. And while both camps believed in the same causes - the presentation of Jewish minority rights to the peace conference, the relief of war sufferers in Eastern Europe, and the future of Jewish settlement in Palestine - there were wide gulfs over the order of priorities and methods of presentation.”⁵⁷

By the end of the war, however, the tide of Canadian Jewish opinion had gradually swung in favour of the Canadian Jewish Alliance.⁵⁸ In Montreal, Jewish papers like the *Canadian Jewish Chronicle*, formerly unsympathetic, now began to favour the idea of a Canadian Jewish Congress. In addition, a significant number of Zionists, many of East European origin, began to support the congress movement.⁵⁹ The idea of a Canadian Jewish Congress was also encouraged by events south of the border, where shortly after the end of the war, delegates were elected at the Philadelphia sessions of the American Jewish Congress.⁶⁰

Although support for a national congress was stronger in Toronto and Winnipeg⁶¹ than in Montreal, it was the latter which was the birthplace of the Canadian Jewish Congress. In December 1918, H.M. Caiserman⁶² established a congress committee in Montreal,

which was intended to persuade all Jewish organizations, including the Federation of Zionist Societies, to send representatives to a congress. Fortunately for the movement, the Federation of Zionist Societies, now under new leadership, agreed to join.⁶³

Thus, on 26 January 1919, delegates from 125 Jewish organizations met at the Baron de Hirsch Institute in Montreal where they agreed on the necessity of establishing a congress to represent all elements of Canadian Jewry. As Tulchinsky notes, the conference's agenda "included the most burning issues of the day: the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, the recognition and legalization of Jewish national rights 'where they live in compact masses,' 'equal rights' with other minorities in Canada, affiliation with a world Jewish congress, relief of war-sufferers, assistance to Jewish immigration to Canada, and 'co-operation with the Canadian labour movement.'"⁶⁴ A committee of forty persons was elected to make arrangements for the election of delegates from the other Jewish communities.⁶⁵ The committee of forty was responsible for organizing the congress on a democratic basis, using the model of the British Board of Jewish Deputies to make the congress an "umbrella organization of other organizations."⁶⁶

The committee also determined that every Jew eighteen years and over should have the right to elect and be elected as a delegate to the congress; that election should be by secret ballot; and that the congress should not be merely a temporary organization, but should be a permanent body to which delegates would be elected at intervals of two years.⁶⁷ The congress would be a broadly-based democratic assembly composed of one delegate for every 750 Jews, with the exception of small communities where one delegate would represent every 100 Jews. Every Jewish national organization would be entitled to one

delegate, to ensure the representation of all shades of Canadian Jewish opinion.⁶⁸ The committee planned for elections to be held simultaneously throughout Canada on 2-3 March 1919, and for the first plenary session of the Canadian Jewish Congress to be held in Montreal on 16 March 1919.⁶⁹

Accordingly, district conferences were assembled in Montreal, Toronto, and Winnipeg to establish the procedure for the election of delegates,⁷⁰ and elections were held in these cities on 2-3 March 1919. Nearly 25,000 ballots were cast⁷¹ and 209 delegates were elected from forty-eight Jewish communities across Canada.⁷² Lyon Cohen was elected first president of the Canadian Jewish Congress⁷³ and H.M. Caiserman was elected permanent general secretary.⁷⁴ According to plan, the first plenary session of Congress was convened on 16 March 1919 and lasted for three days.⁷⁵ There were over 200 delegates present and over 2,500 visitors. Several resolutions were passed, including expressions of loyalty to Great Britain and regard for British institutions; the desire for a world Jewish Congress; a request that the Peace Treaty insert a minority rights clause for all racial and religious groups; and a protest against the massacre of Jews in Romania, Poland, and the Ukraine.⁷⁶ One of the most important resolutions stated that the Canadian Jewish Congress would work with other Jewish Congresses and the World Zionist Organizations to ensure that the promises of the Balfour Declaration were fulfilled and that a Jewish homeland would be established in Palestine.⁷⁷

Thus, by March 1919, the Canadian Jewish Congress had been born. Its significance for Canadian Jewish history cannot be overemphasized. As Congress's national research director Louis Rosenberg remarked, with the establishment of the Canadian Jewish Congress, "the Canadian Jewish community had come of age."⁷⁸ Tulchinsky also notes

how Congress's establishment ended a long struggle between the immigrants and the establishment, and signified "a veritable revolution in the power structure within the community." The East Europeans had demanded democratic governance of the Canadian Jewish community and had fought successfully against the bonds of intra-communal elite control and the political and social inferiority⁷⁹ they experienced as outsiders to "Our Crowd." When the immigrants finally succeeded in setting up a democratically elected body that was representative of all sectors of the Jewish community across Canada, "the East Europeans served notice that they had arrived and that they intended to be an important force in the community thereafter."⁸⁰ Stephen Speisman, in his discussion of the election of representatives to the first Canadian Jewish Congress, remarks that "[t]he new community ... seeing in Congress a chance for the East Europeans, the working class and the recent immigrants to have a voice at last in the organizational structure of Canadian Jewry, flocked to the polls ... The overwhelming number of successful candidates were East Europeans, Yiddish-speaking, and non-affluent ... The election, therefore, was rightly seen as a victory for the 'common people.'"⁸¹

Although the newly-born Canadian Jewish Congress planned to send delegates to the postwar peace conference, by the time it was established in March 1919, the Committee of Jewish Delegations (comprised of Jewish organizations from America and several European countries)⁸² was already at Versailles making representations on matters such as the promise of a Jewish state in Palestine, the political status of Jews in the world, and Jewish immigration.⁸³ Specifically, the Committee of Jewish Delegations wanted assurance that the rights of Jewish minorities would be enshrined in the constitutions of the new European states.⁸⁴ In the United States, the American Jewish Congress and

American Jewish Committee had organized a joint delegation to represent American Jewry on the Committee of Jewish Delegations. Although the newly-created Canadian Jewish Congress did not have time to send its own delegation, Congress officials quickly sent a cable supporting the recommendations of the Committee of Jewish Delegations at Versailles.

As part of its message, the Canadian Jewish Congress unanimously approved the terms of the 1917 Balfour Declaration and urged the peace conference to “recognize the aspiration and historic claims of the Jewish people in regard to Palestine.” It also urged the peace conference to demand that new or enlarged states or states desiring membership in the League of Nations remove “all civil, political, religious and national disabilities, and the prohibition of prejudicial discrimination of any kind whatsoever.”⁸⁵

In short, Congress’s message to the peace conference embodied those resolutions passed at its first plenary session, and notwithstanding there was no Canadian Jewish delegation at Versailles, Canadian Jewry had expressed its concerns and wishes and had supported the Committee of Jewish Delegations. It was important for Congress to rally behind other national Jewish organizations, for it showed its willingness and ability to be part of the larger world Jewish community. Indeed, the Committee of Jewish Delegations held influence at Versailles: the Balfour Declaration had been endorsed; the Treaty of Versailles had provided for minority rights in the new nations of Eastern Europe and promised equality for the Jews of Poland, Romania, and Hungary; and the new states in Central and Eastern Europe had promised they would not discriminate against Jewish and other minorities.⁸⁶ It must be added, of course, that many of the promises made at Versailles were soon grossly disregarded.

The Canadian Jewish Congress could record some definite successes after its first year of operation, which included the formation of the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society⁸⁷ and the co-ordination of Canadian Jewish War Relief Campaign activities. Yet the permanence of Congress was not guaranteed, despite the resolutions passed at its first plenary session. Interest and enthusiasm for Congress quickly waned among Canadian Jewry;⁸⁸ Congress activities faltered; and in a few years the organization was virtually defunct. It then disappeared as a force in Canadian Jewish life, not to be revived until 1933.⁸⁹ In general, the reasons for Congress's "enforced hibernation"⁹⁰ were lack of leadership, lack of funding, and apathy towards its agenda.⁹¹ Outside its three regional offices of Montreal, Toronto, and Winnipeg, Congress failed to set up any mechanism to maintain enthusiasm and continuity between its proposed annual conferences. Consequently, few delegates appeared at the plenary sessions of 1920 and 1921, and by the following year the organization had dispensed with national meetings altogether.⁹²

The lapsing of the Canadian Jewish Congress was a serious setback for Canadian Jewry, which was now "without its parliament, without its forum of opinions from across the intellectual spectrum, and without a voice for its collective concerns."⁹³ Although the 1920s were a relatively peaceful interlude for Canadian Jews, anti-Semitism in Canada, albeit muted, was well entrenched and required only more volatile economic and political conditions in order to flourish. These conditions arose during the Great Depression and the increasing political extremism of the 1930s. By 1929, the Montreal schools question, a thorny problem spanning nearly four decades, had reached a crisis level. The Jewish community found itself at the mercy of the Protestant community, the latter which would not grant Jewish parents a seat in the administration of the schools where their children

were receiving their public schoolings.⁹⁴ That same year in Quebec, Adrien Arcand established the Parti National Social Chrétien and his anti-Semitic campaign within the pages of *Le Goglu*, *Le Miroir*, and *Le Chameau*.⁹⁵ Within the province's political and religious hierarchy, there was very little support for the Jews under attack. Although the Montreal schools question appeared to be resolved in 1930 with the passage of the Jewish School Commission Act, the Catholic Church in Quebec took a strong stand against the Jewish schools which the provincial government had legislated into existence, and the Act was subsequently repealed.⁹⁶

In 1933 the election of Adolf Hitler as chancellor of Germany created further anxiety among Canadian Jews. Political and religious officials in Quebec, as in the rest of Canada, were unwilling to open Canada's doors to German Jewish refugees.⁹⁷ The "achat chez nous" movement, a campaign of economic nationalism directed against Jewish businessmen,⁹⁸ also reached its apogee in the early 1930s. In actuality an anti-Semitic boycott, achat chez nous was portrayed as a patriotic project to strengthen the economy and the morale of the francophone Catholic population. However, the result was that Jewish businessmen were injured in their commerce and some of them driven from their stores.⁹⁹ In 1934, perhaps the most bizarre strike in Canadian history¹⁰⁰ occurred at the Notre Dame Hospital in Montreal, where fourteen resident doctors walked off the job rather than work with Samuel Rabinovich, a Jew.

Many scholars have argued that the anti-Semitic agitation in Quebec during the interwar period was more virulent than in the rest of Canada. As Tulchinsky notes, "[t]he 1920s 'Achats Chez Nous' movement aimed at Jewish storekeepers; the pro-Fascist or anti-Semitic utterances of major Quebec provincial and municipal politicians; the rise of

Adrien Arcand and his Blue-shirts; the attempts by the Catholic syndicates to engender anti-Semitism among French-Canadian clothing workers; and the widespread campaign mounted by the Société Saint-Jean Baptiste and other organizations against the immigration of Jewish refugees during the 1930s all combined to let Jews know that in its special brand of anti-Semitism, as in most other respects, 'La province de Québec n'est pas un province comme les autres.'"¹⁰¹ Yet Quebec was not the only province to experience heightened anti-Semitism during this period. Indeed, Ontario held the only incident of physical violence against Jews during the Christie Pits riots in Toronto in 1933.¹⁰² The *Deutsche Bund* was active in nearly all German and Ukrainian communities in Saskatchewan in the 1930s, while the fascistic Canadian Nationalist Party, created in Winnipeg in 1933, found adherents among many Canadians, not solely those of German origin.¹⁰³ Beginning in 1935, the Alberta Social Credit movement embarked on a widespread propaganda campaign against "international Jewish finance" which lasted for several years. On the national level, prime minister Mackenzie King visited Hitler in Germany in 1937, and despite his knowledge of Hitler's persecution of Jews, found himself favourably disposed towards the chancellor.¹⁰⁴

In addition, it was not uncommon in the late 1930s for Jews to be barred from hotels, public beaches, golf courses, and parks of communities and summer resorts throughout Canada. In the late 1930s there was a startling increase in the number of individuals and companies who refused to rent living quarters to Jews, adopted policies of not employing Jews, and attempted to involve Jews in disturbances and acts of violence. But as Congress's H.M. Caiserman noted, "the most frightening development in Canada during the 1930s was the transition from sporadic and unorganized types of anti-Semitism to

organized activities sponsored by national organizations directed by professional agents of Nazi Germany.”¹⁰⁵

The increase in anti-Semitic agitation throughout Canada confirmed for Canadian Jewry that their country was indeed anti-Semitic. These incidents further emphasized the necessity of a strong and active congress which would protect the welfare of Canadian Jewry. Thus, much of the impetus for the reactivation of the Canadian Jewish Congress after 1933 came from the need to counter the increasingly virulent anti-Semitism in Quebec and elsewhere in Canada.¹⁰⁶ As Caiserman wrote: “Canadian Jewry, for the first time, was faced with an organised violent anti-Jewish propaganda ... [In Quebec] neither the French-Canadian religious, political or cultural leaders, nor the General Press of the Province (French and English alike) uttered a single word of disapproval or condemnation of the most irresponsible and libellous accusations levelled against the Jewish population. This was a sad realisation and was therefore the deciding factor in the re-convening of the Canadian Jewish Congress at its second general session.”¹⁰⁷ Irving Abella and Harold Troper also noted that after its founding convention in 1919, the Canadian Jewish Congress “lay moribund, little more than a name on stationery letterhead, until the rise of Hitler in Germany and the growth of Fascist organizations in Canada. In response, then, to the threat of anti-Semitism at home and abroad, meetings were held in Toronto in 1933 and 1934, and the Canadian Jewish Congress was resurrected.”¹⁰⁸

The specific catalyst for the re-establishment of the Canadian Jewish Congress occurred in April 1933, when Montreal Jews mobilized religious, political, and humanitarian spokesmen at a public rally to protest against Hitler’s actions in Germany, and apply pressure on the Canadian government to provide assistance and refuge to

German Jews.¹⁰⁹ The principal speaker was former president of the League of Nations, Senator Raoul Dandurand, who had been invited by member of parliament Samuel Jacobs.¹¹⁰ The mayor of Montreal was also present. The tone of the rally and the public who attended was shocked disbelief that such horrors could be taking place in the modern world.¹¹¹ Yet within several days, a counter-protest was convened in Montreal by a group of young Quebec intellectuals, le Jeune Canada.¹¹² They were led by André Laurendeau, a leading Quebec intellectual,¹¹³ and supported by the Quebec press (both English and French) and the Quebec Catholic clergy. The purpose of the demonstration was to condemn those Quebec public figures who had joined the Jews in their anti-Hitler demonstration.¹¹⁴ Following the demonstration, organizations such as La Fédération des Clubs Ouvriers, La Ligue de l'Action Nationale, La Société de St Jean Baptiste, and the Association des Voyageurs de Commerce du Canada sent anti-Semitic resolutions to Ottawa protesting against any admission of Jewish immigrants.¹¹⁵

It was clear to Canadian Jewry that the Canadian Jewish Congress must be reconvened. In May 1933, Jewish societies in Winnipeg formed the Western Canadian Jewish Congress Committee and invited delegates from all over the West to attend an emergency meeting. Hundreds of delegates unanimously agreed to re-establish the Canadian Jewish Congress in order to deal with the problems of Canadian anti-Semitism and the plight of European Jewry.¹¹⁶ The next month, the League for the Defence of Jewish Rights of Toronto, the Western Canadian Jewish Congress Committee, and the Pro-Congress Committee of Montreal, sponsored a conference in Toronto to protest Nazi atrocities and made plans to re-establish the Canadian Jewish Congress.¹¹⁷

A provisional national executive committee was organized, which conducted a Canada-wide fundraising campaign to provide relief for Jewish refugees, combat anti-Semitism agitation, and boycott goods from Nazi Germany.¹¹⁸ Delegates were elected in each Jewish community across Canada and met at Congress's second plenary session in Toronto from 27-29 January 1934.¹¹⁹ The Canadian Jewish Congress was thus re-born. It was composed of forty-one executive members including most of the founders of the 1919 Congress, and Samuel Jacobs was elected its new president.¹²⁰ As Abella notes, the agenda of Congress's second plenary session was simple: "keep the pressure on the government to allow more Jewish immigration; mount campaigns to fight the Nazis abroad and the anti-semitic at home; urge the British to open up Palestine to Jewish settlers; and find ways to fund the various cultural, religious and educational activities of Canadian Jewry."¹²¹

The resolutions passed at Congress's secondary plenary session reflected this agenda. The new constitution stated that the central mandate of the Canadian Jewish Congress was to safeguard the civil, political, economic and religious rights of the Jews and combat anti-Semitism; to study problems relating to the cultural, economic and social life of the Jews and seek a solution to such problems; to assist the Jewish Agency in its program of work for Palestine; and to cooperate with world Jewry as may be deemed advisable.¹²²

The revitalized Congress passed other resolutions concerning anti-defamation work, a Jewish home in Palestine, the World Jewish Congress, immigration of German Jewish refugees, Canadian Jewish economic problems, Kehilla matters, boycott of German goods, relief of stricken Jewry, Jewish education, Canadian Jewish archives, and public welfare.¹²³ Specific resolutions included maintaining the Canadian Jewish Congress as a

permanent organization; participating in the World Jewish Congress; calling upon the British Government to remove restrictions against Jewish immigration to Palestine; and assisting the Jewish Agency in upbuilding and developing a Jewish national home in Palestine.¹²⁴

The Canadian Jewish Congress also underwent a structural reorganization in 1934. It was reconstituted as a union of three semi-autonomous regions - Eastern Division, Central Division, and Western Division - whose headquarters were in Montreal, Toronto and Winnipeg, respectively.¹²⁵ The Western Division comprised that part of Canada situated west of and including Port Arthur; the Central Division included Ontario as far west as Port Arthur; and the Eastern Division included Quebec and the Maritime provinces.¹²⁶ The National Dominion Council and the National Executive Committee, both headquartered in Montreal, were responsible for creating various departments and committees, including the United Jewish Relief Agencies with its overseas relief department; immigration of refugees department; public relations department; Jewish education and culture department; youth and adult education department; community organization department; bureau of social and economic research; reference library; and national Jewish archives.¹²⁷

In the years following its reorganization, one of Congress's central priorities was cooperative action with other Jewish organizations. Beginning in 1934, Congress became part of a larger movement of Jewish organizations in North America and the world. It established relations with many other Jewish agencies, including OSE-Union, Jewish Immigrant Aid Society; Anti-Defamation League; American Jewish Committee; American Jewish Congress; National Council of YMHA and YWHA; Canadian Council

of Jewish Welfare Funds; Board of Deputies of British Jews; United Service for New Americans; Independent Order of B'nai B'rith; American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee; World Jewish Congress; ORT Organization;¹²⁸ Jewish Branches of the Legion; National Council of Jewish Women; *Verbands* and *Landsmanshaften*; and the United Zionist Council.¹²⁹

Another priority of the renewed Congress was to participate in solving the problems of world Jewry. For example, after 1934 Congress worked closely with the World Jewish Congress, providing support and attending its various deliberations. It also assisted in the relief of war-stricken Jewry by working with the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. Canadian Jewish Congress representatives were present at the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) conferences, peace conferences, United Nations sessions, and other international meetings of importance to Canadian and world Jewry. Congress continually worked (albeit with limited success) to enlist the support of the Canadian government in defence of Jewish needs and rights.¹³⁰ It initiated the organization of the United Jewish Refugee and War Relief Agencies, which attempted to persuade the Canadian government to lift its immigration restrictions on European Jewish refugees.¹³¹ Thanks in large part to the efforts of Samuel Bronfman, president of the Canadian Jewish Congress from 1939 to 1962, and his "right-hand man" Saul Hayes, national executive director from 1941 to 1959, the United Jewish Refugee and War Relief Agencies became one of the most effective Canadian Jewish bodies, ranking with any humanitarian institution in the country.¹³² By 1948, in the wake of the horrors of European Jewish destruction but with the promise of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, Congress could look back on nearly fifteen years of hard work and hard-won

achievements. In short, by the postwar period Congress had truly become the “parliament of Canadian Jewry,”¹³³ nationally representative and unchallenged in its authority.¹³⁴

The history of Congress’s evolving public relations philosophy, especially with respect to anti-defamation work, also began with its reorganization in 1934. At the second plenary session in 1934, Congress resolved to call upon “all just and fair-minded citizens of this Dominion, of every race and creed” to join it in denouncing the “individuals and groups who disseminate false and libellous anti-Semitic propaganda aimed to undermine the standing and reputation of the Jewish citizens of this Dominion.” Congress discussed the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* and their “widespread and methodical dissemination by ill-disposed persons,” and resolved that “immediate steps be taken for the proper refutation of the statements therein contained by an authority, and that the same be given widespread distribution, and that a special committee be appointed by this Congress to carry out this resolution.”¹³⁵ Congress also resolved that legislation should be sought to make defamation of any religious or racial group actionable, and it invited the co-operation of the various Canadian B’nai B’rith lodges,¹³⁶ which had long been devoted to service, charity, community work, anti-defamation and human rights,¹³⁷ to assist Congress in its public relations work.¹³⁸ This overture eventually led to a joint organization of the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Canadian Conference of the B’nai B’rith in 1938 under the National Joint Public Relations Committee (JPRC).¹³⁹

Congress’s public relations work became more organized, coherent, and administratively easier with the creation of the JPRC in 1938, which also ended a jurisdictional dispute between Congress and B’nai B’rith going back to Congress’s re-organization in 1934. Now the two organizations, operating under the umbrella of

Congress, could work together “to obviate any friction of duplication of effort in the fight against our common enemy.”¹⁴⁰ With its national and regional branches, the JPRC was a unified organization which drafted policy on public relations and anti-defamation work and acted as troubleshooter for anti-Semitic propaganda in Canada.¹⁴¹

Upon its creation, the JPRC collaborated with other organizations, and specifically the Canadian Conference of Christians and Jews (CCCCJ), established in 1934 as the Committee on Jewish-Gentile Relationships, but renamed in 1940. The mandate of the CCCCJ was to create a better understanding between Jews and non-Jews through various educational programmes, including distribution of literature, publication of its bulletin, *Fellowship*, public addresses, and co-operation with organizations and religious bodies committed to combating prejudice against minority groups.¹⁴² Thus, the CCCCJ acted as a sister agency upon which the JPRC could rely in its public relations work.

In terms of the day-to-day functioning of the JPRC, it maintained regular contact with its regional committees in the Eastern, Western, and Central Divisions, the Maritimes and British Columbia, and in some individual communities. When cases of anti-Semitism came to the attention of the regional JPRCs, their staffs responded promptly and often on an emergency basis. Similarly, inner executives of the regional JPRCs made immediate decisions if necessary, but their acts were subject to ratification by the national JPRC in due course. On a non-emergency basis, the national and regional JPRCs formulated policy and gave general directions, which JPRC staff then implemented on a daily basis. The national executive director of the Canadian Jewish Congress and the directors of each regional division also submitted reports of their public relations activities to the national

JPRC. The national executive director then sent out fortnightly confidential reports to all members of the JPRCs.¹⁴³

Thus, the central mandate of the JPRC was to conduct public relations and anti-defamation work on behalf of Congress. This work was not conducted in a haphazard manner, although some cases of anti-Semitism were met with quickly without looking to Congress's organizational infrastructure. For the most part, however, the Canadian Jewish Congress, through the JPRC, attempted to formulate a coherent public relations philosophy. This philosophy did not remain static, and in fact underwent three major, but not mutually exclusive stages from the time of Congress's re-establishment in 1934.

The first phase of Congress's public relations philosophy embraced a central assumption that the purpose of public relations was to influence non-Jewish opinion about Jews. The Canadian Jewish Congress, like its American sister organizations at the time, assumed that if non-Jews were favourably disposed toward Jews, they would help combat anti-Semitism and protect the Jewish community from discrimination. Thus, Congress embraced a somewhat naïve hope that if non-Jews could adopt a non-prejudicial attitude towards Jews, the status of the latter would be protected and anti-Semitism would cease to be a problem.¹⁴⁴

This philosophy was manifested in Congress's response to Quebec's increasing anti-Semitism. After its reconstitution in 1934, Congress embarked on a campaign to end that province's anti-Semitic agitation.¹⁴⁵ It called upon Quebec politicians to recognize the injustice of the *achat chez nous* movement and its use of the radio as a means of spreading economic nationalism in Quebec. Quebec politicians listened, and the CBC accordingly forbade race hatred in any shape and form over the radio.¹⁴⁶ In addition, Congress

spokesmen approached major Montreal newspapers and persuaded them to denounce Adrien Arcand's Parti National Social Chrétien as a danger to Canadian unity and British ideals of fair play and democracy.¹⁴⁷ Congress then undertook a social and economic research¹⁴⁸ of Canadian Jewish life, in response to requests for information on standard accusations made against the Jewish population throughout the country. Based on the findings of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics and independent research, Congress was able to reply to such accusations through the press and pamphlets of its own. It also began to cooperate closely with various religious denominations in Canada, although such efforts were countered by the increase in the amount of Nazi propaganda being distributed throughout Canada in the late 1930s.¹⁴⁹ Thus, much of Congress's anti-defamation work in Quebec was highly successful, but behind nearly all its efforts lay the assumption that education and moral suasion were the most effective tools in ending anti-Semitic agitation.

Leading Congress members also embraced this early public relations philosophy. In 1935, one year after Congress's reorganization, Rabbi Maurice N. Eisendrath commented on Congress's exemplary anti-defamation work in the last year. He discussed such activities as the compilation of strategic mailing lists of "wholesome Jewish materials" to universities, churches, and the press; the "checking and aborting" of anti-Semitic propaganda; and the various educational and research projects which Congress had undertaken. He noted with pleasure that "[w]ith amazing swiftness an effective machinery has been established. All that it needs now is the driving power to be derived from a decent measure of personal effort and some dignified financial support."¹⁵⁰

A similar philosophy was evident at Congress's Western Division conference held in Calgary in August 1939, where Western vice-president Louis Rosenberg discussed the educational and preventative methods taken to combat anti-Semitism. He stated that anti-Semitism was not as yet a factor in Canada and that the Jewish problem in this country was basically one of educating other groups, largely minority groups like itself, to an understanding and acceptance of the Jewish people. He suggested various ways to promote understanding among non-Jews in Canada, such as spreading the "gentle reminder" that British and Jewish culture stemmed from the same origin; showing free films about Jewish achievements in Palestine; holding educational exhibits at exhibitions and fairs in towns and cities throughout Canada; and setting "a fine personal example" in everyday life.¹⁵¹

At the same conference, Rosenberg emphasized the need to conduct positive rather than negative or defensive public relations. He argued that the way to combat anti-Semitism was not to attack in return once anti-Semitism had developed, but instead use positive, preventative measures against defamatory propaganda. "Let us be constructive ... Let us think in terms of mutual understanding, of education work, of public relations of all the various groups in this country. We can act as the link, because of our love of democracy."¹⁵² Rosenberg's opinions were apparently shared by other Congress members, for when the National Joint Public Relations Committee was reorganized in 1941, it too decided that its approach should become more positive and constructive rather than negative and defensive.¹⁵³

Thus, the early phase of Congress's public relations philosophy emphasized education of the non-Jewish public about the social and economic situation of Jews in Canada,

largely to dispel myths about Jewish wealth and power.¹⁵⁴ Many Congress members had great faith in the power of education, yet even Rosenberg, one of its greatest proponents, was not so naïve to believe that education alone would convert the anti-Semite: “I do not for a moment hold out the hope that people already suffering from a chronic or acute case of anti-semitism can be cured by nicely phrased speeches, scientific facts or accurate statistics. Nevertheless it is worth while to know the real truth about the economic situation of the Jews in Canada.”¹⁵⁵ Rosenberg would eventually publish his famous *Canada's Jews*, which is still viewed as the most comprehensive study of the socio-economic status of Canadian Jewry.

Another characteristic of Congress's early public relations philosophy was its determination that anti-defamation work be conducted out of the public eye. In 1935, Rabbi Harry Joshua Stern reported that Congress had been doing “phenomenal work” in its battle against the rising tide of anti-Semitism in Canada. However, “anti-defamation is of such a nature that it cannot be publicized. Hence the failure of the Congress executive to record in the general press its accomplishments in that important direction.”¹⁵⁶ This was an important aspect of Congress's early public relations philosophy, and as will be seen, it quickly discovered the costs of abandoning this approach in its attempts to openly oppose Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda.

A succinct summary of Congress's initial public relations philosophy was given by Congress's general secretary H.M. Caiserman shortly before the Second World War: “[t]he Canadian Jewish Congress, in the interests of Canadian Jewry and in the interest of the Dominion as a whole, observes vigilantly the plans and activities of our enemies. It exposes their plans by educational methods, publishes correct facts in reply to

misrepresentations directed against us, and promotes good will, understanding and co-operation with all religious groups in Canada.”¹⁵⁷

In sum, Congress’s initial public relations philosophy focussed on educational, “positive” anti-defamation work in order to combat anti-Semitism. Before World War Two, Congress was occupied with several cases of anti-Semitism, mostly concerning the activities of Adrien Arcand and other fascist, anti-Semitic organizations. During the Second World War, however, Congress began to question its public relations philosophy, because despite its efforts, anti-Semitism in Canada was actually increasing. Indeed, contrary to popular notions that anti-Semitism decreased throughout the war with public knowledge of Hitler’s annihilation of European Jewry, during this period Congress found itself increasingly burdened with anti-defamation work. The Joint Public Relations Committee of the Central Division of Congress reported in 1940 that “contrary to expectations that a spirit of brotherhood would sweep this country in the face of the thrust of a common enemy, anti-Semitism apparently increased.”¹⁵⁸ In 1942, the Western Division’s Joint Public Relations Committee similarly noted that anti-Semitic prejudice and discrimination had increased rather than decreased since the outbreak of the war. Yet its executive director, Louis Rosenberg, continued to emphasize traditional public relations methods, such as the necessity of the Public Relations Committee adopting a positive and constructive approach, rather than a negative and defensive one.¹⁵⁹

But such public relations methods were becoming increasingly suspect. The increase in anti-Semitism during the Second World War was calling into question the efficacy of this public relations philosophy. Accordingly, Congress gradually augmented its initial philosophy with a more sophisticated approach, which concluded that it was not enough to

convince the non-Jewish community that Jews were indeed “good people,” nor was it enough to correct all the slanders and misinformation which were spread about Jews as a group. Rather, it was more important to show that anti-Semitism, race hatred, and intolerance were harmful to all elements in society, and that those who engaged in anti-Semitism or race hatred would ultimately find that all of society suffered. Accordingly, Congress began a large-scale programme which attempted to persuade group after group - labour unions, business groups, church groups, farm groups - that anti-Semitism was dangerous for all of society, not only for Jews.¹⁶⁰

This emphasis on the universality of race hatred and the importance of combatting all forms of prejudice and discrimination was neatly summarized in 1947 by Rabbi A.L. Feinberg, in his discussion of the evolution of Congress’s public relations work. He argued that Congress began to realize the importance of championing all minority groups who suffered from racial or religious prejudice, not merely the Jews: “[t]he French-speaking Catholic in Ontario, the Japanese deportee from British Columbia, the Negro economic pariah, are no less a Jewish obligation than we are a moral crisis for the Christian.”¹⁶¹

Thus, by the end of the Second World War, Congress’s public relations philosophy had evolved and matured so that it encompassed more than anti-defamation work, and focussed instead on the broader social implications of prejudice and discrimination. Protecting the Jewish community against false reports and hostile propaganda was still important, but by the end of the war, Congress believed that anti-Semitism was less a Jewish problem than a total community problem, and that anti-Jewish manifestations, having their root in social problems, ultimately affected the community as a whole.

Certainly, the horrific lessons of Nazi Germany and the Holocaust had shown Canadian Jewry the necessity of a healthy society in which scapegoatism was not accepted as an inevitable consequence of social, economic, and political problems. In sum, Congress's public relations philosophy now assumed that discrimination against any racial, religious, or ethnic group constituted a menace to the entire social structure, and that the Jewish community should do its part, through cooperation with other religious, labour, and ethnic organizations, to protect the civil and human rights of all groups.¹⁶² As this new mentality took hold in the decades after the Second World War, the Canadian Jewish Congress gradually became *the* "spokesperson" for human rights in Canada and thus greatly assisted other ethnic organizations in their dealings with the nation's dominant, majority culture.

In sum, by the early postwar period, Congress's public relations philosophy had undergone a major shift: from a focus on positive, education-oriented, anti-defamation work, to an emphasis on the necessity of abandoning all race hatred, including anti-Semitism. Notwithstanding these changes and the maturation they entailed, both stages of development still rested on the same assumption: that anti-Semitism could be combatted by changing the attitude of non-Jews.¹⁶³ It was this central assumption which Congress would modify in the third shift of its public relations philosophy.

By late summer 1945, Congress was facing a world of change. Canadian Jewry was forced to confront the very tragic implications of Hitler's destruction of European Jewry; Canadian public opinion was changing with the acknowledgment of the extent of the Jewish Holocaust; and the future of a Jewish state in Palestine was hanging precariously in the balance. Together, these factors helped facilitate the third phase of Congress's public relations philosophy. This final stage, one which has continued relatively

unchanged to the present day, acknowledged that previous philosophies regarding public relations work had been inadequate because they had dealt only with one aspect of Jewish status; that is, the attitude of non-Jews toward Jews. In the postwar period, Congress leaders now believed that more salient factors had and would have the power to affect the status of the Jewish community, such as political and economic discrimination, persecution and genocide, the precarious future of war-torn Jewish refugees in displaced persons camps, and the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. They realized that these factors were infinitely more powerful in affecting the status of the Jewish community than the mental abstractions of non-Jews toward Jews. Accordingly, Congress's public relations philosophy adopted the premise that Jewish protection involved more than an attempt to alter the attitudes of the non-Jewish community. In the postwar, post-Holocaust era, public relations work should ensure that the rights to which Jews were entitled in a democratic society were respected, enforced, and granted. Accordingly, Congress's new public relations philosophy advocated the most complete form of democracy for all groups in Canada.¹⁶⁴

This new philosophy was self-respecting, even pugnacious. Public relations work now assumed that Jewish rights were not something to be begged or pleaded for, or accepted with thanks, but something which the Jewish community could and should demand and fight for legitimately. The status of the Jewish community would not be protected by affecting the attitudes of non-Jews or filling them with goodwill towards the Jews. Jewish protection would come from enactments of public policy, legislation, administrative practices, and judicial precedents which would make the practice of discrimination and racism impossible. During the postwar period, Congress did not abandon goodwill

propaganda or educational campaigns, and the efficacy of this kind of public relations work was still accepted. However, it realized that such public relations measures had basically left the root problem untouched, which was that the Canadian democratic system had allowed large patterns of discrimination and racism to form part of the social, political, and economic landscape of the nation.¹⁶⁵ It was this problem which Congress's public relations work began to address in the postwar period.

Congress's changed philosophy was evident at its seventh plenary session held in 1947. One of the conference's resolutions was that Congress, through its regional and local organizations, would conduct active public campaigns at the local, provincial, and national levels to outlaw "all forms of discrimination and ... provide legal guarantees for full equality of treatment and opportunity for all Canadians regardless of race, religion or national origin."¹⁶⁶

In sum, Congress began to focus on a more rights-oriented, legislative approach to public relations work. This was a slow process, however, and Congress's policy did not change overnight. H.M. Caiserman, as director of the National Joint Public Relations Committee, assessed the evolving nature of Congress's public relations work in the postwar period, and acknowledged the limitations inherent in Congress's earlier public relations approach. He accepted the valid criticisms of several Canadian and American publications which noted that Congress had failed repeatedly to take legal action against promoters of anti-Semitism. These critics had continually pointed out the superior methods of fighting anti-Semitism in Great Britain, South Africa, and Switzerland, where matters of anti-Semitism and other forms of discrimination were brought before the courts. Caiserman acknowledged that Congress's delay in using legal action had

undermined its authority, by opening the door for new organizations which promised “more modern and more effective methods of fighting anti-Semitism.” He agreed that Congress not only must continue its more traditional public relations work of prevention, research, educational literature, and goodwill activities, it must also make authorities aware of all anti-Jewish material distributed in Canada and present proposals for legislation to the Canadian government which would “prevent the undermining of our democratic and constitutional system of government.”¹⁶⁷

Throughout the postwar period, Congress became increasingly committed to this more assertive public relations philosophy. However, there were critics who contended that Congress had not gone far enough. Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld discuss the criticisms that have been and continue to be waged against the Canadian Jewish Congress; namely, that Congress was not militant enough in pursuing and protecting Jewish interests: “[t]his charge is retrospectively levelled against Congress for its actions before and during World War II. Communal leaders, past and present, have been accused of toadying to the state power, selling out the community in the process. ‘Quiet diplomacy’ has had a bad press in the post-Holocaust era ... Thus splinter groups have occasionally sprung up with more militant postures.”¹⁶⁸

Stuart Rosenberg also notes that throughout the postwar period many Jews became increasingly impatient with establishment-oriented Jewish organizations like the Canadian Jewish Congress. In Rosenberg’s view, these more militant Jews “preferred to take up activist positions rather than docilely follow traditional community procedures ... [and] sought to make it patently clear to anti-Semites that Jews would not sit idly by in their

own self-defense: that every anti-Semitic action would be met with a forceful Jewish reaction.”¹⁶⁹

Yet despite such criticisms, past or present, Congress’s public relations philosophy had changed considerably by the postwar period. In his biography of H.M. Caiserman, Bernard Figler makes an insightful comment about the changing nature of Congress’s anti-defamation work and the lessons which Caiserman and others were forced to learn: “[i]n the years to come the great function of the Congress was to fit Canadian Jewry more effectively into the pattern of the post-war world. Before this was to develop Caiserman and his fellow-workers in the program of anti-defamation became self-taught but veritable experts in the theory, mechanics and defence of democracy ... Painfully they learned that informing Ottawa of a wrong is not sufficient for its cure; that a letter of protest or of denial to a newspaper only repeats the falsehood and sets the journalist to its defence with the advantage of the last word ...[;] that polemic with a hatemonger provides him with the meat of his life and prosecution exalts him with the virile blood of martyrdom.”¹⁷⁰

Abella makes a similar statement about Congress’s evolving public relations philosophy. By the early postwar period, he argues, the pervasive anti-Semitism of earlier years had receded; the horrors of the Holocaust had shocked many Canadians; and Jews in Palestine were engaged in a dramatic struggle to create their own state. It was at this time that the Jewish leadership in Canada decided to launch an all-out offensive against discriminatory practices: “[q]uiet diplomacy had been tried and found wanting ... only direct lobbying and public agitation and education would work. Their strategy was to fight to remove restrictions not only against Jews but against all minorities.” Congress’s increasing militancy was also strengthened with the passage of human rights legislation in

Saskatchewan in 1947, and fair employment and fair housing legislation in Ontario and other provinces in the following years. "As these legal protections were put into place, an emboldened Canadian Jewry showed that it was no longer willing to accept the anti-semitism of an earlier period without a struggle."¹⁷¹

Indeed, by the post-war period the Canadian Jewish Congress was more willing to engage in an open struggle against anti-Semitism. This is seen in the activities of the Joint Public Relations Committee, which was now relying less on educational programmes and other means of "intellectual persuasion" to help end anti-Semitic prejudice, and embracing instead the philosophy that "it was actually easier to keep people from translating prejudice into discrimination." The JPRC was less concerned with attempting to alter people's prejudices and focussed more on the force of law and social action to prevent such prejudice from being translated into discrimination. As E.M. Rosenzweig, director of the national JPRC stated in 1950: "prejudices may not damage anyone but the person who entertains them; it is only when the prejudiced mind walks over the bridge of action, and puts the prejudice into effect, that the real danger ensues." In other words, in the privacy of their own minds, people could hate as they chose; but expression of that hatred would be met with the force of the law. To this end, the JPRC focussed its energies increasingly on passage of legislation which would halt employment discrimination, resort discrimination, education discrimination, restrictive covenants, and discrimination in public services.¹⁷²

Yet Congress never completely abandoned its earlier public relations philosophies, and in many ways, its final philosophy became an amalgam of all three. In 1947, Rabbi Feinberg, in his discussion of Congress's public relations work, cautioned that legislation

would never resolve group tensions within society, and that it was vital for Jews to continue to rally behind all oppressed groups: “[w]hen overt acts of discrimination occur, no matter at whom they are aimed, they constitute a threat to us. Every minority is imperilled by every oppression. Once we condone cruelty or gross violations of elementary liberties, we prepare the shackles for ourselves.”¹⁷³ Similarly, in 1948, the National Joint Public Relations Committee re-emphasized the importance of a basic programme of education which “will put the Canadian public on guard against the fomentors of anti-semitism and will ensure that the integration of Canadian Jewry into Canadian life is so complete that anti-semitism will be discredited as the impossible nonsense [sic] that it is in reality.”¹⁷⁴ In its overview of anti-Semitism in Canada in 1949, Congress reported that its battle against prejudice continued in the realms of actual cases of anti-Semitism, educational programmes aimed at “clearing the minds of Canadians from prejudice,” constitutional gains, and developing relationships with the several ethnic groups in Canada.¹⁷⁵ Thus, in the postwar period, Congress’s public relations philosophy had been enhanced, not replaced. It continued to emphasize education work and pro-Jewish propaganda; however, these measures now worked in tandem with more rights-oriented and legislative-directed public relations work.

The gradual evolution of Congress’s public relations philosophy helps in many ways to explain Congress’s response to the Social Credit movement’s anti-Semitic propaganda. As will be shown, Congress found it very difficult to combat the “Social Credit problem.” Over the years, it employed a variety of tactics covering all phases of its evolving public relations philosophy, from education to broad-based social appeals to proposals for legal action. Often these attempts met with limited success and at times negative consequences.

Congress quickly discovered that although it was important to adopt a coherent and intelligent public relations philosophy, converting policy into action was a more complicated matter. The Social Credit movement was a formidable opponent, and as the following chapters will show, Congress spent several frustrating years attempting to end its “number one” public relations problem.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

¹ The postwar period to the present constitutes a distinct phase in Canadian Jewish history, characterized by immigration of Holocaust survivors as well as French-speaking Sephardi Jews. The fourth period is in many ways a unique departure from the three earlier phases, but as it exceeds the boundaries of this study, only the first three phases will be examined.

² Permanent settlement of Jews in Canada began only after the British Conquest. Before the Conquest, as is well known, Jews and Protestants were not allowed to settle in France's North American colonies. Although some Jews came to the Maritimes in the 1750s, it is generally accepted that the "real" history of Canadian Jewry began in Lower Canada when the English conquered Quebec. Irving Abella, A Coat of Many Colours: Two Centuries of Jewish Life in Canada (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1990), 8; Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present: Canadian Jewry and the Canadian Jewish Congress (Toronto: Canadian Jewish Congress, 1986), 2; Louis Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969: 50 Years of Organized Jewish Community Life," n.d., c. 1969 (PAM, JHSWC Collection, P58, File 21), and Two Centuries of Jewish Life in Canada, 1760-1960 (Montreal: Canadian Jewish Congress, 1961), 30; Abel Selick, ed., History of B'nai B'rith in Eastern Canada (Toronto: B'nai B'rith District Grand Lodge No. 22, 1964), 1.

³ B.G. Sack, History of the Jews in Canada (Montreal: Harvest House, 1965), 44, 49.

⁴ Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present, 2.

⁵ Aaron Hart, an officer on the staff of General Amherst, together with Simon Levy accompanied the troops of the British Army into Montreal following the city's surrender on 8 September 1760. Sack, History of the Jews in Canada, 41; Daniel J. Elazar and Harold M. Waller, Maintaining Consensus: The Canadian Jewish Polity in the Postwar World (Lanham: The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and the University Press of America, 1990), 69; Louis Rosenberg, Canada's Jewish Community (Montreal: Canadian Jewish Congress, n.d.), 2.

⁶ Of Aaron Hart's sons, Ezekiel Hart is best remembered for his election to the Legislative Assembly of Lower Canada in 1807, although he was unable to take his seat because he was not a Christian. However, on 5 June 1832, after decades of struggle, a bill was passed which granted full political and civil rights to Canada's Jews. Abraham Rhinewine, Looking Back a Century: On the Centennial of Jewish Political Equality in Canada (Toronto: Kraft Press, 1932), 19-23, 29ff.

⁷ Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969."

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Elazar and Waller, Maintaining Consensus, 69.

¹⁰ Abraham de Sola became a very well-respected member of the Montreal community, in both Jewish and Christian circles. Soon after his arrival in Montreal he was appointed lecturer in Hebrew and Oriental Literature at McGill University, appointed full professor in 1853, and in 1858 was the first Jew in Canada to receive an honorary doctorate from a university. Louis Rosenberg, Chronology of Canadian Jewish History (Montreal: Canadian Jewish Congress, 1959), 9, and Two Centuries of Jewish Life in Canada, 31.

¹¹ Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969."

¹² Stephen A. Speisman, The Jews of Toronto: A History to 1937 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979), 29.

¹³ Abraham de Sola was minister of the Shearith Israel congregation from 1846 until his death in 1882, when he was succeeded by his son Meldola, who also remained in office until his death thirty-five years later. Thus, the de Sola family served the Shearith Israel congregation for over seventy consecutive years. Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present, 2; Martin Wolff, The Jews of Canada (New York: The American Jewish Committee, 1926), 22.

¹⁴ Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969."

¹⁵ Sack, History of the Jews in Canada, 136; Gerald Tulchinsky, Taking Root: The Origins of the Canadian Jewish Community (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992), 41.

¹⁶ "Draft on Anti-Semitism in Canada," n.d., c. 1949 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 2, File 31; CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 1, File 3); The Facts (May 1949) (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 26; NAC, CJC Collection, MG 28, Volume 13, V, 101, Reel M-5461).

¹⁷ Louis Rosenberg, Canada's Jews: A Social and Economic Study of the Jews in Canada, ed. Morton Weinfeld (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), 10.

¹⁸ Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969." Simon Kuznets provides a comprehensive analysis of "non-persecution" factors which compelled Jewish emigrants to leave Eastern Europe after 1880. He argues that Russian Jews followed the same "slow beginning-later explosion" pattern as other ethnic groups in Europe, and that all were part of that broader immigration trend which began as a trickle in the early 1880s and peaked in the years before World War One. He maintains that although legal restrictions and persecutions contributed to the emigration of Jews from Tsarist Russia, it mostly can be attributed to "push" factors such as worsening economic and social conditions in the home country, and "pull" factors such as reduced costs of migration and more promising economic prospects in the host country. Thus, Kuznets suggests that the impetus for Russian Jewish emigration after 1880 was less the "push" of escape from persecution than the "pull" of economic and social mobility. Simon Kuznets, "Immigration of Russian Jews to the United States: Background and Structure," in Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn, eds., Perspectives in American History, vol. 9 (Cambridge: Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History, Harvard University, 1975), 35-124.

¹⁹ Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present, 2.

²⁰ Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969."

²¹ In 1891 Baron de Hirsch founded the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA), which was headquartered in London and later Paris. The JCA helped establish agricultural colonies in Argentina as an evacuation programme for Russian Jews facing pogroms. In 1891 Hirsch also founded the Baron de Hirsch Fund to help absorb Jewish immigrants in the United States. Abella, A Coat of Many Colours, 87; H.H. Ben-Sasson, A History of the Jewish People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 929-30; Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present, 2-3; Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 168.

²² Sack, History of the Jews in Canada, 220-1.

²³ Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present, 3.

²⁴ On 17 June 1891 the Baron de Hirsch Institute officially opened its own building in Montreal. Purchased with funds donated by the Baron, it offered temporary residence for East European immigrants and acted as a day school for immigrant children and night school for the adults. Wolff, The Jews of Canada, 32.

²⁵ In Canada, the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA) initially operated through the Baron de Hirsch Institute until 1907, when it established its own Canadian organization. Together with the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society, the JCA worked to establish Jewish farming colonies in Western Canada. Abella, A Coat of Many Colours, 87; Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 168.

²⁶ Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969." For a description of the various Jewish farming colonies established in the Canadian West, see Simon Belkin, Through Narrow Gates: A Review of Jewish Immigration, Colonization and Immigrant Aid Work in Canada, 1840-1940 (Montreal: Canadian Jewish Congress and the Jewish Colonization Association, 1966); Harry Gutkin, Journey into our Heritage: The Story of the Jewish People in the Canadian West (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1980); Joseph Kage, With Faith and Thanksgiving: The Story of Two Hundred Years of Jewish Immigration and Immigrant Aid Work in Canada, 1760-1960 (Montreal: Eagle Publishing, 1962); Anthony W. Rasporich, "Early Twentieth-Century Jewish Farm Settlements in Saskatchewan: A Utopian Perspective," Saskatchewan History 42(1) (Winter 1989), 28-40.

²⁷ Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present, 2.

²⁸ Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969."

²⁹ "Draft on Anti-Semitism in Canada;" The Facts (May 1949).

³⁰ Louis Rosenberg reported that in 1941, for the first time in the history of the Canadian Jewish community, the majority of the Jewish population (51.04 percent) were Canadian-born. Louis Rosenberg, The Jewish Population of Canada (Montreal: Canadian Jewish Congress, 1947), 9.

³¹ "Draft on Anti-Semitism in Canada;" The Facts (May 1949).

³² In 1941, Jews resided in Canada in the following numbers: 69,875 in Ontario; 66,277 in Quebec; 18,879 in Manitoba; 4,149 in Saskatchewan; 4,164 in Alberta; 3,350 in British Columbia; 2,285 in Nova Scotia; 1,228 in New Brunswick; and twenty-five in Prince Edward Island. Canadian Jewish Congress News Release, "Congress Issues Official Jewish Population Figures," n.d. (CJCNA, ZA 1944, Box 2, File 35); Rosenberg, The Jewish Population of Canada, 15, 18.

³³ Louis Rosenberg, Jewish Communities in Canada (Montreal: Canadian Jewish Congress, 1957), 21-3; The Jewish Population of Canada, 18; and "Social and Economic Problems of Western Canadian Jewry," n.d. (NAC, CJC Collection, MG 28, Volume 13, V, 101, Reel M-5461).

³⁴ In 1906, the colony of Rumsey was founded in the Trochu Valley northeast of Calgary. It was ostensibly the wealthiest Jewish colony in Western Canada during its time, having been favoured with frequent good crops. However, in the post-World War One period, many of the farmers faced insurmountable debts and subsequently abandoned their farms. In 1921, thirteen Jews resided in Rumsey; ten in 1931; three in 1941; and four in 1951. Gutkin, Journey into our Heritage, 64; Cyril Leonoff, Pioneers, Ploughs and Prayers: The Jewish Farmers of Western Canada (Vancouver: The Jewish Historical Society of British Columbia and The Jewish Western Bulletin, 1982), 11; Belkin, Through Narrow Gates, 82; Rosenberg, Jewish Communities in Canada, 23.

³⁵ Rosenberg, Jewish Communities in Canada, 23.

³⁶ Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present, 3.

³⁷ Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 130.

³⁸ Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969."

³⁹ Elazar and Waller, Maintaining Consensus, 71.

⁴⁰ The pogrom wave in Russia beginning after the failed revolution in 1905 resulted in thousands of Jewish immigrants fleeing to Canada. Wolff, The Jews of Canada, 48; Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969."

⁴¹ Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969."

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ As Tulchinsky notes, "even though the Federation of Canadian Zionist Societies was the only national Jewish body - a Canadian Jewish parliament, so to speak - it was not very broadly based, or representative of all segments of Jewish political opinion or all social classes." Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 196.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 266.

⁴⁵ Speisman, The Jews of Toronto, 270.

⁴⁶ Fifteen "uptowners" and six "downtowners" of Montreal together collected \$24,000 in donations. The uptown Jews believed that some of the money should be used for charities at home, while the downtown Jews wanted all the money to be sent to those overseas. However, distribution was in the hands of the uptowners and so \$1,000 was sent to Palestine, \$6,000 to the War Victims Committee, and \$17,000 to charitable organizations in Montreal. Erna Paris, Jews: An Account of Their Experience in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1980), 34-5; Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 262.

⁴⁷ Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 262.

⁴⁸ Among the seventy-one organizations were sixteen synagogues, six labour unions, ten sick-benefit societies, eighteen loan syndicates, eight cultural organizations, five political organizations, and eight charitable societies. Paris, Jews, 35; Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 263.

⁴⁹ Rosenberg, Chronology of Canadian Jewish History, 18.

⁵⁰ Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 262.

⁵¹ *Kanader Adler* (*The Jewish Daily Eagle*) was a Yiddish-language paper established in 1907 in Montreal by the downtowners in an attempt to combat the assimilationist tendencies of the uptown English-language *Jewish Times*, established in 1897 and later renamed the *Canadian Jewish Chronicle*. Paris, Jews, 30-1; Speisman, The Jews of Toronto, 268-9; Wolff, The Jews of Canada, 39.

⁵² Speisman, The Jews of Toronto, 269.

⁵³ Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969."

⁵⁴ Paris, Jews, 36-7.

⁵⁵ The Conference of Canadian Jews, also called the Canadian Jewish Conference, was held in Montreal and attended by delegates from Montreal, Toronto, Ottawa, Winnipeg, Calgary, Vancouver, Hamilton, Saint John, Edmonton, Saskatoon, and Regina. It was led by Clarence de Sola as president. Rosenberg, Chronology of Canadian Jewish History, 18; Stuart E. Rosenberg, The Jewish Community in Canada, vol. 2 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1971), 43.

⁵⁶ Speisman, The Jews of Toronto, 269.

⁵⁷ Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 267.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 268.

⁵⁹ Speisman, The Jews of Toronto, 270.

⁶⁰ Bernard Figler notes that Canadians took part in the December 1918 Philadelphia sessions of the American Jewish Congress where they agreed in caucus to convene a Canadian Jewish Congress. Bernard

Figler and David Rome, Hannaniah Meir Caiserman: A Biography (Montreal: Northern Printing, 1962), 103; Paris, Jews, 38.

⁶¹ Speisman, The Jews of Toronto, 270.

⁶² Hannaniah Meir Caiserman served as general secretary of the Canadian Jewish Congress, first in 1919 and again after 1934. He was deeply committed to the idea of a national congress and was one of its leading advocates from 1915 to 1919. Caiserman remained committed to the congress principle even during its "long night" between 1922 and 1933, and was the person most responsible for its reconstitution in 1934.

Figler and Rome, Hannaniah Meir Caiserman.

⁶³ Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 268. At the sixteenth national convention of the Zionist Organization of Canada held in Toronto from 5-7 January 1919, a resolution was passed favouring "the calling of a Canadian Jewish Congress composed of democratically elected representatives of Canadian Jewry ... and instruct our incoming administration to co-operate with the Congress Committee of Canada with a view of the early realization of the Congress project." Rosenberg, Chronology of Canadian Jewish History, 19.

⁶⁴ Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 268-9.

⁶⁵ Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969."

⁶⁶ Harold Troper and Morton Weinfeld, Old Wounds: Jews, Ukrainians and the Hunt for Nazi War Criminals in Canada (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 50.

⁶⁷ Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969."

⁶⁸ Speisman, The Jews of Toronto, 270-1.

⁶⁹ Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969."

⁷⁰ Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 269.

⁷¹ There were 7,182 ballots cast in Montreal; 2,000 in the rest of Quebec; 6,741 in Toronto; 3,000 in the rest of Ontario; 3,481 in Winnipeg; and 2,462 in the rest of Western Canada, for a grand total of 24,866 ballots cast. H.M. Caiserman declared that, given the number of ballots cast, "nearly every grown up Jewish person, resident in Canada, participated in the elections of the Congress; thus giving to it an authority that no other Jewish organization had every enjoyed." H.M. Caiserman, "The History of the First Canadian Jewish Congress," in Arthur Daniel Hart, ed., The Jew in Canada: A Complete Record of Canadian Jewry from the Days of the French Regime to the Present Time (Montreal: Jewish Publications, 1926), 470; Abella, A Coat of Many Colours, 162; Paris, Jews, 39; S. Rosenberg, The Jewish Community in Canada, vol. 2, 41.

⁷² Rosenberg, Chronology of Canadian Jewish History, 20.

⁷³ Lyon Cohen, a member of the "Montreal establishment," was president of the Baron de Hirsch Institute and of Shaar Hashomayim congregation, as well as head of the Montreal Men's Clothing Manufacturers' Association. Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 269.

⁷⁴ Congress president Lyon Cohen heartily supported the motion to nominate Caiserman as permanent general secretary: "Without Caiserman," declared Cohen, "there would have been no Canadian Jewish Congress." Cohen, cited in Figler and Rome, Hannaniah Meir Caiserman, 107.

⁷⁵ Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969."

⁷⁶ Wolff, The Jews of Canada, 41-2; Caiserman, "The History of the First Canadian Jewish Congress," 465-82.

⁷⁷ Caiserman, "The History of the First Canadian Jewish Congress," 475; Rosenberg, Chronology of Canadian Jewish History, 20-1; Wolff, The Jews of Canada, 42.

⁷⁸ Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969."

⁷⁹ Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 261.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 261, 269.

⁸¹ Speisman, The Jews of Toronto, 271.

⁸² Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969."

⁸³ S. Rosenberg, The Jewish Community in Canada, vol. 2, 41.

⁸⁴ Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present, 5.

⁸⁵ Figler and Rome, Hannaniah Meir Caiserman, 111.

⁸⁶ Rosenberg, Two Centuries of Jewish Life in Canada, 36-7.

⁸⁷ The Jewish Immigrant Aid Society (JIAS), an amalgam of several organizations, was founded at the first plenary session of the Canadian Jewish Congress in 1919. Its mandate was to urge the liberalization of Canada's immigration laws and to co-ordinate Jewish war relief activities across Canada. The JIAS, together with the Jewish Colonization Association, worked continually for the settlement of European

Jewish immigrants in Canada, handling policy questions and problems of Jewish immigrants, especially those involving the Dominion government. For comprehensive treatments of the activities of the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society and the Jewish Colonization Association in Canada, see Belkin, Through Narrow Gates; Kage, With Faith and Thanksgiving; Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 274; Rosenberg, Two Centuries of Jewish Life in Canada, 37; Abella, A Coat of Many Colours, 168; Gutkin, Journey into our Heritage, 198-204.

⁸⁸ Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969."

⁸⁹ Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 274-5.

⁹⁰ Rosenberg, "The Canadian Jewish Congress, 1919-1969."

⁹¹ Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 274; Figler and Rome, Hannaniah Meir Caiserman, 113.

⁹² Speisman, The Jews of Toronto, 272.

⁹³ Yet Tulchinsky also notes that although Canadian Jewry may have been weaker without the Canadian Jewish Congress, "it would be wrong to assume that even a stronger organization could have affected public policy on immigration. The exclusionist policies followed in the 1930s were pursued even after the CJC was reestablished." Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 275.

⁹⁴ Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present, 5. For a summary of the Montreal schools question, see Michael D. Behiels, Quebec and the Question of Immigration: From Ethnocentrism to Ethnic Pluralism, 1900-1985 (Ottawa: Canadian Historical Association, 1991); Tulchinsky, Taking Root, 138-44, 243-8, 273-4.

⁹⁵ Although Quebec journalist Adrien Arcand is most often associated with fascist movements in Canada, fascism had been present in Canada long before Arcand's movement in 1929. In the early 1920s, for example, Mussolini had used the Italian consulates to plant fasci in the Italian communities of Montreal and Toronto, and after 1933 the German consular service sponsored the Deutscher Bund Canada to spread the doctrines of the National Socialist German Workers' Party to German immigrants and persons of German descent. Yet it was in the early 1930s that native fascist parties arose in Canada; namely, the Winnipeg-based Canadian Nationalist Party; the Canadian Union of Fascists (purportedly a nationwide federation with headquarters in Toronto); and Arcand's movement, the Parti National Social Chrétien (PNSC). Under Arcand, the PNSC became a virulently anti-Semitic French-Canadian nationalist party. In March 1938, Arcand and other fascist leaders formed the National Unity Party/Parti unité nationale, with Arcand at the helm. For an extensive discussion of Adrien Arcand and the National Unity Party, see Lita-Rose Betcherman, The Swastika and the Maple Leaf: Fascist Movements in Canada in the Thirties (Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1975); Martin Robin, Shades of Right: Nativist and Fascist Politics in Canada, 1920-1940 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); John Herd Thompson with Allen Seager, Canada, 1922-1939: Decades of Discord (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988), 323-4; John E. Zucchi, Italians in Toronto: Development of a National Identity, 1875-1935 (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988), Chapter Seven.

⁹⁶ Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present, 5; Betcherman, The Swastika and the Maple Leaf, 8-9, 11; Paris, Jews, 42-8; Pierre Anctil, "Interlude of Hostility: Judeo-Christian Relations in Quebec in the Interwar Period, 1919-39," chap. in Alan Davies, ed., Antisemitism in Canada: History and Interpretation (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1992), 135-65.

⁹⁷ The two notable exceptions were the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) and the United Church, both of which pushed for the admission of Jewish refugees. Betcherman, The Swastika and the Maple Leaf, 132-3. The story of Canada's darkest period of humanitarian effort has been expertly told by Irving Abella and Harold Troper in None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948 (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1991).

⁹⁸ The "achat chez nous" movement began in the 1920s but reached its peak in the 1930s. It was strongly supported by Abbé Groulx's L'Action Nationale, whose anti-Semitism was in step with Adrien Arcand's publications. Betcherman, The Swastika and the Maple Leaf, 32-3; Esther Delisle, The Traitor and the Jew: Anti-Semitism and Extremist Right-Wing Nationalism in Quebec from 1929 to 1939 (Montreal and Toronto: Robert Davies Publishing, 1993); H.M. Caiserman, "Anti-Semitism in Canada," n.d., c. 1938-39 (NAC, CJC Collection, MG 28, Volume 13, V, 101, Reel M-5461).

⁹⁹ Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present, 5.

¹⁰⁰ Abella, A Coat of Many Colours, 179.

¹⁰¹ Gerald Tulchinsky, "The Contours of Canadian Jewish History," in Robert J. Brym, William Shaffir, and Morton Weinfeld, eds., The Jews in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1993), 10.

¹⁰² Christie Pits was a working-class district of Toronto which was the scene of violence between Jews and non-Jews. The major incidents took place in the summer of 1933, when the Swastika Club of Toronto erected swastikas at the East End Beaches and harassed Jewish bathers, and then at a baseball game at Willowvale Park (commonly known as Christie Pits) where non-Jewish youths waved swastika flags and yelled "Heil Hitler" and "Kill the Jews." Violence erupted as a result of these anti-Semitic provocations, with Jewish youths battling against non-Jewish youths. Cyril H. Levitt and William Shaffir, The Riot at Christie Pits (Toronto: Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1987); Betcherman, The Swastika and the Maple Leaf, 57-60; Speisman, The Jews of Toronto, 332-5; Cyril H. Levitt and William Shaffir, "The Swastika as Dramatic Symbol: A Case-Study of Ethnic Violence in Canada," in Brym et al., The Jews in Canada, 77-96.

¹⁰³ Betcherman, The Swastika and the Maple Leaf, 65, 126.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 101-2; Abella and Troper, None is Too Many, 36-7.

¹⁰⁵ Caiserman, "Anti-Semitism in Canada."

¹⁰⁶ Tulchinsky, Taking Root, xix.

¹⁰⁷ Caiserman, "Anti-Semitism in Canada."

¹⁰⁸ Abella and Troper, None is Too Many, 10.

¹⁰⁹ Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present, 6.

¹¹⁰ Samuel Jacobs was Liberal member of parliament for the predominantly Jewish riding of Cartier from 1917 until his death in 1938. During the 1930s, Jacobs fought tenaciously for the admittance of German-Jewish refugees into Canada. For an insightful exposition on the public and private Samuel Jacobs, see Bernard Figler, Sam Jacobs: Member of Parliament (Gardenvale: Harpell's Press, 1970).

¹¹¹ Paris, Jews, 61.

¹¹² Le Jeune Canada was established in 1933 and was comprised of young militant students who published a pamphlet entitled, "Politiciens et Juifs," which repeated the familiar libels of Jewish financial domination, Jewish communism, and the terrors of Jewish immigration. Ibid., 52.

¹¹³ In later years, André Laurendeau would go on to head the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, established in 1963.

¹¹⁴ Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present, 6.

¹¹⁵ Paris, Jews, 61.

¹¹⁶ Abella, A Coat of Many Colours, 188.

¹¹⁷ Speisman, The Jews of Toronto, 331.

¹¹⁸ Rosenberg, Two Centuries of Jewish Life in Canada, 37.

¹¹⁹ Caiserman, "Anti-Semitism in Canada."

¹²⁰ Sam Jacobs served as president of the Canadian Jewish Congress from 1934 until his death in 1938. S. Rosenberg, The Jewish Community in Canada, vol. 2, 43; Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present, 6.

¹²¹ Abella, A Coat of Many Colours, 190.

¹²² "Constitution and Resolutions, Second General Session," 27-9 January 1934 (Glenbow, Shumiatcher Papers, M1107, Box 4, File 38).

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Harry Schneiderman, ed., The American Jewish Year Book, 1934-35, vol. 36 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1935), 151.

¹²⁵ Abella and Troper, None is Too Many, 10.

¹²⁶ "Constitution and Resolutions, Second General Session."

¹²⁷ Rosenberg, Two Centuries of Jewish Life in Canada, 37-8.

¹²⁸ The ORT organization (Organization for Rehabilitation through Training) was "Devoted to the Creation of a New Occupational Existence for Refugees and the Masses of European Jews Through Trade-Schools, Farm Colonies, Industrial Workshops." Vladimir Grossman, ed., Canadian Jewish Year Book, 1940-1941, vol. 2 (Montreal: Canadian Jewish Year Book, 1940), 265.

¹²⁹ "The Canadian Jewish Congress and the United Jewish Relief Agencies in Canada," n.d. (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 10).

¹³⁰ Ibid.

- ¹³¹ The United Jewish Refugee and War Relief Agencies was set up in 1939 and worked closely with the American Joint Distribution Committee to rescue Jewish refugees during the war and help settle Jewish displaced persons in the postwar period. S. Rosenberg, The Jewish Community in Canada, vol. 2, 44, 46; letter, Hayes to Shumiatcher, 4 November 1942 (Glenbow, Shumiatcher Papers, M1107, Box 8, File 57).
- ¹³² Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present, 7-8.
- ¹³³ Troper and Weinfeld, Old Wounds, 50.
- ¹³⁴ Canadian Jewish Congress, Pathways to the Present, 9.
- ¹³⁵ "Constitution and Resolutions, Second General Session."
- ¹³⁶ B'nai B'rith, a fraternal organization based on the foundations of service, brotherhood and education, was first organized in New York City in 1843. The first Canadian lodge of B'nai B'rith was set up in Toronto in 1875 and in Montreal in 1881. In 1960 there were more than fifty B'nai B'rith Lodges in Canada, a number of women's lodges, and chapters of the B'nai B'rith Youth movement. Today, B'nai B'rith is Canadian Jewry's largest membership organization. It is probably best known for its Anti-Defamation League in the United States and its League for Human Rights in Canada, both of which are active lobbying groups for civil rights and justice for minority groups. Troper and Weinfeld, Old Wounds, 52; Nathan Phillips, "The B'nai B'rith in Canada," in Hart, The Jew in Canada, 433-7; Selick, History of B'nai B'rith in Eastern Canada, 7-8; Rosenberg, Two Centuries of Jewish Life in Canada, 40.
- ¹³⁷ Abella, A Coat of Many Colours, 203.
- ¹³⁸ "Constitution and Resolutions, Second General Session."
- ¹³⁹ The resolutions passed at the fourth plenary session of Congress in January 1939 ratified the arrangement set up between the Canadian Jewish Congress and B'nai B'rith for the creation of a national Joint Public Relations Committee and regional Joint Public Relations Committees. Vladimir Grossman, ed., Canadian Jewish Year Book, 1939-1940, vol. 1 (Montreal: Canadian Jewish Year Book, 1939), 127.
- ¹⁴⁰ "Resolution, Joint Committee of Winnipeg B'nai Brith and Congress," 2 August [1938] (CJCNA, ZA 1938, Box 2, File 20).
- ¹⁴¹ "The Canadian Jewish Congress and the United Jewish Relief Agencies in Canada."
- ¹⁴² "Summary of Committee Reports for the Sixth Annual Regional Conference, Toronto," 22 September 1940 (Glenbow, Shumiatcher Papers, M1107, Box 7, File 50).
- ¹⁴³ "Summary of Activities of the National Joint Public Relations Committee of the Canadian Jewish Congress and the B'nai B'rith," n.d., c. 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 10).
- ¹⁴⁴ "Proceedings of the Seventh Plenary Session," 31 May-2 June 1947 (PAM, JHSWC Collection, MG6 B3).
- ¹⁴⁵ For a good overview of Congress's anti-defamation work in Quebec during this period, see Betcherman, The Swastika and the Maple Leaf, 40-1, 94-5.
- ¹⁴⁶ On 16 September 1937, the Canadian Broadcasting Commission issued a decree effective on 1 November 1937 that "no one shall broadcast abusive comment on any race, religion, or creed." Harry Schneiderman, ed., The American Jewish Year Book, 1938-1939, vol. 40 (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1939), 171.
- ¹⁴⁷ One of the most effective measures the Canadian Jewish Congress undertook against Adrien Arcand occurred in 1939, when a Congress delegation met with minister of justice Ernest Lapointe and handed him a heavily-documented brief on Arcand's activities. Thereafter, Arcand was interned and remained in prison for the duration of the war, being deemed a threat to security. S. Rosenberg, The Jewish Community in Canada, vol. 2, 44.
- ¹⁴⁸ The Bureau of Social and Economic Research of the Canadian Jewish Congress was set up in 1934 "for the purpose of analyzing and interpreting all available information concerning the Jewish population of Canada ... so as to assist the various committees of the Canadian Jewish Congress and other national organizations in planning the social services, religious and educational facilities, civic protective programs and other phases of Jewish organizational life in Canada." Rosenberg, The Jewish Population of Canada, 1-2.
- ¹⁴⁹ Caiserman, "Anti-Semitism in Canada."
- ¹⁵⁰ Canadian Jewish Review, 7 June 1935 (Glenbow, Shumiatcher Papers, M1107, Box 4, File 38).
- ¹⁵¹ Calgary Herald, 7 August 1939; "Minutes, Third Session of the Third Regional Congress Conference, Western Division," 6 August 1939 (Glenbow, Shumiatcher Papers, M1107, Box 5, File 44).
- ¹⁵² "Minutes, Third Session of the Third Regional Congress Conference, Western Division."

¹⁵³ "Report of the Executive Director of the Western Division, Sixth Western Conference," 23-4 May 1943 (Glenbow, Shumiatcher Papers, M1107, Box 8, File 58).

¹⁵⁴ In 1938, Louis Rosenberg gave a statistical analysis of the economic stratification of Jews in Canada. He reported that there were six Jewish farmers in Canada for every one Jew engaged in financial occupations, and that only two out of every 1,000 Jews gainfully occupied were engaged in finance, as compared with three out of every 1,000 among the total population of all origins, and four out of every 1,000 among those of British origin. Rosenberg also reported that there was not and had not been for forty years in Canada a single Jewish director of a chartered bank, railway, ocean or air transportation company, telephone or telegraph company, public utility corporation, or pulp and paper corporation, and that the membership lists of the Montreal and Toronto stock exchanges "are as clear of Jewish names as the register of an exclusive country club." Other statistics showed that occupationally, Jews were disproportionately represented in the manufacturing industry, trade, and clerical occupations in Canada. In 1941, for example, 31.24 percent of Jews were engaged in manufacturing, as compared to 16.73 percent of all other origins; 34.86 percent of Jews were engaged in trade, as compared to 8.54 percent of all other origins; and 14.20 percent of Jews were engaged in clerical occupations, as compared to 8.04 percent of all other origins. Conversely, only 1.19 percent of Jews were engaged in agriculture, as compared to 25.24 percent of all other origins. Only 0.28 percent of Jews were engaged in finance, which was almost equal to the 0.29 percent of all other origins. Louis Rosenberg, "Canada's Jewish Citizens," in *Social Welfare*, 3 September 1938 (PAM, JHSWC Collection, MG10 F3; MG8 F6); Rosenberg, The Jewish Population of Canada, 32; National Joint Public Relations Committee, "Some Figures on the Jewish Population of Canada," n.d., c. 1951 (PAM, JHSWC Collection, MG10 F3; MG8 F3).

¹⁵⁵ Louis Rosenberg, "Jews in Canadian Industry and Finance," 15 June 1936 (PAM, JHSWC Collection, P600 A).

¹⁵⁶ *Canadian Jewish Review*, 24 May 1935.

¹⁵⁷ Caiserman, "Anti-Semitism in Canada."

¹⁵⁸ "Summary of Committee Reports for the Sixth Annual Regional Conference," 22 September 1940 (Glenbow, Shumiatcher Papers, M1107, Box 7, File 50).

¹⁵⁹ "Report to the Fifth Plenary Session of the Canadian Jewish Congress, Montreal," 10-12 January 1942 (Glenbow, Shumiatcher Papers, M1107, Box 7, File 54).

¹⁶⁰ "Proceedings of the Seventh Plenary Session."

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁶² National Joint Public Relations Committee, "Public Relations in Theory and in Practice," n.d., c. 1950, and "Declaration of Policy," n.d., c. 15 August 1950 (PAM, JHSWC Collection, MG10, File 3; MG8, File 3).

¹⁶³ "Proceedings of the Seventh Plenary Session."

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁷ H.M. Caiserman, "National Plan of the Public Relations Work to be Carried on in Canada by the Joint Public Relations Committee of the Canadian Jewish Congress and B'nai B'rith of Canada," n.d. (PAM, JHSWC Collection, P600 A).

¹⁶⁸ Troper and Weinfeld, Old Wounds, 51.

¹⁶⁹ S. Rosenberg, The Jewish Community in Canada, vol. 2, 50-1.

¹⁷⁰ Figler and Rome, Hannaniah Meir Caiserman, 254-5.

¹⁷¹ Abella, A Coat of Many Colours, 213-15.

¹⁷² National Joint Public Relations Committee, "Public Relations in Theory and in Practice," and "Declaration of Policy."

¹⁷³ "Proceedings of the Seventh Plenary Session."

¹⁷⁴ "Summary of Activities of the National Joint Public Relations Committee of the Canadian Jewish Congress and the B'nai B'rith."

¹⁷⁵ "Draft on Anti-Semitism in Canada;" *The Facts* (May 1949).

PART TWO

DAVID AND GOLIATH: THE RESPONSE OF THE CANADIAN JEWISH CONGRESS TO SOCIAL CREDIT'S ANTI-SEMITISM

The relationship between the Social Credit movement and the Canadian Jewish Congress is less strange and unlikely than it first appeared. It is clear that the Social Credit movement engaged in the dissemination of a large and varied amount of anti-Semitic propaganda. As will be shown, the Canadian Jewish Congress attempted various measures to eradicate it. It was this action and reaction which brought the two organizations together. At the root of their relationship lay a basic antagonism - Social Credit propaganda held up the "international Jewish financier" as an object of vilification, and the Canadian Jewish Congress responded to this "act of aggression" with a defensiveness of its own. For the most part, however, the negativity of their relationship was transmuted by Congress's positive public relations approach and a dialogue based on political considerations, public niceties, and mere dissemblance. Yet stripped of these guises, the Social Credit-Congress relationship was one of hostility. Not surprisingly, such a relationship was bound to have its share of conflicts.

The Social Credit-Congress relationship began in 1935, shortly after Congress's re-organization and immediately following Aberhart's electoral victory in Alberta. However, these early years were marked by little acrimony; although there was some concern within Congress over statements made by Social Credit members, the dialogue between the two organizations was rather muted. It was only after the beginning of the Second World War, and specifically in the early 1940s, that Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda began to

increase dramatically. This caused Congress to respond more actively to what it termed the "Social Credit problem." Throughout the war, various incidents brought the two organizations face to face over the issue of anti-Semitism. But it was at the end of the war that the problem began to reach crisis proportions. This was poor timing for Congress, which was facing other issues of pressing concern.

During the immediate postwar period, Congress was most occupied with the problems of European Jewry and specifically, the thousands of displaced persons who had survived the Holocaust. By 1945, after several years of quiet but persistent negotiation with federal officials, Congress had succeeded in persuading the Canadian government to allow in approximately 5,000 Jewish refugees.¹ Now, in the aftermath of war, it was forced to acknowledge that European Jewry had been nearly destroyed and that the Canadian government had done virtually nothing to assist it. Congress continued to work tirelessly to persuade the federal government to allow in Jewish refugees, while assisting in re-establishing the remaining Jews of Europe in more hospitable areas. At the same time, it remained committed to the creation of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine, and was greatly concerned that Britain's own political considerations would postpone or even cancel fulfillment of the promises made by Lord Balfour in 1917.

While Congress was occupied with problems of European and world Jewry, domestically it focussed on issues of postwar reconstruction and reconversion and the potential effects they would have on Canadian Jewry. Although anti-Semitism appeared to be on the wane across postwar Canada, Jewish refugees were not welcome, notwithstanding the publication of Europe's death camps during the war.² Meanwhile, the

Social Credit movement continued to rail against the international financial Jewish conspiracy.

But Social Credit's propaganda was out of step with the times. Certainly, Social Crediters were not the first, nor the last group to talk of an international Jewish conspiracy, and anti-Semitism was alive and well in post-war Canada. However, in the wake of the Nazi regime and the horrors of the Holocaust, Canadian society's "polite company rule" was changing and the country's political culture was adopting a more tolerant tone. Yet the Social Credit movement continued to march to the tune of a previous drummer.

The increase in the frequency and intensity of Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda in the early postwar period forced Congress to adopt a different public relations philosophy. Yet Congress found it very difficult to execute a more aggressive approach to the Social Credit problem, especially while it was still attempting to curry the favour of a grudging federal government over the immigration of refugees.³ The Palestine question was also increasing in intensity as the British government, no longer willing to partition Palestine, handed the issue to the United Nations in February 1947. Congress, along with other Jewish organizations worldwide, watched with dismay at the wave of Zionist terrorism unleashed in Palestine.⁴ These concerns did not give Congress much time to focus on the Social Credit problem, and in the absence of a strong public relations policy backed by unanimous consent, there seemed little that it could do to halt Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda. Yet many Congress members remained committed to ending their "number one" public relations problem and continued to execute measures to confront and end the years of anti-Semitic propagandizing.

When Premier Manning finally executed his purge of the anti-Semitic Douglasites in late 1947 and early 1948, the Canadian Jewish Congress could take little credit for these favourable turn of events. Notwithstanding its years of efforts, Congress's public relations philosophy had not adapted quickly enough to slay the Social Credit Goliath before he toppled under his own weight. Yet this failure is what makes the Social Credit-Congress relationship so worthy of investigation. Although Congress was ultimately unsuccessful in its attempts to end Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda, the lessons it learned from its travails with the movement enabled it to eventually adopt a strong, effective, public relations approach against all forms of prejudice. Indeed, the Canadian Jewish Congress may have lost the battle with the Social Credit Goliath, but it ultimately won the war against anti-Semitism. What follows then, is the story of David and Goliath - of the relationship between the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Social Credit movement.

NOTES TO PART TWO

¹ Irving Abella and Harold Troper note that "between 1933 and 1945 Canada found room within her borders for fewer than 5,000 Jews; after the war, until the founding of Israel in 1948, she admitted but 8,000 more. That record is arguably the worst of all possible refugee-receiving states." Irving Abella and Harold Troper, None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948 (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1991), xxii.

² A Gallup Poll in October 1946 asked Canadians to choose the immigrant group they found most undesirable. The question stated: "If Canada does allow more immigrants are there any of these nationalities [on a supplied list] you would like to keep out?" The results were as follows: Japanese - 60 percent; Jewish - 49 percent; German - 34 percent; Russian - 33 percent; Negro - 31 percent; Italian - 25 percent; Chinese - 24 percent; Middle European - 16 percent; Ukrainian - 15 percent; Polish - 14 percent; Others - 3 percent; None - 18 percent; No Answer - 3 percent. As Abella and Troper note, "[s]econd on the list was not Canada's prime European enemy, Germans, but Jews. Almost half of those questioned, forty-nine per cent, checked off Jews as undesirable immigrants." Abella and Troper, None is Too Many, 231-2, 323.

³ As noted above, between the end of the Second World War and the founding of Israel in 1948, Canada admitted a paltry 8,000 Jewish refugees, in large part because of the tireless work of the Canadian Jewish Congress. Abella and Troper, None is Too Many, xxii.

⁴ David J. Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 52, 58-9.

CHAPTER FOUR

CONFRONTING THE SOCIAL CREDIT PROBLEM, 1935-1945

In the decade following the ascension of the Social Credit movement and the reorganization of the Canadian Jewish Congress, the dialogue between the two organizations took on a distinctive tone. It was characterized by anti-Semitic propagandizing on the part of Social Credit, concern and frustration on the part of Congress, and mutual, albeit superficial, civility. The Social Credit movement had little interest in Congress's concerns, and Congress's public relations approach impeded its ability to stop the movement's propaganda. An examination of the first ten years of the Social Credit-Congress relationship will reveal the nature of Congress's response to Social Credit, including its attempts to confront Social Credit's propaganda efforts, and its difficulties in formulating an effective public relations policy toward the "Social Credit problem."

Unfortunately, there are very few records of Congress's response to Social Credit until about 1941. Although the re-organization of Congress coincided roughly with the ascension of Aberhart's movement-*cum*-party in the mid-1930s,¹ during this period Congress was more concerned with the immediate threat of Adrien Arcand and other pre-war fascist groups.² At the same time, it was trying desperately to convince the Canadian government to lift its immigration restrictions to allow for the rescue of European Jews from Nazi persecution.³ With the very real threat of fascism at home, and the imminent destruction of European Jewry abroad, Congress was battling enemies on many sides. It is

conceivable that the relatively less threatening rhetoric of the Social Credit movement was not at the top of its agenda during this early period. Further, Congress's national headquarters, located in Montreal, determined most of Congress's policy decisions. It was far removed, both geographically and culturally, from the Alberta Jewish experience under Social Credit. As will be shown ahead, this distance made a coherent, unified response towards Social Credit's propaganda somewhat difficult.

After 1940, however, this geographic and cultural distance was mitigated somewhat by Louis Rosenberg who, in his capacity as newly-elected executive director of the Western Division of Congress and secretary of the Joint Public Relations Committee in Winnipeg, was in a much better position to assess the impact and potential threat of Social Credit on Canadian Jewry. Rosenberg's exhaustive analysis of Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda cannot be overemphasized. Because of his unrelenting scrutiny and persistence in relaying information to Congress's headquarters in Montreal, Rosenberg successfully proved that Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda was a real and pervasive threat, and far surpassed the propaganda efforts typical of a political "fringe." Still, Rosenberg's work did not completely bridge the gap between Congress's national headquarters and the Alberta Jewish experience under Social Credit. Communication between east and west would break down many times in an attempt to formulate an effective public relations policy. The result was that this policy lacked direction and determined leadership, and often consisted of simply monitoring Social Credit's propaganda. Indeed, during this period, of the many actions considered very few were taken to quell the Social Credit menace.

Yet it is important to examine Congress's response to Social Credit in its entirety, and actions considered but not taken should not be deemed irrelevant. In the years before 1945, Congress considered Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda to be a serious public relations problem and tried to develop an effective policy to end it. But as will be shown, its public relations philosophy in many ways hindered its progress. Further, the nature of Social Credit's propaganda and the manner of Social Credit politicians' interactions with Congress members made open confrontation difficult, if not counterproductive. Accordingly, examining all of Congress's responses to Social Credit, even those which did not result in open confrontation of the movement, helps not only to explain Congress's relationship with Social Credit, but also illuminates the "growing pains" in Congress's public relations philosophy.

In the years up to 1945, Congress became increasingly concerned about Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda. Louis Rosenberg had been documenting the anti-Semitism in Major Douglas's writings at least since 1935,⁴ and as early as 1936 concluded that Social Credit's founder was a raving anti-Semite. He called Douglas "the high priest of the Social Crediters," and described how Douglas "mumbles mysteriously about the long discredited *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and spices his stew of 'a + b theorems' and 'social dividend' with a little anti-semitic paprika to taste, reaching the pinnacle of nonsense by turning the fair-haired teutonic Lombards into Jews in order to suit his theories concerning the wicked 'collectivist Communist Jewish bankers.'"⁵ Rosenberg was aware that Douglas's attitudes were permeating the Alberta Social Credit movement, and he brought the topic of Social Credit's anti-Semitism to the attention of Congress leadership in the late 1930s. However, there is little evidence of any action being taken.⁶

The beginning of the war and the plight of European Jewry occupied much of Congress's attention after 1939, but by the early 1940s it was clear that Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda was a chronic characteristic and that Congress needed to respond to this potential threat. In 1941 Rosenberg emphasized that anti-Semitism in Social Credit propaganda was more than the fulminations of certain Social Credit politicians, and that their statements actually represented official Social Credit policy. By this time Rosenberg had examined all the writings of Major C.H. Douglas and concluded that the founder of Social Credit subscribed to and actively promoted those views found in the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*.⁷ Even more seriously, Social Credit politicians in Canada were espousing similar views.

That same year Rosenberg decided to directly confront Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda. On 30 January 1941 the *Western Producer*⁸ published a letter by Social Credit MP Norman Jaques, which stated that the American-based Union Now Movement⁹ was attempting to achieve "[t]he surrender of our national sovereignty to international control ... there is only one thing that ... functions as a 'power' on an international basis and that is International Finance. And who controls International Finance? A gang of German-Jewish 'international' bankers ... Not only German military totalitarianism, but its evil twin, German-Jewish financial totalitarianism, must be destroyed."¹⁰

Rosenberg responded to Jaques's letter as a private citizen and not on behalf of the Canadian Jewish Congress, although he did have the support of its national executive. He wrote a letter to the *Western Producer* which offered evidence to prove that world finance was not, in fact, controlled by "German Jewish International Bankers."¹¹ In it, Rosenberg gave his assessment of Jaques's views: "[s]uch a hodge-podge of ignorance and malice as

displayed in the letter [by Jaques] would not merit reply under normal circumstances. The results of Hitler's propaganda technique however, have shown that no propaganda, no matter how false or ridiculous, can be ignored if it can secure publication ... What does concern me is that there sits in the House of Commons, at a time when we are engaged in a life-and-death struggle with Hitlerism and all it stands for, a man who does not scruple to warm up and offer to the readers of the *Western Producer* a rehash of all the venomous propaganda with which Hitler's publicity machine has been flooding the world since 1933."

Rosenberg questioned why, during such a time of crisis, a Canadian member of parliament would allow himself to be used to spread discord and prejudice: "how long will well-meaning people continue to confuse liberty with license, and furnish an open and free forum for fomenters of discord and racial hatred to spread their pernicious doctrines, and destroy democracy itself?" He admonished the *Western Producer* for "spoil[ing] good newsprint by printing second-hand versions of Deutsche Bunde propaganda" at a time when Canadians were being asked to prevent waste and salvage paper.¹²

Rosenberg subsequently met with the editor of the *Western Producer*, with whom he was personally acquainted. The editor informed him that readers of all opinions had the right to have their letters published in the paper. "He seems to have the curious idea," stated Rosenberg, "that to refuse to publish such letters as those of Mr. Jaques would be transgressing the freedom of the press."¹³ Rosenberg surmised that the editor of the *Western Producer*, a Social Crediter supporter, was "not inclined to criticize anything

which a Social Credit member may have written.”¹⁴ Not surprisingly, the editor did not publish Rosenberg’s response to Jaques.¹⁵

Very early in the Congress-Social Credit relationship, Rosenberg realized that confronting the movement’s anti-Semitic propaganda would not be easy. Part of the problem rested with Congress itself. In a letter to Oscar Cohen, executive secretary of Congress’s Central Division in Toronto, Rosenberg expressed his frustration with the Social Credit situation: “I have long felt that the Anti-Semitic tendencies among Social Credit propagandists should be exposed, but there happens to be a Social Credit government in office in ... Alberta and some Congress workers in that province are rather doubtful concerning the advisability of making any public statements on this subject at the present time ... Aberhart[’s] ... relationship with the Jewish communities in Alberta has always been cordial, and he has been a prominent speaker at Jewish goodwill gatherings. However it will be nothing strange if Mr. Aberhart himself was unaware of these tendencies in Social Credit propaganda, as he is unaware of quite a few things in connection with Social Credit.”¹⁶

Yet Rosenberg was determined that Jaques’s allegations in the *Western Producer* be refuted. He contacted Morris Fine of the American Jewish Committee, asking him to obtain a declaration from the Union Now Movement that its Director, Clarence Streit was not, as Jaques alleged, a “Wall Street Jewish banker.” The Director of the Union Now Movement, E.W. Balduf, wrote to Rosenberg, stating that “Mr. Streit is not a banker and has never had any connection with any banking house or any other business house. Mr. Streit also is not Jewish.”¹⁷ Rosenberg asked Balduf if he would kindly write to the editor of the *Western Producer* and insist upon publication of the facts regarding Streit. “It

would not be necessary,” added Rosenberg, “to mention that the statements had been brought to your attention by the American Jewish Committee and by myself, as this would be used to confirm the impression of Mr. Streit’s ‘Jewishness.’”¹⁸ Yet there is no evidence that Balduf wrote to the *Western Producer*. In the end, the *Western Producer* did nothing to counter Jaques’s anti-Semitic statements. In fact, the paper continued to publish similar letters in its columns.¹⁹ Yet Rosenberg’s failure to silence Jaques was not for lack of trying. To his credit, he had tried various measures to refute Jaques’s allegations, although none were successful.

Several months later, however, another newspaper piece caused Congress to become involved again with the “Social Credit problem.” On 2 February 1942, Richard Needham of the *Calgary Herald* wrote a column in which he exposed the pervasive anti-Semitism in *Today and Tomorrow*, the Social Credit party organ.²⁰ Upon reading Needham’s article, two Congress members from Calgary and Edmonton²¹ agreed that the anti-Semitic propaganda in *Today and Tomorrow*, if allowed to go unchecked, “may develop into something serious to the Jewish people of Alberta and Canada.”²² They decided to approach Premier Aberhart directly, confront him with the fact that his party organ contained anti-Semitic statements, and hopefully persuade him to bring his party’s publishers in line. H.A. Friedman, the Congress member from Edmonton, planned to meet with Aberhart, but he was not overly optimistic regarding the potential success of this meeting: “I am sure [Aberhart] will disclaim any Anti-Semitism so far as he personally is concerned and also in respect to his party in this Province, but this in itself is of little value to us.” In Friedman’s view, getting *Today and Tomorrow* to quit publishing anti-Semitic statements “is about all we can hope to accomplish.”²³

Yet Friedman never met with Aberhart, and the reasons for this are not clear. Shortly after plans were made for their meeting, alternate arrangements were made for Rabbi Solomon Frank, executive director of the Joint Public Relations Committee in Winnipeg, to meet with the premier, who had come to Winnipeg to attend a Social Credit conference. Thus, it was now up to Rabbi Frank to confront Aberhart. The two met, and although they apparently had a candid discussion, one might conjecture that this meeting would have gone differently had Friedman, a lawyer from Edmonton, confronted Aberhart on their home turf. In any event, Frank found Aberhart "most cordial, convincing and sincere in his reactions" to the issues he raised, namely the anti-Semitic statements of Social Credit politicians and specifically those of Norman Jaques. Frank also raised the issue of Jaques's letter to the *Western Producer*. In the course of their discussion, Aberhart gave him the following assurances:

1. That anti-semitism and racial hatred of any kind are entirely foreign to [Aberhart's] own philosophy of life.
2. That [Aberhart] deprecated most strongly any anti-Semitic tendencies on the part of members of his party. Furthermore that he had taken it upon himself ... to express himself in accordance with this thought to those of his party who were guilty of anti-semitic statements. Though he would want his party to be clear from any racial or religious biases of any kind, he of course could not be held responsible for isolated utterances, particularly when these ran counter to his way of thinking.

3. That if, in spite of [Aberhart's] repeated warnings to the contrary, these anti-semitic utterances on the part of his membership were to continue, he would take whatever steps he possibly could in order to definitely squelch any anti-semitic tendency.

Frank remarked that Aberhart "seemed sincerely upset by the actions of those within his party that would seek to connect him with anything of an anti-semitic character."

Although Aberhart had said nothing about keeping their conversation confidential, Frank felt that any statement made by a man in public office must be treated with a certain degree of confidence. Accordingly, he insisted that Aberhart's statements not be publicized.²⁴

Two aspects of this exchange between Rabbi Frank and Premier Aberhart are particularly noteworthy. The first is that Aberhart did not dispute the fact that certain of his members were spouting anti-Semitic statements. Rather, he adopted a tone of apology and even personal injury that members of his party were engaging in such destructive actions. This stance is significant because it would not be continued after Aberhart's death. After 1943, the anti-Semitism in Social Credit circles would become more daring, more vocal, and members like Solon Low²⁵ and even Ernest Manning would deny that their party was anti-Semitic.

The second noteworthy item is that the exchange between Frank and Aberhart was marked by congeniality and good will. Aberhart told Frank at the end of their conversation that he would be happy to listen to any representation the Rabbi cared to make to him at any time.²⁶ In a similar turn of respect, Frank asked the Alberta members of Congress not to publicize the meeting between Aberhart and himself.²⁷ However, such

conventions of etiquette did little to solve the real problem, which was the promotion of anti-Semitic propaganda by Social Credit members and their party organ. Aberhart's assurances aside, little was done to silence Jaques, *Today and Tomorrow*, or any other Social Credit member. Consequently, an opportunity for the Canadian Jewish Congress to publicize the dangers of Social Credit's anti-Semitism, and even more importantly, to make public Aberhart's acknowledgment of the problem, had been passed up.

Yet Congress continued to scrutinize anti-Semitic manifestations in the Social Credit movement.²⁸ In the spring of 1943, Congress's national executive director, Saul Hayes, indicated to Louis Rosenberg that something needed to be done about Norman Jaques, and he enquired whether any Congress members near Wetaskiwin knew the member of parliament.²⁹ In response, Rosenberg gave Hayes an enlightening summary of the Social Credit situation. He told Hayes that he had been watching Jaques's antics for some years, that he subscribed to *Today and Tomorrow*, and was scrutinizing articles by Jaques as well as transcribed broadcasts of Premier Aberhart. He remarked that Jaques was like the great majority of Social Credit "fanatics," who had swallowed all the propaganda regarding the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* and international Jewish bankers, and noted that the MP never missed an opportunity to inject anti-Semitic remarks into his speeches and articles. Rosenberg informed Hayes that in recent months one of Aberhart's main themes in his radio broadcasts was an international financial conspiracy led by international capitalists and international socialists who made their headquarters in the London School of Economics. According to Aberhart, this conspiracy was also behind the Union Now Movement whose object was to enslave Canada and Great Britain to the United States. In assessing the nature and potential threat of Aberhart's and Jaques's

rhetoric, Rosenberg stated: “[t]he only difference between Wm. Aberhart and Norman Jaques is that Mr. Jaques repeatedly inserts the word ‘Jewish’ between ‘international financiers,’ whereas Aberhart omits the word ‘Jewish’ leaving you to guess.”³⁰

Rosenberg believed that the Social Credit situation was becoming increasingly serious. “I have long felt that this is no longer a question of ignoring a crank [Jaques], but it is a question of countering the activities of a group of men as crazy as the Pelleys and Coughlins in the United States and equally as dangerous.” He told Hayes that he had taken up the matter of Jaques with the Joint Public Relations Committee in Winnipeg and with some of Congress’s key men in Alberta. However, “the tendencies in the past among some of our friends in Alberta has been to urge us to leave the matter alone, since the Social Crediters from [sic - form] the Provincial Government in that province, and since Norman Jaques is supposed to be a very sick man with an incurable disease who will soon bother us no longer. Personally, I am inclined to take the matter more seriously, and believe that the activities of the Social Credit Party and its speakers ... from Wm. Aberhart ... downwards, are sufficiently dangerous to merit active opposition.”³¹ Hayes was impressed with Rosenberg’s assessment and agreed Jaques needed to be taken more seriously. Yet in the following months Congress’s national executive took no concrete action against Jaques or Social Credit’s anti-Semitic propaganda.³²

In Rosenberg’s view, Congress members in Alberta were unwilling to create problems for themselves by confronting their own provincial government, and Congress’s national executive in Montreal was too far removed to lead any concerted action against the Alberta movement. Although Rosenberg may have been correct in his assessment of

some Alberta members of Congress, in fact there were others in Alberta who were as determined as he was to end the Social Credit problem.

In May 1943, an article written in the *Canadian Tribune* about the Alberta government caught the attention of Alberta Congress members. James A. MacPherson, leader of the Labour-Progressive Party in Alberta, wrote an article in the *Canadian Tribune* entitled "Alberta's 'Fifth Column,'" which noted that the Alberta Social Credit Board was financed by appropriations by the Alberta legislature, and that the Board used those public funds to "disseminate ... the most violent anti-Jewish material." MacPherson argued that the Social Credit Board was carrying on a "deliberate campaign to destroy the United Nations alliance and to obstruct Canada's war effort against Hitlerism" while the Party's propaganda organ, *Today and Tomorrow*, disseminated "pro-fascist propaganda" and "anti-Jewish material."³³

MacPherson quoted from two pamphlets distributed by the Social Credit Board, one which made the following claims: that the Bank of England was established by William of Orange on the advice of "those Jews who came with him from Holland;" that "[t]he American and French revolutions were utilized by the Jews to gain control of world finance;" and that the crisis of 1929 was engineered by international finance.³⁴ The other pamphlet stated that "Karl Marx found himself in perfect agreement with the men who became the head of the powerful American Jewish banks ... There was an agreement between Karl Marx and the Jewish bankers ... The Jewish bankers entered into an agreement with the Marxists as to the necessity of starting the conquest of Russia."³⁵

MacPherson also quoted from L.D. Byrne, technical adviser to the Alberta government and head of the Alberta Social Credit Board, who stated that "[t]he monetary system is a

highly centralized private monopoly concentrated in the hands of a small group of men, who constitute a super government ... there is a deliberate plan to establish world totalitarianism and the enslavement of the individual ... the names of a number of international financiers are linked with those of Karl Marx and Engels, whose concept of society was essentially totalitarian and materialistic ... Germany is the perfect example of the Marxian state.”³⁶ MacPherson also reviewed the radio speeches of Premier Aberhart and concluded that “Aberhart brands all opposition and criticism, and all post-war proposals such as the Beveridge and Marsh reports, as schemes of ‘sinister international money sharks, revolutionary financiers, Marxists, Socialists, Communists, totalitarians, internationalists and money bags.’” He also quoted Aberhart as stating: “[t]he Anglo-Saxon race is God’s battle-axe today” and “Naziism, sovietism and fascism are one and the same thing.”³⁷

MacPherson had provided a sweeping indictment of the Alberta Social Credit government. He revealed a government which condemned wartime measures such as rental control, price control, national selective service, and machinery and labour-management councils as the first step towards National Socialism in Canada,³⁸ and which deemed the Beveridge and Marsh Reports as well as the United Nations itself as schemes conjured up by international Communistic financiers. According to MacPherson, leading Social Credit politicians believed that communism, fascism, and Nazism were one and the same, and that Jews were involved in all three “conspiracies.”³⁹ Thus, no one reading MacPherson’s article could ignore the serious allegations against the Alberta government, and it did not go unnoticed among Alberta members of Congress.

There were several reactions to the *Canadian Tribune* article,⁴⁰ but it was Congress member L.M. Fradkin of Calgary who took the lead in attempting to confront the Alberta government. Seeking the advice of Louis Rosenberg,⁴¹ Fradkin decided that it was best to try to end the anti-Semitic propaganda in *Today and Tomorrow* by confronting Ernest Manning, the new Social Credit premier.⁴² Fradkin recalled that the previous winter Alberta Congress members had planned to interview Aberhart over the same issue, yet no meeting had transpired. Now, in light of MacPherson's article, Fradkin was unwilling to let matters slide any longer. In a letter to M.I. Lieberman, a fellow Congress member in Edmonton, Fradkin stated: "[w]e are greatly perturbed over this matter, and it is absolutely essential that some action be taken forthwith. My [Calgary] Committee is prepared to co-operate with your [Edmonton] Committee in every way and, if necessary, to assist you in the proposed interview [of Manning] ... we consider this matter of the utmost importance."⁴³ Yet Lieberman replied that someone had in fact spoken to the late Premier Aberhart in February 1942 regarding the anti-Semitism in *Today and Tomorrow*, and that "since that [meeting] no articles appeared in *Today and Tomorrow* which were objectionable." Lieberman added that Congress members in Edmonton were still subscribing to *Today and Tomorrow* and were perusing it carefully.⁴⁴

Two peculiarities need to be noted. First, there is no record of a meeting between Edmonton Congress members and Aberhart in February 1942, although it cannot be assumed that such a meeting did not take place. It is worth asking, however, why there was no correspondence regarding such a meeting between the Edmonton and Calgary branches of Congress. Second, it is quite incredible that any Congress member perusing *Today and Tomorrow* would state that since February 1942 no articles appearing in *Today*

and Tomorrow were “objectionable” - that is, anti-Semitic. An examination of *Today and Tomorrow* during these months reveals a consistent infusion of anti-Semitic references.

Thus, it must be asked what was the nature of communication between the Edmonton and Calgary branches of the Western Division of Congress. Lieberman admitted to Fradkin that “[t]here is no question ... that the statements made by members of the Social Credit Board and their attacks in particular against international financiers are anti-semitic. This problem has for sometime [sic] been receiving our careful consideration and attention.”⁴⁵ Yet despite these declarations of vigilance, the Edmonton branch was unwilling to respond to the article in the *Canadian Tribune*. Eventually, the issue blew over and nothing was done. In attempting to understand why this happened, one wonders whether the Edmonton members of Congress were determined not to “rock the boat” or whether there was jurisdictional in-fighting between the Edmonton and Calgary Congress members. Perhaps the Edmonton members saw the Social Credit problem as *their* concern since the Social Credit government was located in their city, and thus, they wanted to deal with Manning as they deemed fit. Perhaps traditional jealousies between the cities of Edmonton and Calgary were played out even within the branches of Congress. Whatever conjectures may be offered, the consequence was that Alberta Congress members did not confront Premier Manning in 1943.

Throughout that summer, Louis Rosenberg continued to scrutinize the Social Credit problem from his office in Winnipeg. Manning had now replaced Aberhart as premier, and Rosenberg harboured no illusions about the late premier’s promises to quell the anti-Semitism in his movement. In a letter to a Congress member in Vegreville, Alberta, Rosenberg stated: “there can be no possible doubt that the whole ... Social Credit

ideology and propaganda is honey-combed with anti-semitism ... The late Mr. William Aberhart, although he claimed to be well disposed towards Jews, and denied being anti-semitic, nevertheless did nothing whatsoever to prevent prominent members of his Party from repeating anti-semitic statements. In fact he made similar charges about International Bankers and International Conspiracies. The only difference was that he was careful to omit the word Jewish in any of his public statements.”⁴⁶

Yet Rosenberg was not the only one concerned about the Social Credit threat. Congress members in Vegreville were also making plans to confront Solon Low, provincial treasurer of the Alberta government. Rosenberg noted that the National Joint Public Relations Committee (JPRC) was also scrutinizing the situation, and he inferred that its position was “unless the Social Credit Party in Alberta and throughout Canada can be induced to repudiate the anti-semitic remarks of Mr. Blackmore, Mr. Jacques [sic] and Mr. Hlynka, and to expel them from the Party, if they refuse to cease making anti-semitic statements, then we shall have to face them as an open enemy of the Jewish people.”⁴⁷ Thus, according to Rosenberg, the JPRC was planning to take a strong stand against Social Credit. In fact, if his statement is taken literally, organized Canadian Jewry was going to directly oppose the democratically-elected Social Credit government in Alberta. However, it is unlikely that Congress had such a dramatic plan in mind. In fact, it appears that Rosenberg had been mistaken, for the JPRC did not execute *any* action that summer against the Social Credit government.

Yet the summer of 1943 was not without incident. Not long after Aberhart’s death, a letter written by Norman Jaques to one O. Reidell in Swift Current, Saskatchewan, eventually landed on the desk of H.M. Caiserman, general secretary of the Canadian

Jewish Congress. Reidell, as a concerned private citizen, had corresponded with Jaques and engaged in debate over the latter's employment of the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* in the House of Commons and the press. Reidell was clearly antagonistic towards Jaques's anti-Semitism, and when Jaques sent him a letter explaining his views, Reidell forwarded it to the Canadian Jewish Congress.⁴⁸ Jaques's letter, written on House of Commons letterhead, revealed a man who was blatantly anti-Semitic:

All History proves that no nation can tolerate control by the Jews ... I have never said that the *Protocols* are genuine. I do say that what they predict is now coming to pass ... The attempt to destroy the *Protocols*, and to threaten, and intimidate those who mention them is a good indication of what we may expect if these people have their way. You have to remember the Jews control all means of gathering news and of propaganda, so that we hear one side of the case ... Before the war millions of Russians died of starvation, or were done to death ... But all we hear about is Jewish suffering and persecution. The Jews['] religion is that they are the chosen people and that the gentiles are cattle (goyim) and that it is no crime to exploit them, which is the reason for their persecution in reprisal ... I am against surrender of any sovereign power to international control - the Jew[s] being the only people, and money the only thing which is international. Hence I defend the Crown against the "3 brass balls" of Shylock, Ricardo and Marx.⁴⁹

Caiserman handed the letter over to Rosenberg,⁵⁰ who wrote to Reidell thanking him for passing the letter on to Congress. "It is indeed regrettable," wrote Rosenberg, "that at this time when unity and mutual understanding among all citizens of Canada is so necessary,

that Mr. Jacques [sic], a member of the House of Commons should abuse his privileges by spreading the same antisemitic propaganda which is peddled by Goebbels and the Nazis.”⁵¹ Rosenberg circulated copies of Jaques’s letter to the Central and Western Divisions of Congress, as well as to the Joint Public Relations Committees in Edmonton and Calgary.⁵²

Shortly thereafter, Rosenberg wrote an extensive memorandum describing Jaques’s employment of the *Protocols* and sent it to key Congress members in Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Calgary. He summarized the anti-Semitic theories of Social Credit ideology, which included the bogeys of the gold standard, the banking system, the *Protocols*, the Bank of England, the London School of Economics, the Federal Reserve Bank, and Clarence K. Streit and the Union Now Movement. Rosenberg discussed Jaques’s frequent employment of anti-Semitic propaganda in the western Canadian press and in the House of Commons, as well as the anti-Semitism of Anthony Hlynka, Social Credit MP for Vegreville, and John Blackmore, Social Credit MP for Lethbridge and leader of the New Democracy (Social Credit) Party in the House of Commons. Rosenberg emphasized that the late Premier Aberhart, although denying that he had ever mentioned the word “Jewish” in his attacks on “International Bankers,” nonetheless made the same charges as Jaques, merely omitting the word “Jewish” from his diatribes. Through Aberhart’s radio addresses as well as the party organ *Today and Tomorrow*, argued Rosenberg, a wide audience received the anti-Semitic propaganda of the Social Credit movement. He made other references to Jaques’s anti-Semitism, such as his attempts to read excerpts of the *Protocols* into *Hansard*; his letter to Reidell; and the fact that M.J.

Coldwell, leader of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in the House of Commons, also charged Jaques with being an anti-Semite.⁵³

Rosenberg then made the following conclusions:

In the past the tendency has been to ignore Mr. Jacques [sic] as being an old and sick man who is not taken seriously by anybody. Because of the position which he holds, and the privileges which he abuses in the House of Commons, I do not believe it will be wise to ignore his activities, and the antisemitic activities of Social Credit members of Parliament in general any longer. While it may be advisable to approach Mr. Blackmore, the Leader of the Social Credit or New Democracy Party in the House of Commons, and Mr. Manning the Premier of Alberta, and endeavour to secure from them a repudiation of the antisemitic remarks of Mr. Jacques [sic] and other Social Credit members, nevertheless I believe little of [sic - if] any value can be accomplished by doing so. References to the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, to international Bankers and any other antisemitic remarks have become too much an integral party of the Propaganda and policy of the Social Credit Party in Canada to be repudiated by its leaders.⁵⁴

Rosenberg strongly recommended that the entire matter be brought before the next meeting of the National Joint Public Relations Committee, so that a formal policy could be adopted to deal with the Social Credit Party, Norman Jaques, and the Party's distribution of the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*. He advised that this policy be adopted in conjunction with the Joint Public Relations Committee members from Alberta.

Rosenberg had thus offered an incisive and realistic assessment of Social Credit's propaganda and had suggested adopting a concerted public relations policy to eradicate it. One wonders whether he was frustrated with Congress's inability or unwillingness to adopt an aggressive approach towards the Social Credit problem. This was not the first time Rosenberg had outlined the nature of the Social Credit threat and recommended that Congress adopt a formal policy. Yet there is no evidence that during the autumn of 1943 the National Joint Public Relations Committee considered his suggestion.

Yet it should not be assumed that Congress was doing nothing about the Social Credit problem. Late in 1943, in response to a request from general secretary Caiserman, Rosenberg⁵⁵ reported on "three outstanding cases of Public Relations work accomplished this year in the Western Division." He reported that the Western Joint Public Relations Committee had exposed the anti-Semitic activities of Anthony Hlynka, MP for Vegreville, as well as those of Norman Jaques. Second, the Committee had traced the frequent attacks on Jews by Social Credit members in the House of Commons and in *Today and Tomorrow* to anti-Semitic sources in the United States and to Nazi propaganda, and was keeping political leaders and the non-Jewish press informed of such connections. Third, the Committee had challenged Jaques's allegations that Clarence K. Streit, founder of the Union Now Movement was a German Jew, and that the Union Now Movement was instigated by "German-Jewish bankers" in order to subordinate Canada and Great Britain to the United States. In rebuttal, the Committee obtained information from Clarence Streit himself that he was not Jewish, but was a Christian of remote German origin, and that charges concerning proposed Anglo-Canadian domination were entirely false. Lastly, in response to Blackmore's and Jaques's charges that the Bank of England was controlled by

“international German-Jewish bankers,” the Committee obtained evidence that there was not a single Jewish director of any kind on the Bank of England, and that there had not been for several years.⁵⁶

These were not insignificant accomplishments. During this early period, educational anti-defamation work was the basis of Congress’s public relations philosophy, and the Joint Public Relations Committees, at both the national and regional levels, worked dedicatedly to refute allegations against Jews. Certainly, the Western Division of Congress and specifically, Louis Rosenberg, was keeping a watchful eye on Social Credit’s propaganda and was keeping Congress’s national headquarters informed. But for the time being, Congress leadership did not believe that anything more could be done.

Yet some Congress members believed that more direct action was necessary and that educational anti-defamation work was not enough. In early 1944, a more confrontational approach was suddenly adopted when Congress member Harry Olyan from Vegreville⁵⁷ met with Solon Low, provincial treasurer of the Alberta government and minister of education. Olyan gave Low copies of letters written by Norman Jaques (it is probable that Jaques’s letter to Reidell was among them), as well as copies of Jaques’s anti-Semitic statements in the House of Commons. At this meeting, Olyan “obtained the promise of Mr. Solon Law [sic], who is originally a Mormon - a very sympathetic and liberal person - to do his very best to stop Mr. Jaques’ anti-semitic utterances and activities.” Low stated that he had already talked to Jaques and hoped there would be no reason for further complaints.⁵⁸

Upon hearing of Olyan’s meeting with Low, Rosenberg wrote to Caiserman expressing his opinion on the futility of such a meeting. He emphasized that the problem was more

than Jaques's personal anti-Semitic remarks. Rather, the problem lay in the basic philosophy of the Social Credit movement, a philosophy which was embraced by its founder Major Douglas, Premier Ernest Manning, national leader John Blackmore, as well as provincial treasurer Solon Low. The basic philosophy of Social Credit, stated Rosenberg, "is that 'an international German (Jewish) financial conspiracy,' led by communists, socialists and international bankers keeps Canada in slavery, and wishes to bring about an amalgamation of Canada with Great Britain and the United States under the control of American and London Jewish bankers, and that the Social Credit Party in Canada wishes to save Canada from this awful fate." The only difference between Norman Jaques and Solon Low, he repeated, was that Jaques spoke openly about "international Jewish bankers" and had no qualms about listing various Jewish names, whereas Low, Manning, and Blackmore used the same propaganda and quoted from the same list of names, but merely omitted the word "Jewish." Therefore, stated Rosenberg, "I am strongly of the opinion that nothing can or will be accomplished by approaching individual members such as Mr. Solon Low, and accepting their assurances of friendship."⁵⁹ In Rosenberg's view, the "international Jewish financial conspiracy" was too deeply ingrained in Social Credit philosophy for individual expressions of friendship to mean much. As later events will show, he was correct in his assessment of Solon Low, who would reveal himself to be as avid an adherent to Social Credit's anti-Semitic philosophy as Major Douglas himself.

Another development in early 1944 showed that Congress was still attempting to solve the Social Credit problem. General secretary H.M. Caiserman and L.D. Morosnick, a Congress member and lawyer from Winnipeg, were planning to force *Today and*

Tomorrow to cease publication. Caiserman advocated legal action in the form of personal affidavits by various Jews in Canada, protesting the anti-Semitic propaganda in *Today and Tomorrow*.⁶⁰ However, Morosnick argued that the use of affidavits was immaterial. The real issue was determining whether such a publication was a menace; whether it was doing grave injustice to the Jewish people and to Canada; and if so, to suppress the publication and put it out of business. Morosnick implied that too much attention was being devoted to not offending the "interests" of certain "friends;" that is, those Social Credit politicians who were on good terms with various Jews in Alberta and elsewhere. In Morosnick's view, Congress was going to have to take a much harder line in order to stop Social Credit's propaganda: "[t]he sooner your committee grapples with that problem realistically," he told Caiserman, "the better for all concerned including the very publication which we desire to suppress."⁶¹

Caiserman agreed with Morosnick, but nonetheless emphasized: "[w]e live in a free country, where all kinds of racketeers operate within or outside of the law ... Congress is not a better business bureau, and cannot determine which act is an act of racketeering and is to be suppressed, since we should not compete with the Police. Under these circumstances Congress, truthfully speaking, cannot handle the problem, unless Jewish public opinion would be so organized and Congress be given such authority - which as yet it does not possess - to deal with a problem of this nature when it presents itself. The most important Public Relation item possible is one which prevents anti-semitism, and we are doing enough work in this respect to please even such a discriminating person as you." Regarding preventative anti-defamation work, Caiserman believed that the Joint Public Relations Committee was doing a "really good and fine job;" but in counteracting existing

anti-Semitism, the Committee could not deal successfully with all such manifestations. Consequently, regarding any attempts to combat Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda, "I am of the sincere and honest opinion that neither Congress, nor B'Nai B'Rith, nor any group of individuals who are responsible, can do a real job on the matter under discussion."⁶²

These were not the kinds of statements Morosnick (nor probably Louis Rosenberg) wanted to hear, and he minced no words in his reply to Caiserman. It was "trite" to say that Congress was not a better business bureau and could not determine which act was an act of racketeering, declared Morosnick. The issue was not whether Congress was accomplishing other goals, or even whether Congress's activities pleased "such a discriminating person as myself." Rather, the issue was that if there was a racketeering, anti-Semitic publication, then it was the duty of the Canadian Jewish Congress and "all right-thinking Jews" to suppress such an evil, regardless of whether some "of their best friends" were involved in that practice. Further, stated Morosnick, "I am familiar with the very good work that the Congress, the B'nai B'rith and Canadian Public Relations Committees are doing but is there a limit to even the personal accomplishments of your Congress and these Committees[?] Do you ever arrive at a saturation point in Jewish life? Can you afford to sit back and say that we have done enough or that there is no more work to be done[?] If you want to be realistic and are honest this is one of the most important things which should occupy the attention of the Congress in its local activities."⁶³

Morosnick had made some accurate criticisms about the limitations of Congress's public relations philosophy, and Caiserman agreed that "Congress can certainly not afford the luxury of sinking back and saying that we have done enough." But he assured

Morosnick that Congress was not indifferent to the various manifestations of anti-Semitism, including the issue of Social Credit's propaganda. "On the contrary," stated Caiserman, "we are mobilizing all our ingenuity, intelligence and energies to meet each problem. To say that we always succeed would be an empty pretense."⁶⁴ But the issue remained: would Congress be able to adapt itself to a more assertive and even aggressive public relations policy in order to end anti-Semitic propaganda of the Social Credit kind? The matter was in no way settled. Caiserman agreed to hand the whole problem over to a somewhat aggressive Congress member and businessman from Edmonton, John Dower, to see if he could achieve some results with the Alberta government.⁶⁵

While Morosnick and Caiserman were debating Congress's public relations policy, the Social Credit Party in Alberta was confronting that very issue within its own ranks. Faced with an upcoming summer election and barraged by charges of Nazism by Alberta CCF leader Elmer Roper, Manning decided to wipe the pre-election slate clean. On 2 March 1944, he issued a public statement in which he "unequivocally" repudiated anti-Semitism within the Alberta Social Credit Party. However, his statement was remarkable for its equivocality:

It has been brought to my attention that an erroneous impression has been created in certain quarters that the Social Credit movement is anti-Semitic. Nothing could be further from the truth ... Social Credit is not opposed to any religion or race, as such. It is only when the adherents to any religion, or the people of any race take collective action as a group to attack the principles of Christianity and democracy which are fundamental to Social Credit that conflict arises ... In exposing and opposing the

conspiracy of individuals and corporations seeking to impose a state of financial and economic dictatorship upon all nations the advocates of Social Credit consider it most important that the facts of the case be placed before the people irrespective of the color, race or creed of the conspirators.⁶⁶

In Manning's view, he was safely on moral high ground in exposing the enemy of Christianity and democracy, since he had declared that it was irrelevant that the enemy was of a certain "color, race or creed."

Manning also compared the Social Credit movement's fight against the international financial conspiracy with its fight against Nazism. He argued that Nazi Germany had attacked the principles of Christianity and democracy, which necessarily brought it into conflict with the Social Credit movement. "However," declared Manning, "we were not attacking Germans as Germans." He made no further comment, but the insinuation had been made: the fight against Nazism necessitated war against Germans, but no one doing so was anti-German *per se*. Similarly, the fight against the international financial conspiracy necessitated war against Jews, but no one doing so was anti-Jewish. Ironically, Manning invoked the need for "tolerance and co-operation," and stated that "[i]n a properly functioning democracy we have to overcome the divisions of party politics, religion and racial origin which have been deliberately fostered by those who seek to enslave the people. In this crusade for human liberation there is no place for anti-Christianity, anti-Semitism, anti-Catholicism or anti-anything else."⁶⁷

Louis Rosenberg had some comments about Manning's repudiation of anti-Semitism. "Evidently the leader of the Social Credit Party in Alberta does not like to be called an

anti-semite,” he remarked, “although he has done nothing to repudiate the repeated anti-semitic remarks which appear regularly in his official paper *Today and Tomorrow* and the anti-semitic statements made by the Social Credit members in the House of Commons.”⁶⁸ Moreover, “Premier Manning’s repudiation is all very well, but is of little use as long as the party, its official paper; Mr. Blackmore, its official leader in the House of Commons and many of its prominent members continue to express their belief in the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and to attack persons merely because of their Jewish names.”⁶⁹ Rosenberg also pointed out how notorious Jew-baiters like Norman Jaques and Anthony Hlynka, instead of being reprimanded and their statements repudiated, were supported by Social Credit party leaders. He emphasized again that the only difference between blatant anti-Semites like Jaques and Hlynka and “more circumspect and careful men” like Manning and the late William Aberhart, was that the former invoked the word “Jewish” in their fulminations about the international financial conspiracy, whereas the latter “use the same arguments and the same phraseology but omit the word Jewish, leaving their true meaning to be understood.”⁷⁰

Manning’s implicit anti-Semitism was not lost on Rosenberg either. Rosenberg noted Manning’s reference to “the adherents to any religion, or the people of any race [who] take collective action as a group to attack the principles of Christianity and democracy,” and concluded that “the reader can understand this quotation to mean anything he wants, but anti-semites will certainly take it as a hint that ‘a certain religion or race’ is meant.” In sum, Rosenberg’s assessment of Manning’s repudiation was skeptical at best. “Mr. Manning’s repudiation is good insofar as it goes, but personally, I am far from convinced and I believe that the Social Credit party and its propaganda will bear careful watching

insofar as its attitude [sic] towards Jews is concerned.”⁷¹ Rosenberg had good reason to be skeptical. Indeed, this would not be the first time Manning would repudiate anti-Semitism within the Social Credit movement, and such anti-Semitic propaganda would increase in both intensity and frequency before Manning would take a definitive stand.

It did not take long for Rosenberg’s skepticism to be confirmed. Near the end of April 1944, an article in *Today and Tomorrow* revealed that very little had changed regarding Social Credit’s stance on anti-Semitism. The article dealt with the “slimy intrigue” of evil persons comprising International Finance who schemed and plotted at the end of World War One in order to achieve “world tyranny,” and who were plotting for these same goals during World War Two. Names and corporations associated with International Finance were Max, Paul, and James Warburg, Kuhn, Loeb & Company, Dr Carl Melchior, Israel Moses Sief, Sir Felix Schuster, Baron Schroeder, Otto Kahn, Kleinworth & Company, “and others of the same breed.” For good measure, Clarence Streit and the Union Now Movement, the Federal Reserve Bank, Political and Economic Planning, and compulsory state insurance schemes were included as evidence of the sinister character of the “New Order” which International Finance was foisting onto the Allied Powers as the war neared its end.⁷² The article contained the standard accusations and the standard bogeys. Rosenberg called it a “re-hash,” and compared it to the writings of the American-based Silver Shirts under William Pelley: “[i]n history, in sympathies, in propaganda and its attitude towards Jews, the Social Credit Party in Canada has shown itself closely allied with the isolationist, fundamentalist, fringe of cranks in the middle western United States, which were originally looked upon with amusement and contempt, but which have proved themselves so dangerous since the outbreak of the war.”⁷³

A few days later, Rosenberg noted two more articles appearing in *Today and Tomorrow* which dealt with the Ontario government's recent anti-discrimination legislation, as well as the anti-discrimination bill introduced into parliament by Angus MacInnis, CCF member for Vancouver East.⁷⁴ The articles called the Ontario and federal anti-discrimination legislation "muzzling bills." One article remarked that the Ontario legislation would now make it "illegal for a citizen of Ontario to attack any group for preaching atheism, to expose the activities of any racial groups engaged in disruptive activities or to denounce the mischievous and treacherous intrigues of the group of international gangsters who seek to destroy the British Commonwealth and democracy." It added that "[b]oth these measures are the thin edge of the wedge on enactments in all dictatorship countries having for their purpose the suppression of criticism against the ruling regime under savage penalties."

The other article in *Today and Tomorrow* pointed to the "hidden power" and "sinister plan" behind such pieces of legislation: "[b]oth measures obviously [intend] to suppress freedom of speech and protect its originators from exposure of something they are doing. Who is this hidden power? And what are they afraid of having exposed? ... Surely this evidence of an open attack on the constitutional liberties of Canadians should arouse them to action. Only a flood of protests ... is likely to thwart this further advance towards the Slave State."⁷⁵ Interestingly, this article complained that the press gave little attention to these dictatorial pieces of legislation, while only a few years earlier the press's behaviour was that of an "hysterical outburst ... when the Alberta Legislature passed an enactment merely requiring newspapers to publish corrections of false reports dealing with government policies."⁷⁶ In short, *Today and Tomorrow* simultaneously compared and

contrasted the Social Credit government's earlier attempts to censor the Alberta press with the Ontario and federal anti-discrimination bills, arguing that the anti-discrimination bills suppressed free speech, but that the Alberta government had not done so when it attempted to censor the Alberta press in 1937.

In response to these articles, Rosenberg sent a memorandum to national executive director Saul Hayes and other leading Congress members across Canada. He noted how *Today and Tomorrow* had attacked both pieces of anti-discrimination legislation and concluded that "the official organ of the Social Credit Party in Alberta counts the privilege of making defamatory statements against racial or religious groups an important weapon in its arsenal, and is strongly opposed to any legislation which would curb such attacks."⁷⁷ After reading Rosenberg's memorandum, general secretary Caiserman thanked Rosenberg for the work he was doing and made a very telling remark: "I wish to express my appreciation for the trouble you are taking to document the activities of the Social Credit Party, chiefly because their actions are not taken seriously in Eastern Canada."⁷⁸ For his part, Saul Hayes stated that the entire matter of Social Credit should receive national attention, and that it was going to be placed on the agenda for the next meeting in order that appropriate action be taken.⁷⁹

That was the spring of 1944. Matters followed their regular course - no official policy was adopted to deal with Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda, and once again the issue was allowed to recede. However, it still must not be assumed that the Social Credit movement was not taken seriously by Congress leadership. Certainly, Caiserman himself took the Social Credit matter very seriously. During the summer of 1944 he referred to the international banking conspiracy of the Social Credit Party as one of the more blatant

examples of race-hatred in Canada at this time, and emphasized how important it was for the Joint Public Relations Committees of Congress to “watch, explain and defend” against such anti-Semitic attacks. Caiserman also made a broader statement regarding anti-Semitism in Canada: “our neighbours must be convinced of the truth that anti-semitism is as much their problem as it is ours and that we must together extirpate it. The press, the elementary, secondary and higher educational institutions of the Dominion, the literature of the country, the political parties and organized labour must be reached and convinced that race-hatred is the common danger of a united Canada.”⁸⁰

One can see in Caiserman’s comments the first hints of Congress’s changing public relations philosophy, one which realized that anti-defamation work focussing solely on Jewish issues was not entirely effective. For Caiserman, it was clear that Congress’s refutations of Social Credit’s anti-Semitic allegations achieved few results and that other measures needed to be considered. In the shadow of the current horrors in Europe, Congress would begin to apply the bitter lessons of the war to its own situation in Canada, by showing that race hatred damaged all of society. And for some members of Congress at least, the Social Credit movement was viewed as the worst potential threat to Canadian Jewry and Canadian society.

Notwithstanding Caiserman’s insight and direction, it was not until the following autumn that another glaring example of Social Credit’s anti-Semitic propaganda caused Congress to refocus its attention. In this instance the confrontation was between Social Credit MP Norman Jaques and Reverend C.E. Silcox, director of the Canadian Conference of Christians and Jews (CCCJ). In May 1944, Silcox, as editor of the CCCJ’s monthly bulletin, *Fellowship*, published an address which had been recently delivered by

Rabbi Abraham Feinberg at Holy Blossom Temple in Toronto.⁸¹ In his address, Feinberg had spoken about the crucifixion of Christ and how various interpretations of the crucifixion story contributed to anti-Semitism:

A surprisingly-large group of scholars regards the stigma on Jews as the alleged murderers of Jesus to be the underlying cause of anti-Semitism. Taught in Sunday Schools, it becomes an integral part of the sub-conscious mental inheritance and intrudes on every judgment ... In recognition of this danger, as an obligation to truth, and because of the need to establish a ground-work for mutual fellowship in youth first of all, a group of 155 Protestant ministers in the United States last year agreed to revise the text-books now used in Christian Sunday-Schools, in order to expunge hatred-inciting, unauthentic and prejudiced accounts of the Jewish role in the crucifixion. A commission to change these books is now at work. God prosper its labors!

Feinberg then reconstructed the story of the trial and crucifixion of Christ and noted that “[t]he documentary basis for the charge that the Jews caused the death of Jesus can be found in only one of the four Gospels ... the Gospel of St. John, which students universally consider the least reliable of all and the one written after the longest interval.”⁸²

Feinberg’s address appeared in the May 1944 edition of *Fellowship* without much notice. Several months later, Norman Jaques wrote a letter to the editor of the *Edmonton Bulletin* which claimed that Reverend Silcox, the Canadian Conference of Christians and Jews, and *Fellowship* were comprised of prominent Canadian “Leftists” and “Internationalists,” who had “interlocking control.” Jaques misquoted Feinberg as stating:

“[w]e must agree to expunge from our Sunday schools hatred-inciting, unauthentic, and prejudiced accounts of the Crucifixion. This account is to be found only in the Gospel of St. John which students universally consider the least reliable of all the Gospels.” To this misquote, Jaques ranted: “[s]o the Christian Gospels now are labelled ‘unreliable and unauthentic’ - untrue, while St. John is named as an anti-semite.” Jaques alleged that Silcox had demanded that “we must look to the Old, not to the New Testament for our inspiration since ... the Gospels are unauthentic and anti-semitic.” However, declared Jaques, “ours still is a Christian nation, guided and inspired by Christian ideals.” He concluded his diatribe by alleging that Jewish persecution was an invention of “Commu-Socialists” and that the spectre of anti-Semitism was a “communist smoke-screen.”⁸³

Jaques’s rantings did not go unnoticed, by either Reverend Silcox or the Canadian Jewish Congress. Silcox responded to Jaques with his own published letter in the *Edmonton Bulletin*. Regarding Rabbi Feinberg’s address, Silcox stated: “[t]he learned rabbi was pleading for a revision of the attitude of many Christians towards the responsibility of the Jewish people for the crucifixion of Jesus ... when Mr. Jaques puts in quotes certain parts of the article, he should at least be fair enough to quote with accuracy.” Silcox showed the discrepancy between Feinberg’s address and Jaques’s rendition. “I leave it to the unprejudiced reader to judge how Mr. Jaques perverts a simple statement into a vague demand. It is not primarily a question of the authenticity of the gospels at all!” Silcox also denied Jaques’s charge that he was a “Commu-Socialist” and remarked that such a term was clearly “a kind of pink elephant haunting [Jaques’s] fevered brain.” He concluded that “Mr. Jaques is doing exactly what he blames other people for doing. He accuses them of calling every anti-Semitic [sic] a fascist, and he

simply reverses the procedure and calls everybody who seems to be defending the Jews a 'communist' or a commu-socialist, to use his own beautiful and original phrasing. He ought to brush the cobwebs out of his own mind, if he can locate it."⁸⁴

The Canadian Jewish Congress observed the public exchange between Jaques and Silcox with interest, and although there was correspondence between Louis Rosenberg and other Congress members,⁸⁵ neither he nor anyone else suggested further action. Silcox had defended himself and Rabbi Feinberg quite forcefully, and perhaps Rosenberg and others felt that his response was sufficient to meet Jaques's attack. It appeared that the matter might have been dealt with further, since a few weeks later it was on the agenda of the national meeting of the Joint Public Relations Committee in Montreal,⁸⁶ but Rosenberg, Congress's Social Credit expert, was unable to attend. Thus, the topic of the Social Credit movement was dealt with only cursorily and was set aside until Rosenberg could be present.⁸⁷

A more direct confrontation occurred shortly thereafter, however, involving Congress members and Solon Low, now leader of the national Social Credit Party. The results were not as positive as some Congress members may have hoped, and called into question the efficacy of openly confronting Social Credit leaders over the issue of anti-Semitism. On 30 December 1944, H.A. Friedman and John Dower, both Congress members from Edmonton, had a meeting with Solon Low at the legislative buildings in that city. It is not clear how this meeting was arranged, but Friedman and Dower talked to Low for two hours about the Social Credit movement's attitude on the "Jewish question" and showed him several issues from the *Canadian Social Crediter* (formerly *Today and Tomorrow*) which were of an anti-Semitic nature. The meeting appears to have gone well. Low was

conciliatory, assuring both Friedman and Dower that he was strongly opposed to anti-Semitism and that anti-Semitism definitely was not part of Social Credit party policy. According to the Congress members, Low gave them “his personal assurance that he would no longer tolerate the type of articles that we brought to his attention in the party’s paper ... that he would disavow any member of the party who indulged in Anti-Semitic statements ... that he would ... make a public statement to the press on the question of Anti-Semitism, which he assured us we would find fully satisfactory.”⁸⁸

Friedman told Low that while such a public declaration could serve a very useful purpose, it also could do more harm than good if Low “hedged his statement too much and did not come out openly and convincingly on the question.” Low promised him that “there would be no hedging and that [his] statement would be frank, open and forceful.” Friedman was hopeful but not elated, remarking privately: “[a]bout all I can say is that we will have to wait and see.”⁸⁹

Soon after their meeting, Low informed Friedman of an upcoming public address in which he was going to discuss the issue of Social Credit and anti-Semitism: “I hope that [the address] will have the desired effect of removing any misunderstanding and will put an end to these repeated accusations of anti-Semetism [sic] which have been directed against us besides bringing our own speakers and writers into line.”⁹⁰ True to his word, on 9 January 1945 at a public address in Lethbridge, Alberta, Low made a public statement regarding anti-Semitism and the Social Credit movement. Unfortunately for the Canadian Jewish Congress, Low’s statement was blatantly anti-Semitic.

Low began his speech by stating: “some Jewish friends of our movement have told me that we are being identified with anti-Semitism because of our persistent and outspoken

exposures of a group of international financiers and world plotters who are engaged in a criminal conspiracy to destroy democracy and Christianity and to enslave mankind to their rule.” By construing his meeting with Friedman and Dower in these terms, Low set the stage for a vicious anti-Semitic charge under the guise of a full denial of anti-Semitism. “Some of these men happen to be of Jewish racial origin, and to be more specific, of German-Jewish origin,” stated Low. Yet he insisted that the international financiers and world plotters were not exclusively Jewish, and although many were, this was no reason to condemn the Jewish people as a whole. Accordingly, he was going to make it clear to everyone, including Jews, the stance of the Canadian Social Credit movement on the matter of anti-Semitism:

We very definitely are not anti-Semitic or anti any race or religion ... The only times when the Canadian Social Credit movement can possibly be brought into conflict with any racial or religious group would be if those comprising such a group conspired together as a group in an organized attack on democracy and Christianity. I am sure that our fellow Canadians of Jewish origin recognize that a truly democratic and Christian society ... alone will give them the social objectives they seek as individuals in common with all Canadians ... it is fantastic for anybody to suggest that as Social Crediters we are anti-Semitic. I will go further and point out to our fellow Canadians of Jewish origin that actually the Social Credit movement is the most powerful influence in the country working for their emancipation.⁹¹

Low also explained why anti-Semitism was “sweeping” England, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, not to mention Canada. (Germany, interestingly, was not

mentioned.) His explanation served only to publicly reinforce Social Credit's anti-Semitic philosophy: "[o]ur Jewish friends should recognize that the cause of the growing anti-Semitism ... is not due to propaganda alone ... anti-Semitism is spreading, because people cannot fail to observe that a disproportionate number of Jews occupy positions of control in international finance, in revolutionary activities, and in some propaganda institutions, the common policy of which is the centralization of power and the perversion of religious and cultural ideals. This gives people the impression that therefore there must be a Jewish conspiracy to gain world control."⁹²

Low also invoked the "good Jew-bad Jew" argument. He declared there was only one way in which Jews could put an end to anti-Semitism, which was by "denouncing the arch-criminals who are engaged in the world conspiracy against human freedom, be they Gentile or Jew, and, through their powerful organization, join in the growing battle against international finance, and the world plotters." He promised he would ensure that other Social Credit spokesmen and writers for the *Canadian Social Crediter* faithfully reflected the views he had just expressed, and that "they do not say or print anything which can properly be interpreted as an attack on the Jewish people." Low concluded that Social Credit's connection with anti-Semitism was now a closed issue: "[n]ow that I have made our stand clear on this question, I hope that we shall hear no more nonsense about Social Crediters being anti-Semitic. This is, of course, too much to expect from our vociferous communists who are always ready to denounce anybody opposed to their totalitarian doctrine as being fascists, and anybody opposed to their allies, international finance, as being anti-Semitic. But this deliberate mongering in blatant falsehoods does not deceive anybody."⁹³

Low's address had made a mockery out of his meeting with Friedman and Dower, and was the absolute antithesis of what the Congress members had hoped for. One wonders what the two men thought when they first read Low's statement. Undoubtedly it was a great disappointment. Although they could have assumed Low had not dealt with them in good faith, and had responded maliciously to their meeting with him, a closer examination of Low's statements offers an alternate interpretation. It is possible that Low responded to Friedman and Dower as "good Jews," while never abandoning his ideas about the several "bad Jews" who comprised International Finance and the World Plotters. Thus, it was possible for Low to relate positively to some Jews on a personal level, while still exhorting them to denounce their fellow "bad Jews." This raises the fanciful question of what Low would have done had an "International Financier and World Plotter" called on him at the legislative buildings.

In any event, Congress members were unimpressed with Low's address. "There is no retraction there," stated S. Hart Green of Winnipeg, "and it is a fine example of our objections causing re-iteration and further publicity." He added that because Social Credit doctrines were based on anti-Semitism and the world Jewish financial conspiracy, "to do away with these doctrines you have to do away with the Social Credit Party."⁹⁴ Edmonton Congress member M.I. Lieberman expressed how "terribly disappointed" he was upon reading Low's statement and, presumably in reference to Solon Low or even the Social Credit movement, remarked that "[a] leopard does not change his spots easily."⁹⁵

L.M. Fradkin of Calgary told Rosenberg that he too was "terribly disappointed" at Low's statement. Interestingly, Fradkin implied that Congress's Western Division had not been unanimous in its approach to the Social Credit problem, and that an earlier meeting

of the Western Division's Joint Public Relations Committee had decided against such openly confrontational methods. Yet Friedman and Dower had gone ahead and approached Low, contrary to what had been agreed on among the rest of the Committee members.⁹⁶ It was clear that Fradkin wanted to distance himself from Friedman's and Dower's actions: "I want to emphasise that I had nothing at all to do with this interview and same took place without my knowledge or consent."⁹⁷

Thus, it is not clear what exactly was the public relations policy of the Western Division of Congress. However, Fradkin's comments imply two things: first, that the two Edmonton Congress members had acted independently from other Western Division members, and especially Alberta members; and second, that Louis Rosenberg was the person to whom Congress members answered regarding the Social Credit problem. With respect to the Edmonton members' unapproved meeting with Low, Fradkin added: "I do not think it is necessary at the present time to reprimand or take this matter up with the Edmonton [Joint Public Relations] Committee, but I shall be glad to have your reaction and hear from you."⁹⁸ In short, Friedman and Dower had acted unilaterally, and their actions did not go unnoticed by other Western Division Congress members, including Rosenberg. Most importantly, however, this incident shows that there was no coherent, unanimous public relations policy towards the Social Credit problem, and statements such as Low's caused many Congress members to be hesitant about adopting a more confrontational approach.

Shortly thereafter, Rosenberg wrote a confidential memorandum on the Social Credit movement which stated that anti-Semitic statements in the literature and speeches of the Social Credit movement were *not* the opinions of irresponsible individual members;

rather, they formed “an integral part of the basic ‘philosophy?’ and policy of the Social Credit movement.” Rosenberg conceded that the Social Credit Party was not the only political party containing members who made anti-Semitic attacks, and that other parties in Great Britain, Canada, and the United States had their share of anti-Semitic members. However, while leaders of these other parties either repudiated, censured, or ignored their irresponsible members, the Social Credit Party was in a league of its own. The *leaders* of the Social Credit Party were the anti-Semites; therefore, “the anti-semitic propaganda of the Social Credit Party in Canada can no longer be considered as the mouthing of a ‘lunatic fringe.’” Rosenberg thus concluded:

For the first time in the history of any English speaking country, we have a provincial government in power in a British Dominion, which lends its prestige and facilities to the distribution of anti-semitic literature similar to that previously distributed by the Fichte Bunde in Nazi Germany and the Gerald K. Smiths, Winrods, [and] Coughlins in the United States. The official statement issued by Mr. Solon Low and published in the *Canadian Social Crediter*, the official organ of the Social Credit movement in Canada, reveals the policy and tactics of the Social Credit movement in their true light. It pretends to be a repudiation of anti-semitism. In fact it dots the i's and crosses the t's of much of the anti-semitic propaganda distributed by Nazi propaganda agencies, and gives this propaganda the official backing and prestige of a political Party in power in a Canadian province.⁹⁹

Rosenberg had provided an accurate assessment of Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda. In his opinion, it was time to take the matter of the Social Credit movement

more seriously. Yet once again, no concerted public relations policy was agreed upon. Indeed, when general secretary Caiserman received Rosenberg's memorandum, he agreed fully with Rosenberg's assessment. "It shows without a doubt," stated Caiserman, "the verification of your thesis that the Social Credit Movement is anti-Semitic." Yet he added: "[i]t will be interesting to learn the opinion of the Joint Public Relations Committee as to what measures should be taken *if any* [italics added]."¹⁰⁰ In fact, the matter of Social Credit's anti-Semitism was raised at the Joint Public Relations Committee meeting in Toronto in January 1945;¹⁰¹ it was raised again at the Joint Public Relations Committee meeting in Montreal in March,¹⁰² and the Dominion Council's Eastern Division meeting in February also discussed the "problem of the Social Credit Party and its purported anti-Semitic tendencies."¹⁰³ Yet there is no evidence that a concerted public relations policy was agreed upon.

Once again, the Canadian Jewish Congress appeared unable or unwilling to confront Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda. Yet it must be acknowledged that Congress was working hard through its Joint Public Relations Committee to engage in anti-defamation work, much of which was directed at quelling the Social Credit menace, albeit through traditional public relations methods. If direct confrontation was not the preferred tactic, it did not mean that Congress was doing nothing about Social Credit's propaganda. For example, in the spring of 1945, before the end of the war, the National Joint Public Relations Committee distributed 15,000 copies of an article which had appeared in the January edition of *The American Mercury*.¹⁰⁴ The article, "Memorandum on Anti-Semitism," by Philip Wylie, was an eloquent piece on the ignorance and illogic of anti-Semitism. Written for a popular audience, it showed the ludicrousness of the international

Jewish conspiracy theory by quoting figures that proved Jews did not, in fact, control “the banks, Wall Street, the newspapers, the movies, the theatre, radio, and so on.” It also discussed the myriad contributions of American Jews, who comprised Allied soldiers, poets, writers, dramatists, journalists, radio and movie stars, musicians, philanthropists, and scientists.¹⁰⁵ The Joint Public Relations Committee distributed copies of the article “particularly in Alberta where Social Credit propaganda against the Jews is reported to be making some headway.”¹⁰⁶

In late summer of 1945, Congress leaders also circulated a memorandum regarding postwar public relations problems. The memorandum discussed whether the end of the war had changed the problem of anti-Semitism in Canada in any way, and whether new methods of dealing with anti-Semitism in the reconversion and rehabilitation period were being discovered. With respect to organized anti-Semitism in Canada, and specifically the Social Credit movement, the memo stated: “[w]hat is the position of organized anti-semitism in Canada today? ... The Social Credit party in Canada has an anti-semitic plank. It is our duty to determine on a method how to discredit it. How? ... By systematic publicity by our press office ... By Radio publicity ... By further distribution of proper literature ... By further negotiations with the representatives of the members of the Alberta Legislature of all political parties.”¹⁰⁷ This was the most definitive stand Congress had taken thus far to create an effective public relations policy. It was a harbinger of things to come. The end of the war brought a realization of the near destruction of European Jewry, and after 1945 Congress worked towards adopting a more activist public relations approach, especially regarding the Social Credit problem. Yet it was a difficult challenge: in the immediate postwar period, anti-Semitism in Social Credit propaganda continued to

increase, not decrease. Notwithstanding Congress's efforts, it would still be over two years before the anti-Semitism would be eliminated.

Nonetheless, by the autumn of 1945 it was clear that Congress was adopting a stronger position towards anti-Semitism in Canada generally and was evolving a public relations philosophy to reflect this changing attitude. A report of the Committee on Social and Economic Studies of the Canadian Jewish Congress in October 1945 discussed the possibility of public relations studies which would help combat anti-Semitism. Following the lead of similar studies conducted by the American Jewish Congress, the Committee on Social and Economic Studies posed the following questions as parameters: "[u]nder what conditions is anti-semitism a more or less harmless individual prejudice and when does it lead to organized group action? (This is indeed one of the crucial problems of political anti-semitism in Canada[,] a solution to which is necessary for the spotting of potential danger points and for determining the means for counter-action[]) ... How can the democratic forces within the Jewish and non-Jewish community be liberated and mobilized efficiently, not merely for the purposes of a negative 'defense' against anti-semitism, but for a productive positive relation of cooperative living?"¹⁰⁸

These were important questions which the Canadian Jewish Congress was forced to consider in the following years as it gradually shifted the focus of its public relations philosophy. Yet adopting a stronger approach was difficult, especially with respect to the Social Credit problem, which defied an easy solution. The Social Credit Goliath was a slippery foe, and the years before Premier Manning's "Purge of '48" would bring their share of frustrating battles between Congress and the Social Credit movement.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

¹ See Chapter Three for a discussion of the organization and re-organization of the Canadian Jewish Congress in 1919 and 1934.

² An example of Arcand's anti-Semitism is witnessed in the following incident: in 1938, an unnamed member of the Canadian Jewish Congress infiltrated a National Unity Party meeting at Saint Thomas Aquinas Church Hall in Montreal. He reported that Arcand was organizing a 900-signed petition to the Canadian government requesting that four hundred Jewish refugees who had recently arrived at the Port of Montreal be returned to the countries from which they came. At the meeting, Arcand declared that "as soon as his party assumes power he will enforce his own laws and these will see to it that all fortunes accumulated by Jewish thieves will remain [in Quebec]." He added that the Jews would be forced to remain in Quebec to receive their "just punishment," and he would "send his friends, Rabbi Harry J. Stern, A.J. Freiman and H.M. Caiserman and others, to Bordeaux to cut stones." The Congress member noted that the anti-Semitic booklet *The Key to the Mystery* was distributed at the meeting free of charge. This booklet was a compilation of anti-Semitic texts and had been edited by one of the leading members of Arcand's National Social Christian Party. Lita-Rose Betcherman describes it as "undoubtedly the most vicious defamation of the Jewish people ever published in Canada." *The Key to the Mystery* was also distributed at Social Credit Party meetings and was available through the Social Credit Board, the propaganda arm of the Alberta Social Credit government. Lita-Rose Betcherman, *The Swastika and the Maple Leaf: Fascist Movements in Canada in the Thirties* (Toronto: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1975), 91; memo, 25 April 1938 (CJCNA, ZA 1938, Box 2, File 28).

³ Congress's efforts were largely unsuccessful, despite consistent lobbying throughout the war. See Irving Abella and Harold Troper, *None is Too Many: Canada and the Jews of Europe, 1933-1948* (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1991).

⁴ Letter, Silcox to Rosenberg, 12 December 1935 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁵ Louis Rosenberg, "Jews in Canadian Industry and Finance," 15 June 1936 (PAM, JHSWC Collection, P600 A).

⁶ Letter, Caiserman to Rosenberg, 14 April 1941 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁷ Memo, Rosenberg to Cohen et al., n.d., c. 1941 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit). See Chapter One for a discussion of the ideas contained in *The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*.

⁸ The *Western Producer* was a weekly farm paper published in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, owned and controlled by the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool. It had a wide circulation and was one of the most popular farm papers in Western Canada.

⁹ It will be remembered from Chapter Two that the Union Now Movement, also known as Federal Union, was a "non-profit membership association" headquartered in New York, whose mandate was the creation of an international union of the western democracies in order to halt the autocratic ambitions of Hitler and Mussolini. Union Now was run by Clarence K. Streit and E.W. Balduf, as Chairman and Director respectively.

¹⁰ *Western Producer*, 30 January 1941.

¹¹ In his rebuttal to Jaques's accusations that world finance was controlled by "German Jewish International Bankers," Rosenberg cited figures which stated that German Jews had never formed more than 3 percent of the world Jewish population; that in 1925 only 3.3 percent of all persons in Germany who engaged in banking and stock-broking were Jewish; that there was not a single Jew on the Board of Directors of the Bank of England; that there were only three Jews among the 150 directors of the "Big Five" banks in Great Britain, and not one Jew on the directorates of all the other clearing houses in England; that of the 420 directors of the nineteen member banks of the New York Clearing House, only thirty were Jews, and half of these were connected with two of the comparatively smaller banks; that there were no Jewish directors on any of the larger banks such as the National City Bank, First National Bank, or Chase National Bank; that the Morgans of the banking house of J.P. Morgan and Co. were Episcopalians of Welsh origin; and finally, that there was not a single Jew on the Board of Directors of any chartered bank, trust company, mortgage company or railway company in Canada. Rosenberg signed the letter "W.H. McCollum," short for Watt Hugh McCollum. Author William Weintraub states that "[o]nly a few friends knew that Watt Hugh McCollum was the pen name (said quickly it's 'What you m'call'em') of Louis Rosenberg, statistician of the Canadian Jewish Congress. Rosenberg did not want his employers to know that he was moonlighting for

Woodsworth House, a left-leaning publisher." Yet it is debatable whether Rosenberg's pen name was such a secret, given that he used it for his Congress work. In later Congress correspondence Rosenberg stated: "I am, as a rule, not a believer in writing letters to the Editor, and I have therefore signed it with a pen name." It is more likely that Rosenberg was skeptical that a public confrontation over anti-Semitism initiated by a Jew would produce positive results. Letter, McCollum [Rosenberg] to the editor, *Western Producer*, 18 February 1941 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit); William Weintraub, *City Unique: Montreal Days and Nights in the 1940s and '50s* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1996), 145; letter, Rosenberg to Cohen, 25 March 1941 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹² Letter, McCollum [Rosenberg] to the editor, *Western Producer*, 18 February 1941.

¹³ Letter, Rosenberg to Cohen, 25 March 1941.

¹⁴ Letter, Rosenberg to Olyan, 21 April 1941 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁵ When asked why the *Western Producer* did not publish McCollum's (Rosenberg's) letter, the paper's editor stated that he did publish replies to Jaques's letter, but was unsure whether McCollum's letter was among them, stating: "as is our rule, we try to make the best [choice?] we can to cover any particular subject under discussion and according to the space we have to spare - It is not necessarily the letter with the most merit that is published but such as we think have covered the subject from various angles." Letter, n.d., attached to letter, Olyan to Rosenberg, 11 April 1941 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁶ Letter, Rosenberg to Cohen, 25 March 1941.

¹⁷ Balduf further informed Rosenberg that Streit's ancestors "came to this country before the Revolution, and are partly German and partly Irish. There is no trace anywhere in his genealogy of Jewish blood, 'assuming there is such a thing as Jewish blood.' Mr. Streit, does not of course share the Nazi attitude toward Jews and does not regard the imputation that he is part Jewish as an 'accusation.' It is simply a falsehood indulged in by Nazis and Americans with pro-Nazi leaning." Letter, Balduf to Rosenberg, 25 July 1941 (CJCNA, CD, Box 7, File 11P).

¹⁸ Letter, Rosenberg to Balduf, 28 July 1941 (CJCNA, CD, Box 7, File 11P).

¹⁹ On 17 July 1941, the *Western Producer* published a letter from a Cpl. Tom H. Taylor, a member of the Royal Canadian Air Force from St Thomas, Ontario, in which he stated: "[w]hile little is known about the origin or the authenticity of these *Protocols*, the fact remains that all of the moves predicted therein are a precise replica of contemporary history. In the main, they project the International government, which is depicted by the American Wall St. Jew - Clarence Streit in his 'Union Now' ... The *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* constitute a plan for the social, political and economic subjugation of the Anglo-Saxon peoples of the Jewish hierarchy ... National Socialism in Germany was supported by these same people in the hope that they could use Hitler for their own ends." In October 1941 the *Western Producer* published another letter by Norman Jaques in which he claimed: "the real purpose of 'Union Now' is to unify and impose this financial racket on the world, by the surrender of national sovereignty, so as to render all peoples and all nations powerless and helpless to resist this accursed slavery of gold - the crown of Midas, Judas and Shylock." *Western Producer*, 17 July, 9 October 1941; memo, Public Relations Committee, Western Division, 28 July 1941 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

²⁰ In his article Needham made a connection between Social Credit and anti-Semitism, and between Social Credit's philosophy and that of Nazi and fascist leaders. He examined anti-Semitic statements in *Today and Tomorrow* and noted that "the government's propaganda [sic] organ, *Today and Tomorrow*, rarely loses an opportunity to throw an oblique punch at the Jews." *Calgary Herald*, 2 February 1942.

²¹ The two Congress members were L.M. Fradkin and H.A. Friedman, both barristers practicing in Calgary and Edmonton respectively.

²² Letter, Fradkin to Friedman, 4 February 1942 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

²³ Letter, Friedman to Fradkin, 6 February 1942 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

²⁴ Letter, Frank to Friedman, 10 February 1942 (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 1, File 7); letter, Frank to Fradkin, 10 February 1942 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

²⁵ Solon Low was provincial treasurer from 1937 to 1944 and education minister from 1943 to 1944. In 1944, when the Alberta Social Credit Party established its federal wing, Low left the treasury and education departments and became leader of the national party. Alvin Finkel, *The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 104.

²⁶ Letter, Frank to Friedman, 10 February 1942; letter, Frank to Fradkin, 10 February 1942.

²⁷ It is not clear from the sources exactly who was supposed to meet with Aberhart. Even after Rabbi Frank met with Aberhart in Winnipeg, Fradkin asked Friedman if the latter had interviewed Aberhart yet. Thus, it is unclear whether the two men considered the Rabbi's meeting with Aberhart to be sufficient. It appears that they wanted to meet with Aberhart themselves; in fact, two weeks after the Rabbi reported on his meeting with Aberhart, Friedman informed Fradkin that the Public Relations Committee of Congress [Western Division] and the B'nai B'rith of Winnipeg had asked Friedman to meet with Aberhart. Yet there is no record of any such meeting. Letter, Fradkin to Friedman, 18 February 1942; letter, Friedman to Fradkin, 25 February 1942 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

²⁸ Specifically, Rosenberg contacted Fradkin of Calgary and Friedman of Edmonton, and asked the latter to forward clippings from *Today and Tomorrow* which had "an anti-Semitic tinge." It appears that Rosenberg began regularly scrutinizing the Social Credit party organ at this time. Letters, Rosenberg to Fradkin, 26 August, 8 September 1942; letter, Fradkin to Rosenberg, 5 September 1942; letter, Rosenberg to Friedman, 18 September 1942 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

²⁹ Memo, Hayes to Rosenberg, 22 April 1943 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

³⁰ Letter, Rosenberg to Hayes, 28 April 1943 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

³¹ Ibid.

³² Hayes told Rosenberg he was putting the matter of Norman Jaques on the agenda for the next meeting (of which committee, it is not clear). Yet the sources do not show the subject of Jaques or Social Credit on any committee agenda around that time. Letter, Hayes to Rosenberg, 3 May 1943 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

³³ *Canadian Tribune*, 29 May 1943.

³⁴ The pamphlet, "True Prosperity" was a publication of the Victoria, BC branch of the British Israelites. It stated that "[i]n 1932 President Roosevelt promised to drive the money changers from the temple, but to date has been unsuccessful ... Perhaps if he got rid of B.M. Baruch, the Jew, and all his associates he might be successful." *Canadian Tribune*, 29 May 1943.

³⁵ Ibid. This article, "Rending of the Veil" was a 35-page mimeograph located in the reference library of the Alberta Social Credit Board.

³⁶ Byrne, cited in *Canadian Tribune*, 29 May 1943; *Today and Tomorrow*, 13 May 1943.

³⁷ Aberhart, cited in *Canadian Tribune*, 29 May 1943.

³⁸ Specifically, MacPherson stated: "[d]eveloping their arguments that National Socialism is being introduced into Canada by the Dominion government, Mr. Byrne and Mr. James, M.L.A., give such examples of 'National Socialism' as rental control, price control, national selective service machinery and labor-management production councils. Never was their [sic] a more deliberate campaign to confuse and sabotage the nation's war effort." *Canadian Tribune*, 29 May 1943.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ The secretary-treasurer of the Western Canadian Council of B'nai B'rith Lodges was the first to react to the *Canadian Tribune* article, and he reported it to L.M. Fradkin, Congress member in Calgary. Letter, Rose to Fradkin, 31 May 1943 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁴¹ Letter, Fradkin to Rosenberg, 8 June 1943 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁴² Ernest Manning succeeded William Aberhart as premier after Aberhart's death on 23 May 1943.

⁴³ Letter, Fradkin to Lieberman, 8 June 1943 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁴⁴ Letter, Lieberman to Fradkin, 9 June 1943 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Letter, Rosenberg to Olyan, 13 July 1943 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁴⁷ Ibid. It will be remembered that John Blackmore was Social Credit MP for Lethbridge and leader of the Social Credit Party in the House of Commons; Anthony Hlynka was MP for Vegreville, an ethnically-mixed town near Edmonton whose inhabitants were mostly Ukrainian, but also French-Canadian and to a lesser extent Jewish.

⁴⁸ Letter, Reidell to Bernstein, 10 June 1943 (CJCNA, CA, Box 33, File 306).

⁴⁹ In response to Jaques's letter, Rosenberg commented: "For a man who claimed in the House of Commons not to be antisemitic, he seems to have made quite a choice collection of antisemitic charges. The one stating that 'Jews control all means of gathering news and of propaganda' is a choice one, particularly since there is not a single general daily newspaper printed in Canada owned or controlled in any way by a Jew. The source of Mr. Jacques' [sic] inspiration and information is revealed when he translates the Hebrew word 'goyim' in his letter as cattle. This false translation was given in the Nazi propaganda spread throughout

Canada before the war. The true translation of the word 'goyim' as any Hebrew scholar will tell you is 'nations.' The Greek word is 'gentile.'" Letter, Jaques to Reidell, 10 May 1943; letter, Rosenberg to Coldwell, 24 August 1943 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁵⁰ Letter, Caiserman to Rosenberg, 5 August 1943 (CJCNA, CA, Box 33, File 306).

⁵¹ Letter, Rosenberg to Reidell, 16 August 1943 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁵² Rosenberg also forwarded a copy of Jaques's letter to M.J. Coldwell, leader of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) in the House of Commons. Coldwell had tangled with Jaques several times in the House over Jaques's attempts to read excerpts of the *Protocols* into *Hansard*. Rosenberg and Coldwell were on friendly terms, and he told Coldwell he could use the letter to expose Jaques when the latter pled innocence to charges of anti-Semitism. Letter, Rosenberg to Caiserman, 17 August 1943 (CJCNA, CA, Box 33, File 306); letter, Rosenberg to Coldwell, 24 August 1943.

⁵³ Memo, Rosenberg to Fine et al., 17 August 1943 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Rosenberg by this time had replaced Rabbi Frank as executive director of the Western Division of Congress.

⁵⁶ Letter, Rosenberg to Caiserman, 16 November 1943 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 7, File 100).

⁵⁷ Harry Olyan was a leader in the Vegreville community and was chairman of the Vegreville School Board.

⁵⁸ Memo, Caiserman to Members of the Public Relations Committee, 1 February 1944 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁵⁹ Letter, Rosenberg to Caiserman, 11 February 1944 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁶⁰ Letter, Caiserman to Morosnick, 11 January 1944 (CJCNA, ZA 1944, Box 2, File 42).

⁶¹ Letter, Morosnick to Caiserman, 24 January 1944 (CJCNA, ZA 1944, Box 2, File 42).

⁶² Letter, Caiserman to Morosnick, 23 February 1944 (CJCNA, ZA 1944, Box 2, File 42).

⁶³ Letter, Morosnick to Caiserman, 29 February 1944 (CJCNA, ZA 1944, Box 2, File 42).

⁶⁴ Letter, Caiserman to Morosnick, 9 March 1944 (CJCNA, ZA 1944, Box 2, File 42).

⁶⁵ Dower, a "hard-boiled businessman" from Edmonton, had told Caiserman: "Caiserman, there isn't anything which I am not ready to do for Congress. Just ask and I will do it." Letters, Caiserman to Morosnick, 23 February, 9 March 1944; letter, Morosnick to Caiserman, 29 February 1944.

⁶⁶ *Today and Tomorrow*, 2 March 1944.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Letter, Rosenberg to Lappin, 14 March 1944 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 7, File 100).

⁶⁹ Ibid.; letter, [Rosenberg] to Fradkin, 13 March 1944 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 7, File 100).

⁷⁰ Letter, [Rosenberg] to Fradkin, 13 March 1944.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² *Today and Tomorrow*, 27 April 1944.

⁷³ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes et al., 9 May 1944 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 7, File 100).

⁷⁴ The Ontario legislation, officially called "An Act to prevent the Publication of Discriminatory Matter Referring to Race or Creed" was assented to on 14 March 1944, and was known as "The Racial Discrimination Act, 1944." On 20 March 1944 in the House of Commons, CCF MP Angus MacInnis introduced Bill No. 37 to amend the Criminal Code of Canada. The purpose of the amendment, stated MacInnis, would be "to prevent public utterances or the dissemination of material calculated or likely to cause discrimination or disharmony on account of race or religion. The utterance for publication of such statements tends to set race against race and religious groups against religious groups. The intention is to make such action illegal in the interest of unity and harmony among the people of Canada, irrespective of race or religion." MacInnis's motion was agreed to and the bill was read the first time, but it subsequently died on the order table. Ontario, *Statutes of the Province of Ontario* (Toronto: King's Printer, 1944), 231-2; Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, *Debates* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 20 March 1944), 1626.

⁷⁵ *Today and Tomorrow*, 4 May 1944.

⁷⁶ Ibid. In the October 1937 session of the Alberta legislature, the Aberhart government proposed the draconian "Accurate News and Information Act," which was intended to force all Alberta newspapers to publish statements either "correcting or amplifying" any previous press statements regarding government policy or actions. The enforcer of the legislation would be the chairman of the Social Credit Board, who could also force any Alberta newspaper to reveal the names and addresses of sources, as well as the names and addresses of writers of editorials, articles, and news items. The Lieutenant-Governor of Alberta refused

to grant the bill royal assent. David R. Elliott and Iris Miller, Bible Bill: A Biography of William Aberhart (Edmonton: Reidmore Books, 1987), 272-3; Finkel, The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta, 62.

⁷⁷ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes et al., 15 May 1944 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 7, File 100).

⁷⁸ Letter, Caiserman to Rosenberg, 18 May 1944 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 7, File 100).

⁷⁹ Letter, Hayes to Lappin, 19 May 1944 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 7, File 100).

⁸⁰ Letter, Caiserman to Feinberg, 2 August 1944 (CJCNA, ZA 1944, Box 2, File 24).

⁸¹ Rabbi A.L. Feinberg, who was also chairman of the Central Division of the Joint Public Relations Committee in Toronto, delivered this address at Holy Blossom Temple on 26 March 1944.

⁸² *Fellowship*, May 1944 (CJCNA, ZF Fellowship [CCCJ], File PR 210.1).

⁸³ Jaques had claimed that it was not until after Germany's invasion of Russia in 1941 that the Communists saw the Nazis as their enemies and began complaining about Jewish persecution. "Presumably the Jews suffered with the Gentiles [before 1941]," stated Jaques, "but oddly enough, the Jews then were of no concern to those who today are so alarmed about anti-semitism." *Edmonton Bulletin*, 14 October 1944.

⁸⁴ *Edmonton Bulletin*, 28 November 1944.

⁸⁵ Letters, Lappin to Rosenberg, 28, 30 November 1944; letters, Rosenberg to Lappin, 1, 5 December 1944; letter, Rosenberg to Friedman, 1 December 1944 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁸⁶ Letter, Rosenberg to Lappin, 1 December 1944.

⁸⁷ Letter, Lappin to Rosenberg, 28 December 1944 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁸⁸ Letter, Friedman to Hayes, 3 January 1945 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 7, File 100).

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ Low, cited in letter, Lieberman to Fradkin, 19 January 1945 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁹¹ *Lethbridge Herald*, 10 January 1945; *Canadian Social Crediter*, 11 January 1945.

⁹² *Ibid.*

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ Letter, Green to Moscovich, 16 January 1945 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁹⁵ Letter, Lieberman to Fradkin, 19 January 1945.

⁹⁶ It appears that resolutions had been passed at a Conference on Public Relations held in Regina, Saskatchewan, which decided against direct confrontation of the Social Credit Party. Yet no minutes of the Regina meeting have been discovered; thus, it remains unclear exactly what resolutions were passed.

⁹⁷ Letter, Fradkin to Rosenberg, 20 January 1945 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹⁹ Memo, Rosenberg, 30 January 1945 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁰⁰ Letter, Caiserman to Rosenberg, 5 February 1945 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁰¹ Letter, Green to Moscovich, 16 January 1945; letter, Lieberman to Fradkin, 19 January 1945.

¹⁰² The minutes of the Joint Public Relations Committee meeting read as follows: "Mr. Greenwood inquired as to what was done in regard to the anti-Semitic manifestation of the Social Credit Party. The chairman explained that the problem would be on the agenda of a future [sic] Public Relations Committee meeting." "Minutes, Joint Public Relations Committee Meeting," 1 March 1945 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 2, File 19).

¹⁰³ The minutes of the Dominion Council's Eastern Division meeting read as follows: "Mr. Hayes dwelt on the problem of the Social Credit Party and its purported anti-Semitic tendencies. The matter is being very closely studied and efforts are being made to counteract the menace of the propaganda. Mr. Fred Rose supplemented these remarks by stating that to his knowledge only certain groups in the Social Credit Party are inclined to be anti-Semitic." "Minutes, Dominion Council Eastern Division Meeting," 15 February 1945 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 2, File 19).

¹⁰⁴ Memo, Canadian Jewish Congress Dominion Council, 23 May 1945 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 2, File 33).

¹⁰⁵ *The American Mercury*, January 1945.

¹⁰⁶ Memo, Canadian Jewish Congress Dominion Council, 23 May 1945.

¹⁰⁷ Joseph Fine and H.M. Caiserman, "Public Relations [sic] Problems after the End of the War," 14 September 1945 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 2, File 19).

¹⁰⁸ Blumenstein, "Report of the Committee on Social and Economic Studies," n.d., c. October 1945; letter, Saalheimer, 24 September 1945 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 2, File 20).

CHAPTER FIVE

A WORSENING CLIMATE, 1945-1947

The relationship between the Social Credit movement and the Canadian Jewish Congress worsened in the early postwar period, largely because Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda, instead of decreasing, in fact increased. From 1945 to early 1947, the Canadian Jewish Congress responded to this worsening situation by trying to confront the Social Credit problem more directly. However, it still devoted much of its energy to traditional public relations methods; Louis Rosenberg, for example, continued to monitor Social Credit's propaganda while he and other Congress leaders exchanged numerous memoranda. Yet Congress *was* shifting the focus of its public relations philosophy. Its leaders began to openly confront Social Credit leaders in a series of incidents brought about by the latter's propaganda efforts. Congress's more forthright approach stemmed from a realization that only more aggressive measures would end its number one public relations problem. Yet despite Congress's increased assertiveness, its efforts were met with a continuation, and even increase in Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda.

During the early postwar period, Congress's greatest nemesis in the Social Credit movement was member of parliament Norman Jaques, who had become heavily involved with Gerald L.K. Smith, the "dean of American anti-Semites."¹ The connection between Jaques and Smith was first revealed in the spring of 1946, when Jaques was invited to be the main speaker at a meeting of the Christian Veterans Intelligence Bureau, a group which had close associations with Smith's Christian Nationalists.² Larry Asman,³ one of

Smith's employees, arranged a meeting of the Christian Veterans in Detroit and asked Jaques to be the principal speaker.⁴ In an open letter promoting the upcoming meeting in Detroit, Asman wrote: "we are bringing to the City of Detroit one of Canada's outstanding anti-Communist leaders ... the Honorable Norman Jaques, M.P., who ... was one of the members of Parliament responsible for helping to bring about the apprehension of Russian spies and other enemies of Christianity operating in Canada. He is a foe of Internationalism, all forms of Bolshevism, and is familiar with internationalist intrigue as it involves the international bankers and the corrupt money system the world around ... We veterans who believe in Christianity and hate atheistic Communism consider it a high honor to be able to present this distinguished statesman."⁵

On 25 April 1946, the *Canadian Social Crediter* proudly announced that "Norman Jaques, M.P. for Wetaskiwin, is probably the first Social Crediter in Canada to receive an invitation from a prominent United States Society to address them in body, with all expenses paid and a 'substantial honorarium' added."⁶ Jaques spoke at the meeting of the Christian Veterans Intelligence Bureau on 17 May 1946, and also at a rally of Smith's Christian Nationalists in St Louis. Upon returning home, Jaques remarked: "[a] few weeks ago it was my privilege and pleasure to address a meeting in Detroit organized by the Christian Veterans. On that occasion I met, for the first time, Mr. Gerald K. Smith ... Since then I have taken the opportunity to read many of their publications including twelve issues of their paper *The Cross and the Flag* and I wish to say that I am in sympathy with the ideas expressed therein."⁷ Given that Smith and the Christian Nationalists were part of the "radical right" in the United States, Jaques's admiration did

not reflect well on either himself or the Social Credit movement. However, at the time there was little public or political reaction to his connections with Smith.

Indeed, the only notable reaction to Jaques's activities in the United States came from the Canadian Jewish press. The *Canadian Jewish Weekly* called Jaques and Smith "partners in hate," and discussed at length Jaques's concurrence with Smith's "discreditable" views:

Jaques is not an isolated phenomenon. He is part of a group of men, holding high office, the ruling body in the province of Alberta, the representative of the Alberta people in Ottawa that calculatingly employs anti-Semitism to further its rise to power, just as Hitler did in Germany and just as Smith is doing in the United States today ... No honest, sensible Canadian can blink his eyes to the sinister threat which the Social Credit movement, acting through such men as Norman Jaques, has become. Its ascendancy parallels that of the Nazis in many respects. It began as a democratic party, pledged to bring security and prosperity to the people of Alberta. The pledges have been forgotten ... it has resorted to unscrupulous racial slanders and falsehoods to increase membership and influence ... Like Hitler [Social Credit leaders] seek to climb the ladder to power by playing off the people, by dividing and seducing them into civil disruption and racial conflict. Thus would the enemies of democracy, disguised as its champions, go into power through a side-door.⁸

It was clear that the horrors of World War Two had affected Canadian Jewry's response to anti-Semitism, at least within the Jewish press. The *Canadian Jewish Weekly*, a widely-read paper in Jewish circles, was making a strong statement: in the post-Holocaust,

postwar period, there would be little tolerance for Nazi-like rhetoric and behaviour.

Clearly, the paper had no compunction about engaging in a polemical attack against a government and party which it deemed inimical to the welfare of Canadian Jewry.

For its part, the Canadian Jewish Congress was more circumspect. Rosenberg was fully aware of Jaques's activities in the United States, and had been corresponding with the American Jewish Committee on the matter.⁹ For the time being, however, Congress refrained from making any direct response. Indeed, although the issue of Social Credit's anti-Semitism was discussed at a meeting of the National Joint Public Relations Committee in May 1946, a leading Congress member suggested that "nothing be put in the minutes or in writing to anybody about the discussions ... These matters have a habit of getting about and if anything is to be done it must be known to very few."¹⁰ It appears that there were plans to confront Social Credit's activities, but publicly denouncing Jaques or the Social Credit movement was not considered at that time.

Yet Congress was not passive toward the Social Credit problem or to anti-Semitism in general. In the summer of 1946 Rosenberg submitted a report to Congress's headquarters which examined the 1945 federal election results to determine the extent and prevalence of anti-Semitic prejudice in Canada.¹¹ Rosenberg argued that such a study was important because the Social Credit Party made anti-Semitic prejudice and propaganda an integral part of its programme, and members of this party were being elected to the House of Commons. Thus, he hoped that by determining the extent of support for the national Social Credit Party, he would be able to ascertain the extent of anti-Semitism in Canada as expressed through the electoral process. Rosenberg's method, of course, neglected the more complicated possibility that those who voted Social Credit did not necessarily

support Social Credit's anti-Semitic philosophy. Whether Social Credit supporters voted for Social Credit politicians *because* or *in spite* of the Party's anti-Semitism was not an easy question to answer, and it was not one that Rosenberg ever fully addressed.

However, Rosenberg's study was not without value. By determining the levels of support for Social Credit, he was at least able to isolate that bloc of voting Canadians who supported Social Credit and verify whether they agreed with Social Credit's anti-Semitic philosophy. He analysed the votes cast in the 1945 federal election by summarizing the population of every federal constituency in Canada, the total number of votes polled, and the number of votes polled for the Social Credit Party.¹² For each constituency in which a Social Credit candidate was nominated, he tabulated similar information about that polling district.

The results of the report showed that in the 1945 federal election, out of a total of 904 candidates nominated in 245 constituencies across Canada, eighty-seven candidates were nominated by the Social Credit Party.¹³ Social Credit candidates were nominated nationwide: seventeen candidates out of a total of seventeen constituencies in Alberta; three out of sixteen in British Columbia, nine out of twenty-one in Saskatchewan, eight out of seventeen in Manitoba, six out of eighty-two in Ontario, forty-three out of sixty-five in Quebec, and one out of ten in New Brunswick. Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and the Yukon did not nominate any Social Credit candidates. Yet of the 245 constituencies in Canada, only thirteen constituencies *elected* a Social Credit member to Parliament, all in Alberta. In short, every constituency in Alberta nominated a Social Credit candidate, and only four constituencies did not elect a Social Credit member.¹⁴

Rosenberg noted that out of a total of 4,150,221 votes polled in the 1945 election, only 214,431 votes were polled for Social Credit candidates. This was 4.16 percent of the Dominion-wide vote. Rosenberg rightly concluded that “only a very small proportion of Canadian electors voted for Social Credit ... candidates, and a still smaller proportion of such candidates were elected to Parliament.” Yet he cautioned that a party which preached prejudice and intolerance posed a greater danger to Canadian unity and democracy than its small numbers implied. Although proportionately small at the national level, Social Credit supporters had considerable strength in Alberta, where 35.88 percent of all voters had cast their ballots for Social Credit candidates.¹⁵

This was not an insignificant percentage, stated Rosenberg, and he inferred that those voters who supported Social Credit candidates had “allowed themselves to be influenced by propagandists of prejudice and intolerance to such an extent as to vote for candidates pledged to their policies.”¹⁶ He argued that Congress could no longer look upon the prejudice of the Social Credit movement as the irresponsible ranting of a “lunatic fringe,” or assume that such prejudice would not win the support of the average voter. The Social Credit movement had been able to elect thirteen members to the House of Commons “where they are able to make use of the prestige, privileges and immunity and the forum which parliament affords them, to inject the poison of prejudice and racial and religious hatred into the stream of Canadian life.” Clearly, the example of the fate of the Weimar Republic was still fresh in Rosenberg’s mind, and he was adamantly opposed to a democratically-elected party with an anti-Semitic agenda gaining power in the House of Commons: “events since 1933 have raised considerable doubt concerning the wisdom of such complacency.”¹⁷ Rosenberg distributed his report among leading Congress

members, and although it served as a useful educational tool, Congress confined it to internal channels and did not use it in its public relations work against Social Credit. Perhaps this was not injudicious, for it was (and remains) difficult to prove that electors voted for Social Credit because of the movement's anti-Semitic philosophy.

Other events in the immediate post-war period forced Congress to respond more actively to an inflamed anti-Semitism within the Social Credit movement. In 1946, Congress was faced with the Gouzenko affair, which resulted in the arrest and conviction of Fred Rose, Congress member and Labour-Progressive MP for Montreal-Cartier. The story of Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa, who defected in September 1945 by exposing secret documents which revealed the existence of several spy rings in Canada,¹⁸ is a well-known part of Cold War history. What is of interest here is the reaction of the Social Credit movement to the Gouzenko spy trials, and to the fact that, in this case at least, it was able to prove there *was* a connection between Jews and Communists, and more specifically, Jews and Communist spies.

Although Gouzenko revealed evidence of espionage within the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa in September 1945, it was not until the following February that the story was publicized. At that time, Prime Minister Mackenzie King quickly appointed Supreme Court Justices Robert Taschereau and R.L. Kellock to inquire into Gouzenko's story and take testimony from him and others who had been implicated.¹⁹ The Royal Commission to Investigate the Facts Relating to and the Circumstances Surrounding the Communication, by Public Officials and Other Persons in Positions of Trust of Secret and Confidential Information to Agents of a Foreign Power (the Kellock-Taschereau

Commission), submitted its final report in July 1946. Trials took place throughout 1946 and one in 1949.

Many scholars have argued that the sensational spy trials galvanized a Cold War mentality that was already in the making.²⁰ As David Bercuson notes, the Gouzenko affair “was dramatic evidence that all was not well with the wartime alliance and the USSR and the West might not, after all, share common interests on matters of post-war peace and security ... The Gouzenko defection did not ... push Canada completely into the Cold War, but it was the first definite shove in that direction.”²¹ Yet the actual number of Canadians arrested and convicted was not large. The Royal Commission named thirty-six people in its Report and stated that twenty-one of them had been engaged in disclosing secret information to the Soviet Embassy, or were aware of its disclosure. Of the twenty-one, charges were laid against nineteen, the other two having disappeared before they could be detained. Eighteen Canadians were eventually charged with conspiracy or offences under the Canadian Official Secrets Act, while Alan Nunn May was tried in the United Kingdom. Among the eighteen Canadians, eight were convicted and had their convictions sustained; two were discharged on grounds of insufficient evidence; and eight were acquitted.²²

The two Canadians most heavily implicated in the Gouzenko affair were Sam Carr, organizing secretary of the Labour-Progressive Party, and Fred Rose, Labour-Progressive MP for Montreal-Cartier who had been elected in a federal by-election in 1943. Rose and Carr, both Jews, were exposed as senior liaison agents to Colonel Grant Zabotin, the Soviet military attaché in Ottawa and director of the espionage operation.²³ Rose and Carr had acted as recruiters and transmitters of information - finding recruits, handing them

their tasks, and carrying their information to Zabotin or his officers.²⁴ Rose was sentenced to six years imprisonment for conspiracy, and Carr, who had escaped to the United States, was apprehended in 1949 and also sentenced to six years.²⁵

In its final report presented in July 1946, the Royal Commission offered possible reasons why those persons arrested had become involved in espionage against Canada. Jack Granatstein and David Stafford summarize those reasons: “[a] few, the commissioners observed, were interested in the small sums the Soviets paid them; more were ideologically committed Communists who owed their first allegiance to the party; still others were Jews, appalled by North American anti-Semitism and somehow fooling themselves into believing that the USSR, which had played so great a role in destroying Nazism, must be different; one or two were of Russian origin; and one or two were simply lonely people who had joined Communist study groups in the hopes of meeting friends and had been drawn into espionage almost without knowing why or how it had happened.”²⁶ The Commission also reported that some Jews in Canada had become involved in espionage because of the threat of anti-Semitism in North America: “[t]he evidence before us strongly suggests that anti-semitism and the natural reaction of persons of Jewish origin to racial discrimination, was one of the factors played upon by the Communist recruiting agents. It is significant that a number of the documents from the Russian Embassy specifically note ‘Jew’ or ‘Jewess’ in entries on their relevant Canadian agents or prospective agents, showing that the Russian Fifth Column leaders attached particular significance to this matter.”²⁷

The *Canadian Social Creditor* had followed the Gouzenko affair since the story broke in February 1946. In previous months, the party organ had made repeated references to

the spy trials and to the possible religio-ethnic origin of those implicated;²⁸ however, by the autumn of 1946, the floodgates had been opened and *Canadian Social Crediter* headlines read “Communists Use Jews as Spy Stooges.” The party organ stated that of the twenty-four key persons accused of espionage in Canada, no fewer than nineteen were Jews.²⁹ It used the Royal Commission’s remarks about Jews, anti-Semitism, and espionage to argue that Jews were not only the playthings of Communist traitors, but hopelessly enmeshed with the Communists: “[t]he Communists, using fear as a weapon, worked their point admirably, by seeing to it that Communist papers ‘sympathized’ with the Jews and that Communist heads were appointed to positions in leading Jewish organizations and, more particularly, with certain so-called Jewish publishing firms. The average Jewish citizen, who accepts anything blindly once it is offered to him in the name of protection, fell sucker!”³⁰ In other words, the *Canadian Social Crediter* argued that unwitting Jews were duped by Communist spies who used the spectre of anti-Semitism in North America as a weapon to force them to provide information to the USSR. It is questionable whether those Jews involved in espionage were any more “unwitting” than their non-Jewish counterparts, but the party organ intended to expose them *as Jews* and emphasize that the only communist member of parliament was both a Jew and a spy.

In the same issue, the *Canadian Social Crediter* suggested that the best way to combat anti-Semitism would be for Jews to silence the Communist leaders themselves, who were part of “Canada’s spy ring.” However, if Jews preferred Russia to North America, “they should have the decency to leave for it, without staying here haranguing those who do try to build a better democracy.” Yet the paper was skeptical that Jews would heed its message: “[t]his will all fall on deaf ears, as far as Jewish leaders are concerned. But it

may awaken some semblance of thought in the minds of Jewish readers of this paper (few though they are) who, after all, are the ones who pay in suffering and heartache for their blind trust.”³¹

Two points must be noted. First, it is true that during the interwar period many Jews became involved with left-wing groups such as the Socialist Party of Canada, the Social Democratic Party, the Communist Party of Canada, and the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF).³² However, among ethnic groups in Canada, the Finns and Ukrainians were the most highly-represented within the Socialist and Communist Parties.³³

Regarding Jewish membership in the Communist Party, Erna Paris notes that “[i]n the 1930s and 1940s, when the fascist threat loomed ominously both inside and outside Canada, Jews grew deeply attached to the Communist Party’s official United Front against fascism. Jewish membership in the Party grew substantially during this period, but it never represented more than a fraction of the Jewish population.”

Secondly, the primarily Jewish voters of Montreal-Cartier considered themselves to have been betrayed by Fred Rose. They were not happy to be represented in Parliament by a convicted spy.³⁴ As a result of Rose’s actions, “[t]he support lost in Cartier was Jewish support and it never returned to the [Communist] Party.”³⁵ Thus, the *Canadian Social Crediter* may have been correct that some Jews were now “paying in suffering and heartache for their blind trust,” but they were paying no more than other Canadians who had supported Rose. More significantly, the *Canadian Social Crediter* had inflated the evidence of the Gouzenko affair to mammoth proportions. Now that it had concrete evidence of a connection between Jews and Communists, it was all too eager to use this evidence to support its conviction that *all* Jews were Communists

The Canadian Jewish Congress was painfully aware of Social Credit's response to the Gouzenko affair. It had been observing the *Canadian Social Crediter's* coverage of the spy trials, and was in the very uncomfortable position of being unable to refute charges of connections between Jews, communists, and spies. Yet Louis Rosenberg attempted to refute some of the party organ's allegations. Specifically, he took exception to the paper's calculation of the number of Jews involved in the Gouzenko affair. After comparing the number of Jews quoted by the *Canadian Social Crediter* with those provided by the Royal Commission Report, Rosenberg came to the following conclusions. The *Canadian Social Crediter* had stated that out of twenty-four persons accused of espionage, no less than nineteen were Jews. Rosenberg maintained that twenty-eight persons in total were named in the Royal Commission Report, of whom thirteen were of Jewish origin.³⁶ However, Rosenberg was also incorrect; the Royal Commission named thirty-six in its report.³⁷

Based on his own calculations, Rosenberg divided those persons named in the Report into four groups: those who were deemed to be agents; those who were mentioned as suspected of activities but against whom no action was taken; those who were implicated in the false passport case;³⁸ and those who were mentioned briefly as intermediaries. According to Rosenberg, there were seven Jews in the first group: agents Samuel Sol Burman, Sam Carr, Harold Samuel Gerson, Israel Halperin, Freda Linton, Fred Rose, and David Shugar. In the second group, two Jews were suspected of activities: Jack Isadore Gottheil and Arthur Steinberg. In the third group, two Jews were involved in the false passport case: Henry Harris and John Soboloff. In the fourth group, two Jews were named briefly as intermediaries: Germina Rabinovitch and an unidentified espionage assistant named "Gini." Thus, Rosenberg counted thirteen Jews who had been implicated

in the Gouzenko affair.³⁹ In effect, he was attempting to show that thirteen out of twenty-eight persons (or 46.4 percent) were Jewish. The *Canadian Social Crediter* calculated that 79.2 percent were Jewish.⁴⁰

Yet because the Royal Commission had named thirty-six in its Report and did not state how many of those were Jews, both figures were inaccurate, and it was clear that each side had manipulated the figures in the Report to suit its purposes. Rosenberg's intention was to show that there were far fewer Jews implicated than alleged by the *Canadian Social Crediter*, while the latter was determined to show that nearly all those implicated were Jewish. Yet it was unlikely that even a proper calculation would have persuaded the *Canadian Social Crediter* to abandon its propaganda on Jews and espionage.

In the end, the Canadian Jewish Congress did not publicize Rosenberg's findings. Thus, the *Canadian Social Crediter* had free rein to spread its propaganda about Jewish involvement in the Gouzenko affair. Clearly, it would have been difficult for Congress to confront the Social Credit movement over this issue. The fact that some Jews were guilty of espionage did not facilitate Congress's attempts to combat defamation against Canadian Jewry. Indeed, Congress was well aware that confronting Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda by publicizing it could easily result in the spread of greater anti-Semitism. This appeared especially true when it came to opposing the movement's interpretation of the spy trials, in which the party organ flaunted the connection between Jews, Communists, and espionage.

Nonetheless, Congress attempted to adopt a more effective public relations approach which would diminish the extent of Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda. At a National Joint Public Relations Committee meeting in Montreal in early December 1946,

the topic of “subversive movements” was addressed, which included the Social Credit movement.⁴¹ National executive director Saul Hayes reported on the anti-Semitic manifestations in Canada and possible ways to counteract anti-Semitic propaganda. A variety of actions were considered, including getting the post office to bar the distribution of anti-Semitic publications and specifically Social Credit propaganda.⁴²

Another incident occurred about the same time which compelled Congress to translate its public relations considerations into more effective action. The French-language Social Credit paper, *Vers Demain*, had recently published the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* in serial form.⁴³ In addition, the *Canadian Social Crediter* had published articles which quoted from the *Protocols*, the most recent on 5 December 1946 which stated: “the scrambles of what appear to be the major contestants for the prize of world control cloak the machinations of a concealed aspirant: the International Jew. His technique is, through money power and propaganda to dissolve all national institutions, and at the same time to build up his own international organisations of control.”⁴⁴

Congress was determined to end Social Credit’s use of the *Protocols*. It was indirectly assisted in its efforts by the *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, whose exposé of Social Credit’s publication of the *Protocols* shed light on the anti-Semitic nature of the Social Credit movement. On 6 December 1946, the *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix* published an editorial entitled “Home-Baked Fascism,” which exposed the publication of the *Protocols* by the Quebec wing of the Social Credit Party, the anti-Semitism of Norman Jaques, the anti-Semitic bias in Social Credit theory as promoted by C.H. Douglas, and the similarity between Social Credit propaganda and Nazi techniques.⁴⁵ It provided a detailed explanation of the *Protocols* and emphasized that they had been proven a forgery. The

editorial warned that Social Credit philosophy was a “sinister threat” to Canadian democracy, and if not rejected, “will undermine and consume the nation, as it did in Germany.”⁴⁶ The article was reprinted in the CCF party organ, the *People’s Weekly*, the *Regina Leader-Post*, and even the *Canadian Social Crediter*, which used it as negative evidence of Social Credit’s success.⁴⁷

More revealing than the editorial in the *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, however, was the response of J.N. Haldeman, president of the Social Credit League in Saskatchewan and chairman of the National Council of the Social Credit Association of Canada. In a published reply to the *Star-Phoenix*, Haldeman declared that “Social Credit is absolutely opposed to anti-semitism. The evidence indicates that anti-semitism is a weapon of international finance and socialism to introduce totalitarianism.” Further, “[t]he fact that Social Credit is attacked as being anti-semitic shows that it is an imposing obstacle to the schemes of Socialism and Finance.”⁴⁸ Thus, Haldeman’s message was that the Social Credit movement was *not* anti-Semitic simply because to be so would mean that it had been duped by the international financiers.

Haldeman also discussed publication of the *Protocols in Vers Demain*, and argued that when a Swiss court determined that the *Protocols* were a forgery in 1935, the defence was not permitted to give its case. Moreover, he claimed, whether or not the *Protocols* were a forgery was not the point: “[t]he point is that the plan as outlined in these *Protocols* has been rapidly unfolding in the period of observation of this generation.”⁴⁹ Such was the reasoning Haldeman employed to justify publication of the *Protocols*.

Haldeman also attacked socialists in a bald attempt to shift responsibility for anti-Semitism away from the Social Credit movement. He argued that socialists were “the

chief promoters of anti-semitism,” because they “g[ave] to the Jewish race all the virtues and ha[d] Jews in key advisory and government positions carrying out policies which centralize control in the hands of the state and subject the individual to control by the state. Because these policies prove disastrous and repugnant to people, the reaction is to blame the entire Jewish race.” Haldeman conceded that there were many Jews who were not socialists, and he appealed to them to join with Social Crediters “in exposing the enemies of society whether they be Jew or Gentile.” He concluded: “Jewish minorities and other minorities will find their greatest freedom and their best protection in the Social Credit Movement ... Far from being anti-semitic, Social Credit is the greatest defender of freedom of the people and the rights of minorities as long as they do not impose policies of enslavement on others. Social Credit is vigorously pro-Christian and pro-Canadian.”⁵⁰

Haldeman had provided a clear statement of Social Credit’s anti-Semitic philosophy. He had shown that the Social Credit movement was based on the conspiratorial and anti-Semitic theories of C.H. Douglas and that these theories were embraced by leading Social Credit members across Canada. Haldeman was correct in his declaration that Social Credit was “pro-Christian” and “pro-Canadian;” yet such a definition of national identity explicitly and implicitly excluded Jews. In sum, Haldeman’s reply to the *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix* served notice to the Canadian Jewish Congress that the Social Credit movement was intent on using the same parochial and nationalistic weapons as those employed by radical anti-Semites in the United States and Europe.

For Congress, Haldeman’s letter in the *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix* only re-affirmed its suspicion that Social Credit party organs published the *Protocols* in an attempt to prove the existence of an international Jewish financial plot for world control. Consequently,

several Congress members demanded that national headquarters take stronger action against the Social Credit movement. For example, Congress member John Dower from Edmonton stated: “[i]t is obvious that Solon Low and the Social Credit Party have made up their minds not to stop at anything in the way of Anti-Semitic propaganda,” and he asked that editors of the Canadian press be given an “up to the minute analysis” of what the Social Credit Party was printing. “It is so clearly a repetition of what Goebbels did in Germany that I think every Canadian newspaper will be aware of its significance.”⁵¹ Sam Godfrey, a Congress member from Toronto, also responded to Social Credit’s publication of the *Protocols* by asking if distribution of the *Protocols* could in any way “be construed an illegal act on the part of the distributors?”⁵²

Congress’s national headquarters also responded to Social Credit’s publication of the *Protocols*. National executive director Saul Hayes stated that “[t]he reappearance of the *Elders of Zion* has caused us considerable grief and we have studied the implications and the possibility of actions on a wide variety of fronts,” some of which included the following: “[c]onversations which have already been initiated with the leaders of the Social Credit Movement. (This in a very informal and casual manner.) ... Examination of the post office regulations with a view to determining if the Postmaster General can bar these things from the mails ... Possibility of court action even if we lose the case but as long as we are able to publicize widely the evidence that the [*P*]rotocols are a forgery and a complete fraud.” Hayes also mentioned that “I may be able to convince my officers that it would pay us to take action even knowing that the law wasn’t on our side for the morale value involved. It is a difficult decision to take however.”⁵³

Indeed, in the past it had been difficult for Congress to decide how to confront Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda, but it is clear from these proposals that it was considering a much more confrontational approach than that offered by its earlier public relations philosophy. An examination of events in December 1946, however, shows that a new approach was not so easy to undertake. At the same time Hayes was trying to confront Social Credit's distribution of the *Protocols*, discussions were also taking place in Alberta between Social Credit leaders and Alberta Congress members. The nature of these discussions proved that open confrontation of the Social Credit movement was going to be a difficult, if not impossible task.

Early in December 1946, Max Moscovich, a leading Alberta Congress member and lawyer from Lethbridge, was travelling to Edmonton by train, on which were also several members of the Social Credit Party. Moscovich walked onto one of the coaches and sat down with John Blackmore, Social Credit MP for Lethbridge and former Social Credit leader in the House of Commons. "John," said Moscovich, "Saul Hayes has a great respect for you and feels that you are opposed to Anti-Semitic propaganda by your group." They had a brief discussion in which Blackmore told him: "[n]ot only am I not Anti-Semitic - but I am definitely Pro-Jewish." Moscovich returned to his coach when Solon Low, leader of the national Social Credit Party, came and sat next to him. Moscovich said to Low: "Solon - I was with Saul Hayes on Monday - and he states that you had written stating you had no control over members of your group - and that you couldn't control their anti-semitic outbursts." Low replied: "Max - you've known me most of my life - I am definitely not anti-semitic. I have as my secretary - my daughter - who may marry a London Jew ... Jaques - is a definite fanatic - we resent his utterances - and we will

certainly see that he does not get the nomination at next election ... Furthermore Manning ... and I are supervising the policy of the S[ocial] Credit Paper - so that antisemitic statements will be eliminated.” According to Moscovich, Low then brought up his “pet hobby” anti-Communism, and told him that he would “love to see Canadian Jewry openly oppose Communism.”⁵⁴

From these interactions, Moscovich concluded that John Blackmore was sincere when he said he was not anti-Semitic, but in fact pro-Jewish, and was “a sincere - honest devout Citizen - [but] a poor politician.” In contrast, Low was “a shrewd aggressive politician.” Yet Moscovich believed Low’s promises that anti-Semitism in the Social Credit Party would diminish. In fact, wrote Moscovich to Hayes: “[i]f the Policy of the S. Credit paper does not alter - let me know and I will speak to Manning and Low. It may take a little while to change the policy - but outside of that B- Jacques [sic] I feel that S. Crediters of the West are anything but Anti-Semites - their past activities notwithstanding.”⁵⁵

Upon receiving Moscovich’s letter, Hayes wondered how Moscovich, and the Canadian Jewish Congress in general, could test the good faith of Low’s policies: “[i]s there any way in which you can follow this up? Is it feasible to ask Low for a letter committing to writing what he is saying verbally? Is it feasible to ask him to have an editorial denouncing race prejudice in his next issue? Is it feasible for him to undertake to see the Union des Electeurs ... to have them stop the nonsense on the *Elders of the Protocols of Zion*?”⁵⁶ Moscovich skirted these questions, but suggested to Hayes: “write Solon Low an official letter from your office, and tell him that I saw you in Calgary where I joyfully disclosed his assurances to me ... Tell him, that your view is that Canadian Jews

are opposed to Communism - and urge him to intervene and extirpate the anti-semitic propaganda in Quebec - and thank him officially for his pro-Jewish attitude as disclosed by myself.”⁵⁷

It does not appear that Hayes wrote to Low at that time. This may have been because he received four separate memoranda from Louis Rosenberg which showed that Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda was continuing unabated, thus dampening his hopes that Low would do anything about the Party's anti-Semitism.⁵⁸ Instead, Hayes forwarded these recent examples of anti-Semitism to Moscovich, stating: “[w]hen you will look through it you will find many references which we do not like.” He conveyed his skepticism about Low's promises: “I would think that it is a bit early for Solon Low to fulfill his promise, but surely if this kind of stuff would be repeated in forthcoming issues [of the *Canadian Social Crediter*], we can once more take his promises for what they are worth - that is, sub-zero. I hope to goodness I am wrong and I particularly hope that your conversation with him might mean a new deal.”⁵⁹

Unfortunately for the aims of the Canadian Jewish Congress, Hayes was not wrong. On 18 December 1946, Solon Low gave a nationwide broadcast over the CBC which was not blatantly anti-Semitic, but which repeated all the covert anti-Semitic slurs. Low began his speech by stating that the federal government granted political parties free time on the CBC in proportion to their representation in the House of Commons. However, he complained, “they have given the 14 Social Crediters the same time as the Communists whose sole representative elected to Parliament [Fred Rose] is languishing in gaol convicted of treason against his country.” Consequently, “the Canadian people are denied a fair opportunity to learn about the Social Credit viewpoint on current affairs.” Low

launched into a tirade about communism and state socialism, accused the Mackenzie King government of being a “socialist administration,” and declared that it was Liberal policy which had caused “high taxation, the restrictions, the rigid controls, the insane efforts at planning, [and] the foreign policy which results in handing over Canada to the domination of international gangsters.” Low compared the Liberal government to the CCF, the “champions of State Socialism,” and argued that both were linked to world dictatorship: “we are being made the victims of an evil and deep-seated conspiracy by a group of international power maniacs who aim to destroy Christianity, to destroy every vestige of human freedom ... for the purpose of making possible a World Slave State through violence, revolution and war ... the hand of high finance, through monopoly control, debt and taxation, and money manipulation have driven people towards this goal in sheer desperation.”⁶⁰

Low also explained that “International gangsters” controlled both the League of Nations and the United Nations, and that “men in high places” favourable to “treason-mongering” had allowed Russian espionage to occur in Canada. He mentioned the name “Germina (Hermina) Rabionovitch” [sic] in his discussion of the Gouzenko affair. Then, in a spate of rhetorical questions, he declared: “[d]o you know that the same group of international gangsters who are today scheming for world revolution are the same people who promoted the world war? Do you know that these same men promoted and financed the Russian revolution? Are you aware that these arch-criminals were responsible for the economic chaos and suffering of the hungry thirties, for financing Hitler to power, for promoting world war 2 with its tragic carnage? Do you know that there is a close tie-up between international communism, international finance and international political

Zionism?" Low concluded: "[t]he world conflict is a conflict between the forces of good and the forces of evil - of Christianity versus anti-Christianity and paganism ... That is the challenge which Christmas 1946 will bring to each one of us. How will you meet the challenge?"⁶¹

Low's speech was typical for Social Credit leaders. He had not used the word "Jew" once, but given past statements by other Social Credit members, his meaning could be inferred easily.⁶² Yet Congress members' reactions were not uniform. Saul Hayes contacted Congress members in Alberta⁶³ to discuss Low's speech. Max Moscovich did not believe that Low's speech was anti-Semitic,⁶⁴ even though Low had used the name "Rabinovitch" with respect to the Gouzenko affair and had invoked the term "international political Zionism." Nonetheless, stated Moscovich, "outside of these two references his speech was chiefly Anti-Communitic and to sum it up vulgarly - consisted of unadulterated B.S. I doubt if it tended to stir up anti-Jewish feeling." In Moscovich's view, Low's earlier promises to him about quelling Social Credit's anti-Semitism were not yet void, and he exhorted Hayes to give Low a second chance: "[Low] is a damned Hypocrite - true - but I feel his volunteered promises may ultimately be implemented. He told me that Jacques [sic] ... who is now addressing audiences with G.K. Smith - is a fanatic - and that he cannot discipline him ... Now Saul - with your permission I will approach Low ... and if the policy of the Social Credit Press in Canada still follows the same tune - I will see him and ask him point blank - Why he has failed to keep his word ... give me one chance to try to convince this man - and one or two other Federal and Provincial S. Crediters - that they are unjustly and uselessly hurting us - and if that does not bring results - you might try other remedies."⁶⁵

Hayes was less optimistic than Moscovich. In response to Low's speech, Canadian Jewish Congress members in Ontario were exerting considerable pressure on Congress's national headquarters to take action. Hayes summarized the situation from his perspective in Montreal: "[i]t appears that most people who heard the broadcast interpreted it as being anti-semitic and one using the same techniques which Germany made so popular from 1933 to the fateful days of '39. I refer of course to the suggestion advanced by Low that international Communism, international Capitalism and international Zionism (only Hitler said 'Jewry') are responsible for the world's ills and that if the mass of the population would only recognize these evils and exterpate [sic] them all would be well. This has an ominous and familiar ring. Whether it is strictly anti-semitism or not pales into an insignificance beside its dangerous demagogery [sic]."⁶⁶

After further correspondence, Hayes and Moscovich reached an agreement on how to respond to Low's statements. Hayes had initially suggested court action against Low for his statements about "international political Zionism," "knowing full well that we would lose the case." Yet later he agreed that Moscovich would merely "bump into [Low] ... and charge him with hypocrisy and double talk."⁶⁷ Moscovich promised Hayes he would take up the matter of "international political Zionism" with Low and would "not mince words."⁶⁸

Notwithstanding their compromise, Hayes and Moscovich fundamentally disagreed on how to respond to Low's speech. One can see in their differing views an inherent problem with Congress's public relations approach to Social Credit's propaganda. Moscovich believed that Low's speech did not cause either anti-Semitic discrimination or prejudice. He even suggested that the words "Rabinovitch" and "international political Zionism" had

little impact on the broadcast's listeners. Clearly, Moscovich did not agree with Social Credit's propaganda, but he did not believe it posed a real and dangerous threat to Canadian Jewry. On the other hand, Hayes believed Low's speech showed the chilling parallels to Hitler's methods in which democracy was subverted, hatred spread, and the welfare of certain citizens threatened under the guise of democratic methods.

Thus, although both men did not approve of Low's rhetoric, they had different interpretations of its potential threat to Canadian Jewry. Both interpretations had merit: Moscovich was no alarmist, and Hayes was determined to protect Canadian Jewry from a similar fate handed to European Jewry. Given the recent horrors in Europe, Hayes's concern was understandable. The similarity in rhetoric between the Social Credit movement and Hitler's programme was striking, and Congress's duty was to ensure that such propaganda was disallowed, whether or not it posed an immediate threat to Canadian Jewry. Most importantly, the differences in Moscovich's and Hayes's views highlights the lack of consensus within Congress towards Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda. In the absence of consensus, Congress had difficulty establishing any coherent public relations policy towards the Social Credit problem.

Yet Congress was willing to confront the Social Credit movement when it had to, and Low's radio broadcast was the catalyst for such action. The Eastern Region's Joint Public Relations Committee discussed Low's radio broadcast at a meeting on 23 January 1947. The Committee members contemplated a formal protest to the CBC and a draft letter was introduced. Some members wanted the letter publicized in the press; another member suggested that certain members of parliament be contacted to take up Low's speech on the House floor. Everyone agreed that the Joint Public Relations Committee should issue a

statement condemning *Vers Demain* for its anti-Semitic policy and its publication of the *Protocols*, and that the National Joint Public Relations Committee in Montreal should “study the Social Credit Party statements and its publications and if found anti-semitic to issue a public condemnation in the Press.” Saul Hayes suggested that legal methods be used, in this case to fight the anti-Semitic propaganda of the *Canadian Social Crediter* and *Vers Demain*: “[c]ounter propaganda might be used as a defence; efforts might be renewed and strengthened to have legislation outlawing anti-semitism; influential people or even political parties could be contacted to combat those who spread anti-semitism. Legal counsel is now being obtained as to possible court action against the anti-semitic publications; though such action might not have chances of success, it might be of great value from an education point of view.”⁶⁹

In many ways, this Joint Public Relations Committee meeting was typical - it discussed adopting a strong public relations policy towards Social Credit; actions against the Party were considered; plans were debated; motions were carried - meanwhile, the anti-Semitic propaganda continued to flow. However, this meeting was different in one important respect: the plan to send a formal letter of complaint to the CBC was actually executed, by none other than the national president of the Canadian Jewish Congress.

On 23 January 1947, Samuel Bronfman wrote to the chairman of the board of governors of CBC to “register a formal protest against some of the statements which Mr. Solon Low, National Leader of the Social Credit Party, was able to voice in a free time political broadcast over the Trans-Canada Network of the C.B.C. on December 18, 1946.” Bronfman quoted from those excerpts of Low’s speech which discussed “the international power maniacs who aim to destroy Christianity;” the “international gangsters who are to-

day scheming for world revolution;" and the "close tie-up between international communism, international finance and international political Zionism."⁷⁰

Bronfman conceded that Low's allegations were vague and lacked evidence; nonetheless, he argued, such statements contravened the CBC's regulations for broadcasting stations, pursuant to the Canadian Broadcasting Act.⁷¹ Bronfman noted that Low's statements also violated the general policy of the CBC, "which is one of encouraging a fair presentation of controversial questions of public interest and concern." Citing passages from Nazi Party propaganda, including *Mein Kampf*,⁷² to show their similarity to Low's rhetoric, Bronfman stated: "Mr. Low's method, this whipping up of international plots, to scare and frighten people into a confused way of political thinking (including its thinly veiled anti-semitic core) is just a little too redolent of certain European politicians now defunct, to be permitted to pass by the C.B.C. and the Canadian people ... This is the type of political rubbish, very dangerous rubbish, which used to come over Goebbels' radio stations. You will agree, I think, we should not allow these insidious methods to creep into Canadian broadcasting." Bronfman judiciously stated that he assumed the CBC was already aware of what had happened, and that if it had not already done so, would give "certain advice to the party leader who indulged in this type of speech making."⁷³ The president of the Canadian Jewish Congress had finally taken on the Social Credit movement, albeit through the medium of the CBC.⁷⁴ It appeared that a new public relations approach might be underway.

Indeed, this was not the end of Congress's confrontation with Solon Low. Quite by accident, Rabbi Solomon Frank of Winnipeg had a meeting with Low when the latter addressed the Winnipeg Division of the Empire Club (of which Frank was a member) on

25 January 1947. Informed that there were no members of the press present and unaware of the rabbi's presence, Low spoke "quite freely at the meeting." Frank reported that "[i]n the course of his discussion on the state of the British Empire [Low] launched a very vicious attack against the Zionist Movement which he called the number 2 enemy of the British Empire, the number 1 enemy being Communism." Immediately after the meeting, the chairman of the Empire Club introduced Frank to Low. "Mr. Low was obviously embarrassed and tried to soft-pedal his statements somewhat," stated Frank, but when he pressed Low about what he had said, the latter invited him to have lunch the following day "to discuss all problems of mutual interest." Although the lunch was on a Saturday, Frank accepted the invitation, and the contents of their meeting were subsequently reported at a Western Division Joint Public Relations meeting:

In his discussion with the Social Credit leader Rabbi Frank pointed out how erroneous [Low's] attitude was, especially with regard to the alleged link-up between Zionism and Communism. He gave [Low] documentary evidence on the determined anti-Communist stand of nearly all Jewish groups in Palestine and ... Mr. Low was deeply impressed by his statements. He admitted that irresponsible elements in the Social Credit Party such as Mr. Norman Jacques [sic], suggest by their behaviour that the Social Credit Movement is antisemitic. In actual fact this is not the case. Mr. Low asked Rabbi Frank for a number of documents ... He promised that he would do everything in his power to curb antisemitic tendencies within his Party.

Frank suggested that such documents be furnished to Low and that further developments be watched closely. He felt that if Low's intentions were sincere, "we have every reason

to welcome the above development and to work in every possible way towards more understanding of our problems on the part of the followers of the Social Credit Movement.”⁷⁵

It will be remembered that years earlier, Rabbi Frank had met with William Aberhart who gave him similar promises. Perhaps Frank should have been less naïve; this was not the first time Low or other Social Credit leaders had denied anti-Semitism within the Social Credit movement and promised to do “everything in their power” to curb anti-Semitism within their ranks. More importantly, the Joint Public Relations Committee did not use Low’s Empire Club statements or his discussions with Frank to its advantage; instead, it agreed that no publicity whatsoever should be given to Low’s statements.⁷⁶ Nonetheless, the meeting between Frank and Low was productive in that it was a further confrontation of Social Credit’s anti-Semitic propaganda. Many Congress members believed that their organization needed to have more confrontations with the Social Credit movement. If enough members of the Canadian Jewish community exerted pressure on Social Credit leaders, perhaps the movement’s anti-Semitic propaganda would diminish.

Saul Hayes was one member who believed in confrontation. On 14 February 1947, he walked into the House of Commons and waited outside the Social Credit caucus room. After about thirty minutes, Solon Low and other party members came out of caucus. Hayes told Low he wanted to speak with him; Low said he was on his way to an appointment and had no time to spare. Yet he asked Hayes what he wanted, and when the latter told him it was about Low’s radio broadcast of December 18th and other matters, Low invited him to his office and spoke with him for forty minutes. “Either he had no appointment or forgot to keep it,”⁷⁷ remarked Hayes.

Hayes and Low discussed several issues during their brief meeting. Hayes raised the issue of Low's radio broadcast which referred to "international political Zionism." He told Low that his statements "w[ere] not only a fantasy but grievously pained the Jewish Community," and explained why it was fantastic to link international political Zionism with communism, because the two ideologies were antithetical.⁷⁸ According to Hayes,

[Low stated that] the radio speech was not intended to embarrass the Jewish community[;] he was careful not to talk of Jews since this would have been against all his instincts and viewpoints ... Low says he is a Zionist ... His quarrel is that Zionism ... has become a movement which cares not who is in its way and this new political Zionism is what he deplores and will fight ... His attack on international Zionism was not an attack on Jews or his concept of Zionism. He does not allege ... that political Zionism is in conspiracy with international finance and international Communism. His thesis is that there are three insidious forces today working independently but all three have one thing in common - a desire to break up the British Empire. Nowhere in his speech, says Low, does he state that the three are in conspiracy but that each is a link (in a chain presumably) with the end in view of destroying the British Empire. The tie-up he refers to in his speech is the tie-up of having common arms[,] not in conspiracy.⁷⁹

As proof of his faith in Zionism, Low informed Hayes of his membership in the Canadian Palestine Committee.⁸⁰ Hayes did not consider it good tactics to tell him that the Canadian Palestine Committee had as an avowed purpose the very things Low called "international and political Zionism." Low then promised Hayes that he would not give

offence to the Jewish community. He added that he realized the Jews were inevitably oversensitive because they had suffered so much, and that as a Mormon he considered himself a spiritual brother of the Jews, since the Mormons too had suffered for their faith. "Sooner or later," stated Hayes, "I knew he would come to the point that some of his best friends are Jewish and sure enough he stated this." Low declared that he did not want to hurt the Jewish people since among his friendliest contacts were a half-dozen Jewish residents of Alberta, such as Moscovich, Dower, and Freedman.⁸¹

Yet throughout their conversation, Low kept referring to the disproportionate numbers of Jews who were communists. When Hayes finally asked him where he was getting his figures, Low stated that Rabbi Frank of Winnipeg had told him that 700 out of Winnipeg's 1,800 Jews were Communists. Low asked Hayes to agree that this was a very high figure and that it showed where Jewish interests were pointed. "I told him that he had quite obviously misunderstood Rabbi Frank," stated Hayes. "There were 18,000 not 1,800 Jews in Winnipeg and while I knew nothing of the figures certainly 4% of the total should induce far different conclusions than a 40% proportion." Hayes again explained that communism and Zionism were antithetical ideologies, and in return Low promised him that "he would exercise great care to prevent unwarranted statements to creep into his texts."⁸²

The two men then discussed *Vers Demain's* publication of the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*. Low shook his head "sorrowfully" when Hayes mentioned the *Protocols*, and stated that their publication had been done not "mischievously but thoughtlessly," and that it had been a mistake on the part of the editorial force of *Vers Demain*. Low indicated that he could probably arrange an agreement with the editor,

Louis Even, to ensure that such material was not published, and he added that discussions were underway to set up a national editorial board so that the *Canadian Social Crediter* and *Vers Demain* followed a common policy. Low also declared that, in contrast to *Vers Demain*, the *Canadian Social Crediter* would never have published the *Protocols*. He stated that although he had never read them, he assumed the *Protocols* were a forgery and “whether they are true or not they are dangerous and it would be bad to publicize them.” Hayes was unimpressed with Low’s declarations, believing they “sounded hollow in the light of all that had transpired and was said.” Nonetheless, Low suggested that a meeting be set up between Hayes and R  al Caouette, the newly-elected Union des Electeurs MP for Pontiac, Quebec. Hayes agreed and a meeting among Hayes, Low, and Caouette was planned for the week of 24 February 1947.⁸³

The last issue Hayes and Low discussed was the activities of Norman Jaques, who had become increasingly associated with Gerald L.K. Smith in the United States. “Apparently not only has the Canadian Jewish Congress trouble with Jacques [sic] but so has the Social Credit party,” noted Hayes. “[Low] told me (barely above a whisper) that they could not control [Jaques], that he considered himself above party discipline and that he absents himself from all caucuses.” Yet Hayes reminded Low that Social Credit’s internal difficulties were not nearly as important as the fact that “Jacques [sic] is putting the hall-mark of anti-semitism on Social Credit.” Low responded that official Social Credit remonstrances could not influence Jaques. However, he agreed to look into the matter further. Hayes reported: “Mr. Low ... said if Smith was as bad as I said he was, he, Low, would denounce Jacques [sic] either in the *Social Crediter* and at a Social Credit public

conference or convention or he would find some method of dissociating Jacques [sic] from the Party.”⁸⁴

Many issues had been discussed between Congress’s national executive director and the leader of the national Social Credit Party. Issues had been raised; promises had been made; but there still remained a sense of intransigence on Low’s part regarding Social Credit’s stance on anti-Semitism. Indeed, Hayes’s impressions of the meeting were ambivalent: “Mr. Low is quick to make promises. He has certain fixed ideas on money and credit which no amount of cross-conversation will dislodge. These views are ideologies and without them he could not be a Social Crediter. He sounds reasonable on other matters and if he makes good his promises much of the potential harm to us of Social Credit may not emerge. We will soon be in a position to judge these promises. Until then a period of watchful waiting would seem to be indicated.”⁸⁵

Hayes’s meeting with Low was discussed at the next meeting of the National Joint Public Relations Committee on 23 February 1947. The Committee agreed that in forthcoming meetings with Social Credit members, such as the upcoming meeting with Low and Caouette, more than one Congress member should be in attendance. Yet this was not approved unanimously since, as one Congress member cautioned, “there was a danger in having delegations since a person, on delicate matters, might desire to speak only to one person.” Still, it was agreed that from then on at least two Congress members would hold meetings with Social Credit leaders.⁸⁶

Accordingly, for the forthcoming meeting with Low and Caouette, the National Joint Public Relations Committee decided that Rabbi Feinberg, Joseph Fine (co-chairman of the National Joint Public Relations Committee) and Saul Hayes would be Congress’s

delegates. They would be responsible for submitting a report to the Committee on their meeting and would be empowered to co-opt additional Congress members in preparing a policy of action regarding Social Credit.⁸⁷

Yet adopting a stronger public relations approach was not unanimously accepted by members of the National Joint Public Relations Committee. While some believed that Social Credit was Congress's "greatest single public relations problem" and that the movement should be "put on the defensive," others disagreed. One member stated that an open battle with Social Credit could be undertaken only if the movement declared an anti-Semitic policy [as opposed to propaganda], or if it refused to abandon certain practices Congress now found dangerous and anti-Semitic. Others did not believe Canadian Jewry should have to wait for anti-Semitic rhetoric to be turned into policy before taking action. Significantly, there were members, including national executive director Hayes, who wanted to see Congress declare a national public relations policy towards Social Credit at that time. Hayes "felt that there was great need for the methods of possible attack to be discussed now, to be used when the need is apparent."⁸⁸

Although no formal public relations policy was decided upon at the meeting, it was clear that Congress's stance was much more resolute than two years earlier. Both the Second World War and the Social Credit movement itself played a part in Congress's increased assertiveness. As Social Credit leaders became more vocal in their anti-Semitism, Congress's knowledge of the recent horrors of Nazi Germany made such propaganda increasingly intolerable. Congress was developing a public relations philosophy of "Never Again" - a philosophy which viewed the anti-Semitic propaganda and rhetoric of the Social Credit movement as something as potentially dangerous as the

genocidal policies of the Third Reich. For many Congress members, it was unthinkable that in the shadow of the Holocaust, Jews anywhere should wait to see if the rhetoric would once again turn into policy, and policy into annihilation. In this way, Congress was beginning to show its refusal to countenance the prejudices of a democratically-elected government and mainstream political party within its own country.

Shortly after the meeting of the National Joint Public Relations Committee, Hayes and Fine⁸⁹ met with Solon Low, John Blackmore, and Réal Caouette. The meeting, which took place in Ottawa at the end of February 1947,⁹⁰ was somewhat different than that which took place between Hayes and Low two weeks earlier. The increase in numerical strength on both sides seemed to alter the nature of the discussions. The meeting was more formal - the Congress leaders were more forthright, and the Social Crediters more intransigent.

During the meeting, the Congress members gave specific examples comparing the rhetoric of the Nazi Party in Germany to that published in the *Canadian Social Crediter* and *Vers Demain*. "We cited chapter and verse," stated Hayes. "[N]eedless to say, we did not charge them with Nazism or Fascism but drew the conclusion that whatever the motivation on their part, the pattern was identical with the sordid, cynical, brutal one of recent years." Regarding publication of the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*, none of the Social Credit leaders took responsibility for it. They admitted that *Vers Demain* had published the *Protocols*, but they did not offer any explanation. The Congress members informed them that the *Protocols* purported to be "the outlines of a vast Jewish plan to dominate the world." Low and Blackmore admitted that had they been consulted, they would have counselled against publication of the *Protocols*. Low added that he had

never seen the *Protocols* until two days before, when he got them out of the Parliamentary Library. Hayes noticed that “Mr. Low attached great importance to the fact that the Library had a copy. It would appear that he considered this an imprimatur or at least lending a verisimilitude of authenticity to the *Protocols*.” For his part, Caouette appeared non-committal, but stated that he had never bothered to read the *Protocols* and paid no attention to their serialization in *Vers Demain*. Caouette informed the Congress members that *Vers Demain* reached 60,000 French-Canadian homes, and suggested that they contact editor Louis Even to discuss why the *Protocols* had been published.⁹¹

During the meeting, the Congress members also discussed the various speeches and writings of Social Credit leaders which attacked Jews. To many of the examples, the Social Crediters agreed that Congress had cause for complaint. To others, they argued that Jews in fact were implicated and that Social Crediters were only stating the truth. The Congress members informed them that “we were resentful of the accents Social Credit gave to these matters, e.g. if in their creed international finance is one of the cardinal sins, why single out Jewish bankers from among the giants of international finance and moreover, why attack them as Jews.” It was a point to which the Social Crediters did not respond. Congress members emphasized that the methods of the Social Credit Party “were anti-semitic in effect if not in motivation.”⁹²

For their part, the Social Credit leaders expressed their resentment at a recent *Congress Bulletin* whose front page stated “Social Credit Party includes anti-semitism on platform.” They argued that it was not true, and moreover, the story was not consistent with its headline. Nowhere in the *Bulletin*’s article was there any discussion of the Party’s platform; instead it focussed on the two party organs, the *Canadian Social Creditor* and

Vers Demain. Blackmore was very resentful of the *Bulletin*'s headline and both he and Low charged anyone to offer "one scintilla of evidence that the party platform includes anti-semitism." Blackmore and Low also charged many Jews and Jewish papers with "glaring inaccuracies," and Low stated he especially resented the "lies and defamatory libels" of R.S. Gordon, editor of *Today*, the Toronto Anglo-Jewish monthly.⁹³

The Congress members apologized for the *Congress Bulletin* story, as it was supposed to have been removed before the *Bulletin*'s issue. Yet they emphasized that they considered the *Canadian Social Crediter* and *Vers Demain* to be in the category of anti-Semitic literature. Reported Hayes: "[w]e further stated that if [the anti-Semitic literature] continues, we must assume that the S.C. party wish[es] to use these means of appealing to the electorate ... we [emphasized] ... that we learned the lessons of 1923 to the war years and would not view this pattern with resignation or equanimity. We made it abundantly clear that if the signs were portentous we would do all in our power to safeguard the future rights and protect the Jewish community from attacks and onslaughts." Low agreed to examine the examples of anti-Semitism in the *Canadian Social Crediter* which the Congress members had provided.⁹⁴

Over two hours later, as the meeting drew to a close, the Social Credit leaders made their final remarks. For his part, Low "affirmed that he and his party will not tolerate anti-semitism and wherever it rears its head he and his colleagues will decapitate it. He avowed his firm principles and his appreciation certain [sic] of the complaints we made." Blackmore, "who was most sanctimonious, alleged that he and Low were the best friends the Jews ever had. This was due to Low and he being Latter Day Saints who in their creed are descendants of Ephriam. He said moreover that complaints were double edged swords

and he pleaded for accuracy on [Congress's] part." Lastly, Caouette, whom Saul Hayes described as a "laconic individual," said very little except that "he has Jewish friends and contacts and has not resorted to anti-semitism."⁹⁵

In a report written after this meeting, Hayes summarized the Social Credit leaders' arguments: "[t]he [Social Credit] leaders stated they recognized the dangers of anti-semitic propaganda ... The appearance of the *Protocols* was not their responsibility though they stated that had they any part in the paper's policy, they would not have published the *Protocols* ... They admitted it to be a mistake to single out Jews as the preponderant influences in the camps of their enemies - International Communism and International Finance ... They agree that certain articles and copy was offensive ... They avow their hatred of anti-semitism and their immunity from its taints ... They ask for accuracy from us and they on their part will attempt to play fair and deal equitably with us as a group."⁹⁶

Hayes also offered his own impressions of the meeting. He stated that it was possible that the Social Credit movement would be more careful in its generalizations about blaming the Jews for the world's ills, but would continue blaming internationally-known Jews who were involved in international finance and communism. Congress's one hope was that "Social Credit will refer to Kuhn, Loeb, etc. without indicating it is Jewish and by associating it with the giants of international finance. We can hope too that if Social Credit has to attack international financiers and name the machinators it will be accurate[,] in which case individual Jews will be outnumbered by their Gentile confraternity." To hope for more than that was harbouring an illusion, Hayes concluded: "Social Credit from our point of view has cast its die. It has sold its devotees a creed which, if not anti-semitic, is one of the finest backgrounds for anti-semitism. It cannot

retreat very much even if Solon Low, Manning, Blackmore and others, protest their goodwill at matins and vespers; Social Credit knows what the Jewish community will do if it fails to reform itself. We must wait to examine the future issues of the *Social Crediter*, and *Vers Demain*, the speeches of the leaders, their attitude on men like Jacques [sic], etc. and other indices of their viewpoints.”⁹⁷

The next step was for Hayes and the other Congress members to make their recommendations for action to the National Joint Public Relations Committee. To this end, Hayes organized and led a special sub-committee of the National Joint Public Relations Committee, whose purpose was to “study ... [the] Social Credit Party, its leaders, its program and its literature in relation to the security and well being of the Jewish Community in Canada.” Before the sub-committee reported to the National Joint Public Relations Committee, however, it arranged meetings with three American Jewish defence organizations: the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, the American Jewish Congress, and the American Jewish Committee.⁹⁸ The purpose of these meetings was to obtain advice regarding the Social Credit movement’s anti-Semitic propaganda and its threat to Canadian Jewry.

On 14 March 1947, Saul Hayes, Joseph Fine, and Rabbi A.L. Feinberg met with representatives from the Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Congress, and the American Jewish Committee in New York City. Prior to these meetings, Congress had provided each organization with complete documentation of the Social Credit movement’s anti-Semitic propaganda, including copies of literature, speeches, correspondence, and memoranda.⁹⁹ At the meeting, each organization gave its

recommendations for combatting the Social Credit menace. Some suggestions were shared by all three groups, while others were completely contradictory.

The Anti-Defamation League, the American Jewish Congress, and the American Jewish Committee unanimously agreed that Congress should publicly expose and discredit the leaders and ideas of the Social Credit Party.¹⁰⁰ The Anti-Defamation League and the American Jewish Congress made specific suggestions regarding Norman Jaques: “bar Jaques from the United States and use this widely for publicity purposes,” stated the Anti-Defamation League. The American Jewish Congress recommended: “Jaques must be exposed and in the expos[é] tie him up at all times to the Social Credit Party ... Ascertain possibilities of formal censure of Jaques in the House of Commons ... [u]se American periodicals to make a frontal attack on Jaques and other vulnerable leaders.”¹⁰¹

The three organizations also agreed that Congress should make alliances with the “natural enemies” of Social Credit in order to execute a co-ordinated attack. The Anti-Defamation League suggested that Congress “seek out commentators who have a following and ascertain whether they have ... an interest in attacking the Social Credit doctrine ... see if the Canadian Legion will ... protest the Social Credit platform and policy ... use the Trade Unions as a weapon to prevent Social Credit from spreading ... obtain allies from church groups both clerical and lay.” The American Jewish Committee similarly suggested that Congress “[o]btain allies in groups and among interests which would want to ensure the obliteration of Social Credit (church, trade unions, other political parties).”¹⁰²

On other recommendations, the three groups were not as unanimous. Only the Anti-Defamation League and the American Jewish Congress agreed that Congress should assist

opposition candidates in federal and provincial elections in order to defeat key Social Credit candidates. The Anti-Defamation League suggested that Congress “have individuals make financial contributions to trusted individuals who will distribute the monies strategically to ensure defeat of particular candidates provincial and federal.” The American Jewish Congress also emphasized that “the main objective would be to destroy the party in Alberta by an aggressive campaign, by way of expos[é] of leaders and support to opposition candidates in provincial and federal elections.” However, the American Jewish Committee, although suggesting that Congress “[d]iscredit the party leaders,” and through “infiltration arrange for disreputable characters to enter the party so that a successful smear campaign can be undertaken,” nonetheless strongly discouraged using opposition parties to oust the Social Credit government: “[d]o not attempt to aid and assist opposition candidates since these matters cannot long be kept confidential without resulting in a noxious boomerang.”¹⁰³

There were also contradictory recommendations regarding the efficacy of legal action against the Social Credit Party. The American Jewish Congress emphatically supported legal action and suggested a variety of options. First, the Canadian Jewish Congress should determine whether action could be taken by groups aggrieved by Social Credit speeches, pamphlets, and other propaganda. Second, a person *outside* Congress should prepare a content analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter* so that in any projected law suit, Congress would have “a complete objective and scientific study ... on hand.” Third, because the Social Credit Party attacked Zionists as conspirators, some prominent Zionists should sue Jaques, Low, or whoever else was making such attacks. Lastly, legal action should be taken against those Social Crediters who edited, published, and distributed the

Protocols. The American Jewish Congress seemed to indicate that even if the law suits were not successful, the results would be beneficial because of the accompanying exposé of the Social Credit Party. In contrast, the Anti-Defamation League was “doubtful” regarding the use of legal action, and the American Jewish Committee was “unalterably opposed.” Indeed, the American Jewish Committee specifically stated: “[b]y no means and under no circumstances engage in or encourage others to engage in libel action, damage action, [or] group libel action.”¹⁰⁴ No reasons were given, but it had certainly made clear its opposition to legal remedies.

After meeting with the three Jewish defence organizations, Hayes, Fine, and Feinberg provided their comments and conclusions. They expressed no surprise at the recommendations given them by the various organizations, and remarked that their suggestions were congruent with “the pattern of work to which the various agencies have dedicated themselves.” The Anti-Defamation League urged fact-finding and smear campaigns; the American Jewish Congress suggested legal action wherever possible, “even though successful verdict would be largely in doubt from the very start;” and the American Jewish Committee advised against legal action but suggested a “campaign of infiltration of disreputable people” into the Social Credit Party.¹⁰⁵

The Canadian Jewish Congress members concluded that, given the response of the American organizations, organized Jewry in the United States also looked upon the Social Credit movement “as a dangerous group which must be attacked.” Yet they were not hopeful regarding possible action against the movement: “[t]he problem is acknowledged to be a most difficult one and even with the implementation of the program outlined, there is little guarantee that an effective brake will be put on the Social Credit machine.”

However, the members emphasized that Congress must continue its fight against the Social Credit movement: “despite the difficulties and woeful prognostications every possible action must be taken and a long range plan to accomplish the desired ends be formulated and followed.”¹⁰⁶

It had been an important meeting with the American Jewish defence organizations. Yet the Congress members were somewhat discouraged by the daunting task ahead of them. Despite its years of efforts, Congress had had little success against the Social Credit Goliath. It had carefully observed the movement’s propaganda; it had investigated several methods of action and implemented some; it had confronted Social Credit leaders on numerous occasions; and even the president of the Canadian Jewish Congress had taken on the Social Credit movement. Yet the anti-Semitic propaganda continued unabated. From the end of the war until the spring of 1947, Social Credit’s anti-Semitic propaganda had increased, not decreased. It appeared that the national organization for Canadian Jewry was unable to stop the hate propaganda against its people.

Yet Congress’s public relations philosophy was gradually shifting, and more confrontational methods were being considered, if not always implemented. Importantly, Congress was looking to other Jewish defence organizations for assistance with what was now its most serious public relations problem. Indeed, the time was coming when the Canadian Jewish Congress would openly oppose and attempt to bring down the Social Credit Goliath. Little did it know that the giant was already beginning to crumble from within.

NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE

¹ See Chapter One for a brief discussion of Gerald L.K. Smith. For an excellent review of Smith's activities, see Leo P. Ribuffo, The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the Depression to the Cold War (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983).

² *Canadian Social Crediter*, 25 April 1946.

³ The American Jewish Congress, through its fortnightly publication *The Home Front*, scrutinized the activities of anti-Semites across America and showed that Lorence (Larry) Asman was a racist and anti-Semite. He was arrested in 1943 by US Secret Service agents and indicted by a federal grand jury for sending a scurrilous letter of denunciation to President Roosevelt. Asman was placed in jail and later released on bond. After his enlistment in the Army, and after expressing genuine regret for writing the letter, Asman was cleared of all charges. In February 1946, soon after being discharged from the US Army, he sought out Gerald Smith and attached himself to the Christian Veterans of America group. Operating out of Smith's offices, Asman published an inflammatory leaflet entitled "20,000 Little Brown Bastards," which discussed the allegedly illegitimate children of black American soldiers and white women in Europe, and was distributed throughout the United States and to every member of the American Congress. The American Jewish Committee concluded that "because of his strong and active bigotry, Asman is now highly regarded by many overt anti-Semites. He is being used to advantage by Gerald Smith, who, however, is always careful to save the spotlight of attention for himself ... Asman's anti-Semitism is of the 'direct action' variety, as he has made references to his desire 'to see Jewish blood spilled in the gutters.'" *The Home Front*, 15 May 1946; letter, Maller to Rosenberg, 20 May 1946 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁴ *The Home Front*, 15 May 1946.

⁵ Letter, Asman, n.d. (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁶ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 25 April 1946.

⁷ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 18 July 1946.

⁸ *Canadian Jewish Weekly*, 8 August 1946.

⁹ Letter, Rosenberg to Maller, 3 May 1946 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit); letter, Maller to Rosenberg, 20 May 1946.

¹⁰ Letter, Green to Hayes, 12 May 1946 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7C).

¹¹ "Results of the General Election of 1945 as an Index of the Extent and Prevalence of Anti-Semitic Prejudice in Canada," n.d., c. 29 August 1946 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 2, File 31); memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 29 August 1946 (CJCNA, ZA 1946, Box 1, File 8).

¹² Rosenberg's study also included an electoral assessment of the support of *Bloc Populaire* candidates in the province of Quebec.

¹³ An error exists in the "Number of Constituencies and Votes Polled at the General Elections, 1945." It shows that in British Columbia, nine out of sixteen constituencies nominated Social Credit candidates. In fact, only three BC constituencies ran Social Credit candidates - Caribou, Kootenay East, and New Westminster. Thus, the number of Social Credit candidates nominated in British Columbia was *three* out of sixteen, and the total number of Social Credit candidates running in the 1945 federal election was eighty-seven, not ninety-three as indicated. "Results of the General Election of 1945 as an Index of the Extent and Prevalence of Anti-Semitic Prejudice in Canada."

¹⁴ The only four constituencies in Alberta which did not elect a Social Credit member in the 1945 federal election were Athabaska (Liberal), Calgary East (Progressive Conservative), Calgary West (Progressive Conservative), and Edmonton West (Liberal). Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid. It may appear surprising that with only 35.88 percent of the popular vote, Social Crediters won thirteen out of seventeen seats from Alberta in the 1945 federal election. But rural ridings with small populations carried the same weight as urban ridings with larger populations. Indeed, every riding outside Edmonton and Calgary elected a Social Credit MP. Alvin Finkel succinctly summarizes the electoral system as such: "Alberta, like all Canadian provinces, assigns seats on the basis of contests in constituencies rather than on the basis of a portion of the provincial vote. It is this policy that makes Alberta appear to be a single-minded province." Alvin Finkel, The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 93.

¹⁶ "Results of the General Election of 1945 as an Index of the Extent and Prevalence of Anti-Semitic Prejudice in Canada."

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ David J. Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel: A Study in Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985), 38.

¹⁹ Robert Bothwell and J.L. Granatstein, eds., The Gouzenko Transcripts (Ottawa: Deneau Publishers, 1982), 1.

²⁰ Several monographs have been written about the Gouzenko Affair and Canada's involvement in the Cold War. See, for example, Bothwell and Granatstein, The Gouzenko Transcripts; J.L. Granatstein and David Stafford, Spy Wars: Espionage and Canada from Gouzenko to Glasnost (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 1990); John Sawatsky, Gouzenko: The Untold Story (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1984); Denis Smith, Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941-1948 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988); Merrily Weisbord, The Strangest Dream: Canadian Communists, the Spy Trials, and the Cold War, 2nd ed. (Montreal: Véhicule Press, 1994). There is also Igor Gouzenko's enlightening autobiography, This Was My Choice (Toronto: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1948).

²¹ Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel, 38.

²² Smith, Diplomacy of Fear, 135-6.

²³ Erna Paris, Jews: An Account of Their Experience in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1980), 171.

²⁴ Bothwell and Granatstein, The Gouzenko Transcripts, 13-14.

²⁵ Smith, Diplomacy of Fear, 136; Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, 62.

²⁶ Granatstein and Stafford, Spy Wars, 61; Canada, Report of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1946), 81-3.

²⁷ Canada, Report of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission, 82.

²⁸ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 19 September 1946 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

²⁹ The figures used by the Social Credit party organ were wrong; in fact, the Royal Commission Report named thirty-six persons, nineteen of whom were Canadian agents. It did not indicate how many of the thirty-six were Jews. *Canadian Social Crediter*, 12 September 1946; Canada, Report of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission, 4-5, 85.

³⁰ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 12 September 1946.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Bercuson, Canada and the Birth of Israel, 18.

³³ Donald Avery notes that "[d]uring the 1920s over 80 per cent of the membership of the Communist Party of Canada claimed Finnish, or Ukrainian ancestry," and that "members of the Ukrainian Labour Farm Temple Association (ULFTA) and the Finnish organization of Canada (FOC) were especially prominent in the [Communist] party offices. Donald Avery, Dangerous Foreigners: European Immigrant Workers and Labour Radicalism in Canada, 1896-1932 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979), 13, 117.

³⁴ Paris, Jews, 145, 181.

³⁵ Ibid, 181. After Fred Rose resigned his seat in January 1946, Michael Buhay succeeded him as Labour-Progressive member for Montreal-Cartier. In a federal by-election in March 1947, three-quarters of the voters of Montreal-Cartier voted against Buhay. Maurice Hartt, the Liberal standard-bearer, became the new MP for the Montreal constituency. Prime Minister Mackenzie King termed the Liberal triumph a "very significant victory," and John Bracken, Progressive Conservative leader, stated: "Montreal-Cartier is to be congratulated on its decision to turn back Communism. The Canadian people as a whole will rejoice that the one riding in the Dominion to elect a Communist to the House of Commons has decided to reverse its former stand." *Montreal Gazette*, 1 April 1947.

³⁶ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 3 October 1946 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

³⁷ The Royal Commission Report named nineteen Canadian agents and seventeen members of the Soviet Embassy Staff who had engaged in espionage, for a total of thirty-six. Canada, Report of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission, 4-5, 85-6.

³⁸ The "false passport case" referred to the procurement of false Canadian passports and other citizenship documents for the use of agents engaged in espionage. Canada, Report of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission, 541-63.

³⁹ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 3 October 1946.

⁴⁰ Yet both figures were wrong, since the Commission Report named thirty-six people in total. Unfortunately for the purposes of this study, the Report did not state exactly how many of the thirty-six were Jewish. Canada, Report of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission, 4-5, 85-6.

⁴¹ "Minutes, National Joint Public Relations Committee Meeting," 8 December 1946 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 2, File 19).

⁴² Ibid. At a later meeting of the National Joint Public Relations Committee, Saul Hayes reported that the American Jewish organizations were attempting the same plan in the United States. However, before any representation could be made to the Postmaster General in Canada, Congress would have to sure of its legal grounds, since the Department of Justice would be consulted for a legal opinion before the Postmaster General could take any action. "Minutes, National Joint Public Relations Committee Meeting," 23 February 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 9, File 104).

⁴³ See Chapter One for a discussion of *Vers Demain* and its serialization of the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*.

⁴⁴ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 5 December 1946.

⁴⁵ The *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix* stated that *Vers Demain* "has reprinted the spurious document which inspired Hitler and the Nazi racist program, as Hitler's book *Mein Kampf* revealed." It discussed Social Credit members like Norman Jaques who "openly avow their anti-semitism," and C.H. Douglas's book, *Social Credit*, which stated: "[i]t is the Jews as a group, and not as individuals, who are on trial ... The remedy, if one is required, is to break up the group activity." The editorial noted that "[t]he similarity of Mr. Douglas' remedy with that put into effect by Hitler will need no explaining to the Canadian people, whose memory of the notorious concentration camps of Nazi Germany is still vivid." *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, 6 December 1946.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ *People's Weekly*, 28 December 1946; *Regina Leader-Post*, 3 January 1947. The *Canadian Social Crediter* reprinted this editorial with the following preface: "[w]ith the rise of Social Credit to the front of national politics, several daily papers have been going out of their way to couple the Social Credit movement with Anti-Semitism and other evils. Typical of the attacks is the editorial reprinted below from the *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*." *Canadian Social Crediter*, 2 January 1947.

⁴⁸ *Saskatoon Star-Phoenix*, 21 December 1946; *Regina Leader-Post*, 14 January 1947; *Canadian Social Crediter*, 2 January 1947; memo, Zimmerman to Hayes, 28 January 1947; memo, "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*," n.d., c. 29 January 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Letter, Dower to Hayes, 7 January 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2, File 7E).

⁵² Letter, Godfrey to Hayes, 17 December 1946 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2, File 7E).

⁵³ Letter, Hayes to Godfrey, 23 December 1946 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2, File 7E).

⁵⁴ Letter, Moscovitch to Hayes, 6 December 1946 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2 File 7E).

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Letter, Hayes to Moscovitch [sic], 11 December 1946 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2, File 7A).

⁵⁷ Letter, Moscovitch to Hayes, 15 December 1946 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2, File 7E).

⁵⁸ During this period Rosenberg wrote several memos to Hayes, one which discussed the *Canadian Social Crediter's* reprinting of articles from Social Credit papers in Great Britain and Australia which were blatantly anti-Semitic; another which discussed the *Canadian Social Crediter's* coverage of Norman Jaques's activities in the United States under the banner of Gerald L.K. Smith; a third which discussed the recent meeting of the National Council of the Social Credit Association of Canada, the *Canadian Social Crediter* and *Vers Demain*, and the use of the "Wheel-Cross" symbol as the official symbol of the Social Credit Party in Canada; and the last which discussed the *Canadian Social Crediter's* linkage between Judaism and the Ba'hai religion, both of which supposedly advocated "one world." Each memo indicated that the Social Credit movement was still promoting anti-Semitic propaganda. Memos, Rosenberg to Hayes, 11, 12, 16 December 1946 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁵⁹ Letter, Hayes to Moscovitch [sic], 16 December 1946 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2, File 7E).

⁶⁰ Solon Low, "The Nation's Business," CBC Radio Broadcast, 18 December 1946 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7A).

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Further evidence of Low's views on Jews and international political Zionism came from one Kirkland Lee, a Mormon and Social Creditor from Cardston, Alberta who was on personal terms with Low and had recently been debating Zionist theory with him. Lee explained that "Social Crediters who follow Jacques [sic] - believe that when the Jews were first driven from Palestine - 2 classes came into existence - Those who returned to Palestine - and those who were dispersed elsewhere. Those dispersed - are the "International Political Zionists." Consequently, "some who oppose International Political Zionism do so with the feeling that there are two classes of Jews. Good Jews who returned from captivity under the reign of King Darius about 536 B.C. and those who are bad Jews who are not of this group but were to be scattered about the earth and destroyed. In the bad group have been classified the International Zionists. From such a point of view you can see how these exponents claim to be both Anti and Pro Semetic [sic]." Lee added that this theory "does not voice the opinion of myself or the belief of our [Mormon] church." He quoted Low as stating that "he holds no prejudice or animosity towards the Jews," and that his recent broadcast discussing "international political Zionism" referred only to "those people who strive for a complete autonomous state in Palestine without proper recognition to minority groups." Letter, Lee to Moscovich, 28 December 1946; letters, Moscovich to Hayes, 26, 30 December 1946 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2, File 7E).

⁶³ Hayes sent a confidential memorandum regarding Low's CBC broadcast to Congress member John Dower in Edmonton; in response, Dower forwarded a copy of a letter from 1944, in which Low (who was then provincial treasurer and minister of education), had agreed to become a member of the Canadian Palestine Committee, which operated in conjunction with the Zionist Organization of Canada. Low had stated: "[i]t is true that I have kept myself up to date on the history of the Jewish people and have always felt that the Balfour Declaration and the League of Nations mandate to Great Britain should be fulfilled to the letter, so far as they refer to the creation of a National home in Palestine. Under the circumstances I would be pleased to associate myself with the Committee and would appreciate receiving up to date information as it becomes available." Letter, Dower to Hayes, 4 January 1947; letter, Low to Dower, 17 March 1944 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2, File 7E); "List of members of Canadian Palestine Committee," 28 March 1944 (CJCNA, ZA 1944, Box 2, File 29).

⁶⁴ Rabbi Gordon of Saskatoon had listened to Low's speech, and shortly thereafter visited Lethbridge where he told Moscovich that "his impression was that Low[']s address was pronouncedly Anti-Semitic." Moscovich "completely disagreed." Letter, Moscovich to Hayes, 18 December 1946 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2, File 7E).

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Letter, Hayes to Moscovitch [sic], 23 December 1946 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2, File 7E).

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Letter, Moscovich to Hayes, 26 December 1946 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2, File 7E).

⁶⁹ "Minutes, Eastern Region Joint Public Relations Committee Meeting," 23 January 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 2, File 19).

⁷⁰ Letter, Bronfman to Dunton, 23 January 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁷¹ Ibid. Bronfman cited relevant sub-sections from the "Regulations For Broadcasting Stations," pursuant to section 22 of the 1936 Canadian Broadcasting Act, which stated: "[t]he Corporation may make regulations ... to control the character of any and all programmes broadcast by Corporation or private stations" and "[n]o one shall broadcast ... abusive comment on any race, religion or creed ... malicious, scandalous, or defamatory matter ... [or] false or misleading news." Canada, Acts of the Parliament of the Dominion of Canada (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1936), 148; Canada, Consolidated Regulations of Canada vol. 4 (Ottawa: Statute Revision Commission, 1978), 2559.

⁷² One of the passages Bronfman used was from an unabridged English translation of *Mein Kampf* which stated: "[f]or while the Zionists try to make the rest of the world believe that the national consciousness of the Jew finds its satisfaction in the creation of a Palestinian state ... all they want is a central organization for their international world swindle." Letter, Bronfman to Dunton, 23 January 1947; Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, transl. Ralph Manheim (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1943), 324-5.

⁷³ Letter, Bronfman to Dunton, 23 January 1947.

⁷⁴ Congress had further dealings with the chairman of the CBC board of governors. In early 1947, national executive director Saul Hayes met with Dunton personally, although no record of their meeting could be found. "Minutes, National Joint Public Relations Committee Meeting," 23 February 1947.

⁷⁵ Memo, Zimmerman to Hayes, 5 March 1947; "Report, Winnipeg Joint Public Relations Committee Meeting," 17 February 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2, File 7E).

⁷⁶ Rabbi Frank refused to write a report on his discussions with Solon Low because he considered the matter too confidential and "nothing could be committed to writing." When the Rabbi reported to the Western Division Joint Public Relations Committee on 17 February 1947, it was to a so-called "Inner Committee" and the secretary, Heinz Frank, was instructed not to take any minutes. Immediately following the meeting, executive director Alfred Zimmerman wrote a report. Ibid.

⁷⁷ Memo, Hayes to National Executive Officers Only, 18 February 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁷⁸ Hayes told Low communism and Zionism were not friendly ideologies because "Zionism was counterevolutionary [sic] in the U.S.S.R., that Palestine is being built by private enterprise and by the Histadrut [the General Federation of Hebrew Workers] both of which considered Communism their mortal enemy and that the largest proportion of Jews are anxious to see Zionism succeed which means that a tie-up or alliance with Communism is not only untrue but impossible and a fantastic conclusion." Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid. Low draws an interesting link here between the British Empire and Christianity, and thus emulates Major Douglas's views (and fears) about the international conspiracy's plans to undermine the mother country.

⁸⁰ Hayes clearly already knew about Low's membership in the Canadian Palestine Committee, since John Dower of Alberta had sent him the relevant correspondence only a few weeks earlier.

⁸¹ Memo, Hayes to National Executive Officers Only, 18 February 1947.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ "Minutes, National Joint Public Relations Committee Meeting," 23 February 1947.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ It is not clear from the sources why Rabbi Feinberg did not participate in this meeting.

⁹⁰ Memo, Hayes to National Executive, 4 March 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ The memo which records the meetings with the three American Jewish defence organizations is unsigned, undated, and has the following statement at the top of it: "[p]lease do not retain this memorandum after perusal. We would insist that you co-operate by destroying it." Clearly, Congress members did not want this information to be leaked to public, and possibly Social Credit sources. Memo, n.d. (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7D).

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ The Anti-Defamation League suggested that the Canadian Jewish Congress "accumulate all data which sheds discredit on any of the Social Credit members, whether parliamentarians or rank and file, and expose those vulnerable." The American Jewish Congress also stated that an expose of the Party leaders was necessary, and that the Canadian Jewish Congress "ought to be the instrument publicly to fight Social Credit on Jewish issues which Social Credit raise." In a similar vein, the American Jewish Committee instructed: "[d]iscredit the party leaders ... Keep up a constant barrage of literature." Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

CHAPTER SIX

HAMLET WITHOUT THE GHOST, 1947-1948

Throughout the spring of 1947, the Canadian Jewish Congress continued to consider a stronger public relations approach to Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda. It examined the various proposals of the American Jewish defence organizations, although there is no evidence that it executed their suggestions. Thus, once again Congress appeared impotent in the face of the Social Credit movement and unable to take concerted action. In its defence, however, it was learning the difficulties of executing an aggressive public relations policy, especially given past encounters with Social Credit leaders who had made promises and promptly broken them. Yet in the absence of a strong policy backed by unanimous consent, there seemed little that Congress could do. But many Congress members persevered, and continued to push for a more confrontational approach to fight the Social Credit menace. Of particular significance are the efforts of Louis Rosenberg and the Alberta members of Congress.

In early 1947, Rosenberg undertook a content analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*. He garnered examples of anti-Semitic rhetoric from forty-three issues of the party organ covering January 1945 to January 1947,¹ and noted that "42 out of the latest 106 consecutive issues of the *Canadian Social Crediter* have carried anti-semitic articles."² In other words, during the last two years, the *Canadian Social Crediter* published anti-Semitic propaganda about 40 percent of the time.

Rosenberg suggested that the Canadian Jewish Congress charge the Social Credit Party with seditious libel, defamatory libel, or contravention of postal regulations.³ He argued

that the party organ's reprinting of segments of the *Protocols* and its allegations of an international, financial, Jewish world conspiracy could be considered seditious libel, since the latter especially "tends to disturb the tranquility of this country by inciting ill-will between different classes of His Majesty's Subjects."⁴ Rosenberg wondered if a connection could be established between the Social Credit Party, Mosley's Fascists in England, and Gerald L.K. Smith in the United States, and if so, "would such evidence be acceptable as proof of seditious intention?" Rosenberg also questioned whether a libelous attack upon an entire group or class of citizens, namely the Canadian Jewish community, was considered defamatory libel under the Criminal Code, since the relevant section referred only to "persons" being defamed.⁵

Regarding the activities of the Social Credit party organ, Rosenberg wondered whether Congress could legally demand the *Canadian Social Crediter* to publish refutations of its allegations,⁶ or whether it could publicly warn booksellers and newsdealers that the *Canadian Social Crediter* contained defamatory material and advise them that if criminal proceedings were instituted, legally they would not be able to exculpate themselves.⁷ If Congress were to charge the Social Credit Party with contravention of postal regulations, it was important to know if any of the excerpts from the *Canadian Social Crediter* or the *Protocols* themselves were "'indecent, immoral, seditious, disloyal, scurrilous or libelous' within the meaning of the Postal Regulation[.]"⁸ If they were, asked Rosenberg, did the Postmaster General have complete discretionary power to determine what was "indecent, immoral, seditious, disloyal, scurrilous or libelous" and hence unmailable, or were his decisions subject to review by the courts? Further, if Social Credit matter were deemed indecent, immoral and so on, could future issues of the *Canadian Social Crediter* be

banned from the mails or could the Party itself be forbidden use of the mails, “as the organization responsible for the publication of the *Canadian Social Crediter*?”⁹

Rosenberg knew that favourable answers to these questions would demand solid evidence that the Social Credit Party was distributing anti-Semitic propaganda - evidence which he had been gathering for years. The question remained whether the law would support any charges Congress brought against the Party. Employing legal means was problematic at best; under the Criminal Code seditious libel and defamatory libel referred to individuals, not groups, and Rosenberg was well aware of the outcome of earlier lawsuits which had attempted group libel charges.¹⁰ Moreover, he wondered what kind of proof was required to establish a convincing case of seditious libel or defamatory libel, and the types of defences which would be used if such charges were laid.¹¹ Indeed, invoking the law was a double-edged sword; the Social Credit Party could just as easily use freedom of speech and parliamentary privilege to show that it had not contravened any laws or regulations.

Thus, although Rosenberg believed he had indisputable proof that the Social Credit Party was disseminating anti-Semitic propaganda, the real issue was whether it was feasible for Congress to charge the Party with seditious libel, defamatory libel, or contravention of postal regulations. It remained a question which Congress was either unable or unwilling to answer at that time. Still, the fact that Rosenberg had done such an extensive content analysis of the Social Credit party organ and suggested various legal actions showed that certain elements of Congress were seriously considering a more aggressive, legislative-oriented public relations policy.

Meanwhile, other Congress members in Alberta and the West were adopting a more aggressive policy to combat the Social Credit problem. In late February 1947, S. Hart Green, a leading Congress member from Winnipeg, wrote to national executive director Saul Hayes indicating that several Western Congress members perceived Social Credit to be "our greatest enemy today" and that "all our efforts must be put forth to combat this evil." Referring to Hayes's earlier meeting with Solon Low at the parliament buildings, Green remarked that Low's comments were "the same bunk that he gave to Rabbi Frank here [in Winnipeg], and the same as Aberhart gave to Rabbi Frank prior to his death some years ago."¹²

Green argued that instead of meeting with national Social Credit leaders, the way to end the Social Credit problem was to handle it within Alberta. He recalled that a few years earlier Edmonton Congress members had said "to leave the situation with them" and that few results had been obtained, but now Alberta Congress members had a plan which Green believed could be executed from Alberta and would obtain definite results. He suggested that Leonard Bercuson, former director of education at the University of Alberta and current western executive director of the Zionist Organization of Canada, use his public relations contacts to exert pressure on leading members within the Alberta Social Credit government. Green hoped that Bercuson "could be put on this work for the next six months ... and that the Congress look after the necessary expense."¹³ The plan was not revolutionary, but his idea that Congress members in Alberta could achieve quicker, more direct results was certainly worth trying.

Meanwhile, at a Western Division's Joint Public Relations Committee meeting in Edmonton in February 1947, Congress members discussed more assertive ways to combat

Social Credit's propaganda. They agreed that the best attack on the Social Credit government would be to obtain its defeat in Alberta, or at least the defeat of some of its key personalities, and that the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) was the only political party through which such action could be accomplished. Accordingly, the members agreed that all assistance must go to the CCF.¹⁴ Committee member Wolfe Margolus, treasurer of the Alberta CCF, had already obtained about \$2,000.00 from Jews in Edmonton and Calgary which he had anonymously put into CCF coffers. He had also contacted Elmer Roper, leader of the CCF in Alberta, and informed him that the "Jewish people would be behind the CCF party in its attack on Social Credit." Roper indicated that he was prepared to use monies put into CCF coffers to pay five well-known CCF personalities to travel throughout Alberta on a three-month speaking tour.¹⁵

In addition to the \$2,000.00, Margolus wanted Congress's national headquarters to send him at least \$2,500.00 privately, which would also go to the CCF. In return, he would supply Saul Hayes with a detailed and confidential report of all CCF activities against Social Credit. Margolus emphasized that the Social Credit Party "should be attacked by all means, fair or foul" and even suggested the possibility of employing private detectives to obtain material which would blacken and expose key Social Credit leaders who were guilty of dishonesty or "corrupt living." The minimum objective, declared Margolus, should be the defeat of certain Social Credit leaders in their own constituencies.¹⁶

If these plans appeared somewhat radical, it may have been that Margolus and the Edmonton Joint Public Relations Committee were attempting only to counter Social Credit's own "subversive" measures. Margolus mentioned that "a man was sent down to Toronto from the *Social Crediter*. He has accumulated complete data on the recent spy

trials and the people involved. All the information is being prepared by the Social Credit Dep[artment] of Social Security. Pamphlets are being printed, to be used in the next Federal election.”¹⁷ In Margolus’s view, the Social Credit Party was engaging in activities which were anathema to the Alberta and Canadian Jewish communities. Thus, he and the Edmonton Joint Public Relations Committee believed that the only way to solve the Social Credit problem was to remove the Social Credit government from power, by whatever means necessary.

There is no evidence that Hayes or Congress’s national headquarters sent Margolus \$2,500.00. What is significant, however, is that Margolus had already given the CCF \$2,000.00 and that the Edmonton Joint Public Relations Committee was engaging in back-door political activities to bring down the Social Credit government. Yet the Committee’s plans were “back-door” chiefly because of the anti-Semitic nature of Social Credit philosophy. It is probable that the Social Credit Party would have attacked the CCF and Canadian Jewry as co-conspirators in a Jewish-socialist plot if it discovered that Alberta’s Jews were secretly funneling monies into the CCF.

In short, Alberta Congress members were convinced that the only way to end the Social Credit problem was to remove the Alberta government from power. Leonard Bercuson, whom Alberta Congress members had called in to help fight the Social Credit government, informed Hayes that Congress members in Edmonton “are of the opinion that the [Social Credit] party constitutes a grave threat to the Jews of this country: more than that, we feel that its philosophy is a potential menace to all progressive forces in the country.” Bercuson added that it was imperative to “defeat or greatly weaken the present Alberta government for it is from the prestige and the reputation of the Manning regime that the

federal party derives its strength and sustenance.” The only way to defeat the Social Credit government was to support the CCF, he argued: “the rise or decline of this dangerous philosophy will be decided only in the political arena.”¹⁸

Thus, Alberta Congress members believed the Social Credit problem needed to be taken more seriously. They were well aware how the Social Credit government was viewed by Canadians outside Alberta, most of whom “have looked upon Alberta with some amusement as an isolated, remote province carrying out an economic experiment doomed at its beginning to failure.” The rest of Canada viewed Alberta Social Credit “as a rather humorous effort to wring prosperity from ‘funny money’” while Canada’s Jews “look upon the movement with smug unconcern.” However, stated the Alberta Congress members, Social Credit was a dangerous and growing force which needed to be taken seriously by all Canadians, especially Jews: “[t]welve years ago it was only a provincial party; today it has a voice in the Federal House, while neutral observers are amazed by its growth in Quebec and Ontario ... It is time for Canadians to take stock of the situation; certainly the Jews of this country cannot waste another moment. The party philosophy is directed against Jews; the strongest plank in the platform is unquestionably anti-Semitism. A single glance at the party organ, *The Canadian Social Crediter* proves the point, for its pages are filled with propaganda and innuendoes against Hitler’s first victims.”¹⁹

The Alberta members were determined that the Social Credit Party not be allowed to rise to national prominence. The problem was still manageable; there were only thirteen Social Credit members in the House of Commons, and the national Party depended upon the Alberta government’s support and reputation for its continued growth. Even the *Canadian Social Crediter*, which was ostensibly the national party organ, was published in

Edmonton and focussed predominantly on Social Credit activities in Alberta.

Consequently, “the most effective method of striking at the national movement is by hacking at the roots. Paradoxical as it may sound, the most telling way to stop the circulation of the *Protocols* in Quebec is to defeat Norman Jaques in Wetaskiwin, Alberta ... Social Credit must be checked in its home province. If its power in Alberta can be materially reduced or if the party can be defeated, Canadian Jewry’s most direct threat will be averted.”²⁰

The Alberta members were making an important point. Congress’s national headquarters in Montreal had been focusing on the Social Credit Party as a national movement - it had confronted leading Social Credit members in Ottawa; attempted to quash distribution of the *Protocols* by the French-language Social Credit paper, *Vers Demain*; and focussed on Norman Jaques’s antics in the House of Commons. All these actions were important and necessary. However, Alberta Congress members believed it was time to start fighting the Social Credit problem not from Montreal, but from Alberta, where the problem resided. Thus, the Alberta members were emphasizing the need not only for the Social Credit Party to be taken more seriously, but for their own group to be listened to and included in a coherent public relations policy towards Social Credit’s propaganda.

In fact, Alberta Congress members developed their own public relations policy to fight the Social Credit government. Clandestine in nature, the policy was called the “educational programme” and Social Credit politicians were known as the “educational leaders.” It included an analysis of the 1944 Alberta provincial election (presumably not unlike Rosenberg’s analysis of the 1945 federal election); biographical data on important

Social Credit leaders; exposure of the “weak chinks” in Social Credit’s armor; distribution of pamphlets and other media; and financial assistance to “educational leaders [Social Crediters] who oppose present ones where good chance of success possible.” The plan was to be known only to a small group in Alberta and a few members at Congress’s national headquarters.²¹

The Alberta Congress members also constructed an elaborate plan to back the CCF against the Social Credit government. They believed that the CCF was gaining support in Alberta²² (notwithstanding that it had won only two seats in the last provincial election)²³ and that general unrest with the Social Credit government could be galvanized and swung behind the CCF.²⁴ If enough financing were put behind the CCF and public expression was given to Social Credit’s misdemeanors, specifically its censorship of 16 mm movies²⁵ and the activities of Norman Jaques, perhaps the CCF could win the next provincial election,²⁶ to take place in 1948.

In addition, Alberta Congress members made three recommendations for fighting the Social Credit Party on the national level: sponsor a radio commentator, such as Lorne Greene, to expose subversive activities in Canada “while emphasizing the concept of ‘Canadians All;’” publish pamphlets which show “in parallel columns the statements by Social Credit spokesmen and Nazi propagandists” to reveal their similarities; and bring the matter of Social Credit’s anti-Semitic propaganda to the attention of editorial writers throughout Canada.²⁷

The Alberta members of Congress were earnest in their desire to remove the Social Credit threat by removing the government from power, and they were committed to using both traditional and non-traditional public relations methods to achieve their goals. It was

possible that they were overly-optimistic regarding CCF party fortunes in the next Alberta election; nonetheless, they were willing to exercise whatever options they had to stop the Social Credit government from disseminating anti-Semitic propaganda. If that meant financing the CCF and attempting to defeat the government in the next election, Alberta Congress members were willing to do just that. It is important to note, however, the secretive manner in which they conducted their new public relations policy. They were careful to ensure no one discovered that Alberta Jews were contributing funds to the CCF, or that Alberta Congress members were undertaking an “educational programme” to combat Social Credit’s propaganda. This secrecy suggests a kind of siege mentality under which Alberta Congress members were compelled to operate during the Social Credit regime and which influenced the nature of their public relations work. Without the force of the law, government, or even public opinion behind them, they were confined for the most part to traditional public relations methods - education, anti-defamation, moral suasion - and any measure which exceeded such methods needed to be conducted clandestinely.

The Alberta Congress members’ educational programme was the most confrontational and aggressive public relations effort exercised thus far, and it is important to note that their actions were not fully condoned by Congress’s headquarters in Montreal. Saul Hayes had kept abreast of the Alberta members’ plans²⁸ and when he briefed the national executive about it, its members expressed concern that “this Educational Program might prove a bit of a boomerang in that the person whom we are thinking of to implement it, might make statements to educational leaders and might be called to give an accounting in the event that the present educational leaders dislike the project.”²⁹ Although somewhat

cryptic, this statement suggests the national executive's concern that Social Credit leaders might confront the person who was leading the anti-Social Credit campaign (be it Leonard Bercuson or someone else) and ask him for whom he was working. When Bercuson was told of the executive's concern, he assured Hayes that Alberta Congress members would warn their man not to divulge the source of his backing, nor engage in conversations with Social Credit leaders which might reveal that Canadian Jewry was, in any way, attempting to bring about the defeat of the Social Credit government.³⁰ Clearly, Congress members in both Alberta and Montreal did not want Social Credit leaders to know that they were undertaking such confrontational plans.

Congress's national executive was also concerned that attempting to end Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda by defeating its government would bring negative, not positive consequences. It expressed "great doubt ... at the wisdom of the Jewish community actively supporting political parties in opposition to Social Credit" because of the danger of leakage and the possibility that such a campaign could boomerang. Consequently, as a result of its serious reservations about the "educational programme," the national executive decided not to make any decision on plans to oppose the Alberta Social Credit government until "considerable further thought be given it."³¹

Congress's national executive was not the only committee with reservations about Alberta Jewry's new public relations approach. When the National Joint Public Relations Committee met in July 1947 to discuss Social Credit's anti-Semitism, it reviewed the Alberta Congress members' "educational programme" and their "investigations of the [Social Credit] party." The Committee noted that Bercuson had made trips recently to Edmonton, Lethbridge, and Calgary, Alberta "for the purposes of his investigations" which

focussed mostly on “money wastage and corruption” in the Alberta government. It reported that with one exception, “the Jewish communal leaders of Western Canada had been consulted and had expressed their agreement with the plan.”³² Thus, it appeared that Alberta Congress leaders were nearly unanimous in their decision to fight Social Credit in the political arena. This meant not only backing the CCF, but also exposing the weaknesses of the Social Credit government wherever possible.

However, the National Joint Public Relations Committee was not as nearly committed to this plan. One committee member doubted that an exposé of graft in the Alberta government would have the desired effect on public opinion, “judging by the experience in the past in Western Canada and Alberta in particular.” In contrast, other members believed that such an exposé would have an effect on public opinion, even in Eastern Canada.³³ Clearly, there was disagreement regarding the Alberta members’ approach. But despite Congress’s misgivings at the national level, at least Alberta Jewry had a plan, and when Bercuson asked for \$500.00 so that “a responsible person [could] tour the province and assess the situation,”³⁴ his request was duly authorized by Congress’s national executive.³⁵

Yet before Alberta Congress members were able to obtain any concrete results, the Social Credit movement began to experience its own problems resulting from its anti-Semitic propaganda. Two events which sparked public and political reaction were the Alberta Social Credit Board’s 1946 Annual Report which was released in March 1947, and Premier Manning’s repudiation of anti-Semitism at the closing of the Alberta legislative session on 1 April 1947. A closer examination of these two events shows that Social Credit’s anti-Semitic propaganda was beginning to have negative repercussions. Canadian

political and public opinion was beginning to recognize Social Credit's views as obnoxious, intolerant and anti-democratic.

In March 1947, the Alberta Social Credit Board, the propaganda arm of the Alberta Social Credit government, released its 1946 annual report to the Alberta legislative assembly. The Board's report varied little from previous years - it described the nature of the world dictatorship and the international financial tyranny conducted by world plotters. However, the report differed in two important respects: it named several prominent Jews in the United States and Britain as proof to "those who still have lingering doubts regarding the existence and identity of a ruthless group of World Plotters,"³⁶ and it questioned the democratic validity of the secret ballot, majority rule, and universal franchise.³⁷ Although the anti-democratic nature of the Board's report was clear, its anti-Semitism was more covert. It should be noted that the word "Jew" was not used. However, the Board's intention clearly was to show the religio-ethnic composition of the "world plotters" and "international financiers."

Public and political reaction to the Social Credit Board's report was very negative. The *Edmonton Journal* criticized A.V. Bourcier, chairman of the Social Credit Board, for having allowed the publication of a government report which named several eminent Jews as "world plotters:" "[o]ne cannot read the report without receiving the impression that the board listed these names for the precise purpose of linking 'World Plotters' and 'Jews,' and the importance of the latter as leaders among the former. It is just possible, of course, that Mr. Bourcier did not write the report, but surely he read it before he signed it as chairman of the Alberta Social Credit Board." In response, Bourcier accused the *Edmonton Journal* of "uttering a deliberate falsehood," since "at no place in the report can

one say there is one reference to any Jews or to world plotters led by eminent Jews.”³⁸

Bourcier was correct; Jews were not mentioned, but it was a question of semantics. The Board did not label any Jews *as Jews*, but its intentions were clear.

The *Calgary Herald* also criticized the Alberta Social Credit Board for offering “a warmed-over serving of the ideas of Major C.H. Douglas ... with all overt indications of Major Douglas’s basic philosophy of anti-Semitism carefully deleted.” Referring to the Board’s inclusion of Bernard M. Baruch, United States representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, as one of the “world plotters,” the *Herald* stated: “[t]his is utterly meaningless unless one accepts Major Douglas’s theory that every individual who is extremely wealthy and a Jew (and Bernard Baruch is both) is necessarily a ringleader in the plot to seize world power. Mr. Baruch’s high ideals and outstanding record of public service make such a notion preposterous.”³⁹

In the Alberta legislature, Elmer Roper, leader of the Alberta CCF, argued that the anti-Semitic propaganda promoted by the Social Credit Board was the same as that promoted by C.H. Douglas. The CCF leader stated that the Board’s report was “absurd and a menace to democracy” and that the Social Credit Board did not have the right to issue official statements as an “arm of the government operating on public funds.” In response, Premier Manning stated that the Social Credit Board was not an “arm of the government,” but operated under the direct authority of the legislature and was “at liberty to function within that authority designated to it by this legislature.”⁴⁰ Manning was clouding the issue. The Social Credit Board was indeed an arm of the Alberta government, and its authority came only because the Social Credit Party was in power in the Alberta

legislature. If the Social Credit Party were to lose power, the Social Credit Board would cease to exist.

Because of the public and political criticism ensuing from the Board's report, the Alberta government realized it needed to conduct damage control. On 1 April 1947, at the closing of the legislative session, Manning issued an official statement regarding the Social Credit movement and anti-Semitism. He called the recent public and political criticism of the Social Credit Board and the Alberta government "a vicious campaign of deliberate misrepresentation" intended to discredit the Social Credit movement, and declared that "a deliberate attempt is being made to associate the government and the Social Credit movement with various viewpoints and individual opinions which we, as a government and a movement, do not endorse and to which we do not subscribe."⁴¹

Manning delivered three resolutions on the Social Credit movement's philosophy, including its stance on anti-Semitism:

1. We re-affirm our unswerving allegiance to the principles of Social Credit and our unshakable determination to ... fight for social and economic security with freedom initiated in this Province by the late Premier William Aberhart.
2. We condemn, repudiate and completely disassociate ourselves and the Social Credit movement in Alberta from any statements or publications which are incompatible with the established British ideals of democratic freedom or which endorse, excuse or incite anti-Semitism or racial or religious intolerance in any form.
3. We reiterate our intention to do everything in our power to unite the people of this Province and country irrespective of colour, race or creed in an all-out effort to end the

present vicious financial monopoly and restore the effective control over money and credit to the people themselves.⁴²

After Manning's statement, the Calgary-based *Albertan* published a damning editorial which castigated the premier for having implied that there was an "underhanded campaign to slander [the government]." The *Albertan* argued that the Social Credit movement was indeed anti-Semitic, and offered the following examples as proof: member of parliament Norman Jaques and his associations with "semi-fascist anti-Jewish organizations in the United States;" Major C.H. Douglas, "prophet ... almighty omniscient oracle of Social Credit, and one of Britain's most violent Jew-baiters;" the Australian Social Credit movement, which "takes its inspiration from Major Douglas and to a lesser extent from the Alberta Social Credit movement [and which] pins most of its case on anti-Semitism;" and the Union des Electeurs, "the French Canadian wing of the Social Credit Movement ... [which] is now busy circulating the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* ... [and] is fast becoming the rallying point of the numerous Jew haters in French Canada." In its assessment of the Social Credit Board's annual report, the *Albertan* repeated the *Edmonton Journal*'s comment that "one cannot read the report without receiving the impression that the board listed these names for the precise purpose of linking 'world plotters' and 'Jews,' and the importance of the latter as leaders among the former."⁴³

The *Albertan* questioned Manning's ability to control his own movement, and implied that he should take more responsibility for Social Credit's philosophy and propaganda. It was plausible that Manning himself was not anti-Semitic, stated the *Albertan*, "but perhaps Mr. Jaques speaks for the 'movement' more than Mr. Manning does." The paper also

criticized Manning for not dissociating his movement from Douglas's anti-Semitic views:

"Mr. Manning has said that the major's 'personal' views on such things are his own responsibility, but to Major Douglas anti-Semitism is an integral part of Social Credit."

The *Albertan* concluded that "Mr. Manning more than anyone else can speak for the Alberta government, and if he says it is not anti-Semitic, he ought to be taken at his word. But he must pardon a good deal of skepticism when he says the 'Social Credit movement' is not anti-Semitic."⁴⁴

Political responses to Manning's statement were equally negative, and his political opponents in the Alberta legislature took this opportunity to deride his repudiation of anti-Semitism. Elmer Roper pointed out that Manning's statements were not in accordance with the actions of the Social Credit movement nor the views expressed by Major Douglas, Norman Jaques, or L.D. Byrne, adviser to the Social Credit Board.⁴⁵ The CCF party organ, *Commonwealth*, harshly criticized the Social Credit Board's report, calling Byrne "the chore boy and echo of Major Douglas."⁴⁶

Clearly, the issue of anti-Semitism was coming to a head for the Social Credit movement. Manning had been compelled to take a stand on Social Credit's anti-Semitic philosophy, and his public statement following the release of the Social Credit Board's report indicated he was considering undertaking a policy of sanitation. In sum, the incident of the Social Credit Board's report and Manning's subsequent public repudiation showed that the Social Credit movement recognized the political liabilities of disseminating anti-Semitic propaganda.

For its part, the Canadian Jewish Congress was unconvinced that the Social Credit movement was about to discard its anti-Semitic propaganda. Indeed, Louis Rosenberg,

now Congress's national research director, noted that although Manning had repudiated anti-Semitism and racial or religious intolerance within the movement, "the *Canadian Social Crediter* continues to print not only anti-Semitic editorials and articles but also articles against the admission of refugees, against 'pleas for racial tolerance' and against the extension of full citizenship rights to Canadians of Japanese and Chinese origins."⁴⁷ Manning's declarations notwithstanding, Rosenberg had little faith that Social Credit's philosophy of ethnic intolerance was going to change, especially with respect to Jews.

However, a turn of events in the spring of 1947 increased the pressure on the Social Credit movement to eradicate its anti-Semitic philosophy, and gave new hope to the Canadian Jewish Congress. Once again the spotlight turned on the anti-Semitic activities of MP Norman Jaques. On 5 May 1947, the *Montreal Star* showed a picture of Jaques with Gerald L.K. Smith and his wife in Philadelphia, where Jaques had attended a meeting addressed by Smith.⁴⁸ On 7 May, in a telephone interview granted to the *Montreal Gazette*, Jaques revealed the close connection between his ideals and those spread by Smith: "Gerald Smith is a truly great Christian gentleman who has been cruelly maligned. He stands for Christian nationalism. But of course the Communists have smeared him as anti-semitic ... Smith believes in America for the Americans and in the American way of life ... I have tried to do the same with the Canadian way of life and Canadian freedom and I will keep right on trying."⁴⁹

The same day, the *New York Post* reported that the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith (ADL) had recently asked the State Department in Washington to bar Jaques from entering the United States. The ADL described Jaques as a "notorious anti-semite who has abused the privilege of entry into the United States by stirring up misunderstanding and

tensions among racial and religious groups.” When Jaques learned that the ADL had requested he be barred, he stated: “I don’t have to defend my actions.” He added that the ADL was “only a part of the Zionist Terrorists who have been making such trouble in Palestine,” and that it was “part of the Communist front, and blackmail and defamation of character are part of their work.”⁵⁰

Yet in the House of Commons the next day, Jaques retracted his earlier statements and denied that he was a disciple of the notorious Smith. Regarding the recent *Gazette* article, Jaques stated that “most of the remarks, including the quotations attributed to me, are pure fabrications.” However, he admitted stating that Smith “had done more to expose communist plots than any other public man in the United States of America” and that he, Jaques, “would do my best to expose communist plots here.”⁵¹ The *Gazette* remarked that “[a]fterthought apparently convinced burly Norman Jaques ... that he had said either too much or too little when ... he frankly avowed himself a disciple of U.S. Christian Front Leader Gerald L.K. Smith.”⁵²

Further denunciations of Jaques and the Social Credit movement quickly followed. The *Montreal Star* stated: “Norman Jaques ... [has] denied a report that he was a disciple of the notorious American rabble-rouser, Gerald L.K. Smith ... Mr. Jaques may be no disciple of the Jew-baiting America Firster, but he acts like one ... Social Crediters in Canada have become professional anti-Semites; they have re-issued the fake *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and under cover of an attack on communism preach racial hatred ... Little wonder, then, that when [Jaques] was reported to have described Gerald L.K. Smith as a ‘truly Christian gentleman,’ the public would be inclined to believe that he did. Smith has been

discredited in the United States as neither a gentleman nor a Christian ... Mr. Jaques would be well advised to follow a less bespattered messiah.”⁵³

The *Montreal Herald* similarly remarked: “[n]ext time they have the opportunity, Canadian voters - and particularly those of Wetaskiwin, Alta., - should make it clear that the doctrines of Gerald L.K. Smith are not welcome in Canada ... Mr. Smith has been stirring up race hate, anti-Semitism [sic] and similar Nazi specialties, in the U.S. for a considerable number of years. It’s up to Canadian voters in general, because Mr. Jaques is one of the best known spokesmen of the Social Credit Party - and Social Credit doctrine trends toward the type of nationalism carried to the extreme by the notorious Smith.”⁵⁴

The *Montreal Gazette* also condemned Jaques for his association with Smith: “[i]n avowing even partial or qualified support for the vociferated agitation of Mr. Smith, and his intention to promote similar views in this country, Mr. Jaques reveals himself the apostle of an un-Canadian gospel which has no proper place in the life of this country ... Canadians should realize the disruptive and repugnant import of Mr. Jaques’ preachments and his association with Mr. Smith ... they should set themselves in both mind and deed decisively against allowing such alien concepts to take root in this democratic country.”⁵⁵

Interestingly, the *Gazette* invoked a brand of Canadian nationalism which excluded Smith’s pro-American ideals. Yet it is important to remember that Jaques had been preaching an anti-Semitic gospel for years, and never before had the Canadian press condemned him in such terms. However, when he associated himself with an American leader of dubious fame, his views increased in notoriety. Perhaps the press’s response to Jaques was merely a traditional exercise of defining Canadian identity in anti-American terms. Had Jaques not become publicly involved with the American Smith, one wonders

whether the Canadian press would have bothered to take up the case. A Canadian politician who voiced anti-Semitic views was small news; but a Canadian politician who became involved with a notorious American was much more newsworthy. Thus, the press's condemnation of Jaques may have simply been another case of the "American dog wagging the Canadian tail."

As a result of this negative press coverage, Jaques realized that his reputation was at stake. In a second interview with the *Montreal Gazette* on 11 May 1947, he denied that he had described Smith as "a truly great Christian gentleman," quickly adding, "not ... that I deny that he is. But I just don't seem to remember having said it." Calling himself a "Canada First man" and "a Britisher through and through," Jaques affirmed his belief in the principle of "Canada for Canadians" and emphasized that "it is my opinion that I am totally free of bias on all questions involving race, creed and/or religion." Yet in the same interview he railed against Zionists as "poisonous propagandists," expressed his belief in the *Protocols*, and declared that the Balfour Declaration should never have been made and was "the root of the evil." When asked if he was going to organize a Christian Front in Canada along the lines of Smith's organization, Jaques responded in the negative, because "[w]e believe ... that the Social Credit Party is already doing that work here. It defends Christian principles."⁵⁶

If Jaques believed this second interview would help clear up the "misunderstanding" which had arisen as a result of the first,⁵⁷ he was clearly mistaken. The next evening, national Social Credit leader Solon Low rose in the House of Commons and stated: "I want to make it clear that neither the social credit movement in Canada nor the group of social credit members in this house takes its lead from Gerald L.K. Smith, nor is

associated with him in any way,” and that “[e]xcept for the meagre reports we have read in the press, thirteen of us know nothing about the work Mr. Smith is doing or about the movement called the ‘Christian Front.’”⁵⁸ As the *Montreal Gazette* noted, “[Low’s] reference to ‘13 of us’ was pointed since the Social Credit group in the House has 14 members.” The *Gazette* pointed out, quite accurately, that Low was sending an implied rebuke to Jaques and his “political indiscretions.”⁵⁹

To this rebuke, Jaques responded most irrationally. Shortly after Low’s statement, he announced in the House of Commons that he was being threatened by “communist secret police” and that “some of their agents are working within our [Social Credit] movement.”⁶⁰ He recalled that one such agent “was detected a few years ago and among his papers was found a note” which read: “[t]here always are certain individuals prominent in the social credit movement who will deserve careful attention. Jaques is one of them. In my opinion this man is most dangerous to our cause ... Despite our efforts we have never been able to unseat him. Watch him carefully, he has many followers.” Jaques did not identify the Communist agent or explain how he had obtained the note. However, he insisted that “[t]his is not the first time that I have been threatened by the communist secret police.”⁶¹ He concluded his speech with a “we who are about to die, salute you” gesture⁶² and declared: “[s]ooner or later we must all stand up and be counted. I have many friends in the United States, fine, fearless people who are fighting the communist enemies of their country and of our country. I should be sorry not to meet them again. But my mind is made up; I am in a fight to a finish against the red communists and pink fellow travellers. I shall not be stopped by threats. My silence is not for sale at any price. You shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free.”⁶³

Many interpretations could be given regarding Jaques's bizarre behaviour. An analysis of the "Communist agent's note" could reveal its author (undoubtedly Jaques) to be suffering from paranoid anxiety or delusions of persecution.⁶⁴ Yet these psychological terms lack meaning if they are not placed in a personal context. Jaques had believed in the existence of an international, financial, Jewish conspiracy since the beginning of his political career, if not earlier. Why he suddenly dipped into full-blown paranoia is not easily answerable. What is important to note, however, is that Jaques was losing support - publicly and politically. When the leader of the national Social Credit Party stood up in the House of Commons and deliberately excluded the Party and its members of parliament from any association with Gerald L.K. Smith, this was an implicit exclusion of Jaques. Jaques believed he stood alone, and to an extent, this was true. He had been marginalized and excluded from his own party. Thus, he was forced to wage the war against his long-time enemy - international Jewish finance - alone.

The Canadian press was not overly sympathetic to Jaques's plight. The *Ottawa Journal* was skeptical about the Communist secret police agent's note which had been left "lying handily around," and stated that "[i]t was something of a mystery just who might be threatening [Jaques's] life." The *Journal* added that "[w]hile possibly fearing for his life, [Jaques's] concern up to this morning had not been sufficient to impel him to seek any special protection from either the RCMP or the Commons' Protective Staff."⁶⁵ The *Montreal Star* similarly remarked: "[j]ust why anyone would threaten the life of Mr. Jaques is a deep mystery. Certainly he seldom is to be found speaking to a packed House of Commons."⁶⁶ The *Montreal Gazette* called Jaques's address "[t]he wildest speech of several sessions of Parliament."⁶⁷

The real repudiation of Jaques's views, however, came from the Alberta press. The Calgary-based *Albertan* declared that

[t]housands of Social Crediters throughout Alberta are greatly pleased and relieved to hear that Solon Low and Premier E.C. Manning, their federal and provincial leaders, have repudiated almost everything Norman Jaques stands for. It now remains for the people of Wetaskiwin constituency, who elected Mr. Jaques to parliament, to repudiate him also. Although Mr. Jaques calls himself a Social Crediter, he has been devoting most of his time and talents to fostering a peculiar brand of anti-Jewish Fascism patterned on Gerald L.K. Smith's "Christian Front" movement in the United States ... Since Mr. Jaques has declared that Social Credit is virtually identical with the Christian Front, Mr. Low and Mr. Manning seem obliged to go one step further and say Social Credit has nothing in common with Mr. Jaques.⁶⁸

The *Wetaskiwin Times* also published an editorial on 21 May 1947, which revealed its attitude toward its elected member of parliament:

Our Federal M.P. and his penchant for stirring up racial animosity has always been a source of embarrassment to his constituents, but we have overlooked this weakness in the hope that the rest of Canada would take his pet-peeve with a grain of salt as we do at home. The recent request of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith that he be barred from entry into the United States puts things in a different light. This latest development is "the straw that breaks the camel's back" in the relations between Mr. Jaques and his constituents ... About the only time we see our federal member in

Wetaskiwin is when he descends on us during an election to inform us of the dire plots against democracy which he has uncovered at Ottawa and other eastern points. He also makes an excellent job of impressing us with his high-sounding opinions on international finance ... We have no place and no time for Jew-baiting or any other racial isms in Western Canada. It is this very freedom that has kept the muzzle off Mr. Jaques for so many years. But we have had enough.⁶⁹

If the press is viewed as a reflection of public opinion, the people of Wetaskiwin had spoken. They were no longer willing to countenance the views of their member of parliament - views which apparently never held much resonance for these voters.⁷⁰

Thus, by the spring of 1947, Jaques was quickly losing credibility as Social Credit MP for Wetaskiwin. The Canadian Jewish Congress had been following the turn of events closely, and during the exposé of Jaques, had been in contact with the editorial staffs of the Montreal press. Specifically, Saul Hayes had written to the *Montreal Gazette* and *Montreal Star* commending them for their exposure of Jaques's associations with Gerald L.K. Smith: "[y]ou render a public service in informing your readers of Mr. Jaques' connection with Mr. Smith. The more often the public is acquainted with these facts the better. Expos[é]s of this nature are important."⁷¹ In addition, Congress provided one of the Montreal papers with material on Jaques which was used for an editorial comment.⁷²

During this period, Congress also communicated with the Anti-Defamation League, which was still waiting to see if Jaques would be barred from the United States. Hayes wrote to the ADL, indicating his pleasure at the public exposure of Jaques's anti-Semitism: "[t]he whole conjunction of developments is interesting, especially since we

have been discussing with the editors of the *Montreal Gazette* just this sort of expos[é] of Jaques' anti-semitism. I think that we can all be pleased that a dangerous man stands exposed by his own words. The menace, however, that he and his group represent is far from dispelled and the Social Crediters will certainly continue to bear watching."⁷³ Thus, Congress could feel more hopeful that public opinion was turning against Jaques, and by extension, the Social Credit movement. If Social Credit's leading proponent of anti-Semitic propaganda could be discredited, perhaps the entire movement would fall from grace.

Yet throughout the spring and summer of 1947, the Social Credit movement continued to publish and promote anti-Semitic propaganda. As Louis Rosenberg noted, the Alberta Social Credit Board and the *Canadian Social Crediter* continued to stock, advertise, and offer for sale "books and pamphlets which are definitely anti-Semitic and which frequently quote the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* or reprint anti-Semitic canards previously published in Ford's *International Jew* and the Anti-Semitic Nazi literature of the Fichte Bunde." Further, noted Rosenberg, "[n]either Mr. Solon Low nor Premier Manning or any other Social Credit member can deny knowledge of the anti-Semitic nature of the propaganda literature, for it is distributed and sold at all Social Credit meetings and all the members make frequent quotations from it."⁷⁴

Thus, despite Manning's earlier repudiation of anti-Semitism, little had changed in Social Credit's propaganda. More significantly, Congress was unable or unwilling to capitalize on the exposure brought about by the Social Credit Board's report, Manning's repudiation of anti-Semitism, or Norman Jaques's antics. Yet throughout the summer and autumn of 1947, Congress continued to *discuss* public relations measures to end Social

Credit's propaganda. In July 1947, the National Joint Public Relations Committee discussed the Social Credit problem and made plans to continue the fight against the Alberta government. The Committee discussed whether the Mormon Church (of which Solon Low was a bishop, and John Blackmore a member) or any other denominational churches had come out publicly on the matter of Social Credit's anti-Semitism. Congress had not yet approached the churches, and none had made a public pronouncement. Regarding plans to obtain a public statement from the Mormon church, one of the Committee members emphasized that "it was incumbent on Congress to investigate this side of the question as much as possible and enlist the assistance of the American defense agencies to approach the center of this church in Salt Lake City."⁷⁵

The National Joint Public Relations Committee also discussed a proposed press campaign against the Social Credit Party. However, this idea was squelched by Hayes who stated that "this had already in part been accomplished by the actions of Mr. Jaques himself [sic] by his open association with Gerald L.K. Smith, and the publicity given in general in the Canadian press to the letter of the [Anti-Defamation League] to the United States Secretary of State." Hayes noted that both the *Montreal Star* and the *Montreal Gazette* had reproached Jaques for "consorting with Fascists."⁷⁶ Hayes's remarks were somewhat incongruent with his previous efforts, but no other member emphasized the need to build on existing successes against the Social Credit movement. Consequently, although the Joint Public Relations Committee discussed further measures to be taken against the Social Credit movement, its suggestions were remarkable for their passivity. The Social Credit movement had already proven itself vulnerable to public and political

attack, yet Congress remained unable or unwilling to capitalize on that vulnerability and implement an aggressive public relations policy.

Moreover, despite its proposals for a stronger policy, Congress did not execute any plans during the summer and autumn of 1947, and unsurprisingly, there were few successes on the Social Credit front. In August the United States State Department informed the Anti-Defamation League that there were no grounds on which it could bar Norman Jaques from entering the United States.⁷⁷ Later that autumn, David Kirshblatt at Montreal headquarters attempted to link Jaques's anti-Semitism with a comparable anti-Catholicism based on his associations with Gerald L.K. Smith⁷⁸ in the hopes of rallying French-Canadians against the Social Credit Party. However, the ADL informed Congress that there was "no anti-Catholic activity on the part of Gerald L.K. Smith or his cohorts with whom Norman Jaques consorted on his visit to the United States."⁷⁹ Leonard Bercuson in Alberta similarly stated that "there seems little evidence of anti-Catholic agitation being combined with anti-Semitism. One or two educational leaders [Social Crediters] are known to hold anti-Catholic views, but their opinions are not reflected in any of the educational propaganda issued ... there is no merging of anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish attitudes."⁸⁰ However, the Friends of Democracy in New York stated that "[t]he people with whom [Jaques] has been associated in the United States are not only anti-Semitic but also very anti-Catholic." It was currently studying this subject and "may have more to report later."⁸¹ However, there is no evidence that the Friends of Democracy ever provided Congress with evidence of Smith's alleged anti-Catholicism.⁸²

Thus, Congress's plans to "effectively fight the anti-semitism of Jaques ... by exposing the tie-up between Jaques and some of the American Nationalists who are just as

vociferous in their anti-Catholicism as in their anti-Semitism,"⁸³ could not be executed. Nonetheless, Congress's attempt to show that Social Credit's propaganda was dangerous to all Canadians, not only Jews, was an important step in a slowly-changing public relations philosophy. If Social Credit's propaganda could be seen as more than a "Jewish concern," perhaps public opinion would swing away from the movement.

Yet by the autumn of 1947, neither Congress's national headquarters nor the various committees in the Western Division were actively working to confront the Social Credit problem. For too many years there had been meetings, correspondence, expressions of goodwill, declarations by Social Credit leaders, promises by Alberta premiers - while the anti-Semitic propaganda continued unabated. Throughout the early postwar period Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda had steadily increased, fluctuating between anti-Semitic anti-communism and anti-Semitic anti-Zionism. For Congress, the Social Credit problem must have appeared insoluble. As long as the movement was able to spread anti-Semitic propaganda with impunity, and as long as Congress remained bound to a passive public relations approach, it possessed few weapons to combat the Social Credit problem.

Yet the Social Credit movement was on the brink of a major overhaul, one which neither Congress nor any other organization, including the movement itself, could have predicted. Circumstances converged in such a way that Manning's plan to shut down the Social Credit Board at the end of its fiscal year in March 1948 ended in a full-blown party rift and major cabinet shuffle. Amid the confusion, Manning announced a purge of anti-Semitism within the Social Credit movement. The Canadian Jewish Congress had no choice but to sit back and watch the dominoes tumble.

As early as September 1947, there were stirrings in the Alberta government which indicated a change was underway. That month, several newspapers reported that the “fate of the Alberta Government’s Social Credit board will be decided at a late fall caucus in Edmonton of government members of the house,”⁸⁴ because its annual report from the previous March had “prompted widespread criticism even in Social Credit ranks.”⁸⁵ On 21 October, the *Edmonton Journal* reported that at the upcoming caucus meeting, “Social Credit members will discuss the future of the Social Credit board. It is possible the powers of the board will be drastically reduced.”⁸⁶ On 3 November the *Journal* quoted Manning as saying that a statement would be issued soon, “in the light of reports that the board will end its operations by the end of the fiscal year.” The *Journal* rumoured that “the board soon would end its operations under the auspices of the government and that there would be a move to incorporate the board’s activities into the Alberta Social Credit league.”⁸⁷

At the end of November 1947, Manning made some executive decisions which were announced at the meeting of the Social Credit Association of Canada (the national party organization) and the provincial convention of the Alberta Social Credit League. At the meeting of the Social Credit Association of Canada, Manning began the first steps of his “purge.” First, he announced that John Patrick Gillese, editor of the *Canadian Social Crediter* had been asked to resign and would be replaced by Gordon Taylor, Social Credit MLA for Drumheller. Second, the Social Credit Board would be abolished at the end of the fiscal year (31 March 1948) and its activities would be transferred to the Social Credit League and Department of Economic Affairs. Third, the new editorial policy for the

Canadian Social Crediter would be “that in identifying the enemies of the people it should hold no creed or race up in ridicule.”⁸⁸

Shortly thereafter, at the provincial convention of the Alberta Social Credit League, Manning announced that the policy of the Alberta Social Credit government and the Alberta Social Credit League was as follows: “[w]e condemn, repudiate and completely disassociate ourselves and the Social Credit movement in Alberta from any statement or publication which are incompatible with the established British ideals of democratic freedom or which endorse, excuse, or incite anti-Semitism or racial or religious intolerance in any form ... We re-iterate our intention to do everything in our power to unite the people of this Province and country, irrespective of colour, race or creed in an all-out effort to end the present vicious financial monopoly and restore the effective control over money and credit to the people themselves.”⁸⁹ This statement was merely a repetition of Manning’s earlier repudiation of anti-Semitism, which clearly had been ineffective since the movement had continued to disseminate anti-Semitic propaganda. Most importantly, however, Manning’s repudiation still contained Social Credit’s belief in a “vicious financial monopoly.” The only question which remained was whether it was “Jewish.”

Nonetheless, Manning had begun his purge of anti-Semitism. Starting in November 1947 and continuing for several months, the crisis within the Social Credit movement caused much dissension and acrimony. It is unlikely that Manning anticipated the political fallout from his actions. He began with announcing the abolition of the Social Credit Board and ended up firing major members of his cabinet. The details of this purge are extensive and have been documented elsewhere,⁹⁰ but what is significant is that as a result of Manning’s pronouncements, the Social Credit movement experienced a split in its

factions - between the hard-line, anti-Semitic followers of Douglas's views, and the more moderate elements who chose to follow Manning's new line. In the shake-up, former editor of the *Canadian Social Crediter*, John Gillese, began disseminating a new Social Credit circular which touted the international Jewish conspiracy thesis.⁹¹ Norman Jaques was first reprimanded and later banned from submitting articles to the *Canadian Social Crediter*.⁹² L.D. Byrne, the Party's technical adviser to the Social Credit Board, along with R.E. Ansley, minister of education, were fired.⁹³ In response to these firings, several other Social Credit politicians, both provincial and federal, split from the movement and formed their own Douglas Social Credit Council which remained true to Douglas's anti-Semitic principles.⁹⁴

Throughout this crisis, Manning denied there was a split in party ranks, and emphasized that the Social Credit movement had not strayed from its original philosophy. Meanwhile, the press in Canada questioned whether there was a Manning-brand of Social Credit which was distinct from the Douglas-brand of Social Credit, or "has the government so far departed from the true philosophy that it can no longer countenance the very teachings that gave it birth? Is it the heretics who are going to the scaffold - or the true believers?"⁹⁵

For its part, the Canadian Jewish Congress remained unconvinced that Manning's actions would have any lasting effect. In a series of memoranda to national executive director Saul Hayes, Louis Rosenberg gave his interpretation of recent events. Referring to Manning's repudiation of anti-Semitism, Rosenberg believed that it "should evidently be taken with much more than a grain of salt. There is no reason to believe in its sincerity, nor is there any evidence to warrant that it shows any change in policy on the part of Mr. Manning, the Social Credit Party in Alberta, the Social Credit members of the Dominion

Parliament, or the *Canadian Social Crediter*.”⁹⁶ In fact, given “the previous tactics of the Social Credit Party and its leaders, the statement is intended to divert attention from its actual activities and to provide a statement which can be quoted in an attempt to prove its innocence while it continues to follow its anti-Semitic policy.”⁹⁷ Further, argued Rosenberg, Manning differed little from the anti-Semites he was ousting from the Party since he “has several times made public statements over the radio and in the press concerning secret conspiracies of international bankers, etc., and the only difference in the wording of his statement and those of Solon Low or Norman Jaques is that he has been careful to eliminate the word ‘Jewish’ in talking about an international financial conspiracy.”⁹⁸ Rosenberg noted that in the issue of the *Canadian Social Crediter* which printed Manning’s new official policy, there was an advertisement for “no fewer than 6 violently anti-Semitic books which quote from the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* [including] the book *The Brief for the Prosecution* by Major Douglas which is anti-Semitic and contains quotations from the *Protocols*.”⁹⁹

Rosenberg was also skeptical about the *Canadian Social Crediter*’s ban on Jaques’s writings or the change in the party organ’s editorial policy and staff. These developments “may give the impression that there has been a revolution in that party, that it has been purged of its anti-Semitic elements, and that from now onwards the Canadian Social Credit Party, its leaders, its propaganda literature and its members can be relied upon to follow a policy free from anti-Semitism,” stated Rosenberg. However, “it would be dangerous and most inadvisable on our part to believe that the battle has been won and that the Social Credit Party and its activities may now be considered innocuous.” In short, there “has been no actual change in the policy of the party towards anti-Semitism and anti-

Semitic propaganda;" instead, "this may be a tactical manoeuvre to put us off guard and absolve the Social Credit Party and its leaders from charges of anti-Semitism, distribution of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, etc., and that the tactics will be resumed openly at a later period when the hue and cry dies down."¹⁰⁰

Rosenberg summarized the litany of evidence against the Social Credit movement which he had been collecting for years. He repeated that anti-Semitism, together with a belief in the *Protocols* and the idea of an international Jewish conspiracy were "not the result of personal idiosyncrasies of individual members such as Norman Jaques or John Patrick Gillese;" rather, these were "essential and indispensable parts of the Social Credit theory" to help Social Crediters explain why their monetary policies were not implemented long ago. In fact, declared Rosenberg, "Social Credit without anti-Semitism would be like Hamlet without the Ghost." Moreover, Norman Jaques and John Gillese were not the only Social Crediters who utilized anti-Semitic propaganda; indeed, the main leaders of the Party, including Solon Low and other Social Credit MPs, used similar tactics. The *Canadian Social Crediter* and the Social Credit Board had been publishing anti-Semitic attacks for years. Therefore, concluded Rosenberg, "[i]f all leaders and propagandists of the Canadian Social Credit Party who were anti-Semitic were to be repudiated ... it would involve a cleaning out of the party from top to bottom including Solon Low, and Social Credit members of the House of Commons and even Premier Manning himself."¹⁰¹

Rosenberg also summarized what he saw as the main cause of Manning's purge - disagreement over strategy and tactics, not disagreement over fundamental Social Credit principles. Specifically, the Social Credit movement disagreed over the extent to which anti-Semitic propaganda should be used in public pronouncements:

Some of the leaders of the party in Alberta, such as Premier Manning and the more “moderate” elements, while they believe in the mythical *Protocols* and international Jewish conspiracies, do not consider it advisable or necessary to emphasize the anti-Semitic angle, and would like to have it implicit rather than explicit. They believe in “discretion” rather than all out attack, and are, therefore, not very happy about the way in which Norman Jaques, Solon Low and others are continuously occupying the limelight with their anti-Semitic attacks. On the other hand the most active members within the Social Credit Party believe that anti-Semitism is a very useful and practical method of attracting members and gaining control in Canada, and feel that the more moderate group are too “milk and water.”¹⁰²

Thus, Rosenberg did not believe the party split was caused by a rift in Social Credit philosophy. In his view, Social Crediters still believed in the existence of an international financial Jewish conspiracy. The real debate focussed on the extent to which that philosophy should be advertised.

Alberta Congress members had their own interpretation of recent events. With respect to the new editorial policy of the *Canadian Social Crediter*, Leonard Bercuson believed that “Premier Ernest Manning has been increasingly embarrassed by the statements of the more rabid anti-Semites in his party ... It is apparent to Mr. Manning that his party derives no advantage from the line of argument pursued by propagandists like Mr. Jaques.” The prestige of the Party had been seriously damaged as a result of the Social Credit Board’s report the previous spring, added Bercuson, and a number of Social Credit supporters, “particularly those who are deeply religious, have resented the scurrilous nature of much of

the contents of the Canadian publication.” Accordingly, “Mr. Manning flatly insisted on the elimination of anti-Semitism from Social Credit publications ... [stating] that he would resign rather than be saddled by further embarrassment from propagandists.”¹⁰³

Bercuson emphasized his belief that Manning’s repudiation of anti-Semitism and the new policy of the party organ were legitimate. The Social Credit government in Alberta was heavily dependent on Manning for its continued prestige and popularity, he argued, as was the national Social Credit Party: “[c]onsequently to keep him at the helm this reversal in policy has taken place.” Bercuson predicted that in the future the *Canadian Social Crediter* “will in all probability be a different type of publication.” Even more promising was that its new managing editor, Gordon Taylor, had a reputation for integrity and “freedom from any anti-semitic bias.”¹⁰⁴ In sum, Bercuson believed that Manning had always held the power to stop the anti-Semitism in the Social Credit movement: “[w]hat has happened bears out a point that has been held by us in Alberta for a long time - namely, that if Mr. Manning insisted upon it, the Social Credit policy could be altered.”¹⁰⁵

Yet Bercuson’s interpretations were somewhat premature. At least in the short term, Rosenberg was more accurate in his skepticism about the movement’s recent changes. The *Canadian Social Crediter* continued to publish anti-Semitic propaganda, linking Zionism with its theory of an international financial Jewish conspiracy.¹⁰⁶ It also continued to advertise anti-Semitic literature. Indeed, only a few days after the announcement of the change in editorial policy for the *Canadian Social Crediter*, attempts by Congress to obtain a copy of the *Protocols* from the offices of the *Canadian Social Crediter* proved successful.¹⁰⁷

Thus, on the surface, it appeared that Manning's purge was merely cosmetic. On 25 December 1947, the *Canadian Jewish Weekly* remarked that the new editorial policy of the *Canadian Social Crediter* did not indicate any real change in Social Credit policies: "[i]t does not indicate any serious split; it is a case of a section of one of its groups being severely rapped over the knuckles for indulging in activities that are harmful to the movement. Some face-lifting is being undertaken. The show window is being cleaned up but the shelves inside are still piled with the same reactionary goods."¹⁰⁸

Indeed, it was not clear whether the anti-Semitic propaganda of the Social Credit movement would ever be eradicated. The past year had proven to be both frustrating and encouraging for Congress. Although its efforts had met with limited success, a new and more aggressive approach had been undertaken, especially by Alberta Congress members. This was an important step in Congress's slowly evolving public relations philosophy. Even more promising was that the Social Credit movement seemed to be executing its own policy to end anti-Semitism. Notwithstanding these advances, past disappointments were exerting a strong influence on Congress's hopes for the future. Too many times Social Credit leaders had made promises and declarations about ending the movement's anti-Semitic propaganda, while the movement continued to peddle its "reactionary goods." There was no guarantee that Manning's most recent repudiation would bring any fundamental, lasting change. Thus, the Canadian Jewish Congress began the new year unsure whether Social Credit's years of anti-Semitic propagandizing would come to an end.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX

¹ "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*," n.d., c. 29 January 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit); memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 5 February 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit; CJCNA, CA, Box 33, File 306).

² Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 5 February 1947.

³ "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."

⁴ Ibid. To support his claim of seditious libel, Rosenberg referred to Section 317 of the 1944 Criminal Code, which stated: "[a] defamatory libel is matter published, without legal justification, or excuse, likely to injure the reputation of any person by exposing him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or designed to insult the person of or concerning whom it is published." Alan Burnside Harvey, *Tremeeear's Annotated Criminal Code*, 5th ed. (Calgary: Burroughs, 1944), 367.

⁵ Regarding who could most successfully lodge a complaint of defamatory libel, Rosenberg asked the following questions: "[c]an any Jew who is widely known to be actively engaged in Zionist activities, e.g., the President of the Zionist Organization of Canada, consider himself to have personally [been] defamed within the meaning of the ... Criminal Code ... by any of the statements contained in the ... *Canadian Social Crediter*, and maintain an action for criminal libel? ... Can any representative Jew in Canada in view of the derogatory statements concerning Jews generally ... consider himself personally to have been criminally defamed and maintain an action for defamatory libel under the Criminal Code?" Further, asked Rosenberg, could the Zionist Organization of Canada (which was a Dominion corporate body) qualify as a "person" within the meaning of the Criminal Code? Or could the Canadian Jewish Congress, if made into an incorporated body, "as the official spokesman for Canadian Jewry, maintain a criminal action for defamatory libel, where the Jewish community generally is defamed?" "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*," Harvey, *Tremeeear's Annotated Criminal Code*, 367.

⁶ "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*." Rosenberg referred to Section 323 of the 1944 Criminal Code, which stated: "[n]o one commits an offence by publishing in good faith, in a newspaper, a fair report of the proceedings of any public meeting if the meeting is lawfully convened for a lawful purpose and open to the public, and if such report is fair and accurate, and if the publication of the matter complained of is for the public benefit, and if the defendant does not refuse to insert in a conspicuous place in the newspaper in which the report appeared a reasonable letter or document of explanation or contradiction by or on behalf of the prosecutor." Harvey, *Tremeeear's Annotated Criminal Code*, 368.

⁷ "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*." For this argument, Rosenberg relied upon Section 330 of the 1944 Criminal Code, which stated: "[n]o one commits an offence by selling any book, magazine, pamphlet or other thing, whether forming part of any periodical or not, although the same contains defamatory matter, if, at the time of such sale, he did not know that such defamatory matter was contained in such book magazine, pamphlet or other thing." Harvey, *Tremeeear's Annotated Criminal Code*, 370.

⁸ "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*." Section 7, sub-section (d) of the 1927 Post Office Act provided that the Postmaster General could make regulations "prohibiting and preventing the sending of ... obscene or immoral publications ... which, in the opinion of the Postmaster General, tend to injuriously affect the commercial or social standing of the persons to whom they are addressed." Canada, *Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927*, vol. 3 (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1927-28), 3079-80.

⁹ "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."

¹⁰ Ibid. Specifically, Rosenberg referred to the *Plamondon* libel case of 1910 involving a Quebec notary who invoked the "ritual murder" charge against Jews. Leading figures in the Quebec Jewish community launched a libel action against Joseph Plamondon, but because "the law of libel did not cover group defamation, and, since Plamondon was not accusing any *particular* Jew of these abominations, the court found for the defendant." Gerald Tulchinsky, *Taking Root: The Origins of the Canadian Jewish Community* (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992), 253.

¹¹ "Content Analysis of the *Canadian Social Crediter*."

¹² Letter, Green to Hayes, 24 February 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2, File 7E).

¹³ Ibid. Sam Jacks of the Canadian Zionist Organization in Toronto also told Saul Hayes he believed the efforts of Leonard Bercusson [sic] would be "very helpful in connection with the Social Credit menace." Letter, Jacks to Hayes, 27 February 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2, File 7E).

¹⁴ Wolfe Margolus, member of the Edmonton Joint Public Relations Committee and treasurer of the Alberta CCF, strongly favoured this method of action. M.I. Lieberman and H.A. Friedman, both members of the

provincial Liberal Party, shared Margolus's views. Memo, Zimmerman to Hayes, 5 March 1947; "Report, Edmonton Joint Public Relations Committee Meeting," 7-8 February 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2, File 7E).

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Letter, Bercuson to Hayes, 23 April 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7D).

¹⁹ "The Social Credit Movement and Canadian Jewry," 22 May 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7C).

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ "Report of Hayes's interview with Bercuson," 21 May 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7C).

²² The Edmonton branch of Congress explained that the CCF had been gaining support since the last provincial election in 1944, particularly in the rural areas and in "Labor and City constituencies." The reasons were that the Social Credit government had denounced a recent farm strike in Alberta, during which recognized CCF leaders assumed leadership in the farm locals, thus displacing Social Credit people. The Edmonton branch offered the example of Henry Young, a well-known CCF leader, who became vice-president of the Alberta Federation of Agriculture. CCF party membership had also doubled in 1946, according to the CCF annual convention report. Further, the mayor in Edmonton, the mayor and four aldermen in Calgary, and three out of four aldermen in Lethbridge had been elected in 1946-47 as independent Labor, and "are all well-known and recognized CCF personnel." "The Social Credit Movement and Canadian Jewry."

²³ In the 1944 Alberta provincial election, the CCF won 70,307 votes comprising 24.92 percent of the popular vote, but won only two seats in the legislature. Alberta, A Report on Alberta Elections, 1905-1982 (Edmonton: Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1983), 14.

²⁴ The "general unrest" which the Edmonton branch of Congress referred to was manifold: "[r]ecent attack by Canadian Legion against Mental Hospitals and Health institutions in Alberta ... Alberta Teachers Association vigorous and open attacks for better pay and training [which] never occurred before 1946 ... Municipalities made strong attacks against the government in 1946-47 ... I.O.D.E. and other women's organizations attacked present welfare conditions in province ... University of Alberta mock parliament elected a CCF government." The Edmonton branch used these examples to prove that "the Alberta situation is fluid. People are talking of 'Time for a Change.'" "The Social Credit Movement and Canadian Jewry."

²⁵ Alfred Hooke, provincial secretary and former chairman of the Alberta Social Credit Board, announced in 1946 that the Alberta government would ban "communist propaganda" films. Accordingly, the government extended its censorship laws to cover 16 mm films, which were often believed to contain communist material. As Alvin Finkel notes, "[w]ithin a year several 16 mm films had been banned for political reasons, including a British Information Office film that gave unreserved support to the United Nations and warned strongly against race hatred." Alvin Finkel, The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 108.

²⁶ "The Social Credit Movement and Canadian Jewry."

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Letter, Bercuson to Hayes, 2 June 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7C).

²⁹ Letter, Hayes to Bercuson, 13 June 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7C).

³⁰ Letter, Bercuson to Hayes, 23 June 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7D).

³¹ "Minutes, National Joint Public Relations Committee Meeting," 9 July 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 9, File 104).

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Letter, Bercuson to Hayes, 23 June 1947.

³⁵ "Minutes, National Joint Public Relations Committee Meeting."

³⁶ The Social Credit Board Report listed several prominent Jews, including the following: Eugene Meyer, organizer of the World Bank, which was "controlled by individuals who are not responsible to national or international governments ... [and who] can wield incalculable economic power and determine the financial policies of every nation;" Herbert H. Lehman, first chairman of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Association (UNRRA), who was "no doubt nominated by the President of the United States, acting on the advice of the adviser of all Presidents, Bernard Baruch;" Bernard M. Baruch, US representative on the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission; Lord Rothschild, prominent British socialist peer, "who

occupies a prominent place in the inner circle of International High Finance;" Sir Ernest Cassel, contributor of endowment funds to the London School of Economics, "an institution devoted to the training of socialists;" and Harold Laski, "one of the star lecturers in the London School of Economics" who instructed some sixty members of the current British parliament. Meyer, Lehman, Baruch, Rothschild, Cassel, and Laski were used by the Social Credit Board as evidence of "the close kinship which exists between the leading figures in the socialist ranks and those of international finance ... the forces of socialism and finance are both working with all their might to reach the same objective - the establishment of the totalitarian world state." "Annual Report, 1946, Alberta Social Credit Board" (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 2, File 8).

³⁷ Regarding the validity of majority rule, the Board Report stated: "[m]ajority rule is definitely not a democratic concept, though false propaganda has led many to accept [sic] it thoughtlessly ... If the majority of a group want three meals a day, there seems to be no sane reason why the minority should be compelled to eat three meals as well when they only want two." Regarding the use of the secret ballot, the Report stated: "there must be something wrong with the system under which we live when individuals are so insecure and subservient to other individuals that they dare not let it be known how they marked their ballots. If the World Plotters *permitted* the secret ballot, then it was the political party system which they used to render it harmless to their vested interests. Meanwhile, the generality of people were deceived in the belief that they had made one more stride towards true democracy ... there seems to be no reason why a voter should not place an open *signed* ballot into the ballot box, thus openly declaring the results he wanted and automatically assuming responsibility for the policy adopted. It may be taken for granted that a voter would ... ponder carefully the manner in which he proposed to mark his ballot, knowing that, as a result of a wrong decision, he would suffer the consequences and moreover, be obliged to foot the bill." Regarding universal franchise, the Report stated: "[w]e believe that the secret ballot and universal franchise are the labels which identify any genuine Democracy ... There are sound reasons why we should doubt the validity of these and other terms which have been so freely used to describe the Democratic ideal." *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Edmonton Journal*, 1 April 1947.

³⁹ *Calgary Herald*, 28 March 1947.

⁴⁰ *Edmonton Journal*, 28 March 1947.

⁴¹ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 3 April 1947.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Albertan* (Calgary), 5 April 1947.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* The *Lethbridge Herald* offered similar criticisms: "Premier Manning of Alberta has issued a statement condemning statements or publications which endorse or excuse anti-Semitism. We hope he beamed it at the Social Credit M.P. for Wetaskiwin [Norman Jaques], and it wouldn't hurt to include the father of the Social Credit theory, Major Douglas himself." *Lethbridge Herald*, 16 April 1947.

⁴⁵ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 25 April 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7B).

⁴⁶ In response to the criticisms of the CCF party organ, the *Canadian Social Crediter* declared that the CCF was working in tandem with the Communists and that the "Communists have been given official orders to brand everyone who stands in their way as 'anti-Semitic.'" It also referred to the Anti-Defamation League as a "sinister part" of the "smear bund," whose "victims are seldom anti-Semitic but are always anti-Communist." *Canadian Social Crediter*, 17 April 1947.

⁴⁷ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 25 April 1947.

⁴⁸ *Montreal Daily Star*, 5 May 1947.

⁴⁹ *Montreal Gazette*, 8 May 1947.

⁵⁰ *New York Post*, 7 May 1947; *Montreal Daily Star*, 7 May 1947.

⁵¹ Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, *Debates* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 8 May 1947), 2872; *Montreal Gazette*, 9 May 1947.

⁵² *Montreal Gazette*, 9 May 1947.

⁵³ *Montreal Daily Star*, 9 May 1947.

⁵⁴ *Montreal Herald*, 9 May 1947.

⁵⁵ *Montreal Gazette*, 10 May 1947.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 12 May 1947.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Canada, *Debates* (12 May 1947), 2982; *Montreal Gazette*, 13 May 1947.

⁵⁹ *Montreal Gazette*, 13 May 1947.

⁶⁰ Canada, *Debates* (14 May 1947), 3089; *Montreal Daily Star*, 15 May 1947; *Montreal Gazette*, 15 May 1947; *Ottawa Journal*, 16 May 1947; *Windsor Daily Star*, 15 May 1947.

⁶¹ Canada, *Debates* (14 May 1947), 3089.

⁶² *Montreal Gazette*, 15 May 1947.

⁶³ Canada, *Debates* (14 May 1947), 3089.

⁶⁴ Charles Rycroft, *A Critical Dictionary of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), 23-9, 111.

⁶⁵ *Ottawa Journal*, 16 May 1947.

⁶⁶ *Montreal Daily Star*, 15 May 1947.

⁶⁷ *Montreal Gazette*, 15 May 1947.

⁶⁸ *Albertan* (Calgary), 15 May 1947.

⁶⁹ *Wetaskiwin Times*, 21 May 1947.

⁷⁰ Yet it should be noted that Jaques was re-nominated as Social Credit candidate for Wetaskiwin the following year (December 1948) but died before the 1949 federal election.

⁷¹ Letter, Hayes to West, 12 May 1947; letter, West to Hayes, 13 May 1947; letter, Peters to Hayes, 9 May 1947 (CJCNA, CA, Box 33, File 306).

⁷² "Bulletin, Hayes to National and Regional Public Relations Committees," 15 May 1947 (CJCNA, CA, Box 33, File 306).

⁷³ Letter, Hayes to Forster, 19 May 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7B).

⁷⁴ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 20 May 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁷⁵ "Minutes, National Joint Public Relations Committee Meeting."

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷⁷ On 14 August 1947, G.J. Haering, Chief of the Visa Division in the US State Department, informed the Anti-Defamation League that "[a]s Canadian citizens are exempt from visa requirements when proceeding to the United States as nonimmigrant temporary visitors for periods of less than six months, the question of the admissibility of such persons is one which must be determined by the immigration authorities of the United States at the port through which entry into the United States is sought. However, I know of no ground for the exclusion of such an alien merely because he is one who seeks to enter for the purpose of lecturing in the United States." Letter, Haering to Forster, 14 August 1947 (CJCNA, CA, Box 33, File 306).

⁷⁸ Years before, Gerald L.K. Smith was apparently opposed to the Roman Catholic Church, although he did not voice anti-Catholic views in his public addresses. It was Congress's hope that French-Canadians could be rallied against the Social Credit movement once Smith's and Jaques's anti-Catholic biases were confirmed. In this way, an exposure of the movement's anti-Catholicism would help broaden the base of opposition to Social Credit. *Montreal Gazette*, 12 May 1947; memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 8 September 1947; letter, Kirshnblatt to Sheinberg, 9 September 1947; letter, Kirshnblatt to Bercuson, 9 September 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7B); letter, Kirshnblatt to Birkhead, 9 September 1947 (CJCNA, CA, Box 33, File 306).

⁷⁹ Letter, Sheinberg to Kirshnblatt, 11 September 1947 (CJCNA, CA, Box 33, File 306).

⁸⁰ Letter, Bercuson to Kirshnblatt, 26 September 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7B). Bercuson did not mention which Social Credit leaders held anti-Catholic views, but there is little evidence of any anti-Catholic agitation in the Social Credit movement, given the fact that A.V. Bourcier (MLA - Lac Ste Anne), W.F. Gilliland (MLA - Peace River), Lucien Maynard (MLA - St Albert), and J. William Beaudry (MLA - St Paul) represented a substantive minority of franco-Albertans.

⁸¹ Letter, Birkhead to Kirshnblatt, 6 October 1947 (CJCNA, CA, Box 33, File 306).

⁸² Congress's David Kirshnblatt had asked the Friends of Democracy to send him information on Norman Jaques and his activities in the United States, as well as information about Smith's anti-Catholic activities. Although the Friends of Democracy sent Congress a report on the Social Credit movement and its anti-Semitic ideology, there is no evidence that it forwarded documentation on Smith's alleged anti-Catholicism. Letter, Kirshnblatt to Birkhead, 14 October 1947 (CJCNA, CA, Box 33, File 306); letter, Birkhead to Kirshnblatt, 4 November 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7B).

⁸³ Memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 8 September 1947.

⁸⁴ *Edmonton Journal*, 11 September 1947; *Montreal Daily Star*, 12 September 1947; *Montreal Gazette*, 12 September 1947.

⁸⁵ *Edmonton Journal*, 11 September 1947.

⁸⁶ *Edmonton Journal*, 21 October 1947.

⁸⁷ *Edmonton Journal*, 3 November 1947.

⁸⁸ A "Policy of the *Canadian Social Crediter*" was agreed upon at the national council meeting of the Social Credit Party, which stated that the party organ "must put the spotlight on the enemies of the people, but in no case hold any race or creed up to ridicule ... In spotlighting anyone, be extremely careful about calling him a Jew or a Scotsman, etc., unless there is a very good reason for so doing ... The editors have full scope with the aims of Political Zionism. Political Zionism is tied up hand-and-glove with International Finance and Communism. Invite the Jews to take a stand on Communism." "Minutes, National Council Meeting of the Social Credit Association of Canada," 29-30 November 1947 (Glenbow, Solon Low Papers, Box M695, File 469).

⁸⁹ This resolution was passed at the convention of the Alberta Social Credit League and was published in the *Canadian Social Crediter*, 4 December 1947.

⁹⁰ For an extensive discussion of the Social Credit Party's manoeuvres during this period, see Janine Stingel, "In the Presence of Mine Enemies: Anti-Semitism in the Alberta Social Credit Party" (M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1993), Chapter Three.

⁹¹ Gillese, together with the *Canadian Social Crediter's* assistant editor Kenneth Burton, established the Douglas Social Credit Council and distributed among rank-and-file Social Crediters a circular under the name of the Douglas Social Credit Council. The circular emphasized that it was not anti-Semitic, but that its policy was to "fearlessly attack and expose the three evil enemies of genuine democracy - international finance, international communism and international political Zionism (which, for the most part, is controlled by atheists and is also an enemy of the common Jew and of cultural and religious Judaism)." "Douglas Social Credit Council circular," n.d. (PAA, Alberta Social Credit League Papers, File 1830).

⁹² *Albertan* (Calgary), 15 December 1947; *Edmonton Bulletin*, 13 December 1947; *Edmonton Journal*, 15 December 1947; *Lethbridge Herald*, 15 December 1947; *Montreal Gazette*, 16-17 December 1947; *Wetaskiwin Times*, 17 December 1947.

⁹³ *Albertan* (Calgary), 23 February 1948; *Calgary Herald*, 23 February 1948; *Edmonton Bulletin*, 23 February 1948; *Edmonton Journal*, 23 February 1948; *Lethbridge Herald*, 23 February 1948; *Medicine Hat Daily News*, 23 February 1948; *Peace River Record-Gazette*, 26 February 1948.

⁹⁴ Among those Social Credit members who left the Party were A.V. Bourcier, MLA and chairman of the Social Credit Board, Norman James, MLA, columnist for the *Canadian Social Crediter* and member of the Social Credit Board, Patrick Ashby, MP and subsequent organizer of a "union of electors" in Alberta, Ron Gostick, organizer of the Union of Electors in Ontario, J.E. Gregoire, MP and vice-president of the Party's national council, and Norman Jaques, MP. These dissident members organized a rival Social Credit body, the Douglas Social Credit Council, whose purpose was to take "militant action against the unchecked onslaught of the forces identified with so-called communism, monopoly finance, and state socialism which are centred in international Zionism seeking world domination ... For this purpose it has become necessary to set up a Canadian Social Credit Secretariat working in close conjunction with The Social Credit Secretariat of Major C.H. Douglas." "To All Canadian Social Crediters - Mobilization for Action," n.d. (Glenbow, Norman James Papers, Box M574, File 6).

⁹⁵ *Calgary Herald*, 17 December 1947.

⁹⁶ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 21 November 1947 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7).

⁹⁷ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 12 December 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁹⁸ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 21 November 1947.

⁹⁹ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 12 December 1947.

¹⁰⁰ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 16 December 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Letter, Bercuson to Hayes, 17 December 1947 (CJCNA, CD, Box 7, File 11P).

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. Notwithstanding Taylor's reputation for integrity and despite his announcement that as new editor of the *Canadian Social Crediter* he would "no longer publish any articles of an anti-semitic nature or any other 'anti-ism' material," Taylor had been guilty of "anti-isms." In March 1947, in response to allegations that Social Crediters were anti-Semitic, Taylor, then party whip, had declared that such an allegation "could not be further from the truth. We flay certain Jewish bankers for their world-planning Communistic tactics but we have never accused all Jews as being participants in a hideous world-plot to enslave the masses." *Edmonton Journal*, 4 March 1947.

¹⁰⁵ Letter, Bercuson to Hayes, 17 December 1947.

¹⁰⁶ On 11 December 1947, the *Canadian Social Crediter* published an article which stated that "Financial Jewry (both Zionist and non-Zionist) was furthering the aspirations of fanatical Zionism for its own ends, namely, in order to gain possession of the colossal Oil and Mineral resources of Palestine ... Financial Jewry has undoubtedly supported the aims of Zionists, moderate, political and fanatics, because it seeks the political and economic advantages in the struggle for World Domination which a Jewish-controlled Palestine would afford." *Canadian Social Crediter*, 11 December 1947; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 19 December 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁰⁷ Memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 31 December 1947 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁰⁸ *Canadian Jewish Weekly*, 25 December 1947.

CHAPTER SEVEN

A PERIOD OF WATCHFUL WAITING, 1948-1949

By the beginning of 1948 a split was developing within the Social Credit movement, between the hard-line Douglasites and those Social Crediters who chose to follow Manning's new directive. It will be remembered from Chapter One that three splinter groups emerged in the wake of Manning's purge: the Edmonton-based Douglas Social Credit Council; the Ontario-based Union of Electors; and the Quebec-based Union des Electeurs.¹ Each group advocated a similar electoral policy; that is, to work for the election of independent Social Credit representatives who would be responsible only to their constituencies' electors.² On the issue of anti-Semitism, all three groups accused Premier Manning of having converted to the cause of Zionism and declared that the Social Credit movement was being run by Communists, socialists, Freemasons, Jews, and even the Canadian Jewish Congress. An examination of Congress's response to the rift in the Social Credit movement will reveal how Manning's purge affected both his own organization and the Canadian Jewish Congress. Although Congress members continued to scrutinize Social Credit activities throughout this period, the "Social Credit problem" gradually receded as the movement conducted its own purge of anti-Semitism. Yet it is significant that because of Congress's passive approach towards the movement in the past, it ultimately could take little credit for the present turn of events.

It will be recalled that the Edmonton-based Douglas Social Credit Council was created in late February 1948, shortly after Manning's firings of L.D. Byrne, technical adviser to

the Social Credit Board and deputy minister of economic affairs, and R.E. Ansley, minister of education. The Douglas Social Credit Council included Byrne, Ansley, John Patrick Gillese, Kenneth Burton, Patrick Ashby, A.V. Bourcier, and others. These dissidents remained Social Credit in name and some were even re-elected on the Social Credit ticket in the Alberta provincial election of 1948.³ The Douglas Social Credit Council published two propaganda organs irregularly, the *Social Credit Challenge* and the *DSCC Information Service*, which published anti-Manning and anti-Semitic propaganda.⁴ In addition, Roy Ashby, son of dissident MLA Patrick Ashby, operated the Basic Book Club in conjunction with the Douglas Social Credit Council, and offered for sale all the anti-Semitic publications which the *Canadian Social Crediter* had offered, and to a lesser extent continued to offer.⁵

The Douglas Social Credit Council denounced Manning's movement and published excerpts from Douglas's *Social Crediter* in England which harshly criticized the Manning regime. In its September 1948 edition, for example, the *DSCC Information Service* reprinted an article from the *Social Crediter* in which Douglas flayed the Manning administration for not being a true Social Credit government: "the Social Credit Government, now headed by Mr. E.C. Manning, is where it is because some of the most powerful Forces in the world have failed in previous attempts to put it out ... the opposition met by the first three Social Credit Administrations ... was quite different in character to that now existing ... the change results from ... the fact that the Alberta electorate is Social Credit, but the Administration is not ... The Manning Administration is no more a Social Credit Administration than the British Government is Labour."⁶ Thus, Douglas had sided with the dissidents and had no more use for Manning, whom he

considered to be the lackey of international finance. The Douglas Social Credit Council hoped that Douglas's support would lend credibility to its movement. In fact, it did not.

The Ontario-based Union of Electors under Ron Gostick and Ed Williams also split away from Manning's Social Credit movement during this period. The Union of Electors was closely linked to the Douglas Social Credit Council in Alberta and to the Union des Electeurs in Quebec. It operated in direct opposition to the Ontario Social Credit League which had remained loyal to Manning's movement.⁷ The Union of Electors, through its propaganda organ, *Voice of the Electors*, engaged in similar propaganda used by the official Social Credit movement before Manning's purge.⁸ For example, the *Voice of the Electors* invoked the "good Jew-bad Jew" argument, stating that it was "political Zionists" who "sow the seeds of anti-Semitism and bring hatred and persecution to the Jewish people."⁹ The solution, stated the *Voice*, "is obvious. The Jewish people must repudiate Political Zionism, International Communism, and the International Money Monopoly spawned by Amschel Mayer Rothschild [sic]."¹⁰

Similarly, Louis Even's Union des Electeurs in Quebec promoted anti-Semitic propaganda. Specifically, Even accused the Manning group of having sold out to the Jews. He stated that Manning and his group were "ambitious politicians, sellers of Social Credit" and that two-thirds of Social Credit members in Ottawa were members of Freemasonry which was "controlled by the Jews."¹¹ Réal Caouette, Social Credit MP for Pontiac and a leading figure in the Union des Electeurs, similarly declared that "the Ottawa controllers are following the directives of those who aspire to establish a world Jewish and Freemasonry [sic] government."¹²

Vers Demain, propaganda organ for the Union des Electeurs, blamed the Canadian Jewish Congress for Manning's directive on anti-Semitism and for the change in editorial policy of the *Canadian Social Crediter*. It quoted from the *Canadian Jewish Chronicle*, which had reported: "[l]eaders of the Social Credit Party have finally announced a ban on the publication of anti-Semitic articles in the organization's official organ, following [sic] conferences with Joseph H. Fine, chairman of the public relations committee of the Canadian Jewish Congress."¹³ This was proof, *Vers Demain* concluded, that "un officier de la plus grande organisation juive du Canada a le privilège d'influencer les décisions de la faction qui s'est emparée du *Canadian Social Crediter* et de passer jugement sur les rédacteurs!"¹⁴

Despite their harping criticism of the Manning regime, the dissident Social Credit groups held little influence, and Manning's directive of November 1947 ultimately prevailed. Anti-Semitism in Social Credit propaganda was lessening, and the splinter groups were just that - fringe movements which continued promoting anti-Semitic propaganda but held little influence compared to the larger Manning group. The Canadian Jewish Congress followed these developments closely. It scrutinized the splinter groups' propaganda organs, followed press coverage of the split in the Social Credit movement, and continued to monitor the *Canadian Social Crediter*. It is clear from Congress's response, at least in the early post-purge period, that it was skeptical whether Manning's pronouncement was exerting much influence.

In early 1948 the National Joint Public Relations Committee provided a summary of its own activities, and on the issue of anti-Semitism in Canada, reported that "anti-semitism does not present today an immediate menace to the Jewish community ... overt acts of

anti-semitism are rarer today than they have been since Hitler came to power in Germany.” Yet, “however few may be the manifestations of anti-semitism it has nevertheless seared deeply in Canadian soul. Anti-semitism has attained a measure of recognition and respectability which are in themselves dangerous.” The JPRC referred to specific groups which continued to cause concern for the Canadian Jewish community. Heading the list was the Social Credit Party.¹⁵

The JPRC reported that the Social Credit movement and its Quebec wing, the Union des Electeurs, “are today the only political parties whose programs include planks which arouse anxiety in the Jewish community ... Although Social Credit officially disavows the word anti-semitism ... there remains a considerable measure of anti-Jewish propaganda by indirection even if Jews are referred to only as political Zionists, international bankers, Judaeo-communists and by other vague terms. We have found repeatedly that Social Credit literature in Canada echoes the mouthings of avowed antisemites in Great Britain and in the United States. At one time the organization in the Province of Quebec had actually disseminated the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.” The JPRC admitted that the situation “remains quite unsatisfactory,” but that “[t]he problem is receiving the constant attention of the Joint Public Relations Committee. We are alert to antisemitic elements in Social Credit propaganda and from time to time we conduct counter-propaganda efforts to correct specific allegations to which they give currency.”¹⁶

Thus, despite Manning’s disavowal of anti-Semitism, the JPRC still considered the Social Credit movement to be its foremost public relations problem. Such concern was not superfluous: in the early period after Manning’s purge, the Social Credit movement continued to advertise, sell, and distribute anti-Semitic propaganda through its party

organ, the *Canadian Social Crediter*.¹⁷ The *Canadian Social Crediter* had for the most part eliminated anti-Semitic references,¹⁸ but continued to advertise literature by such notorious anti-Semites as C.H. Douglas and Nesta Webster.¹⁹

In Alberta, Leonard Bercuson was not surprised that anti-Semitic literature was still advertised and sold by the Social Credit movement. Bercuson told national executive director Saul Hayes that "Mr. Manning may have won his point with regard to the *Canadian Social Crediter*, but there still remains a virulent anti-semitic element in the Party which considers international finance the keystone of all Social Credit propaganda ... Whether Manning will attempt to quell this group is questionable."²⁰ Bercuson's prediction was accurate. In the end, Manning never was completely successful in quelling the various splinter groups, but he was able to sanitize official Social Credit philosophy sufficiently to make anti-Semitism appear to be the purview of a fanatical few.

In the wake of Manning's new directive, the Social Credit movement was wrought by schism, which continued throughout the early months of 1948. The Canadian Jewish Congress followed the changes in Social Credit party fortunes closely, although for the most part it no longer undertook any active response. Indeed, the days of meeting with Social Credit leaders and conducting covert actions to undermine the Alberta government had come to an end, simply because Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda *was* decreasing. Yet this development was not a consequence of Congress's public relations work. Indeed, despite its years of efforts, Congress was not responsible for Social Credit's purge of anti-Semitism. Its public relations policy, although based on an evolving philosophy, had not adapted quickly enough to deal adequately with the Social Credit menace, and now that menace was receding on its own. Yet Congress continued to

scrutinize Social Credit's anti-Semitic tendencies, and would do so long after Manning's purge.²¹

Occasionally in the post-purge period, there were opportunities for Congress to take a stand on the issue of Social Credit and anti-Semitism. Following Manning's pronouncement in November 1947, Congress closely followed press coverage of the movement, which focussed on Norman Jaques whose writings had been banned from the *Canadian Social Crediter*. In one instance, the *Vancouver News-Herald* published an editorial arguing that the Social Credit movement had been "stigmatized as anti-Semitic" predominantly because of Jaques's statements and activities. Calling him "somewhat of a 'lone wolf,'" the *News-Herald* emphasized that "[a]s a whole, the party is not anti-Semitic. Alberta's King's printer, Abe Shnitka, is, in fact, a Jew - appointed by the Social Credit government." The Vancouver paper commended Manning for disavowing anti-Semitism within his government and ensuring that Jaques's writings were banned from the party organ: "[t]his reform of the *Canadian Social Crediter* was long overdue. Mr. Jaques ... has brought little credit to himself, his party, or to Canada. There is no place in any Canadian party for violent racial or religious intolerance, and it is to be hoped that the Social Credit party is completely sincere in dissociating itself from any such bigotry."²²

Congress leadership did not accept the *Vancouver News-Herald's* interpretation of recent events. At national headquarters, David Rome²³ suggested to Saul Hayes that a letter be written to the editor of the *Vancouver News-Herald* by someone who was a Jew but not part of Congress, and not necessarily for publication. The letter, Rome suggested, should state the following: "that Jaques was not a lone antisemitic wolf among the Social Crediters - citing specially Solon Low ... that having Jewish contacts and appointees does

not disculpate [sic] anyone from antisemitism ... mentioning the *Protocols* in *Vers Demain* ... mentioning that Social Credit is still distributing anti-Jewish literature ... urging that the Social Credit must clean house cleaner, and ... suggesting that the press continue to remain watchful on this important issue - one of the great services it can render Canadian traditions in a democratic world.”²⁴

Hayes agreed and a letter was written to the editor of the *Vancouver News-Herald* by one A. Jacob Livinson of Montreal. Written in a judicious manner, the letter stated that Jaques was not, in fact, a “lone wolf” with respect to anti-Semitism and that other Social Credit leaders, including Solon Low, made similar statements about international Jewish financiers. It stated that the Union des Electeurs through its French-language paper, *Vers Demain*, had published the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* and “this notorious document and other anti-semitic literature are still being sold by Social Credit book-distributing organizations.” Regarding the appointment of Abe Shnitka to the position of King’s printer, “[t]oo much importance may be attached to the appointment of a Jewish businessman to a governmental office ... It is a purely personal relationship, rather inconsistent with the general line of the party, but surely such an appointment does not exculpate anyone from anti-semitism.”²⁵ The letter expressed gratitude to the editor for bringing the issue of Social Credit to the attention of Canadians: “[y]our editorial is an instance of the very great service which the press can render the Canadian tradition of working democracy by being vigilantly watchful on such important issues. I trust that you will continue this excellent work. The Social Credit Party must be urged to clean its house cleaner, for the common good of all peoples of Canada.”²⁶

Significantly, this letter was not sent on behalf of Congress, and David Rome urged that the editor of the *Vancouver News-Herald* not publish it. This incident is yet another example of how Congress's public relations approach continued to be problematic at best, grossly ineffective at worst. By late 1947, the Social Credit movement had been forced to publicly disavow anti-Semitism and clean up its party organ. Public opinion had swung away from Jaques and press coverage showed that there was a definite link between anti-Semitism and the Social Credit movement. Yet the Canadian Jewish Congress continued to work against Social Credit's anti-Semitism in a covert and passive manner. Congress could take little credit for Social Credit's new line on anti-Semitism, and it was failing to take full advantage of the gains which came its way. Nonetheless, the *Vancouver News-Herald* did publish the letter,²⁷ and it can be assumed that some readers were made aware of Congress's views, albeit by proxy.

Throughout 1948 Congress continued to monitor the developments within the Social Credit movement. In early January 1948, Gordon Taylor, the new managing editor of the *Canadian Social Crediter*, emphasized that Social Credit philosophy was positive, not negative, and that "[t]here is no room in the Social Credit movement for misfits and sadists who build their house on hate and intolerance and prejudice."²⁸ Louis Rosenberg found Taylor's editorial interesting because it "appears to be an attempt to put forward a 'positive' approach towards Social Credit as opposed to the 'negative' policy of attacking religious and racial groups." Rosenberg remained skeptical, however: "[w]hether this new policy is merely an attempt to wriggle out of the difficult position in which the Social Credit movement has placed itself because of its previous anti-Semitic attacks, or is evidence of a real change of heart still remains to be seen."²⁹

Similarly, when Manning executed the final stages of his purge in February 1948, Congress leaders remained unconvinced. By this time Manning had fired L.D. Byrne and R.E. Ansley, and dissident members had created the Douglas Social Credit Council. In response to these events, Rosenberg gave his interpretation of the recent developments: "I am convinced that the split between the Manning group and the Jaques-Pat Ashbey [sic] group does not involve any difference in principle, nor does it really mean that there are two groups within the Social Credit Party, one of which is anti-semitic and the other one is not anti-semitic; but rather that it represents a split in matters of policy; the Manning group believing that it is not expedient at the present time to continue an open anti-semitic line in public, while the dissident group ... believe[s] in the policy of open and militant anti-semitism."³⁰

Yet Leonard Bercuson, writing to Congress's national headquarters from his perspective in Edmonton, maintained that "[t]he rupture in the ranks is a definite one and represents a real division of opinion."³¹ He considered the firings to be "the culminating step of a development long expected ... There appears to be a real division of opinion on fundamental matters. That is why I think we have gained considerably from these recent events."³² In later correspondence Bercuson emphasized: "I do not think we should under-estimate the significance of what has occurred. Manning's action in insisting on the resignation of two of the leading Douglasites has done the party no good. The statements of the leaders, including Mr. Low, are full of confusion. On the one hand it is realized that Manning's support is essential to the party; on the other hand it is also recognized that Social Credit without the Douglas theories is not Social Credit."³³

Yet Bercuson also agreed with Rosenberg's less optimistic appraisal. He admitted that just because Manning had publicly repudiated anti-Semitism and had fired two key government members, "[t]his does not mean that the Social Credit party has gone on record as condemning anti-semitism or as eliminating it from the party platform ... The fact remains that for years anti-semitism and international finance have been the keystones of the party's propaganda. Consequently, those of us who are close to developments never expected a complete repudiation of these fundamentals. As Mr. Rosenberg suggests, there has been no repudiation. The rank and file of the Social Credit movement will continue to be anti-semitic, having been indoctrinated along these lines for years." Thus, Bercuson concluded, "there is no open split in ideology; rather, the party members will continue to hold their old views while Mr. Manning or possibly Mr. Low may repudiate anti-semitism because it now seems expedient."³⁴

In short, Bercuson seemed unsure about the meaning of the split in the Social Credit movement. He simultaneously argued that the movement was experiencing a fundamental split and that it was also cosmetic. Rosenberg's view was that the split was, indeed, merely superficial. He amassed a body of evidence to prove that only a month after Manning's firings, the seemingly dramatic changes in Social Credit philosophy were not so dramatic as they first appeared, and that there had been no real change regarding Social Credit's anti-Semitic philosophy.

According to Rosenberg, it was highly questionable whether the Social Credit dissidents led by Norman Jaques and Pat Ashby were actually "rebels," since none of them had been formally expelled from the national Social Credit Party. Second, although the Social Credit Association of Canada had ostensibly repudiated the Union des Electeurs

along with its leader Louis Even and the party organ *Vers Demain*, the *Canadian Social Crediter* still carried Even's name on its masthead as the official Social Credit representative in Quebec. Finally, stated Rosenberg, although Manning had publicly repudiated anti-Semitism and had liquidated the Alberta Social Credit Board, the Alberta Social Credit League had taken over the previous Board's activities, including the advertisement and distribution of anti-Semitic literature in the *Canadian Social Crediter*. These facts, Rosenberg concluded, "justify the belief that the recent 'split' is not one which affects the principles of the movement, but is due to a difference of opinion as to whether it is opportune at the present time for the Social Credit movement to make open anti-semitic attacks."³⁵

Yet Rosenberg's skepticism was over-extended. In fact, Manning *was* attempting to enforce the new line on anti-Semitism. During this period, the Douglas Social Credit Council solicited funds for its new group and accused the Manning government of having sold out to the Zionists and international communist financiers. On 24 March 1948, Manning announced over his radio programme, *The Social Credit Hour*, that the Social Credit movement had not deviated from or repudiated any of the Social Credit principles as enunciated by its founder, C.H. Douglas. However, he declared that in fighting to establish those principles, the Social Credit movement "shall not be sidetracked by controversial abstract side issues and racial prejudices which have nothing whatever to do with the basic principles of a true Social Credit economy." Manning condemned the "self-styled" Douglas Social Credit Council, stating that it had "no connection whatsoever with the Alberta Social Credit League or with the Social Credit Association of Canada and can be regarded only as an organized attempt on the part of a few disgruntled individuals

to create division in the Social Credit ranks.” Dismissing the Douglasites in one moral sweep, Manning concluded: “there are always a few who will never learn that progress in the interests of the people as a whole is not brought about by childish quibblings over names or abstract theories or racial prejudices.”³⁶

Rosenberg was unimpressed with Manning’s latest pronouncements, and concluded that “[e]vidently Mr. Manning is of the opinion that anti-semitism is merely ‘a controversial abstract side issue,’ and believes that it can be separated from Social Credit philosophy itself, whereas in actual fact all Social Credit literature and almost every book written by its founder Major C.H. Douglas is so steeped in anti-semitism that Major Douglas, Social Credit and anti-semitism are inseparable.”³⁷ In short, Rosenberg remained unconvinced that Manning was sincere in his repudiation of anti-Semitism, and he cited Manning’s profession of loyalty to Douglas’s principles and the continued advertisement of anti-Semitic literature in the *Canadian Social Crediter* as proof of his insincerity. These examples, Rosenberg asserted, “should be ample evidence to prove that the repudiation of anti-Semitism by Premier Manning is not sincere, but is merely intended to ward off attacks and lull opponents into a sense of false security.”³⁸

Rosenberg may have been correct, but one wonders whether he would have ever credited Manning with attempting to eradicate anti-Semitism from the Social Credit movement. For Rosenberg, Manning had been, and would continue to be, just as culpable as his more overtly anti-Semitic colleagues. Yet a more objective view of Manning’s actions is needed. Whether Manning truly believed in a Jewish-financial-communist plot to enslave the world is debatable; he openly advocated the theory of an international financial conspiracy, never stating it was Jewish. Yet for years he allowed members and

sections of his government and Party to advocate the theory of an international financial Jewish conspiracy with impunity. Now, in the postwar, post-Holocaust period, Manning was cleaning house. He was explicitly marginalizing those Douglas Social Crediters who advocated anti-Semitic theories, and for this he must be given credit.

It is also possible that Rosenberg was out of step with the changes occurring in the Social Credit movement - that he failed to see the changing contours of Social Credit's philosophy. In many ways, this is understandable. Rosenberg had monitored Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda for years, and had become an expert on the movement. Although he was correct in stating that "Major Douglas, Social Credit and anti-semitism are inseparable,"³⁹ he did not entertain the possibility that Manning could lead a Social Credit movement that was social credit only in name. Indeed, the Social Credit serpent was shedding its skin. Anti-Semitism was being left behind, and the Canadian Jewish Congress would have to adapt itself accordingly.

This shedding, however, was not occurring without a struggle. Douglas's Social Credit Secretariat in England had entered the foray, predictably siding with the Douglas Social Credit Council in Edmonton. Both groups denounced Manning's government not only for deviating from Douglas's Social Credit principles, but for allowing the Canadian Jewish Congress to dictate its policies.⁴⁰ In one instance Douglas's *Social Creditor* warned that the "Planners" for "Communist-Zionist world domination" would stop at nothing short of "murder," because they "cannot permit Social Credit in Alberta to succeed." It added that the premier and some of his more important cabinet members were the "target for perhaps the most venomous [sic] manoeuvres ever directed against administrative office holders ...

A whole world is at stake and atomic or bacterial war are arguments only deferred until less troublesome inducements have failed.”⁴¹

The *Social Crediter*’s “warning of murder” was given newspaper coverage in Alberta and broadcasted over local radio stations.⁴² The *Edmonton Bulletin* reported that Premier Manning “was unperturbed by the warning,” and “had no comment to make.”⁴³ However, certain members of Congress believed a comment was necessary. In Alberta, Leonard Bercuson and others believed that this “dangerous nonsense” could not go unchallenged.⁴⁴ The policy of the Edmonton Joint Public Relations Committee, stated Bercuson, was “to call public attention to statements which are obviously false and which are intended only to prejudice the position of the Jews.”⁴⁵ Accordingly, the Edmonton Joint Public Relations Committee prepared a statement for the press and radio “explaining the absurdity of linking Communism and Zionism in a so-called plot.”⁴⁶

The statement, which was given both radio and press coverage throughout Alberta,⁴⁷ emphasized that the most relentless foe of Zionism over the years had been Communist Russia. Moreover, “[t]he purpose of Zionism is to establish for the Jews a Homeland in Palestine such as every other people possesses. It is sheer nonsense ... to claim that attacks against cabinet members in Alberta would be included in this program. This vicious rumor must be exposed immediately since its inventors cannot supply one iota of proof to substantiate the charges.”⁴⁸ This incident shows that, once again, Congress members in Alberta were more able and willing to adopt an aggressive public relations policy towards the Social Credit movement. Indeed, the Alberta members’ actions were predicated on the belief that it was Congress’s *duty* to issue a public statement on this matter. In their view, a strong stance by Congress was necessary since the Social Credit

situation was “certainly confused” and “there is no clear cut distinction in the party between the Manningtons and the Douglasites. Consequently the anti-semitic barrage still continues in one way or another.”⁴⁹

Alberta Congress members were correct in their assessment of the Social Credit situation. In the early post-purge period, the internecine warfare within the movement was very confusing, and many rank-and-file Social Credit supporters wrote Premier Manning asking for clarification of Social Credit’s philosophy and the purpose of the Douglas Social Credit Council.⁵⁰ Indeed, it was several months before Manning was able to completely marginalize the Douglas Social Credit Council.

Meanwhile, the Ontario-based Union of Electors, together with the Quebec Union des Electeurs, similarly denounced the Manning regime and published increasingly “hard-core” anti-Semitic propaganda. In response to the activities of the Union des Electeurs, which was campaigning various constituencies across Quebec for the upcoming 1948 provincial election,⁵¹ Congress member David Kirshnblatt travelled to Trois-Rivières and Cap-de-la-Madeleine where Union des Electeurs rallies were being held. Réal Caouette, leader of the Union des Electeurs, and J. Ernest Gregoire, former vice-president of the national Social Credit Party, spoke respectively at Trois-Rivières and Cap-de-la-Madeleine in early March. Kirshnblatt noted that although neither Social Credit leader “referred to, or mentioned directly, the word Jew,” local politicians who introduced each leader stated that “members in the House of Commons were under the control of ‘high finance[;]’ that is international Jewry;” “some fifty Jews control the finance of Canada;” and “agents presently at work preparing the ground-work for a revolution in Canada are ‘high financiers, freemasons and Jews.’” Kirshnblatt noted that the “ward-healers

attributed present economic difficulties to agents of high finance, which is 'international Jewry.'" Consequently, "[a]fter such an introduction, Caouette and Gregoire had no need to describe whom they meant by bankers and high financiers."⁵²

From these rallies, Kirshnblatt drew the following conclusions: "I feel that the party leadership recognized the embarrassment entailed by leaving themselves open to direct accusations of anti-semitism. But this is inherent in the indoctrination given to members. Both men who referred to the abstractions of high finance, free-masonry [sic] and Jewry are not of a high intellectual calibre as they admitted in their speeches. However, *Vers Demain* is sowing a dangerous seed which growth the leadership will possibly be unable to control."⁵³

Throughout the spring of 1948, Kirshnblatt kept abreast of Union des Electeurs activities. In May he travelled to Rouyn-Noranda, where he spoke with Julien Morissette, editor of *La Frontière* and leader of the anti-Social Credit forces in Quebec for the past year.⁵⁴ Kirshnblatt concluded from their talk that not only was Social Credit extremely strong in "remote and rural places" in Quebec, but that "[m]eetings of ... Social Credit in this area are definitely anti-semitic. Although the speakers do not make anti-semitism their topic the speeches are replete with references to Jewish finance, International Jewry, Jewish bankers, etc." Apparently the Union des Electeurs was also wooing the farmers in these rural areas by "asking why the Government was able to assist them during the depression years and is not able to pay the \$20 a month dividend now."⁵⁵

However, Kirshnblatt learned that counter-propaganda, such as the condemnation of the Union des Electeurs by certain members of the clergy in Quebec,⁵⁶ was having some effect. Kirshnblatt suggested to Saul Hayes that increased counter-propaganda be directed

at farmers, proving why Social Credit economic theories were unworkable. The purpose of such a campaign would be to “expos[e] Social Credit for what they are. Although they are proven as a bunch of uneducated anti-semites ... the Social Credit speakers still have a strong case in that their doctrine has not been disproven in articles able to make the average layman understand why it is unworkable ... if we were to arrange for the ghost writing of such an article we could place it in various French Canadian newspapers who would be only too anxious to run something like it.”⁵⁷ There is no evidence that Congress arranged for the publication of anti-Social Credit propaganda in French-language newspapers. Yet *La Frontière* continued to publish anti-Social Credit articles.⁵⁸

During this period, the Union des Electeurs continued campaigning for the provincial election, increasing its efforts as the election drew nearer. In June 1948 Kirshnblatt travelled to Drummondville to hear Caouette speak at a Union des Electeurs campaign rally.⁵⁹ Other speakers included Even and Gregoire.⁶⁰ Kirshnblatt reported that there was only one anti-semitic speaker, a Union des Electeurs candidate for Drummond county, who “lumped together financeers [sic], trusts, freemasons and international Jewry in the catagory [sic] of seeking to dominate the world.”⁶¹ Yet despite the Union’s activities, when the Quebec election occurred in July 1948, the results were very poor for the dissident group. Although one Union des Electeurs candidate had optimistically projected as many as “53 seats in the forthcoming election,”⁶² the votes polled for Union des Electeurs candidates were negligible.⁶³

Meanwhile, the Social Credit movement in Ontario was also experiencing difficulties. Whereas the Quebec wing of the national Social Credit Party had been completely taken over by dissidents who controlled the Union des Electeurs, this was not the case in

Ontario. The Ontario Social Credit League, remaining loyal to Manning's movement, competed with the Ontario Union of Electors for Social Credit support. Congress observed the dissident Union of Electors closely and especially its propaganda organ, *Voice of the Electors*, which was increasingly anti-Semitic. In response to this propaganda, it took action, albeit in a limited way.

In the spring of 1948, Congress forwarded copies of *Voice of the Electors* to the Anti-Defamation League in New York for its examination. The ADL compared material from *Voice of the Electors* with material appearing in American fascist magazines and discovered striking similarities.⁶⁴ For example, the 1 May 1948 edition of *Voice of the Electors* described the "anti-Semitic whining" of Jews who used the "ploy" of the Holocaust to accuse innocent people of "Hitlerian practices." The *Voice* cautioned: "let us not revive the 'Hitlerian cry' at every turn. After all, reports indicate that many of the Jews liquidated by Hitler have since entered the United States - most illegally."⁶⁵ The ADL noted that the American fascist publication, *Bible News Flashes*, of August 1947 provided a similar message: "[f]our million Jews which the Germans are supposed to have barbecued or executed in gas chambers in Europe are now walking the streets of America ... Since millions have evidently entered this country 'illegally,' this open violation of the laws of our land is evidently countenanced by the high New Deal officials in Washington."⁶⁶ Although neither the Anti-Defamation League nor Congress suggested any action against the *Voice of the Electors*, its parallels to American fascist sheets was duly recognized.

Thus, in many ways, Congress was still unable or unwilling to confront the anti-Semitism of the now dissident Social Credit groups. In assessing the influence of these

groups - the Douglas Social Credit Council, the Union des Electeurs, and the Union of Electors - it could be argued that Manning's purge of anti-Semitism actually contributed to an increase in anti-Semitism among renegade Social Crediters. Once expelled from the movement, they were free to publish increasingly anti-Semitic statements without impediment, since their propaganda no longer had to pass any standards of acceptability. The mitigating factors were that these groups lacked the legitimacy of the official Social Credit movement, and the readership for their propaganda organs was extremely limited.

Notwithstanding its inaction, the Canadian Jewish Congress remained concerned about the splinter groups and questioned whether the various Social Credit factions, although disagreeing over party policy, had any fundamental divergence over party philosophy. David Kirshnblatt believed that the factions had disagreements, but "it is not over ideology." He noted that during election campaigns, "there appears to be understandings between both [the official Social Credit movement and the renegade groups]." Thus, "the verbal 'split' was merely a public relations scheme to satisfy all concerned."⁶⁷ However, in later correspondence, Kirshnblatt emphasized that the Douglas Social Credit Council and the Union of Electors "should receive closer attention than the more moderate Social Credit Association of Canada."⁶⁸ In short, Kirshnblatt may have been skeptical about ideological differences among the Social Credit factions, but he was still cognizant of the more blatant anti-Semitic propaganda emitting from the renegade groups.

Yet it was not only the dissident groups which caused concern in the early post-purge period - the official Social Credit movement itself still engaged in anti-Semitic polemics. Louis Rosenberg argued that the official Social Credit movement was still plagued by anti-Semitism, and he referred to the 8 July 1948 issue of the *Canadian Social Crediter*,

which published a letter from Solon Low⁶⁹ discussing the recent rift in Social Credit party ranks. Low denied the English *Social Crediter*'s accusations that Premier Manning "had become a Zionist, having been converted by Lady Reading or some such person from England," and insisted that such accusations were "a complete fabrication." Yet he admitted that "[i]t is perfectly true that Mr. Manning has not been a rabid enemy of the Jews, nor has he harped against Zionism. But he has been quite aware of the plotters and planners, and their nefarious schemes against the welfare of the people."⁷⁰

After reading Low's letter, Rosenberg concluded: "there has been no change in the policies and principles of the Social Credit movement in Canada. It is still anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist. It has not expelled from its ranks or repudiated such anti-Semites as Norman Jaques ... Pat Ashby ... or Solon Low, and the Alberta headquarters of the Social Credit Association and the *Canadian Social Crediter* still advertise and offer for sale all the anti-Semitic pamphlets and books by Major Douglas and ... Nester Webster, which quote from the alleged *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*." In short, "[t]he main point of difference is merely a question of tactics. The Alberta Social Credit leaders do not appear to believe it wise to make open anti-Semitic statements. Its opponents ... believe that anti-Semitic statements are both desirable and useful."⁷¹

Other excerpts from the *Canadian Social Crediter* reinforced Rosenberg's conviction that Manning's purge was merely cosmetic. A letter by Dr J.N. Haldeman, president of the Social Credit Association of Saskatchewan and vice-president of the Social Credit Association of Canada, was published in the *Canadian Social Crediter* in July. Haldeman discussed the recent party split and attempted to explain the integral differences between the official Social Credit movement and the splinter groups, the Ontario Union of Electors

and the Quebec Union des Electeurs. He criticized the splinter groups for advocating that they were non-party organizations, since “they have been running candidates in every possible constituency and at present have 92 candidates in the Quebec election.”

Haldeman also criticized them for their non-democratic practices, and compared their attempts to oppose the Social Credit movement with Hitler’s and Stalin’s attempts to “set up puppet regimes to overthrow the democratic governments in Europe.” He pointed to the fate of past splinter groups within the Social Credit movement, all of which had “proved disastrous.” Accordingly, he exhorted: “[l]et us all get back to Social Credit and stick to it. There is room in the Social Credit Leagues for every true Social Crediter. We will consistently fight communism and fascism, political party machine politics, monopoly and international finance wherever we find them. We must uphold the Christian way of life and work to make governments and the money system serve the people. The situation is truly urgent. Let us unite in our fight for Social Credit.”⁷²

Haldeman’s letter only compounded Rosenberg’s skepticism. Rosenberg did not believe there had been any change in Social Credit philosophy, and he took great exception to those Congress members who believed that there had been a real “house-cleaning” of the Social Credit Party: “[t]here has been a tendency in some quarters to accept the statements of Mr. Solon Low, Premier Manning and Dr. J.N. Haldeman in which they disclaim anti-Semitism at their face value, and to believe that there are two kinds of Social Crediters in Canada, i.e., the ‘kosher’ kind ... who claim they are not anti-Semitic, and the ‘non-kosher’ variety ... who have been alledgedly [sic] repudiated by Premier Manning and who hold fast by their anti-Semitic propaganda.” In fact, there was no difference between the “kosher” and “non-kosher” Social Crediters, stated Rosenberg:

"I knew the late Premier Aberhart and the present Premier Manning personally and heard them speak quite often, and despite the fact that they may and did claim that 'some of their best friends were Jews,' I can assure you that both of them were just as anti-Semitic as Norman Jaques is. The only difference between them is that Aberhart, Manning, Solon Low, Haldeman and the 'respectable Social Crediters' do not believe that it is expedient to make open avowal of anti-Semitism while Norman Jaques, Gregoire, Louis Even, and the Union of Electors believe that open anti-Semitism is a useful and practical way of getting into power."⁷³

Rosenberg re-emphasized his belief that "there has been no change of heart and no change of policy within the Canadian Social Credit Party in so far as anti-Semitism in concerned and ... there is no hope or possibility of any such change in the near or the distant future." Accordingly, Congress should "be on guard against accepting any statements by Premier Manning, Solon Low, Dr. J.N. Haldeman or any other Social Credit agitator in Canada regarding anti-semitism at their face value."⁷⁴

Rosenberg may have been correct in his suspicions about Aberhart's and Manning's anti-Semitism. However, the evidence shows that anti-Semitism was diminishing within the official Social Credit movement and that Manning's group was purposefully marginalizing its dissident factions. In fact, when M.R. Freedman of the National Joint Public Relations Committee arranged to send a non-Jewish friend to observe the convention of the Ontario Social Credit League (which remained part of the official Social Credit movement) in early November 1948, Freedman was informed that "there was no indication of any anti-semitic feeling or platform in the proceedings." Moreover, John J. Fitzgerald, president of the Ontario Social Credit League, "repudiated publicly any

connection with the Ontario Union of Electors which we know to be anti-Jewish.”⁷⁵ The *Montreal Gazette* also reported that the Ontario Social Credit League had “sever[ed] its connections with the Union of Electors of Quebec Province.” The *Gazette* quoted Fitzgerald as stating that there was a “sinister campaign ... stamping the Social Credit Party as an anti-semitic organization.”⁷⁶ Fitzgerald challenged “anyone, anywhere, to find one iota of anti-Semitism - or anti-anything for that matter - in the Social Credit League of Ontario.”⁷⁷ Thus, it appeared that Manning’s directive was exerting influence.

Yet the *Canadian Social Crediter* was still publishing inflammatory statements regarding “international political Zionism,” “international finance,” and other world plotters.⁷⁸ Significantly, Solon Low, as leader of the national Social Credit Party, was directly responsible for some of these statements. In November 1948 the *Canadian Social Crediter* published a “suggested manifesto” for the Social Credit movement drafted by Low. One of the manifesto’s resolutions was that “[w]e are implacably opposed to and we shall combat by all legitimate means international communism and socialism, international finance and its commercial ramifications and international political zionism as instruments of a single central group pursuing a consistent policy directed against human freedom and towards the establishment of a world tyranny modelled on the communist dictatorship of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.”⁷⁹

If this “suggested manifesto” had simply remained within the pages of the *Canadian Social Crediter*, perhaps the situation would have been less serious. However, at the convention of the Alberta Social Credit League in late November 1948, Low attempted to pass the manifesto in a resolution condemning “Communism, Socialism, and international political Zionism.” He claimed that international political Zionism sought to “enslave”

the people of the world, yet he distinguished between “religious Zionism” and “international political Zionism.” “[t]he first is a movement to establish a Jewish homeland by peaceful means, but the second is an attempt to set up a state forcibly in someone else’s country ... World peace hangs on a very slender thread because of the way the forces of international political Zionism took over Palestine forcibly without waiting for the sanction of the [United Nations] Security Council.”⁸⁰ Low also suggested that the Alberta Social Credit League establish a chair of history at the University of Alberta “so that the facts of history - not the fancies - are made available to the people.” This government-controlled chair would help counteract the accepted “school histories,” which were merely “a group of bedtime stories” which kept the facts of international finance and economic domination from the people.⁸¹

Premier Manning did not let Low’s resolution pass without amendment. Manning suggested that the phrase “international political Zionism” not be used alongside “international communism and socialism, or international finance,” because opponents of Social Credit would use this to charge Social Crediters with anti-Semitism.⁸² Accordingly, the convention’s delegates struck Low’s comments about international political Zionism from the resolution. The amended resolution stated: “[w]e are implacably opposed to and we shall combat by all legitimate means international communism and socialism, international finance and its commercial ramifications as instruments of a single central group pursuing a consistent policy directed against human freedom and towards the establishment of a world tyranny modelled on the Communist dictatorship of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.”⁸³ As various Alberta newspapers reported: “references to international political Zionism ... were deleted from the

resolution because delegates felt it would prejudice the movement in the eyes of people who did not distinguish between the two forms of [political and religious] Zionism.”⁸⁴

The Alberta Social Credit League convention experienced other difficulties as well. Before Low even introduced his manifesto, the convention “exploded into a bitter battle” because the Social Credit League’s executive denied membership to A.V. Bourcier, former chairman of the Alberta Social Credit Board, and John Patrick Gillese and Kenneth Burton, former editor and assistant-editor of the *Canadian Social Crediter*. The three men were members of the Douglas Social Credit Council. Conference delegates hotly disagreed over whether the executive had acted in a dictatorial fashion by refusing membership to them.⁸⁵ Yet Manning’s influence was able to quell the dissension and the Douglasites were refused membership.⁸⁶ Manning seemed determined about enforcing the new party line - anti-Semitic Douglasites were not allowed in the party convention, and overtly anti-Semitic propaganda would not form part of the convention’s resolutions.

Back in Montreal, Louis Rosenberg remained unimpressed with the Alberta Social Credit League convention, Low’s suggested manifesto, or Manning’s actions. He referred to the inconsistent nature of Manning’s purge of the anti-Semites from the movement. Notwithstanding the expulsion of Bourcier, Gillese, and Burton from the League’s membership, “no official steps have been taken to expel Solon Low ... Norman Jaques and Pat Ashby ... from the national Social Credit Party, although they have repeatedly made statements ... concerning international Jewish financiers, international political Zionism and the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.” Regarding Low’s distinction between “international political Zionism” and “religious Zionism,” Rosenberg believed this was “a very feeble attempt to white wash his attacks, in a similar manner to which Solon Low has

in the past claimed that the Social Credit Movement is not anti-Semitic because the Arabs are Semitic and he is not against the Arabs.” Regarding the deletion of references to “international political Zionism” in the convention’s resolutions, “the amendment as passed did not actually repudiate Mr. Low’s anti-Semitic remarks and attitude, but was motivated largely by the desire of Premier Manning and the group in control of the Social Credit Movement in Alberta to avoid charges of anti-Semitism.”⁸⁷

For Rosenberg, this was ample proof that the Social Credit movement was still honeycombed with anti-Semitism, and the leader of the national Party was leading the attack: “Solon Low, as national leader of the Social Credit Association of Canada, speaking at the annual provincial convention of the Alberta Social Credit Association was responsible for the drafting and support of a resolution which was really a rephrasing of the anti-Semitic charge that the Jews are responsible for an international conspiracy on the lines charged in the alleged *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.” Rosenberg could only conclude that the Social Credit movement’s “pledge” of several months earlier to “keep [its] columns and propaganda clean from anti-Semitic propaganda and attacks” was meaningless.⁸⁸

Meanwhile, the Alberta Jewish community learned of Low’s statements about “international political Zionism” and, in keeping with its more activist public relations approach, decided to take action. Only a few days after the Alberta Social Credit League convention, Low was scheduled to speak in Medicine Hat, Alberta. Members of the Medicine Hat Jewish community, having read about Low’s comments on “international political Zionism” in their local paper,⁸⁹ wrote to Congress’s national headquarters asking that a draft letter be sent to them for publication in the *Medicine Hat Daily News*. The

Jewish community leaders had already contacted the editor of the Medicine Hat paper asking him “to supress [sic] publication of any similar outbursts against our people. We are assured of his co-operation and he will not give Mr. Low any front page publicity at all - expect [sic] to report briefly on page 10 on his meeting.”⁹⁰

Saul Hayes agreed that the Medicine Hat Jewish community was “acting wisely and vigorously in making certain that Mr. Low’s anti-semitic outbursts should not receive unduly great prominence before the public.” He forwarded a draft letter to be used for publication in the *Medicine Hat Daily News*. The letter criticized Low for his “dangerous statements” and discussed the nature of postwar anti-Semitism which “carefully avoids attacking Jews by that name but continues to incite against the same people using the vaguer terms of ‘Zionists and international financiers.’” The letter connected these anti-Semitic statements with the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* and “similar nazi publications.” It also condemned Low for his comments about history and the teaching of history: “Mr. Low cast doubt upon the authority of the study of history and other subjects in our own University of Alberta and suggested that a chair of history be established where he calls ‘the facts of history - not the fancies’ will be taught. Here we have again an attempt at the disruption of academic institutions parallel to that which corrupted and disappointed the once noble universities of Germany and other European countries. It will be well if the public will be alert to the menace inherent in such agitation.”⁹¹ There is no evidence that the *Medicine Hat Daily News* published this letter.⁹² The editor of the paper similarly did not keep his word; Low’s visit to Medicine Hat was the lead story on page one. Yet in the editor’s defence, the coverage dealt mostly with Low’s condemnation of Soviet Russia and its “centralizing” and “totalitarian” tendencies.⁹³

Meanwhile, Low continued to attempt to get his “suggested manifesto” passed at various Social Credit conventions. In early December 1948, only a week after the Alberta Social Credit League convention, the national council of the Social Credit Association of Canada met in Winnipeg. Heading the convention in his capacity as national leader, Low submitted his manifesto. The only change was that he had added “fascism” to the list of world tyrannies, perhaps in the hopes of extinguishing any charges of fascism against the Social Credit movement. Thus, that portion of the manifesto read as follows: “[w]e are implacably opposed to and we shall combat by all legitimate means international communism and socialism, international finance and its commercial ramifications, international political zionism, fascism, and all other policies directed against human freedom ... towards the establishment of a world tyranny modelled on the communist dictatorship of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.”⁹⁴ The national council of the Social Credit Association of Canada endorsed this and eight other points as the “basis for the new manifesto” to be submitted at its national convention the following April.⁹⁵

Louis Rosenberg noted the minuscule change between Low’s original manifesto and that passed by the national council of the Social Credit movement. He concluded that “[e]vidently, Solon Low as national leader of the Social Credit Party is not as squeamish as Premier Manning and has no scruples against placing the National Social Credit Party squarely on record as being opposed to Zionism and coupling it with Communism and International Finance.”⁹⁶ Perhaps Manning did not exert as much influence over the national wing of the Party as he did over his own provincial government. Certainly, it appeared that Low had got his way. His manifesto became part of the national Social Credit Party’s resolutions. Yet the *Canadian Social Crediter* in December 1948 reported

that Low “vehemently denied that anti-semitic sentiment exists in his movement.” As Low himself stated: “[i]n the Social Credit association there is not one particle or bit of anti-semitism. For that matter, there is no race prejudice or discrimination against anyone because of race, colour or creed.”⁹⁷

Such was the state of affairs in Social Credit circles at the end of 1948. Certainly, there was still much confusion regarding the place of anti-Semitism in Social Credit philosophy, and the movement’s stance on anti-Semitism was not always clear. Dissident Social Crediters promoted the international, financial, Jewish conspiracy theory with even greater zeal, while so-called loyal Social Crediters such as Solon Low continued to express views which could be considered just as anti-Semitic.

Indeed, in its assessment of the Social Credit situation at the end of 1948, the Canadian Jewish Congress looked back on a year of complication and contradiction regarding the Social Credit movement. Congress acknowledged that there had been many positive changes, but there had been negative repercussions as well. Manning had completed his purge of anti-Semitism within the movement, but a number of splinter groups had emerged and achieved a small degree of electoral success throughout the year. Manning’s “official” Social Credit movement had attempted to disassociate itself from these splinter groups, only to have major leaders such as national party leader Solon Low declare the existence of a “Zionist-Communist Plot” no different than that advocated by the Social Credit dissident groups.⁹⁸

Congress’s assessment of 1948 was accurate; however, a more objective view of the changes which had taken place within the movement shows a fundamental decrease in the amount of anti-Semitic propaganda, notwithstanding challenges to Manning’s authority.

It was a trend that would continue in the following months. By early 1949, Congress could begin to relax its vigil on Social Credit. The movement continued to experience residual anti-Semitism, but for the most part Manning's purge had been effective. Congress still monitored the activities of the Social Credit splinter groups, which continued to sputter anti-Semitism, but no real occurrences compelled it to undertake a concerted response. Rather, it confined itself to observation, commentary, and information distribution to its various umbrella committees. This public relations work was in many ways the easiest for Congress. Concerted action against the Social Credit movement had always been difficult, and now that the eye of the storm was passing, Congress could return to its observation post with the assurance that the worst was over. However, it could take little comfort in the knowledge that the Social Credit movement had eradicated its own anti-Semitic propaganda, considering it could just as easily revive it.

Yet by early 1949 Manning's purge was completed, and this was confirmed for Congress when it obtained a copy of a document which helped clarify Manning's reasons for conducting the purge. Nearly a year earlier, in January 1948, L.D. Byrne had submitted his final report to the Alberta Social Credit Board in his capacity as the Board's technical adviser. However, his report was not publicized until the Douglas Social Credit Council published it in its *DSCC Information Service* in early 1949," close to twelve months after Manning had expelled Byrne and others from the movement. Byrne's report, which was filled with commentary about the "international, financial, socialist, communist, Zionist conspiracy," eventually landed on Rosenberg's desk.

Upon receiving the report, Rosenberg analysed its contents and noted its overtly anti-Semitic nature. He referred specifically to those portions of the report which stated: “the issue in the world at the present time is Christendom versus Zionism; that the present plight of the remnants of our civilization is the result of a deliberate and deep-seated conspiracy to enslave humanity under a World Police State pursued through the policy of monopoly, manifested in international finance, socialism and communism, and rooted in political Zionism ... The main agencies being used to advance the policy of Monopoly towards its goal of a World Slave State are international socialism, international communism, and international finance. These are all rooted in their parent body - International Zionism.”¹⁰⁰

Byrne also invoked the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* in order to prove that an international Jewish conspiracy was aiming for world control: “[t]he stark fact remains that there is in existence [sic] a document setting forth the policy and strategy under which the goal of a World Slave State would be developed ... The document is entitled *The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*. As such, its contents have been carried out faithfully by the protagonists of world Zionism - and by Zionism in the context of this report is meant a policy based on the claims by a group, and a powerful group, of internationalists of the racial superiority of the Jewish people and directed to the complete subjugation of all nations to the rule of a Jewish hierarchy supported by a Jewish plutocracy.”¹⁰¹

Byrne then issued several directives to the Social Credit movement, which he admonished for losing sight of true Social Credit principles: “[w]hat is necessary - and urgently necessary - is to bring out into the open the nature of the socialist-communist

conspiracy, to reveal their connection with international big business and finance, to connect these with the parent body of Zionism, to make it plain what is going on and to name those responsible ... At the present time, outside the Quebec movement and the Union of Electors organization in Ontario, the Canadian [Social Credit] movement is pursuing a course of action which is, in itself, in conflict with the policy of Social Credit. This cannot fail to play into the hands of the enemy, and if persisted in, lead to the disruption of the movement.”¹⁰²

Little wonder, then, that Premier Manning decided Byrne should be relieved of his duties within the provincial government. If Manning did not think Byrne’s comments on “international Zionism” and the “Jewish hierarchy” were injudicious, he certainly must have taken exception to Byrne’s criticisms that the Social Credit movement was no longer pursuing Social Credit principles. As Rosenberg noted, “[i]t is generally understood that this report was one of the reasons which led to the expulsion of Byrne and his supporters from the Social Credit Party in Alberta.”¹⁰³ Now, however, Congress had the document which proved the extent of anti-Semitism among Byrne and other members of the Social Credit Board. The story behind Manning’s purge was complete.

Another event occurred in early 1949 which symbolized the end of Social Credit’s years of anti-Semitic propaganda. The event, which further helped ease Congress’s concerns about the Social Credit movement, was the death of Norman Jaques.¹⁰⁴ The announcement of Jaques’s death on 31 January 1949 did not go unnoticed by Congress, although its reaction was certainly reserved. David Kirshnblatt merely wrote to Saul Hayes: “[i]t might interest you to know that Norman Jaques departed permanently from this world over the weekend while in Ottawa. For your information.”¹⁰⁵

The Canadian Jewish press, however, was less circumspect. The *Canadian Jewish Weekly* reported: "Norman Jacques [sic] who died Monday, January 31, was one of the first Canadian members of Parliament to openly proclaim his anti-Semitic views to the country. A Social Crediter, Jacques [sic] stunned Canadians when he used the House of Commons to air his bigoted opinions. Jacques' [sic] split with some of his Social Credit associates over party ideology, but he never swerved in his hatred of the Soviet Union and in his attacks against Jews ... Jacques [sic] was connected with the most rabid anti-Semites in both the United States and Canada."¹⁰⁶

The *Canadian Jewish Chronicle* similarly noted that Jaques "was one of Canada's most notorious Jew-baiters, a professional anti-semite, a crony of Gerald K. Smith, a spokesman for the mufti cause, and a juggler of the triple slander against Jewry - namely that there existed against the world a Jewish conspiracy made up of Communism, international finance, and Zionism."¹⁰⁷ The *Canadian Jewish Chronicle* also criticized Prime Minister Louis St Laurent and CCF leader M.J. Coldwell, both of whom in their condolence speeches in the House of Commons had referred to Norman Jaques as "sincere."¹⁰⁸ Indeed, Prime Minister St Laurent had stated: "[o]n many matters [Jaques] held strong views which most of us did not share, but no one could doubt his sincerity or his earnest desire to be of service to his fellow Canadians in the advocacy of those views ... I am sure he will be remembered as an earnest, painstaking and courtly gentleman who served his constituents and his fellow citizens with zeal and devotion." Coldwell had made similar use of the term: "[w]e often disagreed fundamentally, and sometimes violently, with the late member for Wetaskiwin. None the less we do know that the views he expressed in this house were held sincerely and arose from deep conviction, and for

this we respected him, as we respect any member who speaks from sincerity and conviction.”¹⁰⁹

The *Canadian Jewish Chronicle* was outraged that these two politicians, “caught between the requirements of condolence and the imperatives of truth, hit upon the same adjective to cast a glow of integrity over the reputation of the deceased.” Whether Jaques was sincere or not was irrelevant, declared the *Chronicle*: “[w]e do not think that any will question Hitler’s sincerity when he, too, entertained the same notions about ‘international Jewry’ ... Will Mr. St. Laurent say of Mr. Stalin, too, that he is sincere, - which, after his fashion, he no doubt is.”¹¹⁰

Louis Rosenberg seemed to agree with the *Canadian Jewish Chronicle*, for in a memorandum to Saul Hayes assessing the political reaction to Jaques’s death, Rosenberg expressed dismay at St Laurent’s and Coldwell’s choice of words: “[s]ince Norman Jaques was a notorious and rabid anti-Semite who had used his privileges as a member of the House of Commons to make it a sounding board for the most fantastic appeals to racial and religious prejudice, and had read into the official proceedings of the House of Commons many extracts from the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and other anti-Semitic propaganda, it is indeed disturbing, to say the least, to have the Prime Minister of Canada and the leader of the CCF make what appear to be testimonials to his ‘sincerity,’ ‘zeal and devotion,’ and characterize him as a ‘courteous and courtly gentleman’ in the words of the Prime Minister.”¹¹¹

Rosenberg feared that St Laurent’s and Coldwell’s remarks would be used by anti-Semites in Canada as a “testimonial” for anti-Semitism, “since the public in general will assume that to describe Norman Jaques as ‘sincere’ is equivalent to stating that his anti-

Semitic attacks were true.”¹¹² Rosenberg concluded in the same vein as the *Canadian Jewish Chronicle* that “Norman Jaques’ sole claim to praise, if any, is that he was no hypocrite, and was an open and unashamed anti-Semite, rather than a concealed one. From the point of view of being open and unashamed advocates of the policies which they favour, Sir Oswald Mosley in England and Fred Rose in Canada might equally merit the description of ‘sincere,’ yet one cannot imagine parliamentary leaders in Canada or Great Britain applying those adjectives to them in statements to the House of Commons. Hitler, Goering and Goebbels may also have been without pretence and unfeigned in their hatred of Jews, but that would not merit them being eulogized as ‘sincere’ by democratic parliamentary leaders.”¹¹³

Reactions of Social Credit members to Jaques’s death are also worth noting. A.V. Bourcier, a renegade Social Crediter and chairman of the Douglas Social Credit Council, called Jaques “one of Canada’s great Statesmen,” and used the occasion to vilify the Manning faction while martyring Jaques:

Mr. Jaques dedicated his life to the cause of Christian Democracy and he fearlessly denounced those forces which are seeking to destroy Christianity and civilisation itself and rear up in their place a Godless world slave state ... The enemies of Christian civilization are devilishly cunning in the methods which they employ. Mr. Jaques committed the - to them - unpardonable offence of exposing the link which exists between international Communism, Socialism, High Finance and Political Zionism. The method used to silence him was the well-tried smear technique. Press, radio and party heelers labelled him “anti-semitic,” “fascist,” etc. Stupid people who did not take

the trouble to learn the facts took up the hue and cry, and threw their bits of mud at the man who sacrificed his life to the cause of their God-given liberties. Perhaps the heaviest cross he had to bear was the fact that even within the ranks of his own party there were some who were misled by false propaganda and blindly took part in the campaign of abuse.¹¹⁴

Thus, Bourcier neatly accomplished two goals: he vilified the Manning government and those who had followed Manning's new line, and he raised Norman Jaques to the level of sainthood.¹¹⁵

R.E. Ansley, another dissident Social Crediter, also offered a glowing tribute to the martyred Jaques: "[t]he constituency of Wetaskiwin never had a more capable representative combined with the highest degree of sincerity and honesty of purpose ... Mr. Jaques' unimpeachable character made it impossible for the enemies of what he was advancing, or the conscious or unconscious stooges of those enemies, to deter him in his course. No one in our movement was so subjected to smear tactics engineered by the enemies of Christian democracy ... we have lost a great man. I feel that his spiritual strength will be [sic] even greater and, as the truth of the world picture becomes better understood, many of his critics will become his strong admirers."¹¹⁶

Even national Social Credit leader Solon Low, who had ostensibly remained loyal to Manning and had shunned Jaques and other Douglasites, martyred Jaques: "my colleague was a man of deep convictions. His determination was unshakeable. These qualities, together with a high degree of personal courage, often drove him into vigorous debate as well as into strong denunciation of what he firmly believed to be social

injustices or real threats to the peace and happiness of the people of the world. In spite of the fact that much personal criticism was directed to him, often amounting almost to character assassination, he stuck to his convictions, and to the very end continued in what he thought was his duty to humanity ... We, his colleagues in the Social Credit movement, mourn his passing. We have lost in him a devoted advocate and a warm personal friend.”¹¹⁷

Rosenberg, commenting on the various Social Credit members’ tributes, was not surprised that they had eulogized Jaques in the manner they did. However, he noted how ironic it was for Low to praise Jaques’s “personal courage” and criticize those who had engaged in “character assassination,” considering Low himself was part of that group which had banned Jaques’s writings from the *Canadian Social Crediter* and dissociated itself from Jaques’s anti-Semitic attacks.¹¹⁸

The *Canadian Social Crediter* also published an unusually warm tribute to Jaques, given the circumstances of his disbarment from the paper. Indeed, the party organ nearly defended Jaques’s career of anti-Semitic agitation. It stated that the “people of Wetaskiwin have lost a steadfast representative who acted according to his views, and, who regardless of what his opponents might say or think, always tried to do his honest best.” More significantly, the *Canadian Social Crediter* also attempted to defend Jaques’s activities: “[b]orn of English yeoman stock, Mr. Jaques never deserted his forbears or their love of freedom. He detested communism and all totalitarian concepts and only aroused bitter enmity among Jewish peoples when he unrestrainedly attacked what he called international political Zionism. He blamed it for most of the world’s ills ... Those who condemn him for his alleged anti-Semitism are apt to overlook the good work he did

in combatting communism in high places and low, and generally in pushing the cause of the common citizens - who are the people.” The party organ concluded by simultaneously defending and apologizing for its decision to bar Jaques from its pages: “[i]n paying tribute to the manifold good qualities of Mr. Jaques, it should be made clear that, contrary to oft-expressed views, he was not ‘barred’ from the columns of the *Canadian Social Crediter*. What was barred was anything of an anti-religious or anti-racial nature, or what might be construed as such. With that proviso, the writings of the late member were subject to no more disbarment than those of any other.”¹¹⁹

It was a fitting way for the *Canadian Social Crediter* to bid farewell to its leading anti-Semite. Its eulogy expressed an ambivalence toward having purged Jaques from its pages, and a similar ambivalence can be seen throughout the Social Credit movement. Manning may have conducted a purge of anti-Semitism, but the statements and activities of the dissident and not-so-dissident Social Crediters proved that Social Credit’s philosophy had not been completely sanitized. For the *Canadian Social Crediter* to have even published such a eulogy showed that Social Credit’s central philosophy connecting Jews, finance, communism, and “international political Zionism” was still alive.

Yet the death of Norman Jaques can be seen as the symbolic end of anti-Semitism in the Social Credit movement. By early 1949, certainly the worst of Social Credit’s anti-Semitic propaganda had been eliminated. Minor incidents cropped up throughout the 1950s and even into the 1960s; however, they were relatively minor and did not characterize the movement as anti-Semitic as they had in earlier years.¹²⁰ The Social Credit drama had come to an end. The Canadian Jewish Congress could now relax its vigil on the Social Credit movement.

But the victory was not a sweet one. Congress did not beat the Social Credit Goliath; he toppled under his own weight and from circumstances largely external to Congress's efforts. Canada's political culture was changing; there was increasingly little room for publicly espoused intolerance, and Manning had become well aware of the political liabilities involved in spouting anti-Semitic propaganda. The lessons of the Holocaust had had their effect on the Social Credit movement and on Canada's political culture at large, and now it was up to Congress to keep up with this changing climate by adapting its public relations approach accordingly. In sum, the Social Credit battle was not won by Congress, although it gladly reaped the benefits of Social Credit's internal defeat of anti-Semitism. The Canadian Jewish Congress had exerted little influence in its long and frustrating relationship with the Social Credit movement, and ultimately, the "Social Credit problem" must be viewed as a failure in the history of its public relations work.

NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

¹ In Ontario and Quebec, the Union of Electors and the Union des Electeurs had existed before Manning's purge, and for a time both were either associated with or operated as the "official" Social Credit provincial organization for their respective provinces. However, after Manning's ousting of the anti-Semites in 1947-48, both the Union of Electors and the Union des Electeurs were controlled by dissidents.

² The idea of electing representatives who would be solely responsible to their constituents, and not first to the Party was not put into practice by the dissident groups. Indeed, the "official" Social Credit movement criticized the dissident groups for their "anti-democratic" practice of appointing candidates instead of having them nominated by the electors in an open convention. Yet ironically, Manning's movement was guilty of the same practice. As Louis Rosenberg pointed out: "[i]n actual fact there is no real difference in the methods adopted by the two rival groups in nominating or appointing candidates. The Social Credit Movement in Alberta and particularly in Saskatchewan and Manitoba has frequently followed the practice of appointing Social Credit candidates without the knowledge or consent of the electors in the constituency." *Canadian Social Crediter*, 15 July 1948; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 23 July 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 7, File 83).

³ R.E. Ansley, MLA for Leduc, was re-elected in the Alberta provincial election on 17 August 1948, as was A.V. Bourcier, MLA for Lac Ste Anne. At the federal level, Norman Jaques was re-nominated as Social Credit candidate for the Wetaskiwin constituency at the Party's national convention in 1948, but died before the 1949 general election. *Canadian Parliamentary Guide*, 1949 ed. (Toronto: Info Globe, 1949), 423-8.

⁴ The *Social Credit Challenge* experienced difficulties in publishing regular issues, apparently because of financial problems but also because Manning's movement had strongly criticized the Douglas Social Credit Council and its publication. For example, during the period preceding the Alberta provincial election of August 1948, the *Social Credit Challenge* suspended publication because of the conflict between the Douglas Social Credit Council and Manning's Alberta Social Credit League. The *DSCC Information Service* was a bulletin of the Douglas Social Credit Council, and at times took the place of the *Social Credit Challenge*. Letter, Douglas Social Credit Council, 12 September 1948; *DSCC Information Service*, September 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 28).

⁵ It will be remembered that the *Canadian Social Crediter* used to run advertisements for the Basic Book Club. After Manning's purge and the demise of the Alberta Social Credit Board, Roy Ashby began operating the Basic Book Club independently of the Social Credit Party. The Basic Book Club continued to advertise for sale a variety anti-Semitic books by C.H. Douglas, Nesta Webster, and others. Letter, Basic Books, September 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 28).

⁶ *DSCC Information Service*, September 1948.

⁷ The Central Region of the Canadian Jewish Congress in Toronto reported to Congress headquarters that the Union of Electors was "closely allied with Louis Evan's [sic] Union des Electeurs in Quebec. They have also joined the Douglas Social Credit Movement of Canada ... [the Union of Electors] is quite active in the northern and eastern constituencies of [Ontario]. They work hand in glove with the French-Canadian Union des Electeurs and have shown their greatest strength to date among the French-speaking element of this province." In the June 1948 Ontario provincial election, the dissident Social Credit group had entered twelve candidates, while the "official" Ontario Social Credit League had entered only three candidates. Neither Social Credit group fared well in the election, with official Social Credit candidates polling 1,104 votes, and the dissident Union of Electors polling 8,844 votes, for a total of 9,948 votes out of 1,758,037 - slightly over 0.005 percent of the provincial vote. Letter, Wax to Kirshnblatt, 11 June 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7D); Ontario, *Electoral History of Ontario* (Toronto: Office of the Chief Election Officer, 1984), J9; memo, Kayfetz and Wax to Rosenberg, 17 June 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit). Note that the electoral results cited in the Congress memo do not correspond exactly to the records of the Chief Election Officer of Ontario, whose figures have been used here.

⁸ The 31 January 1949 issue of the *Voice of the Electors* published a list of "Books and Pamphlets Every Social Credit Student Should Read," which included the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. The *Voice* promoted the *Protocols* as "[o]ne of the most sensational documents every published. A 'must' for every political student." *Voice of the Electors*, 31 January 1949 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7D).

⁹ *Voice of the Electors*, 1 May 1948; memo, Kayfetz to Feinberg, 11 May 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7D).

¹⁰ The *Voice of the Electors* also published an article entitled, "Control of the Atom," in which it intimated that control of the atom was in the hands of Jews: "[t]he chairman of the U.S.A. Atomic Energy Commission is the Jew, David Lilienthal; the others are Wm. Waymack, L. Strauss (Jew), R. Bacher (Jew), and S.T. Pike. Three Jews out of five ... Behind them is the Jew Barney Baruch, whose official position in the business is U.S.A. member of the U.N.O. commission on Atomic Energy." *Voice of the Electors*, 1 May, 1 July 1948; memo, Kayfetz to Feinberg, 11 May 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7D).

¹¹ *Montreal Daily Star*, 12 January 1948; *L'Evenement Journal*, 12 January 1948; *Lethbridge Herald*, 12 January 1948.

¹² According to David Kirshnblatt, Réal Caouette stated this at a political rally in Quebec City on 8 February 1948. Memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 10 February 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 31).

¹³ *Canadian Jewish Chronicle*, 9 January 1948; memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 19 February 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 31).

¹⁴ The *Canadian Social Crediter* responded to the *Canadian Jewish Chronicle* article by denying any meeting between Social Credit leaders and the Canadian Jewish Congress: "it is with some dismay we learn [of the] article published in the *Canadian Jewish Chronicle* ... The Social Credit Association of Canada is not anti-semitic and we wish to inform our readers that we know nothing of the above-alleged meeting. This paper will not carry 'anti-semitic' articles, not because of any conference with the Canadian Jewish Congress but because this is the policy of the Social Credit Association of Canada." Interestingly, Congress's records do not show evidence of a meeting between Joseph Fine and Social Credit leaders either. Six weeks later, the *Canadian Social Crediter* felt compelled to reprint its denial, after Douglas's *Social Crediter* gave "the *Jewish Chronicle* credit for making the Social Credit movement anti-semitic." The *Canadian Social Crediter* asked why the Social Credit Secretariat in England and the Douglas *Social Credit Challenge* "continually distort and misrepresent Social Credit Activities in Alberta," and restated: "[t]he policy of the Social Credit Association of Canada and the policy of the *Canadian Social Crediter* ... is not affected in any way, shape or form by any outside group ... Surely the Secretariat and its Canadian affiliates will now cease their misrepresentation." *Vers Demain*, 15 February 1948; *Canadian Social Crediter*, 4 March, 22 April 1948; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 29 April 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁵ "Summary of Activities of the National Joint Public Relations Committee of the Canadian Jewish Congress and the B'nai B'rith," n.d. (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 10).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ Although John Patrick Gillese had "resigned" as editor of the *Canadian Social Crediter* in early December 1947, which ostensibly meant the party organ was now to be free of "anti-isms," the 18, 25 December 1947 and 1 January 1948 issues of the *Canadian Social Crediter* still carried on its masthead the name of John Patrick Gillese as editor-in-chief. However, by 8 January, the masthead showed the name of Gordon E. Taylor as managing editor. Louis Rosenberg noted that throughout this period, notwithstanding the change in editorship, the *Canadian Social Crediter* continued to advertise for sale anti-Semitic propaganda by C.H. Douglas and Nesta Webster. *Canadian Social Crediter*, 18, 25 December 1947, 1, 8 January 1948; memos, Rosenberg to Hayes, 6, 12, 15 January 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁸ The *Canadian Social Crediter*, under its new editor, Gordon Taylor, was following Manning's directive. Its 11 December 1947 issue had published part one of a two-part article entitled, "Clues to the Determination of Certain Sections of Jewry [sic] to Secure Palestine as A Jewish State," which discussed how "Financial Jewry (both Zionist and non-Zionist) was furthering the aspirations of fanatical Zionism for its own ends, namely, in order to gain possession of the colossal Oil and Mineral resources of Palestine ... [so] they could be developed for the aggrandisement of Financial Jewry, preferably under the aegis of a Jewish State." However, in the paper's 18 December 1947 issue, the following announcement appeared: "[i]n strict accordance with our new editorial policy the second part of the article by Dr. Homer entitled 'Clues to the Determination of Certain Sections of Jewry to Secure Palestine as A Jewish state' WILL NOT be published. - The Editors." *Canadian Social Crediter*, 11, 18 December 1947; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 6 January 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹⁹ The 8 January 1948 issue of the *Canadian Social Crediter* was the first issue in which the name of John Patrick Gillese as editor-in-chief was replaced by Gordon E. Taylor as managing editor. Yet this issue and subsequent issues continued to advertise anti-Semitic books by C.H. Douglas and Nesta Webster under the aegis of the Alberta Social Credit Board, which was ostensibly in the process of being dissolved. After the Board's dissolution at the end of March 1948, the *Canadian Social Crediter* continued to advertise the same

anti-Semitic books for sale, but under the aegis of the Social Credit League. *Canadian Social Crediter*, 8 January, 4 March, 15, 22, 29 July 1948; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 15 January 1948.

²⁰ Letter, Bercuson to Hayes, 2 January 1948 (CJCNA, CD, Box 7, File 11P).

²¹ The Canadian Jewish Congress continued to keep other Jewish organizations informed of Social Credit developments. For example, in early 1948 Congress sent nearly a dozen "content analyses" of the *Canadian Social Crediter* to the Commission of Law and Social Action of the American Jewish Congress for its perusal. Letter, Kirshnblatt to Sultan, 28 January 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 7, File 83).

²² *Vancouver News-Herald*, 27 December 1947.

²³ David Rome became one of Congress's most valuable researchers and archivists, of the same calibre as Louis Rosenberg. Like Rosenberg, Rome published numerous studies on behalf of the Canadian Jewish Congress and contributed greatly to the social, economic, and demographic study of Canadian Jewry.

²⁴ Memo, Rome to Hayes, 5 January 1948 (CJCNA, CD, Box 7, File 11P).

²⁵ As early as 1944, Louis Rosenberg had commented on the appointment of Abe Shnitka to the post of King's Printer, stating: "[a]fter all, 'one swallow doesn't make a summer,' neither does one King's Printer wash spreaders of antisemitic propaganda clean." Letter, A.J. Livinson to editor of *Vancouver News-Herald*, 12 January 1948 (CJCNA, CD, Box 7, File 11P); *Vancouver News-Herald*, 3 February 1948; letter, Rosenberg to Fradkin, 13 March 1944 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 7, File 100).

²⁶ Letter, A.J. Livinson to editor of *Vancouver News-Herald*, 12 January 1948; *Vancouver News-Herald*, 3 February 1948.

²⁷ *Vancouver News-Herald*, 3 February 1948.

²⁸ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 15 January 1948.

²⁹ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 23 January 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

³⁰ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 11 March 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 1, File 7).

³¹ Letter, Bercuson to Kirshnblatt, 24 February 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 1, File 7).

³² Letter, Bercuson to Hayes, 24 February 1948 (CJCNA, CD, Box 7, File 11P).

³³ Letter, Bercuson to Hayes, 22 March 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 1, File 7).

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 31 March 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 1, File 7).

³⁶ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 25 March 1948; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 1 April 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

³⁷ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 1 April 1948.

³⁸ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 12 April 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

³⁹ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 1 April 1948.

⁴⁰ See footnote 14.

⁴¹ *Social Crediter* (Liverpool), 27 March 1948, cited in *Edmonton Bulletin*, 16 April 1948.

⁴² Letter, Bercuson to Hayes, 20 April 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 1, File 7).

⁴³ *Edmonton Bulletin*, 16 April, 1948.

⁴⁴ Letter, Bercuson to Hayes, 20 April 1948.

⁴⁵ Letter, Bercuson to Hayes, 26 April 1948 (CJCNA, CD, Box 7, File 11P).

⁴⁶ Letter, Bercuson to Hayes, 20 April 1948.

⁴⁷ Letter, Bercuson to Hayes, 26 April 1948.

⁴⁸ *Edmonton Bulletin*, 21 April 1948.

⁴⁹ Letter, Bercuson to Hayes, 20 April 1948.

⁵⁰ For a discussion of the confusion among rank-and-file members regarding the Douglas Social Credit Council, see Janine Stingel, "In the Presence of Mine Enemies: Anti-Semitism in the Alberta Social Credit Party" (M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1993), 121-2.

⁵¹ The Union des Electeurs ran ninety-two candidates in ninety-two constituencies in the 1948 Quebec provincial election, a number equal to the Liberals and greater than the Union Nationale, which ran ninety-one candidates. *Statistiques Électorales du Québec, 1867-1985*, 2e éd. (Québec: Bibliothèque de l'Assemblée nationale, 1986), 631.

⁵² Memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 8 March 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 31).

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Julien Morissette, a French-Catholic journalist, used *La Frontière* (whose motto was "conservons notre héritage français") as a forum to denounce the Social Credit Party and specifically the Union des Electeurs.

For example, on 29 April 1948 Morissette reprinted a speech he had given at a meeting of the Chevaliers de Colomb d'Amos, in which he denounced the Social Credit movement in the following terms: "[l]e Cr dit social donne dans la mat rialisme pur et simple. - 'La philosophie du ventre.' - Il est condamnable par ses m thodes de propagande. - Le manteau de la religion. - Critiques abusives de l'autorit . - Manque   la charit  chr tienne. - L'Union des Electeurs, si elle n'est pas, comme on le pretend, un parti politique comme les autres ne peut conduire qu'  la dictature ou   l'anarchie." *La Fronti re*, 29 avril 1948.

⁵⁵ Memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 27 May 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 31).

⁵⁶ The Roman Catholic hierarchy in Quebec was concerned with what it perceived to be the anti-clerical and demagogic nature of the Union des Electeurs. Monseigneur Joseph Desmarais, Bishop of Amos, publicly criticized the Union and believed it important to "alert ... our faithful against the danger of bad shepherds who could possibly lead them onto the road of perdition." Similarly, the *Montreal Herald* reported that "the R.C. hierarchy feels the expansion of the 'funny money' people in northwestern Quebec is as serious a danger as local Communist strength," and that Bishop Desmarais was leading the drive to "take Roman Catholics out of the Social Credit fold." In a pastoral letter Bishop Desmarais also called the activities of the Union des Electeurs "unclean demagogdry [sic]," and he instructed parish priests in northwestern Quebec not to permit Union des Electeurs meetings in their parish halls. Further, David Kirshnblatt noted that the outbursts against Social Credit in Quebec by an ecclesiastical authority were nothing new. As early as 1941, the late Cardinal Villeneuve had publicly criticized Quebec Social Crediters, who responded by stating that "high finance" played a role in the Church's stance. Cardinal Villeneuve in turn replied: "[a]s to the insinuation - quite sacreligious [sic] - that finance had something to do with Our attitude, let us content ourselves with Our serene and absolute denial." Memos, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 30 March, 13 April 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit); *Montreal Herald*, 4 May 1948; *Canadian Social Crediter*, 15 July 1948.

⁵⁷ Memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 27 May 1948.

⁵⁸ Throughout the spring and summer of 1948, in addition to publishing anti-Social Credit articles, *La Fronti re* also published a series of "open letters" to the members of the Union des Electeurs castigating them for their materialism, their affront to Church doctrine through their lack of Christian charity, their totalitarian and dictatorial measures which smacked of communism, and their concomitant insistence that Social Credit was the only solution to the spread of communism. *La Fronti re*, 27 mai, 3, 10, 17, 24 juin, 1, 8, 15 juillet, 5 ao t 1948.

⁵⁹ Kirshnblatt reported that the rally, which took place on 27 June 1948 at the Drummondville arena, was attended by "[a]pproximately 4500 people ... of which at least a thousand or more were Union [des Electeurs] members from various provincial constituencies who came to this opening rally via specially chartered buses." Memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 29 June 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 31).

⁶⁰ J. Ernest Gregoire, former vice-president of the Social Credit Association of Canada, was introduced at the rally as "provincial leader of the Party." Ibid.

⁶¹ The candidate's name was Edmond Major. Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ In the Quebec provincial election, held 28 July 1948, the Union des Electeurs won 140,050 votes out of a total of 1,531,899, a paltry 6.9 percent of the popular vote. No members were elected on a Union des Electeurs ticket. *Statistiques  lectorales du Qu bec*, 14.

⁶⁴ Memo, Belack to Forster, 28 June 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7D).

⁶⁵ *Voice of the Electors*, 1 May 1948.

⁶⁶ Memo, Belack to Forster, 28 June 1948.

⁶⁷ Letter, Kirshnblatt to Aronsfeld, 3 September 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 1, File 7).

⁶⁸ Memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 24 September 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 28).

⁶⁹ Low's letter was published in response to a letter from the Australian Social Credit paper, the *New Era*. The paper's publishers had written to Low asking for clarification "on the rift in the Social Credit Movement in Canada, as *New Era* readers were greatly perturbed by the development." *Canadian Social Crediter*, 8 July 1948; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 15 July 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1947, Box 1, File 7A).

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 15 July 1948.

⁷² *Canadian Social Crediter*, 15 July 1948; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 23 July 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 7, File 83).

⁷³ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 27 July 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Memo, Kayfetz to Feinberg, 15 November 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁷⁶ Ibid.; *Montreal Gazette*, 9 November 1948.

⁷⁷ *Montreal Gazette*, 9 November 1948.

⁷⁸ The Central Region of the Canadian Jewish Congress noted that the 15 and 29 July 1948 issues of the *Canadian Social Crediter* included references to the "forces of international finance and international Socialism," as well as a speech by Solon Low which stated: "[t]he unholy trinity of rank materialism, namely International Communism, International Finance, and International Political Zionism got in their deadly work. They plotted to engulf the world in war. Having succeeded in this, they proceeded to spread confusion and chaos, and to engender fear and hatred and suspicion into the hearts of men." Further, the Social Credit League, having taken over the duties of the now-defunct Social Credit Board, advertised anti-Semitic books by C.H. Douglas and others in the party organ. *Canadian Social Crediter*, 15, 22, 29 July 1948; memo, Wax to Hayes et al., n.d., c. July 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁷⁹ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 18 November 1948; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 30 November 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

⁸⁰ *Montreal Daily Star*, 25 November 1948; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 30 November 1948.

⁸¹ *Lethbridge Herald*, 25 November 1948.

⁸² It should be noted that it was Louis Rosenberg who stated that Manning had called for this amendment; the press did not specifically state this. Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 26 December 1948 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit); *Lethbridge Herald*, 25 November 1948; *Medicine Hat Daily News*, 26 November 1948; *Montreal Daily Star*, 25 November 1948.

⁸³ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 26 December 1948.

⁸⁴ *Lethbridge Herald*, 25 November 1948; *Medicine Hat Daily News*, 26 November 1948; *Montreal Daily Star*, 25 November 1948.

⁸⁵ *Montreal Gazette*, 25 November 1948.

⁸⁶ As the *Montreal Daily Star* reported, "[i]n a day-long battle on the floor, about 300 delegates voted overwhelmingly to approve exclusion of three men who have criticized the Provincial Government of Premier E.C. Manning." *Montreal Daily Star*, 25 November 1948; *Canadian Social Crediter*, 2 December 1948; *Medicine Hat Daily News*, 25-26 November 1948; *Montreal Gazette*, 25 November 1948.

⁸⁷ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 30 November 1948.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ It is likely that the Congress members first read about Low's comments in the *Lethbridge Herald*, since it published a piece on Low before the *Medicine Hat Daily News*. *Lethbridge Herald*, 25 November 1948; *Medicine Hat Daily News*, 26 November 1948.

⁹⁰ Letter, Raber to Canadian Jewish Congress, 25 November 1948 (CJCNA, CD, Box 7, File 11P).

⁹¹ Letter, Hayes to Raber, 1 December 1948 (CJCNA, CD, Box 7, File 11P).

⁹² A comprehensive examination of the *Medicine Hat Daily News* from 1 December 1948 to 17 February 1949 revealed no letter to the editor regarding Solon Low. However, many other letters to the editor were published during that time.

⁹³ It is not clear whether the editor of the *Medicine Hat Daily News* had excised Low's more inflammatory statements or whether Low had not made such statements at this gathering. *Medicine Hat Daily News*, 30 November 1948.

⁹⁴ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 16 December 1948; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 26 December 1948.

⁹⁵ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 16 December 1948.

⁹⁶ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 26 December 1948.

⁹⁷ Ibid.; *Canadian Social Crediter*, 16 December 1948.

⁹⁸ "Anti-Semitism in Canada - A Brief Review of 1948," 24 December 1948 (CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 1, File 3).

⁹⁹ The Douglas Social Credit Council justified its publication of Byrne's final report in the following way: "[t]his report is being released for publication by the Chairman of the Social Credit Board [A.V. Bourcier] because its contents are of general public concern and, in the light of the acute international crisis which is developing, should be accorded the attention which it has been denied in responsible quarters." Although the *DSCC Information Service* was dated October 1948, it does not appear to have been distributed until

January 1949. *DSCC Information Service*, October 1948; speech, R.E. Ansley, MLA, Alberta Legislature Throne Debate, 1 March 1949 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 28).

¹⁰⁰ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 21 January 1949 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit); memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 7 February 1949 (CJCNA, DA2, Box 3, File 4); *DSCC Information Service*, October 1948.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 21 January 1949; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 7 February 1949.

¹⁰⁴ Jaques had just been re-nominated as Social Credit candidate for the federal riding of Wetaskiwin, Alberta in December 1948; a month later, he died. Memo, Kayfetz to Hayes, 11 January 1949 (CJCNA, CA, Box 33, File 306).

¹⁰⁵ Memo, Kirshnblatt to Hayes, 1 February 1949; memo, Kirshnblatt to Sheinberg, 2 February 1949 (CJCNA, CA, Box 33, File 306).

¹⁰⁶ *Canadian Jewish Weekly*, 3 February 1949.

¹⁰⁷ *Canadian Jewish Chronicle*, 11 February 1949.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, *Debates* (Ottawa: King's Printer, 31 January 1949), 69; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 11 February 1949 (CJCNA, DA2, Box 3, File 4).

¹¹⁰ *Canadian Jewish Chronicle*, 11 February 1949.

¹¹¹ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 11 February 1949.

¹¹² Ibid. Rosenberg appears to be stretching the limits of potential anti-Semitic agitation with this comment. It would be very difficult to prove that anti-Semitism had been fomented because of St Laurent's and Coldwell's condolence remarks.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Speech, A.V. Bourcier, MLA, Alberta Legislature Throne Debate, February 1949 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 28); memo, Kayfetz to Rosenberg, 25 April 1949 (CJCNA, ZC, Social Credit).

¹¹⁵ Speech, A.V. Bourcier, February 1949. This speech is also interesting because Bourcier draws an analogy, perhaps unconsciously, between Norman Jaques and Jesus Christ. Indeed, Bourcier's tribute to Jaques is striking in its resemblance to the story of Christ's crucifixion and his "betrayal" by the Jews. Like Christ, Norman Jaques dedicated his life to a cause for which he was persecuted and betrayed by his enemies - and his friends.

¹¹⁶ Speech, R.E. Ansley, 1 March 1949; memo, Kayfetz to Rosenberg, 25 April 1949.

¹¹⁷ Canada, *Debates* (31 January 1949), 70; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 11 February 1949.

¹¹⁸ Memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 11 February 1949.

¹¹⁹ *Canadian Social Crediter*, 3 February 1949; memo, Rosenberg to Hayes, 14 February 1949 (CJCNA, DA2, Box 3, File 4).

¹²⁰ For a discussion of Social Credit's later incidents of anti-Semitism, see Stingel, "Anti-Semitism in the Alberta Social Credit Party," Chapter Four.

CONCLUSION

This thesis began with the claim that the history of the Social Credit movement is incomplete without an examination of its relationship with the Canadian Jewish Congress. Although the history of the Social Credit movement in Alberta and Canada is not solely an account of anti-Semitism, this facet of the movement's history forms an integral part which heretofore has been inadequately addressed. By examining the "other side;" that is, the response of that ethnic group which was most directly affected and most potentially threatened by Social Credit's propaganda, a new perspective on the Social Credit movement has been achieved.

However, the perspective of the "other side" is not always included in works on racism and discrimination. It is more common for studies to focus on the "aggressor" and to overlook the reaction, role, and responsibility of the aggrieved. Yet it is imperative that the objectified party - the object of vilification - provide its own perspective. Only when this previously dehumanized and objectified party gives a human, subjective voice to its experience can the full effects of such prejudice be revealed. Social Credit's years of anti-Semitic propaganda may not have physically harmed one Jew, but it adversely affected the entire Canadian Jewish community at a time when it feared for the fate of its European brethren and ultimately its own. Thus, the effects of Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda do not become clear until and unless the response of the Canadian Jewish community is expressed.

The response of the Canadian Jewish Congress to Social Credit's propaganda shows the detrimental effects of publicly- and politically-sanctioned intolerance on this

organization's ability to promote and protect its rights. This thesis has shown how difficult it was for Congress to adopt a forthright, assertive, even aggressive public relations policy, and its task was made more difficult by the hostility, insensitivity, and duplicity of the Social Credit movement. While Congress attempted desperately to convince the Canadian federal government to lift the immigration restrictions on Jewish refugees, it was bombarded with anti-Semitic propaganda from the Social Credit movement. This was not a conducive environment for the promotion and defence of Jewish rights.

However, one of the reasons Congress's attempts to open Canada's doors to European Jewry or end Social Credit's propaganda were unsuccessful was its ineffective public relations policy. Congress's main handicap was that it suffered from a lack of confidence - a fear that if it were too vocal or public in its support of European Jews or in its denunciation of the Social Credit movement, further anti-Semitism would ensue. The result was a covert, passive, *insecure* approach to the defence of Jewish rights - an approach which did not work in Congress's or Canadian Jewry's best interests. Yet the fact that Congress was facing such problems as immigration restrictions and anti-Semitic propaganda says much about the nation's political culture of intolerance at that time. It is not surprising, then, that in such a climate the Canadian Jewish Congress lacked confidence.

Nonetheless, the consequence was that Congress was never able to slay the "Social Credit Goliath." When Goliath finally fell, the spoils of victory were snatched by Premier Manning, whom posterity has given full credit for eliminating anti-Semitism from the Social Credit movement. What makes Manning's actions less creditable, however, is that

he waited several years before taking a definitive stand against anti-Semitism.

Throughout the war, when Canadian Jewry was in most dire need of government and public support, this democratically-elected provincial government and mainstream political party undertook a propaganda campaign equal to those of anti-Semites in the United States and Europe. The Canadian government's record of treatment toward the Jews of Europe during this period is not an honourable one, and the Social Credit government and Party contributed in its own way to this climate of intolerance. For this both Aberhart and Manning, as leaders of the Social Credit movement, must take partial responsibility.

Nonetheless, Manning's purge of anti-Semitism fundamentally altered the philosophy of the Social Credit movement. In the wake of public exposure of Nazi death camps, Social Credit's accusations of the diabolical Jewish world plot appeared inappropriate and Manning recognized their liability. He sanitized Social Credit philosophy in response to a changing political and public opinion which in the post-Holocaust period, found the movement's intolerance increasingly obnoxious and undemocratic. Yet a more compelling reason for Manning's purge of anti-Semitism was that anti-Semitic propaganda had become passé. In the postwar period, condemnation of the "international Jewish financier" had less valence than anti-communist, Cold War rhetoric. Accordingly, Social Credit philosophy now focussed on the conspiratorial machinations of Russian communists, and certainly vilification of the "red menace" was more politically rewarding.

Another impetus for eliminating anti-Semitism from Social Credit philosophy came from improved economic conditions. In the postwar, post-Leduc oil strike period,¹ there

was little need for conspiracy theories about the oppressive Jewish-controlled banks and governments. Albertans were embarking on a period of great economic prosperity, and in the absence of economic privation, a scapegoat was no longer needed. Thus, by 1949 the Canadian Jewish Congress could report that *Canadian Social Crediter* occasionally published unfriendly comments about Jews, but such anti-Jewish material, when it did appear, was seldom of a feature or campaign character: “[u]sually it is a snide little item about Jews, almost as a filler, or else it is injected almost off hand in much longer treatment of a totally unrelated character.”² Perhaps this was all Congress could hope for from the Social Credit movement - residual, irrelevant, age-old anti-Semitic slurs.

Social Credit’s purge of anti-Semitism was part of a broader postwar trend of increasing political and public tolerance. Mackenzie King’s platitudes about the nation’s “absorptive capacity”³ were the first of many grudging steps towards a multicultural Canada. This changing climate helped the Canadian Jewish Congress adopt a more effective public relations policy than it had possessed during the war. Its efforts were augmented by Diefenbaker’s passage of the Canadian Bill of Rights and subsequent relaxation of immigration restrictions.⁴ At the grassroots level, a changing economic, political and social reality in which immigrants were a more integral part of the Canadian landscape also contributed to Congress’s increasing confidence. Within this growing climate of ethnic pluralism and legal safeguards for minorities, Congress became increasingly activist in protecting and advancing the rights of Jews and all minority groups. Congress’s broader focus eventually made it the champion not only of Jewish rights, but of all human rights in Canada.

External developments in the postwar period also enabled Congress to protect and promote Jewish rights in a more forthright manner. The creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and the Six-Day War in 1967 were especially influential. Both events instilled greater confidence in Canadian Jewry: the first because it was fulfillment of a millennia-old promise and offered a future sanctuary should there be another lapse in the world's collective conscience; the second because it sent a message to the nations of the world that the Jews were not ready victims and had the military might to prove it. This increased strength enabled Congress to deal more effectively with issues of Jewish concern such as Holocaust denial, neo-Nazism, and war crimes trials, and it became increasingly forthright in the way it represented itself on the national political scene.

Changes in Canada's political and public climate in the postwar period and the increased political strength of the Canadian Jewish Congress seem to confirm Canada's reputation as an evolving tolerant nation. Yet this image is overly-idealized. While Canada's threshold for *intolerance* was remarkably high before and during World War Two, since then Canada has developed a "multicultural myth of tolerance," which has replaced earlier notions of what is acceptable rhetoric. It is possible that the nation is no less racist and intolerant than it was fifty years ago, but legal and constitutional developments, together with the current trend of political correctness, has ensured that public prejudice is considered poor taste and discrimination is officially disallowed. Yet Canada has a long and continuous history of racism and discrimination, even if current political and public discourse obscures this reality.

Nonetheless, it was disallowance of discrimination which the Canadian Jewish Congress began to advocate in the postwar period, and continues to champion in the

present. There appears to be no effective way to end a society's prejudices; but through advocacy of legal and governmental measures, Congress has ensured that such prejudices remain just that - personal, idiosyncratic hatreds, confined to individual minds. In this way, the lessons of the Holocaust have been indelibly etched on the psyche of the Canadian Jewish Congress. It works to ensure that "Never Again" will prejudice be allowed to translate into discrimination, then policy, then annihilation.

If the response of the Canadian Jewish Congress to Social Credit's anti-Semitic propaganda is placed in the broader historical context of Congress's evolving public relations philosophy, it can be argued that the Social Credit experience helped Congress evolve into the strong, effective, politically powerful organization that it is today. Through its numerous, mostly unsuccessful battles with the Social Credit movement, Congress gradually realized the futility of attempting to alter age-old prejudices about Jews and money or conspiratorial mindsets about Jewish world plots. Eventually it acknowledged that the way to stop hatred was not to attempt to alter people's hostile attitudes, but merely to prevent such attitudes from reaching public expression. Seen in this light, the Social Credit experience was ultimately successful: Congress's failure to slay the Social Credit Goliath compelled it to re-examine not the enemy, but its own slingshot.

NOTES TO CONCLUSION

¹ In February 1947 substantial oil reserves were discovered at Leduc, just south of Edmonton. As Alvin Finkel notes, the Leduc oil strike "provided the province with its major ticket out from its previous 'have-not' status. By the end of the period of Social Credit rule in 1971, the oil and gas industries directly accounted for almost 40 per cent of all value added in the province. Royalties from oil and gas gave the Alberta government the highest per capita revenue in the country." Alvin Finkel, The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 100.

² "Draft on Anti-Semitism in Canada," n.d., c. 1949 (CJCNA, ZA 1945, Box 2, File 31; CJCNA, ZA 1948, Box 1, File 3); *The Facts*, May 1949 (CJCNA, ZA 1949, Box 3, File 26; NAC, CJC Collection, MG 28, Volume 13, V, 101, Reel M-5461).

³ In May 1947, Prime Minister Mackenzie King stated in the House of Commons that the federal government's policy was "to foster the growth of the population of Canada by the encouragement of immigration." As Jean Burnet notes, "[i]mmigrants were to be carefully selected, and admitted only in such numbers as could be absorbed by the economy. The principles of selection were to include preservation of 'the fundamental composition of the Canadian population.'" Between the end of the Second World War and 1961, over 2,500,000 immigrants had arrived in Canada, and by the 1971 census, 25 percent of Canada's population identified its ethnic origins as other than British, French, Native Indian, or Inuit. Jean R. Burnet with Howard Palmer, Coming Canadians: An Introduction to a History of Canada's Peoples (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1989), 39.

⁴ On 1 July 1960 in the House of Commons, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker presented the Bill for the Recognition and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which was passed into legislation in August 1960. More impressive for its egalitarian rhetoric than its legal applicability, the Bill of Rights nonetheless reflected Diefenbaker's commitment to creating a nation free from threats to basic human rights. In 1962, the Conservative government also changed Canada's immigration regulations to remove nearly all elements of discrimination. As Jean Burnet notes, "[i]n power, the Conservatives continued to court the ethnic vote ... Diefenbaker attended national celebrations, presented copies of the Bill of Rights to leaders of ethnic groups, and appeared at ethnic rallies on behalf of Conservative candidates." Burnet with Palmer, Coming Canadians, 174; Peter C. Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), 224-31; Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond, and John English, Canada Since 1945: Power, Politics, and Provincialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 188-9.

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




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