An Idealist Approach to Values Education Theory

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für

Irmgard und Elizabeth

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis the writer outlines one form that an evolutionary-developmental paradigm of humankind might take. Beginning with the idealist position that an epistemology must preceed an ontology, the author proceeds to describe the view that emerges when the respected authorities of empirical evidence and logic are joined by the eye that gives us a "scientia intuitiva," or a view "sub specie aeternitatis." From such an expanded view, a Wave Model of Consciousness-Being is formulated. The writer examines the implications of this model for values education theory as well as several other related topics.

RÉSUMÉ

Dans cette thèse l'auteur d'écrit une forme que peut prendre un paradigme evolutio-développemental de l'humain. Ce model est basé sur la position idéale que l'épistémologie précède l'ontologie. L'auteur décrit ce qui ressort quand les deux autorités respectées, l'évidence empirique et la logique sont réunies avec la "scientia intuitiva," ou la vision "sub specie aeternitatis." A partir de cette vision intégrale, plusieurs dimensions philosophiques et psychologiques d'un Wave Model of Consciousness-Being sont examinées et ensuite appliquées à des questions relatives à l'éducation morale.

He whose vision cannot cover
History's three thousand years,
Must in outer darkness hover,
Live within the days frontiers.

Goethe, Westöstlicher Diwan

SECTION 1

PREFACE

> What a chimera then is man!
> How strange and how monstrous!
> A chaos, a subject of contradictions, a prodigy
> Judge of all things, yet a stupid earthworm;
> depository of truth, yet a cesspool of uncertainty and error
> the glory and the refuse of the universe.
> Who will unravel this tangle?
>
> Blaise Pascal

This paper reflects a need to look closely into the philosopher's mirror on the wall. It reflects the need to ask: "Who is this creature who dares to call himself 'Homo Sapiens' - man the wise? Who is this stuttering creature who finds time to sing? Who is this clumsy builder who loves to sculpt, this hobbling biped that delights in dance? Who is this tinker, tailor, soldier, sailor - this dreamer of nightmares and worlds sublime who lives in a restless world that breaks upon him like waves break upon the ocean shore?"

There is a possibility of metaphysical wealth for those who dare to consult the mirror. An even greater wealth awaits those with the courage to return again and again to its discriminating face. But who will endure to hear its verdict? Who will listen to dark mystery upon mystery until the clear light of day? Every earnest prospector must stake some claim; every serious thinker must commit himself to some view. In setting out to be absolutely right about the colour of the whole rainbow every philosopher is bound to be at least a little wrong.

A temptation that the writer is unable to resist, is the temptation to believe that the "best" philosophical view is the most embracing view, hence, my tendency to see things and to interpret them in wholistic terms. In her wisdom, Nature has given us two eyes, two dispositions for sight, two ways in which we can focus on the universe. We can see things in a near-sighted or a far-sighted fashion. Perhaps, if indeed we are homo "sapiens," we can learn to distinguish between the two and then employ each "eye" for its proper function. In the writer's opinion, to be philosophical is to exercise a capacity for far-sightedness. It is to engage in a type of seeing that is often neglected; it is to seek a treasure that is overlooked too often. This paper, by emphasizing our capacity for far-sightedness is meant to represent a sustained and careful look in the mirror on the wall.

Philosophically, the writer's disposition is to see things the way Spinoza suggested we see things, that is, "sub specie aeternitatis". The author's sympathies lie with an organic as opposed to an atomistic view. My search directs me towards a perennial philosophy of humankind as opposed to an individualistic, personal, or "authentic" one. The writer is decidedly a monist as opposed to a pluralist and his approach to the resolution of all problems relies more on the attractive convincing power of synthesis than it does on the cool logic of analysis. In the most physical terms the writer might be described as a right-hemisphere thinker with an active pre-frontal neo-cortex. If this suggests that his heart beats vigorously within him, he would not object too much.

While this paper is basically a philosophical study, I have drawn from sources other than the writings of professional philosophers. For too long now Western philosophy has been under the spell of the scientism. In Philosophy for a Time of Crisis, Adrienne Koch writes: "It is apparant that almost no professional group, as a group, outside the philosophers in the classic tradition, have made it their business to cultivate the integrative attitude." (1) The "integrative attitude" or disposition is I believe of primary importance to a world that is in the throes of a relativisation crisis. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, for the reason mentioned above, refers to our present era as the era of "Western Paganism." That Solzhenitsyn identifies the modern era with paganism does not surprise the writer. Perhaps we are becoming pagan through a kind of neglect. Perhaps for too long now our attention has been diverted from the mirror by the magnifying glass. Of late, the licence technology affords us has also made it clear that our attention needs to be redirected. It is time to order the stockpile of often trivial questions relating to how we live, by asking the order-restoring question of why we live. This paper is an attempt to be philosophical in the way that Plato, Spinoza and Hegel were philosophical, that is, it is an attempt apply a cosmos down as opposed to an atoms up approach to a study of mankind (F1) The difficulties in adopting this approach are legion and these are further compounded when the philosopher who dares to set out on "a road less travelled" is a neophyte. Two difficulties that we have to contend with are as follows.

The first difficulty for the student who attempts to be philosophical is that he or she must suddenly learn to walk on perilously slippery rocks. Or put another way, in the sea of philosophy there appears to be no shallow water where one can slowly learn to swim. Even when the young thinker wishes to do no more than to wet his toes in the ocean of metaphysics, his whole body is immediately swept in and he must swim or sink; and then to make matters worse, the philosophic waters are restless and dangerously deep.

It is not quite correct to say that there is no solution or no easy way out for the neophyte. The beginner can write philosophy by writing about philosophy. That is, he or she can postpone swimming for a while and comment from the safety of the shore on the efforts of some seasoned professional. Academically, this is an accepted practice and for subjects as difficult as philosophy it is even the recommended one. However, there will always be some who no doubt due to some defect in their natures will be foolhardy enough to jump into the sea given the first opportunity. The writer confesses that he is one of those who can not resist the temptation of getting wet and he apologizes to the reader who will no doubt at times be inclined to shake his head.

A second fault endemic to youth, and of which the writer is most certainly guilty, is the fault of ambition. Without the dulling knowledge of all the trials, errors, and pains involved in being just a good swimmer, the adolescent philosopher believes that he or she is a natural. The experienced thinker smiles at the innocence of youth,

but there may be something within him that nods approval as well; for the scholar knows that little of philosophic elegance or beauty is possible without the vitality that is the hallmark of youth. In contemplating these spring blossoms yet innocent of the heat of summer and the frosts of fall, the seasoned thinker may rediscover his own young heart and perhaps even applaud the youthful naivety that is necessary if any of us are to confront philosophical Goliaths.

A few years ago at his farewell supper a noted scholar and distinguished psychologist wrote in his parting speech: "It seems, having reviewed some 2825 manuscripts, that a remarkably high proportion of the research is clean, stringently conceived and effectively executed, reflective of rigorous and painstaking thought and experimentation---and remarkably trivial." (2) A condition or fault of which the writer is acutely aware is one in which significance is sacrificed to correctness, or content is diluted to consolidate form. In this paper we have attempted to find some middle ground between saying too much and saying too little. Perhaps it is true that philosophers begin their careers by saying too much and finally end them by saying too little. Is it time or is it wisdom that slowly eats away at our philosophic nerve? However that may be, in his youth the writer is willing to march on the Capitol. His ears are attracted less by the palavar of the marketplace than by the harmonies he hears in the distance. His eyes are given to a sight that stretches to the luminous horizon. His present is nourished by visions of a future as much as by knowledge of a past.

Some some are drawn to the hearth, others are drawn to the village square, the writer is drawn to the King's highway.

The philosopher Karl Jaspers distinguishes between the future possibilities of either a "world empire" or a "world order." (3) The distinction he makes is an important one in that it points to a subtle but most significant difference in the way we can march into the future. One future attends with the march of feet, the other attends with the march of ideas. Perhaps the most decisive factor determining whether we shall march forward with our feet as opposed to our minds is the way in which we deal with a current relativisation crisis. Enough of philosophic quicksand! To march forward philosophically, that is, towards a world order as opposed to a world empire, we need some firm ground beneath our minds feet. As long as we can not see beyond the boundaries of our disintegrative habits and dispositions every man remains an island, every philosophic truth remains a private truth, and the twenty-first century remains a pagan time. We have much to learn from thinkers like Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, Hegel, and all of those for whom the distance to the horizon is not measured in miles.

This paper represents an effort to support the very difficult work of moving in the direction of a world order. While empire building always involves the march on some distinct external Capitol, order building involves a march on a far more elusive internal Capitol. As Kenneth Clark points out in Civilisation, "..it may be difficult to define civilisation, but it isn't so difficult to recognise barbarism." (4) For the soldier, all roads lead to Rome; for the

philosopher, all roads lead to the Self. In a very real sense we are always at a fork in the road. One path tugs at our arms and pulls at our feet. The other casts its more subtle influence on our hearts. The securities and luxuries promised by a world empire or empire world, are matched against the less tangeable securities promised by a world order or a world in order.

In attempting to keep in view some glimpse of the whole, in attempting to march on the Capitol, this journey down the philosophers road requires that we travel very lightly; no doubt too lightly for the dispositions of some. But for us there is no other way. We believe that the security of a large philosophically "complete" packsack with all the requisite "gear" offers only a false security and absolutely no guarantee that we shall travel far. Needless to say, we shall be more interested in covering ground than in the fine art of camping. Perhaps it is only on a Spartan diet and regimen that one can hope to reach Kilamanjaro.

INTRODUCTION

In introducing this paper let us now say something about the way it is organized. Essentially this paper might be divided into four parts. First of all, we shall set our sights on a particular goal. We shall be interested attaining if only some distant glimpse of that rare and wonderful bird, the texture of a human soul, a paradigm of humankind. Having so set our sights, and for reasons that we shall explain, we are committed to finding a method of approach. In describing the zetesis, or method of philosophical inquiry carried out by Plato, Eric Voeglin writes: "The illuminating inquiry, the zetema, is not carried from the outside to the initial experience, as if it were a dead subject matter, but the element of seeking (zetesis) is present in the experience and blossoms out into the inquiry. The light that falls on the way does not come from an external source, but is the growing and expanding luminosity of the depth." (5) While we believe that in a final sense it is impossible to take things apart in such a way that we are left with the whole picture, nevertheless, we are committed to a certain amount of unfolding what is enfolded if we are to describe anything at all. Hence, we begin with a discussion of the importance of a certain whole and then proceed in the second part of this paper to investigate the ways in which we can "know" it. The "light that falls on the way" is described as a measure of the "growing and expanding luminosity [emerging out] of the depth."

In a third part of this paper we summarize that which we have

seen by offering a model that consolidates our vision. As Martin Buber points out in Paths in Utopia, "the circle is described by the radii, not by the points along its circumference," (6) which is to say that our tracings at some perimeter refer through a radius to a stable center that makes possible all outer arcs. The center and its arc are related in the way that the namer and the named are related. All that we name in this paper refers to a center which is our Self.

Finally, in the last part of this paper we test the quality or depth of our perceptions by applying them to a specific question. In the light of a philosophical Great Wave model and a psychological Small Wave model, we attempt to answer what R.S. Peters considers the most important question in moral or values education, namely: "How do children come to care?"

A PARADIGM

As the works of scholars such as Sir James Frazer, Mircea Eliade, Joseph Campbell and lately Ken Wilber (F2) indicate, humankind has long been committed to a paradigm or model of what it means to be a human being. The paradigm has served to order our thoughts, to bring regularity to our lives and to focus our energies. The paradigm has given the individual a place in his universe; it has given him a sense of purpose and infused his activities with meaning. From the broad perspective, perhaps the interest and even the obscession that man has demonstrated for some paradigm, reflects his need to organize his thoughts in harmony with some purpose or principle of which he is only vaguely aware. Perhaps, his interest in a paradigm is the expression of a will to direct his energies towards the completion or satisfaction of some potential that unfolds before him. Long scattered by the winds of time some of these models or paradigms yet retain their ability to draw our attention. It is difficult to say why some of these have not grown old and lost their meaning for us. Perhaps, Pythagoras, or Gautama the Buddha were able to outline to some degree the parameters of a universal paradigm. Perhaps as Plato and Aristotle held, concepts such as God, the "good," the "absolute," the "true," and the "beautiful," retain a universal facination for us because they appeal to something universal in our natures.

Presently, philosophers are very much concerned with questions related to the mechanics of knowledge. It is not fashionable to talk about paradigms. Questions about method form the vanguard of philosophic debate with content taking a secondary position. The doctors argue over the importance of various instruments and methods while the patient lies etherized upon the operating table. There seems to be less concern for any body of truth and more concern with speculation about the true colour of its blood. Unsure as they are of themselves, philosophers appear to have lost their nerve and now come dangerously close to loosing the patient. C.E.M. Joad offers us a revealing caricature of the Cambridge philosophers and an illustration of what we mean when we say that the doctors are loosing their patients.

> There is a story of a Chinese philosopher who, having visited England early in the 1930's in order to discover from the famous Cambridge philosopher, G.E. Moore, the nature of the world, remarked mock-regretfully at the end of his visit that he had learnt very little about the nature of the world but a great deal about the correct use of the English language. (7)

In his book Legitimation of Belief, Ernest Gellner (1974) explains that: "Modern philosophy (since Descartes) has been preoccupied with the problem of knowledge - its nature, varieties and above all its validation and authority. The emphasis on how we know rather than what we know represented a crucial intellectual shift, which had both a philosophical and sociological dimension." (8)

While the philosopher can devote a good deal of his time attempting to untangle metaphysical knots, analysing or otherwise

taking things apart, there is nevertheless a world of wholes that must not be ignored. Analytic philosophy must accord a part of the stage to synthetic philosophy. The philosopher can contemplate the nature of truth in its various elements, but if he (or she) lives in the "real" world he must as well adopt or learn a language that relates to wholes, integral unities, organic entities, and not just fractions thereof. He must learn to do sums as well as divisions. If the philosopher looses a competence to deal with wholes, if he considers them beyond his scope, if he refuses to deal with them or relegates to them the status of non-problem, then, we suggest, he ignores a very significant and potentially productive field of research.

To commit oneself philosophically to a look at wholes is not popular these days, the pluralists have it over the monists. In fact as Gellner points out: "on the whole, it is very difficult to find self-confessed and militant monists. In philosophy and politics, the position is so rare as to be virtually eccentric." (9) If or when the professional or philosophic monist disappears, his vacancy will be filled by a less professional one. If the philosopher refuses to to relate to mankind in any other way than the way in which an unnerved surgeon might relate to his dying patient, or if he refuses to speak to mankind because he can not decide on the meaning of his words, no doubt someone else, perhaps someone with less training will step in to take his place. Nature will not tolerate a vacuum for long. Even a philosophic vacuum must gradually be filled. The question is who will fill it? Perhaps, we have the first glimmerings

of some reason to be optimistic about the future, Whitehead is not alone in asserting that "Mankind is now in one of its rare moods of shifting its outlook. The mere compulsion of tradition has lost its force." (10)

Ken Wilber, represents one of a newly emerging breed of thinkers who stands with his back to the massive pluralist majority. He too is optimistic about a new wind that is gathering strength. In Eye to Eye, (1983) speaking of an emerging interest in a monistic approach to a paradigm of humankind, he writes:

> The vision itself is fascinating: finally an overall paradigm or theory that would unite science, philosophy-psychology, and religion-mysticism; finally a truly 'unified field theory'; finally a comprehensive overview. Some very skilled, very sober, very gifted scholars, from all sorts of different fields, are today talking exactly that. Extraordinary. (11)

Adrienne Koch, in Philosophy for a Time of Crisis, (1959) is optimistic as well. She writes: "For the first time it appears feasible to look toward the tentative construction of a theory of the total personality." (12)

In Legitimation of Belief, Gellner explains that an erosion of the traditional world view was inevitable as scientific knowledge brought us new and powerful tools of explanation. However, there is some concern today that these tools have directed us into very shallow waters and hence restricted our ability to fathom any depths. Perhaps we have reached another plateau of Copernican significance in understanding that while the scientist will not run out of fresh avenues of exploration and explanation, there is one most significant avenue that appears to be entirely beyond his ken,

this being the avenue that points to the meaning of all his activities and consequently the meaning of his own life as well. It may be suggested that there are two ways in which we can interpret the quest after a paradigm and that these are related to the way in which we conceive of ourselves. Conceived as flesh, man creates paradigms in his struggle to ease his existential soma-fears. Conceived as spirit, man creates paradigms in the struggle to free his spirit from the soma. In this paper we shall recognize both views as part of an organic whole; we shall consider the concept of meaning at least as significant as the concept of the atom. We shall examine the idea that there is "something" to know about meaning in human life just as there is something to know about the atom or an apple. We shall commit ourselves to a very delicate and high-risk type of surgery secure only in the knowledge that without such a committement the patient will surely die. We shall examine the possibility that beyond the field defined by the philosopher or scientist armed with Cartesian principles, there exists another legitmate field of knowledge.

In this paper we shall be concerned with a theory of Self-Culture and its implications for a values theory or axiology. We shall briefly consider the how of knowledge that has captured the attention of contemporary philosophers, but we shall then proceed to link the how with the less popular what of knowledge. That is, we shall not lose sight of the "wholes" in nature to which all our theoretical considerations must finally refer. In particular we shall keep in the back of our minds the relation between values theory and the "teaching" of values in schools.

Merleau-Ponty's claim that: "It is the nature of man to not have a nature" still echoes in our ears. More and more in this complex world of billions of humans it is a philosophic claim that practically becomes less and less tolerable even as psychologically and philosophically it becomes more and more debateable. Today, the opportunity and the desire for finding commonality co-habits with the pressure to do so. Perhaps, in no other time have the forces to critically examine the existing paradigms of humankind been more critical to the inhabitants of planet earth.

Presently, technology advances in leaps and bounds without any consideration for man's ability to keep pace philosophically. Hence, the backlog of important ethical as well as ontological questions grows daily. The demand for a greater global self-consciousness is called for by urgent environmental issues and economic factors that make it more and more difficult to ignore for even a moment that we are one people, as well as many people, and that we are one nation, as well as many nations. Jaspers writes: "Today, for the first time, there is a real unity of mankind which consists in the fact that nothing can happen anywhere that does not concern all." (13) With regard to a paradigm, the past competes with the present, as both wrestle for the future. As much as ever, our natures which have brought us to the present moment compel us and commit us to a process of meaning-making, meaning-finding, and meaning-supporting, that is, compel us to show a concern for the whole world, for the whole of mankind and for the whole of ourselves. In a modern world that sometimes seems to be moving too fast, or that appears too busy to

take notice of meanings and value, the consequences of our ignor-ance are surfacing like a forgotten debt that claims a compound interest. The discussion today of how we shall meet this debt is warming up and becoming more lively; as ever, it remains the greatest challenge to any individual, any society, or any nation that would call itself cultured.

In the very first paragraph of his book, The Aims of Education, the philosopher A.N. Whitehead, explains that: "Culture is an activity of thought, and receptiveness to beauty and humane feeling." (14) Implied in this definition of culture is the suggestion that it is founded on the ability to make, or the sensitivity to see, certain types of distinctions, such as distinctions between the right the wrong, the true the false, the beautiful the ugly, the humane and the cruel. Professor Bloom, in his book, The Closing of the American Mind, points out that the ability to make certain types of distinctions or to recognize standards is the foundation upon which educational objectives must be established. "One of the most important things to human beings", he explains in an interview. "is the capacity to recognize rank order, or decent people, or intelligent or wiser people. Without those kinds of elites, we don't have leaders. This kind of greatness inspiring one to human perfection is the central perspective of education." (15) The process of distinction-making or of valuing stands in opposition to the process in which values are relativised and meaning-making is understood as no more than coping with the vicissitudes of life. Meaning-making, we suggest, has a much greater significance for a

culture than is generally recognized.

J.D.Butler, in Four Philosophies: And Their Practice in Education and Religion, underscores the importance of an active involvement in a process of meaning-making and meaning-finding. He makes the very general statement that, "We are not being responsible educators if we hold unexamined world views and are not self-consciously critical of the views we hold." (16) A few years ago when the American Secretary of Education, William Bennett, told Harvard students that its undergraduate school "failed to manifest a clear educational purpose", (17) he was wrong. It very clearly did manifest a purpose that is the goal of material success. What he meant was that the purpose it manifests does not suggest a very flattering or acceptable model of man. Our model, Bennett would have suggested, of what it means to be educated, cultured, or even ultimately successful as human beings is inadequate and we must do something about it.

Presently, the ideal the "practical man", emerging out of Dewey's influential treatise Schools of Tomorrow (1915) has come under attack again. Hirsh, in Cultural Literacy identifies Dewey as a villain for portraying man as little more than a purveyor of skills. Hirsh proposes that man is also an assimilator of information. Kathleen Gow, in Yes Virginia, There is a Right and Wrong! goes further in reminding us that we must look beyond even a "skills" and "information" man and come to terms with a model of man which can account for an ability to distinguish between the "good" and the "bad," or the "right" and the "wrong". Bloom, as we have pointed out, holds a similar view. Both imply that we need to dig more deeply into the

pockets of ourselves if we expect to find satisfactory answers to the difficult questions related to the formulation of aims and purposes in education and the teaching of values.

Having generally put the problem as the finding of an educationally significant paradigm of humankind, let us examine the first marker on our road. Let us debate our first incision. We shall refer to our first intuition as a first wisdom. This shall be the wisdom of self-knowledge.

THE FIRST WISDOM

While the human sciences of anthropology, psychology, human geography, sociology, and biology, have made, and continue to make contributions to an evolving paradigm of humankind, it seems that precision in sight is gained only at the expense of breadth of vision. As truth gains ground on one front it looses it on another. Perhaps, today we have become so occupied with the process of filling our cups to ever greater degrees of precision that we have forgotten the reason for filling them in the first place. "Malheur au vague; mieux vaut le faux!" goes the expression. But when we notice all of what would be swept away with the "vague," we realize that we can not take this advice seriously. No doubt, as significant for society and the integrity of its institutions as are the specialized sciences of mankind, are studies that attempt to integrate or hold together the splintering strands that more and more narrowly describe the complex creature who calls himself "homo sapiens". "Things fall apart the center can not hold," Yeats wrote between the great wars. (18) Mythologies, religions, philosophies and the arts, have to various degrees provided a focus or cohesive center that appears to be necessary if we are to keep things from "falling apart".

Over two and one-half millenia have passed since Pythagoras nourished Greek minds. What we have not forgotten, because we are creatures with an affinity for a reflection, is a wisdom that has stood the test of time. It is our degree of preoccupation with this first wisdom that distinguishes the scholar or intellectual from

the sage. We are referring to the wisdom of self-knowledge. Pythagoras qualifies as a sage because of his sensitivity for this wisdom. The Scottish scholar Burnet, describes the Pythagorean reflection.

> In this life, [Pythagoras suggested], there are three kinds of men, just as there are three sorts of people who come to the Olympic Games. The lower class is made up of those who come to buy and sell, the next above them are those who compete. Best of all, however, are those who come simply to look on. The greatest purification of all is, therefore, disinterested science, and it is the man who devotes himself to that, the true philosopher, who has most effectually released himself from the 'wheel of birth'. (19)

Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the metaphysical wealth of the world, all its true gold, a nugget here, a nugget there, lie broadly scattered throughout all of its time and space. The great gift that the sage Pythagoras did not possess and that we may ever drawn upon is the gift of time. Ever adding to the wealth that only time can purchase are the insightful offering of men and women from many cultures. Their recorded thoughts and deeds add authority and confirmation to what is, and must become, an ever more clear understanding of what it means to be a human being. Of significant value as well to an evolution of the paradigm of mankind are the often cruel and hard-won lessons of our whole sordid history; lessons that have been paid for in toil and in blood.

Kenneth Boulding, who borrowed the term from Chardin, talks of an evolving "nuosphere", or body of knowledge as it exists in the five billion minds of the human race throughout the world. While it has its weaknesses, the concept is useful in the sense that it suggests a process, however slow, of development. It appears reasonable to

suggest that our concepts of society and particularly humankind take shape within a dynamic expanding matrix whose parameters are outlined by the delicate tracings of every wise man, and as well the bizarre scribblings of every historically significant madman or fool. When the historian Arnold Toynbee describes "Confucius and Lao-tse; the Buddha; the Prophets of Israel and Judah; Zoroaster, Jesus, and Muhammad; and Socrates" the "greatest benefactors of the living generation of mankind," (20), he is suggesting that they have woven major threads into the dynamic paradigm of humankind.

If, out of all the world's collected wisdom we had to choose one phrase, one simple idea, one directive that could stand for the quintessential wisdom of all the ages, perhaps that wisdom would not be unlike the wisdom inscribed upon the temple of Apollo at Delphi which read: GNOTHI SEAUTON, "Know Thyself." That we have chosen to preserve this advice in it's myriad forms suggests something of its perennial importance to us. It is this timeless first wisdom that shall initially guide our hand and determine the path we must follow. The oracle at Delphi is joined by voices that sound from every corner of our world and every time in our history. From ancient China, in the Tao Te Ching we read:

> He who knows others is wise;
> He who knows himself is enlightened. (21)

The Moslem sage Azid ibn Muhammad al-Nasafi explains:

> When Ali asked Mohammad, "What am I to do that I may not waste my time?" the Prophet answered, "Learn to know thyself. (22)

In the Agamas, the traditional Hindu scriptures, regarded as no less authoritative and authentic than the Vedas, (23) we read in the Atma Sakshatkara:

> He who is not aware of the Self is an animal subject to creation, preservation and destruction, whereas he who is ever aware is Siva, eternal and pure. There is no doubt of this. Carefully distinguishing the transcendental from the commonplace, the subtle from the gross, the Self must always be investigated into and realized by the vigilant. (24)

And in the sixteenth century, Paracelsus, the neo-platonic physician who "endeavored to use philosophy as one of the 'pillars' of medical science," (25) wrote:

> Men do not know themselves, and therefore they do not understand the things of their inner world. Each man has the essence of God and all the wisdom and power of the world (germinally) in himself; he possesses one kind of knowledge as much as another, and he who does not find that which is in him cannot truly say that he does not possess it, but only that he was not capable of successfully seeking for it. (26)

Today, there is a growing recognition that a profound look at what constitutes human nature is essential if we want to come to terms with questions such as: "What do we mean by a 'good' education?" or "How do children come to care?" The philosopher-sage of classical or pre-classical times is joined by a growing number of contemporary thinkers and the self has become the subject of a renewed interest. As Wilber (1963) points out:

> (Only in the last twenty years has there been a shift in psychology back to the subject's consciousness of self) Spearheaded by such theorists as Hartmann, Sullivan, G.H. Mead, Erikson, Rogers, Fairbairn, Kohut, Loevinger, Maslow, and Branden, the study of the nature and function of the self-system has recently become of paramount importance. Indeed, the significance of self psychology might be indicated by the fact that the claim has already been made that "Kohut and Chicago are modern equivalents of Freud and Vienna." (27)

Among a new breed of philosopher-psychologists we find Rollo May who stresses the importance of studies that address the question of "being". By "being", May means that reflective or self-conscious creature "who can be conscious of, and therefore responsible for his existence". (28) He writes: "a serious source of resistance is one that runs through the whole of modern Western society - namely the psychological need to avoid and, in some ways, repress, the whole concern with being." (29) Gabriel Marcel makes a similar point when he suggests that: "the sense of the ontological - the sense of being - is lacking. Generally speaking, modern man is in this condition; if ontological demands worry him at all, it is only dully, as an obscure impulse." (30) It is not unusual to hear the importance of a concern for our being and more particularly concern for our "self", stressed in more positive terms. Huston Smith reminds us that:

> ...no issue - anthropological, psychololgical, philosophical, or theological - is more important than the way in which the self is to be conceived: individually, as a skin-encapsulated ego; socially, in terms of interpersonal transactions, role relations, situationism, or personality field theory; or cosmically, as Atman, Oversoul, or Sunyata, void in the sense of being de-void of empirical determinability. (31)

Today, the simple directive to "Know-Thyself," has taken on a more complex meaning, but the underlying impulse that motivates men and women to seek self-knowledge remains the same impulse that stimulates the poet to write verse, the philosopher to order ideas, the composer to arrange sounds, the artist to wed form and colour, the scientist to carefully measure, and the soldier or sportsman to

be fast and strong. The existential question: "Who am I?" is not answered only with words. However, words have the ability to mirror a broad range of experiences and hence they serve us well as we attempt to outline a paradigm in which human endeavor is given a more specific meaning.

AN IDEALIST APPROACH TO A PARADIGM

Having decided that the Capitol upon which we shall march is self-knowledge, or more generally a paradigm or model of humankind, we must now decide on a method of approach. The German idealist Fichte, wrote that "the kind of philosophy a man adopts depends on the kind of man he is." (32) We generally agree with Fichte, and add that the philosophies we adopt are dependent on the activity of a single "organ" which essentially defines the kind of man or woman we shall be. Equally important, we suggest that the "kind of man" we can be is not infinite or unlimited in variety but rather, can be described as one of several distinct types. William James suggests that there are two basic types of philosophies and that these are the expressions of two fundamental types of temperaments. He distinguishes between a "tender-minded" and a "tough-minded" temperaments. (33) (F3) We shall say more later about what we consider as two polar types not entirely dissimilar to James' formulation of types, but for now we must look more closely at the question of understanding itself. It is possible that the question, "How do we know?" holds important clues to what we can know about our natures; or put another way, (assuming God does not lie) that human consciousness can give us clues to the nature of human being. How we see is related to what we see.

Let us now be a little more specific with regard to the way in which we propose to approach the problem of finding a general paradigm of humankind. In a chapter titled, Building a Philosophy of

Education, J.D. Butler argues that "Epistemology, or knowledge theory, is the decisive crux of philosophical thought because it examines the means by which we come to have our alleged truths and thereby helps us to test them." (34) In his well-known Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke, explains that the question of the source of our knowledge is the first question we must tackle before we enter into any philosophical debate. (35) Kant, too, placed this issue first among the significant questions of life. As Harold Titus points out in, Living Issues in Philosophy, "For him (Kant) the problem of knowledge, "What can one know?" came before the problem of ethics, "What we ought to do?" and the problem of religion, "For what may one hope?" (36)

In adopting the position that the first philosophic questions must be epistemological questions, that is, questions about how we know or how we become conscious of certain relationships, facts, or truths, we identify our philosophic temper or disposition as being idealistic in contrast to realistic. The significance of the idealist approach to educational theory as Dupuis and Nordberg explain in Philosophy and Education, is that: "The aims of education are usually expressed [by idealists] in terms of self-development,.." and further, "Generally, idealists have favored broad cultural goals in education (including religious ones) as against narrower vocational goals." (37) Butler notes that the realist by contrast: "...insists that the objects of the external world are real in themselves and are not dependent upon any mind for their existence." (38) In this paper we shall assume that the objects of the external

world can have more than an empirical "there they are" meaning for us, and that the meaning they do have depends on the nature or quality of our reflection. In other words, we shall examine the possibility that an objective reality (in this case the reality of ourselves) becomes visible through a deepening or unfolding of a subjective experience that has a universal nature.

We are skeptical about Russell's reply to the question "What are the sources of knowledge?" which he answers by saying that "sensation, immediate expectation, immediate memory, and true memory all give knowledge...." (39) We might mention as well that we disagree with John Dewey for whom there fundamentally is no knowledge problem or knowledge issue. For Dewey, "the theory of evolution has shown that man and nature are one. (40) For the idealist, the "man is nature" position represents an ontological dead end or abdication from doing a certain type of philosophy that represents its very heart. This type of realist reply neither answers enough questions nor sufficiently exercises our capacity to contemplate possibilities. Hence it might be considered as a kind of excuse for not doing philosopy.

With regard to an epistemology, we shall tend towards objective idealism, that is, the position that there is a purposeful intelligence or meaning at the heart of all nature. Further, we shall assume that this nature is discovered in a very specific and purposeful way as opposed to being arbitrarily "read into" or "projected onto" an open-ended universe. In describing the position of objective idealism, Harold Titus explains: "The existence of

meaning in the world, however, implies something akin to mind or thought at the core of reality. Such a significant order of reality is given man to comprehend and to participate in." (41) Titus further summarizes the idealist position in the following:

> Idealism is thus in harmony with many of the institutions and aspirations of men. Men want to believe that what is 'highest in spirit' is also 'deepest in nature,' and idealism seems to make such a belief not only possible but reasonable. Idealism, its supporters claim, brings intelligence into the spiritual intuitions of the race. (42)

Hence, an important characteristic that the writer shares with certain idealists is the belief or understanding that the quality (as opposed to quantity) of knowing, directly influences the quality of self-consciousness and hence being as well.

Professor Chevalier, writes that for Blaise Pascal, "connaître c'est chercher" (43) and so describes Pascal's optimism in embarking on the search for meaning. Pascal's optimism is not unlike the optimism of a Newton, a Kepler, or an Einstein, whose faiths in an order preceeded an elucidation of its parameters. Perhaps a faith in some order is not an unreasonable way to approach values theory; or more likely, perhaps it is the only way that it can be approached. It should be clear that in this thesis we will not prove anything. We will only attempt to elucidate our particular point of view. It seems that what humankind considers to be true about itself in particular and the universe in general will in a final sense continue to emerge from what it <u>intuits</u> to be the most <u>beautiful</u> or the most <u>good</u> or the most <u>true</u>. What theory emerges must be understood in the original meaning of the word theoria, which is, "a looking at, a

contemplation of," truths or relationships that come into view as our eyes are opened in a certain way. It is in this sense that, "connaître c'est chercher" is meaningful. To embark on this type of philosophic journey requires first of all a faith or a belief that such a journey is worth making.

To give form to our faith or belief, to consolidate it, we shall ultimately organise our thoughts into the substance of a model. We will consider model-making/finding an essential step in the goals we pursue. Fraenkel, in Readings in Moral Education, addresses the issue of model formulation. Writing on what he feels is required in the field of values education, he explains:

> We need to have lots of models and strategies proposed and then lots of research which tests and compares the effectiveness of these models and strategies in promoting both short- and long-range emotional and intellectual development. What is lacking at present is any sort of educational theory which integrates psychological notions about both intellectual and emotional development, together with a philosophical consideration of what values education should be about. This would appear to be a goal toward which all who are interested in seeing a comprehensive program of values education implemented in social studies classrooms might direct their efforts. (44)

Let us proceed with our search for a paradigm of humankind by looking more closely at the ways in which we know, for as we have pointed out, the ways in which we do know are related to what we can know.

SECTION 2

SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

In this section we will examine three ways of knowing generally described by philosophers. We will also attempt to show that the fields of knowledge so described are distinct fields and that a "category error" (to use Ken Wilber's term) results whenever one eye or one way of knowing is called upon to interpret the validity of claims made in another field. Again, we point out that we attempt to approach an ontology or a theory of being through an examination of the ways in which we can know. Hence, we adopt an epistemological approach to ontology. This, we feel may be a relatively safe approach to a paradigm of humankind. By taking note of the distinctions that exist in the way that we know, we may discover distinctions in ways of being human as well. First let us examine the claim that there are three distinct fields of knowledge or "eyes" with which we may interpret the world.

In Living Issues in Philosophy, Professor Titus, lists four sources of knowledge. These are:

1) The testimony of others: Authoritarianism.
2) Intuition, or the way of mystic insight: Intuitionism.
3) Reason as a source: Rationalism.
4) The senses as the source: Empiricism. (45) (F1)

In this part of the paper we shall attempt to shed some light on several important distinctions between the empirical, the rational, and the intuitive avenues to knowledge. We shall exclude for the

moment from our discussion, "Authoritarianism: The testimony of others" which in a sense represents the imposed or impressed "facts" which are distinct from the ways in which we ourselves know. That is, since we are first interested in a model of being, we limit our discussion here to the subjective factors relating to knowledge.

We shall consider that intuition, the convincing force of non-dualistic insight; rationalism, the convincing force of logical form or reasoning; and empiricism, the convincing force of the senses; are the internal authorities or types of sensitivity shared to various degrees by all of humankind. With regard to authoritarianism, while it is certainly true that we grow to know things within a specific cultural matrix, it also appears true that this seedbed does not finally determine the potential of the seed but rather only exists to nourish it; that is, to enable it to reach to a greater or lesser degree the fullness of its potential. An acorn can grow poorly or well, but if it grows at all it can only grow into an oak. Our focus first of all will be on the seed and not the seedbed. In the last part of this paper we shall consider the significance of the environment or others.

Professor W.L.Reese, in his Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion, similarly makes the claim that there are three fundamental epistemologies. While a basic distinction is drawn between empiricism and rationalism, Reese recognizes a third approach to knowledge which is "To be contrasted with empiricism and rationalism as sources of knowledge." (47) and which he identifies as "intuitionism." (F2) It may be reasonable to suggest that these

distinctions in philosophic perspectives or points of view are the views expressed as we "see" things through one or another of the three "eyes" of humankind.

If we seek the philosophical origins for the tripartite distinction made above, we note that it was likely first introduced into the current of Western thought by the writings of Hugh of St. Victor, St. Bonaventure, and St. Augustine. (48) According to these philosophers of the early Christian era, man's perceptions come to him through the eye of flesh (the somatic senses), the eye of reason (the speculative mind), and the eye of heart (the reflective-contemplative faculty). Hence, Wilber explains: "let us assume that all men and women possess an eye of flesh, an eye of reason, and an eye of contemplation; [and] that each eye has its own objects of knowledge (sensory, mental, and transcendental)" (49)

"We see things not only from different sides but with different eyes." wrote Pascal. (50) The Indian philosopher Radhakrishnan is more precise. He explains that: "While all varieties of cognitive experience result in a knowledge of the real, it is produced in three ways, which are sense experience, discursive reasoning, and intuitive apprehension." (51) It is fairly clear that Radhakrishnan was influenced by the Bhagavadgita. In this sacred text of the Hindus, we read in chapter 28, (verses 21, 22 and 23), that there are three kinds of knowledge. These correspond to Radhakrishnan's own tripartite distinction in types of knowledge. The text distinguishes between:

1) The knowledge by which the one Imperishable Being is seen in all existences, undivided in the divided, know that that knowledge is of 'goodness.'"

2) The knowledge which sees multiplicity of beings in the different creatures, by reason of their separateness, know that knowledge is of the nature of 'passion.'"
3) [The knowledge] which clings to one single effect as if it were the whole, without concern for the cause, without grasping the real, and narrow is declared to be of the nature of 'dullness.'" (52)

Blaise Pascal, recognizes "three orders, levels or storeys, which constitute the totality of being" (53) and a type of knowing is associated with each one. As Ernest Mortimer points out in his sensitive study on the French philosopher; for Pascal, "the material world is the basis and the point of departure for studying the whole, yet [it] is as remote from the realm of thought as linear geometry is from solid geometry." (54) Mortimer further explains that Pascal "has become certain that there is a [further] realm of truths which the reasoning intellect cannot, by itself, comprehend...whose distance above the order of mind was 'infinitely more infinite' than that of minds over bodies. He calls this faculty "le coeur", a name with romantic associations but not here used with romantic intention." (55) Plotinos, as well, recognizes three distinct and heirarchaical levels of knowledge. He explains that: "sense perceptions are below us, logical reasonings are with us, and spiritual apprehensions are above us." (56) E.F. Schumacher, in A Guide for the Perplexed, is equally succinct. He writes: "The answer to the question 'What are man's instruments by which he knows the world outside him?' is therefore quite inescapably this: 'Everything he has got'--his living body, his mind, and his self-aware Spirit." (57)

We shall consider this distinction between three "eyes" or three "instruments" of knowledge as hypothetically fundamental, operating in a sense as the three voices or authorities that direct us to ideas about the real. Whenever we enlist the support of one of these three authorities, that is, the eye of flesh, the eye of mind, or the eye of the heart, we observe that three distinct views of reality result. In a very general sense, the empiricist relies on sense experience to order or organize ideas about the nature of reality, the rationalist leans more heavily on discursive reason to order or organize ideas about the nature of reality, and the intuitionist relies on what he would consider a trans-rational stimulus or source for what might be described as, his insights, his belief, his faith, or as we put it, his intuition, to order his ideas about the nature of reality. Again, we point out that the reality that shall concern us is the reality (or realities) of what it means to be a human being.

As an example of how, what we might call three different "dispositions" result in different ways of looking at the world, we point to the affective domain, or more particularly the significance of feelings. The empiricist would tend to describe feelings as the effect of a physiological, psychological or sociological experience of order or disorder. The rationalist (that is, the theoretical one of our definition), would relate feelings to the awareness of some metaphysically knowable state of order. (F3) The man or woman distinguished by an intuitive disposition would relate feelings to

his or her ability to intuit or experience some degree of the wholeness (holiness) of the uni-verse.

It is no doubt clear to the reader that because as human beings we possess all three eyes, our veiw of the real does not fall strictly into one or another of the categories mentioned above, but rather, tends to be a composite of views or dispositions. A first step towards the formulation of a paradigm requires that we untangle the knot of distinct dialects or that we realise that we do not all speak the same "language." Once we can appreciate the significance of these differences, then, we may be in a position to begin a process of inter-communication; or at least we might then learn to accept the legitimacy of a "language" in its own domain and refrain from judging one "language" by the standards of another. It is perhaps naive to believe that some effective philosophic ambassador could ever come to our aid, still, the idea is fascinating. At this point let us distinguish between types of knowledge. Later we shall attempt to put back together what we have taken apart.

We have already suggested that the three authorities described are not clearly differentiated within man, that is, they might raise their voices and lay claims to be heard in what could appear to be a random or "lawless" fashion. Where three authorities exist in a being that makes one decision at a time no doubt internal struggles arise. These on the whole represent a natural state for which some order or degree of harmony will be sought. Concerning this point, we

recall that Plato's concepts of justice and wisdom are related to the establishment of order in a tripartite soul. He distinguishes between an appetitive part of the soul "...shall we say that appetites form one class..." (58), a rational part, "We may call that part of the soul whereby it reflects, rational;" (59) and a spirited part, "...the spirited part makes a third,..." (60). For Plato the highest part is the rational part of the soul, "all are agreed that reason should be ruler" (61). The hierarchy he so establishes forms the foundation for his definitions of the "virtuous" and the "just" man. We draw attention to these terms particularly because we agree with Plato that with regard to knowledge, a distinction between types of authority, and an understanding of the relationship (order) between them, constitute the first and most important steps in the establishment of a model or paradigm of humankind. Plato writes:

> The just man does not allow the several elements in his soul to usurp one another's functions; he is indeed one who sets his house in order, by self-mastery and discipline coming to be at peace with himself, and bringing into tune those three parts, like the terms in the proportion of a musical scale, the highest and lowest notes and the mean between them, with all the intermediate intervals. Only when he has linked these parts together in well-tempered harmony and has made himself one man instead of many, will he be ready to go about whatever he may have to do, whether it be making money and satisfying bodily wants, or business transactions, or the affairs of state. In all these fields when he speaks of just and honourable conduct, he will mean the behavior that helps to produce and to preserve this habit of mind; and by wisdom he will mean the knowledge which presides over such conduct. Any action which tends to break down this habit will be for him unjust; and the notions governing it he will call ignorance and folly. (62)

In The Heart of Philosophy, Jacob Needleman, summarizes Plato's message in the Republic. He explains:

> The Republic, is about man considered as three-storied structure, a tripartite being. All the sufferings and evils of human life arise because these three parts are out of relationship to each other ....There you have it. That is the whole message of Plato. (63)

An important claim that follows this tripartite distinction in ways of knowing is the claim that each "eye" can only be an authority only in its own domain. That is, while the eye of flesh must decide the truth about relationships that are "sensible" in a visible manner, it is quite blind to a body of relationships or truths that are "visible" to the eye of mind. In The Republic, Plato is emphatic about the distinction between belief (pistis) and imagining (eikasia), which refer to the world of appearance and; thinking (dianoia), knowledge (episteme) and intelligence (noesis), which refer to the higher intelligible world. (64)

Further, while the eye of the mind is more or less competent in its own domain, it too, can become hopelessly lost when it attempts to describe truths reserved for the eye of the heart. "Recognizing the poverty of philosophical opinions," says the Buddha, "not adhering to any of them, seeking the truth I saw." (65) Or again, "Do not go by reasoning, nor by inferring, nor by argument as to method, nor from reflection on and approval of an opinion...But when you know of yourselves." (66) Pascal, makes the distinction between the eye of the mind and the eye of the heart in the well-known quotation: "The heart has its reasons, that reason knows not of."

(67) Micheal Polanyi, in The Tacit Dimension explains: "We can know more than we can tell," (68) and Kant points to a house of cards in his important works on the limits of pure reason. He writes:

> Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. (69)

Once we have established that distinctions in perception and consequently distinct categories of knowledge exist, we are likely to become aware as we have suggested, that the truths of distinct categories, like apples and pears, must not be judged by the same criteria. At the outset it is important that we distinguish between various types of authority because we purchase our right to describe something as being "true" with the evidence and support of one of these. We make a "category error," to use Wilber's term, (70) whenever we enlist the authority in one field of knowledge to act as a judge in another field. We have already noted in connection with his triad, that for Pascal, "No amount of magnitude in a lower order could amplify a higher order." (71) Ken Wilber, similarly reminds us that:

> The epitome of fleshy truth is empirical fact; the epitome of mental truth is philosophic and psychologic insight; and the epitome of contemplative truth is spiritual wisdom. We saw that prior to the modern era men and women had not sufficiently differentiated the eyes of flesh, reason, and contemplation, and thus tended to confuse them. Religion tried to be scientific, philosophy tried to be religious, science tried to be philosophic - and all were, to just that extent, wrong. They were guilty of category errors. (72)

Schumacher, makes the same point in, A Guide For the Perplexed, when he suggests that: "The unity of knowledge is destroyed when one

or several of the ...Fields of Knowledge remain uncultivated, and also when a field is cultivated with instruments and methodologies which are appropriate only in quite another field." (73) We add that the danger of making category errors is most likely to occur when one or more of the three eyes of man is shut or only sees poorly; for then, the temptation to describe unfamiliar terrain in terms of the familiar becomes hard if not impossible to resist. A.J. Ayer exemplifies the philosopher who appears to be suffering from a kind of philosophical tunnel vision. Erudition appears unable to buy an ounce of wisdom. Ayer writes:

> We do not deny a priori that the mystic is able to discover truths by his own special methods. We wait to hear what are the propositions which embody his discoveries, in order to see whether they are verified or confuted by our empirical observations. But the mystic, so far from producing propositions which are empirically verified, is unable to produce any intelligible propositions at all. (74)

If Ayer insists on waiting for the day that the quality of an apple can be judged by comparing it to the quality of a pear, he may have to wait for a very long time. Without a clear understanding of the tripartite nature of authority, that is, without an awareness of the distinction between the possibilities for perception that are offered by the <u>three</u> eyes of humankind, much conflict and confusion over what is true, and who possesses "the truth", remains the only reliable certainty. That our perceptions of reality and ourselves, take shape around a disposition towards one of three distinct types of "sight" is not a very novel or ambitious claim. Perhaps, more ambitious is the claim that if we expect to see well, we must first of all open <u>all</u> of our eyes, and secondly, we must organize our

general capacity for sight into a heirarchy not entirely unlike Plato's "well tempered harmony." Having done so, perhaps we can expect that we shall be "one man instead of many" or <u>whole</u> men and women, instead of a people at war with themselves.

Having suggested that there are three "eyes" or philosophic dispositions which we may employ in the pursuit of knowledge in general and self-knowledge in particular, and having suggested that we must be careful to remain aware of the distinctions between these "eyes" as sources of knowledge, we will now proceed with an examination of the kinds of distortions that occur when we lose sight of distinctions between these categories of knowledge. We proceed with a brief discussion of the category error in Western thought.

THE CATEGORY ERROR

Even the most casual investigation of Western philosophical thought reveals how the category error has ever been with us. Socrates, in attempting to use reason to expose men's pretentions to knowledge, himself ran up against the limits or inconclusiveness of even "good" reason. In recognizing to some degree these limits, that is, for confessing his ignorance, the oracle at Delphi called him the wisest of men. And yet, reason represented for Socrates the only sure path to an ultimate knowledge of things. In the Crito Socrates explains: "For I am and always have been one of those natures who must be guided by reason..." (75)

With regard to making category distinctions we owe a great deal to Plato, but it appears that even he was sometimes guilty of making the category error. When Socrates explains in the Theaetetus (76) that wine tastes sweet when he is well and sour when he is ill, thereby demonstrating that the senses are generally unreliable, he does not really invalidate the senses. What he does is to demonstrate that our sense of taste is dependent on certain somatic conditions and that these must be taken into account when we make sense-based judgements. To blame the eye of flesh for not being able to do the work of the eye of reason is to fall into the category error. It is perhaps unfortunate that Plato's trenchant body-soul distinction developed into a wholesale hostility and mistrust of the senses, one that was adopted by Christian theology and is still felt

today. For Plato, as Russell explains, "nothing worthy to be called 'knowledge' (is) to be derived from the senses...the only real knowledge has to do with concepts." (78) Or as Russell suggests, for Plato knowledge is not perception, but reflection. (79) Again, in the Theaetetus, Plato argues that perception "has no part in apprehending truth since it has none in apprehending existence." (80) When Plato speaks of truth, writes Paul Friedländer, he refers to a "goal (which) is an intellectual vision of the highest reality." (81) In the one instance, his very active and capable eye of reason dismisses the eye of flesh, and in another it is reluctant to recognize the mystic's eye of contemplation. As Friedländer, in comparing Plato to Plotinos points out:

> To become God is Plotinos' longing: Our striving is not to be without flaw, but to be God. Plato's object is to grow in the image of God, beloved of God, and, as far as possible, similar to God. This is not merely a difference of words; on the contrary, Plato's dialectical path and Plotinos' scala mystica-wrongly taking its name from the former-sharply divide at this point. (82)

Plato, Friedländer continues, "maintains the separation of the 'I' and the 'object' in strict counterposition to each other." (83) He adds: "It never did or could enter the mind of Plato, a citizen of so form-conscious a world, to let the soul be dissolved in formlessness." (84) In his essay on Platon's Lehre von der Wahrheit, Heidegger, argues that Plato's mistake was to have regarded truth as the correspondence of mind with (empirical) fact. This approach to knowledge which Heidegger claims accounts for the main cause of difficulties and misunderstandings in Western philosophy, (85) is, we suggest, the result of making a category error. Further,

while the distinction between perception and reflection keeps Plato busy on one battlefield, it appears to result in his inability to fully appreciate a third possibility for sight. Writes Cornford, "Plato sinks in the Titanic effort to stand with feet on earth and uphold the sky." (86) (F4)

Aristotle, more the realist than his idealistic tutor, attempted to set things right by according to the eye of flesh at least some of the authority which he rightly felt belonged to it. Thomson calls Aristotle: "the true founder of science; that is of the natural or physical sciences." (88) If Aristotle can be accused of a category error it would point in the opposite direction. Plato tried to grasp the transcendental with his mind. Aristotle was more interested in using the mind to describe what could finally only be sense-validated truths. As Whitehead points out, Aristotle mislead the physicists because: "in effect, these doctrines said to the physicist classify when they should have said measure". (89) Whitehead concludes: "if only the schoolmen had measured instead of classifying, how much they might have learned!" (90) A correction of the errors that resulted when the mind did duty for the senses had to wait for men like Bacon, Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Kepler and later Darwin, who gradually established the authority of the eye of flesh.

While it appears that sages like Jesus or the Buddha, being fully committed to a reality "visible" via the eye of contemplation (heart), were not mislead into making the category error, the influence of Jesus through ignorance and ambition became the source of a whole new generation of category errors. In its early stages

the Christian faith recognized, at least as an ideal, the importance of an active eye of contemplation. Among its early sages were contemplatives like St. Augustine, St. Bonaventure, and Hugh of St. Victor, who attempted to remain true to the Christian ideal of remaining pure in heart that they might "see" God. But as Nasr notes, by the time of Aquinas things had changed.

> In the Occident, however, the translation of Arabic works into Latin, which caused a major intellectual change from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, resulted gradually in the Aristotelianization of Christian theology. Rationalism came to replace the earlier Augustinian theology based on illumination and the contemplative view of nature was increasingly pushed aside as the Gnostic and metaphysical dimension of Christianity became ever more stifled in an increasingly rationalistic environment. (91)

No doubt, for the practical reason of maintaining and managing an expanding kingdom on earth, the eye of reason grew more and more influential. Meanwhile, the significance of an eye of contemplation to a life within the established church grew weaker and weaker. Thomas Aquinas offered as a substitute for "seeing" God, numerous "proofs" of His existence, which is to say that he attempted to capture with the eye of mind that which the mystics would clearly explain can only be "seen" with the eye of heart. (F5)

Having assumed authority over the kingdom of earth, the church, found itself in the unenviable position of having to provide answers for everything; and nowhere was the category error more obvious nor the result more ridiculous than when the eye of the mind interpreting the eye of contemplation, was called on to speak for what properly was the domain of the eye of the flesh. As an example of the kind of gross distortion that was inevitable and that contributed to a

gradual erosion of ecclesiastic authority, we are told of the monk Cosmas, (93) who wrote a book titled, Christian Topography, which was based entirely on a literal reading of the Bible. In the book, Cosmas, in all earnestness points out that the earth is a flat parallelogram whose length is exactly twice its width. Anyone at all tempted to seriously exercise his eye of flesh did not have to look far or hard to realize that the emperor wore no clothes. It is understandable that the emperor grew nervous, particularly as a snigger here and there gradually turned into a wholesale mockery. Some in the crowd, perhaps those who were laughing the hardest, became so irreverent that they fell without realizing it into an equally inexcusable category error. Realizing that the eye of the heart, (reduced for them to the status of a non-eye), was unable to compete with the eye of flesh in mundane matters, they dismissed it altogether, and instead, suggested an inversion of the traditional view. In place of the eye of contemplation all authority was to be given over to the eye of flesh. In his Letters to the Blind, Denis Diderot, in a cavalier self-assured manner, writes: "If you want me to believe in God, you must make me touch him." (94) As it became clear that its eye of reason was weak, its eye of flesh was blind and its eye of contemplation (heart) had entirely atrophied, Christian metaphysics, went into a decline in authority. (95) In attempting in one glimpse to see for all eyes, it finally saw for none.

The Renaissance was a rebirth in the confidence of man's corporal eye; everywhere in the sciences and the arts the creative spirits of that period celebrated and gave wing to its particular

powers. As earlier the Greeks had employed the eye of reason to free themselves from capricious gods that dominated much of their lives, so, thinking Renaissance man employed particularly an awakening eye of the flesh to free himself from the influence of a dogmatic church that dominated much of his life. It is not surprising to find that a counter vision, challenging and even undermining the long established theomorphic structures would grow in popularity. As Nasr points out: "humanists like Petrarch, Gerhard Groot, Erasmus and philosophers like Telesio, Campanella and Adriano di Corneto already had doubts about the power of philosophy to reach ultimate principles". (96) What previously was a reality expressed as some confusion or mixture of the three eyes of mankind, gradually, by a process of separation (to which philosophers such as Plato, Bacon, Descartes and Kant were particularly significant), became a reality that had only two distinct arms, flesh and spirit (heart), each of which struggled to gain control over the consciousness or mind of man.

We know how that struggle is going. In the West, the eye of flesh has the upper hand; the eye of mind has become its servant and the eye of the heart (yeilding intuition) is considered an out-dated organ in our pursuit of a knowledge of the "real" world. The strongly an anti-intellectual position of the church (it has been mockingly suggested that its unwritten eleventh commandment was: "Thou shalt not think!"), no doubt contibuted to the day that the baby would be thrown out with the dirty bathwater. Discovery, for Western man finally came to mean discovery through only one eye, an eye that requires all within its ken to be expressed in a way that

organs of sense tend to perceive things, namely, quantitatively.

As philosophy, which might be considered as thought about that which is true or real in a most general way, slowly freed itself from one authority, it fell under the influence of another. In assuming the role of handmaiden to science, philosophy gave up its soul. Professor Saksena is apologetic for what he admits may be an "unsympathetic oversimplification," but he maintains that nevertheless there is an element of undeniable truth in his claim that: "From ancient times to modern and from modern times to contemporary, the journey of philosophical reflection in the West has been, broadly speaking, from the "practical" to the "useless" and from the "useless" to the "nonsensical." (97) Professor Needleman is more kind, but he too is aware that something highly objectionable has happened to philosophy when he writes:

> ...philosophy, while detaching itself from a relatively elementary form of religion, remains itself-with regard to the actual attainment of wisdom-forever bogged down on the same elementary level. No matter how intricate, subtle, or comprehensive its thought becomes, it will never move from that level. And thus, when an even more efficient way of "living in the desert" comes along-Western natural science - it is quick to recognize this as its master, or at least as that to which it must direct most of its energies. From the point of view of the actual attainment of wisdom, the development of philosophy from Descartes through Locke, Hume, Kant, and the contemporary schools thus represents little more than the rationalization of the chains that hold man in the cave. Philosophy becomes easy. (98)

Having given up its interest in the <u>unitive</u> well-spring of intuitive knowledge, that is, knowledge reflecting the view through the eye of the heart, philosophy turned from discovery to invention.

"Every modern philosopher" as Maritain remarks, "is a Cartesian in the sense that he looks upon himself as starting off in the absolute, and as having the mission of bringing men a new conception of the world." (99) (F6) No doubt the scepticism of Hume contributed to what was becoming a speculative and factious philosophical environment. Kant's "Critiques" were written to clear the thickening philosophic air and he certainly did succeed in clearing it, but in a sense he succeeded too well. Kant suggested that between faith (intuitive belief/knowledge) and a kind of metaphysical knowledge (metaphysics without the meta) which he called the "true method of metaphysics" and which is "fundamentally the same as that which Newton has introduced into natural science, and which has there yielded such fruitful results," (100) there can only exist the kind of unreliable metaphysical speculation that is entirely at the mercy of variations in time and space. Walter Kaufmann explains that Kant espouses a "two world doctrine." (101) In the preface to the second edition of his Critique, Kant confesses that he "had to do away with knowledge (traditional metaphysics) to make room for faith." (102) Commenting on this point, Professor Kaufmann tells us that: "He (Kant) had left room for God and freedom beyond the world of appearance, in that realm of which no knowledge is possible." (103) By proving the inconclusiveness of metaphysical speculation, Kant effectively suggested to mankind that concerning his knowledge of ultimates, much may he wonder but little can he know. This unsettled state, this Kantian split between heaven and earth created a sort of metaphysical vacuum and as Nasr ponts out, set the stage for the "irrational philosophies" (104) of later thinkers.

In his own time, Kant, reacted wisely to what he realized was a category error, that is, the error that results particularly when the eye of mind tries to see for the eye of the heart. Unfortunately however, as Schopenhauer was later to point out (F7), having metaphysically divided heaven and earth, Kant was unable to put them back together again. In order not to loose sight of the God in whom he believed, the pious Königsberger was commited to making a mighty leap of faith that Kierkegaard referred to as a tremendous "somersault, a "salto inmortal" between the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. In the first Critique, Professor Unamuno points out, Kant "pulverized with his analysis the traditional proofs of the existence of God, of the Aristotelian God,...the abstract God, the unmoved prime Mover," while in the second book, he "reconstructs God anew," but this time the "God of conscience, the Author of the moral order--the Lutheran God, in short." (106) Perhaps, if Kant's eye of the heart were a little more open, the space he created between earth and heaven might have remained philosophically more habitable. As it was, Kant, whom Kaufmann refers to as a "moral rationalist" (107) appears to have been satisfied by a cold faith.

If philosophically we are still paying for the errors of a zealous church, then it appears that we are also paying a sizeable interest on that error. The general philosophic reaction to a failing church and the Kantian revolution was a gradual reduction in the credibility of the eye of contemplation (heart) and its voice in the eye of the mind; and a consequent greater reliance on facts

visible to eye of flesh (or sense) interpreted in mind. As Nasr remarks: the universe consequently takes on a mantle of Itness or "pure it", "divorced completely from any ontological aspect other than pure quantity." (108) When Maritain suggests that: "Cartesian evidence goes straight to mechanism", and that from this viewpoint, "The universe becomes dumb," (109) he is suggesting that mankind as well, from this point of view, would have to find himself dumb in a very fundamental way. Indeed as Russell implies, mankind is capable of no greater intelligence than the knowledge and the acceptance of his dumbness. For him, anxiety and despair are the hallmarks of intelligence. Pessimism naturally accompanies the low estate to which philosophy has fallen. Russell explains: "To teach how to live without certainty...is perhaps the chief thing that philosophy, in our age, can still do for those who study it." (110)

We do not deny that an important role of philosophy can be to help us give up or let go of certainties that have outlived their usefulness. We agree that an important role of philosophy can be to help us to be courageous in facing the uncertainties of life. However, we feel that an equally important role of philosophy can be to point out, or to point to, the possibility of new realities, realities with a fresh potential to satisfy our existential needs. The metaphysician's prison is not more comfortable than the theologian's. Both appear unwilling to unlock the doors to mankind's potential for becoming. This occurs because both are blind to the possibility that mankind may possess an "organ" with a distinct capacity for a type of sight quite unlike the others. For all his

claims about the uncertainty of our knowledge Russell nevertheless managed to give advice on a most impressive range of topics. An affirmative positive voice of philosophy must not let itself le bullied into silence by a negative sceptical one. Finding fault with flight (thought inspired by our eye of the heart) is only natural when we perceive ourselves as wingless fowl.

The impressive view offered by the eye of flesh (science) has perhaps made every other view appear unspectacular by comparison. No doubt it has contributed to a hasty judgement of truths or statements of relationship that are supported by an authority that is non-sense. The category error is alive and well in modern philosophy. Perhaps the reason modern philosophies of education have difficulty in coming to terms with the elusive meaning or purpose of education is that under the influence of an empirical-pragmatic particularly Western approach to knowledge, they have been convinced to shut the very eye that alone is capable of detecting it. The projection of the Cartesian and Kantian positions into modern educational philosophy have depraved the eye of mind, supported an ignor-ance of the eye of contemplation and have over-inflated the importance of eye of the flesh. To the extent that our reports of reality suffer because they do not give evidence of our <u>whole</u> potential for "sight", to that extent they will be unable to provide a meaning that satisfies a <u>whole</u> of us. (F8)

With regard to self-knowledge, Wilber points out:

> No wonder Habermas (and others) draws such a strong line between empiric-analytical inquiry and hermeneutical inquiry - it is the difference between inquiry based on modes that are subhuman vs. those properly human. The reason most orthodox Western

> psychology cannot tell you one interesting point about the meaning of your life is that it has proudly restricted itself to empiric-analytic inquiry. (112)

Perhaps Wilber overstates his case here. We would add by way of explanation that the difficulty encountered when we rely only on empirical evidence in our studies of mankind, is that empiric-analytic inquiry on the whole must focus on what presently is, or what has been. That is, empirical inquiry is served by an eye that on the whole looks to, and is restricted by, a <u>past</u>. While this approach works well when we seek knowledge of geological, biological, or physical processes, it appears unable to help us understand that which cannot be observed in this way. The processes studied by the scientist are limited to some form of eye-witnessable constant or repetitive natural processes. Human development differs most significantly from these types of processes in that it is not a process that is empirically observed in its complete cycle. That is, the human developmental process is in progress, ongoing, and we in the spring of our time, we may see roots and leaves and stem, but we are not yet collectively convinced or aware that the organism has a potential to flower.

Empirically, we can not know that humankind is mid-way between the beasts and the angels. Empirical evidence can only point with certainty to the beast. To define ourselves solely by what we have been, Marshall McLuhan might have suggested, is like driving into our future by looking only through the rear-view mirror. It is obvious that to define ourselves by what we have been offers us only a very limited perspective on the nature of human being. By no means should

such a one-eyed perspective be permitted to discourage us from using our other forward-looking, potential-seeking, eye of intuition. From the empirical perspective, the significance of becoming (potential) for humankind is lost in the substance-tial reality of being (actual or past being). Modern man lacks a kind of vision. Writing from the perspective of an enlightened psychologist, Rollo May, recognizes the importance of becoming to humankind. He explains:

> We can understand another human being only as we see what he is moving toward, what he is becoming; and we can know ourselves only as we 'project our potentia in action.' The significant tense for human beings is thus the future--that is to say, the critical question is what I am pointing toward, what I will be in the immediate future. (113)

As we have pointed out in our discussion of the category error, truths are of various kinds and it makes little sense to describe the quality of an orange by comparing it to an even very perfect apple. Apples must be compared with apples, and oranges with oranges. In other words, scientists must decide among themselves which empirical "facts" merit the stamp of "truth," and philosophers, or the philosopher in everyone of us, must likewise be consulted to decide which philosophical "facts" or statements of relationship are worthy to be called truths. To neglect, or worse, to dismiss "the good" because it is an intangeable concept, is to entirely ignore its own particular reality. It is like saying about an apple, "Why bother with it? After all, it does not appear to be a very good orange." When Viktor Frankl reminds us that: "We have not to fear that scientists are specializing as much as generalizing", (114) he hints at a respect for boundaries between distinct fields of knowledge.

We agree with the Buddha, with Plato, with Pascal, with Spinoza and countless other who point out that knowledge has several distinct faces. That is, we do not accept that there is only one type of knowledge and that we can only have more or less of it.

In the next chapter we shall examine the question of heirarchies of knowledge and the related heirarchies of being. We shall suggest that at the very least, a qualitative type of knowledge co-habits in the mind of man with a quantitive variety. We shall examine the proposition that the human mind is like a fertile delta that is built up under the influence of two streams; the one, flowing from the outside-in (sense data) delivering to it the substance or matter of its bed, the other, acting from the inside-out (intuitive influence) stratifying or otherwise organizing that substance according to the laws of its nature. That discussion will result in formulation our theory of knowledge.

A THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

In the last section we distinguished between the three "eyes" of humankind. Making such a distinction is important we pointed out so that we do not commit the category error, that is, so that we do not confuse one type of focus and the images that result with another type. Having suggested that distinctions in the way that we can see exist, a next question must be, what relationship if any, can be found between distinct types of sight? That is, can some sort of order or hierarchy be established between types of knowledge?" The answer to this question has been given in the affirmative by philosophers from Plato through Kant and Spinoza through Berdyaev. It has been answered in the affirmative by sages, from the Buddha through St. Augustine and Lao-ste through Ramana Maharshi. In a most general sense, this hierarchy points from a knowledge through the eye of the flesh to a knowledge through the eye of the mind (the philosophers), or from a knowledge through the eye of the mind to a knowledge through the eye of the heart (the sages), but on what evidence can we draw to support this claim?

A good way to begin may be to look briefly at Kantian epistemology for Kant points to a most important distinction that offers us an excellent point of departure. Kant we recall, was by his own confession drawn from his "dogmatic slumber" by the

philosophy of David Hume. Kant respected the important contribution that Hume made to epistemology but felt that it represented only part of the complete story of how we come to know things. Hume, we recall, suggested that the mind of man was like a passive wax upon which experience traces all that we can know. For Hume, the philosopher John Locke was right when he declared: "There is nothing in the intellect except what was first in the senses." To this, the brilliant Leibnitz had replied, "---nothing except the intellect itself", and Kant agreed. (115) In the preface to the Critique, Kant points out that:

> Experience is by no means the only field to which our understanding can be confined. Experience tells us what is, but not that it must be necessarily what it is and not otherwise. It therefore never gives us any really general truths; and our reason, which is particularly anxious for that class of knowledge, is roused by it rather than satisfied. General truths, which at the same time bear the character of an inward necessity, must be independent of experience,---clear and certain in themselves. (116)

His well-known words about the two wonders of life being "the starry heavens above and the moral law within," hint at the problem he set for himself. Kant was interested in the laws of nature, and deeply impressed by Newtonian physics, but he was also very much concerned with certain "general truths" that are not just the reflection of nature as it is "out there" but that are known because of an "inward necessity" for a "class of knowledge" for which we are particularly "anxious." In philosophy, Kant rejected the radical empiricism of Hume but was not willing to abandon it to the degree that it had been abandoned by the the rationalism of Leibnitz or Spinoza. Kant agreed with the empiricists that our knowledge begins

with experience but he went further when he affirmed that we have the ability to acquire, synthetic a priori knowledge, that is, a knowledge that we did not possess before, "independent of experience," at least, independent of the kind of experience usually associated with the empiricism. In making this claim, Kant in fact postulated two very distinct kinds of knowledge. One kind of knowledge (phenomenal), he suggested is modulated or conditioned by the mind to see things within the parameters of time and space. Kant suggested that a second kind of knowledge (noumenal), independent of the modulating effect of mind, that is, independent of the categories of time and space, is a knowledge that is the function of an internal moral sense. For Kant that was it. With regard to knowledge, the human creature might inhabit one of two quite separate and independent worlds.

Opinions about the "old fox of Königsberg" are as polarized as is his epistemology. While Kant is generally considered to be the greatest of the modern philosophers; he has also been described as "the greatest disaster in the history of philosophy." (117) Whatever is said about him, it appears that philosophers will long continue to take off their hats when they do decide to speak of this not so fraile Prussian. Our hat is off. We agree with Kant before we dare to disagree with him. His bi-polar distinction between a knowledge in time and space and a knowledge outside of it, represents in the writer's opinion a most significant contribution to Western philosophy. However, what the writer finds most difficult to accept about Kantian philosophy is the absolute and trenchant two-world

split that is created by the falling of the Kantian axe. We would not cast the die of the human capacity for knowledge in such an absolute dualist mold. Rather, with regard to knowledge we would postulate a third world between the Judeo-Christain heaven and earth of Kant by suggesting that human knowledge partakes of both the noumenal and the phenomenal. That is, we would speak for a dynamic interpenetration of the two worlds of knowledge, and, by doing so we feel more competently equipped to deal with a concept central to our thesis which is that there is such a thing as human evolution, or with regard to knowledge, there is such a thing as a progression in self-consciousness. We suggest that between the Kantian poles of knowledge in or out of time/space, there exists a third world that fills the void created by Kant. This world between the poles is a world in which there is an interaction between the tendency to see things in time and space and the tendency to see them under the aspect of eternity. The writer believes that it is to this dynamic world of <u>becoming</u> that Kant (perhaps due to the influence of the dualisms evident in Judeo-Christain theology) does not pay sufficient attention. We suggest that humankind can not leap from earth into heaven, but rather (in a certain evolutionary sense) that it crawls there. Spinoza understood this, as did Plato and Aristotle, hence their philosophies contribute to a perennial philosophy that will remain as timeless as it is precious. Mankind, <u>can</u> and does come to <u>gradually</u> see things under the aspect of eternity. It can and does expand its time-space frontiers. The world of consciousness that we inhabit is suffused with elements of both poles. A third kind of

knowledge is a dynamic consciousness of life as a struggle between these poles. While it is true that all concepts are in time and space, some concepts seem to be useful in chipping away at its boundaries. The concept of the "good" can only be described in or with reference to time and space, but part of its real value lies in its ability to point to a trans-rational horizon. Wise men know the uses and the limits of concepts. Socrates will not be laughed at.

Let us attempt to be more precise about the way in which we come to see. So far we have suggested that the mind is under the influence of two streams, one flowing from the outside-in supplying the mind with data through experience, and another stream flowing from the inside-out which appears to be active in ordering that data. The role of the mind, we now suggest is to make us conscious of some degree of the ordering of our experience. Hence, we suggest that it acts only as a reflecting mirror for the reality, as well as of the reality of that which does the ordering. That influence which is responsible for the ordering, the wholing, the re-membering, we shall identify with the eye of the heart. While we shall say more about the distinction between the eye of the heart and Spirit later, here we shall say that the eye of the heart occupies a position between the Spirit and the eye of the mind that gives us consciousness. Hence, for us mind is not an independent eye but a reflective surface upon which consciousness of states of relationship come to life and make their home. Further, with reference to the Kantian split, we suggest that under the influence of the eye of the heart our consciousness of the universe and ourselves moves through

hierarchaically distinct stages. We suggest that it begins with a stage in which the universe and self are securely couched within a limited or closed time and space consciouness, and ends with a stage of consciousness in which these constraints or veils on our consciousness have been entirely lifted. This evolution of consciousness, which is a self-centered integration of experience tending towards a view under the aspect of eternity, we suggest is essentially the work of Spirit. Saint Augustine writes: "our whole business in this life is to restore to health the eye of the heart whereby God may be seen." (118) We take this to mean that through the activity of heart in mind, the Spirit, struggles and finally manages to divest itself of all the trappings that keep it from a resplendent knowledge of its pure, whole and perfect Self.

To further illustrate what we mean by the hierarchy suggested above let us refer to a symbol that appears quite regularly in the mythologies of mankind. The symbol that helps to clarify what we mean is the symbol of the sepent coiled into a circle that appears to be devouring itself by swallowing its tail. There is much that can be said of this serpent. For example, G.A.Gaskel, in A Dictionary of Scripture and Myth, lists the mythological or religious significance of the serpent under eighteen separate headings. We shall only include here an introductory remark that describes the Brazen Serpent. Here, the serpent is described as "A symbol of the buddhic forces acting through the mind which raise and heal the soul." (119) The serpent (essentially Spirit or buddhic forces) by devouring its tail is destroying its It-self consciousness, that is, its consciousness of itself in time and space. When it has fully

accomplished this feat, then, all that remains is pure Will, Spirit or buddhic Force. Again, with reference to the coiled serpent what we are suggesting is that, Spirit, or the head of the serpent, in finding or locating its It-self (its tail) proceeds to devour it. In devouring Its itself Spirit is left with a clearing view of Its real Nature. Between the two poles of experience and knowledge described above there exists the interpenetrating field of experience and knowledge that may be described as a coming to know or the devouring of one's tail. With regard to knowledge this devouring of one's tail is related to Spinoza's coming to see "sub specie aeternitatis."

Joad points out that:

> Both Plato and Aristotle tend to think of the most perfect development of a thing as constituting its 'real nature.' Both tend to think of this 'real nature' as exercising a pull over the thing's less mature phases and determining a development in the direction of an ever greater approximation towards it. (120)

In conjuntion with the distinction between a contracted and an expanded view in time-space, we might also introduce the distinction between seeing the universe in a quantitative fashion and seeing it in a qualitative way. We shall make this added distinction because as we shall later point out, it has a significance for education. First, let us try to clarify how we would distinguish between quantitative and qualitative statements of relationship, knowledge or truth (by truth we mean some verbal-symbolic statement or description of relationship).

We use the term "quantitative studies" to indicate relationships

between "things." So much of this, affects so much of that, at this or that rate. In the pure sciences such as, physics, chemistry, biology, ecology, and astronomy the emphasis or the focus is on finding relationships or truths that exist in a spacial, time-specific universe. The laws of physics, chemistry and biology, refer to something changing at some rate, or being in a certain state of relationship at some specific time. Another way of putting it is that quantitative studies focus on an It universe. With regard to our self, quantitative studies point to I-It relationships or truths as we shall point out in the next section.

When we use the term "qualitative studies" we refer to a very different type of relationship which focuses not so much on <u>actual</u> as on <u>potential</u> with regard to consciousness/being. That is, qualitative studies and expressions are directed to a reality of becoming. Qualitative studies make use of such terms as the: "the Sublime," "the Good," "the Absolute," "the Perfect," "God" and so on because they refer to some <u>potential horizon</u>. In the disciplines of religion and philosophy (before it became "easy" or was "ruined"), or in fields like the arts in general, the emphasis is on qualitative orders or hierarchies (not more or less truth but more embracing truth, the more beautiful, the more perfect). Again, as an example of what we mean we suggest that quantitative truths distinguish between such things as: bigger or smaller; faster or slower; that is, relationships locked into a particular contracted time-space matrix. Whereas, qualitative truths which distinguish between good and bad or better and worse in such things as: our thoughts (including thoughts

about the quantitative) our actions, our creative lives, and whereas, they are expressed in time and space ("This is good.") they derive their meaning out of a intuited perception that the gap between actual and potential can be closed through a specific type of effort. Qualitative truths emphasize that our thought-acts are plastic and that they can occupy a higher time/space ground. A consciousness of such potential is based on the intuition of some absolute such as the perfect composition, the perfect philosophy, the perfect being, and so on. Another way of putting it is that qualitative relationships do not focus on externally witnessed out-there, It-It (or I-It) relationships, but rather focus on internally intuited in-here, my relationship to some Absolute, or as we shall refer to them, I-Thou, relationships. While we will be more precise about our meaning of the term "Thou" later, here we use it with reference to an intuited absolute.

A point that we must make here as well, is that intuited potential has absolutely nothing to do with imagination. God (the Absolute) is not as for example Dewey would suggest, a product of our simple imaginations. Rather, He is an intuited reality, which is very different. Furthermore, He is as real as the potential that we do actually realise on account of our knowledge of Him. The perfect musical composition is not something relative to any composer's fanciful imagination; it an absolute "real" that is recognized by others and has a distinct influence. The truths generated by imagination are relative. The truths generated by our meaning for the term intuition are not. In other words there is absolutely

nothing relativistic about God in a final sense. With regard to knowledge, God is the antithesis of relativity in truth.

Let us continue by suggesting that such knowledge, truths, or relationships that are quantitative intuitions (intuitions about relationships in a contracted time-space matrix) be referred to as X-type truths. Truths that express qualitative relationships we shall refer to as Y-type truths. Taken in this sense, as we have already pointed out, distinctions in the field of Y-type truths are less of the magnitude-saturated distinctions common in the X-field and more the type of distinctions that include an aesthetic dimension or sensitivity whether expressed in religion, philosophy, literature, the fine arts, or any undertaking where the aesthetic, qualitative, sensitivities matter or are important. Hence, Y-type truths refer to a facticity or accuracy of our knowledge or beliefs relative to the qualities (or I-Thou relationships) of our lives, whereas, X-type truths refer to a facticity or accuracy of our knowledge or beliefs relative to the quantities (or It-It relationships) in our lives. We might suggest that whereas, $E = mc^2$ is a one-dimensional It-It or X-type of truth, the statements: "Knowledge is good." or "God is real." represent two-dimensional perception or observations because they includes the important I-Thou dimension which as we have pointed out relies not only <u>eye-validation</u> but also on a self-integrating intuition or <u>I-validation</u> of truth. Huston Smith, would claim that Y-type truth is higher and more real than X-type truth because as Wilber points out, he would suggest that "it is more fully saturated with Being." (121) A concern for "Being" (as opposed to being) we

have related with a concern for our becoming or for the "Thou" potential in us. A higher knowledge relates to that which can give us altitude with regard to time and space.

We have said something about two types of knowledge or categories of truths which are based on experiences of two distinct types of relationship, It-It and I-Thou or I in potential. We have mentioned that not only do we look outside of ourselves and apprehend directly (intuit) relationships that exist, but we are capable of turning our gaze inwards and of looking inside ourselves to find there another field of truths or relationships that as well we can intuit or directly apprehend. So far the reflections that we have referred to have been of the It-It or I-Thou type. We now suggest that a final category of knowledge or type of direct apprehension exists. This is knowledge based on what we shall call I-I relationship. The type of knowledge I-I relationship yeilds does not yield any distinct category of symbolic truths but rather serves to substantiate them as for example the tasting of good ice cream substantiates someone's explanation of how good, ice cream tastes.

To further clarify what we mean by what we might call Z-type consciousness, we would suggest that the distinction between a two-dimensional map and its real-life three-dimensional reality offers a useful clue to the meaning of Z-type consciousness. Behind the quality of Y-type knowledge, is the non-judgemental, supra-intellectual reality that Plato hinted at in The Republic when Socrates was asked to describe, "the highest object of knowledge---the essential nature of the Good, from which everything

that is good and right derives its value for us." (122) To this question Socrates replied: "...I am afraid it is beyond my powers; and with the best will in the world I should only disgrace myself and be laughed at [if I tried to do so]." (123) In Z-consciouness all singular points of reference for value judgements vanish. All compass points, all bearings of X or Y-type knowledge become meaningless. All relative knowledge of both the It-It and the I-Thou types are entirely telescoped back into themselves. A universe that has been "unzipped" (Wilber's term) or become "divided at its seam" (Whitehead's term), (124) becomes entirely zipped up again. The universe becomes pointless. Wilber explains:

> The real world, then [the world in Z] is pointless, valueless. It is an end in itself without purpose or goal, future or result, meaning or value - a dance with no destination other than the present. This is precisely the insight the Buddhists express with the term tathata, the world as it is in its 'suchness' or 'thusness', which Eckhart called 'isness, the Taoists called 'tzu jan', the Hindu sahaja, and Korzybski, more to the point, called the 'unspeakable'. For the real world, the world of the Tao, because it is Void of concepts, symbols, and maps, is necessarily Void of meaning, value and significance. (125)

This is not to suggest however, as the positivist might, that the distinctions between good and evil, or right and wrong are unimportant. It is not to suggest that effort, courage, wisdom, or the search for meaning and values is pointless or that maps are useless. They certainly are not, for in fact they are everything that is important in Y or I-Thou relationship. Maps only become useless when one is <u>in</u> the territory (in Z). When one has "arrived" directions to getting there become meaningless, but until then they do in fact point the way. Being temporarily in the territory can

point to the significance of the map as we have pointed out with our ice cream example, but essentially we are dealing with two very distinct types of experience or relationship.

The distinction between a real-in-itself, and our descriptions of it, has been recognized not only by the mystic, the poet or the philosopher, but by the scientist as well. Erwin Schroedinger, one of the founders of quantum mechanics, reminds us that with regard to reality: "the map is not the territory". (126) Eddington, speaks of an "intimate knowledge of the reality behind the symbols of science", (127) and Sir James Jeans explains:

> As the new physics has shown, all earlier systems of physics, from the Newtonian mechanics down to the old quantum theory, fell into the error of identifying appearance with reality; they confined their attention to the walls of the cave, without even being conscious of a deeper reality beyond. (128)

The wise man realizes that while his wisdom does represent an important map, it is not the territory, hence, he has nothing to say about the absolute in itself. We are informed about the sage Chang-ching who in reaching the Real behind the screen of thought suddenly proclaimed:

> How mistaken was I! How mistaken!
> Raise the screen and see the world!
> If anybody asks me what philosophy I have,
> I'll straightway hit him across the mouth
> with my staff. (129)

The wise man is a respecter of boundaries. When Wittgenstein writes: "In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value - and if there were, it would be of no value." (130), he tries to convince us with words that nothing is worth saying, which of course, is absurd. In attempting to cross

boundaries without a passport so to speak, Wittgenstein alienates himself from both the Y and the Z realms of knowledge. The morality espoused by every sage is not meant to finally produce a moral being, a being who only acts morally or a being who acts as if he has "arrived" or one who is good at reading maps, but rather, it is meant to encourage us to use that "eye" which can permit us to see or real-I-ze, that we are already in the territory. Hence, it is written in the Atma Sakshatkara, one of the twenty-eight Agamas:

> There is nothing for him to accomplish; therefore he reaps no fruits of his actions, nor is he obliged to be active; there is no distinctive caste, creed, or code of conduct for one inhering in the Supreme Self. (131)

EPISTEMOLOGY AND MORALS

With regard to the relationship between the fields of knowledge and the moral domain it follows that moral behavior or ethical sensitivity relates to the strength of the Spirit (openness of the eye of the heart) in our minds. Its influence, which represents a stitching up of what paradoxically is the "seamless coat" of the uni-verse, has been described as our developing, maturing or evolving consciousness of the significance of the Good, God, the Absolute, the One, or a Cosmos (an ordered universe in the orginal meaning of the word). When we use the word consciousness we understand that it encompasses both cognitive and affective sensibilities. To be conscious of something includes feeling or intuiting that something is so. With regard to morality we now suggest that it is possible to identify a pre-moral (It-It) state of consciousness, a properly moral (I-Thou) state of consciousness, and a trans-moral (I-I) state of consciousness. We have already said something about the trans-moral state of morality which is related to "seeing" oneself in the territory; we must now explain what we mean by the distinction between the pre-moral and the properly moral states of being.

Earlier, we suggested that the mind was influenced by two streams that nourish it. We attempted to further clarify our position by adding that the experience of knowing, or consciousness, is more correctly due to the activity of the eye of the heart or the Spirit in mind. Our expanding self-consciousness, we suggested, is the result of a linking together of sensations into an idea of self and

that this occurs as Spirit attempts to know itself or discover its perfect reflection in matter or mind. The experience of wholesness which represents linkages, connections, re-membrances, or relationships, more or less complete or perfect, (L. "perfectus".. "made whole, made complete.") results in various quantities and qualities of consciousness. The eye of the flesh delivers sensory input to the eye of mind but does not actually know anything, and, whereas the eye of the mind reflects things, it is the eye of the heart that directs the ordering of things that they may be "seen." In a final sense, what knows and what is known, is one, and that One is Spirit, the essence of ourselves. As Joad points out, for Aristotle,

> ...we are determined, not by natural forces nor by our external environment, but by ourselves, that is by forces and tendencies operating within us, yet often operating beyond the bounds of our consciousness. These forces and tendencies determine the strength and the nature of our conscious desires. (132)

Further, we have already noted that for Plato as well as for Aristotle it is the soul (heart) sometimes described as a magnet, that pulls us forward. By forward we mean forward in self-consciousness. Since the eye of the heart expresses itself in mind as an impulse to order, consequently under its influence we become conscious of the order of a uni-verse. Let us examine a subtle distiction in the way that we may use the concept "good." By so doing perhaps we can further clarify what we mean by the distinction between the pre-moral and the properly moral states of consciousness.

At the pre-moral level of consciousness, the meaning of good is related to It-It relationship, hence, from an I-It (I as an It) perspective when we say, "It is good!" we mean this or that is an, I as an It, preserving relationship. At the moral level of consciousness, "feeling good," in the I-It sense is evaluated with respect for the intergrity and preservation of an I-Thou self. That is, it is evaluated with regard to a more complete or perfect whole self. We suggest that moral conscience is awakened when feeling good is viewed in the light of a knowledge or sensitivity for the good. When this happens, simple pleasures (goods) and pains become good or bad, right or wrong, pleasures or pains. Under the influence of the eye of the heart, (agent of the Spirit in us which alone can recognize its transcendental Nature), which intuites and draws us towards a consciousness of the connexity of the universe, a consciousness of feeling/knowing good competes with a consciousness of feeling/knowing the good. Hence, we say that moral conscience is related to an ability to intuit, make out, or to "see" the good, for it is only then that morality which is based on a capacity to distinguish between right and wrong or good and bad, can come into existence.

The short-sightedness of the empiricist's view and more particularly his inability to deal in any profound way with the question of morality, results from his claim that all we can see comes through the eye of the flesh. For the same reason that

philosophy has been "ruined" we suggest much psychology has been "ruined" as well. As long as we refuse to look past the reflections on the walls of Plato's cave, (our It-It reflections in mind) we remain chained to a knowledge of shadows.

In attempting to understand the relationship between the good and experience that is ordered by the eye of the heart in mind, let find a concrete situation in which the above are related. Using Beethoven as an example, what can we say about the relationship between above described elements of his experience as it relates to the composition of his music? We begin by suggesting that the notes in themselves that Beethoven produced at the keyboard are not distinguishable from similar notes played by an idiot at the same keyboard. Clearly it is not the notes in themselves that are important, rather, it is the particular arrangement of these notes that is significant. It is not individual sensations but rather a sequence of sensations that is of importance. To listen to some random arrangement of the notes of one of Beethoven's sonatas would drive us mad; again, it is the order applied to sensation that is significant in the satisfaction or fulfillment of our natures. Hence, in this case we note that good or bad is related to a degree of order in experience. Beethoven was motivated not by a need for the simple experience of hearing notes sounded on a keyboard, but rather by a need for a particular type of ordered experience. We further suggest it is reasonable to believe that the experience of that order came after the need or will to have it. Beethoven's strong Spirit found its voice through the keyboard.

More generally, we would say that the works of certain creative individuals can point to another type or level of experience that can equally claim to represent "real" or "true" experience. If we insist on examining a Van Gogh through a magnifying glass, that is, if we analyse an integral expression or experience we shift our attention from its I-Thou (qualitative) significance or meaning to its It-It (quantitative) significance or meaning. Modern psychology attempts to do with man what the critic with a magnifying glass tries to do with a Van Gogh, or what the analyst does with the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle or Spinoza. To the analyst Spinoza's philosophy is suspect beginning with the very first proposition. For a Goethe, a Hegel and an Einstein, its superficial blemishes are overlooked as it is appreciated in its wholeness. And when so viewed the philosophy of Spinoza is pronounced sublime. In looking at a work of art, philosophical or otherwise, some will always tend to focus on a juxtaposition of pigments and a organization of brush strokes, while others, delight in the view that gives them the flowers in a garden reflecting a late afternoon sun. The significant point is that order and our ability to appreciate it, exists at different levels, and furthermore, that a hierarchy of orders based on the Will of Spirit to completely know itself through its agent the eye of the heart can be established.

Perennial philosophy might be described as a meta-science that attempts to find the relationships that exist between the body, mind, and Spirit of mankind. Ken Wilber explains that "a new and transcendental paradigm would ideally and ultimately be a synthesis

and integration of empiricism, rationalism, and transcendentalism." (133) We would amend this statement by suggesting that a new paradigm would be able to subsume both the empiricist's and the rationalist's way of seeing. Unamuno, who shares with Ortega y Gasset the distinction of being Spain's most influential philosopher, is more eloquent: "philosophy, like poetry," he writes, "is a work of integration and synthesis, or else it is merely pseudo-philosophical erudition." (134) He continues, "the most tragic problem of philosophy is to reconcile intellectual necessities with the necessities of the heart and will. For it is on this rock that every philosophy that pretends to resolve the eternal and tragic contradiction, the basis of our existence, breaks to pieces." (135)

The philosopher who attempts to describe the relationship between the matter, mind and spirit of humankind certainly has his work cut out for him. The great idealist Hegel attempted such a synthesis but failed because finally he would not, or could not, give up his attachment to the map. His well-known claim: "What is rational is real, and what is real is rational," points to this short-coming in his thought. Berdyaev, explains that Hegel in attempting to put philosophy above religion allows it to "exceed[s] its bounds." (135) Still, the seductive powers of Hegelian reason have not yet lost all their charms. Wilber comments on the proper task of philosophy as Hegel interpreted it.

> Finally, and let us say it only once with emphasis, true philosophy was, for Hegel, the conscious reconstruction of the developmental-logic or stages/levels whereby Spirit returns to Spirit. "The task of philosophy is to (reconstruct) the life of

the Absolute". That is to say, it must exhibit systematically the...dynamic structure, the teleological process or movement of the cosmic Reason, in Nature (subconsciousness) and in the sphere of the human spirit (self-consciousness), which culminates in the Absolute's knowledge of itself (superconsciousness). (136)

A QUANTITATIVE UNIVERSE

In the next two chapters we shall attempt to further clarify our epistemological position by noting the distinction between a quantitative and a quantitative way of looking at the universe. We shall also begin to shift our attention towards the ontology that follows our theory of knowledge. In the next section we expect to be in a position to integrate these (our epistemology and ontology) into a model of consciousness/being. Again, to summarize our discussion to this point; we began, by pointing out the distinctions between three fields of knowledge. We then proceeded to show how all knowledge is related to the depth of our intuitions (about the connexity of the universe) or the connecting activity of the eye of the heart which is the agent of the Spirit in man. Finally, we suggested that these degrees of intuitions or activity of the eye of the heart, could be heirarchaically ordered with regard to the depth of their time-space matrix which was related to a quantitative or qualitative dimension or content. Having taken things apart, we are now committed to putting them back together again. However, before we shift our attention from epistemological to ontological concerns, we must say a little more about the distinction between seeing things in a contracted time-space, or quantitative fashion, as opposed to seeing things in an expanded time-space or qualitative fashion. Let us begin by examining the "Western" view that has highly developed our understanding of certain quantitative realities in our universe.

Inspired by the Renaissance and in revolt against Aristotelianism and Scholastic Logic, Francis Bacon, (1561-1626) proposed an inductive method of discovering truth. This method was to be founded on: empirical observation, analysis of observed data, inference resulting in hypotheses and finally verification of hypotheses through continued observation and experiment. Bacon's famous four "idola" warn against: the tendency to generalize from only a few instances (idola tribus); the error resulting from personal bias (idola specus); the influence of traditionally held views or philosophies (idola theatri); and the influence of words on mind, (assuming for example that there must be an object because there is a word to describe it) (idola fori). Bacon's goal was the "Great Instauration" that is, the restoration of man to a position of mastery over nature through the application of "science".

John Locke, (1632-1704) who is often called the founder of modern empiricism, explains that we are born knowing nothing. The mind is a "tabla rasa". Everything we know comes to us through our sensory experience, that is, through the senses of sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell. Thus, if we wish to establish a body of truths we must be careful not to wander beyond the boundaries established by what we have gathered through sensation (simple ideas), and reflection on these sensations (complex ideas). David Hume, (1711-1776) further developed the Lockean theory that perception and reflection give us all our impressions and ideas. In his essay, <u>An Inquiry Concerning the Human Understanding</u>, he explains, "there appear to be only three principles of connection

among ideas, namely, Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause [and] Effect." He adds that, "so far as regards the mind ...these are the only links that bind the parts of the universe together or connect us with any person or object exterior to ourselves." (137) Further, in A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume adds, "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." (138) Hence for Hume, knowledge was to be understood as a psychological phenomenon in which the laws of associationism are "the cement of the universe" with regard to every man or woman's thoughts or ideas. Leahey writes that, "Hume asserted a positivism---the claim that all meaninful ideas must be reducible to something observable." (139) In the estimation of some modern philosophers, Hume "may be very hard to refute, but he is almost impossible to believe." (140)

Kant, as we know, did not believe Hume. Whereas Hume exemplifies the empiricists view of knowledge, namely the view that we have knowledge because external objects impress themselves on our minds, Kant, more the rationalist (more trusting of his intuitions), turns the table on knowledge so to speak, by suggesting that we do not conform ourselves to the impressions that we have of the world, but rather, the impressions that we do have, conform themselves to us and our particular way of understanding. Kaufmann writes: "He [Kant] restored man to the center of the world and actually accorded even greater importance to man than the Book of Genesis had done. He tried to prove that it is the human mind that gives nature its laws." (141)

Hume, we might say, restricts what we can know to the eye of the flesh. Kant, restricts it to the way in which the eye of mind habitually sees things, namely within some time-space contraction. For different reasons, both of these explanations of the limits of human knowledge restrict our ability to integrate absolutes into our experience of the real world. It is for this reason that Kant along with Hume must share some of the responsibility for the present condition of Western man which might described as a philosophical blindness in one eye. Kant argued persuasively that in this world the best approach to reality was the approach adopted by Newton. Although he was convinced that a knowledge of the most important realities was beyond the ken of the human mind, "I had to do away with knowledge to make room for faith," (142) and even though he cared deeply about human automony and dignity, (143) he contributed to a gradual eclipse of the view through the eye of the heart by the eye of the flesh. Kant appreciated the difference between a sensible world and an intelligible one. In his correspondence he even called for a phenomenological study of the difference between the two. But with Kant there was to be no final reconciliation between Idealism and Realism. One road led to Hegelian philosophy and the other to positivism.

As the practical wisdom of employing an inductive as opposed to a deductive approach to understanding the universe was recognized and then applied, the cornerstone of modern science was laid. Further, the implications of a newly opened eye of flesh for studies of mankind were a gradual change in the authority that would generally define it. As the focus on man's relationship with God and the

angels became blurred, it was replaced with a new view that promised clarity and precision. This new emerging view was the one that described man's relationship to atoms, molecules and cells. The eye of the flesh replaced the eye of the heart as the authority in the eye of the mind. Matched against the deductive knowledge that was established on intuited first principles, the inductive knowledge of science with its strict reliance on sensible facts proved an indomitable opponent, one that appeared to have time on its side. On the playing field where substance mattered most it soon became clear who would be the winner. In the West, deductive knowledge established on intuited first principles proved to be no match for inductive knowledge established on sensible "facts." In a way the distinction between the inductive and deductive approaches to a knowledge of reality might be described as the difference between an outside-in, and an inside-out approach to reality. More specifically, the "new" way of looking at the universe that would be called the scientific view, was a facination and pre-occupation with the idea of quantity or measurement. Wilber explains:

> Thus, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that empiric-analytic science is measurement. Measurement, and virtually measurement alone, gives the data of scientific experiments. Galileo measured. Kepler measured. Newton measured. There was the real genius of Kepler and Galileo. The reason modern science was not discovered before Kepler and Galileo was that nobody really measured before Kepler and Galileo. (144)

L.L. Whyte makes a similar point. He writes:

> We have here reached a moment of great significance. About 1600 Kepler and Galileo simultaneously and independently formulated the principle that the laws of nature are to be discovered by measurement, and applied this principle in their own work. Where Aristotle had classified, Kepler and Galileo sought to measure. The process of measurement was the one objectively reliable

> approach to the structure of nature and the numbers so obtained were the key to the order of nature. After 1600 mankind was thus in possession of a systematic method of research into those aspects of nature which were accessible to measurement. The centuries since 1600 may well be regarded as the age of quantity. Never before had such a technique been available... (145)

The great leaders of this revolution, men like Galileo, Newton, Copernicus, Dalton, Kepler, Darwin and Einstein, to name a few, made major contributions to our view of the universe as it might be seen from an outside-in perspective. Descartes and Kant supported the idea that the best we can do with regard to reality is to "read" it in the approved scientific manner. (F10) Descartes' contribution to what became known as the scientific view was most significant. With regard to objects in the world of time and space, no one can rob him of his place in history for he inaugurated a new and highly productive approach to discovering the laws of physical nature. In reducing and streamlining the method of research to three or four plain simple rules (146) he "drastically simplified both the field of observation and the method of observing"; (147) and yet, as Professor Whitehead points out:

> We note its astounding efficiency as a system of concepts for the organizaton of scientific research. In this respect it is fully worthy of the genius of the century which produced it. It has held its own as the guiding principle of scientific studies ever since. It is still reigning. Every University in the world organizes itself in accordance with it....It is without rival. And yet, it is quite unbelievable.....Thereby modern philosophy has been ruined. (148)

By "ruined" perhaps Whitehead means that Descartes misinterprets the role of mind in human knowledge; in effect giving it an all too free-wheeling independence. In his essay: Trois Reformateurs,

Jacques Maritain points out that Descartes exaggerates the importance of independent mind. Commenting on Maritain's essay Mortimer writes:

> This long essay is based on the thought-provoking thesis that the world-view which Descartes harnessed upon posterity, the sort of attitude which the human mind has been taught to adopt towards the outer world, is such as the Scholastic theology attributes to the angels; such knowledge claims to be intuitive as to its mode, innate as to its origin and independent of things as to its nature. As men are not angels, in each of these particulars the claim to such knowledge distorts and impoverishes our grasp of facts. (149)

Maritain explains that such an inflated view of mind's capacity leads to a "connaisance inhumaine parce qu'elle s'est voulu surhumaine." (150) As Professor Mortimer points out, "There is an excellent modern series of philosophical works (Etre et Penser, La Baconnière, Neuchâtel) whose slightly mischievous motto 'Sum ergo Cogito ergo Sum...' exposes the circularity of Descartes argument." (151) Unamuno writes: "The truth is sum, ergo cogito--I am therefore I think, although not everything that is thinks. 'I think, therefore I am,' can only mean 'I think therefore I am a thinker.' (152) (F11) We would go even one step further and suggest that, "I think therefore I am." can only mean "I think, therefore I have ideas about who or what I am." As long as these ideas are to be restricted to the type of net woven by Cartesian reason we agree with Whitehead that the philosophical fishing will be very poor. At the very least ontology if not "ruined" will be mortally wounded. "Those who seek the direct road to truth," writes Descartes, "should not bother with any object of which they cannot have a certainty equal to the

demonstrations of arithmetic and geometry." (153) The net of reason can capture arithmetic or geometric certainty, but it appears that ontologic certainty is a far more slippery or subtle fish and to hold it would require an eye that can weave a far more fine net. Paradoxically, it seems that while a philosophy can certainly be too irrational to appear true, it can also be incredible because it is too rational to appear true.

Let us return to our discussion of the quantitative view of the universe. Perhaps the best way to understand it is to find some simple analogy that permits us to compare it with the qualitative view. Let us consider the possiblity that the phenomenal world can be experienced or witnessed as we might witness a movie at the cinema, then perhaps, we have one way of comparing two very different views that represent two ways of focusing on reality. Using the above analogy, we suggest that the view of the phenomenal world through the eye of the flesh, (the view when the eye of the heart is not operative) that is, the empirical-analytic view, is the kind of view that results when we stop the projector and examine the images that make up our experience by looking at them one frame at a time. In order to measure and count we stop the show. In order to establish certain relationships between the elements of a single frame, others, that is relationships between a succession of frames have to be overlooked. In order to measure and count, the eye of flesh requires that we freeze time and dissect space into manageable, measurable quanta. In order to be measured or counted, a flowing dynamic universe is temporarily stopped. We pluck a moment out of an

eternity, focus on a point in an infinity. The images and understanding that results may be described as a snap-shot version of reality. By focusing on the trees, the bark or the parenchyma cells of the leaves, we loose sight of the forest, the hills or the sun in the sky.

In spite of its obvious limitations, the snapshot approach to reality, including the reality of ourselves, remains a significant source of reflection. Today, with a little help from glass eyes and the silicon chip, the eye of the flesh can see as little as a single atom and as much as island universes or clusters of galaxies. When it turns its gaze upon itself the eye of flesh may see atoms, molecules or genes which the sociobiologist E.O. Wilson, believes, "swarm in huge colonies safe inside gigantic lumbering robots, sealed off from the outside world manipulating it by remote control. We are their (the genes) survival machines." (154)

Paradoxically however, the biologist must often kill life before he or she can study it. In summary then, the viewpoint from the empiric-analytic perspective is one in which the universe has been frozen, splintered, and rendered lifeless. From the perspective of the eye of flesh, traditional metaphysics does not count because it can not be counted on. Or in the extreme it is non-sense because it can not produce or point to "substantial" data or results. From this perspective the philosopher's role is reduced to helping mankind to live on the crumbs of a miserly few, cold hard facts. But to return to our analogy, perhaps philosophy can be rescued from such an ill fate if we turn the projector back on; for when we do this we become

aware of a whole new field of relationships, relationships that are invisible until we decide to watch the dance that is.

When the projector is running, or when we are sensitive to more than just the scientist's "substantial" truths, then the reality of something that is visible as motive, will, and purpose, suddenly comes into view. We notice that the actors do things for reasons sometimes hard to understand but which offer another level of clues to what it means to be human. If we call the frame by frame examination of reality, the view in X, then we might say that the view in X is a view that can detect only a very limited variety of value or purpose. In Process and Reality, Whitehead appears to offer the advice that we keep the projector running. He considers the dissections or dichotomies created by the methods of science such as the dichotomies between cause and effect, mind and matter, substance and qualities, as false dichotomies. Instead of cause and effect, Whitehead suggests that we be better off if we thought in terms of process. Further, he adds that we must resist by all means to the tendency to break this process into unities or entities of any kind. (155) Indeed, Whitehead's "philosophy of organism" is a philosophy that ever advises us to see things from the dynamic veiwpoint, that is, it is the advice to ever "tie things together". (156) With regard to the education of children, Whitehead warns against the teaching of "inert ideas", (157) by which he means, the kind of ideas that like the isolated frames of a natural dynamic sequence are unable to be integrated into the child's organic experience field. Things only make sense when a sequence is visible,

which is to say they only make sense when the projector is running.

In his Ethics, Spinoza the "God intoxicated philosopher," offers us a similar advice to see the relatedness of our ideas as well as the relatedness of ideas to "substance" if we wish to find a satisfaction of our natures. We reach the "summit of human perfection" and experience the "highest pleasure" and the "highest possible acquiescence" when "Our mind, [in so far as it] knows itself and the body under the form of eternity," ("sub specie aeternitatis") as opposed to sub specie temporalis. (158) (F12)

We might refer to the difference between the static-atomistic view and the dynamic-organic views of the universe as the difference between the one and the two-dimensional views of reality. The distinction between seeing things in a one-dimensional versus a two-dimensional manner might also be compared to seeing the world in what we have already described as a quantified as opposed to a qualified manner. Lewis Mumford speaks of the empiric-analytic way of looking at the universe as seeing a "disqualified universe". (159) Huston Smith remarks: "values, life meanings, purposes, and qualities slip through science like the sea slips through the nets of fishermen". (160) Ken Wilber explains: "Empiric-analytic science cannot easily operate without measurement; measurement is essentially quantity; quantity is number; number is per se outside of values. Quality never gets in and cannot get in." (161) L.L. Whyte makes a similar point when he writes: "All magnitudes have equal status before the laws of elementary arithmetic, whose operators recognize no distinction between one value and another." (162)

Dupuis and Nordberg point out in Philosophy and Education, that for Whitehead "All of this [confusion between quantity and quality] came about because science deals in abstractions. The trouble [being], scientists forgot that you cannot 'say all' about anything; they confused their abstractions for concrete reality. This is the point he [Whitehead] never tires of making, the key to his elaborate analysis of specific problems. Science, in short, misplaces its concreteness." (163) Or as Joseph Krutch so lucidly points out in The Measure of Man, for Whitehead, scientific thinking is just that and no more. It is a way of thinking about reality and finally not an actual description of reality. (164) Understood in this light, it is clear that since science and metaphysics do not talk about the same types of relationships there should really be no quarrel between them. While they may compete for our attention they do not essentially compete with regard to "the truth" because they deal with very different types of truths.

An interesting observation related to this notion of the "misplaced concreteness" of science, is Unamuno's penetrating insight that: "the atom apart from the universe is as much an abstraction as the universe apart from the atom." (165) Of late, this point has been made by the particle physicist as well. Fritjof Capra, in The Tao of Physics, writes: "in the view of modern physics, everything in the universe is connected to everything else and no part of it is fundamental. The properties of any part are determined, not by some fundamental law, but by the properties of all other parts." (166) That is to say, while certain types of impressions of the "real" are

left behind when we shift our attention, this shift does not alienate us from reality; rather, it only results in our coming to "see" a whole new dimension of reality. Another prominent member of the liberated new generation of physicists, Werner Heisenberg, explains:

> It had not been possible to see what could be wrong with the fundamental concepts like matter, space, time, and causality that had been so extremely successful in the history of science. Only experimental research itself, carried out with all the refined equipment that technical science could offer...provided the basis for a critical analysis--or, one may say, enforced the critical analysis-- of the concepts, and finally resulted in the dissolution of the rigid frame. [writer's emphasis] (167)

When the thinking subject becomes more significant than even the very best instruments of vision, that is when we come to rely more on our eye of the heart in interpreting the universe, then we take a qualitative step towards understanding, as opposed to a quantitative one. It is only by challanging how we think, that a radical change in our ability to "see" can occur. Reality, for the particle physicist is no longer something he can simply point to without pointing at himself. "All through the physical world runs an unknown content which must really be the stuff of our own consciousness." writes Eddington. "The footprint on the sand of time is our own." he concludes on a poetic note. (168) The dance that is, can not be described without reference to the dancer. With regard to ontology or more particularly values theory, Kegan recognizes that we can get caught in the snare of our abstractions when he writes that:

...persons are not their stages of development; persons are a motion, a creative motion, the motion of life itself. The study of the underlying process (of constitutive activity rather than constitutions) moves 'stages' from the very ground of our concern, to a figure upon the ground, and stages a reference point to periods of dynamic stability in that process. (169)

A QUALITATIVE UNIVERSE

Let us here attempt to clarify what we mean by the heart the soul and the Spirit of mankind. Let us be a little more clear about the distinction between them and let us try to show how intuition or insight are related to these. It will be useful here as well to be more specific with regard to the relationship that exists between the eye of the heart and the eye of the mind. Further, in this chapter we shall demonstrate the significance of each of the eyes of humankind for the formulation of a values theory. We begin with a clarification of our terms.

Initially we talked about the three distinct "eyes" of mankind. We attempted to qualify (in our sens f the word) that description by suggesting that the three "eyes" which do indeed see different things, represent three different dispositions or ways of focusing on a single reality. We mentioned the difference between a quantitative and a qualitative way of seeing the universe. Further, we suggested that these differences in the way we are disposed to focus is related to the activity of the Spirit in mankind which serves to open our eye of the heart. What the eye of the heart can do is to experience insight or it can have intuitions of some degree of the connexity of the universe. We suggested that the strength of Spirit resulting in a more or less open eye of the heart will determine whether we are disposed to see the universe in either a quantitative or a qualitative way. The difference between these two being only the degree to which we "zip up the seamless coat of the universe." With

regard to ontology, the hierarchy we establish places qualitative integrations above quantitative ones because the first involve greater time/space integrations. Einstein can be recognized as a genius at two levels. One which points to his ability to discover relationship between forces and objects in the physical world, (quantitative) and the level at which he intuites a qualitative relationship. The genius of Einstein the humanitarian was an expression of his deep sense of the connexity of the universe. In general this intuitive sense may find its outlet in different types of expression whether artistic, religious, scientific or otherwise. Let us examine the meaning of the term "intuition" more closely now and let us describe how these intuitions of our eye of the heart are related to the eye of the mind.

While the importance of the eye of the heart which is the "organ" that permits us to experience intuitive vision or to have a non-dualistic <u>insight</u> into reality has been emphasized by Eastern sages and thinkers in particular, Radhakrishnan, in <u>An Idealist View of Life</u>, argues that certain Western philosophers as well, have admitted that the great certainties of life are the products of intuition. Radhakrishnan explains, that for Aristotle, "<u>Nous</u> represents the intuitive apprehension of the first principles which all reasoning assumes to start with." "Descartes," he writes: "admits that intuitive knowledge ....is a knowledge different from the fluctuating testimony of the senses or the misleading judgments that proceed from the blundering constuctions of imagination." "Liebniz," (sic) he tells us: "does not favour the view that all

knowledge is either perceptual or conceptual" and further, Radhakrishnan, explains that Pascal's 'esprit de finesse' "is but another name for intuition." (170)

It is possible that the term, "eye of the heart," (which St. Augustine uses in his well-known quotation: "The business of life is to restore to health the eye of the heart whereby we may see God,") might be traced back through St. Augustine to Plato, who refers to an "eye of the soul." (171) For Plato, the potential that this "organ" possesses is to "look upon the eternal forms." (172) Paul Friedländer explains that this type of "looking" and consequent understanding is in the last analysis an "intuitive grasp" of the real. (173) The function of the eye of the mind in relation to the eye of the heart is to reflect and as well to "recapture" and fix some facsimile of this vison with the intent of turning men in the right direction. Having caught sight of the Eidos, writes Friedländer, Plato "was then confronted with the task of making his intuition permanently visible through the Logos." (174) Friedländer continues:

> Even if what he [Plato] had glimpsed was unspeakably far removed from opinion and appearance, it was necessary to use the support of words in order to make the intuition last for himself and others. To discover these intellectual ties became the content of his philosophical inquiry. To lead men 'through a long communion' to a point 'where a light is kindled in the soul by a leaping spark' (Letter VII 341c)--this is the basis of all his teaching. (175)

In order to understand the relationship between soul and mind for Plato, or eye of the heart and eye of the mind as we put it, we might ask the question Meno asks of Socrates, and then look carefully at

Plato's reply. Meno asks Socrates:

> But how will you look for something when you don't in the least know what it is? How on earth are you going to set up something you don't know as the object of your search? To put it another way, even if you come right up against it how will you know that what you have found is the thing you didn't know? (176)

The answer to this question as Plato points out must be that we are able to recognize the truth, before we can or do describe it. Our intuitive recollection or apprehesion of the truth, must be preceeded by any symbolic formalization of it. As Plato has Socrates point out:

> Thus the soul, since it has been born many times, and has seen all things both here and in the other world, has learned everything that is. So we need not be surprised if it can recall the knowledge of virtue of anything else which, as we see, it once possessed. All nature is akin, and the soul has learned everything, so that when a man has recalled a single piece of knowledge -learned it, in ordinary language - there is no reason why he should not find out all the rest, if he keeps a stout heart and does not grow weary of the search; for seeking and learning are in fact nothing but recollection. (177)

Recollection is a process which we might describe as a dipping into the wholeness of knowledge with the ladel of the soul (our eye of the heart) and being left with an intuition of the connexity of things. In the above, Plato, furthermore establishes a hierarchy in which the recognition or reflection of a truth in the mind is preceeded by an intuitive grasp of that truth by the soul, or for us, by the heart of man. Michael Polanyi, similarly recognizes or distinguishes between two kinds of awareness that he describes as "focal" and "subsidiary" awareness. Polanyi contends that no knowledge can be wholly focal, rather in every case the sudsidiary aspect is the ground upon which focal knowledge is founded. (178)

Hence, we somehow anticipate that which we are looking for, that which we gradually come to plainly understand or become conscious of in the mind.

St. Augustine describes mankind's journey to an embracing philosophic truth in terms not unsimilar to Plato's when he writes:

> The first step forward....will be to see that the attention is fastened on truth. Of course faith does not see truth clearly, but it has an eye for it, so to speak, which enables it to see that a thing is true even when it does not see the reason for it. It does not yet see the thing it believes, but at least it knows for certain that it does not see it and that it is true none the less. This possession through faith of a hidden but certain truth is the very thing which will impel the mind to penetrate its content, and to give the formula, "Believe that you may understand" (Crede ut intellegas), its full meaning. (179)

In Appearance and Reality, F.H. Bradley writes, "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe on instinct," adding that "the finding of those reasons is none the less an instinct." (180) We would not suggest that the reasons for what we believe need necessarily be bad reasons. They are, we suggest, as good as reason will permit them to be. The point Bradley makes, and that we agree with is that what we say or know is essentially an expression of the health or wholeness of our hearts or souls. From "the first to last in Plato", Grube writes, "we find that the soul is the highest and noblest part of man, the part he should primarily care for and develop." (181) For Plato, it is the highest part of the soul that makes man aware of the beauty, the truth and the perfection of the ordered movement and life in the universe. (182)

Plato explains: "consider what associations [writer's emphasis] it [the soul] reaches out to and longs for, how it is akin to the divine and the immortal, what it would become if it followed this longing entirely and by that desire were lifted out of the sea wherein it now resides, after the stones and shells which cling to it now had been knocked off." (183) Again, Plato remarks: "As regards the most important part of our soul we must think this: that a god has given it as a spirit to each of us, that which we say dwells in the top part of the body, to lift us from the earth to its kindred in heaven, for we are not of earthly, but of divine nature..." (184)

Our own way of putting it is that the soul (heart) being the "eye" that can "see" or intuit the connexity (F13) of the universe, makes possible the "communions," "associations" and "ties," that point us in the direction of an intuitive "vision of the Good." An expression of this order underlies scientific law; philosophic statements or principles; religious insight; moral conscience; aesthetic value or sense of the beautiful as it is expressed in artistic endeavor; and in general terms is an affirmation and confirmation of the significance of the sacred, the (w)holy, the good, the right, and the true.

Let us now examine what we mean by the term, Spirit. To begin, we suggest that the motive force of the heart might be described as Cosmic Urge (Urschmertz), or the Organic Will of the universe, that is, the Will of the Whole as a Whole. For us this is as close as we can get to the meaning of the concept of Spirit. If we place this

way of putting it alongside Aristotle's insight that "all living things are in a greater or less degree aware of God, and are moved to action by admiration and love of God. Thus God is the final cause of all activity"; (185) then, God is pure Spirit and the heart of man is the "organ" that is capable of making him aware of God's plan or the "organ" that to various degrees is sensitive to the Organic Will of the universe. The quality or the "substance" of this awareness is experienced as intuitions of the connexity (I.O.C.) of the uni-verse and these may leave their traces in mind. Cognitively, intuitions of connexity are re-cognitions or re-membrances of some degree of the ordered nature of the cosmos. They are the "associations," and "ties" that we have referred to.

Affectively, intuitions of connexity are experienced as "communions" or "love." We might say that the heart, in making us aware of some aspect of the connexity of the universe, allows us to fall in love. In his final talk delivered two hours before his death, Thomas Merton explained: "The whole idea of compassion is based on a keen awareness of the interdependence of all these living beings, which are all part of one another and all involved in one another." (186) "Originally," wrote Plato in the Symposium, "we were whole beings, before our wickedness caused us to be split by Zeus,...love is simply the name for the desire and pursuit of the whole." (187) The greater or lesser degree of awareness of God that Aristotle refers to, is related to the greater or lesser activity of the eye of the heart. What we mean by the active willing side of the universe, God's Will, or Cosmic Urge, or Spirit, is that this

Will is essentially a Will to know itself and particularly to know itself through a hierarchy of degrees of order. Hence, as Russell explains, for Aristotle, (as for us), "The world is continually evolving towards a greater degree of form, and thus becoming progressively more like God." (188)

We should point out that with regard to God, our view differs from the Aristotlian position in one most significant way. Aristotle's God has no will, being entirely sufficient unto Himself, this, being a necessary condition of His perfection. It is argued that if God were to have will or desire then this would illustrate that in some way He is lacking, consequently He can not be perfect or finally then, God. In our own position we allow God in time and space (which is the only way He can be conceived <u>in</u> time and space) the necessary "imperfection" of having Will, because <u>in</u> time and space, God lacks an eternal and entire knowledge of His Perfect Nature. Hence, in a final sense we might ask if this Will is really an "imperfection." Conceived in this way our God therfore need not be as distant as Aristotle's God who sets things rolling but then step back perhaps only to watch the proceedings. From our point of view <u>in</u> time and space God is committed to having a Will, and this Will can only be the Will to know His Perfection. Hence, we suggest that it is <u>because</u> God has Will in time and space that He is perfect or complete. In this world God purchases a knowledge of his perfection through action. The world is not becoming more like God as something might become like something else, rather, the world is becoming what in potential it <u>Is</u>.

If we return to our discussion of the intuitive knowledge offered by the eye of the heart, we discover that Plato's thoughts lead us to further insights. In The Republic, he writes: "In the world of knowledge, the last thing to be perceived and only with great difficulty is the essential Form of Goodness." (189) Plato draws an analogy between "seeing" the "Form of Goodness," with looking directly at the Sun which illuminates everything else. Plato explains that: "Last of all, he (the initiate into truth) would be able to look at the Sun and contemplate its nature, not as it appears when reflected in water or any alien medium, but as it is in itself in its own domain." (190) He adds that: "Without having had a vision of this Form no one can act with wisdom, either in his own life or in matters of state." (191)

Presumably, we are all wise to some degree and not just entirely wise or entirely without wisdom. If we consider this question of the possession of wisdom in the light of Plato's allegory of the cave, we recognize that as we ever see things by a little more light (represented by a moving out of the darkness of the cave to more and more light at its opening) we presumably become more and more wise. Translated into our terms this would mean that as we move towards the opening of the cave we intuit more and more completely the connexity of the universe. The depth or degree of this intuition hence determines our ability to be wise. More practically put, we would suggest that being wise, as Plato refers to it, is a complex state of being which has an affective component, (having compassion, being in love, feeling the connexity of the universe); a cognitive

component, (being aware of truths or "facts" related to the connexity of the universe); and an active component, (acting as one who knows and feels connexity, that is, with moral or ethical sensitivity).

Although Plato does not use the word intuition, his concern was similarly that we come to see the universe in it's connected wholeness. With regard to the education of the young Plato explains: "Dialectic should be introduced in childhood." (192) By dialectic he means: "Dialectic, which is the same thing as the ability to see the connexions of things." (193)

The Greeks, coined a word in their language, for what they believed was the fundamental orderliness of the world. They referred to their world as a "kosmos" to distinguish it from a world of chaos and disorder. As Professor Butler points out: "this name came eventually to be synonymous for the totality of the universe." (194) Plato, would have given his assent to this broader usage of the word for he believed that "communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven an earth and gods and men, and that this universe is therefore, not disorder or misrule.. (195) The whole business of life for mankind then, is to intuit that connexity or wholeness of the universe with the help of his soul (heart), and in so doing become aware or conscious of the "divine order of the world". According to Plato, this consciousness would have the effect of making him "godlike." Socrates advises Adeimantus to contemplate the following:

> Or do you consider it possible that a man would not imitate that with which he lives in admiring companionship? So the

> philosopher, in constant companionship with the divine order of the world will reproduce that order in his soul and as far as man may become godlike. (196)

To relate this discussion of intuition to the projector and film analogy, we would suggest that the eye of the heart which gives us intuitions of some degree of the wholeness or the connexity of the universe, is the "organ" that allows us to see more and more of the whole picture show or the "divine order of the world". Given such a view, we experience ourselves as more and more significant to the whole picture. That is, we become aware of not only a projection on a screen or cave wall, but as well we become aware of the observer observing the screen or the being who becomes aware of shadow realities. The integrations performed by the eye of the heart are integrations that include more and more of our perfect or whole self. Logos can help to "fix" Eidos in our minds. But without Eidos there is nothing to "fix" and that is why Plato explains that we can not act with wisdom until we have "had a vision of this Form." Without a glimpse so to speak, the film has not been exposed. Without an intuition of the connexity of the universe, our shoe-laces ever come undone and we walk in anticipation of a fall.

As Varga points out, the ethical theory of Plato is oriented towards a "self-realization" and a "fulfillment of potentialities." He writes: "The common element in all self-realization theories is the doctrine that moral good for the individual consists in the development of one's potentialities as perfectly as possible, and thus the fulfilling or realizing of one's nature." (197)

As a final illustration of the hierarchaical "location" of the eye of the heart, we consider some observations made by Albert Einstein. Einstein, the great physicist and humanist, tells us that throughout his productive life he felt in tune with what he called "a cosmic religious feeling." (198) He explains that when one experiences it: "The individual feels the futility of human desires and aims and the sublimity and marvelous order which reveal themselves both in nature and in the world of thought." (199) Einstein would say that it is an intuition of the "marvelous order", or as we have put it, an intuition of the connexity or wholeness of the universe that is responsible for many if not all of our most important descriptions of reality. He writes:

> I maintain that the cosmic religious feeling is the strongest and noblest motive for scientific research. Only those who realize the immense efforts and, above all, the devotion without which pioneer work in theoretical science cannot be achieved are able to grasp the strength of the emotion out of which alone such work, remote as it is from the immediate realities of life, can issue. What a deep conviction of the rationality of the universe and what a yearning to understand, were it but a feeble reflection of the mind revealed in this world, Kepler and Newton must have had to enable them to spend years of solitary labor in disentangling the principles of celestial mechanics. (200)

What Einstein tells us here is that at a most basic level it is the eye of the heart that directs research. Further, if we consider what equations like $F=ma$, or $E=mc^2$ represent and how they relate to the three eyes of humankind, we might say that the eye of the mind elucidates in symbolic form what the eye of the heart has in a general way whispered to it; whereas, it is left to the eye of the flesh to prove or demonstrate empirically the degree to which that whisper has been accurately interpreted or heard.

Arthur Koestler, in The Ghost in the Machine, supports this claim when he writes that: "the greatest mathematicians and physicists have confessed that at those decisive moments, when taking the plunge, they were guided not by logic, but by a sense of beauty which they were unable to define." (201) We seek confirmation of our thoughts and beliefs in the tangible, sensible "real" world; however, what we seek confirmation of in the "real" world, is determined not by what we see with our physical eyes, but what we "see" (intuit) with our eye of the heart.

In concluding this chapter, let us now ask what the meaning of the above might be for a theory of values or more specifically a theory of values education. Generally, we suggest that such a theory should be informed by the whole of our capacity for sight. With regard to values theory, we suggest that the eye of the heart which can intuit the order of the universe must oversee research, whereas, the eye of the mind must organize or formalize the impulses from the eye of the heart with respect to the certain intuited principles of reason. Professor Titus, lists three "laws of thought" that the mind must attempt to respect in its labours. He writes:

> In order to think clearly, men are obliged to accept the validity of certain laws of thought. These would include: the Principle of Identity, that we must stick to our meanings or definitions throughout an arguement; the Principle of Contradiction, that two contradictory propositions cannot both be true; and the Principle of Sufficient Reason, that there must be a cause for every happening. (202)

With regard to a value theory, the function of the eye of the flesh is to supply the two other eyes with the raw data upon which they

can act. Hence, experience of the world through the somatic senses is the potter's clay so to speak, upon which the hands (mind) and heart of the potter work. In the formulation of a values theory, we consequently offer that:

1] The eye of the heart must oversee, direct, or otherwise guide us to its final expression or formulation.
2] The eye of the mind must symbolically formalize our impulses to order and do so with respect to certain acceptable rules or principles of organization.
3] The eye of the flesh must supply us with the material or substance for thought and reflection.

With regard to the anticipated result, we expect that a values theory will:

1] Feel true and right and good; that is, having respected our intuitions, satisfy the eye of the heart.
2] Sound true and right; that is, having reasonably accounted for its needs for order, satisfy the eye of the mind.
3] Appear to be true and right, that is, as far as is possible be based on observable "fact" (social, historical, psychological, biological...) and hence satisfy the eye of the flesh.

If in the formulation of a values theory any one of these conditions is ignored, that is, if any one of our eyes remains shut, we suggest that resultant lacuna will have a destabilizing or damping effect on the whole of any theory that is proposed. Put another way, the resultant paradigm remains incomplete or at its best ineffective when it is not inspired by a wholistic sight. Before we proceed to examine a model of consciousness/being that attempts graphically to capture our "eidos," we will briefly say something about two general dispositions that are significant to its formulation.

DISPOSITIONS AND HIERARCHIES

In this, the last chapter of this section, we offer some support for the idea that generally there are two major dispositions and consequently two major approaches to self-knowledge. We will attempt to show that with regard to a hierarchy in the states of consciousness/being, our intuitions of a hierarchy are supported by certain historical facts. In the chapter that follows the hierarchy that we propose will become part of a wave model of consciousness/being. It has been our thesis that an activity of the eye of the heart is responsible for the different grades or degrees of our self-knowledge. We add that this activity, or lack of it, is also responsible for our general philosophic disposition. We recall that with regard to dispositions, Fichte and James suggest that what we see depends significantly on the state of the viewer who does the seeing. Hence, our preoccupation with a self or the seer and with what we have called the first wisdom---namely the wisdom of pursuing self-knowledge.

A general distinction between two types of dispositions has long been recognized. We recall Gellner's distinction between the monists and the pluralists. As previously noted, William James in Pragmatism, differentiates between "tender-minded" and "tough-minded" individuals. Further, as Cornford points out in From Religion to Philosophy, even from

the time of Diogenes Laertius (the famous biographer of ancient Greek philosophers), we are reminded that two classes or types of dispositions exist. Cornford reminds us that Laertius, "..groups the philosophers in two successions, Ionian and Italiote, headed by Anaximander and Pythagoras, as if the Greeks themselves had divined that two tendencies had been at work in shaping their systems of thought." Cornford adds: "This instinct, as I shall try to show, was right: there were in fact, two traditions, which may be called 'scientific' and 'mystical,' moved by two distinguishable impulses along lines diverging, more and more widely, towards opposite conclusions." "These impulses" Cornford concludes "are still operative in our own speculation, for the simple reason that they correspond to two permanent needs of human nature, and characterise two familiar types of human temperament." (203) Bertrand Russell agrees. In his History of Western Philosophy, he writes: "The opposition of the rational and the mystical...runs all through history..." (204). Again, Arthur Koestler, in The Lotus and the Robot, explains:

> In every chapter of European history we can trace this creative polarity on various levels - the Dionysian and the Appollonian principles; the materialism of the Ionian philosophers and the mysticism of the Eleatics; Plato, Plotinus and Augustine negating the world of the senses, Aristotle, Albert and Aquinas reasserting it; Schopenhauer's Indian pessimism confronted by Nietzsche's arrogant superman; Jung's psychlolgy of archetypes by Adler's psycholgy of power - through the ages the fertile opposition of yin and yang is reformulated under different aspects. (205)

The distinction we allude to has also been made by the poet and the artist. In his famous fresco, The School of Athens, Raphael, in contrasting the personalities of Plato and Aristotle illustrates the distinction described above. At the very center of this work we find

the philosophers Plato and Aristotle engaged in a debate of some sort. Plato holds a great book in his left hand while his right hand points up towards the heavens. If we could hear his voice it might be saying, "Let this Book of Wisdom that I hold in my hand be filled with the whispering of the gods. Let attentive men record these and share them with mankind!" Aristotle, standing to the left of Plato holds a great book in his hand as well. Stretching his right hand forward palm down, we might imagine him replying to his mentor, "Yes Plato! But let us not entirely take leave of our senses. Let us keep our feet on the ground and include in that great book the secrets of the earth." (206) It has been said that Plato built the cathedrals of Europe while Aristotle built its manor houses. While this may be a somewhat unfair comparison, it does point to a perceived distinction between two philosophic dispositions.

It seems reasonable to add that not only can we display one or another of two tendencies or dispositions, but that a third condition, one in which we find ourselves torn between the poles does exist. This view appears to be supported by Plato in the Phaedrus myth in which he contrasts the influence of a black horse and a white horse pulling the chariot of our souls in different directions. It is also evident in the following written by the poet-philosopher, Goethe.

> Two spirits dwell at odds within my breast,
> And each would gladly from the other part;
> The one seems with the single urge obsessed
> To keep the friendly earth within my heart;
> The other draws me forth in willful quest
> Of visions to a finer world apart. (207)

Goethe, in referring to a "finer world apart," suggests a hierarchy of spirits or states of being does exist. In our Wave Model of Consciousness/Being we too shall establish a hierarchy of knowing/being. The question we must ask ourselves is what justification can we offer for doing so?

We have already said that in order for a values theory to be accepted generally it must satisfy to some significant degree the "three" eyes of mankind. Since we have already established a hierarchy with the eye of the heart directing our search, we shall certainly not require the eye of the mind (logic) to prove our claim about what it means to be a whole being. Proofs seem to exist only within closed systems, and as the brilliant mathematician Kurt Gödel has demonstrated, all closed systems can be pryed open and the truths established by them can then be seen to leak out. (208) Hence, recognizing logical proofs for what they often are, pretty goldfish in a fragile fishbowl, we are more interested in supportive evidence as opposed to logical proofs. As Unamuno pointed out earlier in this paper, mankind would be better defined as a feeling than a reasoning animal. Which is to say that particularly with regard to things like self-knowledge, we are more inclined to believe what we feel is true than what someone attempts to prove to be true. Hence, nothing is proved in this paper. Rather, we seek to offer some demonstration of what we intuit to be true. Naturally, we hope that our ordered intuitions or demonstrations, which may be interpreted as reasons, are not quite as bad as Bradley points out they must be.

Given our intuitions, let us attempt to organize them into some concrete form without violating the sensitivities of our eye of the mind and our eye of the flesh. Beginning with an intuition that we must look up to see things in an expanded time-space, that is, the horizon of our entire history, what self-images come into view?

If we consult the historian Toynbee, we would learn that the most significant events in our entire recorded history are associated with the lives and activities of certain "benefactors of mankind." These "benefactors" as we have already pointed out, Toynbee identifies as: "Confucius and Lao-tse; the Buddha; the Prophets of Israel and Judah; Zoroaster, Jesus, and Muhammad; and Socrates." Certainly, a great number of Hindu sages and wise men and women from all corners of the world could be added to this list; what is important here is not the names but that which is behind the names. Associated with this historical evidence or fact of what has been, and what continues to be, most important to us is a clue to our very natures. If we examine Toynbee's "benefactors" quote we note it suggests that mankind has very powerful monistic tendencies. It also suggests that the expression of these tendencies result in his benefit or in some overall satisfaction of his being. This monistic tendency we might add is related to the self-wholing, self-organizing or self-realizing impulses in our natures. The wisdom of humankind it appears is not in the hands of a few philosophers or sages, rather, it is the collective wisdom retained and treasured by a whole of humanity. The essential wisdom of humankind is voiced by a chorus that echoes through time and space. Listening to those voices we come to understand that the organizing, unifying voice of the heart is the

voice that speaks the loudest. Consequently, the great ideas in the history of mankind are those ideas with the greatest perennial appeal to our natures. Such an appeal to our natures would necessarily point to an element of our natures to which they may appeal, hence, we suggest they may offer us clues to it. A timeless interest in the philosophies and lives of our "benefactors" points to something in our natures. The real significance of Toynbee's "benefactors" is the reality of ourselves that they point to; and that reality is that we shall continue to be most profoundly satisfied by the ideas that the cosmos is in order (God exists), and the idea that there is only one order (God is One). There is no compelling reason to believe that humankind will abandon its committment to these ideas any more than there is a compelling reason to believe that mankind will change its nature. For our purposes, we take Toynbee's pronouncement about what mankind has generally considered to be good for him to mean that, a perception of hierarchies in states of being have, and will continue to exist; and that these perceived hierarchies have been, and will continue to be ordered with respect to the degree that they reflect the reality of monistic uni-verse. In another two thousand years when a future Toynbee reflects on the past millenia he will likely say the same thing. No doubt he will have new names to add to his predecessor's list, but the type of people on it will be the same types. From the expanded view or the view "sub specie aeternitatis," mankind appears to remain committed to the pursuit of an eros or satisfaction that is alloyed with what we generally call "the good." This point is made by Plato as well. A.E. Taylor writes:

> Roughly stated, the main thought of Platonic Ethics is this. Man's life is a perpetual search for something he has not got,

> though without it he can never be at peace with himself. This something is 'the good for man', 'that which would make any man's life happy', if only he had the fruition of it." (209)

Plato tells us as well that logos can confirm our eidos. But snail-like, our ideas often only come crawling after our intuitions have pointed the way. Crawling or otherwise advancing, these ideas do point to a human nature that is engaged in a process of self-discovery in which hierarchies of self-knowledge do exist. The binding or integrating activity of the eye of the heart in mind, results in various grades or degrees of self-consciousness which individually and collectively are hierarchaically ordered.

An alternative to this historically expanded time-space view is the highly contracted time-space view forwarded by philosophers like Hume, who suggests that consciousness is the result of an instinct for association operating like a "mechanical tendency" appearing at birth and "infallible in its operations." (210) In the writer's estimation, this nose-to-the-painting view forces us to entirely miss the significance of Toynbee's "benefactors" and the resultant reflection on ourselves. A local time/space view we suggest leads to a dead end for values theory because being limited to an I-It view of mankind it can not explain mankind's pursuit of higher types of eros. A theory of values must account for higher types of eros (the good) if it is to be acceptable in the long run. A values theory based on an epistemology similar to the one Hume proposed would likely have difficulty in explaining the reason we are drawn to sympathy or compassion for others. Hume suggests that mankind possesses a natural sentiment of sympathy for others; but it is

difficult to see how this fits in with his theory that pleasures and pains like ideas, are built up or learned in conformity with his principle of association. Our position is that the psychological laws that apply to humankind will not be like the laws that Newton discovered and that apply to an It universe, because mankind is not an It.

Quite possibly the reason that modern psychology, which certainly owes a debt to Hume, finds itself in deep trouble is due to the fact that it is unwilling to share the It nature of man with an I nature. If Pavlov's suggestion that "the soul is harmful to the psychologist's work" (211) is true, then we must wonder why psychology, which has been mindful of Pavlov's advice is in the words of Sigmund Koch (1974), "breaking up," or why as Joynson (1976) points out, "The history of modern psychology [is] a record, not of scientific advance, but of intellectual retreat." (212) We must ask ourselves, why in the estimation of the great perceptual psychologist, J.J. Gilson, is psychology "ill-founded" and it's gains "puny"? (213) Again, the reason for psychology's present predicament we suggest is that in remaining preoccupied with an "atoms up" approach to understanding mankind it has remained blind to a "spirit down" approach to understanding humankind. That is, it has accepted Diderot's advice that we must only believe in God when we can "touch" Him, or alternately, we must only believe in our souls or hearts when we can "touch" them.

It is difficult to say if an inversion of the accepted approach to doing psychology would be acceptable. Perhaps, as Sigmund Koch points out, in the future much of what remains of psychology will not be a science in our present understanding of the word "science." (214) Perhaps, in order to proceed in our understanding of humankind we need to look beyond the elitist and highly focused approach to self-knowledge that has characterised what we shall perhaps soon consider as the "old science" or the old approach to human studies.

We proceed now to the formulation of a Wave Model of Consciousness/Being.

SECTION 3

INTRODUCTION TO THE WAVE MODEL

Let us now turn our attention to a model that can formalize or fix in our minds the intuitions that we have relating to the developmental processes of human consciousness. To begin, let us consider some general observations that can help us to establish what a model might look like. To maintain the distinction between ways of seeing, and consequently ways of reflecting on ourselves, without losing sight of the integrity of a whole out of which all concepts of self arise, we shall look for a pattern in nature that encompasses the conditions or properties of both apartness and wholeness in itself. With our eye of the flesh we seek evidence for that which is directly known by our eye of the heart, and we coax as well as we can, reason, or the eye of the mind to support our intuitions. We need not look far for the tangible evidence that we seek for as the poet William Blake reminds us, it is possible:

> To see a world in a grain of sand,
> And a heaven in a wildflower,
> Hold infinity in the palm of your hand,
> And eternity in an hour. (215)

St. Bonaventure suggested that all around us in the physical world we can see "the vestige of God". (216) This "vestigium" might be considered as a sort of protopattern, model, or representation of an underlying reality. René Guenon, claims that "the whole of nature amounts to no more than a symbol of transcendent realities," (217) and Peter Berger in A Rumor of Angels, points out: "There is a

fundamental affinity between the structure of his (man's) consciousness and structures of the empirical world. Projection and reflection are movements within the same encompassing reality." (218) The Feuerbachian objection that man's religion is no more than a gigantic projection of his own being, can be understood in several ways depending on how we intuit our being. In a contracted time/space, religion is seen as an expression of man's immediate wishes and fears, but in an expanded time/space view of self or being, a person's religion may be understood as an expression of a universal impulse that is mirrored everywhere in nature, and hence, is fundamentally an expression of a cosmic as opposed to an individual will. It is noteworthy that the psychologist Abraham Maslow (1968) in his later years envisioned a "fourth psychology, transpersonal, transhuman, centered in the cosmos rather than in human needs and interest..." (219)

While it is true that Plato's men in the cave do not see well, they are nevertheless not condemned to an entirely false view of man. Rather, in seeing the form of man in silhouette-like outline, they are exposed to a partial truth. Every reflection is at least a partial truth and never a complete falsehood. It is with the interpretations of reflections and the confusing of the partial truth for the whole truth, that we need to be wary of. When the physicist Schroedinger suggests, that "the world is given but once", (220) we may interpret this as meaning that it is cast in one mold or one protopattern. Since the world is given but once, everything we see,

think and feel is a reflection of that protopattern; a pattern that is repeated in every part of the whole and at every level or degree of its wholeness. "Everywhere we look in nature we see order", (221) explains Jan Smuts. A wave is a wave is a wave. It is given once, however, in one sense (eye of flesh) we can see it, feel and hear it. In another sense (eye of mind) we can derive symbolic meaning from it, and in a third sense (eye of heart) it is what it is, in itself, of itself.

We approach a model of three general states of human conscicusness/being with the humility of one who knows that they are looking to some degree at shadows on a wall. We believe that the cohesive force or firm center provided by some substantial reflection or "vestigium," can help to consolidate a values theory that will no doubt be exposed to the elements. Hierarchies, in such delicate matters are difficult to establish, to say the very least. Some people fearing the rain (the consequences of bad hierarchies) recommend that we remain in our houses. However, it is becoming clear that if we remain too frightened to wander from our houses then the rain will eventually come in through the roof. There is no real escape from hierarchies. However, there may be an escape from the worst kind hierarchies, namely those that surface without the benefit of our capacity for the kind of clear thought that is established under the influence of our eye of the heart.

THE WAVE MODEL

The philosopher A.N. Whitehead suggests that each element of the universe is: "a vibratory ebb and flow of an underlying energy or activity" (222). The poet Goethe, makes a related point in his suggestion that: "At each moment (Nature) starts upon a long, long journey and at each moment reaches her end..." (223) Paul Tillich, the theologian writes: "Life is a process of going out and returning to itself..." (224) Chapter Sixteen of the Tao Teh King, is about Knowing the Eternal Law. It explains:

> The myriad things take shape and rise to activity,
> But I watch them fall back to their repose.
> Like vegetation that luxuriantly grows
> But returns to the root (soil) froms which it springs
> To return to the root is Repose;
> It is called going back to one's Destiny.
> Going back to one's destiny is to find the Eternal Law. (225) (F1)

As a protopattern to describe the development or flow of human consciousness/being, we point to the ubiquitous wave that laps gently or crashes violently upon the seashore. If we visualize such a wave we notice that its motion can be described in two distinct movements. The first movement which represents a rising of the wave out of the sea we describe as an expulse, or a phase of differentiation of the wave from its source. The instant in which the wave turns back upon itself we shall call the repulse phase. The second movement or inpulse, which we also call the phase of integration, completes the wave's movement as it returns transformed to the sea out of which it arose. The two movemens described above

might also be referred to as a centrifugal [expulse] and a centripetal [inpulse] motion. (F2) Ontologically, we describe the expulse as a self-differentiation phase of being; and the inpulse, as a self-integration phase of being. A diagram will help to illustrate what we mean.



Fig. 1 THE WAVE MODEL OF BEING

It might be suggested that support for a bipartite distinction such as the one outlined by our wave is given as well by Plato, who considers life as a journey toward a "vision of the Good," or a search for the "better half" of ourselves. Professor Voegelin, in his book, Plato, reminds us that this "zetema" or process of inquiry is an internal process of self-discovery or self-realization. "The

light that falls on the way does not come from an external source," writes Voegelin, "but is the growing and expanding luminosity of the depth." (228) In his well-known myth in the Phaedrus dialogue, Plato, explains that the soul is driven by two steeds. Failing to control them it looses it's wings and falls to the earth where it becomes incarnated in a body and forgets "this imperial palace whence it came." As Joad further explains with regard to this myth:

> ....thus embodied in the flesh, the soul loses its status as a member of the world of being and enters the world of becoming. Seeing with the eye of the body, it can no longer view the Forms in themselves, but only their manifestation or representation in a material setting. So manifested they serve, albeit blurred and distorted by their material investiture, to remind the soul of the direct knowledge which it had of them in its previous condition, and it is in virtue of this previous knowledge that it recognises the presence of the Forms in material things. (229)

"When perfect and fully winged," Plato points out, the soul "soars upward, and orders the whole world." (230) In our own less elegant formulation of this myth we offer that the eye of the heart operating in the mind, permits us to intuit the connexity of the universe. In so doing it contributes to the gradual transformation in self-consciousness of an It-self trapped in time and space, making possible a Real-I-sation of an I-Self transcending temporal and spacial limits.

Aristotle's "First Philosophy" as well, is sympathetic to the idea that all movements in nature are purposeful and progressive. As A.E. Taylor points out:

> The process of conception, birth, and growth to maturity in Nature, or of the production of a finished article by the 'arts' whose business it is to 'imitate' Nature, may be said to be one of continuous advance towards the actual embodiment of a Form, or law of organisation, in a Matter having the latent potentiality

> of developing along those special lines. This tendency of organic process to culminate in a last stage of complete maturity is the key to the treatment of the problem of the "true end" of life in Aristotle's Ethics. (231)

In his Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel, speaks of a movement of Spirit to Spirit that bears some resemblance to the movement from sea to sea of the model we propose. Hegel divides this movement into three phases: the first he refers to "Abfall" or fall which is "God in his otherness" or "slumbering Spirit." Wilber refers to this stage in the life of human Spirit as the "prepersonal" or "subconscient" (232) realm of being. The second stage in the movement of Spirit to Spirit is characterized by what Hegel describes as a self-conscious stage typical of egoic or mental awareness. Wilber refers to this stage as the, "personal, mental and self-conscious" stage. (233) For Hegel, human development culminates with Spirit's re-discovery of Spirit as Spirit. Wilber refers to this last general stage of human development as the "transpersonal or superconscious" stage of development. (234) He further suggests that: "Precisely the same three stages can be found in Berdyaev and Aurobindo, and Baldwin comes very close to it with his notion of prelogical, logical, and hyperlogical." (235)

Writing from the perspective of the psychologist with some sensitivity for the grand view or the view "sub specie aeternitatis," H. Werner explains: "Wherever development occurs it proceeds from a state of relative globality and lack of differentiation to a state of increasing differentiation, articulation and hierarchical

integration." (236) Further, as Wilber points out in A Sociable God, psychological structures develop in a hierarchical fashion in which:

> Each senior stage displays a greater degree of structuralization, differentiation-integration, organization, functional capacity, and so on through a dozen variables found to define, via a strict developmental - logic, the meaning of the word higher. Thus developmental psychologists speak unabashedly about higher stages of cognition (Piaget), ego development (Loevinger), interpersonal relations (Selman), moralization (Kohlberg), and even quality, as the psychoanalyst Rapaport explains: 'Structures are hierarchically ordered'. (237)

Since our Wave Model describes a progression in the development of self consciousness, we ascribe an I as a prefix to what we propose are three general states of being. As these are states of being-in-relationship, that is, as they represent states of relationship between self and all other, we describe these three states as being in: I-Itness; I-Thouness; and I-Iness. Pointing to the germinal significance of the I-thought, or I-consciousness, the sage Ramana Maharshi explains:

> The first and foremost of all the thoughts that arise in the mind is the primal 'I'-thought. It is only after the rise or origin of the 'I'-thought that innumerable other thoughts arise. In other words, only after the first personal pronoun, 'I', has arisen, do the second and third personal pronouns (you, he, etc.) occur to the mind; and they cannot subsist without the former. (238)

To summarize briefly what we mean by each of these states, we refer back to distinctions in the degree of activity of the eye of the heart. This activity, we propose is experienced as degrees of consciousness in mind. As a state of self-consciousness-relationship, we have already described I-Itness as being associated with an eye of flesh view (weak eye of heart).

This view which we have also associated with what we call a quantitative view, tends to focus on the distinctness or Itness of things in the universe. The I-Thou state of relationship, (not Buber's "I-Thou" as we shall explain shortly), is a state of self-consciousness-relationship resulting from an increase in activity of the eye of the heart, in mind. In this tensive state of self-consciousness, the plexus of self is aware to some degree of its potential for Being in I-Iness. This most important state of being, or rather becoming (midway between the angels and the beasts, as Plotinus put it), is the state of self ideal-I-sation in which ethical concerns become significant, or put another way it is the state in which qualitative distinctions become meaningful. Finally, the transcendent state of I-Iness represents a state or condition in which the Self contemplates the Self in a non-judgemental, non-dual, state of complete or perfect Self-awareness. (F3)

To complete this part of the paradigm or model, we associate the I-other relationships or ontological types given above with three general regions on our wave. Hypothetically, being in pure I-Itness would represent an animal-like state of entirely contracted (into here and now significance), time/space self-consciousness. A state of I-It relationship-consciousness is associated with the beginning of the phase of self-differentiation or the early expulse of our wave. As we become dissatisfied with the reality of I as an It in a shallow time/space, an erosion of the old self view occurs. As we gasp for more space, more time, we become aware of an identity that points to our greater estate. We would say we move from the pole of

I-Itness into the field of becoming in I-Thouness. This field of becoming we note occupies the greater part of our model operating as it does in both the expulse and the inpulse. Being in the time/space transcendent state of pure I-Iness is associated with the last part of our inpulse; that part in which the sea reclaims itself. With regard to the repulse (the turning back of the wave) and self-consciousness, this moment in the life of the wave represents a Platonic "turn(ing) away from this changing world" (239). It represents a moment of Self-affirmation, that is, it represents a kind of reversal in consciousness that in the Buddhist Lankavatara Sutra, is referred to as a, "turning about in the deepest seat of consciousness." (240) Again, a diagram may help to demonstrate what we mean.



Fig. 2. The Wave Model of Being

While our meanings for the states of: I-It, I-Thou, and I-I, can only become more clear as we proceed with our thesis, we should mention here that we do not follow Buber's distinction between the I-It and I-Thou

relationship. Buber makes a twofold distinction which we have expanded to a three-fold distinction. For Buber, "It", "is set in the context of space and time" (241) as it is for us. However, for Buber, "The world of Thou is not set in the context of either of these." (242) The distinction that Buber gives to I-Thou relationship we reserve for our "I-I" relationship. He writes:

> The primary word I-Thou can be spoken only with the whole being. I become through my relation to the Thou; as I become I, I say Thou. The relation to the Thou is Direct. No system of ideas, no foreknowledge, and no fancy intervene between I and Thou. The memory itself is transformed, as it plunges out of its isolation into the unity of the whole. (243)

We shall employ the term "Thou" as a term signifying a state of relationship between I-Itness and I-Thouness in the Buberian sense, or between I-Itness and I-Iness with regard to our Wave Model. Consequently, Buber's "I-Thou" state of relationship contains elements of our "I-I" state of relationship.

As a metaphor for the progression of human consciousness, we note that the Wave Model describes the development of consciousness/being in a linear fashion. In this form, the model is meant only to outline a general tendency or progression in an overall evolutionary sense. We note that all three states, or at least the first two states of relationship (I-It and I-Thou), co-exist as relational possiblilites within an individual. We also note that while the eye of the heart opens slowly in a general sense, it can, and does respond positively to certain environmental factors that we shall describe later when we deal with the implications of our model for education. By this last statement we mean that the activity of the eye of the heart in the mind may <u>quicken</u> under

certain favorable circumstances. This quickening we would add is related to having a heightened experience of the connexity of the universe. Again, the implications of this type of experience particularly for values education will be considered later.

We suggest that with regard to our evolution in self-consciousness, where we find ourselves on the wave depends on our dominant self-perception. Our progression through the three phases of the whole movement might be viewed as a gradual weakening of the I-It self-perception and a consequent strengthening of the I-Thou and then finally I-I self-perception. There are clear parallels between our Wave Model of Consciousness/Being and Karl Jaspers "theory of being". For Jaspers as well, man has a tripartite nature. He describes this nature as being composed of:

1) a "Dasein", "a being there", that is, an empirical object an "it" in time and space;

2) a potential-seeking "being-I", (Bewusstsein Uberhaupt);

3) a Spirit or Geist.

As Russell explains:

> In Jaspers' theory of being, we are confronted with three different notions. At the lowest level, we have the objective world which is simply there. Its being is thus a being-there, grasped from the outside, objectively. It covers the field of science in all its aspects. But it is not adequate to the proper recognition by the self of its own existence. Indeed, the objective existence that holds in the scientific field is a hindrance to a feeling for this higher kind of being, which Jaspers calls being-I, or simply existence. This mode of being is no longer responsible to the rational categories that rule the field of objective being. The being-I, or personal existence contains within itself an indeterminate fund of potentialities. In striving beyond itself, the I attunes itself to a third sort of being, which may be called transcendent, a being-in-itself that includes both former varieties. (244)

As the following quotation points out, there are also similarities between our model and one described by the Indian thinker Ananda Coomaraswamy.

> The life or lives of man may be regarded as constituting a curve--an arc of time-experience subtended by the duration of the individual. Will to Life. The outward movement of this curve...--the Path of Pursuit--the Pravritti Marga--is characterized by self-assertion. The inward movement--...the Path of Return--the Nivritti Marga--is characterized by increasing Self-realization. The religion of men on the outward path is the Religion of Time; the religion of those who return is the Religion of Eternity. (245)

Coomaraswamy's model is adopted by Wilber in The Atman Project, and translated into the schematic form below.



Fig.4. The General Life Cycle

(246)

Commenting on the Outward Arc, Wilber writes:

> The story of the Outward Arc is the story of the Hero--the story of the terrible battle to break free of the sleep in the subconscious, the immersion in the primal matrix of pre-differentiation. The story of the Outward Arc is also the story of the ego, for the ego is the Hero; the story of its emergence from unconsciousness-the conflicts, the growths, the terrors, the rewards, the anxieties. It occurs in the arena of differentiation, separation, and possible alienation; of growth, individuation, and emergence. (247) (F4)

Associated with the Outward Arc are many theoretical and methodological approaches which fall under the broad category of developmental psychology. Wilber mentions the works of Baldwin, Dewey, Tufts, G.H. Mead, Broughton, Jung, Piaget, Sullivan, Freud, Ferenczi, Erikson, Werner, Hartmann, Arieti, Loevinger, and Kohlberg. (249) We would add the "self-psycholgists" May, Rodgers, and Fromm to the list, and in the field of values education the name of Robert Kegan would certainly also be an important addition.

Associated with the inward arc, the trans-egoic path of return, are the mystic-sages among whom we find Toynbee's "benefactors", and with which we associate the wisdom of Buddhist, Hindu, Christian, Taoist, Judaic, Sufi, and Islamic thought. A final point with regard to our wave model is the note that the inpulse does not lead back to the beginning of the expulse. That is, with regard to consciousness, the wave that returns to the sea is not identical to the wave that initially arises out of it. I-I relationship is not to be identified with some pre-egoic, paradisical state of oneness with nature. In Eye to Eye, Wilber devotes considerable space to what he calls the "pre-trans fallacy". Commenting on the importance of not committing the "pre-trans fallacy," he explains:

> But there is another obstacle to the emergence of a comprehensive world view, and by all accounts this obstacle is the most fascinating of all. In its various forms, this obstacle, this fallacy, has infected psychologists from Freud to Jung, philosophers from Bergson to Nietzsche, sociologists from Levy-Bruhl to Auguste Comte; it lurks as equally behind the rational and scientific; it exists to this day in both the attempts to champion mysticism and the attempts to deny it. Until this obstacle is overcome, until this major fallacy is exposed, a truly comprehensive world view will, I believe, most definitely continue to evade us. This obstacle we call the "pre/trans fallacy;...(250).

Having given it a philosophic-psychlogic context, Wilber describes what he means by the "pre-trans fallacy:"

> The essence of the pre/trans fallacy is easy enough to state. We begin by simply assuming that human beings do in fact have access to three general realms of being and knowing--the sensory, the mental, and the spiritual. Those three realms can be stated in any number of different ways: subconscious, self-conscious, and super-conscious, or prerational, rational, and transrational, or prepersonal, personal, and transpersonal. The point is simply that, for example, since prerational and transrational are both, in their own ways, nonrational, then they appear quite similar or even identical to the untutored eye. Once this confusion occurs--the confusion of the "pre" and "trans"--then one of two things inevitably happens: the transrational realms are reduced to the prepersonal status, or the prerational realms are elevated to transrational glory. Either way a complete and overall world view is broken in half and folded in the middle, with one half of the real world (the "pre" or the "trans") being thus profoundly mistreated and misunderstood. (251)

Wilber's point is an important one. With reference to our own terminology, we add that the sea does not change. What changes is a wave of consciousness that contemplates the ground of its being. That is, the dualistic states of I-It and I-Thou relationship are finally dissolved in the non-dualistic reality of I-I, or the reality of tathata, which is the Buddhist term for the "suchness", or the "thusness" of the universe. Hence, returning to the sea as a process of developing self-consciousness is not so much a returning as an ever broadening realization of what we are. It is a remembering in the Platonic sense. It is a non-dualistic seeing of what Is. In crude theistic terms, the process we outline might be described as one in which God who has fallen asleep awakens to a consciousness of Himself. At first, He is frightened, confused and angry. As gradually He remembers Himself, His dis-ease gives way to a health or a consciousness of His Wholeness.

Having so described a model of consciousness/being, let us review with reference to our own model, several ways in which the psychologist and the philosopher have described the being-in-process. In particular, let us remain alert to the significance of our model of consciousness/being for a theory of values education.

THE CONCEPT OF SELF

Having taken a look at the general nature of self as it is described by the Wave Model, we must now examine more closely the "self" that is involved in the developmental process outlined. In this part of the paper we shall examine several psychological approaches to self and their philosophical implications for our developing thesis.

The distinction between philosophy and psychology is not always clear. It doesn't help us much to say that the distinction between philosophy and psychology is such that whereas one is a speculative art the other is a science of real events. As Koch has pointed out, psychology as a science of real events may have little future if it does not somehow fundamentally change. Perhaps the psychologist today is beginning to realise that he lives in a glass house, and that his partner in that house is the philosopher. It may be true that philosophy and psychology need each other much more than they presently realise. While psychology can help us to focus our attention and deal with a here and now, philosophy can integrate the here and now's to provide a view or level of understanding that adds the ingredient of meaning to a human life. The one eye keeps us from stumbling on the stones at our feet while the other allows us to see the forest in spite of the trees; together they can help us find our way out of the woods. Perhaps the future of Western philosophy and

psychology rests with a rapprochement on both sides. Let us examine several psychological approches to self and see how a rapprochement might be possible.

The temptation to anchor a sense of self in the substantial here and now reality of sense experience is understandable. We have a reasonable life-supporting bias for a "sensible" approach to truth. But this approach to self-knowledge leaves many questions unanswered and particularly fails to deal adequately with the being to whom all experiences finally refer, or by whom they are integrated and given their meaning. Hume writes:

> For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. (252)

The hindu sage Patanjali, would suggest that Hume's problem stems from the fact that he confuses the self with its organs of perception. "Ignorance is the identification of the seer with the instruments of perception." (253) To suggest, as Hume does, that when my eye is shut I can no longer be said to exist, is to make a rather doubtful claim. As Needleman points out, were the Buddha to meet Hume, he might ask him: "Who or what is aware of all the impressions and perceptions?" (254) If Hume were to answer: "No one!", we suggest the illustrious Gautama might confront the philosopher with the final question: "But who is aware of 'No one'? Can it be, 'No one'? Is there an inner man, a witness, or even a

witness of the witness and so on?" Professor Chethimattam explains: "Perception of the self is denying the structure to perceive the builder behind it. Every conception can be denied, but the one who denies cannot be denied, and the ground of denial cannot be denied." (255) With regard to causality, Hume's final definition of cause is as follows:

> An object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it in the imagination, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other. (256)

Again, the question we might ask Hume is: "What is it, or who is it that has the imagination or will to hold cause and effect together?" As Joad so lucidly points out with regard to Hume "..if we think of the ordinary conception of the Self as the thread of a necklace along which are strung the beads of its psychological states, the effect of Hume's criticism is to affirm the beads but to deny the thread." (257) Clearly, Hume's view is atomistic.

There is some similarity between the views of Hume and those of William James the American philosopher-psychologist. For James, "the Self of selves" consistes of "successive acts of appropriation, sustained for as long as one can sustain them." (258) Again, to relate self to memory or to the capacity to organize one moment around a preceding one raises more questions than it answers and finally describes self in a purely, outside-in, empirical fashion. Humankind becomes identified with anatomical parts and physiological processes. As Wilber points out:

> The problem with this theory ... is that the act of appropriation itself does not entirely enter the stream and thus neither does the self. Put simply, the fact that the self cannot see itself doesn't necessarily mean there is no self, just as the fact that the eye does not see itself doesn't mean there is no eye. The self as intermediate seer of the stream is not necessarily part of the stream, at least not as entirely as Hume supposed. As appropriator of the stream, the self is constituted by functions other than the stream, and those functions are a legitimate field of study and research. (259)

James' approach to self appears to be that of the boulder in the stream. Wondering who it might be, it is content to identify with the sensations of water splashing upon its surface. "Let me remind you," writes the sage Huang Po, "that the perceived cannot perceive." (260) which is to say that, whatever can be perceived can not be the true subject of perception.

In Ideas Have Consequence, Professor Weaver suggests that, "the first positive step" in the discovery of meaning is the "driving afresh of the wedge between the material and the transcendental." (261) We agree, it is necessary to be clear about the distinction between an I-It and an I-I if we expect to draw an organic as opposed to an atomistic picture of man. However, a risk that we expose ourselves to when we make this important distinction is the danger that Kant exposed himself to when, having sucessfully taken things apart so to speak, he left us holding the pieces. Let us examine briefly the self that emerges from Kant's psychology and moral theory.

As Joad points out, Kant divided man's psychological faculties into three main groups, the senses, the intellect, and the will. (262) This distinction we note, bears some resemblance to our

distinction between the three eyes of man. According to Kant, when we use either our senses or our intellect to know things about the world, our knowledge of it is phenomenal or empirical, that is, conditioned a priori by the categories of time and space which are always associated with ideas in mind. In putting it this way, Kant leaves us with an unsettling schism between appearance and reality. In order to avoid falling into the mire of scepticism that haunted the philosophy of Hume, Kant, suggested that man's third faculty, a faculty that he called man's "will," did offer him some knowledge of the noumenal world. This "real" world of things in themselves which was beyond the phenomenal world was knowable by a moral self which Kant also called a transcendental self. In Kant then, we have two basic ways of knowing about the world; we can know things empirically which gives us contact with a phenomenal world conditioned by the categories of time and space, and we can know things morally, which gives us contact with reality in itself, or contact with a noumenal world. Kant postulates three psychological faculties, two basic ways of knowing, and consquently two types of self-consciousness. As we have already pointed out, what is most difficult to accept about Kantian philosophy is that these two realms of knowing are worlds alien to each other. For Kant, writes Joad, "Psychology can tell us what we are and what we want to do; it cannot tell what we ought to be and what it is our duty to do. The conception of 'ought'" Joad concludes "is [for Kant] on an entirely different plane from the conception of 'is'." (263) We agree that the <u>is</u> of the scientist is on a different plane from the <u>ought</u> of the morally sensitive

philosopher. However, while the chasm between is and ought may appear to be unfathomable, in this paper we do not conceive it that way. Rather, we suggest that the philosophic distinction between is and ought is based on a psychological one that relates to the activity of the eye of the heart in mind. We suggest that the distinction between our consciousness of is and ought is fundamentally related to the depth of our view in time and space. Descriptions of reality are given with reference to the concepts of time and space, but these concepts are elastic or fluid for time and space are a plastic that can be extended. The whole-seeking eye of the heart makes it possible for us to "see" under the aspect of eternity, hence it "stretches" time and space. Moral concern or "ought" becomes significant, or assumes a "real" reality, when we psychologically and then philosophically become aware of relationships in an expanding time/space universe. The dimension of "ought" grows with our conciousness of the connexity of the universe. Unwed psychology and philosophy tend to polarities like "is" and "ought." Interpenetrated they have the potential of a fruitful union.

Recently, support for the idea that an independent noumenal self interpenetrates with a phenomenal self comes from the neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield. Penfield maintains that while mind and brain are certainly interrelated, an independent "mind" beyond the stream of consciousness must exist. Comparing the brain to a computer, he suggests that a hierarchy that includes at least two fundamental elements can be established.

> Because it seems to be certain that it will always be quite impossible to explain the mind on the basis of neuronal action

> within the brain, and because it seems to me that the mind develops and matures independently throughout an individual's life as though it were a continuing element, and because a computer (which the brain is) must be operated as an agency capable of independent understanding, I am forced to choose the proposition that our being is to be explained on the basis of two fundamental elements. (264)

Penfield confesses that: "Throughout my own scientific career, I, like other scientists, have struggled to prove that the brain accounts for the mind." (265) In conclusion however, Penfield finds that: "the mind seems to act independently of the brain in the same sense that a programmer acts independently of his computer, however much he may depend upon the action of that computer for certain purposes". (266) (F5)

Using this computer-programmer analogy, two possiblities for identity appear. We include a third possibility that might be said to exist between the poles. The possibilities for identity are:

1) We can identify with the hardware (the brain, I-It).
2) We can identify with the programmer (I-I)
3) Or we can identify with some activity in the brain directed by mind, some computer function or activity resulting from the influence of the programmer, (the I-Thou that results from the activity of I-I in I-It).

Noam Chomsky's work with language raises some interesting questions about the trenchant mind-body (or spirit-body) dualism as well . In particular, his critique of the behaviorist's empirical model of self offers some support for more penetrating studies. Chomsky's central insight is that language is creative. (267) Writing from the perspective of the linguist he suggests that we must

distinguish between an inner and an outer language phenomenon. (The inner organizing phenomenon or principle behind language we suggest is related to the organizing principle of our eye of the heart.) Leahey reports: "Chomsky argues that when one hears a sentence one analyzes it using grammatical rules, and that this is an act of mind. To study and describe only behavior is inadequate for a scientific understanding of language. Just as theory in physics refers to unobservable entities such as the quark and abstract properties such as a quark's 'charm' or 'color,' so theory in psychology should refer to unobservable mental structures [my emphasis here] to explain observable behaviour." (268)

W.T. Stace describes the universality of the search for the Programmer or that unobservable "structure" behind observable behavior. He writes that the "introvertive experience is the same all over the world in all cultures, religions, places, and ages." (269) And, behind the computer hardware, or even some function of that machine, what do we find? Stace explains:

> Our normal everyday consciousness always has objects, or images, or even our own feelings or thoughts perceived introspectively. Suppose then that we obliterate all objects physical or mental. When the self is not engaged in apprehending objects it becomes aware of itself. The self itself emerges...One may also say that the mystic gets rid of the empirical ego whereupon the pure ego, normally hidden, emerges into the light. The empirical ego is the stream of consciousness. The pure ego is the unity which holds the manifold of the stream together. (270)

What Stace describes here as a deep level self-consciousness (the Self-Itself), is not unrelated to an ultimate step in Self-affirmation as reported by the sage Ramana Maharshi who writes:

> Underlying the unceasing flow of varied thoughts, there arises the continuous, unbroken awareness, silent and spontaneous, as

> 'I-I' in the Heart. If one catches hold of it and remains still, it will completely annihilate the sense of 'I' in the body, and will of itself disappear as a fire of burning camphor. Sages and scriptures proclaim this to be Liberation. (271)

The "Self itself" does not reflect any particular image and is better described as that which makes possible a "holding together." A.Brandt appears to support this view for he claims that: "The self (is not merely) a synthesis of the underlying psychic parts or substructures (i.e., not merely a sum of the streams) but an independent organizing principle, a 'frame of reference' against which to measure the activities or states of the substructures" (272). Mehr Baba speaks of "ego-centered integration" (273) and Wilber identifies self with a "locus of identification" (274). He points out: "Thus, in line with all the above, our first characteristic might be that the self is the executor of psychological organization, integration and coordination." (275) These closely related definitions of self certainly allow more scope for human potential than the "self" of either Hume or James.

It is interesting to note that the human life-span or an existential time-scale is philosophically interpreted in quite different terms by the Easterner and the Westerner. It appears that the Easterner (particularly the Hindu and the Buddhist) is inclined to see things in a more expanded time/space framework. One very significant fact that makes this distinction clear is the difference between the Eastern and Western religious approaches to eschatology. In the Western Judeo-Christian tradition, the emphasis is on immediate salvation, presumably because the "here and now" are all

that there is, or all that is of significance. The Eastern emphasis on karma and reincarnation (in Hinduism and Buddhism) offers a far more expanded (unhurried?) time/space frame within which being is understood. Arguably, the Eastern approach offers greater support for an evolutionary-developmental model like the one described by our Wave Model of Consciousness/Being. The disposition towards a contracted view of time in the West has naturally worked its way into Western philosophy and has had certain interesting effects. One effect that we suggest it has had is to promote an unnatural and trenchant self-other, subject-object, dualism. We shall say more about that later.

Let us continue our discussion of the elusive Self by examining it from a particular psychological perspective. The psychiatrist Carl Jung believed that the best humankind can hope for with regard to self-understanding is the coming face-to-face with his psyche or shadow self which most often lies buried beneath the unstable Ego, or conscious self. According to Jung in his book The Undiscovered Self, the only real changes of which humankind is capable are changes that come about when humankind confronts it's psyche which he also calls it's "soul." (276) "It is highly probable", Jung explains, "that all man's psychic functions have an instinctual foundation, as is obviously the case with animals." (277) The purpose of religion, which Jung describes as "an instinctive attitude peculiar to man", we are told, is to help "maintain the psychic balance". (278) We read in The Undiscovered Self that "to be ideal is impossible," and that "recognition of the shadow, on the other hand, leads to the

modesty we need in order to acknowledge imperfection." (279) Hence, for Dr. Jung, it would appear that religion has less to do with a fulfillment of human potential and more to do finally with a type of psychic health that is related to physical health.

Jung was more interested in the here and now cure of psychically dis-eased souls than in the restoring to health of something like St. Augustine's eye of the heart. (280) Hence, he was inclined to focus on a self that comes to mind via the eye of flesh, that is, a materialistic, I-It, self. Jung's thesis in, The Undiscovered Self, is that once we can name the demons within us, that is, become conscious of them, we free ourselves from their influence over us. (In this light it is easy to understand Jung's fascination with mythologies, which on one level represent a universal attempt by man to make peace with his demons.) Jung may have been right about certain demons. However, to have found the demon within and to be able to name him has not kept humankind from searching for the God within. Traditional psychology, which concerns itself with empirically verifiable causal relationships appears to be unable to make more than I-It statements about humankind because, using its time/space contracted "eye" it cannot "see" an I-I nature. Furthermore, while I-Thou experience and expression is recognized by the psychologist, its possible relationship to a transcendental I-I is necessarily ignored because an I-I reality does not exist for empirical psychology. Hence, I-Thou activity is described as a function of I-It (somatic) need. As Wilber has pointed out, psychologist's tend to commit the "pre-trans fallacy." When

psychologists do attempt to "see" an I-I nature they risk being unscientific, hence, their reluctance to deal with the findings of another eye. Again, perhaps Koch has asked the right question in wondering whether psychology has a future as a science? As Haan, Aerts and Cooper (1985) presently point out; the psycholgist may be working under the constraints of an "occupational hazard" in his studies of humankind. (281) In their book, On Moral Grounds, they explain that psychological "research cannot tell us what might be or what ought to be." (282) The significance of a potential as well as a consciouness of potential to behavioral studies is overlooked. Psychologist's attempt to tell us why our feet move forward and backward without reference to any exceptional horizon. They appear unable to appreciate that the future ever knocks softly at our present.

It is interesting to note in this regard that while in the West we have been busy trying to exorcise demons, in the East psychology has been more concerned with putting mankind in touch with the gods. If we expand our view or our ability to hear, we become aware of another voice in the mind, one that suggests; "You are born not only of the womb of material woman, but as well you are born of the womb of mother earth and indeed of Mother womb of all that can be named, Mother womb of the entire universe." Berdyaev, in The Destiny of Man, refers to Bachofen's Mutterrecht as a "work of genius." (283) Berdyaev writes:

> Bachofen's enormous importance for ethics and anthropology lies in the fact that he discovered the moral significance of the deep underlying layer of the collective subconscious, of instinct and the blood-tie, which most systems of ethics completely overlook.

> Morality can thus be traced back to cosmic principles. (my emphasis) (284)

The first two verses of the Tao Te Ching read:

> 1. The Tao that can be trodden is not the enduring and unchanging Tao. The name that can be named is not the enduring unchanging name.
> 2. (Conceived of as) having no name it is the Originator of heaven and earth; (conceived of as) having a name, it is the Mother of all things. (285)

Hence, while a material body is of the universe (eternal object) it can also be recognized by mind as being in the universe (eternal subject). The psyche, while it expresses the instincts or will of a distinct biological entity must then also reflect the Will of the Universe which is its ultimate source or creator. Consequently mind is not just a repository of biological instinct, but also a mirror that must reflect the impulses, instincts, and Will of the whole cosmos or the whole universe. Physiological needs, then, are ordered and processed with regard to an integral Self that is more than a biological self, being a "real" Self that is responsive as well to the God within or the integral Will or desire of a whole cosmos. From this viewpoint which is related to the Spinozan view of reality from under the "aspect of eternity", the distinction between the transcendental and the material self is understood as being a useful but purely metaphysical distinction.

Whitehead points to a mutual interpenetration of the inside-out and outside-in ways of understanding the world.

> We have to construe the world in terms of the general functionings of the world. Thus as disclosed in the fundamental essence of our experience, the togetherness of things involves some doctrine of mutual immanence. In some sense or other, this community of the actualities of the world means each happening is a factor in the nature of every other happening...We are in the

> world and the world is in us...This fact of observation, vague but imperative, is the foundation of the connexity of the world... (286)

Joseph Needham in describing the oriental world-view is even more clear about the distinction we allude to. He writes:

> The Chinese world-view depended upon a totally different line of thought (than the West's view of a mechanical universe externally ruled by a political Monarch and Creator). The harmonious cooperation of all beings arose, not from the orders of a superior authority external to themselves (God), but from the fact that they were all parts in a hierarchy of wholes forming a cosmic pattern, and what they obeyed were the internal dictates of their own natures. [my emphasis] Modern science and the philosophy of organism, with its integrative levels, have come back to this wisdom, fortified by new understanding of cosmic, biological, and social evolution. (287)

It appears that humankind is a creature that not only blindly accepts a stream of incoming data, but more significantly, consciously and selectively, ignores, chooses, organizes, stores and recalls data in such a way that nourishes or satisfies "something" that we can only refer to as an aspect of its perfect (complete) I-I nature. As Ken Wilber makes clear in Up From Eden, and again in Eye to Eye, humankind did not get "kicked out" of the Garden of Eden. Rather, human beings voluntarily marched out. It appears finally that mankind's appetite for the "real", the "thing in itself", is greater than Kant, Hume, Locke or Russell could anticipate. That many will be satisfied with the crude approximations of a reality comparable to the understanding of men seeing shadows on a dimly lit cave wall does nothing to discredit those who prefer to see humankind by a little more light. The eye of flesh is only strong where the eye of heart is yet weak.

THE CONCEPT OF VALUES AND SELF-OTHER DUALISM

In the light of what we have said so far, let us now briefly explain what we mean by the term values. This term and its sister terms, ethics, moral conscience, and belief, we shall treat under one heading. For our purposes we shall assume that all of these terms or concepts are related to man's ability to intuit the connexity of the universe. We shall also say something about the relationship between an objective and a subjective reality. Finally, in this chapter, we will test our insights by examining how well they apply to a particular type (man-woman) of relationship.

In their book, On Moral Grounds: The Search for a Practical Morality, Haan, Aerts and Cooper make the point that "no amount of careful pure logic can turn a fact into a value, a fact only becomes a value when someone approves of that fact." (288) This statement appears reasonable enough; it is the suggestion that only when we see (are conscious of) the relationship of a "fact" to ourselves, only then can it have meaning or value for us for only then can we appreciate its value to us. However, it is easy to misinterpret this statement or to infer from it, that, since everyone is involved in a very personal process of value-making/finding, therefore values can only be understood in a very personal, subjective, or finally relativistic way. Perhaps, an analogy will help to explain what we mean by the term "values."

We suggest that while the laws of physics come into being as we become

conscious of relationships between things in the physical world (It-It relationships), we presume that those laws express relationships that are generally true independent of our understanding or consciousness of them. Similarly, we suggest that the values (like laws) that a person has, come into being as we become conscious of relationships, in this case I-Other relationships that exist as the laws of physics do exist. Further, while our descriptions of what we see in the mind's mirror of the real depends on our particular ability to reflect, the nature of this ability or disposition, is itself a reflection of what is, or what can be. That is, what as human we approve, and how as humans we come to approve what we approve, is itself determined by a fact of what it is or means to be a human in this universe. Our Nature preceeds our ability to know our complete Nature. So, while it may be true that "a fact only becomes a value when someone approves of that fact," we repeat that, what we approve and how we approve is itself determined by a fact. Hence, all we can do is report what Is. All we can do is reflect the reality of the universe. The stars are never surprised. We can never look at the universe from the outside-in, and from the inside-out all we can do is make out relationships, dis-cover the connections or re-member whatever order there may be in the cosmos. While some truths are won by great sucessess, others are won by terrible failures. In this sense time can only be on our side. The lessons of time permit a maturation of our ability to distinguish between wisdom and ignorance, between the 'benefactors' and the oppressors of mankind, and between good and bad. We might say that the universe is constantly flooding us with truths, illustrations,

demonstrations, symbolic or otherwise of its facticity or "thusness", and depending on the degree to which we (our eye of the heart) are able to relate to and integrate that facticity, that wholeness, to that degree do the "facts" turn into values. "It is," informs "I am," and "I am" conditions "I must" or "I ought." The self-other facts that we appropriate or can make out, are the common currency of our dispositions or values. Hence, our values are the currency whereby a being in a disintegrated, discontinuous, imperfect universe, purchases his right to exist in an integrated, continuous, perfect or whole uni-verse. Our values express the connections that we have made or that through the activity of the eye of the heart we are able to reflect. In a nutshell, we suggest that not only the subjectively voiced (I approve/I choose) but equally, the objectively heard (It Is), factors, determine and participate in the organization of our values or value system.

The suggestion that the influences of both an objective as well as a subjective reality are of equal value on the single coin of self stands in contrast to the view that one or another of these faces of self is more significant for our existence. Both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard reacted, among other things, not unwisely against the "objectivating culture" (289) that was perpetuated by the dogma and ritual of the Christian religion of their times. But there was more to it than that. As Mortimer points out: "The whole of the modern Existentialist movement may be considered to stem from Kierkegaard's blunt protest against the Hegelian Absolute: 'Put me in a system and you negate me. I am not a mathematical symbol. I <u>am</u>.'" (290) What we have here is an arms-up injunction against "It <u>Is</u>." We have an injunction against a paradigm, for every paradigm is understood as

imposing certain limits that finally have the effect of robbing mankind of what Sartre refers to, as its "authentic" being. Kierkegaard declares: "Truth is subjectivity!" (291) Nietzsche announces: "All truths are bloody truths for me!" (292) So far so good. But what does "I am!" mean to Kierkegaard or Nietzsche? As long as we manage to avoid that question we don't have to worry about the confines of some "objectivating" system. But as long as we do avoid it we are playing philosophical hide and seek. There is much to be said for an even-handed or balanced treatment of self, one that is on speaking terms with an objective as well as a subjective face of ourselves. There appears to be little to suggest that the Kierkegaardian variety of philosophical "fear and trembling" is an improvement over the orthodox Christian variety. An existence that is outlined in the most general way by a paradigm may be an existence in a kind of "system," but an existence outside of any particular system is an existence in another kind of "system." The concept "open system" is an oxymoron. It appears that we can never say "No!" to something without saying "Yes!" to something else. Who is to say that a negation of all systems is not an existence in the most confining of all systems? Is the human being negated when it exercises one of its most distinguishing capacities, namely the capacity to discover and express the parameters of an ordered universe? Or is it more likely that the being is negated when it fails to exercise that capacity? Who dares to tell the swallow "Walk!" while overhead it flies?

In contrast to the views of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are the views of the philosophers who suggest that truth and in particular truth related to self has an objective face as well. Professor Copleston reminds us that

Aristotle founded his ethics on certain, "universal characteristics of nature" (293) and further: "If he were alive today and had to answer, eg. Friedrich Nietzsche, he would no doubt insist on the basic universality and constancy of human nature and the necessity of constant valuations, which are not merely relative but are founded in nature." (294) The classical realist offers that an objective reality and truth does exist quite apart from our ability to understand it.

In Eye to Eye, (295) Wilber makes a distinction between the egoic and the transegoic realms of experience, a distinction which we describe in our Wave Model as the distinction between the self-defining expulse and the self-finding inpulse. The importance of the ego (a concept of self), as we have already pointed out, is that it serves as a center or focal point about which our concepts of reality take shape. Anne Bancroft, in Religions of the East, reminds us that while ego or a concept of self associated with the expulse is a natural element in the development of humankind, it does not represent the highest development, organization, integration or wholeness of which we are capable. In summarizing the second Noble Truth of the Buddha, which is "tanha", or the ignorant thirst for existence, Bancroft outlines in brief the Buddhic psychology of self. She writes:

> As a child grows up, it needs to take in food of all sorts, material and mental, in order to grow. It also must learn to distinguish the known from the unknown. So many new things inundate its senses that it must classify those which are similar to each other or it will live in chaos. In this way, an organizing activity is built up in the brain, based on the recognition of relationships. It is this centralizing force, composed of memory and the ability to discriminate, which is the basic of the 'I'-feeling, the ego-consciousness which belongs to humanity. A child without this directing, organizing drive would not develop mentally into an adult.

> Where people seem to have lost their way, however, is that when adulthood is reached (no set age) and the need for this centralization dies away, the ego or 'I'-consciousness does not die with it but, in cancerous fashion, grows large, no longer a by-product of a natural human activity, but a monstrous growth in its own right, feeding on its desire for separate existence as a permanent entity in contrast to the rest of the world. (296)

As an example of how the quality of interpersonal relationships might be affected when the ego is iron-cast in its unwillingness to yield to the trans-egoic self, (that is, when the subjective self refuses to recognize or be integrated with an aspect of its objective or other-self), we are informed by J.D. Butler in Four Philosophies: And Their Practice in Religion and Education, of the effect of chronic or "extreme individualism". As Butler points out:

> The strictures and dilemmas of this extreme individualism can be depicted very pointedly, and without any sensationalism, by referring to sex which in relation to the authenticity of self is a real problem for existentialists. Does the sex relation transcend individualism, or does it fail to do this? For Sartre at least, the answer is that it does not transcend individualism; and because of this any party to the sex act, as to almost all other human relations, emerges as either the master of a conquest or the subject of exploitation. If I submit to another's sex desire, marriage or other legal sanction notwithstanding, just to that extent I have ceased for the time being to be an authentic self. Instead I have been the object of exploitation. If on the other hand I am the aggressor in the relation, my will to power has made the other party to the relation less than a self in order that I may be my self-for-myself in some fuller way which by my own initiative I have chosen. (297)

The point we return to is that; "I am," must find its counterbalance in "It is." The subjective reality must make its peace with an objective reality as we proceed to a deepening understanding of ourselves. The self-defining expulse is only the first movement of a complete wave of becoming that includes a second movement which we have described as the self-finding inpulse. In the

Coptic Gospel of Thomas, verse 22, Jesus says: "When you make the two one, and when you make the inside like the outside.....then you will enter [the kingdom]." (298) Any isolation of the subjective self in the way for example Sartre, Nietzsche or Kierkegaard would isolate their subjectivity, results in the kind of trenchant dualism between subject and object that ultimately points to a wholesale refusal to accept a universe as <u>It Is</u>. The effect of the tendency to over-valuate the subjective self or alternately to under-valuate the objective reality of the universe is a restriction of our ability to experience compassion, love, communion, or to intuit the connexity or (w)holiness of a uni-verse, for all of these require that we accept to some degree a universe as <u>It Is</u>. For Sartre, man is a "pour soi" and not an "en-soi." That is, man is "for itself," and not an "in-itself." He is committed to an ever incomplete self-actualizing project, one in which he is destined to define his own nature on his own personal terms. The existentialism of Sartre tends to entrench the subject-object dualism. Embedded in this kind of dualism it is unable to participate in the process of becoming that we have identified as ideal-I-zation or being in I-Thouness. Being in I-Thouness is only possible when we begin to release our grasp on the time/space contracted being in I-Itness. The existentialist's anxiety is not difficult to understand.

To conclude this section we shall give a concrete example of how a particular self-other relationship would appear in the three states of I-It, I-Thou and I-I relationship. But first let us summarize briefly what we have said so far with regard to the dynamics of self or what we might refer to as a general process of <u>self-culture</u>.

First of all we suggested that what we know about ourselves

depends on what we are able to see. We suggested that humankind has three "eyes" and that each "eye" is capable of giving us a particular type of view of ourselves. As Ken Wilber explains: "The 'three eyes' of a human being correspond, in fact, to the three major realms of being described by the perennial philosophy, which are the gross (flesh and material), the subtle (mental and animic), and the causal (transcendent and contemplative)." (299) In order to establish a hierarchy between these "three" eyes we suggested that how we see ourselves and the universe in general, (the relationships we can make out) depends primarily on the degree to which our eye of the heart is active. That is, with regard to our self-consciousness, the "three eyes" are in essence dependent on the activity of one eye. The greater the activity of the eye of the heart, the greater our ability to see the connections that point to a non-dualistic, I-I, Self-Nature. When this eye, which we have also equated with the term "soul", and which we have suggested is the agent of Spirit, is relatively inactive or somehow prevented from delivering its insights or intuitions of the connexity of the universe to the mind (the seat of consciousness); or if for some other reason they do not take hold in the mind; then, we tend to experience the world and our selves in I-It dualism. Furthermore, we suggested that between the two poles of self-consciousness described as I-Itness and I-Iness there exists the realm of self-consciousness within which our values, our ethics, our moralities, and our ideals are formulated, tempered, tried and reformulated in a cyclic purposeful fashion. This realm of self-consciouness between the above poles we have called the realm of

being in I-Thouness. The process of becoming that we call the process of self-culture might also be described as a process in which I-I self-consciousness (non-dualistic) is distilled from I-It self-conciousness by the process of self-ideal-I-zation leading to self-real-I-zation. Our expressed values, our ethical consciousness and our moral sensitivities are finally related to our consciousness of a potential Wholeness of Being. Furthermore, this consciousness of a Wholeness of Being chipping away at a dualistic self-other identity, results in a growing consciouness of the integrity of the uni-verse or of the reality of a cosmos in the original sense of the word (that is, a universe that is in order).

To conclude, let us turn to a concrete example of how our values (being-in-relationship), differ as we experience ourselves in I-Itness, I-Thouness, and I-Iness. Let us briefly examine the possibilities for relationship between a man and a women in this case from the point of view of a male. We point out that a similar case can be made from the position of the female.

In I-Itness (weak eye of the heart), the predominant sense of self is that I am some "thing." From this perspective a woman is an object as well, for as I see myself so I see all others. In this state of trenchant self-other consciousness, man is frightened and lonely. Woman is the great protectress, the great sustainer of man's physical self. From cradle to grave she is his mother and nurse. It is on account of her distinct physical being that man may experience blissful moments of self-transcendence and it is through the fruit

of her womb that he may establish a kind of physical immortality. As an object, she may satisfy his most urgent It-needs and so gain his greatest attention, but as an object she may as well become the repository of his most cruel abuse.

In I-Thouness, the relationship between man and woman becomes more sacralized. As man becomes aware of himself not only as an object but also as a being-in-potential existing in a cosmos (ordered universe), his relationship with woman displays a more qualitative sensitivity. When man becomes ideal-conscious, woman is intuitively understood as having potential for his own self-idealization. As for example the angels, virgins and madonnas in Western art illustrate, woman, then assumes the form of an ideal. She demonstrates or possesses qualities that can complement man and help him to complete himself. She can be his "better half," the part he cares for, the part he protects and emulates. Qualities such as pureness, goodness, calmness, self-sacrifice, resolve, justness, gentleness, innocence and grace, to name a few, are some qualities that she might represent and which stimulate and support man's self-transformation.

Finally, in I-Iness, woman as other (to satisfy man's physical (I-It), and/or psychic (I-Thou) needs), is replaced as woman-self is fully integrated into man-self, or to put it more accurately, as woman-self is fully realized in man-self. Again, from The Nag Hammadi Library in English, in the Gospel of Thomas we read:

> Jesus said,..and when you make the male and the female one and the same, so that the male not be male nor the female female; and when you fashion eyes in place of an eye, and a hand in place of a hand, and a foot in place of a foot, and a likeness in place of a likeness; then you will enter [the kingdom]. (300)

The relationships we have described between man and woman can be applied to other types of relationship. Our relationship with nature for example, can be an I-It relationship in which nature is viewed as being some thing to be used, conquered or consumed. It can be an I-Thou relationship in which nature is seen as having a capacity for self-transformation. The naturalist Thoreau, wrote that it was his profession to "attend all the oratories and operas in Nature." Or, finally, our relationship with Nature can tend towards an I-I relationship; that is, one in which we tend to identify with all of It. Chief Luther Standing Bear explains the I-I relationship with Nature in the following terms:

> L'homme qui s'est assis sur le sol de son tipi, pour méditer sur la vie et son sens, a su accepter une filiation commune à toutes les créatures et a reconnu l'unité de l'univers; en cela, il infusait à son être l'essence même de l'humanité. Quand l'homme primitif abandonna cette forme di développement, il ralentit son perfectionnement. (301)

Having so related our concept of values to the activity of our eye of the heart and as well the three states of being described by our Wave Model of Consciousness/Being, we proceed now to turn our attention from thoughts about the philosophical foundations for values theory to the more practical concerns for a psychology of values education. Needless to say, our psychological model must remain faithful to the intuitions that we have so far described.

SECTION 4

THE SMALL WAVE OF BECOMING

In this last part of the paper we shall attempt to relate our philosophical insights guided by an eye of the heart disposition, to the events that constitute the arc of "ordinary" experience. A link between the theoretical and the practical is important if we are to contribute anything meaningful to the field of values education. An essential first step in this direction is the search for connections between philosophical truths (insights/intuitions) and psychological "facts". In the concluding paragraphs of the last chapter in his book Four Philosophies, Butler summarizes the steps that he believes are necessary if we are to arrive at a mature philosophy of education. He writes:

> I have ...argued that it is impossible ...to deal responsibly with the aims of education and the function of the school unless theory of value is taken very seriously as the necessary rootage of educational aims and functions. In dealing with value theory, I have made the observation that value thinking necessarily involves conception of reality; and so I have led on to a brief discussion of representative world views. In addition to this succession of steps, I have proposed that an added and final step must be taken by anyone who will be responsible in building a philosophy of education. This added step is to address oneself to theory of knowledge and thereby determine how a world view is known to be true, and also what world view can have a value theory solidly based on it and educational aims or function soundly formulated within its context. What this has amounted to, in my judgement, is a psychological approach to the task of building an educational philosophy. (302)

The writer agrees with the three points made by Professor Butler. Values theory not only relates to the aims and purposes or the philosophy of education, but preceeds them as well. Secondly, we

accept as well that a theory of knowledge underlies a values theory. In this paper we have paid close attention to the question of how we know, for how we know, as we have pointed out, determines what we know. Finally, we believe that Butler is right to emphasize the significance of "a psychological approach" to the building of a "solid" philosophy of education, but we must qualify this statement.

We suggest that a "first" psychological fact is not derived out of some physiological or sociological fact, but rather that it is derived out of the great fact of what it means to be a human being in this universe. That is, the first psychological fact is a cosmocentric as opposed to a sociocentric or a physiocentric one. We are reminded again of Maslow's later in life, "fourth psychology," which as he put it is first of all "centered in the cosmos" before it becomes visible in mundane relationships. (see quote 219). Hence, we suggest that a "cosmocentric" (Wilber's term) existential fact of which we become aware through the mediating activity of our psyches or souls (eye of heart) is fundamentally responsible for the manifest varieties of behaviour. For us, psychology is the study of behavior and its relationship to a transpersonal reality or fact. Our psychology like the psychologies of Plato and Spinoza is a psychology that is written from a view "sub specie aeternitatis." The voice of our psyches or souls which may be described as our intuitions, our insights, our conscience, our instincts for right and wrong or good and bad, are expressed in our songs, our dances, and our works of art.

We recall that Einstein's work was directed by an intuition of

the connexity of things that he referred to as a "cosmic religious feeling." We suggest that the equations of a science of psychology (if such a science can exist), can similarly be established by a reasoning that is guided by an intuition of the connexity of things. Hence, a psychological approach to the questions surrounding values education means for us the finding of a psychology that is consonant with our intuitions.

We must proceed now to outline the relationship between a Great Wave, (the philosopher's intuited Wave of Consciousness/Being previously described) and what we shall now refer to as a Small Wave of Becoming (a cyclic movement that has been described particularly by the philosopher-psychologist).

Martin Buber, in I and Thou, describes an inevitable lifelong tension between the "I" as an "It" and the "I" as a "Thou." Paul Tillich, the theologian writes:

> Life is a process of going out and returning to itself as long as one lives. One takes in elements of the encountered reality and assimilates them to one's own centered whole, or one rejects them if assimilation is impossible. One pushes ahead into space as far as one's individual structure permits, and one withdraws when one has overstepped this limit.....One develops one's parts in balance under the uniting center. (303) (F1)

This view corresponds to our Wave Model's insistence that a dynamic "I", is the focus of our "ego-centered integrations", or our ideal-I-zations. Robert Kegan, the educational writer who was influenced by developmental psychologists such as Kohlberg, Piaget, Loevinger, and theologians such as, Tillich and Buber, points out that: "Any developmental framework, taken as a whole, should be a kind of attention to the human dance--the changing form through time

and space." (304) He further writes:

> ...my own reconstruction of the successive evolutionary truces (or stages) of personal development (building largely on Kohlberg, Piaget, Loevinger, and my own empirical work) suggests a moving back and forth between a resolution of this tension [differentiation and integration] in favor of the one side at one stage, and the other at the next. (305) (F2)

We agree with this assessement that personal development is a dynamic process of "moving back and forth" between the poles of "independence and inclusion" [Kegan], "individuation and participation" [Tillich], and "agency and communion" [Bakan], but we add that while the psychologist can draw a more or less accurate circle in his localized descriptions of human nature, only the philosopher (or philosophical insight) can add the important dimension or perspective that can point to the meaning of all human twistings and turnings. Furthermore, we add that without the qualitative dimension of meaning the picture is incomplete. More precisely, the incompleteness of the contemporary psychological view can take two forms that we shall now briefly examine.

In one of these incomplete forms a particular aspect or type of psychological development is regarded as superior to another. For example, the drive to "autonomy" might be elevated over the drive to "inclusion." When this happens we miss the significance of an interdependence between the two and as well we ignore the contribution that each makes to a process of self-wholing, or the process that we have identified with becoming through self ideal-I-zation. Perhaps, we would do well to resist the temptation of choosing sides before we are clear about the profound nature of

the human developmental process. As Kegan explains:

> Wherever one looks among developmental psychologists, from Freud at one end of a spectrum to Carl Rodgers at the other , one finds a similar conception of growth as increasing automony or distinctness; the yearning of equal stature--the yearning for inclusion--tends to be demeaned as a kind of dependency or immature attachment. (306)

In a second type of incompleteness of the psychological model, a particular cycle of drives is considered as final or complete in itself; that is, the circle of drives is closed, it does not lead anywhere, it is purposeless. In An Outline of Psychoanalysis Freud offers a final statement of his drive theory. He writes: "After long hesitancies and vacillations, we have decided to assume the existence of only two basic instincts, Eros and the destructive instinct.....The aim of the first of these basic instincts is to establish ever greater unities.....--in short, bind together." (307) Freud continues, "The aim of the second is, on the contrary, to undo connections and so to destroy things. In the case of the destructive instinct we may suppose that its final aim is to lead what is living into an inorganic state. For this reason we also call it the death instinct." (308)

In Eye to Eye, Ken Wilber argues that Freud's instincts were good to a point, but that two difficulties arise. Wilber writes: "I reject entirely the notion that eros is generated only in the soma and consequently displaced to mind. In my opinion, each level is defined by its own unitive tendencies in the arc of evolution, and, as a matter of fact, the higher levels (such as mind) possess more holism and holistic drive--more eros--than the lower ones (such as

libido)." (309) Wilber continues: "For example, biological or body-sex eros can form a union with two bodies at a time, whereas mental eros can unite whole peoples in a community of discourse, and spiritual eros can unite the entire manifest universe in radical oneness." (310)

We suggest that the difficulties that arise with Freudian theory stem in good part from the fact that for Freud psychic health and human development are veiwed within a restricted time/space perspective. That is, Freud tends to see things only through McLuhan's "rear view mirror." This disposition, Wilber would suggest, forces Freud to commit the "pre/trans fallacy;" that is, to explain the higher in terms of the lower, or, as we have put it, to judge an apple by comparing it with a pear. Commenting on this tendency in Freud's work, Wilber concludes: "he (Freud) correctly sees that the aim of involution is the return to the lowest level of all (inanimate matter), but he refused to see that the aim of evolution is the resurrection of ultimate unity in Spirit." (311)

> If we assume, [Freud writes], that living things came later than inanimate ones and arose from them, then the death instinct fits in with the formula we have proposed to the effect that instincts tend towards a return to an earlier state. In the case of Eros (or the love instinct) we cannot apply this formula. To do so would presuppose that living substance was once a unity which had later been torn apart and was now striving towards re-union. (312)

"Of course, for the perennial philosophy" explains Wilber, "that is <u>exactly</u> what happened--all things were 'torn apart' from spirit-unity during prior involution, and evolution, driven by love, is now reuniting and re-membering all elements in a climb <u>back</u> to unity-Spirit." (313)

In attempting to find the reasons for human behavior the psychologist finds himself in a dilemma when he does not exercise his capacity for a far-sightedness that complements his ability for near-sightness and that completes his capacity for wholistic sight. When the psychologist is not on speaking terms with the philosopher then the reflection on self is truncated.

To ascribe meanings to our sundry actions is to do far more than to take some leap of blind faith. Rather, it is a committment to an on-going process of self-discovery. A process that refuses to be confined to a myoptic view. By searching for meaning in this way we actually test the waters of reality. We must commit ourselves to a taste before we can comment on the quality of the water; there appears to be no other way to understanding. Hence, to propose a model is finally to test our understanding. Let us proceed now by outlining a form for the observable "psychological" movements, the cycles and drives that we refer to as the dynamics of the Small Wave. In doing so we do not leave behind a philosophical meaning for what we report as psychological fact. What then can be said about a Small Wave, one that accounts for our day-to-day movements, one that exists within the embrace of an intuited Great Wave?

We have already noted that the Great Wave describes a two-phase or two-step movement of differentiation and integration. In the case of our Small Wave these movements are described as the opposing needs for independence and inclusion. To clarify how the polarities we describe are related to each other, and as well, in order to understand how the Great and the Small Wave are related, I am

reminded of a Kay Nielsen illustration from the book East of the Sun and West of the Moon, that was posted in my room when I was younger. I couldn't understand then exactly why it appealled to me but now I understand that it represented an archetypical order that I intuitively felt to be a "good" or "true" representation of how things must be or should be. In the illustration, a knight sits on a charging white steed. In his left hand he holds a long sword. A great combat sheild hangs by his side. Clinging to him is a beautiful maiden in a long silken gown that partially covers him. In his right hand are the reins by which he guides the great horse that carries him and his lady forward. (F3)

When I think of this illustration now I can see a wealth of philosophic and psychologcial meaning in this mythologically inspired illustration. The sword, the shield, and the determined look on the young man's face can be taken to represent the aspect of being or existence that is related to individuation, autonomy or differentiation. Associated as well with a shield and sword in particular, might be the impulses to distinction-making. That is, these represent the impulse to carve out or to cut away at his embeddedness in lower grades of self-consciousness/being. With regard to our Great Wave Model this liberating or differentiating impulse can be expressed at three levels which are: 1) the material I-It level (liberation from all that impedes the satisfaction of his physical needs); 2) the sacral/idealizational I-Thou level (liberation from limiting lesser ideas of self); 3) the transcendental I-I level (liberation from the limits of 1) and 2),

which is to say liberation from identity with any experience or concepts in particular; hence, identity which is neither dualistic nor confined by concepts of time or space. I am reminded here of Maslow's heirarchy of needs which makes a similar distinction between: "physiological" and "safety" needs (I-It); "belongingness" and "Self-esteem" needs (I-Thou); and "Self-actualization" and "Self-transcendence" needs (I-I). In this male (symbolically speaking) aspect of the illustration, self is <u>defined</u> through an active expression of will or purpose.

We notice in the illustration that the female offers support and/or encouragement to the warrior. She represents the other ontological pole of the Small Wave, namely that of communion, integration, or inclusion. Just as the symbolic male must go out to fight identity battles at various levels of reality (physical, mental, spiritual, I-It, I-Thou or I-I) so the female supports him and ever encourages him to engage in the "good" fight. She can be conceived of not only as the supportive mother of a physical home, but as well as the supportive Great Mother of our home in the universe. (F4) Berger makes just this point in <u>A Rumor of Angels</u>, when he writes: "The role that a parent takes on represents not only the order of this or that society, but order as such, the underlying order of the universe that it makes sense to trust. It is this role that may be called the role of the high priestess." (314) The real significance for us of the role of the symbolic female, particularly as it relates to education is made clear as Berger continues:

> 'Everything is in order, everything is alright'- this is the basic formula of maternal and parental reassurance. Not just

> this particular anxiety, not just this particular pain, but <u>everything</u> is alright. The formula can, without in any way violating it, be translated into a statement of cosmic scope--'Have trust in being.' This is precisely what the formula intrinsically implies. And if we are to believe the child psychologists (which we have good reason to do in this instance), this is an experience that is absolutely essential to the process of becoming a human person. Put differently, at the very center of the process of becoming fully human, at the core of <u>humanitas</u>, we find an experience of trust in the order of reality. (315)

Finally, to return to our illustration; the horse upon which the warrior and his maiden are seated carries them both faithfully forward. Hence, it might be identified with the evolutionary movement towards a fulfillment of cosmic purpose or more specifically an evolution of the consciousness/being as it is described by our Great Wave. When I reflect on it now the whole picture makes complete sense. Whereas some psychologists might interpret the illustration as a subconsciously motivated wish to fight one's way back to a physical womb, the insightful philosopher would see in this mythologically inspired illustration something of greater cosmic importance. He might see in this illustration a graphic representation of the parameters involved in the universal drive to "cosmic significance." It is interesting to note that some psychologists do in fact recognize this drive as <u>the</u> basic one. However, what the psychologist most often refuses to do and can not do, (because his theories are formulated within a contracted time/space matrix), is to view this drive as a component of any kind of expanded ultimate reality. The psychologist Becker recognizes the drive for "cosmic significance" and relates it to the need to be heroic. Having surveyed the entire literature on the subject, Becker

concludes: "What I have tried to do is to suggest that the problem of heroics is the central one of human life, that it goes deeper into human nature than anything else." Further, Becker claims that in dealing with heroics: "we are dealing with the universal human problem." (316) As a psychologist who sees the Small Wave and not the Great Wave, unfortunately Becker, like Freud, like Jung, and, as Kegan and Wilber have pointed out, like psychologists in general, thinks that men and women seek to be cosmically significant or like the gods ("immortal" in the works of Otto Rank), because they are "spineless liars" (317) who can not face the impenetrable uncertainties of human life.

Again, as long as we are adamant in our claims that "there is nothing to see!" we shall see "nothing". As long as the eye of the heart whereby we might see things a little more from under the aspect of eternity, is closed, so long will any Great Wave be a figment of the philosopher's imagination; and so long will philosophy in the words of Whitehead be "ruined," or rendered "easy," which is the way Jacob Needleman puts it. (F5)

Before we offer an illustration of the Small Wave we emphasize that the process of cyclical alternations between the polarities described above is a continuous one in which both movements or principles, like the yin and the yang are in simultaneous interaction. How far the being might reach out depends on how securely he or she is held. In one instant we are integrated with, held or nourished by the womb that Is, and in a second instant we pull away to become a relatively independent "I". As we have

mentioned, the movement through degrees of dependence and independence can be witnessed at several levels. The development of the embryo in the physical womb of the female, the development of the psychological being in the womb of the home, the school, or the society, and the development of the psychic or spiritual being in the womb of the universe, are levels at which we can visualize this cyclical alternation. In the Small Wave we are primarily interested in the alternations that occur at the contracted time/space scale.

Another way of putting the interaction or alternation between the active and the passive, the yin and the yang aspects of our natures or the impulses to differentiation and integration, is to view them as the distinction between the existential statements: "It Is," and "I Am." "It Is," might be considered as the stable substratum out of which or upon which a dynamic "I Am" arises. Practically, "It Is" can be the security and warmth of the womb, the security and warmth of the home or the security and warmth of the uni-verse. By warmth we mean the protective, supportive environment or matrix in which "I Am" finds itself and from which it develops or reaches out to Real-I-ize itself. In the diagram which we shall presently offer, we describe the alternation between, "I Am" and "It Is," as the interplay between Being and the ground of Being; this way of putting it is a more general way of expressing the alternation between Kegan's "independence and inclusion," Tillich's "individuation and participation," or the needs for differentiation and integration that we have previously referred to.

An observation that is important to our discussion is the note that "I Am" and "It Is," are the polar elements of one reality just as the yin and the yang are the complementary aspects of one circle or one being. That is to say, the one can not be understood in isolation from the other; any attempt to do so results in an atomistic-subjective as opposed to an organic-wholistic understanding. Another way of putting this distinction is to suggest that, "I Am" is an approach to an awareness of the Real-I through the emphasis of the egocentric-subjective will, (the yang). With regard to the self it represents the self-defining impulse. It is to assert: "My will be done." It is the attempt to make meaning by asserting or testing our natures in Nature. In the Tao-Te-Ching it is symbolically described as the way of the male.

"It Is" on the other hand, might be described as the approach (the yin) to an awareness of the Real-I through an attention to the the reflection of the face of the Real. We might describe it as an allocentric (Gk. allos other) approach. With regard to self, we speak of a self-finding impulse which is expressed when we say: "Thy will be done." With regard to meaning, in this approach we are engaged in the process of meaning-finding by the discovery of our natures in Nature. In the Tao-Te-Ching this approach to self-realization is symbolically described as the way of the female.

With regard to human growth and development two primary factors are involved. By way of analogy we might describe these the seed and the seedbed. Both are important if the seed is to reach its full potential. While the analogy is far from perfect we suggest that the

relationship between "I Am" and "It Is" might be compared to the relationship between the seed and and its seedbed. It is clear that interaction between the two must remain dynamic in order for development to proceed. That is, there arise numerous ontological difficulties when one side is neglected in a discussion of the development of being. It is understood that the seed that attempts to grow entirely on its own stored reserves of energy, soon runs out of fuel. If the seedling is to continue to grow, at a certain stage it must make integrations with its surroundings. That is, its ability to say "I Am" in ever more complete ways is sooner or later dependent on its willing to say "It Is."

Nietzsche, was able to voice a most eloquent "I Am," but failed to raise himself above its limits by proceeding with an ennunciation of "It Is." We might say that he attempted to grease the wheel of becoming by emphasizing the importance of the subjective expression in a world that was too much for his liking dominated by "objectivating" influences. As Bancroft and Butler have pointed out, there are dangers in an over-emphasis or over-inflation of the subjective approach to reality. What we want to emphasize here is that <u>both</u> "I Am" and "It Is" must be recognized as integral to the process of becoming. In a philosophy of education and values theory in particular, let us remain aware of possible imbalances when we pick up our pens.

Needless to say, we do not agree with Russell who suggests that we can do no more than to live with our existential angst or anxiety. Rather, we agree with Berdyaev, who acknowledges that

philosophy is "bound to wage a painful struggle for its rights, which are always called into doubt" (318) but that finally it is a legitimate undertaking representing "a creative effort to break through to the meaning of existence." (319) With regard to education, the philosopher's role is ever to recognize, to point out, and to offer a theoretically balanced approach to values theory. As we shall point out there are many "legitimate" and acceptable ways in which "It Is" can assume its rightful place next to "I Am" in the school curriculum. Let us now illustrate graphically what we have been referring to as the Small Wave; the the cyclic alternation or oscillation between "I Am" and "It Is" which represents a subject-object, or self-other uniting process that Whitehead refers to as zipping up the "seamless coat of the universe."



The Small Wave

If we now superimpose the Great Wave over the Small Wave we get a philosophically sensitive as well as psychologically visible, integrated view of human development. Kegan talks about a "personal sacred history that is universally shared, binding human beings across ocean and century." (320) His concept of "meaning constitutive evolutionary activity" (321) is reflected in the illustration below which shows how the two waves are related. Meaning constitutive activity is the cyclical movement or the psychological turning of the inner Small Wave of our diagram. The evolutionary aspect, that is, the gradual transformation in self-consciousness that is associated with this psychological self-transformation, is represented by our Great Wave which contains and fundamentally inspires all Small Wave movement. The dynamic psychological "fact" which we describe here is an opening of the eye



The Integrated Wave of Becoming/Being

of the heart with which we come to see the connexity of the universe. The resultant composite wave might be called an Integrated Wave of Becoming/Being

By imposing the Great Wave over the little one we pay attention to the person-through-time. That is, we view humankind with the projector running or from under the aspect of a little more "aeternitatis". Kegan reminds us that: "What developmental theory has paid least attention to is the person-through-time, the person who persists, and to memory itself; instead it focuses on what is new and different about the person..." (322) A recognition of the philosophically knowable dimension of human being permits us to open the closed ring of psychological models; it allows us to transform the circle into a directed spiral.

Speaking in support of what he calls his "inductive faith," or an "argument from ordering" (323), Berger writes: "Every ordering gesture is a signal of transcendence." (324) The significance of Berger's argument does not stem from the fact that his statement is true in an empirical sense, (because it can't be proved empirically), nor does it stem from the fact that it is logically sound, (because reason, as Kant pointed out in his Critique can be capricious). In essence its significance is derived almost entirely out of the fact that Berger and others who tend to see things as he does, intuit, or feel the rightness of their claims. That is, Berger's claim is a claim whose authority is the eye of the heart. As such, it may seek support from the eye of the flesh (empirical evidence) and as well from the eye of the mind (reason), but essentially it must stand or

learn to stand on its own two feet. With regard to formulating models it is important that intuited truths be give a chance to to speak. Naturally we shall seek support from the eye of flesh and the eye of mind and there will no doubt be some debate over the correctness of one or another model, but as Fraenkal and others have pointed out, this debate would be a welcome change from the present situtation in which tortoise of intuition has been frighened into its shell. Until it comes out, progress in the field of values education will remain at a stand-still. Einstein, to use the example of one creative thinker, did not need to apologize for his disposition to rely on his intuitions. (F6) As he himself pointed out his work was guided by what he intuited to be true. We have already suggested that a theory of values education must satisfy as well as it can <u>all</u> of the eyes of mankind and that the eye of the heart (the intuitive faculty) must play the prominent role of overseeing the work of model formulation. If intuition was important to Einstein whose work dealt with relationships at the It-It level, how much more important it must be to the theorist who would attempt to find relationships between such concepts as God, the good, the right, the moral, and so on. It seems likely that these and related concepts will only be rendered meaningful when the eye of the heart has been granted the status of a legitimate "organ," capable of giving us "real" and "true" sight.

A logician "sees" logic; and all that a pick-pocket sees is another man's pockets. Because the Skinnerian eye is trained on man the machine that is all it can see. With regard to the nature of humankind, the Skinnerian claim that "feelings are unimportant" is

valid if one is dealing with a purely mechanical man; nonsensical when dealing with a view of man through the eye of the mind; and entirely false when man is viewed through the eye of the heart, in which case "feelings" are of quintessential importance. We should not have to apologize because we see things through the eye of the heart that intuits the connexity of the universe. We should not have to invent and try to soft sell an "inductive faith." Ernest Gellner's excellent book, The Legitmation of Belief, represents an effort to do the impossible. That is, it represents an effort to legitimate a view through the eye of the heart by wrapping it up with ribbons and bows furnished by the eye of the mind. It represents an effort to sell shoes by making the box attractive. What we wind up doing is selling the wrappings and not at all the contents or the shoes. We have nothing to hide in declaring a deductive faith, or in declaring a science of humankind that is nourished by the heart of ourselves. In our efforts to become scientifically (eye of flesh) competent we have ignored the importance of becoming philosophically (eye of heart) competent and as a result we discover that we do not know ourselves at all. "The world," writes Berdyaev, in The Destiny of Man, "is revealed to philosophy in a different way than it is to science, and the philosophical way of knowing is different. Sciences are concerned with abstract, partial realities, they do not see the world as a whole or grasp its meaning." (326)

Kegan points out that the paradigm of mankind formulated by developmental psychologist's has changed very little since Piaget published The Language and Thought of the Child over fifty years ago.

He explains:

> With very few exceptions the work of the Piagetians ('neo' or otherwise) must still be characterized as about cognition, to the neglect of emotion; the individual, to the neglect of the social; the epistemological, to the neglect of the ontological (or concept, to the neglect of being); stages of meaning-constitution, to the neglect of meaning-constitutive process; and what is new and changed about a person, to the neglect of the person who persists through time. (327)

Perhaps not all we need to know about human development is not found out by talking to children; perhaps we need to talk to the enlightened philosopher and the wise man as well. In this paper it has been our interest to accomplish the following:

1) To find an integrated meaning for intuition and cognition.
2) To link the epistemological with the ontological.
3) To avoid the intractable subject-object dualism that characterises some varieties of philosophy; ("Existence slips away both from the subject and the object." writes Berdyaev (328)),
4) To elaborate a model that can accomodate stages of development (I-It, I-Thou, I-I) within a process that remains aware of "the person through time."

Kegan hints at support for a model like our Integrated Wave when he suggests that, "multiple neglects" result from a "truncation in the attention of the paradigm." (329) He explains:

> I believe (1) that the cognitive/individual/epistemological /concept-/stage-/and present-oriented cast to the framework is due to the study of development as a succession of subject-object or self-other differentiations; (2) that this, in fact, is one of the most significant, robust, and universal phenomena to be found in nature; and (3) that it forms the 'deep structure' in all the constructive-developmental stage theories. But <u>the relation of self to other goes on in a context</u> (my emphasis)--and there the dance is. I have suggested there is a context which is prior to the self-other relation , a context which actually gives rise to it. I call this context 'meaning-constitutive-evolutionary -activity,' by which I mean to refer to something that is more than biology, philosophy, psychology, sociology, or theology, but is that which all of these, in their different ways, have studied. I am referring to the restless creative motion of life itself, which is not first of all 'individual' or 'world' 'organism,' or 'environment,' but is the source of each. (330)

THE CASE OF RELIGION

To clarify how the concepts of the Great Wave and the Small Wave relate to practical matters, let us examine how this distinction might apply to an understanding of religion. We focus on the phenomenom of religion particularly because of its relationship to values education.

If we examine the original meaning of the word "religion," we observe that it is derived from the latin root "legio," which means to bind (together). When the prefix "re" is attached to "legio," we note that in its root form, religion means to re-bind, or we could say that it means to order, to put together, to make whole or to re-member. From the perspective of the Great Wave, religion or re-binding is understood as a gradual healing or wholing process that we experience as we are transformed in self-consciousness. As we have pointed out this developmental process is directed by a strengthening of the view through the eye of the heart.

As the Small Wave points out, the binding process that we identify with the religious impulse can also be witnessed at a more mundane level. At this level, religion is an endless sequence of epicycles (waves) or alternations between: a reaching out and a being held; a meaning-making and a meaning-finding; the drive to autonomy and the impulse to inclusion. It is the ever shortening arc of the pendulum-like oscillations between the declarations, "I Am!" and its echo-like rejoinder, "It Is!" Simply put, the relationship between religion, (Small

Wave) and Religion, (Great Wave) is the relationship between these countless turnings or oscillations and their cummulative effect on self-consciousness. Another way of putting the distinction between religion and Religion is to suggest that they are functions of different time/space matrices. Going to church, spending an afternoon in a museum, working in the garden or listening to good music, can be considered as religious events; the cumulative transformative effects of these activities on the individual's self-consciousness by contrast, are events in the individual's Religious life. Taken in this sense, whereas a religion varies from person to person and as well for a person from time to time, all humankind practices the same Religion.

In his book A Sociable God, Wilber, outlines nine usages of the term "religion" but gives it two basic faces which resemble our own distinction between religion and Religion. Both types of religion are valid but for different reasons. Wilber writes: Any religion (or world view) can be judged in its degree of validity on two different, independently variable scales, the first being its degree of legitimacy and the second its degree of authenticity." (331) Wilber distinguishes between what he calls a "horizontal scale" (legitimate religion) which we might associate with the dynamics of to our Small Wave, and a "vertical scale" (authentic religion) which we would associate with the dynamics of our Great Wave. He explains:

> "Degree of legitimacy" refers to the relative degree of integration, meaning-value, good mana, ease of functioning, avoidance of taboo, and so forth within any given level. This is a horizontal scale; "more legitimate" means more integrative-meaningful at that level.
> "Degree of authenticity" refers to the relative degree of actual transformation delivered by a given religion or world view. This is a vertical scale; "more authentic" means more

> capable of reaching a higher level (and not merely integrating the present level.) (332)

The distinction between mankind's "religion" and his "Religion," has often been overlooked by writers. Both faces of his religious nature deserve fair treatment if we are to arrive at an acceptable paradigm of humankind. In attempting to understand man's religious nature we must not miss seeing the forest for the trees. That is, by focusing on his religion we must be careful not to miss seeing the significance of mankind's Religion.

Similar distinctions can be made between a culture that is interpreted within a shallow or local time/space matrix, (my language, my race, my traditions) and a Culture that derives its meaning within a more expanded time/space matrix. In the expanded view the focus shifts from how we say things --what language we use-- to what we say, or the universal wisdom behind the words. In the expanded view we focus on the race of humankind and the significance of particular cultures or traditions to mankind in general.

Along these lines, a distinction between morality (compliance with social or collective mores) and Morality (compliance with personally recognized or felt, universal mores) can be made as well. Everything depends on how well we can see from under the aspect of eternity, that is, to what degree we have restored to health our eye of the heart whereby we may see God, or how competently we can intuit the connexity of the universe.

VALUES EDUCATION: THE VIEW FROM THE GREAT WAVE

While many important questions are being asked in the field of values education, let us focus on one fairly embracing foundational question and attempt to answer it first philosophically (with reference to our Great Wave) and then in the next chapter let us attempt to give a more time/space contracted, psychological or Small Wave reply. The question we shall ask is the one that R.S. Peters considers the most important question for the field of values education namely: "How do children come to care?" (333) We suggest that Peters' question is another way of asking: "What are the parameters of a universally applicable axiology or general values theory?" Rephrased in our terminology, it is the question: "How do humans come to intuit the connexity of the universe?" In outlining the axiology of idealism, Butler explains: "A general theory of value which is a natural expression of the idealist philosophy may be outlined by making explicit the following three propositions:

1] The values human beings desire and enjoy fundamentally are rooted in existence. They are real existents.
2] The values of human life are what they are largely because there are individual persons to possess and enjoy them.
3] One important way in which individual persons can realize value is by actively relating parts and wholes. (334)

With regard to these propositions let us see how well they relate to our own assumptions about the essential parameters of a general values theory. In an earlier discussion we related values to "facts" that we approve of. In the light of Butler's explanation we

now add that the facts that determine our values system are the feelings, the beliefs, the ideas, and the principles that relate our self to all others (related to proposition 3). That is, our values reflect or represent a particular self-other state of relationship. As well, we suggested that the "self" is the integrating, uni-fying, organ-izing, re-membering center that keeps things from "falling apart" (related to proposition 2). And we add that, how well our "self" can hold things together depends on how clearly it can intuit the fact of the connexity of the universe (related to proposition 1). As Butler further points out: "We enjoy values, not only because our emotions and sentiments are appropriately aroused so that we have certain desirable feelings, but because the things we value are realities which have existence (his italics) themselves and are rooted in the very structure of the cosmos." (335)

Again, we suggest that when the eye of the heart is only slightly open or relatively inactive, we see the world within the discontinuous and disjointed time/space framework that suggests a universe of "Its". From this vantage point our identity as well as our relationship to all that is other, tends towards I-It (dualistic) relationship. (F7) Consequently, the quality, or more particularly the degree of care or love that we can have for another is limited and conditioned by the belief that most other is not-self, or unrelated to self. Restated in another way, our ability to be compassionate or to care is dependent on our ability to see the connexity of things.

As our eye of the heart opens or becomes more active, we gain a

deepening knowledge of the connexity of the universe and its cosmic (ordered) nature as well. As a result of this activity of the heart (related to Plato's "soul" and Hegel's "spirit") our identity base or self-consciousness is broadened or expanded. In this expanded state of self-consciousness we are able to recognize to various degrees the wholeness (holiness), the "thouness," or the sacredness of the universe and consequently the holy (from "helig," meaning healed in German) nature of ourselves. To know the "sacredness" of the universe is to be aware of one's relationship to all others. Care, empathy for others, love or compassion, are the natural state of relationship/being when others are intuitively known to be intimately related to oneself. Hence, to the question: "How do children come to care?" which is to ask, "In a general sense, how does care develop in human beings?" we reply: "Care develops as the eye of the heart opens." Sounding somewhat Platonic, Jaspers writes:

> Philosophy leads us along the road to the point at which love acquires its depth in real communication. Then in this love, through the success of communication, (writer's emphasis) the truth that links us together will be disclosed to those who are most remote in the diversity of their historical origin. (336)

While we suggest that it is the eye of the heart, and not philosophy per se that "leads us along," Jaspers does make the point that we have been adamant about, namely that there is a close relationship between love (care) and what he calls "real communication."

To answer Peters' question philosophically (with the eye of the heart open, insightfully or intuitively) is an important first step that we must take in our approach to the complete answer. Having taken this first philosophical step we can then proceed to take the

second step which is to supply the psychological component to the complete answer. From the psychological perspective the question: "How do children (humans in general) come to care?" must be framed within a more manageable or practical time/space scale. Let us then conclude this paper by attempting to answer Peters' question from the view "sub specie temporalis."

VALUES EDUCATION: THE VIEW FROM THE SMALL WAVE

In this last section of our paper we shall deal with Small Wave dynamics. That is, we shall try to be more precise about our psychology. With reference to Kegan and others, we have already described the general parameters of a Small Wave. We mentioned that it might be described as the cyclical alternations between the polar needs to experience "communion," "integration," or "inclusion," and their opposites "autonomy," "differentiation," or "independence." We have also put this distinction into the form of a cyclical alternation between the existential/ontological polarities of "I Am" and "It Is." Let us now examine the implications of these premises for values education.

In concluding our thesis we shall introduce one last analogy that will be useful in helping us to understand "How children come to care." We shall postulate the existence of a reflex related to the cyclical alternations described above. This reflex, which we shall call the Madonna Reflex, derives its name from the numerous Madonna and Child paintings familiar to Westerners. (F8) For the author, some of these paintings suggest an important archetypical relationship that has a seminal importance for our thesis.

In simple terms what the Madonna and Child in art and sculpture suggest is a relationship in which the degree of care or love that the Mother offers the child determines its ability to reach out, (to make connections). That is, in order for the child

(representing the potential for divinity in each of us) to reach out or express his freedom or autonomous nature which is essential to his development, he or she must feel securely held. Put another way, the care and love that are given to the child act as a stimulus or en-cour-agement (to open his eye of the heart) or to gather the cour-age that he needs to seek and find his greater selfhood. This greater selfhood is related to his ability to see the connexity of things (to see his non-dual Self-Nature) and hence it is responsible for his ability to demonstrate care.

The Madonna is symbolic of the Universal Mother, the universal holding or caring that we all experience at various levels and degrees. "She" ("she" taken symbolically) can be a biological mother or any caring parent or other. "She" can be the supportive institutions of society of which the school is one important example. "She" can be a bountiful or a beautiful nature. "She" can be a work that we do. In the most general terms "she" is any circumstance or condition that supports and nourishes our need to express and discover, our Self-Nature. We shall refer to the cyclic alternations between the communion and automony needs of the child as being the operant parameters of what we call a Madonna Reflex.

Let us now examine how this reflex is related to our Great Wave. With reference to the Great Wave, we have already discussed the warrior's determination to make ever more satisfying self-other distinctions with the sheild and sword of discrimintion. Sitting upon the steed with us (the warrior) is the beautiful maiden whom we now identify with the Madonna of our Small Wave. In the Great Wave sense we are the warrior. In the Small Wave sense we are the child.

The horse carries us forward to fight the "good" fight and consequently to be nourished by the maiden who is the Madonna. These two images (warrior-madonna) and the symbolism that is associated with each one are one way in which we can visually describe the relationship between the Great and the Small waves.

We suggest that the mother and child union is a holy relationship in that it serves to make the child whole by en-cour-aging him or her to see a uni-verse which is only visible through his or her eye of the heart. We mentioned earlier that the self is a "unifying center" or the "locus of identification;" the distinctions that we make, we pointed out are related to our sense of self. With reference to our warrior above we suggest that the concepts of "good" and "bad," or "right" and "wrong," are ontological tools, weapons, or instruments that we use and that are absolutely essential in the struggle to find our whole selves. We add that the warrior will only pick up and weild the sword of discrimination if he or she is supported by the Madonna; or put another way, if the maiden is at his side. Ontologically speaking, we are ever expelled from a paradasical Eden. Again and again, we are released from security of our mother's arms. Over and over we are turned away from the embrace of our lovers. But we always wander back, for we need encouragement and repose between the moments, the hours, and the days, that we spend attempting to slay the dragon of Self-ignor-ance.

If we look briefly to the book of Genesis in the Bible, we find a most significant symbolic fork in the road with regard to man's relationship with God. Since it has some historical as well as

philosophical importance for our discussion let us examine what we find in that first book of the bible. In Chapter Three, we read that when Eve and then Adam ate the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, "the eyes of both of them were opened, and they knew that they were naked.." (Genesis 3:7) Eve and then Adam ate the fruit because Eve <u>believed</u> the serpent who told her that "the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing [the distinction between] good and evil." (Genesis 3:9) This act can be interpreted as representing a defiant <u>challenge</u> to the one and only God, or, it can be interpreted as representing the wish to know the difference between good and evil, that is, the wish to be wise. A great deal hinges on the way we interpret this event. Do we challenge God and go against his Will when we become stronger and more wise; or, do we fulfill His Will when we become a little more like Him? The traditional Judeo-Christain belief has been that Eve and Adam <u>disobeyed</u> God and so went <u>against</u> a cosmic order of things when they ate of the fruit. Hence, humankind's troubles are dated from the time (metaphysically speaking) that he dared to reach out from being <u>under</u> God to being <u>like</u> God.

A second interpretation however is possible. We can interpret our will to be like God not as an act of defiance as we have pointed out, but as an act of <u>compliance</u> with the only Will that Is, namely God's Will. In this view, paradoxically defiance is compliance. Woman and then man by desiring to be <u>like</u> God express an autonomy that is an <u>essential</u> expression of a true love for God or a true love for the Good. It is interesting to note in this regard that whereas

in the West or in Judeo-Christian tradition the serpent, which "was more subtil than any beast of the field which the Lord God had made," (Genesis 3:1) generally considered to be a symbol of evil, cunning, and deceit, is in Eastern religious tradition considered to have a dual nature which is as often good as it is evil. With regard to the nature of the serpent as it is expressed in mythology and scripture throughout the world, Gaskell writes:

> These forces [serpent] are dual, and of the higher and lower natures. They act reciprocallly although in opposition. The higher serpent is atma-buddhic, the lower serpent kama-manasic. The first is of the Wisdom-nature and the second of the Desire-nature, and each is active through the mind. (337)

A shift in the way we understand the serpent nature would make for a major difference in the way the serpent's advice might be interpreted. Perhaps Eve's ability to hear the serpent was an ability to appreciate wisdom and then to go courageously forward to her destiny. If this is so, then by eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge which would allow her and then Adam to distinguish between good and evil, Eve and Adam, the symbolic seed of all humankind, were committed to a process of opening their eyes (hearts) and embarking on a long journey of self-discovery which required that they learn to distinguish between "good" and "evil". The important point for us here is the significance of the necessity to recognize and to make certain eye of the heart intuited distinctions. Let the warrior pick up the sacred sword of distinction-making. Having been given by God the ability to recognize the difference between good and evil, in a sense, humankind is condemned to search for ever higher expressions or degrees of it. As we know, a final knowledge of it is not to be

found in a paradaiscal state called Eden but is ever lost and found, found and lost, in an alternation that step by painful step can lead us up out of the darkness of our ontological caves to a place of ever more light.

Seeking must culminate in some kind of finding before the cycle can be repeated again. Differentiation must be consummated by some kind of integration to keep the wheel turning. Autonomy must be counter-balanced by intimacy if the flow is to be preserved. In this regard we note that Tillich's concept of "idoltry," and Niebuhr's concept of "sin," are terms that define a state in which the turning or the "toiling" has for some reason been arrested. Perhaps we can clarify the significance of the Small Wave for the process of education by looking again at two statements made by Plato in The Republic.

In one instance Plato explains that in the perennial process of remembering himself, the philosopher like the artist is guided by repeated glimpses at the "divine pattern." (vi 500) We recall that Plato believes that "the philosopher, in constant companionship with the divine order of the world, will reproduce that order in his soul and, so far as man may, [will] become godlike;" (338). In this statement we have another way of putting the relationship that exists between the two alternations or movements of the Small Wave. "Constant companionship with the divine order of the world," represents the inclusive or integrative aspect, and the "will reproduce that order in his soul" represents its active autonomous self-seeking nature. The process of becoming is one in which more

and more of a whole uni-verse is reflected by a more and more (w)holey Being. The alternation that Plato's statement suggests is an intuit connexity--reflect connexity, (feel and know it--express it) type of alternation.

The second remark by Plato which bears re-examination because it is directly related to the question: "How do children come to care?" (how do they reproduce or reflect care), is again from The Republic. We quote from Book VII, which contains his important allegory of the cave. In a statement significant particularly for values education, Plato writes:

> ...we must conclude that education is not what it is said to be by some, who profess to put knowledge into a soul which does not possess it, as if they could put sight into blind eyes. On the contrary, our own account signifies that the soul of every man does possess the power of learning the truth and the organ (writer's emphasis) to see it with. (339)

We recall that the soul for Plato is that organ which "orders the whole world." (340) But more to the point, as Jowett explains, the whole of the Meno dialogue makes the same claim that: "knowledge does not consist in the accumulation of external facts but[is] rather the unfolding of truth, already latent in the soul, under the stress of persistent inquiry." (341) That the potential to develop towards the wholeness of our Being resides within us is symbolically illustrated by the infant, or potential Christ in the arms of the Madonna. It is evident as well in our identity of the self with the seed in the seedbed. Hence, in education we are essentially concerned with a process of drawing out or awakening a latent potential.

In general terms, we have already suggested that the care or love

of some form of the Universal Mother is an environmental stimulus necessary for our development. Let us examine more closely what this might mean for values education by asking: "What exactly are some of the stimulative-supportive factors in a person's life that permit him to take ever greater steps towards his w(holy) Selfhood?" "What specific forms relevant to the educational process," we might ask, "does the Madonna assume?"

It worth noting that while the plant contains within itself the potential for growth, it does not actually grow unless environmentally stimulated to do so. That is, plants contain within themselves growth hormones such as, auxins, giberillins, and kinins, but these do not act of their own accord. They will for example cause the plant to grow towards the light, but they require the presence of light to become active.

We mention this because we believe it has something to tell us about the Values Clarification approach to values education. The Values Clarification approach to values education assumes that the potential for development resides within the child, (a point with which agree); however, what it fails to recognize adequately is the significance of the "sunlight," to the child's environment. If the light we describe here is identified with the embrace (the holding, the loving, the caring) of the Madonna, then the stimulus-support offered by the Values Clarification approach is equivalent to a Spartan mother's love. The limited care offered by this approach amounts to the well-intentioned but austere advice to: "Grow on your own if you want to become strong!" In adopting this approach it

would appear that the theorists behind the Values Clarification approach to values education indicate that they do not really understand human nature very well, for in adopting the "Spartan" approach they miss entirely the significance of the "good mother." To identify one most significant form of the "good mother," we have only to point to those who have been on the most intimate terms with humankind. We have only to turn to those who, not coincidently, have been as close to self-knowledge as humankind can come. If we train our eyes in this direction we find that we come face to face again with Toynbee's "benefactors of mankind." In the field of psychology, those researchers who identify themselves with the "Humanistic" view, people such as: Allport; Bonner; Bugental; Maslow; May; Moustakas; Murphy and Rogers; recognize the significance of models or examples of "healthy," (which implies caring), individuals, to the developmental process of all humans. (342)

An important note here is that the love of the "good" mother (one who knows us well) is not only demonstrated in the compassion that "she" might physically share with us, but is also expressed in symbolic form as wisdom-sharing. Significantly, this wisdom is of the kind that points to a distinction between: right and wrong; good and bad; true and false with regard to the wholesome development of her child towards perfect Selfhood. That is, the compassion or love of the "good mother" is also expressed as moral law. Hence, the significance of a Moses to his people, a Buddha to the "brotherhood" or the Samgha, or a Jesus to his disciples. It is worth noting that in essence compassion or love for the child, and distinction-making

directives (do this, don't do this) by the "mother", are inseparable. That is to say, such distinction-making is an aspect of love which itself is an expression of an intuition of the connexity of the uni-verse, (in this case mother-child union). Hence, the "good mother," will always say to the young in his or her care: "There is a right and a wrong!" "There is a good and bad!" because this represents one very significant way in which the "good mother" expresses her love for her child.

Plato, as we have mentioned, identifies "persistent inquiry", and the exercise of reason, as the most useful approach to the general education of humankind, but "persistent inquiry" is itself first of all a will to enquire persistently. This will to go out, to test, to seek, to investigate intellectually or reach out emotionally is made possible by the mother in the way that sunlight makes possible the growth of the seed. It is her love for the child that gives it the courage to dis-cover the connexity of the universe, and it is this process which culminates in a recognition of its (w)holiness.

Perhaps, with similar thoughts in mind, researchers in the field are recognizing that the cognitive-developmental approach to values education as outlined by Lawrence Kohlberg is philosophically and finally psychologically an incomplete model. For one thing, we suggest that the Kohlbergian model does not differentiate adequately between a private and a public self, and more relevant to our present discussion it does not appear to recognize adequately the importance of affective factors (love) such as those associated with our Madonna reflex. Callan, Simpson, Fraenkel, Sullivan, and Broughton, feel

that a drawing out of the human potential for care, (love) of which the Kohlbergian concept of "justice" is only one possible expression, can only be accomplished by a more integral (including the heart) appeal to the individual. The Spaniard Unamuno recognizes that behind the appeal of our philosophies and our tidy logic there exists a deeper motive for our actions. He writes:

> Man is said to be a reasoning animal. I do not know why he has not been defined as an affective or feeling animal. Perhaps that which differentiates him from other animals is feeling rather than reason. More often have I seen a cat reason than laugh or weep. (343)

Elizabeth Simpson feels that: "Morality is fundamentally irrational." (344) In our view, Justin Aronfreed is more accurate when he suggests that: "Behavior is not rationally controlled." (345) The implications of these remarks for our discussion are that one does not get the child to reach out, (embrace a greater whole, or come to care) by appealing only to his capacity for reason. Callan writes: "The assumption that rational-cognitive information is the only good information on which to base a decision is an inaccurate perception of human behavior." (346) In her article Feeling, Reasoning, and Acting: An Integrated Approach to Moral Education, she quotes K. Nakata, who explains:

> There are other kinds of relevant information that affect our thoughts and behavior-intuition, unconscious processes, feelings, emotions, extrasensory perceptions, as well as spiritual and mystical experience. All of these elements when fused together make possible decisions and actions which open up the possibility of acting as full human beings. (347)

"Fused together," we suggest that all of these elements amount to the insights or the view through the eye of the heart which turn us

to the reality of the connexity of the universe or its sacredness and a consequent Holy Selfhood.

In proceeding with our investigation of how people "come to care," we note that care or a reaching out away from the mother to make a connection with all other, takes place on several levels. Our Great Wave describes these as a reaching out between the limits of the material world (I-It) and a reaching out into the spiritual Self (I-I). Between these poles (I-Thou) the being is confronted with the possibilities or ideals that exist between these limits. Because of their sensitivity to the empirical (eye of flesh) validity of their data, the studies of Piaget and Kohlberg have been able to describe the ability to care only to the level of a social-I-zation which is a form of I-Thouness. Kohlberg is quite right to point out that the school must reflect the principle of justice, for the school is a womb, and justice is an important attribute of the "good mother." However, even if the school is just, even if the whole world were just, this would not be enough because more than anything else, it must appear (to our hearts) to be compassionate or to care for us and so to be good. It may be just for any number of particular reasons that Tom should fail his test, but Tom can still ask himself: "Is it fair (good or right) that I should fail?" All of which is to say that, justice falls far from satisfying our existential needs which include the need to be loved or to be significant at a wholistic or cosmic level of things. Moreover, with regard to the above, the child knows that the school is only one tiny Eden from which he or she is soon expelled. For a theory of values, the concept of "justice" (by contrast to concepts such as "love" or "intuition of connexity") appears to be an unstable and only peripheral

concept, hence we suggest that its usefulness to values theory is limited.

What is entirely lacking in a cognitive-developmental approach to values education, and what is entirely essential to the child that must be encouraged to expand his or her identity horizon, is the significance of the love or encouragement of the Universal Mother. Without the belief or understanding that somehow, someway, the child's cosmic home is in order, without the belief that it, too, is a place where the distinction between right and wrong exists or where his absolute right to be loved (which includes fair or just treatment) is maintained, he realizes that his lesser homes rest on quicksand.

The encouraging voice that says: "Seek the good and you shall not be disappointed. Carry on! Everything you do does in fact matter;" the voice that says: "Do not be afraid! It is all right! Everything is in order!" is the encouraging voice of the sage or the lullaby of the Madonna, the father and mother of every one of us. (F9)

With regard to education, the ability to "come to care" is a function of how well the child can perceive that he or she exists in a caring universe, that is, how well he or she is held. This in turn determines how well he or she can reach out to an expanded selfhood. Those whom Toynbee calls the "great benefactors of mankind", are its most significant Madonnas in the sense that they uphold the reality of an ordered universe, the reality that our cosmic house is in order and that things do matter. The influence of the "healthy" man or woman, that is, those who are aware of the sacredness or holiness (wholeness) of the universe and all existence, is an influence that

supports our efforts to re-sacralize, (Maslow), re-uni-te, re-member, (Plato) make-wholing or heal, that which is existentially yet un-holy, dis-membered or in a state of dis-ease. A.N Whitehead declared that education must involve an exposure to greatness if it is to leave its mark. (348) The psychologist Jerome Bruner writes: "The school must have as one of its principal functions the nurturing of images of excellence." (349) Exposure and nurture have been for us the mother and the child reaching out. They have been the shield in one hand, the sword in the other; the alternation between communion with (exposure to) excellence, and the nurture of (reaching out for) excellence.

In the school it is possible to "draw out" that potential for the excellent or the good which exists in the student by supporting his understanding that things do matter; or to put it another way, by supporting his understanding that the universe distinguishes between order and dis-order, and hence that it is in a particular kind of order. This view of the universe is not shared by all people. But if there is to be such a thing as a general theory of values education based on a concept of a "universal morality" (something that Haan, Aerts, and Cooper consider as one of the three major goals of research in this field (350)), then we shall have to see more than what is visible from a contracted time/space perspective. From time to time we must step away from our desks and walk to the window to see things as Spinoza suggested we see things for it is only as the community of parents, teachers, and theorists begin to view things from under the aspect of a little more eternity, that we can proceed

towards a more enlightened values theory.

The writer feels that the school curriculum is potentially an excellent place to begin a process of re-qualifying the school environment. By this we mean that the quantitative emphasis in subject matter ought to be augmented where possible with a qualitative component. Mary Callan, agrees when she writes: "In developing curriculum for moral education we face the problem of how to address the "irrational" as well as the rational." (351) As an example of what we mean when we say that we need to pay more attention to the qualitative component in the subject matter of the school curriculum, we suggest that the where, the when, the how much, the how long, how strong, aspect of some historical figure, make room for legitimate questions and concerns over, how good, how wise, a person. From this perspective it may become clear that our curriculums demonstrate a lack or a void. Needless to say, these qualitative concerns and questions must not be relativized into meaninglessness. Rather, they must be secured within some stable ontological matrix. We must find something true, something right, something good, as does the mathematician if we are to advance in our "science." We must come to some agreement, some consensus if we are to talk with each other. We suggest that the great mathematicians, the great founders of this "science" of mankind can be no other than Toynbee's "benefactors."

To return to our concern with curriculum, we add that most subjects could benefit from a qualitative audit. Even subjects such as mathematics could benefit. Mathematics is first of all the expression of a human impulse to order. For the great mathematicians such as Pythagoras, Newton, Pascal and Einstein, to name a few,

mathematics is not unlike a religious (ordering or binding) impulse; that is, an impulse to find relationships or wholes and hence holiness or sanctity in life. This connection between mathematics and religion has been clear for many mathematicians from Pythagoras to Einstein. In the curriculum, mathematics can be given more significance than doing mental gymnastics. Why for example can it not be taught at least to some degree with the purpose that Einstein feels it ought to have when he says: "In my view, it is the most important function of art and science to awaken this feeling [cosmic religious feeling] and keep it alive in those who are receptive to it." (351) (F10)

Many heros and models of excellence have disappeared from our curriculums. With their disappearance, argues Bloom in his best selling book, The Closing of the American Mind, we experience under the justification of numerous labels an erosion of the ability to see (to experience) and to make (to act on) self-enriching and self-maturing distinctions. In a real sense being in I-Thouness, a state which we have also identified as being in a state of ideal-I-zation, is one in which an ideal or model is consciously self-held before our eyes. To keep a model before our eyes is to make possible a metaphysical chiseling away at our concept of self. In the third century A.D., Plotinus wrote:

> Withdraw into yourself and look. And if you do not find yourself beautiful yet, act as does the creator of a statue that is to be made beautiful; he cuts away here, he smooths there, he makes this line lighter, this other purer, until a lovely face has grown upon his work. So do you also:...never cease chiseling your statue." (353)

More recently, Martin Buber summed up the human problem when he

said: "the simple truth is that the wretchedness of our world is grounded in its resistance to the entrance of the holy into the lived life." (354) (F11)

As the Wave Model of Consciousness/Being suggests, we are in a dynamic state of becoming. That is, we are always saying, "I am...I am...I am." Our consciousness of self which implies a continuous process of comparing, measuring, and reflecting with reference to some ideal is influenced by our developing affective and cognitive sensitivities. What we see and what we feel is the matrix [the womb] within which our concepts of self take shape, being the "It is..It is..It is..." of the world we find ourseleves in. Interaction between outside [It is] and the inside [I am] is a dynamic interplay between the supportive-stimulative external environment, and the appetitive-imitative, internal environment. Environmental factors that determine or influence how we feel and what we know form the important substrate or face upon which a reflection can take place. To ask: "How do children come to care?" is to ask as well, "How do children come to reflect care?" To reflect care they must be able to focus on the "substance" of care; they must be able to find it before they can reflect it as we have already pointed out with regard to the Madonna.

We agree with Plato when he says that we imitate that with which we live in admiring companionship. (355) We choose that which we admire, or imitate that which we admire. Admiring relates to the appetitive aspect of our natures, but what we choose or imitate, depends on what choices exist or what there is in the environment

for us to imitate or to reflect. To mirror order in our lives is to mirror or to reflect the order of the universe. The expression of care is a reflection of the experience, affective or cognitive, of a universe that cares or that is in order. A universe that is in order is one in which "things matter" because things are related or connected to other things. A mother's love, a teacher's care, a sage's wisdom, essentially express the order or connexity of the universe. As these stimuli become part of an individual's experience, they act on his appetitive-imitative reflexes and become reflected as: "I am in love." "I am in care." "I am in order." As mentioned above, "It is", is the substrate or reflected face for, "I am". If I can feel or understand that the universe cares, then I can feel or know that I am in care. In care, I can come to reflect (affectively and/or cognitively) care, that is to say I can participate in caring. When I feel or know that what happens in the universe matters, then I may feel or understand that what I do matters.

It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that all reflections of self are reflections of a universe in some degree of order. To have no "sense" for, and hence no knowledge of, or belief in, any basic existential fact (any connexity or relationship) of the universe is to be cast adrift on the stormy sea of existence without any compass; it is to be a child without any arms to hold it; it is to be motherless, orphaned in the most profound possible sense. As Nature will have it, orphanage on the whole is an entirely unnatural state because it is one that mitigates against Nature Herself. To live in a world where "things just happen," is to live in the world without

the capacity to see how things are related, that is, to appreciate how they do happen. It is to have eyes (flesh, mind and heart) that are not able to see well. To live this way is to be unable to distinguish a north from a south, a right from a wrong, a true from a false. Although practically impossible to sustain, at its worst such an existential condition represents a total blindness to the reality of becoming and the reality of Being (I-Thou and I-I relationship). As such, life is a condition of despair or hopelessnes which points accusingly at our con-fusion and mockingly makes us aware of our dis-ease. Perennial as the grass is the organic impulse to heal, to health, to wholeness, to holiness. It appears that every being weaves his own self-sustaining web of order. How well he can nourish himself or more generally satisfy his nature depends on his capacity to reach out and to make the connections and integrations that point to his wholeness.

As Kathleen Gow points out in, "Yes Virginia, There is a Right and Wrong, (356) the concepts of "good" and "bad" are significant for far more than choosing food for the belly. Essentially, concepts such as right and wrong, good and bad, refer to conditions or statements of relationship that we point to. As such, they represent statements that describe a particular state of order. At one end of the spectrum (I-I), they point to the deep relationship that we have associated with a profound experience of the connexity of the universe. At the other end of the spectrum, they refer to the more shallow and less stable relationships such as, "I am flesh and blood," "I am a French Canadian," or "I own a Porsche." Good and

bad, right and wrong, are the integrative or connective symbols that hold up, or hold together every person's web of relationship. To reflect on the distinction between good and bad, right and wrong, or true and false is hence to reflect on the connexity of the universe, the order of things, or how things are related. Not to reflect on right and wrong or good and bad, is by consequence to neglect a potential for discovering how things are, the order of things, or the connexity of the universe.

Furthermore, distinctions between right and wrong or good and bad in the world "out there," have an ontological or existential component that is reflected as a distinction between self and not-self (all other). The concepts of good and bad, right and wrong, are standards that force us or permit us to take measure of ourselves. If, or when, we stop believing or understanding that there is a right and a wrong, we lay down a very important mirror, one that encourages us to be reflective and discriminating in the way we understand the universe and consequently ourselves. At stake is our ability to say, "I am" in ever more satisfying ways.

Without actually saying so, what Gow intuitively understands and what we support is the suggestion that it is a loss for any individual (or society) to give up in any way the self-defining, self-forming, self-finding, potential of moral distinctions such as right and wrong. Put another way, we agree it is important for humankind to contemplate "the good". Socrates' statement about the importance of contemplating "excellence" every single day of our lives, will ever be significant. Its importance rests with the fact

that to find "the good" "out there" is to reflect it. To reflect it, is to experience (affectively and cognitively) to some degree that, "I am the good"; that is, it is to find oneself excellent through reflection or contemplation. To be satisfied and fulfilled in this way is to be satisfied as one who knows and feels his or her "cosmic significance."

We suggest that the debate over the significance of absolutes (such as right and wrong, good and bad) in values education is at heart a debate between those not convinced that the universe is unfolding in any specific or knowable way, and those who claim as Aristotle claimed, that it is unfolding teleologically towards ever higher degrees of form culminating in the perfect Form of God who is described as Form without matter (Pure Spirit). (357) Put another way it is a debate between those who intuit less and those who intuit more, connexity of the universe. William James, considers this distinction which might also be described as the distinction between the pluralists and the monists, to constitute the most fundamental philosophic distinction. He writes:

> I wish to turn...upon the ancient problem of 'the one and the many'...I myself have come, by long brooding on it, to consider it the most central of all philosophic problems, central because so pregnant. I mean by this that if you know whether a man is a decided monist or a decided pluralist, you perhaps know more about the rest of his opinions than if you give him any other name ending in ist. To believe in the one or in the many, that is the classification with the maximum number of consequences. (358)

To treat the debate between the pluralists and the monists as a purely intellectual issue is to guarantee an outcome favourable to

the pluralist. This is because the strength of the monist's position is not based on reason first but only reason after intuition. The intellectual can tear Plato or Spinoza to pieces, but in doing so he must yield an integrated or wholistic understanding of these philosophical works of art. A theory of good and bad, right and wrong as they relate to some Absolute, can similarly be torn to shreds even by a mediocre intellect, but in tearing them up we must ask ourselves: "Do we loose anything? Do we give up something of value?" In approaching a Monet with magnifying glass in hand do we miss seeing anything? What the intellectual tears apart, not all the king's horses nor all the king's men, but only the wise can put back together again. A society that has no use for the wise man is a pagan one that sinks in an amorphous goo.

In this paper we have argued that the concepts of "good" and "bad," and related concepts which are carried on the back of our concept of the universe may be thought of as seeds that can be ignored or placed carefully in fertile earth. What finally such concepts and the ideals associated with them can do for our lives depends on how we treat them, what investment we make in their care. History provides us with ample evidence that belief in the fundamental order of the universe will persist and continue to deeply influence human thought and action particularly because such a way of "seeing" things nourishes humankind in deeply satisfying ways.

With regard to the curriculum, a final point that we make is that the "good" is not something to be considered in the abstract, for as we have attempted to show, the "good" is only visible in particular

states of relationship. Hence, the importance as well of the narrative or story-telling to the "teaching" of values. With regard to the curriculum, the "good" can only become significant in a qualified curriculum, one that is not anemic in its ability to nourish our eye of the heart. To describe adequately the potential of the narrative for values education is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in concluding this paper three of its most promising features deserve mention here.

The first, is that the narrative (anecdotes, tales, stories,) provides the student with an ontologic matrix that permits a sort of immersion in, a temporary embracing or holding of, a one-self. This immersion in the story-matrix results in an ontologic engagement that affects the process of self-ideal-I-zation. That is, the story can make it possible for us to "reach" or to "touch" the student. Needless to say, we want this "touch" to be supportive, hence, the significance of stories of "good" men and women. For the idealist J.A.Leighton, personality, and in particular spiritual personality, offers us the richest clues to the nature of ontological reality. In The Principle of Individuality and Value, Leighton writes: "Since the meanings and values of existence reside in individuality, (my emphasis) everything in the universe must in the end be subservient to the fulfillment and perduration of personality-in-community...the cosmos must have Meaning and must honor Value." (359)

Secondly, the kind of engaging experience provided by the story, which we might describe as a tug at the student's heart, is able to cause a sympathetic resonance in his own heart. Put another way, the story can move the depths of him that isolated facts can not approach. There is a curriculum of integrated facts about the nature

of the universe that only the story, because of its appeal to the heart can illustrate or point to. Professor Butler talks about the difference between object and subject selves in the educative process which relates to our discussion of the importance of the qualitative element in the curriculum. Commenting on the importance of "heart to heart," in contrast to "it to it," or object self to object self exchanges, he writes:

> How much of our teaching and learning, so called, involves object selves meeting object selves could not be determined. But if this is an approxiamately true account of the nature of the self, then it follows that there can be no genuinely educative transaction in the classroom unless subject is meeting subject with a minimum of interference from object selves, playing roles and posturing for effect and, without recognizing it, seducing both teacher and pupil, as well as the educative process. (360)

Thirdly, story telling, if we are sensitive and just a little wise, does not require that we become moralizers, for the facts of this or that life experience which comprise the narrative or story will point to its own lessons or morals. To the degree that the student is receptive, to that degree is he or she embraced or nourished. Hence, the story or narrative, can simultaneously hold or embrace listeners with different needs and capacities for growth.

CONCLUSION

Looking back over this paper we might say that we have set ourselves four objectives. In concluding this thesis let us summarize briefly what we have attempted to do.

The Importance of a Paradigm

We have already noted that researchers in the field of values education would value "lots of models." (361) It is not difficult to understand why. Without well-reasoned models that can be tested in the school environment we are committed to guesses about the best approach to "teaching" values. Whether we want to or not, we teach values. Values are implicit in everything we say and do in the school. A teacher's personal values and the values (or mores) of our society are contrasted or compared with the values of the student. Our various views or perspectives with regard to the meaning of life are not congruent, nor will they ever be. However, the school, and in particular the community of educators is charged with the responsiblity of discovering such truths or "facts" that may effectively be applied to the practice of teaching; hence, educators must assume their role as organizers of truths or principles. To be effective in organizing educational theory, we have argued that

educators must must recognize a hierarchy of authorities in ways of knowing. This hierarchy begins with that which our intuitions can offer and proceeds with that which our reason can support and which our eyes can recognize as truths and facts relating to human nature. Let challenge and dissent ever knock at the door of our theories and truths. Let them knock and pound at the windows or even shake the foundations, but let them not tear down the house unless they are willing to share with us the plans in their possession to rebuild it anew. We have suggested that any theory that violates the above order is finally unstable because it does not voice our whole concern or speak for the whole of us.

In beginning any debate let us be clear about who we are, what we stand for, and what the implications of our views are. Of the great number of educators who are ready to dispense advice, how many bother to answer the question, "Who are you?" How many demonstrate the courtesy of identifying themselves before they speak? Very few in the estimation of the writer. Those who are charged with the responsibilities associated with education have not only a right, but as well a responsibility to know who they are speaking to.

In this paper we have written from the perspective of the idealistic monist. For the writer this is the disposition that best suits his philosophical temperament. To philosophize, for the author is to do ontological integrations, it is to find relationship and meaning as it applies to ideas of self. It is an entering into dialectic so that we might see the connection of things in the way that Plato, Aristotle, and Spinoza saw the connections of things.

As Berdyaev has pointed out, philosophy is "a creative (my emphasis) effort to break through to the meaning of existence." (362) The important contribution of synthetic as opposed to analytic philosophy for values theory can not be underestimated for as we pointed out in our introduction, humankind has an appetite for the whole truth as well as some fraction thereof. As we become ever better at taking things apart let us retain and even improve our ability to put them back together. Life is an interaction between wholes as well as an interaction between parts; we are not fully informed when we do not exercise our ability to focus on the horizon as well as the ground beneath our feet.

The reason that psychology has been "a science of perpetual crisis," as Leahey points out, is because "it has never been able to get entirely past what Kuhn calls the pre-paradigm phase of science." (363) The same will apply to values theory. Until we have a paradigm that we can agree upon we shall experience a similar state of perpetual crisis in the field. As we are bound to be philosophical and to distil some degree of meaning out of our experiences, let us do so in a deliberate open-eyed fashion. As we have pointed out early on in the paper, an ordering or cleaning up of our ontological houses is a first most important task, one that can save us from constantly bumping into an annoying and confusing clutter of disparate signals and messages about who or what we might be. Let us build a values theory on the firm foundation of a time-validated perennial philosophy and a time-validated perennial psychology that accompanies it.

Respect for History

Given the task of finding a paradigm, the question that arises is: "Where do we look?" It seems to the writer that there is only one place to look, and that is the face of humankind, all of it or at least as much as we can make out. Time is a mirror that all women and men must look into if they wish to be called wise, for the truths of human existence are written in bold print across the face of the ages. In its slow but unerring way, time sorts madness from sanity, truth from falsehood, the right from the wrong and the good from the bad. Presided over by the illustrious unerring Judge of Time and his jury which is all of mankind, the "good" and the "truth-speakers" will ever earn a hearty applause while the villans and deceivers will ever earn a contemptful hiss. To look at history is to read the reports of the prosecution, the defence, and to hear the judge's verdict on Man. Time, the ultimate validator points to the significance of Arnold Toynbee's "benefactors of mankind" and as well, the significance of "good" men and women to any model that attempts to be a paradigm of humankind. The Spinozian wisdom to see things "sub specie aeternitatis" is not lost on the historian who is aware that to look at human history is to look up at the horizon.

Formulating a Model or Paradigm

In this paper we have attempted to make a positive statement about the nature of human evolution as it relates to consciousness of

self. The concepts of I-Itness, I-Thouness and I-Iness which we have derived from such sources as, Nasr, Buber, and Ramana Maharshi, we have to some degree modified and integrated into a Great Wave Model of Consciousness/Being. Let us summarize for the last time what we have described.

As long as his eye (i) of the flesh is dominant, (meaning his eye of the heart is weak) mankind is bound to see things in their apartheid (apartness-disconnexity), but as his eye (I) of the heart opens, he begins to see things in their relatedness to other things, which is to say that he begins to see his own relatedness or connexity with everything. As we put it, in his development man comes to experience himself in a maturing or deepening state of I-Thouness, by which we mean that he comes to see things in a more (w)holey, wholesome "resacralized" fashion; he comes to see things "under the aspect of eternity"; he comes to intuit the connexity of a uni-verse. Associated with becoming in I-Thouness is the process of self ideal-I-zation and what we have called the process of <u>self-culture</u>.

A way in which we might visualize the overall process of change in consciousness/being is to refer to a single-beam balance with its two scales. On the left-hand side of the scale is the weight of all that contributes to our <u>egocentric</u> or dualistic view of being <u>with</u> the universe; on the right-hand side, is the weight of all that contributes to our <u>cosmocentric</u> non-dualistic view of Being <u>in</u> the universe. We might say that at first the scales weigh heavily in favour of an egocentric view, but with time, as the evidence of what

IS gradually makes itself felt, that is, as we come to intuit the connexity of the universe, a gradual readjustment or rebalancing in favour of the right-hand side of the scale of consciousness/being takes place. The point at which the scales are tipped in favour of a cosmocentric view, which in the Wave Model would be represented by our reflux point, a deep "turning in the seat of consciousness" occurs; we cross the threshold at which the self-defining impulse (I am) weighs as much as the self-finding impulse (I-Is). The process that makes possible a gradual shift in the balance of the scales we have suggested, is related to the opening of our eye of the heart.

While it may be more difficult to find agreement with the philosophical Great Wave component of our thesis, it should be less difficult to find evidence for, and agreement with, its psychological Small Wave counterpart. In this paper we have attempted to discover the common ground upon which both philosophical and psychological aspects of a model self-consciousness/being can stand. Our Small Wave points to the kind of "real" events that are the currency of our daily lives. These events offer impressions, signals, or "vestiges" of Great Wave dynamics. Further, the Madonna concept which applies to a psychological model has a philosophic significance and hence acts as a bridge between the two waves. The evidence of our mythologies, our religions, our arts and our cultures in general, point to certain psychological facts. It has been our thesis that these facts do not serve ends in themselves but are the "vestiges" of a great fact of existence which is visible only through the eye of the heart. The alternations between extension and contraction or

reaching out and holding on, the drive to automony and the need for inclusion, are several ways in which these Small Wave polarities have been expressed. With reference to the Great Wave, our Small Wave extension-contractions might be described as a snail-like inching along of the human creature to his destiny. Toynbee, in attempting to describe the march of civilisation through time, makes a comment that is relevent for us. He asks:

> Shall we opt, then, for the Jewish-Zoroastrian view of history as against the Graeco-Indian? [the linear as opposed to the cyclical view] So drastic a choice may not, after all, be forced upon us, for it may be that the two views are not fundamentally irreconcilable. After all, if a vehicle is to move forward on a course which its driver has set, it must be borne along on wheels that turn monotonously round and round. (364)

So it is with our relationship between the Great and Small waves. Round and round, or back and forth, ever lead us forward in a straight line to our destiny. Motivated at their very root by a disposition towards "cosmocentricity" or to "be the One", the empirical facts of a human life are in the embrace of deeper facts and these in their turn are the expressions of still deeper facts. Mysteries are enfolded within mysteries. Orders are supported by orders. Micheal Polanyi is right when he says: "We know more than we can tell." The "more" that we know is evidence of the vitality of the eye of the heart. It is the view that is confirmed in a Bhagavad-Gita, a Symphony No.3 in E-Flat Major, a Faust, or a David.

With regard to finding a paradigm that can serve as a foundation of values education theory, no doubt, much work remains to be done. If in this paper we have managed to pick up a worthy scent then we shall consider our time well spent.

Implications For Values Education

A final objective of this paper has been to point out some implications of the Integrated Wave Model for the science and art of values education. A great deal has been left unsaid because this paper has largely restricted itself to an examination of the philosophical superstructure of a values theory. Before the model can demonstrate it usefulness it will have to answer many questions. Purposefully we have woven a very large net. Our reason for doing so is that we are looking for a very large fish. We realize that there are great risks involved in this kind of pursuit. Very possibly, our philosophic appetite is bigger than our belly can manage. Very possibly, but maybe not.

In general, we have pointed out (and as the works of Piaget, Loevinger, Maslow, Kohlberg and especially Kegan, indicate), that the process of maturation from childhood to adulthood is marked to various degrees by a gradual erosion of the egocentric view in favour of a more broadly based sociocentric, biocentric view. In our model we have added the cosmocentric dimension. "Coming to care" is inextricably tied up with this process. Implied by our model is the importance of an educational experience that supports a child's or adolescent's ability to feel, to know, and to act, in ways that reflect the broader sociocentric, biocentric and finally cosmocentric views. More specifically, our Integrated Model is meant to point out the importance of a student's ability to come to feel (intuit) the connexity of the universe. We have drawn the reader's attention to the significance of Small Wave dynamics for the process of "coming to

care." With regard to "learning to care," three types of competence: affective, cognitive, and active or interactive, can be identified. In summary, let us briefly say something about each of these.

Affective Competence

With regard to affective competence, the student's development to maturity might be stimulated by a "qualified" curriculum that emphasizes more consciously the importance of affective competence or right feeling which is to say the importance of love or care. While all subjects can make a contribution in this way, the importance of subjects that lend themselves to a study of, or "contact" with, healthy or wholesome individuals who serve as models has been acknowledged.

Cognitive Competence

Knowing the connexity of things, which relates to knowing some degree of one's cosmocentricity, is related to becoming aware of certain "facts." The ability to see relationships, to join, integrate or connect concepts or facts to one another must be the purpose behind the teaching of "facts." While this is obvious in subjects such as mathematics and ecology, it should become true for all fact-weighted subjects. That is, we must reflect more critically on why we teach facts. We can teach history with a view to national defense, that is, the defense of our physical persons and property,

but we can also teach it with a view to the defence of a self enriching personal humanity that transcends national boundaries. Becoming wise must not be equated with becoming weak. While it is true that facts of connexity alone do not mean a personal understanding of connexity, they at least offer a favourable or supportive environment for their development.

Interactive Competence

Finally, a third type of competence that must be recognized as an important aspect of the educational experience is the ability and opportunity to act or interact in ways that demonstrate a deepening or broadening sense of self that we have identified with a developing cosmocentricity. That is, the social-interactive element of a school experience, whose importance is as yet inadequately recognized must be considered a worthy partner in the learning experience. We must understand that to learn means not only to possess an affective and a cognitive competence, but it means to express an interactive competence as well.

The ancient Greeks believed that they were living in the "Kaipos" that is, a right time for the "metamorphosis of the gods." Capricious gods were brought under the dominion of reason. Perhaps today we live again in the kind of axial time that might be referred to as a "Kaipos." Perhaps the wanning dominance of old forms is an indication that a metamorphosis is at hand. Perhaps the God outside

who is being left in the cold will soon be welcomed as the God within. The great rebel Giordano Bruno, (1548-1600) of whose fire it was said that, "not all the snows of the Caucasus could quench (it)", (365) was burned to death because he dared to suggest that this metamorphosis was inevitable. That Bruno speaks to more people today than when he lived perhaps attests to the possibility that we are approaching a great "Kaipos." In a final letter to the Inquisition Bruno wrote:

> We are surrounded by eternity and by the uniting of love. There is but one centre from which all species issue, as rays from a sun to which all species return. (366)

Philosophically we have come full circle. It is hoped that we have been sucessful in enlarging, however slightly, the radius of that circle. All roads in philosophy lead to a narrow and difficult road. We can chose to avoid taking that road but we do so with dire consequences. For to avoid it is to avoid the path that leads to the heart of this or any other matter. Finally, if we ask again what Pascal asked in the introduction to this paper; that is, when all the tangles have been unravelled, when all the knots have been undone, indeed, what do we find, the "glory" or the "refuse" of the universe?

FOOTNOTES

SECTION ONE

F1: In this paper the writer will attempt to balance considerations for clarity and style with a sensitive use of such terms as "man" in general, "mankind" and "God." These are to be understood as composite terms or whole concepts comprising or describing a male-female nature. While the distinction between male and female is often conceived in physical terms, for the writer it has a much more significant metaphysical importance and reality. Hence, maleness and femaleness are qualities profoundly shared by all of humankind.

F2: At the outset we must acknowledge the importance of Ken Wilber, whose work in this field represents a quantum leap forward. The brillance of Ken Wilber is evident not only in his scholarly handling of the delicate subject of human consciousness, but equally in the creative way in which he presides over the very sophisticated company that he has invited to participate in that discussion. His circle of aquaintances, which is broad and impressive gives his work an authority and significance hard to find elsewhere. Rollo May writes: "Ken Wilber's writings awaken and stimulate the mind and imagination of whoever is fortunate enough to read him." James Fadiman of

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Stanford University calls Wilber "the most important thinker in psychology today." Huston Smith of Harvard writes of Wilber's first book, The Atman Project, "I know of no book that quite equals this Atman Project. Daniel Goleman, Senior Editor of Psychology Today, compares Wilber to the grand theorists of human consciousness like Cassirer, Eliade, and Bateson. Jean Houston, past president of the Association of Humanistic Psychology, believes that "Wilber will likely do for consciousness what Freud did for psychology."

F3: James' famous opposition between these two types is outlined in the following way:

The tender-minded	The tough-minded
Rationalistic (going by 'principles')	Empiricist (going by 'facts')
Intellectualistic	Sensationalistic
Idealistic	Materialistic
Optimistic	Pessimistic
Religious	Irreligious
Free-willist	Fatalistic
Monistic	Pluralistic
Dogmatical	Sceptical

This interesting distinction has some relation to a distinction that we shall make later between the expulse (centrifugal) and inpulse (centripetal) types of personalities.

SECTION TWO

F1: Of course other lists exist. While we are certainly not impressed with what or how man attempts to "know" in modern times, Ernest Gellner explains that "In modern times, three important cognitive selection procedures can be observed:

(1) Empiricism. A claim to knowledge is legitimate only if it can be justified in terms of experience.

(2) Materialism (alias mechanism, or structuralism, with other possible variant names). A claim to knowledge is legitimate only if it is a specification of a publicly reproducible structure.

(3) Logical form. A claim to knowledge is legitimate only if it exemplifies a certain privileged logical form. (46)

F2: Our meaning for the word "intuition" as we shall point out later, is quite specific. By intuition we shall always mean an experience of some degree of the connexity of the universe.

F3: "The philosopher is the happiest of men." writes Plato in the Republic. ix 587. Also, "Nulla est homini causa philosophandi, nisi ut beatus sit." (Man has no reason to philosophize except with a view to happiness.) advises Saint Augustine.

F4: While we read that Plato's epistemology is eye of mind oriented, still we find that he does demonstrate some sympathy with an intuitive, eye of the heart, non-dualistic, way of knowing. In an

enigmatic statement from the Seventh Letter, Plato, in referring to his "Ideas", explains that there never can be or will be any written work about that understanding or knowledge which to him is the heart of his philosophy, because, as he explains: "it is in no way expressible like other subjects of teaching." (87) Again, we read in The Republic (Cornford vi. 508): "both knowledge and truth are to be regarded as like the Good, but to identify either with the Good is wrong. The Good must hold a yet higher place of honour." Continuing in the next paragraph, Plato writes: "And so with the objects of knowledge: these derive from the Good not only their power of being known, but their very being and reality; and Goodness is not the same thing as being, but even beyond being, surpassing it in dignity and power." Whether or not Plato hints here at a clear distinction between the eye of the mind and the eye of the heart is hard to say. What we do know however is that Plato's mistrust of knowledge via the eye of the flesh, was to find its way into Christian epistemology and to have a retarding effect on the establishment of the sciences, which require that we take the senses seriously.

F5: It is interesting to note in this regard, that late in his own life Aquinas recognized the limits of the eye of mind. After an intense ecstatic experience Aquinas put down his quill and wrote no more. At that point he described his life's work as so much "straw" (mihi videtur ut pavia). "Almost gladly," report Andrew Greeley and William McCready in Are We a Nation of Mystics? he died a few months thereafter. (92)

F6: Spinoza, whose own geometrical method of the Ethics, demonstrates a discriminating use of Cartesian Méthode, appears, because of his inability to distinguish clearly between the eye of the mind and the eye of the flesh, to commit the category error. While Spinoza recognizes a "third kind of knowledge," it appears that this kind of knowledge which he calls "intuition" and which we may possess when we view things "sub specie aeternitatis," is not a distinct way of knowing but only a refined variety of the "second kind of knowledge." Proposition XXVIII, in Part V, explains: "The endeavor or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind of knowledge." While Spinoza speaks convincingly for the eye of the mind he appears to deal inadequately with the eye of the heart. This is curious because his whole philosophy is held together by an eye of the heart intuition, or insight that God is one and all there is. (Ethics Part 1, Prop. 5)

F7: Schopenhauer, in his second book The World as Will, points out the weakness in Kant's concept of the "thing in itself." Further, in book three, The World as Idea, he refers to it as an "obscure and paradoxical doctrine," a "stumbling stone" that represents "the weak side of his [Kantian] philosophy". (105)

F8: Professor S. Radhakrishnan defines religion as: "the reaction of the whole man to the whole reality." (111)

F9: That the distinction between what is human and what is sub-human is not significant is clearly illustrated in a noteworthy case by B.F. Skinner. In his book Verbal Behaviour, which is a study on "human" language, Skinner's radical acceptance of phylogenetic continuity makes it possible for him to do all his research on rats and pigeons and then apply, without reservation, his observations to a theory of human verbal behaviour.

F10: A note worth considering is that the emphasis in science is on a a type of knowledge that is communal, shared, and transferable. (See again Gellner's three cognitive selection procedures. F:1) This stands in contrast to, and renders suspicious, any sources of knowledge that tend to be personal, private, or individual. Hence, it tends to ignore or even deny the importance of the individual (any self beyond somatic self) as a significant source of knowledge.

F11: On this point it should be mentioned that finally only Being and not some attribute of Being can justify It. Descartes can say: "I think therefore I am" (little "am"), but this existential statement pales in significance before, for example, God's statement to Moses: "I AM THAT I AM". Rollo May, in The Discovery of Being, reports the experience of a patient who managed existentially to put things in order. Describing her experience she explains:

> What is this experience like? It is a primary feeling--it feels like receiving the deed to my house. It is the experience of my own aliveness not caring whether it turns out to be an iron or just a wave. It is like when a very young child I once reached the core of a peach and cracked the pit, not knowing what I would

> find and then feeling the wonder of finding the inner seed, good to eat in its bitter sweetness...It is like a sailboat in the harbor being given an anchor so that, being made out of earthly things, it can by means of its anchor get in touch again with the earth, the ground from which its wood grew; it can lift its anchor to sail but always at times it can cast its anchor to weather the storm or rest a little...It is my saying to Descartes, "I am, therefore I think, I feel, I do. (p.99)

F12: It is perhaps worth noting in this regard that Spinoza, who adopted a geometric framework for his Ethics--which indicates a respect for some aspect of Cartesian method--nevertheless tries to see beyond the trenchant Cartesian mind-matter dualism by advocating that Substance or God has the attributes of both extension and thought. Extension, which is the material aspect of God is extended through time and space, whereas, thought or mind is the mental or spiritual aspect with which God knows his multitudinous forms. Mankind is a modification or "mode" of God, hence, he shares in the divinity of God and becomes conscious of that divinity as he comes to see himself, "sub specie aeternitatis," that is, under the aspect of eternity. Spinoza's universe is whole or connected (Ethics Prop.13 Pt.1) and accident-free. (Ethics Prop.29 Pt.1) In contrast to Descartes, Spinoza goes off to work but does not leave God, that is, an intuition of the connexity of the universe, behind.

F13: In using this term we have made use of Whitehead's term the "connexity of the world," which appears in Modes of Thought, New York: Free Press, Macmillan, 1968.

SECTION THREE

F1: James Legge's translation of the same chapter is worth reporting particularly as its second paragraph describes a "grand capacity" and a "community of feeling with all things" that relates to what we have described as an "intuition of connexity." It reads:

> The report of that fulfillment is the regular, unchanging rule. To know that unchanging rule is to be intelligent; not to know it leads to wild movements and evil issues. The knowledge of that unchanging rule produces a (grand) capacity and forbearance, and that capacity and forbearance lead to a community (of feeling with all things). From this community of feeling comes a kingliness of character; and he who is king-like goes on to be heaven-like. (226)

F2: Among the Sufis two stages in the evolution of human becoming are identified. The Safar-i-Haq or the Qaus-i-Nazul is the "journey of God towards servanthood;" while the Safar-i-abd or the Qaus-i-Uruj is the name given to the "return journey" of the soul "back to God." (227)

F3: As a point of interest, it is noteworthy that our model is not entirely unrelated to the one proposed earlier by Pythagoras. We recall that he identifies three types of men: Those "who come to buy and sell," or those of a materialistic (I-It) orientation; "those who compete," or who are of an idealistic (I-Thou) orientation; and finally those who "come simply to look on," or are of a contemplative (I-I) nature.

F4: Speaking from the mythological perspective, Joseph Campbell, suggests that all Hero myths show three movements: separation, initiation, and return. (248) The work of Campbell offers many insights that could be useful to researchers in the field of values education particularly since myths appear to play an important role a universal process of valuing. Just as a point of interest, the movement of the sperm (maleness) through the darkness of several distinct passages to the egg (femaleness), and the return journey of that union slowly back out of the darkness to the birth of light, is one more analogy that may be a parallel of a kind to our "philosophic" wave .

F5: Using this computer analogy we might suggest that one aspect of the Intent or Will of the Programmer is to free Himself from the machine (hardware-I-dentification) by writing and running ever more highly ordered, complete or whole, introspective programs.

SECTION FOUR

F1: Tillich's warning, that in resolving the tension between the impulse to differentiation and the impulse to integration, we must avoid the extremes of "annihilating narrowness" and "annihilat ng openness" (Tillich, P. Systematic Theology: Three Volumes. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. p.33) is well taken. However, as an interesting case study described by the psychiatrist R.D. Laing (The Case of Jesse in, The Politics of Experience, "The Ten Day Voyage." Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1967.) points out, existential convergence to a "point" of entire narrowness as well as entire openness is not only not beyond possibility but is more likely a better way of describing an existential end-state.

F2: The writer agrees with Professor Kegan on this point, however it would seem to him that Kegan ought to recognize a distinction between the "meaning-making" which he often refers to and its necessary counterpart which is the experience we refer to as meaning-finding. It seems to the writer that if we are not to be trapped by what might be interpreted as a purely "subjective reality," a stable picture of the developmental process must include a counter-balance to meaning-making

F3: See Appendix 2. From: East of the Sun and West of the Moon, Illustrated by Kay Nielsen, New York: Doubleday, 1976.

F4: The Oedipus Myth symbolically expresses the tension between the male-female polarities within each of us. Nicolas Berdyaev in The Destiny of Man, (p.63) demonstrates its significance to our model. Berdyaev writes:

> It is a profoundly real myth of the ancient struggle going on in man between the solar masculine principle and the feminine principle of the earth. The human being does not easily resign itself to the victory of the sun over the earth, of spirit over matter, of the masculine over the feminine, of personality over the collective unit. Man rebels against the victory of the logos over the maternal element and strives to be absorbed in it once more. He protests against being torn away from the mother-earth, the primary source of life.
> The tragedy of Oedipus took place at the time when masculine moral consciousness had conquered and imposed its norm upon society. The revolt against the father was to play an important part in history. It takes the form of struggling against power, against reason, norm, law. Man will always be attracted by the elementary cosmic force, the mainspring of creative energy. This is connected with the struggle between the Dionysian and the Apollonian principles which is going on to this day.

F5: Professor Needleman is right to remind us that philosophy must stand on it own two feet or "see" things with its own distinctive "eye" if it is to remain credible and significant for modern man. The relevant paragraph reads:

> Consequently, philosophy, while detaching itself in this way from a relatively elementary form of religion, remains itself--forever bogged down on that same elementary level (the empirical view). No matter how intricate, subtle, or comprehensive its thought becomes, it will never move from that level. And thus, when an even more efficient way of "living in the desert" comes along--Western natural science--it is quick to recognize this as its master, or at least as that to which it must direct most of its energies. From the point of view of the actual attainment of wisdom, the development of philosophy from Descartes through Locke, Hume, Kant, and the contemporary schools thus represents little more than the rationalization of the chains that hold man in the cave. Philosophy becomes easy. (In Religion For a New Generation p.396)

F6: In this regard it is interesting to note that physicists continue to be guided to a significant degree by their hearts (intuition). The importance of aesthetic factors which might be described as the whispers of the eye of the heart, are pointed out by the astonomers Rothman and Ellis in an article titled: Has Cosmology Become Metaphysical? They write:

> A peculiar situation has arisen in cosmology. Over the last five years physicists have been hard at work on a theory that set out to resolve two problems that may not exist. This theory has no evidence to support it, and the one prediction it does make appears to be incorrect. To reconcile observations with this theory requires the existence of particles that have not been observed. Assuming these particles exist brings the theory into an even more serious conflict with astronomical observations, unless a further quantity is introduced that has also not been observed. This quantity presents a puzzle equivalent to the one the theory was originally invented to solve. And yet, because the theory is pretty in a mathematical sense, many theorists have embraced it and chosen to disregard these issues. (325)

F7: Professor Nasr offers a lucid discussion of this point in How Science Lost the Cosmos. (In Religion For a New Generation p.462)

F8: A favorite with the writer in this respect is the painting of the Madonna of Mercy and the Family of Jacob Meyer, By Holbein the Younger. (c. 1526) See appendix 3.

F9: In Joseph Campbell's Myths to Live By. (p.212) there is an interesting quotation in which Najagneq a "powerful" Innuit shaman describes the one spirit in whom he believes. This spirit is called Sila. And what does Sila say?

> "The inhabitant or soul of the universe," Najagneq said, " is never seen its voice alone is heard, All we know is that it has a gentle voice, like a woman, a voice so fine and gentle that even children cannot become afraid. And what it says is: Sila ersinarsinivdluge, 'Be not afraid of the universe.'"

F:10 In his book A Spirituality named Compassion, Matthew Fox writes:

> I once asked Dr. Capra what other physicists thought of his writings connecting physics to mysticism. His reply was that at first there was some scepticism until they learned what a good physicist he was, but that actually, in traveling about the country a lot, he had learned that "at least 50% of the physicists of our country are into physics because of the mysticism in it." "That would mean," I pointed out , that "there is a greater percentage of physicists who are mystics these days than priests or ministers."

F:11 The relationship between Buber's quote and Jacques Maritain's remark that "One of the worst diseases of the modern world ....is its dualism, the dissociation between the things of God and the things of the world." (352) is fairly obvious.

APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 2

APPENDIX 3

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