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Bridging The Gap?

A Critical Reading of Bhabha, Said and Spivak's Postcolonial Positions

Don Selby, Graduate Program in Communications
McGill University, Montréal
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Canada

Abstract

With the progress of globalization, it is becoming increasingly evident that there lies within it a Westernizing thrust that forms a part of the European colonial legacy. Postcolonial theorists, exemplified by Homi K. Bhabha, Edward W. Said, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, have, over the last twenty years, produced some of the most influential discourse analysis of colonialism, and critiques of neocolonialism. Their works, committed to various streams of poststructuralism, nonetheless exhibit some debilitating epistemological problems this thesis demonstrates by recourse to Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard. In conclusion it offers an alternative approach to globalization derived from Kierkegaard's dilemma of first principles in <u>Either/Or</u>, and Wittgenstein's discussion of language games in <u>Philosophical Investigations</u>.

Le progrès de la mondialisation revèle de façon de plus en plus évidente l'existence d'un courant occidental dominant qui constitue une part de l'héritage colonial européen. Des théoriciens postcoloniaux, illustrés par Homi K. Bhabha, Edward W. Said, et Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ont produit durant les vingt dernières années quelques unes des analyses les plus influentes sur le discours colonial, ainsi que des critiques du néocolonialisme. Néanmoins, leurs travaux relèvant des divers courants du poststructuralisme, mettent en évidence certains problèmes épistémologiques insurmontables que ce mémoire va explorer au moyen des pensées de Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard. En guise de conclusion, il offre une approche alternative à la mondialisation qui est à la base du dilemme kierkegaardien des premiers principes dans <u>Either/Or</u>, et la réflexion des jeux de langage dans <u>Philosophical Investigations</u>.

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Acknowledgements

Introduction

From, say, Latin America or Africa, what did the Gulf War look like? We should remember that this came on the heels of perhaps the most symbolically potent geopolitical event of the last fifty years: the fall of the Berlin Wall. The immediate temptation might be to assume that it looked much the same as it did in the United States or Canada, but we may acknowledge that there is no good reason to presume that the view from Quito would be the same as that from Cairo, Tunis, or Calcutta, much less New York. We could add another event to these recollections, one less visually captivating than either the War or the fall of the Wall: In 1984 the U.S., acting in concert with the interests of publishers,[1] and the International Federation of the Periodical Press, withdrew from UNESCO, followed a year later by the U.K. This precipitated the end of UNESCO's efforts to support the development of indigenous media in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.[2]

One sees here events that have different impacts in different parts of the world. They do not seem to be clearly related but one could argue that they do form part of a pattern: a pattern indicating that it is altogether premature to think of the world as post-colonial[3] in any but the shallowest sense. If colonialism is distinguished from imperialism by the presence of a governing force - the extension of the colonial governing apparatus in the colonized community - as a subspecies of imperialism,[4] then colonialism seems unproblematically to end with the withdrawal of the governing presence from the colonized territory. This, however, demands a corollary. Independence has been won, so far, only on certain terms: independence as an ostensibly sovereign *nation-state*, in the liberal tradition of the term. One might argue that not

only has imperialism been more resilient than colonialism,
but that the U.N. is a still self-legitimizing, self-
sanctioned colonial force. Though the governing body has
moved off-shore, there is still a form of control. In
Algeria, where the U.N. refused to recognize the
democratically elected Islamic government, in favour of the
French-supported (but electorally defeated) party; in the
Malvinas, where the U.N., while acknowledging the islands to
be Argentine, refused to condemn, much less obstruct the
invading British forces; in the U.N. invasion of Somalia; in
the U.N. assault on Baghdad (in contradistinction to the
Malvinas example); the lesson is clear: independence as a
nation-state in a world of nation-states means sovereignty
only insofar as the U.N. Security Council permits it, and it
is not predisposed to treat all comers equally. It is hard
to imagine a more discouraging environment in which to
obtain sovereignty.

The independence as nation-states of formerly colonized
peoples[5] is analogous to the British abolition of slavery in
the 1800s. A suggestive argument is that abolition was not
simply an act of philanthropy. In addition, with the
improvement of manufacturing technology, in both the U.S.
North and England, slaves became more expensive than wage
labour, and this position of conscience became economically
feasible, while also securing a competitive advantage over
those for whom slavery was still more efficient.[6] It
introduced a newly uneven playing field, from which the
English and industrializing U.S. benefited. The analogy,
then, is that the colonized world gained a dubious
independence: when it had become cheaper for the
colonialists to maintain control through the economy, or by
distant military threat, than by a direct, existent
control;[7] when the independent states could only enter the
world as independent on unequal terms; one that occurred at

a time when political control of distant lands was becoming obsolete, and economic/political (in that order) control of a close-knit global community meant that borders were formal only, and highly permeable to capital, lending agencies, super-statal political/military bodies, and the like, all of which demanded a say in the governing of the 'independent' states.[8] (China is probably the only example of a nation-state that has had any enduring success - and by no means total, by no means at a bargain - resisting the pressures placed on newly independent states). The analogy, then, runs something like this: slaves are to colonized peoples as free labour is to the independent state. A partial liberty in either case.

The analogy, it must be noted, carries through in different ways: in each case (slavery and colonialism), there was resistance to the oppression inherent in both systems, though it may have been more directly related to success in the cases of anti-colonial movements. In another way the analogy does not work as well. Colonial slavery ended at a time of change in the relations of production, but there were few ways a freed slave could opt out of the capitalist system. Decolonialisation, on the other hand, for the most part ended during the Cold War.[9] This all-consuming division in Europe and its settler colonies (for example, the U.S., Canada) provided more latitude for local autonomy at the moment of independence.[10]

In a sense, there were more than two positions to take: alliance with the liberal democracies, the communist bloc, or non-alignment, which could include playing the two sides off against each other, or could include solidarity with other non-aligned nations.[11] One might suspect, however, that the end of the Cold War has substantially limited these choices. In fact, one might take the Gulf War or Somalia to be expressions of the post-Cold War transformation of the

U.N.[12] Put succinctly, it is demonstrable that the formal
aspects of colonialism (as a subcategory of imperialism)
persist:

> The UN is under pressure, to which it is succumbing by
> degrees, to allow UN (i.e. the Western powers and 'allies'
> cobbled together for the occasion) intervention, armed if
> necessary, in various countries on 'humanitarian' grounds:
> the 'right of interference' as the current Health Minister
> of France calls it. But non-Westerners know that no such
> interference will be allowed in Northern Ireland, in
> defense of American Indian Movement, against racist or
> religious violence in Germany or France.
>   But this is a new guise for an old policy of Western
> tutelage and 'rights' of supervision - a more economical
> mode of remote-control, perhaps, than the old costlier
> colonialisms.[13]

Bandyopadhyay goes on to point out that this trend is not
met with universal acquiescence (citing resistance in, for
example, Algeria). It merits consideration, however, as a
trend within a larger process: globalization. It seems
clear that the position of the Bretton Woods progeny on
globalization is not just that it is an acceptable process,
but that it should take a particular form. This preferred
form is emblematic of a conviction that the West has
promoted (since World War II embodied in modernization
theory), that it holds out *the* model of civilization that
the rest of the peoples of the world should follow. Mowlana
and Wilson[14] chart in exquisite detail the intellectual
route that the modernization paradigm, manifest in
contemporary development theory, has taken.[15] There are two
points to be made here. First, this paradigm, whether in
its liberal or its neo-Marxist variant,[16] assumes
Westernization and modernization to be synonyms.
Development is oriented in a defining way to easing the
entry of 'peripheral' communities into the global economy by
instructing them in the adoption of Western values and
social structures. It is assumed that there is a natural

link between these structures and industrialization/
modernization.[17] What receives little reflection is first
that this assumption, as well as the normalization of the
Western/modern conflation, emerge from the colonial era and
the assumptions about humanity and progress embedded
therein. Further, and this is the second of the general
points I want to make so far, there is compelling evidence
that there is no necessary convergence into a single form of
modernity. In other words, modernity does not by necessity
enjoy a causal relation with Westernization. Japan is a
common example held out to support this claim, though
Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Turkey, to name
a few, seem also to have indigenized capitalist
modernization.[18]

If this is the case, if there are models of non-convergent
modernization, then development as a Westernizing project
becomes all the more pertinent. In this scenario,
development can be seen as a force that usurps the
discursive space[19] in which members of a cultural community
might define themselves, both in and against
globalization:[20] *in* globalization as an irrepressible
mechanism of change; *against*, however, a uniform model of
change. The stakes in this instance become the capacity of
peoples to control and indigenize, to whatever extent
possible, the forces upon them *toward a non-colonized* end.
Several scholars with particular influence in such discourse
right now are postcolonial theorists. Mostly made up of
diasporic intellectuals working in the U.S. academy, Edward
W. Said, Homi K. Bhabha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak
"constitute the Holy Trinity of colonial discourse
analysis."[21] I will, therefore, focus on these three.[22]

The project informing this thesis started several years
ago with objectives not wholly different from those of Said,
Bhabha and Spivak: a concern with Anglo-American media

(though the sphere could be widened, as Barthes has demonstrated,[23] to a broader European context) and its representations of 'other' parts of the world. In democracies (which, by their nature, lend themselves to being heavily influenced by popular pressure in decisions concerning international relations), the information the polity received, and the manner in which it was presented, seemed a significant area of study. (Indeed, Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman have made this point over and over again for years.) This seems to be the driving force behind, especially, Said's work in <u>Orientalism</u> and <u>Culture And Imperialism</u> the former of which laid out the methodology[24] and implications[25] of such a study.

The present incarnation of the project is rather different. Instead of following the example set by Said, it questions the epistemological grounds on which he, Bhabha and Spivak rely. This reorientation has some different requirements, and now involves, first, an account of the crisis in Western oppositional and grand narrative discourse (i.e. Marxism), followed by an inevitable, uncomfortable consequence of this crisis: the recognition that the West can not assure itself of a privileged position from which to understand across cultural lines. This is further exacerbated by the growing dominance of liberal discourses of human rights, development, and wo on, with a concurrent eclipse of any compelling critical response. This marks a useful starting point because it was within this context that Bhabha, Said, and Spivak developed their models of colonial discourse analysis. The second major requirement is an explanation of the shortcomings of postcolonial theory, given the particular intellectual commitments of its three central figures.[26]

My trajectory is different insofar as I wish to argue that these innovations involve epistemological problems that

complicate the political and ethical projects of each postcolonial theorist. These epistemological difficulties are better illuminated by recourse to Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard than they are by arguing about orthodoxy with respect to Derrida, Foucault, Lacan and Marx. As a result, these four will mostly enter this project either to provide context or to help elucidate particular problems from case to case, rather than entering in the service of intellectual gate-keeping.

The final requirement is to come with an alternative to postcolonial theory. This cannot happen, as I will try to show early on, by falling back on the dominant paradigm of the day. Liberalism has shown an astonishing capacity to absorb oppositional discourses into its own calls for the vigilant defense of individual rights and freedoms, often articulated along the lines of minority rights, democracy principles, human rights, plurality, and multiculturalism. There are substantial reasons to resist this urge, as Bhabha, Said, and Spivak try to. The point, rather, will be to show, within their historico-intellectual context, the problems that arise from postcolonial intellectual choices and strategies, and to develop an alternative *through* this critique. The critique, then, will both rely upon a certain methodological choice (Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein),[27] directed at bringing their epistemological shortcomings into focus, but the criticism will also constitute the grounds and process of refining this methodology such that it may exceed the particular problems it identifies and become a functioning model in its own right.

The goals of this thesis, then, are to show, on the one hand, that the criticisms of the dominant (liberal) paradigm governing the emanation from the West of globalizing forces (e.g. development, universal human rights, capitalism, democracy, and the like) are to be taken seriously; on the

other hand, the epistemological commitments of postcolonial theory (in its deconstructive formations) compromise the task they set out to accomplish. This leaves us, then, at a particularly vexing juncture: having mounted a respectful critique of Bhabha, Said, and Spivak, we are, yet, unable to reinstate the guiding principles of humanism (radical or otherwise) to resolve the challenges presented by globalization. The concluding section will take the basic critical framework (which relies on Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard), and attempt to demonstrate its elaboration as an epistemologically sound model that theorizes the non-convergent movement of civilizations through distinct social progressions that need not crystalize in a common, universal social system.

Notes:

1. The 1981 Voices of Freedom Conference of Independent News Media.

2. Cees J. Hamelink, The Politics of World Communication (London: Sage, 1994) 200-202.

3. The dash in 'post-colonial' will signify the era following colonialism in any given case, where 'postcolonial' will be used throughout to indicate a methodology and field of study.

4. Foreign domination in general, not requiring the presence of the ruling body in the ruled land.

5. There is not a 1:1 correspondence between these national borders and these peoples, as Burundi, Zaire, and Yugoslavia have recently demonstrated.

6. Henry Bernstein, Hazel Johnson, and Alan Thomas, "Labour Regimes and Social Change Under Colonialism," Poverty and Development in the 1990s eds. Tim Allen and Alan Thomas, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992) 186-188. Also, for the transition to compulsory (rather than waged) labour, see J. Gus Liebenow, African Politics: Crises and Challenges (Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1986) 160-161.

7. Economics, however, must not be taken as the only motive for colonialism. The politics of imperial territory, for example, is one other factor.

8. Cf. Arturo Escobar, "The Making and Unmaking of the Third World Through Development," in Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree, eds. The Post-Development Reader (London: Zed, 1997) 85-93. He explains in his second footnote,

The loan agreements (Guaranteed Agreements) between the World Bank and
recipient countries signed in the late 1940s and 1950s invariably included a
commitment on the part of the borrower to provide 'the Bank', as it is called,
with all the information it requested. It also stipulated the right of Bank
officials to visit any part of the territory of the country in question. The
'missions' that this institution periodically sent to borrowing countries was
a major mechanism for extracting detailed information about those countries.
(93)

9. Henry Bernstein, Tom Hewitt and Alan Thomas, "Capitalism and the Expansion of
Europe," Poverty and Development in the 1990s 172.

10. This is the case even for Latin American countries, despite their early start
on formal decolonization.

11. Such was with the Bandung Conference of 1955, which for a time won some
influence in the U.N.

12. The reformation of NATO is not sufficiently clear, yet, for comment, but it
appears to support the point made here about the U.N., perhaps functioning as an
option of last resort when there is insufficient support among U.N. members. One
thinks, for example, of the recent (April/May 1998) military advance on Iraq, for
which it appeared easier for the U.S. to solicit help outside the U.N. One notes,
further, that this fact seemed to present no obstacle to finding ample enthusiasm
for further military ventures in the Gulf, suggesting that the relationship of the
U.N. to international policing may be similar to the IMF's role in international
loans: as a legitimizing office for the projects of its more influential member
states.

13. Pradeep Bandyopadhyay, "Nations, States and Communities in Transition" in The
movement of Peoples: A View From the South Michael Oliver, ed. (Ottawa: The Group
of 78, 1992) 28.

14. Hamid Mowlana and Laurie J. Wilson, The Passing of Modernity: Communication
and the Transformation of Society (New York: Longman, 1990)

15. Development theory and practice, as explicated in Escobar (op. cit.), functions
in a way similar to Freudian psychoanalysis, starting with an idea of debility from
which it derives a concept of healthy adjustment, and a course of treatment
required to resolve the causal affliction in the ailing.

16. Mowlana and Wilson demonstrate that the most virulent attacks on the
modernization paradigm come from neo-Marxists, especially dependency theorists.
What these theorists do not challenge is the basic modernizationist premise that
development, as elimination of poverty, demands fundamental and extensive social as
well as economic and political change, and that this change should occur along
basically rationalist lines. Pat Howard, "The Confrontation of Modern and
Traditional Knowledge Systems in Development," Canadian Journal of Communication
vol.19 (1994) 189-208; Magnus Bloomstöm and Björn Hettne, "The Emergence of Modern
Development Theory," Development Theory in Transition (London: Zed, 1984); or
Charles K Wilbur and Kenneth P. Jameson, "Paradigms of Economic Development and
Beyond" in The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment Charles K.
Wilbur, ed. (New York: Random House, 1984) corroborate Mowlana and Wilson on this.

17. Johannes Fabian illustrates how even anthropology - the discipline that makes
the most concerted effort to be self-reflexive and self-critical - posits the West

as a snapshot of the peripheral world's future, and the 'pre-industrial' societies as representations of the West's past. Cf. <u>Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object</u> (New York: Columbia, 1983). The consequence is that the West perceives itself as having already passed from the stage of backwardness, and occupying, therefore, a position of authority with respect to all other societies. The values that are impressed upon "developing" societies are, essentially, the contractarianism that emerges out of Hobbes, Lock and Rousseau, combined with the free-market economic formations theorized by Smith and Ricardo. Cf. Ramashray Roy, <u>World Development: A Theoretical Dead End</u> (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1993).

18. The arguments that both explain and support this perspective generally emphasize the role of Confucianism in the social and economic development of South East Asia. 'Japan theory', as it is called, posits the exceptionalism of Japan (based largely on the place of Confucianism within Japanese society) in a way similar to Weber's notion of Western European exceptionalism (based on the place of Calvinism there). Michio Morishima is probably the Japan theorist most visible to the West, particularly with <u>Why Has Japan "Succeeded"?: Western Technology and the Japanese Ethos</u> (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982). See also Roy Hofheinz, Jr. and Kent E. Calder, <u>The Eastasia Edge</u> (New York: Basic Books, 1982). For a dissenting view that nonetheless takes Japan Theory seriously, see Winston Davis, <u>Japanese Religion and Society: Paradigms of Structure and Change</u> (Albany: SUNY, 1992).
   Further, to the point about indigenization, in "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy," <u>Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization</u> (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996) Arjun Appadurai comments:
   [T]he uncanny Philippine affinity for American popular music is rich testimony to the global culture of the hyperreal, for somehow Philippine renditions of American popular songs are both more widespread in the Philippines, and more disturbingly faithful to their originals, than they are in the United States today. An entire nation seems to have learned to mimic Kenny Rogers and the Lennon sisters, like a vast Asian Motown chorus. But *Americanization* is certainly a pallid term to apply to such a situation, for not only are there more Filipinos singing perfect renditions of some American songs (often from the American past) than there are Americans doing so, there is also, of course, the fact that the rest of their lives is not in complete synchrony with the referential world that first gave birth to these songs. (29)

   In a later chapter ("Playing with Modernity: The Decolonization of Indian Cricket,") he goes on to explain the Indian indigenization of the most English of cultural practices, cricket. His point is that a given practice or artefact emerging from the metropole may signify utterly different and novel things when transported to a different setting. It may, that is, be brought under the rules of codification of the recipient people, rather than imposing upon them the full codal apparatus of the culture of its origin.

19. For more on development as a discourse in the Foucauldian sense of the term, "that is...a space in which only certain things could be said and even imagined," see Escobar, op. cit. 85.

20. Globalization both constitutes and is constituted by the increased social, economic and political integration of all communities around the world, with no exit option even for the most discrete, such that changes in one place have inescapable consequences for others. The ramifications of the present Asian currency crisis provides us with a good example.

21. Robert C. J. Young, <u>Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory Culture and Race</u> (London: Routledge, 1995) 163. All further references to Young in the text refer to <u>Colonial Desire</u> as CD, followed by the page number, and references to <u>White Mythologies</u> (London: Routledge, 1988): WM and the page.

22. All references will be made in the text as follows:
by Homi Bhabha, "Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism" in
Francis Barker et. al. eds. The Politics of Theory (Colchester: University of
Essex, 1983) 194-211: DDD; and The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994):
LC;
Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1994): O;
Culture and Imperialism (London: Chatto and Windus, 1993): CI; and "The Text The
World and the Critic," Josué Harari, ed. Textual Strategies (Ithaca: Cornell UP,
1979): TWC;
Gayatri C. Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak," Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman,
eds. Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory (Heartfordshire: Harvester
Wheatsheaf, 1993): CSS; In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics (New York:
Routledge, 1988): IOW; Outside in the Teaching Machine (New York: Routledge, 1993):
OTM; Sarah Harasym, ed. The Post-Colonial Critic (New York: Routledge, 1990): PC;
Donna Landry and Gerald Maclean, eds. The Spivak Reader (London: Routledge, 1996):
SR.

23. His by now famous analysis of a *Paris-Match* cover can be found in Mythologies
Annette Lavers (trans.)(New York: Hill and Wang 1972) 116.

24. This includes archival research, establishing the boundaries of the discursive
field, and hermeneutic analysis.

25. That is to say, the disorientation, through archaeology/genealogy, of 'common
sense knowledge' of 'other' peoples.

26. My aim, however, is not to debate orthodox readings of Derrida, Foucault,
Lacan or Marx.I readily grant that Bhabha, Said and Spivak are not simply trying to
reproduce in any dogmatic way pre-established methodologies, but are trying to
introduce into literary and colonial discourse analysis innovations of some
philosophical and political consequence. That said, we must note that there has
been an eruption of critical readings of Bhabha, Said and Spivak that perfrom the
substantial task of engaging with them through both French deconstruction and Marx,
whether in praise or in criticism. Young and Moore-Gilbert are, to the best of my
knowledge, the only two who have written book-length studies to these ends. The
reader may get some sense of the recent proliferation of publications in the field
of postcolonialism, both friendly and hostile, by consulting Appendix 2.

27. The crucial texts here will be Kierkegaard's Either/Or Volume 1 David F.
Swenson and Lilian Marvin Swenson trans. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1944); Either/Or
Volume 2 Walter Lowrie trans. (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1944); and Wittgenstein's
Philosophical Invesigations G.E.M. Anscombe trans. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958).

Chapter I:

Fading Materialism and An Autonomous Cultural Sphere

> What distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. (Karl Marx, Capital: Volume 1, p.174)

1: Whither Marxism: The Conflicts And Eclipse Of European Marxism

From the end of the seventeenth until the late nineteenth century, the most influential body of thought on global, social issues was that from which would emerge liberalism, derived primarily from Hobbes Locke, J.S. Mill and Rousseau. Essentially, all the contemporary models of progress (exemplified in W.W. Rostow's 1960 The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, and Francis Fukuyama's more recent, if equally dubious "The End of History?"[28]) derive from this heritage. The definition of progress in terms of social transparency, contractarianism, rational individualism, and market-driven property relations is unmistakable. The most significant change was the introduction of a competing position: Marxism.[29] (This is exhibited in the fact that both Rostow and Fukuyama, while demonstrating quintessentially liberal positions, are clearly arguing against Marx: a polemic necessarily absent in all of the foundational figures). Although there are substantial differences between the two camps, they are speaking the same language, if in opposition to one another. One of the key elements of this commonality is the idea of history - developed with different political agendas - as something communities are either within, or outside while awaiting inclusion. Historical convergence is fundamental to both models, whether that be convergence in modernity

defined as free-market democracy (liberalism), or in a
dialectical progression to communism (Marx). This debate is
by now familiar. In the last twenty five years, however, it
has become increasingly eclipsed. The temporal dichotomies
that structure these positions - for example, modern/
primitive, developed/underdeveloped, advanced/backward -
were first complicated indirectly by Saussure's semiotics.
The diachrony that characterized linguistics to that point
was similar to the diachrony of liberalism and Marxism: a
progress over time. Saussure's conviction that language
should be understood synchronically did not immediately
undermine liberal and Marxist analysis, but was soon enough
introduced into anthropological investigation by Lévi-
Strauss. Structuralism chose to focus on the dyadic
construction of society, rather than a social evolution
carried out over time: History ceased to be simply a process
into which communities fit according to a status measured
with respect to the West.

While it is not central to the argument that follows, a
brief digression is necessary here to clarify this term
"history." "History" is not a concept we can take for
granted. As Hanna Arendt[30] so skillfully instructs us, the
Greeks had not just a different history from we moderns, but
a conceptually distinct historicity. For the Greeks the
greatness of acts revealed itself; it was not prone to
subjective judgement. Great acts were written about because
they were great, rather than becoming great because they
were subjectively judged so. They were not rendered great
after the fact, but, in their greatness, preceded and
demanded an account. The immortality of great acts could
only be assured, however, by saving them from oblivion.
They were the singular events in a cyclical time of eternal
return and the unique mortality of humans and their actions.

Arendt explains:

> With Herodotus words and deeds and events - that is,
> those things that owe their existence exclusively to men -
> became the subject matter of history. Of all man-made
> things, these are the most futile. The works of human
> hands owe part of their existence to the material nature
> provides and therefore carry within themselves some
> measure of permanence, borrowed, as it were, from the
> being-forever of nature. But what goes on between mortals
> directly, the spoken word and all the actions and deeds
> which the Greeks called πρξεις or πργματα, as distinguished
> from ποησις, fabrication, can never outlast the moment of
> their realization, would never leave any trace without the
> help of remembrance. The task of the poet and
> historiographer...consists in making something out of
> remembrance. (45)

This stands in some contrast to the modern understanding
of history. Here, history as process replaces history as
great deeds. They are a string of, in themselves,
meaningless events that acquire significance in reference to
the broader historical process. This reverses of what we
found with the Greeks; the singular loses significance, and
the general gains it. Looking back through the process of
history, things gain or lose significance as their meaning
is revealed through the passage of time (which extends
infinitely forward and backward) and in consultation with
history. History becomes a guidebook to the meaning of
things, not a storage place where they may be saved from the
abyss. There is, equally, a shift in emphasis from the deed
to the author of history.

We could also compare modern "history" to that of, for
example, theological time, in which events occur in
reference to fixed points: the Fall, Struggle, the Second
coming, Redemption, and so on. The relevant point for our
purposes is that the concept that underlies history is not
universally shared across time and space, but changes from
one epoch to another, and from one place to another; it has

a genealogy rather than a nature. That liberal and Marxist
histories occur as modern histories, and that other models
of history might come to displace them, then, is not so far-
fetched a claim. From within modernity this might seem
strange, as there is a perception of objectivity in history
- that facts are facts that can be held to some scientific
standard or method, the only errors being errors of the
subject (e.g. attributed to ideology). In any event, both
held that time progressed through linear stages and that the
modern West represented the future of all "primitive"
societies, just as they could be taken to be "snapshots" of
the Euro-American past. Whether these societies played the
part of Rostow's "preconditions to take-off" opposite the
modern stage of "high mass consumption," or Marx's "feudal
mode of production" to the current "capitalist mode" is
important only within the left/right debate. Once we take
this debate to be emblematic of a particular moment -
modernism - and recognize that there have been and may be
other historicities it becomes important to reflect upon
what these other models might be. Please note that we are
not embracing the perspective that other cultures may have
pre-modern conceptions of time and history - like cyclical
time, or time that involves reincarnation - that would then
be dismissed as quaint but mistaken according to the
scientific criteria of modernism. Rather, these histories
may be incommensurate, sharing no common set of criteria by
which to measure validity. With this in mind, we are now
ready to understand some of the implications structuralism
and poststructuralism held for these modern analyses of
society.[31]

Robert Young (WM, chapters 2 and 3) goes to some length to
explain the intellectual shifts that took place in Marxist
thinking from the 1930s on, focusing especially on the moves
made by Lukács to promote a Hegelian Marxism that emphasized

the dialectic of history over Marxian economics and its concomitant materialism. As a response to Stalinism, Young continues, such figures as (at the most influential) Sartre invoked Lukács against the economic determinism-cum-totalitarianism they saw arise from the October Revolution.

Somewhat comparable to the Frankfurt School's concern, their dilemma was how to explain Stalinism by way of Marx. One may conclude that the excesses of Stalin provoked an anti-determinist response in the rest of Europe that involved an anti-economism. This anti-economism, in turn, can be taken to have ushered in the sorts of Marxist analysis that examined culture as in some ways independent of the economy.

At roughly the same time, however, Antonio Gramsci was writing in an Italian prison about, among other things, hegemony. While Young does not examine this work in detail, its influence was to be felt through a different channel than was Lukács'. Rather than coming through Sartre and French Marxist debates, Gramsci was filtered through Raymond Williams in Birmingham, the birthplace of Cultural Studies.

Seen to deviate in some significant ways from Marx, this body of critique also understood the cultural arena to be relatively autonomous from the economic. The base-superstructure model, while not dismissed out of hand, was nonetheless found to be of quite limited utility.[32] Young traces one trajectory into poststructuralism, one in tension but not entirely at odds with the Lukács-Sartre descent mentioned above, but the Gramsci-Williams lineage may be as important and influential for our concerns, as it is upon Williams that Said has more often relied in his critical work. Though Young is justifiably interested in the French debates, and the concern they show for the place of history in cultural analysis (i.e. the Sartrean defense of a singular human history against the French structuralists who

seem to excise history from the analysis of culture), they must not be taken to be either the only debates or the only innovations in Marxism. The Gramsci-Williams moves do not position history in the same central way as did Sartre, perhaps because they did not experience the pressure of structuralism in the same way. There is, however, a concern with the place of culture as a relatively autonomous phenomenon; one that, at times, seems to place Marx's superstructure in the privileged position with respect to the base.[33] Some may read this as a decisive step away from Marxian thought (just as some commentators see Sartre's attempt to save history and the dialectic in Marx to be the unwitting revelation that Stalinism is in no way a deviation from Marxist projections, and as, therefore, sounding the death-knell for Marxism.[34]) In any case, one can see in this the seeds (and perhaps the seedlings) of Said's profoundly influential renovation of Western thought on textual representations of the Orient in particular and the non-Western world in general.

All of the above is not to say that Marxism led to poststructuralism. The debates between structuralism (or poststructuralism) and Marxism aside, the point is that even within various Marxist debates there was an environment conducive to the critical exploration of culture as an important historical and social sphere in its own right. That the analytical stature of culture would become as significant or more so than the economy, however, was somewhat unexpected, especially within Marxist circles. In Culture and Imperialism Said explains that Britain's colonial literature was an essential enabling factor for British colonial expansion. Britain required a justification for conquest, whether politically or economically motivated, and literature provided that paradigmatic justification as a call to civilize the

world.[35] This work could not have come about from Marxist
analysis alone, though Althusser's work may represent a near
approximation.[36] It is here that the importance of
structuralism's intervention becomes clearest insofar as it
contributes to postcolonial theory the intellectual tools
required to pursue particular lines of critique.

2: The French Move to Structuralism

We have seen that during the inter- and post-War eras
there was within Marxism a recoiling from the economic
determinism of Stalin and the Second International[37]
generally, and a concerted effort to prove the historical
truth of Marxism. There was a consequent emphasis on the
scientific validity of Marxism that would exist quite
separate from economism. This entailed a difficult
negotiation with the concept of science in general, as it
became necessary to illustrate a difference between
bourgeois science and Marxian science. Marx had shown how
this could be carried out in the field of economics,
demonstrating the systematic flaws of bourgeois (or now,
Classical) economics and offering his corrections. It was
not obvious, though, how this could be extended to other
sciences.[38] There were, however, other changes afoot, at
least in France, and these changes would be central to the
later post-structuralist contributions of Foucault, and,
less directly, Derrida. Gaston Bachelard, born the year
after Marx's death, Jean Cavaillès, and Georges Canguilhem,
born two decades later (1903 and 1904), directed the focus
of historical and philosophical inquiry into science onto
questions of epistemology. Bachelard published the first
significant texts in this regard between the Wars. He was,
arguably, the first philosopher of scientific discontinuity,
demonstrating that reigning theories (e.g. Einstein's
physics) were not simply intellectual improvements grown

from previous, flawed models (e.g. Newtonian physics) that could be mapped on the same linear trajectory. Rather, he argued, they are incommensurate: they do not share the same criteria of validity; one cannot be rendered sensibly in the terms of the other. Bachelard, for example, finds that modern scientific thought "is fundamentally oriented to seeing phenomena relationally, not substantively, or as having essential qualities in themselves."[39] We may note in passing that this is congruent with Arendt's writing on modern historicity, but more importantly that it coincides with structuralist thought. In fact, beyond noting the relational orientation of modern thought, his model of argumentation is highly compatible with structuralism as it draws attention to the synchronic constitution of thought at any given time; that is, that science can only be understood in its moment, and that diachronic investigations will require violent measures to assert the continuity and growth of thought across time.

Canguilhem, examining "life sciences" fills a role similarly conducive to the ascent of structuralism and to our current interest in the structuralist emphasis on the autonomy of meaning and cultural forms from economic determinants. In any case, the point that emerges most forcefully is that truth/error or scientific validity at a given moment stands in contrast to that of another moment. Knowledge does not progress continuously, then, but as a constantly renewed perception of what is true or false; it is perspectival and historically discontinuous.[40]

Again, it should be noted that this may not be strictly incompatible with Althusser; at least, with the Althusser of "Ideological State Apparatuses."[41] Here we find that different ideologies, corresponding to different modes of production, will express themselves through different organs (ideological state apparatuses), establishing distinct

belief systems. The ideology of the feudal mode, for example, functioned through the Church, disseminating a particular set of validity criteria. With the bourgeois mode of production, the place of the Church - both its function as the dominant organ of ideology, and its capacity to determine the dominant ideology - was taken over by the school and by bourgeois ideology. In this way, these are discontinuous models: they cannot be reduced to each other.

While this is not all that there is to say about Althusser's thought, the point I wish to make here is that, although he remains in large degree a Marxist, the arguments he makes are not in their entirety at odds with structuralism. He is, however, still tied to the conviction that the mode of production plays a fundamental role in shaping society. It is with his student, Foucault, that this changes, and the thought of Canguilhem, in particular, is carried in new directions. It is, further, the move away from analysis that assumes the importance of modes of production, and into the discontinuous history of the human sciences that might best explain the preference in postcolonial theory for Foucault rather than Althusser.

Foucault legitimates the study of institutions and concepts as they relate to power and knowledge[42] without, at the same time, placing the economy at the analytical epicenter. (This is especially important for Said's examination of Orientalism as both institutionally and conceptually organized with respect to power and knowledge.)

Besides Foucault, however, Derrida and Lacan also contribute to this sort of approach. With Derrida we find a serious inquiry into the status of textuality and difference, and a critique of logocentrism and the binary oppositions of Saussurean semiotics, coupled with the recognition that he cannot simply replace the philosophical system he critiques, but must work within a system that, for

example, denies difference according to positive terms, and yet requires the illusion of such identity in order to function.[43] Lacan, on the other hand, in rereading Freud alongside Hegel, contributes two general preconditions to the emergence of postcolonial discourse: he promotes the foundational place of the Other in the formation of the self, and identifies subjectivity as occurring in and through (rather than as preceding) language.[44] Again, this is not entirely out of sorts with Althusser's claim that subjectivity is an effect of ideology, but Lacan's argumentative scaffolding is different, achieving this end without recourse to the mode of production.

What we find, then, is the sudden emergence in post-World War Two France of profound intellectual innovations that form the new heritage from which postcolonial theory derives its trajectory. We may think of this, while not predetermining postcolonial thinking, as providing the minimal conditions for its formation. Colonial discourse analysis, as the study and criticism of the relationship to and representations of the Other (or other), without dependence on materialist analyses; the work of decentring (the subject of imperialism, dominant discourses); the persistent concern for margins (of discourse, of colonial power, of subjectivity versus subalternity, or of reading from this perspective); and the particular invocations of semiology, deconstruction and psychoanalysis, all rely to a substantial degree on, (a) the shaking loose of Marxist thought from the base/superstructure model after WWII, and (b) more directly on the work of Derrida, Foucault and Lacan.

This brief sketch lays out the general intellectual environment within which Bhabha, Said and Spivak developed their particular methodologies, politico-intellectual commitments, and critical interests. It is to these that we

will now turn.

Notes:

28. Walt Whitman Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1960); Francis Fukuyama, "The End Of History?" The Public Interest Summer 1989 (63). His confidence is evident the following year:

> There is a very tight relationship between liberal democracy and advanced industrialization, with the former following the latter inexorably. Industrial maturity is an interconnected whole, requiring higher levels of urbanization, education, labour mobility, and ultimately free communications, political participation, and democratic government.

"Forget Iraq - history IS dead," The Guardian [London] 7 September 1990.

29. Henceforth "Marxian analysis" will refer to the works of Marx or Marx and Engels, while "Marxism" or "Marxist analysis" will indicate those thinkers who work in Marx's wake, but do not necessarily find in Marx a completed model. We may find examples in the innovative work of, for example, T.W. Adorno (and other Frankfurt School scholars), Louis Althusser, Tony Bennett, Terry Eagleton, Antonio Gramsci, Michel Pêcheux, and Raymond Williams.

30. Hanna Arendt, Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin, 1978) Ch.2.

31. With respect to the crisis in Marxism, one could look as well at either Sartre or the Frankfurt School. While they do not bring about the downfall of Marxism as such, their intellectual struggles connote problems in Marxist thought immediately before, during and after World War Two. All too briefly, in the case of the Sartre of the Critique of Dialectical Reason, we find an effort, that may have been doomed from the beginning, to reconcile the radical freedom and responsibility of his existentialism to Marxian thought. On the one hand, his resolute argument for indeterminism, on the other a deterministic theory of social change. In the end, there is no resolution to this attempted synthesis: no theory that can be at once determinist and indeterminist, especially for one still tied to Descartes. If Sartre is right about freedom and responsibility, he must compromise Marx's thinking on such fundamentals as exploitation, the engine of history (class conflict), and the like. If he adheres to Marx, he must abandon his indeterminist positions, openning himself to the possibility that freedom and responsibility, as he has formulated them, cannot be found in Marx.

The Frankfurt School, on the other hand, had to try to explain how fascism could fit into a Marxian dialectic of social change. Max Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment (trans. John Cumming, [New York: Continuum, 1988]) may be taken as the exemplary text in this regard. A perhaps violently brief summary of this unusually complicated book claims as its thesis that reason has always carried within it its own irrationality, and that the very model of reason - instrumental rationality - that allows human command over nature (to economically productive ends, for example) also brings humans under that same control in the form of fascism. While this is not different in all ways from Heidegger's critique of instrumental reason - his 'remedy' being the introduction of poetics into modern thought - it differs in that it attempts to restore via a critical examination of reason and a subsequent purging of its instrumentalist manifestations, the Enlightenment project of individual emancipation.

32. Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977) 75-82. Quite despite himself, Stalin reveals the unwieldiness of the base-superstructure model, at least in its most deterministic moments, in his Marxism and Problems of

Linguistics (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1972).

33. This is particularly evident in their efforts, which are not strictly symmetrical, to establish the consequences of a theory of hegemony. In his Marxism and Literature Williams seems almost singularly intent on establishing the shortcomings of the (determinist) model of base and superstructure, and the strengths of the introduction of hegemony into Marxist thought, en route to his own innovation in the form of structures of feeling. He writes, for example:

> Cultural work and activity are not now, in any ordinary sense, a superstructure: not only because of the depth and thoroughness at which any cultural hegemony is lived, but because cultural tradition and practice are seen as much more than superstructural reflections - reflections, mediations, or typifications - of a formed social and economic structure. On the contrary, they are among the basic processes of the formation itself and, further, related to a much wider area of reality than the abstractions of 'social' and 'economic' experience. (111)

Gramsci's work has, of course, been mobilized to quite different ends as well. For examples see R. W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 12, (1983): 162-75, or Stephen Gill, Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993).

34. Young, for example, arrives at this conclusion in White Mythologies. See chapter 2 for his analysis of Sartre, and for other similar critiques, notes 2 and 7. For various contributions to the entirely different debate between Sartre and Lévi-Strauss, see note 28.

35. He makes the same point in Orientalism, though he does so with reference to a range of genres, not just fiction.

36. Curiously enough, Althusser receives only passing attention in Orientalism, and none in Culture and Imperialism. It seems that his "Ideological State Apparatuses" might dovetail nicely with Said's agenda, but Williams (less in Orientalism than in Culture and Imperialism) and especially Foucault won the day. Young, however, sees Althusser filling a crucial place in France's intellectual ferment, especially as a respondent to Sartre.

37. One must note, less as an excuse for than as an explanation of the economism of the Second International, that much of Marx's writing was unavailable at that time, though it certainly was for Stalin. (Significantly, the first edition of Capital, volume III only became available in 1894, over a decade after Marx's death.) As a result, such quintessentially Marxian concepts as alienation and commodity fetishism only became wide-spread somewhat later. This may, in part, explain the resistance to the Second International as it was formulated by later critics. That Stalin did have access to these concepts and might, therefore, be accused of neglecting them, may equally explain their prominence (especially alienation, however modified) in Sartre's critical reinterpretation (as regards Stalin) of Marx.

38. Indeed, it could not extend into all sciences. Marx employed the sciences of his time, so any criticism of those, especially mathematics, would necessarily compromise his own conclusions.

39. John Lechte, Fifty Key Contemporary Thinkers (London: Routledge, 1994) 4. It may seem problematic to talk about Bachelard and Canguilhem through Lechte's text rather than invoking their own texts. The point of this section, however, is to

demonstrate that the *reception* of certain works or authors was crucial in establishing for Said, Spivak and Bhabha an intellectual clearing within which they could discuss the cultural aspects of colonial discourse independently of a determining economic base. It is worth noting, in this regard, that the discussion we find of each of the former three figures in Lechte is in symmetry with Young's account of their intellectual impact. (See especially Young CD 48-54).

40. Lechte, 12-20.

41. Louis Althusser, "Ideological State Apparatuses," reprinted in Slavoj _i_ek, ed. Mapping Ideology (London: Verso, 1994) 100-140.

42. One need only think of the asylum and madness, the clinic and the birth of modern medicine, or guillotine and prison alongside transgression and punishment to recall a few of the discursive formations and their institutional embodiments studied by Foucault. Cf. Madness And Civilization Richard Howard trans., (New York: Vintage, 1988); The Birth of the Clinic A. M. Sheridan Smith trans., (New York: Vintage, 1975); and Discipline and Punish Alan Sheridan trans., (New York: Vintage, 1979).

43. This emerges throughout his early work. See Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs trans. David B. Allison, (Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1973), Of Grammatology trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1974), and Writing And Difference trans. Alan Bass, (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1978).

44. Cf. Écrits trans. Alan Sheridan, (New York: Norton, 1977) and The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis trans. Alan Sheridan, (New York: Norton, 1978).

Chapter II:

Postcolonial Theory

The indeterminate circulation of meaning as rumour or
conspiracy, with its perverse, psychic affects of panic,
constitutes the intersubjective realm of revolt and
resistance. What kind of agency is constituted in the
circulation of the chapati? (Bhabha, LC, 200)

1 Said

For many, the field of postcolonial discourse, or colonial
discourse analysis, opens with Said's Orientalism. It
seems, indeed, nearly impossible to discuss postcolonialism
(the field of study) or colonial discourse analysis without
invoking Said generally, and Orientalism specifically.
Spivak writes of "the source book of our discipline:"

> Said's book was not a study of marginality, not even of
> marginalization. It was the study of the construction of
> an object, for investigation and control. The study of
> colonial discourse, directly released by work such as
> Said's, has, however, blossomed into a garden where the
> marginal can speak and be spoken, even spoken for. (OTM,
> 56)

Bhabha, in the acknowledgements for Location of Culture
identifies Said as a touchstone as well: "I want here to
acknowledge the pioneering *oeuvre* of Edward Said which
provided me with a critical terrain and an intellectual
project" (ix). Robert C. J. Young, too, is unequivocal
about this: "Colonial discourse analysis was initiated as an
academic sub-discipline within literary and cultural theory
by Edward Said's *Orientalism* in 1978" (CD, 159), and
Bhabha's first major work (DDD) concerned Orientalism. Any
consideration of postcolonial theory, if only on account of
the weight of citation within it, must, therefore, begin
with Orientalism.

Young argues that Said's Foucauldian analysis of
Orientalism, determining what can be said and taken as true
about the "Orient", has three central implications. First,

it showed how Foucauldian discourse analysis presented a
novel way of thinking about the functioning of ideology, in
its lived form and as a form of consciousness. It displaced
traditional Marxist cultural criticism by arguing against an
economically determined Orientalism, and for a degree of
autonomy in the cultural sphere. Second, he demonstrates a
complicity of Western literary and academic knowledge with
European colonialism. The seemingly neutral academy was in
fact central to "the production of actual forms of colonial
subjugation and administration." Third, there is no
alternative to the Western construction of the "Orient"
because the Orient is a creation of Orientalism without an
external, primordial referent. All Western knowledge of the
Oriental Other, therefore, is an element of Orientalist
discourse bearing little or no relation to "the actuality of
its putative object, 'the Orient'" (CD, 159-60).

Said's problematic, then, is the textual creation of an
object, the Orient, that takes on greater authority than
those subjects who find themselves in the socio-geographical
locale of the sign "Orient". This articulates importantly
with development discourse. Both Orientalism and
development emerge from a common tradition, albeit at
different points. Development as a civilizing project and
practice,[45] however well-intentioned, has always worked on
the assumption of knowing what is best for the
'underdeveloped'. This assumption rests on the same
intellectual foundation as Orientalism, in their self-
assurance that all reality can be reductively known based on
the inherited categories of the Enlightenment.

Furthermore, as the body of texts becomes self-
referential, they "can create not only knowledge but also
the very reality they appear to describe" (O, 94). This is

a significant concern, as Said explains:

> It seems a common human failing to prefer the schematic authority of a text to the disorientations of direct encounters with the human.
> Two situations favor a textual attitude. One is when a human being confronts at close quarters something relatively unknown and threatening and previously distant.
> In such a case one has recourse not only to what in one's previous experience the novelty resembles but also to what one has read about it....**The idea...is that people, places and experiences can always be described by a book, so much so that the book (or text) acquires a greater authority, and use, even than the actuality it describes.**
> A second situation favoring a textual attitude is the appearance of success. If one reads a book claiming that lions are fierce and then encounters a fierce lion (I simplify, of course), the chances are that one will be encouraged to read more books by that same author, and believe them....Similarly, as the focus of the text centers more narrowly on the subject - no longer lions but their fierceness - we might expect that the ways in which it is recommended that a lion's fierceness be handled will actually *increase* its fierceness, force it to be fierce since that is what it is, and that is what in essence we know or can *only* know about it. (O, 93-94, bold emphasis added)

The sign reigns over the referent. The sign not only becomes more compelling than the referent, but start to shape the referent to its own logic. There is here an echo of Foucault, if a little distorted. The sign comes to have a disciplining power over the subjects it signifies.

Said returns to this theme in <u>Culture and Imperialism</u>. Here he argues that at "some very basic level, imperialism means thinking about, settling on, controlling land that you do not possess, that is distant, that is lived on and owned by others" (CI, 5). The texts that explain these lands and justify their occupation, Said alerts us, are a fundamental aspect of their actual occupation. Theories of imperialism that neglect the move from literary representation to institutional management, will miss imperialism's essence. There is no clear opposition, he says, between the text and

the world (TWC, 171).[46]

There are, however, some problems with Said's work that complicate its usefulness for those who would resist a uniform, hegemonic globalization. If Orientalism works on the level of signification only, and is independent of its referent, or is without referent at all, how does it function as an efficient administrative tool for colonialism? Furthermore, if the Orient, as distanciated signification, systematically branches off from, distorts and misrepresents the real, it is difficult to understand how, on the one hand, it could uphold itself in the face of the reality it represents, with administration *in situ*, and how, on the other hand, it could condition the 'native' into the colonial subject it de-/in-scribed. This comes down, basically, to the tension Said encounters with his distinction between latent and manifest Orientalism;[47] latent Orientalism being "an almost unconscious (and certainly untouchable) positivity" and manifest Orientalism being "the various stated views about Oriental society, languages, literature...and so forth. Whatever change occurs in knowledge of the Orient is found almost exclusively in manifest Orientalism; the unanimity, stability, and durability of latent Orientalism are more or less constant" (O, 206). He comes back to this distinction later to say

> the doctrinal - or doxological - manifestation of such an
> Orient is what I have been calling here latent Orientalism
> [which supplied] an enunciative capacity that could be
> used, or rather mobilized, and turned into sensible
> discourse for the concrete occasion at hand... But like
> all enunciative capacities and the discourses they enable,
> latent Orientalism was profoundly conservative -
> dedicated, that is, to self-preservation. (O, 221-222)

This leads us to a second major problem. What happens to Said's discourse when his analytical tools are applied to it?[48] Just as the discourse of Orientalism depicted a field

with no referent, no Orient beyond its own invention, and, therefore, misrepresented when it tried to represent, so Said makes an object of Orientalism, of essentializing and misrepresenting it in the same way. As the Orient is to the discourse of Orientalism, so Orientalism is to Said's discourse about Orientalism.[49] If by Said's rules there is no real Orient, then by those same rules there is no real Orientalism.

This last problem makes Said's theoretical tools awkward for any oppositional strategy to an object, a discursive field, like development. But also emerging from his latent/manifest distinction is the problem of agency in its relationship to any discursive field. Said wants to reserve (especially in Culture and Imperialism - see chapter three) a place for a disruptive agent. But, by positing latent and manifest Orientalism in such structuralist terms, he encounters the same problem as Saussurian semiology or structuralist anthropology: how does one gain agency in a totalized discursive field? If there is no outside, from what position can one mount opposition? Or, if one can mount opposition, how can the system be closed, unchanging and fundamentally structuring of discourse? One can only make this choice strategically, but then anyone else could make the opposite choice to other strategic ends. In short, the subversive model Said developed here is itself equally in prone to subversion by the same principle.

2 Bhabha

Bhabha addresses this problem by introducing the idea of ambivalence into colonial discourse analysis. "Difference, Discrimination, and the Discourse of Colonialism" is largely a critique of Orientalism, taking the ambivalence between manifest (a body of knowledge) and latent (expressive of fantasy and desire) Orientalism[50] and recasting it in an enabling form. That is, it shows the Orientalism Said

describes to be an ambivalent discourse, but demonstrates that Said dissolves this ambivalence into a single intention: a projection onto and will to govern the Orient.

(We also find this in Culture and Imperialism). For Bhabha, however, colonial discourse is founded on ambivalence - the desire and the derision seen in Orientalism: "The fetish or stereotype gives access to an 'identity' which is predicated as much on mastery and pleasure as it is on anxiety and defence, for it is a from of multiple and contradictory belief in its recognition of difference and disavowal of it" (DDD, 202).

Orientalism is greater than just representation, but occurs in a discursive field, and we must, therefore, examine not the accuracy or reality of the representation, but who is speaking to whom.[51] Where Said calls for the agency of the individual (the critic), Bhabha shows that the question of enunciation indicates a subject already. There are, then, two differences: for Bhabha, there is no single political/ideological colonial intent, and, further, he rejects the straightforward instrumentalist relation of power and knowledge in Said. (Although Bhabha criticizes Orientalism, this could extend to Culture and Imperialism.)

Bhabha moves from Said's focus (representation for consumption by the West) to look at Orientalism's role as an instrument of colonial power. We find in this a re-articulation of one of the criticisms raised against Said above: the problem of the representation's relation to the real. That is, even the colonizer finds constructing and maintaining a stereotype complex, ambivalent and contradictory. Bhabha shifts focus, then, to the vacillation between recognition and disavowal, comparing it to Freud's theory of sexual fetishism.

I argue for the reading of the stereotype in terms of fetishism. The myth of historical origination - racial

purity, cultural priority - produced in relation to the
colonial stereotype functions to 'normalize' the multiple
beliefs and split subjects that constitute colonial
discourse as a consequence of its process of disavowal.
(LC, 74)

The fetish/stereotype is at once knowable and other,
depending on mastery and pleasure as well as anxiety and
defence. Colonial discourse, according to fetishism's
contradictory logic, both projects and disavows the
difference of the other; mastery, always asserted, is never
complete. The observed/surveilled other[52] is also the
object of paranoia and fantasy. This ambivalence does not,
however, threaten colonial discourse, it only complicates it
(DDD, 205).

To this point Bhabha suggests a more complex possession of
power, avoiding the problem Said encounters with a
monolithic representation of colonial discourse. This
ambivalence to which he points allows the opportunity for
opposition, but Bhabha does not offer a blueprint (as did,
for example, Fanon in The Wretched of the Earth) of such
resistance.

That is not, however, all there is to Bhabha. He is,
clearly, still referring to the latent/manifest "economy" in
the following:

Within that conflictual economy of colonial discourse
which Edward Said describes as the tension between the
syncronic panoptical vision of domination - the demand for
identity, stasis - and the counter-pressure of the
diachcrony of history - change, difference - mimicry
represents an *ironic* compromise. (LC, 85-86)

Here he tries to resolve what he sees as Said's conflict,
now using Lacan's thoughts on mimicry as a jumping-off
point. With mimicry, the colonial Other is constructed as
at once recognizably the same as the colonizer, but still
different. This is worked out as metonymy:[53]

As Lacan reminds us, mimicry is like camouflage, not a
harmonization of repression of difference, but a form of

resemblance, that differs from or defends presence by displaying it in part, metonymically. (LC, 90)

The mimic man, because not entirely like the colonizer, is only a partial representation for him;[54] the colonizer sees a deformed and displaced image of himself: *"almost the same, but not white."* For the agent of representation, this imitation subverts the identity of the represented, causing the relation of power to vacillate. The gaze is returned from an otherness, and the mastery that lay in sameness falters. Agency loses its point of fixity and enters a process of circulation: each effort to assert power comes up against its own ambivalence. This does not, however, release power to the colonized subject, who, in this explanation, is unaware of playing the part of mimic. What it does, simply, is to produce paranoia in the very process by which the colonizer's position is secured, and, as a result, made insecure.[55]

What we find in Bhabha, then, is more complex, but of little help. He delineates a profoundly hybrid space of mutual misrecognition where 'colonizer' meets 'colonized' (LC, 97), that undermines any clear distinction between the two.

> What threatens the authority of colonial command is the ambivalence of its address – father and oppressor or, alternatively, the ruled and reviled – which will not be resolved in a dialectical play of power....Between the civil address and its colonial signification – each axis displaying a problem of recognition and repetition – shuttles the signifier of authority in search of a strategy of surveillance, subjection and inscription. Here there can be no dialectic of the master-slave for where discourse is so disseminated can there ever be the passage from trauma to transcendence? (LC, 97)

Bhabha delivers a subtle model but shows the native as both difficult to identify, and *unintentionally* disruptive. The disruption is an element of the colonial discourse, of its ambivalence.[56] The presence of the colonized is what brings

out the paranoia of the colonizer, but only within the
economy of a discourse that is sown with paranoia from the
outset. The native is analogous to "Freud's sabre-rattling
strangers": once again, signifieds, not referents. They
disrupt not through agency, but precisely without it; not as
activists, but as figments of the paranoid imaginary of the
colonizer (LC, 99). Once again, there is nothing obvious
here for oppositional strategizing, despite the greater
nuance at the level of analysis. Where Said's problem is
the tension of internal contradiction - wanting it both ways
- Bhabha's is about consistency: at one time the colonizer
and the colonized, or the discourses running within and
between them, are absolutely formed in one way, later
absolutely and irreconcilably another. The rules governing
and defining hybridity and its derivative concepts function
exclusively by one principle (fission), then by another
(fusion). That East/West, man/woman, colonizer/ colonized,
are constructions does not allow us, of course, to claim
they do not *function*, just as Foucault is careful to say
that arguing that the author is a function of discourse does
not permit us to do away with the author function as if it
did not exist at all.[57] Indeed, to argue derisively that
they are fictions, as Said and Bhabha do in their different
ways (e.g. the divergence of signs from referents, and the
ambivalent need for the Other in the foundation of the self)
is a strange thing, as it necessarily implies that only the
essential and the natural would form legitimate grounds for
commentary: two categories of analysis they vehemently
exclude. As we shall see in the following section, there is
a more careful shading of these issues in Spivak's work.

3 Spivak

In some contrast to Bhabha, Spivak focuses on strategy and
opposition. There is irony in that Spivak turns primarily
to Derrida;[58] irony, because Said invoked Foucault as a

politically enabling thinker, while Derrida is often criticized for the apparent political void in his work. It is through deconstruction, however, and the search for traces, for the mark of an elision, that Spivak develops her political strategy: the retrieval of subaltern history - that of the excluded, represented object of colonialism - that provides the possibility of counter-knowledge and, therefore, disruption of the neo-colonial narrative. Note, here, that from the outset she is making a necessary place for the post-colonial critic. The subaltern does not miraculously regain a lost speech during this process, though that is the ultimate objective. At this point the subaltern is as impotent as Bhabha's "native." What Spivak aims to do is to provide an enunciative position from which the subaltern can speak herself into being. To achieve this, Spivak shows few hard and fast intellectual alliances.

Like Bhabha, she takes colonialism to be subject-constituting, and sets up a shifting polarity of colonizer and colonized. Against Foucault and Deleuze (and by extension, as a rare case, against Marx) she claims

> We must now confront the following question: on the other side of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside *and* outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and education supplementing an earlier economic text, *can the subaltern speak?* (CSS, 78)

By introducing the problematic sentence "'white men are saving brown women from brown men'" (CSS, 92), she can criticize, for example, both the British who outlawed *sati* (self-immolation), and the Hindu legislators who defend it.

Nowhere in this play of white and brown men do we find a place from which the brown woman in question might represent herself. She indicates, then, that a gendered subaltern must be regarded differently than the subaltern class-subject (IOW, 245-246).

...Jean-François Lyotard has termed the 'différend', the inaccessibility of, or untranslatability from, one mode of discourse in a dispute to another....As the discourse of what the British perceive as heathen ritual is sublated (but not, Lyotard would argue, translated) into what the British perceive as a crime, one diagnosis of female free will is substituted for another. (CSS, 96)

The woman is legislated and spoken for, but nowhere speaks. In a sense, the woman is legislated, is a product of legislation, but is not brought into being by it. She is an inert word, again, a sign without a referent. In a later move, however, Spivak says

The academic feminist must learn to learn from [subaltern women], to speak to them, to suspect that their access to the political and sexual scene is not merely to be *corrected* by our superior theory and enlightened compassion. (IOW, 135)   This is not the tired nationalist claim that only a native can know the scene. The point that I am trying to make is that, in order to learn enough about Third World women and to develop a different readership, the immense heterogeneity of the field must be appreciated, and the First World feminist must learn to stop feeling privileged *as a woman*. (IOW, 136)

The point here is that she is willing to shift positions in order to reveal the lack in any unified perspective. She shows this more concretely in the following:

The Rani of Sirmur emerged in the East India Company records only when she was needed to make "History" march. Shahbano's emergence is structurally comparable. When the very well-known face is brought out, remember the face that you have not seen, the face that has disappeared from view. (OTM, 241)

This seems to be applicable to feminism as readily as to the East India Company. When any figure is brought forth, she seems to advise, recognize that it is at the cost of another figure. When liberal feminism marches out the *sati* victim (i.e. as victim) to promote the cause of the female individual, recognize that the woman you see is (to belabour the point), a sign that hides a subject.

This work is potentially the most useful of the three
theorists under examination here, but suffers from its own
setbacks. First, her admonition to First World feminists is
a homogenizing move of the kind that Said also appears to
make, and that both criticize. Does the subaltern gain
space only by such totalizing gestures? Furthermore, this
rings of Habermasian symmetrical dialogue, which is not only
dubious,[59] but also begs the question on the grounds of what
do we assume a common code through which to speak with and
learn from the subaltern?

> All I mean by negotiation here is that one tries to
> change something that one is obliged to inhabit, since one
> is not working from the outside. In order to keep one's
> effectiveness, one must also preserve those structures -
> not cut them down completely. (PC, 72)
> [There are] two things that I can do in the English
> literature classroom: to see how the master texts need us
> in the construction of their texts without acknowledging
> that need; and to explore the differences and similarities
> between texts coming from the two sides which are engaged
> with the same problem at the same time. (PC, 73)[60]

There is a notable tension here, too. She assumes at once
totalized sides *and* common grounds of comparison, and
identifies the strategic presence of structures. She
assumes a bi-codalism, or bilingualism, if you will. This
raises another potential problem.

> What good does...re-inscription do? It acknowledges that
> the arena of the subaltern's persistent emergence into
> hegemony must always and by definition remain
> heterogeneous to the efforts of the disciplinary
> historian. The historian must persist in *his* efforts in
> this awareness, that the subaltern is necessarily the
> absolute limit of the place where history is narrativized
> into logic....(IOW, 241)

What discourse does the subaltern enter? If it is the
hegemonic, or dominant discourse, what has been the point of
entering it? There may be an argument that it is better to
be complicit in the dominant discourse, even in a
subordinate position, than to be excluded from it, though

this is so unsatisfying (and mercenary) a stance that it is
hard to believe that Spivak would promote it.

In the end, do we, as a result of Spivak's intervention, get
the voice of the subaltern? She cannot provide us with
this. She can, indeed, only point to where the subaltern
might come to enunciate a position (more precisely, where
such a possibility is obstructed), but the place she points
to is at best theoretical. Even if the subaltern were to
find an enunciative space, there is neither any guarantee
she would say anything, nor that what she would say would be
intelligible to anyone beyond that space. Spivak seems to
think that just providing the space will be enough to
introduce a rupture in the (neo)colonial narrative. It
appears that, despite her efforts, the monologue largely
continues, and that all we really have gotten is the
addition of Spivak's voice. This should not be taken too
lightly, as it is a voice that promotes a crisis in the
self-assurance of Western identity.[61] It is not altogether
clear, though, how a community that does not find itself in
Western/dominant/hegemonic discourse might make use of her
strategy, a strategy resolutely located in the intellectual
watershed of the West.

4 Summary

At this moment, then, we may surmise that, despite the
impressive and disruptive work of Said, Bhabha and Spivak,
they equip "peripheral" communities with no immediate
strategies to use as shields against Westernizing drive
behind much of globalization.[62] The next chapter will take
up two particular, and central, instances that grow out of
the particular critical approaches of each theorist -
hybridity in the case of Said and Bhabha, strategic
essentialism in the case of Spivak - to demonstrate, first,
a deep epistemological shortfall and its consequences in
each case, and second, the critical application of

Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein to this arena. While the model
I wish to develop out of <u>Either/Or</u> and <u>Philosophical</u>
<u>Investigations</u> will not be completed there, the critical use
of these will establish the foundation upon which that model
will rest. The essential point will be that, not only does
postcolonial theory provide no protocols according to which
'subaltern' peoples may actively reproduce themselves in all
their distinction, but there are sown into this discourse
epistemological *obstacles* to the formation of such
protocols. It is to the problems embedded in these
epistemological formations that we now turn.

Notes:

45. Again, working in a paradigm of progress defining human goals as universally
met through the erosion of tradition in favour of rationalist, contractarian social
formations, development, in its very name, has embraced the same principles that
led Orientalists to trust their capacity to know and to represent the 'native' for
both Europe and the represented subjects themselves.

46. Spivak takes Said to task for misunderstanding Derrida when he makes the same
point, Said thinking, she reports, that Derrida uses "text" to refer only to the
printed page, as Said does. This articulates with her disagreements with Said over
matters of identity politics, as she notes in "Acting Bits/Identity Talk," <u>Critical</u>
<u>Inquiry</u> 18 (1992): fn.14, 782.

47. The consequences of this tension for his formulation of hybridity will be more
fully examined next chapter.

48. We may note that this is not a new theoretical problem, but forms the
motivating problematic of Kant's critical philosophy. Without claiming we must
accept the whole of Kant's intellectual apparatus, I would, nonetheless, like to
note that it is unfortunate that Said does not reflect on the value of Kant's
exercise, as this might have brought into relief the problems I will now attempt
explain.

49. We could put it like this: orient R Orientalism : Orientalism R <u>Orientalism</u>.

50. Bhabha is careful to foreground the psychoanalytic qualities of these classes
of Orientalism; something Said may accept, but does not make explicit.

51. We can infer from the previous quotation that the question of address is
important. In a sense, colonialism, and the representations inherent in it, always
address an (imagined) exterior. It always calls to the colonized, always demands
recognition of mastery. Even derision is a request of sorts. It is not a neutral,
disinterested gesture, but always, as Bhabha indicates, carries with it a measure
of anxiety. It wants a subordinate, but, just as the recognition of the Hegelian

Slave means nothing to the Master, it also wants the subordinate to be the same, an equal, for it is the recognition from another Master that it really covets. This theme will be developed in the next chapter.

52. This is distinct from surveillance in Foucault, where the internalization of the gaze operates in the opposite direction.

53. In Lacan, metaphor and metonymy are taken from Jakobson and held beside Freud's 'condensation' and 'displacement'. This is found throughout Lacan's work, as we may note by reference to The Four Fundamental Concepts Of Psycho-Analysis, especially chapter 19; to Écrits, particularly "The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious;" but it appears to be developed first in "Metaphor and Metonymy (I): 'His Sheaf was neither miserly nor spiteful'," and "Metaphor and Metonymy (II): Signifying articulation and transference of the signified," in The Seminars of Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses 1955-1956 Jacques-Alain Miller ed., Russell Grigg trans. (New York: Norton, 1993) 214-221 and 222-230.

54. Both the colonizer and the colonized, where they are gendered at all, are consistently gendered male by Bhabha. For further commentary on Bhabha's unrealized promises to attend to gender, see Moore-Gilbert, op. cit. pp.149-150.

55. This line of critique will be re-examined in the next chapter as it pertains to Bhabha's use of hybridity.

56. That this does, in fact, diverge from Hegel, as the quotation claims, is not obvious. Hegel does not present the outcome of the master/slave opposition as a "passage from trauma to transcendence," but, rather, the development of the Unhappy Consciousness; a consciousness, whether manifest as stoicism or skepticism, from which ambivalence is by no means absent. Cf. G. W. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit A. V. Miller trans., (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977) 111-138.

57. Michel Foucault, "What is an Author?" Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected essays and interviews by Michel Foucault Donald F. Bouchard, ed. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, trans. (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977).

58. This is clear throughout her work, but she explains her relationship to Derridean deconstruction most self-consciously in "Revolutions That As yet Have No Model: Derrida's 'Limited Inc.'," in SR, 75-107. She explores the tensions and enabling compatibilities of her readings of Marx and Derrida in "Limits and Openings of Marx in Derrida," IOW, 97-121.

59. In fact, Spivak criticizes it elsewhere (PC, 72).

60. The second part of this passage captures in the most concise form the general project of postcolonial theory, while the first half, in fully acknowledging the critic's need to maintain the structures s/he criticizes from within, avoids Said's problems (with positing no outside, yet requiring one for critical reasons) and the trouble Bhabha has with, at once demonstrating (unwillingly) a need for and a denunciation of Hegel.

61. This crisis is introduced, in part, by showing those moments during which the subaltern and subaltern history became marginal or excluded. This revelation, however, is striking in its similarities to the work of Said and Bhabha.

62. In an unexpected twist, the Japanese example might indicate that the best defense against Westernization is modernization. If, however, we take Japan theory

seriously, we must accept that it is as an exception that Confucian-influenced societies have modernized. This promises little for societies that do not share this heritage.

There may yet be a case to be made that it is not the "rest" of the world that needs to do the work of resisting the West, but that it must occur within the West itself. One suspects, however, that Said's description of latent Orientalism as intrinsically conservative, bent on self-preservation, could be applied to most streams of thought, and must be kept in mind during the postcolonial appropriation of contemporary French thought. (Spivak seems to keep this in mind most explicitly in "Can The Subaltern Speak?" with respect to Foucault and Deleuze, but increasingly endorses Foucault from Outside in the Teaching Machine on. Said becomes more distant from and ambivalent about Foucault in Culture and Imperialism, though he increasingly relies upon Williams there. Bhabha, finally, seems ambivalent about Foucault and Derrida, but fully to subscribe to Lacan.) It is in this light that the work of Bhabha, Said, and Spivak has become important, and within this context that the following chapter questions whether such a project is adequate to the dangers of globalization.

Chapter III:

Hybridity and Strategic Essentialism

What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors,
metonyms, and anthropomorphisms - in short, a sum of human
relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and
embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after
long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to people:
truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that
this is what they are....in moral terms: the obligation to
lie according to fixed convention... (Nietzsche, "On Truth
and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense")

1 Essentialism, Antiessentialism and First Principles

It has come to seem unexceptional good sense to disregard
arguments that entertain the possibility of essences. This
being the case, it is an effective dismissive to label an
argument essentialist, and leave the criticism at that, all
its merits having become irredeemably tainted. Such a move
is most prominent, perhaps, in feminist debates,[63] but has
become increasingly significant to colonial discourse
analysis. It is significant, however, that while anti-
essentialism may have become common sense, it is still
incessantly discussed. In The History of Sexuality[64]
Foucault explains that, rather than a muting of sexuality
during the Victorian era, which is often taken as the
picture of sexual repression, there was a proliferation of
discussion about sex and sexuality. He presents it as an
obsession of sorts, indicating that this period cannot be
simply passed over as sexually repressed. Similarly,
despite an apparent consensus about the scurrilousness of
essentialism, the continuing ferment over its status -
political, epistemological, or what have you - should compel
us to investigate the deployment of "hybridity" on the one
hand and "essentialism" on the other as, rather than
transparent terms, types of trump cards played to particular
ends in anti-essentialist positions. That these are
strategic ends is of itself unremarkable, but we should be

surprised at the uncritical use of these terms, especially of hybridity and its derivatives. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the special[65] applications within postcolonial discourse of "hybridity" and by association essentialism, and to illuminate some of the problems that arise from these uses.

2 Validity Criteria and First Principles

Ien Ang and Jon Stratton recently debated with Kuan-Hsing Chen[66] about the possibilities for and desirability of a transnational cultural studies. Ang and Stratton introduce this debate by discussing the future status of Australia, and, ultimately, whether or not it should become Asian. The significant issue here is the perception of ethnicity as falling within the choice function. It follows more or less this line of reasoning: (a) We have considered ourselves European descendants; (b) we increasingly interact with Asians; (c) we wish to foster closer ties and a stronger cultural identification with Asia; (d) being geographically located in Asia, having both this interaction with and interest in Asia, *and* having criticized the constructedness of the nation-state, we choose to Asianize ourselves; (e) we defend this choice as hybrids who have unique insight into both the European heritage of our ancestors and our current Asian situation.

There is the assumption here that cultural alliance/ identity is simply a matter of choice, but the grounds upon which one makes this choice are left unexamined. Hegel[67] may appear helpful to such a position: if the self/Other dialectic is concretely exemplified by Europe/Asia, and if the dialectic resolves itself into the synthesis of self/Other, Master/slave, or Europe/Asia, why should the call for this synthesis by Ang and Stratton seem outlandish? There are two reasons, the first emerging from their own

work. They make it clear that Asia is a European construction. It is Europe's Other not in any primordial sense, but as a product of European discourse. (As previously noted, this may be Orientalism's most important insight.) As such, any Hegelian synthesis of Europe and Asia takes place not between referents, but on the level of discourse. By this logic, the only Asia to which Ang and Stratton can make a claim is the one in European discourse, returning them to precisely the locale they sought either to escape or to hybridize.

The second reason for this skepticism comes from a critique of the logic that appears to explain the synthesis. Kierkegaard argues that the subject of bourgeois virtue is an intelligent Hegelian: always seeking the middle path, (or, the synthesis). Kierkegaard claims that this synthesis must destroy the essence of the very institutions that contain human relationships. (For example, the resolution of the parent/child dialectic abolishes the family). On the one hand, this forces constant compromise that comes at the cost of one's humanity. But more to the point, Kierkegaard asks, does one not *have* to choose? Hegel would mediate conflict - between religion and reason, or looking out for oneself versus looking out for others -but Kierkegaard argues that ultimately Hegel only offers a comfortable deferral of agonizing decisions (Vol. 1, 174).

It is extremely difficult to quote Kierkegaard as he seldom speaks in his own voice, as is the case here in Either/Or. We can, however, derive the importance of these volumes by way of the dilemma they create for the reader. Alasdair MacIntyre explains,

> Kierkegaard's professed intention in designing the pseudonymous form of *Enten-Eller* was to present the reader with an ultimate choice, himself not able to commend one alternative rather than another because never appearing as himself. 'A' commends the aesthetic way of life; 'B'

> commends the ethical way of life....The choice between the ethical and the aesthetic is not the choice between good and evil, it is the choice whether or not to choose in terms of good and evil....
>
> Suppose that someone confronts the choice between them having as yet embraced neither. He can be offered no *reason* for preferring one to the other....The man who has not yet chosen has still to choose whether to treat [the reasons provided] as having force. He still has to choose his first principles, and just because they are *first* principles, prior to any others in the chain of reasoning, no more ultimate reasons can be adduced to support them.[68]

It is this dilemma of choosing first principles that I wish to take from Either/Or, and to apply, later, to the problems arising from the work of Said, Bhabha and Spivak. The crucial lesson here is that the choice is made not based upon criteria, *but at the moment of selecting criteria.* This is what Ang and Stratton miss: recognizing that the criteria they use to decide to Asianize is not neutral, but immediately situates them, before they recognize having made the decision. They choose first principles that commit them to certain *types* of choices and not others, but another set of first principles would be as compelling, once adopted, providing as they would their own validity criteria. This is also the source of anxiety: there are no *a priori* criteria with which to make the decision, no meta position to which they may resort. The criteria for self-identifying as hybrid are not pre-given, but are part of that identification. Considering, again, that the Asia in question is of European making, the criteria for hybridization are to be found there as well. Once again, Ang and Stratton direct themselves away from the synthesis they pursue and back to the (essential) identity from which they wish to depart.

This lengthy explanation is, I believe, a necessary preamble to the investigation of Bhabha, Said and Spivak. It is tempting to group them into a common arena, and to

treat their uses of hybridity as interchangeable. It would be a mistake, however, to imagine that they can be easily homogenized. Even a cursory study reveals distinct uses of "hybrid" and "essential." It is these uses I will study, but the principle above - that choosing the first order rules for hybridity is more problematic than it appears - should be kept in mind throughout this chapter.

2.1 Said: Hybridity as Fusion

Said is an interesting figure in this light for his almost off-hand use of the concept of hybridity. As we shall see, he is the least reflective of the three in his use of hybridity, though it is a persistent trope.[69] His first use of the term, in colonial discourse analysis at least, is as follows:

> I set out to examine not only scholarly works but also works of literature, political tracts, journalistic texts, travel books, religious and philological studies. In other words, my hybrid perspective is broadly historical and "anthropological," given that I believe all texts to be worldly and circumstantial in (of course) ways that vary from genre to genre, and from historical period to historical period. (O, 23)

This is a curious use for two reasons. First, his argument throughout <u>Orientalism</u>, and in recent work, is that colonial discourse makes up a discursive field; the texts within it hang together according to the logic of latent Orientalism.[70] Differences of genre, period, and so forth, matter not at all. This is central to his thesis: all of these texts are of a certain discursive logic and field and, as such, cannot, be held separate from each other. This being the case, it is unclear why he takes the mixing of these works together to be a "hybrid perspective."

Further, that Said continues to think of texts (as well as critics) as worldly in "The Text, The World, The Critic" (*passim*) is intriguing because of its phenomenological ring. Compare:

> Phenomenology is the study of essences; and according
> to it, all problems amount to finding definitions of
> essences: the essence of perception, or the essence of
> consciousness, for example. But phenomenology is also
> a philosophy which put essences back into existence,
> and does not expect to arrive at an understanding of
> man and the world from any starting point other than
> that of their 'facticity'.[71]

Again, this echoes Said's conviction that texts are 'in the
world', as are critics. And yet, he maintains their
hybridity, their unrepresentability. He generates a
discourse of his own around texts that he takes to be at
once in the world, representable facts, and yet hybrid, both
unable to represent (e.g. the referent of "Orient"), and,
equally, unrepresentable. An extension of this quandary
emerges in Culture and Imperialism. Here he discusses the
contribution of canonical works to British and French
imperialism.[72] No longer is he exploring the discursive
field with respect to the place shared by journalism, travel
and religious writing, and so forth. Now he examines only
"high" literature. Are the texts or his perspective now
unified rather than hybrid? The quick answer is no.
Culture and imperialism are both dynamic, he claims, and the
connections between them doubly so. His interest, then, "is
not to separate but to connect....I am interested in this
for the main philosophical and methodological reason that
cultural forms are hybrid, mixed, impure, and the time has
come in cultural analysis to reconnect their analysis with
their actuality" (CI, 15).

But here we find a crucial element in his use of "hybrid":
the notion of purity. He defines hybridity as denaturation.
He continues:

> [P]aradoxically, we have never been as aware as we now are
> of how oddly hybrid historical and cultural experiences
> are.... Far from being unitary or monolithic or
> autonomous things, cultures actually assume more 'foreign'
> elements, alterities, differences, than they consciously
> exclude. Who in India or Algeria today can confidently

separate out the British or French component of the past from present actualities, and who in Britain or France can draw a clear circle around British London or French Paris that would exclude the impact of India and Algeria upon those two imperial cities? (CI, 15)

The question, then, could focus less on *hybridity* than on *change*. Said rightly recognizes an intersection and interchange of cultures here. Yet, he proposes discrete entities - India, Britain, Algeria, France - mixing with each other. There is mutual impact of these previously (conceptually) unhybridized bodies. They affect and, in the sense in which he writes, effect each other: they cease to be what they were and become something else. How do we account for this change? We require some notion an identity condition with which we can compare the end product. The question is whether that end product is qualitatively different from its initial identity condition or qualitatively the same, if modified. There are two conceptual problems to which I wish to draw attention here: first, as a theorist assuming some form of hybridity in every culture (and artefact), on what basis does Said explain pre-contact Britain and India as unhybridized, if only so that he can claim there was a change in each by its encounter with the other? Second, and related, there is a sense of mutual influence here. Has the influence been equal in each case? If not, as is likely, has either been changed so profoundly as to leave it irreconcilable to its previous identity condition? Probably. Has either changed so little as to remain recognizable? Though difficult to ascertain, this is conceivable. Said, however, neither provides nor recognizes a way of making these distinctions.
An analogy may help.

The Titanic is a sailing in the North Atlantic and has not yet hit the iceberg. Let's agree it has the identity condition of a ship. It hits the iceberg and they act upon

each other. The Titanic has changed, and sinks. Is it any
longer a ship? Arguably, yes. A sunken ship, but a ship.
Its identity condition, the argument goes, is not corrupted
even as its ability to remain afloat is. One could argue
the converse as well: it is no longer a ship once it sinks.

(In other words, the issue is whether sinking constitutes a
change of category or of class). Has the iceberg remained
an iceberg? Certainly. What we could not maintain is that
through this encounter the Titanic has become more iceberg-
like or the iceberg more ship-like. The Titanic may, then,
represent an ambiguous case, in which its status as ship is
unclear. The iceberg presents us with something changed by
the encounter (some snow and ice got knocked off), but not
in an essential way.

To return to Said's examples, that each of these peoples
or cities (India, London, Algeria, Paris) has changed is
not, as he seems to indicate, the same as saying they are
hybrid. Before we move on, it may be helpful to introduce a
conceptual alternative: incorporation.[73] Let us take the
case of Britain and India and work through another analogy:
language,[74] with the case of "hybrids" in language
represented by pidgins.

> If members of two or more cultures which do not use the
> same language come into regular contact with each other
> over a prolonged period, usually as the result of trade or
> colonization, it is probable that the resultant language
> contact will lead to the development of a **pidgin** language
> by means of which the members of the cultures can
> communicate with each other but which is not the native
> language of either speech community. A pidgin language is
> thus a lingua franca which has no native speakers, which
> is often influenced by languages spoken by people who
> travelled and colonized extensively, such as English,
> Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch, and by the languages of
> the people with whom they interacted repeatedly.[75]

Young expands on the definition of pidgins, adding that they
are "crudely, the vocabulary of one language superimposed on
the grammar of another" (CD, 5). In light of the preceding

discussion, this quality of pidgins may be revealing. What
it indicates is that the grammar of one language remains
intact. Or, if you prefer, the code does not change, there
is simply an expansion of vocabulary. When Spivak writes
about *Sati* to demonstrate the mutedness of the subaltern
woman, there is no hybridization of English with Hindi, or
of European traditions with Hindu traditions (CSS, *passim*).
We see, rather, *sati* included in a lexicon. The code under
which this lexicon operates maintains its integrity. This
point goes to the heart of the discussion around hybridity.

In the case of Britain (or France), did the contact with
India (or Algeria) produce lexical or grammatical changes in
London (or Paris)? Said considers only the second of these
to be possible. The omission of the former – that the
general cultural codes of London and Paris went through no
essential change, only cosmetic changes – is puzzling and
unexplained. If Said argues that the basic model of
representing the Orient – latent Orientalism – persisted and
persists as a sort of *langue* according to which operates the
parole of manifest Orientalism,[76] how can he argue that
there has been a fundamental change in London or Paris?
More succinctly, an essential change in London from contact
with India would entail a change in the British codes of
representation of India. Said does not allow for this, but
seems convinced that there has been a strong continuity in
this *langue* (CI, xx).[77] Though he seems right on both
counts – the persistence of latent Orientalism and evidence
of India and Algeria in London and Paris – he cannot explain
this by his model of hybridity. It could, however, be
accounted for by incorporation. The influence of India *is*
present in London, but as lexical rather than grammatical
change. A chunk of the Titanic's hull may be torn off and
rest on the iceberg, never altering the 'icebergness' of the
iceberg. Of course, the Titanic still sinks, indicating

only an unequal influence of the one on the other.

2.2 Bhabha: Hybridity as Fission

Homi Bhabha's use of the concept of hybridity is more
overt, more complex and more oriented to opposition than is
Said's. He also resolves, at least at a rhetorical level,
some of Said's troubles with the closed, European discourse
of colonial representation.[78] As noted last chapter, Bhabha
locates the disjunctures of colonial representation *within*
the discourse itself. This solves the problem Said
encounters when he wants to argue simultaneously for a
closed system of representation that persists over time, and
one that is inherently hybrid, requiring not only an outside
(Said is, unsurprisingly,[79] reticent to consider this), but
an openness to that outside such that hybridization can take
place. While his most extended consideration of hybridity
occurs in "Signs Taken For Wonders,"[80] he makes some
revealing claims elsewhere that deserve examination.

First, like Said, he places the Other within colonial
discourse, but explains that it is this inclusion of the
Other that creates, or divulges a discursive hybridity (as
fission):

> It is through the emptiness of ellipsis that the
> difference of colonial culture is articulated as a
> *hybridity* acknowledging that all cultural specificity is
> belated, *different unto itself....*Cultures come to be
> represented by virtue of the processes of iteration and
> translation through which their meanings are very
> vicariously addressed to - *through* - an Other. This
> erases any essentialist claims for the inherent
> authenticity or purity of cultures...It is in this hybrid
> gap, which produces no relief, that the colonial subject
> *takes place....*(LC, 59)[81]

The Other takes place within the fractures of the colonial
discourse. Or, the colonial discourse fractures itself
along the lines of the Other, producing the space wherein
the colonial subject occurs. That this fission "erases any

essentialist claims" is, however, dubious. It is entirely logical that one language (or, as in Foucault,[82] one *episteme*), may create two contradictory utterances. Language, in its essence, provides for this.

But we may grant that Bhabha's thrust goes deeper than this defense admits. One might, then, object that he just reworks Hegel: self and Other are simply two moments in the dialectic, not, therefore, a hybrid, differentiated culture, but a synthesis in process. At another point, however, he seems to address this very possibility, displacing the Hegelian dialectic with the Derridean supplement:

> [The] emphasis on the disjunctive present of utterance enables the historian to get away from defining subaltern consciousness as binary, as having positive or negative dimensions. It allows the articulation of subaltern agency to emerge as relocation and reinscription. In the seizure of the sign, as I've argued, there is neither the dialectical sublation nor the empty signifier: there is a contestation of the given symbols of authority that shift the terrains of antagonism. The synchronicity in the social ordering of symbols is challenged within its own terms, but the grounds of engagement have been displaced in a supplementary movement that exceeds those terms. (LC, 193)

In this address, he has shifted to the scene of the subaltern, rather than remaining solely in the divided identity of (colonial) discourse. Even if we accept his point, it is no longer clear if the Other is inside or outside the discourse; if disruption is internal (Other) or external (other). He places the subaltern in the discourse using the terms of the discourse itself to contest authority within it. If this is simply the position of the Other against which the self identifies, as in the previous citation, then the discourse *is* operating according to its rule; it is fulfilling its own prophecy, and, therefore, maintains a self that was to be divided in the first instance.[83] There is difference, then, in the discourse,

but discourse takes this as its rule.

Perhaps more significantly, at least at this stage, there are distinct identity conditions. There are the colonial self and the 'native.' This, too, shifts at a later stage.

In his account of the Indian Mutiny he describes the British failure to see the "sepoy-as/and-civil insurgent...[as] two sites to the subject in the same moment of historical agency" (LC, 208). There is an echo here of Achille Mbembe's "The Banality of Power and the Aesthetics of Vulgarity in the Postcolony."[84] In both, the subaltern enters the discourse of authority, (and plays by the rules - an issue to which we will return) even while the presence of the subaltern playing by these rules is unsettling and produces anxiety in the authority. Bakhtin may explain this as the presence of two social languages, or accents, within a single utterance.[85] This would, as Mbembe notes, be somewhat inadequate, and is what Bhabha already described as the split personality of colonial discourse. Mbembe criticizes Bakhtin for attributing certain practices only to the dominated or the dominant. Instead, he says, these practices can be, and are exercised by both. "The real inversion takes place when, in their desire for splendour, the masses join in madness and clothe themselves in the flashy rags of power so as to reproduce its epistemology" (29-30). It is significant that, although both Bhabha and Mbembe argue that this flexibility of discourse obscures clear lines of demarkation (for the dominant), they both clearly maintain for their own analysis the division of colonial/subaltern or powerful/dominated. Furthermore, and this will become clearer still, Bhabha is arguing, first, that it is the place of the Other as a pre-existing element *in* the dominant discourse[86] that matters, rather than the gravity of the 'native' discourse; but second, that it is the presence alone of the native (other) that is disruptive.

There is no agency accorded the native; in fact, to reiterate a point introduced in the previous chapter, it is without agency, and without awareness, that the native disrupts the colonial discourse.[87]

The discourse may produce an identity crisis for authority, but the discourse itself - and this is where Bhabha locates hybridity - continues to function, even if not to the particular ends that the authorities would prefer. Bhabha seems to mistake this subversion of authority's desire as subversion of the discourse. But it is precisely the maintenance of the discourse that allows this subversion. By Bhabha's own reasoning, the dissolution of the discourse would bring about the dissolution of the colonial subject, which exists in the "hybrid gap" of colonial discourse. All we really see here is that power is discursively contestable, and Bhabha starts to seem evasively Foucauldian.

We may call on Wittgenstein to reveal the significance of this. He explains that the important task is to distinguish what is essential from what is accidental to, for example, a grammar or a game.[88] Is the security of the colonialist's identity as authority essential or accidental to the discourse? Can different subject positions inhabit authority?[89] If so, the discourse remains intact, though colonial desire is unrealized; if not, Bhabha's *hybridized* discourse is elusive, as authority has remained intact. It certainly seems, in Mbembe at any rate, that the affects of authority are not predetermined.

Turning now to "Signs Taken For Wonders", Bhabha's prolonged discussion of hybridity, we see a more concerted effort to define and work through the implications of hybridity.

Hybridity is the sign of the productivity of colonial

power, its shifting forces and fixities; it is the name
for the strategic reversal of the process of domination
through disavowal (that is, the production of
discriminatory identities that secure the 'pure' and
original identity of authority). Hybridity is the
revaluation of the assumption of colonial identity through
the repetition of discriminatory identity effects. It
displays the necessary deformation and displacement of all
sites of discrimination and domination. It unsettles the
mimetic or narcissistic demands of colonial power but
reimplicates its identifications in strategies of
subversion that turn the gaze of the discriminated back
upon the eye of power....The ambivalent space where the
rite of power is enacted on the site of desire. (LC, 112)

Here, authority is not immobilized, but is "faced with the
hybridity of its objects, the *presence* of power is revealed
as something other than what its rules of recognition
assert" (LC, 112). It is a production of colonialism that
allows subversion; authority's need for recognition. But
again, this sounds very much like the Hegelian dilemma: the
master desires recognition, but to achieve this recognition
the master must enslave. The recognition of a slave,
however, means nothing to the master, as it is that of
another master that would have the effect of confer
subjecthood. The colonist wants the Other to be
simultaneously master and slave, and it is this impasse that
creates anxiety in the colonist.

Bhabha explains that it is this movement between symbol
and sign of the colonized that (auto-)induces the colonist's
vertigo. "Hybridity represents that ambivalent 'turn' of the
discriminated subject into the terrifying, exorbitant object
of paranoid classification - a disturbing questioning of the
images and presences of authority" (LC, 113). Again, we
find a disruptive (native) subject who is not active in
disruption, but is so only as a result of the latent
ambivalence of the colonial discourse. The native is
incidental. It is the internal dialogue of the colonizer
that brings about this crisis. Bhabha goes on to explain

this and retreat once more from Hegel, (and, as he rarely does, from Lacan, opting by the end for Derrida's doubling):

> Hybridity...is not a third term that resolves the tension between two cultures, or the two scenes of the book, in a dialectical play of 'recognition'. The displacement from symbol to sign creates a crisis for any concept of authority based on a system of recognition: colonial specularity, doubly inscribed, does not produce a mirror where the self apprehends itself; it is always the split screen of the self and its doubling, the hybrid. (LC, 113-114)

Bhabha presents this as, rather than the relativistic resolution of cultural difference, a problem internal to colonial representation "that reverses the effects of colonialist disavowal, so that other 'denied' knowledges enter upon the dominant discourse" estranging its rules of recognition (LC, 114).[90] This is surprising as so far he has tried to maintain that the crisis is internal and intrinsic to colonial discourse, leaving no room for agency except as colonist, even while that undoes the subject effect. He has entertained hybridity as fission, but suddenly develops an outside that is a fundamental source of the colonial predicament, (and with this leaves behind Derrida). He goes on to elaborate this with the example of Indians' reluctance to take the sacrament (as Christians) without evidence first of mass conversion. "When they make these intercultural, hybrid demands, the natives are both challenging the boundaries of discourse and subtly changing its term by setting up another specifically colonial space of the negotiations of cultural authority" (LC, 119).

Bhabha reads this in his way, but ultimately the Indians seek inclusion in English Christianity, the frame of the colonial.[91] They come to police themselves by the same moral (in Nietzsche's sense of the word) codes as the colonialist demands. What is the nature of such 'resistance'?[92]

Bhabha, I propose, produces his own dilemma by producing two notions of hybridity. The first, fission, offers no position of agency for the subaltern; the latter, fusion, agency only within the colonial milieu. This is not, I think, subversion by intrusion of 'denied knowledges' as much as it is incorporation. It functions less like the oppositional strategy Bhabha sets out to find than it does the final victory of colonialism in which, entering the imperial discourse, the 'natives' (if this term still applies) discipline themselves.

There are two further matters that must be taken up , one forming the end of this section, the other will appear in section 3 of this chapter. The first concerns a shift in Bhabha's focus starting in 1990 with his "Articulating the Archaic: Cultural difference and colonial nonsense," from colonial discourse to the discourse of modernity. Hybridity continues to play a central role through the rest of his work, but takes on some different theoretical dimensions, articulating with his newer conceptual innovations.

Second, and entirely relevant to this work, is the

argument that his position assumes as its base or starting

point that which it sets out to prove. This I will take up

in the final section of the chapter.

From 1990 on, there are several new concepts that Bhabha

promotes in his discussions of modernity, postmodernity and

identity formation in the present. Some of these are the

time-lag, the in-between, doubling, and the third space.

All of these, however, rely upon his foundational concept of

hybridity, and, I shall argue, suffer from this attachment.

To demonstrate this, I will turn first to the relation

Bhabha strikes between his understanding of the third space,

and his time-lag, then move on to his lengthy engagement

with Jameson over the third space.

> The time-lag opens up this negotiatory space between
> putting the question to the subject and the subject's
> repetition 'around' the neither/nor of the third locus.[93]
> This constitutes the return of the subject agent, as the
> interrogative agency in the catechrestic position. Such a
> disjunctive space of temporality is the locus of symbolic
> identification that structures the intersubjective realm -
> the realm of otherness and the social - where 'we identify
> ourselves with the other precisely at a point at which he
> is inimitable, at the point which eludes resemblance'. My
> contention, elaborated in my writings on postcolonial
> discourse in terms of mimicry, hybridity, sly civility, is
> that this liminal moment of identification - eluding
> resemblance - produces a subversive strategy of subaltern
> agency that negotiates its own authority through a process
> of iterative 'unpicking' and incommensurable, insurgent
> thinking. (LC, 184-85)

This provides the link between his two projects (colonial

discourse analysis and the postcolonial analysis of the

(post-)modern), but it has not been clear in his work on

colonial discourse that mimicry, hybridity, and sly civility

are expressions of subaltern *agency* (as I already covered:

the fission/fusion distinction), much less that it
"negotiates its own authority." We might recall in this
regard the example of baptism. Further, if it does write
its own checks - negotiate its own authority - while the
dominant authority or discourse is unable to, do we not
have, on the one hand, differing rules of discourse, which
is as contrary to Derrida as to Lacan, and on the other, the
question (if he claims this is the case for the subaltern),
in what sense is this status *subaltern*, that it can
negotiate its own authority?

With of this in mind, we may now turn to Bhabha's
rendering, which is as respectful as it is critical, of
Jameson's "Secondary elaborations," which forms the
conclusion of Postmodernism Or, The Cultural Logic of Late
Capitalism. He begins with the following passage:

> ...Charles Taylor sets temporal limits to the problem of
> personhood: 'the supposition that I could be two
> temporally succeeding selves is either an overdramatized
> image, or quite false. It runs against the structural
> features of a self as a being who exists in a space of
> concerns.' Such 'overdramatized' images are precisely my
> concern as I attempt to negotiate narratives where double-
> lives are led in the postcolonial world, with its journeys
> of migration and its dwellings of the diasporic. These
> subjects of study require the experience of anxiety to be
> incorporated into the analytic construction of the object
> of critical attention: narratives of the borderline
> conditions of cultures and disciplines. For anxiety is
> the affective address of 'a world [that] reveals itself as
> caught up in the space between frames; a doubled frame or
> one that is split,' as Samuel Weber describes the symbolic
> structure of psychic anxiety itself. (LC, 213-214)

Having established his purpose, he shifts his focus onto
the importance of psychoanalysis and its implications for
Jameson's analysis, particularly of a "new international
culture." Bhabha writes:

> Placed in the scenario of the unconscious, the 'present'
> is neither the mimetic sign of historical contemporaneity
> (the immediacy of experience), nor is it the visible
> terminus of the historical past (the teleology of

tradition). Jameson repeatedly attempts to turn
rhetorical and temporal disjunction into a poetics of
praxis. (LC, 215)

Jameson's perception of a new international culture produced
by the movement from modernity to postmodernity, emphasizes
the "transnational attenuation of 'local' space" (215).
Bhabha plays with both of these - Jameson's use of
psychoanalysis and his concern with the attenuation of the
local - by piecing together sections of Jameson's text to
reveal "the anxiety of enjoining the global and the local;
the dilemma of projecting an international space on the
trace of a decentred, fragmented subject" (215).
Disruption, both of the subject and of the local, and
anxiety: From this intersection, Bhabha sees a cultural
globality that "is figured in the *in-between* spaces of
double-frames: its historical originality marked by the a
cognitive obscurity; its decentred 'subject' signified in
the nervous temporality of the transitional, or the emergent
provisionality of the 'present'" (215). Why this globality
must be conjured in interstices - producing, of course,
hybridity - rather than from both frames of the "double-
frames" he evokes, is left to assertion, rather than
explication. Arjun Appadurai, in his discussions of
deterritorialization and global flows between 'scapes, makes
such an assertion seem unnecessary, and possibly mistaken.[94]
He explains this, for example, by recourse to the example
of diaspora who participate, often in a contestatory way, in
the nationalist debates in their nation-states of origin.
The deterritorialization that shapes their lived
experiences, and the mediation of these experiences through
various 'scapes,[95] he indicates, produces lives lived *in* the
different frames, rather than between them, in a way that
tends to make identities, especially fundamentalisms, more,
rather than less pronounced. He explains,

deterritorialization, whether of Hindus, Sikhs,
Palestinians, or Ukrainians, is now at the core of a
variety of global fundamentalisms, including Islamic and
Hindu fundamentalism. In the Hindu case, for example, it
is clear that the overseas movement of Indians has been
exploited by a variety of interests both within and
outside India to create a complicated network of finances
and religious identifications, by which the problem of
cultural reproduction for Hindus abroad has become tied to
the politics of Hindu fundamentalism at home. (38)

The point here is not to reiterate the nuances of
Appadurai's (subtle) analysis of globalization, but to use
to raise the question, why should we assume the necessity
of Bhabha's unitary analytic place or moment, that is, of
in-betweenness? There are no obvious epistemological
grounds for choosing this hybrid positionality/temporality
over bicodalism: functioning in more than one framework.
Appadurai's, shall we say, less speculative discussions of
diaspora appear better suited to analysis that is not
hybrid, as the ties to a national (as distinct from a
patriotic) identity are very clear for the participants,
even as they employ different frameworks of cognition and
identity in their different ideo- and ethno-scapes.

We must acknowledge, however, that Bhabha's target is
different from the one raised here. He finishes his thought
with:

The turning of the globe into a theoretical project splits
and doubles the analytic of discourse in which it is
embedded, as the developmental narrative of late
capitalism encounters its fragmented postmodern persona,
and the materialist identity of Marxism is uncannily
rearticulated in the psychic non-identities of
psychoanalysis. (LC, 216)

Or, in the context of postmodernism, Marxism requires the
complement of psychoanalyses to address globalization.
Having completed the ascent of Jameson's position -
reaching, perhaps, an analytic plateau - Bhabha returns to
the themes of in-betweenness, interstitial signification and

temporal disjuncture (hitherto called the "time-lag" of the sign). Within this context, he approaches his main concern: Jameson's rendering of the 'third space'. He explains that the "non-synchronous temporality of global and national cultures opens up a cultural space - a third space - where the negotiation of incommensurable differences creates a tension peculiar to borderline existences" (LC, 218). This movement back and forth between temporality and spatiality - the problematizing of space by the introduction of time - is meant to mend Jameson's error of overemphasis on spatiality.

This leads Bhabha to make an improbable claim for both hybridity and incommensurability:

> The problem is not of an ontological cast, where differences are effects of some more totalizing, transcendent identity to be found in the past or the future. Hybrid hyphenations emphasize the incommensurable elements...as the basis of cultural identifications. What is at issue is the performative nature of differential identities: the regulation and negotiation of those spaces that are continually, *contingently*, 'opening out', remaking the boundaries, exposing the limits of any claim to a singular or autonomous sign of difference - be it class, gender or race. (LC, 219)

On the basis of this claim, Bhabha points out that, in contrast to his own analysis of interstices, Jameson thinks in terms of cultural distances, in accordance with which he maintains an orientation to a "subject-centred perceptual apparatus" (LC, 219). The subject in question is, neither Bhabha, nor Jameson is surprised to find, the class-subject.

At last Bhabha finds Jameson's psychoanalysis to be in the service of variations on the theme of Marxist base/ superstructure analysis. This model, Bhabha argues, effectively eliminates the "innovative energy" of the third space (LC, 220). For, Jameson's privileging of the expansion of capital and commodification as the preeminent quality of globalization necessarily marginalizes the counteremphasis that Bhabha places on culture and

representation, in all *their* hybridity and indeterminacy.[96]

Although such criticisms of Jameson's approach are warranted, this need not lead us to Bhabha's model, for it is, in its disavowal of economic analysis (Marxist/ materialist, or otherwise), equally unipolar. He places representation and culture at the foundation of his analysis of globalization - read through signification to be sure, but especially through the semiotics of Lacan - which subtly depends for its coherence on an originary (colonial) centre.

This centre of signification; of the ensuing ambivalence of representation; of anxiety; of the iteration and disruption of the sign; of the in-between/time-lag/interstitial/hybrid/ incommensurable; is always colonial Britain. Whether the critique is of Fanon (in a dubious superimposition of British colonial discourse concerning India onto the specific case of Fanon's writing from French-colonized Algeria, as if these cases were perfect synonyms), or Jameson, who is held-up with Conrad's <u>Heart of Darkness</u>,[97] the centre remains the same, however implicitly. Whatever Bhabha's own ambivalence about the status of subaltern agency, that of the British is always present, when it is conflicted, confused, struggling for authority or seeking recognition. (Again, the analysis we find in Appadurai is more flexible and nuanced, and more clearly organized around the contemporary phenomena emergent from globalization.)

Some evidence of this lies in Bhabha's situating the third term as explicitly *not* a dialectical resolution, compared to Jameson's inability to escape binarism. (Please recall Lacan on the "third locus"). The privileging of class for Jameson, Bhabha claims, is necessarily tied to dialecticism (of inside/outside). Further, as Jameson's optic for the perception of race, gender, and ethnicity - as the means by which these modes of interpellation gain their power - class analysis exhibits a certain narcissism. Said differently,

the position that all other difference is only a subset of class is narcissistic. Indeed, this is a convincing attack. He explains:

> If the specularity of class consciousness provides race and gender with its interpellative structure, then no form of collective social identity can be designated without its *prior* naming as a form of class identity. Class identity is autoreferential, surmounting other instances of social difference....Such a narcissism can articulate 'other' subjects of difference and forms of cultural alterity as either mimetically secondary - a paler shade of the authenticity and originality of class relations, now somehow out of place - or temporally anterior or untimely - archaic, anthropomorphic, compensatory realities rather than contemporary social communities. (LC, 222-23)

The question remains, does not such a critique cut both ways? That is, with respect to cultural representation, why should the categories of representation and signification have analytical priority?[98] Bhabha does not ask, much less answer, this questioning of his own mode of inquiry. It is difficult to overstate the implications of such an ellipsis.

It is the sort of omission that appears to haunt all of his work; the unacknowledged shadow that threatens to overwhelm his project entirely. That he does not recognize this threat leaves him, in effect, excessively vulnerable to every criticism he makes of other theorists. When he criticizes Mill, he does not defend his own work as free of the same liberalism; when he criticizes Jameson, he does not establish the grounds for privileging his own analytical categories over Jameson's, diminishing his arguments, effectively, to *ad hominem* positions that cannot withstand their own critical method. The threat implicit in this sort of epistemological disavowal, then, is the reduction of his corpus to the status of *ad hominem*.

There is, however, another dimension to Bhabha's hybridity that is equally troubling. Especially in "DissemiNation" (139-170) and "The Postcolonial and the Postmodern," (171-

197) Bhabha argues as though his politics and ethics are
indeterminate; come from no *specific* place (because hybrid),
with no teleology and infinite inclusiveness of margins. In
fact, he is highly located, and the same debilitations he
tries to ascribe to the colonizer (nationalism, hegemonic
discourse, and so on), must also extend to the postcolonial
or the colonized. If his point is that the identity crisis
of the nation, of culture, and so on - the crisis of
identity formation - is nothing to worry about, but, rather,
something to embrace, something emancipatory because it
undermines dominant discourses and enhances margins, what
are the marginal to do with this, who must experience the
same crises as they try to exercise force, to exert or
assert power? The crisis for them may , in fact, be far
graver.

In Ecuador the program of *el mestizaje*,[99] with a history
dating to at least World War II, has taken biology to
determine culture. (Young's Colonial Desire examines the
same: discourses of biology as discourses about the
cultural, as if hybridity in one finds its equivalent in the
other.) In Ecuador, the point of the *mestizaje* (both
officially, as encouraged by government programs, school
textbooks of Ecuadorean history, and suchlike, and
unofficially as it is played out by the population on a day
to day level, usually with some racist inflection), is to
encourage a policy of cultural mixing not in the service of
multiculturalism, but quite against it, to present
indigenous claims to traditions, identities and culture as
retrograde; an obstacle to national projects of development.
It is employed to bring those invoking indigenous
identities in line with the goals of the nation-state. So,
in Ecuador, the promotion of an insidious form of
politicized hybridity. Colonialist, for their part, were
also concerned about hybridization for exactly the same

reason (and it is this Young criticizes): that
miscegenation might also imply cultural hybridity. In this
instance, there is the same biological/cultural conflation
brought to hybridity, but this time as a racist fear of
hybridization. The strange thing, is that it is exactly
this hybridity, as concerns the hybrid intrusion of denied
knowledges, that Bhabha invokes as if it is valid *only* for
culture but invalid for biology (e.g. in the colonial
discourses of race).

I wish to make one, final point concerning Bhabha's
reading of subaltern (or, here, minority and supplementary)
discourses forcing hybridity in dominant discourses. He
writes:

> The minority does not simply confront the pedagogical, or
> powerful master-discourse with a contradictory or negating
> referent. It interrogates its object by initially
> withholding its objective. Insinuating itself into the
> terms of reference of the dominant discourse, the
> supplementary antagonizes the implicit power to
> generalize, to produce the sociological solidity. The
> questioning of the supplement is not a repetitive rhetoric
> of the 'end' of society but a meditation on the
> disposition of space and time from which the narrative of
> the nation must *begin*. The power of supplementarity is
> not the negation of the preconstituted social contractions
> of the past or present; its force lies... in the
> renegotiation of those times, terms and traditions through
> which we turn our uncertain, passing contemporaneity into
> the signs of history. (LC, 155)

This passage bears many of the same features as Mbembe's
consideration of similar themes. Mbembe, however, was
writing from a particular context, where Bhabha speaks of
and to a rather different one. It seems that liberalism has
proved itself quite capable of taking this beginning, and
incorporating all sorts of erstwhile dissenting voices under
the rubric of equality, rights, multiculturalism, but
primarily individualism, which is aimed at dissolving
exactly the kinds of unities that Bhabha attempts to

dissolve, but on both sides of the power divide: Bhabha, in short, plays right into their hands. There is infinite room for self-representation, hedged in the discourse of minority rights, but worked out in the syntax/economy of individual rights. Bhabha's failure to recognize this comes from his portrait of cultural change as occurring mysteriously, independently of any particular discourse, even though discourse is the terrain upon which it happens; through performatives that seem to be completely chaotic, utterly uninformed by the rules (sedimentation) of the place in which they are exercised. These rules, of course, also provide the rules of change. This is not to say there are never sea-changes (as Foucault ably demonstrates), but that Bhabha flattens out all change, such that any discursive irregularities whatsoever are read as sea change, where the evidence in the country of his practice (performance) seems to indicate quite the opposite trend: an ever-greater capacity to assimilate difference and turn it to its political advantage.

From this discouraging conclusion, we will now turn to Spivak who, writing from the same country about the same themes, has developed a rather different approach.

2.3 Spivak: Strategic Essentialism

Rather than the presumption of ubiquitous hybridity we saw with Said, or the more calculated, oppositional discursive hybridity proposed by Bhabha to exist between self and Other, Spivak moves in the opposite direction. Instead of an oppositional fission or fusion of culture, she proposes strategic essentialism. As Bhabha focuses in "Signs Taken For Wonders" on hybridity, Spivak's "In a Word"[100] focuses on strategic essentialism. Here she explains that "without a minimizable essence, an essence as *ce qui reste*, an essence as what remains, there is no exchange. Difference articulates these negotiable essences"

(OTM, 18).[101] She does not proclaim a straightforward relationship to this essentialism, but explains that "one is left with the useful yet semimournful position of the unavoidable usefulness of something that is dangerous. Those might be the lineaments of the deconstructive critique of essence" (OTM, 5). That deconstruction alerts us to the dangers of essentialism is not, she continues, reason to simply dismiss it as either nonexistent or useless. It should be criticized, rather, only when it is recognized as "the dangerousness of something one cannot use" (5). To emphasize the point, she reiterates:

> Why should deconstruction "dismantle" essentialism? Deconstruction considers that the subject always tends toward centering and looks at the mechanism of centering among randomness; it doesn't say there *is* something called the decentered subject....To think about the danger of what *is* useful, is not to think that the dangerous doesn't exist....Thus does deconstruction teach me about the impossibility of antiessentialism. It teaches me something about essentialisms being among the conditions of production of doing, knowing, being, but does not give me a clue to the real. (OTM, 10)

It is the enigmatic last sentence that should catch our attention here. Despite the "impossibility of antiessentialism," and the productiveness of essentialisms, there is no assertion of the latter's verity. Deconstruction leads to essentialisms but not the real. Essentialism, then, is something that can not be demonstrated, but can only be used. Before we engage any further with the critique of essentialism (strategic or otherwise) that this initiates, Spivak's position deserves additional elaboration.

Her last sentence was a forerunner to an almost inevitable invocation of Marx. The object (in this case essentialism) has a use value. In Spivak's reading of Marx, use value is no more determinate than is the particular use of the object

to which it corresponds. As such, there is no once-and-for-all use value to essentialism any more than there is a once-and-for-all use. Spivak explains the relationship:

> Marx calls the value-form "contentless and simple" (*inhaltlos und einfach*)....Value is contentless yet not pure form. Marx is talking about something that cannot appear but must be presupposed to grasp the mechanics of the production of the world. It's the possibility of the possibility of mediation as it were, which establishes exchange, its appropriation and extraction as surplus and so on. This way of understanding Marx's project would not underestimate the importance of class, but would not see it as a trafficking in ineluctable essences. (OTM, 12)[102]

Essentialism is like value: not a pure form, but something that must be presupposed if we are to understand the functioning of the world. Against those who would accuse her of a determinism, should such a suspicion survive the last citation, she parries

> The question of antiessentialism and essentialism is not a philosophical question as such. Is essentialism a code word for a feeling for the empirical, sometimes? Even as antiessentialism is sometimes no more than an emphasis on the social? *Why is the thought of the social free of essences?* (OTM, 7-8, italics added)

Essentialism as a feeling for the empirical does not, at least here, lay claim to *being* the empirical. She maintains the separation she does above, emphasizing that the social, constructed though it may be, cannot on this account be thought about without essence. If we are not yet convinced of this, she adds

> I must ask why essentialism is confused with the empirical. ...Instead, one says that the careful construction of an object of investigation in a field is essentialism. This has something like a relationship with confusing essentialism with the empirical. All we really want to claim is that there is no feminine essence; there's no essential class subject; the general subject of essence is not a good basis for investigation. This is rather different from being antiempirical. (OTM, 16)

This addition, however, inaugurates a problem. The consistency she maintains until "the careful construction of an object of investigation in a field is essentialism," holds the empirical and the essential apart, privileging the empirical as more real, less constructed, less provisional.

Then, these two categories now fixed (the empirical/real vs the essential/ necessary-but-not-real), she says that, though discursively determined (not real) there are types of essence that we can not consider. Is this part of a strategy? If so, we find strategic antiessentialism at work. If not, there is some confusion, because it is strategy around which she develops this entire discussion.

We should return to the opening of her piece to clarify this. "If one is considering strategy, one has to look at where the group - the person, the persons, or the movement - is situated when one makes claims for or against essentialism. A strategy suits a situation; a strategy is not a theory" (OTM, 4). Is essentialism, then, just a strategy that suits a situation? Are only certain uses of essentialism (i.e. not class or feminine essentialisms) permitted, and only from certain subject positions? On the basis of what can one make this judgement? The difficulty she wishes to address is "that strategies are taught as if they were theories," and essentialism, she instructs, may only be a strategy (4). Her focus on the strategic leaves it unclear in the service of what politics/ethic she writes.

In other words, that it is *strategic* essentialism means that it could as easily be strategic *anti*essentialism. In either case, it is not evident in its use that the choice hinges on ethical criteria. Furthermore, this allows a sort of ontological (rather than strategic) essentialism to enter 'through the back door': only *certain types* of essentialism are legitimate. Spivak relies on two categories, strategy and essentialism, for each of which there are various types,

some of which meet her validity criteria, some of which do not. She claims grounds to differentiate the valid from the invalid, though she does not explain what they might be.

This becomes all the more complicated when Spivak argues that one cannot start from identity. If it is not a starting point, if it is only provisional and after-the-fact, then how is one to decide if the position from which one strategically uses essentialism is legitimate?

> The position that only the subaltern can know the subaltern, only women can know women, and so on, cannot be held as a theoretical presupposition either, for it predicates the possibility of knowledge on identity. Whatever the political necessity for holding the position, and whatever the advisability of attempting to "identify" (with) the other as subject in order to know her, knowledge is made possible and is sustained by irreducible difference, not identity. What is known is always in excess of knowledge. Knowledge is never adequate to its object. The theoretical model of the ideal knower in the embattled position we are discussing is that of the person identical with her predicament. This is actually the figure of the impossibility and non-necessity of knowledge. Here the relationship between the practical - need for claiming subaltern identity - and the theoretical - no program of knowledge production can presuppose identity as origin - is, once again, of an "interruption" that persistently brings each term to crisis. (IOW, 253-254)

In the present context this is an especially tricky passage. Woman, subaltern, and class subject are here all taken to be identities rather than positions. Identities are not essences[103] but are political use values. Furthermore, knowledge presupposes "irreducible difference, not identity." One starts to understand that identity is something trans-subjective. "Woman" and "subaltern" are collective, not individuated, and, therefore, claiming to know one(self) as woman or subaltern would be bad faith. And yet, they are viable grounds for political organization. The question is, in a world of persistent, irreducible

difference, how does one recognize those with whom one can
identify as woman or subaltern? The vicissitudes of such
identification are illuminated in the following exchange
Spivak has with Rashmi Bhatanagar, Lola Chaterjee and
Rajeswari Sunder Rajan:

> Q There are several questions that arise out of the way
> you [Spivak] perceive yourself ('The post-colonial
> diasporic Indian who seeks to decolonize the mind'), and
> the way you constitute us (for convenience, 'native'
> intellectuals):
> ...What are the theories of explanations, the
> narratives of affiliation and disaffiliation that you
> bring to the politically contaminated and ambivalent
> function of the non-resident Indian (NRI) who comes
> back to India, however temporarily, upon the winds of
> progress?
> GCS In the first place, your description of how I
> constitute you does not seem quite correct. I thought I
> constituted you, equally with the diasporic Indian, as a
> post-colonial intellectual!...The space I occupy...is a
> position into which I have been written. I am not
> privileging it, but I do want to use it.
> RB & RS The sense in which we used the notion of
> contamination was not to suggest a degree of purity for
> ourselves. Perhaps the relationship of distance and
> proximity between you and us is that what we write and
> teach has political and other actual consequences for us
> that are in a sense different from the consequences, or
> lack of consequences, for you. (PC, 67-68)

Spivak offers us no way of recognizing who can identify with
whom. Despite this, there is clearly a set of criteria
implied by her exclamation "I thought I constituted you...as
a post-colonial intellectual!" Apparently there are both a
decision to use criteria and a disavowal of any grounds on
which to establish criteria. Spivak claims the political
exigency of both of these cases: the strategic justification
for using one or the other at different times, depending on
what suits her or the situation, but does not acknowledge
that there are criteria underlying this choice as well that,
as the last citation indicates, are not without either their
political or ethical ramifications.

In the end, Spivak (unintentionally, to be sure) argues for a liberal position: the creation of a space from which the subaltern (woman) can speak; the addition to the political of the subaltern individual's voice. The argument of "Can The Subaltern Speak?" is that the subaltern is not regarded as proprietor of her own voice, and that as such is not free. One can see that, compromised by a differend,[104] the last thing the subaltern woman needs is to be ascribed an (prescriptive) essence that may be appropriated by those who would use it to further silence her, or compel her to or from *sati*. Spivak's strategy, then, is to deny any essence beyond that *determined* by strategy. In the same moment, however, she has to deny antiessentialism, as without *ce qui reste*, there can be no collective organization, no politics beyond anarchic individualism. Without that instance of solidarity with the subaltern, Spivak's project founders, as it strives to return to the subaltern possession of her self, in a space from which she can proclaim self-ownership, and, therefore, rights to self-determination. That this is an essentially liberal position is explained by C.B. MacPherson's discussion of the foundation of liberal theory:

> The relation of ownership, having become for more and more men the critically important relation determining their actual freedom and actual prospect of realizing their full potentialities, was read back into the nature of the individual. *The individual, it was thought, is free inasmuch as he is proprietor of his person and capacities. The human essence is freedom from dependence on the wills of others,* and freedom is a function of possession.[105] (Emphasis added).

Where does this leave us with respect to Spivak's work? Like Bhabha and Said, the best she can offer is a position (though oppositional) within the dominant discourse she wishes to undermine. Also like Bhabha, her work resolves into a rather unclear position on essentialism and hybridity

(both ontologically and politically) that provides neither a clear ethical program nor any obvious source of agency for the subaltern. In her effort to avoid the pitfalls of humanist projects of emancipation, the appeal to a metanarrative from which one can strategize *for* something beyond strategy itself, she also obscures the role of essentialism as anything more than an incidental, contentless function to be mobilized to whatever end one wishes. The essences themselves, because 'de-ontologized', are readily manipulated or appropriated to any end, leaving one to wonder how she defends, on the basis of efficacy alone, her strategic choices. She denies all grounds for and meaning of such a defense; it is to the rule of strategy that everything becomes held, meaning that, if it is *strategic* to silence the subaltern (or exclude certain essentialisms claimed from certain positions), there is no higher court of appeal in which to contest this.

In other words, her call for a strategic essentialism is not especially at odds with either Bhabha or Said's calls for hybridity. It is, perhaps, more frank in acknowledging that there is a reference to something not always already hybridized - an intellectual hostage neither Bhabha nor Said will give up - but it is then such a circumscribed, qualified essentialism, so denuded of anything that looks like an essence, that it places her suddenly close to the other two: an argument for provisional essences rather than ubiquitous hybrids. We may find ourselves to be sympathetic to her resistance to reductive, prescriptive essentialism, which attaches restrictive, normative imperatives ("women *should* stay at home, because it is their nature,") to a confusion of signifieds and referents, or signification and ontology ("*women* should stay at home because it is their *nature*"). At the same time, we may also note that there is more to essentialism than this. The end of this section

will be taken up with a demonstration of the consequences of ignoring other aspects of essentialism, for example those descriptive qualities that allow us to distinguish changes of class from changes of category.

Having discussed the theory upon which Spivak relies when she practices strategic essentialism, we can now turn to an example to see how it functions. In "Feminism and Critical Theory" Spivak investigates the problem of Marxism in its exclusion of women's work in sexual reproduction from the analysis of economics.[106] Such an analysis could approach the problem from one of two directions. It would frame the problem as one of: (a) exclusion, which is to say that Marx's concepts are adequate (the Labour Theory of Value, socially necessary labour, value, use-value, exchange value, surplus, exploitation), but that Marx(ists) excluded the labour of sexual reproduction performed by women; or, (b) conceptual adequacy, *viz.* this is an economically *necessary* aspect of social reproduction for which Marx cannot or does not supply the necessary concepts.

If the case is (a), how does Spivak bring the concepts to bear on sexual reproduction? Who exploits the women in this production (and what is its mode? has it changed from feudalism to capitalism?): men in general, the children born, capital? Is the 'product' (the child) in the commodity circuits? Where? How does it enter? Is it a commodity itself? Is it future labour? If this is the case, why does the mother have a claim on its labour power, and, therefore, the value it may produce? If simply a commodity that the mother produces through labour, how is it exchanged, and for what? At what point in its life? What

is its shelf-life as a commodity? At what point does it become labour (i.e. a free individual selling labour power), rather than just a commodity?

If (b), sexual reproduction as an exclusively female productive activity that is economically necessary but neglected by Marxian theory, is this reproduction *essentially* female? Is it, perhaps, a strategic exclusion (showing the vicissitudes of privileging strategy)? Does this essentialize women as reproductive labour? Would this conceptual blindspot invalidate Marxian economics in its entirety? (It would, in fact, have to if it were necessary rather than supplemental). Does it mistake Marx's analysis of what is *economically* necessary as a minimal condition of social reproduction (compared to which there is either surplus production or no reproduction), for what is *biologically* necessary? Does it elide the possibility that Marx does provide a class of labour for sexual reproduction in unproductive labour, which makes it no less labour, but which distinguishes it from producing value for exchange?

There are some answers to these questions, though they raise, arguably, equally vexing problems and misreadings. Her self-avowed emphasis is on alienation, but there are analytical problems along the way that warrant address. First, she explains,

> One way of moving into Marx is in terms of use-value, exchange-value, and surplus-value. Marx's notion of use-value is that which pertains to a thing as it is directly

> consumed by an agent. Its exchange-value (*after the emergence of the money form*) does not relate to its direct fulfillment of a specific need, but is rather assessed in terms of what it can be exchanged for in either labor-power or money. In this process of abstracting through exchange, by *making the worker work longer than necesessary for subsistence wages* or by means of labor-saving machinery, they buyer of the laborer's work gets more (in exchange) than the worker needs for his subsistence while he makes the thing. This...is surplus-value. (IOW, 78-79, italics added.)

The first point to make here is one of minor clarification that takes on some explanatory value later. Simply, commodity exchange can take place without the arbiter of money. Exchange value is first analyzed by Marx in terms of the relation of one commodity to another.[107] The second point also seems minor at first, but the importance she places later on subsistence and reproduction indicate a misunderstanding of the relation Marx illustrates between reproduction (simple or expanded) and surplus value. Spivak makes a (common) mistake by taking surplus value to be measured against subsistence wages. While this may be an example of surplus extraction, it is not the necessary one.

Surplus value is, rather, the amount of labour the worker sells to the capitalist above and beyond that required to match the capitalist's remuneration of labour. So, if the labourer has a ten-hour workday, but produces the value of his/her wage in five hours, the additional five hours of work are surplus; the rate of exploitation is 1:1, or 100%.

There is no *necessary* relationship between the actual wage and a subsistence wage. Spivak is right, however, to point out that labour-saving machinery can increase the production of surplus value. If the necessary labour time (to reproduce the wage) drops from 5 hours to four, the rate of exploitation increases to 3:2 or 150%. All this tells us, however, is that the Detroit auto-worker may be more exploited than the Haitian sugar cane cutter, although the

wages of the latter are nearer subsistence wages. This becomes important in the next section:

> One could indefinitely allegorize the relationship of woman within this particular triad - use, exchange and surplus - by suggesting that **woman in the traditional social situation produces more than she is getting in terms of her subsistence, and therefore is a continual source of the production of surpluses,** *for* the man who owns her, or *by* the man for the capitalist who owns *his* labour. (IOW, 79, bold added.)

For the reason explained above, this analysis is mistaken, but there are some other corollaries to add. First, Spivak offers us nothing to indicate that, in fact, women are compensated only at subsistence levels (much less that all women are compensated equally, though I presume her awareness on this count). It is not clear, either, that male labour is paid only for his own subsistence, or at a level for the subsistence of a family. Furthermore, Spivak indicates the woman in this situation is remunerated, in turn, by the (male) worker. If he is paid only subsistence wages, with what is he paying her? But then, let us accept that labour is paid above subsistence wages. Even if he (sic) pays her in kind, there is no indication that this exchange occurs only at the level of her subsistence. The relationship to ownership of surplus is equally unclear. (Spivak is quick to point out, however, that the domestic scene is not one of capitalist exchange, and she wisely does not put a name to it. One suspects that such a homogenizing gloss would only damage her argument.)

So, if exchange in kind can constitute an exchange of value (as a product is embodied labour), then domestic work, though not necessarily remunerated in the money form, can, nonetheless, be remunerated. Whether it is or not is, now, a different question than when Spivak raised it in terms of monetary remuneration (which is famously lacking), though this does not imply that full remuneration takes place.[108]

Spivak, however, entertains this line of thought only briefly before advancing what she finds is a more compelling invocation (and excavation) of Marx: alienation. In this tack we find both the power of her argument and its relationship to Marx:

> Within the capitalist system, the labor process externalizes itself and the worker as commodities. Upon this idea of the fracturing of the human being's relationship to himself and his work as commodities lies the ethical charge of Marx's argument.
>   I would argue that, in terms of the physical, emotional, legal, custodial, and sentimental situation of the woman's product, the child, this picture of the human relationship to production, labor, and property is incomplete. *The possession of a tangible place of production in the womb situates the woman as an agent in any theory of production. Marx's dialectics of externalization-alienation followed by fetish formation is inadequate because one fundamental human relationship to a product and labor is not taken into account.* (IOW, 79, italics added.)

It is surprising, after such a claim, that her strategy is not to simply add biological reproduction to Marxian theory. It is not, that is to say, a rewriting of alienation-externalization[109] that she seeks, but rather to take reproduction to be something that we can already "interpret... within a Marxian problematic" (IOW, 79). Her move is to demonstrate that the child, a product of the woman, is always taken as the property of the father.[110] That women tend to win custody battles in the West, Spivak dismisses as simply a case-by-case "sentimental questioning of man's right" (IOW, 80). Her conclusion is that

> to an extent, deconstruction as the questioning of essential definitions would operate if one were to see that in Marx there is a moment of major transgression where rules for humanity and criticism of societies are based on inadequate evidence. Marx's texts, including *Capital*, presuppose an ethical theory: alienation of labour must be undone because it undermines the agency of the subject in his work and his property. I would like to suggest that if the nature and history of alienation, labor, and the production of property are reexamined in

terms of women's work and childbirth, it can lead us to a reading of Marx beyond Marx. (IOW, 80)

And yet, it is more a concern with *exclusionary* property rights that we find in Marx. (Thus, "alienation.") Further, does Spivak risk essentializing women as childbearers? Women in general, or only those who give birth? Only those who give birth in wedlock (i.e. the *property* relationship)? The "fundamental human relationship," then, is that of motherhood in wedlock. And yet Spivak does go on to say that the child, the woman's product, is not a commodity. She notes this on her way to another criticism:

> [I]f sexual reproduction is seen as the production of a product by an irreducibly determinate means (conjunction of semination-ovulation), in an irreducibly determinate mode (heterogeneous combination of domestic and politico-civil economy), entailing a minimal variation in social relations, then two original Marxist categories would be put into question:[111] use-value as the measure of communist production and absolute surplus-value as the motor of primitive (capitalist) accumulation. For the first: the child, although not a commodity, is also not produced for immediate and adequate consumption or direct exchange. For the second: the premise that the difference between subsistence-wage and labor power's potential of production is the origin of original accumulation can only be advanced if reproduction is seen as identical with subsistence. (IOW, 83)

What we find here is that Spivak confuses ideas of social reproduction with those of surplus extraction. She equates simple reproduction with subsistence wages and expanded reproduction with surplus extraction. As indicated earlier, surplus extraction bears no necessary relationship to subsistence wages, just as expanded reproduction does not necessarily suggest capitalist accumulation (though it is a prerequisite for capitalist accumulation). Spivak seems reticent to consider the possibility that this particular form of labor (biological reproduction) does not fall into Marx's economics because it is not economically significant

labour. Equally, he does not consider the reproduction of plants and animals, though there is a sort of labour there that is a necessary condition for human social reproduction.

Spivak really only considers the possibility that there is a flaw in Marx's argument, rather than trying to account for the way in which this form of production is not, strictly speaking, economic. She does, however, point to this. The child is *not* a commodity, not a consumable product. It is, perhaps, involved in a cycle of production that is not an economic cycle. It may, in fact, be economically unproductive labour that is involved in sexual reproduction (as distinct from economic reproduction, which need not be thought of in terms of human generations). In other words, the child is not a use-value, much less an exchange value. Marx is clear about this: labour that produces no use-value, that produces something with no economic value, is *economically* wasted labour and valueless. Furthermore, he distinguishes that labour undertaken by nature (involved, we could say, in natural reproduction), that has no economic value, from the value-producing labour of humans.[112] He says: "nothing can have value without being an object of utility. If the thing is useless, so is the labour contained in it; the labour does not count as labour, and therefore creates no value" (48).[113]

Assuming this line of criticism holds, and her revision of Marx is misplaced, with what are we left? First, an assertion that woman, for Spivak, is defined only as the opposite of man, the dominant, normalized term (IOW, 77). Second, an absolute identification of women with wombs (the sites of production, with women as the alienated labourers) and the role of the agents of biological reproduction. That women were invoked in such a way in order to critique Marx, and to have that critique hedged in language that proclaims the critique is performed on behalf of women (as sites of

reproductive labour), seem more and more to operate at cross-purposes. The problem, then, is that the privileging of strategy over epistemology always holds within it the danger of its inversion to opposite purposes. The initial plan - promote a cause of women by demonstrating how their hitherto exclusion from Marxian analysis debilitates that analysis as much as it denigrates women - drifts very near the rocks that destroy it - the critique of Marx proves inadequate, though the essentializing of women does not suffer through the counter-debate - winding up, ultimately, achieving exactly the opposite of its putative goal. There is no reason inherent to the positions on either side to undo the essentialist work, but that is all that remains of Spivak's criticism when the defense of Marx is successful.

3 Summary

The summary of this chapter has to perform double duty. So far I have claimed both that it is dangerous to homogenize Bhabha, Said and Spivak in any simple way, but I have also argued that their conceptualizations of hybridity and strategic essentialism are only superficially different, and bear some striking similarities to each other. This summary, beyond 'wrapping-up' the chapter, will explain some of the deep epistemological differences between Bhabha and Said, and Spivak, as well as to show how some concepts (like Bhabha's language metaphor) that appear congenial to my position in fact diverge from it.

A profound problem with the concept of hybridity is that it relies on itself for its own validation. In the cases of both Bhabha and Said, there is the assertion of the hybrid that elides either the terms involved, in that the identity conditions of the contributing factors are not identified, or the product, the final term of the hybrid. That is, in each case they set out to prove the hybrid products of colonialism, but wind up having to assume it in advance in

order to make their arguments. Hybridity is read back into
an *a priori* position to confer on hybridity an *a posteriori*
status. Said fails to provide two stable referents that
contribute to a third that is a clearly distinct mixture of
the two, such that it is impossible to break it into its
component parts without destroying it. Bhabha detects a
splitting of the colonial subject that was always already
there, but somehow becomes exhibited only in colonial
interaction. He starts with hybridity as both the cause *and*
effect of ambivalence; it both precedes (and instigates) the
discursive split identity and emerges from it. It becomes
its own evidence, initiating *and* symbolizing (*a posteriori*)
paranoia:

> The voice of command is interrupted by questions that
> arise from these heterogeneous sites and circuits of power
> which, though momentarily 'fixed' in the authoritative
> alignment of subjects, must continually be re-presented in
> the production of terror or fear. The paranoid threat
> from the hybrid is finally uncontainable because it breaks
> down the symmetry and duality of self/other,
> inside/outside. In the productivity of power, the
> boundaries of authority - its reality effects - are always
> besieged by 'the other scene' of fixations and phantoms.
> (LC, 116)

One could say, then, that like empiricism, they must take
as a presumption that which they wish to prove.
(Empiricism, for example, must presume certain concepts like
space, time and causality, which we cannot derive *a*
posteriori from experience without supposing them in
advance.) Because Spivak does not attach herself to tropes
such as hybridity, at least not in this way, she
distinguishes herself from Bhabha and Said on this count.
She is, increasingly as time passes, more scrupulous in her
uses of deconstruction, and in the ways in which she
incorporates Marx (often with difficulty, as we have seen),
into it. The result is that, whatever problems her work
might entail, it avoids this one. This, however, has not

come without its cost. In her 1992 "Acting Bits/Identity
Talk," she recounts her experience of a number of converging
incidents. In 1991 she was grappling with the task of
"unlearning learning in order to ask: What is it to learn?"
(776). Implying not only that there is more than one thing
to learn, but more than one *way*, and, therefore, multiple
ways of understanding, she reflected on this problem while
in the disaster zones of Kutubdia and Maheshkash_li in the
Bay of Bengal, recently hit by a cyclone. Faced with the
irreconcilable mentalities of relief workers from American
agencies, and of the Bangladeshis themselves, she calls on
Marx to order her thoughts:

> The way I found myself putting the case [of the
> Bangladeshis] was in terms of the young Marx's perception
> of species-life rather than species-being, where human
> life and death is no more than Nature breathing in and
> out....And in the understanding of history as sequence,
> knowing how to help presumed knowing what should be
> wanted, easier within a mere scientific vision of the
> formation of class, but not possible on this coastline.
> Here the cultural rather than the class subject was
> repeatedly being instituted, or instituting itself in an
> eco-logy, a logic of a greater household or *oikos*, where
> the subject of the logic is not necessarily "worlded" as
> human in the common individualist sense. For my
> interlocutor, Mazhar, this was *proof* that, after the
> critique of consciousness as appropriation, Marx had not
> theorized property adequately, and the *task* of alternative
> strategies of development that respected subaltern
> agencies of the institution of culture is to learn to
> rethink property. I had no such confidence; I was stalled
> at "what is it to learn"... (1992, 777-78)

A number of things emerge here: the inadequacy of one
system of understanding to make sense of another; the need
to rethink "development" (which may evoke inappropriate
terminology for the task at hand) with respect to these
different systems, or syntaxes; and the dilemma, for Spivak
herself, of trying to make progress in this situation with a
framework she *knows* to be the wrong one. She continues:

What was it to learn to help, here? I could respect the

> relief workers' bemused on-the-spot decision that this
> other kind of resistance to rehabilitation must not be
> allowed to develop into an aporia. The work of rehab must
> continue. But with the vestiges of intellectual
> sophistication I possessed, I saw through with distaste
> the long-distance theorist's dismissal of the aporia as
> anachrony or his embracing of it as the saving grace of a-
> chrony. I was adrift. I knew the ways of cutting the
> drift or *dérive*, of course. Silence the subaltern by
> talking too much. (1992, 778-79).

Clearly, Spivak is paying a certain price that Bhabha and Said are not, but it is the price of avoiding their errors, and it comes in the form I pointed to much earlier with Kierkegaard: the anguish of knowing that your first principles are not shared by another, while at once having the *need* to share first-order rules, and yet no immediate, non-violent means of achieving this. (That is, coercion, imposition, and the like are unacceptable). Bhabha and Said seem able to address such a dilemma only with the pallid suggestion of hybridity.

A second substantial problem comes from a line of thought that reveals that taking cultural hybridity to be part of its own definition or validation (as both *a priori* and *a posteriori*), implies that there is a set of validity criteria external to it. Bhabha and Said refuse to provide such criteria, and must even deny its existence, as they do not accept the contingency of their positions, but only that of the liberal and colonial positions. Kant[114] makes the point that the rule, "we ought to do God's bidding" presumes our possession of moral criteria beyond God's commandments.

How could we know we ought always and everywhere to do God's will? We would require some other standard by reference to which we could evaluate the justness of our obedience to God. What are these criteria, and how would they fit into theological governance of behaviour? They would have to be things that lay outside of theology. The

contradiction is that the effort to *privilege* God ends by subordinating His authority to a metric that defines a province beyond Him.

By comparison, we might ask what are the laws governing the production of hybridity? Said and Bhabha want to proclaim the outcome (analogously to "one ought to follow the will of God,") but are equally unable to produce the principle involved in such a discrimination. The definition of such a principle would undermine their promotion of hybridity as the dominant experience of colonialism, power, representation, etc. This is not to offer unqualified support for Kant's categorical imperative, but is to say that, whatever its flaws, it is at least more rigorously reasoned than are Said and Bhabha's formulations of hybridity. Spivak is *aware* of such a danger, though she primarily identifies its presence. In the context of literary criticism, she says:

> [T]he narrator who tells us about the impossibility of truth-in-fiction - the classic privilege of metaphor - is a metaphor as well.
> I should choose a simpler course. I should acknowledge this global dismissal of any narrative speculation about the nature of truth and then dismiss it in turn, since it might unwittingly suggest that there is somewhere a way of speaking about truth in "truthful" language, that a speaker can somewhere get rid of the structural unconscious and speak without role playing. (IOW, p.88-89)

Where Kant seems to look for a way out of such a bind, Spivak presents us with an aporia that should be addressed by infinite regress: dismissal upon dismissal. A strategy that may be metaphorically symbolized best by a shrug. Although dissatisfying, at least this is a dissatisfying strategy formed in awareness of the dilemma it faces. The commitment to cultural hybridity seems necessarily to deny this dilemma in the first place, just as "We should do God's will" denies the dilemma of criteria that lies at the heart

of its claim.

There are a couple of strands of thought that remain for me to address, particularly in Bhabha's work. First is the language metaphor. I want only to make it clear that what he means by this, and the uses to which he puts it, differ from my own meanings and uses. To start, he says:

> Cultural difference does not simply represent the contention between oppositional contents or antagonistic traditions of cultural value. Cultural difference introduces into the process of cultural judgement and interpretation that sudden shock of the successive, non-synchronic time of signification, or the interruption of the supplementary question....The very possibility of cultural contestation, the ability to shift the ground of knowledges, or to engage in the 'war of position', marks the establishment of new forms of meaning, and strategies of identification. Designations of cultural difference interpellate forms of identity which, because of their continual implication in other symbolic systems, are always 'incomplete' or open to cultural translation. (LC, 162-63)

Basically, he seems to say there is no once-and-for-all reading of different cultures, and that the interpretation of another culture brings one back to one's own with new eyes. A valuable point, no doubt. But there are other claims that we may wish to contest concerning difference in language. To reiterate a point made earlier, does not every culture, language, *episteme*, or discursive field provide, by definition, for disagreement, dissention, and contradictory claims, actions and concepts? More important, however, the "designation of cultural difference" that "interpellate[s] forms of identity which, because of their continual implication in other symbolic systems, are always 'incomplete' or open to cultural translation," contains within it the terms on which cultural difference is understood *to be* difference, and, indeed, what the dimensions of difference can be. (One thinks, for example, of the Serbs and Croats who, prior to the end of communist

rule, lived as neigbours.)[115] But further, the way in which difference interpellates identity is not an arbitrary function, a *Deus ex machina*, any more than cultural translation would be. In short, the fissiparousness of identity does not suggest that, by necessity, the code within which different identity positions become formulated is 'incomplete', just as the capacity of syntax to generate an infinite number of sentences, in agreement or conflict with each other, does not allow us to proclaim that it is incomplete. To carry this point one important step further, that a syntax can produce an infinity of sentences is different from saying that any sentence will do for any syntax. There is nonsense that can be identified as a deviation from grammar, just as there is behaviour that transgresses cultural codes, forming the equivalent of nonsense: irrationality, lunacy, or what have you. So, in all likelihood, "the ability to shift the ground of knowledges, or to engage in the 'war of position'," means exactly the opposite of what Bhabha concludes, and implies, rather, a set of rules *according to which* one can engage in the contest for position.[116]

Notes:

63. The foundational text in this case is probably Simone deBeauvoir's The Second Sex (Vintage Books: New York, 1989), first published in the French in 1949. This debate, however, has been indeterminate. Barbara Marshall accounts for it well in her Engendering Modernity (Boston Northeastern UP, 1994). She identifies three essentialist schools of feminist thought (biological, philosophical and historical, corresponding to the radical feminism of, for example, Mary Daly, Shulamith Firestone and Adrienne Rich; the second to debeauvoir and Mary O'Brien; and, finally to socialist feminism and, Marxist feminism, exemplified by a litany of writers, including Michele Rosaldo and Nancy Chowdrow.) She then goes on to explain the anti-essentialist critiques of these positions based, first, on a bid to include other forms of identity and oppression, such as sexuality and ethnicity, (one thinks of the early work of bell hooks in this regard) and then on the different deconstructivist approaches of Julia Kristeva and Judith Butler.

A further, extensive introduction to these debates can be found in Rosemarie Tong's Feminist Thought: A comprehensive introduction, (Boulder and San Francisco: Westview, 1989).

64. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage, 1980).

65. Young's Colonial Desire is a notable study of the applications of theories of hybridity within social contexts (e.g. in the aid of colonialism, in contemporary cultural theory, etc.). Whatever the difficulties of its use in the analysis of culture, we must understand that here we are only referring to such applications and not to its use in genetics. In the latter it is axiomatic to establish the identity condition of the contributing parties. It is in the former where this is neglected, and this is my point of departure.

66. Cf. Ien Ang and Jon Stratton, "Asianing Australia: Notes Toward a Critical Transnationalism in Cultural Studies" Cultural Studies 10.1 (1996): 16-36; Kuan-Hsing Chen, "Not Yet the Postcolonial Era: The (Super) Nation-State and Transnationalism of Cultural Studies: Response to Ang and Stratton" Cultural Studies 10.1 (1996): 37-70; and Ang and Stratton, "Cultural Studies Without Guarantees: Response to Kuan-Hsing Chen" Cultural Studies 10.1 (1996): 71-77. For another example of such a problematic engagement with the idea of choosing one's ethnicity, see P.L. Sunderland, "'You May Not Know It But I'm Black': White Women's Self-Identification as Black," Ethnos Vol.62.1-2 (1997): 32-58. In this, Sunderland focuses entirely on the choice side (in contrast to the labeling/labelled side) of ethnic identification, as if there exists a neutral, tabula rasa-like place from which one can choose one's ethnicity iteratively and without serious conflicts. In her article, the women she studies become "black" basically because they feel like they are. But feel like what? They identify with an imagined identity, but what is the source and the material of this imagined identification and affiliation? They feel like an idea that looks black. What are the discursive powers on which they draw to "become black" that blacks themselves can not grasp to move in the other direction? Once black, do these women lose the capacity to move back, to discursively or socially reproduce themselves as white? No. Given that their choice is motivated by antiracist interests, what kind of blackness do they choose that avoids subjection to racism? Black without the consequences of being black (which was raised in a serious way, albeit in a different context, by Fanon). Does this sort of conviction, that, really, anyone can be black, undermine or perpetuate forms of racism? (The discussion Orientalism starts is informative in this regard.) Are they mistaking a feeling of inclusion in a particular community dominated by black Americans for an inclusion in all such communities in the U.S.? One suspects that this inclusion might not be transferable beyond the groups in which they socialize. The point of mentioning this article, and, in a cursory way, the severe problems it exhibits, is to point out that Ang and Stratton are not the only, nor the least sophisticated writers interested in questions around the choice of ethnicity.

67. That is, that part of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit - chapter IV, on the dialectic of lordship and bondage, or the struggle for recognition - often promoted in Marxist readings of Hegel (see, especially Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit, ed., Allan Bloom, trans., James H. Nichols, Jr. [New York: Basic Books, 1969]), and picked up by Lacan, Sartre and other recent thinkers concerned with the formation of identity through conflict.

68. After Virtue (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981) 40.

69. While I will dwell on this as regards Orientalism and Culture and Imperialism at greater length, it is worth taking note that the inside/outside distinction, and the idea of the hybrid critic that Said develops along with it appears in chapter 1 of The World, the Text, and the Critic (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1983) 26-29 - the second essay of which is titled "The World, the Text and the Critic," and is a slightly shorter, modified version of "The Text, the World, the Critic," to which I

refer later. Furthermore, the publication of his 1993 Reith Lectures as
Representations of the Intellectual (New York: Vintage, 1996) bears this same move
on the second page (x) of the introduction.

70. The reader will recall this distinction from the last chapter. The longer
quotation goes as follows:

> The distinction I am making is really between an almost unconscious (and
> certainly an untouchable) positivity, which I shall call *latent* Orientalism,
> and the various stated views about Oriental society, languages, literatures,
> history, sociology, and so forth, which I shall call *manifest* Orientalism.
> Whatever change occurs in knowledge of the Orient is found almost exclusively
> in manifest Orientalism; the unanimity, stability, and durability of latent
> Orientalism are more or less constant. (O, 206)

Like Ang and Stratton, Said avoids making a choice, and wants to characterize
Orientalism as both latent *and* manifest; stable *and* changing; *representable*, (in,
ironically, the same spirit in which the Orientalist takes the Orient to be
representable) and dynamic.

71. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith,
(London: Routledge, 1962) vii.

72. In contrast to Bhabha, Said, in chapter 2 of Orientalism, at least recognizes
the need to treat French and British Orientalisms as different, though by chapter 3
he has collapsed them into a common form. Considering the differences in French
and British colonial models, it would surely be worth the effort to tease out the
subtleties of their modes of representation. Spivak, for her part, is careful to
maintain such differences: "The language and education policies of the French in
Algeria and the British in India are rather different. The articulation of
patriarchy with Hinduism and with Islam are also significantly different," "Acting
Bits/Identity Talk," Critical Inquiry 18 (1992): 772.

73. I would like to take note here of the invigorating conversations with Anurima
Banerji through which this idea developed.

74. This is not a novel idea. As Young says in Colonial Desire:

> comparatively little attention has been given to the mechanics of the
> intricate processes of cultural contact, intrusion, fusion and disjunction.
> In archaeology, for example, the models have been ones of diffusion,
> assimilation, or isolation, not of interaction or counteraction. Significant
> historical work has been done on the exchange of commodities, of diseases, of
> healing systems and of religions. *Otherwise, the most productive paradigms
> have been taken from language.* (CD, 5, emphasis added.)

75. Kirsten Malmkjær, ed., The Linguistics Encyclopedia (London: Routledge, 1991)
81.

76. I take the *langue/parole* analogy from Young, (WM, 130). Said suggests such a
comparison himself in a passage from Orientalism cited earlier, in which he calls
latent Orientalism an "enunciative capacity" (221-222).

77. While the reader likely notices this, I believe it merits attention that the
latent/manifest distinction emerges in Orientalism but is remains present here in
Culture and Imperialism, fifteen years later. It is not, then, isolated to

<u>Orientalism</u> and later discarded, but is as relevant and open to criticism now.

78. As mentioned before, <u>Orientalism</u> can not debate with the Orientalist descriptions of the Orient, as alternatives can only be proposed *within* Orientalist discourse. (WM, 160).

79. It is unsurprising insofar as Said wishes to argue that critique can only come from within. He is alone neither in this nor in his privileging of the diasporic intellectual/critic as the agent of change. "Orientalism and After" [Aijaz Ahmad, <u>In Theory</u>, (London: Verso, 1992) 159-220] claims that Said makes the "wholesale assertion that the *only* authentic work that can be done in our time presumes (a) Third World origin, but combined with (b) metropolitan location...the autobiographical self-referentiality is quite unmistakable" (201).

80. Cf. <u>The Location of Culture</u>, 102-123.

81. Note when we get to Spivak that she takes difference to mean exactly the opposite: rather than Bhabha's conflation of hybridity and difference, she connects difference to essence.

82. Michel Foucault, <u>The Order of Things</u> (New York: Vintage Books, 1970). Foucault explains, for example, that Marx presents no radical, epistemic break from Ricardo, and he is, taken in the Nietzschean sense, timely. See 253-263.

83. For another explanation of the subject that is always divided by way of the Other, or the self as object, see Jacques Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I," <u>Écrits</u>, trans. Alan Sheridan, (New York: Norton, 1977). One might also keep in mind the importance Lacan places on the formation and displacement of the subject in and through language. Perhaps the most concise example is: "Man speaks, then, but it is because the symbol has made him man." ("Function and field of speech and language in psychoanalysis," 65.) While this is a recurring theme in Lacan's work, one might best refer to "The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud," also in <u>Écrits</u>, and "Of the network of signifiers," in <u>The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis</u>, trans. Alan Sheridan, (New York: Norton, 1978).
    Interestingly enough, we find something similar in Marx, although he does not follow the idea very far. Note 1 on page 59 of <u>Capital, Volume 1</u> says: "In a sort of way, it is with man as with commodities. Since he comes into the world neither with a looking glass in his hand, nor as a Fichtian philosopher, to whom "I am I" is sufficient, man first sees and recognizes himself in other men."

84. *Public Culture* 4.2 (1992): 1-30. I say echo, but I do not wish to claim that either was written in awareness of the other.

85. M. M. Bakhtin "The Heteroglot Novel" <u>The Bakhtin Reader</u>, ed., Pam Morris, (London: Edward Arnold, 1994) 117.

86. Of course, Lacan and Derrida would argue that this is the case for discourse in general.

87. Cf. also "Of Mimicry and Man: The ambivalence of colonial discourse," <u>The Location of Culture</u> (85-92). "Sly Civility," included in the same volume (93-101), explains the same phenomenon according to Freud's explanation of paranoia. In either case, the 'native' is inert: the unknowing mimic playing both sides of the colonial desire for and derision of the Other - as similar yet different; or "Freud's sabre-rattling stranger," whose presence alone is enough to play on the

colonialist's paranoia.

88. Ludwig Wittgenstein <u>Philosophical Investigations</u>, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958) 150ᵉ. I am indebted to Professor Pradeep Bandyopadhyay for the idea of using both Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein to the ends that I have, though all shortcomings in these uses are my own.

89. Wittgenstein's considerations of games and rule following seems to allow for heterogeneous positions within games, and for rules which do not homogenize all followers into the same moves. (On this basis we might also argue that Wittgenstein is not making liberal normative claims.)

90. It warrants a note that, while Bhabha entertains the doubling of language, and its attendant complications of meaning, subjectivity, and the like, only in cases of colonial discourse, it must, insofar as he takes this concept from Derrida, apply to all discourse, *viz.* also to the discourse of the colonized. As he leans heavily on Derrida here, this is of some consequence for Bhabha's unproblematized ascription of agency to the 'native'. In a later essay, "Articulating the Archaic," and slightly different context, Bhabha reveals this equivalent ambivalence:

> When the Mohammedan is forced to deny the logical demonstration of geographical fact and the Hindu turns away from the evidence of his eyes, we witness a form of ambivalence, a mode of enunciation, a coercion of the native subject in which no truth can exist. (LC, 135)

Here he is embarking on a discussion of the irreducibility of cultural difference, and seems not to intend to highlight the way in which colonial discourse impinges upon 'native' discourses, yet that result emerges. Indeed, what we find here is a duplication, if unacknowledged, of Derrida's point that this sort of crisis is one intrinsic to discourse (writing, in the broad sense he applies) in general, and cannot be attributed only to that of the colonizer.

91. And this may, in fact, belie an ambivalence on the part of the colonized about which Bhabha remains silent.

92. Furthermore, as the continuation of his quotation bears out, he reinstitutes the model of Derrida ("'less than one and double'") in a way exactly contradictory to his use of Derrida's doubling as fission only five pages earlier:

> [T]hey do this under the eye of power, through the production of 'partial' knowledges and positionalities in keeping with my earlier, more general explanation of hybridity. Such objects of knowledges make the signifiers of authority enigmatic in a way that is 'less than one and double.'

No longer doubling as fission, we have doubling as fusion-by-intrusion. There is no recognition of this vacillation, or what implications it might have for the uses to which Derrida's work might be put.

93. Bhabha quotes Lacan: "a 'third locus which is neither my speech nor my interlocutor'." "The Agency of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason Since Freud," <u>Écrits</u> (173). This is part of a long passage in which Lacan meditates on the relationships between the Other, the self and language. It is worth quoting this at length, as the place of Hegel is significant to the passage as a whole, while Bhabha's citation does not reveal this.

> Who, then, is this other to whom I am more attached than to myself, since, at the heart of my assent to my own identity it is still he who agitates me? His presence can be understood only at a second degree of otherness, which

already places him in the position of mediating between me and the double of myself, as it were with my counterpart.

If I have said that the unconscious is the discourse of the Other (with a capital O), it is in order to indicate the beyond in which the recognition of desire is bound up with the desire for recognition.

In other words this other is the Other that even my lie invokes as a guarantor of the truth in which it subsists.

By which we can also see that it is with the appearance of language the dimension of truth emerges.

Prior to this point, we can recognize in the psychological relation, which can be easily isolated in the observation of animal behaviour, the existence of subjects, not by means of some projective mirage, the phantom of which a certain type of psychologist delights in hacking to pieces, but simply on account of the manifested presence of intersubjectivity. In the animal hidden in his lookout, in the well-laid trap of certain others, in the feint by which an apparent straggler leads a predator away from the flock, something more emerges than in the fascinating display of mating or combat ritual. Yet there is nothing even there that transcends the function of lure in the service of a need, or which affirms a presence in that beyond-the-veil where the whole of Nature can be questioned about its design.

For even to be a question (and we know that it is one Freud himself posed in 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle'), there must be language.

For I can lure my adversary by means of a movement contrary to my actual plan of battle, and this movement will have its deceiving effect only in so far as I produce it in reality and for my adversary.

But in the proposition with which I open peace negotiations with him, what my negotiations propose to him is situated in a third locus which is neither my speech nor my interlocutor. (172-73)

94. Arjun Appadurai, Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996). Of particular importance are chapters 2 ("Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy," 27-47) and 3 ("Global Ethnoscapes: Notes and Queries for a Transnational Anthropology," 48-67).

95. Appadurai identifies five:
   1.Ethnoscapes—"the landscape of persons who constitute the world in which we live."
   2.Technoscapes—"the global configuration, also ever fluid, of technology and the fact that technology, both high and low, both mechanical and informational, now moves at high speeds across various kinds of previously impervious boundaries."
   3.Financescapes—"the disposition of capital is now a more mysterious, rapid, and difficult landscape to follow than ever before, as currency markets, national stock exchanges, and commodity speculations move megamonies through national turnstiles at blinding speed, with vast, absolute implications for small differences in percentage points and time units."
   4.Mediascapes—"refer both to the distribution of the electronic capabilities to produce and disseminate information...which are now available to a growing number of private and public interests throughout the world, and to the images of the world created by the media."
   5.Ideoscapes—"are also concatenations of images, but they are often directly political and frequently have to do with the ideologies of states and the counterideologies of movements explicitly oriented to capturing state power." (Modernity At Large 33-37)

96. Herein we find the central difference between those Bart Moore-Gilbert identifies as postcolonial critics - e.g. Ahmad, Dirlik, or Parry - and postcolonial theorists - Bhabha, Said and Spivak. In the first case, an affiliation with Marxism, such that materialist analysis must never be shunted away

to the periphery, and in the second, the assertion that colonialism, rather than simply an economic phenomenon, had certain cultural and representational preconditions and outcomes that existed quite independently of any material determination. See Bart Moore-Gilbert, Postcolonial Theory: Contexts, Practices, Politics (London: Verso, 1997). We may also note that, save for the presentation of this critique in terms of hybridity, Appadurai would not necessarily disagree with Bhabha's dissention from Jameson, at least as it is presented here.

97. Bhabha discusses in footnote one of this essay (212) the ubiquity of Heart of Darkness in postcolonial writing. One feels, at times, that there is an odd metonymy in Bhabha's work with respect to Conrad. Heart of Darkness is to stand in for all of Conrad's life and works; Conrad is to stand in for all colonial authors; colonial literature is to stand in for all colonial writing; colonial writing is to stand in for all colonial thought and psychic processes in all colonizing nations. Unless one presumes at the outset an absolute uniformity of psyches in a colonizing people, *of course* one would find ambivalence in such a metonymic progression. Conrad appears in five of the last seven chapters of The Location of Culture, but regarding this particular point, see especially "Articulating the Archaic," (123-138) and "How Newness Enters the World," (212-235).

98. This question can equally be presented to Said, though we must recognize that in Spivak's case, her use of Marx makes such an inquisition difficult.

99. *"Mestizo"* indicates interracial reproduction generally involving the genetic mixing of the Spanish with African and/or Andean descendants. It is, however, laden with racialized overtones of cultural significance, as the 'whitening' effect of becoming *mestizo* (*el mestizaje*) rather than indigenous or black is equated with social progress; a progress associated with racial superiority, as Stutzman points out. Cf. Ronald Stutzman *"El Mestizaje:* An All-Inclusive Ideology of Exclusion," ed. Norman E. Whitten, Jr. Cultural Transformations and Ethnicity in Modern Ecuador (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1981) 45-94.

100. Outside In The Teaching Machine, 1-24.

101. This *"ce qui reste"* seems to adopt Aristotelian "essence." Recall, also, the contrasting way that Bhabha used difference as hybridity.

102. Marx opens Capital Vol.1, [trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (New York: International Publishers, 1967)] with this discussion on pages 43 and 44, though it continues to page 48. Basically, his point is that use value is not determined as a fixed rate, as in exchange value. It can be appropriated to a variety of ends, and is, therefore, indeterminate as regards utility. In specific senses, it is even independent of labour, which may lead to a certain amount of confusion, and may lead us, as it appears it has led Spivak, to conclude that *value* is prior to labour, as an abstract but presumptive property. Marx writes:

> A thing can be a use-value without having value. This is the case whenever its utility to man is not due to labour. Such are air, virgin soil, natural meadows, &c. A thing can be useful, and the product of human labour, without being a commodity. Whoever directly satisfies his wants with the produce of his own labour, creates, indeed, use-values, but not commodities. In order to produce the latter, he must not only produce use-values, but use-values for others, social use-values.... Lastly, nothing can have value, without being an object of utility. If the thing is useless, so is the labour contained in it; the labour does not count as labour, and therefore creates no value. (48)

His point seems to be that, while only labour *creates* use-value, it is also latent in some things (corn, air, diamonds, etc.), both restricted by the

properties of the thing, and existing independently of the labour necessary to extract it: "Being limited by the physical properties of the commodity, [use-value] has no existence apart from that commodity. A commodity...is therefore, so far as it is a material thing, a use-value, something useful. This property of a commodity is independent of the amount of labour required to appropriate its useful qualities" (44). Value, however, *is* a result of labour, and a use-value acquires its commercial dimensions only through labour. While this might seem to be so much hair-splitting, Spivak's claims may be clearer if she were to distinguish more strictly her uses of value and use-value. This will become more important towards the end of this section.

103. "Identity is a very different word from essence," (OTM, 4).

104. According to Jean-François Lyotard: "As distinguished from a litigation, a differend [*différend*] would be a case of conflict, between (at least) two parties, that cannot be equitably resolved for lack of a rule of judgement applicable to both arguments." The Différend: Phrases in Dispute, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) p.xi. For example, Protagoras demands payment from Euathlus, his Law student. Euathlus contends that the agreement was that he would not pay Protagoras if he never won a case and, as he has yet to win, he need not pay. Protagoras replies "'But if I win this dispute, I must be paid because I've won, and if you win it I must be paid because you've won'" (p.6). Introducing the present case into Euathlus' series of cases, presents a differend: Euathlus "becomes a victim" because he is "divested of the means to argue" (p.9).

105. C. B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1962) 3.

106. In this essay, chapter 5 of In Other Worlds (77-92), she examines the relationships between feminism, Marxism, psychoanalysis and deconstruction. Essentially, feminism is brought to the task of deconstructing Marxism and psychoanalysis. To restrain my analysis to a reasonable length, I will focus only on the first deconstruction - of Marxism - and leave aside the second.

107. See the opening chapter of Capital 1.

108. Lest there be any misunderstanding, the argument here is not that women are unexploited as labour (domestic or industrial), nor that they face no special exploitation *as women*. The point is, rather, that a misreading of Marx has led Spivak to erroneous conclusions.

109. It is notable that Spivak discuses only the alienation of the worker from the products of labour. She does not discuss the more vital alienation, from the means of production, though it is related to alienation from the product. It is as a result of the ownership of the means of production that the capitalist has a claim on the products of labour, as Marx takes care to explain in volume one of Capital (667-670). As we shall see, Spivak later makes a parallel misjudgment of Marx by placing revolutionary potential at the point of consumption. Perhaps this is a continuation of commodity fetishism.

110. This is not strictly the case, though a simple parading of counter-examples seems trite and to miss her point. It may be a point of interest, however, that among the Nyinba, a group of polyandrous Himalayan communities, establishing lineage or "ownership" of children to a particular father is, perhaps out of futility, not of concern to the men. Cf. Nancy E. Levine, The Dynamics of

Polyandry (Chicago: University Chicago Press, 1988). Chapter 7 (143-171), is especially revealing in this regard.

111. Of course, this only holds if, in the first place, this premise is accepted, and, second, if sexual reproduction is seen as entering upon the economic sphere in a determining way. But, what if we were to argue, for example, that the mode of this production is not irreducible to a dichotomy of politico-civil and domestic economy? One might argue that this mode is impermanent itself; that the public/private opposition has not always been what it is today, and that it continues to change. The questions that Spivak asks at the beginning of this essay - "Feminism and Critical Theory" - concerning women's entry into the capitalist production process are evidence enough of this change. (With her, I readily accept that this should not simply be read off as an "advance" for women). But such a criticism implies that the questions she raises bear consequentially upon economic analysis. The following paragraphs question this position in some detail.

112. Karl Marx, Capital Vol.1 173-175.

113. Again, it merits stating that this is not to deride the work of childbearing, and is not a moral deprecation of unproductive labour of this or any other sort; such would require the fetishization of commodities as independently valuable, and endorse bourgeois moral values of productivity.
    One might also note that there is another way of formulating unproductive labour. This takes productive labour as that bought with money, exchanged against capital and that, therefore, enters the capitalist production process. This is sold as a commodity and produces surplus value. Unproductive labour, then, is labour hired for personal service, as an item of consumption (as use value rather than exchange value), and is exchanged against revenue, as a product, not entering, therefore, the capitalist production process, and producing no surplus. It is tempting to think of domestic work as falling into this category, as it seems to fall outside of capitalist production, but the argument would then have to accept this work as unexploited, because it produces no surplus that can be appropriated. A closer analysis of its relationship to capitalism may prove more rewarding.

114. Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton, (New York: Harper, 1964) 108-112.

115. While clearly arguing a liberal, contractarian position, Michael Ignatieff makes this point powerfully, if at times anecdotally, in Blood and Belonging: Journeys Into The New Nationalism (Toronto: Penguin, 1994).

116. One might think, in this regard of Anthony Giddens' "Duality of Structure:" "The constitution of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality. According to the notion of the duality of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize." The Constitution of Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) 25.

Chapter IV:
Conclusion

1. **The Alternative**

Throughout my critiques of Said, Bhabha and Spivak I have
avoided a full elaboration of the alternative I propose to
postcolonial theory. I have been in a process of working it
out, however, in the midst of the critiques. The critiques,
then, have not simply been gratuitous, directed only at
tearing down some intellectual edifice. They have at once
taken on various tasks: trying to problematize the role of
the most significant three postcolonial theorists as
intermediaries between the West and "the rest," - the
formerly colonized[117] - (unfashionable though they now are,
Fanon and Memmi should have disabused us of such a project);
emphasizing some of the epistemological problems resident in
their thinking on hybridity and strategic essentialism; but
also laying the ground for a model that will allow us at
once to accommodate the phenomena they observe and address
as/through hybridity (e.g. with "incorporation"), and to
think rigorously about what might be the dimensions and
implications of differing civilizational/ categorial
systems. Through this process, several claims have emerged,
chiefly that, not only within postcolonial discourse, but
within the works of each of its central figures there is no
stable use of the concepts hybridity or essentialism, and
this is related to the series of problems I have tried in
each case to raise. Considering the centrality of these
concepts in postcolonialism, this produces an
epistemological asphyxia. The treatment of this is a
challenge, some of the proportions of which I will now try
to show with reference to Wittgenstein's Philosophical
Investigations.

Imagine a language that describes combinations of coloured

squares. They are patterned like a chess board, and there
are red, green, white and black squares. The corresponding
vocabulary is "R," "G," "W" and "B", any combination of
which would form a sentence. If the pattern they follow is
made of nine squares - three across and three down - that
are ordered by numbers one through nine, like on a telephone
pad, then the sentence "RRBGGGRWW" would yield an
arrangement in which the squares from top left to right
would be coloured red, red, black, green, green, green, red,
white, white. (See appendix A). Wittgenstein's problem is
this:

> I do not know whether to say that the figure described by
> our sentence consists of four or nine elements! Well,
> does the sentence consist of four letters or nine? -And
> which are *its* elements, the types of letters, or the
> letters? Does it matter which we say, so long as we avoid
> misunderstandings in any particular case? (§48, 24*e*)[118]

His discussion moves on in other, and more intricate
directions, but the question raised here is sufficient for
our purposes. The system is either one or the other - nine
elements or four - not both at once. Whether change occurs
in the language depends on which type of element comprises
it. Does the addition of a tenth box or of another colour
constitute a change in identity condition? The choice one
makes - nine or four - determines what one will or will not
register as change. My task is not to answer this question.
Rather, I wish, first, to examine the gravity of such
decisions when they involve (rather than the elements of
this small language) the appreciation of how the syntax of
civilizational differences might be constituted or
conceptualized. Second, I would inquire how these
differences are vital to the ability of peoples to carry on
in their worlds (preserving ontological security[119]), an
ability threatened by the Westernizing thrust of both
discourses of development (embedded in a larger liberal

discourse), and of globalization in the variety of formations it takes. (One might recall Appadurai's 'scapes and flows.)

I would like to unpack these problems by starting with the hypothesis that there has been a shift in the discourse of development from the sort of economism that characterized its initial concern with poverty, to an ever-greater emphasis on human rights, democracy, and fairness or social equality (which favours the market, as all face the same initial conditions, or opportunities, rather than, for example, rules that ensure equal outcomes).[120] This could be evidence of a change in discursive formation (privileging the moral/political imperatives of liberalism, which, as a result, justify market relations as a moral - read democratic - obligation). A brief reading through of the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights[121] is revealing in this regard.

The preamble starts as follows: " **Whereas** recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world," and is reiterated in Article 1: "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood." Both are phrased in the language of the liberal tradition: inherent dignity, by definition as human; equality and inalienability as human; that these (as opposed, for example, to release from desire, as in Buddhism) define freedom, justice and peace. These words could have come almost directly from Locke's Second Treatise

On Government.[122] Article 2, in its turn, extends from the discourse of inalienable rights:

> Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
>   Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3 bears an almost one-to-one relation to probably the most famous line of the U.S. Declaration of Independence: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person," while Locke's chapter 4, "Of Slavery" (17-18) anticipates Article 4: "No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms." These bear an interesting relationship to Article 17: "(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."

   The famous moves that Locke made in chapter 5, "Of Property" (18-29) were as follows:

> **Common property** (§26). God has given the world to all (as equals before God), who therefore have a natural right to use it to live, and may not (in the state of nature) enclose it. **Individual property** (§27-§32). Property can, however, be justified if derived from the appropriation of nature through one's labour. This is based on the principle that each person bears a proprietary relationship to him/herself, and applying the labour of the body to the land removes that land from the state of nature. In turn, it becomes property over which no one else has claim: "*As much land* as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his *property*. He by his labour does, as it were, inclose it from the common" (p.21). **Limited appropriation** (§32-§35). As the preceding quotation indicates, and as Locke goes on to elaborate, one is neither permitted to enclose greater land than one can

cultivate, nor to exclude as much and as good from others. Already in this, however, he establishes the conditions of the next move: God gave the world "to the use of the industrious and rational, (and *labour* was to be *his title* to it;) not to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious" (p.21). **Unlimited appropriation** (§36-§40). With the introduction of money as the measure of labour (which gains this legitimation from consent by use), we have a store of the value of labour. Because it does not spoil, and, therefore, can be accumulated without limit as a stand-in for direct, personal appropriation of land, there is no longer an intrinsic barrier to the accumulation of wealth. (Recall, that one's labour, finding an equivalent in money, is alienable: one can buy and sell labour and, therefore, its products).

In his introduction to Locke's Second Treatise, C.B. MacPherson demonstrates how Locke's thesis justifies, on the one hand, exclusively capitalist accumulation, and on the other, restricted political participation with protection of property.[123] "While the non-propertied were not to have any voice in making the laws[124] they were fully bound by the laws....Both the exclusion of those without estate from the law-making process, and their subjection to the law, were required by the very purpose of civil government, the protection of life, liberty *and estate*" (*xix*). This, too, interlocks neatly with Article 3, ("the right to life liberty and security of person;") especially compared to Locke §6: "being all *equal and independent*, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions" (9). One might also recall the opening paragraph that establishes the grounds for the declaration: "Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family...."

The point of this exercise is to demonstrate that this document, perhaps one of the most powerful in our day, has a particular lineage: Enlightenment philosophy. (I will cite only a few more examples of this, but the analysis could

extend to each clause of the <u>Declaration</u>). Article 16 invokes the same categories of social organization and opposition as Hegel explores in chapter six of his <u>Phenomenology of Spirit</u>.[125] The Article explains the following:

> (1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.
> (2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.
> (3) *The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the state.* (Italics added)

Article 18 states, "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." Article 19 reads: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers." We find here an echo of J. S. Mill's <u>On Liberty</u>.[126] Article 21 reflects the contractarianism of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau:[127]

> (1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
> (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.
> (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Then, Kant's "What is Enlightenment?"[128] reverberates through Article 22:

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

But I risk belabouring the point. It should be obvious that the Declaration comes unmistakably from one heritage: the Enlightenment, broadly defined. That it aspires to global application is evident both in its title and its contents, and that the power to enforce such an application exists (by persuasion, coercion in the form of sanctions, or through force of arms) is by now indisputable.

The significant of the above is that there is a distinct lineage preceding and informing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: it emerges from a history so readily defined that one can identify its central figures. But what if one does not come from this history, does not share this lineage? More precisely, what if one does not share the epistemological foundations that this history and this document exhibit?[129] I am not talking about the sharing of an *episteme* or a discursive formation, in Foucault's terms.

He marks off admirably the discontinuities from one *episteme* to another in The Order of Things, and provides the methodology for distinguishing discursive formations in The Archaeology of Knowledge. He does not, however, investigate the ways in which an *episteme* or discursive formation provide the rules of change by which such shifts and disjunctures occur. There is a sense in which we can still read Marx, Ricardo, or Smith, who according to Foucault shared a particular *episteme*, and make sense of them even as we may appreciate that we no longer operate according to the same epistemic rules they did. (To the extent that we think of ourselves as post-Enlightenment thinkers today, this comparison would hold for the figures to whom I attribute

the _Declaration_.) I wish to claim that we can comprehend
the texts of these writers, even as our discursive formation
is discontinuous with theirs, because at some remove the
rules governing the shifts from one to another are still
with us.   Where we still have the necessary parameters to
make sense of Marx, we possess none to understand Hindu
categories until we learn them as a separate categorial
system; a distinct and incommensurate set of rules.[130] It is
here, I think, that we find one of the limits of Foucault's
usefulness to my project (though I in no way claim that this
was _his_ project, and do not ascribe this limit as a
failing). It is here, too, that I wish to reintroduce
Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard, this time with the task of
providing us with a framework by reference to which we might
understand the gravity of such an incommensurability, and
the complications this raises for initiatives such as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

As an example of the problems of incommensurability,
consider tea. The British, Chinese, Indians, Japanese, and
North Africans all drink tea, but it does not mean the same
thing, or fill the same social functions in each case. We
can identify that there is a difference between British and
Japanese appreciations of tea, but recognizing that
difference in no degree helps us make sense out of either
one. Assuming, now, that we understand the British
tradition of tea time - what tea signifies and does in
British society - we are still no closer to understanding
the Japanese traditions surrounding tea. They cannot, we
discover, simply be translated as so many correspondences to
British traditions. In fact, to gain a sense of tea in
Japan, we must translate not just tea, but the whole of the
social syntax in which it resides.

To replay this in a vocabulary drawn from Wittgenstein,
the same item (referent), in each case operates according to

a different set of rules; is a piece in different games. These pieces and the respective rules that govern them cannot be reduced to each other, but must be regarded as distinct, embedded in larger games that share only the family resemblance of games. (Or, in this case, types of games involving tea, just as football and tennis are types of games involving balls, though the rules of one cannot help us with the other). The same pieces, then, though they appear in both games, are played differently, to different ends, within, if you will, their own universes. Their identity conditions are different. We cannot, then, apprehend each as the same thing as the other, but must accept that whatever first principles we choose to describe the tea in question commits us to one universe of understanding or to another. (And here, of course, I also rely on Kierkegaard). There are two choices, then, of different orders. There is the meta-level of choosing a system of categories, and there is the second-order level of those categories, sorting out reality according to the categorial system you employ. Or, there is the domain of concepts (second order), and what makes them deployable (the first-order rules). Accordingly, we can distinguish change from difference only by way of the deployment of categories.

 Change, we may think, is a movement from one class to another within a category, or a metamorphosis involving the movement from one category to another, where difference involves distinct categories. (Recall the Titanic example, where we started with the categories "ship" and "iceberg," but in the end, the iceberg maintained its identity condition - no change of category - and the ship, in all likelihood, changed categories, and required categories).

 My central points are as follows: Language operates in and through a system of rules - syntax - according to which we can infinitely generate meaning (in the form of sentences

that follow the rules), recognize nonsense (groupings of
words that transgress the rules), and recognize sentences
that, although they may not be nonsense, do not belong to
this language. Likewise, there is syntax to categorial
systems, corresponding to which we can make sense of our
worlds, interact with each other, and form our identities.
By extension, we know by reference to this syntax when a
type of behaviour does not belong, because it is incoherent
within the set of rules. If these rules are, in Hegel
formed in the community (the debt for which we pay in
death),[131] formed for Lacan in and through language, or
result for Merleau-Ponty from the sedimentation of culture
in speech and expression,[132] they are for Wittgenstein the
rules governing language, games, or forms of life. On their
account, not *any* sentence will do: there is not that form of
relativism. There are an infinite number of sentences,
behaviours, actions, that can be generated by a syntax, but
the speaker or the player must also learn it; it provides
for the difference between an infinity of coherent
combinations of words or moves, and chaos.

In Wittgenstein's passage about family resemblance, he
carefully points out that games are games because of a
shared resemblance to one another, not because there is one
(or a few) essential element present in each game.
(Wittgenstein's essentialism enters at a higher level of
abstraction, concerning the deployment of categories, rather
than the sorting out of reality within categories.) It is
worth quoting him at some length to get the full impact of
such a position.

> 65. ...Instead of producing something common to all
> that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena
> have no one thing in common which makes us use the same
> word for all,--but that they are *related* to one another in
> many different ways. And it is because of this
> relationship, or these relationships, that we call them
> all "language". I will try to explain this.

66. Consider for example all the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games and so on. What is common to them all?--Don't say: "There *must* be something in common, or they would not be called 'games'"--but *look and see* whether there is anything common to all.--for if you look at them you will not see something that is common to *all*, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat, don't think but look!--Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost.... And we can go through many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear.

And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.

67. I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances"; for the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way.--I shall say: 'games' for a family. (1953, 31^e-32^e)

He extends this line of thought to numbers, concluding with the following: "And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some on fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibers" (1953, 32^e). Peter Winch's example of the anarchist and the monk is most germane here:

It is important to notice that, in the sense in which I am speaking of rules, it is just as true to speak of the anarchist following rules in what he does as it is to say the same thing of the monk. The difference between these two kinds of men is not that the one follows rules and the other does not; it lies in the diverse *kinds* of rule which each respectively follows. The monk's life is circumscribed by rules of behaviour which are both explicit and tightly drawn: they leave as little room as possible for individual choice in situations which call for action. The anarchist, on the other hand, eschews explicit norms as far as possible and prides himself on

> considering all claims for action 'on their merits': that is, his choice is not determined in advance for him by the rule he is following. But that does not mean that we can eliminate altogether the idea of a rule from the description of his behaviour. We cannot do this because, if I may be permitted a significant pleonasm, the anarchist's way of life is a *way of life*. It is to be distinguished, for instance, from the pointless behaviour of a berserk lunatic. The anarchist has reasons for acting as he does; he *makes a point* of not being governed by explicit, rigid norms....And these notions, which are essential in describing the anarchist's mode of behaviour, presuppose the notion of a rule.[133]

Importantly, we find here a justification of the idea that, while all humans may share the quality of understanding and following rules, not all humans follow *the same* rules. It is in and through these rules, even as they change over time, that people find ontological security. This is important to the case I am making, because it recognizes that the stakes are not just so many variations on a central theme. The modernizationist notions of social progress assume social forms to be variations on the same *essential* plan; one that has a common, uniform *telos*. By contrast, what I would like to suggest is that Wittgenstein, in language games, demonstrates that although we are looking (in my work) at forms of life, they are *incommensurable* forms of life:[134] they share a family resemblance as such, but do not share a common essence. They are not teleologically destined to converge with each other any more than are the syntaxes of languages. It is at this level, I want to say, that we may talk of something like essences. We can tell different languages, different games, apart, even those with superficial similarities. (The tea example was meant to demonstrate this). The larger implication of this is that not only do different peoples think and speak about their worlds differently, they *experience* them differently, for we do not shape the syntaxes to our

masterful, individual wills, but are structured by them.
Liberals will balk at this, because they wish to believe
that, at base, we are all the same, and just have different
ways of *being* the same. (*Viz.*, we share a human nature).
By this reckoning, however, we do not share parameters of
experience any more than we do of cognition (if these can be
held rigorously apart). Spivak writes, briefly and
provocatively, on this: [film maker Kamalkumar Majumdar's]
question: how do the affects work when such extreme
dispensations as widow-burning and the caste system operate
as a felt cultural norm? How could our mothers and
grandmothers have assented to this, and remained human?
There is no possibility here for the viewer to interpret the
film from a position of cultural superiority. This is a
question that can only be asked *by* us as Hindus, *of*
ourselves. (1992, 800)

I will try to explain this carefully. When we hear
someone who speaks both English and Thai, even if we only
understand the Thai, we know when s/he switches from one to
the other. In a similar fashion, we may know when someone
presents us with the ritual surrounding tea from one
tradition or another, even when we are familiar only with
the one. We can recognize the breaks because there is a
syntax - corresponding to a way of life - guiding our
interlocutor in either case. Equally, no amount of
switching back and forth will make the two hybrid forms of
each other. We may find elements of one language, or one
form of life, incorporated into the other, but this will
only represent a lexical addition, unless the syntax
changes; unless there is a change in the rules governing the
deployment of categories. That this happens, I have no
doubt. This is, after all, what I argue is at stake in the
process of globalization:[135] the capacity of peoples to

order their worlds in a way that is meaningful to them, rather than yielding to the pressure to Westernize.

My meaning, then, is that knowing we have made a mistake, or testing the *validity* of this or that statement requires a code against which we arrive at our judgement. If we switch from one set of principles to another, the criteria by which we may judge something to be valid or mistaken will change, just as switching from one language to another compels us to employ a different syntax, or, a different set of rules concerning what constitutes meaningful language. This, again, is Kierkegaard's dilemma: how does one *make* the choice between one form of life and another? Were there a common thread running through all of them, this decision might be one of relativity: whatever suits the moment. There being no such thread, the choice is absolute. For example, I cannot choose to be a secular liberal individual today, Hindu on Wednesday, and a Moslem on Friday, only to schedule a return to my liberalism the following week, remaining the same person throughout. Such would require that the menu of choices and categories of identification at each stop was the same as at the others (i.e. that the states were just variations of each other). In fact, committing to one or the other would involve committing to a different form of life, and, therefore, a different syntax, providing, from each position, a distinct set of options.

This is not, however, to say that fluency in greater than one form of life, or greater than one game, is impossible. It is, simply, to say that we do not carry them each, coextensively (i.e. as a hybrid from which we select the elements that suit our whims), within us. Quite the opposite: they carry us. Moving to one or the other does not alter the particular game, but alters us, as players. Sikhs living in Toronto or Montréal who support Sikh nationalist struggles in India have to know how to carry on

not just in their communities of diaspora, but also in those debates in India.[136] The Sikhs would have to remain competent to mobilize the right sorts of metaphors and emblems - the right types of signs - in order to maintain themselves in the debates.

Now, this raises the last problem: social change. Giddens' duality of structure allows us to consider the way that societies change, yet remain. While Giddens does not, with this, rule out sea changes in social organization, the point that "structure is both the medium and the outcome of practices which constitute social systems"[137] points to the possibility that, although a society, a people, or a civilization changes over time, as a language does, it remains recognizable as a society, people or civilization, just as a language would. We can recognize change, which implies both continuity (the persistence of some form of referent, or identity condition, against which we can measure similarity or difference) as well as discontinuity (the shift from any selected moment, or identity condition, to another). The pivotal point (and this has been made less explicitly earlier) is that the structure (for our purposes, syntax, or first principles) structures its own change.

2. Summary and Conclusion

I have tried to stage the argument of this thesis (unequally) on two fronts: one joining the contestation of the dominant liberal paradigm, but the other against the dominant figures of postcolonial theory. On the one hand, the model I have promoted is directed against the assumption in liberalism and modernization theory that the contemporary West marks the end of history and progress towards which all societies are irrepressibly drawn. There are many possible modernities, this thesis contests, not just the one promised in Westernization, though there is a real threat that many peoples will not find the wherewithal to indigenize the

forces of globalization, and will instead succumb to the Westernizing push of the dominant powers of our day.[138]

Postcolonial theory is, as well, directed largely against such powers, and has made some impressive forays in their midst. Said, Bhabha and Spivak have worked tenaciously, and at times brilliantly, to resist Western neocolonialism. (It has become, for example, nearly impossible to read colonial literature in innocence). For the reasons laid out above, however, their intellectual loyalties have produced some serious analytical and conceptual problems, emerging from their formulations of hybridity and strategic essentialism.

These, in turn, have developed consequences for their political positions, insofar as those who would resist Westernization by promoting identities formed in and through distinct categorial systems are necessarily dismissed as essentialists, nativists, nationalists, and the like.[139] It seems, at times, as if any who do not adopt French poststructuralism are excluded from any meaningful debate. (As I have noted, Spivak's work in the last five or six years has shown signs of retreating from that position, for example, making herself answerable to Indian scholars, in India, and in Bengali.)[140]

This project has aimed in the end to provide a model from within the Western heritage (as, after all, I have access to no other), that can accommodate the possibility of cultural incommensurability, describe that possibility, but avoid sweeping claims about the *content* of difference. It provides, for instance, for rules that, like those of chess, govern different players in different ways, and that change from game to game along with the rules. Thus, the homogenizing gloss that some accuse Bhabha and Said of putting on culture,[141] which neglects questions of gender and class, can be avoided. At the same time, however, we might better appreciate how something like gender, or like class,

might take on entirely different characters from one form of life to another. This is, I realize, unhelpful to those feminists who would propose the common oppression of women in all places to a common patriarchy.[142] It is equally unhelpful, mind you, to those materialist analyses that would place generic economic forms at the base of all social models. This model would, rather, say that superimposing a capitalist mode of production on a Hindu caste system cannot be presumed to produce a class-based society the likes of which emerged with the Industrial Revolution. The organizing principles of each are distinct from the other, and so are, therefore, the rules that guide change in each one.

The contemporary world seems characterized by numerous fault-lines of potentially extreme violence. (Both India and Pakistan have carried out numerous nuclear weapons tests during the final months of the writing of this thesis). These faultlines, if not the product of European colonialism, capitalist expansion and contemporary globalization, are at least exacerbated by the legacy of the first two, and the actuality of the last. (It may *be* this legacy, but that is a debate for another time). As peoples become more and more threatened in their abilities to reproduce themselves as a people, rather than as just so many (liberal) individuals, there is good reason to believe that the potential for violence will increase, rather than decrease, and that this potential will be met in more and more places by NATO and U.N. troops, increasingly with the mandate not just to maintain peace, but to facilitate the installation of, for example, democratic government, human rights legislation (modeled on the <u>Declaration</u>), a rule of secular law privileging the individual and property rights, and such other Western institutions. The message I drive at with this is not that these institution are in and of

themselves bad,[143] but that, as institutions based on a vision of humanness that is not shared by all the categorial systems of the world, they are simply inappropriate. (The decade's shift to capitalism and democracy in Russia and the former Soviet satellites should be demonstration enough of this point.) The goal of this thesis is to impress upon the reader the need, in communication that strives to function across the divides of different civilizations, to appreciate the substantial task of taking intellectual account of the incommensurability of differing categorial systems. Postcolonial theory, as much as modernization theory and liberalism, fail to provide useful models for this task. My hope is that the alternative presented here is a useful first step, not in getting us all to speak the same language, but to understand (a) that we *are not* speaking the same language, (b) the consequences of this realization (i.e. when we lose the ability to assume common parameters of thought, experience and exchange), and (c) the cultural violence that would be necessary to get us all speaking the same language (i.e. that it would require the displacement of one syntax, one form of life, by another, potentially foreign and disorienting to one or several of the interlocutors. Simply put: neocolonialism). This thesis, to conclude, does not offer a panacea for these trials, but argues that the recognition of the challenge is the first move in addressing it.

Notes:

117. Spivak is, perhaps, the best at disavowing such a role, though certainly she does so incompletely. I would refer the reader, again, to "The Postcolonial Critic:"
The space I occupy...is a position into which I have been written. I am not privileging it, but I do want to use it.
...I believe in using what one has, and this has nothing to do with privileging First World theories. What is an indigenous theory?...I cannot

understand what indigenous theory there might be that can ignore the reality
of nineteenth-century history. As for syntheses: syntheses have more
problems than answers to offer. To construct indigenous theories one must
ignore the last few centuries of historical involvement. I would rather use
what history has written for me.
(PC, 68-69)

118. Wittgenstein is not making an argument for essentialism here, but is
demanding an agreement on an identity condition, even if it is constructed, i.e.
determined without recourse to a primordial referent. This requirement (for
defining cultural hybridity) is that not met by postcolonial theorists.

119. "Ontological security" is borrowed from Anthony Giddens, who describes it as
the "confidence or trust that the natural and social worlds are as they appear to
be, including the basic existential parameters of self and social identity," The
Constitution of Society 375.

120. This shift has been evident in the UNDP introduction of "social development,"
(Human Development Report 1990 United Nations Development Program [Oxford: Oxford
UP, 1990]), and in the increasing use of the physical quality of life index as the
yardstick of development, both of which demonstrate a strong interest in levels of
literacy, the status of women, and other social indicators, all of which orient to
the life opportunities of the individual. For more on the increasing prominence of
neo-liberalism, and its accompanying moralism (i.e. market rules of fairness), see
Alan Thomas and David Potter, "Development, Capitalism and the Nation State,"
Poverty and Development in the 1990s (134). For a more extensive critique of the
liberal values underpinning development, see Ramashray Roy, World Development: A
Theoretical Dead End (Delhi: Ajanta, 1993), and of economism as ideology, Claude
Alvares, Science, Development and Violence: The Revold Against Modernity, (Delhi:
Oxford UP, 1992) 1-33 and 90-110.

121. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (New York: United Nations, 1948).
The attribution of particular Articles to the influence of an individual
philosophers should not be taken to imply that the influence of this philosopher
alone counts. In many cases an Article will draw on the heritage of several
thinkers, or on a body of thought by now too broadly established to be identified
with only one or another figure. It is in the aid of brevity that I will try to
identify only the writer most appropriate to, or with the strongest resemblance to
the content of the Article in question. Finally, the Declaration is clearly not a
recent entrant on the field of global politics, but it does seem to have sufficient
stature to be an exemplary for this kind of examination.

122. John Locke, Second Treatise On Government, ed. C.B. Macpherson,
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980) passim, but especially chapters I-VII.

123. He explains this in much greater detail in his chapter on Locke in The
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964).

124. This was thought out as follows: those living hand-to-mouth would not have
the opportunity to develop reason, while the propertied, by virtue of their
accumulation, had already demonstrated reason, and were, therefore, entitled to
legislative and political voice.

125. These are man and woman, on the one hand, but they are taken up as examples
(perhaps synecdoches would be more appropriate) of, on the other hand, state and
family.

126. John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism, On Liberty and Considerations of Representative Government, ed. H. D. Acton, (London: Everyman, 1972) 75-76 and chapter 2. We could also look to Emerson's "Self-Reliance," The Essays of Ralph Waldo Emerson (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1979), or to Thoreau's "Civil Disobedience," The Portable Thoreau, ed. Carl Bode (New York: Penguin, 1947).

127. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Or, The Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil, ed. Michael Oakeshott, (New York: Collier, 1977). John Locke, Op. cit. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G. D. H. Cole, (London: Everyman, 1993).

128. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, trans. H.B. Nisbet, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983). "To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" also anticipates the Declaration throughout its text.

129. Indeed, the argument could be extended to include all the institutions born in Bretton-Woods.

130. India Through Hindu Categories, ed. McKim Marriott (New Delhi: Sage, 1990) represents an astounding effort to accomplish this task.

131. See chapter six of the Phenomenology.

132. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 174-199.

133. Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1958) 52-53.

134. 240. Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question whether a rule has been obeyed or not. People don't come to blows over it, for example. That is part of the framework on which the working of our language is based (for example, in giving descriptions).
    241. "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?" - It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. **That is not agreement in   opinions but in form of life**. (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958) 88ᵉ. Bold added).

135. That Andean indigenous identity is formed, in part, around codes of dress determined by the Spanish Crown during the colonial era, and that contemporary resistance becomes articulated largely through leftist politics and discourses of minority and property rights bespeaks a fairly successful assimilation into a form of life. Resistance occurs, no question, but according to familiar, acceptable forms. (That is not, I should add, the same as saying the resistance is successful or welcome.)

136. This appears in Giddens as practical consciousness: "What actors know (believe) about social conditions, including especially the conditions of their own action, but cannot express discursively" (1984, p.375). This is harmonized with Wittgenstein, as it reflects the need to know how to follow a set of rules in order to participate in a game, even though these rules do not need to be articulated. (One can carry out the tea ceremony in one place without itemizing the rules one follows, but that one can do this does not mean that one can transport this ability to tea rituals in any of the other traditions I named above.)

137. A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (London: Macmillan, 1981) 27.

138. That is, there is pressure not only to accept the capitalist model of the economy, but also the normative social apparatus that surrounds it in liberal discourse. This has been demonstrated in the section above on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, especially the articles that draw on Locke. The argument seems to say: "We want you not only to become enmeshed in global capitalism, but also to endorse it and secular humanism as the only just grounds of human interaction."

139. Such a list, in India, might start with Claude Alvares, Veena Das, Ashis Nandy, Ramashray Roy and Vandanna Shiva.

140. For a clear example of this, beyond those cited above, see "Bonding in Difference, interview with Alfred Arteaga," The Spivak Reader, 15-28.

141. Cf. Anne McClintock, "The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term 'Postcolonialism'," Social Text 31-32, (1992): 84-98.

142. I am, of course, not the first to raise such an objection. One thinks of Patricia Hill Collins, Christina Crosby, bell hooks, and a score of others who have written from the perspectives of socialist, Marxist, postmodernist feminisms, and in terms of the way that race, ethnicity, or sexuality contribute to wide variations in women's experiences.

143. This argument could, and has, been made, but it is not the one I am making here.

The sentence "R R B G G G R W W " describes:

Appendix 2

The list of books and articles here is neither exhaustive nor collected with particular disciplinary boundaries in mind. It should, however, indicate a growing interest in postcolonialism.

Ang, Ien. "On Not Speaking Chinese: Postmodern Ethnicity and the Politics of Diaspora," New Formations 24, (1994): 1-34.

Ang, Ien and John Stratton. "The Singapore Way of Multiculturalism: Western Concepts/Asian Cultures," New Formations 31, (1997). 51-66.

Beverley, John. "Does the Project of the Left Have a Future?" Boundary 2 24.1, (1997): 35-57.

Carter, Erica. "Radical Difference," New Formations 10, (1990): iii-vii.

Chakrabarty, Dipesh. "Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for 'Indian' Pasts?" Representations 32, (1992).

----- "The Death of History? Historical Consciousness and the Culture of Late Capitalism," Public Culture 4.2, (1992): 47-65.

Cheah, Pheng. "Posit(ion)ing Human Rights in the Current Global Conjuncture," Public Culture 9, (1997): 233-266.

----- "Given Culture: Rethinking Cosmopolitical Freedom in Transnationalism," Boundary 2 24.2, (1997): 158-197.

Dirlik, Arif. The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism. (Boulder: Westview, 1997).

Docker, John, "Rethinking Postcolonialism and Multiculturalism in the Fin de Siècle," Cultural Studies 9.3, (1995): 409-426.

Giroux, Henry A. "Post-Colonial Ruptures and Democratic Possibilities: Multiculturalism as Anti-Racist Pedagogy," Cultural Critique Spring, (1992): 5-39.

Goodman, Daniel. "The Cultural Politics of Postcolonialism," New Formations 31, (1997): 107-118.

Guha, Ranajit. "Not At Home In Empire," Critical Inquiry 23, (1997): 482-493.

Lane, Christopher. "The Psychoanalysis of Race: An Introduction," Discourse 19.2, (1997): 3-20.

----- "'Savage Ecstasy': Colonialism and the Death Drive," Discourse 19.2, (1997): 110-133.

MacNeil, William P. "Enjoy Your Rights! Three Cases from the Postcolonial Commonwealth," Public Culture 9, (1997): 377-393.

Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses," Feminist Review 30, (1988): 65-88.

Mutman, Mahmut. "Under the Sign of Orientalism: The West vs. Islam," Cultural Critique (1992-93): 165-197.

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Robbins, Bruce. "Secularism, Elitism, Progress, and Other Transgressions: On Edward Said's 'Voyage In'," Social Text 40, (1994): 25-39.

Shohat, Ella. "Notes on the 'Post-Colonial'," Social Text 31-32, (1992): 99-113.

Slemon, Stephen. "The Scramble for Post-Colonialism," De-Scribing Empire: Post-colonialism and Textuality. Eds. Chris Tiffin and Alan Lawson (London: Routledge, 1994).

Sunder Rajan, Rajeswari. Real and Imagined Women: Gender, Culture and Postcolonialism. (London: Routledge, 1993).

----- "The Third World Academic in Other Places; or, the Postcolonial Intellectual Revisited," Cultural Inquiry 23, (1997): 596-616.

Tiffin, Chris and Alan Lawson, eds. De-Scribing Empire:
Post-Colonialism and Textuality. (London: Routledge,
1994).

Venn, Couze. "Subjectivity, Ideology and Difference:
Recovering Otherness," New Formations 16, (1992): 40-61

Young, Robert J. C. "Foucault On Race And Colonialism," New
Formations 25, (1995): 57-65.

Also of note, Social Text 40, 1994, pp.1-24 contains
"Edward Said's Culture and Imperialism: A Symposium," with
contributions from Bruce Robbins, Mary Louise Pratt,
Jonathan Arac, R. Radhakrishnan, and Edward Said. Public
Culture 6, 1993, is devoted to a debate about Aijaz Ahmad's
In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literatures (London: Verso
1992). The participants are Michael Sprinker, Talal Asad,
Vivek Dhareshwar, Nivedita Menon, Peter van der Veer,
Marjorie Howes, Marjorie Levinson, Andrew Parker, and Aijaz
Ahmad.

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