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DISTURBING (DIS)POSITIONS:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Emotion, Identification, and
the Authority of Fantasy in Theories of Reading Performance

by

Karin Holland Biggs

Graduate Programme in Communications
McGill University
October, 1993

A thesis submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

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Disturbing (Dis)Positions: Emotion in Theories of Reading Performance

Abstract

This thesis is about a problem of interest to reading theorists, psychological anthropologists and cultural studies researchers alike: why we find some narratives, plots, and images compelling and what this phenomenon can tell us about the cultural bases of human motivation. Gesturing to the interdependence of emotion, cognition, and motivation, the notion of the '*(dis)positioned self*' is proposed as a conceptual tool by which to address how motivation is both acquired and expressed in the way the self as 'feeling-mind' reads, that is, negotiates an interpretation of the signifying systems of a text to render it personally meaningful. (Dis)position allows us to overcome the sociocultural determinism of French structuralist and some poststructuralist reductions of the self to a precipitate of cultural constructs by reconceptualizing the interpreting self as an embodied, affective agent who employs unconscious knowledge that itself draws on another form of sociality. On this account, reading performance is culturally informed *action* and interpretations are *motivated*. Emotion is introduced as symptomatic of the intrapsychic investments which mediate how readers internalize cultural knowledge. The thesis looks at three soundings from social discourse--Janice Radway's *Reading the Romance*; *The Singing Detective*, a contemporary metafictional text; and the literature and group therapy practices associated with the codependency movement--in order to examine how presuppositions about emotion and the psychical reality of fantasy appear in cultural representations of the 'ill self as reader' while being fundamental to psychological notions of the self upon which healing practices themselves depend for their efficacy.

Abrégé

La présente thèse porte sur un problème d'intérêt tant pour le théoricien de la lecture que pour l'anthropologue de la psychologie ou le chercheur en études culturelles: pourquoi certains récits, intrigues ou images exercent sur nous un attrait irrésistible et que révèle ce phénomène sur le fondement culturel de la motivation humaine. En guise d'expression gestuelle d'une interdépendance entre émotion, cognition et motivation, la notion du '*moi (dis)positionné*' est proposée à titre d'outil conceptuel, avec lequel aborder la motivation à la fois acquise et exprimée par le moi qui lit en tant que 'sentiment-esprit'; c'est-à-dire qui négocie une interprétation des systèmes du signifiant d'un texte en un sens propre à soi. La notion de (dis)position permet de vaincre le déterminisme socioculturel du structuralisme et post-structuralisme français à réduire le moi en un précipité de notions en reconceptualisant le moi interprétant en agent affectif et incorporé qui utilise la connaissance inconsciente. A ce titre, la performance à la lecture se veut une *action* éclairée sur le plan culturel et les interprétations qui en découlent sont *motivées*. L'émotion est abordée comme étant symptomatique des investissements intrapsychiques qui agissent comme médiateur à l'intériorisation de la connaissance culturelle chez le lecteur. La présente thèse se penche sur trois exemples du discours social - *Reading the Romance*, de Janice Radway; *The Singing Detective*, ouvrage contemporain de métafiction; et la littérature et les pratiques auxquelles ont recours les thérapies de groupe associées au mouvement de codépendance. Elle vise ainsi à examiner comment les présuppositions en matière d'émotion et de réalité psychique du fantasme se manifestent dans les représentations culturelles du 'moi souffrant qui lit.' D'ailleurs celles-ci sont fondamentales aux notions psychologiques du moi, sur lesquelles notions les pratiques thérapeutiques fondent leur efficacité.

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Acknowledgements

This thesis evolved away from its original focus, the political possibilities of metafiction for feminism, when I realized that it was fundamental to ask some much simpler questions about issues I have spent my life studiously ignoring while living in the grip of: Nietzsche's null reference reasoning; emotions are irrational, of secondary import, and 'women's things'; the impact of psychical defences.

Support for this thesis has come from a number of directions. I want to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC) for three years of financial support at an early stage of doctoral study. Secondly, recognition and appreciation are due to members of the Graduate Programme in Communications and other faculty at McGill and Concordia and Trent Universities who have contributed to the progress of this dissertation, but who are not responsible for its limitations: to David Crowley who gave me the initial encouragement to go 'do it' when another area of research had lost its aura for me; to Marike Finlay-de Monchy for all the inspiring books--including her own--she has given me over the years; to Maged El Komos for our talk about ideal readers and for his reading of Chapter Two; to Allan Young in Medical Anthropology and Lawrence Kirmayer in Cross-Cultural Psychiatry at McGill for offering a blockbuster seminar on anthropological perspectives on emotion in psychiatry which changed my thinking and added another hugely significant wrinkle to the thesis; to Bina Freiwald who listened to my garbled thoughts over the telephone one dreary summer day and managed still to say "Keep up the good work," which sent me back to the computer; and to Mike Bristol who is one of all too few 'human' people in academe, giving courage to even the most introverted, while embracing with generosity and enthusiasm ideas tangential to his areas of specialization. Recognition and thanks must also go to the Directors of the Graduate Programme in Communications, especially G.J. Robinson, who, in the face of my missed deadlines, have kept the faith and allowed me to persevere.

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OPENING CONVERSATION

[W]ho one is always an open question with a shifting answer depending upon the positions made available within one's own and others' discursive practices, the stories through which we make sense of our own and others' lives.

(Davies and Harré, 1990: 46)

Student: I'd like to pursue the spirit of an idea of Bruno Bettelheim's, however simplistic it is seen to be these days, that there are types of stories, scary ones, for instance, which are necessary for psychological health. He talks about fairy tales serving psychotherapeutic functions for kids; you know, teaching us how to handle fears we can't name and releasing us from anxieties. I'm aware that Bettelheim's thesis that we need to confront terror in order to acquire a 'healthy' capacity to deal with it in the external world has been made subordinate to the critique of fairy tales as sexist narratives. Assuming this critique has not emptied Bettelheim's thesis of *all* psychological cogency, I'd want to know more about how we use cultural texts for therapeutic ends later in life. Is this even a meaningful question? As adults, do we need stories for any of the same reasons we supposedly needed scary stories as children? It's not *Little Red Riding Hood* or *The Three Bears* anymore but...what exactly does *As the World Turns* or *Roseanne*, *30something* or *Star Trek* do for us? If we watch them regularly, why do we watch? Can the hypothesis of the psychotherapeutic function of reading be developed in a meaningful way for a feminist reader-response theory or with respect to the search for a politically relevant textual practice?

Professor: Let me tell you a story that's got something to do with this. Last year my wife and I celebrated Thanksgiving at her mother's. One evening we watched a drama on television and talked about it afterward. Or tried to. It's so frustrating for both of us talking to her mother because no matter what she watches she always sees the same thing in programs, always complains about the same things: "It's not realistic," "I didn't like her; what an awful person," "It was disgusting. What language!" My mother-in-law has very rigid ideas about what's a good program. It's as if she sees everything through the same template; her responses are so very predictable.

The vulgar lovers' argument says, "Come into my play: let me audition you for this part." But the real seducer says, "I come to you from your own play. Look: here is your part."

(de Sousa, 1987: 258)

INTRODUCTION

0.1

Disturbing (Dis)Positions is about the possibility of self-transformation through reading. The multiple meanings of the title allude to changes in which textual practice, psychic reality, self-identity, and emotion are implicated. My ambition is to work toward a perspective on the psychodynamics of interpretation in reading which relates psychic and socio-cultural domains through the categories of emotion, identification, and fantasy. I take as questionable the antinomies of the 'individual' and the 'social,' 'inner' and 'outer' determinants on individual behaviour, 'reality' and 'fantasy.' This work has several areas of concern as reflected in the subtitle: emotion, identification, and the authority of fantasy in theories of reading performance. These topics are not always addressed under separate headings but reappear as themes and issues throughout this work as interdisciplinary contributions to their discussion are introduced. In these discussions, I draw on reader-response theory, discourse analysis, cognitive psychology, cultural anthropology, and psychoanalysis for conceptual tools of analysis.

The first chapter establishes the outline of a problem to which the remainder of the thesis offers an elaboration and a response. In Chapter 1, I focus on the dialectical, experiential phenomenon of what I am calling 'resistance in the resisting reader'(RRR). RRR refers to the imperviousness of a feminist reader's pleasure in a so-called 'politically incorrect' text even after this text has been submitted to a counter-ideological reading. RRR challenges the adequacy both of post-structuralist accounts of the subject as discursively produced and of the dominant theories of gender and identification employed by second wave, North American, feminist reading theory. RRR displays as mistaken the all too frequent feminist move of conflating a critique of representations with a critique of ideology; it demands we continue with more urgency the exploration of how representations and narratives engage readers at the level of unconscious fantasy. Making operational the axiom of perception mediated by unconscious processes for the study of reading performance continues to be a hugely complex project. Chapter 1 locates predispositions to RRR in the reader's

‘(dis)position’--provisionally, how the reader is positioned by discourse as well as by his/her emotions and the psychological reality they signal. The ‘(dis)positioned’ reader is a concept through which to examine how readers use unconscious knowledge to render texts meaningful and compelling. In Chapter 2, I offer a selective review of a lacuna in reception theory--the concept of emotion or, in psychoanalytic parlance, affect--which has been created by the hegemonic influence of the concept of ‘desire’ in psychoanalytically inspired studies of the text/reader-audience interaction and by the concept of ‘interpellation’ in cultural studies. Chapter 3 examines the relationship of emotion to conscious and unconscious processes as dilated by three paradigms of emotion. Two of these are useful in suggesting what our emotional responses can tell us about our inferential strategies and identificational positionings when reading; one in particular opens onto the question of fantasy’s influence on these processes. We are led to two propositions: emotion’s epistemological indispensability for interpretative processes as well as its ontological indispensability for a sense of self-in-relation. Later chapters explore how assumptions about emotion, drawn from these paradigms, play a role in theses about the reader as ‘ill’ who seeks relief in a therapeutics of reading which accesses fantasy. Chapter 4 addresses the feminist desideratum that "social and psychological oppression is perpetuated in the structure of the personality" (Chodorow, 1989: 65) by selectively examining feminist mass media reception research which has made fantasy a key concept in its analysis of reading; the emphasis is on Janice Radway’s *Reading the Romance* (1984) and the role played by emotion in her research into how identification proceeds in reading. Chapter 5 adumbrates the hypothesis that the transferential response of the analysand to the analyst in the analytical setting offers an analogical model for the projective and introjective operations which enable a reader’s performance of reading. I explore this analogy with respect to a metafictional text which represents the transformation or migration of affect attached to an unconscious idea to a preconscious one, while simultaneously confronting the reader with his/her own unconscious sources of pleasure and desire. Chapter 6 analyses ‘recovery’ discourse for the strategies it employs to enable participants in its self-help groups to access their fantasies, and the assumptions about the self and emotion underpinning these therapeutic strategies. It sketches a brief

analysis of the social and cultural significance of recovery's popularity in the 1980's in light of Rieff's gloomy appraisal of the 'triumph of the therapeutic' in post-World War Two America. In the Conclusion, I summarize the theoretical contribution of this work.

0.2 Theoretical and Methodological Frameworks: Beyond the omnibus concept of the 'subject in discourse' to modalities of the self in reading performance

All inquiry in the social sciences and humanities seeks to identify the processes by which those patterns that we use to organize experience come into being. In the *Geisteswissenschaften*, which are devoted to studying these processes and the patterns they produce,¹ a paradigm shift to an interpretive or hermeneutic approach has produced an increasingly widespread 'textualization' of the objects under investigation by these disciplines.² Fields such as anthropology and social psychology have been forging links with a new range of interpretive disciplines, that is, disciplines chiefly concerned with rendering accounts of human meaning systems. The 'story' or narration as a *pattern of experience* has become the focus of cross-disciplinary scrutiny at both the object-level of disciplines (for instance, an anthropologist's study of a culture's narratives about the body and the linguistic figures or tropes which guide attempts to 'describe' the reality of the body) and at the meta-disciplinary level of reflection about the narrative practices on which the theory-making of a discipline depends (the linguistic tropes of anthropologists' own narrative accounts of the meanings of a culture's narratives on the body) (Nelson et al., 1987). Theoretical debates on the 'use of stories,' and their corollary 'the uses of the self,' in the making of narratives and in processes of interpretation have assumed increasingly widespread multidisciplinary significance as the question of what we mean when we speak of human beings as interpretive agents and intentional actors is elaborated.³

In reader-response theory and reception theory, it is a commonplace to note that theories of the text/reader interaction are primordially about how readers use stories to make meanings. Similarly, cultural critique as practised by cultural studies⁴ is about how culture uses stories to fashion explanations for social life and, particularly, how institutions, such as the mass media, use stories to reproduce

themselves and the values and beliefs upon which their legitimacy relies as well as how these stories show the traces of their origins. The site of the struggle is language and images, and the object of struggle, meanings. A less prominently studied site where the struggle over meaning goes on has been emotion as a *pattern which organizes experience* and which has both a semantics and a motivating aspect. While emotion has long been found within the purview of reading theory in the study of aesthetics and, in cultural studies, as an epiphenomenon of ideology, emotion has not received extended critical attention commensurate with its ubiquity in our lives. Perspectives from cognitive psychology and from anthropology have begun to insist on the dual origins of our emotions--socially shared rules for feeling and for emotion display, and individual 'paradigm scenarios' or 'scripts' linking emotions to conscious and unconscious meanings--which reveal the rich, theoretical significance of emotion both for the study of the psychodynamics of interpretation and for any analysis of the implicit rules of social organization and interaction.

Why use the heuristic of the 'ill' reader to address the psychodynamics of interpretation?

The ambition of this inquiry is an investigation of selected aspects of the psychodynamics of reading which become visible when we take on the heuristic of the reader as 'ill.' This approach intends to redress the limitations of the post-structuralist approach to the subject "constructed by discourse" without remainder, an approach which has correctly done away with essentialist or idealist notions of human nature. However, post-structuralist tenets on subjectivity and its construction in discourse have unfortunately obfuscated a host of questions about human suffering and the means to relieve or to resist that suffering. The heuristic of the 'ill' or 'suffering' reader enables an inquiry into the origins and mechanisms of what I shall provisionally call the 'psychotherapeutic effects' of signs and emotions.⁵ It is a means of questioning the co-inherence of socio-cultural and intrapsychic worlds, the 'reality of fantasy' if you will. It is also a means of following the cultural use of symptoms and emotions, and of stories of illness narrated by suffering selves, and the way these stories, symptoms, and emotions are reissued in divergent ideologies in mass culture.⁶ Three modalities of the self are condensed in the category of the ill reader: the phenomenological level

of emotion and of suffering, the semiotics of illness (how illness represents itself, i.e. in reading behaviour), and the symbolic or hermeneutic level of the meaningfulness of suffering (the self-relevance of suffering). Neither linguistic nor semiotic theory alone contains within it an element to replace the symbolic and the phenomenological significance of emotion in illness.

I begin, therefore, with the claim that the *interpreting self*, rather than being a decentred or fragmented *subject* as Foucault or Deleuze and Guattari would have us believe, has been 'ill,' but not for the reasons deconstructionists and post-structuralists might suppose.⁷ From the point of view of reader-response theory and reception studies, to select the 'ill' reader over the 'oppressed' or 'mystified' reader, and the 'therapeutic' over 'resistance' or 'hegemony' avoids the blatant opposition in mass media theories of reception of inner to outer, of the psychical to the social, of the self as blank slate (hegemony theory) or as inhabited by class consciousness (resistance theory). This is an opposition that has led to the argument that the social world unilaterally produces misery, an account which removes all specificity from the psyche's own processes and drives.⁸ An alternative position is that there is an unconscious, undistorted by social oppression, from whose unfettered sexual drives utopian possibilities can be imagined.⁹ Also avoidable by the use of the heuristic of the 'ill' reader are various reductionisms practiced upon the concept of the unconscious, for instance, reduction to a simple repository for socially prohibited wishes (i.e. implying that 'pleasure' in the prohibited is revolutionary) or to a direct reflection of the ideological (i.e. the unconscious as the realm of illusory belief). If we hold that experience is mediated through unconscious processes which are, to some extent, outside ideology, then this position bears on related hypotheses about the self and strategies for its emancipation, one being the relation between a critique of ideology and a critique of representation. Holding the view that structural domination will be refracted through individual experience does not dissolve the painful paradox that while ideology critique was supposed to salve the suffering created by illusory belief, the reasons why there are better or worse *personal* solutions to suffering in the context of systemic injustice remain mystified on a materialist account. Feminism needs a theory of experience and of the interpreting self who uses culturally available

narratives to relieve suffering (some might call it a theory of pleasure in mass culture), which has neither been hijacked by the conflationary move of reducing a critique of ideology to a critique of representation nor by the equally conflationary Foucauldian elision of individual experience and social representation.¹⁰

Modalities of the reader: illness and therapeutics

To employ the metaphor of illness or affliction with respect to the reader is to say that my concern lies with specific modalities of experience and subjectivity (suffering) and with the 'ill' reader as agent who seeks relief through consumption activities in the marketplace. My interest is in pursuing the usefulness, for feminist cultural and reading theory, of an hypothesis that the consumption of cultural products (i.e. specific genres) can be accounted for from the point of view of a phenomenology and a hermeneutics of illness and a search for a method of healing by readers and audiences. Consequently, this project attempts to link *a theory of the psychodynamics of reading performance to a theory of reading particular texts (cultural consumption) as therapeutics*. It explores how we might view consumption not from a third-person account of its seductive promise to produce 'unique' identities paradoxically through the purchase of mass-produced goods and meanings, nor as an affirmation of social identity; but rather, at one level, as each person's attempt to continue the coherent construction of his or her private experience of self and to find idiosyncratically satisfactory solutions to internal conflicts. This attempt is only accessible through first-person narratives and occasions where the unconscious is allowed to speak. I will be arguing that the unconscious always speaks through our emotions as well.

Corpus and presuppositional analysis

Who is the suffering self which seeks relief in cultural consumption? Relief from what? What measures bring relief? Do texts which we find compelling relieve suffering or ultimately exacerbate it? Specialised psychological and psychiatric volumes alone offer no answers to these questions for it is in the circulation of ideas about the psyche, its symptoms, environment, and developmental history in 'social discourse' (van Dijk, 1977; Gergen, 1985) where the answers in which I am interested

are to be found. We need to understand the conceptual resources and therapeutic languages made available to us in social discourse to think about ourselves, the relation of self to society, and of self to interiority.¹¹ It is for this reason that, in the following chapters, we will turn to a number of contemporary texts, both academic and popular, for what they have to say about the 'ill' self today and the means of its healing through the use of mass culture.

I propose a disarticulation or unpacking of the meanings attributed to the notion of the 'ill' self as it is employed in three types of contemporary social discourse. These are feminist contributions to reader-response theory which privilege the category of fantasy (eg. Radway, 1984; Penley, 1992); a six hour production for television first aired in North America on PBS in 1989, the British playwright Dennis Potter's metafictional text *The Singing Detective*; and a selection of contemporary, best-selling self-help books identified with the 'recovery' movement (eg. John Bradshaw, 1988, 1988; Janet Woititz, 1983; Melody Beattie 1987; 1989). The taped 'seminars' by Bradshaw on the family, which were initially shown on PBS in 1991, also contribute to the corpus. Common to all three examples is: (1) a problematizing of the self and self-knowledge through the metaphor of 'illness' or 'affliction'; (2) a linking of affliction to childhood experience; (3) the 'ill' self, presupposed in each types of social discourse, logically implies some notion of a 'therapeutics'; and (4) each offers proposals for healing feeling through narration. These texts were chosen because, on a quick inspection, they all discuss explicitly, or introduce thematically, the question of the self's healing precisely through an encounter with some form of mass culture (Radway's readers with romance fiction, Penley's fans with K/S zines; *The Singing Detective*'s protagonist with detective fiction; the 'recovery' movement's adherents with self-help books). On closer inspection, all these forms of mass culture put the reading self into a relationship with its unconscious fantasy life and, to differing degrees, bring that fantasy life forward into consciousness. Self consciousness, however, does not necessarily lead to self-understanding.

In order to evaluate the usefulness of my Bettelheimian hypothesis that the reading self engages in reading because it has psychotherapeutic effects, my intention is to put into conversation the above-mentioned specialised and mass mediated

discourses in order: (1) to identify the points of convergence or contradiction or incommensurability of approaches to the interpreting self, as *afflicted self*, offered by these social discourses, both academic and popular (intertextuality); (2) to examine the assumptions of each discourse with respect to the consequences of childhood experience for adult predispositions to affective and identificatory experiences; (3) to examine hypotheses made by discourses on the afflicted self about the links between emotion, identifications, internal worlds, and how meaning is activated during the performance of reading; (4) to determine if there is something in the popular construal of healing through a change in the relationship of emotions to the internal world and to identifications that throws light on or corresponds to theories of narrativity in reader-response theory. Hence, the central purpose of this comparative approach is to discover to what extent we can confirm the correspondence between textual and psychic processes, which some poststructuralist and psychoanalytic literary critics hold exists (Barthes, 1975; Brooks, 1977, 1987; Felman, 1977; Meltzer, 1990), against the premises underpinning the rationale for 'recovery's' therapeutic strategies with respect to the relation between pathology, psychological processes, and sign systems.

Theoretical Note: the interdigitation of intrapsychic and socio-cultural phenomena

What is the theoretical and methodological justification for these diverse soundings of current formulations of the suffering self in social discourse, soundings which seek to make up in sensitivity to nuance and depth what they lack in scope and comprehensiveness?

The theoretical problématique of this thesis grew out of questions which arose from the juxtaposition of the above-mentioned discourses on the 'ill' self. The contemporary self-help movement and two intellectual traditions, which have commented on it or have written tangentially to it, not only affirm the topicality of the 'ill' reader and the 'therapeutic,' they provide some signposts as to why the cultural phenomenon of the self-help recovery movement raises questions feminist social theorists and feminist reading theorists should find disturbing. One signpost question arises from the concern of those in a number of disciplines (Rosen, 1977; Rieff, 1966; Lasch, 1979; Foucault, 1981; Bellah *et al*, 1985; Katz and Liu, 1991; Giddens, 1992;

Ross, 1992) for the political and cultural repercussions of, what Philip Rieff called, the "triumph of the therapeutic" in the mid-twentieth century, a social phenomenon which has recently expressed itself in the popularity of the 'recovery' self-help movement in North America. The 'recovery' phenomenon puts into circulation in mass culture a language of self-reference based on an understanding of the self as 'victimized,' as 'addicted,' as 'co-dependent' as well as a point of view which localizes the source of our 'sick' society in our 'sick' families. It proposes a means to self-knowledge and self-transformation through a recovery of emotion expression.

The second intellectual current that brings me by a somewhat circuitous route to the topics of the 'ill' self and to a 'therapeutics' of reading draws on the contradictions posed to feminist culture critique by the heterogeneous body of thought on mind, language, and subjectivity known as post-structuralism. In feminism's efforts to theorize the preconditions of social and psychical transformation, the turn to the 'authenticity of emotion' has become of interest in the exhausted wake of the continuous, suspicious scrutiny of signs advocated by deconstruction. In fact, it has been said that post-structuralist interrogations of "metaphysical mind, metaphysical language, metaphysical truth" (Flax, 1990) have released emotion as a concept for reexamination while creating a new space for theoretical discourse (Jardine, 1985). In the work of a feminist sociologist such as Arlie Hochschild (1983), emotions and class are made the touchstones of her standpoint theory. The search for the authenticity of the self in the evidence of emotions belies a cultural yearning for an Archimedean point, a truth or master language which cannot be lost in the sea change of rhetoric, swamped by managed feelings, or reduced to "the effect of some limited and challengeable point of view" (Fish, 1992: 215).

Methodological Note: A psychotherapeutics of reading requires a contaminated methodology

In light of these juxtapositions, my interest in two types of practice--the 'ill' self reading texts and the 'ill' self reading itself as text--to some extent are recalcitrantly and uneasily married under the impulse to probe this notion of the 'psychotherapeutic' potential of reading. Fully the child of this context of conception, my methodological probing follows two overlapping routes. These two routes lead to a

'contaminated' methodology (Knauff, 1986), but one which is not as contaminated as I would have liked.¹²

A therapeutics of reading can be meaningfully formulated as an issue for reading theory, for instance, as opposed to being relegated to a sociology of needs *à la* William Leiss (1976) or pursued under a commodification thesis *à la* Frankfurt School. However, it requires a contaminated methodology in which a variety of disciplines acquire a new interest for reader-response theory and are brought to bear on the interpretative issues involved in reading performance. The problem of the psychotherapeutic effects of reading speaks to areas being researched in psychological and cultural anthropology, by personality and culture researchers, by cognitive psychologists studying the prototypes or scripts by which emotions become repositories of cultural and bodily knowledge, by psychoanalytic models of symbolization and ego development, by neonatologists on symbolization, and by individual and family therapists. Constance Penley seconds such a cross-disciplinary initiative, "It seems to me that the strongest work in this field [of the study of popular culture] is the kind that attempts to mix a number of strategically chosen methods of analysis" (1992: 495).¹³

Where does a contaminated method lead?

Two methodological trajectories take me some of the way toward formulating the relation between a reader's identificatory positioning due to the work of fantasy and the emotions experienced in reading which have psychotherapeutic effects.

Route 1 leads to a comparison of different social discursive constructions of the self through its suffering, the import of emotions as symptomatology, and how these emotion symptoms become part of theories about the sources of suffering and the mechanisms of healing. The social discursive analysis of concepts of illness and healing allows us to come at the problem of theories of the psychological make-up of the reading self and its transactions with textual meanings from two different angles in the hope that the juxtaposition will produce new relationships for investigation.

Theories of the reading self (Schweickart (1986), de Lauretis (1984, 1987), Radway (1984), Penley (1992)) are juxtaposed to theories of the self reading itself (Dennis

Potter's metafictional detective fiction; recovery literature and group work). Theories of reader-response and reception studies, by definition, are discourses which investigate the self and, in so doing, put into circulation within a specialized community assumptions about the self or mind--cognitive, unconscious, linguistic, emotional--on which are founded hypotheses about the relation between experience, memory, language, meaning formation, and pleasure. These theories depend upon particular construals of the interpreting self for their hypotheses about textual effects. Like self-help discourses, reader-response theories as well as television dramas are implicated in the reproduction of common sense beliefs and expectations about the relationship of emotion to cognition which make-up a culture's dominant 'folk' theory of the mind as well as its peculiar ethnotheory of emotion.¹⁴ To be discovered in this social discursive analysis are the rhetorical devices, textual strategies, and ideological constructs by which these discourses create a folk model of the self from which derive assumptions about: (1) the interaction between individual experience and social representation; (2) the sources of the emotions; (3) the relation of emotion to cognition, to unconscious identification, and to the internal object world gestured to in fantasy;¹⁵ (4) the etiology of illness; and (5) mechanisms of therapeutic action and their objects and the levels on which these mechanisms work (i.e. bodily-felt meaning and discursive level).

By following Route 2, I intend to dilate the hypothesis that we can learn something about how the self reads texts from a prior understanding of how the self reads itself as text. The latter should compose a picture of how the self's internal world provides its interpretative predispositions. Route 2 involves switching our lens of investigation, for instance, from one which brings into focus in Chapter 6 the contribution 'recovery' literature makes to the social discursive construction of meanings of suffering to an optic on 'recovery' as an emotional experience with mutative effects on the self's emotional constitution. Similarly, in Chapter 5, we move from a lens which allows us to study representations of illness in *The Singing Detective* to the ways this metafictional text puts the reader in a particular relationship to his/her own interpretative processes, wishes, and sources of pleasures.

Is it a defensible project to seek to compare the interpretative processes of the self 'reading' itself in therapy, with the interpretative processes of the self reading a cultural text, when the two interpretative events occur in what seem to be very different contexts, with different premises, aims, and communicative relationships? In psychodynamic therapy, the patient--his behaviour, his narratives and the "polygraphy of the unconscious" (Green, 1978: 284)--are the objects of investigation by the therapist whereas when we sit down to watch *Aliens* on our VCR or buy Scott Turow's *Presumed Innocent* at an airport bookstall, the film and novel are the texts being read and interpreted by us. Or so we think.

I would argue this is a defensible project on two accounts. On the one hand, *The Singing Detective* as well as recovery literature and group practices situate the reader-participant reflexively. Not only do they describe and represent psychic processes but they position the reading self in order that he encounter himself feeling and lead him to probe the sources and meanings of those feelings. Indeed, each reading event implies a transference theory of meaning where "the reader understands the text only insofar as he understands the disturbance the text sets up within him (Marotti, 1978: 473).¹⁶ My account of reading performance is partial due to my angle of vision precisely because I am interested not in the feminist reader nor the female or male reader but in the (dis)positioned reader in order to make a sounding of the archaic and primitive parts of the self (which, furthermore, are not necessarily unconscious). That said, this is not a thesis on psychoanalysis, although it must show some familiarity with psychoanalytic concepts to proceed. Nor is it a thesis on aesthetics.

Secondly. I propose there are parallels between the effects of strategies used in popular forms of therapy (i.e. by 'recovery' groups) to induce therapeutic ends and the effects of certain types of textual practices, particularly those associated with metafiction. To make such a proposal I am assuming portability, that is, that the self does not forfeit its particular psychosexual economy of wishes and defences, compromises and habits when it leaves the perceptual, cognitive, affective rigours of everyday life for the cultural/aesthetic realm proper. The frameworks used by individuals to make sense of everyday life as a semiotic and affective environment,

and themselves within it, are the same ones mobilized to interpret discrete cultural commodities as signifying events (books, films, television sitcoms, news). In this I am following Freud in spirit. As Ricoeur reminds us, "In 'Creative Writers and Daydreaming' Freud stated his basic argument that the barely perceptible transitions from the nocturnal dream to play and then to humor, fantasy, the daydream, and finally to folklore, legends, and genuine works of art leads us to suspect that creativity results from *the same dynamics and involves the same economic structure as the phenomena of compromise and substitutive satisfaction* which he had already developed for the interpretation of dreams and the theory of neurosis" (Ricoeur, 1979: 303) (my emphasis). Furthermore, I am not making a distinction between a hermeneutics of intersubjective experience in daily life and a hermeneutics of intersubjectivity occasioned by the imaginative act of reading a cultural text. The hermeneutical activity of reading texts, and the aesthetic experience of so doing, is a particular, discrete instance of an ongoing, ever present readiness to interpret signifying systems and to find certain types of narratives pleasurable or anxiety producing. This view draws on the psychoanalytic concept of transference which holds that human interaction with the world is informed by the earliest of psychic processes, projection and introjection. The resurgence of conflicts and affects, originating in early life experience, is not restricted to the therapeutic milieu in the form of an artificially stimulated illness known as the transference. It is rather a phenomenological mode of experiencing intersubjectivity in everyday living (Siegle, 1986); it is potentially available as a mode of experiencing human interaction as well as of experiencing representations of human interaction.¹⁷

Note to readers

Readers whose primary interest is in emotion will find it to be the dominant theme in Chapters 2, 3 and 6. Whereas in other chapters the topic of emotion appears in a subordinate position: to a discussion of the inadequacy of the feminist critique as the basis of a theory of reading (Chapter 1); to an evaluation of Radway's thesis on identification and its unconscious origins in readers of romance fiction (Chapter 4); and to an exploration of metafiction as the exemplary instance of the representation of

the transferential aspects of the text/reader transaction (Chapter 5). The substance of these chapters will be further outlined below.

0.3 Two intellectual trajectories intersect at a therapeutics

Let me now return to the second of the two intellectual currents which prompted reflection on the ill reader in order to reprise an issue raised by the feminist theorist Jane Flax that is crucial for any study of the psychodynamics of reading.

0.3.1 Toward modalities of the reader in feminist theory: the paedogenetic impress

The second tradition which has guided me toward an investigation of illness and therapeutics is the impasse to which feminist theories of text and subjectivity have been brought by deconstruction (Kauffman, 1992). Feminist theory has found its encounter with deconstruction and poststructuralism to bear contradictory fruit. While certain tenets of poststructuralism can be profitably deployed to display the social construction of femininity and masculinity and the operations of the sex/gender system, other tenets produce a flat view of the subject's psychic processes as contingent, as both produced and dispersed by the discursive positions made available by texts. Consequently, what can it possibly mean to inquire into the nature of suffering or the therapeutic on a post-structuralist account of the subject? Has post-structuralism not also decentred the concept of the 'therapeutic' into a therapeutics of so many person-slices? Discourse can 'position' individuals in relationships between persons and beliefs, but how this position **feels** is not simply a construct of discourse nor accessible solely through talk. I would argue that the theoretical limits if not ethical emptiness of the poststructuralist approach to the subject, to mind, and to emotions becomes most apparent when it puts the meaningfulness of the psychotherapeutic into doubt if not reducing it to nonsense.¹⁸

Secondly, is the deconstructionist view that 'we do not find a pre-existent meaning when we read, but only our projections' not incoherent in the face of the fact that certain texts rather than others are found to be more satisfying and more pleasurable to some readers? What is the nature of the textual stimulus to which we respond with our projected meanings? Can deconstruction explain what criteria are

responsible for these discriminations of pleasure and unpleasure? Why could the 'reduction or relief of suffering' not be one of those criteria? And, if it is, then deconstruction is only useful to the extent that it leads us to the sources of the suffering and an analysis of the textual mechanisms which mitigate that suffering.

Jane Flax (1990) points reading theorists in a direction to look for an understanding of the ill self and for a psychotherapeutics of reading performance. Flax would concur that feminism's inheritances from post-structuralism have impeded the production of method: "analyse unconscious positioning (as well as archaically determined positioning of which readers are consciously aware). Critiquing the uses of the 'subject' in feminist scholarship, Flax has noted that the *modalities of the subject* have been ignored. She writes, "The importance of child-rearing modes to women's status and men's and women's sense of self is emphasized by feminist theorists, yet...[t]he modal 'person' in feminist theory still appears to be a self-sufficient individual adult" (1990:181). Unfortunately, feminist theory which has devoted itself to critiquing the masculine subject of philosophy, political philosophy, and philosophy of science (Harding and Hintikka, 1983) has been guilty of reproducing its own version of the liberal notion of the autonomous self.¹⁹

While seeking a basis for collective agency among women, and while recuperating from the poststructuralist stripped-down view of subjectivity with which many of its thinkers had become enamoured, contemporary feminism has become embroiled in internal debates about the respective merits of a politics of positionality over a politics of identity (Alcoff, 1989; Gregg, 1991).²⁰ In studies of reader-response theory as in studies of collective action such as union organizing, the categories of class, ethnicity, age, and race present themselves as alternate modalizers of subjectivity in addition to gender (Press, 1991; Long, 1989; Gregg, 1991; McRobbie, 1984). The turn to the reader, however, has yet to produce a fully developed 'internal psychopolitics of positionality' which would address the modality of the self to which I think Flax is referring and the prisonhouse of emotion which is one of its symptoms.

We recall that the grammatical meaning of 'mode' with respect to a verb form or auxiliary verb expresses "a distinction of mood, such as that between possibility and

actuality. The modal auxiliaries in English include *can, do, may, must, need, ought, shall, should, will, and would.*" (*Collins Dictionary of the English Language*, 1979: 946). Modality is a quality, attribute, or circumstance denoting mode, mood, or manner; modalities of subjectivity point to passive or active modes as well as alluding to possible future selves. From Flax's statement I draw the inference that a backward glance in time is a necessary, although ultimately not sufficient, direction in which to look for the preconditions for later modal attributes of subjectivity. Indeed, our various identities may only articulate with possible selves once we have taken that backward glance.

In reading theory, the study of modalities of the reader has been complicated by three competing hypotheses about the unconscious and signifying practices all of which differ in how they formulate the problem of mediation, unconscious determinants and their origins and rules of application. The first is the Lacanian structural psychoanalytic formulation of 'psyche as text' (PAT) and the second, the Derridean poststructural formulation of 'text as psyche' (TAP). Work in cultural studies, primarily influenced by Lacan, has been concerned to demonstrate how female and male consumers are originally created as libidinal subjects for the positions of identification offered by diverse discourses. A competing tradition which investigates our childhood's importance for adult life has occurred in reading theory as an investigation into the relationship between unconscious processes and language with respect to how we become sexed, how our gender identity is formed through the mediated internalization of cultural codes belonging to the sex/gender system. The study of the relation of psychological and cultural realms has been taken up in North American scholarship less under the Lacanian formulation or PAT theory, and more under the influence of Nancy Chodorow's psychoanalytic sociological account, informed by object relations, of the production of different internal worlds which characterise females and males under patriarchal family arrangements. Under this Chodorovian influence, North American feminist cultural and reading theory has begun to investigate whether there are modalities of subjectivity which show a paedogenetic impress, for instance, the modality of the subject-child in time and, particularly, in infantile or developmental time, created by invasions of that time 'past' in time 'now'

for which the subject seeks life-long solutions.²¹ From the perspective of discerning modalities of the self in reading, one problem for *a theory of reading performance as psychotherapeutic* takes the form of drawing out the notion of the ill reader with a view to understanding how *childhood developmental history through its psychodynamic and affective residues provides another 'location' from which women and men throughout their adult lives organize experience, including the experience of narrative, feel it to be true and real, and are motivated to act.*

I am proposing, through the turn to emotion to bypass the usual terms in the debate between structuralist and post-structuralist variants of the relation between subjectivity and language, and the hegemonic importance afforded the concept of desire in order to try to identify this paedogenetic impress in our emotions. Rather than assuming a Lacanian framework to talk about the authority of fantasy in terms of the 'phallus,' the Symbolic, and so forth, positing that emotion is the counterpart to desire offers new opportunities for the study of desire's shadowy presence in social interaction and textual consumption. Inasmuch as emotion is related both to symbolization and to motivation, by investigating emotion we may discover a vehicle by which fantasy asserts its authority on identity and behaviour. An investigation of emotion may lead us to discover aspects of the self which have been lost to a language-oriented structuralism and poststructuralism but which, nevertheless, capture something proper to the ways in which the *self's relations to its internal objects* and the self's self-regulating mechanisms (defences) are mediations of experience just as much as are its consciously held beliefs. The paedogenetic impress is exerted by the imposition of an individual's inner world and intrapsychic conflicts on the 'meaning' of external situations, and that meaning may become accessible through an understanding of the semantics of emotion.

Chapter 1: from the subject in discourse to the (dis)positioned self

Chapter 1 responds to Flax's dissatisfaction with the lack of theoretical progress on the integration of the modal subject into feminist theorizing. In this first chapter, I argue that a fundamental requirement of feminist theory is to explain the political effects of texts by accounting for their aesthetic effects, that is, to explain

from what sources texts draw their power to influence belief or motivate readers to action in the world or to give readers pleasure. In North American feminist circles an alternative objective has been to develop a feminist theory of reading.

The second project founders on two basic accounts. First of all, it lacks a psychodynamics of reading. Efforts to develop such a theory prefer to espouse policies of what readers should do rather than proposing how to understand what readers really do with texts. It refuses a post-structuralist orientation which allows for the positing of a diversity of responses to and uses of narrative. Secondly, the inspiration for promoting a feminist theory of reading is the claim that representations are ideological. This loses a crucial, mediating level of experience, that being the influence of personal fantasy on interpretation, because it collapses the meaning of textual representations, as construed by individual readers, with the linguistic significance of these representations. This position, in other words, refuses to allow that the semantic or semiotic significance of textual representations is necessarily transformed into idiosyncratic and overcoded recordings by each individual's interpretative labour.

Chapter 1 introduces 'resistance in the resisting reader' as a dialectical reading phenomenon observed to be a limit case for efforts to formulate a feminist theory of reading. It is also a useful theoretical heuristic with which to address questions of female subjectivity and the psychodynamics of reading performance. It occurs against the backdrop of an issue dominating cultural politics in the 1970's, which remains relevant today, particularly in psychoanalytic feminist circles: "What is female subjectivity?" Resistance in the resisting reader is an example of resistance to change as it occurs in reading behaviour. A political issue for feminism has always been people's resistance to change, collectively and individually, and the vital requirement to understand it. For instance, differing strategies by which to organise support among women for social change have been grouped under two invocations of shared experience: solidarity defined by identity (as female) and solidarity defined by positionality (class, age, race, ethnicity, and so on). Identity and positionality identify types of factors which are believed to explain motivation and self-understanding; however, their explanatory breadth is severely limited if they cannot include the level

of the repressed. The concept of 'resistance in the resisting reader' attributes the source of a female reader's compelling, repetitive processes of meaning formation and pleasure in images and plots characterized as sexist, stereotypical, or politically incorrect by feminist criticism, to the (dis)positioning of the reader by textual strategies as well as by 'recursive positioning.'

I will argue that recursive positioning, as it pertains to the emotional constitution or 'disposition' of the reading self, is a pre-disposition to particular emotional responses to particular types of internal or external stimuli. The presence of the activity of recursive positioning in a self's cognitive construal of an event is, in part, to be identified through the emotions evinced by that self. Recursive positioning, one of the sources and mechanisms of resistance in the resisting reader, puts into question any direct correspondence or relation of entailment between ideology (or, in post-structuralist terms, discourse), belief, and emotion. On this claim, it follows that emotions and identifications, which are symptomatic of a reader's fantasy and perhaps also suggestive of a rationale for fantasy's *mise-en-scène*, are what have to be investigated in order to grasp the mediated ways in which ideology (dis)positions selves. **By this concept of (dis)position, I mean to suggest that a reader's lived experience (social and idiosyncratic), his/her practical knowledge coded in the expressive form of emotion, both enables and inhibits particular kinds of inferential insight by that reader. By moving from 'position' to '(dis)position' to discuss the ways in which readers are brought to meanings in their encounter with texts, I wish to suggest that meaning may have something to do with the understandings inherent in the emotions experienced by the reader, their relative intensities, and the internal object-relations scenarios with which they are associated.**

What is needed in reader-response theory is a means of nuancing a more complex account of 'positioning' which is a function of a reader's '(dis)position.' With the introduction of the term of art of **(dis)position**, conflict and contradiction within the reading self as a "chronoholistic organism" (Devereux, 1968) is indicated by the dual conceptual frameworks invoked by '(dis)position': 'positioning,' the result of cultural competency to make narrative codes meaningful, and 'disposition,' the

individual self's idiosyncratic set of procedures for the activation of cultural competence, and his/her phenomenological response to textual codes. Part of that phenomenological response is an affective response to a text's verbal and visual signs which has a counterpart in processes of identification by the reader. However, emotional response can exceed what our theorization of codes and rituals would imagine as the appropriate force and type of emotions likely to be experienced by the 'positioned' subject as, for instance, 'mourner' in a funerary rite, or 'father-of-the-bride' at a wedding. 'Disposition' from *disponere*, to arrange, dispose, also entails the sense of "a putting in order," "the power or authority to manage; control," (Webster's *New World Dictionary*, 1957). Therefore, the (dis)positioned reader is not entirely a 'subject-effect,' not completely reducible to the subject positions offered by the mode of address of the text, just as the individual as a social and class subject is not the brute product of ideology.

Chapters 2 and 3: paradigms of emotion

The direction of inquiry into the (dis)positioned reader in the next two chapters proceeds through the introduction of three paradigms of emotion and how these models link emotion to belief and perception, to action, to physiology, and to axiology.

In Chapter 2, I take as my point of departure Jacqueline Rose's defence of intrapsychic fantasy as a means for feminist research to investigate the coinherence and codependence of the socio-cultural world and unconscious processes. She proposes that the importance of psychoanalysis for cultural critique lies in the theoretical insights and investigative protocols it offers our understanding of how "ideology works at the most rudimentary levels of psychic identity and the drives" (Rose, 1986: 5). Inasmuch as desire and interpellation have become exhausted as categories by which we can learn very much about the psychodynamic processes of real readers in their acts of reading, I propose to reformulate Rose's ambition in terms of emotion.²² Chapters 2 and 3 prepare a route by which to begin our account of "how ideology works at the most rudimentary levels of identity and the drives through emotion."

Chapter 3 is an epistemologically oriented chapter which explores how and what we know through the experience of emotion and emotion expressions. It introduces the three dominant paradigms of emotion which organize research on emotion in cognitive psychology, cultural anthropology, and philosophy. Emotions have an ontology and an historical reality; they also have a social dimension, a cultural dimension, and a psychoanalytic dimension. Depending on the paradigm which dominates thinking about emotion--the biobehavioural, cognitivist/social constructivist, or psychoanalytic--the relation of cognition to emotion will be modelled differently. In Chapter 3, I address the problem of how to relate social constructivist 'scripts' for emotion to psychoanalytic 'paradigm scenarios' of affect for the purpose of achieving a coherent account of the dual authorship/authority of emotions: on the one hand, the link inculcated by culture between cognitive schema and the appropriate emotion to feel and/or display and, on the other hand, the impact of family culture on these schema. It may be useful to think of emotion as a form of "repetition with difference" to adapt Linda Hutcheon's description of parody; our emotions repeat the evaluation immanent in an emotion--what our culture says it is to feel a particular emotion--while rewriting the script for some emotions according to the influence of the perspectives and emotional rituals learned in the family culture.

These three paradigms may be more or less able to account for identification as a type of positioning of the subject within competing values in the cultural surround.²³ How is a theory of emotions related to intrapsychic identification or identification in fantasy? What is exciting in a cross-disciplinary endeavour to account for emotions is that a contrastive comparison between the cognitive/social constructivist account (which offers a typology of the objects of the emotions) and the psychoanalytic approach to the semantics of emotion may enable us to make correspondences between the social discourse of emotion and the objects of emotions it authorizes and a psychoanalytic perspective which discerns that the intentionality of affects is authorized by pre-existing internal objects. The modification of the cognitive psychological concept of 'paradigm scenario' to include an intrapsychic or fantasy 'paradigm scenario' offers promise in modelling how emotions may be the product of the transference from the past of the motivational force of desires not

presently felt by an individual but in whose ways of perceiving, *feeling*, or acting these archaic desires continue to be expressed. The focus on how people experience emotion and what it means to them calls for a hermeneutics of emotions. Hence, when we study emotion, we must place it within a model of self-relevance in order to investigate how it provides the measure of the self-relevance of what a person sees, fantasizes, and experiences.

0.3.2 The therapeutic in social discourse: the political import of producing subjects for therapy

My focus on the 'ill' self is mirrored in and mirrors the prevalence in social discourse of a therapeutically-inspired language which has come to the attention of another intellectual current in North America. In *Habits of the Heart. Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (1985), Bellah and his co-authors point out that a therapeutic tradition, deriving from expressive individualism, has become a prevalent resource which Americans are using to think about the meaning of their lives and their society. However, in the view of these authors, individualism, as the dominant ideology of American life, as well as the therapeutically-inspired, psychologically-minded, self-regarding language in which the members of the middle class express their sense of self, are undermining the foundations of commitment and shared meanings and moral philosophy required for the existence of public life.

In contrast, it can be inferred from Arlie Hochschild's argument in *The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling* (1983) that we, as a society, may be losing a sense of the very 'authentic' selves which provide the motivation and axiological guidance for participation in public life. She argues that:

The significance of the growth of new therapies cannot be dismissed by the argument that they are simply a way of extending jobs in the service sector by creating new needs. The question remains, why *these* needs? Why the new need to *do* something about how you feel? The new therapies have also been criticized, as the old self-help movement was, for focusing on individual solutions to the exclusion of social ones and for legitimating the message, "Look out for Number One" (Lasch, 1976b). This critique is not wrong in itself, but it is partial and misleading. It is my own view that the capacity to feel is fully analogous to the capacity to see or hear; and if that capacity is lost or injured, it is wise to restore it in whatever way one can.

(1983: 192)

These comments identify a social phenomenon, the rise of self-help groups in America in the mid-twentieth century; an objective of these groups, to mitigate the suffering caused by a loss of emotions through a recovery of feelings; and a psychological view of emotion as analogous to the faculty of perception. Hochschild explains this phenomenon by proposing that in today's society "the more the heart is managed [by the organized training of feeling], the more we value the unmanaged heart" (1983: 192). As a study of the socio-historical construction of the relevance of the concept of emotion, and its intertwining with notions of authenticity, and true versus spurious self-experience, Hochschild's study suggests that the therapeutic is a way of framing questions about the self in terms of the problem of self-relevance and the self's apprehension of or knowledge of itself through its experience of 'true' or 'authentic' emotions.²⁴

No doubt, Bellah would characterize my interest in the therapeutic as but a manifestation of the Western psychological sub-culture which reinforces liberalist notions of the expressivist self and as another voice in the depoliticizing tendency of which he and his colleagues are critical. No doubt, some feminists would argue that the language of therapy is another aspect of the 'postfeminist' tendency (Friedan, 1981) in our culture in the 1980's to personalize and individualize remedies to systemic problems.²⁵ No doubt my choice of the heuristic of 'illness' also seems a suspect, ego-centric, and overly medicalized characterization when compared with the all too familiar, socio-centric key words and code phrases of feminist theory: "patriarchy," "systemic oppression," "phallocentrism," "learned helplessness," and "consciousness-raising."²⁶ The triumph of the therapeutic response to our dedivinated world does not make irrelevant existential questions of meaning, value, and morality or issues of political transformation. It remains to be seen if, as Richard Rorty says, the questions we are asking about ourselves are changing as the mobile army of metaphors we use to address them also changes. Where reference is made to the 'therapeutic' in a reception study such as Radway's, can this notion have any more specificity than the banal sense of relieving the everyday ordinary misery of life in a sexist society?

From a philosophic viewpoint, the rise of the language of the therapeutic as compared to the language of the moral universe is witness to a massive paradigm shift.²⁷ From an anthropological point of view, this language of the 'therapeutic' can be seen to be part of an intrasocietal battle over which concept of the 'person' or 'self' will dominate as well as the web of concepts and values in which each is lodged concerning intimacy, rights and responsibilities. Furthermore, the language of the self-reflexive examination of one's suffering, which is today widely used to figure the presence of an 'authentic' self, may have become the chosen vehicle in our culture not only to solve problems of the individual's relation to society but of the individual's self-knowledge and identity in the face of contingency and historicity.

I maintain, therefore, that the notion of illness (and of a psychotherapeutics) is crucial to a feminist politics for three reasons. First, it puts forward for debate the meaning of suffering in light of a notion of the 'self' that goes beyond illness as mystification about one's true identity which can be remedied by ideology critique. Second, it calls for a form of healing, of relief at the phenomenological level of individual experience (which will never occur *ipso facto* as a consequence of what are fundamental, but as yet unfulfilled, reforms at institutional, legislative, and policy levels). Third and finally, illness is already implicit in feminist discourse and must be explored systematically in both its social and personal registers.

The prevalence in social discourse of the concept of suffering and self-help was invigorated in the 1970's by feminism in North America. Much contemporary Anglo-American, feminist cultural and literary criticism implicitly assumes illness on the part of whole classes of readers and, indeed, has labelled pleasure in reading 'politically incorrect' representations as 'collusive,' as a symptom of interior colonization or false consciousness.²⁸ For instance, a distinction has always been made between a 'false' self and an 'authentic' self which legitimates the women's movement as a struggle to create conditions for self-understanding and self-realisation no less than as a struggle for political, economic, and legal equality. Feminists 'of one stripe' routinely appeal to some notion of the 'false' self to account for the fact that feminists 'of some other stripe' take pleasure in 'degrading' representations and plots (i.e. pornography, Harlequin romance fiction, Madonna videos). On this view, not to resist these

representations is a sign of illness which must be cured by consciousness-raising. Each woman's discovery of her 'authentic' self is the remedy by which to render her immune to collusion with her society's cultural tools of oppression at the level where it counts, her pleasure. When incorrect belief is figured as illness, the cure lies in changing belief. To this end, feminist responses to patriarchy have been at the level of ideology critique, and of activism on behalf of legal and economic reforms rather than at the level of 'unconsciousness raising.'²⁹ However, there are other recent voices arguing that feminism needs a therapeutics of the self and not solely a revolutionary politics whose aim is to destroy patriarchy as an ideology and as an economic institution noxious to women's psychological and material health.

Only recently has a seminal figure of second wave feminism, Gloria Steinem, disturbed the tendency to sociologism of feminist theory by publishing a book entitled *Revolution from Within: A Book of Self-Esteem* (1992). Outlining the limits of consciousness-raising for feminism at both the personal and collective levels, Steinem argues that women must find the political in the personal at a new level: in the unconscious self. She defends the exercise of self-examination in order to change what could be called the 'internal politics of positionality' and its paedogenetic preconditions. She defends the importance of self-help books and inspirational-autobiographical works, such as she has written, as guides for an 'internal revolution' by proposing that they share equal space opposite political, social, and historical volumes in bookstores.³⁰ Another disturbing effect of Steinem's book is that, in a simple language accessible to the thousands of journalists who think a Steinem book to be newsworthy, she has recovered the concept of fantasy not only for Anglo-American feminist theory but for public discourse. She argues that a reflexive feminism requires that its historical subjects have not only a collective identity but self-knowledge.

This requires that feminist theory operate with a more complex working definition of subjectivity, what I am proposing be called the '(dis)positioned self,' to refer not solely to how we are placed or place ourselves in discourse, but how we are first prepared to be solicited to positions of identification and to place ourselves in discourse according to the demands posed by our internal world of object relations

and its expression in our core fantasies. The exploration of (dis)positioning is properly an exploration of the contribution of internal object relations to our use of socially available, discursively produced, gender-specific positions. The (dis)positioned reader (as against the discursively 'positioned' reader) introduces the unconscious through its presence in the reader's emotional engagement with the cultural text.

Chapter 4: from emotional response to identifications in fantasy

Chapters 2 and 3 introduced the paradigms of emotion which are used in Chapter 4 to evaluate Janice Radway's theoretical and methodological uses of emotion in her thesis on the therapeutic function of women's pleasure in reading the romance. Radway is one of a number of theorists who have rehabilitated fantasy and emotion as seminal concepts for reader-response theory. She has also endowed the notion of a therapeutics of reading with theoretical respectability, although its theorization is far from complete.

Reading the Romance (1984) proposes that romance reading fulfills therapeutic functions because it satisfies certain women's unconscious and culturally induced needs. Radway has taken the phenomenon of women's pleasurable consumption of the so-called politically incorrect genre of romance both as a sign of suffering, which has its origins in the conflict between social demands and personal needs, and as an attempt by these readers to effect healing. The methodological significance of the recuperation of fantasy by Anglo-American, feminist, reader-response theorists such as Radway is that it provides a springboard to the study of the psychological preconditions for identifications and emotions, fantasy's implication in perception and cognition, its relation to illness, to agency, motivation, and memory. Her work implies a more complex notion of subjectivity can be elaborated through an exploration of 'illness' and 'identity' and 'emotion' as epistemological, metaphysical, and ideological categories. A promising first step in this project is an evaluation of Radway's conclusions about the psychodynamic origins of women's pleasures in reading romance plots in light of the diagnostic importance emotion plays in her qualitative research.

0.3.3 The therapeutic in mass mediated discourse: the 'recovery' movement and the commercialization of habits of the heart

The epistemological and methodological debates in academic arenas on the 'uses of the story' and 'uses of the self' have their shadowy avatar in the social discursive realm of the mass media in the 1980's and 1990's in the form of an explosion of interest in the autobiographical voice and in realism (crime shows),³¹ in the propagation of metanarrative techniques in both music videos and serials such as *Moonlighting*, *Dallas*, and *30something*, in a fascination with therapies,³² and in the topics of afternoon talk shows such as *Shirley* (CTV) and *Oprah* (NBC). The latter throw together 'experts'--sociologists, educators, psychiatrists, family therapists, sexologists, lawyers, religious leaders--with the heretofore invisible 'subjects' of expert knowledge--lesbians and their parents, male and female rape victims, batterers of both sexes, wives of bigamists, drug dealers, women whose children have been murdered by their husbands, consenting adult practitioners of bondage and sadomasochistic sex, to mention but a few.³³ These 'characters,' whose generic presence is familiar to Western viewers of the televisual Babel of melodrama, romance, situation comedy, crime thriller, soap opera, and pornographic movie have stepped out of their usual generic frameworks bringing art back into life.

One of the recurrent topics of these talk shows and, given the producers' expectations for the composition and taste of the afternoon viewing audience, perhaps a foreseeable one is the family and its secrets. A growing chorus of voices during daytime television identifies the family and the home, not as "a haven in a heartless world" (Lasch), but as a dangerous place to be, particularly if you are a child. Themes of women's experiences of rape and battery, financial insecurity, and deception in love have been taken up in the Gothic romances being made by Hollywood today which, in contrast to the melodramas of the 1940's and 1950's or the coming of age films of the 1960's, depict a woman's marital or love partner as the single greatest threat not only to her psychical health but to her very physical survival; witness Farrah Fawcett in *The Burning Bed* (1989), Julia Roberts in *Sleeping with the Enemy* (1991) and Goldie Hawn in *Deceived* (1991) which echo Harlequin romance titles such as *Enemy Lover*.³⁴ Moreover, in the search for cause and effect

explanations for failing marriages, male violence, alcoholism, and adult misery, a recurrent theme across many of the stories being related on afternoon talk shows, with viewing audiences numbering in the millions, is that of the relationship of childhood experience to adult behaviour represented in the illness *topoi* of "the wounded inner child," "toxic shame," and "codependency." The *Ur*-story of our origins, ubiquitous on the afternoon talk shows in North America, is the dysfunctional family. The mood of such storytelling is rage and nostalgia for the functional family. However, what 'functional' might mean in society today is being fought out on television and in the popular non-fiction press on ethical, legal, civil rights, and pedagogical fronts, starting with the very definition of what constitutes a 'family.'³⁵ Furthermore, the question is still being asked: Is the family sick because society is sick or *vice versa*?

The stubbornly persistent presence, in the public forum of the media, of the themes of family violence and victimization prompted my hypothesis that the subject, rather than being decentred or dead, has been ill. If subjectivity is being recovered, under a variety of descriptions, as a topic of fascination and investigation in mass culture, it is surely the case that the suffering of the 'self' is a common thread across these descriptions. Not only in cultural and literary theory but in the social discourses of the afternoon television talk show, self-help literature, and alternative healing practices of suburban America (McGuire, 1989), the causes of the sufferings experienced by the self, along with its implicit epistemological, ontological, and ideological stakes, are being fiercely debated.

Chapter 6: 'Recovery' and a therapeutics of 'emotion work'

How 'recovery' is being produced as an object of knowledge, as a value, as a technology of the emotions, and as a therapeutics which invites a process of self-subversive self-reflection will be explored in Chapter 6. The discourse of 'recovery,' which reflects to us elements of the 'folk' or indigenous model of the mind and psychology of emotion in the West, is another site where emotion is being recovered for debate. This indigenous model is fundamental to recovery's view of the nature of the person, the 'causes' or 'reasons' for illness, its symptoms, treatment interventions,

the explanation for their therapeutic action, and expectation for the form healing will take.

'Recovery' is a broad rubric which encompasses self-help books, self-help groups, books for alcoholics, children of alcoholics, 'survivors' of family violence and incest, co-dependents, and so on. 'Recovery's how-to self-help books uses selves and their stories in the construction of texts about these suffering 'others'. My object of analysis will be both mass marketed discourses **about** 'adult children' and 'recovery,' and the stories **told by** 'adult children' in recovery that appear as quotations and cases for analysis within discourses about 'adult children. For instance, the corpus will include books found on bookstore shelves under the title of "Recovery" or "Self-Help" such as John Bradshaw's two best-selling volumes *Bradshaw: On the Family* and *Homecoming*, as well as the two taped series of his lectures, drawn from these books, each of which has 10 one hour segments. The publishers' lists of recovery books are lengthy, with sub-topics ranging from "RECOVERY: Adult Children," "Alcohol and Substance Abuse," "Co-dependence," "Dysfunctional Families," "Eating Disorders," to "Sexual," and "Work/Compulsive Activity." I have made a sampling by reading everything available for sale on October, 1992 in the 'Recovery' section of *Lexus*, a non-specialized bookstore in downtown Montreal, which included self-help books, 'how-to' workbooks, volumes of essays on related psychological and philosophic topics, and books of daily meditations. I have chosen to discuss in greater detail books whose topic was recovery from 'codependency' over those which dealt with sexual abuse or alcoholism because of the emphasis on intersubjectivity as illness, signalled by the notion of 'codependence.' However, Janet Woititz's groundbreaking book, *Adult Children of Alcoholics* is important since it is associated with the early phase of the recovery phenomenon. Bestsellers on the shelf dealing with codependence included: Melody Beattie's *BEYOND Codependency and getting better all the time* and her *Codependent No More*; Anne Wilson Schaef's *Co-dependence. Misunderstood-Mistreated*; and Pia Mellody's *Facing Codependence*. Also to be examined are books by influential feminist authors on the topic of self-esteem and self-knowledge such as Gloria Steinem's *Revolution from Within* (1992). In the recovery group work, to which we have access through John Bradshaw's taped series "Bradshaw: On the

Family," we have an opportunity to investigate what hermeneutics of emotion is being taught by group therapists to group participants. Mastering this hermeneutics becomes an integral part of each group member's 'know-how' in doing the 'emotional work' on which the therapeutic effect of recovery relies.

Chapter 5

Both the recovery literature and group work, discussed in Chapter 6, and the metafictional text *The Singing Detective*, to be explored in Chapter 5, offer an implicit theory of the reading self as a self always positioned by dialogue with the other. Both sets of discourses (*The Singing Detective* and 'recovery' self-help literature) are relevant to the study of the relationship between cognition and emotion since, while using a discourse of emotion to explore a notion of dysfunction, each employs a self-reflexive turn with respect to the relationship between emotion and symbolic systems, thereby scrutinising the preconditions of its own potential emotional effects on the reader. An analysis is required of the narrative strategies through which these discourses construe self-discovery to be accessible.

With *The Singing Detective*, I will explore Iser's 'actualization' thesis respecting the essential creativity of the reader's interpretative activity against de Lauretis' research agenda that narratives be analysed for their 'productivity,' their power to solicit differently gendered readers to positions of identification, through the hypothesis that reading shares by analogy the characteristics of the transference relationship between the patient and the psychoanalyst. Chapter 5 explores a case of 'resisting' reading, for intradiegetic and extratextual readers alike--Dennis Potter's metafictional text *The Singing Detective*--using tools for the analysis of modes of address, dislocations of temporal level, voice and perspective provided by Genette's *Narrative Discourse: An Essay on Method* and Linda Hutcheon's *Narcissistic Narratives*. While analysing the libidinal dynamic organizing the performance of communication in Potter's text by which to infer the existence of both a fantasy "in" the text and a "text as fantasy" structure, I will show how the text used the reader's expectations for plot and character development, her deductions according to familiar genre conventions, as well as the reader's disappointment, frustration, and shock when

these were not fulfilled to create the paradoxical moment of the reader catching herself out in the act of reading expectantly. The mutative potential of such an affective as well as self-conscious experience for self-understanding offers an instance of the therapeutic relation between text and reader enabled by metafiction.

I will argue that a metafictional text such as *The Singing Detective* represents the absence of which consciousness is its own symptom, the usually inaccessible signifying operations which are performed in the gap between signifier and signified. This text offers us a psychopragmatics of the overdetermined sign. Across multiple levels of voice and perspective, it unpacks a pattern of displacement and condensation to intimate the source of the overdetermined significance of key signifiers. It makes visible a pattern through which a psychic syntax can be inferred--the idiosyncratic rules for the formation and expression of signs. *The Singing Detective* also represents "how ideology works at the rudimentary levels of identity and the drives through emotion." It offers an account of the dual processes that simultaneously produce emotion paradigm scenarios in a young boy which mark his (dis)position in later life. Through its metafictional paradoxes and multiple levels of narration, *The Singing Detective* also plays on yet resists the reader's projections and examines possible introjects from which they derive. It provides readers with introspective and emotional data in that they catch themselves both reading with certain expectations and being frustrated by the text's resistance to providing the anticipated, habitual forms of visual and narrative pleasure.

0.4 Summary

This work has several objectives. My intention is to reassert a course for reader-response theory and its research agenda by posing the problem of the (dis)positioned reader. An aim is to disturb, through the concept of (dis)positioning, the assumption that current theories of the subject in discourse are adequate for an analysis of reading performance. Through the heuristic of the reading self as 'afflicted,' a number of concepts will be reassessed--emotion, fantasy, identification--for their analytical power in developing hypotheses about the preconditions of a reader's (dis)position or psychological makeup for his/her positioning by textual

assumptions, and pleasure in such positioning. As an alternative to 'desire' or 'interpellation,' emotion provides an as yet unplumbed perspective on how readers use unconscious knowledge to make narratives meaningful and compelling.

INTRODUCTION: ENDNOTES

1. The *Geisteswissenschaften*, as conceived by Dilthey in the late 19th century, were the specifically human sciences directed to the study of cultural and psychological worlds as distinct from the study of the physical world. His method of *Verstehen* "emphasized the grasping of the subjectivity of other people and cultures, the re-living or co-living of the inner lives that are expressed in texts or other objective expressions of human experience" (Sass, 1988: 323). These sciences were based on understanding, achieved through sympathetic experience, rather than on *Erklaren*, an explanatory mode characteristic of the natural sciences "with their use of causal determinism or explanation by subsumption under general statistical laws" (Palmer in Sass, 1988: 323).

See the excellent collection of essays in *Hermeneutics and Psychology*, edited by Messer *et al* (1988), which introduces three types of hermeneutics and their relevance for psychology and a critique of scientism: methodological hermeneutics, ontological hermeneutics, and critical hermeneutics.

2. The 'refiguration' of social thought describes the adoption of a new set of metaphors originating in the humanities to replace the energy, spatial, and mechanical metaphors inherited from the positivist sciences (Geertz, 1980). The theatre, game-playing, literary texts, and the language of ritual have all been raided for metaphors (Sarbin, 1986). Three exemplary cases of the 'literarization' of disciplines in this century, according to Paul Smith (1988:84), is Richard Rorty in philosophy, Clifford Geertz in anthropology, and Hayden White in history. Of the 'textual' revolution, Fredric Jameson writes:

the conception that everything is a text--that the world is a vast storehouse of sign systems--has had a liberating effect on other disciplines [beyond literary criticism], for which now a host of hitherto objective or referential phenomena--the body, the city, political power, psychoanalytic complexes, ideological opinions, visions of history, practices of everyday life--all may be construed and reconstructed as so many 'texts' or sign systems, or signifying practices, which can be read.
(1981: 369)

Perhaps, the apotheosis of this linguistic turn is Lacan's dictum that "the unconscious is structured like language." Or, in the shorthand used by some, Lacan offers a view of 'psyche as text' (PAT) whereas 'text as psyche' (TAP) captures the Derridean formulation of *différance* (Wright, 1984).

These metaphors have implications for social scientific methodology, for the very nature of research questions, for the nature of the object studied, for the characteristics of the knowledge produced, and for the role of the researcher. For instance, the anthropologist Scholte, having already commented in the early 70's on the need for reflexivity in anthropology, recently wrote, in a retrospective article: "The 'literary turn' [in anthropology] consists of a crucial shift from an observational and empirical methodology to a communicative and dialogical epistemology...from the use of visual metaphors...to a concern with the expressive voice and the constitution of

intersubjective understanding" (Okely and Callaway, 1992: 45). An aspect of the textualization of all domains of investigation in the human sciences under structuralism was that the role of the critic/ethnographer as 'reader' in the interpretation of these signifying systems came under greater scrutiny. In his 1973 publication, Geertz raised a number of questions about the practice of anthropology as an interpretive science, and about its ethnographic methods, in terms of two primary issues: the status of its second and third order interpretations, and the need for self-consciousness vis-à-vis the modes of representation elected (1973:15-19). Similarly, in literary studies, under the impact of structuralism and poststructuralism and with the epistemological shift "from work to text" (Barthes, 1986: 90), came a turn away from art or author as a route to 'Truth' to a consideration of cultural products and their effects. 'Truth' was displaced by questions of subjectivity, language, effectivity, and reception.

The textual revolution has led to a radical hermeneutics and a degree of metadisciplinary doubt about 'objective' (i.e. non-relative) knowledge which Dilthey could not have envisaged when he called for a new interpretative method in the human sciences. Other critics, such as Rosalind Brunt, a cultural studies theorist, warns that a repercussion of the textual revolution for mass media research is that "the message and the context of its production, transmission, and reception can be absorbed in the huge semiotic embrace of 'text'" (Brunt, 1992: 70). From another angle, Jane Flax (1990: 38) describes the similarities she sees between a radical form of hermeneutics and deconstruction:

Like the hermeneutic reader the deconstructionist is interested in the meaning of the text. The deconstructionist wishes to push the text to the limits of its own explanatory force. Also like the hermeneutic reader the deconstructionist believes there is no meaning outside the text. Both assume the text's meaning is internally generated and gains its force from its own strategies, not from its capacity accurately to "represent" something about an "external reality."

In both hermeneutics and deconstruction claims to representational knowledge are to be replaced by concepts of understanding and methods of interpretation. Both the hermeneutic and the deconstructive reader believe knowledge is a subset of and is made possible by larger contexts of meaning or understanding. **The legitimacy or authority of a knowledge claim arises out of and depends upon a set of linguistic practices and communicative interactions. Truth claims or knowledge are inseparable from *pragmatics*--from practice of and skill in contextual "know-how".** Such know-how includes knowing how to speak and how to hear within and by the rules of the appropriate language game. Philosophy may be able to describe how understanding is possible in particular contexts; it cannot create a universalizing theory of knowledge or test all truth claims because these are necessarily context dependent. Pragmatics, knowing how we understand one another and the different ways we do so, should replace epistemology. All understanding is interpretative and depends upon and must be expressed in and through preexisting contexts or language games. Therefore there is no uniquely privileged standpoint outside the text

from which a speaker could claim to understand the whole
"objectively."

(my emphasis)

Within the field of psychoanalytically-inspired reading theory, Marshall Alcorn writes:

Post-structuralist theory seems narcissistic because it makes increasingly emphatic claims about the importance of the reader's role in interpreting or constituting the text. Signifiers in the text do not disappear, but the thing signified by the signifiers becomes a product of reading strategies.
(1987: 138)

His psychological starting point for a critique of the sign has much in common with my interest in the transference processes omnipresent to some degree in all reading performance. He argues that a fuller understanding of particular narcissistic processes--narcissistic projection, idealization, and the role of language in narcissistic functions--can offer theoretical tools for defining a **post-structural notion of textual "objectivity"**.

3. What it means to be an interpretive and agential subject, we know, has come under scrutiny at both the object level and the metacritical level in the human and social sciences. At the object level, the problem of the interpretive subject has been formulated (from a non-phenomenological point of view) as one of the nature of: the mediations between 'inner' and 'outer', mind and world, the psychical and the social; which entail: either immanentist or transcendental accounts of psychological processes of language production, and a questioning of the possibilities for subjective voluntarism versus the determinations of social structure.

When the social sciences turn their critical gaze unto their own methods of knowledge production, they exercise a metalevel inquiry into the procedures of their own storymaking and the materiality of "writing culture" (Marcus, 1986). Disciplinary reflexivity, that is, accounting for the perturbative effects, in their 'weak' or 'strong' form, of the observer's 'story' of storymaking processes in his own and other cultures, has become a growth industry in the academy.*

Both object- and meta-levels of inquiry have been pursued in the sociology of knowledge and the philosophy of social science (Kuhn, 1970; Feyerabend, 1976; Bernstein 1978, 1988; Hollis and Lukes, 1982; Rabinow and Sullivan 1979, 1987; Taylor, 1971, 1985). They have become the focus of methodological self-scrutiny initiated by disciplines such as cultural anthropology (Geertz, 1973; Marcus and Fischer, 1986; Clifford and Marcus, 1986); psychoanalytic anthropology (Crapanzano, 1980; Obeyesekere 1981, 1990; Devereux, 1967),** philosophical anthropology (Rorty, 1979); psychology and hermeneutics (Messer, 1988), social psychology (Gergen, 1985, Henriques, *et al* 1984), and cultural studies (Smith, 1988; Allor, 1989; Probyn, 1989).

*A study of reflexivity inextricably links the perspectival nature of social enquiry to the problem of relativism: interpretation and explanation must make reference to the actor's perspective. This is relativism's "weak" form whereas its

"strong" form insists the interpreter's perspective cannot be peeled away from the account he gives. Neutrality is not possible; bias, inescapable; TRUTH, non-existent.

****In anthropology, George Devereux's study *From Anxiety to Method* (1968) introduced the perspective that distortions may result from the anthropologist's counter-transference. The concept of counter-transference, however, had already created a ferment in the international psychoanalytic community in the 1950's, more than ten years before Devereux, a psychoanalytically trained anthropologist, published his self-reflexive volume of essays. On counter-transference, see Heimann (1950), Money-Kyrle (1956).**

In *From Anxiety to Method*, in a chapter entitled "Countertransference in behavioral science" Devereux writes:

Theoretical Prolegomena: The perception of a situation is radically influenced by the perceiver's personality. The experimental subject often subtracts from, or adds to, reality or else rearranges it in conformity with his personality makeup and with his--largely unconscious needs and conflicts. (...) In anthropological field reports such material [subtractions] is sometimes reported, but is not utilized in the over-all characterization of the cultural pattern. Malinowski (1932) did not utilize in his discussion of the Trobrianders' denial of the role of coitus impregnation a myth about water dripping into the vagina of a woman about to be impregnated, though he, himself, had recorded this myth.

Thus, the anthropologist's report on a tribe and his interpretation of that tribe's culture is, in some ways, comparable to a projective test, where the TAT or Rorschach card is the culture studied and the anthropologist's account of the tribe the equivalent of the tested subject's responses.

Distortion and Anxiety: Studies of projective tests, of perception as a function of personality, of learning in a state of anxiety, as well as the scrutiny of transference and countertransference phenomena suggest that distortion is especially marked where the observed material mobilizes anxiety. The scientist who studies this kind of material usually seeks to protect himself against anxiety by the omission, soft-peddling, non-exploitation, misunderstanding, ambiguous description, over-exploitation or rearrangement of certain parts of his material.

(1968: 44)

Another perspective on the question of distortion created by personality is D.P. Spence who writes, on the epistemology of the psychoanalytic process,

we are always listening from a certain point of view, trying to hear a certain theme. Part of this process has been captured by Gadamer in his concept of preunderstanding: **this must be carefully distinguished from the grosser kinds of countertransference and studied as a necessary precondition for any kind of listening.** If we take seriously the view that some kind of preunderstanding is always with us--that the listener hears the patient from

within a particular horizon--then we can see that we have as many meanings as there are listeners,...

(Messer, 1988: 369)

Interestingly enough, preunderstanding may replicate the culturally constituted cognitive defences against anxieties shared by most members of a society thereby representing more than just an ideologically-invested framework for investigation but a screen against the traumatic whose sources and reasons it is the objective of analysis to uncover and understand. These articles were not accompanied by a complementary scrutiny of the role of the analyst's sex (what anthropologists call the participant observer's "stimulus value" [Devereux, 1968: 115] in the transference, or of the analyst's gender in the counter-transference.

On experiments in the writing of psychodynamic texts in anthropology, Marcus and Fischer observe that:

In sum, rather than attempting to validate old psychological theories, the mark of contemporary experiments in psychodynamic texts is the display of discourse--self-reflective commentaries on experience, emotion, and self; on dreams, remembrances, associations, metaphors, distortions, and displacements; and on transferences and compulsive behavior repetitions--all of which reveal a behaviorally and conceptually significant level of reality reflecting, contrasting with, or obscured by public cultural forms. More intensively than any other kind of current experiment, these psychodynamic texts demonstrate how ethnographies can be specialized and organized around concepts of the person and indigenous discourses about emotions in order to reveal the most radically distinctive level of cultural experience for any society.

(1986: 54)

4. British Cultural Studies refers largely to research on culture, class and the media conducted by social scientists associated with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (the 'Birmingham School') in Birmingham, England. Cultural Studies in North America has not always found useful the emphasis on class and ideology, which characterizes the work of the Birmingham School. For more on the differences, see Grossberg (1988) and Press (1991).

5. My practice will be to use therapeutic and psychotherapeutic interchangeably throughout the text. Where it is important to reemphasize properly psychotherapeutic processes and effects then 'psychotherapeutic' will be used to differentiate my focus from a general improvement in well-being associated with the colloquial use of the word 'therapeutic.'

6. The difficulty for analyses of stories and their uses, at any time, is to find a safe route between the epistemological Scylla and Charybdis posed by two partial and reductive foci in communication research, theories of representation and theories of expression, and the methodological dilemmas they pose. Materialist approaches to

both problems produce analytical oppositions often lacking contextual nuance and psychological depth such as 'industry and audience,' 'above (epiphenomena) and below (base),' while reductivism has been perpetuated methodologically by the panoramic sweep of ideology critique and by the snapshot, atemporal bias of the survey questionnaire.

7. In this thesis I reemphasize the distinction between the 'subject' and the 'self,' choosing to defend the usefulness of the 'self' while guardedly employing the 'subject.' Despite widespread use, I find the notion of the 'subject' to be a very blunt tool with which to attempt any account of an agent with motives or projects or volition and, frankly, inadequate as a concept with which to understand the locus of self-awareness, self-objectification, responsibility, introspection or imagination. By making this distinction I am not following conventional practice in cultural studies, and the reasons for this are discussed below.

As Teresa de Lauretis points out, "the terms in which the question of the subject was to be cast and recast in various disciplines...had been set since the fifties and the well-known debate between Sartre and Lévi-Strauss, when the former accused the nascent structuralist method in the human sciences of doing away with the concrete, existential, historical subject in favour of ahistorical structures immanent in the mind" (1984: 160). Both structuralist and post-structuralist variants of the language paradigm upon which inquiry into cultural phenomena under the description of 'text' has proceeded have put the humanist self into doubt, albeit for different reasons, as a concept through which to understand consciousness, meaning formation, motivation or agency, cultural and social resistance. Indeed, both structuralist and poststructuralist approaches to the subject in language are "fundamentally concerned with the same demonstration: that subjective experience is an epiphenomenal by-product of an impersonal and objective *imprinting* process" (Levin, 1989: 177). In *Thinking Fragments. Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West*, Jane Flax (1990: 50) observes that postmodernism appropriated Freud's concept of the decentered self (his topographic and later structural model of the mind) but reduced its complexity and the consequences of that complexity by eviscerating the subject in discourse of any notion of the body, of emotion, of instincts, of internal conflict, of aggression.

The 'individual' as an analytical term has been replaced by the 'subject' in cultural and literary studies as well as in political philosophy in order to eschew the connotations of a being already endowed with an essential nature by metaphysics or biology. In that landmark volume in British psychology, *Changing the Subject*, Henriques and his co-authors describe the paradigm shift in this way:

'The subject' is the generic term used in philosophy for what in lay terms would be 'the person', 'the individual' or 'human being' and what in psychology is referred to as 'the individual'. Recently the term 'theories of the subject' has tended to refer to approaches which are critical of psychology's assumptions about individuality, theoretical approaches which emphasize the way in which the social domain constitutes subjects rather than the other way round.

(1984: 2)

However, neither the 'person' and the 'individual' were ever synonymous with the 'self'. For instance, the former two are juridical concepts to which are attached questions of moral agency, responsibility and blame whereas we use the 'self' to refer to how we experience our own person.

I reserve the use of 'self' for a hypostatization or superordinate agency that refers to a composite (but not a simple agglutination) of subject-positions which, on self-reflection, gives each of us a sense of continuity and coherence defined as a 'sense of self'. It is from the locus of the self that we review our positionings as subjects. This notion is not meant to install a totalizing, necessarily non-contradictory view of subjectivity in an 'ideal typical' self nor to imply that more than partial self-knowledge is the basis of a sense of self at any one time.

By making this distinction, I distance myself from the Foucauldian and Lacanian inspired construct of the 'subject' to be found in *Changing the Subject*, despite the fact that this volume is an excellent critique of the 'I' or actor or self which stands at the centre of traditional psychology as well as so much of the discourse of the other social sciences. In the introduction to their volume of essays, Henriques *et al* introduce the meaning they attribute to the difficult concept, 'subjectivity':

we use 'subjectivity' to refer to individuality and self-awareness--the condition of being a subject--but understand in this usage that subjects are dynamic and multiple, always positioned in relation to particular discourses and practices and produced by these--the condition of being a subject.

(1984: 3)

Already in this brief formulation is the characteristic confusion between a 'subject' as a concept which strains toward the partial, the particular, while maintaining a notion of agency ("subjects are dynamic and multiple" yet "always positioned in relation to..."), and a concept which strains toward some view of coherence, complexity, and continuity while preserving agency (we use 'subjectivity' to refer to individuality and self-awareness"). A subject is being used to refer both to the product of self-awareness and to the product of being multiply positioned (is this sequentially or simultaneously? Which subject position is the synthesizing one which permits self-awareness?). What can be the nature of agency attributed to the subject in each case? It is apparent that 'subject' tends to be used in three distinct ways: (1) as a non-metaphysical entity with agency which does not conflict with other subject positions which promote/provoke agency, individuality, and self-awareness; (2) as a non-metaphysical entity with agency which does conflict with other subject entities, individuality, and self-awareness; (3) as a position in discourse, an effect of meaning which is incapable of individuality or self-awareness, for which the notion of agency is inappropriate.

In Cultural Studies, two notions of 'subject' tend to be employed. As against the 'subject' in the stripped down, anti-humanist sense of a political or social actor promulgated by post-structuralism (Variant 1), the 'subject,' when employed in discourse analysis, refers to a position within a particular discourse through which the subject takes on attributes (eg. gender) according to the assumptions in a discourse

(Variant 2). For instance, in the traditional discourse of heterosexual, romantic love, the male subject is assigned an active role and the object of his love is the passive female. Moreover the female subject in this discourse of romantic love, even as subject, must assume the attribute of passivity because that is all she is permitted by that particular discourse. To make herself intelligible as a desiring, therefore, active subject, a woman must eschew the conventional assumptions and actions supported by the discourse of romantic love (to turn to the few, unsatisfactory, culturally available alternatives: the discourse of sexual emancipation; of promiscuity; of abstinence; of the "pure relationship" (Giddens, 1992). Nor does homosexual romantic love necessarily offer an alternative since it is still caught within the dominant framework of *romantic* love). A substantive alternative would be to find different means of using the narrative conventions of romantic love, what has been called 'refunctioning' by Laura Kipnis (1986). For an example of women's refunctioning of the conventions of a discourse of male prerogative see *The Currency of Eros. Women's Love Lyric in Europe, 1540-1620* (1990), Ann Rosalind Jones' fascinating discussion of the negotiated use of the poetic devices of the male-authored love lyric by female poets in the Renaissance.

An aspect of experience missing in poststructuralist tenets which shrink the 'self' down to the 'subject of discourse' are categories with which to understand: 1) which subject-position carries the self-representation; 2) why the self makes itself stupid by losing the capacity to learn; 3) in what the experience of interiority consists; and 4) how it is possible to have a sense of being in conflict but coherent nevertheless. Prominently part of an individual sense of the self's continuity are the personal lineaments of suffering. The phenomenological aspect of being, and hermeneutic accounts of being, have been overridden by the third person accounts of the 'subject' and the 'Other' in current analyses of 'ism' discourses (racism, sexism). In clearly defined contexts in this thesis, I will be using 'subject' to capture the psychoanalytic implications of parts of the psychic structure of the self--part-selves--which function always within object relations and in response to particular stimuli and fantasies. For the moment, I am uncertain whether subjects or selves are gendered. An answer to this dilemma should follow from the findings of this thesis with respect to the particular register where gender operates as a potential constraint on reading competence and pleasure. Provisionally, gendered 'subject' is the convention I will follow.

Distinguishing the range of each of these terms becomes more difficult when the concept of 'subjectivity' is inherited with all the vagueness of its diverse deployments. I would wish in my usage that it retain the sense of a multiplicity, of the complex organization of subject/object relations in the self.

Theories of the self/subject, theories of meaning, theories of reading:

A study of meaning is part of a theory of culture, and the problem of the self is fundamental to such a theory. In Communication research the relationship between a theory of meaning and a theory of reading has been charted according to presuppositions with respect to the self and language entailed by different paradigms of communication. As classical American Communication research theory declined in importance to be replaced by inquiry into communication from a materialist/Cultural Studies orientation, exemplified, for instance, by the work of James Carey (1975, 1981), Raymond Williams (1962, 1974), and Stuart Hall (1971, 1976, 1981a, 1981b),

the North American preoccupation with the concept of propaganda, persuasion, and manipulation as a paradigm for the communication process and its relationship to the social formation was superseded by questions of ideology and hegemony (Selucky, n.d.).

Exemplary of the second, primarily British, approach were the early studies on audience's oppositional or 'negotiated' readings of news texts by Brunson and Morley, *Everyday Television: "Nationwide"* (1978), Morley, *The "Nationwide" Audience: Structure and Decoding* (1981), and Hall's "Encoding and Decoding" model of news reception (1981a).

As a model of meaning production, negotiation conceives cultural exchange as the intersection of processes of production and reception, in which overlapping but non-matching determinations operate. Meaning is neither imposed, nor passively imbibed, but arises out of a struggle or negotiation between competing frames of reference, motivation and experience. This [process] can be analysed at three different levels: institutions, texts and audiences.

(Gledhill, 1988: 67)

The negotiations produced by class identifications and affiliations, which produced different decodings by different audiences, or sub-cultural interpretative communities, were of primary interest to early British Cultural Studies. With this move the classic materialist emphasis on production (of cultural commodities by the culture industries, or 'subjects' for ideology) was displaced by a search for a materialist theory of subjectivity through which to understand the conditions of textual reception.

8. . . The Canadian sociologist, John O'Neill reminds us of the difficulties of theorizing how outer becomes inner: "No Marxist theoretician has detailed how the masks of class are donned by an individual as self-identity" (1972). Nor will shifting the valence from class to gender, from a capitalist to a patriarchal society help us along; Chris Weedon further sketches the difficulty:

The analysis of the patriarchal structures of society and the positions that we occupy within them requires a theory which can address forms of social organization and the social meanings and values which guarantee and contest them. Yet it must also be able to *theorize individual consciousness*. We need a theory of the relation between language, subjectivity, social organization, and power.

(Weedon, 1987: 12)

I believe that a focus on the therapeutic redresses an aporia in Marxist thought itself: the way inner and outer coinhere to produce the psychical make-up of an individual. What gets produced in capitalism are not just objects, things for exchange, but people with a variety of psychological defences that influence perception and cognition and which are expressed in fantasies, in emotions, and in conscious and unconscious identifications. The premise of the suffering reader impels an analysis of

the reader not as a somnambulant consumer 'sutured' to meanings and needs but as a self, perhaps mystified as to the real conditions of his/her existence, but nevertheless suffering intrusive emotions, self-deception, yearnings and fears, and defences against these.

9. In the psychic utopianism of thinkers on the Freudian left such as Brown and Marcuse, their simple "notions of libidinal repression collapsed the concept of unconscious psychic conflict into that of cultural malaise" (Rose, 1986: 9).

10. While consumers of particular literary genres and television audiences have both been amply studied from the perspective of the institutional preconditions for the production, sale, distribution, and consumption of texts as cultural commodities, a nuanced analysis of 'consumption' itself has become a theoretical black hole with the individual 'reader' lost within. For contemporary communications research to avoid the sociologism which substitutes a collective subject for an individual one, alternatives to paradigms based on the political economy of the media, social theories of the press, content analysis, the discursive operations of a film or situation comedy, or the "bias of communication" in different communications technologies, have to be found through which to infer, describe, and explain the reading performance of individual members of television audiences. Nor should one substitute the error of psychologism for the error of sociologism. At this point I can only demonstrate recognition of the fact that the strongest model of reading performance must eventually situate hypotheses and findings from reader-response research (with their focus on individuals) within mass communication reception research on audiences and institutions and, thereby, address the social, cultural, political, economic, and psychological contexts in which interpretations are performed. The particular methodological difficulty for a psychoanalytically-inspired reader-response analysis, which is aware of the pitfalls of psychologism but which is not able to pursue its inquiry into the psychodynamics of interpretation by putting its target group of readers into psychoanalysis, lies in modelling the abstraction known as the 'reader,' the individual interpreter, in terms of what characteristics it shares and does not share with the abstraction known as the 'audience' or reading public for a particular genre. A vital research objective is to identify what is shared, by an interpretative community of readers, without losing sight of what might be idiosyncratic in reading.

Martin Allor suggests that cultural studies may finally be working toward such a multiperspectival focus. Jointly in the fields of contemporary mass communications and cultural studies, an important and contentious area of investigation has been identified as the "subject/audience nexus" (Allor, 1989). He observes that postmodern assaults on the "tight connection or homology that [it] cultural studies constructs between subjectivity, identity, social formations, and agency," has impelled cultural studies "to open up the condensation...of three different projects: the analysis of senses of self; the production of cultural forms; and the questioning of state formation" (1989: 88).

British Cultural Studies is not the only discipline to have registered a change in theoretical currents from texts to readers in the post war years. In his review of Eco's *The Role of the Reader*, Dolezel comments that every other aspect of the communicative relationship has been studied--the text, the author--so it seems

reasonable that the institution of literary theory should eventually turn its attention to the reader (*Poetics Today*, 1:4 (1980)). To cite as reasons for this move to the reader/audience either institutional pressures for the exploitation of virgin theoretical territory or academics' interests in increasing their intellectual capital does not do justice to the lived experience in the 1960's and 1970's of the crisis of metanarratives, one expression of which took the form of the women's movement in the United States.

11. Under the impress of the social constructionist orientation to knowledge, 'mind' is moved into the realm of social myth and the 'self,' from the realm of the head to be placed in the sphere of social discourse (Gergen 1985). On the social constructionist movement in psychology, see Gergen's excellent article (1985).

According to Gergen, social constructionism views discourse about the world not as a reflection or map of the world but as an artifact of communal interchange. Social constructionist inquiry is principally directed to explicating the processes by which people come to describe, explain, or otherwise account for the world in which they live and their place in it. The terms in which the world is understood are social artifacts and products of historically situated interchanges among people; knowledge is not something people possess in their heads (mental representations of 'reality', the world as it 'is'), but it is something people 'produce' together through language. In other words, descriptions and explanations of the world themselves constitute forms of social action. This moves the focus of social scientific research from language, in terms of its psychological basis, to the performative use of language in human affairs, to the realm of 'social discourse' in Angenot's terminology.

Constructionism, as an orientation to knowledge and to the character of psychological constructs, challenges the exogenic-endogenic opposition in epistemology. The exogenic perspective, associated with Locke, Hume, the Mills, and logical empiricism traces the source of knowledge (as mental representation) to events in the real world. Knowledge copies or should ideally copy the contours of the world. In contrast, the endogenic perspective, characterizing thinkers such as Kant, Nietzsche, and various phenomenologists, views knowledge as dependent on processes (sometimes viewed as innate) inherent to the human organism. Knowledge is seen to be fashioned according to the tendencies of human beings to categorize or process information rather than according to the features of the world in itself. From the endogenic perspective then, human action is dependent on the cognitive processing of information, on the world as cognized rather than the world as it is. Such cognitivism is perennially incapable of explaining how cognitions "could either be 'built up' from experience or genetically programmed" (1985: 270). A constructionist orientation to knowledge turns away from this dilemma, and from the methods of the natural sciences which are impotent to solve it, to the interpretive disciplines, that is, "disciplines chiefly concerned with rendering accounts of human meaning systems. (...) The explanatory locus of human action shifts from the interior region of the mind to the processes and structure of human interaction. The question 'why' is answered not with a psychological state or process but with consideration of persons in relationship" (1985: 270, 271). As the implications of the social constructionist orientation to knowledge are more fully understood, Gergen argues "the study of social process could become generic for understanding the nature of knowledge itself" (Gergen 1985: 266).

12. Ideally, the present work would have included a study of the clients for 'recovery' groups, how they are solicited, the role of the helping professions in directing people to attend these groups or to read the self-help literature, in order to determine the intercultural factors for why the majority of participants who are comfortable with the psychologically minded, emotionally intense, confessional strategies used in self-help groups are white, middle-aged, and middle class although not disproportionately of one gender or another. My particular interest would have been to follow a select group through the therapy process via participant-observation and interviews, and to solicit their changing self-understandings and expectations of the group work as the therapy process proceeded. A second topic meriting further inquiry is the significance for social theory of the 'recovery' phenomenon as cultural commodity and as a therapeutic technology of the self. To grasp recovery's power to recruit an audience and set of practitioners for its tenets, it would involve a study of the contemporary popularity of the recovery discourse, and other interconsolidating discourses on the afflicted self: i.e. the self-esteem orientation vs. the 'critical thinking' movement in pedagogy in North America. It would involve an institutional analysis of 'recovery' as a marketing phenomenon which has been successful in commercializing steps to learning new 'habits of the heart.' Of primary import to such a study would be the role played to date by Health Communications Inc., the original publisher of the Bradshaw books and a host of other authors, as well as the relationship of this company to authors such as John Bradshaw who, on becoming successful, shift their allegiance to mainstream publishers such as Harper/Collins.

13. This view is echoed by Gergen's ambition for a social constructionist orientation in psychology: "Psychology stands to gain much by opening consideration on literary theory, including accounts of metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), narratology (Genette, 1980), and the deconstruction of meaning (Culler, 1982). (...) dialogue is essential between psychologists and like-minded colleagues in sociology, anthropology, history, philosophy, and literary studies" (1985: 271, 273).

This dissertation, although not itself embodying an ethnographic component, has been inspired by two 'contaminated' approaches which are exemplary of attempts to make more sophisticated our understanding of the relations between symbolization, pleasure, and agency beyond the cliché that subjects construct their knowledge of the world. Janice Radway's study (1986) of the romance genre and a community of romance readers, to be selectively discussed in Chapter Four, proceeded through a combination of formalist, ethnographic, and psychoanalytic methods. The approach of Bruce Knauff, a psychoanalytically inspired anthropologist, in an article on "Narrative 'Longing' and Bisexuality Among the Gebusi of New Guinea" (1986), draws selectively on the positions of social theorists such as Giddens (the double articulation of the self produces a particular kind of reader for whom both private logics and social logics make-up that reader's hermeneutic labour) and Bourdieu that "formal analysis of ideational structures should be supplemented by consideration of social practice--a critical rendering of the concrete strategies, motivations, and experiences of real social actors" (1986: 253). He juxtaposes his ethnographic findings on male listeners' spontaneous responses ("fresh talk") to the telling of a story of heterosexual longing with a discussion of sexual customs, myths, and fears in Gebusi society to show up the limits of a structuralist account of this Gebusi narrative. Particularly significant for

his analysis are the spontaneous responses of listeners in the men's longhouse--shouts, laughter, jokes, and remarks--which contrast with anthropological investigations of responses and reactions to stories through *post facto* interviews or questionnaires, a method used by Radway and by psychoanalytic reader-oriented researchers such as Norman Holland (1975). Knauff criticizes retrospective commentary as "often indispensable" but a move which "adds an extra level of epistemological complexity to the analysis, since [it] is different both in content and in experience from the textual performance itself...retrospective discussion easily skews or filters out intellectual and emotional content. This is particularly true for texts that deal with sensitive topics such as sexual desire" (1986: 253). By juxtaposing an analysis of audience response with a semiotics of the narrative, he is able to consider the significance of the narrative as heterosexual fantasy within the broader framework of homosexual beliefs and practices in this community. Homosexuality is both an outlet for heterosexual practice, forbidden to young Gebusi men, while simultaneously supporting Gebusi belief that the ingestion of semen by pubescent boys is a necessary component of male growth and development. This practice, notes Knauff, is "a strong symbolic statement of male independence and autonomy from women" (1986: 267).

Just as the Gebusi men Knauff studied could only publicly formulate their 'inner' experience of the narrative told in the longhouse by drawing upon a stock of linguistic resources available in their culture, where past responses to the story by other men were part of the repository of conventions present listeners accessed in order to understand and be affectively moved by the story, the best analytic strategy for studying the self may not be "the attempt to specify its phenomenology or supposed essential nature, contents and structure but involves examining the language of self-reference" (Potter, 1984: 140). Narration, the process of telling stories within or without the analytic setting, suggests Ricoeur (1981: 279), leads to self-understanding in that telling stories is already to 'reflect upon' events with the aim of encompassing them in successive totalities. Answers to the questions: "Who am I?", "How do I know what I know of myself?" will come under the description of the story of which I tell myself I am a part. The self is literary by virtue of bringing 'copybook expectations' (Siegle, 1986:112) to its experience; self-knowledge may be the product of realizing the kind of characters one's story preferences have historically assigned as well as of achieving the insight that one has been reading one's life as the wrong kind of fiction--melodrama rather than tragedy. Just as the narrative is both an epistemological category that seeks to know and to domesticate what lies beyond and a strategy of containment which seeks to repress contradictions between the power of social forms and the force of desire (Siegle, 1986: 113), so too are the narratives used in self-accounting the vehicle of self-creation, self-observation, and of mastery of experience.

14. Both discourses: the popular psychological (i.e. 'recovery' books by Bradshaw *et al.*) and the academic (i.e. feminist text-based reception models (Modleski, 1982) and reader-response studies of the text-reader relation using ethnographic methods such as Radway's (1984)) employ concepts from the psychoanalytic and social psychological literature. Each has incorporated into its model of illness aspects from the "scientific" model of the mind. Lay epistemics and scientific epistemics both produce folk models actually. The scientific or specialized model of the mind is also

a folk model in the sense of being the product of a paradigm, a consensus among researchers about what will count as knowledge rather than a reflection of what 'is'.

15. 'Object' has a long history (Strachey, 1941), which will be discussed selectively in Chapter Two in the section on the psychoanalytic paradigm of affect. Jane Flax provides an introductory explanation of 'object' which is clearer than many accounts by psychoanalysts:

Psychoanalysts tend to call other persons objects. This terminology is meant to do justice to the ways in which we do objectify persons--through projection and introjection, for example--and to point to the process through which the cluster of feelings, experiences and fantasies we have with and about other persons become *our* object, that is, part of our internal mental life and structure. In turn, these now internal processes can become an object for consciousness as we attempt to uncover their social roots, in analysis for example. In this sense, subject and object are aspects of one continuous process.

(1983: 274, note 17)

I will mention here an aspect of the 'object' that Flax does not address. As an elaboration of experience in fantasy, the object leaves an internal representation **and** an affect load with the child.

16. Many theorists in recent years have made the case for psychoanalytically inspired models of reading. Shoshana Felman, among others, has proposed that reading shares analogically in many of the characteristics of the transference between analysand and analyst (Felman, 1977). Her description of the positions of identification the reader takes up while reading Poe's "The Turn of the Screw" is now the 'classical' analysis of reading as transference.

See Elizabeth Wright's excellent introduction to the relation of psychoanalytic theory to the theories of literature and the arts, and the way that developments in both domains have brought about changes in critical practices, and her comprehensive Bibliography in *Psychoanalytic Criticism. Theory in Practice* (1984). Also see the groundbreaking 1977 collection of essays in *Yale French Studies. Special Issue on Literature and Psychoanalysis. The Question of Reading: Otherwise* 55/56.

17. Outside of psychoanalytically-inspired reading theory, psychoanalytic sociology is another field which grapples with the invasions of the unconscious in daily life. For instance, from the point of view of psychoanalytic sociology, career choices always serve a dual logic: to fulfil cultural expectations and to respond to intrapsychic needs. See Franz Alexander's *Fundamentals of Psychoanalysis* (1948) for the example of the dual functions military service provides to individuals: gratification of dependency needs while offering a socially legitimate outlet for aggression.

18. Lukàcs has said of the twentieth century novel that as a form it is trying to overcome a state of homelessness (Gasiorek, 1988: 184). Can we not turn Lukàcs' anthropomorphization of the novel around thereby restoring a sense of yearning and

purposefulness to what the deconstructionist view of texts qualifies as nothing but the play of signifiers? Could we not say of the Derridean deconstructionist view of 'psyche as text' (Wright, 1984) that if psyche is text, then, like the novel as form, psyche is trying to overcome a state of homelessness?

19. Flax's plea for research on modalities of subjectivity is an intervention in the encounter between postmodernism and feminism with respect to the debate on gender, the individual, and the underpinnings of a feminist epistemology. In the next chapter, we will see that early feminist reader-response theory represented by Judith Fetterley's work *The Resisting Reader* (1975) was already grappling with what has become a central dilemma in contemporary efforts to formulate a defensible feminist epistemology which could then be put to the service of feminist political projects: the paradox of women "seeking equality for and a valorization of a gendered identity which has been constructed through the very cultural institutions and discourses which feminists have been challenging and dismantling" ("Postmodernism." In *Feminism and Psychoanalysis. A Critical Dictionary*. Ed. E. Wright. 1992, p. 342). Feminist theory which believes the project of modernity is exhausted but still incomplete has tended to embrace a theory of the subject as unified, autonomous, and self-knowing because the 'disengaged' subject (Taylor, 1990) is believed to be the optimal model for the agential subject if a feminist politics is to have efficacy and a rational, historical, collective actor. However, the postmodern camp of feminist theory struggles with the very possibility of defining and legitimating a political project and an ethics once hermeneutic perspectivism is adopted. For further discussion, see Flax (1990) and Jardine (1985).

A variety of feminist volumes have been echoing Flax's observation and critique of the unidimensionality of feminist theories of the subject. For instance, the Introductory essay by Bergstrom and Doane to the excellent and comprehensive special issue of *camera obscura* on "The spectatrix" (1989, 20/21) critiques the dominance of the category of sexual difference in theories of spectatorship. The essay noted that class, race, ethnicity, and generational issues have been secondary if not ignored by feminist film scholarship oriented to questions of sexual difference.

A self-critique in a similar vein was voiced by the editors of the volume of *Signs* entitled *Feminist Theory in Practice and Process* (Malson, et al, 1989). They drew attention to the blindspot of women's studies in its formative years with respect to questions of race, class, and religion, and the ongoing slowness with which methods are being developed to study gender in conjunction with other factors.

20. See Alcoff's overview article (1989) on the debate between a 'politics of identity' and a 'politics of positionality' in feminist theory. While Alcoff advocates a synthesis of identity politics with a politics of location (1989: 422), Judith Butler proposes a politics of location against one of gender identity. On her account, a politics of location means seeing identity as positionality, "[i]dentity as an *effect*" (1990: 147).

Taking up Butler's direction, my interest in this thesis is to show how men and women seek release from the misery-inducing constraints, on their creativity and on living their desire, that are the product of unresolved developmental conflicts. The

place to begin looking initially for these constraints is the language in which the child-in-the-adult speaks, namely fantasy and emotion.

21. Averill notes that:

The term 'paedogenesis' (from the Greek *paedo*, child and *genesis*, origin) was introduced in 1866 by the German embryologist, Karl von Baer, to designate the condition in which larval and even embryonic forms attain reproductive capacity while the remainder of the body is still in an immature state.

(1986: 116, note 2)

I am following Averill in using paedogenesis as meaning 'the origin of adult behaviour in childhood experiences' which is in keeping with the original Greek roots.

From the proposition that splitting, which produces a subject-object relation, is inherent to the self, I want to draw the inference that suffering has to do with the self's relations to its objects or, otherwise put, with the self and mediation, including mediations which are paedogenetic in origin.

22. While libidinal theories of textuality have enshrined the notion of psychopathology and endless talk in cultural studies has elaborated it in terms of psycho-sexual economies, libidinal subjects, and desire inhabiting narration, efforts to discriminate among therapeutic effects have been weak despite the hope by some psychoanalytically inspired theorists that literary criticism could tell us something anthropologically important about the reader (Brooks, 1987). Text-dependent theories of reader-response, such as Barthes' in *The Pleasure of the Text* (1975) and Peter Brooks' formalist endeavours (1977; 1987) affirm that there are textual mechanisms which mimic psychic processes; but these accounts of the readers' pleasures are acontextual and abstract.

23. Here we encounter one of the difficulties of a contaminated methodology: the translation of concepts between different discursive domains in order to obtain useful equivalences for 'emotional positioning'. The difficulties are apparent when the language of 'categorical frameworks', 'scripts', and 'prototypes', in social and cognitive psychology, encounters formalist approaches to narrative, inspired by Lacanian or object-relations theories, which speak in terms of 'desire' and 'wish', 'internal libidinal economy', 'textual internal economy,' and 'erotics of form', 'Oedipal logics' and Freudian 'masterplots'. Alternatively, reader-response theorists want to speak of real male and female reader's feelings or emotions, of their conscious resistance to textual 'positioning' by (stereotypical/sexist/ racist/homophobic...) representations through a strategy of "reading against the grain."

24. Hochschild's own predilection for a true set of emotions (vs. managed ones) accomplishes the transformation of the culture specific values of individualism into tacit facts about the mind. She assumes there are emotions which give access to the essential self.

25. 'Postfeminism' is contrasted to the 'first' and 'second wave' of feminism. The first wave of feminism refers to the movement of suffragettes in the nineteenth century. The second wave denotes the feminist movement in the United States in the period from the early 1960's to the mid-1970's, characterized by intense political activity. The second wave is taken as having been inaugurated with the publication of Betty Friedan's *The Feminine Mystique* in 1963. The postfeminist period "describes a retreat from ideas challenging women's traditional role in the family, an increasing openness toward traditional notions of femininity and feminine roles" (Press, 1991: 4).

26. One of the reasons women turn to romance fiction, according to Radway (1984:54), is that they suffer oppression and emotional abandonment within family patterns of interaction accepted as the norm in Western culture. In other words, she is implying that being female, under these historical conditions, is to be ill.

27. For instance, to ask: "What would have been therapeutic for Sisyphus?" seems sadly to miss the point (whereas to ask "Was Sisyphus happy?" is provocative). Similarly issue-begging would be the proposal that family therapy would have helped Oedipus and his parents. These perspectives all strike us as off-the-mark, irrelevant, and supremely pathetic. Do they not catch us at the moment of experiencing a monumental philosophical paradigm shift in what it is to be human? A classical moral view, where tragedy, fate, and hybris are the currency of reflection on our purpose within an objective order, stands in opposition to the modern move toward disengagement through self-objectification, against the backdrop of a de-divinised world, and the contingency of self and consciousness which dominate our thinking. The struggle, in the modern world, is to invigorate a notion of the therapeutic which enables the self to meet Sisyphus' challenge rather than burying one's head in the sands of consumerism and apathetic futility.

As Charles Taylor puts this shift:

[G]reat classical moralists also call on us to stop living in unreflecting habit and usage. But their reflection turns us toward an objective order. Modern disengagement by contrast calls us to a separation from ourselves through self-objectification. This is an operation that can only be carried out in the first-person perspective...It calls on me to be aware of my activity of thinking or my processes of habituation so as to disengage from them and objectify them. Indeed, the whole (strange ultimately questionable) picture of myself as objectified nature that this modern turn has made familiar to us only became available through that special kind of reflexive stance I am calling disengagement. We had to be trained (and bullied) into making it, not only through imbibing doctrines, but through all the disciplines that have been inseparable from our modern way of life, the disciplines of self-control in the economic, moral, and sexual fields.

(1988: 310)

28. The feminist images and representations approach to cultural critique (Holly, 1975; Fetterley, 1978; Rakow, 1986; Millett, 1970) was a return, following the New

Criticism, to literary criticism based on a work's values and suitability to influence behaviour. This is a view of the function of literature characteristic of "the Classical Period, the Renaissance, and the Augustan Age" (Flynn, 1983: 21). Debates on the politics of representation have imbued debates on the criteria for 'good' feminist writing since the 1970's: eg. should a gynocritics evaluate women's writing as good when it offers plural and alternative representations of women's experience or because it provides primarily 'good' ones of 'strong' women? These debates have gone on against the background of the fortunes and evolving strategies of the women's movement. 'Gynocriticism,' a term coined by Elaine Showalter, focuses on women writers and "the history of styles, themes, genres, and structures of writing by women; the psychodynamics of female creativity; the trajectory of the individual or collective female career; and the evolution and laws of a female literary tradition" (Showalter, 1981:181-5 in Greene and Kahn, 1985: 23).

29. For instance, while feminist psychotherapy (Caplan, 1992: 28) is devoted to combatting the tendency in traditional psychiatry to pathologize as a psychological disorder the learned helplessness characteristic of women's role socialization as well as the tendency to identify endogenous rather than exogenous sources for a woman's depression, some practitioners do so at the cost of believing cognitive therapy alone is the solution (i.e., change beliefs and a change in behaviour will follow).

Feminist psychotherapy is not so distant from the psychotherapy community as a whole that it has jettisoned the latter's notion of a 'true' or 'authentic' self. In so doing, feminist therapy participates in psychodynamic psychotherapy's transformation of the culture-specific values of individualism into tacit facts about the mind. Kirmayer (1989: 247) discusses how three common uses of the term 'true self' in psychotherapy obscure the sense in which the self is a social construction: self as representation, self as subjective experience, and self as essence.

30. In an interview published in a newsletter called "Booktalk", published by Coles Bookstore (Vol. 7, No. 1), in the Winter of 1992, Steinem agrees with the reviewer's opinion that the self-esteem movement is going to continue gaining strength and public interest. "The resistance and ridicule seems to be coming from the media and the scholarly world," she notes (p. 2).

31. "Unsolved Mysteries," whose host is the actor Robert Stack, is an example of the hybrid docu-drama employed to meet the objectives of public safety and entertainment. The show recreates unsolved crimes. It is not unheard of that people who were victims in the original crime now act their own role in the recreation. This may include the role of the mother grieving over the bullet ridden corpse of her son (played by an actor) or a women, alone at home, being terrorized by an armed man outside her windows.

32. In 1990-91, CTV aired from 11:00-12:00 a.m. a British Columbia-made show called "Secret Lives" hosted by an accredited psychologist. Each show featured a 'patient' or 'patients' meeting with the doctor to discuss his/her marital problems, addictions, depressions and so on. Actors played the clients in these cases, which were supposed to have been taken directly from real-life situations.

Two comic strips--"Cathy," by the American Cathy Guisewait, and "Alex" the creation of a British cartoonist--which regularly appear in the national edition of the Canadian newspaper *The Globe and Mail*, suggest by their titles the fascination with gendered personal lives. Men's consciousness raising groups have been satirized in "Alex" along with life-style questions and topical issues featuring politicians and technocrats, which no doubt mirror issues being 'seriously' investigated and reported on in the British press. In this "Alex" is related to the enormously successful British comedy "Yes, Minister." "Cathy," when not pointing a finger at the single, professional woman's struggles to free herself from the sex/gender system's annoyances and inequities, frequently opines on the hazards of being subjected to the insights provided free of charge by her friends who are in therapy.

33. These topics were the subjects of the Canadian talk show, "Shirley" in 1990-91.

34. The Gothic heroine's feelings for her admirer or mate follow a trajectory from love to fear. Her struggle is to understand the deterioration of the relationship once a union with a man has been formalized (Modleski, 1982). The failure of films such as *Looking for Mr. Goodbar* to represent a happy future for the 'sexually liberated' woman of the 1960's, where sexuality outside the confines of monogamy and love was rewarded with murder by a stranger, is being repeated in the 1980's in the story of failed romance. The life-threatening event occurs within the domestic boundaries of home and marriage, and within an eroticism socially sanctioned by 'true love'.

35. The rights of homosexuals and lesbians to marry; to extend health care and insurance benefits packages to their spouses; the right of Anglican priests to practice the homosexuality their church accepts are some of the legal issues involving redefinitions of the 'family'.

CHAPTER ONE

From position to (dis)position: the problem of 'resistance in the resisting' reader

Is *reading* as a *gendered subject* determined by some biological condition or by a strategic, theoretical position, by anatomy or by culture?

(Felman, 1977: 3)

We not only have to recognize differences of class but *entirely different social experiences* based on the fact of sex, the fact of the oppression of one sex.

(Lesage, 1975: 83 in de Lauretis, 1984: 162)

[I]t is no wonder that college students occasionally cut their women's studies classes to find out what is going on in their favourite soap opera.

(Modleski, 1982: 113)

Spivak writes of feminists who "identify with the values of the other side (values considered to be masculine) while rejecting their validity."

(Spivak, 1981: 158)

Even when we come to believe consciously that our fear or shame or revulsion is unwarranted, we may still continue to experience emotions inconsistent with our conscious politics...These unwelcome, because apparently inappropriate emotions, should not be suppressed or denied; instead, they should be acknowledged and subjected to critical scrutiny. The persistence of such recalcitrant emotions probably demonstrates how fundamentally we have been constituted by the dominant world view, but it may also indicate superficiality or other inadequacy in our emerging theory and politics.

(Jaggar, 1989: 164)

1.1 An inquiry into some assumptions made by second wave, feminist reader-response theory

In the 1970's, Anglo-American feminist literary theory returned to a cliché in mainstream literary studies--the taken for granted role of the text's 'natural companion,' the reader.¹ It was part of a general recovery of the primacy of the reader for a critical theory of reading; however, diverse concepts of the reader have started from different assumptions and have aimed at different solutions (Iser, 1978). For instance, the turn to the reader has been achieved, albeit in different ways, under the auspices of both structuralism and post-structuralism: by Eco and the early Barthes, in the first case, and by Derrida, de Man, the later Barthes, and Foucault, to name the most institutionally lionized figures of the second instance.² While the Anglo-American feminist return to the reader came with a new impulse: to find grounds for the hypothesis that gender is a factor in the experience of literature, the rise of gender-sensitive perspectives in literary and cultural studies could be understood to be a response to the limitations of perspectives which reduced the interpreting subject to the effects of economic determination (Althusser), discursivization (Foucault), implosion (Baudrillard), or hypostatization as language categories (Lacan).³

Through a plurality of approaches--semiotics, rhetoric, deconstruction, psychoaesthetics, subjective criticism--feminist literary and cultural criticism has been seeking to make explicit the implicit features of the 'performance' of reading by gendered readers. It is widely accepted today that theoretical feminism must find ways to talk about signifying practices without losing connections to actual practices of reading which some have argued, with Lacan in mind, would be the case through recourse to "the procrustean bed of phallic signification and an exclusive emphasis on the signifier" (de Lauretis, 1984; Hall, 1981; Morley, 1981). It is also accepted today, in the wake of deconstruction, that feminist theorists cannot start out from a given notion of the subject but must take as their point of departure the problem of how codes and the apparati of social formations (family, language, schooling, media) construct the 'subject' and define positions to be taken up in discourses by which experience comes to have meaning. However, how the individual reworks those positions into a personal, subjective construction during the event of reading narrative

texts is the more subtle focus given the problem of the subject and ideology by recent theorists of subjectivity who argue that a notion of the human agent, as more than a composite of subject positions in discourses, must be accounted for (Smith, 1988). A premature resolution of the complexity of the transactional event of reading performance has occurred in the work of the above-mentioned theorists who have drawn "a picture of man from a completely third-person perspective" (Taylor, 1988: 311). Indeed, under the omnibus concept of the 'subject,' which underlies the return to the reader, a host of issues for literary theory, communications, critical theory, and feminist studies have been elided or made invisible. In reception studies, this point has been made with respect to the struggle of British Cultural Studies to overcome the heritage of Althusser (Allor, 1989).⁴

These epistemological and methodological insights have not always been celebrated in feminist studies of subject formation and reading processes. Let us recall that North American, feminist, literary criticism of the 1970's assumed there were signifieds *in* texts with specific effects on readers against which a negative reading strategy was advocated. This approach was modelled on these critics' own practice of 'feminist critique' which was intended to counteract "the limited vision" and "palpable designs of American fiction [written by men] upon the female reader." A 'resisting' reading, a concept originating with Judith Fetterley's influential programmatic work *The Resisting Reader: A Feminist Approach to American Fiction* (1978), but arguably implicit in Kate Millett's *Sexual Politics* (1970), was "to make available to consciousness that which has been largely left unconscious and thus to change our understanding of these fictions, our relation to them, and their effect on us...Power is the issue in the politics of literature" (Fetterley, 1978: x:iii). A 'resisting' or 'counter-ideological' reading was not only supposed to produce a recognition and repudiation of previously hidden social conditions and values denigrating and disadvantageous to women, but also to disrupt what was presumed definitive of the reading experience for women--their internalization and co-optation by those same values, beliefs, and expectations.

While Fetterley's analysis seems rudimentary today fifteen years after the publication of *The Resisting Reader* since it favours a critique of representations over

an analysis of contexts of reception, its basic expressive realist position is still to be widely found in literary and cultural critique, particularly in the culturalist camp in feminist theory.⁵ For that reason alone, a familiarity with Fetterley's thesis is useful. However, her work also introduced to feminist theory the concept of 'immasculation' which is anything but quaint or simplistic. It forecast an incipient psychological sophistication in North-American feminist theory in the 1970's which purported to be sociological and anti-psychological.

For Fetterley, gender in a text takes two forms: as particular signifieds and as a reading effect with implications for the reader's sense of gendered identity. We could think of both as the legacy of what, in *Mythologies*, Barthes calls 'ex-nomination' (1972: 138), the making invisible and unnameable by appearing as normal, natural, and ahistorical a particular configuration of beliefs, values, and power relations. The "limited vision" of "male" texts takes the form of repetitive and mutually consolidating representations and presuppositions where stereotypes and a "male system of values" abound (Fetterley, 1978: *xiii*). These produce what we will find de Lauretis (1984, 1987) and Wendy Hollway (1984) calling "gender differentiated" meanings in their respective analyses, to be discussed below. Female difference is represented in "male" texts in terms of negatively valorized and socially powerless attributes and roles.⁶ In particular, female sexuality and women's attitudes toward their bodies are critiqued as misrepresentations. Fetterley's view of the woman reader's relationship with the text espouses unilateral effect: the reader is believed to be easily moved to collude in a work's sexist positions since these beliefs are consolidated by prevalent social practices and attitudes.

A suggestive contribution of Fetterley's analysis is the notion of 'immasculation.' Her hypothesis about reading extends beyond a formalist analysis of the meanings 'in' male-authored texts to a concern for how the gendered reader's apprehension of a fictional world as gendered will be structured by the narrative strategy. For instance, her study of the fiction of Lawrence, Mailer, and Miller found that the dramatic structure of these novels induced readers to participate in a vision of woman as obstacle to freedom (Culler, 1982: 52). This describes an instance of immasculation which, according to Fetterley, occurs when the female reader learns to

read "like a man" and to identify with the male point of view against her own interests.⁷ Moreover, immasculation also inscribes powerlessness within the subject *because it produces division within the subject*.

To be excluded from literature that claims to define one's identity is to experience a peculiar form of powerlessness--not simply the powerlessness which derives from not seeing one's experience articulated, clarified, and legitimized in art, but more significantly, the powerlessness which results from *the endless division of self against self*, the consequences of the invocation to identify as male while being reminded that to be male--to be universal, to be American--is to be **not female**.

(Fetterley, 1978: xiii) (my emphasis)

Fetterley has identified not only the crucial feature of gender difference, 'otherness' (de Beauvoir, 1972); but, with the notion of immasculation, she has described the psychological experience of non-being that follows on the realization that being like men means **not** being like women. "Intellectually male, sexually female, one is in effect no one, no where, immasculated" (1978: xxii). Furthermore, this masculine persona "produces contradictions rather than simply offering additional and complementary possibilities" (Hollway, 1984: 230).⁸

In that Fetterley's inquiry into the production of subjectivity began with an analysis of power as its focus (Kolodny, 1980: 460; Booth, 1983: 51), other layers of analysis, which would have contributed a 'thicker' (Geertz, 1973: 3-33), more complex understanding of the reading process and of the modalities of the reading self (Flax, 1990) were out of range of her critical project. Fetterley's 1978 work leaves the impression that social relations are uniformly androcentric; 'male-authored' American literature 'reprehensible' and, by implication, 'female-authored' literature, 'good,' being untainted by any of the values or epistemologies in those male-authored books and the social surround which are supposed to have immasculated these female authors.⁹ With this persistent paradox undermining Fetterley's thesis in *The Resisting Reader*, this early example of feminist reader-response theory was already grappling with what has become a central issue in efforts to adumbrate a feminist epistemology: the paradox of women "seeking equality for and a valorization of a gendered identity which has been constructed through the very cultural institutions and discourses which feminists have been challenging and dismantling" ("Postmodernism," 1992: 342).

Moreover, given this paradox, *The Resisting Reader* is emblematic of, to use a Kleinian term, the 'paranoid-schizoid' phase of feminist scholarship on the relationship of representations to subjectivity: an early, primitive, necessary, but cruelly limiting developmental stage which had to be passed through but which can never be fully overcome as a defensive posture.¹⁰ It was motivated by the need, identified by the women's movement in the early '70's, to address the need for alternative voices in mass culture as well as in the canon being taught in university English departments. Fetterley's construal of that which had to be resisted is partial and unsatisfactory as is the link between her premise of a "female" reader and real, female readers' processes of finding meaning in texts. Her analysis privileges a speculative relation of the literary text to the social world and to the reading process. For instance, she abstracts the context of reading to exaggerate the lack of freedom of the female consumer in creating her own meanings. She pretends a materialist theory of the subject (which will reappear in a variety of guises in later feminist reader-response criticism: woman as blank page written by phallogocentrism, as product of discourse, as text) while, on the other hand, appealing to a concept of woman, at some level, as self-identical agent who has authentic, unalienated desires, and conscious access to a realm of experience which has not been colonized by patriarchal values. Due to this, it is presumed to provide the ground from which to reject textual representations as false.¹¹

It is apparent that Fetterley would like the concept of immasculation to account for splitting in the subject as a symptom of the work of sexual politics at the level of individual consciousness, but it is not up to the task. A commentator is plainly wrong when she states that Fetterley's argument can stand on the premise that "androcentricity is a sufficient condition for the process of immasculation" (Schweickart, 1986: 42). Or, perhaps she would have the argument in *The Resisting Reader* to be Fetterley's 'Lacanian moment' because a nuanced discussion of the relationship of androcentric social practices and beliefs and the formation of the individual unconscious is absent. It is doubtful that immasculation is as monolithic nor alienation as massive as Fetterley would characterize the experience of being female (reading) in an androcentric culture to be. To accept Fetterley's reasoning would be to accept her ultimately reductive concept of the self under immasculation,

which is subject to all the critiques put to positions assuming cultural determinism or false consciousness: it cannot explain individual or collective change; it falls victim to cause and effect circularity; it assumes what it has to prove. Immasculation depends on the premise of gender as a fixed locale in a binary system, and on the belief that all readings will produce the same signifieds and understanding of plot development and affective response in women readers. Since the only way personal history is assumed to function in reading is to confirm the values in the 'male' text, Fetterley is comfortable in positing unproblematically a gendered female subject while ignoring differences among women in order to impute their unrecognized and universal collusion in the systemic processes perpetrating their denigration.¹²

These critiques notwithstanding an analytical tool can be rescued from Fetterley's rudimentary sketch of the resisting reader, her concept of bifurcation. She presumes that the paralysis and lack of self-worth which is the subjective experience of immasculation is produced through the vehicle of bifurcation. Now we know that *splitting* in the self sets up a predisposition for multiple identifications of which the reader may be unaware. What Fetterley does not explore is the difference between two modes of bifurcation which I would call passive and active, and the different preconditions for identification they instantiate. 'Passive' bifurcation is what Fetterley has in mind in her discussion: the subject is consciously unaware of contradictory interests operating within her, of reading in-drag from a man's point of view while also living as 'natural' the confining limits which that perspective has writ large on social interaction. The insight promoted through the 'consciousness raising' techniques of women's groups and of feminist critique, of which *The Resisting Reader* is meant to be a standard bearer, was supposed to bring the ideology of male-authored texts under examination by the female reader so that she could remove the mask of male identification and acceptance of these 'hu-man' values as in her interest. This is the point at which she enters the condition I would call 'active' bifurcation. Active bifurcation has two components. The first encompasses a conscious awareness of conflict within the self, of what is responsible for the feeling of conflict, and of how illusory is the self's sense of wholeness and identity, i.e. an awareness of being internally at war with conflicting experiences of self as: woman, young or old, lover,

worker, daughter, mother.¹³ The second component of active bifurcation refers to the extension of domination as an intrapsychic condition, practised within the self and unavailable to reform, despite the above-mentioned expectation that freedom from immasculatation would follow naturally on a conscious refusal of androcentric representations. Therefore, the actively bifurcated reader is aware of splitting and aware of being part of the problem--the parts she would like to disinherit represent, from the psychopolitical point of view, the enemy. I am extending Fetterley's formulation of bifurcation to include active bifurcation in order to address the dilemma posed by the reader's awareness but lack of understanding or control over why she repeatedly puts herself into an immasculated position in everyday situations¹⁴, and why, despite her efforts to read resistingly, she may nevertheless experience a compelling pleasure from literature which, from the perspective of her politics or in the judgement of others, she ought to reject.¹⁵

In summary, Fetterley implicitly claims more for a resisting reading than the subject's mere repudiation of androcentric representations masking as universals. Such a reading is supposed to involve a psychological disengagement from these values and beliefs as self-representations. The weakness of Fetterley's pseudo-psychodynamic theory of the reading subject, however, is that she is only able to imagine the possibilities of resistance in terms of a movement from passive to active bifurcation while leaving the pleasure of the resisting reader unexamined.¹⁶

On the other hand, the work of a more recent group of feminist literary theorists such as Myra Jehlen (1982) and Patrocínio Schweickart (1986)¹⁷, could be thought as essaying an answer to the question: What is the significance of the category of pleasure to our construal of reading as a political activity? They stage a confrontation between feminist critique and the question of reading pleasure which, by bringing back the aspect of singularity into analyses of resistance, has provoked, in turn, my inquiry into the dialectical phenomenon which I am calling 'resistance in the resisting reader.'¹⁸ This phenomenon problematizes an earlier seemingly unquestionable desideratum in feminist criticism--that of women readers' refusal of stereotypical, denigrating, and ubiquitous representations of their 'traits', their bodies, their sexuality, and their social roles. The strategic tool of feminist critique, the

counter-ideological reading, has been found *insufficiently* powerful to explode or to explain the sources of women's pleasure in reading those narrative texts which "de Beauvoir and Millett convinced us were sexist" (Schweickart 1986: 43). 'Resistance in the resisting' reader reveals that there can be "a contradiction between appreciation and political analysis" (Jehlen, 1982: 148); that is, there is the possibility of a reader making an appreciative or pleasurable reading which differs from what is, from a feminist point of view, a politically correct or deconstructive reading of the same work.¹⁹

Two issues are suggested by this observation from actual reading practice. First of all, Jehlen identifies the core of the problematic relationship between feminist criticism and the rest of the literary critical discipline--the lack, in traditional literary studies, of an analysis between the grounds of aesthetic judgements and the unstated ideology of the institution known as the domain of the arts and letters of which literary theory is a part.²⁰ Jehlen wants to know what is at stake in making gender (or politics) a category in formulating an aesthetic, i.e. what happens when one reads critically with one's ideological predispositions up front. Schweickart (1982) advocates circumspection about accepting the notion of the duality of political and aesthetic interests. Toril Moi (1985) argues deconstructing such an opposition is what feminist criticism is all about. Such a dualism implies, for instance, that there can be a non-ideological criticism and that aesthetic judgments are not informed by political views or social interests in maintaining a *Weltanschauung*. That critique of dualism notwithstanding, Schweickart suggests it is not adequate to equate aesthetics with ideology; literature is not just ideology (1982: 175). If feminist theory presupposes that links between power and aesthetic criteria are ever present in judgements of 'good' and 'bad' art pronounced by the critical enterprise, this does not address the question of what is to be said psychologically about the reading performance of a reader who does not think as a critic about the merits of literature but only knows what she likes to read, or who does think like a critic and has difficulty accepting what she likes to read precisely because she is caught on the horns of the dilemma of reducing reading pleasure to aesthetics and then to politics (without allowing for any

intermediate area of experience such as conscious and unconscious fantasy and its uses, to get ahead of myself).²¹

Schweickart's objection to such a reduction brings not just the critic but the real reader into the debate on pleasure. "*Where does the text get its power to draw us into its designs?*" she asks. "*Why do some (not all) demonstrably sexist texts remain appealing even after they have been subjected to thorough feminist critique?*" (1986: 42). Or, as Modleski pondered in the quote at the head of this chapter, why do some demonstrably emancipatory practices (Women's Studies courses) lose audiences to formulaic and 'ideologically conservative' genres such as the afternoon soap opera? Schweickart's question opens onto several routes of investigation for a feminist project of reader-response theory: the effect of gender, described within the context of the intricacies of female subjectivity and the reading process, on the formation of meaning and the experience of pleasure; and sexual difference as a category in the debate between the 'knockers' (manipulation theorists) and the 'boosters' (the utopian exponents) of mass culture and the consciousness industries. It leads directly into a crucial problem for feminist/marxist critics, surprisingly a linkage Schweickart chooses not to elaborate in her essay: Is pleasure in realist narrative, underlying popular cultural texts like the romance, the thriller, and science fiction, a symptom of the psychological roots of oppression, of the success of the cultural origins of subordination? Does gratification in this type of reading express an internally motivated oppression? Does it have anything to do with authenticity or self-expression or is it "degraded consumption" (Jameson, 1988: 68)? Is pleasure what fuels collusion with and reproduction of systemic injustice, or could the experience of pleasure index a sphere of resistance?²²

It should be noted that while feminist reader-response theory in the 1980's has been discovering the 'problem of pleasure,' early feminist film theory had already made a political argument **against** pleasure in its attempt to define the conditions of visibility of a different social subject. Interrogation of the sources of women's unpleasure in Hollywood narrative cinema has been the other side of feminist debates on spectatorship, fetishism, and male scopophilic pleasure as set out by Laura Mulvey's influential essay, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" (1975). A parallel

to Schweickart's questions about the origins of the appeal of sexist, realist texts for the female, feminist reader, is to be found in recent feminist film theory. Teresa de Lauretis asks,

And if we are (right in suspecting the worst of narrativity), then how do we account for women's apparently irresistible attraction to narrative, from Anne Radcliffe to Alice Walker, from Germaine Dulac to Yvonne Rainer? Is it simply, again, a case of masochism, of victimism, a gender-specific pathological condition, or is there something else, or something more, at stake?

(1987: 108)

Her inquiry into the appeal of realist narrative forms for women viewers and into feminist filmmakers' return to narrative, coupled with the bemused realisation that audiences have not embraced avant-garde cinema or feminist films which destroy narrative conventions, led de Lauretis to analyse the structured-in pattern of desire in narrative forms. When, in the same essay as quoted above, "Desire in Narrative," de Lauretis suggests that "much is at stake in narrative, in a poetics of narrative. Our suspicion is more than justified, but so is our attraction" (1987: 109), she echoes Claire Johnston's assessment that feminist textual practice (women's cinema as counter-cinema) must no longer take the destruction of pleasure as its strategy (Johnston, 1974). Rather it should combine rather than oppose the notions of film as a political tool and film as entertainment. Chapter 4 will investigate how feminist theorists Janice Radway and Tania Modleski have studied the irresistible attraction of an unworthy discourse, the romance, for some readers in light of the "something more" which is at stake in such guilty and pleasurable reading.

Before pursuing these clues to the origins of pleasure in narrative in de Lauretis's work, Schweickart's response to her own questioning of pleasure and its status bears looking at. Her revisionist essay "Reading Ourselves: Toward a Feminist Theory of Reading," in the volume *Gender and Reading* (1986), explores the concept of the 'bifurcated' reader and anticipates de Lauretis' methodological thrust, namely, narrative's solicitation of the gendered reader to positions of identification through 'narrativity.'²³ To answer her question, Schweickart needs a theory by which to explain how the subject is addressed by and attuned to different textual registers and has both cognitive and affective responses. Although her question gestures to a non-

identitarian theory of the reading subject-- the subject in the reader who identifies images as sexist is not the same subject who finds these pleasurable or meaningful-- Schweickart's essay is weakened by several implicit and contradictory premises about gender which is her inheritance from earlier North American feminist thinking as represented by Fetterley and Millett.

1.2 A feminist theory of reading: gender in the reader, gender in the text?

The two poles in reader-response criticism are distinguished by where their adherents locate control in the text/reader encounter: is the meaning 'in' the text (Iser, Poulet, Riffaterre) or 'in' the reader (Fish, Holland, Bleich)? In "Reading Ourselves: Toward a Feminist Theory of Reading," Schweickart does battle on two fronts against these positions. She presents the case that reader-response criticism (particularly the aforementioned authors associated with the text-dominant perspective) needs feminist criticism because the former is utopian; it has ignored the perspectives of race, class, and gender in its accounts of reading experiences (1986: 35). Furthermore, when a reader-dominant perspective is put forward by reader-response criticism, it simply transfers the locus of meaning from texts to readers who are treated "as isolated individuals unaffiliated with political or social groups" (Flynn, 1983: 21), thus ironically repeating a version of the acontextualism associated with the New Criticism. Second of all, Schweickart defends theoretical interest in the problem of the *woman reader* against the gynocritical focus on *women's writing*, thereby reopening consideration of reading as a political act. She has correctly pointed out an aporia in the gynocritical project for feminist theory: if it is possible to formulate a method to disclose the "difference" of women's writing, Schweickart argues, "surely it is no less possible to do so for women's reading. The same difference, be it linguistic, biological, psychological, or cultural, should apply in either case" (Schweickart, 1986: 38).

Schweickart holds that the feminist 'story' of reading, *pace* Culler (1982), will have two parts, one concerning feminist strategies for reading 'male' texts and one concerning feminist readings of 'female' texts (1986: 39), given that there is "gender in readers" and "gender in texts." "For feminists, the question of *how* we read is

inextricably linked to *what* we read" (40). The question inspiring Schweickart's essay is, "What does it mean for a woman, reading as a woman, to read literature written by a woman writing as a woman?" (1986: 51).

What does 'gender' in a text and in a reader mean for Schweickart? Animated by the classical realist belief that the function of literature is mimetic representation (Greene and Kahn, 1985: 161), Schweickart presupposes that 'male' and 'female' texts are distinguishable in a number of respects. They present different world views which are gender coded, she implies, *because* the author is male or female. However, that this is a theory-begging conflation which she would ultimately not want to defend is evident by the lack of correlation between the gender of the author and gender in the text implied by her own question, "What does it mean for a woman, reading as a woman, to read literature written by a *woman writing as a woman?*" (51).²⁴

'Male' texts, even when they fail to approximate the particularities of the male reader's own experience, nevertheless "invite him to validate the equation of maleness with humanity" (41), through their linguistic tropes. The male reader is supposed "to feel his affinity with...the paradigmatic human being, precisely because he is male" whereas the same text "structures the reading experience differently" (41) for a woman reader. It solicits her complicity in equating male attributes and desires with the universal and in identifying with the point of view that denigrates "'female difference' into otherness without reciprocity," into inferior maleness (42).²⁵ False consciousness, "into which women as well as men have been socialized--oversimplifies the problem" (42), Schweickart rightly points out since it cannot account for the appeal of a text nor for the complexity of our responses to it. Fetterley had offered such an over-simplified answer in her concept of immasculation.

1.2.1 Resisting immasculation: the dual hermeneutic

Inspired by Fetterley's insight into immasculation but finding it limited, Schweickart formulates the possibility of a resisting reader through an analysis of her own bifurcated reading experience in reading a male authored text. She attempts to salvage something for a feminist theory of reading by focussing on the *potential*, rather than the certain effect, of an androcentric text to induce bifurcation in the

female reader. Her confidence in the female reader's ability to resist positioning by a text derives from her dialectical view of how the reader and text share control. This is both a descriptive and prescriptive account and therein lies its weakness.

She advocates that the female reader practice a 'dual hermeneutic' of male-authored texts which entails a three-step process. In the first moment of reading, what is 'in' the text controls the reader; the reader sees the world through the stereotyped characterizations of the male novel, but because she is also a woman "the reader is immasculated by the text" (49). The second moment "involves the recognition of the crucial role played by the subjectivity of the woman reader. Without her, the text is *no-thing*....In effect, the woman reader is the agent of her own immasculature" (49). We recall that immasculature, according to Fetterley, was said to operate through a woman's bifurcated response; whether she identified with the male point of view or desired a female point of view in the text, she confirmed her position as other (50). The refusal of immasculature begins with a refusal of the position of Other. A refusal of Otherness begins with the female reader taking control of the reading experience, choosing between two modes of reading. Rather than identifying with the authorial point of view, she should choose the strategy of reading for meanings through a negative hermeneutic, a conscious act of critique during which the values, stereotypical representations and plots complicit with 'patriarchal ideology' can be unmasked. The third moment of reading is coincident with the positive hermeneutic. The positive hermeneutic describes the female reader's performance of a role reversal by which the obvious ideological aspects of characterization and plot are suppressed in order to 'take back,' for her self-representations, some of the so-called gender-specific values and aspirations from the schema of androcentric literature. I would argue that it is the cognitively based perspective of schema theory which underpins the dual hermeneutic which Schweickart offers as an explanation of how readers are able to find pleasure in 'sexist' texts.²⁶

Schweickart's example in this essay concerns her personal identification with Birkin in Lawrence's *Women in Love* because "stripped of its patriarchal trappings Birkin's struggle and utopian vision conform to my own" (43). This "recuperates the utopian moment from which the text draws most of its emotional power" (43), that is,

the desire for autonomous selfhood and for love. A positive hermeneutic "recuperates the utopian moment--the authentic kernel--from which they [even androcentric texts] draw a significant portion of their emotional power" (43-44). The positive hermeneutic could be seen to be mutative (and resisting) because it is an example of *reframing* or a consciously *alternative scripting*, which means pulling apart the terms male and female as they are made to participate in clusters of values and attributes in scripts that interpret our culture and history.²⁷ What was once a male attribute is 'liberated' from its sexist package and retrieved as an ideal for women to identify with. Alternative scripting could be likened to what de Lauretis (1984: 178) describes as shifting the "ground" of a given sign (changing the conditions of pertinence of the representamen in relation to the object), which is to intervene upon the codes of perception as well as ideological codes to produce a change of habit--new 'interpretants' in Peirce's sense, and a new set of expectations.²⁸

1.2.2 Reading as/like a woman: feminist theories of reading first need a theory of women reading

The strengths of Schweickart's hypothesis on female reading performance are ultimately only suggestive in light of the many weaknesses in her argument. A strength is that she avoids the monism of text-dominant or reader-dominant models by striving to pry apart the phases in any performance of reading and the micropractices of each moment to achieve a discriminating and psychodynamically illuminating hypothesis. However, the assumption that we can easily agree on the criteria for a 'male' text or the textual and psychical conditions eliciting gendered responses in the reader is a consistent weakness as is the absence of distinctions between gender and sexual orientation as they pertain to identifications woman readers take up. For instance, on reading Schweickart's essay, it is easy to believe that no methodological problems or contrary interpretative paradigms exist to problematize the determination of the 'sexist' ideology of a text. Furthermore, she makes the implicit deduction that because all female readers belong to the same community of readers (the class of 'female' readers), they can automatically agree on what is 'in' a text at the only levels which are of importance--thematics and characterization. Schweickart's poetics is based on the assumption of the androcentricity of signifieds, their power "to induce"

identifications (43), and the feminist proscription of these identifications.

Schweickart's position on the 'male' schema of texts would have been undermined by an analysis of the textual structure of the modern novel which challenges the evidence for the reductive male/female textual typology she employs.²⁹

Secondly, as a theory of reading performance, I would argue that Schweickart's positive hermeneutic achieves no more than a description of the state I have called active bifurcation. Consequently, the potential of a feminist rereading to be "a kind of therapeutic analysis" (50), as Schweickart would have it to be, is limited by the lack of psychological depth in her account of identification. Schweickart foresees a positive hermeneutic as an occasion to take valued attributes (admirable qualities associated with the male hero while rejecting his misogynist traits) and either to fantasize different scenarios where a female heroine might express them or to perform a role reversal and imagine the male hero as female. The latter might seem to degenerate into cross-dressing, since it does away with the prejudice that some values, beliefs, or attributes are distinctively male or, at minimum, the criteria for distinguishing some as female or male values. When a female reader identifies with a male character she cross-dresses the male hero, but it is difficult to see what is distinctively female about this kind of identification, unless the point is exactly that nothing is specifically female about it. It may, instead, accord with identifications "we [feminists] would welcome as expressive of a *feminist* sensibility" (43, my emphasis). Schweickart states that in some ways the argument about women's similarity or difference from men is a false issue:

It assumes that concern about women's "difference" is incompatible with concern about the essential humanity shared by the sexes. Surely, "difference" may be interpreted to refer to what is distinctive in women's lives and work, *including* what makes them essentially human; unless, of course, we remain captivated by the notion that the standard model for humanity is male.

(1986: 60, note 36)

Schweickart implies that identification with characters (i.e. the determined and idealistic hero) is possible without being positioned by an ideology which, for instance, might equate the male with the heroic and woman with obstacle to that heroism.

Thirdly, there is a conflict between the conditions necessary for pleasure attendant on reading resistingly through the negative hermeneutic (unmasking the enemy's propaganda) and the conditions necessary for pleasure derived from the positive hermeneutic (identifying with the values of the other side without accepting their validity, to paraphrase Spivak). Performing a critical reading is supposed to have no unconscious correlates. It either happens at the level of conscious recognition and refusal of representations as authentic or truthful or appropriate or acceptable, or it does not. However, pleasure at the level of the positive hermeneutic is more difficult to describe because of the two moments of reading which are supposed to inhere in this strategic move: role reversal and identification with values and actions that express those values. Schweickart has inferred that, on the occasion of a positive reading, something happens in the reader in several different registers: belief, identification, and pleasure. But, she realizes that "patriarchal constructs have objective as well as subjective reality...they are inside and outside the reader" (50).

Because patriarchal constructs have psychological correlates, taking control of the reading process means taking control of one's reactions and inclinations...in order to undermine the subjective predispositions that had rendered her (the reader) vulnerable to its designs" (51).³⁰

In other words, it is necessary to take control of one's inclinations in order not to be vulnerable to the utopian aspirations represented, for instance, by Birkin. But, how is this to occur? Furthermore, what has happened to the status of the pleasure Schweickart argued she herself experienced on identifying with Birkin? Is what is claimed for the positive hermeneutic as a theory of resisting reading not unrealistic since it is psychologically naive to presume that by an act of will or reason the women reader can extirpate her pleasure or plumb the unconscious sources of her 'subjective predispositions' or 'utopian vision'? This naiveté follows from Schweickart's unstated assumption that the reader is perfectly present to herself and can identify, reflect on, and alter the conditions of her pleasure.

Furthermore, there is an ambiguity in Schweickart's position on the relationship of identification to pleasure. On the one hand, she seems to be making the argument that pleasure is another register which contributes to the immasculation of the reader when the reader has 'incorrect' pleasure, when she identifies with the heroine who is

refused an active part in the hero's utopian vision. Schweickart has made 'acceptable' pleasure in androcentric texts dependent on the female reader's unconscious role reversal whereby it becomes politically correct to identify with the utopian aspirations of a character such as Birkin. To return to her example of reading Lawrence, "The identification with Birkin is emotionally effective because, stripped of its patriarchal trappings, Birkin's struggle and his utopian vision conform to my own. To the extent that I perform this feminist rereading *unconsciously*, I am captivated by the text" (43). This sentence could be interpreted two ways. The weak reading leads to the conclusion that the pleasure (the captivation) attendant on the role reversal of the positive hermeneutic requires that the woman reader *not* be aware of putting herself in the shoes of the hero and thus not in the position of the denigrated other, although this *is* exactly what she is doing at some unconscious level. The strong reading is that a conscious awareness of role reversal is necessary to enjoy the utopian vision of the hero without being positioned (captivated/immasculated) simultaneously as the denigrated other. Pleasure can follow on conscious awareness of one's reading stratagem.³¹ In the tension between the weak and strong reading is the question of the link between pleasure and unconscious identification in reading which Schweickart is refusing to broach.

Fourthly, any hypothesis on the preconditions of identification necessarily presupposes not only a position on the strategies of the text by which limits are set up on the range of meanings a reader arrives at, but also a notion of subjectivity: "Who is the subject of identification?" "How are inducements to unconscious identification made or disrupted by a text?" By relying on a straightforward equation of sex with gender (where are lesbian readers in her universe?), by maintaining belief in the unquestionable, fundamental similarity of female readers, and by not following up her own hints about the unconscious subject of reading, Schweickart loses the opportunity to pursue the intrapsychic interests or compulsions underlying processes of identification and pleasure in reading. Her recourse to some notion of a dual reading to explain the power of the sexist text to elicit pleasure in the woman reader seems to fall back on the premise that a reader, however gendered, will primarily identify with specific desires and aspirations. The source and motivation for certain impulses or

predisposition for identification with certain desires ('authentic liberatory ambitions') is left as a given. The question to be posed in any formulation of a theory of reading performance much less a theory of strategic reading as a feminist, therefore, is not Schweickart's, "what texts do gendered readers read differently?" but "what does a conscious refusal or acceptance of a set of discursive procedures (i.e. binary oppositions which denigrate women) have to do with pleasure and unconscious reading practices?"

Last of all, Schweickart's essay was a contribution to a debate in American literary circles in the early 1980's on literary values, ideology, and on canon formation reinterpreted through the optic of gender (Guillory, 1987; Malson, *et al.*, 1989). Her thesis was an overt critique of reader-response criticism as well as being an intervention in debates about the grounds for "reading as a woman," a hypothesis under review in the work of the well-known theorist, Jonathan Culler (1982).

Schweickart cites Culler's question as a defence of her own project in this essay.

If the experience of literature depends upon the qualities of a reading self, one can ask what difference it would make to the experience of literature and thus to the meaning of literature if this self were, for example, female rather than male. If the meaning of a work is the experience of a reader, what difference does it make if the reader is a woman?"

(Culler, 1982: 42 in Schweickart, 1986: 37).

However, the specific terms of the question organizing Schweickart's inquiry marks the point where she and Culler part ways: "What does it mean for a woman, reading as a woman, to read literature written by a woman writing as a woman?" she asks (51). Although she and Culler agree that "women--because of their numbers if nothing else--constitute an essential class" (38), Culler problematizes the category of 'woman', its predicates, both textual and ontological, and its use in feminist discourse on reader-response theory in ways that Schweickart does not. A confusion which Culler has identified in many feminist works reappears in Schweickart's essay although not as virulently as in what could be called the 'gender realism' camp (Holly: 1975).³² He holds that, "Reading as a **woman** is not necessarily what occurs when a *woman* reads" (1982: 49). This has been otherwise formulated as the difference between 'reading as a

woman' and 'reading like a woman'. This proposition succinctly sets out the potential for semantic contradiction and category confusion caused by slippage between various meanings--theoretical, metaphysical, sociological--of 'woman' (and, by implication, 'female', 'feminine', 'femininity,' and 'man', 'male,' etc.), a slippage often performed and obfuscated in feminist discourses.

When claims for the validity of interpretations (or representations) are made by recourse to the authenticity of experience, the slippage Culler has noted muddies thinking about the purchase for the concept 'woman's experience.' In similar fashion, post-structuralism has challenged early feminist claims to speak for all women. Once the ideal type woman reader--assumed, for example, by Millett's *Sexual Politics*--as a young, white, North American, university educated, middle class, heterosexual female is done away with, contemporary feminist studies faces the uncertainty over which and whose 'experience' should be called forth as evidence for the 'authenticity' of textual representations or the correctness of a reader's interpretation. A plurality of readings becomes justified (Cota-Cárdenas, 1980).

Jardine writes in *Gynesis* (1985: 39ff) of the difficulty, for feminist theorists, of finding grounds for textual critique in personal experience while also arguing for a non-transparency theory of language. She is also uncomfortable, however, with the neutrality of formalist theory which throws out the significance of gender in reading. To ask feminist theory to answer the question: "When do judgements of experience obtain when reading performance has several moments, one of which entails identifications which are not consciously available to examination?" would lead to a specification of the problem of experience in terms which Schweickart professes to be dealing. However, since her own usage of 'woman' and bifurcation is slippery, Schweickart is not able to answer her own question about the origins of the powerful designs made on the woman reader by a 'male' text nor my question about the origins of the psychodynamic condition symptomized by pleasure in active bifurcation.

"Reading as a **woman** is not necessarily what occurs when a *woman* reads." Culler's inference is that the *woman* of the second phrase is the sociologically real reader (for instance, usually studied through the abstraction known as the 'audience') whose reading practice is not limited by homogeneous, consciously held and practised

principles or strategies. This distinction anticipates the debate in feminist theory over positionality versus identity as determinants of a subject's framework for making meaning (Alcoff, 1989; Haraway, 1991). The sociological reader may enjoy little self-awareness and may experience pleasure unself-reflectively upon reading the same sexist texts as the ideal type of the feminist reader, denoted by the **woman** of the first phrase. This ideal typical feminist reader is what Culler has been roundly and unfairly criticized for calling the 'hypothesis of the woman reader.'³³

When Schweickart herself infers that "literature written by a woman" is not necessarily the same as that of a woman "writing as a **woman**" (51) (my emphasis), she is performing the slippage in meaning cautioned against by Culler without clarifying the basis of such a distinction. **Woman** in her paradigm of reading oscillates between meaning 'feminist' and some aspect of the gendered female self which is not discursively determined yet shared by all female readers. The implication of postulating some variety of metaphysical essentialism which informs both the writing and reading experiences³⁴ is that this woman stands outside any problem of referentiality or reflexivity. She is assumed to have unmediated, transparent access to 'authentic desires' and self-knowledge in comparison to the category of the sociologically real woman, presumed to be living in false consciousness, who has been socialized into self-demeaning, self-abasing and accepting attitudes of disempowerment and alienation from her body, her desires, and her creative potentiality. The referent for **woman**, in the ideal typical sense, devolves from a liberal humanist belief in the possibility of the self-identity of the unfragmented self which, of course, if it existed would leave no room for immanulation. By trying to elaborate a prescriptive and feminist theory of reading without first understanding under what textual and psychological conditions sociologically diverse female readers make meaning, Schweickart (like Fetterley) finds herself assuming what it should be her objective to prove or disprove: that there is a metaphysics of gender which has effects on the process of meaning formation. It is the case that Schweickart admits that her study has left out "many important issues;" two of which identify the need for research into the functioning of the dual hermeneutic in *actual communities of readers*:

- b. We need actual reception studies as well as studies of the way women writers conceived of their readers and the way they inscribed them in their texts.
- c. The relationship between the positive and negative hermeneutic in feminist readings of women's writing...Specifically, is this appropriate to the popular fiction written by women, e.g., Harlequin Romances?

(1986: 59-60)

I will address her item (c) in Chapter 4 in the context of a discussion of the role of emotion in Janice Radway's theoretical framework and methods of research into the reading preferences of romance readers.

Culler's distinction has been used to make the argument that 'reading as a **woman**' is perforce an attitude of reading counter-ideologically. We can draw the inference, therefore, that a man could read as a '**woman**'. However, the subject-position of reading as a **woman**, for Fetterley and Schweickart also entails immasculation. Or, in my terms, immasculation entails passive and possibly active bifurcation; that is, initially identification with representations of women as Other and, later, awareness of the apparent paradox between one's conscious, politically motivated refusal of certain representations, tropes, and discursive practices and, at some level, one's pleasure in these same representations and practices. Although, immasculation is not a state that Fetterley or Schweickart extended to male readers, I would argue that it is the particularities of the condition of active bifurcation which distinguishes a man reading 'as a **woman**' from a woman 'reading as a **woman**.' Why? A male reader, reading against the grain--resisting the culturally dominant metaphorical associations with images and plots--still experiences pleasure and conflict around these images and plots in a consciously bifurcated way proper only to a heterosexual or homosexual male in this culture. In order to read resistingly, he struggles with his own long-held, seemingly natural, common sense assumptions born out of his *lived-as-male-experiences*, which may include introjected scenarios where the sexist dichotomies operate (e.g. male/female, culture/nature, universal/particular, active/passive, rational/hysterical, public/private). Even when a man reads against the grain, as a feminist, he is always "a man reading as a man reading as a **woman**".

In summary, to posit the dialectical phenomenon of resistance to resisting reading, we must assume a structure of conflict in the psyche of the reader. Reading

resistingly takes the form of identifying textual representations as ideological by virtue of being partial and sexist and refusing consciously to take them on as part of one's self-image; resistance to reading resistingly takes the form of pleasure through the attribution of meaning to representations in a way peculiar to the reader which is not accessible to voluntarism.³⁵ Resistance puts into question the 'obvious' meaning 'sexist' representations are presumed to invoke in the reader. To allow for the dialectical movement of 'resistance in the resisting' reader, we must postulate a psyche not completely colonized by the psychological correlates of patriarchy--while holding out for an explanation of predispositions which resist these correlates. Neither Fetterley nor Schweickart's approaches develop our understanding of why resisting readers find so-called illicit pleasure in 'sexist' texts and why they will continue to do so. **By positing a notion of the resisting reader whose underpinnings are ultimately unsatisfactorily grounded in a rational, self-identical subject, Schweickart has inadvertently posited the need for the theoretical accommodation of the *unconscious* reader and of a means to capture the influence of a reader's identifications on the schema she accesses by which texts are made meaningful and pleasurable.** By extension, the limited effectiveness of consciousness-raising to promote or engender any concomitant 'unconsciousness-raising' in the historical subject has also been inferred.

Pleasure in the text has become the new political battlefield in theories of reading, but it is the Achilles' heel of feminist theorizing such as Schweickart's where, despite her insights into a split reading subject, the theory is powerless to account for the effects of the relation between representations and narrativity on modes of identification in the reader. Without a notion of the agency of desire as expressed in the fantasies of the real reader, and their stimulation or provocation by various types of texts, and without a means of relating not only thematics but textual form to unconscious interests and intrapsychical processes, Schweickart's rudimentary feminist theory of reading fails to go much beyond Fetterley's early notion of immascultation to meet a fundamental requirement of feminist inquiry: to explain the political effects of texts by accounting for their aesthetic effects.³⁶

The Singing Detective, to be examined in Chapter 5, self-confessedly about "sex and lies" (Potter, 1986: 197), would no doubt warrant a resisting reading, according to Fetterley and Schweickart, because it is full of derogatory and unidimensional representations of women and sex. They would find it rife with sexist, homogeneously denigrating representations and hackneyed stereotypes of the post-war detective fiction associated with Raymond Chandler and Dashiell Hammett: woman as unfaithful (Mrs. Marlow has sex with Raymond, her husband's friend, subsequently breaks up the family, leaves her husband and takes Philip away from his father and beloved forest, Nicola is regularly unfaithful, or so Marlow says); woman as inscrutable (Mrs. Marlow's first name is Bett: a diminutive of Rebecca (a Biblically inspired innocence hides an unknowable interior) and a homonym of 'bête' (one both stupid and driven by instinct)); woman as unstable or crazy (Bett kills herself; Sonya, in defiance of post-war austerity, chews and swallows Binney's £10 note); woman as thing, as sexed body (as 'tail', as 'wiggling arse', as "nice bits of skirt" , "lovely bits of stuff" with "good knockers" (p. 108) or "lovely titties" (p. 115), as 'pin-up' in bra, stockings, and garter-belt, as fetish (the glistening, naked, dead body, being turned to reveal a breast)); woman as stupid (Sonya's aforementioned non-instrumental attitude toward money; or, according to the two mysterious thugs, women are tarts with "brains in their bleed'n nipples" (p. 150), Amanda is "as thick as shit in the neck of a bottle"); woman as duplicitous, uncertain about their sexual desire (Mrs. Marlow chides "no good" Raymond for the "dirty devil" that he is, yet Raymond knows that's what she likes about him when she has sex with him in the woods (p. 112)), woman as seductress (Mrs. Marlow loves 'tart's' music, cabaret songs; Amanda and Sonya in the semi-dressed display of the bar-girl, Sonya as "Snow Queen," nurse Mills as torch singer); woman as castrating, authority figure (Mr. Marlow's mother is an arrogant, ignorant witch, nurses are hoydens, Nicola despises and betrays her husband and prostitutes his work, both Philip's teacher, a sadistic hypocrite, and Sonya, a 'Venus in furs' type, make him "feel small"); woman idealized, put on a pedestal without desire (Mrs. Marlow is the cultivated pianist, she can play classical music not just accompany her crooning husband on the piano in the local pub). Examples of a double standard abound: Mrs. Marlow's old father loves to sip his bitters and listen to

German cabaret songs, but he denigrates the singer as a tart; Sonya refuses to sell herself for money yet when she has sex with Binney she only provokes his sadistic rage and desire to humiliate her; sex for Raymond is "only a bit of fun" yet Bett's seduction counts as "one more done, then" (p. 114), another victory for him, all women are substitutable. No doubt Andrea Dworkin (1987) would reduce the plots of *The Singing Detective* to repetitious accounts of unsatisfactory and sadistic fucking. Thematically, males seem to suffer innocently at the hands of women who, because of their purely irrational or selfish concerns, present obstacles to the formers' self-fulfillment and happiness (Mrs. Marlow runs away from her kindly and good-natured husband, her suicide ruins Philip's childhood, Nicola breaks up their marriage with her infidelities). Beyond a representational analysis, however, Schweickart's and Fetterley's perspectives offer few tools with which to analyze the complexities of plotting, diegetic levels, focalization, modes of positioning the addressee, and character development in a metafictional text such as *The Singing Detective* nor the reader/viewer's perhaps equally complex response to it.

1.3 De Lauretis: toward a materialist theory of the subject

Let us return now to Teresa de Lauretis whose project as a feminist theorist is to provide grounds for an interdisciplinary model of the poetics of narrative, in both cinematic texts and fiction, by compelling a mutually problematizing dialogue between theories of the subject, which rely on discursive determinism, and formalist textual approaches to narrative. Her work on narrative and narrativity is revisionist in that it addresses questions pre-empted by semiotic and structuralist variants of audience-oriented criticism whose categories, like Umberto Eco's, "exclude all pre-symbolic and unconscious processes" (de Lauretis, 1984: 168) as well as those dismissed by Lacanian inspired film theory which can neither bridge nor map the "substantial discontinuity between discourse and reality" (de Lauretis, 1984: 25). Her questions concern the pragmatics and aesthetics of the reading/spectating event as a communicative interaction. Of the project of semiotics, de Lauretis writes

[It] should be precisely such mapping: how the physical properties of bodies are socially assumed as signs, as vehicles for social meaning,

and how these signs are culturally generated by codes and subject to historical modes of sign production.

(1984: 25)

Her commitment to understanding historical agency entails a theorization of subjectivity whose domain she describes, in a chapter entitled "Semiotics and Experience," in the following way:

There are two emphases in semiotics: one focussed on the subjective aspects of signification and influenced by Lacanian psychoanalysis, where meaning is construed as a subject effect (an effect of the signifier), and the other concerns the social aspect of signification--meaning is construed as a semantic value produced through culturally shared codes (this is Eco's emphasis). There is an area of theoretical overlap, and there one ought to pose the question of the subject.

(1984: 168)

Three concepts deployed by de Lauretis (1984, 1987) show up the limitations of earlier feminist theorizing about subjectivity and the reading process: technologies of gender; the 'oedipal logic' of narrative, and the notion of 'investments.'

De Lauretis assumes the strategic theoretical stance of preserving 'gender' as an uncategorizable concept. In so doing, she distances herself from the North American tradition of feminist thinking we have seen represented by Fetterley, Millett, and Schweickart. She rejects a notion of gender as "virtually coterminous with sexual difference" (1987: 2), which would imply it was derivative of some archetypal essence or biological difference and which would reinstate a metaphysical framework of universal sex oppositions making "it difficult to articulate the differences among women or within women" (1987: 2). Nor is gender adequately conceptualized as a changing set of predicates, "a liberal-bourgeois idea encouraged by advertisers" (1987: 21) where in the "Ideal State of gender equality" women will have "careers, their own last names and property, children, husbands, and/or female lovers according to preference" because this hypothetical state has been idealized through disengagement from its material determinants: social relations and heterosexual structures. For de Lauretis' theoretical and political project, it is significant that the concept of gender extends not to a thing nor to a fixed set of attributes but discerns both a state and a process:

We cannot resolve or dispel the uncomfortable condition of being at once inside and outside gender either by desexualizing it (making

gender merely a metaphor, a question of *différance*, of purely discursive effects) or by androgynizing it (claiming the same experience of material conditions for both genders in a given class, race, etc.).

(1987: 11)

Her critical revenge on Foucault is to employ his method--the study of 'discourses' as technologies or conditions for saying something 'true' which produce effects in bodies, behaviour, and social relations--to study what his project ignored: how discourses *solicit males and females unequally to different types of identifications, objects of desire, and positions of power through gender differentiated meanings*. She proposes that gender, both as representation and as self-representation,

is the product of various social technologies, such as cinema, and of institutionalized discourses, epistemologies, and critical practices, as well as practices of daily life.

(1987: 2)

While the similarities between de Lauretis' concept of gender technology and the social psychological concept of gender-based schemata are evident, she tries to step beyond the sociologism associated with schema and scripts to access their psychological concomitant at a level that academic psychology does not recognize, desire. Gender in a text and in a reading subject is "a position occupied in relation to desire" (de Lauretis, 1984: 142). As a semiotician, de Lauretis' endeavour is to retool semiotics to capture the presence and movement of desire in semiosis. She holds that the relation of narrative and desire "must be sought within the specificity of a textual practice where it [desire] is materially inscribed" (1984: 105-6). By introducing the category of desire into her analysis of narrativity, de Lauretis' is claiming that textual modes of enunciation and address not only position the reader before the meaning-effects of narrative but also before the expression of a desire proper to one gender or the other. She will go on to elaborate at length a critique of male desire inscribed in the Oedipal logic of narrative while only being able to posit female desire as what is not-Oedipal. She advises that we stop looking for the meaning of the text to ask instead: "Whose desire speaks? Whom does that desire address?" (1984: 112).

De Lauretis' theoretical work has moved from an early focus, the study of pleasure specific to film spectatorship inspired by Mulvey's work on eroticism and an analysis of the cultural conventions surrounding the 'look,' to later efforts to produce a

more complex account of the interaction (and potential for overdetermination) between the narrative and visual registers in positioning the spectator: "Together, narrativity and scopophilia perform the "miracles" of cinema, the modern equivalent of linear perspective for early Renaissance audiences" (de Lauretis, 1984: 67). This evolution in her thinking seems to have been inspired by Mulvey's post-'Visual Pleasure' phase about which the latter remarked:

In *Visual Pleasure* my argument was axed around a desire to identify a pleasure that was specific to cinema, that is the eroticism and cultural conventions surrounding the look. Now, on the contrary, I would rather emphasize the way that popular cinema inherited traditions of story telling that are common to other forms of folk and mass culture, with attendant fascinations other than those of the look.

(1984: 201, note 6)

Drawing a parallel between the pornographic film, the classical Hollywood narrative fiction film, and the sub-genre known as "the woman's film," de Lauretis answers her questions.

Like fetishism, narrative film is the structure of a *memory-spectacle*, the perpetual story of a 'one time', a discovery perpetually remade with safe fictions.

(1984: 27)³⁷

"Whose memory?" "Spectacle of what?" "From whose perspective?" are all questions that narrative film, according to de Lauretis, does not ask or explore. Its "ob-scenity" lies with its exclusion of the rationale of framing, the "space-off" (de Lauretis, 1987: 26). Her well-known thesis claims that narrative film's modes of enunciation of the question of desire and its addressee and point of reference are to be found in the Oedipus myth: the desire is Oedipus's, its object is woman, its point of reference and addressee is man. Women, as textual voices, do not enunciate questions that propel the narrative; they are represented as spectacles or objects, not desiring subjects.

It would seem to state the absurdly obvious to note that women and men are addressed by cinema and by narrative,

Yet what distinguishes the forms of that address is far from obvious (and to articulate the different modes of address, to describe their functioning as ideological effects in subject construction, is perhaps the main critical task confronting cinematic and semiotic theory).

(de Lauretis, 1984: 15)

What accounts for the content of gender difference are gender differentiated meanings and "the positions differentially made available to men and women in discourse" (1987: 15)? For example, the same practices of heterosexuality are "likely to signify differently for women and men" (Hollway in de Lauretis, 1987: 15). The Oedipal logic of narrative provides an example of the different positions with which women and men are believed to identify.

In "Desire and Narrative" (1984: 112), de Lauretis maintains that the Oedipus story itself is paradigmatic of the inscription of desire in all narratives in Western culture. In film, where there are two registers, visual and narrative, and two kinds of pleasure, scopophilic and that derived from story telling, the "oedipal logic" of narrative overdetermines the visual register.³⁸ Thus, de Lauretis locates desire in the 'oedipal logic' of narrative itself which antedates any particular textual construction of the reading subject.

By 'oedipal logic' she refers to the principle organizing the plot structure: a question begins the narrative; a desire to reach the end, the answer, is inscribed in reading from its outset; a character's desire defines what we see; the narrative is a transformation predicated on the hero who is always male; woman has no subject function, she is passive in the plot space, waiting for the hero to claim her; progression in the narrative is toward the oedipal stage (which for the woman marks the onset of womanhood and initiation into femininity according to Freud and is represented by the woman character finding fulfillment in love and marriage to the male hero). De Lauretis claims that to impede this logic is to impede narrative closure and the fulfillment of male desire.³⁹ Since male desire speaks in narrative structure in our culture, and in the myths of so many others as interpreted by Lévi-Strauss (1984: 112), woman is assigned the passive role of spectator in the narrative register, of occupying the function of obstacle or boundary in the plot space in which males are active principles.

When the Oedipal struggle organizes emplotment in narrative, it is to say that "each reader-male or female--is constrained and defined within the two positions of a sexual difference thus conceived: male-hero-human, on the side of the subject; and female-obstacle-boundary-space, on the other" (1984: 121). De Lauretis proposes that

it has been cinemas's "phallic premise" (1984: 29) that has foresworn "the possibility of a different relation of the spectator-subject to the filmic image, of different meaning-effects being produced for and producing the subject in identification and representation--in short, the possibility of other subject processes obtaining in that relation."⁴⁰

There is much that is provocative in de Lauretis' hypotheses about the way subject-positions are constructed across narrative and visual registers, but I am not confident that a hypothesis about the oedipal structure of narrative is anything more than another version of Fetterley's imasculation thesis. Although de Lauretis's work belongs to a camp in feminist theory which is **not** concerned with showing the inauthenticity of representations of women's experience in order to claim authentic experience can be known, and it is dedicated to the study of the semiotic production of notions of female and male experience and how these function as technologies of the self, I think her account of narrativity as a technology is inadequate precisely because she misunderstands the origins of its power to solicit readers to positions of identification.

1.3.1 From positioning to (dis)positioning

How we come to have certain self-interpretations or narratives of our selves and our lives, and interests in maintaining these understandings of self, is partially accounted for by the concept of discursive 'positioning'. We recall that positioning has two aspects: first of all, as Foucault allowed (1972, 1980), a subject position entails both a conceptual repertoire **and** access to rights for those that use that repertoire, giving them power and legitimacy (Davies and Harré, 1990:46).⁴¹ To take up a subject-position in a discourse, according to both Foucault's and de Lauretis's use of the concept, means taking on beliefs (the internal aspect of being subject-ed) and performing in the world in a relationship with other people (external manifestation). However, taking up a subject position does not necessarily coincide with an agential position. "Positions available in gender-differentiated discourses confer relative power by enabling the suppression of significations which would be undermining of power" (Hollway, 1984: 239). For instance, it has been argued that women positioned as

subjects of the discourse of female heterosexuality acquire diminished status if they too actively pursue their pleasure because of the different meanings which that discourse attaches to permissiveness in comparison with the discourse of male (hetero)sexuality. Notwithstanding the fact that taking up a subject position in a discourse does not necessarily entail taking up the rights of an agent and that discourses bestow powers on those who speak them; nevertheless, discourses do not eliminate choice, a factor whose specifics Foucault omitted to theorize. "At least a possibility of notional choice is inevitably involved because there are many and contradictory discursive practices that each person could engage in" (Davies and Harré, 1990:46). Otherwise put, one's identity as a legal subject does not always precisely coincide, although it overlaps, with one's identity as an epistemological, ontological, libidinal, or unconscious subject. How there come to be interconsolidating links among these identities, at what level, and due to what logic, is a significant problem for which discourse theory must continue to put into question its explanatory adequacy.⁴²

I propose the concept of the **(dis)positioned self** as a heuristic with which to introduce the unconscious as reader through its presence as an affective reader. My notion of (dis)positioning is a response to Flax's observation that analytic tools capable of capturing modalities of the reading subject are lacking. But to what potentialities, preconditions, or limitations could **(dis)positioning** refer? Let us recall why Foucault's influential notion of discursive **positioning** proves inadequate for reading theory. Foucault's concept of discourse provides a vocabulary with which to describe the materiality of language while simultaneously impoverishing the human subject as agent. Reduced to that which is 'spoken by discourse', Foucault's radically decentred subject is a subject divorced from ethics, from will, and from any motivation to be a 'resisting' reader, reading 'against the grain.' The (dis)positioned reader, on the other hand, is a perspective on the reading activity of real readers which admits the usefulness of some elements of post-structuralist theories of language and the subject while addressing the importance of psychoanalytically influenced theories of reading. The '(dis)positioned' reader is not entirely a 'subject-effect,' not completely reducible to the subject positions offered by the mode of address of the

text, just as the individual as a social and class subject is never the brute product of ideology.⁴³ I intend the construct of the (dis)positioned reader to reassert a course for reader-response theory, a course which has been undermined by the pan-discursivism of the subject under a post-structuralist description. In my view, Flax would be in agreement with the project of attempting to find tools by which to account for *unconscious positioning* or *conscious but archaically determined positioning* in readers and the etiology of *the affective mediations of a subject's individual experience of symbolic processes*.

Theorizing the determinations of a person's choices to participate in the use of a discourse or, at the textual level, to take up a position in a discourse in order to make the text meaningful confronts feminist thinkers with a thorny dilemma since it returns them to the problem of **mediation**.⁴⁴ One source of determinations are cultural competencies, the cognitive frameworks a person brings to his/her reading performance of a text. Feminist efforts to theorize these processes through the category of gender have suffered under contradictory pressures exerted by, on the one hand, the requirement to discover the conditions for the production of an historical subject without, on the other hand, essentializing female difference as the ground for claims to collective behaviour. We see this balancing act in de Lauretis' own, diverse writings as feminist social theorist and narratologist. She finds herself wearing both hats uneasily when she takes up the post-structuralist position on gender. For instance, according to de Lauretis, we are both inside and outside the ideology of gender; although it is not clear from her analysis which 'parts' are 'out,' why they 'escape' positioning, or how we would know if they had. While presenting the subject as contingent on discursive production, namely as a construct of technologies of gender and, therefore, without an ontological or constitutive aspect; she nevertheless maintains the critical theorist's interest in domination, emancipation, and fetishism (which presumably relies on something in the nature of being human which provides the ground for an ethics or a politics).

In her work on oedipal emplotments, de Lauretis has not yet given us a purchase on the problem of *different women's differential solicitation to subject-positions*. To attempt this, she turns to a feminist psychologist's work on gender

difference and the production of subjectivity and takes on the difficult task of thinking not only about gendered, individual subjects, which Foucault eschewed, but also about some notion of a constitutive subject, while pursuing a discursive analysis of the sort with which he would have been in agreement. Furthermore, she has not been alone in this endeavour. Reformulations of the study of interpellation⁴⁵ in cultural studies today have opened up the theorization of consumption and use value as well as of the subject as agent, echoing debates in North American reader-response theory on where control lies, in the text or with the reader:

A person is not simply an *actor* who follows ideological scripts, but is also an agent who reads them in order to insert him/herself into them or not. (...) It is necessary to social theory to account for the complexity of individual receptions of ideology and ideological formations, and to be able to construct more than a theoretical notion of resistance.

(Smith, 1988: xxiv)⁴⁶

Furthermore, having chosen to participate in a discourse, how active or passive can a reader be? "Is the text's consumer not infallibly a 'subject' for the text?" conjectures Smith. After all, "the subject-positions ...most overtly offered by the text are the ones which are in a sense necessary to it in carrying out its ideological task" (1988: 92). Not infallibly, he answers. Model or implied reading positions do "not mean, however, that the ones on offer are the ones which are actually effective."

To account for an individual's subjective choices in taking up discursive positions while eluding the pitfall of positing voluntarism, de Lauretis turns to British psychologist Wendy Hollway's notion of 'investments'. Hollway's work explores a lacuna in Foucault's theory of change: how and why it happens at the microlevel of the individual. She says, assuming that at any time there are dominant and subordinate, competing and contradictory discourses (concerning sexuality, for example), and not a homogeneous patriarchal ideology, "How is it that people take up positions in one discourse rather than another?" (Hollway, 1984: 237). What accounts for the difference between some men, and others, between some women, and others? Or, perhaps, we could ask with Schweickart in mind, "How is it that some take up positions of identification in the Oedipal logic of narrative while others escape its rigidity by practicing a dual hermeneutic?" Hollway prepares us to think about these questions by arming us with a more complex notion of the individual subject, *one*

which is non-unitary but nevertheless identifiable by virtue of something constitutive of its choices and desire.

Hollway's hypothesis is that to understand the motivational dynamics through which an individual takes up positions in gender-differentiated discourses and, for example, in sexual practices (i.e. as celibate, as heterosexual, as lesbian, as bisexual, as monogamous), we must exercise a sensitivity to "the recursive positioning in certain positions in discourses" and to understand an individual's "*investment* in that position" (238). She has chosen the term *investment* (*Besetzung*) because it seems to avoid the weaknesses of dualism and the connotations of rationality or lack of complexity that are associated with choice.

...it was the German word for 'investment', *Besetzung*, which Freud chose to refer to what in English has been translated as 'cathexis'. As the two uses share some important emphases, it is a potentially productive meeting of paradigms. By claiming that people have investments (in this case gender-specific) in taking up certain positions in discourses, and consequently in relation to each other, I mean that there will be some satisfaction or pay-off or reward (these terms involve the same problems) for that person. The satisfaction may well be in contradiction with other resultant feelings. It is not necessarily conscious or rational. But there is a reason.

(Hollway, 1984: 238)

She elaborates on this reason:

the availability of a position in discourse which is positively valued and which confers power must be accompanied by a mechanism at the level of the psyche which provides the investment to take up this position. I have argued that the investment in this position is produced in the individual's history.

(Hollway, 1984: 256)

When de Lauretis (1987: 16) pursues Hollway's concepts, she reinterprets investment "as something between an emotional commitment and a vested interest, in the relative power (satisfaction, reward, payoff) which that position promises (but does not necessarily fulfill)." Due to her interest in which investments in which discourses yield more relative power, de Lauretis is more concerned with the apparent lack of evidence for Hollway's conclusion that "every relation [of a subject to a discourse] is a site of potential change as much as it is a site of reproduction" than in mining the suggestive concept of *recursive positioning* as a controlling principle or dynamic--or,

in Hollway's language, *reason*--for the subject's openness to solicitation to gender-typed positions of identification within a discourse. To recall Hollway's remark, the satisfaction gained in taking up positions of identification is "**not necessarily conscious or rational**," and due, in part, to the effects of recursive positioning. The concept of recursive positioning links the individual's (self)-positioning in the here and now, in and by discourses, with early childhood positionings by discourses circulating in the family, even before the child had language.⁴⁷ That this inheritance of positions established by parents for children is present without respite in an individual's (chronologically) adult experience and future negotiation of subject positions in discourses takes on a wholly other aspect when equipped with the connotations of the Freudian notion of 'deferred action' (which may have been intertextually present in Hollway's idea of recursive positioning but which she has not adequately explored).⁴⁸

The ethnographic research which Hollway conducted into the gender-differentiated positions discourses offer has led her to chip her discursive tools against the bedrock of psychic investments without any rewarding discoveries about pressures, loads or landslides which might be associated with the event of recursive positioning in reading performance. What is rewarding in one of her examples, however, is the identification of *emotions*, a correlate of discourses and their use in talk, which have heuristic importance for research into a subject's investments in taking up positions in discourses.⁴⁹

The interview scenario of note is a discussion between Wendy Hollway and two young people, Beverley and her husband Will, concerning their dilemma about whether Beverley should have an abortion. Will had been taking the position of outlining the pros and cons of each option to Beverley who was initially against the abortion option. The interviewer resumes part of the couple's discussion:

Wendy (to Will):

What you said about Beverley saying, "I don't know what you feel about having this baby"--at one level you knew that this was absurd: you'd said a hundred times, "I'm into having this baby," but you'd repressed a lot of the feelings--[Will: Mmm]--for fear that you might be disappointed. So actually, she's (Beverley's) right. Because apart from

those moments, the **feelings that you have about it aren't coming over and that's the *information* that is so lacking.**

(Hollway, 1984: 255) (my emphasis)

Hollway recounts how the couple discovered not only that each one had investments in taking up a subject position but that their positions were interdependent. Will had taken the role of discussing the option of abortion which Beverley had at first refused to consider. When Beverley eventually "resisted the 'gender-appropriate' position," changed her mind, and opted for an abortion, in Hollway's words, "Will broke down in tears":

Rather than remaining the receptacle of all the non-rational feelings about abortion, Beverley adopted the position that Will had been occupying: "She actually thought about it and she decided, maybe she would." Will's ability to repress his feelings of wanting a baby were conditional on positioning Beverley **so that she would want it** (despite rational considerations, which he, not she, was representing). When this unconscious strategem failed, the effect was "completely unexpected." His defence against strong feelings that he wanted a baby--the mechanism of projection--had broken down. It did not, however, break down for long. This demonstrates how the evanescence of feelings is the result of their repression by the defence mechanisms.

(Hollway, 1984: 255-6) (my emphasis)

Will's discourse attributed to Beverley the position of subject in the discourse of "abortion is out of the question," and "I want this baby"; while taking for himself the position of "rationally considering all options." This position meant he was relieved of having to express a preference or of having any painful feelings associated with that preference. This strategy Hollway calls "projection" or splitting, whereby Will *needed* Beverley to be the carrier of beliefs, values, wishes, and expressed feelings he would not admit to having or could not display. This is not a conscious and deliberate strategy on Will's part nor on Beverley's; there are intrapsychic concomitants to this case of splitting of emotional labour. According to a male gender schema for caucasian Protestants in western culture, we can make the paradoxical inference that Will feels most like a man when he is not aware of feeling and, certainly, when he is not displaying emotions. While Hollway maintains that "[d]iscourse analysis provides a way of understanding the content of the split (what in this case Will calls 'being in charge of patriarchal reassurance' because 'somebody else's needs or fears or anxieties are greater than mine')" (256), her analysis reveals

that an inquiry within the framework of discourse analysis alone cannot explain the 'why' of the split between these two members of a heterosexual couple nor the 'why' of Will's brief assumption of the opposite position in his discursive dance with Beverley, the emotional intensity of which was signalled by his tears. Discourse analysis can identify that Will makes use of the pre-existing discourse of "women are emotional" which naturalizes "displaying emotion" as women's socially legitimated "work." However, from discourse analysis alone, we cannot infer why the cultural myth, "women are emotional," became a necessary part of Will's personally authored, self-help strategy for tolerating affects. We can argue that the proposition "women are emotional" does double duty for him: it provides Will with a normative, gender specific role *vis-à-vis* the emotional display required of him (which confirms his gender schema as masculine), and it allows him to insulate himself from the subjective experience of intense, undesirable feelings. As this process between the members of this couple is repeated over time, in Beverley's habitual, familiar, and comfortable emotional display Will finds confirmation of the culturally common sense belief that women are emotional which reconfirms the necessity of his role as 'rational' and 'cool-headed.' Discourse analysis enables a partial explanation of Will and Bev's emotional behaviour; every culture has a discourse of emotion which inculcates display rules. Discourse analysis, however, cannot explain the origins of the investments or needs Will has in maintaining his positioning of Beverley as subject of the discourse of emotions nor the preconditions of her *availability* for his emotional projections nor the reason for his tears when she changes her positioning. Perspectives from systems theory and psychoanalysis will be required to provide background on the psychical mechanisms (i.e. projective identification) which apprentice selves to accept and carry unwittingly the projections of others while finding that experience to be simultaneously painful, familiar, and normal; paradigms of emotion will be introduced in Chapter 3.⁵⁰

How to get at the intrapsychic preconditions or determinants of investment is the problem for theories of a reader's performance of meaning as much as it is for Hollway's type of ethnographic research into people's use of narratives to make sense of their lives. Hollway's essay in *Changing the Subject*, to which I return in later

chapters, is a contribution to the aim of the volume which is to link the psychic and the cultural domains under the aegis of the question, "Can people's wishes and desires be encompassed in an account of discursive relations?" The collective authorship of the volume offers the formulation, according to a general developmental theory, that all persons will have developmentally related problems (which have been theorized differently by Freud, Lacan, Piaget), and a study must be made of the signifying practices which prepare persons to find specific solutions to these developmental problems, solutions such as romance, heroism, selflessness. Given this focus on developmental theory as a privileged discourse on the formation of the subject and desire, it is important to note the lacuna in the authors' ambitious hypothesis to show that "relations of desire are simultaneously produced with power-knowledge relations in discursive practices" (1984: 223). Under the notion of 'discourse,' they include "bodies of knowledge produced by professionals, where links to regulatory apparatuses are obvious, but also received wisdom, culturally based beliefs, folklore and so forth" (223). However, no mention is made of emotion as a discourse whose impacts have their own specificity on the practice and regulation of interpersonal relations and the production of positionings.

Although Hollway observed that Will's splitting was the product of repression associated with defence mechanisms (1984: 256), her analysis in this chapter lacks a paradigm which relates emotion to the defensive workings of the psyche and particularly to the origins of investments. Her essay in *Changing the Subject* is ethnographic by method and sociologically not psychoanalytically oriented. Although she refers readers to essays by other authors in the volume to buttress her self-described Lacanian position on subjectivity (in particular the Introduction to section 3 of the book on "Theorizing Subjectivity"), the integration of such a perspective with her ethnographic research is not convincing.⁵¹

What are the preconditions for the motivations of people to take up the subject positions that they do? "Why did Will believe that he was the stronger of the two?" (Hollway, 1984: 256). Why did Beverley not initially defend the abortion option? Why did Will not continue unemotionally to espouse a variety of options even when Beverley was swayed toward having an abortion? What is to be taken from the

Hollway essay, at this point, is two-fold: emotions are clues to investments, and a subject-position is always taken up in a dialogue, directly or indirectly, with its dark other. One hypothesis about subject positioning, to be drawn from Hollway's analysis of Will and Bev's conversational interaction, is that one subject position in which a self has an investment is always relative to another subject position in which another significant self has an investment. We are locked in an intersubjective dance whose objectively verifiable positions may vary and move across the ideological floor but whose relation to one another is predetermined by non-discursive investments (i.e. the tendency for members of a couple to take up either opposing or similar positions). In Chapter 4, I will investigate the hypothesis that not only is the relational aspect of positioning a sign of a struggle for power between the members of the couple in time present, but that the property of being 'relational' is the *constituent* aspect of positioning as subjects engage in it. Positioning is always a 'dance' between two, or even three, because the investments which underpin it--symbolizations with an affective component--*originate in relational scenarios*. Secondly, it is clear that an approach to the self as a product of discursive technologies (or as a product of gender-based schemata) is inadequate to explain how readers (or members of a couple discussing abortion) are engaged emotionally. Discourse analysis alone, even when employed ethnographically, cannot capture the semantics of emotion.

I am claiming that the notions of investment, recursive positioning, and emotion are promising for a critical theory which "has tended to skirt around the issue of interpretation" (Levin, 1984: 45). Furthermore, I am going to argue, in the chapters which follow, that indices of a reader's recursive positioning are identifications and emotions, neither of which are always directly accessible or identifiable by conscious reflection. An analysis of emotion and recursive positioning promises to repair the deficiencies of de Lauretis' post-structuralist theory of the self as an agglutination of subject-positions across particular discourses. These notions--recursive positioning, investments, and emotion--put into question any relation of direct entailment between 'ideology' and our positioning by discourse, and between positions taken up in discourses and emotions experienced, while defending the possibility of there being coherence in a self-in-division. Recursive positioning, furthermore, poses a problem as

much for an "identity" politics as for a politics of "positionality" if these invocations of collective experience cannot account for the effect on motivation and agency of the relationship between past experience, to which recursive positioning gestures, and experience in the present. Development of these concepts for reading theory await a psychodynamic perspective on the reading self in conjunction with an ethnography *à la Hollway*.

These concepts have ramifications for cultural studies' analyses of texts and reading performance based on semiotics. They provide the grounds for a distinction between signification and meaning which is required to go beyond semantics and the semiotic notion of codes.⁵² I believe de Lauretis would not agree with such a distinction because of her position that the subjective aspects of signification are only accessible through semiotics' Lacanian inheritance. We recall her account of the project of semiotics,

There are two emphases in semiotics: one focussed on the subjective aspects of signification and influenced by Lacanian psychoanalysis, where meaning is construed as a subject effect (an effect of the signifier), and the other concerns the social aspect of signification--meaning is construed as a semantic value produced through culturally shared codes (this is Eco's emphasis). There is an area of theoretical overlap, and there one ought to pose the question of the subject.

(1984: 168)

Although Lacan does argue for desire permeating the workings of language, a Lacanian model does not allow insight into the co-inherence, even codependence, of cognition and emotion in the way in which I am arguing it must be found. I want to reserve the term 'meaning' in discussions of reading performance for the cognitive and affective product of the multioperational process, including recursive positioning, by which the reader arrives at a somewhat idiosyncratic positioning by discourses that *reproduces or alters* his/her investment in such a position. Whereas de Lauretis (1984, 1987) primarily wants to investigate the social aspect of signification--how external worlds are symbolized and how desire is patterned across a pan-discursive social environment--a fully social and historical conception of the self, such as is required by the concept of recursive positioning, reemphasizes the first part of her project for a theorization of subjectivity and demands that her question become: How are *internal* and external worlds symbolized, bounded, and connected, and what is the

role of symbolic reality in the production of the subject *through time* in connection with *physiological processes (drives) and wishes they produce* along with demands from the social environment? I am claiming that inferences about the constitution of the self, which follow from an analysis of investments and emotions attendant on recursive positioning, will contribute to the project of finding means to open up, what Levin (1984), following Winnicott, calls "transitional areas of experience."

The possibility of any future practice, and the key to interesting interpretations, will depend on our realization that objects **(and relations to objects provided by discourses)** are never simply there to be used in the way we merely choose-for in the last, depth-psychological analysis, they always represent another person, and the idea of a relationship with another person.

(Levin, 1984: 45-6) (my emphasis)⁵³

In other words, discourses are never just there waiting to be used as we would like, certainly a position de Lauretis would agree with; but neither do they speak us totally, a position Smith (1988) would hold: the self's interpretation or use of them is mediated by a preceding investment in another scene of reading, an infantile scene of relations with early caretakers and others.

1.3.2 A new project for reader-response theory: the (dis)positioned reader, subjected by discourse, subjected by investments

Following on the endeavour of such post-structuralist volumes as Smith's *Discerning the Subject* and Henriques' *Changing the Subject* to release theories of the human agent from theories of the subject which encircle and enclose it reductively, I would argue that any semiotic theory of the productivity of narrative requires a complementary psychoanalytically-oriented theory of the reader 'waiting to be solicited' or **susceptible** to being positioned. Reader-response theory needs to be able to account for the consumer "who is not infallibly a subject for the text" (Smith, 1988: 92). To do so it must go beyond an analysis of the diegetically **positioned** textual subject to a paradigm by which to make hypotheses about the influence of positions consciously **chosen** by a real reader as well as the residues of unconscious **positions** which a real reader brings to each reading event.

The real seducer says, "I come to you from your own play. Look: here is your part.

(de Sousa, 1987: 258)

As this suggests, positions available to a reader are both those of subject and object, author of transferentially-induced meanings and victim of seductively pre-scripted meanings in a narrative of intersubjective relations predating any discrete textual encounter. This suggests an element of prefiguration, of tenacious repetitiveness, of compulsiveness in the reader, which is not adequately captured by a formulation of the subject constituted in discourse such as the following:

[W]ho one is always an open question with a shifting answer depending upon the positions made available within one's own and others' discursive practices and within those practices, the stories through which we make sense of our own and others' lives.

(Davies and Harré, 1990: 46)⁵⁴

The construct of the '(dis)positioned' reader is intended to reassert a course for the reader-response project which has been undermined by the Derridean deconstructionist credo, "il n'y a pas du hors texte". After all, in the last phase of the post-structuralist reductionistic characterization of 'reading-as-textuality,' reader-response criticism as a coherent theoretical endeavour would disintegrate. Freund puts it well:

[F]or when the discrete concepts of 'reader' and 'text' lose their specific difference the *raison d'être* for both a *text*-centred and a *reader*- or *self*-centred criticism is undone; 'reading' and writing...become distinguishable only as two names for the same activity, a praxis to which the post-structuralist name of 'textuality' is frequently given.

(1987: 10)

The effect of the post-structural characterization of 'text as psyche' (Derrida) leads us to the same critical impasse as the tenet of New Criticism that "response is not a property of the reader at all but something inscribed in and controlled by 'the poem itself'" (Freund, 1987: 4): the specificity of readers, and their differences, becomes invisible.

However, one strand of feminist borrowing from post-structuralist theory offers a place from which to argue, along with defenders of an hermeneutical perspective on the subject, for a "first person view" when seeking to understand the interaction between text and reader or spectator. This is the strand which argues for the diversity of voices describing female experience (which has been critiqued in some quarters as leading directly to relativism since the 'experience' described in these accounts yields

no conclusions generalizable on the basis of gender or criteria for a discrimination among textual interpretations as more or less truthful). One of the basic tenets of the hermeneutical view is "that human beings are partly constituted by the self-interpretations they accept, that there is no answer to how things are with us that is quite independent of our interpretations" (Taylor, 1988: 55). It will become apparent that with the concept of (dis)positioned reader I am reminding reading theorists that human beings are partly constituted by an interpretative process, operating outside of consciousness, that is unacceptable to another aspect of the self; in other words, "there is no answer to how things are with us that is quite independent of our unconscious interests and defences" either. Furthermore, there is no access to the self and all of its first persons narratives, conscious and unconscious in origin, except, as Gadamer (1985) has observed, by means of a 'detour through the other.'⁵⁵

From Hollway's perspective, Fetterley's notion of bifurcation could be seen to contain seeds of insight into the unconscious processes underlying investments. Hollway takes the concept of bifurcation one step further in order to speak about the subject who comes to present experience split into parts by defences and desires, both known and veiled, due to the psychical work of recursive positioning. Immasculation is as much the product of rigid stereotypes in cultural texts as it is due to rigid investments in the reader. In Hollway, to specify the working of investments, some recourse to a level of experience and a regulatory principle which are not consciously available to the subject but which endow his/her taking up of positions and identifications with the character of a compulsion or need is required. Although Hollway notes that conflicts and contradictions arise out of the self's positionings in discourses, and happiness is not necessarily ensured by them, her theoretical model constrains her to see these acts as empowering, resisting expressions of agency (against, for example, a hegemonic heterosexual or class discourse) and provides no purchase for an understanding of the relation between a subject and *non-events* or *absent acts*, which was one of the signposts of Foucault's method (i.e. why Will cannot outline the pros and cons of abortion while also acknowledging to Bev his own ambivalence with respect to these arguments). With the concept of investment as elaborated in this 1984 essay, Hollway cannot explain repression--why the individual

forgets--nor a variety of defensive behaviours (e.g. "projective identification," the attribution to others of characteristics, beliefs or wishes which one cannot accept in oneself) nor the economy of pleasure.

Despite the fact that de Lauretis proposes that gender is not a content but a locale of theoretical and cultural disputation, and that "subjectivity is an ongoing construction not a fixed point of departure or arrival from which one interacts with the world" (1984: 159); nevertheless, she seems in danger of reducing the gendered self as well as its self-representations to the product of discourse out of default of a hypothesis with which to explore unconscious determinants on action.⁵⁶ However, without a concept of a subject of inner experience or some notion of the subject as agent which exceeds the notion of the subject as "an agglutination of multiple positions of identification," de Lauretis' appeal to gendered meanings and oedipal logics is insufficient to explain a text's differential solicitation, not only of women but also of men. Secondly, although social relations of gender constitute and validate sexual oppression as de Lauretis maintains (1987: 15), they alone are not sufficient to account for the individual's experience of imasculation, paralyzing anxiety, a sense of life's futility, a lack of a sense of self-worth, and a host of self-destructive behaviours such as prostitution, perfectionism, or anorexia, which could be thought of as the taking up of a subject positions--in a cash economy, in a libidinal economy, and in a discourse of self-abjection, humiliation, and dependency.

1.4 The absent presence in North American, second-wave, feminist theories of the gendered reader

We have seen that feminists have returned to pre-eminent scrutiny a disenfranchized area of literary theory: the cognitive schemata and experiential knowledge the reader brings to the interpretative activity as a decoding and recoding performance.

An early and influential position in feminist reading theory, represented by Jane Fetterley, offered an account of bifurcation and imasculation which condemned the female reader's mystification through having learned to read as a man. The significance of this thesis was to be found not primarily in its contribution to the project of a burgeoning feminist critique of representation but in its gesture to an arena

of active, unconscious processes which mediate interpretation. Fetterley argued for alternative cultural representations of women's experience to redress immasculation. She contributed to launching the gynocritical orientation in feminist studies and to what have been called the 'Images and Representations' and 'Recovery and Reappraisal' approaches in cultural studies (Rakow, 1986). Fundamental to Fetterley's position, and in opposition to post-structuralist perspectives "on the woman question," is the belief that there is something outside textuality that defines the difference of being female as innate, which difference is secondarily mediated by androcentric thinking and values and symbolic systems. This position reinforced the pre-existing tendency in reader-response theories to talk about what is 'in' the reader and what is 'in' the text. To counteract the cross-dressing brought on by immasculation, Fetterley called for a 'resisting' discernment and rejection of the sexist representations and androcentric prejudices in literature by the appropriately 'conscious' woman reader who was believed to be perfectly present to self-reflection. We have seen that the assumption of women's passivity, underlying Fetterley's immasculation thesis, was reevaluated in Schweickart's reading strategy of the dual hermeneutic. These frameworks for interpretation lend themselves to translation into the social psychological language of schema or script theory, and the reader's hermeneutical activities can be seen as a refusal to accept the premises, and inferences from those premises, entailed by gender-differentiated schema such as gender-typing. However, we found this move to offer only a partial solution to the psychological phenomena of internal colonization identified by Fetterley's immasculation thesis.

Cognitive schema or, in de Lauretis' language, subjectivity-producing technologies of gender, while available to critique as ideological and so on, nevertheless, leave traces and motivational residues within the self which are not accessible to the self's voluntary dismissal or invalidation. It was my hypothesis that operating beside the signifying practices producing gender is a discourse of emotion which has its own specificity in motivating the subject-positions a self is drawn to assume. While I did not find Hollway's discussion of the reader's investment in discourses to account for how pleasure might point to the preconditions for contradictory identifications or subject positions, a strength of her inquiry is that it

provides grounds for reinterpreting, as expressions of resistance and personal agency, what might have been seen by early feminists only as collusion with androcentric values or immasculation. Schweickart pointed out that the cognitive analysis of a reader's beliefs is not adequate to explain the interest and guilty sense of pleasure aroused by reading texts which contradict or offend those beliefs and conscious desires. However, without a theory of the unconscious determinants motivating a reader's practice of a positive and negative hermeneutics, the psychodynamic criteria for either type of interpretative move remain inaccessible. Accounts of 'resistance in the resisting' reader are simply incoherent without a pragmatics of reader-response, specifically one focussed on the unconscious determinants of reading. In Chapter Three, I will look at one recent attempt to produce a psychoethnography of women's pleasure, Janice Radway's study of women reading romance fiction.

The importance of the phenomenon of 'resistance in the resisting reader' is that it identifies conflict within the reading self, or multiple positioning if you will, as a precondition to taste, to meaning-effects, and to emotional response, while locating the very logic of the self's coherence within the patterns organizing its conflicts.

Resistance in the resisting reader is an instance of (dis)positioning, of competition in the self among a number of frameworks and subject positions from which signification and meaning are produced. Resistance may take the form of emotions which the feminist reader would like to disown; however, as Jaggar notes in the quote at the head of this chapter when speaking about, what are from a feminist point of view, unwelcome, disturbing emotions, "The persistence of such recalcitrant emotions probably demonstrates how fundamentally we have been constituted by the dominant world view, but it may also indicate superficiality or other inadequacy in our emerging theory and politics" (1989: 164). Resistance in the resisting reader has yet to be adequately accounted for by feminist theory, and the glaring theoretical aporia is an understanding of the co-dependence of interpretative frameworks, such as cognitive schema for gender typing, and emotion.

The feminist inspired reading strategy of a repudiation of sexist images, plots, feelings, and wishes fails to come out victorious in reading behaviour *not* because readers are not aware these representations are objectively considered to be or

subjectively experienced to be untrue, unworthy, reprehensible, stereotypical, enraging, and so on, but because other interpretative frames prevail in the self and precisely *require* these very representations and the corresponding emotions for psychological purposes associated with the self's defences and the solutions achieved by the self to problems posed by development. The psychoanalyst Joyce MacDougall identifies one such consistent problem for which we strive for solutions: "My observations and reflections on changing sexual mores lead me to conclude that (quite apart from the question of basic differences of psychic structure between one individual and another) sexual norms change continually but castration anxiety remains. It has simply found new disguises." (*A Plea for a Measure of Abnormality*, 198 : 477-478). By refusing an identity assumption of the reader, the concept of resistance in the resisting reader shares in the post-structuralist view of the reader as fragmented. However, by acknowledging continuities in emotion and tenaciously repetitious behaviour by the reader as interpreter, it preserves the possibility of centredness within dispersal and defends the existence of a logic organizing the reader's preferences, pleasures, and voices. Furthermore, it preserves this logic in the face of the despairing and anxious cry by some variants of post-structuralism that since Western society has lost faith in the possibility of metanarratives everything is in flux, all voices are relative. I agree with Susan Bordo that "reality itself may be relentlessly plural and heterogeneous, but human understanding and *interest* cannot be."⁵⁷ The film theorist Joan Copjec phrases well this issue of the self's epistemological limits, origins and patterns, its fragmented yet continuous and coherent ontology. She provides a point of departure, beginning in the next chapter, for an inquiry into the vicissitudes of identification, emotion, and fantasy. Copjec proposes that "the limitlessness of the replaceable objects of the subject's desire" does not imply a "limitlessness of the subject":

The subject of desire is finite, limited. Fantasy defines these limits, not the subject's infinite dispersal. What must be observed in fantasy is not simply the range of positions assumed, but how these different positions are structured so as to circumscribe and thus define an absence at the fantasy's center. This absence or 'kernel of nonsense' holds the fantasy and the subject in place, limits the subject. The location of this kernel is the aim of psychoanalysis and should be, I propose, the aim of

feminism and other political theory as well. It provides the link between the subject and social discourses.

(Copjec, 1989: 241)

Our keyword as we move to Chapters 2 and 3 is emotion. In these chapters, I turn to scholarship on paradigms of emotion and fantasy in order to begin a discussion of the relationship between 'investments' and pleasure as derivative of a pre-existing intrapsychic politics of positionality. Moreover, I propose that models of desire in language which purport to account for this psychopolitics must confront the evidence of investigations of the relations between emotions, cognitive schema, and identifications.

CHAPTER ONE: ENDNOTES

1. In her excellent introductory volume on reader-response criticism, Elizabeth Freund (1987) reminds us that investigation of the reader or audience has always been a part of the study of the work of art along with the other co-ordinates of the 'total situation' of the reading event investigated by the critical enterprise: work, artist, universe. It is also the case that during different periods in the history of criticism, one element tends to be privileged. According to M.H. Abrams, in his study of Romanticism, *The Mirror and the Lamp*, "a focus on the work itself will yield a so-called *objective* approach, on the artist an *expressive* approach, on the universe a *mimetic* approach, and on the audience a *pragmatic* approach" (Freund, 1987: 1-2). Freund points out that with each shift of emphasis, the work of art, which was once the centre of attention, is actually supplanted in importance by one of the other co-ordinates. In particular, she notes,

--the enfranchisement of the viewer's perspective--is precisely the feature which introduces the subversive possibility that each term in the 'total situation' is radically unstable or indeterminate, a product of the beholder's gaze...The drift of the 'pragmatic' or, as it is nowadays called, reader-response orientation in critical theory challenges the privileged position of the work of art and seeks to undermine its priority and authority not only by displacing the work from the centre and substituting the reader in its place, but by putting in doubt the autonomy of the work and, in certain cases, even causing the work to 'vanish' altogether. (1987: 2)

Useful general surveys of the contemporary resurgence of interest in the subject of the 'subject' by Anglo-American critical theory are: Stephen Mailloux (1982). *Interpretive Conventions: The Reader in the Study of American Fiction*; Jonathan Culler (1982). *Deconstruction: Theory and Criticism After Structuralism*; and William Ray (1984). *Literary Meaning: From Phenomenology to Deconstruction*.

Two precursors of reader-oriented criticism were: I.A. Richards, although his name is more often associated with what became the New Criticism. See his *The Meaning of Meaning* (1923), *Principles of Literary Criticism* (1924), *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* (1936); and Louise M. Rosenblatt's *Literature as Exploration* (1937) and *The Reader, the Text, the Poem: The Transactional Theory of the Literary Work* (1978), and her essay "On the Aesthetic as the Basic Model of the Reading Process." In *Theories of Reading, Looking, and Listening*. Edited by H. Garvin (1981).

Collections such as Suleiman and Crosman's *The Reader in the Text* (1980), Tompkins' *Reader-Response Criticism* (1980), Flynn and Schweickart's *Gender and Reading* (1986), and book-length studies such as Radway's *Reading the Romance* (1986) are witness to the influence of Continental reception studies on feminist reader-response theory. See Peter Hohendahl's "Beyond Reception Aesthetics" (1983) for a critique of reception theory, associated with Iser, Jauss, and Fish, to account

adequately for how literature, as an institution, relates to other institutions of the social system.

A note on my use of the term 'second wave' feminist theory. The 'first wave' of feminism is usually considered to have begun in the middle of the nineteenth century, ending in the 1920's with the granting of women's suffrage. The 'second wave' began in the early 1960's, gained influence in the 1970's, and according to some authors, is suffering against a 'backlash' (Faludi, 1992) in the 1980's.

2. Some of the schools and approaches which this turn to the reader has taken are deconstruction, reader-response criticism, *Rezeptionsästhetik*, feminist criticism, psychoanalytically-oriented criticism, theories of spectatorship in film theory, and audience studies in mass communications research. Inquiry into the conditions and predispositions underlying the reader or spectator's cognitive and affective transactions with a text as well as the critic's labours has been of preeminent concern to contemporary Anglo-American and Continental cultural and literary theory since the early 1970's (Tompkins, 1980; Suleiman and Crosman, 1980; Culler, 1982; Freund, 1987). In the post-New Criticism era of theory production, this orientation has superseded evaluations of the aesthetic merits of a literary work, film, or television genre or interpretations of a text's meaning in isolation from the conditions of its reception. In mass communications, since the 1980's, debates on ethno-methodological approaches to the study of the audience have acquired a new fervour (Gerbner, 1983; Jensen, 1987; Jensen and Rosengren, 1990; Ang, 1989; Morley, 1989; Allor, 1989; Seiter, 1989).

The recovery of the 'reader' in literary theory and cultural studies, along with the development of new approaches for the investigation of the hermeneutic and psychological processes required for a reading to be accomplished, represents not only the modern preoccupation with subjectivity in the aftermath of Freud, Nietzsche, and Derrida, but it could be considered to be an efflorescence of inquiry into areas of experience deeply relevant to that field of psychological anthropology called personality and culture theory. As the cultural anthropologist Obeyesekere has noted, since the bias is strong in the social sciences that culture must deal exclusively with group processes rather than with individual motivation, "it is rare to come across psychoanalysts or social scientists, with the notable exception of culture and personality theorists, who deal with the interdigitation of deep motivation and public culture" (Obeyesekere, "Introduction" *Medusa's Hair*, 1981: 1). The field of personality and culture research sounds like the domain British Cultural Studies takes as its own, without the *de facto* marxist framework. LeVine writes, "Nothing could be more characteristic of the field of culture and personality than its concern with the transactions between the microsocial domain of individual experience and the macrosocial domain of institutional functioning" (LeVine, 1982: 12).

3. Feminist perspectives which mitigated the commitment to class based analysis in British Cultural Studies were not completely unknown in the late 1970's and early 1980's. In a 1978 article, "Developments in Feminist Film Criticism," Christine Gledhill noted that problems had arisen for feminists "attempting to utilize current developments in film theory and ideological analysis" because of "the need to

conceptualize the triple relation subject/reader/audience....The general lack in film theory of a means to conceptualize the social relations in which a specific audience is constituted can lead to severe limitations on proposals for subversive cultural activity" (Gledhill, 1984:40).

In "A Critical Postscript" to *The "Nationwide" Audience*, published in 1981, Morley drew attention to the gender blindspot of his own "Nationwide" study. His later work *Family Television: Cultural Power and Domestic Leisure* (1988) looked for the pattern of differences in viewing habits articulated by gender (Ang, 1989: 108). On the other hand, Brunsdon's 1981 article on "Crossroads: Notes on Soap Opera," already indicated the importance of gender to an understanding of specific cultural competencies called upon in the interpretation of certain genres. In spite of specific responses to critiques of the gender blindness of marxist cultural analysis as represented by the aforementioned later work of Morley and Brunsdon, the aporia Barrett identified in British based marxist theories of reading with respect to the place of sexual difference in theories of mass culture and cultural critique remains one of the crucial unknown spaces at the intersection of modernism and feminism. "The corollary to modernism's aesthetic of autonomy and formalism was its isolation from sociopolitical practice" (Buchloch, 1982: 28 in Hutcheon, 1985: 111).

On the North American scene, feminist researchers initiated new directions in the theory and practice of audience research with the introduction of the lens of gender. Despite the fact that the 'ferment in the field' of communications in the early 1980's was heralded as a non-event for feminist perspectives and interests, feminist theory both in and outside of communication studies, was problematizing available (sub) cultural studies and film paradigms by which to understand the formation and phenomenology of gendered audiences. Schwichtenberg, speaking of Angela McRobbie's work on dance and social fantasy (1984) and Janice Radway's research on romance readers (1984), concludes that "in many respects, both women charted the territory for the 'audience debate' (before it was a debate) and have made major contributions to the ongoing dialogue in this area" (1989: 207). Having critiqued the tendency of audience research to glorify the empowerment and choice mass culture is deemed to offer consumers (the Fiske-Hartley thesis) or to lose the critical theoretical inheritance by becoming mesmerized by narrow studies of audiences, or production contexts, or even texts themselves without any synthesis of these different objects of analysis, Modleski proposed, in her 1986 Introduction to *Studies in Entertainment*, that "the critical view that can provide genuinely new insights into mass culture is a feminist one" (xiii).

4. Audience research in North America has been similarly seeking a more nuanced understanding of consumption, in the light of pleasure, as a symptom of something more complex than false consciousness. In the 1980's, paradigm debates in communication studies, represented by the proceedings of the International Association for Communication and the "Ferment in the Field" issue of *Communication*, displayed new interest in the 'human agent', 'intentional action', as well as 'knowledgeability of the social actor' (Robinson, 1989: 206). American media critics in the 1980's have become increasingly aware of the requirement to organize their analyses along two axes: the polysemic nature of the text and the decoding processes of different audiences. However, even as television theorists such as Fiske (1986) and Marchetti

(1989) suggest that popular cultural televisual texts "negotiate contradictions and allow places of resistance for those marginalized by the dominant ideology" (Marchetti, 1989: 183), a focus on the **real** reader's affective and hermeneutic engagement with the text is lost through their recourse to naive psychoanalytic explanations for the reader's supposed unconscious pleasure and processes of identification.

Despite the fact that the 'ferment in the field' of communications in the early 1980's was heralded as a non-event for feminist perspectives and interests, feminist theory both in and outside of communication studies, continues to problematize available (sub) cultural studies and film paradigms by which to understand the formation and phenomenology of gendered audiences. Schwichtenberg (1989: 207), speaking of Angela McRobbie's work on dance and social fantasy (1984) and Janice Radway's research on romance readers (1984), concludes that "in many respects, both women charted the territory for the 'audience debate' (before it was a debate) and have made major contributions to the ongoing dialogue in this area" (See Treichler and Wartella (1986). "Feminist Theory and Communication Studies." *Communication* 9:19-41).

5. The distinction between two kinds of feminism usually takes the form of a 'culturalist' vs. a 'semiotic- or psychoanalytic-inspired' feminism, where the latter may be called the 'post-structuralist' position (Alcoff, 1989). Those adopting the 'cultural feminist' position do not believe it is difficult to arbitrate among true and false views of female experience because they hold two assumptions: 1) they assume there is an essential female nature to be represented; and 2) they adopt an 'expressive realist' view of literature. Cultural feminism assumes a basic, essential truth about women has been hidden by patriarchal society; the 'repressed feminine' is often presumed to represent the humane and moral, and it is used to critique the competitive, individualistic values of 'male' society (Kaplan, 1985: 90). Secondly, adherents of the cultural feminist position hold that the literary text and language itself are transparent media which reflect a pre-existent objective reality (the truth of the experience of reality) rather than being signifying systems which are constitutive of reality. They assume women's experience is directly available in the texts written by women and that "the more 'authentic' the experience is felt to be by the critic, the better and more valuable the text will be" (Greene and Kahn, 1985: 25).

6. While the critical literature on this phenomenon is voluminous, one work stands out for its scope and comparative approach: Alice Jardine's *Gynesis. Configurations of Women and Modernity* (1985).

7. It would seem that what Fetterley is suggesting by the concept of "immasculation" is one of the more significant processes by which "muted groups" are produced. One account of the social psychological theory of muted groups and its application to gendered groups is the following:

[It] was developed to describe situations in which groups of people exist in asymmetrical power relationships (eg., blacks and whites; colonizers and the colonized). The theory proposes that language and the norms for its use are controlled by the dominant group. Members of the muted group are

disadvantaged in articulating their experience, since the language they must use is derived largely from the perceptions of the dominant group. (...) Muted group theory provides a framework within which the pervasiveness of linguistic, semantic, and social distinctions based on gender can be seen as a product of the dominance of male perceptions of the world.

(Crawford and Chaffin, 1986: 21-23)

8. Such a contradiction is clearer with an example from the work of de Lauretis. We find something like imasculation described in de Lauretis (1984) in terms of contradictory identifications: reading from a male point of view--as spectator--but living the female experience of being spectacle, as occupant of the category of what Laura Mulvey calls "to-be-looked-at-ness". Why is identification with male characters rather than female characters likely to occur in female readers? The former tend to be represented as the unique, natural recipients and bearers of attributes, abilities, and opportunities which are both highly valued (through status and power attributions) and denied to 'feminine' women (e.g. a competitive, strong woman becomes 'castrating bitch'). Outside of literary experience, women reproduce their imasculation in their daily lives when they use, in an unself-reflective way, the paradigm of 'to-be-looked-at-ness,' as do men, to appraise and devalue other women. By appraising men unironically through the category of 'spectacle' (the "Chippendale's" phenomenon), women may think they are using the master's tools against the master, but they are still "identifying with the values of the other side" and, therefore, reaffirming the validity of the master's categories which continue to be available to be used against women. It is only in the parodic use of the master's tools that his codes can be destabilized.

9. Of this problem, Roof (1991: 155) writes, "Building upon [Adrienne] Rich's notion of a hidden female identity 'drenched' in patriarchal assumptions, Judith Fetterley in *The Resisting Reader* envisions both text and readers as entrapped behind malign masks of patriarchy in a sort of forced drag." Roof points out that although Fetterley employs the figure of the "Prince cast out" (from Emily Dickinson's Poem 959), without a kingdom, without power, as the condition of women under patriarchy, this cross-dressing metaphor is not exploited to suggest some uncertainty about what the constituents of being gendered female might be. "Fetterley relies instead upon a certainty about gender and a desire for a unified subject" (156).

10. "Paranoid-schizoid": a mode of object-relations specific to the first four months of life, according to Melanie Klein, where the infant, sex notwithstanding, deals with frustrations in its environment by splitting the object--the fantasistic representation of the mother (the breast)--into 'good' and 'bad' part-objects. An integrated representation of the breast/mother, which enables tolerance of the mother's frustrating aspects and remembrance of her satisfying, adequate aspects, is unavailable to the child and underpins extreme persecutory anxiety. This mode may reappear in the object-relations of the adult as paranoid and schizophrenic states. See Laplanche and Pontalis on the 'Paranoid Position' (1988: 298).

11. Although the conditions producing immasculation depended on Fetterley's construal of power as something exercised through external constraints and 'false' representations, **and** in the work of disempowering, internalized self-representations, the 'resistance' she advocates, as a step in women's emancipation, is conceived of as no more than the adoption of a conscious attitude of refusal of the inevitability of external constraints and scepticism toward mass-produced representations of women's experience. As a description of theoretical developments in the feminist project, this could be likened to what is only the second stage of negation, 'scepticism,' of the four outlined by Hegel's teleologic programme for individual and social liberty (Sennett, 1980: 129). Fetterley's conceptual framework does not allow her to address the issue of internalization, how 'outer' becomes 'inner'.

12. As was characteristic of the thinking of the Women's Movement of the 1970's, Fetterley assumed 'male' texts such as Mailer's and Miller's fiction misrepresented what the experience of being a woman was all about; however, she herself could not elaborate distinctions among sex, sexuality, and gender or female, femaleness, or femininity. Since she was not a psychoanalytically inclined theorist, and because of the time when she was writing, Fetterley had not yet the opportunity to confront gender "as a category [emerging] within feminist psychoanalytic discourse at the site of a series of debates about how and where to formulate the problem of cultural construction" ("Gender," 1992: 140). As Judith Butler puts it, "Is gender *acquired* in the course of socialization and the internalization of norms, or is gender part of a linguistic network that precedes and structures the formation of the ego and the linguistic subject?" (140). Fetterley would have acceded to the first view, I believe as does Catherine MacKinnon in her well-known essay, "Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory." MacKinnon's description of how one "becomes a woman" holds that

each element of the female *gender* stereotype is...in fact, *sexual*. (...) Gender socialization is the process through which women come to identify themselves as sexual beings, as beings that exist for men. (...) [O]ne 'becomes a woman'--acquires and identifies with the status of the female--not so much through physical maturation or inculcation into appropriate role behavior as through the experience of sexuality: a complex unity of physicality, emotionality, identity, and status affirmation.

(MacKinnon, 1982: 531)

She proposes 'femaleness' as the alterity to sexuality. MacKinnon's observation allows that consciousness raising will enable recognition of how one's emotions, identifications, role models, sense of status as female, enjoyment and expressiveness of one's body, and sense of 'proper' sexual availability have been shaped by social and cultural attitudes. In other words, gender does not reflect or express sex as a primary given but is the effect of social and cultural processes. The awareness MacKinnon would like women to obtain of how their identities have been made through interconsolidating meanings of sex, sexuality, and gender still only leads women from passive to active bifurcation; she offers no account of how critique, in practical terms, or the presence of alternative representations could alter the tie between a woman's

sense of her gender identity and what excites her sexually. In her well-known essay "Semiotics and Experience," Teresa de Lauretis finds MacKinnon's account a limited one, and she advises that "we still need to be more precise as to the ways in which the process works and how the experience of sexuality, in en-gendering one as female, does effect or construct what we may call a female subject" (1984: 167).

Crawford and Chaffin (1986: 13) agree with MacKinnon. They define gender "as one's psychological sense of one's self as female or male" which is not always congruent with chromosomal sex. The hormonal climate of the body is the other biological variable which helps determine a psychological sense of gender as is the gender label given the individual. Crawford and Chaffin propose, "It is the gender label that begins the process of elaboration and mythification of the biological. Gender is thus socially defined and constructed, becoming "the means through which we attempt to apprehend sex." As MacKinnon puts it, "what women learn in order to 'have sex,' in order to 'become women'...comes through the experience of and is a condition for, 'having sex'--woman as sexual object for man" (1982: 531).

What is missing from MacKinnon's account is the link Butler wants to make between desire and gender in order, I believe, to separate sexual orientation from gender. She argues that heterosexualized gendered subjects are produced through a series of generative prohibitions which regulate not only sexual behaviour, but sexual DESIRE itself. Furthermore, gender cannot be a cultural construction of sex, "for 'sex' is established through the linguistic effect of sexual difference, and this effect is coextensive with LANGUAGE, and, hence, culture as such." (1992: 142).

It seems to me that the problem of what writing 'like a woman' might mean, which inspired the focus of gynocriticism: the study of women's literary traditions and the psychodynamics of writing, to mention just two of its sub-topics, is equally embroiled in these debates over gender. See *infra* this chapter, the section on "reading as/like a woman."

It is apparent from these snapshots of the debate on gender that Fetterley's account, although written before it was fully raging, is seriously limited.

13. Muriel Dimen's articles interweave theory and women's personal and public voices into what she calls 'commentaries' in an extraordinarily vivid and moving way. Although these commentaries are (meta)fictional, the acute sensibility of her ear to women's multiple and conflicting identities may be the result of her access to the psychoanalytic relationship. See Dimen (1984, 1989).

Fetterley does not even allow her resisting reader to enjoy this much identity conflict. As Roof points out, consciousness of immasculation provides a new perspective and a new identity which in turn enables the reader to become conscious of and exorcise her immasculation. Fetterley's notion of the reader's resistance presupposes a stable gender identity and a direct equivalence between awakened consciousness of immasculation and the capacity to throw it off. She "bypasses the suggestive sexual instability of the cross-dressed Prince figure...an instability that imports a wealth of potentially disruptive strategies connected to uncertainty about gender and sexuality" (1992: 157). I am trying to describe that instability in terms of the constituents of passive bifurcation.

14. In "Our Own Worst Enemies: Unconscious Factors in Female Disadvantage," the British psychoanalyst, Jane Temperley, discusses some of the psychological processes that work unconsciously in some women against their conscious wishes for a more just, egalitarian society. Her psychoanalytic inquiry into the functions served by the tendency to paint away differences and to characterize particular others in terms of a unitary or monolithic male Other brings to mind international feminism's confrontation with the ethnocentrism of North American feminist theory. Gayatri Spivak has incisively captured the dilemma of the wish for simple dichotomies along with the wish for nuanced recognition of difference in her poignant question to First World Feminists, "Who then are we (not)?" Her question demands we pay attention to the 'other woman' in theory making, she who exists both intrapsychically and in the external world (Spivak, 1981: 158).

In her own fashion, Temperley, who was writing before Spivak, has a response to Spivak's self-reflexive question, "Who then are we (not)?" She critiques the feminist utopian impulse to expunge from the female inhabitants of society all responsibility for the evils of (patriarchal) society by attributing these evils to its male architects. This utopian impulse, she also sees, as a "delusion" which prevents woman from registering self-reproaches:

...the contention...that men have conveniently rid themselves of certain uncomfortable experiences, such as vulnerability and dependence, by obliging women to carry them on men's behalf...fails, to my mind, to see the reciprocity in this system, i.e. that women are thereby relieved of conscious knowledge and experience of the violence and competition that men express for *us*. (...) Being equal involves taking equal responsibility for what is hurtfully aggressive and self-seeking in human nature.

(Temperley, 1984: 25, 36)

Temperley's own research as a psychoanalyst explores the phenomenon of what she calls the hysterical woman's "active pursuit of the myth of her own passivity" (p. 31) through which "delusion", perhaps, she protects the ego from registering "self-reproaches."

Another view on the question of "what women want" is that of Joan Rivière, a disciple of Melanie Klein. She wrote in the late 1920's on the question of "womanliness as a masquerade" as she studied a type of intellectual woman who refused classification according to a schema, proposed by Ernest Jones, of psychological development along a homosexual/heterosexual continuum (Burgin, 1986). She was puzzled by the fact that some women who are successful in 'masculine' endeavours nevertheless feel compelled to act seductively (or promiscuously) toward men they consider their inferiors to avert unconscious anxiety and the retribution feared from men (when they discover the woman is not passive, conforming, guiltless, and innocent of competitive and aggressive desires.)

15. Of the community of women readers of romance fiction in the mid-western town of Smithton, who took part in her ethnographic study, Radway writes:

...many...feel guilty about spending money on books that are regularly ridiculed by the media, their husbands, and their children...[and] which the larger culture condemns as frivolous and vaguely, if not explicitly, pornographic.

(Radway, 1986: 54)

16. For further confirmation of Fetterley's psychological naiveté, see Roof (1992: 157). Nevertheless, a contribution of Fetterley's work to feminist critique is her proposal that gender is a mode of perception (as well as an identity): "the lines are drawn in such a way that we can know longer assume a masculine subject or a unified reception of texts" (158).

17. Schweickart's essay "Reading Ourselves: Toward a Feminist Theory of Reading," published in the 1986 volume *Gender and Reading. Essays on Readers, Texts, and Contexts* edited by Flynn and Schweickart, won the 1984 Florence Howe Award for Outstanding Feminist Scholarship from the National Association of Women's Studies.

18. This concept I first elaborated in a paper presented at the *Strategies of Critique III* symposium hosted by the Graduate Programme in Social and Political Thought, York University, April 28, 1989.

19. Unfolding this puzzle has implications for two theoretical endeavours: defending the grounds for canon revisionism within the academic community and, from the point of view of theorizing women as historical actors, identifying the causes with which women will identify and be moved to act on collectively.

20. On the 'strategy of letters' in the institution of academic literary theory, criticism and history, and literary criticism by professional critics in the media, see Peter Hohendahl's "Beyond Reception Aesthetics," *New German Critique* 28 (Winter 1983), pp. 108-147.

21. An early version of the debate on 'personal pleasure as political' eluded the problem of aesthetic categories because of the terms of its formulation: the problem of whether sexual fantasy could be evaluated as moral or not. In an essay in *Hypatia* (7:5) entitled "Feminine Masochism and the Politics of Personal Transformation," Sandra Lee Bartky puts the dilemma for feminists this way, "What to do, for example, when the structure of desire is at war with one's principles?" (1990: 465). The solution, at the time, was to attribute women's pleasure in pornography and in sado-masochistic sexual practices to the internal colonization of desire in the form of masochism: whatever pertained to sexual behaviour and sexual desire was to be understood in relation to a larger system of subordination of women by patriarchy. One of the strengths of Bartky's essay is that she soundly critiques the psychologically naive view, held by many feminists, of desire as a product of sexual voluntarism as well as any view of it as externally produced by patriarchy. On the subject of sexual fantasies which include domination, she sees them as contradicting the women's movement's formal commitment to justice and equality and as tendencies which cannot inspire such an ideal. Having said that, Bartky would agree, I think, that the unconscious admits of contradictions, and fantasy and practice are not the same thing.

The question she sidesteps, which other collections of essays have not (SAMOIS, 1987; Vance, 1984), is one of how to determine the political import of sexual *practices* and lifestyles which enact bondage fantasies.

22. See Modleski's discussion of these two positions in mass culture studies and the alternative offered by feminist approaches in her Introduction to *Studies in Entertainment. Critical Approaches to Mass Culture* (1986).

23. 'Narrativity' is understood as "the effective functioning of narrative on and with the reader/spectator to produce a subject of reading or a subject of vision" whereas 'narrative' refers to "the growth and flowing of plot into story across the narrative layering of events, actantial function, and discursive registers" (de Lauretis, 1987: 108).

24. It is unfortunate that in this much-lauded essay, Schweickart has not made a clear statement of her position on the difference between 'gender' versus 'sex' versus sexual difference. I would fall back on the conventional distinction* except that I have found Schweickart's usage not to be consistent nor to uphold that distinction. 'Gender' is used in several different ways in her essay, sometimes to mean 'sexual identity' (i.e., as in biological sexual identity as male or female). On the one hand, she also uses female 'gender' in the sense of nothing more than an attitude taken to sexist representations for which no *a priori* female, sexed body or experience is required (the 'hypothesis' of the female reader). Yet where it is essential to her argument to identify the gender in readers, she assumes that feminist readers are of the 'female' gender and that being female is the only prerequisite for feminist sensibilities. This avoids recognizing the problem of subjectivity underlying the concept of the 'feminist'--male and female--and 'gender' itself. On the other hand, she seems at times to be conceiving of female gender as metaphysical, which experience is then the ground of authority for the evaluation of representations of female experience as sexist or inauthentic or false. Yet another angle on what she assumes about the woman reader comes from the psycho-sociological and developmental studies of Nancy Chodorow, Jean Baker Miller, and Carol Gilligan. Schweickart suggests prescriptively that a dialogical model of reading depends on something "distinctively female" (1986: 54), i.e. the capacity of women to have more flexible ego boundaries and to define and experience themselves in terms of their affiliations and relationships with others whereas men define themselves through individuation and separation.

*In sociology, social and cultural anthropology, gender studies and, more frequently today, in common usage, people's identities are understood to be formed with respect to sex and to gender. We all have a particular sexual identity as male or female determined by our genitalia. However, we also have a gendered identity--not a metaphysical essence or a particular body's attributes nor innate ideas or instinct, but cultural representations and self-representations by which the subject comes to define the objects of his/her desire. *They are always culturally mediated, which is not to say they are necessarily discursive.* Gender involves feelings and ideas about our 'proper', 'normal' roles, qualities, and activities as males or females in our culture as well as a sexual orientation as part of that identity. The sex/gender distinction allows for the analysis of cultural practices by which specific characteristics, 'traits', and activities

are **attributed** or **assigned** to one sex or the other but **appear common sensically** as natural and universal. To look for the sex/gender system in operation is to discover that in the practice of binary or oppositional thinking--for instance, male/female, reason/emotion, public/domestic--all the terms exist in a relation of asymmetrical valorization; to all the terms on the left the dominant voices of our culture attribute greater authority, value, and prestige. This either/or logic underpins the reigning form of representing difference in our culture and the practice of justifying the subordination of all the terms on the right. What has to be noted, of course, is the bankruptcy of cultural or political practice which seeks to invert the hierarchies of valorization simply by moving the terms on the right to the left.

25. Schweickart's example here is the scene of Stephen's epiphany in *The Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* where a male reader is invited to identify with Stephen, to feel the 'riot in his blood' and his difference from the girl, and to equate that with the universal.

A girl stood before him in midstream, alone and still, gazing out to sea. She seemed like one whom magic had changed into the likeness of a strange and beautiful seabird. Her long slender bare legs were delicate as a crane's and pure save where an emerald trail of seaweed had fashioned itself as a sign upon the flesh. Her thighs, fuller and soft-hued as ivory, were bared almost to the hips, where the white fringes of her drawers were like feathering of soft white down. Her slate-blue skirts were kilted boldly about her waist and dovetailed behind her. Her bosom was a bird's, soft and slight, slight and soft, as the breast of some dark plummaged dove. But her long fair hair was girlish: and touched with the wonder of mortal beauty, her face.

(Joyce, 1916: 195 in Schweickart, 1986: 41)

26. See Crawford and Chaffin's essay "Cognitive Research on Gender and Comprehension" in Flynn and Schweickart's 1986 volume *Gender and Reading*, in particular their footnote 5 for a list of introductory readings on schema theory. The following has been drawn from this essay and all page citations refer to this 1986 publication. The evidence for Crawford and Chaffin's position that gender differences in comprehension and memory are to be expected comes from research in cognitive science over the last fifteen years on "schema" or "script" theory. According to Crawford and Chaffin, the three tenets of the schema approach to understanding are the following:

1. the structures that represent understanding and memory are abstract representations of the original events or statements; our mental representations are not "copies" of the original information, as the passive view of the mind suggests;
2. schemata are generalized knowledge structures that provide the framework for and determine the nature of understanding;
3. schemata allow the understander to go beyond the information actually given in a situation. (p. 5)

The import of this work for analyses of reading performance is that it provides research tools by which to test for the scripts that structure the inferences which

readers make about motives, consequences, and other enabling conditions, and so on when they build a meaning. However, what is not explicit in Crawford and Chaffin's article, and in the above outline of the schema approach, is the import of emotional response on the inferences readers make.

Crawford and Chaffin point out that differences in *background* and in *viewpoint* may influence the schemata that readers bring to texts and, therefore, their comprehension and their memory (See pp. 12-13 for examples). Furthermore, gender may affect either the background or viewpoint that readers bring to texts. Gender identity ("I am male") is the result of acceptance of the prescriptions and proscriptions consistent with that label and its norms. Gender- or sex- typing, Crawford and Chaffin use the terms interchangeably, (meaning acceptance of one's culture's views of masculinity/femininity) is what individuals engage in when they behave and evaluate themselves and others in terms of these norms as male or female. Gender-typing is best understood as the development of a gender schema. The gender schema "is a heterogeneous network of associations representing general knowledge rather than specific incidents, and it is used by the individual as an aid in assimilating new information" (p. 17). How is gender identity to be, first, discovered and, then, tracked as an influence on reading comprehension and memory? Crawford and Chaffin describe the Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI) wherein an individual rates him or herself on a series of personality traits that are stereotyped 'masculine' (eg. analytical, ambitious) or 'feminine' (eg. yielding, cheerful). In describing the use of the BSRI in the analysis of reading behaviour, they point out that people who are more highly sex-typed, according to Bem's scale of measurement for sex-typing,

are those who not only conform to their culture's definition of masculinity or femininity, but also readily process information in terms of the gender schema. In other words, sex-typed and non sex-typed people differ in the extent to which they spontaneously rely on the gender schema in understanding. Thus the theory predicts that schema effects on memory should occur differentially for sex-typed and non-sex-typed people when memory for gender-relevant material is measured. (p. 17)

The importance of research using the BSRI is apparently that it shows that sex-typed people are more likely than non-sex-typed people to use the gender schema in processing information. See examples, pp. 18-21.

Crawford and Chaffin report other results of Sandra Bem's research on gender typing and personality. One of her hypotheses, published in *Beyond Sex-Role Stereotypes* (1976), is that psychological androgyny should be positively related to adjustment, partly as a consequence of the behavioral flexibility it produces. More recent research supports this hypothesis rather than the traditional view which identified adjustment with a high degree of sex-typing (p. 14).

I would argue that Schweickart's reading strategy of the positive hermeneutic is actually a refusal to perform what, in the social psychological and personality research

literature, is called gender-typing (of oneself and others) and gender-schematic processing of information. The positive hermeneutic demands a confrontation with the basis of one's own gender identity and an examination of the categories through which gender-typing is culturally and conventionally performed. Although Bem's categories could be challenged on the basis of the stereotypical characterizations of personality traits, for instance, 'ambition' as 'male'; nevertheless, the import of the Bem hypothesis on psychological androgyny is that when both genders are more accepting of so-called stereotypical 'male' personality traits in 'females' and *vice versa*, so-called 'female' traits in males, this is the mark of more tolerant people capable of less rigid and exclusionary thinking. In essence, rigid gender-typing is the problem, not the categories *per se* on which gender typing relies.

Fetterley would likely disagree with this claim and argue that for women to take on a more androgynous profile is simply to think like men against their own interests, which is what they have always done when immasculated (i.e. to take the view that women when strong willed are being 'pushy' or 'obstinate' while men are inspiring 'confidence' or 'respect' in others). But, she would be missing the *double* direction of the androgynous move; its impact on men. Could it not be argued that the negative connotations of stereotypical female personality traits, i.e. "yielding" or "cheerful", would diminish if male persons were encouraged as children to associate those attributes as part of their own gender schema? For her part, Schweickart might argue that the positive hermeneutic is a way to proceed with the work of propagating acceptance for more androgynous gender-typing.

27. Sociologists talk about clusters of values associated with 'male' and 'female' as 'status-sets.' In a chapter entitled "Woman's Place Revisited: Sex Typing and Sex Labeling," Cynthia Fuchs Epstein (1988) describes the concept of 'status-set.' It was originally formulated by the American sociologist Robert Merton (1957) to discuss a procedure, sex typing, which is fundamental to the creation of social distinctions. 'Status-set' refers to the cluster of statuses that an individual holds at any given time (one of Epstein's examples is: mother, daughter, beautician, Democrat, PTA member). Status-set typing "described how the acquisition of certain new statuses is restricted for persons whose prior statuses are deemed incompatible or inconceivable with them because of social values or norms" (Merton, 1957:103-4). Prevailing notions of properly feminine and masculine activities and attributes underpin sex-typed status-sets in societies. Epstein (1970), along with Merton and Everett Hughes, examined the social outcomes of cases in which persons' status-sets were inconsistent with the social image of what statuses "belong together". Merton proposed the conditions under which the "wrong" status in a status-set is activated and made "salient"--for example, in the case of a woman truck driver or a black rabbi. That readers will still probably grin ruefully but agree on the "wrong" status in each of these descriptions without it having to be italicized points to our implicit social knowledge of status-sets **and** how little they have changed in twenty years since Epstein, Merton, and Hughes published their article.

For further reading, see Crawford and Chaffin's "The Reader's Construction of Meaning: Cognitive Research on Gender and Comprehension" in Flynn and

Schweickart (1986), pp. 3-30, particularly the section on the operation of 'default values' in the inferences about gender allowed by schemata. These default values are another way of explaining why we are surprised to read "female bank president" or "male typist." Consider the riddle Crawford and Chaffin use to show the workings of default values:

A big Indian and a little Indian are sitting on a log. The big Indian points to the little Indian and says, "That Indian is my son." The little Indian points to the big Indian and says "That Indian is not my father." Both are telling the truth. How is this possible? (p. 8)

If you did not readily guess that the Big Indian is a mother then you too resorted to the default value for the gender of 'Indian' as male.

28. We recall a representamen is "something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, it creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign [the interpretant]" (1984: 179). However, the modification of consciousness de Lauretis defends as a result of habit change has to extend to the field of desire and affect. She believes she accounts for such a change through modifications to narrative practices, since she has textualized desire by linking it to narrative structure (ie. the Oedipal logic). See the discussion to come in this chapter.

29. We recall that this tendency toward reductive uses of gender as designating a homogeneous field first became widely practiced with unrigorous, situationally inspecific uses of the descriptors 'patriarchal' and 'oppressive to women.' They have been reduced to catch-all condemnatory epithets by the discourses of women's studies.

As Janet Radcliffe Richards notes in *The Sceptical Feminist* (1982), feminism "is not concerned with a group of people it wants to benefit, but with a type of injustice it wants to eliminate" (17), that being the systematic social injustices encountered by a group because of their sex. This means that feminism "turns out to be not only **not** a movement of women but not a movement for women" since it cannot be one which supports the interests of all women all of the time since they could be contradictory. Furthermore, there can be situations where women treat men unjustly, and "a movement concerned with *justice* cannot automatically take the side of any woman against any man" (17). This realization has been responsible for the move to create, in academic circles, 'gender studies' programs rather than 'women's studies' programs. This has followed on a reframing of their object of interest (from 'women' to 'difference') and a broadening of the fields where difference is to be studied (i.e. homophobia in the armed forces, sexual harassment where sexual invitations to a male employee by a female superior are experienced as harassment because the male subordinate is gay).

30. Perhaps language has betrayed Schweickart's difficulty in conceiving of the subject of the Archimedian bootstrapping she is recommending! She resorts to the gerund--"taking control of...means taking control of ..."--to imply that a sovereign, undivided subject can be called upon to effect "this kind of therapeutic analysis," this

rereading (50). However, since gerunds are present participials which function as nouns and name an action or a state of being, they elide the subject doing the action with the action and the subject of a state of being with that state of being, exactly reproducing the type of language toward which feminist analysis has learned to be suspicious.

31. In her discussion of how *Women in Love* plays on the woman readers' false consciousness as well as on her "authentic liberatory aspirations" (43), she admits that the process of immasculation is more complicated than Fetterley allows. The female reader's pleasure actually increases her collusion with Birkin against Ursula:

"When I identify with Birkin, I unconsciously perform the two-stage rereading described above. I reverse the roles of Birkin and Ursula and I suppress the obviously ideological components that in the process show up as absurdities. The identification with Birkin is emotionally effective because, stripped of its patriarchal trappings, Birkin's struggle and his utopian vision conform to my own. To the extent that I perform this feminist rereading *unconsciously*, I am captivated by the text. The stronger my desire for autonomous selfhood and for love, the stronger my identification with Birkin, and the *more intense the experience of bifurcation characteristic of the process of immasculation*.

The full argument is beyond the scope of this essay..." (43)

32. Feminist criticism, such as Holly's (1975), which assumes that the only effective feminist writing is that which "should offer a powerful expression of personal experience in a social framework" and "truthful images of strong women with which the reader may identify," implicitly advocates what Toril Moi has called, "a crypto-Lukácsian favouring of realist narrative forms" (1985: 6-7).

33. Modleski has critiqued what she calls the Showalter-Culler 'hypothesis' of the woman reader because it makes problematic the idea of 'women's experience.' Modleski accuses Culler of being "patriarchal just at the point when he seems to be most feminist--when he arrogates to himself and to other male critics the ability to read as women by 'hypothesizing' women readers" (Modleski in de Lauretis, 1987: 23). Arguably one repercussion of the problematization of the influence of gender posed by Culler's hypothesis is that emphasis is shifted from male/female difference to contrasts among women readers. In practice, this hypothesis (deriving inferentially as it does from the discriminations in Culler's claim that "Reading as a **woman** is not necessarily what occurs when a *woman* reads") I think strengthens Modleski's case for the study of the "actual female reader". Both she and Culler would oppose the erasure of the phenomenological significance of gender for reading performance posed by efforts to reduce 'reading as a *woman*' to the strategies of 'reading as a feminist.'

34. Toril Moi has described the foci of three positions in the feminist struggle: (1) a demand for equal access to the symbolic order; (2) the difference between the genders is drawn and the uniqueness of femininity asserted; (3) a rejection of the dichotomy between masculine and feminine as metaphysical. Schweickart takes up the second general position in her proposal for a feminist theory of reading (Moi, "Feminist

Literary Criticism," in *Modern Literary Theory: A Comparative Introduction*, pp. 204-21 in Wright, 1984: 197)

35. In Judith Roof's latest book *A Lure of Knowledge, Lesbian Sexuality and Theory* (1991), she uses the 'lesbian' and 'lesbian sexuality' as the prototype of the female reader: with no fixed identity and outside binarism. There are arguably similarities between my concept of 'resistance in the resisting reader' and the attributes she assigns to reading 'as a lesbian.' Both hypotheses proclaim the inadequacies of a reading theory, or literary criticism for that matter, which grounds itself in affirmative categories of gendered authors or values and in the concept of 'reading as a woman' (eg. that biologically based gender identity is the decisive factor in reading), and which assumes a continuity between all female experience, literary and non-literary.

36. Toril Moi clearly makes the case for the importance of the aesthetic to feminism:

If aesthetics raises the question of whether (and how) the text works effectively with an audience, it obviously is bound up with the political: without an aesthetic effect there will be no political effect either. And if feminist politics is about, among other things, 'experience', then it is already related to the aesthetic.

(1985: 85)

That unconscious realms of experience are included under the description of "consciousness" or "consciousness raising" and "subjectivity," which have widespread use in feminist theory, seems to me to be belied by the mainstream, North American practice of according it no specificity as a research arena. Those working in feminist theory who struggle not to dismiss outright psychoanalytic perspectives, whether classical, Lacanian, object-relations or self-psychological, seem oft relegated to a camp whose discoveries are seen as marginal at best rather than fundamental to a host of problems to do with individual and collective agency. A lecture by Professor Saraph Westphal, Co-Director of Women's Studies at McGill University, on the "Critical Contradictions in the Progress of Women's Studies" (October 26, 1989), while discussing the co-emergence of a new feminist concept of the self with "identity politics," and while identifying what were perceived as the four central ideas in feminist scholarship today, did not mention any realm of experience which shares characteristics with what might be variously known as the 'unconscious', 'fantasy', or 'desire'. However, the issue which de Lauretis characterized in 1984 as "hardly broached as yet within feminist theory, [that] of the politics of self-representation," is inconceivable without the ability to talk about the formation, effects, and affective load of the internal world of objects in each subject, whether male or female.

The concept of 'internal object' will be discussed at length in the next chapter.

37. In her essay 'Imaging,' de Lauretis reminds us of Pasolini's statement which reaffirms the specular and spectacular nature of daily life, which she will argue is extreme and divisive for women: "In our actions, in practical existence, we represent/perform/enact ourselves. Human reality is this double representation in which we are at once actors and spectators" (1984: 193, note 22). While she would see

this as nefarious because of the difference between how women feel about themselves and culturally available representations of their roles and natures. I would argue, active bifurcation is a consequence for all genders. Furthermore, while being symptomatic of a defensive constitution which can be pathological, neither active nor passive bifurcation is the prerogative of one gender alone.

Furthermore, bifurcation produces both the content and makes possible the process of psychoanalysis: it is that "other speech" which surges forth in the transference and becomes available to interpretation, and the doubling procedure required to enable the analysand to accept and process interpretations. As Marie Cardinal writes in the autobiographical account of her seven year psychoanalysis, "I had to begin again the exacting work in which I was both actress and spectator, and in which the doctor was at once spectator and director" (1975). Chapter 5 argues that the conditions for dual reading, as actor and spectator, are created by metafiction and explores this hypothesis about reading performance with respect to a particular example, Dennis Potter's *The Singing Detective*.

38. "...if images are already, from the beginning, implicated with narrativity and overdetermined by its inscription of the movement and positionalities of desire, there can be no earlier, primitive, primary, or purely imagistic identification; positions of identification, visual pleasure itself, would involve not only primary and secondary processes but personal and social practices as well. We should rather think of the subject's relation to the filmic images(s) as a figural-narrative relation: the spectator's identification with, as well as of, the film's images would be bound up with narrativity in the same way as dreams are with secundarization in analytic practice,..." (de Lauretis, 1984: 149).

39. We recall Barthes linkage, in *The Pleasure of the Text*, of narrative form and meaning, "Every ideological activity is presented in the form of compositionally completed utterances" (1975: 50). It is perhaps not closure but "closure with whom?" in which different ideological values inhere: the closure of the oedipal logic of narrative is circumvented by homosexual and lesbian endings.

40. I have found a promising development in narrativity to have been de Lauretis' attempt to develop a method by which to argue for the dual registers (iconic and narrative) of a filmic text which position a reader in potentially contradictory sites. Gender would appear to enter the interpretative transaction in two modalities: different forms of address construct a textual subject differently while, at the same time, soliciting different types of identification from real readers. However, I am omitting a discussion of de Lauretis' work on imaging and the dual positioning of the woman viewer (identifying with the look of the camera while being positioned by the narrative in ways which differ from those which male readers experience).* It is a provocative hypothesis but one, if explored, would take us in divergent directions from my objective. My present interest in de Lauretis' work has been solely concerned with her observations about narrative logic and oedipal emplotment.

*For de Lauretis, film and cinema are conservative social technologies by which gender constructions are reinforced. She assumes that film addresses women

and men differently. "Yet what distinguishes the forms of that address is far from obvious (and to articulate the different modes of address, to describe their functioning as ideological effects in subject construction, is perhaps the main critical task confronting cinematic and semiotic theory)" (1984: 15).

Throwing out the old dichotomous model of meaning as the product of codes *in the text* and/or *in the reader*, de Lauretis maintains that meanings are not produced in a particular film but "circulate between social formation, spectator, and film...the production of meanings always involves not simply a specific apparatus of representation but several. While each can be described analytically in its matters of expression or its socio-economic conditions of production (i.e. the technological or economic modalities of sound cinema), what is at issue is the possibility of accounting for their joint hold on the spectator and, **thus**, the production of meanings for a subject and/or of a subject in meaning across a plurality of discourses" (1984: 32).

41. Some social psychologists are adopting the concept of 'positioning' to replace 'role' in order "to capture the dynamic aspects of encounters in contrast to the way in which the use of 'role' serves to highlight static, formal, and ritualistic aspects" (Davies and Harré, 1990: 43).

42. A critical literature on Foucault, feminism, and the body is developing which goes some way toward addressing this limitation: see Susan Bordo, "The Body and the Reproduction of Femininity: A Feminist Appropriation of Foucault" in Jaggar and Bordo (1989); Susan Bordo, *Food, Fashion, and Power: The Body and the Reproduction of Gender* (1991); Sandra Lee Bartky, "Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power" in Bartky (1990).

43. My use of **disposition** from the point of view of the psychological literature refers to

the internally determined consistencies underlying a person's behaviour, to the enduring differences among people insofar as they are attributable to stable internal characteristics rather than to differences in their life situation...Personality, in this sense, consists of all those more or less stable internal factors that make one person's behaviour consistent from one time to another, and different from the behaviour other people would manifest in comparable situations.

(Irving L. Child, 1968, pp. 82-83 in Levine, 1982)

Furthermore, according to Child:

behaviour consistencies reflect or express *dispositions* that are not themselves directly observable but are in some sense "internal" to the individual. The disposition is a *potential* for behaviour that is conceived of as existing even at times when it is not being realized in observable behaviour. As a stable characteristic of an individual organism, it is also conceived of as functioning *for* that individual, contributing somehow to his internal workings. These conceptions are

more than theoretical postulates; they have roots in the observation of behaviour. Individual behaviour patterns give evidence of being dispositions by their insistent repetitiveness, intruding themselves into diverse situations even when other behavioural options appear readily available, and surviving even under a variety of unfavourable conditions.

(1968: 83)

44. One of the critiques of post-structuralism which comes from the direction of Cultural Studies is that the problem of **mediation** has been done away with. Martin Allor lecture, Graduate Programme in Communications, McGill University. Fall, 1991.

45. Stuart Hall and Dave Morley have tried to go beyond the dominant theoretical position advanced by *Screen* which operates with an "abstract text/subject relationship" (Morley, 1981: 163). Morley critiqued the *Screen* theory assumption that the 'classic realist text' recapitulates, in its particular discursive strategies, the positions in which the subject has been constituted by the primary process (p. 166). Inspired by Pêcheux's concept of the discursive subject as an 'interdiscourse,' Morley's reader is described by a model of interlocking subjectivities, a network of symbolic systems productive of the social subject who always exceeds the subject implied by the text (p. 170).

Interpellation has been a vital concept in feminist theorizing on the construction of gender identity, precipitating two formulations on the usefulness of the 'body' as a ground for theory:

a) Kaja Silverman seems to hold out for some area of bodily experience which is not reified,

[The female body] is charted, zoned and made to bear...a meaning which proceeds entirely from external relationships, but which is always subsequently apprehended as an internal condition or essence.

(Silverman, unpublished, quoted in de Lauretis, 1987:183)

b) Whereas, according to Spivak,

To advocate a direct language of the body is...not subversive because it is equivalent to denying the reality and the strength of social mediations...that oppress us in our bodies. (...) I will be neither a woman nor a man in the present historical meaning: I shall be some Person in the body of a woman.

(Spivak, 1981: 176)

46. The guiding inspiration for *Discerning the Subject*, according to Paul Smith, was Stephen Heath's 1979 article which problematized the equivalence being made between Althusser's interpellated subject and the psychoanalytic notion of the ego (1988: 21).

Smith's programme of research shares methodological and epistemological similarities with two feminist perspectives on the study of popular culture: the reception and experience approach and the cultural theory approach, as described in Rakow's review of feminist approaches to popular culture (1986). Rakow suggests that the power of consciousness raising of the early women's movement as a means to open up the personal and idiosyncratic to comparison with accounts of what was believed to be shared experience fuels researchers' dissatisfaction today with institutional analyses which lose the subject as a category endowed with any particularity:

[T]here are a great many studies of media power structures, national and international, and a great many too of the content of media messages, but very few on the manner in which the 'dominated' groups and individuals read and respond to them, or oppose to them a specific manner of, precisely, appropriation, and resist them...in the name of some project of their own.

(Michèle Mattelart, 1982: 141 in Rakow, 1986: 33)

In identifying three elements in the process of the construction of an ideology of gender: production, consumption, and representation, the British Marxist feminist Michèle Barrett notes that an account of consumption and reception of texts from the point of view of the ideology of gender is not yet possible because there has been a failure to develop a theory of reading (Barrett, 1980 in Rakow, 1986: 38). Radway's ethnographic study of how a group of women read the romance novel can be seen as one effort to fill the aporia noted by Mattelart, Barrett, and Smith. It will be examined below in Chapter Three.

47. In a course on "Theory and Practice of Family Therapy" in which a tape was being viewed of a family with several schizophrenic members, the following were discussed as contributing factors in the etiology of schizophrenia: genetic make-up, cognitive dysfunction, perspectual distortions. It was argued that genetic loading is only a partial explanation.

Childhood positioning in and by family discourses could be seen as due to the pathologies in patterns of relating within the family environment. These pathologies are the other part of the schizophrenogenic environmental story.

Where cognitive dysfunction produces perceptual distortions on the part of a parent in the form of the *primitive defences* of denial and projection, a child can defend himself more readily against such behaviour (i.e. a parent's paranoia or hallucinations are not usually consensually validated). However, the effects of perceptual distortions which manifest themselves in *shared defences* (where the child has no choice but to participate in an intersubjective relation organized by a parent's particular defence, such as projective identification or self-mechanisms [Kohut]) are much more seriously nefarious. For example, through attribution to one of the children of the 'bad' qualities the parent believes himself to have or about which he experiences unconscious conflict (envy, competitiveness, aggressiveness, nurturance), the child becomes the holder of these negative qualities. For example, the normal needs of a child can be perceived as demanding, tyrannical, and threatening to a parent who has suffered under a tyrannical father without being able to defend himself. The

child of such a parent has but two choices: to accept his/her 'badness' with the behaviour attributed to him, thereby embodying in that behaviour the object the parent is seeking (i.e. the tyrannical 'father' the parent now has the power to revenge himself against), to suffer its destructive consequences for his sense of self-worth as well as the potential loss of the parent's love; or to rebel, which threatens loss of love as well. Even more detrimental to the child's capacity for future, healthy, object-relatedness are inadequate relationships of mirroring and identification where parents, for example, expect a child to idealize them but then are incapable of encouraging, praising, and idealizing the child. (Discussion in Dr. G. Wiviot's seminar, "Theory and Practice of Family Therapy," Dept. of Psychiatry, Allan Memorial Institute, October 19, 1989).

48. As against a notion of linear determination of an individual's present by his/her past, '*Nachträglichkeit*,' deferred action, suggests a conception of temporality where selective aspects of past experience exert an influence in the present while being reworked. The past which returns is not lived experience, in general, but a memory trace of a traumatic event which could not be psychically assimilated and made meaningful, at that time, and, therefore, was repressed. "Deferred revision is occasioned by events and situations, or by an organic maturation, which allow the subject to gain access to a new level of meaning and to rework his earlier experiences" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 112). According to Freud, this reworking involves both a discharge of tension and a complex set of psychological operations after which the traumatic event loses much of its force. For instance, the intolerable, unprocessable feelings aroused in a young child by sexual abuse, which at the time has no sexual significance for the child, will reoccur as unpleasant affect or painful sensation on the occasion of sexual feelings after puberty. These feelings will be associated with the second phenomenon but derive from the first (Bigras, 1990).

Recourse to the concept of deferred action might also be helpful in understanding why women become feminists. Lived experience in childhood and adolescence, which was experienced at the time as peculiar but not directly as the source of one's sense of misery or growing self-hatred, is reexperienced (and reinterpreted) as traumatic when similar types of events in later life produce unreasonably intense feelings of unworthiness or abnormality or rage.

49. In her chapter in Henriques, *et al*, entitled "Gender difference and the production of subjectivity," Hollway (1984) draws on dialogues and discussions conducted for her Ph.D. research. Participants talked about relationships, sexuality and gender, and Hollway talked to them singly, in couples, and in groups without using a structured format of questions. A question underpinning the research reported in her chapter was: "What does it mean to be a woman in my class and culture?" This was examined through three discourses concerning sexuality that Hollway named: the "male sexual drive" discourse, the "have/hold" discourse, and the "permissive" discourse.

50. A psychoanalyst writes of men's selective and proprietary view of emotions such as heroism. Krystal (1988:21-25) notes that heroism allows for a self-representation which enables the self to be free of anxiety, except precisely where anxiety is needed to survive in a life or death crisis situation such as those

encountered in the traditionally gendered sites of the battlefield, the fighter plane, the coal mine, the timber cut, and so on.

Consider that until recently war was a male purview. Perhaps resistance to women filling combat positions could be seen as a conservative attempt to preserve culturally familiar display rules for emotions as well as a division of emotional duties and the other ways of being that are legitimated by this division (i.e. the assumption that women are better fitted for infant care than men). Perhaps the position which refuses to give up the image of woman as 'sensitive' and emotionally expressive is propelled by a sense of cultural necessity (quite aside from the protection of gendered domains and patriarchal privileges). To women engaged in life-threatening occupations would accrue all the power of the heroic discourse and, thus, a legitimation of their apparent lack of emotional expressiveness and emotional availability. To whom will heroic men turn to carry and express intolerable emotions if women are "behaving like heroic men"? The significant issue for cultural critique here may not be the oppression of women because their gender had to suffer the praise and blame of a culture which has been ambivalent about painful affects and their carriers, but rather the ever present social structural requirement that there be an "other" or an "elsewhere" into which anxiety and other intolerable emotions be put through projection. Does this not point to the universal and inescapable function of binarism as protective splitting?

51. Although other dimensions of social difference such as race, class, and age intersect with gender to favour or disfavour certain positions in discourses, Hollway ultimately claims that the motivation for taking up particular subject positions is to protect oneself "from vulnerability of desire for the Other" (Hollway, 1984: 251). From her statement that "the woman in heterosexual relationships is linked to the mother" (1984: 250), we can infer that splitting of emotional and discursive labour by the members of couples, for instance, occurs as a defence, erected by each one, against reexperiencing such vulnerability. Hollway's claim needs to be elaborated through an analysis of expressions of, and defences against, desire for the Other where the illicit object of desire is so by virtue of race, caste, religion.

Although Hollway seems to be holding out for something proper to the individual subject (i.e. the subject's desire), she finally assigns ultimate power for desire to language, and to a hierarchy of discourses: "Significations are a product of a person's history, and what is expressed or suppressed in signification is made possible by the availability and hegemony of discourses" (1984: 239). A difficulty with her analysis is the Lacanian inheritance which leads her to state,

desire as a motive force or process is common to all significations...Although the significations which it occupies may be quite idiosyncratic, I try to show that they are not arbitrary. Positions available in gender-differentiated discourses confer relative power by enabling the suppression of signification which would be undermining of power".

(1984: 239)

52. Signification is what the discipline of formal linguistics studies as semantics or 'ideal' meaning. Chomsky's notion of linguistic competence is what allows us to distinguish between grammatical and non-grammatical sentences, but it has little to do with our ability to decide between meaningful and meaningless utterances. I want to reserve meaning for what is produced through processes of symbolization. Linguistic competence is part of but not all of what goes on in symbolization out of which meanings are produced. For a critique of linguistic models of meaning and for a discussion of symbolization, see Levin (1989) particularly Chapter Two.

53. To get ahead of myself, the position I will be developing in the chapters to follow is that phenomenological and psychoanalytical perspectives, which dissolve the subject/object distinction underlying the opposition between conscious and unconscious experience, allow for a view of reading performance as a transitional area of experience. It also conceives of the identification process in reading as one not so rigidly bound to a single, 'gendered' perspective, however be it defined, but rather to positions which allow for some degree of pleasure or relief from the anxiety whose origins lie in recursive positioning.

54. I owe this suspicion about the tenacity of the reader's conscious and unconscious conceptual and affective frameworks not to Freud, but to Professor Michael Bristol's comments about his mother-in-law.

55. To modify Laing's observation that "The facts about the other available to the self are actions of the other experienced by the self" (1969:5), we might hold, "Aspects of the self available to the self are the actions of the self experienced by the other and communicated by the other to the self which become aspects of the self to be reflected upon by the self and confirmed with the other."

56. This lack is the more puzzling since de Lauretis in *Alice Doesn't* and *Technologies of Gender* does not so much reject psychoanalytic theory as marginalize her engagement with it. Various schools are mentioned in references which are never exploited; for example, "I am not speaking of the libido, which Freud said to be only one, and I think he may have been right about that" (1987: 14). She leaves a brief discussion of Kaja Silverman's Lacanian inspired account of the subject 'as semiotic' until the end of her essay "Technology of Gender" and finds that the issue of gender cannot be usefully explored through Silverman's framework since woman can only be discussed as "structured negatively in relation to the phallus" (de Lauretis, 1987: 19-20). She eschews the insights of psychoanalysis, even "object-relations theory, which has appealed to feminists as much as if not more than Lacan or Freud" (20), because it

defines woman *in relation to* man, from within the same frame of reference and with the analytical categories elaborated to account for the psychosocial development of the male. That is why psychoanalysis does not address, cannot address, the complex and contradictory relation of women to Woman, which it instead defines as a simple equation: women=Woman=Mother.

(1987: 20)

57. This reference comes from her essay "'Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender Scepticism," quoted in Linda Nicholson's *Feminism/Postmodernism* (1990).

CHAPTER TWO

Vicissitudes of Fantasy in Anglo-American Theories of Reading Performance, Part I: Beyond desire and back to emotion

2.1 Introduction

The preceding Chapter 1 outlined the failure of the post-structuralist construal of the subject as 'constituted by discourse' to account satisfactorily for 'resistance in the resisting reader.' It pointed to the need for renewed efforts to produce a psychodynamic theory of meaning in order to formulate and evaluate hypotheses about the origins of the reader's experience of pleasure in certain genres and the possible effects of "recursive positioning" in that reader.

The status of readers' pleasure--as a sign of the self's resistance to or collusion with oppression--is as old as the Frankfurt School's commodification thesis, and recently this topic has been revived in feminist and critical theory. There have been several repercussions of feminist initiatives such as Schweickart's (1986), referred to in the preceding chapter, and others (Radway, 1984; Kaplan, 1986; Modleski, 1982; de Lauretis, 1984, 1987; Treichler and Wartella, 1986; Rakow, 1986; Wyatt, 1990), which have explored rather than repudiated the narrative pleasure experienced by women readers of so-called 'politically regressive' mass cultural genres such as the romance and thriller. Some of these initiatives have successfully critiqued the dualist orthodoxies inherent in the high/low culture debate originated by the Frankfurt School and have opened up the potential of an analysis of pleasure for an analysis of *resistance to ideology* through psychoanalytically-inspired approaches to the inferential and affective transactions between text and reader.¹ We can frame this as a problem for reader-response theory in the following way: if pleasure is a product of unconscious fantasy, it must be specified how fantasy is engaged when readers are drawn into that emotional and interpretative performance we call reading.

By turning from textual semiotics towards a pragmatics of interpretation and by opening the door to inquiry into the unconscious-as- reader, recent feminist reader-centred theorists of mass culture have avoided the conceptual error of reducing ideology to representations (and a critique of ideology to a critique of

representations).² Notwithstanding the fact that personal experience is a ground to which a feminist politics of identity and positionality would like to have recourse, psychoanalytical reality complicates the notion of "personal experience" as a purchase for individual or collective aesthetic and political judgements.³ The phenomenon of resistance in the resisting reader moves the debate from *ideology as wrong belief*, created and reproduced by false representations, to repetitive reading practice originating in the *wish to believe* and its preconditions in preexisting psychic demands, defences, and compromise formations.

The above-noted feminist theorists of mass culture have remained open to the potential of readers and audiences to exercise resistance to stereotypical characters and plots, morals and values precisely because they have chosen to investigate with psychoanalytical instruments *what elaborations in fantasy female readers may perform upon these stereotypes and other culturally available narratives*. To seek a psychodynamic approach to 'resistance in the resisting reader' provokes a re-evaluation of the meaning, origins, and function of personal and textual fantasy. These authors have agreed that the preconditions for textual effects lie not solely in social conditions of reading, or in the text's conventions, but in fantasy, in the transactions between its articulation within texts and within readers.

2.2 Mediation in a Post-Freudian Age: the psychical reality of fantasy

The unconscious is the most important contribution of psychoanalysis to an understanding of the relationship among subjectivity, language, social organization, and power. Yet how to theorize the unconscious and how to access its influences has been and continues to be a problem for Anglo-American feminists as a voluminous literature on the subject attests.⁴ From the perspective of a theoretical purchase for political activity and cultural critique, many theorists, particularly feminists in North America, have rejected psychoanalytic contributions to an understanding of subject formation and ideology because they fear a self divided does not offer grounds from which legitimate political claims can be advanced (Rose, 1986: 9,12, 15). Where division and conflict in the self have been acknowledged by non-psychoanalytic feminist theory, they are discussed in terms of reductive accounts of confrontation and

overdetermination by either 'inner' or 'outer' forces. Such resistance spells out limitations to thinking through the challenge posed by the modernist episteme to feminist projects for new representational practices since it reinstates, this time in female form, the unitary self with direct access to truth through experience.⁵

The inheritance of the individual-society dualism via the philosophical and psychological presuppositions taken on board by cultural studies as much as by feminist reader-centred theory has hampered these attempts to think through social behaviour and the preconditions to its transformation. In the social sciences, their relation "is almost universally theorized as some sort of interaction" (Henriques, 1984: 14) which emphasizes the boundaries between the two. Inner/outer is a recurrent motif particularly as the two entities are thought of as separate but interacting. This presumption of exclusivity "also demonstrates how the individual reduces inevitably to the biological in essence once its opposite number, the social, has been posed to explain the rest" (Henriques, 1984: 15).⁶ The trope of 'inner/outer' also circumscribes thinking around the notion of fantasy and supports the belief that fantasy is an epiphenomenon of reality:

[I]n popular understanding 'fantasy' is always opposed to 'reality'. In this definition fantasy is the *negative* of reality. Here 'reality' is conceived as that which is 'external' to our 'inner' lives. In this common-sense view we simultaneously inhabit two distinct histories: one mental, private; the other physical, public. Gilbert Ryle, however, noted a fundamental defect of the common-sense view: 'the *transactions* between the episodes of the private history and the public history remain mysterious, since by definition they can only belong to neither series.

(Ryle, *The Concept of Mind*, 1963: 14 in Burgin, 1986: 1)

Against the view of fantasy as marginal to perception and cognition, Juliet Mitchell in *Psychoanalysis and Feminism* (1975) argues for the centrality of fantasy in the lived experience of individuals, a position reiterated by Jacqueline Rose in her recent work *Sexuality in the Field of Vision* (1986). Rather than pretend there is safe ground in positing an essential feminine experience or "a state of totally unambiguous and self-possessed lucidity in which an external world may be seen for, and known, as simply what it is" (Henriques, 1984:2), Rose, a Lacanian representative in the psychoanalytic camp of feminist criticism, holds that the concept of the *divided*

subject, characterized by an internal fantasy scenario and the compulsion to repeat, must be the point of departure for a challenge to the "dualities (inside/outside, victim/aggressor, real event/fantasy, and even good/evil) upon which so much traditional political analysis has so often relied" (1986: 15).

Ideology theory has traditionally depended upon these dualities. Their simplicity was the source of the weakness of Althusser's account of how the 'outside' got 'inside' through interpellation, as he called it. Problems with the Althusserian/Lacanian influence on British *Screen* theory, particularly the dominance of "gaze" theory in film studies, have been aptly formulated by Copjec:

Recently, in an attempt to evade the impasses that have resulted from positing the gaze as the single point of entry into the film system, feminists have begun to analyse film as a fantasy structure. The reasons for this are unquestionably sound. For too long **the psychic mechanisms of the viewing subject have been assumed by film theory only to be ignored by concrete analyses.** Though considered necessary the psychical apparatus has so far served no function other than that of being generally available as the site **of the cementing of subject to social structures.** This, as we have said from the beginning has resulted in the reduction of the subject to a mere...point.

(1989: 241) (my emphasis)

A similar disillusionment pervades a report on the April, 1990 British Cultural Studies Conference, held at Sheffield City Polytechnic, which resumes the participants' perceptions of the failure of the last twenty years of theory:

To the extent that we can speak of conceptual trajectories, then, there appeared to be a general consensus that the 'turn to Gramsci' of the last decade notwithstanding attempts to chart a path between, on the one hand, the culturalist paradigm's privileging of the expression of the authentic interests and values embodied in the lived experience of subordinate social groups and classes and, on the other hand, the structuralist emphasis on individuals as interpellated subjects reproducing hierarchical social relations, have reached a *cul-de-sac*.

(*Screen* 1990: vol. 31:3)

A repercussion of this disillusionment may have been the opening up of "the condensation...of three different projects: the analysis of senses of self; the production of cultural forms; and the questioning of state formation" and a severe critique of "the tight connection or homology that cultural studies constructs between subjectivity, identity, social formations, and agency" (Allor, 1989: 88). Allor writes that by opening

up homologies between identity and the social formation a rehabilitation of the 'political effectivity' of emotions has occurred. Cultural Studies has been given some psychological depth.

I believe that Rose felt herself to be writing *Sexuality in the Field of Vision* in a climate tinged by the dead-ends of culturalism and structuralism in New Left thinking. In this 1986 volume, Rose argues for the materiality of psychical reality, of unconscious wishes and the fantasies they produce. She proposes that the importance of psychoanalysis for cultural critique lies in the theoretical insights and investigative protocols it offers our understanding of how "ideology works at the most rudimentary levels of psychic identity and the drives" (Rose, 1986: 5).⁷ When the very meaning of 'reality' changes from something accessible to positivist description to 'psychical reality' in which unconscious wishes are acknowledged to be an immutable presence in the interpretative processes of individuals, then the meaning of ideology must change as well.

Going beyond Mannheim's (1936) notion of ideology as a picture of society and our place in it that we carry around in our heads, Juliet Mitchell echoes Rose in maintaining that ideology takes hold through unconscious processes:

the way we live as 'ideas' the necessary laws of human society is not so much conscious as unconscious--the particular task of psychoanalysis is to decipher how we acquire our heritage and laws of human society within the unconscious mind, or, to put it another way, the unconscious mind *is* the way we acquire these laws.

(Mitchell, 1974 in Rose, 1986: 6)⁸

One of the means of studying "the way we live as (**unconscious**) 'ideas' the necessary laws of human society" is to study the social and psychological origins of *emotions*, their principles of regulation, their relationship to ideology, and to processes of conscious and unconscious identification. One of "the exact mechanisms whereby ideological processes are transformed, via individual subjects, into human actions and beliefs" (Rose, 1986: 7), I propose, is emotion. Rose's proposal for cultural studies can be reformulated in terms of "how discourse works at the most rudimentary levels of identity and the drives *through emotion*."

How fantasy is presupposed to be implicated in processes of human understanding, language, motivation, and pleasure by feminist deployments of

psychoanalysis depends upon the particular school of psychoanalysis subscribed to by the theorist. What is omitted both by the feminist and marxist inspired critique of psychoanalysis⁹, and by the hypostatization of a paradigm for visual pleasure and the formation of gender identity in *Screen's* theory of spectatorship based on a single developmental moment (Lacan's mirror stage), is the requirement to forge a more complex, less reductive, and less instrumental usage of psychoanalytic concepts for theories of interpretation. For instance, along with assumptions about how the ego is formed, how gender identity comes about, how and why symbolization occurs, and the nature of the id, which are taken on board when feminists appropriate any particular psychoanalytic theory for reading theory, are also assumptions about whether people are object-seeking or pleasure-seeking, and *what the preconditions to identification and affect are*. It is no longer satisfactory, theoretically or methodologically, to appeal to the omnibus concept of 'desire' or to the 'male gaze' in order to speculate why women readers and feminist readers take pleasure in 'denigrating' and 'stereotypical' images and plots. Our task is to draw linkages between paradigms of emotion which make it a social construct and a psychoanalytic paradigm which grants to emotion the force of an unconscious semantic. As we will see in the next chapter, the study of emotion has advantages for reader-response theory because it is a fully social concept with feeling rules and display rules. Moreover, the psychoanalytic model of affect brings other categories to bear on emotion which reveal that emotions can tell us something about the tension between ego and unconscious processes. It is instructive to position that discussion after a review of some aspects of the history of Cultural Studies' blindspot around emotion and love affair with the concepts of desire and interpellation.

2.3 Beyond the omnibus concept of desire: Cultural studies discovers emotions/affects to access the double articulation of the self by intrapsychic fantasy and by the social world

In cultural studies and critical theory, the study of emotion has not received the attention warranted by the pervasiveness of emotions in our lives. I would say the analytical distinction between 'emotion' and 'desire' has not been eradicated so much as obfuscated by the dominance of desire as the master category in post-structuralist

theories of text, in general, and in Lacanian-inspired theories of the subject in discourse, in particular. Further resistance to the use of emotion as an analytic category has come from a number of theoretical quarters: the mind-body dualism endemic to Western epistemology, Marx's political economic categories; early critical theory associated with the Frankfurt School, and post-structuralism's 'ontologisation' of the signifier, to gesture rapidly to a few.

Several recent initiatives in North American Cultural Studies (Woodward, 1990-91; Grossberg, 1988a) have explicitly set about moving beyond desire to recover emotion as an object of inquiry. While the omnipresence of text-centred models of reception, which promoted formalist and semiotic analyses, have been supported by the view of desire as fully accessible through the workings of language, recent investigations of symbolization (Green, [1972] 1986; Levin, 1989) have argued for the limitations of linguistic models of the mind's operations on the evidence of an overlooked aspect of Freudian metapsychology, affect. The discovery of emotion, in cultural studies under the impetus of feminist responses to postmodernism and developments in popular music studies (Allor, 1989: 89), has emerged in the wake of the discovery of emotion in other disciplines, beginning with critiques of structuralism in French scholarship in the history of ideas and by semioticians such as Greimas (1993), and by a turn to the study of the practices of everyday life (Bourdieu, 1977). Until recently, studies of emotion have tended to fall into the purview of: psychiatry and psychoanalysis (Rapaport, 1953; Green, [1972] 1986), experimental psychology (Ekman, Friesen, and Ellsworth, 1972; Levi, 1975; Izard, 1978), philosophy (de Sousa, 1987), feminist epistemology (Jaggar, 1989; Flax, 1983), cultural anthropology (Levy and Rosaldo, 1983; Shweder and LeVine, 1984; Lutz, 1985), ethno- and cross-cultural psychiatry (Kleinman, 1980; Kleinman and Good, 1985).

It is a commonplace to note that Communications studies in North America bears theoretical and methodological allegiance to the traditions out of which it has been created as a discipline while also being debilitated by the blindspots of these same traditions and their often competing methodologies (See "Ferment in the Field" issue of *The Journal of Communications*, 1983).¹⁰ Freudo-marxist critical theory, film theory associated with the British journal *Screen* and its precursor *Screen*

Education, cultural studies associated with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies" (known as the CCCS or the 'Birmingham School'), and the work of Raymond Williams have all been instrumental in defining problématiques, providing frameworks, and identifying methods of investigation for the study of culture, mass society, and the mass media. The until recent invisibility of emotion in Communications studies draws on the prejudices against the study of emotion in all these domains. British Cultural Studies,¹¹ itself originating as a cross-disciplinary initiative, grew out of a number of intellectual traditions and theoretical/practical projects, each of which has raised its own obstacles to the study of emotion. Let us turn briefly to each of these.

The structuralist/culturalist antagonism

Within British Cultural Studies, the muted interest in emotion, and emotion's links to unconscious scenarios, has to be attributed, first of all, to longstanding theoretical ambivalence around the very notion of 'culture' and, secondly, to the opposition between culturalist and structuralist allegiances. While culture has been central to theorists associated with the 'Birmingham' School (Hall, 1977, 1980, 1981a), it has had a dual usage: a notion of culture as consciousness, as a realm of ideas and, in particular, a realm of false ideas and false consciousness which are the product of ideology, as against a more anthropological notion of 'culture' as the social practices of a group which must be recorded and understood. Within the context of culture as the content of ideas, culture has also been very restrictively defined to refer to 'the best that has been thought and said' making up the Great Tradition of 'high' art (Williams, 1976), while 'popular,' 'mass,' and 'common' culture have increasingly come to be used interchangeably to refer to the productions of the culture industries. While these meanings are simultaneously in use, the Birmingham School has carried a brief for the investigation of the interventionist potential of working class and sub-cultural groups, their practices and expressive productions, as instances of resistance to the ideological hegemony of capitalist elites and values promoted by the culture industries. The interest of the CCCS theorists in finding the practices of sub-cultures to have escaped false consciousness and to provide semiotic resistance has conflicted with the non-judgemental stance appropriate to the recording and description of

cultural practices, while glorifying any manifestation of popular culture (Press, 1992: 20; Slack and Whitt, 1992:584).

Emotion fell into the gap between the culturalist and structuralist approaches adopted for the study of culture where 'culture' has come to designate "a problematic of mediation which attempts to link...practices of subject formation with the analysis of power or hegemony in the social formation...two levels of analysis [which] are incommensurable" (Allor, 1989: 85).¹² The first, practices of subject formation, Allor calls the 'productivist pull' in cultural studies, while the second, the analysis of power or hegemony, designates the 'sociological pull' in theories of mediation. To say that emotion had no theoretical significance for early British Cultural Studies, of course, would be misleading. Through the notion of mediation, cultural studies has grappled with the issue of how to model the relationship of a social theory of emotion to a social theory of cognitive frameworks, which it resolved first under the influence of Althusser with the notion of ideology and later, under the influence of Gramsci, with the notion of hegemony. Within the culturalist pole of research in cultural studies, ethnographic methods held sway both in studies of sub-cultures and in the study of audiences and the reception of mass media texts whereas the structuralist approach to reception was abstracted from real readers/spectators and text based.

The structuralist approach: Althusser and Lacan

The influence of structuralism on the preexisting culturalist tendency in cultural studies meant that

Whereas, in "culturalism," experience was the ground--the terrain of "the lived"--where consciousness and conditions intersected, structuralism insisted that "experience" could not, by definition, be the ground of anything, since one could only "live" and experience one's conditions *in and through* the categories, classifications and frameworks of the culture. These categories, did not arise from or in experience: rather, experience was their "effect." The culturalists had defined the forms of consciousness and culture as collective. But they had stopped far short of the radical proposition that, in culture and in language, the subject was "spoken by" the categories of culture in which he/she thought, rather than "speaking them." These categories were, however, not merely collective rather than individual productions: they were *unconscious* structures.

(Hall, 1980: 66)

Structuralism entered cultural studies through Althusser's concepts of ideology, ideological state apparatuses (ISA's), interpellation, and through Lacanian psychoanalytic concepts put to use by film theory (the mirror stage, the gaze). According to Althusser (1971), ideology works at the macro-institutional level because it also works at the micro-level of the individual through the socialization processes and ethos of the 'natural' created and disseminated by the ideological state apparatuses (ISA) of church, family, and so on; however, he did not specifically include the language of emotion and rules of emotion display as an institution through which we are constituted as subjects-in-ideology no doubt because emotion was seen as epiphenomenal.¹³ What Allor calls, "the 'productivist pull' within cultural studies' approaches to the analysis of social and cultural identities" framed the analysis of the production of identities, social and cultural formations, "around ultimately economic or quasi-functionalist models of a totality that identities or formations are seen as constituent of and constituted by" (Allor, 1989: 85-87).

The focus of studies of ideology moved from the analysis of reification, taken up through the notion of commodity fetishism, to the analysis of semiosis and the varying interpretive processes of audiences. Not until the recovery of Gramsci's work on the interpretative processes underlying the management of consent was there a concept--hegemony--which promised more for the analysis of social change. This was so because it proposed that there is a never-ending contradiction between ideology and the social experience of subordinated groups which makes the interface between representations and life experience an inevitable site of struggle.

Studies of hegemony were pursued through text-based theories of reception, such as Hall's (1980) encoding/decoding model and typology of dominant, negotiated, and oppositional readings. Morley's (Brunsdon and Morley, 1978; Morley, 1980) testing of Hall's 'preferred reading' theory was focussed on discovering the shared and social dimensions of reading by members of the groups who were interviewed. This phase of reception theory in cultural studies was marked by the 'sociological pull' in analyses of ideology which subordinated the effectiveness of ideological discourses to the impacts of social location (class, gender, race, subculture) on social consciousness:

This 'sociological pull' in the prioritization of *social location* in the analysis of cultural formations seemed just as clear in the encoding/decoding model and the initial audience research that developed out of it (cf. Morley, 1980). The analysis of both circulating discourses (i.e. British television public affairs programmes) and structured audience decoding were framed by the prioritization of institutional locations as first order determinants. Thus, the question of audience decoding was articulated as the ways in which institutional *positionality* worked to determine (or set limits) on the construction of social identities.

(Allor, 1989: 86)¹⁴

Screen theory

With the Althusserian/Lacanian structuralist inheritance, particularly influential in what has come to be known as 'screen theory,'¹⁵ the specificity of emotion was disallowed precisely because of the way psychoanalysis was taken up in the notions of 'suture' and 'gaze' theory, which reproduced psychoanalysis' own hesitations about the significance of affects at the same time as the reaffirmation of a functionalist relationship between language and psychic processes. 'Screen' theory drew upon a combination of structuralism and semiotics, psychoanalysis and marxism, to make its inferences about how textual strategies position spectators within ideological world views.¹⁶ Analyses of spectatorial pleasure and libidinal economics were inspired by drive/defence models of psychodynamics which forfeited a concept of affective constellations.¹⁷ For instance, 'suture' depended upon the conflation of ideology with the 'libidinal economy' of the reader (Grossberg, 1988a).¹⁸ Emotions aroused by film were discussed only as the epiphenomena of cathexis. Cathexis was taken to be formless, intentionless energy directed to or attached to objects due to the work of a libidinal economy whose regulatory procedures for the organization of sexual drives were the product of cultural rules, i.e. ideology. Investigation of ideology appealed to those searching for a science of social change whereas emotion connoted subjective and infinitely variable phenomena. However, the '80's critique of '70's film theory was that the spectator was "notoriously unsocialized and undercontextualized" (Ross, 1986: 170). As Copjec put it, "For too long the psychic mechanisms of the viewing subject have been assumed by film theory only to be ignored by concrete analyses. Though considered necessary the psychical apparatus has so far served no function

other than that of being generally available as the site of the cementing of subject to social structures" (1989: 241).¹⁹ When theories of mediation moved beyond the notion of suture, it became possible to argue that representations are not *de facto* 'expressions' of ideology, etched onto consciousness, but polysemic signs and narratives whose contexts of reception and interpretation have to be studied as much as the contexts for the production and distribution of these sign-commodities.

Desire and continental thought

In the aftermath of structuralism and existentialism, desire was the concept to which post-structuralist thinkers in France had recourse in their struggle with the subject/object relation; emotion as a motivator has been of little interest to debates between critical theory and structuralism (Levin, 1981: 78). In efforts to overcome the traditional subject-object opposition which idealism tried and failed to replace, 'language' had been substituted for 'mind' or 'consciousness' as the interface between the self and the world; desire's medium was language.

'Desire' has had different meanings for film and literary theory which have had implications for how each theoretical endeavour identifies the functioning and effects of desire in the text/reader-spectator interaction.

'Desire' has become an indispensable term for late-twentieth-century critics investigating psychological intricacies of narrative. The word suggests the emotional force implicit in the acts of reading and writing fiction; it provides a means of linking the energies of characters within a text to those involved in creating and in responding to that text; it calls attention to latent as well as overt erotic elements in fiction. Such critics as Nancy Armstrong, Peter Brooks, Ross Chambers, and René Girard have refined "desire" as a tool of exegesis.

(Meyer Spacks, 1990: 1)

Having been the dominant category in film theory in the '70's, desire became the watchword across a variety of sub-disciplines in the '80's, as these titles suggest: *Desire in Language* (Kristeva), *Discourses of Desire* (Kauffman), *The Age of Desire* (Kovel), *Knowledge as Desire* (Furth), *The Desire to Desire* (Doane), *Female Desire* (Coward), and *Desire and Truth* (Meyer Spacks), *To Desire Differently* (Flitterman-Lewis), *Powers of Desire: The Politics of Sexuality* (Snitow, Stansell, and Thompson).

The formation of the relation between desire and emotion, where desire (according to Lacan) is the inescapable consequence of the self's acquisition of language, has actually created an impasse for social thought. Arguably, post-structuralism has contributed to that impasse; it inverted Lacan's structuralist dictum of an "unconscious structured like language" to see desire propelling narrative itself; that is to say, language itself is structured by unconscious processes which preexist its acquisition (Levin, 1989). Elizabeth Wright (1984) introduces her excellent study of the relationship of psychoanalysis to theories of literature and the arts with a reminder of Freud's insight that desire asserts its effects in language and in all forms of symbolic interaction:

The energies of this desire become directed outside conscious awareness, attaching themselves to particular ideas and images which represent unconscious wishes. *Wunsch* in Freud's terminology has this special sense, as desire associated specifically with particular images, whereas 'desire' is better retained for those underlying energies which are not yet bound to specific aims.

(Wright, 1984: 2-3)

The premise that desire is in language and, essentially, preexists the speaking self leads to a view of the subject as contingent on language. The subject "has been deontologised while the signifier has been ontologised" (Young, 1989: 72). Similarly, when desire is made synonymous with instinct (with the id), emotion has once again been discounted as able to tell us anything interesting about human identity, sociability, or the origins of meaning.

In psychoanalytic circles, the problem of affect "has been tackled above all in France in the context of controversies around the work of Lacan" (Green, 1986: 201). André Green holds that Lacan's model of the unconscious as an organized and organizing system, as language, excluded emotions which are so difficult to express in words or to capture in the concepts of structural linguistics (Green, 1986: 6). Models of reading based on Lacan suffer the same defect as Lacanian metapsychology; many aspects of human embodiment disappear, and the relation of emotion to psyche and soma disappears into the gap. "Lacan made the error of excessive abstraction" (Green, 1986: 11), a view being echoed in the late 1980's in some corners of North American

Cultural Studies. In a special issue of *Discourse* on emotions, Kathleen Woodward writes,

[H]istories (of pity, resignation, sincerity, jealousy, tenderness, horror) would also offer us breathing room from the now banal rhetoric of post structuralism and Lacanian analysis as it is summed up by the word "desire." In its ubiquity and virtual solitude, in the deployment of the discourse of desire everywhere, desire has assumed the status of a master category (it is the agent of narrative, it is the hallowed sign of subjectivity). But it is also a curiously empty category. At the same time, desire can be understood to have many (emotional) counterparts--anxiety, say, or terror--and sustained investigation of these emotions (their theories, their histories) would be productive.

(Woodward, 1990/91: 3)

Another way to say this might be that desire becomes a curiously empty category when it stops being useful in accounting for "how experience is mediated through the object" (Young, 1989: 74). Different psychoanalytic theses all argue that affect, particularly primitive emotional experience, brings the object back into view.

Critical theory and marxist categories

Marxist categories have also created an impasse for social thought, and for closer scrutiny of the relevance of emotion for meaning and motivation. In "Baudrillard, Critical Theory and Psychoanalysis," Charles Levin points out that

Critical theory has tended to skirt around the issue of interpretation. There are plenty of exceptions, work that comes out of Benjamin for example, but on the whole this at least has been my experience of critical discourse. What this means in knowledge terms is that critical theory won't come to grips with the fact of uncertainty. Hence the tremendous reluctance, until recently, to open up Marx's categories for cultural interpretation.

(1984: 45)

In fact, investigation of the 'object', an epistemological concept, was closed down by marxist inspired tendencies to understand it as 'reification' and nothing more. The object is 'otherness,' what man produces.

(1981: 94)

Any specific consideration of emotion as a category for cultural analysis was made irrelevant by critical theory's

extension of the series of binary oppositions already in play [in marxism]--true consciousness/false consciousness (on which the theory of alienation is based); use value/exchange value (on which the critique of the commodity is based); and, finally, real needs and false needs (or healthy needs and unhealthy needs, as the case may be). The charge against capitalist culture then becomes, predictably, that the system of exchange value generates false needs because it produces for exchange instead of use; and the familiar counter-position of utility and profit-seeking deception is recycled at the level of individual psychology.

(Levin, 1981: 151-2)²⁰

The culturalist approach: Raymond Williams

The British Left's anthropological optic on culture as a "whole way of life" was epitomized in Raymond Williams' efforts to sketch a theory of the links between cultural formations and modes of production which would escape the reductivism of earlier base/superstructure models. In Williams' notions of 'structure of feeling' and 'social character,' outlined in *The Long Revolution*, there was an incipient social constructionist theory of emotion as is clear in the familiar dictum, "social being determines consciousness" (1977: 80). The oxymoron "structure of feeling" (and its associated web of concepts such as "social character," "selective tradition," "community of process") captured the difficulty for a marxist of systematizing 'feelings' at the social and individual levels; of describing consciousness and socially shared mental structures.²¹

A structure of feeling tends to be described in terms of that which predisposes us to a pattern of expectations, values, feelings, and beliefs or descriptions of shared experience. An adequate social theory of emotion, addressing social structures by which dominant patterns of feeling are produced, requires an account of both social and psychological processes. "Structure of feeling" and "social character" were limited by the productivist emphasis of the models of consciousness and experience in which they were situated. The particularities and specificities of how the self attends to emotion to feel real--emotion as a view from the inside--fell outside the cognitive constituency of the early Cultural Studies because of its repudiation of a variety of non-materialist 'isms': humanism, idealism, individualism, subjectivism, expressivism, psychological realism. It also fell outside of Williams' purview despite his atomistic

commitment in *Culture and Society* (1958) and *The Long Revolution* (1965) as Slack and Whitt point out:

Even when discussion proceeds in terms of the working class, the urban working class, or the people, these groups acquire their status as groups in a process whereby the whole (or totality) is conceived as an aggregate, the sum of individual, atomistic parts. Nowhere is this clearer than in Williams's description of the community of process, where the additive and collective process of individual experience and creativity make up the whole (which he calls culture).

(Slack and Whitt, 1992: 576)

When we recall Flax's critique of feminist theory's historical actor as a 'self-sufficient adult,' discussed in the Introduction to the thesis, we find that Williams' 'individual' suffered from the same lack of 'modalities' as feminism's historical actor. A focus on the individual (as against the mass) did not lead Williams to a psycho-social theory of emotion nor did his philological account of 'culture' in *Keywords*--culture as cultivation of mind and body--ever lead him to the realm of the home and to the family culture in which the first, formative emotions are intensely experienced. While the double articulation of subcultures was a familiar object of analysis to cultural studies researchers, what can be supposed as the 'double articulation' of the individual by the lived experience of class and family culture was not identified by Williams and his *confrères* as accessible or of interest to study.²² It is not until Carolyn Steedman's *Landscape for a Good Woman* (1986) that we have an example of a study of double articulation in the second sense within British Cultural Studies.²³

Instead of investigating the microacts of a self for what could be learned about the relation of feeling to the *self-relevance* of what the self sees, perceives, remembers, or fantasizes, cultural studies has seen the semantics of emotion absorbed into the encoded meanings of representations. Like the ideological 'meaning' which an audience, depending on its class position, was supposed to 'get', so too were the members of each of these interpretative communities supposed to 'have' similar emotions. Cultural studies inherited from Williams' and the early Birmingham School's work a push-button model of emotion inside a theory that was trying to describe how social factors such as representation construct consciousness.

Feminist critique within cultural studies

Further motivations for the disinterest in emotion (and fantasy) by early cultural studies theorists have become visible with the feminist critique. Discussing early marxist-influenced sociological work on youth culture and deviance in post-war Britain such as *Resistance through Rituals* (1976), *Learning to Labour* (1977), and *Sub-culture: The Meaning of Style* (1979), McRobbie (1980) points out a number of features that this research never addressed: gender as an equally central category as class, style, or race in prising open sub-cultural meanings; the contradictions that patterns of cultural resistance pose in relation to women; female alternatives to male subcultures organised around gangs, rock music, drugs, alcohol, and territorial prerogatives; gender oppression and sexual violence within male sub-cultures; the home as a site of resistance equal to the streets; or the role of fantasy and imaginary solutions in both male and female adolescents' lives. She argues that "a fully *sexed* notion of working class culture would have to consider such features more centrally" (1980: 41). McRobbie's well-known work on young women and leisure, on the teen magazine *Jackie*, and on dance and social fantasy begins to repair the gap (1980; 1982; 1984), as does Steedman's *Landscape for a Good Woman* (1986), and Press (1991) on middle and working class women's responses to entertainment television.

The paucity of interest in the specifically *psycho*-social origins of emotion, and the micropractices in everyday life by which emotions are acquired, is all the more surprising given that emotions, while experienced as vital to our autonomy, are, on another level, the very instruments of social control (de Sousa, 1987: 255) and would seem *de rigueur* in a description of a sub-cultural way of life. But McRobbie (1980) reminds us that studies of working class gangs were more studies of male solidarity in groups, or of style and, at best, partial views of sub-cultural life than they were insights into the link between gang life and private experience with parents, girl friends, and siblings. Willis and Hebdige were not interested in the emotional servicing of the 'lads' once they returned home drunk or stoned after a weekend away.

Emotion may also have been ignored in early Cultural Studies research precisely because of the prejudice that emotional expressiveness is a feminine attribute, and the study of emotions, a feminized domain very far from the 'scientific'

concerns of historical materialism. However, a society succeeds in perpetuating itself to the extent that it produces similar emotional constitutions in its citizens. As Jaggar points out, the norms and values which predominate in a hierarchical society tend to serve the interest of the dominant group and reproduce themselves at the emotional level of "our so-called gut-level responses":

The dominant values are implicit in [emotional] responses taken to be precultural or acultural,...they blinker us theoretically. For instance, they limit our capacity for outrage;...they blind us to the possibility of alternative ways of living. (...) We are likely to feel what Irving Thalberg has called "visceral racism"; whatever our sexual orientation, we are likely to be homophobic; whatever our class, we are likely to be at least somewhat ambitious and competitive; whatever our sex, we are likely to feel contempt for women. (...) The emotional responses may be so deeply rooted in us that they are relatively impervious to intellectual argument and may recur even when we pay lip service to changed intellectual convictions.

(Jaggar, 1989: 159)

Another aspect of the feminist critique was the rationalist bias of cultural studies which displays how it has been caught up in the oppositions characteristic of the Cartesian world: reason/emotion, mind/body (Long, 1989). Western epistemology has tended to have a hostile attitude to emotion because it is seen to be the antithesis of reason and to have the power to contaminate "the rules of inference that would guarantee the derivation of certain knowledge from the 'raw data' supposedly given directly to the senses" (Jaggar, 1989: 146). Cultural studies inherited the opposition of reason to emotion which originated in the Platonic-Kantian "splitting (of our) personality into two: the transcendent, dominant controller and the empirical bundle of desires and passions to be disciplined and brought to heel" (Rorty, 1986c: 10). The sequelae of this splitting produced the coronation of reason as the faculty of knowledge, and the 'Dumb View' of emotion (Jaggar, 1989). Plato in *The Phaedrus* ascribed motivational power to emotions like anger and curiosity; however, they were as "horses to the charioteer of reason" (Jaggar, 1989: 145). Aristotle proposed a cognitive theory of emotion in which factual beliefs and moral judgements played a fundamental role in the causation and individuation of emotions (Harré, 1986: 2). Philosophers of antiquity had more complex views of emotion than were to be found in later conceptions. Not until the nineteenth century did emotions become of scientific

interest, but these investigations were dominated by the unsubtle views inherited from the seventeenth century.²⁴

Positivist construals of emotion identified emotions with the physical feelings or involuntary bodily movements that typically accompany them, such as pangs or qualms, flushes or tremors (Jaggar, 1989: 148); "mechanical responses to stimuli...presumably outside of adaptive behavior" (Emde, 1989: 182).²⁵ The myth of the naturalness of the emotions, which entailed a view of them as passive and as connected to our 'animal natures' has contributed to their being overlooked as having anything to do with meanings, beliefs, choices, or thinking (de Sousa, 1987: 45).

According to the 'Dumb View' emotions were not intentional:

[E]motions were not seen as being **about** anything: instead, they were contrasted with and seen as potential disruptions of other phenomena that are **about** something, phenomena, such as rational judgments, thoughts, and observations.

(Jaggar, 1989: 148)²⁶

On this view, as emotions were not believed to be joined to value judgements, they could not be defended as a mode of knowing against reasons's claims to be the indispensable faculty for acquiring knowledge.

Beyond its connotations of the irrational and the feminine for cultural studies, emotion may have been subordinated to the study of the codes of style and ritual for the same methodological rationale as motivated anthropologists, especially symbolic anthropologists studying ritual, to dismiss emotion. The anthropologist Renato Rosaldo, writing his first article after his wife's death, suggests that it is as the result of either notions of objectivity or dogmas about the indeterminacy of inner states that ethnographies have been produced, particularly about death, which "equate the ritual with the obligatory...and conflates the ritual process with the process of mourning" (1981: 189). Emotions were thought "too varied and shifting" to provide the foundation for a theory of ritual (Rosaldo, 1985: 187). Symbolic anthropologists have assumed that "rituals encode and store encapsulated wisdom as if it were the formalized microcosm of the informal workings of everyday life in a culture...The bias that so privileges ritual risks assuming the answers to the questions that most need to be asked" (Do rituals, for example, always reveal cultural depth?) (Rosaldo, 1985:

189). The problem of reducing the complexity of experience to webs of signification to be discussed through codes is captured by Bourdieu:

The anthropologist's particular relation to the object of his study...inclines him to a hermeneutic representation of practices, leading him to reduce all social situations to communicative relations and, more precisely, to decoding operations...And exaltation of the virtues of the distance secured by externality simply transmutes into an epistemological choice the anthropologist's objective situation, that of the "impartial spectator," as Husserl puts it, condemned to see all practice as spectacle.

(Bourdieu, 1977:1 in Rosaldo, 1985: 193)²⁷

'Pleasure' vs. 'use' value: a political issue

A number of mass culture theorists (Modleski, 1984, 1986; Radway, 1986; Rose, 1986; Jameson, 1988) have been in search of paradigms, in the aftermath of the explanatory inadequacy of the manipulation thesis advanced in Horkheimer and Adorno's *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, by which to account for the appeal and significance of the so-called regressive forms of mass culture (the sit-com, romance and detective fiction). Out of the feminist critique has come new directions for research; McRobbie proposes that the conventional conceptual triad of 'class, race, sex' in cultural studies be supplemented by research organised by another consisting of 'pleasure, leisure, populism' (1980: 48). Her work has given a new import to readers' fantasy and pleasure as has Radway's work on the romance for reception studies in North America.²⁸

In "Pleasure. A Political Issue" (1988), Fredric Jameson reviews approaches on the Left to the issue of pleasure and addresses the loss of integrity of 'use value' for mass cultural critique.²⁹ The 'commodification and culture industries' approach of the Frankfurt School raised the question of whether pleasure found in mass culture--in reading Harlequin romances for instance--had anything to do with 'authenticity' or 'real pleasure' or, alternatively, was it not inauthentic because it was 'mere diversion,' a 'commodity fix,' motivated by 'false consciousness'? Were these pleasures authentic or rather degraded consumption? Why degraded? Low culture, a category with its roots in the early Frankfurt School and in the British school of Leavis-influenced criticism, was unworthy and dangerous because it was seen both as

unsophisticated (simple, repetitious, formulaic) and as mesmerizing, capable of injecting apathy or a false sense of contentment in its consumers.³⁰

The failure of aesthetic modernism and of the potential of code breaking initiated a reappraisal of the heretofore assumed hegemonic function of mass culture. This reappraisal did not follow on the appearance of a new aesthetic in mass cultural forms but because the modernist-inspired expectations for a revolutionary aesthetic went unfulfilled in the mass cultural absorption of avant-garde techniques. In Huyssens' view,

To insist on the adversary function of *écriture* and of breaking linguistic codes when every second ad bristles with domesticated avantgardist and modernist strategies strikes me as caught precisely in that very over estimation of art's transformative *function* for society which is the signature of an earlier, modernist, age.

(Huyssens, 1984:41)

Despite the postmodernist refusal of the binarism and identarian principles upon which modernism was enacted (high/low; good/bad taste; identity/non-identity), emotion and pleasure, in particular, still came up for cynical scrutiny in cultural studies because no alternative formulation of use value had been found. "Marx's category of use value could not, with respect to a critical *interpretation* of commodity culture, articulate an adequate alternative to political economy" (Levin, 1981: 148).

In contrast to marxists such as Lukàcs and critical theorists such as Adorno and Horkheimer, for whom emotion (i.e. pleasure in low forms like jazz) was turned into an epiphenomena of false consciousness, for post-structuralists such as Baudrillard, "the consumer's emotional involvement in the object as such" was not the problem for cultural theory (Levin, 1981: 115). Rather the struggle was to find what the meaning of commodities might be in the absence of reification (Levin, 1981: 103). And, in Jameson's view, "the theorists of a French poststructuralism simply change the valences on the old descriptions of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, so that what used to be denounced as commodification is now offered by Deleuze and Guattari as the consciousness of the ideal schizophrenic, the 'true hero of desire'" (Jameson, 1988: 64). He notes that in both cases, the discussion of individual gratification, on grounds of either self-expression or aesthetics, serves "some deeper political and ideological position" (1988:65). In agreement with Jameson would be a film theorist such as Colin

McCabe when he avers, in *High Theory/Low Culture* (1986), that nothing has been gained by shifting the debate on the effectivity of signifying systems from 'ideology' or 'interpellation' to 'pleasure.' Furthermore, such a shift reproduces between the 'descriptive' and 'prescriptive' approaches to pleasure the same conflict as had already surfaced in British Cultural Studies with respect to the concept of culture.³¹

Cultural resistance to the loss of the personal in marxist thought: the 'New Subjectivity'

To this point, I have been reviewing positions and counter-positions within cultural studies which have had an impact on the ways in which marxist ideas were brought into the study of mass media reception and which have effectively excluded emotion from study. However, what bears noting is one particular cultural response which precisely revolted against marxism's neglect of the realm of emotions and intimacy, the family, sensuous pleasure, and ontology. This was a movement in West Germany in film and literature called the 'New Subjectivity' that reacted to the final phase of the student movement of the 60's. Under the influence of feminism and as a backlash against the "idolatry of the concept" of New Left thinking in the 60's and 70's, the rehabilitation of the 'personal' and the emotions characterized cultural production associated with the "New Subjectivity" (McCormick, 1991).

The writing and filmmaking McCormick identifies with the New Subjectivity in West Germany refused the "dogmatism of marxist thought of the time whose schematic models for interpreting the world seemed to have little to offer the individual who felt alienated, who felt trapped in the delayed gratification demanded by bourgeois socialization" (McCormick, 1991: 66). In the face of a crisis of politics, lost political faith, a critique of technology and rationalism, a search for intimacy, for sensuality sought but not found in ruined personal relationships, McCormick finds the seeds of a literature which was returning to themes of the subject in crisis, to psychological self-examination, and desire for the sensuous and the spiritual.³² In Peter Schneider's *Lenz* the hero seeks

a discourse in which physical, emotional, and sensual perceptions can be articulated without withering away under the glare of the intellect, a language that confronts rather than reinforces the repression

of emotions in modern civilization's overly instrumentalized beings--this is Lenz's rather utopian desire. Language should have a healing, therapeutic function, as opposed to being mainly a tool of abstraction. It should be used to bring repressed fears, needs, memories, and dreams to the surface--exactly those most personal elements that have so long been considered irrelevant to rational discourse.

(McCormick, 1991: 92)

The literature of the New Subjectivity also had a didactic purpose. It problematized the boundaries between the personal and the social, and the private and the public. The undermining of these dichotomies was related to the undermining of that fundamental split between what is traditionally considered 'male' and 'female'. Similarly, this has had impacts in West German cultural production for the representations figuring the psychological split between the 'self' and the 'Other' that we know, since Hegel and Lacan, is prerequisite to the development of human self-consciousness.

Grossberg and McRobbie: distinctions within the problem of pleasure

The political effectiveness of emotion is being recovered as post-modernist and feminist perspectives confront the theoretical sacred cows of cultural studies. Both tendencies have contributed to the unbinding of "the tight connection, or homology, that cultural studies constructs between subjectivity, identity, social formations, and agency" (Allor, 1989: 88).

Jameson's article on pleasure (1988) appears to be the backdrop for a recent article entitled "Postmodernity and Affect: All Dressed Up with No Place to Go" (1988a) in which Grossberg presents a discussion and critique of what he sees to be the three strategies used by the Left to make sense of postmodern cultural statements. The 'postmodern,' he offers, is "a historically specific change operating at the level of our affective relation to the world...[which] is emblematically represented in the increasing popularity of particular statements which are, increasingly [sic], ironic, cynical and nihilistic" (1988: 271).

Much of what is talked about as 'the postmodern' is predicated on the perception that something 'feels' different, not only about particular aesthetic practices, but about a wide variety of life-experiences and historical events. Yet it is not clear what the status of this 'feeling' or experience is, in what planes of our existence it is anchored. Moreover, there are two inseparable but different perspectives one can take here,

two different questions one can ask, two different ways of entering onto the same terrain: first, what are the complex determinations or conditions of possibility of this 'feeling' and second, what are the effects that we are trying to describe as an emergent historical 'feeling,' what conditions does it make possible.

(1988: 275-6)

His concern is the second question which he wants to protect from being too quickly answered by a "deconstructive theory of the ideological production of experience [since] there is no reason to assume that it [the experience called feeling] is necessarily and primarily operating within either a signifying or representational economy" (276).

The first of the three strategies Grossberg discusses has been organized around the debate over mystification, that is, whether experience is directly determined by our insertion into the economic relations of late capitalism. A second approach derives from art criticism to argue that in the contemporary context, "all of culture--including the production of meaning and consciousness--has been incorporated into capitalist commodity relations" (1988a: 280). The better part of Grossberg's article is devoted to a critique of the third strategy which he calls "the politics of transgression and pleasure." He initiates an attempt, within North American cultural studies, to draw conceptual distinctions among the pleasure words: desire, emotion, satisfaction, need and enjoyment, which critical attempts to locate "the politics of the postmodern in the regime of pleasure" (281) have failed to do. He correctly argues that confusion has been created by the careless use of these pleasure words which ignore what he calls the different 'discursive economies' from which these words arise. For instance, ambiguity about pleasure is created when no one knows if one is talking about the satisfaction of need, the avoidance of pain, the dissipation of tension (281). As a result, the complex relations between forms of pleasure and ideological formations have been ignored.

Grossberg proposes that affect cannot be accounted for in the same language as ideology; "these are different planes of effects" (1988a: 282). By promoting such an equation, he argues cultural studies researchers have lost the ability to talk about mystification and the space where change occurs, where false consciousness (the difference between belief and action) becomes the object of self-reflection.

Maintaining that there is a disjuncture between affect and libido, he refuses the homology, assumed in "screen theory" between, on the one hand, fictional and cinematic forms of representation and, on the other hand, psycholinguistic structures and practices of representation. This homology assumes "ideological determinations of libidinal displacements" (282).

The central proposition in Grossberg's article is the distinction he makes between libidinal economies of desire and affective economies of mood as two different planes on which psychic energy is organized.

If desire is always focused (as the notion of cathexis suggests), mood is always dispersed. While both may be experienced in terms of needs, only libidinal needs can be, however incompletely, satisfied. Moods are never satisfied, only realized. If desire assumes an economy of depth (e.g. in the notion of repression), mood is always on the surface (which is not to be equated with consciousness). It is the coloration or passion within which one's investments in, and commitments to, the world are made possible. Finally, affective economies empower difference while libidinal economies do not. Pleasure and desire operate within a structure in which it is their own satisfactions--however infinitely deferred--that define the operation of the system. They are systems replete with content. Affect is contentless; it is precisely aimed, on the contrary, at constituting not only the possibility of difference, but the terms within which such differences are possible in a particular affective economy.

(1988a: 285)

Inasmuch as we have not yet reviewed paradigms of emotion, and particularly the psychoanalytic model of affect, nor notions of the self or mind in which emotions or affect are located, it is too early to evaluate the cogency much less the consequences for cultural theory of Grossberg's hypothetical economies of mood. I will return to his argument in the conclusion of the next chapter, after the discussion of models of emotion have equipped us with the conceptual tools with which to evaluate the validity of the distinctions he is making and the claims which follow from these distinctions.

A second theorist, while not speaking directly about the postmodern, has sought alternatives to the conflicts of the culturalist/structuralist opposition. Angela McRobbie's work has been gradually laying the foundation for a turn away from structuralist notions of interpellation and text-based reception studies to inquiry into

emotion and fantasy in everyday life processes of identity formation. In a recent paper, "Post-Marxism and Cultural Studies: A Postscript" (1992), McRobbie makes a plea for identity ethnography, that is, the study of actual process of identity acquisition since the formative influences on "identity" have come to play an increasingly important role in the wake of the "crisis of marxism" in cultural studies. She points to the lack of reference to "real existing identities in the ethnographic sense" given that the "the identities being discussed...are textual or discursive identities" because, in general, "the site of identity formation in cultural studies remains implicitly in and through cultural commodities and texts rather than in and through the cultural practices of everyday life" (1992: 730). A logical extension of McRobbie's position is the study of how the acquisition of emotions is one of the vehicles of identity-formation.

McRobbie argues that,

Identity is not the "bourgeois" individual, nor is it the personality, the unique person, but neither is it the psychoanalytic subject." (...) Identity, therefore, is predicated on social identity, on social groups or populations with some sense of a shared experience and history. And yet it is also a category doomed to dispersal and to fragmentation, committed to anti-essentialism, to anti-absolutism.

(1992: 729-730)

Her plea for an identity ethnography, which would encompass interactive research on groups and individuals who are more than just audiences for texts, seems strangely dated for two reasons. First of all, McRobbie's own and well-known work has included an ethnographic component (see her comments in McRobbie [1980] on her research on drinking for *Young Women and Leisure: How Working-Class Girls Get Working-Class Husbands*). Secondly, McRobbie argues:

[I]t is necessary that we somehow move away from the binary opposition which still haunts cultural studies, that is, the distinction between text and lived experience, between media and reality, between culture and society. What is now required is a methodology, a new paradigm for conceptualizing identity-in-culture, an ethnographic approach which takes as its starting point the relational interactive quality of everyday life and which brings a renewed rigor to this kind of work by integrating into it a keen sense of history and contingency.

(1992: 730)

McRobbie's call for an ethnography of identity surprisingly omits any mention of the methodological necessity of reflexivity on the part of the ethnographer nor does she

show recognition of contemporary efforts in social anthropology in her own country to take account of reflexivity and the role played by a scrutiny of the impact of feelings within an autobiographical ethnography (Okely, 1992).³³

The limitations of a focus on identity based on the 'productivist' logic of positioning through social location has been addressed in North American feminist studies on the relative theoretical merits of the category of 'position' over 'identity.' A last example comes to mind which is instructive as to the inherent limitations of any study of identity and of positionality which emphasizes the psycho-social origins of identity formation as opposed to the psychological dimension. Consider the fascinating example to be found in a recent dissertation on the grounds on which an identity politics could be based for the purposes of feminist organizing (Gregg, 1991). This study tested the importance of two categories, class and gender, for women's self-understanding of the factors which led them to decide to join the unionization effort at Yale University in the mid 1980's. The author's hypothesis: the constitution of identity which informs political action in local contexts is more complex than feminist thinkers would care to think. Her underlying question: which identities were at the basis of women's self-understandings of why they chose to join the union or not?

Gregg interviewed women clerical workers at Yale University, and the example of her encounter with one particular informant points to the limitations of ethnographic research which can go no deeper than an interviewee's expressed self-understandings. One of Gregg's most articulate informants (given the pseudonym of 'Sarah Brach') discussed her reasons for not only choosing to join the union bargaining unit but for voluntarily giving up an administrative position with higher salary and classification in order to do so (1991: 114-117; 177-179). This person was aware that two of the more serious ramifications of her decision were an uncertain financial future because of her lowered earning ability and her loss of power in the university. However, she realized a non-managerial classification released her from conflicts between her work situation and her political identity as well as from conflicts she encountered as a manager.

Leaving her professional position to join the union, the collective, the 'family of underprivileged,' could be seen as altruistic, idealistic behaviour consequent with her political allegiances. Alternatively, she could be considered to have 'bought into'

the anti-individualism and anti-materialism of the ideology of socialism and possibly the equation of power with domination characteristic of some feminist arguments of the early 1970's. From another viewpoint, Brach's decision could be seen as self-destructive, politically naive, and as a despairing affirmation that the 'system' can never be changed in any meaningful way from within *by someone like her*. Although this woman identified class and gender solidarity as fundamental reasons for her return to a non-managerial, less salaried classification in order to belong to the union of clerical and support staff, there are disquietening hints of other motives (which she chose not or could not have expressed to the investigator as part of her self-understanding). These hints were correctly not (and should not have been casually) investigated within the interview framework as set up by Gregg. Wendy Hollway's notion of psychical investment is particularly relevant and pressing given that Brach's actions put her future security in doubt:

the availability of a position in discourse which is positively valued and which confers power must be accompanied by a mechanism at the level of the psyche which provides the investment to take up this position. I have argued that the investment in this position is produced in the individual's history.

(Hollway, 1984: 256)

We are led to ask: What mechanism at the level of the psyche provides the investment for Brach to resolve the conflict between her work situation and her class consciousness in favour of a job and status demotion? What could have made the desire for solidarity so compelling that she was willing to give up her 'desirable job' in order to hold, for the rest of her working life at Yale, a lower paid, less interesting and challenging clerical position which she herself characterizes as part of an environment where "fear and desire [are confused with] enthusiasm, dedication and good-girlism and happy submission" (Gregg, 1991: 115).

This woman, with a university education and professional training, mentioned that she had done better than her parents, "immigrant parents who were poor when they were young" (178). Her mother had told her when she was a child, "We don't cross picket lines." We are led to wonder: could she have given up her professional position out of a sense of duty to renounce power, financial security, and upward mobility because the well-being produced by those conditions was spoiled by guilt and

a sense of unworthiness?³⁴ Because it felt more comfortable to be associated with those situated against the status quo and "on the receiving end of the exercise of power" (178)? Gregg notes that "Brach's desire 'to avoid being in any position of power over people' echoed feminists' rejection in the early 1970s of leadership as domination" (1991: 116). Did she transform those powers and rewards she had earned in the university hierarchy into a sense of unearned 'entitlement'? Did a burdensome and painful dual identification with the 'oppressor,' the largely male manager-guard cohort at the university, and with their 'victims,' the inmates of the female clerical ghetto, lead to her inability to struggle to function compassionately and capably in a supervisory role with a largely female clerical and technical staff? Did this produce conflict for which she sought escape through resignation and which she rationalized as solidarity with the labour movement and other 'marginals'? Other clues to this woman's reasons for joining the union are not to be found by further probing her self-understanding about the union but in her stories of the emotional difficulties she experienced while functioning as a supervisor. A host of difficult methodological and ethical issues about conducting qualitative research which is open to the unconscious are raised by this disturbing and absorbing example in the Gregg dissertation. Of one thing we must not be naive; ethnographic methods must recognize their limitations where unconscious motivation is concerned.³⁵

The study of processes of identity acquisition and formation must encompass studies of emotion at two levels of acquisition. Studies of the socialization into emotion rules, via the shared experience and history of membership in social groups, while necessary will not address issues of intrusive emotion, or emotional self-deception, or the complementarity of emotional self-positioning and the positioning created by the emotional responses of others. Identity studies of the unconscious as interpreter must be reintroduced in order to access the psychic processes in which the internal preconditions for feeling an emotion, or being able to change or expand one's emotional repertoire, are located.

As indicated above, I do not wish to throw out desire as a category but rather to examine what levels of analysis have been overlooked prematurely by not dilating the concept of emotion, either alone or in conjunction with desire, and by not

exploring to what degree emotions are cultural constructs which belong to a discourse (and thus a product of social learning) while nevertheless being rooted in both biology and ontogenetic developmental history within a specific family culture. To be useful to social theory and to cultural critique, an adequate account of emotion must go beyond views of emotion as non-evaluative or non-intentional, irrational, involuntary and as juxtaposed to cognition. Can this be done? Let us address these questions to the discussion in the next chapter on the three major paradigms which have been established for emotion.

CHAPTER TWO: ENDNOTES

1. In communication research the relationship between a theory of meaning and a theory of reading has been charted according to presuppositions with respect to the self and language entailed by different paradigms of communication. As classical American communication research theory declined in importance to be replaced by inquiry into communication from a materialist/cultural studies orientation, exemplified, for instance, by the work of James Carey (1975, 1981), Raymond Williams (1962, 1974), and Stuart Hall (1971, 1976, 1981a, 1981b), the North American preoccupation with the concept of propaganda, persuasion, and manipulation as a paradigm for the communication process and its relationship to the social formation was superseded by questions of ideology and hegemony (Selucky, n.d.) Exemplary of the second, primarily British, approach were the early studies on audience's oppositional or 'negotiated' readings of news texts by Brunsdon and Morley, *Everyday Television: "Nationwide"* (1978), Morley, *The "Nationwide" Audience: Structure and Decoding* (1981), and Hall's "Encoding and Decoding" model of news reception (1981a). These devolved from the premise that an identification of the mediations of class which produced different decodings by different audiences, or sub-cultural interpretative communities, was fundamental to any satisfactory account of the 'consumption' and reception of texts. With this move the classic materialist emphasis on production (of cultural commodities by the culture industries, or 'subjects' for ideology) was displaced by a search for a materialist theory of subjectivity through which to understand the determining conditions of textual reception.

In the 1980's, paradigm debates in communication studies, particularly in the United States as represented by the proceedings of the International Association for Communication and the "Ferment in the Field" issue of *Communication*, in the context of renewed interest in communication for social theory, displayed new interest in the 'human agent', 'intentional action', as well as 'knowledgeability of the social actor' (Robinson, 1989: 206). Despite the fact that the 'ferment in the field' of communications in the early 1980's was heralded as a non-event for feminist perspectives and interests, feminist theory both in and outside of communication studies, was problematizing available (sub) cultural studies and film paradigms by which to understand the formation and phenomenology of gendered audiences. Catherine Schwichtenberg, speaking of Angela McRobbie's work on dance and social fantasy (1984) and Janice Radway's research on romance readers (1984), concludes that "in many respects, both women charted the territory for the 'audience debate' (before it was a debate) and have made major contributions to the ongoing dialogue in this area..." (1989: 207).

2. David Rodowick (1982, 1988) has been an articulate exponent of this view. He maintains that a relation of non-identity between the body of the writer, sexed as female or male and internalized in terms of gendered representations, and representations of sexed and gendered bodies, as produced by writers of a particular sex and gender, must be presupposed if feminist aesthetic practice is to have consequences for a theory of ideology. He writes that "the theorization of problems of identification and sexual difference in alternative aesthetic practices should not seek to

divide or typify 'writing' on the basis of anatomical difference. (...) The symbolization organized by ideology does not blossom from the body; the body receives this symbolization" (1988: 255).

In a similar vein, Constance Penley upholds this distinction since it reorients the ground of judgements from the question of images *per se* to that of "the metaphorical propositions to which they contribute" (Penley, 1989: 86). While making a clear distinction between representations and the significance they take on within the juxtapositions of metaphor, Penley's observation implicitly calls for a psychodynamics of the performance of meaning: the affective and cognitive processes of configuring and refiguring signs engaged in by all authors and readers.

The concept of recursive positioning of the subject in discourse puts into question any direct correspondence or relation of entailment between ideology/discourse and emotion. Similarly, to "feel a text to be true" despite the fact that representations are not verisimilitudinous, for instance as in the case of melodrama (Elsaesser, 1987), puts into question the relationship between meaning and an objectivist theory of semantics. Meaning may *not* be the product of patterns of signifiers organized by difference in a text but rather the product of perceptions and intrusive affects and memories activated in the reader by, but not represented in, the text *per se*.

3. See note #20 in my Introduction on the difference between a 'politics of identity' and a 'politics of positionality'.

4. Authors to be read for a useful survey of the traditions of thought in feminism's checkered relationship with psychoanalysis are: Mitchell (1975), Brennan (1989), Wright (1984), and Flax (1990).

5. Sociologically reductive accounts of agency situate cultural control and socialization in external forces: media, the family, education whereas psychological reductionism sees all social and cultural events (wars, aggression, symbol formation, economic exchange) in terms of psychological characteristics and needs (Rose, 1986: 7-9).

This reductionism is refused by Postmodern theories without clarifying the means to determine how collective subjects come to be formed or how the common grounds for political action and truth are to be formulated. Jane Flax writes in "Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory" that:

We cannot simultaneously claim that (1) the mind, the self, and knowledge are socially constituted and that what we can know depends upon our social practices and contexts and (2) that feminist theory can uncover the Truth of the whole once and for all. Such an absolute truth would require the existence of an "Archimedes Point" outside of the whole and beyond our embeddedness in it from which we could see (and represent) the whole.

(Flax in Malson, *et al*, 1989: 63)

Linda Alcoff's move to develop the implications of consciousness raising for a feminist theory of subjectivity posits consciousness as a strategy rather than a static state of being; this move is supposed to give onto a new basis for identity politics. Her concepts of "reflective practice" and of 'identity' as a point of departure for political action simply endrun the problem of how the divided subject knows itself. These concepts do not lead to a direct grappling with the implications of the divided subject's desire and intrapsychic make-up and defences for political and textual practice.

Nor has reframing issues of identity formation, knowledge, and agency as problems to be solved through understanding the determinations of language provided a materialist theory of subject formation. The problem of language as a transparent or mediating vehicle by which to obtain an understanding of experience and its patterning has been at the crux of debates on realism and the terms of a realist practice capable of producing an understanding of the real world's social processes and historical production (eg. Marxists such as Lukàcs and Brecht vs. anti-realists such as Althusser). This debate underpins all positions in feminist sociology, literary theory and criticism which seek grounds for social and cultural critique in appeals to experience. That this debate on the truth value of experience has been unresolved creates the uncertainty expressed in this question: "How far can the acts of recognition performed in the practical activity of women and men be informed by or produce an understanding of the nature of the social process in which they are caught? (Gledhill in Doane, *et al*, 1984: 24).

6. See the Introduction to Section 1 in Henriques' *Changing the Subject* for an analysis of radical social theory and radical psychology's debilitating inheritances from a philosophy and psychology which assumed the individual and society were two antithetical, exclusive entities which, although interacting, were separable and even pulling in opposite directions (1984: 15). By inadvertently maintaining the antinomy of individual-society, the attempts of radical social theory to account for the social formation of psychological functions failed to offer insights into the obstacles to personal and collective transformation.

7. The full quotation comes from Rose's discussion of how Lacanian psychoanalysis came into English intellectual life through the vehicle of Althusser's concept of ideology and via the two routes of feminism and film analysis. With respect to film she writes:

Film because its power as an ideological apparatus rests on the mechanisms of identification and sexual fantasy which we all seem to participate in, but which--**outside the cinema--are for the most part, only ever admitted on the couch.** If ideology is effective, it is because it works at the most rudimentary levels of psychic identity and the drives.

(Rose, 1986:5)

Approximately ten years earlier, Rosalind Coward published an influential article in *Screen* (1977) in which she argued for a move away from the study of culture, which had become an idealized concept for British Cultural Studies, particularly in its sub-cultural manifestations, toward the study of the constitution of the individual subject in language.

Coward contributed to Cultural Studies' disaffection in the late 1970's with the marxist premise that the working class were the bearers of a solution to the contradictions of capitalism, a premise which relied on the reduction of consciousness to ideology. Her questioning of the grounds for metacritique and its claims to truth and authority participates in what Lyotard associates with a widespread challenge in the Twentieth Century to the so-called 'male' narratives of absolute Truth, History, and Rationalism (Jardine, *Gynesis* 1985: 36).^{*} A consequence of this questioning is that the grounding of the superior and inviolate position of privilege from which to identify the ideological has also been put in doubt. In cultural critique, 'ideology,' as false consciousness or wrong belief, has been superseded by the notion of 'discourse' except in the work of marxist-inspired theorists who refuse the relativization of Truth and Science as a power/knowledge discursive configuration. From a postmodern viewpoint, ideology becomes no more nor less than particular, interconsolidating discursive formations. With this conceptual substitution in mind, I take Rose's formulation above to read, "If a particular discursive formation is effective, it is because it works at the most rudimentary levels of psychic identity and the drives."

^{*} Jardine's *Gynesis. Configurations of Women and Modernity* addresses the difficulties for feminism posed by the problematizing of metacritique. *Gynesis* is an example of a study of the economy of symbolic function. She examines how "woman" is being used by new discourses, how "the feminine," particularly as the "unrepresentable," has become in French theory "a metaphor without brakes" (her examples include Derrida on writing, Lacan on desire, Baudrillard on seduction, Deleuze's work on becoming woman, Foucault on madness). She poses the question, "if responses to modernity are couched in metaphors of 'the feminine' where does that leave feminist theory?" "Should feminist theory be dismissed as irrelevant, like Man and History?" (Jardine, 1985:35-36). This viewpoint seems to speak a yearning for the absolutes on which metacritique believed it could ground itself. Surely it is rather that feminist theory as a discourse employs other discourses to make its case, to contextualize dominant metaphors and their terms, to be persuasive, and to search for new forms of legitimation. It cannot expect to be able to assign unilaterally 'absolute' denotations to words or to eradicate their historicity. It can only join in the conversation about these words and in the production of new metaphors to which they contribute. *Gynesis*, in fact, seeks to do this by problematizing the relationship between the literal and the figural in rhetoric which uses tropes of 'woman', 'the feminine' and so on.

8. The import of psychoanalytic feminism which brought Lacan's thinking to Britain, via Althusser's theory of ideology, was to add sexuality to the historically established links between psychoanalysis and the understanding of how ideology works. Film theorist Elisabeth Cowie has maintained that we must be able "to see 'woman' not as a given, biologically or psychologically, but as a category produced in

signifying practices...or through signification at the level of the unconscious" (1978: 60).

9. A marxist critic and member of the anti-psychoanalytic camp such as Chris Weedon argues "to take on the Freudian and Lacanian models is implicitly to accept the Freudian principles of psycho-sexual development with their universalist patriarchal implications and their reduction of subjectivity to sexuality" (1987:70).

10. Ien Ang argues in "Wanted: Audiences. On the politics of empirical audience studies" in Ellen Seiter, et al. *Remote Control. Television, Audiences, and Cultural Power* (1989) that conclusions about the 'convergence' of approaches in mass communications studies are premature and basically faulty. Ang notes that although uses and gratifications researchers are rediscovering the text, others in cultural studies seem to be moving away from the text, as the object of inquiry, to how audiences (family members) 'use' and 'watch' television. She takes issue with the convergence thesis as put forward by Karl Erik Rosengren, "Communication Research: One Paradigm, or Four?" *Journal of Communication* 33 (1983); Tamar Liebes, "On the Convergence of Theories of Mass Communication and Literature Regarding the Role of the Reader" (paper presented to the Conference on Culture and Communication, 1986), and Kim Christian Schroder, "Convergence of Antagonistic Traditions? The Case of Audience Research," *European Journal of Communication* 2 (1987).

11. The British Cultural Studies tradition belongs to a 'critical' tradition of media analysis which has its roots in Marxist thought, particularly in Althusser's *Lenin and Philosophy* (1971) and Gramsci's *Selections from the Prison Notebooks* (1971) from whom derive the key notions of ideology and hegemony. Ideology has a long history, with a key definition being offered by Mannheim in *Ideology and Utopia* (1936), but generally it is taken to mean the ideas that make up our worldviews which are so central to our beliefs and values that we are unaware of them. In the social sciences, the discussion of ideology has moved from an analysis of how ideas are forcibly imposed by ruling elites, and the role of the mass media in their circulation, to an acknowledgement that the dominated play an active role in the reproduction of ideology. This has opened up the terrain to the concept of hegemony. Although 'hegemony' is widely used in contemporary analyses of media and culture, it originated in the work of Gramsci who developed this notion to describe 'coercion through the securing of popular consent' of the dominated by the ruling class. For more on ideology see Hall (1977, 1983), and on hegemony see Williams (1977).

12. On the culturalist/structuralist split of the late 1970's, see Hall (1980), Allor (1989), *Screen* (1990).

13. The function of ideology in Althusser's account is the positioning of the subject who is 'hailed,' for instance, by modes of address in the mass media. By responding to the hailing ("Hey, you there!"), one is simultaneously placed in a position which is relationally defined. That is, in responding to a hailing, the addressee recognizes the social position language has constructed for her. If her response is cooperative, this signifies she is adopting the position which has been extended to her.

Fiske (1987:259) suggests that when a television program hails us, and when we recognize ourselves as the 'we' being spoken to, we are constituting ourselves-as-subjects in the ideological definition of us that the program proposes. Of course, it remains to be asked: what specific role and force does emotional hailing have *vis-à-vis* ideological (i.e. discursive) hailing? Can they be contradictory, and how would we know this? How can we describe the language of emotional hailing (in terms of kinesics? in voice rhythms? in silences and sighs?).

In order that analyses of interpellation* through 'consumption' escape the circularity and reductivism of Marx's formula in the *Grundrisse* that "[P]roduction not only creates an object for the subject, but also a subject for the object,"** the origin of the prerequisites to certain effects in reading--the prerequisites to solicitation to positions of identification, to successful hailing by visual and narrative modes of address, **and the relief from unpleasure or unsuccessful defences against intrapsychic conflict about sexual identity and gender roles afforded by that hailing**--must be uncovered in the relationship between publicly available sign systems exchanged in the market (i.e. television, films, videos) and private meanings ascribed to those sign systems.

* 'Interpellation,' a term originating with Althusser but an outgrowth of Marx's notion of false consciousness, defines a process whereby a socially available representation is internalized by an individual as part of his/her identity as well as being accepted as part of a commonsense picture of 'how things are in the world'. It becomes 'real' for that individual, even though it is, in fact, imaginary (eg. the culturally created opposition between masculinity and femininity).

** The full passage on the question of the production and reproduction of consumers from the *Grundrisse* follows:

Production not only supplies a material for a need, but also supplies a need for the material. As soon as consumption emerges from its initial natural state of crudity and immediacy...it becomes itself mediated as a drive by the object. The need which consumption feels for the object is created by the perception of it. The object of art--like every other product--creates a public which is sensitive to art and enjoys beauty. **Production not only creates an object for the subject, but also a subject for the object.** Thus production produces consumption, 1) by creating the material for it; 2) by determining the manner of consumption; 3) by creating the products initially posited as objects in the form of a need felt by the consumer. It thus produces the object of consumption, the manner of consumption and the motive of consumption. Consumption likewise produces the producer's *inclination* by beckoning to him as an aim-determining need.

(my emphasis)

(Karl Marx, *Grundrisse* (1857-8), translated by Martin Nicolaus)

14. For a useful and brief review and criticism of earlier traditions of work on the audience in British Cultural Studies from Halloran (1970) to Morley (1980), and a discussion of more recent initiatives coming out of feminist research, such as Janice Radway's (1984) and Cora Kaplan's (1986), see Lidia Curti's "What is Real and What

is Not: Female Fabulations in Cultural Analysis" in Grossberg's anthology *Cultural Studies* (1992), pp. 134-153.

15. "Screen theory" refers to the dominant theoretical orientation of articles published in the British film journal *Screen Education*, and its sequel *Screen*, from 1974 to 1980.

16. For a non-specialist, the breadth of film theory is daunting. A recent work, which provides a good introduction and Bibliography to the issues surrounding the question of desire and the cinematic apparatus through a model of cinematic enunciation, is Sandy Flitterman-Lewis' *To Desire Differently. Feminism and the French Cinema* (1990: 1-46). According to Flitterman-Lewis, the concept of cinematic enunciation has "emerged as a way to describe both the textual articulation of the filmmaker's desire across the visual field and the spectator's desire as it is engaged by this articulation" (1990: 13). Another useful source is the work of David Rodowick. A 1982 article of his notes that in Mulvey's influential "Visual Pleasure" article, she had two aims one of which concerned the relationship between **affects** and textual mechanisms. The first aim was to examine the codes and mechanisms in which the film text exploited sexual difference as part of its narrative organization; and the second was to ascertain the **affective relationship** which these mechanisms establish in the spectatorial experience of sexed individuals as well as their role in the more general ideological machinery of patriarchal culture. In Mulvey's case, affects refer to the general categories of 'desire' and 'pleasure' rather than to specific emotions such as envy, hatred, anger, sadness, shame, etc.

17. A list of references for further reading useful in clarifying the major points can be found at the end of Sandy Flitterman-Lewis's introductory article, "Psychoanalysis, Film, and Television" in Robert Allen's *Channels of Discourse*, pp. 172-210, and in the survey articles on the spectatrix in vol. 20/21 of *camera obscura*.

18. For a concise explanation of the technique of suturing see Kaja Silverman's "Suture (Excerpts)" in Phillip Rosen, ed. (1986). *Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology*. Columbia University Press, pp. 219-235.

19. Jacqueline Rose compares the turn to psychoanalysis as it was taken up in literary semiotics and in film semiotics for its consequences for the spectator:

On the one hand, in literary semiotics, the concept of sexual difference is posed as an inherent part of the redefinition (the placing and displacing of sexual difference taken as crucial in the process of writing itself), with an increasing stress on the 'revolutionary' or avant-garde, 'text' against 'the work', and on the activity of the reader. On the other hand, in cinema semiotics, the problem of difference seems to have been elided with the consequences that this article attempts to specify, attention then directed above all to the classic fiction film and the spectator defined in respect of an imaginary, essentially passive cohesion.

(Rose, "The Place of Visual Illusion," In *The Cinematic Apparatus*, p. 185).

20. As Levin points out "the weakness of this approach is that it is as impossible to draw a line between true and false needs as it is to define "true" consciousness (unless one assumes the constitutive primacy of production, and refers back solely to the critique of political economy as the basis of one's value judgements)" (1981: 152). In an ambitious Master's thesis, *Shadow and Substance: A study of Jean Baudrillard and the Collapse of Critical Theory*, written prior to the 1984 article, Levin discusses how Lukàcs and Horkheimer, in seeking a solution to the problem of the object in a particular theory of the social subject, "tended to short-circuit the hermeneutic moment in critical theory" (1981: 5). Although 'fetishism', for Marx, was a metaphor for a producer's alienation from the product of his labour under capitalism, "the term 'fetishism' also seemed to allude to the cognitive problems posed by the capitalist system. Clearly, the consequences of the rise of the exchange value system were not only social, but epistemological" (20). The importance of Baudrillard, in Levin's opinion, is that he attempted to reexamine the "whole problem of the 'meaning' of the commodity (Marx's somewhat fortuitous phrase) by integrating an entirely new level of analysis," the sign (101).

A critique of marxist categories for social and cultural theory has been made from the quarter which objects to the reduction of all communicative activity to work, and all aesthetic experience to ideology. In *Aesthetic Experience and Literary Hermeneutics*, Jauss appeals to the specificity of aesthetic experience and to the diversity of reception in his critique of the commodification thesis:

The uncritical talk about the 'commodity character' of contemporary art makes one forget that even the products of the 'culture industry' remain commodities *sui genesis* and that the categories of use- and surplus value can no more deal with their character of art than their circulation can be understood by relations of supply and demand. There are limits to the manipulation of aesthetic need because even under the conditions of industrial society, the production and reproduction of art cannot determine reception. The reception of art is not simply passive consumption; it is aesthetic activity which depends on assent and rejection and which therefore cannot be planned by market research...It remains to be shown that the expansion of aesthetic sphere by the unsuspected possibilities of poetic and aesthetic activity will necessarily be overtaken by the "dialectics of Enlightenment" and that aesthetic experience through contemporary as through past art...will unfailingly degenerate into affirmative consumer behaviour.

(Jauss, 1982: xxxvii)

21. To reject emotion as a useful analytical concept seemed a reasonable disciplinary move to the emerging New Left and marxist-inspired British Cultural Studies in the 1950's which was in revolt against the concerns and priorities expressed in post-war literary theory and critique epitomized in the work of Matthew Arnold and Leavis on art, sensibility, and the Great Tradition (Coleridge, Shelley, Byron, Dickens, Eliot, Edmund Burke). As the section on 'Sensibility' in Raymond Williams' *Keywords* ([1976] 1984) makes clear, emotion is the poor cousin to a host of words associated with feeling, with the senses, which assert social distinctions: taste, sensitive (as in fine feeling), sensibility (a personal appropriation of certain social

qualities). Cultural studies has only been interested in emotions to the degree that they assert social distinctions as expressed by sub-cultural tastes and styles.

Several metaphysical assumptions may have snuck into cultural studies, despite its professed materialism, which had impacts for its objects of study. It may have held the belief that emotions were involuntary, animal responses. There may also have been an unacknowledged association of emotion and emotional expressiveness with femininity, and the study of emotions with a feminization of the masculine domain of the study of ideology and the science of historical materialism.

22. "Subcultures are considered to be doubly articulated: on the one hand they are manifestations of the need to express autonomy from their parent (working-class) culture; on the other hand they are maintaining their parent culture's opposition to the dominant culture" (Slack and Whitt, 1992: 578).

23. In "Culture, Cultural Studies, and Historians," Carolyn Steedman expresses her disbelief and surprise that neither in the entry for 'culture' in *Keywords* (1976) nor in discussions of culture in *Marxism and Literature* (1977) did Williams pursue the notion of culture and growth around the figure of the child and childhood. She writes of her collaborative efforts to teach a new course at the University of Warwick on "Learning Culture" whose focus is the history of subjectivity. It merits a lengthy quotation:

We have tried hard to make the students see that the attack on artificiality through into the nineteenth century, was indeed, as Williams claims, "the basis of one important alternative sense of 'culture'--as a process of 'inner' or 'spiritual' as distinct from 'external' development." We have expressed our astonishment...at this description of an actual historical process that is inexplicable without some knowledge of the history of women and children in European society, but that never, ever mentions women and children. "The primary effect of this alternative sense of the term 'culture,'" says Williams, "was to associate it with religion, art, *the family and personal life*..." In those five words, we have said, is occluded a whole history: of women and children in English society, between about 1680 and the middle of this century. But without the history, Williams still manages to say that through these processes, "culture" came to be related to "the 'inner life' in its most accessible, secular form; came to be related to 'subjectivity,' to 'the imagination.'"

(1992: 615)

24. Kant split us into two part, one called 'reason' which is identical in all of us, and another--empirical sensation and desire--which is a matter of blind, contingent, idiosyncratic impressions. This view is reflected today in most developmental psychological views on the mind and by the literature on symbolization. "A Kantian view, recurrent within the [developmental psychological and psychoanalytic] literature on symbolization, is that time, space and sensory reality are intellectual constructs barred to the untutored phenomenal body and symbolization is an additive

phenomenon of mind, where mind stands for the seat of concepts, schemata and structures" (Levin, 1989: 36).

25. The influence of what were supposed as scientific conceptions of emotion is evident in that 'feeling' even today is used colloquially as a synonym for emotion, even though the more central meaning of 'feeling' is a physiological sensation.

26. But, as Jaggar points out,

The Dumb View is untenable on a number of counts. The same feeling or physiological response is likely to be interpreted as various emotions, depending on the context of its experience. Emotions are not just knee-jerk instinctual responses to situations; they depend on how we perceive those situations as well as on the ways that we have learned or decided to respond to them. To posit emotions as **intentional, as about something**, already incorporates a realization that observation influences and partially constitutes emotion.

(1989: 149)

27. For ethnography in which the researcher's self is implicated see Paul Rabinow's *Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco* (1977), which was ahead of its time in raising questions about reflexivity and the anthropologist's political responsibilities in the culture in which he came as an 'oxy-moron'--a 'participant'-observer. See also Okely and Callaway's *Anthropology and Autobiography* (1992) which is critical of recent developments in new American ethnography exemplified by the essays in the Clifford and Marcus volume *Writing Culture* (1986) and the postmodern techniques they advocate.

With respect to the objects of ethnographic investigation in early Cultural Studies, McRobbie suggests that the personal--the family, the private sphere, intimate relationships--was missing precisely for personal (defensive and narcissistic) motives on the part of male researchers:

Many of the radical young sociologists in the vanguard of this attack [on the hegemony of Parsonianism in the sociology of crime/deviance/youth culture] were recruited from the New Left, from the student movement of the late Sixties and even from the hippie counterculture. At this time, before the emergence of the women's movement in the early Seventies, the notions of escaping from the family, the bourgeois commitments of children and the whole sphere of family consumption formed a distinct strand in left politics. Sheila Rowbotham has described how women were seen in some left circles as a temptation provided by Capital to divert workers and militants alike from the real business of revolution, and she has also shown how hypocritical these anti-family, anti-women platitudes were. (...) The writers, having defined themselves as against the family and the trap of romance as well as against the boredom of meaningless labour, seem to

be drawn to look at other, largely working-class groups who appear to be doing the same thing.

(1980: 39)

28. Feminist cultural theory has made efforts to particularize the abstractions of 'audience' and 'reader' by investigating the diversity of publics and types of readers through the category of 'gender difference' and, secondly, through the category of 'pleasure'. In so doing, it has succeeded in exacerbating divisions between those scholars comfortable with representational analyses and theories of how women 'ought' to read and others, myself included, who defend the necessity of a depth hermeneutic by which to develop hypotheses about the multifactorial process of reading but who are, nevertheless, dissatisfied with the theoretical reach of diverse psychoanalytically-inspired methods such as traditional ego psychological approaches in literary and arts criticism, 'gaze' theory in feminist film studies, and formalist criticism à la Peter Brooks.

Feminist initiatives in the analysis of mass culture texts and audiences has been influenced by the trend, in debates between cultural feminism and post-structural feminism, to polarize the masculine and the feminine, to demonize and sanitize male and female 'nature' respectively. On this view, women's experience (and emotions and pleasures) are seen either as natural, authentic, and a guide to action or as a product of socialization and therefore oppressive and false. The first position, what I have called 'gender realism,' has produced internally contradictory and incoherent thinking. Echols agrees, noting that

Cultural feminists use a double standard when analyzing fantasy-- women's masochistic fantasies reflect their socialization, while men's sadistic fantasies reveal their fundamentally murderous nature.

(Echols, 1984:70)*

A second obstacle to feminist analyses of the pleasure of mass cultural forms was the puritanism of the feminist movement of the 1970's, dominated by middle class values (Echols, 1984:70, note 43). "Rather than develop a feminist understanding of sexual liberation, cultural feminists reject it as inherently anti-feminist and instead endorse a sexual code which drastically circumscribes the sorts of sexual expressions considered acceptable" (Echols, 1984: 64). This puritanism has been expressed in a variety of stances: an anti-pornography position in which women continue to be figured as moral guardians; the use of demands for censorship as a vehicle to establish, within the feminist movement, the "proper parameters of lesbian sexuality so as to diminish the possibility that lesbians will defect to 'male-identified' sexual expressions, whether these be s/m, roles, or heterosexuality" (Echols, 1984: 64-65). Echols indicates that "the distinction between personal preference and prescriptivism is often confounded in a movement such as ours which requires that we justify our sexual impulses in political terms and which encourages us to generalize and theorize from our own experience" (1984: 72, note 83).

In her Epilogue to the volume *Pleasure and Danger* (drawn from presentations at the 1982 Bernard Conference, "The Scholar and the Feminist IX: Towards a Politics of Sexuality"), Vance writes movingly of the narrow-minded almost messianic

perspective, accepting of only one view of 'authentic' personal experience, which inspired denunciations of the conference by women's groups enraged by what they perceived to be its support for "anti-feminist" sexuality (1984: 431-439).

*The effects of this trend to polarization of the gender gap, and monolithic construction of the masculine, are to be noted in feminist debate in sectors of the peace movement as well as in the discourse of the anti-pornography movement. See Newton and Rosenfelt's excellent Introduction to *Feminist Criticism and Social Change. Sex, Class and Race in Literature and Culture* and their note 11, in particular (Newton and Rosenfelt, 1985: xv-xxxix).

29. The prerequisites for production as a consumer with particular pleasures and needs has been taken up by two distinct camps of feminist mass media researchers who are divided on the issue of "use" value (Modleski, 1984; Lovell, 1980). Pleasure and the marxist categories of use and exchange value also fall within the scope of Rose's question: how does ideology work at the most rudimentary levels of identity and the drives?

30. These criteria continue today to establish for some the distinction between authentic and neurotic pleasure. Jameson's question is answered by the narrator in Alice Munro's "Bardon Bus" :

The images, the language, of pornography and romance are alike;
monotonous and mechanically seductive, quickly leading to despair.

(Alice Munro, "Bardon Bus" in *The Moons of Jupiter. Stories by Alice Munro*. Toronto: Macmillan, 1982)

31. One of the intersections of poststructuralism and marxism has been on the possible criteria for a revolutionary aesthetic within a postmodern aesthetic practice. A fictionalized response to these debates has been Hebdige's "The bottom line on planet one: Squaring up to the face" (1987). In this essay, he uses a science-fiction metaphor to describe a three-planet system: the planet of modernism (one), of representations of somethings beneath appearances, the world of a unified subject who feels and judges; planet two is a flat, postmodern world where there is no subject behind appearances, no history, no classes, just surfaces and the endless production of simulacra; while planet three is the planet of reality, politics, the underdeveloped and suffering third world. He concludes by reminding us that in the emotions are to be found guidance about human interests and values:

[W]ords like "love" and "hate" and "faith" and "history," "pain" and "joy," "passion" and "compassion"--the depth words drawn up like ghosts from a different dimension will always come back in the 11th hour to haunt the Second World and those who try to live there in the Now. This is not just a pious sentiment. It is, quite simply, in the very nature of the human project that those words and what they stand for will never go away.

(Hebdige, 1987: 583 in Slack and Whitt, 1992: 583)

32. The New Subjectivity was a response to the crisis of subjective agency:

The crisis of subjective agency was not simply a specific reaction by West German students to the deterministic abstractions of the dogmatic phase of the protest movement [of the 1960's]. Subjective agency--related as it is to the ideology of the 'autonomous subject'--has been in crisis at least since the consolidation of industrial capitalism in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. The crisis of the subject in that era found its literary reflection in the crisis of narration explored in the novels of what now is called 'high modernism': the novels of Joyce, Proust, and Musil, to name a few. The modernist response to the crisis--a depiction of the subject as hopelessly determined by political and/or subconscious forces beyond its control (following Marx and/or Freud), and as fragmented by the complexity of modern life--allowed no hint of hope save perhaps for a return of some kind of mythic consciousness, with artists as its priests. Various avant-garde movements attacked this elitism as itself a last vestige of bourgeois subjectivity and its auratic art.

(McCormick, 1991: 55)

McCormick describes a trend of writing, beginning in West Germany in the early 1970's characterizing the New Subjectivity, as *Verständigungstexte*, that is, texts primarily concerned with social communication rather than aesthetic experience. As social communication their purpose was to help readers come to an understanding of shared experience. These texts depended on readers' identification and provided a stimulus to those with similar experiences to join in group discussions through which those experiences could be better understood. The *Verständigungstexte* play a role that literature played for the bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century: as a medium of spreading social understanding and enlightenment.

Two works McCormick discusses at length as exemplary of the New Subjectivity are Peter Schneider's *Lenz* (1973) and Karin Struck's *Class Love* (1973).

In *Lenz*, named after the pleasure seeking protagonist, the immediate and the sensual are of primordial importance. McCormick finds in Schneider's creation, a man whose need to experience the moment and to linger in the superficial is not merely a symptom of his malady but in no small part a reflection of the malady he ascribes to the German nation: rejection and repression of the past before which no effective dealing with the present is possible. Lenz's enjoyment of the present "becomes a goal sought with an urgency that corresponds to the extent that alienation interferes with that enjoyment" (McCormick, 1991: 89). That alienation is to be undone through memory. Lenz sees language as dogmatic and empty, then discovers that language for the purpose of self-disclosure is therapeutic; "articulating unresolved experiences is...practically synonymous with resolving them." What Lenz wants from language "is nothing less than the 'authentic' communication of feelings; language should serve as a nearly transparent medium through which the emotional state of a speaker is perceptible to the listener" (1991: 93). Lenz longs for a use of language that eliminates

the alienation that blocks him from other people and from his own experiences and feelings.

Karin Struck's *Class Love* exposes the fiction of a unified self. Struck's novel shows

there is no realm of personal concerns divorced from the social milieu around it...the ego is nothing but a multiplicity of determining and conflicting discourses...The struggle to take control of these discourses, to write one's own story, can never be an operation of 'withdrawal' into an interior with fixed boundaries, rather it must be a matter of bringing out the fluid interaction of 'internal' and 'external' voices, of personal and social influences that occurs within each individual...

(McCormick, 1991: 110)

33. The chapters in Okely's anthology have been drawn from papers delivered at the Association of Social Anthropologists' Annual Conference held at the University of York (Great Britain) in 1989. The themes of that conference overlapped and extended certain themes from previous ASA conferences which appeared in print in the form of D. Parkin's *Semantic Anthropology* (1982) and A. Jackson's *Anthropology at Home* (1987).

34. Brach objected to the framework within which she was expected to function at work:

I came to feel I had to get out of that job, I couldn't be professional...One of the ...issues is extreme suspicion of qualification, credentials as the most important thing...And that's not what's most fundamental.

Interviewer:

What is most fundamental?

Brach:

People shouldn't have to compete with each other for jobs!...Having gone to school since I was too young to go, and having knowledge and competence beaten into me...I'm forced by the setup to argue in those terms [measuring qualifications]. I was being asked to argue in terms I don't hold with. (Gregg, 1991: 114)

35. Although there are certainly some cross-cultural anthropologists who, as psychiatrists or psychoanalysts (eg. Arthur Kleinman, Byron Good) bring psychoanalytic theoretical frameworks into their cross-cultural studies of illness and cure, I know of only one anthropologist, the feminist, psychoanalyst Mariela Pandolfi, who seeks to incorporate *psychoanalytic techniques of listening and communication* into her ethnographic methods. See "Boundaries inside the body: women's sufferings in southern peasant Italy," *Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry* (1990) 14:255-274.

Pursuing the unconscious motives and meanings of actions by one's informants makes practicing feminist social science research even more complicated. For one thing, even if the researcher is trained as a psychotherapist, he or she cannot put the members of the research cohort into psychoanalysis. Second of all, Gregg sent those draft chapters of her dissertation which presented and synthesized the interview material back to each of her approximately 45 informants for their agreement and corrections. Their suggested changes were incorporated into her text. Understandably the agreement of informants will be more difficult to obtain where an analysis of unconscious material is being elaborated by the researcher; confidentiality is also an issue. Psychoanalysts who publish articles drawing on particular cases generally side-step these difficulties (and the ethical issues attached to them as raised by the feminist critique) by not seeking to obtain the consent of their patients who, admittedly, always appear under pseudonyms.

CHAPTER THREE

Vicissitudes of Fantasy in Anglo-American Theories of Reading Performance, Part II: Preliminary Thoughts on the Preconditions of Emotion

Television is much more interested in how people feel than in what they think. What they think might separate us, but how they feel draws us together.

(Bellah, *et al*, 1985: 281)

Television helps us to bridge the gap between the public and private realms of our lives and to maintain, in our increasingly fragmented lives, a feeling of connection--however precarious--with the social world, *even if* this connection is *emotive rather than substantive*.

(Press, 1991: 17)

I would like to see more horror films that evoke an emotionally visceral experience rather than just an intellectual or physical one, films that hit the heart rather than just the head and stomach.

(Lizzie Francke in *Sight and Sound*, June 1993: 12)

Reason is permeated with the emotion and energy of the drives; an idea which of itself challenges the binary opposition between reason and emotion.

(Brennan, 1990: 15)

For of all the aspects of what we call the 'mind,' emotions are the most deeply embodied.

(de Sousa, 1987: 47)

An immensely personal album that bulges with raw emotion, this is sensual songwriting at its finest.

(*Elle*, July 1992, 58)

3.1 Paradigms of Emotion

We all think we know what these statements mean. But do we? Would we be able to agree? Is emotion an aesthetic response ('That aria is so moving, so sad'); an all pervasive mood (of grief); a vague, internal happening (of arousal or fatigue); a spontaneous response (of joy), or a continuous state (of envy)? We hear emotion being used to describe all of these phenomena. But what *are* emotions? Are they

entities--'things' and 'its'--actions or, perhaps, metaphors? What is it to be in this or that emotional state? Are emotions the product of reasons or causes? Are their sources internal or external to us? If involving both endogenous and exogenous factors, then how do social factors enter a person's internal experience to produce an emotion? Do emotions, like thought, belong to language games? Are there private emotional systems? Are there rules for emotions and rules for the display of emotions? Where do we go looking for answers?

Emotions have been viewed as physiological states with adaptive value in organizing memory and goal-directed action, as interpersonal communications that express personal motives and meanings, and simultaneously as part of specific cultural forms of moral discourse.¹

Definitions of emotion are numerous,² and yet debates about specific aspects of emotion can be traced to "the fundamental difference between what can be called the organismic and the interactional viewpoints" (Hochschild, 1983: 201). These two viewpoints underlie the way the complex field of emotions has been divided for disciplinary investigation. In a metadisciplinary summary, Lang (1984) proposed that humans respond to demanding stimuli in three systems or sets of processes: (1) the neurophysiological-biochemical; (2) the motor- or behavioural-expressive; and (3) the cognitive- or subjective-experiential. Like any complex human behaviour, the emotions can be analyzed at social, psychological, and biological levels of analysis. As subsystems of behaviour, emotions themselves encompass a variety of component elements--physiological changes, expressive reactions, instrumental responses, and subjective feelings (Averill, 1982: 19). In this chapter, I will look at three paradigms of emotion in which these processes indicated by Lang and Averill have become objects of study: a) the biobehavioural, physiological or organismic as it is variously called, which corresponds roughly to (1) and (2) above; b) the social constructivist/cognitivist or interactionist, and c) the psychoanalytic/developmental, both of which offer an approach to the processes described in (2) and (3) above. My intentions are: (a) to clarify the various paradigms of emotion and the theory of mind which they presuppose in order to better identify the appearance of their premises in reader-response theory and other social discourses to be examined in later chapters; (b) to make comparative assessments, where possible, of these paradigms' construals of

the relation of emotion to cognition, intentionality, and motivation; and (c) to attempt to make translations across paradigms in order to identify the processes through which the social and the intrapsychic origins of emotion come to be related, i.e. the problem of internalization or *how* it is possible that emotions are socio-culturally constituted yet give us a sense of our own authenticity and continuity in time.

3.2 The physiological or biobehavioural paradigm

Panksepp, the author of an ambitious and controversial article which aimed to interrelate research in the divergent fields of the psychology and neurology of emotional processes, indicated that his own position was premised on the following seemingly self-evident truths about emotion:

[T]he affective faculties have their origin from within, and are not acquired by any external circumstances. They cannot be taught and must be felt to be understood; in themselves they are blind and act without understanding; finally they are partly common to man and animals, partly proper to man.

(Spurzheim, *Phrenology, or the doctrine of the mental phenomena*, 1846 in Panksepp, 1982: 449-50)

The link between bodily sensations of agitation and emotions and emotion words, evident in this quotation, continues today when we use the word 'feeling' colloquially to mean emotion. Nevertheless, the basis for one-to-one relations between sensations and emotions, the James-Lange theory (1922), was disproven by Cannon's experimental work (1927) which showed that one and the same agitation can be involved in many different emotions. After Cannon's work, research by psychologists turned to cognitive factors in order to discriminate among emotions.³

Problems of how to talk about emotion and doubts about whether emotion is a natural kind or not do not surface in this paradigm which draws on Darwin's organismic model. This model defines emotion as largely an evolutionary-biological process, as linked to impervious organic givens which can be traced to an organism's phylogenetic origins, and as existing apart from introspection. On this account, the ontogenesis of emotions was expected to recapitulate phylogenesis; this premise was also used to account for the belief that emotions were biologically more primitive than intellectual capacities. For Darwin the link between emotion and an orientation to

action was fundamental; "emotion was protoaction, as what occurs instead of or before an action" (Hochschild, 1983: 219).⁴ Otherwise put, for Darwin emotion was instinct; in Freud's early organismic perspective, emotion or affect was libidinal discharge. The stress on instinct and energy led theorists in the organismic camp to propose that emotions are similar across people and across cultures, and the manner in which emotions are labelled, evaluated, managed, or expressed is extrinsic to emotion. Social factors are believed merely to "turn on" biological reactions and to help channel these reactions into socially acceptable expressions. Inheriting a physiological or 'Dumb view' of emotion as bodily sensation, cognitive psychology's 'Standard View' of emotion presupposed that the categories by which recognition proceeds are innate, and that the categories into which people divide emotions would be found to be universal (Russell, 1992: 427). Lexical differences across cultures were assumed by emotion researchers to disappear with translation because equivalence was never put into doubt (Russell, 1992: 434).

The interactionist perspective on emotion, on the other hand, holds that while emotion always involves some biological component, it is the *meaning* that psychological processes take on which differentiates emotions. The interactionist approach has an open-ended concept of emotions partly because social factors are posited as entering into the very formulation of emotions, through codification, management, and expression rules (Hochschild, 1983: 204-207).⁵

3.3 The Cognitive and Social Constructionist paradigms of emotion

The social constructionist approach to emotion puts the 'truths' of emotion, quoted above by Panksepp, into doubt by disputing that emotions are "'hard wired' and therefore automatic, involuntary and largely non-cognitive" (Averill in Panksepp, 1982: 424).

Constructionism is the name given to a new set of theories of emotion in philosophy, in social theory, in psychology, and in anthropology which appeared in the 1980's. They were united by the principle that individual experience, of which emotions are a part, is constituted by conceptualizations, and what is conceptualized derives from language, belief, and the social rules of the agent's community.⁶ The

social constructivist view locates emotion in relations between persons, or between persons and events, rather than within the individual. When the psychoanalyst speaks of the meaning of an emotional response, she refers to the way the response fits into broader systems of behaviour defined at the individual, psychological level of analysis whereas the social constructivist analyzes emotional meanings in relationship to sociocultural systems. Furthermore, against the 'Standard view' of emotion emphasizing the biological level of analysis of emotion which has been dominant in psychology, the social constructivist orientation of most anthropologists (Lutz, 1988), sociologists (Hochschild, 1983), social psychologists (Averill, 1982, 1986; Harré, 1986), and cognitive psychologists (Russell, 1991a, b) leads them to conceive of emotion as a cultural rather than a natural category. Clifford Geertz puts this position as follows:

We acquire the ability to design flying planes in wind tunnels; we develop the capacity to feel true awe in church. A child counts on his fingers before he counts "in his head"; he feels love on his skin before he feels it "in his heart." Not only ideas, but emotions too, are cultural artifacts in man. (...) [C]ultural resources are ingredient, not accessory, to human thought.

(Geertz, 1973: 81, 83)⁷

In cognitive terms, emotions may be thought of "as belief systems or schemas that guide the appraisal of situations, the organization of responses and the self-monitoring (interpretation) of behaviour" (Averill, 1986: 100). Where do they come from? The constructivist view is that emotion schemas are the internal representation of social norms or rules. In behavioural terms, emotions are "socially constituted syndromes, the meaning and function of which are determined primarily by the social system(s) of which they are a part" (Averill, 1982: 19). A syndrome is a variable set of responses; so an emotion syndrome is not identifiable by any single and essential characteristic like a pattern of physiological arousal, a neurological circuit, a feeling, or a kind of cognitive appraisal. As syndromes, emotions include a person's appraisal of a situation; they are interpreted as passions (things that happen to us) rather than as actions (things we do); and they include subjective (experiential) and objective (behavioural/performatory) elements (Averill, 1982: 4). Emotions can be likened to other complex forms of behaviour since a great deal of transfer of training is involved;

components of emotions come together rather than springing up together simultaneously and originally. Moreover, as behaviour, emotions can be usefully conceptualized in terms of social role, that is, the meanings and norms of an emotion "are not just in the minds of actors...but what lies behind both" (1982: 10). Just as the symptomatology of the ill person is determined by the sick 'role' adopted by the patient, all aspects of the emotion syndrome: feelings, expressive reactions, physiological changes, instrumental responses are influenced by the pattern dictated by the emotion role (1982: 20). This role designation neither implies that behaviour and feelings are never consonant nor does it eradicate the distinction between authentic or sincere emotion and feigned emotion. The latter is a kind of role playing in the sense of deliberate behaviour designed to manipulate whereas, in order to count as a social role, emotion behaviour must meet three conditions:

first, the behaviour must be meaningful in terms of social expectations or rules of conduct; second, the person must attempt (on some level, not necessarily consciously) to conform his or her behaviour to those expectations; and third, other persons in similar circumstances must be capable of performing the relevant (role) aspects of the behaviour.
(Averill, 1982: 9)

Not all behaviour is usefully thought about in terms of social role since we do many things which are idiosyncratic to us.

A Sociocultural functionalist account of emotion

"[E]motions are experienced as vital to our autonomy; yet, on another level, they are the very instruments of social control." (de Sousa, 1987: 255). Cultural norms are embedded in our very definitions and explanations of what it is to feel pride or embarrassment, resentment or contempt. In fact, the acquisition of culture is importantly the acquisition of appropriate emotions:

[T]he emotions are assumed here to be the primary source of human motivation. If emotions are simultaneously viewed as cultural concepts, they become important as statements about, and motivations for the enactment of, cultural values. If motivation is seen as culturally constituted...study of the emotions and their development becomes crucial for understanding the psychosocial origins of behavior. Thus **emotion in the individual may be said to have its parallel, on the cultural level, in values;** the concept of emotion, then, can provide a

critical nexus for understanding the individual's creation of, and participation in, social institutions.

(Lutz, 1983: 257)

On the question of what is culture-specific about emotions, a widely-discussed hypothesis among psychologists (Boucher in Russell, 1991a) proposes a hierarchical view of emotions where the top two levels--for instance, the concept of emotion and the sub-concept of anger--are universal while the next sub-level is culturally specific.⁸ The elements of the lowest level category demonstrate which emotions in a particular culture are 'hypocognized'--less important and not nuanced--or 'hypercognized'--very significant and specialized. For instance, the existence of the concepts of rage, fury, madness, bitterness reveal a variety of subtle discrimination have been made within the concept of anger in English. The categories subordinate to the basic level are formed for cultural utility and hence show cultural variability; they indicate what stimuli a culture has identified as stressors. In other words, every culture has its culturally constituted emotional coping strategies (CCECS).⁹

On the constructionist account, the sociofunctional role of emotion includes the fact that they are regulative for behaviour and belief and they have a relation to moral values. Emotions are performative because they sustain and endorse cultural systems of belief and value. In a culture, the contexts deemed appropriate to 'fear' are intrinsically related to their respective moral systems (Armon-Jones, 1986: 63). Fear serves a social function by contributing to the efficacy of a moral system. The mental repertoire required not only to display an emotion but to experience an emotion requires a conceptualization of appropriate contexts but also a recognition of the moral consequences of failing to respond appropriately. Fear is related to acts of transgression; it serves the regulative function of sustaining the moral rules of a society. Even unwarranted cases of having an emotion can be endorsed by a community as having a sociofunctional role since the evaluation of aberrant emotion vindicates the community's beliefs and values (Armon-Jones, 1986: 76).¹⁰ Some emotions are more conflictive than others. For instance, anger is one because it involves competing demands on the individual from within the social system, and between society and incompatible biological or psychological impulses (Averill, 1982: 318). While the feeling of anger is expected by social norms, as in the case of

discovering a thief in your bedroom in the act of emptying your jewelry drawer into a sack, we are expected to settle disputes in a reasoned way so anger is not permitted to be translated into an act of aggression such as beating up the robber before having her arrested.¹¹

Experience and expression of emotion: feeling emotion

Cultural anthropologists such as Lutz (1987) and M. Rosaldo (1980) have stressed the plasticity of emotion and the interpersonal frame of reference within which that experience develops:

Such a frame of reference may include the cultural or personal schemata that are employed in appraising a situation, the norms and values of one's culture regarding particular emotions and their expression, and one's own interpersonal history and self-evaluation. There are both "radical" and "moderate" interpretations of the impact of this frame of reference upon what one feels and whether one expresses what one feels. Radicals argue that emotions and expressive behavior can only be constituted within a frame of reference that is socially defined.

(Saarni and Harris, 1989: 7)

The constructionist wants to argue that sociocultural factors determine not only emotion attitudes and their expression in language and behaviour, but also the experiential aspect of emotion via their determination of emotion feeling.¹²

Constructionists hold that emotions have a phenomenological aspect conveyed by emotion feeling terms. 'I feel angry' suggests the qualitative, experiential aspect of the emotion, and the expression 'I feel' rather than 'I am' suggests the sensation is not self-initiated. To say 'I feel x' logically presupposes an agent has an understanding of the situation appropriate to that emotion. As Armon-Jones points out, it is a semantic claim to say that sensation 'feels' are conceptually related to outward criteria in the form of appropriate verbal and behavioural expressions. To say 'I feel angry' is not an ontological claim about the existence of sensation feelings. This point is important because it allows the constructionist to hold that emotions are qualitative states while simultaneously fulfilling some cultural expectation (Armon-Jones, 1986: 53). "Emotion feeling terms do not refer to irreducible emotion qualia or to sensations; rather, the ontology of emotion feeling should be analysed in terms of the emotion attitudes by which the emotion feeling is constituted" (Armon-Jones, 1986: 55). For instance, a

self-ascription 'I feel ashamed' serves the function of expressing the agent's feelings. But in addition to this expressive function, the ascription of shame (whether explicitly or implicitly voiced) is a self-criticism and an acknowledgement of the agent's act as wrong by reference to some social standard of desirable behaviour.¹³ This view holds that we cannot talk about the internal experience or bodily origins of emotion (phenomenology addresses the problem of 'qualia'); we can only talk about the attitudes which dictate an emotion and its semantics.¹⁴

The socio-cultural world operates as a frame of reference for the authenticity of emotion feelings. The social enters at the level of the criteria the self uses to judge the authenticity of the emotions others display as well as in evaluations of the authenticity of both one's own feelings and feeling display. The notion of ritual introduces the vital dimension of the social: "an important aspect of the question of appropriate origins [of emotions, and hence their authenticity as opposed to sentimentality] concerns the relation of the individual to social norms" (de Sousa, 1987: 320). Among other functions, rituals reassure individuals that what they are feeling is authentic. For instance, "mourning rituals do this, not by convincing you that your emotion is simply spontaneous, but by reassuring you that it is real *because* its expression conforms to expectations" (de Sousa, 1987: 323). Furthermore, sharing occasions of importance with others in rituals like a wedding, a bris [circumcision], a graduation, "the meaning is 'magnified' when it is shared with others" (Bellah, et al, 1985: 137). "We cannot know who we are without some practical ritual and moral 'structure' that orders our freedom and binds our choices into something like habits of the heart" (137). The ritual means of emotion production is a potent tool in contests over power and legitimacy.

Display rules

Another culture-specific aspect concerns the behavioural consequences of emotion such as emotionally-expressive gestures organized by the 'display rules' for emotion. That implicit rules for the display of emotion exist implies that affect expressions which in infancy began as an innate form of social signalling (the cry

which accompanies an experience of distress) become used instrumentally (i.e. the smile or pout).

A social constructivist approach to the study of expressed emotion would endeavour to establish the display rules for emotion expression which would include a synaesthetic dimension of expression: eye contact, body position, proximity of bodies, and so on. Anthropological research has found that cultures without a psychological language for the self express emotion through bodily processes or by, what is called, somatization.

A folk psychology of emotion through emotion talk

It is through the emotion talk of a culture that an indigenous or ethnotheory of emotion becomes accessible as well as the folk psychology to which it is attached. This folk psychology, to be found in people's everyday speech, in non-specialised media, in the popular psychological literature, in the arts, may share presuppositions with medical discourse on emotions and psychology, a discourse which anthropologists recognize as just another type of folk psychology (Young, 1981). These folk psychologies cannot escape the discursive environment in the West dominated by individualism. The view in Western liberal democracies of the person as a sovereign individual has helped to assign the now familiar epithets to emotion: 'irrational', 'instinctual' or 'animal' inasmuch as the discourse of individualism inherited a psychophysiological symbolism which linked emotion to changes in the viscera and to that which disturbs thought.

The concept of 'emotion' derives from the Latin, '*e + movere*' meaning to migrate or to transfer from one place to another.¹⁵ It also referred to a state of agitation or perturbation, both physical and psychological. The etymological root of emotion has contributed in a metaphorical way to a belief that emotions involve intense arousal and disturbance to the body and to reasoning. However, from the time of the Greeks to the middle of the eighteenth century, approximately two thousand years, it was not emotions but 'passions' that people spoke about. The term 'passion' derives from the Latin, *pati* (to suffer) which is related to the Greek *pathos*. The terms *patient*, *pathology*, and *passivity* all stem from the same root. Premised by the root of

these terms is the idea that an individual is undergoing or suffering some change, as opposed to doing or initiating change. In fact, talk in all cultures which locates emotions in organs seems to provide evidence for the universally ascribed organic constitution of emotion and for the view that emotions are something that happen to us not something we do deliberately.¹⁶

Lakoff and Johnson's *Metaphors We Live By* studies language as lay epistemics. They show that the notion of 'the body as container' has become widely prevalent. This reification, in turn, is the basis of a series of metaphoric references to emotion as the contents of the container under a variety of conditions to do with heat and pressure.¹⁷ Freud's hydraulics model inherited and reproduced this metaphor. Our very use of nouns such as 'love', 'fear', 'anxiety' reaffirms this view of emotions as things or states which have a location or residence in the body: "I'm so in love I think my heart will burst"; "Eat your heart out". It was Plato, in the *Timaeus*, who located emotion (the mortal affective soul) in the thoracic and abdominal cavities as far as possible from the head where the rational soul lodged in proximity to the celestial divinities. The neck served as an isthmus to separate the rational from contamination by the irrational elements of the soul in the trunk. Cravings for food, drink, sexual arousal, even love of money, Plato considered as functions of the appetitive or lower part of the mortal soul which had to be controlled. In a move which harkens back to the separation of sensation and visceral movement from the intellect, to this day emotion is spoken about as if it has a presence and quantity independent of the person it is 'in':

We commonly speak of 'expressing,' 'storing,' 'getting in touch with,' or even 'spreading' an emotion. We speak of guilt as something that 'haunts' us, or fear as something that 'grips,' 'strikes,' 'betrays,' 'paralyzes,' or 'overwhelms' us....Love is something we fall into or out of. In this way of talking we use the fiction of some independent, outside agency in order to describe a contrasting inner state.

(Hochschild, 1983: 203)

The connotation of passivity or lack of agency in the person gripped by emotion has led to a variety of legal, moral, and other evaluative judgements which, although not intrinsic to the concept of emotion, become part of what Averill calls the

"extrinsic symbolism of emotion," which serves social ends. For instance, legally a person is not considered responsible for violating cultural norms and moral principles against harming others if he has done it under the sway of emotion (crimes of passion). While the attribution of emotion involves a certain abnegation of responsibility for the consequences of an act, people tend to assume responsibility for acts considered positively by themselves and their social milieu. Therefore, emotional concepts are less likely to be applied to positive than to negative states. Averill finds in Aquinas, for example, the contention that 'passion' is more properly applied to negative (sorrow) than to positive (joy) states, and he notes that 'Good deeds of passion' sounds peculiar to our ears. The passivity of the emotional person is further compounded by the distinction between emotion and reason and emotion and voluntary action which can be found early in Western thought. In Plato, the immortal principle of the soul is self-motion. Given that self-motion is also the motion of thought, he concluded that the immortal soul is the rational soul. In contrast, the mortal soul is passive. The distinction is between deliberate, self-initiated (rational) behaviour, on the one hand, affective, externally-initiated (irrational) behaviour, on the other.

As well as being viewed as unpremeditated, intuitive, and impulsive and for that reason irrational, emotions are also viewed as involuntary. This follows on a confusion in lay epistemics between two meanings of voluntary. In scholastic philosophy, fully voluntary acts are those to which the individual gives full assent and perfectly voluntary acts are those which are performed after due deliberation and forethought. On this distinction, emotions are fully voluntary but not perfectly voluntary; that is, they could be said to involve strong commitment but little freedom of choice. The fact that emotions are in some sense involuntary has become the means to evaluate someone acting emotionally as not only irrational but lacking freedom of the will. Since the ideals of rationality and free will have grounded Western intellectual and ethical traditions, it is little wonder that emotions have been seen as what makes us as bestial, as instinctive, as sub-human in short. Hochschild points out that "this tendency results more from our cultural policy toward emotional life ("watch out for it, manage it") than it results from observing the relation between feeling and

action in all the common but inconspicuous instances in which they are related" (1983: 204).

3.3.1 Rule-boundedness of emotion

On a social constructivist account, the most important feature of emotional development is the acquisition of the social norms and rules that provide the component responses with their meaning and co-ordination. How this acquisition comes about has been discussed in cognitive psychology under the concept of 'script' (Russell); in social psychology under the concept of rules (Averill); and in philosophy under the concept of 'paradigm scenario' (de Sousa), with de Sousa's model offering the greatest theoretical reach, in my opinion.

Due to the dominance of the 'Standard view,' the psychological literature on emotion tends to ignore the role of culture in the acquisition of emotion categories. On the Standard view, children have been assumed either to have emotions innately or to be *tabula rasa*, and this extends to how they are believed to acquire their knowledge of emotion concepts.¹⁸ The research implication of the refusal of the Standard view is that we cannot ask: "What is anger?" Rather we should be asking: "How is the word 'anger', and other expressions that cluster around it, actually used in this or that cultural milieu and type of episode?" (Harré, 1986: 5).¹⁹ Unravelling the basis of usage of emotion vocabularies will lead to the heart of emotion theory, according to social constructionists like Harré. The analysis of emotion vocabularies requires "careful attention to the details of local systems of rights and obligations, of criteria of value and so on...attention to the local moral order, in short" (Harré, 1986: 6).

3.3.1.1 Russell's script theory

To know the sense of a term like anger, fear, or jealousy, Russell argues, is "to know a script for that emotion" (1991a: 39).²⁰ 'Script' is a means to understand ordinary language emotion concepts. Although we often think of emotion as a state or a thing, Russell suggests that "a sequence of subevents" is a more apt description. A script is "a knowledge structure for an event in which the event is thought of as a

sequence of subevents" (1989: 312). A script is to an event what a prototype (a set of attributes) is to an object (Russell, 1991a: 39). To say someone is *afraid* is to combine

in one word a series of consecutive events dependent on one another. To know the meaning of the word *fear*, to have the concept expressed by that word, is to know the sequence. The metaphor of a script subsumes the discrete category, dimension, and mechanistic metaphors: Categories like *anger* and *fear* are mentally represented as scripts. Dimensions like pleasure-displeasure are among the features of the scripts. And the features are related to one another in a causal sequence. Emotions are panculturally represented as scripts, the dimensions of pleasure and arousal may be the panhuman features in those scripts, but other features in the script are culture-specific.

(Russell, 1989: 313)

A script is an idealized case of the emotion which actual events resemble to varying degrees:

[T]he features of the script are neither necessary nor sufficient; rather, the more features present, the closer the resemblance and the more appropriate the script label. Moreover, each feature of the script has a prototypical value. Features/subevents of events in the world can resemble the feature prototype in the script again to varying degrees and in various ways.

(Russell, 1989: 303)

In other words, the features that constitute emotion concepts describe the subevents that make up the emotion: causes, beliefs, feelings, physiological changes, desires, overt actions, and vocal and facial expressions (Russell, 1991a: 39).

A script for anger, Russell proposes, might look like this:

TABLE I

Step	Subevent
1	The person is offended. The offense is intentional and harmful. The person is innocent. An injustice has been done.
2	The person glares and scowls at the offender.
3	The person feels internal tension and agitation, as if heat and pressure were rapidly mounting inside. He feels his heart pounding and his muscles tightening.
4	The person desires retribution.
5	The person loses control and strikes out, harming the offender.

Scripting 'anger' is one of the easiest cases because it is an emotion of moral assessment as opposed to those emotions which cannot be treated as moral, i.e. jealousy, sadness, happiness. A variety of critiques can be addressed to this model, but I will discuss its weaknesses by comparing it to alternative social constructionist models of emotion.

3.3.1.2 Averill: the rule-boundedness of emotion

James Averill's social constructivist view of emotion distances him from the psychophysiological symbolism of centuries of philosophical and scientific thought which embedded psychological processes in physiology. Averill turns his attention not to emotion concepts *per se*, as did Russell, but to the rule-boundedness of emotions. He argues that language is exemplary of how experience is informed by rules (the rules of grammar). Emotions have a relevant grammar by which experience is made meaningful. He applies the concept of rules to the domain of emotion with the proviso that it is to a certain extent metaphorical.

It is important to recognize the limitation of the rule metaphor, not only in the case of emotion but also as applied to language and other psychological phenomena. However, the issue is *not whether emotions are governed by rules in every sense of the word; the issue is, rather, whether there are any senses in which it is profitable to apply the notion of rules to an analysis of emotional phenomena.*

(Averill, 1986:116)

In Foucault's language, Averill is seeking to describe the discourse of emotion--the precepts or standards which guide feeling behaviour and display behaviour--the way we are 'subject-ed' to social norms and rules which, when internalized, go into forming the cognitive schemas on which the experience and expression of emotion depend, in his view.

Table II below reproduces Averill's chart for the cross-classification of the rules of emotion syndromes (1986: 106), which is a more recently revised version of the schema he offered in *Anger and Aggression* (1982). These four broad classes of rules inform emotion experience and distinguish different aspects of emotion syndromes according to type and scope.

TABLE II

<i>Type of rule</i>	<i>Scope of rule</i>			
	Appraisal	Behaviour	Prognosis	Attribution
Constitutive				
Regulative				
Heuristic				

Social norms represent a sub-class of rules so what is true of rules is true of norms (although the reverse is not necessarily true). The difference between norms and rules is apparent if we think of "social rules as arranged on a continuum from those that are merely practical or procedural to those that are value laden. Norms appear toward the latter end of the distribution" (1982: 323); for instance, "simply describing ourselves as angry presupposes we have been wronged, victimized by the violation of some social norm" (Jaggar, 1989: 159). Thus, we absorb the standards and values of our society in the very process of learning the language of emotion, and those standards and values are built into the foundation of our emotional constitution.

To clarify these types of rules Averill invites us to consider the game of chess. The constitutive rules are those which by impelling us to layout the chessboard in a certain way and to use certain chess pieces and permissible moves identify the game we are playing as chess and not checkers. Regulative rules do not determine what game is being played but they do determine how the game is played (i.e. with a time clock we might be allowed thirty seconds to make a move). Heuristic rules determine the strategy of play (i.e. what move is more appropriate than another in order to defeat the opponent eventually) and are more difficult to define. They are often the substance of 'how-to' books on chess, bridge, and so on.

Rules of emotion may also be distinguished depending upon whether they address the evaluation of emotional objects (rules of appraisal), the organization of responses (rules of behaviour), the time course and consequences of the emotion (rules of prognosis) and the connection between the instigation, the responses and one's self (rules of attribution). Elaborating these rules is part of what goes into the anthropological work of formulating any particular culture's ethnotheory of emotion.

Emotions, like meanings, are *about* something; they have intentional objects. An adequate account of emotion must introduce intentionality, and Averill proposes that the intentional objects of emotion can be identified through rules of appraisal.²¹ The emotion response expresses the meaning imposed on events which is the outcome of the rules of appraisal. Each emotion is based on a particular set of appraisals or evaluative judgments, which specify the appropriate object of an emotion. For instance, in order to be envious I must believe that the object of my 'envy', that is, an attribute I do not possess but would wish to have, belongs to another. Nevertheless, while beliefs may be essential to the generation of emotions, they are not sufficient to constitute particular emotions because different emotions can be generated in different people by the same belief (Armon-Jones, 1986: 41). I feel fear on watching the menacing person on the street while my cousin feels excitement. The difference lies in the other attitudes, which I or my cousin may have, to which fear is related. The beliefs, evaluations, and attitudes involved in feeling an emotion are cognitive since they depend upon the agent's knowledge and her capacity to judge and compare.

For many emotions, the intentional object may have three aspects: the instigation, the target, and the manifest aim or objective of the response (1986: 107ff). In the above example, an appraised danger (the instigation or stimulus) presented by the menacing person (the target of my emotion) motivates the response of flight (aim or objective) accompanied by my emotion of fear. On the other hand, my cousin responds with the emotion of courage to the same instigation (an appraised danger) and target (the menacing person). The difference lies in the objectives of the two emotions: in fear the objective is to flee the danger; in courage, it is to stand one's ground in spite of the danger (Averill, 1982: 11-12). The objects of emotions are multifaceted, and it is difficult to ascertain whether all relevant aspects of an object are necessary for the proper attribution of emotion or whether only some need be present.

Rules of behaviour refer to the way an emotion is organized, managed, and expressed. Behaviour here includes physiological responses and subjective experience. Averill offers the example of the Victorian period when young ladies were expected to faint in certain situations, "provided they could do so safely and with decorum" (107).

This raises the question of how to include somatization and its varieties as responses to a rule of behaviour, and how to determine for what emotion it is a substitute expression. In Anglo-Saxon countries where dispassionate traits are held in high esteem, rules of behaviour for anger may be proscriptively more elaborate than, for example, in Mexican and French cultural groups. However, "cross-cultural review of ethnotheories about anger clearly indicate that the expression of anger is often culturally configured as problematic. Provisos regarding 'too much' or 'too little' anger are commonplace" (Jenkins, 1991: 395).

Rules of prognosis direct the time course and progression of an emotional episode. Some emotions last a few minutes (being startled) while others such as grief may last for years and progress through several stages. If the appropriate time course for an emotion is violated, the authenticity of the emotion is questioned or hidden motives are sought (Averill, 1982: 107).

Rules of attribution concern the way an emotion is explained or legitimized by reasons or causes. These rules link together the intentional object, the behaviour, and the prognosis into a meaningful whole and relate the entirety to the self. Although emotions do not follow standard rules of logic, they *do have a logic of their own*.

By crossing the three-fold distinction among constitutive, regulative, and heuristic rules with the four-fold distinction among rules of appraisal, behaviour, prognosis, and attribution, twelve (12) categories are created in Table II. We would ideally have a knowledge of the constitutive and regulative and heuristic rules of appraisal, behaviour, prognosis, and attribution if they obtained. Depending upon the emotion, some of these components will not apply. For instance, some emotions (envy, anger) are more subject to regulation than others (joy, pity); while other emotions (grief) are more subject to the rule of prognosis (i.e. of long duration) than others which are short lived (jubilation).

What would these rules and norms for an emotion look like? They include both prescriptive and proscriptive aspects as we can see by Table III which offers a partial list of the rules and norms related to anger, as Averill (1982: 324-325) has proposed them:

TABLE III

A Partial List of the Rules and Norms Related to Anger

I. Rules of appraisal

A. With respect to the instigation

1. Prescriptive

- a. A person has the right (duty) to become angry at intentional wrongdoing, including an affront to one's honour, freedom, property, or other rights.
- b. A person has the right (duty) to become angry at the unintentional misdeeds of certain others if those misdeeds are due to negligence, carelessness, oversight, and so forth.

2. Proscriptive

- a. A person should not become angry at events which are beyond his or her influence.
- b. A person should not become angry at events which can be remedied in more standard ways.

B. With respect to the target

1. Prescriptive

- a. Anger should be directed only at persons, and by extension, other entities (the self, human institutions) that can be held responsible for their actions.
- b. Anger is more appropriately directed at a peer or subordinate than at a superior. (...)
- d. **Among strangers, anger is more appropriately directed at men than at women.** (my emphasis)

2. Proscriptive

- a. Anger should not be directed at persons who cannot be held responsible for their actions (e.g. because of age or ignorance). (...)

C. With respect to the aim or objective

1. Prescriptive

- a. The aim of anger should be to correct the situation, restore equity, and/or prevent recurrences, not to inflict pain or injury on the target.

2. Proscriptive

- a. Anger should not be used as a tool to achieve selfish ends.

TABLE III (continued)

II. Rules of behaviour**A. With respect to overt behaviour****1. Prescriptive**

- a. The response should be proportional to the instigation.
- b. The response should be open and direct (so the target knows who is angry and why). (...)

2. Proscriptive

- a. The response should not exceed what is necessary to correct the situation, for example, to prevent the instigation from happening again, or to restore equity.
- b. The response should not unfairly or unnecessarily take advantage of the target (e.g. through public humiliation, or "hitting a man when he is down"). (...)

III. Rules of prognostication**A. With respect to the sequence of events****1. Prescriptive**

- a. Anger should begin with an explanation of the harm done, and only if that fails should it escalate to the denial of some benefit, verbal aggression, and--as a last resort--physical aggression.

B. With respect to duration**1. Prescriptive**

- a. Anger should terminate whenever the target apologizes, offers restitution, or gives assurance that the instigation will not be repeated.

2. Proscriptive

- a. Anger should not last more than a few hours or days, at most. (If the situation has not been resolved during that period, action may still be taken, but it will not be interpreted as anger.)

IV. Rules of attribution**A. With respect to event****1. Prescriptive**

- a. There should be a causal connection between the target, the instigation, and the angry response.

2. Proscriptive

- a. Anger should not be displaced on an innocent third party, nor directed at the target for reasons other than the instigation.

B. With respect to the self**1. Prescriptive**

- a. An angry response may, and sometimes should, be dissociated from the self-as-agent (i.e. interpreted as a passion rather than as an action).

2. Proscriptive

- a. An angry person should not be held completely responsible for his or her behaviour.

Averill points out that while much attention in social psychology has been devoted to the rules that help regulate emotions and especially to the regulative rules of behaviour, *"less attention has been devoted to the regulative rules of appraisal, prognosis and attribution; and still less to constitutive rules of all kinds"* (1986: 109). Furthermore, in contrast to the huge interest in the study of cognitive heuristics (i.e. artificial intelligence), little research has been devoted to the analysis of emotional heuristics, in part because of the lack of understanding of the constitutive and regulative rules of emotions.²² Some would argue--perhaps only radical social constructivists--that authentic emotions have culturally variable constitutive rules; others are more comfortable in positing that cultural difference occurs at the level of regulative rules. On the one hand, these topics could be fruitfully addressed in future studies of emotion in literary and cultural studies, such as Woodward (1990/91) has called for. On the other hand, these topics are directly germane to research on (gender and) transference and counter-transference. The psychoanalytic relationship is a privileged research arena for a study of emotion rules (when do which rules change as therapy proceeds?). Chapter 6 of this thesis will endeavour to sketch the role of emotions in the diagnostic hypotheses which underpin the actiology of the recovery movement while identifying the component aspects of the rules of emotion on which recovery grounds its therapeutic mechanisms. It remains to be seen if recovery authors such as John Bradshaw and Melody Beattie would agree with Averill's characterization as 'neurotic' those emotional responses that are presumed to follow from the inadequate socialization of the constitutional rules of appraisal, behaviour, prognosis, or attribution? The person who cannot conform to regulative rules he calls 'delinquent,' while she who has failed to acquire an adequate set of heuristic rules is 'inept.' Averill offers these examples:

the person who becomes 'fearful' of harmless objects (thus violating a constitutive rule of appraisal); whose 'love' is manifested in sadistic cruelty (violating a constitutive rule of behaviour); whose 'grief' is over in a day or prolonged for many years (violating a constitutive rule of prognosis); or whose 'anger' is the product of paranoid delusions (violating a constitutive rule of attribution).

(1986: 109)

Developmental theory and emotion acquisition

Averill does not deny the importance of phylogenesis for an understanding of emotional behaviour during the lifespan; but, he questions the exclusive emphasis that has been placed on developmental stages (that we will see below in the psychoanalytic paradigm) particularly in understanding emotions in adults. He holds that emotions are not innate nor are they predetermined by events occurring during childhood. The components of emotion syndromes--expressive reactions (display), physiological changes, subjective experiences, and instrumental acts (agency)--may undergo socialization independently of each other and may change throughout the life span.

By what means are the scripts or rules for emotions conveyed to young children?²³ Averill reminds us that some members of a category are more *prototypic* than others, meaning they are better exemplars of the rules that help constitute the category. Moreover, research has demonstrated that prototypic exemplars are learned more readily and at an earlier age than are other members of a category (1982: 334). Emotional prototypes are located in 'paradigm scenarios' and it is through familiarity with these that a child learns the attributes and rules that determine what to feel when, where, and why. Averill finds the notion of 'paradigm scenario,' drawn from de Sousa (1980), particularly apt from a social constructivist point of view because it does two things. The concept of 'scenario' emphasizes the role properties of emotion syndromes while the concept of 'paradigm' highlights the prototypicality of the event as well as its importance for the acquisition of new ways of thinking and behaving (Averill, 1982: 334). Of course, what is of preeminent importance for those interested in the relation of emotion to fantasy are the effects of unconscious processes on the formation and tenacity of paradigm scenarios, and the relation between psychopathologies and characteristic paradigm scenarios.

3.3.1.3 De Sousa: paradigm scenarios for emotion

Without emotion, "it is inconceivable that we should ever come to value one state of affairs more highly than another" (Jaggar, 1989: 153). De Sousa agrees, "Emotions act like models which give us frameworks in terms of which we perceive, desire, act, and explain; it is this power to reinterpret the world which has also

contributed to their reputation for irrationality." Proclaiming the epistemic necessity of emotion for rationality and value judgements, however, does not preclude an assessment of emotion as itself rational. Teasing out the implications of both of these statements underlies Ronald de Sousa's *The Rationality of Emotion* (1987). In this enormously provocative volume, he asks: "What contribution do emotions make to the rationality of thought, desire, and action? How does this role fit in with their reputation for irrationality? By what criteria, if any, can emotions themselves be assessed for rationality?" (1987: 19) where rationality "has to do with strategies for the attainment of truth or objectivity" (144). The constructivist thesis that most standard emotional reactions are institutionalized patterns of response, which we have seen expressed by Russell and Averill, is not one strictly held by de Sousa, although he certainly promotes a contextualist view of emotions in some respects. Nor does he find the social constructivist thesis to be unambiguous with respect to a solution to the problem which is his central preoccupation, how to evaluate the rationality of emotion: "do these conventions in fact define these emotions, or do they interpret them in some way that might allow for correctness or incorrectness?" (249).²⁴ One of de Sousa's objectives is to write the relations of emotions to their objects in terms of propositions, which then makes them susceptible to judgments of rationality. This is a prerequisite to translating these propositions into formal logic by which to produce equations which would allow for the simulation of emotions.²⁵ This objective makes de Sousa's work of interest to philosophers in the cognitive tradition as well as to social constructivists such as Russell and Averill.

De Sousa defends another thesis which makes his work of interest to reading theorists, that being that emotions are not reducible to desires, beliefs, behaviour, physiological change, cognition, will, instinct, or social convention (23). Emotions are on the frontier of the subjective and the objective, the mental and the physiological, the active and the passive, the instinctual and the intentional (149). Emotion types (not the class of emotion itself) are congeneric with two species of mental states, belief and wanting. For the most part, they can be understood as analogical to belief, want (desire), and especially perception and, where these analogies fail, something peculiar to emotion alone. A discussion and critique of de Sousa's nuanced and

challenging arguments for the rationality of emotion are not required since my purpose in turning to *The Rationality of Emotion* has to do with capturing the points of entry in his concept of paradigm scenarios where unconscious processes may be found to exert their influence. My discussion of de Sousa limits itself to two issues: his complex classification of the components of the intentional object of emotions, and the axiological properties of emotions.

De Sousa's work on emotion should be of concern to reading theorists because his notion of 'paradigm scenario' has some power to explain the temporal transfer of the force of emotions from earlier situations when they were appropriate to later ones when they are not, and "both appropriate emotions and self-deceptive ones have their origins in paradigm scenarios" (1987: 262). Self-deceptive emotions put the lie to "going with one's feelings as the royal road to authenticity" (1987: 236) while pointing out the necessity of exploring the origins of emotion semantics within the history of the reader as an emotion script user.²⁶

The concept of 'paradigm scenario,' which Averill found so helpful in his 1982 book, originated with de Sousa who argues that a person's emotional repertoire is learned in the context of 'paradigm scenarios.' Paradigm scenarios are the defining rituals of emotion (303). While we have biologically determined inclinations to view certain sorts of events in some aspect rather than others, biological factors are supplemented by paradigm scenarios (231). These scenarios are prototypes of social dramas and they reveal plot structures, some of which are acquired early in life. These are drawn first from daily life when we are small children and later reinforced by the stories, art, and culture to which we are exposed. Paradigm scenarios can become obsolete in a culture where situations of type x come to be felt in terms of quite different scenarios (i.e. the 'purity' of remaining chaste before marriage). "And when there is no adequate original scenario to fall back on, the adult ritual plays much the same function of defining and framing. This is particularly so, for example, with emotions of loss" (323). So our emotional repertoires are not definitively established in childhood; however, childhood is the time of apprenticeship in the basic paradigm scenarios.

The intentionality of emotions

The two views which dominate contemporary philosophical theories of affect are: the view that affect is centrally linked with the concept of an object (the objectual view), and the view that typically affect can be ascribed basic rationality (the rationality view). De Sousa's work subscribes to both views. De Sousa develops his perspective on the intentionality of emotion through the concept of paradigm scenario. It involves two aspects: (1) a situation type providing the characteristic *objects* of the specific emotion type; and (2) a set of characteristic or "normal" *responses* to the situation, where normality is first a biological matter and then very quickly becomes a cultural one. The first roughly overlaps the scope of Averill's rule of appraisal while being more nuanced, and the second addresses behaviour which Averill treats under the description of the rules of behaviour and prognosis.

Explaining the relation of objects to emotions has been a puzzle as far back as Plato's musings in the *Euthyphro* which raised problems of realism and the subjective or objective nature of emotions. Intentionality embroils us in questions of pseudorelations: Sometimes an emotion appears to relate the emoter to something else which need not be as the emoter believes it to be, i.e. the dangerousness of mice toward which we feel fear ("How can there be a real relation with a nonexistent thing?"). Another problem of realism is the *Euthyphro* question itself: "Even if emotions are related to real objects, are the properties that arouse our emotions really in those objects, or are they mere shadows of the emotions themselves" (107)? We normally explain our emotions in terms of a conceptual link between reasons and objects. The reasons we give for our emotions usually take the form of attitudes which describe a feature of the emotion's object, for example, "the reason I was afraid to go into the attic to locate the wasp's nest was because I believed the wasps would immediately attack me." De Sousa rephrases the question of the *Euthyphro* to ask: Are the objects of emotion less objective than those of other modes, such as ordinary sensory perception, the objectivity of which is generally taken for granted and, if so, how? (110).²⁷ Many analyses of the relation between emotions and their objects view the object as the cause of the emotion.²⁸ These questions all take advantage of our conflicts about whether emotions really connect us to the outside world or merely

colour our view of it.²⁹ After presenting a variety of examples which explore the puzzles inherent in the *Euthyphro* question (see his Chapter Five), in subsequent chapters de Sousa offers an analysis and typology of objects intended to resolve these puzzles. He shows that the question of the object-directedness of emotions, what is known as their intentionality, is considerably more complicated than usually thought. While Averill found instigation, aim, and target to make up the three component parts of the intentional object, de Sousa presents a typology of seven different aspects that are commonly collapsed into each other as the 'object' of emotion. Discriminating among these aspects is important to cognitive scientists' engagement with emotion as a type of knowledge amenable to propositional knowledge and computer modelling; however, discriminating among some of these aspects is precisely the work of psychotherapists working with the transference. Furthermore, these aspects of emotion's intentionality are part of everyday intersubjective interaction and create the ambiguities which produce misunderstandings between us.

De Sousa's typology contributes the identity criteria for a specific emotion type: target, focus or focal property, motivating aspect, cause, aim, proposition, and formal object (113ff.). De Sousa formulates ten theses with respect to these aspects. Inasmuch as the distinction between the target, focal property, and motivating aspect are of most interest to a discussion of the paedogenetic origins of paradigm scenarios and of emotions produced by association, it is not necessary to discuss all these components in detail.

"The *target* of an emotion is a real object, typically an actual particular, to which that emotion relates. The target is that real object, if any, *at* which the emotion is directed" (Thesis 1: the target thesis). Targets can be events or persons. We intuitively identify them as the cause of an emotion, although de Sousa's epistemic concerns lead him to distinguish between causes and what he calls motivating aspect. Emotion will be *motivated by* some attribute possessed by the target, which will be a *focus* of the subject's attention. De Sousa's third thesis is that

Thesis 3. Emotions having targets typically involve a *focus* of attention, which is the apprehension of some (real or illusory) *focal property* of the target. Under certain

conditions, which define the standard case, the focal property is also the *motivating aspect* of these emotions. (117)

For instance, my delight in eating mangoes (target) is focussed on their uniquely turpentine-like taste (focal property). Emotions, like perception, can have a hallucinatory target or an illusory focus. De Sousa's example is contempt, an emotion whose focus may or may not be the motivating aspect:

Case 1 Wendy despises Bernie, she thinks, for his vulgar musical taste. But really his musical taste has nothing to do with her feelings. The truth is that Bernie's voice, though she has never actually noticed it, reminds her of her hated grandmother, and that is what arouses her feelings of contempt. (117)

The question is whether an unconscious or conscious memory association can be a cause or a motivating aspect in de Sousa's terms. The target of Wendy's contempt is Bernie, and the focus of her contempt is his vulgar musical taste (let's say his preference for country and western music); however, Bernie's musical taste is not the cause nor the motivating aspect of her contempt. There is a difference here between what she thinks produces her contempt and what has actually lead to it. Moreover, in this case, what has actually triggered her contempt is a cause which does not qualify as a motivating aspect. The cause of Wendy's contempt is Bernie's voice: she feels contempt *because* she hears his voice. His voice is not the object of her emotion of contempt, i.e. the contempt is not *about* his voice to her knowledge. Wendy thinks her attitude is based on a judgment when in fact it is based on an association. She is not reacting to any intrinsic quality in Bernie's voice; there can be no systematic correlation with the specific qualities of his voice. This leads de Sousa to two more theses:

Thesis 4. A causal connection between the focal property and the occurrence of the emotion is a *necessary condition* for the former to be a motivating aspect. (First causal condition)

Therefore, all emotions have causes, but only some causes are motivating aspects. For Bernie's musical taste (the focal property) to be the motivating aspect of Wendy's contempt, there would have to be a causal connection between his musical taste and her contempt. This condition does not obtain because it can be inferred from the

example that whenever Bernie speaks Wendy will feel contempt. Wendy is wrong about the cause of her feelings, as anyone might be, and this implies that *there is no privileged access to motivating aspects of emotions*. De Sousa's thesis 5 reads:

Thesis 5. There is no privilege of incorrigibility in the subject's access to motivating aspects. (117) (Corrigibility)

This state of affairs is precisely the currency of psychotherapies. The importance of theses 1-5 for social scientific research is, of course, that it makes available a conceptual toolbox with which to recognize and talk about how an informant's self-understanding of his/her emotional responses will be mystified when the focal property is mistaken for the motivating aspect. In practical terms, a confusion between the two explains why we would fail to change Wendy's contempt for Bernie's musical taste if we defended country and western music from charges of vulgarity.

De Sousa is not maintaining that motivating aspect has to be the focus of conscious attention, but we do need some word for whatever the experiencing self thinks is a motivating aspect; 'focus of conscious attention' will do. *An unconscious focus is just as relevant as a conscious one and, under some conditions, able to function as the motivating aspect of the emotion*. However, de Sousa does not think an unconscious focus is the motivating aspect in Case 1 whereas he does in Case 2 below:

Case 2 Wendy despises Bernie, ostensibly because of his taste, but the real cause of her contempt (though she is quite unaware of it) is that he is a Jew.

De Sousa maintains that Wendy's antisemitism does clearly constitute the motivating aspect even though it is not conscious. That conclusion will not work for Case 1 because the voice-association does not play the same role as the antisemitism in Case 2. Why? We need a third case to bring out the difference:

Case 3 Wendy thinks she despises Bernie for his musical tastes. But she is really the subject of an experiment on the chemical control of the emotions, and the real cause of what she takes to be her attitude is some direct physiological intervention in her brain. (118)

The chemical intervention in Wendy's brain could not constitute a motivating aspect, chemistry is not a reason. Alternatively, antisemitism might be used to justify the

emotion as correct or legitimate; this is a bad reason but it is a reason. This leads us to thesis 6, the intelligibility condition:

- Thesis 6. Motivating aspects must be *rationally related* to the emotion they cause, in the sense that they must constitute *intelligible rationalizations* for the emotion. (118) (the Intelligibility condition)

The motivational role of emotions defines their characteristic aims and acts as a constraint on the character of each specific emotion. Motivation, says de Sousa, belongs to the sphere of rational discourse, and it must aspire to conformity with rational norms. An emotional state is basically rational if it is based on cognitive attitudes which provide reasons for the state and show it to be minimally reasonable. If a state is basically rational it must be in virtue of something other than itself, i.e. reasons in beliefs. Rationality is not established simply by describing the constituents of the state itself. Furthermore, "grounds of belief need not be conscious, since not all legitimate inference is explicit. But a belief does not count as a ground unless it could figure as the premise of an intelligible inference. **Though association often causes belief, in itself it is a nonrational connection**" (118). De Sousa cautions that the focus of an emotion, whether conscious or unconscious, must be causally effective *and* it must be of a kind that, *if* it became a content of consciousness, it would make the emotion intelligible (119). De Sousa throws out 'mere association' of Bernie's voice with the voice of Wendy's grandmother as a motive for Wendy's contempt because the rationalizing connection is not even intelligible in his view (119). For the purposes of deciding if it could count as a motive for an emotion, Wendy's association has the same status as a chemical intervention which might, through direct physiological intervention, produce a response in Wendy of 'finding Bernie's voice unpleasant.' So the difference between the disreputable motive of antisemitism and the cases of association or chemical intervention is that in the latter the rationalizing connection is not even intelligible. On de Sousa's account of Case 1, it would appear that all emotions caused by association have problems due to the failure of the focus to meet both the first causal condition (Thesis 4) and the intelligibility condition (Thesis 6). Within the terms of his framework, it is not possible to argue that, although Wendy does not know it, the focal property which *is* the motivating aspect of her contempt is

the memory aroused by the sound of Bernie's voice which reminds her of her hated grandmother. However, in a later chapter de Sousa does argue that emotions whose focus is not the motivating aspect are rational in the sense of minimal rationality. So, it would appear that the emotions which occur due to projection, for instance, in the context of the transferential relationship between analyst and analysand can only be minimally rational on de Sousa's account.

It is not the case that emotions occasioned by association have no motivating aspect. Rather it is the case that the focal property is not causally connected to the emotion and therefore the focus is not the motivating aspect. The important question here is: can the focal property (even if not a motivating aspect of an emotion because it is occasioned by association) be the subject of an intelligible rationalization? De Sousa's typology of objects has a number of advantages over Averill's rules approach, the primary ones being its ability to distinguish between target and motivating aspect (as in the Wendy/Bernie example), and consequently to access not only both outside and inside points of view on an emotion's apparent object but the specific relation between the perceiving subject and the target's attributes. "What explains that just this characteristic is a motivating aspect? Why is it, in other words, that this color, shape, or virtue confers desirability on the object that has it?" (131). De Sousa's approach precisely permits, even demands, such a level of specificity of inquiry and sets the stage for the admissibility of idiosyncratic relations.³⁰ To talk about the relations of the objects which make up the identity of an emotion we should ask: Who is angry? At what target? Focusing on what about the target? Motivated by what about the target? To what behaviour? Because of what event? And angry exactly that what proposition is true? (126). In the next chapter we will see if Radway's data on the emotional responses of her target population of romance readers is refined enough to make these distinctions.³¹

Unconscious associations and minimally rational emotions

Why are Freudian paraphrases rational on de Sousa's account? They can be seen to have the structure of minimally rational acts. De Sousa reminds us of two senses of rational. When Aristotle declared that "Man is a rational animal," the word

has a *categorical* sense, meaning the kind of animal that can be either rational or non-rational. However, in the *evaluative* sense (contrasting with irrational), the Aristotelian dictum is false. Why? The evaluative sense presupposes the categorical sense: to be either rational or irrational (evaluatively) is to be rational (categorically). Thus, in terms of this distinction, the principle of minimal rationality is as follows:

(R2) *Minimal rationality*. It is a necessary condition of an intentional state or event's being describable as *categorically* rational, that under some true description it can properly (though perhaps vacuously) be said to be *evaluatively* rational. (160)

When an emotion seems irrational or inappropriate, the principle of minimal rationality tells us that we can only make that judgment stick if we can find some minimal context in which the emotion is rational as well as a more comprehensive one in which the irrationality is manifest. If we have a sophisticated view of how emotions can be assessed for rationality, that entails more possibilities of irrationality (250). In other words, the more we are categorically rational, the greater our potential for evaluative irrationality. Freudian slips are minimally rational because if certain assumptions can be made about the existence of a certain context of beliefs and wants, the event can be fitted into that context and ascribed the minimal rational structure that is definitive of an act. "It does not matter that in a broader context the act is irrational" (161).

Emotions as perceptions of salience; perceptions of values

"If I am angry, astonished, or delighted, how much of the determining situation of those states is owed to context, to individual physiology, and to idiosyncratic history? That this question makes good sense supports a general analogy of emotion and perception, since it can be asked as well of anything that we perceive.³² But how powerful is the perceptual analogy? De Sousa's position is that

The ways in which emotions are subjective do not sufficiently undermine the analogy of perception to exclude a significant claim to objectivity. Emotions can indeed be viewed as providing genuine information. But the analogy is not so close as to warrant the assimilation of emotions to perception, any more than to beliefs or desires. (149)

De Sousa offers both an objectivist and a subjectivist answer to the Euthyphro question. On the analogy of perception, emotions can be subjective without being viciously projective; they can be assessed for objectivity as apprehensions of real properties in the world. Operating like perception, emotions identify patterns of salience.

[T]he essential role of emotions lies in establishing specific patterns of salience relevant to inferences... (201)

Emotions are species of determinate patterns of salience among objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies. (337)

Emotions deal with the insufficiencies of reason by controlling salience. In this role, emotions are frameworks for rationality. De Sousa proposes that emotions may be an answer to the "philosopher's frame problem": we need to know when not to retrieve some irrelevant information from the huge store of which we are possessed. But how do we know it is irrelevant unless we have already retrieved it? "Emotions spare us the paralysis potentially induced by this predicament by controlling the salience of features of perception **and** reasoning; they ...circumscribe our practical and cognitive options" (172). We need emotion to break a tie when reason is stuck (16). Emotions provide frameworks for our beliefs, highlighting some and leaving others in the dark. De Sousa offers the example of the philosophical manic-depressive who insists "on looking at the depressing side of things in order to see them more clearly" (165). Her gloom is so pervasive that it functions as a foundation or framework for her assessments of rationality, but it is not a candidate for rational assessment itself. Her gloom is "beyond the pale of rationality".

As patterns of attention, salience would seem to be a matter of rearranging things that are already there rather than discovering new ones. As that which establishes attention and salience, emotions are neither judgements nor desires; they set the agenda for beliefs and desires. They ask the questions that judgement answers with beliefs and evaluate the prospects to which desire may or may not respond (196). "Experience, which conditions our capacity to care, is largely a product of the poignant exercise of choices among options framed for us by our emotional life" (331).

To get a head of myself, it is useful here to note that the paradigm scenario for an emotion, in effect, has conditioned the patterns of salience which will be established relative to inferences and objects of attention when that emotion is felt. Moreover, that emotion is simultaneously both a response to a perception of salience, and as such a psychological signal to the self, while also being a social signal. This identification of the conditioning effect of emotion paradigm scenarios on perception has some similarity to descriptions, in the psychotherapeutic literature, of selective attention performed by psychic defences. It calls for a comparison of the role of emotion as perception in de Sousa's model as against the role of emotion in perception under a psychoanalytic model of affect, an issue to which I endeavour to make a response in section 3.4 below.

Axiological rationality

De Sousa distinguishes between three types of rationality--cognitive, strategic, and axiological. Cognitive rationality applies to judgments and beliefs, while strategic rationality applies to actions or wants. If emotions were coextensive with, or combinations of, beliefs and desires then the principles governing their rationality would be fully accounted for by cognitive and strategic rationality. He holds that emotions apprehend a special type of reality, the axiological. Axiology is the theory of what is worthy or valuable as opposed to deontology which tells us what we ought to do (de Sousa, 1987: 169).³³ "Emotions are a kind of perception--perception of the axiological level of reality" (de Sousa, 332), of what is valuable to the perceiver, in other words. "...our only access to the level of reality that emotions reveal is through the paradigm scenarios that have shaped our world views" (315). Our original acquaintance with these axiological properties goes back to our experience of paradigm scenarios, "little dramas in which our natural capacities for emotional response were first enlisted" (45).

Does this not collapse into subjectivism? No, says de Sousa. Why? Inasmuch as emotions can be assessed for objectivity on the model of perception (173) (they can tell us something about things other than thoughts or propositions that correspond to something in the real world, qualities for instance), and objectivity must get part of its

meaning from its contrast with subjectivity, emotions can be subjective and tell us something about the world without being projective. De Sousa reminds us there are several types of subjectivity: perspective, phenomenology, projection, relativity. Subjective perception follows on from a normal paradigm scenario which controls salience of features of an event. The measure of success of emotion as perception follows from the fact that present circumstances *match* the original paradigm scenario.³⁴ Paradigm scenarios determine characteristic feelings, and "an emotion can be assessed for its intrinsic rationality--a kind of correctness or incorrectness--in terms of the resemblance between a presenting situation and a paradigm scenario" (201). Rather the specific standard of success of an emotion originates in several conditions: the matching between presenting circumstances, as perceived by an emotion, and the circumstances of the original paradigm scenario for that emotion. The rationality of emotion is defined in terms of the success of the emotion where success by paradigm scenario means control of salience by a normal (vs. abnormal) paradigm scenario (this allows for idea of individual normality in emotions).

When we try to identify the sources of the belief that emotions have something to do with our authentic being, the place to look may be precisely here in the axiological rationality of our emotions, or as Harré puts it, the local moral order which is original to the person. Paradigm scenarios determine the class of real values to which emotions, as meaningful states, are supposed to correspond. They also determine the minimal rationality of even 'unreasoned' emotional states (i.e. phobic fear, anxiety, love, rage, and other emotions which are not necessarily supported by reason-providing beliefs, transference emotions) because these can be secured historically (Armon-Jones, 1990: 131). That is, the objects of emotions experienced, for example, in the analytical transference resemble the objects of the first formative intentional situations in which these emotions were originally created as responses; the minimal rationality of such emotions must be sought in terms of the scenario unconsciously evoked (de Sousa, 1980: 146). Emotions, and the axiological properties to which they are a response, supplement the formal rules we are accustomed to associating with rationality. Thus, emotions provide frameworks for rationality while also being candidates for rational assessment.

Emotions as a class of mental objects undermine the dichotomy between the active and the passive since they "frame and determine the range of our possible choices without being directly willed themselves" (318). Their role as *frames* for other states gives them a determining role in choice, but also makes them too deeply rooted to be simply chosen" (319). When one is faced with two motivational aspects, it is emotion rather than reason or desire which arbitrates; however, this power can be abused. By affecting the saliency of two arguments, emotions will lead to actions which are done intentionally but may not follow the 'strongest' reason and so are 'against one's better judgement' (the philosophical problem since Socrates of *akrasia* or weak will).

Emotions and beliefs

Rather than being directly analogical to beliefs, de Sousa holds that emotions belong to the class of attitudes, "like a perception, but unlike a belief, an attitude is something one cannot hypothetically adopt" (156) or suspend. Otherwise put, attitudes are beliefs which cannot be hypothetically adopted. Furthermore, emotions cannot be attached to hypothetical beliefs. That attitudes, and emotional attitudes, are beliefs which cannot be adopted hypothetically is evidence of the independence of the axiological level from the cognitive. De Sousa offers the example of the joke. Laughter at jokes quickly identifies someone's attitude. To find the joke funny the listener must actually share and endorse the assumptions which create the laughter. Moreover, endorsement does not allow of hypothetical laughter (290).³⁵ Similarly, in reading,

To find a story sad, or exciting, or frightening, it is not enough to be told that something is sad or exciting or frightening. I must already be disposed to find certain things sad, and so forth. This is not to deny that I can be made to care for the most unlikely object...But the point is that although my attitudes can be modified and manipulated by a competent artist or writer, *the manipulator must have a raw material of attitudes and emotional dispositions to work with in the first place.*

(1987: 156-157)

Although we can take up different positions cognitively, the emotional outcome is overdetermined by our axiological positions. Feeling an emotion means I endorse certain attitudes not merely that I have certain beliefs. Moreover, anyone else

endorsing them would probably be feeling that emotion too (292).³⁶ The problem of hypothetical attitudes and emotion reveals, therefore, that emotions point to the existence of a community which endorses similar attitudes.

Contrary to the inference that emotions are somehow less substantive than beliefs, which was implied in the quotations from Bellah (1985) and Press (1991) at the head of the chapter, we see that emotions are the Siamese twin of belief. Affective states have a legitimate role in higher mental life; every cognitive act, no matter how 'cool' and 'logical' involves emotion. Nor are emotions simply epiphenomena of belief; they affect behaviour, making a difference to our reproduction and survival. As the emotional face of desire, they are crucially attached to what human beings value. However, just as beliefs can be false, it is also the case that emotions can be irrational or self-deceptive. In light of this, social and cultural theorists such as Bellah, Press, who were quoted at the head of the chapter, and their confrères would do better to set about devising methods by which to distinguish the rationality of emotion from instances where emotions mislead us about ourselves and about others rather than reproducing the error of arbitrarily consigning the category of emotion to things by nature irrational and devalued. And they can do so precisely because of the intimate connection of emotions with attention and salience and, secondly, because of the crucial role of paradigm scenarios as the original theatres where are emotional repertoires are learned.

One such misleading case--in which the causal or motivational role of emotion is notorious (and probably what Bellah *et al* had in mind)--is the self-deception which refers to false or cognitively irrational beliefs held for the sake of some noncognitive goal, ie. comfort or self-esteem. Research should also be pursued specifically into axiological self-deception: how we deceive ourselves by not knowing what emotions we are experiencing and by having self-deceptive emotions. *It would seem that the link de Sousa makes between axiological rationality, personal emotional idiolects, and the paradigms scenarios which encode objects of value presents culture critics with another set of criteria of value with which to evaluate their hypotheses about the ideological effects of mass culture.*

How to change our paradigm scenarios?

Paradigm scenarios play a crucial role in the genesis and maintenance of our emotional repertoires with respect to the objects of our emotions and the contexts for an emotion. Some emotions are more thought dependent than others; some paradigm scenarios require more complex linguistic skills than others. For those lacking the skills, or knowledge of the language, they will also lack the emotion. Prelinguistic emotions--fight or flight--define so-called primitive emotions of fear and rage. We enlarge our repertoire as we increase our mastery of language into adult life. However, this is not to say that emotions are mere moves in a game because animals have emotions too: rage, fear, grief, revulsion, boredom, anxiety (45). If paradigm scenarios indeed define the very character of our emotions, we acquire the capacity to talk about emotions in terms of the stories that give rise to them sooner than we can talk about the origins of other mental states such as perception, for instance, toddlers have a good sense of what kinds of stories lead to what simple emotions. "Late in the second year of life toddlers seem already to have the sense of existence of other subjects. They become aware that different participants in the same scene will, by virtue of their different roles, feel differently from each other" (183). Learning these scenarios continues indefinitely as the emotional repertoire becomes more complicated (guilt and responsibility are not generally understood by 6 yr. olds to enable them to infer these sentiments in characters in stories).³⁷ Within paradigm scenarios there are roles. Toddlers also know that "by taking a sequence from an emotional scenario out of context, one can play-act or 'pretend' emotions that are not actually being felt" (183). While literature gives us an opportunity to do just that, this method acting involves a suspension of belief (or perhaps disbelief). What cannot be accomplished, however, is a suspension of attitude precisely because attitudes, unlike beliefs, cannot be adopted or discarded.

How can we change the emotions we are experiencing? Can consciousness raising, that is, propositional description and redescription, change emotions? Can repeating over and over again "there's no reason to be angry/envious/sad" really change how I feel? No, says de Sousa:

A change of belief can radically alter an emotion. But this touches only the cognitive aspect, not the distinctively axiologic level that constitutes

the idiosyncratic core of emotions as apprehensions of reality. We have no more direct access to the content of our emotions than we have voluntary control over the past situations in which we learned them. So *one form of the phony is just this: the pretense of complete control*, which can be made at various levels of awareness.

(263) (my emphasis)

Consciousness raising does not provide escape from emotional self-deception because both appropriate emotions and self-deceptive ones have their origin in paradigm scenarios (262). On this account, how do we ever escape self-deception or distinguish authentic from phoney emotions? How does our emotional life ever change if it is rooted in our paradigm scenarios? While we cannot have complete control over past situations in which we learned our emotions, we do have indirect control because we can 'regestalt' early paradigms (263). This is not the same as changing a belief or two; it involves changing the configuration of the paradigm scenario entirely: the emoter's position *vis-à-vis* the target, the motivating aspect, and so on, i.e. the role the emoter assumes *vis-à-vis* imaginary others in terms of needs, wants, and desires. The redirection of attention changes the salience of some features thereby diverting the 'feel' of a situation from one paradigm scenario to another (244). For instance, in not trying to redescribe the emotion ("There's no reason for me to be angry here.") but in redescribing the paradigm scenario instead ("He's being so intimidating only because he's shy."), we may feel differently. We will see in Chapter 6 that one of the common strategies used by recovery therapy is the regestalt of paradigm scenarios.

Pathologies of emotion: undetachable paradigm scenarios

Temporal transference explains the rationality or intelligibility of feeling desires on the basis of emotions experienced at other times. If we assume that experiential memory provides the principal mechanism for the onward transmission of the influence of a person's past life over his later life, then past experiences and their underlying paradigm scenarios for a particular perception and emotion will be transferred onto scenarios in the present. But when is this temporal transfer appropriate and when not? "If, for example, I have learned my emotions in the context of an original, infantile relationship, what hope is there for an authentic relationship with a radically new object?" (236).

The potential of emotions to mislead lies in the mechanisms that enable the emotions to fulfil their function in shaping and framing our cognitive and decision-making rationality. Emotions continue to be determinants of attention and salience even when they are produced under the influence of more or less defensive psychic operations resulting in control of salience by a paradigm scenario which does not match presenting conditions. De Sousa describes the Freudian transference as the case where

a situation or target evokes an expressive response that is not appropriate to it as a whole but is merely triggered by some partial aspect. The response has been associated with a paradigm scenario, defining an emotion that reads back the paradigm scenario into the present situation. (...) The defining feature (of the semantic structure) is that it lacks *detachability* from the paradigm scenario" (244).

De Sousa acknowledges that the motivation for a salience perception may be a *defence* or a *sublimation*; in this his view of paradigm scenario suggests similarities with a psychoanalytic model of affect. Without the metapsychological and developmental presuppositions of a psychoanalytic paradigm on affect, de Sousa's model has very little to offer by way of explaining the relation between defensive operations and how objects acquire their motivating aspects, or how social rules and norms for emotions get inside us with such ferocity. His position is ultimately that "emotions are essentially mental--even if we grant the possibility that some of them may be unconscious" (de Sousa, 331).

3.3.2 Critique of the cognitive/social constructionist paradigm of emotion

There are useful insights to be conserved from the social constructivist approach; however, the limitations of the various models within the social constructionist orientation to emotion can be argued on a number of grounds. Two specific problems identify questions we can take into the discussion on the psychoanalytic model of affect: 1) the consequences of the rule analogy, taken from language, to emotion (reification); and 2) how internalization of social norms, codes, and rules occurs.

Reification

Applied to emotions rather than to gaming, the rules framework proposed by Averill becomes more problematic. De Sousa argues emotions are not merely moves in a game. If they were, how then would we account for the emotions we ascribe to animals such as fear, grief, revulsion, rage, boredom (1987: 45)? The gaming metaphor works best for emotions which are highly conventionalized both in expression and in occasion. Applied to emotion, the language analogy implies there are emotional grammars and poor knowledge of grammar leads to limited and faulty emotion behaviour. De Sousa does agree that some emotions are more thought dependent than others. The language analogy, however, leads radical constructivists to hold that feelings can only be named and talked about in a social context; that they exist by virtue of conventional consent; and anything we talk about we have to learn to talk about. The constructivist view "might be thought to have been anticipated by La Rochefoucauld's epigram, that hardly anyone would ever fall in love if they hadn't first read about it" (de Sousa, 1987: 44). This echoes the view of the subject we get from Foucault; the subject is non-existent without discourse. The main objection to the social constructivist paradigm of emotion, what de Sousa's calls the contextualist approach, is that "like many antireductionist views, it offers no avenue through which we might look for links between more 'primitive' and more 'elaborate' forms. It turns its back on biology and resuscitates the errors of old-fashioned dualism in a different way" (1987: 45). Of his own position in *The Rationality of Emotion*, de Sousa writes,

Although the view defended here has strong affinities with [that] contextualist theory, my verdict is that emotions are not social creations in the same sense as chess moves or even language. A discrepancy between the socially prescribed scenarios and those that evoke an individual's feelings is not necessarily settled in favour of the public dialect. Once again, we confront the need to recognize a notion of individual normality.

(de Sousa, 1987: 236)³⁸

Although Averill himself noted the limited usefulness of a rule approach to the emotions, no picture of the self as a whole is intelligible from his classificatory schema for the rules of emotion syndromes. But we know that emotion, like meaning, *is for a specific subject or a group of subjects*. Emotion, like meaning, is also of *something*. We can distinguish between a given element--a situation or action--and its

meaning, its emotional semantics *for us*. And whereas things have meaning in a field, so do things have emotional meaning only in relation to the emotional meaning of other things. The 'for-ness' of emotion disappears in the rule-bound approach.

Wollheim's critique of the disappearance of a self that has interiority in constructionist theory holds for Averill's work on emotion rules:

By a constructionist theory I mean a theory--it can be psychological theory or a corporeal theory--that holds that everything that needs to be said about the events that make up the life of a person...can be said without introducing a person who has them. On a constructionist theory a person arrives on the scene only when there is a set of suitably interrelated events, and then the person is or is identical with that set. (...) A constructionist theory, not qualified by further metaphysical assumptions enjoying an independent authority, must allow that there could be events of the kind that normally make up a person's life but that turn out to belong to no one's life.

(Wollheim, 1984: 16)

In lieu of a notion of the self who feels and manages feeling, who wishes and desires, social constructionist orientations to emotion tend to reify the frames (i.e. the rules, the scripts, the paradigm scenarios) for emotion. It would seem that these scripts which organize cognitive attention and physiological sensations act independently of any underlying mental disposition or proprioceptive monitoring. Since these rule frameworks have been given the weightiness appropriate to a notion of a self which has private experience, in effect the capacity to act on feeling derives from the occasion rather than from the individual. Furthermore, what is inaccessible via scripts and rules, precisely because cognitive theory is focussed on the constitutive role of information, are the means to describe adequately how inferences are made from perceptions.

A social constructionist focus on rules is necessarily a focus on social convention and it forfeits sensitivity to the idea that "emotions reflect the individual's sense of the self-relevance of a perceived situation" (Hochschild, 1983: 202). A social constructionist rule-bound approach to emotion by itself is bereft of an openness to the self's motives, beliefs and wants, which compel him to feel something to be true and/or real. Averill's approach shares some similarities with Goffman's notion of surface acting (Hochschild, 1983: 216ff). Averill's classification schema for emotion rules lacks the insights on the inner life of the self provided by an interactionist model

which presumes that there is a reflexive or subjective aspect to emotional signalling. The signal points out to the self the self's, or a part-self's, positioning vis-à-vis another. Emotion reveals the "'me' I put into seeing 'you'" or what Hochschild calls the 'from where I am' quality of emotion (1983: 30). A theory of emotion as a view 'from the inside out' is needed in order to account for why a self might repeatedly violate cultural rules of emotion, acquire a particular style of emotion management as an identifiable emotional signature, and to put this emotional behaviour on a continuum between the normal/conventional and the disturbed.

A social constructionist perspective would agree that emotions create our sense of self-identity, but the rule-bound perspective misses the phenomenological aspect of emotional self-identity on two counts. The focus on rules, as noted above, misses the signalling function of emotion to the self and what follows on it, the capacity for emotional self-monitoring and self-regulating which is part of what contributes to our subjective sense of the coherence and agency of the self. Emotional tolerance relates to the nature of a person's responses to having an emotion. However, the social constructivist perspective never gives the impression that emotions are something a person might experience as overwhelming and develop defences against. Nor can it capture the diversity of results of the process in family cultures by which we, as children, acquire differing capacities to tolerate different emotions through learning and through identification with parents. The identification with parents and imitation of their way of dealing with emotions (which may differ from what they say one should do) become the most important determinants of the patterns the child will develop for himself. While being geared to accounting for disorders in social communication through emotion as the product of poor rule learning, a rule-bound framework on emotion cannot even begin to account for anhedonia or alexithymic disorders in the individual or somatization. Averill's 'neurosis' tag belies 'what it feels like' to have the constitutive rules one has, which may differ from those of others, and how researchers are to begin to sort out what the substance and logic of these idiosyncratic constitutive and regulative rules of appraisal, prognosis, behaviour, and attribution are and how they were acquired. On Averill's rules-description, it would be

difficult to schematize rules appropriate to emotions at different developmental stages as we develop increasing abilities to tolerate anxiety and other painful emotions.

De Sousa has more of a concept of the whole person who has emotions:

because of the complexity of the ways in which our emotions are linked to each other and to our other mental states, they account for what makes us one continuing person as opposed to a succession of person-slices. (324)

De Sousa's position on the authenticity of emotion is framed by his formal classification of emotions and their objects--the rightness of the correspondence of the emotion type to the target--not by an analysis of the phenomenological sense of our continuity. The determination of the authenticity of emotions relies on formal criteria for him not phenomenological ones. Unlike Hochschild who appears to make the spontaneity of emotions the proof of their authenticity (i.e. as having a relation to what the subject values), and of the person who has them, de Sousa's work would suggest the axiological level of emotions, not their spontaneity, is the key which links emotions to a sense of personal authenticity. "Simply going with one's feelings is not the royal road to authenticity" (264). Emotions can be self-deceptive in that they do not always lead us directly to what we value.

What is so profoundly insightful about de Sousa's approach to emotion (and what makes resuming the major lines of his thought so difficult) is his picture of emotion as inseparable from cognition, action, and value. In this his work resembles the new orientation of cultural anthropologists who speak of 'culturally constituted cognitive coping strategies' or of 'culturally formed cognitive schemas.' These cultural models "are learned, internalized patterns of thought-feeling that mediate both the interpretation of on-going experience and the reconstruction of memories" (D'Andrade and Strauss, 1992: 3). "When we speak of 'mind' or 'cognitive representations' we refer to psychic processes and states in which thought and feeling are linked" (1992: 2). Strauss, the co-editor of *Human Motives and Cultural Models*, tells us that new models of mind which integrate what nineteenth-century psychology took to be separate faculties of cognition, emotion, and motivation are being formulated in cultural anthropology to emphasize the interdependence of these aspects of the psyche; the self has become a "thought-feeling" construct. New models of mind have allowed

researchers to investigate the hypothesis that cultural models have motivational force because not only do they describe and name the world, desires and conscious and unconscious goals are embedded in them (1992: 3). The work of cultural anthropologists such as Michelle Rosaldo (1984) has been revolutionary for the study of emotion since she encouraged her colleagues to recognize that "knowing the feelings that people associate with different cultural models as a result of their specific life experiences is crucial in order to understand what motivates them" (D'Andrade, 1992: 14).

Inasmuch as de Sousa's notion of paradigm scenario may be used to refer both to scenarios which are socially normative as well as scenarios which are the norm for an individual, he allows that so called pathological emotions and their expression--what Averill would call neurotic--are nevertheless intelligible, even rational, within the experiential world of that particular individual. Averill does not find atypical emotions to be promising avenues for research into the sources and contexts through which we acquire constitutive and regulative emotion rules nor does he express curiosity about the circumstances which lead us to violate rules we may once have implicitly known. On the other hand, de Sousa's concept of paradigm scenario stresses the formative, enduring, and tenacious influence of early emotion scenarios which involves relations among objects, aims, and motivating aspects. In de Sousa's notion of a paradigm scenario for an emotion, I suggest, we can flesh out the concept of (dis)position as the emotional self whose being in the world is organized by a propensity to particular types of perceptual/attentional salience discriminations in which are embedded motivations, attitudes and values. A repertoire of paradigm scenarios make up the emotional disposition of each of us. The paradigm scenarios making up a person's emotional repertoire are amenable to description in terms of Averill's notion of rules and norms (of prognosis, attribution, behaviour, etc.).

If we return to our example from Chapter 1 of Will and Bev and the emotional dance in which they are engaged as they discuss abortion, we now have a social constructivist rules orientation by which to explain their emotional responses. From the statements of each respecting what made them sad as they discussed the abortion, as well as third-party observations of their expressive behaviour, a list of rules of

appraisal, behaviour, prognosis, attribution could be extrapolated. A rules approach might confirm that Bev and Will draw on culturally appropriate social roles with respect to private expressions of loss. Nevertheless, there is no category in Averill's typology to account for not only the aspect of complementarity in Will and Bev's emotional labour, but the necessary quality of the precise steps of their emotional dance, which might, as a recurrent and dependable feature of this couple's emotional interaction, be called their identifying emotional signature or style together. The timing and onslaught of Will's distress points to something other than what can be explained through a social constructivist rules approach.

Recall that we noted when Bev stopped feeling grief and decided on an abortion Will then found himself overwhelmed with sadness. Most clearly in the context of emotional communication between intimates such as the members of a couple, the 'from-to' or positioning quality of any particular emotion both depends upon and expects to elicit a complementary 'from-to' quality in the emotional behaviour of one's emotional interlocutor *for reasons other than social proscription and prescription*. The 'rules' regulating the necessary and fixed quality of the couple's emotional waltz may be a function of the requirement each has to regulate the tension or relief associated with the expectation of emotional response from the other where this expectation is the product of past experience encoded in the rules of appraisal and prognosis peculiar to the paradigm scenario which produces that emotion in that person. Consequently, the rules directing the couple's interaction is less a function of a requirement to regulate *actual* conflicts in time present produced by differences in their respective emotional repertoires. Only a psychoanalytic model of affect has the theoretical equipment to engage with two issues raised by the Will/Bev example: (a) the source of the intransigent quality of the motivating aspect of a focal object for a self which makes an emotion undetachable from a paradigm scenario to the extent that it is reality distorting, and (b) whether the difficult, somewhat nebulous category which Averill, in his 1986 typology, calls the heuristic rule of emotion (which applies to the way rules of appraisal, behaviour, prognosis are exercised) can be given a psychological rather than a sociological dilation in terms of what psychology calls defences, where projection, the attribution to another of what the self is feeling but is

unable to recognize, is one example. Some of what we do not know about ourselves reappears through projection in terms of the emotions others feel when with us. This occurrence is basic to the analytical counter-transference. Projection participates in maintaining a particular configuration of meanings and relations to objects in the internal object world. Projection may be the framing emotional defence to which Will is forced to resort by the demands of his internal object world; these demands also require him to construe the abortion debate in terms of 'regrettable choices' which leave him calm and resolute since it is 'ultimately Bev's choice because it is Bev's body' while Beverley, finding those terms frustratingly incomplete because Will seems to so little recognize the implications of the loss *they* would be facing by her having the abortion, expresses her sadness and anger more intensely than she might have had he showed through sadness that he shared her 'salience perception.'

Remarkably, Russell, Averill and other social constructivists, with the exception of de Sousa, introduce their paradigms for emotion without reference to gender. A rule-bound approach to emotion would seem designed to identify the gendered prescriptive and proscriptive socially sanctioned explicit and implicit conventions for emotions. Their treatment of anger, much discussed in feminist and self-help circles, is a case in point. In *Anger and Aggression. An Essay on Emotion*, Averill maintains there is no evidence for the feminist hypothesis, presented by authors such as Adrienne Rich, Phyllis Chesler, and Harriet Lerner, that women in western culture, due to the predominance of their roles as wives and mothers, suffer the consequences of a societal proscription of female anger, both in terms of recognizing its legitimacy and its expression. He maintains studies of sex differences in the self-reported experience of anger found few reliable differences due to sex, except for the incidence of crying; men and women were far more similar than dissimilar (1982: 286-297, 314-315). On the other hand, de Sousa appeals precisely to feminist authors for examples of how gender socialization affects anger and jealousy (1987: 258-261). The difference between them is that the rule-bound approach cannot capture the struggle between an individual's self definition and society's, which will depend on how congruent an individual's idiosyncratic rules are with socially prescribed rules. Much could be said about the methods by which these two researchers arrived at different conclusions.

Averill's conclusions are remarkable given the findings of feminist psychotherapy which is able to unearth not only a woman's memories of incidents when she was angry and expressed it, but those incidents when she was angry and felt ashamed or guilty to have such a response *and how the idiosyncratic rules of her personal paradigm scenarios for anger* provided the regulative prescriptive and proscriptive rules of appraisal, behaviour, prognosis, and so on. For instance, the authors of *Women's Growth in Connection* hold the view that our society does not permit women to be validly angry except in the case of the defence of their children (1991); this reinforces the social construction of women's role as nurturer and caretaker of the weak. While expressions of anger are often thought to lend a male more authority, they diminish a woman's authority (except in her defence of the vulnerable) because they are met with judgements of her angry behaviour as irrational, hysterical, illogical, silly, too emotional.³⁹ A central area of concern in feminist approaches to women's psychology and psychotherapy is on rethinking the assumptions about the rules of emotion to which psychiatrists appeal when they are trying to understand a woman client's emotions as signs of mental illness or as justifiable responses to systemic conditions.⁴⁰

Internalization

Internalization is a black box for social constructivists. Obviously writing scripts for discrete emotion events or typologies of rules, as we saw above in Tables I and III, has nothing to do with explaining how these rules, if understood by social actors in the same form, get 'inside' them even when internalization of social norms for emotion is expected to occur through language. Averill notes that there are three major traditions in social psychology with respect to emotional development: nativist, social learning, sociological (Averill, 1982: 332).⁴¹ However, Averill's rules approach ignores the incongruence of rules with subjective experiences and beliefs. It is not enough to know what information people are exposed to; it is necessary to study how they internalize that information. While the social learning tradition focuses on internalization through the practices of everyday life, it has a problem in showing "how regularities in emotion behaviour reflect cognitive patterns unconsciously

extracted from repeated experience" (D'Andrade and Strauss, 1992: 22). In general, the failure to internalize social rules is attributed by the social constructionist position to linguistic limitations and poor knowledge of emotion concepts. Interesting differences in atypical behaviour, which Averill simply calls 'neurotic,' disappear into the global category of 'faulty learning.' De Sousa, on the other hand, allows that pathological versus normal emotional behaviour can be the product not of an omission (the failure to learn a rule) but a commission of an act (the control of salience by an abnormal scenario).⁴²

Internalization is essentially a question of the relevance of the paedogenetic impress. Averill asks: To what extent are adult emotional experiences similar to those of young children?

Most contemporary theories of emotion assume an essential continuity between the emotional life of children and adults. By contrast, a social constructivist view assumes that emotional syndromes can be acquired at any age; and that even when there is continuity (as between the anger of the child and that of the adult), the transformation may be so great that one can speak of the 'same' anger in only a limited sense.

(Averill, 1986: 110)

I think the issue is badly formulated. The issue is not whether emotion syndromes as a whole carry on from childhood, but whether one or more components are brought forward largely unchanged: for instance, the rules of appraisal or behaviour.

Averill's attribution of atypical rule use to faulty learning excludes all the interesting questions about the relation between an internal psychopolitics and emotion behaviour. From abnormal rule use and inappropriate emotion display, Averill can tell us nothing about individual wishes and yearnings which may be accessible precisely through the discernment of the paradigm scenarios for what are considered to be inappropriate emotions or abnormal emotional responses. Nor can Averill's approach develop the idea that defences influence salience perceptions. Cognition, whose inferential processes are constitutive of emotion rules, may be caught up in defensive psychical operations such as splitting and projection which affect how and when the rules of appraisal, attribution, and prognosis are invoked. De Sousa's approach to emotion protects the idiosyncratic aspect of emotion; however, the weighty

propositional structure he employs overshadows questions to do with the psychic mechanisms by which paradigm scenarios are produced in the first place.

3.4 Psychoanalytical paradigm of emotion (affect)

To answer the questions: "What are emotions? What do they do? What are they for?" the social constructivist and cognitive views examined the semantic domain of emotion words and their contexts of use to infer the cognitive categories presumed to underpin people's understanding of emotion concepts. The epistemological privileging of observable events such as linguistic interaction led to a methodological preference for the study of language itself rather than to an inquiry into feelings analysable by introspection of internal states. In its anthropological application, the 'denaturalizing' orientation of the social constructivist view revealed that every culture has an ethnotheory of emotion, that is, a set of implicit and explicit rules for what to feel and when to display feelings. This tacit knowledge of what emotions mean and of how they function as social glue is the outcome of "a set of principles and connections [which has] elaborate ramifications for...social life." (M. Rosaldo, 1980: 45 in Russell, 1991b: 432). Emotions are motivators for action and therefore regulators of interpersonal interaction; their rules for display vary with cultures and with male and female gendered persons within a culture.

A psychoanalytic theory of affect, on the other hand, addresses the internal factors organizing or regulating emotion, factors which may not be amenable to subsumption under the script or paradigm scenario descriptions of emotion as they presently stand. A psychoanalytic paradigm of affect differs in the main from all other paradigms because it locates the origin of the force or intensity of emotions in our idiosyncratic, unconscious transformations of experience, beginning in infancy, through which affects come to be attached to internal objects (imagoes) in a highly personal and intransigent way. These early linkages become the internal predispositions by which experience is affectively figured in later life. The psychoanalytic relationship has been described as one of the few human interactions where the child in the adult is allowed to speak precisely because the *lingua franca* of the *infans* is "the language of infancy," emotional expression (Emde, 1989). The clinical relationship, whose data

is always in conversation with a slowly evolving though sometimes anachronistic psychoanalytic metapsychology, offers a privileged site and method of investigation into the origins of the conditions and structures of our emotional life. This investigation proceeds not through introspection alone or transference onto the analyst but through that part of herself the analysand can access by a detour through the other, the psychoanalyst's counter-transference.

It remains to be seen if psychoanalytic research on the emotions can supplement cognitive psychological models of emotion, or even enter into a conversation with the social constructivist models since the latter use a vocabulary of scripts, rules, linguistic propositions, rationality, roles and paradigm scenarios whereas psychoanalytic approaches beginning with Freud speak in terms of energy, cathexis, desire, wish, and defence. What benefits would accrue to an endeavour to make translations or comparisons across these disciplinary domains? One immediate benefit of interdisciplinary dialogue is that one approach may offer strengths in the face of an aporia within another approach. Such is the case of psychoanalytic perspectives on emotion in light of the theoretical limitations of social constructivist and cognitive orientations to offer hypotheses about affect in its dynamic sense: about its function with respect to unconscious processes, to intrusive emotions, and to the links between emotions and identifications. While the social constructivist and cognitive perspectives open up the concept of emotion to analysis as a cultural construct thereby enabling the investigation of the specifics of differences in emotions in terms of socio-cultural patterns of interpersonal interaction, the social function of emotions, and so on, these two perspectives have closed down avenues of investigation of emotion and its relationship: (a) to inner worlds and to the unconscious, (b) to early body experiences and their significance for later emotional life, and (c) to identifications and the cognitions they support.

'Affects,' the term of art used in psychoanalytic parlance to refer to emotions and their relation to the mental symbolization which permits thinking, have been accounted for under the descriptions offered by two different genetic hypotheses: the drive/defence model, associated with Freud, and the object-relations approach, associated with such figures as Melanie Klein (1948), Hannah Segal (1955), Ronald

Fairbairn (1952), Alice and Michael Balint ([1952] 1985), and Donald Winnicott (1971). Each genetic hypothesis has contributed to the formulation of an 'organizational model of affects' (Emde, 1989; Emde and Buchsbaum, 1989), widely assumed by psychoanalytic practitioners today, which considers affects

as complex states rooted in biology, with direct feelings of pleasure and unpleasure, but seated in the ego and involving perceptual, evaluative, and cognitive functions. Affect structures as active agencies have signal functions and therefore have an important role in the regulation of mental functioning and behavior.

(Emde and Buchsbaum, 1989: 213)

However, debate on the nature of affects remains an ongoing and lively area in contemporary psychoanalysis not the least of the reasons for this being the repercussions for metapsychology of contradictions in Freud's formulations of affect.⁴³ The problem of affects for psychoanalytic metapsychology is articulated through two lines of questioning: (1) What is the relation between affects and symbolization (thought); and (2) What is the dynamic sense of affects? What are their vicissitudes? Are affects a quantitative or qualitative phenomena, quotas of energy or value attributions?

3.4.1 Affects and the drive-derivative hypothesis

Freud's models of affect were embedded within his metapsychology of psychic energy and reflected the evolution in his thinking which never resolved completely difficulties created by the two horses he was trying to ride: a mechanistic theory with his economic and topographical points of view, and a personal theory with his dynamic point of view, which produced genetic hypotheses about psychopathology and family relationships.

His earliest models of affect evolved through two versions of a mechanistic stimulus-response (S-R) relationship.⁴⁴ In Variant I of the S-R model, associated with Freud's 1895 "Project," emotions were defined as passive, mechanical responses to external stimuli. This view reflected Freudian metapsychology's beginnings as a psychobiology rather than a psychodynamics. As discharge phenomena, affects were determined by quantities of excitation which operated on a single axis: discharge of tension brought pleasure while an increase of excitation brought displeasure. Since

affect was associated with quantities or 'quotas' as he called them, it operated according to an economy which led to Freud's failure, in this early phase of his thinking, to recognize the qualitative aspect of affect and "the role of transformations implied in the notion of economy" (Green, 1986: 190). The background to the first S-R model was Freud's first topographic description of the mind in which no relation was posited between quotas of affect and ideas.⁴⁵ This first S-R model participated in and contributed to a hydraulic view of the body as a container threatening to 'explode' or 'overflow' until equilibrium is restored by an 'outburst' of emotion. This view is still prevalent in the psychophysiological symbolism of both our clinical-folk and indigenous-folk psychologies, as Lakoff and Johnson have pointed out in *Metaphors We Live By*.

In Variant II of the S-R model, coextensive with Freud's libido theory (approximately 1900-1923), an internal stimulus or drive replaced the external stimulus as the main cause of excitation (Emde, 1989: 169). This was based on a view of the ego as a control apparatus which defends itself against assaults by instinctual forces from the id. Instinct was seen as organic phenomena which generate tension; affects were discharge processes which release tension and which have the potential of disorganizing psychic activity since massive quantities of affect were believed to act like an external trauma (Green, 1986: 175). Pleasure continues to be seen as a byproduct of tension reduction. But now it has to do with detensioning around different zones and organs of the body since instincts are identified with a developmental stage (oral, anal, phallic, genital) and a zone (source of somatic excitation) in which they are most interested. Variant II of the drive-reduction model of affects endured in psychoanalytic thinking in spite of Freud's acknowledgement that differences in qualities of affects could not be accounted for by differences in quantities of drive (Emde, 1989: 169). In fact, this pleasure/pain account of early psychodynamics posits as a given the polarized organization of affect without accounting for types of emotions. It also caught Freud up in the contradiction of positing that the ego is pleasure seeking and seeks to avoid excitation; however, excitation is required as a precondition to its reduction which brings pleasure (Green, 1986: 176).⁴⁶

Freud began studying affects from the perspective of groupings of neurotic symptoms and categories of syndromes--hysteria, paranoia--which served as criteria for evaluations of psychic functioning according to a description of the 'vicissitudes' or different relations between representations and affect (Green, 1986: 212). Freud and Breuer discovered the apparent therapeutic value of emotional discharge (abreaction) when they treated hysterical patients, the most famous case of which was Breuer's patient, Anna O. Abreaction was proposed as releasing the affect attached to a traumatic memory. Failing such release, the affect remains attached to the memory which leads to the persistence of a group of ideas forming the basis of neurotic symptoms. "Freud considered recollection of trauma to be effective in therapeutic change only when recovery of the memory brought about the revival of the affect originally attached to it" (Greenberg and Safran, 1987: 16).

Up to 1923, Freud's theory favours representation over affect as the *organizational principle* of the psychic apparatus (Green, 1986: 9). However, with the second topographic model, presented in *The Ego and the Id* in 1923, a third model of affects began to take shape in Freud's thinking where the gulf between affects and thought is diminished. In *The Ego and the Id*, Freud also implied affects were "highly composite" or complex structures which include motoric perceptions and direct feelings of pleasure and unpleasure. His formulation of the signal affects (depression and anxiety) allowed that they "were located within the ego (or superego), that they include cognitive aspects, that they organize mental functioning and behavior (both conscious and unconscious), and that they are rooted in biology" (Emde, 1989: 174). So affects, initially described as drive derivative, had the characteristics of ego functions attributed to them. They were both physiological and ideational.⁴⁷ Inseparable from cognition, as both *organizing* and *motivating* factors for mental functioning and behaviour, emotions had become signals.

Freud made anxiety the prototype affect for analytic theory and discussed its signal function. Anxiety posed many problems for Freud's quantitative model of affect while putting his economic and topographic theories into conflict. For instance, under the economic hypothesis, affect has to be made unconscious by inhibition while, under the topographic point of view, it is representations which must be made unconscious

(Green, 1986: 184). It proposed that the signal function of anxiety prevents the individual from becoming overwhelmed by states of helplessness "which in turn are linked to specific, hierarchically arranged early affective structures which have been experienced in development" (Emde, 1989: 172). Emde and Buchsbaum hold that evidence from infancy research shows the usefulness of Freud's later organizational model. Affects do seem to organize mental functioning and behaviour since "they function as motivational signals which are at first predominantly biosocial and then psychological" (Emde, 1989: 214).⁴⁸

Although affects were associated with internal perception and given a signal function, the possibility that they might be unconscious had not been resolved.

Internal perceptions yield sensations of processes arising in the most diverse and certainly also in the deepest strata of the mental apparatus. Very little is known about the sensations and feelings; those belonging to the pleasure-unpleasure series may still be regarded as the best examples of them. They are more primordial, more elementary, than perception arising externally and they can come about even when consciousness is clouded.

(Freud, 1923: 21-22)

Green points out that "what Freud underlines in this new formulation is the more primitive, more elementary character of this type of sensation, and hence their deep bodily location" (1986: 185).

Affects and Symbolization

Prior to 1923, the ideational representative was identified as the representative of the drive. However, by 1923, symbol formation, or thinking, was presumed to occur in response to the drives as they encountered obstacles to their satisfaction, be they from the external world or from defences erected by a psychic agency such as the superego. Affect, a quantitative phenomenon according to Freud's original energy model, by the post-1923 phase of his thinking had become attached to 'objects,' internal representations which the instincts identified as offering satisfaction by cathexis.⁴⁹ Beginning with the second variant of the S-R model, *affect assumes a semantic function without fully losing its discharge aspect*.⁵⁰

The whole problem for metapsychology is to know how the 'idea' which forms an integral part of the nature of affect differs from what is conventionally called an

idea, the content (Green, 1986: 197). Green seems to be suggesting mental processes and mental contents may not be as divisible as suggested by the language of quantities of affect and representations. Green points out that Freud's later thinking inclined toward a semantics for affect.

What prevented Freud from coining this word [*Affekts- repräsentanz*] is an internal contradiction which it appears to contain in the conceptual framework of his time. It seems to me that today there is nothing unacceptable in this contradiction. It is in any case less unacceptable than the contradiction which made Freud conceive of the unconscious state of affect only in the form of a simple quota.

(Green, 1986: 189)

Affect and Psychic Defences

There is no single interpretation of whether Freud believed there could be unconscious affect (or whether it was the idea alone that was unconscious). Emde points out that as the structural model of the mind replaced the topographical one, "by implication affects functioned not only as unconscious monitors, but also as monitors at the preconscious and conscious levels" (1989:172). However, while Freud stated that affects must be conscious, he also stated that anxiety and guilt function unconsciously, which implies that affect was attached to that part of the idea that had been banished to the unconscious, what he called the 'thing-presentation.' Green, on the other hand, avers that it is possible to speak of an unconscious modality for affect. With the second topographic model and the assigning of a signal or declamatory function for affect, Freud proposed a concept of internal trauma "created by the inevitable but quantitatively and qualitatively variable failure of the object to provide mothering" (Green, 1986: 189). In *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926) Freud displaced the emphasis he had given castration anxiety in the Oedipus complex to recognize separation anxiety. Signal anxiety "brings the functioning of affective life more in line with that of thought, and traumatic anxiety which remains the expression of psychic disorganization which is unspeakable, in the strict sense of the word" (Green, 1986: 191). In the analytic relationship of patient to analyst, any replacement of verbalization by non-verbal elements is taken as a sign of psychical conflict requiring a solution which demonstrates a certain degree of censorship. Affects signal

repression is operating since "it seems likely that censorship interferes to a minor extent when words are replaced by images, to a greater extent when words are replaced by affects, and to an even greater extent when acting out or bodily states come to the forefront" (Green, 1986: 307).

Freud posits that relations among affects are created by the demands of repression. Under the repressive activity of the censor (in the dynamic model), transformations of affect could take the form of either displacement onto another idea or the actual change of the affect into another type (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 224). In fact, according to Green (1986: 187), by 1927, in the essay "Fetishism," Freud has admitted affect can be repressed (*Verdrängung*) while disavowal (*Verleugnung*) is a vicissitude of the idea. He had formerly reserved repression for the representation. The single, essential difference between affect and representation "is the impossibility of affects being in direct conjunction with the verbal mnemonic traces" (Green, 1986: 186). However, verbalization induces the affect:

Affect is an original subjective modality. For all that, its expressive dimension does not exclude it from semantic material. This supposes the transmission of a communication from affect to affect, or a consensus on the spoken messages which refer to it, whilst the information retains an allusive status.

(Green, 1986: 186)

3.4.2 An object-relations hypothesis for affects

An object-relations approach to the self is to Freudian metapsychological views of emotion what the social constructivist approach was to the Standard view of emotion. Both refuse an ontogenetic solution for emotion (i.e. that emotion is to be explained within the terms of a "one-body psychology" (Rickman in Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 277)) to hold instead that affect is not solely or necessarily a derivative of drive but a response to stimuli, a response which originates in the body, and later becomes a form of psychological signalling and social signalling by having been made meaningful through the response of others in the external environment. Thus, the importance of an object-relations view of the internal world of persons versus a drive-reduction model of the psychic apparatus is a more complex theory of the aims, objects, and modes of the drives, of neuroses, as well as a different perspective on the

developmental tasks of the self. Theorists such as Klein, Brierley, Segal, and Fairbairn of the British School "include the question of representation and affects in the framework of object-relations" (Green, 1986: 9). Object-relations is a theory of early psychological development which provides the terms for the first identifications and formation of 'internal objects.' Many have pointed to the centrality of affects for object relations (Emde, 1989: 175); "from the beginning the very process of internalization of social objects is an affective one" (Emde and Buchsbaum, 1989: 217). In other words, an emotional experience always *entails a linkage between an affect and an internal object*.

It is in the study of how affects get attached to internal objects that we have finally come upon some conceptual tools with which to pursue Rose's hypothesis that ideology works at the rudimentary level of identity and the drives. She assumes that ideology is implicated in *the processes* of self-formation because she takes a view of the unconscious as "the discourse of the Other." However, culture (or ideology Rose might prefer) operates outside language paradigms; evidence of the identity of the self is as much a product of how the self feels as how it construes its identity conceptually. We have seen that the social constructivist paradigm which introduces the social through scripts and rules for emotion display enables the study of how culture sculpts different emotional realities for men and women by allocating different rules of prognosis, attribution, etc. to events in which men and women are actors (we recall the Will and Bev example from Chapter 1). But we have also seen that the social constructivist approach, a view 'from the outside,' fails as a view 'from the inside' because it cannot account for internalization. It is only with a concept of links between intrapsychic and sociocultural phenomena and emotion that we have found a means to follow the lines of desire back to the hooks implanted in our bodies: affects, and defences against affects, which make us feel real and secure. The missing concepts in Rose's formulation of the problem of ideology for cultural research are emotion and internal objects.

Let us look at what happens to the concept of 'object' under an object-relations' description. 'Object' has a long history in the psychoanalytic literature (Strachey, 1941); however, according to André Green, "there is no convergence of

views about what is meant by *an object* in the diverse theoretical orientations" (1986: 193). Flax's non-specialist formulation is useful:

Psychoanalysts tend to call other persons objects. This terminology is meant to do justice to the ways in which we do objectify persons--through projection and introjection, for example--and to point to the process through which the cluster of feelings, experience and fantasies we have with and about other persons become *our* object, that is, part of our internal mental life and structure. In turn, these now internal processes can become an object for consciousness as we attempt to uncover their social roots, in analysis for example. In this sense, subject and object are aspects of one continuous process.

(Flax, 1983: 274)⁵¹

Whereas the drive-reduction model of the instincts and of psychological organization offered a view of the object as the libidinal target of the instincts, an object-relations model offers a different perspective on objects and their genesis. It puts the development of the object back into the subject's history of interrelationships and interactions (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 277).⁵²

Social origins of internal objects

The distinction drawn by Freud between the instinctual *object* and the instinctual *aim* was troubled by the object-relations questioning of the dominance of the instinctual, drive-reduction model of psychic operations; Fairbairn asked, "Is the libido object-seeking or pleasure-seeking?". The role of instinct as pleasure seeking, where pleasure is the mechanical response to a reduction in tension, is assigned a secondary importance by object-relations theorists. The concept of aim, where aim meant, under Freud, the sexual satisfaction of a particular erotogenic zone, gives way to the concept of relationship (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 280). For the object-relations school of metapsychology, drives are always directed toward objects, a view also to be found in attachment theory (Jones, 1983). Fairbairn revised Freud's libidinal theory of development based on erotogenic zones into a developmental theory based on different techniques of response to varying kinds of internal objects.⁵³

An inherent aspect of the concept of internal object is not the idea of a thing or a person but the idea of a *relationship to another person*. This entails a view of pleasure as the product of relations with the object. Pleasure comes to be defined "in

terms of desire for the interactive presence of the object, and the fantasy productions which spin off from this desire" rather than in terms of "the primordial aim-oriented discharge economics of the pain-reality principle" (Levin, 1989: 495). Our experience is organized by configurations of self and object, to which are attached affects, which are part of the structure of our unconscious world. These affects, objects, and symbols are produced out of relational experiences which gradually form the internal world *from earliest infancy*. Implicit in the drive-derivative model (as well as in cognitive approaches to emotion) is a view that object-relations theory rejects, that of there being developmental hierarchies of affect, with early, reflex-like structures and later, more complex structures involving higher forms of representation with and without conflict. This view complements developmental theory which postulates that increasing degrees of object permanence permit the infant increasingly complex interactions with the external world. This view of early or primary affects also has parallels with cross-cultural research on semantic primitives (Russell, 1991a,b). With maturation and development, the number of affects increases (Emde, 1989: 175). On the other hand, Melanie Klein represents the most extreme opposition to this developmental model by positing the existence of moral emotions--guilt and depressiveness--from the earliest months.

The production of the internal object world begins in infancy and "in a mode of life so inescapably social that most of what the infant does, feels, and perceives occur(s) in different kinds of relationships" (Levin, 1989: 350). Object-relations assumes that emotions occur in relational events, past and present, and affects came into being and became attached to early important internalized objects. In fact, it has been argued that these objects need to be reexperienced affectively for a successful psychoanalysis and "many affects express basic identifications" (Emde, 1989: 176). Against the ego psychological view that "differentiation from the other is an important prerequisite for symbolization" (Levin, 1989: 401), Levin proposes in a view much closer to the object-relations school that the semantic domain emerges in the activity of differentiation itself, rather than as a result of it (this implies a refutation of the primary narcissism hypothesis). To answer Fairbairn's question above, we must first ask: What does the infant or individual bring to the process of object formation and

what does the external world, in the form of relationships with the infant body and, later, with the adult body, bring to the formation and peculiar character of these internal objects? (i.e. objects are internalized through introjection, projection, identification, etc. and these are expressive of relations to people)

It is the work of Melanie Klein and of those inspired by her--Brierley, Segal, the Balints, Fairbairn, and Winnicott--which emphasizes the emotional complexity of object relations in the pre-Oedipal phase of childhood, before language acquisition. The object-relations school of thought amended Freud by insisting that drives never operate solely with the aim of discharge and satisfaction but always in conjunction with an ego which symbolically 'creates' or perceives the need-satisfying object and endows it with emotional significance (Levin, 1989: 321).

The analysis of very young children has taught me that there is no instinctual urge, no anxiety situation, no mental process which does not involve objects, external or internal; *in other words, object-relations are the centre of emotional life.* Furthermore, love and hatred, phantasies, anxieties, and defences are also operative from the beginning and are *ab initio* indivisibly linked with object-relations.

(Melanie Klein in Levin, 1989: 320)

So significant are these object-relations that objects are more than the target of the instinctual aim, they act upon the subject to persecute him or reassure him (this is how the motivational force from the past inheres in desires presently felt). The move of the object-relations school to intertwine primary affective development with object relations was clearest in the important theoretical step, made by Marjorie Brierley (1937), to speak "of *object cathexes rather than of affective charge of ideas* and to underline the inadequacy of the quantitative standpoint" (Green, 1986: 198).

Affects have to do initially with primitive sensibility which precedes cognition. They also hold that internal representations of objects (persons) are produced through fantasized gratifications of needs. So the affect--which begins as a need gratification, hunger, and becomes pleasure with a satisfactory feeding--is gradually accompanied by an image of the satisfying object, the breast. Object-relations theory would argue that because we need more than drive-satisfaction, we have needs for relationships, the image of the satisfying relational object includes a more developed image of the mother as other, not solely as a part-object, the breast.

Object-relations theorists Michael and Alice Balint developed the notion of a primary object relationship, the infant with the caretaker, which has fundamental consequences for infantile experience (Chodorow, 1978: 70) and for the Freudian hypothesis of primary narcissism.⁵⁴ In contrast to Freud and to the ego psychologists, the Balints developed hypotheses about primary love to explain the cathexis of that person or persons who are particularly important to the pre-verbal infant in providing satisfaction and holding. The hypothesis of primary love maintains that infants have a primary need for human contact for itself. Bowlby, in turn, argues from his own research on the development of attachment behaviour in infants and from ethology that "there is in infants an in-built propensity to be in touch with and to cling to a human being. In this sense there is a 'need' for an object independent of food which is as primary as the 'need' for food and warmth" (Bowlby, 1969: 222 in Chodorow, 1978: 65). Another group of object-relations theorists--Klein, Fairbairn, Benedek--cohere around the more libidinally determined view that object-relations derive from specific libidinal modes and zones.

In answer to his own question, Fairbairn maintains that all object-relationships are primarily based on the oral incorporative, 'taking' mode: oral dependence is not solely the need for food but also the need for relationship to the orally providing mother (Chodorow, 1978: 66). Symbolization begins out of

the child's first interests and impulses which are directed to his parents' bodies and to his own; and it is those objects and impulses existing in the unconscious which give rise to all further interests by way of symbolization...In the analytic view, the child's interest in the external world is determined by a series of displacements of affect and interest from the earliest to ever new objects.

(Segal, 1986: 51)

"The reality principle intrudes on an emotional level as well as on the cognitive level. The child comes to recognize that its mother is a separate being with separate interests and activities" (Chodorow, 1978: 69). The child's production of an image of the mother as an other, with an internal world too, is the way the child first experiences reality (Levin, 1989).

The work of the object-relations theorists clearly addresses the black hole of internalization through the notion of internal objects, which the social constructivist

approach to emotion was not able to chart. "From the beginning the very process of internalization of social objects is an affective one" (Emde, 1989: 217). While Freud's view of the defences was that they were the psyche's method of coping with the frustration of the drives (and fantasy is defined accordingly as an image of the wished for but unattained satisfaction), an object-relations view reconceptualizes defences as *types of relations to objects* such as introjection, projection, identification, repression. Levin points out that the habitual method of defining the difference between internal objects and the self is "to rank them on a developmental scale graduating from incorporation to identification" (1989: 456);⁵⁵ the earliest relations to objects are described by the processes of introjection and projection which are the prototypes of identification.⁵⁶

Identification is the psychical operation which constitutes the human subject. The importance of identification was signalled in Freud's second theory of the psychical apparatus, the structural or tripartite model, where the "individual's mental agencies are no longer described in terms of systems in which images, memories and psychical 'contents' are inscribed, but rather as the relics (in different modes) of object-relationships" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 207). Fantasy supports certain types of identifications where the self, or one of its psychical agencies (i.e. the superego) is organized on the model of earlier objects, such as parents (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1982: 206). If disturbances in the ego's relation to objects are reflected in disturbances of symbol formation as Hanna Segal proposes (1986: 52), then what is the relationship between an internal object world, symbolization, and affects?

Thinking through fantasy: from RIG's to paradigm scenarios for affect

Two psychoanalytic schools of thought exist on fantasy, its origins and functions. In classical Freudian psychoanalysis, the contents of thinking (the representational world, i.e. a fantasy) are always separated from the processes which produced them (i.e. a drive and defence). So a fantasy is a by-product of something else. Laplanche and Pontalis describe the fantasmatic process in this way:

"[U]nconscious ideas are organized into phantasies or imaginary scenarios to which the instinct becomes fixated and which may be conceived of as true *mises en scène*

[performances] of desire" (1988: 475). On the other hand, for those in the object-relations tradition who follow Melanie Klein, psychic process is not differentiated from its contents or products: "a fantasy is not a mental content or a representation: it is the psychic process itself" (Levin, 1989: 434). The key to the Kleinian alternative notion of fantasy as thinking is the relation between symbolization and internal objects. Fantasy describes the way internal objects are organized and the manner in which they influence perception. On this account, fantasy is more than a mediation of experience, it is a *precondition of experience by virtue of being a perceptual grid, a propensity to ascribe salience, intensity, interest, value to certain phenomena and not to others*.

A recent and challenging interdisciplinary inquiry (Levin, 1989) into the prelinguistic conditions of symbolization and meaning makes a convincing case for the significance of debates between psychoanalysts, developmental theorists, and neonatal researchers for a discussion of emotion in the context of a theory of the object and of what Green calls 'primary symbolization' (1986: 211). Two ideas in Levin's thesis are suggestive for the ambition of making translations between the sociocentric social constructivist paradigm and the psychoanalytic 'view from the inside': the prelinguistic origins of affect and affect's relation to "representations which have been generalized" (RIG's).⁵⁷

Levin's revisionist aim is to develop Freud's inspiration to link the genesis of meaning to bodily experience--essentially a claim for the prelinguistic foundations of meaning--by bringing forward neonatal discoveries about infant symbolization and communication. He performs a critique of dominant assumptions in psychoanalytic thinking about drive theory and primary narcissism, and in cognitive psychology about the onset of representation and of object constancy as the necessary conditions for thinking. Arguing against Piaget's epigenetic developmental theory that mental representations are the basis for intrapsychic activity and thinking, and against the metapsychological gratification-frustration model of ego development, Levin makes the case for a different view of thinking, as symbolization based on bodily experience of self and other. Meaning, he holds, can be prelinguistic and embodied in affect. Affect's inherent meaningfulness due to its bodily beginnings has analogies with the

meaning of a symbol. The Greek 'symbolon' referred to two halves of a pottery inscription broken and shared between friends on parting (Levin, 1989: 2). If a symbol implies a bond between persons in a relationship, Levin tells us, then thinking as a process of symbolization or making meaning could be said to draw on an internalized interpersonal relationship, what psychoanalysts call object relations.

Neonatal research such as Daniel Stern's (1985), a developmental psychologist, argues that rudimentary cognitions begin as emotions. Affects are considered to be organizing factors in the development of the ego. Following on the premise that "the somatic type of interactive experience" is "the basis of social-psychological development" (Emde and Buchsbaum, 1989: 250), and no human relatedness is conceivable without affective participation" (Emde, 1989: 175), subjective experience is therefore intersubjective and inalienably affective in its origins. It has been argued that affects are, from an ontogenetic point of view, "social signals before they are psychological signals. They are involved in social reciprocity before they are anticipatory, before they can be mobilized internally and involved in means-end relationships" (Emde and Buchsbaum, 1989: 217).⁵⁸ Levin proposes that Stern's theory of the sociality of subjective experience has features which suggest something similar to the psychoanalytic concept of internal object relations (1989: 351).

Levin maintains that the foundation of the semantic domain is precisely to be found in affect before the child has language or representational capacities according to Piaget's developmental schema. In other words, affect is an early type of thinking. Psychoanalytic developmental theory holds that the frustration of the drive forces the *infans* to think and to perceive. But Levin finds the hypothesis of a primary fusional state called primary narcissism, of complete egocentrism, is increasingly untenable in the light of neonatal research which is finding infants to have a wide emotional repertoire. He maintains there is "no reason to believe, as did Freud and Piaget, that cognitive processes are an *outgrowth* of undifferentiated or crudely differentiated affective states" (340) (my emphasis). Secondly, from an argument to show that infants relate from birth, and are not autistic, Levin draws the inference that they have object constancy from an early age even if they have not yet acquired language. Against the Piagetian framework, he proposes we can assume that symbolization is a

multidimensional process involving cognition and perception and affects which begins in the infant *even before* the onset of language.⁵⁹

While the rise and development of the capacity (which Piaget locates at the end of sensorimotor development) "to represent something...by means of a signifier"...enormously enhances the child's capacity to refine its concepts of objects and of perspectival relativity, it is not a prerequisite for coherent and interrelated perceptions of the external world, for object permanence, for emotional attachment to a specific object, for communication based on the recognition of the difference of the other. (...) The symbol is characteristic of psychological activity prior to the cognitive period marked by the consolidation of linguistic behaviour.

(Levin, 1989: 393, 430)

In that I want to draw attention to Levin's discussion of Stern's concept of 'representations of interactions which have been generalized' (RIGS) and its implications for modifications to the notion of paradigm scenarios for emotion which we found in de Sousa, I can only resume the major propositions in Levin's finely drawn argument.

Levin proposes rudimentary ego and id are there at birth, and object formation goes on as well *even before language*. He holds that thinking or symbolization and meaning are not synonymous with language and, furthermore, symbolization is not representational but metaphorical. The terms 'symbolization' and 'symbol-formation' he reserves "for the possibility of 'meaning' of any kind at any stage of life after birth" (Levin, 1989: 400). He takes empathy as the paradigm for the requirements for thinking--the positing of the other with an internal world.

The inheritance of Piaget has been a representational theory of psychological development and a view of the psyche as a representational world. On this assumption, introjection and identification, as cognitive constructs, are impossible before the psyche achieves the capacity to make representations. The implication of this is that representation is fundamental to all psychic activities. Against this view, Levin proposes that an internal object is not "a quasi-mimetic representation of something in the external world"; rather an internal object "behaves more like a metaphor than a representation" (436), and fantasy is the metaphorizing activity which produces the internal world of relatively stable configurations of meaning and affects (Levin, 1989: 454). What does he mean by this?

First of all, the fundamental 'mechanisms' by which human identity is constituted--introjection, projection, and identification--can be thought of as metaphorical structures. "To internalize features of a relation with another person on a more or less permanent basis--to 'introject an object'--is essentially to give shape to aspects of one's experience in the light of other experiences. That is metaphor" (437). For instance, in the case of introjection, my experience is the tenor of the metaphorical process and the dimension of the object which is introjected acts as the vehicle of the metaphor. Perception is always the perception of something in terms of something else; it has a "from-to structure" (438).

The notion of internal object as it relates to memory shares characteristics with Stern's notion of episodic memory. An episode "is a structured unfolding in time, and the experience of an episode involves the integrated functioning of capacities for perception, action, emotion, and cognition" (Levin, 1989: 445):

The advantage of an episodic memory system...is that it permits the indexing and reindexing and the organizing and reorganizing of memorial events about self-invariants (or other invariants) in a fluid and dynamic fashion. It allows one to imagine attributes of many different kinds, interrelating in different ways and resulting in a growing and integrating network of organized self-experience.

(Stern in Levin, 1989: 448)

Episodic memory in infancy is the product of repeated somatic events with consistent features (i.e. feeding, holding, bathing, and diaper changing experiences) which become generalized to form not specific memories but an abstract, background experience. Episodic memory is connected to the development of the self "by means of experiences of interpersonal interaction which, when generalized mnemonically, he terms RIGS (representations of interactions which have been generalized)" (Levin, 1989: 447). Levin proposes that we think of internal objects as RIGs,

with one proviso: that the condensing and structuring activities of perception and memory are understood as metaphorizing processes, rather than mimetic "representations;" it is, after all, the activity of filtering events, linking them together, and transforming them in terms of each other, that constitutes the core sense of self...

(Levin, 1989: 448)

Moreover, RIG's suggest that the way in which the somatic experience of events is retained is related to affects. As a metaphoric relation, an affect is a particular relation

of vehicle and tenor in which the body of the infant is implicated. Levin's discussion suggests that there may be fascinating parallels between RIG's, as they occur in infant minds, and recent work in the cognitive sciences on new 'connectionist' models of the brain which address something they are calling "parallel distributed processing" (PDP). These models, which throw out the idea that the brain works like a digital serial computer, suggest that

knowledge need not be learned or retained as explicit generalizations or formulae; instead regularities in behavior reflect cognitive patterns unconsciously extracted from repeated experience...In connectionist models the meanings of concepts such as piety, love, or success are represented not as a symbolic string (love is a feeling state with features x, y, and z) but rather *as links of different strengths among units representing co-occurring features of experience*. Stated another way, in connectionist models **semantic information** (e.g. what love is) is not stored in anything like a dictionary, separate from **episodic information** (e.g. specific experiences of loving and being loved or not loved, reading and hearing about love, etc.). (...) [A] further assumption that is implicit in connectionism's neurological inspiration, if not explicit in most connectionist formulations: life experiences are remembered along with **feelings** associated with them. (my italics)

(D'Andrade and Strauss, 1992: 11-12, 14)

Identification, introjection, and projection now can be seen as the fundamental metaphorical processes through which the self is constituted; all somatic experience and not just oral ingestion, the 'perceptual' mode generally associated with introjection in the psychoanalytic literature, have a part to play in the formation of internal objects. The internal world may be an elaboration of many somatic sources, not just swallowing, and the internal objects which are produced by the body's relation to things and people.⁶⁰

The social constructionist models of emotion we have looked at seem light years away from a psychoanalytic/developmental psychological approach to affect such as Levin is exploring. However, although scripts and classificatory schemas and paradigm scenarios are conceptual instruments which freeze complex, multisensorial signifying procedures into a static abstraction called rule-governed behaviour, the presumption that there are conventions of some sort regulating the subjective experience of emotion as well as emotion display "does not have to imply that we have rules in our heads" (Kirmayer, 1989).⁶¹ The feelings we have in our bodies

may be expressive of cultural schemas which have embedded directive force with respect to our goals for action. Moreover, the sociality which haunts us forever in intimacy with other bodies and inheres in what a body yearns for or is repelled by, begins with those 'conventions' for intimacy somatically encoded in family life which had their primordial beginnings in the mother-infant bodily relationship and its fantasy concomitants.⁶²

In spite the brief sketch I have made of Levin's discussion of internal objects as RIGs, the question can be asked: Could RIGs describe the residue of a particular configuration of psychic processes (attention, proprioception, perception, sensation, desire, need) encountering internal and external stimuli, where this semantic residue resembles what is described by the notion of paradigm scenario, particularly since this latter concept seeks to grasp what is both subjective and objective about emotion? The notion of paradigm scenarios for affects may offer a way to press this idea of the metaphoric functioning of internal objects in light of the types of aims or goals particular metaphoric operations might be found to satisfy.

It is worth speculating if internal objects, behaving as metaphors (i.e. by their selecting, filtering, associating operations), can be found to function according to relations which de Sousa has tried to describe by breaking down the intentional object of emotion into seven component parts and formulating criteria by which to talk about the rationality of an emotion for the emoter. It remains for future research to show if de Sousa's typology which discriminates among aspects of the object (target, focal object, motivating aspect, and so on) can be productively translated into a set of concepts by which to discriminate the *aspect* of the external object (which is itself the end result of perception) to which an affect is a response and according to which the metaphoric operation is proceeding, and with what aim or goal. This translation problem will have something to do with answering the difficult question de Sousa poses which gets at the heart of emotion's challenge to the subject/object distinction in perception: "How is the determination of criteria of emotional 'success' by paradigm scenarios compatible with their roles as determinants of salience?" (1987:172).

We recall that emotions act like frames carving inchoate sensation up into patterns of salience among objects of attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential

strategies. To pursue this line of thinking, let us focus on two different features of the 'scenario' aspect of paradigm scenario.

First of all, despite its unfortunate visual association to images and pictures, 'scenario' can be likened to a condensed drama involving the self and internal object counterparts of external objects. Scenario emphasizes that emotions begin as relations among bodies in space with reciprocal intentionality. This is not to spatialize affect but to make it a way of acting in space. We might call 'embodied space' that modality of experience only accessible through emotion. Or put another way, the subjective experience of affect could be thought of as depending on extension in space in two senses. On the one hand, emotion is a component of relational patterns between persons in 'social space' whereas our self-internal object relations are the product of motivated configurations of bodies (or body-parts) in the sociality of 'in-space.' The avowal quality of an emotion, mentioned by de Sousa, draws on an aspect of the self's position within embodied space: the foredained and inescapable quality of the configuration of bodies expressed by that emotion. The particular 'from-to' quality of the subjective experience of emotion follows from reciprocity in the creation of the original emotional atmosphere between infant and caretaker bodies out of which came the symbolizing called affect and its paradigm scenarios. We can speculate that before emotion becomes a component of increasingly complex patterns of salience perceptions among objects of attention and inferences, something like a proto-paradigm scenario has been formed in the infant mind which subsequently mediates how affect laden experiences create a motivational system in the child or, in Averill's language, how the internalization of cultural rules for emotions proceeds.⁶³

No one would disagree that it is the personal paradigm scenario, not the cultural script for an emotion, which accounts for the force of an emotion we may feel. For instance, when I respond on hearing of the death of a child, I make use of a culturally written paradigm scenario for grief. However, something other than that impersonally authored set of rules informs my specific response of grief when I learn that it was *my* child who has just died. The directive force of that grief comes from an internal object relations scenario drawing both on my possible past experience of grief

at the loss of an immediate family member and the specific object-relations which defined the kind of attachment and wishes I had for my child.

The notion of 'paradigm' in paradigm scenario captures the sense of there being conventions which habitually organize the metaphoric operations of our internal objects upon experience to transform it into the embodied space our emotions tell us about. Paradigm also suggests the epistemological importance of affect scenarios as being constitutive of our way of organizing experience preparatory to responding to it, a process which is invisible to consciousness and which we tend to call 'just natural.'

The idea of a paradigm scenario for emotion has connections with the notion of cultural models which, according to cultural anthropologists, link cognition to action through motivation. Cultural models have motivational properties because of goal schemas and because of affects attached to these goal schemas (D'Andrade, 1992). D'Andrade's position is that "drives, affects, and other kinds of instigations to action function by activating goal-schemas, not by instigating behavior directly, since for humans appropriate action depends on role and setting contexts which require elaborate cognitive interpretation prior to action" (1992: 33). He even brings the notion of drive into his discussion of how cultural schemas act as instigators of action for academics in their pursuit of high standards.⁶⁴ The relation between the motivational force of cultural models and internalization became apparent for cultural anthropologists with Spiro's work on internalization. It is his emphasis on childhood that is of interest to us since it bears a resemblance with the psychoanalytic notion of intrapsychic predispositions:

The child's experience sometimes preadapts--to use Spiro's term (n.d.:43)--the child to internalize certain cultural propositions. For example,...various experiences of the Burmese infant preadapt Burmese men to internalize at a highly salient level the culturally elaborated schema of women as dangerous creatures -oversexed, polluting, dishonest, unintelligent, and low born. Spiro traces out the behavior and affective consequences of this schema - the sub-goals embedded in this schema such as taboos surrounding women, varieties of avoidances of sexual behavior, along with male maintenance of a sense of superiority and domination by means of culturally constituted fantasies. (n.d.)
(D'Andrade, 1992: 37-38)

From de Sousa's discussion of emotion as an avowal, we know that emotion carries the weight of the self's investment in the indisputable correctness of belief, in

the necessity of the passive/active mode which structures the relations among the objects in embodied space, and in a requirement that particular and foreseen repercussions ensue.⁶⁵ We are reminded of James Strachey who, in seeking an English equivalent for Freud's '*Besetzung*,' coined the term cathexis from a Greek word meaning "to occupy." While scenario highlights the role properties of emotion, role suggests the aspect of necessity in our emotional responses because our embodied space has been occupied by a particular motivated configuration of bodies.

We can think of the rules and motivations encoded in intrapsychic paradigm scenarios, perhaps, as having come into existence through the developmental process as expressions of aims toward objects and as devices or techniques employed by the self to mitigate difficult endopsychic situations with respect to object-relationships around, for instance, loving and hating (sucking and biting). These rules are invoked in relational extensions of embodied space in the external world when similar difficulties with respect to loving and being loved, hating and being hated are provoked. In other words, these rules which regulate internal objects are exteriorised in interpersonal interactions with people and things in the external world; this is the work of fantasy as thinking.

We have a methodological problem when seeking an articulation of the social constructivist approach to emotion, which finds in the rules underpinning emotion experience and expression an abstract system for the regulation of selves in the world in the light of culturally recognized aims and strivings (anger is based on notions of violation of boundaries: of property, of the self's sense of goodness), and an earlier system of prescriptions and proscriptions, idiosyncratically formulated in each of us, by which the self's relations with internal objects is regulated. The analytic transference (and counter-transference) present one method by which to discover what may be idiosyncratic rules for perception, inference, and behaviour which are encoded in the paradigm scenarios for different affects.

3.5 The incoherence of Grossberg's approach to affect

Having examined three paradigms of affect, we are now in a position to return to Grossberg's proposal in "Postmodernity and Affect: All Dressed Up with No Place

to Go" (1988a), which was introduced in Chapter 2. We recall his central proposition is that culture researchers must make a distinction between libidinal economies of desire and affective economies of mood as two different planes on which psychic energy is organized. Affect cannot be accounted for in the same language as ideology; "these are different planes of effects" (1988a: 282).

The distinctions he wants to make between desire and mood are simply not intelligible as Grossberg resorts to 'psychobabble':

If desire is always focused (as the notion of cathexis suggests), mood is always dispersed. While both may be experienced in terms of needs, only libidinal needs can be, however incompletely, satisfied. Moods are never satisfied, only realized. If desire assumes an economy of depth (e.g. in the notion of repression), mood is always on the surface (which is not to be equated with consciousness).

(1988:285)

The psychophysiological symbolism of emotion as energy appears in his proposition that affect is contentless. Grossberg ignores all post-Freudian psychoanalytic scholarship on affect (and the omission of the object-relations school is egregious) as well as interdisciplinary views on emotion in order to appeal to an outdated, exhausted economic view of psychic structure and to a drive-derivative view of affects. This foredooms his ambition to extrapolate from a model of affect in the individual to a hypothesis about affect's production in the collective cultural body. The metaphor cannot survive the unintelligibilities produced by this extrapolation. What is the equivalent of the structural model of the mind in the social domain? What is the social equivalent in the economy of mood of Armon-Jones' distinctions between objectual and objectless M emotions?

How do we move, moreover, from descriptions of the economy of mood in the social 'body' to an economy of mood in the individual body? Or from hypotheses about the production of 'structures of feeling,' achieved through the analysis of discrete cultural commodities or discourses at different historical conjunctures to hypotheses about individual psychic constitutions, desires, needs, and defences?

While Grossberg's article correctly distances itself from the reductive thinking of an era of Freudo-marxist-inspired cultural studies where no distinction was made among the pleasure words: desire, emotion, satisfaction, need, enjoyment, and libidinal

displacements were construed as determined by ideology, he falls back into that circle's disinterest in the real selves with internal worlds who make up the audiences for cultural commodities. His position, "in seeking to avoid any form of metaphysics" (1988a: 284), loses a concept of the self in which the preconditions to the phenomenological differences pointed to by these various sorts of emotions words can be located. The anthropological concept of 'culturally constituted cognitive coping strategies' supplemented by 'culturally constituted emotional coping strategies' are suggestive for what Grossberg is trying to accomplish. Ideology operates through what could be called FCCECSs--family culturally constituted emotional coping strategies--which embed particular cultural schemas (CCCCSs) with powerful directive force (i.e. why in straitened economic circumstances or situations of loss, a person's self-schema is more likely to find a fit with the schema of being a 'sensitive, artistic' type, where depression becomes a kind of goal of action, rather than the self-schema being attached to the schema of 'breadwinner' and to something like stoical resoluteness and quiet optimism when difficult economic and social conditions have to be confronted⁶⁶).

Levin's hypothesis impels a reconsideration of a theory of the unconscious--Lacan's linguistic model of the psyche--which has had an enduring influence in the Cultural Studies circles in which Grossberg travels. It follows from Levin's hypothesis that symbolization has prelinguistic origins that language-based models of emotion such as we find in social constructionist endeavours in cognitive and social psychology will be limited in what they can tell us about the meaning and functions of emotions. Whereas both Freud and Levin, in different ways, argue that affects predate learning language, and affects bring us into interpersonal relations before language, the Lacanian reinterpretation of Freud makes the learning of language the moment of insertion into the social realm. Levin has made the case that this is too late for an understanding of the processes by which emotions come to have meaning.⁶⁷

Social constructivist and cognitive approaches to emotion do not start looking for the conditions for emotional development early enough in the human life span because their hypotheses attach emotions to the capacity for representation and information processing. Jacqueline Rose's project for cultural studies--the investigation

of how ideology works at the rudimentary levels of identity and the drives--is misconstrued if it depends on a Lacanian paradigm because it is insensitive to the bodily basis of meaning.

3.6 Conclusion

While the social constructionist locates emotion squarely in emotion systems of a culture in terms of social contexts and rules for the display, feeling, and interpretation of emotions, it lacks a view of the preconditions for emotion in psychical reality, specifically the impact of the paradigm scenario provided by internal objects for an emotion, and how the mediating influence of an individual's psychical reality can be identified in his or her use of cultural rules for emotion. Determining these rules in the first instance is complicated by the problem of distinguishing what is culturally aberrant for members of a cultural group from simple variations on a continuum from conventional (normal) to disturbed rule use. The psychoanalytic paradigm offers various accounts of the nature of affect, as energy, in terms of symbolization, while lacking the social constructionist perspective on emotion as social glue. The paradox for social constructionists that while emotions are culturally created and rule-bound phenomena they are also affirmations of our authentic selves is partially unfolded by de Sousa's notion of paradigm scenario and more fully addressed by the psychoanalytic model of emotion. We found the social constructivist approach to hook emotion expressions and feelings to a knowledge of emotion concepts and to explicit and implicit rules. However, both Freudian and object-relations psychoanalytic paradigms of emotion prise emotion from cognition, as representation, to protect a view of the prelinguistic, bodily beginnings of affect. The social constructivist approach stresses the sociality implied in emotion syndromes: "the person who says 'I am angry with you' 'I love you' is not simply labelling a state of physiological arousal; he is entering into a complex relationship with another person" (Averill, 1982: 25). Having stronger explanatory power than the nativist, social learning, or sociological theories to which social constructivism has recourse in an attempt to explain how the internalization of the rules of emotion occurs, the psychoanalytic paradigm has argued the importance of the world of internal objects to affects. Depth

psychological models reveal that the fantasy origins of emotion, the paradigm scenarios in which affects have a part, are primordially about relations to persons.

We turn now to Chapter 4 with a very specific focus. If Radway's readers are readers of emotional syndromes, then what are the paradigm scenarios on which these emotions depend? Radway uses her informants' expressions of emotions as evaluations of the anxieties induced by plot, and redundant characteristics of relations between protagonists in these stories. Our task is to examine Radway's move from inferences about the prototypic attributes of plot to prototypic attributes of emotion they engender and the connection she makes between these narrative scenarios and what we can now call the paradigm scenarios in fantasy of her readers which underpin their emotional responses to romance narrative.

CHAPTER THREE: ENDNOTES

1. So reads the introduction to the syllabus of a course entitled "Culture and Emotion in Psychiatric Theory" given jointly by a McGill Anthropology professor, Allan Young, and a psychiatrist interested in cross-cultural issues, Louis Kirmayer, in the Winter of 1991 at the Institute of Community and Family Psychiatry, Jewish General Hospital, Montreal.
2. A non-instrumental approach to emotion, which emphasizes discrete states such as subjective emotional experiences, is represented by Frijda (1986) who defines emotional phenomena as "noninstrumental behaviours and noninstrumental features of behavior, physiological changes, and evaluative, subject-related experiences, as evoked by external or internal events" (p. 4). From a functionalist perspective, Campos, Campos, and Barrett (1989) define emotions as "processes of establishing, maintaining, or disrupting the relations between the person and the internal or external environment" (p. 395). This formulation stresses the interpersonal and intrapersonal uses of emotion and its signalling function. Emotions have also been defined as ephiphenomena of cognition (Hesse and Cicchetti, 1982), discrete expressive behaviors (Plutchik, 1980), and action tendencies (Izard, 1972; Tomkins, 1962).
3. James and Lange's views do differ. Whereas James defined emotion as subjective experience dependent on bodily change, Lange defined emotion as the bodily event itself, without a mental process intervening between the perception and bodily change. Their general position is taken as equating emotions with bodily changes and visceral feelings. It followed from this that different bodily states (natural or manipulated by drugs) would be accompanied by different emotions. Cannon's experimental work on dogs refuted the James-Lange theory since he found that separation of the viscera from the central nervous system did not alter emotional behaviour. Cannon provided a functional interpretation of visceral changes during emotion, while arguing that visceral alterations accompanying emotion are highly adaptive from an evolutionary standpoint. These theories are described in James and Lange's *The Emotions* (1922) and Cannon's response in "The James-Lange theory of emotions: a critical examination and an alternative theory." *American Journal of Psychology* (Washburn commemorative volume) (1927) 39:106-124. See Averill (1947: 169-171) on James-Lange and Cannon.
4. Whereas anger, for Darwin, was the prelude to killing, and love, the prelude to copulation, envy could be thought of as the prelude to stealing, gratitude the prelude to giving back, and jealousy the prelude to excluding. On this view, emotion is the body readying itself physiologically for action. (Hochschild, 1983: 220).
5. The interactionist model of emotion is associated in sociology with the works of John Dewey, Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mill, and Erving Goffman. See Appendix A in Hochschild's *The Managed Heart* (1983) for her discussion of the strengths and limitations of their approaches to emotion.

6. A bias exists in the psychological research on emotion which takes the form of a propensity for researchers to interpret emotional experience in a polarized way such that a false dichotomy emerges between emotion as a state system, primarily studied by psychologists, and emotion as interaction, or interpersonal process, primarily studied by sociologists, anthropologists, and infancy researchers. (See References in Saarni (1989) for representative authors in each discipline).

7. On the question of whether emotion is a cultural or natural category, the psychological literature presupposes the widely shared 'standard view' which includes these assumptions:

1. Emotions divide naturally into a small number of discrete kinds.
 2. English words like *fear* and *anger* are names given to these natural kinds. Other languages may use other words, but they denote the same natural kinds. Emotion words thus can be translated one-to-one between languages.
 3. Human beings easily recognize the natural kinds of emotion both in themselves and in others. Although young children seem to make errors when trying to recognize emotions, these errors are gradually eliminated, leaving accurate recognition.
- (Russell, 1987: 293-294)

In contrast to the standard view, a moderate social constructionist position assumes the following, in recognition of the variability of each culture's 'folk theory of mind':

1. Emotions may or may not divide into natural kinds. In either case, neither children nor adults have direct knowledge on this topic.
 2. Emotion words express culturally influenced concepts that are embedded in a culturally influenced theory of mind.
 3. Human beings must, in part, learn their emotion concepts and theory from their culture.
- (Russell, 1987: 295)

8. A parallel assertion takes the form of a belief in semantic primitives, that is, emotion words like anger or love which cannot be broken down into smaller components. Every culture has a word for the 5-plus-two basic emotions.

9. The Reference sections of the following three articles by James A. Russell, a well-published emotions researcher affiliated with the University of British Columbia, provide an excellent and comprehensive introduction to emotions research in fields anthropological, cognitive psychological, and historical/philosophical: "Culture, scripts, and children's understanding of emotion." (1989); "In defense of a prototype approach to emotion concepts." (1991a); and "Culture and the Categorization of Emotions." (1991b).

10. The pertinence of socio-functional arguments for emotions would seem to fall down when we are called on to explain as socially desirable: (1) self-deceptive emotions on a functional account; and (2) emotions which seem destructive of community such as anger, hate, envy, jealousy. Therefore, naturalists might seem to

have a stronger case here than social constructionists. The difficulty with the objection that destructive emotions have no social functions "is that it confuses absolute moral assessment with the *de facto* assessment of the role of these emotions for a community" (Armon-Jones, 1986: 72). Inasmuch as the Western inheritance of natural rights, negative liberty (liberty from constraints), and possessive individualism (Macpherson, 1973) dominates one strain of our thinking about democratic society, it would not be inexact to say that these emotions do serve a necessary function in capitalist society. It is not the case that every instance of hatred or envy, for example, can be deemed unwarranted by a community. On the contrary; how could capitalism survive if we did not desire, if we were not jealous and wish to possess, and envious and wish to possess and destroy? Capitalism requires a discourse of emotion which provides legitimations for these 'negative' emotions.

11. See Averill (1982: 286ff.) for a wealth of contextualized examples, and in particular his disputation, with clinical and statistical data, of the feminist argument that women living in a male-oriented society have had to suppress their anger, that the legitimacy of their anger has been denied, and that their physical and mental health has suffered as a result.

12. The 'qualia' thesis requires that it is a necessary condition of a state's being a felt emotion that the attitudes involved are accompanied by an irreducible subjective feeling. But the individualist implications of this mean that there is a domain of individual emotion which is not reducible to emotion attitudes and expressions and, therefore, could be exempt from the sociocultural factors which are alleged by the constructionist to explain these latter components (Armon-Jones, 1986: 45). Inner feelings are not radically private but rather they are accessible because the terms in which we describe them depend upon socially shared criteria for their meaning and justification. They form a part of a shared public language: "an 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria" (Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* (1980) in Armon-Jones, 1986: 40).

13. Russell allows that there may be a gap between emotion feelings themselves and the means by which they are conceptually represented. He says that what researchers can talk about are methods by which to make discriminations among external circumstances and the internal states they are believed to create. Consequently, although we often think of emotion as a state or a thing, Russell offers that "a sequence of subevents" is a more apt description. See the discussion of his concept of 'scripts' for emotion, to follow.

14. As a brain science researcher has put it, "while major concepts concerning the nature of emotions arise from human introspection, most knowledge concerning the mechanisms underlying emotionality arises from animal brain research...the study of emotions...continues to be impoverished by our failure to blend these two sources of knowledge" (Panksepp, 1982: 407).

15. The following has been largely drawn from James Averill's excellent 1974

article "An Analysis of Psychophysiological Symbolism and its Influence on Theories of Emotion". *J. Theory Soc. Behaviour* 4:2, 147-190.

16. In the west, we say 'He did the job with a heavy heart'; 'His stomach was in his throat'. Many other cultures talk of emotions as if they were 'bodily' occurrences whether in terms of organs, like the liver, which are rarely felt, or in terms of bodily parts such as the stomach and the neck, which can be felt. Paul Heelas (1986: 245) cites a number of examples from a survey of 'emotion talk across cultures': in Gahuku-Gama, thought, 'the seat of the emotions is located in the stomach'; for Maori, *ngakau* (associated with the intestines) means 'feel well', 'laugh', 'be satisfied', 'feel pain', 'be weak' or 'dark'; the Yoruba talk of 'depression' as the 'heart is weak', 'anxiety' as 'the heart is not at rest'; the Chewong say 'my liver is good' (I am feeling fine) or 'my liver is tiny' (I was very ashamed).

17. Our culture uses various vehicles to talk about the emotions, although they are essentially understood as inner experiences; there is talk which concentrates on internal states and inner experiences ('I feel angry; 'I hide my envy') and talk which uses: bodily parts ('I vented my spleen'); physiological phenomena ('I went cold with fear'); behaviour as signs ('Her smile said it all'); and which appeals to social contexts ('Well, I was furious. What would *you* have done in a case like that?') (Averill, 1986: 243).

18. This follows from two separate traditions which predict that categories into which people divide the emotions would be universal. According to Russell:

One tradition stems from Darwin's argument [in *The expression of the emotions in man and animals*] (1872/1965) that the communication of emotion, both its expression and its recognition, is part of our biological heritage. The theory that recognition is innate presupposes that the categories by which recognition proceeds are innate. A second tradition is the argument stemming from rationalist philosophy that most of our concepts are innate [Fodor's *Representations*, 1981]. A third is the idea...that words like *fear* and *anger* are undefinable semantic primitives.

(1991a: 427)

These traditions contributed to the 'Dumb' view of emotion which was responsible for the "ontological illusion"; that there is something *there*, an abstract and detachable 'it', the emotion, of which the emotion word is a mere representation" (Harré, 1986: 4). Russell observes that "cultural differences in basic categories of emotion would present difficulties for all these theories" (1991a: 427).

19. There has been a tendency of philosophers and psychologists to abstract an entity--'grief', 'love', 'anger'--and try to study it. The first of two problems associated with this overconfidence is one the social constructionist viewpoint holds dear: to ask, "What is anger?" is a misleading question because it ignores how it is that people ordinarily speak about emotion, and it is liable to bring along the researcher's unexamined commonsense assumptions. It encourages the practice of cross-cultural translation without attention to the subtle distinctions and bases of usage that regulate any single member's production of that emotion word. Furthermore, as the

anthropologist Catherine Lutz (1987) notes, "We have no access to the emotions of others, in other cultures, except through our cultural discourses, of which emotion is one."

20. The Canadian cognitive psychologist James Russell observes that psychologists have used three dominant metaphors as heuristics to guide research and to talk about how people understand emotion. These he outlines as follows:

In the *discrete category* metaphor, people sort emotions into mental pigeon holes, which are called categories and which are labelled such things as *anger, fear, happiness*, and the like. In the *dimension* metaphor, people place emotions on internal scales, which are called dimensions and which are thought to represent such attributes as amount of pleasure, power, or physiological arousal felt during the emotion. In the *mechanistic* metaphor, people perceive that one event causes the emotion and that the emotion causes subsequent actions. A bear appears before you, the bear elicits fear, and the fear causes the person to shoot it. (Russell, 1989: 313)

Against these background metaphors, Russell offers the new metaphor of 'script'.

Russell's research is primarily concerned with the study of the relation of emotion to cognition through the study of the concepts we have about emotion. He does not reduce the emotions we have to the concepts of emotion we have. As a moderate social constructivist, he does not maintain that culture is the sole determinant of emotion concepts nor does he claim that different cultural conceptions of emotion necessarily produce different emotional experiences (Russell, 1989: 312); however, he does argue that emotion is inextricably interwoven with categorical frameworks for cognition (Russell, 1990, 1991a,b).

21. Another consequence of the positivist, Dumb view of emotion was that they "were not seen as being **about** anything: instead, they were contrasted with and seen as potential disruptions of other phenomena that are **about** something, phenomena, such as rational judgments, thoughts, and observations" (Jaggar, 1986: 148).

22. "Perhaps the most notable exception to this generalization is work done by cognitive-behavioural therapists on 'skills training.' As the name implies, skills training refers to the development of appropriate strategies for appraising situations and responding effectively" (Averill, 1986: 108).

23. The conventional view on the acquisition of emotions holds that emotional behaviour precedes emotional knowledge and the acquisition of emotion concepts. The developmental sequence, however, may be the reverse of what is conventionally assumed. When Russell claims that "the emotion that children display may depend upon their acquisition of a culturally appropriate emotion script" (Saarni and Harris, 1989: 20), this turns on its head the usual relationship of dependency assumed to obtain between knowledge and behaviour. On Russell's account (1989), children may learn an explicit script first, followed by the display of the emotion called for in that

script. Constructionism posits that prescription plays a fundamental role in the acquisition of culture appropriate emotions, for instance, a display of inappropriate emotions may be met with mocking behaviour.

Russell (1989) critiques the evidence gathered to support the hypothesis, in the early 1970's, that there is a set of discrete emotional expressions that are universally recognized as conveying particular emotional states (Saarni and Harris, 1989: 4). This has been a cornerstone of the standard view of emotion, and it has been the context in which emotion has been extensively studied. On the standard view, emotions are to be understood in terms of discrete, qualitatively different categories. In their Introduction to the volume *Children's understanding of emotion*, Saarni and Harris (1989) note that the capacity to distinguish among different expressions of emotion, facial or otherwise, is not tantamount to the possession of a concept of any of the discriminated emotions. It is believed today that the infant is well tuned to the discrimination of emotional expressions but requires considerable instruction in their significance (1989: 5ff).

Another weakness of research that focuses on the recognition of facial expression is that it gives a restricted view of the conceptual task facing the child. The emotional repertoire that a child understands includes emotions that are not linked to distinctive facial expressions. For instance, there is no compelling evidence to show that individuals distinguish between the emotions referred to by the English words *pride* and *relief* in terms of facial, postural, or vocal cues that are associated with them. However, it is easy to think of situations that would provoke one emotion but not the other.

Russell draws the conclusion from his own research that children discriminate among expressions on the dimension of affective valence, so 'happy' faces are differentiated from 'angry,' 'fearful,' and 'disgusted' ones, while the latter three tend to be confused because they all have negative valences. From his research on children's interpretation of facial expressions and performance of word sorting tasks (1989), Russell maintains that children are universally constrained to interpret emotional episodes not in terms of discrete categories but rather in terms of two continuous dimensions, those of pleasure-displeasure, and arousal-sleepiness. He holds that children start off from a pancultural base. They apply the two dimensions of pleasure and arousal to differentiate emotions into two broad categories and then gradually distinguish emotions "located at similar points within that two-dimensional space in terms of the particular script that is associated with each particular emotion" (Saarni and Harris, 1989: 19). "Depending on the emotional scripts we learn within our culture, we will develop emotion categories at quite different loci within the universal two-dimensional grid (Saarni and Harris, 1989: 8).

Russell is not saying that a prerequisite to recognition of emotions in others is a mastery of emotion concepts; on the contrary, we can recognize some emotions before having the concepts with which to explain our knowledge of the emotion. We have some scripts even if we do not yet have the concept to verbalize. However, research on emotion socialization, salience, and cognitive developmental theory has found that certain emotions are not recognized by children before certain ages. The research of Saarni and Harris (1989) takes the form of presenting children with narratives or scenarios in which they are to identify the emotions a character may be feeling, or offer an explanation for why a character may be feeling angry, shame, or

fear. Their research suggests that certain emotions, such as guilt or shame, occur at stage specific moments in individual development. However, they do not imply that a child needs to have a word for emotions in order to express them. Facial expressions are only one component of a repertoire of expressive behaviours which are recognized "as being part of a temporally organized script that can include an appropriate cause, a subjective emotional state, and ensuing behavior" (Saarni and Harris, 1989: 5). In research on children's use of personal information in judging emotions, when facial expressions of emotion and situational cues conflict, children between the ages of 3-5 years are strongly influenced by the facial expression (Gnepp in Saarni and Harris, 1989: 170).

Saarni and Harris point out that how researchers understand the task facing the child is understanding emotion will depend quite critically on the role the researchers assign to social context. The radical and moderate social constructivist views differ from developmental approaches which tend either : (a) to assume certain key features of emotional understanding are present from an early age, or (b) in the quasi-Piagetian position, to assume that the child will proceed through various stages in the development of a theory of emotion that reflects a universal base with increasing adequacy. Thus, social experience is commonly seen as a general facilitator or inhibitor of cognitive development rather than a crucial determinant (Saarni and Harris, 1989: 8). Moderate social constructivists maintain that although a child may start from a pancultural base, the social context has an organizing or moderating influence on universal predispositions. Radical social constructivists claim that the child can have little understanding of emotion that is not socially transmitted. A cultural anthropologist such as Catherine Lutz, who is sceptical of the view that there are precultural primary or basic emotions which are secondarily elaborated by culture, takes up a radical social constructivist position in her book *Unnatural Emotions* (1988). Lutz holds that in cultures which are not psychologically minded, emotions serve interpersonal functions and carry meanings deriving from the premium a society puts on cooperation, social bonds, and community. However, in a 1988 article, "she opens the possibility that there are universal situational causes of emotional experience" (Oatley, 1991: 77).

24. Unless otherwise specified, all citations from de Sousa are from his 1987 book.

25. By the method of logical form, sentences of ordinary language can be replaced with a representational language which disambiguates English sentences. This method is used in information processing systems, and de Sousa hopes it might work in attempts to model emotions. Logical form is presumed to expose deep structural differences and similarities beneath the grammatical surface. De Sousa suggests emotion sentences be written using the method of logical form in order to reveal deeper structural relations which, assuming that they have some psychological reality, would explain some of our intuitions about meaning and inference. Different classes of emotions might be partly differentiated by the logical form of the sentences in which we ascribe them (1987: 127).

26. It is worth speculating if it is possible to find in Fredric Jameson's approach to pleasure in mass culture as degraded and inauthentic equivalences for the distinction

cognitive psychologists and philosophers make between emotions which are self-deceptive and those which are rational.

27. In Chapter 6, de Sousa shows how objectivity takes its meaning, in part, through its contrasting term, subjectivity. However, there are 4 or 5 different meanings attached to the notion of subjectivity: phenomenology, projection, relativity, perspective, and agency, each of which relates differently to the triad of truth, objectivity, and rationality. To prevent our tendency to confuse these modes of subjectivity, de Sousa calls them 'projection-subjectivity,' 'relativity-subjectivity,' and 'perspective-subjectivity'. These three modes are distinguished as follows:

Projection offers the subjectivist answer to the Euthyphro question. It is the view that properties attributed to the object are merely shadows of our choices. Although de Sousa's use of this term is meant to be larger than the use of projection in the psychoanalytic sense, he wants it to retain the psychoanalytic flavour in that it captures that aspect of necessity associated with projection in the psychoanalytic sense. It is necessary that the content of what I project comes entirely from me, and that I am convinced it is an objective part of the world I perceive (1987: 145ff.)

Relativity is the view that the properties attributed to the objects are really produced by relations between the object and the observer. One form of relativity is perspectival relativity: things look different from different angles. It is not incompatible with objectivity in the sense of thought, propositions, or something other than either of these, that corresponds to something in the real world.

Relativity only collapses into projection if some quality attributed by an observer to a target depends totally on the perceiver and not at all on the target. De Sousa suggests a criterion is needed to assess when relativity shades into projection. Drawing on a tradition of thought about objectivity, Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities, de Sousa is led to ask: "To what degree is the perceptual state of which the tertiary quality is the focus covariant with the subject, and to what extent is it covariant with the object?" (152) But this question splinters based on his distinction among formal object, motivating aspect, cause, and so on, i.e. the single question becomes a series of questions: "Is it covariant with the motivating aspect, with the cause?" (152).

Turning to a discussion of the operations of a sensory channel, i.e. sight, to identify the factors which influence the operation of a sensory organ like sight and which may, in turn, influence the operation of emotion, on the analogy of emotion as perception, de Sousa is led to conclude provisionally that a case can be made for emotional subjectivity in the sense of relativity. See his discussion of perception as encapsulation in footnote 32. However, in an argument too extended to resume here, he concludes that perception is more complicated than we have imagined, that we should expand the range of properties we think of as being perceived, thereby being able to conclude that "the objects of emotion may be of such complexity that the interference of factors beyond covariants of primary properties..., far from undermining objectivity, actually enriches the objective range of emotion" (155).

Pure perspective is the view that anything we know or perceive is known or perceived from a given point of view; it is the problem of the "I-ness of I" (47). It is not possible to achieve "the view from nowhere" in Thomas Nagel's phrase.

28. For instance,

If I am distressed because you stole my teddy bear, I naturally believe that my distress was caused by your theft. Now unless I can blame you twice over--first for theft and second for distress--this gives rise to a dilemma. Is it the fact of your theft that caused my distress, or my belief in the theft? It cannot be the fact, it seems, because I would still be distressed if I were mistaken in thinking you had stolen my teddy bear, and there were no such fact. But it cannot be my belief, either. More exactly, if the cause *is* my belief, then this is an unknowable truth: one of those things that cannot be both true and believed. For if I believed that the true cause of my distress was my belief, surely I couldn't continue to be distressed at you.

(de Sousa, 1987: 110-111)

29. In *Emotion in Psychotherapy* (1987), Greenberg and Safran, cognitive psychologists who are developing task-analysis procedures to investigate the nature of the information-processing activities involved in specific emotional experiences of people in psychotherapy. They identify three global categories of affective expression in therapy for the purpose of clinical assessment since each plays a different role in psychotherapy and change in their view:

Primary emotions are generally those which the experiential therapies refer to as "authentic" feelings. They are adaptive responses to specific situations. Anger, sadness, and fear are three primary emotions. *Secondary reactive emotions* are expressed in response to a more primary emotion or cognition. For example, a person might express anger when afraid. Secondary reactive emotions have been focused on most by behavioural and cognitive therapists. *Instrumental emotions* are emotional behaviour patterns that people have learned to use to influence or manipulate others. (1987: 172)

30. De Sousa raises the puzzle of love and its objects, i.e. whether we love particulars or aspects of those particulars, through the case of Alcmene, who Zeus was only able to seduce by taking the form of her husband Amphytrion. The logicomoral question is: should Alcmene mind when she finds out? And should we? Zeus took on Amphytrion's qualities, some of which were what Alcmene loved her husband for having. The man she loved that night was qualitatively the same as her husband, but not the same numerically. Whatever Alcmene loved about her husband, Zeus had it that night. "This apparently implies that her desire to be faithful, under the circumstances, is only compatible with a love that is literally completely irrational. (...) Most disturbing is Alcmene's paradox: if her love is rational only if it relates to Amphytrion's qualities, then love must be either irrational or fickle" (9). Or is love more like a mood, that is, one of whose defining properties is to be objectless? De Sousa suggests the solution lies in sorting out the variety of ways in which emotions are related different categories as well as the degree to which they can be specified in terms of propositions. He formulates his Thesis 10 accordingly:

- Thesis 10 The target of an emotion, where it exists, is a particular that has played a crucial role in the causation of the emotion in virtue of being apprehended as instantiating some motivating aspect. The motivating aspect in turn instantiates the formal object that defines that particular emotion. (133)

This simulation problem is not of interest to us; however, what is of note is that de Sousa points out that this question of what we love is complicated by the phenomenon of Freudian transference. "How do we acquire the capacity to change objects under certain conditions--to transfer love from Mother to Other? And how, under other conditions, do we acquire the capacity *not* to transfer our love to other objects presenting the right motivating aspects?" (133). Of Freud's recognition of this, Rorty says:

What is new in Freud are the details which he gives us about the sort of thing which goes into the formation of conscience, his explanations of why certain very concrete situations and persons excite unbearable guilt, intense anxiety or smouldering rage.(...) He shows us why our ability to love is restricted to some very particular shapes and sizes and colours of people, things or ideas. He shows us why our sense of guilt is aroused by certain very specific, and in theory quite minor, events, and not by others which, on any familiar moral theory, would loom much larger.
(Rorty, 1986b: 12)

These psychological problems connect directly to certain moral problems. When is it right to transfer love from one object to another (Mother to Other) and then "to become, according to the ideology of monogamous love, immunized against further such transfers?" (134). Why should Alcmena mind that she had Zeus in her bed and not her husband? De Sousa answers that we have a partial answer in terms of logical form: "she should mind, because not to would be a category mistake" (134). The psychological answer is that we are attached to particulars, and we acquire attachments to people in the course of our causal interaction with them. "The fabric of our social and emotional life depends on our ability to transcend the original fungibility of all reactivity and transform it into nonfungible emotions" (134).

31. Claire Armon-Jones, in a recent article "Affects, Objects, Rationality" (1992), has proposed that the rationality and objectual paradigm which philosophers adopt is an untenable view. She proposes that a more representative account of affective states is to be found by using the notion of an 'affective continuum.' Points on the continuum are occupied by affective types according to the degree of independence they possess from the concept of an object. She prefers to use the generic term 'affect,' restricting emotion to objectual states and 'mood' to refer to a wide range of affective states that differ from emotions in being objectless. She holds that objectless affective states, or M states, typically lack basic rationality because they are not supportable by minimally warranting reasons. By this she means, they lack "those specifically normative reasons which are relevant to basic rationality, i.e. reasons

which aim to provide justification, and which are assessable as good or bad" (136). The affective continuum she proposes would look like this:

Objectual (emotions)	Middle position may or may not have an object (emotion or mood)	Objectless (mood)
anger	depression	dread
envy	anxiety	serenity
gratitude	sadness	melancholy
pride	elation	elation
fear	joy	

32. The sociologist Arlie Hochschild also holds this view of emotion as perception: "It is my own view that the capacity to feel is fully analogous to the capacity to see or hear; and if that capacity is lost or injured, it is wise to restore it in whatever way one can" (Hochschild, 1983: 193).

How far can this analogy of emotion to perception be carried? De Sousa notes that variations in sensations of sight may result from (1) variations in (some subset of) the intrinsic or primary properties of the object; (2) environmental factors; (3) one's physiological apparatus and its condition; (4) one's experiential history and current beliefs and desire; and (5) social and ideological factors (152).

Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn make a distinction between perception and general cognition. Our sensory apparatus is sensitive to factors (1)-(5) in decreasing order; in fact, our perceptions are not modifiable by either (4) or (5) above whereas our beliefs may be. De Sousa follows Fodor in speaking of the computational mechanisms of perception which proceed without reference to semantic representation [factors (4) and (5)] as "the informational encapsulation of perceptual modules" (153).

Emotions cannot be encapsulated in the same way as perception since they are subject to all five of the factors named above. Therefore, emotions would seem to be more subjective, with respect to relativity than perceptions. See Chapter 6 (152-156) for de Sousa's arguments in defence of this analogy, particularly the argument that emotions do mimic the encapsulation of perception in certain specific ways (salience or perspectival perception) that prove crucial to one of their central functions (preventing information overload and cognitive paralysis). This accounts for the fact that emotions are attitudes. They share with beliefs a lack of specific organs and encapsulation specific to organs; however, they share with perception the feature that they must be in some sense perspectival. An attitude is perspectival, unlike a belief, because attitudes cannot be hypothetically adopted.

33. De Sousa argues that emotions may at least be meaningfully assessed for objectivity on the model of perception. However, emotional objectivity cannot be assessed in terms of truth: emotions are not beliefs (173). As well as being assessed for objectivity, emotions can also be assessed by the metaphor of success: "each emotion has its own formal object, congeneric with truth, but representing a specific standard of success as different from truth or goodness as these are from each other" (173). These different formal objects are dimensions of evaluation which are axiological.

34. De Sousa's key question: How is the determination of criteria of emotional 'success' by paradigm scenario compatible with their roles as determinants of salience? (172).

35. See de Sousa's discussion (1987: 289ff.) of the following joke:

M. visits the hockey team. When she emerges she complains that she has been gang-raped. Wishful thinking.

He argues to laugh at such a joke means you must share and endorse its sexist assumptions.

36. The social constructionist perspective is one which focuses on cognitive schemas for the experience and expression of emotion. Evidently it can not take us very far in evaluating the view that "it is precisely because our accusing emotions, such as contempt, hate, sadness, self-pity and embarrassment, as well as anger, *are* avowals and not merely inwardly held experiences reported by expressions of emotion that our beliefs do not determine our feelings" (Warner, 1986: 162).

In his essay, "Anger and Similar Delusions," Warner argues against the cognitive position that cognitions and affects are separate. He addresses the view that anger is based on the belief that someone intends to harm you; anger should cease when the belief that 'caused' the anger is proven unfounded. However, it is Warner's view that the judgement/feeling dichotomy, required if the causal view is to account for the corrigibility of anger, breaks down when the attempt is made to systematically understand anger in terms of it (1986:144). The judgement embedded in anger is not simply about the anger-object, but about the angry individual himself. The anger with which he is concerned is not wholly with another's deviation from a principle, but a violation of personal rights--of rights that constitute him as the kind of person he is. The offence is experienced as a deep violation of what one is as a person. "[W]hat B thinks is his perception of A's offensive conduct can be *nothing other than* B's taking offence. There is no perception of offensiveness that is not also a taking of offence" (1986: 144). Warner holds that "the beliefs ingredient in these [accusing] emotions change only with, and not prior to, the relevant changes of emotion" (162). Furthermore,

The existence of one's own anger-feeling (together with the logical obstacles to consider whether one might be mistaken) is enough in the angry person's mind to establish the culpability of the anger-object. *Post hoc ergo propter hoc*. What objective evidence there may be, one way or the other, is inaccessible as such. **Given one's experience of a feeling that can only seem the effect of offensive conduct, it is all but inconceivable that one could be wrong...In a sense, the evidence against the anger-object is the anger itself.**

(1986: 163) (my emphasis)

37. Developmentally there are emotional responses before there are intentional states. For instance, smiling is an innate capacity. It seems to be a biological function

which elicits adult responses without involving any intentional communication. Between 6 weeks and 3 months the baby begins to use the smile "instrumentally", to get a response from someone. (Daniel Stern, 1977 in de Sousa, 1987: 182). Blind children lose expressiveness in their smiles because they get no visual feedback, but babies with blind mothers whose faces are masklike and do not mirror the smiling of their babies nevertheless smile when with seeing persons who do smile. (Levin, 1989: 359). "There are no scenarios, and therefore no emotions, until those responses can be integrated into an intentional structure, enabling the child to understand the meaning of different possible roles" (de Sousa, 1987: 186). *How an infant is treated determines the paradigm scenarios that define its emotional repertoire; but its treatment, in turn, partly depends on its own innate facial characteristics and behaviours. A child is genetically programmed to respond in specific ways to the situational components of some paradigm scenarios.* But what situational components can be identified as *information* depends on the child's stage of development. [this sounds like another epigenetic theory]. Some emotions are more thought dependent than others, and it follows that "if the paradigm scenario cannot be apprehended without complex linguistic skills, for example, we shall not expect to find in someone who lacks those skills an emotion specifically tuned to that scenario" (184).

De Sousa mentions that aesthetic emotions may be an exception to the general rule that paradigm scenarios go back to infancy. He offers that "they constitute *emergent emotional structures*, which bear witness to our capacity for fresh emotional experience, built on, but not out of, preexisting emotional repertoires....Fresh emotions are not necessarily unreflective: on the contrary, the emotions of the unreflective are threatened with cliché" (1987: 263).

38. Recalling Averill's example of my cousin who feels 'courage' when he sees the dangerous man on the street and I feel 'fear'. There is no reason to conclude that what my cousin feels is courage because he does not run. The weakness of the social constructivist focus on patterns across external behaviour is made clear by this example. It would seem rather that fear is felt by both if a threat is perceived; this fear is expressed by flight or by staying put. The latter, depending on the outcome of staying put, and an estimation of the cousin's: a) evaluation of the danger and b) motives for staying put if danger had been assessed as present, is either called courage or stupidity or psychosis. Courage is the social evaluation of one action which is possible once a particular emotion is experienced; it is not the emotion itself. Greenberg and Safran point out that every emotion requires a rapid two-step perceptual process: there is an initial perception of a situation which involves autonomic cues. This proprioceptive data is processed along with, and compared to, cognitive information which produces an emotion, i.e. fear.

39. Consider an example of rule application to women's behaviour in non-nurturing situations such as professional sport. Let us recall that one premise of the interactionist model is that emotions function as signals to others according to culturally predetermined display rules. We assess emotional display for its meaning in relation to a prior expectation about how someone in role 'x' or 'y' feels, acts, and how a person of a specific gender will act. Hochschild (1983) offers the example of the TV announcer at a tennis match who infers from the signs of anger displayed by a female

tennis player when she missed a return that she "really wants to win," "she is a serious player," "she is a pro." Anger rather than apologetic laughter at unsuccessful shots is interpreted as an attribute of the serious player. It is assumed that no one can win by playing with humour or expressions of enjoyment. The rules of prognosis and appraisal can be misapplied; we have only to think of the 'temper tantrums' for which John McEnroe is infamous. Similarly, anger can be underdone; Jimmy Connors has raised his stock as a 'good sportsman with heart' as his game fades in his later years precisely because he transgresses the rules for anger. (He reacts to downturns in his game with self-deprecating humour and clowning, to the crowd's enduring delight, rather than with furious arguments with umpires, obscenities, and sulks.) The most respected signs of anger are those which are self-directed (i.e. Boris Becker's voluble self-castigations in German), or which are expressed symptomatically, for instance, as an increase in unforced errors in the game of notoriously inexpressive players such as Stefan Edberg and other Swedes reputed for their inscrutable and calm exteriors.

Outside the sports arena, 'professionalism' continues to be gender-typed. Anger when expressed by males in work and home contexts gives them authority and connotes the gravity of an issue (probably because against the backdrop of usual male cool inexpressiveness, it has the effect of shock and surprise). On the other hand, expressions of anger by females, in home and work contexts, may actually reduce their authority because it is interpreted not as being a sign of a judgement that something grave or serious has occurred, but rather as an emotional or shrewish 'outburst' exemplary of a loss of reasoning capacity.

40. The existence of feeling rules is presupposed by the psychiatric diagnosis of affective disorder, which locates inappropriate display of affects and inappropriate affects themselves within socially defined rules for feeling and display *and* within an intrapsychic environment of processes proper to the self and its self-regulation.

41. In the *nativist* tradition a limited number of innate primary emotions are assumed, learning goes on as a consequence of classical conditioning, and emotion behaviour is closely identified with biological systems of behaviour. The *sociological* tradition assumes the original openness of the child is quickly directed and limited by social custom through the internalization of norms and rules but it is vague on the mechanisms of internalization. The *social-learning* tradition attempts to mitigate this aporia by emphasizing the direct reinforcement of emotional responses, the modelling of behaviour, and environmental conditions which reinforce a given response.

42. The problem of neurotic, deviant, and inept use of emotion rules, according to Averill, is formulated somewhat differently by de Sousa (1987: 172ff.). He asks the hugely important question which involves a translation between two points of view: "How is the determination of criteria of emotional 'success' by paradigm scenarios compatible with their roles as determinants of salience?" Furthermore, these two approaches suggest opposite answers to the Euthyphro question. He finds that the problem disappears when we remember that there are several types of subjectivity. 'Patterns of salience can be subjective in some senses, without being viciously projective. What is needed is a concept of individual normality, in terms of which the


rationality of an emotion might be judged. Correct axiological assessment is then control of salience by a normal scenario" (172).

43. Some of these contradictions will be discussed below; however, a full account is to be found in André Green's *Le discours vivant. La Conception psychanalytique de l'affect* (1973) and a shorter account in the article "Conceptions of affect," written for the International Psychoanalytical Congress in 1977 organized on the theme of 'Affect and the Psychoanalytic Situation.' It was published in the *International Journal of Psycho-analysis* (1977), 58:129-156 and included in a reprint of *On Private Madness* (1986).

44. The following discussion owes much to André Green's *On Private Madness*, particularly the chapter entitled "Conceptions of Affect" as well as to two articles in Greenspan and Pollack (1989). *The Course of Life: Psychoanalytic Contributions Toward Understanding Personality Development*. Robert Emde's "Toward a Psychoanalytic Theory of Affect: I. The Organizational Model and its Propositions" and Robert Emde and Helen Buchsbaum's "Toward a Psychoanalytic Theory of Affect: II. Emotional Development and Signalling in Infancy".

45. Freud's successive models of the mind, commonly identified as the first 'topographical' and the second 'topographical' model, were essentially descriptions of the functional relationship between psychical subsystems. The first topography identified the Unconscious, Preconscious, and Conscious. Each had a specialised function, type of process, cathectic energy, and specific ideational contents (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 451). The second topography differentiated among the agencies of the id, ego, and super-ego. However, Freud made three characterizations of the unconscious: the descriptive, the dynamic, and the systematic. (See Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988; and Meltzer, 1990)

The descriptive and the dynamic unconscious were earlier and later formulations of the unconscious as it was believed to operate under a topographic view of mental functioning. On the *descriptive* characterization of the unconscious that which is present in our minds is *conscious* (giving a lecture), that which is not present but retrievable in memory is *preconscious* (the date of my wedding anniversary), and that which is not retrievable by any act of conscious will is *unconscious* (a childhood fear which has been repressed). Freud's first 'topographical' model looked like this:



It is from this topographic model that all Freud's spatial metaphors derive of "layers" of the mind, of "uncharted territory," the dream as "royal road" to the unconscious. In this model, the unconscious is a noun since it is seen as the 'place' of memories, thought, wishes, fears, and dreams (Meltzer, 1990:150). The unconscious is the antechamber leading to the sitting room (consciousness) guarded by a sentry who refuses thought entry into consciousness (a personification of the repression barrier).

Under the *dynamic* description where the subsystems are in conflict with one another, the unconscious is an energy flow rather than a locale, and this description motivated Freud's hydraulic metaphors of pressure and release, the mechanisms through which repressed material may 'leak' into consciousness. The major activity that characterizes the *dynamic* model of the unconscious is repression. Leakages or breakthroughs of unconscious energy, wishes, and information occur across the repression barrier into consciousness always in distorted or oblique forms. Traumas, for instance, are relived over again, in dreams and daily life, in order to relieve the tension caused by the intrusion of the trauma into consciousness. "The dynamic model of the unconscious is an economic one, as it is often called, because it describes a system of control and exchanges: tension which builds up, seeking release into consciousness, in order to maintain a balance and stability, seen as "profitable" (Meltzer, 1990: 151).

In the 1920's, Freud replaced the first topographic model of the mind with a second topographic or *structural* model which described a tripartite schema of id, ego and superego. Under this description, the ego is both part of the unconscious (the id) and part of conscious perception as well (the super ego). This model, which enabled ego psychology, lost the dialectical opposition between consciousness and unconsciousness.

46. We recall that contemporary cross-cultural research inherited the pleasure/displeasure continuum as one valence for the comparative evaluation of emotion and confirmed its universality while also adding several other dimensions (Russell, 1991a,b).

47. The structural metaphor of the psyche is problematic because:

The very structural models we employ in our consideration of personality and its development expose us to the potential for a peculiar aberration of thinking, for example, we are apt to conceive of the ego as something having a psychic structure which 'experiences' emotions...as being of the essence of what we speak of as ego.

(Krystal, 1988: 25-26)

In *A New Language for Psychoanalysis*, Schafer (1972) advocates dispensing with economic theories as well as container/contained theories which spatialize affect. Rather he suggests that affect be described in terms of adjectives describing self-experience or as adverbs describing a way of acting.

48. The work of Spitz has contributed directly to this view. He documented the universality of the smiling response and infant distress behaviour and their crucial significance for early social relations, for ego development, and for survival. See his "Hospitalism: An inquiry into the genesis of psychiatric conditions in early childhood." *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* (1945), 2:113-117

49. In Freudian metapsychology, an idea (a symbol) does not connote a subjective presentation of an object to consciousness. Idea was supposed to be the ideational

representative of the drive or, otherwise put, "a representative of the somatic domain in the psychical one" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 224). Ideas operate as 'thing-presentations' in the unconscious and as 'word-presentations' in the system preconscious-conscious. The idea was registered as a 'memory-trace' or 'thing-presentation' in 'mnemic systems,' which are taken to mean associational networks or unconscious pathways. As a 'memory-trace,' an idea takes the form of a series of associations rather than as a word or image with a direct representational relationship to the object. As such, the memory trace bears similarities with the linguistic notion of signifier since it draws its meaning from its relationship to other signs rather than to a referent or sensory quality (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 200).

50. In Freud's writings, variations in his use of the concept of cathexis suggest there is some support for a translation of cathexis from an economic concept, within an energy model, **to a value concept, within a phenomenological or emotional model** (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 64). In their review of the concept of cathexis, Laplanche and Pontalis note that Freud himself adopted "the term 'valeur affective' as the equivalent of '*Affektbetrag*' (quota of affect)," in his article, "Some Points for a Comparative Study of Organic and Hysterical Motor Paralysis" (1893). In other writings, "cathexis seems to mean less a measurable load of libidinal energy than qualitatively differentiated emotional intentions" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 65), and "it is observable that certain objects which are pregnant with value for the subject are affected by a negative rather than a positive load: in phobia, for example, cathexis is not withdrawn from the object--on the contrary, the object is heavily 'cathected' as an object-to-be-avoided" (1988: 64).

51. 'Imago' a concept attributable to Jung, is another way of talking about internal objects, but it emphasizes representation rather than process. It carries the idea of an imaginary residue of one or other of the participants, parents, in a situation involving the child. "Feelings and behaviour...are just as likely to be the concrete expressions of the imago as are mental images" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 211). Imagoes are not to be thought of as reflecting the real world. "The imago of a terrifying father, for instance, may perfectly well be met with in a subject whose real father is unassertive" (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1988: 211).

52. On the question of the internal 'object,' it could be thought of as everything that makes up the environment of the subject with which s/he establishes a relationship fashioned by her/his unconscious conflicts. In describing several meanings of the concept 'internal', Alix Strachey (1941) defines two types of 'internal objects' in order to distinguish between imaginary internal phenomena and imaginary external phenomena: (1) one type refers to objects, situations, or events which are specifically imagined as being inside a person, such as a wolf gnawing at the vitals from within. It is something imagined as inside as opposed to (2) the type which refers to an imago, which is not experienced as being within the body itself. The distinction is made in order to be clear whether a given character-trait rests upon certain processes of identification (defn. #2) or upon phantasies of incorporation (defn. #1) For example, she writes of Mr. K.:

...who from being the calmest of mortals, has suddenly taken to having fits of rage, just as his younger sister used to do. Is this symptom an identification in the sense that Mr. K's ego has become modified to be like his sister or is it based on a phantasy of having got his sister inside him, so that his rage represents his sister raging from within? Of course, both factors will probably be operative and interacting. But the analyst who likes inside objects (defn. #1) will be inclined to see everything as the doing of the imaginary sister inside...whilst the analyst who does not like inside objects will attribute the symptom entirely to imitative factors, due to guilt or emulation, the replacement by the ego of the lost love-object, and so on (defn. 2). (my parentheses).

As Levin (1984: 50) notes, it is difficult to sum up concisely the object-relations point of view. His effort is adequate for our purposes:

It involves a clinically-inspired shift away from concern with instinctual development and management to an exploration of the emotional layerings of emerging ego-object structures. The potential ego is no longer viewed as inherently the "servant of three masters"--the somewhat schizoid defense centre of classical Freudian theory. Very often, however, so much of the ego is split off or repressed during development that a detached, reactive surface structure is all that remains of the outwardly functioning personality.

53. For instance, in his *Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality* (1952), Fairbairn discusses the anal and phallic attitudes as libidinal manifestations of techniques for dealing with objects which have been incorporated. The individual who is preoccupied with the disposal of contents is anal rather than, in Freud's formulation, being anal because he is preoccupied with disposal of contents. For the object-relations school, the object-relationship determines the libidinal relationship not the reverse.

54. Primary narcissism, a fusional state where the infant was believed to have no concept or perception of an external world other than his own fantasies. Piaget's developmental theory has expanded the currency of the notion of primary narcissism since he makes the child's capacity to represent dependent on object permanence. This marks the beginning of the acquisition of language in the 5th (or 6th?) sensorimotor stage, after 18 months.

55. "Psychic incorporation connotes a concretistic fantasy of ingestion, something corresponding to the oral stage of libidinal development, whereas identification implies a more measured, but at the same time deeper, relation of unity with discriminated features of the object...Since internal objects are neither quite so simple as incorporations, nor so refined as to be smoothly integrated into psychic structure and personality, they presumably lie somewhere along the developmental progression from one to another." (Levin, 1989: 456)

56. As a defence against feelings of helplessness, frustration, and ambivalence toward its mother, the infant is said to split its perception of her. When it performs this splitting operation, which necessarily involves projection and introjection, the infant or child (debate rages at what age this happens) also makes an identification. Depending on whose view you follow, the infant is said to introject the good part-object and project the bad part-object outside of itself. This leads to an experience of the external world as dangerous and disappointing as against an experience of self as all good.

57. All references to Levin (1989) in this section will be noted as page numbers in the text unless there is confusion as to the reference in which case the author's name, date of publication, and page citation will be stated in full.

58. While I understand Levin to be arguing for symbolization as a composite of cognition, perception, and affect which begins before language acquisition and which is not tied to sensorimotor developmental stages *à la Piaget*, he also proposes that the difference between affect and perception

is not something that an "environment" can produce, according to the logic of individual development, or ontogeny. In *statu nascendi*, the relation between affect and perception belong to the genotype, as a proposition of functional biology. At the level of the phenotype, neither the affiliation nor the differentiation of cognition and emotion can be created, but only modified. The essential difference between them will have to be explained by neurologists and biologists, not by psychoanalysis, social scientists, philosophers, and students of the symbolic process. (Levin, 1989: 359)

59. The Piagetian view of human development identifies a pre-representational phase of about 2 years. The cognitive capacity for representation was presumed to occur around the end of the second year through the achievements of the 5th and 6th sensorimotor stages--object permanence, mental representations, and semiotic function (Levin, 1989: 431). This view finds support in "the psychoanalytic metapsychological argument that object permanence and object relatedness are secondary modifications or socialized derivatives of need-fulfilling and drive-gratifying experiences (learning theorists, those interested in the role of conditioning in psycho-social development are interested in and have refined this view). On the other hand, Levin argues that there is evidence for a contextualization of the drives which would make object relations primary and birth as the onset of symbolization as against the Piagetian view that linguistic structure and usage, whether learned or innate, are the preconditions of thought (1989: 398). Levin clarifies the usage of object constancy versus object permanence in psychoanalytic and developmental psychology. See his Chapter 8 on 'Representations,' particularly pp. 377-78.

60. "There is no reason to think that looking, hearing, breathing, touching, grasping, recoiling, itching, smelling, or stretching, are less primordial metaphors of mind than swallowing. The fantasy of seeing what one wants probably runs just as

deeply in the currents of the internal world as the idea of feeding on it" (Levin, 1989: 457).

61. In her introductory chapter to *Human Motives and Cultural Models*, Claudia Strauss points out that the cognitive model of motivation being developed by cultural anthropologists, which makes feelings the crucial vehicle of motivation, "converges nicely with recent theories of action proposed by some psychoanalytic anthropologists" such as Robert Paul and Robert LeVine. Paul refers to drives "not as quantities of hypothetical energetic stuff in finite supply, but as cognitive mental images already endowed with an affective tone which renders them motivational." See his "What Does Anybody Want? Desire, Purpose, and the Acting Subject in the Study of Culture." *Cultural Anthropology* (1990) 5(4):431-51.

62. In *Love's Executioner and Other Tales of Psychotherapy* (1989), the psychiatrist Irving Yalom writes movingly of his patient Betty, a fat woman whose body remembered what her mind had forgotten. As she lost weight, with the goal being 100 pounds, she reexperienced the major traumatic or unresolved events of her life that had occurred when she was at a particular weight. Her descent from 250 pounds led her spinning back through emotionally-charged events in her life: 190, her college graduation; 170, her junior high prom. She was never able to lose the 100th pound which would have brought her to 150 pounds, "virgin territory" and what she had weighed the year her father died.

63. Levin would seem to want to argue something like proto-inferential strategies are performed by the neonate who must set up the other with an internal world if empathy is to be possible (as well as introjection, projection, and identification).

64. D'Andrade notes that despite the fact that identifying the drives that activate particular goals is difficult, it is what psychotherapists do with their patients:

Two academics, for example, may both be described as having the goal of maintaining high standards, but have different configurations of drives which are importantly satisfied by this goal. For one academic, this goal may be importantly connected to a narcissistic self-esteem drive - high standards need to be maintained to keep the high prestige of a department from which this person derives great satisfaction; while for the other, academic high standards may be maintained as a way of satisfying aggressive, competitive, and punitive desires involved in keeping out and beating down various unworthy candidates for degrees, appointments, or promotions. However, it is often the case that it takes considerable insight and knowledge about the individual to discover such connections. (1992: 31-32)

65. "The baby does not just want, love, hate, and fear, in a kind of elemental fashion: it also mixes drives, perceptions, cognitions, and sensations together into modulated states of feeling..." (Levin, 1989: 493).

66. These examples have been inspired by Lutz's discussion of a recent article by the psychoanalyst Roy Shafer in which he attempts to explain some patients' persistence in "idealizing unhappiness" and "pursuing failure." In the terms of cognitive anthropologists, the issue is how to explain "the directive force of these painful cognitive/affective patterns" so that sadness and task failure become goals and their pursuit valorized (1992: 190-191).

67. The Lacanian theory of mind is circumscribed by the language paradigm in epistemology. André Green, speaking of Lacan, notes that in *Écrits* (1966: 799), Lacan "explicitly and clearly maintained that it was fruitless to try to give conceptual status to affect as an expression of undifferentiated psychic functioning (1986: 202). However, given that neither a linguistic nor a semiotic theory contains any element that could replace the function which energy completes in Freud's economic model (i.e. as a motivational source of intentionality) (Litowitz, 1991:103), then Lacan's view of the unconscious as structured like a natural language overlooks the problem of the possible common foundations of the different modalities of expression of the unconscious, language and affect. Green formulates the problem this way,

Reference to language, if it has the merit of putting the accent on the structure--which is indeed of decisive importance insofar as it relates to the structure of unconscious intelligibility--avoids the essential questions posed by structuration: *What can be structured, by what, by whom? to arrive at what type(s) (in the singular or plural) of structuring? (...)* Lacan's concept of the symbolic as the key to the unconscious system would be much more acceptable if it could be related to a paradigm other than that of language, but one which makes language possible.
(1986: 204-205)

Green notes that it was unfortunate that Freud had recourse to a language metaphor ("the unconscious speaks more than one dialect" (1917: 177)) when he wanted to indicate the diverse semiotic forms in which the unconscious communicates (the dream as sign, the symptom as sign, language as sign), instead of recourse to a metaphor which allowed for the meaningfulness of affect expressions. We have seen that Levin has proposed a move beyond this limitation which is coincident with Green's revisionist thinking: "language without affect is a dead language: and affect without language is uncommunicable. Language is situated between the cry and the silence" (Green, 1986: 205).

**DISTURBING (DIS)POSITIONS:
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Emotion, Identification, and
the Authority of Fantasy in Theories of Reading Performance**

(PhD Thesis)

by

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CHAPTER FOUR

Vicissitudes of Fantasy in Anglo-American Theories of Reading Performance, Part III: Emotion and Identification as Symptoms of (Dis)Positioning

The psychological content of neurotic symptoms would appear "normal" if the patient were a child.

(Alexander, 1948: 206)

No one is more intolerant of unconscious fantasy than the general public.

(Winnicott, *Home is Where We Start From*, 1986)

But Freud shows us how something which seems pointless or ridiculous or vile to society can become the crucial element in the individual's sense of who she is, her own way of tracing home the blind impress all her behaviors bear.

(Rorty, 1986b: 14)

The enormous popularity of romantic fiction with women has always presented a problem for feminism. It is an empirical given that preeminently signifies some of the limits of feminist understanding and effectivity.

(Ang, 1988: 180)

Psychoanalysis shows how the unconscious inner world, or worlds, developed during childhood affect the external experiences of adulthood and how different aspects of psychic life enter into conflict. These inner worlds and intrapsychic conflicts are imposed upon and give meaning to external situations.

(Chodorow, 1978: 51)

Winnicott (1965) said that there is no such thing as a baby without a mother. He also thought that there was no adult without a baby and mother portion or, as I mean to emphasize, there is no adult who, in relation to himself as an object, is not existentially through self management, or representationally through self objectification, managing certain aspects of himself as a mother or father does a child.

(Winnicott in Bollas, 1987: 42)

4.1 **Fantasy and appropriations of psychoanalysis for reading theory: Janice Radway, feminist 'masterplot' theorist**

Reader-centred theorists who appropriate psychoanalytic concepts and theories for a discussion of the psychologically founded sources of pleasure and unpleasure in reading use certain premises from orthodox Freudianism, Lacanian or object relations theory as the basis for their argument about meaning-effects. Although these theorists endeavour to 'poach' judiciously in order to bring psychoanalytic frameworks out of the clinical encounter and into our understanding of everyday reading behaviour, overshadowing these attempts at translation and application, sometimes reducing them to empty psychobabble, is an awkward heap of bulky conceptual baggage which goes along with the selective claims theorists wish to make on behalf of the reading self as unconscious reader. Into this baggage are packed premises pertaining to: psychic structure and psychodynamic processes (i.e. the psychodynamic correlates of attachment and interaction behaviours); the drives; primal fantasies; the internal world and how internalizations occur and are influential as preconditions for motivation, agency, and defences; the libido as object-seeking or pleasure-seeking; symbolization; the relation between emotion, perception, and cognition; the relation between affect and motivation; memory and the conditions under which it is mobilized. However, a psychoanalytically-informed reader-response theory is still in its infancy, since no sufficiently complex and sophisticated model of reading performance--of particular genres in particular contexts by particular selves, much less a method of research--has been formulated which can do more than gesture summarily to psychoanalytic premises about but a few of the above-noted structures and mechanisms as they are engaged by cultural forms (not to mention findings on cognition and emotion from disciplines such as cognitive psychology and sociolinguistics which have turned their attention to reading behaviour).¹

Another type of conceptual baggage for which the psychoanalytically-inspired camp of reading theorists are responsible has to do with identifying the semiotic and narratological preconditions for a reader's affective and cognitive responses to textual signs. Members of this camp consider: the cultural categories and rules, the generic and narrative conventions that motivate and map the inferential walks taken by different readers. This conceptual baggage takes the form of hypotheses about meaning

as the consequence of a particular textual given, a reading context, and a particular reader's will to meaning, where the latter addresses the role of the unconscious in motivating a reader's response to the materiality of signifiers (i.e. what textual procedures incite/enable processes of projection and introjection). These theorists' focus of attention is not with the meaning of the text, but with its meaning-effects, not with the truth of a reader's interpretation but the disturbance set up in the reader by the text.

One result of the confrontation in the last chapter of the social constructivist paradigm of emotion with the psychoanalytic model of affect is that it is time to recharacterize the interpretive relationship of reader/audience to text/commodity by replacing the metaphor of consumption-ingestion by digestion-elaboration. In light of the early origins of our paradigm scenarios for emotion, and the fact that emotions signal a relationship has occurred among a perception of salience and inferences which carries with it beliefs, values, and desires, if we did not think it before we now know the consumption/ingestion metaphor is simply wrong and should be replaced by the diverse metaphoric associations of 'digestion' and its associated expressions of refusal.

Culture is not taken in like water in a cup, but filtered, refused and taken in through processes that psychoanalytic thinkers have described with words like repression, denial, splitting, introjection.

(Luepnitz, 1988: 180)

The importance of characterizing reading as an operation which is performed through the digestive mediations of 'fantasy'--a concept whose meaning varies with its constituency--is that the validity of a number of conventional assumptions in narrativity must be questioned: for instance, one to one equivalences of reader with the protagonist, and identification according to gender-typed positions in discourses.

Discovering the effects of fantasy in the reading process may take the form of identifying the workings of the reader's 'identity theme' (Holland, 1975a,b)² or of characterizing the text as an erotics of form in which the reader participates because the fantasy 'in' the text duplicates the content of the fantasy 'in' the reader (Brooks, 1977, 1984a).³ Theorists of the romance genre (Modleski, 1982; Rabine, 1985; Radway, 1984; Ang, 1988) have all made use of 'fantasy' to characterize either the content of the genre of romance or as a way to refer *grosso modo* to unconscious

sources of the emotional and psychological satisfactions romance plots are believed to offer their readers.

One exemplary appropriation of psychoanalysis for reader-response theory is *Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature* (1984) the work of Janice Radway, a feminist 'masterplot' reading theorist.⁴ It is theoretically and methodologically exemplary as much for its ambition to join formalist text analysis and ethnography to a depth hermeneutic in reader-reception research as for the difficulties it has identified in attempting such a project. A conceptual mixture of textual determinism and object-relations theory defines Radway's expectations for readers' pleasures. In this chapter, I examine Radway's use of the concept of fantasy for its power to explain the attraction of romance fiction for women readers and the psycho-social preconditions of their pleasure.

In that Radway's research seeks an elucidation of the functioning of the female reader's internal object world when confronted by the stimuli of specific plots and character types and a textually supplied 'fantasy' constellation of interpersonal conflicts, ideals, and emotions, her work contributes to the development of a theory of the modalized self in reading, which Flax (1990) has called for. She believes we can develop a psycho-ethnography for the analysis of reading behaviour which will tell us something about how ideology has played a hand in forming our gender identity in a web of unconscious desires and needs, lines which have their hooks in our flesh. As was the case with Laura Mulvey's seminal "Visual Pleasure" article on film spectatorship,⁵ a fundamental aim of Radway's research is to ascertain the affective relationship which textual mechanisms establish in the reading performance of gendered individuals for which the issue of identification is central. Furthermore, although Radway completed *Reading the Romance* before Rose published *Sexuality in the Field of Vision*, her research has addressed Rose's demand that cultural studies investigate the ways in which "ideology works at the most rudimentary level of identity and the drives." Indeed, *Reading the Romance* precisely operates with the materialist psychological hypothesis, from the early work of Nancy Chodorow, that the differences in male and female personality are rooted in the structure of the family,

then reaffirmed and exacerbated by socio-cultural expectations for sex-roles and the division of emotional division.

On Chodorow's account, the ideology of sex-roles (and, Rose might argue, of gender difference itself) is present in the child-rearing intersubjective relationship from the mother's first apprehension of the sex of her baby. The ideology of sex-roles also describes *post facto* the solution adopted by the male and female child for the different problems presented to each by his or her first caretaker having been a woman. Each is believed to internalize a gender identity which reveals itself behaviourally in a pattern which generates the role stereotypes that women and men bring to experience and which circumscribe their emotional negotiations. Radway's book is an application of hypotheses about the ways in which the psychosexual inheritance of conflicts and desires peculiar to male and female personalities forms the precondition for female readers' identification and pleasure in the wish structure of romance fiction.

Another feature of Radway's research, of note for feminist approaches to mass culture critique, is her attempt to link her account of the operations of the female psyche with a specific articulation of a feminine and resisting point of view achieved during romance reading. Her belief is that the desires fuelling romance reading can be released from the ideological form, the romance genre, which 'manages' them. She implies that the oppositional impulses and discontents attached to readers' unfulfilled desires are a resource to be organized for change with respect to gender relations in society as a whole and in the organization of the family.

The steps by which Radway makes inferences about romance readers' internal worlds and unconscious desires from the data of their reports on their emotional reactions to different romance novels is of particular interest since she affords emotion symptomatic significance of unconscious wishes. Radway avoids a premature answer to the question of why women read romance novels by refusing the masochism thesis in which a correlation between content of the fiction, assumed to be an irreducible given, and psychopathological profile of the reader is assumed. The importance of the problem and method of investigation Radway has chosen is that it endeavours to tell us something about the means by which the different sexes search for solutions to developmental problems, problems which are encapsulated affectively and re-engaged

or stimulated by events throughout the life span, reading fiction being one such event and means to a solution. Her research should be seen as a contribution to a conversation among those cognitive psychologists, developmental theorists, and anthropologists who have been studying emotion and memory.

4.2 Methodology of *Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature*

In *Loving with a Vengeance: Mass-Produced Fantasies for Women*, Tania Modleski (1982) makes two assumptions when she calls romance novels 'mass produced fantasies': romance novels both offer and inculcate a culturally widespread conventional belief about the nature of women's desire which for Modleski is an ideological rendering (i.e. romances are fantasies because they are illusion promoting myths), and the romance novel as a genre takes the form of a wish which has utopian aims (i.e. fantasy as wish). The assumption that consumers of romance fiction published today by Harlequin, Doubleday, Dell, and Avon interpret the meaning of these fantasies/myths and wishes in the same way, and because of these 'ingested' meanings become targets of the ideological reassurances believed implicit in these fantasies, has been endemic to the work of Modleski on romance as it has been to the earlier work of Millett on Mailer and Arthur Miller. However, against the commonplace view--which Modleski herself partakes of and which is characteristic of early second-wave, feminist, Anglo-American criticism--that mass cultural forms "perform their social functions by imposing alien ideologies upon unsuspecting if not somnolent readers," Janice Radway explains that she set out, in *Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature*,

to explore the question of the totality of the ideological control achieved by mass culture,...an attempt to see whether it was possible to describe not only what the **romance meant** to a specific group of women but also what the **act of reading signified** to them within the context of their daily lives. In doing so, I hoped to detect whether the usual account of the **form's meaning** as a component of patriarchal society (Douglas, 1980; Modleski, 1982; Mussel, 1984; Snitow, 1979) bore any resemblance to the **romance as it was interpretively constructed** by a group of real romance readers" (1984:98) (emphasis added)⁶

In that Radway's major objective is to construct a convincing explanation of the genesis of some women's intense desire to read romance novels on a regular basis (between 1 and 4 every week),⁷ she treats the reconstruction of the internal world of these readers in the context of their everyday use of romance fiction as prerequisite to an understanding of their behaviour in the marketplace. The hermeneutic circle of Radway's investigation is organized around and propelled by two initiatives, an ethnographic study and a formalist text analysis.

The core group of Radway's informants were 42 romance readers and Dot Evans, the editor of a small newsletter offering reviews of newly published romances, in a small Pennsylvania town renamed 'Smithton' by Radway. Through questions put to the Smithton readers in oral interviews and in questionnaires, Radway solicited these women's self-understanding of their reading habits and preferences and what their emotional responses told them about good and bad books (120). Reflecting on her method of research, Radway argues that

although our own interpretation as analyst is an escapable, inevitable part of all mass culture research, it is nonetheless important and helpful to begin with a real audience's **conscious, surface interpretation** of a given form if we wish to understand how that form functions within the larger culture and, most especially, if we hope *ourselves* to contribute to the possibilities for challenging the material situation which gave rise to the particular **form of the fantasy** in the first place.

(1986: 99) (my emphasis in bold)⁸

Her second initiative took the form of a Proppian analysis of the plot structure of novels whose selection was motivated by the distinctions her informants had already made between 'ideal' and 'failed' romance plots. With the results of her formalist analysis in hand, Radway reinterpreted her informants' affective and self-regarding responses in the light of her knowledge of narrative functions and character development in her sample of plots and on the new assumption that female readers identified with the heroine in both failed and ideal narratives (an inference made on the basis of her informants' responses), to draw conclusions about the relations between the meaning-effects of these novels and the 'depth' psychological preconditions--desires, fears, conflicts--for these women's pleasure in ideal plots and displeasure in failed plots. She uses literary and psychological concepts that do not exist in the cultural world of the readers themselves (1986: 99, 103); however, we will

see that Radway does not need object relations theory to be able to account for readers' distinctions between ideal and failed plots.

Ideal vs. failed romances

When the romance novel as real seducer says to the female reader, "here is your part," what part *does* the reader find herself being offered? What part does her unconscious theatre demand that she play? Radway answers with a hypothesis about the romance as fantasy. It bears a resemblance to Modleski's twin characterization of romances: as illusion or myth, and as a wish structure. Romance as myth offers the reader a position among an audience which wants and expects to hear reassurances of their conscious wish that true love, marriage, and female independence are compatible; however, readers know that "reality is neither as just nor as happy as romances would have it" (109). A different pleasure is offered to the unconscious as reader by romance as unconscious wish structure.

Radway asks: To what conscious and unconscious uses do female readers put romance fiction? What are their repressed motives in reading romance literature? The answer to this depends on the view the researcher has of what unconscious processes reflect or support. Methodologically, this entails the crucial problem of "[w]hat constitutes evidence for an unconscious motive, and how can one learn to recognize it as such?" To formulate conclusions about the psychological needs and unconscious motives of readers, and the therapeutic effects of romance reading on them, Radway constructs a "composite Smithton reader" (14) and a hypothetical reading process representative of the Smithton interpretive community which distinguishes between failed and ideal plots.

Her structuralist analysis produced formal distinctions between the plots of ideal and failed romances in a language that her informants themselves would not have used. She concludes that not every love story is a romance; it is the way the loving relation is developed and the final happy ending arrived at that makes for an ideal romance. As a formulaic structure, the ideal plot was found to take a variation on a basic form: "a woman is misunderstood by the hero, mistreated and manhandled as a consequence of his misreading, and then suddenly loved, protected, and cared for by

him because he recognizes that he mistook the meaning of her behavior" (75).⁹ Several criteria were essential to these women's reading pleasure: a one woman-one man relationship, the presence of a "spectacularly masculine hero" who the "fiery" heroine is capable of "defying, softening...and showing him the value of loving and caring for another" (54). The enemy is turned into a lover--expressive, nurturant, tender, and kind--and women readers are reassured that "female independence and marriage are compatible rather than mutually exclusive" (54). Readers are believed to attach huge value to the heroine's abilities--she must retain her independence and individual identity even in the face of paternalistic care and protection by a male (54). The stories are experienced as "a reversal of the oppression and emotional abandonment suffered by women in real life...they provide a utopian vision in which female individuality and a sense of self are shown to be compatible with nurturance and care by another" (55).

I intend a specific discussion below of failed romances in the context of the symptomatic significance of readers' emotional responses to them, but for the moment, it is enough to say that they differ primarily in the way the hero treats the heroine (64). A 'failed' plot is one which does not allow the reader to triumph in imagination over fears she struggles with in life: rape, unhappy endings, and catastrophic love affairs. "Garbage-dump" romances ask the reader "to identify with a heroine who is hurt, humiliated, and brutalized or with a heroine who learns to adjust to scaled-down desires" (180-1). These events destroy the therapeutic value of romance which depends on enabling the reader to maintain hope that male and female relations can be managed successfully (72).

According to Radway's research, the ideal plot is one where both therapeutic and didactic functions are accomplished, and she expects both have their yields of pleasure for the romance aficionado. However, these pleasures are not of the same type. Romances serve a compensatory function (95), offering readers relaxation and escape. Although Radway argues the romance novels are fantasies in the sense of being myths or "a false picture of reality" (Ang, 1988), they relieve fears because readers learn strategies to manage male/female relations via the exemplary heroine's predicaments. Readers are supposed to put a novel down with a renewed feeling of

confidence and self-efficacy. Radway says she adopts Bettelheim's explanation for why romances are therapeutic--they offer hope (*The Uses of Enchantment*, pp. 121-126). The good feelings they give us about ourselves and our future are real and what we need to sustain us even though the fantasies (or fairytales) themselves are not:

In discussing the therapeutic function of true fairy stories and folk tales, Bruno Bettelheim has argued that they perform the fundamental service for children of creating and maintaining *hope*. Because he believes folk tales take as their true subject the psychosexual traumas of early childhood and that they are psychologically 'true' in the sense that they symbolically demonstrate how these conflicts can be resolved, Bettelheim maintains that they act as emotional primers for the children who imaginatively participate in them. Not only do they indicate specific psychological solutions to problems such as separation anxiety and the Oedipal conflict, but they also hold out the promise of future solution for the child who cannot see the way to negotiate the necessary journey at the present moment.

(Radway, 1984: 100)

However, Bettelheim argued that stories do more than inspire hope; they are also a sentimental education. They provoke inchoate feelings which a child learns to tolerate and manage through the process of giving them a name and a meaning in the context of the child's relationship with the parent during the event of reading the story.

Fairytales create anxiety provoking situations and model responses to them. In similar fashion, the pleasures associated with unconscious therapeutic effects of romance reading follow from a reduction of anxiety in the reader of a particular sort, that associated with a loss of self-esteem and love. Anxiety retreats when the female reader feels valued sexually and emotionally through vicarious identification with the heroine.

These didactic and therapeutic functions coincide with the two registers in which romance narratives exert meaning-effects: the romance fantasy as myth and as wish-fulfillment. The didactic operates at the level of romance as myth. The romance genre, as Radway defines it, is never simply a love story but also an exploration of the meaning of patriarchy for women. "[It is concerned with the fact that men possess and regularly exercise power over [women] in all sorts of circumstances" (1984: 75). The representation of misogyny, power struggles, are believed to be pleasurable not in themselves, but because they teach coping strategies. While affirming that feared situations are the conditions of life for women, Radway maintains that romances

reduce fears by showing how to survive them. The therapeutic aspect of the 'map for' action which romances provide follows from the change which is effected in a reader's beliefs about her powerlessness and about the nature of the 'enemy'. A reduction of fear and a subjective sense of powerlessness is supposed to follow from a change of belief.

Romance fiction provides a sentimental education by tacitly teaching the reader about emotion-as-inner experience and emotion-as-social interaction.¹⁰ Radway's analysis of failed romances reveals the prerequisites of the cultural script for romantic love. The companionate relationship--stability, resolute, trusting, emotionally expressive--does not offer 'romantic love' since it is based on only trust, affection, and tenderness between the members of the couple. First person narration in the romance novel offers insight into the emotional states of the heroine while confirming the usefulness of gender prescribed rules of overt behaviour (power accrues through prescriptive display rules, i.e. "I will not show him I care"). While showing how the heroine makes sense of her own emotional responses ("I feel so ashamed that I desire him") and how she assigns meaning to the emotional-expressive behaviour of others, romances confirm the cultural assumption that emotions are things that happen to you over which you have little control. The romance also provides instruction in how to read male emotional display. Radway argues that by presenting the triumph of the romantic heroine as "simply bringing to the surface traits and propensities that are part of the hero's most basic nature" (129), the romance encourages women readers to shoulder the burden of 'teaching' the real men in their lives, of accepting their limitations because the men in their lives cannot be held responsible for a socialization which has deformed their intrinsic natures. Consequently, "the romance can say nothing about the more difficult problem of how to teach men to be gentle who have developed within a set of family relationships that systematically repressed the boy's capacity to nurture and, then, in an act of overdetermination, reinforces that destruction by branding tenderness in a man as a sign of weakness" (129). Although the ultimate and traditional message of romance fiction that "pleasure for women is men" cannot be denied, "readers interpret these stories as chronicles of female triumph" (54).

Radway's conclusions about the therapeutic value of the formulaic structure of ideal plots and their fulfillment of a formulaic wish content ("of total surrender where all danger has been expunged, thus permitting the heroine to relinquish self-control" (97)) depends upon her assumptions about the female personality and its characteristic psychological needs. Radway's hypothesis about the preconditions for these psychological needs derives from her appropriation of Nancy Chodorow's theory of female psychological development and gender personality under capitalist-patriarchal family structure. Chodorow is a major feminist contributor to the position that social ills, particularly relations between the sexes, are an outgrowth of what could be called family dysfunction because it is in the family that gendering occurs, i.e. families where children are mothered by women rather than by men. Why? Male and female children bring their troubled relation to internal objects to all adult experience where it informs decisions about cultural consumption, judgements of taste, and even the interpretative transactions between readers and texts. Radway's selective use of Chodorow's argument in *The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender* (1978) provides her with a set of developmental presuppositions about the formation of male and female personality differences from which she infers reading processes and psychic preconditions to repression, pleasure, and selective perception.¹¹

Her appropriation of Chodorow defines the psychological predisposition of women readers, in terms of characteristic and prototypical anxieties for which they will search for reassurances. Women's suffering Radway would have us accept, drawing on Chodorow's account of the formation of women's personality, is a product of "asymmetrical engendering" which predisposes men and women to experience intimacy differently (men are less afraid of discontinuity while women are less afraid of commitments). These differences predispose women to behaviours such as nurturance and commitment which are necessary for mothering: a female is psychically constituted with an "internalized portrait of the female self as a self-in-relation which is later generalized as a view of the self as an extension or continuation of the world and others" (1984: 136) whereas the male's personality structure "is defined by autonomy and independence, by a denial of irrationality, and often by a

corresponding devaluation of women" (137). The male child denies his preoedipal identification with and desire for the mother in order to achieve a firm gender identity as male. The typical female personality is supposed to be based on an incomplete resolution of the Oedipus complex which results in the daughter never severing her pre-oedipal ties to the mother. "The girl becomes erotically heterosexual but at the same time carries an internal emotional triangle into adulthood, a triangle that is completed by her continuing need and desire for her mother. This finally produces in women a continuing wish to regress into infancy to reconstruct the lost intensity of the original mother-daughter bond" (136). This experience cannot be relived with the male partner who is non-nurturing, because he precisely defines himself as not-female by rejecting all characteristics associated with women.¹²

It is in the therapeutic relief provided by the emotional gratification of the romance as wish structure where the tenacious appeal of romance literature is supposed to lie. From Radway's account, we can infer that the satisfaction of psychological needs provided by the romance as wish structure is of two types and correlates with developmental struggles at the pre-oedipal and oedipal stages.

Relief follows on completion of the sexual trajectory:

The story permits the reader to identify with the heroine at the moment of her greatest success, that is, when she secures the attention and recognition of her culture's most powerful and essential representative, a man. The happy ending is, at this level, a sign of a woman's attainment of legitimacy and personhood in a culture that locates both for her in the roles of lover, wife, and mother. (84)¹³

Satisfaction and well-being through recognition by the other is both social and intrapsychic in origin: social in the sense of meeting a sex-role norm, a representation of the collective gaze (heterosexual love and marriage), and intrapsychic in that a wished for internal object scenario has been achieved by action in the external world; she has gained the love of not just any man but a 'worthy' male in her eyes. She is a "self-in-relation" with her object of desire.

Radway hypothesizes that ideal narratives satisfy fundamental psychological needs which result from the effects on women of patriarchal parenting arrangements. The ideal romance "simultaneously recapitulates a woman's psychosexual development and vicariously satisfies some of the reader's needs created by such development and

seldom met fully by traditional, patriarchal marriage" (16). The romance plot appeals to "unconscious needs" activated in women by early object-relations and cultural conditioning in patriarchal society (83) and satisfies those pre-oedipal needs by confirming the woman as a "self-in-relation" in a way appropriate to pre-oedipal needs. The ideal romance first frustrates then satisfies the female reader's wish to be protected and cared for by an all-powerful parent. The ideal heroine's journey toward female selfhood takes the form of efforts both to reject and to regain the mother (the quest for motherly nurturance). The fantasy in the ideal plot provides an account of a woman's successful journey from isolation and its threat of annihilation to connection and the promise of a mature, fulfilled female identity "as that particular psychic configuration is constructed and realized within patriarchal culture" (135).

The preeminent distinction between ideal and failed romances turns on the power of the former to enable the reader to take up a pleasurable identification with the heroine. Narration from the first person point of view of the heroine or a third person description of the heroine is supposed to facilitate the reader's identification. "Emotion generated within the reader by her identification with the heroine is the crucial determining factor" of a successful romance, over and above narrative structure (184). Readers want to experience the hero's "protective concern" and "tender regard" for the heroine (105). "[A]ttention to the heroine's responses to his [the hero's] appreciation of her physical beauty is not only desirable but central to the entire event" (105). Romance reading is compensation for emotional deprivation by providing vicarious emotional nurturance through identification with the heroine whose womanliness is always confirmed, sexually and romantically, by an ideal male. The desire to identify with the heroine who falls in love and finds herself the object of love and admiration--being the 'prize'--is not what makes a love story a romance. Rather it must chronicle the courtship and what it feels like to be the object of one. It is the process of seduction in which women take pleasure. Although a novel may include all the narrative features of an ideal romance (i.e. the heroine gets a kind, nurturant hero in the end, one who appreciates her as a full human being and excites her sexually), it fails if it does not offer the reader the lengthy opportunity "to imagine herself so valuable an individual that she is actively pursued, gently caressed, and

passionately loved by a man who also promises safety and protection" (181). These emotionally regressive needs have to do with the wish to be cared for, loved, and validated in a particular way. It is not about discovering a uniquely interesting life partner (83).

4.3 Critique of Radway

Any extension of Radway's work by reader-response theorists must begin with a reconsideration of her proposals for the female subject and narrative pleasure. My discomfort with the conclusions of *Reading the Romance* follows from two aspects of Radway's method which raise more questions than they answer: the way readers' reports of their emotional responses to particular romances narratives are used to draw inferences about the psychological needs of these readers, and her less than satisfying view of how identification between the reader and textual characters proceeds, particularly since these identifications are presumed to motivate the reader's emotional reactions. Although Radway's account is provocative and sometimes convincing, I believe she has given us but a partial hypothesis about the relation between readers' emotions and the identifications they signal.

4.3.1 Emotions as symptoms

The psychoanalytic paradigm of emotion embedded in *Reading the Romance* is crucial for Radway's thesis about the unconscious sources of the pleasures experienced by the reader of the romance as wish structure. *Reading the Romance* ascribes to 'emotion' symptomatic significance and signalling power. Romance literature compensates women for what they cannot live in their daily lives (Radway, 1984: 89, 95) not only by offering them "a symbolic gratification of the psychological need for nurturance and care...which, given their entrapment in the arrangements of "patriarchal marriage," cannot be satisfied in "real life" (Ang, 1988: 179), but by offering satisfying emotional experiences through vicarious identification with the strong willed, feisty, independent heroine.

To interpret what an emotion signals at the level of wishes or aims or anxieties or beliefs, Radway goes looking in two directions: the type of relation holding

between the heroine and the hero as defined by the plot function (i.e. emotional isolation and sense of loss when the heroine's social identity is destroyed), and the object-relations scenario to which the emotion is attached. This scenario consists of actors, inferences, and aims. Radway presumes that the *prototype* of emotions the reader may feel in vicarious identification with the heroine originates in memories of the pre-oedipal and oedipal developmental phases. By proposing the ideal romance plot *recapitulates* or repeats a woman's psychosexual development (by that she means a journey from loss of first object, emotional isolation into the oedipal phase, then the mother is refound when the male is transformed into a tender lover), Radway would seem to be assuming that particular events in the plot, and the emotions they compel in the heroine with which the reader identifies, are repetitions of the paradigm scenarios for the *reader's* emotions of fear, love, hate and wishes for completion and fears for a loss of separate boundaries. For instance, in discussing the ideal plot Radway argues:

In returning to the narrative structure of the romance, it should now be clear that the initial function dictating the heroine's loss of connections and identity *is more deeply resonant in a psychoanalytic sense than it is overtly topical*. When she is plucked from her earlier relationships and thrust out into a public world, the heroine's consequent terror and feeling of emptiness *most likely evokes for the reader distant memories of her initial separation from her mother* and her later ambivalent attempts to establish an individual identity.

(138) (my emphasis)

Radway's assumption about the role of emotions in the therapeutic effects of ideal plot romances is fundamentally an abreactive one: the reader is drawn along an emotional trajectory which culminates in the satisfaction of wishes and desires which, in life, are frustrated (97-98). The need to achieve the end of this trajectory and the anticipated emotional gratification in whatever time is available for reading is what determines a reader's choice of a "quick read" (less than 200 pages) or a "fat book." Readers reread their favourite books at times of stress or depression in order to regulate themselves emotionally by having a reliable emotional journey.

4.3.2 Radway's theory of identification

Object-relations theory enters Radway's research as an explanatory model for female psychic make-up and needs. Psychoanalytic theory is used in an analogical fashion as a method of analysis of the psychology of the text/reader interaction. However, it enters her method in a very selective way which is most strikingly apparent in her theory of how identification proceeds. The lynchpin of Radway's hypothesis about the therapeutic mechanisms of action of ideal plots and the source of readers' pleasure is that, on the one hand, female readers identify with characters on the basis of gender congruence, and on the other hand, that the wish-fulfilling fantasy of reexperiencing the pre-oedipal joys with the lost first object (the mother), through the love of a tender and nurturing male, is collectively shared by female readers. But where does the propensity to identify with the female heroine come from? To question the basis for this assumption of gender congruence in identification opens up Radway's data to new hypotheses about why women read romances and the meanings attached to the emotions they experience. What remains of Radway's thesis on readers' psychological profiles and the utopian possibilities of the pleasures of romance novels if her theory of identification is found wanting?

In this section, I will put into question this identitarian assumption of congruence between reader and heroine on the basis of gender through a consideration of the following issues:

4.3.2.1 the slippage which occurs between two meanings of fantasy and two notions of identification;

4.3.2.2 the sociologism of the Chodorovian inheritance in debates on gender, identification, and fantasy;

4.3.2.3 a recovery of a Freudian notion of fantasy; and

4.3.2.4 its ramifications for identification based on gender congruence.

4.3.2.1 Questioning identification from the point of view of two notions of fantasy: as content, as process

The notion of 'identification,' the portmanteau nature of which has long been recognized, has been central nevertheless to debates in psychoanalytically-influenced literary theory as in film studies and reader-reception studies. The literary use of

identification differs from the meaning of this term as employed in purely psychoanalytic contexts. In literary analysis, identification has been used loosely to mean sympathising or engaging with a character. Identification with the textual subject means participating in the action, making inferences, sharing in the knowledge of a character by adopting the narrative point of view. The psychoanalytic notion of identification intrudes when it is assumed that the reader not only empathizes with a character (which could be accessed by self-reports) but actually assimilates an aspect or attribute of a character and is subtly changed by the reading process (and this is not accessible to conscious reporting). Identification, on this account, is seen as the key mechanism for the production of identity. This assimilation process may require a prior lifting of psychic defences and the anxieties and conflicts they protect against. Different assumptions about the communicational (i.e. dialogical) preconditions to intrapsychic change and what it 'is' that readers identify 'with' are fundamental to whether cultural theorists dispute the merits of texts on the basis of an argument about representations (and their ideological effects) or primarily on the basis of an argument about textual form through which processes of representation occur (parody and metafiction vs. the realist novel or melodrama, for instance)

While the works of Radway and Modleski characterize romances as fantasies, and these authors actually make use of two different notions of fantasy as has been noted above, neither notion (fantasy as illusion, fantasy as hallucinatory wish) captures the aspect of fantasy as a *compromise* between satisfaction of the wish *and* defences against the satisfaction of the wish. The tension between these two imperatives is lost by the reduced psychoanalytic notion of fantasy as a vehicle to express directly and literally without veiling of any sort a wish content supposed generic of the fantasies 'embedded' in women due to their cultural experience.¹⁴ This harkens back to the structuralism we find in Peter Brook's early work (1977) where an Oedipal masterplot is supposed the mainstay of the reader's anxieties which find relief in a fantasy 'in' the text. This 'wish' view of fantasy implies a static view of the unconscious, as a container for certain needs and fears, patterned by fantasies that reflect a child's earliest relational experiences in the nuclear family. Radway has not gone beyond Holland's identity theme view of the influence of the unconscious on reading pleasure.

Due to Radway's assumption that fantasy is in the content of a narrative which expresses a desired outcome or wish, she construes romance narratives as undistorting reflections of the wish content of women's own fantasies. Spigel's critique of the tautology in Modleski's argument in *Loving with a Vengeance* holds for Radway's assumptions about fantasy and desire in *Reading the Romance*:

Modleski argues that the texts of mass culture can help to answer the riddle of femininity. "To commit ourselves to a search for the utopian promises of mass art for women...is to put ourselves in the way of answering the great vexed question first posed by Freud: 'What do women want?'" (p. 31). I would argue that Modleski's answers are organized around a fundamental tautology. The question of feminine desire is answered by the text, and the question of the text is answered by feminine desire.

(Spigel, 1985: 220 ff.)

Despite the fact that Radway was inspired to pursue ethnographic research methods by the insight of reader-response critics such as Stanley Fish (Radway, 1984: 243), and despite her critique of those "critics [who] posit a desire in the reading audience for a specific meaning they have unearthed" (1984:4); nevertheless, she reveals herself to be a masterplot theorist to the extent that she postulates there are plots which activate the same fears, anxieties, and pleasures in a community of readers, at the conscious level **and** at the unconscious level. Indeed, by definition, her heuristic device of the 'composite Smithton reader' has cogency only as long as shared psychological predispositions are posited in the Smithton group of romance readers. Although she admits that texts have no irreducible meaning, nevertheless, she does posit a desire in a reading audience for specific plots she has unearthed, plots to which desire is tenaciously connected. The 'masterplot' to which Radway refers in order to explain women's pleasure in the romance is both (a) a narrative which recapitulates a developmental process whose stages the female reader is supposed to re-experience when she shares vicariously the emotions of the heroine throughout her travail, and (b) a paradigmatic pre-oedipal fantasy. An object-relations model of development is used to defend the finding of a paradigmatic fantasy wish in the romance narrative which is supposed to reproduce a paradigmatic fantasy in the female reader; i.e. the regressive, pre-oedipal fantasy of union with and care by another who is a stand-in for the mother.

Radway ascribes to 'infancy' the origins of female psychosexual developments which influence all later behaviour, needs, conflicts, and fears. By taking Chodorow's assumptions about female personality on board, this leads to the adoption of an object-relations framework which presupposes a world of 'objects' preconstituted as always-already there for recognition. It allows Radway to avoid the question of "the constitutive role of representations, substantial and psychical, conscious and unconscious, in the cultural production of 'reality' (Burgin, 1986:iv). It also means Radway takes on board Chodorow's assumption that all women have a yearning to refine or repair the relationship with the mother. This is the background for, what Penley calls, a "regressive pre-Oedipal fantasy," that which Radway assumes is the source of readers' desire and the structuring principle of their identifications: "a desire to return to the mother's body, to fuse with it, to enter a world without distinctions or differences" (1992: 480, 500). But, in a move which brings Lacan back into an account of fantasy against the Chodorovian focus on the pre-Oedipal, Penley points out, "this is not the *only* desire that structures those fantasies...One can want completion but one can also desire lack" (1992: 500). The two poles of fantasy, in Lacanian terms, are relation to the phallus: 'being the phallus' and 'having the phallus' (the aim of one who lacks it) (Chase in Feldstein and Roof, 1989: 5).

Without Chodorow, Radway could not have posited the psychological significance to women readers of the prototypicality of successful romance plots. By adopting Chodorow's thesis of a female personality she is led to assume what she wants to prove with respect to the question of whether the source of romance readers' pleasures lies in identification with the heroine or not. Indeed, all commentators on the romance and its readership claim that romances call attention to a feminine character structure that differs from the masculine one (Snitow, 1979; Radway, 1984; Rabine, 1985). The assumption made by all these critics is that if a reader finds pleasure in the romance she must be sharing in the heroine's emotions and identifying with the heroine's struggles because they touch on her own.

4.3.2.2 Identification via gendered role

The inherent sociologism of Radway's view of gender identity and its formation, inherited from Chodorow, leads her, first of all, to conceive of gender identity in terms of role identity. She recasts the process of unconscious identification into a kind of "more or less conscious role modelling (Penley in Grossberg, 1992: 479). That is, our sense of our identity as female is a product of the internalization of the demands of female roles. This implies the conflicts in psychical reality are the product of unfulfilled needs created by the non-complementary roles of the two sexes rather than from conflicts immanent to the self.

The focus on gender roles creates the impression that women's subjectivity is less conflictual than under a Freudian picture. Her theory of female subjectivity is a simple one, circumscribed by Chodorow's framework which talks about the development of relational capacities only. Radway's work has lost the concept of the *divided subject, characterized by an internal fantasy scenario and the compulsion to repeat*, which for Rose must be the point of departure for a challenge to the "dualities (inside/outside, victim/aggressor, real event/fantasy, and even good/evil) upon which so much traditional political analysis has so often relied" (1985:15). Like Chodorow, Radway displaces "the concepts of the unconscious and bisexuality in favour of a notion of gender imprinting...The book sets itself to question sexual *roles*, but only within the limits of an assumed sexual identity" (Roof, 1991: 259). In neither Radway's nor Chodorow's framework is there a place for conflicts over homosexuality because neither allows for it in her assumptions about the gendered unconscious and female personality.

In the search for a clarification of the dynamics of female literary response, Radway assumes an ironclad gender congruence. She makes the tautological move of assuming that women readers, because they are women, identify solely with women characters (the gendered masterplot) thereby defeating the purpose of her inquiry into the psychological interaction of texts and gendered readers. Furthermore, she compounds her error by presuming gender congruence also operates at the level of positions taken up by the reader in fantasy, textual or otherwise. Chodorow's influence is clearly apparent again.

The assumption that gendered readers identify with gendered characters comes from the dominance of psychoanalytic sociological models of identification. Identification is presumed to occur through an identification with roles, and roles are gendered. On this sociological account, readers search for role models for their gender. The advantage of role theory in hypotheses about psychological development and readers' predispositions to identification is that social links to the psychical, how outer becomes inner, seem easier to describe. They seem more powerful because they avoid the question of the gap between psychoanalytic theories of gender production and the 'how' and 'why' of sexual orientation as object-choice (for instance, because lesbians take women as their erotic object-choice does not mean they identify with men. Furthermore, there is always a difference between erotic gender identity and erotic role).

Cora Kaplan's critique of Modleski's theory of the reading subject in *Loving with a Vengeance* applies with a vengeance to *Reading the Romance*:

The female subject/reader has, as she [Modleski] suggests, a great deal of active psychic process in relation to texts in which heroines are posed as passive, but she must be situated in the text *as* female subject. Crossing the boundaries of gender as part of the act of reading and fantasizing plays no significant part in her analysis. (...) The ways the subject/reader engages with textual fantasy which combines original or primal fantasy..., is clearly more complex than most accounts of reading romance have allowed.

(Kaplan, 1986: 152, 153)

When Radway critiques the message of the romance as ideological: "it repeats the conventional wisdom that a woman can best realize her potential as an individual by assuming the relational roles of wife and mother" (1986b: 112), her objection to this message is due to the fact that she assumes a sociological notion of identity as role which is a product of social learning as opposed to identity being a product of internalization and identifications which are multiple, whose origins are early, and whose effects are unavailable to consciousness or to conscious repudiation.

Radway's appropriation of Chodorow leaves her view of the female mind, as proposed in *Reading the Romance*, open to the same criticism as Chodorow herself has directed to traditional psychoanalysis, that is, that psychoanalysis is a view of the mind dominated by childhood. Its view of women is what a child wants to believe, i.e.

mother as nurturing, tender, devoted, self-abnegating, and so on. Radway's view of women readers is that they are dominated by unfinished business with their mothers and want men in their lives who will provide the tender nurturing associated with the pre-oedipal relation. The 'true self' of the Smithton reader is a psychic construction dominated by pre-oedipal needs and desires. Radway has a blindspot around women readers' so-called negative emotions of aggression and anger.

Radway believes she can move convincingly from a sociological account of women's roles and lack of power in a patriarchal society, and the fears which economic dependence and misogyny produce, to find the psychic preconditions for these fears and needs *already established by the developmental stages women have passed through*. The pleasures offered by ideal romances are supposed as originating in a diminution of these fears, through a sort of cognitive therapy, and a vicariously achieved emotional gratification which is supposed as leading to the recovery in the reader's imaginary of the lost first object through a pre-oedipal regression. The creation of pleasures of the first type, through cognitive change, is an adequate explanation for the pleasures of romance. Radway's psychoanalytic argument for pleasures at the level of wish-fulfillment are not convincing, largely because of her incomplete notion of fantasy and her assumptions about identification.

4.3.2.3 Rethinking Radway through a model of fantasy as 'scenario'

In *Reading the Romance*, Radway has chosen to use a very restricted notion of fantasy as wish fulfillment which, in turn, shores up a problematic hypothesis about what it is that emotions symptomatize and an equally restricted and unsatisfying thesis on identification. She ends up assuming what it was her intention to prove about identification and its fantasy substrate. The lacuna created by using Chodorow to theorize identifications female readers make is that we get a reduced view of cultural 'digestion' through personal fantasy. We recall that Ryle said the defects of the common sense view of fantasy was that "the *transactions* between the episodes of the private history and the public history remain mysterious, since by definition they can only belong to neither series" (Ryle in Burgin, 1986: i). Radway simplifies the transactional activity when she assumes that identifications between readers and

characters proceed under the sway of a pre-Oedipal regressive 'masterplot' and its legacy of needs and desires which female readers themselves seem to attest to when they express emotional identification with the heroine. It is peculiar that Radway remained glued to the manifest level of what her informants reported about their identifications and feelings and did not carry through the implications of using a psychoanalytic lens, particularly given that she admitted that her methodology involved a second order interpretation of her informants' behaviours via literary and psychological concepts they themselves would not have used. A different concept of fantasy has other ramifications for how the mechanisms regulating identification between the reader and characters are construed. A reading of fantasy closer to what Freud intended in his theory of 'phantasy' will tell us why.

Fantasy as scenario: 6 points

The well-known, synthesizing account of Freud's views on fantasy which was formulated by Jean Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis in "Fantasy and the Origins of Sexuality" (1968) has become a foundational article for appropriations of fantasy in cultural and literary theory. A recent commentator Constance Penley (1992) has rewritten in an accessible way the conclusions of the Laplanche and Pontalis article. Point #4 below was not part of her list but is to be found in the original article:

1. Fantasy has nothing to do with an opposition between 'reality' and 'illusion' but rather interjects a third term--psychical reality--that structures both, itself has a structure;
2. Fantasy is not the object of desire but its setting;
3. Fantasy is a story for the subject, a story that attempts to answer certain basic or 'primal' questions about the origins of the individual, the origin of sexuality, and the origin of the difference between the sexes (other questions can be posed and 'answered' in fantasy but these are the most basic ones);
4. Primal fantasies or 'inherited memory traces,' which provide support for individual fantasies, have a prehistory in the parental fantasies which are transmitted to the child;
5. Sexuality is detached from any natural object; to start existing as sexuality, it must begin in fantasy;
6. Although the subject is always present in the fantasy, she or he may be there in a number of positions or in a de-subjectivized form, that is, 'in the very syntax' of the fantasy sequence;

7. There is no separation between conscious and unconscious fantasies but rather a profound relationship and continuity between the various fantasy scenarios--'the stage setting of desire'--ranging from the daydream to the fantasies that can be recovered or reconstructed only in an analytic investigation;
8. A psychoanalytic account of fantasy must necessarily show the dialectic relationship between fantasy productions, the underlying structures, and the reality of the scene.

(Penley, 1992: 493)¹⁵

On this account, fantasy does not set itself up as something in the self which operates in opposition to preconstituted experience; rather fantasy as psychical reality is *a precondition of any experience* by virtue of being an internal perceptual grid, a propensity to ascribe salience and intensity to certain phenomena which are of cognitive interest to the self but perhaps not to others. The operations of fantasy are at the centre of all our perceptions, beliefs, and actions.

The sixth point in the list from Laplanche and Pontalis above concludes that fantasy is a scenario. Taken up in film theory, this view has underpinned the move away from the Metzian/Mulveyian "gaze" theory of spectatorship, and its fascination with voyeurism and fetishism, to an approach which treats film as a fantasy structure whose authority cannot be located *a priori* in a body of a particular gender:

Recently, in an attempt to evade the impasses that have resulted from positing the gaze as the single point of entry into the film system, feminists have begun to analyse **film as a fantasy structure**. The reasons for this are unquestionably sound. For too long the psychic mechanisms of the viewing subject have been assumed by film theory only to be ignored by concrete analyses. Though considered necessary the psychical apparatus has so far served no function other than that of being generally available as the site of the cementing of subject to social structures. This, as we have said from the beginning has resulted in the reduction of the subject to a mere...point. Attention to the structures of fantasy restores the subject to fuller view, since the fantasy displays the subject's desire.

(Copjec, 1989: 241)

The significance for our discussion of Radway's theory of identification of the Freudian formulation of fantasy as an imaginary scenario to which the instinct becomes fixated and which may be conceived of as a true *mise-en-scène* [performance] of desire is primarily point #6: the subject of identification is there in a "de-subjectivized" form in the syntax of the scenario or in multiple oscillating

identifications. The impact of this innovation on "gaze" theory has been that the idea of a unitary, coherent imaginary associated with maleness (opposed to the unrepresentability of femaleness) is thrown out by the move to posit an oscillation or potential for bisexual identification on the part of the spectator whether male or female. In other words, there is no female or male spectator, at least at the level of unconscious identification.

Point #8 is significant for its absence in Radway's use of fantasy as content of a wish rather than as textual devices for transforming the anxieties and wishes of romance readers as well as devices for distancing readers from these anxieties (i.e. condensation, displacement, projection, inversion of mode which are common to the dream). Where fantasy is an analogue for a type of narrative practice which allows what produces anxiety to be contemplated without becoming overwhelming, pleasure originates in the compromises afforded simultaneous satisfaction of the wish and satisfaction of the censor of the wish:

The way in which event-fantasies provide concealment for the desires they contain--that is to say, they disguise both the object of the desires, so as to preserve them from testing, and the opposition between them, so as to remove felt conflict--is through exploiting various essential features of narrative, which in turn provides the structure of event-phantasy... shifts in point of view, changes of protagonist,...allow one and the same phantasised event to exemplify competing desires at one and the same moment. It superimposes one desire upon another...to represent simultaneously the satisfaction of sadistic and masochistic desires.

(Wollheim, 1984: 150)

Although Radway does propose that some plots fail because they induce overwhelming fears and anxieties in the reader, this observation remains unintegrated into the psychological argument she makes for the distinction between failed and ideal plots precisely because she does not look for fantasy as a kind of narrative structure. Radway locates the overwhelming aspect of garbage-dump romances in the manifest content of scenes (over violent, unrealistic, improbable) not in the fantasy digestion of these scenes by readers.

What has been gained by characterizing narrative as fantasy in which multiple positions of identification may be taken up?

[T]here is something troubling in the way the consideration of fantasy has tended often to limit itself to the polemical observation that, in the fantasy scenario, the **subject takes up and shifts between different and even contradictory positions, here a female position, there a male one.** Certainly it is important to be reminded of the psychoanalytic claim that the sexed positions one occupies in fantasy and other discourses are not determined by one's anatomy. But it is unclear where this emphasis on the multiplicity of shifting positions can lead us. Above all, we must not allow it to **confuse the limitlessness of the replaceable objects of the subject's desire with a limitlessness of the subject.** *The subject of desire is finite, limited.* Fantasy defines these limits, not the subject's infinite dispersal. What must be observed in fantasy is not simply the range of positions assumed, but how these different positions are structured so as to **circumscribe and thus define an absence at the fantasy's center.** This absence or 'kernel of nonsense' holds the fantasy and the subject in place, limits the subject. The location of this kernel is the aim of psychoanalysis and should be, I propose, the aim of feminism and other political theory as well. It provides the link between the subject and social discourses. (my emphasis)

(Copjec, 1989: 241)

Copjec's insight is that although the psychical subject is divided by splitting, this splitting coheres around a kernel of nonsense and characterizes the continuous identity of the self as a self-in-division. The part-selves of the split self are the parts which are managed in object-relations. Of course, the question to be asked is: What is the *motivation* or investment in the oscillation? What is the "kernel of nonsense" that requires an oscillation across *these* particular positions? In answering this, we will understand why the fantasy scenario takes the form it does. When fantasy is conceived of as a scenario, the psychological significance of identification is that it takes place not with a character but with several characters and entails an investment in a particular action and outcome among this configuration of bodies. The required oscillation authorizes the form of the fantasy. The scenario model of fantasy directs our attention to relations among the actors and to what is threatened and perilously tested in the unfolding of the action between them rather than to the outcome which has already been foreordained.

4.3.2.4 Rodowick: identification severed from gender congruence

David Rodowick takes us some of the way toward understanding the motivation behind oscillating or conflicting identifications and precisely the requirement that there be an oscillation with his reading of Freud's "A Child is Being Beaten" (1919), an essay which has almost cult status in the number of rereadings and cross-references it has collected. With his essay "The Difficulty of Difference" (1982), Rodowick was intervening in debates on the female spectator which were too narrowly framed by the terms of Mulvey's foundational article in 1975.¹⁶ I believe his observations with respect to the oscillation of the reader across gendered positions hold for the reader's positioning in narrative in general and not to positioning by filmic narratives alone.

In this essay, Rodowick reiterates the importance of the model of fantasy as a paradigm for textual analysis. The key to the link between drive theory and the method and theory of dream and textual analysis (the phantasization of narrative this has been called) lies in the belief that the drives can only be apprehended through their investment in representation. There are textual analogues of psychic processes, in other words. Secondly, Rodowick reminds us of the complexity of identificatory processes in fantasy; he argues that Freud's theory of fantasy demonstrates that the positions of identification represented by masculinity and femininity are irreducible to either a binary logic or to a biological grounding of difference.

"A Child is Being Beaten" is Freud's retroactive construction of the male and female version of the fantasy of being beaten, and the three phases of development in each. Freud understood at least three different senses of the distinction between masculine and feminine--biological, psychological, and cultural--and accepted that their interrelation was by no means unproblematic. Rodowick tells us:

In "A Child is Being Beaten" (1919), Freud demonstrates most clearly that the identity of subjectivity can never be simply nor singularly aligned with femininity or masculinity. Indeed, Freud's version of the acquisition of gender understands the subject as divided within itself according to identifications that are continually traversed by sexual difference. (...) These divisions are described by Freud in several ways. As has been often pointed out, Freud uses the terms *Männlichkeit* and *Weiblichkeit* to refer simultaneously to biological sex, to "social" gender

defined by object choice and to sexual identification according to an active or passive organization of the drives.

(1989: 271)

Rodowick reminds us that since there is no negation in the unconscious, "[r]epression is the ego's only means of defense for maintaining its "unity" against the contradictory desires articulated in the three phases of the fantasy." Freud isolates three distinct phases of the phantasy, two of which are conscious, the third is unconscious. Each phase is distributed according to whether the subject is genitally masculine or feminine. The beating fantasy, "a child is being beaten," is supposed to dominate masturbation fantasies of the latency period from about age five to when puberty begins. Assuming feelings of jealousy aroused by the Oedipal constellation, Freud reconstructs three different phases of the fantasy (four of his examples are from female adolescents, two are from males): (1) 'my father is beating the child that I hate; therefore, he loves only me'; (2) 'I am being beaten (therefore loved) by my father' (this is the regressive substitute for the incestuous relationship); and (3) 'a child is being beaten'. The fantasy is sadistic only in its form and it grants masochistic gratification by way of identification with the anonymous children who are being beaten. In Rodowick's view, what defines a version as "male" or "female" are the *particular* transactions between masculine and feminine identifications within *each* of the three phases of the fantasy (1989: 27). The structural complexity of this schema is intensified by the fact that the unconscious is governed by neither time nor negation. All three phases, with their particular ratios of masculinity and femininity, coexist in the male and female subjects analyzed.¹⁷ What Freud's analysis of the fantasy reveals is not the fixing of identity to a body, but rather a shifting structure of symbolization and differentiation.

Rodowick's analysis is important for hypotheses about identification in theories of reading and spectatorship because it pries the reader's identification away from congruence with sexed identity as well as from a textual point of view or mode since, "in fantasy, grammatical relations such as agentive can become objective and active voice can become passive" (Litowitz, 1977). On this view of fantasy as a scenario, the position to which the reader is solicited is one with the logic of the syntax of the narrative sequence. "While there are 'masculine' and 'feminine' positions in fantasy,

there is no reason to presume that men and women assume these positions according to their assigned genders. (...) [I]f we were to look for a sexually differentiated spectator, we would have to look elsewhere than the unconscious--in models of address or more conscious levels of fantasy" (Penley, 1992).¹⁸ Another way to put a conclusion to be drawn from discussions of Freud's essay on the beating fantasy is that positioning takes place with respect to a relationship between bodies for which the reader has *an equal interest* in different positions. One view of rape fantasies may clarify this oscillation for us.¹⁹

4.4 Two alternatives to Radway's theory of identification

Penley reminds us that fantasy is a motivated scenario:

The psychoanalytical account of fantasy, which describes how the subject participates in and restages a scenario in which crucial questions about desire, knowledge and identity are posed, and in which the subject can oscillate through a number of identification positions, can help us to provide a fuller account of how subjects actively rework the materials of mass-produced culture to serve their own desiring ends.

(Penley, 1992: 480)

If we redescribe the romance as a scenario which captures the positions between which the reader oscillates in her identifications, then what is the logic of this presumed oscillation between identification with the hero and the heroine? In order to answer this, I propose that one of the criteria by which a reader discriminates between a failed and an ideal plot is an experience of unpleasure which is the psychological effect of the collapse of the oscillation. Secondly, the logic of the oscillation can be inferred from cases when the oscillation fails. In other words, in the logic of the oscillation is to be found one of the sources of the pleasure which distinguishes ideal romances from failed ones. Furthermore, it is in the distinction and tension between the ideal and failed romance, not in the criteria for the ideal romance alone, where we find the key to the *mise-en-scène* of the reader's conflicts, wishes, fears, and pleasures as well as the script for the identifications she will be predisposed to make. I would like to be able to say at this point that I have an alternative theoretical model but this is not the case. I can only try to redefine some issues and challenge some assumptions. Although I cannot question Radway's conclusions about the criteria used by readers to

evaluate ideal from failed plots, I can propose other hypotheses for why they *feel* the way they do toward failed plots.

The feminist psychoanalytic quest has been to answer the question Freud failed to answer satisfactorily: "What does woman want? The answer the ideal romance provides is that *first* she wants an extraordinary, magnetic, moody, darkly handsome, cruel, emotionally unreachable, and violent man and *later* she wants a tender, caring lover and mate. But nowhere in studies of the psychology and sociology of reading the romance do we find this question: *Why* does the heroine become emotionally involved with *this* man and not another? If he were nurturing to begin with, would he be the one she seeks love and recognition from? Or is it precisely *because* he is ironic, scornful, emotionally distant, physically powerful and threatens to remain so *despite* his apparent transformation into a 'soft' male?²⁰

In answering, Radway tries to have her sociological cake while eating it with a psychologically juicy filling. A study of the failed romance can be used "to highlight the complex way in which the ideal romance manages women's covert fears" (158).²¹ Radway proposes that one of the measures of ideal romances is that they "deal convincingly with women's fears and reservations by permitting them to surface briefly during a reading process that then explicitly lays them to rest by explaining them away" (158). Assuaging these fears is more difficult in garbage-dump romances because "they greatly exaggerate the extent of the hero's independence, taciturnity, cruelty, and violence" (158). That the hero is required to be "spectacularly masculine" solely due to the narrative requirement that he be transformed from threatening enemy to loving husband and protector is the rationale supplied by Radway. This is in light of her premise that ideal romances disseminate the myth of romantic love to counteract "the conditions of oppression and emotional abandonment women suffer" (54-55). Alternatively, on a reading of romance as regressive preoedipal fantasy, the reader's fears that the male threat will not be managed and, furthermore, that the desired outcome, the mother substitute, will not be achieved emotionally and symbolically is reason for a romance's failure (158). But there is no reason to suppose that this transformation is all that these emotions signal.

An alternative view of fantasy as scenario demands we reconsider the psychological significance of the reader's emotional responses in light of the plot as a "process of seduction" and the opportunities it provides for oscillating identification between seducer and seduced, aggressor and victim.²²

Janet Radway has shown that popular romances feature a ...similar grafting of heterosexual motifs onto a preoedipal base. In the plots that prove most gratifying to female readers, the heroine captures a hero who can stand in for both mother and father: the hero's "spectacular masculinity" unexpectedly reveals a soft underside--an "extraordinary tenderness and capacity for gentle nurturance"

(Wyatt, 1991: 37)²³

Let us imagine that since the hero "can stand in for both mother and father," the female reader occupies a dual position toward this character and, consequently, harbours two different sets of wishes toward him since he has two symbolic functions. The reader through identification with the heroine is able simultaneously to satisfy the requirements (aim, mode, object) of two different object relations: to have the heterosexual lover and to have the longed for pre-oedipal mother. But she does not want to give up the fiery, inscrutable, male lover, object of her sexual passion, in order to have the tender mother substitute. In fact, that the hero's capacity for cruelty and violence, inscrutability and intensity *be checked not extinguished* is precisely what is required for the juxtaposition to be satisfying, or the heroine would lose both what impassions her and what promises to ensure her identity, a man with these fearful qualities.

In addition to taking up an identification with the heroine's desire *vis-à-vis* the hero in each of his two functions (as mother and lover) where the heroine is symbolically a daughter searching for a mother and a woman searching for a heterosexual lover, I propose the reader also identifies with the hero and his aggression, mistrust, and cruelty toward the heroine. This is the other pole of the oscillation in which the romance reader imaginatively engages but which is rarely acknowledged. I propose it is this identification which begins to account for the reader's pleasure in, and the necessity of, the violence of the romance hero.

4.4.1. Slater's dualistic theory of identification

When the romance novel as real seducer says to the female reader, "here is your part," her part may be dual. A glance at Philip Slater's revised account of the Oedipal phase--as a developmental stage involving not one but two types of identification--leads us to reappraise as only partially plausible the view that a female reader 'identifies with the heroine':

[I]f we assume that it is a fact that each individual seeks to satisfy both male and female wishes in his sexual life, we are prepared for the possibility that those [two sets of] demands are not fulfilled by the same object, and that they interfere with each other unless they can be kept apart and each impulse guided into a particular channel that is suited to it.

(*Civilization and its Discontents* in Rodowick, 1982: 8)

The Oedipus complex is supposed as accounting for a number of developmental tasks, some of which require identification. In "Toward a Dualistic Theory of Identification," Philip Slater points out that the complete Oedipus complex involves male and female children alike in two modes of relating to each parent. He defines these modes as personal and positional types of identification.

Personal identification involves the

identification of ego with the actual person of alter--the adoption of his personality traits, values, and attitudes, even his view of ego. It is motivated primarily by ego's love and admiration for alter. The child who identifies in this way with a parent is saying, in effect: "I want to be like you. If I were, I would have you (and your virtues) with me all the time, and I would love myself as much as I love you. To achieve this I will incorporate your qualities and your values and ideals. I will view and judge myself through your eyes."

(Slater, 1961: 113)

Laplanche and Pontalis discuss personal identification as that which occurs with a love object, at the genital stage: "It is the object of the narcissistic choice: what one is, was or would like to be" (1988: 275). Personal identification enables a capacity for empathy for others because it requires, in the first instance, an understanding of the alter and a wish to see through his or her eyes.

Objects will be identified with to the degree that they command the desired goal states, says Slater (1961: 118). Positional identification is characterized as defensive because ego identifies with the role of alter out of envy and fear of the

parent not love. It allows for the reassurance: "I will be menacing rather than menaced."

Each Oedipal fantasy has a desired goal (the love of a parent; let's say parent A) which entails anxieties about being excluded from a loving relationship with parent B at the same time as feelings of hostility and jealousy towards parent B. For instance, "the standard Oedipal fantasy alone (for the male), e.g., fails to handle the hostile feelings toward the mother, while it eliminates the father, [as] an alternative source of support." The standard male Oedipal fantasy requires positional identification with the father. Personal identification with the father and positional identification with the mother "is therefore required to rectify the imbalance" (Slater, 1961: 121). This "reverse Oedipal twin" involves a positional identification with the mother when the boy acts in a feminine way toward the father. Logically positional identification with one parent is incompatible with positional identification with the other parent; however, in fantasy, contradictions of this sort do not hold. The four trends which make up the complete Oedipus complex are supposed to coalesce eventually into a father-identification and a mother-identification for healthy outcomes in a child (and this has no impact on the formation of sexual identity, according to Slater).

Slater posits there are twin Oedipal fantasies for children of each sex. Therefore, when a child takes up a positional identification with parent A, she simultaneously takes up a personal identification with parent B. However, each of these twinned positions fails to satisfy one of two relational goals harboured by the child with respect to a parent (to be the parent's object of desire, and to be like the parent). For instance, the reverse oedipal fantasy of the female child is love for the mother which necessarily entails hostility to the father because he is a rival (so the child takes up a positional identification with the father). However, in the other half of the twin oedipal fantasy for the girl, the father becomes the object of desire; hostility and jealousy are directed to the mother since she has become the rival. A positional identification with the rival parent is motivated in each case where the child desires to replace this rival in the affections of the other parent: "Mother will love me rather than you." A personal identification with a parent whom the child loves does not entail the replacement of that parent; "I will be loved by mother/father and love myself if I

am like him/her." Nor is simultaneous personal and positional identification impossible (I want to be like parent A and I want to replace parent A in the affections of parent B).

I propose that since Radway argues that the hero occupies a dual symbolic function for the reader--as heterosexual lover (father substitute) and as mother substitute--the female reader could take up four positions of identification as dictated by the Oedipal and reverse Oedipal fantasies. She will take up a personal identification with the hero when he functions as the object of her desire--either as heterosexual love object or as a female caretaker figure; she will also take up positional identifications with the hero when he functions as rival. Her encounter with the hero as rival in the two Oedipal scenarios in which he figures (because of his dual significance for the reader) is symbolically represented in the romance narrative by the hero's cruel, violent, inscrutable behaviour and enjoyed by the reader because it provides a figuration of her identification with the rival's hostility. Slater's theory of dualistic identification offers a possible explanation for the dynamic underpinning the reader's oscillation. This oscillation is complicated, as we have seen, by the hero's dual symbolic function as both mother and father substitute.

Let us return to the question of the transformation in the hero which Radway posits is the basis for the pleasure of female readers. He must be without exception a "spectacularly masculine," read "exaggeratedly and stereotypically male" hero. The uncompromising character of this genre requirement is the sign of the intransigence of the demands of the twin Oedipal fantasies. If the juxtaposition of violence and tenderness, cruel mockery and empathic understanding were not required by an oscillation the reader finds satisfying, narratives where the heroine chose the hero's kind, tender, sweet-tempered, generous but rather inept and unexciting friend would have been found more satisfying by readers. But Radway tells us the *Smithton* readers refused stories of the companionate marriage, where the heroine is perceived as having settled for "less," in favour of stories where the heroine is consumed by intense passions and ambivalence about whether she should trust the hero.²⁴ This immediate refusal of the man with 'feminine' qualities points to what it is that the reader requires: not a story of tenderness and concern, of companionship, of understanding,

but a struggle in which not only the mother is symbolically refound but something, represented by the threatening presence of the violent hero momentarily tamed, is always only partially overcome.

What is partially overcome by the reader, I suggest, is not solely a dimly conscious fear of a misogynist threat from the external world as Radway proposes, but a threat experienced as coming from inside the reader in the form of intolerable and disturbing affects associated with her identification not only with the heroine *qua* fearful female but also with the hero as aggressor. Why *must* the individual to whom the heroine is passionately attracted be scornful and cruel? Adult women in society have choice. But a psychological hypothesis takes its terms from fantasy scenarios and internal object relations which is where we have to look for why ideal romance narratives repeatedly draw a heroine who is attracted to such a man. A child does not have a choice about whom she has as parents and whom to love; she loves her father even if he is terrifyingly scornful, cruelly mocking, and unempathically unreachable. (This kind of father may be created as a terrifying imago, although such a real life man is not required for such an imago.²⁵) He is the carrier of the reader's own unacknowledged and disowned rage and aggression. He is the other half of the emotional couple in which the heroine/reader paradoxically feels most at home. Positional identification with his violent and emotionally cruel behaviour does not provoke overwhelming distress for the reader of ideal plots since she has been freed to enjoy identifying with his violence because she knows he is not 'really' a violent man. The omniscient narrator has told the reader more than the heroine knows about the reasons for the hero's behaviour; it is the hero's attempt at protecting himself against emotional involvement because he was hurt by another woman long before meeting the heroine. His aggression is regestalted as a sign of his fears and vulnerabilities.

If we can accept Nancy Chodorow's account of the psychological engendering process within the patriarchal nuclear family, it becomes possible to see this aesthetic judgement as the product of a woman's ongoing need for the kind of nurturant, tender care she received at the hands of her primary love, her mother.

(Radway, 1984)

It is apparent that Radway's appropriation of Chodorow for the analysis of the practical consciousness which underpins women's aesthetic judgements replays the

unidimensionality of feminist theories of the subject by making one mode "relatedness and neediness" the dominant one through which women invest the reading of romances with significance. Radway has taken on board a sanitized view of the female "self-in-relation"; it appears that another repercussion of 'asymmetrical engendering' is that women are deemed to lack a psychological predisposition for identification with the haughty, greedy, cruel male, powerful because of his self-confidence, sophistication, and worldliness in contrast to the heroine's innocence and naiveté.²⁶

Rather than readers' pleasure being the product of different cognitive categories and gender schema which they use to interpret the actions of women characters (as courageous victors rather than as women eager to become 'mousewives'), the pleasure of romance readers may come from the compromise afforded by taking up oscillating positional and personal identifications with the heroine *and* with the aggressor. Romance encodes aggression in the figure of the male which mimics a social fact: physical abuse between the members of a couple is more likely to be initiated by the male than the female member. However, this cultural, conventional knowledge which depends on the ideology of the sex/gender system becomes the vernacular on which splitting, required to contain anxiety and ambivalence around separation-individuation issues, draws for its images and metaphors. A cultural system of representation notwithstanding, splitting, as it occurs in its person's psychic development, begins by having its own, idiosyncratic *raison d'être*. When splitting is the primary strategic form of psychic defence and by definition involves the polarization of good and bad and its projection into different carriers, female and male in this case, splitting creates the psychic predisposition for women readers to identify simultaneously with the 'bad' violent male as their dark double and with the 'good' heroine, his victim. Thus, splitting is the source of the investment the reader has in taking up multiple positions of identification in scenarios of conflict. Doubling in a text figures that splitting.

4.4.2 The preoedipal scenario

Slater's thesis aside, it can be argued that oscillation between two poles-- identification with the 'good,' 'needy' heroine and with the 'bad,' 'rejecting hero--is motivated by the ambivalence of the pre-oedipal child toward the caretaker. This

polarization characterizes defense mechanisms of this phase of development where the earliest form of splitting takes the form of introjection of all that is good (as me) and projection of all that is experienced as bad and dangerous into the world (not me). Other accounts of this stage suggest that rather than it being some blissful fusional moment where the other seems part of the child, it already demands of the child a difficult adaptation to interrelatedness (Levin, 1989).²⁷ Relatedness is threatening as is the absence of relatedness. Ambivalence over the satisfaction of dependency needs versus the satisfaction of desires for separation and autonomy is the basis of a different fantasy which could be fuelling the oscillation. The reader may find a compromise for the demands of these conflicting desires through an oscillation between an identification with the heroine who fervently hates the hero (for frustrating her needs for tenderness, *and* for provoking ambivalence about her dependency needs), and an identification with the hero who hates women because a woman (the mother), whom he trusted, hurt him in the past. The investment in the oscillation is the need for a compromise between two conflicting relations to the object, and this compromise is what stamps the specific scenario with the self's desire. The oscillation between finding and destroying the mother, dependence and separation, securing and losing the loved object, which occurs with pleasurable results in the ideal plot, may stall in the failed romance and bring on the intense emotions of fear and anger, dismay and hopelessness Radway reports her readers have experienced. *An object-relations account would argue a traumatic "destruction of the object" has occasioned these emotions.*

Fantasy as a scenario produces satisfaction as much by what is threatened, perilously tested, and saved in the unfolding of the action as by the achievement of the anticipated resolution. We can surmise that when the scenes of violence, rape, and emotional cruelty which define failed romances are felt as "too brutal and degrading," "sicky," "pornographic" and "gratuitous" or "contrived" (see pp. 160-167), they are also experienced at another level as *too* anxiety provoking for readers to endure, this is because one destination or end point, necessary to the oscillation, has been annihilated. Extensive violence threatens to stop the imaginative oscillation by the reader between two positions of identification (with the brutalized victim, with the brutalizer; the

prototype is the rape fantasy) and the pleasure from achieving a compromise between wish and its prohibition that such oscillation afforded. The oscillation also stops because the object of ambivalence, the loved and hated object, has been destroyed in fantasy. On an object-relations account, this produces unpleasure; the good internal object has not been preserved nor has the self's goodness escaped its own aggression. Killing off the loved and hated object precipitates the child into a psychotic state of omnipotence, terrifying because of the isolation created by the loss of the other. When the narrative strategies which allowed the reader to experience the hero's anger and aggression toward the body of the heroine have slipped leaving her to contemplate the violated, suffering body of the heroine, she encounters unveiled a part-self destroyed by another part-self. Radway's psychodynamically inadequate theory of identification prevented her from fully developing her inferences about the symptomatic meaning of readers' emotions of despair and anger in the failed romance in order to lead to an understanding of the formal *and* psychodynamic necessity that the object of the heroine's desire be the cruel, mocking, emotionally inaccessible hero found in the ideal plot. Rather than seeing a utopian element in readers' desires which romances manage, we might instead shift the emphasis to seeing the repetitive reading of romance as an attempt to confront and master persecutory demons among the reader's internal objects.

The eroticization of impotence

In his dual symbolic functions, the romantic hero serves simultaneously as the suffocating but desired mother, the unreachable and desirable father, and as the third term which can release the daughter from the mother-infant dyad. This may account for the kinesic imagery in romance novels which powerfully depicts assaults on the body's boundaries: not only the rape scenes of penises in every orifice, gagging, choking, retching, multiple unidentified bodies and organs but scenes of a woman's weaker body being pinned and subdued by the bulk of the larger male body. The eroticization of impotence is discussed in a useful article by Leslie Rabine (1985) which offers an alternative thesis on the psychomachia of the romance.

Rabine investigates the explosion of interest in the romance in the last fifteen years in light of the computerization and bureaucratization of the workplace which has reduced even further women's sense of efficacy and control over their environment, their bodies, and the social uses of the products they produce. She looks at those romances which feature professional heroines with fabulous jobs in highpowered corporate settings as the site where conflicts created by our society's different messages about the disarticulated segments of women's lives--sex, work, family, emotion--find solutions within the romance genre. Romances address the depersonalization women feel, despite (or precisely because of) their superwomen roles as players and clients within the faceless bureaucratic settings of the office, the supermarket, the school, the bank, the hospital. Rabine's hypothesis is that "the force of Harlequin comes from its ability to combine, often in the same image, the heroine's fantasy *escape* from these restraints [of the workplace] and her idealized, romanticized and eroticized *compliance* with them" (1985:254) (my emphasis). Rabine points to "the heroine's struggle-filled, stormy relationship with the hero [which] involves a strange combination of tempestuous physical movement and physical restraint by the hero" (255). For instance, from *Across the Great Divide*, she cites this passage:

'I hate the lot of you!' she sobbed brokenly. 'And don't touch me!' trying to jerk out of his hold. 'You're all a load of two faced liars, only interested in your own egotistical aims.' Then, when he didn't release her, 'I said don't *touch* me!' as she began pummelling violently at his broad chest.

For God's sake, Nicky!' Lang gripped her wrists grimly in one hand and wrenched open the car door with the other. 'Get in,' he muttered, and bundled her flailing figure on to the back seat. Slamming the door behind them, he pinned her helplessly to his muscular form until she had exhausted her struggles and consented to stay there, crying quietly. (140).

Rabine's explanation for this formulaic mixture of acquiescence and protest is rooted largely in a sociological framework: "the 'shackles' of the office or factory job are on the one hand compensated for by vigorous movement; on the other hand they are romanticized and eroticized...the heroine's restraint becomes intermittent and emotionally and sexually gratifying" (256). This is a long way from depicting the lonely 'I' ecstatically dissolving into the 'we', the common denominator of every form of bliss--romantic, sexual, political, religious, mystical. This is not merger; this desire

for intimacy and safe vulnerability is shameful. Why? Because the heroine is already experiencing a defence against the ridicule expected from the other; she is experiencing her own desire as shameful because it implies she could be good and yet she knows there is nothing good about her which does not issue from the hero's estimation of her. Need feels shameful to the romantic heroine, just as it does to the hero. Whereas the romantic novel assigns the disdain of intimacy to the hero, the heroine carries the emotion attached to this need of intimacy for which males are allowed to invoke disdain. She is portrayed as feeling shame and humiliation as if shame were *the normal way women feel about their desire*. Desire is experienced as a shaming assault on her integrity and separateness. Each of the actors in the romantic couple portray gendered cultural responses to the predicament of boundaries posed by need of the other: he is aloof, she is needy and shamed. Rabine locates in the eroticization of the shame the heroine feels the means by which women turn the humiliation of their daily work lives and subordinate status and lack of power into a reassurance of their sexual identity and desirability.²⁸ In other words, sexual identity is the stage on which the power struggles proper to other life dramas gets played out. The domestication of the reader's anxieties as 'worker' and 'woman' is accomplished in a manner which reasserts sexual politics in the workplace and converts women's rage at their subordination and powerlessness into love for their symbolic or real captors.

However, could there not be another source of pleasure in these scenes of being overpowered and physically restrained? Could the intensity of this culturally supplied fantasy not also draw from universally shared childhood experiences of impotent struggle? Could readers' infantile struggles with caretakers not be reexperienced through kinesic memories evoked by the vividly described physical struggles of the heroine with the hero along with a description of her shame and ambivalence and rage: evocative of a child's rage at being thwarted because she is smaller, less physically powerful and coordinated, shackled by her love and dependence on the hated other. Perhaps identification in the reader occurs precisely because these scenes in enclosed spaces of the raging woman physically overpowered and subdued arouse bodily memories in the reader. On this account, sexual relations

becomes the stage where unhappy relations to internal objects and problems with intimacy created by them are played out. For women, rape may be a cultural imagery and language in which her preoedipal fantasy of attack and invasion finds expression, where bad objects (the bad the child projects as belonging to what is outside it) assault the body from every direction.

4.5 Emotions as practical consciousness

Toril Moi has called for feminist research into the political effects of aesthetics. *Reading the Romance* contributes to this research programme with the hypothesis that readers' aesthetic judgements are evidence of their 'practical consciousness.' Radway proposes the women's "highly elaborate procedures for aesthetically evaluating and selecting those books is, in Raymond Williams's phrase, a form of practical consciousness" (1986: 113). That is, "those procedures are a set of practices elaborated to address acutely felt but only partially acknowledged desires that arise because of the way patriarchy asymmetrically constructs gender. That set of aesthetic priorities is, then, a practical way of "knowing" that situation (i.e. partially acknowledged desires) so that it might be addressed and dealt with" (113). This conclusion drew on her purported discovery that a community of readers makes stock responses to the formulaic nature of the romance genre. Since romances elicit stock responses, they are 'tools to think with'; readers are presumed to take these narrative solutions and apply them to their own lives because of the identifications they make with the heroine's predicaments. Where does this shared knowledge come from? Radway uses two lenses to get at the inner and outer determinants of the schema by which meaning is forged in reading.

Looking through the external lens, Radway adopts the "woman's culture" thesis, that is, women receive and respond to cultural products in a distinct way due to their experiences as women in a patriarchal culture. (Press, 1991: 62). This experience affirms its existence by means of the typical reader's stock responses which, according to Radway, involve the "unconscious but nonetheless active recall of learned cultural conventions" (1984: 198). Practical consciousness has to do with cultural assumptions not consciously available to people "precisely because those givens constitute the very

foundation of their social selves, the very possibility of this social action [reading romances]" (210). Romances both tap into practical consciousness and reproduce it as Radway is at pains to show through her analysis of language and narrative conventions of the romance genre which reaffirm the "already known."¹²⁹

Radway's claim that aesthetic judgements evidence practical consciousness rests on assumptions about the imaginative movement that goes on in the reader from representation to everyday life, from feelings generated in reading to feelings experienced by the self in her daily life, from aesthetic judgements about displeasing relations between characters to judgements about gender relations. *If judgments of fearful situations and strategies to mitigate the danger are part of practical consciousness (i.e. what it means to 'go on' in the world), and fear is understood to have unconscious sources as well as being available to conscious articulation as belief, then practical consciousness must include an account of how defences operate unconsciously to protect against fears.* Since Radway has extended the foundation of practical consciousness beyond the domain of social learning and *non-conscious* knowledge of social actors to include the domain of *unconscious* needs, desires, and anxieties specific to the female gender in our society and the psychic defences produced to cope with those frustrations and anxieties, identifying the formation of practical consciousness means being attuned to the formation of defensive configurations and the ambivalent meaning of emotion which any study of representations and images alone cannot provide.

The practical consciousness which Radway believes is expressed in romance readers' aesthetic judgements draws on two orders of reality, the social and the realm of fantasy. She equivocates as to which order emotions draw upon for their status: do they signal the authentic self or the oppressed self which finds pleasure in illusory solutions? The fantasy of romantic love derives its authority for women from the oppressive conditions of real life and from the psychic make-up peculiar to the female gender. Looking at reader's behaviour through an internal lens, Radway surmises that the psychological needs which are satisfied by ideal plots originate in asymmetrical engineering which can be altered, on Chodorow's account, only via changes to the family structure and childraising practices. Radway's hypothesis is exciting for cultural

criticism because it promises a linkage between conditions of everyday life and the psychological needs deriving from it which motivate not only judgements of realism but choices in cultural consumption dependent on those judgements of realism.

That notwithstanding, there is an equivocation in her work respecting the epistemological and ontological significance of readers' judgements as signals of the authentic self (vs. the oppressed self) which has a long history in western philosophy. The dilemma of the subject/object dichotomy, which plagues post-Kantian aesthetics, reappears in debate on the psychology of reading, particularly so in Anglo-American criticism beginning with I.A. Richards who was the predecessor of Radway's study of reading behaviour. This dilemma is most evident in the antithetical impulses informing Radway's programme of research and particularly her theoretical use of emotion phenomena. Radway's insights into reading behaviour as a performance of practical consciousness are undermined by her double gesture of denial and assertion with respect to the status of readers' 'conventional' feelings when reading romances. She confirms that a prerequisite to reading are stock responses, and these stock responses are evidence of shared or public knowledge. But if these responses are evidence of women's practical consciousness, what in these 'ways of knowing' is a defensive response to the deformation of women's potential by their socialized roles and what is pre-social and authentic or 'natural' about women's psychic make-up? Moreover, inasmuch as I have proposed that identification may be more multiple than previously thought and not circumscribed by gender congruence, it stands to reason that conclusions about what stock responses are responses 'to' may be different from those conclusions Radway drew.

The problem with the dual nature of practical consciousness, as both social and depth psychological in origin, as both ideological (as an illusory or incorrect story of women's desires) and as the expression of women's authentic desire, is best illustrated by the problems Radway has in discussing the implications of readers' judgements of the realism of characters and action in the romance. On the one hand, Radway concludes that the practical consciousness that underwrites the stock knowledge that the reader uses to make sense of texts and human action only serves to justify as "natural the very conditions and their emotional consequences to which the reader's

reading activity is a response" (1984: 214). On the other hand, the stock responses of women, particularly their emotional responses, signal women's personality, the product of asymmetrical engendering which is, nonetheless, *what is unique and good about women* (better to be a self-in-relation seeking nurturance and emotional expressiveness and tolerating relatedness well than a bounded self seeking independence). Women's suffering due to emotional abandonment is a validation of their subjective experience and their essential difference from men. These inchoate desires are authentic; however, women's pleasure in romances is regrettable because it is the product of deforming socialization. In her 1986 article, Radway presumes women can be enlightened or jolted into activism--"persuaded to occupy a feminist ground" (114)-- by recognizing their fantasy (i.e. the solution to their inequality lies in romantic love) as the symptom of a social ill they could work to change.

In making judgements about the psychological realism of a character's motivations and subsequent behaviour, readers draw upon a folk psychology of the self which offers rules for what constitutes the intelligibility of emotions and acts, motivations and feelings. This folk psychology, inasmuch as it is one place to look for practical consciousness, is the meeting ground of women's lived experience of gendered human behaviour; it underpins what feels familiar and real and how it is understood. The currency of folk psychology of the self, furthermore, is emotion, 'common sense,' parables and sayings. The folk psychological views of any one person cannot be completely divorced from social myths and stereotypical views about the genders while simultaneously bearing the idiosyncratic stamp of that particular person's investments in holding onto certain assumptions about gender and behaviour. These beliefs may have the character of formulae. For instance, a belief fundamental to the folk psychology of romance readers appears to be the view not only that magical changes can be operated upon the personality of a man by the right woman, but that it is a sign of her heroic superiority to be able to transform this distant, insensitive, and cold man into a tender expressive intimate:

Of course, the ideal hero does become more expressive in the course of the story, but because the early descriptions of him emphasized that this tender side was always part of his true character even though it was suppressed, the narrative structure places ultimate responsibility for its nurturance and flowering on the heroine herself. In reassuring him about

the purity of her motives, it is *she* who frees him to respond warmly to her...All that is possible, really, is the cultivation and encouragement of tendencies already there in the personalities of particular men.

(1984: 216)

The authority of personal fantasy exerts its influence through the precepts about human motivation implicit in a shared folk psychology. Or, otherwise put, the realism of characters that attracts reader's identifications draws from two orders of explanation. The conditions for the intelligibility of a character's actions draw from what readers know from the folk psychology they encounter and use in everyday life experience (the B view) *and* from what their fantasy life requires they believe (the A view); the overlap is not perfect. Corresponding to the degree to which A no longer overlaps B, we would find a continuum could be drawn to map the increasing gap between a socially normative and psychotic psychology and hermeneutic of human action.

The account of a character's motivation and behaviour in the romance is believable because it accords with common views about the self that readers encounter and employ in their daily lives. For instance, they dismiss heroines "whom they consider either too meek or too aggressive to be believable. As one of Radway's informants (Maureen) remarked, "We know how men react to that kind of behaviour. No real woman would ever think of trying to get away with that. She'd get hurt." (201-202). On the other hand, it can be argued that the limits of 'reality' are not those produced by everyday lived experience since readers appeal to some other standard of measurement than what they personally know to judge the credibility of a character. They admit that although the hero and heroine characters are idealized and, therefore, not realistic in the sense of resembling people they personally know; nevertheless, they seem realistic because *their motivations are believable*. Revealing the oft-forgotten difference between the theory and practice of reading, what critics will dismiss as formulaic action, "reminiscent of morality plays between stereotyped characters" (201), to some readers may feel emotionally familiar, true, and real. That is because the behavioural propositions about romantic action which they take as credible are the product of a folk psychology and the inflection of that psychology through their own fantasy screen of wishes, justifications, defences, punishments.

Emotion signals the oscillating positions within a paradigm scenario

Linking aesthetics to practical consciousness is another way of trying to draw the relationship between the social constructivist and psychoanalytic paradigms of emotion and between the workings of ideology on the drives and process of identity formation. Radway herself attributes two etiologies to emotions. First as part of the common knowledge of everyday life, she assumes they are the product of social interaction and social learning: Radway speculates that there are "specific aspects of male behaviour legitimated by patriarchy that are nonetheless feared by these women to such an extent that they are avoided *in imaginative experience* whenever possible" (p. 16). But she also wants emotions to be symptomatic of a defensive configuration, of unsatisfied needs belonging to women as a gendered psychic configuration and as particular women.

She affords emotion symptomatic significance of unconscious wishes. Radway implicitly claims that emotional responses to romances, which are superficially organised by identification with the heroine and vicarious experience of her emotions as the reader's own, are motivated *at a deep level* by the reader's troubled relations with internal objects, one of which is an unresolved wish to recover the feeling of coherence and security belonging to the pre-oedipal dyad. Any evaluation of the ideological effects of romance reading on women's practical consciousness would logically have to evaluate the potential of reading to reconfigure the internal world which motivates the way the external world is perceived and the way problems encountered in it are dealt with. Radway's work has not been able to investigate this because of the limits of her methodological protocol.

4.6 Practical consciousness and the therapeutic potential of fantasy

The therapeutic potential of reading romances has been axed around the contents of the 'fantasy' wish which are variously characterized as either utopian or ideological. This approach to fantasy as therapeutic falters on several counts.

Should the wish content of romances be condemned? Radway does have an ambivalent attitude toward romances, seeing them as empowering by virtue of the coping strategies they provide while, on the other hand, managing womens' desires for

relatedness through the myth of romance which focusses satisfaction of these desires in the patriarchal family. Radway sounds as if she agrees with Modleski who defends romances only so long as she believes they respond to 'false' needs created in women by patriarchy and not their 'real' needs. Thus, the fantasy of living happy domestic lives with men disseminated by romance novels has a recuperative function, undercutting women's discontent with the palliative of romance and marriage as all fulfilling.³⁰

Radway has the therapeutic to do with resistance to what she, and her community, would define *a priori* as ideology, false reality because it excludes many voices and perspectives. But the expression of different voices and different views, however utopian, is only the carapace of a vehicle for change with the engine missing. The move from a psychological theory of pleasure to an evaluation of the critical cultural potential of mass entertainment in the form of romances is made through the premise that fiction, which pleases by giving *expression to utopian yearnings*, is *resisting*. It is psychologically naive to see fantasy content as utopian and a force for change if this content is not attached to a textual form which we can argue on psychologically coherent grounds might put in place conditions enabling change in the self's internal object relations. Contents *per se* may be idealistic or utopian but alone they are 'resisting' in only the most nominal of senses. This view of speaking differently as 'resistance' is based on the distinction, which differentiates the role of the state in democracies, between 'freedom from' constraints and 'freedom for' creative expression. To express different views is the product of negative freedom, 'freedom from' limits on expression. It contributes little to an understanding of the enabling conditions of freedom 'for' entertaining and evaluating differences of thought, for refusing to take refuge in the defensive strategies of projection and splitting, scapegoating, paranoia, and denial. Hence, it is the manner of treatment of conflicts between yearnings or ends and whether change is motivated in the reader's inner conflicts and ways of dealing with them where we find the criteria to judge a narrative practice as laying the conditions for changing defensive motivation and, therefore, as ultimately *enabling* and, therefore, potentially resisting.

On André Green's view, psychic health has to do with reducing intrapsychic 'ideology' that, in turn, has to do with barriers to "lively intrapsychic communication" by which defences to creativity or change in relation to internal objects are reduced. I hold the criteria for the therapeutic must derive, first, from an individual's suffering, that is, from within some notion of intrapsychic politics of representation and articulation. Reducing ideology, that is, the dominance of exclusionary, defensive thinking and part-self accounts within the self, and the causes of polarization and splitting, is what constitutes the therapeutic:

'Integration' is a word that comes in here, because if one can conceive of a fully integrated person, then that person takes full responsibility for *all* feelings and ideas that belong to being alive. By contrast, it is a failure of integration when we need to find the things we disapprove of outside ourselves and do so at a price--this price being the loss of the destructiveness which really belongs to ourselves.

(Winnicott, 1965: 82)

Radway talks about the need to change "female subjectivity" which presumably means both unconscious and conscious aspects. She points out the author (*autoritas*) of the fantasy in romance novels are the psychosexual needs produced by the asymmetrical engendering process which instills in men and women uncomplementary needs for relations; but she retreats to evaluate the romance genre in terms of how it can and cannot change consciousness alone. In order to argue the pleasures and behaviours--or dispositions to act represented by romances and encouraged in their readers--are not ideological in light of Radway's view that ideology is the pretence that patriarchy knows what women want, it stands to reason that women would have to act differently and seek different solutions to the problems in their lives than those presented by romances, after reading romances. The important staging of those different solutions is the private arena of the home and family where mothers might attempt to alter their relationships to their husbands and to change the way caretaking of infants and children goes on, i.e. in the way women teach sons to be male and daughters to be female so as not to reproduce the same relational and affective deficiencies which they suffer in the men around them. This would be an exercise in living some version of the "Archimedean fulcrum" (Jehlen, 1982) which is necessary if feminist theory is to intervene in the production of subjects. Thus, you might expect

Radway would be vitally interested in investigating how romance reading could inadvertently be having effects on a crucial aspect of women's lives, their child raising practices. However, her inherited Chodorovian framework--which finds a solution to the vicious cycle of the reproduction of gendered personalities in broadbased social change along with a call for males to take on the caretaking of children within the family--makes moot the question of the degree to which changes in the way women mother might effect the internal worlds of their children.

Radway tends to use psychological arguments and claims selectively when they suit her and to drop them and to appeal to understanding and consciousness most of the time. She attributes to women a psychological make-up of which they are not aware whose desires/needs are assuaged by romance; yet she offers that culture critics must write for non-academic audiences with the intent of "getting these women to see precisely what conditions in their own lives romances address, why they do it only temporarily, and perhaps most important, what would have to be changed in the real world if the fantasy of the romance was to be made real, that is, the social construction of masculinity itself" (1986: 114). However, telling women why they yearn for what they yearn for does not give them better inner resources nor change their own habits of educating children, relating to their husbands, running the home, changing the power structure in the home and so on.

How readers live the practical consciousness which informs their aesthetic decisions and consumption choices has to be investigated by broadening the framework for the ethnographic study of meaning-effects from the discrete text-reader encounter to the context of the reader as actor in his or her life environments and in his or her emotional embodied space.

4.7 Conclusion

What happens when the romance reader closes her book with a heavy heart, not because she hasn't a new one on her shelf, but because the emotional gratification she obtains from reading evaporates when she turns to her family life? What happens when the endorsements of romantic love, made by her favourite authors, are found empty? How does she deal with the discovery, one day, that her darkly handsome son

is as inexpressive and emotionally inhibited, as sardonic and critical towards women as her husband? And that his girlfriends through high school, although "raven haired" with "flashing eyes," have all been anything but feisty, articulate, spirited young women like her favourite romance heroines. Even as she calls angrily to her daughters to come help her with the dishes, she may feel an inconsolable disappointment in them as well. She happens to hear John Bradshaw's series "Creating Love" on PBS one weekend, and on Monday she's standing in front of the self-help section in her local bookstore and, by the following Monday, reading notices for recovery groups in the paper and on the bulletin board in her neighbourhood natural food store.

Will a recovery, self-help group wean her from her 'addiction' to romance novels? Is she simply trading one emotional dependency for another? Or does the recovery approach to thinking about the self's unhappiness promise a more conscious contestation of patriarchy than romances provide? Might the recovery movement appeal to the same inchoate needs, fears, and dissatisfactions as romance novels are purported to do, while enabling women to mobilize a different response to the emotional consequences of patriarchy than those provided by romance novels?³¹ To know this, *methods of interviewing would have to be found to access the reader's fantasy world precisely through a process of unravelling the polysemic significance of emotional response.*

Before following our disenchanted reader to the bookstore, we find her curiosity aroused by a mystery program on PBS which has stalled her husband's overactive finger on the television remote control. They both were snagged by the music, and a repetitive scene of a drowned and naked woman being pulled from a river into a boat. She watched it with her husband who thought it all pretty tame stuff; no full frontal nudity...that Marlowe guy in the hospital bed was gross...why did that little boy keep popping back...the whole program was pretty weird when you come to think of it...leave it to those Brits, you wouldn't catch Hollywood making films like *The Singing Detective*. She was horrified, fascinated, repulsed, yet impatient for the next episode to find out who...

CHAPTER FOUR: ENDNOTES

1. Examples of the latter which directly address emotion and reading are: Conway (1990). "Conceptual Representation of Emotions: The Role of Autobiographical Memories" and publications in the journal *Cognition and Emotion* such as Gernsbacher, *et al* (1992). "Do Readers Mentally Represent Characters' Emotional States?".
2. In defense of the individuality of aesthetic response, Norman Holland attempted to examine the unconscious interaction of id-fantasies and ego-defenses that was responsible for an individual's "identity theme," a notion he takes from the ego psychologist Heinz Lichtenstein, which shaped his or her experience of literature. In the case studies which make up *5 Readers Reading* (1975a), he located the organizing principle of an interpretation in the reader's own core self or personal style rather than in the text. This style was proposed as being the product of a persistent configuration of defences, expectations, fantasies, and transformations (a perceptual/interpretative gestalt Holland designates under the acronym DEFT). Holland was a preeminent psychoanalytic critic in the 1970's precisely for his groundbreaking initiative in addressing the theoretical and practical applications of the concept of countertransference to the literary transaction. However, his experimental study in psycho-aesthetics had its roots in I.A. Richards' protocols experiment in reading, published in his *Practical Criticism* (1929). Among the many responses Holland's work has elicited, critiques of the solipsism of his theory and lack of attention to issues of literary competence can be found in Marotti (1978) and Freund (1987).
3. A psychoanalytically-inspired, formalist theorist such as Peter Brooks assumes that all readers have a psychological predisposition to experience pleasure and unpleasure in certain organizations of narrative or plottings, based on an instinctually-designed and universally-shared 'masterplot' in the unconscious make-up of each one. In his 'fantasy-in-the-text' model (1977), he hypostatizes textual fantasy (a hallucinatory, wish-fulfilling staging of desire) as a model of the structure of the unconscious and makes tropes indigenous to the mind. The actual reader as desiring subject is expected to have the same fantasy as the implied reader as desiring subject. In his 'fantasy-in-the-text' model, he hypostatizes textual fantasy as supplying the preconditions for a modality of aesthetic consciousness. This is like saying emotions are hard-wired and therefore automatic and involuntary when prompted by certain cognitions. After his own premise, Brooks can be called a 'masterplot' thinker because of his elevation of the unconscious 'masterplot' to a transcendental structure of meaning (just as logos--grammar and rhetoric--seem to be for Lacan). However, his attempt to locate mythopoeisis in metapsychology is blind to the pragmatics of interpretation and to the potential of gender-differentiated reading effects in that process.
4. The term comes from Peter Brooks' article "Freud's masterplot: questions of narrative" (1977). I include the later Barthes (*The Pleasure of the Text*, 1975) along with Brooks in the masterplot camp. I propose that Radway is a feminist 'masterplot' theorist because, although she and Brooks offer different orientations to unconscious

fantasy, its preconditions and effects, and to how identification proceeds in the reading act, each fundamentally assumes an isomorphism between text and psyche.

For other studies of the audience which have followed Radway's initiative, see: Richard Dyer's "Judy Garland and Gay Men" in *Heavenly Bodies* (London: Macmillan, 1987); Helen Gray's *Scarlett's Women: 'Gone with the Wind' and its Female Fans* (London: Virago, 1989).

5. See "Visual pleasure and narrative cinema" in *Screen* 16:3 (Autumn 1977), 6-18, which is reproduced in *Visual and Other Pleasures* (London: MacMillan, 1989), and "Afterthoughts on visual pleasure and narrative cinema inspired by *Duel in the Sun*" in *Framework* 15-17 (1981).

6. Radway has argued that critics use the premise that "reading can be therapeutic" to validate the meanings (and fantasies) these critics find in texts (1984:6). She holds that critics tend to posit a desire in the reading public for specific meanings that the critics themselves have unearthed in the texts under study. When critics argue that they know how readers read by using their own reading as a model, they tend to assume there is an irreducible givenness to a text, and its features have a coercive power which necessarily produce specific reading effects. Critics make behaviourist conclusions by inferring from consumption patterns a psychological reader who reads with certain intransigent unconscious needs. A less deterministic use of this premise of "reading as therapeutic" allows that precisely because unconscious processes are part of reading performance, the very different uses readers might make of the same text must be identified and accounted for.

In sections where it is clear my references are drawn from *Reading the Romance*, page numbers only will be given.

7. Radway encountered the participants in her study through her principal informant Dot Evan, a bookstore employee and editor of a newsletter on romances. Of the 42 women who answered her questionnaire (16 were interviewed as well):

more than a third (fifteen) reported reading from five to nine romances weekly. An additional twenty-two (55 percent) completed between one and four romances every week, while four women indicated that they consume anywhere from fifteen to twenty-five romances during that same period of time.

(1984: 12, 60)

8. Radway's Introduction to *Reading the Romance* (pp. 3-18) joins volumes such as Freund's (1987) and Suleiman and Crosman's (1980) as a good review of arguments for a reader-oriented approach to literature. It also provides a useful discussion of how the inheritance of the poetics of the New Criticism, in present day critical discussion of romance literature, has provided the ammunition for delegitimizing and rejecting as 'mystification' or as 'coerced' or as 'inauthentic' the pleasures readers derive from romances.

9. For a summary of the narrative structure of the ideal romance, see Radway, Chapter 4, p. 134, and for the failed romance, Chapter 5.

One of the problems of studying the romance plot for the fears and desires it is supposed to figure are the differing appraisals by critics of what constitutes the characteristic romance plot. In *Loving with a Vengeance*, Modleski's account describes the Harlequin romance as:

particularly concerned with courtship, and its central problematic is feminine innocence, guilt, and self-assertiveness. The Harlequin formula ensures that the heroine is a virgin considerably younger and poorer than her male suitor, yet not in search of his fortune. Her narrative trajectory involves a series of self-effacing acts (including suicide attempts) and regressions to a child-like state as she faces a hero who is often brutally mocking.

(Spigel, 1986: 217-218)

10. Inspired by Geertz's *The Interpretation of Culture* (1973: 412-53), Radway holds that romances function in the same way for readers as does the cockfight for the Balinese. Geertz wrote that the young Balinese, in attending a cockfight, "receives from this essential art form of his culture 'a kind of sentimental education'...What he learns there...is what his culture's ethos and his private sensibility...look like when spelled out externally in a collective text" (Radway, 1984: 149). Romances are, therefore, both 'maps of' and 'maps for' action; the emotions they situate in contexts of motivation, communication, and desire are to be read as 'maps of' the terrain of human interaction as well as 'maps for' action on that terrain between the sexes.

11. Chodorow's synthesis of feminism and object-relations is one of the most widely known and influential theories of gender development and gender difference. Chodorow believes neither biology, social conditioning theories nor economic factors alone can explain how gender differences come to be. Her project in developing this theory is to explain what happens between the biological level and the cultural level. Her psychoanalytic view pushes role training back to the point where training is largely non-verbal, unconscious, and fantasy based. Furthermore, what is learned in infancy is relatively intractable. She posits:

1. there are psychological differences between the sexes;
2. this is due to the fact both sexes are parented by women;
3. even in the pre-oedipal stage, boys and girls have a significantly different experience because they have different degrees of sameness to the person they first know;
4. girls are not pushed into the oedipal stage as rapidly as boys;
5. unlike the boy, the girl is not asked to make a switch in identification to one with the father;
6. the boy's relationship with the mother and sense of identity is based on discontinuity from earliest relations with mother whereas the girl's identity is founded on a sense of continuity;

7. the girl is not expected to perform a psychological renunciation of the mother the way the boy is.

Chodorow argues that object-relations theory is a materialist psychology: it proposes how personalities are formed due to social conditions and how those personalities themselves affect social conditions. According to her account of object-relations theory, males and females experience the world differently because they enter it with different personalities due to different boundary experiences, differently constructed and experienced inner and outer worlds, and preoccupations with different relational issues.

Girls retain the preoedipal attachment to the mother, so come to define and experience themselves as continuous with others. They retain both parents as love objects. Whereas boys resolve the oedipus complex more cleanly since they repress their ties with the mother (love for mother threatens father). The issue for boys to resolve through the oedipus complex is apparently gender identification. The problem for a male child is to distinguish himself from the mother and to protect himself against the real threat she poses for his identity (separation and individuation is also a problem for the female child but gender identity is apparently not). The male's conflictual and oppositional efforts lead to the formation of rigid ego boundaries, the distinction between the 'me' and the 'not-me'.

Chodorow wants to say there is something about girls' inner worlds which is more relational than boys, and this is exemplified in the greater capacity for empathy among women than men. This relational inner world is then reinforced by the process of socialization. Girls have a concretely present mother to identify with; boys have to identify with an abstract set of rules and behaviours which are associated with the world of their fathers.

Chodorow maintains that the fact the sexes feel like "intimate strangers" to one another will not change until changes are wrought to the way the earliest parent-child experience is structured. She makes recommendations for social change: female-dominated child care needs to be transformed so that women and men do not continue to develop different relational capacities.

12. A study of the self-understandings of the members of a working class community Breslow Rubin's *Worlds of Pain*, also published in the mid 1970's, refers to Chodorow's soon to be published book to develop its thesis on the separate realities of male and female members of blue collar families. From an already abundant literature on sex-role socialization, Rubin chooses to quote from one particular study which uses the same language of expressiveness and relatedness vs. independence and instrumentalism as Chodorow, and thus would appear to support Chodorow's thesis. This study sought correlations between the sex of the individual and that individual's self-rating with respect to the attributes of expressiveness:

...men associate independence with negative expressiveness. While the women in our sample were able to incorporate positive expressiveness, positive instrumentalness, and independence in their self-pictures, the men in our sample could not include expressiveness with independence and instrumentalness. This supports the theory that development of

masculinity involves the rejection of femininity. The young boy becomes a man not by accepting masculine traits but by rejecting feminine ones.

(Miriam Johnson, *et al.* (1975). "Expressiveness Reevaluated." *School Review* 83 in Rubin, 1976: 230)

Without examining the method and data of this study it is impossible to make anything of its findings other than to note its participation in creating the discourse of sex roles of the mid-1970's upon which *The Reproduction of Mothering* drew for its hypotheses about male and female personality differences.

13. Jehlen has written in a similar vein of women readers of the sentimental novel, whose readings "revision plots by which the 'opportunistic virtues of submission' of women characters are reinterpreted as a sign of the emergence of female power and victory in a patriarchal society" (Jehlen, 1982: 203-4).

14. A hypodermic notion of fantasy's origins is common among theorists using Chodorow. Jean Wyatt's indicates a common problem:

If female readers of a particular culture share certain fantasies, it is because particular childraising patterns, shared across a culture, embed common fantasy structures in their daughters. A reader brought up in a different culture, with different child-raising practices, might not, for example, respond with passionate attachment to the patriarchal family relations reflected in *Jane Eyre*.
(1991: 20)

15. I reintroduced point #4 above on prehistory, which Penley omitted, no doubt, because her focus was primarily the location of the subject in fantasy rather than the relation between neurosis and fantasy's intergenerational filiation. Penley minimized the question of fantasy's origins with regard to its structure, its content and its most concrete details. Penley wants to deal with the issue contained in #4 via a Lacanian formulation where the non-reciprocity between subject and object which he posits, means that the subject is structured by that which it has negated, that which is lacking to it.

16. "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" (1975) first spelled out the implications of Lacanian-Althusserian models of spectatorship for a critique of patriarchal cinema. It proposed that in aligning the pleasure of spectators with a hierarchical system of sexual difference, classical American cinema entailed a masculinization of the spectator position, no matter the sex of the real audience member. Rodowick's "Difficulty of Difference" article critiqued Mulvey's argument for its inability to account for a female spectator.

17. See Rodowick's painstaking discussion of the transformations of this fantasy in his 1982 article (i.e. masculine/active subject of enunciation shifts to feminine/passive position, the sex of the object of the fantasy changes).

18. See Constance Penley's fascinating article (1992) on why women write and draw erotica for themselves which features two heterosexual men. Penley has discovered that female fans are the primary writers and readers of 'slash' Star Trek fanzines as erotica. A 'slash' fanzine is one that features stories, poems, or drawings that take as their premise an explicitly sexual relationship between two of the main male characters: a K/S zine is one where Captain Kirk and Dr. Spock of the U.S.S. Enterprise are linked in an explicitly romantic and sexual relationship. Their sexual encounters are set in the alternate or mirror universe of strange planets and space vehicles where Kirk and Spock find themselves marooned while cut off from the Enterprise. These 'nowhere' spaces narratively enable and legitimate diverse expressions of their sexual love. Penley discusses some of these (s/m practices in a slave colony, Spock's cyclical '*pan farr*' syndrome, a reprise of PMS).

Attending a convention for fans of slash lit and fascinated by what she calls "one of the most radical and intriguing female appropriations of a popular culture product" that she has ever seen, Penley asked: "What reasons did the fans give for writing erotic fantasies across the bodies of two men--and why these particular men? What was the sexual orientation of the fans--straight, lesbian, or some of each?" "What cannot be said in K/S writing; what are its self-imposed or unconscious taboos?" (1992: 483, 484). But what is most intriguing is why Kirk and Spock are represented as heterosexual, not homosexual. "What is served at the level of fantasy?" This, she posits, is a prerequisite of female readers' identification with positions in the fantasies depicted through the bodies of these two men:

I think it allows a much greater range of identification and desire for the women: in the fantasy one can *be* Kirk or Spock (a possible phallic identification) and also still *have* (as sexual objects) either or both of them since, as heterosexuals, they are not *unavailable* to women. If, in the psychoanalytic description of fantasy, its two poles are being and having, in the slash universe this binary opposition remains but is not held to be divided along gender lines. (...) I want to show that the range and diversity of identifications and object relations can be much greater than is currently being recognized in feminist studies of women and popular culture.

(Penley, 1992: 488)

19. In rape fantasies, the subject of the scenario proceeds through an oscillating identification across conflicting positions (top/bottom), modes (active/passive), and aims (to humiliate, to be humiliated; to inflict pain, to survive pain). In the scenario she has imaginatively authored, the female reader is the rapist and the victim simultaneously, controlling the rapist's actions and the victim's and, finally, being victorious over the rapist because she has 'endured his attack' without being destroyed, thereby achieving orgasm. This is her infantile solution to infantile conflicts over fusion and separation, penetration and annihilation, power and powerlessness, insides and outsides. Recalling our quote from Winnicott at the head of the chapter:

[T]here is no adult who, in relation to himself as an object, is not existentially through self management, or representationally through self

objectification, managing certain aspects of himself as a mother or father does a child.

20. Contributions to our culture's discourse on woman's desire are not lacking, but a recent, pithy statement in an article on a new Sherlock Holmes series on PBS is worth quoting for its Lacanian-flavoured, aphoristic quality. Jeremy Brett, the actor who, in the 1980's, brought a Draculean ferocity to Sherlock Holmes's passion for knowledge, says about Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's hero: "Sherlock Holmes, he's what every man wants to be, what every woman wants to seduce" (*TV Guide, Montreal Gazette*, July 23, 1993). ("To be the phallus" or "to have the phallus" are the two poles of fantasy and identity according to Lacan, see Jane Gallop's *Reading Lacan*, 1985.)

21. "Bad romances seem to earn their dismissal by Dot and her customers precisely because they heighten key fears to a fever pitch, prolong them unnecessarily, and inadequately explain away the hero's actions that provoked the heroine's and reader's fears in the first place." On the other hand, "[t]hese fears figure only momentarily in the reading of a good romance because they are sketched out very quickly and then managed, recontained, or explained away by a plot that shows that the dangers were mere figments of the heroine's imagination" (Radway, 1984: 16).

This approach to determining what made a plot 'ideal' was suggested to Radway when she found her discussions with readers "focused not on the aesthetic qualities of bad stories nor on the uninspired nature of overly repetitive plots, but rather on the **intense emotions that the process of reading a bad book evoked in the women themselves**" (159).

22. While Radway provides evidence that the romance plot functions like a fantasy scenario for the reader, she does not follow through on the implications of this formulation of fantasy for her theory of identification. For instance, Ang notes that Radway was puzzled by that fact that "many of the Smithton women...always want to ascertain in advance that a book finishes with a happy ending" (Ang, 1985: 186). Insightfully, Ang suggests,

When the reader is sure *that* the heroine and the hero will finally get each other, she can concentrate all the more on *how* they will get each other. Finding out about the happy ending in advance could then be seen as a clever reading strategy aimed at obtaining maximum pleasure: a pleasure that is oriented towards the **scenario** of romance, rather than its outcome.

(1985: 186) (emphasis added)

This is a view supported by Cora Kaplan:

[T]he oscillation between realistic and lyrical modes, the disruption of the terms of sexual difference is both titillating and vertiginous. It

makes obvious what is perhaps always true in romance reading for women: that the reader identifies with both terms in the seduction scenario, but most of all with the **process of seduction**.

(1986: 162)

23. On this question of grafting, the object relations analyst Benedek reminds us that

It is characteristic of the spiral of human development that the representations of the primary object relationship with the mother are in continual transaction with the representations of all later object relationships according to the age and maturity of the child and the significance of the particular object.

(Benedek, 1959: 400)

24. A romance receiving only two-stars out of a possible four, *Wanton Fires*, offers a drab, scaled-down, essentially practical and domestic romantic fantasy since it seems to suggest to readers that they rest content with their less than perfect relationships, that sexual passion is not always earth-shattering or even necessary to a strong and stable relationship. It suggests what is important is compatibility, generosity, and dependability. Consider the heroine Georgie's reaction to Sir Miles Dynham,

[He]...is presented to the reader as bumbling and inept, though a well-meaning young man. Although Georgie "likes" him, his "gentle affectionate" kisses do "not disturb her at all, one way or the other."

After Georgie is spurned by Miles' friend Adrian, a typically dark, charismatic hero, her opinion of Miles undergoes a transformation and the "logic of the story suggests that a merely mediocre suitor can become a loving and satisfying marriage partner even though he might not be as spectacularly masculine as the typical romantic hero" (Radway, 1984: 176-177).

25. In Spigel's review of Modleski's *Loving with a Vengeance*, she writes that the figure of the evil woman or male tyrant in Gothic novels is "a paranoid projection of the heroine's own guilt caused by her ambivalent feelings toward her parents, and later, her husband" (Spigel, 1989: 218).

26. The regressive fantasy of recovering a mother-substitute in the hero by making him more emotionally available is itself based on an idealized picture of an emotionally satisfying mother-daughter relationship. Some feminist psychologists and therapists writing self-help books, Charlotte Davis Kasl's *Many Roads, One Journey* being an excellent example, argue that daughters, in their adult relations, want anything but a repeat of the relations they had with their mothers which were experienced as suffocating, controlling, and growth-debilitating. The self-in-relation of the ubiquitous 'co-dependent' mother in the recovery literature is a mother who refuses to recognize boundaries and dominates the daughter who wishes to grow beyond the enforced symbiotic closeness and overprotectiveness and to escape the

punitive mother, enraged by the daughter's struggle for difference and independence. The predicament, in Kasl's words:

I was never able to let go of my hurt or forgive my mother for suppressing my passion, talent, and mind until I could tune in to her predicament as a woman growing up in patriarchy in the early 1900's--a woman who was taught to believe with every inch of her being that marriage and motherhood were the only respectable satisfying roles for a woman. Her responses to my strong beliefs and feelings stemmed from her belief that she had to control me so I could "catch" a man. Given her socialization, it is not surprising she shamed me for my strong views: they were too bold...for attracting a man. My passion for piano was too intense...for attracting a man. And yes, I hid my pain with drugs, depression, and food. *I needed to be angry at her, to drop into the angry child and rage at my losses*, but I also needed to feel my rage at the female socialization that *set us up against each other and robbed us of the kind of mother-daughter bond we both yearned for and never had*. How could she love the power in me when she had so deeply buried her own to be a "good" wife and mother?

(Kasl, 1992: 66) (my emphasis)

27. The unadulterated goodness of the pre-oedipal phase is based on primary narcissism, which Chodorow accepts. However, alternative formulations of the origins of symbolization, one of which was introduced in the last chapter in the discussion of Levin's work, entail a rethinking of our assumption that the pre-Oedipal inheritance in fantasy is primarily "the desire to return to return to the mother's body, to fuse with it, to enter a world without distinctions or differences" (Penley, 1992: 500). Levin's argument against primary narcissism is also an argument against the pre-Oedipal as a fusional state. He provides for an object-relations view of the pre-Oedipal which has ramifications for the claims Radway would like to make for it as the fantasy source of regressive wishes underpinning readers' pleasure. Rather than invalidating Radway's research, an alternative formulation of the pre-Oedipal in light of a Freudian view of fantasy still bears hypotheses of interest to mass culture researchers.

28. The hero restrains her "in an attempt to control her anger, to arouse her sexually, to fulfill his burning desire to have her confess her feelings for him, or all three" (Radway, 1984: 256).

29. She holds that the reader "is never required to forge new interpretive conventions or to construct consciously a theory about character motivations" because of a variety of conventions which confirm her expectations: every book is dominated by the same set of events resolved in an identical way; the illusion of threat and contingency that accompanies a story whose outcome is unknown is preserved; inferences the reader is asked to make are always immediately confirmed; events are interpreted redundantly in conventional ways by a trustworthy narrator; the technique of the 'aimless gaze' creates a reality effect about character as well as about domestic

interiors; language is conventional, i.e., words are not used in unfamiliar ways, syntax is almost never deformed (1984: 193-208).

In *Women Watching Television* (1991), an ethnographic study of working and middle class women's responses to situation comedies which depict working and middle class work and family environments, Andrea Press critiques Radway's conclusions about readers' identifications based on her methodological deficiencies, particularly the absence of a control group and a comparative framework involving other variables than gender in her analysis of women's ways of knowing. In her own study which examined the hypothesis that judgements of realism are the determinant of spectator's identifications with characters, and which variable--class or gender--was the more powerful in influencing those judgements, Press proposed that working class women responded to television first in terms relating to class then in terms relating to gender (thereby critiquing the dominance of Chodorovian presuppositions about women's personality and psychological needs in gender-based theories of media reception current in North American feminist cultural studies). She concluded that middle-class women make their identifications on the basis of gender, while working-class women make identifications on the basis of class. "Middle-class women both speak more distantly of television than do working class women and, at the same time, seem to identify more closely than working-class women with many of television's images of women" (1991: 96) whereas working class women were less likely to identify with characters while construing television depictions of middle-class environments as realistic. In other words, with neither group of viewers could identification be directly correlated with evaluations of realism, where realism was understood to mean "a closeness of fit between experience and image" (1991: 109). Rather realism for the working class respondents was the product of the closeness of fit between wish fulfillment and image. See Press, pp. 138ff. on this.

30. This ambivalence is the product of Radway's forgetting to take off the hat of the feminist, social critic when she sets about wearing the hat of the psychologically-astute researcher. She operates with the annoying presumption that she knows more about the deep unconscious reasons for these women's pleasure in romance reading than they do while ignoring fundamental tenets of the analyst's method--to work within the transference, not to be judgmental but to seek the historical, biographical sources of an individual's psychic make-up. She does not go back to her informants for their responses to her conclusions about their inner worlds, or seek corroboration of their wish for nurturance, or more permeable ego-boundaries by evidence from other methods of investigation. It is unfortunate that rather than assuming emotional abandonment on the part of these readers, Radway did not build a contemporary picture of their lives by including in her interviews with the Smithton readers questions of the sort asked by Lillian Breslow Rubin in her influential study of blue collar family life, *Worlds of Pain* (1976). A view of these women's daily worlds and self-understandings regarding their expectations of marriage and family life, relations with mothers, mother-in-laws and children, their fantasies, their sexual relations would have provided welcome biographical and social contexts for the reading behaviours Radway is at pains to explain.

A frustration with the snapshot portraits provided by informants along with an inability to reach the unconscious in any reliable way by formalist textual tools is one

of the reasons for scholars to become depth researchers themselves as is the case in fields such as psychoanalytic sociology (Chodorow, 1978), anthropology (Dimen, 1989), medical anthropology (Pandolfi, 1990), social theory (Benjamin, 1977, 1981), psychoanalytical study of texts, critical theory (Finlay, 1989, 1992; Levin 1984, 1989), and political science (Steinberg, 1988).

31. The romance novel leads readers to a "barely conscious contestation of patriarchy," according to Radway (1984: 220), since it "avoids questioning the institutionalized basis of patriarchal control over women even as it serves as a locus of protest against some of its emotional consequences" (217).

CHAPTER FIVE

The Singing Detective: The Problem of (Dis)positioning for the Reflexive Project of the Self in a Metafictional Illness Narrative

To understand why someone acts the way they do it is not enough to know the discourses, objects, and events to which they have been exposed; we need to know the psychic structures that assimilate those things and render them a basis for meaningful action.

(Spiro in D'Andrade and Strauss, 1992: 1)

His uttered speech was so many iron filings in a magnetic field.

(Kovel, 1981: 140)

Consciousness is a sign of its own absence.

(Bacr, 1991: 11)

Affects, accompanied by the ideation of free association and dreams, are considered by clinicians to be an indispensable road to the unconscious. While some emotions are totally repressed and unavailable to introspection, others are modified and distorted as a result of partial repressions. Furthermore, ego defence mechanisms can transform or modify the nature of introspective reports on internal states.

(Plutchik in Panksepp, 1982: 442-3)

The unconscious speaks more than one dialect.

(Freud, 1913: 177)

5.1 Transference: the theory and method of reading performance

Approaches to reading performance which have returned to the epistemological foundations of psychoanalysis have found in the insights and method of Freudian reflexivity the most sophisticated approach to date for the study of the reader/text interaction. The move to conceive of reading as a participatory performance which shares many of the characteristics of the transference and countertransference that occurs between psychoanalyst and analysand involves an understanding of the reader's meaning making activity which displaces traditional notions of subject-object relations.

The interpreting reader is recognized as being part of the field he is interpreting. Reading, like ethnography, is the meeting place of two signifying systems, one within the reader and one within the cultural text. However, in the analysis of transference between the psychoanalytic couple, the signifying systems of the self as text become the self's object of investigation. Transference, the object of inquiry, is inescapably the context of the investigation. This is the problem of creation and finding investigated in Dennis Potter's metafictional work *The Singing Detective*.

By characterizing reading as a *transferential process*, we mean all the ways in which the reader's experience of the text becomes organized according to configurations of self and object that unconsciously structure his or her subjective world and to some degree are both solicited by the text and projected into it. This might be called small-t transference to be distinguished from big-T Transference which refers to the artificially stimulated illness enabled by the particular conditions which obtain between the members of the psychoanalytic couple. Big-T Transference, discovered by Freud as the keystone to clinical practice in the Dora case (Freud, 1905; Glenn, 1986; Jennings, 1986), is the concept which describes a process of actualization of unconscious wishes by the analysand toward the analyst where infantile prototypes or object-relations re-emerge and are experienced with intensity and immediacy. The patient not only perceives the analyst in a distorted way, reacting to this distorted view, and communicating these reactions to the analyst, but also does things to the analyst's mind, projecting into the analyst in a way which affects the analyst's counter-transference. Fantasy, affect, and identification are the signifying and significant terms in which these configurations manifest themselves.¹ The Transference, without which psychoanalysis would be reduced to a conversation involving small-t transference between two persons, one horizontal, one vertical, is what makes the encounter between analysand and analyst an intensely affectively and symbolically overdetermined event. The psychoanalytic situation, while not the only interpersonal space where transference occurs, is the most refined instance of what is the *sine qua non* of all models of knowledge, the interference of the self in the production of the world which the self perceives.

A transferential theory of meaning proposes that "the reader understands the text only insofar as he understands the disturbance the text sets up within him (Marotti, 1978: 473). This grasps the kernel of the epistemological insight which made Freud's discovery of the transference--as a form of participatory reading--available as a model of knowledge and investigation which displaces traditional notions of the subject-object dichotomy:

By shifting and undercutting the clear-cut polarities between subject and object, self and other, inside and outside, analyst and analysand, consciousness and the unconscious, the new Freudian reflexivity substitutes for all traditional binary, symmetrical conceptual oppositions--that is, substitutes for the very foundations of Western metaphysics--a new mode of interfering heterogeneity. This new reflexive mode--instituted by Freud's way of listening to the discourse of the hysteric and which Lacan will call "the inmixture of the subjects" (*Ecrits*, p. 415)--divides the subjects differently, in such a way that they are neither entirely distinguished, separate from each other, nor, correlatively, entirely totalizable but, rather, interfering from within and in one another.

(Felman, *Jacques Lacan and the Adventure of Insight: Psychoanalysis in Contemporary Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1987), pp. 22-3 in Brennan, 1989: 197)²

In reading theory, the analogy of transference is a useful formulation of the origins of the meaning-effects of a text as long as it does not imply that meaning takes place through projection alone which would precisely destroy the transactional or biactive nature of the text-reader interaction. This tendency to make projection alone the essential mechanism of reading is a problem in reader-response theory where projection is taken to describe a process whereby, "[t]he 'pictures' the reader 'sees' in the text are determined not by the words, but solely by the film inside the projection machine, the fantasies animating the reader. Reading thus appears a highly narcissistic, or even solipsistic, activity" (Alcorn, 1987: 241). Formulating a transferential model of reading in this way destroys the specificity of the stimuli provoked by the object the subject perceives, and is no advance upon text-dominant models of reading which commit the reverse error of attributing all regulatory power over interpretation to the text alone.

A theory which holds (1) that reading of all types of texts, fictional and not, has analogies with the transference (but some texts are more active in provoking the

transference than others) and (2) that it is meaningful to talk about reading as a form of psychotherapeutics (and some texts have greater therapeutic potential for some readers than others) moves the debate on reading performance among cultural studies and reader-response theorists from the axis of true and false representations, politically 'correct' and 'incorrect' images and their effects on belief, to the problem of the reader's 'wish to believe' and its semiotic and psychological preconditions. No direct connection can be posited between ideology and the subjective meaningfulness of representations and their employment in the personal cognitive schema by which the everyday world becomes knowable by the self.

The preconditions to the wish to believe in the analysand is what psychoanalysis sets out to discover by inducing an artificial illness, i.e. particular, seemingly irrevocable patterns of object-relating, accessible through affect-infused talk and the polygraphy of the unconscious: sighs, tears, bodily fidgets, internal sensations, silence. The Transference, nevertheless, is primordially about modalities of spectatorship and address, about the self split into part-selves with access to limited affect. Accounts of experience given by part-selves are necessarily part-accounts; they tell two or more different stories about a happening which are not complementary parts of the same story. The 'theatre of the mind,' a metaphor stressing the dramatic and social quality of the scenarios which are strongly part of the experience of the reader's ambivalent or multi-positioned engagement with the analyst, points to the Transference as a staging of the 'reality' of the patient's fantasy world of internal object relations.

Psychoanalysis has taught us that the scenarios were written years ago by a naive and childlike I struggling to survive in an adult world whose drama conventions are quite different from the child's. These psychic plays may be performed in the theater of our own minds or that of our bodies or may take place in the external world, sometimes using other people's minds and bodies, or even social institutions, as their stage.

(MacDougall, 1986: 4)

Transference within the analytic setting is more than a repeat performance of familiar intersubjective dramas; it becomes an intermediate region of experience in which the artificially induced semiotic illness of the client is accessible to intervention. As both a metaphor for, and a re-presentation of, the lived relation of the individual to

her internal object world history as well as to memory, transference is also the process of repeating, surviving, and working through the compulsiveness of particular neurotic configurations and the partial accounts of experience which accompany them to achieve new modalities of perceiving, feeling, and interpreting. 'Working through' does not mean simply that the patient achieves new ways of interacting with her present partners but it "produces an intrapsychic transformation" (Miller, 1983: 270), that is, a disposition to perceive and to feel differently. It has been argued that since the Transference is actually a microcosm of the patient's total psychological life, analyses of the Transference provide a focal point around which patterns dominating the patient's existence as a whole can be clarified, understood, and perhaps altered (Atwood and Stolorow, 1984: 47). The psychotherapeutic purpose of working with the transference are outcomes defined from within orthodox psychoanalytic theory as the re-experiencing of what has been made inaccessible to us through defences, and an integration or incorporation of refused aspects of infantile experience through a development by the adult ego of an increased ability to tolerate conflict and loss.

The curative factors in psychoanalysis begin with psychoanalytic insight: the acquiring of knowledge about one's unconscious through experiencing consciously and, in most cases, being able to acknowledge explicitly and verbally, previously unconscious processes.³ Insight is therapeutic for two reasons. It leads to reintegration of lost experiences and lost parts of the ego, enabling a new orientation to objects, a strengthening of the ego, and growth of the personality, which usually means more correct reality perception. Secondly, insight is therapeutic because knowledge replaces omnipotence; this enables a person to deal with her own feelings in more realistic terms. "Cure does not mean conformity with any stereotyped pattern of normality prejudged by the analyst. It means restoring to the patient access to the resources of his own personality, including the capacity to assess correctly internal and external reality" (Segal, 1986: 71). These conditions enable better object relationships, for instance:

the replacing of denial by acceptance of psychic reality; acceptance of conflict, ambivalence, and guilt; the replacing of omnipotence by a realistic attitude to the task at hand...; the lessening of persecutory anxiety and aggression, and the increase of love and confidence in the

self and in others, acting out giving way to symbolization and symptom to sublimation.

(Segal, 1986: 75)

As the patient sees people as whole objects instead of persecutory part-objects, she is able to feel increasing love for them and diminished anxiety and aggression. Just as she sees the actions and motives of people in less polarized terms so is polarization less the principle by which the objects of her internal world are organized:

‘Integration’ is a word that comes in here, because if one can conceive of a fully integrated person, then that person takes full responsibility for *all* feelings and ideas that belong to being alive. By contrast, it is a failure of integration when we need to find the things we disapprove of outside ourselves and do so at a price--this price being the loss of the destructiveness which really belongs to ourselves.

(Winnicott, 1965: 82)

Reading theorists who are exploring the constraints on meaning formation and pleasure through an attempt to make operational a model of reading performance as in some sense analogical to the transference are faced with the question of reading as practice: Can any of the above noted therapeutic outcomes be promoted in the reader or only represented within a text? When we attempt to capture and account for a reader’s pleasure in metafictional paradox are we describing something we might call human needs or simply cultural models? *The Singing Detective* answers this question.

5.2 *The Singing Detective*: fantasy ‘in’ the text; ‘text as fantasy’

Now we turn to a text which figures the process of self-examination, the self reading the self, in order to solve a mystery: the meaning of its suffering. *The Singing Detective* is remarkable for the way it can be made paradigmatically to illustrate what psychoanalysis has to do with text structure *and* with the psychology of the reader’s interaction with a metafictional text.⁴ *The Singing Detective*, written by Dennis Potter, self-consciously plays with the repressed and processes of repression in both its formal structure and thematic content. It is both a modern and a postmodern text: modern in that it is preoccupied with epistemological questions of myth, of perception, of the dialectic of inner and outer experience, fantasy and realism, subject and object; postmodern in that it explores the loss of the authority of voice when it seems to belong to no speaking subject.

Every culture paradoxically both creates and furnishes certain types of discomfort the means to express themselves (the paradox we encountered in Bettelheim's view of the psychotherapeutic effects of fairy tales). *The Singing Detective* is both an investigation and an expression of a type of culturally specific discomfort which produces suffering. The assumptions grounding the possible worlds created in classical detective fiction have been subverted by *The Singing Detective*, drawing it into the camp of "metaphysical detective fiction" which expresses doubt that a subject (collective or individual) and its history (lifestory) can be definitively known. Unlike earlier exemplary post-modern experiments with the detective genre--Borges and Robbe-Grillet come to mind--Potter's metafictional text provokes speculation again on the possibility of there being not mythological/universal explanations for human nature but certainly psychological ones. It weaves an elaborate and parodic intertextured cloth from many other forms: the Gothic novel, melodrama, the musical comedy, the *Bildungsroman*, and two forms dominated by the search for knowledge, the Grail quest and the detective story. *The Singing Detective* creates an enigmatic relationship among five narrative levels and their temporal registers. It offers concurrent tellings of two stories: the absent account of a crime (or crimes?) and the presented story of an investigation. Its deployment of the thriller genre--conventionally a means of regulating discomfort over the sources of evil--as the basis for an exploration of the *immanence of otherness*--locating evilness within the self--takes its departure from the expectations familiar to all of us in the role of readers of detective stories while playing out a fascination with composition, with the figure of the double (the repudiated part-selves in men and women), and with the "heart of the dark continent" in all of us (an intentionally disturbed Modernist allusion). Paradoxically, it puts the topos of masculinity into question and, by implication, that of femininity as well, by employing the thriller genre--a form prototypically organized by an oedipal logic--as the basis for its experimentation with the subject in and of the text.

As with the romance genre, there is a fantasy *in* the text. However, *The Singing Detective* offers itself as something other to the reader. It represents the exteriorisation of unconsciousness through the transference by presenting the processes in the gap

between signifier and signified. This text itself has a fantasy structure. It unpacks displacements and condensations to display the psychic syntax, the rules for the formation and expression of signs, and in so doing catches the model reader up in a transference neurosis which it then exposes. It also reveals the movement of affect from a preconscious to a conscious idea; it potentially initiates such a movement in the real reader as well. Like a quadruple-layered Mobius strip, where the uncanny appears not once but three times, the intricate slippage between four diegetic levels disturbs the subject/object distinction on the level of character, figuration, and narrative.

Confirming Eco's distinction between the 'closed' and 'open' text, *The Singing Detective* may be found to set up conditions of participatory reading which refuse all determinate meanings and textual subjects; however, as a fantasy scenario, the subject is to be found in the psychic syntax of the multiple layers of voice and perspective which lead the reader to a discovery. Through its metafictional paradoxes and multiple levels of narration, *The Singing Detective* invites the reader's habitual projections with respect to a detective plot (it expects the competent reader's knowledge of the detective genre), but it goes on to examine the internal conflicts and introjects which find relief and reassurance in such plot structures. It provides readers with introspective and emotional data in that they catch themselves both reading with certain expectations and being frustrated by the text's resistance to providing the anticipated, habitual forms of visual and narrative pleasure.

This metafictional text impels an awareness in the reader/spectator not only of her implicit knowledge of generic conventions, but of the draping of wishes (belonging to our sense of self and its deepest interests, fears, and pleasures) in a culturally provided language of plots and images. It links our investment in particular plot structures and habitual pleasures in detective fiction not to the mastery of a cultural or literary competence *per se* but to intrapsychic origins of paranoia, shame, and self-disgust, which it describes through allusion to a folk psychological version of Freudianism. In fact, it is a tongue-in-cheek presentation of those very scenarios.

Although the detective genre--especially Raymond Chandler from which *The Singing Detective* has intertextually thieved--is undoubtedly colonized by male heroes and stereotypical attitudes against which Jane Fetterley would admonish a resisting

reading, I would argue that it is one of those popular cultural forms which de Lauretis has suggested feminists not immediately reject, in effect, because of what it can teach us about the subject at the source of our reading pleasure. The thriller genre which stages the modern search for identity around the figure of the double, and whose riddle hides a threat to the social order, preeminently instantiates a moral landscape in which the self struggles for meaning. It articulates moral struggle in the cultural vocabulary of the late nineteenth century beginning with Sherlock Holmes' struggle with his evil projection, Moriarity, and his nurturing, plodding but ever dependable double, Watson.

The Singing Detective figures the process of self-examination through the double, employing it as a *mise-en-abyme* of the psychological process of splitting and projection. The characteristic relations between the agents of the double reveal the intersubjective relation dominating the text. Avatars of the double take a number of culturally recognized forms: according to the principle of opposition (detective/criminal), according to the principle of identity (twins). There is a correspondence to be hazarded between what is projected into the double and the psychoneurosis which is being expressed by the textual fantasy.

Watching a trauma unfold does not initiate a similar trauma in the reader, nor does watching the conflict resolve itself lead to similar conflicts being resolved for the reader. However there are cultural, social, and narratological conditions within which the emotions impelled by the detective story and the plots of the thriller make sense. Some of these conditions are socio-cultural (a cultural competence: liberalism, individualism, the melodramatic imagination); some are narratological (literary competence); and others are psychological and peculiar to the reader. *The Singing Detective* explores another realm of preconditions for the thriller. Along with using conventions which are intelligible because the world outside the drama allows them to be so, it links the prior world of intrafamilial experience and interpsychic inheritance/filiation (which is less available to introspection in most people) to more common, culturally available experiences in order to comment both on the interests the genre upholds, and the link between fantasies, produced by the child's attempt to

understand the social world of the family, and values and beliefs widely disseminated in the world of everyday life.

5.3 Narcissistic narratives: sighting/siting the reader in an uncanny scene

Transference brings forth the analysand's expectations (projections) about the analyst's feelings and beliefs toward her, her wishes for how the analyst would treat, see, or feel toward her, and her defences (introjections) against how she assumes her demands will be received. Similarly, the reader has expectations about how the plot will develop, how the story will turn out, about the pleasure to be had, according to cues received from the text. In so doing the real reader is conforming to the profile of the 'model' (Eco) or 'implied' (Iser) reader, decoding the textual conventions with respect to character and plot in the expected manner. Precisely because some degree of common decoding and recognition of conventions which characterise a genre can be attributed to the real reader can a metafictional text be written which, throughout or in part, includes parodic, ironical, or satirical passages.

A transferential model of reading is particularly appropriate as a description of the relationship of reader to metafiction because it acknowledges the importance of the psychological function of paradox. Metafiction creates that intermediate, 'as if' area of experience, to be likened to the phenomena of the 'transitional space' (Winnicott). Metafiction, whose stock in trade is parody and paradox, is peculiarly well-fitted to do so. The reader-as-analyst "must grasp not only what is said, but always what the discourse intends, its implications, how it would work on him," suggests Brooks (1987: 155) and the reader must deduce this through his/her own reactions just as the analyst uses counter-transference to understand the unsaid of the analysand's discourse. Like the analyst who must be wary not to gratify a patient's angry demands or mournful requests when they are expressions of resistance to exploring the repressed, likewise must the reader "refuse the text's demand in order to listen to its desire" (Brooks, 1987: 155).

The changing role of the reader, both encoded and real, brought about by metafictional narrative forms is addressed by Linda Hutcheon's *Narcissistic Narrative: The Metafictional Paradox* (1980). While not predominantly dilating the contribution

of psychoanalytic insights to a theory of reading, it does provide specific analytic tools to identify the textual mechanisms through which a narrative incites the reader's participation, or in de Lauretis' terms, the reader's solicitation to positions of identification and meaning. Although Hutcheon's work predates de Lauretis' 1984 essay, "Desire in Narrative," her theses on metafictional parody and the role of the reader could be interpreted as corroborating even while making more sophisticated de Lauretis' hypotheses about the oedipal logic of narrative. *Pace* Hutcheon, it can be argued that a text such as Dennis Potter's *The Singing Detective* both provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that narrative has an oedipal logic while simultaneously putting it into question. Furthermore, we maintain that a transference model of reading reveals the Oedipal positioning of the reader by *The Singing Detective* and its dialectical disruption of that effect, thereby revealing other aspects of the narrator's and reader's intrapsychic theatre.

In Hutcheon we find themes which resonate with the concerns of feminist theorists who are undertaking a critique of popular cultural forms while seeking a recuperation of their potential for a contestatory politics of representation and self-representation. Hutcheon questions the political usefulness of parody: "If a new parodic form does not develop when an old one becomes insufficiently motivated, the old form tends to degenerate into pure convention; witness the popular traditional novel, the best seller" (1980: 24). Like de Lauretis she is concerned about the repressive and conservative effects of narrative in popular cultural or entertainment programming. On the other hand, the self-reflective effects which she describes as issuing from the foregrounding of the reader's role by metafictional parody may provide guidelines for the type of text which would collaborate in inducing a mode of reading satisfactory to Schweickart's project of establishing a feminist theory of reading. By making some tentative headway in answering Schweickart's question about the power of sexist texts to elicit pleasure, we may also have found that metafictional parody is one of the ways to exploit the Oedipal logic of entertainment narrative for destabilizing ends by repositioning the gendered reading subject within it.

Extrapolating from Hutcheon's discussion of metafiction, it can be argued that narcissistic narrative embodies some of the strategic conditions for self-reflection in

the reading subject (as opposed to the textual subject) which are associated with the transference. We will examine how *The Singing Detective*, as a narcissistic narrative, thematically explores and structurally presents the process of reading narratives through semiotic and narratological analogues to what in the transference would be called instances of resistance, repetition, and working through. Our analysis will pursue problems of referentiality raised by a narrative organization which creates the effect of the uncanny: through temporal anachronies, voice and perspective dislocations, an uncertain subject of enunciation.

One of the aims of narcissistic narrative, and one shared by a psychoanalytically-inspired analysis of the transactions between text and reader, is to uncover "the emotional springs that make the spectacle an affective matrix in which the spectator sees himself involved and feels himself not only solicited but welcomed; as if the spectacle were intended for him" (Green, 1979: 8). Just as psychoanalytic reflection has the character of unmasking which appears well-suited to a critique of ideology, narcissistic narrative promotes awareness of the potential non-congruence between the model reading position (Eco, 1979) and the real reader's expectations and active choices in the reading process which, in turn, clarifies where the sources of his/her reading pleasure are to be found and how the text exploits or contains the fears and anxieties produced in the non-conjuncture.

It can be argued that reading is both narcissistic because the meanings and emotions experienced fulfill a reader's private wish, and transnarcissistic since it involves a relationship of mutual desire between reading and writing subjectivities. What must be rediscovered are "the ways in which a relationship of enchantment and possession [is] created by a spectacle and its spectator" (Green, 1979: 9); how, in other words, the text desires the reader even as the reader finds the text compelling.

5.4 The accomplice of self-reflection: narcissistic narrative

By the term 'narcissistic narrative,' Hutcheon (1980) refers to a type of fiction which embodies within its organization a commentary on its own narrative and/or linguistic identity, its construction and effects on meaning. 'Narcissistic' because like

Narcissus, the mythical boy entranced with his own image, the metafiction Hutcheon dubs an "essentially modern form" is preoccupied with textual self-consciousness.

The paradox of metafiction precisely concerns the contradiction between what the reader believes happens when she reads and what metafiction shows us actually is required for meaning to take place. The paradox, in brief, is that fictional language must engage the reader in order for its represented 'possible world' to exist, yet it reflects on its own engagement with the reader by which interpretation takes place, thereby perturbing the very process which is the interpretative activity. Hutcheon notes

On the one hand, [the reader] is forced to acknowledge the artifice, the "art," of what he is reading, on the other, explicit demands are made upon him, as a co-creator, for intellectual and affective responses comparable in scope and intensity to those of his life experiences. In fact, these responses are shown to be *part of* his life experience.

(1980: 5)

The effect of metafiction is not to communicate a message so much as to enable a *performance of affective communication* where the conditions influencing the performance are bared. It links interpretation to the process character of perception in time while trying to catch the reading subject out in the very act of perceiving. Any metafictional work indirectly alludes to the means by which narrative, in general, incites the reader to produce order and meaning. Some narratives make more aggressive invitations or incitements to the reader to be an active collaborator in the production of meaning while simultaneously making the reader more aware of her own activity.

Hutcheon identifies a four part typology of narcissistic narratives, one of whose categories of differentiation refers to the varying demands narratives make upon the reader. This typology comprises those texts (1) which are *diegetically self-aware*, that is, conscious of their own narrative processes, and (2) those which are *linguistically self-aware*, conscious of the limits and powers of language. Each of these two modes can be present in either an *overt or covert form* (1980: 21-23); namely by direct methods where the text self-consciously reflects upon its aims and positioning of the reader or through indirect methods by which the reader becomes aware of her manipulation. In overt diegetic narcissism, as many aspects as possible of the

storytelling are made into "dramatically relevant emblems of the theme" (of metafictional reflection): structure, the process of composition, narrative viewpoint, as well as the reading or listening processes (1980: 53). Explicit thematization may take place through narratorial commentary, through the "Dear Reader" address, or by an actor speaking directly to the camera. Parodic intent is essential to the formal identity of much metafiction and it specifies an encoded position for the subject in the text. Covert diegetic self-awareness is achieved through repetition or through a change of stylistic convention. Hutcheon notes that a recurring model of covert narcissistic structure is the detective story (1980: 31).

Overt linguistic narcissism is commonly expressed in three ways: (a) through parody (of names, styles of writing); (b) through drawing the reader's attention to its existence as a written or printed set of textual conventions; and (c) through puns and anagrams (1980: 99). When metafiction, as self-interpreting text, embodies within itself its own critical frame of reference as part of its theme and often its form, this implies "an amalgamation of the functions of reader, writer, and critic in the single and demanding experience of reading" (1980: 152).

5.5 Narcissistic narrative as instantiating transference; transference as narcissistic narrative

5.5.1 The dialectic of metafiction: text-as-fantasy; text-as-analyst

In contrast to any simplistic view of storytelling which makes unproblematic the interrelationship between the two aspects of communication, metaliterature poses the relationship of levels--i.e. form acting as a comment on content--as its *raison d'être*. Similarly, the paradoxically simultaneous production, juggling, and scrutiny of levels is reproduced in another disciplinary arena: psychoanalysis. The interaction of the psychoanalytic couple is both spectacle and experience organized by a pre-text, an already written script whose various enactments in the analysis (repetition) imminently potentiate its revision (working through). Just as the analyst is made to play differing roles by the analysand (e.g. his/her interpretations are refused, ignored or denied, the analyst's silence not tolerated by the analysand who may actively seek expressions of confirmation or justification for her goodness or badness from the analyst), the reader-

as-analyst is cast in varying roles by various types of texts. Metafiction is 'paradoxical' in that it identifies 'doxa,' the commonsense values and expectations one brings to reading, and questions its sources and intransigence. Metafiction is also covertly didactic. "Narcissistic narrative is process made visible" (Hutcheon, 1980: 6). It confuses in order to show the impossibility of attaining a definitive stance from which to know; it performs a partial deferral of meaning. The reading of metafiction, like the transferential relationship, demands the practice of a type of behaviour which is intrinsically paradoxical and emotionally intense. It requires the reader-analysand tolerate the queasy insecurity of operating simultaneously within the assumptions of a narrative point of view, and enduring emotional responses attached to that perspective, as well as at operating outside those assumptions, which also requires a capacity to reflect on the feelings while feeling them.

A transferential relationship is set in motion in a narcissistic narrative such as *The Singing Detective* where the reader occupies roles analogically similar to that of analyst and patient: the reader-as-analysand finds herself distanced from the familiar, confronted with her expectations by virtue of feeling disappointment, surprise, or shock when the text-as-analyst does not meet them, and when hoped for pleasure and gratification do not materialize from the reading event. Eschewing the specular echo which imprisoned Narcissus in a fusional psychic death, metafiction estranges the reader from her narcissistic demands for self-affirmation as a competent and self-sufficient reader by presenting her with her own expectations for comfortable, familiar texts and, if she can tolerate the ambiguity and the confusion of the journey, lead her not to self-love but to self-awareness. As Iser maintains, "it is only when the reader is forced to produce the meaning of the text under *unfamiliar* conditions rather than under his own conditions (analogizing) that he can bring to light a layer of his personality that he had previously been unable to formulate in his conscious mind" (1975: 50). Metafictional works demand the most activity and participation by the reader, while either openly reflecting on or causing the reader to reflect upon that participation both in terms of the expectations she brings to the reading process (genre characteristics, familiar plots) and to the ways the text uses those expectations to control and position her by drawing her along a path of inferences. "We read and

understand ourselves as we follow the operations of our understanding and more important, as we experience the limits of that understanding" (Culler, 1975: 264). It is at this second step that the reader-as-analysand becomes the reader-as-analyst.

[T]he role of the **witness-consciousness**, i.e., the psychoanalyst's own, has not received enough attention in the constitution of the unconscious as a reality.(...) The role of the other consciousness (other than the patient's that is) is considered to be accidental rather than essential and **is reduced to a relationship of therapy**. But it is essential to the unconscious to be an object elaborated by someone other through a hermeneutics which its own consciousness cannot perform alone. In other words, **the relationship which the unconscious and its witness-consciousness maintain is not merely therapeutic; it is also a diagnostic relationship**.

(Ricoeur, 1974: 106) (my emphasis)

The imaginative-emotional labour of the reader-analyst requires she fulfill a dual function: to make herself available to become chameleon-like the projected creation of the text (the encoded reader), the empty space filled by the text's-analysand's neediness for a certain kind of interlocutor and meaning-effects to be achieved, and the one who listens both to the demands being made upon her and the assumptions being made about her by the text-analysand as well as to the emotions being aroused in her as listener. The reader-as-analyst becomes engaged in her own counter-transference to the text's demands as she struggles to understand her own affective responses to demands the rhythm of textual voices, plot structure, and thematic design make upon her. "The narratee, the addressee, the "you" of these texts is always in some measure a surrogate for the reader, who must define his own interpretation in response to the implied judgment, and the discursive implication, of the explicit or implicit textual "you" (Hutcheon, 1980:154). Metafictional texts, in particular, perform the function of analysts reflecting back to us our transference to them as reader-analysands: for example, our expectations for plot and character development, our frustration, annoyance, and disappointment when these are not met, our surprised delight when they are. We become analysts, in turn, of our own transference reactions when the text disrupts the encoded positions we anticipated we would have to adopt.

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(analogizing) that he can bring to light a layer of his personality that he had previously been unable to formulate in his conscious mind.

(Iser, 1978: 50)

Propelling the analogy of the text-as-analyst are the strategies of metafiction which act diagnostically and interpretatively in a two-fold way. Not only is the repressed in the text uncovered by a symptomatic reading across diegetic levels to piece together the unsaid, but the reader's own blindspots (ideology) may be uncovered when the text frustrates the reader's demands for gratification by conventional meanings and narrative resolutions. It relies on the reader's activity to make sense of the interwoven narrative levels, it provides no explicit answer to "Whose fantasy?" is in the text.

The text-as-analysand expresses its fantasy under repression. The reader-analyst's transference, cannot be solely a reaction to a specific session or plot development but involves a responsiveness to what has been going on in the text as a whole, in the analysis as a whole. She reads not linearly but recursively, testing apparent new patterns against old understandings, prior assumptions. A dynamic analysis of narrative looks at the totality of the ensemble, not the various components; slippage across levels of voice and perspective, not content symbolic of psychopathology. The unreadable and the effects of the unreadable are the focus of the analytical attitude. As against a fantasy *in* the text, the analytic attitude listens for the self's desire in the pattern of the whole, the text-as-fantasy.

5.5.2 Text-as-fantasy: the enigma variations

Hutcheon (1980) identifies three characteristics of detective fiction which reveal parallels between the way it functions internally and models of metafiction: strong conventions organize the narrative, its form expresses self-consciousness of its conventions and, lastly, the hermeneutical act of reading serves a function within the text itself.

The conventions attributed to the classic detective story, first created by Poe and Conan Doyle, have been described as including:

the transcendent and eccentric detective; the admiring and slightly stupid foil; the well-intentioned floundering and unimaginativeness of the official guardians of the law; the locked room convention; ...

deduction by putting oneself in another's position...; concealment by means of the ultra obvious; the staged ruse to force the culprit's hand; even the expansive and condescending explanation when the chase is done. (Holquist, 1971: 141)

Although in Potter's *The Singing Detective* only one diegetic level is thematically, and apparently by virtue of *mise en scène*, the detective story proper--the Singing Detective sub-plot (or first metanarrative being written in hospital by Philip Marlow, author of detective fiction)--many of the conventions of the classic detective story operate across the totality of narrative levels to activate the proairetic and hermeneutic conventions which govern plot construction retrospectively and prospectively. The text relies on the real reader's awareness of these conventions to lead her to discover that the governing structural principle of *The Singing Detective* is an analogy among labyrinthine fictional levels. A gnoseological search (Todorov, 1971:40) dominates the narrative totality as the reader seeks clues for the principle of analogy. One such clue is that the text is propelled forward by enigmas which are repeated at each narrative level. The questions provoking the reader are legion: Why is it that Marlow feels he has to tell? What does he have to get to the bottom of? Why must he rewrite *The Singing Detective* story again? What is Binney afraid of? Why are the two mysterious men chasing him? How did that woman (women) get in the river? What didn't Philip do that he fears God's punishment for? Who put a knife through Finney's heart?

The reader learns to read simultaneously within each narrative level and across narratives by clues offered by the narratives themselves as they unfold concurrently. As with all of Dennis Potter's novels or plays, *The Singing Detective* is set in contemporary Britain but involves a reflection on British life since the Second World War. In its simplest form *The Singing Detective* tells a story about Philip Marlow, an author of detective fiction who has been hospitalized with a painful and life-threatening psoriatic condition. In hospital, Marlow rewrites a detective story called *The Singing Detective*. This process of mental composition, a revisioning of a previous work also called *The Singing Detective*, wanders to include remembrances of painful and decisive events from Philip's childhood which form a counterpoint both to his experiences in hospital and to the plot of his new detective novel. Marlow is a man who hates the world and particularly the women in it. The novel he is rewriting

is set in the immediate post war months of 1945. It involves a Singing Detective who sings in a dance band and who is hired to solve the mystery of a woman's death by drowning. The Singing Detective uncovers a conspiracy in which his client, Binney, a member of an Intelligence organization is a double agent, giving information to the Russians while helping Nazis to safety after the war. Another sub-plot, Marlow's memories of a traumatic childhood in war torn Britain, involves adultery, the break-up of his family, and the suicide of his mother by drowning. A third sub-plot involves the theft and sale of an unpublished play by Marlow, also called *The Singing Detective*, by his estranged wife Nicola and Finney her male accomplice, which results in the murder of the latter. Part of the plot of the purloined play relates the theft of a play called *The Singing Detective* by a woman and a man called Binney. A fourth narrative ostensibly represents the text of the purloined play being input into a computer by Nicola, but the perspective of this voice is a riddle in itself.

The superimposition of plots, each remaining slightly visible, their lack of temporal or spatial boundedness, their refusal of closure, their intermixing voices and perspectives all work to create a 'palimpsest' effect, a visual metaphor for traces of narrating and narrated voices and places variously surfacing and descending, variously familiar yet strange by their juxtapositions (Holquist, 1971: 151). A defining feature of metafiction is the production of the effect of the paradoxical, the uncanny, the quasi-hallucinatory, effects also associated with the text-as-fantasy structure. Although the master sub-genre being parodied in *The Singing Detective* is the detective/thriller, the *text-as-fantasy* structure demands a type of reading orientation beyond the pure ratiocination and logical inference of the detective, to enable the reader to discern not only the logic of temporal and voice relations in the multiple diegeses but the *intertextual* solution to the mystery of the *fantasy 'in' the text*. In consequence of this double orientation, every diegetic element (Voice, Perspective, Temporal Anachronies) has a three-fold function: to impel thematic, character and plot development not only **in** but **across**, what will be provisionally called, the three second-order or metadiegetic narratives and their pseudo-englobing instance (Genette, 1980: 228) while, at the same time, providing clues to the fantasy in the text, and to provoke the reader into

awareness of being manipulated by the text while simultaneously functioning as an intratextual accomplice, a co-investigator in the search for clues.

While the hermeneutic and proairetic conventions provoke the reading orientation in "Who dunnit?" fiction, a structured-in conflict between pairs of opposites, appearing at various levels of conceptualisation in metafiction, creates not the simple tension of antitheses but the potentially anxious, unresolvable, and uncanny sense of paradox. The major topos of the detective story is the 'double,' and it figures the mirroring and substitutive play across character and diegetic levels in *The Singing Detective* to produce the indeterminacy of discursive fragmentation. Gaps, the withholding of information, is what the reader expects of the authorial strategy of detective stories; however, the reader's vertiginous oscillation between several or more focalizations (points of view) is the stuff rather of dreams and madness. The narratological conventions of voice and perspective in the text-as-fantasy contribute to disorientation as much as does any particular fantasy content. The 'absent presence' threading the gaps on a filament of the unspoken, the forbidden, the prohibited becomes the real reader's object of detection when caught up in the fantasy and the fantastic metafictional text.

Doubling is the figure of epistemological and ontological uncertainty in the thriller as in metafiction, putting into doubt a self-identical subject (as detective, as guiding authorial force, as trustworthy narrator, as textual subject). Inhering in the double is a polarity neither term of which can be reduced to the other, nor can one engender the other. The pair is the motor of any dialectic, the basic dualism which provides the ultimate explanation for intrapsychical and intratextual conflict. As a psychological phenomenon the double is the figure of splitting and disavowal; textually, it animates the struggle among the polyphonic voices, each seeking mastery. Doubling asserts itself both paradigmatically and syntagmatically in characterization and plot through oppositional pairs which reveal *The Singing Detective's* discursive heritage, metaphysical detective fiction. Identity vs. polymodality, self and other, autonomy vs. determination, ratiocination vs. emotion, order vs. the irrational, time and timelessness--these are the keys to the mysteries.

Notwithstanding the fact that *The Singing Detective* incorporates many of the structures and conventions of the detective genre, a closed textual form, it remains an 'open' work (Eco, 1979: 34, 144-175), narrative filaments unsutured to any fixed point of view or moment of enunciating. Reading symptomatically, reading the gaps for the event that cannot be named, listening to her own inferences and feelings, *brings the reader's activity into correspondence with the analytic attitude of listening to the unspeakable in the analysand's narrational and kinesic discourse.*

5.5.3 The Fantastic: temporal dislocation and the problem of certainty

The Singing Detective, as a series of "narrative situations" that present the data of mood and voice (Genette, 1980), ultimately reveals the textual equivalent of the disturbed and disturbing world of schizophrenia, that being the non-coincidence of voice and perspective and the continual destruction of narrative level associated with parabasis. The effect of the fantastic and uncanny, peculiar to *The Singing Detective*, is the result of temporal transgressions which characterize the relationship among diegetic levels. These transgressions are licenced by several conditions, the first of which is the loss of a fixed subject of enunciating against which a relationship of narrating responsibility can be defined.

The problem of the identity of the speaking voice underpins all detective work which requires that a case be built from inference and from (represented) evidence. Who is speaking? Who saw what? When? In narratological terms, these are the uncertainties created by the registers of mood, voice and perspective (Genette, 1980). In accordance with a seminal convention of detective fiction, *The Singing Detective* begins with the enigmatic intimations of a violent crime: it hints at the object and method of that crime (a woman, battery), its suspicious evidence (lipstick, blood), and overtly positions the reader as an investigator:

Marlow: (Voice Over) The doorman of a nightclub can always pretend that it's lipstick and not blood on his hands. **But how'd it get there? Let's be economical. Nothing fancy.** If he smacked some dame across her shiny mouth, then he's got both answers in one. (p. 1) (my emphasis)

The first scene of the screenplay is a micro-example of a recurrent problem of interpretation of detective fiction: Who sees the doorman, outside the bar called

Skinscapes, take out his handkerchief to wipe his hand? Without knowing from whose perspective we are seeing, we cannot know how to contextualize and, therefore, interpret the 'evidence' we have been shown. Are these clues from the Voice Over narrator to be trusted? Whose viewpoint links the 'nasty smear' (p. 1) with a woman's lipstick and not with a man's blood from a knifing, for example? Who is this 'Marlow' who, because we have the benefit of the written screenplay, we know to be the identity of the Voice Over? (viewers of the film version enjoy a different surprise when they hear Marlow speak for the first time from hospital, realizing that his is the voice they have already heard as the Voice Over narrator of the detective sub-plot beginning with the doorman at the nightclub. Auditory recognition precedes the cognitive exercise of naming.)

In the screenplay version of *The Singing Detective*, the usual stage directions for staging have been anthropomorphized into an extradiegetic, homodiegetic narrator. As in Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, "a framed tale, in which a first narrator introduces Marlow and has the last word after Marlow has fallen silent" (Brooks, 1984: 239), this narrator describes the thrillerish *mise en scène* and then accompanies the reader, as a sometimes humorous and well-informed, sometimes distanced guide, on his tenebrous journey through the textual maze. Marlow can scarcely help himself from putting this guiding narratorial presence into doubt; the reader, lost without compass in the labyrinthine seas of *The Singing Detective*, may share these sentiments:

Marlow: (*Voice over, whisper*) The captain is asleep. We are drifting off unanchored into the dark. We are lost. All of us. Lost. (Pause. Mutters out loud) Rubbish. Stop it. bloody rubbish. Stop it, stop it. (p. 33)

The mediation performed by this mysterious, first narrator is materially transfigured to become the technical presentation of the *Singing Detective* as a coupling of visual and auditory registers. The beguiling effect of 'immediacy' of the first narrative level, in which Marlow is the hero who appears to narrate other stories, is reproduced for all the other narrative levels as well. Arbitration of narratorial responsibility is, thus, interfered with by the convention, most powerfully exploited by film, of what Genette (1980) calls the "reduced or pseudo-metadiegetic:" this implies a metadiegetic level,

narrated by an extradiegetic narrator, which is reduced to the diegetic. Without deictic markers to reveal its presence it appears to be narrating itself.

Once the temporal signs of a prior narrating instance are removed, it becomes impossible to tell if, for example, the narrative we are viewing is a narrative of a dream or experience originating in time past or the dream itself being momentarily experienced in time present, i.e. is Marlow dreaming or remembering when he mentally writes the scene of a woman with her legs in the air underneath the naked, glistening buttocks of a grunting man? The importance of the reduced metadiegetic lies in the problems posed to the reader/viewer's ability to arbitrate the truthfulness of what she has seen, its status as a partial or full account of some experience according to someone's perspective, as well as its function for the semic code of characterization.

5.5.4 The disappearance of a subject of enunciating

Information in the narrative work is regulated, according to Genette (1980: 175-185), by two modalities--narrative distance and narrative perspective. Distance refers to the degree of visibility and mediation exercised by the narrator as revealed by types of speech: e.g. reported speech (He said, "_____"; or He said that he felt...), or free indirect style (which is the convention by which the reader believes she has access to the inner, unmediated thoughts of a character.) The focal position or perspective underlying a narrative is determined by asking, "Who sees?" "Who is the character whose point of view orients the narrative perspective?" This is not to be confused with the voice, or speaking subject, of a narrative passage. The category of 'voice' respects the identity of the narrator, but this category is not one for whom Barthes' five codes have explanatory power.

Narrator is one of the internal reference points of discourse by which narrative levels are hierarchically related as englobed or englobing and by which a narrator's or character's information is to be judged as trustworthy or not. Disruptions of a continuous perspective or voice, furthermore, disturb the process of identification between reader and characters. The problem of a trustworthy narrator begins with the

disappearance of a dependable subject of enunciating in a determinable time of enunciating.

Marlow's authorial function conventionally licences the perspectives and voices which invade his porous consciousness; we understand these perspectives to be his imaginative creations, his characters. Although *The Singing Detective* begins in the Skinscapes metanarration, we quickly come to understand that we have access to this story because we have access to Marlow's thoughts, to the actual process of creation. Without temporal indices to show his authorial relationship to this and other metadiegetic levels, however, Marlow is only the apparent, represented narrator. The originating consciousness or voice of the other levels remains unidentifiable.

Marlow's authorial control is put into question when his voice is invaded by perspectives which originate in his own diegetic level, and which may even mix with perspectives from his detective story (e.g. Binney's initial conversation in Skinscapes with Amanda, the bargirl, when she compels him to buy her champagne).

Then - weirdly, he imitates **exactly** what he mostly cannot possibly have heard. That is, he lip-synchronizes precisely to the real voices.

Marlow: (*Lip-syncs in Mr. Hall's voice*) 'It would be enough to put you off your bread and jam. If they bothered to give you any.' (*Tiny pause*) Sugar. (*Then, in Reginald's voice*) 'Poor sod.' (*Tiny pause*) Toots. (*Then in porter's voice*) 'Hooo, man. Jesus holy shit.'

(p. 6)

Echoes of other conversations creates of Marlow's voice a zone of confusion and mysterious intermixing. That these voices are their author's creation is disturbed when Marlow himself is literally spoken by other perspectives and voices. An effect of either the comical or the fantastic is produced by an intrusion of this sort where an extradiegetic narrator or narratee appears in a diegetic universe or vice versa. When Borges writes, "Such inversions suggest that if the characters in a story can be readers or spectators, then we, their readers or spectators, can be fictitious' (in Genette, 1980: 236), he has identified the dual function of temporal dislocation in the textual development: it contributes to the narratological mystery which becomes one of pursuing a suspect, the enunciating "I", and identifying the logic of focalization in the text and the identity of the dominant focal character. It creates anxiety, puzzlement, and suspense in the reader about the identity of the organizing consciousness. It also

produces a sense of the uncanny when the world "of which Marlow tells"--the thriller sub-plot, Finney's house by the river, the beloved and mythically significant Forest of Marlow's youth--become the world "in which he tells," the now of the narrating (Genette, 1980).

The uncanny appears not only when the boundaries of a character's identity are dislocated when his/her usual perspective and voice is usurped by another, but when porous temporal and diegetic boundaries result in characters from one narrative infiltrating the plots of other characters: the two mysterious men, of the Singing Detective metanarrative, find themselves in the barren, winter forest of Philip's childhood and burst into the hospital ward where Marlow is recuperating, the soldiers on the war time train Philip took with his mother to London have the faces of the patients in Marlow's hospital ward, the woman in the forest under the naked, grinding buttocks of an anonymous man looks like Nicola and beckons to the watching Philip; the ghost terrorizing Marlow in his hospital bed looks like the sadistic teacher of his youth. Some 'appearances' are clearly Marlow's doing: either a wish or an hallucination for which he takes narrative responsibility. But, what is the logic driving the juxtaposition of these voices?

5.5.5 Taking up a model reading position when the subject of enunciating has disappeared

It has been widely argued that the mystery genre is an allegory of the reading activity, Hutcheon notes (1980). As such, it both lends itself to and condones the deliberate destruction by metafiction of the reader's traditional sensemaking assumptions by pushing her into a vertiginous oscillation across a variety of restricted points of view--a process somewhat like the good investigator's ability to identify with potential suspects (Sherlock Holmes' famous strategy) and the analyst's empathic ability to make either complementary or concordant identifications (i.e with the patient's superego or ego respectively). In the case of Potter's screenplay, an investigator, at each level in the persona of the focal character (e.g. Marlow, writer of detective fiction, as extradiegetic narrator, the Singing Detective at the metadiegetic level, Philip at another metadiegetic level), hides from the reader a part of his discoveries and inductions until the final revelation. The overwhelming textual

mystery of the *Singing Detective*, therefore, is to find the focal point of reference obtaining in each syntagm, and to draw comparisons across syntagms, since there is no single focalization and time of enunciating which bears over the entire work and against which other acts of narrating and representing can be anchored. When the narrator's voice is not an exterior, authenticating, authorial one, it becomes the voice of just another character (Hutcheon, 1980: 63). In his capacity as detective author, Marlow can put words into the mouths of others; in his capacity as created character, he has words put into his own mouth.

When the textual origin of the speaking voices is obscured, the real reader's identification with these voices provokes an exploration of the projective and introjective attributions of identity and value which the model reader is expected to be able to make in order to create sense of the action. Part of the reader's search for meaning is to disengage the story from the narrative by reading the clues provided by focalization which are available in the form of prolepsis and analepsis.⁵ The difficulty in Potter's text with respect to determining the time of the thing told (time of the signified--the story) as compared to the time of the narrative (the time of the signifier), the time of enunciating, is created by this slippage across narrative levels. Slippage is perpetrated by both covert and overt linguistic and diegetic factors.

The referent (e.g. of a memory or a prior published work of fiction) as well as any concept of an organizing consciousness or a unified subject of enunciation becomes the very object of the reader's search via clues for the principle of organization by which to unravel the cause of the disappearance of a trustworthy narrator and the logic of the textual crime--the referent has been done in by text's enigmatic structure. For example, the signifier "*The Singing Detective*" takes a variety of signifieds: the published, pocketbook edition of a detective story by Marlow from which Dr. Gibbon, in the first diegesis, occasionally quotes; the work Marlow is rewriting in his head which we identify with the *film noir* metanarrative in which the Singing Detective, the character who speaks 'Chandleresque', is the protagonist; and the unpublished screenplay about a detective who sings in a dance band which Nicola has stolen from Marlow's apartment and retyped. The reader is repeatedly reminded that the original text of *The Singing Detective* can never be known: Reg (a fellow

patient in the heart ward, and another clue to Marlow's 'disability'--is it only superficially a skin disease and not profoundly an ailment of the heart?) reads a pocketbook volume attributed to Marlow and frequently comments aloud. He parodies back to real readers their reading orientation while acting as an intratextual instigator of suspense since we are never quite sure if he is reading ahead or behind us (in the time of the filmed version) nor if his copy of *The Singing Detective* is closely or distantly similar to the only one to which we have access, the filmed version, which is but a part of the one Marlow, in hospital, is imaginatively authoring.

The reader is self-consciously positioned as a fellow creator/author/detective when Marlow seems to cede authority for narrative developments to the narratives themselves. The englobing of one voice by another (through indirect discourse, for example, "He said that...") is a device of mastery which is rhetorically unavailable to Marlow; it is precisely the uncontrollability of his narratives, the psoriatic etchings of involuntary memory on his inflamed body, which make Marlow's encounter with a psychiatric detective, Dr. Gibbon, a turning point in the reader's investigation of narrative accountability. Until this point, the reader's passage through the disturbed and disturbing world of the text has been propelled not primarily by inferences but by interrogatives. What's going to happen? Who's speaking now? What has just happened? have been the questions driving the reading orientation. Paralipsis (the hyper restriction of a field of vision [Genette, 1980: 205]) and external focalization (where the narrator knows less than a character) are the vehicles and cohorts of the hermeneutic code.

The figure of the double is crucial to the effect of self-consciousness induced by narcissistic narrative (one of Hutcheon's points of equivalence between the detective form and metafiction); yet it is the basis of the conventional relationship assumed to exist between the author and his detective hero, a prerequisite to the reader's interpretation of description in the narrative from the point of view of clues or disinformation.

Many of the conventions of detective fiction regulate our understanding of the relationship between the first narrative level, Marlow in hospital, and the story he is mentally re-writing without making clearer the differences or similarities between

'histoire', in this case, Marlow's published novel called *The Singing Detective* and 'discours,' Marlow's mental 're-visioning' of the story. The protagonist of Marlow's rewritten story, the first metanarrative (an englobed narrative of the first degree [Genette, 1980]) is the Singing Detective. Like Le Carré's serialized hero, George Smiley, or Inspector Maigret in Simenon's multiple volumes, or Dorothy L. Sayers' Harriet Vane, we understand that Marlow and his detective hero have probably had a long, 'fictional' relationship. Are we not habituated in assuming the author-creator of the criminal plot to be on intimate terms with his creation, the detective, the reader of clues? As Marlow says to no one in particular, "I am the Singing Detective" (p. 6). That the Singing Detective is Marlow's fictional alter ego, his double, is overdetermined by the fact that the same actor plays both roles. The expectation that the reader identifies with the detective since they both receive narrative clues at the same time, while the author is "the criminal's surrogate" (Hutcheon, 1980: 72; Todorov, 1977:41)), is complicated when the author (Marlow) expressly identifies with the detective and, furthermore, professes to know no more than the detective. In fact, he knows less than his detective.

5.5.6 Temporal circling: the missing referent

Temporal and spatial circling is both a fantasy structure and a metafictional device pointing to the literary and fictive ontological status of the story (Hutcheon, 1980: 80). Without a fixed moment of narrating, the reader's search for the order of 'what really happened,' the story (*histoire* in Genette's terminology, *fabula* according to the Russian Formalists) at each diegetic level becomes what the reader learns from the narrating (*discours*) in order to create *récit* or *sjuzet*. Metafiction simply calls attention to the fact that this interpretative activity, exploited by fantasy, is "not a deviation from either reality or the conventions of realism. (...) The 'fantastic' temporal and spatial self-involvement of metafictional works of the covert diegetic mode is ultimately emblematic of the imaginative leaps in time and space required in the reading of any fictional work" (Hutcheon, 1980: 81). The reader shares with Marlow the predicament of trying to locate *fabula* through *discours*. Delirious and powerless in his hospital bed, Marlow is haunted by the need to find something out, to

confess something, which he knows he can only discover by writing. As in so many Modernist novels (Proust, Gide, Mann, Joyce), the "becoming of the book is also the becoming of the writer"; the writing of a new version of the old *Singing Detective* plot is Marlow's destiny.

Temporal and spatial circling characterizes the interweaving of narrative levels as we are repeatedly returned to two scenes, reminiscent of refrains in a fugue we have not yet been able to hear: to the scene of a crime, and to Philip, nestled in the leafy elbow of his special oak tree friend intermittently beseeching God or carried away by bird song into exultant reveries. The fetishistic return of the same scene--that being the recovery of the drowned and naked body of a woman--propels the narrative's forward movement and the detective's search--he has a victim, an apparent crime, murder, and an apparent motive--conspiracy and espionage. It similarly overdetermines our understanding of the 'crime' which the Singing Detective is investigating. In these repetitive segments, suspects begin to multiply as do signifieds for the 'naked and murdered' signifiers which come floating up in the river. Each time the naked body--and it is always the same one--is pulled from the river, the face is that of a different woman: a beautiful Russian whore; Nicola, Marlow's estranged wife; Marlow's young mother who had thrown herself from a bridge. Each time, the camera lingers over the glistening firm flesh, buttocks and back turning to offer us a glimpse of breast, a face. Whose this time? "Who is seeing?" Genette and de Lauretis join the reader in asking. Hutcheon notes that

while it is axiomatic in fantasy literature that...its referents are fictive...fictive referents are more real to the imagination than are "real ones" just as bedtime stories, fantasy, and hallucinations have more to do with the real world we feel we live in than does realistic fiction.

(Hutcheon, 1980: 79)

Whose unconscious is seeing?

The penultimate shots in Potter's *The Singing Detective* are reminiscent of the beginning of a sit com like *Dallas* where a recap of past episodes flashes by in a bricolage of images. Like the verbal resumé before the beginning of an episode of *Masterpiece Theatre*, it renders another diegetic overlay to our understanding of the action of previous episodes, seeking through repetition to fix a referent for *fabula*. However, this circular ending ends by circling back to a beginning, Marlow as the

young boy Philip, grinning "When I grow up, I be wanting to be a detective" (p. 249). This wish had been first expressed by Philip when he faced not only the mystery of why he and his mother were going to London without his father, but the confusing and anxiety provoking contradiction between what she said to him about how he should feel and the feelings he was experiencing.

"Repetition speaks in the text of a return which ultimately subverts the very notion of beginning and end, suggesting that the idea of beginning presupposes the end, that the end is a time before the beginning, and hence that the interminable never can be finally bound in a plot" (Brooks, 1977: 297). Philip's adult persona, Marlow the detective author, cannot find a solution to this contradiction without a digressive and circular reading.

Solving crimes depends on being able to juxtapose one set of actions against another, to establish a temporal relation, and this is just the pose of narrative fiction: to invent one time scheme in terms of another time scheme, a relationship which produces an implied reader who is expected to make attributions of causality. The very condition of the possibility of meaning, plotted through time, is presumed to depend on the anticipated structuring force of the ending (Brooks, 1977: 299). However, in *The Singing Detective* temporal anachronies thwart any conventional temporal order which would provide a plot structure meeting requirements of causality or irreversibility. Logic will not solve the riddle of the crime(s) which we infer has been committed from clues distributed across the five diegetic levels.

To go forward to the solution, Marlow, with Dr. Gibbon's aid, must go back into memory to understand his present. The story of the crime is told over and over along the pathways of substitutive narratives, and as the detective gets closer to the riddle Philip's narrative figures more prominently in the chorus of voices speaking through Marlow.

5.5.7 Borderzones: the homelessness of place, the timelessness of time

Marlow's epistolary journey unfolds in an uncanny place precisely because of the contradiction between the extreme specificity and vividness of momentary images, recovered memories, sounds, and musical tunes and the 'no-place' aura created by

their juxtaposition in the 'country of the mind,' the locus of Modernist novels (Holquist, 1971: 145).⁶ He is caught somewhere between Mrs. Thatcher's Britain and the Britain of World War II, somewhere between his identity as a nine year old boy and his identity as a man old enough to have a nine year old son. Place in *The Singing Detective* comes to be grasped as a borderzone between the past and present, the memory and the telling. These segues exploit all signifying registers--auditory, visual, narrative--to act like porous boundaries where voices are juxtaposed unexpectedly with perspectives the reader has learned to associate with other characters.

The borderzone is out of time and this sense of timelessness, or wrong timing, is thematized by overt linguistic commentary of a variety of sorts: in one of the most sentimental yet poignant moments of *The Singing Detective*, the still misshapen Marlow, in pyjamas, joins the pub crowd listening with rapt attention to his father singing *Birdsong at Eventide*. When a cloth capped man at another table chides him, "Thou's never did give the poor bugger credit when him was alive!" Marlow replies, "Are you trying to say-nowlisten-Are you saying my Dad is *dead*-?" (p. 79). That Marlow's time is invested with regressive time is the brunt of Dr. Gibbon's questioning: "How often have you been in hospital? How many times?; To Marlow's reply, "Thirteen, fourteen. I don't know" he remarks, "Quite an old lag, then. Aren't you?" (p. 53), with more than laziness in mind. Dr. Finlay's evangelical group sings to the prisoner-patients in Marlow's ward the hymn *Be in Time* (p. 156). A part of a verse, "Life at best/ Is very brief/ *Like the falling/ Of a leaf*... sends a memory crashing into Marlow of the village school when he sang another song about time, *It's a Lovely Day Tomorrow* (p. 98). It was a song to celebrate the ending of the war; but, for Marlow, it was an ironic comment on an absence in his temporal universe. Like the ellipsis of a future tense phrase in the title of the song, Marlow's linguistic universe lacks a future tense or even a present continuous: "I am going to...". Unlike the title, his 'now' cannot foresee a 'tomorrow' nor escape from the horrors of the war. Hitler continues to haunt him in the guise of the scarecrow.

Some characters reflect on the disjuncture between their sense of being in the right place, and where they actually find themselves in the represented world of the narrative, using the compass of language:

Second Mysterious Man: On the nail. Or is it, on the nose they say nowadays?

First Mysterious Man: Whenever **that** is. (p. 245)

It is the sense of place as known through representations that provokes the ironical description, by the extradiegetic, homodiegetic narrator, of a bit of action between the Singing Detective and the two mysterious men :

An alabaster-white little cupid on the lip of the balustrade smashes a part as one of Marlow's bullets whips off it, with a singing sound. The two mysterious men are hurtling at break-neck speed for the exit. And the lugubrious barman, unfazed, continues wiping the glasses. *Trapped in an old tradition.* (my emphasis) (p. 192)

The brooding and unknown terror of Marlow's mental visions invokes Gothic horrors, the echoing tunnels and shadowy rooms of the no-place of the mind and the Skinscapes bar, a subterranean world beneath the efficient, overlit clatter of a post-modern hospital ward, all colours and types thrown together indiscriminately.

'Skinscapes' is the metaphor and the locale where the fantasistic narrative organization of *The Singing Detective* joins the fantasy in the text. Marlow's skin is a psychosomatic landscape, a map of psychic defences against an ever increasing internal horror. It is the body as theatre on which the play of Marlow's intrapsychic trauma has been etched. Dr. Gibbon describes Marlow's illness in the terms of a Gothic imaginary,

Dr. Gibbon: ...There are bats in it. Squeaking rodents with wings of skin, and fur, and eyes that see in the pitch darkness--creatures that hang upside down. But, then--you know about those. You know about **bats**.
(p. 98)

Significant places have their totemic creatures: Skinscapes has bats and rats, Binney's river house has cats (tigers, which Marlow in a covert linguistic narcissistic aside tells us, are trapped in the bars of language. " 'Period' " (p. 100). Just as the first thoughts and words with which an analysand begins an analytical session are harbingers of the repressed which will have some significance to what follows in the session and must be interpreted by the analyst, the first scene of *The Singing Detective* casts the reader into the hellish wonderland of Skinscapes and goes on to embroider a triptych of 'scapes' all painted in the colours of conspiracy, betrayal, and loss: scenes from a utopian childhood before the Fall, a fictional Cold War world where the SS continue

to terrorize and murder, and a revenge narrative. Marlow's body is his canvas; as he says, "I don't need pen nor paper." The cast of characters in Marlow's intrapsychic theatre, like those in Pirandello's play *Six Characters in Search of an Author*, take control of their lines when they feel the compulsion to be on stage. When Marlow's fever soars, they take control of their author. His bubbling, seething flesh is a mask behind which to hide, an escape from sin and sex.

The disgust and revulsion of others to his swollen, peeling, fiery, flaking sign body is constant and reassuring confirmation of his inner sense of disgust while, simultaneously, feeding his rage at the world. A "scabby leper," in Nicola's words, he has justification for shunning the world, for not initiating sex except with prostitutes. During the worst times of his illness his helplessness brings him the solace of being delicately touched by the lovely Nurse Mills, a contact which he has not had to initiate; his emotional boundaries have been maintained, rejection forestalled. The illness enables him to enact denial as a form of self-punishment. It is also the mark of one who has sinned; Philip's childhood prophetic fear of torture come true:

Philip: They won't find out who it was. Na! They'll never ever-ever find out.
Na! (...)
They can give I the worst Chinese burn ever. The worst in the history of the world. (...)
They can tie I down on a hill of cruel, poisonous black ants, with my shirt off my back. (pp. 143-4)

A modern day Job, Marlow's sign of martyrdom also affords him some measure of comfort. An escape through regression, Marlow's psoriatic skinscape puts him regularly into hospital. Returned to a state of infantile dependency, against which he rages, he is also assured of being taken care of. Although polysemous, Marlow's skinscape is nevertheless overdetermined. It is the site of the repetition compulsion's insidious work where the past forever dominates the present. The body's recovery and progress into health and wholeness is backward through memory, peeling away the screens on memory along with the layers of scarred skin. Marlow's passage into self-knowledge is painfully bodied forth in his recovery of movement, the independence that writing brings. Of what repressed is the skin a signifier, the reader must ask along with Dr. Gibbon?

The fantastic world of *The Singing Detective* is a world where boundaries are being breached. Marlow's Skinscapes portends a leakage, which is repeated across his narratives, of the repressed. Marlow seeks protection within the boundaries of conventions (he writes a 'closed' textual form); his fictional and real world human relations are divided into Manichean polarities of good and evil; he demands fidelity from Nicola and suffers passionate fits of jealousy, he is obsessed with inside and outside (through the character of Mr. Hall), his personal characteristics as a cold, sceptical, unlikeable person, yet these characteristics are counteracted and symptomatized as pathological by the opposite event, his psoriatic skin condition returns him to a state where his boundaries are constantly being put into question.

Marlow refuses ambivalence and accords a persecutory object status to most people around him, in both his hospital and fictional worlds (via stereotypes of the detective genre). Nevertheless, he creates an ambivalent world where, through a subject/object inversion, his characters become subjects and he experiences the ultimate loss of control--he becomes a character in his own narrative creation. The lack of mutual recognition between characters, and the sense of emptiness and dependency that being hired as a caricature, a part-self, creates, is thematized by the two mysterious men who demand to know from Marlow who they are, what they are (p. 246). They have no names, they are "padding. Like a couple of bleed'n sofas" (p. 231).

Skinscapes is the metaphoric scene which links themes of intrigue, treachery, sex, and death. It is the bar where Binney goes for prostitutes and where he meets his German contacts. Like Marlow's mask, it is a "front for the Nazis that haven't been caught" (p. 125). Not a fantasy world of furry bunnies, but a "sort of high class brothel...but not all the girls are what they seem" (p. 103). It is a world of deceit and duplicity, of ratting, squealing.

Marlow: (*Voice Over*) And so the man went down the hole, like Alice. But there were no bunny rabbits down there. It wasn't that sort of hole. It was a rat-hole. (p. 2)

However, the club where the Singing Detective croons is all sweetness and light, dance band, coloured lights, warm music--an urban variation on his father's country pub and adoring audience.

The forest for Marlow is the Utopia of his childhood, before the Fall, before he was taken away from his father to London, before his mother's death. It is not Lawrence's Nature, violent, instinctual, punishing, but a sanctuary near to God, a place of natural delights (birds, splendid noble trees, solitude), a shelter from his parents' stormy relations, a canopied cradle where Philip soothes himself, chanting, "the oak and the beech and the ash and the elm" (p. 185).

5.5.8 The productivity of language

Language in *The Singing Detective*, like Marlow's 'Chandleresquerie' overflows with novel juxtapositions that take the measure of the popular cultural imagination in the changing face of Britain in the 1980's as against the California caught by Chandler of the 1930's and '40's.⁷ The linguistic landscape of *The Singing Detective* has the diversity of a fast zap across twenty-five cable television channels when talk show guests from Sidney, Australia drawl sunny syllables before the next flick brings on the BBC evening news commentator or community programming in Hindi: a multi-cultural cacophony is Marlow's world. He has Binney and Sonia conjugating 'rooski' in their ersatz Russian. The black orderly who attends to Marlow through a Walkman haze speaks in Jamaican patois. Amanda's class origins are betrayed by a "speech full of wrong notes, pseudo-american with an undertow of cockney and occasional diversions into Mayfair-idiot-upper-class, a 1940's nightclub mix" (p. 19). These sub-cultural dialects and expressions which belong to the present day, cosmopolitan world are juxtaposed to dialects whose roots are in communities of the land and spoken by Philip's 'people.' As Marlow recovers his memories of his childhood and works through their painful significance with Dr. Gibbon, he is able to recover the dialect which speaks to him powerfully of his father and of the forest.

A host of ills of the late Twentieth Century spring familiarly from Marlow's modest proposal to the Registrar's question:

Registrar: I know it's always an embarrassing question. (*Little smile*) Even between husbands and wives. But - what do you believe in?

Marlow: Malthus, but mandatorily. Compulsory depopulation. By infanticide, genocide, suicide, or whatever other means suggest themselves. Aids, for example. (...) I also believe in cholesterol, cigarettes, alcohol, masturbation, carbon monoxide, the Arts Council, nuclear weapons, the

Daily Telegraph, and not properly labelling fatal poisons. But most of all, I believe in the one thing which can come out of peoples mouths.

Vomit.

(p. 40)

The magical power of language to create the world, to remake or undo the horrors of the past at both the individual and social level, is celebrated covertly and overtly in *The Singing Detective*. When the inspiration to write has been lost to Marlow, he describes the effect in terms of a sterile universe, "The hens wouldn't lay and the cock wouldn't crow" (p. 38).

When Dr. Finlay clumsily tries to protect Ali against what he suspects are racial slurs from Marlow, he shows by his extreme circumspection that he lacks a language and a sensitivity through which to speak about what is at stake in questions of race. He draws attention to language's material complicity in perpetuating colonial attitudes; how 'natural' it is for the guilty white children of the Raj to reconfirm the values of the colonial past, whose attitudes they presume to decry, by their awkward circumspection and refusals to name the object of those attitudes--'difference'. Marlow deftly ridicules Dr. Finlay's too earnest attempt to be unprejudiced by showing him how to talk about colour. In doing so, he undermines Finlay's 'good' intentions, while showing the struggle between colony and ruler continues in modern Britain in the battleground of the unspoken. By parodying the colonial discourse (the British sahib colonel to his Indian manservant) Marlow draws attention to exactly that which Dr. Finlay's clumsy remarks tried to cover up--the continuance of racist feelings even in generations who were not yet born when India stopped being a colony. Marlow shows that language is a way of being in the world, and humourous recognition, irony, paradox, not heavy handed earnestness, are the tools to subvert the old values, one of which is the authority of the BBC announcers' use of 'received' English pronunciation:

Marlow: 'That'll be one less, then. Won't it?

Deadly little pause.

Dr. Finlay: (*Cold*) What are your talking about?

Marlow: Immigrants, sunshine.

The young doctor stares at Marlow, then turns abruptly to Ali.

Dr. Finlay: Are you having trouble with this fellow?

Ali: (*Beam*) Oh yes, my god yes.

Dr. Finlay: Has he been making offensive remarks about your origins?

Ali: (*Puzzles*) Origins?

Dr. Finlay: Your - ah - race, or - ?

Ali: Race?

Dr. Finlay: (*Irritated*) Yes. Your race!

Marlow: Go on. Tell him. You brown bugger.

Ali gives a whoop of laughter. Dr. Finlay, taken aback, goes to say something but - **bleep-bleep-bleep!** goes his bleeper, and he turns on his heels to stride away, angrily flustered.

Marlow: Jumped up little snot. You get out of bed when you want, Ali, old pal.

Ali: No, no, no.

Marlow: Well-why not? What's the point? What are we waiting for? Why endure one moment more than you have to? Go on! Get out of bed, Ali! Jump up and down! And then hold a pillow down over my face! Come on!

He stops abruptly, like one suddenly aware of the true extremity of his feelings, and the depths of his bitterness or despair. Very close on Marlow. A beat. Then -

Marlow: (*Whisper*) At first comma the only sound is the slap hyphen slap of the water against the boat comma which has its engine switched off double space The other comma natural noises increase as the -

On the cold river, at dawn, the struggling, grunting policemen slowly pull in and up on to the deck of the launch the naked, drowned body of a beautiful young woman. (pp. 14-15)

5.6 Pathological variations: clues to the fantasy in the text

5.6.1 Metaphysical detective fiction

According to Holquist,

What myth was to experimental fiction before World War II, detective fiction is to avant-garde prose after World War II. The possibilities for symbolic action and depth psychology which Homer provides for James Joyce are replaced in the later period by the ambiguous events, the psychologically flat and therefore mysterious world which Holmes and Poirot make available to Robbe-Grillet and Borges.

(Holquist, 1971: 148-9)

Just as the Modernists modified the possibilities of myth, the Post-Modern experimental form parodied the conventions of a type of folk-myth, the detective story, to produce what has been called, according to Holquist (1971) the metaphysical detective story, or according to Peter Brooks, the "detective story gone modernist"

(1984: 239). Detective fiction was considered to be nothing but plot; however, the crisis provoked in the understanding of plot and plotting, wrought by Conrad or Joyce, when translated to detective fiction by the post-moderns, destroyed the sense of reassurance and order provided by classical detective fiction (i.e. through solutions to mysteries, punishments for crimes, dependable detective heroes). The work of Borges and Robbe-Grillet, for instance, foregrounded processes of composition in order to produce a mysterious relation whose solution or meaning had to be found in the experience of the reader himself (Holquist, 1971: 151). Marlow appears to be writing a conventional detective story when he describes how he works:

Marlow: In my head. Yes. In my head. The worst thing about a detective story is the plot. The best thing too. What am I saying? It's the *only* thing. You have to work it all out in your head. And that's what I've been trying to do. Like a rat in a maze.

This speech is a bit of covert diegetic narcissism thematizing a variety of issues in narratology with respect to metaphysical detective fiction--i.e. Is plot all there is to it? What significance has character development to plotting? Marlow is also addressing the teleologic aspect his kind of writing has for him (and perhaps for the reader): you have to know the ending before you write it down. This is an allusion to his own way of working in the hospital but, more importantly, it draws an analogy between writing and reading. Making order is something done recursively; you cannot know the beginning until you know the end (Brooks, 1977). However, it is also an anxious process; he is a rat trying to escape a labyrinth. Rats are Marlow's totem: rats know where their tails are; the club *Skinscapes* is a rat-hole. Marlow points out that he does not intend to help his reader (nor us) escape the maze:

Marlow: All solutions, and no clues. That's what the dumb-heads want. That's the bloody Novel--He said, she said, and descriptions of the sky--I'd rather it was the other way around. All clues. No solutions. That's the way things are. Plenty of clues. No solutions. (...) (p. 140)

Intimations of two views of the detective story appear in Marlow's description of his work: as dependably conventional under a veneer of difference, and as an unsettled world, resistant to reason and explanation. Ultimately he is caught in his own labyrinthine web. He is under a compulsion to write.

5.6.2 Reading as detecting; detecting as rereading

The parallel between the author's functions and the detective's is heightened by the explicit analogy of writing as visionary reading; Marlow's mental reworking of an old story licences the quasi-hallucinatory thriller landscape of murder and espionage he produces for his sleuth the Singing Detective and, what could be called, the "treachery to the fatherland" theme of his plot. Marlow's reading, perhaps, could be likened to a recovery of the "space-off" of the original, paperback version of *The Singing Detective*, "the space not visible in the frame but inferable from what the frame makes visible" (de Lauretis, 1987: 26). In which case, the absent context or pre-text of the plot of Marlow's first paperback novel, *The Singing Detective*, written long ago and out of print, becomes the 'in-forming' subject of its second performance--an absence which is present in the symptomatic gaps within and across Marlow's simultaneous writing of three narratives. The requirement to write what cannot be said, this 'invisible space,' underlies Marlow's compulsive search for "some equanimity," some way to break the cycle of repetitive plotting; perhaps to retire the Singing Detective to a cottage in the Lake District but never to Hollywood.

Why has Marlow chosen to rewrite a story he knows well, Nicola wants to know (p. 140) and so do we. Even though he is rewriting what should be a familiar story, Marlow does not seem to know how the original ended nor how he would like his new version to end. The story, as the cliché says, has to write itself and we, as Marlow, struggle to see. Why does he repetitively write detective fiction, to answer Nicola's question? His destiny is to write detective fiction, if only because of his handle, P.E. Marlow. His birthright, and somehow his unhappy condition as a detective story writer, he intimates, comes not from his father but from his mother who named him. Had he been Christopher Marlowe he might have written verse to be proud of (p. 21). His intertextual analogue is Philip Marlow, Chandler's hero in so many stories among which *The Big Sleep* is the most well-known through its film version with Bogart and Bacall.

Marlow is in hospital because he's been blocked. He's stopped investigating, stopped writing, although there is a mystery he knows with urgency he *has* to solve. To the chorus line of doctors who come to examine him, Marlow confesses:

Marlow: I'd like-Christ, I'd-like to get out of it. I don't want-I can't-listen-I can **not** stand it really truly can not stand this any more. I can't get on top of it or see clear of it or think straight or-or tell what is from what isn't-ar:d- (*Rising panic*) And if I don't tell someone, if I don't admit it-I'll never never never get out of it, never beat it off and nevernevernever- (p. 28).

Getting out lies in finding a beginning, in finding the words to say It. He refuses tranquilizers:

Marlow: (*Quickly interrupting*) I'm not taking those things! I've got work to do. Got a lot of thinking to do. If I don't **think** I'll never get out of here... (p. 16)
(...)

Marlow: Got to work. I've got to work. Somehow, I've got to work.

And then, greatly to his own embarrassment, an only half-suppressed sob of distress hurtles up his throat. (p. 21)

He is afflicted, not only by a psoriatic condition that leaves him helpless as a baby, unable even to hold a pen, but by uncontrollable imaginary scenes that terrorize him. He is quintessentially the bifurcated reader/viewer of the pictures which pass unsolicited across the screen before his mind's eye:

Marlow: (*In pain*) Sometimes--sometimes these--hallucinations--they're better than the real thing. People can sing in them or dance or--I don't mind. I don't mind. I like pictures. I don't care.

But there is terror in his voice... (p. 21)

Marlow refuses the tablets proffered by his doctors to dull his pain and anxiousness, choosing instead to take for a self-cure a descent into the hellish world of the thriller, to unleash his alter ego hero, the Singing Detective, on the mystery. Like so many readers of detective fiction written prior to Borges and Nabokov's disturbing parodic innovations, the reassuring "bromide" of kitsch is what Marlow chooses to effect a self-cure (Holquist, 1971: 139). It is not paradoxical that Marlow turns to a genre/eric solution--the detective story--which epitomizes his lack of self-esteem because it is held in low regard. He identifies with the cheap, sordid, superficial entertainment form and the low-class world it creates. When the Singing Detective agrees to work for Binney, it's "Just 10 cents a dance." He does not argue that detective fiction is not what "Lawrence would call the one bright book of Life (p. 52). To the psychiatrist, Dr. Gibbon, he admits with the sincerity of the schizophrenic:

Marlow: I would have liked to have used my pen to praise a loving god and all his loving creation. (p. 57)

Dr. Gibbon's belief is that Marlow did not set out to write detective fiction; something turned him from goodness he would have liked to celebrate. What effected this change in Marlow's character, turning him into a modern day Swift, eager to preach his modest proposal to a hateful world? Why does Marlow repeat the experience of self-degradation by writing "silly" detective stories which his wife tells him are, after all, not "about real people, real joys, real pains"? Or, so our model reading position would have us ask as well.

Holquist notes the appeal of detective fiction is that it gives a sense of reassuring sameness via its dependable clichés; it is not real but it is familiar. While Joyce and Conrad were probing the limits of reason and the depths of otherness, the detective story, whose particular reassuring magic was the power of the mind, was flourishing (Holquist, 1971:141-2). Marlow has found a defence, a way of reasoning, in the orderly universe of the detective story. However, it is not to Conan Doyle's world that Marlow turns where Sherlock Holmes holds to the Scholastic principle of *adequatio rei et intellectus*, the belief that the mind given enough time can understand everything (p. 141) nor to the world of Poe's Dupin that Marlow turns. Rather he seeks identification with the metaphoric representative of an order which is not that of causal chronology derived from uncovering facts by logical reasoning, but an order that comes of the *adequation of heart to heart*. Whereas action not character was vital to early detective fiction, Chandler's experimentation with the genre produced characters with more depth and complexity, who were not simply foils for the detective's ratiocination. Marlow's 'singing detective' alter ego is not the flat caricature of the classical detective story but a paradoxically endowed figure: worldly, 'hard boiled,' outwardly cynical, blunt, but nevertheless capable of sensitivity, empathy, identification, and idealism; he is even a romantic. The mystery Marlow needs to solve requires a detective who understands character, and human motives, desire not things. Holquist's view of the detective story suggests a manifest and latent function for Marlow's re-writing exercise, "Each fictive world has its own magic, its own form of reassuring omnipotence" (1971: 142).

A dialogic relationship sets itself up as Marlow gradually loses control, not only of the inner pictures of his hallucinations but of his authority as a creator, and comes to listen to his own narratives; he is positioned by them as an addressee. His detective work is to be an hermeneut of this polyphonic chorale (But, ultimately babble or counterpoint, the reader wonders?). Marlow's search is for the plot of these narrations; he does not yet know it must be for the forbidden desires underpinning the conspiratorial plotting of his 'creations', his repetition compulsion.

It is through Dr. Gibbon that Marlow's reading for the plot is linked to the process of associating, recollection, and self-analysis. That metaphysical detective sleuthing is effectuated through a transferential relationship is a thesis that becomes explicit through Marlow's visits to the psychiatrist-detective. Gibbon's perspective is the model reader's ally: it provides insights into and interpretations of Marlow's published detective novel, a text for which the reader has only truncated accounts mediated by Marlow's hallucinatory re-writings. Reading from a paperback copy of Marlow's *The Singing Detective*, Dr. Gibbon leads the model reader into making the equation between author and narrator when he asks Marlow,

Isn't it clear that you regard sexual intercourse with considerable distaste or what is more to the point, with fear (...) even with loathing?
(p. 54)

It is through Marlow's relationship with Gibbon that the reader begins to piece together clues about the 'Ur text', the original paperback version of the *Singing Detective* and its traces in the doublings operating across the other narrative levels in Potter's text. Just as for Marlow for whom the answer to the mystery he does not understand and the crime he cannot identify is to be found through Dr. Gibbon's guidance in patterns organizing his narratives, the reader's solutions to the mysteries she too cannot yet name lie in an analytical attitude of listening for patterns in the rising and falling of voices and perspectives across the surface of the text's distressing fragmentation. The relation of *discours* to *histoire*, which emerges in the remembering and repeating of the transferential relationship, has a parallel in the sense-making activity of the reader who must reconstruct not primarily story events but the determining relation of narrative discourse--the story-telling--to the story which it unfolds. Detective, author, analyst, reader are united in a common telos: the logic of

plotting. The reader, like Gibbon, reads associatively and, at some point, constructs an hypothesis about Marlow's history. Unlike Gibbon, she has five narrative levels to work with.

The Singing Detective structurally embodies the idea that the repetition of childhood defences against trauma may have its analogue in the formal structure of a text as well as in the way characters are depicted; thus the symptomatic structure of a text which expresses a fantasy. "Repetition is a return in a text, a doubling back" (Brooks, 1977: 288) which may take the form of a return to origins or a return of the repressed. "Repetition through this ambiguity appears to suspend temporal process, or rather, to subject it to an indeterminate shuttling or oscillation which binds different moments together as a middle which might turn forward or back" (Brooks, 1977: 288), thereby creating an uncanny moment, the quasi-hallucinatory sense of encountering for the first time what one has already known. Repetition in narrative form signals the return of the repressed in a disguised form. The mirroring play across Marlow's four narratives occurs in rhythms, patterns of association which signal what cannot be figured (out), the Forbidden and the Impossible.

Deviations which function as defence mechanisms, states Freud's *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, are propelled by the logic of the repetition compulsion which allows for the control of anxiety through iterative behaviour and obsessive ideation. Repetition allows for mastery of trauma and effectively enables a subject to move from passive to active states. The prototype of this process is what has been called the first narrative, the Fort/Da game, wherein the infant tolerates the mother's absence by creating in the toy a transitional object with which he repeatedly enacts her loss--throwing the spool from his crib, for example--and her return--through the recovery of the spool. The repetition of the very event producing distress, separation from the loved object, Freud theorized, allows for the binding of the anxiety produced by the separation. Pleasure is experienced as the spool reappears; the separation, survived.⁸

5.6.3 The labour of reading: detecting textual resistances to any model reading--language based resistances

Like the analyst who refuses the analysand's demand for collusive identification in order to listen to her desire as expressed in the tropes of speech--

metaphors, slips and puns, abrupt silences and surprising self-editings--linguistic self-reflectiveness in the text-as-analyst resists the subject-effect of lulling the model reader by shifting attention to the semantic, syntactic as well as the phonetic *texture* of words which actually serve to structure as well as constitute the work.

This centripetal pull, however, does not cut the reader off from what has here been called "vital" or life experience. While it is true that the work becomes a self-contained artificial unity, nevertheless, the extramural link is made through the process of fiction making in language, the creation of worlds in words.

(Hutcheon, 1980: 119)

Linguistic play is diagnostic before it can be used to revivify that part of reality structured and developed through language.

However,

If linguistic play is going to activate the productive labour involved in reading, it presumably has to be textually immanent, and in some way evident: cryptograms are different from anagrams.

(Hutcheon, 1980: 122)

Without intratextual generators, the logic of language play will be lost on the reader who has not been taught the rules of the game. If the word play cannot be deciphered and enjoyed, it is not functional within the textual project of leading the reading subject somewhere. It is not, says Hutcheon, narcissistic narrative.

Dr. Gibbon's word game with Marlow prefigures the associative logic that is symptomatized in the rhythms by which fugitive narrative levels appear and disappear in the intertwined narratives of Marlow's fantasy world. It is one of the clues to the fantasy in the text. It also provides the clue to reading for the model reader: through gaps created by textual resistances.

A key exchange between Gibbon and Marlow, an associative word game, a rebus of sorts, on one level is an immensely amusing parody of the chief principle and diagnostic tool of psychoanalysis--word play which belies unconscious association--while, nevertheless, capturing the brilliant incisiveness that attention to parataxis offers as an hermeneutical tool. The totality of voices and levels in *The Singing Detective* is a powerfully evocative, intricate embroidery of the compulsive logic ever so briefly, cryptically displayed in Marlow's deadly word play with Gibbon.⁹

Marlow, ever wary, struggles to assert what he fears the game will steal from him, his (authorial) control over the framing of encounters:

Marlow: We have to agree **in advance** that it is meaningless.

Gibbon: Oh, quite.

Marlow: Has no diagnostic value.

Gibbon: Fine. (p. 174)

Marlow wrests control of time from the doctor, paradoxically initiating the playing of the game with a (mock/authentic?) free association precisely in order to discredit the game's diagnostic legitimacy; he attempts to show it can be used to say anything anyone wants:

Gibbon: Doctor -

Marlow: (*Rapid fire*) Charlatan. (*Gibbon smiles*) Click-clock-clack. (p. 174)

Despite himself, Marlow is the first to be taken aback by the revealing associations which pop out:

Gibbon: (*Deliberate temptation*) Politician.

Marlow: (*Smirk*) Lie.

Gibbon: Tale.

Marlow: Lie.

Gibbon: Writer.

Marlow: Liar.

Gibbon: Sentence.

Marlow: Prison.

Gibbon: Cage.

Marlow: School.

And he blinks, self-surprised, but he has no time. (...)

Gibbon: Passion.

Marlow: Pretence.

Gibbon: Woman.

Marlow: Fuck.

Gibbon: Fuck.

Marlow: Dirt.

Gibbon: Dirt.

Marlow: Death.

Marlow jerks suddenly, and knows it is no longer a game and never was. (p. 177).

The word game uncovered the repressed through associational ideation, which also formed the template of the plots of all his narratives, but not the fantasies associated with these couplings.

The doctor comes to discover that Marlow's shame is mirrored in his loathing and undervaluation of the cultural form in which he expresses himself. His perspective on the world is inseparable from his identity as an author of detective fiction: Marlow's template for understanding experience is thoroughly saturated with a cultural form he despises. For him, reality exists invested with the paranoia of the mystery genre; his reality is peopled by a cast of characters who fit pre-established types and motives, including the doctor.

Marlow (to Gibbon): You're not a character in *The Maltese Falcon*.

You're more like something in *The Archers*. (p. 95)

Marlow's enigmatic mask, of course, is circumscribed by his identity as a detective fiction writer. To the Registrar's suggestion that his illness might be psychosomatically induced, Marlow in a fit of denial responds reluctantly, "What do you mean? What are you talking about? It's not *your* job to be cryptic" (p. 39).

5.6.4 Repetition and the Möbius strip¹⁰

Although the two narrative levels which persistently refuse precise spatial and temporal indicators--what we have been calling the "purloined play" and the "computer voice"--destabilize Marlow's authorial function and narratorial voice, they are just the most extreme examples of a dislocation between voice and perspective which characterizes the diegeses in *The Singing Detective* as a whole. This dislocation is attributable to the structural organization of *The Singing Detective* as Möbius strip. As a temporal and spatial figure, it describes the work of the repressed at the paradigmatic level of plotting. As a circular movement of voices in time and in space which goes on seamlessly accordingly to a latent principle of organization, it disturbs the subject/object distinction at the level of character identity and narrative. The narrator becomes unreliable not because there is no meaning to be had (a demonstration of the artifice of fiction is not what is at stake) but because the subject of the text--the organizing consciousness--is split.

At the level of the signifier/signified coupling, the Möbius strip captures the slippage of signifieds out from under signifiers. For example, depending on the answer to the question, "Who sees?" or "Whose desire is operating?", the fetishistic return of the naked body of a drowned woman could enact one of two different

substitutions. When what appears to be the same body reappears with a different face each time, it signifies a different dead woman to the same or different viewers and functions, therefore, as a murder in different plots in different narratives. However, when read as a synecdoche, the dead body stands in for the substitutability or nondifferentiation women have for the viewer(s) who hold a unifocal and undifferentiated perspective, thereby pointing to the dominating perspective of a focal character (the textual subject).

The Möbius strip also captures a particular kind of paradoxical inversion between two narrative levels as the hierarchical relationship between them, to which each initially owes its existence, is inverted. The dizzying, dreamlike *mise en abyme* structure which characterizes the transgressive, non-embedded relationship of narrative levels in *The Singing Detective* produces a perturbation of the subject-object relation as the object-level narration overtakes the meta-level narrating. Part of the pleasure associated with this event originates in our abrupt engagement in a change of perspective tantamount to a figure/ground reversal such as would be practised in experimental phenomenological perception exercises (e.g. seeing a duck rather than a rabbit in the one-dimensional line drawing). This reversal takes two predominant forms. The first is the effect of covert diegetic narcissism in metafiction where the reader feels herself to be the real addressee of the narrator even though the narratorial voice has a represented interlocutor. The communicative function of the expression changes as the reader feels herself being drawn into the plot, by all three registers--sound, image, and narration--as a character whose presence was expected; the narrative's implicit commentary on her hermeneutical function in turn serves as an event in the plot; it raises the reader's suspicions that her inferences to that point in the text have been manipulated and are untrustworthy. In other words, *when she encounters her presence being recognized by the text and catches herself simultaneously in the act of reading herself, she feels both perceived object and perceiving subject*. For example, Part One ends with what is also a condensed, complex juxtaposition of events and connotations which, while serving thematic purposes, also invites the reader to appreciate this complexity. There is a cut from

Marlow in his hospital bed, grieving over Ali's death as he sucks on one of Ali's sweets, to the tune of 'After You've Gone,' to the camera panning over Philip's forest:

Gliding along the rolling treetops of the Forest to the bounce of the Casa Loma Band.

Peeping out of the foliage of the tall oak, high in the cleft of the topmost branches, the small boy Philip stares out at us. The music dips to allow-

Registrar: (*Voice Over*) It must be hellishly ticklish to work out a plot in a detective story, I should think. I suppose you have to scatter clues all over the place. (p. 44)

The troubling aspect of the metalepsis inherent in the *mise en abyme* is that it gives rise to the disturbing hypothesis that "the extradiegetic is perhaps always diegetic and that the narrator and narratees--you and I--belong to some narrative" (Genette, 1980: 236). That hypothesis is explicitly thematized as the existential enigma of the "purloined play" narrative level; Binney begins to doubt his existence, a fear foreshadowed in his description of the smell of Marlow's old screenplay which Nicola has stolen from his basement flat:

Nicola: It still stinks of tobacco and something that - well, smells to me like old cabbage stumps. (*Sniff*) Typical!

Binney: It smells of something worse than that. It - (*Stares at her.*) It smells sulphur.

Nicola: What!

Binney: It's as though - as though - (*With difficulty*) Nicola. I know this sounds crazy. I feel almost as though he has made all this up. I feel - (p. 148)

Binney's premonition of being a creation, a fiction is overtly, linguistically presented as he speaks his own dependency. We are dizzyed by the disappearance of boundaries and a slippage beyond Marlow's position as narrator to another perspective which allows an englobed level to comment on the englobing narrative:

Binney: Mark Binney! In the script! Right! In his bloody script that we've purloined! Mark Finney to Mark Binney is as close as - as close as -

He stops suddenly, then his tone changes.

Binney: I have this awful - I have this awful dash he stops himself comma and all but shudders full stop

Nicola: Darling dash question mark

They look at each other. Weirdly, almost frighteningly, they seem to have no idea of what they have just said, which is delivered in a straightforward manner. (p. 149)

The crisis of identity deepens as Binney delivers up the clue based on his 'Saussurean' reflections.¹¹ On what basis has he any existence except as a result of the arbitrary difference between two consonants in the English language? He is, therefore, nothing more than a signifier, a shadow cast by the effect of a distortion. He has no referent.

Binney: Mark Finney to Mark Binney is as close as - as close as (*Stops.*) I have this awful

He stops himself and all but shudders.

Nicola: Darling?

He tries to smile at her, would-be rueful, but fear springs in him again.

Binney: Premonition. This awful premonition. (*Then, incredulous*) Nicola? Why are you doing that?

Nicola: (*Distracted*) What?

She is making a shadow with her hand again.

Binney: (*Angry*) Nicola!

Nicola: See. A rabbit. don't you think that looks like a rabbit, Mark? And I thought I could only do parrots. (p. 149-150)

Binney is a shadow; but, nevertheless, not the same shadow signifier as a Finney.

This exchange (an example of covert diegetic narcissism) raises a flag that Binney and Finney, if the reader has not already inferred it, have more in common than their slight difference. It foreshadows the doubling across levels which leads us back to their author, Marlow. *Mise en abyme* confronts the reader with the expectations the text harbours for her participation. It incites the question: Whose consciousness expects me to be here? What subject in the text as a whole is manipulating the voices in these narratives, if Marlow is not? With what purposiveness?

The most disorienting instance of the *mise en abyme* effect occurs when the Singing Detective, hero of the thriller metanarrative, shoots his creator, Marlow, in his hospital bed in the penultimate scene of the play. This murder is the most blatant perturbation of the subject-object relation. It catches the real reader out in the shock of her own unacknowledged yet disappointed expectations "about what is to happen next" as the firm support of her encoded reading position is whipped out from under her. Part of the shock and displeasure of the moment comes from the ambivalent feelings it produces: it appears that one of the two 'good guys' has been mistakenly done in. Has our allegiance to the Singing Detective been abused? Have we been very

wrong about this character? We will return to how this murder is consonant with the most classical cliché of the detective story and should have been expected by the competent reader.

The relationship of Marlow's narrative level to that of Singing Detective, an englobing relationship which is explicitly exploded in the violent denouement, is paradoxical since it is a *mise en abyme* of the "aporistique" type (Hutcheon, 1980: 56). It is a fragment which is supposed to include the work in which it itself is included.¹² That is to say, we can no longer determine which narrative takes precedence nor what is rightly history versus reconstructions from history. Like a Möbius strip, beginnings are untraceable as are endings. Metaphorically this is the problem of reading the past for Marlow: he cannot recover it except through narratings in which it makes itself known to him; *fabula* exists only through *discours*. This circling can take two forms: repetition which destroys time by making every time 'now' like time 'past,' and as the achievement of new perspectives that allows for reconstruction which progressively recovers time and the capacity to learn.

Paradoxically, "if mastery is an assertion of control over what man must in fact submit to--choice, we might say, of an imposed end [the choice takes the form of how we will respond to the inevitable]--we have already a suggestive comment on the grammar of plot, where repetition, taking us back again over the same ground, could have to do with the choice of ends" (my addition) (Brooks, 1977:286). Narrating is understood as mutative; Marlow achieves integration by his narrative journey into memory. He overcomes the persecutory fears endemic to the detective genre. The indeterminacy of the 'open' work might be none other than an instance of the 'play' Winnicott (1971) describes which occurs in the sphere of transitional phenomenon.

If we had not understood that when the detective 'got his man,' thereby fulfilling one of the basic conventions of the genre, it was only possible because Marlow had beaten the repetition compulsion, then the return of a grinning Philip in one of last scenes leaves us in no doubt that the force of repression has been explored and worked through. He tells the reader happily, "When I grow up, I be going to be a detective" (p. 249). The dead forest has become an Eden again and Philip has regained his wide-eyed childish enthusiasms.

5.6.5 The double as intertext of identity

When patterns begin to emerge across the disparate voices in *The Singing Detective* as regularities of perspective, they show doubling to be an organizing principle of characterization as well as of narrative structure. Focalization is the vehicle of the double.

While Marlow's confession, "I am the Singing Detective," reveals a double, it shows the speaking "I" to be bifurcated and (a) suspect. In fact, the Singing Detective, conventionally the seeker after truth, is the agent of the discovery of the other, suspicious parts of the "I". The double is the essential figure not only of the quest to catch oneself as an "I" speaking (i.e. through externalization via characterization or role playing) but of the inversions characteristic of the figure/ground perceptual paradox of the Möbius strip; these inversions are processes indigenous to the workings of the unconscious. "Freud made turning something into its opposite and turning something against itself the primary mechanisms of psychical functioning prior to repression of representations and to cultural sublimation" (Pontalis, 1978). The otherness of the self, and its immanence, is structurally manifested by the disappearance of the subject of enunciating and the disintegration of the unity of identity into multiple, new couplings of voice and perspective.

The double, as the result of an analogy across characters, figures the paradox of identity--it defines identity even while dispersing it.

...the self is both lost through an identification with the other and at the same time most authentically defined by it. The phenomenon of repetition...serves to deny not only temporal succession but also the autonomy of the self.

(Rimmon-Keenan, 1980: 645)

The double may not only symbolize the split-off, repudiated and reprehensible parts of the self; the figure of the double may function as a *substitute* for what cannot be said or admitted to consciousness. As in the phenomenon of projective identification, where feelings one refuses to allow into consciousness are put into someone else who then becomes open to criticism while the repudiated actions nevertheless provide some relief to the agent of the projection, the double, as part-self, becomes a psychodramatic vehicle for the expression of the desirable but forbidden. The double represents both alienated desire and the means by which Marlow finds self-unity through which to

experience desire as his own. Ultimately, the murder of the double resolves the struggle for mastery between part-selves. "It's either him or me." says the Singing Detective before plugging Marlow with a bullet in his hospital bed:

(Voice over, side-of-mouth) I suppose you could say we'd been partners, him and me. Like Laurel and Hardy or Fortnum and Mason. but, hell, this was one sick fellow, from way back when.. And I reckon I'm man enough to tie my own shoe-laces now. (p. 248)

Marlow has not only pruned his sick self; he has overcome the tyranny of the repetition compulsion and the bifurcation which required the incessant rewriting of the same mystery script. Philip is able to reappear, but in a world "resonant with the birdsong and the sound of the wind in the leaves" (p. 249).

One principle by which doubles are created by Marlow is the principle of reversal and displacement: rather than accepting that a part of him carries a certain unacceptable emotion or desire he projects the desire into a simulacrum, Binney's voice, for instance, and hides the objectionable, unmentionable subject by referring to some other. The reader has to keep this projective process constantly in mind to read the clues to Marlow's associational logic. A micro example of the operation of this principle occurs in an exchange between Mr. Hall and Reginald. Mr. Hall has woken up in the middle of the night needing the bedpan and tries to call the night nurse without waking the ward because he would be embarrassed for them to know he needed "the contraption." However, the nurse when she comes is unsympathetic that he did not get it himself and blames him for waking the other patients:

Mr. Hall: *(Whimper)* Sorry, nurse, but I -

But she is padding heavily away, excessively disgruntled.

Reginald: *(Bleary)* What the hell's going on-? Mr. Hall?

Mr. Hall: You. It's you, my boy.

Reginald: What!

Mr. Hall leans across to whisper, nastily.

Mr. Hall: You've been grinding your teeth, Reginald. In your sleep.

Reginald: What?

Mr. Hall: You woke everybody up. Grinding your teeth. Like rocks being rubbed together. (p. 35)

This displacement of guilt through scapegoating (and the displacement of Mr. Hall's subjective discomfort of constipation to the grinding noise he accuses Reginald of

making with his teeth) is a repetition of the psychological principle in Marlow's narratives by which Philip's destiny became wedded to a fictional Binney. Philip accused his classmate, dumb, defenceless Mark Binney, as the one who had left the nasty, shitty offering on the teacher's desk. In this memory, Marlow as Philip abused Binney's trust just as his father's good friend Raymond had abused Mr. Marlow's trust by 'shagging' his wife in the forest. Philip's sense of self-disgust was compounded by the eagerness of his schoolmates to fabricate 'corroborating' evidence of Binney's filthiness, a modern rendition of the Crucifixion. This scene is contiguous with scenes of a woman on the ground in the forest under a man with heaving, naked buttocks. In the homosexually tinged aggressiveness of Mr. Hall to the innocent Reginald is a displaced parody of Philip's childhood 'ratting' or screwing of the witless Binney (Philip is the filthy rat; by projection, the fictional character Binney is made a rat, a Nazi conspirator). His 'ratting' and 'squealing' on Binney, the supposed perpetrator of the anal attack on the teacher, is linked metonymically (filth/shit/ass/sex) to Raymond's filthy doings with Philip's mother, where as a child observer he saw only naked male buttocks at the scene of the woodland seduction.

Philip was the original victim of this practice of reversal and displacement. A characteristic of the behaviour of his parents, it was responsible for most of his childish misconstruals and confusions about the world. In a key scene where Philip arrives late for tea, Mrs. Marlow punishes him more out of a desire to assert her control and defend her values in her mother-in-law's house than to teach Philip the importance of being punctual for bread and butter. The real object of her reprimand was her husband, "the gutless bugger" (p. 69), who refused to take sides with his wife against his mother. The real issue was whether they would move out of his parents' "poky hole," symbolically severing the ties between Mr. Marlow and his mother. Philip believes himself guilty for causing the ensuing angry verbal battle and for not having stood up for his father against his mother's tirade. When Mrs. Marlow leaves her husband, taking Philip with her on the train, she refuses to tell her son the real reason why they are going to her parents in London, preferring to leave Philip in anxious suspense about "Where's our Dad?"

Fiction, colonized by the double, explores a premise about perception and subjectivity, that being that "all experience [of a subject] is mediated through the object" (Levin, 1988). From the textual point of view, this emphasizes that the reader's understanding of character identity is the result of intersubjectivity--a relationship where two beings apprehend each other. That process of mutual apprehension is mediated by each person's world of internal objects. Where a non-cohesive ego is posited, apprehension of the parts of the self comes through interaction with others: through one's experience of oneself through the reactions of others and through one's immanent experience of oneself.

Knowledge of the other available to the self are the actions of others experienced by the self, R.D. Laing observes in *Self and Others* (1969: 5). Fantasy is the name given to this mode of interpersonal experience as well as to the content of the experience as it takes psychic representation. Laing's explanation of unconscious fantasy (or phantasy, in his usage) in terms of a theory of mapping is useful as an explanation of the function doubles serve across the various diegetic levels of *The Singing Detective*. It is worth quoting at length:

Briefly, if I project an element x from set **A** on to an element y of set **B**, and if we call the operation of projection or mapping ϕ , then y is called the image of x under ϕ . The operation ϕ is a function whereby y acquires the ϕ -value of x . Johnny is the image of his grandfather. A set of relations may be mapped on to another set of relations, and elements of one set may be mapped on to themselves. This is not the place to develop this, but it is perhaps appropriate merely to suggest that this formula seems to me to clarify the double usage of phantasy, as in the expressions: the 'contents' of phantasy, and phantasy as a 'function.' As a function, phantasy can be regarded as an operation of mapping, from any domain of experience to any range of experience. It seems even possible to conceive of mapping desires (instincts), not experienced *in* themselves, as it were, on to experience, such that the range of experience so mapped acquires a ϕ (phantasy)-value, and to conceive that a person may not himself recognize that this range of his experience has acquired such a ϕ -value, usually called the unconscious 'content' of phantasy. (1969: ix)

Focalization, the dislocation between voice and perspective, is evidence of the mapping function by which analogies can be drawn between plots and character. The reader's search in *The Singing Detective*, paralleled by Marlow's search for his identity, is a search for contiguous points across the perspectives inhering in the focal

characters. The doubles are repudiated part-selves created by the projective and introjective labour of Marlow's intrapsychic theatre and banished to the bodies of characters in Marlow's fictions, where they repetitively play out the roles assigned by a drama, unknown to Marlow but by which he has been held captive since childhood.

5.6.6 The eurhythmics of the spectacle of memory

When the reader is carried through a vertiginous oscillation of viewpoint and voice in scenes marked by rapid changes of perspective and temporality, her focus is shifted from the 'fictive' world of the text to the 'narrating'. As abrupt breaks in narrative continuity, they shock the reader into an awareness of her function as the interpretative condition of possibility for a narrative's existence. They suggest another interpretative condition may also be at work, a score by which background and foreground voices in these borderzones rhythmically rise and fall. These narrative dislocations may 'disenchant' the fantasy world and rescue the reader from total enmeshment in Marlow's fantasy even as they consolidate her sense of being in an intriguing, uncanny border zone between waking and sleeping. The shocking effect of voice and perspective dislocations prevent the reader's identification with character, as character unity has been ruptured. Lacking a trustworthy narratorial presence, she becomes her own detective, tracking the focal character, namely, the relationship between voice and point of view. She has been set up to do the inferential, empathic work of the hero of post-war detective fiction, like Chandler's Marlow, and Marlow's Singing Detective; each is capable of fluid identifications in which *he thinks like his suspect in order to infer motivation and responsibility*.

Repetitions--of a musical phrase, of images, of words, questions, or entire lines disengaged from a source of enunciating--mark the transition points between narrative levels. Repetition is not only the vehicle of the segue--an apparently seamless, fluid movement across temporal levels--it is the index of an overdetermination, a pattern. Patterns, in turn, eventually point to the perspective inhering in a focal position split-off from a recognizable voice; they operate according to an intertext. In the polyphonic world in which Marlow loses control of his narratives, the intertext of patterns across diegetic levels will be the intertext of repression. What anxiety, the reader is provoked

to ask, links the scene of the recovery of the dead body across three narrative levels, in the following example?

He stops abruptly, like one suddenly aware of the true extremity of his feelings, and the depths of his bitterness or despair. Very close on Marlow. A beat. Then-

Marlow: (*Whisper*) At first comma the only sound is the slap hyphen clap of the water against the boat comma which has its engine switched off double space The other comma natural noises increase as the-

On the cold river, at dawn, the struggling, grunting policemen slowly pull in and up on to the deck of the launch the naked, drowned body of a beautiful young woman.

On the screen of a word processor, a bright glow of letters softly blip-blips across the monitor-

The other, natural noises increase as the struggling, grunting policemen slowly pull up on to the deck of the launch the naked, drowned body of a beautif-

In the hospital ward, an attractive young nurse, Nurse Mills, is suddenly, on the uncompleted word 'beautiful', standing at the foot of Marlow's bed. Marlow, jolted out of reverie, stares at her.

Marlow: The naked, drowned body of a beautiful woman.

(p. 14-15)

Sex, loss, and despair--how must they be connected?

The censor of repression asserts its presence in the transitions from Marlow's narrative level to a second order narrative which occur whenever he feels an uncontrollable and disturbing emotion, the anxiety associated with the repressed is confirmed somatically by a jump in his body temperature. A disturbing thought need not occur to Marlow himself to trigger the slippage; it may appear in one of his doubles.

Reginald: By the time we get it, the tea's either cold or stewed to buggery-
Staff Nurse White: Language!

Mr. Hall: (*Quickly*) But very welcome it is, miss, in **this** bed. Whichever way you turn.

A River Police launch bobs gently on the river, which is oily black...

(p. 10)

The *double entendre* refuses the infantilizing nurse's authority to sanitize language. It suggests two different sexual acts under the guise of accepting with patient gratitude the arrival of tea by whatever route it should be delivered. This is an unexpected act

of unconscious revenge from Mr. Hall, who usually seeks every childish and elaborate euphemism to avoid having to refer to a bodily function or contraption associated with it, and who expresses all the characteristic mannerisms, fussiness, exaggeratedly delicate sensibilities and old-maidish qualities associated with the stereotype of the closet homosexual. The allusion to violent sex associated with buggery (or possibly the polymorphously perverseness of such a desire) sends Marlow into the Skinscapes plot and its fetishistic index, the retrieval from the oily, sludgy filth of the river Thames of a beautiful dead female body. Again, what is the compulsive logic underlying this segue?

The reader learns to look for patterns across types of sounds, what narrative level and event immediately preceded the reverie or metalepsis that they seem to have induced, and what follows. These heavily affect laden patterns may be initiated by a repetitive sensory and sensuous experience. We come to expect a reverie, a shift of narrative and perspective with the lighting of a cigarette. Not until page 181, two-thirds of the way through the screenplay is the indexical significance of the cigarette explained ("He blows out a column of smoke: understood, now, as one means of entry to his thoughts").

The auditory register in *The Singing Detective* is a crucial symptom of the principle of association by which levels come to be juxtaposed. Recurrent couplings of images with musical themes or with voice, of course, act as leitmotifs of a focal character's point of view. For example, birdsong and the sound of the wind in leafy boughs indexes not only Philip's tree perch, his own secret and private place in his beloved forest, but the kind of thinking he did as a child when he entered that world: contemplation of the mysteries of life and his family, his suffering, guilt, and attempts at expiation. His forest 'space' is akin to a religious experience, its splendid sense of security and serenity preserved and recalled by a ritual, the lulling rhythms of the child's chant, the wondrous naming of his forsworn, steadfast friends: "The oak and the ash and the beech and the elm." Philip's accent and dialect are immediate invocations of another period, another time, now found eccentric in the post-war world.

Tunes are another vehicle of association. As Marlow says, "The thinking comes with the tune" (p. 86). But the labour of thinking, of memory has to be apportioned to different part-selves according to the censor of repression.

Marlow: (*Thinks*) There are songs to sing. There are feelings to feel. There are thought to think. That makes three things. And you can't do **three** things at the same time. The singing is easy. Syrup in my mouth. The thinking comes with the tune- (...) so that leaves only the feelings. Am I right? Or am I right? I can sing the singing. I can think the thinking. (*Suddenly savage*) But you're not going to catch me feeling the feeling. No, sir. (p. 86)

The puzzle pieces of Marlow's illness begin to fall into place. The Singing Detective is both the policeman who will solve the mystery of his creator's suffering, take revenge on Binney, and do it all with the witty repartee, charm, and self-possession of Chandler's Marlow. However, the Singing Detective, the warbler, is also the demeaned father, talented but unrewarded with stardom, unappreciated by his wife who wanted better things for herself. The sweet and syrupy songs his father sang, the innocent songs of the war years that the Singing Detective croons in his club, are likened to food. His singing will tell the truth in beautiful tones while Binney is the squealer. The feeling that has been split off into the Philip character is the feeling that finds no measure in the Singing Detective's songs: it is the dark side of *The Sunny Side of the Street*.

Marlow can summon a tune which then refuses to be dismissed; it carries its own urgency. While the title or lyrics of songs often thematize metonymically or allegorically the action or emotion characterizing a particular narrative segment, it is the pre-symbolic importance of the musical register, invested with powerful and uncontrollable affect that threads different plots together. It is music which allows for the seamless cuts across voice and temporal level while invoking the overpowering perspective of a boy's view of the past. Themes of songs evoke emotions and affect characteristic of the specific time period in Marlow's life when he heard them; most are popular dance band tunes from the end of the Second World War. There are songs associated with Philip's halcyon days, eating chips and drinking ginger beer in the pub while his father crooned a sentimental song, bringing tears to the eyes of the good folk in the pub, his fellow miners, old friends, his community. Marlow's childhood

memories are drenched in music: sweet, innocent, sentimental, rhythmical. It is the music of Marlow's father that the Singing Detective sings. Feelings for Marlow are coded in music.

Rhythms of another sort metre the repetitive circling of Marlow's thoughts. Philip's question to his mother, "Where's our Dad?"--repeated with growing and anxious insistence the longer he is in London away from his beloved forest--creates a series of moments of increasing tension until they explode in the brutal disappointment of his mother's reply--"He's not coming"--and its equally brutal sequel, his question to his mother, "Was it because of what she had done in the bushes?" ('shagging' in the bushes with his father's best friend, Raymond). Answers to the question "who dunnit?" in Marlow's detective story are found by asking "what happened?" and listening to the rhythmic repetition of scenes of violence. As Marlow goes back in memory with Dr. Gibbon's aid, scenes of violence become frequent and more visible: Hitler in the corn field, the blond German spy is shot, his mother commits suicide by drowning herself, Binney is stabbed, the author himself is murdered in his hospital bed. As the work of memory proceeds, the scene of Philip in the arms of the old oak reoccurs with ever increasing frequency, his pinched face staring accusingly out at the viewer or pleading with God. A repeated prolepsis which creates suspense and foreboding in the filmed version of *The Singing Detective*, but which does not exist in the screenplay, is a shot of a bright light in a tunnel bearing down on the viewer accompanied by the screeching brakes of a train.

5.6.7 Marlow's 'scene of reading': the architexture of ideo/oedipathology

It is through a circular, digressive reading that the clues to the full story of Marlow's 'crime' can be pieced together as the reader identifies the work of the repressed. The four pseudo-metadiegetic narrative levels are interrelated, on the one hand, by the logic of memory--an associative logic expressed in the displacements and condensations peculiar to Marlow's quasi-hallucinatory, sometimes paranoid, reality, and on the other hand, their organization borrows from the compulsive logic of the thriller genre. The interplay of *roman policier* elements and the Oedipus myth is crucial to the act of interpreting the text. (Hutcheon, 1980: 74).

Every detective story must have a crime or intrigue, a victim, a perpetrator, a motive, and a detective. The fantasy in the text, as expressed by the interrelation of three of the four metanarratives, is a fantasy of persecution, doubled across several plots. This doubling fulfills a condition for the good detective plot identified by Chandler himself (1976: 38-39), "the most effective way to conceal a simple mystery is behind another mystery." The solution to what haunts Marlow lies through solutions to what persecutes the Singing Detective, Binney, and Philip. However, what is repeated is a structure of delay across all the narratives and what is delayed is the discovery of who killed the woman and who is guilty. The reading of clues goes on simultaneously across four narrative levels, and it is in inferences made about events as condensations and displacements of an unspoken scene that must be revealed, that forms the reader's search for the repressed which will explain Marlow's persecutory anxieties. The overdetermined crime is the drowned, naked body of a female who keeps appearing in the palimpsestic undulations of the river Thames: first Sonia, then Nicola, finally Philip's mother. Another overdetermined clue is Marlow's skinscape. Marlow's elbow, where the first psoriatic lesion appeared on the day his knowledge of the 'shagging' was revealed to his mother in the underground and he learned his father would not be coming, constitutes what Wollheim in *The Thread of Life* calls an 'mnemic symbol': "an hysterical symbol which represents somatically some aspect or constituent of the forgotten event" (1984:133). Marlow's skin, so sensitive it cannot be touched; the subject of sex and skins against skins when touched reveals sadism, fear, disgust, anxiety all in his double, Binney.

Freud wrote that "hysterics suffer mainly from unconscious reminiscences." Wollheim explains that the "event in an hysteric's life which is excessive by being in the present although originating in the past was at the time it occurred conscious or preconscious." The traumatic events which Philip witnessed or knew about, and which occurred in close proximity to one another, were the scene of his mother's sexual encounter with Raymond and her suicide, but these were forgotten until his encounters with Dr. Gibbon had allowed him to work through some of his defences against remembering. This working through is first centred primarily in the substitutive

Skinscapes narrative before Marlow is finally able to find his child's voice and enter Philip's narrative.

Raymond/Binney/Finney are doubles who serve a variety of functions for Marlow. (They are intertextually figured as doubles by being played by the same actor.) They represent projections of Marlow's hatred, sadism, and desire to humiliate women which were responses to being made to feel small by his mother and his teacher both of whom were eager to blame him. All are patterned on the first encounter between Philip's mother and Raymond which from the child's point of view was perplexing, frightening, and exciting. The scene of the seduction was full of incomprehensible and dangerous sounds.

Once Freud had repudiated the seduction theory, he posited that memories of a passive sexual experience are made unconscious not because of the character of the event but because of the impulses and desires that are expressed in or associated with those events by the observer. Guilt by association causes memories to be forgotten. An oedipal reading of Marlow's symptomatic narratives accounts for his misogynist attitudes to all women, who are patterned stereotypically after the tarts and sexy cabaret singers of his thriller story. His disgust at sex is a product of his repressed fixation to an incestuous object. Humiliating the woman with whom he has sex has an overdetermined function: it assures him that she deserves his hatred; it assures him that his object of desire is not his mother while simultaneously allowing him to identify with Raymond, who both possessed his mother and sniggered at her. If the woman is already a whore then he saves himself from identifying with George (a Raymond double) the licentious defiler of starving, blond, German women, frightened rabbits in bombed out cities. The war never ended for Philip. Raymond and Binney are projections of his devalued and repudiated part-self which wanted mother to himself, but which also identified with the desire of her lover, Raymond, who was construed as replacing him as his mother's object of desire. When Philip identifies himself with the aggressor, Raymond (who, through condensation, becomes the cause of the destruction of family unity, the loss of his father, and the suicide of his mother), Philip's adult desire can only be accommodated in a compulsive repetition of fetishistic sexual acts with endlessly substitutable prostitutes, since none is the mother-

- "pro-stitute" meaning one "who stands in for someone else" (Laing, 1969 in Coates, 1983: 200). He is both confirming that the prostitutes are not his mother while expressing his rage and horror at the original scene of the shagging he witnessed when he, like Binney, asks the woman he has paid to have sex with: "Doesn't it disgust you, what you do? Being paid to stretch yourself out, and let a stranger enter you?" (p. 59). All the villains are parts of Marlow himself; all women he desires, by definition, the recipients of his projected feelings of self-disgust, fear of being found small, and of death, which originated in his childhood misreadings of the adult world.

"Implicated without choice in the slippery catastrophe of the copulations which splatter us into existence" (p. 58), Marlow has spent a life trying to write away the intolerable feelings and persecutory internal objects that came out of contiguous events one summer near the end of the war. The Fall from Eden myth asserts its legacy in Marlow's bifurcated imaginary world: there is the fallen world of Skinscapes, Christopher Marlow's "And where Hell is, there must we ever be-", the world in which the Singing Detective pursues Binney, the double-agent. Philip, duplicitous Binney, feels himself to be a traitor to both parents. While taking the place of his father (by virtue of desiring mother), and physically replacing him (protecting his mother on the train against the advances of a soldier), Philip feels he is deserting him. He is guilty for not protecting his father against the gossip of the village. He is guilty for not having defended his father against his mother's attacks of not "being a man" (p. 69). Guilt for his parents' separation is the aftermath of being blamed by the mother for an unrelated event, the argument in the grandparents' house. The weightiest guilt is for the naked, dead body of a beautiful woman pulled out of the filthy Thames: after Philip revealed to his mother that he had been an accomplice to her infidelity, an observer, a voyeur, she committed suicide by jumping from a bridge. Marlow's world is henceforth a dead universe (a barren forest) devoid of Grace or meaning; the moment prior to the revelation, the glare and screech of the subway train, destined to be a blinding refrain as the Singing Detective croons, "You always hurt the one you love." Marlow has the child's sense of all the good gone from life along with the persecutory sense that he is the criminal. The seething, bubbling eruptions of his leprous skin mark him as Job in a fallen universe, but it is also a

fabrication, a *masque* to disguise the duplicitous source of his hatred of the world. Says Marlow of writers, "We are all cannibals..We eat up others to protect ourselves."

In the condensation Binney/Raymond occupies the hated status of collaborator: Philip gave the teacher what she wanted, whatever answers were needed to keep his 'good little boy' mask intact. Sex and submissiveness (to be protected against by sadism), collaboration and filth are united in the jeering school children's chant, "Clever Dick! Clever Dick! Makes me sick! Clever Dick! Clever Dick! Give her arse a lick!" (p. 76). His Intelligence is later turned to nefarious ends, collaborating with the cheap entertainment industry by day, writing trashy literature that only uses "four letter words" (p. 188); plotting his revenge on Binney, the murderer of his mother, by night.

Marlow writes Nicola a role to avenge his mother. When Binney is stabbed through the neck, Marlow finds himself in touch with feelings of remorse and tenderness for Nicola. Until the recovery of repressed affect-laden wishes, Marlow had lived in the child's horror of the worst double-bind possible, one whose cruelty was proven again when he shared sweets with Ali, who was shortly to die of a heart attack:

Marlow: Don't trust anybody again! Don't give your love. Hide in yourself.
Or else they'll die. They'll die. And they'll hurt you! Hide! Hide!
(p. 232)

It is out of this fear of his own omnipotence that Philip, returning alone to his grieving father, silences his father's endearments lest the scarecrow of death overhear them. Once Marlow learns to mourn, as he learns from remembering having caught his father howling with grief and rage in the woods at the loss of his wife, he discovers that the most beautiful word in the world is "elbow," the site of the first lesion, the site of the healing process. It is only with Marlow's murder by the good part-self, the defender of virtue and truth and affect, that the strains of *Peg o' My Heart* fade away.

As it is not my object to pretend to an arbitration of comparative hypotheses about Marlow's psychopathology (paranoid, obsessional, hysterical) or the psychopathology that organizes the repetition compulsion's operation in *The Singing Detective*, I want to underline other tendencies in the narratives which allow for a reading beyond the paranoid hypothesis.¹³

It is precisely this paranoid view of human relations, as expressed in the detective/thriller genre, that *The Singing Detective* as metafiction comments on and surpasses because of its emphasis on the creativity of language and paradox. First of all, *The Singing Detective* puts into question any simple pleasures to be derived from Manichean oppositions, the elemental foundation of the ideological level of detective novels such as those written by Ian Fleming (Eco, 1979: 145-174).¹⁴ While it offers a familiar cultural form where plot is informed by an oedipal logic, and a panoply of stereotypes and representations that demand a resisting reading, it also undermines that logic by presenting a man's struggle toward agency and out of the sway of those sexist roles and stereotypes under which he too suffered. From one point of view, the oedipal logic of the text is confirmed, the Singing Detective as Marlow walks away with a loving, long suffering wife, Nicola.

But it is not the same Singing Detective/Marlow bifurcated character that we have known: the quest of this modernist hero has not been Oedipus' destiny--blindness--but insight and integration which came out of a recovery of affective memories, a mourning of that which had been lost and could never be retrieved, and with it a capacity to feel empathy and sorrow and compassion for others. Understanding what had in the past to be split off because it provoked intolerable anxiety leads not only to greater tolerance of similar anxiety plots in the future and a diminished necessity to perform repetitive readings of those plots. New ones beckon. This is to say that Marlow the "neurotic-subject-as-agent," once returned to his boyhood enthusiasm and capacity to love, has the power to face an unchanged world with new expectations for himself and for women in his life. If we were to ask will Philip Marlow continue to find the paranoid world of detective fiction expressive of his world view, we would say, "Probably not." Or, if he did, he might choose parodic inspiration from a work by Dennis Potter called *The Singing Detective*.

5.7 Affects and a pre-oedipal interpretation

I would argue that a palindromic reading of *The Singing Detective*, as expressive of an Oedi-ideo/pathology, cannot account for the victory of psychic integration represented by Marlow's murder by the Singing Detective nor can it deal

with questions of separation and dependency, vulnerability and loss. A pre-oedipally inspired reading of *The Singing Detective* draws its inspiration from Marlow's skinscapes as communicative of a primordial form of anguish. It represents a double polarity of terror: "that of losing one's psychic and bodily limits and dissolving into the Other, and that of desiring this fusional form of psychic death" (MacDougall, 1980: 8) This other dimension of the psychic reality, which cannot be accounted for by the Freudian hypothesis of phallic-oedipal tensions underlying neurotic symptomatology, led the psychoanalyst Joyce MacDougall to look for other ways to understand the urgency and despair associated with sexual perversions. She suggests another desire is being pursued, "one that is more global and more archaic so that in many cases it may bypass the aim of orgasmic end pleasure and the dimension of love" (p. 8). Perversion enables the individual not to lose all satisfaction of instinctual desire while not encountering the threat of losing himself in relation to another.

In this exchange (with a real or fantasied object) the subject recovers not only his self-image and identity feeling, but also the assurance that no one is destroyed. This latter guarantee is a cardinal element in that the fierce wish to attack the threatening object of desire is aimed, in the unconscious, at the earliest and most beloved objects. (p. 9)

I want to argue that the recurrent themes of flight from dependency and fear of vulnerability, which are defended against by Marlow's choice of detective fiction and its reassuring male and female role models, evoke anxieties of an earlier, more primitive type around a different loss than that expressed through castration anxieties (represented by the sadistic, authoritarian teacher and Raymond's possession of Mrs. Marlow). It is the loss of the state of omnipotence experienced by the child in the earliest months, what Melanie Klein calls the "paranoid-schizoid" phase. It is associated with phantasies of incorporation: of destroying the object of pleasure (the breast) by its greediness, and having that devouring greed turned in on itself to be experienced as a persecutory internal object. The ambivalence of the desire to have 'within' the good object by devouring it, which also expresses an aggressive, envious desire toward the object of satisfaction is found in common incorporative expressions toward things we enjoy, "She just ate up all the attention she was getting," or towards a loved one: "I'm going to eat you all up." Raymond, who embarrasses the self-conscious Bett by his admiration of her breasts, says, "I could bit a piece out of tha',

and that's the trooth..." (p. 116); "Bite tha'. I could bite tha', my babby. Sweet as an apple..." (p. 117). After their hasty coupling something more moving than genital lust passes between them.

Raymond: All the same, my beauty. Thee's **still** got lovely 'uns! Again, his hand moves up to cup her breast. It looks for a moment as though she is going to protest or to stop him. But, suddenly, in a spasm of quick feeling, she covers his hand with her hand. Other feelings, other emotions, appear to be engaged, rather than simple desire.

Mrs. Marlow: Raymond?

Raymond: (*Tenderly*) Oh, my babby. My babby.

Mrs. Marlow: Do you-mean it?

Raymond: My lovely soft babby.

He gently presses her back on the grass again, and begins to lick her face.
(pp. 115-116)

In hospital, Marlow's ironical outburst to the doctors describes his condition all too well despite its intent to make them aware they were infantilizing him:

Marlow: (*Cutting in*) I don't understand because I seem to have regressed into the helpless and pathetic condition of total dependency. Of the kind normally associated with infancy. (...) The last time I experienced anything like this was in my bloody pram! Being drooled over by slobbering cretins... They thought they were doctors and nurses. (p. 27)

His swollen joints and scabrous body leave him helpless under the ministrations of the nurses, to comic effect, when the "only part of him that still works" works with Nurse Mills. However, the emotions of the *infans*, the infant without a language through which to take control of his environment and without bodily coordination to give him independence, are well-known by Marlow:

Helpless and marooned, in a kind of sitting position on the edge of the bed, within a space now like a tent because the curtains are closed, Marlow gasps and struggles and sucks in his breath in pain and--more importantly for him--a terrible inner rage and sense of humiliation. The passion of it momentarily passes and he holds himself dead still. (p. 6)

Skinscapes is the somatized expression of psychic conflict in the *infans*; the musical register--the forest birds, the wind in the trees, the songs sung by Marlow's father, with its prototype in the first caretaker's voice, is the original grammarless language of rhythms and bodily caresses soothing to the infant. The Singing Detective's songs, the magical aura of Philip's serene forest where he sat in the elbow

of a natural innocence are all expressions of that early state of bliss with the mother, a fusional state. Marlow takes his first, tottering steps, down from his tree perch and into relatedness with Nicola, when he gets out of bed and shouts like an exuberant and delighted child secure in the vision of an idealizing parent's eye, "Look at me! I did it! I walked! I can walk! Look at me!" (p. 242).

De Lauretis claims that "narrative film is the structure of a *memory-spectacle*, the perpetual story of a 'one time', a discovery perpetually remade with safe fictions" (1984: 27). *The Singing Detective* works on a problem of seeing, but it goes beyond being another production of a "drama of vision" while capitalizing upon the very desires to reenact forbidden scenes. It problematizes the culturally conventional ways men view women but not the origins of the psychodynamic mechanisms which express themselves through available cultural forms, such as the detective genre. Marlow sees the world through the dichotomous classifications of the detective genre; however, when the Singing Detective triumphs, it is unlikely that he will write any more detective fiction unless it should happen to take a parodic form.

The Singing Detective ironises the "discovery perpetually remade of safe fictions, an image of woman as beauty, desired as remembered" by repeating the image of a woman--beautiful, passive, glistening--but dead; one who is indeed remembered, with grief and regret--as murdered. It ironises the code of visual beauty, filling the screen with close-up shots of a destroyed landscape, the furrows and eruptions of Marlow's face. When he makes his antihero a 'scabby leper,' Potter has turned our expectations for visual pleasure into a test and vindication of the power of plotting to contextualize that (dis)pleasure.

The Singing Detective eschews the linear form of narrative expressing an oedipal logic and asks a different question about a son's desire than one designed to be answered by the oedipal situation. *It asks about the origins of a sense of the self as integrated.* The original threat to that sense of plenitude and bliss of the nursing child is the loss of the omnipotence associated with that first state of non-differentiation before ambivalence toward the mother sets in. Ambivalence is expressed in the form of splitting 'good' object from 'bad': the mother's breast, sometimes gratifying and timely sometimes not, is experienced as two different objects by the child. Splitting

allows for destructive aggression to be expressed toward the bad object, while the breast as good internal object remains unharmed. A similar splitting, characterizing a lack of tolerance for anxiety toward contradictory qualities in the same object, is the process out of which the characters in Marlow's narratives are created. The template for these good and bad guys, inherited from detective fiction, which *expresses a culturally acceptable form of defence against persecutory anxieties*, allows that they share no common qualities. There must be a detective, searching for truth, and a villain.

These all too familiar character types represent positions taken up toward vulnerability and dependency, within a cultural vocabulary open to males, and adopted by Marlow as Everyman. The text shows this bifurcation as the work of projection. The text shows how a female body is made to bear a meaning and an affect quota through the cultural discourse of the detective/thriller which coincides with the meaning attributed by the misogynist. It enacts the circumstances out of which one boy's particular fears and incomprehensions and child desires coalesced into fantasies with a powerful affect quota which underpin that child's subsequent capacity to make sense of his experience. It contextualizes specifically male-gendered meanings of woman by showing them to be the work of bifurcation within the male textual voice. It shows this process of attribution of characteristics not to be natural but specific to childhood experiences: the thriller provides a culturally available language for the child's projections. But since we are there at the 'scene of reading' these misogynist representations and paranoid processes are shown as one type of position available and attractive to some selves by which to cope, not only with the oedipal situation, but with the dilemma presented by the conflicts around separation and dependency, vulnerability and desires for omnipotence. However, taking up a position in a misogynist or paranoid discourse is shown to be a partial solution based on denial of contradictory desires within the subject.

Juliet Mitchell says in *Women, the Long Revolution*, that if castration is a means of talking about how each sex organizes its relation to a loss of completeness (the loss of being all that satisfies mother), then the sense of wholeness has to be recaptured by each in a different way (Freud's dubious version was through phallic

potency in the male and having a child in the female.) If we, as readers, are always detectives then, perhaps, gender in the reader is the mystery each is trying to solve, that being the particular logic governing his or her own compromises between desire and satisfaction that is most poignantly repeated in the struggle with loss and longing. Perhaps gender difference can only be thought as the particular form the struggle for dominance among a multiplicity of sexually marked voices takes in the body of an individual, whether man or woman. Defining gender in terms of intrapsychic reality--in terms of identifications and how they are motivated--implies that we need think of the category 'gender' as a much wider, more flexible and relational concept than has been allowed by the work of feminist literary theorists such as Fetterley and Schweickart. It must allow for the taking up of positions of identification with the part-selves of detective fiction as part of a process of dealing with anxieties. And that process of identification may become a mutative one in the context of a reflexive text such as *The Singing Detective*.

5.8 Taking responsibility for oedipal logics

The Singing Detective takes responsibility for its paranoid fears and misogyny by exploring the fantasies implicit in the detective genre. Indeed, it practices a show trial of sorts: the author of such fiction is summarily executed; the detective gets his man. Perhaps, it could be argued that rather than exploiting or reproducing the fears aroused by its palimpsestic structure, it contains these fears through the pleasure associated with parodic and paradoxical juxtapositionings. It goes beyond an oedipal logic precisely by producing a polyphonic reconsideration of the oedipal situation, which is not only about the Forbidden but about the Impossible--the impossibility of remaining symbiotically attached, the impossibility of relatedness without the fear of losing the boundaries of the self. Since it seeks integration of the part-selves produced by the dual mechanisms of splitting and projection rather than reproducing these, this text could be considered to reinstate a cohesive self-in-division even as it destroyed the textual subject as a dependable narrating voice.

Finally, we would want to ask: Who or what principle authors the Singing Detective's murder of his creator, Marlow? The answer is to be found in the

equivalency between the labour of writing memories into existence--peeling away the skin to escape from what "Yellow mellow curls at the edges. Breaks. Goes rotten" (p. 50)--and the process of discovering what terrors splitting is a defence against. Both reveal the desire for integration. That process is best practised in the "as-if" or "transitional" space of metafiction where the mutative process of writing/reading lies not with recovering the *fabula* of an ancient story out of which comes some kind of immediate understanding but of achieving understanding through the process of *discours*, of narrating one's past into a story of which one feels oneself to be a part, and of tolerating the contradictions. Whereas the Oedipal situation reveals the power of an englobed narrative, the Sphinx's riddle, *The Singing Detective* celebrates the power of paradox and contradiction, expressed in narrative as the triumph of the figure/ground reversal of the Möbius strip, the moment of losing boundaries to identify with the perspective of the other. 'Reality' has become for the reader as for the writer/speaker the narrating space itself, a boundary zone without beginning or seam, locating the narrator differently even as he draws the map of his memories in which to find his bearings from which his perspective on the terrain of those memories constantly changes.

The thriller is the stage on which the two fundamental aspects of external reality, the Forbidden and the Impossible, are played out. The process of ironic reframing of the thriller genre such as we find within *The Singing Detective*, which puts its own strategies of coherence into question and those of the thriller as well, might promote the kind of reading that a theory of feminist reading would like to support. That is, not just the refusal of insulting, hackneyed images and plots but an ironic 'revisioning' play with them, designed to take the anxiety out of their influence and the authority out of any repetitively fixed spectator or subject position they might solicit. While celebrating the oedipal logic of narrative and seemingly reinforcing oedipal themes by juxtaposing the oedipal myth with the thriller as cultural form, *The Singing Detective* ultimately refuses the narrative closure that such a logic requires and recontextualizes castration anxiety by a preoedipal reading. It creates conditions of reading where the illicit and pleasurable identification with the 'oedipal' hero, a private 'dick' in a trenchcoat, by women readers, feminist readers, all readers need

neither be resisted *a priori* as immasculating, or disowned since such an identification, as well as our defences against it, is resisted through the disruption of genre conventions and narrative form, provoking the reader's 'private eye' to pursue the criminal double in herself.

The Singing Detective shows that Marlow's 'I' is suspect; we, as readers, can never observe our 'I' observing except through the interpretations and observations of others, in this case, of the text-as-analyst. While the text works on the problem of the origins of the disembodied voice, the logic of patterning, the intertext of the manifest content, it explores splitting within the self and the necessarily intersubjective origins of a sense of self. Its aim is two-fold: to include the intertext of its own developments as an hermeneutical problem for the reader, while making the reader's reading activity more transparent thereby revealing to her the operations of her reading/interpretative processes structured by her own, peculiar intertext, her fantasy. Thus, *The Singing Detective* both presents the processes by which an "I" tries to apprehend itself apprehending the world while simultaneously, on another plane of interpretation, enabling the reader to enact that same struggle with herself. Catching herself reading the text, catching her own fantasy at work, is the process of contemporaneous gazing 'from the inside out' and 'from the outside in' which the metafictional text-as-analyst sets in motion both within the textual fantasy and between itself and the real reader.

CHAPTER FIVE: ENDNOTES

1. In addition to her comprehensive Bibliography in *Psychoanalytic Criticism. Theory in Practice* (1984), see Elizabeth Wright's excellent introduction to the relation of psychoanalytic theory to the theories of literature and the arts, and the way that developments in both domains have brought about changes in critical practices. Also see the groundbreaking 1977 collection of essays in *Yale French Studies*, Special issue on *Literature and Psychoanalysis. The Question of Reading: Otherwise* 55/56, particularly Shoshana Felman's essay. Felman's description of the positions of identification the reader takes up while reading Poe's "The Turn of the Screw" is now the 'classical' analysis of reading as transference.

2. In fact, awareness of the inescapability of the 'interference' called transference by the anthropologist George Devereux in the 1960's provided a new criteria for objectivity and scooped volumes such as Clifford and Marcus (1986) and Marcus and Fischer (1986) by two decades:

Objectivity results from the creative control of consciously recognized irrational reactions, without loss of affect, whereas in countertransference resistances irrational and unconscious defensive reactions are denied and affect inhibited to the point where neurotic isolation occurs. (Devereux, *From Anxiety to Method in the Behaviour Sciences*, pp. 100-101 in Marotti, 1978: 473)

See note #3 in the Introduction on Devereux's discussion of counter-transference in the behavioural sciences.

3. This view of the therapeutic has been drawn from "The Curative Factors in Psychoanalysis" in *The Work of Hanna Segal* (1986), pp. 69-80.

4. Dennis Potter's screenplay *The Singing Detective* was the basis of a 6 hour televisual serial by the same name first broadcast on BBC Television in 1986. It was refused by the three American networks and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. However, Canadians receiving either or both PBS from Plattsburgh, New York or TV Ontario, Ontario's cultural cable channel, would have been able to see it between October and December, 1988. This screen drama resists programmers' simple categories of 'art' or 'popular culture' by confusing them. Its status as a category mistake, along with its unusual screening time, contributed to its indigestibility for the commercial networks.

5. We recall that **prolepsis** refers to any narrative manoeuvre, by the narrator not the focal character, consisting of evoking or narrating in advance an event that will take place later. This is what we conventionally call foreshadowing. **Analepsis** is any evocation after the fact of an event that took place earlier than the point in the story where we are at any given moment (Genette, 1980: 40).

6. Holquist's thesis is that "what structural and philosophical presuppositions of myth and depth psychology were to Modernism (Mann, Joyce, Woolfe, etc.), the detective story is to Post-Modernism (Robbe-Grillet, Borges, Nabokov, etc.). These works are marked by "recurring patterns of experience, those paradigmatic human occasions that seem to happen outside of time: the trauma of being cast into the world in birth, the sorrows of travel, the joys of love, and the mystery of death...in the Modernist period there was a conscious attempt to get at the archetypal ahistorical meaning of such events..." (1971: 146-7).

7. A sample of Chandler's notebooks (1976) shows that he wrote himself short notes comparing English and American styles of writing, and lists of all sorts: titles for novels and short stories ("The Man with the Shredded Ear," "They Only Murdered Him Once", "The Corpse came in Person", "Twenty Inches of Monkey"), San Quentin Prison Slang ("back door parole-die in prison, "croaker"-doctor, "Dinah"-nitroglycerine), Narcotics Squad Slang ('fancy pants'-to act cagily, 'Hard Harry'-a hard guy), Hollywood Slang ('garbo'-a high hat, 'toots'-chorus boy (getting stale), fluff-baby doll); Pickpocket Lingo ("kiss the dog'-work face to face with the victim, 'stiff'-a newspaper or other shield to hide operations), Similes and Comparisons ("Lonely as a caboose of a fifty car freight", "As shiny as a clubwoman's nose"), even a list of Chandlerisms ("I left her with her virtue intact, but it was quite a struggle. She nearly won", "He wanted to buy some sweetness and light and not the kind that comes through the east window of a church").

8. Object-relations theory would hypothesize the transitional object, as a fantastic elaboration of the 'good mother,' allows the child to retain the mother as a good internal object. Where a transitional object is not available to the child, s/he may respond with lack of recognition or disinterest when the mother does return. This signals that distress at her absence had become too great. It can be accompanied by the psychic process of 'Verlungneung' or foreclosure. The child 'kills off' the desired object not by repression but by splitting which is revealed initially as an affectless state toward the actual parent.

Recent work on the theory and method of treating adolescent incest victims in psychoanalytic psychotherapy has identified repetition of the incestuous fixation to the abuser to be a constant in the transference (within the analytical couple, the analyst takes that identification for the patient). Moreover the adolescent girl's frequent sexual promiscuity and seductiveness, her desire to be available to all the needs of the abuser, derives from her identification with the aggressor (frequently a paternal or fraternal abuser). Repetition of seduction can be understood as a means of confirming that she has survived the trauma, while masking the extreme depression due to maternal abandonment and lack of love which are the usual precursors to abuse in incestuous families (Bigras, 1990).

9. The psychiatric profession is parodied through Dr. Gibbon. He presents the conflict between belief in authoritative historical accounts, as represented by one whose name became cultural coin for the invocation of objectivity, certainty, and unquestionable values and a name, Gibbon, also associated with the comic spectre of a

monkey. The doctor paces the room, jumps on the desk, sallies attacks, lies, is a dubiously trustworthy caretaker of secrets in an embodiment of everything pompous, silly, theatrical of common depictions of the professions' practitioners. He doesn't need a couch or chair since Marlow brings his own. Yet he is strangely different: he does not push tablets on Marlow (or at least respects his reasons for not taking them). He is an acutely sensitive reader of Marlow's work, appreciates the lyrical passages, and astutely discerns Marlow's shame in writing detective fiction. Although experienced in the decline and fall of human empires, he is perhaps best equipped to understand Marlow since he, like his namesake, directed his "most insidious railery, his most relentless reason,...against the Christian religion" (Virginia Woolf, *Collected Essays*, Vol. 1, p. 119)

10. A Möbius strip is a one-sided continuous surface formed by twisting a long rectangular strip of material 180° and joining the ends. It looks like a three-dimensional infinity sign.

11. According to de Saussure the twin notions of arbitrariness and difference are the main constituting features that establish the systematic character of *langue*. Just as Binney is suspicious of coincidence as the explanation for the series of commonalities between his life and Marlow's script which they have stolen, we have been cued to be suspicious that it is due to coincidence alone that proximities play such a role in *The Singing Detective*. Rather Potter seems to be making a contribution to the debate on the arbitrary nature of the sign. Giddens notes (1979: 14) that the notion of arbitrariness, as used by Saussure, "seems to have been used to make at least two points...*langue* is not in any sense an intended product of the activity of the subjects who are the language speakers. The second is to stress the conventional nature of the sign, in the sense in which 'convention' is ordinarily employed by British and American philosophers...." The examples Saussure offered to document the second claim "do not concern this bond... (*but*) only the nature of the signifier.

12. The other two possibilities, after Lucien Dallenbach's study in *Le Récit spéculaire*, are: firstly, "a simple reduplication, in which the mirroring fragment has a relation of similitude with the whole that contains it." And, secondly, a type consisting of "repeated reduplication 'in infinitum' in which the above-mentioned mirroring fragment bears within itself another mirroring fragment, and so on." In Hutcheon (1980: 55-56).

13. Part of Potter's parodic work has been to scatter clues widely to reference intertextually a variety of Freudian hypotheses with which he could expect a certain portion of his audience to be familiar: certainly Rat Man: a Case of an Obsessional Neurosis" comes to mind, as does his "On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love" (1912)

14. Witness John Le Carré's response to North American critics of his most recent work, *The Russia House* which has been released in the Soviet Union, who are presumed to be angry at him for taking away "their Cold War toys" ("The chill at the end of the Cold War," *The Globe and Mail*, September 29, 1989, A7). "Spy books," he

notes of his detractors' disappointed expectations apparently, "should celebrate our incompatibility, our specialness, our insularity, our superiority. Anything else, why that's just treating with the enemy." Calling for end to the "blinkered jargon and sleazy antagonisms of a vanished era," the British author sees another future for detective fiction: to dream an awakening "from the morbid confinement of Cold War belligerence," to set in circulation a new set of cultural expectations and myths, a new script which we want to make play.

CHAPTER SIX

The 'Recovery' Phenomena: Narrative Strategies in Search of the Self through Idioms of Family Dysfunction as Illness

The television program begins, screen dark, tentative notes from a piano can be heard, invisible fingers searching out a melody. Then a collage of black and white still photographs, Black families, Chinese families, White families, Native American families. Intimate groupings of two, three or five--grizzled father, middle aged daughter, granddaughter; two sisters embracing; a young couple--posed like those you see in the window of professional photography studios, smiling into the camera, smiling at you and me so calmly.

At the end of each part of the broadcast, as the picture fades away into the PBS station fundraising break, the last image to be seen is of a father walking away down a brilliantly coloured autumn country lane hand in hand with his tiny daughter. The past ever so briefly walking hand in hand with the future. Piano notes, sighing.

In this series I offered a new understanding of emotional health and illness, as well as an understanding of the way this health and illness is multigenerationally transmitted. This book offers you a way to recover your lost childhood self, as well as a platform to begin the journey of discovering your true self.

(John Bradshaw, 1988a: viii)

6.1 Disturbing (Dis)positions: Commercializing habits of the heart through the 'recovery' movement

"Recovery from what?" is the first question which comes to mind about the cultural phenomenon in the self-help field becoming known as the 'recovery' movement. In the sub-field of self-help literature with which I am concerned the answer *grosso modo* is recovery from compulsive or addictive behaviour. Recovery books construe a definition of normalcy and health by virtue of defining what constitutes illness. Recovery puts into circulation, in mass culture, a language of self-reference based on an understanding of the self as afflicted or victimized. The modality in which the self suffers affliction is an illness, 'codependence,' due to family 'dysfunction.' Dysfunction focuses attention on the idea that we are parts of

larger units and challenges the view that an individual's life is a personally authored story. The recovery movement is underpinned by beliefs about the relationship between childhood experience and adult behaviour, and by premises about patterns of behaviour and feeling and identification which 'victims' of dysfunctional families continue to reproduce throughout their lives.

Concerned with issues of psychic suffering and healing, the recovery movement subsumes several forms of cultural practice in contemporary North America: there are 15 million Americans in 500,000 recovery groups; 300 recovery bookstores in the United States which stock nothing but recovery self-help books, visual and audio tapes; several television series shown on PBS for the first time in 1990 and 1992; recovery evening and weekend seminars offered by travelling therapist-lecturers. The majority of bookstore customers buying recovery books are believed to be between 30 and 50 and college-educated. According to analysts in the book publishing industry, women are responsible for 75%-85% of the total sales in recovery books. Recovery is marketed more by word of mouth than through the media:

Word of mouth counts even more than an appearance on *Oprah*. The importance of an author's grass-roots reputation is not lost on mainstream acquisition [book] editors. "We look for people who have something of a name on the recovery circuit, who are reaching out to people, before they get to the book.

(Jones, 1990: 18)

The underground which can create bestsellers is the seminar speaking circuit where an author's own experience with dysfunction and with, in the lingo, 'working a program' is vital to developing a following. John Bradshaw was introduced in Canada through weekend seminars organized by LifeCycle Learning, an organization which offers seminars through cooperation with The Canadian Association for Children of Alcoholics. Specialized bookstores, starting up to meet the demand created by these road therapists, carry only books the owner and employees recommend. They too are members of self-help groups. Recovery is also being marketed through professional referrals from the medical and social work communities and by mail through the catalogues of specialized presses such as Hazeldean and Health Communications, Inc. Bradshaw's series "Homecoming" was so popular, WGBH, the PBS affiliate in Plattsburgh, New York decided to program a full weekend of these tapes as part of its

quarterly fundraising. Bonus gifts for pledges were Bradshaw books and audiotapes.¹ The question may no longer be, 'why study recovery?' but 'how to study recovery, this amalgam of 'how-to' books and group therapies which aims to help readers understand the feelings that lead them to their problems?''²

In the Preface to *BRADSHAW ON: The Family*, one of the self-help recovery movement's bestselling authors John Bradshaw explains that the book is an amplification of ideas presented without manuscript or teleprompters before a live television audience on PBS; "[c]onsequently the material often lacked detail. In that medium this lack was acceptable as my goal was to present material not only for content but also for *emotional impact on the listener*" (1988a: viii). What the television series lost in depth and development of Bradshaw's ideas it gained in emotional impact not only through demonstrations of the techniques used in recovery group therapy as Bradshaw advocates it be practiced but through his own compelling rhetorical presence, a hybrid of educator, faith healer, and priest. Produced by the intersection of a variety of discourses, the notions of what it is to be in 'recovery' are intertwined with concepts of health and illness, the sacred, authenticity, individualism, morality, and rationality. Premises from the Christian religion and holistic spirituality, ego psychology and Jungianism, systems theory and child psychology all make an appearance in a collection of texts which can, by virtue of their shared premises and stylistic characteristics, be called the discourse of 'recovery.'

As a member of the home television audience, I reluctantly found myself to be a fascinated 'ideal reader/spectator' for the series "On: Homecoming" and "Creating Love." Bradshaw, as a 'spiritual systems theorist,' can be mesmerizing. I wondered if I might be a candidate for a recovery self-help group for recovery addicts? Did I need to 'recover' from this reluctant but overweening compulsion to watch twenty hours worth of his two series of programs, to probe the source of my own tears as I complied with his instruction to visualize painful scenes from childhood or spellbound watched taped sequences of group work? What's wrong with me? As a reasonably astute culture critic with agnostic tendencies, I should be repelled by these blatantly manipulative exercises in sentimentality and voyeurism, shouldn't I? This is "Dear Abby" for 30-somethings; Bradshaw, the Oprah Winfrey of the soft therapy set. What

would my marxist colleagues in Cultural Studies think or the deconstructionists over in the English Department?

It is the case that the 'self-healing,' or more colloquially known 'self-help,' literature is a despised form; its seminars and group therapy a target for journalists cum amateur social anthropologists to do some psychological slumming by attending an evening or weekend workshop for the self-professed unhappy and addicted in order to find material for a sexy article on the latest psychobabble craze that is sure to sell copy. What better reason do culture critics need to raise their curiosity than the strident, sneering declarations of unworthiness heaped on the self-healing movement, on the one hand, and the best-seller status of these publications, the crowds attending John Bradshaw workshops, on the other?

These books, quickly written and read, have been equated with intellectual junk food. Having been characterised as, "Part pop psychology, part spiritual thought-for-the-day, they range from simple-minded to scholarly...a typographic dog's breakfast, mixing scholarly footnotes, italics for case histories, large capitals for exhortatory headings and bold-type "affirmations" (I love myself. I will accept myself unconditionally) (*Globe & Mail*, 1991), they invite dismissal. "You gotta be a moron to read a book like that," says a senior publisher at McClelland & Stewart, while also noting that the younger staff at editorial meetings all say, "Great idea" to suggestions for new 'recovery' topics (*Globe & Mail*, 1991). The approach of critics and publishers alike to the recovery phenomenon suffers the consequences of cultural elitism. The 'knockers' take the position of patronizing recovery's consumers, denigrating the melodramatic categories (toxic shame, wounded inner child) and aphorisms masquerading as sociological insights, ridiculing its ideas and psychological pretensions to knowledge. For instance, critical reception of recovery books, by reviewers in the media, tend to lambast these books as 'simplistic', parading common-sense in the jargon of psychology (Kingwell, *Globe and Mail*, 22 Feb. 1992: C4). As psychobabble,

Long-suffering grown-ups are not helped in the crusade against infantilism by the psychobabble currently wafting its way across the Atlantic. "It's never too late to have a happy childhood," chirps sometime feminist guru Gloria Steinem, while Elizabeth Taylor

celebrates her 60th birthday gambolling round Disneyland, hand-in-glove with Mickey Mouse, and burbling about the child-within.

(*Elle*, July 1992: 53)

With few exceptions (*The Globe and Mail*, 'Focus,' Dec. 5, 1992), media reviewers rush to lump recovery books in with books for the new men's movement (Robert Bly, et al); sub-genre distinctions among these books elude their mass media reviewers.

The authors of self-help books and journalists are no longer the only writers today who have pounced on the selling potential of self-help topics. The turn by academics in a variety of disciplines to a perusal of the self-help field is part of the cultural process of absorbing recovery and, to use Miller's (1991) useful phrase, of reissuing it in divergent ideologies. For instance, the recovery movement, and codependency in particular, has been discussed in two recent books by the reputed Cambridge sociologist Anthony Giddens where the second *The Transformation of Intimacy. Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies* (1992), essentially a companion volume to the more scholarly *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (1991), is a thin, simply written text, with few footnotes, in large print, designed for the non-specialised reader. Where Giddens sees in the self-help movement, and recovery from codependency in particular, a vehicle introducing democratising tendencies to the sphere of intimate relations which he believes must have inevitable consequences for the public sphere, the American sociologist Robert Bellah and his fellow authors of *Habits of the Heart. Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (1985), in the same vein as Philip Rieff (1966) and Christopher Lasch (1979) before them, identify the therapeutic turn in American culture as a threat to the ideals and practices of democracy. In pedagogy, policy debates about design of educational curriculae have been recently contextualized by discussion of the "40% factor," the premise that 4 out of 10 children enrolled in the public school system have some sort of "subjective dysfunction," a personality problem which prevents them from learning no matter what the curriculum (Valpy, 1993); echoes of Bradshaw's dictum "relationship problems are learning deficits, children need a model for how to be intimate."

Giddens' specific interest in the addictions/codependency literature is not widely shared by his university colleagues nor is his apparent interest in writing for a

non-academic audience about serious issues (political theory) through the vehicle of a sexy, topical issue (sexual relations and self-help groups). Andrew Ross suggests why there has been notable academic resistance, particularly among his own colleagues in cultural studies, to such 'middlebrow' objects of study as the New Age and self-help movements.³ It is the middlebrow which "remains one of the largest challenges for cultural studies" if it is committed to creating a more democratic cultural politics, proposes Ross (1992: 537). As compared to popular culture,

the more contiguous field of middlebrow culture, when it is not passionately denigrated, is thought to be stale, flat, and unprofitable, its politics unremarkable, and its pretensions devoid of the edge that comes with the everyday alienation, as at least one version of populist cultural studies would put it, endured by the popular classes. I know, for example, that many of my fellow intellectuals think of New Age as the lowest of the low, and cringe on contact with evidence of its influence on their daily environments, while these same people can be passionately devoted to analyzing and talking about the cultural politics of TV soap opera....It is a symptom of the logic of cultural capital that the culturally wealthy can afford the kind of downward mobility which sanctions their devotion to the popular, while they police the cultural order by deriding the sub-legitimate middlebrow as only they can. The challenge for intellectuals, clearly, is to help create a more democratic cultural politics that would not be hamstrung by this logic.

(Ross, 1992: 536)

Quite apart from the distaste or reluctance of academics to study the recovery movement, the difficulty of the approach of cultural studies' researchers such as Ross and sociologists such as Giddens to the recovery phenomenon is that they convert and reduce the phenomenological experience and subjective moral significance of suffering of the many "I's" who speak in recovery workshops and therapy groups to an evaluation of the political effects of the discourse's presuppositions. That recovery is a discourse about a particular kind of suffering *and* a set of therapeutic practices for healing has been overshadowed by analyses of recovery, lumped together with New Age thinking, as a new battleground for debates about science and technology or about the politicizing of intimate relations. However, recovery discourse has import as a cultural text which not only sketches a social critique through a theory of illness but provides a hermeneutics of suffering along with healing practices to which many people, more women than men, in North America are turning. The primary social

significance of the ideological effect of this discourse lies precisely in the ideal of health that recovery proposes along with its effectiveness as a practice which reduces suffering; both become part of an overarching meaning system embodying distinctive ideals that may not coincide with the social norm:

Each [alternative healing system's] idea of health embodies its distinctive ideals. It is impossible to understand why a group uses healing as it does without first understanding what it considers to need healing--that is, what falls short of the norm of healthiness. It is difficult, however, to grasp a group's notion of health, because often the ideal is articulated only in formulating responses to illness. A group's overarching meaning system shapes its basic definitions of health....it is necessary to understand each group's ideals of health in terms of its larger belief system.⁴ (McGuire, 1988: 32) (my addition)

While it is difficult to measure how recovery discourse is changing people's beliefs and with what effect on social norms, issues on the public policy agenda, family welfare services, child counselling services, and so on, today in the therapy community composed of both professional medical (psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers) and lay practitioners, we find the recovery movement has met with quite a different reception than in scholarly circles. Recovery is being heralded as giving lay people a vocabulary with which to talk about their problems themselves. "Maybe if these books were literary masterpieces...the direct communication would be lost. The most scholarly books aren't necessarily the most popular; it's whatever tells people their own stories in straightforward language, whatever resonates with people," says the owner of a recovery bookstore in Toronto (*Globe & Mail*, 1991). It has been common practice for psychiatrists to supplement their treatment of patients with addictions by encouraging them to join an Alcoholics Anonymous self-help group (Galanter, 1990). Some even make attendance in such a group a condition of treatment. Only recently has this practice come under criticism in a book, which appeared on self-help shelves in bookstores, from a psychiatrist who "explores the psychological damage self-help methods can inflict" (Katz and Liu, 1991).

Critics who castigate these books as pabulum, as "toy town sentiments," are more concerned with recovery's conceptual deficits than in plumbing the reasons for its appeal to a particular group of consumers for whom, until recently, 'white,' 'Anglo-Saxon,' 'middle-class,' 'female,' and 'Protestant' have been the default values, or in

accounting for the impact of the healing recovery purports to effect on gender relations in the private sphere. There has been a lack of interest in the sociological question of the preconditions for the production of consumers for the idea of 'recovery'; or a cultural studies question of the figuration of a 'structure of feeling' for the 1990's by virtue of relations between the popularity of romance and passionate love for 40-something baby boomer cultural consumers and recovery's mysticism and reinvigoration of love; or in a discourse question concerning the preconditions for the production of a model reader for recovery's textual positions; or in a literary question about recovery books as a sub-genre of self-help writing; or in a medical anthropological question regarding the preconditions for the production of healing in recovery adherents. Neither have any of recovery's mass media commentators analysed the recovery phenomenon as a response to: a social crisis about morality, a generational crisis about spirituality, the failure of the myth of the 'moral ecology' of the home (Bellah, et al. 1985), a crisis of legitimation which occurs through the twin horrors of environmental degradation and a loss of trust and hope in the efficacy of the democratic political process, as a contribution to a debate on individualism, or as a particular class-bound fantasy of self-transcendence or completion. With the exception of reviewers writing in the trade journals of the publishing industry, no one has examined recovery as a marketing phenomenon nor as a form of cultural production which draws its 'artists' overwhelmingly from the so-called 'softer' health professions (psychology, social work, counselling). Nor have those writing in the media made a point of distinguishing between the discourse of recovery and recovery group work as discourse, between what recovery books say about the self, its suffering, and paths to healing, and the regularities of the narrative practices and emotion exercises required by recovery group work which constitute its specific technology of healing.

Although the recovery phenomenon offers many tantalizing avenues of investigation particularly, in my opinion, the burgeoning debate on the de- vs. re-politicization of the public sphere represented by the perspectives of Bellah and Giddens respectively, my interest in the therapy literature is limited in this chapter to the characteristics of recovery discourse in its codependency aspect for a cultural studies concerned with the import of emotion as an epistemological and ontological

category, and for the conceptual resources this discourse provides the contemporary self to read its suffering as a text with symbolic meaning. My objective is to examine the presuppositions of a small corpus of recovery books treating the topic of codependency, and John Bradshaw's work in particular, as a discourse which exhibits regularities with respect to how it formulates the meaning of illness, ideas of health and of the self, causes of illness, diagnoses, and the sources of healing effected by therapeutic practices. The treatment interventions and practices of recovery group work are described in the literature but they are also experientially available, in a limited fashion, through Bradshaw's taped series *Bradshaw On: The Family* (1990) and *Bradshaw On: Creating Love* (1992).⁵ It is these techniques which put into practice assumptions about the relation between cognition and emotion, language and affect, ritual and symbolisation in their effort to disturb the dispositions of recovery group members. The chapter concludes with a brief comparative discussion of the recovery healing system as ideology against notions of the ill self and the function of emotion in self-transformation proposed by Radway's analysis of romance reading and by *The Singing Detective*.

6.2 The meaning of illness in a healing system

From the point of view of medical anthropology, the discourse and therapeutic practices associated with the 'recovery' phenomenon function as an "indigenous healing system" (Kleinman, 1977) which provides alternative healing practices to biomedical models and practitioners. The recovery literature demonstrates the loose grouping of beliefs, many of which are contradictory, characteristic of an indigenous healing system and draws them from: systems theory, developmental psychology, family therapy, Christian spirituality, holistic religion. Its lack of systematicity allows for a 'pick and choose' approach which, in theory, makes it attractive to a diverse group of people who have no framework with which to arrive at a meaning for their suffering or an understanding of its sources.

The therapeutic practices associated with recovery as a healing system take the form of workshops of several days' duration and group meetings led by a counsellor, who may be someone trained in psychology, social work or counselling or,

alternatively, self-help groups led by a peer whose claim to legitimacy as a counsellor begins with personal experience of being "a victim in recovery."

Recovery from what? In the main, the discourse coheres around illness as a form of psychological compulsion which robs the sufferer of free will and choice; some authors treat addictions to substances (alcohol, drugs, caffeine, chocolate), others treat varieties of relationship addictions (sex addiction, work addiction, women who "love too much"). An emerging variety of relationship addiction which is gaining hegemonic status as the category subsuming every other addiction is 'codependency' (Beattie, 1987, 1989; Kasl, 1992; Schaef, 1986); others such as Bradshaw (1988a, 1988b), while participating in recovery discourse's intertextual dissemination of these ideas, has coined his own terms for the suffering created by compulsion/addiction in the more religious rhetoric of a 'hole in the soul', 'soul murder' and the 'wounded inner child.' This emphasizes psychological addiction and the suffering it produces by incapacitating the self's subjective sense of wholeness and capacity to choose. The codependency literature thus treads into the area known in psychoanalytic terms as 'intrapsychic autonomy' as defined by ego psychologists Hartmann and Mahler, although it eschews their technical vocabulary.

For Bradshaw, compulsion/addiction as a syndrome is expressed through a variety of behaviours: alcoholism, sexual acting out, codependency, where all are manifestations of an "addiction to being *victimized*" (1988a: 7) whose precondition was parental neglect and unresponsiveness to the vulnerable, developing self. In essence, recovery is taking up the medical profession's recent perspective on substance addiction as a physical condition for which some persons are genetically predisposed, even genetically *programmed* (rather than as a sign of moral defectiveness) and transferring it, along with its weighty teleology, to the realm of psychological addictions for which all families may potentially program their children.⁶

At the same time, an earlier view of addiction as a defence against some kind of suffering of a mental origin has been retained: so addiction has been formulated as both a symptom and a cause of suffering. Against the prevailing opinion in cross-cultural psychological anthropology of the availability in our Western culture of a psychological language of the self whose absence leads the members of non-Western

cultures to express psychiatric disorders and mental suffering through physical ailment (Pandolphi, 19 ; Kirmayer, 1989), recovery is promulgating the view that people in North America somatize. "Our addictions and compulsivities are our mood alterers. They...are our ways of managing our feelings" (Bradshaw, 1988a: 6).⁷

Recovery authors writing on codependency fall into two camps: the first issue from the self-help community created around twelve-step programs and addictions treatment (Beattie, Schaef) which has a myopic perspective on social theory, the second places the emphasis on social factors which need healing such as the family and interpersonal relations (Bradshaw, Kasl, Melody).

Unlike other types of alternative healing systems, namely Christian and metaphysical groups which advocate resignation or adapting to poor interpersonal relationships (McGuire, 1988: 94), codependency writers see problems as opportunities for making decisions, particularly choosing relationships and getting out of bad ones. For all authors, the emphasis is on personal healing, and the social critics in the group would argue social change begins by 'healing' individuals. This is also the message of Steinem's *Revolution from Within. A Book of Self-Esteem* (1992), a best-seller heavily influenced by Charlotte Davis Kasl's feminist reformulation of AA's twelve-step program that was originally published in *Ms.* in the late 1980's.⁸

Recovery discourse is riven by competing notions of the self, of emotion, of freedom, and it is in the management of these ambiguities that the ideological work of recovery as a social discourse is to be found. The category of emotion is the key concept or 'switching station' through which conflicts created by contradictory notions of the self, of free will, of the source of suffering, and of cure are managed and contained.

Codependency/addiction: Disease or illness?

Medical sociologist Meredith McGuire suggests an aspect of the appeal of 'alternative' healing medical systems is

their lack of sharp dichotomies between the meaning providing elements and their healing practices, in contrast with modern "scientific" medicine. Most contemporary Western physicians limit their help to the cure of *disease*--a biological disorder. They are generally unprepared to heal *illness*--the way the ill person experiences his or her disorder, in a

given social and cultural context. Alternative healing, by contrast, appears generally to address illness more than disease.

(McGuire, 1988: 6)

Western biomedicine or allopathic medicine, as it is known, reserves causality for disease processes and declines to talk about meaning. Whereas alternative healing systems talk about suffering, whether induced by a physical problem or not, in terms of a loss of meaning produced by a threat to the coherence and connectedness of the sufferer's lifeworld. In the recovery literature, disease and illness are usually employed interchangeably with respect to 'codependency.' Bradshaw calls codependency the "disease of the disease" of addiction (1988a: 209). The person suffering codependency is variously a 'victim,' 'survivor,' 'wounded inner child,' all allusions to the malevolence of the attack and the blamelessness of its object. By calling codependence a disease, recovery discourse relieves the survivor of responsibility for his condition while also making a claim for the meaningfulness of addiction or codependency in terms of a threat to intrapsychic wellbeing and to sociocultural norms of the good life.⁹ The dual focus of the addictions/codependency self-help movement has interesting parallels with a recent revival of a dormant tradition of thinking by the 'specialized, experts' in psychiatry and medical anthropology with respect to mental disorder, particularly schizophrenia. That tradition, associated with Harry Stack Sullivan, Edward Sapir, and Gregory Bateson considered mental disorder as "an interactive process rather than as a discrete disease entity" and schizophrenia as "a paradigmatic case for the analysis of fundamental human processes" (Jenkins, 1991: 388).

"Health" in recovery discourse is attached to a notion of a core self which is 'whole' where wholeness is a product of the successful completion of an epigenetic developmental process in which the child "got its needs met." The core self is also the 'true' self which, somewhat paradoxically, both preexists dysfunctional experience and can be refound through recovery therapy.¹⁰ This equivocation on the self as both a potential and an essence is the result of recovery's inheritance of both strains of romanticism bequeathed by the Enlightenment.¹¹

A crucial condition of satisfactory passage through the epigenetic developmental trajectory is free emotional expression. Where this has not been allowed

by the emotional environment of the family, a false self has come to occupy the place of the true self and personal growth is stunted. This false self, as opposed to being a role the self is uncomfortably aware of playing, refers to a split in the personality which remains outside of conscious awareness but which expresses itself in a subjective sense of malaise and in addiction behaviours of diverse sorts. Recovery's idea of the self could be defined as a configuration of interpersonal devices for protection against emotional distress and for seeking emotional comfort; consequently, the need to regulate emotional atmospheres created between interrelating selves is a significant part of what the dysfunctional self must do. The whole or true self is a self capable of choosing connectedness with others without the need to be in relationships where the reciprocity between selves in creating an emotional environment *must* be destroyed by controlling the other's feelings. Compulsions are seen as an illness not only because they compel the self to live tied to seemingly impersonally authored bodily felt demands (for cocaine, sex, cigarettes, alcohol, chocolate, caffeine, romantic love, shopping) thereby denying a cultural ideal, freedom of the person, but also because they are acknowledged as imprisoning the self in a restricted and restricting emotional repertoire. Compulsions thwart the ability to make choices in all areas of life. They interfere with personal growth:

Healing groups that do not assert traditional norms and selves instead idealize a flexible self, with changing (often multiple) roles and norms. Rather than socializing members to fixed 'right' and 'wrong' images of self and moral expectation, there is an ideal of experimentation, 'growth,' and the expectation of continual change.

(McGuire, 1988: 254)

How did codependency as a compulsion, a characterization of the self's problem with relationships, come to acquire the status of a disease? 'Codependent' was a term originally coined to refer to the spouse of an addict who had the disease of alcoholism. Once systems theory perspectives overtook the treatment of addicts and their families, 'codependent' replaced the term 'enabler' to indicate the other member of the couple was equally ill. Originally, the addict was the identified problem, and the spouse, usually female, seen as the enabler of the addictive behaviour. The enabler's dependence on the dependent behaviour of the addicted spouse came to be seen as an addiction of another sort. Addiction in the recovery movement has come to mean any

behaviour perceived to be out-of-control (hence, chocolate 'addiction,' sexual 'addiction,' women who 'love too much') as opposed to the more limited sense in medical circles of "a state of physical and or mental dependence produced by the habitual use of a chemical substance, such as heroin, or a behaviour, such as gambling, to attain a pleasurable sensation" (Katz, 1991: 6). A behaviour pattern has been made into a pathology with a logic of its own and whose viral source is outside of the codependent's control:

- 1) ...Alcoholism and other compulsive disorders are truly family illnesses. The way the illness affects other family members is called codependency.
- 2) Once they have been affected--once "it" sets in --codependency takes on a life of its own. Once you've got it, you've got it.

(Beattie, 1987: 16)

A corollary of the disease labelling of addictive personalities has been the extension to them of two premises about chemical addiction: all addictions are progressive; any addiction will kill you if it progresses to its logical end. Both enforce the idea of the passivity of the codependent and the need for continuous treatment. Being codependent is seen as a chronic condition.

6.3 Diagnosis of codependence

Diagnoses are the means by which signs are semiotically transformed into symptoms where these symptoms, precisely because they are socially produced, fit into preexisting socially available categories of meaning. The ideology of a healing system most clearly operates in this transformation of signs to symptoms. Recovery authors make reference to a floating complex of signs which serve as symptoms of a variety of illnesses which must all be treated through recovery: addictions, codependency, toxic shame, wounded inner child.

While recovery discourse speaks about emotion as an abstract cultural system whose rules families have followed in order to regulate the emotional behaviour of children, with traumatic and enduringly painful consequences, it is in recovery's diagnostic categories that its sensitivity to individual experience is to be found, which may explain one source of its appeal to potential adherents. Recovery discourse assumes that the subject's position within a field of social relations must be considered

in order to grasp the meaning of emotional experience. It invites recovery group participants to do that autobiographical work. That said, it proceeds to give people conceptual tools by which to talk about social relations and their repercussions for the self's growth and emotional development, in effect providing a belief system and a narrative form by which to organise, order, and link inchoate experience, memories, and pain into personal stories which ascribe a meaning to the past. One of those conceptual tools is a diagnostic schema of symptoms. The ideological impact of these diagnostic categories is to unlink symptoms from beliefs about character defects.

Codependence is being defined preeminently as the disease of people addicted to relationships:

[A] common thread runs through all stories of codependency. It involves our responses and reactions to people around us. It involves our relationships with other people, whether they are alcoholics, gamblers, sex addicts, overeaters, or normal people. Codependency involves the effects these people have on us and how we, in turn, try to affect them.

(Beattie, 1987:26)

In other words, for Beattie any human relationship qualifies as codependent.

Bradshaw's chapters in his *On: The Family* provide checklists of 'symptoms' "for how you lost your SELF and became an adult child of ____" and the reader can fill in the blank after reading the chapter checklists which enable self-identification as an adult child of alcoholics, as an adult child of childhood physical and sexual abuse, as an adult child of childhood emotional abuse, and finally, as an adult child of any dysfunctional family which leads the reader to the inevitable self-diagnosis as a victim of the super-illness, codependence.

The characteristics of a codependent person are organised across recovery discourse by what could be called the 'fruit salad' principle by virtue of its catholicism with respect to categories of kind, intensity, and duration. For instance, Beattie (1987: 35-47) lists 236 characteristics under 14 headings such as Caretaking, Low Self-Worth, Repression, Obsession, Controlling, Denial, Dependency, Poor Communication, Weak Boundaries, Lack of Trust, Anger, Sex Problems. A cooperatively edited recovery resource book (Friends in Recovery, n.d) includes nine inventories of issues related to specific addiction types (eg. domestic violence survivor, incest/molestation survivor,

sex-, power-, phone-, and work-addiction, overachiever, codependent 'managers'). Each of these includes questions by which to determine if the reader expresses the behaviours and has the feelings which are symptomatic of a "domestic violence survivor" or "incest/molestation taboo violator" and so on. A meditation exercise specific to each focus inventory is included to help the reader accept her discovery that, having answered the questions, she has addictive patterns in her life and should begin a 12-step program.¹² The symptoms of addiction as defined by the discourse do not allow for a continuum from the conventional to the severely disturbed. On the contrary, recovery tends to assume everyone in Western culture is codependent addicted.

Bradshaw's diagnostic 'traits' of adult children of alcoholic families, of physical or sexual abuse, and of emotional violence are hardly differentiated from each other and they confuse symptoms with causes. His typology of traits, which exemplifies concrete thinking, has the strength of being easily remembered. This type of concrete language use also characterizes some of recovery's healing techniques. Bradshaw subsumes the symptoms of each dysfunctional disorder according to traits which can be attached to each letter of the dysfunctional label. For instance, he uses the phrase ADULT CHILDREN OF DYSFUNCTIONAL FAMILIES as a checklist of the traits of adult children of dysfunctional families. Here are the symptoms generated by the acronym ADULT:

- A. Abandonment issues: you were physically abandoned by one or both of your parents. You were physically, sexually or emotionally violated by someone in your family. Your developmental dependency needs were neglected. You were enmeshed in your parents' neediness or in the needs of your family system. You stay in relationships far beyond what is healthy.
- D. Delusion and Denial: After reading this book, you still think you had a great childhood and that your family was the good old American Family!
- U. Undifferentiated Ego Mass: You carry feelings, desires and secrets of other people in your family system.
- L. Loneliness and Isolation: You have felt lonely all or most of your life. You felt isolated and different.

- T. Thought Disorders: You get involved in generalities or details. You worry, ruminate and obsess a lot. You stay in your head to avoid your feelings. You read about your problems, rather than taking action.
(Bradshaw, 1988a: 173-174)

Emotion dysfunctions figure preeminently in recovery's diagnostic arsenal for codependence.

Her problem, she says, is that other peoples's moods control her emotions; she, in turn, tries to control their feelings.

(Beattie, 1987: 25)

Emotion is an epistemological and ontological concept in recovery discourse. Bradshaw names loss of emotional connectedness with ourselves as the core problem in our compulsions, codependencies and addictions which, in turn, results in the breakdown of the family and the inability to go forward in our lives. This is the 'hole in the soul.' The state of this emotional anorexia he describes with an emotion word, "toxic shame," but it refers to an ontological state. It reduces us to what Bradshaw calls 'human doings' not 'human beings' (1988a:150). Toxic shame is more than one of the objectless emotions of long duration described by Armon-Jones as M-states. It is a framework for rationality. It has become a perceptual-cognitive filter so thorough that it influences how we perceive ourselves and make meaning. "It has become the core of our identity" (Bradshaw, 1988a: 45).

Codependency is symptomized by the behaviour of trying to control the feelings of others. These feelings may be experienced as potential weapons because the codependent self has no experiential, feeling based knowledge of itself and its values. Not knowing how one feels and not taking responsibility for those feelings and their reasons often involves the use of projection as a defence. Projection, initiated by the codependent person, is one mechanism responsible for the codependent's subjective sense of being manipulated by others. Codependents "say other people make them feel the way they do"... "believe other people are making them crazy" (Beattie, 1987: 43). Projection involves the attribution to others of one's own impulses and reactions which are disowned, a process severely disruptive of interpersonal communication. In his zeal to increase people's reality testing and 'ownership' of their beliefs, emotions, and values, Bradshaw shows how language itself encourages us to believe in projection: "Statements like, "You make me sick," "You give me a

headache," to another family member are **cause-and-effect distortions**. There is no real way to make another sick or give headaches simply by behaving in a certain way" (1988a: 51).

The 'fruit salad' principle allows for a 'mix and match' reading strategy by the reader seeking labels by which to name her misery. Somewhat like the indeterminacy of meaning celebrated by the 'construction kit' form of the postmodern novel, recovery discourse provides for a postmodern diagnostic strategy; everyone gets what he or she wants. Like primary process thinking, recovery's aetiology does not admit the principle of the excluded middle; codependents tend to be: extremely responsible/extremely irresponsible; have an overall passive response to codependency--crying, hurt, helplessness/have an overall aggressive response to codependency--violence, anger, dominance (Beattie, 1987: 37-45). Symptoms run the gamut from general dysphoric states (feel hopeless, feel depressed) to specific types of acts (become violent, abuse and neglect their children and other responsibilities). In these lists to aid the self-diagnosis of codependency, recovery discourse is also formalizing rules and norms of behaviour and feeling that it assumes have been implicit and unacknowledged in most people's lives; it is codifying an ethnotheory of emotion in the context of a symptomatology for codependency. By implication, the healing it proposes will involve some sort of rewriting of these rules for feeling and acting on feeling. One aspect of recovery's political import then is directed at the most intimate of all realms--the personal emotional prisonhouse--to identify and delegitimize prescriptive rules for emotion. Its emphasis is on identifying 'what it is not O.K. *not* to feel'. As a critique of non-feeling, it directly puts into question gender specific prescriptive rules of emotion in our culture. Despite the 'mix and match' approach to self-labelling, it has to be recognized that all the choices imply a voluntary acceptance of a role that once was highly devalued in contemporary North American society and has now become a self-identity schema which brings both meaning and self-esteem to the 'survivor.'

As a strategy of reader positioning, these lists make identification inescapable; there is belief or emotion which everyone can recognize as part of their own experience. The style in which these phenomenological experiences are represented

further primes identification. For instance, these titles of recovery books, drawn from the Catalogue of *That Other Bookstore*, often take the form of a perspective looking for a voice to be assigned to:

If I'm So Wonderful, Why am I still Single
But I Didn't Make Any Noise About It
I Want to Change But I Don't Know How
Why I Haven't Been Able to Help? I Couldn't cry When Daddy Died
I Can Be Me: A Helping Book for Children from Troubled Families
Leave a Light on For Me: A Novel

Distinctions between habits, compulsions, and addictions are not made except by Kasl (199: 100-109). However, across the literature, the core characteristics of codependency would seem to be that codependents feel out of control, they feel they behave compulsively, they mistrust their feelings, have low self-esteem, are controlling, are caregivers and may also be addicted to substances, relationships.

Melody Beattie adds another dimension to disease diagnosis, gender. Without explicitly saying so, Beattie suggests that codependence is a woman's disease:

Does endlessly taking care of other people, resenting it, and expecting nothing in return mean Marlyss is a good wife and mother? Or could it mean Marlyss is codependent?

(Beattie, 1987: 22)

It is a dependency on people--on their moods, behaviours, sickness or well-being, and their love. It is a paradoxical dependency. Codependents appear to be depended upon, but they are dependent. They look strong but feel helpless. They appear controlling but in reality are controlled themselves, sometimes by an illness such as alcoholism.

(Beattie, 1987: 46)

Bradshaw calls addictions like alcoholism the cover-ups for the disease of codependence. But codependence describes a set of behaviours which because of their compulsivity are called a disease. What produces the disease of codependence?

6.4 Causes of illness: aetiology of codependency/toxic shame

All alternative healing systems are underpinned by an alternative understanding of what causes illness.

Part of the healing process in all healing systems is the sick person's and healer's co-construction of an illness etiology. This etiology incorporates an organization of both physical and social events (for

example, violation of a moral norm) prior to the occurrence of the illness. These etiologies are typically in the form of narratives with conventional formats. They are analytical, focusing on certain facts and discarding others as irrelevant; they result in a culturally meaningful explanation of the illness that specifies causal relations among selected facts and connects them with the larger, socially prescribed, or "ideal" relations of that group.

(McGuire, 1988: 33)

Thus, recovery constitutes a subcultural system, a meaning system within a meaning system. Just as the co-construction of an illness etiology is required for the self's experiences to be meaningful, similarly, healing requires that the self-understandings of the individuals in recovery therapy, even those finding recovery books helpful, must come to reflect and incorporate the knowledge organized by the recovery system of beliefs.

What causes addictions, codependency, toxic shame? Bradshaw distinguishes himself from other writers on codependency such as Schaeff and Beattie by locating a theory of the causes of disease within an explicit theory of the self and a larger meaning system which involves a critique of the family, of childrearing practices, and the society which values such practices.

John Bradshaw's formulation of the causes of the illness of addiction to victimization for which recovery is the answer is the most developed and scathingly critical of all writers but for the feminist analysis of the relation between family practices and illness in Charlotte Davis Kasl's weighty *Many Roads, One Journey* (1992) which, at 408 pages, is too long and scholarly to become a best-seller. CRISIS is the acronym which sums up Bradshaw's analysis, and since it is the core of the healing system as proposed in his book *Bradshaw On: The Family* it merits direct quotation.

C stands for a "Compulsive/Addictive Behavior Disorder" that affects three-fourths of the population in every aspect of their lives; it is the 'bubonic plague of today'. According to Kasl, the addictive personality as one "who attempts to fill an inner emptiness or assuage inner pain with substances, relationships, sex, things, and other compulsive behavior" (1992: 99). So what causes the "inner emptiness or inner pain"? And what exactly is the link between inner emptiness, a mood, and compulsivity, a behaviour? Families disturb dispositions: "Such behavior is modeled

and set up in families" (99) and produce disturbed (dis)positions: "When feelings are not affirmed, they are split off from one's sense of self. One is be-side oneself" (1988a: 162). Children are (dis)positioned as adults to have stunted emotional repertoires and an inability to take up subject positions in discourses where they identify with non-victims. Recovery's therapeutic exercises are designed to open up other identificatory positions and to integrate split off feelings.

R is for "Rules for Child Rearing" which create a poisonous pedagogy (PP) which promotes ownership of children and exalts obedience as the highest value. 'Poisonous pedagogy' refers to the parenting rules the psychoanalyst Alice Miller critiques in her book *For Your Own Good* which has introduced the idea of children's rights to a wide readership outside the psychoanalytic community. PP "preaches non-democratic ways of relating. It especially espouses inequality of power. It promotes the denial of feelings and corporal punishment. (...) It asks us to crush their vitality, spontaneity and emotional expression." Beattie and Bradshaw introduce the notion of codependent behaviours as a coping, self-protective device, as a role, by which to "get one's needs met" in a PP household. It is the behaviour of a child in an adult body coping with the complexity of an adult's life through the perspective and emotions of a child.

I is for "Idealization of Parents and Family."

One of the rules of the poisonous pedagogy is that the rules cannot be challenged. This means that parents and family cannot be critically evaluated. Children naturally idealize their parents out of survival needs. What emerge are adult children who carry their parents' rules to the next generation. This creates more adult children.

S is for "Shame" and shame is a "being wound" which says "I am a flawed person."

Adult children are adults with a soul-murdered child living inside of them. The true self is ruptured and a false self must be created.

I is for "Ideological Totalism-Nazi Germany,"

The ultimate expression of the poisonous pedagogy was Nazi Germany. Hitler created the master/slave national state. He used the socialization structures of the German family to create the Nazi Regime. As long as the poisonous pedagogy goes unchallenged, the phenomenon of Hitler is still a potential in the west.¹³

S is for "Social Systems"

We now understand that social systems have laws, components, and structural dynamics. Societies create 'consensus realities' which ultimately become unconscious. Families are systems in which the whole is greater than the parts. Such systems have rules which if left unchallenged become closed systems and such closed systems can go on for generations. (Bradshaw, 1988a: 21-22)

Thus, codependency is a role with which we have been 'infected' by our codependent families and which distances us from who we really are. The false role we learn to play to survive in violent families provides the scripts for future social interaction. This behaviour is governed by rules learned in the family, but this is not to say that these rules are in our heads. Recovery's significance as a discourse on the self is to show that these rules are embodied as emotions. We will see below that recovery's therapeutic techniques are deployed according to a dual strategy, both cognitive and affective, with which to access these rules so they can be rewritten.

All the manifestations of the illnesses of addiction/compulsion are family illnesses which are inherited multigenerationally: great grandma begat codependence on grandpa who begat codependence on mother who begat codependence on me who begat codependence on my children, and so on. Dysfunctional families do not discriminate as to the preferred gender of the carrier of codependence. Through the notion of 'begatting,' Bradshaw has popularized an understanding of the repetition compulsion, minus its Freudian metapsychological scaffolding, as the reenactment of violence by abused children when they become parents. He has also offered a partial answer to Rose's interrogation of the processes by which ideology works at the rudimentary level of identity and the drives. For ideology in recovery discourse, read 'poisonous pedagogy' and 'inadequate or dysfunctional rules' in the family as a system which necessarily produces persons with codependent identities. What is clear in recovery's assumptions about the construction of a sick self-identity is that we are our biographies; its vision of health means we must become our autobiographies. By this move, it shows itself to be firmly a part of the Modernist project of self-reflexivity. Although the family system is sick, recovery is not designed for families but rather for the adult children who have physically but not psychologically left the family long ago.

Bradshaw's model of the cause and effect between traumatic childhood occurrences and the capacity to escape the tyranny of those first character forming experiences in later life is unremittingly bleak precisely because he affords little importance to social or cultural factors outside of the dysfunctional family (schooling, peers, sports, adult mentors) and because early childhood experience is taken as crucially formative. Emotion scripts are written in the family and they are intransigent. For instance, "impulse control is learned from about two years old on. So the spouses and children in violent families are living under the reign of an adult person whose behaviour is not even as mature as a well adjusted two year old" (Bradshaw, 1988a: 129). While pointing to the family as the crucible of all social problems is simplistic and ignores social structural inequalities, a vacuum of political will, economics, racism, it does pose a social critique of family life from which no family is immune.

The breeding ground for infection by toxic shame and the repetition compulsion is created by what Bradshaw calls the original family SPELL, which stands for our Source People's Emotional Language Legacy (1988a: 36). It consists of what family therapists call the myths the family believes about itself which usually protect one member (i.e. father keeps losing jobs because he has bad luck, not because he is an alcoholic; mother is not mentally ill, just misunderstood and suffering culture shock in her adopted country). However, Bradshaw's emphasis is on the emotional repertoire a child inherits as a legacy of this "family trance" which leaves her not only enmeshed in the family's peculiar model of what family life should be, but estranged from her true self. "Toxic shame is a being wound. It says I am a flawed person" (1988a: 21).

Individualism and Giddens 'pure relationship'

Both individualism and expressive romanticism have left traces in recovery. Individualism marks recovery's adumbration of what constitutes a healthy self and a healthy society. The processes and values which make for health in the family are microversions of the same principles which make for the health of the social system. Bradshaw proposes that "one of the paradoxical aspects of functional and healthy families is that as individuation increases, togetherness grows" (1988a: 55). The

freedoms so championed not only by democracy as a political system but required as the foundation for democracy as a theory of society (MacPherson, 1973) have their theoretical prototype in the model of the freedoms within the healthy family as system, according to Bradshaw. Possession of a whole self is the precondition for freedom of thought and association which is required for democratic decisionmaking, and families "are the soil for mature peoplemaking" (Bradshaw, 1988a: 42). Alternatively, sick families can 'grow' sickly codependent selves. A whole mature person "is one who has differentiated himself from all others and established clearly marked ego boundaries" (Bradshaw, 1988a: 43). Bradshaw's whole self resurrects the liberalist premise of the individual as an atomic, self-motivating, self-regulating unit who joins with others on the basis of common interests:

Needy and incomplete people seek others to make them complete. They say, "I love you because I need you." Individuated persons who have faced aloneness and separation know they can make it alone. They seek a partner because they want to love, not because they need to be completed. They say, "I need you because I love you." They offer love out of generosity rather than need. They are no longer fantasy bonded.
(Bradshaw, 1988a: 55)

A good relationship demands that there be two whole people who *choose* to be in the relationship and know that each can *live without the other*.

(Bradshaw, 1988a: 168)

By conflating fantasy and the unconscious with compulsive neediness and fantasy bonding, Bradshaw has swiftly done away with internal object worlds as providing the preconditions for whom we love. His model of healthy human relations, enabled by having a true self, presupposes a compulsion free, 'giving and getting' kind of calculus as the basis for human attraction and association. Here would seem to be evidence of what Giddens is calling the 'pure relationship' (1992).

Recovery: for or against Giddens' 'pure relationship'?

Giddens proposes that romance was the prototype of the pure relationship since it located the sources of love, sexual desire, and the wish for association between individuals in the qualities they found in each other rather than 'love' being due to the pressure of economic necessity or social and moral convention. While Giddens sees

the roots of the pure relationship in romantic love, Bradshaw fingers what we have been taught as 'true love' as an addictive relationship. "Two people come to believe that they can't live without each other" (1988a: 169). Bradshaw's view of romantic love is a more potent view of the ways in which cultural systems produce desire than is Giddens' view. Bradshaw is developing a language to talk about intrapsychic phenomena and techniques with which to access and transform internal worlds whereas Giddens approaches 'romantic love' and the 'pure relationship' from a macrosociological external perspective (how they evidence new practices of association by individuals within a social structure) as opposed to a view from the inside sensitive to ego-internal object relations (what it is that couples desire about each other; what is the basis of erotic desire and mental attraction; why biological forms of satisfaction do not exactly overlap with satisfaction at the level of fantasy). Giddens' appreciation of what he calls the democratising effects in the private sphere of therapies for codependence, one of which is to affirm the values and beliefs of the pure relationship, does not extend to a consideration of *how internal object-relations worlds continue to work despite the surface manifestation of new rules for interpersonal relations*. To take an example, unconscious conflicts may be embodied in, not mitigated by, the pure relationship. Giddens has confused social and intrapsychic phenomena, interpersonal autonomy with intrapsychic autonomy, a fact which highlights the pervasive influence of individualism in his own thinking.¹⁴

A concept associated with ego psychologists Heinz Hartman and Margaret Mahler, intrapsychic autonomy is the ability to maintain enduring mental representations of sources of self-esteem and comfort which permit a more flexible adaptation to environmental conditions, both physical and emotional. It is the product of the capacity to make a clear separation of object and self representations formed in early childhood and, therefore, in later life, of one's needs and desires in time present from those of others. Contrary to the dominant view in ethnosociological studies of Western and Asian concepts of the person, the achievement of interpersonal autonomy--for instance, commitment defined by contractual relations rather than by socially imposed relations of obligation and duty--may occur in the presence or absence of intrapsychic autonomy. What recovery discourse is naming as codependency has

similarities with what a psychoanalytic perspective would call enmeshment due to a lack of intrapsychic autonomy.¹⁵

The apotheosis of the liberalist view of the relation of individual to society is the egocentric contractualism of the pure relationship. "By its own logic, a purely contractual ethic leaves every commitment unstable. Parties to a contract remain free to choose, and thus free to remake or break every commitment, if only they are willing to pay the price for doing so" (Bellah, 1985: 130). This 'giving-getting' model of interaction between equal and freely choosing individuals is based on no obligation outside the terms of the contract between the two individuals. The prototype for such a model of human relations would seem to be the Personals column where the lovelorn list their qualities and seek same "with recent picture please" rather than being able to address the intangible bases of attraction or allowing the psychical reality of fantasy to pen a list limning the object of desire.

Development means killing the double

Doubling supplies the metaphors for every recovery author's model of the ill self. For Bradshaw, the pairing takes the form of a true self vs. a false self, a wounded inner child and the adult. Kasl believes everyone has a good and a bad survivor. On the one hand, the true self is what you can get in therapy, on the other hand, it has been there all along. Labelling oneself as codependent is an early part of the recovery process of healing; however, the label ultimately is not coextensive with the self of the codependent person. Although Bradshaw talks of toxic shame as what 'we are' not something 'we have'; nevertheless, he reserves an uncolonized true self from toxic shame and codependence.

For individuation and differentiation to take place and to produce a mature individual, the family must be stable enough for the child to get his or her needs met. What he calls basic human needs are: self-acceptance (self-worth), security (physical, touch, warmth), strokes (love, recognition, belonging), structure (intellectual meaning, trust), stimulation (change, challenge, fun), self-actualization (identity), spiritualization. His systems model proposes that if parents did not get their needs met when they were children (producing the wounded inner child in each of them), then their children are

being raised by parents who are nothing but little children themselves; so loss of self is a multigenerational and inevitable process. By the systemic principle of dynamic homeostasis, the rules in closed system families make it impossible for children to challenge destructive rules and form new beliefs. Shame based parents beget shame based children; however, they cannot be blamed because, according to Bradshaw, "family systems fail, *not because of bad people*, but because of bad information loops, bad feedback in the form of bad rules of behavior....Our parents are not bad people for transmitting the poisonous pedagogy" (1988a: 31). In healthy family systems the roles are flexible and rotating, while in dysfunctional families, everyone plays a role which means no one can move without creating anxiety and pain for all the others. Against his anthropomorphic view of rules as dictators of family interaction and legislators of multigenerational dysfunction relentlessly operating through zombie like adult children, Bradshaw juxtaposes the true self.

E-motions

The state of the true self's needs is what emotions signal. Emotions are "the oil gauge on our car telling us how it goes with our basic needs" (Bradshaw, 1988a: 144). Recovery discourse exemplifies the same ambivalences as we find in much thinking on emotion. Is it energy or does it have a semantics? Is it social or instinctual in origin? Along with perceiving, knowing/thinking, remembering/imagining, the last of the four basic powers Bradshaw attributes to humans is the power to emote and to feel. He writes emotions as "E-motions" to emphasize they are forms of energy-in-motion. "Emotional energy is what moves us; if the energy is not expressed, it is repressed" (1988a: 145). Other assumptions about emotion draw most on a cognitive psychological framework:

E-motions are signals from the body telling us of a need, a loss, a satiation. The energy is used to help us act *effectively* to take care of ourselves. E-motions are direct expressions of reality as opposed to thoughts which translate or analyze our experience. Emotions give *important information* about what we need to do, what we want or how we want to change. (Bradshaw, 1988a: 44)

Thinking comes out of feeling, "emotion is in the muscles;" "our bodies carry pain." The capacity to feel emotions is required not only to initiate the developmental

process of individuation and differentiation, but, in later life, for self-knowledge, and hence, eventually for more sensitive self-expression which allows for more effective self-assertion. Without the E-motions, Bradshaw says, "I am powerless to uphold my dignity and self-worth" (1988a: 45). Grief is the 'healing feeling'; along with sadness, it gives the energy to complete the past, to accept life's necessary losses, and to move on. As opposed to the ontological state of toxic shame induced by poisonous pedagogy, healthy shame has a particular function in Bradshaw's universe. It is the "energy that lets us know we are limited and finite. Shame allows us to make mistakes and lets us know we need help. Shame is the source of our spirituality" (1988a: 45). When Bradshaw writes that "emotional violation is the most common core of our current cultural crisis. Our massive addiction and family violence are rooted in the denial and repression of our affective life," he is taking aim at cultural emotion rules, particularly those in catholic and fundamentalist Christian families in North America which enforce the repression of the so-called negative emotions of anger and sadness. According to Bradshaw, this leads to psychic numbness which is the soil of addiction. "Addictions are the way the psychically numb feel alive" (1988a: 145). Emotions are required for development: "When a child can experience his own emotions, he can individuate in the proper developmental sequence" (1988a: 149).

Why we are so embarrassed by the teddy bears

The linkage of shame with humility, reliance on a Higher Power, and with spirituality may be interpreted as recovery's closet ambition to attach a religious message to a healing system. It is part of Bradshaw's celebrity persona that he as well as being an alcoholic and codependent in recovery, he is a theologian who studied to become a Roman Catholic priest. Objections to recovery's religious rhetoric along with its very direct valorization of one emotion, shame, as an ethical and communitarian emotion which is necessary for spirituality may have their origins in another quarter, not agnosticism or a secular attitude, but in individualism. If "much of what passes for independent, autonomous behaviour among Americans is actually a defensive reaction in response to unmet dependency needs, which remain repressed" (Ewing, 1991: 137), then recovery's rhetoric of a Higher Power, an Inner Force could be thought of as

recognizing lifelong dependency needs and the importance of transitional objects (the stuffed toys group members are encouraged to bring) for solace and growth, an admission which is anathema to a clichéd but widely prevalent cultural myth of the independent individual as occupying a state "beyond" dependence or reliance on others. This fact has import for a blindspot in Western psychotherapy, that being therapists who overlook such sources of anxiety in their patients "because the ubiquity of such dependency needs is so covert in Western culture" (Ewing, 1991: 157).

Expressive vs. instrumental views of emotion

As with much thinking on emotion, recovery discourse presents an ambivalent stance on emotion. While recovery says it will help us handle our feelings more effectively and thereby manage others' responses to us, at the same time it holds an expressive view of emotion, not as instrumental or strategic but as the essence of our good selves. This ambivalence has to do with the traits of romanticism in recovery discourse. Concurrently with an expressive theory of emotion, recovery links knowledge of the true self and the ontological experience of wholeness with free expression of emotions. On the other hand, a fundamental principle of the recovery method of healing is that emotions have to be taught to people in order for each one to find the true self. Bradshaw, for instance, is very divided in his attitude to the expression theory and to the nature of the self. On the one hand, he assumes a linear, mechanistic view of human development rather than a dialectical or cyclical view, so once the developmental needs peculiar to a phase are not met, your passage through all further phases feels the effects of this lack, and your emotional expressiveness is truncated. On the other hand, against this rhetoric of "getting your developmental needs met" in order to be your true self, is this language of spirituality and romantic expressivism. Once you have gotten your needs met, *then* you will be free to be "what you can be", as if there is an essence or organic potentiality waiting to flower under suitable conditions. The premise of the metaphor of the adult child is that the self is inescapably a product of its biography, beginning with the earliest of childhood experiences. Against that stress on the paedogenetic impress is the metaphor of the wounded inner child; the idea that healing will unveil the inner child as true self.

Recovery is a thoroughly modern discourse in presuming what was an alien idea to pre-modern culture, that being, that each person has a unique character and special potentialities that are waiting to be fulfilled. That unique character has first to be rescued from deformation with the sociality of the family.

Voluntarism vs. systems theory

The assumption of voluntarism within a theory which purports to explain multigenerational dysfunction through a systems model (where dysfunction lies in rules of interaction not motives or personal responsibility) would seem logically to generate a host of inconsistencies for explanations of the causes of illness and for the mechanism of action of therapeutic techniques used by recovery counsellors. It is precisely because ritual action and language, initiated by the therapy member, has curative properties, and mental work can eradicate the effects of negative thoughts, that voluntarism's appeal is really an appeal to believe in the usefulness of these techniques.

Exactly *how* dysfunction in multigenerationally inherited is mystified by Bradshaw's invocation of a systems model which ascribes the organization of behaviour and its emotional sequelae to dysfunctional rules. Recovery discourse is replete with anecdotal 'evidence' for this mysterious but powerful inheritance. For instance, Bradshaw writes that often a child will identify with a persecuting parent as a way to feel powerful and will carry the parent's feelings and beliefs, and he gives the following example:

Jill, one of my clients in Los Angeles had a violent and verbally abusive father. He shamed and humiliated her in front of boyfriends. He constantly accused her of being seductive and prophesized that she would be raped. Jill hated her father and had tremendous repressed anger for him.

When Jill married, she found a Caspar Milquetoast type of man who she criticized, maligned and verbally abused. She copied her offender father's behaviour and vented her rage at her father onto her husband. One of her daughters was raped four times!

(1988a: 37)

The ideological impact of such case stories is to paint a picture of the incorporation, in the private sphere, of human relations and intimacy into capitalist production. The

family is seen as a factory producing defective human beings: greedy, self-interested capitalists (parents) practice their means-end rationality (the instrumental use by parents of each other and their children to get their wounded inner child needs met) within the heart of what was to have been a haven against such a heartless world, the nurturing, loving family. Miniature replicas of the defective model (the parent original (itself a copy)) are shooting off the assemblyline of families around America to pollute the world with adult children who are dangerous because they are scared and morally stillborn. The commercial film industries' demand for certain profits expressed in Hollywood's forfeiture of creativity and novelty for the unremitting stream of 'son of Sam' films has an analogue in recovery's view of the family as captured by the logic of violent repetition.

Recourse to a systems model of family functioning holds for good functioning as well as bad; the problem becomes one of restoring "the organismic holistic imbalance due to inadequate rules or belief systems which result in frozen feedback loops and circularity" (Bradshaw, 1988a: 37). "Frozen feedback loops" are unfrozen by rules for communication which counter the poisonous pedagogy's insistence on rules such as: children should be seen and not heard, parents are always right; parents deserve respect no matter what they do and say; do what parents say and not what they do. "Good and effective communication centers around highly developed individual awareness and differentiation" (Bradshaw, 1988a: 50). The needs of the organism for personal growth can only be fulfilled by rules of communication in the family which allow freedom of expression of beliefs, wishes, emotions. These needs are considered natural to the self-organism which is part of the family-organism which in turn is part of the social-organism. Inasmuch as the language of systems theory complements the language of balance and imbalance in the organism and both appear to operate according to 'natural' and immanent rules of balance and imbalance, the absence on recovery's part of any discussion of the 'needs' of the self in the broader context of ethnicity, gender or religion in which the sub-culture of the family is located is not immediately notable. It is only with an exceptional book such as Kasl's *Many Roads, One Journey* that voices of dissent within the recovery movement can be

heard, particularly with respect to the use of any twelve-step program modelled on the original produced by Alcoholics Anonymous.

The metacommunicational framework of recovery discourse

Bradshaw is the most eloquent exponent of a communicational model of family health as he tries to fit an argument for communication and equality into an argument for preestablished rules of interaction in the family as a system. What he lists as the fourteen "good functional rules" for a healthy family are actually a mixture of norms for behaviour, principles of association, and ideals to aspire to:

1. Problems are acknowledged and resolved.
2. The five freedoms are promoted. All members can express their perception, feelings, thoughts, desires and fantasies.
3. All relationships are dialogical and equal. Each person is of equal value as a person.
4. Communication is direct, congruent and sensory based, i.e., concrete, specific and behavioral.
5. Family members can get *their* needs met.
6. Family members can be different.
7. Parents do what they say. They are self-disciplined disciplinarians.
8. Family roles are chosen and flexible.
9. Atmosphere is fun and spontaneous.
10. The rules require accountability.
11. Violation of other's values leads to guilt.
12. Mistakes are forgiven and viewed as learning tools.
13. The family system exists for the individuals.
14. Parents are in touch with their healthy shame.

(Bradshaw, 1988a: 55)

This 'wish' list appears to have been written for parents from the perspective of the child who wants desperately to realign the balance of power in the family. Bradshaw diminishes the normalness of conflict in a healthy family and the realistic probability that family members will not get all their needs met no matter how freely they speak. He presumes talk resolves conflict, and that conflict in families is due to a repressive injunction against talk. However, freedom to communicate will not inevitably produce satisfactory solutions to conflicts; conflicts between and among values cannot be reconciled by talk. So whereas point #11 suggests that in a healthy, functioning family, the violation of another's values should lead the violator to feel guilt (and, we presume, to repair the damage), in the reality of family interaction, where a hierarchy

of power and responsibility is the product of generational differences and experience, some values will not be acted upon if they offend the general welfare as parents' perceive it to be.

On the other hand, point #4 suggests some circumspection is required in this assumption that Bradshaw heralds talk as a solution to all conflicts in the family. From Point #4, we can infer that he recognizes another level on which communication occurs in the family, the metacommunicative level of expressed emotion (voice, intonation, kinesics), which potentially complicates understanding between children and their parents. This recalls Gregory Bateson's work on the concept of the 'double bind' in *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* (1972) which focused on the perception and consequences of disordered communication within family interaction. Bateson was particularly attuned to tone of voice as a metacommunicational feature of family interaction.

A systems theory de-emphasizes the cultural norms for family life, setting up instead universal rules for healthy functioning. Similarly, therapeutic techniques, based on the systems approach, ignore the question of whether these objectives are appropriate for different ethnic groups and their family life and whether these techniques can be complied with by persons from different ethnic groups where, for instance, a psychological language of self-reflection and of feelings as internal states is not part of one's world view. To move from an anthropological claim that codependency is a culture bound syndrome, and recovery a culture bound form of healing, to the premise that recovery books and therapy procedures may have relevance to only some segments of the population (based not only on considerations of ethnicity but on considerations of class and gender within the dominant ethnic group in North American societies), leads to a hypothesis for audience research in cultural studies: that the consumers for recovery are also 'ideal' readers both for its belief system about the self-in-relation-to-society and for the discourse of emotion required for its therapeutic techniques to have healing efficacy.

The wounded inner child as Freudened body

Codependency is a childhood illness which stays with you for life, if untreated. It is the state of being an adult but feeling, thinking, and behaving according to the dictates of the 'wounded inner child' which seeks to defend itself against pain. How was the child in us wounded? One assumption basic to the codependency movement is that we learn how to relate to other people, and thereby acquire our illness, by watching and interacting with our parents. The paedogenetic impress of recovery literature appears in the cause of the disease of codependency: family dysfunction, soul murder.

The recovery literature 'outFreudens' Freud to the extent that it locates childhood trauma in a dysfunctional family as the psychopathogenetic factor. However, debates on Freud's various positions on the veracity of childhood memories of incest, which today have cost careers--Jeffrey Masson comes to mind--have been bypassed by an almost blanket assumption that everyone in Western society is the issue of a codependent environment. The nature of memory as a narrative of construction or as a veridical snapshot has been rendered moot by universalizing childhood trauma. According to the literature, if you don't have traumatic memories, then you are repressing them. Recovery makes a caricature of Freud's metapsychology by highlighting some concepts, notably repression, while ignoring the theoretical context on which they drew for their meaningfulness. Just as Social Darwinism perverted the insights of Darwin with social and political ideology, so have recovery's authors distorted Freudian insights with ideological importations like the social repression imposed by poisonous pedagogy. Repression as an endopsychic process, as a concept which requires a structural theory of the mind, as a process used to minimize pain for the individual has lost all meaning because recovery has made exogenous factors--social repression--the cause of repression in the individual. Also lost has been the Freudian view of neurosis as the outcome of the individual's compromise with the Pleasure Principle and the Reality Principle, while the mistaken view that neurosis is the direct effect of a repression of the Pleasure Principle holds sway as we can infer from recovery's emphasis on removing the weighty constraints on emotional experience imposed by parental authority.¹⁶

Family origins of misery is not a new idea since it prevails in psychoanalytic theory within a psychodynamic framework which describes where the parental influence is lodged and how that residue can be mitigated. The recovery version loses the 'dynamic' aspect of psychic functioning, particularly in its elaboration of therapeutic strategies, which will be discussed below.

A series of contradictions issue from this doubling image of the self with respect to ideals of health and emotions. The contradictions as they appear in the premises about the therapeutic action of healing practices will be discussed below.

Medicalizing moral issues vs. spiritualizing human concerns

A first encounter with recovery leads to the conclusion that moral issues are being medicalized. For instance, ordinary life behaviours have become the object of scrutiny as symptomatic of sickness; this is the outcome of the feminist impetus to examine all aspects of the personal with an eye to their significance for unequal power relations being the genders. What used to be called "being a traditional nurturing housewife dependent on her husband" has become codependence, and 'deviances' such as alcoholism, child abuse, overeating, sexual promiscuity are being redefined. 'Badness' has become 'sickness' to be treated medically. However, the recovery texts studied could equally be characterized as spiritualizing these issues. By such a rhetorical formulation, problems of living as illness require alternatives to an allopathic medical response. "The 'spiritualization' of moral concerns in illness is exemplified in these notions of the sources of illness and individual responsibility for it" (McGuire, 1988: 247). Like Eastern and human potential groups, codependency discourse does not hold the individual responsible but finds the cause of illness in social and family lifestyle factors.

Responsibility for illness entails the corollary belief in the individual's control over the problem area. This fact bears on how we should expect recovery to lead its practitioners to think about cure. Despite the attribution of victim status, recovery locates the power to heal in the individual. This is possible for two reasons. First of all, victim status does not entail victim-blaming. Bradshaw is vociferous in his attacks on Christian thinking which creates a sense of guilt and undeserved blame in victims,

be they children or adult children. This shift in the metaphoric associations of illness is from moral badness to wounded innocence. This shift is most clearly evident in Kasl's critique of the twelve-steps used by AA, particularly the step requiring group members "do a fearless moral inventory."¹⁷

Secondly, it is possible for the victim of codependence to heal herself of her disease because of the nature of the illness which, as we noted above, is due to a developmental deficit and the assumption of a false self. Self-identification as a victim is one of the first steps in the rituals of empowerment in which recovery locates healing. Personal bootstrapping is required, but it is set against the backdrop of familial and social and environmental sources of responsibility for creating codependent people which must change.

Moral Order and Responsibility

The way any social group addresses the question, "Why does a good person get sick?" is not simply rationalizing, rather it provides important ways of structuring these persons' views of the self within a moral and social context.¹⁸ The impact of not making a distinction between codependency as a disease and codependency as an illness is that, on the one hand, the codependent person can be cast as a "victim of infectious agents," powerless before their onset, without responsibility for infection and it would seem for cure. But because the recovery movement is a self-help movement, and like other alternative healing practices outside of biomedical circles, defining codependency as an illness restores the power to heal to the sufferer.

One of the few psychologists writing critically about the codependency movement with the intent of reaching the audience for recovery books, Katz has argued that by defining behaviour as a disease, the self-help movement has absolved the 'victim' of responsibility for her behaviour as well as relieved her of the means to heal herself. Codependency is not seen as a consequence of the personal values or beliefs, choices or actions of the individual who suffers but as something that happened to the individual when that person was a child. Furthermore, the codependent addict is led to believe without life long attendance in a self-help group,

she will relapse. This is a carry-over of the philosophy behind the 12-step programme of AA.

Where authors writing in the codependency vein differ from 12-step programs is that whereas they stress a person is not responsible for becoming codependent, that person is responsible for solving her own problems. Melody Beattie stresses "Each one of us must decide what part we played in our victimization" (1987: 32). The problem, of course, is how this recovery to be accomplished in light of the fact that the codependent illness involves "a habitual system of thinking, feeling, and behaving toward ourselves and others that can cause us pain" (Beattie, 1987: 34).

6.5 Healing Practices and Therapeutic Mechanisms

Together recovery literature and group practices provide a cognitive and sentimental education, but it is in the group work that members learn how to talk 'the talk' and feel 'the feelings.' (The latter, we recall, was something the Singing Detective was loathe to allow himself to do, although at talking detective 'talk' he was no slouch). It is primarily through the group work, rather than in seminars or through solitary reading, that healing is expected to occur. But healing, as we will see, follows from the acquisition by group members of an emotion vocabulary, a personal story, and mutative emotional experiences which have symbolic value.

Recovery group work goes on in several formats. Bradshaw, like many other, less well-known authors, travels many months of the year giving evening and weekend workshops and lectures in Canada and the United States. The material published in *Bradshaw On: The Family* is an amplification of a television series recorded before a live audience 'group' and broadcast on PBS. Video clips from therapy workshops Bradshaw had led in his private practice were part of "The Family" series and they introduce some of his techniques of group work which are reasonably standard for recovery groups as well as for cognitive therapy. These taped samples are poor substitutes for ethnographic research of group work; however, they do provide a preliminary view of how a recovery author searches out the paedogenetic impress in group members' lives. In general, recovery's wide variety of therapeutic exercises are

designed to open up other positions of identification and to integrate split off feelings in the group member.

6.5.1 Group work and the role of group leader

Recovery, as with other alternative healing systems, allows that healing power is accessible to anyone; however, although democratizing the power to heal, it grants 'expert' status and privileges to some. Part of the healing process in all healing systems is a co-construction of an illness etiology by the healer and the sick person. This is at one and the same time a resistance to the claims to authority of medical professionals and an endorsement of non-professionals. However, a rhetorical strategy and ontological claim from experience often used by the cultural feminist camp is in operation in recovery discourse with respect to the qualifications of lay healers. Claims to legitimacy as a healer have their grounds in personal experience; "if you haven't been an addict, codependent, incested, you can't know what it's like." John Bradshaw peppers his text with examples of personal traumas created in his life by his alcoholism; Charlotte Davis Kasl, a Ph.D. in Psychology is a professional counsellor but also a self-proclaimed devotee of twelve-step programs; Melody Beattie, a recovering codependent; Gloria Steinem, not yet a counsellor, but certainly an acolyte has appeared on *Oprah* to sing the merits of having healed her fat, bespectacled, wounded inner child (1992). That having the experience of being an addict might not be either a necessary nor sufficient condition for knowing how to help people is a moot issue for those in recovery. This is not because they do not believe specialized techniques are required to aid others in healing, but because the most important aspect of healing is the power of example and the feeling of inclusion created among a group joined by common suffering.

The creation of a feeling of inclusion among a group of like-minded people is consolidated by the way recovery is marketed. In the Catalogue of titles put out by *That Other Bookstore*, the owner Ellen Campbell introduces their new Western Sales Representative in this way:

Fred Scanes can be reached at (204) 474-2929. Fred's own recovery has given him the experience and knowledge to make him a natural choice for us." You had to have been there to get it: "In fact, it remains a

policy that all staff are in recovery in one way or another. They are sensitive and aware of our customer's needs."

Recovery's emphasis on personal experience while being perhaps an adequate ground for the creation of community on the basis of identity is not adequate as a claim to healing expertise. Recovery discourse does not acknowledge that there is a difference between sympathy and empathy. First of all, sympathy is the ability to understand another's point of view while not necessarily having had the same experience. Recovery, on the other hand, emphasizes that you cannot understand another's experiences without having had similar ones yourself and, furthermore, you can not be of help to the sufferer if you are not a co-sufferer (whether your experiences are similar to someone else's or not is supposed to become clear through the relating of one's story; however, as we will see below, illness narratives do not spring from the heads of recovery group members without external assistance). If carried to its logical conclusion, this assumption of "you had to be there too to understand me and to have the right to speak" erodes the recovery member's sense of civic responsibility and justification for becoming involved in public debates about issues the individual herself may not feel have much to do with 'her experience.' Secondly, recovery appears to refuse the distinctive joining of the capacity to assume the other's perspective *without* losing a simultaneously operating analytical perspective which is the mark of empathy. This formulation of empathy, at least, has been called the method of listening to the counter-transference in psychoanalytic practice. The demand in recovery for counsellors who 'have been there' implicitly encourages an 'us/them' division of the world. Community is being created on the basis of exclusion not inclusion, and this is an assumption which recovery's rhetoric of universal dysfunction cannot declaw. Recovery also tends to close its eyes to conflicts; it encourages the naive assumption that because people have had the same experience, they can be healed through the same methods and will share the same values and beliefs.

6.5.2 Recovery group practices: positioning the cognitive reader

In *Modernity and Self-Identity*, Giddens adumbrates a host of concepts which he proposes, in 'high' or late modernity, characterize popular consciousness and

behaviour in the formulation of issues of self-development, self-worth, intimate relationships: the pure relationship, the reflexive project of the self, the sequestration of experience, the privatising of passion to name a few from a long list (1991: 243-244). Recovery group work is a prime vehicle of the reflexive project of the self, a phenomenon on the level of the individual which Giddens describes as "the process whereby self-identity is constituted by the reflexive ordering of self-narratives" (1991: 244). For cultural studies of the self and for the study of emotion semantics, the context of this reflexive ordering is all important: By what is it guided? Does it have a performative aspect whereby self-narratives 'take' as part of the self's identity precisely through an emotional experience of some specific sort?

An implicit theory of the model reader is manifest in both the therapeutic practices of recovery group work as well as in recovery literature. For instance, both put into practice narrative strategies through which the self is believed to be able to achieve self-knowledge or a diminution of its suffering and sense of affliction; to heal, recovery discourse requires there be no gap between the reader as agent and the subject position which the reader takes up in the signifying practice of recovery's therapeutic strategies. There would be no basis for the use of specific therapeutic strategies if recovery literature were unsuccessful in situating illness in a context of meaning. Indeed, the significance of recovery discourse for social theory lies in its concept of healing, with its overtones not of cure for a disease but of the self's discovery of the meaningfulness of illness, which alters all future frames of reference for experience.

Learning to restore authorial prerogative: from biography to autobiography

The objective of recovery as a therapy, like most psychotherapies, is to move the sufferer from biography to autobiography where the latter form of narrative ordering is considered to be 'authentic' because it is the product of the self's inner view of itself in a way that no biography by a therapist could be. The objective of recovery group work is to talk the true self into existence by letting the wounded inner child speak, in other words to 'find' or 'give' the self an identity (the distinction

devolves from an ambiguity in recovery's approach to the self as essence or potential). Although, in theory, recovery's ambition is to move its practitioners from biography to autobiography, in practice, recovery provides the *narrative and affective conventions* with which each will write her autobiography and come to feel the truth of her memorial history as constituted in recovery therapy. Autobiographical writing never escapes conventionality, but its status as a genre of writing is usually overpowered by the reader's assumption that it is the 'natural,' spontaneous capture of the truth of a life, an assumption that supports the reader's wish that it be the essence of the writer that lies before her, not artifice.

The healing work of transformation could be thought of as taking the form of what a psychological anthropologist calls identity "diffusion and reconstitution" (Cain, 1991: 217). In Cain's anthropological work on the narration of personal stories in Alcoholics Anonymous, she points out that for persons to seek help by coming to their first AA meeting, a disruption in self-image must have occurred (a realization that "I am not a 'normal' drinker"), followed by the acquisition in the AA group of a new identity, which individuals must internalize and to which they must become emotionally attached (1991: 218). To heal from codependency, the disease of the emotions, recovery proposes identity reconstitution via two methods: first of all, at the conscious level of changing belief, particularly belief about what emotions are, what they do, and what they mean. It involves learning many of the concepts and propositions discussed above in the sections on diagnoses and etiology in recovery discourse. In practice, as with AA, identity reconstitution in recovery groups also occurs at the level of emotional experience. Creating a narrative is secondary to the role of affects in the process of that creation which enables, what a psychological discourse outside of recovery would call, the internalization of new introjects and the constituting of self-identity from different self/object representations. We will see more of how this happens in the examples below on role play, visualization, and age regression exercises.

Learning how to talk 'the talk'

The production and ordering of narratives of the self goes on in recovery's therapeutic practices as memorial work, but it is memorial work which proceeds through participation in rituals and in learning to tell stories. Doing 12-step work is one of the methods by which group members are taught how to tell a codependent story. They learn the structure of the story, the cultural model of codependency encoded in the story, codependency propositions, and appropriate episodes (memories) to serve as evidence, and appropriate interpretations of events. In adopting this schema, both inside and outside the group, in order to talk about the self, the self-labelled 'codependent' is learning an identity, what it means to be codependent. The label, and techniques which confirm the label, is a cognitive device for self-understanding; "the personal story...[is] a cultural vehicle for identity acquisition" (Cain, 1991: 215). Recovery as a cultural meaning system expresses itself not only through the provision of conceptual tools and a language for suffering; it expresses itself in the phenomena recovery calls evidence for the cause-effect relationship it is teaching via diagnostic categories.

Recovery as postmodern textual practice

Although it would certainly dispute this characterization, recovery's steps for identity diffusion and reconstitution arguably make it a postmodern textual practice. The process of writing the story of one's illness is memorial work for which recovery supplies the writer with conventions which influence the shape the story takes. Linda Hutcheon has proposed that the issue for postmodern textual practice is no longer "to what empirically real object in the past does the language of history and memory refer?" but rather "to what discursive context could this language [of memory] belong?" (Hutcheon, 1989: 67). While recovery's various strategies for healing do not question that emotion is a reservoir of memory, members have emotional experiences in the context of scripted performances of emotion in which their roles as actors are contextualized and justified with an explanation beforehand, and then guided in ways that transferential emotional experiences in psychoanalysis are not.

Recovery's 'case studies': telling stories

The prevalence of first person narratives in recovery discourse either in the form of reports of autobiographical stories or in the author's own frequent self-reference arrives by different routes at the same end, soliciting the reader/group participant to identify with the narrator of the codependent story. The 'I' form, carrying connotations of naturalness, uniqueness, and spontaneity, dissuades attention to the similarities across the personal stories reported in these books. They allow the listener to find himself in the story.

Bradshaw's books all refer to "we" and "our". Like the sponsor in AA who guides a new member in the construction of his life story, recovery authors refer to themselves and to their own sufferings as testimony of the power of recovery. The narrator's stories provide a model of codependency, so that readers and groups members (and television audience members) alike may find so much of themselves in the lives of professed codependents in recovery that they cannot help but ask whether they too are alcoholics/sexual abuse victims/codependents.

All recovery books rely on a few narrative devices of which the omniscient narrator, first person dialogue, and the case study report are the fundamentals. For instance, Beattie's 'stories' tell the tale of a life which falls apart: Gerald who repeatedly married chemically dependent women; Patty, the nurse, who was dissuaded from suicide because too many people depended on her; Sheryl, the ex-fashion model who would not leave her sex-addict husband. Each one visits a counsellor who suggests perhaps his or her problems are caused by an addiction in the family of origin. Gerald gives up on counselling, deciding his problems with women are due to bad luck. His story ends, "Is Gerald's problem bad luck Or is it codependency?" (Beattie, 1987: 19). The smart reader knows Gerald must be in denial to stay in relationships with women like that; of course, he's codependent. Patty discovered that when she was a child her parents had gone to their respective groups, AA for her father, Al-Anon for her mother, nevertheless Patty had been affected. "Now if you ask Patty what her problem is or was, she will answer: 'I'm codependent'" (Beattie, 1987: 21). Sheryl joined Co-Sa (a self-help group for spouses of sex addicts), stopped

chasing her husband around the house with a butcher knife, divorced him, and is now feeling better about herself.

The author reminds the reader she "has been there"; she appears to speak from her own experience and invites the reader to agree with her. She expresses what the codependent person, on Beattie's own description, will not be able to express, tenderness toward the self:

Other professionals say codependency is a disease; it's a chronic, progressive illness. They suggest codependents want and need sick people around them to be happy in an unhealthy way. They say, for instance, the wife of an alcoholic needed to marry an alcoholic and chose him because she unconsciously thought he was an alcoholic. Furthermore, she needed him drinking and socking it to her to feel fulfilled.

This latter judgment may be overly harsh. I'm convinced codependents need less harshness in their lives. Other people have been hard enough on us. We have been hard enough on ourselves. Friends, we have suffered enough. We have been victimized by diseases and people. Each of us must decide what part we played in our victimization. I don't *know* if codependency is or isn't an illness. I'm not an expert. But, to tell you what I *believe*, let me complete this brief history of codependency...

(1987: 32)

Reflexive textual devices such as overt linguistic narcissism are used. Bradshaw acknowledges his reader or the television audience to emphasise a moment of identification, "I can see some of you shaking your heads and know what I'm talking about."

Recovery teaches a way of making inferences; testimonials are a significant generic device for both teaching these inferential schema and for embedding within them goals which have motivational force. Testimonials serve an important function because under the guise of the voice of spontaneous, first person experience, they substantiate recovery's diagnostic schema, its etiological premises, and the efficacy of its healing practices. Testimonials, affirmations, visualizations, 'inner voice' and 'feeling' work are all components of the process of identity diffusion and identity reconstitution as the recovery group member learns a story of his or her identity as a codependent. This story allows a reinterpretation of self-identity from bad child, failure, to codependent victim in recovery. A person's private dysfunctional family

story line comes to resemble the recovery story line about dysfunctional families. As the newcomer learns the structure of the codependent story, and learns the model of codependency encoded in the story, he or she learns to place the events and experiences of his or her own life into this form. For instance,

I'm learning who the real me is (uhm), the me that wasn't me was artificial, and I (silence) I was in a cloud for the...like eighteen years. And so the person that's me now is completely different than I was (smile). Because I used artificial means of meeting people. and (uh) surrounding people around me so that I would be O.K.. And now I'm O.K. and growing within myself the people I meet are people who really like me for just me. That's exciting.

(Bradshaw, "Creating Love", excerpt of Program 6, 1992)

This process of learning how to tell your story was part of even the earliest Recovery, Inc. meetings. On these meetings Weschler (1960) writes:

The first part of the meeting is usually devoted to the reading of a chapter from the textbook...A technique widely used in some groups is to call on members who are hesitant about reading in public...At the conclusion of his paragraph, the reader is quite often asked whether he had any symptoms during the reading. He is then "endorsed" for having the "will to bear discomfort," the "courage to make mistakes," and for being "group minded" by doing what he "feared to do."

(1960: 300)

It would seem that group members come to the truth of recovery's diagnostic categories and illness profile, if not to the codependent label, via emotions experienced in the story telling activities in the group. At the same time, as we can see from the above example, as a member is encouraged to participate, for instance, in doing one of the 12-steps, he is given a practical demonstration of the recovery method at work. Affirmations of the member's pain and difficulty in speaking, encouragements to try again next week, personal examples of one's own past difficulties now overcome, are a large part of the supportiveness members come to expect from each other.

The accomplice of group work: recovery literature as genre

Therapy books, as the linguist Robin Lakoff has said, are to the twentieth century what etiquette books were to the nineteenth.

(Hochschild, 1983: 192)

Like etiquette books, all recovery books have a basic structure: short chapters which introduce propositions about codependence, using case studies primarily to

illustrate the history of the illness. While primarily didactic, recovery books, have a performative dimension. These books usually include exercises, questions to answer, lists to complete, all to make unfamiliar the familiar, to reprise information introduced in a chapter, and to invite the reader to apply it to herself. There are publications which are nothing but workbooks of exercises with attached marking scales which encourage the reader to make a self-diagnosis and assume a reassuring label. The myriad lists are joined by other cognitive tools for quick learning and memory refreshment; using a jargon word (SOUL MURDER, DYSFUNCTION) as an acronym is a favourite technique. Repetition is used extensively within and across chapters as well as across the books of the same author. Recovery authors quote each other. A mark of all recovery books are their lists of behavioural 'Do's and Don'ts,' i.e. fair-fight rules. A strength of the literature is that many, concrete examples of 'don'ts' are supplied and alternatives are modelled. Particularly interesting are the instructions on how to work out differences; they are a rich mine of dialogue for the erstwhile playwright of scenes of family feuds, and they are often written in a woman's voice, as if designed as didactic lessons for women in difficult domestic situations. They are immediately available tools for changing one's interactions with people: "Avoid judgment. Stay with self-responsible 'I' messages"; "Stay in the now. Avoid scorekeeping"; say "You are late for dinner. I feel angry. I wanted everything to be warm and tasty." Rather than "You are late for dinner as usual. I remember two years ago on our vacation you, etc., etc." (Bradshaw, 1988a: 53).

6.5.3 Recovery group practices: (dis)positioning the affective reader

Although 12-step programs are part of recovery, and it is while 'working the steps' that members learn how to tell their stories, recovery group work enjoys a wealth of therapeutic techniques which go beyond identity reconstitution through the learning of the propositions and biographical history of cause and effect which characterizes the 'codependent' story as a genre. The most powerful techniques to promote identity diffusion and reconstitution follow from recovery's assumption that codependence is a psychological addiction whose hooks in the flesh are embodied emotions. Recovery techniques aim to unhook the body from patterned responses and

from numbness to permit new emotional experiences of self and other. The two major components of recovery as sentimental education are 'inner voice' work and 'feeling' work. Not only do the techniques belonging to these two components serve as methods to bring the group member to a visceral bodily apprehension of the 'truth' of the propositions of codependency (i.e. through emotional response), as rituals they move the participant across an emotional trajectory which has cathartic effects.

To discover the conditions determining our emotional responses is the first step to outlining an ethnotheory of emotion, that is, a theory of emotion as a culture bound syndrome. Therapies that seek to produce change through emotion 'work' must understand the ethnotheory of emotion which underlies their clients' emotional world view. Recovery therapy relies on the 'sentimental education' its participants bring with them to group therapy when it engages in reforming that very sentimental education. In fact, all therapies implicitly or may even directly express propositions about the dominant ethnotheory of emotion in the culture where they operate:

Ethnotheories of emotion describe a fundamental and ubiquitous aspect of psychological functioning. They are used to explain why, when, and how emotion occurs, and they are embedded in more general theories of the person, internal processes, and social life. As they play a central role in the organization of experience and behaviour, an examination of the structure of emotion ethnotheories can contribute to both cultural and psychological models of emotion and social action.

(Lutz in Quinn and Holland, 1987:320)

As we have seen, recovery discourse explicitly critiques the rules of the Western ethnotheory of emotion. By confronting the proscriptive rules of the poisonous pedagogy, and gender specific rules for emotional expression in males and females, recovery is engaged in rewriting the Western ethnotheory of emotion, particularly with respect to gendered rules of emotion behaviour. This is not solely for pragmatic purposes within the intratherapeutic context of group work; it is designed to change beliefs and compulsive habits both of which are seen to restrict emotional expression.

Sentimental education

The affective memorial work required in groups Bradshaw calls 'inner voice' and 'feeling' work. They are the closest recovery gets to bringing the non-conscious self to consciousness. Sentimental education is about learning to feel what it means to

be a codependent which means dissolving defences against feeling, particularly feelings of intense pain. Since the developmental sequences and needs of the self adequate to the formation of identity were not met at the proper time and in the proper sequence in dysfunctional families, recovery therapy proposes to reignite that developmental process and push the self "through a self-recovery, uncovering, discovery process" (1988a: 193). The journey to 'the whole of the true self' is made up of disenchantment and grieving.

The witness consciousness in recovery: the group

'Bildung', self-realization through a detour through the other, of which Gadamer speaks in *Truth and Method*, is recognized as necessary in recovery, and the other takes the form of the group. Group work is the crux of the theory and technique of recovery from codependency which, as an emotional illness brought about by dysfunctional social relations, can only be cured by curing social relations. The 'witness-consciousness' of Bradshaw's therapeutic method is the group which largely functions in quite different ways than in the analyst-analysand relationship. However, in some exercises, group members become symbolic stand-ins of parents for other group members with intense emotional effects. 'Feeling' work is not quite transference, but there are similarities between the two which cohere around the notion of mirroring. Narrating goes on in a group context of mirroring, and the responses of other members are what invest new understandings with the 'feel' of truthfulness due to the imprimatur of emotions felt intensely during the narrating.

Bradshaw in his "Creating Love" taped series of seminars in 1992 calls the codependency stage of development in infancy "the time when looking into eyes is so important." Interestingly enough, the group exercises of which excerpts are shown by Bradshaw during his televised seminars employ voice and movement primarily; often members of the audience or group members in the video clips have their eyes closed. Looking becomes important between the television audience and the cast of characters in the television program: we identify with the in studio audience when we follow Bradshaw on stage. But during guided visualizations Bradshaw does with his studio audience, the camera picks out and holds face after face, eyes closed, tears sliding

down cheeks impelled by thoughts we cannot hear, faces naked for our inspection. When Bradshaw shows taped testimonials, the television screen fills with a head shot of an earnest stranger speaking directly 'to' us of intimate things. We are locked into his look, incapable of flinching lest he see us shrinking from the details which we do and do not want to hear. The television viewer has the illusion of personal contact, as if that person's message is directed to him or her personally. The power of rapt faces in close-up, like the fascination the ravaged visage of Marlow could exert on the audience for *The Singing Detective*, is what hooks the television viewer on the idea that recovery group work offers something intangibly frightening, enticing, yet possibly consoling.

Three stages of recovery: Reading the text of the self through 'inner voice' and 'feeling' work

Stage 1

The three stages of recovery are described by Bradshaw through his own experience of going through the exercises of each stage (1988a). Stage I begins with agreeing to stop addictive behaviour and to admit one's limitations. This is recovery's inheritance of AA's first step. At meetings this involves introducing oneself as an addict: "Hi, I'm Lisa and I'm codependent." "I had to surrender and acknowledge my powerlessness. I had to feel as badly as I really felt"; Bradshaw models a key phrase, pinpointing confrontation with denial at Stage 1 (1988a: 197). Sharing feelings in the group leads the new member to the first step in recovery, speaking as frankly as possible of her emotions and experiencing mirroring, being accepted by the group. "Each time I went to a meeting I felt better." The new recovery member or reader of his book learns to expect to feel better because she will recover her self-respect in this new family with healthy rules: there is mutual respect, social equality and rigorous honesty. However, no demand has been made on the member to give up her compulsivity; often one addiction supplants another at this point, Bradshaw warns. Stage I also begin the externalization process of toxic shame to "transform the energy of the shame into revolutionary action."

Stage 2

Stage 2 work requires a support group or therapist in order to do the work of disenchantment. Disenchantment is required to uncover the delusions the recovery member has been living under which were cast by the original SPELL, the family trance. Since the family SPELL "is learned outside of one's awareness, it becomes just as much second nature to us as the spoken language" (Bradshaw, 1988a: 210). It can only be unlearned through what Bradshaw calls "original pain" or grief work. This begins by regestating the family of origin, giving up denial that parents were happy, that father was not an alcoholic, that uncle did not sexually abuse his nieces, and so on. However, this language of voluntarism masks how the group member is to achieve this new, clear-sighted perspective on family members. How, for instance, is the member to escape from idealization if he or she does not realize idealization has been operating? This example points to a frequently occurring catch-22 in the recovery method. On the one hand recovery discourse has noted that denial and projection are characteristics of the codependent personality while, on the other hand, it proposes regestating on the assumption that a person will be able to overcome projection by a willed act of thinking differently, "in a less mystified way" about the family of origin. However, voluntarism has never been a weapon against projection or denial.

Theoretically, owning one's shame rather than denying it, and then uncovering its sources, is the step that initiates the all important mourning process which has a pivotal role in recovery as in all psychotherapies. It is the recognition that, as Tom Wolfe said, 'we can never go home again' and we must give up the hope of getting unmet childhood needs met. On Bradshaw's account, addictive/compulsive personalities never went through the pain of this loss. Those childhood emotions of loss were denied, and "denying our emotions is a way that causes us to lose control over them" (1988a: 213).¹⁹

Bradshaw's energy model of emotion supplies the argument against denial: "Emotional energy has to go somewhere. You either repress emotions (act them in); project them onto others (say others look needy when you feel shame over your own neediness) or 'act them out'" (1988a: 213). Bradshaw advises that therapy which stays

at the level of cognitive insight, when a member is at this stage, should be avoided.

He quotes from Alice Miller's *The Drama of the Gifted Child*:

...problems cannot be solved with *words*, but only through *experience*, not merely corrective experience as an adult but...through a reliving of early fear (sadness, anger)...Mere words, however skilled....will leave the split from which he suffers unchanged or even deepened.

(in Bradshaw, 1988a: 213)

Feeling work has to be done in a group of some sort: a 12-step group, support group, or interactive therapy group, since codependent issues are relationship problems. It is interesting that work with a single therapist is not advised, particularly since, in the following quote from a medical doctor who treats codependence, we see objectives for the counsellor/group member relationship which are consequent with the transference possibilities of psychodynamic psychotherapy:

The primary purpose of a long-term interactive group is to provide a setting in which the issues of codependency emerge spontaneously...Interactive group therapy works best when members discover themselves behaving inside the group much as they do in real life--being distrustful, controlling their feelings, sacrificing their own needs to ensure that others are taken care of, revealing only carefully chosen parts of themselves...when they finally understand that those behaviours reflect habitual and unconscious patterns, the group can become a laboratory for experimenting with alternative behaviours.

(in Bradshaw, 1988a: 215)

The group experience is to provide mirroring which has a number of functions. Confrontation is a form of Stage 2 specific mirroring to keep a member 'in' her feelings and prevent splitting and denial. It catches the member out in the act of *feeling but not being in touch with feeling*. As the following example shows, the absence of which consciousness is a sign appears in the speaking presence of the body. Bradshaw gives this example of confrontation mirroring:

A man in a share group I am in was describing how he had totally accepted his wife's recent affair. As he spoke *his fist was clenched and his voice tone was shaky*. I simply said to him, "Herkamer, when you said you had accepted your wife's affair, I saw that your hand was clenched and I heard your voice crack." This is confrontation...Two other men in our group gave him similar feedback. In this way, he has the opportunity to become aware of what he was not aware of.

(1988a: 216)

Stage 2 group work which takes the form of role play, and symbolic mirroring follow from Bradshaw's epigenetic developmental model of the feeling-mind. For instance, the rationale for "corrective experience feeling" work follows from this developmental theory. Bradshaw holds that "all our experience is encoded and imprinted in our memory banks. Our developmental stages are like the circular layers of a tree. Each developmental stage is left intact" (1988a: 217). Citing the neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield and evidence from hypnotic age regression experiments to substantiate the hypothesis that developmental states stay intact within us, Bradshaw presents Eric Berne's tripartite model of ego states which form the personality as evidence for Bradshaw's own notion of the 'inner child.' Berne proposed that the personality is made up of "an Adult Ego State (our current thought life); a Parent Ego (our recorded and unexamined life--an exact copy of our own parents); and a Child Ego state (our felt life, especially as we experienced it as a child)" (1988a: 218).

There is strong agreement that the children we once were live in us as a complete energy state of feelings, thoughts and desires. If our developmental dependency needs were not met, the energy which would have accrued in the resolution of each developmental stage is blocked. This blocked energy is mostly composed of blocked emotions.

(Bradshaw, 1988a: 218)

Bradshaw concludes that if recovery group members can age regress, they will rework blocked energy and the emotions that cannot be felt. Age regression emotion exercises could be thought of as parody in the terms in which it has been defined by Hutcheon as "repetition with a difference" (Hutcheon, 1987). Feeling work sets up the group member in an interpersonal drama which ends differently than plots in which he or she has been previously cast. Feeling work either writes original scripts for emotions the member will not allow himself to feel or inscribes a new paradigm scenario over an old one (the cathartic effect) which allows the member to feel and therefore to think and act differently.

Stage 2 feeling work is designed to allow participants to go through the developmental stages of childhood, and it offers them corrective experiences relating to each developmental stage. This is done by creating small groups "which serve as nurturing mini-families. Each person receives from the group various kinds of mirroring and feedback appropriate to the age specific developmental need" (1988a:

219). Group work is significant for its foregrounding of corporeal modes of emotional expression: facial expression, tone of voice, body posture and proximity, touch, all of which contribute to the creation of an emotional atmosphere in the group which is the context of storytelling.

Excerpts of these group exercises were shown by Bradshaw during his televised ten hour series, *Bradshaw On: The Family*, and they are very powerful even for the television viewer. The exercise involves a circle of four or five seated group members with another in the centre. The group moves as close to the member as she feels comfortable with; she closes her eyes and listens. The purpose of these affirming exercises is to produce a corrective emotional experience to fill developmental needs that were not met in infancy and childhood. Bradshaw states that the fundamental emotional need in infancy is basic trust; when that has not been met, the child will move on to the next developmental stage in a wounded state which makes successful passage through it even more difficult. The incremental factor in distorted development is obvious.

Affirmations are inserted into age regression exercises such as this. In the exercise to allow trust to develop, the members sitting in the circle say what the wounded child who never achieved trust needed to hear. As they speak softly and warmly, they reach forward to touch or stroke the person in the centre: "Welcome to the world;" "You can count on me being here for *you*;" "I'm glad you're a boy;" "I'm glad you're a girl;" "Everything about you is O.K. with me." In the segment I watched on television, the young man in the centre very shortly began to sob, particularly when an older man in the circle leaned close toward him and said with feeling, "I'm so *glad* you're here." Bradshaw's expectation is that when a participant feels something very painfully and intensely, those feelings signal an emotional need which was not met in childhood, and he mentions, as an example, his own tendency to become particularly sad when he hears stories and sees images of father-son tenderness. We could think of affirmations as giving the member in the circle a paradigm scenario for love which comes from a sense of security and trust, a scenario the member never had. There are exercises to take members through all the developmental stages of childhood, with the

expectation that group work will provide corrective emotional experiences and newly embodied paradigm scenarios.

In psychoanalytic terms, the group serves the function of other to the child/codependent, enabling the adult child to introject good experiences in the group as a 'good' internal object and carry that internalized goodness away from the group. An interesting question for medical anthropologists would be the similarity between the mirroring work and the functions of the therapeutic alliance between the psychoanalytic couple and the diverse mirroring procedures of recovery groups.

Symbolic Action in Imagery and Visualization

Recovery utilizes the creation of new images or visualizations in the healing process, although few in dominant medical practice consider imagery useful in treating or preventing physical disease. Recovery employs guided visualization or 'created' images which are frequently used in combination with meditation techniques. "In Catholic and some Protestant charismatic groups, one prevalent healing ritual was the 'healing of memories'... [which] consists of the visualization of a past situation that evokes problems that need healing, such as an unhappy relationship, bitterness, envy, anxiety, and so on" (McGuire, 1988: 223). Bradshaw uses visualization in his workshops with hundreds of people, including the studio audience for his "Homecoming" series.

There are space meditations and interaction mediations. In the first, group members are invited to imagine a special retreat, to be furnished at will and imagining in detail colour, texture, smell and so on. He invites the listener to..... and watches as his charges begin their imaginative work. Although guided to begin with, imagery is creative and individualized. The camera, seemingly an extension of Bradshaw's gaze with which members in the television audience identify, pans slowly over the naked faces of audience members, catching the furrowing of a brow, the sob, the shaking shoulders. Instructions to breathe, to relax, to return slowly are given.

Interaction visualizations imagine an action which will produce change. One involves wrapping up the illness, pain, or unwanted emotional quality and then floating it away on a rushing stream. Like Eastern and meditation groups, Bradshaw

typically used peaceful and visually attractive images to rid the mind and body of impurities. Visualizations seem to be devices to produce insight and an abreactive emotional experience. Another source of healing is through empowerment rather than insight. We see recovery using techniques from both types of healing.

Performative Aspects of Ritual Language

The centrality of ritual language in the healing process sheds light on some of the ways alternative healing systems work for their adherents. Every healing group has beliefs about the loci of power to cause and to heal illness as well as ideas about ways to channel that power (McGuire, 1988: 227). What recovery seeks to do is to strengthen the victim's healing power which is immanent, whether it be called her Higher Power, Inner Force, Spirit or Goddess.

Many alternative healing systems maintain that ritual language or objects transmit healing power. The sole object of import for Bradshaw's recovery work is the childhood stuffed toy, often a teddy bear, not always the original, which members bring with them to groups and hold throughout the session. He has introduced at one and the same time a strongly affectively charged symbol of childhood attachments as well as what was for many their original transitional object. Winnicott called the transitional object the first 'me/not-me' object; however, other objects and practices (aesthetics and play) have the characteristics of being transitional objects or transitional spaces. The presence of the transitional object symbolically, and perhaps for some affectively, licences emotional openness. A vital characteristic of symbols, like the teddy bear, is their capacity to link subjective experience to a culturally available scheme of shared meanings.

Recovery believes ritual language is a vehicle for energy or power. When words are afforded almost magical power, much as the schizophrenic treats words as things which can physically wound, they become agents in themselves. They have a force attached to them which can be likened to the placebo effect. "The placebo effect may be merely one way of describing an individual's response to his or her society's peculiar symbolization of empowerment--be it an amulet, ritual word, or pill" (McGuire, 1988: 228). Recovery's language of a Higher Power may encourage people

to believe themselves in touch with a great power *in themselves* which belief may, in fact, empower the individual believer to be more effective in daily life.

Stage 3

Stages 1 and 2 enabled the group member to contact the spontaneous, natural child she had lost while trying to survive the poisonous pedagogy. Finding the lost child is preparatory to discovering the true self by restoring an inner life. This is the spiritual work of Stage 3, which makes Bradshaw a 'spiritual systems theorist.' It is a step that not all codependency authors take. Investigation of this stage is not required since it leads away from our discussion of emotion as it pertains to the healing practices of recovery group work; however, it is crucial to an understanding of the romantic strain of thinking in recovery discourse.²⁰

Taking aim at projection

Much of the didactic aspect of recovery discourse concerns the teaching of new ways of perceiving and making inferences which will enable the self to have a different emotional response and an interpersonal emotional communication which enables reality testing. In other words, recovery is involved in the writing of new rules for emotion and the training of people in these rules through the 'feeling' work it proposes. This ambition is fundamental to the liberalist inheritance of the autonomous individual which structures recovery's aims and methods.

Recovery's earliest origins, in Dr. Low's textbook, held to basic belief that an individual can and must exercise control and self-discipline in all matters that affect his mental health. The will was to be trained to this desired end through continuous practice of Recovery techniques. Self-discipline was to be generalized to all spheres and levels of activity. To promote self-discipline, these early Recovery groups assumed the characteristics of exercises in self control and indirectly taught members to adopt highly routinized forms of speech and thought:

Impulses to speak must be checked. The individual must first raise his hand, and must make his comments in accordance with the strict procedural regulations...In nearly all cases, examples are presented in terms of Recovery language. If an occasional term such as "projection" or "identification" is introduced, it is soon withdrawn by the speaker...at

no time may one question the Recovery method itself, except to obtain clarification of a term or concept. No discussion of other psychological theories or systems is permitted.

(Wechsler, 1960: 300-304)

While contemporary recovery literature still expresses the aim of giving the codependent his free will, the idea of what it means to be an individual with free will has changed since the days of Recovery, Inc. To be an individual with free will means to take responsibility for what the self feels and thinks, to recognize and speak rather than to deny and suppress. Consequently, recovery practices forego disciplining the body of the group member by controls on movement and speech and aim instead to produce a decrease of the member's controls on emotional expression and feeling.

Taking responsibility for all that one thinks, feels, and does is a good indication of the presence of intrapsychic autonomy. To that end, recovery takes aim at a singular source of dysfunctional cognition and communication, projection. Projection interferes with responsible behaviour toward others. Recovery advises that we are accountable to each other but not responsible for each other. "If Mother responds angrily to Father, Father does not believe he *made* Mother angry. He knows that Mother's anger is about her own response (interpretation) and her own history (Father's voice may have sounded like her father). Each takes responsibility for his or her own responses" (Bradshaw, 1988a: 56). To avoid projecting one's views (eg. criticism) onto others and then responding angrily or defensively to them as if they had been critical (the mechanism of the self-fulfilling prophecy), recovery advises: "Use active listening. Repeat to the other person what you heard them say. Get their agreement about what you heard them say before responding." (Bradshaw, 1988a: 53). Recovery actively campaigns against projection (confusion about the source of a feeling or thought) and adds an interpersonal context to contextualize what Averill calls the rule of instigation with respect to prescription (i.e. when it is acceptable to become angry): "A person has the right (duty) to become angry at intentional wrongdoing, including an affront to one's honour, freedom, property, or other rights" (Averill, 1982: 324). Recovery teaches verify first, then feel.

The apex of self-reflexivity: bootstrapping by 'parenting yourself'

Auto-suggestion is part of recovery's 'right thinking' work. It involves members telling themselves that "every day I get better and better" on the belief that self-fulfilling prophecies are possible to engineer. It is the most radical form of self-help by, in essence, denying the necessity of anyone other than the self to help the self.

As we have seen, recovery discourse has recourse to an epigenetic developmental model, meaning that personality development is stage specific, cumulative, and progressive. To miss one stage inhibits all further growth. On the other hand, recovery also proposes that we can parent ourselves to get our unmet needs met as adults. This is tantamount to saying we can become our own traditions and learn from them; we can lead and be lead by ourselves. What are the criteria to be of this personal bootstrapping?

The work of therapy is often aimed at so distancing us from our parents that we may choose, or seem to choose, freely, which aspects of them we will resemble and which not. Leaving home in a sense involves a kind of second birth in which we give birth to ourselves. And if that is the case with respect to families, it is even more so with our ultimate defining beliefs. The irony is that here, too, just where we think we are most free, we are most coerced by the dominant beliefs of our culture. For it is a powerful cultural fiction that we not only can, but must, make up our deepest beliefs in the isolation of our private selves.

(Bellah, 1985: 65)

Its bootstrapping philosophy catches recovery on what appears to be the horns of a dilemma. While, on the one hand, it promotes the importance of the solidarity and cohesion of the group, doing the 12-steps, doing the feeling work, on the other hand, it says members that recovery can only be attained through individual active effort, right thinking, self-discipline in following the steps. It promotes dependency on the group and on the basic authority of the recovery method while counteracting this tendency with an emphasis on self-help. This may not be as contradictory as it appears in that it satisfies an individual's dependency needs without prescribing passive inactivity and blind obedience.

6.6 The ideology of emotion work: motivating cultural schemas

The notion of 'codependency' has been receiving widespread cultural publicity in the 1990's in North America. Just as in the early years of this century when "the vocabulary of neurasthenic diagnosis and treatment showed up in the thinking of figures as different as the founder of Christian Science, Mary Baker Eddy, the environmentalist John Muir, the socialist Upton Sinclair and the black leader and writer W.E.B. Du Bois" (Miller, 1991: 1), the language of recovery and codependency has begun to appear in many discourse sites other than the self-help literature. 'Recovery' is in the process of becoming a kind of allegory for the form the human condition has taken in the last decade of the twentieth century.

The topos of the 'wounded inner child' is the essence of recovery's theory of illness and healing. Childhood traits--spontaneity, curiosity, wonder, willingness to be vulnerable--are glorified if not exaggerated into a cure for all social ills. However, childhood has to be 'done right' or a fallen universe is inherited. This simplified story of 'original loss' may be a reassuring metaphor to a generation in light of their grief, rage, and apparent impotence before their inheritance, an environmentally degraded and politically poisonous natural and social world.

Recovery discourse, like *The Singing Detective* and *Reading the Romance*, upholds a view of illness as a life ruled by a teleology installed in childhood. Against such a teleology, recovery reassures its adherents that a certain measure of authorial sovereignty over personal events can be achieved through accessing emotions and memories to build intrapsychic autonomy. Recovery discourse shares a number of presuppositions about the self with *The Singing Detective*: the ineluctability of biography and the requirement to bring what is denied to consciousness through memorial work. They differ in that recovery conflates self-consciousness with self-understanding while *The Singing Detective* holds out for a more Freudian view of consciousness as symptomatizing what we do not and cannot know of ourselves. Radway's feminist criticism locates the sources of the self and its characteristic psychological needs in exigencies created by the inner object world during the pre-oedipal years. Recovery's evaluation of the paedogenetic impress on adult emotional life is shared by the traditions to which Janice Radway and Dennis Potter appeal for

their representations of the origins of psychic life. All three discourses contribute to a growing discussion in North America on the dysfunctional family and its dangers to children. While the implications of this debate for social policy are unforeseeable, the infiltration of a child-oriented perspective into mass culture's theory of the person and its rights is indisputable.

The ideological work of recovery as a healing system is evident in the premise that everyone comes from a dysfunctional family. Since everyone is ill, then recovery's prescriptions for healing becomes a therapy for society as a whole. "Get your needs met": by this rallying cry recovery shows itself to uphold the liberalist emphasis on the rights of the individual. On the other hand, it also addresses another aspect of liberalism, the obligations of the citizen. It recognizes that the sovereignty of the individual to participate in society, to make decisions, to exercise free will, and to enjoy rights is compromised by the traits of codependency. Experiencing feelings which have been denied will "restore the disabled will" (Bradshaw, 1988a: 216). Recovery does not only locate healing in a change of belief, it proposes a new way of experiencing which requires disturbing emotional dispositions across North American society. Disturbing emotional dispositions is linked to disturbing positions in discourses, such as the poisonous pedagogy which will effect future generations.

Recovery's focus not only on using emotions to effect healing but in identifying a particular emotional constitution as an ideal of health is a critique of rationalized biomedicine and its severing of illness from meaning by calling it disease. It is also a resistance to the rationalization of emotion through the demands of role playing and the commodification of feeling in the public sphere in Western society today, both of which Hochschild documented in her study of stewardesses in the airline industry (1983), to name but one example. Recovery discourse adopts no simple approach to emotions. It claims that emotions can be both faulty or insightful epistemological instruments; they may be both a sign of our alienation from ourselves or signs of subjective experience of authenticity. This is a rhetorical move which highlights how diverse discourses (this thesis is no exception) deploy assumptions and claims about emotion to serve a variety of ideological ends. Recovery's reiteration of the importance of emotion for epistemology and its ontological indispensability for any

sense of self-coherence takes place against the backdrop of a rationalized world and its bleak dichotomies of private self and public self, corporate self and true self, physical being and emotional life.

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the idea of being 'cured' has been absolutized in contemporary society under the sway of spiralling consumer expectations for bliss. Similarly, the fetishization of 'personal growth' by the recovery movement has led mental health to be less about the capacity to confront, explore, and survive some of the contradictions of living and more about a triumph over all that might challenge the autonomy of the individual. In contrast to the tendencies of other cultural groups to recognize and endure existential sources of suffering, recovery discourse supports Anglo-American cultural expectations which incorporate values of the pursuit of happiness, triumph over life's trials, and self-realization. However, it can be argued that recovery discourse does raise the question of how to revive sacred institutions without sacrificing a commitment to cultural pluralism. One of the more interesting questions for future research on the recovery phenomena, apart from the Giddens/Bellah protodebate on the effects of the turn to the therapeutic on the public sphere, is the question of audience construction. What theory of the person, degree of psychological-mindedness, and ethnotheory of emotion is shared, if any, by those classes, genders, age, ethnic, and religious groups from which recovery draws its adherents? How were they prepared intrapsychically and socioculturally to find recovery discourse compelling?²¹

CHAPTER SIX: ENDNOTES

1. This information has been drawn from articles in *Publishers Weekly* (November 23, 1990) and from information obtained through a visit to *That Other Bookstore*, Toronto's only recovery bookstore. It opened in April, 1989 and was also the first of its kind in Canada. *That Other Bookstore* combines several functions. It specializes in recovery books, produces a catalogue of over 1100 titles and 86 different audio cassettes, and runs a café where, on a monthly basis, a therapist offers an informal evening seminar for customers about different styles and disciplines of therapy. In addition to traditional bookstore activities, it acts as an informal rehabilitation and information centre for counsellors and clients, with a therapist in private practice as part of its 'team.' She is available to offer bookstore customers support and information and has an office above the store itself. For a study of the battles over acquisitions and licensing of titles between small publishers and the major New York publishers such as HarperCollins when they began to see the possibilities in religious/spiritual publishing and in the recovery concept, see Jones (1990) and Rivkin (1990).

2. Although in the popular press and the recovery literature itself, the origins of the recovery movement are located in 1935 and the founding of Alcoholics Anonymous and what has since become the ubiquitous Bible of addiction self-help groups, the 12-step program, the concept of 'recovery' appeared with a new form of activity in the mental health field in the late 1930's: the self-help group for former mental patients. By the early 1960's the largest and oldest of these groups was called Recovery, Incorporated: The Association of Nervous and Former Mental Patients. Recovery was founded in 1937 by Abraham Low, M.D., a neuropsychiatrist at the University of Illinois College of Medicine for the patients at the Psychiatric Institute attached to his university. In 1942, the Institute and Low's organization severed connections. Low developed Recovery as a regime of self-help and after-care to prevent relapses among former psychiatric patients. Group meetings were part of Low's treatment procedure. As the organization grew, Low's direct control over group activities decreased and, in 1952, he gave permission for Recovery to expand on the national level. With his death in 1954, Recovery moved from being a professionally supervised adjunct to psychotherapy to a lay-run form of self-help.

The only criteria for membership was to be a former mental patient or "nervous person," or an individual who perceived himself to be emotionally disturbed. Most adherents, according to a questionnaire survey of 779 group members in 1959 (Wechsler, 1960), were middle-class, middle-aged married women with some high school education and possibly college. Husbands were employed in non-manual occupations and the yearly family income was approximately \$6,000. Typically, these women had one or more children, were active in community and church affairs, belonged to one or more voluntary community associations, attended church services weekly, and had a variety of leisure time activities. These women joined Recovery because they learned about it from the lay press or from a relative or friend. The major reasons for joining were given as:

- a) psychological symptoms, such as fears, delusions, and "nerves";
- b) psychosomatic symptoms, such as tremors and heart palpitations;
- c) curiosity about whether the organization could help.

(Wechsler, 1960: 302)

Very few had histories of hospitalization for treatment of nervous or mental disorders prior to joining Recovery.

Recovery utilized only the techniques, principles, and terminology of its official text *Mental Health Through Will-Training* written by Dr. Low. Members were expected to learn Dr. Low's system and use it in his everyday life. Recovery's emphasis was on the use of free will to control thoughts "which only serve to increase temper, which in turn increases tenseness and contribute to symptoms" (Wechsler, 1960: 299). With this emphasis on controlling tension, nerves, and negative emotions of fear and anger, Recovery seems to be an offshoot, within the psychiatric community, of early nineteenth century America's fascination with neurasthenia, or nervous disorders. For more on the Recovery method, role of members and leaders in the group, functions of the Recovery method, and group functions of Recovery, see Wechsler (1960). On neurasthenia, see Miller (1991).

3. In "New Age Technoculture" (1992: 535-5), see Ross's development of the analogy between the demarcation lines in science and the border between hierarchical taste cultures--high, middlebrow, and popular. Recovery as 'middlebrow', along with 'Dr. Ruth', self-help groups like Alcoholics Anonymous and other 12-step programs, is positioned between the 'highbrow' discourses of psychoanalysis and psychiatry and the 'popular' discourses of advice columns such as Ann Landers.

4. "Alternative healing" refers to a wide range of beliefs and practices that adherents expect to affect health but which are not promulgated by medical personnel in the dominant biomedical system (McGuire, 1988: 4). These may include in North America: naturopathy, faith healing, Christian Science, psychic healing, Transcendental Meditation, occult and New Age therapies, human potential therapeutic methods (Arica, est, and psychosynthesis), reflexology, and Native American healing methods.

5. The books making up this corpus were all those available for sale in the self-help section of *Lexus* a downtown Montreal bookstore whose stock while duplicating the self-help shelves at *Coles*, the most non-specialised book store in Montreal, was not as extensive as the stock at a store such as Toronto's *That Other Bookstore* which specializes in self-help books. While not comprehensive, my selection I believe to be representative of the publishers and authors in the field, particularly as it includes John Bradshaw and Melody Beattie, both best-selling authors on the New York Times Best Sellers Lists. A list of these authors is to be found in the Bibliography under Primary Texts.

6. See Cain (1991:211-213) for a discussion of the evolving positions biomedicine has taken on alcoholism and how those changing definitions have found their way into Alcoholics Anonymous' own literature and construction of alcoholism.

7. This possibility indicates a direction for audience research on the recovery phenomenon with respect to its attractions for different national and ethnic populations, particularly in immigrant communities which seek alternative healing systems to professional medical institutions and their practices of diagnosis and treatment since they interact very poorly with non-Western cultural groups' languages of suffering. For instance, would Italian or Irish populations, which differ markedly in their cultural use of alcohol and in their attitudes to drunkenness, be more attracted to recovery's method of dealing with alcoholism or would the self-disciplined "cold turkey" approach and embrace of humility and guilt of AA be more effective? On this see *Pain as human experience: an anthropological perspective* (1992), the newest book by the prolific group of medical anthropologists at Harvard, Mary-Jo Delvecchio Good, Byron Good, and Arthur Kleinman, eds.

8. For those who are culturally illiterate and do not know the Twelve Steps of Alcoholics Anonymous, here they are:

1. We admitted we were powerless over alcohol--that our lives had become unmanageable.
2. Came to believe that a Power greater than ourselves could restore us to sanity.
3. Made a decision to turn our will and our lives over to the care of God, *as we understood Him*.
4. Made a searching and fearless moral inventory of ourselves.
5. Admitted to God, to ourselves, and to another human being the exact nature of our wrongs.
6. Were entirely ready to have God remove all these defects of character.
7. Humbly asked Him to remove our shortcomings.
8. Made a list of all persons we have harmed, and became willing to make amends to them all.
9. Made direct amends to such people wherever possible, except when to do so would injure them or others.
10. Continued to take personal inventory and when we were wrong promptly admitted it.
11. Sought through prayer and meditation to improve our conscious contact with God *as we understood Him*, praying only for knowledge of His will for us and the power to carry that out.
12. Having had a spiritual awakening as the result of these steps, we tried to carry this message to alcoholics, and to practice these principles in all our affairs.

(Kasl, 1992: 144-145)

In her critique of recovery groups which use the traditional 12-step program devised by AA, Kasl's book implicates ethnic, cultural, and gender differences from the beginning in any definition of needs to be met through recovery self-help work. She notes that *whereas steps which involved demanding humility and confessions of being out of control may have been appropriate for adult male alcoholics in the 1950's, abused and victimized women and aboriginal peoples who are looking for relief today do not need to be made more humble when they already have low self-esteem nor should they be required to take responsibility for their addictions when*

they are due to systemic conditions of impoverishment associated with being a woman or a member of a marginal ethnic group. Bradshaw's books, on the other hand, are written as if the codependent's needs which have not been met can be universalized. Along with her revision of the 12-steps, Kasl includes in her book several examples of ways in which the 12-steps have been rewritten for use by Native Americans, by feminists, and by sexual abuse survivors. *Antiga's Thirteen Circles* are an example of the meeting of feminist and holistic interests in designing a 'program' for group work:

1. We believe that we are not responsible for creating the oppression that permeates our society.
2. We believe that a Power outside ourselves and deep within us can restore our balance and give us wholeness.
3. We make a decision to ask for help from the Goddess and others who understand.
4. We acknowledge our beauty, strengths, and weaknesses and look at the ways we have been taught to hate ourselves.
5. We acknowledge to the Goddess, to ourselves, and to another person our successes and shortcomings.
6. We make a list of the ways we have acquiesced to oppression.
7. We become ready to say no to oppression.
8. We ask for the courage to resist oppressive situations.
9. We mend our lives with respect for all.
10. We continue to be conscious of our actions and thoughts, promptly acknowledging our mistakes and enjoying our successes.
11. We seek to improve our conscious contact with the Goddess.
12. We believe that at every moment we are doing the best we can, and that is enough.
13. We accept ourselves exactly as we are, trusting our experience and affirming that health, joy, and freedom are our Goddess-given rights.

(Kasl, 1992: 328-329)

9. The disease label may also paradoxically relieve the family of origin from direct blame since the family's sickness as a dysfunctional system 'infected' the children. Systemic rules, not parents who are themselves 'victims' of their family systems, become the object of criticism.

10. In therapies of all sorts, the patient is expected to discover a self that is not only healthier or better functioning but in some sense more 'true'. The true self is a heuristic device in psychotherapy, but it performs poorly when it is used as an explanatory construct about psychotherapy. "This appeal to a true self is one way that psychodynamic psychotherapy transforms the culture specific values of individualism into tacit facts about the mind" (Kirmayer, 1989: 247). Anscombe (1989) suggests that the concept of the true self is more like the concept 'unicorn' since it borrows from three approaches, each of which is concerned with different kinds of mental construct. Three common uses of the term 'true self' in psychotherapy obscure the sense in which the self is a social construction: self as representation; self as subjective experience; and self as essence.

11. There are two varieties of Romanticism to which humanistic psychologies (of which recovery could be considered to be one) are heir. Type I romanticism treats self-knowledge as an unquestionable ideal and so accepts the most central notion of the Enlightenment that knowledge will make you free; it accepts self-control and self-knowledge as means to authenticity; it perpetuates certain values and assumptions of the Enlightenment: individualism, freedom; it is animated by its objection to the tendency to understand and treat human beings on the analogy of inanimate things and thereby to deny the distinctive nature of subjectivity, the inner perspective; humanism and this first strain of romanticism are reactions against the technologicistic society of modernity. Type II romanticism expresses a longing for a sense of community (*Gemeinschaft*); it places emphasis on traditions and social order as much as on self-expression; emphasizes community as prior to individuality and it seeks to transcend the dualisms of mind versus matter and of freedom vs. determinism. This is the tradition of those romantics who accepted that human existence required an element of opaqueness or incomprehensibility. Type II romanticism is more concerned about an alienation from within. Concern for such a form of alienation has come to be especially prominent in the literary and artistic culture of modernism, where the privacy and individuality of consciousness is valorized as against the inauthenticity of the public persona and the outer world.

The effects of this second strain on therapy would be a downgrading of themes of finding one's true self or inner self or discovering the autobiographical sources of one's idiosyncratic traits in comparison to more traditional concerns of the moral or practical life, such as the exploration of one's relationship to shared ethical norms. The distinction between Type I and II romanticism has been drawn by Messer *et al* (1988) who should be consulted for their excellent extended discussion of the impact of the Enlightenment on humanistic psychology and ontological hermeneutics.

12. The following are a selection of 5 items from each section of the Codependent 'Managers' Issues Inventory (Kathleen W., n.d.: 174):

Behaviours

1. Are you preoccupied with controlling others? Is much of your time and attention focused on overseeing the activities of others?
2. Do you hold the opinion that there are spiritual, ethical, social or business basics which are important for everyone to live by?
3. Do you get your sense of security from authority? Do you act according to the rules and stick by them no matter what?
4. In your world view, does survival depend on keeping control? Resisting the control of others? Is it an us versus them world?
5. As a child, were you the acting parent of a parent or of siblings? Did these responsibilities interfere with studies or school activities? Recreation or play? Self-care?

Feelings

1. Do you have a feeling that something awful might happen or things might not work out if you were to relax your vigilance? Have awful things happened which haunt your memories?

2. Is there behaviour, including body language, tone of voice, or personality types you feel threaten your control? Do you feel justified in rejecting such people?
3. Have you experienced feeling fearful, exposed, or powerless in situations where the rules were suspended, violated or ignored?
4. Do you feel safe only among those who constantly reassure you by actions and words that they share your same beliefs, ethics, or business theories? Does critical feedback make you angry?
5. Do you trust your Higher Power with the care of your life under all circumstances, including when you make a mistake?

This author offers that there are different 12-step programs that deal with incest, molestation, sexual addiction, and abuse. Religious issues, including special formats for Christians, Jews, and Pagans in recovery, and formats for secular "non-supernatural" approaches and for dealing with some religious practices as addictions in their own right are available (Friends in Recovery, n.d.: 158)

13. The example of Nazi German is characteristic of Bradshaw's simple social theory: sick families make for a sick society. His use of the conclusions of the psychoanalyst Alice Miller to make a direct leap from childraising practices to personality and national character is interesting to compare against another analyst's refusal to draw conclusions about national characteristics from patterns of childraising, despite pressure to do so from his listeners who were looking for simple cause-effect relationships. This example comes from Burgin (1986) who is himself trying to make a point about the limitations of psychoanalysis, particularly object relations theory, for our understanding of adult life:

I [the psychoanalyst Waelder] mentioned among other factors...the failure of German nineteenth-century liberals, and the subsequent impact of Prussian militarism...I also mentioned the impact of rapid industrialisation upon a society still almost feudal...I was then interrupted by my host...this was not what I had been expected to contribute. As a psychoanalyst I should point out how Nazism had developed from the German form of child rearing. I replied that I did not think that there was any such relationship; in fact, political opinion did not seem to be to be determined in early childhood at all. This view was not accepted and I was told that the way the German mother holds her baby must be different from that of mothers in democracies. When we parted it was clear that my hosts felt that they had wasted their time. (R. Waelder, *Basic Theory of Psychoanalysis*, 1960:53-54 in Burgin, 1986: 2)

14. In the distinctions recovery literature makes between addictive and non-codependent relationships, Giddens sees the characteristics of a transformation of intimacy and a programme for the democratisation and emancipation of daily life (1992: 94). He quotes from a therapist's chart comparing the two types of relationships and concludes that no matter what one thinks of the superficiality of the recovery literature, the qualities associated with intimate relationships are to be preferred:

Addictive

Obsession with finding someone to love
 Imbalance of power
 No-talk rule, especially if things are not working out
 Attempts to change partner to meet one's needs
 Expectation that one partner will fix and rescue the other
 Fusion (being obsessed with each other's problems and feelings)
 Passion confused with fear
 Blaming self or partner for problems

Intimate

Development of self as a first priority
 Balance and mutuality in the relationship
 Sharing wants, feelings, and appreciation of what your partner means to you
 Embracing of each other's individuality
 Self-care by both partners
 Loving detachment (healthy concern about partner's well-being and growth, while letting go)
 Sex grows out of friendship and caring
 Problem-solving together

15. Ethnosociological studies generally affirm that individuality and autonomy are not valued in South Asian extended families where caste, community, hierarchy, and interdependence are integral to family dynamics and values. This sociological research led psychologists of the 1950's and 1960's to argue that South Asians show a weakness with regard to independence and autonomy. Psychological anthropologists in later years have taken a culturally relativist stance on whether a lack of autonomy is a weakness; however, they have continued to propose that intrapsychic autonomy is not to be found in the East Asian personality organization. According to Ewing (1991), this assumption has even influenced the psychotherapeutic community in India as can be seen in the writings of B.K. Ramanujam and the American Alan Roland (as opposed to the writings of psychoanalyst Sudhir Kakar). See Ewing's "Can Psychoanalytic Theories Explain the Pakistani Woman? Intrapsychic Autonomy and Interpersonal Engagement in the Extended Family" (1991) who offers a thesis to the contrary, and a good bibliography.

16. There is little in recovery to remind us of the complexity of Freud's theory of self in civilization; however, what has entered recovery discourse is the notion of unconscious resistance, despite the fact that the unconscious is seen to play a very minor role in the etiology of illness or in healing. According to Bradshaw, "in functional families covert rules are brought into consciousness and dealt with. Very little will be covert and unconscious. The children, therefore, will not have to act out a bunch of 'secrets' or family system imbalances. (1988a: 54). 'Unconscious' here means secretive or not consciously recognized as opposed to something which is the product of repression and therefore unavailable to self-examination. The unconscious as that existential principle which divides us from self-knowledge and that mental process which imposes indeterminacy and ambiguity in all human communication is denied by the wholeness associated with the uncovering and recovering of the true self.

17. See one version of the rewritten steps in note 8 above.

18. The following discussion has been drawn from Chapter One of McGuire's *Ritual Healing in Suburban America* (1988).

19. It is interesting to note that affect was anathema to Dr. Low's Recovery method in the 1940's which, by having no release component, was even more rigid than AA's basic set of traditions and steps. Recovery's emphasis upon control was supposed to provide members with defences against anxiety and to help them cope with their symptoms. This denial of affect may have followed from prevailing psychotherapeutic beliefs in the 1940's about the dangerousness of working with emotions, particularly with "nervous" patients.

20. Bradshaw, Beattie, Schaef, even Kasl can be located in a mind cure and self-help tradition more than a century old in the United States. In the middle of the nineteenth century, there were movements whose message was that nervousness, neurasthenia, and confusion could be treated by the therapeutic benefits of religious faith. Mind cure meant spiritual self-discovery. This theological perspective survived to the present in Norman Vincent Peale, among others, and is certainly present in the works of John Bradshaw, himself a theologian. With the arrival of Freudian psychology in the early part of the century, mind cure took on a more secular tone. Books such as *On Being a Real Person*, published in 1943 by a liberal Protestant minister named Harry Emerson Fosdick introduced the public to Freudian psychological principles while diminishing the importance of the conscience stricken character. Fosdick made integration, not religious salvation, the prevailing ideal, and he conveyed a sense of the continuing struggle faced by the complex psyche to become "real". In 1975, five of the top ten nonfiction bestsellers were self-help books (Rosen, 1977: 27). In the late 1960's, a young Boston psychiatrist named David Viscott began publishing a successful series of self-help books (*Feel Free* [1971], *How to Make Winning Your Lifestyle* [1972], *How to Live with Another Person* [1974], *The Language of Feelings* [1976]) while introducing a line of greeting cards called Sensitivity and a popular adult game by the same name which evolves into an encounter session among the players. For more on the mind-cure precursors to recovery discourse, see Rosen's *Psychobabble. Fast Talk and Quick Cure in the Era of Feeling* (1977), Chapter Two.

21. The recovery literature offers itself, to my knowledge, as an as yet unmined thematic area for a wide-ranging discourse analysis to identify the spread and transformation of its presuppositions in discourses far from the domain of illness and healing not to mention its significance as an object of sociological investigation into the cultural preconditions of recovery's potential popularity in non-North American English-speaking contexts or non-English milieux. Audiences for recovery programs such as Bradshaw's taped series as well as participants in workshops and therapy groups may be constrained "by cultural variability in conventions concerning what aspects of one's inner experience are to be shared with others" (Ewing, 1991: 158). Cultural understandings of rules for appropriate behaviour, intimacy, and affective distance in the context of non-family interpersonal relations, as well as class, age, and gender variables as they effect rule application, may all influence the suitability of audiences for positioning as 'ideal affective' readers of recovery's techniques quite

apart from divergent cultural notions of the self which may also impede recovery's appeal.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Problem of (Dis)Positioning for the Reflexive Project of the Self in Post-Modernity: Concluding Remarks

Knowing the dominant ideologies, discourses, and symbols of a society is only the beginning--there remains the hard work of understanding why some of those ideologies, discourses, and symbols become compelling to social actors, while others are only the hollow shell of a morality that may be repeated in official pronouncements but is ignored in private lives....How do cultural messages get under people's skin (both literally and metaphorically)?

(D'Andrade and Strauss, 1992: 1)

The writing of this thesis was motivated by dissatisfaction with certain presuppositions fundamental to feminist reader-response theory and with the implications of these assumptions for conceptions of the cognitive and affective processes of the interpreting self. The alternative to which the thesis was striving is a paradigm of embodied thought that would include the preconceptual origins of our understanding, a robust theory of experience in other words, from which to generate more powerful methodological tools for the study of the text-reader relationship in research on reception in cultural studies. My reference, in the title of the thesis, to reading as 'performance' reminds us that interpretative activity is a problem of how perceptual consciousness and unconsciousness of signs constitute their object. It stresses that reading is an action whose effects on the beliefs and behaviour of the reader are anything but the product of a simple incising into the subject of discourse of a set of cultural constructs (ideology), or of internal cognitive schema which have motivations embedded in them like raisins in a cake. The emphasis on performance also stresses the variability of responses to a text and the very different meanings and uses social actors will make of the same text be it a romance novel, a detective story, or a self-help group working the 12-steps.

A precondition of semiotic performance on the part of the sign-reader is reasoning: psychology has long recognized there are two types of reasoning variously called the rational vs. the intuitive, primary process vs. secondary process, logical vs.

prelogical. I took the phenomena of emotion and fantasy, incompletely theorized in cultural studies, as offering the necessary leverage by which to pry open these dichotomies to examine their validity with respect to 'how' readers arrive at meanings, and 'why' those meanings are compelling, namely, because they have personal significance (motivational force in everyday life for particular readers). 'Action' is as appropriate a characterization of reading as 'performance' because it highlights the everpresent (and possibly implicit) goal-directedness of reading which goes on inescapably within the context of a self's regulation of experience and problem solving in order to maintain its sense of self-coherence. Reading is always a search for meanings within a context of prior meanings.

A fully-fleshed paradigm of embodied thought remains an unrealized project, but it has been the analytical backdrop of this thesis. On the other hand, it is in response to this lacuna in cultural studies that the thesis proposes a theory of the reader (and social agent) as a "(dis)positioned self" and of reading (and social) activity as a complex, dynamic process which generates conflictual structures of knowledge and experience. The '(dis)positioned self' was the term of art used to propel an investigation of how the influence of socio-cultural **and** intrapsychic domains can be captured as they respectively mediate the processes drawn upon by the interpreting self, be it the ill self as reader or the ill self as self-reflexive reader. I believe that the new concept, introduced and dilated in this thesis, of '(dis)position' as well as the extended investigation of emotion and its relation to the reader's internal world are analytical contributions toward such a paradigm. They also propose new directions/objects for future psychoethnographic research into the motivations underlying a reader's specific processes of making meaning.

My hypothesis of the (dis)positioned reader draws a less sub-personal and more fully human picture of the reader. It is put forward as an antidote to the deficiencies of Anglo-American, feminist reader-response theory (discussed in Chapter 1), and to the distortions wrought on our understanding of the process of meaning formation by dominant metaphors in cultural studies of subjects who are presumed to 'decode' or 'consume' textual meanings in an unnuanced, undigested manner (discussed in Chapter 2), and to the reduction of the reading self who has motives and missions in life to the

subject in discourse or to "an unconscious structured like language." I see '(dis)positioning' as a contribution not only to the debate on the dual articulation of the self by internal and external forces but to the study of the prelinguistic bases of our predispositions for organizing experience. (Dis)positioning guides us to a disturbing lacuna in cultural theory, namely, the problem of emotion. (Dis)positioning argues for the subsumption of socio-cultural, linguistic determinations (what in reading theory we call the 'positioned' reader, the 'subject in discourse') within another set of determinations, 'body-emotion-cognition.'

Through the optic of emotion, we cannot help but identify another absence in reader-response theory. All theories of reading make assumptions about the psychology of the reader on which the meaning-effects of the text depend. However, in neither text-centred nor reader-centred models of reception does *the reflexive aspect of being an interpreter of signs* figure in the theory of how readers construe meanings. There is little if any attention directed by these reception theories to the self-relevance of meaning, to the role of the reader's self-concept as an integral part of his/her process of making meaning. This produces a flawed formulation of the objectives of reader-response theory not to mention the methodological handicaps of reader-response researchers: as Charles Taylor has argued on many occasions, the significance of 'significance' (1983) must be taken into account by our models in the human sciences. Investigators in cultural studies are accustomed to studying the socio-cultural and political relevance of cultural forms; at one time, analyses of ideology, interpellation, and hegemony were supposed as adequate to account for the constraints on how we variously come, according to our class position or racial and gender identity, to have conceptual tools to think with. Self-relevance has been a central category in feminist reader-response and reception theory; nevertheless, it has been lost within text-centred models of reception or subsumed into views about how women ought to read and what they ought to find self-relevant masquerading as theories of how women do read. Schweickart's question, which propelled the introduction of the new concept of 'resistance in the resisting reader' in Chapter 1, was an important question to begin with since it went to the heart of the issue of self-relevance in acts of (un)pleasurable interpretation: we recall that she asked "How do we account for the fact that a

politically incorrect text, even once submitted to a reading which identifies its ideological message, may still give us pleasure?" Schweickart's question juxtaposed a framework for belief against another framework for emotion or pleasure/aesthetic judgement; however, it only went so far as to remind us (against the sanitizing tendency in politically correct feminist theory) that there are various modalities of the reader which are in conflict.

My contribution to a discussion of these conflicting modalities was the concept of the dialectical phenomenon of 'resistance in the resisting reader.' Through this concept, I defended the importance of an assumption about the reader which has been anathema to Anglo-American theories of reading oriented to a critique of representations and antagonistic to psychoanalytic perspectives, namely, that reading practices are fundamentally repetitive and originate in the reader's 'wish to believe' whose preconditions lie in a constellation of perduring, somewhat idiosyncratic psychic demands, wishes, and defences. Highlighted by the concept of resistance in the resisting reader was the recognition that any attempt to explain how a self's being-in-the-world, or gendered understanding of signifying systems, influences the way a reader construes meanings has been wrongheaded, or at least naively ambitious, without a prior understanding of the constitution of the inner world of a reader: how it is symbolized, bounded, and connected. In other words, a semiotics, even a theory of narrativity, requires a complementary psychoanalytically-oriented theory for readers in order to grasp the non-textual forces (emotion, fantasy, intrapsychic processes of identification) which predispose a reader to be positioned--to identify--with textual assumptions. The phenomenon of 'resistance in the resisting reader' pointed to the inadequacy of present theories of the subject in discourse to account for human motivation, agency, suffering, and self-transformation through healing.

Marotti's definition of the meaning reading theorists should be studying meets the criteria of self-relevance: we can only grasp the meaning of a text for a reader when we understand the disturbance the text sets up within him or her. This assumes a depth psychological model of the reading self for whom making meaning has always something to do with self-regulation and the mitigation of suffering. To understand that disturbance in the reader, I proposed that the object of study in reader-response

research becomes the elaborations in fantasy that readers perform on cultural texts; symbolic transformation that is motivated in the reader (as Jacqueline Rose puts it) "as divided self, characterized by an internal fantasy scenario, and the compulsion to repeat." To pull apart this question of the reader in conflict, to find evidence for the ingestion and elaboration of culture through the workings of fantasy, this thesis proceeded by asking a simpler question: What are emotions? What are their significations? What do emotions index and/or symptomatize?

There is a willed, productive tension in the thesis between two kinds of endeavour: an investigation of the concepts of emotion and fantasy in the core chapter, Chapter 3 on emotion paradigms, and an investigation of how these concepts are called upon in studies of the self reading itself which appeal to emotion data for their propositions about illness and healing. My expectation that a study of representations and presentations of the self in a reflexive position would enable the linking of a person's developmental history and the timing and selectiveness of the cultural and bodily knowledge immanent in that self's emotions was borne out in the soundings of the social discourse offered in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. The motivational force of emotions simultaneously draws from and is constrained by this selective inheritance. Psychopathology was found to be represented in all three soundings as the repetitive and limited exercise of motivation toward some goals, some values, some beliefs, some actions and not others which prevent the self from tolerating emotions in itself and in others. Of the three studies, Chapter 5 on *The Singing Detective* in particular, confirmed that an investigation of the self examining itself via a detour through the Other goes to the fundamentals of what the self allows itself to experience affectively or defends itself against.

Each of the texts examined in the three analytical chapters of the thesis--Radway's discussion of women romance readers, *The Singing Detective*, and recovery literature and group practices--each was chosen because it produces an ethnotheory of the mind and of emotion by linking stories of the suffering self, its symptoms, and emotions, to beliefs about the true self and where to find it, and to proposals for healing the ill self precisely through the anticipated therapeutic effects of experiencing emotion. Each presented the self being healed by an encounter with some form of

mass culture through a particular kind of emotional transformation; each either directly argued or showed that emotion was the guarantor of the authentic self: Radway's readers with romance literature; Marlow with metafictional detective fiction; recovery adherents with codependency groups and recovery literature.

The most creative contribution of this thesis to cultural studies is precisely in its interdisciplinary investigation of emotion with the intent of making correspondences between the insights of two models of emotion: a view from the outside, the social constructivist, and the view from the inside, the psychoanalytical. This analysis reconfirms the importance of research on the emotions for an understanding of the processes by which cultural schemas (such as the schema for romantic love, or the schema for codependency) come to be invested with motivational force. The dual optic on emotion provided by the social constructivist and psychoanalytical models, provides another set of concepts with which to talk about the tension inherent in the notion of dispositioning, between psychodynamic and socio-cultural and linguistic determinants on the self.

Chapter 3 described the three dominant paradigms of emotion in cultural anthropology and cognitive science--the physiological, the social constructivist or cognitive, and the psychoanalytic paradigms--and offered a critique of these preparatory to a investigation of how these paradigms of emotion reappear in social discourse in representations of the authentic or ill self. Chapter 3 also sought to bridge these paradigmatic boundaries, to make correspondences among the physiological, social constructivist and psychoanalytic paradigms with the aim of finding an answer to what is a fundamental methodological difficulty in doing ethnographic research on emotion and motivation in reading: *how to capture the effect of psychodynamics on the motivational force of cultural and self-object schemas*; how to grasp the origins of a reader's 'will to believe.'

It became apparent from a comparison of these models of affect that a culturally available emotion semantics, such as we found being proposed by Averill's rules typology or Russell's scripts for emotion cannot be equated with or directly overlap the meaning of emotion which draws on self-internal objects where an internal object is a composite of perception, wish, fantasy, defence. However, there are

exciting correspondences between de Sousa's analysis of emotion and the psychoanalytic object-relations paradigm of affect which have consequences for our approach to emotion data in cultural studies research. Both de Sousa and the psychoanalytic perspective agree that emotions have epistemological importance: most importantly, perhaps, affects are seen as supplementing, not interfering with, formal logic because they are frameworks for rationality. De Sousa argues they establish specific patterns of salience among objects of perception and attention, lines of inquiry, and inferential strategies. Emotions take their form from paradigm scenarios learned in childhood and supplemented by cultural texts. Both de Sousa's cognitive approach and the psychoanalytic approach argued that emotions are intentional, that is, they are directed to objects; emotions are social signals but, more importantly, they are signals to the self. The study of emotions, therefore, enables the concurrent study of what is self-relevant to a self; this move points us toward a synthesizing of what have been heretofore understood primarily as dual and separate articulations of the self.

In Chapter 3, I argued that de Sousa's notion of paradigm scenario could be fruitfully complemented by the concept of internal object which is a psychoanalytical heuristic to account for how the self symbolizes its relation to significant others. The psychoanalytic view proposes that affects have a semantics deriving from intrapsychic fantasy scenarios that are the product of early relations between the infant and its caretakers. Psychical reality is made up of these scenarios which can be thought of as operating as constraints or predispositions to perception and reasoning and to the capacity of feel. Dennis Potter's *The Singing Detective* is an addendum to the dialogue between de Sousa and the object relations school, providing insight into the movement of affect from attachment to an idea which was unconscious (and maybe preconceptual) to a preconscious and then to a conscious one. Idiosyncratic principles of association across multiple diegetic levels were found to be the source of Marlow's semantics of affect; the guiding consciousness was that of a self-in-division seeking to know itself. *The Singing Detective* most convincingly presented evidence for the view that emotions are repositories of cultural and bodily knowledge: as repositories of cultural knowledge they have a semantics shared by all members of that culture. When we, as readers,, shared in that emotion semantics we could infer Marlow's state of

mind and what he would do in future, and we had a reasonable understanding of why that would be the case. Not only *The Singing Detective* but recovery discourse as well showed emotions to have an ontological indispensability for the self's sense of being in-relation with other selves. It was apparent that a social constructivist explanation for Marlow's semantics of emotion or for the emotions of co-dependents could not adequately account for the bodily knowledge gestured to by the emotional repertoires of these suffering selves.

Both de Sousa's model of emotion and the psychoanalytic are in agreement that the paedogenetic impress on our emotions carries over into adult life. Importantly, it has implications for meaning formation: the learning of goal-schema from cultural models is influenced by the 'fit' of these goals with a person's pre-existing self-schema. Chapter 3 effected one translation between the social constructivist and psychoanalytic paradigms of emotion. It argued that we can usefully think of paradigm scenarios for affect as configurations of bodies with interests and aims: dramatic *mise-en-scène*, if you will. These theatres in which the self is always an actor with multiple roles are metaphors for the configurations which propel the form of the psyche's defences. It accounts for the investments actors have in being recruited to some positions of identification in discourse and not to others, in finding a fit with the positions in some narratives and the relations among bodies they figure. We can formulate the concept of (dis)position as that which refers to the reader's emotional self whose being-in-the-world is organized by a propensity to particular types of perceptual/attentional salience discriminations in which are embedded attitudes and values.

Future directions for reader-response theory and cultural studies: motivation and goal-directed schema

Progress in answering Rose's crucial question about "how ideology works at the rudimentary level of the formation of identity and the drives" can be made by reformulating it as a question about cultural systems or models, schema, and motivations, as we began to do in the comparative review of emotion paradigms and the discussion of the significance of fantasy for thinking in Chapter 3. These conceptual tools, familiar to cultural anthropologists and cognitive psychologists,

together with insights from psychoanalytic theory, developmental psychology, and social theory hold promise for the development of methods of inquiry into the relation of ideology to people's thought and action that challenge any kind of simple socio-cultural determinism. The insightful thrust of Rose's formulation for cultural theory is that it seems to be seeking means to grasp how people in acquiring cultural models also acquire motivations. Although she does not phrase it this way because of her Lacanian allegiance, Rose's insight is that rather than looking for how directive force gets attached, by some separate procedure, to the directive content of a cultural tradition, we should begin to think of affects and ideation as inseparable. Rose's project for cultural studies can perhaps be rephrased as the challenge of developing a "one box" theory of culture and human motivation (Shweder, 1992) in which the directive force of culture can be understood in terms of its directive content.

The parallels between the problems addressed in this thesis, under the aegis of issues in reader-response theory, and questions being posed in cultural anthropology are striking. New directions and methods in reader-response theory into questions of meaning formation, pleasure, and audience formation for particular genres, exemplified by Radway's *Reading the Romance* for instance, shadows new directions in psychological and cultural anthropology as essays in the volume *Cultural Models in Action* (1992) indicate.

Cultural anthropologists used to believe that "to understand why people do what they do, we have to understand the cultural constructs by which they interpret the world." However, an alternative, familiar, but not well defended view is that "it is not enough to know the dominant constructs of a society; it is also necessary to study how actors internalize those constructs" (D'Andrade and Strauss, 1991: 4). These two positions will sound familiar to those in cultural studies who have been disciplined by poststructural thinking (Lacan, Althusser, the later Barthes, Foucault) only to discover that work such as Radway's, with its richly contaminated methodology, was being written. Focusing on internalization is hardly new in psychological anthropology, Strauss points out, nor is it new for Critical Theory associated with the Frankfurt School or for Cultural Studies, particularly for theorists of sub-cultural resistance. Motivation and its attachment to cultural models through the directive force of goal-

schema is a new language for the older theorists of the latter group (Hall, Willis) while being suggested if not directly invoked in feminist work (Radway, McRobbie, Gregg, Probyn).

Other parallels between the endeavour of this thesis and very recent work in cultural anthropology are conceptual: where the latter's focus is motivation, the thesis took as its basic premise the ill reader who seeks relief through cultural consumption of particular genres. While cultural anthropologists are now stressing the importance of analysing the interaction between public and private realms of culture, I have argued that psychoanalytic notions of the internal object world as a realm of sociality organized by its own idiosyncratic conventions, obligations, and rights mediates how the self interprets symbolic systems and acts in the external world. Anthropologists are working on how childhood experience preadapts a child to internalize certain cultural propositions and not others and the affective consequences of these culturally elaborated schema. The core hypothesis of the notion of (dis)position, which I have sought throughout the thesis to defend and expand upon, is that the psychological reality of fantasy predisposes a child to find certain types of interpersonal interaction particularly anxiety provoking and to seek solutions (goals) to conflicts embedded in self-internal object relations which underpin these anxieties.

Anthropologists' models are becoming more complex and based on the premise that human action is not a direct precipitate of cultural constructs nor is motivation automatically acquired from cultural messages which have been sent. A new issue is how the learning of goal-schema from cultural models is influenced by their 'fit' with a person's already existing self-schema. As noted above, in this thesis I have reconceptualized paradigm scenarios for affects as configuration of bodies with interests and aims. This configuration propels the form the psyche's defences take and accounts for the investments actors have in being recruited to some positions of identification in discourses and not others, in finding a 'fit' with the positions in some narratives and the relations among bodies they figure while others are unwelcoming. The reader's pleasure in *The Singing Detective* as well as Marlow's own compulsion to narrate could be attributed to them both finding compelling the same goal schema

to do with good and evil, obligation and personal responsibility, and suffering for expiation of guilt.

The cultural anthropologist Roy d'Andrade (1992: 41) points out that it will no longer do to say "the self is culturally constituted" or "emotion is culturally constituted" or "action is culturally constituted." We must be able to specify how culture is related to action. Motivation forms one link between culture and action. Cultural models--sets of schema (others might say 'discourses') that are conceptual structures which make possible the identification of objects and events (where these models are available in mass culture, in forms of speech, in common sense, in science)--have motivational properties because of goal schema and because of affects attached to these goal schema (i.e. taboo on homosexuality takes the form of prescriptions on practice and in feelings of repugnance, fear, and curiosity).

The translation across paradigms of emotion which I hoped to make some headway with in Chapter 3 is extraordinarily propadeutic. A modified object-relations psychoanalytic paradigm allowed us to see that the paradigm scenarios for affects should theoretically be describable in terms of self-internal object relations. The way the self manages itself through its internal objects is carried over into the way the self manages objects in the external world and the various kinds of ways they are experienced as stressors to be defended against. De Sousa's argument for the minimal rationality of even transference emotions allows that emotions have reasons or, otherwise put, goals.

A psychoanalytic perspective on affects that links them to intrapsychical investments which have consequences for behaviour seems to be talking about the goal-directedness of self-internal object relations. That goal-directedness may promote a type of intersubjective relating which is so unconventional as to be considered to be culturally aberrant, that is, evidence of psychopathology. D'Andrade has stated that a desired by-product for cultural anthropology of the argument that motivation forms one link between culture and action is "to highlight the irrelevance of theoretical conceptions of culture which have no psychological reality and cannot be related to either action or feeling" (1991: 41). It may be that exciting steps toward successfully translating between 'external view' (social constructivist/cognitive) and 'internal view'

(psychoanalytic) paradigms of emotion lead in the direction of bringing the object-relations approach to affects into dialogue with cultural anthropology's notions of schema and motive as psychological constructs, all *within a consideration of the problem of illness and healing*.

A neglected part of ethnography in cultural anthropology has been the description of the motivational properties of central cultural models (D'Andrade, 1992: 40). It would seem that cultural models of illness and healing and psychotherapeutic practices, such as psychoanalysis as well as indigenous healing systems, suggest practices for ethnographic inquiry into the variables (class, gender, age, ethnicity) which influence the directive force of cultural schema (for instance, for chronic pain or co-dependency) without simultaneously destroying the co-inherence of intrapsychic and externally supplied motivations. The therapeutic under a cultural anthropological formulation of illness becomes a question of: How to recognize and then to change the self's self-object schema and the motives attached to internal objects? Inasmuch as we have recognized that socialization into schema is predated by the creation of an internal object world which predisposes the self to intrapsychic goal schema which have motivational force for provoking action in the world, then changing schema may wait on changing internal objects. 'Unconsciousness raising,' as Steinem said, is paradoxically both a precondition of social change and a method of effecting it.

In Chapter 5, we discovered that metafiction destroys the transparency of cultural schema, that is, the way people see the world through cognitive constructs without seeing the schema themselves. However, it showed that although the transparency of some schema gives them motivational force, destroying the transparency does not always destroy the affects associated with the schema. We can peruse a model without destroying our investments in it or its capacity to move us. On that topic, Chapter 5 suggested by an indirect route the possibilities of the uses of transference and counter-transference as research instruments into goal schema symptomatized by an individual's emotional repertoire. These methods by their nature impel scrutiny as to how they create the very interpersonal contexts on which their (counter)transferential method of investigation draws for its conclusions about interpretative and communicative processes.

The theoretical import of affect as an object of investigation for cultural studies is tied to the methodological importance of affects in cultural research through transference and counter transference phenomena. The significance of de Sousa's 'seducer,' and of what Marotti recognized years ago from his interdisciplinary encounter with the writings of psychoanalytic anthropologist George Devereux, still remains to be satisfactorily investigated:

"Objectivity results from the creative control of consciously recognized irrational reactions, without loss of affect, whereas in countertransference resistances irrational and unconscious defensive reactions are denied..." (...) What we normally regard as subjectivity, then, is really "the royal road to an authentic, rather than fictitious objectivity."

(Marotti, 1978:473)

Chapter 6 sketched an alternative route by which to investigate how cultural models join cognition to goal-directed action. The recovery authors, like cultural anthropologists, uncover culturally based schema for shame, love, self-esteem, and achievement, which are encoded not primarily in the lexicon of recovery group members but rather in these person's emotion repertoires. The 'feeling' work, which is foundational to recovery's therapeutic effects, was designed to rewrite some cultural schema, learned in the family which determine motives, by *first* changing affects and the internal object relations scenarios to which they are attached.

Finally, affect offers a perplexingly complex reference point for thinking about agency: that is, how a sense of meaningfulness, possibility, and creativity rather than a sense of futility and despair becomes available to the individual. While research in cognitive anthropology is available to show that motivation is acquired with culturally formed cognitive schema that label and describe the world and also set forth goals (both conscious and unconscious) and elicit or include desires, it remains to be determined how the acquisition of motivation through public culture and its cognitive schema is disturbed by private culture, since motives are also embedded in private cultural models.

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