

The Kriegsmarine, Quisling, and Terboven:  
An Inquiry into the Boehm-Terboven Affair,  
April 1940 - March 1943.

By

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### Abstract

This is the story of a World War II dispute between a German naval officer, Generaladmiral Hermann Boehm, and a high-ranking Nazi party functionary, Josef Terboven, the Reichskommissar Norwegen. Essentially, their dispute was centered on the question of who should administer German occupied Norway, and in which capacity: as a leader of a semi-autonomous nation or as a German figurehead.

This dispute began in late June 1940, when Terboven first attempted to place both the Norwegian administration and the leadership of the native fascist party under his control. Once his plan had been short-circuited by opposition from both the Kriegsmarine and a rival Nazi party official, Terboven began to complain about the Kriegsmarine's "Norwegen-Politik". In March 1941, Boehm and Terboven became embroiled in a military controversy as to who was responsible for the failure to prevent the successful Allied raid on the Lofoten Islands. From that point onwards, their dispute took on the character of a personality clash. Even after the Kriegsmarine's protégé, Vidkun Quisling, was appointed to the post of Norwegian Minister-President, this continued to be the case.

Overall, the Boehm-Terboven affair appears to have been a dispute of form, not substance. In this sense, it has offered us a valuable insight into the relationship between the Kriegsmarine and National Socialism.

### Abstrait

La présente raconte un conflit de la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale entre un officier de la Marine Allemand, Generaladmiral Hermann Boehm, et un fonctionnaire supérieur du Parti Nazi, Josef Terboven le Reichskommissar Norwegen. Essentiellement, le conflit fut centré sur la question "Qui devrait administrer la Norvège pendant l'occupation Allemande, et en quelle capacité, comme Directeur d'une nation semi-autonome ou un personnage représentatif Allemand?"

La conflit se déclenche le 30. juin 1940. Terboven aurait tenté de placer l'administration Norvégienne et la direction de la parti fasciste Norvégien sous son contrôle. Suite à l'opposition de la Kriegsmarine et d'un officier rival du Parti Nazi, Terboven questionne la "Norwegen-Politik" de la Kriegsmarine. En mars 1941, Boehm et Terboven dispute la question militaire sur qui fut responsable et à défaut de prévenir la réussite des forces alliées sur les îles Lofoten. De ce point le conflit a pris l'allure d'un désaccord de personnalité. Ceci fut le cas, même après la nomination d'un protégé de la Kriegsmarine, Vidkun Quisling, au poste de "Minister-President" de la Norvège.

L'affaire Boehm-Terboven apparaît comme un conflit de forme, et non de matière. En ce sens, il nous offre un aperçu de relation entre la Kriegsmarine et l'idéologie Nationale-Socialiste de Hitler.

### Zusammenfassung

Dies ist die Geschichte eines Streites während des zweiten Weltkrieges zwischen einem deutschen Marineoffizier, Generaladmiral Hermann Boehm und einem hochstehenden Funktionär der Nazi Partei, Josef Terboven, Reichskommissar Norwegen. Der Mittelpunkt des Streites lag im wesentlichen in der Frage, wer das deutsch-besetzte Norwegen verwalten sollte und in welcher Form - als Verwalter einer halbselbständigen Nation oder als deutsche Rollenfigur.

Dieser Streit fing ca. 30. Juni 1940 an, als Terboven zuerst versuchte, die Regierung von Norwegen sowie die Leitung der einheimischen, norwegischen faschistischen Partei unter seine Kontrolle zu bringen. Als sein Plan kurzgeschlossen wurde, durch Opposition seitens der Kriegsmarine und auch durch einen konkurrierenden Funktionär der Nazi-Partei, fing Terboven an, Beschwerde zu führen gegen die "Norwegen-Politik" der Führung der Kriegsmarine. Im März 1941 waren Boehm und Terboven in einen militärischen Meinungsstreit verwickelt über die Frage der Verantwortlichkeit für das Versagen der erfolgreichen alliierten Unternehmung gegen die Lofoten-Inseln. Von diesem Zeitpunkt an hatte der Streit den Anschein eines Konflikts zwischen Persönlichkeiten angenommen. Dies blieb auch so, als Quisling das Amt des Minister-Präsidenten des deutsch-besetzten Norwegen übernahm.

Wenn auch die Boehm-Terboven Affäre vor allem ein Formalstreit war, vermittelt sie doch wertvolle Einsicht in die Beziehungen zwischen der Kriegsmarine und Hitlers national-sozialistischer Ideologie.

### Preface

This dissertation has two modest claims to originality. It is the first study covering the entire story of the Boehm-Terboven affair from its inception in 1940 through to its evaporation in 1943. I have also traced the final stage of the Kriegsmarine's relationship with the Reichskommissar Norwegen from 1943 through to 1945. For the first time the War Diary and other associated war documents from the Commanding Admiral Norway and its successor office, the Naval Commander Norway, have been consulted for historical research.

The most important sources for this thesis were the captured German naval documents available in the United States National Archives (USNA) under the collection number T-1022. I am greatly indebted to the USNA for providing me with copies of two of its unpublished guides on this collection. I would like to indicate that the German documents utilized were inconsistent in regards to the use of the German umlaut. In all cases, I have remained faithful to the practice adopted in the original.

Unfortunately, the bulk of the records of Terboven's office either remained in Norway or were returned to Norway without being copied by the USNA. The only exceptions to this statement are a few folders which were copied and are to be found in the USNA Microfilm Publication T-501 "German Military Records of Rear Areas and Occupied Territories". Although I have ordered

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a copy of the roll on which they are to be found, fate conspired to have it delivered after my manuscript had been completed. It is fortunate that the records of the Reichskommissariat Norwegen had already been consulted by at least two historians: H. D. Loock and A. S. Milward.

Two West German institutions, the Institut für Zeitgeschichte (IfZ), and the Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv (BA/MA), were kind enough to provide important unpublished primary material. From the former I received a copy of both the War Diary and Akten of the German Naval Attaché in Norway, Korvettenkapitän R. Schreiber, as well extracts of post-war material deposited by Boehm. The BA/MA provided me with a copy of a manuscript written by Boehm in 1944, in which the former Commanding Admiral Norway discussed the political evolution of German occupied Norway.

Two publications of documents proved to be invaluable in giving me an insight into the political struggles and options of the Boehm-Terboven dispute. They are Ursachen und Folgen, edited by H. Michaelis; and Documents on German Foreign Policy, series C and D, edited and translated by the U. S. State Department. I used the English translation of the latter work in an attempt to limit the number of German citations in the text of my manuscript. I have also consulted material from both The Trial of the Major War Criminals and the documents collected by the American prosecutors at Nuremburg which were published under the title Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. The work edited by G. Wagner, Lagevorträge des Oberbefehlshabers

der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939-1945 was also of use. I have utilized Boehm's book, Norwegen zwischen England und Deutschland, as well as some of his post-war articles to fill in the gaps in the documentary record. The published Goebbels diaries for the periods 1939-41, 1942-3, and 1945 provided a sort of colour commentary from the heart of the Nazi leadership. In addition, Das politische Tagebuch Rosenbergs, edited by H. G. Seraphim, was quite useful. In terms of secondary sources, I am indebted to the following works which helped me overcome my deficiency in Norwegian history; P. M. Hayes' Quisling: The Career and Political Ideas of Vidkun Quisling 1887-1945, R. Hewins' Quisling: Prophet Without Honour, and perhaps the most important of all, H. D. Loock's Quisling, Rosenberg und Terboven.

At this point I would like to thank all those individuals who, either privately or on behalf of their respective institutions, took the time to respond to my requests for documentation, information, and suggestions. This list is in alphabetical order, not in order of importance:

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On the technical side of things, I would like to thank Maria Szulhan for the typing of the final draft of this manuscript. I would like to express my gratitude to Mrs. M. Harrison for taking the time to type my preliminary drafts. Special mention must go to my proof-reading team of: fellow McGill student Mr. R. Critchley, former McGill students Mr. R. Vidal and Mr. J. Bahnan, and Mrs. M. Harrison. Mr. Vidal was kind enough to provide the French translation of my abstract. I am indebted to the person who provided the German translation of the abstract. I would like to thank my supervisor, Mrs. P. Bissonnette, for a badly needed reduction in working hours at a crucial time in the preparation of this manuscript. I am indebted to Miss B. Elskamp for taking the time to copy material for me.

at the BA/MA; and to Frau Weiss of Munich who made a valiant effort to do the same in the IfZ.

On a more personal note, I would like to thank both my sister, Barbara and her husband, for the extended use of their typewriter. Special thanks are also due to my parents and other sister for their moral support and encouragement. Last but not least, a very special thank-you is owed to my fiancée, Miss Donna E. Harrison, who put up with my obsession for so long. I only hope that I can return all of her love, affection, and understanding. It is to her that I dedicate this manuscript.



Table of Equivalent Ranks \*

<u>German Navy</u>	<u>Royal Navy</u>
Grossadmiral	Grand Admiral **
Generaladmiral	Admiral of the Fleet
Admiral	Admiral
Vizeadmiral	Vice-Admiral
Konteradmiral	Rear-Admiral
Kapitän zur See	Captain
Fregattenkapitän	Commander
Korvettenkapitän	Lieutenant-Commander
Kapitänleutnant	Lieutenant, Senior
Oberleutnant zur See	Lieutenant, Junior
Leutnant zur See	Sub-Lieutenant

\* Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1939, ed. by F. E. McMurtrie. (London, 1939, rep. ed. 1971), p. 217.

\*\* In the table provided in the above source, this rank is also translated as "Admiral of the Fleet". As this title does not do justice to Raeder's position as Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine, I have chosen to use the term "Grand Admiral". This title has been used to describe Raeder's position in most general accounts of the Kriegsmarine during the Second World War. For example see: R. Humble, Hitler's High Seas Fleet, (New York, 1971); and E. P. von der Porten, The German Navy in World War II, (New York, 1969).

Note

I have used the following abbreviations in the text and Notes:

APA	Aussenpolitisches Amt
BA/MA	Bundesarchiv-Militärarchiv
<u>DGFP</u>	<u>Documents on German Foreign Policy</u>
IfZ	Institut für Zeitgeschichte
Ktb.	Kriegstagebuch
<u>NCA</u>	<u>Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression</u>
NSDAP	Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
Ob.d.M.	Oberbefehlshaber der Marine
OKM	Oberkommando der Marine
OKW	Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
Skl.	Seekriegsleitung
<u>TMWC</u>	<u>Trial of the Major War Criminals</u>
USNA	United States National Archives
WBN	Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Norwegen
ZS	Zeugenschrift

### Introduction

One of the lesser known episodes of the history of the Second World War is the struggle between Generaladmiral Hermann Boehm, the German Navy's Commanding Admiral in Norway; and Josef Terboven, the Reichskommissar for Norway who was appointed by Adolf Hitler. Historians seem to have shied away from any serious study of the German policies in occupied Norway during World War II. In the standard work, Hitler's War Aims by Norman Rich, there is a general, but very brief coverage of Norway under Terboven.<sup>1</sup> The Boehm-Terboven struggle has been ignored, however, by Norman Rich as it has been by most scholars.

The same is true of the two full-length biographies of Vidkun Quisling, the leader of the native Norwegian fascist movement, available to the English reader. Both Paul M. Hayes, in his Quisling: The Career and Political Ideas of Vidkun Quisling 1887-1945, and Ralph Hewins, in his Quisling: Prophet Without Honour, note that Quisling did receive support from the German Navy, without delving into this aspect.<sup>2</sup> A notable exception to this trend is the work of Hans D. Loock, Quisling, Rosenberg und Terboven, but even in this volume the Boehm-Terboven affair is presented in a brief and passing manner.<sup>3</sup> Another weakness in this work is that Loock did not examine the period after September 25, 1940 in detail.

The reasons for the disinterest in the Boehm-Terboven affair are easy to ascertain. The majority of the Norwegian historians and authors whose works are available in English, all had close ties to the Norwegian resistance movement.<sup>4</sup> They have tended to concentrate on explaining the growth and evolution of their movement in response to Terboven's policies. As a result, they have left the rich field of Terboven's quarrels with the competing German institutions and organizations involved in the administration of occupied Norway relatively unmined. In part, their reluctance in the case of the Boehm-Terboven affair can be excused by the fact that their nemesis - Quisling - was the main benefactor of the dispute.<sup>5</sup>

From the other point of view, the Norwegians who supported Quisling are anxious to de-emphasize their leader's involvement with the occupying power. For example, in his memoirs entitled I Was Quisling's Secretary, Harold F. Knudsen assiduously avoided discussing the support given to Quisling by the Kriegsmarine and other German organizations.<sup>6</sup> He maintained that virtually every German organization in occupied Norway had a different conception of the best way to achieve Germany's aims, leaving Quisling free to choose the options best suited for Norway.<sup>7</sup>

The memoirs of the two most important German naval officers involved in this issue have also contributed to the general disinterest in the Boehm-Terboven affair. In the memoirs of Grand Admiral Erich Raeder entitled Mein Leben,<sup>8</sup> the former Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine from 1928-1943, the

affair occupies only three pages of text; and Raeder fails to convey the impression that it had any real significance. The book written by Boehm, Norwegen zwischen England und Deutschland, at times seems to be more intent on clearing the name of his Commander, Raeder, than discussing in adequate detail the goals of, and measures undertaken by, the leadership of the German Navy in Norway.<sup>9</sup>

Thus, we can understand why most scholars have concluded that this issue was not worthy of any serious investigation, at least until 1963. The first hint of the importance of this affair was provided with the publication of the second volume of the official War Diary of the German High Command of the Armed Forces. In this volume, the editor discussed the long-standing tension between Boehm and Terboven, noting that the enmity between these two individuals had reached its nadir in October, 1942.<sup>10</sup> In that same year, Walter Baum published an article which criticized the German Navy severely for its lack of resistance to Hitler and National Socialism.<sup>11</sup> This article prompted a retired German admiral, Wilhelm Marschall, to challenge Baum. In his rebuttal of Baum's thesis, Marschall wrote:

Auch bei den vielen Zwischenfällen mit örtlichen Machthabern hat die Marine sich energisch und fast immer erfolgreich durchgesetzt - ich erinnere hier nur an den jahrelangen Kampf des Marine-Oberbefehlshabers in Norwegen, Generaladmiral Boehm, gegen den damaligen Reichskommissar Terboven.<sup>12</sup>

The recently published edition of the Goebbels diaries for the period 1939-41 eliminated my remaining doubts as to the importance of the affair. For example, under the date of November 15, 1940 Goebbels wrote:

The Führer is not so satisfied with Terboven's work. But he has probably been misled by the Navy, who are constantly having rows with Terboven.<sup>13</sup>

These are the statements that first attracted my attention to the Boehm-Terboven struggle. Does this affair throw light on the relationship of the Kriegsmarine with Hitler and National Socialism? This thesis will attempt to rediscover and study the issues which resulted in this struggle. From there, we shall be able to discern the goals and concerns of the Kriegsmarine. More importantly, we shall see the extent of the success, if any, that the German Navy was able to achieve.

To address this issue properly, one must examine the role that the Kriegsmarine played in the decision to invade Norway in 1940. The aims of the Kriegsmarine in this period undoubtedly played a crucial role in developing its attitude as to what policy should be implemented in German occupied Norway. Furthermore, we must attempt to discover the policy that Hitler wanted to follow in occupied Norway. The roots of the Boehm-Terboven affair may be found there.

# NOTES

- 1) N. Rich, Hitler's War Aims. (2 vols., New York, 1973-4). In vol. 1 see pp. 132-45; in vol. 2 pp. 121-40.
- 2) P.M. Hayes, Quisling: The Career and Political Ideas of Vidkun Quisling 1887-1945. (London, 1971); R. Hewins, Quisling: Prophet Without Honour, (London, 1965). In the former see p. 213, and in the latter see p. 249 for examples of this statement. There is a third biography of Quisling available to the English reader: O. K. Hoidal, "The Road to Futility: Vidkun's Quisling's Political Career in pre-war Norway" (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Southern California, 1970). As his title indicates, Hoidal concentrated on the earlier period of Quisling's career. In his epilogue, Hoidal has also noted the support given Quisling by the Kriegsmarine, see p. 390.
- 3) H. D. Looock, Quisling, Rosenberg und Terboven. (Stuttgart, 1970), pp. 492-99.
- 4) T. Gjelsvik, Norwegian Resistance 1940-1945, trans. by T. K. Derry. (Montreal, 1979), B. Nøkleby and O. Riste, Norway 1940-1945: The Resistance Movement. (Oslo, 1973), O. Riste, ed., Norway and the Second World War. (Oslo, 1973) and M. Skodvin, "Norwegian Non-violent Resistance During the German Occupation" in The Strategy of Civilian Defense, ed. by A. Roberts. (London, 1967), pp. 136-153.
- 5) Professor A. Brodersen, letter to the author, October 1, 1984.
- 6) H. F. Knudsen, I Was Quisling's Secretary, (London, 1967).
- 7) Ibid., p. 126.
- 8) E. Raeder, Mein Leben. (2 vols., Tübingen, 1956-7), see vol. 2, pp. 218-20.
- 9) H. Boehm, Norwegen zwischen England und Deutschland. (Lippoldsberg, 1956), see pp. 9-43.
- 10) Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht, vol. 2 part 1 January-June 1942, ed. by A. Hillgruber. (Frankfurt am Main, 1963) p. 125.
- 11) W. Baum, "Marine, Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand". Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 11 (1963), p. 24.

- 12) W. Marschall, "Marine, Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand: Eine Entgegnung zu der gleichnamigen Abhandlung von Walter Baum.", Marine-Offizier-Hilfe Nachrichten 12 (1963), p. 106.
- 13) The Goebbels Diaries 1939-1941, ed. and trans. by F. Taylor. (London, 1982), pp. 173-4.



## Chapter I

### The Road to Weserübung: September 1939 - April 1940

When the war clouds began to gather over Europe in 1939, Norway was one of the few countries which seemed to have little to fear from Germany's armed forces. She was after all, a small nation pledged to neutrality and had never attracted the wrath or even the interest of Adolf Hitler, Germany's dictator. Yet, when the Second World War was less than a year old, Germany suddenly invaded Norway. The roots of this action are to be found in the interplay of several distinct trends, none of which could have found fertile ground on their own. It was only with the merger of these trends into one compelling entity, that Germany's leaders began to consider seriously a Norwegian adventure.

The starting point for any venture into this issue must be an examination of the attitude towards, and interest in Norway, held by the two leading ideologists of the Third Reich - Adolf Hitler and Alfred Rosenberg. In Hitler's Mein Kampf there is no discussion of Norway's importance to the new Germany which Hitler wished to create.<sup>1</sup> He clearly did not see this poor country as offering even a small part of the solution for Germany's shortage of Lebensraum, or living space, that he believed Germany faced. Furthermore, he did not discuss the racial proximity of the Norwegian people to the Aryan race, which he perceived to be the master race. In

his second book, which was discovered and published only after the end of the Second World War, he alluded to this proximity on one occasion when he wrote:

That the American Union itself feels itself to be a Nordic-German state and in no way an international mishmash of peoples further emerges from the manner in which it allots immigration quotas to European nations. Scandinavians, that is, Swedes, Norwegians, further Danes, then Englishmen, and finally Germans, are allotted the greatest contingents. Rumanians and Slavs very little, Japanese and Chinese they would prefer to exclude altogether.<sup>2</sup>

He still did not incorporate them in his new Germany. It was only after Germany's invasion and occupation of Norway that he began to consider this seriously. His statement of April 5, 1942 will serve as an example:

...when speaking to the Germanics of the North-west [Danes] and North [Norwegians], one must always make it plain that what we're building is the Germanic Reich, or simply the Reich, with Germany constituting merely her most powerful source of strength, as much from the ideological as from the military point of view.<sup>3</sup>

Thus, it is clear that Hitler had no intention of letting these "Germanic" peoples play a leading role in his Reich.

The man most concerned with the role of the "Nordics" in the Third Reich was Alfred Rosenberg, who is often regarded as being the "philosopher" of the National Socialist movement.<sup>4</sup> Rosenberg had made a point of studying the "racial" map of Europe, with the intention of discovering the best Aryan and Nordic racial groups. In 1927, he published a pamphlet which was based on the results of this research. In it, he expressed both his concern for the future of the

Nordic race, and his proposals for the racial principles which the foreign policy of a National Socialist Germany should follow.<sup>5</sup> Already before the "Seizure of Power" by the National Socialists, Rosenberg had come to the conclusion that the descendants of the Saxons and Normans who emigrated to England were charter members of the Aryan race.<sup>6</sup> As a result of this, his conception of Germany's foreign policy was very similar to Hitler's. They both believed that Germany could obtain from her racial brothers in England a free hand in Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>7</sup> It was in this shared conception that the roots of Rosenberg's desire to be the Foreign Minister of a National Socialist Germany are to be found.<sup>8</sup>

In April of 1933, Hitler appointed Rosenberg to the position of Chief of the Party's Aussenpolitisches Amt (APA), the Foreign Policy Office of the NSDAP. This allowed Rosenberg to meet with many kindred spirits throughout Europe, thus partly satisfying his dream. At the same time, it allowed Hitler to keep Germany's foreign policy on a more traditional basis for the short term. One of Rosenberg's first actions was to have his office take over the direction of the Nordic Society.<sup>9</sup> This group, which had been established in Lübeck in September 1921 by Thilo von Trotha, was devoted to cultural exchanges between German and Scandinavian authors.<sup>10</sup>

Through this organization Rosenberg first met Vidkun Quisling in 1933, at which time they had a brief conversation.<sup>11</sup>

Quisling was the leader of a recently established Norwegian party, the Nasjonal Samling, which was to develop into the native Norwegian fascist party. Unlike his new movement, Quisling himself was well known to the Norwegian public. He had achieved some degree of renown through his work for the League of Nations in 1921. He had served the League in Russia, under Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, the High Commissioner for Repatriation of Prisoners of War and Director of the European Famine Relief. Quisling later served for a brief period as Norway's most controversial Minister of Defence.<sup>12</sup>

Quisling was no stranger to the German National Socialist party. As early as 1930 he had had a meeting with Max Pfefferkämper, an old member of the NSDAP, and this meeting was followed by another in 1932.<sup>13</sup> An official of the APA travelled to Norway in 1934 and attended two meetings of the Nasjonal Samling. The official, Thilo von Trotha, was apparently encouraged enough to recommend that Rosenberg try to maintain his contact with Quisling.<sup>14</sup> Despite this initial interest, Quisling's movement never received strong financial aid from Germany because the movement failed to play an important role in Norwegian politics. Quisling did not meet Rosenberg again until 1939. In this year, Quisling had two meetings with Rosenberg; one in June and the second in August. As a result of these meetings, Quisling received permission to enrol a small group of his followers in a special course in Nazi propaganda tactics.<sup>15</sup>

It was only in his next series of meetings with high ranking German officials that Quisling was able to arouse interest in himself and in his movement. These meetings occurred in December 1939, and they were stimulated by the interest in Norway by both the APA and the Kriegsmarine.

The fact that Norway occupied a strategic position in Europe vis-à-vis both England and Germany had not escaped the attention of the Kriegsmarine. The importance of Norway's position was underlined by her proximity to Sweden. Neutral Sweden exported annually large amounts of iron ore to Germany which was particularly suited to German coal. These imports were crucial for the German military-industrial complex. In the winter months, when most of the Swedish Baltic ports were closed by seasonal freezing, the bulk of this ore had to be shipped to Germany via the Norwegian port of Narvik. In a war between England and Germany, this traffic would present an alluring target to both the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. Indeed, as early as 1934 Hitler had foreseen the need for a strong fleet "because it would be impossible to wage war if the navy were not able to safeguard ore imports from Scandinavia."<sup>16</sup>

Norway was also important for another reason. In any war between Germany and England the Royal Navy would undoubtedly set up a blockade against Germany. This blockade would have one major loophole - Norway's territorial waters. As long as Norway remained neutral, these waters formed Germany's

major protected ocean shipping route, assuming that the Royal Navy would respect Norway's neutrality.<sup>17</sup> Conversely, the German Navy would face the same question of respecting Norway's neutrality. For a German counterblockade of England to have been successful, England's trade with Scandinavia would have had to be cut.

There were circles within the German Navy who advocated a more drastic solution to this dilemma. The radical solution called for Germany to acquire bases in Norway from which to attack the English lifelines. The commander of the German submarines, Admiral Karl Dönitz, had advocated this measure in a memorandum dated October 9, 1939.<sup>18</sup> His idea was not new, as the idea of establishing a German naval base in Norway predates the outbreak of World War II. As early as 1915, a German Admiralty Staff officer, Fregattenkapitan Wolfgang Wegener, had foreseen the need for a base in the "nordic fjords", i.e., Norway.<sup>19</sup> Wegener never let go of this idea; for he saw it as being the only solution to Germany's relatively weak strategic position vis-à-vis the Royal Navy.

In 1926, as a Vizeadmiral in the Weimar Republic's Reichsmarine, he made his thesis public in a book entitled Die Seestrategie des Weltkrieges. This work was to have a great influence on the thinking of many leading German naval officers.<sup>20</sup> Wegener's book was also highly critical of some of the policies of Admiral von Tirpitz, the founder of the German battle-fleet. Wegener's criticism angered the pro-

Tirpitz officers of the fleet, led by Raeder who regarded Wegener as a heretic.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, Wegener's thesis was not fully supported by the entire fleet.

There has been speculation that Hitler had been exposed to Wegener's work. Hitler's long-time naval adjutant, Konteradmiral Karl Jesko von Puttkamer, informed one author that he may have provided Hitler with a copy of this book at some time.<sup>22</sup> In addition, one should not overlook the possibility that Hitler may have been exposed to Wegener's thesis in the 1920's, as there are at least three passages in Hitler's Secret Book which have definite Wegenerian overtones.<sup>23</sup> At least one author has gone to the extreme of arguing that Wegener's book served as Hitler's "naval bible".<sup>24</sup> Given the fact that the essence of Hitler's pre-war strategy was to avoid a conflict with England, this view needs clarification. This is all the more necessary, because the raison d'être of Wegener's thesis was the scenario of a future Anglo-German conflict.

As one student of Hitler's foreign policy has argued, Hitler's intention was to achieve his aims in a series of stages. In other words, his aim was to win several localized wars in Europe, e.g. against Poland, France, and Russia first. Hitler wanted to avoid conflict with England until these campaigns had been concluded.<sup>25</sup> Apparently, Hitler came to the realization that England might not be willing to give Germany a free hand in Europe in 1938. Yet even

at this late stage he obviously believed that an open conflict with England would come only later in the 1940's. This is indicated by his approval for the Kriegsmarine's long term construction plan, the Z-plan, which was to be completed in the mid-1940's as opposed to a short-term program emphasizing submarine construction.<sup>26</sup> Even when war did break out between Germany and England, Hitler's policy was to respect Scandinavia's neutrality because he regarded it as being the best way to maintain his ore supply.<sup>27</sup> Obviously, whatever influence Wegener may have had upon Hitler, it was not manifest in 1939.

As a result of the increasing Anglo-German tension in 1938, the leadership of the Kriegsmarine began to consider seriously the possibility of a new war with England. The initial studies confirmed Wegener's thesis that Norway would occupy a position of major strategic importance. It was concluded, however, that Germany did not have the forces necessary to invade and occupy Norway successfully. The conclusion was that the available forces would be better employed, at a greatly reduced risk, in other potential war theatres.<sup>28</sup> The theme of an Anglo-German conflict formed the basis of the war games which were held in 1939. The conclusion reached as a result of these games was that Germany would need bases on the Atlantic coast in such a conflict. It should be noted that these war games envisaged the use of the fleet which would be available in the mid-1940's.<sup>29</sup>



Thus, when the Second World War began in September 1939, the Kriegsmarine had to improvise its strategy. As a provisional measure, it had placed, in August, two of its larger warships and several submarines in their assigned operational areas. This was a precaution should war between Germany and England develop as a consequence of Germany's attack on Poland. The advantage gained by this early deployment was quickly negated by Hitler's refusal to allow the surface ships to commence their commerce raiding operations against England. He also placed restrictions on the activities of the submarines. This was in keeping with his belief that England would withdraw from the war after Poland had been defeated.<sup>30</sup>

In the early months of the war, it must have seemed to the Kriegsmarine that it alone was actually concerned with England. The conclusions of the 1939 war games were quickly brought to the attention of Raeder by Dönitz. On October 9, the latter submitted his memorandum which dealt with the feasibility of the Norwegian ports of Trondheim and Narvik as submarine bases.<sup>31</sup> This was the day before Hitler made this declaration regarding Germany's relations with the countries of Northern Europe: "Provided no completely unforeseen factors appear, their neutrality is to be assumed."<sup>32</sup>

On the same day, October 10, 1939, Raeder brought Hitler's attention to Germany's need for bases in Norway for the first time during the course of the war. In a letter to

Admiral Assmann, Chief of the Kriegsmarine's Historical Section, Raeder explained the origins of his new found interest in Norway:

...during the weeks preceeding the report of 10.10.39 I was in correspondence with Admiral Carls, who, in a detailed letter to me, pointed out the importance of an occupation of the Norwegian coasts by Germany.<sup>33</sup>

In the conference of October 10, 1939 Hitler was impressed enough to ask Raeder to leave his documents behind so that he could study them in depth.<sup>34</sup> Raeder later claimed in his post-war memoirs that his initial interest in Norway had been triggered by Admiral Canaris, the head of German Military Intelligence, as early as September 1939 when Canaris had advised Raeder that the Allies were determined to do something about Norway.<sup>35</sup>

Two naval incidents which occurred in the early part of the war helped the Kriegsmarine to refine its attitude towards Norway. On September 26, Hitler finally allowed German surface warships already at sea to commence operations.<sup>36</sup> On October 9, the German armoured-ship<sup>37</sup> Deutschland stopped an American merchant ship, the City of Flint, off the Newfoundland banks. The Deutschland's commander, Kapitän zur See Wenniker, decided to take the City of Flint as a prize for three reasons: (1) she was carrying an important cargo, (2) she could accommodate the prisoners already aboard the Deutschland from an earlier victim, and (3) Wenniker was anxious to test the feasibility of sending prize ships to Germany through the English blockade.<sup>38</sup>

Under the prize crew, the City of Flint journeyed to Norway, arriving at Tromsø on October 20. Here, she was allowed to take on provisions according to the Norwegian Neutrality Regulations of 1928. Once this operation had been completed, the Norwegian authorities gave her 24 hours in which to leave Norwegian waters.<sup>39</sup> Instead of sailing south towards Germany, the City of Flint headed north to the Russian port of Murmansk.<sup>40</sup> The reason for this decision is not clear. One source contends that the prize commander was concerned over the intentions of English warships which were following the Flint just outside Norwegian waters.<sup>41</sup> Another suggests that the Flint did not have the necessary charts for the safe navigation of Norway's rocky coastline, but it also cites possible engine problems.<sup>42</sup> In any case, the City of Flint quickly resumed her journey, returning to Tromsø from Russia on October 30.

At this point, the Norwegian government refused her permission to anchor in Norway's territorial waters, although she was allowed to proceed to Germany via these waters. As she travelled through the coastal waters of Norway, her prize commander again made an attempt to receive permission to anchor. Finally, on November 4, he did so without a valid pretext. The Norwegian Navy promptly seized control of the City of Flint, and after an investigation by Norwegian authorities, it was decided to return the ship to the control of her American crew. Although Raeder was well aware of the

errors made by the prize crew commander,<sup>43</sup> this incident must have led him to question the value of Norwegian neutrality.

Within two weeks, another naval incident occurred in these waters. This incident involved the Deutschland's supply ship the Westerwald. This ship carried both fuel and munitions for the raider and was herself armed for self-defense. When she entered Norwegian territorial waters she was flying the flag of the German Merchant Marine. She was stopped near Trondheim by a Norwegian patrol boat, whose captain demanded permission to search the German vessel. Due to the presence of the munitions and installed armaments, her captain refused for fear of internment. As a result, the Norwegian ship forced the Westerwald to anchor. Diplomatic activity secured her release, but only after Germany had been forced to admit that she was a naval auxiliary on duty with the Kriegsmarine, and should have entered Norwegian waters under the German Service Flag. The Westerwald finally left Norwegian waters on November 20.<sup>44</sup> Once again, the Kriegsmarine had been embarrassed by Norway.

The use of Norwegian waters by German merchantmen, prizes, and naval auxiliaries was only one facet of the Kriegsmarine's Norwegian problem. From the outset of hostilities, it had wanted to attack England's overseas lifeline. For this reason, early on October 10, 1939, Raeder ordered that German Submarines should commence operations in Scandinavian waters on October 19.<sup>45</sup> Sometime later on the same day that he had given this order,

Raeder conferred with Hitler. The dictator refused to sanction Raeder's initiative, as he wanted to avoid the harmful repercussions which would result from any attacks on Scandinavian ships.<sup>46</sup>

Had Hitler been aware of a series of meetings between the English Board of Trade and a Norwegian delegation, he might have reconsidered this decision. The Norwegian delegation in question represented the Norwegian Shipowners' Association, and it had been negotiating the chartering of the bulk of the sizable Norwegian Merchant Marine by England since September, 1939.<sup>47</sup> These parties came to an agreement in November, 1939, with the result that England had increased her available shipping tonnage dramatically.<sup>48</sup> This immense and sudden increase in Allied shipping capacity undermined the basis of the Kriegsmarine's war plan against England. The German Naval Attaché in Oslo, Korvettenkapitän Richard Schreiber, did not confirm the rumours concerning this agreement until April 2, 1940.<sup>49</sup>

Raeder made a new attempt to impress upon Hitler the need to undertake operations against Norway. On November 25, while Hitler was preoccupied with the preparation of the German attack on the west, Raeder expressed this fear:

Chief Skl [Seekriegsleitung] sieht Gefahr in der Möglichkeit, dass England bei einem deutschen Vorgehen gegen Holland eine überraschende Landung an der norwegischen Küste und Inbesitznahme eigenen Stützpunktes dort vornehmen könnte und ordnet Überlegungen in dieser Richtung an.<sup>50</sup>

Thus, at this point, Raeder was working on two different aspects of the Norwegian problem: (1) Germany's need to wage unrestricted submarine warfare against England's Scandinavian trade, and (2) the danger of an Allied intervention in Norway.

Raeder's concern over the latter prospect cannot be dismissed outright. It appears that two Royal Naval Officers, Admiral Tom Phillips and Captain W. G. Tennant, had both reached a conclusion similar to that of Raeder's November 25 order, on November 11. In a minute discussing how the Admiralty could cope with the German ore ships sailing through Norwegian territorial waters, Phillips noted that a German attack on Holland and Belgium could furnish "a most adequate excuse" for Allied countermeasures in the area of Narvik.<sup>51</sup>

In the meantime, Hitler's conversion to an advocate of tonnage war became apparent on November 29, in his War Directive No. 9. In this document, he clearly recognized England's dependence on her overseas shipping routes as her fundamental weakness. Hitler argued: "Das wirksamste Mittel hierzu ist, die englische Wirtschaft durch Störung an entscheidenden Punkten lahmzulegen."<sup>52</sup>

At this time, German-Norwegian relations took on an added dimension because of the outbreak of the Russo-Finnish War on November 30. Russia's sudden attack on Finland placed Germany in an awkward position, as it undermined the neutrality of Northern Europe. Hitler could not intervene in this

struggle, because his hands were tied in two ways by the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. The most important of these was that the bulk of Germany's foreign supplies of food and raw materials came from Russia at this juncture in the war, and only these Russian supplies allowed Germany's war economy to function. Secondly, under the German-Russian agreement, Finland had been assigned to the Soviet Union's sphere of influence.<sup>53</sup> As long as Germany was confronted by the undefeated Allies in the West, Hitler could not afford to antagonize Russia for fear of starting a two-front war. This official disdain was particularly embarrassing for many Germans as Germany had played a key role in Finland's struggle to gain independence from Russia in the latter stages of the First World War. Furthermore, the little pro-German sympathy that had existed in Scandinavia began to decline drastically under the influence of this event.<sup>54</sup> Of even greater importance, however, was that this conflict presented the Western Allies with new opportunities through which to tackle the Norwegian problem.

The Allies had been concerned about Norway from the start of the war, due to the shipment of Swedish iron ore from Narvik to Germany through Norwegian waters. On September 19, Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, began to press for the mining of parts of Norway's territorial waters. While doing so he emphasized that the on-going negotiations for the chartering of the bulk of Norway's merchant marine by England must be concluded first.<sup>55</sup> The plan

to deny Germany's shipping access to Norwegian waters was not new, it was a variant of a similar plan which had been carried out on 1918. The implementation of this plan in the First World War had been delayed by Norway's reluctance to anger Germany at least until her defeat seemed imminent. Churchill's proposal was debated until the end of November 1939, when the British cabinet agreed to study it in earnest.<sup>56</sup> As a result, the Allies' interest in Norway had been aroused just before the Russo-Finnish War broke out.

Despite Russia's superiority in numbers and her having the advantage of striking the first blow, she experienced extreme difficulty with her Finnish opponent. Because the small Finnish army was able to parry the thrust of her larger foe, world opinion had a chance to develop moral support for Finland. In the Allied countries this feeling was particularly strong and it led to the idea of giving Finland military aid.<sup>57</sup> Any Allied military aid for Finland could follow only one route: by sea to Narvik, and then by railroad through Sweden into Finland. Therefore, it is not surprising that Churchill saw the possibility that aid to Finland could "kill two birds with one stone."<sup>58</sup>

By December 19, the Allied Military Co-ordinating Committee had considered two plans for cutting off Germany from her winter supplies of Swedish iron ore. The first called for laying a minefield in Norwegian territorial waters. The second was far more ambitious, foreseeing an occupation



of Narvik by an Anglo-French force of circa 3,000-4,000 men, some of whom would proceed from there to occupy the Swedish iron-ore fields; while a third group would go to Finland's aid. The members of the Committee believed that the overwhelming popular support for Finland in Scandinavia and in the Allied nations would allow them to carry out this plan.

The only stumbling block was the need to obtain the necessary consent from Norway and Sweden for the passage of Allied troops enroute to Finland through their territory.<sup>59</sup> By the

end of December, the Allied Chiefs of Staff recommended

intervention in Scandinavia, on the assumption that the co-

operation of Norway and Sweden would be obtained. The ration-

ale behind this recommendation was that "the opportunity

is a great one and we see no prospect of an equal chance being

afforded elsewhere".<sup>60</sup>

While the Allies prepared their diplomatic offensive, Raeder again tried to regain Hitler's support for a tonnage war in Scandinavian waters. On December 8, Raeder reported that:

Transporte durch Schweden u. Norwegen nach Drontheim-England sind sehr lebhaft. Ausfahrten aus Norwegen-Küste sehr zahlreich, daher schwer zu kontrollieren. Wichtigkeit der Besetzung Norwegens. Umstellung der Nordstaaten auf Lieferung an Deutschland u. a.<sup>61</sup>

At this juncture, Raeder obviously had reached the conclusion that only a German intervention in Scandinavia would close this significant loophole in the German blockade of England.

Thus, Raeder was more than willing to meet with Quisling a few days later.

Quisling had left Norway for Germany on December 10. Upon his arrival in Berlin, he attempted to obtain an audience with an old acquaintance, Ernst von Weizsäcker, the State Secretary of the German Foreign Office. They had first met in 1932, when Quisling had been the Norwegian Defence Minister, and Weizsäcker had been Germany's Minister to Norway. Weizsäcker was aware that Quisling had a political adventure in mind, and explained his subsequent actions in this manner:

I really had nothing against Quisling except that one cannot talk politics with him; and when he tried to see me in Berlin I excused myself. I advised that Quisling should not be received by anyone in a responsible position; I was one of the few people in Berlin who knew him.<sup>62</sup>

Quisling was undeterred by Weizsäcker's cold reaction, and turned towards his other German contact, Rosenberg. The latter had no scruples about going behind the back of the Foreign Office and quickly devised a scheme to use this pro-German Norwegian. As he was clearly aware of the limited nature of his support within the Nazi movement, Rosenberg contrived to have Quisling meet with Raeder first.<sup>63</sup> This meeting took place on December 11, 1939. At this time, Quisling went out of his way to exaggerate the danger of an Allied intervention in Norway. He claimed that England and Norway had reached an agreement which would see the English land troops in the vicinity of Stavanger and elsewhere to

establish bases in Norway.<sup>64</sup>

While Quisling was meeting with Raeder, Rosenberg discussed Quisling's visit with Hitler. In Rosenberg's diary the following entry is dated December 11, 1939:

Soeben dem Führer den Besuch von X. [Quisling] aus Skandinavien mitgeteilt. X. sagte, die Stimmung im Norden sei jetzt immer deutschfeindlicher (russisch-finn. [ischer] Konflikt), die Englandpartei würde immer stärker. Der Jude Hambro arbeite dauernd gegen uns. In Schweden sei tatsächlich die Frage brit. [ischer] Flottenstützpunkte beredet worden. Es könnte sich ein Fall wie mit der Türkei wiederholen. Er machte nochmals konkreten Vorschlag, eine deutsche Landung vorzubereiten, auf Bitte einer neu zu erkämpfenden Regierung. X. ging zu Raeder.<sup>65</sup>

On December 12, Raeder reported to a Hitler whose interest in Quisling had already been aroused. In this conference, Raeder repeated Quisling's belief that an English occupation of Norway was imminent. Raeder added that Quisling was prepared to stage an internal coup d'état in Norway to forestall such an event. In this case, the Norwegian had indicated that he would be willing to call upon German military support for his regime. Finally, and most importantly, Quisling was quite prepared to aid the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), the German High Command of the Armed Forces, to prepare plans to cover this eventuality. Raeder, in keeping with his own increasing concern over Scandinavia, stressed the unbearable consequences that an Allied occupation of Norway would have.<sup>66</sup>

The combined efforts of Raeder and Rosenberg certainly had enough of an impact on Hitler for the latter to decide to meet with Quisling. During his first meeting with Quisling

on December 13, Hitler affirmed his personal preference for the maintenance of the status quo in Scandinavia. At the same time, he declared that he would counter any attempt to enlarge the scope of the war.<sup>67</sup> Immediately after this meeting Generalmajor Alfred Jodl, the Operations Chief of the OKW noted in his diary that: "Führer befiehlt, dass mit kleinstem Stab die Untersuchung geführt wird, wie man sich in Besitz N. [orwegens] setzen kann."<sup>68</sup>

? This first Hitler-Quisling meeting was followed by a second within a few days. Rosenberg's diary indicates that Hitler had asked for this meeting on December 17, and Rosenberg's summary of the meeting is found under the entry for December 19. At this meeting, they discussed details of their first meeting, with Hitler again emphasizing his preference for Norway's continued neutrality. At the same time, Hitler stated that he did not want to be caught off-guard by unexpected developments in Scandinavia. Quisling asked Hitler if this meant that he was willing to help him, to which Hitler replied: "Ja, das will ich."<sup>69</sup>

This meeting resulted in a promise of German support, especially financial, for Quisling's movement. The money which was to come from the coffers of the Foreign Office was to be used primarily for the propagation of the pan-Germanic idea. A special staff for military matters was created, with a liaison to Quisling. Rosenberg was to be responsible for political relations between the Nasjonal Samling and the

NSDAP. To this end, Rosenberg was to send Hans Scheidt of the APA to Norway where he was to be attached to the staff of the German Naval Attaché in Oslo, Richard Schreiber. Raeder agreed to this proposal immediately.<sup>70</sup>

Through the remainder of December the formulation of the German plans proceeded smoothly. At first, the code name Studie Nord had been assigned to this project; but on January 27, 1940 the cover name Fall Weserübung was officially adopted.<sup>71</sup> At this time, the focus of the plans changed dramatically. Prior to the new year, two separate plans had been under consideration, both of which had originated in the Hitler-Raeder conference of December 12. The first of them had envisaged limited German military support for a Quisling coup d'état, while the second called for a German invasion without the aid of the Nasjonal Samling.<sup>72</sup> By late January, the latter plan had gained predominance.<sup>73</sup> This meant that Quisling's role and importance were being eroded.<sup>74</sup>

Evidence for this development is to be found in an entry in the diary of General der Artillerie Halder, the Chief of the General Staff of the German Army, dated January 1, 1940:

Schweden und Norwegen streng neutral. General [sic!] Quisling - Norwegen - (von Rosenberg zugeführt) hat niemand hinter sich. Wir haben ein Interesse daran, dass Norwegen neutral bleibt. Sollte England Norwegens Neutralität gefährden, dann wird sich unsere Haltung ändern.<sup>75</sup>

This entry indicates that some leading personages of the

Third Reich were aware of the acute weakness of Quisling's support within Norway. The source of this knowledge seems to have been the Foreign Ministry.<sup>76</sup>

The final determining factor for this development, however, did not come from any official source. It was a naval incident off the coast of Norway which involved the German supply ship Altmark. This vessel had been assigned to the armoured ship Admiral Graf Spee, a sister-ship of the Deutschland. The Spee had been sent on a raiding cruise in the South Atlantic, and had achieved greater success than her sister ship. As a result, the Altmark's holds held a large number of English sailors from the Spee's victims. On December 13, the Spee was found by three English cruisers under Commodore Harwood. After an inconclusive battle, the Spee sought shelter in the neutral harbour of Montevideo, Uruguay. On December 17, she was scuttled just outside this port to avoid being sunk by the Royal Navy or internment by Uruguay.

The Altmark had no recourse but to try to return to Germany on her own. Even as she began her cautious voyage home, the British Admiralty ordered all ships to be on the lookout for her.<sup>77</sup> Despite Churchill's order, she was sighted only on February 14, 1940 when she was well inside Norwegian waters. On the next day, she was inspected by the Norwegian Navy which found nothing to be in violation of the Norwegian Neutrality Regulations. The commander of the Altmark had

had no intention of repeating the mistake of the Westerwald, and had entered these waters under the German Service Flag.<sup>78</sup> The Altmark was allowed to proceed to Germany via Norwegian waters under escort of the Norwegian Navy. On February 16, two English destroyers attempted to enter the fjord in which the Altmark had sought refuge once she was aware of their presence. These destroyers were intercepted by the Altmark's Norwegian escort, whose commander informed his English counterpart that the German ship had been searched and had been granted permission to proceed to Germany. The English destroyers, not willing to risk a confrontation with a neutral power, withdrew to seek further instructions.

Captain Vian, aboard his flagship H.M.S. Cossack, did not have long to wait for Churchill's order:

Unless Norwegian torpedo-boat undertakes to convoy Altmark to Bergen with a joint Anglo-Norwegian guard on board, and a joint escort, you should board Altmark, liberate the prisoners and take possession of the ship pending further orders.<sup>79</sup>

Vian immediately re-entered the fjord and invited his Norwegian counterpart to accept this suggestion, but the latter refused to comply. The Norwegians made no effort to interfere with the larger English ships, when they steamed past and boarded the Altmark. This was a clear indication that the Allies were prepared to disregard Norway's neutrality under some circumstances.<sup>80</sup>

On February 19, Rosenberg noted in his diary that the Altmark affair had moved Hitler to advocate a full invasion.

of Norway - ,should one be necessary:

Dadurch fällt nach m. [einem] Vortrag u. [nd] Vorschlag der politische Plan der Norweger. Sie müssen sich ev. [entuell] zur Verfügung halten, wenn wir gezwungen sind, uns vor engl. [ischer] Abschneidung unserer Wege nach Norwegen zu schützen. Das Bemühen des Führers, die Neutralität des Nordens zu erhalten u. [nd] nur für den schlimmsten Fall sich vorzubereiten ist gescheitert.<sup>81</sup>

This is the real significance of the Altmark incident, as from this point on Hitler had decided that it was best to prepare for the worst possible development. Again, we see that his preference was for the continued neutrality of Northern Europe. In any case, Quisling's role had been diminished to that of a fifth columnist should Germany invade Norway.

It is much more difficult to determine the date when Hitler finally decided that a German attack on Norway was absolutely necessary. For example, Raeder had felt it necessary to warn again of sinister Allied plans against Norway as early as December 30, 1939. On that date, Raeder presented Hitler with this scenario: a surprise attack by the English using merchant ships carrying concealed troops.<sup>82</sup> In a document modifying the official war diary of the OKW, this note carries the notation "Middle of January, 1940": "The Führer makes up his mind to utilize the Danish and Norwegian space for German warfare."<sup>83</sup>

It was only on February 20 that Hitler summoned General von Falkenhorst, one of the few leading German officers with combat experience in Northern Europe. Falkenhorst had



served in Finland during the last year of World War I. Hitler began the conversation by asking about the details of the General's experience in the North. Finally, as the General later testified under oath:

Then he got up and he led me to a table that was covered in maps. He said, 'we are concerned with something similar this time, an occupation of Norway.' Then he pointed to the map and he said, 'This is intelligence; the Reich Government has knowledge that the British intend to make a landing in Norway.'<sup>84</sup>

From that point Hitler discussed the reasons why Germany must forestall the Allies. It is also important to note that Hitler did not even mention the Altmark affair to Falkenhorst.<sup>85</sup>

On February 23, Raeder spoke again with his superior commander, but at this time the Admiral voiced an opinion which corresponded more closely to Hitler's:

- a) Der günstigste Fall ist für diesen Verkehr wie allgemein die Aufrechterhaltung der norwegischen Neutralität.
- b) Untragbar ist - wie früher ausgeführt - die Besetzung von N. [Norwegen] durch England. Denn sie ist nicht rückgängig zu machen; sie bedeutet verschärften Druck auf Schweden, evtl. Ausbreitung des Krieges auf der Ostsee, Fortfall der gesamten Erzzufuhr aus Schweden.<sup>86</sup>

The reason for the change in Raeder's opinion is to be found in his realization that an invasion of Norway would result in severe losses in ships and manpower.<sup>87</sup> The knowledge of the actual strength of Quisling's following in Norway may also have played a role.

This is certainly the impression that one gets from Halder's diary of January 1 cited above. The German Army, in

particular, was very concerned with the high risks involved in the proposed preventive strike against Norway.<sup>88</sup> In early February, the Army moved to prevent a dispersal of its military capability. It had been occupied with preparing the plans for the proposed Western offensive since the fall of Poland. In the final stages, this plan envisaged the invasion of France and the neutral countries of Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg under the code name Fall Gelb. On February 6, a new plan was being circulated: a simultaneous attack in the North- Weserübung - and against Holland in the West.<sup>89</sup> As a result of the Army's luke-warm attitude, Weserübung was relegated to a low priority. At one point, some circles within the Army believed that Weserübung would remain at the study stage.<sup>90</sup>

The preparatory work was not halted, however, and at the end of February, Hitler received the preliminary plans from Falkenhorst. These formed the basis for the subsequent war directive which Hitler issued on March 1:

Die Entwicklung der Lage in Skandinavien erfordert es, alle Vorbereitungen dafür zu treffen, um mit Teilkraften der Wehrmacht Dänemark und Norwegen zu besetzen ("Fall Weserübung"). Hierdurch soll englischen Übergriffen nach Skandinavien und der Ostsee vorgebeugt, unsere Erzbasis in Schweden gesichert und für Kriegsmarine und Luftwaffe die Ausgangstellung gegen England erweitert werden.<sup>91</sup>

This document is important for a number of reasons. First, it reviews all the reasons why Germany might be faced with

the necessity of attacking Norway, thereby indicating some uncertainty on the part of the German leadership. It is not so much an indication of Hitler's intention to invade Norway, but rather of his determination to be prepared for any scenario. This is reinforced by Hitler's statement of February 29, that Norwegian neutrality was still best for Germany.<sup>92</sup> Finally, this directive did not give any indication as to when the attack should be carried out.<sup>93</sup> This situation changed dramatically by March 3, as witnessed by this entry in Jodl's diary:

Führer expresses his opinion about the necessity of prompt and strong action in Norway very sharply. Führer decides to undertake Weser-exercise before Case "Yellow", with several days interval.<sup>94</sup>

Almost at the same time, the Kriegsmarine was ordered not to send any more submarines into the Atlantic, so that they would be available for Weserübung.<sup>95</sup>

This sudden determination was due to increasing rumours of Allied intentions to act in the North. In December 1939, the Allies had begun to discuss with Norway and Sweden their intention to aid Finland. At the same time, they had approached Norway regarding the subject of mining parts of her territorial waters. The two countries refused to cooperate in either of the two actions. Nonetheless, the Allies continued to perfect their plans. The re-cast plans called for the Allies to occupy Narvik, Stavanger, Bergen and Trondheim.<sup>96</sup>

The last Allied diplomatic attempt to obtain the agreement of Norway and Sweden occurred in the conference of all Scandinavian Foreign Ministers which took place on February 25. The attempt of the Finnish Foreign Minister to persuade his counterparts from Norway and Sweden to allow Allied military aid to travel through their territories was unsuccessful. Undoubtedly, Sweden and Norway were leary of giving this right to the power which had so recently violated Norway's neutrality in the Altmark affair. Also, they were still uneasy over the Allied proposals of early January. Finally, on March 2, the Allies offered Sweden and Norway military aid in the case of any German aggression against them.<sup>97</sup> Despite this diplomatic failure, the British cabinet agreed to stage landings at Narvik, Trondheim, Stavanger, and Bergen. These operations were to be carried out circa March 20.<sup>98</sup>

At this point, the foundations of both the German and Allied plans crumbled. On March 12, a cease-fire was arranged between Russia and Finland which led to an unexpectedly quick end to the hostilities. As Jodl remarked in his diary: "The conclusion of peace deprives England, but us too, of any political basis for occupying Norway."<sup>99</sup> This situation was not destined to last for a long time.

Churchill quickly returned to his original plan, the mining of the Norwegian coast with or without the approval of Norway. This operation was given the code name Operation

Wilfred, and after a postponement of a few days, the Royal Navy received the order to carry it out on April 3. The mines were to be laid on April 8.<sup>100</sup> The Allies were aware that this operation would endanger Norway's relationship with Germany. Indeed, this realization formed the basis of a corollary operation, Plan R 4. This foresaw a strong German military reaction against Norway because of Operation Wilfred, and called for the immediate transfer of Allied troops to Norway to forestall the Germans.<sup>101</sup> During the actual campaign in Norway, the Germans discovered copies of English orders dated April 2, 6, and 7, which dealt with plans to occupy the more strategic Norwegian ports.<sup>102</sup> Having failed to obtain their ends diplomatically, the Allies had clearly decided to create a situation in which their aims could still be realized.

The Germans were fully aware of the last Allied attempts to obtain the right of passage through Norway and Sweden for their troops. On March 6, Halder noted:

England wie Frankreich haben Durchmarschrecht durch Norwegen und Schweden gefordert. Führer will handeln. Am 10.3. Vorbereitungen fertig. 15.3. Beginn Weserübung. Glaubt, 3 Tage später mit grösserer Unternehmung im Westen beginnen zu können.<sup>103</sup>

On March 9, Raeder again discussed the Norwegian problem with Hitler. The minutes of the conversation contain this conclusion:

Die Engländer haben jetzt die gewünschte Gelegenheit, mit Vorwand der Unterstützung der Finnen, Truppen-

transporte durch Norwegen und Schweden zu führen und diese Länder damit gegebenenfalls zu besetzen. Daher ist Fall Weserübung dringend.<sup>104</sup>

Raeder must have had some influence on Hitler, for on March 13, Jodl noted in his diary that: "Führer does not yet give the order for "W" [Weserübung]! He is still looking for some justification."<sup>105</sup>

At this time, Raeder's prediction of November 25, 1939 came back to the fore. As a result, on March 15, in a conversation with his fellow naval officers, Raeder was confident enough to say that while:

...the "political leadership" did not believe that the British action against Norway was imminent, but that Weserübung was still necessary and that preparations should continue so that it could be put into operation at the shortest possible notice. Weserübung would then be carried out shortly before the attack on the West.<sup>106</sup>

The Allied preparations of March 1940, had not gone totally unnoticed by the Germans.<sup>107</sup> It is true that the eleven battalions which Churchill admits were being kept in readiness for eventual use in Norway were not enough to stage an invasion.<sup>108</sup> They were, however, not intended to invade Norway but rather to come to the aid of Norway. Raeder's great fear, as seen in his conference with Hitler on February 23, was that once the Allies had established a military foothold, the odds were against Germany being able to eliminate it. It is then easy to understand why Norman Rich concluded that Hitler's northern offensive was an attempt to reduce his vulnerability in this sector of Europe - especially at the

time of his Western offensive.<sup>109</sup>

The actual timing of the invasion of Norway was decided in the Raeder-Hitler conference of March 26. Raeder again felt confident enough to downplay the fear of any Allied action in Norway, but he still argued that Weserübung was necessary. The minutes of this conference make interesting reading:

Die Frage, ob zur Zeit engl. Landung in Norwegen noch akut sei, ist m. E. zu verneinen.  
Die Frage, "was werden die Engländer im Norden in nächster Zeit unternehmen?", ist so zu beantworten: Sie werden weiter versuchen, den deutschen Handel in den neutralen Gewässern zu belästigen und Zwischenfälle hervorrufen, um dadurch vielleicht die Handhabe für ein Vorgehen gegen Norwegen zu erhalten. Ein erwünschtes Ziel ist und bleibt die Unterbindung des deutschen Narvik-Handels. Diese tritt aber, zum mindesten zeitweise auch bei Durchführung der Weserübung ein.

Früher oder später wird Deutschland vor die Frage gestellt werden, die Weserübung durchzuführen.

Daher ist Durchführung sobald wie möglich zweckmässig - bis 15.4. spätestens, denn nachher werden die Nächte zu kurz; am 7.4. ist Neumond...

Führer ist einverstanden mit Weserübung - X-Tag um Neumond.<sup>110</sup>

Although both sides had simultaneously initiated operations aimed at undermining Norway's neutrality, they managed to avoid each other. The major exception occurred when the German heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper encountered the English destroyer H.M.S. Glowworm. The latter did not survive this David and Goliath confrontation.<sup>111</sup> On the whole, the German forces reached their objectives with almost complete surprise, as noted by Jodl in his diary entry of April 9:

"The surprise effect succeeds in Bergen, Trondheim, Narvik,

and from the air in Stavanger. Not at Christiansand and in Oslo."<sup>112</sup>

Of these two, the latter failure was by far the most serious, due to unexpectedly fierce Norwegian resistance. The German plan to occupy Oslo had been quite daring and ambitious in that the large warships were to sail past an old military fort. This fort was strategically placed at the narrowest part of the entrance of the fjord that leads into Oslo. The capital's defences were already on the alert due to the Allied mine-laying operation. Therefore, when the German naval task force was sighted, the old guns of the fort opened fire with devastating results. The Blücher, flagship of the task force and a sister-ship of the Hipper, was struck by the shore-based artillery and she stopped. She was then hit by some shore-based torpedos and sank quickly. The Lützow - the re-named Deutschland - was also struck by the shore-based artillery. As a result, the remaining German ships quickly retreated and landed their troops further away from the capital.<sup>113</sup>

This setback was crucial because the Blücher was carrying a large contingent of Gestapo and administrative personnel. These people were supposed to administer the affairs of the Norwegian state during the hostilities. More importantly, she also carried the field commander for the Norwegian invasion, General von Engelbrecht. The General was supposed to deliver the German ultimatum to the Norwegian King and Parliament, and should he have failed to obtain



their co-operation he was empowered to arrest them.<sup>114</sup> Also aboard the Blücher were many key documents concerning the German plans for the occupation and initial administration of Norway. Both the King and government of Norway managed to elude the German forces. This effectively prevented the Germans from co-opting the Royal family and Norwegian government as they were to do to some degree in Denmark.

The Germans found themselves in a most uncomfortable position, for there was now a political vacuum in the capital. Quisling took advantage of the resultant confusion to seize power on April 9. As the Kriegsmarine was unaware of Hitler's plans for the future government of Norway - especially under these unexpected circumstances<sup>115</sup> - it not only welcomed this move but had recommended it. On April 9, the Naval Attaché in Oslo, Schreiber, reported to the German Foreign Office that under these new circumstances:

...there was only one sensible course to follow if there was to be organization of a government friendly to Germany. The obvious choice was Quisling...he had the correct outlook with his pro-German political views.<sup>116</sup>

Thus, in this roundabout way, Quisling again came to the forefront. He was the individual who had first managed to impress upon Hitler the need to be prepared to forestall an Allied move against Norway. Now that Norway had been invaded, he offered the Germans another prospect - that of Norwegian co-operation at a time when there was no legitimate Norwegian authority through which the Germans could operate.<sup>117</sup>

It is of even greater significance that Quisling had come to power at least partly on the recommendation of the Kriegsmarine. Boehm, the Commanding Admiral in Norway, arrived in Norway on April 10, while Josef Terboven, the future Reichkommissar Norwegen, was appointed only April 20. The story of these two men and their differences will be dealt with in the next chapters.

# NOTES

- 1) A. Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. by R. Manheim. (Boston, 1943), contains no reference to Norway.
- 2) Hitler's Secret Book, ed. and trans. by S. Attanasio. (New York, 1962), p. 108.
- 3) Hitler's Secret Conversations, trans. N. Cameron and R. H. Steeves. (New York, 1972), p. 327.
- 4) J. C. Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, trans. by M. Bullock. (New York, 1970), p. 163.
- 5) P. E. Mancha, "Alfred Rosenberg: A Career Illustrative of Administrative Discord in the Third Reich 1940-1943". (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Duke University, 1971), p. 28.
- 6) Ibid., p. 15.
- 7) R. Cecil, The Myth of the Master Race: Alfred Rosenberg and Nazi Ideology. (London, 1972), p. 162.
- 8) Fest, p. 169.
- 9) Cecil, p. 184.
- 10) Loock, p. 165.
- 11) International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. 11. (Nuremberg, 1947-9), p. 455. Hereafter, this source will be referred to as TMWC.
- 12) Hayes, pp. 21-37 and pp. 56-99. I have also consulted the biography of Quisling presented in Loock, pp. 17-157. The serious reader is also referred to the works by Hewins and Hoidal which are noted in the Introduction.
- 13) Hayes, pp. 53 and 87.
- 14) Ibid., p. 134.
- 15) TMWC, vol. 11, p. 455.
- 16) Ibid., vol. 34, document no. C-190, pp. 775-6.
- 17) Raeder, vol. 2, pp. 199-200.

- 18) Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. (Washington, 1946), vol. 6, document no. C-5, pp. 815-6. Hereafter, this source will be referred to as NCA.
- 19) C. A. Gemzell, Organization, Conflict and Innovation. (Lund, Sweden, 1973), p. 221.
- 20) H. Boehm, "Beitrag zu 'Nochmals: Selbstverständnis und historisches Bewusstsein der deutschen Kriegsmarine'." , Marine Rundschau 68 (1971), p. 311.
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- 22) Ibid., p. 54, footnote 2.
- 23) Hitler's Secret Book, pp. 49, 125-6, and 157.
- 24) H. Rosinski, "Strategy and Propaganda in German Naval Thought", Brassey's Naval Annual (1945) p. 144.
- 25) A. Hillgruber, Hitlers Strategie. (Frankfurt am Main, 1965), p. 36.
- 26) G. Bidlingmaier, Einsatz der schweren Kriegsmarineneinheiten im ozeanischen Zufuhrkrieg. (Neckargemünd, 1963), pp. 13-4.
- 27) TMWC, vol. 15, p. 375.
- 28) Gemzell, p. 284.
- 29) K. Klee, Das Unternehmen "Seelöwe". (Göttingen, 1958), vol. 1, p. 36.
- 30) Bidlingmaier, pp. 27-8.
- 31) NCA, vol. 6, document no. C-5, pp. 815-6.
- 32) Ibid., vol. 7, document no. C-52, p. 803.
- 33) Ibid., vol. 6, document no. C-66, p. 891.
- 34) Ibid.
- 35) Raeder, vol. 2, p. 200.
- 36) Bidlingmaier, p. 29.
- 37) I prefer to use this term, as it is more descriptive of this type of warship. For more information see S. Bryer, Battleships and Battlecruisers, trans. by A. Kurti. (New York, 1973), p. 287 footnote 1.
- 38) Bidlingmaier, p. 63.

- 39) G. Jones, Under Three Flags. (London, 1973), pp. 32-33
- 40) W. Churchill, The Gathering Storm. (New York, 1961), p. 431.
- 41) Bidlingmaier, p. 64.
- 42) Jones, p. 33. Another source has maintained that the Norwegians refused to allow the German prize crew to keep the navigational charts that they had purchased in Tromsø, see: H. Knackstedt, "Der 'City of Flint' Fall.", Marine Rundschau 57 (1960), p. 81.
- 43) G. Wagner (ed.), Lagevorträge des Oberbefehlshabers der Kriegsmarine vor Hitler 1939-1945. (Munich, 1972), p. 44.
- 44) Jones, p. 41 and Bidlingmaier, p. 73.
- 45) W. Hubatsch, Weserübung. (Göttingen-Berlin, 2nd Ed., 1960) p. 16.
- 46) Wagner, p. 27.
- 47) Churchill, pp. 476-7.
- 48) H. Koht, Norway: Neutral and Invaded. (London, 1942), p. 28.
- 49) IfZ Fd. 54, Kth, das Marine Attaché Norwegen. p. 13. For more information on the English-Norwegian negotiations see: N. Örvik, "Das englisch-norwegische Handelsabkommen und die alliierten Interventionspläne in russisch-finnischen Krieg.", Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 4 (1956), pp. 345-61.
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- 57) R. Albrecht-Carrié, A Diplomatic History of Europe. (New York, rev. ed., 1973), p. 544.
- 58) Churchill, p. 500.
- 59) Butler, p. 100.
- 60) Ibid., p. 102.
- 61) Wagner, p. 57. Emphasis in original.
- 62) Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsäcker, trans. by J. Andrews. (Chicago, 1951), pp. 227-8.
- 63) NCA, vol. 6, document no. C-65, pp. 885-7.
- 64) Wagner, p. 59.
- 65) Das politische Tagebuch Rosenbergs, ed. by H. Seraphim. (Göttingen, 1956), p. 91. Slanted brackets are mine.
- 66) Wagner, pp. 60-1.
- 67) NCA, vol. 3 document no. PS-004, p. 22.
- 68) Jodl's Diary, reprinted in Hubatsch, p. 355.
- 69) Tagebuch Rosenbergs, pp. 93-4.
- 70) NCA, vol. 3, document no. PS-004, p. 22.
- 71) Ibid., vol. 6, document no. C-65, p. 883.
- 72) Wagner, p. 61.
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- 74) Hayes, p. 178.
- 75) Kriegstagebuch Generaloberst Halder, ed. by H. A. Jacobsen. (Stuttgart, 1962), vol. 1, pp. 149-50.
- 76) D. Irving, Hitler's War. (New York, 1977), pp. 65-6.
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- 78) K. Knackstedt, "Der Altmark Zwischenfall." Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 9 (1959), p. 392.
- 79) Churchill, p. 470.
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- 89) NCA, vol. 4, document no. PS-1809, p. 380.
- 90) Warlimont, p. 71.
- 91) Hitlers Weisungen, p. 47.
- 92) Tagebuch Rosenbergs, p. 102.
- 93) Hubatsch, pp. 47-8.
- 94) NCA, vol. 4, document no. PS-1809, p. 389.
- 95) Hubatsch, p. 24.
- 96) Bütler, p. 104.
- 97) Hubatsch, p. 24.
- 98) Churchill, p. 512 and Irving, p. 93.
- 99) NCA, vol. 4, document no. PS-1809, p. 392.
- 100) Churchill, p. 519.
- 101) T. K. Derry, The Campaign in Norway. (London, 1952), p. 15.

- 102) Irving, p. 103.
- 103) Kriegstagebuch Halder, vol. 1, p. 221.
- 104) Wagner, p. 85.
- 105) NCA, vol. 4, document no. PS-1809, p. 392.
- 106) Rich, vol. 1, p. 144. *Weserübung* italicized in the original.  
See also Looock, p. 255.
- 107) Boehm, Norwegen, p. 62.
- 108) Churchill, p. 512.
- 109) Rich, vol. 1, p. 144.
- 110) Wagner, p. 86. Emphasis in original.
- 111) Churchill, pp. 529-30.
- 112) NCA, vol. 4, document no. PS-1809, p. 397.
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- 115) C. A. Gemzell, Raeder, Hitler und Skandinavien. (Lund, Sweden, 1965), pp. 267 and 289.
- 116) Cited in Hayes, p. 213.
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## Chapter II

### Early Co-operation: April-May 1940

Since Boehm arrived in Norway before Terboven, a summary of this naval officer's career may help to clarify later developments. Generaladmiral Hermann Boehm found himself facing an uncertain future in the autumn of 1939, and for this German naval veteran of some thirty-six years, the future must have looked very bleak. His naval career had begun in 1903 when he had entered the Imperial fleet as a cadet. During the First World War, he had risen to command a torpedo boat flotilla. Boehm remained at his post in the period of revolution and reaction which followed the armistice of 1918. In 1919, he was appointed to the Admiralty Staff of the newly created Reichsmarine of the Weimar Republic. Upon the completion of his tour of duty on the Admiralty Staff, he returned to active sea duty as the commander of a torpedo boat flotilla. From 1928 to 1932, he served in the operations department of the Naval Command, and later as the fleet's Chief of Staff for a brief period. In 1933 he returned to active sea duty, this time as the commander of one of the old pre-dreadnought battleships which Germany had been allowed to retain under the Treaty of Versailles. After serving in this capacity for a year, he was appointed to the post of Commander

of the Scouting Forces of the fleet. He remained in this post until 1937, when he was appointed Commander of the North Sea naval base. In November 1938, he left his position to become the Fleet Commander. As such, his primary responsibility was to command Germany's only two operational capital ships, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau - both of which had been recently commissioned - in the event of war. The opening days of the new global conflict of September 1939 found Boehm in this post.<sup>1</sup>

Boehm's naval career suffered its first major reverse in late October 1939. At this time, Boehm felt himself forced to tender his resignation, due to a disagreement with his superior, Raeder. An examination of the events which resulted in this occurrence is imperative because it has been suggested that Raeder had actually "sacked" Boehm.<sup>2</sup>

The incident which cost Boehm his post concerned his willingness to use the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau as a distant covering force for a German destroyer operation off the coast of England. Boehm's immediate superior did not relish the prospect of placing Germany's two most powerful operational warships in waters within striking distance of the RAF. Once Raeder had been informed of the details of this proposed sortie of the capital ships, he immediately ordered Boehm to cancel the operation. After a vain attempt to explain the rationale behind the proposed operation, Boehm promptly complied with Raeder's command. Nonetheless, Raeder was not

content to let matters rest here. The Grand Admiral also insisted that Boehm dismiss the officer responsible for the detailed planning of the operation. Boehm refused to comply, arguing that the junior officer involved, Kapitän zur See Weichhold, was being unjustly punished for carrying out the orders of a superior officer. With Raeder proving obstinate, Boehm felt obliged to tender his resignation.<sup>3</sup> In his post-war memoirs, Raeder claimed that under the circumstances, he had to accept Boehm's resignation. Raeder went on to say that he had had no desire to deprive the Kriegsmarine of the services of this distinguished officer for long.<sup>4</sup>

At that time Raeder had stated his position somewhat differently, as his letter to Boehm of October 21, clearly shows. In this letter, Raeder suggested that Boehm take an extended vacation; and stated that: "Die Frage Ihrer weiteren Verwendung muss ich von der Entwicklung der Lage abhängig machen."<sup>5</sup> Boehm replied that he would welcome any opportunity through which he could continue to serve Germany in the Kriegsmarine.<sup>6</sup>

Loock, one of the few historians who has studied Boehm's later career in Norway, has argued that Raeder's earlier "sacking" of Boehm had placed the latter in a relatively weak position. Boehm had been re-instated on the Kriegsmarine list of active officers only through Raeder's act of grace. Consequently, Loock has maintained that Boehm had no choice but to follow Raeder's lead blindly as Raeder could remove him from his new post at any time.<sup>7</sup>

If Boehm's account is accurate, one must see his resignation as being a humanitarian gesture which had little to do with the personal relationship between the two men. If this had been the case, Raeder would never have considered re-assigning Boehm to any position. Also, Boehm later claimed that when Raeder appointed him to the post of Commanding Admiral Norway, the Grand Admiral had given him a virtually free hand. As Boehm later put it, Raeder had told him: "Gehen Sie als mein Bevollmächtigter nach Norwegen. Was Sie aus der Stellung machen, liegt in Ihrer Hand!"<sup>8</sup> Had Raeder really wanted a "yes-man", would he have chosen to appoint an individual who had been prepared in the past to assume full responsibility for his actions?

While we do not know the exact date when Raeder began to consider seriously appointing Boehm to his future post, it was most likely in early March 1940.<sup>9</sup> This is confirmed by the date of the very first entry in Boehm's War Diary as Commanding Admiral Norway which was dated March 7, 1940:

Ich erhielt die Mitteilung über die mir zugedachte grundsätzliche Aufgabe, als Kommandierender Admiral und Bevollmächtigter des Ob. [erbefehlshaber] d. [er] M. [arine] in Norwegen nach Besetzung bestimmter Stützpunkte des Landes.<sup>10</sup>

During the initial stage of Weserübung both Boehm and Falkenhorst, the overall commander of the operation, were in Hamburg and oversaw the progress of the invasion from there. Late in the evening of April 9, they boarded a flight to Oslo and arrived on the following morning.<sup>11</sup> Boehm in particular was quite concerned over the power vacuum in Oslo which had

been caused by the unexpected sinking of the Blücher. He was also concerned with the confusion created by Quisling's coup d'état. In his War Diary, he stated his belief that his presence in Oslo was now of paramount importance for any dealings with the Royal Norwegian Navy.<sup>12</sup> Upon his arrival, Boehm was met by Schreiber, the German Naval Attaché, who briefed the Admiral on the general political and military situation. It was through Schreiber's briefing that Boehm learned of the ongoing negotiations which the German Foreign Office was conducting with the Norwegian King. The key German demands called for an immediate cease-fire and the King's endorsement of the new Quisling regime.<sup>13</sup>

On April 12, Boehm noted that the German envoy, Dr. Bräuer, the German Ambassador to Norway, had had an audience with the Norwegian King on April 10. In this conference, the King had insisted that before he would enter into any serious negotiations, Quisling must resign. Bräuer's request for a second audience on April 11, was refused. Although Boehm was aware that no accurate figures existed regarding the size of Quisling's following, he noted that this fact did not alter the position of official Germany which continued to be one of support for the Norwegian.<sup>14</sup>

This support, however, was not destined to endure for much longer. On April 13, Dr. Bräuer sent a telegram to his superior in Berlin, Ribbentrop, in which Bräuer took his first concrete anti-Quisling measures. The Ambassador began by

cautiously insisting that he had made every effort to support Quisling's attempt to establish a Nasjonal Samling government. Leaving nothing to chance, Bräuer went so far as to say that he had refused to let his personal opinion of Quisling affect his attitude. With Quisling proving to be the chief stumbling block which prevented the return of the Norwegian King to Oslo, Bräuer felt it advisable to advocate a re-examination of the decision to support Quisling:

Ich halte unter diesen Umständen die nochmalige Prüfung der Frage für erforderlich, ob wir Quisling weiter stützen sollten; zu dieser Frage gibt auch die Tatsache Anlass, dass Quisling trotz Abwesenheit einer legalen Regierung und trotz Vorhandenseins deutscher Bajonette bisher noch nicht in der Lage gewesen ist, sogleich nur annähernd Landesregierung in den Sattel zu setzen.<sup>15</sup>

Bräuer went on to criticize the Quisling government, arguing that Quisling's cabinet was complete only on paper.<sup>16</sup>

Bräuer still faced one major obstacle, he needed to come up with an appropriate alternative to Quisling as leader of occupied Norway. The Ambassador had been contacted two days earlier by a spokesman for a group of Norwegians who wished to establish a non-Quisling administration. The initiative had come from a Norwegian lawyer, Johannes Rivertz, who had just discovered that Quisling did not enjoy the unconditional support of all German authorities.<sup>17</sup> Once this information had been confirmed, Rivertz approached a fellow Norwegian, Paal Berg, the Chief Justice of the Norwegian Supreme Court. Thus, by April 12, Bräuer was fully aware of the existence of an anti-Quisling group of prominent Norwegians who were prepared to govern

occupied Norway.<sup>18</sup> Berg and the other members of this group were prepared to take on this thankless task until a more satisfactory and legitimate government could be found, which would enjoy the support of the Monarch. To avoid being cast in Quisling's shadow, Berg's group wished to be known as an "Administrative Council."

Therefore, on April 12, Quisling found himself in a difficult position. With Bräuer favouring Berg's group, Quisling's sole hope for the survival of his government rested with Hitler's continued support. The only way to keep Hitler's support was for Quisling to persuade the King to return to Oslo and issue a ceasefire. As the King refused to do so, Quisling had to seek another solution.

On April 12, Schreiber played a key role in the final attempt to prevent the establishment of a non-Quisling government. The Naval Attaché managed to provide a Quisling supporter, Hagelin, with a seat on a naval flight to Berlin.<sup>19</sup> In so doing, Schreiber was clearly indicating his full support for Quisling. Hagelin's mission was to persuade Hitler to continue supporting the Quisling regime. The Norwegian envoy met with the Führer on April 13, and found the dictator to be very uncertain regarding the desirability of the Quisling regime. At this stage, Hitler seemed to be intent upon achieving one main goal, an armistice with Norway. Hagelin realized, that if push came to shove, Hitler would find Quisling's regime expendable. The net result of Hagelin's mission was that Hitler

decided to postpone the inevitable - at least until a new envoy, Theodor Habicht of the Foreign Office, could report on the political situation in that beleaguered country.<sup>20</sup>

Upon his arrival in Norway, Habicht held a series of meetings with various individuals including Quisling and Berg. In the end, Habicht came out in support of Berg's group, informing Quisling that "...eine Aufrechterhaltung dieser [Quislings] Regierung nur auf den Bajonetten der deutschen Wehrmacht möglich wäre."<sup>21</sup> On April 14, Hitler and Ribbentrop decided to adopt Habicht's recommendation for the establishment of a new Norwegian government. In his telephone conversation with Bräuer on April 14, Ribbentrop also informed the German Ambassador that Hitler still intended to keep Quisling in "reserve":

...damit man auf ihn zurückgreifen kann, für den Fall, dass die kommende Regierung nicht in unserem Sinne funktioniert.<sup>22</sup>

During the evening of April 14, Quisling made several attempts to contact Hitler, but these failed. A Norwegian source has argued that Quisling was being encouraged by some unknown Kriegsmarine personnel to try to find a way to delay the imminent creation of the Administrative Council.<sup>23</sup> Given Schreiber's most recent effort on behalf of Quisling, this certainly seems plausible. With the failure of these eleventh-hour efforts, Quisling had no choice but to announce his retirement from public life on April 15, and the Administrative Council was recognized by Germany as being the new Norwegian government on the same day.



Boehm's initial reaction to the change in the political administration of Norway indicated that he was very much aware of the intent behind the transformation:

Innerpolitisch Bildung einer neuen Regierung nach  
 Austritt Quisling ohne sichtbare Wirkung auf alte  
 Regierung und Anhang.<sup>24</sup>

His reaction also indicated that this change in policy had misfired. Schreiber's reaction was much stronger, and far more critical:

Damit ist eine "Regierung" in den besetzten  
 Gebieten nicht mehr da. Der Administrationsrat  
 betrachtet sich nicht als solche.<sup>25</sup>

There was then a slight difference of opinion between Boehm and Schreiber over the value of Quisling to the German side. While Schreiber had played an active role in a futile attempt to change the course of events, Boehm had opted to stay out of the political arena.

The raison d'être for this change in German occupied Norway had been Bräuer's persistent argument that any government without Quisling would be more acceptable to the Norwegian King. Already on April 14, a Quisling supporter who had witnessed the heated debate between Quisling, Habicht, and Bräuer maintained that the Germans had earnestly believed "that the King would yield to German demands if only Quisling were removed."<sup>26</sup> Apparently Hitler had hoped that the transfer of power from Quisling to the Administrative Council would be enough to induce the Norwegian King to return to Oslo. Quisling was then to be held in reserve until Hitler felt capable

of placing enough pressure on the Monarch to force the latter to "legally" appoint Quisling at a later stage.<sup>27</sup> In short, Bräuer had convinced the Führer of the plan to create yet another "legal" National Socialist revolution.

This well-laid plan, like so many others, soon went astray. On April 17, the Norwegian King's negative reaction to the mandate of the Administrative Council was revealed. Hitler's immediate response was one of anger towards the chief architect of this now disgraced plan, stating: "that man's career is now finished."<sup>28</sup> It was at this point, that Hitler received a suggestion from Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring, the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe. Göring's proposal was that Hitler appoint a Reichskommissar to govern occupied Norway, and he recommended a candidate. On April 19, Hitler sent for the man whom Göring had supported so earnestly, Josef Terboven, Gauleiter of Essen.<sup>29</sup>

Terboven is one of the many Nazi officials whose lives have been relatively ignored by historians.<sup>30</sup> Josef Terboven was born in Essen in 1898. Upon his graduation from high school in May, 1915, he entered the German Army's Artillery Corps, then served in the German Air Service. It has been speculated that Terboven first met Göring during his service with the German Army's Flying Corps. After the war he was demobilized and returned to school. His studies were interrupted when his father died in the winter of 1920-1. He returned to school in the summer of 1921, but he left shortly afterwards never to return. In 1923, he worked for a bank, but his career in this

field was cut short when he was laid off in 1925.

Terboven had joined the NSDAP in 1923; and he soon attracted the attention of prominent Nazis such as Dr. Josef Goebbels, the future Nazi Minister of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment. By 1925, Terboven had decided to make the party his vocation. Terboven had chosen to support the Munich establishment of the party quite early in his career, and like Goebbels, reaped the benefits when this wing of the party outmaneuvered the Strasser brothers' North German wing. In 1928 he was appointed to the post of Gauleiter of Essen. In 1935, he added the title of Senior President of the Rhine Province to his portfolio.

In 1935 Terboven met a Norwegian, Jonas Lie, who was to play an important role in his future post in Norway. At the time of their first meeting, Lie was the Norwegian representative on the International Police force which oversaw the 1935 Saar Plebescite which resulted in the return of the Saar region to German jurisdiction.<sup>31</sup>

The appointment of Terboven as Reichskommissar for Norway, did not sit well with Rosenberg, for the two men had been involved in several jurisdictional disputes of the type innate to the National Socialist system of government.<sup>32</sup> Perhaps of greater importance was the fact that Terboven had already been involved in at least one affair of honor with the Navy. It was an incident which had occurred in September, 1934 which involved a minor Nazi party official who had insulted a German

sailor at the NSDAP's annual Nuremberg Party rally. As the Nazi functionary involved worked for Terboven, the Navy approached the Gauleiter with a request for an investigation. Terboven, however, refused to co-operate in any fashion and let the affair drag on. This matter was resolved only when it was brought to the attention of the Nazi Party's Deputy Führer, Rudolf Hess, sometime in 1935.<sup>33</sup> Thus, even before he arrived in Norway, Terboven had been involved in disputes with both of the original architects of Germany's Norwegian adventure.

Raeder's first known reaction to the course of recent events was on April 22, 1940. On that date, he entered a brief account of the Weserübung operation in the War Diary of the Naval Command. He was, in particular, sharply critical of the policies followed by Bräuer and Falkenhorst in Norway:

Die Lage entwickelte sich entsprechend: Q[uisling] fand nicht die erforderliche Unterstützung durch General von Falkenhorst und den Gesandten Bräuer. Die norwegische Regierung entkam. Die Umbildung einer Regierung im Einvernehmen mit dem König missglückte. Q[uisling] geriet in den Verdacht des Landesverrates. Ein "Verwaltungsausschuss", der aber keine Regierung darstellte, war das Ergebnis der Verhandlungen. Die norwegische Bevölkerung war in zwei Lager gespalten. Ob die Ernennung Terbovens zum Reichskommissär [sic!] unter Abberufung des Gesandten Bräuer noch was ändern kann, bleibt abzuwarten.<sup>34</sup>

On the same day, Raeder also had a conference with Hitler in which he advocated quite strongly the need for Terboven to co-operate with Quisling:

Ob. [erbefehlshaber] d. [er] M. [arine] befürwortet Zusammenarbeiten von Terboven mit Quisling u. Befriedung der Gebiete, in denen keine Kampfhandlungen mehr stattfinden. Qu. [isling] warnt davor,

durch rigorose Massnahmen einen allgemeinen nationalen Widerstand hervorzurufen.  
 Führer: Terboven hat Anweisung mit Qu. [isling] zusammenzuarbeiten.<sup>35</sup>

In the pre-Terboven period, Boehm played no role in the political developments in German occupied Norway. After the end of the war, he maintained that he had been too concerned with the military duties of his office to "bother with Norwegian politics" in this period.<sup>36</sup> As a result, he did not take any action against Schreiber's constant involvement in Norwegian politics. Likewise, he chose to ignore the more radical actions of the overzealous Vice-Admiral von Schrader, who was the naval commander for Bergen. For example, on April 19, Schrader showed no compunction in formally announcing to the local citizenry that he was now the highest authority in Bergen, thus proclaiming the end of the political power vacuum in that city.<sup>37</sup> Shortly afterward, he issued some decrees which have been seen as the first application of direct German pressure on the people of Norway.<sup>38</sup>

Schreiber's pro-Quisling activities did not cease in this period either. On the day the Administrative Council was proclaimed, he found time to entertain Quisling and the recently returned Hagelin. There is no doubt that Schreiber, in conjunction with Scheidt of the APA, firmly believed that Quisling would eventually return to power. Schreiber clearly saw Quisling as being the key to German-Norwegian co-operation. At this time, he made an attempt to boost Scheidt's morale by arguing that Quisling still had a chance to return to power.

through the proposal to have him supervise the demobilization of the Norwegian Army.<sup>39</sup>

Boehm viewed the change in the political administration of the German occupied parts of Norway in a positive light. In a letter to Raeder dated April 19, Boehm was particularly optimistic about the effect of recent events in Oslo:

Politisch hat sich der Rücktritt Quislings und die Bildung einer Art Regierung im besetzten Gebiet von 8 Prominenten unter Führung des Reichsgerichtspräsidenten ohne Zweifel günstig für dieses Gebiet ausgewirkt und das Fussfassen, Erfassen militärischer Werte und Faktoren erleichtert und beschleunigt.<sup>40</sup>

Perhaps as a result of this early optimism, Boehm requested that Schreiber be relieved of his post on April 19.<sup>41</sup> On this date, Schreiber had received orders to travel to Berlin to report on the final developments of his service in Norway.<sup>42</sup> The Naval Attaché's War Diary indicates that he returned to Oslo on April 23, and that he remained there until April 30 during which time he slowly wound down the affairs of his old office.<sup>43</sup> If Schreiber's War Diary is any indication of his frame of mind in this period, then he was certainly not overly perturbed about his imminent transfer. On April 24, he sent a new dispatch to Under-Secretary of State von Weizsäcker in the Foreign Office, in which the Naval Attaché again advocated that Germany support Quisling wholeheartedly.<sup>44</sup> Whatever the case, Schreiber did not have long to wait before being transferred back to Boehm's command. Thus, on May 1, Schreiber was able to record the news of his new posting in

Norway:

Der Kommandierende Admiral Norwegen wünscht, dass der Marineattaché Oslo als A 3 (Bearbeitung wirtschaftlicher und politischer Fragen) in dessen Stab tritt.<sup>45</sup>

In a special report written in 1944, Boehm discussed the work and importance of Schreiber in Norway:

Schreiber hatte ferner eine ausgezeichnete Kenntnis von Land und Leuten, hatte viele Beziehungen zu prominenten und einflussreichen Persönlichkeiten und war daher stets über die Lage und Entwicklung unterrichtet. Zu den führenden Kreisen der NS [Nasjonal Samling] stand er in einem hohen persönlichen Achtungsverhältnis, weil diese seine schon vor der Besetzung vertretene Auffassung kannten, dass der weltanschauliche Krieg Deutschlands eine Verbindung mit den norwegischen Kräften verlange, die weltanschaulich auf dem Boden des Nationalsozialismus standen, also mit der NS.<sup>46</sup>

Loock, the historian, has seen Boehm's reversal on the desirability of Schreiber's continued presence in Norway as an example of Boehm's total subservience to Raeder's policy and wishes.<sup>47</sup>

There is a problem here, because in April 1940, the leadership of the Kriegsmarine did not exhibit a firm pro-Quisling policy as advocated by Schreiber. As Loock's own research indicated, the Naval Command (Sk1.) in the period from April 9 through 15 was not overwhelmingly impressed by Quisling. Two entries in particular are of great importance. The first, dated April 9, records that the Kriegsmarine was aware that the "Regierung Quisling [sic!] ohne jede Resonanz im norwegischen Volk."<sup>48</sup> On April 13, the Sk1. actually recommended that the Quisling regime be dismissed because he had

failed to fulfill:

...die Erwartungen, die auf Grund seiner eigenen Äusserungen in den Gesprächen mit dem Ob. d. M. in Quisling und seinen Einfluss in Norwegen gesetzt werden konnten, ...bisher nicht erfüllt.<sup>49</sup>

Given that Boehm felt confident with the establishment of the Administrative Council, did he have any need for a co-worker who was obviously pro-Quisling? Thus, as long as the Administrative Council was in a favourable position, and Quisling remained in a political vacuum, one can see why he would have requested the transfer of Schreiber.

We are then left with the question of what transpired between April 19 and May 1, which reversed the entire situation. One must conclude that Hitler's decision to appoint Terboven was paramount in stimulating this about-face. The installation of Terboven was the first real indication of Hitler's intention to create a National Socialist Norway. In this new scenario, a man with strong connections to the native fascist movement could have been a great asset to the Kriegsmarine.

Another important factor must have been the formal state of war which existed between Germany and Norway after the failure of Bräuer's mission. In addition to fighting Allied troops in northern Norway, both Boehm and Falkenhorst were concerned over the possibility of sabotage operations against the German troops now in Norway. On April 26, Boehm discussed this fear, and recommended that Germany find a way to promote good relations between the Wehrmacht and the Nor-



wegian people:

Das Letztere ist weider einer der vielen Gründe, die uns dazu zwingen, die durch den Krieg bedingten Massnahmen gegenüber Norwegen so durchzuführen, dass die freiwillige Mitarbeit der Norweger, für die gute Voraussetzungen vorhanden sind, bestehen bleibt.<sup>50</sup>

The problem was how to win, on the one hand the co-operation of the Norwegian population, and on the other hand how to ensure that Norway had the kind of government that would meet with Hitler's approval.

The same problem had already surfaced, albeit on a smaller scale, in Bergen. One of the major industries in this city was a ship and engine building concern known as the A/S Bergens Mekaniske Verkstedt. This company was considered to be "sehr kriegswichtig" by the Germans and they faced a hard choice between two radically different alternatives.<sup>51</sup> The first called for a complete takeover by a new German administration. This was deemed unsatisfactory because the Germans feared a large scale sabotage effort and they also forecast a shortage of willing workers. The second alternative called for the creation of a new Norwegian administration which would have to walk the tight-rope between the often diametrically opposed German and Norwegian interests. While this alternative was believed to diminish the drawbacks of the first proposal, it also limited the degree of control that the Wehrmacht could exercise over this company. Nonetheless, the second alternative was seen as being the lesser of two evils and was there-

fore adopted.<sup>52</sup>

Meanwhile, Terboven had arrived in Oslo on April 21,<sup>53</sup> although the Führer's decree which officially appointed him to his new post was issued only on April 25.<sup>54</sup> As Terboven's first order of business was to establish his bureaucracy, his first meeting with Boehm occurred only on April 27. Their subsequent conversation was summarized by Boehm in the entry for April 28 in his War Diary.<sup>55</sup> In this conversation, Boehm first expressed his concern over the need for a unified policy on the part of both the German military and civil authorities in Norway. Boehm emphasized that he had no intention of undertaking any action in the political or economic sphere without first reaching an agreement with the Reichskommissar. The next point that Boehm stressed was that the German authorities must attempt to obtain the co-operation of the Norwegian people and thereby reduce the need for a large army of occupation. The native population should be encouraged to work by the prospect of receiving decent wages.

Boehm went on to cite the requirements of the Kriegsmarine in Norway. He requested that all the shipyards, especially the largest at Horten, be allowed to return to production as quickly as possible. Boehm argued that these goals would be easier to obtain if the Germans were to avoid direct takeovers; but he also maintained that some security precautions be taken.

Boehm then requested that some 60 small fishing vessels be transferred to the Kriegsmarine for general military

duties. This confiscation was to be dependant on a detailed study of the Norwegian fishing industry to ensure that the proposed measure would not cripple a vital sector of the Norwegian economy. The only demand made by the Kriegsmarine on the Norwegian Merchant Marine was that the German Navy have the right to seize any contraband found on these vessels. To this end, the Kriegsmarine had to be in a position to control all facets of marine traffic. Again, Boehm stressed that the Kriegsmarine was willing to work in a spirit of close collaboration with the Reichskommissar.

Terboven replied to these points by saying that he had no intention of making the Norwegian people suffer because of the German war against the now departed Norwegian regime. Naturally, he too would prefer to obtain the co-operation of the Norwegian populace by avoiding unpopular or extreme policies. In particular, he agreed with Boehm that a fair wage must be paid to the workers. The Reichskommissar stated that he favoured a policy of chartering the available ships of the Norwegian Merchant Marine, as opposed to confiscating the vessels. Terboven declared that only he, not the military authorities, had the power to confiscate the assets of any Norwegian enterprise. Notwithstanding this, he was more than willing to meet the requests of the Kriegsmarine insofar as they were in keeping with the capabilities of the Norwegian economy.

Terboven stated that, for the short run, Germany must

bear the occupational costs created by the invasion, but in the long run, Norway must repay all the debts incurred by Germany. Therefore, Terboven wished to be kept informed of the costs contracted by all sections of the German military establishment through the work performed for them by Norwegian industry - in particular the naval dockyards at Horten. In addition, Terboven was willing to sanction an orderly adjustment of tariffs for the good of both the Norwegian populace and the captains of the Norwegian economy.

Terboven went on to state that he was responsible for all aspects of the Norwegian economy. He was determined to ensure that the military or any other German institutions would not plunder the Norwegian nation. He alone was the central figure who was to determine Norway's economic development. He indicated that he would prefer to govern with a soft hand in an attempt to bring the German and Norwegian people closer together. To this end, he was willing to discuss the Kriegsmarine's recent proposals which were aimed at alleviating German-Norwegian tensions in the post-invasion period with von Falkenhorst. Terboven pledged that he would resort to force only when there was no other reasonable option.

From this point, Boehm and Terboven went on to agree on several other issues. The naval dockyard at Horten was to receive a one-hundred percent guarantee of payment for all work done on Germany's behalf. Like the Bergen concern, the Horten company was to remain under Norwegian control, but its

production was to be increased a hundred percent by production for Germany. Boehm then listed the remaining naval firms in which the Kriegsmarine had an interest, stressing in particular the dockyard at Trondheim. In order to achieve a better degree of co-operation, Boehm indicated the extent of the ship-building program that the Kriegsmarine intended to implement in Norway. Finally, the two men came to a general agreement as to the extent of the Navy's right to seize smaller vessels for miscellaneous military duties. Terboven insisted that the Norwegian fishing fleet must at all times be large enough to provide both Norway and Germany with adequate supplies of fish. Terboven would consider the Kriegsmarine's requests for fishing vessels only upon the completion of an appropriate study. Even then, Terboven indicated that he would consider only the more crucial requirements of the Kriegsmarine.

Both men avoided the topic of Norway's political evolution during the war. Most likely, Boehm felt that Terboven was still too occupied with the more practical aspects of his new post to dwell upon this issue. Also, Boehm was more than likely aware of Hitler's agreement with Raeder that Terboven should co-operate with Quisling. In general, Terboven seems to have tried to dispel any fears that Boehm may have had, such as the possibility that the Reichskommissar intended to ride roughshod over Norway. Boehm was probably impressed by Terboven's willingness to consider the Kriegsmarine's recent pro-

posals which were aimed at alleviating German-Norwegian tensions. Before presenting these, a discussion of the issues which were to dominate their next meeting is in order.

The question of how the Kriegsmarine was to deal with the Norwegian Merchant Marine was first broached by the German Naval Commander for Trondheim on April 23. On this date, he queried Boehm as to whether Germany was to apply the rules of Prize Law to Norwegian vessels.<sup>56</sup> Boehm reasoned that since Norwegian ships in the North Sea were being regarded as hostile, he could not consider issuing a special decree to cover vessels which had returned to Norwegian waters voluntarily. He stressed therefore that all documents concerning the cargo of any prize ships be forwarded to the Prize Court in Hamburg, the office of the Reichskommissar, the harbour commander of Oslo, and to Boehm himself. The future use of the ships involved and the ultimate disposal of their cargo and equipment would be decided jointly by these authorities. The decision to seize any vessel, as well as any cargo or equipment, required the use of special vouchers which could be issued only by these authorities. The Generaladmiral then added that the ships of neutral countries would still fall under the earlier regulations.

This order was countermanded on April 25, due to a new ruling from the Naval Command. It stated that in future Norwegian ships in German occupied Norway were to be placed under German custody; but they were no longer subject to the Prize Law Court. This was because Berlin had not yet decided

whether or not it should apply the Prize Law in all cases.

On April 26, the German Naval Attaché met with an official of the Foreign Office to discuss this issue. Ultimately, they wished to establish a provisional set of rules in conjunction with the Norwegian Shipowners' Association. These rules were to lay the foundations for future claims against the Norwegian merchant fleet, taking into consideration the needs of Norway's industry and population. The new regulations were to be operational once Terboven had given them his seal of approval.

The new procedures called upon the individual commanders of Norwegian harbours to compile a list of all the Norwegian vessels berthed in their respective ports. Details such as the ship's name, displacement, the fuel on-board, cargo, and equipment were to be recorded as well as the possible capacity in which they could serve the Kriegsmarine. In the latter case, before any seizure could be effected, the ships in question were in turn subject to further study by both the local German and Norwegian officials. The Norwegian officials were to be appointed by the shipping owner involved. The impact on Norway's economy, transportation industry, and food supply would be taken into careful consideration. These considerations could be ignored only in the case of extreme military need or urgency. The regulations went on to prescribe the special forms which were to be utilized for such cases. The question of compensation for any vessel seized was left unanswered, pending a decision of the Reichskommissar. In

any case, all the appropriate documents were to be forwarded to the Oslo Naval Station.

The question of the ship's cargo was divided into two separate categories, contraband, and cargo intended for either Norway or other countries. In the former case, all such items were held to be subject to the rules of Prize Law. In the latter, foodstuffs and other material considered essential for the upkeep of German troops were to be confiscated only if no other way could be found to satisfy the needs of the Wehrmacht. In any such case, the Wehrmacht had to compensate the owners of the vessel fairly. The captain of the vessel had to be given a voucher stating the nature and value of the cargo seized, with a duplicate being forwarded to the ship's owner. Finally, the owners of vessels which Kriegsmarine appropriated, but were not subject to the Prize Law, were to be reimbursed in accordance with the local custom. The viewpoint of the representative of the Shipowners' Association had to be considered in the settlement of such cases.

On April 27 there came word that a formal state of war existed between Germany and Norway. Therefore, all Norwegian ships were now considered hostile, and they fell under the jurisdiction of the Prize Law. All vessels in the ports already occupied were subject to seizure, unless both the Kriegsmarine and their owners could come to an agreement as to their better use. Representatives of the Reichskommissar's office and the Kriegsmarine came to a new agreement. From now on,



the application of the Prize Law would be limited to those ships which were carrying cargos intended for Germany's enemies. With this exception, all other ships would continue to fall under the previous arrangements. The question of paying an indemnity for any vessel or cargo seized was to be deferred for the time being. In all cases, Terboven was to be informed prior to the actual seizure of any vessel, for only he could sanction it.

On April 28, the Naval Command signalled its approval of this agreement. This telegram also confirmed that all neutral ships found in Norwegian ports with cargos destined for the Allies were subject to the Prize Law. All cases which involved Norwegian ships were to be handled individually, depending on the importance of the vessel involved to the Norwegian economy. As a precaution, it was asserted that the Kriegsmarine must have a voice in the Reichkommissar's decisions. Finally, this telegram ended with a note reaffirming the earlier procedures outlined for those ships which were earmarked for service as naval auxiliaries.

The Naval Command attempted to strengthen its position on the following day, by declaring in a new telegram that all the requirements of the Kriegsmarine for shipping vessels, especially tankers, must be met. The agreement of the Reichskommissar was only necessary in cases where the Prize Law was to be applied without indemnification, or if the proposed requisition should be challenged by the ship's owner. This tele-

gram went on to say that a clarification of the degree to which cargo found on Norwegian ships could fall under the jurisdiction of the Prize Law was needed. In the case of cargo bound for the enemy, such scruples did not apply. It concluded with a reminder that the Naval Station in Oslo was to be informed of all cases which had been referred to the Prize Law Court as well as the Reichskommissar. Boehm responded by stating that the measures to clear up the ambiguities in the application of the Prize Law to Norwegian vessels should impress upon the Reichskommissar the full extent of the Kriegsmarine's need for Norwegian shipping. The net result of these negotiations was a formal agreement as to the policy to be implemented when dealing with Norwegian and neutral ships.

Overall, Boehm was pleased with the results obtained in these early exchanges between the Kriegsmarine and the office of the Reichskommissar. He declared that the needs of the Kriegsmarine had been recognized by the Reichskommissar, especially the Kriegsmarine's need for small ships to fulfill the roles of minesweeping and general security work - as well as the need for tankers. In conclusion, Boehm offered this description of his relations with Terboven:

Die zentrale Leitung durch den Reichskommissar ist mehr formal, und ich bin der Überzeugung, dass wir so am weitesten kommen. Sollten unsere Forderungen auf irgend einem Gebiet aus schwerwiegenden wirtschaftlichen Gründen nicht erfüllt werden, so wird es letzten Endes einer Entscheidung des Führers bedürfen.<sup>57</sup>

Of particular interest here is the fact that Boehm had already realized that in certain circumstances, disagreements between the Kriegsmarine and the Reichskommissar could be settled only by the intervention of Hitler himself.

On May 8, Boehm requested another conference with Terboven to discuss new issues. The agenda proposed for this meeting included the creation of coastal shipping to supply both the German troops and the Norwegian population, and the export of war materials and other products to Germany. Once this traffic had begun, the Kriegsmarine would have to be in a position to control and protect it. This led the Kriegsmarine to request again the appropriation of some small Norwegian vessels.<sup>58</sup> This meeting finally took place on May 13.<sup>59</sup>

During this conference, Boehm argued that only the Reichskommissar could authorize the commencement of coastal shipping traffic. Boehm also limited the responsibility of the Kriegsmarine to the control and protection of such traffic. He undertook to notify the Reichskommissar's representative in Berlin on the pending clarification of the question as to which flag was to be used by the vessels. For the control and protection of this traffic, the Kriegsmarine requested the right to requisition seventy-five smaller Norwegian vessels - especially trawlers. As this type of vessel was not available in abundant supply, Boehm recognized that the need would have to be satisfied by German vessels. In general, Terboven gave his approval to these points, but he requested that the Kriegsmarine not requi-

sition some of the more important vessels belonging to coastal shipping owners. In regards to the fishing boats that Boehm desired to acquire, Terboven indicated that he preferred to follow the practice used in Germany where the owners were compensated for the loss of their source of income by a continual indemnity. Terboven agreed with the Generaladmiral's request for new Norwegian ship construction, emphasizing that the Norwegian yards should concentrate on the types of vessels to which they were already accustomed. Boehm then stressed the urgent need for coastal pilots, urging the Reichskommissar to take all necessary measures to provide them. They agreed that there would be little problem in supplying government pilots, but they were very concerned over the shortage of private pilots. Terboven hoped to overcome this deficiency by bringing in German captains experienced in negotiating Norwegian waters. He also sanctioned the seizure of two merchant vessels by the Kriegsmarine. Finally, Terboven took advantage of this meeting to give Boehm letters of safe-passage for two Norwegians.

Again, Boehm and Terboven seemed to have been able to agree on several key issues. As Boehm noted in his War Diary on May 15, his policy to that date had stressed three points. The first was that the Kriegsmarine was to work in co-operation with the other branches of the military. The second was that the Navy would have to work with the Reichskommissar in both the political and economic spheres. Boehm was determined to

define the rights and responsibilities of the Kriegsmarine in Norway.<sup>60</sup> To this date, no major differences of opinion had occurred between Boehm and Terboven. As a matter of fact, on May 2, Boehm had reported that Terboven was making every effort to fulfill Hitler's special injunction to the Reichskommissar: "Sie werden mir keinen grössern Dienst erweisen, als wenn Sie die Norweger zur Mitarbeit auf unsere Seite ziehen."<sup>61</sup> In all of his later writings, Boehm phrased this injunction slightly differently: "Sie werden mir keine grössere Freude machen, als wenn Sie mir dieses Volk zu Freunden machen!"<sup>62</sup>

The Kriegsmarine had been pre-occupied with this goal even before Weserübung had begun. For example, it was at the instigation of the Kriegsmarine that the invading German troops were handed a printed leaflet which aimed at preventing altercations between German troops and Norwegian citizens. The first point made by this leaflet was that the Wehrmacht had come to Norway as a friend whose intention was to protect her neutrality. The second asserted that the private life of the average Norwegian citizen was to be respected. The third strictly forbade any form of plundering, including military requisitions. The fourth point stated that the honour of the Norwegian woman was to be respected fully. The leaflet then concluded with the admonition that every soldier of the Wehrmacht was a representative of Germany and that he must conduct himself in the best possible manner.<sup>63</sup>

It should be no surprise to learn that the Kriegsmarine

was one of the leaders in the attempts to minimize German-Norwegian tensions. In early May, Raeder presented Hitler with Schreiber's last report as Naval Attaché in Norway. In this document, the Attaché had earnestly recommended that Germany make a swift and generous peace with Norway. In addition, Schreiber reasoned that Germany could win over the Norwegian people by reducing the suffering imposed on them by the war. The key element in Schreiber's recommendation was that the proposed transfer of captured Norwegian officers and men to prisoner of war camps in Germany be cancelled. In its stead, Schreiber suggested that Germany free all of these men upon their oath of honor not to fight again against Germany in this war - upon the cessation of hostilities in the north.<sup>64</sup>

The proposals met with the full support of Raeder, who later wrote Boehm on this subject:

Der Brief schien mir so wichtig, dass ich ihn dem Führer durch Puttkamer zur Kenntnis geben liess. Der Führer ordnete darauf an, dass der Brief sowohl dem Reichkommissar als auch dem General v. Falkenhorst zur Kenntnis gegeben werden sollte mit dem Bemerkung, dass er, der Führer, auf dem gleichen Standpunkt stünde.<sup>65</sup>

Boehm had been advised of this plan as early as April 18, and had even expanded it:

Linie für Betrieb Horten. Billigung der Abwachung von Kpt. (Ing.) Gradthof, der sich sehr geschickt benommen hat. Norweg. [ischer] Offz. [Offizieren] müssen ins Privatleben treten. Bezahlung Arbeiterschaft und Beamte durch Norw. [egischen] Staat, über ausgeführte Arbeiten Quittungen, Verrechnung später nach Krieg.<sup>66</sup>

It was on May 9, that Schreiber was able to record the initial

success of his proposals:

Auf Befehl des Führers sollen die norwegischen Kriegsgefangenen gegen Ehrenwort in Freiheit gesetzt werden. Dies ist die grosse, von Marineattaché vorgeschlagene Geste.<sup>67</sup>

Therefore, while there were differences in the attitude towards Norway's future exhibited by Raeder, Boehm and Schreiber, a consensus of sorts was evolving. Boehm later outlined the basis of the Kriegsmarine's proposals for a German-Norwegian rapprochement:

Dem norwegischen Volke durch Taten, nicht nur Worte beweisen, dass wir durch den Krieg gezwungen ins Land gekommen sind, nicht als Eroberer, -  
Dementsprechend den nationalen Stolz der Norweger achten; alles Kränkende vermeiden und die nun einmal im Kriege unvermeidlichen materiellen Lasten möglichst klein halten, -  
Die ationale Zukunft und Selbständigkeit des Landes für spätere Zeit durch eindeutige und sofortige Erklärung zusichern unter der Voraussetzung des Zusammengehens mit Deutschland, -  
Das Vertrauen des Volkes gewinnen durch gradlinige und ehrliche Politik, -  
Die deutschfreundliche Partei der National [sic!] Samling (NS) in jeder Weise unterstützen und herausstellen und so dem norwegischen Volke beweisen, dass das Heil und die Freiheit für Norwegen über diese Partei wirklich erreichbar ist.<sup>68</sup>

Both of the early Boehm-Terboven encounters had allowed Boehm to anticipate good relations between Germany and Norway. How else can one explain Boehm's statement that Terboven did indeed seem to want to fulfill the Führer's directive and bring the Norwegian people into Hitler's camp?<sup>69</sup> On May 15, Raeder made his first appearance in Norway.<sup>70</sup> After a brief meeting with Boehm, during which the two admirals discussed the more pressing military questions, Raeder went to call upon Terboven

personally.<sup>71</sup>

Boehm's War Diary for this date does not mention any discussion between the two admirals on the more political aspects of German-Norwegian relations. In a post-war document, Boehm has indicated that they did discuss the topic.<sup>72</sup> In this document, Boehm stated that Raeder had specifically requested that he be kept informed of the political developments in Norway. Thus, Boehm's policy was not uniquely his own. It was, however, a policy which both men firmly advocated, and one to which they remained loyal for the duration of their respective tenures in office.

During this meeting, Raeder and Boehm also discussed their vision of the 'New Order' in Europe. Boehm has argued that the goal of the Kriegsmarine was to establish a German friendship with the northern states of Europe; i.e., Norway and Denmark, which would result in the creation of a new political entity. There was to be no national humiliation, no partition of territory, and no annexation of territory. More importantly, there was to be no forceful attempt to transplant the ideology of National Socialism to those non-German nations. Both men saw the creation of an "honourable" peace between Germany and Norway as being the first step in establishing future close ties between these nations. They realized that Germany had no choice but to advance the cause of the pro-German Norwegian faction: i.e., Quisling and the Nasjonal Samling. Through Quisling and his party, the German admirals hoped to find the



road to future German-Norwegian friendship. To promote this relationship, they recommended that German policy stress the common points of both ideologies - in particular their fear of communism.

There were to be a number of problems with this proposed policy. By far the most important was that it was Hitler and Terboven who were the ultimate arbiters of the destiny of occupied Norway. It can be said with certainty, that Hitler's vision of a German-led union would not be one based on equality but rather on total German domination. Perhaps more important was the fact that the majority of the Norwegian people had little or no desire to be ruled by Quisling and his followers - and the Kriegsmarine was not ignorant of this fact. Their belief that a native Norwegian fascist government would be more palatable to the Norwegians than a German National Socialist one, seems ill-founded. Furthermore, with the Kriegsmarine's urgent need for bases in Norway, as well as ships and materials, the question of how to avoid "excessive" measures was to become even more complicated. In general, the Kriegsmarine's proposals appear to have been almost impossible to fulfill. Nonetheless, Boehm was to make a valiant effort to promote this program and this attempt may have resulted in one of the most bitter military-party struggles in the history of the Third Reich.

# NOTES

- 1) This biography was compiled from Ursachen und Folgen, (Berlin, 1979), Index vol. 1, p. 65; and W. Lohmann and H. H. Hildebrand, (eds.), Die deutsche Kriegsmarine. (Bad Nauheim, 1956), vol. 3, sec. 291, p. 25.
- 2) M. Salewski, "Selbstverständnis und historisches Bewusstsein der Deutschen Kriegsmarine", Marine Rundschau 67 (1970), p. 71.
- 3) H. Boehm, "Eine Richtigstellung.", Marine Rundschau 67 (1970), pp. 289-92.
- 4) Raeder, vol. 2, pp. 197-8.
- 5) Cited in Boehm, "Richtigstellung", p. 292.
- 6) Ibid., p. 293.
- 7) Loock, p. 435.
- 8) Boehm, Norwegen, p. 93. See also idem, "Seekriegsleitung, Gruppen und Flottenkommando im Zweiten Weltkrieg.", Atlantische Welt 11 (1967), p. 24.
- 9) IfZ ZS 12. Boehm, p. 5.
- 10) USNA, T-1022 reel no. 2842; PG-46853/a, Ktb. Kommandierender Admiral Norwegen, p. 1. All future references to Boehm's War Diary will be identified as Ktb. Boehm.
- 11) E. H. Stevens, (ed.), The Trial of Nikolaus von Falkenhorst. (London, 1949), p. 256.
- 12) PG-46853/a, p. 4.
- 13) Ibid.
- 14) Ibid., p. 8.
- 15) Ursachen und Folgen, vol. 15, p. 76.
- 16) Ibid.
- 17) Hayes, p. 227.
- 18) Ibid., p. 228.

- 19) Knudsen, p. 105.
- 20) Hayes, pp. 230-1.
- 21) Cited in Loock, p. 319. Brackets are his.
- 22) Ibid., p. 320.
- 23) Ibid., p. 321.
- 24) ~~Reel~~ no. 2842, PG - 46853/b, Ktb. Boehm, p. 3.
- 25) IfZ Fd. 54, p. 19.
- 26) Cited in Hayes, p. 237.
- 27) Loock, p. 320.
- 28) Cited in Hayes, pp. 243-4.
- 29) Ibid., p. 246, Loock, p. 495.
- 30) Loock, pp. 335-9; and Hewins, p. 270. Unless otherwise cited, this brief biography of Terboven is based on these sources.
- 31) Hewins, p. 270.
- 32) Tagebuch Rosenbergs, p. 112.
- 33) C. S. Thomas III, "Bluejackets and Brownshirts: The German Naval Officer Corps in the Era of National Socialism, 1928-1939." (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Vanderbilt University, 1983), p. 197. See also footnote no. 101 on the same page.
- 34) Wagner, p. 97. Emphasis in the original. Brackets are mine.
- 35) Ibid., p. 99. Emphasis in the original. Brackets are mine.
- 36) ZS 12, p. 10.
- 37) G. S. Gordon, "The Norwegian Resistance movement during the Occupation 1940-1945: Repression, Terror and Resistance: The West County of Norway." (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pittsburgh, 1978), p. 125.
- 38) Ibid., p. 163, footnote no. 30.
- 39) Hayes, pp. 247-8.

- 40) Cited in Looock, pp. 493-4, footnote 51. See also p. 493, footnote 48.
- 41) Ibid., p. 495.
- 42) Fd. 54, p. 20.
- 43) Ibid., pp. 21-2.
- 44) Hayes, p. 251.
- 45) Fd. 54, p. 21.
- 46) BA/MA K-10-2/97, H. Boehm, "Die politische Entwicklung in Norwegen in der Zeit der Besetzung 1940 bis zum Frühjahr 1943." (Unpubl. manuscript 1944), p. 10. Emphasis in original. Hereafter referred to as Boehm, MS 1944:
- 47) Looock, p. 495.
- 48) Looock, p. 493. Brackets are his.
- 49) Ibid. Looock has also provided extracts from the entries of April 10, 12, and 15. They appear on the same page.
- 50) PG-46953/b, p. 38.
- 51) Gordon, p. 141.
- 52) Ibid.
- 53) Fd. 54, p. 20.
- 54) Ursachen und Folgen, vol. 15, pp. 89-90 gives the complete text of the decree of April 24, 1940.
- 55) PG-46853/b, pp. 5-10. All the information presented on this meeting stems from this source.
- 56) T-1022 Reel No. 2843, PG-46853/c, Ktb. Boehm, pp. 6-10. Unless otherwise stated, all information on these issues comes from this source.
- 57) Ibid., p. 10.
- 58) Ibid., p. 36.
- 59) Ibid., pp. 47-48. Unless otherwise stated all the information on this meeting comes from this source.
- 60) Ibid., p. 52.

- 61) Ibid., p. 10.
- 62) Boehm, MS 1944, p. 6; and ~~id.~~, Norwegen, p. 92.
- 63) TMWC, vol. 41, p. 61.
- 64) Ibid., p. 62.
- 65) Cited in Boehm, Norwegen, pp. 96-7.
- 66) PG-46853/b, p. 17.
- 67) Fd. 54, p. 22.
- 68) Boehm, MS 1944 p. 9. Emphasis and unique punctuation style are in the original.
- 69) PG-46853/c, p. 10.
- 70) Fd. 54, p. 22.
- 71) PG-46853/c, pp. 52-3.
- 72) ZS 12.p. 11. Unless otherwise stated all information presented on this meeting comes from this source.

### Chapter III

#### Friction: June-December 1940.

While the leadership of the Kriegsmarine was formulating its own version of the proper German policy for occupied Norway, Terboven had also been developing his own. One of the major differences between these two proposed policies was the ultimate role and importance of Quisling. Indeed, the divergence on this point was so great that at one time Terboven had felt it necessary to explain it by arguing that he had been virtually "pulled off the street" for his new post and had never received a proper briefing on the importance of Quisling.<sup>1</sup> Nonetheless, Terboven must have had some inkling of the importance of this controversial Norwegian by April 23, 1940 as the two men had met for the first time on that date.<sup>2</sup> The net result of this meeting was that Terboven had formed a highly negative opinion of the leader of the Nasjonal Samling. Apparently, the Norwegian had proved incapable of providing the Reichskommissar with accurate figures for the membership of his party, while the membership cards which Quisling did show Terboven were, in his view, very old. In addition, Quisling had been unable to provide the Reichskommissar with the names of the district leaders in the provinces of Norway. To add insult to injury, the financial position of the party also left much to be desired. It should then be no surprise that Terboven quickly concluded that the Nasjonal Samling would have to under-

go a major transformation before it could be used to Germany's advantage. In particular, Terboven felt that the only way to make it into a useful political instrument was to replace Quisling.<sup>3</sup> There is no doubt that Terboven was aware of the ideological affinity between the National Socialist Party and the Nasjonal Samling. For example, Hitler was able to inform Rosenberg on April 25, 1940: "Auch Terboven meint, Q. [uisling] u. [nd] seine Mitarbeiter stünden uns ideologisch nahe u. [nd] seien wirklich unsere Freunde."<sup>4</sup> Despite this attempt to assuage Rosenberg's misgivings about Terboven's intentions one Norwegian historian has maintained that the Reichskommissar saw the Nasjonal Samling as a millstone which was wrapped around Germany's neck.<sup>5</sup>

On April 24, Terboven left Oslo to confer with Hitler in Berlin. During this meeting the Führer advised his Reichskommissar to give some consideration to Quisling and stressed Rosenberg's continuing interest in Norway. These two comments of Hitler's reflect the dictator's earlier conversation with Rosenberg.<sup>6</sup> The head of the APA also had made a concrete effort to maintain his influence in the evolution of political events in Norway. Rosenberg had managed to persuade Hans Lammers, the head of the Reich Chancellery, to appoint Arno Schickedanz of the APA to a liaison position between Terboven and the Reich Chancellery.<sup>7</sup> With this move, Rosenberg was confident that he had scored an important victory against Terboven.<sup>8</sup>

Upon his return to Norway, Terboven found Quisling and

the Administrative Council locked in a power struggle of their own. On April 18, Quisling received the good news that he had been appointed to the position of overseer of the demobilization of the Norwegian Army. His hopes of using this position as a political springboard were quickly dashed, however, by the arrival of Allied troops which rekindled the battle for Norway. Faced with this setback, Quisling and his advisors decided that their best course of action was to create new tensions in German occupied Norway in the hope that the Germans would turn to them to solve these problems. The first measure used by the Nasjonal Samling was to ignore the Norwegian Law of May 13, 1937 which had banned the use of uniforms by political groups. This placed the German authorities in a dilemma, because it complicated the process of the identification of friend and foe. Falkenhorst, much to Quisling's chagrin, resolved this problem by getting the Administrative Council to issue a decree enforcing the anti-uniform law.<sup>9</sup>

On April 28, Terboven began to intervene in the Quisling-Administrative Council struggle. During their meeting of that date, the Reichskommissar informed Quisling that for the moment, his movement was to be held in reserve by the Germans. Terboven's most telling argument was that since the Nasjonal Samling and Quisling were being regarded as traitors, they were useless at this time.<sup>10</sup> As Quisling and his supporters had no intention of waiting in the wings, they began to intrigue against Terboven. Schickedanz encouraged Quisling to prepare



a document outlining his grievances against Terboven and the Administrative Council, which was to be presented to Hitler. This document took the form of a letter from Quisling to Hitler, which had in fact been ghost-written by Scheidt of the APA. Work on this document was completed on May 1, and the plotters contrived to have it sent through Terboven's office. By using this route, they were able to avoid the stigma of backstabbing Terboven. As a precaution, Schickedanz had a copy of this letter in his possession when he returned to Berlin on May 4.<sup>11</sup>

In his letter, Quisling had been careful not to exaggerate his importance, and he even admitted that he did not enjoy majority support in his homeland. Despite these weaknesses, Quisling maintained that he was still the leader of a determined group of Norwegians who represented the true interests of the people. For this reason Quisling felt that he had the right to make three key demands. The first was that the Nasjonal Samling be represented on the Administrative Council and that it occupy the portfolios of Justice and Police. In addition, Quisling wished to obtain control over the Norwegian press and radio. The next demand was that the Nasjonal Samling should continue to receive support, especially financial, from Germany. Last, but not least important, Quisling insisted that Hitler commit himself to a firm timetable for the formation of a new Quisling regime.<sup>12</sup> In a covering letter to Schickedanz, the guardian of the second copy of Quisling's May 1, letter to Hitler, Quisling complained that:

I am now excluded from any influence, while the German agencies in Norway work together with the very same circles that have already deceived Germany once.<sup>13</sup>

Faced with this new challenge, Terboven once again flew to Berlin on May 8, to consult with Hitler.<sup>14</sup> The subsequent meeting was very brief, as Terboven left for Norway on the following day. Terboven returned with a renewed determination to weaken Quisling's position and this meant eliminating Rosenberg's organization in Norway. Upon his arrival, Terboven immediately requested a meeting with Scheidt. During their conversation Terboven went out of his way to describe his plans for aiding Quisling, which included the assigning of several Nazi Party experts to Quisling's organization. The fields of competence of these experts included fiscal planning, administration, propaganda, S.S. leaders to train their counterparts in the Nasjonal Samling's Hird, and some labour service leaders. Terboven then asked Scheidt what role the latter envisaged for himself in Norway. Scheidt's response was that he intended to work at Quisling's side as an advisor. Terboven then argued that there was no need for two different sets of advisors for Quisling. The Reichskommissar then informed the APA official that a new post was awaiting him in Berlin. Two days later, Terboven wrote Rosenberg informing him that Scheidt was now available for a new assignment, as his "work had come to its natural conclusion."<sup>15</sup> It is important to note that at least one of the experts whom Terboven had placed at the service of

Quisling was actually a spy for the Reichskommissar. Terboven was hoping that this official - Walter Eck - would in time place all the blame for the shortcomings of the Nasjonal Samling on Quisling's shoulders.<sup>16</sup>

Simultaneously, Terboven decided to profit from a weak link in the position of Schickedanz, which existed in the communication centers utilized by the Reich Chancellery. At first, because there was no direct teletype link between the governments in Berlin and Oslo, Terboven and Lammers had availed themselves of the Luftwaffe's communication center. This was only a short term solution, as the Luftwaffe's teletype center was already overloaded. This situation was further complicated on May 6, when the Chancellery used the OKW's center, a move which Terboven did not follow. Instead Terboven had had the old German Foreign Office teletype installed in his own office, and convinced the Foreign Office to lay a direct link from there to the Chancellery in Berlin. Terboven then waited until Lammers again raised the issue of communications between Berlin and Oslo. Both men realized that with a direct link in existence, there was no longer any need for liaison official. Thus by this time, Schickedanz's position was hanging by a thread, which was finally cut at the end of May.<sup>17</sup> In less than a month, Terboven had virtually eliminated Rosenberg's organizational foothold in Norway.

The only solace for Rosenberg was the renewed interest in Norway and Quisling shown by the leadership of the Kriegs-

marine. It is also important to note, that as a military organization the Kriegsmarine was far less susceptible to interference from Terboven. On May 8, Rosenberg had received a copy of Schreiber's proposals for an honourable peace between Germany and Norway. There is no doubt that Rosenberg was pleased with this initiative as the following entry in his diary shows:

Unser "Mitverschworener", der Marine-Attaché in Oslo, hat an Raeder auch/einen Bericht über Norwegen geschickt, der sich mit meiner Stellungnahme deckt. Das OKW., gez. Keitel, schickt mir Abschrift zu, m. [it] d. [em] Bemerken, das sei Ansicht des Führers. (D.h. Regierung Quisling).<sup>18</sup>

Of far greater importance was Raeder's meeting with Hitler of May 21. As is typical of the entries in the minutes of Hitler's Naval Conferences, all that is mentioned is that the Norwegian question was discussed: "Ausführungen über politische Lage in Norwegen."<sup>19</sup> Fortunately, Boehm provided us with an extract from a May 25 letter of Raeder's to the Kommandierender Admiral Norwegen, in which the Grand Admiral discussed the political aspects of his recent conference with Hitler:

Ich habe vor einigen Tagen dem Führer Vortrag über die politische Lage in Norwegen gehalten... Ich habe den Führer darauf hingewiesen, dass der Verwaltungsausschuss die alte Regierung noch anerkenne, dass er Polizei und Justiz in seiner Hand habe, und dass unbedingt eine Änderung eintreten müsse, insofern als Polizei und Justiz mit zuverlässigen Deutsch-Freunden besetzt werden müssten und allmählich eine Regierung gebildet werden müsste, durch die die alte Regierung in ihrem Einfluss auf das besetzte Gebiet ausgeschaltet würde.<sup>20</sup>

In recommending that the portfolios of Police and Justice on the Administrative Council be filled by German sympa-

thizers, Raeder must have been referring to Quisling and his followers in the Nasjonal Samling. Raeder's letter indicates that he wished to see Quisling's people in the same portfolios that Quisling had demanded in his letter from Schickedanz. In his covering letter dated May 20, Schickedanz explained the origins of this document to Raeder:

By order of Reichsleiter Rosenberg I take the liberty of also sending you herewith a copy of a letter of M. Vidkun Quisling to the Führer. I obtained the copy of the letter shortly before my departure by plane from Oslo on May 2. The letter itself was to be forwarded to the Führer through the Reichskommissar for the Occupied Norwegian Territories, Terboven. Whether that has been done, I do not know. Reichsminister Lammers has<sup>21</sup> likewise received a copy of this letter from me.

Meanwhile, having checked his rival, Rosenberg, Terboven felt confident enough to re-examine the continued suitability of the Administrative Council. He was aided in this by Quisling's new campaign against the Council; in which Quisling had called for the creation of a new government based entirely on his party.<sup>22</sup> In this period, the Reichskommissar had two main goals, to re-organize the Nasjonal Samling under a new and more pliant leader, and to create a new official government for occupied Norway which was to be called a Riksåd or State Council. Terboven intended to create a more co-operative government which would be dependant upon him.<sup>23</sup>

Terboven decided to move on the second goal first, as he could take advantage of the campaign being conducted by Quisling and his supporters in the APA and the Kriegsmarine. The Administrative Council was a compromise body which had been

created to achieve two limited aims. The first was to replace the Quisling regime, and the second was to ensure that competent Norwegian representatives could meet with the Germans on economic and other pressing matters. Its organizers and members had never intended to supplant the Monarch and the constitutional government.<sup>24</sup>

Before the Reichskommissar could lay the foundation for any change in the administration of German occupied Norway, he had to fend off another attack from Rosenberg. On May 20, Rosenberg had sent a long memorandum to Hitler through the Foreign Office, in which the head of the APA criticized Terboven for his treatment of Quisling and his duplicity in the elimination of Scheidt's position in Norway. Rosenberg accused Terboven of alienating Germany's friends in Norway:

Quisling is doing what he conceives to be his duty towards pan-Germanism, but feels embittered and cheated. Nevertheless, he is working without voicing any complaint on the development of his scheme in unquestioning obedience to the Führer. All that which he with his coworkers, given different treatment, could otherwise be doing whole-heartedly and voluntarily, is now being done with inward aversion to a number of persons. This view of their treatment cannot fail to become known, nor can the knowledge of it fail to reach friends of Germany in all countries.<sup>25</sup>

Terboven responded quickly to Rosenberg's latest offensive. On May 21<sup>st</sup>, the Reichskommissar flew to Berlin for audiences with Hitler on May 22 and May 23. During these meetings, Hitler refused to give Terboven control over Quisling's activities, and maintained that some consideration must be given to Quisling's future. The Führer again reminded Terboven of Rosenberg's

continuing interest in Norwegian affairs. Terboven did not, however, leave empty handed as Hitler gave his approval to the Reichskommissar's plans for a change in the administration of German occupied Norway.<sup>26</sup>

Terboven waited for the right moment to begin laying the foundation for this new administration. His first move occurred on June 3 when in an address to the nation he asked for the co-operation of the Norwegian people.<sup>27</sup> On June 7, came the news that the Allies were retreating from their last strongpoint in Norway-Narvik. The King made his last speech on Norwegian territory on June 9, immediately afterwards he went into voluntary exile. On June 10, the Commander-in-Chief of the Norwegian Army surrendered and the official battle for Norway had ended.<sup>28</sup> The decision of the Norwegian King to go into exile rather than return to Oslo was a major nail in the coffin of the Administrative Council. This final act of defiance revealed that the Administrative Council had out-lived its purpose as an interim government until the return of the King to Oslo. On June 13, Terboven presented his master plan for the re-organization of the administration of Norway to the remaining representatives of the Storting, the Norwegian parliament.<sup>29</sup> The Reichskommissar's representative to the Storting, Hans Delbrügge, gave this body until June 17 to come to terms with Terboven. The Reichskommissar had provided Delbrügge with a letter which stated:

dass der Augenblick kommt, in dem das norwegische Volk jene zur Verantwortung ziehen wird, die sich - ganz gleich wo im öffentlichen Leben - zwar als die Führer

und Verantwortlichen ausgegeben haben, die sich in der geschichtlichen Stunde ihrer Nation aber als unfähig erwiesen, die Zusammenhänge zu verstehen und zu Gunsten des norwegischen Volkes in die Wirklichkeit umzusetzen.<sup>30</sup>

Terboven went on to state that the consequence of a refusal by the Storting would be the establishment of a Quisling regime.<sup>31</sup>

The Storting finally agreed to Terboven's demands on June 18.<sup>32</sup>

Terboven's demands were indeed onerous.<sup>33</sup> The first two called for the abrogation of both the pre-Weserübung government and the King. The third declared that the mandates of the members of the Storting who had fled Norway were to be declared null and void. Terboven was willing to negotiate on his fourth demand, which dealt with the rights remaining to the representatives who were subject to the three preceding demands. A new election was to be called as soon as circumstances permitted the formation of a new Norwegian government. A general election was to be held no later than three months after the conclusion of an official peace treaty between Germany and Norway. Terboven demanded that, until these elections were held, the Storting govern through an "Ermächtigungsgesetz" or Enabling Law, an analogy to Hitler's similar legislation passed by the German Reichstag on March 23, 1933.<sup>34</sup>

In these negotiations, Terboven used the technique of offering the Storting a choice between a carrot and a stick. His threat to place Quisling in power should the Storting refuse to acquiesce, was the stick. The carrot was his statement to the Storting that once they had agreed to these demands, Hitler would recall the Reichskommissar. As a precaution



Terboven indicated that he would have the right to name the new German plenipotentiary to the Norwegian regime. Until his demands had been met in full, however, Terboven was to retain his post.<sup>35</sup> One reason why Terboven was considering vacating his post was that he hoped for the more prestigious position of "Reichskommissar England".<sup>36</sup>

Boehm's earliest known reaction to Terboven's political offensive occurred on June 30. On that date, Terboven had invited the chief German military commanders in Norway to his office. He informed them of his recent actions and plans. From Terboven's presentation, Boehm concluded that the Reichskommissar was determined to make an even more radical change in the political administration of Norway. According to Boehm's postwar account, the Reichskommissar outlined his future plans in this manner:

1. Abdankung des Königs,
  2. Absetzung der alten Regierung,
  3. Einsetzung eines Reichsrates von 15 Personen mit besonderer Vollmacht.
- Von den 15 Personen des Reichrates, die den verschiedenen alten Parteien angehörten, hätten sich 8 schriftlich für die Zusammenarbeit mit Deutschland beriet erklärt, so dass er, der R.K., stets mit einer Mehrheit im Sinne Deutschlands rechnen könnte.<sup>37</sup>

Terboven stated that the Storting would agree to these demands, because of his threat to turn Norway into a German protectorate should they refuse.<sup>38</sup>

Boehm indicated his negative reaction to Terboven's plan. He argued that the Norwegian people would be aware of the fact that the Storting would only agree to such

demands under great duress. Boehm informed Terboven that Raeder, who had a keen interest in Norwegian affairs, would be notified on Terboven's recent actions.<sup>39</sup> In his memoirs, Raeder described the net effect of Boehm's memorandum:

Ich legte die Meldung über diese Sitzung Hitler vor, der schliesslich nach Anhören der Beteiligten entschied: Keine Einberufung des Storting, keine Komödie einer Absetzung des Königs, Auflösung der Parteien bis auf die Partei "Nasjonal Samling", Einsetzen eines Staatsrates aus Mitgliedern dieser Partei oder parteilosen Männern.<sup>40</sup>

Not surprisingly, both Boehm and Raeder have argued that this exchange was the initiating incident of the Boehm-Terboven affair.<sup>41</sup>

Given this evidence, one has to address the issue of what events could account for the sudden and strong interest in the political evolution of Norway on the part of both Boehm and Raeder. In the case of Boehm, one cannot dismiss a recent setback administered to him by his old immediate superior commander of October 1939. The background of this setback involved a recent operation by the German warships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Admiral Hipper, and some destroyers. The operation was code named Operation Juno and had begun on June 4 under the command of Admiral Wilhelm Marschall. The plan called for the German warships to intercept Allied re-inforcements enroute to Norway. After some slim success, Marschall concluded that the Allies were retreating and he decided to respond to the changed strategic position. After detaching the Hipper and the destroyers, he searched a more promising area with the capital

ships. On June 8, Marschall's gambit paid off as his lookouts spotted the British aircraft carrier Glorious and her escort of two destroyers. After a long chase, the German capital ships finally caught and overwhelmed their opponents. Despite this success, Marschall's superior was furious that the Admiral had taken it upon himself to change an operational plan. Marschall became the second Fleet Commander to have been sacked by Raeder. A few days later, Marschall had gone on a visit to Boehm's headquarters. Fearing a combined demonstration by the two ex-Fleet Commanders, Marschall's immediate superior sent an envoy to Boehm on June 13, to remind him: "daß der Admiral Norwegen lediglich Territorialbefehlshaber ist und keinen Einfluss auf die Seeoperationen hat."<sup>42</sup> After a rebuke such as this, Boehm must have been anxious to preserve some measure of authority in his sphere.

Both Boehm and Raeder may also have been influenced by the ease with which Terboven was able to short-circuit Rosenberg's organization in Norway. Of far greater importance, however, was Terboven's recent moves against Quisling. On May 9, the Reichskommissar had spoken to Scheidt on the subject of Quisling's letter to Hitler on May 1. According to Scheidt's subsequent report to Rosenberg which was dated May 22, Terboven had said that:

Herr Quisling habe ihm, dem Herrn Reichskommissar, einen Brief an den Führer übergeben. Der Reichskommissar habe selbstverständlich diesen Brief dem Führer übergeben und dieser habe nur gelächelt über den Inhalt des Schreibens.<sup>43</sup>

There is no doubt that Terboven had decided to act against Quisling, as soon as an opportunity presented itself. Early in June, Quisling's party newspaper called for a transfer of power from the exiled Norwegian government to the Nasjonal Samling. On June 24, Quisling spoke to his party in a rally and demanded "the total destruction of the party system and its replacement with a national government."<sup>44</sup>

This was a challenge that Terboven could not ignore during his difficult negotiations with the Storting. As a result, Terboven summoned Quisling and insisted that he co-operate in the scheme which was unfolding. In return for this co-operation, Terboven hinted that he would be willing to give the Nasjonal Samling a seat on his proposed State Council. From the start, the Reichskommissar made it clear that this seat would not be available for Quisling himself. As Quisling proved unwilling to co-operate, Terboven then threatened to eliminate the Nasjonal Samling completely and exile Quisling to Germany. On June 29, Terboven informed Quisling that the Nasjonal Samling's seat on the proposed State Council would be given to Jonas Lie, Terboven's old acquaintance from the Saar. Quisling interpreted this as a deliberate provocation, as Lie had been one of Quisling's "paper ministers" in his ill-fated government of April 9 who had openly shunned Quisling's call. Things soon came to a head on July 6, as Quisling had been pressing one of Terboven's deputies for a more acceptable representative on the planned State Council. This was the straw which broke Terboven's

remaining reticence and the Reichskommissar promptly ordered that Quisling be sent to Germany. Simultaneously, Terboven attempted to place Lie at the head of the Nasjonal Samling, a move which was short-circuited by Hagelin. Quisling's associate managed to prevent Lie from obtaining control over the party's machinery and funds by maintaining that he was Quisling's chosen successor as party leader.<sup>45</sup>

Quisling was not destined to remain hidden for long. By July 10 he had managed to get in touch with Schickedanz through a letter which was forwarded immediately to Hitler. At the same time, the Norwegian author H. F. Knudsen, a member of the Nasjonal Samling, heard of Quisling's plight. He contacted Dietrich Hildisch, the "margarine king of Norway" who happened to be a friend of Raeder's. Hagelin arranged to have Hildisch's letter to Raeder sent on a naval courier plane with the co-operation of Schreiber.<sup>46</sup>

By now, Terboven must have been fully aware that he had indeed stepped upon a hornet's nest. If the revival of APA and Kriegsmarine interest in Norway was not enough of a headache, Terboven quickly discovered that he had made another powerful, though temporary, enemy - Ribbentrop. The German Foreign Office had ordered all neutral diplomats to leave Norway by July 15. This cut-off date annoyed Terboven as he was of the opinion that the continued presence of these diplomats could aide the negotiations between Delbrügge and the Storting as well as the Norwegian King. At first Ribbentrop refused to grant an exten-

sion of this date, but he gave in and extended the deadline to July 25. Ribbentrop exacted his revenge shortly after, as he arranged to have Quisling's letter of July 10 reach Hitler.<sup>47</sup>

Terboven's action against Quisling was not unpremeditated. On June 30, Terboven spoke openly about his negative opinion of Quisling to Boehm and his counterparts in the other services, maintaining that Quisling was:

"...für anständig, aber potenziert dumm, eitel, ohne Ideen und für einen Mann halte, der nur den Führer kopieren wollte." Quisling sei ein Hemmnis für unsere angestrebte Politik mit den Norwegern. Er habe ihn daher - wörtlich! - "mit Schnäpsen und Holzhammer", bearbeitet, um ihn zum Rücktritt als Parteiführer zu bewegen, und wollte ihn unter "ehrenvollem" Vorwand, einer Einladung zu einer Studienreise nach Deutschland, ausschalten und den Polizeipräsidenten Lie, eine Durchschnittspersönlichkeit, an seine Stelle setzen.<sup>48</sup>

If Boehm's account is correct, Terboven had decided to move against Quisling even before the end of June.

Terboven was fortunate enough to have seen Hitler just before the storm over Quisling's sudden disappearance actually broke. In this meeting which occurred around July 7, Terboven managed to obtain an extension from Hitler of the deadline for the re-organization of the Norwegian regime.<sup>49</sup> This was one of Terboven's few successes in this period.

Walther Eck, upon whom Terboven was counting to provide material discrediting Quisling, had returned to Germany sometime in July. Even before he left, Eck had reported to Terboven that the latter's policy towards the Nasjonal Samling was bound to lead to the party's ruin. Upon his arrival in

Berlin, news of Eck's report had reached Rosenberg who lost no time in bringing it to Hitler's attention.<sup>50</sup> On June 26, Hagelin wrote to Kapitan zur See Erich Schulte-Mönting, the Chief des Admiralstabes des OKM, informing him that:

Als Protest gegen die Politik des Reichskommissars hat der Gauschatzmeister Eck aus Frankfurt/Main heute dem Reichskommissar seinen Rücktritt angekündigt. Er lehnt jede Verantwortung für die Fehler, die jetzt hier geplant sind, ab und wird in den nächsten Tagen nach Deutschland fahren, um dem Stellvertreter des Führers und seinem Gauleiter Bericht zu erstatten.<sup>51</sup>

On July 1, Hagelin made this entry in his diary: "Wie wir hören, reist der Reichskommissar heute nach Deutschland. Scheinbar möchte er vermeiden, dass Herr Eck ihm zuvorkommt."<sup>52</sup>

Rosenberg's letter to Hitler was dated July 2, and it had been addressed to Lammers with the specific instruction that it be forwarded to Hitler. The contents of this letter indicated that Rosenberg was very well informed of Terboven's desire to discredit Quisling:

From the material enclosed I gather in the first place that, contrary to the wish expressed to me by the Führer, which presumably was communicated to Reichskommissar Terboven as a directive, the efforts of the German Administration are constantly directed not indeed at supporting the Nasjonal Samling under Vidkun Quisling, but at disabling it by forcing on it former renegades as associates. More and more outspoken demands are advanced that the founder, that is Quisling himself, detach himself from his own movement; in fact it is being suggested to him that he had better devote himself to other things, possibly in Germany, since he was no longer acceptable.<sup>53</sup>

From this point, Rosenberg went on to report Terboven's threat to make German financial support for the Nasjonal Samling dependent upon Quisling's acceptance of Terboven's demands. Finally,

in a reference to Terboven's wish to replace Quisling with Lie, Rosenberg deplored the fact that "Otto Strasser" types were being forced on Quisling.<sup>54</sup> The implication was that Lie would attempt to distort the ideology of the Nasjonal Samling, just as the Strasser brothers had attempted to do in the North German wing of the NSDAP during the 1920's.

Rosenberg continued this initiative on July 6, when he submitted a memorandum on his most recent conversation with Quisling.<sup>55</sup> During this conversation, Quisling had been critical of Lie. According to Quisling, Lie had been instrumental in an interrogation of a Nasjonal Samling member at the time of Weserübung. Rosenberg mentioned a conclusion reached by Eck on the question of the Reichskommissar's "impossible treatment" of Quisling and the Nasjonal Samling. As if Terboven's advocacy of Lie had not been enough of a slap in the face, Rosenberg reported that Terboven had tried to force Quisling to accept Walter Fürst as manager of the Norwegian counterpart to the German Labour Service. Fürst was unacceptable to Quisling because he had been expelled from the Nasjonal Samling for "bad conduct."<sup>56</sup>

At the same time Quisling had discussed his audience with Terboven of June 25. The Norwegian stated that Terboven had suggested that Quisling leave Norway for a while and take up a residence in Germany, in order to carry out a special assignment. When Quisling refused to comply, Terboven had threatened to supplant the Nasjonal Samling by establishing a



new, pro-German Norwegian party. In a following meeting, Quisling was again advised to accept an invitation to conduct a special study on behalf of the Reich Government. The rest of this discussion dealt with aspects of Quisling's proposed temporary retirement. Quisling was adamant in refusing to give Terboven the power to name his successor. On June 29, Terboven saw Quisling again and announced that Lie, who was already slated to be the Minister of Police on the proposed State Council, was to replace Quisling as party leader. Overall, Quisling's account of the events of June 25-29 coincides well with Boehm's rendition of Terboven's speech of June 30. The Reichskommissar's threat to create a new movement rather than work through the Nasjonal Samling could be the "Holzhammer" that Terboven had boasted of using on Quisling.

Quisling's biographers are in great disagreement over the actual duration of his "house arrest" in Germany. Hewins stated that Terboven lured Quisling to Germany in July and cited a claim that Quisling had disappeared for a month. He maintained that Quisling had gone to Germany only in the hope of having a meeting with Hitler so that he might criticize Terboven's policy. Hayes dated the arrest and deportation of Quisling for July 6. He did not, however, give any indication of the duration of Quisling's confinement; saying only that "Quisling's long stay in Germany may be seen as an attempt to influence Hitler's decision by his presence."<sup>57</sup> Loock maintained that Quisling received an invitation on July 4 to come to

Germany as a special guest of Dr. J. Goebbels, the Nazi Propaganda Minister, and that the Norwegian had left on the following day. In addition, Loock has claimed that Terboven delayed his planned trip to Germany of July 6 by one day so that he could meet with the official who had escorted Quisling to Germany. On July 7, Terboven learned that Rosenberg had given Quisling refuge.<sup>58</sup> The general consensus is that while Terboven had intended to isolate Quisling from his many friends and supporters in Germany, the Reichskommissar's plan backfired. Given the date on which Rosenberg initiated his second attempt to correct the situation in Norway, July 6, Loock and Hayes appear to be more accurate than Hewins.

The months of June and July were not very kind to Terboven. With opposition to his recent moves coming from the Kriegsmarine, the APA and also the Foreign Office, the Norwegian representatives also began to drag their heels.<sup>59</sup> On July 22, Rosenberg issued a new memorandum on the situation in Norway. While he ignored the temptation to recommend the recall of Terboven, the head of the APA did advocate a reversal in Terboven's policies to date:

- (a) The Nasjonal Samling is to be assisted by every means as the coming party of the Norwegian people and Vidkun Quisling is to be unequivocally recognized and supported as the leader of the Nasjonal Samling.
- (b) As long as a Norwegian state government under the leadership of Vidkun Quisling does not appear possible because of the tactical situation at the moment, it must be arranged that the essential departments of the coming State Council [Reichsrat] be headed by persons approved by Quisling and who

give assurance of the preparations that appear necessary to the Nasjonal Samling in the transition period. This means that in the future state council a safe majority for the wishes of the German Reich and the Nasjonal Samling is to be assured.

- (c) That there be attached as advisors to the Reichskommissariat several persons who are acquainted with Scandinavia and who, possibly through personal connections, can bring about some moderation in the psychological treatment in the transition period.<sup>60</sup>

Quisling used his long stay in Germany to lobby for an audience with Hitler, which was finally granted on August 16. During this conference Quisling repeated his complaints of May 1, that Terboven was merely paying lip service to the Nasjonal Samling. The Norwegian maintained that Terboven was interested only in dealing with the "representatives of the old system and even intends to recall the Storting in order to have the old party representatives confirm a new Norwegian government and depose the King."<sup>61</sup> The Norwegian party leader did not confine his criticism of Terboven to this point:

Reichskommissar Terboven has always pursued the policy of supporting the Nasjonal Samling only secretly. He is afraid that it would be compromised by German aid. He compares this case with the occupation of the Ruhr. This is incorrect!

To the question of the Führer as to what Quisling proposed now, he answered: Formation of a Norwegian government with the Nasjonal Samling forming a majority. Whether this would be under Quisling's leadership or not was at the moment of no importance. Dissolution of the Storting and then clear cut and effective work for a future collaboration with Germany.<sup>62</sup>

Hitler responded to these points by defending Terboven:

"Quisling should not think that Terboven did not wish him well. Terboven had always explained to the Führer that the Nasjonal

Samling was the only movement which was of any use with regard to collaboration.<sup>63</sup> The German dictator was intent on ignoring Terboven's most recent attempts to dislodge Quisling from the leadership of the Nasjonal Samling. The memorandum of this conference states that Hitler:

...also shared Quisling's opinion that the policy should be followed which was clearly directed toward a goal. In the next few days he would send for Terboven and would discuss this with him. It was not correct to say that aid by Germany for the Nasjonal Samling would compromise this movement. A Great Germanic movement could never be compromised through aid extended by the Greater German Reich.<sup>64</sup>

At the conclusion of the meeting, Hitler offered Quisling further encouragement by informing him that he "could only conceive of a young Norway under the leadership of the Nasjonal Samling and indissolubly linked with Quisling's person."<sup>65</sup>

Hitler's kind words were followed by firm actions. In a telegram to Terboven, Hitler went out of his way to praise Quisling:

Minister Quisling's many years work against world revolution has involved myself and the German nation in a debt of gratitude and honor to him which will be repaid in full to him personally as well as the Norwegian people who produced him.<sup>66</sup>

On August 21, Terboven arrived in Berlin, for a tête-à-tête with the dictator.<sup>67</sup> A telegram from the German Foreign Office dated August 29 contains the essential results of this meeting:

The Führer's order to secure to Quisling the leadership of the administration of the Norwegian State will lead next week to the dissolution of the Norwegian Administrative Council, prohibition of all parties with the exception of the Nasjonal Samling, the founding of a German party and the assignment of commissioners

in the Norwegian administration. In this way the taking over of the leadership of the state by Quisling is to be prepared and secured.<sup>68</sup>

On September 4, Rosenberg met with Hitler, and criticized Terboven strongly:

Ich erläuterte dann, dass Terboven ja Habichts Methoden fortführe. das [sic!] Groteske sei dabei, dass er dies dem F. [ührer] gegenüber als Kamradschaftlichkeit gegenüber Q [uisling] hinstelle.<sup>69</sup>

On August 23, Boehm had held a discussion with his staff on the vital issues which were to be raised in his forthcoming presentation to Raeder.<sup>70</sup> Boehm left Norway on August 24 with Schreiber for this consultation and they returned on August 28:<sup>71</sup>

Ich habe meinen Letzten Vortrag über Aufgabe und Ziele der KM [Kriegsmarine] am 17.5.40 vor dem Ob. d. M. gehalten. Der Zweck des jetzigen Vortrags in Berlin war: Prüfen wie weit diese Ziele erreicht sind, ferner Erörterung der Aufgaben für die weitere Zukunft.<sup>72</sup>

On September 6, Hitler and Raeder discussed again the political situation in Norway. The minutes of this meeting note that:

Führer denkt (im Sinne von Quisling, dessen Standpunkt er als den richtigen anerkennt gegenüber Terboven, A. Amt, v. Falkenhorst und den auch allein die Marine richtiger Weise von vornherein vertreten hat) an nord-germanische Gemeinschaft, in der die einzelnen Glieder eine gewisse Souveränität (Dipl. Vertretung u.s.w.), eine eigene, aber nach dem Muster der deutschen Wehrmacht organisierte, ausgebildete u. [nd] ausgerüstete Wehrmacht haben, sonst aber politisch und wirtschaftlich aufs engste mit Deutschland verbunden sind.<sup>73</sup>

For Raeder this endorsement of his position on Norwegian affairs must have been an uplifting experience.

Perhaps the oddest aspect of the Boehm-Terboven exchange of June 30, and its consequences up to September 1940, is the fact that Boehm refrained from discussing these political issues

in his War Diary. Boehm did discuss his encounter with Terboven of August 2, and reported on the war tasks of the Kriegsmarine in Norway. He then brought Terboven up to date with the Kriegsmarine's plans for the rebuilding of Trondheim as a major German naval base.<sup>74</sup> As has been reported by Albert Speer, Hitler's architect and later a very successful Minister of Armaments, the Kriegsmarine provided him with concrete data for this project only on May 1, 1941. On June 21 of that year, Speer and Raeder discussed the project with Hitler. On May 13, 1942, Hitler again mentioned it to Speer.<sup>75</sup>

In his discussion with Terboven of August 2, 1941 Boehm indicated that the Kriegsmarine was considering some land east of Trondheim for the proposed naval base. Terboven countered with a suggestion of an area south-west of Trondheim on the northern side of a nearby fjord.<sup>76</sup> On August 5, a representative of the Kriegsmarine met with officials of the Reichskommissar's office to discuss the issue.<sup>77</sup> Finally, on August 10, Falkenhorst informed Boehm that Hitler was interested in the possibility of establishing a first-rate naval base at Trondheim.<sup>78</sup> At this point, the conversations were allowed to lapse, pending the completion of the appropriate studies. Apparently, both Boehm and Terboven were anxious at this delicate juncture to avoid any major confrontation on political issues.

Terboven's reaction to the political developments in August 1940 was not long in coming. He was certainly not content with the setback that he had just suffered at the hands

of Quisling and his supporters. If this setback was not enough of a blow, Terboven also received on August 21 the bad news that his ambition to be "Reichskommissar England" was to remain unfulfilled.<sup>79</sup> Terboven did not waste much time in attempting to reverse his fortunes.

On August 25, the Reichskommissar met with Quisling to discuss the implementation of the Führer's recent decision. Although Terboven had no choice but to drop his scheme for a State Council, he revised it under the guise of replacing the Administrative Council by a government of Commissars. This new body was to be composed of individuals directly responsible to Terboven. Its mandate was to run until at least early March 1941. At the end of this term, Terboven reasoned that there would be no longer any need for a "transitional Government", and he foresaw the appointment of a Quisling regime at that time.<sup>80</sup> His intention was to delay the implementation of Hitler's decree until he could find a way to limit the extent of Quisling's power. Terboven's ultimate aim was to turn Quisling into a German figurehead.

Once Quisling had accepted Terboven's timetable for the political transition of the Norwegian government, Terboven began to weaken Quisling's position further. Originally, the Nasjonal Samling was to have a majority on the fifteen seat State Council. The Reichskommissar managed to get Quisling to agree to fill only four of the proposed National Samling seats

with actual party members. As a precaution, Quisling insisted that the four outside members give him a pledge of loyalty. The final list of the Nasjonal Samling's seats on the council included Jonas Lie, Terboven's ex-candidate for the leadership of the Nasjonal Samling. Another member, Axel Stang, was also disliked by Quisling. The remaining two belonged to the party's old guard; but even one of these men held a strong dislike for Quisling's right-hand man-- Hagelin. On September 9, Terboven agreed to let Hagelin sit on the State Council as a Minister without Portfolio. In the end, agreement was reached on all the available seats, but the one of Foreign Minister. For this portfolio, Quisling preferred Keld Stud Irgens, a former merchant marine captain, while Terboven wished to see Ellef Ringnes in this position. Irgens was a political unknown, who had failed in his only pro-Quisling diplomatic endeavor. On April 11, 1940 Irgens had attempted to persuade the Norwegian King to return to Oslo and govern beside the Quisling regime.<sup>81</sup> Most likely, Quisling's advocacy of Irgens can be interpreted as a sign that Quisling wished to play a major role in Norway's foreign policy.<sup>82</sup> In the end, Quisling and Terboven agreed to let Hitler decide between Irgens and Ringnes.<sup>83</sup>

At this point, both Quisling and Terboven left for Berlin in order to confer with Hitler. After his audience with the Führer, Quisling visited Rosenberg on September 13. Overall,



Rosenberg was pleased with the final arrangement.:

Am Morgen Besuch v. [on] Quisling. Sehr zufrieden. Die Tour der Stortingsabstimmung soll beendet werden. T. [erboven] trägt dafür die Verantwortung. Dann Übergangsreichrat mit N. [ational] S. [ozialistischer] Mehrheit, dann Q. [uisling]-Regierung. Zum Schluss ging noch R. [ingnes] als Aussenminister-Kandidat der anderen über Bord. D. [er] Führer war mit I. [rgens] einverstanden, den Q. [uisling] vorschlug. Q. [uisling] fährt zufrieden weg, ich wünsche ihm alles Gute. Er hat seine Ehre in die Hand des Führers im Dienst des grossgermanischen Gedankens gelegt. Kleinste "Diplomaten" wollten hier dem Namen des Reichs Unehre tun. Dagegen habe ich mich mit allen Kräften gewandt u. [nd] d. [er] Führer hat mir recht gegeben! Jetzt muss sich Q. [uisling] selbst bewähren.<sup>84</sup>

With both sides having come to terms, it was only a matter of waiting for the proper moment to announce the revised Norwegian administration.

By September 25, all the behind the scenes manoeuvring came to end when Terboven addressed the Norwegian people and outlined the changes in the country's political system. He proclaimed that both the King and the entire Royal Family had been deposed, as well as the pre-invasion government, that a State Council had been formed and the Administrative Council had been disenfranchised, that the mandate of the elected Storting delegates who had chosen to remain in Norway were still valid until new elections were held, and that all Norwegian political parties were dissolved with the exception of the Nasjonal Samling.<sup>85</sup>

Reactions of the Kriegsmarine High Command to the changes in the administration of Norway are hard to ascertain.

This was not due to any ignorance concerning the impending transfer of power as is shown by this entry in Boehm's War Diary for September 21:

Sämtliche Standortältesten im Raume Norwegen waren zu einer Reihe von Vorträgen, beginnend mit einem Vortrag des R.K. [Reichskommissar] Terboven über die politische Lage, nach Oslo befohlen worden.<sup>86</sup>

In a private letter to Boehm dated October 9, 1940 Raeder informed Boehm that:

Ich würde es sehr begrüßen wenn ein Wechsel sowohl in der politischen als auch in der militärischen Spitze eintreten würde, und bin der Ansicht, dass in Norwegen der Wehrmachtbefehlshaber ein Seeoffizier sein müsste. Sollte sich eine Gelegenheit dazu ergeben, werde ich diesen Standpunkt energisch vertreten.<sup>87</sup>

At this time then, Raeder had already set his sights on augmenting the position of the Kriegsmarine in Norway substantially. The fact that the recent shake-up in the administration of Norway was more cosmetic than revolutionary was indicated in an incident reported by Boehm on September 27:

Kommandant "Hipper" schlägt vor, das Einlaufen "Hipper" in Kristiansand-Süd mit der Neubildung der norwegischen Regierung zu begründen, um hierdurch ausländischen Nachrichtendienst irre zu führen. Er bittet, wenn möglich, entsprechendes Gerücht in Umlauf zu setzen.

Ich gebe den Vorschlag wegen seines politischen Einschlages an SKL (Adm. Norwegen B.Nr. 9 Kdos 1473 AI.) SKL lehnt den Vorschlag ab.<sup>88</sup>

Quisling and his supporters were also aware of the lack of any real political change in the administration of Norway. On October 2, Hagelin wrote Schickedanz in the hope of stimulating an earlier revival of a Quisling regime with some measure of real authority.<sup>89</sup> Hagelin suggested that the ideal date for this

transition would be November 10, as the King had to return to Norway or legally forfeit his throne according to the Norwegian constitution. The fact that Hagelin had to allude to this constitutional provision is an indication that the majority of the Norwegian people still felt allegiance to their Monarch - despite Terboven's declaration of September 25. This constitutional provision was of dubious value to the Germans and the Nasjonal Samling, as it could have been extended in exceptional circumstances.<sup>90</sup> Hagelin then stated that Quisling wished to acquire the title of "Chief of State" or some other title analogous to the position of Admiral Horthy in Hungary. The post of "Minister-President" which had been suggested for Quisling should be given to Hagelin instead.

On October 22, Rosenberg took up another of Hagelin's initiatives. In his letter to Lammers of that date, the head of the APA attempted to draw attention to a major problem identified by Hagelin. It was the matter of the comparatively higher occupation costs which Germany levelled against Norway in contrast to the payments demanded from other, better developed nations such as Holland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France.<sup>91</sup> The economic historian Alan S. Milward has confirmed these figures in his study of the Norwegian economy during the German occupation.<sup>92</sup>

In his letter, Rosenberg also indicated that the Kriegsmarine-APA co-operation on Norwegian affairs was still intact; for he claimed that:

Dass auch in militärischen Kreisen ähnliche Tatsachen laut werden, beweist der an mich gerichtete persönliche Brief des Korvettenkapitän Schreiber aus Oslo, früherer Militärattaché und Verbindungsmann zum Grossadmiral Raeder, den ich mir erlaube, zu Ihrer persönlichen Kenntnis beizulegen.<sup>93</sup>

One can certainly understand why Looock has described Schreiber as "... der grauen Eminenz der Marine-Politik in Norwegen."<sup>94</sup>

Quisling's secretary, Knudsen, once described the German Naval Attaché as being "... a fervent friend of Norway."<sup>95</sup>

Included as an annex to Rosenberg's letter of October 22 was a copy of a report which Hagelin had drafted on September 25. In it, Hagelin had complained about one aspect of the State Council compromise, which was that the members were to be appointed by Terboven and not by Norwegians. Hagelin felt that this was bound to have a negative effect in Norway and that it would make the task of the Nasjonal Samling that much more difficult.<sup>96</sup> In addition, Rosenberg appended yet another report of Hagelin's dated October 14. In this one Hagelin listed several other complaints.<sup>97</sup> These included a severe criticism of the large amounts of important items which had been requisitioned by the Wehrmacht, including the bulk of the Norwegian Merchant Marine vessels still in Norwegian waters, as well as foodstuffs such as coffee and various types of alcohol. The Norwegian argued that such measures only conveyed the impression that the Germans intended to treat Norway as a conquered nation. He feared that this type of action would endanger the prospects

for a peaceful and voluntary unification of Germany and Norway.

Hagelin then criticized Terboven's recent request for the sum of 140,000 Kronen, from the State Council. This money was to be used for the personal expenditure of the Reichskommissar. Actions of this nature did not meet with the approval of Raeder. For example, on June 4, 1940, Raeder had criticized Terboven's open disregard for the national pride of the Norwegians:

Dagegen spricht aber natürlich die persönliche Eitelkeit Terbovens, dessen persönliche Massnahmen - Besetzung des Stortings mit seinem Büro und Bewohnen der Königsvilla ja sehr unglücklich sind.<sup>98</sup>

At this point Hagelin advocated that Germany sign a formal peace treaty with Norway as soon as possible. In conclusion, the Norwegian protested against the seizure of over 80 percent of Norway's fishing fleet. This move, he argued, had reduced Norway's capability to provide both her population and Germany's with fish products - especially since the best ships had been seized. This extreme measure was not in keeping with the positions of both Boehm and Terboven who had discussed the issue in April and May of 1940.

Quisling himself sent off the next memorandum, which was to be presented to Hitler and was dated October 25. He wished to give it a large circulation and for this reason he entrusted Boehm with the copy intended for Raeder.<sup>99</sup> The document, addressed to Schickedanz, contained several key points and demands.<sup>100</sup> In it, Quisling proposed a five-point programme

for regulating Norway's integration into the "New Order" in Europe. The first called for the establishment of a new, independent Nasjonal Samling government with the party's chosen leader acting as head of state. Quisling asked that the office of Reichskommissar Norwegen be abolished, and recommended that it be replaced by that of a Reich plenipotentiary. His next suggestion was that Germany formally restore and recognize Norway's neutrality, although he was willing to offer Germany the right to take appropriate military measures in Norway should the Allies choose to violate her neutrality. Finally, Quisling wished to commence secret negotiations for the foundation of a pan-German federation. Quisling also outlined 15 articles which he felt should form its constitution.

Having presented these, Quisling then made an argument in defense of the plan which was clearly aimed at impressing the leadership of the Kriegsmarine, stating that he earnestly believed that:

It will also greatly contribute to the final liquidation of the influence of the deposed King and the deposed government and make it possible to gain influence with the Norwegian merchant fleet abroad, which now is removed from any influence emanating from Norway. As of October 7, 1940 more than 3,600,000 tons were outside areas controlled by the Axis powers.<sup>101</sup>

For the Kriegsmarine, this must have been a telling argument. As Boehm reported in his 1944 manuscript, he and Terboven had clashed several times over the appointment of a Nasjonal Samling man to the position of president of the Shipowners' Association.

The Generaladmiral maintained that:

Auf diese Weise bestand immerhin die Möglichkeit, die so wichtigen norwegischen Schiffe, die in Schweden, Gotenburg lagen, bzw. im Ausland für England führen, zu beeinflussen und durch geeignete Propaganda der Reeder und Schiffsbesatzungen in die Heimat und damit in deutsche Dienste zu bringen.<sup>102</sup>

Terboven had favoured, from the beginning, the appointment of a man who was not affiliated with the Nasjonal Samling. To make matters worse, Terboven's chosen man had acquired the reputation of being an Allied sympathizer. In the end, sometime in March of 1942, Terboven finally gave in and appointed a man who was more acceptable to both the Kriegsmarine and the Nasjonal Samling. It was by then an ineffective gesture, as Boehm maintained that the best prospect for a successful outcome had been irretrievably lost.<sup>103</sup>

Quisling's memorandum did stir at least one of his allies to take up his cause again - Raeder. On November 1, the Grand Admiral sent this telegram to Schreiber:

Ob. d. M. bittet um sofortige Übersendung politischen Lageberichts über derzeitige Lage Norwegen von Kory. Kpt. Schreiber mit Stellungnahme Kommand. Admiral.<sup>104</sup>

Unfortunately, copies of the two reports requested by Raeder have not yet come to light. In any case, Raeder pressed Hitler on the political situation in Norway on November 14. Therefore, he most probably had received them before this date. The minutes of the November 14 naval conference again offer only a slight amount of insight into the details of the conversation:

Ob. d. M. trägt Misstände in politischer Verwaltung Norwegens vor, bittet, dass Quisling und Hagelin von

Minister Lammers empfangen werden zum Vortrag. Führer ist einverstanden.<sup>105</sup>

Terboven had been searching for a new ally to help him in his now deepening rift with the Kriegsmarine. The man the Reichskommissar finally settled upon was Joseph Goebbels, the NSDAP's chief propagandist and one of Hitler's closest associates. Goebbels' first entry in his diary for this period which discusses Terboven's "rows" with the Kriegsmarine is dated November 15, 1940.<sup>106</sup> Goebbels had mentioned the future Reichskommissar in his diary on December 23, 1925.<sup>107</sup> Of particular importance is the entry that Goebbels had made on May 5, 1926 when he commented: "Terboven good".<sup>108</sup> In an entry dated January 28, 1940 Goebbels defended Terboven, noting that the latter did have some good points despite his penchant for indulging in disputes with other Gauleiters and party officials.<sup>109</sup>

Little is known of Goebbels's first impressions of Quisling, as crucial sections from his diary have not come to light. There is, however, a hint in Rosenberg's diary under the date of April 30, 1940. In this entry, Rosenberg recorded a comment from Goebbels to the effect that it was a scandal that Quisling was being depicted as a traitor to his own country.<sup>110</sup> Rosenberg also recorded Goebbels' criticism of the manner in which Quisling had been handled by the German authorities:

"Wissen Sie, wie Habicht Q. [uisling] behandelt hat? Er hat ihm gesagt, es sei schon so-in der Politik: wenn jemand eine Aufgabe erfüllt habe, so müsse er eben gehen..."<sup>111</sup>



While on a visit to Oslo at the end of November, 1940 Goebbels noted that Terboven "does not get on well with the Navy, which is giving itself great airs here".<sup>112</sup> By December 4, Terboven had had enough of the constant intervention in Norwegian politics by the shapers of Kriegsmarine policy: for on that date Goebbels recorded that he had:

A number of telephone conversations with Terboven. He intends to complain to the Führer about the Navy in Norway. And he has every reason to do so.<sup>113</sup>

There was ample reason for Terboven's timing, as the first days of December 1940 found him preparing for a number of meetings with Hitler, Quisling and Falkenhorst, which finally occurred on December 7. No documentation exists on the topics of conversation which dominated these latest exchanges.<sup>114</sup> Terboven had prepared at least one topic carefully; his critique of the constant interference of the Kriegsmarine in Norwegian politics. On December 6, he visited Goebbels and the latter noted in his diary:

Terboven comes by for a short visit. He intends to give the Führer a picture of the situation in Norway and his differences with the Navy. But the Führer does not seem to be very receptive on this issue.<sup>115</sup>

This pessimism proved to be ill-founded. On December 10, Terboven had another meeting with Goebbels:

Terboven calls me: he has reported to the Führer and fired off some heavy salvos against the Navy. The Führer was all ears. He now wants a written report. I shall help Terboven with this.<sup>116</sup>

Terboven had been well-prepared for this outcome, for he was able to respond to Goebbels offer of help on the same day:

Terboven comes in the evening with his memorandum. It amounts to a massive attack on the Navy in Norway and its political experiments. The Navy is trying to play off Quisling against Terboven. This damages our position very seriously. Terboven has also brought into play the story of Böhme's [sic!] ice-cold attitude towards me in Oslo. I cut out a few slanders which are dear to Terboven's heart but will do his cause no good. Thus the memorandum can go to the Führer.<sup>117</sup>

Terboven's memorandum was to have little direct effect upon the position of Raeder and others, and on December 22, Terboven felt it necessary again to complain to Goebbels that the Kriegsmarine was "still causing trouble for him."<sup>118</sup> Most likely, Terboven's latest complaint concerned the discussions between the German civil and military authorities over the protection of the winter shipments of iron ore from Narvik to Germany. The Kriegsmarine maintained that the protection of this traffic would detract from its other duties in Norway. In addition, the fact that the major Norwegian harbours were also relatively defenceless due to the lack of operational coastal batteries was also a point of dispute in this period.<sup>119</sup>

In December, 1940 Boehm presented Raeder with a formal report on the situation in Norway. Raeder gave the document a favourable assessment in a statement dated December 19:

Ich gebe der sicheren Erwartung Ausdruck, dass es dem Einsatz des Komm. Admiral Norwegen weiterhin gelingen wird, die Sicherung der deutschen Interessen im Norwegischen Raum in der Masse zu gewährleisten, wie es der hohen Bedeutung dieser nordeuropäischen Position im Rahmen der Gesamtkriegführung entspricht.<sup>120</sup>

In this document Boehm had declared that, to date, Terboven had failed to bring the Norwegian people closer to Germany.<sup>121</sup>

Boehm then listed several key proposals for Germany's policy towards Norway. The first called for the shapers of German policy to back the Nasjonal Samling and win the friendship of the Norwegian people through active co-operation. He then insisted that the Nasjonal Samling needed some symbol of political success in order to win support within Norway. In this light, Boehm recommended that serious peace negotiations be started as soon as possible. The final aim of these talks was to be the unification of Norway and Germany in a sort of federative union. Boehm emphasized that Norway would still retain both her territorial integrity and that her people would remain free. Boehm then earnestly recommended that a formal peace treaty between Germany and Norway be signed before April 1, 1941. As a symbol of Germany's intention to respect the sovereignty of Norway within this union, the Admiral suggested that the Storting building be returned to the Norwegian government. In addition, an independent Norwegian Army was to be created, although the Norwegian military forces were to be placed at the disposal of Germany.<sup>122</sup>

Raeder responded to this report in a letter dated December 30, 1940 and the Grand Admiral was in full agreement:

Ich billige selbstverständlich Ihre mir aufgezeichnete Linie in Bezug auf die Politik und werde diese dem Führer gegenüber auch stets vertreten.<sup>123</sup> )

The continued support for Quisling by both Raeder and Boehm

was bound to lead to more friction with Terboven. In addition, the already strained relationship between Boehm and Terboven on political matters was about to be expanded to the military sphere as well.

. NOTES

- 1) Boehm, MS. 1944 p. 16.
- 2) Loock, p. 367. Hayes maintains that this meeting occurred April 21, see his book p. 249. Unless otherwise cited, all information presented on this meeting stems from Loock's book.
- 3) Loock, p. 367.
- 4) Tagebuch Rosenbergs, p. 108.
- 5) H. D. Loock, "Zeitgeschichte Norwegens.", Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 13 (1965), p. 94.
- 6) Hayes, p. 250.
- 7) Loock, Quisling, p. 348.
- 8) Tagebuch Rosenbergs, p. 108.
- 9) Hayes, p. 248.
- 10) Ibid., p. 249.
- 11) Ibid., p. 252.
- 12) DGFP, Series D vol. 9 document no. 182, pp. 263-5.
- 13) Ibid., doc. no. 186, p. 267.
- 14) Tagebuch Rosenbergs, p. 114.
- 15) Loock, Quisling, pp. 349-50.
- 16) Hayes, p. 252.
- 17) Loock, Quisling, p. 344 and p. 352.
- 18) Tagebuch Rosenbergs, p. 114.
- 19) Wagner, p. 104.
- 20) Boehm, Norwegen, p. 98.
- 21) DGFP, Series D vol. 9 document no. 186, p. 263 fn. 1.
- 22) Hayes, p. 253.
- 23) Ibid., pp. 253-4.

- 24) Statement of Dr. Brodersen to author on Jan. 12, 1985.
- 25) DGFP, Series D. vol. 9 document no. 283, p. 391.
- 26) Hayes, p. 253.
- 27) Ibid., p. 254.
- 28) Loock, Quisling, pp. 398-99.
- 29) Hewins, p. 276, Loock Quisling, p. 406.
- 30) Loock, Quisling, p. 408.
- 31) Ibid.
- 32) Ibid., p. 419.
- 33) Loock, Quisling, p. 407 unless otherwise mentioned.
- 34) K. D. Bracher, The German Dictatorship, trans. by J. Steinberg. (New York, 1970), p. 94.
- 35) Loock, Quisling, pp. 407-8.
- 36) Hewins, p. 280.
- 37) Boehm, Norwegen, p. 104.
- 38) Ibid.
- 39) H. Boehm, "Die politische Entwicklung in Norwegen 1940-43 unter Grossadmiral Raeder", Nation Europa 1 (1952), p. 26, Raeder, vol. 2, p. 219.
- 40) Raeder, vol. 2 p. 219.
- 41) Ibid.; and Boehm, "politische Entwicklung", p. 26.
- 42) M. Salewski, Die deutsche Seekriegsleitung 1935-1945. (Munich, 1975), vol. 1, p. 206.
- 43) Cited in Loock, Quisling, p. 369.
- 44) Hayes, p. 256.
- 45) Hewins, pp. 281-3, and Hayes, pp. 256-8.
- 46) Knudsen, p. 116.

- 47) Hayes, p. 258.
- 48) Boehm, MS 1944, p. 15.
- 49) Hayes, p. 258.
- 50) DGFP, Series D, vol. 10 document no. 124 p. 138.
- 51) Cited in Loock, Quisling, p. 485 fn. 29.
- 52) Ibid.
- 53) DGFP, Series D, vol. 10 document no. 83 p. 94.
- 54) Ibid., pp. 94-5.
- 55) DGFP, Series D, vol. 10 document no. 124 pp. 138-141.  
Unless otherwise stated, all the information on this document stems from this copy.
- 56) Hewins, p. 282.
- 57) Hayes, p. 256 and p. 259.
- 58) Loock, Quisling, p. 482.
- 59) Hayes, p. 259.
- 60) DGFP, series D vol. 10 document no. 207 p. 273.
- 61) Ibid., document no. 350 p. 492.
- 62) Ibid., p. 493.
- 63) Ibid., p. 494.
- 64) Ibid.
- 65) Ibid., p. 495.
- 66) Knudsen, p. 117.
- 67) Loock, Quisling, p. 513.
- 68) DGFP, Series D. vol. 10 document no. 412 p. 581.
- 69) Tagebuch Rosenbergs, p. 117. Slanted brackets are mine.
- 70) T-1022, Reel no. 4132 PG 46860, Ktb. Boehm p. 12.
- 71) Ibid., p. 13 and p. 17.

- 72) Ibid., p. 17.
- 73) Wagner, pp. 137-8. Square brackets are mine.
- 74) T-1022, Reel no. 2843 PG 46859, Ktb. Boehm, p. 2.
- 75) A. Speer, Inside the Third Reich, trans. by R. and C. Winston. (New York, 1970), pp. 181-2.
- 76) PG 46859, p. 2
- 77) Ibid., p. 5.
- 78) Ibid., pp. 11-12.
- 79) Hayes, p. 261.
- 80) Ibid., p. 261, Looock, Quisling, p. 513.
- 81) Koht, p. 88.
- 82) Statement of Dr. Brodersen to author on Jan. 12, 1985.
- 83) Hayes, pp. 262-3.
- 84) Tagebuch Rosenbergs, p. 120. Slanted brackets are mine.
- 85) Ursachen und Folgen, vol. 15, pp. 124-133.
- 86) T-1022, Reel no. 4132 PG 46862, Ktb. Boehm, p. 7.
- 87) Cited in Looock, Quisling, p. 498.
- 88) PG 46862, p. 11.
- 89) DGFP, Series D vol. 11 document no. 144 pp. 239-40.
- 90) Koht, p. 142.
- 91) Tagebuch Rosenbergs, p. 183.
- 92) A. S. Milward, The Fascist Economy of Norway. (Oxford, 1972), p. 107.
- 93) Tagebuch Rosenbergs, p. 184.
- 94) Looock, Quisling, p. 498, as in the original.
- 95) Knudsen, p. 87.
- 96) Tagebuch Rosenbergs, p. 186.



- 97) Ibid., pp. 187-90. Unless otherwise stated all information presented on this document comes from this source.
- 98) Cited in Boehm, Norwegen, p. 99.
- 99) Ibid., p. 121.
- 100) DGFP, Series D, vol. 11 document no. 233 pp. 398-400. Unless otherwise stated all information presented on this document stems from this source.
- 101) Ibid., p. 399.
- 102) Boehm, MS 1944, p. 17. Emphasis in original.
- 103) Ibid., pp. 17-8.
- 104) IfZ. Fd. 500, Akten Marine Attaché Norwegen p. 20.
- 105) Wagner, p. 155. Emphasis in original.
- 106) Goebbels 1939-1941, p. 173. For the actual statement see the citation on p. 4 of this manuscript.
- 107) The Early Goebbels Diaries 1925-1926, ed. by H. Heiber and trans. by O. Watson. (N.Y., 1963) p. 56.
- 108) Ibid., p. 83.
- 109) Goebbels 1939-1941, p. 105.
- 110) Tagebuch Rosenbergs, p. 110.
- 111) Ibid.
- 112) Goebbels 1939-1941, p. 187
- 113) Ibid., p. 192.
- 114) DGFP, Series D, vol. 11, editor's note p. 814.  
See also: Kriegstagebuch OKW. vol. 1 May 1940-December 1941, ed. by H. A. Jacobsen. (Frankfurt am Main, 1965), p. 218.
- 115) Goebbels 1939-1941, p. 195.
- 116) Ibid., p. 199.
- 117) Ibid.
- 118) Ibid., p. 216.

- 119) Kriegstagebuch OKW, vol. 1 pp. 221 and 223.
- 120) T-1022, Reel no. 2756 PG 47324, Akten Komm. Adm. Norwegen  
n.p. From now on, documents in this series will be  
referred to Akten Boehm.
- 121) Boehm, Norwegen, p. 125.
- 122) Ibid., pp. 128-9; Loock, Quisling, p. 497.
- 123) Boehm, Norwegen, p. 129; idem, "politische Entwicklung"  
p. 30.

#### Chapter IV

##### Open Enmity: January 1941 - November 1942

During the fall of 1940, Boehm and Terboven displayed no outward signs of animosity. For example, a representative of Terboven's office assured Boehm on October 8, 1941 that once the Kriegsmarine had raised the sunken ships in the harbour of Narvik, Terboven would authorize the construction of an additional iron-ore quay.<sup>1</sup> Boehm even managed to have the Reichskommissar take over the actual raising operation as well. Terboven assigned this work to the German Stinnes company. He agreed also to Boehm's request to have the quay at Ramsund in northern Norway enlarged through the addition of a wooden pier.

On the same date, Boehm reported that the excessive demands of the German Army and Luftwaffe had virtually doubled the cost of important construction materials such as wood. This inflationary pressure was eased by the direct intervention of the German Minister of Armaments, Dr. Fritz Todt. One of Todt's representatives reported to Terboven that the tasks assigned to this organization in Norway were far more formidable than any others previously allotted to it.

Boehm was confident that a fair amount of interservice co-operation had been established, which extended to the Reichskommissar's office. Terboven had responded well to the Kriegsmarine's proposal to establish firm guidelines for the work and co-operation of both the Wehrmacht and the Security Police in

Norway. Terboven had offered to ease the chronic labour shortage that threatened the Norwegian Merchant Marine:

Vom R. K. sind daher Verordnungen gegen einen Wechsel des Arbeitsplatzes beabsichtigt, die künftighin eine gewisse Sicherheit gegen eine unerwünschte Abwendung der Schifffahrt treibenden Bevölkerung geben.<sup>2</sup>

Having tackled these issues, Boehm and Terboven were able to reach an agreement on the boundaries of the waters open to Norwegian fishermen, on October 17, 1940.<sup>3</sup> Ten days later, the boundary of the zone open for commercial fishing was officially established as being thirty nautical miles to the west of the Norwegian coast.<sup>4</sup> Special regulations were issued to deter the fishermen from moving outside this area:

Über den Reichskommissar wird diesse Regelung bekanntgegeben und darauf hingewiesen, dass die Fischerfahrzeuge, die ausserhalb der freigegebenen Gebiete angetroffen werden, Massnahmen deutscher See - und Luftstreitkräfte zu gewärtigen haben.<sup>5</sup>

Terboven had been careful to avoid making political comments to Boehm in the period October, 1940 through January, 1941. At the end of January, however, Terboven revealed his opinion of the Norwegian people to Boehm:

dass überhaupt ein starkes nationales Empfinden im norwegischen Volke wäre, und dass man Norwegen leichter mit Deutschland verschmelzen könne, als Bayern mit Preussen!<sup>6</sup>

Terboven's statement indicated that he wished to see Norway become an integral part of the Third Reich rather than remain an independent nation. At the War Crimes Tribunal in Nuremberg, Raeder probably referred to this comment when he accused Terboven of "wanting to remain Gauleiter Norwegen".<sup>7</sup> The defense

council asked Raeder if he had ever specifically requested that Hitler remove Terboven from his post in Norway, to which Raeder answered:

Several times. And I suggested that he [Hitler] should appoint General Admiral Böhm [sic!] as Commander of the Armed Forces for Norway and give him far-reaching powers so that he could carry out his - Hitler's-aims.<sup>8</sup>

This statement is in agreement with the content of Raeder's letters to Boehm of October 9, and October 30, 1940 in which the Grand Admiral had stated: "dass in Norwegen der Whermachtbefehlshaber ein Seeoffizier sein müsste".<sup>9</sup> Both Raeder and Boehm had never been satisfied with the attitude that Falkenhorst had displayed towards Quisling. In his 1944 manuscript, Boehm had repeated Raeder's concern of April 22, 1940 that Falkenhorst actually believed that the Germans could co-operate with the then fleeing Norwegian Government.<sup>10</sup> Boehm had first reported to Raeder on the subject of Falkenhorst's negative opinion of Quisling in a letter dated April 21, 1940. At that time, Boehm maintained that Falkenhorst had stated that Quisling was an "Abenteurer, der eine Partei als Gefolgschaft vorgetäuscht habe".<sup>11</sup> In a later report to Raeder on political developments in Norway dated December 12, 1940 Boehm claimed that Falkenhorst had told Terboven that Quisling was an "Abenteurer, den die Kriegsmarine dem Führer ängedreht hatte".<sup>12</sup>

In the meantime, Quisling had begun an ambitious program designed to enlarge the power base of the Nasjonal Samling in preparation for its return to power.<sup>13</sup> One of the first measures embarked upon was an attack on the Farmer's Union and its

counterpart in the fishing industry. Quisling's intention was to replace both of these organizations with party-controlled bodies. His ministers soon proved incapable of achieving any success with this strategy. Hagelin, in his new capacity as Minister of the Interior, made an equally unsuccessful attempt to obtain control over the bodies representing doctors and dentists. Other Nasjonal Samling figures had attempted to achieve the same with the Norwegian Press organization and the Athletic Federation without success.

In December 1940, Hagelin attempted to purge the Civil Service and bring in Nasjonal Samling officials. At the same time, pressure was applied to both the education and legal professions. On November 23, the spokesmen for the teachers had declared their unwillingness to propagate the ideology and aims of the Nasjonal Samling. The lawyers, on the other hand, had been lulled into a false sense of security by Terboven's promise that the Germans had no intention of interfering with the Norwegian legal system. However, both the Germans and the Nasjonal Samling had interfered constantly with the Judiciary. On December 3, Terboven released a statement which confirmed the worst fears of the lawyers, for the Reichskommissar had openly declared that "neither the Supreme Court nor any other inferior court was permitted to raise the issue of the validity of decrees issued by him or the commissarial government".<sup>14</sup> In the fall of 1940, Quisling had turned his attention towards the Norwegian Church. His aim was to force the Church to allow Nasjonal

Samling members enter the clergy. On October 25, the Protestant Bishop Eyvind Berggrav formed a council whose sole purpose was to prevent any penetration into the clergy by the Nasjonal Samling.

In short, all of these manoeuvres failed in their objective of entrenching the Nasjonal Samling in the every-day life of Norwegians. Boehm tended to ignore the policies followed by the Nasjonal Samling in both his wartime and post-war accounts. In any case, Boehm was soon to be involved with his first major clash with Terboven.

The incident which was to spark this confrontation had begun relatively innocently in December 1940. At that time, Terboven had dispatched the fish-factory ship Hamburg to the harbour of Svolvær in the Lofoten Islands. The Reichskommissar had done so on his own initiative without informing the Kriegsmarine of his action and intentions.<sup>15</sup> Since the Hamburg was not a military vessel, she fell under his jurisdiction. Terboven was apparently unconcerned about the relative weakness of that harbour's defences. The Hamburg lingered on in this unsafe outpost throughout the months of January and February 1941. On February 25, the Kriegsmarine's office in Oslo received a telephone call from an officer in the German military intelligence who requested that an officer be dispatched in haste to examine a recent piece of information.<sup>16</sup> Upon careful examination, it was apparent to the Kriegsmarine's envoy that the intelligence service's discovery related to an Allied plan to stage a commando raid on Svolvær.

As the Allied raid would endanger the Hamburg, Terboven was contacted with great urgency and advised to move this ship. On February 28, a German naval officer had met with Terboven's official responsible for all matters dealing with the Norwegian fishing industry, Dr. Vogt. In this conversation the Kriegsmarine's officer again emphasized to Dr. Vogt the endangered position of the Hamburg. On March 1, the German naval staff at Oslo warned not only the Hamburg, but also all the naval bases, installations, and ships in the immediate vicinity of the imminent Allied attack.<sup>17</sup>

On March 4, the Naval Commander at Narvik received a teletype report which informed him that an English cruiser and destroyer had entered the waters off Svolvær on March 3. The report stated that the Allied warships had fired upon the Hamburg and the oil bunkers situated there. Upon receipt of this report, the commander of the Luftwaffe in Norway immediately dispatched a group of three Heinkel He 111 bombers in a belated attempt to counter this attack. Given the head start granted the Allied warships, the German officers involved realized that this small force had little chance of even sighting the enemy vessels.

A report dated March 4 by the commander of a nearby German naval base, a Kapitän zur See Bachmann, contained several important observations:

Die Norweger in Sandnessjøen waren sehr frühzeitig ueber Beschiessung von Oeltanks in Svolvær unterrichtet, lange bevor beim Seekommandanten das erste Kr. -Signal aufgenommen wurde.

Die norweg. Bevoelkerung in Bodø kolportiert, dass die



Englaender am 6.3. vorm. wiederkaemen. Aus Lagemeldung durch FT von Adm. Polarkueste von Mitternacht geht hervor, dass die Norweger in Svolvær den Engländern aktive Hilfe gegen die deutsche Besatzung geleistet haben.<sup>18</sup>

On March 5, Boehm was able to give a preliminary account of the previous day. He reported that an English force had landed on the island, and occupied all strategic points in the town as well as the ships in the harbour. Demolition experts then started to destroy all the important military and economic installations such as the fish factory, oil tanks and the ships in the harbour. When they departed, the commandos had taken many Germans and Nasjonal Samling members as prisoners. Eight ships, including the Hamburg, had been destroyed and at least 27 members of the Wehrmacht were regarded as dead, missing or captured. There was, Boehm noted, no accurate figure available of the casualties suffered by the crews of the civilian ships in the harbour.<sup>19</sup>

The raid on Svolvær placed Terboven in a dangerous position, as he was open to the charge of having recklessly endangered the Hamburg and its crew. Consequently, on March 6 Terboven sent this report to Hitler:

"Zur Vorgeschichte stelle ich folgendes fest: Seit Monaten habe ich alle in Frage stehenden Dienststellen, insbesondere die Marine, immer wieder auf die gefährdete Situation im Bereiche der Lofoten aufmerksam gemacht und insbesondere immer wieder auf den Schutz des wertvollen Schiffes "Hamburg" hingewiesen. Am 25. Februar habe ich dem Admiral Norwegen Agentenmaterial übermittelt, das uns unmittelbar zuvor bei Ausheben einer Spionageorganisation, die Nachrichtendienst nach England trieb, in die Hände fiel. In diesen Nachrichten, die jüngsten Datums waren, heisst es auszugweise: ist bereits in meiner Unterlagen an Ob. d. M. übermittelt."<sup>20</sup>

Boehm met with Falkenhorst later that same day to discuss the

Svolvaer raid, and during this meeting the Admiral Norwegen was informed of Terboven's telegram to Hitler. Falkenhorst took it upon himself to provide Boehm with a copy.

On March 7, Boehm sent an urgent telegram of his own to the Chef des Admiralstabes, Kapitän zur See Schulte-Mönting, concerning the Svolvaer raid. In it, Boehm defended himself vigorously against what he termed Terboven's misrepresentation of events.<sup>21</sup> He labelled Terboven's assertion of his constant concern over the safety of the Hamburg as false. He argued that it was he who first informed Terboven as early as December 7, 1940 of the dangerous and impossible position that the Reichskommissar had placed the Hamburg in. Boehm maintained that he had recommended other, safer harbours for this ship, but Terboven had chosen to ignore the representations of the Kriegsmarine. In addition, Boehm stressed that Terboven had sent the Hamburg to Svolvaer without even consulting with the Kriegsmarine on this decision.

In his War Diary, Boehm felt it necessary to review in detail all the events surrounding the Svolvaer raid. He deflated Terboven's role in the reception of the espionage material which had warned of the impending raid. This information, the Admiral argued, had been given to the Kriegsmarine directly by the security force involved, and it was the Kriegsmarine which had been the first to realize the full extent of the contents of this information. Thus, on February 25, the Kriegsmarine had warned the appropriate agency that an attack on Solvaer was

imminent and advised it to move the Hamburg immediately. This warning was repeated on February 28. Boehm then noted that Terboven had not ordered his staff to move the Hamburg from Svolvaer before March 4.

Boehm listed another warning which the Kriegsmarine had given an official from Terboven's office on the evening of February 27-8. He also noted that the commander of a nearby naval base had offered to make some light anti-aircraft guns available for the Hamburg, and they had been shipped on March 2. Terboven's earlier argument that Svolvaer was the only logical harbour in which to station the Hamburg, was dismissed by Boehm on the grounds that a better suited, and protected, harbour was only forty nautical miles away.

Boehm received strong support from some of the naval commanders stationed in Norway. In a document dated March 25, 1941, which was annexed to the War Diary of the Commander of Narvik, it was argued that in all, Terboven had received five warnings concerning the endangered position of the Hamburg. The author of this note placed the responsibility for the loss of this ship squarely on the shoulders of Terboven.<sup>22</sup> In a telegram dated March 26, and also annexed to Boehm's War Diary, Boehm's Chief of Staff defended his superior:

Abschliessend wird der zwischen dem Kommandierenden Admiral Norwegen und dem Reichskommissar gepflogene Briefwechsel beigelegt, aus dem hervorgeht, dass der Reichskommissar nicht gewillt ist die dem Führer übermittelte, einseitige Schilderung der Vorgänge zu berichtigen und eine sachliche Stellungnahme zu den Berichten des Kommandierenden Admiral in Norwegen zu nehmen.<sup>23</sup>

Boehm also received the full support of Falkenhorst in this instance; as he noted on March 7 in his War Diary after a brief meeting with the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht in Norway:

Bin mit WBN [Falkenhorst] zu Führer befohlen, Zeitpunkt voraussichtlich am Mittwoch, den 12.3. Beabsichtige, meinen Standpunkt wie vorstehend mit aller Schärfe zu vertreten. WBN beabsichtigt, dem Führer inzwischen zu melden, dass der Bericht RK [Terboven] einseitig. Ich bitte ähnliches erwägen zu wollen unter Hinweis auf meinen bevorstehenden Vortrag.<sup>24</sup>

Unfortunately, no documentation has yet come to light regarding the proposed meeting between Hitler, Falkenhorst, and Boehm; it is very possible that it may never have occurred. At Nuremberg, Falkenhorst commented on the nature of the relationship between Boehm and Terboven:

The relationship between Terboven and the Navy soon became more strained through all kinds of friction; after the British attack on Svolvær on the 3rd to 4th March, 1941, there existed an open enmity between Admiral Boehm and Terboven, which lasted right up to the time of Admiral Boehm's departure.<sup>25</sup>

Terboven was determined to punish the population of Svolvær for its collaboration with the Allied commandos. On March 8, Goebbels noted in his diary that "Terboven has gone straight there [Svolvær] and is clearing things up."<sup>26</sup> Later in the same entry Goebbels recorded his brief telephone conversation with Terboven that had occurred later on the same day:

Terboven rings up. He has established a punitive court of the harshest kind on the Lofoten island which aided the English and betrayed Germans and Quisling's people to them. He has ordered saboteurs' farms to be put to the torch, hostages to be taken, etc. This Terboven fellow is all right. One does not need to pussyfoot with him; he knows exactly what he must do.<sup>27</sup>

At least one naval officer, Admiral Thiele, then the Admiral Norwegische Nordküste, was perturbed by the severity of Terboven's actions. His comment was dated March 22, and it offers an insight into the dilemma that the Kriegsmarine faced when dealing with the more extreme actions of the Nazi leadership:

Es handelt sich um Massnahmen gegen die norwegische Zivilbevölkerung nach Beendigung der militärischen Vorgänge. Die vollziehende Gewalt liegt in Händen des Reichskommissars. Ob dies zweckmässig ist oder nicht, unterliegt nicht meiner Beurteilung. Dass die Wehrmacht ausserhalb solcher Massnahmen bleibt, hat ihre unleugbaren Vorteile.<sup>28</sup>

On March 10, in the wake of the Svolvaer incident, Quisling made another attempt to regain the political initiative in a letter to Reichsminister Lammers.<sup>29</sup> The first subject Quisling raised was that the mandate for the Provisional Government of Commissars was to have expired at the beginning of March 1941. Quisling stressed that his party had managed to achieve a significant increase in registered membership, and he claimed that the German authorities had not, to this date, exhibited a strong pro-Nasjonal Samling posture.

Quisling's attack on Terboven did not stop here. The Norwegian criticized the manner in which Terboven had obtained a twenty per-cent reduction in Norwegian wages. Apparently, the local populace had come to blame the Nasjonal Samling for this unpopular act as Terboven had had the Government announce and issue the decree. Quisling blamed Terboven for the Nasjonal Samling's failure to take over the trade unions. According to Quisling, the Reichskommissar had negotiated directly with the

recalcitrant union leaders. After a much publicized meeting, both Terboven and the head of the Norwegian trade union movement issued a joint communique to the effect that both sides were in favour of the status quo; much to the chagrin of the Nasjonal Samling.

Quisling also commented on an ill-fated evening which the Nasjonal Samling had planned for high-ranking German military and civil figures. This event had been scheduled for January 24, 1941. On the request of Terboven, it was postponed to January 26. The organizers then received word from Falkenhorst that he would not be free to attend. This act effectively doomed the planned event. Quisling was particularly distraught to discover that Falkenhorst had actually dined in public on the day of the planned event. Quisling viewed this act of Falkenhorst's as a public slap in the face, as he felt that the General could have changed his dinner plans. The Norwegian party leader was careful to note that the naval officers who had been invited had accepted the invitation. Quisling railed against a recent order of Falkenhorst's which prohibited marriages between Norwegian women and the men of the Wehrmacht - even if the women were expecting children from their German partners. He contrasted this with the fact that Norwegian men were permitted to join the Wehrmacht and fight under its colours!

Having made these comments and criticisms, Quisling aired his key requests. The main one was that Hitler commit himself to a deadline for the formation of a Nasjonal Samling government.

On the same date, Quisling anticipated a formal declaration of Norway's independence, and the proclamation of a preliminary peace settlement between the two nations. In addition, Quisling demanded a "transformation and redesignation of the office of the Reich Commissar as already approved by the Führer."<sup>30</sup> Quisling advised against the holding of a German military parade on April 9, 1941 to mark the first anniversary of Weserübung. In its stead, he suggested that Hitler use the occasion to give a firm declaration of his intentions to grant Norway independence. In conclusion, Quisling pleaded that the Germans should not yield to the temptation of establishing a military dictatorship in Norway because of the unfortunate acts of a few individuals in Svolvær.

It became apparent that Quisling was not the only one overly concerned with festivities marking the first anniversary of Weserübung. On April 7, Terboven moved to put a damper on any plans to hold an anti-German demonstration to mark the occasion. In his proclamation, Terboven declared that any demonstration or public gathering was illegal and that anyone apprehended in such an act would be dealt with severely. He reminded the Norwegians that April 9 was a regular work-day, and that anyone who attempted to disrupt commerce and industry would be punished. Terboven also banned the use of any symbol of mourning, including the flying of flags at half-mast. In recognition of legal holidays, Terboven emphasized that only events which had been registered with the police, and were both organ-

ized and orderly, would be permitted in the spirit of "Germanic Brotherhood".<sup>31</sup>

On June 6, while on a visit to Germany, Boehm had a brief conversation with Lammers. Six days later, he submitted a report on this conversation to Raeder:

Zunächst einmal sprach mir Minister Lammers aus, dass er Zweifel darüber habe, ob die politischen Absichten des Führers bezüglich Norwegens noch die gleichen seien wie früher. Er, Lammers, sei sich darüber jedenfalls nicht klar. Der Führer hatte einerseits seine Dankbarkeit und Verbundenheit gegenüber Quisling betont, den er nicht fallen lassen wolle, andererseits kämen die Dinge bezüglich Norwegens nicht weiter, und der Führer wäre auch der Anordnung für "geistige Vorarbeit", wie Lammers es vorsichtig ausgedrückt und nahelegt hatte, nicht zugänglich gewesen.<sup>32</sup>

On August 17, Lammers wrote Boehm in an attempt to bring the admiral up to date on Hitler's political timetable for Norway.<sup>33</sup>

In this letter, Lammers explained that the last possible transition date should be September 25, 1941. The Minister then reported that the secret talks in preparation for a German-Norwegian peace treaty must begin in the near future if it was to be announced simultaneously with the formation of the new administration. Finally, he added that discussions for the future relationship between Germany and Norway must begin immediately. He provided a copy of a recent letter of his to Quisling as an annex. In this letter, Lammers had stressed that Hitler was aware of the need to settle the Norwegian problem; but that the dictator could only do so after he had dealt with the more pressing military situation.

The fact that Boehm had entered into direct contact with



Lammers could be explained by the almost total evaporation of Rosenberg's political influence, which appears to have become manifest in this period.<sup>34</sup> Apparently Terboven was also kept in the dark on the nature of Hitler's plans. On June 6, the Reichskommissar met with Goebbels who recorded in his diary that he had:

Some official business to discuss with Terboven. He tries to sound me out about future developments. But I cold-bloodedly lead him up the wrong track.<sup>35</sup>

Meanwhile, relations between Boehm and Terboven were still strained. On August 5, Boehm included a copy of a telegram he had sent Terboven in his War Diary. This communication of July 26, referred to Terboven's insistence that the number of ships involved in the transport of coal from the mines in northern Norway and the island of Spitzbergen be doubled:

Betrifft: Kohlenfahrt Spitzbergen.  
Auf besondere Forderung des R.K. werden z. Zt. 8 Dampfer für die Kohlenfahrt nach Spitzbergen eingesetzt.  
Es wird jedoch nochmals betont, dass Admiral Norwegen nicht in der Lage ist, diesen Dampfern ausserhalb der Schärengebiete irgendwelchen Schutz gegen See - und Luftstreitkräfte zu gewähren.  
Der Einsatz der Dampfer erfolgt, wie auch von dort bestätigt, auf eigenes Risiko des Reichskommissars.<sup>36</sup>

One can only conclude that Boehm wished to take every precaution against a repetition of the Svolvær incident. These fears were soon overshadowed by an event of a much more serious nature.

On September 10, Terboven declared a civilian state of emergency in the area of Oslo, in response to a wildcat strike which had broken out on September 8.<sup>37</sup> The strike was known as the "Milk Strike" since it had begun as a protest to the planned

reduction of milk rations to the workers in heavy industry. It was both spontaneous and short-lived as the workers had decided to return to work on the next day. Terboven, however, was determined that this act of defiance would not go unpunished. On September 10, he had two union leaders arrested, even though one of them had been instrumental in persuading the workers to return to work on the previous day. At this point, the strike was resumed and began to spread.

Terboven realized that the only way to meet the new situation was to declare a state of emergency. His first move was to consult with the Wehrmacht which meant he had to deal with Boehm. Due to the absence of both Falkenhorst and his counterpart in the Luftwaffe, the responsibilities of the commander-in-chief were assumed by the senior military officer present - Boehm. Accordingly, Terboven met with Boehm on September 9 to discuss the situation. The Reichskommissar outlined his plan to declare a state of emergency and have the leaders of the strike executed. When he asked Boehm for the position of the Wehrmacht, the General-admiral replied that internal-political developments did not fall under his jurisdiction. Boehm added that he refused to share in the responsibility for any of Terboven's actions.<sup>38</sup> His position soon proved to be ill-advised, for Terboven decided to declare a civilian state of emergency which effectively eliminated the possibility of interference by the Wehrmacht. Had he not done so, the Wehrmacht commander would have exercised complete authority for the duration of the crisis.<sup>39</sup>

Nonetheless, Boehm's War Diary for the period indicates that he had ordered the Wehrmacht to support the security police wherever necessary.<sup>40</sup> His telegram to Raeder also indicated that Boehm had been inclined to believe Terboven's version of the event:

Reichskommissar hat heute über politische Lage ausgeführt: Im Bereich Oslo sind in den letzten Tagen 45 Betriebe und 50 Reparaturwerkstätten in den Streik getreten. Angeblicher Grund Verpflegungsschwierigkeiten und Löhne. Planmässigkeit und Schnelligkeit der Durchführung bei Streiks zeigt Organisation und Hinarbeiten auf Generalstreik, besonders bei etwaiger Aktion der Engländer, worüber hartnäckiges Gerücht für 12. September umläuft. Auch ohne solche Aktion abgleiten in Generalstreik seine Überzeugung. Daher Absicht R.K. Einführen des zivilen Ausnahmezustandes für Oslo-Bereich 10.9. fünf Uhr, Festnehmen und standrechtliches Erschiessen von führenden Elementen, Brechen des Widerstandes.<sup>41</sup>

In his reaction to Terboven's statement, Boehm stressed that anyone involved in acts of sabotage against the Wehrmacht would be punished. Boehm maintained in this report that he had questioned the intelligence of using extreme measures against the workers involved in the strike. He argued that Germany's main concern was the restoration of industrial peace. However, he noted that this decision could be made only by Terboven. In his third point, Boehm stressed that the Wehrmacht would co-operate with Terboven in all matters.

Later, on September 10, Boehm noted that approximately 130 people had been arrested immediately after the declaration of the state of emergency, and that work had been resumed in all the factories and plants involved. From the information provided by police sources, he remarked that two people had been executed

for their role in the strike on that afternoon, while another four had received prison sentences'. On September 16, Boehm reported that the state of emergency had been lifted. At this time, he provided a complete summary of the sentences handed out to the twenty-eight Norwegians who had been implicated in the strike. Five people had received death sentences, of which two had been executed. Another five had received life-term imprisonment, seventeen had received prison sentences ranging from ten to fifteen years, and one person had been released. Boehm also reported that no acts of sabotage had occurred.

Boehm had not been overly critical of Terboven's response to the general strike. The sole exception had been his advice to Terboven to consider refraining from excessive measures. Boehm became aware later that the two men who had been executed, had been in custody before the state of emergency had been declared. In his post-war account Boehm placed the responsibility for this act, which he termed "cold-blooded murder", on Terboven's shoulders.<sup>42</sup> Boehm's final report to Raeder on the events of September 9-16 was made on October 6, 1941 and indicated that Boehm had become aware of the more obvious contradictions in Terboven's position during those days:

Die Streikbewegung im Oslogebiet Anfang September dauerte 2 bis 3 Tage. Es ist festzustellen, dass der vorher sorgfältig geheimgehaltene Ausnahmezustand am 10. September morgens 5 Uhr durch Anschlag veröffentlicht wurde und um 6.30. Uhr die Arbeit in allen Betrieben aufgenommen war. Es ist ausgeschlossen, dass die nach Tausenden zählende Arbeiterschaft, die zerstreut in der Umgegend wohnt, benachrichtigt sein konnte. Der Streik war bereits am 10. September morgens beendet. Von Zusammenstößen, Unruhen und Gewaltakten ist nichts bekannt geworden.<sup>43</sup>

In his 1944 report of his tour of duty in Norway, Boehm discussed a meeting which had occurred in the period after September 10, 1941. Terboven had boasted to the military men present that:

"Die Ereignisse sind mir nicht unerwünscht. Ich bin den Norwegern vergebens nachgelaufen, jetzt will ich sie in die Knie zwingen."<sup>44</sup>

Throughout the period of July 1941 - January 1942, Terboven and his counterpart in the Kriegsmarine had been locked in several disputes on economic matters. The major area of dispute was the application of the Prize Law to Norwegian ships. In his "Activity Report" for the period of November 1940 to September 1941, Boehm had noted that:

Die Tätigkeit in Völkerrechtsangelegenheiten und Preisensachen ist im Berichtsjahr sehr gering gewesen, weil die Mehrzahl der zu entscheidenden Fragen auf den Reichskommissar übergegangen und alle Preisen - und Beuteschiffe bereits erfasst sind.

In der noch schwebenden Frage der Behandlung norwegischer Schiffe wurde der J-Referent vom Reichskommissar herangezogen.<sup>45</sup>

On the bright side, Boehm had reported that some progress had been made with the Reichskommissar on the difficult tariff issue. This agreement had eased many of the problems which had been raised by the pilots of Norwegian ships.<sup>46</sup>

On August 26, 1941 Raeder raised the issue of Norwegian ships with Hitler. The Grand Admiral was particularly concerned about the Norwegian ships which had taken refuge in Swedish waters. Raeder stressed that the ships' crews were led by officers who recognized the pre-Weserübung government. He then went on to say that the only way to counter this situation was

to place a Nasjonal Samling man at the head of the Shipowners' Association. In his final point, Raeder recommended that Quisling be consulted on this issue.<sup>47</sup>

On January 15, 1942 Raeder raised the issue of the application of the Prize Law to Norwegian ships with Terboven. In his reply of January 17, the Reichskommissar maintained that, as per Hitler's directive, all prize actions against Norwegian ships had been annulled. He noted, that since Hitler's ruling had not addressed the issue of the cargos of the ships in question, these were still subject to the Prize Law. He argued that Germany's failure to apply the Prize Law in these cases was tantamount to forsaking her rights under International Law. Terboven insisted that Norway had to bear the cost of any such seizures. In a conciliatory gesture, Terboven suggested that the Prize Law would only be applied against those Norwegian ships which were stopped by the Wehrmacht in German controlled waters.<sup>48</sup>

On January 17, Schreiber discussed this issue with Quisling and Hagelin, and the points raised were subsequently telegraphed by Boehm to Berlin on January 18.<sup>49</sup> Quisling had been upset to learn that Norwegian ships could be seized by the Germans because a formal state of war still existed. He argued that the Prize Law should only be applied to those ships which had been stopped with cargos intended for the Allies. This situation, he argued, was just another example of how the lack of a formal peace treaty was hurting both Norway and his movement. Boehm's

telegram paraphrased Quisling's final words on the subject:

Dagegen bittet Herr Quisling, dasz [sic!] die Schiffe, die freiwillig nach Norwegen oder zu den Achsenmaechten bzw. in neutrale Staaten zurueckkehren, samt ihren Besatzungen als Freunde behandelt und nicht beschlagnahmt werden.

[Zusatz Adm. Norwegen:

Dies ist von OKM bereits zugesagt, jedoch von R. K. noch nicht weitergegeben worden] 50

On January 18 Boehm sent another telegram on this issue to the OKM.<sup>51</sup> In it he maintained that the Norwegians accepted the fact that any Norwegian ship which was working for the Allies would be treated by Germany as an enemy vessel. In his view, he said, the Norwegian people were not aware of the full scope of the Prize Law, and would therefore interpret German seizures of returning Norwegian vessels as a sign of hostility. Boehm noted that this could have only a negative effect upon the most recent attempts of the Nasjonal Samling to influence Norwegians against working for England. Boehm spoke of the support given Quisling's party by the Kriegsmarine, and the lack of interest exhibited by Terboven in the proposal to treat such ships magnanimously:

OKM SKL hat im grundlegenden Schreiben 18943/41 Geheim V 5/5/41 Ziff 8) dieses Einwirkungsabsicht der N. S. unterstuetzt mit dem Angebot, dasz [sic!] nicht nur das freiwillig heimgekehrte Schiff dem norwegischen Reeder als eigentum belassen werden kann, sondern dasz [sic!] sogar zusaetzlich ein oder mehrere weitere Schiffe derselben Reederei als Anerkennung preisrechtlich freigegeben werden koennen. Eine solche groszzuegige [sic!] Anordnung versteht der Norweger. Trotzdem hat der R.K., dem diese Regelung in Norwegen allein uebertragen worden war, dieses Angebot bisher weder den Reedern bekanntgegeben, noch in der Presse propagandistisch verwertet.<sup>52</sup>

Boehm advocated this policy because it had advantages for both Germany and the Nasjonal Samling. The former would benefit because more Norwegian ships would be tempted to leave the employ of the Allies. The Nasjonal Samling, on the other hand, would be able to speak of having obtained a major concession from the Third Reich.

In the end, this conflict too had to be presented to Hitler for a final decision. During the naval conference of January 22, 1942 the Führer ruled in favour of the position of Raeder and Quisling:

Die Angelegenheit Terboven wird in unserem Sinne entschieden. Eine entsprechende schriftliche Entscheidung wird Seekriegsleitung und Reichskommissar zugehen.<sup>53</sup>

On January 26, Boehm received his official notification of the new January 24 agreement between Raeder and Terboven on the Prize Law issue.<sup>54</sup> This agreement was applied retroactively to some Norwegian whaling ships, and resulted in the lifting of the Prize Court's ruling against them. The new agreement stipulated that in future, the Prize Law would be applicable only to those ships which were working directly for the Allies, or whose cargos were intended for the Allies. All ships which returned to Norway, Germany or her allies from neutral harbours would no longer be subject to seizure. Ships which had been seized on the grounds listed above were unable to benefit from the new ruling. There must have been a lot of last-minute negotiations on the fine points of this agreement, for it was officially announced only on March 23, 1942. Even the Japanese had decided to



co-operate with this initiative, but they imposed a final deadline of April 15, 1942. After that date, the Japanese intended to treat all Norwegian merchant ships in the Pacific Ocean as hostile.<sup>55</sup>

This major, though belated, achievement was overshadowed by the appointment of Quisling to the position of Minister-President of Norway on February 1, 1942. During the period between Quisling's March 1941 letter to Lammers, and the new year, Terboven had come to realize that he could no longer avoid the inevitable. As Hitler still did not have any intention of ruling Norway with a visible German bureaucracy and administration, Terboven had no choice in the matter. On January 23, the Reichskommissar formally charged Quisling with the formation of a Nasjonal Samling Government.<sup>56</sup>

It had become obvious at the end of 1941 that some changes in the political administration of Norway had to be implemented. On December 30, Boehm discussed the military-political situation with Falkenhorst. A few days later, on January 3, 1942 Boehm conversed with his counterpart in the Luftwaffe on the same topic.<sup>57</sup> On January 23, both Boehm and Schreiber received an invitation from Quisling to attend an information session on the proposed transition in government. During this meeting, Quisling stressed that one of his chief goals would be the signing of a formal peace treaty between Norway and Germany.<sup>58</sup> To the surprise of the naval officers, Quisling announced that - contrary to his March 10, 1941 letter,

to Lammer's - for the moment he had no objection to Terboven remaining as Reichskommissar. The Norwegian party leader had been swayed by Terboven's argument that his continued presence would ensure that Falkenhorst would not attempt to declare a "state of siege" in a crisis and usurp Quisling's power!

It transpired soon that this was not the only concession that Terboven had managed to obtain. The Reichskommissar managed to get Quisling to agree to a more protracted time-table for the normalization of relations between Germany and Norway. To avoid branding Quisling's new government with the stigma of having been appointed by the Germans, the Norwegian was to assume his post as Minister-President upon the call of the administration immediately, and would then enter into serious peace negotiations. These talks were to be concluded before May 1, at which time Quisling was to make an official state visit to Germany. On this date, a large number of German officials were to return to Germany - symbolizing Norway's new-found independence. Terboven also held out the prospect that Germany would end Quisling's quest for a peace treaty by that date.<sup>59</sup>

At this point, Boehm felt it necessary to warn Quisling against relying too heavily on Terboven's word; and, that the Norwegian should obtain written guarantees and promises from both Hitler and Terboven. This was certainly a major reversal for a man who tended to avoid becoming directly involved in "political" questions. Even more significant is Boehm's post-war comment that he had advised Quisling against assuming power under these conditions.<sup>60</sup> The most probable explanation was

that Boehm was aware of Rosenberg's inability to counsel his former Norwegian protégé. Boehm's misgivings may have had some impact on Quisling who was to argue on January 26 that Terboven's continued presence in Norway beside a Nasjonal Samling government would place an undue burden on the new regime.

Therefore, Quisling intimated that he would accept this arrangement, with an important provision. He requested that Terboven's mandate expire within three months of the installation of the new regime.<sup>61</sup>

In the end, Quisling was undeterred and readily assumed the position offered him by Terboven. Two documents have come to light which confirm Boehm's apprehensions about the relative weakness of Quisling's position. On February 13, Hitler mentioned his conversation with Quisling of that date to Goebbels; who recorded this note:

As to Quisling, he developed very naive ideas in his talk with the Fuehrer, as the latter confided to me. He thinks he will be permitted to build up a new Norwegian Army, protect the Norwegian harbors himself, and finally create an entirely free Norway. That, of course, is very childish. The Fuehrer replied evasively to these claims.<sup>62</sup>

In a Wehrmacht communique drafted by Falkenhorst and dated February 11, 1942, the effect of the installation of the new Quisling regime was described tersely: "Die vollziehende Gewalt bleibt in den Händen des Reichskommissars."<sup>63</sup>

On February 5, Boehm had reported to Raeder that the new political situation in Norway was much more dangerous for Quisling and the Nasjonal Samling than the pre-1942 status quo.<sup>64</sup>

He argued that all that Quisling had achieved was the honor of an empty title. He returned to his belief that Quisling desperately needed to obtain a solid political success or concession from Germany. He was critical of Quisling's decision to accept such a heavy responsibility without taking any precautions to safeguard against the possibility that the negotiations might be longer than expected:

Ich habe stets die Überzeugung vertreten, dass die Vorarbeiten und Grundlagen für den Friedensschluss und eine spätere Machtübernahme der NS rechtzeitig geschaffen werden sollten, da solche staatspolitisch wichtige Dinge in der Durcharbeitung Wochen und Monate brauchen, zumal mit dem Gedanken eines germanischen Bundes völlig neue Gesichtspunkte auftreten und verarbeitet werden müssen. Ein solcher Staatsakt lässt sich nicht plötzlich über das Knie brechen.<sup>65</sup>

After the war, Boehm received a letter from Terboven's one-time deputy Gauleiter, Paul Wegener.<sup>66</sup> In this letter, Terboven's deputy claimed that after November 1941, Terboven had expressed his desire to return to his positions in Germany. Apparently, his ambition to achieve a greater status was to be fulfilled by his assumption of the post of Reichskommissar Belgien, for which Göring was now recommending him, and Terboven had been inclined to accept such an offer. In line with this proposal, Terboven had been willing to phase out the position of a Reichskommissar Norwegen by October 1942. In the end, Göring's proposal remained a paper project. Despite the misgiving that Boehm had expressed to Quisling in January 1942, the Kriegsmarine was well represented at the official swearing-in ceremony for the new government.<sup>67</sup>

One of the first acts of the Nasjonal Samling Government was a renewed attempt to bring the professional groups under its direct control. The first major group to be singled out were the teachers.<sup>68</sup> On February 8, an official of the new government announced that they intended to create a new teachers' association linked to the Nasjonal Samling's youth organization. The teachers took exception to the party's plan to gain control over their organization and they were directly supported by the spokesmen of the Norwegian Church, headed by Bishop Berggrav. What had begun as an attempt to integrate one of Norway's largest professional groups into the state had been transformed into a major power struggle.

To cope with the recalcitrant teachers, Quisling turned to Terboven for permission to act vigorously against them. On March 16, with Terboven's full approval, the new government acted. It proclaimed a decree empowering it to arrest the protesting teachers. Those who continued to refuse to co-operate with the government were then arrested and sent to do forced labour on the German fortifications under construction in Northern Norway. By March 20, over 1,000 teachers had been arrested. Most of these were transported to a construction site in the Kirkenes in the arctic circle. Approximately 500 of the teachers sent to the construction site in the Kirkenes were crowded aboard a small steamer, the SS Skjerstad, which had been designed for only 96 passengers. In addition, most of her facilities were restricted for the use of her guards.<sup>69</sup>

This episode is of importance, because of the comment Hitler made on this incident in May, 1942:

In Terboven I am pleased to have a man capable of assuming control of Norway, the most difficult commissarship of the Reich. As he himself told me this very day, if he relaxes his authority for a single instant, he feels as though he were on quicksands. He was, for instance, compelled to arrest a number of Norwegian teachers, who had seen fit to try and sabotage certain measures taken by the German High Command - and he is now employing them in building fortifications. I only regret that the traditional German benevolence of the naval authorities charged with the transportation of these people was once more carried to stupid lengths; the embarkation authorities at first refused to carry these passengers, on the grounds that sufficient lifebelts for them were not available.<sup>70</sup>

It is clear that Hitler relished the use of a heavy-handed approach wherever and whenever opposition was to be found. Hitler's statement also conveys the impression that he, at this point, held Terboven in high regard. Finally, it indicates that Hitler was not pleased with the "benevolent actions" carried out by the Kriegsmarine in Norway. This attitude did not auger well for the Kriegsmarine's pro-Norwegian triumvirate.

In March 1942, Quisling issued a memorandum on German-Norwegian relations which dealt with the stalled peace treaty talks.<sup>71</sup> From a letter dated September 17, 1942 it is apparent that Hitler had responded to Quisling's March memorandum on June 22, 1942. Regarding Quisling's latest query of September 1942, Lammers maintained that Hitler's position had not been

revised since June. He reiterated that Hitler would address the issue of a German-Norwegian peace treaty only after the world war had been concluded.<sup>72</sup>

While Quisling was preoccupied with his attempts to achieve his goals in both domestic and foreign policy, Boehm's relationship with Terboven was marked by continual strife. On May 9, 1942 Terboven had sent a list of complaints to Hitler about Boehm's actions in Norway. Boehm summarized and refuted these complaints in a document dated November 3, 1942.<sup>73</sup> The first of Terboven's complaints dealt with Boehm's refusal of an invitation of April 21 to an event organized by Terboven. The Reichskommissar maintained that Boehm had chosen to attend a competing event staged by Hagelin. In this case, Boehm was able to report that an investigation had cleared him of the charge. Terboven had also made an identical charge concerning two special events which had taken place early in May, 1942. Boehm was again able to refute these petty charges, and added this comment:

So unwürdig es ist, den Führer in einem Schicksalskampf des deutschen Volkes mit derartigen Nichtigkeiten zu befassen, so muss ich doch, angegriffen, erwidern, dass beide Einladungen aus wichtigen repräsentativen Gründen seit langem ergangen und zugesagt waren. Die Erbärmlichkeit der Anklagen des RK zeigt sich besonders klar, wenn er sich auf solche Dinge beziehen muss.<sup>74</sup>

Terboven's last charge was based on more serious grounds. The Reichskommissar had accused Boehm of deliberately going behind Terboven's back in a political question. This charge

was based on a report that Boehm had written on Germany's possible use of the Nasjonal Samling's Marine-Hird. This group was comparable to the German Marine S.A. Again, Boehm had demanded an investigation which cleared him of the charge. The document upon which Terboven had based his charge, proved to be nothing more than an preliminary draft of a study, which had been presented to Falkenhorst. The latter had presented it to Terboven in order to assure that it would meet with Terboven's approval.

In September 1942, the dispute had spread to the economic sphere. On the fifteenth of that month, Boehm warned that the supplies of fuel oil, lubricants, and coal were inadequate to meet the demands of the three services and the civilian authorities.<sup>75</sup> Boehm was determined to avoid a repetition of the chronic coal shortage which had occurred in March 1942. At that time the Wehrmacht had been forced to turn over 57,000 tons of coal, of which 27,000 came from the Kriegsmarine's reserves, to Terboven in order to keep the Norwegian economy functioning.<sup>76</sup> His next entry on this issue was more optimistic, for he maintained that to date no serious conflict had arisen. Despite this, he warned that difficulties were bound to occur because of the three competing programmes - Wehrmacht, Kriegsmarine, and Reichskommissariat.<sup>77</sup> Near the end of the month, September 26, he reported that a new dispute had arisen.<sup>78</sup>



On October 24, Boehm noted in his War Diary that the Kriegsmarine was faced with an alarming shortage of small ships for its myriad tasks in Norwegian waters. One solution was to seize the remaining suitable Norwegian vessels. He warned, however, that he did not believe that Terboven would agree with this assessment, and feared that the Reichskommissar would not sanction this move. Boehm stated that, before he would be willing to advocate this measure, the Skl must eliminate other minor problems. These included the shortage in wood, anti-aircraft guns, neon-treated metals, and personnel.<sup>79</sup> A month later, Boehm reported that Terboven would not countenance any additional seizures of Norwegian vessels. Apparently, all the available vessels had been assigned to Göring's new-found venture aimed at increasing the import of sea-products by Germany.<sup>80</sup>

Political events also contributed to the further deterioration of the relationship between Boehm and Terboven. On October 5, 1942 Terboven had declared a civilian state of emergency in the city of Trondheim. The Reichskommissar had issued this decree to counter a wave of sabotage actions against German installations. The state of emergency was lifted on October 12.<sup>81</sup> Terboven later maintained that the local Kriegsmarine commander had not supported his actions against the saboteurs. Boehm countered by arguing that the commander in question had been given orders to support the security forces

in Trondheim.<sup>82</sup> A subsequent inquiry found this statement to be accurate. Boehm had been informed afterwards that ten hostages had been executed on Terboven's orders in the wake of the crisis in Trondheim. Boehm later declared that the responsibility for this act rested solely with Terboven.<sup>83</sup>

In his report to Hitler on the Trondheim crisis, Terboven attempted to persuade Hitler to remove Boehm from his post in Norway.<sup>84</sup> These actions of Terboven, resulted in another of Raeder's attempts to right the situation in Norway. The Grand Admiral raised the issue of a formal peace treaty between Germany and Norway with Hitler at this time. In addition, Raeder suggested that Terboven be recalled and that Boehm be appointed to the position of Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Norwegen.<sup>85</sup>

Unfortunately, the date on which this initiative occurred cannot be pinpointed with certainty. At Nuremberg, Raeder offered a limited amount of information on his conversation with Hitler of October 1942. Raeder placed the full blame for Germany's failure to win over the Norwegian population on Terboven's shoulders:

That went on until 1942, at which time Böhm [sic!] made a final report to me, in which he explained that things could not go on like that, and that Hitler's intentions would never be realized. I submitted the report to Hitler, but since it did not bring about any change-it was late in the autumn of 1942- this failure of mine became one of the reasons which finally led to my retirement.<sup>86</sup>

Schreiber confirmed this statement in a document submitted to the Nuremberg Court in defence of Raeder. The former Naval Attaché

maintained that Raeder's final official attempt to influence the course of political events in Norway had occurred in late 1942. In his document Schreiber noted the location, agenda, and the participants involved in this meeting. Unfortunately, he did not indicate the date on which it was held.<sup>87</sup>

Most likely, this meeting had been held before October 23, 1942.<sup>88</sup> In a letter of that date to Boehm, Raeder had discussed the Norwegian problem with his Commanding Admiral Norway.<sup>89</sup> In his letter, Raeder stated that he was pleased with the fact that recent judgements by the Prize Court had gone against Terboven's position. For Boehm's information, he also included a copy of Lammer's letter to Quisling of September 17, 1942. On the subject of the latter letter, Raeder was pessimistic:

Es ist mir nunmehr unmöglich, in dieser Angelegenheit noch etwas zu unternehmen, und wir werden uns in die neue Lage, die dem Willen des Fuehrers entspricht, durch groesste Zurueckhaltung hineinfinden muessen. Wenn sich eine Gelegenheit bietet, werde ich hoechstens den Fuehrer bitten koennen, dass er gestattet, dass Quisling sich in politisch wichtigen Dingen auch weiterhin an ihn persoendlich wendet. Bei einer evtl. Zusammenkunft, wie der Fuehrer sie in Aussicht stellt, wird er es jedenfalls tun koennen. Ich bitte, auch Schreiber anzuweisen, dass er sich nunmehr voellig zurueckhaelt.<sup>90</sup>

For the moment, Raeder was advocating an abandonment of the Kriegsmarine's pro-Quisling stand.

Boehm's reply was dated November 8, 1942 and took the form of a six page report outlining all of Terboven's intrigues against the Commanding Admiral Norway from March 1941 to the end of October, 1942. Near the end of this document, Boehm

argued that:

Ein Offizier, der mehrfach dem Führer leichtfertige oder unwahre Meldungen erstattet, würde auf das schärfste zur Verantwortung gezogen werden. Ich zweifle nicht daran, dass die gleichen Gesetze auch auf den Gauleiter Terboven anzuwenden sind.<sup>91</sup>

Little did Boehm know that he had just fired his last official salvo at Reichskommissar Terboven.

NOTES

- 1) T-1022 Reel no. 4132, PG 46863, Ktb. Boehm, pp. 8-10. Unless otherwise noted, all information presented on this meeting stems from this source.
- 2) Ibid., p. 18.
- 3) T-1022 Reel no. 4133 PG 46866, Ktb. Boehm, pp. 4-5.
- 4) Ibid., p. 21.
- 5) Ibid., p. 22.
- 6) Boehm, MS 1944, p. 15.
- 7) TMWC, vol. 14 p. 101.
- 8) Ibid.
- 9) Cited in Looock, Quisling, pp. 498 and 500.
- 10) Boehm, MS 1944, p. 15; see also Wagner, p. 97.
- 11) Cited in Looock, Quisling, fn. 59 pp. 495-6.
- 12) Ibid., fn. 59 p. 496; Boehm, MS 1944, p. 15. In the later source, the comment was not dated.
- 13) Hayes, pp. 268-71. Unless otherwise stated, all the information provided on Quisling's political activities in the period September 1940 - January 1941 comes from this source.
- 14) Ibid., p. 270.
- 15) Boehm, Norwegen, p. 120.
- 16) T-1022 Reel no. 2842 PG 46872, Ktb. Boehm, n.p. Unless otherwise mentioned, all information presented on the background of this incident stems from this source.
- 17) Ibid., Reel no. 2843 PG 46873, Ktb. Boehm, n.p. Unless otherwise mentioned, all information presented comes from this source.
- 18) Ibid, Reel no. 3926 PG 46854/1, Ktb. Kommandant der Seeverteidigung Sandnessjøen, item no. 128, n.p.

- 19) Ibid., Reel no. 2843 PG 46873, Ktb. Boehm n.p.
- 20) Ibid. Brackets are mine.
- 21) Ibid. Unless otherwise stated, all information presented on this aspect comes from this document.
- 22) Ibid., Reel no. 3926 PG 46854/1, Ktb. Seekommandant Narvik, items 86 and 87.
- 23) Ibid., Ktb. Boehm B. Nr. gkdos 811 AI item 90, n.p. This document was heavily corrected. In its original form it had been much sharper:  
Abschliessend wird der zwischen dem Kommandierenden Admiral Norwegen und dem Reichskommissar gepflogene Briefwechsel beigelegt, aus dem klar hervorgeht, dass der Reichskommissar nicht gewillt ist, die vor dem Führer ausgesprochenen Anschuldigungen gegen die Kriegsmarine zurückzunehmen oder eine sachliche Stellungnahme dazu eintreten.
- 24) Ibid., Reel no. PG 2843 PG 46873, Ktb. Boehm, n.p.
- 25) Stevens, p. 260.
- 26) Goebbels 1939-1941, p. 258.
- 27) Ibid., p. 260. See also pp. 261, 277, and 284.
- 28) T-1022 Reel no. 3926 PG 46854/1, Stellungnahme Adm. Norwegische Nordküste zum Ktb. Seekommandant Drontheim v. 1-15.3. [41] item 95 second page n.p.
- 29) DGFP, Series D vol. 12 document no. 147, pp. 260-5. All information presented on this document comes from this source.
- 30) Ibid., p. 264.
- 31) T-1022 Reel no. 2843 PG 46878, Ktb. Boehm, n.p..
- 32) Boehm, Norwegen, p. 133.
- 33) Ibid., pp. 134-5. Unless otherwise stated, all information presented here comes from this source.
- 34) J.C. Fest, Hitler, trans. by R. and C. Winston. (New York, 1975), p. 683.
- 35) Goebbels 1939-1941, p. 397.
- 36) T-1022 Reel no. 2844 PG 46885, Ktb. Boehm, n.p.

- 37) Gordon, pp. 88-9. Unless otherwise mentioned all the information on the background of this strike comes from this source.
- 38) Boehm, Norwegen, p. 137.
- 39) Gordon, p. 89; Looock, Quisling, p. 552.
- 40) T-1022 Reel no. 2844 PG 46887, Ktb. Boehm n.p. Unless otherwise stated, all information presented here comes from this source.
- 41) Ibid.
- 42) Boehm, Norwegen, p. 138.
- 43) Ibid.
- 44) Boehm, MS 1944, p. 26.
- 45) T-1022 Reel no. 2757 PG 47326, Akten. Boehm, p. 109.
- 46) Ibid., p. 26.
- 47) Wagner, p. 284.
- 48) T-1022 Reel no. 1970 PG 33134, 1/Skl. Akte. 'Nord', Item 149, n.p.
- 49) Ibid., Item 254, 3 pp. Unless otherwise stated, all information comes from this source.
- 50) Ibid., p. 3.
- 51) Ibid., item no. 255, 3pp. Unless otherwise stated, all information comes from this source.
- 52) Ibid., p. 2.
- 53) Wagner, p. 348.
- 54) T-1022 Reel no. 2700 PG 46896, Ktb. Boehm, p. 2.
- 55) Ibid, PG 46900, Ktb. Boehm, p. 19.
- 56) Hayes, p. 277.
- 57) T-1022 Reel no. 2700 PG 46895, Ktb. Boehm, pp. 1- and 9.

- 58) Boehm, MS 1944, pp. 26-9. Unless otherwise mentioned, all the information presented on this topic comes from this source.
- 59) Hewins, p. 318.
- 60) Boehm, "politische Entwicklung", p. 28.
- 61) Idem, Norwegen, p. 146.
- 62) Goebbels Diaries, ed. and trans. by L.P. Lochner. (New York, 1948), p. 99.
- 63) Reprinted in Boehm, MS 1944, p. 39. Emphasis in the original.
- 64) Cited in idem, Norwegen, p. 148.
- 65) Ibid., p. 149.
- 66) Ibid., pp. 150-1. Unless otherwise mentioned, all the information presented on this point comes from this source.
- 67) Hayes, p. 277.
- 68) Ibid., pp. 279-80. Unless otherwise mentioned, all the information presented on this point comes from this source.
- 69) Skodvin, p. 148.
- 70) Hitler's Conversations, p. 374.
- 71) This document is reprinted in Boehm, Norwegen, pp. 153-6.
- 72) Ursachen und Folgen, vol. 18 p. 297.
- 73) Boehm, MS 1944, pp. 41-2.
- 74) Ibid., p. 42.
- 75) T-1022 Reel no. 1973 PG 33141, 1/Skl Akte 'Nord', item no. 1635, p. 2.
- 76) Milward, p. 151.
- 77) T-1022 Reel no. 2071 PG 46912, Ktb. Boehm, pp. 10-11.
- 78) Ibid., p. 32.
- 79) T-1022 Reel no. 2071 PG 46914, Ktb. Boehm, Anlage 1 p. 4.
- 80) T-1022 Reel no. 2071 PG 46916, Ktb. Boehm, Anlage 4 p. 2.



- 81) T-1022 Reel no. 2071 PG 46913, Ktb. Boehm pp. 9 and 27. See also Reel no. 1973 PG 33142, 1/Skl Akte 'Nord' item no. 1716.
- 82) Boehm, MS 1944, p. 43.
- 83) Ibid., p. 32. See also Boehm, Norwegen, pp. 159-60.
- 84) Idem, Norwegen, p. 160 footnote no. 11.
- 85) Kriegstagebuch OKW, vol. 2 part 1, p. 125.
- 86) TMWC, vol. 14 p. 101.
- 87) Ibid., vol. 41 Raeder 107, pp. 62-3.
- 88) This agrees with the conclusion reached by A. Hillgruber as the editor of Kriegstagebuch/der OKW, vol. 2 part 1, p. 125.
- 89) TMWC, vol. 41, Raeder 108, pp. 64-6. Unless otherwise mentioned, all information presented on this document comes from this source.
- 90) Ibid., p. 65.
- 91) Boehm, MS 1944, p. 45.

## Epilogue

### Sudden End and New Skirmishes: December 1942 - May 1945

When Boehm left Norway on December 22, 1942 for a brief vacation, he had every reason to look forward to his return in the new year.<sup>1</sup> There were only two men who had the power to remove him from his post, Grand Admiral Raeder and Hitler himself. Since Boehm enjoyed the confidence of his immediate superior he had little to fear from that quarter, while Hitler had been reluctant to intervene directly in Boehm's dispute with Terboven. This favourable constellation of forces was overturned by the shock-waves created by a German naval defeat.

The naval operation which was to undermine Boehm's position had begun on December 30, 1942 under the code-name Regenbogen.<sup>2</sup> On that date, the armoured ship Lützow, the heavy cruiser Admiral Hipper and six destroyers had sailed from their base at Alta Fjord to attack an Allied convoy enroute to the Russian port of Murmansk. The convoy, known as JW 51B, was escorted by six English destroyers as well as some minor naval auxiliaries. In addition, a small task force composed of two British cruisers, H.M.S. Sheffield and H.M.S. Jamaica, and two destroyers formed the convoy's close covering force. The Hipper and some of the German destroyers sighted the van of the convoy on the morning of December 31. In the course of the ensuing battle, the Hipper sank one of the convoy's auxiliary

escorts and badly damaged a destroyer which sank later.

The remaining British destroyers managed to keep the Hipper at bay, until the two British cruisers could enter the fray. They did so with a vengeance, severely damaging the Hipper and sinking one of the German destroyers. The arrival of the British cruisers allowed the convoy's escort to thwart the Lützow's attempt to shoot up the convoy by laying an effective smokescreen. After the Hipper had been damaged, the German commander ordered his ships to return to base in compliance with his orders to avoid unnecessary risks.

Over the horizon, a German submarine commander viewed the flashes of gunfire and reported that "...the battle has now reached its climax. I see nothing but red".<sup>3</sup> When this vague signal reached Berlin, Hitler interpreted it as an indication of a German victory. Within hours, this delusion was smashed by an intercepted BBC news report which outlined the full extent of the Royal Navy's victory. Hitler immediately demanded a full report from the operation's commander, Vizeadmiral Oscar Kummetz, who chose to maintain radio silence until his force was in port. Kummetz did so, on the grounds that breaking radio silence might have endangered his already damaged flagship.

By this time the dictator had worked himself into a rage, and Raeder was summoned to his headquarters.<sup>4</sup> Raeder delayed his arrival in Berlin, in the belief that Hitler's anger would subside in the interim. The Grand Admiral argued that the delay was necessary for him to prepare a full report on the operation.

His belief that Hitler's anger would peter out proved to be mistaken. On January 6, 1943 Raeder met with the aggravated dictator who harangued his Grand Admiral on the uselessness of the surface fleet in all of Germany's wars. Raeder insisted that Hitler accept his resignation, and requested that it be effective on January 30, 1943. As a face-saving measure for both parties, it was agreed that Raeder would be appointed to a new, but powerless, position of "Admiralinspekteur" of the Kriegsmarine.

On January 14, Raeder recommended two candidates to Hitler for the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine. The preferred candidate was Generaladmiral Carls, who was regarded by the German naval officer corps as "Raeder's Crown Prince". His second candidate was a man whom Hitler had been considering for the post: Admiral Karl Dönitz, the commander of the submarine fleet. Although Raeder did recommend Dönitz, the retiring Commander-in-Chief warned Hitler of a reservation concerning the promotion of Dönitz:

Voll geeignet ist ferner der Admiral Dönitz, dessen Ernennung den Vorteil in sich schliesse, dass damit die Bedeutung des Ubootskrieges für die Kriegsentscheidung besonders betont würde.

Als Nachteil wäre nur anzuführen, dass Admiral Dönitz mit seiner Ernennung zum Ob.d.M. sich der unmittelbaren Führung des Ubootskrieges nicht mehr in dem bisherigen Masse widmen könnte. Vielleicht liesse sich dieser Nachteil aber durch organisatorische Massnahmen mildern.<sup>5</sup>

During his brief period as a Russian prisoner-of-war, Raeder indicated that his preference for Carls was based on Dönitz' inadequate preparation for the task of Commander-in-Chief:

Er war aber naturgemäss einseitig auf die U-Boots-

Kriegführung eingestellt und besass nicht den erforderlichen Überblick über alle Fragen der Gesamtkriegführung.<sup>6</sup>

On the basis of these two documents, one historian has argued that Raeder's recommendation of Donitz was only a ploy through which the retiring Grand Admiral hoped to eliminate Dönitz' candidacy. By stressing that the promotion of Dönitz could have negative repercussions on the submarine war, Raeder may have been hoping to influence Hitler to retain Dönitz in his post. This ploy failed. During an interview with Hitler on January 25, Dönitz declared that he was resolved to direct the submarine campaign personally - even if he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine.<sup>7</sup>

At Nuremberg, Raeder maintained that the Boehm-Terboven affair had been one of the factors which had led to his retirement in January 1943.<sup>8</sup> Since Raeder had written to Boehm on October 23, 1942 that the Kriegsmarine should withdraw from the struggle, this appears doubtful.<sup>9</sup> There was a further indication that the question of Norway's political future under the Third Reich was not a dominant factor in Raeder's decision to retire. This was apparent in his final address to the officers of the OKM on January 30, 1943 as Raeder did not discuss his "Norwegen-Politik".<sup>10</sup> Most likely, this issue had played only a minor role in Raeder's resignation.

For Boehm, the period between early January and the middle of February 1943 must have been difficult. According to his War Diary, he had returned to Norway for a brief period during the first fifteen days of the month.<sup>11</sup> From January 16 through

February 20, Boehm was again on vacation. While it is not known when Dönitz informed Boehm that he was to be retired, this probably occurred before February 20. Boehm's last tour of duty lasted from February 20 through to March 2, 1943.<sup>12</sup> This is the last time that Boehm is listed as the Naval Commander Norway in the War Diary of this office.<sup>13</sup> The change in title for Boehm's post in Norway had been made on February 14, 1943.<sup>14</sup> Schreiber was somewhat more fortunate than Boehm, as the former Attaché remained at his post in Norway until September 1943. At that time, he was reassigned to the OKM offices in Berlin.<sup>15</sup>

Boehm's release from the Kriegsmarine was not an isolated incident. Following his installation as the new Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine, Dönitz made a very thorough shake-up of the Kriegsmarine's hierarchy. On March 9, Goebbels drew a parallel between Dönitz and his new counterpart in the OKW:

"Schmundt is making a clean sweep here, just as Dönitz is doing in the Navy."<sup>16</sup> At Nuremberg, the new Grand Admiral defended his shake-up:

Since I was between seven to ten years younger than the other commanders for the Navy, for instance Admiral Carls, Admiral Boehm, and others, it was naturally difficult for both parties. They were released for these reasons and, I believe, in spite of mutual respect and esteem.<sup>17</sup>

In the case of Boehm, one cannot dismiss the possibility that Dönitz wished to eliminate one area of dispute between the Nazi party and the Kriegsmarine. One historian, M. Salewski, has cautioned that one should not attempt to read too much into these changes, because the leading edge of Raeder's Kriegsmarine was "veraltet". In addition, he has argued that the very nature

of a Dönitz-led Kriegsmarine would in itself justify the transition.<sup>18</sup> Nonetheless, Salewski has also noted that Dönitz viewed Boehm's successor - Admiral Ciliax - as being: "wesentlich konzilianter, weniger ehrgeizig und weniger empfindlich war als sein eigenwilliger Vorgänger."<sup>19</sup>

Whatever the reason, Terboven had benefited from the recent shake-up in the Kriegsmarine. On March 19, 1943 he met with a representative of the new Naval Commander Norway to discuss the recruiting of Norwegian sailors for the Kriegsmarine. An indication of the wind of change which was blowing in Norway was that Terboven did not speak with Schreiber on this issue. Also, there was no hint of any animosity during this meeting.<sup>20</sup>

Terboven was indeed fortunate that the last of his highly placed German critics had now made their exit, all the more so, because from the spring of 1943 onwards, Terboven had started to lose the support of both Hitler and Goebbels. On March 9, Hitler and Goebbels discussed the candidates who were available for new posts in the Nazi regime:

Terboven is out of the question. Terboven didn't measure up to expectations in Norway. His actions were too drastic. He considered the Norwegian problem so to speak an SA man's job. Instead it required tremendous political cleverness. This Terboven did not possess.<sup>21</sup>

In September of 1943, Raeder made another attempt to influence the course of political events in Norway. Both he and Boehm had been requesting that Hitler grant Boehm an audience, so that the former Commanding Admiral Norway could vent his views on the failure of Terboven's policies in Norway.<sup>22</sup> Boehm

finally got his wish on September 29, 1943 when Hitler allowed the retired Admiral to voice his opinion. Boehm has maintained that, during this meeting, he vented all his complaints against Terboven and his policies. In this meeting, perhaps over an hour and a quarter long, Hitler listened to both Boehm's complaints and recommendations. On October 31, Hitler's naval adjutant wrote to Boehm and gave him Hitler's final verdict on the Boehm-Terboven affair:

Der Führer hat vor einigen Tagen einem Herrn seiner Umgebung gegenüber geäußert, dass er sich freue, dass niemals eine schwerwiegende Differenz zwischen einem höheren Marineoffizier und Parteiführer vorgekommen sei im Gegensatz zum Heere. Der Fall Boehm-Terboven habe auf einem anderen Gebeite gelegen, und ausserdem habe da der Generaladmiral Boehm Recht gehabt.<sup>23</sup>

Despite these words, Hitler made no visible move to replace Terboven. It would appear that Hitler had chosen to regard the Boehm-Terboven affair as being more a personality conflict than a power struggle.

Raeder's very last initiative on the Norwegian problem was made near the end of 1943. At this time, Raeder had suggested that Hitler replace Terboven with Boehm. Although this has never been firmly dated, it was probably before Boehm's last encounter with Hitler. As late as January 3, 1944 Boehm had indicated to Raeder that he would have been willing to accept the post of Reichskommissar Norwegen.<sup>24</sup> Hitler never acted on this proposal, even in the wake of Terboven's ill-considered actions of November and December, 1943.

On November 30, 1943 Terboven moved against the



student population of Oslo in retaliation for an act of sabotage on campus.<sup>25</sup> In one fell swoop, the German security police arrested over 1200 students. The Reichskommissar's chief of police justified this action on the grounds that the majority of the university students had been opposed to the Germans ever since Weserübung. On December 7, Terboven ordered that 291 of the students and some 740 other political prisoners be transported to special camps in Germany. For a brief moment, this "Oslo Affair" was to revive the Kriegsmarine's flagging interest in the legacy of the Boehm-Terboven affair.

On December 7, Admiral Ciliax - the newly appointed Naval Commander Norway, noted in his War Diary that Terboven had defended this extreme measure as the only effective way to eliminate acts of sabotage. Ciliax was, however, of another opinion:

Es bleibt jedoch offen, ob dieses Ziel nicht durch Massnahmen hätte erreicht werden können, die der Feindseite und dem neutralen Ausland weniger Gelegenheit zur propagandistischen Auswertung gegeben hätten.

Gelegentlich einer heutigen Unterhaltung mit dem Reichskommissar stellte ich zu meiner Überraschung fest, dass der beschrittene Weg, dessen politische Tragweite nicht unterschätzt werden konnte, ohne vorherige Fühlungnahme mit der politischen Führung des Reiches erfolgt ist.<sup>26</sup>

Terboven's independant action angered both Goebbels and Hitler:

Nevertheless, the whole Oslo affair stinks. The Fuehrer too, is quite angry about the way in which it was handled. He received two representatives of Terboven and gave them an energetic scolding. Terboven has once more behaved like a bull in a china shop.<sup>27</sup>

Goebbels went on to call Terboven's latest manoeuvre "stupid"

and argued that if Terboven had consulted with Hitler first, the Führer would have "forbidden the coup".<sup>28</sup>

On December 8, Ciliax answered Hitler's request for suggestions on how the Wehrmacht could reduce its manpower wastage. The Naval Commander Norway said that many duties and functions had been duplicated needlessly in Norway. His main point was, however, that the overall command of the Wehrmacht be given to a naval officer.<sup>29</sup> The revival of Raeder's long-standing ambition at this time was a strong indication that some circles in the Kriegsmarine still wished to play a major role in occupied Norway. Ciliax followed up this suggestion on December 17 by listing the advantages of a naval command of Norway.<sup>30</sup> His second effort proved a waste of time, for he received a telegram later on the same day informing him that the OKM had no interest in assuming the responsibility of the territorial defense of Norway in addition to the maritime.<sup>31</sup>

Ciliax' pre-occupation with the position of Wehrmacht-befehlshaber Norwegen was stimulated by the fact that this post was to become vacant in the near future. On December 18, 1944 Falkenhorst was officially released from both his command and the German Army. His immediate successor was Generaloberst Dr. Lothar Rendulic. Rendulic was replaced by General Franz Böhme on January 18, 1945.<sup>32</sup> To some degree, it can be said that Falkenhorst's career in Norway paralleled that of Generaladmiral Boehm. He too had had his share of disagreements with Terboven, and had been dismissed for military reasons.<sup>33</sup>

Ciliax' criticism of Terboven's actions of November-December 1943 was the second to last confrontation between the Kriegsmarine and Terboven during the Second World War. On March 9, 1945 Terboven made a formal appeal to Hitler on the subject of the administration of Norway in the last stage of the Third Reich. Goebbels has discussed this proposal in his diary entry for that date:

Terboven has submitted a memorandum to the Führer about the system of command in Norway in emergency. He proposed that he should become deputy Commander-in-Chief to [General] Böhme to ensure that political affairs are handled correctly in emergency. I do not think that the Führer can accept this proposal.<sup>34</sup>

Terboven made a last-ditch attempt to gain some additional power in May, 1945 from Hitler's successor-Dönitz.

As the Third Reich was crumbling, Terboven combined forces with Himmler to force the hand of Hitler's appointed successor. They wanted to have the right to order large scale demolitions in the areas still under German control; Denmark, Norway, and parts of Holland and Czechoslovakia. They hoped to use these powers as a bargaining tool with the Allies. In addition, they requested that a censor oversee all of the public announcements made by the new German Government. Dönitz refused to consider these requests.<sup>35</sup>

Thus, it was Dönitz who fired the last round in the Kriegsmarine's long struggle with Terboven. On May 8, 1945 Terboven committed suicide.<sup>36</sup> Quisling, the would-be benefactor of Raeder's "Norwegen Politik" was arrested on May 9 and brought to trial by the Norwegian government. The verdict was delivered

on October 13, and on October 24, 1945 Quisling was executed for treason.<sup>37</sup> Quisling's death signified the end of the dream of a "Germanic Federation" of the "Nordic peoples" of Europe which he, Rosenberg, and the naval triumvirate of Raeder, Boehm, and Schreiber had promoted.

# NOTES

- 1) T-1022 Reel no. 2701 PG 46918 Ktb. Boehm, n.p.
- 2) This summary of the Battle of the Barents Sea is based on: B. B. Schoefield, The Russian Convoys. (London, 1971), pp. 130-47. For a more detailed account see: D. Pope, 73 North. (London, 1976).
- 3) Schoefield, p. 145.
- 4) M. Salewski, "Von Raeder zu Dönitz: Der Wechsel im Oberbefehl der Kriegsmarine 1943." Militär-geschichtliche Mitteilungen, 4 (1973) pp. 101-146. Unless otherwise mentioned, all information presented on the 1943 change in command of the Kriegsmarine is based on this source.
- 5) This document is reproduced in Ibid., p. 133.
- 6) Ibid., p. 124.
- 7) Ibid.
- 8) TMWC, vol. 14 p. 101.
- 9) Ibid., vol. 41 pp. 62-3.
- 10) See Salewski, "Von Raeder zu Dönitz", pp. 139-45.
- 11) T-1022 Reel no. 2701 PG 46919, Ktb. Boehm, title page, n.p.
- 12) Ibid., PG 46920, - 46922, Ktb. Komm. Adm. Norwegen and Ktb. Oberbefehlshaber des Marineoberkommandos in Norwegen, title pages, n.p. Unless otherwise noted all documents in this group will be referred to as Ktb. Boehm.
- 13) See Ibid., PG 46922, and PG 46923, Ktb. Boehm, title pages, n.p.
- 14) Ibid., PG 46921, p. 39
- 15) Lohmann and Hildebrand, vol. 3, sec. 291 p. 341.
- 16) Goebbels Diaries, p. 325
- 17) TMWC, vol. 13 p. 310.
- 18) Salewski, Seekriegsleitung, vol. 2 pp. 244-5.
- 19) Ibid., p. 241.

- 20) T-1022 Reel no. 2071 PG 46924, Ktb. Oberbefehlshaber des Marineoberkommandos Norwegen, p. 4. Hereafter referred to as Ktb. Ciliax.
- 21) Goebbels Diaries, p. 407. See also the entries for May 22, 1943 on pp. 436-7; and for September 23, 1943 p. 534.
- 22) Boehm, Norwegen, p. 164.
- 23) Idem, MS 1944, p. 1.
- 24) Idem, Norwegen, pp. 163-4.
- 25) T-1022 Reel no. 2702 PG 46940 Ktb. Ciliax, pp. 8-10. Unless otherwise mentioned, all the information presented on this action of Terboven comes from this source.
- 26) Ibid., pp. 8-9.
- 27) Goebbels Diaries, p. 612.
- 28) Ibid.
- 29) PG 46940 pp. 10-11; and Anlage 1 pp. 1-2.
- 30) T-1022 Reel no. 2702 PG 46941, Ktb. Ciliax, pp. 3-4.
- 31) Ibid., Anlage 1 p. 1.
- 32) For the dates of Falkenhorst's dismissal and Böhme's appointment see: Das deutsche Heer, ed. by M. Keilig. (Bad Nauheim, 1956), vol. 3 sec. 211 pp. 79 and 35 respectively. For Rendulac's brief term see: Kriegstagebuch OKW vol. 4 part 1, 1944-1945, ed. by P. E. Schramm, p. 920.
- 33) On Falkenhorst's disputes with Terboven see: Stevens, pp. 152, 161, and 187. See also Ursachen und Folgen, Index vol. 1 p. 180, and Gordon, p. 460. For the military reason behind his dismissal see: Kriegstagebuch OKW vol. 4 part 2, p. 1332.
- 34) The Final Entries 1945: The Diaries of Joseph Goebbels, [trans. by R. Barry] and ed. by H. Trevor-Roper. (New York, 1979), p. 109.
- 35) Speer, pp. 495-6.
- 36) For a graphic account of Terboven's suicide see idem, Spandau, trans. by R. and C. Winston. (New York, 1976), p. 239.
- 37) Hayes, pp. 302-3.

### Conclusion

The focal point of the Boehm-Terboven affair was the role cast for Quisling by the Kriegsmarine's leadership which diverged greatly from Terboven's own viewpoint. From their first meeting onwards, Terboven had held a very poor opinion of Quisling's abilities. For this reason, the Reichskommissar had attempted to force Quisling to resign his position as head of the Nasjonal Samling so that an old acquaintance of Terboven's could assume this position. Simultaneously, Terboven had attempted to form a more malleable Norwegian administration to replace the Administrative Council. Success in both of these manoeuvres would have given Terboven full control over the political evolution of German occupied Norway.

Quisling had some highly placed German supporters, most notably the head of the APA, Rosenberg, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine, Raeder. Before Terboven's arrival in Norway, some segments of the Navy's leadership had begun to express doubt over the advisability of maintaining the support given Quisling earlier. The appointment of Terboven was a clear signal that Hitler intended to bring his 'National Socialist Revolution' to Norway. Both the APA and the Kriegsmarine were aware of the ideological proximity between Hitler's National Socialist Party and Quisling's Nasjonal Samling. The two groups which had first introduced Quisling to the Nazi Court, also felt the need to protect their protégé from all comers - including Terboven.

Both Raeder and Rosenberg were aware of the ideological affinity of the German and Norwegian parties and leaders. While Rosenberg probably supported Quisling for this reason, it can be said that the concerns of the Kriegsmarine were primarily tactical. Quisling was the only Norwegian political figure who was willing to co-operate with the Third Reich. Since the Kriegsmarine had wished to avoid creating tensions between the German military and the Norwegian population, it seemed logical for it to support the formation of a new, semi-autonomous Norwegian administration, which would be able to walk the tightrope between German and Norwegian interests. The Kriegsmarine had already implemented this strategy in the industries which it regarded as important, eg. the Bergens Mekaniske Verksted. Even before Weserübung, the Kriegsmarine had made every effort to prevent the creation of tensions between the Wehrmacht and the Norwegian people. The naval triumvirate of Raeder, Boehm, and Schreiber realized that any attempt by the Germans to install a fully subservient puppet regime in Norway would not be accepted by the Norwegian people. They maintained that the best way to assure Germany of a complacent, occupied Norway was to respect the Norwegians' national pride. They believed that Quisling would be able to rally the country behind his movement and would therefore prove to be a useful collaborationist. Terboven's campaign against Quisling was seen as threat to good relations between the two nations. In addition, Terboven's attempt to replace Quisling with his own candidate would have certainly eliminated a major part



of the influence which the Kriegsmarine could bear upon the future political and economic development of occupied Norway.

In the sense that Quisling managed to retain the leadership of his party throughout the German occupation, the intervention of the Kriegsmarine can be labelled successful. The fact that Quisling was able to assume the mantle of Norwegian "Minister-President" is due to the support given him by Raeder, Rosenberg, et al. The Kriegsmarine must share the kudos for these limited achievements with Rosenberg's organization, for it was the combined weight of their recommendations, and protests, to Hitler that finally resulted in the compromises of September 25, 1940 and February 1, 1942.

One can say with certainty, that Terboven's open dispute with the Kriegsmarine began no later than June 30, 1940. Until March 1941, Terboven was content to force the issue through direct complaints to Goebbels and Hitler. In this period, with a few minor exceptions, his dispute was with Raeder not Boehm. In December of 1940, the tension soon spread to military matters.

The Allied raid on Svolvær changed the character of this dispute considerably. Terboven felt the need to place the blame for this fiasco squarely on the shoulders of the Naval Command in Oslo- Boehm. The ultimate repercussions of this action lead to the real Boehm-Terboven dispute. In 1942, Terboven began to intrigue against Boehm, and this campaign was only ended by Boehm's departure from Norway in March 1943. Although Raeder and Boehm made some attempts to advance their cause after

this date, they no longer presented a real threat to his position.

During the first months of his tour of duty in Norway, Terboven concentrated on eliminating the pro-Quisling faction within the Nazi Party. It was only after his defeat at the hands of both the Kriegsmarine and the APA that the Reichskommissar began to complain about the Navy's "Politik Norwegens". For the most part, Hitler chose to remain aloof in Terboven's growing struggle with the Kriegsmarine. In the end, Terboven resolved his dilemma by luring Quisling into a hopeless position. When Quisling chose to accept political responsibility, against the advice of the Kriegsmarine, on Terboven's terms the issue was finally resolved.

Quisling proved incapable of providing the strong and popular leadership necessary to win Hitler's support. Consequently, Quisling became a powerless German figurehead.

The policy advocated by the naval triumvirate, closely approached Quisling's proposals. Both wanted to see Norway regain a degree of independence while being closely bonded to Germany in a special "federative union". At most, Quisling was willing let Germany obtain control over neutral Norway's foreign policy and to retain the right to intervene militarily, should Norway's independence and neutrality be threatened. He fervently hoped to gain for Norway a special status in Hitler's "grossgermanische Reich". Both Goebbels and Hitler found this conception of Quisling's to be "childish".<sup>1</sup>

The policy advocated for the administration of German occupied Norway by the Kriegsmarine was, therefore, also "childish".

The naval triumvirate had expected Hitler to treat Norway as a special nation in his New Order. Both Raeder and Boehm had consistently maintained that Hitler should give the Norwegian people a clear sign that their nation would regain its independence and neutrality after the successful conclusion of the war- if not earlier. Naturally, they foresaw a Norway closely allied to Germany via a "Germanic Federation" and the ideological bonds of the Nasjonal Samling and National Socialism.

In the end their policy failed, both because of Terboven's heavy-handedness and the full scale lack of popular support for Quisling within his own nation. The hope that Quisling, as leader of the native fascist movement in Norway, would be acceptable to both Hitler and the Norwegian people proved to be ill-founded. The Kriegsmarine's support of Quisling has allowed the historian Looch to claim that the "Marinepolitik Norwegens" was nothing more than an example of the existence of a "Marine-National-sozialismus".<sup>2</sup>

Looch has also argued that there was an economic basis for the Kriegsmarine's interest in the administration of occupied Norway. He has maintained that this concern was triggered by the appointment of "Göring's man" to the post of Reichskommissar Norwegen. As evidence Looch noted that, for the most part, Terboven did prove to be more concerned with the economic needs of the Luftwaffe than the Kriegsmarine.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, the economic historian Alan S. Milward did not examine this aspect in his The Fascist Economy of Norway. The War Diary of

Admiral Commanding Norway and its successor office do not throw much light on this issue. In general, there is no evidence in these sources which indicate that the economic factor was crucial from the outset, and for that matter during, the entire Boehm-Terboven affair.

We are then forced to return to Loock's argument regarding the existence of a "Marine-Nationalsozialismus". In the final analysis, the full edifice of the policy proposed by the Kriegsmarine for post-invasion Norway was a reflection of Hitler's National Socialist ideology. This reflection was, like most reflections, distorted and somewhat inaccurate; as Hitler never exhibited any intention of granting Norway even a degree of independence. At best, the Boehm-Terboven affair was more a question of form, not substance. Despite the post-war protestations of Boehm and Raeder, both parties in this dispute wished to see Norway under a fascist-type administration. The significance of the Boehm-Terboven affair is that it should have challenged the misconception of National Socialism which was prevalent in the leadership of the Kriegsmarine. The tragedy of the Boehm-Terboven affair is that it never did so.

NOTES

- 1) Goebbels Diaries, p. 99.
- 2) Looçk, Quisling, p. 498.
- 3) Ibid., pp. 499-500.

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PG 46921-964	Kriegstagebuch, Oberbefehlshaber des Marineoberkommandos Norwegen.
PG 47316-326	Akten, Marineoberkommando Norwegen.

PG 47346-349 Akten, Kommandierender Admiral Norwegen.

PG 47511-512 Marineoberkommando Norwegen, Kriegserfahrungen und Sonstiges.

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1977	1978	1979	2012	2013
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2019	2020	2021	2057	2058
2059	2060	2061	2700	2701
2702	2705	2706	2724	2750
2756	2757	2758	2777	2842
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