Emile N. Nucho: THE SHĪ'Ī MATĀWILA OF LEBANON

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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of the Shī'ī community of Lebanon. The thrust of the study is the political development of the Shī'a in the light of certain past events. The Shī'a, otherwise known as Matāwila, are admitted to be the poorest of the Lebanese communities, materially and educationally. They are almost totally dependent on a small upper class of notables who derive their power from land as well as financial enterprises, and by exploiting their "clients" through control of their resources.

The thesis attempts to discover why the Shī'a are in such a state of political, economic and social retardation. It is proposed that much of the answer lies in their history and their geographic situation.

The study attempts to fulfill a no les important task: that of presenting interested students with an introduction to the Shī'a of Lebanon, who have been hitherto grossly ignored by Oriental ard Western scholars alike.

THE SHI'I MATAWILA OF LEBANON

A Study of Their Political Development in Historical Perspective

by

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Introduction

The Matāwila, is the name by which the great majority of the Shī'a of Lebanon are known. Not all Shī'a are Matāwila, since there are small numbers of Shī'a called 'Alawiyyūn, and Nuṣayriyyūn.

Mutawālī, singular of Matāwila, has its roots in the verb walia or walā and walā'. These words mean to befriend, or to acknowledge the "suzerainty" or authority of a designated person. According to one ḥadīth (Prophetic tradition), the Prophet Muḥammad said:"Man tawallānī fal-yatawalla 'Aliyyan"[1]. The sentence conveys to the reader the meaning: "Whosoever accepted my authority (and supported me), let him then accept the authority (and give support to) 'Alī."

These alleged instructions by Muḥammad also serve as one of the bases of Shī'ī adherence to 'Alī and the ensuing dispute with Sunnī beliefs.

In the religio-social sense, therefore, Mutawālī simply means one who befriended 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, or at least his cause. But again, it is strictly applied to the Shī'a of Lebanon who are also Twelver Imāmī Shī'a in doctrine.

Different explanations have appeared in different sources, as to the origins of the term Mutawālī. As late as the 11th century, A.H., Muḥibbī, author of Khulāṣat al-athar fī a'yān al-qarn al-ḥādī 'ashar, used the appellation Rāfiḍa (deniers).[2] And in Silk al-durar fī a'yān al-qarn al-thānī 'ashar, under the heading Jabal 'Āmil, they have been mentioned as Matāwila;[3] while, "In some annual gazettes of Turkey, the

origin of Matāwila has been traced back to A.H. 1100. In short, the political organizations formed against the Lebanese aristocracy supporting Āl Naṣṣār al-Wā'iliyyūn, fighting under the banner of Āl Ḥarfūsh in Ba'labakk and under the leadership of Āl Ḥamāda in north Lebanon, were called Banī Mutwāl.[4]

A different explanation of the term Mutawālī comes from the same source:"The great scholar Muḥammad 'Abdu writes that the ....Matāwila used the war-cry: 'mutt waliyyan' (die a friend; or, die loyal), in their battles; and as such, all Shī'a were named Mutawālī."[5]

There are several stories pertaining to the origins of the Matāwila. In his Histoire du Liban, J. Nantet explained that certain Arab tribes of Yemenī affiliation, as well as certain groups of Persian exiles and immigrants were brought to the Syrian coast during the Muslim conquests and the reign of Mu'āwiyā (661-680 A.D.), first Khalīfa of the Umayya dynasty, These people, it is reported, were to become the nucleus of the future Lebanese Shī'a or Matāwila.[6]

I have included the above from Nantet because it is one more version of a clouded part of history. It must be noted however, that the author does not give any reference to his point. Therefore, it could not be examined for accuracy.

Despite the lack of reference in those accounts they seem to agree, at least in terms of location, with the accounts of such geographers and travelers as Muqaddasī, Dimashqī and Ya'qūbī. In 825 A.D., Muqaddasī

wrote:

> Jabal ʿĀmila is a mountainous district where many fine villages are. This district is called after thetribe of the Banū ʿĀmila, who were settled here in the early days of the Muslim conquest. The district corresponds roughly with Upper Galilee. During the period of the Crusades, the tribe migrated north..." 7

In 1300 A.D., Dimashqī wrote:

> In the Province of Ṣafad is the district of ... Jabal ʿĀmila, full of vineyards, olives, carob and terebinth trees. Its population is of the Rāfiḍa Imāmiyya; and Jabaʿ with a population of Rāfiḍa Imāmiyya as well". 8

Dimashqī also mentioned the existence of the fortresses of Shqīf Hawnayn and Shqīf Tayrūn, as well as Mount Tibnīn. He also wrote that the area had been regained from the Franks by the Mamlūk Sulṭān of Egypt, al-Ẓāhir Baybars; and that the whole region was governed by a Nā'ib (deputy to the Sulṭān; Governor).[9]

Under the heading, Jabal al-Jalīl (Mount Galilee), Yaʿqūbī wrote in 891 A.D.:"The inhabitants of these mountains are Arabs of the ʿĀmila tribe."[10] Jabal al-Jalīl includes the whole area south of Sidon and Ṣarafand.

The Banū ʿĀmila was an old tribe in north-western Arabia. They were apparently settled south-east of the Dead Sea at the time of the Muslim conquest. They are mentioned in Ṭabarī, al-Aghānī (xi, 155 and i, 2347), and in Balādhurī (59). Shortly after the invasion, they were established in Upper Galilee which is named Jabal ʿĀmila after them. But they do not seem to play any significant role. Following the 11th

century A.D., the ʿĀmila seem to have spread to what is now south Lebanon and the whole area is now called Jabal ʿĀmil.[11]

It is interesting to note that as yet the central Biqāʿ region had not been populated by the Shīʿa; at least such a conclusion is arrived at by lack of any mention in any of the geographies and chronicles surveyed. Moreover, in those early days of settlement and conflict between Sunnī and Shīʿī, the latter sought refuge in the wild fastness of the more or less inaccessible mountain ranges of northern Palestine. There, the Matāwila, like other religio-ethnic groups who sought refuge in the area, quickly developed a fiercely defended sense of autonomy, if not independence.

At the beginning of the 11th century, A.D., a new religious sect made its appearance in the mountains of Lebanon: the Durūz.

Born in Egypt during the reign of the Fāṭimī Khalīfa al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh (996-1021), and revering him, the Durūz faced persecution during the reign of al-Ḥākim's successor.[12] There seemed only one way to go: east and north, towards Syria's mountains. The Matāwila were thus faced by a new, militant threat to their domains. The Durūz were bent on carving out a refuge for themselves. while refusing to co-operate with the Matāwila who believed in a different type of Shīʿism than that of the Fāṭimīs.[13] The Matāwila succeeded in defending themselves and forced the Durūz to move further north, where they eventually pitched their tents in the region of Wādī al-Taym, placing themselves

between the Matāwila and another vigorous mountain people, the Christian Maronites.

I came upon the subject of this study almost by chance: I became interested in the problem of the Shī'a early in my studies. The Shī'a, otherwise known as the Matāwila, comprise almost 50 per cent of the total Muslim population of present day Lebanon, and constitute just over 20 per cent of the national population. Despite this numerical strength, the Shī'a are in general, one of the poorest groups of people in Lebanon. Furthermore, in a country built and administered on the basis of confessional and regional balance, the Matāwila have a very small share of responsibility in the affairs of state; on the contrary, they make up a large part of the illiterate segment of the country and of the menial labor force.

> Shi'ites, find themselves in Lebanon because of the excellent hiding places provided by its steep mountains, narrow valleys, and wild gorges. Whether originally resident in these parts or subsequently finding refuge in the remote parts of Lebanon, the outer fringe of contemporary Lebanon is now inhabited by Shi'ites. The Shi'ites are found in two concentrations, one in South Lebanon along the Palestine border, and in Tyre, and the second in the Baalbak-Hermel area of the northern Biq'a district. While some links are maintained with Shi'ites elsewhere, especially in Iraq and Iran, and while the ulama are influential in the larger towns of these two districts, the political power of the Shi'tes is concentrated in the hands of two major zu'ama and a few local dignitaries. The Shi'ites are generally admitted to be the worst off in terms of education and material progress. The Shi'ite is typically a peasant or landless agricultural laborer rather than a member of the urban proletariat. Many

> of the Shi'ite villages are so backward that their internal organization is still primarily based on tribal affiliations. The za'im presides over all tribes.... but the za'im is not able to prevent intra-communal conflict. In matters of broad political concern the poor, uneducated Shi'ite peasant depends entirely upon his za'im. Shi'ite zu'ama can deliver the vote automatically and hence control the composition of the list which gets elected in their own regions.
>
> The extension of roads, health, electrification and potable water systems to the remoter parts of the country is now beginning to reach the Shi'ite peasantry and may cause some important changes in the pattern of Shi'ite political relationships. It will certainly permit more Shi'ites to find their way to the big city. In the meantime however, the zu'ama control this community very tightly. They maintain control by saving their peasants from the police, through their economic control over the villages' land and/or crops, and through the support of the religious authorities. Unlike other confessional groups, the Shi'ites are fairly isolated and cannot learn by simply watching what other groups are doing. There is no traditional or 'natural' Shi'ite tendency to form friendships and intercommunal cliques and factions at the grass roots level. When all is said and done, the Shi'ite rank-and-file experience little and know less of the democratic aspects of the Lebanese régime... The 'share' of the Shi'ite community remains the share of the Shi'ite zu'ama. 14

The above quotation aptly summarizes the background situation of the Matāwila; at the same time it raises the question to be posed: why are the Matāwila in such a position and how did they come to be in it?

In order to answer this question, a knowledge of Mutawālī development is necessary, for in it lies the key to their present condition. The task grew in magnitude as I discovered that nothing extensive has been written about that segment of the Muslim population of Syria, either in Arabic or in any Western language. In fact, neither

fellow Syrians or Lebanese on the one hand, nor Western scholars on the other hand, have seriously explored the matter for its own sake. Only one work is devoted to that community, but it is written by an ʿĀmilī and confines itself to his native Jabal ʿĀmil. Thus, the history and development of the Shīʿa in other regions had to be found in fragmentary form.

This work then, is an attempt to present a case study of the political progression of an underdeveloped community and its reactions to the appearance of modern events. It is also a study of the role played by the political lay leaders of that community.

A secondary aim of the study is to present students of Islamic history with an introduction to the history and development of the Shīʿa of Lebanon which, hitherto, and for one reason or another, has been totally ignored.

The entry of Jabal ʿĀmil in particular, and the Matāwila in general into the modern era, can be dated from 1863, when the last of the so-called feudal phases (1842-1863), came to an end and direct Ottoman rule was established. The study begins on that date by describing the turmoil which resulted. There occurred a kind of fermentation in politico-social relationships which shook the bases of the old traditional structure. This upheaval was followed later by the rise of a new kind of notable who was reform minded and interested in the betterment of the region and its people. This new kind of figure gained so much

popularity so quickly that the traditional notables were alarmed and reacted violently. The immediate results were in favor of the traditional notable; but the long term effects were to be detrimental. The traditional notables had eventually to find an accomodation and meeting-ground with the young notables.

The era of the zu'amā' was not destined to end with the coming of direct Ottoman rule, or the advent of the 20th century. In fact, with the arrival of the French in 1918, and the institution of the Mandate in 1920, the zu'amā' became useful to the French in their attempts to pacify an essentially hostile Syria, and to restructure the political map of that country. Some notables were therefore cultivated, while others were harassed; but all were manipulated to further French policies. Against the wishes of a large number of the population, the zu'amā' finally cooperated in the creation of an independent state of Lebanon. Following that, the zu'amā' discovered that the only way in which their existence and positions could be maintained was through continued attempts to suppress social, economic and political progress and through the preservation of the traditional system and enmities. All this at the expense of their clients in the lower economic classes.

It is important at this point, to present a short review of the book which has inspired this work. Ta'rīkh Jabal 'Āmil, written by Muḥammad Jābir Āl Ṣafā has also been the single most important source, and the guide to most of the other sources used in developing the research.

Ta'rīkh Jabal ʿĀmil, written under more or less subjective conditions, must be approached with circumspection. This is true especially of the period following the turn of the century. Whereas the earlier, pre-20th century events can be verified in relatively available primary sources described in the annotated bibliography, only the most general happenings related by Āl Ṣafā from the 20th century can be checked. The details recounted are basically his own observations and eyewitness accounts of events happening to specific individuals.

Muḥammad Jābir Āl Ṣafā (born in al-Nabaṭiyya in 1875), was given a mixture of religious and secular educations. There are no records of his membership in any of the principal Arab associations or organizations which sprang prior to the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans just after the outbreak of the war of 1914. He was, however, involved in the Movement of Sidon (Ḥarakat Ṣaydā'), described in the main part of this study. He was also instrumental, by his own account, in the formation of a political club, with the aid of Shaykh Aḥmad Riḍā and Shaykh Sulaymān Ẓāhir, at al-Nabaṭiyya. Āl Ṣafā was subsequently tried at the infamous ʿĀlay tribunal in 1915. He was acquitted for lack of evidence.

Āl Ṣafā does not exagerate his partisan sentiments, though he is naturally hostile to the Ottomans as well as to the French. On the other hand, he does not hide his admiration and sympathies for the al-Asʿad family, and indeed, for the traditional system in general. This aspect surfaces several times throughout his work. Thus, given these sentiments,

it is quite impressive to read his accounts of events which were basically uncomplimentary to the al-As'ads or to the scion of the family in the early 20th century, Kāmil al-As'ad. Though some of those accounts cannot be fully substantiated because of the lack of primary sources, be they family records or otherwise, they acquire credibility, for the author could just as easily have ignored them or else have passed them over as insignificant.

The actual work cannot be classified as scholarly by Western standards. Thus, there are no footnotes or reference material accompanying the text. This fact makes matters more difficult for the reader who may also be interested in further research; on the other hand, this is not to say that the work can be dismissed or that it is basically incorrect. It is, after all, the only available general history of Jabal 'Āmil, in any language. It must be added here, that the author has provided a list of books at the end of the work by way of a bibliography. Though it is not structured in the Western manner, it is nevertheless a great indicator towards further research and adds to the credibilityof the work.

Note on Transliteration

Throughout, I have used the Arabic version of words and names. In the case of Turkish names, I have used the Arabic equivalent or origin (e.g. Jamāl, not Jemal or Cemal). There are some exceptions: thus, Pasha (not Paşa or Bāshā). In general, I have used the transliteration system used by Professor P.K. Hitti in his several works,(see, History of Syria, Lebanon in History, and History of the Arabs, all referred to in the bibliography). Again, the exception lies in adding accents where needed. Thus, whereas Hitti writes al-Shihābi, I have added an accent over the last vowel; thus, al-Shihābī. Furthermore, for silent endings, I have disposed with the use of the H to denote such endings (e.g., Zaḥla, not Zaḥlah; al-Jam'iyya, not al-Jam'iyyah).

Common place names used throughout appear in the form generally used in Lippincot's Gazeteer of the World, (e.g., Damascus, not Dimashq; Tripoli, not Ṭarāblus; Sidon, not Ṣayḍā'). Less known places appear in the transliterated form of the original.

Chapter I

Introduction to the Modern Era

The setting of this work is mainly Jabal ʿĀmil, an area which today comprises most of the south of Lebanon. There, the greatest concentration of Matāwila in Syria and Lebanon exists. But it is not the only region inhabited by the Matāwila: there are such large Shīʿī communities in the central Biqāʿ plains of Lebanon, as well as in the northern parts of these plains known as al-Hirmil.

The period I have chosen is that following the momentous but brief Egyptian occupation of Syria and Palestine between 1832 and 1842. The Egyptian presence which saw the introduction of reform measures by Muḥammad ʿAlī Pasha and his son Ibrāhīm, shook the traditional foundations of many regions touched by the new administration.[1]

In Jabal ʿĀmil and in al-Hirmil the traditional customs of total obedience to the dominant notable families were cracking under the impact of the administrative and economic reforms of the Egyptians. In the Jabal proper, feuding among traditional ruling families was an event which began to discredit these families in the eyes of their followers. In fact, sometime in the 1880's, a large delegation of ʿĀmilīs led by Ḥajj Qāṣim al-Zayn travelled to Beirut to present a petition of protest to the Wālī of al-Shām.[2] The petition accused the ruling al-Asʿad, Shaykh Ḥamad, and his friends, of abusing their privileges and positions. The petitioners were fortunate for they had acted at a time when the Ottoman government was casting about for an excuse to weaken these

traditional ruling families, in an effort to implement the new reforms enacted at Istanbul.[3]

The squabbles which broke out following the Egyptian withdrawal were interesting because they demonstrated the system which controlled Jabal ʿĀmil. Previously, the relations of the families were cordial though laced with disagreements. However, matters very rarely reached such serious levels as during this series of feuds.

Incidents began over a disagreement between the most influential family, al-Asʿad, and another important clan, al-Ḥusayn, over the post of ra'īs al-ʿashā'ir[4] of Jabal ʿĀmil. The al-Asʿads who had been the traditional overlords of the region, naturally claimed the position. Furthermore, they had been on the side of the Ottomans in the struggle to evict the Egyptians from Syria. However, after the Egyptian departure, another notable, Tāmir Bey al-Ḥusayn (not a member of the al-Asʿad family whose clan was Āl ʿAlī al-Ṣaghīr), demanded the position. He claimed it on the basis that his father had held the post of Administrator during the occupation.[5] Tāmir Bey even went to Egypt to obtain Egyptian intercession on his behalf.[6] The Ottomans, anxious to break the traditional feudal institutions in the area were then apprehensive of the growing power and influence of the al-Asʿads, led by two brothers, ʿAlī Bey and Muḥammad. The Ottomans therefore granted Tāmir Bey his request. The al-Asʿad brothers resigned their posts as self-styled Administrators and sent a letter of protest to the Wālī. They were simply arrested and deported to Damascus

where they died within days of each other and under still mysterious circumstances.[7] Tāmir Bey, now left to himself, found that he had virtually no freedom of action. As for personal influence and prestige, it was far from what the al-As'ads could muster. Furthermore, the area had, by then, become the scene of violent squabbles and clashes between different notables and their partisans. One of the reasons for this situation was the deliberate Ottoman policy of favoritism towards the lesser families; this in turn whetted the appetite for power of these secondary notables.[8]

By pitting one family against another, one clan against its neighbor, the Ottomans finally succeeded in a kind of direct rule in Jabal 'Āmil for the first time since their conquest of Syria, three and one half centuries earlier. Jabal 'Āmil can now be said to have entered the modern period, for it was in 1864-65 that the reforms of 1839 and 1856 finally began to seep into the region: legal feudalism was eliminated, taxes prescribed by the reforms were to be applied and military service was to be introduced to the Jabal.[9]

Unfortunately, the advent of direct Ottoman rule ushered in an era of oppression and official abuse of powers. Jabal 'Āmil was ruled by the Ottoman Wālī of Syria through a local Mutaṣarrif.[10] The region was therefore at the whim of the Wālī and his deputies. If he were favorable and fair, then Jabal 'Āmil would fare well; if he were corrupt, careless and abusive, then the Jabal would suffer. Within certain limits the wālī had leeway in the interpretation and application of the laws of the Empire. This

characteristic did not help matters because if the wālī were corruptible, he would then accept gifts from prominent families who would become exempt from all or some of their taxes. The poor had no such influence and the burden fell upon them, for the wālī or his deputies had to collect a fixed amount of revenue from any particular region. Thus, if some did not pay, taxes had to be squeezed out of others.[11]

Jabal ʿĀmil was, like many other regions, heavily taxed. On the other hand, land reforms and reapportionment resulted in the wholesale acquisition of huge parcels of land by the wealthy. Added to their traditional properties, these families now became vast land owners. In many cases clients and followers of the notables believed what the latter told them: that land reapportionment and registration laws were nothing more than means to conscript them into the army, or into a sort of corvée, and to tax them further. The peasants, not relishing either prospect sold their prescriptive rights to the wealthy. They then either left, or stayed to become tenants or share-croppers. Those who refused to sell were taxed on their land, on its products and on each tree that might be planted on it.[12] Furthermore, taxes were imposed on buildings of all types, while varying amounts of tolls were imposed on roads and on certain types of transportation.[13] Finally, businesses as well as their profits were taxed.

The worst aspect of these taxes was the fact that they were imposed without regard to individual needs and situations, and without recourse. The wālī was the final resort and usually, he was either unable or un-

willing to examine the ways in which the wealthy paid or evaded their taxes.[14]

Probably the worst measure undertaken by the Ottoman Government was the ban on the free cultivation of tobacco. In Jabal ʿĀmil, this occurred in 1883. For a long time, the economy of the region had been dependent upon that leaf and its reactions to the weather and to pests. The ban came as a blow to the peasant and landlord alike. However, as will be shown, whereas the peasant suffered, the landowners discovered means to turn the new system to their advantage.

In 1881, the Porte turned the tobacco industry in the Empire over to the Ottoman Public Debt Monopoly.[15] In 1883, the monopoly was given to the Régie co-intéréssée des Tabacs de l'Empire Ottoman. This monopoly was held by a mixed French, British, Austrian and German consortium.[16] The company had sole control over the harvesting, processing and marketing of tobacco grown in Jabal ʿĀmil, among other areas.[17] It limited and controlled the areas to be cultivated, therefore depleting production through less cultivation. One argument in praise of the new system was put forth by Vital Cuinet, a student of commerce in the Near East, in 1896. He wrote that the new monopoly gave the tobacco growers stable markets and prices.[18] But other authors, such N. Verney and G. Dambmann, writing four years later, repeatedly explained that the immediate effects of the existence of the Régie was to diminish production considerably, wherever tobacco was grown.[19] These writers went on, giving reasons such as harassment of the grower,

the difficulties in obtaining permits, competition from other sources, and the diminutions in exports. Another effect of this restrictive system was the development of widespread smuggling.[20]

The Régie, which had four processing plants for the Syrian region (including two at Beirut, and one each at Jaffa and Damascus), also kept accounts, measured out areas of cultivation and policed and enforced its regulations.[21]

Tobacco was, and still is the main agricultural product of Jabal ʿĀmil. Other agricultural products were harvested, but they were minimal in relation to the tobacco crops. These products were exported from Sidon, Tyre and Beirut.[22] According to the statistics for exports and imports of the Wilāya of Beirut (in which Sidon and Jabal ʿĀmil were two sanjaqs)the other sources of income and gains never came close to matching the gains from tobacco.[23] The same sources show, furthermore, that the tobacco market was highly competitive. At the same time, the Régie showed no inclination to expand production.[24]

Control of the tobacco industry thus proved detrimental to the small farmer who, as today, found difficulty in acquiring the necessary permits and in competing with the wealthier growers. Control reduced his capacity to cultivate and therefore reduced his selling abilities. Others lost their livelihood outright. The result was that many were forced to join smuggling groups (which meant the death penalty, if caught);[25] or join the army or emigrate.

Crime and smuggling were the most serious results of this rise in unemployment. Highway robbery became widespread and legendary. Among the wealthy, the squabbling for riches and land as well as the efforts to curry favors with the authorities increased. At the same time, the exploitation of the poor rose: wealthy families avoided taxes through certain loopholes, while they discovered that in certain cases it was more profitable not to cultivate their lands. In other cases, through wealth and influence, they obtained extra permits from the Régie, thus monopolizing whole tracts of land and employing peasants for next to nothing.

Over and above all that, compulsory military training and service, as well as the recruitment of road gangs, proved to be great sources of trouble to the peasant. In either case, the long duration of service meant that the peasant had to absent himself from his plot for far too long a period. On the other hand, many of the peasants were Christian, and they just did not want to serve. These aspects of life created whole new fields of corruption and crime.[26]

Three results appeared from all the above: first, there was mass emigration which further bled Jabal ʿAmil of its most important asset, human resources;[27] the Ottomans quickly realized what would happen, but instead of ameliorating matters, they simply outlawed emigration. The upshot of the matter was that people left illegally, despite the death penalty attached to their actions. Second, there was some fragmentation of what used to be a rather well knit society; thus, brother fought brother, and people accused

each other to the authorities for petty matters. Finally, but paradoxically, common people sought the protection of the very notables who were swindling them. But the peasants did rally around these local leaders, each clan to its own.

Except for one short instance in history, the ʿĀmilīs never seemed willing or ready to throw off their masters; while these notables were always able to develop new clients. For such reasons, Jabal ʿĀmil took a long time, until well after Lebanese independence in 1943, to break out of its customary isolation.

Developments in al-Biqāʿ and al-Hirmil were not as interesting or significant. In fact, the area of al-Hirmil was quite calm and relatively untouched by the Ottomans until the period of religious and economic unrest from 1840-1860. In the Baʿlabakk region, however, the Ḥarfūsh clan was periodically but frequently involved in conflicts with, and in uprisings against the Central Government. The reasons were not so much desire for regional autonomy, but rather for clan superiority and autonomy. It was a conflict between the traditional overlords of Baʿlabakk and an authority which wanted to eliminate them. With the coming of direct rule through the Wālī of Damascus, al-Biqāʿ was separated from Mount Lebanon. Thus, part of the disturbances in the plains were caused by those who clamored for re-annexation of the plains to the mountain areas. In Mount Lebanon there were similar re-annexation agitators, since al-Biqāʿ was the agricultural mainstay of Mount Lebanon. Furthermore, by rejoining the mountain

the Ḥarfūsh clan would escape direct Ottoman domination and the growing supremacy of the Ḥamāda clan, another Shī'ī group. But such was not to be the case. The region remained under Ottoman rule and within the jurisdiction of the Governor of Damascus. In 1859, Ḥusnī Pasha, the Wālī, was sent by the Central Government with express orders to capture al-Amīr Salmān al-Ḥarfūsh.[29] He was caught in Zaḥla and imprisoned at Damascus. He escaped seven months later and was subsequently pardoned.[30] But al-Ḥarfūsh persisted in his periodic rebellions. He thought that the Ottomans would continue to pardon him. Indeed, the Central Government did just so for some time, since it was occupied with other affairs and could not busy itself with a minor problem.

At a certain point in time, however, the limits of Ottoman parience were overtaken; Salmān and his brother As'ad, had pushed a segment of the population to revolt. They set upon rivals, raided several districts and in general, made great nuisances of themselves. Thus it was, that Ḥusnī Pasha was again sent to eliminate al-Ḥarfūsh. Ḥusnī pursued them with dogged perseverance over a period of two years from 1864-1866. He pushed al-Ḥarfūsh and his followers further and further from their territory, thus isolating them from their own ground. Early in the expedition, Ḥusnī's forces captured many of members of the Ḥarfūsh clan. Several were executed in Damascus, while others, including many women, were exiled to Edirne in Turkey.[31] Sometime later, As'ad al-Ḥarfūsh gave himself up and was sent to Edirne. Salmān, on the other hand, went into hiding, hoping to keep up the

struggle. However, he was later betrayed and captured in Ḥimṣ, in ~~northern~~ central Syria.[32] He died in Damascus of unknown causes.

Such was the end of what had once been an illustrious family which, for a long period of time, had dominated Ba'labakk and its environs.

Chapter II

The Rise of the New Zu'amā'

The partial dislocation of 'Āmilī society and the loss of prestige on the part of the traditional aristocracy, helped along by the still remembered Egyptian attempts of reform, were not encouraged by Syria's new wālī, Midḥat Pasha.

Midḥat, who had been instrumental in the promulgation of the Ottoman Constitution of 1876 and who had become Grand Vizier in the same year, had been demoted and appointed Wālī of Syria in 1878.

The new wālī was very diplomatic with the Matāwila, but he may have angered his superiors by giving special attention to the traditional leaders of Jabal 'Āmil, instead of continuing in the policy of setting minor notables up against the old ones. In fact, Midḥat proceeded to form a new qā'im maqāmiyya in Jabal 'Āmil at Marj 'uyūn.[1] This district included al-Nabaṭiyya, Hawnayn and al-Ḥūla.[2] Khalīl Bey al-As'ad was appointed qā'im maqām, while another al-As'ad was appointed to a similar post in the district of Ṣahyūn in northern Syria. Khalīl Bey subsequently rose to the rank of Mutaṣarrif of al-Balqā' district whose capital was Nābulus, in Palestine.

Midḥat Pasha's era saw important achievements in Syria, in a short period of time. Jabal 'Āmil shared in these benefits: a school was built at al-Nabaṭiyya, the first of a series which was to teach modern, secular subjects at primary, and later, at secondary levels. This school differed from others which were essentially theological and tra -

ditional.

The Wālī also sponsored the efforts of a prominent Sunnī ʿĀmilī, Riḍā Bey al-Ṣulḥ, to establish a Muslim benevolent society.[3] It was named Jamʿiyyat al-Maqāṣid al-Islāmiyya.[4] This society was concerned with opening schools and extending social services to needy Muslims. Its success on the Syrian coast between Beirut and Tyre was largely due to the efforts of Riḍā Bey.

Riḍā rose to prominence in the region and earned the respect and admiration of many ʿĀmilīs at all levels. At the same time, he attracted the enmity and jealousy of certain notables, especially the al-Asʿads. Al-Ṣulḥ was a new breed of politician and notable. He was descended from a family of Turkish bureaucrats who had come to Jabal ʿĀmil as "administrators of the modern style Ottoman Government."[5] The al-Ṣulḥs subsequently settled in Sidon and then acquired some land.[6] But Riḍā's influence did not stem from landed wealth: he did not own very large tracts of land, neither had he owned them for a long enough period. His influence however, stemmed from his abilities in administrative tasks, as well as his genuine concern for reform. He was thereby considered a parvenu by the traditional elements. Al-Ṣulḥ's conscientious attitudes were construed as undue interference in the political domain of the traditional lord of the region, Kāmil al-Asʿad.[7] A few years later, Kāmil Bey's fears and injured ego were to lead many to tragedy.

The Ottoman Government tried its best to extinguish the emergent

ideas which had developed before and during the administration of Midḥat Pasha and his no less tolerant successor, Ḥamdī Pasha. In fact, Ḥamdī's era (1880-1883), was marked by more constructive projects in Jabal ʿĀmil. Many of these works were conducted by Riḍā al-Ṣulḥ, who also became qā'im maqām of the newly formed district of al-Nabaṭiyya. This fact did not escape Kāmil Bey's attention. To him, it meant a further advance in the reputation and prestige of Riḍā al-Ṣulḥ and in an area traditionally controlled by the al-Asʿads.[8]

In 1908, the Party of Union and Progress came to power. The reaction in Jabal ʿĀmil, like that of many other regions of the Ottoman Empire, was jubilant. This was the more so because Jabal ʿĀmil had its own centers of the Unionist Party at al-Nabaṭiyya. Many prominent ʿĀmilīs became members. Among them were Shaykh Aḥmad Riḍā, Shaykh Sulaymān al-Ẓāhir and ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Khalīl.[9] However, bitter disappointment was to set in soon enough, when the Young Turks showed that they were not ready yet to give consideration to basic minority rights and demands. At that point, the ʿĀmilī Unionists decided to withdraw their memberships from the Party, and closed all chapters in Jabal ʿĀmil.[10] The resignations were followed by a sharp protest note sent to the Central Government, and published in several journals, including Sidon's al-ʿIrfān.[11]

The ʿĀmilīs did not stop there. In fact, by 1913, renewed agitation on behalf of Arabism and Arab autonomy developed in the Jabal as it did

in the rest of Syria. In 1914, ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Khalīl, leader of an Arab association at Istanbul (which had been banned at this date), arrived in Sidon to organize chapters of the Arab Revolutionary Movement in Tyre, Jabal ʿĀmil and al-Biqāʿ.[12]

Such political activism was bound to attract attention; and it was to run afoul both the Central Government and the traditional local leadership. The latter was not included in the Movement. The al-Asʿad family was conspicuous in its absence from all these efforts.[13]

It was already mentioned that Riḍā al-Ṣulḥ had succeeded in irritating the sensibilities of Kāmil al-Asʿad; now, there was a new "upstart" in the fold: ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Khalīl. He was enjoying much support from several sources, including some ʿUsayrāns and Zayns. It is possible to argue that al-Khalīl was not quite the diplomat with the traditionalists, but then, in the estimation of the activists, time was probably not on their side and they were working from a position of inferiority, as regarded power, influence and political mobility. According to Āl Ṣafā, the policies of al-Asʿad and al-Ṣulḥ, for instance, were diametrically opposed, especially on the question of reform.[14]

Al-Asʿad's paternalistic attitude toward the ʿĀmilīs also contributed to his resentment of the new politicians. Both al-Ṣulḥ and al-Khalīl had run for Parliament after the fall of the Ḥamīdian Government. Al-Ṣulḥ won, while al-Khalīl could not muster the necessary votes to succeed. However, al-Ṣulḥ's victory and al-Khalīl's popularity were

enough to worry and anger al-As'ad. The whole idea of anyone else claiming to represent Jabal 'Āmil was an insult to al-As'ad's position and person. It was therefore anathema. Though Kāmil Bey had himself been elected to Parliament, he had presented his candidacy because it was a good way to ingratiate himself with the new authorities, as well as to acquire whatever prestige could be acquired by becoming a deputy. Essentially, however, parliamentarianism was, to al-As'ad and his peers, a sort of circus and a sop to the people. Thus, the success of al-Ṣulḥ and the popularity of al-Khalīl and other reformers stung him.

In 1915, al-As'ad's arrogance and jealousy caused him to act in a tragically petty manner. The involvement of al-Khalīl in revolutionary organizations and, with al-Ṣulḥ and many other patriots, in what was called Ḥarakat Ṣaydā (The Sidon Movement), gave al-As'ad the excuse he needed to rid himself of these opponents.[15] Al-As'ad's revenge came in the form of a note sent in June 1915, to the Muftī of the Ottoman Fourth Army occupying Syria. In the note, al-As'ad reported on the activities of the men in question. The information was relayed to the Ottoman wālī who passed it on to Jamāl Pasha.[16]

From Jamāl Pasha's own account, it seems that the report he received triggered the wave of arrests which he ordered.[17] These took place in late June and early July 1915. The detainees were immediately tried in the town of 'Ālay in Mount Lebanon.[18] Jamāl Pasha personally conducted the later sessions of the courts martial. The penalties meted out

ranged from exile to life imprisonment to death. Twenty one men were hanged in a double series of executions conducted at Beirut and Damascus, on May 6, 1916. Among those executed was ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Khalīl. Riḍā al-Ṣulḥ and Shaykh Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-Zayn were exiled to Izmīr, in Turkey.[19]

Now, it seemed, there was no one to bother Kāmil Bey in his pursuits. But the tables were soon turned. With the retreat of the Ottoman forces in late 1918, provisional Arab Governments were established at Sidon and Tyre. The former was headed by Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ, son of Riḍā, while the latter was led by ʿAbd Allāh Yaḥyā al-Khalīl, a cousin of the executed ʿAbd al-Karīm. Naturally, this infuriated al-Asʿad, for he thought that he was in full control of the whole region. He also believed that he was entitled to have full authority in the area of Jabal ʿĀmil. According to Āl Ṣafā, who cannot be substantiated at this time, Kāmil al-Asʿad had led a contingent of Sharīf Ḥusayn's forces into al-Nabaṭiyya and the Jabal when the Arab armies arrived in Syria.[20]

From then on, the wily but frustrated al-Asʿad never ceased in his attempts to sabotage the Provisional Governments set up on the coast. He even gathered some minor notables and ʿulamāʾ in order to bring some sort of collective pressure on all who supported those organizations, to cease doing so. These events, related by an author whose sympathies toward al-Asʿad have already been established, seem to be accurate, in my opinion. Āl Ṣafā approved of the initiatives taken by al-Ṣulḥ and al-Khalīl. In his writings, he neither commends al-Asʿad's

behavior, nor does he seriously apologize for it, as he did in other instances.

Al-As'ad's personal plans, whatever they may have been, never bore fruit, for, ironically, Sidon and Tyre lost their Provisional Governments when they were summarily dismissed by the Allied administration which established itself in October and November of 1919. The French proceeded to occupy all the main centers of Jabal 'Āmil, thus averting a possible conflict between al-As'ad and his opponents.

In the final analysis, Kāmil al-As'ad's behavior was all the more petty since it was based on purely personal interests; for the fact remains that al-As'ad and his opponents were all representing the new Arab Government of Prince Fayṣal at Damascus.

As a means of establishing themselves, the new occupiers used propaganda, persuasion and coercion. The French tried to convince the populace that they were carriers of peace and progress, and were the benevolent protectors of the oppressed minorities. Yet, all in all, circumstances frustrated rapid implementation of French plans.[21] Unlike the Maronites, the Matāwila as well as the Sunnīs of the area had no affinity with these alien Westerners. Discontent continued to simmer in Jabal 'Āmil and agitation became a daily feature. The French countered in various ways. One was the use of sympathetic collaborators: these individuals were cultivated by the occupier and became transmission

belts of control and influence, from the occupying forces to the subjugated populace. The collaborators attempted to explain away their attitudes and their cooperation with France by claiming to be working in the best interests of the people.

By and large, however, the French could not solicit the help and participation of the important notables who, otherwise may have helped in keeping in check the population, and in soliciting its support. The French were more successful, however, with the younger, rising zu'amā'. The big notables organized, at the beginning of French occupation, loose knit guerilla bands which roamed the interior and harassed the French. Needless to note, all semblance of calm and order disintegrated under such circumstances.[22]

On April 24, 1920, a meeting was called by Kāmil al-As'ad, to be held at Rās Nahr al-Ḥujayr. The members, all notables of Jabal 'Āmil, unanimously resolved that their region be forthwith united with Syria under the leadership of King Faṣal, son of Sharīf Ḥusayn of Makkā.[23] Furthermore, they declared their opposition to any kind of foreign protection or mandate. They also issued appeals to the population to remain calm, to refrain from any acts that may provoke the retaliation of foreign troops and to protect the lives and properties of all Christians residing in the region.[24] There seems to be no reason why the last provision should be inserted if no serious sense of unease were developing between the two communities. The resolution which was conveyed to

Damascus by Sayyid ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Nūr al-Dīn and Sayyid ʿAbd al-Ḥusayn Sharaf al-Dīn, apparently did worry some influential Christians of the region. These had gained favor with the French authorities and thought that they had much to lose if the French were to leave. Thus, they went to great lengths, apparently with French blessings, to proclaim that the meeting and its resolution were nothing more than a scheme to harm and engulf the Christians. They then proceeded to incite the small Christian communities of Jabal ʿĀmil against their Shīʿī neighbors. The Christians were provided with weapons by the French, while the Durūz and Shīʿā were forcibly disarmed.[25] According to one source, several Christian notables advised the French not to behave in such manner, but to no avail.[26]

Using the usual pretexts of "protection and the retention of the Christian entity", these families (e.g. al-ʿAzūrī, Nūr, Karam, among others), proceeded to arm their Christian clients. Under such conditions, it was not long before the tragic incident of ʿAyn Ibil (a village in the vicinity of Bint Jubayl, in the extreme south of Jabal ʿĀmil), occured. Serious fighting between Christians and Shīʿa broke out; then it spread to neighboring areas.[27] The whole affair degenerated into banditry on both sides.[28] The French military made no move to separate the feuding communities or to investigate the causes. They were content to remain in their garrisons in Sidon, Tyre, al-Nabaṭiyya and Marj ʿuyūn. The conflict, however, soon spread and continued until the middle of

1920. It was not until the French garrisons and munitions convoys were attacked, that the French interfered. In June, the occupier brought together certain 'ulamā' and notables whom they could find quickly and forced them to sign a three-point agreement, including:[28]

1- Payment of 100,000 gold Ottoman pounds in compensations and indemnities;

2- Give a pledge of peace and the turning over of wanted persons to the authorities;

3- The return of Christians to their villages and guaranteed safe conduct.

Through the indemnity clause, the area was drained economically. The sectors of Sidon, Tyre and al-Nabaṭiyya were given Lebanese governors; two were members of those Christian families which cooperated with the French and had initially incited the Christians, while the third was also a traditional enemy of the Matāwila, a Durzī Junblāṭ. Following these appointments, the French military authorities closed their ears to the repeated complaints of the Shī'a.[29] Again the 'Āmilīs were isolated and again they fell back on their own means and their own leaders. Yet, inspite of this seeming isolation, the Matāwila never failed to be represented at nationalist meetings and conferences, as will be shown later.[30]

It is important to note the name of Jabal 'Āmil whenever Mutawālī solidarity with a united Syria is mentioned. The reason for this is that the differences in attitudes between the notables of Jabal 'Āmil and those of al-Biqā'- al-Hirmil became bolder with time. For instance,

one of the prominent notables of al-Biqā', Tāmir Bey Ḥamāda, was an active member of the delegation sent to represent those interested in an independent Lebanon, at the Peace Conference at Paris, in 1919. That delegation pointed out to the victors of the Great War, that it expected an independent or at least, an autonomous Lebanon. The delegation also indicated that such a political unit would have to include more territory than the area of the former sanjaq of Mount Lebanon as it existed under the Mutaṣarrifiyya (1864-1918). Earlier, in 1918, a Directorate (Majlis Idāra) was formed in Mount Lebanon, and it made similar demands from the arriving Allied forces, while protesting the division of the Middle East into the infamous zones of control and assistance. The Directorate contained one Shī'ī, Muḥammad al-Ḥajj Muḥsin, representing al-Biqā' and al-Shūf.[31] The Lebanese delegation to the Peace Conference made its demands all the more urgently because Fayṣal had apparently arrived at an agreement with various Syrian notables which would put Syria, including the Lebanese sector, under his rule.

An interesting aspect of all this is that despite the trend of the leadership in al-Biqā' and al-Hirmil, the general population did not feal any need to become Lebanese. In fact, to this day, the prominent sentiment is one of belonging to Syria, not Lebanon. The population in general would just as soon rejoin Syria, if given the chance.[32]

At this juncture, an interesting observation can be made about the later development of political life among the Shī'a.

To this day there has been a difference between the character of the inhabitants of Jabal ʿĀmil and that of their co-religionists of al-Biqāʿ and al-Hirmil. Given the geographic differences between those regions, the populations were affected by events in dissimilar ways. Whereas Jabal ʿĀmil is mountainous, al-Biqāʿ and al-Hirmil are flat, open country. Thus, while Jabal ʿĀmil was generally insulated, the other areas afforded their inhabitants more lebensraum, but less refuge.

In a sense then, the behavior of the people of the plains was true to the form of most plains inhabitants. Besides being semi-nomadic in their early days, they were also raiders and wanderers. In fact, the problem which they posed to far-reaching areas across northern Mount Lebanon and down the foothills to Byblos, al-Batrūn and Tripoli, was not solved until 1771, at which time they were evicted to al-Hirmil.[33]

The Qaysī and Yamanī partisan feuds which spread over many parts of Syria, exacerbated the troublesome behavior of the Biqāʿī Shīʿa.[34] They warred amongst themselves, as well as with other people. In attitudes which reflected their vulnerability, the Biqāʿī Shīʿa were quick to form and break alliances, so that it set a pattern which was unbroken until the middle of the nineteenth century.

The above developments, I believe, caused the Matāwila of the plains to form highly individualistic traits and less well knit relations as members of a group. The example set by their leaders in their frequently contradictory alliances and feuds, seemed to point the way to a

character development which did not have any group consciousness beyond the narrow clan circle.

In contrast, the ʿĀmilī developed differently, given his geographic milieu. The typical ʿĀmilī became part of a closely knit and highly patriarchal society.

The presence of the Matāwila in Jabal ʿĀmil was caused by their search for a refuge. Chroniclers do not indicate the existence of settlers in the region, prior to their arrival. It therefore became almost exclusively a Mutawālī home. There, the ʿĀmilīs kept away from their neighbors and resisted Sunnī, Durūz and Christian incursions. These were, except in few cases, successfully repulsed.

The ʿĀmilīs were so isolated, that there is no record to show that they were involved on anyone's side during the momentous Ottoman invasion of Syria in 1517. But being left on their own was to become as detrimental to the ʿĀmilīs as constant interference may have been, for they never received the attentions other peoples did. In effect, their early isolation caused basically by their religious separation and geographical quasi-inaccessibility, contributed to the development of the strong sense of loyalty manifested towards the powerful leading clan or family. The Shīʿī belief in the single leadership of the Imām was imbedded in them as a principle which remained unshaken even in the Imām's absence. That principle was given full vent, combined as it was with the existing political and economic situation. Thus the almost

unswerving loyalty to the leaders. In fact, the notable's character as "benevolent despot", especially in earlier periods of history, endeared these families to the people even more.[35] Admitedly, society was not at all egalitarian, but the contrast between the rapacity of the Ḥamādas and the Ḥarfūshs and their colleagues, and the relative concern shown by the ʿĀmilī lords towards their people, was quite marked.[36]

In general too, when a major force appeared to threaten Jabal ʿĀmil, as for instance, in Jazzār's attempts to invade the area between 1776 and 1780;[37] or through the repeated attacks of the Shihābīs which occurred sporadically between 1697 and the Egyptian occupation in 1832,[38] the ʿĀmilīs reacted in unison and not only as followers of this or that notable, but as ʿĀmilīs. Even in times of excess duress, as after the occupation of the Jabal by Aḥmad Pasha al-Jazzār in 1782, the population, though deprived of its leadership, lent their support to the resistance led by a new young notable, a member of the Nāṣīf family.[39]

Thus it is that the defensiveness of the ʿĀmilīs as a people, within the relatively narrow confines of their ethnic homeland, made of them an essentially isolated and separate group. They became intensely self-conscious, shunned inter-marriage with other groups and sought to preserve their traditions. At the same time, they were hospitable and allowed several Christian enclaves to exist peacefully in their midst. Furthermore, their isolated nature caused them to depend on the notables in their districts, These families, though having differences,

rarely allowed their conflicts to degenerate into violence. Several of them persist to this day in their domination of Jabal ʿĀmil and its population.

Another aspect of the development of Jabal ʿĀmil in its later period, was the rise of a new type of leader. This phenomenon was not at first understood by the traditionalists, and its implications were not realized. The new leaders appeared basically as a result of the efforts made at Istanbul to develop some sort of Western style constitutionalism. These efforts attracted the younger men in general, but those who really adhered to it were men who had no traditional power bases such as family or land.[40] As time progressed, this new class of politicians began to be feared by the traditional bosses because of the quick popularity achieved by the members of this new élite. These were political newcomers who did not base their rise on traditional factors. Some could claim prominent descent, but not wealth or membership in the ruling power structure. They could not, therefore, challenge the traditional figures on their own terms.

The support enjoyed by the new notables was all the more alarming because it came from the middle and lower economic classes: the very people who had hitherto been quite subservient to the great families.

While it is true that the several blows which traditional notables received created great fissures in their power bases, it would seem correct to assume that had it not been for the era of Ottoman Tanzimats,

the abolishment of feudalism and the later establishment of the first Ottoman Parliament, the crumbling position of the big notables would have taken much longer.

The Ottoman Parliament (1908) and the general atmosphere in Istanbul after that year, gave several bright young men a chance to learn the intricacies of contemporary politics and to widen their horizons. Upon their return to their respective districts, they were socially and politically conscious and full of ideas for reform. Consequently they ran head-on into conflict with such people as Kāmil al-As'ad and his clients. The consequences of an awakening populace and its introduction at least to the ideas of reform and the betterment of their living conditions, were soon realized by the Bey. Hence his conflict with, and subsequent reaction to, such men as 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khalīl, Riḍā and Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ and the 'Usayrāns.

The above does not necessarily imply that the powers of al-As'ad and his peers were destroyed; far from it. The traditional overlords' absolute mastery of their regions was weakened and had to be shared henceforth with the new notables. Furthermore, the al-As'ad power structure was forced to adopt — as time went on — a more socially conscious façade. This was necessary in order to compete with the new politicians. However, this adaptation was to take a long period of time, and meanwhile, al-As'ad did his best to harass his competitors and tried to keep them off balance. One instance of this is the behavior

of Kāmil al-As'ad towards one of his own relatives, Shabīb Pasha al-As'ad, a cousin. The story appears in Āl Ṣafā, which is significant since it is critical of the behavior of Kāmil Bey, toward whom Āl Ṣafā has obvious admiration, as he does toward the whole al-As'ad family.

It seems that Shabīb Pasha al-As'ad was a rarity in his family in that he adhered to reformist ideas. This had set him at odds with his brothers and relatives. Matters were so serious that he apparently departed from Jabal 'Āmil and took up residence in Istanbul for twenty years. Āl Ṣafā does not however mention whether this exile was self-imposed or not. In 1909, Shabīb returned to present himself for the elections which took place that year. He was defeated by the strong opposition mustered against him by Kāmil Bey.[41] This was all the more significant because, given the closely knit family structures in such traditional societies, public humiliations of this sort are quite serious. Thus, Kāmil al-As'ad overrode discretion and traditions in this case, to ensure the defeat of his cousin who, otherwise, did not differ from the other reformists. In this way, Kāmil Bey clearly set himself against all his younger opponents.

The veracity of the above can only be checked by interviewing informed members of the al-As'ad family on the motives and methods of Kāmil al-As'ad. However, the story seems plausible enough, since its tone, though apologetic, is also critical of Kāmil Bey. Furthermore, it was not an isolated aspect of Kāmil al-As'ad's character, for he later

demonstrated his jealousy of others in a tragic and petty manner.

Not all of the new notables, it must be added, grew in opposition to the traditional powers. In fact, some were groomed by the big bosses, becoming somewhat like corporate subsidiaries who present to the public a variety of products differing only in name from the mother source. This was indeed another tactic of adaptation: the big families would sponsor satellite notables, thus exuding an image of reform and giving the electorate a feeling of democracy and choice.

It must be repeated here that for some time after the end of the first World War, the Matāwila of Jabal ʿĀmil never envisaged themselves as part of an independent Lebanon. The most acceptable compromise they would accept was the formation of some sort of federal structure within which they would enjoy some internal autonomy. Generally, however, being part of Syria was natural to them.[42] The ʿĀmilīs had always been at odds with their northern neighbors and they were never part of the Mutaṣarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon. Furthermore, until very recently, they were never included in any of the histories of Mount Lebanon. Consequently, they never felt akin to the people there. They also protested their annexation to Great Lebanon (established in 1920 by French decree),[43] until their zuʿamāʾ capitulated in the early 1940's.

Chapter III

French Occupation and the Mandate Period

Research into this period of ʿAmilī political developments reveals a mixed picture. ʿAmilī leaders could be described as being undecided, at best, and confused, at worst. Such a state of affairs was not unusual given the circumstances of post-war Syria. In this chapter, we shall attempt to explore the pressures under which the ʿAmilīs laboured. Their situation, however, did not essentially differ from that of the rest of the people inhabiting Syria.

The French Mandate (1920-1943), began inauspiciously. No sooner had the new order been proclaimed by General Gouraud in the summer of 1920, that unrest began to spread among various communities of Syria. The Durūz were the most emphatic and energetic in their antagonism to the French. Later, theirs was the most violent part of the revolt which erupted in 1925.

The deposition of King Fayṣal in 1920 shattered the hopes and aspirations of many and was the first event to demonstrate to the Syrians that France meant to stay on in their country. The departure of Fayṣal also gave rise to a régime of collaboration with the Mandatory power.

With the King out of the country, the French embarked forthwith on their policy of dividing Syria into smaller states. On August 30, the State of Great Lebanon was established; its capital was to be Beirut and it was formed by depriving Syria of the regions of Tripoli and ʿAkkār, the whole of the anti-Lebanon range, the regions of al-Biqāʿ

and al-Hirmil, and Jabal ʿĀmil. Finally, the whole coastal area between Tyre and the Bay of ʿAkkār was also annexed. Even the collaborating government at Damascus felt obliged to protest this act. The French disregarded the protest, as they were to do on several other occasions.[2]

The French authorities, in effect, went right ahead and created another state in Aleppo, in northern Syria. A few weeks later, Damascus was given the same status and in March of 1921, Jabal al-Durūz was also given statehood.

In Great Lebanon, the new arrangement sat well, not only with many of the Christian populace, but also with some Muslim and Durūz notables.[3] The Christians were satisfied because of their fears, whether they were real or imaginary, of their fate in a united, Muslim Syria. Furthermore, they feared the loss of foreign patronage if included in such a large nation. On the other hand, some local Muslim and Durūz notables who saw that their chances of political advancement and influence were rather slim in a larger Syria, decided to collaborate, however discreetly. The attitude of these notables was especially true of an heterogeneous area like Lebanon. But it is worthy to note that, at least until the mid-1930's, almost none of the prominent Muslim and Durūz notables were involved in the Lebaneses independentist effort. It was not until later that these zuʿamāʾ began proclaiming that the areas forming Great Lebanon were legitimately Lebanese. To this end, they presented geo-

graphical and so-called, historical, social and economic arguments.

One of the problems in dealing with such matter, is one which appears to plague any account concerned with the political allignments of whole regions. Namely, where do we differentiate between the leadership's wishes and those of the people. In this chapter, this same problem arises, and is most difficult to resolve because history has concerned itself mostly with the behavior of leaders. At other times, it is not very difficult to decide, for, then the differences between notables and populace are quite clear; while at other times, populace and leadership are agreed, at least on immediate objectives.[4]

Thus, it may be assumed that the populations including the more prominent notables of the territories taken from Syria, were adamant in their protests against the annexations to Great Lebanon. Only in al-Hirmil, it seems, there was a divergence between some in the large Ḥamāda family and the popular wish.[5] The Muslims of Tripoli, however, were indignant; and so were the Matāwila of Jabal ʿĀmil.[6] However, for apparently geographic reasons, there seems to have been no concerted action among the people of these regions. The Durūz were also seething, despite the fact that some of their leaders were sympathetic to the idea of an independent Lebanon.[7] As a consequence of these feelings and the manner in which the French treated them, several communities formed bands of raiders which attacked French outposts or patrols, as well as villages. The Durūz rose in revolt along with their co-religionists of

Jabal al-Durūz in the period between 1923 and 1925. A more or less generalized revolt spread across Syria by 1924, and continued sporadically until 1928.[8]

The Syrian revolt, known as the Great Syrian Revolt, (al-Thawra al-Sūriyya al-Kubrā), created rather predictable repercussions in the areas taken from Syria to form Lebanon. Thus, people inhabiting the coastal strip between Tripoli and Tyre, as well as the surrounding interior, demanded reunification with the Syrian nation, while Jabal 'Āmil would have settled for a federal Syrian structure as a minimum condition. Tripoli, the 'Akkār region, Tyre and Sidon wanted nothing less than outright reunification.[9]

In a letter of grievances addressed to the French High Commissioner in January 1926, spokesmen for Jabal 'Āmil emphasized the poverty of their region and its state of neglect under the Mandate system.[10] They stated that despite onerous taxation, none of that revenue was spent on projects to better their living conditions. Furthermore, they pointed out that they were not given any responsible positions in any of the important and vital sectors of government.[11] The letter was signed by members of the Tāmir, 'Usayrān, al-Faḍl, al-Khalīl and others.[12] No one from the al-As'ad family signed the letter.

Similar demands were presented by citizens of the district of Sidon.[13] The Ba'labakk municipal council, for its part, passed a resolution signed by minor notables, as well as other citizens, which called

for the boycott of upcoming elections. These had been announced by the French, to elect a Lebanese chamber of deputies.

In both cases, that is in Jabal 'Amil and Ba'labakk, people who had circulated such resolutions had done so without the participation of their important and traditional leaders.[14]

The dreams of those who wanted union with Syria never came true; but the Syrian Government never ceased to demand the return of those separated areas. In fact, when the French finally gave in and allowed the formation of a Syrian Constituent Assembly in 1928, the Assembly included in its constitutional draft, Article 2, which stated that: "All of the Syrian areas detached from the Ottoman State are one single political unit, indivisible. Any division of it since the end of the War is therefore not recognized."[15]

That article spoke, in part, for 'Amilī wishes as well as for those of all the other sectors of the population who did not accept separation. But it came to naught because the Syrian Government did not possess the guns with which to back their words. The French did, and they promptly adjourned the Assembly.[16] On the other hand, the people in the annexed sectors could not cooperate with each other. French military positions added to the geographic distances and obstacles, presented many difficulties. Furthermore, the attitudes of some of the leaders as well as 'Amilī hesitation on the question of outright reunification with Syria, presented added problems. In fact,

no one was sent to represent Jabal ʿĀmil at Damascus, where a conference of leaders of Tripoli and other regions arrived to express their wishes to rejoin Syria.

Thus, by 1928, the ʿĀmilīs seemed to have become quite recalcitrant about reunification; the leaders showed more inclination towards the federal arrangement, if not separatism. Yet, again, the sense of uncertainty which gripped the leaders of Jabal ʿĀmil became apparent during the second Congress of the Littoral, (Mu'tamar al-shāṭi') in 1936. At that time, as they did three years earlier, they affixed their signatures to an unconditional demand for reunification of Beirut, Sidon, Tripoli, ʿAkkār, Jabal ʿĀmil and al-Biqāʿ to Syria.[17] But by 1943 the ʿĀmilī leadership as well as the leadership of al-Biqāʿ and al-Hirmil, had definitely opted for acceptance of Lebanese existence and independence.

Given the research material at my disposal at the time, it is not possible to give full explanations of this development of Shīʿī sentiment and attitude. However, certain lines do emerge and can afford us some general insights.

1- In the beginning, the Shīʿa were, as a matter of fact, Syrians. They did not question this premise, despite their communal individualism.

2- The French armies arrived with the Allies and settled themselves in the area. This, coupled with the realization that the Allies broke their promises to the Arabs, was the initial shock which disoriented the hopes of many who had been glad to see the Ottomans go.

3- The second shock wave was to come with the humiliating treatment reserved by the French for King Fayṣal. This culminated with his summary eviction from Syria, while his ostensible friends, the British, looked on. The ʿĀmilīs were as dismayed by this action as were most other Syrians, including many Christians. The ʿĀmilīs, for instance, had sent a strong delegation to perform the bayʿa (acknowledgement of the King's status; a form of swearing of allegiance), on March 8, 1920. In fact, the delegation had proceeded to Damascus while knowing that it was braving French ill-will in doing so.[18] Upon their return, many of the delegates experienced harassment by the Mandatory. Protestations notwithstanding, the Shīʿa realized that the French had power and meant to carry out their policies.

4- A further proof that the French were to be long in departing was shown by their final crushing of the revolts of 1923-1928. Jabal ʿĀmil itself had experienced French military incursions in 1918, 1920, and at various times after.

5- In combination with the above events, the French did not stop in their policies of winning over certain notables and their followings, through favoritism, bribery, force and other means.[19]

6- More important, possibly, were the predominant sentiments in these areas, mainly regionalism and religion. Two events may serve to illustrate this point. Both events involved one of the most prominent and respected men of his time, Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīn. Sayyid Muḥsim was

not a member of a politically oriented family or background; he was rather one of the main Shī'ī religious leaders and authorities. When Prince Fayṣal arrived in Damascus, leading the victorious Arab columns in 1918, Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīn led an 'Āmilī delegation to greet him and express their loyalty. There, he expressed his sentiments to Fayṣal: though he was a staunch 'Āmilī, he also wanted to see his region as part of a great Syrian, Arab nation.[20] Later, in 1920, following the coronation of Fayṣal, which Sayyid Muḥsin attended, he felt compelled to assume his role as a Shī'ī community leader. He sent a letter to the King and the Syrian Government, protesting the position the Government had adopted vis-à-vis the Shī'a:[21] in drafting new electoral laws, the Syrian Government had allocated so many seats to the Sunnīs, and so many to the minorities. In this category, the Goverment had lumped the Durūz, the Shī'a and the Christians. Sayyid Muḥsin's letter emphasized that Muslims ought to be considered as one community, regardless of sectarian differences.[22] The provision was dropped after the letter had been read and published. However, it is probable that the event re-awakened certain traditional fears among the Shī'ī leadership: fears of the possibility of becoming just another minority in a large, Sunnī Syria, much as their situation was in the Ottoman Empire. It is therefore possible that the Shī'a felt that a future in an independent form or as part of country formed of several communities, none of which would have a majority of numbers, would assure them

equality of status with the Sunnīs.

7- It would also be safe to assume that the notables, as mentioned earlier, would have lost much, if not all their power in the larger context of Syria. Thus, in Syria, Aḥmad al-As'ad, za'īm of Jabal 'Āmil and his son after him, would have been eclipsed, if only by the more important notables of Syria. These latter wielded more power at any one time tnan al-As'ad dreamt of. The same applies to the Ḥamādas and all other zu'amā' who were of even lesser importance. All would have probably declined to the status of mere parliamentarians. Not so in Lebanon, an artificial unit built on confessional and regional balance; and they were quick to recognize this feature. They called the political moves in their districts, and held the keys to the country's balance.

Jabal 'Āmil's economic situation may also have helped in demoralizing the 'Āmilīs: heavy French taxation drained the already impoverished people. Though this was not numerically greater than in other districts, yet the state of poverty prevailing in Jabal 'Āmil made such revenue collecting truly onerous. The region suffered, while its neighbor to the north, Mount Lebanon, prospered. Already during the Mutaṣarrifiyya, Mount Lebanon had been given special attention by European powers who had their own interests in the area. Foreign missions conducted educational, social and health projects. Russian, British, French, Austrian, Italian, German and American missions competed with

one another. When the French were established in Lebanon in 1920, they continued to show favoritism to Mount Lebanon. They helped Muslims only when and where it helped in the task of solidifying separatist Lebanon.[23] Jabal 'Amil therefore received no French attentions. Only the zu'amā' were cajoled and pressured; and these efforts succeeded in co-opting their efforts.[24]

In the strictly economic field, Jabal 'Amil fared badly: the tobacco industry was put back under the monopoly system, the Régie Co-intéréssé des Tabacs, in 1930.[25] After the defeat of the Ottomans, the industry had been freed of such monopoly regulations. From 1930 onward, the Régie was, as previously, a foreign concern. Graft, cheating, thievery and general corruption and chaos reigned.[26] Even the cadastral reforms effected between 1930 and 1939, did not do much good. Although they improved the bureaucratic aspect of land distribution and taxation, these reforms did nothing to eliminate unfair land distribution, crop-sharing, and absentee landlordism.[27] Almost no progress was made through the Rural Co-operative Societies, or through the Agricultural Bank. In each case, the wealthy benefited while the poor were left behind through the evils of debt.[28] Unfortunately for Jabal 'Amil, the people did not seem to realize that the corruption was deep-rooted and that the departure of the French would only transfer that and other features into indegenous hands.

It is ironic that the establishment of the banderole (free growing

of tobacco) system,[29] eliminated in favor of the re-establishment of the monopoly, raised an outcry from assorted merchants, growers, manufacturers, landlords and politicians. Today, as will be shown later, the existence of the Régie is the main asset of the vested interests in their exploitation of the inhabitants and their region.

During the second World War, the Lebanese sector fared better than in the previous war. Jabal ʿĀmil was hardest hit, for during the Franco-British advance up the Palestinian and Syrian coasts to oust the Vichy-French forces from the region, almost all of the fighting and bombardment took place in and around Tyre, Marjʿuyūn and Jazzīn. There were many civilian deaths, many refugees and great material damage. By the time independence came to Lebanon late in 1943, Jabal ʿĀmil was exhausted, physically as well as in spirit.

Thus it was that, in the period between 1920 and 1943, the zuʿamāʾ of Jabal ʿĀmil decided to cast their lot with an independent Lebanon, while retaining a semblance of Arabism.[30] Some were totally committed, while others attempted to rationalize their attitudes. They explained that first things came first and that priority should therefore be given to ousting the French occupier. As for the Shīʿa of al-Biqāʿ and al-Hirmil, they were basically powerless in the face of the French and the determinedly collaborating zuʿamāʾ led by Ṣabrī Ḥamāda. Yet, despite Ḥamāda's influence, large segments of inhabitants of the region as well as those of the anti-Lebanon range were in the hands of re-

bellious elements, allied to those who had risen against the French in 1925.[31] By 1936, however, most zu'amā' in all the Shī'ī districts had been co-opted by means of a new party, Hizb al-Dastūr (Constitutional Party),[32] led by Shaykh Bishāra al-Khūrī, a Maronite Christian. Even Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ, a staunch Arabist, had agreed to the idea of an independent state. In fact, it was al-Ṣulḥ's decision to join forces with al-Khūrī which made the latter's success possible and decided other notables to acquiesce.

Chapter IV

The Politics of the Shī'ī Zu'amā'
and
The Misery of the Shī'ī Masses

One of Lebanon's most crucial elections took place in September of 1943. There was widespread competition, while the French and the British openly interfered, each supporting respective presidential candidates. The nationalist faction, led by Shaykh Bishāra al-Khūrī and supported by Major-General Sir E.L. Spears and the British Mission in Beirut, emerged victorious.[1]

The secret of Shaykh Bishāra's success was his ability to form and maintain alliances with rural zu'amā' and their urban counterparts.[2] In fact, it was thanks to Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ's adherence to al-Khūrī's Dastūr Party (Constitution Party), that these zu'amā' accepted to cooperate. Thus, the first cabinet formed following the elections was headed by Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ and included 'Ādil 'Usayrān as representative of the Shī'ī community and of the South. Ṣabrī Ḥamāda was elected President of the Assembly.

In effect, that cabinet's membership and the elections set the tone for future cabinet configurations, parliamentary proportions and political play: regionalism and confessionalism.[3]

The new Government, heavily made up of zu'amā', soon precepitated the anger of the French High Commissioner, Monsieur Helleu. He had become highly displeased with the behavior of the new Government which inaugurated its era with a series of resolutions and innovations antagonistic to the French.[4]

Helleu's response was quick. In pre-dawn raids on November 11, 1943, French troops arrested the President, the Prime Minister and all but two Cabinet Ministers. Later in the day, the Constitution was suspended, the Assembly dissolved and, of course, the Cabinet was dismissed.[5]

The harshest treatment was reserved to the great leader of Tripoli, ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Karāmī.[6] That venerable leader had never ceased to demand the return of Tripoli and the ʿAkkār region to Syria, where it rightfully belonged. Furthermore, he had refused to deal with the French at any time and for any purpose. Just as they had tried earlier with Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīn of Jabal ʿĀmil, the French also tried every means of persuasion to halt Karāmī's activities: all to no avail. They even assembled several collaborating ʿulamāʾ to pass a fatwā,[7] stripping Karāmī of his post as Muftī of Tripoli.[8] The idea was to isolate the man and erode his political support. As in other attempts however, that measure was not successful.

If, by arresting these leaders, the French thought they could extinguish nationalist feelings and resolve, and impose a government to their liking, then they committed a great blunder. In fact, to paraphrase General Catroux's account of the affair, "Helleu's act ... had unified the entire Lebanese nation against France in a single night."[9]

The news of the arrests spread like wildfire. Beirut, Tripoli, Tyre, Sidon, Baʿlabakk, Zaḥla, Marjʿuyūn and al-Nabaṭiyya, to mention

only a few urban centers, were shut tight in one of the most complete general strikes ever witnessed in Lebanon.[10]

The general strike and the persistent popular demonstrations isolated both the French and their local friends. The Mandatory appointed Emile Iddi, the Francophile candidate who had lost in the presidential contest; but Iddi was unable to form a Government: no politician would cooperate with him. Iddi, then formed a governing council consisting of the Directors of the various Ministries. The appointees promptly issued a joint declaration of refusal to cooperate.[11] It was a stalemate: the administration was at a stanstill. The French were faced with a unity of purpose never seen before in Lebanon; they had struck at every region, and no religious confession was left out when they arrested the new Government. In fact, the French inadvertently decided all factions to cast their lot with those who wanted an independent Lebanon. The Matāwila of all regions voiced their protests while the Tripolitanians went on a rampage.

When the French finally released their captives (following no little British pressure and ultimatums), Riyāḍ al-Ṣulḥ reaffirmed his support for a separate Lebanon and the Mīthāq al-Waṭanī (National Covenant).[12] This was the "national unity" arrangement which the Shī'a (as well as other communities) through their zu'amā' accepted in the euphoric circumstances following the two week captivity of the national leadership.

No one of any consequence raised the point that, between the Mīthāq and Article 95 of the Constitution,[13] the perpetuation of confessionalism was being established as the basis of political life in the new nation. In effect, the political groupings which appeared in the twenty years of French occupation were all, except for one or two, basically confessional in membership.[14] Thus, the Shī'ī party, al-Talā'i' (Front Ranks) was typical, in that it claimed to be progressive and even socialist in outlook, but nevertheless based its strength upon, and worked for a religious community. Among the Shī'a, much more than among any other community, the power of the za'īm was solidly entrenched.

The new era of Lebanese independence crowned the re-birth of the power of the notables. Already they had performed a quick recovery during the French presence. This was especially true of the minor zu'amā' who developed under the impact of French administrative policies. The Mandatory sought to establish its influence, thereby encouraging the small notables to rival the powers of their bigger counterparts. Furthermore, the French retained and employed confessional differences to further their aims.

The régime of Shaykh Bishāra al-Khūrī thus became the heyday of the older zu'amā'.[15] Just as the period of the Ottoman Parliament helped create a new breed of politician and thereby a new class of zu'amā',

so the era of the first President of politically independent Lebanon helped in consolidating the power of the new zu'amā' and in restoring the influence of the old. Thus, the President came to depend on men like Aḥmad al-As'ad of Jabal 'Āmil and Ṣabrī Ḥamāda of al-Hirmil, to deliver the votes both at the polling booth as well as in the Assembly. To do this, these zu'amā' surrounded themselves with satellite notables who did their share in guaranteeing deliveries of votes from their respective districts. For instance, al-As'ad's influence in Jabal 'Āmil and the rest of South Lebanon was such that, at its peak in 1948, he wielded more power than the President himself.[16]

Al-Khūrī imitated the French precedent and depended on these zu'amā'. In return, they were confirmed more than ever in their districts and in the state apparatus. They and their clients received political favors. Their clients did not see their standard of living raised, however, they were immune from the law in many instances of crime and petty disputes with the agents of the Central Government.

In fact, the power of the zu'amā' developed from two opposites: the State on the one hand, and on the other hand, the people who instinctively trusted the za'īm and was wary of the State. The people therefore lent the za'īm their almost unconditional support: anyone who could reach the attention of an al-As'ad or a Ḥamāda was confident of being safe from the State.

It is upon such features of a za'īm's functions and character

that is based the claim that political, if not landed feudalism still exists in Lebanon and most strongly and deeply rooted in the more destitute regions such as Jabal ʿĀmil, al-Hirmil and al-Biqāʿ. The present zuʿamāʾ in those areas (for the purpose of simplification, the two big families will be used: al-Asʿad and Ḥamāda), are descendant from feudal grandfathers.[17]

> Buttressed by private property and by administrative office, as he had once been sustained by the 'delegated feudal authority' of the state, the za'im continues to fulfill social and political functions similar to those of his ancestors. He even retains some of his warrior functions. In times of crisis he is able to lead his community in the field. Above all he preserves his quality as a spokesman and intermediary between the government and his client group. 18

Assuming the backwardness of the regions under study, it can also be said that such an arrangement seems to work rather well. Thus, it was through al-Asʿad, and to a lesser extent through ʿUsayrān, that al-Khūrī could lure Jabal ʿĀmil into forming part of Lebanon. And he did that precisely by guaranteeing the continued status of al-Asʿad and his likes; and by involving them in the machinery of government. This gave them a personal interest and a dgree of prestige.[19]

As time went on, matters became more and more intolerable within the régime's hierarchy. Corruption became evident and favoritism and nepotism were accepted practices.[20] Naturally, the big zuʿamāʾ did not object, for even the electoral laws were favorable to them. For instance, Aḥmad al-Asʿad and Ṣabrī Ḥamāda were assured re-election thanks to the existence of few large electoral districts and therefore the so-called grand

list of candidates. Through this system, the big za'īm not only controlled candidates in his own region, but also in some areas outside his.

During 1950-51, as opposition to the continued Presidency of al-Khūrī grew, alliances among political leaders crystallized. Again, there was a popular impetus for the discontent. This was basically due to worsened economic conditions.[21] This time, however, the leadership was provided by the younger zu'amā'. Their motivation was basically selfish: given the grand electoral list, their chances of getting anywhere in the political arena were quite difficult. Though the older zu'amā' continued to support al-Khūrī for a time, they finally realized that it was not politically viable to do so indefinitely. In fact, Bishāra al-Khūrī had to resign his post within twenty four hours after the defection of the big zu'amā'.[22]

The last minute defection of the zu'amā' was motivated by their realization that their positions were untenable and their prestige at stake and threatened by the dynamism of the younger politicians. In fact, the victory of the opposition gave these older notables much to worry about: the régime of President Kamīl Sham'ūn was inaugurated on a tone of electoral reform which seemed to be genuine as well as having chances of success.

Shortly after his election in 1952, the new President issued, by decree, a new electoral law.[23] The linchpin of this new program was the

short electoral list which replaced the grand list. This robbed the big bosses of extensive electoral districts and curtailed their influence. Furthermore, the short list tended to force these zu'amā' to look for support outside their actual political fiefs.

In 1953, Sham'ūn dissolved the Assembly and called for new elections. The results were generally unfavorable to the land-lords, especially to al-As'ad and his group. Violence errupted several times between partisans of the new and the traditional zu'amā' in the South and in al-Biqā'.[24] Voter turn-out, however, was not very satisfactory despite threats of heavy fines. Arm-twisting at the polls, and ballot-box stuffing took place, and the army had to interfere to keep the peace.[25] In Jabal 'Āmil, Aḥmad al-As'ad and his son Kāmil were elected; but their group of candidates had to seek votes outside their areas and none of their hand-picked electoral partners were able to win seats in the Assembly. That in itself could be paralyzing because it deprived al-As'ad of his "bloc" in the Assembly.

In contrast, 'Ādil 'Usayrān was handily elected from Sidon against an al-As'ad candidate.[26] He had thus successfully challenged the big za'īm at the popular level. Furthermore, 'Usayrān also proceeded to defeat the al-As'ad candidate for the Presidency of the Assembly. It was significant that he also defeated another candidate for that post, Ṣabrī Ḥamāda, a long time incumbent.

Ḥamāda had made a fair showing at the polls. He won his tightly

controlled district of al-Hirmil with a bare majority; while another Shī'ī member of the Assembly of almost thirty years standing, Ibrāhīm Ḥaydar, failed in his bid for re-election.[27]

Despite the shaking that most of the old zu'amā' received in the 1953 elections, Sham'ūn's victory was not to prove so sweet. The new President had claimed interest in weakening political feudalism. But in effect the results showed a serious inconsistency: Sham'ūn and his supporters tried their best to weaken opponents only, so that several pro-Sham'ūn "political feudal lords" succeeded in being re-elected. Furthermore, the President attempted to curb his opponents' powers through administrative appointments.[28] These policies were to become exacerbated by the passage of time and by the development Arab rivalries, as well as the general Cold War situation.[29]

In 1957, the Sham'ūn administration issued yet another electoral decree.[30] This one was aimed at ridding the Assembly of Sham'ūn's opponents, old and new. As in 1952, the new electoral law enlarged the Assembly to sixty six seats. This naturally meant that there were more districts to contest and narrowed the short list even more. The idea thus, was to outflank the older generation of zu'amā' as well as the more bothersome of the reform minded ones. Sham'ūn was interested, therefore, in packing the Assembly to his liking and amending the Constitution in view of his re-election.[31]

The ensuing elections were quite disastrous to Sham'ūn's opponents.

Several important zu'amā' lost to lesser régime candidates.[32] Aḥmad al-As'ad was prominent among the losers, with his seat going to a relatively unknown za'īm, Kāẓim al-Khalīl. Ṣabrī Ḥamāda, however, could not be unseated despite Sham'ūn's manifest efforts and interference.[33]

Again, Sham'ūn's victory proved to be quite pyrrhic. From the very beginning of the election process, the Government was accused of interfering in the balloting and in actually stuffing the ballot boxes, as well as gerrymandering.[34]

Sham'ūn also had to pay the price of his wide use of factionalism to weaken his opponents; by doing so he strengthened factionalism, therefore ironically weakening his own position.[35] He was not able to build a strong basis of universal support for his office. The elections results thus alienated the vast majority of the Shī'a: one za'īm resented the high-handed manner of his defeat, while the other would not easily forget Sham'ūn's efforts to unseat him.

In the politico-social structure of Lebanon, no za'īm can really afford to stay out of the Assembly for long. That, among other things, is his façade of modernism, his act of legitimization as well as his clients' means of dealing with the government. By the same token, the government itself, cannot, within the same context, afford to keep such a deputy out either. Thus, the gerrymandering which eliminated most of the top zu'amā' from the Assembly made that body less effective as a market place where differences are worked out and regional and

confessional deals are performed. Naturally, matters were worsened since the State proposed nothing as a viable substitute to the zu'amā', however temporary such replacement measure might have been.

> Politics in Lebanon seems to evolve on two different planes: an onstage of official government and parliamentary political life and a backstage of personal, confessional, regional group, family and interest group politics.... But what singles out Lebanon is the fact that the onstage has remarkably little connection with the backstage and needless to say, that the backstage decisions, invisible as they are, are the ones that really count. 36

The results of the electoral campaign caused al-As'ad, Ḥamāda and their peers to consider the whole affair as illegitimate and as a sanction to use extra-legal methods.

The reaction of these zu'amā' was not so much along ideological lines, nor even religious premises; it was rather an attempt to preserve the powers of the clan-family and its vital interests. However, it would be incorrect to completely exclude the ideological or religious garb which the opposition zu'amā' actually donned. For now, there was another element that had to be used: the masses. And as Sham'ūn increasingly espoused the cause of the Western powers, he began to alienate more people. This did not escape the zu'amā'. The popularity of President 'Abd al-Nāṣir of Egypt, the unpopularity of the Baghdad Pact, and the adhesion of Sham'ūn to the "Eisenhower Doctrine" to avoid what he called "Communist infiltration" and "Egyptian imperialism", gave the zu'amā' a cause célèbre[37] to take up. The President's policies of factionalism thus enmeshed themselves in new issues which his predecessor

never had to deal with: the growing rift between Arab nationalists and Lebanese isolationists; the deepening cleavage between the wealthy and the poor, and to some extent, a growing hostility between Christians and Muslims.[38]

Sham'ūn's persistence in forging closer links with the United States, and his refusal to sever relations with Britain and France during their aggression on Egypt in 1956, infuriated those sympathetic with the Arab cause. The President finally brought matters to the breaking point when he committed the country to the "Eisenhower Doctrine".[39] It was then that the old outlying and contested regions of Lebanon began buzzing with talk of seccession to rejoin Syria.[40] At the same time the major political zu'amā' accused Sham'ūn of a breach of faith, and of having violated al-Mīthāq al-Waṭanī. This so called national consencus had actually been severely damaged.[41]

On that over-all tone, the civil strife of 1958 exploded.

The main cause of this civil conflict, then, was the attempt of the zu'amā' to re-establish their power and position. Naturally, there were foreign interests at work; and the fact that these interests worked through the zu'amā' was testimony to the importance of those politicians.

In the fighting which ocurred and in the alignment of forces, the Muslims, in general (with a large section of Christians, nevertheless) formed the opposition. And while the majority of the zu'amā'

were active opposition members, only one of their lot sided with the Government: he had won his seat in the Assembly and had always been a Sham'ūn supporter.

As a rule, the Shī'a were supporters of the insurgents. They were primarily led by Kāmil al-As'ad, now heir to his father's position; and by Ṣabrī Ḥamāda. The latter directed roving bands of rebels who clashed with loyalist forces or helped smuggle weapons, while the former transformed Jabl 'Āmil into a defensive fortress.

At first, the Shī'a of Jabal 'Āmil remained inactive, as far as offensive movement was concerned. On the other hand, they were impressive in numbers and in potential. Furthermore, they kept loyalist forces at bay and were in constant touch with what came to be called al-Jabha al-Waṭaniyya (the National Front). Here, the Shī'a became useful in extending protection when needed, as well as food and equipment to the insurgents. In fact, they were directly linked to the Durūz of Jabal al-Durūz in Syria, who sent caravans of equipment to their co-religionists in Lebanon through Shī'ī territory and up historic Wādī al-Taym.

Basically, therefore, al-As'ad did not lead his men outside the confines of their territory. Instead the Shī'a formed a home defence force and a link in the over-all effort. That was remarkably consistent with the historical behavior of the Matāwila of Jabal 'Āmil. In fact, by the beginning of July 1958, Kāmil al-As'ad sought to assume

the position of mediator in the conflict.[42]

As was the case with the Jabal ʿĀmil Shīʿa so it was with the Biqāʿ and Hirmil Shīʿa who seemed to be behaving as consistently as their ancestors. Thus, Ṣabrī Ḥamāda, though not in over-all control of the region nevertheless, exerted much influence and weight. As was mentioned above, his men did participate in insurgent activities and prevented Government forces from entering the region, though this was mostly by night. However this tended to remove any Governmental or loyalist threats to the free flow of arms and men between ʿAkkār in the north and Jabal ʿĀmil in the south, and quickly stole control of the borders with Syria from the Government.[43] It is interesting to note that the "frontiers" of the Biqāʿ, beyond which the Government forces did not venture, were those of the old sanjaq of Mount Lebanon.[44]

Many minor zuʿamāʾ as well, lent their support to the rebel forces. They did so either because they really believed in what was being done, or because they could not afford to stay neutral or join the Shamʿūn faction: their clients or constituents, as well as their overlords, just would not tolerate a pro-Shamʿūn notable. A good example of the fate of one such zaʿīm who chose to support Shamʿūn, is that of Kāẓim al-Khalīl, representing Tyre in the 1957 Assembly. Al-Khalīl had to seek armed protection while in Beirut; and after the resolution of the crisis, he dared not return to his native city for some time. When al-Khalīl did finally return, several attempts were made on his life.[45]

While in Lebanon, in 1958, I heard and read various reports which indicated a certain amount of divergence between the zu'amā' and the people in the rebellious districts. It seemed that many people inhabiting those regions bordering on Syria, were ready to rejoin Syria, if given the chance. This feeling was mixed, in that it arose both from a sentiment of "Syrian-ness" as well as from enthusiasm to join the newly formed union of Syria and Egypt, the United Arab Republic.[46]

The zu'amā' were in a quandary. They were willing to use Nasserism and the Arab nationalist cause, as well as platforms of social justice and reform, as vehicles for their continuance in their positions of power; but they soon discovered that the whole affair could backfire on them. They wanted Sham'ūn out and the return of the previous status quo, but not a new system which would sweep them out of power. Thus, they did their best to restrain such separatist and radical activities.[47]

Such dual behaviour was to be expected: what would Kāmil al-As'ad or Ṣabrī Ḥamāda, or even their lesser satellites have amounted to, if Lebanon had been absorbed into the U.A.R. ? These zu'amā' were not naïve. They knew that they would be totally eliminated if their areas were joined to Syria. Several types of reforms passed through legislation or by decree had been enacted throughout the early and mid-1950's.[48] Furthermore, before Syria joined Egypt, the situation looked too "socialist" to the great majority of Lebanese zu'amā'. Under the impact of these social and landed reforms, as well as the progress towards the left,

the zu'amā' of Lebanon would have lost both lands and political power.[49]

It is significant that the regions where poverty was most prevalent, also were the regions most solidly under the control of the local zu'amā'.[50] It is a sad fact, that Jabal 'Āmil and al-Hirmil should be so poor. The reasons for this are multiple: the Central Government has not cared much for them because they have been considered "safe" areas, almost completely controlled by one or two notables. The notables themselves see no good in the advancement of their people, for the less these clients become isolated the more independent they will tend to feel. Hence, the slow pace and the lack of encouragement for the development of modern farming methods, schools and medical facilities. At the same time the circus-style behavior in the Assembly continues to dupe the masses into believing that all efforts are being made to better their situation.[51]

In a study of the five provinces of Lebanon (see maps in appendix), each Muḥāfiz (Governor) gave a revealing report about the state of affairs in his respective muḥāfaẓa (province).

Muḥāfaẓat al-Biqā' (al-Biqā' province) consists of five subdivisions each called a qā'im-maqāmiyya and administered by a qā'im-maqām (deputy governor), of which Ba'labakk and al-Hirmil are heavily Shī'ī.[52] These have an approximate area of 3,000 square kilometers. The region has arid as well as relatively fertile areas. Three rivers drain these plains, but there are few, if any, proper irrigation

arrangements. The Ba'labakk district includes ninety two villages, none of which had electricity when these reports were made in 1963. Only Ba'labakk, the capital of the Muḥāfaẓa, had electric power which was intermittent and weak at best. Twelve villages had no roads, while thirty had dirt roads. Twenty nine villages had no schools, while eighty six hamlets and farms had no water supply schemes, and only two villages besides Ba'labakk, had any telephone services.[53]

In the Hirmil district which numbers thirty one villages, all of which look to the powerful za'īm Ṣabrī Ḥamāda for patronage, none have electric power and seven have no roads, while sixteen have dirt tracks. Only two have paved roads leading to them.[54] Here there is an improvement of the school situation: there are thirty villages with Government schools (all primary).[55] One village has a telephone exchange, and one has a booth, while another has a post office. Twenty four of the thirty one villages rely on rain-water collected in wells, two have springs and two have piped water.[56]

According to the Muḥāfiẓ, the Central Government is well aware of the problems facing these people. At one point he says that," The low social standards in some of the Beka's districts is the result of poverty and ignorance, owing to their distance from civilization."[56] But the State has done nothing to improve their lot or to bring a little of that civilization to them. At the same time, it has not tried to replace the power of the za'īm with its own presence.[57]

The Muḥāfiẓ goes on:

> Often I have heard Beka'ese from the Northern area say ruefully, "We are not Lebanese". They are extremely sensitive, because they are tillers of soil and live from its crops. Their fate is linked with the land, in prosperity and adversity alike. Their relations with the state are clouded now and then by misunderstanding, and they believe that their contacts with goverment authorities, if they are to produce results, have to be conducted through intermediaries. However, they are very patriotic and dignified people. Their relation to the State is similar to that of a son who shows his love for his father by leaving home. 59
>
> Good people, these Beka'ese.

The report is quite revealing. The Muḥāfiẓ alludes to the problems of these people and hints that the Government can do more. At the same time he completely ignores the za'īm and his responsibilties; and he tries, implicitly, to deny the role of "the intermediate" between the people and the State. At the same time, the Muḥāfiẓ reveals that "these Beka'ese" are really caught between one or more zu'amā' who exploit them at will, and a paternalistic State which not only exploits them as well but cares not about ameliorating their situation. Infact, there is no incentive for real, deep-rooted reforms as long as the zu'amā' control and form governments.

Agriculture is another apalling area. Ninety per cent of the population living in al-Biqā' draw their livelihood from the land; yet the fate of the crops is left to the whims of the weather. In 1959, for instance, the rainfall was measured at less than four inches (and such rainfalls are by no means rare ocurrences). Yet, little was done to help the peasant manage with what little rainfall there was, while the landlords' demands of the peasant were constant. The peasant gets

no guidance as to methods and upkeep of his plot. As a result, the land is lost and turns into dust instead of being reclaimed. Consequently, the peasant is either pushed into further debt, or else is driven off the land completely. The Shī'ī farmer of northern al-Biqā' is one of the poorest and most destitute of the Lebanese. Again, in the field of encouraging the small farmer to help himself, agricultural banks are almost non-existent, and where they do operate they are, in effect, controlled by the wealthy and are wasted, or their funds mismanaged and finding their way into the pockets of politicians and local functionaries. "In the matter of agricultural loans it is imperative that the appropriation of funds be increased and that these be distributed fairly to districts under the supervision of departments which can control their correct use."[60]

Educational statistics for the region show that there has been no boom in education or literacy, despite the figures released on the quantity of schools. The same report, quoted above and released in 1963, showed that the Biqā' region had a 13.5 per cent student population (percentage of estimated provincial population) while the national average is 16.4 per cent.

Health is another lacking area. Hospitals and clinics in Shī'ī areas are almost non-existent. In 1965, L.L. 48,600,000 were allocated for health projects across Lebanon, but nothing was done until 1967, when L.L. 12,000,000 were spent on the erection of a military hospital

located not ten miles from Beirut which has at least fifty seven hospitals.[61] When a new Government was formed in 1970, a native of Ba'labakk was appointed Minister of Health and he intended to push ahead with the development of a hospital in his home-town.[62] The hospital had been building for some time and as yet not a penny more had been spent on it. It was still closed while all the allocated monies in the budget had been spent.[63]

The economic picture of Jabal 'Amil is not better. At one time the region was relatively prosperous. This was due to certain 19th century economic conditions, as well as a spate of wise influence on the part of certain al-As'ad notables. Local and smaller zu'amā' such as those of the Munkir, Ṣa'b, al-Zayn and al-Ḥurr families, also helped. But during the past years of the twentieth century economic and social conditions went from bad to worse. The gap between the development of Jabal 'Amil (and al-Biqā' - al-Hirmil) and the other neighbouring regions has grown quickly.[64] For instance, the Beirut monthly, Commerce du Levant of April 1969, reported such discrepancies in growth. The article contained information on the high concentration of the highly salaried in Beirut and Mount Lebanon regions.[65] It must be reiterated, however, that it is not in the interests of the notables to see to the advancement of their region. Serious, down-to-earth development would only speed the end of the power of, and the need for the zu'amā'.[66]

The main livelihood of Jabal 'Amil is tobacco. This plant has been

the economic mainstay of the area since the early part of the 19th century. Yet the cultivation of this leaf is one of the hardest occupations in the agricultural field. The Government has done next to nothing to alleviate the peasants' harsh living conditions; in fact, the authorities give their support to the Régie National des Tabacs et Tombacs, in the form of police assistance as well as occasional military help in enforcing Régie regulations. Except in certain cases, the peasantry has had no recourse.[67]

A recent short study of the conditions of Jabal 'Amil's tobacco growers illustrates the above point:

Following the formation of the Régie in 1935, the story of misery and exploitation of peasants who work the tobacco field has been a well-known feature of Lebanese life. Yet, nothing has been done to change matters. The Régie, backed by the State, determines, regulates, purchases, processes and sells tobacco products, just as an equivalent company did during the Ottoman era.[68] The Régie is also in charge of enforcing the law and if necessary, punishing offenders.[69]

In 1964, in the village of 'Aytarūn, a large scale tobacco crop failure took place. This affected 6000 village inhabitants and one of the most important tobacco growing regions of the country. The failure was due to mildew, a common fungus which occasionally attacks the plants. The small growers were hardest hit, and their earnings plummeted. They then decided to go ahead and re-plant quickly. However, because of the mildew, they planted in fields not allocated by permission of the Régie.

Some unemployed peasants (unemployed mostly because of Régie restrictions) planted some fields as well in an attempt to take advantage of the situation and possibly earn a few pounds. When the Régie announced that it would destroy the new crop regardless of the disaster, the villagers decided to stand up to the exploiting company. They sent a delegation to petition the President of the Republic, Fu'ād Shihāb, who had announced a vast program of reform.

Because of its timing, the attempt was a success, and the Régie was asked to take the new crop. The peasants were satisfied even though some did not receive payment for the excess tobacco which had in fact replace the diseased crop.[69]

In 1968 approximately 25 per cent of the total crop was ruined due to heavy rains. The villagers requested that a committee be formed to study the effects of the disaster, thinking that some compensation would be given to them. It was in vain. Instead, tractors accompanied by local gendarmes appeared to destroy the remaining crops. The villagers of 'Aytarūn claimed that this was the Régie's way of wreaking revenge on the growers for their temerity.[70] This time, however, the inhabitants decided to resist. Shots were fired and several people were hurt, while others were arrested and accused of a variety of crimes.[71] But the crop was saved; and the Régie's behavior seemed to tighten the ranks of the peasants in the whole region. Messages of support streamed in from various areas of the country and an uproar in workers sectors developed.[72]

The Régie then took the crops and paid for part of the lot. They apparently meant to use the balance as a lever to force growers not to cultivate additional areas in the next season, despite past shortages and disasters.[73] But the peasants defied the Régie and went ahead with their planting schemes. At that point, the Régie moved in again with gendarmes and, at the crack of dawn, occupied the town while its employees plowed up the fields with no interruptions from the villagers.[74]

Thus, with the collaboration of the authorities, the peasants were suppressed and exploited by the Régie. The zu'amā' too did their share in exploiting the tobacco growers. This they did through collaboration with the Régie, or through their silence in the face of Régie attitudes and behavior. Such a system, therefore, cannot be expected to improve the lot of the peasant, toiling in the fields for ten or twelve hours daily; nor can it be expected to curb the excesses of the Régie, or give the peasants some mechanism of recourse against injustices. Furthermore, the Government has not even attempted to seriously overhaul the methods of tobacco farming, yet that plant is an important part of the country's economy as a whole.[75]

The situation of the peasants was critical in 1969. Following all those natural and man-caused disasters, the crop yield amounted to only sixty perccent of the previous year's yield which, in itself, was lower than usual.[76] The greatest concern was how to feed and clothe 6,000 people while the restrictive planting system persisted. Scores of families were jobless because there were no fields to cultivate; and

the children had to pay the price by being deprived of school.[77]

This situation was by no means confined to ʿAytarūn. Other tobacco growing centers such as Bint Jubayl, Marjʿuyūn and Tibnīn were equally involved. In one of the villages of the district of Marjʿuyūn, Kafar Rummān, one grower told the author of the study that, in his opinion, the problem extended beyond cultivation and poor methods. There was the quota problem as well. In fact, if a peasant planted a mere one hundred additional square meters, that was considered an act of defiance and impudence, and the crop was summarily destroyed. But when ten or fifteen dunums[78] were planted over and above the quota, by the large landowners who are wealthy and possess all the facilities and influence nothing was done to punish them.[79]

The above expression by the peasant indicates that there is not only an awakening to the surroundings by the peasant, but also an attempt to voice complaints and analyze causes. Thus, the new awareness, already evident among their peers in Mount Lebanon. The role played by President Shihāb during his régime (1958-1964) in attempting to institute reforms in government and administration cannot be discounted, however unsuccessful they were in the short run. His attempts to streamline the bureaucracy, to control internal economic factors and to curb the powers of the zuʿamāʾ, left an undoubted psychological impact on the country. Jabal ʿĀmil was not left untouched by these attempts, though actual material benefits were few.[80]

Today, however, a new element has introduced itself upon the scene: the Palestinian resistance, and its ideas of social upheaval and the elimination of bourgeois, capitalist and politically feudal régimes and systems. This new development shall be dealt with in more detailed fashion further on in the work.

One of the roots of the problems facing the peasant of Jabal 'Amil stems from the privileges given to the Régie by the Government. A case in point is the issuing of permits to cultivate land for the purposes of growing tobacco. Large land owners, including deputies, functionaries and other monied members of society, manage to obtain no less than one hundred dunums, while the legal maximum is fifty. This maximum has been circumvented by the wealthy through the purchase of land in the names of relatives, most of whom, along with the actual owner, are absentee landlords.[81] The amount of land acquired by these landlords and the consequences of this, can be readily appreciated when compared to the amounts obtained by individual small growers. The average holding in the latter case is one to two dunums. In statistical terms, matters today stand as follows: 55 per cent of the growers own or share-crop areas not exceeding one or two dunums; 3 per cent own beteen six and ten dunums, while 2 per cent own between ten and fifty dunums. The really vast areas are owned by less than one per cent of the owners.[82]

In many, if not most cases, the small grower loses money instead of breaking even, much less making a profit. A typical example of the

expenses of the peasant will illustrate this point:

If a farmer wanted to cultivate a single dunum of land, it would cost him L.L.50.00 to plow the land and another L.L. 100.00 to purchase seed, to seed and maintain his land.[83] Yet another L.L. 100.00 would have to be spent to purchase water and bring it to his plot, while L.L. 75.00 would be allocated to pick, sort and clean the leaves when they are ready. An extra L.L. 50.00 would be needed to dry and pack the final product. The farmer would then have to add L.L. 225.00 on rental or mortgage expenses for his plot, as well as for the permit to plant obtained from the Régie. The total expenditures needed would amount to L.L. 530.00.[84]

If this same peasant were to produce an average of one hundred kilograms (220 lbs.) which would bring him approximately L.L. 5.00 per kilogram, he would then end with a loss of L.L. 30.00. Fortunately for his family, it too works. They earn not more than L.L. 0.50 per head per day, but it allows them to eat.[85]

Another way in which the peasant is exploited is through the Régie's arbitrary setting of prices and compensations. Early in the 1960's the company decided not to accept two particular varieties of tobacco which had been hitherto grown in the region. However, for a time, the Régie had taken those crops but had not paid for them. Later, the Régie decided to alter its scale of rates for tobacco bales with each season. In each case, there was no semblance of consultation with the peasants and these had no recourse. Thus, after limiting the size-weight of a

bale to twenty to twenty five kilograms, the company deducted rates for one kilogram of non-usable leaf per bale while in reality the non-usable leaves amounted usually to no more than two hundred and fifty grams per bale. Furthermore, the Régie now forces the peasants to buy wooden boxes to pack the tobacco in, at a rate of LL. 10.00 per box.[86]

On their part, the large landowners do their share in exploiting the peasants by practicing child-labor. This is outright exploitation, for the children are employed from about three o'clock in the morning until past one o'clock in the afternoon. This is a back-breaking job and at earnings of not more than L.L. 3.00 for older children (early teens). The younger ones get not more than L.L. 1.60 per day.[87]

In 1963, Jabal ʿAmil had an estimated 340,000 inhabitants living in four hundred and fifty two towns and villages, on an area of about 2800 square kilometers.[88] Eighteen deputies, not all of whom are Shīʿa, represent the region. According to the Muḥāfiẓ of the South, there is much partisan conflict in the region. "The municipality can itself be the prime mover in partisanship, and quite often the Mukhtār is its instigator."[89][90]

The mukhtār, it must be noted, is usually a member of the local prominent family, and is appointed by the state with the approval of the local zaʿīm. This latter feature is, of course, not a legal requirement, but rather part of the system of deferring to the zaʿīm. Theoretically, then, the mukhtār is the Government's man in the locale; but

in practice he is the choice of the za'īm. At best, then, there is a conflict of interest; at worst, the mukhtār is nothing more than the za'īm's puppet and the person who gets things done for the notable at the village level.

The South lacks doctors, nurses, dispensaries, hospitals and pharmacies. The infant mortality rate is quite high in the whole country: in 1969, the Government set it at 15 per cent. However, considering that many infantile deaths are gone unreported because of remoteness of location and because it is not uncommon for the rural (as well as some of the urban) population, to refrain from reporting deaths. Thus, statistics are unoficially set at 20 to 25 per cent in the cities and as much as 30 to 35 per cent in the countryside.[91] Being mostly rural, both Jabal 'Āmil and al-Hirmil are two of the hardest hit sectors. Yet, there are only three mother-and-child care centers in the whole country and all are located on the coast, at Tripoli, Beirut and Sidon.[92]

In Jabal 'Āmil most doctors are concentrated in Sidon, following the national pattern. The same applies to hospitals: there are seventeen in the South, most of which are private.[93] The private hospitals charge rates which cannot be afforded by people tilling the soil, or fishing for a living and having an income level of not more than L.L. 5.00 per day.

The great majority of these seventeen hospitals are concentrated on the littoral.[94] In 1963, there was only one operating government hos-

pital in Sidon and none in the rest of the area. A second hospital has recently been inaugurated in Tyre. One state-supplied doctor usually looks after 50,000 people in Ḥāṣbayya, and two work out of Bint Jubayl. These two districts have an estimated population of 80,000 and send five deputies to represent their "interests" in the Assembly.[95]

One hospital at Tibnīn, in the very southern part, was on its way to total dilapidation by 1963 and has not as yet been repaired, while another has been in the process of being built for the past fifteen years.[96]

The situation with pharmacies and dispensaries is just as lamentable: four of the seven districts of the province have none.[97] "I leave you to imagine a worried man taking his sick wife or son on the back of an animal over rough tracks, seeking the chief town of the district, any district, in the hope that he will find a practicing doctor."[98]

The quotation is a revelation in itself: the peasant, seeking medical help, is unable to get adequate and quick transportation because he either cannot afford it, or else it simply does not exist; he does not have an adequate road which would help him in getting to his destination by some other means; and he is forced to search about for some town which may have a doctor or his equivalent. The description is made all the more serious, since it emanated from the Central Government's chief representative in the province, in a report made

public.

Education is in worse condition in Jabal ʿĀmil than in any other district in Lebanon.[99] In 1963, out of a total of 70,000 school-age children, only 32, 851 attended schools, both private and public. Most of these children attended elementary schools. These schools number two hundred and seventeen. If the children are lucky, some would attend one of the fourteen primary schools, and later one of the two secondary institutions in the area.[100] The literacy rate in South Lebanon, according to the I.R.F.E.D. mission report in 1962, was 13.2 per cent of the population.[101]

Other problems of Jabal ʿĀmil include the lack of roads and electricity as well as postal and telephone communications. Only seven of the more than four hundred towns and villages have electric facilities. Much of this is due to the fact that there has been no effort in spending on projects for the area. According to the South's Muḥāfiẓ, all of the profits gleaned from the oil refinery at Sidon, as well as from tobacco and citrus products, were going to other parts of the country.[102]

Besides exploitation from the zuʿamāʾ and neglect by the Government, Jabal ʿĀmil also suffers from the effects of centralization. Everything that is exported from the South has to go through Beirut and therefore through the hands of Beirut financiers and brokers. However, due to this economic centralism, the big southern zuʿamāʾ have also built financial bases for themselves in Beirut, therefore accentuating this

ill.

Until recently, then, the share of the Shī'a in the national wealth and in the social and political conditions has been essentially the share of the za'īm.[103] But, slow as it is, the process of social mobilization is there, despite its unevenness and despite the efforts of the zu'amā' and other elements in society to slow it down. There are several factors (besides the village television set or the individual transistor radio), working against the zu'amā' such as Kāmil al-As'ad and Ṣabrī Ḥamāda. Even those most backward areas of Jabal 'Āmil and al-Hirmil are witnessing and experiencing a situation where "urbanization is outrunning industrialization; exposure to mass media is outrunning formal education; and the supply of secondary [school] graduates is exceeding the demand for their services."[104]

In effect the above quote points up a serious contradiction in the Lebanese system; and inasmuch as it affects the whole system, it definitely victimizes one of the weakest areas of the country. The contradiction, brought about mainly by the economic system, is rather complicated. There are not enough children in the schools, and therefore, not enough educated graduates. In fact, many children, as is in the case of the 'Āmilīs, are forced to work in the fields to help supplement the family income. At the same time, however, there are not enough jobs for the number of graduates in existence. Thus we have a seemingly contradictory situation where there are few people in schools

and graduating, while at the same time, having too many graduates for the existing job opportunities.

The 1971 budget of Lebanon recently called for and earmarked a part of the monies to build more schools.[105] The project seems ambitious. However, it will not solve the problem of what to do about creating or generating employment. Thus, the controversy and contradiction will persist. At present, the net effect of these policies is not untypical of those in other countries of similar economic natures. ʿĀmilīs as well as inhabitants of al-Hirmil move to urban centers in the hope of finding employment. In most cases, the situation in the cities is not better than in the rural region; in fact, it is worse from hygienic and housing points of view. Thus, the interior suffers from a lack of manpower; and the cities become congested with human throngs who have nothing to do and nowhere to go. These results cause a certain amount of political and social mobilization which worry the zuʿamāʾ as well as the Government: there is an expansion of the politically relevant spectrum, a rising level of potential tensions, an increase in the political participation of the people and a shift from parochialism to nationalism.[106]

These strains are now appearing in the regions studied in this paper, as well as among the Shīʿa who have recently sought refuge in Beirut. Tensions are especially prominent in Jabal ʿĀmil where, due to the developing clashes with Israel, there is a new fermentation. Further-

more, hope is a little brighter now simply because the people of the Jabal and the Shī'a of the north are waking up to reality. They are slowly discovering that they missed much of what others in the rest of the country received. They are also waking to the fact that they have no positions of responsibility at several levels of the administration. Even the Muḥāfiẓ of the South is not a Shī'ī. In the armed forces, for instance, there are hardly any Shī'ī officers, but there is a large segment of Shī'a below the grade of sergeant.

Most of all, however, the Matāwila have begun to realize that, like many of their peers, they are being duped by those who were meant to protect them, and consequently by those who stand to gain the most advantage from regional and confessional tensions.

Postscript

The Khūrī régime (1943-1952) attempted, and to a large extent succeeded in co-opting the traditional zu'amā', especially important ones such as Aḥmad al-As'ad and Ṣabrī Ḥamāda. The Sham'ūn régime (1952-1958) on its part, attempted to challenge these same zu'amā', including lesser ones, many of whom were reformist in attitude: Sham'ūn and his supprters had thus set themselves onto a collision course. At first, Sham'ūn had achieved limited success, but in the end he failed. Nevertheless, the zu'amā' themselves were weakened by the experience.[1]

Capitalizing on that weakness, the next President, Fu'ād Shihāb (1958-1964) attempted in his turn to deal with the notables. His method was to try to ignore them and thus circumvent them, as it were. The weakness of those zu'amā' and the popularity, influence and political power of the President (who was also the former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces), kept the notables from attempting any overt or bold come-back.

The new President instituted certain reforms which were meant to repair the machinery of state and smooth the bureaucracy and its processes. The reforms ultimately meant (and aimed at) the weakening of such people as Kāmil al-As'ad and his peers, and their alliances with the religious leaders as well as with the urban financial leaders. More government agencies were created in an attempt to circumvent, or possibly replace, the functions of traditional leaders. However, one

result of the proliferation of agencies, was the increase of the bureaucratic labyrinth, which tended to counteract efforts to minimize the difficulties encountered by citizens who came into contact with these agencies. Thus, the creation of new government departments confused the common man and he ended by resorting to the help of his za'īm. The Shī'a, being the most underpriviledged group in the country, were in an acutely unsettled position. They still did not trust the Government, but at the same time they were losing much of their admiration of the zu'amā' who controlled them. As Hottinger put it: "Enthusiasm for his [the za'īm] person or family in many a client's mind gives way more and more to a feeling of affectionate irony mixed with indulgence for 'our somewhat quaint customs'."[2]

In the final analysis, the Shihāb régime, though succeeding in weakening the zu'amā' a little bit more, was either unable or unwilling to take radical enough steps to rid the country of the influence of the notables and present it with a viable alternative. Full realization of most Shihābī projects (even those not related to to administrative reform plans), was thwarted: Jabal 'Āmil is still very underdeveloped; so is the northern Biqā' and al-Hirmil. The effects of the accelerated pace of social mobilization, spurred mainly by a serious exodus from rural to urban areas, have been too uneven and have run into too many obstacles. The Matāwila are not ready yet to throw off the yoke of their respective zu'amā', despite their increased contacts with regions and

people outside their homeland. But a new set of pressures has developed in Jabal ʿĀmil after the Israeli-Arab war of June 1967, the most significant of which has been the presence of the Palestinian guerillas. In the face of these developments, the zuʿamāʾ have been relatively, and quite strangely, paralyzed.

The Resistance needs to use the excellent strategic facilities of the rocky and cavernous mountains of southern Jabal ʿĀmil. But the Palestinian forces did not propagate their message to the people of the region, with a concentrated and efficient manner. Some propaganda was performed and cells were formed in villages, where the inhabitants were enlightened as to the aims of the guerillas. Being Leftists, the guerillas naturally tried to point out to the ʿĀmilīs the class structure and its contradictions. They tried to explain to them, in economic as well as in other terms, why the peasant is subjugated by the very people who claim to have his interest at heart. The response of the ʿĀmilīs has been mixed. But the urgency of the military problem which the Resistance has had to face, as well as the pressure applied to them by the Lebanese armed forces, seems to have detracted from their opportunities to fully educate the population of the region.[3]

The tempo of the fighting in the area was not really accelerated until late in 1968 and the beginning of 1969. It had become serious enough by February 1969, to prompt the Lebanese authorities to declare the South, a "prohibited zone".[4] Declaring the region as a prohibited

area meant that security forces had the run of it. Furthermore, it meant that commerce was curtailed and visits by tourists virtually at a standstill.[5] In any case, it was a further blow to an already bad regional economy. Add to that the almost daily loss of homes, property damages, destruction of fields and loss of livestock, and a rather bleak picture emerges.

By mid-1969, homeless or scared people were streaming to urban centers, especially Beirut. There were two principal reasons behind the post-1967 exodus from Jabal ʿĀmil, which began in 1968. In July, an official report pointed to the lack of protection people received from the armed forces against the ever increasing Israeli incursions into Lebanese territory.[6] These incursions resulted in kidnappings of people, killing or thefts of cattle and general terrorist and destructive acts.[7] The second reason given for the accelerated pace of migration from the Jabal was the lack of employment opportunities in the region, and the near total lack of industrial centers outside of the coastal region.[8]

The situation became alarming enough to prod a group of Shīʿī deputies to present a list of demands to the Prime Minister.[9] These included: a) the allocation of LL 1.2 million for housing projects in the affected areas of the South; b) the appointment of at least one Shīʿī member to the Ministry of Agriculture; c) the implementation of various irrigation projects already existing on paper, and, c) the formation of a new Muḥāfaẓa in the South with its capital at al-Nabaṭiyya.[10]

The whole period during which ʿĀmilī refugees fled to Beirut, pointed to an important development in the relations of the ʿĀmilīs with several leadership segments. These included the Central Government, the zuʿamāʾ and the religious authorities.

Ever since independence, relations between the Executive branch of government and the zuʿamāʾ, have been variously cooperative and competitive. The President continuously attempted to displace the zuʿamāʾ; and each of the four presidents since 1943 has tried a different method. Thus, at various times, some of the zuʿamāʾ were either co-opted, undermined, ignored or actively attacked politically.[11] It was not surprising then to see the Central Government attempting to extract some gain from the woes of the poor ʿĀmilīs. In the face of almost complete "zaʿīmal" inaction, the Government in effect attempted to project itself as the only recourse. Furthermore, it pointed out to the refugees, in various ways, that had it not been for the presence of the Palestinians none of this would have befallen them. Thus, the Government may have extracted some advantage on two scores. In fact, the Administration started announcing projects of all sorts. In December of 1969, following a series of severe Israeli raids into southern Jabal ʿĀmil, the Minister of Agriculture announced that the Government had a "special interest" in the areas and would speed-up the economic development of the region. The Minister added that very little had been done earlier because of a shortage of funds.[12]

In the meantime, nothing of consequence was heard from the zu'amā'. All, including Kāmil al-As'ad, issued some pithy declarations and waved their arms about. This did not escape the attention of their constituents. It was the chairman of the Shī'ī Grand Council (al-Majlis al-A'lā al-Shī'ī), who took the initiative by sponsoring and heading a South Lebanon bloc in the Assembly and outside it. Shaykh Mūsā al-Ṣadr announced the formation of that body, including all the Shī'ī deputies of South Lebanon, "to give priority to South Lebanon's social, economic and defence requirements".[13] The response among the Shī'ī refugees was such, that it added quite a lot to the prestige of the newly elected Shaykh Mūsā.

The failure of the Palestinian organizations to present their case well and adequately to the inhabitants of the frontier villages of South Lebanon, contributed to the tendency among some to blame all their miseries on the guerillas. It also gave the Government a golden chance to pursue its advantages by encouraging this sentiment whenever possible, and by applying as much pressure as they could on the Palestinians who could not enjoy full popular support.[14]

By early 1970, the refugee problem became so acute that a whole section of suburban Beirut became inhabited by squatters, living in tents, tin shacks or under open skies. In March of that year, security forces began to tear down squatters' shelters.[15] No reason was given, and no other housing was provided. The squatters rioted: two were killed

and eighteen injured[16] by the time the clash was halted. The Government's action did not go un-criticized, for these were more than 1500 people involved. Ten Shī'ī deputies presented a petition to the Government, demanding a reversal of that policy.[17] But by then, the damage had been done.

All the while, Shaykh Mūsā al-Ṣadr's prestige rose: the Government sought every opportunity to weaken al-As'ad and his friends, and to demonstrate that only the State can save the 'Amilīs from their dilemma. The authorities suddenly showered unusually great favors upon the Shī'ī community and on Shaykh Mūsā. This was done through monetary contributions to the Shī'ī Council chest, through veiled verbal and press attacks against the zu'amā', and through offers of facilities for mass meetings and transportation thereto. Honorifics were presented to the Grand Council and its President. On one occasion, the Government banned all musical programs on Radio Lebanon in favor of readings from the Qur'ān when Sayyid Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm al-Ṭabāṭabā'ī died in Irāq, on June 1, 1970.[18] This was an unprecedented act on the part of the Lebanese Government.[19]

The great popularity of Sayyid Mūsā al-Ṣadr was reinforced during the events following a particularly severe Israeli raid on South Lebanon on May 12, 1970. Again, the initiative was Shaykh Mūsā's, for he called a general strike on May 26 to dramatize the serious plight of the Shī'a refugees.[20] The strike was a total success. In fact an interesting result of it was the subsequent query as to whether the strike was for, or

against the Palestinian presence in South Lebanon. Inevitably, that question is deeply involved in anything that has to do with Jabal ʿĀmil. The reason for the question was the manifest encouragement and presence of such right-wing parties as Shamʿūn's Liberal Bloc, the Maronite League, and Jumayyil's Katāʾib (Phalange).[21] It seems correct to assume under such circumstances that, if the intent of the demonstrations and the strike were not anti-Palestinian, they were not anti-Government either. On the other hand, in a report on May 27, the Manchester Guardian reported that refugees from South Lebanon who resided in areas overlapping with sectors inhabited by Palestinians were, "not on the best terms, but they now share a common disgust at the powers that be. It was mainly the Shiʿites' day but Palestinians joined in."[22]

In any case, the whole affair was effective enough to shut down several urban centers and block air traffic at Beirut International Airport.[23] Furthermore, in a surprisingly rapid move, the Assembly pledged LL30,000,000 to relieve the plight of the refugees.[24] In language resemblingthat of leftist and revolutionary organizations, the Council for South Lebanon, to whom the project was entrusted, described a program to deal with health, nutrition, clothing, housing and child care, as well as the repatriation of refugees, the building of shelters, ensuring immediate defense needs, training the population to be members of a defense militia, and arming the population.[25]

Thus, the Government decided to pose as the only recourse of these people. It did not really care whether it had the LL30,000,000 or not. Neither did the authorities care whether they could carry out such a program with that much money, or not; nor did it care whether it was

capable of carrying out such a program without actually having to overhaul the whole system.

Toward the middle of June, against a background of daily raids into South Lebanon, and a continued increase of refugees and damages, the Council issued its first report: 22,853 people had now been forced from their homes while 119 houses had been destroyed and 444 damaged.[26] This is not to mention the loss of livestock and damages done to cultivated fields. At that point too it was discovered that there were no LL30 million to be allocated. Only LL2 million could be found.[27]

All the above did not escape Kāmil Bey al-As'ad's attention. He understood quite clearly whose palaces Shaykh Mūsā threatened to have burned; and the Bey also saw the decline of his popularity. Thus, he felt constrained to call a counter-demonstration in an attempt to show his strength and possibly minimize the advantage al-Ṣadr and the Government had gained. The 'Āmilī za'īm called a mass meeting and delivered a speech full of flourish and alarums. Beside him stood a Palestinian guerilla who had allegedly been the victim of an attempted attack by Government men.[28] Kāmil Bey then proceeded to describe himself as a fidā'ī (a commando), and called on the Government to do what the people wanted of it.[29] So much for the Bey's public speeches, for interestingly enough, it contradicted an earlier allocution he made in the Assembly in which he declared his agreement to measures planned to discredit and eliminate the Palestinians' presence in Jabal 'Āmil

and the rest of the country. He also declared that the Cairo agreements reached between the Lebanese authorities and the Palestinians concerning a sort of protocol, actually gave the Palestinians more leeway than they ever dreamt of having.[30]

This sort of clouding of issues is, of course, nothing new in Lebanese politics. The Government, on its part, again tried to present itself as a saviour of the ʿAmilīs, and one who is truly concerned with their plight. It requested that the United Nations Industrial Development Organization present a project-study on the South. UNIDO is now examining a program for the establishment of an international industrial free zone in South Lebanon. Even private corporations have joined in: thus, the Iraq Petroleum Company, with refineries at Tripoli and in a turbulent zone of Palestinian influence and constant anti-western feelings, has presented LL100,000 for relief work among the ʿAmilī refugees.[31]

The year 1971 has not witnessed a lessening of the problems of the Shīʿa. Al-Biqāʿ and al-Hirmil are as poor as ever. During a recent trip (August to September 1971), the arridity of the central plains, as well as the eroded appearance of the foothills, still attest to a lack of irrigation methods. Furthermore, in an effort to help western countries in the fight against narcotics, the Lebanese Government has forced the peasants of al-Biqāʿ to cease planting "ḥashīsh", and to turn to sunflowers and their by-products. But this has been a failure

so far. Many villages in the area still have no roads leading to them, while other services, mentioned earlier, are still lacking. In Ba'labakk, the municipal hospital has finally been completed. An interesting observation was also made and it is to be freely interpreted by the reader: while passing through the region, as well as through the town of Ba'labakk itself, no Lebanese flags and no presidential portraits appeared anywhere in sight. On the other hand, most other districts (Jabal 'Āmil and the city of Tripoli to a lesser extent), displayed a large number of banners, pictures and calicos. In Ba'labakk, I noticed some pictures of Gamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir and of General Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad, President of the Syrian Arab Republic.

Jabal 'Āmil, especially its southern region, continued to suffer from Israeli attacks[32] and the inaction of its so-called leaders. One of the deepest raids[33] was an air, sea and land attack taking place about ten kilometers south of Sidon, at Ṣarafand. These attacks have always been followed by yet another wave of refugees streaming towards Beirut. In the meantime, the Government declared that it had found the money needed to finance the projects of the Council for the South. And in July, 1971, the Deputy Chairman of the Council announced that about LL15,000,000 had been spent or allocated for relief and development programs.[34] However, three months later, in mid-October, the Minister of Water and Resources, a Shī'ī himself, attacked the Council. In a report submitted to the Cabinet, he accused the Council of mismanagement

of funds, waste, nepotism and favoritism. He demanded that it be investigated immediately.[35]

Given the system in Lebanon, this was not surprising. The little men, among whom stand the Shī'ī peasants and laborers, still emerge as the losers.

The developments presented in this part of the study are not yet clear. The events are too recent and too close, while much emotion attaches to them, to afford good analysis. Yet, certain new lines seem to be taking shape within the tangle of facts. One thing is very clear: new forces are slowly crystalizing and applying new pressures on the Shī'a. Modernism cannot be excluded forever and, though it is slow in coming to these regions, still, it is relentless. The zu'amā' are not yet eliminated. Their fortunes fluctuate while, at the same time, the overview shows that they no longer as much in control as they used to be. In many important cases they react rather than act.

The Palestinian presence, whether it remains or fades, has introduced a new factor in the lives of the people in the regions of Jabal 'Amil as well as in the other Shī'ī districts. The creation of a group of refugees which has gravitated towards urban centers (while keeping in touch with home), has caused new elements to vie for the attentions and loyalty of these people: these include the Central Government led by the presidency; the religious authorities (feering the development of secularism in the ranks of the urbanized); and the Palestinians and

their local progressive allies interested in social justice for the lower classes on the one hand, and in seeking local bases for further political proselitizing, on the other hand.[36]

Conclusion

The central point of this work was to study the political development of the Shī'ī community of Lebanon. That being the main thrust, the Matāwila's religious developments were not included. However, pertinent religious features affecting their collective character were dealt with. The same applies to their social and economic situation and customs.

The method used was one of historical perspective. Thus, it is in their past that is found the key to their present situation which has been shown to be relatively retarded politically. It is in their past development that one one can find the reasons behind the almost complete dependence of the Mtāwila on their notables, or zu'amā'.

Throughout their history, the Shī'a of Jabal 'Āmil have been isolated from the rest of their surroundings. It is not, however, true to claim that they never had contacts with the outside world; but they never seriously tried to expand their frontiers; and they were generally successful at keeping foreign occupiers from either settling among them, or affecting them.

As a community, they jealously guarded their religious and social customs surrounded as they were by people with different traditions, religions and in many cases, customs. These same neighbors were frequently hostile and belligerent. Furthermore, and added to their self-isolation, the Ottoman State was frequently the agent or the instigator of persecution. At other times, it just ignored the Shī'a.

The Egyptian occupation was to be one of the momentous events in the history of the Jabal as it was in the whole region. The effects of the attempted Egyptian reforms were slow in seeping into Jabal ʿĀmil; but they nevertheless did appear and caused a stir among the people. Lesser notables took heart and tried to challenge the power of the important lords. Thus, when some felt that the rule of the incumbent al-Asʿad was intolerable, they took the unprecedented step of petitioning for his ouster. They were fortunate, for historical circumstances had it that the Ottoman Government was anxious to curb, if not completely eliminate, the traditional structure following the promulgation of the tanzimat of 1839. The absence of al-Asʿad was short, it is true, but the deed had been done and it set a precedent.

A few years later, in 1863, the State succeeded in abolishing the traditional system of land tenure. This was at least official and from a legal view-point. That event, however, can be interpreted as Jabal ʿĀmil's introduction to the modern era. It was an era of turmoil in that it upset the established structure, however slowly, and introduced lesser notables to the taste of power and position: they vied for these, and outdid themselves in flattering Ottoman officialdom while, inevitably, squabbling and feuding amongst themselves. At the same time, the old traditional zuʿamāʾ attempted to hold on to their power and to regain their former prestige by playing lesser notables off against each other whenever possible.

It seemed as if this pattern indicated a general decline of the notables. An important blow to the traditional za'īm was administered with the establishment of the Ottoman Parliament of 1909. It was this event which created that new breed of politician, modern in outlook and reformist in aim. The new generation of notables successfully challenged the traditional elements, though some paid for it with their lives. But it was an important challenge because it was made without benefit of an illustrious lineage o. of landed wealth, but with popular help.

That was to be the only effective challenge to the establishment of Jabal 'Āmil, for the new élite soon became "establishment" itself, as it entered the avenues of power and politics; and as its members acquiesced to, and cooperated in the formation of the separate State of Lebanon. This, as was shown, was done against the manifest wishes of large segments of the population, especially in al-Biqā' and al-Hirmil. The political leaders (traditional or otherwise) estimated that they would have no place in Syria, while in Lebanon their influence one way or another could mean the balance or disintegration of the country. The Mutawālī zu'amā' are intensely interested in keeping matters as they are, and therefore slow the progress of politicization of their masses. On the part of the population, there is an increasing dissatisfaction with the zu'amā' as well as with the Government. Thus, during the elections of 1953, several ballots in Jabal 'Āmil were

returned with such phrases as, "We want roads", and, "Give us water".

The pace of the coming awareness and politicization of the Shī'a in all regions has recently quickened. The main cause has been the appearance of the Palestinian resistance in their midst. This is the new challenge. However, this time it is a challenge to the very structure of the State. It is furthermore, a challenge to the hitherto complacent attitudes, indeed servile stance, of the Shī'a. This is slowly forcing the crystallization of several issues and it is impelling the peasant to examine his surroundings and, consequently, to decide which way to turn, and how to act.

The above does not mean that an overnight change will occur; far from it. Too many forces, internal as well as external, are arrayed against those who look forward to the eventual overthrow of the structure. In fact, these same forces resist even simple reformism which are labeled socialist or Communist.

Even the Shī'ī masses are as yet undecided: residual traditional feelings, the power of the religious authorities, as well as the general fear which develops in leaderless masses in the face of turmoil and unknown developments, all militate against a quick self-induced change. The Matāwila are almost unanimous in their disgust and dissatisfaction with the zu'amā'; but they have turned towards the religious powers who are now sponsored by the Government which has been traditionally mistrusted by the masses.

So long as there is no proper, organized and progressive leadership to help the Shī'a extricate themselves from their exploited state, they will remain in awe of the exploiting za'īm and his associates, as well as of the religious authorities and the Government.

As my research progressed, one of the premises I held as I embarked upon this work was gradually, but completely eliminated: I had believed that the Matāwila had, in general, allied their interests with those of the Maronites and other Christians of Mount Lebanon and the coast in the period after 1919. The idea here was that the Matāwila simply did not want to be drowned in a mass of Sunnīs following the formation of the Syrian nation. They therefore allied themselves to the Christians who shuddered at the thought of being part of a Muslim state, and at the mercy of that state.

There is no evidence to corroborate this claim. There are indications that some Matāwila feared minority status in a united Syria. However, matters were rectified after the Syrian faux pas concerning the 1920 electoral law, at which time the Shī'a had indeed been relegated to minority status. From then on, the Shī'a had no reason to fear the Sunnīs. At the same time, feelings of regionalism were no different in Jabal 'Āmil or al-Biqā' than in Aleppo or Jabal al-Durūz. The fact remains that they all wanted to be part of Syria.

Thus, the idea which is quite widely held, especially by Christians, is not correct and seems to be part of the efforts deployed by the

ultra-nationalist Lebanese school which has created several myths and half-truths to justify the existence of that country.

Appendix I

The following statistical table was extracted from an article by Ralph E. Crow, entitled, Confessionalism, Public Administration, and Efficiency in Lebanon.[1] As the author pointed out, the table is not from official sources, because no official census has been conducted in Lebanon, since the mid-thirties. Any population figures at this time, are calculated from demographic trends and specialized statistics on various aspects of Lebanon's development rate. If a census were to be taken now, it would upset the existing confessional basis, because it would make it manifest that the Muslims are, by now, numerically superior."In most states such a demographic shift might have scant political relevance, but in Lebanon it challenges the myth that supports the entire intricate governmental structure."[2]

The figures shown in the table indicate that the Matāwila, as was explained earlier, receive less positions by far, within a system based on the stability of confessions and regions. Such a state of affairs, it must be repeated, is due to two reasons: first, a government and a state which has never cared for the Matāwila; and second (and most imposrtant), the zu'amā' of the regions (all, in general, but particularly al-As'ad and Ḥamāda) who control their regions so tightly because of such poverty and ignorance, and who are therefore interested only in slowing down the arrival of benefits to their people. The number of their clients, is used by the zu'amā' to keep their own positions in the "right" circles, and receive benefits from the Govern-

ment, which does not really care, as long as the zu'amā' deliver the votes and control their areas.

The table below, was taken by Crow from Halim Fayyad, The Effects of Sectarianism in Lebanese Administration[3] :

DISTRIBUTION OF HIGHER ADMINISTRATIVE POSITIONS
AMONG RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN 1946 AND 1955

	Maronite	Sunnī	Shi'ite	G.O.*	G.C.	Druze	Total Number of Cases
per cent of posts 1946	38.7	29	3.2	19.3	3.2	6.4	31
per cent of posts 1955	40.0	27	3.6	11.7	9.0	7.2	111
per cent of population, 1956	30.0	20	18.0	10.0	6.0	6.0	1,430,908

In, The Precarious Republic published in 1969, Michael C. Hudson[4] used statistics drawn from Rondot's Les Institutions Politiques du Liban(1947), and from a list of government officials provided by the United States Embassy (Beirut, 1962), to form a table of samples which "are not necessarily comparable in any statistical sense, but they may be useful for rough generalizations"[5]. The table entitled Balance of Sects in Administration serves as a rough comparison of the shares of each community in the distribution of higher administrative posts.[6] From this table, subsequent calculations and comparisons showed that, 1962 was a year which, if anything, saw a drop in the share of the Shī'a rather than any increase, compared to the Sunnīs, or the other communities.

*Abbreviations: G.O.- Greek Orthodox; G.C.- Greek Catholic

Map of Jabal ʿĀmil



Legend: ---------- Limits of historic Jabal ʿĀmil

—.—.— Present-day state boundaries

Map of Present-Day North Lebanon -

Ba'labakk-al-Hirmil and 'Akkār Regions

Legend:—·—·—·—Present day-state boundaries

Map of Modern Lebanon

The Five Muḥāfaẓāt



Notes

Introduction

1. Abū al-Faḍl Jamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Makram ibn Manẓūr al-Ifrīqī al-Miṣrī, Lisān al-ʿArab, (15 vols.; Bayrūt: Dār Ṣādir, 1376/1965) XV, 408. Also R. Dozy, Supplément aux dictionaires Arabes, (2 vols.; Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1967) p. 844.

2. Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīn, Aʿyān al-Shīʿa, (17 vols.; Bayrūt: Maṭbaʿat al-Inṣāf, 1380/1960) I, 16, 68. Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīn, a native of Jabal ʿĀmil, wrote Aʿyān al-Shīʿa but without providing any references. Thus, I cannot find the places referred to in either Murādī or Muḥibbī. Neither can I find the ʿAbdu work quoted in Sayyid Muḥsin's volumes, and cited in note 5. A possible source of further reference, Muḥammad Kurd ʿAlī, Khiṭaṭ al-Shām, was unavailable at the time of writing. However, the article in the Supplement to the Encyclopoedia of Islām (1938) pp. 163-4, bears out the above references.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Jacques Nantet, Histoire du Liban, (Paris: Les éditions de minuit, 1963) p. 40. Here again, an otherwise excellent narration of the history of the region of Lebanon, is spoiled by the lack of references, however minimal. The veracity of what is written can only be assumed and must be painfully cross-checked. The article in the Supplement of the Encyclopoedia of Islām, quoted above also supports the story of the transplant of tribes from Irān (the Banū Ḥamrā) to Syria, by Muʿāwiya.

7. al-Muqaddasī, Aḥsan al-Taqāsīm fī maʿrifat al-Aqālīm, ed. M.J. de Goeje (leyden: 1877) p. 162.

8. al-Dimashqī, Nukhbat al-dahr fī ʿajā'ib al-barr wa-al-baḥr, ed. A.F. Mehren (St. Petersburg: 1865) p. 211.

9. Ibid.

10. al-Yaʿqūbī, Kitāb al-buldān, ed. M.J. de Goeje (Leyden: 1892) p. 114.

11. H. Lammens - [W. Caskell] "ʿĀmila", Encyclopoedia of Islām, new edition, p. 436. Also, ʿUmar Riḍā Kaḥḥāla, Muʿjam Qabā'il al-ʿArab al-qadīma wa-al-ḥadītha (2 vols.; Dimashq: al-Maktabat al-Hāshimiyya, 1368/1949) II, 714.

12. In the closing days of the reign of the Fāṭimī Khalīfa al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh, it is alleged that the Khalīfa encouraged the institution of a sect which considered him divine. The man who did the organizing was al-Darazī, after whom the sect was to be known; but al-Darazī was later eliminated (apparently for political reasons). The

actual formation of the sect went to Ḥamzā ibn ʿAlī (circa 1020-21). The doctrine includes the idea of ta'wīl (inner truth) and its embodiment, the Imām, as against the idea of tanzīl (outward revelation) embodied by the Prophet. [See Encyclopoedia of Islām, new edition, pp. 631-7].

13. The subject of the doctrinal and historical differences between the Maṭāwila who are Imāmiyya Jaʿfariyya Iṯnā-ʿashariyya (Twelver Imāmī Jaʿfarī Shīʿa) and the Ismāʿīliyya Sabʿiyya Shīʿa (Sevener Ismāʿīlī Shīʿa) would call for lengthy discussion. In a very short summary, the differences are the following: the origins of the divergent views is in the differing line of Imāms which are followed and respectively believed in. For certain reasons, al-Imām Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq (d. 762) is said to have disinherited his first son, Ismāʿīl, transfering the succession to another son, Mūsā Kāẓim. Furthermore, Ismāʿīl died before his father, but had nominated his own son Muḥammad to the Imāma. It is in his line line that the Ismāʿīliyya believe in. Thus, the partisans of Ismāʿīl refused to accept the change in the succession. They also believe in a line of seven Imāms, thereby earning the name Sevener (Sabʿiyya) Shīʿa. Those who did accept the alleged transfer of the succession and therefore, the line of Mūsā Kāẓim, became known as Jaʿfariyya, after Imām Jaʿfar. The reason they were called thus, is because their namesake was the most famous of the religious figures of his time.
Within this doctrinal cleavage are included differences in esoteric as well as exoteric outlooks and interpretations.

14. Leonard Binder, "Political Change in Lebanon", Politics in Lebanon, ed. Binder (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966) pp. 300-1.

Chapter I

1. For an interesting account of this period, see A.L. Tibawi, A Modern History of Syria (Edinburgh: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 63-93.

2. Muḥammad Jābir Āl Ṣafā, Taʾrīkh Jabal ʿĀmil (Bayrūt: Dār Matn al-Lugha, n.d.) p. 169.

3. The Hattı Serif Gülhane, 1839. In 1856, the Hattı Humayun was promulgated at Istanbul. It was part of a series of reforms instituted by the Ottoman Government. The Hattı Humayun was also a modification and follow-up of the earlier set of reforms, the Hattı Şerif Gulhane. Among its several provisions, the decree awarded equality before the

law, between the Muslim community and the non-Muslim rayas. Equality was to be accompanied by responsibilities, mainly equal taxation and military service. These items displeased the rayas in general, but especially their leaders who had profited from the posture of inferiority. [See Ed. Engelhardt, La Turquie et le Tanzimat (2 vols.; Paris: A. Cotillon et Cie., 1882) II]. The outcry was so widespread that it was made legal to buy oneself out of military service. This was called the bedel-i askeri; it was essentially the same as the old jizya, but was considered by non-Muslims as nothing more than the former capitation tax still referred to as the kharāj. Buying oneself out of military duty was open to all, legally, thus maintaining the concept of equality. But for two main reasons, the practice came to acquire an exclusivist coloring: first, the Christians were wealthier in general, and second, the Muslims had to pay considerably more. [See R.H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876 (Princeton, N.J., 1963) pp. 94-5]. There were illegal practices as well: papers were falsified (an easy matter since the census and other methods of personal registration were ineffectual); bribing was used to obtain the protection of important personages and have people substituted for others.

4. Clans Chieftain.

5. Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, p. 58.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., pp. 60-1.

8. Ibid., p. 169.

9. Ibid., pp. 166-169.

10. See J. Deny, "Sandjak", Encyclopoedia of Islām, old edition (1934) IV, 150. Following the destruction of the Janissaries in 1826, by Sulṭan Maḥmūd II, the feudal military organizations were also suppressed. "It was then that the sandjak definitely acquired the meaning of an administrative subdivision pure and simple. The mutaṣarrif, governor of the sandjak was henceforth a civil official..."

11. Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, p. 166.

12. Ibid. Aldo, Tibawi, Syria, p. 176.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. N. Verney and G. Dambmann, Les Puissances étrangères dans le Levant, en Syrie et en Palestine (Paris: n.p., 1900) pp. 182-4.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. V. Cuinet, Syrie, Liban, Palestine, (Paris: E. Leroux, 1886) pp. 31-2.

19. Verney and Dambmann, Les Puissances étrangères, pp. 182-4.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 652. Also see pp. 636-53; and in V. Cuinet, Syrie, Liban, Palestine, pp. 70-91. It is to be remembered that Jabal ʿĀmil was then part of the Wilāya of Beirut. Statistics showing the area's exports for the 1890's, point to certain fruits (apricots, bananas, citrus fruits, medlars, pomegranates, olives and their by-products, and vegetables); a few kinds of cereals and herbs (fennel, beans, lentils, lupin, peas, sesame seeds), and some silk, eggs and bitumen.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid., p. 652.

25. Ibid., p. 183-4.

26. This has already been described in note 3. Also Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, pp. 167-9.

27. Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, pp. 167-9.

28. Ibid.

29. Mīkhā'īl Mūsā Alūf, Ta'rīkh Baʿlabakk (Bayrūt: al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya, 1908) pp. 91-3. Also Iskandar Maʿlūf, Ta'rīkh Madīnat Zaḥla (Zaḥla: Maṭbaʿat Zaḥla al-Fatāt, 1911) p. 234-5.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. 91.

32. Ibid.

Chapter II

1. Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, p. 172.

2. Ibid.

3. ʿĀdil al-Ṣulḥ, Suṭūr min al-risāla (Bayrūt: n.p., 1966) p. 98. Also Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, p. 205.

4. Tibawi, Syria, p. 156.

5. Arnold Hottinger, "Zu'ama in Historical Perspective", in Politics in Lebanon, ed. L. Binder, p. 92.

6. al-Ṣulḥ, Suṭūr, p. 93.

7. Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, p. 214.

8. Ibid., p. 174.

9. Ibid., p. 185.

10. Several chapters had been established in the area of Jabal ʿĀmil. The reaction of Jabal ʿĀmil was similar to that of other peoples of the Empire who thought that their deliverance had come with the assumption of power by the Young Turks. But the new Government was still imperialist in bent and did nothing to decentralize the Empire's administration. The new order was therefore a great disappointment to those who expected much of it.

11. Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, p. 185.

12. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Khalīl was a ʿĀmilī. Early in his political career, he was involved in various segments of the Arab nationalist movement. He had a hand in the formation and conduct of Jamʿiyyat al-Ikhāʾ al-ʿArabī (The Society of Arab Brotherhood); al-Muntadā al-ʿArabī (The Arab Literary Club); and al-Jamʿiyya al-Qaḥṭāniyya (an association named after the mythical ancestors of all Arabs, Qaḥṭān). He was also a delegate, along with another ʿĀmilī, Kāmil al-Ṣulḥ, to the Paris CConference of 1913, known as the First Arab Conference. Al-Khalīl also carried the resolutions and demands of that conference's members to Istanbul. He was executed by the Military Government of Jamāl Pasha in Syria, in ~~1915~~ 1916. [See Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, pp. 186-8, 215.

13. Ibid., p. 65. Only one of the al-Asʿads became involved in these

movements. That was Shabīb Pasha al-As'ad, son of the famous 'Alī Bey al-As'ad. Āl Ṣafā wrote that he was a patron of the arts and the 'ulamā'. He was in conflict with his brothers early in his adult life and was soon constrained to depart to Istanbul. [See Āl Ṣafā]

14. Ibid., p. 213.

15. Ḥarakat Ṣaydā' was actually just another link, or cell, in the multitude of such revolutionary units forming the over-all clandestine effort of the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans. Such cells sprang to existence in Tyre, Tripoli and Beirut. In fact, the author of Ta'rīkh Jabal 'Āmil, Āl Ṣafā asserts that he helped establish a branch at al-Nabaṭiyya on October 26, 1914, with the coeperation of Shaykh Aḥmad Riḍā and Shaykh Sulaymān Ẓāhir. [See Āl Ṣafā, p. 212]

16. The Muftī was Shaykh As'ad Shuqayr and the wālī, Hulussi Bey. See, Memoirs of a Turkish Statesman by Djemal Pasha, Hutchinson and. Co., n.d.

17. In his efforts to win the Arabs over to the Ottoman cause, Jamāl Pasha had ignored earlier evidence and reports incriminating many of those who were later arrested. See Djemal Pasha, Memoirs, p. 197. Also, George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (New York: Capricorn, 1965) p. 185.

18. Below is a list of those accused:
Riḍā al-Ṣulḥ, Ḥusayn and Bahīj and Tawfīq al-Jawharī, 'Abd al-Karīm al-Khalīl, Muḥiy al-Dīn al-Jawharī, Bahā' al-Dīn al-Zayn (Muftī of Ṣaydā'), Badī' and Maḥmūd al-Zayn, Ḥasan Zantūt, Ḥasan al-Majdhūb and Taḥsīn al-Kayyāṭ all from Ṣaydā'. Tawfīq Shātīlā, Ḥasan Rashīd 'Allāmā, Ḥajj Najīb Bakkār, Ḥusayn al-Yūsuf, Muḥammad Sa'īd Bizza, Murād Ghulmiyya, Iskandar Shdīd, Naṣr 'Awda, all, except the first two, from Marj 'uyūn. Shaykh 'Abd al-Karīm al-Zayn, Shaykh Aḥmad Riḍā, Shaykh Sulaymān Ẓāhir, Muḥammad Jābir Āl Ṣafā, Muḥammad Yūsuf al-Ḥajj 'Alī, all from al-Nabaṭiyya. Also, Ḥajj 'Abd Allāh Yaḥyā al-Khalīl and Ḥajj Ismā'īl al-Khalīl. See Āl Ṣafā, Jabal 'Āmil, p. 215.

19. Ibid., p. 218. Also Hottinger, "Zu'ama", Politics in Lebanon, p. 92.

20. Ibid., p. 223. Also Hottinger, "Zu'ama", Politics in Lebanon, p. 92.

21. For a short description of these problems, see Stephen Helmsley Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate (London: Oxford University Press, 1958) pp. 113-123. Also, Albert H. Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: a political essay (London: OXford University Press, 1954) pp. 180-198.

22. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon, p. 137.

23. Ẓāfir al-Qāsimī, Wathā'iq jadīda ʿan al-thawra al-Sūriyya al-kubrā (Bayrūt: Dār al-Kitāb al-Jadīd, 1965) p. 137. Also Muḥiyy al-Dīn al-Ṣafarjalānī, Ta'rīkh al-thawra al-Sūriyya (Dimashq: Dār al-Yaqẓa al-ʿArabiyya, n.d.) 259. Also Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon, p. 161.

24. Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, pp. 226-7.

25. al-Qāsimī, Wathā'iq, p. 137.

26. Ibid.

27. Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, p. 227.

28a. Ibid.

28b. Ibid., p. 228-9.

29. Ibid., p. 229. It must be noted here, that this incident, as was the case with many events which took place in that general period of time, are reported by Āl Ṣafā in his capacity of contemporary witness. However, the reader should keep in mind that though the incident may have happened, it could not be verified from other sources due to their inavailability.

30. Ibid.

31. Yūsuf Muzhir, Ta'rīkh Lubnān al-ʿāmm (2 vols.; Bayrūt: n.p., n.d.) p. 869.

32. This feeling runs quite strongly among the inhabitants of the Biqā' and the Hirmil regions. It is a sentiment which is well known in Lebanon, and as a Lebanese, I have heard it personally from many of those inhabitants. In fact their attitude is as much as admitted by the Governor of the Biqāʿ District in a report he made to the Lebanese "Cénacle", im 1963. See Halim Abu-Izzeddine, ed. Lebanon and its Provinces (Beirut: Khayats, 1963) p. 13.

33. al-Amīr Ḥaydar al-Shihābī, Ta'rīkh al-Amīr Ḥaydar al-Shihābī, ed. Naʿʿūm Mughabghab (Miṣr: Maṭbaʿat al-Salām, 1900) p. 813. Within that general geographic area, the Ḥamāda and the Ḥarfūsh clans flourished to become the two most prominent families. Also, see al-Shidyāq, Akhbār al-aʿyān fī Jabal Lubnān (2 vols. in 1; Bayrūt: Maṭbaʿat Sumayyā, 1954) pp. 206-215. There were other families with clients, but they were not always under the control of the big clans.

34. These feuds date back to early Islamic history and the conflict which arose between the South Arabian tribes (Yamanī) and the North Arabian tribes (Qaysī) soon lost much of its regionalism. The feud spread far, to almost every corner of the Islamic world. On the Syrian coast, as in other areas, the parties became purely political and lost completely its original motive. In 1711 the battle of ʿAyn Dārā decided the fate of the Yamanī faction in Mt. Lebanon. It was crushed, while its leading family, the ʿAlam al-Dīn were all but obliterated. However, the feud took another form soon enough. It was perpetuated under a new name, Yabakī-Janbalāṭī, and lingered o n in the region until very recent times. See, Philip K. Hitti, Lebanon in History (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957) p. 358.

35. Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, p. 89.

36. al-Shidyāq, Akhbār al-aʿyān, p. 206. Also, al-Shihābī, Taʾrīkh, p. 801. And, Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, p. 118.

37. al-Shihābī, Taʾrīkh, pp. 841-2. Also, Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, p. 137.

38. al-Shihābī, Taʾrīkh, pp. 749-50. Also, al-Shidyāq, Akhbār al-aʿyān,p. 18, part 2. And Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, p. 114.

39. Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, p. 138; and alluded to in al-Shihābī, Taʾrīkh, p. 844.

40. For instance such families as al-Khalīl, ʿUsayrān, al-Zayn, al-Ṣulḥ, as well as some Christian families.

41. Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, p. 65.

42. The ʿĀmilīs not only showed their displeasure with the French presence, but also overwhelmingly expressed their desire to be part of Syria and the larger Arab nation, to the King-Crane Commission in 1919. Later, they helped in the Syrian revolt of 1925, and boycotted French sponsored elections.

43. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon, p. 83 and 123-4. An attempt was made on the life of General Gouraud the French High Commissioner. The attacker was believed to be a Mutawālī, while an abortive revolt led by Kāmil al-Asʿad was put down in 1922. See also, in Longrigg, p. 219: Mutawālī discontent at their inclusion into Great Lebanon in 1920, was shown through rioting; and in 1936, in protest of the Syrian-French treaty, again riots, and a show of solidarity with the people of Tripoli who violently opposed separation from Syria.

Chapter III

1. Amīn Sa'īd, al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya al-Kubrā (3 vols.; Miṣr: 'Isā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, n.d.) III, p. 223-5. The cabinet was led by 'Alā' al-Dīn al-Durūbī.

2. Ibid., p. 225.

3. See Chapter II, p. 20.

4. To give but simple examples, one can cite the French Revolution which happened as a result of the sharp divisions between the peopleand the two Upper Estates. On the other hand, Germany's people showed a great amount of solidarity with Adolph Hitler and his leadership.

5. See chapter II, p. 20.

6. Pierre Rondot, Les Institutions Politiques du Liban (Paris, 1947).

7. See chapter II, p. 20.

8. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 154-81. For a detailed account of the course, aims, events and results of the Syrian Revolt of 1925, in the Arabic language, see Amīn Sa'īd, al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya, pp. 289-390.

9. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 125, 126, 130.

10. Sa'īd, al-Thawra al-'Arabiyya, p. 415.

11. Ibid. Today, the Matāwila do occupy some important posts in the administration of the Lebanese Republic. However, their numbers are proportionately less than the total number of the Shī'ī population. See Appendix I.

12. Aḥmad Riḍā, Muḥammad Tāmir, Rashīd 'Usayrān, Ḥusayn Darwīsh, Najīb 'Usayrān, Faḍl al-Faḍl, 'Alī Jābir, Sulaymān Mrūwwa, 'Alī 'Abd Allāh, Khanjar 'Abd Allāh, Ismā'īl al-Khalīl, Muḥammad Jābir, 'Abd al-Ḥusayn, Maḥmūd al-Amīn, al-Sayyid Badr al-Dīn , Aḥmad Ḥājj, Sa'īd Ṣabāḥ.

13. Sa'īd Amīn, a-Thawra al-'Arabiyya, p. 413.

14. Ibid., p. 413. Sa'īd wrote that those who signed the petition were secondary notables.

15. Muzhir, Lubnān, p. 974.

16. Ibid. Also Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon, p.173.

17. Rondot, Les Institutions, p. 33.

18. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon, p.98.

19. Naturally, Jabal ʿĀmil or al-Biqāʿ were not the only districts to be so treated. For a good short description of the above, see Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 118-123.

20. Ḥasan al-Amīn, ed. al-Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīn (Ṣaydāʾ: Maṭbaʿat al-ʿIrfān, 1376/1957) pp. 95-6.

21. Ibid., p.96.

22. Ibid.

23. In effect, French tutelage of the Christians helped to create a new group of zuʿamāʾ, all Christians. These included the al-Khūrīs, the Iddīs, the Farʿūns and others (See Hottinger, "Zu'ama", p. 94.) The Muslims remained aloof if not hostile to the French. The French tried to cajole and pressure some into cooperating with them. Such a treatment was reserved for ʿAbd al-~~Ḥakīm~~ Ḥamīd Karāmī and Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīn. Karāmī, leader of Tripoli was eventually thrown into prison. (Ibid., p. 95 ; also al-Amīn, p. 95; and Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 219, 243). On the other hand, minor Muslim notables who had almost no popular or political weight, were included in the French created administration.(See Hottinger, "Zu'ama", p. 95; and Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 200, and 201-202n.

24. The attitude of the leadership was quite divergent from that of the popular sentiment and demonstrations, especially at the time of the debate on the projected Treaty with France in 1936. (See Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon, p. 219.

25. Ibid., p. 268.

26. Ibid., p. 280. Also, Āl Ṣafā, Jabal ʿĀmil, p.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. This term originated with the custom of wrapping set quantities of tobacco with a band of measurment and pricing it accordingly.

30. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon, p. 219.

31. Ibid., pp. 161-5.

32. Those zu'amā' thus coopted included among others, Aḥmad al-As'ad (son of Kāmil), 'Ādil 'Usayrān, Yūsuf Sālim (non Muslim), and Kāẓim al-Khalīl.

Chapter IV

1. Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon, p. 329. Also Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 137.

2. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 140.

3. For an excellent discussion of the confessional aspects of the Lebanese polity, see Pierre Rondot, Les Institutions Politiques du Liban: des communautés traditionelle à l'état moderne (Paris: Institut d'études de l'Orient contemporain, 1947) p. 33.

4. The new Government broke certain established precedents: it did not pay the customary visit to the French High Commissioner; it decreed that, henceforth, Arabic would be the official language of the State as well as the schools; it did not consult with the High Commissioner either as to the wording of, or as to the contents of its policy paper, declaring that this time it would seek complete independence and propose deletion of all provisions in the Constitution, which hinted of ties to France; it also demanded the turning over of all public utilities and the security forces to the Lebanese Government. See Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon, p. 330.

5. Munīr Taqī-al-Dīn, Wilādat Istiqlāl... (Bayrūt: Dār al-'Ilm lil-malāyīn, 1953) p. 69- 72.

6. Ibid., p. 63. Also Muzhir, Lubnān, p. 1130.

7. An opinion based on Sharī'a (Islamic law), by a muftī and used by a qāḍī in any particular case.

8. Hottinger, "Zu'ama'", Politics in Lebanon, p. 94

9. Georges Catroux, Dans la bataille de Méditérranée..., Paris, 1949, quoted in Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon, pp. 332-3.

10. Ibid., p. 331. Also Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 45.

11. For an interesting account of Iddi's trials and tribulations in this period, see Taqī al-Dīn, Wilādat, pp. 80-84.

12. The National Pact or al-Mīthāq al-Waṭanī, provided for harmony among the religious communities in which the Christians would accept the formation of Lebanon without seeking attachement to France or any western power, and accepted the fact that Lebanon is part and parcel of the Arab entity; on the other hand, the Muslims accepted an independent Lebanon and ceased to look for unity with Syria.

13. Article 95 of the Constitution of Lebanon (as amended on November 9, 1943):"As a provisional measure and for the sake of justice and amity, the sects shall be equitably represented in public employment and in the composition of the Ministry, provided such measures will not harm the general welfare of the state." See, The Lebanese Constitution (ed., trans., Department of Political Science, American University of Beirut; Beirut: Khayats, 1960) Part IV, art. 95, p. 33. Each section of the article quoted can be shown to be false and as not having fulfilled its aims; however, as to "equitable" representation, the Shī'a have never been thus represented in State posts. See also Appendix I, p. 87.

14. The Communist Party and the Parti Populaire Syrien (Syrian Popular Party, or Syrian National Party, and subsequently re-named Socialist National Party) were both, from the start, multi-confessional parties with members scattered everywhere in Syria and Lebanon. They became thus, non-sectarian parties.

15. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 149.

16. Ibid., p. 132.

17. Ibid., p. 131.

18. Hottinger, "Zu'ama'", Politics in Lebanon, p. 91.

19. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, pp. 265-6.

20. Describing the political philosophy of Henri Pharaon, a prominent Christian political leader, who also was a brother-in-law of al-Khūrī, Hudson, in The Precarious Republic, writes,"... internal reforms and development are far down the scale of Pharaon's political priorities. The governmental corruption of bribes and favors is infinitely preferable to military interference in government and administration. No amount of social reform is worth this price, particularly if it disturbs the free enterprise system." p. 139. See also the quote from Sāmī al-Ṣulḥ, Prime Minister of Lebanon from time to time, in Malcolm Kerr's "Political Decision Making in a Confessional Democracy", Politics in Lebanon, p. 204.

21. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, pp. 152, 153, 106-7.

22. Ibid., pp. 271-3.

23. Ibid., p. 154. Also see, Clyde G. Hess and Herbert L. Bodman, "Confessionalism and Feudality in Lebanese Politics", Middle East Journal, VIII, No. 1 (Winter 1954) p.18.

24. Hess and Bodman, "Confessionalism and Feudality", M.E.J., VIII, 1, p. 20.

25. Ibid.

26. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 155.

27. Hess and Bodman, "Confessionalism and Feudality", M.E.J., VIII, 1, p. 21.

28. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 156.

29. Ibid. Also, Pierre Rondot, "The Political Institutions of Lebanese Democracy", Politics in Lebanon, ed. Leonard Binder. p. 138. Also, Kerr, "Political Decision", Politics in Lebanon, p. 207.

30. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, pp. 156 and 279.

31. According to Article 49 of the Lebanese Constitution, an incumbent president cannot stand for re-election until after he had been absent from that post for one full term.

32. Kamāl Junblāṭ, ʿAbd Allāh al-Yāfī, Ṣāʾib Salām were among those who lost.

33. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 156.

34. Ibid., p. 218. Also, Kamal Salibi, The Modern History of Lebanon (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1965) p. 200.

35. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, pp. 157 and 218. Also, Kerr, "Political Decision", Politics in Lebanon, pp. 206-7.

36. Hottinger, "Zuʿama'", M.E.J., XV, 2, p. 127.

37. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, pp. 156 and 286-90.

38. Ibid., p. 157.

39. Lebanon was the only Middle Eastern Arab country to accept the "Eisenhower Doctrine". Not even Jordan or Saudi Arabia adhered to this new scheme by U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

40. Tibawi, Syria, p. 403. Also personal experiences and observations during the crisis of 1958.

41. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, pp. 113, 218. Also, Hassan Saab, "The Rationalist School in Lebanese Politics", in Politics in Lebanon, p. 279.

42. Hottinger, "Zu'ama'", Politics in Lebanon, p. 130.

43. Ibid., p. 134. Also, Salibi, Lebanon, p. 201. And, Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 112 map.

44. Hottinger, "Zu'ama'", Politics in Lebanon, p. 134. Also, Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 110. "A glance at the map of areas held by loyalists [in Mount Lebanon and some parts of the South] shows that the loyalists were defending the developed area of Lebanon against the poor regions controlled by the insurgents".

45. Hottinger, "Zu'ama'", M.E.J., XV, 2, p. 130.

46. Salibi, Lebanon, p. 201.

47. Hottinger, "Zu'ama'", Politics in Lebanon, p. 133.

48. Already in 1951-52, reform laws had been enacted including, among other features, a ceiling on the amount of land that could be owned by any landlord, while small-holders were granted lands from State domains. Also, advance credits were granted to peasants and small industrialist by respective development banks, under government supervision. See Tibawi, Syria, p. 389. Also, Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria (London: Oxford University Press, 1963).

49. Tibawi, Syria, p. 398. Also, Seale, The Struggle for Syria, pp. 120, 182.

50. Writing on the Shī'a, Rondot relates that they are the most illiterate group in Lebanon. They are totally rural, poor and dominated by a local, rural aristocracy. Les Institutions politiques, p. 40.

51. This is a conclusion based on some evidence. Much of that evidence is presented in the pages following. On the other hand, it is also based on the fact that statistics (also shown in those pages) show

that where the zu'amā' (especially those of the al-As'ad or Ḥamāda caliber) are most entrenched, there too is a concommitant level of poverty and misery. At any rate, such a state of affairs is an almost universal ocurrence and, as a general proposition, hardly needs documentation.

52. Nasri Salhab,(Mohafez of Al Beka'), "Al Beka'", in Lebanon and Its Provinces, ed. Halim Abu-Izzeddin (Beirut: Khayats, 1963) p. 6.

53. Ibid., p. 10.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., p. 11.

57. Ibid., p. 13.

58. Kerr, "Political Decision", Politics in Lebanon, pp. 191, 193. Also, Leonard Binder, "Political Change in Lebanon", in Politics in Lebanon, p. 292.

59. Salhab, "Al Beka'", Lebanon and Its Provinces, p. 13.

60. Ibid., p. 15.

61. al-Ḥurriyya, Arabic language political weekly; (Bayrūt: Dār al-Ḥurriyya) No. 512, 27/4/'70, p. 6. al-Ḥurriyya is a socialist oriented weekly by its own admission. It is therefore inclined to advertize the cause of the peasant and condemn the zu'amā' and the Central Government. The reader should then keep that in mind. On the other hand, the facts and figures quoted here and in other issues, were drawn by al-Ḥurriyya from reports or governmental statistics and press releases. I have not quoted any editorial material.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid. In the meantime, a 200-bed hospital begun in 1957, finally opened in 1968. Arab Report and Record, a general chronicle published bi-monthly (London: 84 Chancery Lane) No. 1-15 January, 1968.

64. Several sources attest to this contention. These range from early travelers (e.g. al-Muqaddasī, Ya'qūbī and al-Dimashqī) to commercial reports (Verney and Dambmann) to 19th century travelers (Volney) to to historians (Āl Ṣafā, Tibawi) as well as the muḥāfiẓ of the South, Ghālib al-Turk (1963).

65. A.R.R., No. 11, 1-15 June, 1969, p.

66. At that time, the power of the Shī'ī zu'amā' was such that they could prod their people to modernism, had they so wished. It may be argued that the process, once begun, is hard to stop. But it has just barely done so and every obstacle and diversion is put in its path. The Government too has practiced a general "hands-off" policy: the zu'amā' deliver votes and keep their districts in check, therefore there is no need to interfere, either monetarily or otherwise. At the same time, great fanfare is made every year as new development projects are announced. Binder, "Political Change", Politics in Lebanon, pp. 300-1.

67. al-'Irfān, a general Arabic language monthly journal published by Shī'a mainly for their co-religionists. (Bayrūt: Dār al-'Irfān) No. 5, 1389/1969. Al-'Irfān contains literary reportages, criticisms, and information, as well journalistic investigations dealing with various subjects. It is definitely conservative in stance and caters much to religious affairs. In that sense, it can be viewed, in a manner of speaking, as a populist oriented journal. But it is not all anti-Government. It merely chides government and zu'amā', warning them of the consequences of their neglect of the Shī'a. It is basically concerned with saving the system from its errors, rather than changing it, much less destroying it. In my opinion, by its very nature, such a journal indirectly confirms the accusations and condemnations of more radical people.

68. Ibid. The editor, "Ṣūra 'an awḍā' muzāri'ī al-tabgh fī al-janūb" (Report on the conditions of the tobacco growers in the South), p. 738.

69. Ibid., p. 740.

70. Ibid. Also, al-Ḥurriyya, No. 485, 13/10/'69.

71. al-'Irfān, No. 5, 1389/1969, p. 740.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid., p. 741.

75. Ghaleb el Turk, (Mohafez of the South), "The South", in Lebanon and Its Provinces, p. 60.

76. al-'Irfān, No. 5, 1389/1969, p. 741.

77. Ibid.

78. The dunum measures roughly o.23 acres or 919 sq. meters.

79. al-'Irfān, No. 5, 1389/1969, p. 741.

80. For an excellent analysis of the Shihāb régime, see Hudson, The Precarious Republic, chapter 8.

81. al-'Irfān, No. 5, 1389/1969, p. 742.

82. Ibid., pp. 742-3.

83. $1.00 = L.L. 3.10. Costs quoted at 1969 levels.

84. al-'Irfān, No. 5, 1389/1969, pp. 742-3.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid. I also remeber similar examples in the cases of packing apples, pears and peaches. The prices of wooden boxes is a burden which falls on the grower and it is not easily recuperable.

87. Ibid., p. 744.

88. el Turk, "The South", Lebanon and Its Provinces, p. 58.

89. Mayor.

90. el Turk, "The South", Lebanon and Its Provinces, p. 58.

91. al-Hurriyya, No. 512, 27/4/'70, p. 6.

92. Ibid.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid.

95. el-Turk, "The South", Lebanon and Its Provinces, p. 59.

96. Ibid. Also, al-Hurriyya, No. 512, 27/4/'70, p. 6.

97. el Turk, "The South", Lebanon and Its Provinces, p. 59.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

101. Institut de Recherche et de Formation en Vue de Développement (I.R.F.E.D.) 2 vols. (Beyrouth: 1960-1961) I, p. 65.

102. el-Turk, "The South", Lebanon and Its Provinces, p. 59.

103. Binder, "Political Change", Politics in Lebanon, p. 301.

104. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, p. 53.

105. A.R.R., No. 18, 16-30 Sept., 1971, p. 501. Also No. 19, 1-15 Oct., p. 531.

106. Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development", American Political Science Review, 55, No. 3 (1961), pp. 493-501.

Postscript

1. For an excellent analysis of the attitudes of various Presidents toward the zu'amā', and vice-versa, see Hudson, The Precarious Republic, pp. 125-61; 262-90; 297-308.

2. Hottinger, "Zu'ama", Politics in Lebanon, p. 100.

3. al-Ḥurriyya, an Arabic language political weekly; No. 504 (Bayrūt: Dār al-Ḥurriyya) 2/3/'70,

4. Reported by Agence France Press, February 18, 1969, and quoted in A.R.R., No. 4, 15-28 Feb. 1969, p. 75.

5. There are, unfortunately, no specific statistics concerning the South as a separate entity. However, the imposition of military rule over much of the region, and the almost daily raids and counter-raids across the Lebanon-Israel border and the surrounding areas was bound to have an adverse effect on tourist visits.

6. A.R.R., No. 13, 1-15 July, 1968, p. 188.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.,

9. 'Abd Allāh al-Yāfī.

10. A.R.R., No. 14, 15-30 July, 1968, p. 206

11. For an excellent analysis of the Presidential struggle to dominate, see Hudson, The Precarious Republic, chapter 3, pp. 105-114; chapter 4, pp. 127-47; chapters 7 and 8. Also see Hottinger "Zu'ama", Politics in Lebanon, p. 102. Also, Rondot, "Political Institutions", Politics in Lebanon, pp. 133-137. Also, Kerr,"Political Decision", pp. 192-211.

12. A.R.R., No. 23, 1-15 Dec. 1969, p. 511.

13. Ibid., No. 24, 16-31 Dec., 1969, p. 535.

14. Ibid. No. 22, 16-30 Nov., 1969, p. 487.

15. Ibid. No. 5, 1-15 March, 1970, pp. 147-8.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid.

18. Sayyid Muḥsin was the Grand Mujtahid (al-Mujtahid al-akbar) of the Shī'a for the previous 25 years.

19. Mrs. Rajā Ghandour Dirlik, in a private conversation, in which she related her observations and impressions after a recent trip to Lebanon in June 1970.

20. A.R.R., No. 10, 16-31 May, 1970, p. 295.

21. al-Ḥurriyya, 2/3/70, No. 504. These parties are adamantly anti-Palestinian.

22. A.R.R., No. 10, 16-31 May, 1970, p. 295.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid. Also in M.E.J. v. 24, No. 4 (Winter 1970) p.507.

25. al-Ḥurriyya, 15/6/70, No. 519.

26. A.R.R., No. 12, 16-30 June, 1970, p.357.

27. Ibid.

28. al-Ḥurriyya, 29/6/70, No. 520, and 6/7/70, No. 521;

29. al-Ḥurriyya, 29/6/70, No. 520. Also, A.R.R., No.11, 1-15 June, p. 325.

30. Ibid., 15/6/70, No. 519.

31.

32. A.R.R., various numbers, 1971, pp. 32, 141, 168, 192, 290, 324, 412, 475.

33. Ibid. No. 1, 1-15 Jan., 1971, p. 32.

34. Ibid. No. 13, 1-15 July, 1971, p. 351.

35. Ibid. No. 19, 1-15 Oct. 1971, p. 530.

36. In a paper entitled Changing Class Structures in Lebanon, in M.E.J. (v. 23, No. 1, 1969), Fuad Khuri contends that there is no real change

in the loyalties of rural populations once they have moved to the city. This is based, he goes on to write, on the electoral system which tends not to enfranchise the individual in the city, but still binds him to express his vote choice at the village level (i.e. in his own locale of origin). This is quite true; however, this does tend, in its turn, to create a class of discontented, uprooted people, many of whom are jobless. These people also tend to seek extra-legal (if not illegal) and extra-electoral means to express their political aspirations. Further, Khuri supports my view that Shī'ī za'īm is losing ground in favor of either indifference, or, as he points out, ideological affiliation which, however, does not bring any response (in this case, traditional, therefore, positive) from the za'īm. See p. 41 of article.

Appendix I

1. Ralph E. Crow, "Confessionalism, Public Administration, and Efficiency in Lebanon", Politics in Lebanon, p. 172.

2. Hudson, The Precarious Republic, pp. 22-3.

3. Crow, "Confessionalism", Politics in Lebanon, p. 172, quoting Halim Fayyad, The Effects of Sectarianism in Lebanese Administration, (unpublished Master's Thesis, American University of Beirut, 1956).

4. Hudson, The Precarious Republic.

5. Ibid., p. 320.

6. Ibid.

Annotated Bibliography

The main over-all reference text for much of this study was Muḥammad Jābir Āl Ṣafā, Ta'rīkh Jabal ʿĀmil. It is, however, defective, in that it does not cover all aspects of the region, and almost ignores the Matāwila of al-Biqāʿ and al-Hirmil. It contains several innacuracies or at least data which conflicts with other data in sources which are either primary or secondary. In the case of conflict, all sources were consulted. Āl Ṣafā's work is nevertheless important because it is unique.

I have relied much on primary sources, where they were available. Thus, Ḥaydar, Ta'rīkh al-Amīr Ḥaydar al-Shihābī, a chronicle based on events which took place during the Shihābī imāra in the 19th century, is a faithful source on much of the history of the era. It was invaluable because it related the relations between the Shīʿa in all regions with the Shihābīs.

To a lesser extent, Shidyāq, Akhbār al-aʿyān fī Jabal Lubnān, was of cross checking value as well as of informational worth. The work is essentially a collection of clan-family biographies. It was also written in the 19th century.

These works also covered events and developments in the Biqāʿ region, and therefore filled the gaps in the Āl Ṣafā account. Ṣāliḥ ibn Yaḥyā, al-Mukhtaṣar fī ta'rīkh Jabal Lubnān was valuable for information and for checking data on the events taking place in Jabal Lubnān which

had any relation with the Matāwila.

The best secondary source that I could find at this writing on the history of the Matāwila of al-Biqā' was Alūf, Ta'rīkh Ba'labakk. It is however, not a detailed work, and it had to be supplemented from Ḥaydar, Shidyāq and the biographer of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Ma'nī II, Ma'lūf, Ta'rīkh al-Amīr Fakhr al-Dīn al-Ma'nī al-thānī. This last work is, to date, the most recent and comprehensive study of the great Amīr. It contains material on the relations of Fakhr al-Dīn with Jabal 'Āmil and al-Biqā', with biographical notes on many Mutawālī families.

Two works were invaluable for information and some analysis of the events of 1830-1865: Abū Shaqrā, Ḥarakāt fī Lubnān ilā 'ahd al-Mutaṣarrifiyya, written from a Durzī point of view. This is refreshing to some extent because of the prevalence of Christian accounts and their almost fanatical bias. The other work is also surprisingly objective but it is hard to tell who wrote it since it has no author: Ḥaṣr al-lithām 'an nakabat al-Shām: Mujmal akhbār al-ḥarb al-ahliyya al-ma'rūfa bi-ḥawādith sanat 1860; it contains copies of documents of the era. Another work, a compilation of documents of the age of Muḥammad 'Alī the Great of Egypt is Rustum, al-Uṣūl al-'Arabiyya li-ta'rīkh Sūriyā fī 'ahd Muḥammad 'Alī Bāshā.

Yūsuf Muzhir's two volume work on the history of Lebanon, Ta'rīkh Lubnān al-'āmm, is very helpful as a guide to events, some documents and general research. A similar case is Hitti, Lebanon in History.

History of Syria, by the same author is similar to the previous work, but with a different emphasis. However, in all cases, if the primary sources are available they must all be consulted and cross-checked for accuracy.

For the modern period, Āl Ṣafā was used extensively since his account is first hand. He lived through most of the events he described and was involved in many. It was necessary to keep in mind that memoirs are not infallible and that they are subject to change with time and to some bias, normally. Thus, Āl Ṣafā had to be checked against the accounts of Muzhir whose work, in its later stages, is a personal account and the result of personal experience and some involvement. His work is worthwhile because it contains certain documents which cannot be found easily today.

For reference to the relations between the ʿAlawiyyīn of north Syria and the ʿĀmilīs, during the resistance to the French, first hand accounts are found in Sharīf, al-ʿAlawiyyūn, man hum? wa-ayn hum?, and Ṭawīl, Taʾrīkh al-ʿAlawiyyīn. The general histories mentioned also apply in this case.

Excellent secondary works on the period of the French Mandate and the years immediately preceding and following are, Longrigg, Syria and Lebanon Under French Mandate, and Hourani, Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay, as well as Zeine, The Struggle for Arab Independence. All three works present not only accounts, documents and chronology of events, but

also analysis of the Arab struggle and French and British policies. Meo, Lebanon: Improbable Nation, is a short work which concentrates on confessional politics and intricacies of the country. It describes well the institution of the za'īm, especially as it applies to the more powerful ones.

Much information on contemporary developments can be had from articles in various journals (Middle East Journal, al-'Irfān, al-Hurriyya). A particularly useful work which explores the recent scene in Lebanon from almost every aspect is Binder, ed., Politics in Lebanon. The book embraces several articles by different authors, Western as well as Arab. The articles are based on personal observations, interviews, previous works and newspaper articles. In fact, one particular article, a paper by Arnold Hottinger, entitled Zu'ama' in Historical Perspective, pointed the way for this study's main thrust and style. I am therefore indebted to Dr. Hottinger for being such a guide, however unknown it was to him.

Two works, or compilations, served to shed some valuable light on the economic and social situation of the Matāwila and their regions. These consequently exposed that community's political underdevelopment. The first is Abu-Izzeddin, Lebanon and Its Provinces. The book is short, but full of revealing material made all the more significant because they were presented publicly by each of the governors of the five muḥāfaẓāt of Lebanon. The attempt to whitewash the manifest ills of the regions is so thin that one has no difficulty in seeing the true misery which

prevails. The second work is actually a report written up for the Lebanese Government by a French research mission, Institut de Recherche et Formation En Vue de Développment, released in 1962. The report supports and in fact adds to, the reports of the governors. It was subsequently banned in Lebanon by the very government which sought reforms.

Finally, a word about Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in Lebanon. This work is the latest effort to examine the intricacies of the Lebanese political process. It is quite detailed and brings the reader up to date (1969). This work, and the collection of papers in Binder, Politics in Lebanon, are highly recommended to those who want easy access to present-day Lebanon.

There are several works which were not available at this writing; in most cases they were out of print and were not even available through the inter-library loan system. Among these works are Aḥmad ʿĀrif al-Zayn, Taʾrīkh Ṣaydā; Ibn Fatḥūn's chronicles; Shaykh ʿAlī al-Ṣabaytī [al-Sabītī?], al-Jawhar al-Mujarrad; Shabīb al-Asʿad, al-ʿAqd al-munaḍḍad; Shaykh Aḥmad Riḍā, al-Shīʿa aw al-Matāwila fī Jabal ʿĀmil; most of the issues of al-ʿIrfān, an important journal published in Ṣaydā and Bayrūt by the al-Zayn family; and Kurd ʿAlī, Khiṭaṭ al-Shām.

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