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The Nose of Death:
Baroque Novelistic Discourse in the History of Laughter

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The Nose of Death:
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Abstract

The Nose of Death considers the common matrix of the English scientific revolution and the modern English novel through the indicator of laughter. Whereas death is the paradigmatic object of laughter in the premodern period, animate or thinking matter is the prevailing object of laughter in modernity. The change is located in texts of the English baroque period from 1607 to 1767. Baroque discourse is defined by the language developed by writers loyal to both the Christian and the Copernican world views. Contradictory allegiances required them to institute a narratorial position based on simultaneous attachment to and detachment from a single point of view. This position is the defining feature of baroque discourse, the basis of both the perspective of modern science and the animation of multiple viewpoints in the modern novel.

The Nose of Death develops Walter Benjamin's reading of baroque "muting" and "fragmentation," processes that free matter, language, and time for alternative composition. The dissertation likewise adapts M. M. Bakhtin's account of the "grotesque method," considered as the approach to language and the human body that the modern "scientific method" posits itself against. This study treats baroque novelistic discourse in forgotten texts drawn from McGill's Redpath Tracts by Thomas Tomkis, Thomas D'Urfey, Tobias Swinden, and a selection of anonymously authored pamphlets. It considers, as well, two early medical works by Robert Boyle and Walter Charleton. Analogous fragments are similarly analyzed from three canonical works: Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), Samuel Richardson, *Clarissa, or The History of a Young Lady* (1747-48), and Laurence Sterne, *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman* (1759-67).

The Nose of Death : discours romanesque baroque dans l'histoire du rire

Résumé

The Nose of Death se penche sur la matrice commune de la révolution scientifique anglaise et du roman anglais moderne à travers le prisme du rire. Alors que la mort est, à l'époque prémoderne, l'objet paradigmatique du rire, la substance animée ou pensante est le principal objet du rire dans la modernité. Ce changement intervient dans les textes de l'époque baroque anglaise, entre 1607 et 1767. Discours baroque s'entend de la langue conçue par des écrivains fidèles à la vision chrétienne et copernicienne de l'univers. Des allégeances contradictoires exigeaient d'eux qu'ils instituent une position narrative fondée sur un attachement et un détachement simultané à partir d'un point de vue unique. Cette position est la caractéristique qui permet de définir le discours baroque, fondement à la fois de la perspective de la science moderne et de l'animation de plusieurs points de vue dans le roman moderne.

The Nose of Death approfondit la lecture de la "mise en sourdine" et de la "fragmentation" baroques que fait Walter Benjamin, procédés qui libèrent la matière, le langage et le temps et autorise une autre composition. Cette thèse est une adaptation de la "méthode grotesque" de M. M. Bakhtin et renvoit à une approche de la langue et du corps humain contre laquelle s'élève la "méthode scientifique" moderne. L'étude traite du discours romanesque baroque dans des textes oubliés, tirés des *Redpath Tracts* de McGill, par Thomas Tomkis, Thomas D'Urfey et Tobias Swinden et dans plusieurs opuscules d'auteurs anonymes. Elle considère également deux oeuvres médicales de Robert Boyle et de Walter Charleton. Des fragments analogues sont également analysés à partir de trois oeuvres classiques : *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (L'Anatomie de la mélancolie) (1621), de Robert Burton, *Clarissa, or The History of a Young Lady* (Clarissa Harlowe) (1747-1748), de Samuel Richardson et *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman* (Vie et opinions de Tristram Shandy) (1759-1767), de Laurence Sterne.

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Introduction

The principle of animate, or "thinking," matter is preserved in the modern novel. It is preserved not in a metaphorical sense but in reality as the novelistic method. The novel's method is the objectification and dialogization of languages to test them against life, or to test their authority and persuasiveness in lived reality. Languages are activated as embodied socio-ideological viewpoints, as animate or thinking matter. Whereas science attempts to locate the object world maximally deprived of human, authorial intentions by means of the scientific method, the novel works by way of the "grotesque method" to mobilize and enhance all of the languages, including the languages of science, that surround and ensnare objects.

My use of the term "objectification" derives from Walter Benjamin and is diametrically opposed to another sense of the term which I also employ from time to time. Objectification in the latter sense refers to the construction of fixed, timeless objects within the observation of transcendent, knowing subjects. Benjaminian objectification, by contrast, seeks to free objects from singular, atemporal viewpoints. Distinctions between the two uses of the term will be contextually established. Both assume that objectification is anthropologically necessary. We cannot avoid establishing "I / other" relations. The manner in which we do so, however, is historically and politically conditioned, and to some extent subject to alteration and intervention.[1] Prevailing conditions of objectification are difficult to "see" because the one who sees is bound up in the given historical process. For reasons that will become clear in the following discussion, the English baroque is a period that developed novelistic discourse as the technology for externalizing its own process of objectification. Baroque writers were forced into this innovation by being caught between contradictory ways of objectifying the world. They developed genres of

discourse that instituted a narratorial position based precisely on independence from any one manner of objectification. This narratorial position is the basis of novelistic discourse, the enabling condition and activating principle of the modern novel. The special relationship between baroque writers and language is effectively described by M. M. Bakhtin's term "dialogization," which I shall equate in this discussion with "novelization." "Novelistic discourse" is language that is dialogized or, alternatively, novelized. "The grotesque method" is the term I use in this essay to describe the dialogic or novelistic process. The grotesque method exposes the materiality of language; it thus compromises the distinction between matter and thought upon which science is based.

Science silences matter in order to isolate and rescue it from the enchanted semantic network that enmeshes it. This has the productive effect of bringing matter into the present, or indeed, of creating the time of the present as the distinct moment in which the "reality" of matter is realized and experienced.[2] The tremendous achievement of modern science derives from its ability to disaggregate present reality. The functioning of science in the silencing of matter, however, simultaneously forecloses the possibility of sustaining access to the present for the scientific subject, the one who "knows" matter. For just as matter is "as if" dead in relation to science, the modern human subject of scientific inquiry is "as if" dead in relation to its object of investigation. Intentions and desires are quieted and regulated and as far as possible factored out of the encounter with the object of study. Finite human boundaries in time and space are "as if" transgressed in the production of knowledge that extends infinitely backward and forward in time and universally in space. The one who knows is correspondingly posited "as if" occupying a position outside time and space. But the "as if" position in eternity, as it were, by which matter is

retrieved for the present, is the articulation point where modern science fails to disenchant the world and to fully evacuate the forms of the old gods. They reappear in science's subsequent privileging not of the present but of the freakishly hybrid time of the "immediate future," the modern sense of time as the instant before *everything* will be known.

The modern sense of time enables and constrains science to reinscribe the doctrines of revelation and redemption into the project of enlightened inquiry. In the experimental process, the formulation of time as suspense and waiting, or as the instant before final judgement, renders scientific knowledge redemptive in that, by referring always to the immediate future, such knowledge leads only to something beyond itself. This something else is the necessarily mystical referent which guarantees that the subject of scientific knowledge is fundamentally other to its object and establishes the premise of distance by which it can claim to know it. Science is therefore predicated on maintaining the status of the human as radically distinct from its object of study. In formulating its object as fundamentally other, science sees matter as the means to redemption rather than as an end in itself. Science betrays matter by deferring its full "realization" in the present, or by deferring its fully recognized presence to the future. Moreover, science *must* do this because it takes its place, historically, in a self-perpetuating cycle of enchantment-disillusion-enlightenment-progress that exactly replaces rather than displaces the charmed cycle of innocence-fall-guilt-redemption. To possess knowledge or to know in modernity is to be redeemed, paradoxically, in earthly terms. It is to be "rewarded" with sovereignty of self that is accompanied by a commensurate access to power over immediate earthly conditions. Both knowledge as such and matter are devalued in this relation. The products of knowledge and matter are not valued in and of themselves. They are betrayed in the new form of the commodity

made possible by such a configuration of time and matter. The commodity suppresses and conceals the creativity, materials, and labor that constitute it and functions to refer to a (redemptive) meaning beyond itself.

The muteness of matter is sufficient to guarantee the dominance and difference of the scientific subject in relation to the object of study. But mute matter mocks science by resisting and eluding science's need to know, the imperative to know that arises from the silencing of matter. For mute matter yields partial, contingent, "fallen" knowledge. Mute matter scorns its "creator" — the one who renders it mute. Because it is partial, scientific knowledge is perennially susceptible to laughter's mocking, cruel, and destructive techniques of unmasking and inversion. The incorporation of laughter's negative capacities guarantees mockery *of* animate matter by science and mockery of science *by* mute matter. This reciprocal laughter continually renews and reproduces the precondition of redemption, which is guilt. The subject of science assumes the mantle of guilt for silencing matter and receives the guilty reminder of the partiality of knowledge, which fuels the necessary "eternity" of scientific endeavor. Unmasking and inversion are the mechanisms productive of the time of science, the time of suspense and waiting for the truth to be revealed. (In modernity, we anxiously await the punch line on the treadmill to eternity.) But science can never hope to know matter because matter is not mute any more than humans are mute. Matter is alive. It is animated. It communicates. It thinks. It laughs. For in a truly secularized world, in which the forms of the gods are wholly vacated and absolutely abandoned, what else is the human but thinking matter?[3]

Animate matter is the most despised and ridiculed idea of the modern period, even up to the present day. A *Farside* cartoon presents a university teacher standing near a lectern. She

points to the lower chest area of a human male "specimen" who stands beside her and addresses an audience of students: "Let's say, for example, you have just discovered how to reanimate dead tissue....Begin by keeping your diaphragm tight! The sound should originate deep and low — about here!" The caption below this scene reads: "In their final year, all research science students are required to take one semester of Maniacal Laughter." While animate matter is the paradigmatic object of laughter in modernity, the *Farside* reveals the posture, passion, and physiognomy of the laughing subject as the paragon of "thinking matter." The contradictory correspondence of subject and object is masked and inverted in the dead serious enterprise of modern science. The project to "reanimate dead tissue" is the outer limit — the far side — of modern science. For if the prevailing mechanistic view of matter is a "true" one, science should be able to construct living machines. Mechanism at this far side tips over into the ridiculous project that, despite the modern triumph of mechanism, has never entirely disappeared from science, especially from the margins of biology.[4] Vitalism must be rejected by science because it necessarily has recourse to non-scientific, metaphysical explanations about the origins of "life." At the same time, however, mechanistic science has very little to say about "life." The "abiogenesis" theory that life originates from inorganic chemical compounds is rejected as equally unscientific.[5]

To the extent that it recognizes and affirms the human as thinking matter, novelistic discourse is more true to life, less fictional, and less enchanted than the discourse of modern science. In the novel, death rather than animate matter is the paradigmatic object of laughter. The novel objectifies and affirms death as the boundary against which life is lived and can be known in the form of experience. The novel is based on death in the sense that the meaning of a

person's life can be finally evaluated and narrativized only once that person's coordinates are fixed in time and space — that is, the coordinates of birth and death. Gaining a perspective on such narrative material is the problematic task of the novel's author or narrator, who is in the contradictory position of presenting or posing as witness to otherwise inaccessible subjective experience. The modern novel solves this problem in the objectification of the narrator. The narrator "masks" the problem of the human relationship to matter, the problem of how to gain access to the human subject and to human and non-human objects. In drawing attention to its status as "mask," however, the narrator unmasks its own function, which is to test the ability of any mask (or language) to tell a tale, let alone adequately represent a truth. The narrator papers over the gap between subject and object by emphasizing the ludicrous necessity and impossibility of doing so.

While science speaks on behalf of mute matter, the novel "listens" to matter. It gathers together and organizes the myriad ways an object is spoken about and the ways its image operates in various languages in order to measure and test the distance or proximity between those languages and lived experience of the object. Instead of maintaining the sovereignty of the self through the testing of mute matter, the novel taps into vast reservoirs of human and non-human material in celebration of the unfinished subject, awash in the living languages of knowledge and objects, the materials of regeneration, renewal, and extension of the human potential for becoming other — that is, for alternative realizations of thinking matter. The novel's time of "listening" is enabled also by the modern form of time. But instead of the anxious suspension of time, the novel works to bring time onto its side, or onto the side of matter. The novel privileges the immediate present of the materials and the materialized activities of writing and reading. All of time opens

up, becoming a space that not only may be filled but also *must* be filled with the *materials* of language in time. Both language and time itself are materialized and become subject matter. Time is relativized in the interplay of chronotopes (literally, *time/space*); the grounds of representation are themselves represented.

That the *Farside* assigns a female science professor to teach the obligatory (and need I say, *constitutive*) bird course in "Maniacal Laughter" and that she objectifies and anatomizes the body of a male specimen to illustrate her lesson draws attention to the productive inversionary logic at work in the relation between science and animate matter. But the question of the gendered human body is more than reflective of that logic, for the physical body and the female version of it are certainly in a funny relation to modern science. The body refutes and refuses the eternity of thought, while the female body, with its reproductive access to the eternity of the species, is especially hideously implicated in the despised notion of animate matter. And indeed the modern form of gender difference, in which male and female differ in kind rather than degree, is bound up with modern science's self-definition *against* or in opposition to animate matter. Modern gender differentiation guarantees the modern epistemological differentiation of matter and thought. The emergence of the modern form and relation of male and female is what renders the entire system of differentiation systematic.

The distinction between the premodern and modern periods is here located in ways of organizing physical matter and time in relation to human experience. The premodern period recognizes a vertical hierarchy of interlocking rungs of status while modernity seeks out the horizontal differentiation of interests. Michael McKeon designates the former a "regime of hierarchy" and the latter a "regime of difference."[6] Science is the form of the modern regime of

difference and is characterized by the systematic objectification of phenomena that is approached and verified through observation and experiment from a position of subjective fixity or certainty. Synonymous with this usage of the term "science" in the present essay are variations on the phrase "the modern way of knowing," for, as Niklas Luhmann points out, "science has never had any trouble representing itself as 'modern,' nor has it ever stood in need of doing so."[7] The novel, by contrast, has both a long premodern history and a specifically modern origin, as indicated in the important recent evaluations by Margaret Anne Doody and by McKeon.[8] Doody is concerned with continuities in the novel from ancient antecedents to the present. One limitation of such an approach is that it cannot conceive of novelistic discourse as productive of anything but more and more incarnations of novels that are understood to have a set form. For Doody, the novel is a fixed object of observation that undergoes only surface transformations and does not participate in the evolving socio-historical world. Such emphasis tends to affirm and even widen the modern divide between science and literature; it betrays, I think, the modern location of the principle of eternity in human thought. Doody's argument "proves" that continuity prevails in that she refers to the evidence of more than two thousand years of novel writing. But her thesis also constitutes a reaction against the homogenization of time and knowledge that results from "eternal thought," for her implicit aim is to explore and enhance the novel's status as a form of knowledge on the basis of a great tradition. Doody's claim would be unnecessary for a truly historicized conception of knowledge in which the novel's importance, "even" for science, would be quite secure.

Alternatively, McKeon's dialectical method attempts to account for the modern form of the novel while accounting also for its premodern existence and for its ongoing dependence on

premodern forms, notably "romance" and "aristocratic ideology." McKeon's "origins" describe the moment in time when the broadest and most heterogeneous range of writing practices emerge as the abstraction of *the novel*. "The origins of the English novel occur at the end point of a long history of 'novelistic usage' — at the moment when this usage has become sufficiently complex to permit a generalizing 'indifference' to the specificity of usages and an abstraction of the category whose integrity is presupposed by that indifference."[9] The novel

> attains its modern, "institutional" stability and coherence at this time because of its unrivaled power both to formulate, and to explain, a set of problems that are central to early modern experience. These may be understood as problems of categorial instability, which the novel, originating to resolve, also inevitably reflects. The first sort of instability with which the novel is concerned has to do with generic categories; the second, with social categories. The instability of generic categories registers an epistemological crisis, a major cultural transition in attitudes toward how to tell the truth in narrative....The instability of social categories registers a cultural crisis in attitudes toward how the external social order is related to the internal, moral state of its members.[10]

McKeon's discussion is organized around the instability concerning "questions of truth" and "questions of virtue" which are analogous in posing problems of signification: "What kind of authority or evidence is required of narrative to permit it to signify truth to its readers? What kind of social existence or behavior signifies an individual's virtue to others?"[11] My own approach is closer to McKeon's than to Doody's because I am concerned with the coincident emergence of the English novel and modern science. However, while I accept and proceed from McKeon's institutional origins of the novel, my project differs from his in collapsing or rejecting distinctions between "generic" and "social" categories in an attempt to understand the relation between them in a way that goes beyond that of analogy. I am also more concerned than McKeon with the specific conditioning of novelistic discourse during the baroque period.

Thinking Matter

A debate raged throughout the eighteenth century over whether or not matter could think. John Yolton traces the immediate pretext of the controversy to a passing remark in John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690).[12] Here is Locke's provocative suggestion:

> We have the ideas of ***matter*** and ***thinking***, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no: it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ***ideas***, without revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some system of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to matter, so disposed, a thinking immaterial substance: it being, in respect of our notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive that God can, if he pleases, superadd to matter a faculty of thinking, than that he should superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking.... (4.3.6)

Locke added to this statement that "immateriality was not necessary for immortality."[13] Edward Stillingfleet, then Bishop of Worcester, was one of the first to reply to Locke's apparently offhand provocation. His objection, characteristic of the volley of protests that followed, was that "if matter thinks, matter and thought would be confounded, and hence the essence of matter destroyed."[14] Samuel Clarke misread Locke's comment as favoring the view that matter *can* think, an idea he finds as ludicrous as saying that "blueness" is really "squareness."[15] John Broughton said he had no trouble conceiving that God could suspend the laws of gravity so that "iron might swim," but he could not conceive of matter as thinking.[16] Another writer asked if any man "that is not a Coxcomb" could say "that a single Atom thinks?"[17] Anyone who entertained what Yolton calls "Locke's suggestion" was instantly attacked. This minority included Anthony Collins, who ventured that consciousness or the power of thinking is a mode of motion peculiar to the "particles of the brain." Collins's detailed and protracted debate with Samuel Clarke on the question centered on whether the power of thinking (or any power) could arise from an

arrangement of parts or whether it must necessarily be immanent in each part in order to arise in the whole.[18]

Locke's suggestion was thus interpreted as a threat not only to the recent discoveries but also to the very basis of the new philosophy, which became "natural" philosophy in the decade following the publication of Locke's *Essay*. At the same time, the idea that matter can think was, from a religious point of view, a threat to the *essential* agency of God in nature. The grounds for objection were therefore both "scientific" and religious. Science and religion both had everything at stake in the absolute distinction between "thought" and "extension," to use the Cartesian terms. The two poles of opposition against the idea of thinking matter, then, were ***mechanism***, in which there is only biology and physiology, and ***extreme immaterialism***, in which God's intervention to effect each and every motion of matter renders human action merely a kind of transcendental puppetry. But note the surprising identity of these poles. Both mechanism and immaterialism assume the determination of action from an external source.

The pole of extreme immaterialism was most closely approached in the "occasionalism" of Nicholas Malebranche (1638-1715), whose work is devoted to reconciling Catholicism and Cartesian mechanism.[19] Malebranche's ideas were represented in England by the Cambridge Platonist John Norris (1657-1711), author of the first published objection to Locke's comment on thinking matter. Norris's *Cursory Reflections Upon a Book Call'd, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690) appeared just five months after Locke's *Essay*.[20] Although Norris was primarily a moralist and theologian, he responded to Locke's epistemology rather than his theology. The argument between Norris and Locke centered on the nature of human thought. Norris insisted it is *passive* in opposition to Locke's presentation of the understanding as *active*.[21]

Several years before Locke's *Essay* moved Norris to demand clarification on the issue, the preeminent Cambridge Platonist, Ralph Cudworth, characterized the entire range of conceptions of matter, from inert and dead to self-moving, as underlying all forms of atheism.[22] Both Cudworth and Norris worked just as diligently to discredit the mechanist reduction of the human to "automata" as they did to dislodge the idea that thought could arise from "stupid" matter. Through their works and those of Henry More and Joseph Glanvill, among others, the Cambridge Platonists crucially shaped the modern formulation of matter as mute; hence they also molded the peculiar Anglican physiognomy of modern science[23] as well as the Hermetic physiognomy of the modern novel. I use the term "physiognomy" here in Walter Benjamin's sense, which I think correlates with Mikhail Bakhtin's "grotesque." Both terms are fundamentally ambivalent in signifying the orientation of bodies, including non-human bodies and fragments, to the socio-historical world and to the individual organism or fragment. My usage should become clear in the discussions of Benjamin and Bakhtin to follow.

The key tenets of seventeenth-century Platonism are the preexistence of the soul, the physical embodiment of the soul, the absolute goodness of God, free will, and the related motivation to gain access to reason.[24] All are drawn primarily from the Hermetic writings ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus and only secondarily from Plato, who was thought to have derived his ideas from more ancient Egyptian and Mosaic sources.[25] Authority for preexistence was also drawn from the Alexandrian theologian Origen.[26] Writing with full awareness of Isaac Casaubon's correct dating of the Hermetic texts and debunking of the historicity of Hermes Trismegistus, Ralph Cudworth nevertheless salvaged what he believed was the genuinely Egyptian core of the *Corpus Hermetica*, the eternity and divinity of matter. He insisted on preserving the

dogma of the Trismegistic books, "That nothing in the world perisheth, and that death is not the destruction but change and translation of things only."[27] On the same authority, Henry More modified Cartesian mechanism with his concept of a "spirit of nature."[28] The Hermetic idea is that through the manipulations or "translations" of matter, especially through the "secret virtues" of plants and stones, the powers or influences of the gods (the allegorized sun, moon, and planets) can be drawn down to earth for the immediate amelioration of earthly conditions, particularly those concerning health and romance. This "astral magic" includes "god-making" in the Hermetic practice, but the two are separated in Christian Platonism, in Yates's words, "upon that momentous entry of Hermes Trismegistus into the Church."[29] The Jesuit priest and Hermetic-Cabalist Athanasius Kircher carefully distinguishes between diabolic magic, or god-making, and natural magic, which is concerned solely with matter, language, and astology. Kircher proceeds in the study and perhaps the practice of the latter.[30] The important feature of natural magic is that its function, as derived from Hermetism, is to placate the gods of time, or to bring time onto one's side.[31] A spatio-temporal continuum between earthly matter and the astrological signs underlies this function, and I think it is key to the seventeenth century achievement of rearranging time in relation to matter.[32]

Locke's position on the question of thinking matter was elaborated in his responses to Stillingfleet. Yolton stresses that Locke was, finally, "firmly of the opinion that thought cannot be a property of matter."[33] Locke stipulates, however, that thought "could be, or perhaps even is, a separable accident, attachable by God to either material or immaterial substance."[34] Yolton draws attention to Locke's failure to specify what that "accident" might be. Yet, while noting Locke's obscurity on this point, he does not venture an explanation of it. I think Locke does not specify

the accident in question for a very good reason. The unspecified accident and Locke's equivocation (although matter does not think, God could cause it to think if He wanted) constitute the space between thought and matter in the form of a question mark. The querying gap functions as an interpellation to which the new form of the individual must answer. The equivocal separation of thought and matter calls for *a third thing* to mediate between the two. This is the situation that renders objectively necessary the functioning of something like Locke's new liberal contractual relations. The equivocation of liberalism is: true to materialist vitalism, which is the implication of materialism *per se*, matter *may* think; yet, true to materialist mechanism, matter does not think *in effect*; which is to say that matter is not necessarily "animate" *or* "dead," but that it is certainly and effectively "mute." The new god of the secularized world is, then, Janus-faced. In its mechanism, it confronts and "defeats" the animism of the discredited, pagan past. In its vitalism, it faces the apparently godless and "secular"world.

Yolton can be excused for not distinguishing between the characterization of matter as "dead" or "passive." His seventeenth-century sources, notably Cudworth, also fail to make the distinction, which I read as the manifestation of their necessarily productive equivocation on the question. There is a marked preference in the work of the Cambridge Platonists, however, for the term "passive," as in the work of Norris.[35] For the passivity of matter opposes the "dead" matter of mechanists such as Hobbes and Descartes, but also opposes vitalists such as William Harvey or worse, Gerard Winstanley and others of the radical protestant sects. In his meticulously researched *The Matter of Revolution: Science, Poetry, and Politics in the Age of Milton*, John Rogers reads what he calls "the Vitalist Moment," the flourishing of a vitalist ontology in the works of William Harvey, John Milton, Gerard Winstanley, Andrew Marvell, and Margaret

Cavendish, as formulations of proto-liberal notions of "agency" and "organization," terms that come into English with their modern valences at that time. Rogers traces how each of these writers, however reluctantly, abandons the vitalist model because its egalitarian implications are unthinkable. While Rogers links Locke to the Vitalist Moment, he stresses that Locke's liberalism has, finally, "a more politically functional origin in the economics of contract."[36] According to Rogers, the connection between vitalism and liberalism exists but is not an enduringly vital one. The radical animism associated with the politically defeated sectarians of the English Revolution "could persist into the Restoration as little more than an imperilled vision of matter, blurred and fleeting." Rogers points out that the "fact that one of the most formal and thoroughgoing articulations of a vitalist world-view, Francis Glisson's late *Tractatus de natura substantiae energetica* (1672), remains untranslated to this day attests to the vitalists' inability, or unwillingness, after the Vitalist Moment to reassert this ontology's place in the popular imagination."[37] Similarly, Yolton concludes in his study that the thinking matter controversy was never resolved. None of the disputants ever clarified how intentions and volitions fit into or help cause actions.[38] With Joseph Priestly's "force theory of matter" in 1777, science redirected its attention from matter to energy.[39] According to Yolton, the debate persists into modernity only in the philosophy of action, a marginalized discourse relative to the natural sciences. I think, in contrast to both Rogers's and Yolton's assessments, that vitalism is constitutive in its explicit modern negation by the competing materialism of mechanism. We are living the "resolution," however unsatisfactory, of the thinking matter controversy.

The point at which all materialisms knowingly or intentionally converged was in the "need" for there to be something eternal. For if nothing is "first" or "eternal," then matter can

never begin to be. And if only matter and motion is first and eternal, then thought cannot begin to be.[40] So goes the argument that was productive of human thought as occupying the category of the eternal. "Matter cannot produce a thinking intelligent being," says Locke. "[T]his is just as impossible to conceive as that nothing should of itself produce matter" (4.10.10). Locke links the "need" for the gods or God in the first place to this very problem.[41] His achievement lies in his conclusion that the principle of eternity or the eternal "must necessarily be a cogitative being" and that such a being is necessarily radically distinct from matter in some sense (4.10.10). On this ontological "foundation," modernity arises in all its equivocal and productive instability. The implication that human consciousness is *material* is simultaneously elicited and suppressed in seventeenth-century materialism. The operative conception of consciousness as *immaterial*, meanwhile, disallows the full realization of a positive identification of the human as matter and of matter as capable of thought.

Walter Benjamin and The Allegorical Imperative

[T]he program of [Walter] Benjamin's philosophy is the anti-idealist construction of the intelligible world. — Rolf Tiedemann[42]

Walter Benjamin is concerned with the fact that, historically, "those who make culture possible have always been excluded from it."[43] "There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism."[44] Benjamin's historical approach takes as its critical starting point that the "adherents of historicism...empathize...with the victor": "Whoever has emerged victorious participates to this day in the triumphal procession in which the present rulers step over those who are lying prostrate. According to traditional practice, the spoils are carried

along in the procession."[45]

These comments are a sobering, perhaps even paralyzing, challenge to the historian. No doubt Benjamin had in mind Marx's equally demanding view of his own task as one of changing history rather than merely describing it. Benjamin's response led him to seek a standpoint for the critique of history that could reveal "new relationships within the [historical] material itself and not just between the modern critic and his material." [46] The concern is to avoid reducing the products of history to the status of examples of some other, transcendent meaning, such as the "evidence" of progress or the "effects" of the cynical machinations of a preexistent and self-interested ruling class. Benjamin's pre-Marxist immersion in the seventeenth-century mourning play, or "Trauerspiel," in *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, inaugurated his project in the form of trying to think outside the historical trope of progress. In this work, Benjamin characterizes Shakespeare's *Hamlet* as the supreme example of the mourning play genre, which makes his analysis immediately relevant, even in a thematic sense, to literature of the English baroque.[47]

The "allegorical imperative" of modern history — the form that history takes from the seventeenth century to the present — is the name I give to Benjamin's findings in the baroque mourning play. The echo of the "categorical imperative" of Immanuel Kant is intentional and speaks to Benjamin's critique of Kant's "radical subjectivism" and neglect of language. Benjamin deals with these as one problem. "In Benjamin's view, the richness and fecundity of our conception of truth diminishes profoundly if it is limited to something which is merely 'subjectively constituted,' as Kant argues in the Transcendental Analytic."[48] In Benjamin's words:

The great transformation and rectification of the one-sided, mathematical-mechanical

> conception of knowledge can only be accomplished by relating knowledge to the philosophy of language.... Kant completely neglected the fact that all philosophical knowledge has its unique expression in language, not in formulas or numbers.... A concept of knowledge acquired by reflection on its linguistic essence will create a correspondent concept of experience, that will also encompass the domains whose true systematic arrangement Kant has failed to grasp. The highest of these domains is called religion.[49]

The "allegorical imperative" describes the process by which the "progress" of enlightenment, the authorizing master narrative of the modern way of knowing, reinstitutes the Christian allegory of the Fall and Redemption but under the mask of "secularization." In strictly Marxist terms, modernity involves a radical change in the forces of production that leaves the former relations of production intact, even while giving these relations new faces. Benjamin's idea that history constructs allegories is widely recognized, but rather than serving as the starting point and tool of analysis it seems to have the status of a fact that stops all attempts to intervene in history.[50] Even those who read Benjamin sympathetically and attempt to imitate his methodology tend to view his work, like the Marxist project generally, as an admirable, even heroic, but romantically foredoomed attempt to realize what must remain a utopian ideal.[51] The importance of Benjamin's formulation of the allegorical imperative, however, is that it achieves the objectification of modern history. Through it, Benjamin sustains an objectifying distance *outside* the allegory of the Fall in order to examine precisely how enlightenment re-enchants the world. This is a point of earth-shattering importance but one that is apparently missed in the prevailing reading of Benjamin's method as "redemptive critique" or, variously, as a "metaphysics" or an "aesthetics of redemption."[52] Jürgen Habermas is only one of the best known readers who finds Benjamin's model of critique to be ultimately in a conservative rather than critical relation to its object.[53] I think Benjamin here is mistaken for his object of study. Habermas and nearly everyone else who

reads Benjamin makes the same entirely understandable, not to say *necessary* mistake, however, because, as we will see, Benjamin's method aims precisely to ambiguate the relation between subject and object in an unprecedented way, a way that is rendered ridiculous or unthinkable from the position inside modernity from which Habermas speaks. For Benjamin proceeds as if the world of objects "speak," which is to say, as if matter is animate and "thinks." This is invisible to the majority of Benjaminian readers because to take Benjamin or anyone seriously is to rule out the possibility of this idea. In the following, I offer an alternative reading on the basis of my own immersion both in baroque writing and in Benjaminian analysis. I find that, rather than advocating a politically egalitarian means to *redemption*, which his critics seem to be seeking, Benjamin characterizes baroque allegory harshly because it *settles for* redemption. But at the same time, his dialectical reading is capable of recognizing the utopian potential of this need and search for redemption. Benjamin's work contains suggestive clues as to the form of an alternative to the present regime of redemptive knowledge that condemns us to the perpetually doomed attempt to *transcend* the present, miserable state. I am prompted to work out this alternative because of my focus not on melancholy but on laughter. Benjamin only arrives at the question of laughter at the very end of the mourning play study, and this requires me to extrapolate from and extend his analysis in ways that put an end to Benjamin's "responsibility" for what I have to say.

In dispensing with the traditional historian's inventory of tropes, particularly that of "progress," Benjamin proposes a methodology for confronting the past in its specificity by means of the material object-world. Instead of trying to overcome or transcend the gap between past and present, subject and object, or the material and the ideal, Benjamin begins with a repudiation of exactly these distinctions. This opening gambit has the effect of rendering such distinctions not

as preexistent or absolute but as achievements that are themselves historically contingent. They are the product of the period of history under examination. Benjamin's aim is not to recover the past or to know it in the sense of coming to possess knowledge about it, for these, too, are modern forms, the effects of what he is studying. Instead, Benjamin seeks out the way images, objects, words, personages, or events intervene in time. He means to blast them "out of the continuum of history" in order to rescue their utopian content and potential.[54] He refers to the historian's task as one of awakening the dead in the sense of waking up in the present to the desires and dreams that energize the anonymous toil of history, and to the ways in which such energies are extorted, frustrated, and subsumed. This is the significance of his comment: "[o]nly that historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly convinced that *even the dead* will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And this enemy has not ceased to be victorious."[55] A practice of history that is concerned to fan sparks of *hope* in the past exposes the "bias" of modern historiography that assumes it marches, triumphant and superior, out of and away from the past. For how could that be the case when the dead are always ahead of us? They have gone on ahead. They are the "future" that we awaken to and walk towards.

Such a startling and radical rearrangement of time, which is my own and not Benjamin's, is not so strange as to be unrecognizable in terms of an individual life — an individual, for example, who experiences the death of a parent, an event which not only alters the taste of food but rearranges the course of time. Nor is this reorganization so radical that something of its magnitude has not actually occurred. Baroque literature registers nothing so much as shock at the simultaneously arbitrary and relativizing reconception of time taking place before its eyes. Benjamin's historical methodology requires just such an objectification of time in order to identify

how a thing intervenes in time. He finds time objectified in the language of baroque allegory, which foregrounds itself as a system of materially spatialized reference operating through, or in, or across time. Whereas a system of representational language displaces or condenses its referent in the static simultaneity of the symbol, a system of referential language records and addresses the object world's distance from the language by which we could know it.

Benjamin reads baroque allegory as an "objectively necessary artistic structure."[56] The reinvigoration of the pantheon of pagan antiquity during the sixteenth century "aroused the seventeenth century to protest."[57] The vehement denial and suppression of the pagan cosmology — the forced evacuation of the old gods as operative and meaningful images — released their forms of personification, the virtues, vices, and elemental forces that shape life, for alternative contents. In order to implement the evacuation, it was imperative that their forms be filled with other meanings. The values associated with these gods and the kinds of relationships they "speak" to are pried loose from their former absolute identifications and become available as "masks." A simultaneous denigration and restoration takes place. The purposeful destruction of the old gods preserves the places they occupied. These sites are the target and destination of the meaning that displaces them. In this process, the "guilt-laden physis of Christianity" defines itself against the "purer nature" of the gods embodied in the antique pantheon.[58] The gods versus Christian fallen nature are repositioned in this conflict as God versus fallen nature — nature in the attire of the old gods, who are gathered and intensified in the "original allegorical figure" of Satan. Thus, the middle ages bound together the material and the demonic with the corollary of the strict prohibition imposed on the study of nature. Even and especially mathematics are "rendered suspect by the devilish essence of matter."[59] Guilt is ascribed to the pursuit of such

knowledge — guilt which therefore extends to the object of such knowledge, to nature itself in its new status as "matter." Fallen nature is "mute" in the sense that matter becomes entirely dependent on being "read" in order to "mean" or to signify. Moreover, mute matter is "mournful" as is anything that "has the feeling...it is known comprehensively by the unknowable" infinite. Nature yields knowledge now thanks only to the intervention of the allegorist, which shows how, in Benjamin's reading, the imposition of muteness on matter generates the need and place for a certain kind of subject of knowledge. The more nature and antiquity (the hollowed out images of the gods) are conceived as guilt-ridden, the more necessary is their allegorical interpretation as their only conceivable salvation.[60] The dynamic contradiction at work is that the allegorist derives authority over matter from the mute mournfulness of his object of study, which he himself has silenced. At this point in the allegorical process, however, the allegorist "betrays the world" in foreclosing the productive potential of his own melancholy disposition. The baroque melancholic intention "does not faithfully rest in the contemplation of bones, but faithlessly leaps forward to the idea of resurrection," and allegory "goes away empty-handed."[61] My challenge to the reading of Benjamin's method as "redemptive critique" rests on this latter suggestive formulation.

Melancholy cultivates what Benjamin calls "loyalty to the world of things."[62] Melancholy, says Benjamin, "is determined by an astounding tenacity of intention, which, among the feelings, is matched perhaps only by love — and that not playfully. For whereas in the realm of the emotions it is not unusual for the relation between an intention and its object to alternate between attraction and repulsion, mourning is capable of a special intensification, a progressive deepening of its intention."[63] Melancholy heightens concentration and extends the capacity for sustained

effort in giving in to the downward pull and immersion in "the life of creaturely things," even to the depths of the earth. Benjamin quotes Ficino's analogy, widely known and repeated in baroque literature, between the force of gravity and mental concentration: "Melancholy...continually challenges the mind to concentrate itself and come to rest in one place and to practice contemplation. And since melancholy is in itself like the centre of the world, even so, it compels an investigation which reaches out to the centre of every individual object of enquiry, and leads to an understanding of the very deepest truths."[64] Benjamin's own analogy between mourning and love indicates the more ambiguous and variable relation of subject to object that is proposed in the practice of history that is "loyal" to the world of things. This ambiguity is understood by some of Benjamin's critics as an unacceptable sacrifice of subjectivity.[65] Theodor W. Adorno demanded that Benjamin, in his later work, find a way to explicate or save subjectivity "in such a way that those on whose behalf critique was meant to intervene not be sacrificed."[66] But surely Benjamin's point is that the subject is shaped by the formulation of the object. The sovereignty of the subject is not preexistent but is a product of a historical delimitation of the object in a certain way and the usurpation of superiority over it. The modern subject, whether "bourgeois" or "working class," remains under a magical spell in thinking it can, with impunity, formulate its object in any way that it "chooses" and not itself be delimited in an exactly commensurate way. In fact, as we will see in the following discussion, the grotesque method of novelistic discourse both supports and undermines this delusion in its playfulness with languages in relation to objects. The sovereign subject is achieved and maintained only at the enormous cost of the full realization of *this* world, in favor of a chimerical redemption in some other world, or, as the twentieth-century market would have it, in some other product.

Max Pensky agrees with Adorno after examining Benjamin's further experimentation with his special historical practice in the works of Proust, who offers the physiognomy of the "brooding" subject, and in the surrealists, who celebrate the sudden silencing or disappearance of the subject in the realization of form.[67] Pensky isolates the problem of critical agency in a short work by Benjamin titled "Passagen" (passages). The work was to be the basis of Benjamin's "Passagenwerk," known in English translation as the "Arcades Project," an investigation of the Paris arcades or shopping malls of the early nineteenth century.[68] The "Passagenwerk" remained unfinished at Benjamin's death, and the "Passagen" Pensky examines exists as a fragment. Both works were conceived as the "past become space." Pensky describes them as presenting a "mode of historiographic imagination...in which a visual-anamnestic collection of discarded or forgotten objects constitutes the means for a definitive insight into historical truth."[69] The "Passagen" fragment is apparently devoid of narrative. It presents a found juxtaposition of objects that "speak" to the present through their arrangement in relation to each other rather than through a standard historical contextualization, description, and accounting. The object of contemplation is a new arcade, "the newest Paris *passage*," built on the Boulevard Haussmann. To make room for it, the old Passage de l'Opera is bulldozed away. The glitter and destructiveness of the new passage opens onto what remains of the old. "Passagen" presents a catalogue of the contents, corners, doors, and hallways of the "vanished arcade" that appears "as an occluded or occulted text awaiting translation."[70] But Pensky finds that "Passagen" "bears no methodological clues as to how dialectical images are to be distilled" from a mass of commodities deprived of their primary value of newness. He wonders how Benjamin could conceive of the meaning of these objects as "leaping out" at the historian. What are the Benjaminian "tactics of remembrance"?

"What sort of subject, in short, would one have to be, in order for the jumbled world of the vanished arcades to "translate" themselves into messages of historical — revolutionary — truth?"[71] Not finding the answers to these questions in Benjamin's writings, Pensky arrives, finally, at a negative appraisal. He concludes that Benjamin's proposal of locating historical truth by means of "passage work" between subject and object is simply unthinkable.

That both Adorno and Pensky concentrate on the implications of Benjamin's thought for the subject serves to underscore Benjamin's understanding of baroque allegory as productive, specifically, of "the triumph of subjectivity" in the modern period, but at the expense of variation in forms of contact with the object world, the kind of variation in which "the grotesque method" revels.[72] I think Benjamin was trying to correct the modern obsessive focus on the subject in order that the object world might return to the line of vision and resume a position of value in and of itself, not merely as a "mute" means to an illusory human redemption.[73]

Benjamin's exposition of the foreclosing of melancholy in a faithless leap "to the idea of resurrection" points to its alternative. The delineation of this road not taken — or this world not realized — requires a brief review of Benjamin's reading of the baroque process of allegory. His reading is suggestively informed by the privileging of key terms that arise from and give shape to the material he is investigating. In effect, he "occupies" or dons the mask of the point of view that these words provide. The key words I would like to emphasize are "ruins," "fragments," and "physiognomy." The baroque allegorist finds the world in ruins and fragments. Even language itself appears as disarticulated material that calls for the intervention or "writing" by some meaning-making agency. "The many obscurities in the connection between meaning and sign" did not deter "but encouraged" the baroque allegorist, for whom "[a]ny person, any object, any

relationship can mean absolutely anything else."[74] Moreover, the object or material of representation is "not merely a sign of what is to be known but itself is an object worthy of knowledge."[75] Baroque physiognomy, the practice of reading the outer physical signs as corresponding in a system of reference to the deepest inner passions, allegorically personifies them in assigning each a human face. The parts and expressions of the human face and body are disaggregated to constitute discrete objects of study and repositioning. The melancholy physiognomy or mask appears on finding things in this state of affairs which promotes the deepest, most perplexed contemplation. The baroque allegorist makes the faithless leap, however, by assuming responsibility, formulated as "guilt," for the fragmented nature of things. Melancholy contemplation intensifies the guilt and drives the motivation for redemptive meaning-making through the gathering and collection of the fragments as the means to restoring the lost wholeness that guarantees the true meaning of each piece. This movement, which gives the modern way of knowing its shape, ensures that the fragmented objects of knowledge are not and cannot be valued in and of themselves but only as the broken or "fallen" parts of a whole that is irrecoverable but that nevertheless stands as the ultimate goal towards which all meanings are directed. The process sustains and renews itself in the definition of knowledge as that which ensures its own ongoing fragmentedness. The project of knowledge becomes that of discerning the differences between things. The consolidation of differences as constitutive is guaranteed by the absolute demarcation between things, the abyss or "Hell." The allegorist is idealized in the image of Satan, "the original allegorical figure," who bears the hubris and the guilt for the fragmentation of things and in fact for bringing into the world the cleavages of time and death. The allegorist takes on the mantle of guilt because guilt is the precondition of his redemption by

way of the gathering of separated knowledge which, because of the abyss, can now only be further divided. Divided knowledge can be collected and possessed for "passage" or transcendence to an illusory redeemed state but, because of the abyss or the proliferation of snaking chasms between things, such knowledge cannot be inhabited or lived. The differences between things, rather than any creative or positive value, constitute knowledge. The divided knowledge of modernity makes a virtue of fragmentation in coming up with a brilliant resolution that guarantees the reconstitution of wholeness, for recognition of the ingenuity of the solution requires the constant renewal of the problem. But because wholeness does not exist outside the past moment of the realization of any given value, the "guarantee" of achieving or "discovering" the "whole" truth is an empty one. It is the new shape of the gods or of God that operates to defer perpetually the fulfillment of meaning in and for the present. Another way of saying this is to say that modernity is realized in the forestalling of the Copernican revolution. In drawing an absolute distinction between the subject and object of knowledge, modernity prevents the objectification of the human (body *and* mind) and does not complete the Copernican de-centering of the human that is the precondition of a truly revolutionary change in relations of production, which is to say relations between the human and the rest of material reality. Completion of the Copernican revolution would involve completing the reversal of the temporal values of the eternal and the present. The present would be the supreme value and the eternal subordinated as an abstraction against which time is posited. Benjamin's approach suggests what might be involved in completing the Copernican revolution.[76]

The scope of the baroque allegorist's betrayal comes into focus more sharply by imagining how it could have been otherwise. If the faithless leap takes place in the proud and melancholic

assumption of guilt for encountering the world in ruins, the alternative is to "faithfully rest in the contemplation of bones." My reading of this phrase is that the fulfillment of melancholy entails the *realization* of matter instead of its *redemption*. Realization involves giving in, or giving over, to the signifying power of matter. Precisely this realization must be avoided in the redemptive regime for the commodity to perform its magical tricks, which explains why signifying matter becomes the paradigmatic object of laughter in modernity. Melancholy acceptance of the world in ruins and fragments would involve acknowledgment and embrace of the originary, open, and unresolvable conflict of representations of the world — the true character of experience for the finite human, who is bound in time by the coordinates of birth and death and therefore cannot *but* encounter the world in pieces. But here, the fragment is a positive value in its opposition to totality, totalization, or the absolutist values of seventeenth-century western Europe. In its opposition to absolutism, the fragment points to a utopian, anti-absolutist desire or motion in the baroque process of giving form. The potential of this alternative evaluation is that fragments of matter are then of necessity valued in themselves as the fibres and repositories of creativity and labor — both "natural" and "cultural" — out of which they are constituted. Fragments of matter are what we have access to, here and now. In the modern regime of redemptive knowledge, matter can only have a degraded status. The consumption of all available human energies in the maniacal production of commodities, both human and non-human, and the reproduction of the "need" for them, function to suppress and conceal the materials and relations out of which they are made. Reduced in the world of meaning to its price, as Marx showed, the modern commodity form can only point to the going measure of value whose standard is set elsewhere and not in or of the "thing" itself, which, as material, is thereby prevented from being "realized" as a value in

and of itself.

The realization rather than redemption of matter would bring about a corresponding physiognomic change in the subject of knowledge, from one of melancholy to one of laughter. The melancholic intention is fully realized in laughter, for "[j]ust as earthly mournfulness is of a piece with allegorical interpretation, so is devilish mirth with its frustration in the triumph of matter."[77] In place of guilt and the subsequent expert knowing of the distinctions between things as the means to redemption, Benjamin proposes "loyalty to the world of things," a relation to materials as ends in themselves. In place of redemption, I propose the *realization* of the labor and creativity that is actualized in things, including human and "creaturely" things.[78] The physiognomic expression of loyalty to the signifying power of matter and to the most diverse realization of matter is laughter:

> Here, of course, the muteness of matter is overcome. In laughter, above all, mind is enthusiastically embraced by matter, in highly eccentric disguise. Indeed, it becomes so spiritual that it far outstrips language. It is aiming higher, and ends in shrill laughter.[79]

Laughter, or "mirth," or "the pure joke," is "the essential inner side of baroque mourning which from time to time, like the lining of a dress at the hem or lapel, makes its presence felt. Its representative [in the baroque mourning play] is linked to the representative of mourning." The affinity between joking and cruelty takes shape in the alternation, in the character of the intriguer of baroque allegory, the vice figure whose "fundamental trait" is scorn for human pride, the baroque inversionary troping of Satan. That is, rather than representing the defeated and laughable consequence of pride, Satan functions to unmask pride in others and to effect their humiliation. In the figure of Satan, it is not a matter of joking *or* cruelty, melancholy *or* laughter,

but the arrest of both at the point of their intersection. The resultant mixed passion is what we call "genius," the embodied actualization of new and different kinds of value. "Genius" is here located in a process rather than in certain "blessed" or lucky humans. "Where thinking suddenly stops in a configuration pregnant with tensions, it gives that configuration a shock, by which it crystallizes into a monad."[80] The monad is not only a fragment of the universe but "the universe itself seen from a particular point of view."[81] This startling formulation informs the Benjaminian fragment. He encounters fragments as viewpoints on the world rather than as the broken pieces that have a mysterious and irrecoverable relation to it. The monad "speaks" in making visible a viewpoint, a set of spatialized relations, and a manner of intervening in time. The monad is what the historian is looking for.

M. M. Bakhtin and The Grotesque Method

It would be extremely interesting to write the history of laughter. — A. I. Herzen

Like Benjamin, M. M. Bakhtin is concerned with the "anonymous toil" of history and specifically with the unacknowledged or, variously, romanticized role of folk culture in what came to be known as high artistic forms in the early modern period. I take the term "the grotesque method" from Bakhtin's Introduction to *Rabelais and His World.*[82] The term is introduced briefly and without the special emphasis I give to it. In Bakhtin the grotesque refers to the construction of images that are temporally and spatially ambivalent.[83] They are ambivalent in simultaneously representing both poles of life, the dynamic processes of procreating and dying. This dual image of transformation brings together the temporal coordinates of the ephemeral present of processes

and eternity or death. Both are spatialized, with no small degree of tension, within a single object or body. The grotesque image differs from the classical in its emphasis on the reality of experience as struggle and contradiction rather than on a static and finished idealization. Grotesque images are "ugly, monstrous, hideous from the point of view of 'classic' aesthetics, that is, the aesthetics of the ready-made and the completed."[84] In the adaptation of the grotesque method to my own material, I develop or push grotesque ambivalence to refer to a contradictory and simultaneously dual orientation of the object or body towards both its socio-historical existence and its status as an individual, living organism. The articulation point of the two is the social material of language. Even vegetable and non-organic objects are enlivened and "speak" in their formulation in and contact with the living material of language. This duality is the basis of the grotesque's inseparability from language, a point I base on Bakhtin's theory of language developed elsewhere, particularly in the four essays that make up *The Dialogic Imagination*.[85] The grotesque's embrace of the transformational poles of life is the point of intersection of its socio-historical and individual aspects. The coordinates of birth and death, the conditions of possibility of a life, are strictly social in being unavailable to the individual who comes into being and passes out of life by means of these reported events. In the case of the human, our births are narrated to us and our deaths are narrative material for others. For the individual, death can have only a figural status, yet only after death can a life be fully known and evaluated, and then only to others. The material in which our own material preconditions become accessible, therefore, is the biologically-based utterance that is realized in socio-historical language. This is the significance of Bakhtin's theory of the utterance as living, social material, which he posits in opposition to what had been (and still is to some extent) the tendency of linguistics to isolate and objectify lexical

units as inert instruments that a preexistent speaker uses. In Bakhtin, the defining boundaries of the utterance are social and not grammatical. The utterance is social because it is made in response to a previous utterance and anticipates an utterance in reply.[86] The material in which utterance and speaker are realized is not the Saussurean *langue*, the system of linguistic norms, or *parole*, language as it is used in specific utterances, but a "contradiction-ridden, tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies."[87] A unified language system is a centripetal force, always in dynamic tension with the centrifugal forces of social heteroglossia:

> A unitary language is not something given but is always in essence posited — and at every moment of its linguistic life it is opposed to the realities of heteroglossia. But at the same time it makes its real presence felt as a force for overcoming this heteroglossia, imposing specific limits to it, guaranteeing a certain maximum of mutual understanding and crystallizing into a real, although still relative, unity — the unity of the reigning conversational (everyday) language and literary language, "correct language."[88]

This "correct language" struggles against its own internal stratification, which is social heteroglossia, animated or opposed in specific utterances, including "social dialects, characteristic group behaviours, professional jargons, generic languages, languages of generations and age groups, tendentious languages, languages of the authorities, of various circles and of passing fashions, languages that serve the specific sociopolitical purposes of the day, even of the hour (each day has its own slogan, its own vocabulary, its own emphasis)...."[89] As a result of these stratifying forces in language, there are no neutral words. All are "shot through" with their uses by others in previous utterances, in previous times and places. With every word, the speaker takes an evaluative stance in relation to these previous utterances, to the way in which these words have been used in the past, and this evaluation, elsewhere called "answerability," conditions

the way they may be used in the future.[90] The speaker weighs or evaluates every word but is never the originator of the word. The speaking subject is not a preexistent essence who comes to language and uses it as an instrument. Rather, the speaking subject is a function of the social utterance. The "self" has no referent in itself but only gets or constructs itself from the other, the addressee, in the sense that only the other's categories or vision will enable it to be an object of its own perception. The self can only be shaped from the outside. It is therefore, in its own vision, always and only in a state of incompleted becoming.

The image of the unfinished self exists in representational practices from remotest antiquity. The grotesque body is always in a process of growth and decay. It is climbing or falling, spawning strange lumps or losing bits of itself in life's processes. It is the body impinged on by "culture." The discovery of grotesque figuration in Roman catacombs in the sixteenth century renewed and elevated the status of grotesque images for western European literatures. The grotesque was immediately grasped in the seventeenth century as the figure of matter in motion, the dominating trope of the new philosophy. It will be part of my purpose here to show how the baroque embrace of the grotesque produced a "Galilean language consciousness"[91] that was the precondition of, on the one hand, the visibility of the human body (the ground of spatial form and therefore of value) as a discrete, biological organism — the idealized object of modern medicine — and, on the other hand, the availability of the grotesque method as the animating principle of the new realm of novelized literature, the result of the incorporation or channeling of the grotesque into privatized literary forms.

The novelization of literature was achieved by what I am calling the grotesque method. Novelization is the key term in Bakhtin's theory of genre, which is dispersed throughout his

works.[92] The implication of his theory of language as material and social is that text and world are not oppositional but relational conditions, differing in degree but not in essence. Such a "historical" or "sociological" poetics requires the identification and materialization of the articulation point of text and world, and Bakhtin formulated this point as the "chronotope" (literally, "time space") of the utterance.[93] The chronotope is offered "almost, but not entirely" as a metaphor for the inseparability of space and time "as a formally constitutive category of literature."[94] Specific forms or spheres of language use, or "speech genres," are defined by their chronotopes, by the times and spaces that give rise to them and to which they remain integrally linked. The chronotope is the material grounding of representation that in literature is objectified, relativized, and subjected to variation, depending on the positioning of the individual body of the speaker, whose positioning (rather than whose "essence") is unique by virtue of the fact that when the speaker is there, no other can be. So not only does a word arise from a geological and social space, but it also carries within it a corresponding sense of time. Each word has its own sense of time. Various "languages," now understood as embodied and positioned viewpoints, bring concrete chronotopes into play in literary representation. The modern novel is the form that embraces the diversity of languages as both embodied (physical, biological) and "masked" (speaking in the language of the other, or the social material of language). The novel is the genre that brings all genres together and puts them into play. It is distinguished from genres that disallow or separate other languages and discourses in order to privilege one fixed space and time that is, as a result, apparently dehistoricized and disembodied. In non-novelistic genres, the greater the distance between embodiment and particular historical positioning, the more authoritative is the utterance and the greater its status as a timeless truth or artifact. Historically,

of course, the novel does not appear triumphant, superior, and alone at the top. Rather, its realization authorizes and valorizes a special use of language — the grotesque method — that novelizes all genres of discourse, both literary and extraliterary. Novelization is conceived as a historical force while the novel is its most fully realized form.

The chronotope of the Renaissance grotesque image is the public square, and the speaking position is that of the fool. The fool is linked to the public square because it is a form not of "being" but of radical alterity, and the public square or marketplace is the paradigmatic space of the intersection of individuals in all their various roles and types. It is the place where all languages intermingle in "concrete competition for limited supplies of authority and territory."[95] The Renaissance excavation of Titus's baths, "called *grottesca* from the Italian word *grotta*,"[96] conferred classical authority on the grotesque image and commenced its migration into official discourses. But the grotesque had all the while flourished in unofficial "folk" forms of carnival which were so strong that the medieval church was forced to recognize and incorporate them into sanctioned feast days and periods of the year. Because "carnival" is the most compelling and the most often expounded of the Bakhtinian vocabulary, I do not review it here in any detail.[97] Its relevance for present purposes is as the chronotope that brings together and revels in the possibility of viewing events from various chronotopic perspectives. This development enables the isolation and objectification of the problem of how to gain access to subjective experience. The problem of the validity of subjective experience, in turn, enables the isolation of an "objective" realm, purified of subjective desire and intention. The validity of subjective experience, the self-contradictory position of presenting a "witness to intimacy," is the defining problem of the novel. [98] While novelized discourse, or novelization, brings all languages into

play, the novel defines itself in the task of "coping" with the resultant impossibility of a universal or objective viewpoint. Subjective experience is defined precisely as inaccessible and therefore as lacking recourse to proofs and evidence that guarantee objective knowledge. The novel resolves this problem not by suppressing it but by opening up to it in the figure of the narrator whose problematic relation to the material of the story is engaged in the text and whose authority is subjected to continual testing for accuracy and validity in relation to "reality." The novel establishes "reality" through the use of a common or normative language against which all others are measured. The narrator sometimes agrees with this common language and at other times exposes its inadequacy to a situation. The grotesque method consists precisely in orchestrating languages for the purpose of measurement and evaluation.

The modern novel therefore emerges as a "system of languages" in which discourses are tested against each other for their ability to accurately reflect and manage reality.[99] "The incorporated languages and socio-ideological belief systems, while of course utilized to refract the author's intentions, are unmasked and destroyed as something false, hypocritical, greedy, limited, narrowly rationalistic, inadequate to reality."[100] Novelistic discourse mocks all "weighty seriousness" with the assumption that all languages are "maliciously inadequate to reality."[101] This explains the privileged physiognomy of the narrator as fool or as radically "other" to all languages. The narrator/fool plays with languages as masks, none of which can "claim to be an authentic, incontestable face," but whose activation and realization are the measure of "the author's freedom from a unitary and singular language."[102] On this basis, I would answer Pensky's question to Benjamin — "What sort of subject...would one have to be" in order to access the "truth" of the jumbled and discarded objects of history? — with Bakhtin's idea of the

"listening" and "orchestrating" subject of novelized discourse.

Essential to figures of the fool is "the right to be 'other' in this world, the right not to make common cause with any single one of the existing categories that life makes available; none of these categories quite suits them, they see the underside and the falseness of every situation."[103] The fool is granted "the right not to understand, the right to confuse, to tease, to hyperbolize life, the right to parody others while talking, the right not to be taken literally, not to be oneself...the right to act life as a comedy, and to treat others as actors, the right to rip off masks, the right to rage at others...and finally, the right to betray to the public a personal life, down to its most private and prurient little secrets." [104] The fool exposes the other side of "wisdom" and "truth," not simply the creaturely, transient (decaying) side but the entanglement of all truth in finite human coordinates. The narrator/fool employs novelistic double-voiced discourse which was "worked out in the minor low genres" such as itinerant stage productions, street songs, and jokes. Double-voiced discourse draws on a repertoire of devices for constructing the image of a language, for "coupling discourse with the image of a particular kind of speaker, devices for an objective exhibiting of discourse together with a specific kind of person [who is] not understood by all in the same way."[105] The "philosophy of discourse" of such jokesters could be phrased as: there are "no words belonging to no one." Such a philosophy grounds the grotesque method in a "profound distrust of human discourse as such."[106] The devices of the street-level jokester insist that who speaks, and under what conditions, determine a word's actual and effective meaning. But in their firm attachment to specific speakers, words are simultaneously distanced from the mouth "by means of a smile."[107] The word is recognized to function as a mask in novelistic discourse.

The grotesque method of embracing and emphasizing contradiction and multi-sidedness rather than synthesis and unity is inseparable from the knowing smile and from laughter. The grotesque method activates the corrective of laughter, "the corrective of [a] reality that is always richer, more fundamental and most importantly too *contradictory and heteroglot* to be fit into a high and straightforward genre."[108] As the indicator of a non-determined relation to the other (and the other's language), laughter is the opening to difference, heterogeneity, and alterity.[109] Its fully realized chronotopes are the privileged ports of entry or passage between "reality" and the languages or representations by which we know it. "In reality," says Bakhtin, "[laughter] is life itself, but shaped according to a certain pattern of play."[110] In this view, the engine of history is not the search for enlightenment or truth, or some kind of inevitable progressive movement toward it, but exactly the opposite. The struggle against time-bound, partial truths, congealed in authorities and institutions, is the reality of history, in which laughter is privileged as the creative and corrosive mechanism of form and deshaping that disrupts all narrative chronologies. In this way, Bakhtin's attention to laughter displaces literature's traditional object of study from unified canonic forms to their confrontation with the historical shaping forces they are posited against. Normalcy and canons turn out to be momentary formations that are always giving way, crumbling, and falling into ruins that are then gaily picked up and become the fragmented materials out of which new forms are made.

Many skillful writers, particularly in the field of anthropology, have raised and responded to the criticism that Bakhtin fails to consider the function of carnival in renewing monologic, authoritarian regimes by providing the social "vent" for letting off oppositional steam. I would like to anticipate a more general criticism that has a direct bearing on my project. The modern

melancholy view of history as an ongoing catastrophe from which we hope to escape intuits Bakhtin's and my emphasis on laughter as wrong, frivolous, and even disrespectful of the damage that has been done to the millions of people who serve as the fodder of history. I think that the suppression of images of death in modernity and the taking of animate matter as the object of laughter, instead of death, the true boundary condition of life, prevents the modern subject from objectifying death and thereby productively repressing it (by laughing it out of existence).

In the following chapters, I will examine aspects of how the grotesque method and the allegorical imperative combine in baroque literature to produce two entirely new and thoroughly mixed forms that are nevertheless radically distinct from each other: modern science and the modern novel. The grotesque method of novelistic discourse enables the new philosophy of the seventeenth century to locate and isolate "mute" matter in the time of the immediate present and necessitates the formulation of "the scientific method." The scientific method predicates itself on the discrediting and expulsion of its grotesque progenitor. In doing so, science shapes modernity as the historical period whose paradigmatic object of laughter is thinking matter, the very principle that animates the grotesque method. Yet, the grotesque method remains a crucial part of modern science not only as its occluded and constitutive other but also in the adoption of laughter's destructive techniques of unmasking and inversion by enlightened enquiry. These techniques are the mechanism and assurance of modern scientific "enlightenment" as that which re-enacts instead of repudiates the allegorical imperative to remain within the enchanted allegory of the Fall. Unmasking and inversion renew recognition of enlightened knowledge as partial and fallen. They fuel the drive for more knowledge as the means to redemption or progress rather than knowledge as the means to the realization of material (reality) in and for the present. Modernity harnesses

these destructive elements of laughter not to bring us down to earth but to prevent such a possibility. In modernity, laughter is the mechanism of distraction that entertains us while we are waiting, when it could be the means to disrupt the allegorical imperative in which we are dreaming. The grotesque method is constrained and unleashed in the privatized sphere of novelized literature where it subjects all genres to parodic unmasking and inversion. As the only tolerable form of animate matter, the novel preserves and sustains death as the object of laughter. In this separated sphere, the grotesque method maintains the link between laughter's negative and positive poles. Unmasking and inversion remain linked to laughter's regenerative capacities: (1) to affirm the sense of finite human boundaries; (2) to restore a fully embodied presence of mind, in other words, a heightened awareness of both biology and history in and for the present; and (3) to authorize and energize a playfulness with the boundaries of time, language, and matter. The grotesque and the scientific methods are severely limited, however, in being cut off from each other and from the rest of life. To the extent that they are entangled and unable to break out of the charmed cycle of the allegorical imperative of modern history, neither can be sustained. Instead, science and the novel are anxiously content to summon utopian aspirations whose realization must be continually deferred to some other object, some other life, some other world.

Bakhtin points to baroque writing as decisive in the formation of the novel but does not dwell on or develop his assertion of its importance except in a taxonomic sense, focusing instead on the works of Rabelais at one end of the modern literary era and those of Dostoevsky at the other end. In the English tradition, baroque literature is typified as exceptional (to coin a baroquism). The great epic of John Milton, the outlandish court comedies of the Restoration stage, and the neoclassical poetic values of John Dryden stand out against a hazy background of

writing that is, strictly speaking, neither literary nor scientific in the modern sense. It is precisely in this mixed material that I find the process of novelization taking place. Baroque novelistic discourse grapples with typically baroque problems in the most exposed and awkward way. The essential features of this material are threefold. First, baroque discourse adopts the dialogue form, in imitation of classical dialogue forms rediscovered in the sixteenth century, not the least of which are the "Hermes-Tat" or father-son dialogues of the Trismegistic texts.[111] Second, in the baroque dialogue, both the language used and the speakers are materialized, or treated in their aspect as matter, which moves baroque language into the representational practice of allegory. Third, baroque writing pays special attention to time, which is also materialized or becomes thing-like.

I begin with a now virtually unknown work by Restoration playwright and street-level jokester, Thomas D'Urfey. My reading of D'Urfey's *Essay* does three things. First, it demonstrates how I arrive at the irreducible elements of the baroque process of giving form, exemplifying and introducing the kind of sources from which they are derived. Second, it opens the question of laughter in D'Urfey's explicit thematization of the confrontation between the role assigned to it in medieval and modern formulations. Third, the *Essay* generates terms that resonate throughout the baroque materials taken up in the remainder of my discussion.

Notes to Introduction

1. Peter Berger and Stanley Pullberg draw much finer distinctions between "objectivation," "objectification," "alienation," and "reification." They consider the first two terms to be "anthropologically necessary" while the last two are not. I am concerned with processes described by the two former terms. For Berger and Pullberg, "objectivation" is the "process whereby human subjectivity embodies itself in products," and "objectification" is "the moment in objectivation in which man establishes distance from his producing and its products, such that he can take cognizance of it and make of it an object of his consciousness." See "Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness," *New Left Review* 35 (Jan./Feb. 1966): 60-61. In my use of the term "objectification," I refer to both the embodiment of human subjectivity ("objectivation") and the establishment of distance that enables cognizance of the "act" and the "thing" produced ("objectification"). That is, I treat "objectivation" and "objectification" as mutually informing aspects of a single process which is productive of effects that may contradict each other and that are not necessarily present to the "consciousness" of the individual. "Objectification is self-externalization, and ought to be, but is not always, self-realization," as Seyla Benhabib points out in her discussion of Marx's anthropological critique. Benhabib exposes Marx's investment in the "philosophy of the [Hegelian] subject" despite his attempt to repudiate idealism. I try to avoid a similar result by considering "objectivation" and "objectification" as inseparable. See *Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 55.

2. In my usage of the term "reality," I assume that although we have no direct or unmediated access to phenomena, to each other, and even to ourselves — there being no universal position from which to apprehend "reality" in its entirety — the means that we employ to gain access to it, such as language or scientific methodology, are themselves part of that reality rather than part of a separated realm of human fiction. In effect, my usage refuses an absolute distinction between the material and the ideal, or between a thing and its word. Even the use of a language that makes this distinction in the present discussion serves to relativize that language rather than claim its reference or meaning as the only one that could be true.

3. Even the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, characterizes the most recent discoveries in biological cloning technology as a "spiritual" problem. As the reporter interviewing him put it, with no little concern, "Will human clones have souls? And if not, what will be their legal status?" *Unsolved Mysteries*. Documentary. CFCF 12. August 8, 1997.

4. L. Richmond Wheeler, *Vitalism: Its History and Validity* (London: H. F. & G. Witherby, 1939). Wheeler reports that in this century C. H. Waddington suggested the way out of the mechanist-vitalist controversy is through "'the idea of organization or arrangement in a pattern'...analogous to the increased knowledge gained in physics from the study of patterns found in electron-photon combinations. 'When we have discovered what particular arrangement of the fundamental physical elements gives rise to consciousness, we shall be able to add the necessary property to our definition of the physical concept' [i.e., of "life"]" (259). Wheeler cites Waddington's article in the May, 1935 edition of *Discovery* magazine. See also J. Loeb,

Dynamics of Living Matter (London: Macmillan, 1906), 223.

5. Abiogenesis is, however, the focus of interesting recent developments in biochemistry and evolutionary biology. Specifically, Stuart Kauffman's concept of "self-organization" by complex chemical compounds reconfigures energy as "information" that enables self-replication. Kauffman defines "intelligence" as the ability of an entity to choose what it wants and needs within its environment. In this formulation, matter-energy quite literally "thinks." See *At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Self-organization and Complexity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

6. "Historicizing Patriarchy: The Emergence of Gender Difference in England, 1660-1760," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 28:3 (Spring 1995): 300. I understand that "regime" refers to implicit fundamental laws of epistemological ordering, a matter of what is given priority in the ordering system. The regime of hierarchy emphasizes "status" as defining the boundary between levels of the social order. The regime of difference priorizes a center-margin axis, with "difference" defining the boundary between center and margin. The premodern ordering hierarchizes time and space so that each kind of space is associated with a corresponding coordinate of time. Heaven is the spatialization of the highest value and correlates with eternity. Earth spatializes the lowest position in the ephemeral present. The modern ordering associates human thought with the supreme value of the eternal. From this "fixed" position, science locates the present in objectified matter. Modernity emphasizes and privileges the time that is "closest" to the present, yet simultaneously defers and seeks substitutes for realization of the present, as we will see.

7. "The Modernity of Science," *New German Critique* 61 (Winter 1994): 9.

8. Margaret Anne Doody, *The True Story of the Novel* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1996). Michael McKeon, *The Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).

9. *The Origins of the English Novel*, 19.

10. *The Origins of the English Novel*, 20.

11. *The Origins of the English Novel*, 20.

12. John W. Yolton, *Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), xi. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. and "Introduction," by John W. Yolton, 2 vols. (London: J. M. Dent, 1961. Revised printing, 1965.) References to Locke's *Essay* are given in the text.

13. Yolton, *Thinking Matter*, 17.

14. Yolton, *Thinking Matter*, 17.

15. Yolton, *Thinking Matter*, 39.

16. Yolton, *Thinking Matter*, 23. Broughton, *Psychologia: Or, An Account of the Nature of the Rational Soul* (London: Printed for W. B. Bennet, 1703), 26-27.

17. Yolton, *Thinking Matter*, 24. Benjamin Hampton, *The Existence of the Human Soul after Death Proved from Scripture, Reason, and Philosophy* (London: Printed for S. Popping, 1711), 27-28.

18. Yolton, *Thinking Matter*, 41.

19. Brian Easlea, *Witch Hunting, Magic and the New Philosophy: An Introduction to Debates of the Scientific Revolution 1450-1750* (Sussex, UK: Harvester, 1980), 123.

20. *John Norris: Cursory Reflections Upon a Book Call'd, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), ed. and "Introduction" Gilbert D. McEwen (The Augustan Reprint Society, Publication Number 93, Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, University of California, 1961.

21. McEwen, "Introduction," *John Norris: Cursory Reflections...*, 4. Two posthumously published works indicate that Locke seriously considered Norris's objection. McEwen says Locke did not publish them out of sensitivity to the fact that his patroness, Lady Masham of Oates, was Ralph Cudworth's daughter (3).

22. *The True Intellectual System of the Universe: The First Part; Wherein, All the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism Is Confuted; and Its Impossibility Demonstrated...*, (London, Printed for R. Royston, 1678), 761. See Yolton, *Thinking Matter*, 6.

23. Thomas Harmon Jobe, "The Devil in Restoration Science: The Glanvill-Webster Witchcraft Debate," *ISIS* 76:263 (1981): 356.

24. Philip C. Almond, "The Journey of the Soul in Seventeenth-Century English Platonism," *History of European Ideas* 13:6 (1991): 775-791.

25. Frances A. Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 424.

26. Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition*, 423-424; Almond, "Journey," 776.

27. *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, 326-327.

28. *The Immortality of the Soul*, in *A Collection of Several Philosophical Writings of Henry More*, Second Edition (London, 1662), 113. See also E. A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physics* (London, 1932), 127-136.

29. *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition*, 422.

30. *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition*, 422.

31. In the Egyptian cosmology, Jupiter is the "Ruler of Heaven." Second to Jupiter is the sun, then the thirty six "horoscopes," "decans," or "gods of time," each correlating with ten degrees of the zodiac. Each moment of the day has its god. The children of the "decans" are demons. Below the "decans" are the planets (Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition*, 46). The association of time, the decans, and the planet Saturn was isolated for ridicule by Augustine. He was especially incredulous at the idea of temporal gods or even the association of the godly and the temporal: "Does not his [i.e. Saturn's] own portrait distinguish him, which shows him with covered head like one that hides himself? Was it not he who showed the Italians agriculture, as is shown by his sickle? No, say they... For we interpret Saturn as the 'fullness of time,' which his Greek name suggests: for he is called Kronos, which, when aspirated, is also the name of Time. For this reason he is also called Saturnus in Latin, as it were, full of years ["quasi saturetur annis"]. I really do not know what to do with people who, in attempting to interpret the names and portraits of their gods in a better sense, admit that their greatest god, the father of all others, is Time. For what else do they betray but that all their gods are temporal, since they make time itself the father of them?" Quoted in Raymond Klibansky, Erwin Panofsky, and Fritz Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art* (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1964), 162.

32. The relation between Hermetic god-making and the modern commodity is outside my scope here, as is the related interest of both Kircher and More in the Cabalist theory of language. I can only flag both as warranting further research. Kircher clearly disapproves of Hermetic god-making, which he calls "diabolic magic." At the same time, he is "very interested in Egyptian mechanical expertise for giving statues an animated appearance, by means of pulleys and other devices, suggesting a strong and admiring interest in Egyptian priestcraft" (Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition*, 421). Kircher is also associated with the seventeenth-century "magic lantern," by which shadow images were projected onto a flat, vertical surface.

33. *Thinking Matter*, 17.

34. Yolton, *Thinking Matter*, 19.

35. Henry More disparages the "slippery business" of substituting "Natures Active and Passive, instead of Immaterial and Material." See "An Answer to a Letter of a Learned Psychopyrist Concerning the True Notion of a Spirit, Exhibited in the foregoing Discourse; Wherein Both their Notions are compared, and the Notion in the said Discourse defended, and many things discussed and cleared for more full satisfaction touching the Nature of a Spirit," in Joseph Glanvill, *Saducismus Triumphatus, or Full and Plain Evidence Concerning Witches and Apparitions* (1689), A Facsimile Reproduction with Introduction by Coleman O. Parsons (Gainesville, FL: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1966), 200.

36. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996, 226.

37. *The Matter of Revolution*, 225.

38. *Thinking Matter*, 194-195.

39. Joseph Priestly, *Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit; To which is added, The History of the Philosophical Doctrine concerning the Origin of the Soul, and the Nature of Matter; with its Influence on Christianity, especially with Respect to the Doctrine of the Preexistence of Christ* (London: Printed for J. Johnson, 1777).

40. Yolton, *Thinking Matter*, 16.

41. Yolton, *Thinking Matter*, 4.

42. Quoted in Susan Buck-Morss, *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project* (1989) (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), 175.

43. Irving Wohlfarth, "Smashing the Kaleidoscope: Walter Benjamin's Critique of Cultural History." *Walter Benjamin and the Demands of History*. Ed. Michael P. Steinberg. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996, 202.

44. "Theses on the Philosophy of History." *Illuminations: Walter Benjamin, Essays and Reflection*, ed. and "Introduction" Hannah Arendt, tr. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1968), 256.

45. "Theses on the Philosophy of History," 256.

46. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, tr. John Osborn (London: NLB, 1977), 54.

47. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 157.

48. Richard Wolin, *Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of Redemption* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 33.

49. Quoted in Wolin, *Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of Redemption*, 36-37.

50. See, for example, Michael P. Steinberg's "Introduction: Benjamin and the Critique of Allegorical Reason," in *Walter Benjamin and the Demands of History*, ed. Michael P. Steinberg (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 1-23.

51. Françoise Meltzer, "Acedia and Melancholia," *Walter Benjamin and the Demands of History*, ed. Michael P. Steinberg (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 141-163. Meltzer gathers together the commentary on Benjamin, remarkable for its simultaneous praise and blame, beginning with Theodor W. Adorno and Hannah Arendt, two of the most important mediators between Benjamin and present readers, especially those encountering his writing in English translation. Arendt emphasizes Benjamin's status as a foreigner to "normal German intellectual life," one who does not "apply the work ethic to his intellectual projects; that he is literary (i.e.,

French) rather than philosophical or political (i.e., German)" (143-144). Adorno emphasizes the sadness and alienation of Benjamin's life and work, subtly (Meltzer says, "unconsciously") underscoring the "nonutilitarian" nature of Benjamin's project even while recording his own affection for the man and his fascination for the work (146). Both Arendt and Adorno, in championing Benjamin's work, regretfully acknowledge that Benjamin was not *really* a poet, nor was he thorough or well-read enough to be a true philosopher, political scientist, or historian.

52. Wolin, 29.

53. Wolin translates Habermas: "Benjamin does not see his task in an attack on art, which is already understood as being in a stage of decomposition. His criticism of art relates to its objects conservatively, whether it is a question of baroque *Trauerspiel*, Goethe's *Elective Affinities*, Baudelaire's *Fleurs du mal*, or Soviet film of the early twenties. It aims, to be sure, at the 'mortification of works'; however, criticism effects a mortification of the work of art only in order to transpose it from the medium of beauty to the medium of truth — and thereby to *redeem* it" (29). The Habermas article quoted is also published as "Consciousness-Raising or Redemptive Criticism: The Contemporaneity of Walter Benjamin," tr. Phillip Brewster and Carl H. Buchner, *New German Critique* 17 (Spring 1979): 30-59. The "mortification of works" is from Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 182.

54. "These on the Philosophy of History," 261.

55. "Theses on the Philosophy of History," 255.

56. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 49.

57. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 220. See also Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy*, 159. Benjamin had access to Panofsky and Saxl's monograph on Albrecht Dürer's "Melencholia I," which was republished as part of *Saturn and Melancholy*, only after finishing his study of the baroque mourning play. See Max Pensky, *Melancholy Dialectics: Walter Benjamin and the Play of Mourning* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993), 263-264.

58. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 226.

59. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 227.

60. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 224-225.

61. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 233.

62. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 157.

63. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 139.

64. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 153 n.

65. I think addiction and obsession are pathologized forms of alternative relations between individuals and the object-world. The nonexceptional nature and prevalence of these conditions indicates the enormous constriction of human capabilities required to enforce and maintain the single way of relating to the object-world that is authorized and rewarded in modernity. The U.S. poet Carolyn Forché, whose most recent book of poetry takes more than its name from Benjamin's writings on history, investigates alternative nonpathologized forms of linking subject and object. When teaching poetry writing, Forché maintains a prohibition on the word "about." Students are asked to write poems *through*, or *under*, or *against* things rather than remain at the exact distance required to write "about" them. Forché made these suggestive comments during a reading of her poetry on December 28 at the 1996 MLA convention in Washington, D.C. And see her book, *The Angel of History* (New York: Harper Collins, 1994).

66. Quoted in Max Pensky, "Tactics of Remembrance: Proust, Surrealism, and the Origin of the *Passagenwerk*," in *Walter Benjamin and the Demands of History*, ed. Michael P. Steinberg (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), 189.

67. "Tactics of Remembrance," 164-189.

68. An excerpt of the project, "Paris: Capital of the Nineteenth Century," was published by Benjamin in *Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism*, tr. Harry Zohn (London: NLB, 1973). In *The Dialectics of Seeing*, Susan Buck-Morss reimagines and "completes" the "Passagenwerk" from notes Benjamin left in the care of Georges Bataille and the Bibliotèque Nationale in Paris in 1940. Buck-Morss emphasizes the strange experience of writing a book about another book that never was written, and in doing so, she is careful to avoid the claim that she realizes Benjamin's intentions. She describes her work as "proceeding mimetically, extrapolating from it (i.e., Benjamin's "work") in order to illuminate the world that Benjamin experienced and described" (ix). While *The Dialectics of Seeing* is a richly creative work in its own right, and indispensable for the English reader of Benjamin, it retains the standard reading of Benjamin as *advocating* a metaphysics of redemption.

69. "Tactics of Remembrance," 166, 164.

70. "Tactics of Remembrance," 167.

71. "Tactics of Remembrance," 167-168.

72. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 233. Benjamin sees the "triumph of subjectivity and the onset of an arbitrary rule over things" as "the origin of all allegorical contemplation." "In the allegorical image of the world, therefore, the subjective perspective is entirely absorbed in the economy of the whole" (233-34).

73. This obsession has only increased in the years since Benjamin's death. We could say that if the modern subject was not dead when it was "found" by poststructuralism, it has surely been

done to death by now. In announcing the "death" of the episteme of representation, Michel Foucault stresses that the realist correlation of words and things — the notion of language as a transparent medium — is a historical fiction that is exhausted. The corollary of the death of representational language is the death of the subject or author who encounters the world as speaking to him directly and without mediation. Poststructuralism emphasizes that the idea of the world "speaking" to us in an unmediated way is what has died. Rather, what speaks is language. This is the point of contact between my reading of Benjamin and poststructuralism. My point of departure, however, is in trying to work out the next step which is to fully objectify the human. Foucault's work culminated in the elaboration of an ethic of "care of the self," which may amount to a remythologization of the subject. See *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*, (New York: Random House, 1970) and *The Care of the Self: The History of Sexuality* Volume 3, tr. Robert Hurley (New York: Random House, 1986.) And while psychoanalysis achieved the decentering of the self in the "discovery" of the unconscious, it casts that development as a *fall* into language. The critique of the subject, then, remains "subject" to the allegorical imperative and seems to be the wrong way to proceed in order to intervene historically.

I think that Tony Kushner's Pullitzer-prize winning play, *Angels in America: A Gay Fantasia on National Themes, Part One: Millenium Approaches* (dir. Gordon McCall, Centaur Theatre, Montréal, May 25, 1997) explores the Benjaminian critique of subjectivity. In my reading, if homosexuality is to be a source of power and identity it has to remain forbidden. "Gay Pride" derives from transgressing the law (civil or moral) and flaunting it, but this means that homosexuals are invested in maintaining their own oppression. A similar logic works for feminism. For females to derive social and political power as women or feminists, they have to uphold the absolute distinction between male and female that is the basis of their exclusion. Everything is at stake in finding a way to refuse and rewrite the allegorical imperative of modern history.

74. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 174-175.

75. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 184.

76. Buck-Morss quotes Benjamin describing his work as a "Copernican revolution" in the practice of history writing. She goes on to say that "[h]is aim was to destroy the mythic immediacy of the present, not by inserting it into a cultural continuum that affirms the present as its culmination, but by discovering that constellation of historical origins which has the power to explode history's *continuum*" (x). Because Buck-Morss does not cite the source of the quotation, I am unable to assess her interpretation of the particular passage. If the opposing term to her "mythic immediacy of the present" is a "materialized immediacy of the present," then I agree with her account. If she means that the present generally has a mythical status, then on the basis of my other reading in Benjamin, as will become clear, I read the temporal implications differently. The inaccessibility of the present is perhaps the most counter-intuitive effect of the modern formulation of knowledge as redemptive and not realizable. My understanding is that the enormously productive achievement of the Copernican revolution was to locate the "object" of study in the materialized present, but the revolution is incomplete in failing to recognize and in fact preventing the subject's similar, fully objectifable status as material that operates in and for

the present. Instead, the modern subject of knowledge is expected (or condemned) to seek ultimate meaning in a redemptive realm, the access to which is eternally deferred. The subject and object of modernity exist in distinct and incommensurate time/spaces, a condition that I think is unsustainable in any long-term sense for the biological organism. Benjamin tries to "complete" the Copernican revolution in finding a standpoint from which to fully objectify the human, just as Copernicus found the standpoint from which to see the earth as a planet among others in a heliocentric universe nearly one hundred years before Galileo found the mathematical and empirical means to "prove" it. This positions Benjamin's project squarely within modernity, rather than in a postmodernity. Perhaps it lays out the task of what would be truly *post*modern.

77. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 227.

78. I think "realization" is (or describes) the very methodology that opened the baroque allegorical fragment for Benjamin and enabled him to know or to "realize" the secrets of the allegories of history.

79. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 227.

80. "Theses on the Philosophy of History," 262-263.

81. Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Enlightenment*, tr. Fritz C.A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951), 32. Benjamin defines the "monad" in a terse statement in *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*: "The idea is a monad — that means briefly: every idea contains the image of the world" (48).

82. Tr. Hélène Iswolsky. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984, 28.

83. *Rabelais and His World*, 24.

84. *Rabelais and His World*, 25.

85. *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M. M. Bakhtin*, ed. Michael Holquist, tr. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981).

86. V. N. Vološinov/M. M. Bakhtin, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, (1929) tr. Ladislav Matejka and I.R. Titunik (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 72. Bakhtin's authorship of this text is disputed, and it continues to be reprinted in Vološinov's name. Vološinov was a member of the "Bakhtin Circle" in St. Petersburg when it was written. All scholars do agree, at the very least, that Bakhtin had great influence on the work of both Vološinov and that of P. N. Medvedev. The ideas and formulations I draw from the disputed texts are in every case consonant with those in works of Bakhtin's undisputed authorship.

87. *Dialogic Imagination*, 272.

88. *Dialogic Imagination*, 270.

89. *Dialogic Imagination*, 262-263.

90. "Art and Answerability," a fragment, is published in *Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays by M. M. Bakhtin*, ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov, tr. and notes Vadim Liapunov, supplement tr. Kenneth Bostrom (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 2.

91. *Dialogic Imagination*, 415.

92. In addition to *Rabelais and His World*, see *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, ed. and tr. Caryl Emerson, "Introduction," Wayne C. Booth, Theory and History of Literature, Volume 8 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), and *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays*, tr. Vern W. McGee, ed. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986).

93. Bakhtin borrows the term from Einstein's theory of relativity. See *Dialogic Imagination*, 84. Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist point out the decisive relation of the "chronotope" to the "philosophical biology" of I. I. Kanaev and the vitalism of Henri Bergson and Hans Driesch. See *Mikhail Bakhtin*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984), Chapter 7.

94. *Dialogic Imagination*, 84.

95. *Dialogic Imagination*, 431.

96. *Rabelais and His World*, 31-32. Benjamin adds that the Italian word *grotta* is derived from the word for "burial," in the sense of concealment. He emphasizes the underground, grave-like source of these images as the feature that made them intensely compelling: "The enigmatically mysterious character of the effect of the grotesque [is] associated with its subterraneanly mysterious origin in buried ruins and catacombs...." See *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 171.

97. The most notable and enduringly authoritative accounts include Michael D. Bristol, *Carnival and Theater: Plebian Culture and the Structure of Authority in Renaissance England* (1985) (New York: Routledge, 1989); Terry Castle, *Masquerade and Civilization: The Carnivalesque in Eighteenth-Century English Culture and Fiction* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986); and Peter Stallybrass and Allon White, *The Politics and Poetics of Transgression* (London: Methuen, 1986).

98. Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, *Mikhail Bakhtin: Creation of a Prosaics* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 401.

99. *Dialogic Imagination*, 412.

100. *Dialogic Imagination*, 311-312.

101. *Dialogic Imagination*, 309.

102. *Dialogic Imagination*, 272, 314.

103. *Dialogic Imagination*, 159.

104. *Dialogic Imagination*, 163.

105. *Dialogic Imagination*, 400-401.

106. *Dialogic Imagination*, 401.

107. *Dialogic Imagination*, 402.

108. *Dialogic Imagination*, 55.

109. See David Carroll, "The Alterity of Discourse: Form, History, and the Question of the Political in M. M. Bakhtin." *Diacritics* 13:2 (Summer 1983): 83.

110. *Rabelais and His World*, 7.

111. Marvin K. Singleton, "Trismegistic Tenor and Vehicle in Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*," *Papers on Language and Literature* 4:2 (1968): 167. See also Brian P. Copenhaver, *Hermetica: The Greek 'Corpus Hermeticum' and the Latin 'Asclepius' in a new English translation, with Notes and Introduction* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

Chapter One

The Nose of Death:
An Essay Toward the Theory of the Intelligible World

> "Tis certain there is [Magick] still extant in the Natural World....not to mention the Enchanted Labyrinth we travers'd in our way thither."
>
> — Gabriel John, also known as Thomas D'Urfey, *An Essay Towards the Theory of the Intelligible World. Intuitively Considered. Designed for 49 Parts. Part III. Consisting of a Preface, a Postscript, and a little Something Between. Enriched with a Faithful Account of His Ideal Voyage, and Illustrated with Poems by Several Hands, as Likewise with other strange Things Not Insufferably Clever, nor Furiously to the Purpose*. The Archetypally Second Edition. (1701?)[1]

Above the sink in the janitor's closet of St. James' Church, Piccadilly, there hangs a memorial plaque to Thomas D'Urfey (1653-1723).[2] He is the thinly disguised and little-known laughing philosopher whose discovery, at the turn of the eighteenth century, of the "Hiatus" or "passage" between the "Sensible" and the "Intelligible" worlds might be lost even now amid the mops, rags, and pails were it not for the present dispensation of laughter in the study of English baroque literature. Yet, my preoccupation with laughter in relation to D'Urfey's *Essay* is concerned with more than increasing the likelihood of recognition on peering into faraway broom closets. The notoriously problematic relation between "sensation" and "reflection," in its Neoplatonist, pre-enlightenment form, that is D'Urfey's topic, arises again in the twentieth-century discrediting of enlightenment objectives and procedures. Disillusionment with enlightenment has unleashed energetic explorations of alternative proposals and methodologies to

account for and incorporate extrarational motivations and effects into a viable reordering of things.

The problem is that disillusionment plays into the hands of enlightenment, which aspires to disillusion in the positive sense. The exercise of reason proceeds through the relentless demystification and explanation of illusions. To be free of illusion is to be fully enlightened. A cycle of enchantment and disillusion therefore reproduces or reinscribes enlightenment, apparently precluding the possibility for critique of its model of knowledge and its positioning of the subjects of enlightened knowledge. "Reason," in its enlightenment formulation, was precisely posited and "achieved" as a solution to the problem of mediation between sensibility and intellect, experience and thought. Reason was rearticulated as a function rather than as a body of preexistent knowledge, principles, and truth. Its function was to unify the two realms of sensation and reflection; reason casts them not in opposition to each other but in a new relation of interdependence and reciprocal reliance. The viability and success of this unification, as measured by its productivity of certain forms and differentials of value, authorized the further correlation of nature and some embodiments of human nature. With Isaac Newton's discovery and mathematical elaboration of the laws of gravity, both nature and human nature are acknowledged as elemental and as fundamentally connected to one another by "reason."

Ernst Cassirer, from whose *The Philosophy of Enlightenment* this summary is derived, usefully places enlightenment reason in a relation of comparison to its medieval form.[3] In the middle ages, the realms of nature and sense were also equated but subordinated to the realm of grace. Grace was achievable only through revelation, and reason was the servant of revelation. "Knowledge" pertained only to the finite objects of sense. The extent of "natural knowledge" was

determined not by an object but by its origin in sensuous experience. Knowledge, by definition, is lived knowledge, while reason and truth are that to which one can only aspire. The medieval view recognizes and institutionalizes a split between sensation and reflection in its fundamental division between sacred and profane spheres. I would like to emphasize that the correlative of this spatial division is the absolute demarcation of time between the eternal and the transitory. By contrast, we can see that enlightenment's equally absolutist but opposite unification brings together the coordinates of the immediate present of the senses and eternity in conceiving of sensation and reflection both as informing of knowledge that is the means to absolute truth. Knowledge is thereby conceived as readily, or "presently," accessible.

The confrontation between the medieval opposition and the enlightenment unification of experience and knowledge is where D'Urfey's "Hiatus" opens with a loud guffaw. On the one hand, his "Intuitively Considered" theory partakes of the medieval view by inverting its hierarchy of sacred reflection over profane sensation, and restores the primacy of material, sensible existence through provocations to bodily laughter. While poking fun at the aspirations and pretensions of intellectual speculation and reason, D'Urfey's "Hiatus" insists upon a distance that necessitates communication between the sacred and profane realms, and erects a bridge between them in the form of corrective laughter. The object of laughter, in this formulation, is death, in that the laughter operates to return human knowledge to a recognition of finite human boundaries. The human tendency (capacity) to stray outside time is checked by the spatial, material register of laughter, a function of the body. This is the "Hiatus" as "passage." On the other hand, D'Urfey's *Essay* revels and labors in the profound formal confusions that arise from the suspended conflation (to coin another baroquism) of the sensible and intelligible realms. When the space

between them itself goes missing, we are dealing with another kind of "Hiatus," a temporal rather than a spatial coordinate. The "Hiatus" as a temporal gap, or the "constant pause," is the "form" of a suspenseful hesitation over the "Chasm" or abyss of the unknowable infinite.[4] The new, idealized placement of the coordinate of eternity in human thought and the correlative location of the ephemeral present in rude matter render death unavailable to laughter as object. With death no longer available as the external object of reflective knowledge, laughter loses its function of remembrance of the finite human state. The new functioning of reason therefore precludes the former functioning of laughter. D'Urfey thematizes this new configuration when the outburst of restorative laughter that dispels the illusion of attaining direct access to the "Intelligible World" is relegated to the slim, four-page section that makes up his negligible "main text," the "Little Something Between" the engulfing "Preface" and the spewingly regurgitative "Postscript."

D'Urfey begins with an elaborate, twelve-page "Table of Contents" listing fifty-one chapters with paragraph-length titles that refer largely to ideal rather than real material that appears nowhere in the text. The form of the *Essay* itself is primarily that of a hyperbolic "Preface" that takes up one hundred and ninety-three of the text's total 227 pages and consists almost entirely of outlines and lists of material collected on his voyage to the "Intelligible World." The presentation of all the "things" that can now be known in their true essence as a result of the voyage can only be deferred to future volumes because of their great magnitude, the insufficient, "real" space available for them due to the length of the Preface, and the author's lack of present time in the face of the task of advertising an imminent and more urgent, immediate, future truth. The true essence of things is displaced in the delivery of all that which advertises its coming. The tenth volume in the projected series, for example, "shall be imbellished with an account of these

Essences, among others, viz. the Essence of a Chaffing-Dish, of a Bell-sounder, of a Clock-maker, of Stewed-Prunes, of the Number 16, of Pain, of Mustard,...of 7,258,918 different Ideas of Wisdom, 12,345,678,987,654,321 of Unity, &c" (153).

The real, as opposed to the ideal, content of D'Urfey's *Essay*, besides such advertisements of the booty of wisdom collected on the voyage, is his account of the voyage, dispersed in fragments that appear in the midst of frequent verbose disquisitions on various possible organizations and conceptions of time and numerous defensive justifications of the length of the "Preface." The voyage itself takes place in a dream, outside of time, just as it is fragmented and therefore discontinuous in the space of the "Preface." The account of the voyage and the preoccupation with time and the space of the preface are further interlarded with apparently digressive musings, for example, on fragments from the "Cabala," thirteen stanzas of "Pope Joan's Kissing Dance," quotations from Dryden's translation of Virgil, a "Fragment of the Sun's Speech on Cows," various epitaphs (notably to an anonymous "Maiden-head"), and recipes for literary production and wit as well as for philosophy and food, such as "A Section Containing, Two Receits out of Echard's Translation of Duns Scotus, viz. How to broil Hazle-Nuts with pickled Ivory-Sauce and Ablative Cases: and the Best Way of Stewing Curds in a Vision" (88). Section or chapter headings only sometimes bear a relation to the contents of the text they ostensibly refer to, and neither title nor subject matter correspond to what is advertised in the "Table of Contents." Only Sections I through IV appear in numerical sequence. Section IV is followed by an unnumbered chapter titled, "A Section," which is followed by Section XXI, and then by Sections XXIII, XXIV, XXVIII, XXX, VIII, and so on.

D'Urfey's *Essay* presents a particular view and practice of the baroque process of giving

form. The baroque is marked by a historically new and self-conscious relation to "matter." The form-giving process is characterized by three features that I isolate on the authority of my own wide reading in the varied, non-canonical, and somewhat idiosyncratic materials collected in Series I and II of McGill University's Redpath Tracts. In their non-exceptional status, such materials offer what is most characteristic of the baroque.[5] I do not wish to reduce D'Urfey's *Essay* to the status of an incomplete or fragmented part or "example" of a larger meaning that can only be understood and located in the *redeeming* whole of the baroque period. Instead, I enter it as a monad, as a particular view of the acute antinomies of the baroque. I provisionally designate the "baroque" as a way of viewing the world that specifically engages its materiality in relation to language and time, predominant in but not limited to the late sixteenth to mid-eighteenth centuries in English politics, theology, economics, science, historiography, and literature. I differentiate the baroque from the classical values that dominate in the "Renaissance," "enlightenment," or "modern" periods, which render baroque writing "incoherent." I assume the mask of works such as D'Urfey's *Essay,* which entails "giving in" to the signifying power of matter, the *matter* of D'Urfey's *Essay*, in order to see what it sees and how it makes sense. This is to say, I try to discover the way it intervenes in time. The three features of the baroque process of giving form are: 1) the staging of dialogues; 2) the treatment of all aspects of those dialogues, the languages as well as the speakers, as matter, or in their material aspect; and 3) a special concern for time, which also is presented as thing-like or as person-like. Languages, speakers, and time are objectified and investigated as "material" whose primary characteristic is its immediate and ephemeral presence.

The pretext of D'Urfey's "discovery" of the "Hiatus" is the publication of an essay by the

now only slightly less obscure John Norris (1657-1711), considered the last of the Cambridge Platonists and, according to a certain Grub Street publisher, the first to make metaphysics pay.[6] Norris titled his best-seller *An Essay Towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World. Design'd for Two Parts. The First Considering It Absolutely in It Self, and the Second in Relation to Human Understanding* (1701-1704).[7] Norris's *Essay* was a major intervention in the reception, shaping, and tempering of Locke's notion of the understanding as active. With reference to the "occasionalism" of Nicholas Malebranche, Norris directly addresses the implication that the human is "thinking matter" by pointedly trying to prevent its full realization. Whereas matter and God were previously of two distinct but integrally linked spheres, the new centrality and scrutability of matter, under the rubric of "nature," produced a problem regarding the status of the corresponding entity that could "know" it. The mutability and transience of nature locates it *as* the present and *in* the present. But to the extent that matter or nature appears in and as the very form of present time, matter insists on having an eternal antecedent.[8] Death exists; the present incarnates subjection to death. As Norris puts it in the "Ideal Hypothesis," though God made the world without preexistent matter, he "could not be conceived to do it without Prae-existent Form or Idea...[and] so neither could he think of it without having something to terminate that thought, which must be the Nature or Essence of the thing" (27). In other words, for God to be able to say "let there be light" with effect, "there had to be an idea of light" (32). If there was no idea of light, the thing that issues forth at God's word would not be able to "terminate" in the form of light. This realm of eternal, preexistent "Form or Idea" is the "Ideal World," to which "Man" has access through "Ideas" present in his thoughts, and which constitutes the basis of his capacity to know nature. The problem of deviations from ideal forms

is where Norris has recourse to Malebranche, whom he calls "the Galileo of the Intellectual World" (4). Malebranche's "double principle" is that an absolute God acts in nature but not through the manipulation of "particular Wills." Instead, he intervenes by establishing the general laws of motion. His removed, policy-setting managerial style, combined with the "fewness and simplicity" of his fundamental laws, sometimes gives rise to what may be considered not mistakes but the aberrant "Limitation of forms," otherwise known as "Monsters" (41-42). The "Ideal Hypothesis" thus binds the highly mutable phenomena of nature to human thought in a relation that replaces and correlates with the old categories of body and soul. The new distinction between matter and thought, or the real and the ideal, is the basis of a proliferation of further differences of kind that appear counterintuitive to D'Urfey but that function to continually test and affirm the original demarcation. Norris effectively splits matter into two kinds and calls one kind "thought," which is transcendental. The small problem of the sensible human body, which encases the instrument of thought, (the meat of) the brain, is "resolved" by enforcing "natural" distinctions between myriad particular *kinds* of human bodies, differences whose "naturalization" reinforces the originary divide. The primary separation of matter and thought is guaranteed by the special modern emphasis on the distinction between female and male. These two constitutive divisions — matter versus thought and female versus male — reciprocally justify each other and render all other distinctions systematic. That is, all others, such as the separation of "nature" and "culture," follow "naturally" from the original partition. The divisions are absolute and brook no transgression of the boundaries. Any claim to attain passage between them becomes the object of the most viciously energetic scorn and ridicule. Curiously, the age-old constitutive boundary between life and death also bifurcates and becomes somewhat ambiguous as an effect of the

separation of matter and thought. The implication is that there is an aspect of the human that cannot live in materialized space and time and that does not die, an aspect that is eternal. The new "ideal" realm, which human thought incarnates, replaces rather than removes the category of the soul and is rendered, like the soul, eternal. With the incorporation of the coordinate or principle of eternity into human thought, eternity becomes the salient feature that distinguishes the human understanding from materials and processes. Material, biological death is final, horrible, and absolutely foreign to life, while spiritual death becomes "Death," the face of "science," "knowledge," or later, "enlightenment." In this way, the unprecedented demythologizing achievement of acknowledging the material status of the human is affirmed in the objectification of the human body as matter and, at the same time, is foreclosed in the high voltage of insistence and resistance surrounding the question of matter's capacity to think. The category of the "ideal" specifically blocks recognition of the corollary that human thought is a material process. When D'Urfey's narrator dons the mask of the language of Norris's *Essay*, we can see the process by which "thinking matter" replaces death as the paradigmatic object of laughter in modernity. The essential and mutually productive by-products of the process are the scientific method and the baroque grotesque method.

D'Urfey's parody of Norris's *Essay* targets two problems that are intertwined in a contradictory tension that heightens and illustrates the way that the categories of "real" and "ideal" reinstitute body and soul as well as profane and sacred realms while also rearticulating these categories in a completely new and bizarre way. The first problem relates primarily to the medieval opposition of sensation and reflection while the second provides a dystopian vision of the productively unstable foundations of "unified" reason. First and foremost, Norris's idealism

requires the devaluing of everything relegated to the real or "Sensible" world compared to the inestimable "Essences" soon to be forthcoming from the "Intelligible." "Whoever first thought of Eating or Drinking, Living or Dying; or pretended to invent Shining, Sneering, Half-crowning; Acrosticks, Eclipses, Lord-Mayors, Bread 'n' Butter, &c.," for example, "he did no more than look into the Ideal World, and make Transcripts of what he saw there" (151). The favored synonym of the Sensible World is "Raree-Show," indicating its partial and cheapened status as peep show or street performance in relation to the fully staged panorama of the "Intelligible World." In a "Section" that elaborates this theatrical reference, the *Essay* asks, "Have you not at any time inspected the travelling Theater, or *little inanimate World* Erratick?" (132, italics mine). The real world has all the dimensions here of the "British Pastboard" that provides the backdrop for a street performance. The "Raree-Show" is reduced to the status of "an Emblem of the Ideal World" (138), just as D'Urfey's own essay presents itself as "The Archetypally Second Edition." Although it is the real author's first real edition and in that sense archetypal, like all "real" things, it has a preexistence and original form in the Ideal World. The real, sensible human, too, is an inferior being, a monster in comparison to its ideal counterpart, the infinitely more complex and knowledgeable centaur. And because the present is the time of the human senses — the time in which the world is directly available to the inadequate human — present time is denigrated by its suspension in the "constant pause" that anticipates the imminent future, the time when all will be known. The flagrantly fictional D'Urfeyan "Hiatus" makes Norris's unthinkable "Idea" thinkable: the transcendent (objective, absolute, eternal) knowledge of things-in-the-present is possible when the one who "knows" is constrained to exist "as if" in eternity. The object of study becomes newly available in the sensible present if the subject of knowledge is debarred from living in the

present. Subject and object are constituted in distinct and absolutely incommensurable realms.

The second problem with Norris's idealist revision of the world is that the new link, the suspended hesitation, between the Intelligible and Sensible worlds allows, even requires, so much "knowledge" that the apparently necessary divisions by which we could "know" it, in the sense of living it, would disappear. The absurdity of the absolute demarcation between sensation and reflection, by which the world is known-as-lived, confronts the absurdity of a world in which no distinctions exist, a situation that calls for human intervention and labor to make the divisions and possess the products of those divisions. D'Urfey calls the latter absurdity the world of "separated and quintessential Truth" because it seems to open a confusion or abyss of form-giving possibilities and puts "Man" in the preposterous position of making the divisions by which things will be known. The consequence is so much will be known that, in effect, nothing will be known, the point suggested by the plethora of material essences that will not fit into D'Urfey's "Preface," let alone into his essay. The spectacle and vertigo of the simultaneous severance of the "real" from the "ideal" and their imminent collapse into one another give D'Urfey pause over the new world "discovered" by means of the "Hiatus," a world that can and must be known in an unfathomable way, given all the "Curious and inestimable Rarities that will in time be imported from the Ideal, and become common among us" (132). "Knowledge" will necessarily be an infinite stream or collection of "things" — shadowy, imitated, fake real things (archetypal second editions) — whose "real" essence is debased by sheer volume, the effect of their status as "fallen" (through the "Hiatus"). As in D'Urfey's interminable lists that advertise the essence of the number 16 beside the essences of mustard and pain to be forthcoming in future volumes, they will have the compelling but cheapened status of curios, prototypical commodities. "Knowledge" will

be "things" that can be possessed in an astonishingly intimate and individual way but, curiously, "things" that cannot be lived.

At the beginning of his parodic presentation, D'Urfey mimicks Norris in a rapt apostrophe to a vision of the "Intelligible World":

> ...had Men but one clear and distinct View of thy rich intellectual Scene, could we but draw the Curtain of our Mortality so far, as but once to see as thou art, we should be so transported and ravish'd with thy Divine Beauty, so enamour'd of thy glorious System, all shining with the very Essence of Being, and full of Grace and Truth, that we should lose not only all Value for this Sensible World, but even Sense it self too, and pass along in the Croud and Throng of Creatures, without any Notice or Perception of them, all fix'd and intent upon thy more ingaging Views, not minding the Bodies we see, nor feeling those we touch. We should in a manner be dead to this sensible World, and alive only to thee. (6)

How to live "in a manner...dead" to the "little inanimate World" is precisely where D'Urfey's "Hiatus" opens with a grin, baring the teeth of a mocking skull. When D'Urfey's narrator puts it on, the personification or "mask" of Norris's language shows itself to be a death mask, the face of "Death" itself. The image functions to unmask Norris's language as allegorical. D'Urfey's thematization of the collision between the spatialized and the temporalized "Hiatus" requires and produces such an allegorical mode. Languages become the masks of their speakers, and in the process the two become inseparable. The effect is that all words are positioned and at the same time released or alienated from the guarantee of any particular "meaning" in relation to a pre-existent "whole." Who speaks, and under what kind of conditions, determines the actual meaning of a language or a word.[9] In D'Urfey's hands the gap or space between words and their meaning widens with a grin — in temporal terms, the "constant pause" — opening up a corresponding position, so to speak, for the particular listening narrator to whom each word is addressed and whose eavesdropping recontextualizes everything that is said. Each word loses its absolute claim

to that which is spoken about. D'Urfey's narrator is the super-addressee, the "agent" of the grotesque method, who usurps Norris's words for his own purposes. The narrator can only guarantee his own position, however, by prolonging and extending the activity of listening. He is bound to elicit and body forth the maximum number of languages, which he presumes to orchestrate and conduct, in order to maintain his position of authority. His own intentions and desires are withheld by means of the "constant pause" and only realized to the extent that they are mediated and refracted through his orchestration of the words of others. Even so, the narrator establishes a "common language" that amounts to an assessment of basic values held in common by the speakers. The common language represents "the going rate" of discursive value against which all other languages are measured. Yet, the narrator himself does not always concur with the common language. Sometimes, the activated words offer a preferred value, and sometimes the historical author overrides the values arraigned in the speakers he mobilizes. D'Urfey's parody of Norris's apostrophe to the "Ideal World" illustrates his mocking double-voicedness. It is entitled "A short Apostrophe to the Ideal World, wherein all principal Matters are explain'd by the Bye":

> Hail to the happy Mansion of separated and quintessential Truth....The only World that is eternal; that was in the Beginning, and yet never began, that was never made, and can never perish, neither subject to Time, nor Chance, nor Alteration, where are those Essences of things, that are neither generated nor corrupted, which had their orderly System when the Earth was without Form and Void, and shone forth in full Light and Lustre, when Darkness was yet over the Face of the Deep, and should still persevere what they are, tho' this sensible All were reduc'd either to Chaos or Nothing, where there is Substance without Shadow (*that is, where we are all in the Dark*), Act without Capacity (*i.e. where a Man does more than he can*) and Light without Darkness. (139-142)

In a similar manner, D'Urfey's narrator, masked as "Norris," gathers together and sets up

dialogues between theories of time embodied in their proponents, such as the Epicureans, the Futurists, and other "sects" of time. But just as Norris in his real, historical *Essay* bewails the fact that thinking about the "Intelligible World" puts the vulgar to sleep (11), D'Urfey's hapless narrator falls asleep from his "great reach of thought" about time, a development that motivates the representation of a fantastic voyage to the "Ideal World": "At length my Intellectual Part quite drooping under the Pressure, began to retire from the sensible World, and would have resign'd it self into the dark state of Incogitancy, had not Father Malebranche appear'd, in that very Instant, to divert it from that Inclination" (113-114). The peculiar suspension of time in dreams provides the position for the *Essay's* objectification of time. In sleep, the dreamer wakes up to the relative nature of time, enabling the *Essay* to emphasize the inseparable connection between specific configurations of time and embodied perspectives. The *Essay* draws special attention to this essential embodiment or masked nature of perspectives with a characteristic interruption at this exact point. Beside the introduction of the dream state and the appearance of Malebranche, an inserted marginal note reads: "If we had not an Innate Idea of a Circle, &c. saith Mr. Norris, we could never acquire an Idea of a Circle by seeing material Circles."[10] The "common language" measure of the *Essay* is established and interrogated through such marginal notes. The text continues: "I had never seen him [Malebranche] before, but found an Innate Idea to know him by, without which I could never have known him by any Description, or even Sight of his Person."

The French philosopher flatters "Norris" for his "extraordinary Merits," by which means D'Urfey slyly disparages Norris's efforts to proceed towards a "theory." "Malebranche" then offers to remove the grounds of "Norris's" discontent over the question of time — the fact that it puts him to sleep — by escorting him to a "better World" where everything will be resolved into

beautiful sense. In response to this generous offer, "Norris" dons the mask of "Icarus." On hearing "Malebranche's" enticing description of paradise, he concludes that "this Blessed World could be no other but That call'd the Ideal, and therefore growing impatient to be upon my Voyage, began to look about for my Wings. They were a very strong and new Pair; and such I had Reason to provide myself with, having long owed, and design'd, a Visit to an old Acquaintance, who has been settled some Years at Copernicus in the Moon, a very rich and delightful country as any in those Parts, but a great way from my Lodgings in Barbican" (114-115). But when "Icarus" reaches for his wings, "Malebranche" assures him they will not be necessary. The evaluation of "D'Urfey" can be heard in the narration of "Norris": "[T]he Father order'd me to leave my Wings behind, for they would be a mighty Hindrance to me in Flying, and he would undertake for my safe and easy Conveyance without them; only I must needs *give my self up entirely* to his Guidance, and also submit to be hoodwink'd...." (115, italics mine). The short-lived "Icarus" is abandoned for the normative "Norris," who readily sees that he has no need of his own body, let alone wings:

> [I]f my Desire was to become a true Philosopher, by seeing the Ideal World to the best Advantage, there was nothing so proper or expedient as to put out my Eyes.... For this he [Malebranche] alledged Examples...assuring me, the only Reason of imposing this Condition, was the great Inconvenience that arises from the Use of our Senses; for, 'tis Sense, continued he, that is the great Impediment to Knowledge and Enemy to Philosophy; for Alas — we should find our eyes infinitely sharper, if it were not for Light; nay we should see even Ideas themselves, did not this Outward Light stand in the way. I greatly fear it must remain a Doubt in History, whether I was more surprised by the Novelty of this Philosophy, or satisfied by the Clearness of it; 'tis certain that I was struck with great Admiration, and likewise receiv'd entire Satisfaction; as every thing that comes from Father Malebranche is new, and admirable, and clear, and satisfactory. (115-116)

Putting all "faith" in Malebranche, "Norris" covers his eyes, and they pursue their destination "very Lovingly together." Along the way they pass through a labyrinth with singular certainty.

Only later research gives "Norris" an appreciation of the danger they so easily by-passed, for it was "a Labyrinth (as I have since learnt) that has a single Path leading to Truth, but ten Thousand that draw you away from it.... Each of them spreads into infinite Subdivisions, which running out every way at random, do often interfere and twine among themselves....Hereby they have distracted Mankind into a Confusion of Sects, Philosophical and Religious; setting opposite Parties to demonstrate Contradictions, and reproach each other with equal Justice, as well as Ignorance and Obstinacy. These drill'd on Democritus into an Abyss of Atoms, and have carried the Platonists from an Ideal Republick to a Universe of the same No-nature. In my sixteenth or seventeenth Volume you will find a most accurate Map of this famous Labyrinth..." (118-121). "Norris" then haplessly undermines his own progress "towards" a theory by revealing its groundlessness:

> The Path that leads to Truth, is said to be the only one, in this Intellectual Labyrinth, that gives a Man any solid Ground to proceed on, or support himself steadily. This, had I known it in time, would have damped all the fond Thoughts that I was possessed with of my Ideal Voyage; for the way I was conducted there was seldom any Footing at all to be felt under me. I often thought my self treading the Air, sometimes by way of ordinary Steps, but more frequently by skipping by uncertain Intervals, and springing forward I knew not how. (122-123)

In the evaluation that "Norris" is on the shakiest of grounds according to all common measurements of value, "D'Urfey" prepares the reader for the sensation and form of the voyage as a fall. I reproduce the lengthy but enlightening title as well as an extended excerpt of the opening passage of this chapter both for its representation of the fall and to give an indicative sample of D'Urfey's multi-voiced language:

> [Section or chapter title:] Of the Cartesian World and its Vortices. The Perfection of a Vortex. An extraordinary Way of Travelling. What happen'd to me in my Voyage, and to

> my Head. Of Gravitation. Our Arrival at the Ideal World. Our Reception there. Several Symptoms and Properties of Ideality. My Guides Complaisance. The calefying Quality, and remarkable Nature of a good Fire.
>
> The Vortex of the Intelligible World, like every thing else that appertains to it, is infinitely more perfect than any Vortex, Whirl-pool, or Whirl-gig that our sensible World can boast of; now this Perfection consists in such a Rapidity *cui nihil deest ad constituendum suum Esse.* As soon as we came within the Sphere of its Activity, you may imagine it was some Surprize to find my self very Gravely turning round upon my own Axis; which to me was a strange way of proceeding, and very much against my Inclination, having never travell'd in that manner before. And this probably might be the Reason that my Brain was seiz'd with a most violent Sickness; as if a great Number of Windmills had been very diligently at work within it; and I verily perswade my self, that there is no going over to the Ideal World without being so affected. We were easily suckt down by the Vortex; as you may guess that weighty Bodies have no great Appetite to resist in that Case; being seldom known so obstinate as to insist upon nothing, or fly upwards when they are mov'd to the contrary. My vertiginous Circumstances of Brain were not in the least abated by the continued Rolling of my Person, which grew more violent as we descended. (123-124)

It turns out that "Icarus" has no need of wings because the "Ideal World" is not above but below. The overweening aspirations that the figure of "Icarus" personifies and brings into the *Essay* function as a critique of "Norris's" idealism and as the means to extend or complete the image of "Icarus" in "Icaromenippus." In this god figure, D'Urfey's melancholy perplexity over time is fully realized in laughter at Norris's idealist betrayal of the "Sensible World" and his revision of it as a "little inanimate World Erratick." As the completion of Icarus, Lucian's Icaromenippus is "condemned" to an eternity of witty superiority and wistful conversation with his fellow inhabitants of Hades, the gods and the dead. There they knowingly and satirically discuss their former vainglorious hopes and inevitable mistakes in the realm of the living, arguing and joking among themselves in the dialogic form as they view, with ironic relish and satisfaction, the doomed earnestness of those still on the other side. The laughing denizens of Hades are dead but

more fully awake than the living. Death is here conceived as unmasking the hidden other side of life. The victory and fate of the dead is that they have nothing to fear. Their laughter is the contrary of fear:

> Menippus, Diogenes advises you, if mortal subjects for laughter begin to pall, come down below, and find much richer material; where you are now, there is always a dash of uncertainty in it; the question will always intrude, who can be quite sure about the hereafter? Here you can have your laugh out in security, like me. [11]

The representation of an idealist flight of fancy as a plunge to the depths is the recognizable inversionary troping that assumes a traversable relation between sacred and profane realms. Menippean inversion is only effective, however, if top and bottom are integrally connected as the parts of one whole. In D'Urfey's *Essay*, such a spatialized and spatializing inversion is in collision with the time of the "constant pause," with the consequence that his Menippean voyager encounters, not a jovial group of colleagues who talk in a knowing way about both sides of life, but a melancholy death's head, the figure of "Death," though here debased or unmasked as a skull without brains:

> At last I descry'd something that seem'd to be a Scull, and was making very discernible Circumvolutions about its own Center. My Guide bid me welcome to the Intelligible World, and immediately we were at it; for this Scull was no other than the Shell of it, or the Ideal Scull. It is the Archetype of all Real Sculls, and a Promptuary of all Ideas whatsoever; from which, as from a never-failing Spring-Head, they are constantly drawn forth into Things; each at its appointed time, when summon'd by Fate to exert it self, and put on Real Existence. Within the Cranium, tho' for certain there is little or nothing of Brains, yet 'tis thought, there is the Idea of Brains, which is altogether as good, and accounted even far Preferable by the more subtile and refin'd Species of Philosophers. (124-125)

Looking into the skull's "Idea of two Eyes," he finds the eye of death to be both darkness incarnate *and* thoroughly transparent, as if it does not exist at all. Just as D'Urfey laughingly

"sees through" Norris's idealism (which proposes to see the world through the eyes of death), the ideal eyes of the death's head are the "true Emblem of Illuminating Darkness...compensated by a more rare and admirable Virtue; for both of them were transparent, and might clearly be *seen through*" (126, italics mine). Our voyager then makes a significant decision about where to position himself in order to look death in the eye:

> My Guide propos'd to my Choice, whether I would content my self with a distant View, or make Application for personal Admittance. We might take a Prospect conveniently thro' those Inlets of Sight, whereas there was no way to enter, but along the same Ductus, by which all kind of Vapours insinuate into the *Penetralia* of [the] human Head. I declin'd the Proposal of getting in,...conceiving...that for the present, it would be satisfaction enough to make my Observations at a distance." (126)

Demurring, thus, to enter the nose of death, voyager and guide delicately attach themselves to either side of the nasal "Aperture," where they "rowl'd about the Rotation of the Scull" like two flies that have alighted "upon some convenient part of a Goose as 'tis roasting" (127). The insinuation of heat and fire in the image of "roasting" and the "calefying Quality" in the title of this chapter is not "explained" here but refer to the fires of hell which, as it turns out, "wrought" the "Hiatus" in the first place. A few pages further on, we come to a description of the formation of the "Hiatus": "There lies near the Equator of this mundane Fabrick, a private Aperture or *Hiatus*, wrought, as is reasonably suppos'd, by the Force of penetrating Heat, or violent Perustion..." (135). The significance of choosing the distant view from atop the nose of death rather than proceeding through it, is that laughter requires distance in order to take death as its object, or to see through the eyes of the death's head. Reluctance to enter the nose of death is a pivotal moment when the *Essay* balances between bridge and pause, allowing laughter to do its corrective work, but at the same time registering melancholy puzzlement at the possibility of the

disaggregation of the nose from the rest of the body. The corollary of this fragmentation is the separation of laughter's capacity to unmask and invert values from its ability to reconstitute the whole body within the reaffirmed boundaries of its life.

The image of the nose of death inverts the "materialist" creation story that follows the primary account in Genesis. In the first account, humankind is created by God's word. In the second version, God looks around after creating the earth and the heavens and sees "no one to till the ground." "[T]hen the Lord God formed man from the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and the man became a living being."[12] In the Creation, the nose is the passageway of the breath of life whereas in D'Urfey the nose is the only possible entrance to death. The nose is the *material* gap between life and death, both bridge and "constant pause." The nose is the "Hiatus" in time measured by the intake and outflow of the breath, the smallest possible unit of human time but the crucial one by which distance is maintained between life and death. In the nose of death, the essence of laughter is revealed as the preeminent distancing device. For what could be farther from the realm of death, which is eternity, than the realm of the nose, the transitory realm of matter? Laughter screams this distance in bringing together the nose and death and at the same time putting them in a mutually generative relation (i.e., the nose *of* death). The nose, by which the human is always one or two breaths away from death, functions to critique Norris's philosophy that pretends to "inhabit" the position of death, and also to register the ambivalent status of the human body in the new scientific idealism. For science cuts the human in two in quite a new way. It separates the body's capacity to "think" and "know" from its material basis in the "gross Matter" of the physiological body.

That D'Urfey refrains from putting the nose of death into words as I have done reveals, in

a particularly effective way, the powerful companion to the trope of inversion, which is the mechanism of unmasking. The defamiliarizing language in which the nose is described as the "Ductus...by which all kind of Vapours insinuate into the Penetralia of [the] human Head" assumes such a close-up and slow-motion perspective as to make the object described barely recognizable. Language that so obscures the very nose on one's face, which in all other circumstances is the one thing in life that a body can be sure about, presents this grossly familiar body part as a perplexing riddle. For a brief moment, perhaps no longer than a sneeze, the nose is freed up from its defining whole, a condition in which it may well turn out to have affairs of its own. It may have any number of discrete adventures in which it combines with or stands in for other body parts, for example. The nose in this regard is somewhat notorious in English literature. But quite apart from the nose itself, the riddle by which it is "unmasked" and recognized as having a life of its own emerges as an egalitarian and energizing form of pedagogy.[13] The nose is most clearly seen as if for the first time and as itself an aggregation of "meanings" and parts. The answer to the riddle that the nose presents is most completely embraced and "known" by those who arrive, unassisted, at its formulation from the clues provided. The riddle makes the nose available as experience rather than as predigested information that is "obvious" (as the nose on one's face).

The profound stillness and melancholy of the moment of refusal to go through the nose derive from the fact that, funny as the image is, the narrator cannot help but see laughter robbed of its object in the process of the image's formation. When "Death" becomes the face of the new scientific way of knowing, laughter itself is apparently dismembered. The destructive techniques of inversion and unmasking, previously aimed at the ultimate boundary condition of death, now

take a position *beside* "Death," as its right and left hands. Laughter's distancing devices and effects are therefore incorporated as the very foundation of enlightened critique.[14] They are the active ingredients of the scientific method's recipe for bringing the object world into the present as the object of knowledge. The merciless techniques of unmasking and inversion enable science to strip objects of previous words and intentions. In its scientific incarnation, destructive laughter has not failed to do its job. As the primary tropes of "enlightenment," inversion and unmasking are the assurance that no "truth" is allowed to stand for long before it is inverted or unmasked as a lie or "as if" a lie in its partiality. Destructive critique can only reproduce itself by way of redemptive knowledge. It maintains no link, let alone commitment, to the shape of things that results. Authority and resources for experimentation with alternative realizations are parsimoniously awarded only to the elect, who are named as such in the ongoing demonstration of their commitment to the process of fragmentation (differentiation) and therefore to redemptive knowledge.

At the nose of death, inversion and unmasking part company with laughter's regenerative inclination to distort, exaggerate, and play with the boundaries by which time, language, and matter are demarcated. Laughter's power, through these means, to restore an embodied presence of mind, with its imperative to live in and for the moment, is cast adrift, becoming the orphaned counterpart to the life / death boundary that science pointedly disregards in order to "occupy" a position "as if" in death. To live in the moment (in the "nose," to use the metaphor closest to "hand") and to insist on earthly realizations of value is to forego redemption of an otherworldly kind. Such a refusal would threaten the entire scientific project. Bringing the thinking human subject into the present to "be" with its gross, material, infinitely better half is what has to be

prevented at all costs. But just as the life / death boundary is retained by the grotesque method and its modern agent, the narrator of novelized discourses, laughter's renewing resources survive in somewhat reduced or marginalized form in the modern novel.

The melancholy moment of refusal to enter the nose of death resounds most forcefully in the "Little Something Between" D'Urfey's "Preface" and "Postscript." This squeezed main text of the *Essay* features, chiefly, the displaced moment of restorative laughter in which "D'Urfey," now finally given the name of "Narcissus alter," wakes up quite by mistake from his dream of an "Ideal Voyage":

> Turning accidentally my internal Opticks towards my Ideal Garret in New Barbican, what should appear to me at the Window, but the Counterpart, or the beautiful Idea, of my self. It was sitting as Solitary as a Hermit, but in a violent Fit of Mirth, and undoubtedly under the Operation of some pleasant Conceit, which is a thing very familiar to me in my Retirements. And as 'tis sung of the former Narcissus, that his Idea in the Water, as cruel as he found it, never refused to smile, when it saw that he smiled in Return; I on the other side, *Narcissus alter*, could not chuse but rejoyce to see my Idea so joyful. But here indeed I fell into a fatal and deplorable Oversight — here was I seized with a rash Curiosity, which was proved the sad Occasion of so much Regret, and such grievous Lamentation, to me and to my poor Reader...for by endeavouring to stare hard upon my Idea, my Eyes burst open, and I saw my self at that Instant, relapsed into the Sensible World. Thrice did I call for Help to my Guide, and thrice I endeavoured but in vain to clasp hold of him. My Guide, the Ideal World, and my own beloved, and lovely, Idea were all ravished from me, and vanished on the sudden; and, behold! I was sitting in the Place Father Malebranche and my own Idea had appeared to me, even by my Garret-Window in Barbican; where the Good Reader shall be very welcome to Paper-Diet, and may be furnished at reasonable Rates with all sorts of Ballads, Madrigals, Anagrams, Acrosticks, and Heroick Poems, either by Whole-sale, or by Retail; the Excellency of which I give him leave to judge by the following Samples. (197-199)

The only other contents of the "Little Something" are chapters entitled "The Best Section in the Book, concerning Seven Hundred Pounds a Year," and "The next best Section treating of Six Hundred Pounds a Year." The contents bear little or no relation to their titles but the titles

themselves function to introduce "D'Urfey's" bid, at the end of the excerpt quoted above, to try to raise some money, at least, in the event of finding insufficient space and time to raise a laugh. That raising money is the ready alternative to raising a laugh is presented not as an unfortunate incidental alignment but as the actualization of Norris's and Malebranche's subjective idealism. In their fully "Intelligible" world, words are reunited with things in a redemptive relation that calls for the marketplace as the site of redemption. While words are regrettably "fallen" away from the things to which they refer and no longer "mean" anything in particular, they can, in the vision of the new world, be exchanged, or *redeemed*, for immediate monetary reward, the symbolic measure of absolute value. D'Urfey's baroque novelistic discourse resists this conclusion in stressing the materiality and essential embodiment of the word, an irrefutable, self-contained repository or monad of value. But it embraces the new economy in the composition of the *Essay* as an entirely new arrangement of words that is possible only because words are freed from fixed referents. The new economy both enables and constrains the author, as it does any author of novelized genres, to fob off prefaces or introductions and representations of the words of others in place of "real," present languages or fully written books. D'Urfey thus registers the intensification of the value and availability of the word for alternative formulations and their simultaneous devaluation as "meaningful" in and of themselves.

Near the beginning of the *Essay*, in the mask of "Norris" and "encourag'd by the Authority of Father M_____che" (61), D'Urfey announces that the already burgeoning "Preface" will take precedence in his book because it is imperative to guard "against all Kind of Admiration...[so] highly pernicious to the Welfare of human Understanding, and a great Obstruction to the Growth of Truth." "Now whereas I have a most tender Concern both for the

Preservation and Improvement of my good Reader's Sences,...I judged it would become an Author to use the utmost Precaution for moderating the Surprize that is to come upon his Reader, and no better Expedient occurred to me than that of confessing and laying open the whole Mystery of my Art, since nothing does more take off from our Astonishment than a right Apprehension of the Way a thing is done" (61-62). But "D'Urfey's" promise to lay bare his method remains a pleasurably empty one. Just as the advertisement of the imminently available "Essences" of things leaves no time or space for those "Essences" themselves, the wordy description and defence of his "so famous *Tincture for Wit* (also known as the "Elixir Scribendi") forces him to leave out the recipe itself. In the "constant pause" of the "Preface," we are left salivating for the potion which, we read, "mightily helps Digestion of what you take inwardly, removes Dulness, comforts the Vital Heat, strengthens the Poetick Spirit, helps Inspiration, provokes Ryming, cherishes the Fancy, corrects the Judgement, &c. by excoriating all membranous Diaphragms in the Musculus Ensiformis; and finally it brings upon Vena Docta to a due Crasis of Body, and is a Medicine infinitely Preferable to any hitherto in Use among the Criticks, and will keep its Virtue in long Voyages..." (59-60). In these words, which reveal the mask of the writer as mountebank, "D'Urfey" dramatizes the fact that the readers of the new economy of reading and writing, like the "Patient-Disciples" of idealism, pay not for a "cure," but for the promise of a cure. The reader's "money" — the time invested in reading all these words — redeems the *words* of the mountebank, while the real, material cure to which the words ostensibly refer is rendered quite immaterial to the transaction. The new arrangement of words for money (as opposed to words for things, words for words, or things for things) is identified as precisely the new site, source, and guarantee of the reader's ongoing enchantment. Immediately

following the passage that lists the "Essences" forthcoming in the tenth volume — the one that advertises the imminent availability of more than twelve quadrillion "Ideas" of unity — the common language measure of value is audible in the voice of "D'Urfey," who asks, "What," in a world where all essences are so soon to be known, "have we remaining of Magick?" (156).[15] The question is aligned with the prevalent view, from the turn of the eighteenth century to the present, that modernity involves a "disenchantment" of the world. In the common view of D'Urfey's *Essay*, however, the question and its underlying assumption that there is no magic remaining unmasks the all too obvious basis of the new enchantment. D'Urfey's *Essay* is his own answer to the question of the new place that is created for "Magick":

> 'Tis certain there is [Magick] still extant in the *Natural* World, that famous Raree-Show, so deservedly celebrated as an Ectype of the Intelligible; not to mention the Enchanted Labyrinth we travers'd in our way thither. Who has not had his Purse enchanted out of his Pocket, or been himself enchanted out of his Senses? Who knows not, that a Jargon of sounding Periods, tho' perfectly insignificant, shall carry a Cause against the most powerful unregenerated Arguments, and convey Delusions by the Enchantment of meer Sophistry? ...Thus much we may modestly affirm in vindication of our modern and natural Magick. (156-157)

The *Essay*'s dependence on the magical power of a "Jargon of sounding Periods" to raise laughs for money by promising to demystify everything from mustard to pain in such a way as to wholly obscure the material "Essences"of all these things, thematizes the special knowledge, available only to laughter, that we cannot but be enchanted. The implication of D'Urfey's ingenious *Essay* is that momentary release from enchantment is only possible through the escape hatch, or "Hiatus," of laughter, a bodily function in which the nose is not innocent. D'Urfey's *Essay* "exploits" in the most bourgeois manner the laughing awareness that we may be enchanted in one way or in another way, but we cannot claim or choose thereby not to be enchanted.

Notes to Chapter One

1. [London, n.p., 1701?], 156. Further references will be cited by page number inserted immediately following the quotation. The title page of D'Urfey's *Essay* does not contain the city or publisher, and the date appears as "Printed in the Year One Thousand Seven Hundred &c." All authoritative listings cite London as the place of publication, as above, and the date "1701?" with the exception of the British Library, which dates it "1705?" I assign authorship of the *Essay* to D'Urfey on the authority of Donald Wing, compiler of the *Short Title Catalogue*, who enters it under "John, Gabriel," the name that appears on the title page. Wing enters title and author with the note, "Pseudonym of D'Urfey, Thomas. Entry Cancelled. Post 1700." He also notes that the pseudonym was used by Daniel Defoe and does not cite his own authority for attributing the *Essay* to D'Urfey. All other sources attribute it to D'Urfey, who is known chiefly as a playwright for the Restoration stage. He produced thirty-three dramatic works — tragic, comic, and operatic — during a career spanning nearly fifty years, from 1676 to 1721. Henry Purcell set to music the songs of at least two of the plays. *A Fool's Preferment: Or, The Three Dukes of Dunstable* (1688) is also one of only four D'Urfey plays to be reprinted since the eighteenth century. See Robert Stanley Forsythe's *A Study of the Plays of Thomas D'Urfey, Western Reserve Studies* 1:2 (1916). See also the *Dictionary of National Biography*, hereafter referred to as the *DNB*.

In his lifetime, D'Urfey was as well known for his topical, satirical songs and poetry as for his plays. Most were printed in *Wit and Mirth: or, Pills to Purge Melancholy* (1684), a collection that went through numerous variations and editions until what may be called a standard edition appeared in 1719-20 (*DNB*). The collection remained in print until 1791 and maintains a central place in the history of popular English songs. See *Wit and Mirth: or, Pills to Purge Melancholy: A Selection of His Best Songs into One volume. With an Account of the Author's Life* (London: Published by William Holland, No. 50 Oxford-Street, 1791). A modern selection is printed in *Sixty Ribald Songs from Pills to Purge Melancholy*, ed. S. A. J. Bradley and arranged for guitar by John Duarte (New York: Praeger, 1968).

D'Urfey's importance is attested by the telling intensity of praise and blame to which he is subject by his contemporaries and by formal scholarship to the present day. Gerard Langbaine compared him, famously, to a "Cuckow [who] makes it his business to suck other Birds Eggs." See *An Account of the English Dramatick Poets* (London, 1691; rpt. New York: Burt Franklin, n.d.). The tradition that "[m]any an honest Gentleman has got a Reputation in his Country, by pretending to have been in Company with Tom d'Urfey" is attributed to Joseph Addison, who is also quoted as saying, "I myself remember King Charles the Second leaning on Tom d'Urfey's Shoulder more than once, and humming over a song with him." See *The Guardian*, "Number 67," ed. John Calhoun Stephens (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1982), 254-255. James L. Thorson and Jack Vaughn question the chronological possibility of these stories, pointing out that Addison was only thirteen years old when Charles II died. Thorson's remarks

preface a reprint of D'Urfey's "completion" of Samuel Butler's poem, *Hudibras*. See "Introduction," *Butler's Ghost (1682) By Thomas D'Urfey* (Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1984), v-vi; and Vaughn, "Introduction," *Two Comedies by Thomas D'Urfey* (Rutherford: Associated University Presses, 1976), 17. D'Urfey was proud of the fact that four successive monarchs, from Charles II to Anne, showed him personal favour; however, as with his friend John Dryden, D'Urfey's talent for changing politics to suit those in power was not admired by all.

D'Urfey is widely noted as taking the most malicious abuse as a joke. "He knew that the laugh was always on his side against the heavier hand" in the assessment of the *DNB* editors. D'Urfey was considered physically unattractive because of his remarkable long hooked nose and a speech impediment that made him the butt of many lampoons, including a "vicious" and anonymous satire, *Wit for Money: Or, Poet Stutter*, which appeared in 1691 (London: S. Burgis; cited in Vaughn, 14). Addison says that D'Urfey was able to "curse vociferously without stammering" and to sing "without hesitation" (Thorson, v), and the *DNB* records D'Urfey's answer to *Wit for Money* as, "The Town may da-da-da-m me as a poet, but they sing my songs for all that." D'Urfey was finally provoked to reply to Jeremy Collier, who also attacked Congreve, Etherege, and Wycherley but seems to single out D'Urfey for particularly harsh treatment in *A Short View of the Immorality and Profaneness of the English Stage* (London, 1698). Collier devotes a full thirteen pages to D'Urfey, focusing primarily on his extremely popular play, *The Comical History of Don Quixote*, written and performed in three parts from 1694 to (probably) 1696 (Vaugn 24). In *The Campaigners: Or, The Pleasant Adventures at Brussels. A Comedy As it is Acted at the Theatre Royal. With a Familiar Preface Upon A Late Reformer of the Stage. Ending with a Satyrical Fable of The Dog and The Ottor* (London: Printed for A. Baldwin, near the Oxford Arms Inn in Warwick Lane, 1698), D'Urfey organizes his response to Collier around the churchman's characterization of his work as "smutt" and accuses Collier "of having a better nose for smut than a clergyman should have." See Joseph Wood Krutch's "Introduction" to the volume in which D'Urfey's "Preface" is reprinted, *Essays on the Stage* No. 4, Augustan Reprint Society (New York: Kraus Reprint Corporation, 1967), 1.

Alexander Pope, Jonathan Swift, and John Arbuthnot all record clearly positive as well as jestingly ambivalent appraisals of D'Urfey's work. The *DNB* reads them humorously while Vaughn interprets them as ironic condemnations (15-16). The only critical comment that I could find on the present *Essay* is the annotation made by the compiler of the catalogue for Series II of the Redpath Tracts held in the Rare Book Department of McGill's McLennan-Redpath Library. Stuart S. Clark notes in the catalogue that "Swift is supposedly indebted to this curious work." No other account of D'Urfey's considerable output so much as mentions the *Essay*. The sign of the neglect of this work is that it continues to be assigned a questionable publication date. The only source I have not consulted but that perhaps discusses the *Essay* is a Ph.D. dissertation held in just two U.S. university libraries. Neither the Harvard University nor the University of California at Berkeley libraries has reproduced the thesis on microfilm, and neither will lend it via interlibrary loan. This yet to be consulted source, which remains the authoritative account of D'Urfey's life, is Cyrus Lawrence Day, "The Life and Non-dramatic Works of Thomas D'Urfey," 2 vols., Dissertation, Harvard University, 1930. Day's comment, in *The Songs of Thomas D'Urfey* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), that "most of D'Urfey's writings

deserve the oblivion into which they have fallen" suggests, however, that his work on D'Urfey will not lend authority to my quite contrary appraisal.

D'Urfey's link to Swift is readily apparent. Although *A Tale of a Tub* was not published until 1704, Swift insists that it was written and in circulation as early as 1696. That D'Urfey was familiar with Swift's *Tale* seems to be borne out in the *Essay's* discussion of Hobbesian geometry. The narrator insists that the same mathematical sophistry applies not only to commonwealths but to all manner of cylinders and tubs. He refrains from elaborating, however, because tubs "are now become a very empty and dry Subject, having lately been exhausted, as it were, in the Telling of a merry Tale" (149). Alternatively, D'Urfey may have been referring to the "Meal-Tub Plot," one of the late incarnations of the Popish Plot. The reverse direction of "influence," from D'Urfey *to* Swift, particularly to *Gulliver's Travels* (1726), should become apparent in the discussion that follows. D'Urfey's "Risible" and "Hinnible" categories are richly suggestive of Swift's "Yahoos" and "Houyhnhnms." The prominence of D'Urfey's *Essay* in the present work can be placed within the *long durée* of D'Urfey criticism, which is increasingly abundant and favourable. The prominence of female protagonists in his plays, the importance of his work for sentimental drama and for "sentimentalism" generally, are among the reasons cited for increasing interest in his work. See Jack Knowles and J. M. Armistead, "Thomas D'Urfey and Three Centuries of Critical Response," *Restoration: Studies in English Literary Culture, 1660-1700*, 8/2 (1984): 72-80. Knowles and Armistead include an extensive bibliography of commentary on D'Urfey's plays.

2. The memorial was originally on the outside wall but because of a subsequent annexation to the church building it now "adorns" the wall inside the closet. See Vaughn, "Introduction," *Two Comedies by Thomas D'Urfey*, 19.

3. See especially Chapter 2, "Nature and Natural Science," 37-92.

4. "Chasm" is one of D'Urfey's synonyms for the "Hiatus" (162). Others are "passage," as already noted, and "Aperture" (135). The term "constant pause" is from Benjamin's discussion, in *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, of the baroque style of language as "bombast." The "constant pause" (197) is the form of time produced in the confrontation between the spoken and written word, the chronotope in which the resounding "ecstasy" of the "creature" meets its written "composure" (201). "The spoken word breaks off in the middle of resounding, and the damning up of the feeling, which was ready to pour forth, provokes mourning. Here meaning is encountered, and will continue to be encountered as the reason for mournfulness..." (209).

5. Benjamin justifies his own concentration on "minor" writers and the neglected genre of the German baroque mourning play as follows: "It is one thing to incarnate a form; it is quite a different thing to give its characteristic expression. Whereas the former is the business of the poetic elect, the latter is often done incomparably more distinctly in the laborious efforts of minor writers." *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 58.

6. The publisher is John Dunton. See Gilbert D. McEwen's "Introduction" to *John Norris: Cursory Reflections*, 1. The *DNB* concurs on the designation of Norris as the "last offshoot" of

Cambridge Platonism "except so far as the same tendency is represented by Shaftesbury." Shaftesbury discusses the question of thinking matter in "The Moralists" (1709), *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*, ed. John M. Robertson (Indianapolis: Bobs-Merrill, 1964).

7. London: Printed for S. Manship, at the Ship in Cornhill, near the Royal-Exchange; and W. Hawes, at the Rose in Ludgate-Street, near the West-End of St. Paul's Church. 2 parts. *Part I* (1701) and *Part II* (1704). D'Urfey is surely on the mark to burlesque Norris's prolixity. *Part I* is over 500 pages, and together the two parts run to more than one thousand pages, not counting scholarly apparatus, front and back. Norris is known to have exhausted Henry More after a year of copious correspondence in 1683-84 (McEwen, 2). Norris's personal relations with John Locke were marred by all too human misunderstandings. After one incident, William Molyneux wrote to Locke "in a spirit of outrage over the *obscure enthusiastic man*," John Norris (McEwen 2-3).

8. The problem is one of "agency," a word that, together with "organization," comes into the English language with its present meaning around 1650. See Rogers, *The Matter of Revolution*, 2.

9. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination*, 401.

10. Locke's discrediting of "innate ideas" in Part III of his *Essay* prevailed of course and Norris was later persuaded to give up the notion. But the "Ideal Hypothsis" could accommodate a reformulation, from "innate ideas" to "innate mental capacities," because either serves the function of privileging thought, which at the end of the seventeenth century was the main thing. Norris's point about the necessity of having "something to terminate the thought" is suggestive of the intersection (or insemination) of the modern epistemology of science, philosophy, and aesthetics. With Priestley's force theory of matter in the eighteenth century and the subsequent "disappearance" of the debate over "thinking matter," science shifts its attention from matter to energy, re-conceiving matter as a form of energy.

11. This excerpt from Lucian is quoted in Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, 69. Bakhtin discusses in detail the features of Menippean satire, all of which are present in D'Urfey's *Essay*, and the relation of the *Menippea* to the modern novel in *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, ed. and tr. Caryl Emerson, "Introduction" Wayne C. Booth, Theory and History of Literature, Volume 8 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 112-121.

12. Genesis 2: 5-7. New Revised Standard Version. By contrast, John Norris, in his *Essay*, appeals to the first version of Genesis, in which men and women are created by God's authorizing word. Norris's quotation and commentary reads: "*And God said let us make Man, in our Image, after our likeness*, &c....Ought it not to be...remark'd that here is a plain implication of an *Intelligible Human Nature*, antecedent to and distinct from that Humane Nature which was the Effect of the Divine Creation?" (35).

13. In discussing Benjamin's investment in Kabbalist thought, Buck-Morss provides a description of its procedure: "Kabbalists read both reality and the texts, not to discover an overarching historical plan..., but to interpret their multiple, fragmentary parts as signs of the Messianic

potential of the present. The truth thus revealed was expressed in the Kabbalist writings inventively, indirectly, in riddles, providing an antiauthoritarian form of pedagogy" (231). See also Buck-Morss's authority, Gershom G. Scholem (*Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism* (1941), New York: Schocken Books, 1946), 10.

14. Peter Sloterdijk points out the relation between "ideology critique," rooted in Enlightenment values, and traditions of satire. "The vivisecting approach to critique is the everlasting embarrassment of ideas confronted by the interests underlying them: human, all too human." See *Critique of Cynical Reason*, tr. Michael Eldred, "Foreword" Andreas Huyssen, Theory and History of Literature, Volume 40 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 19. With extensive reference to Bakhtin and Benjamin, as well as to Kant and Nietzsche, Sloterdijk calls for a renewed linkage of the weapons of critique and the regenerative powers of satire in the form of "physiognomic thinking," the "mutual interaction of physis and logos" that might constitute a "true philosophy," "a theory of consciousness with flesh and blood (and teeth)"(xxxi). Physiognomic thinking is conceived as a reincarnation of the ancient "kynicism" of the laughing philosopher Diogenes and would be deployed to combat the pervasive "cynicism" of the "enlightened false consciousness" and the "pathology of identity" politics of the European left that Sloterdijk addresses. Sloterdijk's "kynicism" rejects the modern "mania for identity" and revels instead in "Nobodiness" in which it can be acknowledged that "no life has a name" (73). In his generally laudatory but critical "Foreword," Huyssen writes, "It is difficult for me to imagine a nonhostile, nonobjectifying satirical laughter, and Sloterdijk never really addresses the question of what kynics actually do to the persons they laugh at" (xx). I offer my own work on laughter as a beginning, at least, of attaining a more constructive understanding of what was involved when laughter's destructive techniques of masking and inversion were recuperated for "enlightenment," and what it might mean for these tropes to be reunited with an "embodied presence of mind" (Sloterdijk's formulation) and for laughter to be reinstated as the ultimate test of truth, as in Shaftesbury's "Rake's Creed," also cited by Richardson's Lovelace, rather than being defined as precisely that which cannot possibly be true. As Sloterdijk maintains, the weak point of "enlightened" philosophical critique is that "it remains fixated on serious opponents" (8). It cannot take seriously, for example, petty bourgeois men with funny moustaches who want to make everyone wear brown shirts and adopt final solutions. But if laughter were the arbitrating test of truth, such a proposal would be subjected to the skill testing question: Can it be *lived* by everyone who is addressed by it? If it cannot be lived, it cannot survive what Bakhtin calls the "laughing chorus" of history, which always wins in the end. The requirement that philosophy or science or the realization of any discourse be livable precludes such abstractions as "final solutions." D'Urfey's *Essay* here subjects Norris's idealist abstraction of human thought to the test of laughter. But because of the *Essay*'s historical position, it also registers the moment when laughter's indestructible corrosive techniques are themselves reconfigured and harnessed to the project of the perpetual unmasking and inverting of values. Unfortunately, when severed from its positive pole, the affirmation of an embodied presence of mind, laughter becomes quite vicious in the service of renewing the preconditions for unattainable, which is to say unlivable, redemption. Huyssen cannot imagine a "nonhostile, nonobjectifying satirical laughter" because it is heard the most rarely in the most "enlightened" societies. Novelized literature is the main generator and repository of laughter (and all emotion) that reconstitutes as well as destroys, but in the

enlightened world of instrumental reason, literature is one of the discourses most vulnerable to tests of instrumental and immediate utility and profitability. Literature barely moves the needle on such a scale of measurement. Sloterdijk's attempt, however, like that of Benjamin and Bakhtin, to maintain a position within the best of Enlightenment values instead of taking up a position against them is not unlike the two-faced stance of the most creative baroque thinkers, some of whose "funny" work will be examined in the remainder of this essay. The regime of enlightenment and the regime of laughter may only seem to be mutually exclusive orderings. Recent developments in evolutionary biology, itself on the fringes of science, bode well for literature in relation to science, and it is here, at the margins, that we should watch for screwball hybrid forms of knowledge and knowing, for it is certainly at the edges of enlightenment that "the expansion of the boundaries of subjectivity" will take place with the most moment and impact. The problem with Sloterdijk's attempt to correct Western philosophy's tendency to take itself too seriously and its blindness to what truly threatens it is that he falls into the trap of the exact inversion of values. He privileges laughter and bodily sensuousness rather than trying to include or reconfigure them. I think this serious oversight results from his neglect of the power of melancholy and the importance of the intersection of melancholy *and* laughter. Sloterdijk does not see that satire itself is a narrowing of laughter. In my material, I find modern satire, from Swift onwards, to be directly associated with taking animate matter as the object of laughter, rather than death. Satire can lead nowhere on its own. It maintains no link, let alone commitment, to the shape of things that result from its destructiveness. Satire is entirely subservient to the project of redemptive knowledge. Sloterdijk does not place the emphasis that I do on the *two poles* of laughter or on the investment of any particular "subjectivities" or relations with the object-world. He does not, in other words, see or engage Benjamin's proposal to complete the Copernican revolution. Finally, Sloterdijk does not deal with the theological capers involved in the passage work between subjects and objects in the material, discursive economies.

15. A marginal note reinforces the parallel I am drawing between the previous discussion of the tincture for putting off astonishment, the "Elixir Scribendi," and the question of "What have we remaining of Magick?" The note refers to a treatise by the historical Malebranche, which endorses Sir Kenelm Digby's "Grand Elixir, or regenerated Medicine" (156).

Chapter Two

Icaromenippus

In which utterance is there ever a face — and not a mask?[1]

The readiness of D'Urfey's voyager to put on wings and fly upwards to the Ideal World — or at least to "Copernicus in the Moon" — and his subsequent willingness to submit to the downward pull of the deadly Ideal Vortex, typify the baroque narrator and account for his name, "Icaromenippus." Proud, aspiring "Icarus" meets the wiser and merrier "Menippus" in a mask that is the most rapturous while also the most grittily realistic, the most jovial and yet the most saturnine. Icaromenippus affirms Christianity's defeat of pagan idolatry, a triumph that explains the prevalence of this mask in baroque writing. In both soaring upwards and falling to his death, the baroque Icaromenippus secures the fallen condition of God's world. The more directly that baroque dialogue, in the image of Icaromenippus, addresses the new paganism — the Copernican revisioning of the universe — the more tightly it grips victorious Christianity. Icaromenippus can countenance, with some security, the coexistent Christian and Copernican mapping of the heavens and the earth.

Robert Burton's 'Digression of Air'

"[T]here are few chapters in the literature of the seventeenth century which depict so copiously, if ambiguously, the rich variety of contending world systems as [Robert] Burton's discussion entitled 'Air rectified. With a digression of the Air'" in *The Anatomy of Melancholy*. [2]

Because the "Digression of Air" engages the "new sciences," specifically Copernican astronomy, scholarship tends to focus on this section of the *Anatomy* as evidence of Burton's modernity and therefore the enduring relevance of his book.[3] I, too, will isolate the "Digression" but with the difference that I will explore its productive ambiguity for a modernity that includes not only science and its method but also, more importantly, the grotesque method, which shapes and makes possible both science and a new form of the novel. Such an approach has the advantage of accommodating even those parts of the "Digression" that science may find somewhat embarrassing.

The *Anatomy* is prefaced by the lengthy and widely quoted "Democritus to the Reader" (I.15-123). The mask of Democritus Junior is sometimes twinned with Democritus of Abdera, his "senior" who is likelier to be a weeping rather than a laughing philosopher. But Democritus does laugh when teamed up with the morose Heraclitus (I.47). The important feature of these masks is the mixed passion of laughter and weeping, but this physiognomic stance is nearly impossible to comprehend from the vantage point of modernity.[4] Indeed, much Burton scholarship is concerned to establish the basis on which the *Anatomy* can and should be taken seriously rather than the basis on which it laughs at science. The scholarship almost obsessively reviews and reconstructs a historical context in which the book becomes coherent in modern terms, as if to suggest that a book which laughs so much is in need of apology or defense.[5] The *Anatomy*'s laughter flaunts a reluctance to commit itself to any one language or judgement of the world just as its melancholy makes possible the inhabitation of many different masks that "know" the significance of the way various words and world views intervene in time. "[I]n connection with melancholy occurs one of the few sparks of literary invention" in an interesting book, *Dialogicall*

Discourses of Spirits and Divels (1601), cited by D. P. Walker. "All speakers have names appropriate to their opinions," including "Orthodoxus," "Lycanthropus," and others.[6] The heuristic uses of the masks in the *Anatomy* are rarely discussed except for requisite comments on the relation they are presumed to have to a sly historical author.[7] By the beginning of the second "partition," or volume, and the inserted "Digression of Air," which runs to about forty pages, the mask of Democritus is all but abandoned and that of Icaromenippus is assumed instead. [8]

There are three mentions of Icaromenippus in the "Digression" and three of his half-brother "Menippus," who is strictly associated with the underworld. Besides the change of masks, what constitutes this section as a digression is that the entire second partition is called "The Cure of Melancholy." Previously, in the first partition, the problem of "bad air" is introduced as a cause of melancholy. Bad air refers not only to local pollutants but to climate as well. We are presented with an example extracted from Jean Bodin's "Method of History" of hot climates where "great numbers of madmen....are ordinarily so choleric in their speeches, that scarce two words pass without railing or chiding in common talk, and often quarreling in their streets" (I.237-238). D'Urfey presented the hidden other side of this phenomenon in the opposite climate: "Some report that in Nova Zembla, and Greenland, Men's Words are wont to be frozen in the Air, and at the Thaw may be heard" (17). The melancholy symptom of words getting entangled or left hanging in the air is significant, but for now I draw attention to the expectation in Burton's text that a discussion of "air" will examine climatic conditions more than discursive weather. The "Digression" digresses, then, by interminably prefacing the promised consideration of climate. It withdraws from the immediate topic in order to survey the world as the endpoint of God's creation and, alternatively, as a geologically and galactically situated planet. The

"Digression" is very much to the point, however, in the relation between the *Anatomy*'s theory of melancholy and the doctrine of stellar influences. Burton's book is operating at the intersection where a decision is made regarding whether melancholy belongs to medical or astrological discourse. The determination of melancholy's status involves discoursing about discourses, and this activity signals the *Anatomy*'s contribution both to science and literature, as well as to the formation of an absolute division between them.

The "Digression" opens with an intricate construction of a special point of view to "wander round about the world" and inquire into the nature and place of things. The viewpoint will be that of "a long-winged hawk" who, for pleasure, will fetch "many a circuit in the air, soaring higher and higher till he be come to his full pitch..." (II.34). The transitional sentence from this conceit to the contents of the "Digression" provides the first mention of the Icaromenippus mask:

> In which progress I will first see whether that relation of the friar of Oxford be true, concerning those northern parts under the Pole (if I meet *obiter* [on the way] with the Wandering Jew, Elias Artifex, or Lucian's Icaromenippus, they shall be my guides).... (II.35)[9]

The "Digression" thus sets off on a series of four fantastic voyages. The first ranges over the surface of the earth and then dives down inside it, where the question arises, "is it hell?" (II.42). The second voyage roams the atmosphere, the realm of weather, plenums, vacuums, and meridians. The third voyage looks into the Copernican, Aristotelian-Ptolemaic, and Mosaic structurings of the heavens, and the fourth, "merely to show my literary skill," goes into Heaven to see "what God Himself doth" (II.58).

The patterned repetition of references to Icaromenippus indicates the *Anatomy*'s

ambivalence about the security of its own commitments in the "Digression." Perhaps because "Icaromenippus" already knows that his overarching digressionary destination is the Copernican heavens, the double-faced mask is introduced at the outset but does not make another appearance until the important third voyage, where two appearances frame the entire discussion.[10] Correspondingly, the two mentions of "Menippus" frame the descent to the bowels of the earth. The last reference to "Menippus" occurs in the fourth voyage. There he is the mask of the voyager who claims to "see" God, but who, in the same breath, cautions that "nothing of what I am about to relate is true" (II.58). In his association with the underworld and the fundamental lie that is subservient to God's truth, "Menippus" is wholly dependent for his being on the existence of God's world. He is associated with God's hidden other face, or Satan, whereas "Icaromenippus" represents the attempt in the "Digression" to have it both ways, the desire to situate the Copernican heavens securely *within* God's world, which the text nevertheless "knows" is impossible without a radical rearrangement of physiognomies and perspectives. Here is the very symmetrical structure of appearances of the mask:

Voyage I	Icaromenippus	Object: Progress through earth and heavens
	Menippus	Object: Hell
	Menippus	Object: Hell
Voyage II	(no appearances)	Object: Atmosphere
Voyage III	Icaromenippus	Object: Heavens
	Icaromenippus	Object: Heavens
Voyage IV	Menippus	Object: God's World / Heaven

The voyages proceed as a series of questions about what the earth and sky are made of, their relation to each other, and the place of both in the universe. The answers that have been

offered are also surveyed. Our Menippean voyager places the answers beside each other as if to hear them argue among themselves. The voyager's narratorial role is enhanced as he stands back and puts the words that "explain" phenomena into contact. He merely listens to them harangue each other. The decisive importance of the baroque dilemma for the discovery of the grotesque method derives from the imperative to occupy a position in space and time from which to "hear" the object world "speak" in the conflict of languages that claim it. In the face of mutually exclusive but equally compelling views, the baroque writer is perplexed, quieted, silenced. The simultaneous pull of contending discourses — Christianity and Copernicanism — renders him "as if" mute. The spatial and temporal disarray of the heavens gives him pause, one that is extended and maintained by the irreconcilable gap between incommensurate discourses to which he is loyal. His loyalty bids him to find a way to represent the words or languages that speak for each view. The represented word claims a place beside the representing word. Putting into words the image of a language is the achievement of baroque novelistic discourse and the condition that makes it an objectively necessary artistic structure.[11] The baroque writer stands back, listening and watching the spectacle of clashing, conflicting views of the world. His own intentions are mediated through the activity of breaking up and rearranging the words and images in which the universe is configured. He evaluates and intones as he orchestrates the words of others as *material* that commands his listening posture. The "incoherence" of baroque prose arises from its double movement toward clearing away the narratives and intentions of others the better to "hear" the object, and at the same time toward engaging the languages that embody those narratives and intentions in order to do so. Word and image seek each other out in new ways.[12] Neither the modern scientific method of systematic objectification nor the grotesque method of

dialogization pre-exist this process. Both are products of the baroque sifting and sorting of words in relation to the object world. They are effects of the baroque word's creative work on its referent. Baroque novelistic discourse entails keeping all views of an object in play, which permits the scientific view to get close and claim it. The *Anatomy*'s contribution to the discovery of this process is enormous.

Burton's "Menippus" functions to anchor "Icaromenippus" in "Menippus," emphasizing the status of "Icaromenippus" as fallen, and subduing fears about the destination of knowledge that results from the fantastic flights. "Menippus" approaches an aspect of the object world, in this case hell, and at the same time maintains a position at a distance in order that contending explanations of hell and the earth's core may register. The descent to the center of the earth begins, "I would have a convenient place to go down with Orpheus, Ulysses, Hercules, Lucian's Menippus, at St. Patrick's Purgatory, at Trophonius' den, Hecla in Iceland, Aetna in Sicily, to descend and see what is done in the bowels of the earth; do stones and metals grow there still?" (II.40). "Menippus" only stands out among the gods named because of the structure and repetition of his appearances outlined above. But this presentation is also characteristic in the way the listing of the gods splinters any one notion of the underworld. The appearance of so many gods together emphasizes the widely differing accounts of the underworld and holds any *one* account at a distance from the object. Only by this means can an *actual* center of the earth — *actual* according to the modern view of mute, geological reality — be located. The baroque relation to material consists of a "re-clothing of surrounding reality in alien material."[13] Of a piece with bringing in all known "alien" elements is the fracturing of thoughts and sentences through direct attributions and interruptive parentheses: "What is the centre of the earth? Is it pure

element only, as Aristotle decrees, inhabited (as Paracelsus thinks) with creatures whose chaos is the earth: or with fairies, as the woods and waters (according to him) are with nymphs, or as the air with spirits?" (II.40). The distance maintained between objects and the words that have spoken for them means that any new word encounters alien words and citations already in the object: "Or is it the place of hell, as Virgil in his Aeneid, Plato, Lucian, Dante, and others poetically describe it, and as many of our divines think? In good earnest, Anthony Rusca, one of the society of that Ambrosian College in Milan, in his great volume *de Inferno, lib. 1, cap. 47,* is stiff in this tenent [sic], 'tis a corporeal fire tow, *cap. 5, lib. 2,* as he there disputes" (II.41). Every word in the "Digression," as elsewhere in the *Anatomy,* is associated with a face and a name. Every word, every proof, every argument bears a mask of nationality, religious belief, social role, or localized system of measurement. No word is a dead material object, but rather every word is alive with meanings that, once realized, can never be completely extinguished.[14] Languages become mutually implicated and operate to animate each other. In the following rather long passage, note also the way in which words are "called in question," "held," "contracted," "contradicted," "feigned," and "taken away" from their object, the nature and place of hell:

> Well then, is it hell, or purgatory, as Bellarmine, or Limbus patrum [limbo], as Gallucius will, and as Rusca will (for they have made maps of it), or Ignatius' parlour? Virgil, sometime Bishop of Salzburg (as Aventinus, *anno* 745, relates), by Bonifacius, Bishop of Mentz, was therefore called in question, because he held antipodes (which they made a doubt whether Christ died for) and so by that means took away the seat of hell, or so contracted it that it could bear no proportion to heaven, and contradicted that opinion of Austin, Basil, Lactantius, that held the earth round as a trencher (whom Acosta and common experience more largely confute) but not as a ball; and Jerusalem, where Christ died, the middle of it; or Delos, as the fabulous Greeks feigned: because when Jupiter let two eagles loose, to fly from the world's ends east and west, they met at Delos. But that scruple of Bonifacius is now quite taken away by our latter divines: Franciscus Ribera, *in*

> *cap.* 14 *Apocalyps.*, will have hell a material and local fire in the centre of the earth, 200 Italian miles in diameter....But Lessius, *lib.* 13 *de moribus divinus, cap.* 24, will have this local hell far less, one Dutch mile in diameter.... (II.42)

On considering all the ways that, variously, hell or the earth's core is animated by the words of others, the listening voyager reappears, but only to emphasize his constant withdrawal. The first voyage ends with his typical though perhaps only apparent lack of commitment to any one explanation: "Let Lucian's Menippus consult with or ask of Tieresias, if you will not believe philosophers; he shall clear all your doubts when he makes a second voyage" (II.43).

We meet our two-faced host again at the beginning and end of the third voyage, which departs from the earth's railing and agitated discursive atmosphere and heads for the stars. In both references, "Icaromenippus" is associated pointedly with the descriptive term "newfangled." At the opening of the third voyage, he is introduced as one who may pry away belief from truth: "If the heavens then be penetrable, as these men deliver, and no lets [hindrances or obstructions], it were not amiss in this aerial progress to make wings and fly up, which that Turk in Busbequius made his fellow-citizens in Constantinople believe he would perform: and some newfangled wits, methinks, should some time or other find out: or if that may not be, yet with a Galileo's glass, or Icaromenippus' wings in Lucian, command the spheres in heavens, and see what is done amongst them" (II. 50). But the "Air" here too is rife with the embattled volleys of recoiling words, intervening qualifications and questions, bracketed comments and citations. The language of the third voyage is especially "heavy with material display."[15] The simultaneous gathering and splattering of rapid-fire queries clears space around the object of the nature of the sky. A lengthy clotting of questions about whether the sky is vulnerable to time's "generation and corruption,"

the size, substance, and number of stars (concretized as "so many nails in a door"), their spatial relation to the "centre of the world," the status of light as their "substance" or "accident," finally arrives at the scholastic proposition that the sky may contain a "crystalline watery heaven."[16] This image has the advantage of providing a source of water sufficient to deluge the earth "at Noah's flood."

Questioning of the heavens culminates in this theological reference and brings the voyager briefly back to earth, where a related question suddenly occurs: "Besides, *an terra sit animata* [whether the earth is animate]? Which some so confidently believe, with Orpheus, Hermes, Averroes, from which all other souls of men, beasts, devils, plants, fishes, etc. are derived, and into which again, after some revolutions, as Plato in his *Timaeus*, Plotinus in his *Enneades*, more largely discuss, they return (see Chalcidius and Bennius, Plato's commentators), as all philosophical matter, *in materiam primam* [to their original material]. Keplerus , Patricius, and some other neoterics have in part revived this opinion; and that every star in heaven hath a soul, angel, or intelligence to animate or move it, etc." (II.51-52).[17] Immediately following this apparent "relapse" is an about-face, equally abrupt: "Or, to omit all smaller controversies, as matters of less moment, and examine that main paradox of the earth's motion, now so much in question..." (II.52). The well-informed consideration of the Copernican theory and its corollary of infinite worlds that follows is thus introduced as an abandonment of the animate earth and the simultaneous relegation of biblical natural history to the less interesting past. The full realization of the Copernican de-centering of the human would reanimate the earth, and this is what must be avoided at all costs. Just as Christianity "saves" Icarus in the allegorical image of "Icaromenippus," the new secularized view preserves the redemptive form of Christianity in

muting the earth, configuring scientific knowledge as that which claims the entire universe as God's dominion.

The discussion that follows this backslide towards the animate earth is commonly cited as proof of Burton's acceptance of the Copernican view.[18] Scholarship that is looking for proof of Burton's modernity, however, can make nothing of the interruption of the survey of the Copernican heavens by the sudden and brief return to the possibly *animate* earth. In his dissertation, *Arabism, Hermeticism, and the Form of the Anatomy of Melancholy* (1970), M.I. Apple places the *Anatomy* in the Hermetic tradition, which enables him to read it not simply as modern but as providing an early critique of "scientific progress."[19] Why did Burton mostly engage the old sciences rather than the new, as Bacon did? Apple finds that the answer lies in Burton's Hermeticism.[20] The sudden review of the question "whether the earth is animate?" is Burton's "appropriately Hermetic" warning to the knowing reader, that while the new view of things accounts for more of the "behavior," motions, and patterns observed in the sky, the exact cost of adopting it is the old view of the earth as a living thing.[21] "Icaromenippus" adopts the grotesque method of putting all existing words, arguments, and calculations into play in order to "listen" to them. He then acquiesces in the idea of infinite worlds not because the Copernican theory is most likely to be true but because its claim gets nearest the thing and accounts for more of its behavior and patterns. In the event, "Icaromenippus" separates the words of his acceptance from his mouth by means of a smile:

> But *hoc posito*, to grant this their tenent [sic] of the earth's motion: if the earth move, it is a planet, and shines to them in the moon, and to the other planetary inhabitants, as the moon and they do to us upon earth: but shine she doth, as Galileo, Kepler, and others prove, and then, *per consequens*, the rest of the planets are inhabited, as well as the moon, which he grants in his dissertation with Galileo's *nuncius sidereus* [messenger from the

stars], "that there be Jovial and Saturnine inhabitants,".... (II. 53-5)

An implication of the Copernican system is immediately reached and displayed. But it is not the feared implication that the corollary of infinite worlds precludes God's creation of a finite world subject to his judgement. Rather, we meet the implication that infinite worlds will bring in customers. "Icaromenippus" laughingly points out that there will no doubt be infinitely more "Jovial and Saturnine inhabitants" that will expand the readership of his book and reach a larger clientele with his "cure." Just as subtly, he justifies identification with the new word (the Copernican world) that claims his object (the earth as a planet among others) by portraying continued official opposition as not necessarily right or wrong but as certainly symptomatic of the irreconcilability of opinion: "But to avoid these paradoxes of the earth's motion (which the Church of Rome hath lately condemned as heretical, as appears by Blancanus' and Fromundus' writings) our latter mathematicians have rolled all the stones that may be stirred: and, to solve all appearances and objections, have invented new hypotheses, and fabricated new systems of the world, out of their own Daedalian heads" (II.56). The *Anatomy*, as we have seen, makes a virtue of constant controversy and dispute. And here we get another view of the complicity of novelistic discourse in the regime of redemptive knowledge. The "being" of the narrator exists only through the mediation of the chorus whose dissonance makes his orchestration necessary. The narrator has a vested interest in maintaining the most acute discord because it requires more words, more correspondence, more contracts to bridge the gap between words against the receding hope of ultimate harmonization. Recognition of the brilliance of the novelistic solution calls for constant renewal of the horrors of the problem it solves.

The reference to Daedalus preserves the image of the labyrinthine trap that novelistic treatment constantly conjures up and that science guarantees a path out of, but Daedalus is accompanied too by the echo of his doomed son, Icarus. The faint reference, by extension, to "Icaromenippus," Icarus's fallen, Christianized form, resounds not only with Christianity's triumph over paganism but also with the pathos of the process by which God replaced the old gods. Those Christians who hold the Copernican view to be heretical are here aligned with the vanquished Daedalus, who was defeated in being replaced. Backward-thinking Christians are only faintly identified with Icarus, who survived by falling into God's world and rising again as "Icaromenippus." It is quite typical of the grotesque method that old Daedalus is identified with the laughing impossibility of ever having the last word on the world, *and* with the melancholy necessity, nevertheless, of standing behind the mask of *some* word in order to "claim" or "see" it. Baroque discourse may be seen as a prolonged hesitation over or between or through these imperatives. This is the source of its "genius." I read the third voyage as the register, then, not only of novelistic discourse's complicity in renewing the preconditions of redemption but also of its animation *by* and *of* an indestructible regenerative principle. The qualifications with which Burton embraces the Copernican view resound in this moment of thoroughly mixed laughter and melancholy in which, potentially, all gods are defeated.

The *Anatomy* registers one important objection to the Copernican theory. Adherents are named "Copernical giants" because they put "such an incredible and vast space or distance (7,000,000 semi-diameters of the earth, as Tycho calculates)" between Saturn and the firmament (II.53-54). "[A]nd besides, they do so enhance the bigness of the stars, enlarge their circuit...that it is quite opposite to reason, to natural philosophy, and all out as absurd as disproportional (so

some will), as prodigious, as that of the sun's swift motion of the heavens" (II.53). This objection is immediately followed by the passage already quoted, "But *hoc posito*, to grant this their tenent [sic] of the earth's motion...." Many readers take this as evidence that Burton did not take his own objection too seriously. I think the reservation is quite serious. It prompts and authorizes the *Anatomy*'s modern scientific and novelistic withholding of judgement by means of the phrase "we do not yet possess the requisite data" (II.55). There is nothing more modern in the entire work.

The *Anatomy*, however, does not hesitate due to prophetic awareness that it inaugurates a new epistemological regime. Rather, it pauses on this point because, if Saturn is not the outermost planet closest to the heavenly "firmament," the delicate and essential dialectic between the contradictory poles of God's earth and Saturn is also disturbed. The extremities of earth and Saturn correspond to the distance between everyday, finite creaturely life and the greatest reaches of thought to which melancholy provides access.[22] The proximity of Saturn to Heaven secures the wisdom of the melancholic's immersion in the contemplation of creaturely things. Saturn, we might say, is the contrary equivalent to D'Urfey's laughing "Hiatus" in its function as bridge, medium, and guarantor of a relation between Heaven and Earth. The Copernican vision of the heavens as chaotic and random unseats the Saturnine perspective, the point from which the downward contemplative gaze can be fixed. A choice presents itself in this situation. The melancholy intention can remain loyal to things, or it can betray the world for the sake of (scientific) knowledge. The Copernican theory does accord with "visible appearances" and "come nearest to mathematical observations" (II.53). But loyalty to things is rooted in a mistrust of discourse as such because of its woeful inadequacy to approximate the richest "reality." Loyalty

to things demands a commitment to the ongoing realization of material "reality." Betrayal involves the acceptance of one discourse (for example, the Copernican theory) as entirely commensurate with one view of "reality" that is then privileged at the expense of all others. In betrayal, science makes its faithless leap while the *Anatomy* rests faithfully in the contemplation of bones, in this case the discursive materials that populate the heavens with endless numbers of gods. In so doing, the *Anatomy* retains an anchor not in Heaven but in Saturn. For if Saturn is to survive the new rapprochement of the heavens, then all the gods must survive. Such loyalty to things is key to the process that makes the choice of the Copernican view available. At once supplementary and indispensable, loyalty to things is preserved as a subordinate principle of and in scientific investigation ("we do not yet possess the requisite data"), while such loyalty remains the dominant principle of novelized discourse, the famed repository of which is the modern novel.

Neither the "Copernical giants" nor the *Anatomy* dispenses with the "firmament" entirely but only pushes it further and further away, a move that is not immaterial to science's betrayal of things. Pushing heaven ever backward and outward has the effect of extending the territory that is subject to scientific knowledge while deferring, eternally, confrontation with the *material* out of which heaven is made. "Icaromenippus" takes off on the third voyage with the stipulation, "If the heavens then be penetrable," the issue considered in the previous voyage. The anonymous inquirer of the second voyage cannot even get off the ground of a world where Moses, Ptolemy, or Aristotle prevails — he says, "I had to laugh at Aristotle's meteorology..." (II.46) — but the Copernican view, while dismantling the previously earthbound orderings, does not seem to provide alternative principles of order:

How comes, or wherefore is, this *temeraria siderum dispositio*, this rash placing of the

> stars, or, as Epicurus will, *fortuita*, or accidental? Why are some big, some little? Why are they so confusedly, unequally site [sic] in the heavens, and set so much out of order? In all other things nature is equal, proportionable, and constant; there be *justae dimensiones, et prudens partium dispositio* [just dimensions, and a wise arrangement of parts]; as in the fabric of man, his eyes, ears, nose, face, members are correspondent, *cur non idem coelo opere omnium pulcherrimo?* [why is it not so in the sky, the fairest part of creation?] Why are the heavens so irregular, *neque paribus molibus, neque paribus intervallis* [as regards both mass and interstices]? Whence is this difference? (II.46)

The subsequent survey of opinion on the kind of matter that constitutes the earth's atmosphere and the sky above it includes the newly conceivable separation of the question of heaven from the question of matter. "Tycho will have two distinct matters of heaven and air..." (II.49). Although Tycho Brahe opposed the Copernican system for theological reasons, his conception of matter helped to distinguish it from heaven. His distinction effectively pushes heaven away and isolates "air" as a separate thing that may be studied.[23] I have not yet located a single moment when science absolutely rejects the anchoring fiction of the "firmament," but my sense is that, like the question of plenum or void, it simply falls away and outside the scope of scientific inquiry. The decisive additional consequence is science's de facto occupation of the omniscient and infinite heavenly viewpoint. Quite ingeniously, it appropriates, as if by default, the best of both worlds.

On reaching its roundabout destination, the third voyage ends with the most concrete vision of "Icaromenippus" and his distancing function, the prerequisite for any new word to make a claim on the world. Successive images in this passage elicit first laughter and then fear that the object, the heavens, will be hidden in the onslaught of so many words competing to claim them:

> In the meantime, the world is tossed in a blanket amongst them, they hoist the earth up and down like a ball, make it stand and go at their pleasures: one saith the sun stands, another he moves; a third comes in, taking them all at rebound, and, lest there should any paradox be wanting, he finds certain spots and clouds in the sun, by the help of glasses....and thus they disagree amongst themselves, old and new, irreconcilable in their

> opinions; thus Aristarchus, thus Hipparchus, thus Ptolemaeus, thus Albateginus, thus Alfraganus, thus Tycho, thus Ramerus, thus Roeslinus, thus Fracastorius, thus Copernicus and his adherents, thus Clavius and Maginus, etc., with their followers, vary and determine of these celestial orbs and bodies: and so, whilst these men contend about the sun and moon, like the philosophers in Lucian, it is to be feared the sun and moon will hide themselves, and be as much offended as she was with those, and send another message to Jupiter, by some newfangled Icaromenippus, to make an end of all those curious controversies, and scatter them abroad." (II. 57-58)

More than whole-hearted acceptance, the *Anatomy*'s qualified reception of the Copernican view attests to its modernity. The serious consideration of heliocentrism in God's world requires a use of language that is indirect, conditional, and distanced; such usage therefore makes room for scientific language (which is direct, absolute, and "transparent") to claim the object world. The text's extreme openness to the words of others signals a "Galilean language consciousness" that relativizes the perception of language boundaries in the letting go of any one language as absolute.[24] But if the existence of Copernical giants in God's world drives the wedge between language and material and destroys the conditions for belief in God, Christianity flourishes by providing the *form* of the new relation between words and things. In redemption, Christianity cements its bond with science under the sign of secularization.

Tobias Swinden's *Enquiry into the Nature and Place of Hell*

The "certain spots and clouds in the sun" that confound the various views of the world tossed in Burton's blanket were sighted by the Jesuit priest Athanasius Kircher (1602-1680) through the telescope at Rome in 1635.[25] Kircher's report on the sun spots in *Mundus subterraneus* (1664) is the source and model for a later English writer, Tobias Swinden (d. 1719).[26] For Swinden it is not a matter of choosing Copernicanism over Christianity but of

seeing both as reciprocal proofs of each other. Swinden was an Anglican clergyman, who became vicar in Kent in 1689. His only known work is the grandly titled *An Enquiry into the Nature and Place of Hell*, published in 1714.[27] The nearly 300-page essay enjoyed wide currency and credibility, going through two editions in English and three in French translation, the last published as late as 1757.[28] In the ongoing debate over the Copernican universe, Swinden weighed in with the audacious, although entirely characteristic, idea that the "local Hell" was to be found in the dark spots on the sun.[29] His book is illustrated with an engraving based on Kircher's visual representation of what could be seen through the telescope (210).[30] Swinden argues that "if the Figure of Sun, as it was discovered by Kircher and Scheiner...have any thing of Truth in it...there are not only great Fountains of Ebullitions of Fire and Light spread thick over the whole Body of it, but in many Places dark Spots representing Dens or Caverns; which therefore may not irrationally be supposed the proper Seats of the blackness of Darkness" (209-211).[31]

Kircher was a Hermeticist and Egyptologist whose work was well known and much admired in England, as indicated by the encomium prefixed to his *Oedipus Aegyptiacus*: "To thee belongs the fame of Trismegist / A righter Hermes; th' hast outgone the list / Of 's triple grandure...."[32] Kircher's geographical and archaeological interests led to his "discovery" of an Egyptian city called "Heliopolis," "civitas Solis," or the City of the Sun. His account resembles "Adocentyn," the legendary city built by Hermes Trismegistus and described in *Picatrix*, a twelfth-century collection of Hermetic writings.[33] Both cities feature a temple to the sun, and the *Picatrix* specifies that Hermes Trismegistus built it to practice "astral magic" there. He arranged images of the "decans," or the Egyptian gods of time (every moment had its god that had to be

placated), in or on the temple for the purpose of drawing down the influences or "virtues" of the stars and planets for various practical ends, such as medical and love problems. The *Corpus Hermeticum* describes the same process used for "god making," or the animation of statues. The companion to the *Corpus Hermeticum* is the *Asclepius*, which elaborates the sun's importance: "[I]t is through the intermediary of the solar circle that light is spread to all. The Sun illuminates the other stars not so much by the power of his light as by his divinity and sanctity. He must be held as the second god. The world is living and all things in it are alive and it is the sun which governs all living things."[34] Below the sun in this animist pantheon are the thirty-six "decans," "horoscopes," or gods of time, divisions of ten degrees that make up the 360 degrees of the circle of the zodiac.[35] Demons are the children of the "decans." Beneath the decans are the planets.

The centrality of the sun in Hermetic representation assisted Christianity in encompassing heliocentrism, but also determined the nature and place of the Christian signature on the new system. By Swinden's time, the Hermetism of the Neoplatonists was assimilated into the orthodox Christian world view but, with a few exceptions, without reference to the figure of Hermes Trismegistus. Isaac Casaubon's assignment of the Trismegistic writings to the second century rather than to the time of Moses or, as Kircher maintained even after Casaubon's dating, the time of Abraham, was accommodated in various grotesque ways and frequently through the mask of Icaromenippus. The sun that represents the destination of the highest soarings of pride for Icarus becomes the "local Hell" for Swinden. In the same movement that restores the old god and binds him irrevocably to a fallen state, Swinden's asserts the centrality of Christianity in the new regime of science. The *Enquiry* shares the *Anatomy's* retention of the Ptolemaic hierarchy of

the heavens in its embrace of the Copernican view but otherwise moves in an opposite direction.[36] It composes itself in the genre of epic rather than anatomy in working to fasten down the meaning of the new universe rather than exposing successive layers to view and disputation.[37] The *Enquiry*'s twelve chapters have a canonical, symmetrical, Miltonic form rather than the Burtonian structure of profound disorder.[38] The first five chapters clear the ground of alternative opinion through the use of the grotesque method, the central sixth chapter announces the thesis that the sun is hell, and the last six chapters vigorously expound and defend this new claim on orthodoxy. The epic form conditions two decisive departures from the *Anatomy*'s grotesque method. The *Enquiry's* insistence on the muteness of matter corresponds to its muting of language, the familiar insistence on a literal rather than allegorical reading of scripture. Swinden's essay shows how the muteness of matter and language is the mechanism of science's faithless leap to redemption.

Swinden's idea could only become plausible in conditions where language and nature appear as distinct (fragmented) from each other and therefore as requiring a radical rearticulation. He begins by insisting on the separation of language from nature and for the primacy and immediacy of the latter. His argument gives the fourth chapter its name: "That the Fire of Hell is Not Metaphorical, But Real" (35-61); here he insists on a literal reading of biblical history: "I should think that to multiply Figures in the divine Writings, and to allegorize away the Text when there is no necessity for it, is unreasonable" (35). The last scriptural passage that he subjects to a literal reading is the most telling:

> Our blessed Saviour describing the great and terrible Day of Judgement telleth us, he will pass this final Sentence upon the Wicked, *Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting Fire, prepared for the Devil and his Angels.* (38)

The kind of "Sentence" indicated would seem to be clear from the context here of "Judgement." It would seem to be the "sentence" of a penalty pronounced upon a person convicted. But as this passage continues, we find this is not what Swinden means. For taking hell literally also literalizes language. By "Sentence," he refers to the literal, grammatical unit of the sentence:

> Now the Sentence of a Judge cannot well be supposed to be wrapped up and delivered in Figures and Parables, especially at that time when Allegories must cease, and all dark and obscure, both Things and Words too, must be laid open and brought to Light.... It is evident therefore, that the general and final Sentence, by which the Wicked shall be adjudged to everlasting Fire, must have in it no Figures or Allegories, but plain and proper Speech only; because the Guilty must perceive thereby what is their Doom.... (38)

In Swinden, the grammatical sentence not only refers to or describes a judgement. It is itself a judgement with the power of legal enforcement. Swinden's literal reading arrests the moment of the shift from the baroque referential system of language, by which words point to things, to a representational system, by which words are conflated with and displace things (in "plain and proper Speech"). Shown in this process, the representational system is, perhaps alarmingly, revealed to be closer not to "reality" but to a rearticulated mythological conception of language, in which words have mystical powers of conjuration in the refusal or suppression of their distance from the things to which they refer. The change may be conceived as the relation between allegory and symbol, in which allegory charts a progression or continuum of a series of movements, whereas the symbol appears as a momentary totality, such as that of the final judgement.[39] The "Sentence of a Judge" will be understood *literally* "at that time when Allegories...cease." The category of time is decisive. Bringing the Christian allegorical image of hell (eternity) into nature subjects the material that hell is made of — language — to time. And

language which thus registers time separates from things in emphasizing itself as a system that refers to those things. Baroque allegory spatializes language as a referential process in or through time, which is why Benjamin reads it as an "objectively necessary artistic structure."[40] In the baroque, time acts on language as well as on nature: "History stands written on the countenance of nature in the characters of transience."[41] But in the Christian view, as in our passage from Swinden, time is inseparable from the sense of doom, the certainty of guilt that is the precondition of redemption. And redemption is held out in the imperative that "both Things and Words too, must be laid open and brought to the Light...." The bringing to light, or enlightenment, will forestall this doom, paradoxically, by simultaneously precipitating and suspending judgement, for the literal language of judgement, like the day of judgement figured here, appears outside of time. In this way, "nature" is established as a realm outside of time.

By such literally magical means, and at such a cost, Swinden separates language from material reality in order to establish that "Hell" exists in nature and is therefore the possible and privileged object of his "scientific" enquiry and explanation. While Christianity's desperate bid to maintain its ground by magnanimously "authorizing" science is readily understandable, the reverse accommodation is less so. The commonsense view that science needed only to get past the Christian censors, and once it did, the incremental credibility of the knowledge it produced effected a gradual secularization, just as "Heaven" fades away, seriously underestimates the investment of modern science in the Christian eschatology. The scientific perspective is absolutely spiritual, as the *Enquiry* demonstrates in its treatment of matter and thought. Swinden concludes his discussion of the literal nature of hell with an exposition of the correspondent theory of matter. "What, though we cannot discern the Manner how material Fire may be of eternal Duration, will

we thence directly conclude it is impossible to be so? 'Tis true, no material physical Thing is naturally capable of immaterial or hyper-physical Properties; but what then! Will we confine the infinite power of God to the scanty Laws of nature, or to the more scanty Measures of our shallow Understandings?" (59-60). I draw attention to the key term "naturally" in this statement because it prepares the way for an opposite artificial or "cultural" capability for acquiring "hyper-physical Properties" in material human bodies that is pursued, in Swinden's sixth chapter, as the precondition for the reader's acceptance of Swinden's theory. The term, "hyper-physical Properties" is crucial for Swinden's conception of human thought as the principle, or "coordinate," of eternity. The above passage continues in preparatory fashion with reference to the non-materialist creation story: "Will we deny a possibility of Continuation of that by the breath of his Mouth, which by his Word he created? Besides, to say that no material or corporeal Being is in any respect capable of Eternity, is manifestly false; for the Bodies of men after they are raised again, and reunited to their Souls, shall endure forever." In this we see Swinden's affinity to Norris's Platonist insistence on the principle of eternity in matter, or the existence of an "immaterial spiritual Nature,"[42] as well as the great importance of this idea for the mutual in-forming of Christianity and modern science. For Christianity, in the masks of Swinden and Norris, can countenance materialism only if it is of the mechanist and not the vitalist kind.[43]

In Swinden's Chapter Six, the reader is further prepared for the announcement that Hell is in the sun through a defensive representation of knowledge as the dutiful development of "hyper-physical Properties" by individuals. The *Enquiry's* scheme is unveiled as the marriage of Christianity and Copernicanism: the Christian shaping of knowledge as redemptive, and science's shaping of the world as in need of it:

> It was God that implanted in our Minds the Love of Truth, and interwove it with our Natures. On which Account I hold it is good to stir up the Gift of God that is in us, to exercise our discerning Faculty, to contemplate the Works of the Creation and Providence, and to observe how they contribute to the Proof of Natural Religion, and to the Illustration of revealed Truth. (87)

The *Enquiry* prefaces its climactic conjecture that hell is in the sun by making what seems to be the preliminary and necessary discrimination between those who develop the "intellectual Principle of Life" and those who languish in the human's natural "torpid and lazy Stupidity."

> For what is more plain than that some Men, by a studious and speculative Life, have as much improved and raised their Minds above the common Level, as others by a Stupid and thoughtless activity have sunk them down beneath it? Hence it is that one discourseth, reasoneth, and speaketh more like an Angel than a Man, when at the same time it may be justly disputed whether there be any difference between another and a good tractable Horse...for he ploddeth on too in the same little Circle of Things, employeth his Thoughts on the Roads and Dishes before him; and, if he is question'd in any thing beyond that narrow Sphere, he remaineth *ut Piscis in arido Montium jugo*, mute as a Fish and quite out of his Element. (90)

The muteness of Swinden's "literal" language, cleansed of all previous intentions, here finds its counterpart in the human who is "mute as a Fish" in refusing enlightenment. In relation to such brute matter, the learned enquirer who speaks clearly in (muted) language is "more like an Angel than a Man." Science's knowledge is God-like in status and viewpoint: "Whereas Speculation and Theory make a Man feel he hath within him not only an animal, but also an intellectual Principle of Life; so that we may almost say, that the Soul of Man, blessed with the Benefit of Knowledge, and Happiness of Speculation, doth as much differ from it self, without those Improvements, as in the same State it is described, to differ from it self when in its Platonical State of inactivity" (96).

The *Enquiry*'s conditions for locating hell in the sun are available only to those Angels

with God-like knowledge. The two main conditions are empirically qualitative and quantitative by means of the new physics and mathematics. An empirically verifiable hell must have "a real, Material Fire" that necessarily feeds on the "Air" newly disaggregated from Heaven, and it must be large enough to accommodate the untold numbers of the damned. Both of these requirements disqualify the center of the earth as the site of hell, the tradition that Swinden argues against. He considers and then rejects volcanoes on the basis of Kircher's mapping of the distribution of volcanoes over the earth's surface. There are too few of them, and their location only in the torrid zones indicates that they are "only Fires of Nature's Kindling in some of the extreme Parts of the Earth" (79).[44] In any case, the earth is simply too small.[45] The "Magnitude of the Body of the Sun," as revised by Kircher and others, is taken as "proof" of the hypothesis. Swinden acknowledges that the accuracy of his theory depends "in good measure" on the new measurements of the sun: "It will be over and above sufficient for my Purpose if the Sun's Body come up, or near to the Calculation of our late and most eminent Astronomers, who earnestly contend that it is ten, eleven, nay, more than twelve hundred thousand times bigger than the Earth. I leave it to professed Arithmeticians to sum up, if they can, the square Miles of its Superficies; or, what is more, the cubical Miles of its solid Content; whilst I satisfie my self with observing, that if they who suppose Hell to be in the Earth, think the twentieth part of its Semidiameter on every side the Center to be Sphere sufficient for the Activity of its Flames; then certainly the Body of the Sun, which is so many hundred thousand times, as these Philosophers have described it, bigger than the whole Earth, must be acknowledged by all to be capacious enough for that Purpose" (113-114). The findings of the new sciences, then, which raise the question of the nature and place of Hell in the first place, are offered as proof that Hell exists in

nature.

The two-faced nature of this gesture is evident in the final and most conclusive arguments Swinden makes. One faces the new theories and the other faces the pagan past. Swinden's theory addresses both, and both prove his theory to be true. First, he introduces the still only tentatively accepted Copernican view of the universe while carefully acknowledging all of the refutations of it still in circulation. He then adopts a form of heliocentrism as the foundation of his own theory of the nature and place of Hell not because its scientific basis more closely aligns it with "reality" but because the Copernican "scheme" lends itself to a more *analogically* coherent vision of heaven and Hell. After reviewing the Copernican view of the universe, to which Swinden adds "the Coelum Empyreum" from the "vulgar Ptolemaick Scheme," he writes:

> Now that which I desire to be observed from this is...[f]irst, that the two Extreams or Opponents in the highest degree, are the Empyreum, and the Body of the Sun. The former of these is confessed by Divines...to be the Region of Angels and happy Souls. And therefore what more rational than to suppose the latter to be the Seat of Devils and miserable Spirits?..Since there is nothing more distant from God than Satan, from Angels than Devils, from Saints than Sinners, from Elect to Reprobate...how can we think but that there must be likewise the greatest Distance of Space between them? (117-122)

Swinden acknowledges that the telling equivalence of space is predicated on acceptance of the truth of the Copernican universe and therefore generously offers his own theory as proof, in turn, of the Copernican system:

> I confess, indeed, this and the former Argument have no Weight at all in them, if the Hypothesis be not admitted, or the Earth be supposed the Center of the Created World: For then the Earth and not the Sun would be in the highest degree opposed to Heaven and would also be the lowest Part of the whole Creation.... [However,] the burning Nature of the Sun's Body, and the Magnitude of it are, to me, not only Arguments of its being the Tartarus or Local hell, but, for that very Reason, a good proof too, of the Truth of the Copernican System, which hath so placed Heaven, the Earth and the Hell as suiteth with

> the Nature and Constitution of each one of them, and is agreeable likewise to the universal Notion which Mankind hath received of the situation of them. (134-35)

Swinden's final argument faces the past, the old pagan gods, as well as the new image of the world, and in the process shows how his *Enquiry* brings Hell into the world, rather than destroying it, in the secularizing language of qualitative materials and quantitative measurement. Any residual conception of the sun as life-affirming is simply evidence of a world (an earth) that is subject to Satan's dominion, not God's:

> The last Argument I shall urge in favour of this Opinion shall be drawn from the ancient and almost universal Idolatry of the Sun....[H]ad he [Satan] not as great Reason...to triumph over the wretched Folly of Mankind, in so universally imposing on them the Idolatry of the Sun, whereby he made them not only to deny the God that is above, but in Opposition to him to assert and vindicate the Seat of his own Empire below: And, which was above all worthy of his Craft and Cunning, even to adore and worship the Place where he knew he should hereafter punish and torment them forever? (148-152)

With this characteristically baroque rhetorical flourish, Swinden cleverly answers his critics in advance by damning them. He addresses but does not name the old gods, and in so doing, unveils his own identification with Icaromenippus. Those who would disagree with the findings of his enquiry in order to maintain the one-sided positive role of the sun in human life are only the dupes of Satan, who shapes the physiognomy and is the super-addressee of the new scientific view of the world. Paradoxically, Swinden's hypothesis ensures that the image of Satan will continue to have power in the new philosophy. It is to Satan's world that I now turn.

Notes to Chapter Two

1. Bakhtin, *Mikhail Bakhtin*, Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1984), 170. Clark and Holquist translate this sentence from a source that remains otherwise unavailable in English.

2. Richard G. Barlow, "Infinite Worlds: Robert Burton's Cosmic Voyage," *Journal for the History of Ideas* 34 (1973): 291. Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*, 3 vols., Everyman Edition, edited with Introduction by Holbrook Jackson (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1932, rpt. 1972). The Everyman Edition follows the posthumously published sixth edition (1641; rpt. 1660, 1676), which was based on a collation of the fifth edition (1638) and Burton's notes for its revision. Barlow mistakenly dates the sixth edition 1651. References to Burton's *Anatomy* will be cited in the text by volume and page number.

3. Lawrence Babb maintains it is impossible to ascertain Burton's opinions on the new cosmology. See *Sanity in Bedlam: A Study of Robert Burton's "Anatomy of Melancholy"* (Ann Arbor, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1959), 61. Barlow argues convincingly against Babb that Burton embraces the heretical implication of the Copernican theory, the existence of "infinite worlds" (302). Alternatively, Ruth A. Fox, in her still influential book, writes a few years later: "The 'new science' of the *Anatomy* does not come in the form of Burton's acceptance of new cosmological theories; he is not modern in that sense. Instead he is modern in Chaucer's sense, extracting new knowledge from old authors, gaining not new certainty of things never before understood, but fruitful questions and hypotheses which are the source of human knowledge." See *The Tangled Chain: The Structure of Disorder in the Anatomy of Melancholy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 100. Fox's Burton is modern in subjecting all opinion and observation to "reason" rather than to belief (98). Unfortunately, Fox does not distinguish between Burton's use of the term "reason," by which he refers to that which is subservient to divine revelation, and modern "reason," by which nature is rendered quite immediately and humanly knowable. If she had made this distinction, her argument would have made an opposite point, for Burton's reason is the old-fashioned kind. It is synonymous with "speculation" and becomes "nonsense" in straying outside human boundaries, as indicated in the part of the "Digression" that pretends to soar so high that God himself can be seen, lolling around in the afternoon (II.58-59). Such transgressions by "reason" are the source of much laughter, as they are in D'Urfey's *Essay*. But the *Anatomy*'s melancholy, also like D'Urfey's, encourages the deepest consideration of the Copernican theory. I agree with Barlow that the "Digression" signals acceptance of it, but I do not think such acceptance is the most significant sign of the text's modernity. More importantly, simultaneous laughter and melancholy prevents the *Anatomy* from foreclosing on the Copernican revolution, and is productive, instead, of the scientific and grotesque methods that are marked by a withholding of judgement by means of the "constant pause." The scientific method shapes the new regime of knowledge as redemptive while the grotesque method shapes novelistic discourse as science's other, which refuses redemption and struggles instead for the realization of matter. I hope to show that the modernity of the *Anatomy* derives from the creative work its words perform on their referents. Objective conditions of positioning and process rather than subjective notions of "genius" or authorial sovereign wit make

the *Anatomy* an especially active ingredient in the baroque crucible of modernity.

4. In an interesting monograph, Karl Josef Höltgen describes the *Anatomy* as a monad, although he does not use the term: "While another melancholic, Milton's 'Penseroso,' wishes to communicate with the immortal spirit from his tower of contemplation, Burton wants to use his vantage point in order to see as much of the world as possible." Höltgen goes on to explore Burton's adaptation of Ramist rhetorical method for his material on melancholy. See "Literary Art and Scientific Method in Robert Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*, *Explorations in Renaissance Culture* 16 (1990): 1-36.

5. The physician and bibliophile Sir William Osler rejuvenated scholarly work on the *Anatomy* in the present century when he designated it "a great medical treatise, orderly in arrangement, serious in purpose, and weighty beyond belief with authorities." See Osler's "Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*," *Yale Review* 3:1 (October 1913): 252. Most recently, Eleanor Patricia Vicari explicates the *Anatomy* as an extended Christian homily in *The View from Minerva's Tower: Learning and Imagination in The Anatomy of Melancholy* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 7. Martin Heusser, following Stanley Fish, brings reader response theory to bear in *The Gilded Pill: A Study of the Reader-Writer Relationship in Robert Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy* (Tubingen: Stauffenburg, 1987). And see Fish, *Self-Consuming Artifacts: The Experience of Seventeenth-Century Literature* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972).

6. D. P. Walker, *Unclean Spirits* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981), 69. The *Dialogicall Discourses* (London, 1601) are by the prominent witchcraft investigators, John Deacon and John Walker.

7. See, for example, Michael O'Connell's biography, *Robert Burton* (Boston: Twayne, 1986), 34.

8. My emphasis on the mask of Icaromenippus signals my reading of the "Digression" as "Menippean." Heusser disputes the categorization of the *Anatomy* as Menippean satire, saying that to "renounce categorization is one of the indispensable prerequisites for a successful reading of the *Anatomy*. This is just one more basic attitude on the part of the reader which Burton asks us to give up and on which he indefatigably insists" (103). Heusser is responding to Northrop Frye's suggestion that the term "anatomy," derived from Burton's particular realization of the genre, be adopted as the English term for menippean satire. See Frye's *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (New York: Atheneum, 1967), 311-312. Heusser is primarily concerned and satisfied to amplify the uniqueness and "genius" of Burton's text and does not explain how "uniqueness" might be seen unless it is placed against some kind of normative background of generic markers by which historically situated readers approach situated discourses organized into texts written by situated writers. But Heusser has only one reader-writer relationship in mind — the "successful" one between himself and his Burton! Despite his derivation of Menippean features from Bakhtin's enumeration, already cited, Heusser's dismissal of Menippean elements as marginal to the *Anatomy* are directed at the reader who would insist on generic classification as a final or authoritative "explanation" of a text, rather than the reader, such as Bakhtin, who reconfigures genre as a fundamental social and historical process, one that makes the realization

of specific genres, such as classification, anatomy, or the novel, possible. Heusser's dismissal therefore does not have a bearing on the present assumption of Burton's access to what Bakhtin, in distinguishing it from satire (a modern *delimitation* of Menippean genres), calls "the Menippea" See Bakhtin, *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*, 114. In *Voyages to the Moon* (New York: Macmillan, 1948) Marjorie Nicolson quotes a Herald in Ben Jonson's *News from the New World* to the effect that there are three authoritative generic models for the fantastic voyage or "going thither": "One is Endymion's way, by rapture in sleep, or a dream. The other is Menippus's way, by wing....The third, old Empedocles's way; who, when he leapt into Aetna, having a dry sear body, and light, the smoke took him, and whift him up into the moon" (40). Burton's own awareness of the productively constraining function of genre is indicated in the comment — in his book that is fully two-thirds quotation — that "we can say nothing but what hath been said, the composition and method is ours only, and shows a scholar" (I.25).

9. Words in square brackets are translations or clarifications provided by the *Anatomy*'s editor Holbrook Jackson.

10. Barlow takes his evidence of Burton's acceptance of "infinite worlds" from the third voyage (296-302).

11. The phrase about "objective necessity" is from Benjamin, as noted in my earlier discussion of allegory. The significance of the appearance of the *represented word* alongside the *representing word* is stressed by Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, 336.

12. Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, 377. Also see Bakhtin on "listening." The author of novelized discourse "listens" to the fundamental heteroglossia inherent in actualized language (327).

13. Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, 387.

14. Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, 419.

15. Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 200.

16. Earlier, "Icaromenippus" refutes a "fiery" or empyrean heaven in which the sun is closest to God (II.47). The empyrean heaven is associated with the theory of the decay of nature, considered a "cause" of melancholy in the seventeenth century, but, as Barlow notes, Burton shows little interest in it (300).

17. Johann Kepler is included in this list of Hermeticists because he considered that his discovery and mathematical calculation of the elliptical orbits of the planets confirmed the music of the spheres. See Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition*, 440.

18. Barlow's convincing case is impoverished by disregard for the careful placement and interchange of masks. Summing up his presentation of evidence, he refers to the *Anatomy*'s first mask to add weight to his argument: "It is appropriate that Democritus Junior, like Democritus,

believed in infinite worlds" (299). He later notes that in the "Lucianic cosmic voyage...[Burton] evidently considered himself a modern Icaromenippus" (302), but he makes nothing more of his observation. In claiming Burton and the *Anatomy* for modernity, Barlow is silent on the voyage to hell.

19. University of Michigan, Ph.D. Thesis, 1970, 82. The Osler History of Medicine Library holds a copy printed from Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1973.

20. *Arabism...*, 67. Burton's problem, according to Apple, is that there was no "secular model for everyday language to approach serious philosophical and theological matters" (41). The Arabic tradition, by contrast, as derived primarily from Ficino's translation of the writings of Hermes Trismegistus, values interpretation over textual accuracy (48), commentary over analysis (60), and is therefore instrumental in turning Western philosophy toward literature (60). Apple's dissertation is full of the most suggestive but all too brief comments that could be profitably developed. For example, he points out that the *Anatomy* more closely resembles a Persian *nawadir* than a Menippean satire (127). He also finds that Burton "justifies the hermetic doctrine that the powers of the gods can be called down to animate statues" by making a book out of himself (125).

21. Apple, *Arabism...*, 120.

22. Klibansky, Panofsky, and Saxl "discover" this "vital function of the Saturn-image." See Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 149-150.

23. The Danish astronomer Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) "introduced the practice of observing planets throughout the whole of their courses, instead of just trying to pick them out when they happened to be at special points in their orbits." But Brahe had no nose for math. Shortly after Christmas in 1566, he found himself in extreme disagreement with fellow student Manderup Parsbjerg over a certain mathematical point. After a very short fight with swords, "Parsbjerg cut off a good slice of Tycho's nose. This conclusively ended the dispute." A contemporary reporter explained that "as Tycho was not used to going around without a nose, and did not like to, he went to the expense of purchasing a new one. He was not satisfied, as some others might have been, to put on a wax one, but, being a nobleman of wealth, ordered a nose made of gold and silver so soberly painted and adjusted that it seemed of a natural appearance." See John Allyne Gade, *The Life and Times of Tycho Brahe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), 34-35. The records of Brahe's astronomical observations remain "as a strange monument of colossal intellectual power working on insufficient materials." After his death, his assistant, the more mathematically inclined Johannes Kepler, "reduced to order the chaos of data" with productive results. See H. Butterfield, *The Origins of Modern Science 1300-1800*, (1949) (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1968), 24 and 59-64.

24. Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination* 415, 323-324, and 367.

25. The *Anatomy* cites an earlier report published in 1611 by a certain "Jo. Fabricius" (II.57 n#3).

26. Athanasius Kircher, *Mundus subterraneus, in XII libros digestus; quo divinum subterrestris Mundi Opificium, mira Ergasteriorum Naturæ in eo distributio, verbo πανΓάμορφον Protei Regnum, universæ denique Naturæ* Majestas & divitiæ summa rerum varietate exponuntur. Abditorum effectuum causæ acri indagine inquisitæ demonstrantur; cognitæ per Artis & Naturæ conjugium ad humanæ vitæ necessarium usum vario experimentorum apparatu, necnon novo modo, & ratione applicantur. Two vols. (Amsterdam: J. Janssonium and E. Weyerstraten). On Kircher, see Patrick H. Harrop, *Inseminate Architecture: An Archontological Reading of Athanasius Kircher's Turris Babel*, with "Appendix: A Partial Translation of Athanasius Kircher's Turris Babel," Faith Wallis and Patrick H. Harrop (McGill University, M. Arch. Thesis, 1992). Harrop contains an extensive bibliography on Kircher, including, notably, Fred Brauen, "Athanasius Kircher (1602-1680)," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 43 (1982): 129-134; J. Fletcher, "Astronomy in the Life and Correspondence of Athanasius Kircher," *ISIS* LXI (1970): 466-468; Joscelin Godwin, *Athanasius Kircher: A Renaissance Man and the Quest for Lost Knowledge*, London: Thames and Hudson, 1979.

27. London: Printed for W. Bowyer, for W. Taylor at the Ship in Pater-Noster-Row, and H. Clements at the Half-Moon in St. Paul's Church-yard, 1714. Readers at McGill University can find the *Enquiry* in Redpath Tracts Series II, vol. CCCX, 1714 (9) Item #1. References will be cited in the text by page number.

28. The second edition was issued in 1727. It was translated into French in 1728 by Jean Bion, minister of the English church at Amsterdam. Other editions of the translation appeared in 1733 and 1757. My main source of information is the *DNB*, which lists the scant scholarship that exists on this work. The *Gentleman's Magazine* in 1789 includes a puzzling and brief description of the *Enquiry* (ii.620). The other references are in seventeenth-century official registers or eighteenth- and nineteenth-century letters or collections of anecdotes. The only reference I find in the twentieth century is in the most recent novel by the semiotician and novelist, Umberto Eco. *The Island of the Day Before* (1994), tr. William Weaver (New York: Penguin, 1995) is set in the baroque period and features the skewed masks of many "characters" familiar to the historian of science, such as a certain eccentric Englishman named "d'Igby" who is obsessed with the "weapon salve cure." The labyrinthine plot involves French, Italian, Spanish, German, and English virtuosi, shipping captains, and princes in competition to discover an accurate way to calculate the location of the meridians. Burton, Kircher, and Swinden all appear in Eco's novel in the masks of the works discussed here. Eco's thirtieth chapter is called "Anatomy of Erotic Melancholy." Chapter 33 is "Mundus Subterraneus," and Chapter 38 is "An Enquiry into the Nature and Place of Hell."

29. Christopher Hill reproduces, from a popular almanac published around 1640, the usual formulation of the question that accompanied consideration of the Copernican universe: "Where is your God, in heaven or in earth, aloft or below, or doth he sit in the clouds, or where doth he sit with his arse?" See *The World Turned Upside Down* (1972) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1975), 176.

30. The engraving, "Schema corporis Solaris prout ab Authore et. P. Scheinero. Romæ Anno 1635 observatum fuit," appears between pages 64 and 65 of Kircher's *Mundus subterraneus*.

31. Burton cites "Christopher Scheiner, a German Suisser Jesuit" and his book, "Ursica Rosa," published in 1630, in the third voyage of the "Digression of Air" (II.57).

32. Cited in Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition*, 416.

33. Yates provides the provenance and summarizes the contents of the *Picatrix*, 49-57.

34. Yates, 36. Yates is paraphrasing her own translation of Ficino's Latin translation of the *Asclepius*.

35. Yates, 36-37.

36. The "empyrean" is salvaged from the three worlds theory, in which the empyrean, the celestial world, and the elemental world are bound together as macrocosm and microcosm.

37. On the generic conventions of anatomy and Burton's usage in relation to the novel, see Devon L. Hodges, *Renaissance Fictions of Anatomy* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1985), 1-19 and 107-123.

38. Kircher's *Mundus subterraneus* is also structured in twelve books.

39. Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 165-166.

40. Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 49.

41. Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 177.

42. Norris, *An Essay Towards the Theory of the Intelligible World...*, 43.

43. Likewise, Easlea notes that mechanism "needed" hell in order to defeat vitalism (125).

44. After an earthquake in 1638, Kircher climbed Vesuvius and had himself lowered by rope into the volcanic crater. With the help of his pantometer he was able to ascertain the exact dimensions and structure of the crater. The data collected formed the basis of his great work, *Mundus subterraneus*, published forty years later. Just as Tycho Brahe helped to isolate the air from heaven, even though he rejected the Copernican system, Kircher helped to separate the subterranean powers of volcanoes from hell despite his Christian belief in hell.

45. Burton's "Menippus" surely prefigures the meaningless precision of statistics when he asserts that the earth's core, "cubically multiplied, will make a sphere able to hold 800,000 millions of damned bodies (allowing each body six foot square), which will abundantly suffice...since it is beyond question that, after proper subtraction is made, there will not be 100,000 millions damned...." (II.42).

Chapter Three

The Ideal World Realized as Hell

One single demon knows more than you.[1]

In D'Urfey's fragmented narrative of the voyage to the "Ideal World," the variously masked narrator and his guide "Malebranche" perch on the nose of death for a good fifty pages before their story continues. I will return to the intervening material in due course but here I pick up the far-flung account which assumes their distanced perspective and records some funny things. The voyage suddenly resumes in a chapter called "A Disappointment that gave me much Uneasiness and Astonishment. A very good Jest. The Nature of a Praedicable" (173-174). It opens with the narrator congratulating himself for not proceeding through the nose: "Among all the Particulars I discover'd, there was one which dissatisfy'd, as well as surpris'd me, to such a degree, that I blest myself not a little for my happy Caution in keeping out of this Ideal Enclosure [i.e. the death's head]. Not one of my own Species could I set my Eyes on, (I mean the Eyes of my Understanding) nor discover the least Idea of a human Creature in any Corner of the Ideal World." "Malebranche" chides him for "the very good jest" of even inquiring into this glaring absence and ascribes the expectation of seeing humans in the "Ideal World" to the lingering "Predjudice of Sense." For, "Malebranche" explains, "Men are not changed in the Ideal World, but 'tis the Idea that suffers an Alteration, when it becomes a Man." While there are no humans in the "Ideal World," "Malebranche" prompts his voyager to discover instead "the Idea of a

Centaur": "[A] Centaur (de'e mark) is the compleat and original Idea; for, Centaur, or Animal, being the Genus, its two Species, Rational and Irrational, are only broken Ideas of a Centaur dismember'd, or distributed into the Parts of its self." "A Corollary" immediately following enlarges on the point: "Tis absurd therefore, and ridiculous, to talk of the eternal and unchangeable Idea of a Man, or of a Horse; Since, taken apart, they are no better than Monsters in Nature." Our apparently convinced narrator offers the eminent examples of Richard the Third, the "Jesuitico-Fanatical Saints, the Regicide English, Cain, Judas, and Sir Satanides Goatham" as worthy of adorning such a "Black-List."

Since the reader is likely to be unfamiliar only with the last name mentioned, an "Advertisement" concerning his character follows. But getting to know Sir Satanides involves "seeing" the world through his eyes. Before making that leap, I draw attention to the fact that this Satanic creature and his perspective are first seen from the outside, from the nose of death, the position of distance from which "D'Urfey's" laughing account objectifies death, relying on the "Hiatus" as a bridge. The "Hiatus" links life and death, voyager and discovery, as well as the "broken Ideas" of the "Rational" and "Irrational." But this is the view that "Malebranche" means to correct and the bridge loses its girding in the process of assuming or getting inside Sir Satanides' preferred, ideal viewpoint. It is "as if" the voyagers enter the nose of death and begin to see the world through Satan's eyes. The intimate identification with Sir Satanides prompts a preparatory and pseudo-sympathetic "A Further Account of Centaurs..." (177-178), in which the poets of all former ages are taken to task for spreading misinformation about centaurs and specifically the misconception that the entire genus is "comprised within the two Species of Risible and Hinnible, or Man and Horse...." In his own survey of the Ideal World, our narrator

testifies that he did not see (that is, his "Understanding" did not see) more "Men-Horses, than Men-Bulls, Men-Camels, Men-Elephants, Men-Sharks, Men-Cuckoos, Men-Foxes, or Men-Asses, which make as good Centaurs as the best" (179). That there is more to a Centaur than a simple and readily discernible mix of Laughing Man and Whinnying Horse (or, more familiarly, Yahoos and Houyhnhnms) is established in order to account for the many variations (fragmentations) of the passions and temperaments of men, the allegorized physiognomic signs by which they are distinguished as good or evil. These are differences by which we can "know" the highly individuated Sir Satanides, but they also become available only from his special point of view, that of "Death." Indeed, the apparently infinite variations of the "Ideal Man" generated by "primitive Copulations" under wildly varying circumstances are enough to put "a good Herald at a loss where to begin their Pedigree." "Consider'd in their talkative Capacity, they discover the Jay, Magpie, or Parrot; In their Port they bear great Resemblance to a Peacock, though their Pertidapperipragmaticofinicality betrays the perfect _____."

The "Ideal Genealogy" of Sir Satanides is traced to the "Satyrs, or Man-Goats," a branch of the Centurean race, but his particular family branch is marked by "an Hereditary Distemper, something allied to the Syphillis," which links him not only to knowledge of good and evil but to sexual knowledge, the very secret — and here, the very disease — of life. If his "Pertidapperipragmaticofinicality" fails to give him away, we find the additional clue that in a raging fit once, he apparently "demanded an Exchange of Blood...[and] to ease his Spleen of the Satyr, he transfused into his Jugular an incredible Quantity of Hounds-Blood; so that now remaining Man-Goat as to his Concupiscible, and Man-Hound as to his Irascible, his very Name is become frightful to Male and Female; neither of which can endure to meet him in the dark..."

(180-181).

From the safety of his position on the nose of death, "D'Urfey" mocks death in the image of Sir Satanides. He unmasks "Death" as the unlivable realization and viewpoint proposed by Norris's and Malebranche's idealism and reveals its "real" endpoint in the new kind of man, the "as if" dead man. Characterized as the "Species Intentionales" (135), the kind with the will to knowledge who admirably and deliberately traverses the "Hiatus" as passage, "Death" is the ideal counterpart of the ingenious Author. The "Hiatus" itself is the agent of the discovery of the author, on the one hand, and the perspective of "Death" on the other: "The Author very well understands that a good sizable Hiatus discovers a very great Genius" (163). A short section called "Concerning My Own Pedigree and the Present War" clarifies the relation of correspondence:

> I know not whether I may expect Thanks for my Discovery of a new World; for I am resolved to stand it out, that 'tis entirely my own Discovery, *tho' the thing was long since discovered by my Predecessors*. Therefore *We the Author of this Theory*, in *our own Name and Person*...challenge Mankind to appear, and *do us Homage* for the new Province put into their Hands.... (185)

The "Hiatus" as gap between the real, sensible, fragmented, fallen world and the ideal, "intelligible," dead essence of redeemable things is bridged by this new counterpart to the Ideal Man: the Author.[2] He "discovers" a whole new world in the gap, the "constant pause," that bids him to narrate, describe, introduce, defend, mock, redeem, condemn, unmask, invert, and otherwise materialize, manage, and orchestrate all the "Ideal Essences" that come pouring in through the "Hiatus." The special position that gives shape to the Author in this process, indeed, would not exist except for the discovery of the "Hiatus." I have italicized the phrases in the

passage quoted above that dramatize or enact the "Hiatus" as the gap between the represented and the representing word. In the italicized words, "D'Urfey" comments on words ostensibly belonging to "Norris." They are the smiling means of distancing these words from the mouths of either speaker. Both the common language measure of "D'Urfey" and the objectified language of "Norris" are represented as languages at the same time that they speak for their referents. The object of laughter from this doubled or removed perspective is not only death but also, through the eyes of "Death," the beastly, human, animate nature of life. For the narrator, "life" is nothing but animated viewpoints realized in languages, and "Death" is the only viewpoint from which this "essence" of life can be made to appear ridiculous, as "the little inanimate World Erratick." In the process, however, "Death" is also rendered laughable.

Satan and Epistemological Fear

The achievement of baroque novelistic discourse is precisely the materialization rather than the unproblematic assumption of this omniscient, God-like viewpoint of "Death." Novelization completes the Copernican revolution by retaining or locating eternity ("Death") in matter (language), an accomplishment which effects a truly earth-shattering inversion of value. For here the only reality of eternity is the eternal mutability of matter, its answerability to its environment, the defining condition of life itself.[3] The novel insists there is no first word and no last word. The realization and visualization of this condition privileges the present, the perspective opposite to eternity. The universal, omniscient view is subordinated in relation to the present of the text and subjected to continual testing. The author/narrator is the mocking God and the "external mover" (the conductor) of words and languages, the primary units of value and

extension, as in D'Urfey's interminable "Preface." The author/narrator, bearing the physiognomy of the centaur or Satan, mocks God in feigning his totalizing vantage point, while at the same time unmasking the fictional status of such a perspective. Science stops short of this Copernican discovery by occupying, in all seriousness, the perspective outside time, that of "Death." Science requires laughter's objectification of death, which makes the perspective of "Death" available. But science resists laughter's resolution of the fear that death evokes. In order to harness laughter's capacity to arouse the fear of death but prevent laughter's dissolution of that fear, science, once securely occupying the mask of "Death," marginalizes the life-death boundary in favor of that between matter and thought, the emergent remodelling of relations between baroque allegorical fragment and whole. Fear of death is replaced by fear that fragments of matter have "views" and trajectories of their own, that matter sees, resists, and mocks the illusory whole. The idea that the "little inanimate World" is, in reality, quite animate, becomes the most necessary but also the most "risible" idea in the new scientific form of "hinnible" knowledge.

A mixture of allegory (Satan) and empiricism (the "as if" objective viewpoint he makes available) gives rise to the peculiar form of baroque natural history.[4] Typically concerned to distinguish between "ordinary" and "extraordinary" phenomena, between those that signify the work of the devil and those that occur in nature and are therefore the work of God, baroque natural history operates to disaggregate and place side by side the languages of allegory and empiricism, a placement that is productive of an ingeniously rich mixture of laughter and melancholy. A pamphlet called *An Account of Some Late Characters* (1643) lampoons the Church of England's insistence on the communion as the literal body and blood of Christ by juxtaposing the mysterious transubstantiation with orthodoxy's language of empirical

substantiation and reference to physical evidence.[5] The result is certain notorious sermons that "make men laugh, till they fall downe Dead."[6] A somber anonymous fragment that mourns rather than laughs, but in the same admixture of languages, is attached to similar materials from the same date and publisher:

> A Relation of a Vision of Blood in the Skie,
> which appeared at Redding [sic] on Tuesday night last.
>
> Upon Tuesday night last there appeared a skie red as bloud about Redding, halfe a mile long, or more, which was seen so cleare and visible about six of the clock at night, that not onely many people thereabouts did run to see it, but it being apparent so farre that it might be seen to London; there were thousands that went to London-Bridge, some went into the fields, others to the tops of houses to behold this wonderfull vision, which was in this manner viz.: In length halfe a mile or more, as it was judged, sharp at the North end, and broad at the South end: for the length of it was North and South, red as bloud, and very clear, almost in colour like the Moon when she is in an Eclipse; which though it seemed cleere, yet caused rather a darknesse than a light; the length continued much alike, but it grew sometimes broader, and sometimes again it was narrower; there was neither Sun, Moone, nor any Star visible in the skie, which was very black and dark, onely this bloudy vision which appeared in this manner. What can we otherwise judge of, then to be a token of Gods displeasure against the cruell Cavaliers thereabouts, who kill, murder, and slaw the people of God, whose bloud cries to heaven in the ears of God for vengeance against them.

Blood in the sky is the allegorical sign of God's displeasure and his promise or threat of retribution. Yet note the empirical precision that presumes to guarantee the truth of this allegorical vision. We are provided with day and time of its appearance, length, width, directional orientation, and comparative relation to the astronomical reference point of the moon. Most importantly, we are provided with the special perspective of the "thousands" of people below, "the people of God" between Reading and London, who witness and confirm their own experience of history in the heavens.

On the one hand, the empiricism of this passage continues and extends the process of allegorical fragmentation. "What the sciences stand in need of is a form of induction which shall analyze experience and take it to pieces, and by a due process of exclusion and rejection lead to an inevitable conclusion," writes Francis Bacon in *The Great Instauration*.[7] Empirical detail isolates this particular sunset in nature and history. Such information locates the sunset in the present and makes it available for the special allegorical reading by the people who witness it. In effect, empiricism produces the viewpoint from below. On the other hand, empiricism forestalls and undermines the allegorical reading it makes possible. Whereas allegory moves to reconstitute a meaning of the whole, empiricism defers a final reading pending the collection of more and more data. In its dependence on a situated point of view, empiricism tirelessly raises the question of the credibility of the testimony even of "thousands" of people.[8] Empiricism delineates their viewpoint but also questions its authority. In fact, the viewpoint from below is widely disparaged. "The Truth and Goodness of any Doctrine is not to be tried by the telling of Noses."[9] In other words, what is true cannot be arrived at or known through counting the numbers who reach consensus. Yet such earthly agreement is exactly what empirical differentiation and testing depend on and aim to achieve. While empiricism rests on a foundation of readily verifiable sensible experience, at the same time it perpetually defers the realization of conclusions drawn from its own evidence. The genius and dynamism of seventeenth-century empiricism is its simultaneous emphasis on the power and the limitations of human cognition, recognition of "its ability to gain only partial, fleeting insights into the nature of things."[10] The new empiricist, in the words of Robert Boyle, "will be very inclinable, both to desire and admit further information,...but he will be very inapt to take, for the adequate standard of truth, a thing so imperfectly informed,

and narrowly limited, as his mere or abstracted reason."[11] As the middle way between scepticism and dogmatism — including the dogmatism of unbelief — empiricism not only allows but also requires the tentative suspension of disbelief that subjects more and more phenomena to scientific investigation, including heaven, hell, miracles, monsters, witches, and Satan himself.[12] Until the "requisite data" settle a matter, everything remains open to question.

The nose is the telling metonymic fragment of the human body that stands in for empiricism's authoritative recourse to sense experience and at the same time to the fallen, fallible, mute, and ephemeral nature of its data. It is perhaps the second most prevalent image, after Satan, in baroque polemics concerning politics, theology, and the new philosophy: "Come, come, ye Cock-brain'd Crew, that can suppose, / No truth but that which travells through the Nose." The rallying cry of a collection of poems and songs equates sense perception, the "catastrophic" inversion of power by the republican parliament, and the folly of consorting with Satan by greeting him with the well known gesture of "kissing him in the breech": "Most men do now the Buttocks lick / Of their great body Politick; / For not the head, but breech is it / By which the Kingdom now doth sit; / The world is Chang'd, and we have Choyces, / Not by most Reasons, but most Voyces,...."[13]

D'Urfey's ingenious image that brings together the nose (the present) and death (the eternal) is not idiosyncratic, then, but rather a widely used figure of unified reason. Hesitation on the bridge of the nose, however, registers the dependence of this epistemological achievement on the marginalization of the life-death boundary. Empiricism makes an abrupt about-face. It turns away from the fear of death as primary and towards the more threatening fear of misreading matter, for which it now speaks. We might say that empiricism more than anything fears the nose.

The lies, tricks, and illusions of Satan are no longer the greatest obstacle to truth. The larger obstacle is empiricism's own reliance on the evidence of the human senses. In making the 180-degree turn away from death, the empiricist assumes the viewpoint of "Death" in relation to muted matter. Satan, the mask through which empiricism views objectively the subjective realm of the nose, is reconstituted in relation to the nose, the paradigmatic fragment or "member" of animate matter. [14]

The risible realization of this perspective is novelized discourse, while the hinnible is science. That is, novelized discourse retains the distinction between the objectification of death and that of animate matter, while the former is invisible to science because science occupies the perspective of "Death" that, in its objectivity, constitutes and relates to the "subjective" realm. Daniel Defoe's novelized and risible *The Political History of the Devil* (1726) renders Satan harmless. We are not bound, he says, "to speak of the Devil but with an Air of Terror, as if we were always afraid of him." Rather, Defoe's aim is to "shew him to the World that he may be laugh'd at."[15] Instead of fearing the Devil, Defoe conjures up the threat of the nose that Satan himself ought to fear: "[L]et the Devil and all his fellow Complainers stand on one Side, and the honest, well-meaning, charitable World, who approve my Work, on the other, and I'll tell Noses with Satan, if he dares...."[16] Here the nose is the means of verification and the very ground of truth. Satan cannot survive its scrutiny. There is no evil in such a world. But Defoe's history of the devil is novelized in that it incorporates laughter *at* death and at the same time flirts with inhabiting Satan's objectifying point of view. The Devil's "History of his own Times" would be a "Devilish good one" because Satan is "qualified by his Knowledge of Things to be a compleat Historian." Alongside the tales the Devil could tell, "Milton's Pandemonium...would appear a

meer trifling sing-song Business...."[17] Defoe emulates Satan when he claims that his *Political History* "shall be so just and so well-grounded, and, after all the good Things I shall say of Satan, will be so little to his Satisfaction, that the Devil himself will not be able to say, *I dealt with the Devil* in writing it."[18]

Risible, novelized representation retains, most importantly, distance from its object. It is more true to life in representing both death and death's objectification of animate matter as varying positions of perspective available in language and as discourse, and this capacity signifies the novel's rootedness in laughter and critique. Hinnible representation, by contrast, is immediately "performative" of the new hell. Realization or completion of its meaning elicits the reader's response in actions rather than words. Empiricism's foreclosure of allegorical signification is aimed solely at allegory's system of reference. For while empiricism extends the grotesque allegorical process of fragmentation, it aims, finally, to narrow down and tighten the fit between words and things. As Bacon put it, science works towards "inevitable conclusions."

Hinnible discourses of the baroque realize the world as Hell in the presentation of allegory and the telling of noses as the primary objects of fear. A characteristic pamphlet entitled *Hell Broke Loose: or, A Catalogue of Many of the Spreading Errors, Heresies and Blasphemies of these Times, for which we are to be humbled* (1646) lists forty-two recently noted instances of "heresy" that are to be taken as evidence that Hell has sprung loose in the world. [19] Chief among them is the heresy of allegorizing the Bible, which amounts to calling into question its historical accuracy and therefore its status as arbiter of truth. Allegorizing God's word realizes the world as Hell, the perspective and pretext of this author's thundering pronouncement of the present as "a day of Trouble, and of Rebuke, and of Blasphemy." [20] The "heresy" of allegorizing is

answered in the kind of project that Swinden undertook to locate Hell empirically. As we have seen, literalizing hell invests language (the material hell is made of) with a totalizing symbolic / representational power. A second widespread heresy is the location of sovereignty in "the body of the common people" (7). According to this "heretic" view, the "Earthly Sovereign," constituted in the people, claims "underived" authority: "...the King, parliament, &c. are their own meer creatures to be accountable to them, and disposed of by them at their pleasure; the people may recall and reassume their power, question them, and set others in their place" (7).

Like the people's freedom to read their own history in a bloody sunset, the absence of external authoritative controls on what people may "know" (or on what they "nose") both liberates and condemns baroque readers — a category that includes the new empiricists — to determine for themselves what is true and what is false, what is the work of Satan and what is the work of God. This is Hell broke loose, and the performative climate of fear is only intensified in the identification of the source of fear as the former source of certainty: direct experience. Knowledge of such experience is recast as "subjective" and placed in the gravest doubt in order to authorize objective knowledge, which calms fear and self-doubt, but has no other foundation. *Hell Broke Loose* operates performatively to scare the reader and in the same gesture offers the means of quieting that fear. According to this text, the reader can meet the "crisis" only by locating spiritual certainty in the affirmation of an absolute God.[21]

The Gates of Hell Open'd: In a Dialogue Between the Observator and Review works more subtly and ambitiously to position the reader in the fallen viewpoint of objectivity. Authored "By a Friend of the Light," it promises to reveal which of current and recent reported events are the work of the devil.[22] The reader is first tricked into the position of eavesdropping on two

journalistic organs, the *Observator* and *Review*, that speak openly to each other. The reader's indiscretion backfires, however, because the newspapers proceed to ridicule those who, like the present hapless reader, believe such "interested" reportage to be absolutely true. The journals' own readers are unmasked as consorting with Satan when the authors reveal themselves as working for the Devil in claiming to know and report on events in an unbiased, objective way: "...in Ambush we may lie, yet seen / With open Countenance like honest Men. / Hypocrisie kept close, like Fire, spreads / Through secret Vents into a Thousand Heads" (22-23). While the baroque reader is compelled to find out the truth through the acquisition of the facts, the only sources of information — the apparently objective newspapers, periodicals and pamphlets — are, in reality, quite animated viewpoints, animated by vested interests that may or may not be the evil masks of the devil. The "Friend of the Light" calls on the reader to beware what he reads and believes, for the devil is most productive among the unwary, the ignorant, and the unknowing.

In both *Hell Broke Loose* and *The Gates of Hell Open'd* the primary object of fear is not Satan but allegory (the stuff Satan and Hell are made of) and the new, concomitant "underived authority" of the majority view (the truth arrived at by the telling of Noses). The point of this genre of combined spiritual and civil horror is the provocation to epistemological fear and the prevention of laughter's dissolution of fear. Robert E. Stillman reads the most well-known work by Thomas Hobbes as a deliberate and effective arousal of fear. The "*Leviathan* is so constructed as to call out from the reader not merely fear for his own mortality but also to induce a state of profound epistemological fear." Hobbes's widely noted deployment of monstrous metaphors to disparage the intolerable ambiguities introduced by figurative language "disturbs and provokes" the reader because the recourse to metaphor dramatizes the text's inability to supply the remedy it

insists is essential to meet the impending civil crisis.[23] Stillman cites Hobbes's contemporary, John Eachard, who lists "in a single sentence that extends for nineteen pages...examples of metaphor from the *Leviathan* mainly for the pleasure of lashing Hobbes with his own whip."[24] This is a graphic enactment of the effect of Hobbes's work in widening the gap between words and things and provoking the reader to bridge it. Readers are induced by this means to move from "readers of a text to authors of a commonwealth."[25] Hobbes's "liberal" state is absolutist in constituting the *only means* of bridging the gap. There is only one way, and it is final. It consists in the final judgement, the form of settling for redemption in the new regime of knowledge rather than embracing the liberating possibilities of the fragmented world.

On the occasion of a visit by the Prince of Wales, soon to be King Charles I of England, who would later lose his head to baroque violence, the archbishop of Madrid calls on various orders of monks to appear in a procession "with some decent mortifications" in order to teach people how they should deal with the affairs of this world:

> the Descalzos of St. Gil and of St. Bernard appeared together with the Order of St. Francis; then, the Our Lady of Mercy Descalzos of St. Barbara, the Augustinian Hermits, the Capuchins and the Trinitarian Descalzos, some with skulls and crosses in their hands; others with rough vestments and hairshirts without hoods, and their heads are covered with ashes and crowns of thorns, and are pouring blood; others with ropes and chains at their necks or around their bodies; crosses on their shoulders, fetters in the shape of a cross tied to their feet, piercing their chests with stones, with muzzles on their mouths and the bones of the dead in them, and everybody praying the psalms. Thus they went down the Calle Mayor and by the Palace and returned to their convents in a trek lasting more than three hours, which amazed the Court and left it full of examples, tenderness, tears and devotion.[26]

The mask of "Death" appearing in this devout yet circus-like parade still retains a vital link to laughter. Maravell cites a letter dated May 27, 1634, written by a Jesuit, that relates "the case of

a hanging as something to provoke laughter."[27] What Maravell calls the "baroque pedagogy of the sentiments of violence" commands response — amazement, tenderness, tears, or laughter. When the new philosophy turns away from the terrifying boundary between life and death, such passions have only one place to go.

Empirical Testing and Novelistic Becoming in Joseph Glanvill's Ghost Stories

Joseph Glanvill (1636-1680) and Henry More (1614-1689) adopt the baroque pedagogy of fear in their collaborative collection and publication of ghost stories in the hope that "the History of Spirits" might "fetch off men to an easier belief of a God." "As a sensationalist and an empiricist, Glanvill argued from sense data" in his immensely popular *Saducismus Triumphatus* but feared "his public might feed on the bait and not submit to the doctrinal hook." [28] He carefully distinguishes his pedagogical concern from the storyteller's concern for titillation. "I have no humour nor delight in telling Stories, and do not publish these for the gratification of these that have; but I record them as *Arguments* for the *confirmation* of a Truth."[29] Glanvill's works appeared after the witch hunts had already abated. His "contribution" lies not in those historical events but in the Anglicization of the scientific revolution, and, despite the disdain for "telling Stories," in his sifting through the court records of the witchcraft cases that serve as raw material for literary genres of horror to the present day.[30] Glanvill is central to the history of science and the novel because he makes use of empirical technique in examining legally documented cases of witchcraft, yet he refuses to make the about-face that science makes. He resists seeing through the eyes of "Death," a move that would render the witches' purported manipulations of (thinking) matter ridiculous.

As Prior points out, Glanvill's most decisive and extraordinary weapon in his defense of the reality of witchcraft is scientific scepticism itself. "Hence the paradox that Glanvill believed in witches because he was a sceptic."[31] Glanvill's scepticism took the form of a tentative suspension of disbelief, as indicated in the title of his earlier work, *Scepsis Scientifica: or Confest Ignorance the Way to Science....* Or in Bacon's well-known formula: "If a man will begin with certainties, he shall end in doubts; but if he will be content to begin with doubts, he shall end in certainties."[32] Glanvill's tentative scepticism led him to adapt another principle of scientific method to his investigations of witchcraft: the doctrine of hypotheses.[33] He insisted only on the probability of witchcraft in imitation of scientific procedure. Glanvill's "experimental demonology" derives further coherence from the clearly shared notion that there were limits to nature.[34]

The popularity of *Saducismus Triumphatus*, from the earliest variations and editions, derives from its engagement of the problem of subjective experience. The validity of subjective experience is the fundamental problem that the novel responds to in the form of the narrator who must both claim and resist authority as witness to the subjective experience of others. In its concern for the biographical historicity of the individual, the novel, in turn, generates the conditions of possibility for the emergence of the knowing subject, the one who can know the world of nature as well as that of history. On this latter point, we can see Glanvill's importance as much for science as for the novel. The genres of observational and experimental reporting that developed in the *Transactions* of the Royal Society, of which Glanvill was a member, tended increasingly to posit the boundary "outside" the observer or natural philosopher.[35] "Matters of fact" were carefully constructed, as in Boyle's air pump experiments, through the testimony of reputable witnesses to phenomena or to experiments.[36] The combination of their credibility, the

immediacy of reportage, and the repeatability of the described effects enabled the presentation of such facts as "natural" and self-evident.[37] This development invested nature with a special authority. Science objectified nature and then presumed direct access to its elevated and "eternal" authority by means of experiment and testing.

Glanvill's ghost stories perform three tasks that are preconditions of the novel. First, they locate the chronotope of "becoming" as the threshold between life and death, which Glanvill formulates as a continuity rather than as a rupture; second, they implicate the narrator with Satan, the representational figure of "becoming" who occupies the threshold between life and death; and third, they subject this narrator's language to testing. The combination of testing and becoming is the defining feature of the modern novel which, as Bakhtin notes, thrives on "the lack of wholeness characteristic of living human beings, a mixture within [them] of good and evil, strength and weakness. Life and its events no longer serve as a touchstone, a means for testing a ready-made character...now, life and its events...reveal themselves as the hero's *experience*."[38]

Glanvill presents his "relations" of spirits and demonic activity as matters of fact that rely for their credibility on the criteria of scientific reportage: the reputation of witnesses, the immediacy of reporting, and the repetition of effects (if not through experiment, then through sheer volume of incidence). Contradictory tension arises, however, because Glanvill applies these criteria to the question not of an objectified world that can be known but to the question of how individuals in the world are connected to each other and to the world. Repeated references to the "obvious" influence of a mother's imagination on the well-being of her foetus, and accounts of precisely how, where, and with what instruments and venoms the Devil sucks and infuses his bewitched, indicate Glanvill's concern for the linkage of the material and spiritual realms rather

than their separation. The frequency with which he mentions the obviously charmed relation between mother and foetus marks this relation as particularly suspect and speaks to the necessity of the gendering of the witches as primarily female. The reproductive capacity is the sign of the female's ambiguous relation to the new configuration of matter as mute.[39]

But Glanvill's inability to represent and point to the site of linkage between matter and spirit as concrete and empirically available forces him to elaborate with "scientific" precision what *can* be known: the time and place of reported demonic activity and the vehicle or mechanism of knowing it — that is, the circumstances of how the narrator came to know what is narrated. My examination of this evidence shows, first, that Glanvill's ghosts most often appear at physical threshold points of entry and exit (e.g., "at the stile,") and usually at the time of the change from day to night or night to day or from work to rest.[40] In the repetition of this "fact" and the importance he places on it, Glanvill establishes the chronotope of the novel: the time/space of "becoming," the condition of the individual life in a state of becoming other. Anxiety on this condition signals the text's concern for the biographical historicity of the individual in its preoccupation with the most fundamental of thresholds: that between life and death. The new, emergent genre of the novel that Glanvill helps bring into being bases itself on death in the sense that the "meaning" of a person's life can only be known and therefore narrativized once that person's coordinates are fixed in time and space — that is, the coordinates of birth and death.

Second, Glanvill's ghosts necessarily always appear to a third, usually unrelated and "uninitiated" party, which both raises the problem of posing as a witness to the subjective experience of others, and offers a solution. This third party subsequently appears to have a clairvoyant knowledge of events to which he or she would not otherwise have access. Special

foreknowledge of details of the haunted person's life and of the dead's unfinished business complicates as well as reinforces the third party's credibility in narrating the story. His or her credibility or lack of it then has to be directly engaged in the text. Typical is Glanvill's relation "XIV," in which the ghost of a murdered man appears to the cell mate of two men suspected of killing him.[41] The story consists chiefly of testing the credibility of the "third Man." His innocence of the crime and of the accusation of guilt against his fellow inmates must be established, as does the "innocence" and reliability of all subsequent narrators who stand between the original ghostly vision and the present reader. More and more doubts are raised in the enumeration of "proofs," including the fact that the first legal representative to hear the case, a justice of the peace, is the slain man's cousin, and the fact that the third man is in jail because he is a "Rogue." The atmosphere of doubt is especially highly charged because knowledge of peoples' secrets is itself a mark of possession, and because the third man offers a more accurate description of the dead man and his fatal wounds than could someone who knew him.[42] The very source of his credibility, then, is the source of doubt about his motives and "abilities." In this problematic relation of the narrator to the devilish material, Glanvill's stories, in novelistic fashion, engage their own historical preconditions in continually testing their ability to tell a tale.

In Glanvill's relations of witchcraft and ghost stories, there are at least four kinds of testing that define the articulation point between modern empirical method and the novel. The first three have generic antecedents in accounts of saints' lives and other forms of Christian narrative. In the first kind, the Devil or his agent, a witch or ghost, approaches, usually by knocking at the door, to make a specific request, usually for food. The analogue is the New Testament's "Be not forgetful to entertain strangers: for thereby some have entertained angels

unawares," the test that Christians must be prepared for at all times.[43] The second kind is the trial of punishment and torment that results from turning away the stranger or refusing the request. The trial is survived, as in the Book of Job, only through steadfastness and consistency. The third sort of testing involves exposing the unnatural relationship between the accused and non-living matter. In the case of Florence Newton's witchcraft upon Mary Longdon, a case that Glanvill takes from Irish court records of 1661, a witness named Edward Perry testifies that, having "read of a way to discover a witch," he proceeded to try it out on "Goody Newton":

> And so they sent for the Witch, and set her on a Stool, and a Shoemaker with a strong Awl endeavoured to stick it in the Stool, but could not till the third time. And then they bad her come off the Stool, but she said she was very weary and could not stir. Then two of them pulled her off, and the Man went to pull out his Awl, and it dropt into his hand with half an Inch broke off the blade of it, and they all looked to have found where it had been struck, but could find no place where any entry had been made by it.[44]

Other tests of this kind involve examining marks on the skin, such as a wart on the nose, where the Devil might be found to be sucking or infusing his "Familiar," and asking the accused to recite the Lord's prayer. A true witch will not be able, or will refuse, to utter the words "And forgive us our trespasses" (377).

The fourth kind of testing is the most generically dynamic and interesting for our purposes as well as the most problematic for the investigator of witches, partly because it is decisive in terms of empirical proof. It involves testing to find whether bewitchment has taken place by reproducing at will the relation between the witch and the bewitched. A reciprocity of effects proves that witches exist and therefore that there is such a thing as immaterial spirits that operate in nature. The fact that witches such as Florence Newton exist explains, in turn, the observable effects on Longdon's behavior, health, and disposition. In this notorious Irish case, Mary

Longdon turns pale when ordered to look at Newton in the court room (373) and collapses when Newton, "betwixt the heads of the By-Standers that interposed betwixt her and the said Mary," returns the gaze (375). According to Roger Moore and Thomas Harrison, whose credibility is laboriously attested to, Newton then makes an "angry violent kind of motion...as if she would intend to strike at her," and mutters, "Now she is down" (375). Longdon falls into a fit or trance and is removed to a nearby house, away from the eyes of the court, where she vomits pins, straw, and wool that are returned to the court room as evidence. Mary recovers only when, secretly, Newton is put into bolts. Previously, the witch had been only in manacles (376).

While these instances would seem to be conclusive, it is precisely in the relation of such reciprocal effects that Glanvill's narrator registers a dis-ease in the narration. The time of the constant pause opens wide as more and more proof is called for to verify the credibility of more and more witnesses and the "proofs" offered. The text is generated — it gets longer and longer — in the repetition and elaboration of proof. For even though the effects on Longdon and Newton seem to be externally verifiable evidence of bewitchment, they are still based on Longdon's word and the testimony of witnesses to her symptoms. Longdon's testimony remains a subjective interpretation of subjective experience. This section of the narrative is riddled with qualifying comments in parentheses that point to the problem, such as "(as the Deponent was told)" (375), "(as was seen and observed by W. Aston)" (375), and "(...as was sworn by some that observed her.)" (376). Even Longdon herself must rely on the reports of family and neighbors for confirmation and explanation of the part of her bewitchment that transports her, without her knowledge, from her own bed into other rooms, into other beds, into chests, and even onto the roof beams of the house (374). Precisely this atmosphere of doubt means that further

tests are required of such evidence.

One test is devised by a Nicholas Pyne and the already mentioned Edward Perry. These two men along with others remove a tile from the prison wall next to where Florence Newton languishes and take it to Mary Longdon's house. They put the tile in the fire until it is red hot, "and then dropped some of the Maid's water [i.e., urine] upon it" (380). The witch, back in the prison, "was then grievously tormented, and when the Water was consumed she was well again." But even this test is not left to stand on its own merits, as Edward Perry and several other witnesses are called on to verify Pyne's relation of the story. Each witness adds details to the account, but none of them deal with the question of how Newton's action was observed if all the witnesses were, as they say, in Mary Longdon's house with the sizzling wall tile. Even though no one deals with this problem, Perry and a few others go so far as to say not only that Newton was tormented when the "Maid's water" was dropped onto the tile, but also that, at this torment, Newton confessed to bewitching Longdon.

A second test of the reciprocity of effects is described by a Mr. Wood, a Minister, who, it is explained, heard of Longdon's case, met with her brother, and then accompanied him to see Mary on the occasion of her next fit (382). (The question arises: why was he interested?) Wood wants to test Longdon's story by bringing Newton into her presence and observing the effect. Newton, however, refuses to come. The mayor of the town (whose name, handily, but somewhat suspiciously, is the allegorical "John Mayr") appears just then, presumably because he has the authority to cause Newton to be brought to Longdon's. When the two women are once again in close proximity, Longdon immediately falls into a fit. Our narrator reports:

> And still when the Witch was out of the Chamber, the Maid would desire to go to

> Prayers, and he [Mr. Wood] found good affections in her in time of Prayer, but when the Witch was brought in again, though ever so privately, although she could not possibly, as the Deponent conceives, see her, she would be immediately senseless and like to be strangled, and so would continue till the Witch were taken out, and then though never so privately carried away, she would come again to her senses. (382)

Wood testifies that he tries this several times "with all possible privacy, and so as none could think it possible for the Maid to know either of the Witches coming in or going out" (382). The mayor ("Mayr") verifies this and other elements of the witnesses' stories. He adds a description of a similar test he carried out on Newton concerning "three Aldermen in Youghall, whose children [Newton] had kist, *as he had heard them affirm*, and all the Children died presently after" (italics mine, 383).

While this evidence is quite enough, in the event, to convict Florence Newton, the legitimacy and justice of convicting her is apparently still in need of proof. Glanvill provides the required proof in the account of David Jones, a gentle skeptic who stands guard outside Newton's prison cell one night, a month after her conviction, in order to "see whether he could observe any Cats or other Creatures resort to her through the Grate, as 'twas suspected they did" (385). The appearance of these creatures was an agreed upon sign of the witch's consorting with the Devil. Jones's wife and the man who accompanied him on the night watch testify at another trial of Newton that after Jones attempted several times without success to teach Newton the Lord's prayer through the Grate, the witch feigned gratitude to him "and told him she had a great mind to have kist him, but that the Grate hindred, but desired she might kiss his Hand" (385). Jones lets her kiss his hand, which gives him a "great pain in that Arm" (384) as if Newton "had him now by the Hand, and was pulling off his Arm" (386). With all the authority of the man on his deathbed,

he begs his friend, the narrator (by now, two or three times removed from the reader): "Do you not see the Old Hag how she pulls me?" (386). Within two weeks, David Jones is dead.

Twentieth-century scholarship acknowledges that the witch hunts — the most risible and hinnible episode in the history of science — belong to the history of science. What I hope to add is their situation within the history of the novel as well. Science and the novel are based on the witch hunts rather than on deliverance from them.[45] Because the vast majority of "witches" were women, the implication of science and the novel in modern gender distinctions is similarly unavoidable. Evelyn Fox Keller locates the seventeenth-century witch hunts in the partial defeat of hermetic by mechanical philosophy, while Carolyn Merchant differentiates the animist beliefs that women were accused of holding from the more respectable Neoplatonic magic practiced by Cornelius Agrippa and others.[46] Merchant complicates the relationship by pointing out that those who defended women against accusations of witchcraft, such as the Paracelsian magician John Weyer, did so on the basis of "antifeminist arguments." Weyer argued that women are predisposed to melancholy and therefore to deceptions of the devil. The legal and medical authorities that advocated witch persecutions refuted Weyer on the basis of the exclusion of women from the category of melancholy.[47] More suggestively, both Keller and Merchant identify the exclusion of sex and love from the new philosophy as the basis for the modern equation: masculinity = objectivity = science. According to Keller, the female witch was the focus of anxiety about the relation of knowledge to sex and love.[48] Similarly, Merchant points to sexual lust as the basis for most of the accusations of witchcraft.[49]

The problem with love is its ambiguation of the relation between subject and object and the related "confusion," in the sexual act, between the will and desire. The preexistent division of

male and female provided the ready means to enforce a distinction between knowledge as eros and knowledge as power, the latter articulated in Bacon's "Masculine Birth of Time."[50] All gender characteristics had to fit into either of two broad categories, and each gender was assigned a narrowed, specific range of acceptable behaviors and capabilities. The following chapters examine further the relation between language and the gendered human body. In particular, I will consider evidence of very mixed anxieties regarding the status of knowledge given its mediated and somatic basis. Chapter Four will focus on the female and language; Chapter Five will concentrate on the appearance of the normative male body, genre, and time.

Notes to Chapter Three

1. St. Francis of Assisi, quoted by Benjamin, *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 230. Benjamin glosses the comment as "the true path to [i.e., of] a disciple who shut himself up all too deeply in study": "The absolute spirituality, which is what Satan means, destroys itself in its emancipation from what is sacred.... The purely material and the absolutely spiritual are the poles of the satanic realm; and the consciousness is their illusory synthesis, in which the genuine synthesis, that of life, is imitated."

2. A list of "Errata" at the end of D'Urfey's *Essay* includes the helpful correction that where the text reads "intelligible" on page one, the word "unintelligible" should be substituted. It remains unclear whether this substitution should be made throughout the text (224).

3. Holquist identifies the biological homology to Bakhtin's concept of "answerability": "If the [life] form has the capacity to react to a stimulus, such as light, it is alive. If it does not change in the presence of altered circumstances, it is constructed as not having life. In other words, at this primitive level, the capacity to react to, or interact with, the environment is the test of life.... The protozoan...needs what lies outside the oozy borders of its integral shape to ensure continuation of the internal, reactive capacity that is defined as life itself. Responding to the environment, being able to answer it, is life itself. Whatever engenders a particular response of the organism in a specific situation — if only the lowly hydra's shrinking from light — is the center of its life." *Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World*, (London: Routledge, 1990), 66. Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist emphasize Bakhtin's engagement of biology in his development of the "chronotope," which he refines through his critiques of "Freudianism" and the vitalism of Henri Bergson and Hans Driesch. See *Mikhail Bakhtin*, Chapter 7.

4. McKeon carefully distinguishes between "naive empiricism" and its conservative countercritique of "extreme skepticism" (*The Origins of the English Novel...*, 21), while Burns's qualified "moderate empiricism" (19) correlates with McKeon's "naive empiricism." I use the term "empiricism" to include both poles of McKeon's terms.

5. Anon., (London, Printed for T. Wright, 1643). Redpath Tracts, Series II, Volume LI, Item #6.

6. *A Relation...* appears anonymously at the back of *Mr. Hollis His Speech to The Lords in Parliament Concerning Peace. With a Motion for some course to be taken for repairing of trade, that so poore tradesmen may be preserved to hold out during these troublesome times. Whereunto is added A Relation of a Vision of Blood in the Skie, which appeared at Redding on Tuesday night last*. London, Printed for T. Wright, 1643, 26. Redpath Tracts, Series II, Vol. LI, Item #7.

7. *The Works of Francis Bacon*, eds. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath (1857-74; repr., Frommann-Holzboog: Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1989), 1:137.

8. Jose Antonio Maravell delineates the "mass character of baroque culture," in which the earliest "standardized industrial production meets the prototypical consumer." See *Culture of the Baroque: Analysis of a Historical Structure*, tr. Terry Cochran, Theory and History of Literature, Volume 25 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 85-87. The characteristics of emergent baroque mass culture are 1) heterogeneity; 2) anonymity; 3) the individual's partial inclusion in any given grouping of the mass; and 4) individuals united only by the shaping factors acting on them and the unity of their response (102).

9. Samuel Johnson, *Reflections on the History of Passive Obedience* (London: Printed, and are to be sold by Richard Baldwin, in the Old-Bailey, 1689), 2. Redpath Tracts, Series I, 1689, Item #9.

10. R. M. Burns, *The Great Debate on Miracles From Joseph Glanvill to David Hume* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1981), 16. Burns enumerates the epistemological stance underlying seventeenth-century scientific method as presupposing the existence of God, stressing moral rather than mathematical probability judgements, and opposing "any notion of a methodological a priori" (15). See also Henry G. Van Leeuven, *The Problem of Certainty in English Thought, 1630-1690* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 24-49; and Barbara Shapiro, *Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A Study of the Relationships Between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).

11. *Robert Boyle: The Works*, 6 vols., ed. Thomas Birch (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1966), 5:536.

12. Moody E. Prior, "Joseph Glanvill, Witchcraft, and Seventeenth-Century Science," *Modern Philology* 30 (November, 1932): 192.

13. Anonymous, *Rump: or, An Exact Collection of the Choycest Poems and Songs Relating to the Late Times. By the Most Eminent Wits from 1639 to 1661*, rpt., "Part One" only (London, Printed for Henry Brome at the Gun in Ivy-lane, and Henry Marsh at the Princes Arms in Chancery-lane, 1662). The epigraph appears on page 113 and the poem excerpt on page 36.

14. Rogers, in *The Matter of Revolution*, examines the "literary crisis vitalism precipitates in *Paradise Lost*," and concludes that "much of the animist materialism Milton espoused in his *Christian Doctrine* must be transferred in his epic, for specifically political reasons, to the discredited voice of Satan" (28 and Chapter Four, "Chaos, Creation, and the Political Science of *Paradise Lost*," 103-143). In my reading, novelistic discourse, including parts of Milton's epic, maintains a distinction between Satan and animate matter, while science conflates the two in its re-allegorization of the world.

15. *The Political History of the Devil. Containing His Original. A Statement of his Circumstances. His Conduct public and private. The various Turns of his Affairs from Adam down to the present Time. The Various Methods he takes to converse with Mankind. With the Manner of his making Witches, Wizards, and Conjurors; and how they sell their Souls to him, &c. &c. The Whole interspersed with many of the Devil's Adventures. To which is added, A Description of the Devil's Dwelling, vulgarly called Hell*, Sixth edition, (London, Printed for W. Strahan, J. and F. Rivington, W. Nicoll, and S. Bladon, 1770). The first two quotations are from the unpaginated "Preface."

16. Defoe, "Preface," n.p.

17. Defoe, 10.

18. Defoe, 15. Later in the *History*, Defoe seems to directly answer Swinden's *Enquiry* written twelve years earlier: "The Notion we receive of the Devil, *as a Person* being in Hell *as a Place*, are infinitely absurd and ridiculous; the first we are certain is not true in Fact, because he has a certain Liberty, (however limited...)...as to his corporeal Visibility...."Tis enough that we can hunt him by the Foot, that we can follow him as Hounds do a Fox upon a hot Scent: We can see him as plainly by the Effect, by the Mischief he does, and more by the Mischief he puts us upon doing...as plainly, as if we saw him by the Eye" (181). Notice that the nose is a more certain detector of Satan's presence than the eye. He was noted for leaving behind a certain "sulphurous smell."

19. London, Printed for Tho: Underhil, at the Bible in Woodstreet, March 9, 1646. Redpath Tracts Series I, 1646, Item #1. An epigraph that calls for a day of "Publique Humiliation" to "seek God for his direction and assistance for the suppression and preventing" of the "Errors, Heresies, and Blasphemies" of the pamphlet's title is signed by "Joh. Brown, Cleric Parliamentorum," but it remains unclear whether he is the author of the pamphlet. This pamphlet and thousands like it are the products of a "print explosion" that followed the collapse of press censorship from 1640 to 1660. See Robert E. Stillman, *The New Philosophy and Universal Languages in Seventeenth-Century England: Bacon, Hobbes, and Wilkins*, (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1995), 115.

20. *Hell Broke Loose...*, title page.

21. Maravell in *Culture of the Baroque* emphasizes the borrowing and migration of the term "crisis" from the discourse of medicine to the discourse of civil politics during the seventeenth century. A "crisis" calls for a "remedy," that is, for intervention (21).

22. Anonymous, *The Gates of Hell Open'd: In a Dialogue Between the Observator and <Review>. By a Friend of the Light*, London, Printed; and sold by J. Morphew, near Stationers Hall, 1711. Redpath Tracts Series II, Volume CCLXXXIX, Item #6.

23. Stillman, 154. In claiming that "epistemological fear" is equal to fear of death, Stillman betrays some defensiveness: "In the chaos accompanying England's civil wars, for an intellectual

with Hobbes's convictions, there is no great distance between the seemingly abstract concerns of epistemological contradictions and the historically specific experience of death" (154). I hope to strengthen Stillman's excellent reading by arguing that novelized language incorporates both fears, while science turns its back on the fear of death and views epistemological fear as primary.

24. Stillman, 132. John Eachard, *Some Opinions of Mr Hobbs Considered.* London: by J. Macock for Walter Kettiby, 1673, 167-186.

25. Stillman, 154.

26. Maravell, *Culture of the Baroque*, 163.

27. *Culture of the Baroque*, 162-163.

28. Coleman O. Parsons, "Introduction," *Saducismus Triumphatus: or, Full and Plain Evidence Concerning Witches and Apparitions. In Two Parts. The First treating of their Possibility, The Second of their Real Existence*, by Joseph Glanvill, third edition, reprint (London, Printed by Tho. Newcomb, for S. Lownds at his Shop by the Savoy-Gate, and are to be sold by Anth. Baskervile, 1689. Facsimile Reproduction. Gainesville, FL: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1966), viii-ix. The 1681 edition appeared posthumously in the year of Glanvill's death and was reprinted in 1689, 1700, and 1726. The 1689 reprint of the 1681 edition was chosen for facsimile reproduction because it is the last edition which Glanvill's colleague Henry More could have corrected and because of its continuous pagination. The following is a list of editions, all published in London, by short titles: *A Philosophical Endeavour towards the Defence of the Being of Witches and Apparitions* (1666); *Some Philosophical Considerations Touching the Being of Witches and Witchcraft* (1667); *A Blow at Modern Sadducism* (1668); *A Blow at Modern Sadducism....*(4th ed., 1668; a different printing from the preceding); *Saducismus triumphatus* (in some editions spelled *Sadducismus*) (1681, 1689, 1700, 1726). The reprint in Glanvill's *Essays on Several Important Subjects in Philosophy and Religion* (1676) is called "Against Modern Sadducism in the Matter of Witches and Apparitions."

29. From a letter, "Bath, June 8. 1668," cited in Parsons, "Introduction," *Saducismus Triumphatus...*, x.

30. On Glanvill's role in the "Anglicization" of science, see Jobe, "The Devil in Restoration Science," 356. Parsons notes the long literary life of Glanvill's ghost stories, especially "The Drummer of Tedworth" (xi).

31. Moody E. Prior, "Joseph Glanvill, Witchcraft, and Seventeenth-Century Science," *Modern Philology* 30 (November, 1932): 189, 192.

32. *Works*, 3:293.

33. Prior, 188.

34. Jobe, 345; Prior 183; and Stuart Clarke, "The Scientific Status of Demonology," *Occult and Scientific Mentalities in the Renaissance*, ed. Brian Vickers (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 363.

35. Charles Bazerman, *Shaping Written Knowledge: The Genre and Activity of the Experimental Article in Science* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 59-79.

36. Glanvill uses the phrase "matters of fact" on pp. 73, 77, 87, 107, 273, 334, 337, and 484.

37. Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, *Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 3-21.

38. *Dialogic Imagination*, 392-393.

39. See, for example, 70-76.

40. One of the most common places to meet a ghost in Glanvill is "at the stile." See, for example, 417. If the time is not dusk, dawn, or at the time of the shift from work to rest, it will be at a seasonal change or during a social change.

41. 414-416.

42. D.P. Walker, *Unclean Spirits* (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1981), 12.

43. Hebrews 13:2.

44. 380. The account of Florence Newton and Mary Longdon appears between 372-386. Further references will be cited by page number in the text. The time of the first meeting between "Goody Newton" and Mary Longdon is in the Christmas season. All four kinds of testing are present in this case. Newton, a poor, elderly woman, knocks at the door where Longdon works as a servant and asks for food. Longdon fails this test of charity by refusing to give away "her Master's" food (373). She suspects Newton of bewitching her when she soon begins to suffer strange symptoms. During the preoccupation of testing Newton for the practice of witchcraft, Longdon too is tested through her suffering.

45. Brian P. Levack identifies the development of legal procedures as one of the key preconditions of the witch hunts. At first this seems to be an avoidance of fundamental epistemological and ideological factors but, of course, legal procedures are *genres* in the sense used in my analysis. Levack's account is perhaps one of the most exacting and useful because he takes this approach. See *The Witch-Hunt in Early Modern Europe* (1987), Second Edition (Harlow, Essex, UK: Longman, 1995). Also useful but somewhat dated is H. R. Trevor-Roper, *The European Witch-Craze of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries and Other Essays* (1956), (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).

46. Keller, *Reflections on Gender and Science* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 64; Merchant, *The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1980), 140-144.

47. Merchant, 141-142. Juliana Schiesari finds that women have been systematically excluded from what she calls the canon of melancholia. See *The Gendering of Melancholia: Feminism, Psychoanalysis, and the Symbolics of Loss in Renaissance Literature* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1992). She singles out Burton's *Anatomy* as well as Klibansky et al., *Saturn and Melancholy*. While the latter are working wholly within the modern regime of difference, in which women are not visible in any form of serious pursuit, I think that women are still similar to men in kind in Burton, and I can point to many instances where women are not only included but, as Weyer attests, suffer more from melancholy than men, partly because of menstruation. The "Third Partition" of Burton's *Anatomy*, for example, in its treatment of "erotic" or "heroic" melancholy, has much to say about possibilities for a gender-enriched erotic and symbolic economy. ("[W]hen lovers swear, Venus laughs" (III.123). Schiesari's approach risks homogenizing historical variations in the manifestation of patriarchy. Her study, like Doody's study of the novel, perhaps suffers from the understandable but uncritical search for continuities in the oppression of women.

48. Keller, 59.

49. Merchant, 134.

50. Keller, 48. The critique of "knowledge as power" derives from Foucault's productive reading of Nietzsche in *The Order of Things*. Sloterdijk, in *Critique of Cynical Reason*, notes that "[t]hose who utter the sentence ["Knowledge is power."] reveal the truth. However, with the utterance they want to achieve more than truth: They want to intervene in the game of power" (xvii). Sloterdijk himself is motivated by his interest in recovering, without the least hint of nostalgia, "the tradition of knowledge...that was an erotic theory — the love of truth and the truth through love" (xxvi-xxvii). Is it possible? What would it involve? Under the guidance of baroque writers, who were more or less aware that they were required to "decide" between knowledge as love and knowledge as power, I hope to move my own work in this direction.

Chapter Four

Hiatus and Hymen

[T]he Book has no other Office but that of filling up the Gap in the Middle....[1]

While D'Urfey's ideal voyagers lounge on the nose of death, and long before they are introduced to Sir Satanides Goatham, the account of their voyage is interrupted by a short poem,[2] followed by this "Epitaph on a Maiden-head":

I.
Beneath these Stones intomb'd, is laid,
Something that was a Maiden-Head.
That Word alone doth here lie dead,
Whose Substance into Nought is fled.
Does any ask me how I lost my Breath?
I broke a fatal Vein, and bled to Death.

II.
Some think (and 'tis a common Fame)
That I (howe'er a Place I claim
With Beings of Substantial Frame)
Am but a Nothing with a Name.
Else Man did my Reality create,
Since he alone can it annihilate.

III.
Yet I, the Guardian of the Zone,
(While such) unbuckled it to none;
But since that I am dead and gone,
The wincing Minor hurries on:
Lavish of Love, at once turns Prodigal,
And Spend-thrift keeps open House for All.
(128-129)

This outburst establishes a female counterpart, the hymen, to the D'Urfeyan "Hiatus." Hymen / Hiatus. Bridge and gap. "She" appears — "a Nothing with a Name" — in the act that ruptures and destroys her. The hymen is here related to the muting of woman ("I lost my Breath") and to the demarcation of the deeper and more jagged line drawn between female and male that constitutes the paradigmatic modern relation between them as a rape. The "Epitaph" is inserted without explanation and gives way to several pages of description and demonstration that enable the reader to experience with the narrator the extreme formal reversals precipitated by his fall into the vortex and the "Ideal" world of preexistent form. The "*curious Eye*" is "directed to survey original Forms naked of Being, and unessential Essences, Specifick or Generical, that lye forever buried dark and deep, in the unfathom'd Womb of bottomless and inexhausted Nothing..." (138). The narrator is rapturous but puzzled as to how he might "grasp" disembodied knowledge. "[W]ith what Gesticulation, what Elocution, shall we signify the emotions of the Spirits, express our Joy, and proclaim our Raptures? Shall we fall into a Trance together, or shall we leap out of our *Essences* for very Gladness?" (140). The considerations of form finally get to a sort of a point in the idea of *deformity* "so exquisitely Deform, that what is most Beautiful and most Charming, in the Sensible World, can never compare with it" (146). "Ideal deformity" culminates in the "Advertisement" concerning the new ideal man who is made visible not only as a result of "the great Reach of Thought required for the Contrivance" of a "Hiatus" but also by means of the rupture of a certain unnamed hymen:

> Advertisement, very necessary to be here inserted.
>
> You are to know, that this Sir Satanides Goatham, is a certain Man in Office, who by several great Attempts has made himself very considerable, and purchased an invaluable Reputation, Honour and Esteem, among all the Nobility and Gentry that live within the

> Sound of his Name. The Particulars are, a harmless Rape upon a Young Lady of extraordinary Virtue, as well as Wit and Beauty; a civil Design to murther one of her Relations; together with sincere Endeavours to ruine and defame her whole Family: in all which laudable Undertakings, by the Spite of envious Fortune, he has come off with Disappointment and Infamy, though not Shame. (175-76)

D'Urfey's devil, Sir Satanides Goatham, only takes shape in relation to and in differentiation from woman. Both figures are negative forms, the correspondent products of a lighthearted rape. "She" is fallen Man's fallen counterpart, the fitting companion to the Ideal Centaur ("Death" or the "as if" dead man).

Anti-female satires in the manner of D'Urfey's "Epitaph" and proto-feminist responses to them erupted at the very time when the witch hunts were being discredited and disappearing. Between 1660 and 1750, the satires focus obsessively on the female body fragment of the hymen, as in the polemical yet pastoral *The Lost Maidenhead, or Sylvia's Farewell to Love* and the quite vicious anti-female response, *The Restored Maidenhead*, both published anonymously in 1691.[3] Felicity Nussbaum, whose work has recovered both the anti-female satires and the responses by women writers, points out that women outnumbered men in this period, and they were certainly "chipping away at the edges of traditional expectations." She characterizes the anti-female satires as the voice of the "group in jeopardy."[4] In the vitalist writers Rogers studies, he finds that "despite the continued assignment of male and female qualities to spirit and matter, vitalism's general reconfiguration of the relation of spirit to matter compelled, at least rhetorically, a parallel reconfiguration of the relation of male to female. The monist's insistence on the spiritualization of matter worked inevitably to elevate the discursive category of femaleness" and "seemed implicitly to *necessitate* a feminism...that would not be positively embraced or explicitly voiced until the

Restoration prose of the monist Margaret Cavendish."[5] I think feminism is the more negative although quite necessary product of the modern form of "woman." For this reason, feminism is, at its core, reactionary and cannot be in itself "liberating." If vitalism as Rogers portrays it had prevailed, "feminism" would have quite a different face.[6]

Rape is the brilliant allegorical means to destroy any lingering association of knowledge with eros. At the same time, rape constantly invokes and justifies epistemological fear because of the subjective nature of the evidence that "proves" the incidence of rape. For only a woman knows precisely when and how she "lost her maiden-head," and she could be mistaken or lie. The problem with the hymen is that it speaks objectively for (virginal) women who are raped. The hymen therefore must be punctured and, in D'Urfeyan terms, "intomb'd," in order to silence woman. Medical authorities long denied the existence of the hymen, yet "the intact hymen was one of the mainstays of the midwife's diagnosis of virginity" when called on to testify in court.[7] The traditional authority of midwives was challenged on the question of the hymen in their marginalization from the practice of medicine; as part of the process of marginalization, midwives were "favored victims" of the witch hunts from the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries.[8] In rape, the witch hunts are incorporated into the regime of difference rather than ended. Rape functions as the paradigmatic guarantor of the knowledge / power nexus that defeats the knowledge / eros relation.

An extraordinary allegorical play dating from the beginning of the baroque period registers the process by which language and the female are subordinated, muted, and excluded from the modern regime of scientific knowledge. *Lingua: or The Combat of the Tongue and the Five Senses* features "Lingua" as the sole character gendered female. The secret and unreliable

information about where she lost her "maiden-head" is associated in the play with Lingua's self-betrayal and the fundamental ambivalence of language and the female in relation to "truth" and "will." While *Lingua* represents the muting and exclusion of the female, Samuel Richardson's *Clarissa, or The History of a Young Lady*, published over a hundred years later, explicitly represents the relationship between language and rape of the female. In Richardson's radical use of the epistolary form, the "narrator" indeed stands back and "correspondence" papers over the gap between subject and object.[9] All speech falters in the constant pause during which the doubtful nature of self-knowledge is confronted, examined, tested, denied, and affirmed, in *writing*. "[T]he Book has no other Office but that of filling up the Gap in the Middle." Clarissa's rape and the question of how it is characterized bind her to the rapist Lovelace in a voluminous correspondence that both bridges and increases the gap between them until death ("Death") renders it absolute. Rape commits Clarissa to fragmentation and allegory, redeemable only in death, or pure spirituality. Lovelace represents pure materiality. He is "Death" *to* and *for* Clarissa and, as the figure of vice, he spirals downward in parody of the Fall. The hinnible, hellish representations of the gendered body and language in both *Lingua* and *Clarissa* turn on their simultaneous incorporation of the risible moment of alternative possibility.

"Where she lost her maidenhead": "Somaticall" Science in Tomkis's *Lingua*

This allegory of the human body was written for the Cambridge University stage in 1607 by Thomas Tomkis.[10] The play remained in circulation as late as 1663, even while the theaters were closed, because, I think, it shares the anxiety of writers and new philosophers such as John Bulwer and his colleagues, William Holder and John Wilkins, about the status of knowledge given

its "mediated and somatic basis."[11] A commendatory poem at the opening of John Bulwer's *Chirologia: or The Natural Language of the Hand* (1644) contains the following lines: "Who'll not believe...that men / May have more senses than they erst did ken? / Since speech, that doth within thy hand commence, / Deserves the double honor of a sense, / And may obtain unto a better end, / That, to which *lingua* did in vain pretend?" [12] The author of this commendation hopes that Bulwer's lexicon of the hand will fare better than Lingua's suit to attain the status of a "Sense." *Lingua* is also read in laughing relation to seventeenth-century taxonomies of the passions. In Henry More's play, *Pathomachia: or, The Battell of Affections* (1630), Lingua's suit is aped by the character of "Laughter."[13] On applying for the title of an "Affection," "Laughter" is told: "By that Sophistry, Madame Lingua might sue as well for the office of an Affection as of a Sence, for her garrulous, all-daring Ladyship, which dares lye with everie Man and Woman, doth sufficiently separate Man-kind from the Choristers of the Aire, and from the dumbe Lords of the Woods and Floods..." (33).

The reason Lingua fails to achieve the status of a sense, and Laughter is excluded from the "Affections" or passions of the soul, is that both relate ambivalently to the will. "Lingua" is understood by the author of *Pathomachia* to arbitrarily — that is, rhetorically — separate mankind from "the dumbe Lords of the Woods and Floods" when science is trying to locate the "natural" ground of such a division in its search for epistemological authority. Bulwer's hands fare a little better because he is able to establish the hand in a privileged relation to the new science. But like the drawings of the natural source of articulate sounds in the esophagus, throat and mouth in Wilkins's search for the "universal character" of language, Bulwer's fragmented hand and Tomkis's isolate tongue claim the status of a Sense on the basis of their special function

as "true" or "natural" articulation points that mediate between the individual body and the social, historical world. The problem, however, is that the "natural" body — the body as subject to or the subject of "nature" — is only conceivable in a world where the possibility for belief in the "true" or "natural" correlation between the body and its signs is disappearing. The claim of hand and tongue to articulate the body requires their disarticulation or dismemberment from the "whole" body. So the very conditions that generate the seventeenth-century language projects and make them historically imperative render them impossible.

Tomkis's play brings this contradictory tension to the surface. *Lingua* registers the emergence and new authority of the "natural" human body, which takes shape by what it excludes: language and the female. The separation of language from the body, and female from male bodies, produces, by means of this exclusion, first, the "natural" grounds for the male as a discrete and superior gender, differing from the female in kind rather than degree, and second, the enabling conditions for the credibility and viability of empirical knowledge, the basis of a unitary and universally demonstrable truth. While the association of woman, language, and knowledge is as old, at least, as Eve and the serpent, we see in this play the reconfiguration of the terms of the constitutive patriarchal myth. It maps the change in what we would now call gender relations from McKeon's "regime of hierarchy" to a "regime of difference."[14] The process by which female bodies came to be viewed as "physically and naturally distinct," rather than as "aberrant versions of a unitary male body," involved a shift from the differences between men and women "experienced as inseparably interwoven with sociocultural factors" to the differences "understood as what renders the system systematic." [15]

In *Lingua*, attempts to subordinate language and woman within the regime of hierarchy

fail to achieve lasting effects. Lingua, the female character of language, turns out to be not only the agent of the periodic, troublesome and expensive toppling of the hierarchy but also the ingredient fundamental to its structure. The play finds that the only way to truly subordinate her is to exclude her entirely. This entails the construction of a new and wholly other regime — the regime of difference — based precisely on that exclusion.[16] Tomkis's play specifies how this change, from one regime to the other, is put into words.

The subordination and then exclusion of language and the female body are necessary, in the play, because of their common and related grotesque ambivalence in relation to "truth." By "ambivalence," I mean more than the psychological state of uncertainty and changeability arising from the simultaneous experience of opposed emotions. My usage of the term retains this sense but extends it to refer to the intersection and conflict of will in language that arises from a simultaneous orientation both to the individual, biological organism and to the social, historical body that is key to the grotesque method. Language is the material that enables and requires such a two-faced stance and is therefore inseparable from the female body, which generates necessarily narrativized links between individual bodies, such as mother and child, through time.[17] The embeddedness of the female body in social, historical narrative "naturally" excludes it from the new realm of the "natural" body that is strictly delimited in time and space to the individualized male of the immediately knowable present.[18]

In Tomkis's play, language and the female body are brought together in the figure of Lingua. The action is generated by Lingua's dissatisfaction with her subordinate position relative to the "pentarchy" of the Senses. Formerly, she enjoyed greater status as signified by a crown and robe awarded to her in a contest of orators. Each performed so well according to a previous

system of evaluation that the prize was given to language itself, to Lingua, their "sovereign." The sign of Lingua's declining status, however, is that she cannot gain access to Common Sense, Governor of the body's ordering. She is barred from even making a case for regaining her status by Auditus, Hearing, who is, at the outset, spokesperson of the five senses. So in a new scheme, Lingua brings her crown and robe out of storage and uses them to set the Five Senses at variance. She wagers that if they are divided against themselves, rather than organized against her, there will be a place of importance for her once again in the hierarchy of the body.

The ensuing battle over Lingua's crown forces Common Sense to consider a complete re-ordering of the body. Lingua and the Five Senses are called on to present their "objects" and "instruments" so their relative priority can be newly established. Superiority (and "sovereignty") will be granted to that which demonstrates the most direct and therefore "truest" access to external truth. The test is predicated on the notion that there exists such an external truth, that "the truth is out there." But this is precisely what is at issue for Lingua. She represents and insists on a continuum of intercourse — and in an allegory about language, no word is innocent — between individual bodies, a process that assigns primary importance to her role in *making* truth and resists the new, categorial distinctions, such as "inside" and "outside" the body, so important for establishing the superiority of the five "exterior" senses.

Lingua's ambivalence is characterized as problematic from the opening scene when her suit falls on the deaf ears of Auditus. He accuses Lingua of tediously harping on the same thing — that she deserves the status of a Sense. Lingua explains that she always says the same thing because she speaks the truth, and "Truth no descant needs / For Una's her name, she cannot be divided" (I.i). But as Auditus points out, "the ground it self is nought, from whence / Thou [i.e.,

Lingua] canst not relish out a good division." From this beginning, then, language is characterized as insisting on one truth while at the same time "naturally" tending to divide the ground of truth. Lingua does not explain or apologize for this duality. When Auditus chides her, "Lingua confess the truth, th'art wont to lie," she responds unproblematically: "I say so too, therefore I do not lye."

The theory of language as ambivalent is further elaborated when Lingua and the Five Senses appear before Common Sense to compete for primacy in the hierarchy of the body. Lingua's strategy is to place a positive value on the very quality that damns her: ambivalence. She points out that the dual orientation of language enables the body to speak *otherwise* and *to the other*. She demonstrates this claim by speaking "all Heterogeneall languages together, congealing English Tynne, Graecian Gold, Roman Latine all in a lumpe" (III.v). Each of her listeners gets some of the meaning, but none get the whole sense. Lingua explains that her own ready access to other languages — to the otherness of language — is what confirms her worth to be equal to or better than the senses: "their knowledge is only of things present, quickly sublimed with the deaf file of time, whereas the tongue is able to recount things past, and often pronounce things to come, by this means re-edifying such Excellencies as Time and Age do easily depopulate" (III.v). In terms of speaking *to* the other, Lingua boasts that she is the body's ambassador, employed to speak to foreign kings and emperors and to formulate and broadcast the laws, will, and deeds of the body. "Cities would dissolve, traffique would decay, friendships be broken, were not my speech the knot...to bind, defend, and glew them together."

Lingua's final claim is that language itself is unspeakable. She presents this coyly as the only "imperfection" she can find in herself, that she can "never speak enough of the unspeakable

praise of speech...that the most exquisite power and excellency of speech cannot sufficiently express the exquisite power and excellency of speaking." Typically, however, her own words work against her because the implication is that the terms of language always somehow lie beyond its own domain, a condition that places language at the mercy of erratic, unknowable, even dangerous imperatives. This implication is drawn out in the disruptive appearance, at this exact moment, of the character of ambivalence *par excellence*, Appetitus (variously Hunger or Desire). After listening to the "unspeakable praise of speech," Common Sense is about to dismiss Lingua when she asks permission to put forward more evidence:

> *By your Lordships favour, I can soon prove that a sense is a faculty, by which our Queen sitting in her privy Chamber hath intelligence of exterior occurrents. That I am of this nature, I prove thus. The object which I would challenge is* — Enter Appetitus in haste.

The sudden entrance of Appetitus cleverly both interrupts Lingua's sentence and completes it. The object of language is desire, and language is subject to desire.[19] The timely appearance of Appetitus "says" this, betraying Lingua, just as the allegations he brings from the Five Senses condemn her. They accuse Lingua of upsetting all "natural" hierarchies. She does this by various means: by prostituting "the hard mysteries of unknown Languages to the profane ears of the vulgar....as to make a new hell in the upper world," by "railing against men in authority" and depraving "their honours with jests," and by lending wives weapons to fight against their husbands. Lingua is charged with imprisoning truth (in the person of her assistant *Veritas*), of behaving like a common whore by allowing everyone to lie with her, and of making "Rhetoric wanton, Logick to babble, and Astronomy to Lye." "Last and worst," she is charged with being "a Woman in every respect" (III. v).

The Five Senses go on, in the presentation of their objects and instruments, to raise their own status at the expense of Language and Woman. They attempt to displace language by claiming to carry out its functions in a more direct and authoritative manner. For example, Olfactus parades Tobacco as his most valued object. Tobacco, like Lingua, speaks *otherwise* in the language of his native Trinidad. He replaces Lingua as social "glew" because he is the "knot of good fellowship and Adamant of Company" (IV. iv). The best object of Auditus is music that is "superior to the voices power," the music of the spheres — that is, *inaudible* music. Oddly enough, Auditus also brings forward the *silent* gesture of pantomime as one of his prime objects in words that John Bulwer would later find useful: "for the hand (you know) is harbinger of the tongue, and provides the words a lodging in the ears of the Auditors" (IV. ii). Similarly, the objects of Visus present a reticence in speaking that is lauded as a great virtue. The point is that the senses bypass the need for language. They are the body's silent, direct, and truest servants.

In addition to displacing language, the Five Senses depend on the denigration of woman in order to present themselves in the best light. Tactus planned to show a beautiful woman as his chief object but ends up merely describing her because she could not get dressed in time. He uses much of his time on stage to expound the consistent mutability of women, who "will never change in changing their apparel" (IV. vi). When Visus introduces his objects, Color speaks, blushingly, in the form of a riddle that works only because of the expectation that women are being denigrated:

> That's nothing of it self, yet every way
> As like a Man, as a thing like may be,
> And yet so unlike, as clean contrary;
> For in one point it every way doth miss;
> The right side of it, a man's left side is.

'Tis lighter than a Feather, and withall
It fills no place, nor room it is so small.
(III. vi)

Vision's audience guesses immediately that Woman, obviously, is the answer to this riddle, but then an argument breaks out about whether or not the last line disqualifies her. The audience is confused and only slowly comes to "see" that Woman is not in the picture. Significantly, as we will see, Heureses (Invention), eventually comes up with the right answer, that it is "a man's face in a Looking Glasse." This is, I think, a moment of transition between McKeon's two regimes.

In the regime of hierarchy, Woman would be the answer. Formed out of man's left side (Adam's rib), she would "fill no place" because she would be a kind of man; she would be of the same order and in the mutual relation to him that obtains between "clean" contraries. But here, at the inauguration of the regime of difference, such a contrary and complementary relation does not apply. Man and woman begin to differ in kind. Man appears as himself alone, a sovereign and discrete individual organism whose outer contours are defined without reference to social structures and relations. The importance of this vision of Man is marked by the sign of the "sovereign": Visus is awarded Lingua's crown. Lingua's subordination is renewed and sustained because she is found "to be no Sense simply" (IV. vii). The concession granted — that she will have the status of a Sense, but for women only — confirms her subordinate status and maintains the hierarchy. At the same time, it augurs her final expulsion and the change from one regime to the other. For Lingua's sake, "henceforth...all women...shall have six Senses, seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching, and the last and feminine sense, the sense of speaking." Woman is becoming a completely new, and wholly different, kind of animal.

To separate language from the body, human bodies are divided into two distinct kinds.

The female retains the link to language, and enables the distinction of the male for whom this link is severed. But Tomkis's allegory finds that further cuts are required in order to sustain this division. An incision is now necessary between desire and the will, and another between the will of the (sovereign) individual and the "will" of nature. The connection of these distinctions or boundaries to the expulsion of Language and Woman is elaborated in Common Sense's discovery that, as a result of the presentations of the Senses, he has come to "conceive the state of Sense to be divided into two parts, one of commodity, the other of necessity." The commodious senses are those that profit the Soul and "are to be estimated before or above those that are needful for the Body" (IV. vii). The effect is to make room, in the revised body, for the will in relation to desire. That which is "commodious" or desirable is subject to the individual will;[20] that which is "necessary" is subject to the newly authorized "will" of nature. The "commodious" and the "necessary" reconfigure desire as the object of management and domination, and the new body that is thus divided displaces the body that was wholly subject to the unruly, ruling passions and appetites. The new, "natural" will is precisely that which is charged with telling the difference between what the body desires and what it needs, the difference between its lies and *the* truth.

Lingua cannot countenance these new divisions for two reasons. First, no place is granted for a social, historical or ideological "will," such as inheres in the social "glew" of language. The new boundary disallows her dual orientation. Second, language is that which both lies and tells the truth. Lingua's incompatibility with the new order — and the very reason she must be finally expelled — is played out after the judgement scene when, newly re-subordinated, she predictably and necessarily resumes upsetting the hierarchy. She gets to work right away and enlists the help of Appetitus (Desire). Previously, he betrayed her, but he is the ambivalent joker who swings

both ways, and now he happily does her bidding. He entices the Five Senses to drink a potion that deranges their sensors. Pandemonium reigns again until all, including Lingua and Appetitus, are bound in sleep.[21] They continue to talk in their sleep, however, a phenomena that is quickly and emphatically gendered female: "Women are troubled, especially with this talking disease, many of them have I heard answer in their dreams, and tell what they did all day awake" (V. xviii).

The sleep talking disease is associated with the revelation of truth, particularly sexual truth. On hearing Lingua talking in her sleep, Phantastes is delighted and hopes that "we shall hear anon where she lost her maidenhead" (V. Xvii). If language speaks sexual truth in sleep, so much the more does it utter any and all treacherous and self-incriminating truths. The sleeping Lingua eventually betrays herself and confesses all of her mischief in upsetting the senses. Language apparently has a will of its own, in that Lingua speaks the truth while sleeping. At the same time, language is subject to the will in Lingua's tendency to lie, willfully and strategically, while awake. Lingua-Language is intolerably ambivalent in relation to the will. After the truth comes out in her sleep, Lingua is awakened and banished, receiving a sentence of imprisonment. When appearing in public, she is to be heavily guarded and is required to wear a tongue-shaped hood, the "Embleme of a Woman" and the sign of her difference.

The relation between Lingua's expulsion and the new dispensation of empiricism is delineated in the corresponding destiny of Heureses, Invention. He was the first to recognize the male body as separate and distinct from that of Woman, the "vision" that enables him to correctly decode the riddle of the new image of Man in the mirror. Heureses is the visionary of the world founded on Lingua's exclusion as well as the product and chief beneficiary of its new regime of

difference. Throughout the play, the struggle of Heureses for credibility within Microcosm is parallel but inverse to Lingua's suit for the status of a Sense. As Lingua's fortunes fall, those of Heureses rise, apparently in spite of himself, for he is characteristically preoccupied with matters other than status, such as the quadrature of a circle, the Philosopher's Stone, and the next way to the Indies (II. ii). Instead of opposing the Five Senses, however, Heureses suffers the derision of Anamnestes, Remembrance, in three comic scenes that echo and parody Lingua's combat. A fist fight breaks out between them at one point that is mediated by Lingua's lying "page" Mendacio who repeats the "axiome" that "A quick Invention and a good Memory can never agree" (III.iii). The "fight" ends with Anamnestes threatening to tickle Heureses with a new trick. Heureses is the "page" of Phantastes, one of the three "inward wits," while Anamnestes is the "page" of Memoria.[22] Anamnestes thinks Heureses's head is swollen due to the exaggerated value lately placed on the powers of invention. He ridicules the destructive effects of Heureses's inventions, such as the mining of gold and the manufacture of gunpowder and weapons (IV.i). An earnest, detailed, and apparently digressive exposition of Heureses's devices follows, with reference to the mechanism of magnetism, nature's attitude towards a vacuum, and other "absurd" controversies of the contemporary science.[23] That this is a digression of central importance, however, is indicated when Lingua's crown is awarded to Visus specifically as "the author of invention" (IV. vii). The final superiority of the Five Senses over Lingua in the main plot, and of Invention over Remembrance (Tradition) in its comic inversion, registers the grounding of the new regime of difference in the empirically knowable world and the instrumentality of science, conceived as the extension of the ability of Man's body to "know" the truth.[24]

"A mere jest to die for": The Correspondence of Virtue and Wit in *Clarissa*

Clarissa is strangely out of character when she writes Lovelace an allegorical letter with an intent to mislead. Lovelace is equally so when he fails to read the letter sceptically, let alone allegorically. The boldly deceptive letter is surprising because of Clarissa's insistence that "wit" be linked to virtue, and because of her aspiration to be a paragon of virtue. Lovelace's failure to catch the double meaning of the letter is puzzling because of his tendency to give everything his own parodic or whimsical reading, especially things treated with high seriousness by Clarissa, and because of his emphasis on the necessary connection of wit to circumspection.

Lovelace frames his trial of Clarissa's virtue as the simultaneous trial of his wit. He is delighted to find Clarissa taking precautions to protect the privacy of her correspondence. Her care with the seals of her letters signals a lack of credulity, "a suspicious temper," that makes her a worthy opponent who is deserving of his guile. "The only point that can admit of debate," he says, "is who has most wit, most circumspection: and that is what remains to be tried" (571). Lovelace's formulation gives a notable twist to Clarissa's claim, recounted by Belford, that unless wit is joined with virtue, it will come to nothing. At dinner with the rakes, Clarissa has quoted Cowley:

> Wit, like a luxuriant vine,
> Unless to Virtue's prop it join,
> Firm and erect, tow'rd heaven bound,
> Tho' it with beauteous leaves and pleasant fruit be crown'd;
> It lies deform'd, and rotting on the ground.
> (712)

For Clarissa, wit needs virtue in order to flourish. A *trial* of her virtue by Lovelace's wit confirms this interdependence at the same time that it puts virtue and wit at odds. Clarissa's "resistances"

(her virtuous behaviour) will be Lovelace's "stimulatives" (to higher achievements of wit) (716). The more virtuous Clarissa is, the sharper Lovelace's wit.

Lovelace's jest upon Hickman enacts this relation between virtue and wit (1091-98). The jest constitutes a proleptic parody of Clarissa's allegorical letter, which demonstrates by inversion how to read her allegory. In this sense, virtue and wit correspond. But the jest also emphasizes the incommensurability of virtue and wit in demonstrating, by inversion, how to read Lovelace's inability to read the letter. As parody, the jest mimicks certain characteristics of allegory but is not itself allegory. Benjamin describes the relation of baroque allegory to the profane materials out of which it is made:

> Any person, any object, any relationship can mean absolutely anything else.... But it will be unmistakably apparent...that all of the things which are used to signify derive, from the very fact of their pointing to something else, a power which makes them appear no longer commensurable with profane things, which raises them onto a higher plane, and which can, indeed, sanctify them. Considered in allegorical terms, then, the profane world is both elevated and devalued.[25]

The *process* of allegory is a dialectical one of simultaneous correspondence and incommensurability of (sacred) signifiers and (profane) referents. This is the process at work in the relation between virtue and wit in *Clarissa*. In the jest on Hickman, the allegorical letter is shown to demand an anagogical reading, one which is "upward leading." But the jest moves in a downward direction. It works to uncrown allegory, to bring it "down to size," to the level of "mere jest." This contradictory movement parodies as it represents the incommensurability between virtue and wit, between Clarissa's "message" and Lovelace's reading. The implication is that the incommensurable terms of the jest — Clarissa and Lovelace, virtue and wit, earnestness and jest, allegory and parody — are both the condition of *correspondence* and the cause of the

final rupture signified by Clarissa's allegorical letter.

The jest parodies three main features of allegory that signal its direct relation to Clarissa's letter. It makes use of personification in the figure of "Death" and presents the equivalents of other character "types" such as the Fool (the "good man") and the Vice. It mimicks allegory's "speaking otherwise" in the way that Hickman's words, actions and intentions become disarticulated and take on opposite meanings. Specifically, the jest prefigures the allegory of Clarissa's letter in that it recasts in sensual and temporal terms her real situation. Lovelace represents Clarissa's rejection of him as owing to her encouragement of another lover — whose "name" is Death — rather than as dictated by the principles of virtue she is willing to die for. Just as Lovelace disarms and answers Hickman with this jest, Clarissa disarms and answers Lovelace, when he is close to making his final "assault" on her, with the allegorical representation of her imminent death as the earthly "setting out with all diligence for my father's house" (1233). A further correspondence is suggested in the purpose of the interview between Lovelace and Hickman. Hickman initiates the meeting because of a letter Lovelace has written in support of his relatives' request that Anna Howe intercede with Clarissa on his behalf. Lovelace's letter has an "air of levity" which Anna does not know how to "read." His letter ends:

> ...if I may be once more admitted to pay my duty to the most deserving and most injured of her sex, I will be content to do it with a halter about my neck; and attended by a parson on my right hand, and the hangman on my left, be doomed, at her will, either to the church or to the gallows. (1050)

Given this representation of his intentions, Anna's question for Lovelace, transmitted through Hickman, is whether he is *in earnest* or *in jest* about requesting Anna's intervention and about making reparation to Clarissa through marriage. In posing this question, the interview with

Hickman anticipates Lovelace's own dilemma in reading Clarissa's allegorical letter. Is *she* in earnest or in jest — about a reconciliation with her family and about receiving him at her father's house?

In her letter, Clarissa writes that she is assured of a reconciliation "through the interposition of a dear blessed friend." Lovelace refers to this interposition as "mediation" (1243) as does Clarissa when explaining her allegory to Belford: "for the interposition of my dear blessed friend, suppose the *mediation* of my Saviour" (1274). In Lovelace's jest, it is Hickman who plays the role of the mediator (1096). He is the profane counterpart of Clarissa's Saviour. Hickman even effects inversions of value, but they are inversions which tend to damn rather than save both himself and Clarissa.

While the role of the mediator appears, like Hickman, to be "good," it is based on the assumption that the parties to a dispute desire a resolution *in relation to one another*. The mediator is "interpositioned," or positioned between the poles of complete rupture and resolution by force. The mediator is bound by standards of formality and civility in the interests of maintaining communication between these two poles. He is both enabled and constrained by these standards as well as by the fact that he speaks not for himself but on behalf of another. In this case, Hickman speaks for Anna Howe, who presumes to speak on behalf of Clarissa. The mediator's medium of exchange is information, and the *means* of exchange is reciprocity. He seeks the truth of the matter in the exchange of information, but must be impartial to the "truth" of either side. These are the values which Hickman assumes when he plays the role of mediator. The spiralling downward movement of the jest is produced in their systematic inversion.

Even before the meeting takes place, Lovelace has announced to Belford that he sees the

interview not as mediation but as a challenge (1086), and he proceeds to re-position Hickman into a correspondingly antagonistic stance. He deploys mockery, mimicry, ridicule, parody, exaggeration, diversionary questioning, equivocation, threats, and hyperbole in order to achieve this uncrowning. Everything Hickman is, everything he says, and everything he does is pushed until it tips over into its opposite state: the good man becomes the bad man, reciprocity becomes extortion, the mediator turns informer, questions are redirected back to the questioner, the quest for the truth becomes "curiosity," and objective truth turns out to be partial, until, finally, the mediation degenerates into Hickman's challenge to fight Lovelace physically. And Hickman no sooner gives in to *this* stance than Lovelace makes the proposition of a duel ridiculous by suddenly answering — "in earnest" — Anna Howe's question.

Lovelace begins by ridiculing Hickman's politeness and formality as empty pretense. The challenge to Hickman is to prove they are otherwise. Of course he cannot, as neither Lovelace nor Clarissa consents to his profane mediation. Lovelace is the proponent of resolution by force (the "challenge," rape, marriage). And because she does not desire a resolution *in relation to* Lovelace at all, Clarissa is the proponent of rupture.[26] Lovelace next draws attention to the fact that Hickman does not speak for himself but for Anna Howe. He displaces the question Hickman has come with — the question of whether he is in earnest or in jest — with a question of his own: "Will Miss Howe permit me to explain myself in person to her, Mr Hickman?" This question implies another: *Why do I need a mediator?* Read against Clarissa's allegory, Lovelace implies refusal of the "services" of a (divine) mediator. Meanwhile, Hickman is bound by his code of civility and finds himself in the position of having to answer for himself before Lovelace has had to answer for anything.

When Hickman finally manages to formulate a question, Lovelace uses it to draw him into an exchange of information, and then to exploit the underlying assumption of that exchange, which is reciprocity. Hickman asks: "All I beg in Miss Howe's name is to know if you really, and *bona fide*, join with your friends in desiring her to use her interest to reconcile you to Miss Harlowe?" Confronted so (apparently) directly, Lovelace engages in a form of equivocation which consists of interpreting questions narrowly and literally in order to mock the interrogator and the question while appearing to answer: "I should be extremely glad to be reconciled to Miss Harlowe; and should owe great obligations to Miss Howe if she could bring about so happy an event." Lovelace's equivocation is calculated to invite Hickman to press on. What follows is an apparently polite and generous exchange of views, which leads easily from reciprocity to extortion:

> Well, sir, and you have no objections to marriage, I presume, as the terms of that reconciliation?
>
> I never liked matrimony in my life. I must be plain with you, Mr Hickman.
>
> I am sorry for it: I think it a very happy state.
>
> I hope you will find it so, Mr Hickman.
>
> I doubt not but I shall, sir. And I dare say, so would you, if you were to have Miss Harlowe.
>
> If I could be happy in it with anybody, it would be with Miss Harlowe.
>
> I am surprised, sir! — Then, after all, you don't think of marrying Miss Harlowe! — after the hard usage —
>
> What hard usage, Mr Hickman? (1093)

Once Hickman starts giving information, in the spirit of reciprocity, Lovelace extorts more by making it the price of his answer to Anna Howe's question and representing the transaction as fair exchange: "I hope you would not expect that I should answer *your* questions, at the same time that you refuse to answer *mine*" (1094). Lovelace quizzes Hickman on how much Clarissa has revealed about the rape. But when Hickman tells all he knows, he only confirms his ignorance of the "truth" of the very matter he pretends to make his business. Worse, he has now assumed the unsavory role of informer, one who informs against another, by providing Lovelace with information which may be used to Clarissa's disadvantage. In a reversal of Clarissa's redemption — the "buying back" of her soul by her "Mediator" — Lovelace, as Vice or Lucifer, "pays off" or "rewards" Hickman for providing this information by beginning to answer Anna's question.

Lovelace's answer is presented as praise for Clarissa but in the form of blame for three things. The first is that she will not give him the opportunity of repairing her wrongs. The implication is that Hickman's and Anna Howe's question is misdirected and would be better put to Clarissa: Is *she* in earnest or in jest — about the nature and degree of her violation, about her rejection of Lovelace, and about dying? Secondly, Lovelace blames Clarissa for her persistence in appealing "her case" and revealing details of her rape. This article of blame contains the threat that Lovelace will not marry her if she tells all. But this is also a truth, in that reparation through marriage *is* impossible unless both Lovelace and Clarissa accept marriage as, variously, sanctifying, legitimizing, or covering up their sexual relations after the fact.

Lovelace sets up Hickman for "the third article" of blame by displaying a reluctance to reveal it and playing on Hickman's "curiosity," which is the way Lovelace recasts the mediator's "earnest" desire to know the truth. Lovelace's coyness leads Hickman to volunteer the

information, in a backhanded way, that doubts have been raised about Clarissa's conduct:

> It may not be proper, said he, for me to know your *third* article against this unhappy lady: but I never heard of anybody, out of her own implacable family, that had the least doubt of her honour. Mrs Howe, indeed, once said after a conference with one of her uncles, that she feared all was not right of her side — But else, I never heard — (1095)

This slip suggests that Hickman himself cannot dismiss the very doubts about Clarissa implied in Lovelace's third article of blame — that her conduct has been or is improper, and that she may be to blame for what is happening to her. Hickman must entertain such doubts because, if he wants to know the truth, he must be prepared for that truth to damn Clarissa. Hickman's apparent neutrality betrays a notion of truth as fixed, impartial, objective, and external either to himself or to Lovelace or Clarissa. Yet his ignorance of the facts of the dispute he presumes to mediate has established that truth is positioned in persons, in roles, and that it looks different depending upon positioning. He cannot represent Clarissa to Lovelace because he does not believe in or partake of Clarissa's truth (the truth of her position). He shows himself to be too prepared — in his quest for truth — to find Clarissa at fault. Hickman's preparedness, even desire, to believe that Clarissa is at fault is so strong that he persists in imagining her new "lover" even after he begins to suspect that Lovelace is in jest:

> H. Why, sir, there is some joke in this, surely. A man of common parts knows not how to take such a gentleman as you. But, sir, if there be any truth in the story, what is he? Some Jew, or miserly citizen, I suppose, that may have presumed on the lady's distressful circumstances; and your lively wit points him out as it pleases.
>
> L. Why the rascal has estates in every country *in* England, and *out of* England too.
>
> H. Some East-India governor, I suppose, if there be anything in it. The lady once had thoughts of going abroad... (1097)

The effectiveness of the jest is commensurate with the amount Hickman has invested in accepting the wrong implications. And it is very effective, as Lovelace describes Hickman's disarray on hearing the punch line ("His name, in short, is DEATH!"): "Thou never beheldest any man so disconcerted. He looked as if the frightful skeleton was before him, and he had not his accounts ready." Hickman uncrowned prefigures the Lovelace who begins to "be afraid, after all, that [Clarissa's] letter was a strategem to get me out of town" (1269), but who nevertheless clings to its literal meaning. He tells Belford of his resistance to any other reading: "Charlotte, who pretends to have the eye of an eagle, was for finding out some mystery in the style and manner, till I overbore her, and laughed her out of it" (1270). Here, Lovelace finally laughs Hickman out of his role as mediator. He turns to Lovelace "at...more than half-menace," prepared to fight physically. The mediation becomes a naked challenge as Hickman resorts to force, the very means of resolving differences that mediation is supposed to prevent:

> I came, sir, said he, as a mediator of differences. It behoves me to keep my temper. But, sir, and turned short upon me, as much as I love peace and to promote it, I will not be ill-used. (1098)

Hickman's final position is that of the fool. As Lovelace dismisses his own jesting and proceeds to answer Hickman's original question, he is disarmed and ridiculous for having taken himself and Lovelace so seriously. The fool has no place to stand. This is the position Lovelace later fears finding himself in for failing to read Clarissa's letter with due circumspection:

> ...what a stupid figure I should make to all my own family, if my Clarissa has been capable, as Gulliver in his abominable Yahoo story phrases it, of saying the *thing that is not*. By my soul, Jack, if it were only that I should be *outwitted* by such a novice at plotting, and that it would make me look silly to my kinswomen here who know I value myself upon my contrivances, it would vex me to the heart.... (1271)

But Lovelace, like Hickman, is made the fool of Clarissa's allegory because the only way he can interpret its "speaking otherwise" is as a lie, as the *thing that is not*, the profane counterpart of the anagogical reading which the letter requires. The *thing that is not*, for Lovelace, is Clarissa's death, which is, in turn, her "meaning." As Rosemary Bechler, following Benjamin, puts it: "Human experience is the movement towards the apprehension of allegorical significance which is the death of things."[27] Lovelace can only counter Clarissa's sacred standing with profane jesting. Benjamin identifies this dialectical relation (or bind) in baroque allegories of Satan, who is associated with matter and material existence:

> Just as earthly mournfulness is of a piece with allegorical interpretation, so is devilish mirth with its frustration in the triumph of matter. This explains the devilish jocularity of the intriguer, his intellectuality, his knowledge of significance....so that the allegorist is countered by the scornful laughter of hell. [28]

Lovelace's jest, a profane parody of allegory, is "of a piece" with the frustration of allegorical interpretation. Thus, Clarissa's allegory meets with Lovelace's parody in a relation of both correspondence and incommensurability. Even after Belford has "translated" the allegory, Lovelace calls it a jest, "a mere jest to die for!" (1308), and dignifies his position with the name of philosophy:

> ...is it not philosophy carried to the highest pitch, for a man to conquer such tumults of soul as I am sometimes agitated by, and in the height of the storm to be able to quaver out an horse-laugh?....This high point of philosophy, to laugh and be merry in the midst of the most soul-harrowing woes, when the heart-strings are just bursting asunder, was reserved for thy Lovelace....this is the laughing-time of my life. (1310)[29]

Lovelace's "laughing time" is Clarissa's "shining time." We have only to invert Lovelace's jest in order to "read" Clarissa's allegorical letter. Where the jest moves from mediation to resolution by force, the allegorical letter moves from mediation to rupture (confirmation of the truth of her

rape, absolute rejection of Lovelace, death). Whereas Hickman as mediator is prepared to doubt and to damn Clarissa, her divine mediator has found her worthy and redeems her, which renders her death a triumphant reconciliation. But Clarissa's allegory is never as mysterious to the reader as it is to Lovelace. The jest's explanation of Lovelace's failure to read the allegory is more urgent.

The text invites us to puzzle over the question by emphasizing Lovelace's characteristic tendency to read whimsically and critically, especially immediately before and after he receives Clarissa's allegorical letter. After the jest on Hickman but before receipt of the letter, Belford forwards two of Clarissa's meditations and challenges Lovelace to take them seriously (1124). Lovelace first insists he is aware that some things are above jesting:

> I could make some pretty observations upon one or two places of the lady's meditation: but, wicked as I am thought to be, I never was so abandoned as to turn into ridicule, or even to treat with levity, things sacred. I think it the highest degree of ill manners to jest upon those subjects, which the world in general look upon with veneration and call divine. (1145)

Lovelace is, as Richardson points out, "an Infidel only in *Practice.*"[30] He proceeds to read Clarissa's first meditation profanely and to jest upon the second. For example, the first meditation is made up of passages from the Book of Job and includes the following lines:

> ...For the arrows of the Almighty are within me; the poison whereof drinketh up my spirit.
> The terrors of God do set themselves in array against me...
>
> For the thing which I greatly feared is come upon me!
> ...(1125)

Lovelace reads these words to mean that Clarissa is pregnant:

> But now that I have cleared myself of any intentional levity on occasion of my beloved's meditation; which, as thou observest, is finely suited to her case (that is

> to say, as she and you have drawn her case); I cannot help expressing my pleasure, that by one or two verses of it (the *arrow*, Jack, and *what she feared being come upon her!*) I am encouraged to hope, what it will be very surprising to me if it do not happen: that is, in plain English, that the dear creature is in the way to be a mamma. (1147)

When Lovelace is sick, he uses the second meditation to jest on the parson, Lord M. and Mrs. Greme, and even takes credit for having written it (1202-3). Lovelace's comment on Dr. Brand's letter to the Harlowes is also in striking contrast to his inability to read Clarissa's allegory. When Colonel Morden visits Berkshire, Lovelace brings out her letter, and together they puzzle over its meaning. "She must have some meaning I cannot fathom," says Lovelace (1290). Morden then shows Lovelace Dr. Brand's letter, which shows the pedant's misreading and misrepresentation of Clarissa's relationship to Belford. Lovelace is incensed at this. He suggests that Belford show the letter to Clarissa, as "it may put her upon such a defense as she might be glad of an opportunity to make, and to shame them [the Harlowes] for their *monstrous credulity*" [emphasis added] (1291).

Lovelace's own credulity in reading Clarissa's allegorical letter is entirely uncharacteristic and implausible in this context. Following our reading of the jest upon Hickman, we may read this "gap" in Lovelace's character, as well as the apparent "gap" in Clarissa's character in writing the letter, as signifying the final divergence of their paths, the end of their correspondence to one another, the incommensurability of virtue and wit. In the jest, Lovelace occupies the position opposite Clarissa's "rupture." He is placed at is the pole of resolution by force (rape of Clarissa, provocation of Hickman to violence, marriage despite the rape). In reducing Hickman's mediation to a challenge, Lovelace spurns the services of a "mediator" (sacred and profane) and commits himself to movement in an opposing direction. The downward movement of the jest

which leads to Hickman's undoing precludes the "upward leading" anagogical reading required by Clarissa's letter. Clarissa's allegory, her death, and her "meaning" are, to Lovelace, the *thing that is not*.

Notes to Chapter Four

1. D'Urfey, 21-22. D'Urfey makes this comment in justifying his decision to give precedence to the "Preface" over the "Book."

2. The short poem is called "A Kentish Petition" and concerns an apparently topical property dispute that I do not deal with here.

3. Felicity A. Nussbaum, *The Brink of All We Hate: English Satires on Women, 1660-1750* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1984), 38-39.

4. Nussbaum, *The Brink of All We Hate*, 9, 18.

5. *The Matter of Revolution*, 14-15. Rogers dates the "Vitalist Moment" from 1649 to 1652 (1).

6. Rogers linkage of vitalism to feminism and his connection of both to liberalism are important discoveries that invite further research and development.

7. Erwin H. Ackerknecht, "Midwives as Experts in Court," *Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine* 52:10 (1976): 1227. In modern medicine, I think, the adult male body is the norm against which the "specialties" (or aberrations) of gynecology, obstetrics, pediatrics, and geriatrics are defined.

8. Ackerknecht, 1224.

9. References are to the reprint of the first edition, edited with "Introduction and Notes," Angus Ross (London: Penguin, 1985).

10. *Lingua: or The Combat of The Tongue and the Five Senses for Superiority. A Pleasant Comedy*, (London, Printed by G. Eld for Simon Waterson, 1607). Subsequent editions were printed in 1610?, 1617, 1622, 1632, 1657. The text to which I refer was published in London: Printed for Simon Miller, at the Starre in St Pauls Church yard, 1657. *Lingua* continued to be advertised as a "serious comedy" as late as 1663. The play was well known enough that a popular tradition about it also survives. According to this tradition, Oliver Cromwell played the part of "Tactus" in the play's premiere. Cromwell would have been only eight years old at the time. Nevertheless, William Winstanley, who, in *The Lives of the Most Famous English Poets* (1687), attributes *Lingua* to Antony Brewer, embellishes the tradition in recording that Cromwell's mock contention for the crown is said to have swollen his ambition so high that afterwards he contended for it in earnest (115). See also G. C. Moore Smith, "Some Notes on English University Plays," *Modern Language Review* 3 (1908): 141-156. Most of the scholarly commentary on *Lingua* occurs on the pretext of comparing it, usually unfavorably or as derivative, to canonical authors and works. See F. S. Boas, "Macbeth and Lingua," *Modern Language Review* 4 (1909): 517-520; M. P. Tilley, "The Comedy *Lingua* and Du Bartas' *La Sepmaine*," *Modern Language Notes* 42 (1927): 293-299; M. P. Tilley, "The Comedy *Lingua*

and *The Faerie Queene*," *Modern Language Notes* 42 (1927): 150- 157; M. P. Tilley, "The Comedy *Lingua* and Sir John Davies's *Nosce Teipsum*," *Modern Language Notes* 44 (1929): 36-39; and H. G. Dick, "The Lover in a Cask: A Tale of a Tub," *Italica* 18 (1941): 12-13. Louise Vinge treats *Lingua* in a more positive, although brief, manner in *The Five Senses: Studies in a Literary Tradition* (Lund, Sweden: Publications of the Royal Society of Letters at Lund, CWK Gleerup, 1975), 98-103. On Thomas Tomkis, see Gerald P. Mander, "Thomas Tomkis," *Times Literary Supplement*, 31 March 1945, 151.

11. See Richard W. F. Kroll, *The Material Word: Literate Culture in the Restoration and Early Eighteenth Century* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 185; William Holder, *Elements of Speech: An Essay of Inquiry into the Natural Production of Letters: With an Appendix Concerning Persons Deaf and Dumb* (London: Printed by T.N. for J. Martyn, Printer to the R. Society, at the Bell without Temple-Barr, 1669); John Wilkins, *An Essay Towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language* (London: Sa: Gellibrand and for John Martyn, Printer to the Royal Society, 1668).

12. Thomas Diconson, "To His Singular Good and Approved Friend: This Express or Signature of Intellectual Amity Upon His Chirologia" in John Bulwer's *Chirologia: or The Natural Language of the Hand and Chironomia: or The Art of Manual Rhetoric* (1644), ed. James W. Cleary (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1974), 10.

13. *Pathomachia: or, The Battell of Affections. Shadowed By a Faigned Siedge of the Citie of Pathopolis. Written some yeeres since, and now first published by a Friend of the deceased Author*, (London, Printed by Thomas and Richard Coates, for Francis Constable, and are to be sold at his Shop in Pauls Church-yard at the Signe of the Crane, 1630). The title appears as *Pathomachia, or, Loves Loade-Stone*," on page one. The "Epistle Dedicatorie" to "Henry, Baron of Hunsdon, Viscount Rochefort, Earle of Dover," is signed by "F. Constable."

14. Michael McKeon, "Historicizing Patriarchy: The Emergence of Gender Difference in England, 1660-1760," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 28/3 (Spring 1995): 295-322.

15. McKeon, "Historicizing Patriarchy," 301.

16. McKeon does not specifically define his term "regime," but from his usage I understand it to refer to the implicit fundamental laws of epistemological ordering. It is a matter of what is given priority in the ordering system. The regime of difference priorizes a centre-margin axis, with "difference" defining the boundary between centre and margin. In the regime of hierarchy, status defines the boundary between "levels" of the social order.

17. The basic unit of language is here understood as the utterance, the boundaries of which are necessarily social because an utterance is made in response to a previous utterance and anticipates an utterance in reply. See V. N. Volosinov / M. M. Bakhtin, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, tr. Ladislav Matejka and I.R. Titunik (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1986), 72.

18. In *Baroque Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity* (London: Sage Publications, 1994) Christine Buci-Gluckmann credits the French poet, Charles Baudelaire, with locating the feminine in culture rather than nature. "[I]n a break with a whole philosophical tradition since Plato, he places the feminine in a relationship not to nature but to culture" (78). In fact, the baroque writing I consider indicates that the nature / culture distinction follows from, rather than precedes, the modern system of gender differentiation, as here in Tomkis, and later in Walter Charleton, whose work I discuss in the following chapter. Baroque writers hesitate over this key assignment of value and many others. The importance of their work resides precisely in such moments of hesitation.

19. I understand the separation of "will" and "desire" to be an effect and central pillar of the enlightenment project. When *Lingua* was written, this separation was in process and still had a quality of strangeness and unfamiliarity. It was a problem to be wrestled with. For the purposes of this essay, I take the terms "appetite" and "desire" to be interchangeable as in the usage of Hobbes in *Leviathan* (1651) and that of his disciple, the physician and Epicurean, Walter Charleton in his *Natural History of the Passions* (1674).

20. Such a division makes room for the later primacy of "reason" in relation to desire and perhaps belies any fundamental opposition between empiricism and rationalism. If they are separate or separated, perhaps it is only in order to achieve their rearticulation in the formation of the new sciences.

21. "Somnus" temporarily levels the still intact hierarchy by laying them in a circle. He says, "ther's no difference twixt the King and Clown, The poor and rich, the beauteous and deformed, Wrapt in the vail of night and bonds of sleep" (V. xvi).

22. The "inward wits" are *phantasia*, *cogitatio*, and *memoria* in Edmund Spenser's *The Faerie Queene*, but they vary in number and character in medieval and Renaissance representations. Their changing importance, according to E. Ruth Harvey, "was to have extensive consequences in later disputes over the status and value of works of imagination," and their significance in the epistemological shift I am describing derives from what Harvey calls "their 'in between' nature: their intermediate position between sensible and intelligible, material and incorporeal...." See *The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (London: The Warburg Institute, University of London, 1975), 61.

23. In one of the few articles that address laughter and science as if they are part of the same universe, C. S. Duncan notes a change in the predominant type of scientist appearing in dramatic and prose representations. The change coincides with the rising respectability of the new philosophy after the Restoration and the chartering of the Royal Society. Before this period, Duncan finds the majority of comic scientists are alchemists, astrologers, and witches. Afterwards, the new type is exemplified in Thomas Shadwell's "Sir Nicholas Gimcrack" who appears in *The Virtuoso* (1676). Heureses, although appearing on stage much earlier, is the Gimcrackian type. See "The Scientist as a Comic Type," *Modern Philology* 14 (1916-17): 89-99.

24. The hierarchy is as follows: 1) Visus, Chief Sense and author of Invention; 2) Auditus, Lord's Intelligencer; 2) Olfactus, Priest of Microcosm; 4) Tactus, Wearer of the Robe; 5) Gustus, Psyche's only Taster. In the play's earlier ordering, Lingua was the sixth sense but for women only. The character Memory remembers that the same judgement was made forty-nine thousand years ago (IV.vii). Lingua, in the final ordering of the senses, is committed to "close Prison, in Gustus his house" (V.xix). Gustus is charged with keeping her in custody "every day till she come to 80 years of age" and guarded by "30 tall watchmen, without whose license she shall by no means wag abroad." Phantastes is the one who asks for the additional punishments: "I pray you my Lord ad[d] this to the judgement, that whenever she obtaineth license to walk abroad, in token the Tongue was the cause of her offence, let her wear a velvet hood, made just in the fashion of a great Tongue, in my conceit 'tis a very pretty Embleme of a Woman." Interestingly, in the very last scene after Lingua is finally banished and everyone else has left the stage, Appetites is found sleeping, which prevents the play from ending. The audience is asked to wake him up with their applause.

25. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 175.

26. Frances Ferguson's analysis of the rape in *Clarissa* is organized around the terms "stipulation" and consent." Ferguson argues against the tendency of *Clarissa* scholars to equate "the violence enacted by Lovelace in the act of rape and the violence of any interpretive gesture." In her "conjectural history" of the rape story genre, Ferguson finds that "the distance between objects and persons is progressively increased" in the symbolic systems used to narrate the "unspeakable" act. "Richardson's achievement in *Clarissa*," Ferguson says, "is to insist on a fundamental mistake in the idea of equating epistemology and psychology." *Clarissa* is a "psychological novel" because "it insists on the importance of psychology as the ongoing possibility of the contradiction between what one must mean and what one wants to mean." See Ferguson's article, "Rape and the Rise of the Novel," *Misogyny, Misandry, and Misanthropy*, eds. R. Howard Bloch and Frances Ferguson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 107-109. I agree that *Clarissa*, and, in the discussion to follow, Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*, inaugurate the modern novel precisely because they "discover" and elaborate interiority. The problem, in the terms I have tried to develop in this essay, is not to dissolve the inside / outside distinction, but to somehow ground human interiority in materialist rather than transcendental categories. For the analyses of Clarissa's rape that Ferguson critiques, see Terry Castle, *Clarissa's Ciphers: Meaning and Disruption in Richardson's "Clarissa"* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), Terry Eagleton, *The Rape of Clarissa: Writing, Sexuality, and Class Struggle in Samuel Richardson* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), and William Beatty Warner, *Reading "Clarissa": The Struggles of Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

27. Rosemary Bechler, "'Trial by what is contrary': Samuel Richardson and Christian Dialectic," *Samuel Richardson: Passion and Prudence* (London: Vision Press, 1986), 106.

28. *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*, 227.

29. William Warburton traces the relation between laughter and death in the combination of merriment and wisdom. In the morality plays of the Middle Ages, "the Fool of the Piece, in order to shew the inevitable approaches of Death (another of the Dramatis Personae) is made to employ all his strategems to avoid him.... So that a representation of these scenes would afford a great deal of good mirth and morals mixed together." See Warburton's "Supplement to the Translator's Preface," *Don Quixote* (1749), tr. Charles Jarvis, 5th edition (London, 1788), xxxvii.

30. "Postscript to the 4th Edn.," *Samuel Richardson's Clarissa: Preface, Hints of Prefaces, and Postscript*, Augustan Reprint Publication No. 103, ed. R. F. Brissenden (Los Angeles: William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, University of California Press, 1964), 362.

Chapter Five

Geometry and Physiognomy

Grim-death's fierce pangs, are rather to be sought;
Than that we should to Babels-yoke, be brought.[1]

D'Urfey's *Essay* registers a loss of the basis for the spatialized division of knowledge between sacred and profane spheres. The groundlessness of all such divisions is, in fact, the real "Hiatus" that he discovers and is the "foundation" and source of laughter. Divisions and the lack of divisions are linked in the *Essay* to the problem of time. Discussions about time are staged as polemics between two sects of Epicureans as well as Stoics, Platonists, Chymists, Skeptics, and Futurists (the Helmontians and Aristotelians are deferred to future volumes), between whom the lines are drawn clearly enough but who nevertheless agree on one thing: "that nothing has any Influence upon the happiness of Ages; but their Distance from the Present only" (88). The debates about how to organize time are introduced in a chapter called "A Very Rhetorical Section" (68-113). The conception of time as a rhetorical problem — the narrator hesitates over whether to proceed by the "Rules of Grammar" or those of "Heraldry" — spatializes time in repeated, defensive justifications of the length (the "space" taken up) of his "Preface," which prompts digressions on the giving of form in general as a problem of the rhetorical formulation of coordinates in time and space.

The implication of the formal confusions and groundlessness of the placement of spatio-temporal coordinates, and of this placement as a rhetorical problem, is that they are human

coordinates. They are divisions in language that determine the relation between language and reality. By the common language measure of the *Essay*, the ludicrous presumption is that the humans who make the divisions also take their coordinates in time and space by means of language, much in the same way that they customarily pull themselves up by the bootstraps.

A section entitled "The Method of making a Chasm, or Hiatus, judiciously; the great Reach of Thought required for the Contrivance thereof, together with the Difference between the French Academies and the English" mixes the rhetorical placement of time / space coordinates with language and the human by inserting a macaronic paraphrase of Latin verse — a "Macaronicon," as Robert Burton would say, but with the difference that most of the words, especially those that might probably be in English, remain "ideal" (162). They are left out and replaced with blanks, as Tristram Shandy would do. The *Essay* announces its "real" discovery of the new "Man" in a boxed insert on a page of such inestimable Shandean blanks:

> The Author very well understands that a good sizable Hiatus discovers a very great Genius, there being no Wit in the World more Ideal, and consequently more refined, than what is display'd in those elaborate Pages, that have ne'er a Syllable written on them. (163)

The real endpoint of D'Urfey's discovery and, by implication, of the new mode of knowledge in general, is this new kind of "Man," characterized, as we have seen, as the "Species Intentionales."

When the subject of knowledge, the one who has access to the Intelligible World, takes up or usurps the only available position outside of time — that of death — in order to secure eternal truth, then the language of this new creature of eternity is similarly disembodied and atemporal. Mathematics is the ideal language of infinite, all-knowing, "dead" Man because it is, like him,

abstracted from any particular object of measurement. Mathematics, the abstraction of space, has the happy quality of apparently being denuded of rhetorical form while at the same time constituting form incarnate in its figuration of space. It is the barest of bones, the skeleton, of signification. The *Essay* draws attention to this separation in the ground of form when the formal free-for-all precipitated by the "Epitaph on a Maiden-head" lands, finally, in a chapter called "How Geometry and Physiognomy were improv'd by the famous Mathematician at Malmesbury" (146-148). Geometry / Physiognomy.

Shortly after introducing Hobbes in terms of geometry and physiognomy, and just before the new "Man" is challenged to appear, the vertiginous effects of falling into the vortex are resumed in the announcement of an imminent change in the terms of the discussion. A section called "Of the Building of Babel" declares that henceforth the word "Old" will stand in for "Sensible" and "New" for "Intelligible." The sudden shift in terms brings to the fore how the tumbling and teeming "Preface," the space of movement or motion toward a theory, connects to the lengthy digressions on time that stall and impede the text's movement toward any theory at all. Both the "Preface" and the digressions emphasize the constraints and latitude that language permits the "Inquisitive Discoverer":

> To manifest my Desire of dealing openly and fairly with my Reader, I judg'd it convenient to give this publick Notice of my Terms being alter'd, that all things being duly perform'd on my side, if any Mis-understanding should happen, the Fault may ly entirely at his Door. I therefore farther advertise him that by the Old World shall be understood the Sensible; from which he may readily collect, that the Intelligible is to be meant by the new. For, altho' the Sensible World be in very Deed the Recenter of the two, in regard to Age; having been created but of late Days, whereas the Intelligible has been a World from the first Moment the Eternity it self saw the Light; yet the Discovery of the Intelligible is of later Standing than the Creation of the Sensible. The Discovery of the former is owing to a Lucky Accident in the Building of Babel, upon which I am not now at Leisure to dilate. This Accident gave the hint; but had it not been Favour'd and coadjuted by the

> Conjunction of certain Circumstances and Planets, together with a benign Irradiation from the Moon, we had been buried in Darkness to this day, and the Curtain would still have continued Drawn between human Minds, and that bright Region of Intellectual Light, tho' seated and residing even within them; such having been the Will and Pleasure of Fate, that notwithstanding the New, or Ideal World consists in nothing else but every Man's Knowledge, yet sublunary Things should be so nicely order'd, that for many Ages together no Man should know it. (171-72)

No Man was informed of the existence of the Intelligible World, not because it did not exist, but because "Man" was as yet unformed. The "Hiatus," and therefore the "Hymen," had not yet been discovered. The condition of his new form is the redrawing of the grids of time (language) and space (bodies, texts, prefaces).

Despite all the ado, however, the announced substitution of terms remains "ideal." The changes never take place except in a section that precedes their announcement. Ten pages earlier, with no warning at all, the new terms are inserted alongside their counterparts as substitutes not for each other but for the mathematical values of Hobbes's geometry. The Burtonian "Macaronicon" and the pages of Shandean blanks that introduce the explanation of how a "Hiatus" makes "a very great Genius" are interrupted by a demonstration of Hobbes's geometry — in "Fig. 1" (though there are no others) (164-65) — excerpted from his treatise on Euclid. Here, the narrator "explains" (a term that might as well be replaced by "obfuscates") how the "Hiatus" and its new Genius are discovered or effected through the interchange of rhetorical and numerical values:

> Explanation of Fig. 1.
>
> N new. O old. W word. W world. I intelligible.
> S sensible. D december. T totum. P pronouns.

From which subtracting the fourth Operation by Cylinders, it will stand thus,

aa _____ ax _____ d
ad _____ bc _____ 5
xb _____ og _____ y 2

1/20 _____ 11/1 _____ 3/(?)

7183165291 _____ 9 _____ 6

The coordinates thus calculated and established, the stage is set for the quite rhetorical appearance of the Ideal Man.

Robert Boyle and the "Semeiotical Part of Physick"

In his essay "Concerning Some Particulars Relating to the Semeiotical Part of Physick" (1663), Robert Boyle's aim is to legitimize experiment with "chymical" remedies for the cure of disease.[2] The project both requires and produces a substantial reorganization and rearticulation of diseases, patients, and remedies in relation to "experiment."[3] I here draw attention to a small but, I think, not insignificant episode in the prehistory of experiment that specifies Boyle's re-articulation of patients, diseases, and remedies as a process of genre. Boyle's *Essay* exemplifies the rhetorical conception of time to which D'Urfey's *Essay* introduces us.

The essay is the third in a series of five on the usefulness of the new philosophy for medicine. The set make up Part II of *Some Considerations Touching the Usefulness of Experimental Natural Philosophy*, published in 1663. Experimentation with remedies falls under the "semeiotical" part of physick because the interpretation of symptoms organizes medicine in a way that obstructs, or even precludes, the legitimacy and productivity of testing and administering

chemical remedies. Boyle calls it the method that is "the least capable of improvement by natural philosophy" (89). Yet, lacking alternative authoritative ground, he cannot do away with "the old Rules of prognostication" directly; instead, he puts them to work in a new way. Through experiment, he proposes that the signs of disease can be made to produce facts about specific pathologies in specific bodies and indicate specific treatments. The previous demonstrative system of reading the body's signs consisted of the "true" or "natural" correlation of body and sign in a catalogue of diseases. The signs themselves constituted knowledge of the nature, causes, and substance of disease. For Boyle, these socially and cosmically constituted signs lack self-evident significance. Rather than pointing to any obvious, pre-existent meaning, they invite testing to find out "not so much what is thought as what is proved" (95). The contradiction at work is that the legitimacy and promise of Boyle's remedies depends on isolating *particular* qualities and effects of *specific* ingredients and applying them to *autonomous* diseases and *determinate* bodies — all new divisions conceived and configured in unstable and dependent relation to each other. But such discrete bodies and entities, differing in essence as well as in relative positioning, are only conceivable in a world where the conditions of possibility for belief in the true or natural correlation (and conflation) of body and sign has disappeared. Hence, the very condition — the unintelligibility of the signs — that makes Boyle's task of testing the signs historically imperative renders it impossible.

Boyle proceeds by addressing a medical debate, a disease, and a series of patients paradigmatic of received tradition. The debate is the one about the curableness of diseases. On the one hand, the Galenists jealously guard a dogmatics of prognosis and diagnosis — "the semeiotical part of physick"— in a "catalogue of incurable ones" (101). On the other hand, the

Paracelsians and Helmontians claim that most if not all diseases might be curable if subjected to their multipurpose and variable "alkahest," a mixture that is *organically* concocted but administered to intervene in the quite *mystical* correspondences.[4] The disease Boyle focuses on is the stone, or gall stones, which resists or eludes practitioners from both sides of the debate about curableness. The most memorable and confounding patient Boyle discusses is the bizarre and infamous Claudius of Lorraine who

> loaths nothing that stinks, or is otherwise unpleasant. He hath often been seen to chew and swallow glass, stones, wood, bones, the feet of hares, and other animals, together with the hair; linen, and woollen cloth; fishes, and other animals alive; nay, even metals, and dishes, and globes of tin: besides which, he devours sewet, and tallow-candles, the shells of cockles, and the dungs of animals, especially of oxen, even hot, as soon as it is voided. He drinks the urine of others mixt with wine or beer; he eats hay, straw, stubble, and lately he swallowed down two living mice, which for half an hour continued biting at the bottom of his stomach; and, to be short, whatsoever is offered him by any noble persons, it goes down with him without more ado upon the smallest reward, insomuch that within a few days he hath promised to eat a whole calf raw, together with the skin and hair. (98-99)

In the prevailing account, Claudius of Lorraine demonstrates that there exists no substance corrosive enough to dissolve gall stones because he frequently eats any and all noxious substances with no apparent effect on his health. Anything stronger — strong enough to dissolve the stone — would necessarily be so corrosive that it would harm other non-diseased body parts. Claudius is a sign of the incurability of the stone in general even though, curiously, he himself does not have the stone or any other known disease. His own lack of the stone is irrelevant because Claudius's individual body or the stone as a separate entity or disease is not the object of study, let alone treatment. Claudius functions as a sign rather than as a patient in the modern sense as indicated by his own doctor's response to his monstrous appetite. Doctor Nesterus periodically testifies to the veracity of Claudius's story but otherwise waits patiently to carry out the autopsy.

With the primary task of the reading of signs, there is nothing else for medicine to do.

Boyle takes the story from the French physician, Daniel Sennert (1572-1637), for whom he uses the Latin designation, "Sennertus." While it passes without comment in the text, it cannot pass without comment here that *Sennertus* would seem to be the anagrammatical kinsman of Claudius's Doctor *Nesterus*. Sennertus / Nesterus. It's an amazing correspondence but one that is quite at home behind this genre of the taller and taller tale in the language of incredibly escalating hyperbole. What does an experimental philosopher do with such material? He adds empirical detail from the emergent genre of experimental reportage. In the present case, this has two effects. The first is intentional; it shores up the credibility of the tale. According to Boyle, Sennertus reports that he first heard the story in 1632 when Claudius was fifty-eight years of age. Sennertus says that precisely four years later, in 1636, he again wrote to Doctor Nesterus and learned that Claudius was "yet alive, and did yet devour all the things mentioned in his former letter, but not so frequently as before; his teeth being grown somewhat blunter by age, that he was no longer able to break bones and metals" (99).

Boyle's addition of this framing detail serves no purpose other than to testify to the historicity and therefore the accuracy of the account. But the need for such assurance betrays a defensive awareness that the signs of a "semeiotical physick" are beginning to appear as ridiculous from the perspective of the new philosophy as his own "chymical" approach to medicine appears from the standpoint of tradition. The assumptions of the received order of things have become nonsensical while the new ordering yet lacks its own epistemological framework and authority. The second and simultaneous effect of adding empirical detail to such a tall tale is the activation of what I will call the "baroque grotesque method," related, in the same way as the funny twins

Sennertus and Nesterus, to Boyle's "experimental method," a method that can only later appeal to a "reason" that is still to be constituted. In his effort to make Claudius of Lorraine believable from one side of the epistemological divide, by specifying times and dates, Boyle renders him laughable from both sides. The baroque grotesque method that authorizes and presides over Boyle's hybrid or Janus-faced genre is associated with such historical laughter. What is so funny is the sensation of freedom and the dilemma of constraint that arise from the peculiar status of the human body as both *precondition* and *product of knowledge*. Variable bodies are produced in various formulations of language. The grotesque method generally is a powerful heuristic device that animates the sifting through and recombination of such formulations, necessarily realized in genres. Genres, in this view, configure time and space, determining what *parts* will be visible and in what kinds of relations. Boyle's *baroque grotesque* method makes possible the discovery of the physiological body, which entails a separation between the physiological and the "semeiotical." The grotesque method here is *baroque* because of its particular hesitant formulation of present time, as distinct from the past. Time is bifurcating. Past and present, history and nature, the semiotical and the physiological awaken to each other at the very moment that they go separate ways. And the baroque here is *grotesque* in its simultaneously form-giving and deshaping method by which it not only accepts but embraces heterogeneity and the interplay of disparate elements and genres, such as the tall tale and the experimental report. The semiotic body is the ceaselessly deforming and reforming subject of history and culture. The physiological body appears in the unprecedented timeless present of nature, where its organs and systems are unchanging and uniform, regardless of any particular body's name or story.

The language of the baroque grotesque method is marked by not the one or the other but

by a discourse of pathos that utters them together in the moment of their mutual recognition and separation; it is the kind of pathos associated with self-justification and accusation, with "modes of apologia and polemic" that continually sense and respond in advance to the resistance offered by alien discourses and other points of view.[5] In his essay, Boyle develops the possibilities and implications of the "specificity" of disease stressed by Sennert and Jean-Baptiste Van Helmont.[6] For example, he distinguishes between a disease and the individual suffering from it, as "tis one thing to dispute, Whether all Diseases be curable; and another, Whether all Persons be recoverable" (91). On this fundamental division and those that follow from it, Boyle sides with Sennert and Van Helmont despite his stated reluctance to support their views against the Galenists in the debate about curableness. In the baroque grotesque manner, he repeatedly introduces the evidence and practices of Sennert and Van Helmont negatively, by way of the most decisive criticisms against them. Then, positioned in apparent sympathy with their critics, he proceeds to answer those same critics but without appearing to agree with Sennert or Van Helmont. When he introduces the all-purpose, mysterious "alkahest," he enumerates the claims made for it, which are "so strange (not to say incredible) that their followers must pardon me, if I be *not forward to believe* such unlikely things, till sufficient *experience* hath convinced me of their truth" (97). With this ambivalent introduction, characteristic of the baroque grotesque method, Boyle reformulates the terms of Sennert and Van Helmont not as true or false but as possibly both; that is, they are *hypotheses* that require testing. His material, thus presented, *cries out* for experiment, and Boyle only obliges in offering up an "experimental method" as an answer. Despite being *not forward to believe* in it, he goes on here to speak approvingly, if not of Van Helmont's particular "alkahest," then of the possibility of making such remedies. He refers to

numerous experiments he has carried out that prove the selective corrosiveness of substances such as vinegar, fruit juices, and mercury, and concludes that "the operations of these dissolvents "are...determined by the various textures of bodies on which they are employed" (98). In this same paragraph, and with the same pathos and apparent lack of commitment, Boyle then backs into the story of Claudius of Lorraine: "And I must confess," he says, "...that one thing, among others, which hath made me *backward to affirm* with many learned men, that there can be *no* potent dissolvent, that is *not* corrosive enough to fret in pieces the parts of a human body, hath been a story..." (98). Again, he introduces the material from Sennert while seeming to argue a point which that very material contradicts.

Being "*not forward to believe*" and "*backward to affirm*" are the typically pathetic and double-voiced (or convoluted) formulations that characterize this essay and that I do not read as disingenuous or unskillful so much as indicative of Boyle's productively contradictory position between the episteme in which Claudius of Lorraine is an authoritative sign, and the yet-to-be-realized episteme that renders him ridiculous. The problem is that in developing and investigating the productive potential of "chymical" innovations and claims, Boyle also has to establish or find the epistemological framework and authority for doing so, and only a baroque grotesque method that embraces two opposing points of view in a single utterance can put such a tentative and intermediary moment into words.

Boyle's point in recounting the story of Claudius — what he has at stake in its being believed or "affirmed" — is to suggest that there must be "menstruums," in this case, "prepared by nature only," that enable Claudius to digest all the "uncouth things" he eats, and "why should it be thought, that the alkahest, or some other menstruum, wherein nature is skillfully assisted, and

to the utmost heightened by art, should not be able to dissolve concretes of very differing textures?" (99). Boyle has earlier pointed out that

> If we knew and considered well, how many of the operations of natural bodies depend upon the suitableness and difference of the figures of their parts, and the pores intercepted between them, the number of impossibilities would not, perhaps, be thought so great, as by many learned men it is.... (97)

The singularity of Claudius's digestive system indicates that effective "Specificks" or remedies could conceivably be found or made. Boyle's Claudius is at least potentially a particular physiological body rather than a sign of the generality of bodies in which the stone is incurable.

The problem of time in conceiving of such a body comes up in the opposing responses of the reversible twins, Nesterus and Sennertus. While Nesterus still hopes to dissect Claudius, Sennertus is pessimistic about what an autopsy can reveal. He refers to an autopsy performed on another glass-eater named Lazarus. It found only the cause of his *lack of taste* in a certain "conjugation of nerves" that failed to reach either the palate or the tongue, but had nothing to say about how the man could digest glass because, as Sennert points out, autopsy does not permit access to the living and physiological digestive process, "which yet may not appear to the eye by the effects" (99). While Sennertus leaves it at that, Boyle lingers over and repeats this point, locating the need and possibility for conceiving of a human body in the present, the only time in which living processes such as digestion are available and susceptible to medical knowledge and treatment. The means of bringing the body into the physiological now is the storytelling present. Sennert's tale ends with the pressing and immediate, "within a few days he [Claudius] hath promised to eat a whole calf raw..." (99), a prediction that is followed by the consideration of the pro's and cons of autopsy. Only by bringing together the need for encountering and then

examining the body in the present act of ingestion and digestion with autopsy's need for a body that no longer digests anything, necessarily a "semeiotical" body, can a point of separation of the physiological and the "semeiotical" be formulated.

Boyle's *Essay*, therefore, proceeds by the following logic. First, "incredible" material forces him to verify the story of Claudius by specifying the time of its relation and occurrence. Second, the attention to time forces and enables Boyle to locate the body in the present. Third, the body of Claudius bifurcates into the specific, physiological present and its general, semiotic, non-present form, the form of its story or representation. The physiological body separates from its story and passes into medicine, just as semiotics takes leave of medicine, the discourse that first deploys the term in English, to its new home in "literature."

Walter Charleton and The Motions of Laughter:

Walter Charleton's *Natural History of the Passions* (1674) has one foot planted firmly in the dying canon — in the freshly-dug grave, we could say — of the grotesque body.[7] The other foot rests on the grotesque's belly, which is, even in death, swollen with the new, modern, bodily canon — the stillbirth — of the naturalized body. As in the tragedy and promise of human birth, the "natural" human body is both more and less than its progenitor. It is more in that, for the first time, a body is visible as a discrete organism with identifiable parts and processes. It becomes visible in the new genre of observation — "natural history"— which the natural body both requires and produces. In the new genre, the human body is disembedded from language, separated from the ways it is talked about, from the legend and romance of "History."[8]

This new body is laid out on a table. Its motions are slowed, quieted, in order that it may

be observed, its parts enumerated and classified, its processes explained. Convexities are levelled. Orifices are sealed off. The inside is separated from the outside. Natural history is most interested in the body's *inner workings*. The intimate examination of bodily functions in the seventeenth century produced a new understanding of the mechanism of the senses, especially the sight, and engendered the technological means to extend those senses. The marvel of the microscope, for example, facilitated ever more detailed and minute observation. Its extended eye was apparently, fantastically, detached from any particular body. It seemed to be disembodied, disinterested, dispassionate — free of the tyranny of the passions. This was the seduction of natural history.

In all these ways, the canon of the naturalized body promised to excel its unwieldy, grotesque parent. But in other ways, the new canon could not hold a candle to the pleasures of the mother's body. Despite natural history's claims to empirical knowledge grounded in the senses, it actually disallowed the knowledge produced by all but one sensory input. And the heightening of one sense is the distortion of all the others. Technology's tendency not only to extend but to exceed, displace, and devalue the bodily senses is similar to the way in which the genre (or technology) of natural history excludes knowledge produced by all senses except the eye, as Foucault has noted:

> Natural history is nothing more than the nomination of the visible....Observation, from the seventeenth century onward, is a perceptible knowledge furnished with a series of systematically negative conditions. Hearsay is excluded, that goes without saying; but so are taste and smell, because their lack of certainty and their variability render impossible any analysis into distinct elements that could be universally acceptable. The sense of touch is very narrowly limited to the designation of a few fairly evident distinctions (such as that between smooth and rough); which leaves sight with an almost exclusive privilege, being the sense by which we perceive extent and establish proof, and, in consequence, the means to

> an analysis...acceptable to everyone.[9]

Natural history could not compete with the grotesque mother's more rounded sensory and explanatory powers because it does not have her "ambivalence." Natural history specifically excludes the grotesque body's two-faced orientation to social, historical life and to the individual biological organism. In the grotesque body, this duality is stressed, even exaggerated. The focus is on the surfaces where the individual meets the world and where boundaries divide one body from another. This is where bodies are "coloured" and "gendered" and positioned in a system of value.[10] What is important are the points of transition and intersection, the orifices, where the dividing lines are demarcated, and where they might be effaced. Because of Charleton's particular historical positioning, and perhaps for other reasons as well, this grotesque body is alive in his *Natural History*. It does cartwheels through his most chaste and "scientific" descriptions of the body's passions. But, to the extent that Charleton realizes a new historical genre, the grotesque body is a casualty of his text. Natural history necessarily sees a single organism.

But in what sense can we speak of "canons" of the body? Is this hyperbole? By what excess or perversity can I suggest that a canon belongs to, or is generated by, the human body, rather than some legal, institutional, or constitutional authority? I mean the terms and conditions — the laws governing — the representability of the body. This is what Charleton found himself struggling with in order to produce a *Natural History of the Passions*. The conditions of the body's representation had to be redefined. The grotesque body, with its permeable boundaries, its failure to distinguish between public and private, inner and outer, had performed on a stage without footlights, a world free of, or lacking, a "proper" and discrete aesthetic realm.[11]

The authority of canons of the body derives from the human body's peculiar status as

precondition and product of all discourse and knowledge. Knowledge constitutes an ordering of the body in the world.[12] This ordering enables and constrains discourse. Discourse can only be realized by way of the organizing device of genre. Genres set the boundaries of what can be said, and generate what is said within those boundaries. This contrasts with the notion of genre as a means of classifying literature, as if the activity and utterance of classification somehow preceded and stood above genre. The relation is the other way around. Genres provide the principles of recognition and organization. We have already seen that natural history cannot "recognize" the grotesque body, which is to say that it cannot represent the human body in its simultaneously individual and social aspects.

The intersection of the grotesque and the naturalized body is nowhere more evident than in Charleton's account of the motions of laughter. That laughter is treated at all is a sign of this text's position on the border of two different ways of viewing the world. Laughter is inseparable from the canon of the grotesque body. Yet it is not isolated for consideration in similar accounts of the passions by Charleton's English predecessors, Thomas Wright (1601) and Edward Reynolds (1640).[13] Charleton's explanation of laughter was not possible before the emergence of natural history because, without this enabling genre, with its connections to the practices of anatomy and physiology, the body could not be isolated as an object of study. But neither was his explanation possible afterwards, when the personalized and individualized human body became completely divorced from language and culture. Charleton's straddling of two distinct orders of knowledge prompts and enables him to deal both with the laughing body — the subject of laughter — and with the admixture of things that set it in motion — the object(s) of laughter. He treats subject and object as if they were separate, yet inseparable, and envisions laughter as a

bodily motion produced in the link — the point of separation, or articulation — between the body and language, between the body and culture, the individual body and the body politic. In laughter, the body is sensibly aware of this linkage and of its profoundly conventional rather than biological character. The body is sensibly aware that it may be ordered in any number of ways, and that the way in which it is ordered at any given moment is to some extent arbitrary. This special bodily knowledge is accessible only to laughter, or through the motions of laughter. The body is sensible of its own duality as an individual body which is, at the same time, constituted by and constitutive of a social body. Laughter is the sensation of the ground of meaning shifting beneath the feet.

The picture of laughter drawn in Charleton's *Natural History* is distinct from two other prevailing views. One is the theory of "superiority," associated with Plato, Hobbes, Freud, and Bergson. It focuses on the subject of laughter and on the subject's relative power in discursive exchange. The other view, of "incongruity," associated with Kant, Schopenhauer, and Emerson, focuses on the object(s) of laughter in texts and phenomena.[14] The limitations of both approaches are obvious. Neither deals with the relation between the laughing subject and its object as Charleton does, perhaps in spite of himself. But before the appearance of the genre of natural history, there could be no awareness of the linkage of subject and object because there was no awareness of a separation. After natural history, when the separation was complete, this linkage of the individual body — to anything — is practically inconceivable.

If we examine genres on the basis of their membership in either the grotesque or the natural bodily canons, we see the Levitican separation of the *kinds* of bodies and texts that solidifies into a hierarchy of genres in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The genres of the grotesque bodily canon include the medieval bestiaries, such as those based on the

Physiologus by Theobald, as well as the marvels of Sir John Mandeville and the fables of Aesop.[15] All were discredited as sources or vehicles of knowledge in Charleton's time.[16] The bodies in these genres are inseparable from "the whole semantic network" that connects them to the world.[17] A body as a separate entity is unthinkable and therefore unknowable.

Genres of the naturalized bodily canon are those of scientific observation — documentary, encyclopedia, natural history. They assemble and disassemble the body in a different way, stripping it of cultural and historical contaminations. It is bleached, pickled, designated "man," and canonized in natural history. But the smooth, outer contours of the naturalized body are only visible against a specific background. And there, in the background, the grotesque body is suddenly and shockingly brought into relief, with its dirty, tyrannical desires and its bumpy countenance, besmudged with the stains of its social intercourse.[18] Natural history has nothing to do with this body except to suggest, by implication, that it is there as the excluded. Natural history cannot include and explain it because the grotesque body does not "occur" in nature. Natural history has nothing whatever to say about it.

These are the issues Charleton found himself grappling with in order to write his *Natural History of the Passions*. He seems to have been aware of his participation in the development of a new genre, as he indicates in the following explanation of his methodology:

> I digested my Collections and private Sentiments into such an order or *Method* which seem'd to me most convenient, as well as to show their genuin [sic] succession, and mutual dependence, as to make the Antecedents support the Consequents, and both to illustrate each other reciprocaly [sic]. I put them also into a dress of *Language* so plain and familiar, as may alone evince, my design was to write of this Argument, neither as an Orator, nor as a Moral Philosopher, but only as a *Natural* one conversant in *Pathology*.... ("Epistle Prefatory" n.pag.).[19]

By means of his new genre, Charleton sought to disentangle the realm of knowledge from the tyranny of the passions. Along with his Royal Society colleagues, he was concerned to put knowledge on a firm empirical footing where it would not be subject to the ravages of desire or, to use the seventeenth-century term, "enthusiasm." [20] His inquiry into the nature and signs of the passions, with the aim of controlling them, was predicated upon the appearance of the naturalized body. But the requisite separation of this body from language (from its representations) was only possible in a world where the conditions of possibility for belief in the "true" or "natural" correlation between the body and its signs had disappeared. So the very conditions that made his project historically imperative rendered it impossible. At the historical point marked by Charleton's text, a gap opened up in the ground of knowledge, between the body and its "signs." All inquiry in this de-stabilized historical moment therefore focused on the nature of the mediation between these two, between the material and spiritual worlds. McKeon considers the generic significance of mediation in his account of the origins of the novel:

> "Science" and "religion," moving swiftly toward their modern separation, at this moment stand united in their concern with matters of signification. Ostensibly preoccupied with divergent realms of human experience, the scientific revolution and the Protestant Reformation converge on the common ground marked out by the problem of mediation.[21]

The moment is marked by generic turmoil, a "categorial instability so acute" that it leads to

> a proliferation of epistemological reversals that seem to imitate, in particularized miniature, the continual oscillation that is built into the original and inconceivable relation of spirit to matter. Thus... the "true histories" of the Royal Society are historicized into the "strangeness" of romance; the empirical validation of Scripture as true history reverses into the skeptical depreciation of it as bad or mere history — that is, as romance; the empirical verification of sacred revelation renders it literal; and the historical criticism practised, to different ends, by sectarian saints, liberal Anglicans, Roman Catholic apologists, and freethinking atheists renders them indistinguishable from one another.[22]

We see in Charleton's *Natural History of the Passions* the mechanism of such epistemological reversal and generic ambivalence. At one moment, the represented body is of the grotesque canon — open, dual, and in motion. At the next, it is "natural"— sealed off, singular, and still. As a result, the text is part "science" and part allegory, part semiotics and part divination, part catalogue and part theatre.[23] It has been called "a strange potpourri of divergent theory illustrative of the muddle of psychological thought in which the seventeenth century found itself. "[24] But perhaps only in such a rich muddle can the question of laughter be correctly posed. Charleton's profoundly confused *Natural History* totters on an expectant node of problems, bringing together questions of history, discourse, genre, the body, and laughter, and opening them up for a completely new kind of treatment.

Charleton's aim is to find a way to direct human desires to the "right" objects. He begins by posing two questions. He asks what is the material of mediation between body and soul. And he asks how that material might be manipulated in order to control the passions. The first question arises from René Descartes's account of the physiological process of communication between body and soul. Descartes asserts that the soul acts on the body "by the mediation of spirits, nerves, and even blood, which, participating in the impressions of the spirits, can carry them through the arteries into all the members."[25] But Charleton, in his "Epistle Prefatory," asks how "an Immaterial Agent...comes to move by impulse a solid body without the mediation of a third thing that is less...disproportionate to both." This "third thing" is identified as the key to mediating the "fatal discord" of reason and passion, the "civil war too frequently hapning betwixt these twins, which every Man sometimes feels in his own breast,...inclining us two contrary waies

at once" (53-4). Descartes had insisted that there is one soul "which hath in her no variety of parts." [26] The nature of the soul was only debatable because "her functions have not been sufficiently distinguished from the function of the Body; to which alone is to be ascribed all that can be observed in us to be repugnant to our reason" ("Epistle"). Charleton mobilizes the authorities, from Aristotle and Francis Bacon to his contemporary Thomas Willis, who would dispute Descartes's claim and posit instead the duality of the soul, one part "rational" or "reasonable" and the other "sensitive." The sensitive soul is that which mediates between the "gross" body and the reason. But in the attempt to describe in material and physiological terms the elements that make up this "third thing," Charleton ends up talking about the body as dual rather than about a duality of the soul. And the dual body is a central tenet of the grotesque bodily canon.

Charleton insists that the sensitive soul is "coextensive" with the body in that body and soul have the same limits or extent. This is demonstrated in the simultaneity of the motions of the senses:

> [M]any and divers Animal actions are daily observed to be, at one and the same time, performed by divers Parts and Members of the Body: for instance, the Eye sees, the Ear hears, the Nostrils smell, the Tongue tasteth, and all exteriour Members exercise their Sense and Motion, all at once. For as much then as betwixt the Body and Soul of a Brute, there is no Medium (both being intimately connexed).... (6)

No intermediary is required because there is no identifiable place where the sensitive soul joins with body, and no place where it is separable from it. Because it is indistinguishable and inseparable from the body, the substantial and material nature of the sensitive soul can only be established first *by analogy* (with fire), then *by association* (with the blood), and finally, in

unabashedly metaphorical terms, as an *intertext*.[27]

Charleton proposes that the sensitive soul is of a "mixed nature" consisting of "a certain congregation of most minute, subtle and agile particles corpuscles or atoms (call them what you please)" (10). These atoms are in substance and in their motions "analogous to Fire" (9). Like fire, the Sensitive Soul "consists in motion" (14), but it also functions to "actuate" or to set the body in motion (52). This motion is *material* in that it arises from a chemical reaction. It is fueled or "fed" with the earthly nutrients of sulphur "from the blood within" and nitrogen "from the aer without" (10). The evidence of this materiality is the negative proposition that the lack of either of these nutrients destroys the blood and therefore, by association, the Sensitive Soul:

> that Blood, and Fire subsist by the same principles, viz. Aliment and Ventilation; is evident from hence, that a defect of either of these, doth equally destroy both the one and the other. (9)

Charleton repeatedly describes the relations in the figural terms of analogy and association because the relationship itself is "insensible." His inability to account for the mediation between body and soul in strictly material and physiological terms necessarily leads him to a theory of language based on his de facto theory of the body as dual. The fire-like substance and motion of the Sensitive Soul is an "intertexture" that "may be, by continually repeated supplies of Spirits, rendered equal and coextensive to the body" (23). The mediating "third thing" turns out to be language, a fabric or text woven of "representations sensible" (50) supplied by the body:

> [A] Sensitive Soul may be conceived to be a most subtle body contained in a gross one, and in all points, of the same Figure with it.... But though the same be intimately united to the body, and everywhere closely intertexd with all parts of it; as the warp and woof are interwoven in cloth: yet so fine and subtle are the threads of which it doth consist, that it cannot possibly by our senses be discerned, nor

indeed be known, otherwise than by its own Effects and Operations. (13-14)

These "Effects and Operations" are the "signs" which spell out the passions. Like any text, they must be read.

Both the duality of the body and its inseparability from language are, as we have seen, generic attributes of the grotesque bodily canon. From the outset of his inquiry, Charleton's conception of the body as grotesque — as cultural and historical and as "intertexd" with language — is at extreme odds with the genre of natural history that dictates his methodology of designation and classification. Charleton's answer to the question of how to manipulate the mechanism of the passions in order to subdue them reflects this tension. He tries to find a basis in nature — that is, in the natural body — for a stable hierarchy to support an authority with the power to regulate the passions. But because his assumption is of the body as grotesque, he finds no basis for such a hierarchy. Instead, he can only establish the absolute mutability of hierarchies. Like Hobbes, he finds that the only constant element and therefore the only possible fixed point or "seat" from which to regulate the passions is the perpetual motion of bodies. But while Hobbes orders the body politic in such a way as to accommodate and productively channel perpetually moving (or desiring) bodies, Charleton, the physician, tries to order the individual body, and to do it by regulative and prescriptive means. He wants to "quiet" the bodily motions. This requires him to delimit the body, to lay it flat and cut it off from conditions that cause it to be moved. Such a delimitation is both predicated upon and produces the new assumption that there is a "natural" state of the body outside culture. Here Charleton and natural history locate the tenuous basis of a new hierarchy based on the authority of a "natural" realm outside human control. But before Charleton finds this new footing, the head of the grotesque body has to roll, which it does,

quite literally, with the beheading of Charles I in 1649.

The last word spoken by the King, before placing his head on the executioner's block, was "Remember." As he lay down, the executioner leaned over to tuck his hair into his cap, the better to make a clean cut at the neck. Then Charles gave a signal, as planned, and the executioner "at one blow severed his head from his body."[28] The head was held up for all to see. As if in response to the king's final command to "remember," the assembled crowd surged onto the scaffold to get their mementoes. According to contemporary accounts, Charles was "rent piecemeal by a devouring mob":[29]

> They were inhumanely barbarous to his dead corpse. His hair and his blood were sold by parcels. Their hands and sticks were tinged by his blood and the block, now cut into chips, as also the sand sprinkled with his sacred gore, were exposed for sale. Which were greedily bought, but for different ends, by some as trophies of their slain enemy, and by others as precious reliques of their beloved prince.[30]

For both Charleton and Hobbes, the beheading of the king and the civil war period which led up to it produced the question of how to control the passions in the first place and invested it with historical urgency. The fact that the passions — in this case the religious and political "enthusiasm" of the Puritans and parliamentarians — could prevail to the extent that the sovereign power, the "head" of the body politic, could be lopped off, an act threatening the life of the entire social body, motivated all of the new philosophers to seek a ground of social and political truth not subject to the vicissitudes of such passions.[31] But in order to find a way to control them, Charleton, like his colleagues in the Royal Society, had to take the position of the usurpers who questioned tradition as the ground of authority and knowledge. Charleton's political orientation was therefore at war with his role in developing and legitimizing the new empirical scientific and

medical practices that would ground authority in the evidence of the senses. Likewise, in dismembering the king, both those who wished to ridicule him and those who meant to venerate his body parts as "relics" betrayed their rootedness in the canon of the grotesque body even as they pulled it apart and drove it underground.[32] The regicide is a metaphor — though not entirely, of course — for the dismembering of the body politic and its reconstitution in a completely new form. Marked at the Restoration, and then consolidated in the Glorious Revolution of William and Mary, the monarch of England becomes truly a "figurehead," the sign of the authority of the state rather than authority itself. In the world as in its canons of representation, the human body is severed from its signs.

Combining the dismemberment of the body and of society is a mark of the grotesque bodily canon. By "dismemberment," I mean — as on the scaffold at Whitehall — tearing the body apart, limb from limb, requiring that it be put back together in new and sometimes fanciful, bizarre, or ridiculous ways. The grotesque bodily canon emphasizes the role of culture in the body's constitution. The way in which the body is put together correlates with the organization of social, civic, and even cosmic bodies. Anatomical hierarchies pointedly correspond to the social structure and to the cosmos. Charleton's theory of the body as dual easily and necessarily becomes a theory of cultural processes:

> For, this intestine War, seeing it cannot arise from one and the same thing possessed with affections mutually repugnant, and inclining us two contrary waies at once; argues a *Duumvirate* of Rulers reciprocaly clashing, and contending for superiority; and such too that are as remote in their natures, as different in the modes of their subsistence. (54)

Mapped onto the topography of the human body, the English civil wars, the regicide, and the Restoration enter Charleton's *Natural History* as a riotous sexual orgy. The two "Rulers" are

inseparable and irreconcilable lovers, tumbling and cavorting in such a way that it is impossible to tell whether they are more concerned with self-propagation (with each other) or self-preservation (against each other), whether they are having their murderous pleasure, or suffering in exquisite pain. In the to'ing and fro'ing of meaning, with both bodies flat on their backs, or otherwise prone, even their gender designations refuse to lie still.

In order to establish a "natural" and therefore immutable basis of authority for the exercise of power required to subdue the passions, Charleton tries first to establish the "natural" hierarchy of the body's parts. But hierarchies in the grotesque bodily canon cannot be fixed. They are always going ass over teakettle.[33] Their continual toppling tends to make ineffectual the border separating the body from the cultural realm. Charleton's hierarchy of the body moves irresistibly downward. Starting at the brain, it moves down to the heart, then to the stomach, and then to the Sensitive Soul, which must be you-know-where, below the stomach. The genital centre of procreativity is somehow at both the top and the bottom of this and all hierarchies:

> the brain is beholden to the heart, both to the stomach; and reciprocally the stomach is assisted by them: all parts conspire, by contributary helps, to continue the Soul in its subsistence, as that again acts perpetually to the conversation of herself and them. (22)

In this vertiginous anatomy, subordinating relations — the brain "beholden" to the heart — quickly and inevitably become a dialogue, a "conversation" or a "turning together" on a flattened plane, a bed perhaps.

The Rational Soul is placed above all this in "a higher sphere of impassibility, like the top of mount *Olympus*...looking down the while upon all tumults, commotions and disorders hapning in the inferior parts of man" (56). But it, too, tends to topple in a downward direction. It or

"He" is king and in every way considered vastly superior to the Sensitive or Corporeal Soul. The preeminence of the Rational Soul derives first from its or "His" "unconfined power of speculation." It can perceive the immaterial realm, in contrast to the Sensitive Soul's corporeal limitation, which prevents it from "knowledge of things above the sphere of her own nature" (47-8). The Rational Soul is also the "natural" ruler or the "seat" of authority in its capacity for acts of "judgment." As "intellect," it presides over and corrects the errors "occasioned by the senses" of its "host" (48). However, it is only from "representations sensible" that the Rational Soul is able to make its superior judgments and to deduce its "notions of things altogether unknown to sense" (50). These representations are generated by the body, or the Sensitive Soul. There is no direct access to the world, not even to one's own body, except by way of the representations of the senses, "performed" in the theatre of the passions.

Here in Charleton, the fundamental hierarchy of soul and body collapses under the weight of the "gross" and irrefutable human body. Charleton discovers only the alarming mutability of his categories as he struggles in a relentlessly horizontal world to find the ground for establishing the superiority or supremacy of the one over the other. But the usurper always behaves exactly as did the sovereign. The Sensitive Soul occupies the throne as Queen Regent and may owe "obedience to the commands and dictates of her superior" (81). But she is in fact — which is to say *in nature* — married to the body and therefore inclined to favour its needs and desires. She cannot be "trusted" or counted upon to uphold or honour the abstract injunctions of her king, the Rational Soul:

> [B]eing by so strict a ligue, and as it were a conjugal union affianced to the body, she is strongly inclined to prefer the conservation of that her favourite, to all other relations; and accordingly to gratify and indulge it even in those things that are

> prohibited by religion and reason. (81)

The imperatives and loyalties of the Sensitive Soul are a continual threat to the sovereignty of the Rational Soul. Both "his" superiority and vulnerability lie in his access to — indeed, his "seat" in — the "immaterial" spiritual world. So the basis of his preeminence is also the basis of his tendency to be "unseated" as ruler of the passions. The non-material nature of the Rational Soul renders it irrelevant and superfluous in the very material passions of the body. While the Sensitive Soul, perhaps understandably, has just one thing on her mind:

> ...being much neerer allied to the body...she is continually courted and presented by all the Senses with variety of blandishments and tempting delights. So that charmed by those powerful enchantments of sensible objects, and intirely taken up with care of the body, and in that respect prone to pursue pleasures: she too often proves deaf to the voice of Reason advising the contrary, and refuses to be diverted from her sensual to nobler affections. (57-8)

These sensual affections are only barely sublimated in the civil realm where they take the form of the desires of the straight-laced Puritans and their populist upstart parliamentarian brethren.[34] Like everything repressed or oppressed, the Sensitive Soul — here a kind of Puritan slut — always sooner or later wants to be on top:

> Yea sometimes grown weary of subjection, she takes occasion to cast off her yoke of allegiance, and like a proud and insolent Rebell, aspires to unbounded license and dominion. (58)

The moment of the inversion of the hierarchy (of body and soul) is the moment of sexual intercourse, appropriately cast here as an inverted rape (the female rapes the male):

> [T]he forces of sensual allurements then proving too strong for all the guards of Reason, though assisted by the auxiliary troops of *Moral* precepts, and the sacred institutes of *Religion*...the whole unhappy man is furiously carried away to serve the brutish lusts of the insolent usurper, and augment the triumphs of libidinous carnality: which degrades him from the dignity of his nature...for, *Reason*, once debauch'd so as to become brutal, leads to all sorts of excess; whereof beasts are

seldom guilty. (57-59)

The "libidinous carnality" so debauches this wobbly king that he falls to a position and into behaviour "lower" than that of animals. Now *he* is in the position of the usurper. But an even more astonishing transformation takes place. The ever-mutable Rational Soul is recollected and reassembled after the rape not as male but as female. Elsewhere in Charleton's text, and even earlier in this same passage, it is gendered male.[35] But here, this transsexual "Princess" has the rejuvenating potential to reverse "her" fortunes. The above passage continues:

> Yet this is not always the issue of the war. Sometimes it happens that the victory falls to the right side; and the Princess overpowering the Rebell, reduces her to due submission and conformity. Nay sometimes *Reason*, after she hath been long held captive, breaks off her fetters; and remembering her native Sovereignty, grows conscious and ashamed of her former lapses: and thereupon with fresh courage and vigour renewing the conflict, vanquishes and deposes the *Sensitive* Soul with all its legions of lusts, and gloriously re-establishes herself in the throne. Yea more, at once to secure her empire for the future, and expiate the faults of her male-administration in times past; she by bitter remorse, severe contrition, and sharp penance, punishes herself, and humbles her traitorous enemy the Flesh. (59)

That Charleton has not simply made a mistake or forgotten himself in this feverishly baroque-grotesque allegory is evident in the deliberate designation of the Princess's administration as male, and in the laying of a good part of the blame for "her" usurpation at the feet of this "male-administration." The sudden changeability of identities in Charleton's inquiry — from Queen Regent to Puritan whore, from king to beast, and now from male to female — is unsettling at the same time as it is insisted upon as the essential generative principle of both the individual and the social body. Now one is on top, now the other. The only certainty in this relation is the constant motion.

Motion or "becoming" is the unwieldy condition of the grotesque body. It is always in the

state of becoming someone or something else. It is climbing or falling, pregnant, giving birth, or dying, spawning strange lumps or losing bits of itself in life's processes. Ironically, we see the unmistakable appearance of the genre of natural history — the genre that must *still* the body in order to observe it — in Charleton's account of the body's *motions*.

Mapping the processes of the body in terms of motion can be seen as an influence of Hobbes, whose thinking is grounded in the "profound reversal of assumptions about rest and motion" which, earlier in the century, resulted in Galileo's theory of inertia:

> In the old prevailing view, rest was the natural state of things — nothing moved unless something else moved it. Galileo postulated that motion was the natural state — things moved unless something else stopped them. Hobbes would apply this to the motions of men, would get a system which would explain their motions relative to one another....[36]

Hobbes saw the passions as the source of all motivation and achievement and sought to enhance or capitalize on the natural state of movement.[37] His theory of culture is based on the assumption of individual bodies constantly in the motions of aversion or desire. Although Charleton wants to account for the passions in terms of motion, and though he says, following Hobbes and Galileo, that he understands motion to be the body's normal state, his whole project is to enable more "quiet and tranquil" motions and to prevent those of "disquiet and perturbation" (68). His concern is to find "the most powerfull Remedies" against the "Excesses" of the passions ("Epistle"). For Charleton, extremes of "good" motions can be as destructive as those of "bad." The "Vital Flame" of the sensitive soul may be suffocated as easily by an excess of joy as by an excess of despair (143). Immoderate motions can dangerously disrupt the normally smooth circulation of the blood:

> ...the calm and equal circulation being interrupted, is forced to undergo irregular

> floods and ebbs, and other violent fluctuations...and by their exorbitant manner of influx into the nerves of the Heart and Lungs, they move them irregularly, and so contribute to render the course of the blood more unequal. (69-70)

In the genre of natural history, Charleton's language becomes increasingly technical and removed from the world of politics and social intercourse. However, he never entirely eliminates the conception of the grotesque body. This passage goes on to describe disturbances of the circulation of the blood in meteorological terms as a "tempest" which can cause the "discomposure of the Reasonable Soul her selfe" (70). When describing the desired state of tranquillity of the passions, the body with its geographical contours and meteorological systems is placed in the natural landscape and at the center of a pre-Copernican solar system (69). Struggling to resist such a centrifugal way of thinking and to remain focused on the naturalized body before him, Charleton paradoxically finds that the calm and regular "motions" of the tranquil, or ideal, state are most readily observable during sleep or in conditions of "indifference." The passions, by contrast, are produced only when the body is "perturbed" and moved to the degrees of expansion or contraction resulting from desire and aversion:

> [T]he Sensitive Soul, when put into this state of perturbation, doth strangely vary her Postures according to the diversity of motions caused in her: and though that diversity be very great, yet that in all perturbations whatever, she is more or less amplified, so as to swell beyond her ordinary bounds; or more or less contracted within her self, so as to be less extensive or diffused, than usually she is at other times, in her state of tranquillity.... [H]ow great soever the variety of such her Mutations may be in the vast diversity of Passions, yet they are all but several degrees, and divers modes of either her Extension, or Contraction. (72-73)

The Sensitive Soul expands towards that which it desires and constitutes as "good." It shrinks from that which it would avoid and defines as "evil." As in Hobbes, the values of good and evil

do not inhere in things themselves but are produced by human desires and aversions, since "we are more or less prone to consider the greatness or meanness of an object, because we more or less love it" (92).

This scandalous notion, which led to charges of atheism against Hobbes, is the point of the separation of the body from any essential connection to human value systems. Charleton has difficulty making such a separation. For him, "Virtue" and "Vice" exist in the external world, and he is puzzled as to why he cannot locate their point of connection to the body. He contends that "there seem to be much less of Convenience or fellowship betwixt Virtue and Passion, than between Passion and Vice" (99), but he cannot find any ground that might fix these good and evil twins more firmly:

> ...no reason appears, why the same Motion that serves to confirm a conception that is ill-grounded, may not serve likewise to confirm the same conception though it be well grounded. (99)

For example, the "good" emotion of generosity and the "bad" one of pride "seem to be but one and the same Passion originaly [sic] excited by a certain motion" (100). What can be established with certainty is only the physiological process, quite apart from its moral orientation or implication. In the genre of natural history taking shape before our eyes, Charleton's ordering of things moves towards the separation of the body from its faculty of evaluation:

> [W]hen the Imagination conceives any thing to be embraced as good, or avoided as evil; presently by the spirits residing in the brain, and ranged as it were into order, the Appetite is formed: and then the impression being transmitted to the Heart, according as that is contracted or dilated, the blood is impelled and forced to various fluctuations, and irregular motions: and thence the Appetite being by instinct transmitted to the nerves ordained for that use, they cause motions of the solid parts respective thereunto. And this we may conjecture to be the *order of motions* excited successively in the phantasy, spirits, blood and solid parts, in every Passion of the mind of what sort soever. (71)

Once he establishes this order of motions in general, Charleton undertakes a "close reading" of those motions most likely to be immoderate and therefore most urgently requiring regulation. These are the motions associated with Joy (Laughter), Grief or Sorrow (Weeping), and Anger (Rage). In all three discussions, Charleton has difficulty focusing on the bodily motions alone. He has trouble sorting out the impassioned subject from the object of its passion. As a result, his account of laughter, to be examined below, is suggestively oriented toward both.

Laughter is introduced as being among the signs of mirth, which is ranked as the lowest degree of Joy. While laughter "is not proper to all Joy," neither is it *inseparable* from Joy (144). From the outset, we get Charleton's sense of the mixed or ambivalent nature of laughter, as in the statements that "Joy cannot produce Laughter, unless it is very moderate, and hath something of *Admiration* or *Hate* mixt with it," and that, while profound Joy "doth never force us to break forth into Laughter...we are most easily provoked to laugh, when we are sad" (144-145). That we may better understand this ambivalence, Charleton proceeds to examine first of all the occasions, conditions, or objects of laughter. The three external conditions that produce laughter are novelty, infirmity, and eminency. Novelty engenders the motions of surprise. Infirmity arises from the "representation of some absurdity or indecency of another...or at the mischances and infirmities of others" (146). Eminency is produced in the laughing subject's "sense" of superiority to such infirmity:

> These requisites in a ridiculous cause considered, we may adventure to conclude, that *Laughter is an effect of sudden, but light Joy arising from the unexpected discovery of some infirmity in another not our friend, and from* imagination *of our own* eminency, and exemption *from the like*. Here then (you see) is something of *Admiration* from the *Novelty*, something of *Aversion* from the *Infirmity*, & something of *Joy or triumph* from our opinion of some *eminency* in our selves.

(146)

The "motions" of admiration and joy or triumph are those of identity and expansion, of a movement upward and towards the object of admiration. Aversion moves the body in the opposite direction, producing contraction and a shrinking away from the object. Laughter is apparently the physical sensation and dilemma of the body in producing, at the same time, these opposed movements of attraction and repulsion, inclusion and exclusion, sympathy and antipathy, similitude and difference.

The relation of this sensation to time is fundamental.[38] Laughter is produced in the *sudden* awareness of *novelty*, in the *motions of surprise, orienting* it, I think, towards the future, to the new, unexpected meaning, and the moment of reordering the body in the world. Laughter is the body's register of the "truth" of the process that produces particular truths and meanings. The primary constituent motion of Admiration precedes the judgment and therefore situates laughter in special relation to both the relativity and the ground of knowledge:

> When the image of any *new* and *strange* object is presented to the Soul, and gives her hope of knowing somewhat that she knew not before; instantly she *admireth* it, as different from all things she hath already known; and in the same instant entertains an appetite to know it better, which is called *Curiosity* or desire of Knowledge. And because this *Admiration* may, and most commonly is excited in the Soul before she understands, or considers whether the object be in itself convenient to her or not: therefore it seems to be the *first* of all passions, next after Pleasure and Pain; and to have no *Contrary*....Whence it is manifest, that all natural *Philosophy*, and *Astronomy* owe themselves to this passion.... (88-89)

Immediately on presenting the admixture of admiration, aversion, and triumph that produces the motions of laughter, Charleton tries to resolve its ambivalence — its double and doubtful movement — by examining this question of the relation of laughter to the will. He introduces the strange case of Ludovicus Vives, a man who, in certain circumstances, could not stop laughing.[39]

Apparently, Charleton says, "when he began to eat after long fasting, he could not forbear to break forth into a fit of loud laughter" (147). The question is how to tell whether this is "true" or "fictitious" laughter. Vives is trying to distinguish "totally bodily" and involuntary laughter from that which proceeds from an emotion. He raises the interesting question of whether the emotions constitute the body's "true" and "natural" *judgement*, or whether they follow judgements emanating from the will, a faculty which is necessarily "located" somewhere else.[40] The story of Ludovicus Vives seems to provide the language Charleton needs to isolate the will in his own account. For Charleton, the will is based precisely on making the distinction between the "true" and the "fictitious" or "artificial." The will is predisposed to distinguish between, let us say, the objects and sensations of "admiration" and "aversion." It can recognize one or the other and cannot concede or conceive of their *simultaneous* occurrence or coincidence in a single bodily motion.

By isolating the will in this way, Charleton is attempting a reordering of the body. Whereas Hobbes had identified the "will" with the "appetites" or passions, Charleton follows Descartes in seeing them as separate.[41] He makes the will a function of reason, or of the Rational Soul, and considers it to be operative on the passions — that is to say, it is "above" them in a hierarchical reordering.[42] This has the effect of divorcing the faculty of discrimination — the judgement — from any particular body and any particular bodily positioning. But because of his unexamined and as yet unexpurgated notion of the body as grotesque (because he has one foot in that freshly dug grave), Charleton's hierarchy topples as he turns around and grounds both the will and reason in the passions of the body. He falls back on the grotesque conception of the body in the face of the contradiction confronting all of the Christian natural philosophers, namely,

that "Nature" both is the source of laws governing all "bodies" and is lawless in giving rise to laws outside of human value systems.

In its linkage of laughter, food, and death, the story of Ludovicus Vives is unmistakably of the grotesque canon. The "gaping mouth" of laughter and eating is the "open gate leading down into the bodily underworld." [43] Swallowing is the "most ancient symbol of death and destruction." [44] Vives brings these images together in quoting Pliny the Younger on the ticklishness of armpits:

> "That the heart diaphragm is the main location of laughter can be learned from the tickling we feel under the armpits, to which the diaphragm reaches." The same author [Pliny] claims that gladiators who were wounded under the armpits, frequently died laughing. That kind of laughter, however, is totally bodily and has nothing to do with any emotion, as the tickling under the arms and other locations of the body. I myself cannot keep from laughing when I take the first or second bite of food after a long fast; the reason is that food also expands the contracted diaphragm.[45]

For Vives, this involuntary laughter is "natural" but not "true." True laughter would be that which proceeds from an emotion and is therefore subject to the will. The canon of the grotesque body, in which Vives writes, specifically aligns "true" laughter and other motions of the body with the cultural rather than the "natural" realm. Truth arises from or is available in social processes and relations. Cultural values determine whether or not the body will laugh.

Because of his footing in this grotesque canon, Charleton seriously considers the case of laughing Ludovicus. But his understanding of physiology and his access to the genre of natural history prevent him from being able to distinguish between "true" and "fictitious" laughter in quite the same way. On the strict basis of the physical motions of the body, he finds no way to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary, "passionate" and calculated, "fictitious" and "true"

laughter. Because of his involvement in natural history, the value placed on these categories is reversed in Charleton. For Vives, "natural" laughter is "bodily." It is assigned a negative value and is placed in opposition to "true" laughter. By contrast, for Charleton, "fictitious" laughter is negative, while "true" laughter is the sign of the positive passion of "Joy":

> And as for that *Laughter* which is sometimes joyned with *Indignation*; it is most commonly *fictitious* or artificial, and then it depends intirely upon our *will*, as a voluntary action: but when 'tis *true* or *Natural*, it seems likewise to arise from *Joy* conceived from hence.... (146)

But while Charleton reverses these values, the fact is that laughter, with its dual status as cultural and fictitious as well as natural and true, tends to straddle these tables and columns of classification. Accordingly, Charleton is incapable of explaining the "odd example" of Ludovicus Vives's involuntary laughter without recourse to "cultural" as well as "natural" causes. He finally has to say that the laughter of Ludovicus is "Natural, though not passionate" (147). It is natural in the sense that "in this Learned man, either the *Lungs* were more apt to be distended with blood, or the *Midriff* more easily put into the motions that produce laughter, than commonly they are in most other men (147). But the "admirable laughter of Ludovicus" is calculated, cultural, or "artificial" in that "the nerves inservient to the motion of the Midriff...cause quick and short reciprocations ...upon the grateful relish of his meat, after long abstinence, which doth alwaies highten the pleasure of refection..." (150).

The problem is that Charleton tries *not* to have it both ways, as the genres of the grotesque body would have it. He tries to separate out one way of talking about the body and the world from another way, one genre from another. The genre of natural history is finally only partially realized in his account of the physical motions of laughter. It is necessarily an account of

no particular body; it stills the motions and severs the dismembered parts from all spheres of discourse except those of physiology and anatomy. In Charleton's terms, "natural" or "moderate" laughter — the kind that does not perturb the passions and threaten the health of the body — consists in a

> brisk and placid motion of the heart, as if it sprung up with joy to be alleviated or eased of its burden. Wherefore that the blood may be the more speedily discharged out of the right Ventricle of the heart into the Lungs, and out of the left into the Aorta or grand Artery; the *Diaphragm*, being by abundance of Animal spirits immitted through so many nerves proceeding from the...*Plexus*, briskly agitated is by nimble contraction drawn upwards; and so making many vibrations, doth at once raise up the *Lungs*, and force them to expell the blood out of their vessels into the *arteria venosa*, and to explode the aire out of their pipes into the windpipe; and this by frequent contractions of their lax and spongy substance, answerable in time and quickness to the vibrations of the *Midriff*. And then because the same *Intercostal* nerve, which communicateth with the nerve of the *Diaphragma* below, is conjoyned above also with the nerves of the jaws and muscles of the face; thence it is, that the motions of Laughter being once begun in the brest, the *face* also is distorted into gestures or grimaces pathetically correspondent thereunto. (149-150)

In this physiological account of laughter, the entire social context disappears, as does, strangely enough, the body itself. What remains are bundles of nerves and knots of blood vessels with barely a traceable link to the historical world. As it lies open for dissection by the anatomist, this body is closed off from the cultural processes which make up the story of its "passions." Having completely lost its head and its link to the immaterial world of signs and meaning, it lies still, dead, and sovereign only to itself.

Notes to Chapter Five

1. These lines serve as an epigraph on the title page of *British Lightning, or Suddaine tumults, in England, Scotland and Ireland; to warne the United Provinces to understand the dangers, and the causes thereof: to defend those amongst us, from being partakers of their plagues. Written first in lowe-dutch by G. L. V. and translated for the benefit of Brittaine.* London, 1643. Redpath Tracts, Series II, Vol. LI.

2. Robert Boyle, *The Works*, II: 89-103. Further references will be cited by page number in the text.

3. The terms "experiment" and "experience" were not yet clearly distinguished in contemporary terminology. See Peter Dear, "Narratives, Anecdotes, and Experiments: Turning Experience into Science in the Seventeenth Century," *The Literary Structure of Scientific Argument*, ed. Peter Dear (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1991), 135; and Shapin and Schaffer, *Leviathan and the Air Pump*, 127-128.

4. On this debate, see Peter Elmer, "Medicine, Religion, and the Puritan Revolution," *The Medical Revolution of the Seventeenth Century*, eds. Roger French and Andrew Wear (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 10-45, and P.M. Rattansi, "The Helmontian-Galenist Controversy in Restoration England," *Ambix* XII (1964): 1-23.

5. Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, 387, 394.

6. Peter H. Niebyl, "Sennert, Van Helmont, and Medical Ontology," *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 45 (1971): 115.

7. Walter Charleton, *Natural History of the Passions* ([London]: In the Savoy, Printed by T. N. for James Magnes in Russell-Street, near the Piazza, 1674). Although he produced more than twenty-five works, Walter Charleton (1619-1707) is known primarily from John Dryden's 1663 encomium, "To My Honor'd Friend, Dr. Charleton, on His Learned and Useful Works; and More Particularly This of Stone-Heng, by Him Restored to the True Founders," *The Works of John Dryden*, ed. Edward Niles Hooker and H.T. Swedenberg, Jr., 15 vols (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1956), I:43-44. Charleton contested Inigo Jones's theory that Stonehenge was built by the Romans. Instead, he claimed boldly, and quite as mistakenly, Stonehenge was built by the Danes. But Dryden did not know better and in his poem Charleton's historical revisionism exemplifies the larger challenge to received knowledge posed by the new philosophy of the seventeenth century. Charleton sponsored Dryden's membership in the Royal Society a few months after the poem appeared. See Geoffrey Tillotson et al., *Eighteenth-Century English Literature* (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1969), 78. Charleton studied under John Wilkins at Oxford, graduating with the degree M.D. in 1641. He was a member of the Royal College of Physicians and, as physician to Charles I, a junior colleague of William Harvey's. At the Restoration, he was named Physician in Ordinary to Charles II. He was a personal friend of Thomas Hobbes and one of Hobbes's contemporary disciples. He is not considered an "original"

thinker but is credited with reviving Epicurean philosophy in England and disseminating Hobbes's ideas on human nature. In *The Aesthetic Theory of Thomas Hobbes* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1940), Clarence DeWitt Thorpe assigns Charleton "a considerable part in linking the conceptions of the new philosophy, as found in Hobbes especially, with a gradually emerging psychological aesthetics" (188). It is likely that Charleton's work on cognition, entitled "Concerning the Different Wits of Men" (1669) was consulted by John Locke (188). And Richard W.F. Kroll, in *The Material Word*, points out that even Isaac Newton was "deeply indebted to Charleton in his earliest formulations of the mechanical philosophy" (96).

The *DNB* enters Charleton's *Natural History of the Passions* erroneously as a "translation from the French of Senault" (X:118). Richard A. Hunter and Emily Cuttler correct the error in "Walter Charleton's *Natural History of the Passions* (1674) and J.F. Senault's *The Use of Passions* (1649): A Case of Mistaken Identity," *Journal of the History of Medicine* 13 (1958): 87-92. Charleton does draw on Senault, however, in his attempt "to displace Descartes's account of the passions and to embark on a neo-Epicurean expansion of Senault's safely orthodox cognitive theories" (Kroll 219).

8. The separation of the body from its signs also made language visible and available for examination, prompting the many inquiries into language by John Wilkins, William Holder, and John Bulwer, among others. The *DNB* notes that Wilkins's influence "may probably be traced in the elaborate tabulation and analysis of his subject which characterise all the writings of Charleton." The seventeenth-century concern with signification as mediating between body and soul (between the material and spiritual realms) led the new philosophers to seek the "natural" and "literal" bases of sign systems in the human body itself.

9. *The Order of Things*, 132-33.

10. The grotesque "lives," for example, in the seventeenth-century interest in the production and circulation of coins and medals for emulation, dissemination and exchange. The body provides the ground of spatial form, and therefore of value. Charleton's younger colleague in the Royal Society, John Evelyn, makes these links concrete in his *Numismata* (London, Printed for Benj. Tooke at the Middle Temple-Gate, in Fleetstreet,1697), especially in the last chapter, "A Digression Concerning Physiognomy." Evelyn conveys both a sense of discovery about the body — specifically the marvel of the inexhaustible diversity of human faces — as well as a distinctively baroque defensiveness about the "natural" and obvious connection between the body and measurements of value: "[W]ho can but take notice of that Wise, and Wonderful Providence, which has ordain'd such variety of Looks, and Countenances among Men, whilst the other Parts and Members of our Bodies are in comparison so little different, much less the *Heads* and *Faces* (as I may also call them) of other Creatures, of the same Species? since were it otherwise, and that Men had been made all like one another, the whole Government and Politie of the World, must long since have run into Confusion and sad Disorder. For who could have distinguish'd the *True-man* from the *Thief*?" (336).

11. Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, 7.

12. In *The Material Word*, a study of linguistic theory and rhetorical practice of the neoclassical period, Richard W. F. Kroll challenges the notion that ideology stands in direct positive relation to epistemology. He bases his argument on an analysis of the literary production and political positioning of the major writers of the Restoration and "Augustan" periods. While supporting Kroll's overall project, Robert E. Stillman points out problems in his argument, especially in the use of the term "ideology." See "Assessing the Revolution: Ideology, Language, and Rhetoric in the New Philosophy of Early Modern England, *The Eighteenth Century: Theory and Interpretation* 35:2 (Spring 1994): 99-118. Stillman critiques Kroll's attempt to resolve the contradiction between neoclassical theory and practice and suggests that we might accept such a contradiction as productive of an authorizing ideology and therefore as necessarily irresolvable. The neglected works of Walter Charleton, including the one under consideration here, like the texts Stillman points to, are particularly instructive for understanding the complex intersection of seventeenth-century debates about language and knowledge.

The proposition that knowledge constitutes an ordering of the body in the world retains the sense of aesthetics as concerned with the conditions of sensuous perception (OED). The grotesque is a way of talking about aesthetics as cultural process rather than as a settled and exclusive order. The grotesque as, perhaps, *anti-aesthetic* (my term, not Bakhtin's) is constantly undoing the classicism of any posited aesthetic ideal because it represents the "truth" of the process of human "becoming." The grotesque resists the totalizing tendency of any given epistemology. Aesthetic values are thus generative and degenerative of cultural processes. They are not artistic choices or tastes but rather the means by which such choices are made available. The relation between an aesthetic (an ordering of the body) and an epistemology (an ordering of the world) necessitates ideology, as a sense of authority and necessity is assigned to a particular view of the body and the world, both of which might be explained in any number of alternative ways. Charleton's *Natural History*, by locating a moment of historical change in aesthetics and epistemology, suggests that the process is one of genre, here readable only with reference to the particular *discursive formation* that generates and includes natural history.

13. Thomas Wright, *The Passions of the Minde* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1973) and Edward Reynolds, *A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soule of Man*, "Introduction," Margaret Lee Wiley (Gainsville, FL: Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints, 1971).

14. Susan Purdie, *Comedy: The Mastery of Discourse* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993), 9.

15. Theobald, *Physiologus*, ed. P.T. Eden (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972) and Sir John Mandeville, *Mandeville's Travels*, c. 14th century, ed. P. Hamelius (London: Oxford University Press, 1960).

16. The apparent revival of *Aesop's Fables* in the neoclassical period was really a devaluation as they were in the process of being relegated in importance to the status of children's literature. Samuel Hartlib's *A True and Ready Way to Learne the Latin Tongue* (1654) includes a tract on education which argues, as Kroll points out, "that the child best learns the rudiments of language by perceiving them in animal forms, because then they appear to the mind almost literally as bodies. The child subsequently learns to understand the linearities of linguistic, and thus

historical, experience by being immersed in Aesopic fables" (201).

17. Foucault, *The Order of Things*, 129. The "semantic network" which connects bodies to the world is also Bakhtin's "dialogic word." Genres which put this semantic richness to work, rather than expunging it, are dialogic or, in generic terms, "novelized." Bakhtin, *Dialogic Imagination*, 299-300.

18. The term "grotesque" first appears in English at the end of the fifteenth century coincident with early practices of anatomy. See Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, 31.

19. The "Epistle Prefatory" is not paginated. Subsequent references to this introductory section of Charleton's work will be cited as "Epistle." All other references to the *Natural History* will be documented in the text parenthetically by page number.

20. In Charleton's time and in his political circles, "enthusiasm" suggested "ill-regulated or misdirected religious emotion" (OED) particularly with reference to radical Protestantism. My suggestion that the term "enthusiasm" is interchangeable with desire, and specifically with sexual desire, is authorized by Charleton's own allegorical depiction, recounted below, of the "civil war" between the reason and the passions, and the political consequences he envisions of failing to regulate or properly subdue the passions of individuals.

21. *Origins of the English Novel*, 75.

22. *Origins of the English Novel*, 87-88.

23. In *The Order of Things*, Foucault does not commonly use the word "genre," but he designates these two worlds, or orders of knowledge, as "the age of the theatre" and "the age of the catalogue" (131). He does not cite Charleton's *Natural History*, but he might have. Charleton repeatedly refers to the body as the "theatre" of the passions. At one point, he speaks of the "Theatre of the World" in relation to the "Catalogue" of natural history (18). As we will see, it is only with the utmost difficulty and self-restraint that Charleton is able to conceive of a naturalized body, one which will fit into a table or catalogue of classification, and lie still long enough to be enumerated. Interestingly, Charleton elsewhere refers to his work as a "genealogy" (87, 165). I think he uses this term in the obvious sense of tracing the origins of the passions as the "natural" signs of the body. However, because he locates the source of the passions in the simultaneous desires for self-preservation and self-propagation (22), and finds that their motions are produced in psycho-sexual-political struggle, Charleton's "genealogy," like Foucault's, uncovers imperatives of power in the body's ordering of itself and the world.

24. Thorpe, 181.

25. René Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*, tr. Stephen H. Voss (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 37.

26. Descartes, qtd. in Charleton's "Epistle."

27. The OED enters this word in the form of "intertex." It records William Harvey as among the first to use it but with the more modern spelling, "intertext." In 1666, Harvey writes of "The heart...consisting of robust fibres variously intertext." Charleton uses both "intertex" and "intertexture" in his *Natural History*. Harvey and Charleton were colleagues as royal physicians to Charles I. Charleton's use of the word "intertex" is one of several borrowings he makes from Harvey's authoritative anatomical writings.

28. Patricia Fumerton, *Cultural Aesthetics: Renaissance Literature and the Practice of Social Ornament* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 9.

29. Fumerton, 17.

30. Sir Richard Manley, qtd. in Fumerton, 9.

31. I do not mean to suggest that the regicide caused the rise of science but that many of the new philosophers, as royalists and religious conservatives, sought authority for their bourgeois and secularizing work by positing and claiming to complement an idealized and stable political and epistemological order analogous to the absolutist monarchy of the Stuarts.

32. Fumerton notes that, as late as 1860, "a child was brought a long distance to touch these relics as a cure for the King's evil" (210, n.29).

33. "The entire logic of the grotesque movements of the body...is of a topographical nature. The system of these movements is oriented in relation to the upper and lower stratum; it is a system of flights and descents into the lower depths. Their simplest expression is the primeval phenomenon of popular humor, the cartwheel, which by the continual rotation of the upper and lower parts suggests the rotation of earth and sky. This is manifested in other movements of the clown: the buttocks persistently trying to take the place of the head and the head that of the buttocks." See Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, 353.

34. Typically, Jonathan Swift has it from the opposite perspective: "[E]verything spiritual is really material; Hobbes and the scientists have proved this; all religion is really a *perversion* of sexuality." Quoted in Norman O. Brown, *Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History* (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1959), 192-93.

35. The Rational Soul is gendered female in a few other instances; for example, when it is linked to *excessive* motions of the passions (70). Many of Charleton's sources — Descartes, Hobbes, Vives, Willis — were available to him only in Latin. The word he translates as "Rational Soul" may have been, variously, the feminine "mensa" (mind) or "anima" (spirit). This could account for the indeterminacy of gender in Charleton's *Natural History*. However, I think that rather than arising from sloppiness or mistranslation these mutable gender designations seem to be explicitly thematized in Charleton's text, as my recounting here suggests.

36. C. B. Macpherson, "Introduction," *Leviathan* by Thomas Hobbes (London: Penguin, 1968), 19.

37. Thorpe, 182.

38. As Charleton begins his account "Of the Passions in Particular," he writes: "Which that we may perform with more of order, and less of obscurity; we are to consider, that the Passions receiving their most notable diversity from certain *circumstances* of *Time*, may therefore be most intelligibly distinguished by having respect to the same Circumstances. For, since there are of *Conceptions* three sorts, whereof one is of that which is *present*, which is *sense*; another, of that which is *past*, which is *Remembrance*; and the third, of that which is *to come*, which is called *Expectation*.... (86-7)

39. Johannes Ludovicus Vives (1492-1540), also known as Juan Luis Vives, was a Spanish humanist and philosopher. He was befriended by Thomas More and patronized by Henry VIII and Catherine of Aragon. He collaborated with Erasmus in editing and publishing an edition of Augustine's works. Both Charleton and Descartes quote from *De Anima et Vita* (1538), one of Vives's last works, on the question of the voluntary or involuntary nature of laughter (Charleton, 147; Descartes, 86). Specifically, they quote Book III, "The Passions of the Soul," which has been translated into English and published as a single volume. See *The Passions of the Soul: The Third Book of De Anima et Vita*, tr. and "Introduction," Carlos G. Norena (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990). Robert Burton also cites Vives frequently in *The Anatomy.*

40. Vives, 1-6 and 57-59.

41. Overall, Thorpe finds that Charleton's account of the passions is closer to Descartes than to Hobbes (182). Kroll, by contrast, finds the entire English empiricist movement, including Charleton's contributions, to be predicated on a critique of Descartes which has not been fully appreciated (15-16). This early critique of Cartesian rationalism explains, for Kroll, the relative irrelevance, for the English tradition, of the current post-structuralist challenge to "enlightenment" ideas and epistemologies. I agree with Thorpe that Charleton is closer to Descartes than his rhetoric at times suggests.

42. Thorpe, 183.

43. Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, 325.

44. Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, 325.

45. Vives, 57.

Chapter Six

Fragments for a History of the Nose

It would be extremely interesting to write the history of the nose.[1]

Jewels of the Nose

The jockeying of Lingua and the five senses for preeminence in the hierarchy of the body finally affirms Aristotle's ordering as well as his qualified limitation of the senses to five. Visus is sovereign, followed by Auditus, Olfactus, Tactus, and Gustus. The superiority of sight and hearing is based on their operation through the mysterious media of image and sound. The inferiority of touch and taste derives from the necessity of direct bodily contact in order to produce a sensation. Yet, the competition among the senses is also as old as Aristotle. In some places, he maintains that hearing or touch is more important and valuable than sight.[2] Elsewhere, he speaks of the ordering established in *Lingua* as self-evident: "There is an odd number of senses, and an odd number has a middle; the sense of smell comes midway between the tactile senses (touch and taste) and those that operate through a medium (sight and hearing)."[3] The problem with classifying smell is that its medium "has no name."[4] Like sight and hearing, smell "perceives objects at a distance," but, unlike images and sounds, smells emanate solely from material sources. Smell and its organ, the nose, are therefore problematically bound to both the material and spiritual realms. The ambivalence of smell in the body's ordering is reinforced by Ficino, who in one place aligns it with the body, lust, and madness, and elsewhere makes the god

Mercury the spokesman for the spiritual delights of sight, hearing, and smell.[5]

In Tomkis's play, Phantastes puts a finger on smell's strange status: "Olfactus, of all the Senses, your objects have the worst luck, they are alwaies jarring with their contraries; for none can wear Civet, but they are suspected of a proper bad scent: where the Proverb springs, He smelleth best, that doth of nothing smell" (IV, iii). The contrariness of Olfactus gives the nose the character of a swivel between the material and the spiritual and makes it the ideal articulation point of the question that the novel answers: how are subjects related to objects? In the competition among the senses, Olfactus presents his "objects," like Visus, in the form of a riddle; this time, however, the riddle inverts Aesop's fable of the jewel in the dunghill. Instead of finding something valuable buried in excrement and failing or refusing to recognize its value, as with Aesop's cock, Olfactus parades his "jewels" as the somewhat overvalued contents of the nose:

> Just in the midst of Cephalons round face
> As 'twere a frontis-piece unto the hill,
> Olfactus lodging built in figure long,
> Doubly dis-parted with two precious vaults,
> The roots whereof most richly inclos'd
> With Orient Pearls, and sparkling Diamonds:
> Beset at the end with Emeralds and Turchois,
> And Rubies red and flaming Chrysolits...
> (IV, iv)

Women Have Noses Too

Like Lingua, Olfactus makes the most of his ambivalence by displaying it as a precious virtue. But Olfactus is a swinger not only with regard to status in the body's hierarchy. The presentation of his "jewels," quoted above, continues in a way that also compromises "his" gender: "At upper end whereof in costly manner, / I lay my head between two spungeous

pillowes, / Like fair Adonis twixt the paps of Venus, / Where I conducting in and out the wind, / Daily examine all the ayr inspir'd."[6] The uncertain gender of the nose derives from Galen's contention that the organ of smell is not, in fact, the nose. "The nose, he argued, was no more than a passage which carried smells up to the true olfactory organ, the brain itself."[7] Avicenna, following Galen, described two olfactory projections attached to the front ventricles of the brain as "breast- or nipple-like." This figure of speech was "repeated by writer after writer until, by the time of Ambroise Paré (1510-1590) in the sixteenth century, 'mamillary projections' (*procez mammillaires*) could be used as a scientific term."[8] Outside the medical profession, the Galenic nose was combined, somewhat grotesquely, with the Aristotelian organ of smell. Fifteenth- and sixteenth-century illustrations of the brain show the "olfactory nipples," after Galen, but situate them inside the nose, after Aristotle, and conceive olfaction to operate in a manner similar to the other senses: "animal spirits pass from the brain down the nerves to the nipples, where they gather impressions to be conveyed back up to the common sense in the front ventricle of the brain."[9]

The Nose in Ruins

"For by the word *Nose*, throughout all this long chapter of noses, and in every other part of my work, where the word *Nose* occurs, — I declare, by that word I mean a Nose, and nothing more, or less." From the moment Laurence Sterne's Tristram Shandy "clarifies" his definition of the nose, a gap opens between the name of the nose — that is, the word "nose" — and the real, material nose.[10] In accord with the baroque grotesque method, the word "nose" is detached at a stroke. The word-thing is free to roam body and text (Tristram's life and his "Life") and to signify at will. A rather pointed and repetitious prohibition on exceeding the boundaries of the

definition invites a reading of the Shandean nose, most readily and familiarly, as the (profane) male genital organ. A typically direct and helpful admonishment to the reader interrupts the consideration of "the various uses and seasonable applications of long noses":

> Now don't let Satan, my dear girl, in this chapter, take advantage of any one spot of rising-ground to get astride of your imagination, if you can any ways help it; or if he is so nimble as to slip on, — let me beg of you, like an unback'd filly, *to frisk it, to squirt it, to jump it, to rear it, to bound it, — and to kick it, with long kicks and short kicks*, till like *Tickletoby's* mare, you break a strap or a crupper, and throw his worship into the dirt. — You need not kill him. (III.xxxvi.267)

Such perverse encouragement to resist sexualizing the nose (or taking the "dirty" road) not only emphasizes the equation of nose and penis but also opens the door to alternative and similarly arbitrary associations. The nose-penis in this respect functions as (sacred) phallus, or allegorical signification as such, and the same condition that severs the nose from its name liberates it from any single part of the body, or any particular kind of body. For why should the "phallus," or signification as such, be exclusively male? [11] Women have noses too. In *Tristram Shandy*, the nose is gendered female. The "funny" designation emphasizes the male-female distinction. To elicit the nose-penis image, and then to gender the nose female, compromises both the Shandean males, who are thereby feminized or stigmatized as impotent, and Mrs. Shandy, who stands accused, by implication, of conceiving Tristram in extramarital sexual relations. Just as the defining of the nose constrains it to acquire any and all other meanings, the Shandy's Lockean marriage contract also constrains the penis/phallus to exceed or escape the terms of agreement. "I was doom'd by marriage articles, to have my nose squeez'd as flat to my face, as if the destinies had actually spun me without one," is Tristram's lament (I.xv.46). The system of male-female gender differentiation that is supposed to guarantee the distinction between the name and the nose

is established only by the threat of its imminent collapse.

The Shandean System consists chiefly of a Hermetic theory of the agency of names that is associated with a skewed preformationist account of biological life that correlates with a Calvinist theology of predestination.[12] Preformation holds that the adult form — the "animalcule" or, in Sterne, the "homunculus" — is present in miniature in the sperm,[13] an account that Tristram and his father consider to be analogous to the Hermetic or Platonic belief in the preexistent soul. The problem is that equating the soul's arduous journey to earth with the sperm's risky trip up the fallopian tubes to the female ovum collapses the matter-spirit distinction that preformation tries to explain. Walter Shandy's opinion, in the matter of names, is "That there was a strange kind of magick bias, which good or bad names, as he called them, irresistibly impress'd upon our characters and conduct. The Hero of Cervantes argued not the point with more seriousness...than my father had on those of Trismegistus or Archimedes, on the one hand, — or of Nyky and Simkin on the other. How many Caesars and Pompeys, he would say, by mere inspiration of the names, have been render'd worthy of them?" (I.xix.57-58). The "inspiration of the names," with its punning conflation of the physical intake of breath and the mysterious preexistence of names (or language), is characteristic of the way the novel presents Tristram with the imperative task of separating the nose and the name. The requirement to distinguish between them makes his "Life" a necessary yet interminable project, and the laughter of Sterne's novel is based on producing a heightened awareness of the arbitrariness of the distinction.

The Shandean theory of the nose contradicts the theory of the name by assigning responsibility for the size and shape of the nose to the female progenitor. The theory of the nose is accordingly associated with the biological theory of "epigenesis" and the doctrine of free will,

the competing and contradictory counterparts of preformation and predestination indicated by the Shandean theory of names. In the epigenetic process, each part of a growing embryo exists in the matter supplied by the female but is animated with a soul and given a form only through the seed of the male. Epigenesis, which is associated in the seventeenth century with William Harvey, emphasizes the organization and development of parts rather than their preexistent character.[14] It is related to Hermetism nevertheless in that the "actually existent" matter of the female is analogous to the Platonic "idea" that arises out of, or only in relation to, something "potentially existent."[15] The common derivation from Hermetic thought of both the "male" and the "female" parts of Tristram's life underscores the arbitrariness of the male-female division that the modern little gentleman is required to straddle. His crushed nose and truncated name are the emblems of the resulting deformed human physiognomy.

A fragment called "Slawkenbergius's Tale" is singled out for inclusion in Tristram's "Life" because it "flatters" two of his father's "strangest hypotheses together — his Names and his Noses" (IV.312).[16] "Slawkenbergius" is the fictional author of a "grand FOLIO" in Walter Shandy's collection of books on noses. Finding that "the point of long noses had been too loosely handled by all who had gone before," Slawkenbergius takes in "the whole subject, — examined every part of it, dialectically" to produce "a thorough-stitch'd DIGEST and regular institute of noses; comprehending in it, all that is, or can be needful to be known about them" (III.xxxviii.274). Tristram introduces the "Tale," however, by qualifying his father's praise for Slawkenbergius. "Slawkenbergius's Tale" is excerpted from "the ninth tale" of the esteemed author's tenth "decad," and when introducing it, Tristram insists that because "[p]hilosophy is not built upon *tales*...'twas certainly wrong of Slawkenbergius to send them into the world by that

name" (III.xlii.286, italics mine). The endless project of Tristram's "Life" is to oppose the conflation of nose ("tale") and name, yet his own life makes such a distinction impossible. [17]

The action of the "Tale" begins with Slawkenbergius arriving in the city of Strasbourg en route to Frankfurt. As he enters the city on horseback, arguments break out among the citizens. They are astonished at the spectacle of Slawkenbergius's remarkably long nose and they debate whether it is a true or a false one. "Every eye in Strasburg languished to see it — every finger — every thumb in Strasburg burned to touch it" (IV.304). With some justification, Slawkenbergius begins to fear that someone, notably a certain trumpeter's wife, will make "an attempt" to touch his nose in order to find out what it is made of. "Lest his nose should be attempted," Slawkenbergius rides directly and swiftly through the city. The grasping Strasburgians pursue him as far as the road to Frankfurt, where they stop and anxiously await his promised return. While the people keep watch for "Slawkenbergius his nose," they neglect their own affairs. The French army invades and takes control of the city. "It is not the first — and I fear will not be the last fortress that has been either won — or lost by Noses," writes Tristram (IV.324). Analogues of the nose and the name proliferate in the novel; in this wry statement, Tristram alludes to "fortification," which is repeatedly distinguished from *and* confused with "fornication."

Slawkenbergius's fear of an "attempt" on his nose inverts the paradigmatic image of rape by reversing gender roles. A male fears rape, or an "attempt," by a female. "Slawkenbergius's Tale," then, affirms Walter Shandy's nose theory, as do his books on noses generally. Prior to the presentation of the "Tale," he reads of a polarizing debate between two more fictional scholars, Prignitz and Scroderus. Both offer theories of the nose that equate it with the penis/phallus, expressed in the word "fancy." Whereas Prignitz maintained that "the excellency of the nose is in

a direct arithmetical proportion to the excellency of the wearer's fancy" (III.xxxviii.275), Scroderus reverses the relation by insisting "That so far was Prignitz from the truth, in affirming that the fancy begat the nose, that on the contrary, — the nose begat the fancy" (III.xxxviii.276). "My father was just balancing within himself, which of the two sides he should take in this affair; when Ambrose Paræus decided it in a moment, and by overthrowing the systems, both of Prignitz and Scroderus, drove my father out of both sides of the controversy at once" (III.xxxviii.276).

We have already encountered "Paræus," or Ambroise Paré, who gives the nose a female physiognomy with the term "mamillary projections." Sterne's Paré insists that "the length and goodness of the nose was owing simply to the softness and flaccidity in the nurse's breast.... [B]y sinking into it, quoth Paræus, as into so much butter, the nose was comforted, nourish'd, plump'd up, refresh'd, refocillated, and set a growing for ever" (III.xxxviii.277). The well-proportioned nose is the sign, then, of the softness of the breast rather than the hardness (or virility) of the penis. In overthrowing the nose systems of Prignitz and Scroderus, Paré also upsets the system of peace, harmony, and signification in the Shandy family, and turns "likewise the whole house and every thing in it, except my Uncle Toby, quite upside down" (III.xxxviii.277).

The historical Paré was widely known in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries for, among other things, his risible description of a famous nose-restoration procedure carried out on a syphilis patient by the Italian surgeon Gaspare Tagliacozzi (1545-1599) in 1575. Paré's account, though mistaken in its medical details, provided Tagliacozzi as a figure of ridicule for Samuel Butler's poem *Hudibras*, for a 1710 number of the *Tatler*, and for a "Critical Dissertation on Noses," the script of a stage burlesque of the discourse of the passions, published in 1767, the same year as the final volume of *Tristram Shandy*.[18] "I hope none will turn up the nose at this

dissertation," says the author in defense of his lowly subject matter, the nose. The "Critical Dissertation" points out that "Noses are of great antiquity. Adam and Eve each wore one, and any of their descendants cuts so very ridiculous a figure without that ornament, that Tagliacotius, a learned Italian physician, gained immortal honour in finding out a way to supply them where they were wanting."[19]

While Paré seems to be wholly on the side of the female nose, he is also associated with the Shandean theory of the name. His actual contributions to modern medicine include a method for stopping hemorrhaging after amputations or incisions and the delivery of babies of "abnormal presentation," that is, "podalic version" or feet-first births.[20] The Shandean system holds that the human soul resides not in Descartes's pineal gland but in the "medulla oblongata," or the front ventricle of the brain, dangerously close to the nose. "[T]he nonsensical method of bringing us into the world" head-first leads Walter Shandy to advocate Caesarian section deliveries, the coming "sideways, Sir, into the world" in order to avoid the "violent compression and crush which the head was made to undergo" and the concomitant threat to the nearby soul (II.xix.175, 179). Hermes Trismegistus, whose correspondence theory of language forms the basis of the Shandean theory of names, is cited among the greatest (and happiest) men to enter the world sideways. Paré's expertise in feet-first births as well as his innovations in stopping bleeding after surgical incisions, like those required in Caesarian section births, prevents his exclusive alignment with either the Shandean nose or the name. Paré signifies on both sides of the Shandean divide when the nose is detached from its singular name. The grotesque method of Sterne's novel is to draw out and emphasize such conflicts and possibilities of representation.

In addition to having hardened breasts that shorten Tristram's nose, Mrs. Shandy is

blamed for the use of the forceps that leave her son's nose in ruins. She insists on a clause in her marriage contract guaranteeing her right to be taken to London for professional medical care in childbirth. But the same contract that grants her "right" also stipulates the conditions under which it may be forfeited. Her concern is to prevent exactly the kind of "accident" that takes place, but Mrs. Shandy's false labour the year before leads her husband to invoke the Janus-faced marriage article to keep her at home during her fateful "lying in" with Tristram. [21] Fearing complications and the transfer to himself of responsibility for them, Walter arranges for a grotesquely gendered "man-midwife" to attend the birth. "Dr. Slop" brings his newfangled forceps, eager to try them out for the first time. But like everything in the Shandean system, the forceps, as well as the marriage contract, are "progressive" and "digressive" at the same time. Both "work" by generating the very problems they are designed to prevent. The relation between Slop's "tool" and the marriage "article" is indicated in a passing comment about the clatter of noise made by the servant rushing to deliver the forceps to the man-midwife. It "would have been enough, had Hymen been taking a jaunt that way, to have frightened him out of the country" (III.vii.194). Hymen, the god of marriage in the animate world, would flee at the "terrible jingle" of the mechanical birthing implements.

The crushed nose that results from the series of mishaps surrounding the birth is "treated" with the name "Trismegistus." According to the Shandean system, the name that corresponds with "the greatest good" will counteract the "evil" done to the nose (IV.viii.364). Corrective use of the name, however, once again confounds the material and immaterial spheres when the name is described as a physical thing: "that great and elastic power within us of counterbalancing evil...like a secret spring in a well-ordered machine" (IV.viii.334). The risible conflation of matter

and spirit accounts for the hinnible failure of the name in the Shandean case. The maid charged with delivering the name to the curate waiting to baptize the child stammers out only the first part because it is *too long* to remember: "'Tis Tris — something" (IV.xiv.344). The material nature of the word is similarly emphasized elsewhere. Tristram typically lets "an apostrophe cool" (II.iv.104), and Uncle Toby consistently fails to get to the end of his sentences (II.vi.115) or takes stories out of Trim's mouth (III.xxiv.248). Now, like D'Urfey's "poet stutter," the word "Trismegistus" materializes as a thing in the maid's mouth, and, in so materializing, it actually becomes the agent of the child's "triste" name and fate. The "megistus" sticks in her throat like so much foreign matter until it is *too late*, and "Tristram" is christened with a truncated name that, after all, more truly corresponds to his shortened nose.

A good deal of "Slawkenbergius's Tale" is devoted to recounting a dispute that preoccupies scholars at the universities when Slawkenbergius's nose comes belatedly to their attention. The directional movement in Tristram's "Life," from nose to name, is reversed in the digressive inversionary "Tale," from name to nose. Lutheran and Catholic scholars are engaged in settling the precise date and time of Martin Luther's birth so that his name and correspondent astrological signs can be read either to condemn or to vindicate him and the Protestant Reformation, and to decide on the preeminence of predestination or free will. The status of the name as a digression in an excerpt from the authoritative book on noses emphasizes that the correspondence between Walter Shandy's names and noses is predicated on their absolute incommensurability. The name and the nose never quite link up, yet neither are they completely separated, for both Tristram's life and his "Life" are shaped in the process of mediating between name and nose. When the scholars at Strasbourg's universities get wind of Slawkenbergius's

nose, they quickly drop Luther's name and turn to the new controversy with gusto, filling the "Tale" with more and more material that is the very stuff of Tristram's "Life":

> 'Tis above reason, cried the doctors on one side.
> 'Tis below reason, cried the others...
> 'Tis possible, cried the one.
> 'Tis impossible, said the other.
> God's power is infinite, cried the Nosarians, he can do anything.
> He can do nothing, replied the Antinosarians, which implies contradictions.
> He can make matter think, said the Nosarians.
> As certainly as you can make a velvet cap out of a sow's ear. (IV.314)

The hiatus between name and nose is sustained, finally, by a temporal gap.[22] Jean-Jacques Mayoux aptly describes Sterne's achievement in *Tristram Shandy* as the location of "the absolute present." "'Time: the Present'...could be Sterne's prevailing stage direction."[23] The present, in novelistic terms, is the *represented* word, the image of the word as a thing, and moreover, as a thing that thinks. The represented word is separated by a gap from the *representing* word, which means what its author intends, and strives to suppress its own volubility. The representing word denies its subjection to time. The paradigmatic word-things in *Tristram Shandy* and their many possible meanings (instances of representation) are the coordinates of signification as such. The nose is associated always with the present (the physical word lodged in the throat) while the name is aligned with the constant pause (the stuttering tendency to deform and reshape the objects that are named). The nose, with its commitment to breath (respiration) and to the "Life" (inspiration of the names) sniffs out the representational plane of the present and partially completes the Copernican revolution in the modern form of the novel. For the novel is, like Slawkenbergius's "tale," a kind of suspicious nose, perhaps only a grotesque prosthesis, that mediates between the present and the constant pause. Completion of the Copernican revolution involves recognition

that the principle of eternity resides in matter and is not separable from matter. The constant pause sustains the fiction of the separability of matter and eternity (thought). *Tristram Shandy* is constrained to reverence the modern hinnible perspective — the "as if" status of human thought as eternal — even while realizing its risible "foundations" in time and in death.

Tristram Shandy so thoroughly inverts the world that the "as if" position in eternity, the mask of "Death," presumed by the modern knowing subject, is presented not as the afterlife but as the eternity *before* birth. Tristram's "Life" is conceived, so to speak, as an interruption of eternity. At the moment of his conception, Mrs. Shandy's question about time — "have you not forgot to wind up the clock?" (I.i.2) — disrupts the careful machinations underway to deposit Tristram's preexistent form. The "unseasonable question" disperses the "animal spirits, whose business it was to have escorted and gone hand-in-hand with the HOMUNCULUS, and conducted him safe to the place destined for his reception" (I.ii.2). Tristram's birth is a similar interjection of time into eternity. Like D'Urfey's "Narcissus alter," Walter Shandy and Uncle Toby fall asleep while discussing time and eternity. The hiatus affords Tristram the opportunity to write the "Preface" to his "Life," while upstairs his mother gives birth to him. Such declarations of freedom to manipulate time anchor Tristram in the present, the space between the writing and the living, between the represented and the representing word. But the laughing stress he places on this "freedom" simultaneously covers and points to anxiety about "getting the writing abreast of the living."[24] "The Book has no other Office but that of filling up the Gap in the Middle."

Tristram's "master-stroke of digressive skill" lies in the care he takes to order his affairs (his narrative material) so that his "main business" does not stand still during his digressions, but the digressions, of course, are the stuff of his "Life." The novel is the grotesque prosthesis that

performs the *work* of fiction. It maintains the hiatus (bridge and gap) between matter and eternity. The fiction that eternity is somehow separate and separable from matter is sustained by the novel's centering of the life of its protagonist, the subject of redemption. *Tristram Shandy*, however, is "the most typical novel" in its dramatization of the hero's inability to make himself the center of his own system.[25] Tristram is a hero who remains unborn for his first three volumes and remains unshaped to the very end because his "Life" is made of fragments of the lives and opinions of others. Early in the first volume, the Copernican system is used to explain the Shandean system by analogy. While the former explains all epicycles, or the apparent counter-movements of the planets, the latter explains the counter-movement of digression, and makes it the very basis of progression (I.xxi.76-77). Just as the Copernican system paradoxically abolishes a cosmic center in its attempt to resolve observational problems that result from positing a terrestrial center, so the Shandean system, equally paradoxically, decenters the representing word, the word of authorial intentionality, and produces an uncentered universe of free-floating signs — the nose and the name. The represented word is dialogic potentiality which authorial intentions interrupt in the attempt to pull word-things into a constraining orbit of lives and opinions. Thus, *Tristram Shandy* restores the dynamism of the word as a thing-in-itself, as animate matter. Tristram's persistent denial that the nose and the name have any allegorical significance produces the contrary effect of unconstrained allegorical reading. Such proliferation of meaning only conduces to the collapse of all meaning in laughter, the irreducible matrix from which fresh meaning is born. "If 'tis wrote against anything," Tristram says of his book,

> 'tis wrote, an' please your worships, against the spleen; in order, by a more frequent and a more convulsive elevation and depression of the diaphragm, and the succussations of the intercostal and abdominal muscles in laughter, to drive the *gall* and other *bitter juices*

> from the gall bladder, liver and sweet-bread of his majesty's subjects, with all the inimicitious passions which belong to them, down into their duodenums. (IV.xxii.360)

The Nose of Death

From Shakespeare's *Henry V*, a description of the death of the most illustrious and laughable grotesque body:

> PISTOL: ...Boy, bristle thy courage up; for Falstaff he is dead...
> BARDOLPH: Would I were with him, wheresome'er he is, either in heaven or in hell!
> HOSTESS: Nay sure, he's not in hell! He's in Arthur's bosom, if ever man went to Arthur's bosom. 'A made a finer end, and went away and it had been any christom child. 'A parted ev'n just between twelve and one, ev'n at the turning o' th' tide. For after I saw him fumble with the sheets, and play with flowers, and smile upon his finger's end, I knew there was but one way; *for his nose was as sharp as a pen*, and 'a babbled of green fields.... (II, iii, 5-17, italics mine)[26]

A sharp nose is the sign of imminent death.

Notes to Chapter Six

1. All words in this dissertation belong to the author, unless marked as belonging to someone else.

2. Vinge, 18.

3. Aristotle puzzles over the basis on which taste and touch can be distinguished because both are based on touch. And is touch "one sense or several?" Quoted in Vinge, 18-19.

4. Vinge quotes from Aristotle's extended discussion of "how sensations are transported to the sense-organs from the objects" in *De Anima* (17).

5. Richard Palmer, "In Bad Odour: Smell and its Significance in Medicine from Antiquity to the Seventeenth Centruy," *Medicine and the Five Senses*, eds. W.F. Bynum and Roy Porter (Cambridge, U.K.: Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine, Cambridge University Press, 1993), 68.

6. Palmer cites these lines as evidence of Olfactus's ambivalent gender, 62.

7. Paraphrase from Galen's *The Olfactory Organ* in Palmer, 62.

8. Palmer, 62.

9. Palmer, 62.

10. Laurence Sterne, *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gent.*, The Florida Edition of the Works of Laurence Sterne, vols I-II, *The Text*, eds. Melvyn New and Joan New, vol. III, *The Notes*, eds. Melvyn New, Richard A. Davies, and W.G. Day (Gainesville, FL: Florida University Press, 1978, 1984), III.xxxi.258. Hereafter called *Tristram Shandy* and *Notes*. *Tristram Shandy* References are to the original volume and chapter number and to the page in the Florida edition.

11. As Jane Gallop puts it, "The masculinity of the phallic signifier serves well as an emblem of the confusion between phallus and male which inheres in language, in our symbolic order." *Reading Lacan* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 135. Cited in Schiesari, *The Gendering of Melancholia*, 27 n#49.

12. Judith Hawley points out that the "animalcule is an embodiment of predestination in medical theory." See "The Anatomy of Tristram Shandy," *Literature and Medicine During the Eighteenth Century*, eds. Roy Porter and Marie Mulvey Roberts (London: Routledge, 1993), 92.

13. Wheeler, *Vitalism*, 35.

14. Wheeler, *Vitalism*, 7.

15. Wheeler, *Vitalism*, 7.

16. Volume and page number only are cited because the "Tale" is inserted at the beginning of Volume IV but appears before Chapter I.

17. The Florida Edition editors maintain that Sterne's theory of noses derives solely from Rabelais. See *Notes*, 266. By contrast, Jeffrey R. Smitten locates the following source for Sterne's association of "tale" and "nose" in Bruscambille's *Pensées facetieuses* (1709): "Gentlemen who style themselves fine-nosed...[feel] that anyone who has no nose at all is contemptible and does not even deserve the light of day. And that is the reason why one customarily hides one's arse as it is a face without a nose and contrariwise one always uncovers the face as it has a nose in the middle of it; a man without a nose is repellant to women. Albertus Magnus the physiognomist as well as Trismegistus the scholar says that women think of big noses as noble, and well-bred middle-sized ones as satisfying, and little ones as having good inclinations." "*Tristram Shandy* and Spatial Form," *Ariel* 8 (1977): 45. The translation is Smitten's.

18. For Butler and the *Tatler*, see *Notes*, 276. The "Critical Dissertation" is from J.S. Dodd, *A Satyrical Lecture on Hearts: To which is added, A Critical Dissertation on Noses. As They are Now Performing, at the Great Room, Exeter Exchange* (London: Printed for G. Kearsley, in Ludgate-Street; W. Nicoll, in St. Paul's-Church Yard; Richardson and Urquhart, at the Royal Exchange; and G. Pearch, at No. 34 on Fifth-street Hill, 1767). Redpath Tracts Series II, Vol CCCCLXXXVI 1767 (2), Item #5.

19. *A Critical Dissertation on Noses*, 46-47.

20. George Sarton, *Six Wings: Men of Science in the Renaissance* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), 199.

21. The two-faced, baroque nature of the Lockean marriage contract is underscored by the detail provided (as part of the contract) that Mrs. Shandy's name is "Elizabeth Mollineux" (I.xv.43), which makes her certainly the "descendant" of Locke's friend William Molyneux, the one who rather nastily called D'Urfey's John Norris "an obscure enthusiastic man." See my Chapter One, note #8. D'Urfey's song, "A Ballad of all the Trades," is cited by the editors of the Florida Edition as a possible source of "Trim," the name of Uncle Toby's valet. See *Notes*, 95.

22. The OED cites *Tristram Shandy* as the sole instance of the word "hiatus" used in a humorous context. During the "Visitation Dinner" with church authorities, where Walter Shandy and Yorick inquire into the possibility of changing Tristram's name to "Trismegistus," the proceedings are interrupted when a hot chestnut falls into the lap of a clergyman named "Phutatorius": "It is not my business to dip my pen in this controversy — much undoubtedly may be wrote on both sides of the question — all that concerns me as an historian, is to represent the matter of fact, and render it credible to the reader, that the *hiatus* in *Phutatorius*'s breeches was sufficiently wide to

receive the chestnut; — and that the chestnut, some how or other, did fall perpendicularly and piping hot into it, without *Phutatorius*'s perceiving it, or any one else at that time" (IV.xxvii.381).

23. "Variations on the Time-sense in *Tristram Shandy*," *The Winged Skull: Papers from the Laurence Sterne Bicentenary Conference*, eds. Arthur H. Cash and John M. Stedmond (Westerham Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1971), 12.

24. Mayoux, "Variations," 13.

25. Victor Shklovsky, "Sterne's *Tristram Shandy*: Stylistic Commentary," *Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays*, tr. And "Introduction," Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 57.

26. I am grateful to my colleague, Wes Folkerth, for bringing to my attention Falstaff's nose of death.

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