FINLAND'S ROAD . . . IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE, 1808-1910

FINLAND'S ROAD FROM AUTONOMY TO INTEGRATION IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE, 1808 - 1910

a dissertation

by

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation studies the problem of Finland's autonomy in the Russian Empire, 1808-1910. It examines the circumstances leading to the privileged relationship Finland was to enjoy following her conquest by Russia in 1809. It traces the growth of Finnish autonomy until the end of Alexander II's reign, at which time Finland's ambitions were checked by a now less tolerant Russia. It then carries through the Russo-Finnish press war of the 1880's and 1890's into the period of administrative Russification. It describes the relaxation of Russification following the Great Strike (1905) and the subsequent reimposition of russifying policies, ending with the Manifesto of June 17/30, 1910 which effectively suppressed Finnish autonomy.

This dissertation concludes that Finland's special status was doomed when Nicholas II withdrew the Imperial guarantee of her constitution. Although Finnish administrative institutions were russified, the population continued to resist social and cultural Russification.

EXTRAIT

La Finlande depuis son autonomie jusqu'à son intégration à l'Empire russe, 1808 - 1910

Dissertation d'Edward W. Laine
Pour un doctorat en philosophie au département de l'Histoire,
Université de McGill, Juillet 1974.

Cette dissertation étudie le problème de l'autonomie de la Finlande dans l'Empire russe de 1808-1910. Elle examine les circonstances menant au statut priviligié dont la Finlande devait jouir à la suite de sa conquête par la Russie en 1809. Elle remonte jusqu'à l'origine de l'accroissement de l'autonomie finnoise jusqu'à la fin du règne d'Alexandre II; moment à partir duquel, les ambitions de la Finlande étaient contrôleés par une Russie moins tolérante.

Cette dissertation continue de présenter les phases de la Guerre froide russo-finnoise des décades 1880 et 1890 jusqu'à la période de la russification administrative. Elle décrit la détente de la russification à la suite de la Grève générale de 1905; la réimposition subséquente de la politique de russification prenant fin avec la proclamation du 17/30 juin 1910, qui a supprimé effectivement l'autonomie finnoise.

Cette dissertation conclut que l'autonomie de la Finlande a été condamnée quand Nicholas II a retiré les garanties impératives de la Constitution de ce pays. Bien que les institutions administratives finnoises aient été russifiées, la population continua à s'opposer à la russification sociale et culturelle.

DEDICATED

To Molly my wife,

The Love of my life,

Without whose support

And encouragement

This work

Would not be done.

PREFACE

The purpose of this dissertation is to study the process of Finland's incorporation into the Russian Empire and her gradual integration into the Imperial administrative system. To this end, this work will begin with an examination of the circumstances which gave rise to that special status enjoyed by Finland within the Empire following her seizure during the Russo-Swedish War of 1808-1809. It then will trace the growth of Finnish autonomy until the end of Alexander II's reign, at which time Finnish aspirations began to be checked by a now less tolerant Russian society and government. Thereafter, the dissertation will discuss the period of the Russo-Finnish press war of the 1880's and 1890's and the first concerted Russian attempt toward the integration and administrative Russification of Finland during the period of 1899-1904. After a survey of the relaxation of Russian pressure in the short interval following Governor-General Bobrikov's assassination in 1904, it will deal with the renewal of Russian efforts in 1908 to integrate the Finnish administration into the Imperial

administrative system, concluding with the Manifesto of June 17/30, 1910 which effectively suppressed the Finnish claim to autonomy.

All this suggests certain questions which have to be analysed and answered: If Russia was the oppressive power as she had often been reputed to be, why should she have allowed Finland so much freedom at the beginning? Secondly, what was there in the nature of Imperial Russia that allowed the particular status of Finland to flourish for so long a time? Then, what was the cause for the abrupt destruction of this stable relationship between Finland and Russia after so many years, and how far was the assault upon Finnish autonomy successful? In sum, the crux of this dissertation will appear in the answers to these questions.

At the time of the conflict between the Finnish autonomists and the Russian integrationists, it was not possible for historians to analyse objectively the situation and to offer an unbiased historical presentation of the historical process. The nineteenth century students of the Russo-Finnish question invariably formulated their conclusions according to which camp they belonged. The Finlander Léo Mechelin led the way with a juridical defence of the Finnish autonomy which was based upon the Finnish constitution that he

believed Alexander I had guaranteed to Finland in perpetuity.[1] Even after Tsar Nicholas II had proclaimed that Imperial interests took precedence over local privileges, Mechelin persisted with his legal arguments.[2] Other Finlanders, Finnish and Swedish speakers alike, rallied behind him in defence of Finland's autonomy on the basis of the Finnish constitution.[3] To these constitutionalists, any abrogation of the constitution by Russia was not to be tolerated, for these fundamental laws provided Finland with a shelter from the pressure of Russification. Even sympathetic foreigners adopted this view of Finland's constitutional rights.[4]

On the whole, Finnish historians of a later date have tended to accept the concept of Finnish autonomy as formulated by the Finnish autonomists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[5] Because of this, their interests have tended to focus on the periods of intense Russification with no real consideration of Finno-Russian relations in the preceding era.[6] The works by Lauri Hyvämäki[7] and Keijo Korhonen[8] are valuable exceptions to this pattern.

In the Russian nationalist camp, K.F. Ordin developed a counter-argument to the Finnish claim of autonomy. In his view, Finland was a simple conquest of Russia and, therefore,

had no rights whatever save for the temporary privileges given to her by her generous conqueror.[9] His followers also entered into this legal debate, declaring that Finland's autonomy had no juridical basis whatsoever.[10] To them the Russification of Finland was the only solution to the "Finnish question."

Soviet historians, however, have not been eager to tackle such problems as the Russification of Finland. They have been more concerned with establishing the existence of friendly ties between Lenin and Finland[11] and demonstrating the solidarity of the revolutionary movements in Finland and Russia.[12] In a great many ways, Pokhlebkin's book, "Finland as Enemy and Friend 1714-1967,"[13] follows this Soviet tradition of trying to demonstrate the undying friendship of the Russian people for the Finns, noting that Nicholas II's oppression of the Finns was but an aberration in the behaviour of the tsars toward Finland. Soviet historiography offers very little in relation to the subject apart from this, although one Soviet historian has dared to criticize the Finns for their narrow, non-Marxian "bourgeois" perspective.[14]

My own historical interpretation of the problem of Finland's relations with Imperial Russia is principally

indebted to three writers. The first of these has been Leonid I. Strakhovsky who, in his brief article on the national minorities in the Empire,[15] has suggested that an underlying principle of federalism was partly responsible for the Imperial toleration of minority groups. The second is S. Frederick Starr who recently documented the Russian government's drive to decentralize its authority during the second third of the nineteenth century.[16] While Starr deals only with Russia proper and ignores the Finns as well as other minorities, the inference of his work is to suggest that Russia's laissez-faire attitude towards the minorities stemmed from the same desire. In this regard, it should be noted that the development of Finnish autonomy coincided with this period of decentralization. The third one is Osmo Jussila, who in his work on the evolution of Finnish and Russian conceptions of Finnish constitutional law,[17] has denied the concept of the Finnish constitution as a static, formally rigid body of law passed down to future generations as guaranteed by Alexander at Borgå.

The first and foremost claim of this dissertation to originality lays in its attempt to establish a proper historical perspective with regard to the political relations existing between Finland and Russia in the century that

followed the incorporation of the former into the Russian Empire. Earlier writers on the subject have not been able to treat it satisfactorily because they have become too enmeshed in the legal-juridical argument of Finnish rights or have been too narrow-mindedly concerned with the supposed repressiveness of the Russian government toward the minorities of the Empire. Most importantly however, they have failed to make the distinction between the Imperial government's policy of russifying the Finnish administration and the Russification of the masses (which was never attempted). Hence it is now necessary to study in close detail the circumstances underlying the situation that gave rise to the extensive expression of Finnish autonomy and the later revocation of these privileges by Russia.

The dearth of scholarly works in the English language on the subject is particularly evident. Apart from Fisher's pro-Finnish polemic that appeared before the process of Russification had really begun[18] and Wuorinen's printed dissertation,[19] there are virtually no published works that deal with nineteenth century Finland's relationship with Russia. William Copeland's recently published book, the only English language volume to treat the first period of Russification, does not analyse the process of Russification.

Moreover, there are no works in English which concern themselves with the second period of Russification.

Originality in research is also claimed in this dissertation's use of certain primary and original materials. For example, the French consular reports from Helsinki have never been utilized in any published work to the best of my knowledge. The British Foreign Office papers relating to Finland have only been used by Professor George Maude, and then with another purpose in mind.[21] Some of the Finnish archival material has probably been used before, such as the Yrjö-Koskinen collection in the Finnish State Archives, but, as far as I know, only for a different purpose.

It perhaps should now be mentioned here that the use of primary sources in this study have tended to follow a certain pattern. Since the first part of this work deals with Finland at a time when she was a matter of international concern, the documentary sources reflect this interest. French, British and Russian diplomatic papers have been used, principally from Sbornik Russkago Istoricheskago Obshchestva[22] and Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka.[23] The portion of this work dealing with the evolution of Finnish autonomy has also included the following collections: G. Borenius' Akty dlia vyiasneniia politicheskago poloshenii

Velikago Kniazhestva Finliandskago;[24] Sobranie postanovlenii finliandskikh;[25] and Suomen Suuriruhtinaanmaan Asetus-Kokous.[26]

The second half of this study begins with the controversy between Finland's autonomists and Russian nationalists, in which newspapers, periodicals and contemporary literature provide the major sources for establishing the temper of the times. In the concluding periods of Russification, as the consequence of strict newspaper censorship in Finland, the Helsingfors-based French and British consuls offer a much needed source of information in their political dispatches.[27] To this must also be added materials from the Finnish underground, much of which has been published in the "Kagnalin" arkisto.[28] Private correspondence, memoirs and recollections, and contemporary literature help fill out the details. Of course, this brief survey of the primary sources has by no means mentioned all such sources used, but the major ones have been indicated here to show the logic in the choice of documentary evidence in relation to the construction of the dissertation.

At this point, it would do well to mention several matters of a technical nature. First of all, all foreign language quotations have been rendered into English by me unless otherwise noted. All proper Russian names, with the

exception of the tsars of Russia, have been transliterated. A modified version of the Library of Congress system for transliterating the Cyrillic into the Latin alphabet has been used. All word-ending diacritical marks have been omitted. The Gregorian calendar has been used throughout the text unless otherwise noted. All bilingual place-names of Finland have been given in the Swedish version, as that was the current practice of the day. When such names are mentioned for the first time, the Finnish form is also given in brackets.

I should now like to thank those who have helped to make this dissertation possible. First of all, I must acknowledge my debt to Professor M.M. Mladenovic who, after suggesting this topic to me, has been a good friend and uncompromising critic well beyond the duties of an ordinary research director. Also within the University, I should like to thank the McGill Inter-Library Loan Department for cheerfully enduring my massive lists of book requests, especially singling out Mrs. J. Symansky and Mrs. I. Murray who processed the bulk of my requirements.

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With respect to travel, I should like to express my

appreciation to the Finnish State Archives, The Finnish Literature Society, the Library of Helsinki University, and the Library of Parliament for their kindness in extending to me the use of their archives, libraries and other research facilities.

There have also been several private individuals who have generously assisted me in the acquisition of certain vital materials to my research. They are: Docent Pirkko Rommi of Helsinki University; Dr. L.C. Tombs, former Consul-General of Finland in Montreal and past president of the American-Scandinavian Foundation; and Mr. Bruce Dolphin, Doctoral Candidate with the Department of History, McGill University. I am most grateful for their assistance.

Last but foremost in my mind, I should like to thank my wife, Molly, to whom this dissertation is dedicated.

NOTES

PREFACE

[1]L. Mechelin, A Precis of the Public Law of Finland, trans. by Charles J. Cooke (London, 1889), pp. 5-7.

[2]L. Mechelin, Suomen Itsehallinto ja perustuslait (Stockholm, 1903), p. 32.

[3]For example, J.R. Danielson, Suomen yhdistäminen Venäjän valtakuntaan, K. Ordinin "Suomen valloitus" nimisen teoksen johdosta (Helsinki, 1890); Agathon Meurman, Suomi ennen ja nyt (Helsinki, 1890); [A. Lille] On the Validity of the Fundamental Laws of Finland, trans. by Edward Hisinger (Stockholm, 1892); C.V. Nyholm, Die Stellung Finnlands im russischen Kaiserreich (Leipzig, 1901).

[4]For example, Jean Deck, Pour la Finlande (Paris, 1902); Phibbs, The Grand Duchy of Finland (London, 1903); Franz Despagnet, La question finlandaise au point de vue juridique (Paris, 1901); Ernest Nys, Le government russe et la Finlande (Brussels, 1909).

[5]For example, see Tauno Kuosa, Johdatteleva Suomen historia, IV: Autonominen ja itsenäinen Suomi (Porvoo, 1959; rpt. 1963); Eino Jutikkala and Kauko Pirinen, A History of Finland, trans. by Paul Sjöblom (London, 1962); John H. Wuorinen, A History of Finland (New York, 1965); L.A. Puntila, Histoire politique de la Finlande de 1809 à 1955, trans. by Jean-Louis Perret (Neuchâtel, 1966).

[6]For example, see Eino Parmanen, Taisteluiden kirja (4 vols.; Porvoo, 1936-1941); Päivi5 Tommila, ed., Venäläinen sortokausi Suomessa (Porvoo, 1960).

[7]Lauri Hyvämäki, Ennen routaa, Esseitä ja tutkielmia 1880-luvusta (Helsinki, 1960).

[8]Keijo Korhonen, Autonomous Finland in the Political Thought of Nineteenth Century Russia (Turku, 1967).

[9]K.F. Ordin, Pokorenie Finliandii, Opyt opisaniia po neizdannym istochnikam (2 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1889).

[10]For example, N.D. Sergeevski, K voprosu o Finliandskoi avtonomii i osnovnikh zakonakh (St. Petersburg, 1902); von Sarwatus, Russland und Finnland vom russischen Standpunkte aus betrachtet (Berlin, 1903); A.P. Liprandi, Rossiia i eia Finliandskaia okraina (Kharkov, 1910).

[11]For example, see M.M. Koronen, "V.I. Lenin i finskie revoliutsionery," Voprosy istorii, 1969, No. 9, pp. 3-17.

[12]Ia. S. Il'inskii, "Revoliutsionnyi 1905 god v Finliandii," Voprosy istorii, 1955, No. 12, pp. 45-62.

[13]V.V.Pohlebkin, Suomi vihollisena ja ystävänä 1714-1967, trans. by Natalia Pienimäki and Aaro Yedlin (Porvoo, 1969).

[14]See A.C. Zherbin, "Nekotorye novye tendentsii v sovremennoi finliandskoi burzhuaznoi istoriografii," Voprosy istorii, 1966, No. 8, pp. 183-189; A.C. Zherbin, "Kratkii obzor poslevoennoi literaturi po istorii Finliandii," in Izvestiia karel'skogo i kol'skogo filialov Akademii Nauk SSSR, IV (Petrozavodsk, 1958).

[15]Leonid I. Strakhovsky, "Constitutional Aspects of the Imperial Russian Government's Policy toward National Minorities," The Journal of Modern History, XIII (1941), pp. 467-492.

[16]S. Frederick Starr, Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia, 1830-1870 (Princeton, N.J., 1972).

[17]Osmo Jussila, Suomen perustuslait venäläisten ja suomalaisten tulkintojen mukaan 1808-1863 (Helsinki, 1969).

[18]Joseph R. Fisher, Finland and the Tsars, 1809-1899 (London, 1899).

[19]John H. Wuorinen, Nationalism in Modern Finland (New York, 1931).

[20]William R. Copeland, The Uneasy Alliance: Collaboration between the Finnish Opposition and the Russian Underground, 1899-1904 (Helsinki, 1973).

[21]George Maude, "Finland in Anglo-Russian Diplomatic Relations, 1899-1910," The Slavonic and East European Review, XLVIII (1970), pp. 557-581.

[22](148 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1867-1916).

[23]Russia, Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka, Ser. I: 1801-1815 (8 vols.; Moscow, 1960-1970).

[24](Helsingfors, 1890).

[25]I: 1808-1839 (St. Petersburg, 1892)

[26](Helsinki, 1860-1891).

[27]These reports appear in: France, Archives Nationales du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à Paris, Russie: Politique interieur, "Pays Balts, 1896-1904" and "Pays Balts, 1905-1914"; Great Britain, The Public Records Office, Foreign Office Papers (for file numbers, see bibliography).

[28]"Kagaalin" arkistoa. Kokoelma vuosina 1899-1905 ilmestyneitä poliittisia lentolehtisiä, julistuksia, kiertokirjeitä y.m. Ur "Kägalens" arkiv. Samling av poliska flygskrifter, uppropr, cirkulär m.m. tillkomna åren 1899-1905, ed. by Ernst Estlander (Helsinki, 1939).

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CHAPTER ONE

SWEDISH FINLAND AND RUSSIA, 1703-1808

Exasperated by Finland's current demands for a separate consular service, M.N. Katkov, the founder and editor of the Russophil newspaper Moskovskaia vedomosti, felt himself compelled to pen an editorial on March 10 (o.s.), 1883 which accused Finland of exploiting her favoured position in the Russian Empire. He wrote in part:

> Finland is a completely separate state organism from Russia. She has her own fundamental laws, her own separate monetary and commercial policies, her own monetary system, her own customs tariffs. Why must the Russian nation at times sacrifice its own interests for the sake of such a country that lives such a separate political and economic life?[1]

To Katkov, the spokesman for "Russian-national imperialism,"[2] Finland had abused the generosity of the tsars since the time of her incorporation into the Empire in 1809.[3] The fact was, however, that his analysis of the Russo-Finnish question was too simple. Although it was quite true that the position of autonomous Finland had been countenanced by Alexander I's good will towards his newly conquered Finnish subjects, the historical antecedents leading to this course were already present in Russia's

attitude toward Finland a century before her annexation. In effect, it was Katkov himself and those other Russophils of his persuasion -- and not the Finns and other national minorities as had been claimed by them -- who were intent upon altering the historic verities of Russian Imperialism and the thrust of its future development.

Finland, for her part, was then merely seeking to maintain her autonomous position within the Russian Empire, a historic condition the roots of which stemmed from the days of Peter the Great, for it was Peter who had stimulated Russia's new interest in Finland. "The founding, on the Neva, of the new capital of the Russian empire by Peter the Great," wrote Leo Mechelin, Finland's great nineteenth century liberal champion, "was the starting-point of the policy pursued by the Russian rulers, with regard to Finland, for a whole century."[4]

The success of Russian arms against the Swedish army of Charles XII in the Battle of Poltava (1709) guaranteed the continued existence of six year old St. Petersburg.[5] To show his great joy, Peter invested in that city during the same year the function of capital of the Empire as "the Byzantine Stockholm, the symbol of Imperial Russia."[6] Hence Peter, possessing a sense of invincibility not always shared by his successors, dared to install his throne by

his "window on Europe" without a care for the fact that the frontier of a hostile Swedish Finland was only some twenty miles distant. After his passing, a less confident Russia began to gravitate toward the view that the control of Finland was the key to the solution of the "Baltic question" -- that is, the maintenance of the Imperial Throne on the Baltic and the continued Russian presence in western Europe.[7]

It was also becoming more and more evident that as long as Sweden retained any part of Finland, her own revanchist imperial vision would continue to be fed by a burning hatred of the Romanov usurpers of her former Finnish and Baltic dominions. Although Peter had been so eager to conclude a peace settlement at Nystad (Uusikaupunki) that he willingly restored to Sweden the greater part of Finland, a province which his armies had conquered;[8] Sweden was by no means equally reconciled to the loss of so large a piece of her empire, that which included a portion of Karelia, the city of Viborg (Finn. Vipuuri; Russ. Vyborg), and the Baltic provinces of Ingria, Estonia and Livonia.[9] Therefore, even while Count Arvid Horn, the Swedish chancellor from 1720 to 1738, sought to effect a détente with Russia, there were unmistakable signs that Sweden would not be content without a revision of the Peace of Nystad.[10]

In this regard, the presence of Swedish troops in Finland did not merely threaten some vague frontier in the Russian hinterlands but directly menaced the imperial centre of the Empire which Peter had fashioned out of the Neva's mud.[11] Afraid for the safety of the capital, Peter's successors down to Alexander I sporadically sought to extend their control over the entirety of Finland, choosing between a policy aimed at annexing Finland outright and one that intended to establish her as an "independent" buffer-state.[12]

From the vantage point of hindsight, one might assume that Russia's fears of Sweden were hardly justified. Broken by her defeat in the Great Northern War, decrepit Sweden appeared to be scarcely able to withstand the ambitious demands of her rapacious, expansionistic Russian neighbour, much less threaten her. In economic terms alone, the Swedish kingdom proved to be so powerless in resisting the encroachment of Russian competition that her historic monopoly of the European tar trade was irretrievably broken.[13] Moreover, in the first decade following Charles XII's <u>débâcle</u> at Poltava, Swedish military power was so feeble that Sweden-Finland's territorial integrity, on occasion, had to be protected by foreign interests, just as Britain had once threatened to do so "even to the point

short of open war."[14] However, not only did Russia continue to overestimate Swedish power, but Sweden also believed that she still possessed the wherewithal and initiative to regain that which she had recently lost.[15]

Therefore, by 1740, the political relations between these two states were quickly deteriorating. As General Manstein, a mercenary then in the Russian service, noted:

> Russia, dissatisfied at the alliance of Sweden with the Porte, prohibited the exportation of grain from Livonia; and in Sweden, the assassination of Sinclair [the Swedish envoy murdered by Russian agents] still made a great noise.[16]

To compound these difficulties, the moderate Count Horn had been driven from office by a French-financed, anti-Russian "Hat" majority in the Riksdag.[17] So, when the War of the Austrian Succession broke out in 1741, the French were in the position to apply sufficient pressure upon the Hat government to plunge Sweden into open conflict against Russia, an ally of France's enemy -- Austria.[18] When Anna, the Russian empress, died shortly after the commencement of war, the Swedish government could no longer resist the temptation to intervene; during the ensuing Russian <u>interregnum</u> and struggle for the Imperial Throne, Swedish armies sought to influence the succession and so to revoke the Treaty of Nystad.

Indeed, Swedish troops indirectly afforded Tsarevna

Elizabeth the opportunity to elevate herself to the Imperial Throne by means of a palace revolution.[19] Cognizant of this, she was willing to terminate the war on terms more favourable to the Swedes than justified by their success at arms.[20] The Swedish general, Count K.E. Lewenhaupt, refused on instructions from his government to settle for anything less than the return of the fortresses of Viborg and Kexholm (Käkisalmi); moreover, he had been ordered to resume the march upon St. Petersburg should the new empress dismiss these Swedish demands.[21] Elizabeth's reply was couched in a manifesto dated March 8, 1742. While this manifesto's immediate concern was to threaten the Swedish state with swift retribution for any resumption of hostilities, it, for the first time in history, made public a concrete expression of the idea of an "independent" Finland.[22]

In this manifesto, Elizabeth directly addressed Finland:

> We, Elizabeth I, Empress and Autocrat of All the Russias, etc., etc.
> With this we make it known to all and sundry, and to each Estate and District separately, to the entire Grand Duchy of Finland . . . .[23]

The manifesto went on to blame the king of Sweden for his undertaking of a war of aggression without just cause. It then pointed out that if Finland would only cease to succour the overweening ambitions of Sweden with military

and material aid, and adhere to a strict observance of neutrality.

> . . . everyone will wholly enjoy his own well-being and goods and shall be freed from all difficulties; and there, for those under our protection, we will shield in every way; . . . moreover, we do not want a foot's breadth of land; we would rather Finland, ourselves being open to this from every point, that the oft-named Grand Duchy of Finland, if it has any intention to separate itself away from under Swedish rule, . . . be as one free and not a subject country of another power.[24]

Whatever the manifesto's political effect had been amongst the Finlanders,[25] its real importance lay in the fact that it had established a mode in Russian policy which could visualize a separate political existence for Finland apart from Sweden and yet would allow her to retain a separate political identity from the Russian Empire. Although Elizabeth's proposition often has been viewed as an expendable wartime promise[26] and a means to win the crown of Sweden for one of her own relations,[27] it undoubtedly provided a more acceptable alternative to the course ultimately taken by the empress in the opinion of the majority of counselors in her own court.[28] Moreover, since so many of her own entourage had favoured the retention of Russian control of Finland, Elizabeth afterwards felt it necessary to keep alive the promises of the March Manifesto for domestic as well as foreign political reasons.

Even if she refused to recognize the authority of the

meeting of the separatist elements of Finland's four Estates in Åbo (Turku) and their offer of the crown of an independent Finland to her favorite nephew, Charles Peter Ulric, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, she continued to play on the hopes of Finlanders in other ways. For example, she "confirmed" the ancient privileges, liberties, laws, courts, jurisdictional immunities, customs and usages of Viborg and other Russian-held, Old Finnish towns, except only for the rural areas which had already been included in the Russian legal system.[29] More importantly, she demonstrated the flexibility of the Russian state, administering occupied Swedish Finland with a relatively humane and enlightened government.

Although Finns still regard this period of their history as the Pikkuviha ("Lesser Wrath"), Finland was comparatively well treated by the Russian occupation authorities. General Keith directed the military administration with a considerate hand and, for a time, continued to guide the succeeding civilian authorities of the Russian government with the same good effect.[30] Although no more was said of an "independent" Finland, the Russians did establish a pattern of differentiating between Finlanders and Swedes. Unlike the Swedish forces, troops from Finland were not interned -- nor, for that matter, even disarmed.[31] To

further reinforce the impression amongst Finlanders that only the Swedes, and not they, were the enemy, General Keith constrained his army from exacting their usual wages of booty and rapine in Finland.[32]

By appointing Baron Johan von Campenhausen as her governor-general of Finland, Elizabeth further developed this policy of benevolent occupation. Campenhausen proved to be the ideal instrument; being a Swede by birth himself, he possessed a natural affinity for the Finlanders of his own class and so, by magnifying and extending his connections with these people, he was able to remove much of the sting of the Russian occupation from the most influential elements of the population. Of course, other inducements were offered to those who refused to be seduced by his bonhommie.

Hence, under his lenient and sympathetic administration, the occupation government began a programme of reconstructing war-ravaged public buildings, paying from its own treasury the wages of the local labour force at the same rate as prevailed before the war. The Russian Senate also authorised Campenhausen to retain in the government's employ those incumbent public functionaries who were Finlanders; at the same time, it instructed him not to raise Finland's taxes above the pre-war level to cover the cost of the additional

expenditures incurred by this increase in the size of the public service. Provision was even made for those left destitute by the war to receive welfare payments from the funds of the Russian state treasury,[33] and Finlanders who had served in the Swedish-Finnish army continued to receive their service pensions according to their entitlements under the Swedish regime. With regard to these several points, V. Pokhlebkin has suggested that Finland was "humanely treated" with a full understanding of her separate identity from Sweden.[34]

Russia even accorded to her own Finnish possessions a unique position within the Empire. She willingly accepted the provisions in the Treaty of Åbo which stated that those slivers of Finnish territory annexed by Russia were to be guaranteed the same rights and privileges that they had enjoyed under Swedish rule.[35] Moreover, the Russian government, of its own accord, combined Old Finland with these recent acquisitions to form the province (Russ., guberniia) of Vyborg on January 14, 1744; and so, by this measure, the rights and privileges as laid down by the Treaty of Åbo were even extended to those inhabitants of Old Finland who had been Russian subjects since the days of Peter the Great.[36] Elizabeth, therefore, continued the tradition of Petrine benevolence toward Russia's Baltic

dominions,[37] although her succession had represented the victory of the "Russian" party.[38]

Catherine II became the first autocrat to endorse the principles of Russian centralism. Soon after her usurpation of the Imperial Throne, she let it be known that Russia would no longer tolerate any minority rights within the Empire:

> Little Russia, Livonia and Finland are essentially provinces which are governed according to the privileges confirmed to them, and it would be in most indecent haste to destroy them by disavowing their privileges all at once; however, to consider them as foreign and to deal with them on that basis would be a most undesirable mistake, and should be so termed in truth. These provinces should be led by the easiest stages to become Russianized . . .[39]

Catherine was good at her word: she extinguished the special rights and privileges of the Ukraine and the Baltic provinces.[40] She did much the same in Old Finland too, for on May 3, 1783, she introduced the Russian system of taxation there and, on July 25, 1783, she placed that region under a Russian provincial administration.[41] The second measure, however, was revoked on November 12, 1796, by her son and successor, Paul I.[42] Thereafter, the special status of Old Finland within the Empire remained unchanged until it was reunited with the rest of Finland in 1811.[43] Hence the irony of Catherine the Great's reign: that the first official attempt to russify European minority

groups in the Russian Empire should have been borne in the ample bosom of a non-Russian, non-Romanov German princess.[44]

The set in Russia's policy toward Sweden-Finland, however, was largely of Elizabeth's making, for it was she who had returned Finland to Sweden in exchange for the right to nominate her own creature as heir apparent to the Swedish throne. The bargain soon proved to be a bad one for Elizabeth; the marriage of the weak-willed Adolphus Frederick to Louisa Ulrica, sister of Frederick II of Prussia, had the unforeseen and unwanted effect of stiffening the bridegroom's own resolve to free himself from the empress' tutelage. Being possessed of the same ambition, determination, and energy which had made her brother Frederick "the Great", Louisa Ulrica prodded her husband to enhance the royal prerogatives, to ally himself with the Hats, to draw himself out from under the Russian thumb, and to look forward to Sweden's entry into a Franco-Prussian alliance.[45] Meanwhile Elizabeth was also losing her grip on the Estates as the consequence of a concerted campaign on the part of France to regain its influence in Sweden.[46] The Hat victory in the Riksdag of 1746-47 once again established the fact that Russia had to look upon Sweden as an enemy rather than as a client state.

Both St. Petersburg and London were incensed by the

Hat coup but were reluctant to take any decisive action. Russia vainly tried to buy the support of the House of Burghers. Lord Chesterfield, on behalf of the British government, rejected such a course as costly and futile, grimly ordering his envoy Colonel Guy Dickens to tighten the purse-strings until the Russians had taken "most vigorous measures."[47] When such countermeasures were not forthcoming, he then instructed Dickens to tell the Russians what sort of action Whitehall expected of them:

> I acquainted you by my letter of the 2d inst. with his Majesty's opinion that the views of Russia in Sweden could not be effectuated unless vigorous measures should be taken by the Empress. His Majesty is further of opinion that those measures should be taken forthwith by marching a body of troops into Finland, where the Swedish forces are so few, and in so very bad a condition, that little or no opposition could be made.[48]

In spite of continued pressure by the British,[49] Russia would not be pushed into war with Sweden. Elizabeth rather hoped that a solution to the present difficulties could be arranged by the Swedes themselves. So, the Russian minister in Stockholm actively encouraged Cap plots to overthrow the Hat government. One such plot involved the Cap leader and clergyman, Dean J. Serenius, who, according to the Russian minister Baron von Korff,

> hoped that ten thousand men would march into Finland bearing the tidings that they would remain there until the people had been released from bondage and French tyranny, and Swedish liberty had been

saved. He was wholly convinced that all Finland would side with Your Imperial Majesty.[50]

Elizabeth, while being tempted by Serenius, did not even dare to mobilize a Russian army along the Finnish border because the English fleet would not support her. George II of Great Britain, Hanoverian that he was, had no wish for the success of such a manoeuvre, fearing the object of it would be to replace Adolphus Frederick with his hereditary enemy, the Prince of Hesse, as heir apparent.[51] So, Elizabeth's most vigorous response was to allow her Baltic fleet to anchor in the proximity of Helsingfors for some ten days during the summer of 1747, a gesture which had the contrary effect of encouraging the Hats to hasten their agreement to a military alliance with France and Prussia.[52]

Disappointed by the failure of her Swedish policy, Elizabeth began to regret that she had relinquished Finland. Therefore, in June, 1748, the Danish minister to Stockholm was advised that the empress wanted a separation of Sweden and Finland, with the latter acquiring an "independent" status under Russian protection. In the following year, Elizabeth suggested that Denmark should attach some of Sweden's western borderlands to her own Norwegian possessions, while Russia be given a free hand in Finland.[53] In the final analysis, however, Denmark was unwilling to risk a war for

the sake of Russian interests, and Russia herself was not ready to face Sweden's allies alone.[54]

To protect herself, Elizabeth was forced to beat a hasty retreat; and so, the bellicose von Korff was withdrawn to be replaced by the more unctuous Nikita Panin. The chastened empress would not allow her new minister to provoke any kind of direct confrontation of international consequence with the Swedish government, but rather she directed him to aid and abet the cause of Finnish separatism.[55] This Panin did with alacrity.

Probably the most serious of Panin's intrigues was the Fredenstierna affair. In this case, Panin had become involved with A. Fredenstierna, a Finnish-born Cap whose seeming object was to establish a separate and distinct Finnish diet and governmental apparatus to deal with Finnish questions. Panin grew enamoured with this project to separate Finland from Sweden and even drew the support of influential members in the empress' coterie. Elizabeth, however, did not wish to involve Russia directly, and so instructed Panin to direct the Finlanders first to achieve independence by themselves. Then, after this <u>fait accompli</u>, Russian troops would give Finland military assistance.

Apart from this, Panin was authorized to render to the "separatists" all reasonable aid, including the disbursement

of funds from the Russian treasury. He was also told to give the Finlanders a carte blanche to organize the internal affairs of their country as they wished, provided that Finland would accept to be placed under Russian protection. None of this was sufficient to remedy the lack of immediate Russian military support. Furthermore, Panin had "misunderstood" the aims of Fredenstierna and his co-conspirators, not reckoning them to be mere Caps devoted to their "patriotic" duty of turning the Hats out of office without the slightest tincture of interest in detaching Finland from the Swedish kingdom.[56] Hence, before the end of 1750, it became clear to Russia that this policy, too, was destined to fail.[57]

Meanwhile, Sweden-Finland was waxing stronger. With the support of her allies, the Swedish government grimly declared that it was no longer bound by Article VII of the Treaty of Nystad, the device through which Russia claimed the right to interfere in Swedish domestic affairs; and then to prove the point, the Swedes "undertook the unprecedented measure of shipping a force of 8,000 men, in a time of peace and without any intention of attacking, to reinforce the defences of Finland."[58] The border fortresses of Lovisa (Loviisa) and Ulrikaborg were built to replace those handed over to the Russians. The Orlogsflotta or High Seas Fleet was enlarged while a Skärgårdsflotta, the Archipelago Fleet

of war galleys patterned after the coast guard vessels in Russia's Baltic Fleet, was created to protect Finland's shores. Helsingfors (Helsinki) was chosen as the base for the Skägårdsflotta and so the construction of the fortress of Sveaborg (Viapori; now Suomenlinna) was undertaken to guard the approaches to the harbour.[59]

Indeed, by the time of Adolphus Frederick's succession in 1751, the initiative in Elizabeth's northern policy had petered out. Moreover, the so-called Diplomatic Revolution perpetrated by Great Britain led to an alliance between Sweden and Russia and eventually to their joint military operations against Prussia in the Seven Years' War (1755-1763).[60] But this period of co-operation quickly came to an end when Peter III succeeded to the Russian Empire; he immediately ordered the Russian armies to turn their bayonets on their erstwhile allies, forcing Sweden to withdraw from the war without victory or honour and to the chagrin of her French allies.[61]

Meanwhile, Catherine overthrew her husband Peter III and replaced him on the Russian throne. All of this was accomplished with the nodding approval of the British who had seen in her the means to scuttle the new diplomatic alliances which they themselves had initiated with their Diplomatic Revolution.[62] Particularly with respect to

Swedish affairs, Catherine II fulfilled the expectations of Whitehall: as in the days of old, she resumed the payment of fabulous subsidies to the Caps through her ministry in Stockholm, then headed by Count Ivan Andreevich Ostermann; and while so encouraging every manner of domestic anarchy, she sought to enlist the aid of other European powers in this endeavour to preserve Sweden's "golden age of liberty." Under the guiding hand of her President of the College of Foreign Affairs, Nikita Ivanovich Panin,[63] these precepts of the empress were enshrined as part and parcel of that policy known as the "Northern System."[64]

Catherine immediately revitalized Russia's policy toward Sweden-Finland. Taking heed of those who, like the British minister to Stockholm, saw "no moment since the commencement of the French system so favorable for overturning it as this,"[65] she willingly disgorged £89,000 from her treasury while the British were content to dole out only £17,500 to assist the Caps in acquiring control of the 1765-1766 session of the Riksdag.[66] The Russo-British efforts were indeed amply rewarded, for the Riksdag fell under the sway of a liberal-minded, anti-metropolitan Cap majority.[67] Their success was so complete that Britain was beginning to have some misgivings.[68]

At the same time, Catherine had embarked on a course

to detach Finland from Russia. Her reasons were cunningly outlined by one contemporary visitor of the Russian scene:

> You will observe, that the great Despots of Europe seem desirous of having small Princes, rather than mighty Potentates, on the frontiers of their dominions. Such neighbours are not so formidable: in case of foreign wars they stand in the way of invasion; and may in time become a part of the neighbouring empire. Perhaps the Sovereigns of Russia would not be sorry to see Finland and Lithuania, no less than the provinces of ancient Dacia, erected into what they might be pleased to term independent Dukedoms and Principalities. "Why," they will say, in the superabundance of their goodness "ought the Finlanders and the Lithuanians to be subject to the Kings of Poland and Sweden?"[69]

As a matter of fact, in 1769, Russia seemed just short of the attainment of this end. Already during that year, she had reached an understanding with Denmark, Prussia, and Great Britain to guarantee the Swedish constitution, whereby any modification to the Swedish Form of Government would be viewed by these powers as a casus belli. Next she offered Scania to Denmark and Pomerania to Prussia while she, according to Panin's intimations to the British and Danish ambassadors to St. Petersburg, wished only to establish an "independent" Finland.[70] This, however, was too much for the liking of His Britannic Majesty's Government, and so, a sharply worded remonstrance was sent to St. Petersburg:

> The project of erecting Tatary, Moldavia and Wallachia into independent States as a defence against Turkey,

> and the idea Your Excellency imagines you perceive of forming a barrier against Sweden, by erecting all Finland into an independent Great Duchy, are not thought entirely to correspond with the principle of moderation You suppose in the Court of Russia not to increase her dominions, but rather part with some others to secure a permanent peace as it is easy to see, that such independent States can be meant to be no other in reality than entirely dependent on Russia, . . . 71

Once again the tide began to turn against the Russian project. On no account would the British government consider spending more money on the 1769 Riksdag elections than necessary "to form such an opposition as shall preserve the constitution entire, and prevent other violent measures."[72] The British government was gradually coming to the view that Russia was not really England's natural ally, but rather a danger to the balance of power.[73] As a consequence, the British saw that the Hats were only allowed to win a narrow victory.

Then in 1771 Adolphus Frederick died, leaving his throne to Gustavus III, a headstrong young man steeped in the notions of absolutism and enlightenment in the style of his French patron, Louis XV.[74] Stymied by a Cap-packed Riksdag,[75] Gustavus, with the help of military men like Colonel Jakob Magnus Sprengtporten of the Nyland (Uusimaa) Dragoons Regiment,[76] prepared to spring a coup d'état. When the time came in August 1772 for Gustavus to declare

himself King in power and rights as well as name, the conspiracy did not proceed as originally planned but was carried off smoothly anyhow by the king with the help of the Stockholm garrison.[77]

Russia's reaction was immediate but quite ineffectual. She ordered Denmark to dispatch a Danish fleet into the Sound and to mobilize the Danish army along the Norwegian-Swedish frontier. Meanwhile, Russia put her own Finnish border fortresses on a war-footing, transferred her troops from the Lithuanian interior to the Baltic coast,[78] and detached nine infantry regiments from Rumiantsev's army on the Danube to reinforce Pskov against a possible Swedish attack.[79] But once again Russia was not ready for war either to change the attitude of the Swedes or to use this occasion as a pretext to take Finland, for her countryside was ravaged by a cruel plague, her armies were committed to battle against the Turks, her diplomats were too concerned with negotiating a peace with Turkey or mollifying a truculently resentful Austria and checking a greedy Prussia in the matter of the forthcoming First Partition of Poland, and before long Empress Catherine was too busy defending her crown against the revolting pretensions of Pugachev.

Moreover, Russia's allies and co-guarantors of the Swedish Constitution also were not prepared to move against

Gustavus III. Britain, fearful that a change in the balance of power was being worked out in the closeness of Russo-Prussian diplomatic relations, chose to ignore Russian entreaties for military assistance.[80] Although Frederick the Great bore no great love for his nephew[81] and had talked of issuing joint notes condemning Gustavus' actions, he had no wish to embroil Prussia in a war (against certain French opposition) that could very well jeopardize Prussia's title to its newly acquired Polish possessions.[82] Of the anti-Swedish coalition, only little Denmark began to arm itself in earnest for a swift descent upon Sweden from its Norwegian bases; but Gustavus, using the inertness of his other enemies to good advantage, was able to threaten solitary Denmark with the full force of Sweden's superior military might. Under these circumstances, the prudent Danes had no choice but to accede to the Swedish ultimatum that they cease all military preparations.[83]

Thus, the success of Gustavus' Royal Revolution of 1772 was assured and, in Panin's view, Catherine the Great had suffered the only serious setback of her lengthy reign.[84] For Count Panin himself, this turn of events presaged his own personal downfall at the Russian court and the demise of the Northern System with which he had been so closely associated.[85] Although the ghost of a northern accord

lingered in Sweden's and Russia's support of the Armed Neutrality of 1780, the real substance of their international relations was much less than cordial.[86] In 1783, the sovereigns of Sweden and Russia met at Fredrikshamn (Hamina) supposedly to resolve their differences,[87] but without avail, for their two countries were irreconcilable. Indeed, Gustavus soon resolved to wage war against Russia,[88] while Catherine reverted to the old policy of coddling Finnish separatists.[89]

To this end, Catherine welcomed Göran Magnus Sprengtporten into her service. Like his older brother Jakob Magnus, Göran had been a devout royalist in 1772 and so had taken part in the capture of Sveaborg on behalf of Gustavus III but, in time, he had grown to detest the king. Hence, by the mid-1780's, Sprengtporten had become a leading member of the aristocracy which opposed Gustavus' policy of undermining the prestige and authority of the nobility, his storskifte (Finn., iso jako) or subdivision of lands for distribution among the peasantry, and his refusal to prepare "adequate" defences for Finland.[90] Indeed, this circle of discontented nobles began to toy with the idea of an independent Finland under Russian protection as the means to preserve their aristocratic privileges, and to solve Finland's "impossible" military situation. In Sprengtporten's

case, this project was to remain an idée fixe even after significant aristocratic interest in it evaporated with the collapse of the Anjala League.[91]

Before his defection, Sprengtporten submitted to Catherine a memorandum outlining the problem of Finland's independence.[92] This document noted that an independent Finland would ultimately benefit all the parties concerned, although it conceded, "It is surely useless to surmise that Sweden will agree to this as long as she is able to resist it."[93] Therefore, Sprengtporten opined, "we must be clear about that its success depends completely upon Russia and those bold efforts which Finland's people can undertake in its realization."[94]

Catherine was definitely interested; in her own hand, she wrote:

> If the project of Finland's independence is in question, it would not be difficult to apply this project to Russia's benefit. If Finland can acquire an independent constitution and asks Russian support for it, this we cannot deny.
>
> N.B. Since Finland has twice in this century been in our power, it is necessary to see from the Åbo and Nystad treaties by what design it has been ceded back both times.
>
> As soon as our support has been given, our protection begins.
>
> Their concern is to throw the yoke off their shoulders; after this happens, everything else will follow of its own accord.[95]

So, once more the Russian autocracy hesitated to give

more than conditional support to Finnish separatism; first Finland would have to sever her ties with Sweden by herself before Russia would dare offer her open recognition and support. This was Catherine's implacable will on the eve of a new Swedo-Russian war.

In effect, because of Russia's embroilment in a war with Turkey, Sweden regained the initiative in the north; therefore, Gustavus was even then plotting the means to trigger the commencement of hostilities with his reluctant adversary. In order to bypass Article XLVI of the Constitution which forbade the king to undertake an offensive war without the consent of the Riksdag, Gustavus was prepared to manufacture a fictitious casus belli, that is, to stage an attack from across the Russian border with Swedish troops dressed in Russian costumes supplied by the tailor of the Swedish Opera. Meanwhile, Swedo-Finnish troops were deployed on the border for the attack (although their purpose there was supposedly defensive).[96] Accordingly, Colonel Stedingk, an army commander in league with the king, triumphantly wrote to his sovereign on June 27, 1788:

> At last, Sire, the sword is drawn; nothing else remains for us but to conquer or perish. I hope that this sentiment will pass into every heart. Our small corps is in movement on all sides.97

The next day some troops under Stedingk's command were allegedly fired upon by members of a Russian reconnaissance

patrol who had strayed across the border at Pumala (Puumala). Whatever the true facts of this hazy, obscure incident, Gustavus now had his pretext to wage war. Shortly thereafter, he sent a patently unacceptable ultimatum to Catherine in which he demanded the return to Sweden of Livonia and all the Finnish and Karelian territories ceded to Russia by the treaties of Nystad and Åbo, the disarming of the Russian Baltic Fleet, the ending of Russia's war against Turkey and the cession of the Crimea to the Porte.[98] The empress' predictable response was to call Gustavus' demands nonsensical and the product of a feverish delirium.[99] Swedo-Finnish land and sea forces were already positioning themselves for combat in anticipation of the tsarina's intransigence.

On its way to St. Petersburg to bombard Catherine into submission, the Swedish fleet met the Russians off Högland (Suursaari) without being able to inflict a decisive defeat upon them.[100] The Swedish fleet was forced to retire to Sveaborg where Admiral Grieg was able to bottle it up with a Russian naval blockade. The morale of the Swedo-Finnish army crumbled under the impact of their fleet's failure to win a victory and the anti-war sentiments in the Finnish officer corps flared up once more.[101]

It did not take much to demoralise the army in

Finland, for it was already opposed to a war with Russia even before the first shot of the campaign had been fired. The temper of Finland itself was also clearly pacific. Stedingk, for example, was so impressed by the prevailing attitude that he reported:

> On my trip I have found the Finns extremely frightened of the prospect of war; they only dream of Cossacks who will eat their children and the ladies dread the brutality of these gentlemen; that is the result of the ill success of our arms in unhappy times which, I hope Your Majesty is destined to erase without a trace.[102]

Indeed, the army officers in Finland were growing increasingly apprehensive as the war drew nearer and nearer. On July 2, a group of officers decided to arrest the king in Helsingfors should he order the army to invade Russia.[103] It was on such a base of deeply committed military people, a few of whom were in close contact with Sprengtporten,[104] that the Anjala League was to be founded.[105] In this respect it may be said that their mutinous activities were representative of a particular caste interest rather than a manifestation of a truly national sentiment for the separation of Finland from Sweden.[106]

On July 31, the commanders of the Åbo and Björneborg (Pori) Regiments, Colonels J.H. Hästesko and Sebastian von Otter, asked Gustavus III for permission to withdraw their troops back across to the Finnish frontier. On the following

day, Colonel Robert Montgomery sent word to the Russians at Fredrikshamn that three Finnish regiments have refused to fight. Even the king's personal appearance before these regiments did not succeed; the attack against Fredrikshamn ground to an embarrassing halt.[107] Then, on the evening of August 8, defeatist officers from the highest ranks of the Swedo-Finnish army in Finland gathered at their military encampment in Liikkala, Old Finland, to plot the way to end this "illegal" war. The result was the "Liikkala Note" which they addressed to Empress Catherine:

> . . . we, the undersigned,[108] have agreed to announce that the whole nation and particularly the Finnish people altogether sincerely wish that between these two states will be preserved an everlasting neighbourly accord, . . . Dare we in our deepest humility submit to Your Imperial Majesty's gracious consideration, that would not a permanent and so beneficial a peace for both our states be best defended if our country were to regain those areas which it had some half a century ago.[109]

Major Jan Anders Jägerhorn was immediately dispatched on a secret mission to deliver the note to Catherine. At the Russian court, he appears to have joined forces with Sprengtporten to promote the idea of Finnish autonomy.[110] The empress reserved her support; Jägerhorn was able only to return on August 23 with an unsigned note from Catherine demanding that the Swedo-Finnish troops be withdrawn at once and suggesting that the Finlanders convene their Estates to discuss the future of Finland.[111]

Meanwhile, getting wind of Jägerhorn's mission, the king ordered his officers to renew their oaths of allegiance to the Crown. In response, one hundred and thirteen officers met at Anjala, drafted and signed the document to Gustavus III dated August 13, which has since been called the "Anjala League Letter." This letter charged that an ill-equipped army had been fielded to fight an illegal war without a particle of need or benefit to the fatherland. It also noted that this would probably result in the invasion and ruin of the homeland, although the signers of the letter stated that they were quite determined to defend their country's soil to the last drop of their blood. The letter then complained of Swedish interference in Finland's local government. Lastly, it declared that the officers were resolved not to disarm themselves until a satisfactory peace settlement had been concluded.[112]

Civil war seemed to be both inevitable and imminent throughout most of August until the Danish declaration of war on Sweden allowed Gustavus to flee the encampments of his rebellious army in Finland with honour on the pretext of going forth to lead the heroic Swedish hosts against the hated "Jute." With the king safely away, the Anjala League began to lose many of its adherents over the question of collaboration with the Russians. However logical it may

have been for them to look to Catherine for support, that was not possible for as Klick was to attest somewhat ruefully:

> I have heard of people of other sensibilities to proudly declare that before consenting to separation from Sweden, they would all arm themselves to oppose it and also the peasants, who please to see in it a plan of the nobility for subjugating them, in having taken a new subject of hatred for the nobility and the plan of independence.[113]

In fact, the Anjala League may be viewed as one of the last convulsive efforts on the part of the Swedish aristocracy to recover that power and prestige to which it had become heir during the Frihetstiden.[114] Certainly, this view of the conspiracy was quite popular according to Henrik Porthan, the foremost intellectual of the day, who wrote that "this foolish, criminal attempt is detested by all, excepting possibly a few windbags among our nobility who probably hope that they can transform their fellow citizens into serfs on the Livonian or Courland model."[115]

The king himself encouraged the spreading of this dread of the aims of the Anjala conspirators among the common people. For example, in his manifesto of December 6, 1788 to the Finns, he cautioned the lower estates to "Study the misfortune of those provinces --- the situation of the Polish lands, Courland, and the Crimea --- in which the promise of their one wish for independence has drawn them into helplessness, suffering and misery."[116]

Moreover, once the Anjala League had been quashed, Gustavus continued to use the underlying premise of the culpability of the entire noble estate as a means to destroy its privileged position. In this regard, the Act of Union and Security of 1789 was a punitive measure exacted against the "blameworthy" aristocracy; its effect was to make the king an absolute monarch and to reduce noble privilege to such a point that the political eclipse of the Swedish nobility was assured by about 1792.[117]

Indicative of this was the fact that individual conspirators were not usually treated with great severity. Indeed, only one of the Anjala officers, Colonel Hästesko, was executed, while several others were imprisoned for varying lengths of time. Most of them, however, were excused. A few, such as Jägerhorn, escaped Hästesko's unfortunate fate by fleeing to Russia. As for Sprengtporten, he continued to serve in the Russian army with the rank of Major General, distinguishing himself in battle against his former comrades-in-arms. In one operation against units of his former command, he fought so well that he received a serious bullet wound and subsequently a commendation from Catherine for services of "merit at its furthest extent."[118] Under Paul, this "renegade" Finlander[119] continued to find preferment, once being sent as a special envoy to Napoleon.[120] However, his

greatest service to the conception of a separate Finland was yet to come when he was to serve as governor-general of Alexander I's newly conquered Finnish possessions.[121]

For the moment, however, the king's victory seemed complete. Even the war had begun to turn for the better. By late spring in 1790, the French chargé d'affairs in St. Petersburg was able to report to his minister the following good news of Gustavus' rising fortunes:

> The Russian army is badly paid, badly fed, and discouraged; the peasants are tending towards revolt and are ready to surrender to Sweden; the General are divided amongst themselves . . . . The Empress appears to despise the dangers which surround her, but I have learnt from a person belonging to her entourage that she has often been shedding tears, and that she has cried out in a moment of agony: "What have I done to heaven for it to employ for my humiliation an instrument so feeble as the King of Sweden?"[122]

Unfortunately, just as the Swedish forces were able to assert enough pressure upon St. Petersburg from the direction of Vyborg to force the Russian government to consider the possibility of abandoning the capital, Swedish control of the sea was ended by superior Russian naval strength. As a result of the Russian blockade of Viborg Bay, the land offensive stalled and the Swedish sailing fleet was practically annihilated in the Battle of Viborg on July 3, 1790 during its attempt to break out.

The Russians, however, failed to capitalize on their victory as they had allowed Gustavus III to escape with his

entire galley fleet to the lee of Svensksund (Ruotsinsalmi). Prince Nassau-Siegen, a man whom the great General Suvorov had once prophetically characterized as his own worst enemy,[123] gallantly delayed the Russian attack against these remnants of Sweden's proud navy until Catherine II's birthday, June 28/July 9, so that he might present his sovereign with the gift of the final obliteration of the Swedish naval forces in the east Baltic.[124] To Nassau's chagrin, Gustavus had made such good use of the delay in reorganizing his tattered navy that it was the Swedish sailors instead who inflicted a crushing defeat upon the hapless heads of the over-confident Russians.

Sensing that Sweden could wish for no more from the fortunes of war, Gustavus wrote to Count Ostermann from Svensksund on July 11, demanding a revision of the boundaries as laid down by the Treaty of Åbo:

> . . . I cannot believe that Peter I, founder of the grandeur of Russia (to which the Empress has given a so great consistency) and your father, this so enlightened a minister, could be so mistaken about that which concerns the security of the capital; but they could also sense how it was necessary to reassure Sweden about its own safety. [125]

Ostermann, however, realized that Sweden's advantage was only temporary and therefore refused to accede any of Gustavus' territorial demands:

Peter I thought more or less to flatter himself in

> that the peace of Nystadt would be imperturbable. St. Petersburg was in its birth and did not then present itself to the foresighted genius of this monarch to the degree of importance and splendour to which it has now risen.[126]

Whatever their original war aims had been, both countries were well aware of the fact that they had almost exhausted themselves without ever really being able to attain a decisive military victory over each other. If Gustavus was now willing to treat with his adversary, Catherine was no less eager to parley. Indeed, she took all the credit to herself, saying: "I am glad that in time I was able to occupy him [Gustavus] with French affairs."[127] Under the circumstances, it was logical that the peace negotiators -- General G.M. Armfelt, on behalf of Sweden, and General Igelstrom, for Russia -- should ultimately settle upon a status quo ante along the lines suggested in a proposal dated July 24 (o.s.).[128]

The Peace of Värälä, in fact, confirmed the territorial settlements of the Treaty of Åbo.[129] More importantly, it revoked Section VII of the Treaty of Nystad, the article by which Russia had laid claim to the right of interference in Swedish domestic affairs. Although Swedo-Russian relations were now to enjoy a period of relative calm until after Russia's Tilsit agreement in June 1807,[130] there has been the suggestion that the withdrawal of Russian influence from

Sweden's internal politics was leading Russia to consider even more seriously the necessity of seizing control of all of Finland (the same policy as advocated by the brothers Bestuzhev in the 1740's).[131] Yet one must not make too much of this, for it seems that Russia embarked upon this course of absorbing Finland with the greatest reluctance and only after she had made her peculiar peace with France, Sweden-Finland's traditional ally and protector.

Unfortunately, the actual impression of a dilatory Russia has not always been made clear in many of the standard treatments of the Franco-Russian Tilsit diplomacy. Indeed, a most common viewpoint would have it that Finland was allotted to Russia as the consequence of Alexander I's own initiative,[132] creating that happy situation whereby a defeat won far more for Russian arms than had many a victorious campaign.[133] This opinion even was shared by some of Napoleon's own followers, for example, Marshal Masséna who, in his memoirs, was to complain that Russia had been granted too many advantages without being tied to a balance of corresponding obligations.[134] In essence, persons of this persuasion have later decided that Russia's natural appetite for aggrandizement found at Tilsit both the pretext and the conditions whereby it could satisfy itself with the engorgement of Finland.[135]

The reality of Russia's predicament was quite different: certainly, from Russia's point of view, the Tilsit agreements were less the product of her own original desires (which, of course, had been frustrated by her defeat:) and of Alexander's vaunted hatred of the English[136] than the result of the need to retire from a war in which she no longer had any effective allies.[137] As Sir Robert Ker Porter, then an official at the Russian court, put it:

> The necessity which compelled the Emperor Alexander to make that Treaty, there is little doubt originated in the nonfulfillment of promises made by powers in Alliance with him, to give their support to a warfare which involved not more the safety of Russia than that of all the civilized world.[138]

Moreover, it is most significant that the Tilsit agreements made no specific reference to Finland. In fact, Sweden [- Finland] is mentioned only once, namely in Article V of the treaty of a Franco-Russian offensive-defensive alliance concluded at Tilsit on June 25/July 6, 1807. Moreover, this concern with Sweden was not primarily related to Russian interests but rather with those of Napoleon, who could not bear to have Sweden obstinately standing apart as the sole remaining Baltic state unheedful of the strictures of the Continental System.[139] Article V sought to remedy the situation by demanding:

> . . . the three Courts of Copenhagen, Stockholm and Lisbon [are] to close their ports to the English,

> to recall from London their ambassadors and to declare war on England. Whichever of the three Courts refuses will be treated as an enemy by the High Contracting Parties [France and Russia], and Sweden, if she refuses, Denmark will be compelled to declare war on her.[140]

Insofar as the Russian aristocracy was concerned, it was sternly opposed to any form of Franco-Russian alliance[141] and, in particular, one which envisioned a war against its late Swedish allies.[142] Hostility toward France was so overpowering in Russia that Alexander, whatever his autocratic will had been, was forced to refuse categorically to wage war against Britain,[143] and was even constrained to vacillate in attacking Sweden for fear of a declaration of war by the English.[144] Since Alexander dreaded the consequences to his person in the event of his strict adherence to the Tilsit agreements, it became the task of Napoleon to elicit the proper degree of Russian cooperation.[145]

So, in his endeavour to have the dilatory Alexander close the Swedish ports to English shipping, Napoleon struck upon the thesis that Sweden was "the geographic enemy of Russia."[146] Once having fixed this conception of Russo-Swedish relations in the mind of his ally, Napoleon next directed the tsar to invade Finland, implying that this province was to be Russia's reward for dealing with the recalcitrant Swedes. The task fell upon General Savary, the French plenipotentiary to St. Petersburg, to initiate this programme of dangling

the Finnish carrot before Alexander's nose following the instructions relayed to him by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[147] The tsar's reply to the unpopular ambassador was less than enthusiastic and more than a trifle sharp: "Finland, where you would have me go, is a province whose possession does not enrich anyone."[148]

The simple fact was that Finland was not the key to Russia's political interests at that particular time.[149] Indeed, Russia's entire attention was focused upon the embarrassing and humiliating demands of the French that Russian troops be evacuated from Moldavia and Wallachia in compliance with the Tilsit accords. Naturally, the Russian government was most concerned with this problem because the dynastic and personal fate of the tsar was dependent on its outcome. Moreover, it became imperative for Russian foreign policy makers to demand the return of these two Turkish provinces under Russian control so that Bonaparte's deepest injury to Russia's pride and historic interests might be expunged;[150] otherwise, it would be unthinkable for Russia to underwrite a military adventure in aid of Napoleonic France. In this regard, the main significance of the Treaty of Erfurt (September 30/October 12, 1808) to Russia was centred in the fact that it conferred formal French recognition to the Russian interest in Moldavia and Wallachia rather

than in France's acceptance of Russia's annexation of Finland. Only at Erfurt was the tsar really able to lay to rest some of the major objections to his Tilsit policies.[151]

Throughout the autumn of 1807 Alexander waited without responding to the continuous pressure of the French to have him attack Sweden to force her adherence to the Continental System in accord with the Tilsit agreement.[152] When the French grew impatient, Alexander replied with the excuse that he needed more time to move his army to the Finnish frontier.[153] In response, General Caulincourt -- Savary's successor to the Court of St. Petersburg -- was instructed to urge Alexander to transport the necessary troops to the border without delay.[154] Then, when all else failed, Napoleon personally applied himself to the chore of persuading Alexander to take action:

> Your Majesty has need to move the Swedes away from your own capital; that you may extend from this side your frontiers also as far as you would like; I am ready to help you there with all of my means.
> . . . The work of Tilsit will regulate the destinies of the world.[155]

In his letter to Alexander of February 17, 1808, Napoleon openly raised the price for Russian cooperation to include all of Finland:

> In every case, I will do only that which Your Majesty desires. I would rejoice heartily to know that you have conquered Finland, and that you have added this province to your vast estates.[156]

In his complementary instructions to Caulincourt on the following day, the French emperor predicted:

> . . . I think that he [Alexander] will have Finland in any case, as that will be always advantageous for him, so the belles of St. Petersburg will not hear the cannon.[157]

Napoleon was quite right: Alexander pressed a stealthy attack upon Sweden-Finland without even the benefit of a formal declaration of war.[158] Indeed, it was most politic of the autocrat to present his own subjects with a fait accompli, for they lived in fear of the expected British reprisals and in hatred of their master's regicidal French allies.[159] Nothing, however, availed the Finnish victims while two of the world's greatest rulers[160] were ranged against them -- and the late (d. 1804) Professor Porthan's pessimistic prophecy provided even less comfort:

> We must pray to God that Russia will succeed in situating its Capital in Constantinople. Then it might leave remote Finland in peace under the scepter of Sweden. But, now that its capital city is located so near, I am afraid that Finland will sooner or later fall under the power of Russia . . . . I hope that I won't have to witness this misfortune, but you may live to see it, you, who are young.[161]

Notwithstanding the brave, centuries-old boast enshrined in the heraldic trappings of the Finnish coat-of-arms -- the Lion Rampant of Finland trampling down the cruel scimitar of the East[162] -- there remained little hope that tiny Finland could forever resist the countless reserves of men marching under the double-eagle standard of Imperial Russia.

NOTES

CHAPTER ONE

[1] Moskovskaia vedomosti, March 11, 1883, No. 70, editorial. This piece also appears in Finliandskaia okraina Rossii. Sbornik statei, ocherkov, pisem, dokumentov i inykh materialov dlia izucheniia tak-nazyvaemago "Finliandskago voprosa", edited by Sergei Petrovskii (3 vols.; Moscow, 1891, 1894, 1897), I, 3-5, and in a Finnish translation in Suomen historian dokumentteja, edited by Mikko Juva, Vilho Niitemaa and Päivlö Tommila (2 vols.; Helsinki, 1968, 1970), II, No. 438.

[2] Keijo Korhonen, Autonomous Finland in the Political Thought of Nineteenth Century Russia (Turku, 1967), p. 53.

[3] For example, see Katkov's editorial in Moskovskaia vedomosti, March 20, 1883, No. 79.

[4] Leo Mechelin, A Précis of the Public Law of Finland, trans. by Charles J. Cooke (London, 1889), p. 3.

[5] Oliver Warner, The Sea and the Sword. The Baltic: 1630-1945 (London, 1965), p. 81, quotes from a letter of Peter's relating to the Russian success at Poltava: "The enemy's army has had the fate of Phaeton . . . . Now, by God's help, are the foundations of Petersburg laid for all time."

[6] Anatole G. Mazour, Russia Tsarist and Communist (Princeton, 1962), p. 113.

[7]Pre-revolutionary Russian nationalists and their Soviet counterparts have been in agreement on this point. Cf.K. Ryl'skii, Kratkii ocherk Finliandskago Teatra. Sostavil general'nago shtava podpolkovnik (St. Petersburg, 1906), pp. 75-76; Mikhail Mikhailovich Borodkin, Finland: Its Place in the Russian State (St. Petersburg, 1911), pp. 1-3; M. Bobovich, Russko-Finliandskie ekonomicheskie otnosheniia nakanune Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi Sotsialisticheskoi Revoliutsii (epokha Imperializma) (Leningrad, 1968), pp. 12-13. The article "Finliandia," in the Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia, ed. by C.I. Vailov, B.A. Vvedenski, et al. (51 vols., 2nd ed.; Moscow, 1949-1958), XLIV, p. 182, likens Finland as a constant "base for Swedish military action against Russia."

It has been Finland's inescapable destiny to be of geo-strategic importance to the defence of Russia and St. Petersburg-Petrograd-Leningrad right to the present day. However, following the last war's revision of the Finno-Russian borders, there has been an attempt in Finland now to dissociate the country from Russia's old concept of it as a "Baltic state" and to neutralize Finland by claiming it to be a "Nordic" state instead. For a sample of this, see Aimo Pajunen, "Finland's Security Policy," and Keijo Korhonen, "Finland and the Soviet Union," in Valtiotieteellinen Yhdistys ("Finnish Political Science Association"), Essays on Finnish Foreign Policy, ed. by Ilkka Heisanen et al. (Vammala, 1969), pp. 3-30 and 31-40 respectively.

[8]Russian nationalists in Nicholas II's reign propagated the view that Peter the Great himself had really intended to annex all of Finland. For example, Grigorii Alexandrovich Evreinov, a member of the Russian Imperial Senate, flooded Europe with this opinion with translations of his pamphlet: i.e. Exposé de la question finlandaise, by G. Evreinow (St. Petersburg, 1910), pp. 4-5; Zur finnischen Frage, by G. v. Ewreinoff (St. Petersburg, 1911), pp. 4-5; and Russia's Policy in Finland, by G. Evreinov (London, 1912), pp.4-5. Borodkin did much the same in support of this view. In Finland: Its Place in the Russian State, p. 3, he offers as proof a quotation from Count Shuvalov's diplomatic conversation with Napoleon I: "Finland was necessary to Russia . . . such was the intention of Peter, who otherwise would not have made his capital where now is." (The primary source for this quotation is: "Pis'mo general-ad'iutanta I.A. Shuvalova i Imperatoru Aleksandru Pavlovichu, Paris, 1e

3 /15/ mai 1811," in Sbornik Imperatorskago Russkago Istoricheskago Obshchestva / 148 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1867-1916/, XXI /1877/, pp. 411-420. Hereinafter this series will be referred to as S.I.R.I.O.)

Historians of a more moderate persuasion hold other views. B.H. Summer, for one, in Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia (London, 1951), p. 120, unequivocally declares that Peter considered the holding of Viborg, Reval (now Tallinn), and Kronstadt as adequate security for the defence of St. Petersburg. Michael T. Florinsky, in his Russia: A History and a Reinterpretation (2 vols.; New York, 1955), I, 335, goes so far as to suggest that Peter's wars of conquest "were embarked upon without any realization of what they actually meant, and without any definite and clear object in view."

This quality of random action is perhaps best revealed in Peter's own words -- as quoted in N. Grechaniok at al., Baltiiskii Flot: Istoricheskii ocherk (Moscow, 1960), p. 35, and as rendered into English in Jill Lisk's The Struggle for the Supremacy in the Baltic, 1600-1725 (London, 1967), p. 194 -- "All students of science normally finish their course in seven years: our schooling has lasted three times as long, but, praise God, all ended so well that it could not be better."

[9]Irene Scobbie, Sweden (London, 1972), pp. 55-56. W.F. Reddaway, in "Macartney in Russia, 1765-1767," Cambridge Historical Journal, III (1931), 264, suggests that the greater part of Sweden's refusal to accept her loss of the Baltic provinces was occasioned by the fact that they had constituted her "granary." For a detailed listing of the real losses incurred by Sweden, see the text of the Treaty of Nystad and that of its Ratification in Russia, Ministerstvo Iustitsii, Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, Series I (1649-1825) (45 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1828-1830), VI, Nos. 3819 and 3821 respectively. Note especially Article VII, the source of the Russian "right" to interfere in Swedish domestic politics in order to ensure the continuance of the Swedish Constitution of 1720. (Hereinafter Polnoe sobranie zakonov . . ., series I, will be referred to as P.S.Z. I.)

[10]Already in 1727, the Secret Committee gave its authorization to the Royal Council, circumstances permitting, "to see to bring the Russian back to and within his old boundaries, or at least out of the Baltic again."(See H. Arnold Barton, "Russia and the Problem of Sweden-Finland, 1721-1809," East European Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 4 (January, 1972), p. 436) So, Swedish diplomats had busily begun to engage themselves in the search for allies against Russia. Most particularly, Count Cedercreutz, the Swedish minister to Russia, actively sought to enlist French aid to counter any Russian designs upon Sweden, as reported in S.I.R.I.O., LXXV (1891): Donesseniia frantsuzskago poverennago po delam pri russkim dvore za 1727-1730, No. 47 ("M. Magnan à m. de Chauvelin, Pétersbourg, 22 novembre 1727"), pp. 128-134, and No. 60 ("M. Magnan au comte de Morville, Moscou, 16 mars 1728"), pp. 166-171.

Rondeau, the British envoy, reported that he, too, had been approached by Cedercreutz, being told by the Swedish minister that the arrangement recently concluded between Sweden and Russia was entirely defensive in nature and, therefore, allowed Sweden complete freedom to reach other accomodations with Britain. For this dispatch, see S.I.R.I.O., LXVI (1889): Diplomaticheskaia perepiska angliiskago poslannikov pri russkom dvore s 1728-1733 gg., No. 5 ("C. Rondeau to the right honourable lord Viscount Townshend, St. Petersburgh, September the 19th o.s. 1728").

[11]E.W. Laine, "Finland's Military Significance for Nineteenth Century Russia," in War and Society in the Nineteenth Century Russian Empire (Toronto, 1972), p. 34.

[12]Great Britain, Foreign Office, Finland, ed. by G.W. Prothero (London, 1920), p. 15; M.N. Kovalevskii, Russian Political Institutions (Chicago, 1902), pp. 285-286.

According to Olof Höijer, "Les rapports suédo-russes et Finlande dans le passé et dans le présent," Revue des sciences politiques, XLI (1919), p. 102, Russia's excessive preoccupation with Finland resulted from Peter's initial blunder in making St. Petersburg the Imperial capital, a measure which only served to divert the Empire's energies from the fulfillment of its historic mission. Barton, "Russian and the Problem of Sweden-Finland, 1721-1809," p. 432, concurs.

[13]Sven-Erik Aström, From Stockholm to St. Petersburg:

Commercial Factors in the Political Relations between England and Sweden, 1675-1700 (Helsinki, 1962), p. 130. H.S.K. Kent, in his War and Trade in Northern Seas: Anglo-Scandinavian Economic Relations in the Mid-Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 9-10, and Klaus Zernack, "Von Stolbovo nach Nystad: Russland und die Ostsee in der Politik des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts," Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, NS XX (March 1972), 98, note that even Sweden's iron trade with Britain was not secure from Russian competition after 1734.

[14]"Townshend to Finch, Whitehall, 17th June [o.s.] 1721," in British Diplomatic Instructions, 1689-1789, I: Sweden, 1689-1727, ed. by James Frederick Chance (London, 1922), pp. 157-158.

[15]Barton, "Russia and the Problem of Sweden-Finland, 1721-1809," pp. 436-437.

As early as 1728, there was a return of confidence in the Swedish morale. In this regard, Rondeau noted in one of his dispatches (S.I.R.I.O., LXVI, No. 5) that Cedercreutz believed that fifty war-galleys would be enough to ensure a Swedish victory over Russia. In the same report, the British diplomat also wrote: "The Russians seem yet to have some fear that they shall not be able to keep Livonia for long, for most of the old boyars, who have estates in that province, which were given to them, try to sell them fast as they well can, to the natives of that country."

Nevertheless, Britain herself did not rate the Swedes so highly even as late as the mid-1730's, and so continued to view the Russian "fear" of Sweden with a healthy degree of scepticism. Hence, England refused to be drawn into an alliance with Russia; she even discounted the potential threat to Russia in the Franco-Swedish defensive treaty of 1735. For a sampling of British opinion, see S.I.R.I.O., LXXVI (1891): Donesseniia i drugiia bumagi angliiskikh poslov, poslannikov i rezidentov pri russkom dvore c 1733 goda po 1736 god, especially Nos. 75, 169, 203, 209, 213, and 263.

[16]Christoph Hermann von Manstein, Memoires of Russia, Historical, Political, and Military from the Year MDCCXVII, to MXCCXLIV: A Period Comprehending Many Remarkable Events; In Particular the Wars of Russia with

Turkey and Sweden; With a Supplement Containing a Summary Account of the State of the Military, the Marine, the Commerce, &c, of that Great Empire, trans. from the original manuscript (London, 1770), p. 289.

[17]Helge Pohjolan-Pirhonen, Kansakunnan historia, I: Herääyä kansakunta, 1709-1772 (Porvoo, 1967) pp. 133-134. As Pohjolan-Pirhonen points out, the sitting of the 1738 Riksdag inaugurated that period of the Swedish Frihetstiden ("Age of Freedom") when money ruled the votes of the deputations from the Estates. In the words of one unidentified French diplomat -- as cited by Ragnar Svanström and Carl Fredrik Palmstierna, A Short History of Sweden, trans. by Joan Bulman (Oxford, 1934), p. 212 -- "The Swedes in general calculate their prospective incomes from a Riksdag meeting as others calculate it from the rents of their fields."

[18]Carl Hallendorff and Adolf Schück, History of Sweden, trans. by Lajla Yapp (Stockholm, 1929), p. 329.

[19]See S.I.R.I.O., XCII (1892) and XCVI (1896) for the correspondence relating to La Chétardie's mission in Russia, especially in regard to his and France's involvement in the establishment of the terms of Swedish aid for the Tsarevna Elizabeth's coup d'état. See also Recueil des instructions données aux Ambassadeurs et Ministres de France depuis les traites de Westphalie jusqu'a la revolution Française, Vol. VIII: Russie I, ed. by Alfred Rambaud (Paris, 1890). (Hereinafter this series will be referred to as Recueil des instructions.)

[20]The basic settlement which Elizabeth offered Sweden for its assistance in assuring her succession is contained in "articles promis et affirmés par serment par ordre de la princesse Elizabeth du neuf septembre 1741," S.I.R.I.O., XCVI, No. 73. In this document, Elizabeth promised:
1) to reimburse Sweden for its expenses, beginning with the first transport of soldiers to Finland;
2) to pay subsidies to Sweden for the remainder of her life;
3) to give Sweden the same advantages in trade as were then enjoyed by Great Britain;
4) to renounce all treaties and conventions existing between Russia, England and Austria -- and to ally Russia

only with France and Sweden;
5) to tend to the best interests of Sweden and, in doing so, to lend the government of that country the sums necessary to ensure its continued good health.

[21]Of course, the French stiffened the intransigence of the Swedish Hats, instructing their own ambassador to block all avenues of compromise: "It would be, however, more à propos that Sweden appear to have recovered its provinces by conquest rather than by voluntary cession which could turn to the dishonour of the Princess Elizabeth and which perhaps she could not make nor want to make." (Translated from "M. Amelot au marquis de la Chétardie, Versailles, 16 février 1741," S.I.R.I.O., XCII, No. 52.)

[22]Eino Jutikkala and Kauko Pirinen, A History of Finland, trans. by Paul Sjöblom (London, 1962), p. 148; Eino Jutikkala, "Vapaudenaika," in Suomen historian käsikirja (2 vols.; Porvoo, 1949), I, p. 534; Pohjolan-Pirhonen, Kansakunnan historia, I, 163.

[23]Translated from "Keisarinna Elisabetin julistus suomalaisille, annettu Moskovassa 18.3.1742," in Suomen historian dokumentteja, I, No. 262, pp. 362-365; the Russian text is printed in Mikhail Mikhailovich Borodkin, Istoriia Finliandii, vremia Elizaveti Petrovna (St. Petersburg, 1910), p. 165.

[24]From Suomen historian dokumentteja, I. No. 262.

[25]Pentti Renval, in his "The Foreign Policy Attitudes of the Finns during the Swedish Rule," in Valtiotieteellinen Yhdistys, Finnish Foreign Policy: Studies in Foreign Politics (Helsinki, 1963), p. 17, and his "The Origins of Finland's Autonomy," in Introduction to Finland 1963, ed. by Stenius Gorän (Porvoo, 1963), p. 33, argues that there was little real interest in Finland for "independence" under the aegis of Russian power. John H. Wuorinen, in A History of Finland (New York, 1965), chooses to ignore this question altogether. On the other hand, the father and son team of Einar W. Juva and Mikko Juva, in their Suomen kansan historia, III: Ruotsin ajan loppukausi

(Helsinki, 1967), p. 220, entertain the possibility that a broader sympathy for separation did exist than had been previously supposed.

[26]For example, Aurélien Sauvageot, Histoire de la Finlande (2 vols.; Paris, 1968), I, 126, and Tauno Kuosa, Jokamiehen Suomen historia, III: Ruotsin vallan viimeinen kausi (Porvoo, 1952), p. 810.

[27]Jalmari Jaakkola, Précis d'histoire de Finlande, trans. by Jean-Louis Perret (Lausanne, 1942), p. 135. For a detailed study of the peace negotiations themselves, see Richard Lodge, "The Treaty of Abo and the Swedish Succession," The English Historical Review, XLIII (1928), 540-571, and Sergei M. Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii s drevneishikh vremen (16 vols.; Moscow, 1960-1966), XI, 212-223.

[28]J.R. Danielson, Die Nordische Frage in den Jahren 1746-1751. Mit einer Darstellung russisch-schwedisch-finnischer Beziehungen 1740-1743 (Helsingfors, 1888), pp. 35-61; Einar W. Juva, Finlands väg från Nystad till Fredrikshamn, Historisk studie, (Stockholm, 1947), p. 134; Lodge, "The Treaty of Abo and the Swedish Succession," pp. 566-568.

According to Barton, "Russia and the Problem of Sweden-Finland, 1721-1809," p. 438, Count Mikhail Bestuzhev-Riumin, the Russian minister to Sweden, was among those even before the war who believed that Russia's security depended upon her attainment of her "natural frontiers" on the Gulf of Bothnia. This view, when later championed by Bestuzhev's brother Aleksei, as Grand Chancellor, almost succeeded in becoming the official policy of the Empire.

[29]P.S.Z. I, XI, No. 8652. Please note that the term "Old Finland" -- Sw., Gamla Finland; Finn. Vanha Suomi; Russ., Staroi Finliandii -- herein specifically refers to Finnish territory ceded to Russia by the Treaty of Nystad. After the Treaty of Abo, the new territorial cessions were also included as a part of Old Finland.

[30]Jutikkala and Pirinen, A History of Finland, p. 149.

[31]V.V. Pohlebkin, Suomi vihollisena ja ystävänä,

1714-1967, trans. by Natalia Pienimäki and Aaro Majanen (Porvoo, 1969), p. 83. In fact, the main thesis of this book (originally published in the U.S.S.R. under the title of Finliandiia i vostochnyi sosed) is to prove that Russia, apart from the period of 1899-1914, had been most sympathetic to Finland's needs and aspirations.

For a perceptive consideration of Pokhlebkin's argument, see Marvin Rintala, "Review of Suomi vihollisena ja ystävänä, 1714-1967," in the Slavic Review, XXIX (1970), 526-527, wherein he writes that Pokhlebkin is often too much a Finnophil in that "he argues, for instance, that traditional Finnish anti-Russian sentiments originated in Sweden, and therefore were not authentically Finnish . . . Pohlebkin glosses over the very real and very passionate hatred of everything Russian by many Finns . . . He is much more successful in demonstrating, however, that Finnish hatred of Russia was not always justified."

[32]Hugues Colin du Terrail, La Finlande et les Russes depuis les croisades suédoises (Paris, 1963), p. 86.

[33]Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov (hereinafter referred to as TsGADA), Kantselliarila senata, Vol. 1262, pp. 63a-71, cited by Pohlebkin, Suomi vihollisena ja ystävänä, p. 83.

[34]Pohlebkin, Suomi vihollisena ja ystävänä, pp. 83-84.

[35]P.S.Z. I, XI, No. 8766.

[36]B.E. Nol'de, Otcherki russkago gosudarstvennago prava, (St. Petersburg, 1911), p. 415.

[37]Peter's acts of "benevolence" toward the Baltic provinces in matters concerning the retention of Swedish custom in law seem to have been practically motivated by his desire to reform Russian law after Swedish models. For a discussion of this aspect of his reforms, see A.G. Man'kov, "Ispol'zovanie v Rossii shvedskogo zakonodatel'stva pri sostavlenii proekta ylozhenilia 1720-1725 gg.," Istoricheskie sviazi Skandinavii i Rossii, IX-XX vv.: Sbornik Statei, ed. by V.K. Nosov and I.P. Shaskol'skii (Leningrad, 1970), pp. 112-126.

[38]George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (5th Rev. Ed.; New Haven, 1961), p. 160.

[39]Translated from "Sovstvennoruchnoe nastvlenie Ekateriny II Kniaziu Viasemskomu pri vstuplenie im v dolzhnost general-prokurora (1764 goda), "S.I.R.I.O., II (1871), 345-348.

[40]For a discussion of this, see Leonid L. Strakhovsky, "Constitutional Aspects of the Imperial Russian Government's Policy toward National Minorities," The Journal of Modern History, XIII (1941), 477-482.

[41]P.S.Z. I, XXI, No. 15,795.

[42]Ibid., XXIV, No. 17,637.

[43]"Vysochaishii Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva Manifest o prisoedinenii Vyborgskoi Gubernii k Velikomu Kniazhestvu Finliandii, ot 11/23 Dekabria 1811 g.," in G. Borenius, comp., Akty dlia vyiasneniia politicheskago polozheniia Velikago Kniazhestva Finliandskago (Helsingfors, 1890), pp. 26-27. (Hereinafter this volume will be referred to as Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F.)

[44]Ian Grey, Catherine the Great, Autocrat and Empress of All Russia (London, 1961), p. 15, suggests that Frederick the Great encouraged the marriage of Princess Sophia of Anhalt-Zerbst, the future Catherine the Great, to the Grand Duke Peter in order to protect his own sister Princess Louisa Ulrica from such a marriage. Frederick wanted his sister to marry Crown Prince Adolphus Frederick of Sweden instead. So, Sophia was pawned off on the Romanovs to forestall a Russian alliance with the daughter of Poland's Augustus II.

[45]Terrail, La Finlande et les Russes, p. 89; Jutikkala, "Vapaudenaika," p. 545. In 1751, after his falling out with Louisa Ulrica, Count Tessin wrote of her that she "did not know well enough that free countries should be ruled more with love than with the sceptre and the sword." (Cited by Pohjolan-Pirhonen, Kansakunnan historia, I, 312.)

[46]For a concise summary of France's efforts to influence Swedish domestic politics in this period, see "2° Nouvelle instruction au Baron de Breteuil, Versailles, 23 avril 1766," in Recueil des instructions, Vol. II: Suède, ed. by A. Geffroy (Paris, 1885), pp. 407-413. According to James Frederick Chance (ed.), British Diplomatic Instructions, 1689-1789, V: Sweden, 1727-1789 (London, 1928), p. xvi, the French spent more than the combined total of the Russian (£14,000) and British (£5100) expenditures to secure the Riksdag for the Hats in the 1746-1747 session.

[47]"Philip Dormer Stanhope, Earl of Chesterfield, Secretary of State, to Colonel Guy Dickens, Whitehall, 2d January [o.s.] 1746/7, "British Diplomatic Instructions, V, 122-123.

[48]"Chesterfield to Dickens, Whitehall, 20th January [o.s.] 1746/7," Ibid., pp. 123-124. In this letter, Chesterfield also provided Russia with the raionale for undertaking such "vigorous measures": " . . . whereas should the Empress begin forthwith in Finland Sweden would be obliged to be quiet, not being in any condition now to oppose on that side, the schemes of France would be defeated, and Russia be secure against future disturbance not only from the Swedes but likewise on the side of Turkey."

[49]"Chesterfield to Dickens, Whitehall, 27th January [o.s.] 1746/7," Ibid., p. 124. In part, this letter said: ". . . his Majesty will not advance any further sum and is of opinion that the only measure left for Russia to take is to march a body of troops into Finland and act with vigour on that side, and that all other attempts to bring the Swedes into their views will be fruitless and ineffectual."

In a further letter, "Chesterfield to Dickens, Whitehall, 3d March [o.s.] 1746/7," Ibid., pp. 124-126, the British Secretary of State wrote: " . . . his Majesty was extremely disappointed, when he found that the conclusion from these principles went no farther than the project of only getting together a body of Russian troops, with a train of artillery, upon the frontiers of Sweden with a view to intimidate, and not with any design to act effectually."

He continued: "If Russia means any thing by their present negociation with Sweden during the dyet it can only be effected, as I have told you before, by taking advantage of their present defenceless state and marching a body of troops immediately into Finland."

Once more he repeated: " . . . there is but one effectual method left for them to bring Sweden back to the good system . . .; which is to march instantly a body of troops (whether great or small is immaterial, as Sweden is not in a condition to resist) into Finland, to take possession of that province, and to insist with the prince successor to displace Count Tessin and the rest of the French faction in order to make room for the well-intentioned party in Sweden . . ."

[50]Cited by Jutikkala and Pirinen, A History of Finland, p. 151. According to Phjolan-Pirhonen, Kansakunnan historia, I, 279, another anti-Hat conspirator, J.H. Wijkman, gave Secretary J. Simolin of the Russian Embassy a similar impression of Finlanders: "If war really flames up against their wishes, no one will fight wholeheartedly. This will require nevertheless (from the Russian quarter) good manifestoes, as you well know."

Although these conspirators may have overstated their case, Finnish resentment against the Hats was very real. This can be appreciated from one of the Finnish deputation's addresses to the Estates (translated from Pohjolan-Pirhonen, Ibid., p. 227,): "In Sweden's habit to care for Finland is effected Finland's faith in Sweden; for that reason this country has belonged to the Swedish Crown for almost 700 years, but as yet has never enjoyed 25 consecutive years of peace, rather it has been ruined and plundered often three times within the same generation, but nevertheless after this like a dispersed swarm of honeybees have congregated together anew to construct their hive and to collect the honey for Sweden's inhabitants. Sweden's most dangerous enemy's thrusts have gone through Finland's heart, and in spite of this it more than rivals all of Sweden's provinces in its gratitude, that it has shown unblemished and unselfish fidelity to the Swedish crown."

The War of the Hats had been a particulary ill-starred adventure and, in the words of Martti Kerkkonen, (Peter Kalm's North American Journey: Its Ideological Background and Results /Helsinki, 1959/, p. 41), " a serious break and a retrogade step in the cultural life of Finland." In fact, Finland's misfortune began before the war itself, for the

Swedish troops brought with them a plague which killed at least five percent of the Finnish population (Jutikkala, "Vapaudenaika," p. 529). Then, not only did Finland feel the consequence of occupation by enemy troops, but for more than a generation she continued to suffer economically from the mounting inflation caused by the War. See P.N. Christiernin, "Lectures on the High Price of Foreign Exchange in Sweden," in The Swedish Bullionist Controversy: P.N. Christiernin's "Lectures on the High Price of Foreign Exchange in Sweden" (1761), ed. and trans. by Robert V. Eagly (Philadelphia, 1971), pp. 68-69.

[51]Jutikkala, "Vapaudenaika," p. 552.

[52]Pohjolan-Pirhonen, Kansakunnan historia, I, 256.

[53]Ibid., pp. 256-257.

[54]France, for one, was prepared to send 12 warships and an army corps to Sweden itself about the time of this crisis, according to Albert Vandal, Louis XV et Elisabeth de Russie: Étude sur les relations de la France et la Russie au dix-huitième siècle d'après les archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (4th ed.; Paris, 1903), p. 239. However, in August 1749, the Russian Imperial Council had already decided against risking a general European conflict for lack of support from Russia's own allies (Barton, "Russia and the Problem of Sweden-Finland, 1721-1809," p. 443).

[55]Kuosa, Jokamiehen Suomen historia, III, 835.

[56]Juva and Juva, Suomen kansan historia, III, 243-245.

[57]Pohjolan-Pirhonen, Kansakunnan historia, I, 261.

[58]Quoted from Jutikkala and Pirinen, A History of Finland, p. 154.

[59]For brief English language historical surveys of Sveaborg, see Olof af Hallstrom, "Sveaborg: Gibralter of the North," American-Scandinavian Review, LII (1964), 49-56,

and Anthony Wood, "Sveaborg and the Defense of Finland," History Today, VI (August, 1956), 536-545.

[60]Ironically, the war was undertaken by a Hat government, but only at the behest of the French and in the sure knowledge that it would embarrass Louisa Ulrica who had recently been a party to an aborted royalist coup. Adolphus Frederick, as usual, reflected the wishes of his queen. (See Hallendorff Schück, History of Sweden, p. 333.)

[61]As a consequence of the Hat's government's betrayal of its French ally, France introduced a "new system" whereby her support would go the Royalist Party in Sweden rather than to the Hats. For this, see "2° Nouvelle instruction au Baron de Breteuil, Versailles, 23 avril 1766," in Recueil des instructions, II, 407-413.

[62]In fact, Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams took much time in cultivating and grooming Catherine for that moment when she would assume the throne. For an appreciation of this British Ambassador's involvement with the future empress, see The Correspondence of Catherine the Great when Grand-Duchess, with Sir Charles Hanbury-Williams, and Letters from Count Poniatowski, ed. by the Earl of Ilchester and Mrs. Langford-Brooke (London, 1928), passim.

[63]David M. Griffiths, "The Rise and Fall of the Northern System: Court Politics and Foreign Policy in the First Half of Catherine II's Reign," Canadian Slavic Studies, IV, No. 3 (1970), 547-549.

[64]Russophils seem to prefer the friendlier term "Northern Accord"; for example, see George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, p. 164, and A Short History of the USSR [originally published as Kratkaia istoriia SSSR], ed. by I.I. Smirnov et al., trans. by George H. Hanna (2 vols.; Moscow, 1965), I, 176.

[65]Sir John Goodricke, as quoted by Chance, British Diplomatic Instructions, V, xviii.

[66]Ibid., p. xix.

[67]The chief spokesman for this group was Anders

Chydenius, a Finlander from Ostrobothnia who emphasized the need for greater satisfaction of provincial aspirations. For a review of his work and thought, see Carl G. Uhr, "Anders Chydenius, 1729-1803, A Finnish Predecessor to Adam Smith," Western Economic Journal, Spring, 1964, pp. 85-116.

[68]In the dispatch of the Earl of "Sandwich to the Earl of Buckingham, Whitehall, November 20, 1764," S.I.R.I.O., XII (1873), No. 115, the aims of the British are shown to be limited: "The electing of a Marshal of the diet, the obtaining of a majority in the secret committee, and the preventing Sweden from entering into the late propositions of France, are essential articles, in which both the Courts (English and Russian) are perfectly agreed; . . ."

Once these aims had been met, Britain had no desire to see stronger measures taken. For this, see "H.S. Conway to Sir George Macartney, St. James's, 19 December, 1766," Ibid., No. 167, in which the British Foreign Secretary writes: "The great and only worthy object of that Treaty was to wound the interests of France in that Country; that end has been answered, even beyond our hopes, and our Treaty will prove, if followed, not a wound only but a mortal blow to the French interests in Sweden, by which the field is now open for Russia to take what she pleases; . . ."

[69]Quoted from William Richardson, "A Principle of Power, October 1770," in Seven Britons in Imperial Russia, ed. by Peter Putnam (Princeton, N.J., 1952), p. 153.

[70]Jutikkala, "Vapaudenaika," p. 584; Erik Amburger, Russland und Schweden, 1762-1772. Katharine II., die schwedische Verfassung und die Ruhe des Nordens (Berlin, 1934), pp. 208-213, 219-220.

[71]Quoted from "The Earl of Rochford to Lord Cathcart, Whitehall, 20 June, 1769," S.I.R.I.O. XII, No. 236. Italics are as they appear in this text.

[72]Chance, British Diplomatic Instructions, V., xxi.

[73]Michael Roberts, "Great Britain and the Swedish

Revolution," in Essays in Swedish History (London, 1967), p. 331; see also Griffiths, "The Rise and Fall of the Northern System," p. 553.

[74]According to Jarl Gallén, "Les relations culturelles avec les pays occidentaux," in La Finlande hier et aujourd'hui, trans. by L. Hagfors, G. Bethune and M. G. de Briders (Paris, 1968), p. 14, Gustavus III's reign "was to be the most 'French' in the history of Sweden and Finland."

R. Nisbet Bain, in Gustavus III and his Contemporaries (2 vols.; London, 1894), I, 15, notes that Louisa Ulrica would allow Gustavus to study only French, saying that she wanted him to grow up a Prince, and not a pedantic German professor. Princess Dashkova, Catherine the Great's confidante, saw the Swedish king's inclination for things French less as product of his early education and more in the fact "that His Swedish Majesty had been completely gulled in France, that he had swallowed with immense relish all the flattery lavished on him and that he, therefore, was greatly prejudiced in favour of that country and its people." -- Quoted from The Memoirs of Princess Dashkov, trans. and ed. by Kyril Fitzlyon (London, 1958), pp. 228-229.

[75]Since the British and Danes would not contribute any part of the necessary £40,000 to win the election for the Caps, Russia paid out this sum by herself (Chance, British Diplomatic Instructions, V, xxi). Russia also paid some 50,000 dalers in additional bribes to the Cleggy to assure that this yet undecided House would go along with the Cap-dominated Burghers and Peasants (Helge Pohjolan-Pirhonen, Kansakunnan historia, II: Kansakunta etsii itseään, 1772-1808 [Porvoo, 1970], p. 18).

[76]It seems to have been well known by everyone, including the British Foreign Office, that Sprengtporten was the ringleader of the Royalist cabal and that Sveaborg was to be the springboard of its coup. For example, see the dispatches of "Henry Howard, Earl of Suffolk, Secretary of State, to Sir John Goodricke, St. James's, August 4th 1772," "St. James's, August 18th 1772," and "St. James's, August 21st 1772," in British Diplomatic Instructions, V, 218-221.

[77]Sprengtporten took over Sveaborg according to schedule and, in fact, made himself the temporary ruler of Finland, governing in the name of the king. Unfortunately, the weather proved too foul for his ships to take him to Stockholm in aid of Gustavus. Hence, the king was forced to take matters into his own hands when he was threatened with arrest. See The Cambridge Modern History, VI: The Eighteenth Century, ed. by A.W. Ward, G.W. Prothero, and Stanley Leathes (Cambridge, 1934), pp. 770-772; Kuosa, Jokamiehen Suomen historia, III, 861-868; Juva and Juva, Suomen kansan historia, III, 269-274; Pohjolan-Pirhonen, Kansakunnan historia, II, 15-29; Eino Jutikkala and Erkki K. Osmonsalo, "Kustavilainen aika," Suomen historian käsikirja, I, 591-594.

[78]Bain, Gustavus III, I, 148.

[79]The Cambridge Modern History, VI, 773.

[80]Roberts, "Great Britain and the Swedish Revolution," p. 331.

[81]Nancy Mitford, Frederick the Great (New York, 1970), p. 261. In fact, Gustavus "the Northern Sun King" was not loved in all quarters; the reason for this is perhaps hinted at in the following anonomously written polemic supposedly dating to the early nineteenth century, Memoirs of the Courts of Sweden and Denmark during the Reigns of Christian VII. of Denmark and Gustavus III. and IV. of Sweden (2 vols.; Boston, 1900), I, 321: "Whilst vast and important designs filled his mind, Gustavus gave himself up to his licentious companions and polluted pursuits. He attended the select parties of the beautiful and meretricious females of the Gallic Court. With those he did not long remain a favourite, for it could not be concealed that this prince did not pay homage at the Shrine of Venus."

[82]According to Solov'ev, Istoriia Rossii s drevnelshikh vremen, XIV, 596, Frederick's considered response was: "I cannot give Russia better advice than to conceal her anger concerning the Swedish revolution; this is not difficult, for Sweden will be in no condition in the first year to undertake anything hostile against her."

[83]Bain, Gustavus III, I, 148-151.

[84]The Cambridge Modern History, VI, 772.

[85]Griffiths, "The Rise and Fall of the Northern System," p. 556.

[86]Isabel de Madariaga, Britain, Russia and the Armed Neutrality of 1780: Sir James Harris's Mission to St. Petersburg during the American Revolution (London, 1962), pp. 189-190.

[87]For a perceptive eye-witness account of the meeting between Gustavus (travelling under the pseudonym of Graf Haga) and Catherine, see The Memoirs of Princess Dashkov, pp. 226-229. Encounters between the two enlightened monarchs finally lapsed into embarrassment and boredom (Ibid., p. 228) when agreement could not be reached on the two major issues, i.e. Sweden's disinterest in joining into a new alliance with Russia and Russia's refusal to support the Swedish scheme to absorb Norway (Jutikkala and Osmonsalo, "Kustavilainen aika," p. 611).

[88]Ingvar Andersson, A History of Sweden, trans. by Carolyn Hannay (London, 1956), p. 290.

[89]Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg, "Finnischer Separatismus und russischer Imperialismus im vorigen Jahrhundert," Historische Zeitschrift, CLXXXVII (1959), 250-251.

[90]Sauvageot, Histoire de la Finlande, I, 145-146.

[91]For a recent consideration of the separatist opposition to Gustavus, see Yrjö Blomstedt, "Den finländska självständighetstanken på 1780-talet -- ideologi eller politisk spekulation," Historisk Tidskrift för Finland, L (1965), 92-102.

[92]For a copy of this memorandum, see "Y.M. Sprengtportenin itsenäisyyssuunnitelma 1786," in Suomen historian dokumentteja, I, No. 296.

[93] Ibid., p. 436. Even so, Sprengtporten still hoped that a way could be found to mitigate Swedish hostility toward his plans for Finland's independence; for this, see "Venäjän Tukholman lähettilään A.I. Markovin raportti kreivi I.A. Ostermanille 11.6.1786," in Suomen historian dokumentteja, I, No. 297, in which Markov, the Russian minister, noted: " . . . [Sprengtporten] said that he wanted to point out through them [i.e., his proposals] that Sweden could be led to freely consent to Finland's independence if Norway were ceded to her in compensation. I did not have difficulty in proving to him this reasoning as erroneous."

Cf. J.R. Danielson-Kalmari, Suomen valtio- ja yhteiskuntaelämää 18:nnellä ja 19:nnellä vuosisadalla: Kustavilainen aika (3 vols.; Porvoo, 1921-1935), I, 398-401; and see Ia. Grot, "Sprengtporten, shvedskii emigrant pri Ekaterine II," Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnago Prosveshcheniia, (OS 362 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1834-1905 -- NS 72 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1906-1917), OS CCXXXVII (1885), Part 1, p. 19. (Hereinafter, this periodical publication will be referred to as Zh.M.N.P.)

[94] "Y.M. Sprengtportenin itsenäissuunnitelma 1786," pp. 436-437.

[95] "Venäjän keisarinnan Katariina II huomautukset Sprengtportenin suunnitelman kansilehteen," Suomen historian dokumentteja, I, No. 298.

[96] Catherine, however, was not fooled; see her letter to "Monsieur le Prince de Ligne, 12 juin 1788," in Les Lettres de Catherine II au Prince de Ligne (1788-1796), ed. by Princess Charles de Ligne (Brussels, 1924), pp. 98-99, in which she wrote: "My very dear cousin and neighbour, Gustavus III, arms by land and by sea with an extraordinary vivacity; he has taken for the pretext the armament of my fleet [which is destined] for the Mediterranean.

[97] "Lettre de M. de Stedingk au roi. Saint-Michel, ce 27 juin 1788," in Mémoires posthumes du feld-maréchal comte de Stedingk, rédigés sur les lettres, depêches et autre prèces authentiques laissées à sa famille, ed.

by the general Count Björnstierna (3 vols.; Paris, 1844-1847), I, 92. According to A. Brückner, "Schweden und Russland 1788," Historische Zeitschrift, XXII (1869), p. 400, Gustavus wrote in a similar vein: "Catherine does not want war, but she will have to go to war: no one can escape his own fate."

[98]A. Brikner [A.G. Brückner], "Voina Rossii s Shvetsiei v 1788-1790 godakhu" Zh.M.N.P., OS CXLIII (1869), Part 2, p. 341; and Bain, Gustavus III, II, 16-17.

[99]For Catherine's appreciation of the Swedish ultimatum, see her letter to Baron Grimm, "Ekaterina Grimmu, 5 iiulia 1788," in Russkii arkhiv (55 vols.; Moscow 1863-1917), XVI (1878), Part 3, pp. 158-161.

[100]Alfred Rambaud, The History of Russia from the Earliest Times to 1877, trans. by Leonora B. Long (2 vols.; New York, n.d.), II, 115; Grechaniok et al., Baltiiskii flot, pp. 61-62; Jutikkala and Osmonsalo, "Kustavilainen aika," p. 632.

[101]Svanström and Palmstierna, A Short History of Sweden, p. 278. In the words of one contemporary (from the diary of K.Kr. Ekman, a judge of the military court, as cited by Jutikkala and Osmonsalo, "Kustavilainen aika," p. 634): "At the same time when Swedish arms won at sea, when the soldier is consumed with the desire to be relieved of the fight against the nation's hereditary enemy, when the Russian is unable to defend himself, when with every word uttered everything promises success for Swedish arms, just then and when the army is already standing on Russian territory we raise the question, is the king any longer to be obeyed or not?"

[102]"Lettre de M. Stedingk au roi Gustave III. Datée à Helsingfors, ce 30 mai 1788," Mémoires . . . de Stedingk, I, 81-82.

[103]Jutikkala and Osmonsalo, "Kustavilainen aika," p. 630.

[104]For example, Major Jägerhorn is considered to have been in close touch with him according to Juva and Juva, Suomen kansan historia, III, 319.

[105]For a good account of the Anjala League's history, see A. Brückner, "Der Anajalabund in Finland, 1788," Batische Monatsschrift, XIX (1870), pp. 309-354, which also appeared as A. Brikner, "Konfederatsiia v Anjala v 1788 g. Materiali dlia istorii prisoedineniia Finliandii k Rossii," Zh.M.N.P., QS CXXXVII (1868), Part 2, pp. 679-771.

[106]John H. Wuorinen, Nationalism in Modern Finland (New York, 1931), p. 28; Eino Jutikkala, "The Road to Independence," in Introduction to Finland 1960, ed. by Urho Toivola (Porvoo, 1960), pp. 19-20 -- also published in German as "Der Weg zur Selbständigkeit," in Finland, Foreign Ministry, Geschichte und Gegenwart (Porvoo, 1961), p. 34.

[107]Jutikkala and Osmonsalo, "Kustavilainen aika," p. 634. For an intimate appreciation of the king's precarious position, see the correspondence between Gustavus III and Stedingk for the period of August 5 to August 28, in Mémoires . . . de Stedingk, I, pp. 111-127.

[108]The signers of the Liikkala Note were: Major General Karl Gustaf Armfelt, commanding general of the Swedo-Finnish forces in Finland; Colonels von Otter and Hästesko of the Björneborg and Åbo Regiments; Lieutenant Colonels P. af Enehjelm, commander of the Light Infantry, and Otto Klingspor; Major Gustaf von Kothen, local district commander of the cavalry; and Lieutenant Karl H. Klick, chief adjutant to General K.G. Armfelt.

[109]Translated from "Liikkalan nootti 9.8.1788," in Suomen historian dokumentteja, I, No. 299. See also Danielson-Kalmari, Kustavilainen aika, II, pp. 280-282; A.R. Cederberg, Anjalan liiton historialliset lähteet. Lähdekriitillinen tutkielma (Helsinki, 1931), especially pp. 233-326 for documents printed in the original Swedish, French, and German texts relating to the Anjala League; and Yrjö Koskinen, "Kaksi Anjalan liittoa koskevan kirjettä," Historiallinen arkisto, VII (1881), 172-175.

[110]Bruno Lesch, Jan Anders Jägerhorn, Patriot och världsborgare, separatist och emigrant. En Tidskildring (Helsingfors, 1941), pp. 206-226 passim; Bain, Gustavus III, II, 26.

[111]Juva and Juva, Suomen kansan historia, III, 323-324.

[112]"Anjalan kirje 13.8.1788," in Suomen historian dokumentteja, I, No. 300.

[113]Brikner, "Konfederatsiia v Anjala v 1788 g.," p. 691.

[114]Bain, Gustavus III, II, 48-49; Scobbie, Sweden, p. 61.

[115]As translated by Wuorinen, Nationalism in Modern Finland, p. 28. The same quotation also appears in J. Hampden Jackson, Finland (London, 1938), p. 45.

[116]Translated from Suomenkielisiä historiallisia asiakirjoja Ruotsin vallan ajalta (vuosilta 1548-1809), ed. by Kustavi Grotenfelt (Helsinki, 1912), pp. 244-247.

[117]Michael Roberts "The Swedish Aristocracy in the Eighteenth Century," in his Essays in Swedish History (London, 1967), p. 284.

[118]Cited from "Podpisannyi Ekaterinoiu II reskript kniaziu Potemkinu o priniatii na sluzhbu k kemy sama general-maiora barona Sprengtportena. (8 aprelia 1790 g.)," S.I.R.I.O., XLII (1885), 74-75.

[119]Hallendorff and Schück, The History of Sweden, pp. 349-351, label Sprengtporten as a "malcontent" and speak of his "treacherous machinations among his Finnish friends." But when we examine the writings of the Russian nationalists about him -- for example, N.F. Ordin, "Sprengtporten, geroi Finliandiia," Russkii arkhiv, XXV (1887), Part 1, pp. 469-502 -- we find that Sprengtporten's misdeeds are in the eyes of the beholder. So farfetched were the Russian claims of Sprengtporten's pro-Russian activities that the Young Finn newspaperman and propagandist Agathon Meurman felt it necessary to counter the most outrageous of these claims in his La Finlande d'autrefois et d'aujourd'hui, Réflexions à propos des attaques dans la presse russe (Helsingfors,

1890), pp.20-28. A more balanced view of Sprengtporten's accomplishments was sought by the historian Yrjö Koskinen, in his Yrjö Maunu Sprengtporten'ista ja Suomen itsenäisyydestä (Helsinki, 1870) and his compilation of Yrjö Maunu Sprengtporten'in, Suomen Kenraali-kuvernöörin, virallista kirjevaihtoa vv. 1808-1809. -- Correspondance officielle de George Magnus Sprengtporten, Gouverneur Général de Finlande en 1808-1809 (Helsinki, 1882). In A.R. Cederberg, "Suomen valtiollisen itsenäisyyden henkinen isä Yrjö Maunu Sprengtporten," Historian aitta, III (1930), 7-15, Sprengtporten is treated as the spiritual father to Finnish independence; a somewhat milder version of this view is probably the most popular one today.

[120]For correspondence concerning this, see S.I.R.I.O., LXX (1890); Diplomaticheskiia snoshenila Rossii s Frantsieiu v epokhu Napoleona, 1800-1802, ed. by A.S. Trachevskii, Nos. 5-10, and also Napoléon, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de France sous le règne de Napoléon écrits à Sainte-Hélène sous sa dictée par les généraux qui ont partagé sa capitivité, ed. by Desiré Lacroix, New Edition (4 vols.; Paris, n.d.), III, 194.

[121]At least this was the view of K. Ordin who wrote angrily about the services of Sprengtporten, G.M. Armfelt and the other Finlanders attached to Alexander I in his Letter to the Editor, Novoe vremia, January 9, 1888, No. 4,261;

"Not the Borga acts, but these gentlemen enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor Alexander and with success began, and others also with success continued, under the Russian aegis, to destroy the great works of Peter, Elizabeth and the same Alexander."

[122]Edmont Genet, chargé d'affaires to Comte de Montmorin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Archives Quai d'Orsay, Paris, Correspondence Politique, Russie, Vol. 132, No. 39 of May 31, 1790, as translated in David Marshall Lang, The First Russian Radical; Alexander Radishchev, 1749-1802 (London, 1959), pp. 127-128.

[123]Pis'ma Suvorova k Printsu Nassau-Zigen, 1788 god Paris, [1973?], No. 28. After the Battle of Ruotsinsalmi, Gustavus III noted much the same: "The gallantry of the pr. of Nassau, with little prudence, makes for the loss of

many Russian subjects." For this, see K. Ordin, "Vyborgskaia pobeda i Rochinsal'maskii pogrom. (Epizod iz shvedskoi kompanii 1790)," Zh.M.N.P., OS CCLV (1888), Part II, p.107.

[124]Jacques Mordal, Twenty-five Centuries of Sea Warfare, trans. by Len Ortzen (London, 1970), pp. 156-157.

[125]Russkii arkhiv, XXV (1887), Part 3, pp. 488-490. See also "Lettre du roi à m. de Stedingk. Svinskund, le 14 juillet 1790," in Mémoires . . . de Stedingk, I, 272-273, in which he confides that he should like to make a peace following this great victory of the Swedish navy and while the Russians are also pressed by the British naval presence in the east Baltic and the Prussian army in Courland.

[126]"Copie de lettre du vice-chancellier comte d'Ostermann au roi de Suède datée à S-Pétersbourg du 25 juillet 1790," Russkii arkhiv, XXV, Part. 3, pp. 490-492.

[127]Cited from Dmitrii Tolstoi, "Verel'skii mirnyi dogovor s Shvetsieiu 3-go avgusta 1790 goda (Po dokumentam iz arkhiva grafa Igel'stroma.)," Ibid., p. 487. See also L.G. Beskrovnyi, Russkaia armii i flot v XVIII veke (Moscow, 1958), p. 592.

[128]See "Copie de l'acte de réconciliation," Russkii arkhiv, XXV, Part 3, p. 515.

[129]For the text of the treaty, see P.S.Z. I, XXIII, No. 16,893; Articles V and VI are also published in French in Recueil manuel et practique de traités, conventions et autre actes diplomatiques, ed. by C. de Martens and F. de Cussy (6 vols.; Paris, 1846-1856), II, 31-32.

[130]Pchlebkin, Suomi vihollisena ja ystävänä, p. 86.

[131]Barton, "Russia and the Problem of Sweden-Finland, 1721-1809," p. 451.

[132]For example, see Anatole G. Mazour, Finland between East and West (Princeton, N.J., 1956), p. 10; and George Lefebvre, Napoleon: From 18 Brumaire to Tilsit, 1799-1807, trans. by Henry F. Stockhold (New York, 1969), p. 274.

[133] W.F. Reddaway, A History of Europe from 1715 to 1814, (3rd ed.; London, 1948), p. 406.

[134] Mémoires d'Andre Masséna, Duc de Rivoli, Prince d'Essling, Maréchal d'Empire, rédigés d'après les documents qu'il a laissés et sur ceux du dépot de la guerre et du dépot des fortifications, ed. oby General Koch (7 vols.; Paris, 1966-1967), V, 336.

[135] For instance, Sauvageot, Histoire de la Finlande, I, 156; Barton, "Russia and the Problem of Sweden-Finland, 1721-1809," p. 451; Mazour, Finland between East and West, p. 10; and Michael Jenkins, Arakcheev, Grand Vizier of the Russian Empire (New York, 1969), p. 115.

[136] For example, Alexander I diplomatically expressed his hatred of perfidious Albion to Napoleon thusly: "I hate the English as much as you hate [them] and I will be your second in all that you do against them." -- See F. de Martens, ed., Receuil des traités et conventions conclus par la Russie avec les puissances étrangères -- Sobranie traktov i konventsii . . . (15 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1874-1909), XIII; Traités avec la France, 1717-1807, p. 300; A.A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, Russia and Europe, 1789-1825 (Durham, N.C., 1947), p. 155; Albert Vandal, Napoléon et Alexandre Ier; l'alliance russe sous le premier empire, (5th ed., 3 vols.; Paris, 1891-1896), I, 58; F. Loraine Petre, Napoleon's Campaign in Poland, 1806-7; A Military History of Napoleon's First War with Russia (London, 1901), p. 337.

[137] M. Eustaphieve [Aleksi Iustafiev], The Resources of Russia, in the Event of War with France, (3rd ed.; London, 1818), pp. 24-25; E.M. Almedingen, The Emperor Alexander I, (London, 1964), p. 100.

[138] Sir Robert Ker Porter, A Narrative of the Campaign in Russia, during the Year 1812 (London, 1813), p. 1.

[139] George Lefebvre, Napoleon: From Tilsit to Waterloo, 1807-1815, trans. by J.E. Anderson (New York, 1969), p. 11; Päivi Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne en 1809-1815 (Helsinki, 1962), p. 14; Heiki Kirkinen, "Les relations culturelles avec l'est," in La Finlande hier et aujourd'hui, p. 26.

[140] Recueil des traités et conventions, XIII, No. 494. For the other documents negotiated at Tilsit, see Ibid., No. 492 (the armistice of 9/21 June), No. 493 (the peace of 25 June/7 July), and No. 495 (the accords relating to the Ionian Islands of 27 June/9 July).

[141] For a sample of anti-French feelings in Russian society, see Correspondance de l'Empereur Alexander Ier avec sa soeur la Grand-Duchesse Catherine, Princess d'Oldenbourg, puis Reine de Wurtemberg, 1805-1818, ed. by Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich (St. Petersburg, 1910), No. XII (dated June 25 [o.s.], 1807, and General Savary's "Tableau de Saint-Petersbourg à l'epoque du 23 juillet au 5 août," in S.I.R.I.O., LXXXIII (1892); Politicheskaia peripiska Generala Savari vo vremia prebyvaniia ego v S.-Peterburge v 1807 g., No. 10. See also Eugene Tarle, Napoleon's Invasion of Russia, 1812, trans. by G.M. (New York, 1942), pp. 11-12, and Jean Jacoby, Napoléon en Russie (Paris, 1938), pp. 26-28.

[142] Mémoires d'André Masséna, VI, 27; Krusius-Ahrenberg, "Finnischer Separatismus und russischer Imperialismus im vorigen Jahrhundert," p. 253; Arthur Dalton West, "'La Question Française' in Russia 1806-1812" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, McGill University, 1972), Chapter III.

[143] F. de Martens, Recueil des traités et conventions, XIV: Traités avec la France, 1807-1820, p. 67.

[144] Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, pp. 16-17; Erkki K. Osmonsalo and T.V. Viljanen, "Suomen Sota vv. 1808-1809," in Suomen historian käsikirja, I, 696.

[145] For example, see Correspondance de Napoléon Ier (32 vols.; Paris, 1858-1869), XV, Nos. 13078 13083 (to Alexander, August 26 and 28, 1807) and 13078 (to Savary, August 26, 1807); Ibid., XVI, Nos. 13338 (to Alexander I, November 7, 1807), 13339 (to Savary, November 7, 1807), and 13383 (to Alexander I, December 7, 1807); S.I.R.I.O., LXXXIII, No. 68 (Savary to Champagny, November 18, 1807); Ibid., LXXXVIII (1893); Diplomaticheskiia snosheniia Rossii s Frantsiei v epokhu Napoleona I, 1807-1808, ed. by Aleksandr Trachevski, No. 91 (Champagny to Savary, October 19/31, 1807).

[146]F. de Martens, Recueil des traités et conventions, XIV, 67; K.K. Zlobin, "Diplomaticheskiia snosheniia mezhdu Rossieiu i Shvetsieiu v pervye gody tsarstvovaniia Imperatora Aleksandra I do prisoedineniia Finliandii k Rossii," in S.I.R.I.O., II (1868), 66.

[147]S.I.R.I.O., LXXXVIII, No. 67 (Champagny to Savary, September 14, 1807) and No. 68 (Napoleon to Alexander, September 16, 1807).

[148]From a citation in Pohjolan-Pirhonen, Kansakunnan historia, II, 618.

[149]Osmonsalo and Viljanen, "Suomen Sota vv. 1808-1809," p. 697.

[150]See S.I.R.I.O., LXXXVIII, Nos. 68 ff.; Mémoires du General de Caulincourt, Duc de Vicence, Grand Écuyer de l'Empereur, ed. by Jean Hanotaux (3 vols.; Paris, 1933), I: L'Ambassade de Saint-Pétersbourg et la campaigne de Russie, p. 263.

[151]See Recueil des traités et conventions, XIV, No. 498 for the text of the Treaty of Erfurt, and pp. 39-68 for F. de Martens' commentary. See also The Cambridge Modern History, IX, 312-313.

[152]Walter Bacon, Finland (London, 1970), p. 75.

[153]S.I.R.I.O., LXXXVIII, No. 73 (Alexander to Napoleon, September 10/22, 1807). However, in Savary's report to Napoleon of September 23, Alexander is quoted as saying, "Add to it [i.e. Savary's report] that my troops are marching and that I am going to occupy Finland." (S.I.R.I.O., LXXXIII, No. 33.)

[154]S.I.R.I.O., LXXXVIII, No. 101 (Instructions to Caulincourt, November 12, 1807).

[155]Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, XVI, p. 586 ("À Alexandre Ier, . . . 2 février 1808").

[156] Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, XVI, 588-589.

[157] Lettres inédites de Napoléon Ier (An VIII-1815), published by Léon Lecestre (2nd ed., 2 vols.; Paris, 1897), I: An VIII-1809, No. 229. Rarely has a passage been so often misquoted and used out of context as this one, especially in that it has been erroneously included as part of the discussions between the two emperors at Tilsit. Eg., see Leonid Strakhovsky, Alexander I of Russia: The Man Who Defeated Napoleon (London, 1949), p. 82; F. de Martens, Recueil de traités et conventions, XIII, 304; Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich, L'Empereur Alexandre Ier: Essai d'étude historique (2 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1912), I, 65; Bobovich, Russko-finliandskie ekonomicheskie otnosheniia, p. 13.

Incidently, Napoleon's courtly solicitude for the welfare of the demoiselles of St. Petersburg elicited this response from Alexander: "I thank him [Napoleon] for myself and for the belles of St. Petersburg; (laughing) I will tell it to them; he is always kind to me." (From the quotation in Vandal, Napoléon et Alexandre Ier, I, 318-319.)

[158] Frantz Despagnet, La question finlandaise au point de vue juridique (Paris, 1901), p. 19; [E.G.W.] Becker, "La Finlande," Le Contemporaine. Revue Catholique, 3rd series, XIX (February 1880), 204; Sten Carlsson, Gustaf IV Adolf: En biografi (Stockholm, 1946), p. 163; and E.K. Osmonsalo, Suomen valloitus 1808 (Helsinki, 1947), p. 51 ff.

Andrew A. Stomberg, A History of Sweden, p. 601, suggests that the Swedo-Finnish army was taken wholly by surprise, placing the blame for this state of military unpreparedness at the feet of Ambassador Stedingk for having been a dupe of the Russians to pass on assurances rather than warnings to his government. Yet if there was unreadiness in Sweden, it was not Stedingk's fault for he had accurately predicted the Russian attack on at least two occasions. See his Mémoires posthumes, II, 422-430 and 431-432 for his letters to the king (Jan. 11/23, 1808) and General af Klercker (Jan. 16/28).

[159] For example, see General Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Eiler, "Zapiski A.A. Eilera," Russkii arkhiv, XVIII (1880),

Part 2, p. 349, and Stedingk, Mémoires posthumes, II, 454-461, for his dispatch of Feb. 14/26, 1808 to the king.

[160]So vivid were Alexander and Napoleon in the minds of the people that even a court battle was waged between two Finnish peasants to decide which of them was the world's greatest ruler. For this, see Håkon Holmberg, "Ett politiskt gräl mellan bönder år 1807," Historisk Tidskrift för Finland, XXXIX (1954), 76-78.

[161]As cited by Jutikkala and Pirinen, A History of Finland, p. 177.

[162]Yrjö Niiniluoto, "Finland -- An Introduction," in Introduction to Finland 1960, p. 14.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ANNEXATION OF SWEDISH FINLAND BY ALEXANDER I

It has been a popular view among historians that Alexander I had deliberately set out to complete the work begun by Peter the Great -- that is to extend Russia's northern borders to the limits of her natural geo-physical frontiers with Sweden in order to secure the safety of her Imperial capital.[1] While it is true that Russia kept this possibility in mind,[2] Alexander's solution to the "Finnish problem" was nevertheless forced upon him by Napoleon, as has already been suggested in the first chapter of this work. Therefore, it is not quite accurate to assume that Alexander had consciously embarked on a course of action to complete Peter's expansionist policy with respect to Finland.

In the first place, war between Sweden and Russia was not of the tsar's own choosing. Even Ambassador Stedingk admitted as much in spite of his deep-lodged fear and suspicion of Russian designs on Finland. It was this view

which he stressed in his dispatch to King Gustavus IV of January 11/23, 1808:

> He [Alexander I] believes himself to be reduced to the alternative of being embroiled with Sweden or with France; and as experience has proved to him that Russia cannot resist this latter power, he prefers war with Sweden, which presents him with less danger, and a conquest for which he has always hoped, and which will put Sweden out of order. He is certain that Finland will be lost.[3]

Thus, when Russian troops crossed the Finnish frontier at six o'clock on the morning of February 9/21, 1808, their primary purpose was to mount a punitive expedition against Sweden in order to compel her to join Napoleon's Continental System.[4] To attain this end, it was necessary that they first place Finland under a state of occupatio bellica.[5] Hence, although Swedish historians have continued to insist that this invasion of Finland was motivated by Russia's own ambitions,[6] it must be recognized that this war did not really stem from the Russian desire for conquest.[7]

In this matter, we can rely upon the words of the tsar himself, who, in his conversation with Councillor of State J.A. Ehrenström, was reported to have said:

> . . . Then after a slight pause the Sovereign added the following remarkable words: "We had not thought about the conquest of Finland; but we had to cede to the force of circumstances. We were coming out of a terrible war with France, and we were not in a state then to begin a new one. It was necessary at the time to prepare for it. . . ."
> From these words I concluded that the Sovereign

> wished to give the notion that Bonaparte had threatened him with war, if he did not want to conquer Finland, . . .[8]

Only some five days before the Russian attack on Finland, Alexander declared before the Swedish ambassador: "God is my witness, I do not covet a single village of your king's domains."[9]

This statement also serves to underline the tsar's genuine reluctance to undertake a war against his Swedish relative with whom he had once enjoyed very close ties.[10] Only Gustavus IV's obstinate and unreasoning hatred of Bonaparte prevented Sweden from joining the Napoleonic system in Alexander's view, forcing the tsar to take domestically unpopular military measures against him.[11] This is most concretely confirmed by the fact that Alexander's subordinates understood this to be his position vis-à-vis Sweden,[12] although they differed in their personal opinions as to what course the tsar should follow.[13]

On the basis of his instructions from the tsar, General F.F. von Buxhoevden, the commander-in-chief of the invasion force, readied his troops[14] and prepared his pre-invasion manifesto of February 6/18, 1808 to the inhabitants of Finland. In this document, he declared that the entrance of Russian troops into Finland would be effected only to compel Gustavus to withdraw from his anti-Russian alliance

with England. He then called upon the Finnish people to remain calm, assuring them that their laws, rights and customs would be "inviolably preserved" by Russia. He also requested that the deputies from each Finnish province meet in Åbo to discuss the special needs and concerns of their country.[15]

In another proclamation dated February 10/22, 1808 (the day after the Russian attack), General Buxhoevden addressed the Finnish forces ranged in front of him. In it, he also suggested that this war concerned not Finland but only the Swedish monarch. To this he added that Russian troops had entered Finland "for the attainment of tranquility and peace and for the good of the Finns themselves," and that they would not fire upon Finnish positions unless and until they were first fired upon.[16]

Obviously, the Russian high command was governed by the overwhelming consideration to pacify the country as quickly as possible. Even its promise to summon together Finland's deputies at this time seems to have been directed to the purpose of assisting in the pacification and administration of occupied Finland. This passionate desire to see a swift end to all Finnish resistance led to additional proclaimations when the earlier ones proved to be ineffective. So, once again on February 16/28, 1808 Buxhoevden issued another manifesto, this time promising all Finlanders the

full enjoyment of all their lands and possessions if they only would return to their abandoned homesteads and end their unlawful resistance against the Russian army.[17]

However, Russia's willingness to placate the Finns is perhaps even better illustrated by Buxhoevden's address to them on March 12/24 from the steps of the townhall in Åbo, the recently captured capital of Finland:

> Inhabitants of Finland: You, who showed fear at the approach of the Russian Imperial Army, by the experience have been persuaded that your peace and safety were not disturbed. You have much evidence of His Imperial Majesty's mercy. The laws of the country are preserved. For the complete encouragement of trade, former duties at the state borders are abolished. In the cities are abolished the customs and the collection of shares of products entering for sale from the country. You, the assembled, standing prisoners-of-war, are allowed to return to your homes. Damage caused by the movement of the army will be compensated for. In order to indemnify the willingness with which the commands of our all-gracious Emperor were carried out in the time of the campaign of his army in Finland, all of you inhabitants of Finland according to the all-generous command of His Imperial Majesty, beginning with the current year, are liberated from the payment of extraordinary taxes established to defray the Swedish national debt.[18]

Russia's kind disposition toward Finland and her inhabitants was the direct responsibility of the tsar. His motive for this extraordinary behaviour toward the Finns was recorded by Caulincourt in his report to Napoleon of March 1st concerning that evening's conversation with Alexander I:

The Ambassador. Your Majesty must finish with this incommodious neighbour.

The Emperor. That is my intention. As to the Finlanders, they seem to be of good will: those of the first district have given their oath [of fidelity].[19]

The Ambassador. It is necessary to organize the country to the measure that one advances; that dispenses for it to be guarded by many troops.

The Emperor. That is why I am going to have this done by sending out a proclamation.[20]

In the opening weeks of the Finnish campaign, the Russian advance was almost too rapid, leaving potential pockets of resistance behind the front lines. The extent of this problem, however, was to become clear only after the first flush of victory. Meanwhile, the main spearhead of the attack force, the 17th Division under the command of Lieutenant General Gorchakov and accompanied by General Buxhoevden, which had invaded Finland on February 9/21, 1808, followed the shore of the Gulf of Finland with the aim of taking the fortresses of Svartholm and Sveaborg. Also on February 9/21, the 21st Division under the command of Lieutenant General Bagration had started its drive through central Finland toward Tavasthus (Hämeenlinna) and then on to a link-up with the 17th Division before Åbo, so that the combined forces would be able to effect the capture of the Finnish capital and also push northward along the Bothnian coast to the busy port of Vasa (Vaasa).

Lieutenant General Tuchkov's 5th Division did not begin its attack until February 28, 1808; its task was to take St. Michel (Mikkeli) and Kuopio, and then head northwestward toward the Torneå (Tornio) River.[21] So weak was the initial response from the Swedo-Finnish army that these Russian forces actually succeeded in reaching most of their objectives within the two to three months as they had estimated.[22]

Yet Finland was by no means overrun by the full potential of the Russian military might because the Russian transport and supply services could not solve the logistic problems for the reprovisioning of great masses of soldiers.[23] Hence, of the 60,000 troops in the Old Finland-St. Petersburg Military District, only some 24,000 regulars were initially committed to the Finnish campaign.[24] By comparison, the Swedo-Finnish army offered an almost even match in numbers with a force of some 22,000 men. Of course, it must be remembered that this army included garrison troops, militia units filled with over-age reservists, raw recruits, and elderly, unpracticed generals. Moreover, there were no reserves.[25] In effect, the Russians still maintained a considerable degree of superiority, enough to allow them a certain victory provided that they could scotch the impulse within the mass of the Finnish population of caring to participate in partisan activities. The French were even

more optimistic than the Russians on this score, believing that Russia would need only 3000 regulars and 7000 militia in occupied Finland for the establishment of good order and the maintenance of peace.[26]

Russian expectations continued to run high, for under the command of the sixty-three year old Field Marshal W.M. Klingspor and his septuagenarian second, General K.N. af Klercker, the Swedo-Finnish army kept on retreating northward without contest. Indeed, much criticism had been levied against the Swedish high command, incompetance and defeatism being the most serious of these charges. But to be fair, Russian generalship has also been criticized for its helter-skelter advance, its heedless seizure of territory, and its inability to adapt its tactics to the geographic conditions of Finland.[27] Of course, any errors made by the Russians were not yet apparent because Klingspor had not yet begun to develop a concerted defence of Finland. In fact, Caulincourt was still able to report to Foreign Minister Champagny on March 3/15, 1808, more than three weeks after the opening of the campaign: "The operations continue in Finland without much vigour and resistance."[28]

As late as April, 1808, the king of Sweden approved the conduct of his army in Finland as "a safe and honourable retreat." Moreover, it had been at his insistence that

Finland be sacrificed temporarily to the Russians so that the bulk of the Swedo-Finnish forces might remain intact for the defence of Sweden proper.[29] However, when this policy proved to be in error and Finland seemed to be irretrievably lost, Gustavus IV changed his tune, declaring: "To the deuce with Finland: I'm too good to rule over these cattle."[30]

This retreat contributed most particularly to the lowering of morale of the troops and reinforcing their feelings of defeatism. Hence, the fortress of Svartholm capitulated on March 5/17, 1808 without much of a struggle. This victory served two purposes: while Svartholm's fall added greater credence to the image of Russian invincibility, the written instrument of surrender also gave the Russians the opportunity to demonstrate the tsar's generosity toward the Finnish troops whom he deemed to be blameless for their king's evil foreign policy. Therefore, the Russian negotiators allowed the native Finnish troops the privilege of removing themselves to their homes or to any other place in Russian-occupied Finland.[31] Thus, once more as had been done during the War of the Hats, Russia adopted the policy of differentiating between captured Finnish and Swedish soldiers.

On March 8/20, 1808, Ambassador Caulincourt wrote to General Savary, telling him that the war in Finland was

almost over:

> The fort of Svartholm is taken; they have made 900 prisoners. The place contained much artillery and rifles, all in good condition. They are transporting the artillery in front of Sveaborg. They occupy Åbo; shortly they will be in Vasa. Finland should be regarded as conquered. This campaign . . . does not cost thirty men. The Finnish officers and soldiers quit the Swedish flag proportionately to their approach in the North, in fear that one would not want to conduct them to Sweden.[32]

Now the pressure to annex Finland began to be applied upon Alexander with full force. From within, his generals, flush with the exercise of their glorious march through Finland, argued for the extension of Russia's borders to their natural frontier on the Gulf of Bothnia.[33] From without, Napoleon urged Finland upon Russia in the hope of forestalling his ally's embarrassing ambitions to the south and so told the Russian ambassador M.M. Alopeus: " . . . but Finland, your master has need of it; it is too near to St. Petersburg."[34]

Moreover, since this war had generated in Russian society little enthusiasm[35] but much hostility,[36] it necessitated Alexander I to consider the annexation of Finland as one means to clearly show the beneficial value of his alliance with Napoleon.[37] So, on March 16/28, 1808, the tsar published a proclamation for the eyes of Europe, in which he declared that Sweden's stubborn refusal to join Russia in a coalition

against Great Britain, Gustavus IV's obstinate adherence to an alliance with Russia's English enemies, and the Swedish government's despicable jailing of D.M. Alopeus, Russian minister to Stockholm, had all contributed to the present state of war between Russia and Sweden. As the consequence of this, Alexander announced:

> The Emperor declares to all European governments, that he from this time forth accounts Sweden's former share of Finland's territory, which his military forces have in no other way than by war acquired, as one land conquered by his arms, which the Emperor joins with his Empire forever after.[38]

It was not until March 20/April 1 that he published a manifesto to the Russian people "Concerning the conquest of Swedish Finland and its union forever with Russia." This document declared that "the security of the nation" required action against Sweden. For the sake of propaganda, it greatly emphasized the heinousness of the Swedish conduct toward Russia's ambassador while contrasting this with the valiant and honourable behaviour of the Russian fighting forces in Finland. Now that Finland was conquered and incorporated into the Russian Empire, the tsar also charged all Finlanders to present "their oaths of fidelity as subjects to Our Throne."[39] It was at this point that Russia's punitive expedition in Finland officially and factually became a war of conquest.[40]

Four days later, on March 24/April 5, Alexander informed Napoleon of his actions:

> Sir my Brother. I address these lines to Your Majesty to announce to you that all Swedish Finland finds itself conquered. There only remains the fortress of Sveaborg, which is still held, but the commandant has already entered into talks, and I hope that shortly it will capitulate. The king of Sweden has judged it appropriate to imitate the Turks and lock up my minister to Stockholm. I have not wanted to resort to reprisals against him, but I have declared Swedish Finland a Russian province. As Your Majesty has judged it very well, the security of my capital was demanding this.[41]

In his rather terse response of April 29, 1808, Napoleon indicated his constrained pleasure in the good fortune and new-found independence of his ally:

> Sir my Brother, I have received through M. de Czernitchef [Chernyshev] the letter of Your Majesty, of March 24, with the publications which you have judged appropriate to make on the occupation of Finland and on the prohibition of English merchandise. I have seen one and the other of these acts with the pleasure that I approve all that Your Majesty has done.[42]

In fact, the French were not at all pleased that Alexander refused to press an attack on Sweden itself at this time. The tsar had begged off with the excuse that his forces in Finland were not yet strong enough.[43] The wily Caulincourt then fashioned a counter-argument demonstrating that an attack on Sweden was the only sure means of protecting Russian interests in Finland and on the Baltic.[44] Once again it was the French who harped on Finland's strategic importance to Russia and how the conquest of Finland had been to the particular advantage of Alexander.[45]

This view, however, was not wholly endorsed by the Russian Imperial Council, as was noted in Caulincourt's dispatch to Champagny of March 31/April 12, 1808:

> There was in the last week a grand council on the subject of the union of Finland. There was explained openly the system adopted by the Emperor. They did appreciate the new acquisition which they have come to make; but they have spoken of the necessity to have the Turkish provinces, as the veritable and at the same time the only means to prove the advantage of the French alliance.[46]

Of course, even now it was already gradually becoming clear that the Tilsit alliance had been but a truce between enemies,[47] a temporary <u>détente</u> in which France recognized Russia as the foremost representative of Slavdom.[48] French resentment, in spite of the many declarations of amity, grew with each new Russian acquisition resulting from this alliance.[49] As a consequence of this, Napoleon would later aver that "the acquisition of Finland turned his [Alexander's] head,"[50] and that he regretted sacrificing his oldest ally, Turkey, for the sake of so hollow a friendship with such an ungrateful tsar.[51] Although the French emperor's hatred of his Russian "brother" still had to mature, he already admitted to misgivings in his letter to Champagny of May 22, 1808: "I do not have anything to gain in seeing the Russians in Stockholm."[52]

Meanwhile, in Russia, the opposition to the Finnish campaign was being silenced by the successes of the Imperial

forces and soothed by the syrup of government propaganda until the society began to accept the situation with a fatalistic sense of "we finally had to conquer Finland."[53] Ironically, at this point the military fortunes of the Russian army in Finland were about to turn for the worse because the Russian high command had not bothered to neutralize the captured areas as its back. Therefore, the Finnish forces were able to launch a brilliant counter-offensive in the summer of 1808, putting to good use the partisans left behind the Russian lines. The change in the character of warfare so bewildered the Russian military that they managed to lose fourteen engagements in which they had held the advantage of superior numbers.[54]

The first indication of trouble in this supposedly "conquered" country occurred at the battle of Siikajoki on April 18, 1808. Colonel Carl Johan Adlercreutz, Klingspor's Finnish-born chief of staff, and Colonel G.C. von Döbeln, commander of the Finnish 2nd Brigade, had persuaded Klingspor to allow them to attack the inferior forces of Lieutenant Colonel J.P. Kulnev. Although the 2nd Brigade was unable to decisively crush Kulnev's four companies at Siikajoki, this victory did show that the Russians were vulnerable after all.[55] This point was further emphasized when Swedish landing parties with the aid of local islanders recovered the Åland

Islands (Ahvenanmaa) from the Russians in May.[56] So, although Russia had militarily detached Finland from Sweden, her own military and civil authority over this new conquest had yet to be established.

The fall of Sveaborg, the fortress aptly described by Bernadotte as "the boulevard of Finland,"[57] doomed Sweden's last hope of retaking Finland by the force of her arms; this so-called "Gibraltar of the North" was to have been the linchpin of Swedish efforts to oust the Russians in the next year's campaign. Unfortunately, Sveaborg's garrison was afflicted with a debilitating spirit of defeatism while many of its officers still nursed rebellious sympathies for the ideals of the Anjala League.[58] Under such circumstances, this fortress was ready to be taken.

On February 19/March 2, 1808, some 2000 Russian troops seized the small coastal town of Helsingfors situated on the mainland just facing the islands on which the fortress had been built.[59] Although Sveaborg was garrisoned by about 6750 men, no attempt was made by them to drive off the enemy. In fact, the great cannon of the fortress were not used for fear of damaging Helsingfors.[60] Instead, the Russians were allowed to reinforce themselves to the total of 6500 men and to set up their own batteries without the least opposition. Meanwhile, Rear Admiral C.O. Cronstedt quickly entered into

truce negotiations with the besiegers.

The commandant's lack of bargaining skills resulted in such favourable terms for the Russian cause that Buxhoevden dared not wait for the tsar's prior assent to these conditions before approving them himself.[61] In fact, so faint-hearted was Cronstedt's defence of Sveaborg even at the bargaining table that many Swedish writers have insisted that he was a traitor purchased by his forty pieces of silver.[62] A more objective view, however, suggests that the surrender of the fortress did not result from bribery (since evidence of such does not exist) but rather stemmed from the concern of the garrison troops for the safety of their families living with them, the soldiers' indifference or hostility to the political aims of their king, and the officers' assumption of the hopelessness of the Swedo-Finnish military situation in Finland.[63]

In any event, an armistice was signed on March 25/April 6, 1808, in which was stipulated that Sveaborg and the archipelago fleet wintering in the harbour of Helsingfors would be handed over to the Russians on April 22/May 3 if the siege was not lifted by noon of that date by the appearance in the harbour of at least five Swedish ships-of-the-line. As a guarantee that these terms would be carried out, Cronstedt was to hand over immediately three

of Sveaborg's fortified islands.[64] The disposition of the Swedo-Finnish garrison after surrender was to be fashioned along the same principles as had been agreed to at the capitulation of Svartholm; these terms were included in the above armistice and a later supplementary agreement that was to be concluded on April 14/26.[65]

As Buxhoevden had rightly predicted, the late thaw common to this area prevented the early arrival of reinforcements. Also, to make it more certain that Swedish forces would not purposely initiate any early attempts at relief, the Russians delayed the communication of the armistice terms to Stockholm until after the date of Sveaborg's surrender.[66] Thus, the mighty Gibraltar of the North came to fall without a decent fight, providing Alexander I with the excuse to prepare for a lavish victory celebration of a magnitude not witnessed since Catherine the Great's victory over Gustavus III at Svensksund.[67]

The combined effect of Russia's success in the field and Gustavus IV's refusal to accede to her demands in regard to Sweden's alliance with Great Britain cast deep shadows on the course of Finland's future. During this period of indecision General G.M. Sprengtporten, who had been attached to Buxhoevden as political officer, emerged as possibly the most important figure in the tsar's councils in the debate

over Finland's destiny. Unlike the old Anjala League men who were now in the Imperial service, he did not argue either for total independence or for complete absorption but rather for the incorporation of Finland into Russia with a separate status. Hence, with this aim in mind, it was he who had actually written Buxhoevden's manifesto of February 6/18, 1808 which guaranteed the Finlanders their ancient rights and privileges, and promised the convocation of their Diet.[68]

Moreover, on March 17/29, 1808, the day after the tsar had proclaimed to the European courts his intention to annex Finland, Sprengtporten sent a memorandum regarding the Finnish Diet to Foreign Minister N.P. Rumiantsev for transmission to the tsar. His note argued that the convocation of deputies would best serve Russian interests "to consolidate the union of Finland with Russia" because it would provide the means to legitimize this relationship in the minds of Finlanders with respect to Finland's fundamental laws and customs. It would also provide the occasion to heal the wounds between the tsar and his new subjects that had been opened by the present war. The most important reason, however, was that this approach would pacify Finland:

And finally for the regulation of a manner stable

> and permanent in the civil administration in general as well as the military forces of the country, its [the Finnish army's] reorganization on the footing that it subsists following the constitution and the new order of things wherefore the grand duchy of Finland united with the Russian Empire and protected by her will not need one of the same number nor of the same expenses for its maintenance.[69]
>
> . . . I still advise to proceed with the convocation of the deputies which has contributed the most in tranquilizing the biased souls and disposing them to our interests, when in this measure they have believed to be able to flatter themselves to conserve their civil liberty.[69]

The effect of Sprengtporten's ideas on the tsar's policies with respect to Finland was quite considerable. For example, their influence was felt in Buxhoevden's proclamation to the Finlanders of March 19/31, 1808, in which was stated:

> According to His Imperial Majesty's all-gracious command it is announced that in the newly conquered Finland, the recruitment levy which is in effect in Russia, will not be applied; after that as the inhabitants of Finland swear their oath as true and faithful subjects, the Finnish army is to stand without alteration such as it was during the time of Swedish rule.[70]

In a further memorandum of March 30/April 11, 1808, General Sprengtporten continued to press for the creation of a separately constituted Finland within the Russian Empire and for the convocation of the Finnish Diet.[71] Obviously, the fact that Sprengtporten still believed that a defence of his views was necessary strongly suggests that Alexander still had not formulated a Finnish policy and that even now he was responding to each new problem with

whatever expedient might take his fancy. This note also implied the existence of a great deal of opposition to Sprengtporten's schemes among the tsar's circle of intimates, particularly to the convocation of a Finnish Diet. Although Alexander I seemed to favour Sprengtporten's proposals, his own inconstant and irresolute will could not face up to this determined opposition while he still lacked Napoleon's express consent to Russia's annexation of Finland.[72]

Yet the people of Finland required a further clarification of their present status if only to prevent the encouragement of further resistance and disabedience to the authority of the Russian occupation government. To satisfy this need, Alexander appointed Rumiantsev as as his mouthpiece. His choice was rather shrewd because Rumiantsev could not possibly be identified with the liberal camp. Moreover, since Rumiantsev was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, his involvement with the Finnish question clearly demonstrated to the Russian conservatives as well as to Napoleon that the tsar considered the solution of Finland's problems still to be a question of foreign rather than domestic policy. Of course, Alexander also left open for himself the option of being able to repudiate the commitments made by his foreign minister should such an action become politic.[73]

So, on April 8/20, 1808, Rumiantsev addressed the Finnish people, amplifying upon those measures which Sprengtporten had favoured for Finland. Rumiantsev promised that the Finnish nobility and officer corps would not incur losses from the annexation of Finland to Russia. This union, he promised, would provide enormous economic opportunities and advantages for Finnish merchants and artisans. He categorically denied that there was any substance to the rumour that the peasant class would be enserfed. He stated that the population would be allowed to present the Russian commander-in-chief with the accounts of their war damages and petitions of their immediate needs for just recompense. Indeed, Rumiantsev's address satisfied each of Sprengtporten's propositions, except only that the meeting of the Diet was to be postponed indefinitely.[74] Even so, the benevolence of this manifesto was such that it provided for everything that a Diet could have requested, rendering such a convocation superfluous.[75]

Naturally the Russian autocracy had deep reservations with respect to the meeting of the Finnish Estates. For one reason, it still feared that a Diet might very well become the focal point for a popular demonstration of loyalty on behalf of the King of Sweden. Moreover, many of the Russian conservatives -- and liberals for that matter --

were unable to differentiate between the Finnish Diet and the "popular assembly" of Revolutionary France. Sprengtporten, however, knew better the nature of the Finnish Diet, perceiving it to be the conservative embodiment of medieval corporative life.[76] So, we should remind ourselves that Alexander's later convocation of the Finnish Diet was not a liberal act from this point of view but a deeply conservative one.

It was, therefore, no accident that the nobility as a whole, and those of Cap and Anjalist sympathies in particular, were among the first Finlanders to look upon the unfolding fact of the union of their country to Russia with growing favour.[77] In having seen the effect of Russian rule in the Baltic provinces,[78] the nobles expected that conservative Russia would also reinforce their own privileged position in the Finnish society. The promise of a Diet appealed them, for this assembly would provide them with an arena in which they could check any untoward desires of the lower orders.

Neither the functionaries of the Finnish civil government nor those of the church deserted their posts in large numbers with the coming of the Russians; they tended to carry on business as usual. They, too, had begun to realize that Russia actually intended to maintain the status quo[79] and that it was to their advantage to secure their own

future in the service of their new sovereign. For example, Bishop Tengström of Åbo welcomed the conquering General Buxhoevden to his city's gates, expressing the Church's best wishes and gratitude to Russia for her promise to maintain Finland's fundamental laws and Lutheran religion.[80] So, it can be said with much justice that it was the Swedo-Finnish gentry which betrayed the cause of Sweden for the sake of their own rights and privileges, while the greater part of the Finnish army and peasantry -- the latter fearing that this unseemly compliance of the nobility had been bought at the expense of the peasants' freedom -- continued to resist until all hope had been lost.[81]

Once Napoleon had given his tacit consent to a Russian "free hand" in Finland, Alexander was at liberty to do whatever he considered necessary to ease the pressure of the growing Finnish counter-offensive.[82] Indeed, the threatening situation which moved him to compel the Finns in all Russian-occupied zones to take their oaths of fealty in May, 1808,[83] now led him to make his proclamation of June 5/17 in confirmation of his annexation of Finland to Russia.[84] The act itself was interpreted in a number of ways: while the Russian nationalists later claimed that it was the absolute expression of the tsar's autocratic will,[85] their pro-Finnish opponents were to consider it as a

fundamental instrument of Alexander's liberalism.[86]

A proper reading of this proclamation within its historical context yields to neither of these camps, but clearly exposes the fact that the June 5/17 decree was basically a piece of war propaganda designed to placate Finland. In this regard, the manifesto emphasized the incorporation of Finland into Russia "in perpetuity" only to make the point that all Finlanders now had to become reconciled with this new order of things and, thereon, adhere loyally to the Russian throne. The bounties and benefits of Russian rule, including the creation of Finland's special status, were outlined to the Finns so that they could see that it was to their own profit to accept their fate. The last half of this proclamation dealt with the tsar's exhortation to his new subjects not to commit themselves again to war against Russia.[87] Yet the temporality of this act in Alexander's mind was such that it, notwithstanding his promise to hold Finland "in perpetuity," did not even exclude the possibility of a voluntary restoration of Finland to Sweden in return for Swedish military aid in Russia's war against Napoleon.[88]

Nevertheless, the June 5/17 and the earlier March 20/April 1 proclamation as well were to retain a much greater significance to the course of later events than could have

been immediately foreseen. More by accident than by design, they were to provide an important part of the foundation upon which Finland's autonomous status was laid.[89] In this way, the successes of the Finnish army and its partisan sympathizers in battling their Russian enemies were not wasted in a losing cause, for they were instrumental in guaranteeing for Finland such "rights" as she had not known even under the Swedish regime.[90]

As a matter of fact, the war went badly for the Russians throughout the summer. Gustavus IV grew increasingly optimistic, ordering a series of counter-strokes against his enemy before the onset of autumn. However, the much-fatigued Klingspor frustrated his king by coming to terms with General Buxhoevden in regard to an unlimited armistice. At this time, the cautious Marshal Klingspor believed his army to be afflicted with too much illness and war-weariness to be able to continue to fight; while, on the other hand, Buxhoevden badly needed the respite in order to dislodge the audacious Colonel J.A. Sandels and his troublesome brigade from the neighbourhood of Toivola.[91] Although Klingspor was to be relieved on the day of the signing of this armistice at Lohtaja -- September 17/29, 1808 -- army headquarters did not receive these orders until hours after the deed had been done. Hence, Klingspor's armistice duly came into effect

along the front between Gamlakarleby (Kokkola) and Kuopio, situating the Swedo-Finnish forces north of the Iisalmi-Lestijärvi-Himmanka line.[92] Then, to add to these difficulties, old General Klercker was left in command of the Finnish army.

Ironically, Alexander I seems to have been no more happy with this armistice than his Swedish cousin, believing himself to have been cheated out of a decisive victory over the Swedes by a bungling Buxhoevden. At least, this is what he told Rumiantsev in a letter dated November 6/18, 1808:

> The affairs in Finland go very well; we have had many very brilliant engagements, among others two in Tuchkov's corps, but that cost much, because in the first I have lost my aide-de-camp general, the Prince Dolgoruki, . . . General Buxhoevden has made an unpardonable stupidity in accepting an armistice which the Swedish general had proposed to him. But the council of ministers in my absence have handled it very wisely to break off at once and the affairs about which I have mentioned to you above have already passed since the resumption of hostilities. I have replaced General Buxhoevden, with whom I am very discontented, by General Knorring.[93]

Nevertheless, this armistice had been really to Russia's advantage. For example, the most important task of reinforcing and reprovisioning Tuchkov's unit was accomplished during this truce. So, when Tuchkov had been ordered to break the truce, the Russian army was once again able to take the initiative until the Swedish high command was forced once more to sue for another armistice. This time the Russians, being influenced by the extremely sanguinary

disposition of their sovereign, at first demanded that the enemy surrender forthwith. But since the Imperial forces were experiencing acute shortages in their supplies, the Russian negotiators soon relented.[94] Therefore, at Olkijoki on November 7/19, 1808, Generals Kamenski and Adlercreutz signed a new armistice on behalf of Buxhoevden and Klercker which provided for the removal of all Swedish and Finnish troops from Finland and left Russia wholly in command of the country right to the limits of the Swedish province of Uleåborg.[95] Although this truce had to be renewed several times, it marked the real end of the Swedish military presence in Finland.

The favourrable conclusion of this convention of Olkijoki, however, was not enough to save Buxhoevden, and so he was replaced by two of his chief political enemies, that is, General B. von Knorring as commander-in-chief of the forces in Finland and General Sprengtporten as the first civil governor-general of the country.[96] Obviously, General Buxhoevden's disgrace involved much more than the tsar's simple displeasure with the hapless soldier's military conduct. Indeed, Buxhoevden's downfall signified the end of all attempts to implement that policy of absorbing Finland into the Russian Empire as an ordinary conquest which had been so closely associated with him.[97]

It was also no accident that the sacking and replacement of Buxhoevden by his rivals was arranged for the same day, November 19/December 1, 1808. Nor was it mere coincidence that a project paper of the same date had been prepared by Sprengtporten, Knorring, and War Minister Arakcheev for the establishment in Finland of a separate and distinct administration from the rest of Russia.[98] It is also interesting to note that the tsar gave his written approval to this project on the very same day as well.[99]

The crucial significance of Alexander's memorandum was in the fact that it instructed Sprengtporten to report all matters pertaining to Finnish affairs directly to the tsar himself and not through the usual apparatus of the Imperial administration:

> According to that which has been known of your experience and attachment to Russia, you will demonstrate every means of governing and transforming the inhabitants into Our faithful subjects, and for you it only remains to present before Me all those new institutions established for their benefit and for that of their country, in the full promise that the prosperity of the Finlanders is equally dear to me, as that of the rest of my subjects.[100]

So important were the concepts contained in these two documents of November 19/December 1 that it has been suggested that Finland's autonomous position actually stemmed from their implementation.[101] In fact, the Finnish "separatists" were to claim that the union of a separate Finland with the

Russian Empire was only particularized in the office of the Tsar-Grand Duke,[102] a contention which was vigorously denied by the so-called Russifiers,[103] those Russian nationalists who wanted the pure and simple Russification of the local government as well as the official language of the non-Russian minorities. Nevertheless, it seems that Alexander was, in effect, quietly setting apart Finland as a non-Russian testing-ground for the constitutional reforms of his good friend, Minister-State Secretary Mikhail Speranskii.[104]

Yet it would be too rash to suppose that even Alexander, much less his government, was altogether committed to the pursuit of revolutionary political solutions. Alexander himself implied that his desire to accomodate his new Finnish subjects as much as possible was founded upon solid military considerations at the time when a state of war still continued to exist between himself and Finland's former sovereign. In this regard, he said that he wished "to give this people a political existence of a kind that they will not regard themselves as conquered by Russia, but to the contrary as attached to her by the bond of their evident self-interests."[105]

As a consequence, the tsar openly responded to the pressure of Finnish interests. The favour that he had accorded

to Baron C.E. Mannerheim's delegation in the previous autumn,[106] was repeated to another group of Finnish petitioners in St. Petersburg by means of Saltykov's address to them on January 4/16, 1809. In his discourse, Saltykov made note that a number of their wishes concerning "New" Finland had already been granted. It was, he said, Russia's desire that the ancient laws and privileges of the inhabitants of Finland would be preserved. He further promised that the question of taxation would be on the agenda for discussion at the forthcoming Diet (Russ. <u>seim</u>) while adding that the governor-general was now prepared to satisfy all legitimate claims of Finlanders for the indemnification of their war losses at the hands of Russian troops insofar as it was possible for him to do so. Saltykov then said that while many prisoners-of-war had already been repatriated, those remaining under guard would be returned home as soon as possible at the discretion of the Ministry of War. He also declared that the Russian army in Finland had been given orders to suspend the sale of <u>boställen</u> (estates held by army officers in return for their military services) at least until peace had been made with Sweden. Moreover, the Russian high command had been given instructions to draw up strict laws for the maintenance of discipline among the Russian troops quartered in Finland. Lastly, Saltykov announced that Russia was ready to ammesty

all Finnish inhabitants who voluntarily returned home from Sweden.[107]

On January 20/February 1, 1809, Alexander extended the historic invitation to the Estates to meet in Borgå (Porvoo):

> We Alexander the First, by the grace of God, Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, etc., etc., etc., Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc., etc., to You, Our beloved and faithful subjects living in the Grand Duchy of Finland, Counts, Barons, Nobles, Bishops, Priests, Burghers and peasants, Greetings.
>
> By the decrees of Providence and the successes of Our arms, the Grand Duchy of Finland having been united forever with our Empire, the welfare of its inhabitants becomes one of the prime objects of Our solicitude. Persuaded that, for the attainment of this salutary goal, all the estates of Finland will hasten to second Us with their efforts, We have decided, in conformity with the constitutions of the country to assemble them in a diet and in consequence We have ordered and do order by these present that a general diet is to be convoked for the tenth of the month of March of this year in the town of Borgå. To this effect the plenipotentiaries of all the estates will render themselves there in the manner prescribed in the regulations of the diet to discuss those objects which We shall find good to confide to their deliberations. Given at St. Petersburg the 20th of January 1809.
>
> ALEXANDER[108]

The significance of this decree cannot be over-emphasized, for it established the tsar's total adherence to Sprengtporten's views concerning the shape of the provisional government to be imposed upon Finland. It also marked the first instance in which the tsar publicly proclaimed himself as the "Grand Duke of Finland," although he had adopted this title on

Christmas Day (o.s.), 1808.[109] The defenders of Finnish "rights" were to declare later on that this special distinction conferred upon Finland had been deliberately created by Alexander to further separate his new Finnish conquest from the rest of the Empire.[110] Notwithstanding the vehemence of the Russifiers' counter-arguments,[111] Alexander appears to have been determined to set up a separate if only a temporary, ad hoc administration to govern Finland until her permanent status was to be settled by a peace agreement with Sweden. This provisional government, designed to render all Finlanders into a state of submission to the Russian will, gradually solidified under the pressure of circumstance into Finland's permanent form of government.

In large measure, this result was attributable to the reconciliation of Russia's own somewhat dichotomous interests in Finland. While on the one hand it was in the interest of Russia to treat the Finns gently for the sake of her immediate ends, it also seemed necessary to incorporate Finland as an integral part of her empire. So, at the very time that the Russian government laboured to create a separate provisional government for Finland, it also strove to make its hold over this country permanent by certain measures preparing for its incorporation into the Empire. Now that Finland had been conquered, Alexander had no desire to

relinquish it once more to Sweden.

According to D.M. Alopeus' memorandum to Saltykov on January 29/February 10, 1809, Alexander wanted a clear title to Finland:

> H.M. desires that the treaty of peace, when it will come to that, will be concluded and, that before all things, the formal cession of Finland therein will be expressed in a clear and precise manner.
>
> Since the treaty of Åbo, interminable differences have arisen from these frontiers which were not marked with the ultimate precision. Those of the province of Uleåborg [Oulu], where Finland ends, do not qualify to serve as the limits to the two States, and he will press to fix them either at the river Kemi, or that of the Torneå. The latter seems the most natural to separate Finland from Sweden.
>
> Will it be necessary to stipulate something about the native Finns who are found in the service of Sweden, or will it not be preferable to pass over this matter in silence and rather to fix a term at the end of which those who live in Sweden must have sold their possessions in Finland in order to prevent the inconveniences which are born from the part of mixed subjects?[112]

Alopeus also mentioned the necessity for the restoration of good relations with Sweden. He suggested that this could be accomplished by Russia's endeavour to see Pomerania and the island of Rügen returned to Sweden once she had joined the Continental System. Furthermore, he saw a need to compensate Sweden for the loss of Finland and its agricultural products.[113] Hence, these aims were also to affect the settlement of Finland's status within the Empire, as well as the nature of the peace agreement between Russia and Sweden.

But since the war had first to be won, Alexander had to content himself with the pacification of Finland and, if possible, the neutralization of those Finnish troops to whom had been delegated the responsibility of defending Sweden's northern frontier from the Russian onslaught.[114] Indeed, Alexander was now more determined than ever to end this war with Sweden as was noted in his February 1/13 ukaz to General Knorring. In these instructions, the tsar acknowledged that Knorring's troops had quite succeeded in suppressing all hostile military activity in Finland by virtue of their conquest of that country, but he also complained that in spite of this "a lasting peace still does not draw near."[115] Therefore, to hasten the war's conclusion, Alexander unfolded to Knorring his plan of action, one which had been conceived by Sprengtporten[116] and developed by Arakcheev.[117]

According to Alexander's directives, Knorring was to undertake a threefold attack upon Sweden: the first of these was to be mounted in the neighbourhood of Torneå; the second was to be directed against Umeå by means of an assault over the hard-frozen waters of the Gulf of Bothnia from Vasa; while the third was to begin with the seizure of the Swedish-held Åland Islands and following this it was to descend upon Stockholm itself across the narrow bridge

of connecting ice.[118] In obedience to his master's command, Knorring immediately began preparing for the late winter campaign with the hope that ultimate victory was near at hand.

On March 14, 1809, 17,000 Russian soldiers led by General P.J. Bagration started to move out of Kumlinge, one of the westernmost islands in the Åbo archipelago, for their descent upon General G.C. von Döbeln's 4,000 man army of the Åland Islands. Three days later, General Barclay de Tolly ordered his 3,200 soldiers to begin their trek over the ice to Umeå and to attack the Finnish 4th Brigade (1,050 effectives and 850 sick) and the Umeå Swedish Division (500 effectives). On March 23, the third Russian attack force of 4,400 men forded the river Kemi and marched against the 3,000 man command of General H. Gripenberg. Decimated by sickness -- for example, the Finnish 2nd Brigade had 650 effectives and the Finnish 1st Brigade had only 500 effectives out of their 1,150 man contingents -- Gripenberg's troops were heavily overmatched.[119]

Having marshalled together infinitely superior forces against his Swedish enemies, Knorring anticipated his triumph in his address to the Finnish people at the beginning of March.[120] He even disclosed Russia's price for peace with Sweden by declaring:

> Finland was conquered three times by Russian arms during the course of the last hundred years, and twice she was returned to Sweden in the hope that such extra-ordinary high-mindedness would prompt the Swedish government into more peaceful relations. In everyone's opinion this was the basis of what was expected when the predecessors of the present king succeeded to the Swedish throne. But such relations were too quickly and frequently forgotten. In the future the Gulf of Bothnia will separate the Russian Empire from Sweden, and Finland now for the last time will be found as the theatre of military activity between these peoples, . . .[121]

By this time, Russia had indeed decided that her major war aim was the permanent annexation of Finland. For example, when Arakcheev informed Alexander I on March 4/16 of his communication of peace terms to Döbeln, he noted that he had given the Swedish government clearly to understand that the chief pre-condition was to be Sweden's formal cession of Finland.[122] The enclosure to this letter, being a copy of the memorandum sent to General Döbeln, also attested to this fact. It read as follows:

> The preliminary conditions which must serve as the basis of the peace
>
> 1. In order to cut out from the future every root of war with Russia, Sweden must cede to her forever the whole of Finland up to the river Calix, including the Åland Islands, and the Gulf of Bothnia shall ever serve as the exterior frontier.
> 2. Sweden will renounce her pernicious alliance with England, and ally herself with Russia.
> 3. If it should happen that in case of a rupture with England, Sweden would not believe herself in a state to oppose the descent of the English by herself, Russia engages herself to help her with

a sufficient corps of troops, ...
[The document concluded by inviting the Swedes to discuss a peace on these terms. It was signed by Count Arakcheev and Generals Knorring and Suchtelen.] [123]

Gustavus IV refused even to consider these terms, but the Russian military pressure had already begun to undermine his government. Already on March 7/19, D.M. Alopeus was able to write to Saltykov that the Swedish king had been deposed so that he could be replaced by his more reasonable uncle, Duke Charles of Södermanland, as regent. Now the Swedish government could be expected to ask for an armistice so that a peace might be concluded. In any case, Alopeus allowed that the military situation was still well in hand. Indeed, General Kulnev's incursion into Sweden in the neighbourhood of Grisslehamn had forced Döbeln to agree to a truce, leaving the Russian forces in possession of the Åland Islands, twenty cannon, and three thousand prisoners at the cost of seven men killed.[124]

At Umeå on March 10/22, General Barclay de Tolly concluded a favourable agreement with Count Cronstedt after having exerted much pressure upon the latter's disease-weakened forces. Cronstedt had to agree to the evacuation of all Swedish troops from Umeå and their withdrawal southward to Härnösand. Moreover, the Swedes had to give up all their munitions and stores but for a four day's supply of provisions. Only the sick were allowed to remain at Umeå under the care

of a Swedish medical officer. The Russians promised, "The convalescents will be handed over to the forward posts of the Swedish army as soon as possible, except for the Finnish soldiers who must return to their homes in Finland with passports from the Russian general."[125] So, once again, Russia tried to influence the return of Finnish soldiers to their homeland.

This aspect of the pacification of Finlanders was even more clearly defined in the truce arranged between Aide-de-Camp General P.A. Shuvalov and General Gripenberg at Seiviz on March 13/25. The following articles of that truce were especially intended for Gripenberg's 1st and 2nd Finnish brigades:

> 2. The Finnish troops will retire to their homes and will give their word of honour at no point to serve until the peace.
> 4. It [the Russian command] will furnish rations to the Finnish troops, be it in supplies or be it in money, as well as passports until they arrive at their destinations.
> 8. All the baggage and effects belonging to the troops, to the Finns as well as to the Swedes, will be left to them in all propriety.126

This tactic was again repeated in May of that year. At the end of April, Alexander ordered Knorring to break the Åland truce that had been made with Döbeln. This quickly led to the encirclement and forced capitulation of a mixed Swedo-Finnish regiment under the command of a Colonel Furmarck

at Skellefteå. The act of surrender, signed on May 3/15, 1809, stipulated that the 394 Finlanders in Furmarck's regiment had to be returned to Finland,[127] leaving in Sweden's service no more than three battalions of infantry, a few handfuls of dragoons, and several units of artillery of the troops raised in Finland.[128] Militarily the war thereafter really was no longer a Finnish affair.

The five hundred year old political connection between Finland and Sweden had been broken well before this diminution of Finnish military participation in the war against Russia. The overthrow of Gustavus IV on March 1, 1809 had given the Finnish Estates the excuse to consider their allegiance to the Swedish crown therewith cancelled.[129] To further encourage the dissolution of Finland's ancient ties with Sweden, Alexander I issued the following proclamation on the day of his arrival in Borgå -- March 15/27, 1809:

> By the Grace of God We Alexander the First, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, etc., etc., etc.
>
> By the Will of the Most High, having entered into the possession of the Grand Duchy of Finland, We have recognized for the best herewith again to confirm and certify the Religion, fundamental laws, rights and privileges, in which each estate of this Grand Duchy in particular and all the subjects living there from the small to the great according to the constitutions of theirs enjoyed by them up to the present, promising to maintain them inviolable and inalterable in their force and effect; in witness of this, We have been favourably disposed to confirm

this charter with Our signature in Our own proper hand . . . .

ALEXANDER.[130]

On the following day at the opening of the Diet, Alexander greeted the deputies in French with this speech:

> By the decree of Providence called to govern a people good and loyal, I have wanted to see their representatives reunited around me.
>
> I have wished to see you to give you a new proof of my intentions for the good of your fatherland. I have promised to maintain your constitution, your fundamental laws; your convocation here guarantees My promise to you.
>
> This convocation will make an epoch in your political existence; it is destined to strengthen the ties which you attach to the new order of things, to complete the rights which the fortunes of war have deferred to Me by the rights most dear to My heart, most in conformity to My principles, those which give the sentiments of love and affection.
>
> I shall let you know My wishes on the objects of your assembly. You will easily recognize in them the spirit which has inspired Me to them.
>
> That the love of the fatherland, the love of order and an inalterable harmony in your view, would be the soul of your deliberations and the benediction of Heaven will come to descend upon upon you to direct, to clarify your labours.[131]

Alexander's list of propositions to the Diet was issued the same day under the signature of State Secretary Speranskii. It's preamble repeated again His Majesty's wish "to give by this [convocation of the diet] a solemn assurance of His generous intentions to conserve and maintain inviolably the religion, the laws, the constitution of the country, the rights and privileges of all the estates in general and

of each citizen in particular."[132]

It additionally noted that the tsar would hear through this first Diet the voice and sentiments of his new subjects as well as receive their oaths of fealty. This document then declared that His Imperial Majesty's paternal solicitude for the well-being of Finland had made him particularly attentive to matters concerning the public economy and general administration. Therefore, the deliberations of the Diet were now directed to certain questions so that it could properly advise Alexander. These matters were four in number: the organization of the military forces; the collection of taxes; the monetary system; and the Governmental Council.[133] In this, the "Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias" chose to retain the consultative function of the Gustavian Riksdag in the new Finnish Diet in such a manner as to allow liberal Finlanders later to claim that it exercised, in concert with the Emperor-Grand Duke, the legislative power.[134]

Of course, the tsar's intentions were not at all clear in this regard, for he seemed more concerned with the problem of exacting an oath of fealty from the Finnish "nation"[135] than establishing its governmental structures. At least this is the implication of the elaborate programme prepared by Speranskii for the declarations of allegiance by the various Estates. In part, this was to be the procedure on March 17/29,

1809:

> 5. HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY, seated on the Throne, gives a speech. The Governor-General will give a translation in Swedish.
> 6. The Chancellor, placed on the second step from the throne, will invite the Nobility to the taking of the oath of fidelity, to whom he will read the promises in a loud voice; -- the Nobility, in approaching the Throne, will repeat them after him. The other Estates will proceed in the same manner.
> 7. After that the Governor-General will declare, that HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY has deigned to solemnly confirm the Constitution of Finland, by sanctioning it with His signature; He will read in a loud voice the Act of Confirmation and will give it to the Marshal of the Nobility.
> 8. The Marshal will give a speech of thanks in the name of the Nobility; the speakers in the name of their respective Estates.
> 9. Then a Herald-of-Arms of the Nobility, standing at the foot of the Throne, will proclaim in a loud voice to salvoes of Artillery these words: Long live ALEXANDER THE FIRST, Emperor of All the Russias and Grand-Duke of Finland! . . .136

According to the procedure outlined above, the delegation from the House of Nobility pledged their oath of allegiance in the following way:

> We the Chivalry and Nobility assembled at this general Diet, so for our own persons as for that part of those of our estate who remain at home, promise and swear all in general and each in particular before God and on His Holy Gospel, that we accept for our Sovereign ALEXANDER THE FIRST, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, Grand Duke of Finland, and that we invariably wish to maintain the fundamental laws and the constitutions of this country as they exist and are in force, as well as to be the support of the Sovereign Power; to obey His orders and to execute them so as to be able to be responsible before God and man; to the Sovereign appertains the order and to us the execution; to maintain that which is just so for the person of the Sovereign as for ourselves;

> also we promise and assure His Majesty to be always faithful to his service, especially to defend the country; to maintain, after the laws and our privileges, our military service as soon as it will be required, be it for reviews, be it for the defence of the country. We exhort all the subjects of the country to be faithful and to pay the contributions due to the Crown; we hold all this faithfully to our best knowledge and power, in witness of which we promise this with hands raised and pray that thusly God is in aid of us, in our soul and in our body.[137]

Using much the same formula, the lesser Estates also pledged themselves to their new sovereign. In reply to them all, Alexander gave this response:

> I receive with sensibility the oaths of fealty which the inhabitants of Finland come to swear to Me by means of their representatives.
>
> The ties which unite me to them, strengthened by this spontaneous movement of their affection, consecrated by this solemn act, in becoming more dear to My heart, conform to My principles.
>
> In promising to them to maintain their religion, their fundamental laws, I have wished to show them the price that I attach to sentiments of confidence and of love.[138]

To further assure the Finlanders of his generosity, he issued "His Imperial Majesty's Manifesto to all the inhabitants of Finland, of March 23 / April 4, 1809":

> We Alexander the First, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, etc., etc., etc., Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc.
>
> In having united the estates of Finland in a general Diet, and received their oaths of fealty, We have wanted for this occasion through a solemn act prepared in their presence and proclaimed in the sanctuary of the Supreme Being to confirm and assure the maintenance of the Religion, the fundamental laws, the rights and the privileges to which each estate in particular and all the inhabitants of Finland in general have enjoyed

up to the present.

In promulgating this act by those present, We believe it necessary to instruct at the same time Our faithful subjects of Finland that in our conformity to the ancient and revered customs of this country, We regard the oaths of fealty sworn by the estates in general and by the deputies of the peasants in particular in their name and in that of their constituents of their own spontaneous motion as good and binding for all the inhabitants of Finland.

Intimately persuaded that this good and loyal people will conserve forever for Us and for Our successors the same sentiments of fidelity and inviolable attachment with which they have always distinguished themselves, We will attach Ourselves to them to give with the help of God continual proofs of Our assiduous and paternal care for their happiness and prosperity. At Borgå this 23rd of March 1809.

ALEXANDER.[139]

Up to this time, it was apparent that the basis of Alexander's concessions was founded in his desire to pacify the Finnish people.[140] It is for this reason that he chose particularly to single out the new obligations of the peasantry, for it was the least reconciled to the new order of things. However, Alexander's speech at the closing of the Diet on July 6/18, 1809 proved to be much more than that, the most significant part of which declared:

Carry into the bosom of your provinces, imprint in the spirit of your compatriots the same confidence which has presided here in your deliberations. Inspire in them the same conviction, the same assurance on these objects the most important to your political existence: the maintenance of your laws, personal safety, the inviolable respect for your properties.

This brave and loyal people will bless Providence which has brought forth the present

> order of things. Placed henceforth to the rank of nations under the empire of its laws, they will not reminisce about the past rule in the cultivation of friendly relations when they are to be re-established by the peace.
>
> And for me, I shall have gathered the greatest fruit of My labours when I shall see this nation quiet on the outside, free in the interior, . . .[141]

If the tsar was not genuinely enamoured with revolutionary ideology,[142] he had certainly adopted the rhetoric of liberalism. Moreover, he also saw fit to create the Governmental Council invested with "sufficient authority for the maintenance of the laws and based upon liberal principles," an administrative organ peculiar to Finland and dependent only upon the Emperor for its powers.[143] In this manner, the spirit and essence of Finnish autonomy were being distilled from the tsar's preoccupation with the tranquility of Finland.

The Diet of Borgå and the consequent settlement of Finland's "political existence" served notice to Sweden[144] and France[145] as well that Russia had been quite able to incorporate this nation into her Empire and that any peace had to take this into account. Although Swedish public opinion still refused to accept the loss of Finland, the regent and his government were ready to accept the inevitable. For when D.M. Alopeus noted that no one in Sweden seemed willing to cede an inch of Finland, Regent Charles replied, "Yes, I do not conceal that it was necessary to do like that,

but to justify myself before the Estates which wish to assemble shortly, it is necessary that I make every pretense to obtain the restitution of Finland."[146]

In reality, the only question of substance yet to be resolved was the western boundary of Russia's new Finnish acquisitions. In keeping with the tsar's role as the protector and sovereign of the Finnish nation, the Russian negotiators endeavoured to establish Finland's natural frontiers on the basis of language. Hence, in the preliminary negotiations, D.M. Alopeus suggested that Finland's linguistic and natural frontier was the Calix River.[147]

His Swedish counterpart protested, noting that the Kemi River better served as a natural frontier. Furthermore, he suggested that instead the frontier should be drawn up on the principle of uti possidetis. Alopeus' reply was that he would then be pleased to inform the Swedish government the moment Count Shuvalov reached the Calix. At the same meeting, the other part of the boundary question, the possession of the Åland Islands, also was raised without any closer agreement being effected in this area either.[148] As a consequence of this, the Swedes once and for all tried to turn the tide by military means but without appreciable success.

So, in the summer of 1809, Swedish and Russian peace negotiators met in Fredrikshamn to hammer out a settlement

of the war. Stedingk vigorously attempted to recover the Åland Islands at the diplomatic table, contending that they were an integral part of Sweden and that their continued possession was necessary to his country if Sweden was ever again to get a peaceful night's sleep. Rumiantsev countered that Russia had had no pretensions with respect to Finland as well as no desire to fight Sweden, but had been pushed into taking Finland and warring with Sweden. Therefore to avoid any renewal of this conflict, Russia now found it necessary to retain her conquests.[149] In reply to Stedingk's proposal to leave the islands in Swedish hands, Rumiantsev remarked, "To cede Finland without the Åland Islands, this means one delivers the chest but keeps the keys."[150]

When the talks threatened to bog down, Rumiantsev persuaded Alexander to consent to a compromise and make the Torneå River the frontier,

> . . . on the condition that the town of Torneå enters into your possession and becomes part of your Empire.
> That this was not the desire to acquire one village or town more or less which makes me speak thusly, but the desire to ward off that which was able to hinder my success; that I knew that, when Your Majesty had been in Finland, many persons of this grand duchy have begged you not to separate Torneå from the acquisition you were coming to make, that the poor inhabitants of Torneå have always been of the ecclesiastical hierachy of Finland and that they can neither be happy nor well governed as when they are not separated, that I was not sure, but it might have been that Your Majesty had promised the Finlanders not to suffer its separation from them and from their destiny the peaceful inhabitants of Torneå. [151]

On one point, however, the tsar would not yield; on no account would he entertain any conditions made by the Swedish king to limit the exercise of Russian sovereignty over Finland. At the peace talks, Rumiantsev disallowed those articles which the Swedes had rewritten to touch upon Finland's internal administration.[152] In this respect, Article VI of the Treaty of Fredrikshamn alone gave even the barest whisper of a hint that the Swedish crown retained a measure of interest in the destiny of Finland and its inhabitants:

> His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias having already given the most manifest proofs of the clemency and justice with which His Majesty has resolved to govern the inhabitants of the lands which he comes to acquire, in generously assuring them and from the spontaneous motion of the free exercise of their religion, their rights of property and their privileges, His Swedish Majesty sees himself by that to be discharged of the otherwise sacred duty to make conditions on that in favour of his former subjects.[153]

However, Article IV of the same treaty gave the Swedish king no cause for interference in Finnish matters at all:

> His Majesty the King of Sweden so for himself and as for his successors to the throne and the kingdom of Sweden, renounces irrevocably and in perpetuity in favour of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and his successors to the throne and Empire of Russia, all his rights and titles to the governments hereafter specified which have been conquered by the arms of His Imperial Majesty in the present war . . .
>
> These provinces, with all the inhabitants, towns, ports, fortresses, villages and islands, as well as

> the dependencies, prerogatives, rights and emoluments, will appertain henceforth in all propriety and sovereignty to the Empire of Russia and to it are incorporated.
>
> To this effect, His Majesty the King of Sweden promises and engages himself in a manner most solemn and most obligatory so for himself as for his successors and for all the Kingdom of Sweden never to form any pretension direct or indirect on the said governments, provinces, islands and territories, in which all the inhabitants will be, by virtue of the said renunciation, released from the hommage and oath of fidelity that they have swarn to the Swedish crown.[154]

In this manner, Finland was finally passed over into the hands of Alexander I and his successors. Alexander himself was most pleased with the outcome. In writing to his sister on the day following the conclusion of the peace, he noted:

> Dear, dear friend, my good, my true friend, it is peace that I announce to you with Sweden and how that I have desired it. . . . This peace is perfect and how absolutely that I have wanted it. I cannot thank the Supreme Being enough. The entire cession of Finland up to the Tornea with the Aland Islands, the membership to the continental system and the closing of ports to England, and finally peace with the Allies of Russia: all of this concluded without intermediaries.[155]

All that remained for Alexander to do was to inform his people of his great triumph. He did this with his manifesto of October 1 (o.s.), 1809, "On the Conclusion of the Peace between Russia and Sweden." In this document, he presented a brief history of the war and consequent peace settlement. He emphasized the matter of the incorporation of the Finnish people into that great body of so many other peoples under

his rule.[156] By this means the conquest of Finland was finally offered to Russia as a *fait accompli* and as an adornment to Alexander's reign rather than as a lackey's wages earned at the bidding of Bonaparte.

As for conquered and annexed Finland, Alexander had bought her silence, tranquility, and cooperation, so that she might not embarrass him. His benevolence toward Finland ensured him of the grand duchy's loyalty; hence, Finland had become Russian, but was not to be Russified.

NOTES

CHAPTER TWO

[1]For example, William George Meredith, ed., Memorials of Charles John, King of Sweden and Norway (London, 1829), p. 6; E.E. / Ernst Karl Engman /, "Rossiia i Finliandiia. Istoricheskii ocherk," Russkaia starina (176 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1870-1918), LVII (1888), p. 691; Slobin, "Diplomaticheskiia snosheniia mezhdu Rossieiu i Shvetsieiu," p. 95; General C.R. Andolenko, Histoire de l'armée russe (Paris, 1967), p. 171; Höijer, "Les rapports Suédo-Russes et la Finlande," p. 102.

However, Alan Palmer, in his Russia in War and Peace (London, 1972), p. 145, suggests that Alexander I made use of this thesis in his wartime propaganda: "Although the Tsar and his ministers sought to mobilise patriotic feeling by representing the campaign as the completion of Peter the Great's policy, the war with Sweden was far from popular. It completed the ruin of the Baltic trade and, if it improved the security of St. Petersburg from outside attack, society in both Russian capitals tended to condemn the campaign as a waste of men and material."

[2]The Russian military, for example, had begun planning and preparing for the next campaign as soon as peace had been made between Gustavus III and Catherine the Great, according to V. Golovachev, "Deistvii russkogo flota v voine so Shvedami v 1788-1790," Morskoi sbornik (St. Petersburg, 1848-1940), CXV (1871), No. 7, Part 2, p. 14. For a good summary of Russian military preparations with respect to Finland for the whole period of 1791-1809, see Keijo Astala, "Venäläistä puolustus - ja selustatoimintaa Suomessa vv. 1808-09 sodan edellä ja aikana," Historiallinen arkisto, LXI, (1967), 148-295.

[3]Stedingk, Mémoires posthumes, II, 423.

[4]Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, p. 16; K.F. Ordin, Pokorenie Finliandii. Opyt opisaniia po neizdannym istochnikam (2 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1909), II, 374.

[5]Jutikkala and Pirinen, A History of Finland, p. 179; Einar W. Juva and Mikko Juva, Suomen kansan historia, IV: Kansallinen herääminen (Helsinki, 1966), p. 11; Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, p. 18; I.I. Kiaiviariainen / Käiväräinen /, Mezdunarodnye otnosheniia na severe Evropy v nachale XIX veka i prisoedinenie Finliandii k Rossii v 1809 godu (Petrozavodsk, 1965), p. 151.

[6]For example, Sten Carlsson, Gustaf IV Adolf: En biografi (Stockholm, 1946), p. 163.

[7]Erkki K. Osmonsalo, "Suomen valtion perustaminen," in Suomen historian käsikirja, II, 20.

[8]Translated from N.K. Shil'der, Aleksandr Pervyi: Ego zhizn i tsarsvovanie (4 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1897-1898), III, 500-504, Appendix XV: "Razgovor imperatora Aleksandra s Erenstremom v Gel'singforse v 1812 godu (Iz zapisok Ioanna Albert Erenstrem.)" For a fuller account of this Finlander's life in the Russian court, see J.A. Ehrenström, "Iz istoricheskikh zapisok," Russkaia starina, LXXIX (1893), 1-40, 209-267, and 417-460, and LXXX (1893), 38-62 and 243-252.

[9]Quoted from Svanström and Palmstierna, A Short History of Sweden, p. 307.

[10]For traces of their early friendship, see S.I.R.I.O., IX (1872): Peripiska otnositel'no nesostoiavshagosia braka Gustava-Adolfa IV s velikoiu kniaznoiu Aleksandroiu Pavlovnoiu.

[11]Most particularly, see "Deklaratsii Aleksandra I" of February 10/22, 1808, in Russia, Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del, Vneshniaia politika Rossii XIX i nachala XX veka, Series I: 1801-1815 (8 vols.; Moscow, 1960-1970), IV, No. 68. (Hereinafter this series will be referred to as V.P.R.I.) For evidence of

Russia's sincere efforts to effect a rapprochement with Sweden over the question of the Continental Blockade by means of resurrecting the League of the Armed Neutrality, see also Ibid., Nos. 33, 34, 47, 58 and 67; Zlobin, "Diplomaticheskiia snosheniia mezhdu Rossieiu i Shvetsieiu," S.I.R.I.O., II, 68-80; and Kiaiviariainen, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia na severe Evropy, pp.130-142.

[12]Osmonsalo, "Suomen valtion perustaminen," p. 3.

[13]On the one hand, Rumiantsev favoured the annexation of Finland (according to Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I: Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801-1825 [Berkeley, Calif., 1969]); while on the other hand, Arakcheev opposed the commencement of a war with Sweden (Zapiski Filipa Filipovicha Vigelia, III [Moscow, 1892], 44-45 -- published as a supplement to Russkii arkhiv, XXX: 1 [1892]).

[14]P.S.Z. I, XXX, No. 22,761.

[15]Wolf von der Osten-Sacken, La condition de droit du Grand-Duché de Finlande comme partie intégrante de l'Empire Russe, trans. by A. du Chayla (St. Petersburg, 1912), Appendix, no. 33.

[16]Shvedskaia voina 1808-1809 gg. Sostavlena voenno-istoricheskogo general'nogo shtava (4 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1906-1911), I, 295; Åttiofriga minnen. Deklarationer, proklamationer, kungörelser och andra officiella publikationer utfärdade Finland under kriget 1808-1809 och under de nästföljande åren (Helsingfors, 1890), pp. 8-9.

[17]V.P.R. I, IV, 176.

[18]Ibid., No. 83.

[19]According to Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, p. 19, the sole purpose of the oath was to act as a preventative measure in pacifying the Finns after the example of a similar oath of fidelity that was administered also to the Finns by the Russians during the War of the Hats

in 1741-42. The breaking of such oaths by civilians was cause enough for the occupying army to treat such resisters with strictest of penalties under the international conventions of the day.

[20] V.P.R. I, IV, No. 72.

[21] For bibliographies and other sources for historical studies on the War of 1808-1809, see Yrjö Aav, "L'histoire militaire en Finlande. Essai de bibliographie," Revue internationale d'histoire militaire, No. 23 (1960), pp. 263-264; L.G. Beskrovnyi, Ocherki po istochnikovedeniiu voennoi istorii Rossii (Moscow, 1957), p. 249; the sections on war history in the excellent Suomen historiallinen bibliografia series, 1544-1960, by various compilers (5 vols., Helsinki, 1940-1968); and Anja Lehikoinen, compiler, Bibliografisk översikt över böcker, artiklar och andra publikationer på svenska om finländsk politik på 1800- och 1900-talet (Turku, 1970), pp. 21-29.

[22] "Lettre de m. de Stedingk au général de Klercker. Saint-Pétersbourg, le 16/28 janvier 1808," in Stedingk, Mémoires posthumes, II, 431-432.
In his letter to Napoleon of March 1/13, 1808 -- after exactly three weeks of war -- a confident Alexander I noted the following: "I envisage this moment as one of the most beautiful in my life. The conquest of Finland has not been deferred; my armies occupy already the most important points and march on Åbo while one bombards Sveaborg. I imagine that shortly all will be finished on this side. . . ." (Translated from S.I.R.I.O., LXXXVIII, No. 176).

[23] Stedingk, Mémoires posthumes, II, pp. 410, 424-425; cf. Russia, Voennoe Ministerstvo, Stoletie voennago ministerstva, ed. by D.A. Skalon (13 vols. in 48; St. Petersburg, 1902-1914), V, Part 1, p. 342.

[24] Stedingk, Mémoires posthumes, II, 410-411; Osmonsalo and Viljanen, "Suomen Sota vv. 1808-1809," p. 706.

[25] Osmonsalo and Viljanen, "Suomen Sota vv. 1808-1809," p. 699; Terrail, La Finlande et les russes, p. 115.

[26]Caulincourt to Savary, April 14/26, 1808, S.I.R.I.O., LXXXVIII, No. 212.

[27]For a comparison of the weaknesses in the Swedo-Finnish and Russian military leadership in the war, see Matti Lauerma, "La guerre de 1808-1809," Revue internationale d'histoire militaire, XXIII (1961), 190-191, and Andolenko, Histoire de l'armée russe, p. 171.

[28]S.I.R.I.O., LXXXVIII, 549-560.

[29]Carlsson, Gustaf IV Adolf: en biografi, p. 164. Terrail, La Finlande et les russes, p. 116, emphasizes the Swedish king's share of the blame for not committing his army to an early defence of Finland; on the other hand, Kuosa, Jokamiehen Suomen historia, III, 969-971, suggests that Field Marshal Klingspor's own fear of his army's inability to defend Finland at all was the primary cause behind its disasterous retreat.

[30]J.R. Danielson, Suomen sota ja Suomen sotilaat vuosina 1808-1809 (Helsinki, 1896), pp. 22-23.

[31]See Articles 4 and 5 in Svartholm's treaty of capitulation, in V.P.R. I, IV, No. 78.

[32]Translated from S.I.R.I.O., LXXXVIII, No. 183.

[33]For example, see "Glavnokomanduiushchii korpusom v Finliandii F.F. Buksgevden ministru inostrannykh del N.P. Rumiantsevu. Gel'singfors, 31 marta (12 aprelia) 1808 g.," V.P.R. I, IV, No. 96, and Zapiski Filipa Filipovicha Vigelia, III, 41.

[34]Cited from the report of M.M. Alopeus to Alexander I, March 6/18, 1808, V.P.R. I, IV, No. 79.

[35]N. Dubrovin, "Russkaia zhizn v nachale XIX veka," Russkaia starina, CIV (1901), 56.

[36]N. Grech, Zapiski o moei zhizni (St. Petersburg,

1886), p. 267; N. Dubrovin, "Russkaia zhizn v nachale XIX veka," Russkaia starina, CVII, 456; E.M. Almedingen, The Romanovs: Three Centuries of an Ill-fated Dynasty (London, 1966), p. 211.

[37]Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, p. 173; Vandal, Napoléon et Alexandre Ier, I, 320.

[38]Translated from Suomen historian dokumentteja, I, No. 309; the Russian version is found in P.S.Z. I, XXX, No. 22, 899. See also Robert Redslob, Abängige Länder. Ein Analyse des Begriffs von der ursprünglichen Herrschergewalt (Leipzig, 1914), p. 245.

[39]Ibid., No. 28, 911; Osten-Sacken, La condition de droit du Grand-Duché de Finlande, Appendix, No. 34, gives a French translation.

[40]Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, p. 18; Pohjebkin, Suomi vihollisena ja ystävänä, p. 88.

[41]Translated from S.I.R.I.O., LXXXVIII, No. 193.

[42]Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, XVII, No. 13792.

[43]S.I.R.I.O., LXXXVIII, No. 193.

[44]This is described in Caulincourt's dispatch to Champagny of March 31/April 12, 1808, Ibid., No. 199.

[45]Caulincourt to Champagny, April 14/26, 1808, Ibid., No. 212.

[46]Translated from Ibid., No. 199.

[47]Eugene Labaume, A Circumstantial Narrative of the Campaign in Russia, Embellished with the Plans of the Battles of the Moskwa and Malo-Jaroslavitz, . . . (Hartford, 1817), p. 15.

[48]N.Ia. Danilevski, Rossiia i Evropa: vzgliad na kul'turniia i politicheskiia otnoshenii Slavianskago mira k Germano-Romanskomu, (5th ed., St. Petersburg, 1894; Rpt. New York, 1966), p. 320.

[49]Eg., see S.I.R.I.O., CXXII (1905): Zhizneopisanie, vcepoddanneishie doklady i perepiska kniazia Aleksandra Ivanovicha Chernysheva, pp. 35-36, and Le Baron Bignon, Souveniers d'un diplomate: La Pologne (1811-1813) (Paris, 1864), p. 204.

[50]Armand de Caulaincourt, With Napoleon in Russia. The Memoirs of General de Caulaincourt, Duke of Vincenza, edited by George Libaire (New York, 1935), p. 53.

[51]Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, XXI, No. 17395 ("À Alexandre Ier, Empereur de Russie, à Saint-Pétersbourg. Paris, 28 fevrier 1811 "); see also Caulincourt, Mémoires, I, 194.

[52]Correspondence de Napoléon Ier, XVII, No. 13955.

[53]Dubrovin, "Russkaia zhizn v nachale XIX veka," Russkaia starina, CIV, 56.

[54]General [Aleksei Nikolaevich] Kuropatkin, The Russian Army and the Japanese War, trans. by A.B. Lindsay (2 vols.; New York, 1909), I, 12.

[55]Osmonsalo and Viljanen, "Suomen Sota vv. 1808-1809," pp. 712-713.

[56]Great Britain, Foreign Office, The Aland Islands, ed. by G.W. Prothero (London, 1920), p. 15.

[57]Quoted by General P.K. van Suchtelen in his report to Rumiantsev of November 12/24, 1810, V.P.R. I, V, No. 264.

[58]Kiaviariainen, Meshdunarodnye otnosheniia na severe Evropy, pp. 169-170.

[59]P.K. Sukhtelen, Kartina voennykh istvii v Finliandii v posledniuiu voinu Rossii so Shvetsei v 1808 i 1809 gg. (St. Petersburg, 1832), p. 8.

[60]A.I. Mikhailovskii-Danilevskii, Opisanie Finliandskoi voiny na sukhom puti i na more v 1808 i 1809 godakh (St. Petersburg, 1841), p. 45.

[61]See "Iz Vcepoddanneishikh raportov Grafa Buksgevdena," No. 1, March 21 (o.s.), 1808, in K. Avramov, comp., "K stoletiiu Russko-Shvedskoi voiny 1808-09 gg.," Voennyi sbornik, 1908, No. 1, pp. 227-229.

[62]The classic account written from this viewpoint is Wilhelm Odelberg, Viceamiral Carl Olof Cronstedt. Levnadsteckning och tidsskildring (Helsingfors, 1954).

[63]See Kiaiviariainen, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia na severe Evropy, pp. 168-171; Osmonsalo and Viljanen, "Suomen Sota vv. 1808-1809," p. 715; and especially Martti Kerkkonen, "Viaporin antautuminen v. 1808. Näkökohtia ja tutkimustuloksia," Historiallinen aikakauskirja, 1954, pp. 149-159, for his refutation of Odelberg's interpretation of Cronstedt's actions.

[64]See "Konventsiia o sdache kreposti Sveaborga ot 25-go marta (6-go Aprela) 1808 goda," S.I.R.I.O., LXXXIX (1893), No. 96 (Enclosure to the letter of "Graf Rumiantsov -- Grafu Tolstomu," St. Petersburg, March 31 [o.s.], 1808). A discussion of these terms are also contained in "Glavnokomanduiushchii korpusom v Finliandii F.P. Buksgevden ministru inostrannykh del N.P. Rumiantsev. Gel'singfors, 24 marta (5 aprelia) 1808 g.," V.P.R. I, IV, No. 92. See also Ibid., pp. 222, 601-602.

[66]V.P.R. I, IV, pp 232, 603.

[66]Osmonsalo and Viljanen, "Suomen Sota vv. 1808-1809," p. 715.

[67]Ordin, Pokorenie Finliandii, II, 383.

[68]V.P.R. I, IV, 589.

[69]Translated from V.P.R. I, IV, No. 86.

[70]Translated from Ibid., No. 88. On March 27/April 8, 1808, Buxhoevden additionally promised that Finns could serve in the Russian army if they wished, but would not be compelled to fight the Swedes (Ibid., p. 223).

[71]Ibid., pp. 226, 588, 589.

[72]Napoleon's informal assent to Russia's annexation of Finland was dated April 29, 1808 (see above p. 81 for text of this). Formal ratification came at Erfurt (Martens, Recueil de traités et conventions, XIV, No. 498) on September 30/October 12, 1808.

[73]Osmonsalo, "Suomen valtion perustaminen," p. 35.

[74]"Venäjän ulkoministerin Nikolai Rumjantsevin kuulutus 8.4.1808," in Suomen historian dokumentteja, I, No. 311; V.P.R. I, IV, p. 270.

[75]Osmonsalo, "Suomen valtion perustaminen,", p. 35.

[76]For example, see V.P.R. I, IV, No. 86.

[77]Jaakko Numminen, "Finland's Foreign Policy as an Autonomous Grand Duchy and the Winning of Independence," in Valtiotieteellinen Yhdistys, Finnish Foreign Policy, p. 25.

[78]The most notable effect of Swedish rule over the Baltic provinces stemmed from its determination to expand state control at the expense of the privileges of the Baltic barons. (See Aleksander Loit, "'The Good Old Swedish Times' -- Myth or Reality?" Second Conference on Baltic Studies: Summary of Proceedings [Norman, Oklahoma, 1971]; and J. Mouvret, Histoire des Pays Baltiques [Paris, 1934], pp. 99-102). After wresting away the Baltic provinces from Sweden, Russia accorded them a large measure of autonomy

which resulted in the following situation as described by Strakhovsky, "Constitutional Aspects," p. 479; "The self-government of these provinces was in reality a means of perpetuating the domination of Latvians and Estonians by the German minority composed of the landed nobility and of the bourgeoisie."

[79]Russia cultivated the impression that she was only interested in altering the outward forms of the Finnish administration while leaving the substance unchanged, as was exemplified by the Act of May 27, 1808 to rename the "Court of Appeals of Åbo" to the "Imperial Court of Appeals of Åbo" without further injury to the status quo. (Osten-Sacken, La condition de droit du Grand-Duché de Finlande, Appendix, No. 36).

[80]Jutikkala and Pirinen, A History of Finland, pp. 183-184; Jackson, Finland, p. 48; Kiaviariainen, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia na severe Evropy, p. 165.

[81]In her study of the popular ballads and broadsheets of the period between 1750-1820, Ulla Riitta Waris, "Arkkiveisuissa ilmenevä suhtautuminen isämaahan, kuninkaasen ja maalliseen esivaltaan Kustavilaisella ajalla," Historiallinen arkisto, LXI (1967), 25-147, notes the presence of strong monarchist feelings in lower class writers even after the educated, upper class writers had become publicists for the Russian conquerors. Only after the war did the monarchism of the lower classes attach itself to the person of the tsar.

[82]Evreinov, Exposé de la question finlandaise, p. 5.

[83]A. Lille, On the Validity of the Fundamental Laws of Finland, trans. by Edward Hisinger (Stockholm, 1892), pp. 6-7.

[84]Sobranie postanovlenii finliandskikh, I: 1808-1839 (St. Petersburg, 1902); pp. 1-2, a French translation appears in Osten-Sacken, La condition de droit du Grand-Duché de Finlande, appendix, No. 1.

[85]Eg., see N.N. Korevo, Vortrag über die finnländische

Frage (Berlin, 1910), p. 4. The same propaganda pamphlet also appeared in other language editions including: The Finnish Question. A Lecture Read before the United Nobility of the Russian Empire at St. Petersburg, 17/30 March 1910 (St. Petersburg, 1911); Den finska fragen. Föredrag vid ryska kejsarrikets förenade adels möte d. 17/30 mars 1910 (Stockholm, 1912); and La question finlandaise -- rapport lu en la séance du 17/30 mars 1910 du congrès de la Noblesse Unifiée de l'Empire russe, trans. by A.M. du Chayla (Paris, 1912).

[86]For example, see Jean Deck [pseud. of Jean Poirot], Pour la Finlande (Paris, 1902), pp. 9-10; Jules Leclercq, Le conflit entre la Russie et la Finlande (Brussels, 1901), 8-9 (an offprint of La revue generale, August-September, 1901); La situation politique de la Finlande (Brussels, 1900), p. 8 (an offprint of La revue de droit international et législation comparée, II [1900]).

[87]Mechelin, A Précis of the Public Law of Finland, p. 4, merely hints that the June 5/17 manifesto constituted a wartime promise, giving the lie to Osten-Sacken, La condition de droit du Grand-Duché de Finlande, p. 5, and Eugène Fiodorow [Evgenie Fedorov], La revolution finlandaise en préparation, 1889-1905 (Paris, 1912), pp. 61-62, to contend that this decree was inimical to Finnish autonomy. One Finnish sympathizer, Despagnet, in his La question finlandaise, pp. 19-21, clearly emphasized the importance of the war situation to Alexander's pronouncement and that it reinforced the idea of a separate status for Finland.

[88]Hallendorff and Schück, The History of Sweden, p.365.

[89]Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, pp. 14-15.

[90]Lauerma, "La guerre de 1808-1809," p. 192.

[91]Osmonsalo and Viljanen, "Suomen Sota vv. 1808-1809," p. 736-738; Ordin, Pokorenie Finliandii, II, 398-399.

[92]For the armistice concluded at Lohtaja, see V.P.R. I,

IV, No. 157, or Sveriges krig åren 1808 och 1809. Utgifvet af generalstabens krigshistoriska afdelning (9 vols.; Stockholm, 1890-1922), V, Appendix, pp. 156-157.

[93]Translated from V.P.R. I, IV, No. 179.

[94]Osmonsalo and Viljanen, "Suomen Sota vv. 1808-1809," p. 739.

[95]For the text of the armistice, see V.P.R. I, IV, No. 180, or Sveriges krig åren 1808 and 1809, V, Appendix, pp. 192-193. In Stoletie voennago ministerstva, V, Part 1, p. 344, it is noted that the truce of Ölkijoki was particularly useful to the Russians for the reprovisioning of arms and ammunition to their exhausted stores in Helsingfors, Åbo, Lovisa, Nystad, Björneborg, etc.

[96]Ordin, Pokorenie Finliandii, II, 414, darkly hints of malicious "intrigues" against Buxhoevden in the Russian court. Since Buxhoevden's handling of the military situation in Finland did not really merit his dismissal, it may very well have been that Alexander himself had been a part of this intrigue, and that his letter of November 6/18 to Rumiantsev (quoted above, p. 95) was intended to justify the general's removal to his closest ideological ally.

[97]For example, Buxhoevden tried to establish the principle that Finland was an ordinary conquest of the Russian Empire through his confiscation of the Finnish boställen, these being the properties provided by the Swedish crown to army officers in return for their military services. In this regard, also see his manifesto of March 21/April 2, 1808 (in Shvedskaia voina 1808-1809 gg., III, 7) which threatened to dispossess those Finnish soldiers who continued to serve in the Swedish army against their own legal sovereign.

For a sampling of the complaints made against Buxhoevden for his policy of confiscating boställen and for his Russification programme in other matters, see Yrjö Maunu Sprengtporten'in, Suomen keneraali-kuvernörin, virallista kirjevaihtoa, I, Nos. 2 and 5, and 1, 3 and 6 respectively. Nor was the opposition to Buxhoevden limited to Sprengtporten, for Soltykov declared his opposition to

the confiscation of the boställen before the Council of Ministers and obtained its support for his view (V.P.R. I, IV, 401).

[98]While Sprengtporten's and Knorring's non-Russian origins may have temepred their resolve in favour of a special status for Finland, one must look elsewhere for Arakcheev's reasons. Perhaps he was anticipating the moment when he would be proclaimed the Prince of Finland. Jenkins, Arakcheev, p. 123, notes that rumours of Arakcheev's expected promotion were widespread. In any case, the report drawn up by these three appears in Yrjö Maunu Sprengtporten'in, Suomen keneraali-kuvernörin, virallista kirjevaihtoa, pp. xiii-xxii.

[99]The tsar noted his own approval on this document in his own hand (Yrjö Maunu Sprengtporten'in, Suomen kenraali-kuvernörin, virallista kirjevaihtoa, p. xiii) and also gave Sprengtporten instructions (Ibid., pp. xi-xii) which charged him to carry out the project.

[100]Translated from the Russian text, Ibid., p. xi.

[101]In his introduction (Ibid., p. ix), Yrjö-Koskinen remarked that the Arakcheev-Sprengtporten-Knorring "Project for the institution of a provisional government in Finland" and the tsar's letter to Sprengtporten "constitute the base of the new state of the country." See also Osmonsalo, "Suomen valtion perustaminen," p. 49; Osmonsalo, Suomen valloitus, pp. 436-437; Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, p. 26; Jutikkala and Pirinen, A History of Finland, p. 185.

[102]Yrjö-Koskinen, in a sense, introduced the idea that "the organization of Finland as a separate state" stemmed from the relationship that had grown between Finland and Alexander I (see Yrjö Maunu Sprengtporten'in, Suomen keneraali-kuvernörin, virallista kirjevaihtoa, pp. vii-x), but he did not define exactly what it was. Mechelin, in his Précis du droit public du Grand-Duché de Finlande, chaps. I and III, declared that Finland's connection to the tsar as the constitutional ruler of Finland established the

"real" union between the Grand Duchy and the Russian Empire. J.R. Danielson, in his Suomen yhdistäminen Venäjän valtakuntaan. K. Ordinin "Suomen valloitus" nimisen teoksen johdosta (Helsinki, 1890), destroyed Ordin's charge (in Pokorenie Finliandii, pp. viii-ix) that he and Yrjö Koskinen favoured any theory of "personal" union between Finland and Russia, but to some degree he amplified upon the theory of a "real" union between Finland and Russia in his Suomen sisällinen itsenäisyys (Helsinki, 1892). It is from this point that Finnish publicists, for example, Meurman, La Finlande d'autrefois et d'aujourd'hui, pp. 60-65, emphasized the constitutional nature of the tsar as Grand Duke of Finland and of his rule in that country.

[103]Ordin's Pokorenie Finliandii naturally received immediate support from the Russian nationalist journal Moskovskaia vedomosti: for example, see the editorials, "Finliandskaia loiial'nost i Finliandskii separatizm," Ibid., May 14, 1889, No. 131; "Borgoskie akty i Lichnaia uniia Finliandii s Rossiei," Ibid., June 3, 1889, No. 151; "Real'naia uniia Finliandii s Rossiei," April 11, 1890, No. 98. See also F.M-v, "Review of Konstitutsiia Finliandii v izlozhenii mestnago senatora 'L. Mekhelina.' Perevedstvo i dopolnevo primechaniiam po russkim dokumentam K. Ordinim, S.-Pb 1888," in Zh.M.N.P., OS CCLV (March 1888), Part 2, pp. 208-217; and the "Review of 'Novaia kniga K.P. Ordina. Pokorenie Finliandii,'" in Moskovskaia vedomosti, January 14, 1890, No. 14. To this must be added N.M. Korkunov, "Pinliandskoe Velikoe Kniazhestvo," Iuridicheskaia Letopis, April 1890; "Novaia derzost finliandskikh separatistov," in Sergei Petrovskii, ed., Finliandskaia okraina Rossii. Sbornik statei, ocherkov, pisem, dokumentov i inykh materialov dlia izycheniia tak-nazyvaemago "finliandskago voprosa" (3 vols.; Moscow, 1891, 1894, 1897), I, 144; and Fedor Pavlovich Elenev's Finliandskii sovremennyi vopros po russkim i finliandskim istochnikam (St. Petersburg, 1891), his "Uchenie o Finliandskom gosudarstve," Russkaia starina, LXXVIII (1893), 255-322 (see especially pp. 255-257), 455-489, and also his Les pretentions des séparatistes finlandais (Paris, 1895).

[104]Marc Raeff, Michael Speransky, Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772-1839 (2nd rev. ed.; The Hague, 1969),

p. 71; Eino Jutikkala, "Toward Independence: A Survey of the History of Finland to 1920," in The Finns in North America: A Social Symposium, ed. by Ralph J. Jalkanen (Hancock, Michigan, 1969), p. 11; Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, p. 23; Yrjö Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen, Suomen kansan historia (3rd ed.; Helsinki, 1933), p. 693.

[105]Cited in Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, p. 46; cf. Armfelt's thesis that Poland's "political existence" would be guaranteed only if Alexander and his successors were crowned as kings of Poland (in E. Tegner, "Imperator Aleksandr I i graf Armfel'd [1811-1812 gg.]" Russkaia starina, LXXXVIII [1896], 142).

[106]A delegation of the four Estates chaired by Baron Mannerheim met in St. Petersburg at the behest of Tsar Alexander. Because it steadfastly refused to admit to having the competence of a regular Diet, this deputation is given credit for Alexander's statute of November 19/December 1, 1808 and also for the eventual convocation of the Diet at Borgå. For this, see Ibid., pp. 24-25; Osmonsalo, "Suomen valtion perustaminen," pp. 48-49.

[107]V.P.R. I, IV, 462.

[108]Translated from Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., pp. 1-2, ("Vysochaishee Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva povelenie o sozvalii obshchago seima v gorode Borgo, ot 20 Ianvaria [1 Fevralia] 1809 goda.").

[109]P.S.Z. I, XXX, No. 23,421, which is translated as follows: " . . . We, Alexander I, Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, of Moscow, Kiev, Vladimir, Novgorod, Tsar of Kazan, Tsar of Astrakhan, Tsar of Siberia, Tsar of Tauric Chersonese, Sovereign of Pskov and Grand Duke of Smolensk, Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, and Finland, Prince of Estland, Livland, Kurland and Semigalia, Samogitia, Bielostok, Karelia, etc., etc., . . ."

[110]For example, see Mechelin, A Précis of the Public Law of Finland, pp. 32-35; W. van der Vlugt, Le Conflit

Finlandais envisagé au point de vue juridique (Paris, 1900), pp. 80-81; Despagnet, La question finlandaise, p. 74.

[111]For example, Wolf von der Osten-Sacken, The Legal Position of the Grand Duchy of Finland (London, 1912), pp. 4, 66-67.

[112]Translated from V.P.R. I, IV, No. 216.

[113]Ibid.; see also p. 515 -- "Aleksandr I. D.M. Alopeusu." The need for compensation of Sweden's loss of Finland was also recognized in Article XVII of the Treaty of Fredrikshamn, September 5/17, 1809 (see Ibid., V. No. 106), in which was stated that the regular commerce between Sweden and Finland in most commodities, particularly in raw materials and foodstuffs, "would be re-established and conserved until 1(13) October 1811 exactly on the same footing as it was before the war and will not be struck down for any pretext . . ."

[114]The Russians applied a great deal of diplomatic pressure to their Danish allies, insisting that the Danish forces in Denmark and Norway maintain a high level of military activity so that Sweden dare not transfer the bulk of her army to the Russian front. For an example of this, see "Poslannik v Kopengagene V.G. Lizakevich tovarishu ministra inostrannykh del A.N. Saltykovu. 12 (24) dekabria 1808 g.," Ibid., IV, No. 195.

[115]Ibid., No. 218.

[116]Osmonsalo and Viljanen, "Suomen Sota vv. 1808-1809," p. 740.

[117]Karl Stählin, Geschichte Russlands von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (4 vols. in 5; Graz, 1961), III, 152.

[118]"Ukaz Aleksandra I glavnokomanduiushchemu armiei v Finliandii B.F. Knorringu. 1 (13) fevralia 1809 g.," in V.P.R. I, IV, No. 218.

[119]Osmonsalo and Viljanen, "Suomen Sota vv. 1808-1809," pp. 740-741.

[120]V.P.R. I, IV, No. 234. The date of this document is vaguely alluded to, viz. "nachala marta." One should also note that Knorring was not above using such proclamations as major pieces of propaganda as illustrated by the fact that his February 15/27, 1809 manifesto to the Swedish people made no reference to the fate of Finland but dwelt on the question of the Anglo-Swedish alliance (Ibid., No. 230).

[121]Translated from Ibid., No. 234.

[122]Ibid., No. 237; see also No.242 (Alopeus to Saltykov, March 7/19, 1809).

[123]Translated from Ibid., No. 237.

[124]Ibid., No. 242.

[125]Ibid., No. 244.

[126]Translated from Ibid., No. 247.

[127]V.P.R. I, V, No. 20, the relevant articles being:
"Article 3. Messr. the officers of the Finnish nation will receive passports to be able to go home and will receive a travel allowance according to their ranks until their arrival at home. The Finnish soldiers will also receive until their destination two pounds of flour and fifteen copper kopecks per day to count from 6(18) of May."
"Article 6. Messr. the Finnish officers shall enjoy their boställen and annual incomes until the conclusion of peace."

[128]Osmonsalo and Viljanen, "Suomen Sota vv 1808-1809," p. 741.

[129]Jutikkala, A History of Finland, p. 179.

[130]Translated from the Russian text as in Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., p. 3. The notorious Russifier N.N. Korevo has included a somewhat less than accurate French rendition of this text in his La question finlandaise, Appendix I, pp. 31-32. For example, he rendered korennye zakony as les lois primitives which, of course, is at variance with those utterances of the tsar that were originally written in French as les lois fondamentales. Korevo also has presented a French translation of the Swedish text. It differs significantly from the French "original" of the Swedish text that Mechelin has included in his A Précis of the Public Law of Finland, p. 6, the English translation of which has been added by Cooke.

While Mechelin has suggested that the original copy of this gramota was in French and then separately translated into Russian and Swedish (with the Finnish retranslated from the Swedish), Korevo has adopted the view that the Russian was the original copy since it is the one autographed by the tsar (La question finlandaise, p. 32). Of late, Osmo Jussila, Suomen perustuslait venäläisten ja suomalaisten tulkintojen mukaan 1808-1863 (Helsinki, 1969), p. 20, has fallen in with Korevo's view. Whatever the merits of either viewpoint, the existence of two differing versions of the March 15/27 manifesto was to create difficulties at the end of the nineteenth century.

Therefore, Cooke's translation (in Mechelin, A Précis of the Public Law in Finland, p.6) is reproduced here as it best reflects the Swedish and Finnish texts of this law. (Cf. Jussila, Suomen perustuslait, p. 20, for an extract of the Swedish text and Suomen historian dokumentteja, II, No. 317, for the Finnish.) It reads as follows: "Providence having placed Us in possession of the Grand Duchy of Finland, We have desired, by the present act, to confirm and ratify the Religion and fundamental Laws [Swedish, Grundlager; Finnish, perustuslait] of the Land, as well as the privileges and rights, which each class in the said Grand Duchy, in particular, and all the inhabitants in general, be their position high or low, have hitherto enjoyed according to the Constitution. We promise to maintain all those benefits and laws firm and unshaken in their full force."

[131]Translated from Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., p. 4.

[132]Translated from Ibid., p. 5.

[133]Ibid., pp. 5-6; cf. Mechelin (A Précis of the Public Law of Finland) who has reordered the list to give first priority to the question of Finland's form of government whereas it appears last on the list as printed in Borenius. Borenius' order of business is retained above.

[134]Lille, On the Validity of the Fundamental Laws of Finland, p. 25, said as much, after noting that the Diet's recommendation were duly enacted into law, "From this it will unequivocally appear that opportunities were offered to the estates at the diet of Borgå to avail themselves of the right of legislation warranted to them in 'Regeringsformen' of 1772 and 'Förenings- och Sakerhet-sakten' of 1789."

The claim to the Diet's legislative powers is given in Mechelin, A Précis of the Public Law of Finland, p. 76:

"Legislation, properly so called, which is exercised conjointly by the Emperor and the Diet, comprises --

1. The fundamental laws and privileges of the orders;
2. The laws on civil and penal matters, and those on civil and criminal procedure;
3. The laws regulating the Lutheran Church, and the rights of other creeds;
4. The maritime code;
5. The laws on military organisation;
6. The laws regulating the Bank of Finland [founded in 1811, but put under the control of the Diet in 1867 by virtue of Art. 55 of the 'Form of Government of 1722,' according to L. Mechelin, 'Monnaie, banques, caisses d'épargne,' in (L. Mechelin, ed. ?) Notices sur la Finlande publiées à l'occasion de l'Exposition Universelle à Paris en 1900 (Helsingfors, 1900), Part iv, p. 1] and the monetary system;
7. The laws on taxation;
8. The laws on economical and administrative matters concerning, not the duties of public servants, but the rights and duties of citizens; such are the laws on industry and commerce and on communal administration, the agrarian laws, &c."

[135]The use of the term "Finnish nation" (Swedish, Finska nationen; Finnish, Suomen kansa) had been used for a long time before the Diet of Borgå with the meaning that is suggested in the German term Volk or the French nation, i.e. the folk, the native peoples or inhabitants of Finland. The concept of political nationhood was not yet then attached to this word. For a discussion of this, see Aira Kemiläinen, "'Nation'-sana ja Porvoon valtiopäivien merkitys," Historiallinen aikakauskirja, LXII (1964), 289-297.

[136]Translated from Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., pp. 7-8.

[137]Translated from Ibid, pp. 9-10.

[138]Translated from Ibid., p. 11. Alexander's pointed emphasis of the free and spontaneous urge of Finlanders to pledge their allegiance to him was aimed to convince Sweden that Finland's will was behind her union with Russia and as well to suggest that he was "tsar-liberator" of a magnitude rivaling Napoleon himself. This gave rise to the Finlanders later claims that the settlement at Borgå was a free agreement of the Finnish nation contracted with the tsar. For this viewpoint, see E. Hornborg, "Le Parlement finlandais," in Werner Söderhjelm, ed., Finlande et finlandais (Paris, 1913), pp. 91-92; Despagnet, La question finlandaise, pp. 50-51; L. Michaud and A. Lapradelle, La question finlandaise (Paris, 1901), p. 24 (an offprint of La revue de droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger, XV [1901]); B. Getz, Das staatsrechtliche Verhältnis zwischen Finnland und Russland (Leipzig, 1900), p.5; F. Moreau, La question finlandaise (Paris, 1900), p. 22 (an offprint of La Revue du droit public et de la science politique en France et à l'étranger, XIV [1900], 193-225).

Those who denied that Finland entered into a voluntary union with Russia included the following: Conrad Bornhak, Russland und Finnland, Ein Beitrag zu der Lehre von den Staatenverbrindungen (Leipzig, 1909), p. 14; N.A.T., "K finliandskomu 'Voprosu.' Mnenii a N.A. Manassena i E.V. Frisha po proekty finliandskoi kodifikatsionnoi komissii 1885-1887 gg.," Russkaia starina, CXXXI (1907), 593-595; Osten-Sacken, Précis du droit public du Grand-Duché de Finlande, pp. 60-61. Osten-Sacken's is perhaps the most

interesting argument; in it, he says that the assembly at Borgå was not a juridically constituted body since it had not been convened by the king of Sweden although Finland was still joined to the Swedish crown at that time.

[139]Translated from Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., p. 12-13.

[140]Jussila, Suomen perustuslait, pp. 18-21; Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, pp. 34-35.

[141]Translated from Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., pp. 14-15. The most famous phrase, "Placé désormais au rang des nations, . . ." was shaped from a fragment of verse which had been written by F.M. Franzén to Alexander I in the spring of 1809: "Tu vins donc consoler, Toi-même, o tendre Père, L'orphelin que Tu mis au rang de tes enfants." (As quoted in Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, p. 34). While Tommila cites this source as proof positive of the meaning of "nation" in this context as " a people" among "the Russian family of peoples," Kemiläinen -- in "'Nation' sana ja Porvoon valtiopäivien merkitys," pp. 299-303 -- disagrees with this interpretation, suggesting instead that it indeed meant "national state." This latter viewpoint is, of course, consonant with Alexander's concept of a "political existence" for the Finns, that kind of "historical life" for them that only came with Russian rule according to Danilevskii, Rossia i Evropa, pp. 25-26.

[142]In the words of George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (New Haven, 1961): "An autocrat by birth, Alexander favoured the constitutional form of government, which he actually introduced in Finland and Poland and intended eventually, but failed, to introduce in Russia."

On the other hand, Ian Young, "Alexander I. Emperor of Russia," History Today, XI (1961), 301-308, suggests that constitutional reform was never achieved in Russia because the tsar himself was not really committed to such a programme. Finnish historians have tended to be even more sceptical; for example, Jussila, Suomen perustuslait, p. 98 (my own translation): "The preservation and stimulation of the ancient, characteristically consultative estate-institutions in the areas conquered from the west, those in which

had already earlier been an organ for estate representation, were from the tsar's viewpoint tactically wise; in this situation it was the one means of Russia's despotic-absolutist tsarism to prevent in advance the eastward spread from France of the revolutionary spirit and the menace of a constitutional diet to the sovereign's power. When the direct threat of revolution was over after the war, Alexander was able to remove his mask of liberalism and begin to drive openly toward a reactionary policy."

[143]"Uchrezhdenie Pravitel'stvuiushchago Soveta v Velikom Kniazhestve Finliandii, ot 6/18 Avgusta 1809 goda," in Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., pp. 16-20.

[144]Rumiantsev instructed D.M. Alopeus to treat the Diet of Borgå in this light in his negotiations with the Swedes, according to his letter of March 21/April 2, 1809 (as translated from V.P.R. I, V, No. 2):

"Providence having already submitted to the scepter of His Majesty all of Finland, this Grand Duchy, to which this monarch comes to open the diet, has renewed through its representatives and from a spontaneous sentiment its oath of fidelity to the Emperor.

"Finland finds itself therefore given to the Russian Empire forever and that alone already alleges the negotiation of a peace with us, in determining this basis so completely."

[145]In that spring Napoleon was trying to exact from Russia the price of involvement in Austrian affairs in return for the annexation of Finland. (For this, see "Zapiska M.M. Speranskago. Nachalo aprelia 1809 g.," in V.P.R. I, V, No. 1.) When he surmised that his project was unattainable, the French emperor had the grace to inform Ambassador Chernyshev the "good news" that Sweden was prepared to meet all of Russia's demands, noting that "The Emperor Alexander realizes Russia's dreams of yore and its frontier in the north of all Finland, . . ." (Translated from "Zapiski A.I. Chernysheva o prevyvannii ego pri Imperatore Napoleone I v Mai i Iiune 1809 goda," S.I.R.I.O., CXXI [1906]; Bumagi A.I. Chernysheva za tsarstvovanie Imperatora Aleksandra I. 1809-1825 gg., part 1, No. 2.

[146]Translated from V.P.R. I, V, No. 13 ("D.M. Alopeus ministru inostrannykh del N.P. Rumiantsevu. S.-Petersburg, 21 aprelia [3 maia] 1809 g.")

[147]Ibid. Since the areas adjacent to the Calix had never formed a part of Finland's ecclesiastical or administrative districts (for evidence of this, see the various maps in Eino Jutikkala, ed., Suomen historian kartasto -- Atlas of Finnish History [2nd rev. ed.; Porvoo, 1959], especially Nos. 15, 16, 19, 21-25), Stedingk later protested against this Russian high-handedness. Rumiantsev replied that Russia had no desire to enter into a historical dispute as to Finland's ancient limits when such a question really concerned Russia's security. See "Protokol'naia zapis russko-shvedskikh mirnykh peregovorov v Fridrikhsgame s 2(14) po 5(17) avgusta 1809," in V.P.R. I, V, No. 79.

[148]V.P.R. I, V, No. 13.

[149]V.P.R. I, V, Nos. 79 and 80 ("Ministr inostrannykh del N.P. Rumiantsev glavnokomanduiushchemu armiei v Finliandii M.B. Barklaiu-de-Tolli. Fridrikhsgam, 5 [17] avgusta 1809 g.").

[150]Translated from S.I.R.I.O., II (1868): Diplomaticheskiia snosheniĭ mezhdu Rossieiu i Shvetsieiu y pervye gody tsarsvovaniia imperatora Aleksandra Pervago do prisoedineniia Finliandii k Rossii, p. 93. In D.M. Alopeus' summary, "Protokol'naia zapis russko-shvedskikh mirnykh peregovorov v Fridrikhsgame s 12(24) avgusta po 24 avgusta (5 sentiabria) 1809 g., " in V.P.R. I, V. No. 95 the following is recorded:

"But Åland, said Baron Stedingk, is the spyglass of Sweden, and if she does not have it, it will always be necessary to be prepared for war, to have a strong garrison at Stockholm and to make immense expenditures for the defense of the kingdom. It seemed to him that the Emperor Napoleon, in guaranteeing Russia the possession of Finland, did not intend thereby to mean the Åland Islands. Count Rumiantsev replied . . . that to want to cede Finland and keep the Åland Islands would be to give away the strongbox and to keep the keys to it for oneself."

[151]Translated from "Ministr inostrannykh del N.P. Rumiantsev Aleksandru I. Fridrikhsgam, 26 avgusta (7 sentiabria) 1809 g.," in V.P.R. I, V, No. 97.

[152]"Protokol'naia zapis russko-shvedskikh mirnykh peregovorov v Fridriksgame s 31 avgusta (12 sentiabria) po 5(17) sentiabria," in V.P.R. I, V, No. 105.

[153]Translated from the Peace Treaty of Fredrikshamn, 5/17 September 1809, as in V.P.R. I, No. 106.

[154]Ibid.

[155]Translated from Perepiska imperatora Aleksandra I s sestroi velikoi kniaginei Ekaterinoi Pavlovnoi, comp. by Grand Duke Nikolai Mikhailovich (St. Petersburg, 1910), No. 27.

[156]P.S.Z. I, XXX, No. 23,883.

CHAPTER THREE

FINLAND -- STATE OR RUSSIAN PROVINCE ?

Finland had always dreaded that the worst would befall her under Russian domination, and yet this did not happen. Finland enjoyed a much happier fate than she had predicted for herself. As one historian put it:

> It was remarkable in that Finland was allowed to retain its native laws, courts, administration, and coinage. The government personnel was non-Russian, and no Russian was allowed to settle in Finland without Finnish permission. The major beneficiaries of this hands-off attitude were the Swedish aristocrats, who continued to be the real rulers of the Finnish people.[1]

The fact that Finland was able to enjoy a privileged existence at the time of her union with Russia, however, was not quite as "remarkable" as this writer seems to suggest, for the Imperial Russian Government had traditionally accomodated itself to the desires and aspirations of its newly conquered subject peoples.[2] For example, the position of the Swedish-speaking elite in Finland was analogous to that accorded to the Germanic Balts in the Baltic provinces, a privileged minority which even exercised a "preponderating

influence in the evolution of Russian destiny."[3] Moreover, as long as the Imperial government was paralysed by wasteful administrative procedures, bureaucratic inefficiency, and a dearth of trained personnel,[4] it was forced to rely upon the native aristocracy to govern in local affairs and to supply the central government with the needed reserves of competent manpower. Therefore, while Finland had been incorporated into the Imperial domain,[5] she was not fully absorbed into the political system of the Empire.[6]

In time, this situation helped to give rise to the conditions against which Dahilevskii was to complain so bitterly:

> Finland, conquered from the Swedes, was given complete individuality and independence: a separate military force which was not to be sent beyond the boundaries of Finland; separate monetary, customs and financial systems; even a constitution and parliament; to her was annexed an area that had already belonged to Russia for a hundred years; the Russian language was not introduced in her schools, the Orthodox Church was not made the state religion; she was not noticeably in the market for our manufactures; not one kopeck of Finland's revenues goes to Russia; in other words, neither in moral nor material relations -- Russia does not only not exploit Finland, but completely to the contrary always extends her own hand in assistance to her.[7]

However, at the moment of Finland's incorporation into the Russian Empire, Russian public opinion bore no resentment toward Finland or her special status. Although Finland had been a recent enemy, sympathy rather than

hostility was shown her after her defeat.[8] Russia's interest in Finland centred largely in finding out the nature of her new conquest.[9] There was as yet no Slavophil movement demanding the Russification of Finland;[10] to the contrary, those Russian conservatives who bore the nascent strains of Slavophilism, Karazin in particular, preferred that Finland be returned to Sweden, be kept apart from Russia, or be absorbed gradually into the Russian State by a natural process of evolution.[11] More importantly, Alexander I himself "had no idea of unification of territories which through historical precedent he considered to be Russian; and, especially in the case of Poland and Finland, he was quite opposed to any Russification measures in border areas."[12]

As a matter of fact, the tsar himself seemed to be quite sympathetic towards Finland and its problems. This, at any rate, is the impression left by his Finnish advisor Ehrenström in this record he had made of a conversation with Alexander.

> . . . He wished to know more about Finland's present situation. In this I replied: "I cannot find myself in this case, Sire, replying with exactitude . . . Of this I am sure, because it has been confirmed to me in every respect, that is that the person of Your Majesty is generally loved in Finland, that everyone is filled with admiration for your magnanimity as well as the most profound gratitude for your justice and kindness. But that Your Majesty should not expect that in so little time Finlanders are able to give way to sentiments of intimacy and affection toward the Russian nation, which for centuries they have

> envisaged as an enemy nation, or that all in one fell swoop, they are able to break off their liaisons of friendship and attachment with Sweden, with which they have been united for five hundred years, and from which they have drawn their religion, their language, their civilization, their laws and their customs. Your sentiments, Sire, are too elevated and too generous, for you not to scorn in your soul a nation capable of changing in a day, so to speak, its penchants, its sentiments, its affections and gratitude as one changes a shirt."
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> The magnanimous monarch then said: "Nothing is more natural than the aversion of the Finns for the Russians. It dates from the time when they made war on Finland as barbarians and devastators, and the hate, which this conduct has excited, has been transplanted from generation to generation by tradition. I still hope that after the last war it has much diminished, for the most severe orders have been given for the observation of the most exact discipline and the fear of punishment for each violation and no complaints of any transgressions from these orders have reached me. I have remarked with satisfaction, during this voyage [of 1812], on the good terms which, in many places, I have found established between the Russian soldiers and the peasants of the country. I am flattered that this good harmony will ever increase."[13]

The truth is that the tsar had every reason to be mindful of Finnish sentiments from the day of the signing of the peace at Fredrikshamn until the day that the Napoleonic menace had finally been contained. For the moment, Finland seemed to be secure in Russian hands, but there was always the fear that the Finlanders would cause much embarrassment to the Russian forces should they ever combine with the forces of Swedish revanchism and Napoleonic ambition. In this sense, Alexander's conduct of internal Finnish matters could not be divorced from foreign affairs although Finland

had been "incorporated" into the Russian Empire early in 1808.

Russia's alliance with France had already reached its turning point. Since Russia refused to support Napoleon's interests in Austria, France seriously began to resent the Finnish gains of its ally.[14] As a consequence of this, France's attention fell upon Sweden as a possible friend and ally in any future war against Russia, reckoning that Stockholm had to renew the conflict sometime if only because of necessity: "Never was the position of a country [Sweden] made more alarming: the loss of Finland removes from it a quarter of its population and of its forces; Petersburg has acquired a frontier, Stockholm has none anymore."[15]

Meanwhile, Napoleon's attitude toward Russia quickly grew more and more hostile. By October of 1810, Napoleon dared imply that those areas (Finland, Moldavia and Wallachia) he had entrusted to Russia for her part in maintaining the Continental System could very well be taken away from her should she not enforce the blockade's strictures.[16] What appeared to be the final blow to the Franco-Russian accord was the election of Marshal Bernadotte as crown prince to the Swedish throne. Bernadotte's promotion, of course, appeared to guarantee that Sweden would soon ally herself with France. Indeed, Napoleon himself believed that:

"If the Swedes take a Marshal for their king, it is to reconquer Finland. . . ."[17]

The resumption of the Russo-Swedish contest seemed imminent. In spite of Russia's effort to persuade Sweden to find compensation for her losses in Norway and her attempts to make such conciliatory gestures as the underwriting of generous Russian trade concessions at Fredrikshamn,[18] revanchist sentiment still filled the heart of every loyal Swede and carried the government as well. According to Tomilla,

> The basis of the idea of revenge originated principally in the feeling of insecurity caused by the detachment of Finland, the rampart against the east, the loss of economic gains native to this country, and, in part also, of the envy motivated by certain advantages given to the Finlanders in the new national unit. It did not seem however that these latter could admit that the separation of Finland was advantageous for their country, for one believed them to be malcontents of their own kind.[19]

As for Alexander, he tried various means to heal the wounds he had inflicted upon Sweden and Finland. For example, he sent Andrei Brun, who was a man well-versed in the language and customs of Finland from the time he had been Russian consul in Åbo during the Swedish regime, to Göteborg to assist the Finlanders there and to show them the benevolence of the tsar.[20] Of even greater importance was the issuance of "His Gracious Majesty's Manifesto Concerning the Finnish Forces," of March 15/27, 1810:

WE ALEXANDER THE FIRST, Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, etc., etc., etc., Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc., etc.

From the moment that Providence has delivered to US the fate of Finland, WE resolved to govern this country as a free nation and enjoying the rights which its constitution guarantees it.

The proofs of devotion which the inhabitants have given US since the oath of fidelity which they have offered to US of their own full will through their representatives meeting at the Diet have only been able to reaffirm this resolution in US.

All the acts emanating until now, for the internal administration of this country, are only a continuation and an application of this principle. The maintenance of the religion and of the laws, the meeting of the Diet, the formation of the Governmental Council within the heart of the nation, the conservation intact of the judiciary and administrative order, are in themselves the proofs which must assure the Finnish nation of the rights to its own political existence.

Among the institutions to which all OUR attention has had to be fixed, the organization of the military force is one of the most important. Having resolved never to introduce that which does not conform to the existing laws, WE have decided to conserve in Finland the military organization as it has existed before this time, therein adapting it more to the manner of the country and to the welfare of its inhabitants.

. . . . . .

ALEXANDER.[21]

One major intention of this manifesto was to entice the veterans of the Finnish army in Sweden to return home and enjoy their military land-holdings. For although the Finnish army had been dissolved by the tsar for the period of fifty years at the insistance of the Borgå Diet whose fear was that Finnish soldiers otherwise might be forced to face in battle old comrades-in-arms of their former

fatherland, this manifesto guaranteed to these men the retention of the extensive system of land tenure in Finland based upon military service to the Swedish crown.[22] It also promised them the continuation of that system of constitutional rule that had proven to be so advantageous and appealing to Finland and Finlanders. In a very real sense, it was intended to attract the Finnish malcontents in Sweden to return home so that their poison might be drawn out.[23]

This decree was also of greatest importance to Finland itself, for it assured the continuance of Finland's autonomous political existence within the Russian Empire as had been established during the Russo-Swedish War and immediately thereafter. Indeed, this manifesto was to become one of the major weapons in the hands of the Finnish autonomists of the late nineteenth century.[24] However, it also had a more immediate consequence inasmuch as it assisted the economic life of the country return to that level of normalcy so necessary for the pacification of the Finnish people.

Undoubtedly Alexander's fear of a Finnish uprising in concert with the determined forces of Swedish revanchism was at a peak during these critical years of 1810-1812 when the pattern for Finland's separate political existence

was created. The tsar's uncertainty over the behaviour of the Finlanders prompted him to make every concession possible in their favour,[25] so much so that the satisfaction of Finland almost became an end in itself. In fact, Alexander said so in his letter of April 16, 1810 to Count Aminoff: "My goal is fulfilled at the moment that they recognize the motive that makes me stir; that is to see the political existence of Finland consolidated."[26]

Alexander established this aspect of his Finnish policy even more clearly in the opening lines of his instructions to Finland's Governor-General Steinheil in a secret rescript dated September 14/26, 1810. This rarely quoted passage reads as follows:

> The actual situation in Sweden, from a political point of view, hardly gives rise to an extraordinary uneasiness, but, by reason of the local Finnish circumstances and in consideration of the novelty of its government and of the multiplicity of the ties which still exist between this country and Sweden, it would be better to take measures for which the new order ofthis kingdom will not be ill-starred for Finland.[27]

Then came the famous paragraph which was seized upon by the defenders of Finnish state rights,[28] and whose very existence was doubted or importance denied by the Russophils.[29] It declared:

> In regulating the situation of Finland, I have had the intention of giving this people a political existence; of such a kind that they would not regard themselves as conquered by Russia, but as attached

> to her by the tie of their evident [self-] interests; that is why not only their civil laws but also their political laws have been maintained.[30]

At this point the evidence suggests that Alexander still had been toying with the idea of making over Finland into a dependent buffer-state of the Empire. Presumably this had been on his mind for some time before he called together the Estates at Borgå. Had the war not gone well enough for Russia for her to wrest Finland forthright from Sweden, the precedent would have been set for the secession and detachment of Finland from Sweden as an "independent" state under the protection of Russia at the behest of an acquiescent Finnish diet. Perhaps the "urgent necessity" to which Alexander alluded in his decree of August 6/18, 1809 for the establishment of a Governmental Council in Finland had its inspiration in the on-going peace negotiations then taking place at Fredrikshamn.[31]

Doubtlessly the Governmental Council could have provided, should it have been necessary to do so, the nucleus for an independent Finnish government. Accordingly, this body was created as "a special commission formed of citizens of Finland distinguished by their knowledge and their patriotic views" and invested with "sufficient authority for the maintenance of the laws and based upon liberal principles."[32] The competence of the Governmental Council was defined as

follows: "All that concerns the general administration of justice and the public economy is in the jurisdiction of the Council, excepting the cases in which the decision according to the laws appertain to the immediate authority of the Sovereign."[33] In short, the Governmental Council under the chairmanship of the governor-general had been made the chief executive body in Finland: "As the Council may not exercise any other power than that which is delegated to it by the Emperor, all its acts are rendered in the name of His Imperial Majesty."[34] While the peace settlement at Fredrikshamn established that there was no longer any need to consider turning Finland into a client state, the continuing hostility of Sweden encouraged the tsar to retain the Governmental Council as a way to guarantee Finnish loyalty to the Russian regime.

Yet changes in Russo-Swedish affairs were in the air. Although the majority of the Swedish populace resolutely retained a deep hatred of their hereditary enemy, their government began to edge toward a rapprochement with Russia as early as the fifth of November 1810 when the Russian ambassador General Suchtelen and Bernadotte, the Swedish Crown Prince, exchanged pledges of peace between their respective countries.[35] Bernadotte, having joined his own coat of arms with those of Sweden and the ancient Folkungar

dynasty,[36] shrewdly realized that the legitimacy and good fortune of the new dynasty he was founding would be dependent upon the approval, friendship and protection of Russia. As a consequence of this, he was ready to betray the wishes of his electors and future subjects who expected him to be anti-Russian and pro-French in his foreign policy.

Russia was quick to perceive this in the attitude of Bernadotte. As early as November 5, 1810, Baron P.A. Nikolai wrote to Prince M.S. Vorontsov from Tornea:

> The Swedes have hoped to learn something of Finland through the mediation of their new prince-royal; but they have found themselves well-fooled, when he has declared to them that it was no longer necessary to dream of it.[37]

It also soon became clear that Finland, for the recovery of which Bernadotte had been chosen crown prince, was to be the gambit for his own royal ambitions. To this effect, we have Suchtelen's report of November 12/24, 1810 concerning his conversations with Bernadotte:

> Bernadotte: "Let us speak of military matters, . . . the nation has suffered a great loss, she knows what part you have had in this war, that it is you who have taken Sveaborg, which was the boulevard of Finland, . . ."
>
> Suchtelen: "Allow me, milord, . . . to speak to you also of military matters. Finland was indispensible to Russia for a century. She was always an apple of discord between the two States; . . ."
>
> Bernadotte: "Yes, . . . you are quite right; at present

> this apple of discord no longer exists; moreover, I am perfectly agreed upon that Finland by its geographic situation must belong to Russia."[38]

For his own part, Alexander applied as much pressure as possible upon the new successor to Sweden's King Charles XIII. Chernyshev, for example, was sent as an envoy to Stockholm with the instructions to promote the peace with Sweden and the prince royal.[39] Obviously Chernyshev's diplomatic skills were of a high order so that he was able to receive assurances from Bernadotte like the following: " . . . I will not have trouble to persuade you that I will be a good neighbour."[40]

In his report to Alexander on December 7, 1810, Chernyshev noted that Bernadotte declared that Sweden's welfare was dependent upon Russia. To this, the prince royal also added that he pledged his word that Finland was not recoverable.[41] Such overtures were not without their effect upon Alexander, for in his letter of December 19/31, 1810 to Bernadotte he expressed his desire for the crown prince's and Sweden's friendship. In a postscript addressed "For Your Highness only," there appeared this statement: "Our interest is found in the conservation of Sweden."[42]

Yet there was more to the northern game of diplomacy than this, for Bernadotte also entered into discussions with the French. He sought to improve the stakes by asking

Napoleon to give him subsidies, Finland and, most importantly, Norway, should Sweden ally itself with France in war against Russia.[43] According to Segur, Napoleon was enraged with the audacious proposal of his one-time underling.[44] Nevertheless, Napoleon was inclined to agree to all but Sweden's annexation of Norway.

Napoleon, in a letter to Champagny on February 25, 1811, gave these reasons for his decision not to support Sweden's aspirations to Norway:

> It will be added that to wish to take Norway, it is a folly on the part of Sweden; that Russia will not be more content than Denmark, since, as mistress of Norway, Sweden will have more of the means to retake Finland; so long as the court will be in Stockholm, it will be the first thought and the first need of Sweden; that Denmark cannot intervene in the war against Sweden except through Norway; and that Russia will never be crazy enough to forget that Sweden is its irreconcilable enemy.[45]

According to Baron P. Nikolai's report of October 19/31, 1811, Bernadotte had told him that France had later made Sweden another kind of offer. Sweden was, in this instance, to be given neither subsidies, Finland, nor Norway. France would simply insist upon Sweden's neutrality in the event of any Franco-Russian war. This proposal was declined by the crown prince.[46] It seems that he was not really interested in reaching any sort of accomodation with the French.[47]

While professing that he had no wish to wage war

against France,[48] Alexander began to treat with Bernadotte in earnest. In his instructions of February 25/March 8, 1812 to Ambassador Suchtelen, the tsar suggested that Russia had gained as much advantage as she could from Sweden as she had seized most of Finland. Therefore, he believed, it was desirable to change and improve Russo-Swedish relations. As a consequence, Suchtelen was told to convey to the Swedish crown prince the information that Russia now consented to Sweden's designs upon Norway -- and would even offer the assistance of Russian troops from Finland for this project.[49]

Almost in reply the Russian court heard news that France's counter-proposal of March 25 included subsidies and a part of Norway if only Sweden would invade Finland.[50] On April 20/May 11, 1812, Suchtelen corrected this rumour, telling Rumiantsev that Baron Engeström had informed him that Napoleon had not offered Norway to Sweden. Instead, the French emperor had tempted Sweden with all of Finland, Mecklemburg, certain other small territories, and six million francs at once and one million pounds per month in subsidies.[51] This, in effect, was France's final offer to her former Marshal Bernadotte.

The crucial question could not be postponed any longer. Hence, one of his closest courtiers felt himself compelled to ask Bernadotte: "Ah well, Count Charles, we are thereby forced

to take a side -- either with Napoleon to have Finland -- or against him with Russia to have Norway -- what will be your advice?"[52]

Since Bernadotte was not a Swede, he did not feel himself bound to the wildest fancies of Swedish chauvinism which demanded the return of Finland. Indeed, his practical nature led him to cast his lot with Alexander and Russia, which resulted in a schism between his own dynastic aspirations and the sensibilities of the Swedish people.[53] In retrospect, Bernadotte had chosen well for his dynasty's sake, for following Napoleon's defeat Alexander even hushed the persistent murmurs that were raised against him in St. Petersburg.[54]

But in 1812, it was Bernadotte who was of service to Alexander. According to Alexander's letter of May 2, 1812, the crown prince had informed the Russian court of Napoleon's plan of attack.[55] Moreover, the agreement which Bernadotte and Alexander concluded in Åbo during the summer of 1812 ended the fear of a Swedish attack on Finland, thereby enabling Steinheil to transfer Russian troops from Helsingfors to the opposite Baltic shore nearer the field of military operations.[56] Since the Swedish threat to Finland had ended, the more fanatical Finnish officers resigned from the Swedish service and took up arms under the banner of Napoleon.[57] In this way Finland's remaining political ties with Sweden

were severed and she was irretrievably cast adrift without the hope of redemption into Russian hands -- a necessary step before Russia could truly act as though she had a free hand in Finland.

Certainly the combined weight of political and military considerations had been pressing enough to persuade the tsar to treat Finland with a gentle and discreet hand. Moreover, Alexander's own proclivity for things European were to stimulate him to establish this country as a cordon d'acclimatation for those western influences he wished to introduce into the rest of his Empire.[52] Concomitant with this aim of the tsar was his desire to remove the blemishes of arbitrariness and caprice in the rule of the Russian autocracy by means of a constitution.[53] Herein may have lain another principal motive for his guarantee of Finland's political existence as separate from the rest of the Russian Empire: for Finland's constitution, in particular Gustavus III's Form of Government of 1772 and Act of Union and Security of 1789, could provide the model for rationalizing the rule of the Russian autocracy.

There is indeed evidence that Alexander was quite enthused with Finland's mode of government. This was clearly stated in the reply he made to G.M. Armfelt when asked if Finland's constitution interfered with the tsar's rule:

> My dear monsieur le baron, I vow to you that these forms please me much more than that exercise of an unbridled power, for which there is no other basis than my own will, and which admits to a principle of perfection in the sovereign that, alas, does not exist in mankind. Here [in Finland] I cannot err except in that which I well wish; all the facts are offered to me; there [in Russia] I am only surrounded by uncertainty and almost always by customs which have taken the place of laws.[60]

Then, during the same audience with Armfelt, Alexander went on to say:

> You will see what I think of that, there where exist the means for making a change to my States, since I come without delay to reunite old Finland with the rest of Finland and to give it the same constitution and the same forms of liberty.[61]

Alexander was good at his word; on December 11/23, 1811, he issued a manifesto declaring the union of the guberniia of Old Finland with the Grand Duchy of Finland. According to the terms of this manifesto, the province of Viborg was to take its place alongside the other Finnish provinces.[62] Since Old Finland had fallen upon hard times under Russian rule,[63] many Finlanders believed that this union constituted a backward step for Finland until their misgivings were finally overcome by their desire to help the Old Finns improve their situation.[64]

Also, the Finlanders' more immediate fear that this union would lead to the absorption of Finland into the Russian Empire under Russian law soon proved to be groundless.

On December 31/January 12, 1812, Alexander published a "Decree concerning the Changes in Vyborg Gubernia," in which he confirmed that the legal conditions of this province were to be brought into conformity with those of New Finland. In Old Finland, the "Constitution of the Grand Duchy of Finland" now was to govern the convocation of the Estates, establish the basis for property rights of immovables and land, and determine the rights and duties of landlords and of all those peasants who were descended of Finnish stock in Viborg province.[65] In the preparation of this decree, the tsar was so careful to maintain Finland's separateness that he struck out the phrase "incorporated into our Empire" from the preamble in Speranskii's original draft.[66]

While the tsar's behaviour pleased the Finlanders, it did nothing good for the temper of conservative Russians, particularly for those whose estates in Old Finland were to be put in jeopardy by the new order of things. Since it would have been presumptuous for the opposition to challenge the autocracy itself, Speranskii became the central target of its criticisms. One highly placed person had this to say:

> On the first day of my entrée into the [Imperial] Council, it was proposed to assimilate the two Finlands. I myself went to oppose it; I asked of what possible use that was to be and what change must there be made to our Old Finland? Speranskii has been the promoter

> of this project. He wished to reply, but the Emperor himself took the floor and assured me that no change would be made there, as the two were governed on the same principles, that by the fact were already united, one has only reunited them in name. . . .
> . . . Everything that Speranskii wishes inevitably must be done, and all opposition becomes a lost cause.[67]

Moreover, in influential quarters feelings ran so high against this project that Karamzin, buoyed up by them, dared even to confront the tsar himself with this accusation:

> What right have You, Sire, without battle, without any visible reason, not for the welfare of the whole state, but by your own arbitrariness, to strip away from Russia this province which has been acquired by your ancestors and by their subjects and not by You? Find an example in history as unjust . . . Why does one speak of it, the conquest of Finland is the glory and not the crime of Alexander I[68]

Obviously the Russian society was being kept in the dark as to the true motives of the tsar and, as a consequence, found his actions to be quite incomprehensible. Alexander seems to have wished it so; fearing the worst opposition from his subjects, he chose to achieve his ends by the covert exercise of his autocratic powers. Shil'der, however, provides the essential clue through which Alexander's Finnish policy can be fathomed:

> The problem concerning the extent of the Finnish state was already resolved for a long time in the mind of Emperor Alexander, and scarcely a thought of this belonged to Speranskii although he was recognized as the author of this project; to the contrary, similar generosity concerning the frontier corresponded entirely to the favoured, secret thoughts of Alexander and was intimately tied to his notion of the superiority of constitutional order over unlimited autocracy.[69]

In decreeing the union of the two Finlands, Alexander obviously abandoned any thought he may have had setting up his conquest as a client state after the manner proposed by the Empress Elizabeth as a means of guaranteeing the pacification of the Finns and of reaching a suitable compromise with Sweden prior to the anticipated war against Napoleon. How such a solution proved to be no longer necessary, but by this time Finland's isolation from the rest of the Empire was already nearly complete. It was precisely in this context that Speranskii had declared: "Finland is a state [gosudarstvo], not a province [gubernia]."[70]

In this instance, Speranskii was not making a definitive statement on Finland's future relations with the Empire as was later contended by the Finnish separatists,[71] but rather he was commenting on the existing order of things. In any case, it was neither Speranskii's nor Alexander's intention to shield Finland from Russia; it was, however, their aim to hide their programme of constitutional reform from Russia in Finland. This was made quite clear in Speranskii's response to the following statement he saw in a memorandum: "Finland is deemed to be a province." Speranskii's reply was: "Quite so, it is undoubtedly a province, but for the present it is disagreeable to speak of this."[72]

This time it was the Russophils who had partially

misinterpreted Speranskii's intent, for they did not understand that Finland's real relationship with the Empire then had to be concealed from Russia itself.[73] While it may be true that Speranskii himself and his reforms were by no means truly liberal in comparison with western European political thought,[74] in Russian terms they were all too liberal.[75] The knowledge of what had been done to Alexander's father was still too fresh in his mind to allow for unnecessary antagonism of the Russian conservatives, hence the need for silence in regard to Speranskii's Finnish adventure.

Speranskii's concern for Finland is perhaps best perceived in "Observations sur la Finlande avec quelques parallèles sur les principes de l'administration intérieure," a memorandum prepared under his direction.[76] In this document, he had adopted Finland as the model of good government, noting that

> Finland was united to Sweden less by her geographic situation or by the connection of language than by their institutions. Her happy destiny had her submitted to the most generous of Monarchs. The different classes of inhabitants there have enjoyed civil and political rights. They have conserved their rights and the form of their Government. Not by her good fortune as to the character and the knowledge of the best of Sovereigns, it is due to the local Government of the Grand Duchy responding to its liberal views and proving through taking after the example of a free province that it has conserved its rights, will cede nothing and will surpass all others in the strict observance of the

> laws, and by the wisdom of its administration, the maintenance of simple morals and religious spirit (which distinguished them formerly) as well as by its efforts to contribute to the needs of the State. These people have surpassed their neighbours in civilization, their administration is better, they must continue in that spirit.[77]

It was also herein that Speranskii revealed the conservative nature of his contemplated reforms in his definition of the "principles of constitution":

> A Constitution must not be an edition of cabinet nor a Privilege accorded by the grace of the Sovereign. It is not properly other than the result and the spirit of all the institutions which appertain to a Country. Time and circumstances lead to it, the will of the Legislator accelerates it, it consolidates.
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> . . . . . .
>
> The constitution of Finland is one of the most ancient monuments of the feudality and of the Principle of communities [i.e. feudal corporations].[78]

Following this, the memorandum entered into a lengthy analysis of Finnish administrative practices in politics, law and economics for the express purpose of illustrating those points of Russia's shortcomings wherein it might do well to follow Finnish models. Nevertheless, this document cautioned that while reform in Russia was necessary, that it could only come when all the parts of "the great machine of the state" had been organized. Then, having accepted the thesis that change in great states was unavoidably slower than in the small ones although the same principles of good government applied to both, this memorandum dared only to

conclude with a set of temporary measures for the reform of the Russian administration.[79] If this memorandum can be taken as a true indication of Speranskii's reformist tendencies, we are forced to agree with those scholars who have decided that Speranskii's "liberalism" extended only so far as his pursuit of efficient administrative centralism in the Russian government.[80]

Although a more genuine attachment to liberal sentiments may be discerned in the person of the tsar, the accomplishments of his reign have been less than in keeping with such ideals. Indeed, the whole thrust of constitutional reform in his reign seems to have been directed toward the acquisition of greater administrative order -- and not at all toward the constitutional limitation of the tsar's autocratic powers and prerogatives.[81] In this context, the tsar's generosity toward Finland can therefore be perceived as a clever first step in the overhaul of Russia's creaky administrative machinery rather than as some altruistic whim on his part in contravention of his own dynastic and national interests.

The tsar's treatment of Finland cannot be dismissed as either an accident or isolated occurrence, for a similar experiment was even then being repeated in Poland for similar reasons. Russian-held Poland also was guaranteed its ancient

rights, laws and language by the tsar.[82] Here again Alexander sought to improve the administrative and judicial processes by favouring the appointment of native officials and functionaries to many of the higher posts in the Polish provinces.[83] He even endeavoured to streamline Poland's governmental machinery with the assistance of such Finnish experts as J.A. Ehrenström and G.M. Armfelt. The fact that Alexander should have chosen Armfelt in particular for this task was most significant, for this Finlander had not only come to favour a federalist union for his own country's tie with Russia,[84] but he also wished a similar sort of political existence for Poland under the presidency of the tsar as king of Poland.[85] These details pieced together indicate the ultimate direction toward which Alexander was moving in search of the ideal formula for good government in his Empire.

In simple terms, Alexander was conducting an experiment in federalism. While such a view of Alexander's policies has not yet succeeded in becoming very popular with historians, it has existed for a long time. A. Kizevetter, for example, recognized that Poland and Finland were "two states on the Russian frontier which were united to Russia by ties of a federal character" and that they had "revived in the mind of Alexander his old interest in federalism."[86] The tsar's continuing interest in federalistic experiments later led

to his employment of Nikolai N. Novosiltsev in a project of constitutional reform for Russia after the federal pattern of the United States of America.[87] Nevertheless, Alexander dared not introduce into Russia such radical schemes as this one.

While Alexander's political sagacity was of the highest order, the same could not be said of his resoluteness and firmness of will. For example, when the furor over the union of the two Finlands raged too hot for comfort, the tsar, fearing another firestorm of dissent, postponed his constitutional project for Poland until a later date when he could lay the responsibility for its implementation upon the Polish settlement made at the Congress of Vienna.[88] The combined opposition of high court officials, Old Russian Conservatives, young nobles and junior army officers (among them the later Decembrist, Pestel) to Poland's special status had forced the tsar to reconsider his plans for Poland.[89]

Although Finland did not quite evoke the same intensity of jealousy in the Russian heart as did Poland, there were those who still considered that: "We believe that we have conquered Finland, but it is, quite to the contrary, Finland who has taken a part of Russia."[90]

R.H. Rehbinder, Speranskii's aide in the drawing up of Finland's new order of government, presciently warned

his fellow-Finlander and colleague Count C.E. Mannerheim in February of 1812 that this union of the two Finlands would create enormous difficulties for them with Russia in the future.[91] Rehbinder was probably more correct than he would have cared to believe, for it was in this act that the Russian animus against Finland had been conceived.

Indeed while Alexander had contrived to strengthen and consolidate the separate political existence of the Finnish state through this act of union, he had also inadvertantly succeeded in ending the isolation of Finland from the political consciousness of the Russian public and, more importantly, in increasing greater Finland's strategic significance to the defence of St. Petersburg. The tsar had so inextricably interwoven the destinies of Finland and Russia that it was inevitable that Finland's separate status would henceforth be a growing source of irritation to those who would include Finland within the framework of a unified Russia.

To avoid any admission of contradictory evidence to their own views in Alexander's Finnish policies, the Russian nationalists at the end of the nineteenth century either claimed that the tsar's intentions were being misinterpreted by each succeeding generation of Finlanders or that he had been "tricked" by the Finlanders themselves

such as the likes of Sprengtporten and Armfelt.[92] Yet, as one Finlander noted, Alexander was hardly so naive as to allow himself to be so contemptibly gulled.[93] While the ultimate aim of Alexander's will with respect to Finland was never fully realized and therefore remains to some degree as a matter of conjecture, there is no doubt as to the nature of his immediate objective -- the pacification of Finland. When judged in this context, the tsar's Finnish policies show an unerring consistency and an enormous measure of success.

For example, it was due to Alexander's kind treatment of the Finns that he was able to transfer Russian troops from Finland in the late summer of 1812 to those areas directly menaced by Napoleon. Furthermore, he was able to entrust the defence of the Imperial family and St. Petersburg to units of the newly formed Finnish army in the spring of 1813,[94] thereby relieving the Russian guards for combat duty. The fact that Alexander was able to accomplish both of these measures at all, much less without any untoward incident, amply demonstrates that he had truly pacified and reconciled Finland to her new situation.

This is not to say that Finland had become "russified" to any extent, for she retained an identity and feeling of separateness from Russia that betokened a sense of nascent

nationalism. It was Alexander's genius or good fortune that his wishes and needs were often in concert with this undercurrent of Finnish opinion. In the matter of the creation of the Finnish army for instance, Alexander's desire for more fighting men was more than matched by the wish of Armfelt and his fellow patriots to have a Finnish national army that would redound to Finland's honour through its sharing of the common Imperial responsibilities and sacrifices in defence of Tsar and Empire. At the time, it little mattered that these Finlanders also wanted to establish a Finnish national army for purely nationalistic reasons, the most important of which were to exploit the occasion of the creation of such a force as the pretext for reconvening the Diet of the four Estates, to use this army as the repository for Finland's sense of national identity, and to make it of sufficient size to allow the displacement of Russian troops as redundant to the defence of Finland.[95]

Alexander, in catering to his own and Finland's wishes, continued to make satisfactory compromises. Rather than chance the re-establishment of a 20,000 man Finnish army as had been the case under the Swedish regime, he assented to the creation of a token 3,600 man force only. It was to consist of three Jaeger regiments, each of which was to be made up of two 600 man battalions. These units were to be

raised by means of voluntary enlistment in New Finland and by conscription in Viborg province.[96] The tsar also decreed that, "Having given that the intended purpose of the creation of that army is the defence of this country, that army will not be employed in war otherwise than in the case of an enemy attack against Finland or against another possession of the Empire on the shores of the Baltic Sea."[97]

However, on the advice of his Finnish advisors, he later withdrew this last concession to the Finnish army's special status:

> In condescending to the petition of the Finnish Forces which have manifested their praiseworthy desire to be employed by Us not only in the defence of their country [patrie] and the possessions of the Russian Empire on the shores of the Baltic Sea, but to participate with the Russian Forces in the honour and the glory of martial exploits wherever the occasion will present itself, I order you to abrogate Article II of the rescript given by Me to General of the Infantry Count Armfelt the 6th of September 1812. You shall not fail to declare my consent to the Finnish forces, and to certify to them that I have accepted with gratitude that new demonstration of their zeal toward Me and Our common Fatherland.[98]

Since only a small force had been formed after the pattern of those units recently disbanded, Alexander avoided the need to convoke a Diet to deliberate upon the questions of organization and expenditures of this force. Furthermore, he saw to it that the Finnish army remained too small to replace the Russians whose strength was counted in divisions.

By making the military units from New Finland volunteers, that is mercenaries, Alexander frustrated the attempt of the Finlanders to have a national army of Finland formed on the basis of universal conscription in the style of the new post-revolutionary national armies of Europe. Nevertheless, it is clear that Alexander of his own will had freely consented to the formation of a separate Finnish military force apart from that of the rest of his Imperial Russian Army.

A similar sort of development had occurred in the realm of the economy, trade and commerce. On February 12/24, 1808, Alexander issued a manifesto declaring that the customs border between Finland and Russia was henceforth dissolved[99] with the intention of drawing Finland into closer trading relations with St. Petersburg.[100] Yet the economic bonds which had existed so tightly between Finland and Sweden for so many centuries would not permit themselves to be quickly loosened without disasterous consequences to the Finnish agricultural economy. Persuaded by these circumstances as well as by the diplomatic necessity to satisfy Sweden's need for Finnish produce and materials, Russia allowed the old Finnish-Swedish trade to continue. Moreover, in response to the request of the Diet, Alexander allowed Swedish money to circulate as legal tender in Finland alongside the Russian

ruble so that this trade might be facilitated.[101] Indeed, Russia was to permit Finno-Swedish trade to continue as before the war for almost ten years following the Peace of Fredrikshamn; moreover, Sweden was not fully deemed to be a "foreign country" for another twenty-five years after this in her commercial dealings with Finland.[102] Therefore, to bar the entry into Russia of tariff-free Swedish goods, it became necessary in 1811 for the Russian government to re-establish a customs border between Finland and the rest of the Empire.[103]

Finland, for her part, did not protest the erection of this customs border since her main aim was to preserve her trade with Sweden. The effect of this customs border was in any case negligible with respect to Finnish goods as they were allowed to enter Russia duty-free.[104] Hence, when Viborg province was reunited with Finland, the new province was included into the Finnish customs zone[105] without causing undue economic hardship to it although it had enjoyed extensive trade with St. Petersburg.

In addition to the not inconsiderable trading privileges she enjoyed with the Swedes, Finland sought the right to set her own rates of tariff on Finnish exports to other countries. Spearheading the drive to achieve this end was Baron Robert Henrik Rehbinder,[106] a young Finlander who had been

Speranskii's assistant in Finnish affairs. It is possible that the original impetus for this had even come from Spreranskii himself, for he was in favour of a general easing of import-export restrictions throughout the Empire.[107] In spite of the Finnish Senate's taking up of this cause, the Russian Ministry of Finance succeeded in rebuffing every effort during this first decade of Russian rule on the part of Finlanders to establish their own tariff structure.[108]

Even so, the autonomous development of Finland's economy received much reinforcement from the country's special status in the question of foreign trade. For example, Finland acquired its own monetary, credit, and banking systems as the result of it. It was also a natural outcome of these circumstances that Finland had a separate budget and the right to the independent disposal of her state revenues.[109] She was able to add to this special privileges for her industries,[110] so that it might be later claimed that Finnish industry enjoyed too many advantages over that of Russia.[111] Indeed, Alexander had granted Finland such a measure of economic and administrative independence that she was allowed to prosper quite on her own.[112] The fact is that Finland's autonomous position within the Empire was as firmly planted on economic foundations as well as political ones.

Since Alexander had granted Finland religious rights according to her constitution, the Finnish Lutheran Evangelical Church remained outside the pale of the Russian government. In fact, those of other faiths were penalized by the Finnish laws that made Lutheranism the state religion of Finland. It was not until 1827 that the Finnish citizens of the Orthodox faith, who until then had been barred from the ranks of the duchy's officialdom, were given political equality with their Lutheran brothers.[113] Even then, the churches, schools and other institutions belonging to the Orthodox faith did not receive the same measure of state funds and support as did those of the official church.[114] In this, Finland existed far apart from Russia.

In terms of language, Finland was once again separated from Russia. Since Alexander had guaranteed Finland the right to its own language, this meant that the official language of the country continued to be Swedish. Swedish was the language of government and of instruction in the schools, excepting in Viborg province where all twenty schools used German instead.[115] However, upwards of ninety percent of the population were Finnish-speakers but whose mother tongue had no official status. Thus, while language served to separate Finland from Russia, it also proved to be a devisive factor in the establishment of the unity of the

Finnish nation.[116] But, on balance, Alexander's language guarantees did provide a good part of Finland's protective armour against the intrusion of the Russian bureaucracy into Finnish affairs.

However, the most effective guarantee of Finnish internal autonomy was the body of constitutional law that had been inherited from the Swedish regime and which Alexander had solemnly promised that he and his successors would maintain for all time.[117] It, for example, specifically excluded all but Finnish citizens from the military and civil service of the grand duchy,[118] a regulation which was later to irritate many Russians when they saw Finlanders freely receiving honours and preferment in the Russian service while they themselves were barred virtually from all employment in Finland.[119] Of course, the governor-general with his chancellery, in representing the person of the tsar, were excluded from this provision.[120] The constitution further established a definite category of fundamental law which could neither be enacted, amended or abolished by the tsar except in conjunction with the Diet.[121] In addition to this, it also maintained the principle that all extraordinary taxes and expenditures required the consent of the Diet as well as the approval of the tsar.[122] Also embedded in the constitution were the religious, personal rights and privileges of

Finlanders which further separated Finland from Russia. The consequence of all this was that Finland's internal autonomy was assured as long as the reigning tsars chose to respect her constitution.

Indeed, in the first ten years of his rule over Finland, Alexander gave every indication that he intended to govern according to her constitution.[123] For example, when Speranskii and N.F. Eminé drafted a proposal in 1811 to strengthen the powers of the governor-general to "dictatorial" proportions, Armfelt and his supporters were able to persuade the tsar that such a measure would be "unconstitutional" and contrary to Finnish interests.[124] Although the tsar continued to favour Finland in these confrontations between Finnish and Russian interests, his Finnish advisors agitated for the rationalization of the body of the constitutional laws in keeping with the new situation of the grand duchy as a possession of Russia for fear that the inconsistencies between the word and application of these laws would weaken the constitution's force and ultimately result in its cancellation by a less sympathetic sovereign.

Alexander acceded to their desires with the intention of calling together the Estates, signifying his intent through the issuance of an "Instruction to the Diet Drafting Committee 1819" in which was clearly expressed the federalistic

concept that was to govern Russo-Finnish relations. This committee, which was given as its main task the job of combining and coordinating the separate constitutions of Finland into one consistent body of law applicable to the present circumstances of Russian rule for ratification by the Diet, was told to revise the constitution of the grand duchy "on the basis, that Finland is united to the Imperial State of All the Russias, placed under the general sphere of the monarch in external relations with another power, but in its internal administration enjoying a special political existence."[125]

Unfortunately for Finland, nothing came of this project, nor was Diet called to meet again in Alexander's reign. Nevertheless, the effect of Alexander's solicitude for the Finns was to perpetuate the de facto if not altogether de jure federalist solution in Russo-Finnish relations. Central to this was the establishment in Finland of a separate governmental and administrative organization, and with it, the creation of a "patriotic Finnish bureaucracy."[126] It was within this bureaucracy and the larger elite of upper class Finlanders from which it was drawn that emerged the first real strains of "Finnish" nationalism.[127] Ironically, the early Finnish nationalists were mainly Swedish in language and orientation, but who had been transformed by

the conquest from provincials resentful of Stockholm into patriotic Finlanders fearful of St. Petersburg. However, as their experience with Alexander had suggested, their loyalties should be twofold: to the Emperor as well as to the Finnish Fatherland.

For at the apex of the government of Finland was the Emperor; the sole authority to rule the country belonged to him and no other. It was he who was ultimately empowered to uphold and execute the laws of the Finnish state. He was the final arbiter in all civil and criminal cases. He had the full control of the military and foreign affairs. The tsar also had the right to fill the higher offices with his own appointees, to confer titles, and to naturalize foreigners as Finnish subjects. With him resided the power to raise all customary taxes and revenues for the state and to spend them according to the prevailing budgetary practices. The tsar also had the clear right to legislate by decree such laws as were necessary to the routine administration of the country and only he had the right to initiate such new legislation as required the deliberation of the Diet. According to the liberal viewpoint, these comprised all the constitutional powers of the tsar-grand dukes of Finland.[128]

This, however, is not to say that the tsar-grand

dukes, beginning with Alexander I, felt themselves to be thus limited in the exercise of their powers in governing Finland. Alexander I, as we have already noted, simply preferred to rule according to law rather than by arbitrary fiat. Nicholas I, his brother and successor, also desired to be guided by the letter of the law; being an old army man, he had grown accustomed to the military regulations and directives that allowed a man to dispense with the constant need to make his own decisions.[129] But, by the time of Alexander II's reign, the idea took hold in Finland that the tsar-grand dukes were bound by the constitution.[130]

Certainly the fact that the constitution had been left largely untouched by the tsars between 1808 and 1863 (the year in which the Diet was convoked for the first time since 1809 so that certain revisions might be legally made to the constitution) lent credence to the liberal notions of its sanctity.[131] The liberals, however, were not satisfied with this, for they began to claim an even broader measure of autonomy for Finland on the basis of her "historic rights" under the constitution. In many respects these demands could not really be substantiated for Finland's autonomous status was already greater under the Russians (even more so under Alexander II than Alexander I) than it had ever been under the Swedes.[132] Thus, while Finland's

political institutions had been derived from her Swedish connection,[133] it was only with the severing of these ties and her union with Russia that Finland was at all able to acquire a sense of national identity and independence.[134]

Ironically, the Diet, which supposedly represented the Finnish nation through the assembly of the four Estates according to the Finnish constitution, did not play any part in the early development of Finland's national character. Once Alexander I prorogued the Diet at Borgå in 1809, it was not convened again until September 15, 1863 by Alexander II.[135] The prolonged absence of this deliberative institution from the affairs of the nation so embarrassed the liberals that they were forced to use the dubious excuse that an earlier convocation of the Diet had not been necessary since there had been no change made in the fundamental laws.[136] This, however, was not quite true since the Swedish constitution had required the periodic assembly of the Estates. Moreover, Tsar Nicholas' granting of political equality to the Finns of the Orthodox faith in the grand duchy without the consent of the Diet had been a violation of the Finnish constitution since it involved the alteration of the fundamental laws themselves.[137]

Ultimately, the Diet had to be reconvened to appease the liberals on their grounds that certain necessary reforms

could not be legally carried out until the requisite amendments had been agreed to by the Estates.[138] But before the Diet was called to order, Alexander II on the advice of his ministers tried to bypass the inevitable through the proclamation of the so-called "April Manifesto" of 1861. This decree called for the election of a 48-man committee of Finlanders to enact provisional laws which, upon their ratification by the tsar, would be considered as legal until such time as circumstances permitted the convocation of a regular Diet. The storm of protest arising in Finland over this bald-faced invalidation of the constitution persuaded the tsar to redefine the work of this "January Committee" to that of making reports on legislation proposed by the tsar for the benefit of the future Diet.[139] Thus, when the Finlanders remained peaceful, loyal subjects of the Empire during the Polish rebellion of 1863, the tsar gave in to their wishes and convoked the Diet to a September sitting.[140]

Among the several items touched upon by the tsar in his opening address to this Diet, the most important passage concerned the development of Finland's constitutional law and autonomy:

> In maintaining the Monarchic constitutional principle inherent in the customs of the Finnish people and in which all its laws and its institutions bear the

> character, I wish to make the admission in this project a right more extended than that is possessed already by the Estates as far as the regulation of the amount of the taxes, as well as the right of motion which they have formerly possessed, reserving for Myself at all times that of taking the initiative in all the questions which touch upon the alteration of the fundamental law.[141]

While the resulting Diet Act of 1869 did not quite live up to this promise, it did serve to define more precisely the powers of the sovereign and those of the Diet as well as to provide in law the regular convocation of the Diet at least every five years.[142] However, in practice, the Diet was usually convoked every three years by the tsar. It met in the capital which had been moved to Helsingfors in 1812.[143] While its powers continued to remain quite limited, the Diet co-legislated with the tsar-grand duke on matters touching upon the fundamental laws and taxes. It also had the right to control the Bank of Finland, the right to draft opinions of administrative projects submitted by the tsar, and the right of petition. Most importantly, henceforth it was charged to consider itself as the unified voice of the nation rather than as a sounding-board for the contending wills of the separate Estates.[144]

During the "political night" between 1809 and 1863,[145] it was not the Diet but the administrative bureaucracy of Finland that had nurtured the country's autonomous development. Chief among these organs was the Governmental Council

which was renamed the Imperial Finnish Senate in 1816,[146] reminding all that it was on a par with the Russian Imperial Senate. Although it had been inspired by the ancient Swedish Council of the Realm, the Senate differed from its predecessor quite significantly in that it did not possess the same governmental powers.

Because the members of the Senate were appointed by the tsar and were responsible to him, it was more like a modern ministerial cabinet. At first it referred all but the least of matters to the "highest authority", but in time it expanded its own sphere of administrative action and developed more and more into a "home government" for Finland.[147]

The Senate itself was divided into two departments: the Department of Justice and the Department of Administration. Each of them was composed of ten senators, one of them being the departmental vice-president. The president of the Senate was the governor-general who seldom presided over the Plenum of the Senate as the proceedings were conducted in the official language -- Swedish. This Plenum, or general assembly of the Senate, was charged with the preparation of bills and measures which the tsar intended to present to the Diet. It gave the tsar its opinion of the resolutions and petitions of the Diet. But foremost of its tasks during the whole period

of Russian rule was that it received and promulgated the decrees and laws sanctioned by the tsar. A smaller Plenum of Eight operated in a similar fashion, dispensing with matters of lesser importance.

The Department of Justice was responsible for the supervision of justice in the grand duchy. It was the tribunal of the last instance in civil and criminal matters, excepting that all executions, acts of clemency, and pardons had to be ratified by the tsar. This department also presented the tsar with candidates for the position of burgomaster, judges of the first instance and justices of the courts of appeal.

The Department of Administration was divided into six colleges, which were in effect ministries of the interior, of finance, of public accounts and financial control, of military affairs, of public worship and instruction, and of agriculture and public works. Each of these colleges was presided over by a senator. An additional senator functioned as deputy-head in each of the colleges of the interior and of finance. One senator served without portfolio and one as vice-president of the Department of Administration. The Department as a whole and in its several sub-sections were responsible for the administration of the country according to the decrees of the tsar and the laws of the land.

Matters that exceeded an individual college's or department's authority were referred to the Plenum, the tsar or the Diet, according to the requirements of the case at hand.[148]

The governor-general, as already mentioned, was the president of the Senate. It was he who received the tsar's rescripts and delivered them to the Senate. He accepted the reports of the Senate to the tsar, forwarding them to the Finnnsh state secretary in St. Petersburg for transmission to the tsar. He supervised the work of the Senate, and when in disagreement with it on matters that it submitted to the tsar he had the right to append his own opinion.[149] In addition, the governor-general was the head of such executive authorities as the polic and the eight provincial governors. He acted as inspector of the country. He presented those meriting rewards to the tsar. He nominated candidates to the posts of senator, procurator-general, and governor. He was also commander-in-chief of all Finnish and Russian troops posted in Finland.[150]

The procurator-general was another very important official in the Finnish government. His primary duty was to oversee the performance of all public officials and to force them to observe the laws. To this end, he attended all the meetings of the Plenum of the Senate. While he received his orders from the governor-general, he also acted

independently as chief prosecutor of Finland. Therefore, should either the Senate or governor-general be adamant in their transgression of the law, the procurator-general had fully the right to notify the tsar of their non-compliance.[151]

In St. Petersburg, there was established the Committee for Finnish Affairs in 1811.[152] It reported to the tsar through the Finnish state secretary (a member of this committee) in the presence of the chairman of the committee. Nicholas I abolished this body in 1826, ordering that the Finnish state secretary -- now renamed the minister-state secretary for Finland -- was to report to the tsar all alone.[153] The Committee for Finnish Affairs was once more revived in modified fashion in 1857 by Alexander II.[154]

In the latter instance, this committee was again made an advisory body to the tsar. However, this time the minister-state secretary was its president. This body now included his assistant and three members appointed by the crown, two of whom were nominated together by the governor-general and the Senate. The function of the Committee for Finnish Affairs was to examine those matters brought before it by the minister-state secretary at the command of the tsar. Its resolutions were then recorded in a <u>procès verbal</u>, including in it the views of the governor-general and the Senate. This report would then be attached with all the

materials pertaining to that matter and be forwarded by the minister-state secretary to the tsar for his decision.[155]

The single most important institution in buffering Finland's autonomy from the general administration of the Empire was the Office of the State Secretary for Finland. This office was established in St. Petersburg to funnel all matters concerning Finnish affairs to the direct attention of the tsar. It was headed by the minister-state secretary and his assistant, both of whom were appointed by the tsar. Until V.K. von Plehve's installation as minister by Nicholas II in 1899, the minister-state secretary for Finland was always a Finlander, and therefore his office could be counted on protecting the interests of Finland at the highest level of government.

The minister-state secretary reported directly to the tsar on all matters pertaining to Finland except military affairs. He also had the right to request additional information from the governor-general. Following the statute of 1826,[156] all the tsar's decisions in the form of rescripts were to be signed by the sovereign and countersigned by the minister-state secretary for Finland to make them legal, the originals of which were sent to the governor-general. If the tsar rendered his decisions in the form of annotations to reports, the procedure was for the minister-state secretary to relay them to the governor-general by means of letters. The minister's office also

acted as a translation bureau, sending out all documents to the Senate in both Russian and Swedish languages and rendering those intended for the tsar into Russian. Moreover, the minister-state secretary also acted as intermediary between Finland and other higher authorities of the Empire such as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of War, both of which had the right to legislate or administer in certain areas on behalf of Finland.[157]

This bureaucracy, although often characterized as weak and compliant,[158] formed a wall between Finland and the Russian government. This, in itself, was of great service to Finland. The bureaucracy also served to protect and enlarge Finland's autonomy in a number of more active ways. For example, it frustrated the attempt of Governor-General Zakrevskii to stream his reports directly to the tsar instead of through the Office of the State-Secretary for Finland.[159] While the bureaucrats failed to stand up against Zakrevskii's determination to have them swear allegiance to Grand Duke Constantine as successor to Alexander I without first receiving the new sovereign's assurances with respect to Finland's constitution, the damage was nullified by Constantine's abdication and Nicholas' succession to the throne. By that time, the bureaucracy was better prepared to solicit the necessary guarantees from Nicholas.[160] Later in Nicholas' reign, the bureaucracy was so able to convince Governor-General

Menshikov of Finland's deep disapproval of a Russian project to codify and revise the fundamental laws that he persuaded the tsar to make an end of it.[161]

Conservative in its own right, this bureaucracy sought to suppress all agitation in the grand duchy for its own sake as well as for that of Finland and the tsar. In part, to accomplish this end, the local administration continually asserted the principle that Finland was conservative by nature[162] and ever peaceful and loyal to the Empire.[163] Then, it strove to create these conditions by suppressing all untoward stirrings in the country.[164] Perhaps the most infamous of its attempts to do so was its support of a censorship regulation to ban all Finnish language works from circulation but for a few educational and religious texts.[165] By means such as these, it tried to maintain the stereotype of "loyal Finland" and the confidence of the tsars in Finnish institutions.[166]

Even while the bureaucracy was shaping its own sense of Finnish identity and destiny, there arose another current of nationalist feeling that was in opposition to the official view. The generally accepted father of this offshoot of the Turku Romantic Movement was Adolf Iwar Arwidsson, one time student, poet, writer and pamphleteer. As a propagandist against the Swedophile bureaucracy,

Arwidsson declared: "Swedes we are not, into Russians we do not wish to become, let us therefore be Finns."[167]

Hounded out of Finland in 1823, Arwidsson continued to expound his ideas of Finnish nationalism and independence from Sweden into the post-Crimean War era.[168] Johan Vilhelm Snellman, a follower of Arwidsson's "Fennicism,"[169] argued that the only protection for Finland against Russification would be for Finnish to become the language of the elite and the state as well as being the language of the vast majority of the common people. In his programme to acquire official status for the Finnish language, Snellman was ably assisted by Yrjö Koskinen who laboured on behalf of the ethnic Finns until his death after the turn of the century.[170] At first, the "Fennomen" or advocates of Finnish rights were discouraged not only by the bureaucracy but by the tsarist government as well, as it had learned to fear nationalist movements after the Polish rebellion of 1830.[171]

The Crimean War, however, caused Russia to view this matter in a different light. Once more the Russophobia of Sweden reasserted itself as England sought to interest the Swedish government to join Britain and France in the war as co-belligerent.[172] Only Britain's refusal to guarantee the return of Finland to Sweden ended any serious thought

of Swedish intervention.[173] Nevertheless, anti-Russian agitators in Sweden still tried to encourage a Finnish revolt,[174] but their propaganda failed to ignite a positive response in any but a few of the liberal, pro-Swedish elite.[175] While British landing parties on the Finnish coast noted that the Finns were "friendly" to them[176] and "indifferent to the Russian government,"[177] the fact was that the Anglo-French fleet's depredations along the Finnish coast only encouraged the Finns to stand patriotically by Russia.[178] As for the Russian government, the Crimean <u>débâcle</u> had so deeply underscored the vulnerability of the Russian borderlands that a new policy toward these regions had to be developed.[179]

In Finland after the war, the new tsar, Alexander II, found it expedient to increase his support of the Finnish majority to the detriment of the Swedish-speaking elite. To this end, he passed a number of edicts increasing the use of Finnish in the grand duchy, culminating in the Language Decree of 1863 which established Finnish as one of the official languages of Finland.[180] On behalf of the Finnish majority, Yrjö Koskinen wrote: "Finland's Grand Duke, Alexander II, has now, more than ever before, opened his heart to the Finnish nation . . ."[181]

Naturally, the opposition Svecoman movement did not agree. For decades later, it continued to accuse the Fennomen

of having opened Finland to the meddling of the Russian government. The attitude of this group was that the Finnish "barbarians" had delivered Swedish civilization into the rough hands of the Russian "barbarians."[182]

The liberals were akin to the Svecomen in their predominantly Swedish character and hatred of Russian "barbarism." Since they were passionately committed to the cause of Finnish autonomy, the liberals aroused equally violent emotions in Russian nationalist circles against Finland.[183] It could hardly be otherwise when the liberal Helsingfors Dagblad openly discussed the possibility of Finland declaring herself neutral in the event of Russian involvement in an outbreak of European hostilities at the time of the 1863 Polish rebellion,[184] while liberals in the House of Nobles tried to bar Finlanders from taking their seats if they served in the Russian military or civil service, for the constitution denied participation to those "in the service of foreign monarchs, masters and states."[185]

Regardless of their recklessness, the liberals accomplished much in pushing Finland along the road to autonomy in the Russian Empire. Under the impact of liberal ideology during the 1860's Finland adopted the silver mark as her monetary unit and in the 1870's changed over to a gold standard. The latter gave her a completely separate

monetary system from the Russian Empire which was formally on the silver standard but in fact adhered to no standard as it was dangerously inflating the money supply through the issuance of too many paper rubles.[186] But the liberals' greatest victory on behalf of Finnish autonomy was their passage of the Conscription Act of 1878, a measure which gave Finland a semi-independent army[187] and protected her youth from the forcible Russification of near-penal servitude in the regular Russian military service.[188]

Hence, at the close of Alexander II's reign, Finland had reached the furthest point in her autonomous development apart from the Russian Empire. While Alexander I with his Finnish friends and advisors laid down the foundations of Finland's separate political existence which Nicholas I had maintained out of a sense of duty, it was Alexander II's reputation as a reformer that gave Finnish liberalism its impetus to push for the widest possible interpretation of Finland's constitutional powers in the establishment of this separate political existence. However, the vigor with which Finnish local autonomy was pursued tended to exaggerate the dangers of political separatism and nationalism to Russia's own interests in this politically and militarily sensitive border region. Moreover, it was becoming quickly apparent to Russia, particularly after the grievous blow

had been struck against her international prestige at the Congress of Berlin (1878), that she could no longer tolerate the looseness of the bonds between herself and any of her non-Russian borderlands.[189]

NOTES

CHAPTER THREE

[1]Quoted from Warren Bartlett Walsh, Russia and the Soviet Union: A Modern History (Ann Arbour, Mich., 1958), p. 172; see also "Swedish and Finnish Finland," in Scandinavia Past and Present (3 vols.; Odense, 1959), II, 732.

[2]Strakhovsky, "Constitutional Aspects . . .," pp. 467-468; Istoriia SSSR s drevneishikh vremen do nashikh dnei, First Series, Vols. I-VI; S drevneishikh vremen do Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi Sotsialisticheskoi Revoliutsii (Moscow, 1967), IV, 368. Taking a more hostile and negative view, Jesse D. Clarkson, A History of Russia (2nd ed.; New York, 1969), pp. 263-264, suggests that Russia's non-assimilation of minorities depended almost entirely upon each minority group's individual ability to resist the forces of Russification.

[3]Jean Finot, "The Psychology of the Russians," Twentieth Century Russia and Anglo-Russian Review, I, No. 1 (September 1915), 15.

[4]For a careful appreciation of early nineteenth century Russia's state of administrative chaos, see S. Frederick Starr, Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia, 1830-1870 (Princeton, N.J., 1972), Chapter One: "The Undergoverned Provinces." Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, pp. 24-27, provides a most specific and illuminating example of the nature of Russia's administrative difficulties in so critical a branch of government as the Foreign Ministry.

[5]Those in the camp of the Russophils contended that Finland's "incorporation" into the Russian Empire was wholly based on Alexander's March 16/28, 1808 declaration to the European cabinets (P.S.Z. I, XXX, No. 22,899), and his manifestoes of March 20/27, 1808 (Ibid., No. 28,911) and June 5/17, 1808 (Sobranie postanovlenii finliandskikh, I, 1-2) in proclamation and confirmation of his annexation of Finland, leading to their conclusion that Finland's status and her internal political conditions were equally dependent on the will and pleasure of the Russian autocracy.

For arguments in favour of this view of Finland's incorporation into the Russian Empire, see N.A.T., "K finliandskomy 'Voprosu'. Mneniia N.A. Manassena i E.V. Frisha po proekty finliandskoi kodifikatsionnoi komissii 1885-1887 gg.," Russkaia starina, CXXXI (1907), 593; S.K. Mikhailov, Iuridicheskoe polozhenie Finliandii. Zametki po povodu otzyva seima 1899 g. (St. Petersburg, 1901), p. 56; [M. Borodkin] Condition juridique de la Finlande (Paris, 1902), p. 69; F. Souvoroff, Question finlandaise. Condition des russes en Finlande et des finlandais dans le reste de l'Empire de Russie (St. Petersburg, 1908), p. 8; K. Valiszevsky, Question finlandaise. L'Autriche et le moineau, trans. by A. Manceau (St. Petersburg, 1910), p. 6; Korevo, La question finlandaise, pp. 8-10.

However, this writer intends to restrict the concept of Finland's incorporation into the Empire to that which was recognized in international law, for Alexander himself chose not to further define this matter. For others who taken this view, see Finland (Baltimore, 1910), pp. 363-364 (Reprinted from The American Political Science Review, IV, No. 3 [August 1910]; K.R. Brotherus, Katsaus Suomen valtiollisen järestysmuodon historialliseen kehitykseen (Porvoo, 1948), pp. 45-47; Robert Hermanson, Ein Beitrag zur Beurteilung der staatsrechtlichen Stellung des Grossfürstentums Finnland (Leipzig, 1900), p. 48; M.G. Schybergson, Finlands historia (Helsingfors, 1890), p. 491.

[6]For a good summary of various writers' viewpoints on the question of Finland's political status in the Empire, see La situation politique de la Finlande, pp. 43-58. See also Despagnet, La question finlandaise, p. 74; Getz, Das staatsrechtliche Verhältnis zwischen Finnland und Russland, p. 39; Finlande et Russie, Déliberation internationale de Londres, 26 février - 1er mars 1910 (Paris, 1910), pp. 48-50;

Rudolf Euchen, "Finnlands drohender Untergang," and W. van der Vlugt, "Finnlands Kampf ums Recht," in Wilhelm Habermann [Johannes Ohquist], ed., Finnland und die öffentliche Meinung Europas (Leipzig, 1910), pp. 14 and 24 respectively.

[7]Translated from Danilevskii, Rossiia i Evropa, p. 443.

[8]See E.A. Baratynskii, "Epilog k stikhotvornoi povesti 'Eda'," Russkaia starina, XXXIX (1883), 64-65, a portion of which is translated as follows:

Land of granite, thou art conquered,
Russia's might thou hast experienced,
And thou can'st not push away her heel,
Even though thou breath'st upon her concealed emnity,
Begun hast thy term of eternal captivity,
But glory to the fallen people!
For they have defended the liberty of their sullen crags.

[9]See V. Kiparsky, "Finland and Sweden in Russian Literature," The Slavonic and East European Review, XXVI (November 1947), 176-178; Korhonen, Autonomous Finland, pp. 16-18.

[10]Korhonen, Autonomous Finland, p. 15.

[11]See Richard Pipes, Karamzin's Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia: A Translation and Analysis (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), p. 77 -- for Pipes's own commentary on Karamzin, p. 146 -- for Karamzin's hostility toward Alexander's conquest of Finland (as per Pipes's translation), and pp. 189-190 -- for Karamzin's reservations as to the unification and Russification of non-Russian border areas (Pipes's translation).

[12]Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, p. 44.

[13]Translated from Ehrenström, "Iz istoricheskikh zapisok," pp. 249-251. This speech was made before the open court at Åbo during his visit there during the summer of 1812. Alexander was , of course, then actively seeking to whip up the Finnish public into a pro-Alexandrine frenzy

prior to the coming of the Swedish crown prince, Bernadotte, for the cementing of the alliance between their two countries.

[14]The break in the Franco-Russian accord appeared at least as early as December 9, 1809. For this, see Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, XX, No. 16035 ("A.M. de Champagny, . . . 9 décembre 1809."), in which the French foreign minister was asked to deliver the following message to Caulincourt: "The Duke of Vincenza [Bernadotte] must say to M. Rumiantsev this proper phrase: 'You feel that there is nothing in the past conduct that the Emperor has not grasped; in the affairs of Austria, you have been without colour. How is the Emperor to act? He has given a province which pays for more than the costs you have incurred for the war, and he declares above all that you have annexed Finland, Moldavia and Wallachia to your empire.'"

Indeed, it seems that Danilevskii (Rossiia i Evropa, p. 487) was quite right to say that France's envy and indignation was aroused unbearably, for Napoleon continued to raise the same theme almost to the outbreak of war. For example, see "Pis'mo general-ad'iutanta P.A. Shuvalova k Imperatoru Aleksandru Pavlovichu," S.I.R.I.O., XXI, 411; in this letter dated May 3/15, 1811, Napoleon is reported to have said:

". . . the Emperor Alexander has made two unhappy wars against me and he has acquired Finland, Moldavia, Wallachia and several districts of Poland; . . . [then adding that France even now supports Russia's possession of the Åland Islands]."

[15]Translated from Shil'der, Aleksandr Pervyi, III, 471-480, Appendix III: "Zapiska o vzaimnom polozhenii Frantsii i severnykh derzhav v nachala 1810 goda, predstavlennaia Napoleonu 16 marta 1810 goda."

[16]"Doneseniia polkovnika A.I. Chernysheva Imperatoru Aleksandru Pavlovichu," S.I.R.I.O., XXI, p. 1, No. 1: "1810 g."

[17]Quoted in Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, p. 103.

[18]See Articles XVII and XVIII of the treaty, V.P.R. I, V, No. 106. Alexander even acquiesced to Sweden's request that Article XVII be maintained for an additonal year after its original date of termination of October 1/13, 1811. -- Kauko E. Joustela, Suomen Venäjän-kauppa autonomian ajan alkupuoliskolla vv. 1809-65 (Helsinki, 1963), p. 33.

[19]Translated from Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, p. 72.

[20]See "Instruktsiia Kollegii inostrannykh del A.K. Brunu. 9(21) aprelia 1810 g.," V.P.R. I, V, No. 198.

[21]Translated from Borenius, Akty dlia I . . V.K.F., pp. 21-22.

[22]O. Seitkari, Vuoden 1878 asevelvollisuuslain syntyvaiheet (Helsinki, 1951), pp. 20-21. For a detailed study of the Finnish officers and their families in the post-war period, see Kaarlo Wirilander, "Suomen upseeri perheiden sijoittuminen vuoden 1809 jälkeiseen yhteiskuntaan," Historiallinen aikakauskirja, 1955, pp. 104-115.

[23]Jarl Gallén, "La Finlande militaire au temps du grand-duché (1809-1917)," Revue internationale d'histoire militaire, XXIII (Helsinki, 1961), 194.

[24]For example, see Mechelin, A Précis of the Public Law of Finland, pp. 15-16; Despagnet, La question finlandaise, p. 26.

[25]Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, pp. 117-123.

[26]Cited from C.V. Nyholm, Die Stellung Finnlands im russischen Kaiserreich (Leipzig, 1901), p. 49.

[27]Translated from Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, p. 122. Tommila also notes that while J.R. Danielson-Kalmari, Aleksanteri I:n aika. Suomen valtio-

ja yhteiskuntaelämää 18:nnellä ja 19:nnellä vuosisadalla (6 vols; Porvoo, 1920-1928), I, 7-13, published the document, he placed no emphasis in his studies on this part of the text. He further notes that apart from M.G. Schybergson, Finlands politiska historia 1809-1919 (Helsingfors, 1923), pp. 49-50, this prefactory paragraph of Alexander's instructions to Steinheil has been virtually ignored by Finnish historians while Swedish historians have tended to avoid the entire document altogether.

[28]For example, J.R. Danielson, Mihin suuntaan? (Porvoo, 1901), pp. 23-24; Victor Bérard, L'Empire Russe et le tsarisme (Paris, 1906), p. 230; René Puaux, Pour la Finlande (Paris, 1899), p. 11; Despagnet, La question finlandaise, p. 26; Deck, Pour la Finlande, p. 13.

[29]For example, Evreinow, Exposé de la question finlandaise, p. 6. According to Eino Karkhu [Karhu], Finliandskaia literatura i Rossiia, 1800-1850 (Tallinn, 1962), p. 34, this rescript is now posited in the Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota SSSR, fond 19, File No. 24, pp. 74-78.

[30]Translated from Despagnet, La question finlandaise, p. 26.

[31]See the preamble "Uchrezhdenie Pravitel'stvuiushchago Soveta v Velikom Kniazhestve Finliandii, ot 6/18 Avgusta 1809 goda, " in Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., p. 16.

[32]Ibid.; cf. K. Ordin, Sobranie sochinenii po Finliandskomu voprosu, III (St. Petersburg, 1909), Appendix pp. 156-162.

[33]Ibid., p. 18 (Chapt. III, Art. 15).

[34]Ibid., p. 19 (Chap. IV, Art. 20). Later to reinforce this point, the Governmental Council was renamed the Imperial Finnish Senate by "Vysochaishii Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva Manifest o pereimenovanii Imperatorskago Pravitel'stvuiushchago Soveta v Imperatorskii Finliandskii Senat, ot 9/21 fevralia 1816 goda," Ibid., pp. 31-33.

[35]Gabriel Girod de l'Ain, Bernadotte: Chef de guerre et Chef d'État (Paris, 1968), p. 365.

[36]Arvid Berghman, Dynastien Bernadottes vapen och det Svenska Riksvapnet (Stockholm, 1944), pp. 18-24.

[37]Translated from "Pis'ma barona Pavla Andreevicha Nikolai k kniaziu M.S. Vorontsovu," No. 7, in Arkhiva kniazia Vorontsova (895 vols.; Moscow, 1870-1895), XXVII (1891), 124.

[38]"Inzhener-general P.K. Sukhtelen ministru inostrannykh del N.P. Rumiantsevu," V.P.R. I, V, No. 264.

[39]"Instruktsiia A.I. Chernyshevu pri otpravlenii ego Stokgol'm [1810], S.I.R.I.O., CXXI, Part 3, No. 1.

[40]Cited from "Pis'mo A.I. Chernysheva k kantsleru grafu N.P. Rumiantsevu," dated December 7, 1810, Ibid., Part 2, No. 15.

[41]"Doneseniia polkovnika A.I. Chernysheva Imperatoru Aleksandru Pavlovichu," S.I.R.I.O., XXI, No. 2.

[42]Cited from "Pervoe pis'mo imperatora Aleksandra k naslednomu printsu Shvedskomu (Bernadotu)," in Shil'der, Aleksandr Pervyi, III, Appendix IV, pp. 480-484.

[43]Torwald Tovaldson Höjer, Carl XIV Johan: Kronprinstiden (Stockholm, 1943), p. 75; General, Count Philip de Segur, History of the Expedition to Russia, undertaken by the Emperor Napoleon, in the year 1812 (2 vols.; London, 1825), I, 43.

[44]Segur, History of the Expedition to Russia, p. 43.

[45]Translated from Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, XXI, No. 17386.

[46]"Poverennyi v delakh v Stokgol'me P.A. Nikolai ministru inostrannykh del N.P. Rumiantsevu," V.P.R. I, VI, No. 83.

[47]For example, it is thought that G.M. Armfelt's "expulsion" from Sweden (1811) and entry into the Russian service was set up so that Bernadotte might hide from Napoleon the true nature of Armfelt's mission of welding together an anti-French alliance. For this see de l'Ain, Bernadotte, pp. 392-394; Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne pp. 210-220; Sir Dunbar Plunket Barton, Bart., Bernadotte: Prince and King, 1810-1844 (London, 1925), p. 22.

[48]Alexander to Frederick William of Prussia, St. Petersburg, June 18, 1811, in Correspondance inédite officielle et confidentielle de Napoléon Bonaparte avec les cours étrangères, les Princes, les Ministres et les Generaux Français et Etrangers en Italie, en Allemagne et en Egypt (7 vols.; Paris, 1815-1820), VII, 433.

[49]V.P.R. I, VI, No. 119.

[50]"Pis'ma russkago posłannika pri Stokgol'mskom dvore barona Sukhtelena k Imperatoru Aleksandru Pavlovichu," S.I.R.I.O., XXI, No. 1; "Stockholm, ce 18 mars 1812."

[51]V.P.R. I, VI, No. 159.

[52]Translated from Alma Söderhjelm, Carl Johan: Ett karaktärsporträt (Stockholm, 1939), p. 260.

[53]Ibid.; O. Seitari, "Venäjän polittiset tavoiteet Suomessa," in Venäläinen sortokausi Suomessa, ed. by Päivi Tommila (Porvoo, 1960), p. 22.

[54]"Le comte de Noailles au duc de Richelieu. Saint-Pétersbourg, 30 mai 1817," S.I.R.I.O., CXIX (1904), No. 104.

[55]"Pis'mo Imperatora Aleksandra I k admiralu Chichagovu," ed. by M.I. Bordanovich, S.I.R.I.O., VI (1871), 67-73.

[56]Suchtelen to Alexander, September 7/19, 1812, V.P.R. I, VI, No. 238, noted that the troops were already on board ship. See also Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, pp. 348-354.

[57]Jarl Gallén, "La Finlande militaire," p. 195.

[58]Arthur Reade, Finland and the Finns (New York, 1915), p. 16; Borodkin, Finland: It's Place in the Russian State, p. 26.

[59]See Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, pp. 47-57; J.H. Schnitzler, Secret History of the Court and Government of Russia under the Emperors Alexander and Nicholas (2 vols.; London, 1847), I, 48-50; Condition juridique de la Finlande (Paris, 1892), p. 100.

[60]Translated from Shil'der, Aleksandr Pervyi, III, 362. See also Elof Tegner, Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt (3 vols.; Stockholm, 1887), III, 294, and Jussila, Suomen perustuslait, p. 82. Cf. Speranskii's opinion in his "Observations sur la Finlande avec quelques parallèles sur les principes de l'administration intérieure": "Finland offers the example of a representation organized with a great simplicity and which provides the Sovereign the means of having a most exact notion on the state of things." -- As translated from the version published in Peter Scheibert, "Eine Denkschrift Speranskijs zur Reform des russischen Reiches aus dem Jahre 1811," Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte, VII (1959), p. 30.

[61]Translated from Shil'der, Aleksandr Pervyi, III, 362; see also Tegner, Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt, III, 294, and Juva and Juva, Suomen kansan historia, IV, 48-49.

[62]See P.S.Z. I, XXXI, No. 24,907; Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., pp. 26-27.

[63]Yrjö Kaukiainen, "Vanha Suomi ulkomaalaisten matkailijoiden kuvauksissa," Historiallinen arkisto, LXIV (1969), 202-203; Jutikkala and Osmonsalo, "Kustavilainen aika," pp. 685-687.

[64]Jouko Teperi, Vanhan Suomen suomalaisuus, Vol. II (Helsinki, 1967), pp. 278-279.

[65]See Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., pp. 28-30. See also "Extrait des délibérations du Conseil de l'Empire et du Comité des Présidents (1810-1811) relativement à la jonction de l'ancienne et de la nouvelle Finlande, . . .," in Osten-Sacken, La condition du droit public du Grand-Duché de Finlande, Appendices, No. 41.

[66]Joseph R. Fisher, Finland and the Tsars, 1809-1899 (London, 1899), p. 70; Osten-Sacken, La condition du droit public du Grand-Duché de Finlande, p. 77, and Appendices, p. 57, however, attributes this omission only to Speranskii. The final version of the above-mentioned decree is printed in Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., p. 28-30.

[67]Translated from "Pis'ma Pavla Vasil'evicha Chichagova k grafu S.R. Vorontsova, Le IX-bre 1812, Hesna, près de Vilna," Arkhiva kniazia Vorontsova, XIX, No. 49.

[68]Translated from the quotation in Zapiski Filipa Filipovicha Vigelia, III, 66.

[69]Translated from Shil'der, Aleksandr Pervyi, III, 8. See also Pierre Morane, Finlande et Caucase (Paris, 1900), pp. 6-8.

[70]"Otchet v delakh 1810 goda, predstavlennyi Imperatoru Aleksandru I M.M. Speranskim, 11-go fevralia 1811 goda," S.I.R.I.O., XXI (1877), 456.

[71]Eg. J.R. Danielson, Suomen yhdistaminen Venäjän valtakuntaan (Helsinki, 1891), p. 109. See also Leclercq, Le conflit entre la Russie et la Finlande, p. 9, and Taimi Torvinen, J.R. Danielson-Kalmari, Suomen autonomian puolustajana (Helsinki, 1965), p. 109.

[72]Translated from Torvinen, J.R. Danielson-Kalmari, p. 109. In his "Observations sur la Finlande," Speranskii referred to Finland as a "free province" (une province libre) -- see Scheibert, "Eine Denkschrift Speranskijs," p. 27. Elsewhere Speranskii also referred to Finland as being a province, as is noted in Mikhailov, Iuridicheskoe polozhenie Finliandii, p. 41.

[73]For example, see Osten-Sacken, La condition de droit public du Grand-Duché de Finlande, p. 77.

[74]For example, see Raeff, Michael Speransky; Scheibert, "Eine Denkschrift Speranskijs," especially pp. 41, 56-58; Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, pp. 23-24; Jussila, Suomen perustuslait, p. 89.

[75]Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia (New York, 1963), p. 338. Indeed, conservatives on the order of Karamzin(/ Borodkin / Condition juridique de la Finlande, p. 105), Rumiantsev (Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, p. 184) and Armfelt (Schnitzler, Secret History, II, 400) were ranged against Speranskii because of his "liberal" tendencies.

[76]Scheibert, "Eine Denkschrift Speranskijs," pp. 40-41.

[77]Translated from Ibid., pp. 27-28.

[78]Translated from Ibid., p. 28.

[79]Ibid., pp. 39-40.

[80]Vernadsky, A History of Russia, p. 205; Jussila, Suomen perustuslait, pp. 89-91; Grimsted, The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I, p. 184. In this regard, Speranskii's support of the Finnish constitution was made on conservative grounds, as noted in his "Observations": "The constitution of Finland is one of the most ancient monuments of feudalism and the principle of communities / i.e. feudal corporations /." -- Translated from Scheibert, "Eine Denkschrift Speranskijs," p. 28.

[81]See Jussila, Suomen perustuslait, pp. 81-82, 85, 87-89; Wuorinen, A History of Finland, pp. 129-130; Mikhailov, Iuridicheskoe polozhenie Finliandii, p. 26.

[82]Oginski, Observations sur la Pologne et les polonais, pour servir d'introduction aux mémoires de Michel Oginski

(Paris, 1827), pp. 86-87. Note also "Pis'ma admirala Chichagova k Imperatoru Aleksandru I," ed. by M.I. Bordanovich, S.I.R.I.O., VI, 2; "18 juillet 1812," wherein Chichagov suggests that Alexander offer the Poles the equivalent of Napoleon's promise of independence.

[83]Mémoires du Prince Adam Czartoryski et correspondance avec l'Empereur Alexandre I (2 vols.; Paris, 1887), I, 288.

[84]Päivö Tommila, "Itsenäisyysajatuksia Suomessa vuonna 1810," Turun historiallinen arkisto, XVII (1964), 273-284.

[85]Elof Tegner, "Imperator Aleksandr I i graf Armfel'd (1811-1812 g.g.)," Russkaia starina, LXXXVIII (1896), 142.

[86]A.A. Kizevetter, "Imperator Aleksandr I i Arakcheev," in his Istoricheskie ocherk (Moscow, 1912), pp. 299-300.

[87]Vernadsky, A History of Russia, p. 205. See also his La charte constitutionnelle de l'Empire Russe de l'an 1820, trans. by Serge Oldenbourg (Paris, 1833), pp. 16-19, 157-161.

[88]Krusius-Ahrenberg, "Finnischer Separatismus und russischer Imperialismus im vorigen Jahrhundert," p. 261.

[89]Korhonen, Autonomous Finland, pp. 25-27. According to Borodkin, Finland: It's Place in the Russian State, pp. 27-28, F.P. Pestel's reaction toward the Finnish question was as follows: "In him also the actions of the Emperor Alexander I, in Finland aroused a 'murmur at heart'; he found that there was no ground for giving Finland 'the privileged position of a status in statu', since it had never enjoyed 'a self-sufficing independence, and in the future it ought not to form a separate State'. Pestel dismissed all thoughts of a federate arrangement and acknowledged that the most fitting thing would be 'to introduce into all parts of Finland those laws and that form of administration which is in course of preparation for the provinces of Russia itself. . .The Russian language must be introduced into Finland, for this purpose schools must be organized and

other measures taken for the same end. Pestel went still further and proposed to include Finland in his Chud Territory with the territorial town of Petrograd."

[90]Baron C.J. Walleen to Bishop Jacob Tengström, June 10, 1812, J. Tengströmin kirjekokoelma XI, Helsingin Yliopiston Kirjasto (hereinafter HYK), as cited by Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, p. 257.

[91]Tommila, La Finlande dans la politique européenne, pp. 257-258.

[92]For example, see Borodkin, Finland: It's Place in the Russian State, pp. 13, 20-21, and 26; Borodkin, Condition juridique de la Finlande, pp. 147, 165-166; Evreinov, Russia's Policy in Finland, pp. 6-9.

[93]Meurman, La Finlande d'autrefois et d'aujourd'hui, pp. 31-32.

[94]Gallén, "La Finlande militaire," p. 198; Sergei Pushkarev, The Emergence of Modern Russia 1801-1917, trans. by Robert H. McNeal and Tova Yedlin (New York, 1963), p. 112.

[95]Borodkin, Condition juridique de la Finlande, pp. 151-152; Laine, "Finland's Military Significance for Nineteenth Century Russia," pp. 36-37; Erkki K. Osmonsalo, "Itsevaltiuden kausi," Suomen historian käsikirja, II, p. 101.

[96]Seitkari, Vuoden 1878 asevelvollisuuslain syntyvaiheet, p. 21; Gallén, "La Finlande militaire," p. 197.

[97]Translated from "Rescrit Impérial du 6 septembre 1812 au nom du Comte Armfelt, chargé des fonctions de Gouverneur-Général de Finlande," in Osten-Sacken, La condition de droit public du Grand-Duché de Finlande, Appendices, No. 43, p. 59.

[98]"Rescrit Impérial du 5 Mars 1822 au nom du Comte Steinheil, Gouverneur-Général de Finlande," Ibid., p. 60.

[99]P.S.Z. I, XXX, No. 22,980.

[100]Joustela, Suomen Venäjän-kauppa, p. 31.

[101]Ibid., pp. 32-34.

[102]Ibid., p. 303. For examples of commercial treaties between Russia and Sweden in which Finno-Swedish trade was particularly and uniquely favoured, see "Convention de commerce, entre LL. MM. l'empereur de Russie et le roi de Suède, signée à Saint-Pétersbourg, le 14/26 Février 1828, . . ." in C. de Martens and Cussy, Recueil manuel et pratique de traités, IV, 150-158, and "Traktat o torgovle, moreplavanii i druzhbe, zakliuchennyi mezhdu Rossiei i Shvetsiei 26 aprelia (8 maia) 1838 g.," in I. Ivanovoskii, compiler, Sobranie deistvuiushchikh dogovorov, zakliuchennykh Rossieiu s inostrannymi dershavami. -- Recueil des traités en vigueur, conclus par la Russie avec les puissances étrangères (2 vols. in 3; Odessa, 1889-1890), I, Part 1, no. 47, the latter also appears in P.S.Z. II (1825-1881) (56 vols.; St. Petersburg, 1825-1881), XII, No. 11,492.

[103]See "Déclaration Impériale et Disposition du 5 (17) novembre 1811, relativement à l'établissement d'un cordon douanier entre Wyborg et Kexholm, et à l'importation des produits finlandais dans les autres gouvernements de l'Empire de Russie," and "Disposition Impériale du 16 Juillet 1816, sur le commerce et les droits de douane en Finlande," in Osten-Sacken, La condition de droit public du Grand-Duché de Finlande, Appendices, Nos. 42 and 44 respectively; G.A. Kornilov, Russko-finliandskie tamozhennye otnosheniia v kontse XIX-nachala XX v. (Leningrad, 1971), p. 51.

[104]Joustela, Suomen Venäjän-kauppa, pp. 36-37; Kornilov, Russko-finliandskie tamozhennye otnosheniia, p. 51; Irina Bobovitsh, "Venäjän ja Suomen taloudelliset suhteet 1800- ja 1900-luvun vaihteessa," Historiallinen arkisto, LXVI (1973), 47.

[105]Joustela, Suomen Venäjän-kauppa, p. 37; M.M. Borodkin, Istoriia Finliandii. Vremia Imperatora Aleksandra I (St. Petersburg, 1900), p. 341.

[106]Paavo Korpisaari, Suomen ulkomaankauppasta vv. 1812-1825 (Kotka, 1911), p. 27.

[107]Joustela, Suomen Venäjän-kauppa, p. 35.

[108]Ibid., pp. 39-42.

[109]Bobovich, Russko-finliandskie ekonomicheskie otnosheniia, p. 15.

[110]D.S. Trizna, Finliandiia za 100 let v sostave Rossii (1809-1909 gg.) Po offitsial'nym dannym (St. Petersburg, 1911), p. 60. For example, the private liquor distilleries in Finland were protected from cheap Russian imports by such legislation as "Disposition Impériale du 20 Juin 1816, relativement de la vente de la wodka, . . . de la défense d'importer la wodka en Finlande" (in Osten-Sacken, La condition de droit public du Grand-Duché de Finlande, Appendices, No. 45). Visitors to Russia -- for example, August von Haxthausen, Studies on the Interior of Russia, ed. by S. Frederick Starr (Chicago, 1972), p. 210 -- continued to find it strange that Finland should enjoy a private liquor industry while in Russia proper it remained a state monopoly.

[111]For example, see Alexandre Baschmakoff, "La question de la prospérité finlandaise et ses causes extérieures," Revue politique et parlementaire, IX (1896), 612-619.

[112]"Lettre de M.L. Mechelin à propos de la question de la prospérité finlandaise traitée par M. Alexandre Baschmakoff [in the article referred to in the preceding footnote]," Ibid., X (1896), 671-677.

[113]E.G. Palmén, Suomen valtiopäivain historia (Porvoo, 1910), p. 52; Mikhailov, Iuridicheskoe polozhenie Finliandii, p. 31.

[114]The Grand Duchy did not even admit the principle of religious freedom until the Church Act of 1869, and its

implementation was further delayed until 1889 because in 1870's the Diet refused special status to those adhering to the Orthodox Church and the tsar would not ratify any bill without such a provision. For this, see R.A. Mäntylä, "Eriuskolaisia koskevien lakiesitysten valmistaminen 1870- luvulla," Turun historiallinen arkisto, XXII (1970), 182-213, and also his "Eriuskolaiskysymys Suomessa 1870- ja 1880- luvulla," Ibid., XIX (1967), 207-227. The Russians continued to complain of religious disabilities and prejudice in Finland almost down to the Great War, as in A.M. du Chayla, Affaires de Finlande. La loi, octroyant aux russes, en Finlande, des droits civils égaux à ceux des citoyens finlandais, répond-elle à des exigences vitales? (St. Petersburg, 1912), pp. 13-27 passim.

[115]Wuorinen, Nationalism in Modern Finland, pp. 247-248. The first Finnish-language secondary school was founded only in 1858.

[116]As Erik Hornberg notes in his Suomen historia, trans. by Kai Kaila (Porvoo, 1965), p. 227, the struggle for Finnish language rights began under the leadership of Swedish-speaking intellectuals such as J.V. Snellman and Yrjö Koskinen as a purely political movement. For example, according to Th. Rein, Johan Vilhelm Snellman (2 vols.; Helsingfors, 1895, 1899), I, 110, Snellman did not prefer Finnish out of personal reasons or sentiment but out of the intellectual conviction that Finnish had to become the language of the state and educated classes in order to preserve them from Russification. But the dispute took on angry racist colours with the publication of August Sohlman's Det unga Finland (Stockholm, 1855) in which it was asserted that the Finns were barbarians who had fortunately been civilized by the Swedes.

[117]This promise was contained in "Vysochaishii Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva Manifest or pereimenovanii Imperatorskago Pravitel'stvuiushchago Soveta v Imperatorskii Finliandskii Senat, ot 9/21 Fevralia 1816 goda," in Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., p. 32.

Even so, the custom was for the successor to the Imperial throne to offer an Act of Assurance to the Finlanders in the fashion of the old Swedish kings. Nicholas I set the pattern, my translation of which follows (from the text

in "Vysochaishee Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva Udostoverenie Obitateliam Finliandii, ot 12/24 Dekabria 1825-go goda," in Ibid., p. 34):

"By the grace of God, We Nicholas the First, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias and Grand Duke of Finland, etc., etc., etc.

"Make it manifest through this: That by the will of Providence having assumed the hereditary possession of the Grand Duchy of Finland, We have recognized for its good again to confirm and ratify the Religion, fundamental Laws, rights and privileges, to each estate of this Duchy in particular and to all the subjects, to him who dwells there from the small to the great, according to the Constitution they have up to now enjoyed, promising to preserve them inviolably and steadfastly in their force and effect; in confirmation of which, this law is undersigned in our own proper hand."

The Acts of Assurance given by Alexanders II and III were identical to the above except that "according to the Constitution they have up to now enjoyed" became "according to the ancient statutes they have up to now enjoyed" and that the phrase beginning with "in confirmation of which, . . ." was omitted. For this, see Ibid., pp. 39 and 52; compare with the somewhat differing texts of the Swedish versions as translated into English in Mechelin, A Précis of the Public Law of Finland, pp. 162-163.

[118]Mechelin, A Précis of the Public Law of Finland, pp. 139-140.

[119]For example, Gallén, "La Finlande militaire," p. 207, and Kirkinen, "Les relations culturelles avec l'Est," p. 29, have estimated that between two to three thousand Finnish officers served in the Russian forces between 1809-1917, of which 300 achieved the rank of general and 67 that of admiral. In 1877, of the 281 commissioned Finnish officers in the Russian army, 40 of them were generals; according to Lauri Hyvämäki, "Bulgarian suomalainen diktaatori," in his Ennen routa. Esseitä ja tutkielmia 1880-luvusta (Helsinki, 1960), pp. 31-32, they numbered more than the total of general officers in the service of the king of Sweden-Norway. Under the circumstances, it was little wonder that the Russophils -- e.g. Ewreinoff, Zur finnischen Frage,

p.20; Alexandre Baschmakoff, "Finlande: La question finlandaise," Revue politique et parlementaire, XII (1897), 702 - rebelled.

[120]For the development of the role and duties of the governor-general, see the Araicheev-Sprengtporten-Knorring project in Yrjö-Koskinen, Suomen kenraali-kuvernöörin, virallista kirjevaihtoa, pp. xiii-xxii; "Uchrezhdenie Pravitel'stvuiushchago Soveta v Velikom Kniazhestve Finliandii, ot 6/18 Avgusta 1809 goda," in Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., pp. 16-21; Mechelin, A Précis of the Public Law of Finland, pp. 50-53.

[121]Mechelin, A Précis of the Public Law of Finland, pp. 73-76, 84-88, 90-91; cf. Mikhailov, Iuridicheskoe polozhenie Finliandii, p. 26, who, in commenting on Article 40 of the 1772 Form of Government ("The Crown cannot publish new laws, nor old laws withdraw without the knowledge and consent of the Riksdag."), wrote: " . . . History tells us that Alexander I, neither at Borgå, nor by later decree, completely adhered to this article."

[122]Mechelin, A Précis of the Public Law of Finland, p. 85, contended that until 1865 there had been no extraordinary budget as the general state revenues had sufficed and, therefore, there had been no need on the part of the tsars to convoke a Diet for the sake of budgetary matters.

[123]At the end of this time, according to Jussila, Suomen perustuslait, p. 142, Alexander's interest in Finland and relations with his Finnish advisors cooled considerably. It was not until than that the Swedish matter was settled with Chernyshev being ordered on April 24, 1818, to go once more to the Swedish court on an extraordinary mission to oversee the liquidation of Norway and to calm the Swedes. See "Instruktsiia A.I. Chernyshevy pri otpravlenii ego v Stokgol'm," S.I.R.I.O., CXXI, 360-363.

[124]Jussila, Suomen perustuslait, pp. 134-138.

[125]Translated from the Russian text as published in "Ohjesääntö valtiopäivien valmistelukomitealle v. 1819," Ibid., Appendices, No. 1, p. 250.

[126]Jussila suggests the use of this term in his reference to "byrokraattis-patrioottinen Suomi-idea," Ibid., p. 151.

[127]Cf. I. A. Puntila, Histoire politique de la Finlande de 1809 à 1955, trans. by Jean-Louis Perret (Neuchâtel, 1966), p. 34: "The political life had fallen into lethargy: there passed a period of bureaucracy and frozen constitutionality."

[128]Mechelin, A Précis of the Public Law of Finland, pp. 32-35, 77.

[129]See Osmonsalo, "Itsevaltiuden kausi," pp. 131-132; A.A. Kizevetter, "Imperator Nikolai I, kak konstitsionnye monarkh," Istoricheskie ocherk, pp. 402-418; N.V. Riasanovsky, Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-1855 (Berkeley, 1959), p. 227.

[130]Keijo Korhonen, "Kansallisvaltiollinen linja," in Suomen ulkopolitiikan kehityslinjat 1809-1966, ed. by Ilkka Hakalehto (Porvoo, 1968), p. 15; Erkki K. Osmonsalo, "Perustuslaillisen kehityksen kausi," Suomen historian käsikirja, II, 165-166.

[131]Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg, Der Durchbruch des Nationalismus und Liberalismus im politischen Leben Finnlands 1856-1863 (Helsinki, 1934), pp. 7-8.

[132]Numminen, "Finland's Foreign Policy as an Autonomous Grand Duchy," p. 24.

[133]Anders Mattson Myhrman, The Swedish Nationality Movement (Chicago, 1939), p. 3; "Finland as a Nordic Legal State under Russia," Scandinavia Past and Present, II, 688-691.

[134]With poetic justice, this view originated in Sweden. Israel Hwasser, Professor of Medicine at Uppsala University, anonymously published his Om Allians-tractaten emellan Sverige och Ryssland år 1812. Politisk Betraktelse öfver Nordens nuvarande ställning (Stockholm, 1838) which, in defence

of Bernadotte's "1812 Policy," stated that Finland's separation from Sweden enabled that grand duchy to become a nation. J.V. Snellman, the first great Finnish language rights champion, agreed, noting that the creation of a Finnish national consciousness only occurred as the result of Finland being effectively isolated from both the Russians and Swedes following her annexation to Russia. For this, see his Kootut teokset, VII (Porvoo, 1930), p. 256.

Y.S. Yrjö Koskinen (Finnicization of Georg Z. Forsman, who was still later dubbed Baron Yrjö-Koskinen), Snellman's chief disciple and an even more radical Finnophil, even dared to suggest "that Finland's present situation in terms of the state is different and better than in the Swedish period, and the year 1809 really made of Finland a separate nation and its own state." Taken from "Moskovalaisen lehden tuimistelemiset," Helsingin uutiset, December 21, 1863, No. 101; the same article is also published in his Kansallisia ja yhteiskunnallisia kirjoittuksia (4 vols.; Helsinki, 1904-1906; Tampere, 1930), II, 192-202.

[135]"Vysochaishee Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva Povelenie o sozvanii chinov Finliandii no Obshchii Seim v g. Gel'singforse 3/15 Sentabria 1863 g., ot 6/18 Iiunia 1863 g." in Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., pp. 43-45.

[136]For example, see Mechelin, A Précis of the Public Law of Finland, pp. 20-21; Deck, Pour la Finlande, p. 18.

[137]Jussila, Suomen perustuslait, pp. 147-150; Osmonsalo, "Itsevaltiuden kausi," pp. 130-132.

[138]Maurice Chalhoub, La Finlande (Paris, [1910]), p. 263; W.E. Mosse, Alexander II and the Modernization of Russia (London, 1958), pp. 119-120.

[139]Osmonsalo, "Perustuslaillisen kehityksen kausi," pp. 179-181; Mosse, Alexander II and the Modernization of Russia, pp. 121-122; Toivo Nordberg, "Huhtikuun manifestista tammikuun valio-kuntaan," Historiallinen arkisto, LVI (1958), 256-312.

[140]Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu, Homme d'état russe (Nicolas Milutine) d'après sa correspondance inédite; étude

sur la Russie et la Pologne pendant le règne d'Alexandre II (1855-1872) (Paris, 1884; rpt. Hattiesburg, Miss., 1969), p. 581.

[141] Translated from "Rech Gosudaria Imperatora Aleksandra II, Velikago Kniazia Finliandskago, k zemskim chinam Finliandii pri otkrytii seima v Gel'singforse 5/18 Sentiabria 1863 g.," in Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., p. 48.

In following up the above promise in his address to the Diet, Alexander II formed a committee toward the end of 1864 with the task of revising Finland's fundamental laws into an exact and unified code of law, charging it to respect these principles (as translated from the document published in Deck, Pour la Finlande, pp. 20-22):

"1. That the Grand Duchy of Finland, being part of the Russian Empire, is indissolubly united to this Empire;

"2. That the Grand Duchy is governed according to its Form of Government and its laws;

"3. That the Emperor of Russia is at the same time Grand Duke of Finland, . . .

"4. That the relations of Finland with foreign powers depend on those of the Empire and are identical;

"5. That the supreme administration in the country is entrusted to the Senate, . . . to whose functions men of Finnish origin will be nominated by the Emperor;

"6. That the judicial power of the Emperor will be exercised by a supreme Tribunal, . . . of men of Finnish origin . . .;

"7. That the affairs which must be decided by the Emperor himself are reported to the Emperor by a Minister-ecretary of State, who must be of Finnish origin;

"8. That the Minister-Secretary of State and the members of the Senate, as well as other public functionaries of the country, are only responsible to the Emperor in the exercise of their functions and employment;

"9. That the Estates of the country have the right to assemble in an ordinary Diet;

"10. That, henceforth, no loan of State will be made without the consent of the Diet, save in the case of a war or some other unforeseen general calamity which would render it necessary to do otherwise.

"11. That the right appertaining already to the Estates in the subject of taxes will be enlarged, . . .;

"12. That the right of initiative which has appertained to the Estates in the past will be restituted to them, . . . the initiative in matters of the fundamental laws staying at all times reserved to the Emperor alone; and

"13. That religious liberty must be extended in the manner that every Christian, that to whatever special faith he adheres, is able to obtain the right of citizenship in Finland and is to be admitted into the public, civil and military service."

[142]Jutikkala and Pirinen, A History of Finland, pp. 214-215; Michael T. Florinsky, "The Grand Duchy of Finland," in Governments of Continental Europe, ed. by James T. Shotwell (Rev. ed.; New York, 1952), p. 684; Despagnet, La question finlandaise, p. 34.

[143]For brief histories of Finland's capitals, see Kuosa, Jokamiehen Suomen historia, IV, 1039-1040; Eino E. Suolahti, "Helsinki, capitale de la Finlande autonome," in La Finlande hier et aujourd'hui, pp. 35-47; C.J. Gardberg, "Turku -- Ancient Capital of Finland," in Introduction to Finland 1963, pp. 18-30.

[144]Mechelin, A Précis of the Public Law in Finland, pp. 73-74.

[145]The concept of this period as being one of political stagnation (Hornberg, "Le parlement finlandais," p. 93) and frozen constitutionality (Puntila, Histoire politique de la Finlande, p. 34) can be misleading; except in the matter of the Diet, other aspects of Finnish political life then were quite lively as this was the period of "national awakening" (Jutikkala and Pirinen, A History of Finland, p. 194) during the "era of autonomy" (Suomen historian dokumentteja, II, 29-30).

[146]For the rescript concerning this, see Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., pp. 31-33.

[147]Wuorinen, A History of Finland, pp. 117-118; Jutikkala and Pirinen, A History of Finland, p. 190.

[148]Mechelin, A Précis of the Public Law of Finland, pp. 36-50, 118-125.

[149]Ibid., p. 51.

[150]Ibid., p. 52.

[151]Ibid., pp. 53-54.

[152]See "Vysochaishaia Ego Imperatorskago Velich Instruktsiia uchrezhdennoi v S. Peterburge Kommisii finliandskikh del, ot 25 Oktiabria (6 Noiabria) 1811 goda," in Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., pp. 23-25.

[153]See "Vysochaishii Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva Manifest ob up azdnenii Kommissii Finliandskikh Del v S. Peterburge i ob uchrezhdenii Stats-Sekretariata Velikago Kniazhestva Finliandii, ot 17/29 Marta 1826 goda," Ibid., pp. 35-38; Osten-Sacken, La condition de droit public du Grand-Duché de Finlande, Appendices, No. 49.

[154]"Vysochaishii Ego Imperatorskago Velichestva Manifest ob uchrezhdenii Komiteta dlia Finliandskikh Del pri Stats-Sekretariate Velikago Kniazhestva Finliandskago, ot 27 Marta/8 Aprelia 1857 g.," in Borenius, Akty dlia . . . V.K.F., pp. 41-42. The Committee for Finnish Affairs continued to function until 1891.

[155]Mechelin, A Précis of the Public Law of Finland, p. 57.

[156]See note 153 above.

[157]Mechelin, A Précis of the Public Law of Finland, pp. 54-56.

[158]For example, see Jutikkala and Pirinen, A History of Finland, p. 198; Puntila, Histoire politique de la Finlande, pp. 37-38. Cf. Jussila, Suomen perustuslait, pp. 210-211.

[159]Osmonsalo, "Itsevaltiuden kausi," pp. 130-131.

[160]For the Act of Assurance, see Note 117.

[161]Jussila, Suomen perustuslait, pp. 204-211, and also his "Finnland in der Gesetzkodifikation zur Zeit Nikolajs I," Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, NS XX (1972), 38-41.

[162]For example, see C.J. Walleen's report to Nicholas I on the Constitutional Acts of 1772 and 1789 (tabled in 1825) and his report to Governor-General Menshikov on Finland's Constitutional Acts and the Diet (prepared in 1835) as published in Jussila, Suomen perustuslait, Appendices II and III.

[163]Even Governor-General Zakrevskii who was an ardent Russian patriot -- e.g. see his letters of December 4, 1823 and January 20, 1824 to Prince P.M. Bolkonskii, S.I.R.I.O., LXXIII: Bumagi Grafa Arseniia Andreevicha Zakrevskago, ed. by N.F. Dubrovin, Nos. 127 and 129 -- had fallen under the spell of Finland ("Biograficheskaia Zametka o zhizni grafa Arseniia Andreevicha Zakrevskago, sostavlennaia kniazem D.V. Drutsnim-Sokalinskim," Ibid., p. viii). In reply to the most unfavourable report about Finland by A.D. Hummel, a former Swedish subject in the service of Russia, Zakrevskii made a stinging rebuttal. See both documents, "Sensuurivirkamies A.D. Hummelin raportti Suomesta kenraali A. von Benckendorffille 10.12.1826" and "Kenraalikuvernööri A.A. Zakrevskin vastaus Hummelin rapporttiin 28.12.1826," in Suomen historian dokumentteja, II, Nos. 330 and 331 respectively. For other favourable reports appearing at this critical time just before the outbreak of the Polish Rebellion of 1830, see "Graf A.N. Benkendorf o Rossii v 1827-1830 gg.," Krasnyi arkhiv, XXXVIII (1929), 138-174 passim.

[164]Krusius-Ahrenberg, "Finnischer Separatismus und russischer Imperialismus," pp. 264-265; Jussila, Suomen perustuslait, pp. 162-163.

[165]This regulation -- as translated from "Vuoden 1850 sensuuriasetus suomen kielellä julkaistavista painotuotteista," in Suomen historian dokumentteja, II,

No. 335 -- reads as follows:
"His Imperial Majesty, to whose attention it has come that in Finland there has been the intention to publish new works in the Finnish language, and having observed that those individuals who know only the Finnish language belong entirely to the labour force or the agricultural worker class, has deigned to take heed of that, that the uncultured, those readers belonging to the lower class, in some cases are able to misunderstand books which are harmless for the educated classes, also that unnecessary reading generally estranges the working and agricultural classes from beneficial activity, and because of this has graciously deigned to determine that the Finnish censorship ordinances are to include the following regulation:

"Of the new books, brochures, news periodicals or other writings, whatever their type or size may be, it is permitted to publish in the language only that kind which do no injury to the censorship ordinances nor life and that which intends only religious edification or economic good; on the other hand, it is forbidden to publish altogether in Finnish the national news or information of crimes committed outside the country, the same as the non-publication in the aforesaid language of romances, be they then in the original or in translation, from which may not be exempted even those which the censor has approved in other languages. Nevertheless, this ordinance does not bar from publication those works which already exist in the Finnish language, nor also those descriptions touching upon Finnish history, fairy tales, and old folk-songs or folk-verse."

Parenthetically, it should be noted that this law was essentially the product of the Swedo-Finnish bureaucracy and not of the Russian government; the consequence of which was that Johan Ludvig Runeberg's Fänrik Ståls Sägner ("The Tales of Ensign Stål"), an epic poem-cycle glorifying Finland's participation in the War of 1808-1809 against Russia, was allowed to circulate freely although it was obviously anti-Russian in spirit and content.

166 Menshikov had noted once that the Finnish bureaucracy took pains to see "that from Finland one was not able to hear of anything, good or bad. The bad should not be heard by the Emperor; the good by the nationalists." (Cited from Jussila, Suomen perustuslait, p. 162) Tsar Nicholas' response to Finland's demonstrated loyalty, such as in the sending

of the Finnish guards to assist in the crushing of the Polish rebels in 1830, was reportedly to resist the would-be Russifiers of Finland with this statement: "Leave the Finns in peace: It is the only province in my great empire, which has not caused me a minute of anxiety or disappointment in my entire reign." (Ibid.)

[167]The extent of the threat to the Swedish-speaking elite is perhaps better illustrated in this passage from the manuscript copy of Yrjö-Koskinen, "Muistinpanoja itseäni varten ja Biogr. Nimikirjan kirjailijoille," November 8, 1881, Agathon Meurmanin kokoelma, III, HYK:

"The Finnish national existence had to be fashioned completely on the same model as other nations. Finnish in Finland, just as Swedish in Sweden, French in France [my emphasis]; to the existing conditions had to be given only a temporary right; . . ."

[168]An excellent study of Arwidsson's literary work in this period is found in Olavi Junnila, Ruotsiin muutanut Adolf Iwar Arwidsson ja Suomi (1823-1858) (Helsinki, 1972). An English summary is included (pp. 284-292).

[169]Ibid., p. 160.

[170]K.F. Ignatius, "Yrjö-Koskinen," Valvoja, 1903, p. 586.

[171]Krusius-Ahrenberg, "Finnischer Separatismus und russischer Imperialismus," pp. 266-267. Extremist reaction to the Polish rebellion and its consequences upon other minorities within the Empire led to the melding together of Old Russian conservatism and the newer strain of Slavo-romantic nationalism even in high offices of the Empire; witness the employment of Count L.A. Perovskii as Minister of the Interior, a man who championed a programme to make an end of Finland's special status. For this, see Jussila, "Finnland in der Gesetzkodifikation," pp. 27-28; Bruno Lesch, "Greve Leo Perovskij och Finland," Historisk Tidskrift för Finland, 1945, pp. 1-2; Korhonen, Autonomous Finland, p. 29.

[172]The early misgivings of Sir Robert Wilson, A Sketch of the Military and Political Power of Russia in the Year 1817 (2nd ed.; London, 1817), p. 38, at Britain's ratification of Russia's possession of Finland had finally emerged as Palmerston's "beau ideal" of seeing "Aland and Finland restored to Sweden." For this see "Memorandum by Palmerston, March 19, 1854," and in a like vein, "Memorandum by Lord John Russell, May 20, 1854," in The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell, 1840-1878, ed. by G.P. Gooch (2 vols.; London, 1925), II, 160-161 and 165-166 respectively. See also Kenneth Bourne, The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 1830-1902 (Oxford, 1970), p. 78; Edgar Anderson, "The Role of the Crimean War in Northern Europe," Jährbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, N.S XX (1972), 46-47.

[173]The die was cast against the alliance when Lord Russell turned against it as in his letter to Lord Clarendon, August 3, 1854 (from The Later Correspondence of Lord John Russell, II, 169):

"Strongly as I have been in favour of a Swedish alliance, these terms are too much for my stomach. A declaration that we wish to see Finland detached from Russia and re-united to Sweden would almost pledge us to make no peace without the accomplishment of that object."

[174]See Krusius-Ahrenberg, "Finnischer Separatismus und russischer Imperialismus," pp. 270-272; Junnila, Ruotsiin muuttanut Adolf Iwar Arwidsson, pp. 173-176; Hyvämaki, "Ne tahtovat marssia Narvikiin," Ennen routaa, p. 124. According to Barbara Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy, 1814-1914 (Philadelphia, 1964), p. 128, the French as well as Swedish revanchists, pan-Scandinavians and emigrant Finlanders, were eager to foment an uprising in Finland in 1854, but were dissuaded from taking this course by the British. In 1855, however, the British themselves "discovered" the downtrodden Baltic minorities -- Anderson, "The Role of the Crimean War," pp. 56-57 -- although they did nothing for fear of the consequences of another Napoleonic war of liberation.

[175]Juva and Juva, Suomen kansan historia, IV, 279-284; Korhonen, "Kansallisvaltiollinen linja," pp. 15-16; Sauvageot, Histoire de la Finlande, I, 195-196.

[176]William Gerard Don, Reminiscences of the Baltic Fleet of 1855 (Brechin, 1894), pp. 60-61.

[177]Captain Mundy to Rear-Admiral Seymour, Björko Sound, September 6, 1855, in D. Bonner-Smith, ed., Russian War, 1855. Baltic. Official Correspondence (London, 1944), pp. 281-282.

[178]Gallén, "La Finlande militaire," p. 200.

[179]For example, of the two major Finnish fortresses, Bomarsund proved to be "the flesh of a giant without muscles or sinews" according to M.M. Borodkin, Voina 1854-1855 gg. na finskom poberezh'e (St. Petersburg, 1904), p. 124. Sveaborg, of course, was much stronger. But when an Anglo-French naval attack failed to materialize against Sveaborg in 1854 due to an excess of British caution -- for this, see Sir Charles Napier to Secretary of the Admiralty, September 18, 1854, and the report of Brigadier-General Jones on Sveaborg, August 27, 1854, in D. Bonner-Smith and A.C. Dewar, eds., Russian War, 1854. Baltic and Black Sea. Official Correspondence (London, 1943), pp. 125 and 111-112 respectively -- the Russians began to speculate that the attack on the fortress might come by land instead. In "Prigotovleniia Anglii kampanii 1855 goda," Morskoi sbornik, XV: 3 (March 1855), 106, it was suggested that the English seemed to be interested in the city of Tavastehus as a most strategic point of attack for the disruption of the communications of the grand duchy and in preparation for a descent upon Sveaborg. This thinking was symptomatic of Russia's own nervousness concerning the inadequate strength of her troops in Finland and the reliability of her Finnish subjects, the effect of which was to bring in Finland (and in a wider sense to the whole Baltic area) a period of "liberation" under Alexander II (Anderson, "The Role of the Crimean War," p. 59).

[180]In 1858, for example, the tsar passed a rescript allowing Finnish to become an official language in the Church and at county meetings. For this, see "Keisarillisen Majeestin armollinen julistus kirkon- ja pitäjänkokous protkollain kirjoittamisesta Suomen kielellä 14.7.1858," in Suomen historian dokumentteja, II, No. 379. For the 1863 decree, see "Kielireskripti 1.8.1863," Ibid., No. 381.

[181]"Aleksanteri II," Helsingin uutiset, September 21, 1863, No. 75.

[182]For example, see Rosalind Travers, Letters from Finland, August, 1908-March, 1909 (London, 1911), Letter II ("To Frances Clare, . . . August 29th").

[183]Katkov's response was to initiate a press campaign against Finland's special rights; see Moskovskaia vedomosti, September 10, 18 and 26, 1863, Nos. 196, 202 and 209, editorial; Ibid., November 11, 1863, No. 258, editorial.

[184]Helsingfors dagblad, April 15, 1863, No. 85. In response to Katkov's counterattack (see the previous note), further articles defining Finland's "independence" appeared: Ibid., October 22 and November 24, 1863, Nos. 245 and 273.

While the "old, honest" Fennomen journals, Päivätar and Suometar, supported the liberal Dagblad (Korhonen, Autonomous Finland, p. 56), Snellman urged the young Fennomen to stand loyally by the tsar in his article entitled "Krig eller fred för Finland," Litteraturblad, No. 17 (1863), pp. 193-201.

In Helsingin uutiset, December 21, 1863, No. 101, Yrjö Koskinen took the middle ground; while giving credence to Finland's autonomy, he lashed at Katkov for believing that the "Svecoman" voice represented Finland. Nevertheless, his general predilection was toward Finnish compliance; he even had grown impatient with Polish intransigence, having once suggested that the Poles had worsened their situation by half. For this, see his letter of February 5 [1863] to his brother Jaakko Forsman, Suomalaisen Kirjallisuus Suera (hereinafter SKS), Jaakko Forsmanin kirjeita, No. 185.

[185]Jutikkala and Pirinen, A History of Finland, pp. 210-211.

[186]Bobovitsh, "Venäjän ja Suomen taloudelliset suhteet," p. 56, suggests that Finland's separate monetary system was really of advantage to Russia, inasmuch as the latter received much needed gold in payment for the deficits the Finns incurred in the Russian trade.

[187]Finland, Lantdagen, The Reply of the Finnish Estates Adopted at the Extraordinary Diet of 1899 to the Proposals of His Imperial Majesty Nicholas II., for a New Military Service Law in Finland (London, 1900), pp. vi-vii, summarizes well the virtues of the military reforms in the Manifesto of December 6/18, 1878. It noted that Finnish youths were eligible for three years active service at age twenty-one while Russians served six years and were liable for call-up at twenty years. It emphasized that it had been most important that all personnel connected with the military service be Finnish in accordance with the fundamental laws. Other provisions included that those in active service should serve a further two years in the reserve, and all others not called would pass directly into the reserves and take ninety days of military training within three years. After a period of five years, all Finlanders who were eligible for military service (whether they served in the active or reserve forces) were to be transferred into the militia until they were retired at age forty. But the most important detail of the 1878 military reforms was that these forces constituted a de facto national army; as The Reply of the Finnish Estates put it: "The object of the Finnish army is to defend the Throne and the Fatherland, and thereby contribute to the defence of Russia."

See also F. Veimarn, "Russkoe Voennoe obozrenie. Finskiia Voiska," Voennyi sbornik, CLVI: 3 (1884) and 4 (1884), pp. 22-41, and 136-143 respectively; Seitkari, Vuoden 1878 asevelvollisuuslain syntyvaiheet, pp. 274 ff.

[188]For example, Peter Kropotkin, Memoirs of a Revolutionist (Boston, 1899), pp. 54-55, described how the common people likened military service call-ups to death sentences. Certainly, the twenty-five year term of service entailed the loss of a man to his relatives and community virtually forever; in the case of Finlanders, it would have meant Russification as well.

[189]Cyril E. Black, "The Pattern of Russian Objectives," in Russian Foreign Policy. Essays in Historical Perspective, ed. by Ivo J. Lederer (New Haven, Conn., 1962), p. 28; Puntila, Histoire politique de la Finlande, pp. 77-79. Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, p. 440, has taken a different tack,

stating: " . . . the case of Finland represented in many respects the most telling instance of the folly of Russification. . . . in general the Finns participated actively and fruitfully in almost every aspect of the life of the empire. Yet the new nationalism demanded that they too be nationalized."

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RUSSIAN COUP D'ÉTAT IN FINLAND

Before the reign of Alexander III, Finland and the Baltic borderlands scarcely constituted a major problem in the eyes of Russia. The legacy of Tsar Alexander I's glorious military victory over Napoleon, the weakness of Sweden as well as her faithfulness to the precepts of Carl Johan's "1812 Policy", and the traditional friendship existing between Prussia and Russia, all had contributed to St. Petersburg's strong feeling of security. But now, in the year 1881, the depressing effect of the Crimean defeat, the Polish rebellion of 1863, the growing friction with Sweden,[1] the worsening relations with the newly formed German Empire -- a contest which would ultimately culminate in "a duel to the death between Slavism and Germanism"[2], and the internal disorder, together combined to sap Russia of her self-confidence and to erode her spirit, causing her to doubt her own abilities to resist the ambitions of her enemies. Governed by this gnawing sense of uncertainty,

Russia turned inward to apprise herself of her own defensive situation, paying particular attention to the condition of her extensive borderlands. Under the circumstances, it was inevitable that she would decide that these frontier areas presented a special problem for her.

Had it been an age less firmly attached to the idea of nationalism, Russia might still have continued to preserve that benign cosmopolitan outlook that had characterized her Imperial dominion in the past. Now, however, there existed the opinion in all levels of Russian society and government that those inferior, non-Russian people of the vulnerable borderlands, who comprised some twenty-eight percent of the Empire's population,[3] would not serve as the defensive ramparts of Russia in time of war.[4] This problem was made even more acute in the minds of the Russophils with the realization that all the non-Russian minorities in the whole Empire numbered more than half of the country's entire population.[5] Outnumbered in their own homeland and besieged on all sides by their external enemies, the Russian nationalists succumbed to extremist attitudes and solutions in their efforts to secure the safety and unity of the Russian fatherland.

Their answer to the problem was unitarism; history offered them, so they believed, no other choice. As evidence,

it was noted that the Poles had twice dared to revolt in spite of the numerous privileges granted to them. Nor had the Finlanders proved to be much better; for though Finland had been treated so liberally by Alexander II in 1863,[6] even she had shown a lack of proper gratitude.[7] Indeed, the Fennomen -- Yrjö Koskinen in particular[8] -- had tried to make theirs a common cause with other Finnic minorities in the Baltic region against the Baltic German elite and as well the authority of the central government.[9] Moreover, the apparent success of the unified Bismarckian nation-state persuaded many of the more chauvinistic Russians that unity and Russification had to go hand in hand.[10]

Although governmental reform toward decentralization, self-government and local autonomy had been tried as the immediate cure to Russia's ills after the Crimean War, this solution had already been abandoned by 1870. In its place, there crystallized the notion to stress the ideals of the common good of the whole Empire over and above local interests.[11] The Imperial government's importance was further magnified by the fact that the huge investments required for the modernization of Russian industry, transport, and military technology, could only be adequately financed through the means and resources at the disposal of the central authorities. In addition, the accoutrements of the industrialized state,

for example, the railways, demanded such a high degree of standardization in planning, manufacture, and use, that the complementary processes of centralism and unification necessarily became a growing force in industrializing Russia.[12] Thus, the Russifiers were generously assisted by the general conditions of the times.

Of the major minorities in western Russia to suffer the blow of Russification during the last half of the nineteenth century, the Poles were the first. Immediately following the abortive rebellion of 1863, all privileges of the Polish nobility were revoked while the peasants were emancipated.[13] The Baltic provinces were next to receive the attention of offical Russification measures during the 1880's. Once more selective Russification was practiced in that Tsar Alexander III chose to withdraw the privileges of the Baltic German elite to the benefit of the Estonian and Latvian peasantry.[14] In both instances, the principal motive was not to russify per se but to destroy a specific threat against the state as posed by the local aristocracies.

In this regard, it has also been said that the Russian government tried to do much the same in Finland at the end of the nineteenth century but less successfully since this time it faced national rather than class resistance.[15] Unlike Poland and the Baltic provinces, Finland had been

given more time to develop a keen sense of national identity. Indeed, an intense policy of centralization was not directed at Finland until 1899. Prior to that time, particularly in the reign of Alexander III, relations between Finland were regarded as being excellent and that ". . . it was only later that Finnish confidence was shattered when Nicholas II broke his Imperial word, under pressure of the Russian nationalist movement."[16]

Actually Finland had been quite fortunate that Alexander II died when he did, for Minister of Interior Loris-Melikov was preparing at the tsar's instructions a project of constitutional reform and representative government that would have directly injured Finland's autonomy. Alexander III, being of a different stamp, refused to admit the principle of representative government[17] and thereby unintentionally preserved Finnish rights. Loris-Melikov's successor, Count Ignatiev, redrafted the constitution, leaving only the specific rights of the borderlands for later definition.[18] Ignatiev also failed to gain support for his project, and he too was fired for "liberal" tendencies.

The first attempt of the new tsar to follow the general pattern of destroying the elite's privileges in Finland came with his March 18, 1886 confirmation of his father's language decree of 1863. By this instrument, Finnish was now given the

same official status that had been formerly allocated to Swedish alone.[19] Then followed a relatively quiescent period in terms of official Russo-Finnish relations until 1890. One reason for this had been given as follows: "Indeed, the criticism directed against him [Pobedonostsev] from 1887 until 1890 over Baltic policy may have preserved Finland from his attention in the next decade."[20]

Then, in January 1890, three Finnish-Russian mixed committees were convened to consider the post, customs and money questions. The chairman of the committees was Finland's Governor-General F.L. Heiden of whom it had once been suggested that he was too easily and quickly persuaded to follow the path of least resistance.[21] On the commission for the posts there were two Finns: Assistant Minister — State Secretary for Finland W. v. Daehn and Senator C. Tudeer. The Russian delegates were the head of the Imperial Posts, Telegraphs and Communications, and his assistant director. In this instance, the Russians wanted to unite the postal system under the Russian Ministry of Interior. The Finlanders objected, stating that this would be in violation of the fundamental laws. Heiden did not dare push through all the changes he would have wanted for fear of raising difficulties in Finland. So, the use of Russian in the Finnish postal system was restricted to the cities of Finland and all of

Viborg province.[22] But the postal systems were united by the tsar in his manifesto of May 31/June 12, 1890,[23] and Finlanders continued to protest this invasion of their autonomy.[24]

At this time, Russian was also introduced in the text of Finnish postage stamps.[25] In 1891, the amount of Russian text was increased and different designs of the tsarist regime had to be included on all Finnish stamps destined for use in Russia. The last stage of the Russification of Finnish postage stamps occurred in 1900; then Russian stamps had to be used on all mail addressed to Russia and foreign countries, while domestic Finnish stamps had to be based on Russian designs.[26]

In matters concerning money and customs, the Russian government now did not care to press for the incorporation of the relevant Finnish departments into their Russian counterparts. However, Russia did legislate the increased use of the Russian language in Finland. The use of Russian was demanded of those working on the Finnish railways and those employed by the directorate of the police and as well those officials in seaports and other places frequented by Russians. Judges in areas adjacent to Russia and in the large cities also had to know Russian.[27] Naturally many of the more extreme nationalists in Finland did not accept this too kindly.

The last area of friction in official circles between Finland and Russia during Alexander's reign arose over differing interpretations of Finnish constitutional rights. In Alexander III's time, these differences were not deemed to be as important as they were to become in the reign of his son Nicholas II. However, the first consideration of this matter was undertaken at Alexander's command by a special committee chaired by H.N. Bunge. The Bunge Commission sat from 1891 to 1894, but the result of its work was not acted upon until the rule of Nicholas.[28] Only then were Finland's fundamental laws really interfered with.

In retrospect, it appears that Alexander III's policies in Finland were chiefly intended to produce a greater degree of efficiency in certain institutions common to both the Finnish and Russian administrations. Although occasional storms of protest rose among the Finlanders to the effect that their autonomy was being threatened, the Russian government's tendency toward Russification as such had not been great.[29] The tsar still had a paternal attitude toward the minorities. It was only in the nationalist periodical press that the question of Russification became the primary issue.

Before the 1840's, Russian publications about Finland tended to exhibit some mild curiosity about this remote corner

of the Empire.[30] Then, a more ominous quality began to appear in Russian romantic literature: at first, these stories told of the Russification of Finnish lovers by their Russian sweethearts; then, tales recounting the stupidity of the Chukny became increasingly popular.[31] About 1863, the first major attacks on Finland's autonomy were launched by Katkov in his Moskovskaia vedomosti. He then lapsed into a silence on the subject of Finland from the late 1860's until 1883 as he was occupied with Russia's problems in the Balkans. Thereafter, he took up the literary struggle again on behalf of the Russification of Finland, and so began the polemics of the 1880's.[32]

Nevertheless, the responsibility for the Russian suspicion and distrust of Finland was at least partially the result of the extremist position taken by the Finnish autonomists. For example, E.G.W. Becker wrote in 1880 an article which argued for "a Finland independent and neutral, under the guarantee of the great powers."[33] Indeed, Finnish autonomists already were pressing for a separate consular service. In the same vein, Robert Runeberg declared during his visit to the British embassy in St. Petersburgh in 1885:

> Monsieur Runeberg stated that he came on behalf of his countrymen, who were very apprehensive that a war would result from the present complications between Russia and England; . . . He ventured to submit their hope that in the event of war on the

> present occasion, Her Majesty's Government would take the position of Finland into their benevolent consideration,. . .
>
> I pointed out to Monsieur Runeberg that Finland was an integral part of Russia,. . .
>
> . . . He added that there was so little friendly feeling between Russians and Finns that, if anything, the former would rather be pleased at any misfortunes to which their countrymen in Finland might be exposed, . . .[34]

The extreme attitude of the Finns made Russia's position in Finland appear to be extremely precarious. To prevent the permanent rupture of the Russo-Finnish union, Katkov declared that it was necessary to regulate Finnish trade in the Russian interest and to abolish the customs border between Finland and Russia as it supported a separate Finnish existence with its multitude of privileges.[35] The fact that Katkov had also begun to overestimate the power of the more rabid Finnish autonomists led him to propose more and more radical solutions of his own to the problem.

In an editorial, Katkov gave this analysis of Finnish separatism: "The Finnish programme amounts to no more or less than the complete separation of Finland from Russia and the belittling of the power of the Russian Emperor to the point of helplessness of the Swedish crown a century and a half ago."[36]

Moskovskaia vedomosti felt that Russia was particularly menaced by the fact that the Finnish separatists had begun to agitate on behalf of their cause outside Finland's borders.

It reported that even a new society was then being formed to carry on this task of spreading notions of Finnish separatism throughout Europe. It also gloomily foresaw that L. Mechelin and R. Montgomery would be elected to head this society as they had been most active in this project.[37]

Revealing his fear of foreign interwention, Katkov warned his readers that the separatists constituted a real danger to Russia's security in the borderlands.[38] His newspaper reported with some alarm that the Finnish separatists intended to publish a newspaper in Germany, implying that the whole project was strictly a German venture as the Finns themselves possessed neither sufficient funds nor adequate Russian language skills.[39]

In another issue, Moskovskaia vedomosti noted the return of the Kaiser from a Norwegian visit in order to introduce some speculation about the role of Sweden in a future Russo-German war. It suggested that the military support of the Triple Alliance by Sweden would result in her recovery of Finland once victory had been achieved over Russia. The newspaper supported its view by noting that such reports had been denied neither by Germany nor Sweden and so concluded that a new alliance had indeed been formed. Quoting from Krestovaia gazeta, this editorial then stated that "as already long ago has come to light, Russia seems to be the general

enemy of all of Europe, . . ."[40]

It appears that the Germanophobia which the Russians contracted at the Congress of Berlin had not been confined to measures taken against the Germans in the Baltic provinces. It had now been transferred to the Svecomen as well.[41] As a consequence, it seemed to the Russian nationalists that they could not really speak of "loyal Finland" any longer, especially when it could always be pointed out that the Finnish press had once declared that any war between England and Russia was Russia's and not Finland's fight.[42]

Of course with all this distrust getting the upper hand in the Russian mind, every aspect of Finland's autonomous existence was questioned in the Russian nationalist press. The "Borgå Acts", for one, were labelled apocryphal so that they could not establish any agreement between Alexander I and the Finnish Diet that might have resulted in a Russian constitutional monarchy of personal union with Finland.[43] The same press also fought for an extension of Russian language requirements in Finland.[44] Finnish schools were attacked as hotbeds of anti-Russian tendencies, for they were deemed to be the prime instruments in the inculcation of the ideas of Finland's separate historical, cultural and political development in the Finnish youth.[45]

Soon the foremost institutions of the Finnish

administration were also attacked. Finland's separate "army" came under fire for being too small and too independent of the regular Russian command.[46] The Finnish bureaucracy did not escape unscathed,[47] nor did even the Office of the State Secretary for Finland.[48] It was suggested that the latter should become subordinate to Russia and Russian interests.[49] Moreover, it was argued that this office should be headed by a Russian since the first minister — state secretary had been Russian, and that it was too important to be entrusted any longer to Finnish separatists.[50]

In this campaign of Moskovskaia vedomosti against Finland, support for the Finnish position in Russia came from liberal newspapers. They had allied themselves with the Finnish liberals on the presumption that Finland was the one haven of true liberalism in the Empire, and so would be the inspirational source for the winning of the rest of Russia to the liberal cause as well. Hence, in a matter even as provocative as E.G.W. Becker's 1880 pamphlet, La Finlande indépendente et neutre, the Russian liberals asserted that Becker's separatist views were isolated to only a few extremists and that most Finns rejected these ideas for they fully appreciated the good works of the tsars. The Russian liberals wholly believed that the past benevolence

of their sovereigns had created a firm bond between the majority of Finns and Russia.[51]

Sparked by Katkov's polemics of 1885, the liberal newspaper Russkaia vedomosti stated that Finland should not be merged into the Russian state for it would mean complete disaster for her. It argued that this would entail the undesirable replacement of a developed constitutional system for one that was more rudimentary.[52] To this defence of Finnish autonomy, Russkii vestnik, a moderate Slavophil paper, added:

> The complete setting aside of Finnish privileges should happen only as far as Russian interests are openly interfered with and are clearly offended. Common political sense advises avoiding the alteration of political and social institutions of which we, the Russians, have, unfortunately, during the last two centuries been able to learn too much. . . . It would not be in accordance with the worthiness of a strong political power if, when the first signs of discontent appear, it threatens institutions which it has created and which have grown with its permission and under its protection for over half a century.[53]

The fact was that Finland did have friends in Russia as well as enemies. Unfortunately for her, however, she was unable to gain the confidence of the Russian conservatives who formed perhaps the most influential group in the Empire. The conservatives feared that Finnish liberalism would support Russian liberalism, an element they considered to be a debilitating factor to the strength of the Empire.[54]

They, from their reading of Russia's internal and external situation, could not countenance any vestige of liberalism anywhere in the Empire and so they were prepared to make an end of Finland's autonomy if necessary.

Meanwhile, the Finlanders were busy defending their country's separate status. R.A. Montgomery, for example, published a descriptive account of Finland's legislative progress in a French annual in 1880.[55] But the real landmark in the debate over the "Finnish question" was the appearance of Leo Mechelin's Précis du droit public du Grand-Duché de Finlande in 1886. In this volume, Mechelin, the leading liberal constitutionalist in Finland, unequivocally declared that Finland was an autonomous or "still-born" state bound in a "real union" with Russia and ruled over by the tsar-grand duke as her constitutional monarch.[56] The effect of this work was less than helpful, for it planted fears in Russia of Finnish separatist tendencies arising from the defence of Finland's special status.[57]

As a consequence, Mechelin's work provoked a massive attack upon itself and Finland's autonomy by the Russian nationalists. K.P. Ordin, an avowed enemy of Finland,[58] made Mechelin's book accessible to the Russian reading public by publishing an annotated Russian translation entitled Konstitutsii Finliandii in 1888.[59] It was, therefore,

Ordin's annotated version which came to be reviewed in Russia. This too had its effect in weakening the Finnish case, for as one reviewer remarked: Mechelin had lost sight of the requirements of the Empire, but that Ordin's "excellent work" redressed the balance by bringing to the attention of the reader Mechelin's numerous errors.[60]

Some of these supposed errors included Mechelin's concept of Finland as an autonomous state and of the tsar as a constitutional monarch in Finland.[61] It was said that Mechelin's concept of a "real union" of the Finnish nation with Russia was cut out of the fabric of fiction, for Finland was simply a conquered territory of Russia without any pact of union having been made between Finland and her conqueror.[62] N.M. Korkunov, in his article "Finliandskoe Velikoe Kniazhestvo,"[63] lent his prestigious reputation as jurist to this thesis. F. Elenev also chose to agree with this interpretation, to which he added the ultimate nationalist criticism by saying that it had been wrong for Mechelin to have sought to publicize his view in western Europe.[64]

Indeed, Ordin himself wrote a major work directed against Konstitutsii Finliandii which appeared in 1889 under the title of Pokorenie Finliandii. This book laid the basis to the thesis that Finland was a simple conquest

of Russia and therefore had been annexed and incorporated into the Russian Empire without reference to Finnish desires or rights. Naturally, Ordin's volume was received with open arms by the Russian nationalist elements, and accordingly received warmest praise from them.[65]

J.R. Danielson, a Fennoman, quickly responded to Ordin's charges with an article, "Keisari Aleksanteri I ja Suomen valtiollinen asema."[66] In it, he refuted that Finland was just a province of Russia. He scorned the Russian contention that: "The Finnish belief, the Finnish historians' and legal experts' information, that their fatherland is a separate state, is supposed [by the Russians] to be contrary to Tsar Alexander I's intentions and those documents as well, which direct Finland's relations with the Russian Empire."[67]

In the next year, Danielson released Suomen yhdistäminen Venäjän valtakuntaan. K. Ordinin "Suomen valloitus" nimisen teoksen johdosta,[68] which was also published in Russian and various western European languages.[69] It did much to refute many of Ordin's contentions by picking erroneous bits and pieces out of his arguments and interpretations of documents. After this, he followed up his defence of Finland with a study of its domestic situation in a book called Suomen sisällinen itsenäisyys,[70] in which

he tried to show that Finland's internal order was supported by various legal documents and charters.

At this time, several other pro-Finnish works were also published. Foremost among these was Borenius' carefully selected collection of documents.[71] The texts of these documents were either in their original French or Russian, which presumes that Borenius was trying to appeal to the educated strata of Russian liberals and conservatives. The Russian nationalists were not to be convinced and so they roundly condemned the book.[72] Golovin also tried the same soft approach with his document collection.[73] In fact, Golovin became so certain that the best way to protect Finnish rights was to appeal to the Russian public at large that he became involved with the publication of Finliandskii vestnik, a Russian language paper founded by Finlanders to put forth their views to the Russian society.[74]

This was probably a better way to retain and gain support for the Finnish cause in Russia, but such was not to be the general method in this age of extremism. Agathon Meurman, for one, directly chose to attack the Russian press in his book Suomi ennen ja nyt.[75] Nya Pressen, the main Swedophil paper, entered into a debate with the Moskovskaia vedomosti over customs amendments.[76] Hufvudstadsbladet boldly asserted that Finland was given her rights by the

manifesto of March 15/27, 1809 and that they had been confirmed by all of Alexander I's successors.[77] This provoked an outcry from Moskovskaia vedomosti which demanded why the Finnish censors had not banned such separatist impudence.[78] On another occasion, the same Russian newspaper noted its anger at the fact that a cartoon had appeared in a Finnish periodical which dared to call the author of a book published under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a "liar."[79] The polemics were escalating with dangerous intensity.

In Finland tempers ran very high. For example, Nestor [Emil Schybergson] had a pamphlet printed in Stockholm which insulted Gustaf Aminoff, governor of Kuopio province, presumably for the heinous crime of working on behalf of the Russians.[80] The air grew so heavy that Governor-General Heiden sent a circular to Savo province, saying that he was pleased with Finland and her loyalty all but for some

> people, who are trying with their writings to raise doubts in the government. . . . That in the Russian periodical press appear writings hateful to Finland should not bother you, and that is to be explained in that some Finlanders themselves have given cause for this . . . As an old experienced person at life's end, I can give you good advice; raise your children with love for the Government and the Russian nation. That is the best security for Finland's welfare.[81]

These words were not heeded. A good many Finlanders were not ready to live in the bosom of the Russian nation.[82]

As a matter of fact, Finland's own national demonstrations on Runeberg day seemed to be taking on more and more of an anti-Russian character. Witness Count Heiden's circular which was published in the Helsinki papers of March 24, 1893:

> On the day of the birth of the poet Runeberg, 24 January (5 February), almost in all the land his memory was celebrated and, among the rest, the stage of the Swedish theatre in Helsingfors was furnished with his dramatized poetic works, arousing, not without foundation, displeasure amongst the Russian population of the city and calling forth an unkindly response in some Russian newspapers. Besides this, before the beginning of the spectacle was recited a prologue, the work of R. Hertsberg, which was not presented for the inspection of the censor. In order to avoid at a future time the displeasure of the Russian society both within Finland, and in the Empire, I command you, Messrs. governors, in order that henceforth during similar celebrations and for these celebrations a fully detailed programme of their intended festivities be presented beforehand for confirmation: in the governors' towns -- to the governor, but in the parishes of the region -- subject to police power, so that a presentation is not to be tolerated without having a permit. During the inspection of their programmes, you must strictly observe that they have not contained anything offensive to Russian national feelings.
>
> Adjutant-General
> Count Heiden
> Director of the Chancellory
> Blofield [83]

In many respects, it was finally true that Finland was no longer the "loyal" country that it had once been. An impression of this change and the period of time in which it took place also appears in the private correspondence of A. Loué with Yrjö Koskinen. In a letter dated July 18, 1890,

Loué wrote that he agreed entirely with Yrjö Koskinen on the point that the tsar did not realize nor did he have any interest in the oppression of "loyal Finnish subjects" just for the sake of uniformity and centralization.[84] Less than two years later Loué wrote sadly of an "unhappy Finland" and of her "Russification."[85] Apparently, sometime in between, his information concerning the welfare of Finland and its relations with Russia had been revised rather drastically.

Hyvämäki suggests the essential clue to this abrupt change in attitude. To him, it seems that Yrjö Koskinen, Loué's firsthand source of Finnish news, had taken a new course following the passage of the Postal Manifesto of 1890. Although his Svecomen political enemies continued to accuse him of working hand-in-glove with Governor-General Heiden in the policy of Russification, such was not the real case. After 1890, Yrjö Koskinen's cooperation with the Russians ceased; instead he began to collaborate with W. von Daehn.[86] This was quite a revolution for Yrjö Koskinen for he had been the foremost supporter of a policy of compliance with the Russian government. If he had been so moved to discard his lifelong policy, the rest of Finland indeed must have been terribly soured by Russia's measures to establish a certain degree of Finnish conformity

with the other parts of the Empire. The fact is that the combination of the Postal Manifesto with the press war was leading to the point where it would not longer be possible to reconcile Russo-Finnish political differences.

Even at this stage, the Finlanders already were resisting those measures which did not necessarily contravene the fundamental laws but were essential to the Empire's well-being. In one instance, Minister-State Secretary von Daehn wrote to Yrjö Koskinen, cautioning him that Russian dictates involving military assistance, railroads and other matters of obvious Imperial concern still had to be complied with, for Finland was an integral part of the Russian Empire.[87] In another letter, von Daehn continued on this theme, stating that it was his duty to effect a balance between the Russifiers and the Vikings (his preferred term for Svecomen). In this, he declared that he was ready to support the genuine needs of the Empire, adding that some of the protest from Finland was not wholly reasonable.[88]

Finland was indeed most fortunate in having von Daehn in St. Petersburg. His own levelheadedness did much to ameliorate the situation that was developing between the grand duchy and Russia. For example, even in the matter concerning the Russian Government's changes to the criminal code of Finland, von Daehn argued that the tsar's intention

was not to undermine Finland's rights or fundamental laws but to add some further measure of Imperial unity.[89] Since he always kept in mind the needs of the Empire as well as those of Finland, he was able to retain the confidence of Alexander III.

Von Daehn was very conscious of this critical role he had to play; his only regret was that the minister-state secretary lacked sufficient power to do his job properly.[90] Nevertheless, on the most important occasion of his service in St. Petersburg, his powers of persuasion were enough to wring from Nicholas II an Act of Assurance for Finland, thereby assuring her of her constitutional rights once more.

When Alexander III died on October 20, 1894, the Empire was stripped of the powerful, strong-willed monarch who was able to withstand the pressures from all sides. In his place, his son Nicholas ascended the throne. Nicholas II, however, was quite a different person, young and very weak-willed.[91] In Finland, it was thought that he had already succumbed to the spell of the Russian nationalists. Therefore, it became essential to acquire the proper guarantees of Finland's special status as soon as possible.

When a week had passed since Nicholas' ascension to the throne without any proclamation of the customary

assurances to Finland, von Daehn grew anxious. To force the issue, he travelled to the Crimea for an audience with the vacationing tsar, bearing in one pocket a draft of the Act of Assurance and the usual accompanying rescript to the governor-general, and in another his own resignation.[92] The minister — state secretary was determined to have his way or he was prepared to resign. The new tsar gave in to him and so Finland received her guarantees.

The "Gracious Act of Assurance" assented to went as follows:

> We Nicholas the Second, by the Grace of God, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias and Grand Duke of Finland, ~~etc.,~~ etc., etc. We make it manifest: That We, by the will of Providence, having assumed the hereditary possession of the Grand Duchy of Finland, We have by this means wished once more to confirm and ratify the Country's Religion and fundamental laws as well as those rights and privileges, to which each particular estate in the mentioned Grand Duchy separately and together to all Its subjects, so to the high as to the lowly, according to the fundamental rules they have up to now enjoyed; We promise to preserve all these steadfastly and inviolably in force and effect.
> Livadia, 25th of November, 1894.
>
> Nicholas.
>
> Minister-State Secretary
> W. v. Daehn.[93]

Once again the Act of Assurance had been slightly weakened. Apart from indicating the temper of the Imperial court, this was to have no practical political consequence. Indeed, the real threat to Finnish autonomy was to develop

from the young tsar's appreciation of three critical issues he had to face with respect to Finland. The first and foremost of these was the question of Imperial security. Secondly, there was the matter of Sweden joining the Central Powers. The third was the fear of possible rebellion in Finland.[94]

Regarding Germany, Russia had to consider that Finland would constitute a prime target. Therefore, the improvement of Finnish defences, transport systems, and manpower reserves was of paramount importance. The Russian nationalist press became particularly annoyed over the less than equal contributions of the Finlanders to military expenses[95] and military call-ups.[96] They insisted that the Finnish share must increase for the good of all the Empire. Russia had to be defended at all costs.[97]

The second issue the tsar had to deal with was Sweden. By the 1890's relations between the two countries had seriously worsened. Because of what it felt to be the "eastern danger" the Swedish periodical press began to watch carefully the doings of Russia.[98] Indeed, both Sweden and Russia had developed their defensive capabilities through the extension of railway lines to their common border. Since these railroads could be easily sabotaged by an internal enemy, northern Sweden's Finnish population was being

forcefully Swedified at the same time that Russia contemplated Russifying the Finns on her side of the border.[99] The irony was that the Swedes still dared to protest the Russification of their Swedish-speaking confreres in Finland.

The third problem facing the new tsar was the "Finnish question." It, of course, was related to the two preceding matters and so took on added importance. Undoubtedly the Finlanders were beginning to unite together in a dangerous fashion. More and more of them were becoming decidedly anti-Russian in their attitudes. In this respect, the Young Finns[100] and the Vikings were melding together against the threat of Russification.[101] More significant was the fact that even more moderate elements in the Finnish society were also carrying out acts in defence of their fundamental laws and privileges. The weekly Isämaan ystävä, for example, ran a series on "Finland's fundamental laws," asserting in one issue that Finland's entire happiness depended on the sanctity of these laws.[102]

The Slavophils took another view however. Elenev, for example, declared that if Sweden had had the right to legislate for Finland, then why should not Russia do the same.[103] Another asserted that there was no such thing as a "Finnish state."[104] Others argued that Finland was an integral part of Russia and so her laws should be promulgated

in the same fashion.[105] Retvikh retorted with sarcasm: "After all of our fastidiousness, can one possibly speak of the political independence of Finland to produce the theory of a Russo-Finnish Empire:"[106]

Finally, the loyalty of Finland itself came into question. Novoe vremia reported that some Finnish "patriots" were opposed to the harnessing of the Imatra River for the purpose of supplying hydro-electric power to St. Petersburg. The reason given in this paper was that the Imatra was deemed to be "Finland's pride" and so should not be sacrificed for the requirements of a strange land. It then concluded with this statement: "Certainly, Finland is in the right to defend not only her own interests, but the beauties of Finnish nature only at the time when they abandon their habit of speaking about Russia as about a 'foreign' land."[107]

The constant pressure of these press attacks was quite harmful to the relations between these two peoples. According to Puntila, the Russian government and nationalist circles were joining together in the early 1890's with mutual feelings of great distrust in Finnish aspirations and the direction in which Finland's special status was taking her. Then, when the Finns used their legal and historical studies to refute Russian charges toward the end of the 1890's, there no longer existed a basis for confidence in

cooperation between the two nations. Even when the Finns wholeheartedly tried to bring their interests into harmony with those of Russia, the Russians replied with negative responses. This only served to strengthen the Finnish party's own belligerence. Ultimately, this led to a parting of the ways between them with no hope of reconciliation or compromise.[108] At that precise point, only Nicholas II could have exercised the power to curb his government and placate the Finns.

Nicholas, as we have already noted, lacked the strong will of his father. Although he expressed a liking for Finland and wished her well, his advisers led him to believe that his father's policy toward Finland had been aimed at her total absorption into the Empire. Nicholas felt that he had to continue this policy even though he professed no personal desire for it; as his father's son, his duty seemed clear to him.[109] In this way, he had let himself be led down the path of transforming his Imperial office into a *de facto* national monarchy. With the passage of time, Nicholas even let it be known that he preferred the title of *Tsar* to that of *Imperator* as though to underscore the change.

Naturally this loss of Imperial support and protection against the Russian nationalists was to undercut the one

party in Finland that had traditionally espoused the policy of compliance in matters of Imperial concern. The Old Finns, who had drawn their support from the majority of the Finnish people,[110] had always placed their trust in the tsar to defend Finland's special status. As a consequence, they were the one source of Finnish loyalty to the Russian crown and the only means to check the growth of an anti-Russian Finnish-nationalist coalition.[111] Thus, when the axe finally did fall, Yrjö Koskinen and his Old Finns were in no position to stem the tide of a radical Finnish nationalist movement; their conciliatory policy towards Russia had been bankrupted by the tsar's withdrawal of his trust in Finnish institutions. This was eventually to cause the Russian government even greater embarrassment in Finland than if it had followed a more tactful course.

However, since the shift in the tsar's policy did not begin to take place until sometimes in 1897 and had no occasion to make itself felt until several years later, the Old Finns were blissfully unaware of the impending danger. Instead of formulating a new line of action, they kept up the old struggle against their Viking enemies. Minister-State Secretary von Daehn continued to receive requests from Yrjö Koskinen,[112] and even from Agathon Meurman,[113] either to obtain for or to exclude from an administrative appointment

this or that person. The now Baron Yrjö-Koskinen[114] continued to stress the need for one language in Finland.[115] As late as July 26, 1898, Meurman still gave this cooperative answer to the Russian authorities' desire to increase the Finnish defensive establishment: "If from us is demanded a larger force, more expenditures of monies, so we doubtlessly shall spend what we can, ..."[116]

The only dark cloud in the sky had been Acting Governor-General Goncharov's own attempt to foist a Russian language bill on Finland on his own initiative without going through the proper channels of the Finnish administration. In addition, this bill proposed to make Russian the offical language of all the higher levels of the administration of the grand duchy in fifteen years time. As anger mounted in Helsingfors, an anxious Leon Duplessis, the French consul in residence there, reported home that the political situation in Finland had become quite serious.[117] The matter was shelved, however, when a new governor-general was appointed. The appointee was General of the Infantry Nikolai Ivanovich Bobrikov. This time Finland's status was to be really in the fire.

General Bobrikov came to his new post well recommended by influential people in nationalist circles in Russia. Pobedonostsev, for one, had approved of him many years before.

He had even written the following endorsement of this soldier then:

> I have found there many names which are unknown to me; but I know the superior generals, . . .
> . . . The first is Major-General Bobrikov; I know little of him, but each time that I have had occasion to meet him, he has left me the impression of a serious man. He has spoken very well of himself to me, and sensible people have attributed to him an irreproachable intelligence.[118]

Actually, his appointment was now made on the basis of a personal recommendation to the tsar by Minister of War Kuropatkin. This appointment had already been decided upon in 1897, but Governor-General Heiden's resignation was not accepted until August 1898. Therefore, Bobrikov's appointment was delayed until that time.[119] In Helsingfors, the promotion of Bobrikov became known about the beginning of September, and it was to cause some anxiety amongst the Finlanders for they, too, were aware of his reputation as an ardent Russian nationalist.[120]

However, they did not know just how zealous Bobrikov really was. The new governor-general was so opposed to Finland's special status that he even found it distasteful to remind himself that his new title was "Governor-General of the Grand Duchy of Finland" rather than the simple "Governor-General of Finland" after the fashion of Russian provincial governors-general.[121] Furthermore, the brave general had decided that he knew little of Finland's special

circumstances and cared to know even less about them.[122] Governor-General Heiden, whom the Finlanders had grown to dislike for his role in the passage of the Postal Manifesto of 1890,[123] had been an Old Russian Conservative with the usual predisposition for preserving as much of the past as possible; Bobrikov, however, was of a more radical disposition and so his aim was to strip Finland of her autonomy and to incorporate her directly into the Empire.[124]

To this end, he went to Finland with a programme of Russification in his pocket. The first task in his project was to see that Finland's "local forces" were to be absorbed directly into the Russian military system. Next, he wished to oversee the dissolution of the Office of Minister-State Secretary for Finland and to have its functions taken over by the normal channels of the Russian government. Thirdly, he thought it necessary to codify Finland's laws and to fit them into the general laws of the Empire, that is really to say to destroy the separate Finnish legal system. Fourthly, Russian had to become the language of the Senate, the higher administration and the schools. Fifthly, Russians had to be allowed to enter into the Finnish civil service as freely as they could anywhere else in the Empire. Sixth, the troublesome university students were to be put under strict surveillance so that they might cease their noisy

agitation. Seventh, Finland's separate monetary and customs systems had to be integrated with the corresponding Russian systems. Eighth, the Russian official gazette would have to be introduced into Finland and that Russians should be free to publish materials either in their own language or in those of the indigenous inhabitants. Ninth, the elaborate ceremonies staged at the opening of each new Diet had to be simplified. Tenth, the role of the governor-general as laid down by the regulations of 1812 had to be reviewed, for it was beneath the dignity of the governor-general to submit his business to the Senate as he now had to do with the copies of all his correspondence to the provincial governors. By these means, Bobrikov intended to establish the Finnish borderlands as a fully integrated province of the Empire, thereby ending all doubts as to Finland's loyalty and status within the Empire.[125]

In March 1899, Bobrikov was to make the following additions to his above mentioned policy of Russification. Firstly, the curriculum of study in the schools was to be revised so that separatist ideas would no longer be taught to the young. Secondly, special legislation had to be enacted enabling all lawful acts of general Imperial concern emanating from the Russian autocracy to be fully applied to Finland. Thirdly, all Orthodox schools in Finland had

to be freed from the control of the Finnish authorities. Fourthly, the censorship laws and regulations had to be revised. Fifthly, the economic well-being of the landless peasants had to be improved.[126]

In this way Bobrikov planned to end the threat posed by the Finnish separatists. He believed that once Finland was wholly absorbed in the Empire these people would no longer be as readily susceptible to the blandishments of the revanchists in Sweden, for it was still believed that these separatists actually wanted to reunite Finland with their old country.[127] Bobrikov's programme, which was based on the Russification policy used by Senator Manassein in the Baltic provinces,[128] was expected to end for once and for all any danger to Russian security from this corner of the Empire.

By this time, there was no one of any stature in St. Petersburg to offset Bobrikov's initiatives. W. von Daehn had retired from his post in the summer of 1898, following ill health and exhaustion.[129] General V. Procopé, his deputy, was promoted to Minister — State Secretary for Finland. However well-meaning he was, Procopé just did not have the personal strength to stem the tide of Russification. Even those Finlanders who had vilified von Daehn for signing the Postal Manifesto of 1890[130] were yet

to suffer the loss of his services in St. Petersburg.[131]

Meanwhile, another link in the chain of Finland's sad fate was even now being forged in the Russian capital. Minister of War Kuropatkin had begun to examine the materials relating to Finland's military service laws and to the role of the Finnish forces within the Russian military establishment as left to him by his predecessor, P.S. Vannovskii. Under Vanovskii, nothing had been done other than to study the problem of incorporating Finnish forces into the Imperial Army. This project had been shelved because of Governor-General Heiden's resistance to the introduction of the Russian military service system in Finland for fear that it would have very disagreeable consequences there.

On July 31, 1893, Count Heiden had written a report to Alexander III containing his objections to this scheme, part of which read as follows:

> In the event of the approval of this project of the Ministry of War and its confirmation by Your Imperial Majesty, this ought to be said about the new statutes on the military obligations in Finland now near completion:
>
> The putting of them into effect will meet with much embarrassment. Instead of cooperation from the local organs of administration, it is possible to foresee indifferent relations in the execution of the new laws. The inhabitants over there will be concerned with the military obligation, and will evade it in every way. Emigration, during the last years having reached up to 6,000 persons a year, will increase

> at a greater rate. Coercive measures will have to be adopted to counter any evasion of the military obligations. This can lead to a collision and, God forbid, mount to bloody struggles.
>
> If it were possible to modify those paragraphs in the new statutes which deal with the term of service of the contingents, it will not be in their interest to oppose the execution of those compelling duty at the front; but the paragraphs which concern organization and policy are of state importance to them, they must be altered, and then all well-thinking Finlanders will not be able to disagree with these innovations.[132]

Heeding Heiden's advice -- but not to the letter or the spirit of it, Kuropatkin wished to find the means to overcome Finnish opposition to any imposed revision of the military service laws. To this end, he asked the tsar to appoint a commission to study this matter. In due course, a commission was called together in 1898 under the chairmanship of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich. Other members of this body included: Councillors of the Empire Solskii, Ostrovskii and Frisch; State Secretary Podedonostsev; Governor-General Bobrikov; Imperial Secretary von Plehve; Minister of Justice Muraviev; and the only Finlander, Minister — State Secretary Procopé.[133]

To this commission were brought the various legal materials relating to this affair from the Ministry of Justice. Included in these papers were the deliberations of the Bunge Committee of the early 1890's. At that time, the Bunge Committee had formulated the concept of Pan-Imperial

or All-Empire legislation. In effect, this meant that in the case of conflict between Imperial legislation and local laws and customs, the latter would have to give way to former for the sake of the greater good of the Empire. Of course, this was deemed to be particularly true in such matters as defence. As a consequence of its study of the Bunge report, the commission was prepared to override Finnish law.[134]

By means of an ukaz dated June 19/31, 1898, the Estates were called together for an Extraordinary Session of the Diet to consider the commission's proposals concerning the new military law. This Diet was to be convened on January 7/19, 1899. The future looked none too promising for the Finns when they learned what the proposals were:

1. All references to military service laws in the fundamental laws were to be omitted, including those sections which had been incorporated into the fundamental law by the Imperial manifesto of December 6/18, 1878.

2. All references to other than matters directly affecting military service were to be removed from the Finnish Military Code.

3. The periods of service with the active forces, the reserves and the militia in Finland were to be made standard with those of the Russian military forces.

4. Uniform rules were to be established in accordance with those of the Empire concerning the drafting of men into the militia and for the fixing of their numerical strength and for the calling of them into military service.

5. Periods of service and exceptional privileges for voluntary enlistment in the Finnish forces were to be made identical with those of the Russian Army.

6. The order for determining the annual number of military recruits was to follow the general Military Code of Russia, and that it would be the Russian Minister of War -- and not the Finnish Senate -- who would fix the size of contingents.

7. The whole cost of maintaining these troops was still to be defrayed from the general revenues of the grand duchy.

8. The Russian Minister of War was to exercise the power of drafting Finnish soldiers into the reserves whenever it might be deemed possible, before termination of their regular period of service on the active list.[135]

The uproar in Finland caused by these proposals was considerable. Opposition grew on the grounds that this was contrary to the fundamental laws, that this threatened outright Russification of the Finnish forces, that the financial obligations would be ruinous, that Finnish troops

would have to serve in Russia, and that Russian officers might serve in the Finnish forces. Notwithstanding the opposition of the Finns, the British consul-general could only speculate that Finland's position would be impossible to defend against the Russian demands.[136]

The uncertainty was even reflected in the newspaper press. Päivälehti, for example, launched a seathing attack on an article written by a V. L-t in Stockholms dagblad. The Swedish writer had advised his "Finnish friends" to withdraw their cooperation from the endeavours of Russia. For its part, Päivälehti thought it could very well do without such Swedish "friends".[137]

However, Uusi aura looked upon the Russian connection with some misgiving, when it reported the rumour of the nomination of V.K. von Plehve as next minister-state secretary for Finland. The newspaper was frightened by the implications of this impending appointment. Then to reaffirm the concept of Finland's autonomy, it repeated Speranskii's dictum, "Finland is a state and not a province."[138]

The worst news came in Aamulehti of January 22, 1899. It published Nicholas' instructions to the Senate in regard to the treatment of the military proposals, orders which contravened the customary practices of the Finnish administration, if not Finland's fundamental laws:

> Let the Senate comply in this particular manner, that the terms touching on the main principles of the organization and administration of the Finnish forces to be word for word, without any changes or additions, to be left for the Diet for preparatory examination, and to keep this matter afterward from any occurrence of a deliberative process according my Instructions already given.
>
> Nicholas.[139]

This time, the Diet was not to receive any assistance from the Senate in its deliberations on the Military Bill. So it was on January 24, 1899 that the Extraordinary Session of the Finnish Diet was officially opened midst the turbulence of rumour, anxiety, fear and distrust. The Estates gathered apprehensively to hear the delivery of Nicholas' convocation speech:

> Representatives of the Finnish people:
> You are summoned to an extraordinary Diet, and this circumstance will manifest to you the special importance of the questions now brought before you for consideration.
> Inseparately united with the Russian Empire, and living under it's shelter and protection, Finland has no need of a military force distinct from the Russian army. The law of conscription in Finland must therefore be brought into conformity with the law in force in the Empire.
> As We desire, however, that the new law to be introduced may at the same time, so far as possible, be in conformity with the peculiar local conditions of the country, We have considered it expedient to submit the Bill for this law together with the fundamental resolution of "The Decree concerning the organization and administration of the Finnish troops" to the preliminary examination of the Diet, in the firm conviction that the Estates will conscientiously fulfil the task set before them, . . .
> The chief principles on which these Bills are based, and the purpose of which is the defence of

> the borders and the security of the whole Empire, are, as being most conformable with equity, chiefly approved by the late and never-to-be-forgotten Emperor, Alexander III, now fallen asleep in God, and Ourself.
>
> May God assist you in the accomplishment of this work . . . 140

Count S.W. von Troil, Speaker for the House of Nobles, gave a most polite and persuasive rebuttal in reply to the Throne Speech. Addressing Governor-General Bobrikov, he suggested that the proposed changes in the military law would create an intolerable economic burden for "polar" Finland. He then said that surely the placing of an added military burden upon the shoulders of Finland was not compatible with the tsar's high-minded call to European nations to reduce their warlike preparations, for which the tsar had earned the admiration of the whole civilized world. Then followed his concluding argument:

> Whatever may be the decision of the Estates in reference to the proposed alterations in the conscript law, and whatever authorities in the Empire His Imperial Majesty may appoint to give their opinion upon the same, the Estate of nobles expects that such opinion will be given with due regard to the different view of life of the Finnish people, and, above all, that the constitution and fundamental laws, the maintenance of which was by His Majesty the Emperor Alexander I of most glorious memory, assured to the Inhabitants of Finland, and according to which he also convoked the Estates of Finland to a Diet in Borgå, be fully respected by the same authorities; as only thus can His Imperial Majesty's gracious intention of effecting by ties of mutual confidence and love, a closer union between Finland and the Empire, be successfully realized. Acknowledging with gratitude, that Finland during 90 years enjoyment of the said fundamental laws, further developed by successive high-minded monarchs, has been in a position

> to make most gratifying progress both intellectually and materially, the Estate of Nobles ventures also most humbly to hope that H.I.M. on the final consideration of the answer of the Estates in the matter given as it is from the very bottom of the heart of the Finnish people, will graciously find that the love of this People for its Finnish Fatherland is, in point of fact, entirely compatible with an unswerving devotion to Russia and the Russian Empire.[141]

On January 30, 1899, Governor-General Bobrikov invited members of the Diet, senators, and heads of department in the central administration for dinner at his palace. In traditional fashion, he greeted his guests: " . . . You, representatives of the Diet, are welcomed in the Russian way with salt and bread."

Then Bobrikov gave a talk, directing his guests' attention to the tsar and his wishes. Then Count von Troil made reply, mentioning Finland's gratitude to Russia and toasting Nicholas' health. Dinner followed: "Sandwich assortis, Potage à Tortue, Petits pâtés, Stérlets à la Russe, Selles de veau à la Metternich, chaud-froid de poulardes et pâtés de fois gras, Punch à la Romaine; Rôtis: Faisans, dindes, et gélinottes; Salades verte et compôtes, Asperges en branches, Ruch d'abeilles, Fromage, Fruits, Café."

Music was also provided: "March Albert, Captain; Ouverture de 'Ruy Blais', Mendelsohn; Barcarolle, Tchaikovsky; Mosaique de l'opéra 'Tannhauser', Wagner; Valse 'Ich liebe dich', Valotteufel; Melodies de l'opéra 'la vie pour le



[redacted]. Glinka: [redacted]. Mickeolis: [redacted]. Glenborg: [redacted]. Witt: [redacted]. Baliboo: [redacted]. Napoleon: [redacted]. Saint-Saëns."[142]

In all, this was a most enjoyable evening. Yet the gaiety of the night was somewhat forced. On that very day, The Times was telling its readership about the "Russification of Finland." The report specified how Russian had been made mandatory in communications with the Governor-General and higher offices of the administration.[143] Two weeks later, [redacted] was suppressed for publishing an article, "Optimism or Pessimism," which Päivälehti, in quoting the owners of the prohibited paper, said it was done without regard for the workers' livelihood, on the basis of only one warning and "without a legal hearing or investigation."[144]

The inescapable truth was that the Russian government was beginning to lose its nerve over the "Finnish question." In this process, it rightly began to believe that it could not pass its own military bill. Therefore, to forestall any attempt on the part of the Finnish administration to block the legislation on the basis of violation of the fundamental laws of Finland, the Russian Government decided to subvert the Finnish constitution. In effect, it proposed to carry

out a coup d'état.[145]

On February 3/15, 1899, Nicholas signed what came to be know as the "February Manifesto" in Finland. On February 17,[146] when word of it came to the Senate, it fell upon Finland like "lightning from the clear blue sky!"[147]

> By the Grace of God, We, Nicholas II, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias, King of Poland, Grand-Duke of Finland, etc., etc., etc.
>
> To all our faithful subjects, make it known:
>
> The grand duchy of Finland had become since the commencement of this century an integral part of the Russian Empire, enjoying, by the grace of the magnanimous assent of the Emperor Alexander I, of happy memory, and the Sovereigns his successors, special institutions, in those which concern its internal administration and its legislation, which correspond to the local conditions of the country.
>
> But, independent of the questions of the local legislation of Finland deriving from the particulars of its social organization, it presents itself in the domain of the high administration reporting to this country in other legislative questions, which, being strictly linked to the needs of the whole Empire, cannot be in the exclusive competence of the institutions of the grand duchy. The method of solution to questions of this kind is not defined in the existing laws by precise rules and this absence of a definition has given rise to grave inconveniences.
>
> To ward off these inconveniences, We have found it useful, in Our incessant solicitude for the good of all our faithful subjects without distinction, to establish in a manner firm and unshakable, to complete the existing laws and to claim the direction for imparting to the competent institutions of the Empire and the grand duchy, the method that they will have to follow for the editing and publication of common laws for all the Empire.
>
> While leaving in effect the existing regulations for the publication of laws in the local interest, which exclusively refer to the needs of the Finnish country, We have recognised it necessary to reserve to Our appreciation the final specification of the common legislative questions of the whole Empire.

In consequence of that which precedes, We have ratified in Our proper hand the attached regulations to serve after as the base for the editing, for the examination and for the promulgation of laws rendered for all the Empire, there included the grand duchy of Finland.

As with our august ancestors, We see the profit of the development of Finland in its most strict unification with the Empire. Under the protection of the Russian power, Finland, while drawing her strength in the security which Russia gives her, has marched invariably during close to a century in the way of peaceful progress and it has been agreeable to Us to convince Us after the recent communications of the Estates of the Diet that the sentiments of devotion to Our person and to Russia are alive in the hearts of the Finnish people.

We hope that the activity in common of the institutions of the Empire and of the grand duchy, founded on the express dispositions of the positive law in that which regards the affairs of legislation concerning their reciprocal interests, will constitute the best guarantee of the real needs and interests of the Russian Empire.

. . . . . .

NICHOLAS. [illegible]

[redacted]

CHAPTER FOUR

[1]The basis for this friction in 1903-1905 is reported in Herman Rumbold, [redacted] (London, 1907), p. [redacted]

> . . . a considerable interconrse between Finland and Norway by these migratory Finns -- a fact of some interest in view of the reports which them reached the Russian government from their Consul-General at Helsingfors, calling attention to a flow of immigration across the Swedish frontier, together with a steady increase of the subversive tendencies in Finland, and the strange phenomenon that Finnish, although so primitive an idiom, was very convenient, and was actually to some extent supplanting Swedish, not only in the Finnish Army but in some northern districts of the adjoining kingdom and Norway. There was good reason to suspect that this spread of the Finnish language at the expense of Swedish, both in Finland and beyond the frontier, was viewed with anything but displeasure in those days at St. Petersburg, as tending to smooth the path for possible ulterior designs on those northernmost regions. . . .

[2]Lionel Decazeville, Member of the Council of the Empire for the country of Caux, as quoted by Maurice Paléologue, [redacted] trans. by F.A. Holt, Vol. I: [redacted] (New York, 1923), p. 65.

[3]Graves Haven, [redacted] (Washington, D.C., 1911), p. 163.

[4]See "Letter from Sigrid, a Finnish-American, 1911," in [redacted] (Minneapolis, [redacted] 1937), p. [redacted]

[5]According to Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union, Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923 (Cambridge, Mass., 1954), p. 2, the 1897 census noted that 55.7 percent of the Empire's population were non-Russian speakers. Finland's population was not included in these figures.

[6]George Vernadsky, Political and Diplomatic History of Russia (Boston, 1936), p. 325; L.A. Puntila, "The Historical Basis of Political Life in Finland," in Democracy in Finland, p. 5.

[7]The celebrations of Alexander II's assassination by university students and faculty so outraged J.R. Danielson that he spoke up midst hundreds of students, denouncing an "unnamed professor" who declared that "in the display of a bright light Alexander II's reign offers much misfortune and dreadful gloom." For this, see L.A. Puntila, "Suomi ja Venäjä: J.R. Danielson-Kalmari ja hänen aikalaisensa Suomen oikeuksien puolustajina," Historiallisen aikakauskirja, 1953, p. 27.

[8]Yrjö Koskinen, "Pikainen käynti Viron puolella," in his Kansallisia ja yhteiskunnallisia kirjoituksia, II, p. 218, is a reprint of an article of his visit in the 1860's to Estonia which made the following parallel with Finland:

"Where, for example, is Estonianism in the country of Estonia? Truly it is everywhere in the city as well as the country, still in the district of Livonia to Vere, Valka and up to Saalatsi -- but in every place trampled into the mud of the earth."

[9]L. Loone, "Soome ja Eesti ühiskonna tegelaste poliitilisest suhtlemisest Eesti Rahvuslikku liikumise päevil (1860-1880-ndate aastatest)," "Eesti NSV Teaduste Akademia Toimetised, I (1959), 19-39; Emanuel Nodel, "Rise and Development of Estonian Nationalism 1700-1905" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1956), pp. 88-89.

[10]Starr, Decentralization and Self-Government, pp. 339-343.

[11]Ibid., p. 300; Alfred J. Rieber, "Review of S. Frederick Starr, Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia, 1830-1870," The American Historical Review LXXVIII (1973), 465-466.

[12]See Richard A. Preston, Sydney F. Wise, and Herman O. Werner, Men in Arms, A History of Warfare and its Interrelationships with Western Society (rev. ed., New York, 1962), pp. 208-211; J.C. Purves, "19th Century Russia and the Revolution in Military Technology," in War and Society in the Nineteenth Century Russian Empire, pp. 7-22.

[13]Strakhovsky, "Constitutional Aspects," p. 491.

[14]Nodel, "Rise and Development of Estonian Nationalism 1700-1905," pp. 126-131; Strakhovsky, "Constitutional Aspects," p. 482.

[15]Strakhovsky, "Constitutional Aspects," p. 482; cf. Paul Avrich, The Russian Anarchists (Princeton, N.J., 1971), p. 15.

[16]Quoted from Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim, trans. by E. Lewenhaupt (New York, 1954), p. 5.

[17]"Alexandre III à Pobédonostsev, Gatchina, 24 avril 1881," in Pobédonostsev, Réflexions politiques, pp. 53-54.

[18]For the wording of the project, see Ibid., pp. 212-213.

[19]For the manifesto, see Suomen Suomalaisuuden Aanitar-Kokous, No. 11/1886.

[20]Quoted from Robert F. Byrnes, Pobedonostsev, His Life and Thought (Bloomington, Ind., 1968), p. 190.

[21]See Assistant Minister-Secretary of State for Finland Johan Casimir Ehrnrooth as cited by Hyvämäki, "Suomalaisen Suomalaisuuden diskurssi," in his Suomi suuriin, p. 82.

[22]Eero Kivimetaja, [redacted] (Helsinki, 1961), p. 8.

[23]For the text, see Petrovskii, [redacted], I, 307-308.

[24]For example, see the reprint of a contemporary criticism in "Ehmm ja nyt, Helsinki 9.7. 1890." In [redacted], II, No. 44). According to "Vysochaishii manifest i Finliandskaia tamozhnia," [redacted], July 5, 1890, No. 183), the Finnish censors delayed publication of the Postal Manifesto in the official gazettes until June 29th, while suppressing all news of it for some three days. — Kertuli Saarni, "Kyyneet Postimanifestin Perustuslailliseudesta," [redacted], 1965, pp. 287-305, notes the fact that the Finnish Diet and Senate were really unable to prove the Postal Manifesto of 1890 to be contrary to the fundamental laws. Saarni concludes that the Finnish officials were primarily concerned with establishing a political defense of Finnish autonomy rather than adhering strictly to the principles of law.

[25]Kivimetaja, [redacted], p. 8; for the design of the stamps, see [redacted], ed. by James B. Hatcher, Bert Fenb. and Lajos L. Hudina (3 vols.; Omaha, Nebr., 1971), II, 534-535. Until 1891, all Finnish stamps bore the Finnish coat-of-arms with the Lion Rampant and the text was only in Swedish and Finnish, except in certain issues in which the denomination also appeared in Russian characters. But in 1890, the name "Finland" also appeared in Russian letters.

[26]Kivimetaja, [redacted], p. 8; see also [redacted], II, pp. 535-536.

[27]For the language decree, see [redacted], No. 39/1891.

[28]See [N.Kh. Bunge,] "Vospominaniia dotsenta N. Kh. Bunge (iz epokhi 1863 g. po voprosy o konfirmatsii [redacted]," [redacted], 1913, No. 12, pp. 779-788; Semenenko, "Pereselenie finnskikh [redacted]

Russi," p. 264; Strakhovsky, "Constitutional Aspects," p. 485. A re-examination of the Finnish criminal code was also inspired by this commission. For this, see N.S. Tagantseff, Le manifeste impérial du 1/13 décembre 1890 et le code criminel finlandais, trans. by Count A.N. du Chayla (Paris, 1912), pp. 9-10, and "Rezul'taty rabot Osobago Soveshchaniia i osobai kommissii Vysochaishe uchrezhdennykh dlia nerassmotra Finlandskago Ugolovnago Ulozheniia," Moskovskaia vedomosti, February 12, 1891, No. 43, editorial. The text of the tsar's manifesto of December 1/13, 1890 instructing the re-examination of Finland's criminal code appears in "Tsarskoe slovo o finliandskom ugolovnom uloshenii," in Petrovskii, Finliandskaia okraina Rossii, I. 597-598.

[29]The Finnish administration developed a strong defence on behalf of its autonomy which included every manner of delay and opposition. For example, see Robert Montgomeryn asiakirja kokoelma, Pietari, 1892-1893, S.V.A., "Osnovnyia poleshcheniia dlia vyrabotaniia proekta Vysochaishago predlozheniia zemskim chinam Finliandii po delu ob izdanii zakonov obshchikh dlia Rossii Imperii i Velikago Kniazhestva Finliandskago," printed report under the signature of Procurator Calonius from the Minister-State Secretary to Nikolai Khristianovich [Bunge], November 30, 1892. This copy has Montgomery's pencilled endorsement -- "good:"

[30]For example, [Sergei] Solov'ev, "Zhiteli i proveshchenie v Velikom Kniazhestve Finliandii," Zh.M.N.P., 06 XXIV, No. (1839), pp. 1-28.

[31]Kiparsky, "Finland and Sweden in Russian Literature," pp. 180-181. The reference to Chukhny above refers to Lautish Finns and Estonians, being derived from the old tribal name Chud.

[32]Krusius-Ahrenberg, "Finnischer Separatismus und russischer Imperialismus," p. 281; Korhonen, Autonomous Finland, pp. 83-84.

[33][K.G.W.] Becker, "La Finland," La Contemporaine. Revue Catholique, 3rd series, XIX (February 1880), 189-230; see also Polnobkin, Suomi vihollisena ja ystävänä, pp. 110-111.

[34]Great Britain, Public Record Office, Foreign Office Papers, 65/1216, No. 140, Edward Thornton to Earl Granville, St. Petersburg, April 27, 1885. (Hereinafter the Foreign Office Papers will be abbreviated to F.O. followed by the proper file numbers.)

[35]Katkov, Moskovskaia vedomosti, March 11, 1883, No. 70, editorial; Ibid., March 20, 1883, No. 79, editorial.

[36]"Programma finliandskago separatizma," Ibid., February 6, 1888, No. 37.

[37]"Obshchestvo rasprostraneniia separatistskoi idei," Ibid., December 28, 1890, No. 358.

[38]N. Borodkin, Iz noveishei istorii Finliandii vremia upravleniia N.I. Bobrikova (St. Petersburg, 1905), p. 3.

[39]"Nemetskii sovet finliandskim separatistam," Moskovskaia vedomosti, May 18, 1890, No. 135.

[40]"Germanskie vidy na Finliandiiu," Ibid., July 13, 1890, No. 191, editorial.

[41]Kyösti, "Suomen puolustusta Pietarissa v. 1809," in Suomen vapaus, p. 106.

[42]"Finliandskaia 'ideal'nost' i Finliandskii separatizm," Moskovskaia vedomosti, May 14, 1889, No. 131, editorial.

[43]"'Berzpomnie akty' i 'Lichnaia unilia' Finliandii s Rossiei," Ibid., June 3, 1889, No. 151, editorial. Indeed, the whole concept of Finland's "historical rights" went under attack as in "'Istoricheskiia' prava Finliandii," Ibid., February 7, 1888, No. 38, editorial.

[44]See "Finliandtsy i russkii iazyk," Ibid., December 14, 1890, No. 345, editorial; "Vopros o russkom iazyke v Finliandii," Ibid., February 19, 1892, No. 50 and February 20, 1892, No. 51, editorials.

[45]"Finliandskaia shkola," Ibid., June 6, 1891, No. 154.

[46]For example, see "Nashny li v Finliandii russkiia voiska?" Ibid., September 28, 1891, No. 268; "Finliandskaia armiia (?)" Ibid., October 8, 1893, No. 277; "'Finskiia' i 'russkiia' voiska," Ibid., October 10, 1890, No. 280, editorial; "Germanskie vostergi ot finliandskoi kavalerii i § 18 'Formy Pravleniia 1772 goda," Ibid., February 24, 1890, No. 55, editorial; "Spravka o sostave, chislennosti i privilegiiakh finskoi armii," Ibid., February 13, 1890, No. 44, editorial.

[47]K.P. Ordin, "Finliandskoe chinovnichestv," Ibid., January 4, 1888, No. 4.

[48]"Otkuda poshli finliandskie State-sekretari?" in Petrovskii, Finliandskaia okraina Rossii, I, 56-59.

[49]M.K., "Finliandskii State-sekretariat," Moskovskaia vedomosti, November 17, 1893, No. 317.

[50]"Po povodu konchiny barona Bruna," Ibid., August 27, 1888.

[51]Polon, March 13/25, 1880, No. 23, editorial.

[52]Korhonen, Autonomous Finland, p. 88.

[53]As cited in Ibid., p. 89.

[54]L.A. Puntila, "Kiista Suomen asemasta Venäjän valtakunnassa," in Päivi Tommila, ed., Venäläinen Suomen kuvastaja (Porvoo, 1960), p. 16.

[55]R.A. Montgomery, "Notice sur les travaux législatifs de la diète du Grand-Duché de Finlande (1863-1879)," in Annuaire de législation étrangère (Paris, 1880), pp. 727-756.

[56]L. Mechelin, Précis du droit public du Grand-Duché de Finlande (Helsingfors, 1889), chapter I; see also Puntila, "Kiista Suomen [illegible]," op. cit.

[57]Puntila, "Kiista Suomen asemasta," pp. 17-18.

[58]According to "Kosar Filippovich Ordin 'Nekrolog,'" Moskovskaia vedomosti, June 8, 1892, No. 157, Ordin's interest in Finland came about in this fashion:

"An accidental occurrence -- the purchase of an estate in Finland, in the Vyborg gubernia -- at first led K.P. Ordin to his occupation on the history of the Finnish region. While acquainting himself with the Swedish language and Finland's literature, and having investigated at the same time how a Russian person lives in Finland, the late Kosar Filippovich proposed in all to acquaint the Russian society with the fruits of his investigations, to direct the attention of the Russian people to the conscious and impudent trampling of Russian interests in the Finnish borderland." Cf. Antti Inkinen, "K.P. Ordin ja Suomen kielikysymys," Historiallinen aikakauskirja, 1966, pp. 34-38.

[59]L. Mechelin, Konstitutsiia Finliandii v izlozhenii nastoiashego senatora L. Mekhelina. Pervyi perevod i dopolnenie primechaniiami po russkim zakonam K. Ordina (St. Petersburg, 1888).

[60]P. N-v, "Konstitutsiia Finliandii v izlozhenii nastoiashego senatora L. Mekhelina. . . .," Zh.M.N.P., CCLVI (March 1888), Part 2, pp. 208-217.

[61]V., "Legenda Finliandskom gosudarstve," in Petrovskii, Finliandskaia okraina Rossii, pp. 24-40.

[62]P.P. Klénow, Les prétentions des séparatistes finlandais (Paris, 1895), pp. 5-21.

[63]Published in Iuridicheskaia letopis, 1890, No. 4, pp. 317-329. See also "'Real'naia unila' Finliandii s Rossiei," Moskovskaia vedomosti, April 11, 1890, No. 98, editorial.

In essence, Kormnov contended that a "real union" did not exist in the Russo-Finnish context, citing examples of the following non-union relationships: England-Canada; Denmark-Iceland; Holland-Surinam and Curacao; Russia-Finland and Poland. To him, a "personal union" existed between England and Hanover, and Luxemburg and Belgium. A "real union" only existed between Sweden and Norway.

Nevertheless, Finlanders dared speak of Finnish autonomy in the same breath as accepting that "Finland's position is the same as that of Iceland or Canada." Cited from a letter of Bishop Gustaf Johansson to L. Mechelin, Ylivieska, September 30, 1890, in Hyvämäki, "Piispa Johansson ja kreivi Heiden," in Ennen vanhaa, pp. 184-187.

[64]Klenov, "Uchenie o Finliandskom gosudarstve," p. 225.

[65]Cf. "Novaia kniga K.P. Ordina. Pokorenie Finliandii," Moskovskia vedomosti, January 14, 1890, No. 14; S.A. Skriabin, "Pokorenie Finliandii, K.P. Ordina," Morskoi sbornik, 1890, No. 5, pp. 1-8; N. Pavlov, "'Pokorenie Finliandii' K. Ordina," Russkii vestnik, 1890, No. 4, pp. 135-163.

Nevertheless, Ordin's book was not well received in court, for according to Taimi Torvinen, Suomen puolustusta Kööpenhaminassa (Porvoo, 1967), p. 38, the tsar and tsarina were both sorry and amazed that Finlanders believed it to be official or semi-official and that the Imperial couple approved of it.

[66]Published in Valvoja, 1889, pp. 27-38.

[67]Ibid., p. 27.

[68](Helsinki, 1890). A measure of Russian nationalist reaction to this work is found in "Knizhka finliandskago professora Daniel'sona," Moskovskia vedomosti, November 23, 1890, No. 224; Ibid., December 4, 5, 7 and 8, 1890, Nos. 335, 336, 338 and 339.

[69]Finland's Union with the Russian Empire (Borgå, 1891); Finlands förening med ryska riket (Helsingfors, 1890); Finlands Vereinigung mit dem russischen Reiche (Helsingfors, 1891); Pokorenie Finliandii i rossiiskaia dorshavsia (Helsingfors, 1890).

[70]Also in the following language editions: Finlands jura sällskapsmässigt (Helsingfors, 1892); [illegible] (Borgå, 1892)

[71]Akty dlia . . . V.K.P.

[72]"Broshiurka g. Boreniusa," Moskovskaia vedomosti, June 29, 1890, No. 177. The main criticism was that this included an extremely small number of documents selected only on the basis of their "separatist tendencies."

[73]Wladimir Golovin, Lehtiä Suomen nykyisyydestä ja entisyydestä. Suomen suurruhtinaskunnan nykyinen valtiollinen asema. Historiallis-polemillinen esitys (Kuopio, 1891). Other language editions included: Listki iz nastoiashcho i proshlago Finliandii (St. Petersburg, 1891); Blad ur Finlands nutid och forntid (Helsingfors, 1891).

[74]Hyvämäki, "Suomen puolustusta Pietarissa v. 1889," p. 114.

[75](Helsinki, 1890). Other language editions included Finland för och nu (Helsingfors, 1890) and La Finlande d'autrefois et d'aujourd'hui (Helsingfors, 1890).

[76]K.F. Ordin, "Finliandskaia oppozitsiia v tamoshennom voprose," Moskovskaia vedomosti, February 12, 1890, No. 43.

[77]Hufvudstadsbladet, December 2/14, 1889.

[78]"Novaia derzost finliandskikh separatistov," Moskovskaia vedomosti, 1889, No. 339.

[79]In Matti Meikäläinen, 1890, No. 11, there is a cartoon of Matti telling Ordin, "Don't lie:" Ordin is holding a copy of Pokoreniie Finliandii. The Russian reaction to this is found in "Finliandii kak ona, est, bez maskaradnago kostiuma," Moskovskaia vedomosti, May 26, 1890, No. 144.

Eino I. Parmanen, Taisteluien kirja, I (Porvoo, 1936), p. 61, still maintained that Ordin was a deliberate liar.

[80]Translated from Hyvämäki, ""Piispa Johansson ja kreivi Heiden," in Rauhan rautaa, p. 179.

[81]Translated from Ibid., p. 182.

[82]J. Dods Shaw, "Finland and Its Parliament," The Westminster Review, CXLII (1894), 429, made the observation following a trip to Finland.

[83]Translated from "Teirtmaller finlandskago general-gubernatora," Moskovskiia vedomosti, March 18, 1893, No. 76.

[84]A. Loué to Yrjö Koskinen, Averne, France, July 18, 1890, in S. Yrjö-Koskisen kokoelma, Suomen Valtion Arkisto, Folio 19, No. 22a (Hereinafter Y.-K. kok.).

[85]Loué to Yrjö Koskinen, April 21, 1892, Ibid., No. 25.

[86]Nyvänäki, "Piispi Johanneson ja kreivi Heiden," in Ennen routaa, p. 161.

[87]Von Daehn to Yrjö Koskinen, September 12/24, 1893, in Woldemar von Daehn, Potentatti kokoelma: Suomi IV, Woldemar von Daehnin kirjeet G.Z. Yrjö-Koskiselle sekä adressit, xxiv: 20, S.V.A. (hereinafter von Daehn kok.).

[88]Von Daehn to Yrjö Koskinen, December 25, 1893/January 6, 1894, Ibid., xxiv: 22.

[89]Von Daehn to Yrjö Koskinen, Mustamaki, July 11/23, 1892, Ibid., xxiv: 10.

[90]Von Daehn to Yrjö Koskinen, arrived November 27, 1891, Ibid., xxiv: 8. In another letter, von Daehn compared himself to the governor-general's "valet" -- see von Daehn to Yrjö Koskinen, Siippola, January 6, 1898, Ibid., xxv: 25. In fact, the minister -- state secretary was two grades lower than the governor-general.

[91]For example, see Dmitrii Ivanovich Abrikossow, Revelations of a Russian Diplomat: The Memoirs of Dmitrii I. Abrikossow, ed. by George Alexander Lensen (Seattle, 1964), p. 90; Eugene de Schelking, Recollections of a Russian Diplomat, The Suicide of Monarchies (William II and Nicholas II) (New York, 1918), p. x; Andrew D. Iswolsky, Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat, Outposts of the Empire, 1893-1917 (New Haven, Conn., 1971), p. 27.

[92]E.N. Rantakari, "Routavuodet," in Suomen historian kasikirja, II, 293.

[93]Suomen Suuriruhtinanmaan Asetus-Kokoelma, No. 40/1894.

[94]Tuomo Polvinen, "Venäjän sotilaalliset Suomessa," in Päivi6 Tommila, ed., Venäläinen sortokausi Suomessa (Porvoo, 1960), p. 50.

[95]G. Abov, "Voennyi biudzhet Finliandii," Moskovskaia vedomosti, March 8, 1894, No. 66. Abov noted that 27% of the Russian budget went on defence and only 12% of Finland's in 1890. This was a per capita spending of 2.50 rubles per Russian and only 1.20 rubles for each person in Finland. He further pointed out that Finland spent only 1,600,000 silver rubles on defence while other countries of the equivalent population -- i.e. Norway, Serbia, Greece, Denmark, Switzerland -- spent anywhere from three to eight million silver rubles for this purpose.

[96]"Voinskaia povinnost v Finlandii," Moskovskaia vedomosti, February 26, 1894, No. 57, noted that for every 1000 men called up in Finland, only 196 men were drafted into the military forces; while while in the rest of the Empire, 461 men out of a 1000 were taken into the services.

[97]Polvinen, "Venäjän sotilaaliset Suomessa," p. 50. There were Russians who were already prepared to destroy any Finnish institution for the purpose of greater Imperial security. For example, in "Finliandskii stats-sekretariat v Russkie gosudarstvennye interesy," Moskovskaia vedomosti, January 31, 1896, No. 31, it was argued that in military

affairs the Russian interests were not well served by the State Secretariat for Finland, and that it would be better to entrust such matters to the Russian minister of war and to the governor-general without any reference to that office or the Diet.

[98]Hyvämäki, "Me tahtovat marssia Narvikiin," in Ennen routaa, p. 130. See also Note No. 1 in this chapter.

[99]Ibid., p. 131.

[100]The Young Finns split away from the Old Finns about the time of the Postal Manifesto of 1890. They still retained their allegiance to the Fennoman cause but were outspoken in their opposition to Russification.

[101]Pirkko Rommi, "Myöntyväsyyssuuntauksen ideologia," in Tommila, Kansallinen sortokausi Suomessa, p. 95.

[102]January 22, 1897, No. 4.

[103]P.P. Klenov, Vchenie o Finliandskom gosudarstve (St. Petersburg, 1893), pp. 93-95.

[104]P.I. Mescarosh, Finliandii -- gosudarstvo ili russkaia okraina? Kratkoe osvetlenie voprosa o Finliandskoi okraini Rossiiskoi Imperii (St. Petersburg, 1897), pp. 314-321. On p. 332, he wrote that while Finland had a "real national culture," she had only a "phantom separatist state."

[105]P.P. Klenov, "Chego dostigli i chego domogaiutsia dostignut finliandtsy po puti otpadeniia ot russkoi gosudarstvennoi vlasti," Russkii arkhiv, XXXVI (1898), 354; see also "Evoliutsia finliandskoi mysli," Moskovskiia vedomosti, December 30, 1895, No. 359.

[106]N.L. Rotvikh, Russko-finliandskaia idyllia. (Kritika trudov prof. V.A. Kvachalova.) (St. Petersburg, 1898), p. 27.

[107] Translated from "Finlandskii patriotism." Moskovskiia vedomosti. January 19. 1896. No. 19.

[108] L.A. Puntila, "Kilota Suomen suunnasta Venäjän valtalehdissä." pp. 17-18.

[109] V. von Daehn to Yrjö Koskinen. Sippola. March 30. 1897. von Daehn Kok., XXV: 15. In an earlier letter -- January 9/21. 1897. St. Petersburg.. Ibid.. XXV: 12 -- von Daehn told Yrjö Koskinen that the Tsar had even stood up in defence of Finland against the minister of war over a passage relating to the redrafting of the military penal code.

[110] The old Finnish "compliers" rarely used the foreign press or tried to influence it. So, the articles published abroad traditionally reflected the liberal position in regard to the "Finnish question" vis-à-vis the Russian Empire. For a sampling, see: P. Kropotkin, "Finland. A Rising Nationality." The Nineteenth Century, XVII (1885). 527-546; Edward A. Freeman, "Finland." [illegible]'s Magazine, LXV (March. 1882). 521-528; Minister Hilchkoff Danner, "Finland's Relations to Russia." Harper's Monthly, XXXIX (1895). 797; L. Mechelin, "Finlande." [illegible] et parlementaire, XV (1898). 182-196.

Belonging to the upper classes, this elite had many contacts with the outside world and was able to turn them to Finland's advantage. J. Leclercq, who later authored articles of support for Finland, was in contact with the Idalfelt family (see Julien Leclercq, Brev till Albert Idalfelt, Ljeis. March 25. 1898. in N.Y.K., Brev Amil Idalfelts autografsamling, III). Emil Zola even wrote to Axel Bernstein, correspondent for the [illegible], that he supported the Finnish cause in the name of truth and justice. (See Zola to Bernstein, Paris, January 26. 1898. N.Y.K.) P. Levy-Dumilen also corresponded with Bernstein. (See Levy-Dumilen to Bernstein. 1899. N.Y.K.)

[111] This fact -- now ignored -- had been recognized even in Russian nationalist circles, as in "Finliandskie 'Shvedomany' i 'Finnomany' i ikh otnoshenie k Rossii." [illegible], November 7. 1891. No. 308 and [illegible]. pp. 1-2.

[112] For example, Yrjö Koskinen to von Bagge, Savonlinna, July 6, 1898. Y.-K. kok., Folio 24, in which he favored Procopé to replace as von Bagge's replacement as Minister — State Secretary. In another letter, Yrjö Koskinen to von Bagge, January 24, 1897, ibid., the writer argued against the appointment of a Swedish-speaker as Bishop of Kuopio with a seat in the Senate. He noted that the Finnish peasants found churchmen very important, but found very few Finns at the top. Furthermore, he wrote that the Swede-Finns formed in the main the corps of functionaries -- and yet they also formed at the same time the opposition to the government. How could the tsar show his confidence in them?

So strong was Yrjö Koskinen's advocacy of Finnish rights that Leo Mechelin considered his three major enemies were: Yrjö Koskinen, the east and militarism. For this, see Ryömäkki, "Suomalainen diktatteri," in [illegible], p. 86.

[113] [illegible] to von Bagge, Petersburg, November 29/December 11, 1897, Agathon Meurmanin kirjekokoelma III, K.V.K.

[114] According to von Bagge to Yrjö Koskinen, Sippola, May 26, 1897, von Bagge kok., XXV: 19, he was responsible for suggesting to the tsar that Yrjö Koskinen be ennobled so that the Finnish Party might be strengthened.

[115] For example, see "Senatteri vapaah. Yrjö-Koskisen puhe ylioppilasmaanan lauluajille," Iltalehti ystävä, April 29, 1898. In the previous autumn, he had been in a struggle to introduce Finnish as one of the languages of instruction in the Corps of Cadets. For this, see Yrjö Koskinen to von Bagge, Helsinki, October 17, 1897, Y.-K. kok., Folio 24. (In the same letter, he asked for a pension for Jean Sibelius.)

For material on the general language struggle in Finland, see Matti Klinge, "Suomen kansalliskuvaliikkeiden sosialisista vaiheista," Historiallinen aikakauskirja, 1969, pp. 185-207; Mikko Juva, "Suomen kielitaistelun ensimmäinen vaihe," Historian aikakirja, LVIII (1962), 364-380; E.N. Setälä, [illegible] in Finland (Helsinki, 1919).

[116] From Uusi Suometar, July 26, 1898, No. 169. Yet Meurman's "Kirje Helsingistä," Valvoja, 1898, pp. 563-

564, declared that all Finland was one with the constitutionalists. Meurman's great political enemy, Jonas Castrén, in his Uuden Suometaren ja sen miesten "puoluemoraali" (Helsinki, 1894), p. 14, suggest that Meurman was rather unprincipled. Indeed, Meurman's Muistelmia, I (Helsinki, 1909), p. 290, repeats this passage he had directed against Castrén during one session of the Diet:

"When Gustavus III saved his country contrary to the fundamental laws and when the Anjala men according to the fundamental laws of the estates were ready to rain down destruction, which then acted rightly, to which has history given its pardon? The people of Germany do not count how many times Bismarck breaks the fundamental laws, but they do add what he has done for the people's benefit."

[117]Duplessis to Hanotaux, Helsingfors, June 6, 1898, in France, Archives Nationales du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères à Paris, Russie: Politique interieur, "Pays Balts, 1896-1904," DP A 85 1 (hereinafter A.N.M.A.E.).

[118]From "Lettre de Pobiédonostsev au comte D.A. Tolstoi, ministre de l'interieure, 8 juin 1883," in Mémoires politiques, pp. 260-261.

[119]Juva and Juva, Suomen kansan historia, V: Tie itsenäisyyteen ja itsenäisyyden aika, p. 15; Rantakari, "Routavuodet," pp. 297-298.

[120]Edward Evenson to Delcassé, Consulate, Helsingfors, September 8, 1898, A.N.M.A.E., DP A 85 1; No. 23. V. Semennikov, "Nikolai Romanov i Finliandiia," Krasnyi arkhiv XXVII (1928), 226.

[121]Tuomo Polvinen, "Kenraalikuvernööri Bobrikov ja helmikuun manifesti," Historiallinen aikakauskirja, 1973, p. 124.

[122]Borodkin, Iz noveishei istorii Finliandii, Vremia upravleniia N.I. Bobrikova, p. 71, quotes Bobrikov as saying he would support Finnish laws and rights as long as they are not contrary to Russian interests. Incidently, the then Colonel Borodkin had been an aide and friend to Bobrikov.

[123]Hyvämäki, "Pilspa Johanneson ja Kreivi Heiden," pp. 184-187 passim.

[124]Päivi Tommila, "Kenraalikuvernööri Bobrikov ja suuri adressi," Historiallinen aikakauskirja, 1964, pp. 210-211.

[125]Beredkin, Iz nevzgod istorii Finliandii. Vremia upravleniia N.I. Bobrikova, p. 68.

[126]Ibid., p. 69.

[127]Polvinen, "Kenraalikuvernööri Bobrikov ja helmikuun manifesti," p. 125; Polvinen, "Venäjän sotilaalliset tavoitteet Suomessa," pp. 35-39, 48-49.

[128]Beredkin, Iz nevzgod istorii Finliandii. Vremia upravleniia N.I. Bobrikova, p. 68.

[129]V. von Daehn's later letters to Yrjö-Koskinen through their complaints suggest that his health was failing. However, the strain of politics must have affected him as well during these last days of his tenure in St. Petersburg. In a letter to Yrjö-Koskinen, Sippola, March 6, 1899, von Daehn Kok., xxv: 32, he said he was off to winter south and would no longer speak of or think of politics.

[130]When Minister — State Secretary Ehrnrooth refused to sign the Postal Manifesto of 1890, von Daehn, as his assistant, signed it. For this, he received many a Finlander's anger.

[131]When von Daehn died, his obituary appeared on the front page of Suomen kansa, January 12, 1901, No. 6. The article itself, "Waldemar von Daehn," was really still an apology for his role in the signing of the Postal Manifesto, for which he was excused as being only the assistant. Actually, his real value has not been apparent until long after his lifetime.

[132]Translated from the quotation in Semennikov, "Nikolai Romanov i Finliandiia," pp. 231-232.

[133]Polvinen, "Kenraalikuvernöörі Bobrikov ja helmikuun manifesti," p. 126.

[134]To the minutes of the Commission's proceedings, Procopé noted: "While agreeing with the minutes of our proceedings I only amplify them with the declaration made by me when the question of changing the laws of Finland was under consultation, that the Imperial Manifest of the 29th of October 1894 confirmed the rights and privileges of the Grand Duchy of Finland and that the order in which the laws of Finland were subject to change was prescribed in the Statutes of the Diet of 1869." Quoted from Memorandum of John Michell, St. Petersburg, December 6, 1898, F.O. 181/221, No.1, Salisbury to Pakenham.

[135]Ibid.

[136]Ibid.

[137]"Suotsimmaalaiset 'ystävämme' !" Päivälehti, January 10, 1899, No. 7.

[138]"Suomen ministeriwaltiosihteerin wirka," Uusi aura, January 15, 1899, No. 12.

[139]Translated from Aamulehti, January 22, 1899, No. 22. The article then goes on to specify the proposals of the Military Commission:

1. The Finnish military command be subordinated to the Russian Ministry of War.
2. The Finnish high command be subordinated to the commander of the military district of Finland.
3. The commander of the military district be in command of all Finnish troops in the district.
4. The governor-general of Finland no longer be the commander-in-chief of the Finnish forces.
5. There be the dissolution/ment of the separate Finnish staff attached to the Russian Ministry of War, the Finnish high command, the Finnish chief-of-staff.
6. The Finnish forces be formed into two brigades, and its dragoon regiment be melted into one of them.
7. Russian born officers be allowed into the Finnish officer corps.

8. That all military expense be supported by Finnish revenues.

This document was issued under the signature of Procopé, Minister — State Secretary for Finland.

[140]Quoted from Krogius to Michell, Helsingfors, January 31, 1899, F.O. 65/1577, No. 39, Encl. 2, Scott to Salisbury. For newspaper accounts, see Uusi aura, January 25, 1899, No. 20; Uusi Suometar, January 24, 1899; The Times, January 27, 1899, p. 3.

[141]Quoted from Krogius to Michell, Helsingfors, January 31, 1899, F.O. 65/1577, No. 39, Encl. 3, Scott to Salisbury.

[142]Suomen virallinen lehti, January 31, 1899, No. 25.

[143]January 30, 1899, p. 6.

[144]"'Ostra Finlandin' lakkauttaminen," Päivälehti, February 13, 1899, No. 40; the first report, however, was made in "Lakkautettu sanomalehti," Ibid., February 11, 1899, No. 38.

[145]For the early use of coup d'état as the term describing this event, see L.A. Atherley-Jones, Letter to the Editor, The Times, June 5, 1899, p. 5; R. Nisbet Bain, "Finland and the tsar," The Forthnightly Review, LXV (1899), p. 741; and a booklet of documents entitled, Le coup d'état en Finlande (n.p., n.d. [1899]).

[146]The manifesto was published in Suomalainen virallinen lehti, February 18, 1899, No. 41. It appeared in other newspapers as follows: Päivälehti, February 19, 1899, No. 46; Uusi Suometar, February 19, 1899, No. 46; Nya Pressen, February 19, 1899, No. 48; Aamulehti, February 19, 1899, No. 42; Inkeri, February 9 (o.s.), 1899, No. 12; Ilkkumaan yutävää, February 24, 1899, No. 8; Uusi aura, February 21, 1899, No. 43. Ironically, "Suomen autonomia," Uusi aura, February 19, 1899, No. 41, stated that Russian newspapers would like to see Finland's autonomy end. It noted that Finland had all its external matters handled

by Russia, and even her army followed all the exercises and commands along with the Russian army, the only difference being the length of service which in Finland was based upon the pattern of the United States of America.

[147]This is the description of the effect of the February Manifesto in Uuno Tuominen, "Helmikuun manifesti ja yritykset sen kumoamiseksi tai saattamiseksi sopuisintuun Suomen lakien kanssa," in Tuomila, Vapaudingen sortokausi Suomessa, p.51, i.e. "Helmikuun kiskonalta taivalta."

[148]Translated from the text in the Journal de St. Pétersbourg, February 6/18, 1899. With the manifeste there was published an accompanying set of regulations for the editing, examining and promulgating of laws of the whole Empire in Finland.

CHAPTER FIVE

ADMINISTRATIVE RUSSIFICATION AND RESISTANCE

The February Manifesto proved to be the great watershed in Russo-Finnish relations during the tsarist regime. before this time, Finlanders had tended to place their trust in the agreements arrived at in Borgå in 1809 and upon the good will of the tsar. Thereafter, neither was possible any longer, and so the Finnish nation had to turn away from St. Petersburg and look into itself for the resources necessary to sustain its own individual identity. This it began to do from the moment that Finland learned of the February Manifesto, and then proceeded to undertake an ever-escalating line of resistance against every new measure of Russification.

Immediatedly following publication of the February Manifesto in St. Petersburg on February 17, news of it began to filter into Finland. Already on that evening a great national conference was called together at the Ateneum in Helsingfors to consider this problem and the course that should be taken to remedy it.[1] On the following day, a

full sitting of the Senate was called for the purpose of promulgating the manifesto. The meeting was rather stormy. Some of the senators insisted that the manifesto could not be promulgated in its existing form; others were of the opinion that the Senate was obliged to promulgate it.[2] When put to a vote, ten senators voted for and ten against the motion of promulgation. They then reached an unanimous agreement to postpone any decision on the matter of promulgation until the tsar had considered their objections to the February Manifesto.[3] The senators, as appointees of the crown, were in no position to be more vigorous in their defence of Finnish rights.

The "Observations of the Finnish Senate concerning the Gracious Manifesto of February 3/15, 1899" naturally reflected some of this timidity of the Senate. Nevertheless, it did point out that the manifesto "inadvertently" contravened the Finnish constitution which the tsar had promised to maintain. To correct this error, the Senate asked to have prepared "through the mediation of competent persons, Russians and Finlanders, a proposition of law on the legislative treatment of the affairs concerning the general interests of the Empire, which proposition, after a careful examination, will be submitted to a preliminary and legal constitutional treatment by the Estates of Finland."[4]

W.W. Söderhjelm, Procurator of the Senate, also drafted his "Reservations" concerning the February Manifesto. He, too, noted that this legislation seemed to contravene the Finnish constitution. He asked that the tsar rescind it or, at least, give his official assurance that it was not intended to injure the fundamental laws of Finland.[5]

The Extraordinary Diet, which was still in session deliberating upon the new military proposals, voiced its objection to this new manifesto.[6] The Diet, being the representative institution of the Finnish nation, felt itself to have no other obligation than the Finnish people, and therefore believed it more essential to underline its dismay with this decree rather than be excessively polite. The "Note" of the legislative commission of the Diet reflected this attitude; it tersely reported that the tsar should be seen without delay and be made aware of this improper intrusion upon the constitution, and then that he be asked to redraft a legal document in conformity with the country's fundamental laws.[7]

On February 20th, a second great national conference was held in the Ateneum. It was spontaneously decided at this meeting that a petition should be circulated throughout Finland calling for the repeal of the manifesto, and that this document would then be forwarded to the tsar. The extent

of national participation in this "Great Address" was underscored in that the organizers and canvassers were chosen from "politically inexperienced" and unknown people simply on the basis of their willingness to serve the country.[8] At this meeting, Jonas Castrén, a leading figure among the Young Finns, declared that Finland was now: "One mind, two tongues!"[9]

Fearing the temper of the country as it was, Bobrikov had already forbidden the celebration of Runeberg Day. This brought up such a storm of protest in the Finnish papers that Bobrikov felt it necessary to issue a warning. In this announcement, he noted the mistreatment and misrepresentation of the government position in the newspapers. He then exhorted the censors to maintain greater vigilance according to the appropriate laws.[10] For the moment, it seemed as though Witte's prediction to Bobrikov was going to prove true; Witte had said, according to his memoirs:

> As long as Count Heyden, the Finnish Governor-General, was alive he held Kuropatkin's zeal in check. But soon the count died, and General Bobrikov was appointed to succeed him. When I congratulated him upon his nomination, he remarked that his mission in Finland was analoguous to that of Count Muraviov in Poland. The comparison was rather unexpected, and I could not refrain from observing that while Count Muraviov had been appointed to suppress a rebellion, he was apparently commissioned to create one. . . . That was our last friendly conversation."[11]

The Finns, however, did not dare to commit open acts

of civil disobedience and insurrection, for fear of Russia's power of instant military retaliation and her ability to suspend the articles of Finnish autonomy altogether. Instead, the womenfolk of Helsingfors began to don mourning clothes to show their grief at the destruction of their cherished fundamental laws.[12] It was, as Yrjö-Koskinen told his son, a bad time, but the hope was that God would take care of all.[13] There was even yet the belief that the tsar himself would set things right.

Indeed this attitude was even current in the underground pamphlets and broadsides that began to circulate surreptitiously throughout the grand duchy. One of them, for example, protested mightily against the February Manifesto as the first step in the destruction of Finland's fundamental laws. Even so, it concluded with the loyal salute: "God save Finland's rights! Long live Finland, long live His Majesty the Emperor and Grand Duke."[14]

The tsar-grand duke, however, was not receptive to the pleas of his Finnish subjects. The Russian government's position was, as even Bobrikov was to suggest in a newspaper interview,[15] that no injury of the fundamental laws of Finland was intended by the February Manifesto. Therefore, the tsar felt himself at liberty to refuse an audience to the vice-chairman and procurator of the Senate. He also refused to see the Lantmarskalk, the speaker of the House

of Nobles, and the speakers of the other Estates on February 23. According to the Lantmarskalk's subsequent report to the Nobles, the tsar had made it known through Minister-State Secretary Procopé that he had in fact guaranteed Finland's internal legislation in the February Manifesto, choosing only to affect that part which pertained to Pan-Imperial affairs. Therefore, he commanded the delegation to return home.[16]

With the tsar's refusal to undertake any changes in the manifesto, the Finlanders began to believe that the tsar himself had broken his promise to guarantee the Finnish constitution.[17] Even some Russians accepted this viewpoint, as did Prof. Colonel Martinov:

> It's true that the tsar with the publication of the February Manifesto has broken his given word to Finland . . . but he was forced to do this, because if the emperor does not wish to follow a Russian nationalist policy, then we Russians would topple him from his throne.[18]

In any case, it was now very clear that the tsar had no intention of revoking or amending this legislation. The Senate, when it resumed its full sitting on March 2, had no choice but to vote "yes" or "no" to the manifesto as it stood. This time, above the strenuous objections of a now non-compliant Yrjö-Koskinen, it voted in favour of promulgation. Having lost control of the Finnish Party in the Senate,

Yrjö-Koskinen then tendered his resignation from the Senate on the grounds of "age and ill-health." The consequence of this was a severe blow to the whole Finnish Party which was left leaderless.[19] It, as well, created division in the opposition movement to the Russian government's policies at a most critical time.

The combination of the tsar's lack of response to official protestations from Finland and the present malaise in the Finnish Party put the opposition movement into a drift toward the use of extralegal means to impress the authorities of its dissatisfaction. In this regard, the newspapers, in spite of censorship and the threat of suspension, began to take an active, if guarded part in opposition to the Russian government. Ampulehti, for example, asked, "What Does the New Situation Require?" This "new situation," of course, referred to the Russian government's intransigence with respect to the February Manifesto. This article concluded that what was really required was the strength and courage to face the Russian demands resolutely.[20]

Ignoring the existence of the February Manifesto, Uusi aura stated that the military laws of Finland formed a part of the fundamental laws, and therefore they could be changed only with the consent of the Diet.[21] In another newspaper, encouragement was given to the Finns in a notice

that the world press tended to be strongly pro-Finnish.[22]

Other forms of nationalist demonstrations also began to take place. For example, on March 4 in the evening, a group of Finnish "patriots" met outside the home of Procurator M.M. Söderhjelm to sing Finnish and Savolaks songs in his honour for his part in trying to set aside the February Manifesto. The fête ended with noisy yells of "Long live the Finnish procurator: Long live the Fatherland:"[23]

An even more popular form of demonstration was the public veneration of the memory of Alexander II.[24] This was an ideal tactic as the government found itself unable to object to manifestations of love for one of its own monarchs. So, the heroic statue of Alexander II in Senate Square in Helsingfors was constantly festooned with flowers and wreaths, the latter bearing inscriptions of the following nature:

> You loved your Finland
> and kept your promises holy.
> We remember you.[25]

But the really overwhelming national outburst of public sentiment in Finland against the February Manifesto was found in the preparation of the "Great Address." On March 5, 1899, E. Ramstedt sent out requests throughout the country asking for the people's signatures to enclosed

copies of a petition to the tsar.[26] In less than two weeks, 522,931 signatures were collected.[27] When it is realized that Finland was populated by barely more than two and a half million souls, the number of signatories was well nigh phenomenal.

In substance, the Great Address first declared that the February Manifesto had saddened Finland. It then noted that the foundations of Finnish society were fixed on the base of the rights accorded to Finland by Alexander I and his successors. The petition then appealed to the tsar to hear the plea of his subjects and revoke the manifesto. Finland, it said, had progressed materially and intellectually under the Russian Imperial scepter, and so has been ever loyal to the Empire. Only the enemies of Finland in Russia have provoked Finnish ill-will. Therefore, the faithfulness of the Finnish people deserved the opportunity to continue the development of their own unique national character as an inseparable part of the Empire. It suggested that the tsar was unaware of the difficulties attached to this manifesto, and hoped that he would, upon careful examination, remedy them.[28]

At a meeting in Helsingfors on March 14, it was decided to send the Great Address in the company of a delegation of five hundred Finlanders to St. Petersburg

for submission to the tsar.[29] On the evening of the fifteenth, the delegates left for the capital by the 7:25, 8 and 10 P.M. trains.[30] Only now having learned of this petition, the embarrassed governor-general sought so have Governor de Pont of Nyland province telegraph the director of the St. Petersburg police to turn back this delegation. The governor refused to comply on grounds that this was not in his jurisdiction.[31] The delegation, therefore, arrived in St. Petersburg unhindered.

Meanwhile, in Helsingfors, it was decided that the governor-general should be informed of the address and have him recognize officially the delegation of five hundred. First, Governor de Pont was sent to Bobrikov on the sixteenth to inform him of the address. Bobrikov refused to accept the notification from de Pont for the reason that this petition did not pertain exclusively to Nyland.[32] On the morning of March 17, a group of Finlanders, including Juho Brusila, K.A. Snellman, Juho Jalkanen, Juho Silvasti, and Juho Tarvanen with Eero Jarnefelt as interpreter, went to visit Bobrikov. They handed him their letter addressed to His Excellency.[33] Following the reading of the letter, Bobrikov refused official recognition to the delegation in St. Petersburg. He declared that this address had not gone through proper channels since the petitions of each province should have been forwarded

to him by the provincial governors and that, in any case, he could not support its contents. But, he added, should it go through Minister-State Secretary Procopé's hands to the tsar, that was God's will.[34]

Since Procopé was too timid to ask for an audience for the delegation by himself[35] and also because the delegation had no official standing in the capital, the tsar refused to see it.[36] Through the minister-state secretary for Finland, he therefore sent the following reply to these petitioners:

> Inform the members of this 500 man delegation that I surely will not receive them, although I am not in any case angry with them.
> They should return each to his home and they can then give their petitions to the Governors, who will send them to the Governor-General, who finally must direct you [Procopé] to me for their discussion, if there is anything in them to consider.
> Explain to the delegation that the significance of the February 3rd Manifesto has reached here and then they should return in peace to their homes.[37]

This refusal was met with a ringing attack by the British pro-consul Eugene Wolff who demanded that Minister-State Secretary Procopé obtain an audience for the delegation, which was a peaceable body of men seeking the right of redress before the magnaminity of the tsar. He assured the minister that they intended no mischief, but were themselves faced with illegal procedures and persecution in their homeland.[38] The only result of this fine speech was Wolff's

"firing" by the British.[39] The delegation had to go home with nothing to show for its efforts.[40]

On March 20, the results of the confrontation with Procopé were recorded at another meeting of the organizers of the Great Address. It was there decided that the copies of the address would be forwarded to the provincial governors, save for the first copy which was to be kept for future submission to the tsar through the minster-state secretary.[41] Thus ended in failure this great manifestation of national solidarity.[42]

In one respect, however, the Great Address was not a failure; it succeeded in stirring up learned societies in Europe. Letters of support began to pour into the grand duchy.[43] Then, Rudolf Euchen of Germany began to collect signatures from other European scholars for an international address to the tsar on behalf of the Finns.[44] All told, 1050 names were appended to the "Pro-Finlandia Address," among them those of T. Mommsen, Max Weber, Richard v. Krafft-Ebing, Edvard Grieg, Henrik Ibsen, A. Leroy-Beaulieu, Emile Zola, Anatole France, Lord Lister, Herbert Spencer, George Meredith, etc., etc.[45] A delegation of the signatories arrived in St. Petersburg on June 25 o.s., 1899 to present the address to the tsar. The tsar refused to receive the delegation over the question of Finland.[46] The delegates were then forced to return

home in defeat, unless it is assumed that such measures as these were to make Russia more cautious in her future treatment of Finland.

There was also an attempt on the part of the Finns to introduce the question of Finland at The Hague Disarmament Conference.[47] This also ended in failure, because even the Germans had no desire to set the precedent of interfering in another country's internal affairs.[48] France, of course, had no interest in wounding her own ally,[49] and Great Britain was faced with a similar problem regarding home rule in Ireland.[50] In effect, only the Scandinavian countries were really concerned with Finland's plight.[51] For this reason, there was to be no help for Finland from the nations of the western world.

In the first half of 1899, it still had been possible to be optimistic in respect to Finland's chances of getting the February Manifesto repealed. It still was thought that the tsar could be persuaded by the force of international pressure. Hence, Konni Zilliacus could still say: "We have not yet lost all hope in Finland, insofar as the measures applying to the February 3/15 manifesto will not be received until the commencement of their execution."[52]

Toward the end of the year, however, it was more difficult to remain optimistic. It began to become quite

apparent that there was no external agency or force that might be marshalled by Finland in support of herself. Although Finland then continued to appeal to Europe by means of periodicals which she started to publish for this purpose,[53] it seems that this was done rather for the sake of obtaining moral support rather than for fostering a movement toward some definite end.[54] The Finlanders had already begun to realize that there was a genuine need to institute a system of defence at home against the threat of Russification.

The policy of "compliance" in the minds of many Finns was the most judicious course to take in a world dominated by Realpolitik. "What the Present Situation Requires?" a pamphlet published by the Suomalainen Kirjallisuuden Seuran Kirjapaino ("The Finnish Literary Society Bookpress") -- an arm of the Finnish Party, exemplified this view. It declared that the Russian newspaper press and certain other nationalist elements in Russia had aimed their barbs at Finland without cause. The most prudent thing to do, therefore, was not to give them any excuse to substantiate their lies. To this, it added: "A bright spot in this worrisome situation is that honest Russian men themselves, at least to some degree, stand on our side, for the obvious reason that they must admit that the Finnish nation has not given them any real cause for their destructiveness which they are inciting against us."[55]

Notwithstanding the grave danger posed by Russia, that is if the danger was as grave as the constitutionalists claimed it to be, this pamphlet attacked the Swedish Party and liberals as being of no avail to the country's problems. It stated that the wish of the Swedish Party was only to maintain their pre-eminence in the grand duchy. It further argued that: "This kind of single-mindedness [yksimielisyys] does not signify anything else but the continuation of Viking rule."[56]

At the meeting of the Finnish Party at the Fennia Hotel, Helsingfors, on December 12 and 13, there were spokesmen who expressed this view.[57] However, there were also others of the membership who believed that the Russian problem should receive top priority. E.G. Palmén, for one, spoke out that he was against "compliance," saying that it had been the Swedish opposition which prevented the 1878 conscription law from becoming more onerous.[58] J.R. Danielson, however, made the most telling and blistering attack on the Finnish Party, suggesting that its defence of Finnish rights was weak[59] and that it pitted itself against the staunchest defenders of the rights.[60] It was his view that:

> . . . that this nation should not surrender in any place its legal rights or accept illegality as being legal, it just should stand on the same basis on which the last Diet stood in declaring that if soon it

> would be necessary for this country to bend before the command given by the all-powerful state, this nation should not accept as legally constituted those laws which have been created by illegal processes. 61

Danielson had struck to the root of the policy of "passive resistance." It was a line of action that grew very popular. Its adherents included the constitutionalists, liberals, Young Finns and the Swedish Party. In Finnish historical studies, these groups have been lumped together under the term of "Constitutionalists"[62] for they emphasized the maintenance of the Finnish constitution above any other consideration.

According to J.K. Paasikivi, this was the internal political situation in Finland regarding the rivalry between the Compliers and Constitutionalists:

> The supporters of passive resistance were in many ways in a good position in comparison to us Old Finns. They had the adoration of the law and rights, a lofty and simple, straightforward programme. Their demand, that our rights in every respect should be returned to us, touched every Finlander's feelings and hopes. On the other hand, the Old Finns' talk was of moderation and reconciliation, and to which attainment was uncertain and which demanded sacrifices of us. According to the preceding advice and for the attainment of possible ends it was in our opinion not to have relations between Finland and the Emperor or Russian ruler become overly agitated, not to establish a situation in which the question was who is the stronger: Finland or Russia, and who was to admit itself to be the weaker and submissive before the whole world. Our endeavours and actions easily got the stamp that we had united our business with the Russian affair so hateful to us. 63

The language issue remained such a bitter point of contention between the Finns and Swedo-Finns that the Compliers

and Constitutionalists drifted even further apart in the following year.[64] The parties became even more antogonist toward each other when the passive resisters in the corps of functionaries of Finland's administration began to resign rather than uphold what they considered to be illegal regulations.[65] Into the vacant offices popped the Compliers who felt that it was better that they filled these posts rather than some Russian gentlemen.[66] Under those circumstances, the use of the resignation as a weapon of resistance could not be fully effective.

The Finnish press, whic had rigorously carried on a campaign of resistance in 1899,[67] was being stifled in 1900. On January 15, 1900, new press regulations were issued: persons were liable for fines of 500 marks for publishing prohibited material; the governor-general was given the power to change publishers or to suppress journals; the governor-general was given the right to appoint a consultative committee to watch over the press; Finnish newspapers were forbidden to publish Imperial decisions until they had appeared in the official gazette or other governmental organ, nor were they now allowed to report the proceedings of scientific societies, public speeches or commercial affairs. The Senate was given the task to draw up the punishment for infractions of these measures.[68]

Through the use of these powers, Bobrikov began to rid himself of the newspaper opposition. For example, Eero Erkko, editor of Päivälehti, and Tollet, editor of Viborgs bladet, were removed from their posts by order of the governor-general.[69] In Erkko's case, his dismissal was occasioned by his publication on the anniversary of the February Manifesto of an article that had appeared originally in 1899.[70] Viipurin sanomat was suspended for four months, Hämäläinen for two months, Rauman lehti for two months, and Uusimaa also for two months.[71] The most important casualty was the Nya pressen, which was permanently suspended.[72]

In fact, the suppression of Nya pressen became a cause célèbre. Axel Lille, the editor, drew much attention on his journey from Åbo to Helsingfors where, on his arrival, 6,000 people were waiting to greet him at the station. Russian policemen armed with revolvers at the ready lined Helsingfors station. Thereafter, a meeting took place at Societetshuset where the participants voted in favour of liberty and against tyranny. While Leo Mechelin was received with loud applause, the loudest tribune was paid to the idea of abolishing censorship.[73]

On July 20, 1900, Pradère-Niquet, the French consul in Helsingfors, became more and more apprehensive. He reported home that the suppression of Swedish language

newspapers was continuing unabated. He also noted that those who resigned from their posts were now considered to be "deserters" by the tsar. Their punishment for such acts included the loss of pensions. Of commercial as well as political interest was his remark that the minister of finance in Russia wanted to incorporate Finland into the Russian customs system. Lastly, Pradère-Niquet requested a diplomatic pouch to insure the secrecy of his dispatches as he said the mails were uncertain.[74]

To counter the effect of the anti-Russian press in Finland, Bobrikov established his own Russian language paper, Finliandskaia gazeta,[75] and shortly thereafter, he had a Finnish language supplement included as well. This was called Suomen sanomat. In its first issue, Finliandskaia gazeta promised to deal with all aspects of Finnish life, and to include Russian matters as well. The Finnish supplement was to be introduced for the sake of Finlanders living in the Empire.[76]

In one issue, part of the first page of Finliandskaia gazeta was devoted to the problem of alcoholism in Finland, suggesting that because there was a high incidence of alcoholism in the country that the Finlanders were not really so "civilized" after all. It concluded that alcoholism affected the productivity and political responsibility of

of the country.[77] The propaganda in Suomen sanomat was just as subtle: one article extolled the virtues and good done in Finland by a Russian benevolent society.[78] Perhaps Lieutenant-General Chipov, Bobrikov's adjutant, was partially right when he said that the pro-Finnish press campaign was having adverse results in Russia;[79] for when the shoe was on the other foot, the pro-Russian campaign in Finland was certainly not succeeding. Yet the press war continued unabated in and out of Finland.[80]

The clandestine press also continued to print pamphlets directed against the Russian regime.[81] The anti-Russian campaign took a new course when Mumm's Champagne was boycotted by Finlanders because it bore the inscription: "By appointment to the Grand-Duke of Russia."[82] The boycott soon included the French consulate, all French wines,[83] and even E. Evenson's house because he was the manager of Pommery Wines.[84] The British were hardly better off; after the forced resignation of E. Wolff, all his Finnish colleagues had resigned and Britain was unable to hire Finnish replacements.[85] Russian stores and other Russian establishments were boycotted.[86] The quarantine soon came to include the most notorious of the Compliers as well.[87] In this, the high point of passive resistance was being reached in 1900.

However, other means of protest were also used. For example, the composers Sibelius and Kajanus were sent on tour with the Helsingfors Philharmonic Orchestra to drum up support.[89] Books were still being written on behalf of the Finnish cause.[90] The statue of Alexander II was still a popular focal point for protest until September 12th, the late tsar's birthday, when so many wreaths were brought there that the nervous police considered this as a subtle demonstration and dispersed the crowds.[91] Russian tempers were quickly wearing thin.

Despite all the reforms and promises of 1900, the Bobrikov programme of Russification advanced very little. It was true, of course, that the effectiveness of the office of Minister-State Secretary as the protective agency of Finnish autonomy in St. Petersburg already had been nullified by the appointment of F.A. von Plehve as permanent Minister-State Secretary for Finland on January 13, 1900. The fact that he was State Secretary of Russia as well meant the practical dissolution of the Finnish office and its incorporation into the Imperial one. In spite of von Plehve's bad press,[92] there is the impression that he was not unaware of Finland's needs but had been pushed into his role of Russifier by the greater forces about him.[93]

So, Bobrikov's greatest achievement of the year was the passage of the Language Manifesto of June 20, 1900.[94]

On June 22, Fredère-Niquet got first hint of it and reported home that Obedonostsev intended to make Russian obligatory in Finland.[94] On the following day, he learned of the Language Manifesto's publication.[95] The main features of this edict were: to make Russian the one official language of the Office of Minister-State Secretary for Finland, the chancellery of the governor-general and the Finnish passport office effective on October 1, 1900; as of the same day, all written communications of the Senate (administrative section) with Russians had to be made in the Russian language, and that, following five years of grace, all meetings of the Senate would have to be conducted orally in Russian as well; other provisions relating to the Russification of specific areas of the Finnish administration and documentation were also included.[96]

As has been already noted, Bobrikov now succeeded in suppressing the use of Finnish stamps even on mail that was intended only for circulation in the grand duchy. According to Consul Fredère-Niquet, the governor-general had told him that this was just "an administrative matter" of no great consequence.[97] Many Finlanders did not agree, and protested through their use of Finnish mourning labels, that is, by affixing to their mail stamp-like, non-official labels bearing the design of the Lion Rampant of Finland.[98]

The year 1901 seemed to begin quietly enough, for even Runeberg Day, February 5, was calm in Helsingfors. Finnish resistance to the Russian regime, nevertheless, was not at an end. On the anniversary of the February Manifesto, a truly impressive demonstration was carried out. At 7 P.M. on this long winter's night, all the lights dimmed out in the Finnish homes and people gathered in the dark, unlit streets for a silent protest march. Stores which dared to remain open, were marked with paint: "Traitors of the fatherland." Thereafter, the situation in Helsingfors grew worse day by day. Rumours even circulated to the effect that Bobrikov wished to place the city under a "state of siege," and already grim-faced Cossacks were patrolling the streets.[99]

The angry governor-general dismissed the police chief, Colonel Gordie, and the governor of Nyland province, General von Minkvitz. They were replaced by Colonel Carlstedt, a Russified Finlander, as chief of police and newly promoted Brigadier-General Kaigorodov as governor of Nyland.[100] At this point, Bobrikov had begun a policy of replacing of the passive resisters among the Finnish functionaries with Russians in most of the higher administrative posts,[101] which soon caused the Kagaal, the shadowy secret committee of the Finnish Constitutionalists, to issue orders that Finnish officials were to change their tactics from those of passive

resistance to non-compliance.[102]

The political situation in the capital remained in turmoil throughout the spring. Various types of demonstrations continued. Mechelin's Kagaal refused to accept responsibility for the hot-headed youths who were behaving so rowdily. To prevent possible Russian reprisals, the police chief ordered the end of further demonstrations. However, the students ignored the command and met en masse in front of Alexander II's statue on the anniversary of his death, May 13. When the gendarmes and troops were called in to disperse the crowd, General Chipov, the interim governor-general, was greatly shaken by the fact that the Finnish troops spontaneously joined in the demonstration. All Finnish battalions were thereafter ordered out of Helsingfors for manoeuvres. Bobrikov also stopped the call-up of reservists and expressed the wish to see the rifles destined for the Finns transported to St. Petersburg. Meanwhile, numerous individual and group protests were periodically organized by the Finlanders.[103]

Bobrikov's response to Finnish resistance was simply to apply more pressure. As a consequence of this, those persons convicted for taking part in the February 18 demonstrations were sent to jail from ten to thirty days. The Russian gendarmes, who had been brought to Finland at Bobrikov's request, were charged to the Finnish budget

contrary to the constitution and to the complete consternation of the Senate. Bobrikov sent orders for the Finnish postal workers to learn Russian immediately. He replaced the governor of the province of Tavastehus with a Russian colonel.[104] All said and done, Bobrikov was hardly a discerning politician.

To this situation, the new conscription law was soon to be added. Early in May 1901, a delegation of compliant Finlanders, including Senate President Linder, went to St. Petersburg to persuade the tsar to modify the proposed military law to reflect Finnish needs, laws and customs. At this time it was thought that a certain détente had been achieved between the tsar and this delegation.[105] Indeed, the tsar was under pressure at home to put a halt to further Russification in Finland.[106] The supporters of the Finlanders included such persons as Witte, the Grand Duke Vladimir and the Dowager Empress Marie.[107] On the other hand, there were others of the standing of Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaievich who were in agreement with Kuropatkin's scheme of military reform.[108] The effect of this argumentation on the weak will of the tsar was to confuse him even to the point of not knowing whether the Finnish conscription law pertained only to a local Finnish matter or was one of Russian concern.[109]

On July 6/19, 1901, the tsar signed the new military conscription law for Finland, and it was published on the

following day in Journal de St. Petersbourg. Pradère-Niquet's first impression was that this law had been most reasonable, especially as it demanded only the maximum of 500 men per year, no additional military tax contributions to Russia, and the replacement of Finnish troops with Russian soldiers without any demand for subsidies.[110] The British ambassador to Russia thought that this law marked the defeat of the "military and reactionary" party in the Empire.[111] Yrjö-Koskinen and the Finnish Party were well disposed toward the new law as it favoured the great majority of Finns, but the Svecomen bitterly opposed its acceptance.[112] Nevertheless, the Fennoman-packed Senate voted to promulgate it by the margin of 16 votes to 12, following which the Svecomen began to portray themselves as patriots and martyrs and the Fennomen as base traitors.[113]

Fearing the worst, the Russians began to take measures to combat any hostile activity on the part of the disappointed element. The police force was doubled in Helsingfors. All Russian troops were confined to quarters to prevent the possible occurrence of ugly incidents. Sveaborg was called to arms. Yet everything remained very quiet and calm in the Finnish capital. As Pradère-Niquet remarked, the Svecomen did not necessarily reflect the country's views as a whole.[114]

Nevertheless, the Svecomen were a most influential

group, and could marshal a great deal of support for their views. First of all, they began publishing secret pamphlets against the new law which tried to enlist the assistance of pastors, municipal chairmen, and army doctors to sabotage the call-up.[115] At this time, the pastors in particular were pressured not to read out the military law from the pulpit, so that it could not take effect.[116] The clergymen, of course, grew quite confused as to their duty, not knowing what to do.[117] At Bobrikov's request,[118] Archbishop Johansson sent a letter to all the clergy, reminding them that they were obliged to announce all laws from the pulpit when given to them by the government.[119] When the pastors did proclaim the conscription manifesto, the Swedish-speaking congregations either drowned out the readings with singing "Vårt land" or walked out of church.[120] In this way, the protest movement was becoming more and more active in its opposition with the encouragement of the Kagaal. The Kagaal, to finance its work, in turn demanded taxes as a kind of parallel shadow government.[121]

Once more the opposition drew up a petition. In this instance, the text was actually written by L. Mechelin himself.[122] It was then circulated until some 471,000 signatures had been affixed to it. It has been suggested that coercion was used to obtain some of the signatures. At least that was the

contention of the Russians. Bobrikov also suggested that the number of signatures in no way constituted a majority of the Finnish people in this "plebiscite."[123] Yet it seems that this time the whole nation was opposed to the conscription law,[124] and that even Yrjö-Koskinen was forced to admit to this.[125]

In what was now left of the Finnish forces, the desire to serve directly under Russian control was virtually non-existent. So, when Bobrikov went to administer the new oath of allegiance to the Finnish dragoon regiment, the regimental colonel refused to take the oath on the grounds that it was contrary to the Finnish constitution. Bobrikov replied that it was legal and it was up to the others to take it or leave it. Thereupon the colonel resigned, taking with him four squadron leaders. The vacant positions were then filled with Russians.[126] The rest of the officers of regiment then resigned <u>en bloc</u> to show their solidarity with their commander. They did this under the pretext that their colonel had been insulted.[127] Following this, the Russians had no choice but to dissolve the regiment, replacing it with soldiers drawn from various Russian dragoon regiments and assembled together into a new formation, the 55th Regiment of the Finland Dragoons.[128]

Minister-State Secretary von Plehve's public response

to the anti-conscription petition was to chastise all public officials who, in signing it, had taken part in an intolerable anti-government demonstration. Instant dismissal was promised to all disloyal functionaries with the promise that: "If one does not find among the Finlanders sure enough candidates to fill the administrative functions in the Grand Duchy, one will give their positions to Russians."[129]

The tsar, according to von Plehve, had decided not to take the petition into consideration. Moreover, a thorough examination of the country's internal administration was promised. In addition, Bobrikov detained a number of important Finnish functionaries, threatening to use the discretionary powers he recenty obtained to exile dissidents to Siberia. Panic ensued. Pradère-Niquet thought that the resistance had been broken and that the Kagaal would be content only to have its material published in the foreign press.[130]

However, the French consul's pessimism was somewhat premature. For although the governor-general relieved numerous people from their posts or used other coercive means, the Finlanders stubbornly continued to resist in a number of ways. Their boycott included even the support of Finnish doctors who would not treat Russian patients. France found that as the result of the lack of sales of French products she was buying four times more than she was selling. The resistance

was so severely felt that the Russian police force had to be quadrupled and a unit of the Secret Police had to brought in as well.[131]

Emigration proved to be a most effective means of protest.[132] A strange plan was even proposed whereby the Finlanders would be brought to Canada to augment the French Canadian population. In Pradère-Niquet's words:

> One can recount in this regard that a great Swedish capitalist, M. Nordin, who is actually found in Canada, who has obtained an enormous concession of land near lac St. Jean with the goal to found a great colony of Finlanders. M. Nordin hopes, it is said, that with the system of schools established there, the Finlanders who will be transported there will be able, by the second generation, to unite themselves with the French Canadian population of Quebec, which will gain as well as new force in face of the adjacent English states.[133]

This time on Runeberg Day, February 5, 1902, the city of Helsingfors took on a festive mood. Students went into the streets singing patriotic songs. They gathered before his monument to do him homage. Every window in each Finnish home was brilliantly lit up. But on February 18, the anniversary of the February Manifesto, the city again was plunged into darkness in protest. People again walked the darkened streets in silence. Women wore their veils of mourning. Both demonstrations had been calm and orderly, so that the watchful gendarmes and waiting troops were not needed.[134]

The really critical period was yet to come. The

governor-general had ordered the drawing of lots for recruits to begin on April 15. Two hundred men were required for the Finnish guards. The Svecomen were not content even to let so few individuals be conscripted. They ordered those eligible for the draft not to answer it and tried various means to stop the draw. During the Easter holidays, the Kagaal had the university students distribute propaganda leaflets throughout the country. The municipal councillors, the officials responsible for the draft, were threatened with boycott. In the draw, men in good health were not to be chosen, while those who were sickly and incapacitated were to be drawn.[135] With these preparations, the determination of the nation was beginning to harden.

The first draw took place in Helsingfors on April 18, and with it swelled a popular movement. Knots of people formed in the streets about Senate Square, the townhall and the police headquarters. To disperse the growing crowds, the police on horseback charged a gathering of some 3000 men and were hurled back by a barrage of snowballs. In the course of this action, a number of policemen were hurt. Since the police could not dislodge this well-armed crowd, the Cossacks were called in, and they charged with whips and drawn sabres, trampling down men, women and children under their horses' hooves.[136]

The Cossacks seemed to have a preference for using their whips on men who, in their rush to flee, had slipped and fallen in the cobble-stoned streets. Upon these unfortunates, the Cossacks would rain blow after blow until the blood flowed freely. They even assaulted a sick woman on the steps of the hospital located some two hundred meters from the Square. Appalled by the barbarity of these horsemen, Linder begged the governor to recall them and replace them with infantry, preferably the Finnish Guards. General Kaigorodov refused, saying that he found the Cossack reaction quite normal and, furthermore, he was afraid what Russia would think if he withdrew them now.[137]

Just then, a police agent was felled with a stone and was taken to be dead. Angrily, the Cossacks drew out their revolvers and aimed them at the crowd. Linder, heedless of his own life and limb, interposed himself between the Cossacks and the defenceless people, ordering the cavalry unit to retire on his own initiative. Once this was done, he telephoned the Finnish Guard battalion commander to report immediately with his troops to the square. Once the Finnish troops formed a cordon around the square, the Cossacks were withdrawn. When the Cossacks were gone, the Finlanders applauded their own Guards and even wished to carry the commander, General Hedlund, about in triumph. As this would

have been unseemly and improper for a man of his position, the general declined. Instead, he evacuated the square and blocked off all the access routes to it with units of Finnish soldiers. By evening, order was restored; all the police and soldiers, except for a few pickets, had returned to their quarters.[138] Thus ended the demonstration which was dispersed, according to The Times, by an unjustified attack of the Cossacks.[139]

The city subsided quickly into a calm,[140] but the resistance remained firm. On the May 3rd draw, only 20 out of 850 eligible draftees answered the call-up.[141] The summer passed quietly as well, for the governor's threat of reprisals quelled the revolutionary spirit of the city. Moreover the Svecoman party leaders had either hid in the country or fled abroad. The most ardent among them waited for revolution in Russia itself.[142]

Meanwhile, the tsar issued one rescript after another in pursuit of the goal of Russification. Bobrikov himself was imbued with the spirit of Russian nationalism, so much so that his deputy, General Chipov, and his chief-of-staff, General Rodzianko, resigned in protest over his policy of Russification. Nevertheless, the remaining Finnish governors were about to be replaced by Russian generals. The bureaucracy was being russified as well, and the same thing was

happening to the schools. But the conscripts were not answering the call-up; when caught evading the draft, the judges released them as they did not recognize the new military law to be a legal statute. So, Bobrikov's next project was reformation of the Finnish courts.[143]

Rescripts were issued on July 31 and September 8, 1902, which severely curtailed the powers of the judicial branch of the Senate in favour of the governor-general.[144] As a consequence of this, a number of senators and justices were removed from their posts. Furthermore, it was now possible to import Russians as functionaries and magistrates. Still Bobrikov could not solve the conscription crisis.[145] The Kagaal continued to maintain pressure on the priests[146] and bureaucrats not to cooperate.[147] Some of the propaganda was also directed toward those eligible for the draft[148] and also to the country at large.[149] It seemed to be as one secret newspaper article put it: if Bobrikov wished to succeed, he would have to apply more and more force against the Finnish nation.[150]

Bobrikov was a determined man -- and was prepared to use as much force as was necessary. To this end, he sacked the remaining Finnish governors and replaced them with Russians.[151] He dismissed the police chiefs in Nyland and Viborg provinces.[152] He fired Th. Rein from the rectorship

of Alexander University.[153] Nevertheless, Lobrikov's only real political victory over the hearts of some Finns was accomplished through his distribution of food and other aid to destitute, unemployed workers.[154] But that was hardly enough to win the war he was waging in Finland.

So, he requested and got a further extension of his powers through the manifesto of March 27/April 9, 1903,[155] which became better known as the "Dictatorial Manifesto." It was so called because it gave the governor-general almost unlimited powers for three years so that he might unify the grand duchy with Russia. He now had the absolute right to close hotels, libraries, bookstores, stores and factories. He could forbid meetings or adjourn them in the interest of the state. He could terminate any private or public association. He, with Imperial consent, could exile or transport to Siberia those persons deemed dangerous to the state. They could be held at the pleasure of the governor-general without reference to any court or tribunal.[156]

The governors were delegated powers to deal with offending municipal councils without having to refer these matters to the courts. They could exact penalties in terms of fines or imprisonment for disobedience to the law. At the same time, this ordinance placed all urban and rural communal officials, who previously had been answerable only

to the courts for their actions, under the absolute authority of the governor-general and under the supervision of the local governors. Mayors, town councillors and deputies were subject to the approval of the governors, and should the election of any official displease a governor, he could ask the Senate to nominate another person to fill the post.[157] In essence, the Dictatorship Manifesto became the ultimate weapon of political Russification during the Bobrikov years.

According to the Constitutionalists, a reign of terror had brutally descended upon Finland.[158] The same was said outside Finland as well.[159] The British consul to Helsingfors also wrote of the reign of terror that was gripping the country.[160] The banishments, for example, had begun almost immediately. Count C. Mannerheim, Baron von Born, the brothers E. and R. Wolff, A. Lille, L. Mechelin, J. Castrén, K. and F. Brofeldt (brothers of Juhani Aho), J.A. Lyly, K. Zilliacus, and several others were exiled forthwith.[161] The list was always growing longer and came to include E. Erkko and the ex-senators Grippenberg and Poblmann. To show their sympathy a large crowd saw these last exiles off at Åbo.[162] Even in Russia, pressure once again mounted against Bobrikov's cruel Finnish policies, and there were rumours of his recall to replace Kuropatkin as war minister.[163]

When this did not happen, Pravdoro-Niquet once more

believed that Bobrikov's repressive measures had won. He reported that the Kagaal's treasury was exhausted and the organization virtually abolished.[164] He noted that the conscripts were answering their summonses in eighty percent of the cases as opposed to the previous year's ten. Bobrikov demanded that officials above a certain grade pay their respects to him upon the pain of dismissal for non-compliance, and by this means expected to break the boycott. To quell the university unrest, he appointed the moderate Fennoman J.R. Danielson as rector of Alexander University. For a while, it seemed as though the "white terror" soon would end and everything could return to normal.[165]

But in the summer, new repressive measures were undertaken with the aim of pacifying and russifying Finland. Firearms and explosives were to be restricted. The post office department was further russified, and even Finnish banknotes now began to bear the Shield of St. George and the Dragon of Russia rather than the Lion Rampant of Finland. The military academy at Fredrikshamn was closed. The Finnish police were clothed in Russian police uniforms now. While the terms of the senators had been renewed for an additional three years, the functions of the Senate itself became more limited with the manifesto of July 3/16, 1903. Still more people were told to leave the country.[166]

In September, the tsar authorized the governor-general to summon a Diet for the following autumn provided the people of the grand duchy remained calm, loyal and otherwise deserving of this privilege.[167] Nevertheless, there was no change of heart in the government, for the tide of Russification continued. The head of the Finnish railways was replaced by a Russian. On October 1, the Senate began to carry out some of its oral deliberations in Russian, at which time Councillor of State Deutrich, the civil deputy to the governor-general, presided.[168] On November 3, Yrjö-Koskinen died and 6000 people came to pay their respects, giving Bobrikov the opportunity to say that this proved that the resistance movement encompassed only a small number of people.[169] As the year closed, the resistance movement was certainly in a weakened state so that it had to redefine its strategy, tactics and objectives.[170] The constant stress and increased repression had taken its toll, and the future looked bleak for the opposition movement.

Ironically, Russia herself was about to provide the means of salvation for the weary resistance. In the pursuit of an aggressive Far-Eastern policy, the Empire came into conflict with Japan,[171] On the night of January 26-27/February 8-9, 1904, Japanese torpedo boats attacked Port Arthur, destroying Russia's Far Eastern fleet. This was just the

opportunity that the Finnish "Patriots" had been waiting for. Their hope was for an unmitigated Russian military disaster so that the ensuing revolution might then free Finland from the bondage of Russia.[172]

Part of the Finnish resistance movement was now ready to enter into a more active phase. While the birth of the activist movement has been set as early as April 18, 1902,[173] really there had only been talk of taking positive action.[174] The discussion phase still continued into 1904 with the suggestion of linking up with the Russian revolutionaries.[175] To scotch the possibility of insurrection by these people, the government stepped up its programme of repression.[176] However, this time the useful limit of force had been reached and the consequences for Bobrikov were to be fatal.

On June 16, 1904, the French consul sent the following telegram: "Today attempt against the Governor-General who is seriously wounded by two bullets fired by an employee of the Senate." Pradère-Niquet."[177]

By letter on the same day, the consul sent this more complete account: Today at 11 a.m., at the moment when Governor-General Bobrikov went into the Assembly Hall of the Senate to preside over a high assembly, an employee of this administration, Eugene Schauman, fired five shots from a revolver at the governor-general and the sixth into his own

head. One shot entered the governor-general's neck near the throat and the other into the abdomen.[178]

Bobrikov was carried to a nearby surgical hospital to be cared after. The attending surgeon thought the throat wound not to be too serious but had found the intestines badly cut up by the second bullet. It was also felt that even barring further complications, the victim's age did not augur well for his recovery. Nevertheless, it was still hoped that Bobrikov might be saved. His assassin, however, was already dead. His name was Eugene Schauman, the twenty-one year old son of a senior senator, a former student of Alexander University and a member of the revolutionary movement.[179]

In Schauman's billfold there was an address to the tsar. In it, he accused the procurator and the Imperial Finnish Senate of blindly obeying Bobrikov in the oppression of his country by means of illegal acts. He noted that the law had been ignored or openly flouted, that lies and misrepresentations had been fed by Bobrikov and von Plehve to the tsar, causing the monarch to break the very laws that he had solemnly promised to maintain at his succession, and that upright and honest Finlanders had been dismissed without any investigation or due process, to be replaced by worthless adventurers. He also pointed out that the present minister-

state secretary, von Plehve, was not Finnish born and therefore knew neither the laws nor the customs of the country but had joined together with Bobrikov to oppress Finland. Since Schauman decided that he could not reach the tsar to have the governor-general recalled, he found that he was forced to use other means to neutralize this dangerous man. He conceded that the method was rather too forceful, but the only one available to him. He then implored the tsar to pay heed to the wishes of Poland and the Baltic provinces as well of Finland. In closing, he implicated no one else, stating emphatically that this deed was done by himself alone.[180]

The reaction to Bobrikov's assassination was mixed; some denounced it and others were quite pleased by this turn of events. The Novoe vremia was incensed that this "honest and firm protector of Russian political interests in this region of the Empire" should be killed by odious revolutionaries.[181] At the same time, other Russians were noted to have declared that Bobrikov was not very popular even in Russia because of his excessive harshness.[182] The Dowager Empress even delayed sending condolences to the widow of the man she detested until, it was believed, she had been forced to do so.[183]

The French chargé d'affaires in St. Petersburg said that Bobrikov had been killed by a "fanatic," but that this

was not unexpected because the governor-general had been too harsh. He then surmised that the assassin had been pushed into carrying out his heinous deed through revolutionary exasperation.[184] Sweden-Norway was even more sympathetic toward Schauman, so much so that even the conservative Stockholms dagblad said that the deed was done by a "patriot" against a despotic government.[185]

In Finland, the general attitude was one of elation at the death of a "tyrant."[186] The Young Finn newspaper, Päivälehti, cautiously damned Bobrikov and fought the Russian papers with respect to their charges against Finland,[187] and was suppressed for its writings.[188] In some instances, there were even visible outbreaks of revolutionary fervour,[189] but the Senate was finally able to clamp down on them to produce a measure of calm.[190]

When the news of von Plehve's assassination reached Helsingfors, once more undisguised joy filled the streets of the city at the death of another oppressor. Champagne flowed freely in the restaurants and cafés in parting toasts to the much detested man. The French consul, his sense of propriety wounded by the demonstrations of glee at this poor soul's demise, found the Finnish attitude quite "indecent."[191]

With the deaths of Bobrikov and von Plehve also ended the Bobrikov years of Russification. These years had had a

traumatic effect upon Finland; the remaining trust she had had in the tsars and their resolve to maintain the sanctity of Finnish institutions had entirely vanished. While Bobrikov had been largely successful in his attempt to russify the Finnish administration, he had totally failed to russify the Finnish nation. Hence, "loyal" Finland was no more.

If Bobrikov was consciously trying to Finnicize Finland -- as his former deputy Deutrich had suggested[192] -- his policy had well taken root in the soil of Finland. Just how successful he was became apparent only after his death. The effect of his work was to create deep linguistic and class divisions between Swedish and Finnish speakers that were to break out into the open. While Bobrikov had broken the political, social and cultural dominance of the Swedo-Finns in the grand duchy, neither he nor Russia would admit that the time had come for the Finns to determine their own future. Any kind of Finnish autonomy was not to be tolerated. In this respect, the bobrikov years had inadvertently shown the Finlanders the way to a common national goal: to seek the end of their connection with Russia.

NOTES

CHAPTER FIVE

[1]Kivikataja, Sortovuosien tapahtumia, p. 17.

[2]Ibid., pp. 15-16; Tuominen, "Helmikuun manifesti," pp. 54-55. Hugo E. Pipping, "Fromulgation av Februarimanifestet 1899 -- en obeaktad formell invändning," Historisk Tidskrift för Finland, LV (1970), 51-56, notes that the February Manifesto was formally in error inasmuch as it had not been countersigned by the Minister-State Secretary for Finland. However, the senators, although aware of this omission, did not care to use this as a delaying tactic.

[3]Kivikataja, Sortovuosien tapahtumia, pp. 15-16.

[4]Translated from "Observations du Senat finlandaise, à propos du manifeste gracieux du (3) 15 février 1899," in Le droit de la Finlande et le manifeste du tzar du 15 février 1899. Quelques feuilles de la lutte d'une petite nation pour sa vie, (Stockholm, 1899), p. 14. This obviously was the product of a clandestine press; see also "Protestation du Senat finlandaise, à propos du manifeste du 15 février 1899," in Le coup d'état en Finlande, pp. 27-34, another publication of the underground press.

[5]"Réserves du procureur du Sénat Imperial contre la promulgation du manifeste," in Le droit de la Finlande, p. 15.

[6]According to Le droit de la Finlande, p. 17 below, an Extraordinary Diet such as this one had no legal right to deal with questions other than the one for which it was convoked.

[7]Note de la commission de législation de la Diète finlandaise sur le manifeste du 15 février," Ibid., pp. 16-18.

[8]E.N. Setälä, "Muistelmia ensimäiseltä sortokaudelta ja sen päättymisestä," in Murrosajoilta. Muistoja ja kokemuksia (2 vols.; Porvoo, 1913, 1918), II, 389; René Fuaux, "Les manifestations du sentiment national en Finlande," La grande revue, IV (1901), 470.

[9]Kivikataja, Sortovuosien tapahtumia, p. 21. Castren had said: "Yksi mieli, kaksi kieltä::" The Young Finn slogan had formerly been: "Yksi mieli, yksi kieli:" ("One mind; one tongue:").

[10]"Öfversättning," January 31/February 12, 1899, No. 310, as published in Päivälehti, February 22, 1899, No. 49.

[11]Quoted from S.Iu. Witte, The Memoirs of Count Witte, trans. and ed. by Abraham Yarmolinsky (Garden City, N.J., 1921), p. 259.

[12]Michell to Scott, March 9, 1899, F.O. 65/1577, Scott to Salisbury, No. 70. This is a memorandum of the "State of feeling in Finland produced by Imperial Manifesto." It was the first report submitted on the "Finnish question" by a British official. (Krogius was a Finlander.) According to George Maude, "Finland in Anglo-Russian Diplomatic Relations, 1899-1910," The Slavonic and East European Review, XLVIII (1970), 561, Ambassador Scott did not agree with Consul-General Michell's assessment.

Michell's assessment was, in fact, very like that of the French report on Finland. For this, see (name indecipherable) to Delcassé, St. Petersburg, March 11, 1899, A.N.M.A.E., DP A 83 1, No. 22. It spoke of a coup d'état in Finland, substantiating this with an excerpt from Aftonbladet, March 9, 1899.

[13]Yrjö-Koskinen to Eino Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen, Helsinki, February 22, 1899, Y.-K. kok, folio 25. In the same letter, Yrjö-Koskinen tells his son that the Senate has produced

a pronouncement on the manifesto and that Procurator Söderhjelm has gone to St. Petersburg with it.

[14]"Kagaalin" arkistoa. Kokoelma vuosina 1899-1905 ilmestyneitä poliittisia lentolehtisiä, julistuksia, kiertokirjeitä y.m. -- Ur "Kagalens" arkiv. Samling av poliska flygskrifter, upprop, cirkulär m.m. tillkomna åren 1899-1905, ed. by Ernst Estlander (Helsinki, 1939), pp. 31-34.

[15]"Kenraalikuvernööri Bobrikoffin luona," Päivälehti, March 7, 1899, No. 62. This report had been first published in the Swedish newspaper Aftonbladet. Other Finnish newspapers also republished this interview, for example: Aamulehti, February 21, 1899, No. 43; Isänmaan ystävä, February 24, 1899, No. 8; Uusi aura, February 21, 1899, No. 43.

[16]"Rapport du grand-maréchal du landtdag et des présidents des autres états, concernant l'accomplissement de la mission qui leur avait été confiée par les états," in Le droit de la Finlande, pp. 18-19.

[17]For example, see Oskari Tokoi, Sisu. "Even through a Stone Wall" (New York, 1957), pp. 93-94; A.R. Cederberg, Suomen uusinta historia 1898-1942 (Porvoo, 1943), pp. 50-51; Parmanen, Taistelujen kirja, I, 7.

[18]As reported in Hannes Ignatius, Sortovuosista itsenäisyyteen. Muistelmia (Helsinki, 1927), p. 16.

[19]For the study of the impact of the February Manifesto and Yrjö-Koskinen's resignation upon the Finnish Party, see Pirkko Rommi, Myöntyvyyssuuntauksen hahmottuminen Yrjö-Koskinen ja suomalaisen puolueen toimintalinjaksi (Helsinki, 1964), pp. 235-252.

Yrjö-Koskinen received some support for his stand. For example, see Aamulehti, March 18, 1899, No. 68, in which a letter dated March 11, 1899 in support of Yrjö-Koskinen had sixty-six signatures attached to it. His old friend and comrade-in-arms Agathon Meurman, however, had cooled toward him; see Agathon Meurman's "Wapaaherra Yrjö-Koskisen erotessa

Senaatista," Uusi Suometar, April 6, 1899, No. 891 and "Kirje Helsingistä," Valvoja, 1899, pp. 236-237. Yrjö-Koskinen even wrote to Meurman complaining of the latter's lack of confidence in him -- see Yrjö-Koskinen to Meurman, April 1, 1899, Y.-K. kok., folio 24. The saddest personal denunciation of Yrjö-Koskinen came from his god-daughter Siiri Sivén, in a note dated November 22, 1899, Y.-K. kok., folio 20, No. 9, in which was written:

"I cried thinking that you were my father's friend and am ashamed that you are my godfather."

[20]"Mitä uusi asema waatii?" Aamulehti, March 2, 1899, No. 51.

[21]"Sotawäen walankaawa," Uusi aura, February 21, 1899, No. 43.

[22]"Suomi ulkomaan sanomalehdissä," Aamulehti, March 3, 1899, No. 52. The New York Times, for example, carried articles entitled "Russian Despotism in Finland" and "Russification of Finland," March 19, 1899, p. 19, and March 20, 1899, p. 7.

[23]Aamulehti, March 5, 1899, No. 54.

[24]Memorials began to appear in newspapers in honour of Alexander II, as in Inkeri, February 9 o.s., 1899. In this paper, there appeared the following words draped in a wreath: "**'Alexandre II. -- Finlandois reconnaissants' (Aleksanteri II:lle -- Kitollisent suomalaiset).**"

[25]"Kunnianosotukset Aleksanterin patsaalla," Päivälehti, March 4, 1899, No. 54. See also "Aleksanteri II:n muisto," Ibid., March 15, 1899, No. 70. Isänmaan ystävä, March 17, 1899, No. 11, showed a giant front page picture of the wreath-lader statue of Alexander II. On the 13th, the same paper had reported stories about the floral tributes to the dead tsar, noting that lovelier flowers had never been seen in this country before.

[26]See letter of E. Ramstedt, Askaisi, March 5, 1899, in Suurta lähetystöä koskevat asiakirjat 1699, S.V.A. **(In the following and subsequent footnotes, "Minutes" will refer to the minutes of the meetings concerning the Great Address contained in this document collection.)**

[27]Minutes, March 14, 1899, 5 P.M., Ibid.

[28]"Suuri adressi," Ibid.

[29]Minutes, March 14, 1899, 5 P.M., Ibid.

[30]Minutes, March 15, 1899, 5:20 P.M., Ibid.

[31]In the end, de Pont did send a telegram to the police, but only to say that this delegation was going to see the minister-state secretary to whom they were legally entitled to have free access. For this, see Tommila, "Kenraalikuvernööri Bobrikov ja suuri adressi," p. 213.

[32]Minutes, March 16, 1899, A.M.

[33]"Teidän Yhäisyytenne!" Ibid.

[34]Ibid.; see also Tommila, "Kenraalikuvernööri Bobrikov je suuri adressi," pp. 214-215.

[35]Tommila, "Kenraalikuvernööri Bobrikov ja suuri adressi," pp. 215-216.

[36]See Nicholas II to N.I. Bobrikov, St. Petersburg, March 7, 1899, and Nicholas II to Procopé, St. Petersburg, March 5, 1899, in Semennikov, "Nikolai Romanov i Finliandiia," Krasnyi arkhiv, No. 27 (1928), pp. 229-230; see also memorandum of Michell, St. Petersburg, March 1/22, 1899, in F.O. 65/1577, Scott to Salisbury, No. 89, Encl. In a second enclosure, Michell submitted his translation of "The Remonstrance of the Finnish Imperial Senate against the Imperial Manifesto and Fundamental Regulations of the 3/15 February," as it was published in Nya Pressen, Hufvudstadbladet, Uusi Suometar and Päivälehti.

[37]From Otto Engström's and A. Armfelt's authenticated copy of the tsar's reply, in Suurta lähetystöä koskevat asiakirjat 1899, S.V.A.

[38]Minutes, March 20, 1899, 10 A.M.

[39]See Scott to Salisbury, St. Petersburg, April 18, 1900, F.O. 65/1605, No. 3 consular; "News of the Month," Finland: An English Journal Devoted to the Cause of the Finnish People, No. 5 (November, 1899), p. 2. See also Chayet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, September 29, 1899, A.N.M.A.E., DP A 83 1.

[40]Tokoi, Sisu, p. 95, recorded this comment of the opponents of the "Great Address": "When you go berry-picking with the masters, you lose your berries and the berry-pail too."

[41]Minutes, March 20, 1899, 10 A.M. See also Minutes, March 21, 1899, A.M., in which it was also agreed to publish the address.

[42]Cf. Evensen to Delcassé, Helsingfors, April 1, 1899, A.N.M.A.E., DP A 83 1; "The Monster Address" and "The Deputation of Five Hundred," Finland: An English Journal, No. 1,(June 3, 1899), pp. 10-17; "Pietarista," Inkeri, March 9 o.s., 1899, No. 20; Isämaan ystävä, March 24, 1899, No. 12; "The Russification of Finland," The Times, March 17, 1899, p. 5.

[43]For example, P. Leroy-Beaulieu to Axel Berndtson, 1899, H.Y.K.; Anatole France to Gabriel Séailles, 1899, H.Y.K., which read in part: "You know how the cause of the Finlanders is beautiful."; W. van der Vlugt to Yrjö-Koskinen, October 28, 1899, Y.-K. kok., folio 20, No. 95.

Other expressions of sympathy appeared in print, as in: L. Bernardini, "Le droit des faibles, Finlande," Revue de Paris, VI (1899), pp. 654-672; "The Downfall of Finland," Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, CLXVI (July, 1899), 1-15; Jacques de Coussange, "La question finlandaise," Le Quinzaine, XXXI (1899), 152-161; "What Has Been Done in Finland," The Review of Reviews, XIX (1899), 454-55; "The Plight of Finland," The American Monthly Review of Reviews, XX (1899), 592-594; Boris Mintses, Finlandiia i Rusiia [sic] (Spomen ot edna nauchna obikolka) (n.p., 1899); Boris Minzes, Staatsreich in Finnland und national-russische Eroberungspolitik. Ergebnisse einer Studienreise in Finnland auch ein Beitrag zur Friedenkonferenz (Berlin, 1899).

[44]Eduard Westermarck, "In Memoriam," Nuorsuomalaista, II, 4-5).

[45]See the facsimile Pro Finlandia, ein address an Seine Majestät Kaiser und König Nicholas II (Berlin, 1900), Russia.

[46]De Margerie to Delcassé, Copenhagen, July 5, 1899, A.N.M.A.E., DF SDN A 63 1, No. 60; Chayet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, September 24, 1899, Ibid..; "The International Address," Finland: An English Journal, No. 2 (July 25, 1900), pp. 6-7; "The Foreign Friends of Finland," The Review of Reviews, XX (1899), 996; Konni Zilliacus, Sortovuosilta, Poliittisia muistelmia (Helsinki, 1924), pp. 24-25.

[47]The view that Finland to make an international question is cited in the following: J.A. Reuter, "Russia in Finland," The Nineteenth Century, XLV (1899), 899; "The Finnish Question," The Review of Reviews, XX (1899), 3-5.

[48]"Aufzeichnung des Staatssekretärs des Auswärtigen Amtes Bernhard von Bülow," Berlin, May 14, 1899, Germany, Auswärtiges Amt, Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette 1871-1914, XV: Bände 40 bis Haager Friedenskonferenz (Berlin, 1925), pp. 1-4.

[49]This attitude is best expressed in Jusserand to Delcassé, Copenhagen, March 31, 1899, A.N.M.A.E., DF A 63 1, No. 23; the same document is printed in France, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Documents diplomatiques français 1871-1914, 1st ser., XV (Paris, 1949), No. 127.

[50]"The Finnish Outcry," The Review of Reviews, XIX (1899), 394; "Home Rule in Finland," Ibid., pp. 211-212.

[51]Henry [illegible] to Delcassé, Stockholm, March [illegible], 1899, A.N.M.A.E., DF SDN A 63 1, No. 22; de Margerie to Delcassé, Copenhagen, July 5, 1899, A.N.M.A.E., DF SDN A 63 1, No. 60.

[52]Cited from de Margerie to Delcassé, Copenhagen, April 29, 1899, A.N.M.A.E., DF SDN A 63 1, No. 34.

[53]Zilliacus, Sortovuosilta, p. 18, noted that these were largely private endeavours; he said that he wrote up the first issue of Finland almost by himself.

[54]For a good short study of the question of these papers, see Osmo A. Wiio, "Sortokautta ulkomaiden lehdistossa," in Tommila, Venäläinen sortokausi Suomessa, pp. 155-169.

[55]Translated from Mitä nykyinen asema vaatii? (Helsinki, 1899), p. 1.

[56]Ibid., p. 3.

[57]See Pöytäkirja joka tehtiin Suomalaisen puolueen kokouksessa Helsingissä Fennia hotellissa tiistaina 12 ja keskivvikona 13 pnä joulukuuta 1899, Suomalaisen Puolueen Arkisto 3 (Hereinafter Pöytäkirja), S.V.A., 2, 6 Lyly; 12. Suuronen; 29., 34. Yrjö-Koskinen.

[58]Ibid., 10, Palmén.

[59]Ibid., 1, Danielson.

[60]Ibid., 14, Danielson.

61. Translated from Ibid., 1, Danielson.

[62]For example, see Taimi Torvinen, "Myontyvyys- ja perustuslaillinen linja," in Hakalehto, Suomen ulkopolitiikan kehityslinjat, pp. 23-38; Lauri Hyvämaki, "Perustuslaillinen ideologia," in Tommila, Venäläinen sortokausi Suomessa, pp. 75-92. In Juhani Aho (Kirjekokoelma) 71, S.K.S., there is a pamphlet, Perustuslaillisen Klubin Säännöisksi, which has this to say of the actual Constitutionalist Club: "The Club's purpose is be a meeting place for the constitutionalist party's membership, those who are interested in the accomplishment of social and political restoration in the liberal and nationalist direction."

[63]Translated from J.K. Paasikivi, Paasikiven muistelmia sortovuosilta, I (Porvoo, 1957), 62-63.

[64]Yrjö-Koskinen to Eino Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen, Helsinki, February 10, 1900, Y.-K. kok., folio 25, wrote that the Finnish party opposition to Bobrikov must hold separate meetings from the Swedish-speaking group because the latter have withdrawn from their joint sessions. Yrjö-Koskinen's "Avoin kirje ystävilleni," Uusi Suometar, December 11, 1900, assisted in making this split permanent.

[65]For accounts of these resignations, see The Times, July 13, 1900, p. 6; Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, July 12, 1900, A.N.M.A.E., DF SDN A 82 1, No. 6; Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, October 4, 1900, Ibid., No. 14; Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, September 11, 1900, Ibid., No. 13.

[66]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, July 12, 1900, Ibid., No. 6, thought the seven senators who resigned pro patria were actually playing into the hands of the Russians.

[67]For example, see "Waltiopäiwät Porvoossa 1809," Isänmaan ystävä, April 1, 1899, No 13; "Valtiopäivät v. 1863," Ibid., April 14, 1899, No. 16; A. Meurman, "Mikä nydistää kansoja," Uusi Suometar, April 25, 1899, No. 108; "Suomen Suuriruhtinaanmaan waltiosäätyjen päätös," Aamulehti, June 2, 1899, No. 125.

[68]"Russian Press Regulations in Finland," The Times, January 15, 1900, p. 6. Even without the benefit of these new regulations, twenty-six suspensions had been handed out between April and November, 1899, according to Finland: An English Journal, No. 6 (December, 1899) p. 8. Yet Eugene Linnedorfer, "Finland's Plight," The Forum, September 1901, pp. 88-89, chose to blame the present censor, the renegade Senator Yrjö-Koskinen, for the suppression of the press.

[69]Finland: An English Journal, No. 11 (May, 1900), p. 2.

[70]The Times, April 6, 1900, p. 4.

[71]Finland; An English Journal, No. 11 (May, 1900), p. 2.

[72] The Times, July 2, 1900, p. 5. In 1899, during the short span of a few weeks, Nya pressen was cited for its polemics in issues nos. 62, 63, and 65. For this, see Kenraalikuvernöörikanslia, Sisällön mukaiset asiakirjat, lehdistöä koskevia asiakirjoja 1824-1904, S.K.A.

[73] Cradère-Viguet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, July 19, 1900, A.D.M.A.E., D: A 82 1, No. 7.

[74] Cradère-Viguet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, July 20, 1900, Ibid., No. 8.

[75] Finland: An English Journal, p. 7 (January, 1900) pp. 7-8.

[76] "Zadachi 'Finliandsko. Gazet..'" Finliandskaia gazeta, January 8/13, 1900, No. 1, pp. 1-2.

[77] "Alkogolizm v Finliand..." Finliandskaia gazeta, January 21, 1900, No. 12, p. 1.

[78] "Venäläiset sivistyksellisyyssuura Suomessa," Suomen sanomat, March 27/April 8, 1901, No. 5.

[79] Chayet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, February 12, 1900, A.D.M.A.E., D: A 82 1, No. 3. Chayet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, April 12, 1900, Ibid., No. 4. Himself suggested that the Finns through their own papers and foreign press had been resisting changes to their constitution, so much so that the tsar had been reluctant to force the issue in the face of pro-Finnish sentiment, especially in England.

[80] For pro-Finnish material, see Julien Leclercq, "La Finlande et le tsar," Mercure de France, XXXV (1900), 56-95; P. Voreau, "La question finlandaise," Revue du droit public et la science politique, XIV (1900), 193-235; Augustine Birrell, The Contemporary Review, XXVIII (1900), 16-27; J. Westlake, "The Case of Finland," The National Review, (March, 1900), pp. 111-121.

[81]For example, "Lukijalle"(n.p., 1900), in "Kagaalin" arkistoa, pp. 55-74; Kehoitus isänmaan puolustukseen (Stockholm, 1900); Huomattavaa venäläisistä santarmeista (Stockholm, 1900); Huomattavaa julkisista kokouksista (Stockholm, 1900).

[82]Chayet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, April 12, 1900, A.N.M.A.E., DF A 82 1, No. 4.

[83]Fradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, August 27, 1900, and December 25, 1900, Ibid., Nos. 11 and 17.

[84]Fradère-Miquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, August 15, 1900. Ibid., No. 10.

[85]Michell to Scott, St. Petersburg, April 12, 1900, in F.O. 65/1605, Scott to Salisbury, No. 3 consular, Encl.

[86]Fradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, December 25, 1900.

[87]Ibid.; Fradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, October 4, 1900, No. 14.

[88]Fradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, July 5, 1900, No. 5; Nils-Eric Ringbom, Jean Sibelius. A Master and his Work, trans. by G.I.C. de Courcy (Norman, Okla., 1954), pp. 64-65, for other of his nationalist efforts.

[89]For example, Mysli o sovremennom polozhenii Finliandii (London, 1900); /Wilhelm Chydenius/ Das Recht Finnlands und seine Wehrpflichtfrage. Eine kurze aktenmässige Betrachtung von einem finnländischen Juristen (Leipzig, 1900); Getz, Das staatsrechtlich Verhältnis zwischen Finnland und Russland; Hermanson, Ein Beitrag zur Beurteilung; W. van der Vlugts, Les vrais coupables. Lettre à Monsieur Ed. Tallichet, rédacteur de la Bibliothèque Universelle et Revue Suisse (Amsterdam, 1900); The Reply of the Finnish Estates . . . for a new Military Service Law in Finland (also in French and German); L. Mechelin and E.G. Ehrström, eds., La constitution du grand-duché de Finlande (Paris, 1900); /L. Mechelin, ed../ Notices sur la Finlande publiées à l'occasion

de L'Exposition Universelle à Paris en 1900 (Helsingfors, 1900) -- and its Russian counterpart, Vladimir Ivanovich Kovalevski, La Russie à la fin du 19e siècle, trans. by V. Rocher (Paris, 1900).

[90]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, October 4, 1900.

[91]For example, see Alexander, Grand Duke of Russia, Once a Grand Duke (New York, 1932), pp. 176-177; Violet Conolly, "The 'Nationalities Question' in the Last Phase of Tsardom," in George Katkov et al., eds., Russia Enters the Twentieth Century (London, 1971), p. 166; Shmuel Galai, The Liberation Movement in Russia, 1900-1905 (Cambridge, 1973), pp. 137-138.

[92]While it may have been politeness or an ingratiating kind of diplomacy, Yrjö-Koskinen told von Plehve that he alone of the tsar's councillors considered Finland's true interests and heard her voice. For this, see Yrjö-Koskinen to von Plehve, Helsinki, May 10, 1901, author's copy, Y.-K. kok., folio 24, No. 133. Plehve's replies to Yrjö-Koskinen do show a measure of sympathy and understanding for Finland. For example, see Plévé to Yrjö-Koskinen, St. Petersburg, May 8/21, 1901, and February 10/23, 1902, Ibid., folio 19, Nos. 155 and 156.

In this regard, see also Un russe [V.K. von Plehve], "La Russie et La Finlande," La nouvelle revue, XX (1903), 201-216; V.K. von Plehve, "A Defence of Russia's policies in Finland," The Review of Reviews, XXVIII (1903), 354-356. The latter article was prompted by William T. Stead, "Russia's Policy in Finland. An Open Letter to His Excellency V. de Plehve," The Review of Reviews, XXVIII (1903), 142-145, and received this rebuttal as well, "M. de Plehve's Admissions: A Comment by W.T. Stead, "The Review of Reviews, XXVIII (1903), 357-358.

[93]Suomen Suuriruhtinanmaan Asetus-Kokelma, No. 22/1900.

[94]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, June 22, 1900, A.M.A.E., DF SDN A 82 1, No. 2.

[95]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, June 24, 1900, Ibid.

[96]See Suomen Suuriruhtinanmaan Asetus-Kokoelma, No. 22/1900; Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, June 29, 1900, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 3; Montebello to Delcassé, St. Petersburg, Ibid., DP A 82 1, No. 72.

It should be mentioned that the language decree was really disasterous only for the Swedish-speaking element. According to Yrjö-Koskinen's old idea (e.g. see Päiväkirja, 29, G.Z. Yrjö-Koskinen):

"Count Heiden at once noted, of course I well understand that, and I understand that also how the Swedish language has become the official language during the Swedish regime; but it is altogether simple and logical if it follows that now, when Finland belongs to the Russian Empire, that we would want this same principle maintained, . . ."

To Yrjö-Koskinen and other Fennomen, it little mattered whether or not Swedish was to be substituted by Russian. Finnish-speakers would have to learn either in any case.

[97]Pradère-Niquet to Delcasse, Helsingfors, June 16, 1900, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 1.

[98]See the copy in Henry Norman, All the Russias. Travels and Studies in Contemporary European Russia, Finland, Siberia, the Caucasus, & Central Asia (London, 1904), p. 78. According to Arthur S. Holmes, "Finland and Russia," The Calcutta Review, No. 223 (January, 1901) p. 13, these labels were soon banned from the mails. Harry de Windt, Finland as it is (London, 1901), p. 125, noted that the labels were then pasted inside the envelope.

[99]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, February 27, 1901, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 3.

[100]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, March 15, 1901, A.N.M.A.E.,DP SDN A 82 1, No. 4; The Times, March 29, 1901, p. 11.

[101]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, May 20, 1901, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 7.

[102]For directives to this effect signed by J.R. Danielson and A. Meurman, see "Kagaalin" arkistoa, pp. 102-108

-- "1901 -- Promemoria uti promulgationsfrågan." In any case, Meurman did not see hope for much resistance on the part of officials because of the fear of loss of salaries and pensions. For this, see Meurman to Pekka Aulin, Helsinki, April 13, 1901, in Agathon Meurmanin kirjekokoelma III, H.Y.K.

[103]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, March 15, 1901. Russian nerves in Finland were not helped by the poor state of affairs throughout the Empire (as witnessed in Beresford to Scott, Belmont, Londonderry, April 18, 1901, F.O. 65/1621: "Effect of unrestful state of affairs in Russia on military position of Empire") and by the Swedish consul, Count Björnstjerna, who toasted his king's birthday publicly before Chipov, saying that the tsar has ruled Finland badly and that good rule would not be experienced there until that country was once again attached to Sweden (in Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, April 19, 1901, A.N.M.A.E., DP A 82 1, No. 5). Yet in the popular opinion, Russia was always the aggressor, as in Daniel Bellet, "La crise finlandaise," Journal des économistes, 5th ser., L (1902), p. 234; cf. Baron S. Korff, Russia's Foreign Relations during the Last Half Century, (New York, 1922), pp. 175-176.

[104]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, May 20, 1901, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 7.

[105]Ibid.

[106]Ibid.; Scott to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, May 30, 1901, F.O. 65/1621, No. 146.

[107]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, June 1, 1901, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 9; Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, May 20, 1901. Several letters of the Dowager Empress to her son championing Finland are printed in Edward J. Bing, ed., The Letters of Tsar Nicholas and Empress Marie. Being the Confidential Correspondence between Nicholas II, Last of the Tsars, and His Mother, Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna (London, 1937), pp. 161-219.

[108]Scott to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, June 13, 1901, F.O. 65/1621, No. 163.

[109]This is suggested in the letter of Vihtor Lounasmaa (Löfgren) to Yrjö-Koskinen, Helsinki, July 4, 1901, Y.-K. kok., folio 19.

[110]Journal de St. Pétersbourg, July 7/20, 1901; Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, July 23, 1901 and August 15, 1901, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, Nos. 10 and 12.

[111]Scott to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, July 23, 1901, F.O. 65/1622, No. 204; see also Memorandum from Michell, St. Petersburg, July 23, 1901, Ibid., Encl. being an analysis of the new military law.

[112]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, July 23, 1901.

[113]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, July 31, 1901, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 11. For British reservations regarding Finland's acceptance of the new military law, see Scott to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, August 7, 1901, F.O. 65/1622, No. 223 (printed), including Cooke to Scott, Helsingfors, July 25, 1901, Encl. No. 1, and Memorandum of Michell, St. Petersburg, August 6, 1901, Encl. No. 2.

[114]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, July 31, 1901.

[115]For examples of the propaganda and instructions issued in 1901 to the pastors by the secret committee, see "Maamme papistolle," and "Asevelvollisuuskutsunnat," in "Kagaalin" arkistoa, pp. 297-298 and 447-457 respectively.

[116]For example, see "Tuleeko papin julaista laittomia asetuksia?" Ibid., pp. 305-307. This piece noted that a law which was not read from the pulpit did not go into effect in that parish. It further stated that a pastor who refused to announce the conscription decree was not a lawbreaker but rather an upholder of the law for refusing to countenance an illegal act.

[117]Lindstedt to Yrjö-Koskinen, Lauttakylä, December 12, 1901, Y.-K. kok., folio 19, No. 50.

[118]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, September 23, 1901, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 14.

[119]"Arkkipiispa Gustaf Johanssonin kirje papistolle 12.8.1901," in Suomen historian dokumentteja, II, no. 459.

[120]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, November 1901 (received November 27th), A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 16.

[121]Ibid.; see "Kagaalin" arkistoa, p. 119, regarding the tax rate.

[122]Einar W. Juva, "Laiton asevelvollisuuslaki, kutsuntalakkoja virkamiesten erottamiset," in Tommila, Venäläinen sortokausi Suomessa, p. 65. For a sensitive appreciation of Mechelin as the leader of the Constitutionalists, see Tekla Hultin, Päiväkirjani kertoo, 1899-1914 (Helsinki, 1935), pp. 9-23; Tekla Hultinin Kokoelma, folio XLVI, päiväkirja 1, S.V.A.

[123]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, October 17, 1901, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 15, and Encl. to No. 15.

According to Th. Rein, Muistelmia elämän varelta, II (Helsinki, 1919), pp. 430-433, V.K. von Plehve had even argued with him that the petition did not signify much since it was not signed by the majority of the country. Rein's reply was that those who did not sign were not necessarily in favour of the conscription law either. See also his "Muutamia mieskohtaisia muistelmia V.K. Plehwestä Suomen yliopiston hallitusmiehenä," Murrosajoilta, p. 7.

[124]Tokoi, Sisu, p. 97; Juva, "Laiton asevelvollisuuslaki," p. 74.

[125]Yrjö-Koskinen to von Plehve, Helsinki, January 15, 1902, Y.-K. kok., folio 24, No. 134 (author's copy).

[126]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, November, 1901, The Times, December 25, 1901, p. 3.

[127]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, November 25, 1901, A.N.M.A.E., DP DPN A 82 1, No. 17.

[128]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, December 23, 1901, Ibid., No. 18.

[129]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, January 6, 1901, Ibid., No. 1. (Document misdated; it should read "1902.")

[130]Ibid.

[131]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, February 20, 1902, Ibid., No. 2.

[132]According to A. William Hoglund, Finnish immigrants in America (Madison, Wisc., 1960), pp. 10-12, many felt that these emigrants were not patriots but deserters. By way of return, Amerikan Suometar, between September 4, 1901 and January 1, 1902, gave secondary importance to news from Finland.

[133]As translated from Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, February 20, 1902.

[134]Ibid.

[135]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, April 5, 1902, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 4.

[136]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, April 18, 1902, Ibid., No. 6.

[137]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, April 21, 1902, Ibid., No. 7.

[138]Ibid.

[139]"Finland," The Times, June 25, 1902, p. 11. Charges were later pressed against General Kaigorodov for

reckless[illegible] at A[illegible]. For this see, radère- [illegible], March 25, 1[illegible], A. [illegible].A. [illegible] Times, February [illegible].

[illegible] radère- [illegible], [illegible] 1902, A. [illegible].A.E., [illegible].

[illegible] radère- [illegible], [illegible] 1902, I.C., [illegible].

[illegible] radère- [illegible], [illegible] 2[illegible], 1[illegible], I.C., [illegible] o[illegible] w[illegible] re[illegible] Colerus, The Treaty Alliance. [illegible] between the Finnish Opposition and the Russian [illegible] (Helsinki, 1[illegible]).

[illegible] radère- iquet to Delcasse, [illegible], February 2[illegible], 1902.

[illegible] Partakari, "Poltavuodet," [illegible]. 337.

[illegible] radère- iquet to Delcasse, Helsingfors, October 23, 1902, A.[illegible].A.E., [illegible] A 52 1, No. 15.

[illegible] For example, see Feurman to Bishop Koskimies, Helsinki, October, 1902, in Agathon Feurmanin kirjekokoelma III, H.Y.K.; "1902 joulukuun 2[illegible] minä yhti Turussa 32 pappia . . ." (1902), and "Yritykset 'matkanappien' avulla saada venäläiset asevelvollisuusasetukset julkaistuksi" (1902), in "Kagaalin" arkistoa, pp. 33[illegible] and 318-319.

[illegible] For example, see "Kansalaiskokous Savonlinnassa 21/12 1902" (1902), "Arvoisa Virkaveli!" (1902), and "1903 vuoden kutsunnat" (1902), "Kagaalin" arkistoa, pp. 262-263, 332-333, and 392-394.

[illegible] For example, "Olette arvattavasti kuulleil . . ."

[illegible] erästäs.i [illegible]set suomenmieliset,
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

[154] Pradère-Niquet to Delcasse, Helsingfors, March 25, 1903.

[155] Suomen Suuriruhtinanmaan Asetus-kokoelma, No. 35/1903; also in T.V. Vainio, ed., Lähdeyihkosia Suomen historian opiskelijoille I. Ensimmäinen venäläistämiskausi 1899-1906 (Porvoo, 1933), pp. 1-13. See also Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, April 15, 1903, A.N.M.A.E., DF SDN A 82 1, No. 5, which says that Bobrikov brought back these powers with him after having gone to St. Petersburg. It would seem that he had asked the tsar to grant him these powers of dictatorship.

[156] British reaction was unfavourable; see Scott to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, April 30, 1903, F.O. 65/1660, No. 123, and accompanying Encl.: Memorandum of Nichell, St. Petersburg, April 23, 1903; Pommard to Delcassé, St. Petersburg, April 22, 1903, A.N.M.A.E., DF A 82 1, No. 5.

[157] Memorandum of Nichell, St. Petersburg, April 23, 1903; Pommard to Delcasse, St. Petersburg, April 22, 1903.

[158] "Missä oikeus -- missä sivevs," Viikon varrelta, April 15, 1903, No. 2.

[159] John Jackol, "The Reign of Terror in Finland," The Arena, XXX (July, 1903), 37-42; Finlander, "The Situation in Finland," The North American Review, CLXXIX, (1904), 913-925.

[160] Cooke to Scott, Helsingfors, April 14, 1903, in Scott to Lansdowne, F.O. 65/1660, No. 129.

[161] Memorandum of Nichell, St. Petersburg, May 12, 1903, in Scott to Lansdowne, F.O. 65/1660, No. 134; Pradère-Niquet to Delcasse, Helsingfors, April 22, 1903, A.N.M.A.E., DF SDN A 82 1, No. 6; "The Dictatorship in Finland," The Times, May 12, 1903, p. 5, and May 21, 1903, p. 5.

[162] Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, May 4, 1903, A.N.M.A.E., DF SDN A 82 1, No. 7.

[163] Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, May 19, 1903, A.N.M.A.E., DF SDN A 82 1, No. 8.

[166] Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, [illegible] 1903, A. [illegible] A.E., [illegible] A [illegible]. [illegible] Arkistoa, [illegible], there is reprinted [illegible] for the donation of two [illegible] of Yrjö's income for the year, dated [illegible].

[167] Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, June 24, 1903.

[168] [illegible] to Lamsdowne, St. Petersburg, August 14, 1903, [illegible] Scott to Lansdowne, F.O. 65/1564, Encl. [illegible] printed document; Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, August 23, [illegible] August [illegible], A.E., [illegible] A [illegible].

[169] Scott to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, September 25, 1903, F.O. 65/1564, No. 249, Encl. translation of notice from Pravitelstvuiushchii Vestnik announcing the Governor-General to summon the Diet for June 10, 1904.

[170] Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, October 3, 1903, A. [illegible] A.E., [illegible] A 82 1, No. 1.

[171] Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, December 7, 1903, Ibid., [illegible]. It is, however, significant that K.F. Ignatius, "Yrjö-Koskinen," Valvoja, 1903, pp. 504-507, skirted the issue of Yrjö-Koskinen's activities during the Bobrikov years in this obituary of his old friend and ally.

[172] According to Copeland, The Uneasy Alliance, 131, the exile of the most important opposition leaders weakened the moderate element that preferred passive resistance and, conversely, strengthened the hand of the activist members, thereby tending to lead to active resistance.

[173] Roderick E. McGrew, "Some Imperatives of Russian Foreign Policy," in Russia under the Last Tsar, ed. by Theofanis George Stavrous (Minneapolis, Minn., 1969), p. 220.

[174] Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, February 14, 1904, DP SDN A 82 1, No. 2; Copeland, The Uneasy Alliance, pp. 146, 169.

[173] Matti Kaila, "Aktivistien liitto," in Hakalehto, Suomen aktivistien kehityslinjat, p. 40.

[174] For example, see "Aktivisten suhteet venäläisiin vuosina 1903," in Suomen historian dokumentteja, II, [illegible].

[175] For example, see "Pragaalin" arkistoa", [illegible]. For a discussion of Russian literalism as a support [illegible] see also Upton, The Uneasy Alliance, [illegible], where the author argues Activist [illegible] interest in the Russian literature movement in general, and the Constitutionalist movement in particular, has been manufactured during the last year and that more and more people in Finland are beginning to realize that Finland will have everything to gain and nothing to lose if Russia becomes a constitutional state."

[176] The Times, April 1, 1904, p. 2.

[177] Translated from Bradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, June 16, 1904, A.N.M.A.E., D' SDN A 82, 1.

[178] Bradère-Niquet to Delcasse, Helsingfors, June 16, 1904, A.N.M.A.E., D' SDN A 82 1, No. 7.

[179] Ibid.

[180] See "Eugen Schaumanin kirje Keisarille Bobrikovin murhan totiiveista, päivämäärän 1904," in Suomen historian dokumentteja, II, No. 462; Bradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, June 20, 1904, A.N.M.A.E., D' DSN A 82 1, No. 8.

[181] Hardinge to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, June 19, 1904, F.O. 65/1680, No. 301, Encl. No. 1: Translation of article in Novoe vremia dated June 17. The Times, July 4, 1904, p. 10, notes that Moskovskaia vedomosti had been naive to be surprised that Finland did not have much sympathy for Bobrikov.

[182]Hardinge to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, June 14, 1904.

[183]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, June 24, 1904, and June 24, 1904, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, Nos. 9 and 10.

[184]Boutiron to Delcasse, St. Petersburg, June 15, 1904, Ibid., No. 39.

[185]Marchand to Delcasse, Stockholm, June 16, 1904, Ibid., No. 38. Paul Miliukov, Charles Seignobos and L. Eisenmann, History of Russia, III: Reforms, Reaction, Revolutions (1855-1932), trans. by Charles Lam Markmann (New York, 1969), p. 1274, and Maurice Pompard, Un Ambassade en Russie, 1903-1908 (Paris, 1937), p. 142, adhere to the same view. For more views of world opinion to Bobrikov's assassination, see The Times, June 15 and 20, 1904, pp. 7 and 5.

[186]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, June 22, 1904, A.N.M.A.E., DP A 82 1, No. 9.

[187]See "Helsinki, kesäk. 15 p. Surhayritys Hänen Ylhäisyyttään Kenraalikuvernööriä vastaan," and "Suomenmaan Kenraalikuvernööri Nikolai Bobrikoff," Päivälehti, June 15, 1904, No. 116, pp. 3 and 2; "Kenraalikuvernööri Bobrikoffin kuolema," Päivälehti, June 21, 1904, No. 118, p. 4; "Helsinki, kesäk. 23 p. Keneraalikuvernööri Bobrikoffin kuolema," Päivälehti, June 23, 1904, No. 120, p. 3; "Helsinki, Kesak. 24 p. Keneraalikuvernööri Bobrikoffin kuolema," Päivälehti, June 24, 1904, No. 121, p. 3.

[188]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, June 29, 1904, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 10.

[189]Cooke to Hardinge, Helsingfors, June 17, 1904, in Hardinge to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, June 19, 1904, Encl. No. 2, and also Encl. No. 3: translation of a revolutionary pamphlet.

[190]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, June 24, 1904.

[101] Pradère-Vigné to Delcassé, Helsingfors, June 24, 1904.

[102] As cited by Pierre Miodonow, La révolution finlandaise et pacification 1880-1905 (Paris, 1907), pp. [illegible]. Cf. Bernt Federly, "Generalguvernör Bobrikovs berättelser om Finlands förvaltning," Historisk tidskrift för Finland, XLI (1956), pp. 139-186, in which Bobrikov's accounts are described, leading to Federly's conclusion that Bobrikov's main aim was to create internal disunity in Finland so that he might be better able to russify her.

[illegible]

[illegible] the assassination of Bobrikov gave the opportunity, as Witte thought it might,[1] for the government to pursue a new policy of reconciliation and pacification in the grand duchy.

The nomination of Prince Obolenskii as the next governor-general of Finland was popularly regarded as a significant indication of Russia's willingness to alter her course with respect to the Finns.[2] Even in personality and character, the prince differed radically from his predecessor, having been described as less of a corporal and more of a diplomat.[3] After the Bobrikovian years, Finland certainly had need of a diplomatic governor-general.

The new governor-general took over his post with [illegible] immediately after the arrival of reinforcements in August 1904. He was most optimistic; he believed that by the time of his coronation, he would be in a position to [illegible] the Russian autocracy; at most, he would be [illegible]. At the station, he met with the [illegible] of Russian and Finnish officials in the administration. At four in the afternoon, he greeted the [illegible] of the next day, he planned to begin a tour of Finland's provincial cities and towns. Although [illegible] there was a presence of calm, military precautions had been taken throughout the city against possible demonstrations.[4]

In a later interview with the French consul, the governor-general outlined his policies for Finland. He suggested, for one, that Obrikov had used a "too hard a hand in the execution of the new military law," and that he himself intended to use a lighter touch. He promised to be conciliatory but expected in turn that the "Finlanders would lay their cards on the table." He also intended to summon the Diet for December, although he believed that the Diet belonged to another era. Moreover, he said that he was ready to suppress the Senate if it did not act according to Russian needs and interests. He deemed Finland to be a conquered Russian province, and therefore opposed the

"Finlandophils" including the Dowager Empress for encouraging the Finns.[5] In effect, the Prince brought with him the spirit of accomodation, although his underlying principles were still the same.

So, by the manifesto of August 13/26, 1904, the tsar convoked an ordinary Diet for December 6. The nobility, the middle class Svecomen and the Young Finns still willfully opposed the government in spite of this sign of relaxation. The clergy, the peasants, and some of the bourgeois Old Finns welcomed this initiative and threw their support behind the governor-general. Hence, when Obolenskii made his trip throughout Finland, the Old Finns trooped out to do him homage while the Constitutionalists were conspicuous by their absence. The latter, in fact, were smarting from the gesture of the Senate to pay a pension to von Plehve's widow for "services rendered by the deceased to Finland"; they hurled invectives at "these traitors of the fatherland" who would recompense the tyranny of "the persecutor of the Finnish peoples."[6]

The government, mindful of Finnish public opinion, even chose to try General Schauman, father of the Bobrikov's assassin, in the High Court of Åbo rather than in St. Petersburg for his alleged involvement in revolutionary activities.[7] Pradère-Niquet conceded that Obolenskii was really attempting to follow a moderate course in Finland,[8]

and that he was much milder in action than the late General Bobrikov.[9] He also saw the appointment of Prince Sviatopolk-Mirskii as Minister of Interior as beneficial to the easing of tensions in Finland as well. Another proof of the tsar's willingness to compromise was seen in his calling together of a mixed commission of Finlanders and Russians to discuss the means for harmonizing the Finnish fundamental laws with the February Manifesto.[10] Paul Miliukov thought that this was the dawn of a new era.[11]

In the elections to the Diet, the opposition Svecomen and Young Finns won the majority of seats. It was even thought that those sent into banishment might return to take up their seats in the Diet.[12] Indeed, the tsar allowed the elected exiles to re-enter Finland for the deliberations of the Diet. At their head came L. Mechelin, who was met at the station by 10,000 people singing the forbidden national anthem, "Vårt Land." Just to be on the safe side, the tsar named K. Linder as Lantmarskalk of the Diet, and it was also rumoured that he had prepared and left in the governor's possession an undated Imperial decree ordering the adjournment of the Diet.[13]

At the opening of the Diet, the tsar's speech said in part:

> The political life of the country has been troubled many times by the opposition made against my commands by a part of the Finnish population which has been

> blackened by the murder of the highest representative of the Imperial Autocracy in Finland.
>
> It has been brought to my attention that according to widespread opinion in Finland, the essential condition for the re-establishment of order in the country would be the transformation and, in part, the abolition of the ordinances rendered during the most recent times and the measures taken for their execution.
>
> . . . The latest measures have been, moreover by their nature, that of a temporary character and I shall be happy to be able to suppress them when the governor-general shall decide that the causes which have provoked them, have ceased to exist.[14]

However, for the good of the Empire and for the closer unity of Finland with the Imperial administration, the tsar refused to withdraw the three most important measures that bothered the Finnish opposition. They were: The February Manifesto; the manifesto of June 7/20, 1900 making Russian the official language of Finland; and the military conscription law of July 6/19, 1901.[15] As a consequence of this, there could be no reconciliation between the tsar and the Constitutionalists, for both sides were uncompromising on these points. So, the only hope for Russia was to attach the Old Finns even more closely to herself, as in the naming of Linder as Minister-State Secretary for Finland.[16]

With the failure to reach an understanding between the tsar and the Finnish opposition, the resistance entered into a more violent phase. On January 22, 1905, even the workers had begun to agitate on behalf of socialist causes in response to "Bloody Sunday" in St. Petersburg, and on

the twenty-fourth and twenty-sixth the socialist demonstrations were of such seriousness that the police and Cossacks had to be called in.[17] On February 6, Procurator-General of the Senate E. Johnsson was assassinated by a Svecoman medical student of the name of Hohenthal.[18] On a Sunday, February 19, a mass demonstration of 10,000 workers and Fennomen marched behind a red flag and bore slogans such as: "Down with the privileged classes!" "Long live universal suffrage!" "Down with the law which withdraws from women the right to be human!" "More to the Estates-General! One chamber only!" "Universal suffrage is the key to progress in the future!" "Democracy is the safeguard of the people!"[19]

The political atmosphere in Finland was beginning to polarize rather dangerously. Indeed, the Finlanders were dividing themselves into two camps, the Constitutionalists and the Fennomen-Socialists.[20] On the one side, the Constitutionalists were seeking to re-establish and perpetuate their ancient privileges. On the other, the Fennomen were looking for political equality while the Socialists were demanding political and economic justice. At that moment, the aims of the Fennomen and Socialists were closest together. The internal disunity which Bobrikov had actively sought to sow in Finland for the sake of Russification, was now bearing fruit, although certainly not that which he had intended.

The violence continued into March. On March 21, an assassination attempt was made on the life of General Miasoedov, Governor of Viborg province. It was carried out by a Hjalmar Reinikka, a self-confessed anarchist. Miasoedov, who survived the attempt, was detested in Viborg as a creature and emulator of Bobrikov. Hence, the police suspected a broader plot than the simple madness of a one-armed anarchist.[21]

Frightened by the restlessness in Finland, the tsarist government relented. It suspended the execution of the military conscription law for three years and demanded in lieu of this, a subsidy of ten milion marks.[22] In Finland, the news was received with joy and, on his return from St. Petersburg, Prince Obolenskii was greeted with flowers, a choir and 10,000 happy people.[23] In Russia, the Russophils were beside themselves with anger against the governor-general since it appeared to them that he intended to reverse Bobrikov's policies.[24]

On April 12, 1905, the adjournment of the Diet was ordered by the decree of the tsar. This session, under the leadership of Mechelin's Constitutionalist majority had accomplished very little. Only the budget for 1905 had been voted on instead of the usual three year budget. The Constitutionalists had vainly pleaded for the prolongation of the session in the hope that more could be accomplished.

Failing this, the Diet presented a petition to the tsar requesting the convocation of an extraordinary Diet. This demand also was refused, opening up a new source of conflict.[25]

The situation in Finland was deteriorating badly for the Russians. For example, General Schauman was acquited of all charges. There were demonstrations in favour of universal suffrage. Meanwhile, Russian troops were being pulled out of the grand duchy to protect St. Petersburg; so, while the Russo-Japanese War was going badly for Russia, the tsar had to make more concessions to Finland.[26] Strangely enough, Finland still seemed to be the quietest area in the whole Empire, so that wealthy Russians rented dachas there for the summer in anticipation of troubles in St. Petersburg.[27]

The May defeat of the Russian navy in the Strait of Tsushima was greeted with joy in Finland. It was now hoped that the Russian government now would be forced to grant new concessions. The opposition movement feared only the consequences of future Russian military successes and peace in the Far East, as it believed that such eventualities would permit Russia to reimpose upon Finland the oppressive Bobrikovian policies. So, the "Patriots" counselled greater resistance in hope of the appearance of a Japanese squadron in the Baltic. To counter this threat, Russian torpedo boats were on stand-by in Helsingfors' harbour.[28] As a matter

of fact, some of the Activists, such as Konni Zilliacus, were in league with the Japanese.[29]

The Activists in the opposition movement were becoming more visible and perhaps even more popular. Hohenthal, the assassin of the procurator-general, was showered with flowers on his way to court and later was assisted to escape.[30] Moreover, the terrorist campaign continued. Deutrich, an old Bobrikov aide, was seriously wounded by a thrown bomb.[31] Colonel Kramarenko of the Viborg gendarmerie was shot three times and killed.[32] When the government decided to send his murderer Procopé to the Russian War Council for judgement as an example to future assassins, threats were made against Obolenskii and Linder for this "flagrantly illegal act."[33] Threats against Deutrich's life were still made while he was recuperating. Colonel Seyn, director of the governor-general's chancellery, and Colonel Reynholt, Governor of Nyland province, were also rumoured to be marked for assassination.[34] Mass demonstration of support for Procopé took place in Helsingfors, Viborg and Kotka.[35]

Midst the turmoil, the government disbanded the last active unit of the Finnish military forces, the Battalion of Finnish Guards. By the order of the tsar which was dated September 6, 1905, the proud battalion of Finnish

sharpshooters was forced to surrender its colours. As Pradère-Niquet remarked, another stone had been taken out of the edifice of Finnish autonomy when "The flag of this elite corps, all shredded by grapeshot and decorated with the Cross of St. George, has been transported yesterday, from Helsingfors to St. Petersburg to the Winter Palace."[36]

Once more Russian fears were raised when Finnish customs officials found an unmarked 3000 ton steamer caught upon the shoals of the northeast shore of the Gulf of Bothnia. The ship's hold was filled with firearms and ammunition which were obviously intended either for Finnish or Russian revolutionaries. The name of the vessel was the John Grafton, a ship which had been originally owned by the British. However, it was bought later with Japanese money for the purpose of gun-running in aid of a Russian revolution.[37] The Japanese now were actively encouraging the growth of revolutionary activity in the Empire in the hope that this would hinder the Russian war effort in the Far East.

At this point, the frightened Russian government was trying all kinds of measures to pacify Finland. On the one hand, it conceded that only those Russians who had the necessary knowledge of Swedish and Finnish would be allowed to serve in Finland;[38] on the other, it moved more and more troops into Finland, even suggesting that they would be

billeted in private homes if barrack space was lacking.[39] Unfortunately for the Russian government, the troops sent to guard the Finns were not themselves considered reliable, and so had to be withdrawn back to St. Petersburg.[40] Moreover, as Ambassador Hardinge noted, arms caches were found periodically in Finland and that general conditions throughout the rest of Russia were steadily deteriorating.[41]

By October 27, the Russian railroad strike had extended as far as Finland, but the Helsingfors-St. Petersburg line was still running because the Finnish railway workers had refused to join their Russian counterparts. Indeed, Russians were streaming into Finland to escape the troubles at home, for as it was said, "Finland is certainly the most quiet country in the Empire, where Russians find . . . an excellent refuge."[42]

Matters, however, were to worsen in Finland as well. On November 1, the French consul in Helsingfors sent out a coded telegram bearing this message:

> General strike in Finland, police with strikers, senators have given in their resignations as demanded by the people. Finnish flag hoisted on Senate and the public buildings, national police [a provisional police force of Finnish civilians] organised by regular police to maintain order.
>
> Pradère-Niquet[43]

Two days later, another message was relayed by the French embassy in St. Petersburg to Paris. It said:

> Finland has ceased all relations with the central authority. The government has not taken any decision yet as to the attitude to adopt vis-à-vis the grand duchy.
>
> Boutiron[44]

Not only had Finland's connection with the central government in St. Petersburg been broken, but the Russian administration in the grand duchy had ceased to function as well. The Senators had tendered their resignations and the governor-general had retired to a Russian warship, the Slava, in Helsingfors harbour, after having been held as a virtual prisoner for several days by the Finnish irregular police force. Russian gendarmes were disarmed and sent packing with their families to Sveaborg. Russian troops, many of them Estonians and therefore sympathetic to the Finns, stood by passively watching the political drama unfold, seeing that Obolenskii had no desire to order them to intervene with force for fear of great bloodshed. In every respect, this spontaneous strike was to achieve its immediate constitutional objectives, happily without much violence.[45]

Early on the morning of November 4, Nicholas II capitulated to the demands of the Finnish Constitutionalists. On the advice of Minister-State Secretary Linder, he signed the manifesto of October 22 /November 4, 1905. By this decree the February Manifesto was suspended and the executive orders of Bobrikov were rescinded. The extra powers granted

to the governor-general were also withdrawn. The military conscription law of 1901 and the civil service act of 1902, which allowed Russians into the Finnish administration, were revoked. The decree curbing civil liberties was suspended as was the decree that made Russian the official language of the Senate. To this manifesto, the tsar also appended the following proposals: that the Diet's election procedure be re-organized to reflect a more equitable representation of the people; that the Finnish administration be made responsible to this Diet of "national representatives" and that the citizens be guaranteed their civil liberties; that a new law concerning the freedom of the press be drafted and that preventative censorship be ended immediately.[46]

At the same time, the tsar convoked an extraordinary Diet to meet on December 7/20, 1905. It was called upon to deal with three particular issues. The first concerned certain problems of the grand duchy's finances. The second involved the establishment of a new fundamental law for the purpose of determining the "national representation" in the Diet on the basis of a universal and equal vote. Then the organs of the local government were to become responsible to this representative body of the nation. The third item was the drafting of a new law concerning the liberty of the press, assembly and association.[47]

The news of these decrees did not filter through to Helsingfors until two days later because the strikers had cut off all regular lines of communication.[48] When the tsar's decision finally reached the ears of the Constitutionalists, they were jubilant. Only the Socialists were less than happy with this manifesto, for they viewed it as a victory for the privileged classes.[49] Nevertheless, it was the Constitutionalist faction and the other old-line parties which carried the day. As a consequence of this, the French consul was able to send the following message by telegraph on November 7th:

> The Imperial Manifesto is right to the wishes of the Finlanders. The strike is ended.
>
> Pradère-Niquet[50]

While there were yet repercussions to sort out, such as the resignation and replacement of the governor-general[51] and the pacification of the Socialists -- the "Red Guards" of Captain Kock in particular -- who still insisted that the strike was not over,[52] the fact remained that Finland had indeed recovered her autonomous position in the Empire as it had existed at the beginning of 1899. In this respect, the general strike had brought about the complete reversal of Russia's policy in Finland. The question now became how long would this situation last.[53] Mechelin, who had been made the effective head of government by virtue

of his appointment to the presidency of the Senate, believed that the future of Finland was secure as long as the tsar did not capitulate to the revolutionaries. Moreover, he had every confidence in the Russian Duma as a liberal institution which would not consider the repression of the national minorities.[54]

Unfortunately, Mechelin was too devoted to the liberal cause to realize that nationalism had become the dominant force in Russia. Already in the first months of 1906, the new liberal governor-general, Gerard, was under heavy attack in St. Petersburg and was nearly relieved of his post.[55] Behind this campaign against Gerard and Finland in general had been the Novoe vremia and other reactionary nationalist papers which were endlessly calling upon the Russian government to withdraw the "particular privileges" of the Finlanders and render them to the same level, title and condition of the other nationalities in the Empire.[56] In April, the Finns feared that the tsar was about to fall in with the nationalists,[57] particularly after they heard of a plan to appoint a mixed commission of Russians and Finlanders to establish what measures should be taken to coordinate the Finnish fundamental laws with All-Imperial legislation.[58] The objections of the Finns and their Russian allies were heard and the idea was dropped. This time Finland's only

salvation had been that the Duma was controlled by Mechelin's Russian liberal colleagues.

It was for this reason that a British observer, Viscount Cranley, could report in the summer of 1906 that Russo-Finnish relations were on good terms. On a visit to Helsingfors, he noted that the Finlanders were pleased with their lot and were also changed in their attitude toward the Russians. As for Russian government, it seemed to him that it too wished to be on friendly terms with Finland. As a show of good faith, it had amnestied all Finlanders who had violated certain Imperial commands, and as well had pardoned the resigned officers of the Finnish Dragoons, giving them full pensions.[59]

There were however, a number of incidents in the latter half of 1906 that served to further inflame the reactionary press in Russia. One of these was the revolt that broke out in Sveaborg on July 31, especially because of the part that the Finnish Red Guard played in this mutiny and the lenient sentences imposed upon the Red Guard insurgents by the Finnish courts.[60] Another grave irritant was the uncovering of Voima Liitto ("Union of Power"), which was ostensibly an athletic club but was in fact an organization for training Svecomen in the martial arts in preparation for the battle of independence from Russia. Voima Liitto

became such an embarrassment to Mechelin that he was forced to suppress it.[61]

The Voima Liitto affair continued to be exploited by the Russian nationalists into the next spring.[62] The uneasiness of Russia was expressed through the reinforcement of her army in Finland and the removal of the control of these forces from the hands of the governor-general. In addition, the question of Finland's financial contributions to Russia's defence budget was about to be raised again at the same time that the Socialist majority of the new Parliament refused to contribute a "cent" to Russia. The hardening of the Russian attitude in response to all this was underscored in Nicholas' reply to the Finnish demands placed before him by Minister-State Secretary Langhoff:

> I gave the Grand Duchy that which she wanted; but do not ask more of me, because I have assented to the extreme limit of possible concessions. On the question of the 10 millions, I will not become more liberal because I must think of Russian opinion.[63]

Yet during the first session of the Diet convoked on May 22, 1907, the Young Finns unheedingly submitted a new demand for the repatriation of the Finnish constitution on such matters as the post, army and language.[64] Following the summer recess, the Diet once more came into conflict with the Imperial government over the question of military contributions, for the Finns refused to pay this "humiliating

tribute" but were willing to raise their own army. In the end, they voted for the credits, charging them against the previous Diet with the stipulation that no future credits would be forthcoming as Finland intended to reorganize her own military forces.[65]

The attitude of the Finnish administration was unacceptable to Russia, which of course strengthened the resolve of the Russian state to re-examine the concessions it had made to Finland during the 1905 crisis. An important sign of the hardened Russian approach to Finland was the appointment of General Frans Seyn, a hated former aide of General Bobrikov, as deputy to the governor-general.[66] This was followed by the recall of Governor-General Gerard, who attributed his own fall from grace to the consequences of the Voima Liitto affair and the growing influence of the reactionaries in Russia.[67] As the time approached for the first session of the Third Duma, one which proved to be much more reactionary and nationalistic than its predecessor, the Russian nationalist press attacked Finland's autonomous status mercilessly while Finlanders grew more and more apprehensive about their future.[68]

The situation was further aggravated for Finland by the fact that the Russian prime minister, P.A. Stolypin, was wholly interested in integrating all Finnish institutions

that he deemed to be of "Imperial concern" into closer union with the Empire. Such matters, he told the British ambassador, included the military forces. In the case of Finland, he said, Russia could not trust an independent Finnish army but, if Finland refused to pay her share of the cost of defending the Empire, her menfolk would be recruited directly into the Russian Imperial Army. Moreover, Stolypin indicated that it was necessary for the Russian government itself to counter the development of revolutionary activity in Finland, for it was there that the Russian agitators hatched their schemes and sought refuge.[69] It was little wonder that the Finns felt the end of their autonomy near when they viewed the internal political conditions in Russia.[70]

The chill wind even blew colder when the Nya Pressen of February 25, 1908, filed the report of an article from Okraini Rossii which described a dinner in memory of General N.I. Bobrikov. General Chipow had spoken in tribute to the memory of Bobrikov at this affair, noting his own hope "that the hour was near, when the light of truth would disperse the clouds that had hovered over the Finnish border-land, which, harboured plans to be a separate state from Russia."[71]

A Colonel P. Nivé read a poem entitled, "To the Centenary of the Conquest of Finland," and General Borodkin suggested "casting a parallel between the events of the

conquest of Finland a century ago and the present state of matters there."[72]

General Seyn, the present deputy to the governor-general of Finland, had this message delivered in his absence:

> We, Bobrikoffians residing in Helsingfors, united to our comrades in St. Petersburg by the same thought of the great man who devoted his whole life, even till his martyr-death, to his beloved fatherland, beg Your Excellency to forward to all those who have met to honour the dear memory of the never-to-be-forgotten Nikolai Ivanovitch, their hearty greeting and deep reverence. Abandoned here in a foreign border-land, but faithful to the tenets of our former teacher and leader, General Bobrikoff, we do now derive moral strength in the firm hope that by mutual efforts of Russian men, the dying-out glare of our case shall not be darkened again and that the truth, with God's help, once more shall triumph."[73]

Indeed, the government had accepted the Russifiers' opinion and, on March 28, 1909, appointed a mixed commission of Finlanders and Russians to define and delimit the sphere of Finland's autonomy within the framework of the Imperial administration.[74] This commission was made up of five Finlanders and five Russians with a sixth Russian, P. Kharitonov, acting as chairman.[75] General Langhoff thought that the Kharitonov Commission should have no trouble arriving at an equitable compromise provided that "good will" existed on both sides, a question about which he had grave misgivings in general.[76]

As a matter of fact, the "Finnish question" came up

in the Duma that spring, and was discussed in a debate on the basis of three interpellations that had been introduced. The first was a demand for an explanation from the President of the Council of Ministers regarding the minister-state secretary for Finland's alleged misconduct in favouring Finnish autonomy to the detriment of Imperial interests.[77] The Octobrists claimed that the minister had not followed the obligations of his office as he had not submitted all affairs of Imperial concern affecting the grand duchy to the tsar. The other two interpellations concerned the question of revolutionary activity and "secret organizations" (that is, the Red Guard and Voima Liitto)in Finland. As a consequence of the latter interpellation, Procurator of the Senate Grotenfelt was relieved of his post for failing to show enough firmness and energy in the Voima Liitto affair.[79]

On May 5/18, 1908, Stolypin, as President of the Council of Ministers, gave a most effective reply to the interpellations,[80] which it is thought may have been initially prepared by himself.[81] At any rate, the interpellations suited his purpose to argue a case for the reduction of Finland's autonomy. To this end, Stolypin first dealt with revolutionary activity in Finland, particularly emphasizing such sensitive matters as the assassinations of Russian officials by Finnish Activists. Once having assured himself

that he had elicited the proper chauvinist response from the Duma, he concluded his reply with the idea that Finland must be brought closer to the bosom of the Empire.[82]

In Finland, the general reaction to this speech was reported to have been one of "depression." At the same time it was noted that the country was prepared to undertake another campaign of passive resistance should Bobrikovian measures be re-introduced.[83] Mechelin was forced to resign for his administration had lost the Parliament's confidence in regard to its ability to counter the Russian offensive. While he realized the situation to be serious, he had placed too much reliance on the Russian liberals like Professor Miliukov for their ability to stave off the worst threats against Finland's autonomy.[84]

In any event, the worst fears of the Finlanders were about to be realized. On June 2, 1908, the tsar approved special minutes submitted by the Council of Ministers which gave the right to the Council to examine all legislative proposals concerning Finland before they would be presented to the sovereign.[85] By this means, the minister-state secretary for Finland was circumvented, as it was now the task of the Council of Ministers to decide which bills constituted matters of Imperial concern as opposed to purely local Finnish interests. All the Finnish parties in the Diet, with

the exception of the Socialists, signed a petition to reinstate the prorogatives of the minister-state secretary.[86]

In a manifesto signed October 7th, the tsar imposed an annual military tax upon Finland of ten million marks for 1908 and 1909, and rising thereafter each year by one million marks until twenty millions per year.[87] Since the decree had not passed through the Finnish Parliament, it was clearly an unconstitutional act. As a result of this, the Finnish Parliament would not approve the measure, and the tsar chose to dissolve Parliament.[88] The new election of deputies to the Finnish Parliament returned an even larger Socialist majority in the following February, leaving the Finnish administration and the Russian government at an impasse.[89]

To break the deadlock, the Russian government called for the Kharitonov Commission's report. Since the commission had been unable to reach any agreement between the Finnish and Russian members, the Russians issued their own majority report which called for the subordination of Finland to Imperial interests.[90] On March 27, 1910, the tsar issued an Imperial manifesto ordering Stolypin to draw up a bill on the basis of the Russian majority's proposals. Notwithstanding Miliukov's opposition, the bill was passed on June 10, 1910 in the final vote of the Duma. Since the ultimate effect of

this bill would be to reduce the powers of the Finnish Parliament to that of a provincial assembly,[91] the ultra-nationalist V.A. Purishkevich felt obliged to shout out in elation: "Finis Finlandiae!"[92]

After the bill had passed through the State Council, it was signed into law on June 17/30, 1910 by the tsar. In September, the Finnish Parliament under the presidency of F. Svinhufvud met to reject it as being unconstitutional and, therefore, illegal. The tsar dissolved this Parliament and called for new elections the following spring. The new Parliament took the same course as its predecessor and also was dissolved. Thereafter, Russia ruled Finland by dictatorial fiat.[93]

NOTES

CHAPTER SIX

[1]See "Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne, St. Petersburgh, June 30, 1904," in G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, IV: The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement 1903-7 (London, 1929), No. 3. Of course, Witte had no sympathy either for Bobrikov or his ally, von Plehve, a fact which is recounted in Baron Rosen, Forty Years of Diplomacy, I (London, 1922), p. 220. Witte's sympathies remained with Finland; for example, see S.Ia. Witte, "M. de Witte on Finland," The Contemporary Review, IXC (1910), 663-670.

[2]Sir C. Hardinge to the Marquess of Lansdowne, in Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, IV, No. 3; Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, July 1, 1904, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 11; The Times, July 4, 1904, p. 10. Cf. "The New Governor-General in Finland," The Times, September 1, 1904, p. 3.

[3]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, July 14, 1904, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 11.
Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, June 24, 1904, stated that the Dowager Empress once told him when describing Bobrikov: "He is a muzhik!" Grand Duke Vladimir's wife is reported to have said of Bobrikov: "He is a corporal and nothing more!"

[4]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, August 19, 1904, Ibid.

[5]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, August 30, 1904, Ibid., No. 15.

[6]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, September 2, 1904, Ibid., No. 16.

[7]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, November 14, 1904, Ibid., No. 19.

[8]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, November 29, 1904, Ibid., No. 21.

[9] Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, November 15, 1904, Ibid., No. 20.

[10] Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, November 29, 1904.

[11]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, November 15, 1904.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, December 6, 1904, and December 10, 1904, Ibid., Nos. 22 and 23.

[14]Translated from Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, December 14, 1904, Ibid., No. 24, Encl.

[15]Ibid., No. 24.

[16]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, January 18, 1905, Ibid., No. 1.

[17]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, January 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1905, Ibid., Nos. 5, 6, 7 and 8; "The Demonstrations in Finland," The Times, February 2, 1905, p. 3; Ia.S. Il'inskii, "Revoliutsionnyi 1905 god v Finliandii," Voprosy istorii, 1955, No. 12, p. 49.

[18]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, February 6, 1905 and February 15, 1905, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1,

Nos. 9 and 10; "Helsinki, Helm. 7 p. Prokuraattori ammuttu," Helsingin sanomat, February 7, 1905, No. 31, p. 3.

[19]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, February 23, 1905, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 11.

[20]See Hannu Soikkanen, "Vuoden 1905 tapahtumat ja niiden taustakehitys suomalaisen tutkimuksen näkökulmasta," Historiallinen aikakauskirja, 1966, pp. 82-83.

[21]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, March 21, 1905, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 12.

[22]Journal de St. Petersbourg, March 23/April 5, 1905; Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, March 30, 1905 and April 3, 1905, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, Nos. 13 and 14.

[23]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, April 10, 1905, Ibid., No. 15.

[24]Ibid.; Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, April 2, 1905. Of the Russifiers, Baron S.A. Korff, Autocracy and Revolution in Russia (London, 1923), p. 27, had this to say: "There grew up, for instance, a whole class of men who made their living from the Russification of Poland, Finland or the Ukraine, who received promotion, decorations and high salaries for this kind of work, notwithstanding the fact that public opinion in Russia was against them, denouncing this foolish policy of the government."

[25]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, April 16, 1905, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 16.

[26]Ibid., Soikkanen, "Vuoden 1905 tapahtumat," p. 92.

[27]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, April 16, 1905. For a study of Russian settlement in the Karelian borderlands and its relationship to official Russian government policy, see Vilho Hämäläinen, "Karjalan kannaksen venäläisen huvila-asutuksen polittinen luonne," Historiallinen aikakauskirja, 1969, pp. 5-19.

[28]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, June 2, 1905, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 18.

[29]V.M. Smirnov, "Revoliutsionnaia rabota v Finliandii 1900-1907 gg.," Istoricheskii zhurnal, I (1926), No. 48, p. 129; John H. Hodgson, "Finland's Position in the Russian Empire, 1905-1910," Journal of Central European Affairs, XX (1960), 159; Korff, Autocracy and Revolution in Russia, pp. 110-111.

[30]Pradère-Niquet to Delcassé, Helsingfors, June 2, 1905 and October 2, 1905, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, Nos. 19 and 47.

[31]Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, July 19, 1905, Ibid., No. 22.

[32]Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, July 21, 1905, Ibid., No. 23.

[33]Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, August 3, 1905, Ibid., No. 27.

[34]Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, July 26, 1905, Ibid., No. 26.

[35]Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, August 8, August 11 and September 2, 1905, Ibid., Nos. 30, 31 and 33.

[36]Cited from Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, September 9, 1905, Ibid., No. 35; see also Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, September 2, 1905, Ibid., No. 33.

[37]Hardinge to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, September 23, 1905, F.O. 65/1702, No. 566; Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, September 12 and 14, 1905, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, Nos. 36 and 37; Michael Futrell, The Northern Underground, Episodes of Russian Revolutionary Transport and Communications through Scandinavia and Finland, 1863-1917 (London, 1963), pp. 66-84.

[38]Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, October 17, 1905, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 48; "The Tsar and Finland," The Times, October 10, 1905, p. 5.

[39]Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, September 25, 1905, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 39.

[40]Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, October 17, 1905.

[41]Hardinge to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, October 11, 1905, F.O. 65/1703, No. 507.

[42]Cited from Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, October 27, 1905, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 50.

[43]Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, November 1, 1905, A.N.M.A.E., DP A 83 3.

[44]Boutiron to Rouvier, St. Petersburg, November 2, 1905, Ibid., No. 388.

[45]Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, November 5 and 7, 1905, Ibid., telegram unnumbered and No. 51; Boutiron to Rouvier, St. Petersburg, November 5 and 7, 1905, Ibid., A 83 3, No. 395, and DP A 83 3, No. 134; Cooke to Spring-Rice, Helsingfors, November 8, 1905, in Spring-Rice to Lansdowne, F.O. 65/1703, No. 678, Encl. 1 (printed document); Spring-Rice to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, November 9, 1905, F.O. 65/1703, No. 649; "The Movement in Finland," The Times, November 3, 1905, p. 3.

[46]Published in Journal de St. Pétersbourg, October 26/November 8, 1905; Suomen Suuriruhtinanmaan Asetus-Kokoelma, No. 49/1905.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, November 7, 1905, A.N.M.A.E., DP A 83 3, No. 51.

[49]Ibid.; "Freedom for Finland. Constitution granted," The Times, November 6, 1905, p. 5.

[50]Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, November 7, 1905, A.N.M.A.E., A 83 1.

[51]Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, December 1, 1905, Ibid., DP SDN A 83 1, No 59; Spring-Rice to Lansdowne, St. Petersburg, November 21, 1905, F.O. 65/1703, No. 670.

[52]Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, November 8, 1905, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 83 1, No. 52, notes how the "White Guard" and "Red Guard" almost came to open warfare for the reason that the Red Guard was still actively agitating for strike action.

[53]Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, December 1, 1905, asks that very question.

[54]Based on the French consul's interview with Mechelin as reported in Pradère-Niquet to Rouvier, Helsingfors, December 9, 1905, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 83 3, No. 61.

[55]Pradère-Niquet to Bourgeois, Helsingfors, April 4, 1906, Ibid., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 6; Spring-Rice to Grey, St. Petersburg, March 28, 1906, F.O. 371/122, No. 226 (Printed Document).

[56]Spring-Rice to Grey, St. Petersburg, March 14, 1906, F.O. 371/122, No. 188.

[57]Spring-Rice to Grey, St. Petersburg, April 25, 1906, F.O. 371/122, No. 284.

[58]Pradère-Niquet to Bourgeois, Helsingfors, April 12, 1906, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, No. 7.

[59]Report of Cranley, St. Petersburg, July 31, 1906, in Nicolson to Grey, F.O. 371/122, No. 489 (Printed Document).

[60]Hodgson, "Finland's Position in the Russian Empire," p. 162.

[61]Pingaud to Bourgeois, Helsingfors, October 30, 1906, and November 5 and 14, 1906, A.N.M.A.E., DP SDN A 82 1, Nos. 10, 11, and 12; Cooke to Nicolson, Helsingfors, November 10, 1906, in Nicolson to Grey, F.O. 371/129, No. 753; Cooke to Nicolson, Helsingfors, November 13, 1906, in Nicolson to Grey, F.O. 371/129, No. 759.

For additional details of this organization, see O. Seitkari, "Eduskuntauudistus ja uusi sortokausi," in Suomen historian käsikirja, II, pp. 392-393; Herman G. Gummerus, P.E. Svinhuvud, 1861-1936 (Helsinki, 1936), p. 9.

[62]Pingaud to Pichon, Helsingfors, March 23, 1907, A.N.M.A.E., A 83 3, No. 4.

[63]Quoted in Ibid.

[64]Pingaud to Pichon, Helsingfors, June 21, 1907, Ibid., A 82 1, No. 12.

[65]Panafiey (?) to Pichon, Helsingfors, September 16, October 18 and November 1, 1907, Ibid., A 83 3, Nos. 102, 120 and 127.

[66]Dormer to Nicolson, Helsinfors, December 10, 1907, in Nicolson to Grey, F.O. 371/327, No. 612, Encl. (Printed document); "The Tsar and His Finnish Subjects," The Contemporary Review XCIII (1908), p. 379.

[67]Based on Gerard's interview with Cooke, as reported in Cooke to Nicolson, Helsingfors, February 20, 1908, in Nicolson to Grey, F.O. 371/515, No. 91, Encl. (Printed Document).

[68]Nicolson to Grey, St. Petersburg, February 22, 1908, Ibid., No. 97 (Printed Document).

[69]Nicolson to Grey, St. Petersburg, March 3, 1908, Ibid., No. 122 (Printed Document); Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, 1801-1917 (Oxford, 1967), p. 668.

[70]Cooke to Nicolson, Helsingfors, February 28, 1908, in Nicolson to Grey, Ibid., No. 124, Encl.

[71]From "Translation of Nya Pressen," Ibid., Encl.

[72]Quoted from Ibid.

[73]Quoted from Ibid.

[74]Strakhovsky, "Constitutional Aspects," p. 487.

[75]Seitkari, "Eduskuntauudistus ja uusi sortokausi," 412-413; J.N. Reuter, "The Rights of Finland at Stake," The English Review, 1909, pp. 144-145; cf. N. Kuplewasky, Die Ansichten von 25 russischen Rechtsgelehrten über die rechtliche Stellung Finnlands im Bestande des russischen Reichs (Berlin, 1911), p. 7.

The Russian members of the committee included some of the most virulently anti-Finnish personalities, such as Deutrich, Korevo, Miasoedov, and Borodkin.

[76]Based on interview with Langhoff as reported in Nicolson to Grey, St. Petersburg, May 5, 1909, F.O. 371/725, No. 288.

[77]Gosudarstvennaia Duma. Stenograficheskie otchety, tretii sozyv, sessiia 1, chast 2 (St. Petersburg, 1908), p. 2915.

[78]Ibid., pp. 2913-2914.

[79]Cooke to O'Beirne, Helsingfors, May 7, 1908, in O'Beirne to Grey, F.O. 371/515, No. 224, Encl.

[80]Gosudarstvennaia Duma, tretii sozyv, sessiia 1, chast 2, pp. 2919-2941; a French translation of Stolypin's speech appeared as P.A. Stolypine, La question Finlandaise. Discours prononcé dans la Séance du 5/18 Mai à la Douma d'Empire (Paris, 1908).

[81]Hodgson, "Finland's Position in the Russian Empire," p. 167.

[82]Gosudarstvennaia Duma, tretii sozyv, sessiia 1, chast 2, pp. 2938-2941.

[83]Cooke to O'Beirne, Helsingfors, May 22, 1908, in O'Beirne to Grey, F.O. 371/515, No. 250, Encl. (Printed document).

[84]Based on an interview with Mechelin as reported in Cooke to Nicolson, in O'Beirne to Grey, Ibid., No. 266, Encl.

[85]Hodgson, "Finland's Position in the Russian Empire," pp. 167-168.

[86]Translation of petition in Cooke to Nicolson, Helsingfors, August 26, 1908, F.O. 371/515, No. 12.

[87]Cooke to Nicolson, Helsingfors, October 15, 1909, in Nicolson to Grey, F.O. 371/725, No. 560, Encl. No. 2 (Printed Document); a translation of the manifesto is in Cooke to Nicolson, Helsingfors, October 20, 1909, Ibid., No. 568, Encl. (Printed Document).

[88]Göran von Bonsdorff, Suomen poliittiset puolueet (Helsinki, 1957), p. 37.

[89]Seitkari, "Eduskuntauudistus ja uusi sortokausi," p. 413.

[90]Hodgson, "Finland's Position in the Russian Empire," p. 169; René Henry, "La Finlande. Défense d'une constitution protectrice d'une nationalité," in Les aspirations autonomistes en Europe (Paris, 1913), pp. 71-72.

[91]For a full discussion of Finland's rights in this matter from the Finnish point of view, see Finland, Lantdagen, The Humble Petition of the Diet of Finland to H.I.M. the

Emperor of Russia, Grand Duke of Finland, May 26th 1910 (London, 1910). See also Finland and Russia. International Conference in London, February 26- March 1, 1910 (London, 1910); René Henry, La question de Finlande au point de vue juridique. Conférence faite à Paris le 28 janvier 1910 et suivie d'une discussion à laquelle ont pris part MM. Mechelin, van der Vlugt et Lapradelle (Paris, 1910); J. Oppenheim et al., Mémoire à consulter sur la question finlandaise (Haarlem, 1910); / J.N. Reuter / The Russo-Finnish Conflict. The Russian Case, as stated by Representatives of the Russian Government (London, 1910); Wilhelm Habermann, Der finnländische Verfassungskampf. Der Stolypinsche Gesetzentwurf (Leipzig, 1911). For the full text of the Manifesto of June 17/30, 1910, see Korewo, La question finlandaise, Appendix II, pp. 33-39.

[92] Gosudarstvennaia Duma, tretii sozyv, sessiia 3, chast 4, p. 2582.

[93] For a discussion of the proposed extension of Russian interference in the affairs of Finland, see Viljo Rasila, "Vuoden 1914 venäläistämisohjelman synty," Historiallinen aikakauskirja, 1966, pp. 1-16.

CONCLUSION

Although the Russian nationalists of the late nineteenth century adopted the attitude that Finland had abused the generosity of the tsars and of Alexander I in particular, the fact is that there were historical antecedents even in the eighteenth century suggesting this course in the shaping of Finland's destiny. In this period of empire-building, conquered national minorities were often given charters which promised them their ancient rights, customs and usages. Indeed, Peter the Great himself granted the Baltic provinces such privileges. Elizabeth I was also to do the same in the areas she had detached from Finland. In the granting of local rights to Finland, Alexander I was simply following in the footsteps of his Imperial predecessors.

Moreover, Alexander's concept of an autonomous Finland approximated the desires of Elizabeth and Catherine the Great who had wished to have Finland as an "independent" state -- that is, a client or buffer-state -- in order to better protect St. Petersburg. Although Elizabeth had even issued a manifesto calling for the independence of Finland, she ultimately satisfied her desire for the Imperial capital's security by influencing the course of Sweden's foreign policy

through her direct interference in Swedish domestic politics. Catherine, on the other hand, had to abandon her aim to annex Finland because she felt that Russia's power was not sufficient to withstand the opposition of the other great powers to such a course of action.

Hence, the taking of Finland was left to Alexander I, and even then this was only accomplished because of Napoleon's constant proddings and his assurances of support. In fact, Finland was not actually on Alexander's programme of conquest; the attack upon Finland was forced upon the tsar by Napoleon who wished to have Russia punish Sweden for not joining the Continental System. Throughout this period, Alexander's own embarrassment at home was acute since his own subjects were bitterly opposed to the Franco-Russian alliance itself, and with it the Russo-Swedish war of 1808-1809 which had been undertaken on Napoleon's behalf. Therefore, Alexander delayed his attack on Finland as long as possible and then, once begun, wished to end it as quickly as possible. It was this latter consideration which ultimately led to the tsar's "generous" wartime policy of appeasement toward the Finlanders with the hope that this policy might pacify more easily these vehemently anti-Russian people.

Indeed, when the Russian troops first invaded Finland, they brought with them the message that their quarrel was

with Sweden and not with the Finlanders. To this they added the promise that Finnish rights and customs would be maintained. Then, when this expedition turned into a war of conquest, it became even more imperative that Finland be quickly calmed. The achievement of this end became more and more important when the Swedo-Finnish military and partisan activity intensified with rather successful results. As a consequence of this, the tsar was once more compelled to promise Finland the retention of her rights and privileges.

It also became incumbent upon the Russians to establish a temporary administration of the country. The easiest course to follow under the circumstances was to incorporate the existing local administration into the Russian government of occupation. Moreover, this had the effect of demonstrating Russia's good faith concerning her assurances to Finland. Many of these temporary institutions survived into the post-war period, providing the basis for the autonomy of Finland.

The point at which a radical departure was made from the earlier granting of local immunities and privileges, such as occurred in the case of the Baltic provinces, was Alexander's promise to the Diet of Borgå to give Finland a "political existence" of her own. This suggests that Alexander was seeking a solution to the problem of Finland through a compromise between outright annexation and the

creation of a client state. By this means, he could offer Finland to his own subjects as a newly conquered country, and still keep his promises to the Finlanders. In effect, Alexander had established a kind of federal solution to the situation. Finland had therefore become Russian but not russified.

There were also a number of other contributing factors to this. For one, Russia did not have the trained personnel to take over the Finnish administration. Secondly, Alexander I himself had no particular desire to unify his country, for such concepts as unification did not become current until the middle of the nineteenth century. Even after the Peace of Fredrikshamn, the tsar was still interested in enticing Finnish veterans and expatriates to return home from Sweden so that they would not continue to stir up Swedish resentment against Russia anymore. In any case, until Alexander's <u>détente</u> with Bernadotte, the Swedish crown prince, Russia did not feel yet that Finland belonged to her. Only after 1812 did Alexander have the confidence that the grand duchy was inseparably tied to the Empire. By that time, most of Finland's autonomous institutions had been put into operation, and had Alexander wished to abolish them, it would have been most difficult politically to do so.

There is, however, more than a suspicion that the

tsar with the aid of Speranskii had actually set Finland aside as a testing-ground for constitutional reform. Because of the deep-seated hostility of conservative Russia to innovation and reform, it was deemed best to keep the entire matter a secret. The remoteness of Finland served this purpose ideally. Moreover, Finland's own fundamental laws provided a sound basis upon which Russia could model, to some extent, her own laws.

In the matter of constitutional reform in Russia, Speranskii has been usually characterized as a "liberal." The fact is that Speranskii may have been liberal by Russian standards, but he was not so in western terms. In essence, Speranskii was most deeply concerned with administrative reform, centralization, and in the general rationalization of the structure of the Imperial government. Indeed, the net effect of the whole programme of reform during the "liberal" regime of Alexander I appears to have been initiated for the purpose of rationalizing the basis for autocratic rule.

Nevertheless, Alexander still seemed to have retained his interest in federalism. Firm indications of this were his guarantees of a separate "political existence" to Finland and Poland, which clearly embodied the notion of federalism in the political relationship between the Empire and the two border regions. It is also of significance that Alexander

chose Armfelt, a Finlander who had been most enthused with the idea of a federal relationship governing Finland's ties with Russia, to carry out similar governmental reforms in Poland as well.

Alexander's keenness for this Finnish project led him to strengthen the position of Finland by uniting Old Finland with New Finland. Since Old Finland had been incorporated earlier as a wholly integrated part of Russia, its attachment to New Finland had the effect of introducing constitutional reform into a part of Russia herself. However, it also served to stress Finland's strategic importance to the defence of the capital, a matter that was later to create a great deal of Russian distrust toward Finland. Furthermore, this union threatened the holdings and privileges of the Russian landlords in Old Finland, leading to the first manifestations of Russian irritation with Finland and her special status in the Empire. Therefore, the tsar's generosity toward the Finns was a mixed blessing.

Finland's autonomy was enhanced by the fact that she was allowed to retain her close economic ties with Sweden for a long period of time. In fact, it was several decades before Sweden was classified as a foreign trading partner in respect to Finland. As a consequence of this trade, Russia decided it was necessary to erect a customs border between

herself and the grand duchy. This naturally prevented Russia from tightening her ties with Finland through economic means.

An even more significant factor in the establishment and retention of Finnish autonomy was Finland's constitution. This constitution provided the legal basis for the exclusion of Russian interference in Finland's internal administration. For example, it allowed only Finlanders to serve in the grand duchy's civil and military service. It laid down the general regulations for the collection of taxes and disposal of revenues. It established the state religion, Lutheranism, which was other than that of Russia. It defined social, political and economic relationships between the different classes which were at variance with those of Russia.

The administrative bureaucracy which Alexander allowed Finland to retain and develop was another great support of Finnish autonomy. In general, as with all bureaucracies, its major aim was to perpetuate itself and, in so doing, it fended off all threats that might have restricted its growth, and in the process protected Finland's separate status as well. The two most important of these bureaucratic institutions were the Imperial Finnish Senate and the Office of State Secretary for Finland. The Finnish Senate, which had been so named to suggest that its status was at the same level as that of its Russian counterpart, operated as the administrative

organ for the execution of the tsar's orders. At first, it was merely the tool of the tsar, but it was to develop into a Finnish government with certain powers of independent action by the end of Alexander II's reign. The Office of State Secretary, situated in St. Petersburg, was the sole organ through which all affairs relating to Finland were to be reported to the tsar, and therefore the minister-state secretary held the most important position for the defence of Finnish interests. By means of these and other institutions peculiar to Finland, the Finlanders were able to protect and expand their privileges.

As already mentioned, these defences of the Finnish autonomy were wholly dependent upon the tsars. In Alexander I's case, he was enamoured with the Finnish constitution because it rationalized the basis of absolute power and removed from it the taint of arbitrariness. Although in certain instances he contravened the fundamental laws of Finland, Nicholas I also preferred to rule constitutionally because of his own conservative proclivities. Up to this point in time, the fundamental laws were viewed in Russia particularly, as forms of administrative procedure rather than as limitations upon the tsar's autocratic power. Therefore, the proposed codification of Finnish law during Nichlas I's reign was only directed at properly defining the limits of Finland's local autonomy.

However, the spread of liberalism to Finland led to the notion that the sovereign were bound to observe her fundamental laws. This view came into its own during Alexander II's reign. Since Alexander was a "liberal" monarch, his presence on the throne at the time tended to give even greater force to the liberal arguments. Moreover, in the one test of the Finnish constitution against the will of the tsar, Alexander II preferred to withdraw from the contest rather than force a rupture in the constitution. The practical implication of this was that Finland had become a kind of autonomous state rather than a Russian province.

While the Finnish liberals were pressing to extend Finland's sphere of autonomy, a change had already begun to take place in the Russian society. The defeat in the Crimea and the Polish rebellion of 1863 were to have a profound effect on the confidence of the Russian people. To this was to be added the growing rivalry between Russia and the new German Empire. Sweden, too, had become a threat to Russia once more. No longer could the Russian Empire view itself as the victor of Napoleon and the arbiter of Europe; those days were gone and it was now necessary to reinforce the state's internal and external security.

When the Russian government started to examine its own domestic weaknesses, it recognised the national minorities

as a potential threat to the state. Its solution to make these minorities loyal to Russia was to russify them, for Russification was understood first of all to include unification and centralization which were then believed to be the foundations of a strong nation. So, the Russification of Poland and the Baltic provinces was begun with the idea of creating loyal Russian subjects. The method used was to destroy the Polish and Baltic German upper classes, so that the lower classes of Ukrainians in Poland and Baltic peoples might rally behind the Russians as their saviours from the oppression of the local aristocracies.

For the time being, this process of Russification was not extended to Finland. Indeed, Finland remained quiet until the crisis of the Postal Manifesto of 1890. The Finlanders viewed the Russian attempt to unify the Finnish and Russian postal systems as an infringement of their constitution and autonomy. Spearheading the Finnish resistance were the liberals. However, even moderates like Senator Yrjö Koskinen were alienated from the Russian regime by this policy. Thereafter, relations between Finland and the Russian government were permanently cool.

Nevertheless, Alexander III's project had only been concerned with the processes of unification and centralization. But the popular Russian press, especially the Russian

nationalist segment of it, had begun a serious campaign against Finnish "separatism." Katkov's Moskovskaia vedomosti led the attack on Finland and demanded full integration of Finland into the Empire. This nationalist campaign and the Finnish counterattacks intensified throughout the rest of Alexander III's reign into a full-scale Finno-Russian press war. With the decline of Russian liberalism, the Finlanders were left more and more on their own to defend their constitution. Under the circumstances, it was natural that the Russian nationalist press would win the debate in Russia, which ultimately led to a want of confidence in Finland by significant numbers of Russians.

As long as Alexander III lived, he was quite able to resist the pressures of the Russian nationalists. He still retained the concept of Imperial rule which saw all people under his dominion treated with more or less the same favour. Unfortunately, Nicholas II was not as strong as his father. He allowed himself to be captured by the nationalists under the pretext that only by integrating Finland would he be following his father's policies of abolishing her special status. At the end of the century, the nationalists persuaded Nicholas to create the conditions whereby the Finnish fundamental laws could be struck down, and with them her autonomy.

The opening attack upon Finland's autonomy by the official government was the appointment of N.I. Bobrikov as Governor-General of Finland, for it was his policy to russify the country. The next major step was inaugurated with the announcement of proposed changes in the military service law. This raised such a storm of protest in Finland that the Russian government began to seek other means to force its will upon the Finlanders. The instrument for this was the February Manifesto, and it caused the complete break between the tsar and Finland. Now Russification was the only solution for the Russian government.

The development of resistance in Finland to these acts of the Russian government went through different stages of development. In the case of the February Manifesto, the Senate and the Extraordinary Diet of 1899 presented their objections to the tsar. When these were rejected, the Great Address was collected for presentation to him. When this too failed, the opposition movement had to try other, less legitimate means. These included various kinds of demonstrations. The press began its campaign of resistance notwithstanding censorship and other types of sanctions. Boycotts of Russians, Russian establishments and Russian sympathizers were begun.

However, not all Finlanders shared this desire to resist. On the one hand, the "Patriots" and Constitutionalists

were in the forefront of the resistance; they were for the most part Svecomen and Young Finns. On the other hand, the Old Finns believed that such a policy of opposition would bring down more repressive measures upon Finland. Their attitude was that compliance would delay the inevitable while resistance would only quicken its course.

Indeed, the Russian government did counter the resistance movement measure for measure. It prohibited public celebrations of national holidays. It began to suppress the newspapers. Moreover, it attempted Russification by making Russian the official language of Finland, introducing Russian postage stamps, and, most particularly, appointing von Plehve as Minister-State Secretary for Finland. In this process of Russification, Finland had been shorn of her defences against Russian interference in her affairs. Since her administrative safeguards were rendered ineffective, Finland had to find other means to protect herself from Russification.

When the Russians introduced the new military conscription law, there arose what came to be termed as passive resistance. This included the refusal of conscripts to report to the military draft boards and the resignations of Finnish officials or their non-compliance in the administration of the conscription law. To coordinate the resistance, the Kagaal, a secret organization of resistance, was founded, and in

certain areas it began to function as an underground government. The success of the passive resistance campaign was quite extraordinary in the first year of operation, but each successive year its effect was lessened.

Nevertheless, this resistance and the growing unrest led to the proclamation of the Dictatorship Manifesto of 1903. This gave Bobrikov wide powers to banish, to close public meetings and otherwise suppress the opposition. Its success led ultimately to the creation of the active resistance movement and Bobrikov's own assassination. At that point, the resistance had won a temporary victory, for a halt was called to the policy of Russification.

Prince Obolenskii was installed as the new governor-general and he proved to be moderate and conciliatory. However, since the tsar refused to withdraw the February Manifesto, the language law and military conscription law, the result was that no reconciliation was possible. This became clear only during the Russo-Japanese War when the activists even went in league with Russia's enemy. Until Finland had recovered at least those rights and privileges she had possessed at the beginning of 1899, there was not much chance left for a peace between Finland and Russia.

The Great Strike of 1905 was instrumental in having the tsar remove all the restrictive legislation imposed during

the Bobrikov era. Finland was declared autonomous according the Russian Constitution of 1906. She was given a Parliament whose members were elected by universal suffrage. The future looked so bright that the Finlanders themselves began to oppose Russian demands for military contributions. Moreover, the power of the Socialists, their Red Guard and the secret Svecomen Voima Liitto frightened the Russian reactionaries and nationalists.

But the breathing spell was very short. The Third Duma was very conservative, and began to look unkindly at Finland. To this were added the policies of Stolypin who wished to draw Finland into a closer union with Russia. Once more Finland was left without an ally in Russia. This time, in 1910, it was to be "Finis Finlandiae!"

In conclusion, Finnish autonomy was tolerated as long as the possession of Finland with its special status was considered to be sufficient security for Russia. Moreover, the tsars continued to preserve Finland's special status as long as they themselves maintained the old Imperial tradition of paternal solicitude for the national minorities. However, once Nicholas II fell in with the Russian nationalist camp, Finland was deprived of the protection of the Imperial guarantor of her constitution and her autonomy. Nevertheless, the Russification of Finnish institutions did not lead to

the Russification of the Finlanders themselves, for even those who accepted administrative Russification were basically hostile to Russia, her culture and her society.

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