TENURE AND PROMOTION EVALUATIONS: ACADEMICS' PERCEPTIONS AT CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES' FACULTIES OF EDUCATION

Saturnin Espoir Ntamba Ndandala

Dept of Integrated Studies in Edudcation

McGill University, Montreal

July 2016

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

ABSTRACT

Up to now, existing studies suggest that there is a dearth of literature on faculty perceptions about performance evaluations, in particular for education professors. Through mixed methods and equity theory of management, the present study identifies the perceptions of education professors about performance evaluations at Canadian universities' education faculties. It outlines which performance appraisals related to tenure and promotion processes across Canadian universities' education faculties function as workplace demotivators. Based on interview and survey findings, this study reveals that education professors are frustrated with the ambiguity of departmental appraisal standards and merit expectations, and the procedural shortcomings of student course evaluations and peer ratings. However, their dissatisfaction with the aforesaid issues does not translate into turnover intentions. On the contrary, education professors from both professorial groups (junior and senior) and sex (male and female) hold retention intentions.

Par l'entremise des méthodes mixtes et la théorie de l'équité du management, la présente étude identifie les perceptions des professeurs d'éducation travaillant dans les facultés d'éducation de certaines universités canadiennes. Elle identifie lesquelles des évaluations de la performance sont des facteurs d'insatisfaction au travail. Les résultats provenant de l'enquête de terrain révèlent que les professeurs d'éducation éprouvent des frustrations envers : (1) l'ambiguïté des standards d'évaluation employés au niveau départemental ; et (2) les faiblesses procédurales ancrées dans les évaluations de cours par les étudiants et les évaluations par les pairs. Cependant, leur insatisfaction à l'égard des facteurs mentionnés ci-dessus ne se traduit pas en intention de quitter leurs emplois. Les professeurs d'éducation, juniors et seniors, hommes et femmes, pensent plutôt rester dans leurs emplois présents.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Yahweh my God and the Author of my success (יהוה הוא אלוהים שלי ואת מחבר ההצלחה שלי) for providing me with the ability and the opportunity to complete the present thesis.

I am grateful to the members of my doctoral committee for their relentless heuristic guidance. I thank Dr. Annie Savard, associate professor at McGill University and Dr. Marybeth Gasman, full professor at the University of Pennsylvania, for their effective and exuberant academic support and mentorship. In addition, I thank Dr. Kevin McDonough, associate professor at McGill University, for his advisory contributions.

I am indebted to my father, Georges Ndandala who passed away before the completion of this work. Thank you, dad for raising me up, paying my tuition fees and being a role model to your dearest son. I would like to also thank papa Jean Pierre and my brother Ramechephar for their love and support.

PREFACE

This doctoral thesis is an original study and is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at McGill University. The research described herein contributes to the field of higher education management in Canada by identifying the perceptions that education professors have about performance evaluations pertaining to the tenure and promotion process. While doing so, it also identifies which components of these performance reviews mostly cause their frustration. Based on study results, the distinct contributions of this thesis are as follows:

(1) It reveals that education professors are frustrated with the inconsistency of appraisal standards and the ambiguity of merit expectations employed at the department level.

(2) It reveals that education professors are somewhat dissatisfied with the shortcomings of student course evaluations and peer ratings.

(3) It establishes that education professors have no intention to depart from their current institution despite perceiving certain shortcomings in performance reviews pertaining to the tenure and promotion process.

So far, the subject of education professors' perceptions on the objectivity of performance evaluations related to the processes of tenure and promotion at Canadian universities' education faculties has never been studied. It is for the first time that this subject is studied from both qualitative and quantitative angles. In total, this thesis is to the best of my knowledge original, except where references and acknowledgments are ascribed to previous scholarly work for literature review purpose. Beside McGill University, the present thesis was not or is not submitted to any other university or institution.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Prior to pursuing a doctorate in higher education management at McGill, I completed three masters' degrees in France and Canada. The first one was in the sociology of organizations and was completed at the Universite Paris-Sorbonne. The second one was in management and was completed at the Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne. The last one was in theology and was completed at the University of Toronto, precisely at Trinity College. Two of these three post-graduate degrees have influenced my interest in studying the organizational behaviour of academics. During the completion of these two degrees, I wrote two dissertations on the issues of employment. In the first dissertation, I examined the impact of the labour market segmentation on the career paths of young South Africans. Findings from that dissertation showed that young South Africans working in the formal sector of the economy were satisfied with their career choice. Whereas their peers employed in the informal sector of the economy were dissatisfied with the orientation of their career. In the second dissertation, I employed Polanyi's social embeddedness theory to investigate the impact of social capital on employees' career mobility. Findings from that study suggested that informal workplace socialization partly affected their attitude and career advancement. At a meeting with Dr. Ralf St Clair, my potential supervisor for my doctoral studies at McGill, he spoke to me about the challenges that academics experience to be tenured. His description of the social reality of the academe led me to study the limitations of tenure and promotion processes. Although he left McGill before I started my doctoral studies, his

perspective on tenure and my expertise in organizational behaviour convinced me of the value of studying the problems that faculty encounter in their academic career trajectories. That is why education professors' perceptions about performance evaluations were chosen as a subject of study.

1.1 The problematic of university merit-based system

Existing studies suggest that performance evaluations related to tenure and promotion processes are management practices which derived from the implementation of the merit-based academic system (Buller, 2012) across Canadian universities. Merit refers to job performance and the quality of being worthy, especially so as to deserve reward (Aarts, 2014). While the academic merit-based system refers to the process of hiring and promoting faculty members based on their job performance. This system denotes the idea that faculty members must be promoted on the basis of their individual merit alone. It reduces the recognition of professorial achievement in an ethos of quantitative indices (Winkler, 2000). Ideally, it represents a selection habitus in which academics are led to work harder to keep their job. As stated by Buller (2012), its functional purpose is to hold academics accountable. However, some researchers have contended that this system presents some limitations. For instance, in their paper on the factors which contribute to academic career mobility, Lutter and Schroder (2016) found that tenure and promotion achievement is not only influenced by the individual merit, but also by social capital and symbolic capital. For example, network size and individual reputation also matter in being promoted (Lutter & Schroder, 2016). Existing studies suggest that the processes of tenure and promotion are far from being perfect and embed procedural shortcomings. One of the procedural

shortcomings was identified by Gravestock (2011) in her study of the problematic of student evaluations of teaching in Canadian universities. Her findings suggested that the reports of students on the measurement of teaching effectiveness are not always objective. However, the scope of her study was limited because it did not include other types of performance evaluations such as peer evaluations and other forms of external evaluations,..etc. It does not provide a full portrait of the procedural shortcomings that faculty across Canadian universities may be encountering. Besides the issue of shortcomings in performance evaluations, a study conducted by two Canadian education scholars, Henry and Tator (2012) on tenure and promotion inequalities reveals that the processes of evaluation across Canadian universities cause considerable apprehension (Jones et al., 2012) among junior and senior professors alike, and is still cumbersome for all professors to navigate (Brown & Sherry, 2010). Brown and Sherry (2010) argued that the road to tenure is complex, and universities require faculty members to meet a variety of merit expectations which are not always clearly defined in the university tenure and promotion policies. In addition, the institutional environment wherein faculty members apply for tenure and promotion is competitive and stressful. Brown and Sherry's claim is further supported by Henry and Tator (2012). Their findings suggest that promotions from associate professor to full professor are difficult to achieve. A qualitative study conducted in the US by Williams (2016) on the uncertainty of the path to full professorship reaches the same conclusion as Henry and Tator. Reflecting on the lived experience of his participants with promotion processes, Williams (2016) stated that the advancement to full professorship stands in sharp contrast to what is required to achieve tenure. His participants who were associate professors complained that the path to full professorship was difficult to understand and ambiguous. Williams' (2016) findings state that associate professors felt that the merit expectations required for further

promotions were murkier. Because of this perceived procedural complexity, some of them gave up the idea of applying for promotion. Others decided to postpone their promotion application for many years because they felt that they were not ready to do that. A scrutiny of Williams' (2016) study on US senior academics' attitude clearly implies that the ambiguity of evaluation standards has an impact on the decisions that faculty members make about their career advancement. What Williams' findings also tell us is that a consideration of academic status in studying performance evaluations is necessary. By academic status I mean tenure-track and tenured professors.

1.2 The dearth of studies on academics' appraisal perceptions in Canada

In Canada, the dearth of studies on faculty perceptions about tenure and promotion evaluations remains a subject of constant debate among education scholars. Badali (2004), a professor and dean of Mount Saint-Vincent University's Faculty of Education, states that there are not enough studies pertaining to education faculties in Canadian higher education literature. Acker, Webber and Smyth (2012) think that tenure is still a highly-debated topic within the academy. Their study on the complexity of the tenure processes at 7 Ontario universities, indicates that flaws exist in the review processes. Although their findings were only limited to tenure issues at 7 institutions and not to promotion issues, their study provides a critical portrait of tenure that strengthens the need to further investigate faculty experiences with its process. As they conclude, "our results suggest that there is a good reason to investigate directly – as we will do in future publications based on the next phase of our project – how early-career academics in Canada experience the tenure process and whether there is evidence of difficult circumstances and

institutional micro-inequities for some but not others" (Acker et al., 2012). Their argument suggests that the experience of academics with the tenure and the promotion processes has not been extensively studied in Canada. In the same vein, Weinrib, Jones, Metcalfe, Fisher, Gingras, Rubenson and Snee whose research interests focus primarily on higher education in Canada raises the same concern. In their paper on Canadian academics' perceptions, they state that there has been little research on our understanding of faculty organizational behaviour (Weinrib et al, 2013). The dearth of literature on academics' experience with the tenure and the promotion processes does not only transpire in the Canadian higher education literature. It is also apparent that universities do not undertake enough studies to explore how academic performance evaluations are perceived by faculty members. Findings from a study conducted by Wolfgang, Gupchuk and Plate (1995) on US pharmacy faculty members' perceptions of performance evaluations outline this problem as well. Based on their analysis of the survey responses of 197 participants, they stated that universities are not that much interested in surveying their academic personnel's opinions. They also suggested that performance evaluations were perceived as workplace demotivators by pharmacy academics. In other words, performance evaluations are a source of stress and job dissatisfaction. In the same vein, Gmelch et al. (1987) argued that professional recognition and rewards are a primary source of faculty stress. Since performance evaluations cause academics' workplace stress and that education professors' perceptions of these evaluations have not been extensively explored, the present study attempts to contribute to filling that gap. Given that merit expectations can vary from one department to another, and that universities are comprised of multiple academic faculties, this study has selected to focus only on faculties of education.

1.3 Why is it significant to study education faculties and education professors' perceptions?

Badali's (2004) remark on the dearth of studies on education faculties in Canada provides a rationale for why education professors are a subject of greater interest in this study. Badali states that Canadian scholars have devoted relatively little attention to the study of education faculties. He points out that in Canada, education professors consider that in comparison to engineering, management and medical professors, they are not adequately rewarded for their academic work (Badali, 2004). Their consternation is directed to the fact they are less paid than other academics despite the institutionalization of a merit-based system. In comparison to other academic faculties, education faculties are new. Badali's argument shows that it is important to consider education professors as a subject of inquiry. That is why in the present study, education professors are employed as the main variable. To date, the few studies on education faculties that exist were conducted decades ago. One of them is an article published in 1987 by Gambell in the *Canadian Journal of Education.* His analysis of the survey responses of 73 education professors at the University of Saskatchewan indicates that organizational issues such as the writing skills of students affected his participants' perceptions (Gambell, 1987). Although limited in its scope, Gambel's study shows that education professors are not indifferent to the issues that they encounter in their workplace settings. Like other academics whose experience with promotion and tenure processes entails narratives of frustration (Gentry, 2015), it is logical to assume that education professors may also be concerned with the problem of procedural shortcomings in the appraisal of their merit. In a scholarly context where debates on the need to address shortcomings in the processes of tenure and promotion continue to echo, it is important to hear what education professors think about the objectivity of performance evaluations. Another study that shows why education professors' perceptions of tenure and promotion evaluations are significant to be

explored is provided in Henry and Tator's research article (2012) on inequalities in the tenure process. Outlining the causes of tenure inequalities across Canadian universities, Henry and Tator (2012) stated that promotion from associate professor to full professor is more difficult to achieve than getting a tenure status. Their assertion implies that senior faculty may harbour different opinions about performance evaluations. And that their belief may not necessarily be homogeneous to the opinions held by junior faculty. Rousseau (1989), a professor of organizational behaviour at Carnegie Mellon University with expertise in organizational climate, suggests in her article on the antecedents of employees' job dissatisfaction that employees are more likely to be frustrated when they perceive that the processes of merit recognition are not objective enough. A consideration of Rousseau's rationale implies that education professors like any other employees may also be concerned with the objectivity of their merit appraisal.

Another reason is provided by Sa et al. (2011), Wyn et al. (2000) and Tierney (2001). Sa et al's (2011) empirical study on the institutional strategies of faculties of education in Canada points out that problems exist within education faculties, particularly on the issue of knowledge mobilization. It indicates that institutional barriers such as resource limitations and the lack of measurable targets and outcomes demotivate education professors in putting more effort into the dissemination of their research. Findings from Sa et al's study implies that organizational barriers act as workplace demotivators in Canadian education faculties. However, their findings are limited and do not tell us what these organisational barriers are. They don't suggest that performance evaluations related to tenure and promotion are perceived as such by education professors. Furthermore, a comparative study published by Wyn, Acker and Richards (2000) on

women in management in Australian and Canadian faculties of education provides a critical portrait of education faculties. Drawing on their in-depth interviews with eight women in Canada and nine women in Australia who held management positions in faculties of education, these three researchers concluded that education faculties are a hostile environment to work in. Vetting processes are biased and the participants cited incidents of unfair treatment during appraisal processes. Incidents of unfair evaluations were identified by these three researchers as a source of participants' frustration. Parallel to Sa et al (2011) and Wyn et al. (2000), Tierney (2001), a professor of higher education at the University of Southern California contends in his book that the academic culture within education faculties is undergoing a constant change but not in a way that is beneficial to the welfare of education professors. He argues that education faculties need to clarify and to develop new standards for promotion and tenure evaluations (Tierney, 2001). Education faculties have their own micro-evaluation criteria which differ from those applied in faculties of science or medicine.

Informed by the findings of existing studies on the limitations of tenure and promotion processes and the dearth of literature on education faculties in Canada, my research study aims to explore education professors' perceptions on the objectivity of performance evaluations. Particularly, it aims to determine the shortcomings that education professors perceive in those appraisals. Workplace demotivators mean organizational factors that may cause job dissatisfaction among education professors. In contrast to Gravestock (2011), whose study on tenure and promotion evaluations across Canadian universities is only limited to teaching evaluations, this study seeks to go much further than Gravestock's research on academic evaluations.

Ochola (2008), a researcher on career mobility among faculty members contends that academic rank matters when it comes to looking at the questions of turnover intentions. His findings suggest that junior professors were more likely to leave their institution than senior professors. During their probationary appointment, when junior professors perceive that their chance of achieving tenure is minimal, they are more prone to involuntarily develop departure intentions (Zhou, 2001). Before Ochola's paper, Telly, Wendell and Scott's (1971) research on turnover intentions among US non-academic workers indicated that there is a clear link between perceptions of injustice and turnover among employees. Two decades earlier than Ochola, Baldwin (1990), a professor at Michigan State University argued that there is a differential level in the development of turnover intentions among academics. He stated that in the US, junior professors were more likely to intend to leave their institution than their senior peers. Taking into consideration Ochola (2008), Baldwin (1990) and Telly et al's (1971) findings on turnover intentions among US academics, the components of academic rank and turnover intentions are employed as variables in my study. The purpose of doing so is to determine whether turnover intentions (Kim et al., 2013; Rosser, 2004; Zhou & Volkwein, 2004; NCES, 1997) are more frequent among junior education professors than senior education professors across Canadian universities' education faculties. To address the purpose of this study, the following research questions are answered in this thesis' results:

1-How is merit defined in the tenure and promotion policies of unionized and non-unionized Canadian universities' education faculties?

2- What are the perceptions of education professors on tenure and promotion performance evaluations?

3-Considering their perceptions, which group (junior and senior) of education professors is more likely to develop turnover intentions?

The aforesaid questions were designed considering what existing studies say about the inconsistency of appraisal standards, the limitation of performance evaluations and turnover intentions differential among academics. Shortcomings in tenure and promotion processes are further discussed in the literature chapter, including why the institutional status is considered in this study.

1.4 Definitions of terms

The following definitions consist of the main terms used in this study and have been useful to make this study comprehensible to readers.

Education professors refer to tenure-track faculty members who are in tenure-track and tenured positions in faculties of education. Specifically speaking, it refers to assistant professors, associate professors and full professors (Shamos, 2002). Assistant professors are the junior education professors who are still in their probationary period and are still navigating the processes of tenure. Senior education professors are associate professors who already tenured and may or may not be seeking promotion to full professorship. Full professors are also senior education professors who have already been awarded the status of full professorship as the terminal level of the academic ranking.

Faculty of education refers to a network of academic departments of education operating at one specific university. Depending on the orientation of the university, the network can be composed of departments of educational psychology, educational administration, curriculum studies and teaching, second language acquisition, etc. It is usually headed by a dean in concert with the department chairs of each affiliated department. Each department is managed independently and has its own set of merit expectations. Usually, the department has its own tenure and evaluation committee and has the power to vet and recommend candidates for tenure or promotion to the faculty tenure and promotion committee. In turn, the faculty tenure and promotion committee has the power to evaluate and to recommend a candidate to the university board of tenure and promotion evaluation. The process of tenure and promotion is further discussed in chapter 2. Across Canada, the mission of education faculties is to primarily teach and train new elementary teachers, secondary teachers, educational administrators and educational psychologists. Besides offering vocational training to undergraduate and graduate students, the mission of education faculties consists also of disseminating new knowledge to the academic world. Scholarly activities and research are produced through the work of education professors and post-graduate students. At these institutions, educational programs can range from teaching certificates, bachelor degrees to doctoral degrees. In the present study, only education faculties offering doctoral programs are considered as subjects of inquiry because I do not have sufficient funding to explore all types of educational institutions. In addition, it will require tremendous time to collect data across all academic faculties. It will be less feasible to extensively analyze all field data within a reasonable time frame.

Unionized and non-unionized Canadian universities collectively refer to Canadian doctoral degree-granting institutions as defined by the *Association of Canadian Universities and Colleges (AUCC).* They serve as institutional covariates in my study. Unionized universities refer to institutions with faculty collective agreements, where the bargaining rights of professors are defended by faculty unions (Baer, 2003). Non-unionized universities refer to institutions with non-certified agreements (Baer, 2003). In this study, these agreements are referred to as tenure and promotion regulations. These institutions are mostly public universities, funded by the provincial and federal government (Fanelli, 2015).

Tenure and Promotion refer to the career transition of education professors after the probationary period. Tenure confers the status of permanency or an irreversible appointment in the professoriate; entitlement to job security and academic freedom (Tierney, 2004). Promotion signifies appointment to tenured positions, such as associate professors and full professors. A reflection on tenure and promotion is further provided in chapter (2).

Satisfaction and dissatisfaction refer to perceptions that education professors have about the process and outcome of tenure and promotion performance reviews. Broadly speaking, satisfaction denotes the positive emotional state and self-actualization of employees (Glicken & Robinson, 2013; Locke, 1976), in relation to the fairness and unfairness of performance reviews. Dissatisfaction refers to frustrations caused by perceived unfairness in procedural evaluations and reward distributions (Herzberg, 1966; Adams, 1965). Both terms are used as dependent variables in my study.

Performance evaluations refer to merit expectations, student course evaluations, peer ratings, external evaluations, and the dossier evaluations that are done by department and university tenure and promotion committees. They are used as tools to decide whether a candidate deserve to be tenured or promoted to full-professorship (Trower, 2009; Altbach, 2016; Hahn & Doganaksoy, 2012). Broadly speaking, performance evaluations are merit metrics used to measure employee high performance. Across universities, outcomes deriving from performance evaluations inform university decision making on matters of faculty layoff and retention. The practices of performance evaluations emerge from the neoliberal discourse of new managerialism espoused by Canadian universities since the 1980s. They are an outcome of the corporatization of higher education whose value is associated with new managerialism (Kim and Holzer, 2016).

1.5 Thesis outline

The present study is structured in 7 chapters. **Chapter 1** introduces the rationale from which this thesis topic is based upon. Based on existing literature, it argues why a study of education faculties and education professors' perceptions in relation to the processes of tenure and promotion matters. In addition, it states what it is the purpose of this thesis. It also defines the main terms or concepts employed in the thesis.

Chapter 2 provides the literature review and describes the problematic of performance evaluations as debated in existing management studies. From a historical perspective, it describes the historical antecedents that led to the creation of the system of tenure. Along the same lines, it outlines the processes of tenure and promotion. It explains the function of tenure and states the

shortcomings of academic performance evaluations as identified in existing higher education studies. Along the same lines, this chapter describes the university neoliberal culture and the corporatization of campus as the environment context in which the merit of education professors is evaluated. Based on existing higher education and management studies, it argues why the academic status (junior professors and senior professors) and the institutional status (unionized universities' education faculties and non-unionized universities' education faculties) matter in the study of education professors' workplace attitude. Chapter 2 also describes the organizational theory employed in the interpretation of findings in depth.

Chapter 3 presents the result of the first research question. It considers the factor of institutional status to explore differentials of merit definition in university tenure and promotion policies. Chapter 4 discusses the methodology of this study. It describes how data were collected including the analysis of these data. **Chapter 5** delineates the interview and survey findings related to education professors' perceptions of performance evaluations at unionized universities. While **Chapter 6** reports the interview and survey findings related to education professors' perceptions of performance evaluations at non-unionized universities, **Chapter 7** discusses the implications of all findings and concludes the thesis.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Performance evaluations as seen by management scientists

Before delving into existing tenure and promotion literature, it is important to situate the scholarly discourse held by management researchers about performance evaluations. The discourse which emerges from existing management literature is that employee acceptance of performance evaluations is related to justice perceptions. A cross-sectional study conducted by Kim and Holzer (2016) on public employees' reaction to performance evaluations reveals that employee acceptance of performance appraisal is associated with their trust in the objectivity of personnel evaluators. Kim and Holzer argue that no matter how valid and accurate the performance standards are, the absence of employee trust in their evaluator would negatively affect employees' perceptions of performance evaluations (Kim & Holzer, 2016). Findings of a study conducted by Swiercz et al. (2012) through principal component analysis on the perceptions of 230 public employees suggest that the prevalence of procedural justice in performance evaluations increases employees' organizational commitment and job satisfaction. They found that the process of the evaluations was more important to employees than the outcomes which derive from them. Likewise, Sabeen and Mehboob contend that if employees believe the procedure itself is fair, they may be willing to accept some injustice in the outcomes (Swiercz et al., 2012). In contrast, the lack of procedural justice in the procedures and practices of evaluations lead to appraisal aversion than appraisal acceptance. Here procedural justice means that the process of evaluation practices is fair and objective.

On a similar note, Roberts and Pregitzer (2007) argue that providing a transparent and verifiable performance management system in which employees understand the criteria, standards, and the process is imperative. They allude that the following determinants cause employee performance appraisal aversion: (1) rating bias, (2) hypocrisy, (3) poor informal feedback, (4) poor formal feedback, (5) rater errors, and (6) rater appraisal-self appraisal mismatch. Rating bias refers to arbitrary judgement, and hypocrisy signifies the politicization of merit recognition. Poor informal feedback means negative feedback provided by colleagues. Poor formal feedback refers to negative or insufficient feedback provided by evaluation committees. Rater errors mean mistakes made by formal evaluators. Rater appraisal-self appraisal mismatch refers to employee self-evaluation of his/her work output in comparison with the evaluations provided by other raters. Employees dislike performance evaluations when they judge that they are not entirely rated with greater objectivity. The aversion of performance evaluations lowers their job satisfaction and leads employees to develop turnover intentions (Roberts & Pregitzer, 2007). Hypocrisy transpires when managers or evaluators do not follow and respect the meritocratic criteria defined in organisational policies. The contradiction between meritocratic criteria and evaluation practices erodes employees' confidence in the system of performance evaluations.

The lack of constructive and positive feedback which can help them to improve the quality of their work output indicates that performance communication between the management and employees is poor. Formal and informal feedback are negatively perceived by the employees when lower performance ratings are not supported by clear evidence. Roberts and Pregitzer (2007) state that when the employees judge that their managers have failed to provide them with enough evidence to why their performance level has been underrated, they were more likely to develop an aversion attitude towards performance evaluations. This again shows that objectivity

in all aspects of performance evaluations, whether in terms of evaluation practices and the communication of evaluation results is important to employees. Finally, Roberts and Pregitzer argue that a mismatch between employees' self-evaluation and the ratings provided by managers negatively and any third party affect their perceptions on appraisal objectivity. Such a mismatch occurs because employees have also a tendency to highly self-rate their work performance (Roberts & Pregitzer, 2007). In other words, while most factors leading to performance appraisal aversion are intrinsic to the practices and processes of performance evaluations, not all are. Some of them are extrinsic and can be ascribed to employees' self-expectations and ratings. Drawing from the rationale of Kim and Holzer (2016), Swiercz et al. (2012), and Roberts and Pregitzer's (2007) studies, the present study examines whether the same implications stated by these researchers also transpire among education professors.

2.2 The historical background of tenure

Talking about the limitations of tenure and promotion evaluation processes will not make any sense without providing the historical background of tenure. The granting of academic tenure started in 1158 in medieval Europe (Cameron, 2010). A protection edict issued by the Holy Roman emperor Frederick Barbarossa to some of his contemporary scholars inspired medieval universities to do likewise. However, from that time to the nineteenth century, tenure was still not well institutionalized within the walls of the academy as it is today. It was issued through ecclesiastical patronage and could be terminated by the church authority for any reason. In the US, the institutionalisation of tenure was only initiated at the beginning of the twentieth century. *The 1915 Declaration of Principles of AAUP (Association of American University Professors)* is

the major policy which gave birth to the system of tenure (Cameron, 2010). Horn (2015) states that in Canada, tenure was institutionalized to protect academics against arbitrary dismissal. Performance evaluations were introduced in the process of tenure and promotion (Proulx, 2010) with the intent of enhancing procedural justice in academe. Procedural justice refers to the fairness and the objectivity of the processes by which decisions are made (Dailey & Kirk, 1992; Martin & Bennett, 1996; Ochola, 2008). In contrast to medieval era and the nineteenth century, the tenure path was now conceived and defined as a democratic process that all academics could aspire to navigate. It could only be granted to academics after a probationary period and the appraisal of their performance level (Horn, 2015). Promotion to full professorship was reserved for those who have already achieved tenure and worked for more years in academia. For many academics, tenure and promotion were now perceived as an ultimate career goal to achieve and a symbol of self-actualization and collegial recognition. Aiming to protect their academic freedom, Canadian academics created a professional association, the *CAUT (Canadian Association of University Teachers)* in 1951 (Horn, 2015). A professional association is a non-unionized organization of employees who exercise the same profession. Although the system of tenure became normative, in the 1970s, debates emerged on its value. To date, there are still ongoing debates between its supporters and those want it to be replaced by job contracts as practiced in non-academic institutions. The nature of these ongoing debates is further discussed in Cameron's (2010) article. Cameron states that tenure remains a critical issue in contemporary higher education, with many young professors and administrators criticizing the system as the number of faculty tenure issuances and tenure-track positions decrease (Cameron, 2010). Although debates around its benefit continue to be engaged through interposed scholarly literature, tenure remains a tradition that is not going to disappear soon. Most full-time academics continue to

consider it essential because it grants them the right to exercise their research work without fear of unjust dismissal. For them, tenure still represents a symbol of academic career mobility which comes with a promise of job security and academic freedom. However, in a new organizational context where neoliberal norms and corporatized management practices have become the dominant management habitus, achieving tenure and full professorship has become more competitive than ever before (Buller, 2012).

2.3 The function of tenure

The function of tenure extends beyond providing academic freedom to faculty members. Academic freedom (Gariepy, 2015) means that they have "full freedom in research and in the publication of the results" as well as "freedom in the classroom in discussing their subject (Anonymous, 2016). As stated by de Montigny, a tenure status communicates an affirmation of the membership and place of faculty among a community of scholars, to engage in the work of teaching and research (de Montingy, 2011). Chait (2009) provides an understanding of tenure which goes beyond the above definition. By studying the role of tenure in university governance across 8 universities, he found that tenure is not just a matter of job performance and job security (Chait, 2009). It also encompasses a pattern of faculty power and legitimation. His findings indicate that with tenure comes an increase of faculty participation in university governance. It empowers academics and influences the dynamics of decision making within universities in a way that academics are not entirely left at the periphery of power. It contributes to the normalization of power relations between academics and university administrators. In a sense, Chait's research findings denote the function of tenure in terms of enhancing institutional

democracy within universities. While that may be true, the ongoing erosion of tenure as debated in existing higher education literature points a dire picture of university governance that is shifting from collegiality to a corporatized management style. In agreement with Chait's claim, de Montigy provides a rationale which also substantiates the significance of tenure. In that article, de Montigny contends that tenure is a fundamental element for ensuring the right of each faculty member to participate in the rich social and collegial relations that make a university (de Montingy, 2011). Besides its democratic value as shown in Chait's book, tenure also bears an economic value. A 2015 study of medicine and chemistry's 6 million research abstracts conducted by Foster, Rzhetsky and Evans suggests that tenure makes academics more willing to conduct innovative research than conservative research. In explicit terms, tenure affects academics' organizational decisions and workplace behaviour to the extent of influencing them to partake in spin-off research studies (Anonymous, 2016). Spin-off research means scholarly activities that bring financial gains to universities in the form of research funding and patent royalties. Furthermore, tenure also carries a pedagogical value (Anonymous, 2016). It influences the quality of teaching. It improves the quality of classroom instruction and is beneficial to faculty members, students and universities at large. This year, a survey study was conducted by a group of anonymous scholars to measure the impact of tenure on teaching (Anonymous, 2016). The result of that study shows that full-time faculty members are more likely than their part-time colleagues to experiment innovative teaching methods (66 to 56 percent) in the classroom and to teach content that challenges students' understanding (48 to 40 percent) of their social world (Anonymous, 2016).

2.4 The process of tenure and promotion as described in existing higher education literature

The process of tenure and promotion is described here to situate the procedural context in which the performance of full-time academics is measured. Firstly, studies indicate that in general, tenure and promotion processes are structured on two models, the procedural model and the judgment model (Matusov & Hampel, 2008). The procedural model is characterized by specific measures of assessing the quality of a candidate's scholarship. The judgment model refers to a process where the merit of the scholarship under review is primarily decided by departmental colleagues (Matusov & Hampel, 2008). Some Canadian researchers (Gravestock & Greenleaf, 2008; Jones, 2001) indicate that Canadian universities have a single set of tenure-track faculty ranks. With a tripartite hierarchy, the ranks of assistant professor, associate professor and full professor constitute this set. For junior professors, the position of assistant professor is an entry level and a probationary position that is not linked to a perennial appointment or job security. The transition from assistant professor to associate professor usually takes 3 to 5 years. During the transition or probationary period, junior professors are annually or biannually reviewed through a 'progress toward tenure' report (Bess & Dee, 2012; Whicker et al., 1993). Annual performance reviews are done with the intent of informing the candidate on the degree to which his or her current efforts are likely to result in tenure and on the changes perceived by the department as necessary to achieve tenure (Bess & Dee, 2012). The department chair in concert with the departmental committee is responsible for monitoring pre-tenure annual reviews. University tenure and promotion committees only evaluate a candidate when the dossier is processed for a final appraisal (Clark, 2003). Annual reviews and final tenure evaluations represent a great concern for junior professors (Gravestock, 2011) because their reappointment depends on the outcomes of these evaluations (Speight, 2015). In comparison to senior professors, junior professors are concerned with final pre-tenure performance reviews (Jones et al., 2012; Sorcilleni, 1992). As stated by Gravestock (2011), while faculty members undergo substantial reviews during their probationary period, it is at the tenure

juncture that their teaching, research and, to a somewhat lesser degree, service contributions are most thoroughly assessed. Yet, for senior and junior professors alike, the process of tenure and promotion inspires anxiety (Jones et al., 2012; Henry & Tator, 2012). Reza Nakhaie (2013), a professor of sociology at the University of Windsor, and a researcher in inequalities relating to the tenure processes wrote that over the years, the tenure and promotion processes have inspired fear and trepidation for many applicants. That is why this study compares the perceptions of junior and senior education professors about tenure and promotion performance evaluations. Yet existing studies also indicate that it is rarer to be denied tenure in Canadian universities (Rubenstein, 2000) than in US universities.

Promotion to associate professor necessitates department tenure committees' positive recommendations. Secondly, the university tenure and promotion committee must provide a positive evaluation of a candidate's dossier. Tenuring someone necessitates appraisals because such decision can cost the university about $3,000,000 in paid wages during 40 years (Bess & Dee, 2012; Perlmutter, 2010). In addition to the financial cost, there is a concern about the input or research value that the candidate will add to the academic performance of a department. Lastly, the granting of tenure and promotion is decided by the board of governors and university president (Nakhaie, 2013) after receiving positive recommendations from the university tenure and promotion committee (Clark, 2003). However, even though rarer, some researchers (De Montigny, 2011; Perlmutter, 2010; Jones et al., 2004) claim that university presidents have often denied tenure or promotion despite positive evaluations. Once tenure is granted, the candidate is guaranteed academic freedom and job security (Ochola, 2008; Campbell, 1981). If tenure is not granted, the probationary appointment of the candidate is terminated (Acker et al., 2012). Failing to be tenured is

accompanied with the stigma of not measuring up, a sense of embarrassment among those who have been denied tenure (Gravestock & Greenleaf, 2008).

Concerning promotion to full professorship, an associate professor who undergoes post-tenure performance evaluations can be promoted after at least 4 years of academic work at the associate professor level to the rank of full professor (Twale, 2013). Although promotion from assistant professor to associate professor is often successful, few faculty members are promoted to full-professorship and some do not apply for this promotion (Nakhaie, 2013). Unlike junior professors, the appointment of senior professors who are not promoted to full professorship is not terminated because the latter already have an irreversible tenure status (O'Toole et al., 1979). Does this imply that even if unsatisfied with outcomes of post-tenure evaluations, senior education professors may be less likely inclined to develop turnover intent because of their tenure and job security? This question is explored in my research because up till now, higher education literature has focused more on the tenure process than on promotion to full professor status (Crawford et al., 2012; Mabrouk, 2007). Doing so is significant because post-tenure appraisals are more developmental than decisional (Dun et al., 2010). In other words, post-tenure appraisals focus more on measuring the job performance of senior professors than on revoking their tenure. Yet Dun et al. (2010) argue that in universities where post-tenure performance reviews are practiced, senior faculty often view the exercise as threatening and of limited value. Within the same paradigm, O'Meara's (2004) findings on the unionization of US faculty indicate that senior professors perceive post-tenure evaluations more as a nuisance rather than as a scholarly form of continuous quality improvement.

2.5 The inconsistency of tenure and promotion evaluation criteria

Previous studies have reported that criteria for tenure and promotion are not always clear (James, 2015; Wicker et at., 1993). Thus, an outline of the inconsistencies of tenure and promotion evaluation criteria helps me to explore whether these inconsistencies cause dissatisfaction and turnover intentions among junior and senior education professors. Citing the ambiguity of evaluation criteria, James (2015) points out that the criteria considered for granting tenure are stated in university tenure regulations. But these criteria are not always consistent and clearly outlined in full details. In some collective agreements, the considerations are spelt out for the tenure committee's direction, while in others the tenure committee must provide its own definitions (Campbell, 1981). Wicker et al. (1993) also stated that although tenure criteria are written for prospective tenure candidates to peruse, the operational standards to meet the criteria are not. Standards in assessing tenure and promotion criteria are often inconsistent (James, 2015; Wicker et al., 1993). Because of crucial differences among academic disciplines, tenure or promotion reviews and considerations can vary from one department to another (James, 2015: 51). Haney (2012), Gravestock and Greenleaf (2008), Dileo (2005), Zhou (2001), Hopkins (1990) and Mingle & Lenth (1989) argue in their publications that in addition to such inconsistency, not all criteria are valued and objectively assessed. They claim that universities often tend to place a higher value on research output rather than on teaching and service. Service is not always highly valued and taken into consideration in tenure and promotion decisions (Luchs et al., 2012). For example, findings from critical studies (Bazeau, 2003; Antonio et al., 2000) conducted on the system of tenure in the US show that the objectivity of performance evaluations is somewhat blurred by the fact that service is not adequately evaluated. Similarly, Iqbal (2014) whose research paper pertained to shortcomings in peer evaluations argues that the principle of objectivity is not always pervasive in the process of evaluations (Canon, 2001). Performance evaluations are conducted within the context of a competitive academic culture where academics are often prone to underrate their colleagues' output. For example, when

studying the limitations of peer ratings in US universities, Crase and Crase (1976) reported that, with pressure to succeed, some faculty members have competitive attitudes and would welcome the opportunity to underrate their colleagues. The shortcomings of performance evaluations related to the tenure and the promotion process are further discussed below.

2.6 The limitations of performance evaluations as stated in existing higher education literature

Peer ratings and external evaluations are based on judgment method and procedural method. Both rating methods play an important role in determining the merit of a candidate's research input. During peer ratings, the candidate's course materials, student evaluation of teaching, publications, grant writings and competency in the discipline are evaluated (Schachtsiek, 1994; Iqbal, 2014). Peer reviewers use narrative reports such as questionnaires, evaluation forms, personal statement and reference forms (O'Connell, 2015). However, Schachtsiek's (1994) findings on professors of nursing in Illinois universities indicate that peer evaluators are not always trained in doing appraisals. Sharing the same concern, Iqbal (2014) argues that in Canadian universities, faculty members are conducting peer reviews "blindly", without any objective (i.e., research-informed) criteria or standards upon which to base their evaluations (Iqbal, 2014). Could the lack of training in best evaluation practices imply that peer ratings cannot be absolutely considered reliable when recognizing a candidate's scholarly merit?

Upon the request of the department head, external evaluations are written by external senior professors (Kelsky, 2011). Although external evaluations are requested by departments, little is known (Schlozman, 1998) about the extent to which external ratings properly measure a candidate's performance. Schlozman (1998) points out that little is known about whether these outside letters are used appropriately, whether they contribute to the making of decisions that are fair and professional. From the criticism provided in the

existing literature, readers can agree with me that peer ratings and external ratings cannot be perceived being free of any discrepancy. As it stands now, no substantial studies have been conducted to date on how education professors in Canadian universities perceive peer ratings' processes. Without a proper study on this subject, it is hard to know whether peer ratings and external ratings cause satisfaction or dissatisfaction among these academics. Therefore, it is also important to explore what education professors think about the objectivity of these ratings. Denisi et al. (1983) contend that peer ratings represent a problem to faculty members in the US. US professors who felt that they have been poorly rated by their colleagues were dissatisfied with peer ratings' outcomes. Negative peer ratings significantly caused lower satisfaction among them (Denisi et al., 1983). In addition, negative peer ratings engendered a conflictual workplace socialization among faculty members (Denisi et al., 1983).

In Berk's book *Top 10 Flashpoints in Student Ratings and the Evaluation of Teaching (2013),* the issue of the limitation of student evaluations of teaching is raised. Berk (2013) claims that university administrations commit serious mistakes when using normed student ratings to rank faculty for tenure and promotion decisions. His argument implies that students do not always objectively evaluate their university teachers. For example, Davis (2013), Cramer and Alexitch's study (2000) findings on academics' lived experience suggest that student course evaluations are influenced by systemic biases. Davis's (2013) findings show that students were more prone to underrate women faculty and minority faculty than white male faculty. Explicitly speaking, race and sex as non-meritocratic factors had a negative effect on the processes and outcomes of student ratings. In addition, a study done by Crawford and MacLeod (1990) on the effect of classroom size on student ratings suggests that professors who teach larger classes were more likely to be negatively rated by students than those lecturing in smaller classes. Professors with more teaching experience, and who scheduled more office hours with students, received more positive evaluations (Cramer & Alexitch, 2000). Davis, Crawford and MacLeod's research findings imply that student course

ratings do not entirely represent an objective metric for teaching effectiveness. Arguing against the validity of student course evaluations, researchers (Seiden, 1984; Bures et al., 1990; Richer, 1996) pointed out that students cannot accurately rate the teaching effectiveness of their professors. For Herbert Marsh (1987), student ratings which constitute one measure of teaching effectiveness are difficult to validate since there is no single criterion of effective teaching. To date, the prevalence of bias in student ratings of teaching continues to raise doubts among certain scholars on whether student course evaluations are fair, and should be trusted and considered as one of the metrics of performance (Driscoll and Cadden, 2010). Given that the outcomes of student course evaluations are considered for tenure and promotion, a scrutiny of these teaching metrics in relation with education professors' perceptions of appraisal objectivity can enrich the scope of this study.

2.7 The effect of academic status on turnover intentions

In addition to the rationale provided in the introduction chapter about the significance of academic status in perception differential among faculty, I have drawn upon the following literature to further argue why the variables of junior education professors and senior education professors are used in this study. To begin with, it is important to provide a comprehensive definition of turnover intentions. This concept is broadly defined as departure intentions, precisely a measurement of whether an employee intends to leave his or her organization (Curtis, 2016; Telly et al., 1971). Curtis (2016) argues that turnover intentions, like turnover itself, can be either voluntary or involuntary. To put it simply, turnover intentions refer to the thought that an individual develops in relation to his interaction with other social actors and the outside world. Through the lens of Schopenhauer's critique of the Kantian philosophy (Tsanoff, 2016), turnover

intentions could be considered as the noumena, “that which is thought”. While the actual turnover, the act of leaving an institution can be considered the phenomenon, things as they exist apart from their existence as thoughts in the mind of an observer. In many existing organizational behaviour studies, turnover intentions are used as a scale for predicting actual turnover among employees. As stated by Cha in her paper on teachers’ turnover intentions, research in applied psychology, organizational behavior, and management treat turnover intention as one of the most widely studied outcomes of job dissatisfaction and predictors of actual turnover behaviour (Cha, 2008). This term serves as a dependent variable in my study because it has been argued that employees’ feelings of inequity may lead to actual turnover (DeConinck & Stilwell, 2015).

Academics’ perceptions of their professional identity are somewhat homogeneous. Findings from Smit and Nyamapfene’s (2008) study on the perceptions of junior professors and senior professors regarding what it is meant to be an academic reveal the same thing. Based on the survey responses that they received from their research participants in South Africa, they found that junior and senior professors concurrently stated that their understanding of what it means to be an academic has changed over time (Smit & Nyamapfene, 2008). Other researchers (Grace & Khalsa, 2003; Schmalenberg & Kramer, 2008; Basak, 2014; Masum et al., 2015) have reported that good collegiality, job security, and departmental support are still perceived as workplace motivators (positive factors), a source of motivation. Academics from both professorial groups express their satisfaction when they judge that their work is fairly assessed and recognized at its just value by their institution (Schulze, 2006). Far from presuming that all professors’ perceptions are always identical, researchers (Locke & Benion, 2013; Jones et al, 2012, Okpara

et al., 2005) contend that the attitude of academics is not always homogeneous. The level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction can vary across professorial ranks. For example, Locke and Benion (2013) reported that when asked the question "if I had to do it over again, I would not become an academic", Canadian universities' junior professors were more likely to respond "yes" than their senior colleagues. While it is too soon to suggest that junior education professors may be more likely to intend to leave their institution, it is important to point out that not all factors leading to faculty turnover intentions can be considered as intrinsic workplace demotivators. Other extrinsic factors lead as well to faculty turnover. For example, in Ambrose, Huston and Norman's (2005) study on faculty satisfaction, it is suggested that new professional opportunities and matrimonial responsibilities can push faculty to depart from their organization.

2.8 The corporatization of universities as a neoliberal norm

The processes of tenure and promotion are not only entangled by shortcomings in performance evaluations but also conducted in an institutional context dominated by neoliberal values such as the corporatization of academic management. With the rise of neoliberalism as a system of corporate values, there has been an increased attempt to transform universities into corporate organizations. Since the 1980s, academic administrations in both unionized and non-unionized Canadian universities have adopted the new managerialism as the one best way for management optimization (Acker et al., 2012; Acker et al., 2010; Miller, 1998). Like universities in the United Kingdom (Deem, 1998), Australia and the US, over the last 30 years, Canadian universities have espoused a merit-based tenure and promotion system as a neoliberal value. The introduction of a merit-based system is part of the trend of new managerialism which has driven the restructuring

of public institutions in Canada since the 1980s. New managerialism has engendered the practices of performance evaluations as metrics for tenure and promotion decisions (Currie & Newson, 1998). A comprehensive definition of new managerialism and its implication on tenure and promotion evaluations are provided after this section. Drawing from Turk's (2000) critical work on the commercialization of Canadian universities and Ball's (2015) reflection on the neo-liberal university culture, I contend that the neo-liberal university culture has changed the identity of Canadian universities, from public institutions to more corporate like institutions. One of the main issues raised by Turk and other education scholars is that universities which were traditionally considered as institutions belonging to the public domain are employing corporate management practices at the expense of the quality of goods and services to students and faculty (Turk, 2000). What matters now for universities is not to provide an academic environment which is more supportive to faculty self-actualization. Responding to the concerns of faculty such as improving tenure and promotion processes and merit expectations are secondary to university management. Instead, senior university administrators continue to prioritize the corporatization of campus and the maximisation of financial revenues to balance their budget deficit. The corporatization of campus has redefined faculty members' role as mere service providers to the student clientele. The organizational context of Canadian universities has changed for the past 25 years (Ball, 2015). It has become a competitive environment where academics are evaluated based on corporatist values than humanist values. As claimed by Ball (2016), the academe is now infected by an obsession with performative individualism. It has become a corporatized-academic world where faculty members are constantly evaluated and are valued based on their job performance. The corporatization of universities than ever before has created a workplace climate where those who underperform and fail to meet the merit

expectations required by their university management are subjected to moral approbation (Ball, 2016). The rationale provided by Ball, Turk and other scholars supports the idea that the present organizational context in which professors are appraised does not guarantee outcomes that may always lead to their job satisfaction.

2.9 New managerialism as the dominant force of the neoliberal university culture

Broadly speaking, new managerialism underpins the use of corporatist leadership practices in the management of public institutions, precisely, Taylorist principles such as quality control, high performance and emphasis on an individual reward for individual efforts (Gibson, 2012). As pointed out by Mirrlees and Alvi (2014), the ethos of scientific management is no longer contained in factories but is now institutionalized in many organizations, including universities. Deem (1998) argues that new managerialism refers to the adoption by public sector organizations of organizational forms, technologies, management practices and values more commonly found in the private business sector. It is an outcome of new public management policies implemented by Canada's public bureaucracy (Simpson, 1988). Across unionized and non-unionized universities, it has redefined power relations and the bargaining power of faculty unions and faculty associations. The imposition of a powerful management body overrides the power and the negotiation rights of professors per se (Gehrke & Kezar, 2015). It has contributed to the solidification of the power of senior academic managers in tenure and promotion decision making (Jones et al., 2004). For example, De Montigny reported that at Carleton University, the university president has often reversed the tenure recommendations of department and faculty committees (De Montigny, 2011). In violation of union collective agreements, 7 professors were denied tenure despite department and university tenure or promotion committees' positive performance ratings and recommendations. In addition to embodying meritocratic values, new managerialism has partly contributed to the scarcity of tenure-track positions

(Santiago & Carvalho, 2008). Notably, it has heightened the casualization of the professoriate in terms of increased adjunct positions, increased workloads; and has affected tenure and promotion evaluations (Tudiver, 1999; Kezar & Sam, 2011; Rajagopal, 2002). As alluded by Rajagopal (2002), Canadian academia has undergone a process of casualization because university administrations have limited the hiring of tenure-track professors. Universities have instead relied on hiring contract teachers rather than hiring full-time professors. In contrast to the 1960s, new managerialism has rendered achieving tenure and promotion more competitive and demanding (Dobbie & Robinson, 2008). As a management approach, its implementation by university administrations has fostered workplace contexts and tenure systems which have made performance evaluations mandatory and do not always facilitate the tenure or promotion of professors (Boyko & Jones, 2010; Deem, 1998; Watts, 1992).

2.10 The portrait of the academic workforce and university governance in Canada

The contextualization of the problematics of tenure and promotion processes cannot only be limited to analysing what the existing literature said about the shortcomings of performance evaluations and the implication of the neoliberal university culture. It also necessitates understanding the nature of university governance in Canada. Likewise, an understanding of university governance also implicates the need to identify the portrait of the academic labor force because junior and senior professors are employed as one of the main variables in this study. The Canadian higher education system is constituted of 98 unionized and non-unionized (Table 1) research and comprehensive universities. These institutions are mostly public (Robinson & Dobbie, 2008) with an estimated academic workforce of about 44,934 professors and 1.2 million students. There are 14,946 full professors, 15,475 associate professors and 10,161 assistant professors (Table 2). These numbers imply that senior

professors statistically outnumber junior professors. Male professors (28,486) outnumber female professors (16,448) (Statistics Canada, 2012). With about 70% of men versus 30% of women with full-professorship (CAUT, 2010), these quantitative data demonstrate that sex inequality is still pervasive in academe. Higher education enterprise makes a capital gain of about CAD 31.5 billion per year (CAUT, 2015). Meanwhile, the federal government cash transfers for post-secondary education, when measured as a proportion of GDP, have declined by 50% between 1992–1993 and 2013–2014 (CAUT, 2015). Due to this financial constraint, Canadian universities are relying more and more on tuition fees. University expenditures have increased in the past 30 years by 205%. Yet, spending on professors' salaries only represents 20% (Table 1) of university expenditures (CAUT, 2015). In the same time, the working conditions and career advancement of professors have been hit harder by universities' implementation of budget optimization (Tudiver, 1999). University governance's neoliberal values endorsed by senior university administrators have been detrimental to the welfare of academics (Tudiver, 1999; Jones et al., 2012; Jones & Weinrib, 2012; Kezar & Sam, 2011; Rajagopal, 2002). University governance refers to systems of decision-making and resource allocation, mission and values, patterns of authority and hierarchy (Marginson & Considine, 2000:7). In terms of internal power relations and management practices, the system of governance has implicitly shifted from a bicameral or collegial model to a corporatist or business model (ISGUG Report, 1993). Still, the bicameral model exists in Canadian universities, whether they are unionized or not (Jones, 2012). Commensurately, Canadian universities have a higher level of institutional autonomy (Jones, 2013; Baker, 2014), and are governed by two complementary organs, the board of governors and senate (Jones et al., 2004; Jones, 2013). According to Duff-Berdahl Commission's recommendations (1966), the board of governors was originally structured for managing administrative and financial affairs. The senate was originally created with the intent of making

academic policies and decisions and was supposed to represent professors' interests. Instead, current phenomena in academe show that the control of university governance has fallen into the hands of the board of governors or senior administrators (Jones et al., 2004; Campbell, 1981). Given the power of the board of governors over the senate, previous studies have indicated that final tenure and promotion decisions taken by university senior administrators are often more unfair (Bombardieri, 2014; De Montigny, 2011; CAUT, 2001; Huer, 1991) than those taken by departments. Unfair decisions consist of refusing to tenure a candidate in spite of positive recommendations from department and faculty appraisal committees. For example, an arbitration conducted by the *Canadian Association of University Teachers* (CAUT, 2001) concerning Professor Michael Thorpe versus Mount Allison University, indicated that the university president and the board of governors inappropriately denied him the status of emeritus professor. De Montigny (2011) contends that senior administrators often arbitrarily overturn tenure or promotion recommendations. *InsideHigher Education*'s report on US universities also supports the argument that university tenure and promotion decisions are not always fair. This report indicates that senior administrators often believe that tenure and promotion recommendations sent by departments are not rigorous enough (Jaschik, 2008). For this reason, they apply new standards of evaluation which have never been shared with faculty leaders. Considering the risk of potential arbitrary performance evaluations, this study explores the perceptions that Canadian universities' education professors hold on the evaluations of their merit.

Table 1: University status and revenue

Number of universities in Canada: About 98 unionized/non-unionized. They are mostly public than private	Higher education's revenue per year: ≈ CAD 31.5 billion Universities' expenditure on academics' salaries: 20%

Table 2: Faculty at Canadian universities	**2006/2007**	**2007/2008**	**2008/2009**	**2009/2010**	**2010/2011**
Total rank	40,567	41,306	41,954	44,423	44,934
Full professor	14,039	14,187	14,382	14,718	14,946
Associate professor	13,195	13,618	14,208	14,941	15,473
Assistant professor	10,910	10,986	10,824	10,591	10,161
Rank or level below assistant professor[1]	2,181	2,203	2,196	3,402	3,487
Other ranks (not elsewhere classified)[2]	242	312	344	771	867
Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM, table 477-0017. Last modified: 2012-05-03.					

2.11 The effect of unionization status as discussed by researchers

Given that the institutional status is considered in the present study, it was salient to further provide the rationale that has informed me to include the factor of unionization in this study. For Baer, non-unionized universities have non-certified agreements that have a lesser legal or bargaining power (Baer, 2013). It is assumed that the negotiation rights of professors are more tenuous in such institutions than in unionized universities. As pointed out by Baer (2013), because of the lack of institutionalized

unionization, non-certified agreements typically have clauses which restrict negotiating rights to professors and give more power to university administrations. In contrast to non-unionized universities, unionized universities have faculty collective agreements which provide more bargaining power to faculty unions and negotiation rights to faculty members (Baer, 2013). As of 2004, the Canadian full-time academic workforce was composed of 79% of unionized professors and 21% of non-unionized professors (Robinson & Dobbie, 2008). Existing literature suggests that unionization has not countered the casualization of the academic workforce. Faculty unionization has not reduced the ongoing erosion of tenure track positions (Robinson & Dobbie, 2008; Omiecinski, 2003). For example, between 1990 and 1997, the number of part-time faculty members employed in Canadian universities rose by 10%, while the number of full-time faculty fell by 8% (Omiecinski 2003). While the link between faculty collective agreements and the objectivity of the processes of pre-tenure and post-tenure performance evaluations has not been demonstrated in Canada, previous studies (Rees et al., 1995; Tullock, 1994) indicate that faculty unions have been bargaining for fair wages. Rees et al. (1995) state that professors at unionized universities earn 6% more than their peers in non-unionized universities. Jones and Anderson (1988) argue that the tenure and promotion policies in universities where faculty members are not unionised are somewhat identical to unionised universities' tenure regulations. The present study attempts to determine which of Baer and Jones and Anderson's claims relate to education faculties.

2.12 Sex discrimination and faculty grievances as indicators of job dissatisfaction

Studies suggest that the experience of sex discrimination leads to job dissatisfaction among women. Ochola (2008) argued that female professors are more likely to develop departure intentions because of discrimination and biased performance evaluations. In contrast to their

male peers, female professors are often underrated and less likely to be promoted to full professorship (Todd et al., 2008; Acker et al., 2012). Studies suggest that climbing the professorial ladder is much more strenuous for women than for men, and requires additional efforts (Goulden et al., 2013; Bronstein, 1996). Even when they work harder, their input is often overlooked (Rice, 2013; Neilson, 2013; Black & Islam, 2014), and outcomes don't always meet their expectations. Todd et al. (2008) found that when filling a position, male and female professors who sit on search committees are more inclined to recommend the hiring of a male applicant than a female applicant. Until now, women only represent 21.8% of full professors in Canada, 36.9% of associate professors, yet 44.6% of assistant professors (CAUT, 2009). That is why I use sex as a covariate for an intersectional study on my demographic variables.

Even though tenure denial in Canadian universities is rare (Pettigrew, 2011, the recurrence of tribunal complaints filed by some professors implies that tenure and promotion evaluations in these institutions are far from being perfect. For example, in 2011, a grievance was filed by Professor Nicolas Robidoux against Laurentian university (Surdykowski, 2011). He claimed that his tenure dossier was not adequately assessed by Laurentian university's faculty of Science and Engineering tenure evaluation committee. Bargaining on the behalf of the grievor; Laurentian University's faculty association complained that the university improperly denied tenure to the grievor. Moreover, in 2016, the *National Post* reported that Professor Lorna McCue from UBC faculty of law was denied tenure because of biased peer-evaluations (Hoper, 2016). She claimed that the merit of her scholarly output was not fairly recognized by her institution. What these two grievances tell us is that faculty performance appraisal aversion may be pervasive across Canadian universities, and that academics do not always believe that their work output is adequately evaluated and recognized at its just value by the evaluators mandated by their institution.

2.13 Equity theory of motivation in management

I chose equity theory instead of other organizational theories such as expectancy theory and Maslow's hierarchy needs because of its emphasis on employees' justice perceptions (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1944). As one of the main theories of organizational behaviour, it adequately aligns with the themes of my research questions. And it assumes that employees are motivated by procedural justice, and dissatisfied by the lack of objectivity in reward mechanisms. They often leave their organization because of shortcomings in the rewards system and unfair treatment (Adams, 1965; Christensen et al, 2014). As contended by Adams (1965) in his article *'Inequity in Social Exchange'*, employees' perceptions of procedural justice, distributive justice and interactional justice within the process of merit recognition affect their motivation. This theory assumes that job satisfaction is an indicator of self-actualization. In contrast, it considers job dissatisfaction as an indicator of employees' aversion against their institution's workplace reward mechanisms. Equity theory provides a framework to identify the workplace demotivators that affect employees' judgement of appraisal objectivity. It suggests that if an employee feels that his output has been objectively recognized, he/she will be satisfied, if not, he/she will be dissatisfied. On par with Adams's article claim, management scientists such as Long (2014), McFarlin et al. (1992) and Dittrich et al. (1985) contend in their study of workplace motivation that the higher an individual's perception of justice is, the more committed to the organization he/she will become (Adams, 1965). The lower the perception of justice is, the more dissatisfied the individual will become, and turnover intentions will transpire. In other words, management practices which foster organizational injustice are predictors of turnover intentions. In that regard, equity theory provides a significant rationale to explore what education professors feel and think about the objectivity of performance evaluations employed to measure their merit.

Within the paradigm of equity theory, Greenberg (1986) proposes considering procedural justice as one of its components when assessing the objectivity of performance evaluations. Dailey and Kirk argue that procedural justice derives from equity theory and is an antecedent of job satisfaction/dissatisfaction and turnover/retention intentions (Daileyl & Kirk, 1992). It refers to employees' perceptions about the objectivity of the rules and procedures that regulate an appraisal process (Zahed, 2015). For example, in his study of the organizational antecedents that influence the motivation of bank employees in Ghana, Dartey-Baah, (2014) argues that procedural justice denotes that procedures used to determine employees' performance level are objective enough (Colquitt et al., 2001; Dartey-Baah, 2014). Likewise, Leventhal (1980) in his book *What should be done with equity theory?* argues that procedural justice is key to examining the procedures which generate reward distributions. In comparison to procedural justice, Folger and Konovsky (1989) argue that distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of the amounts of compensation employees receive, while procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of the means used to determine those amounts. (Folger & Konovsky, 1989). Distributive justice provides a framework to determine whether rewards received by employees are perceived by them as being just and reflective of their productivity. It can provide a lens to determine whether education professors believe that tenure and promotion evaluation decisions adequately reflect their own expectations. Considering that non-objective evaluations and unfair rewards engender workplace frustration (Howard & Cordes, 2010), procedural and distributive justice as components of equity theory are useful to address the questions raised in this study. Equity theory does not endorse egalitarianism (Walsh, 2014), neither nepotism or favouritism and patronage. Rather, it is supportive of organizational, distributive and procedural justice in reward distributions (William, 2016). Employees compare what they get to what they expect to get (Landy & Conte, 2010). When they identify inequities between their output ratios and that of their referent group's, they seek to adjust their input to reach their perceived equity (William, 2016). If this is not achieved, they

then intend to leave their organization (Adams, 1965). Turnover intentions and retention intentions are subjected to employees' moral judgment of fairness (Dittrich et al., 1985. Furthermore, equity theory also deals with reference standards and considerations that are used in assessing performance (Anderson; 2014). It is not only concerned with perceptions of fairness but also about the fairness of reference standards used in assessing merit. Moreover, equity theory denotes that the work identity and self-actualization of employees are constructed within the pattern of social embeddedness. The workplace culture and climate in which employees socialize and work shape their perceptions of interactional justice. Walsh (2014) points out that this theory suggests that outcomes are just in social relationships when those who have made the largest contributions receive the greatest rewards and those who have made the smallest contributions receive a lesser reward. Finally, equity theory conceptualizes merit as an ethos of justice on which performance evaluations were intentionally designed by the management. Arguing against this conceptualization, Castilla and Bernard (2008) claimed that performance evaluations can also generate paradoxical and indeed unjust outcomes. There are unrecognized risks behind certain organizational efforts used to reward merit, like unintentional biases in rating procedures (Castilla & Bernard, 2008). Sarah Kaplan (2015) also states that the appraisal of merit leads to injustice (Cooper, 2015). While the desire to enhance merit in an organizational setting is a good thing to do, its implementation does not always guarantee transparency (Au, 2013) and procedural objectivity. Researchers such as Frank (2016), McNamee and Miller (2013) continue to argue that it is utopian to assume that factors leading to career advancement are entirely based on individual merit (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990). Overall, the rationale provided herein on equity theory implies that it is important to explore whether job dissatisfaction can be a predictive factor of turnover intentions among education professors.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Research method

Mixed methods was employed to collect data because of the nature of questions asked in this study. It is needed to produce qualitative findings, namely the narratives of my participants about performance evaluations. In addition, it is instrumental to produce statistic data, especially the rate of participants who are satisfied and dissatisfied with performance evaluations. Historically speaking, mixed methods was first explicitly discussed by Campbell and Fiske in 1959. They employed multiple methods to study the validity of psychological traits. Campbell and Fiske claimed that biases inherent in any single method could neutralize or cancel the biases of other methods. In other words, the results of one method could help and inform the other method (Greene et al., 1989). From a philosophical angle, mixed methods simultaneously employs a positivist and constructivist epistemology. From a positivist perspective, it is argued that findings derived from a scientific method are valid knowledge. The positivist epistemology was developed by sociologists and empiricist philosophers such as Durkheim, Comte, Mill and Locke (Smith, 1983). It states that a researcher's interpretation of social reality is based on objectivity, empirical facts, and non-experimental designs such as surveys (Creswell, 2003). My choice of mixed methods was informed by the ontology of its epistemological lens. Its epistemology is based on deductive and inductive inquiries of the phenomena studied. From a socio-constructivist point of view, it involves the use of surveys and interviews completed by research

participants. Although no universal definition exists about mixed methods research, some researchers define it as a combination of both quantitative and qualitative approaches. The phenomena studied here refer to the lived experiences and the narratives of the participants. Within the parameters of mixed methods, it is possible for a researcher to explore the perceived reality and the hidden reality which shape participants' perceptions. It is also possible for the researcher to employ an inquiry approach that involves studying a small number of subjects through extensive and prolonged engagement to develop patterns and relationships of meaning (Creswell, 2003). In Creswell's (2003) discussion about the implications of using mixed methods as a research design, it is contended that both quantitative and qualitative methods have their own limitations. One of the limitations is that an in-depth exploration of participants' perceptions and interpretations of their social reality cannot be completely done by solely relying on survey questionnaires. Creswell argues that a deeper inquiry on people's perceptions should employ qualitative techniques such as unstructured interviews or structured interviews and participant observation. At the same time solely relying on these qualitative techniques cannot fully help a researcher to measure participants' satisfaction or dissatisfaction level. Thus, to simultaneously explore their perceptions in-depth, it is appropriate to apply sequential procedures. Creswell defines sequential procedures as a fieldwork process in which the researcher expands the findings of the qualitative method with the quantitative method. This may involve beginning with a qualitative method for exploratory purposes and following up with a quantitative method with a large sample so that the researcher can generalize results to a population (Creswell, 2003). Sequential procedures are techniques that are proper to mixed methods. Namely mixed methods research is complementarian in its essence. Mixed methods is an approach to research which claims to be built upon pragmatic assumptions. It is efficient to collect data for studies that are

consequence-oriented and problem centred. Studies such as mine whose focus is consequence-oriented align well with the cross-analytical ontology of mixed methods. Four types of research design emerge from this method: (1) triangulation design, (2) embedded design, (3) explanatory design, and (4) exploratory design. Mostly used by researchers, the triangulation design is a one phase design and aims to gather different but complementary data on the same topic (Creswell, 2005). It is used when the researcher intends to directly compare statistical results with narrative findings (Creswell, 2005). In comparison to the triangulation design, the embedded design incorporates the collection of both quantitative and qualitative data, but one of the data types plays a supplemental role within the overall design (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 20011; Creswell, 2005). It is a two-phase mixed methods research design and has influenced my methodological framework. I chose to frame the procedure of my data collection on a two-phase modality by prioritizing one data set over the other. As such the qualitative method was primarily employed to collect non-numerical field data and was supplemented by a quantitative approach to collect numerical field data. Qualitative data were prioritized because the scope of this study is primarily about exploring my participants' perceptions about performance evaluations.

3.2 Study variables

The population of my study consisted of faculty members teaching in the education faculties of unionized and non-unionized Canadian universities. The dependent variables of my study were the perceptions of junior and senior education professors (Table 3) in tenure-track and tenured positions. In other words, the participants consisted of female and male assistant, associate and full professors. To explore the issue of sex discrimination (Goulden et al., 2013; Acker et al.,

2012; Ochola, 2008; Tod et al., 2008), sex was used as a covariate (Table 3). The institutional covariates were comprised of unionized and non-unionized Canadian universities' education faculties (Table 3). The main independent variables were the following: merit definition, student course evaluations, peer ratings and external evaluations (Figure 1). The other independent variables consisted of dossier evaluations by department, faculty and university tenure and promotion committees (Figure 1). The principal components consisted of two variables: satisfaction and dissatisfaction.

Table 3: Dependent variables and covariates

Dependent variables	**Covariates**
	Institutional covariates:
• Junior education professors' perceptions	• Canadian unionized universities' education faculties
• Senior education professors' perceptions	• Canadian non-unionized universities' education faculties
	Demographic covariates:
	• male
	• female
	• senior faculty
	• junior faculty

Figure 1: Independent variables



3.3 The representative sample of tenure and promotion policies

To answer the first research question, it was necessary to select a small representative sample of university tenure and promotion policies because it was impossible to have access to education faculties' evaluation policies. This institutional sample consisted of the tenure and promotion agreements (policies) of 6 public research universities. These institutions were selected as a representative sample of unionized and non-unionized Canadian universities. The following institutions: University of Montreal, Queen's University and the University of Ottawa were chosen to represent unionized Canadian universities. McGill University, University of Toronto and the University of British Columbia (UBC) were chosen to represent Canadian non-unionized universities (Figure 2). These universities were selected because they are defined in the existing literature (Mackinnon, 2015; Mackinnon, 2014; Baer, 2013) as unionized and non-unionized institutions.

Located in Toronto, the University of Toronto was officially created in 1849. It is a non-unionized public research institution and has a faculty workforce of around 2,547 professors, and an enrollment of about 84,556 students. Its faculty of education is OISE (Ontario Institute for Studies in Education). At present, there are approximately 3,000 full-time students and 130 full-time education professors at OISE (Friedland, 2013). On par with the University of Toronto, McGill University is also a non-unionized (in terms of professors) public research university. Created in 1821 and located in Montreal, it has approximately 40,000 students. About 2,667 of those students study at the faculty of education (McGill University, 2015). The academic labour force of the whole university comprises 1,667 tenured and tenure-stream professors. UBC was established in 1915 and has a non-unionized faculty association. Situated in Vancouver, it is one

of the top Canadian universities and has about 5,000 faculty members, plus 67,542 students (University of British Columbia, 2015). The sample universities are public and anglophone. No francophone university was included in the non-unionized category because faculty at all these institutions are unionized.

Located in Montreal, the University of Montreal is a francophone institution and was established in 1878. With an academic staff of 7,329 members and a student population of approximately 45,000 students, it is a unionized public research university. Around 90 education professors constitute the academic personnel of its faculty of education. Like the University of Montreal, the University of Ottawa is not unionized, yet it is a bilingual comprehensive university. It was created in 1848, and is in Ottawa, and has 1.262 regular professors. Around 55 of those faculty members are education professors. There are 42,672 students from which 2,224 students are enrolled in the faculty of education (University of Ottawa, 2015). In the same vein, Queen's University is a unionized public university, yet anglophone and located in Kingston. It has 22,114 students and around 1,000 professors (Queen's University, 2015) in full-time positions. There are 117 education professors working at its faculty of education.

Figure 2: Sample of university tenure and promotion policies



3.4 Interview and survey data collection

In line with mixed methods' embedded research design, the collection of data was done in two sequences. The first sequence consisted of collecting interview data on 20 participants (Table 14). These participants were recruited from the groups of junior education professors and senior education professors (Table 14). The modality of recruitment consisted of making phone calls and sending invitation emails with attached letters of consent to the workplace emails of several academics employed across 31 unionized and non-unionized Canadian universities' faculties of education. Most of these education professors declined to participate in this study. Only twenty of them accepted to be interviewed after reading and signing the letter of consent. For reasons of confidentiality, the institutions of these interview participants cannot be disclosed as agreed upon. Each individual interview lasted about 40 minutes and was audio-tape recorded. Depending on the geographical location of participants, interviews were conducted on a face-to-face or on an online basis. Participants who were interviewed face-to-face were education professors from faculties of education located in Montreal. Participants from faculties of education located across other Canadian cities were interviewed by telephone. Interviews were conducted in accordance with the question guideline that I had designed. The guideline form comprised 16 interview questions as informed by the rationale provided in the literature review (Chapter 2), in particular, the inconsistency of evaluation criteria and shortcomings in performance evaluations. These questions related to the issue of merit definitions in university policies, to student course evaluations, peer ratings, external ratings and dossier evaluations. All my participants (Table 14) were asked the same questions. Participants were asked to give their opinion on the definition of merit as defined in tenure and promotion agreements. Subsequent to that, they were asked whether they believe that performance evaluations pertaining to the

processes of tenure and promotion are objective and lead to job dissatisfaction, including turnover intentions.

The second sequence consisted of collecting survey data across 42 Canadian universities' education faculties. The survey was conducted to determine whether qualitative findings from semi-structured interviews could be generalized to the larger population (education professors) of this study. Survey-emails were sent privately to the workplace emails of 505 education professors working in these institutions. Eighty-three education professors responded to the survey-questionnaire (Table 15). Since online surveys are less likely to achieve high response rates (Benton, et al, 2010; Archer, 2008; Wiseman, 2003; Monroe & Adams, 2012; Nulty, 2008), the relatively low response rate is acceptable within the scope of a doctoral research. Considering the aim of my study, other potential participants may have harboured suspicions about the online survey administration (Smith, 1997; Sax et al., 2003). The survey responses were adequate to ensure a relevant statistical analysis. Forty-nine of those 83 survey participants were senior education professors, while the remaining 34 were junior education professors (Table 15). Senior education professors were slightly over-represented in the representative sample. Forty-one survey participants were men with 42 participants being women (Table 15). Thirty-three of the survey participants were from non-unionized universities. Fifty of the survey participants were from unionized universities (Table 15). The questions asked in the survey questionnaire were informed by the aim of this study. Hence the content of the questionnaire was comprised of targeted questions. Targeted questions were also asked to participants who took part in the interviews. Such questions were designed to align the themes of interviews and the survey with the same problematics raised in the literature review. The following issues informed the nature and themes of questions:

(1) Not all tenure and promotion criteria hold the same value when assessing merit

(2) Performance evaluations are not always objective and based on procedural justice

(3) Job dissatisfaction among employees is a predictive factor of turnover intentions

All in all, the interview questions and the survey questionnaire were initially designed in English, then translated into French to collect data among both anglophone and francophone participants. In total, 103 education professors participated in the present study (Figure 3), and both interview and survey data were collected over two months.



3.5 Data analysis

To answer the first research question, sample tenure and promotion policies were thematically analyzed. These documents were categorized into two groups, unionized and non-unionized. The definitions of merit in the unionized group's documents were compared with the discourse of non-unionized group's documents. The comparison consisted of finding similarities and dissimilarities in the way merit was defined in these administrative documents. Drawing from that analysis (Wach et al., 2013), I identified the criteria for tenure and promotion that are emphasized in each group.

To answer the second and third research questions, the analysis of interview and survey data was done in two phases. In the first phase, the audio-recorded interviews that were collected during my fieldwork were transcribed and coded into four categories:

(1) Faculty members perceived that merit expectations related to tenure and promotion were clear enough

(2) Faculty members perceived that merit expectations related to tenure and promotion were not clear enough

(3) Faculty members perceived that performance evaluations related to the process of tenure and promotion were not objective enough

(4) Faculty members perceived that performance evaluations related to the processes of tenure and promotion were objective enough.

Considering the variables of institutional status and academic status, I thematically analyzed coded interview data through the following themes: (1) biased performance evaluations cause job dissatisfaction, (2) objective performance evaluations cause job satisfaction, and (3) job dissatisfaction causes turnover intentions (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Interview data coding and analysis



To supplement interview findings, SAS (statistical analysis system) was used to compile all online paper-based survey responses. The survey responses were categorized into an ordinal scale: (1) satisfied, (2) dissatisfied, and (3) intended to leave. Satisfaction and dissatisfaction were the main statistical components. In accordance with survey participants' academic status,

sex and institution status, statistical component analysis was employed to analyse these survey responses, and produced the following mean values: 0.4693878 (sex), 0.6734694 (merit definition), 0.7142857 (student course evaluations), 0.7551020 (peer ratings), 0.7346939 (external evaluations). Principal component analysis (Meyers, Gamst & Guarino, 2013) was used because it helps a researcher to determine to what extent the phenomenological factors affect the perceptions of participants. Survey participants' perceptions of dossier evaluations by department, faculty and university tenure and promotion committees were not considered for cross-sectional analysis between academic ranks because most junior education professors who participated in the survey study did not respond to questions related to these variables. The reason given by these academics was that they have not reached that stage of evaluation in their tenure process. Only sample senior education professors responded to all questions. The statistical test conducted on survey responses generated the following Eigen values: merit definition (0.98821223), student course evaluations (0.93769461), peer ratings (0.89045761), and external evaluations (0.67207966). The data that were generated and coded into two descriptive categories:

(1) Junior education professors' perceptions of merit definition and performance evaluations
(2) Senior education professors' perceptions of merit definition and performance evaluations.

Findings from the survey study were presented in a percentage scale to simplify their meaning in the scope of this study. However, the rate of survey participants who may harbour turnover intentions was not generated because none of them stated that they intended to leave their institution. The same observation was also made about interview participants as none of them stated that they planned to quit their job. Thus, I categorized codes into major themes related to participants' aversion of performance evaluations.

CHAPTER 4

STUDY RESULT ON THE DEFINITION OF MERIT IN TENURE AND PROMOTION POLICIES

4.1 Unionized universities' sample faculty collective agreements

University of Montreal:

University of Montreal's faculty collective agreement *(Convention Collective intervenue entre l'Universite de Montreal & le Syndicat General des Professeurs et Professeures de l'Universite de Montreal 2013-2017)* outlines what a candidate needs to include in his or her tenure and promotion dossier (Article CP 4). In addition, it identifies four main criteria for tenure and promotion to full professorship (Article CP 5.02, Article CP 5.03). These criteria are the performance in teaching, in research, in service and contribution to the reputation of the university (SGPUM, 2013). It is stated in *Article CP 5.02* of the agreement that:

Est promu au rang de professeur agrégé le professeur adjoint qui:-a accompli sa charge de travail de façon conforme à l'objectif d'excellence de l'université. Pour ce faire, le professeur, compte tenu des activités de cette charge et des circonstances de sa realisation: -a démontré des qualités d'enseignant; a contribué au développement de sa discipline par des recherches; - a contribué aux activités de l'institution; -a contribué au rayonnement universitaire (SGPUM, 2013). (French, original version)

Promotion to the rank of associate professor is possible for "the assistant professor who: -has completed 5 years of academic work in the rank of assistant professor, -has demonstrated performance in teaching, -has contributed to the development of his or her academic discipline through scholarly research, -has contributed (services) to the life of the university, -has contributed to the reputation of the university (SGPUM, 2013)." (English translation)

Article CP 5.03 also states that:

Est promu au rang de professeur titulaire, le professeur agrégé qui: -a complété six (6) années de service au rang de professeur agrégé; et a accompli sa charge de travail de façon conforme à l'objectif d'excellence de l'Université. Pour ce faire, le professeur, compte tenu des activités de cette charge et des circonstances de sa réalisation: -s'est distingué dans son enseignement; - s'est distingué par la qualité de sa recherche; -a contribué de façon significative aux activités de l'institution; -a contribué de façon significative au rayonnement universitaire (SGPUM, 2013). (French, original version)

Promotion to full professorship is possible for "the associate professor who: -has completed 6 years of academic work in the rank of assistant professor, -has demonstrated performance in teaching and in scholarly research, -has contributed (services) to the life of the university, -has contributed to the reputation of the university (SGPUM, 2013)." (English translation)

From the aforesaid articles, merit is defined by performance in teaching, scholarly research, service and contribution to the reputation of the university. While the first two criteria can be considered tangible, the latter two are more intangible. In comparison to previous studies cited in my literature review which indicate that universities often value research and teaching over service, the University of Montreal's faculty collective agreement gives a more holistic definition of tenure and promotion criteria. However, it neither outlines nor defines what standards and considerations are applied for rating and measuring teaching, research, service and contributions to institutional reputation.

Furthermore, this faculty collective agreement allows for faculty members to exercise their negotiation rights when necessary. For example, *Article CP 5.01* states that professors have the right to file a grievance if unsatisfied with their teaching workload (SGPUM, 2013). It is indicated as follows:

Le professeur, le professeur sous octroi ou le professeur de formation pratique insatisfait de sa charge de travail peut déposer un grief ou formuler une plainte au Comité paritaire sur la charge professorale. La

plainte doit être faite par écrit dans les dix jours ouvrables après la réception de la charge de cours attribuée et transmise simultanément au directeur de l'unité et au syndicat par le plaignant (SGPUM, 2013). (French, original version)

The professor who is unsatisfied with his or her workload can file a grievance to the equity committee responsible for academic life. The grievance must be written within ten working days to the head of the department and faculty union after receiving his or her teaching workload (SGPUM, 2013). (English, translated version)

The discourse of the agreement is compatible with Baer's argument that was mentioned in my literature review. Baer (2013) argues that faculty collective agreements of unionized universities give bargaining rights to faculty unions and professors.

Queen's University:

In Queen's University's faculty collective agreement, merit refers to evidence of effective teaching and high quality scholarly or creative work. For tenure and promotion to full professorship, it is emphasized in its *Article 30.6.3* that the candidate is supposed to meet the following requirements:

A record as a very good teacher committed to academic and pedagogical excellence.
A record of high quality and expert peer-assessed scholarly or creative work which is normally demonstrated by presentation or publication in a suitable academic or artistic forum; writing and research with respect to pedagogy and innovative teaching shall be assessed as scholarly activity; the diverse backgrounds of faculty members and the type of scholarship appropriate to their research areas shall be considered when assessing the quality of scholarly or creative work.
A record of professional, university or community service which has contributed to the department, unit, faculty, university or broader academic community. (QUFA, 2015)

Furthermore, *Article 30.6.3* points out that tenure and promotion to full professorship can be only granted when there is a clear evidence of demonstrated professional growth and the promise of future development (QUFA, 2015). However, based on previous tenure grievances, it transpires that faculty members at Queen's University are not always satisfied with performance review outcomes and tenure decisions. For example, the grievance of Dr. Ogunyankin versus the Queen's University substantiates the existence of some unfair performance reviews. In defence of the grievor, the Queen's faculty association listed the following inequities in tenure process:

> The university tenure committee disregarded his external letters of recommendation, which, according to the applicant were very positive. (HRTO, 2011)
>
> Contrary to the policy requiring that letters of recommendation be written by persons holding a rank superior to the applicant, the committee requested a letter from the applicant's department head, who held the same rank as himself. (HRTO, 2011)
>
> The committee's decision not to promote was based in part on false information; the department head informed them that the applicant had 50% time for research. Whereas, he only had a fraction of that time. (HRTO, 2011)

Likewise, the results of a study conducted by Frances Henry (2004) on equity in academe, indicated that 17% of professors at Queen's University complained that tenure and promotion process was not equitable and fair enough. Even though most faculty members were satisfied, the dissatisfaction of 17% of the professoriate implies that perceptions of inequities among professors are not rare. Like the University of Montreal's faculty collective agreement, considerations for evaluating research, teaching effectiveness and service contributions are not consistently defined in Queen's University's faculty collective agreement. Instead, the agreement authorizes each department to define their own standards for assessing the aforesaid criteria (QUFA, 2015).

University of Ottawa:

As a unionized institution, the University of Ottawa has a faculty collective agreement which lays the criteria for tenure and promotion for its faculty members. In this agreement, merit is defined by displaying an effective teaching record, scholarly or professional activities and satisfactory academic service (APUO, 2012). It advises faculties and departments to primarily appraise these criteria when appointing candidates for tenure or full-professorship. As indicated in *Articles 25.3.2* and *25.3.3*:

> "Promotion to the rank of associate professor and full professor shall be granted when a member meets the following conditions…the member has evidenced teaching…. the member has produced scientific, literary, artistic, or professional works or a combination thereof…the member has undertaken academic service activities…...the member must have met the requirements regarding the level of proficiency in French and English." (APUO, 2012)

The clauses of this faculty collective agreement are less rigid regarding the fulfillment of all prescribed criteria. For example, *Article 25.3.2.3* states that "in the evaluation of a member's performance in terms of the criteria set forth…. teaching of outstanding quality can compensate for performance in scientific, literary, artistic, or professional works which is deemed merely satisfactory." While the criteria for promotion to associate professor are almost similar to those required for promotion to full professorship, there is a slight difference. The small difference exists in the level of performance and academic input, also in the number of years spent in scholarly and teaching endeavor. As pointed out in *Article 25.3.3.3* of this agreement: "Promotion to the rank of full professor shall be granted to a member whose workload has included, in the period since promotion to associate professor, teaching activities or academic service activities or a combination thereof, significantly in excess of the norm (APUO, 2012)." As in the faculty collective agreements of these unionized universities, promotion to the rank of

associate professor and full professor is based solely on a merit-based system and requires a production of effective inputs. As with the preceding sample faculty collective agreements, there is less clarity in terms of the standards applied for assessing the quality of prescribed tenure and promotion criteria.

4.2 Non-unionized universities' sample non-certified agreements

University of British Columbia (UBC):

UBC's non-union faculty agreement titled *'Guide to Reappointment, Promotion and Tenure Procedures at UBC 2015/216'* emphasizes teaching and research performance as primary criteria for tenure and promotion. Meanwhile, service to the university and to the community is relatively less weighted as criteria. As stated in *Article 3:*

> "Competence is required in both scholarly activity and teaching. A particular strength in one of these areas cannot compensate for a deficiency in the other. Service is also important; however, again, it cannot compensate for a deficiency in teaching or scholarly activity." (University of British Columbia, 2015)

Article 3 expresses the meritocratic discourse of this agreement. In specific terms, merit is defined as a demonstration of evidence-based scholarly activity and effective teaching. For scholarly activities to be considered merit worthy, they must reflect the following characteristics: "originality or innovation, demonstrable impact in a particular field and dissemination in the public domain *(Article 3.1.5 & Article 3.1.8)."* Concurrently, the discourse of this non-union agreement espouses one of the principles of equity theory, precisely the emphasis on individual performance for individual reward. As stated in *Article 3.1.2,* "judgment of scholarly activity is based mainly on the quality and significance of an individual's contribution." As with the

University of Montreal's faculty collective agreement, it does not precisely outline the standards and considerations applied for rating the performance of professors. Equity guidelines to enhance procedural and distributive justice in tenure and promotion processes are not clearly stated. Yet UBC's non-union agreement was designed with the intent of enhancing procedural and distributive justice, as stated in *Article 2.1.1:*

"Given that the university strives to foster excellence in teaching, scholarly activity and service, the mandate of all involved in a reappointment, tenure and/or promotion review is to make recommendations, which ultimately advise the president on individual cases, in accordance with: -the concepts of procedural fairness in the university context (often called natural justice); -and considerations on appropriate standards of excellence across and within faculties and disciplines by: 1) objectively considering the merits of each specific case; and 2) examining the preceding deliberations to ensure that the procedures were consistent with UBC policy, the agreement and the concepts of procedural fairness." (University of British Columbia, 2015)

While UBC's non-union agreement defines merit in terms of high performance in research and teaching, existing tribunal grievances indicate that tenure and promotion evaluations at UBC are far from being perfect and free of any unfairness. For instance, in 2016, British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal condemned UBC of unfair pre-tenure performance reviews against a junior professor, Lorna June McCue (Hopper, 2016). Likewise, in 2013, Jennifer Chan, an associate professor at UBC's faculty of education claimed that she was unfairly denied promotion because of unfair performance evaluations (BCHRT, 2013). Parallel to this case, in 2012, a tribunal decision also condemned UBC of unfairly denying tenure to a junior professor, Steven Lund (Hall, 2012). The tribunal court stated that during the process of evaluation, performance reviews were not fairly conducted (Condon & Patch, 2010).

McGill University:

In the absence of a faculty collective agreement, McGill University has a tenure and promotion regulation titled *'Regulations Relating to the Employment of Tenure Track and Tenured Academic Staff.'* Like UBC's tenure and promotion policies, this administrative policy outlines and regulates the process of tenure and promotion. In response to the first question asked in my study, my analysis of the *'Regulations Relating to the Employment of Tenure Track and Tenured Academic Staff'* indicates that merit is defined in terms of demonstrating high performance in the following three criteria: scholarly research, effective teaching and substantive service (McGill University, 2015). As stated in *Article 8.5.1* of these professorial regulations:

> Candidates for promotion must demonstrate: "(i) a record of excellence in the area of research and/or other original scholarly activities, and professional activities, as evidenced by international recognition by peers; (ii) a record of high quality teaching; (iii) a substantial record of other contributions to the University and scholarly." (McGill University, 2015)

However, like UBC's non-union agreement, McGill's non-union agreement neither defines nor outlines the standards and considerations that respective departments and university tenure and promotion committees can apply in assessing whether the candidate has produced original scholarly activities, effective teaching and service. Rather, it mandates each department to write its own standards for faculty reappointment *(Article 6).*

University of Toronto:

Similar to UBC's and McGill University's tenure and promotion regulations, the University of Toronto does not have a collective agreement for tenure and promotion regulations. Its '*Policy and Procedures on Academic Appointments'* is the administrative policy wherein performance

criteria are stated. In this policy, merit is defined in terms of demonstrating high performance in three criteria: research and creative professional work, effectiveness in teaching, and clear promise of future intellectual and professional development. Service is not recognized as a prime criterion for tenure and promotion evaluations. As stated in the '*Policy and Procedures on Academic Appointments',* service may constitute a fourth factor in the tenure decision but should not, in general, receive a particularly significant weighting (University of Toronto Governing Council, 2015). This administrative policy defines what should be considered as scholarly research and teaching. However, the standards for measuring the quality of these criteria are not uniformly outlined. In comparison to McGill University's '*Regulations Relating to the Employment of Tenure Track and Tenured Academic Staff',* UBC's and University of Montreal's non-union faculty agreements, University of Toronto's professorial policy recognizes that the lack of consistent standards for evaluating merit represents a concern. It states that:

"significant differences among divisions and disciplines in the university will lead to some differences in the detailed application of these criteria. Nevertheless, there should be a high degree of uniformity across the University, in standards and procedures for granting tenure." (University of Toronto Governing Council, 2015).

Therefore, this statement correlates what previous studies in my literature review have indicated. Precisely speaking, there are often inconsistencies in the procedural appraisal of performance. While the University of Toronto is not a unionized institution, it has two equity policies: *Guidelines for Employees on Concerns and Complaints Regarding Prohibited Discrimination* and the *Human Resources Guideline on Civil Conduct* which regulate grievances and advocate for institutional equity (AFDG, 2010).

4.3 The implication of university merit definitions

The discourse of sample tenure and promotion policies implies that merit at unionized and non-unionized education faculties is defined in terms of producing scholarly research, effective teaching and quality service (Table 4). Depending on their institutional status, the nuance on valuing one criterion over the other differs slightly across Canadian universities. In comparison to unionized universities, in non-unionized universities, there is an overemphasis on research and teaching by comparison with service. In that regard, the result on merit definitions at non-unionized Canadian universities are analogous to existing US studies. Tenure systems across US research universities give less consideration to service (Luchs et al., 2012; Bazeau, 2003; O'Meara, 2002; Antonio et al., 2000). The result implies that merit definitions in Canadian universities' faculty collective agreements slightly differ in tone with US research universities'. At Canadian unionized universities, merit is defined as a demonstration of high performance in research or professional activities, teaching and service. With unionization comes a definition of merit that is tripartite. Although one might expect there to be differences in the definition of merit between unionized and non-unionized institutions (Table 5), the result suggests that documents regarding tenure and promotions across all institutions include clauses to protect academic freedom. All regulations empower academics to appeal against arbitrary tenure and promotion decisions. Faculty collective agreements provide more bargaining power (Baer, 2013). For example, the collective agreement of the University of Montreal (SGPUM, 2013) stipulates that "The professor who is unsatisfied of his or her workload can file a grievance to the equity committee that's responsible for academic life. The grievance must be written within ten working days to the head of department and faculty union after receiving his or her teaching workload." (English, translated version). Considering that education faculties like any other

academic faculties operate under the same university central administration, the result on merit definitions implies that all education professors regardless of their institutional status are required to outperform in research and teaching.

Table 4: The definition of merit in sample university tenure and promotion regulations

Unionized Canadian universities	Non-unionized Canadian universities
University of Montreal: Performance in research, teaching and service Contribution to the reputation of the university	University of British Columbia: Overemphasis on high performance in research and effectiveness in teaching Less emphasis on service inputs
Queen's University: A record of high quality and expert peer-assessed scholarly or creative work Effectiveness in teaching A record of professional, university or community service	McGill University: Evidence of high performance in scholarly research and activities (overemphasized) Record of high quality teaching Service inputs
University of Ottawa: High performance in scholarly or professional activities Evidence of effectiveness in teaching Satisfactory service (administrative or community)	University of Toronto: Evidence of high performance in research or creative professional work (overemphasized) Effectiveness in teaching Clear promise of future intellectual and professional development Less consideration of service

Table 5: A summary of sample tenure and promotion policies
Research: Demonstration of high performance is required at unionized universities, and highly required at non-unionized universities
Teaching: Demonstration of teaching effectiveness is required at unionized universities, but somewhat required at non-unionized universities.
Service: Administrative and community contributions are somewhat required at unionized universities, but not required at non-unionized universities

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS ON EDUCATION PROFESSORS' PERCEPTIONS OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS AT UNIONIZED CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES' EDUCATION FACULTIES

5.1 Frustration against the vagueness of merit definition and appraisal standards

Interview findings reveal that at Canadian unionized universities' faculties of education, one of the internal factors which causes frustration among junior and senior education professors is the inconsistency and vagueness of standards employed for tenure and promotion performance evaluations. For instance, because of the absence of reliable standards, senior education professors observe that the appraisal of the international impact of their scholarly activities is often daunting and arbitrary. In the same vein, survey findings indicate that most senior education professors (83.67% of senior male education professors and 73.46% of senior female education professors) are dissatisfied with the ambiguity of merit expectations (Table 6). Some junior education professors (32.25% of junior male education professors and 44.9% of junior female education professors) also complain about the same issue (Table 6). As stated by participant #15 "appraisal standards are not clear enough. Expectations for tenure are not clear enough." For example, participant #16 said that he is anxious that "appraisal standards are not consistent, and change often." Junior and senior education professors are not satisfied by such a discrepancy. They are frustrated by the interpretation of tenure and promotion criteria at the department level. They are frustrated by such interpretation because merit expectations are not cohesively defined by the department. In particular, junior and senior education professors complain that while the agreements state that research, teaching and service should be

considered, in practice, service is not always considered. As argued by participant #12, “there is a discrepancy between how merit is defined in university agreements and practices related to performance reviews. Service receives little consideration”. Research is the criterion which receives the most consideration. To a certain degree, effectiveness in teaching is also evaluated. Junior and senior education professors are somewhat dissatisfied with the overemphasis that is put on research. They are preoccupied with the high value placed on research funding, and are frustrated with a tenuous or non-recognition of service. To them, it seems that merit is partly defined by getting research grants. In other words, a faculty member who brings a lot of external research grants to the department is lauded and recognized as an outstanding scholar. Preoccupied with the primacy of research funding, they suggest that macro public policies should also be considered when evaluating performance. They suggested this because they think that it is difficult for them to obtain external grants in a context where the government has been cutting research funding. Their discontent is not only limited to the inconsistency of performance review standards and the high value placed on research funding. It also extends to the importance given to the quantity rather than the quality of publications. As stated again by participant #12 “we are under a constant pressure to produce many research papers. The quality does not matter. It is all about having many publications under your name. For tenure, evaluation committees care more about the number of your publications.”

Table 6: The percentage of junior and senior education professors who are somewhat satisfied (S) and dissatisfied (D) with merit definitions

	Male	Female
Junior education professors	S 67.75	S 55.1
	D 32.25	D 44.9
Senior education professors	S 16.32	S 26.53
	D 83.67	D73.46

5.2 Faculty perceptions of student course evaluations, peer ratings and external evaluations

On student course evaluations, interview findings indicate that on the one hand, senior education professors are somewhat satisfied with the outcome of these ratings. On the other hand, junior education professors are somewhat dissatisfied. Survey findings corroborate the same conclusion by indicating that most senior education professors (67.89 % of senior male education professors and 56.45% of senior female education professors) are somewhat satisfied (Table 7). But most junior education professors (67.5% of junior male education professors and 86.35% of junior female education professors) are not satisfied with the shortcomings of student course evaluations (Table 7). Interview findings also reveal that junior and senior education professors are concerned by the shortcomings of course evaluations and potential bias. Participants from both professorial categories presume that such ratings are often influenced by grades received by students, and believe that the rating process is not objective. To some extent, they harbour doubts about considering course evaluations as the sole indicators of teaching effectiveness. Yet they also believe that feedback provided by students can be useful to improve their teaching skills and courses.

Table 7: The percentage of junior and senior education professors who are somewhat satisfied (S) and dissatisfied (D) with student course evaluations

	Male	Female
Junior education professors	S 32.5	S 13.65
	D 67.5	D 86.35
Senior education professors	S 67.89	S 56.45
	D 32.11	D 43.55

Furthermore, interview findings reveal that senior and junior education professors believe that peer ratings are not entirely free of bias. Assistant, associate and full professors who responded to the interviews believe that peer ratings are often arbitrary and orchestrated in a chilly (conflictual) academic workplace climate. Participant #8 shared that for some education professors "peer ratings represent an opportunity to settle a score against a colleague by under-rating him or her". It transpires that colleagues who act as evaluators often use their own subjective interpretation of appraisal standards. Such behaviour exists because they are not informed enough by the department on what the appraisal standards are. Alongside this, the lack of detailed feedback from peer ratings causes dissatisfaction among those in the pursuit of tenure and full professorship. As contended by participant #15, "feedback from peer reviewers are not detailed and critical enough to contribute to my professional development." Most junior education professors (86.2% of junior male education professors and 57.87% of junior female education professors) are not satisfied with the process of peer ratings. Despite the shortcomings of this process, most senior education professors (86.59% of senior male education professors and 76.54% of senior female

education professors) are somewhat satisfied (Table 8). Thus, there is a need to answer the following question: Why are many senior education professors somewhat satisfied while also believing that peer ratings are often arbitrary? In that regard, further studies need to be done to answer the aforesaid question.

Table 8: The percentage of junior and senior education professors who are somewhat satisfied (S) and dissatisfied (D) with peer evaluations

	Male	Female
Junior education professors	S 13.8	S 42.13
	D 86.2	D 57.87
Senior education professors	S 86.59	S 76.54
	D 16.41	D 23.46

Interview findings show that senior and junior education professors think that it is important to be evaluated and recommended for tenure or promotion by external reviewers who are well versed in the candidate's field. It is believed that external ratings partially contribute to the fairness of the tenure and promotion process, and partially foster the culture of distributive justice. In support of this rationale, participant #17 mentioned that "to some degree, recommendation letters from external evaluators partly reduce the risk of unfairness." Although survey findings reveal that senior education professors (71.1% of senior male education professors and 68.86% of senior female education professors) with their junior peers (50.9% of junior male education professors and 46.3% of junior female education professors) are

somewhat dissatisfied with external ratings (Table 9). When asked why they are not satisfied, participants did not provide tangible responses to the question. Thus, the present study suggests that education faculties and departments, university administrations and faculty associations at unionized Canadian universities may consider conducting further studies to answer that question.

Table 9: The percentage of junior and senior education professors who are somewhat satisfied (S) and dissatisfied (D) with external evaluations

	Male	Female
Junior education professors	S 49.1	S 53.7
	D 50.9	D 46.3
Senior education professors	S 28.9	S 31.14
	D 71.1	D 68.86

5.3 Faculty perceptions on the preparation and evaluation of tenure and promotion dossiers

Survey findings reveal that junior and senior education professors are relatively dissatisfied with the fact that the tenure and promotion process at the department level is politicized. They are exasperated by the time that is required to prepare their dossier. They stated that it is too time-consuming and a complex task to do. Some of them are confused on what to include in a dossier and would prefer a procedure that is less complex. Furthermore, senior education professors think that evaluations for professorship are more likely to be arbitrary than evaluations for tenure. Interview participants stated that they were not informed enough on how to prepare a dossier for tenure or promotion. Senior education professors said that the path to tenure

is less strenuous than it is for full professorship. Junior and senior education professors think that the evaluation of their dossiers by the faculty and university tenure and promotion committees is less arbitrary than evaluations at the department level.

5.4 Findings on faculty collective agreements and turnover intentions

Participants who responded to interview questions stated that they hold a positive opinion on faculty collective agreements. There is a common belief among junior and senior education professors that existing agreements have been instrumental in regulating the process of tenure and promotion evaluations. In addition, they also agree that these agreements have provided them with negotiation rights to appeal against arbitrary performance reviews. As opined by participant #11, "the collective agreement is important and protects professors against arbitrary decisions. It empowers a faculty association to advocate the rights of faculty members." Still, some of them complain that the regulations set by these administrative policies are not thoroughly implemented at the department level. In the context of unionized universities, the term faculty association refers to faculty union.

About turnover intentions, most of them express no desire to voluntarily or involuntarily depart from their institution. Despite procedural shortcomings, retention intentions are still ubiquitous. Some reasons associated with their intent to stay are as follows: academic freedom, job security and self-actualization. In term of self-evaluation, junior and senior education professors rate themselves in the scale of average to excellent. No one ranks himself or herself below average. Their positive self-evaluation implies that they are satisfied with their work input and academic contributions.

5.5 The covariate of sex and perceptions

Considering the covariate of sex, interview findings suggest that male and female faculty members believe that performance evaluations undergone before and after tenure are not always objective. Female education professors at Canadian unionized universities stated that they don't feel being differently evaluated by peers and members of tenure and promotion committees. My findings suggest that male and female education professors alike are concerned with the same issues: (1) dissatisfaction related to the vagueness and inconsistency of appraisal standards, (2) dissatisfaction related to arbitrary peer ratings, and (3) frustrations related to potentially biased student course evaluations. Although early career female participants complain experiencing a conflict between motherhood and academic life. As contended by participant #15, "there is a conflict between meeting academic expectations and motherhood." To resolve this issue, they propose that university administrations need to design and implement policies that will help female professors who have parental responsibilities to adjust to academic life. Consequently, this study suggests that further studies need to be done to address the conflict between motherhood and academic life.

CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS ON EDUCATION PROFESSORS' PERCEPTIONS OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS AT NON-UNIONIZED CANADIAN UNIVERSITIES' EDUCATION FACULTIES

6.1 Frustration against the vagueness of merit definition and appraisal standards

Interview findings reveal that junior and senior education professors at non-unionized Canadian universities hold the same attitude as those at unionized universities. Survey findings also show that faculty members (87.76% of senior male education professors, 87.76% of senior female education professors, 67.85% of junior male education professors and 12.4% of junior female education professors) are somewhat dissatisfied with the ambiguity of evaluation standards (Table 10). They complain that at the departmental level, merit expectations are not meticulously defined. In addition, they complain that standards employed to measure the quality of their research, teaching and service are not consistent enough, and vary from one department chair to another, from one year to another. In the same vein, they are concerned with the risk presented by the vagueness of appraisal standards, such as a subjective interpretation of tenure and promotion criteria by potential evaluators. As stated by participant #14, "appraisal standards are not clear enough at the department level, and are opened to many interpretations." Furthermore, it also transpires that the vagueness of appraisal standards implicitly affects early career academics' awareness of merit. They rely on their informal socialization with senior colleagues to know what the expectations are. As asserted by participant #3, "expectations when first hired are unspoken, not clearly written at the department level. I figured out from senior colleagues." Likewise, senior education professors raise the same frustration as they recall their own past pre-

tenure experience. For example, participant #10 said that "standards of evaluation depend on the culture of the department. They are not too clear at the departmental level…not clear for assistant professors to know the expectations enough." Senior and junior education professors are also somewhat dissatisfied with the reality that the numbers of publications and grants awarded are valued more highly than research impact in performance evaluations. As argued by participant #2, "the contribution impact factor rather than the quantity of publications in the field should be considered." Likewise, they are critical about the culture of overemphasizing research and scholarly activities. As evidenced in interview findings, they question why all tenure and promotion criteria are not equally considered in the process of evaluations. They ask why teaching is not valued as highly as research and service is often omitted. Consequently, this study suggests that the management of education faculties may consider engaging further studies on how to value teaching and service because enhancing an appraisal system in which each tenure and promotion criterion is equally considered necessitates evaluation policies and practices in support of procedural justice.

Table 10: The percentage of junior and senior education professors who are somewhat satisfied (S) and dissatisfied (D) with merit definition

	Male	Female
Junior education professors	S 32.15 D 67.85	S 87.6 D 12.4
Senior education professors	S 12.24 D 87.76	S 12.24 D 87.76

6.2 Faculty perceptions of student course evaluations, peer ratings and external evaluations

Pertaining to student course evaluations, junior education professors (73.3% of junior male education professors and 82.47% of junior female education professors) and senior education professors (23.9% of senior male education professors and 65.87% of senior female education professors) are somewhat satisfied but also critical (Table 11). Survey findings suggest that they think that ratings from students are somewhat subjectively done. While those ratings generate feedback that is necessary for improving teaching skills, it is also assumed that those ratings are not entirely impartial and unbiased. For instance, participants reported that often students who are not happy about their grades or did not like a course use course evaluations to express their anger against a particular faculty member. For example, participant #2 said that "we have heard cases of student bashing. Some students use course evaluations as an opportunity to under-rate the teacher because they found the course too demanding." On par with their unionized peers, non-unionized faculty members judge that student course evaluations are not a sufficient metric to measure teaching effectiveness. As contended by participant #16, "without the consideration of other teaching metrics that are more objective, it is problematic to use student ratings of professors as a criterion for tenure". They suggest that this metric should be supplemented by other teaching scales such as classroom observations by peers. In the same critical vein, it is believed that the low response rate of students to online-based evaluations and class size heterogeneity heighten the weaknesses of the process of course ratings. As substantiated by most interview participants, professors who teach in larger classes are more likely to be under-rated by students than those who teach in smaller classes. For instance, participant #16 stated that "the context of teaching environment needs to be taken into consideration when looking at the course reports. The professor who teaches a small class of doctoral students is less likely to be poorly rated by learners than someone teaching in a class full of undergraduate students." Based on the limitations of the process of student course

evaluations, this study concludes that its outcomes cannot be always fair. Thus, I suggest that further studies into the implications of the process of course evaluations at non-unionized education faculties are needed.

Table 11: The percentage of junior and senior education professors who are somewhat satisfied (S) and dissatisfied (D) with student course evaluations

	Male	Female
Junior education professors	S 16.7 D 73.3	S 17.53 D 82.47
Senior education professors	S 76.1 D 23.9	S 34.13 D 65.87

At non-unionized universities' faculties of education, the prevalent perception among faculty members is that peer ratings are not always fair. They (48.45% of junior male education professors and 50.12% of junior female education professors; 67.7% of senior male education professors and 61.66% of senior female education professors) think so because the process of peer ratings is somewhat arbitrary (Table 12). They perceive that peer ratings are occasionally entangled by conflicts of interest among faculty members. They deplore the behaviour of some peer evaluators who denigrate the dossier of colleagues to stay competitive. As commented by participant #13, "getting ahead by denigrating, putting down and slandering your colleagues is often pervasive in the department." After experiencing arbitrary appraisals from peers, some senior education professors expressed no interest in applying for full professorship. Based on

such an attitude, it is logical to deduce that arbitrary performance reviews cause attrition among professors who feel that they were unfairly evaluated by colleagues. One of the other issues raised by junior and senior education professors is that departmental peers are not always best placed to evaluate their scholarly activities. The reason given by them is that peers are not always well acquainted with the research discipline of a candidate because of a diversity of research disciplines within a department.

Table 12: The percentage of junior and senior education professors who are somewhat satisfied (S) and dissatisfied (D) with peer ratings

	Male	Female
Junior education professors	S 51.55	S 49.88
	D 48.45	D 50.12
Senior education professors	S 32.12	S 38.34
	D 67.7	D 61.66

Regarding external evaluations, interview and survey findings indicate that senior education professors (46% of senior male education professors and 72.41% of senior female education professors) have a positive view on external evaluations (Table 13). The intrinsic factor that engenders their satisfaction is the right that they have in providing the list of potential evaluators to the department chair. In most cases, they state that they were more inclined to list external

reviewers who were more acquainted with their research spectrum. In terms of process and outcomes, they presume that external evaluations are more objective than peer ratings and student course evaluations. In comparison to senior education professors, survey findings show that few junior education professors (28.5% of junior male education professors and 25.32% of junior female education professors) are satisfied with external evaluations (Table 13).

Table 13: The percentage of junior and senior education professors who are somewhat satisfied (S) and dissatisfied (D) with external evaluations

	Male	Female
Junior education professors	S 28.5	S 25.32
	D 71.5	D 74.68
Senior education professors	S 45.76	S 72.41
	D 54.24	D 27.59

6.3 Faculty perceptions on the preparation and evaluation of tenure and promotion dossiers

Despite the inconsistency of appraisal standards and the shortcomings of course evaluations and peer ratings, it transpires that junior and senior education professors are somewhat satisfied with the outcomes of tenure dossier evaluations conducted by their department tenure and promotion committee. Senior education professors feel that way because they were all granted tenure after a positive recommendation by the department evaluation committee. For junior education

professors, like those at unionized education faculties, their satisfaction is related to the institutionalization of tenure success rate. As commented by participant #3: "In comparison to the US, tenure is less competitive in Canada. Yet, still a stressful process. Tenure is like training for a marathon. It is a long intense endeavour, yet 95% of assistant professors at my faculty have achieved tenure. Because of higher tenure rate at my university, my chances and of those on tenure-track of getting are pretty good and pretty higher." Despite complaining that the path to tenure is arduous, they still believe that tenure appointment is based on distributive justice. In other words, they believe that tenure is awarded to those who are meritorious. Yet, to some extent, junior and senior education professors are frustrated by the fact that all tenure and promotion criteria are not equally considered by department evaluation committees. From their own perspective, there is an assumption that those who apply for tenure are recommended in part because of the politics of tenure slots implemented by the university administration. The politics of tenure slots refer to a fixed number of tenure positions that the university issues to each department to fill (Leap, 1995). As explained by participant #13: "The politics of tenure slots make it less appealing for a department to turn down a candidate from tenure because not tenuring a candidate can lead to the loss of a faculty slot. A faculty member cannot be turned down from tenure unless he or she is clearly and really incompetent." But for promotion to full professorship, senior education professors opine that departmental promotion recommendations are arduous to get. And the process of promotion evaluations at the department level is perceived as being too politicized and complex. My findings suggest that junior and senior education professors believe in the objectivity of dossier evaluations provided by the university tenure and promotion committee. At the same time, they are frustrated with the process of tenure and promotion evaluations per se because it is perceived to be demanding and stressful.

6.4 Findings on tenure and promotion regulations, turnover intentions and the covariate of sex

In comparison to their unionized peers, non-unionized senior and junior education professors stated that they do not have enough bargaining power. They are relatively dissatisfied with the fact that university tenure and promotion regulations do not empower them enough to effectively influence the politics of tenure at their institution. On the question about whether tenure and promotion performance evaluations lead to faculty turnover intentions, participants responded that it was not the case with them. Concurrently, perceptions on the shortcomings of student course evaluations, peer ratings, and external evaluations do not cause turnover intentions among junior and senior education professors employed at Canadian non-unionized universities' faculties of education. Pertaining to the covariate of sex and perceptions on performance evaluations, interview findings reveal that female professors from both professorial groups (senior and junior) do not believe that they are assessed differently.

CHAPTER 7

IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY

7.1 Procedural shortcomings exist in the processes of tenure and promotion in education faculties

In response to my first research question, precisely on the definition of merit in tenure and promotion policies, the present study reveals that merit is defined in terms of producing scholarly research, effective teaching and service. Yet in comparison to unionized universities' faculty collective agreements, non-unionized universities' tenure and promotion regulations overemphasize research and teaching. Service is not considered in the same scale as research is valued. Still, the lack of consistent appraisal standards is endemic to all institutions, unionized and non-unionized education faculties. The inconsistency of appraisal standards implies that education professors are not adequately informed about the merit expectations. Thus, education professors are not well prepared by their department to navigate the system of tenure and promotion with ease and less frustration. The result of my study suggests that the problem is not with the discourse of meritocracy itself but rather how merit is assessed at the department level. Pertaining to bargaining power, the present study infers that junior and senior education professors at unionized universities hold a positive opinion about faculty collective agreements. Additionally, they believe that these agreements have been instrumental in regulating the process of tenure and promotion. The negotiation rights that faculty collective agreements confer upon faculty unions and faculty members. For junior and senior education professors at non-unionized institutions, opinions on bargaining power relatively differ from those of their unionized peers. They think that current university tenure and promotion regulations (non-certified agreements) do not confer them enough negotiation rights. Yet, in relation to their experience and

frustrations with performance evaluations, this study suggests that there is no difference between them and those working at unionized universities' education faculties. This conclusion implies that the experience of education professors with the processes of tenure and promotion regardless of their institution status is somewhat identical.

Regarding my second research question, namely the question on education professors' perceptions of performance evaluations, the present study suggests that departmental performance evaluations related to tenure and promotion processes affect the perceptions of junior and senior education professors. On a par with the vagueness of appraisal standards, the overvaluation of research is critically judged by education professors. The determinants at the epicentre of this negative perception are the following: (1) the emphasis on attracting research funding and the quantity rather than the quality of publications as indicators of scholarly performance prompts dissatisfactions among education professors; and (2) the relative consideration and the failure to value their service input. To some extent, education professors are also dissatisfied with the shortcomings of student course evaluations and peer ratings. The prevalence of biased and arbitrary evaluations within the processes of these evaluations is criticised. Which implies that the objectivity of student course evaluations and peer ratings is questioned by education professors. Commensurately, what they said about the shortcomings of these two evaluations shows that performance appraisals conducted at the department level are not free of any bias. It implies that there is a certain assumption among education professors that evaluation processes at the department are not always objective and fair. Education professors also complain that they don't receive enough feedback from peer evaluators. Considering the concerns raised by education professors, this study suggests that academic administrations at the department and faculty levels may engage further studies on the clarification and consistency of appraisal standards and merit expectations. Doing so may permit the development of consistent and clear

evaluation guidelines or rating scales that all stakeholders (education professors, academic administrators) can refer to.

7.2 Departmental merit evaluations cause performance appraisal aversion

Present findings substantiate two of Roberts and Pregitzer's (2007) seven factors that cause performance appraisal aversion among employees. As it stands now, the dissatisfaction of education professors indicates a feeling of performance appraisal aversion. Their belief implies that the pattern of procedural justice is not reflected in all types of evaluations associated with the processes of tenure and promotion. The procedural shortcomings that have been identified in this study entail the following characteristics: (1) rating bias and (2) poor feedback. The recurrence of rating bias as perceived by education professors lowers their trust in the objectivity of student course evaluations and peer ratings. The existence of rating bias implies that non-meritocratic factors also affect the outcomes of tenure and promotion evaluations. Present findings corroborate Lutter and Schroder's (2016) argument about the influence of non-meritocratic factors on tenure achievement. They also substantiate what Acker, Webber and Smyth's (2012) study stated about academic review practices at seven Ontarian universities. In similarity with the result of the present study, Acker, Webber and Smyth's findings suggested that flaws exist in the processes of tenure evaluations. Present findings go much further than their result by stating that flaws also exist in the processes of promotion evaluations. The lack of detailed feedback related to peer evaluations implies that the system of performance evaluations at the department level is somewhat gangrened by poor communication. The fact that education professors complain that peer raters do not provide them enough feedback shows that the poor peer feedback is one of the predictive factors of job dissatisfaction.

The existence of arbitrary ratings can be interpreted as a characteristic of hypocrisy. It implies that peer evaluators often do not objectively evaluate their colleagues. All things considered, the result of this study aligns with Witchurch and Gordon (2009)'s study findings on the factors of demotivation among US academics. My findings and theirs show that arbitrary appraisals cause workplace demotivation among faculty members. Rationalizing on Schulze's (2006) claim that the politics of tenure and promotion are factors of job dissatisfaction. The results of my study reveal the same thing among Canadian education professors. Arbitrary peer ratings and biased student course evaluations undermine the principles of justice in education faculties' micro-system of tenure and promotion. Tantamount to equity theory's emphasis on procedural objectivity and fairness, the perceptions of education professors reveal that they value objective performance evaluations. The result somewhat aligns with Adams' conceptualisation that employees value fair treatment which causes them to be motivated to keep the fairness maintained within the organization. When the treatment is not fair, feelings of aversion arise among employees (Adams, 1969). As my findings show, education professors believe that external evaluations and dossier evaluations conducted by faculty and university tenure and promotion committees are somewhat objective and reflect the pattern of distributive justice. Such a belief suggests that while shortcomings exist in peer evaluations and student course evaluations, not all types of appraisal are perceived as being arbitrary and biased. Yet considering the system of tenure and promotion, a system in which student course evaluations and peer evaluations matter and inform tenure and promotion decisions, shortcomings in these ratings need to be addressed to enhance the objectivity of the system of tenure and promotion at the department level.

7.3 Perceptions of performance evaluations somewhat affect career decisions

The concerns raised by education professors echo the same narrative voiced by Acker et al (2012), Weinrib et al (2013) and Gentry (2015). The claim that the path of tenure and promotion is strenuous to navigate and is a source of frustration among academics is supported by present findings. The discourse of some senior education professors corroborates the claims made in Henry and Tator's study (2012) of tenure inequalities in Canadian universities and findings in Williams' study of promotion processes leading to full professorship. These senior education professors state that they have given up the idea of applying for full professorship because merit expectations associated with promotion are too complex and the promotion process is too politicized at the department level. Although all education professors are somewhat dissatisfied with the procedural shortcomings identified in performance evaluations, feelings of attrition transpire more among senior education professors than among junior education professors. In other words, the decision not to pursue an academic career advancement is sometimes taken by senior education professors rather than by their junior colleagues. It looks like that existing tenure and promotion mentoring programs that are supposed to assist faculty are not effective enough. It denotes that the current department management has not succeeded in guaranteeing a tenure and promotion process that is free of any unjust appraisal. Performance evaluations as a value of new managerialism and an embodiment of the university neoliberal culture are antecedents of education faculty demotivation. Considering senior education professors' demotivation, it is self-evident to recognize that achieving the rank of full professorship in education faculties is more difficult than getting tenure. As argued by Tator and Henry (20112), across Canadian universities, full professorship status is more difficult to achieve than a tenure appointment. However, this does not mean that achieving tenure is easier either. As suggested in

the findings, all education professors are frustrated and believe that the path to career advancement is difficult.

7.4 The absence of faculty turnover intentions implies that actual faculty turnover is not pervasive in education faculties

Pertaining to my third research question, precisely the question about faculty turnover intentions, the analysis of education professors' perceptions through the lenses of equity theory shows that junior and senior education professors at unionized and non-unionized Canadian universities' education faculties do not intend to leave their institution. Contrary to US researchers' studies (Basack, 2014; Ochola, 2008; DeConinck & Stilwell, 2015) of faculty turnover intentions which state that junior professors are more likely to develop turnover intentions than their senior peers, this study suggests otherwise. It suggests that Canadian universities' junior education professors, along with their senior peers, instead hold retention intentions. Bearing in mind that the findings of most organizational behaviour studies have suggested that employees' job dissatisfaction often cause turnover intentions, it is surprising to see that the findings of the present study have not reached the same conclusion. For example, findings in Basak's research (2014) on academic turnover indicated that faculty members often leave their organization because of inadequate compensation, and lack of recognition. In the same way, Sweeney and McFarlin (1993) contended that perceptions of objectivity in performance evaluations increase the trust of employees in their organization. Ochola's study on the predictive factors of faculty demotivation suggested that ambiguous merit expectations negatively affect the attitude of academics by causing them to develop turnover intentions. As with my study, there is no correlation between academic status and faculty turnover intentions. The absence of turnover intentions implies that

actual faculty turnover is not prevalent in education faculties. Thus, the result of this study somewhat contradicts equity theory's argument that employees' perceptions of unfairness cause turnover intentions. This inconsistency may be due to external factors that are hard to be measured and controlled. Concomitantly, it may be useful to explore through further studies why education professors at Canadian universities' education faculties prefer to remain at their institution despite their frustration with the processes of tenure and promotion. My findings suggest that for junior education professors, not leaving their institution is partly caused by the prevalence of tenure success. According to assistant professors who responded to my interview questions, the rate of tenure achievement is higher (95%) and is a motivation factor. Whereas for associate and full professors who responded to my interview questions, it is partly due to their self-actualization, and the job security and academic freedom conferred by tenure.

7.5 The lack of faculty turnover intentions echoes employee silence behaviour

Employee silence behaviour refers to the attitude of employees to withhold information or not to fully express their opinions, whether intentionally or unintentionally (Brinsfield, 2014). A study survey conducted by Vakola and Bouradas (2005) on the antecedents and consequences of organisational silence revealed that organizational forces lead to employees' silent behaviour. The findings of that study indicated that the fear of suffering negative consequences and being characterized as a "troublemaker", lack of openness in communication and lack of supportive supervisory style to exchange of ideas affect the way employees express or fail to express their disagreements or different opinions and the possibility of adopting or not adopting a "silent" behaviour (Vakola & Boudras, 2005). Given that none of my research participants has mentioned any

intentions to leave their faculty, I can hypothesize that their refusal to state so is a symbol of organizational behaviour silence. Perhaps the institutional context in which data were collected might have induced them not to state that they harbour turnover intentions. They may have been afraid to freely express their opinions because they fear that it could be interpreted as a lack of organizational commitment. Perhaps the corporatization of universities which is affecting the academic workforce in terms of the erosion of the tenure system and the casualization of the professoriate does not offer other opportunities. Education professors may not intend to depart because they perhaps assume that it is too difficult and very competitive to secure tenure positions outside of their current institution. In contrast to their colleagues in business, engineering and medicine faculties who have opportunities to pursue lucrative careers in the private sector (financial institutions, healthcare institutions and research and development), education professors may be more afraid to undertake a non-rewarding career outside of academia. Although the reasons mentioned in this section can be considered as mere assumptions, this study suggests that a further study needs to be engaged to investigate why education professors do not express turnover intentions.

7.6 The limitations of the study

This study is limited to full-time education professors employed at Canadian public research universities' education faculties. It is confined to those in tenure-track and tenured positions, and who are currently teaching at these institutions. It primarily explores their perceptions in relation to the objectivity of performance evaluations related to the processes of tenure and promotion. Findings of this study do not represent the perceptions of contractual and non-tenure track academics. Issues related to race, maternity, and fringe benefits such as wages differentiation are not addressed herein. The perceptions of academic administrators and students were not considered because the objective of this study consists of presenting

findings which exclusively represent the voice of certain education professors. Regarding the theoretical framework, the literature review was limited to existing higher education and management studies on tenure, academia, and employees' justice perceptions to inform the rationale of the study. The consideration of equity theory is limited to procedural justice and distributive justice. Procedural justice was mainly used to theorize the findings because of the nature of collected interview and survey data. The discourse which emerged from those data was primarily about participants' aversion against procedural shortcomings in performance evaluations. While distributive justice was somewhat employed as a secondary lens in the interpretation of findings, interactional justice was not used for data interpretation. It was not used because the themes and narratives emerging from data did not show that participants felt and stated that their workplace socialization with their department chair and colleagues has a consequential effect on the objectivity of performance evaluations. In terms of methodology, the sample of merit policies was limited to central university tenure and promotion regulations because it was impossible to have access to education faculties' micro-performance policies. Statistical data on education professors' perceptions of performance evaluations at the faculty level could not be produced because sample junior education professors who participated in the survey stated that their tenure applications have not yet been evaluated by their faculty tenure committees. The choice of university samples was limited to public research universities where faculties or departments of education exist. The risk of my bias having an influence on the interpretation of findings was reduced by taking proper measures. Yet the nature of targeted questions in survey questionnaire and interview questions does not exclude the fact that the questions might have affected the answers of my participants. The theorization of findings was limited to the notions of job satisfaction and job dissatisfaction.

7.7 Concluding remarks

This study concludes that education professors are somewhat dissatisfied with the inconsistency of appraisal standards and the ambiguity of merit expectations in education faculties. Based on its interview and survey findings, it reveals that shortcomings exist in student course evaluations and peer ratings. The shortcomings consist of biased and arbitrary ratings perceived by education professors. Consequently, these arbitrary evaluations act as workplace demotivators by causing job dissatisfaction among education professors irrespective of their university status and academic status. This implies that the processes of tenure and promotion in education faculties are entangled in performance evaluations that are not objective enough. The implication that can be drawn from this study is that its findings entail that procedural justice does not transpire in all processes of tenure and promotion. While it suggests that arbitrary performance evaluations cause job dissatisfaction, this dissatisfaction is not a predictive factor of turnover intentions among education professors. Therefore, it suggests that a further study is needed to explore why education professors have not stated developing turnover intentions.

REFERENCES

Aarts, B., Chalder, S., & Weimer, E. (2014). *The Oxford Dictionary of English Grammar*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Acker, S., Webber, M & Smyth, E. (2012). Tenure troubles and equity matters in Canadian academe. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 33(5), 743-761.

Acker, S., Webber, M & Smyth, E. (2010). "Discipline and publish? Early career faculty meet accountability governance, new managerialism and (maybe) gender equity". Paper presented at the Gender, Work and Organization Conference, June 21–23, Keele University, UK.

Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology*, New York, NY: Academic Press, 267-299.

AFDG. (2010). Guidelines for Employees on Concerns and Complaints Regarding Prohibited Discrimination. Retrieved from: www.hrandequity.utoronto.ca

Altbach, P. (2016). *Global perspectives on higher education*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.

Ambrose, S., Huston, T., & Norman, M. (2005). A qualitative method for assessing faculty satisfaction. *Research in Higher Education*, 46(7), 803-830.

Anderson, N.H. (2014). *Contributions to information integration theory volume 3: Developmental*. New York, NY: Psychology Press.

Anderson, B., & Jones, G.A. (1998). Organizational capacity and political activities of Canadian university faculty associations. *Interchange*, 29(4), 439-461.

Antonio, A., Astin, H., & Cress, C. (2000). Community service in higher education: A look at the nation's faculty. *Review of Higher Education,* 23(4), 373–397.

Anonymous. (2010). Higher education at a cross road: The economic value of tenure and the security of the profession. *Academe,* 102(2), 9-29.

APUO (Association of Professors of the University of Ottawa). (2012). Collective agreement between the University of Ottawa and the Association of professors of the University of Ottawa 2012-2016. Retrieved from http://www.apuo.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/APUO_CA_2012-2016.

Atasoylu, M., Wright, S., Beasley, B., Cofrancesco, J., Macpherson, D., Partridge, T., Thomas, P., & Bass, E. (2003). Promotion criteria for clinician educators. *Journal of General Internal Medicine,* 18(9), 711-716.

Au, W. (2013). Hiding behind high-stakes testing: Meritocracy, objectivity and inequality in US education. *The International Education Journal: Comparative Perspectives,* 12(2), 7-9.

Badali, S. (2004). Exploring tensions in the lives of professors of teacher education: A Canadian context. *Journal of Teaching and Learning,* 3(1), 1-16.

Baer, D. (2013). Should faculty and librarians unionize? Retrieved from http://web.uvic.ca/~baer/ Certification.pdf

Baker, J. (2014). Academic freedom as a constraint on freedom of religion. In J. Turk (Ed.), *Academic freedom in conflict: The struggle over free speech rights in the university,* Toronto, ON: James Lorimer & Company, 127-146.

Baldwin, R.G. (1990). Faculty career stages and implications for professional development. In J. Schuster & D. Wheeler (Eds.), *Enhancing faculty careers: Strategies for development and renewal*. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 20-40.

Ball, S. (2015). Living the neoliberal university. *European Journal of Education,* 50 (3), 258-261.

Basak, S. (2014). A comparison of university academics job factors: Satisfaction and dissatisfaction. *Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies,* 6(6), 500-5008.

Bataille, G. M., & Brown, B. E. (2006). *Faculty career paths: Multiple routes to academic success and satisfaction.* Westport, CA: Praeger Publishers.

Batchelor, R. (1998). *Academic freedom and tenure: Protections for the tenure candidate*. Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest.

Bazeau, G. (2003). Revisiting faculty service roles: Is faculty service a victim of the middle child syndrome? *American Journal of Pharmaceutical Education,* 67(3), 1-6.

Beran, T., Violato, C., Kline, D., & Frideres, J. (2005). The utility of student ratings of instruction for students, faculty, and administrators: A consequential validity study. *Canadian Journal of Higher Education,* 35 (2), 49-70.

Berk, A.D. (2013). *Top 10 flashpoints in student ratings and the evaluation of teaching: What faculty and administrators must know to protect themselves in employment decisions*. Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing

Bess, J.L., & Dee, J.R. (2012). *Understanding college and university organization: Theories for effective policy and practice.* Sterling, VA: Stylus Publishing.

Black, C., & Islam, A. (2014). Women in academia. What does it take to reach the top? The Guardian, February 24.

Bombardieri, M. (2014). Harvard professor challenges schools' denial of tenure. Retrieved from https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/06/12/harvard-professor-challenges-tenure denial.

Bourdieu, P., & Passeron, J. (1990). *Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture.* London: Sage.

Boyko, L., & Jones, G. (2010). The roles and responsibilities of middle management, chairs and deans in Canadian universities. In V. Meek et al (Eds.), *The changing dynamics of higher education middle management,* London: Springer, 83-102.

Brinsfield, C. (2014). Employee voice and silence in organizational behaviour. In A. Wilkinson et al (Eds.), *Handbook of research on employee voice,* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 114-134.

Bronstein, P., Briones, M., Brookes, T., & Cowan, B. (1996). Gender and family factors as predicators of late adolescent emotional expressiveness and adjustment: A longitudinal study. *Sex and Roles,* 34, 739-765

Brown, W., & Sherry, J. (2010). When the tenure road is rocky: Toward integrated selves and institutions. *Journal of Educational Thought,* 44(1), 147-161.

Buller, J. (2012). *Best practices in faculty evaluation: A practical guide for academic leaders.* San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass.

Cameron, M. (2010). Faculty tenure in academe: The evolution, benefits and implications of an important tradition. *Journal of Student Affairs at New York University,* 1-11.

Campbell, L.R. (1981). Tenure and tenure reviews in Canadian universities. *McGill Law Journal*, 26, 362-390.

Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT). (2010). The changing academy: A portrait of Canada's university teachers. *CAUT Educational Review*, 12(1), 1-8.

Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT). (2009). Almanac of postsecondary education in Canada: A portrait of Canada's university teachers. Ottawa.

Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT). (2001). Report of the committee of inquiry into a complaint by Professor Michael Thorpe. Retrieved from https://www.caut.ca/docs/default-source/af-ad-hoc-investigatory-committees/report-into-a-complaint-by-professor-michael-thorpe-at-mount-allison-university-(2001).pdf

Cannon, R. (2001). Broadening the context for teaching evaluation. *New Directions for Teaching and Learning*, 88, 87-97.

Cargile, A.C. (2011). Discriminating attitudes toward speech. In L. Samovar et al (Eds.), *Intercultural communication: A reader*. Boston, MA: Wadsworth.

Caplow, T., & McGee, R.J. (1958). *The Academic marketplace*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Castle, J.B & Schutz, A. (2002). Voices at the top: Learning from full professors. *Canadian Journal of University Continuing Education, 28(1), 1-23.*

Castilla, E., & Bernard, S. (2010). The paradox of meritocracy in organizations. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 55(0), 543-576.

Catano, V., Francis, L., Haines, T., Kirpalani, H., Shannon, H., Stringer, B., & Lozanzki, L. (2010). Occupational stress in Canadian universities: A National survey. *International Journal of Stress Management,* 17(3), 232-258.

Cha, S. (2008). *Exploring teachers' job satisfaction, intent to leave and actual turnover intentions: A structural question modelling approach.* Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest.

Chait, R. (2009). *The questions of tenure*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Chant, J. (2005). How we pay professors and why it matters. *CD Howe Institute,* 221, 1-29.

Christensen, R., Sassler, E., & Moon, K. (2014). Organizational equity, justice, and individual public service motives. *Academy of Management.*

Christen, M.., Iyer, G., & Soberman, D. (2006). Job satisfaction, job performance, and effort: A re-examination using agency theory. *Journal of Marketing,* 70, 137-150.

Clark, H.C. (2003). *Growth and governance of Canadian universities: An insider's view.* Vancouver, BC: UBC Press.

Collins, J.M. (2008). Coming to America: Challenges for faculty coming to United States' universities. *Journal of Geography in Higher Education,* 32(2), 179–188.

Colquitt, J.A., Conlon, D.E., Wesson, M.J., & Colh, P. (2001). Justice at the millennium: A meta-analytical review of 25 years of organisational justice research. *Journal of Applied Psychology,* 86(3), 425-445.

Condon, A., & Patch, T. (2010). *Valuing difference: A strategy for advancing equity and diversity at UBC.* Vancouver, BC: UBC.

Cooper, M. (2015). The false promise of meritocracy. Retrieved from http://www.theatlantic.com/business/ archive/ 2015/12/meritocracy.

Corley, E. A., & Sabharwal, M. (2007). Foreign-born academic scientists and engineers: Producing more and getting less than their US born peers? *Research in Higher Education*, 48, 909-940.

Council of Canadian Academies. (2012). Strengthening Canada's research capacity: The gender dimension. Ottawa: Council of Canadian Academies.

Cramer, K., & Alexitch, K. (2000). Student evaluations of college professors: identifying sources of bias. *Canadian Journal of Higher Education*, 30(2), 143-164.

Crase, D.R., & Crase, D. (1976). New tenure and promotion guidelines produce growth pains. *Peabody Journal of Education*, 54(1), 56-59.

Crawford, M., & Macleod, L. (1990). Gender in the college classroom: An assessment of the chilly climate for women. Sex Roles, 23, 101-122.

Creswell, J. W., & Plano Clark, V. L. (2011). *Designing and conducting mixed methods research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Creswell, J. W. (2003). *Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approaches.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Creswell, J.W. (2005). *Educational research: Planning, conducting, and evaluating quantitative and qualitative research*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Merrill.

Currie, J. K., & Newson, J. (1998). *Universities and globalization: Critical perspectives*. London: Sage Publications.

Curtis, M. (2016). What is turnover intention? Retrieved from http://smallbusiness.chron.com/turnover-intention-12753.html

Dailey, R.C., & Kirk, D.J. (1992). Distributive and procedural justice as antecedents of job dissatisfaction and intent to turnover. *Human Relations*, 45(3), 305-317.

Dartey-Baah, K. (2014). Organizational antecedents and perceptions of fairness in policy implementation among employees in the banking sector of Ghana. *African Journal of Business*, 8(18), 816-831.

Davis, D. (2013). The experience of marginalized academics and understanding the majority: Implications for institutional policy and practice. In P. Boyer & D. Davis (Eds.), *Social justice issues and racism in the classroom: Perspectives from different voice*, Bingley: Emerald, 56-71.

DeConinck, J., & Stilwell, D. (2015). Turnover intentions of marketing managers. In E. Wilson & W. Black (Eds.), *Proceedings of the 1994 academy of marketing science*. New York, NY: Springer.

Deem, R. (1998). New managerialism and higher education: The management of performances and cultures in universities in the United Kingdom. *International Studies in Sociology of Education*, 8(1), 47-70.

De Montigny, G. (2011). Put on a happy office: Tenure, grievance and governance. *Canadian Journal of Educational Administration and Policy*, 1-39.

Denisi, A.S., Randolph, W.A., & Blencher, L.G. (1983). Potential problems with peer ratings. *The Academy of Management Journal*, 26(3), 457-464.

DiLeo, J. (2005). Uncollegiality, tenure and the Weasel clause. *Symplokē,* 13(1), 99-107.

Dittrich, J., Couger, D., & Zawacki, R. (1985). Perceptions of equity, job satisfaction and intentions to quit among data processing personnel. *Information and Management,* 9(2), 67-74.

Driscoll, J., & Cadden, D. (2010). Student evaluation instruments: The interactive impact of course requirement, student level, department and anticipated grade. *American Journal of Business Education,* 3(5), 21-30.

Duff, J., & Berdahl, R. O. (1966). *University government in Canada*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.

Dun, D., McCarthy, M., & Baker, J.H. (2011). *Using quality benchmarks for assessing and developing undergraduate programs.* San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass.

Dyke, N. (2006). Devenir professeur d'universite au Quebec: Une insertion professionnelle laborieuse. Retrieved from http://www.affairesuniversitaires.ca/opinion/a-mon-avis/devenir-professeur-duniversite-au-quebec/

Fanelli, C., & Evans, B. (2015). Capitalism in the classroom: The commodification of education. *A journal of Critical Study Research,* 26, 11-20.

Folger, R., & Konovsky, M. (1989). Effects of procedural and distributive justice on reactions to pay raise decisions. *The Academic of Management Journal,* 32(1), 115-130.

Frank, R.H. (2016). *Success and luck: Good fortune and the myth of meritocracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gambell, T. (1987). Education professors' perceptions of and attitude toward student writing. *Canadian Journal of Education,* 12(4), 495-510.

Garand, L., Matthews, J., Courtney, K., Davies, M., Lingler, J., Schlenk, E., Yang, K., Bender, C., & Burke, L. (2010). Development and use of a tool to guide junior faculty in their progression toward promotion and tenure. *Journal of Professional Nursing*, 26(4), 207-213.

Gariepy, K. (2015). *Power, discourse, ethics: A policy study of academic freedom.* Rotterdam: Sense Publishers.

Gehrke, S & Kezar, A. (2015). Unbundling the faculty role in higher education: Utilizing historical, theoretical and empirical frameworks to inform future research. In M. Paulsen (Ed.), *Higher education: Handbook of theory and research*, Dordrecht: Springer, 93-150.

Geister, C., Kaminski, D., & Berkley, R.A. (2007). The 13+ club: An index for understanding, documenting, and resisting patterns of non-promotion to full professor. *NWSA Journal*, 19 (3), 145-162.

Gentry, R., & Stokes, D. (2015). Strategies for professors who service the university to earn tenure and promotion. *Research in Higher Education Journal*, 29, 11-13.

Gibson, J. (1992). Taylorism and professional education. In J. Heim & D. Compton (Eds.), *Manufacturing systems: Foundation of world class practice*, Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 149-157.

Gladies, J.J., & Kennedy, V. (2014). Comparative analysis of performance management systems in higher education systems. *Journal of Applied Management Research*, 3(1), 63-70.

Glicken, M., & Robinson, B. (2013). *Treating worker dissatisfaction during economic change*. London: Elsevier.

Goulden, M., Wolfinger, N., & Masson, M. (2013). *Do babies matter? Gender and family in the ivory tower*. Rutgers, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Grace, D., & Khalsa, S. (2003). Re-recruiting faculty and staff: the antidote to today's high attrition. *Independent school*, 62 (20–27).

Gravestock, P. (2011). Does teaching matter? The role of teaching evaluation in tenure policies at selected Canadian universities. OISE, University of Toronto.

Gravestock, P & Greenleaf, E.G. (2008). Overview of tenure and promotion policies across Canada. University of Toronto.

Greenberg, J. (1986). Determinants of perceived fairness of performance evaluations. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 71(2), 340-342.

Greene, J., Caracelli, V., & Graham, W. (1989). Towards a conceptual framework for mixed-methods evaluation designs, *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis*, 11(3), 255-274.

Hahn, G., & Doganaksoy, N. (2012). *A career in statistics: Behind the number*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

Hall, J.B. (2012). In the matter of an arbitration under the Labour Relations Code, RSBC 1996 c. 244.The University of British Columbia and the Faculty Association of the University of British Columbia. Retrieved from http://www.blackgropper.com/media/AWARD

Haney, J. (2012). The problem of collegiality: Fostering dissent, diversity and academic freedom. Retrieved from http://www.universityaffairs.ca/opinion/in-my-opinion/the-problem-of-collegiality/

Henry, F. (2004). Systemic racism towards faculty of color and aboriginal faculty at Queen's University. Retrieved from www.queens.ca/provost/responsibilities.

Henry, F., & Tator, C. (2012). Interviews with racialized faculty members in Canadian universities. *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 44 (2), 75-99.

Henry, F., & Tator, C. (2009). *Racism in the Canadian university: Demanding social justice, inclusion and equity*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.

Herzberg, F. (1966). *Work and the nature of man*. Cleveland, OH: World Publishing.

Hopper, T. (2016). Law professor argues in UBC human rights complaint that Indigenous scholars shouldn't have to publish peer-reviewed research. Retrieved from http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/b-c-aboriginal-scholar-wins-bid-for-rights-hearing-after-shes-denied-tenure-in-part-over-lack-of-research.

Hopkins, D. (1990). The higher education production function: Theoretical foundations and empirical findings. In S. Hoenack (Ed.), *The economics of American universities*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 11-36.

Horn, M. (2015). Tenure and academic freedom in Canada. *Ethics in Science and Environmental Politics*, 15(23), 25-37.

Howard, L., & Cordes, C. (2010). Flight from unfairness: Effects of perceived injustice on the emotional exhaustion of employee withdrawal. *Journal of Business Psychology*, 25, 409-428.

Huer, J. (1991). Tenure for Socrates: *A study in the betrayal of the American professor*. New York, NY: Bergin & Garvey.

HRTO (Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario). (2011). Ogunyankin versus Queen's University. Toronto.

Independent Study Group on University Governance (ISGUG). (1993). Governance and accountability. Ottawa: Canadian Association of University Teachers (CAUT).

Iqbal, I. (2014). Don't tell it like it is: Preserving collegiality in the summative peer review of teaching. *Canadian Journal of Higher Education*, 44(1), 108-124.

Jaschik, S. (2008). Changing the tenure rules without telling anyone. Retrieved from https://www. insidehighered.com/news/2008/04/01/baylor.

Jones, R.F., & Froom, J.D. (1994). Faculty and administration views of problems in faculty evaluation. *Journal for the Association of American Medical Colleges*, 69(6), 476-483.

Jones, G. (2013). The structure of university governance in Canada. In A. Amaral et al (Eds.), *Governing higher education: National perspectives on institutional governance*, Dordrecht: Springer, 213-234.

Jones, G., Gopaul, B., Weinrib, J., Metcalfe, S.A., Fisher, D., Gingras, Y & Rubenson, R. (2013). Teaching, research and the Canadian professoriate. In J. Shin et al (Eds.), *Teaching and research in contemporary higher education*, Dordrecht: Springer, 335-356.

Jones, G; Weinrib, J; Scott-Metcalfe, A; Rubenson, K., & Snee, I. (2012). Academic work in Canada: The perceptions of early-career academics. *Higher Education Quarterly*, 66 (2), 189-206.

Jones, G., & Weinrib, J. (2012). The organization of academic work and the remuneration of faculty at Canadian universities. In P. Altbach et al (Eds.), *Paying the professoriate: A global comparison of compensation and contracts*, New York: Routledge, 83-93.

Jones, G., Shanahan, T., & Goyan, P. (2004). The Academic senate and university governance in Canada. *Canadian Journal of Higher Education*, 34 (2), 35-68.

Jones, G. (2012). *Higher education in Canada: Different systems, different perspectives*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Kaplan, S. (2015). Meritocracy: From myth to reality. *Rotman Management,* 48-53.

Kelsky, K. (2011). Hooray for elite white men: External reviewers for tenure. Retrieved from http://theprofessorisin.com/2011/07/07/hooray-for-elite-white-men-external-reviewers-for-tenure/

Kim, D., Wolf-Wendel, L., & Twombly, S. (2013). The role of citizenship status in intent to leave for pre-tenure faculty. *Journal of Diversity in Higher Education,* 4, 245-260.

Kim, T., & Holzer, M. (2016). Public employees and performance appraisal: A study of antecedents to employees' perceptions of the process. *Review of Public Personnel Administration,* 36(1), 31-56.

Landy, F., & Conte, J. (2010). *Work in the 21st century: An introduction to industrial and organizational.* Altamont Pass, CA: Wiley Blackwell.

Leap, T. (1995). *Tenure discrimination and the courts*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Lee, C.J., Sugimoto, C.R., Zhang, G., & Cronin, B. (2013). Advances in information science: Bias in peer review. *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology,* 64(1), 2-17.

Lee, C.J. (2012). A Kuhnian critique of psychometric research on peer review. *Philosophy of Science,* 79(5), 859-870.

Leventhal, G. S. (1980). What should be done with equity theory? In K. Gergen et al (Eds.), *Social exchange: Advances in theory and research,* New York: Plenum, 27-55.

Locke, W & Benion, A. (2013). Satisfaction in stages: The academic profession in the United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth. In P. Bentley et al (Eds.), *Job satisfaction around the academic world*, London: Springer, 223-238.

Locke, E.A. (1976). The nature and causes of job satisfaction. In M. Dunnette (Ed.), *Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology*, Chicago, IL: Rand McNally, 1297-1349.

Long, J.R. (2014). *Strategic compensation in Canada*. Toronto, ON: Nelson Education.

Luchs, G., Seymoure, S., & Smith, W. (2012). How important is service in the promotion and tenure process? *Research in Higher Education Journal*, 15, 1-11.

Luppicini, R. (2015). Technological reflections on the evolving organizational culture of university. In B. Burnell & H. Schnackenberg, *The ethics of cultural competence in higher education*, Oakville, ON: Apple Academic Press., 11-26

Mabrouk, P. A. (2007). Promotion from associate to full professor: *Analytical and Bioanalytical Chemistry* 388, 987-991.

MacKinnon, P. (2014). *University leadership and public policy in the twenty first century. A president's perspective*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.

Marsh, H.W. (1987). Students' evaluations of university teaching: Research findings, methodological issues, and directions for Future Research. *International Journal of Educational Research*, 11, 253-387.

Marginson, S., & Considine, M. (2000). *The enterprise university: Power, governance and reinvention in Australia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Martin, C. L., & Bennett, N. (1996). The role of justice judgments in explaining the relationship between job satisfaction and organizational commitment. *Group & Organizational Management*, 21(1), 84-104.

Masum, A., Azad, A., & Beh, L. (2015). Determinants of academic job satisfaction: Empirical evidence from private universities in Bangladesh. *Plos One*, 10(2), 1-15.

Matusov, E., & Hampel, R. (2008). Two approaches to tenure and promotion criteria. *Academe*, 94(1), 37-39.

McFarlin, D.B., & Sweeney, D.P. (1992). Distributive and procedural justice as predictors of satisfaction with personal and organizational outcomes. *Academy of Management Journal*, 35(3), 626-637.

McGill's REB (Research Ethics Board). (2011). Regulation on the conduct of research. Retrieved from https://www.mcgill.ca/research/files/research/conduct-of-research-regulation-on_4.pdf.

McGill University. (2015). Regulations Relating to the Employment of Tenure Track and Tenured Academic Staff. Retrieved from http://www.mcgill.ca/secretariat/files/secretariat/ employment of tenure track and tenured academic staff.

McKee, D. (2014). Don't throw them to the wolves. Retrieved from http://teachbetter.co/blog/2014/03/04/ thrown-to-the-wolves/

McNamee, S & Miller, R. (2013). *The meritocracy myth.* Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Meyers, L., Gamst, G., & Guarino, A. (2013). *Applied multivariate research*. London: SAGE.

Miller, H. (1998). Managing academics in Canada and the United Kingdom. *International Studies in Sociology of Education*, 8(1), 1-23.

Mingle, J., & Lenth, C. (1989). A new approach to accountability and productivity in higher education. Denver, CO: State Higher Education Executive Officers.

Mirrlees, T., & Shahid, A. (2014). Taylorizing academia, deskilling professors and automating higher education: The Recent role of MOOCs. *Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies*, 12(2), 45-73.

Monahan, E. (1983). Tenure and academic freedom in Canadian universities. *Interchange*, 15(1), 94-106.

Monture, P. (2009). Doing academia differently: Confronting whiteness in the university. In F. Henry & C. Tator (Eds.), *Racism in Canadian university: Demanding social justice, inclusion and equity*, Toronto: University of Toronto, 76-105.

Nakhaie, R. (2013). Ideological orientation of professors and equity policies for racialized minorities. *Canadian Ethnic Studies,* 45(1), 43-67.

Neilson, W. (2013). Gender representation in Canadian universities. Retrieved from http://www.newbrunswickbeacon.ca/30196/gender-representation-canadian-universities.

Nightingale, D. (1982).*Workplace democracy: An inquiry to employee participation in Canadian work organizations.* Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.

Niosi, J. (2014). The construction of national systems of innovation: A comparative analysis of Argentina and Canada. In G. Dutrenit & J. Sutz (Eds.), *National innovation systems, social inclusion and development: The Latin American experience*, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 349-380.

Norton, L. (2016). The scholarship of teaching and learning. In P. John & J. Fanghanel (Eds.), *Dimensions of marketization in higher education.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Ochola, J.E. (2008). *Assessment of faculty self-initiated intention to leave: A causal model of turnover*. Ann Arbor, MA: ProQuest.

O'Connell, T., Dyment, J., & Smith, H. (2015). "Students' appreciation, rejection and perceptions of creativity in reflective journals. *International Journal of Teaching and Learning in Higher Education,* 27(1), 1-13.

Okpara, J., Squillace, M., & Erondu, M. (2005). Gender differences and job satisfaction: A study of university teachers in the United States. *Women in Management Review*, 20(3), 177-190.

O'Meara, A, K. (2002). Uncovering the values in faculty evaluation of service as scholarship. *The Review of Higher Education,* 26 (1), 57-80.

O'Meara, A, K. (2004). Beliefs about post-tenure review: The influence of autonomy, collegiality, career stage and institutional context. *Journal of Higher Education,* 75(2), 178-202.

Omiecinski, T. (2003). Hiring of part-time university faculty on the increase. *Education Quarterly Review*, 9 (3), 9–15.

O'Toole, J., Van-Alstyne, W., & Chair, R. (1979). *Tenure: Three views*. Philadelphia, PA: Change Magazine Press.

Perlmutter, D.D. (2010). *Tenure and promotion confidential*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Pettigrew, T. (2011). Assistant? Associate? What the words before professor mean. Retrieved from http://www.macleans.ca/education/uniandcollege/assistant-associate-what-the-words-before-professor mean/.

Pololi, L., Krupat, E., Civian, J., Ash, A., & Brenan, R. (2012). Why are a quarter of faculty considering leaving academic medicine? A study of their perceptions of institutional culture and intentions to leave at 26 representative U.S. medical schools. *Academic Medicine,* 87(7), 859-869.

Posner, C. (2008). *Higher education faculty self-evaluation survey handbook.* Murphys, CA: Gateway Press.

Price, J., & Cotton, S.R. (2006). Teaching, research, and service: Expectations of assistant professors. *The American Sociologist,* 37(1), 5-21.

Price, E., Powe, N., Kern, D., Golden, S., Wand, G., & Cooper, L. (2010). Improving the diversity climate in academic medicine: Faculty perceptions as a catalyst for institutional change. *Academic Medicine,* 84 (1), 95-105.

Proulx, R. (2010). Benchmarking in 10 major Canadian universities at the divisional level: A powerful tool f

QUFA (Queen's University Faculty Association). (2015). Current collective agreement. Retrieved from http://www.queensu.ca/facultyrelations/faculty-librarians-and-archivists/or strategic decision making. Society for College and University Planning (SCUP).

Rajagopal, I. (2002). *Hidden academics: Contract faculty in Canadian universities*. Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.

Rajakumar, M. (2016). My American academia: At home and abroad. In C. Hutchison (Ed.), *Experiences of immigrant professors: Cross cultural differences, challenges and lesson for success,* New York, NY: Routledge.

Rees, D., Kumar, P., & Fisher, D. (1995). The salary effect of faculty unionism in Canada. *Industrial and Labour Relations Review*, 48(3), 441-451.

Reid, L. D. (2010). The role of perceived race and gender in the evaluation of college teaching on RateMyProfessors.com. *Journal of Diversity in Higher Education*, 3 (3), 137-152.

Reis, R. (2013). Best practices for improving faculty diversity recruitment and retention. In Williams, D. (2013). *The chief diversity officer: Strategy, structure and change management*. New York, NY: Stylus Publishing.

Rice, C. (2013). Five suggestions to the Norwegian government about women professors. Science in Balance, January 10.

Roberts, G., & Pregitzer, M. (2007). Why employees dislike performance appraisals. *Regent Global Business Review,* 14-21.

Robinson, I., & Dobbie, D. (2008). Reorganizing higher education in the United States and Canada: The erosion of tenure and unionization of contingent faculty. *Labour Studies Journal, 33(2),* 117-140.

Rosser, V.J. (2004). Faculty members' intentions to leave: A national study on their work life and satisfaction. *Research in Higher Education, 45(3),* 285-309.

Rousseau, D. (1989). Psychological and implied contracts in organisations. *Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 2(2),* 121-139.

Rubenstein, H. (2000). Rewarding university professors: A performance based approach. *Fraser Institute,* 44, 1-30.

Sa, C., Li, S., & Faubert, B. (2011). Faculties of education and institutional strategies for knowledge mobilization: An explanatory. *Journal of Higher Education,* 61(5), 501-512.

Santiago, R., & Carvalho, T. (2008). Academics in a new work environment: The impact of new public management on work conditions. *Higher Education Quarterly,* 62(3), 204-223.

Sen. A. (2000). Merit and justice. In K. Arrow et al (Eds,), *Meritocracy and economic inequality*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Schachtsiek, J.M. (1994). Peer review in the evaluation of baccalaureate nurse educators in Illinois. ProQuest, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.

Schlozman, K.L. (1998). External reviews in tenure and promotion decisions: How does the process wok? How should it? *Political Science & Politics,* 31(3), 623-630.

Schulze, S. (2006). Factors influencing the job satisfaction of academics in higher education. *South African Journal of Higher Education,* 20(2), 318-335.

Swiercz, P., Bryan, N., Eagle, B., Bizzotto, V., & Renn, R. (2012). Predicting employee attitudes and performance from perceptions of performance appraisal fairness. *Business Renaissance Quarterly*, 7(1), 25-46.

SGPUM. (2013). Convention Collective intervenue entre l'Universite de Montreal et le Syndicat General des Professeurs et Professeurs de l'Universite de Montreal: 2013-2017.

Shamos, M. (2002). Handbook of academic titles. Retrieved from http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/titles/titlebook.htm

Shepherd, K., Nihill, P., Botto, R.W., & McCarthy, M.W. (2001). Factors influencing pursuit and satisfaction of academic dentistry careers: Perceptions of new dental educators. *Journal of Dental Education,* 65 (9), 841-849.

Simmons, E. (2012). Leveraging your annual evaluation. Retrieved from https://www.insidehighered.com/ advice/ 2012/02/03/essay-simmons-how-professors-can-compose-effective-self-evaluations

Simpson, J. (1988). *Spoils of power: The politics of patronage*. Moosic, PA: Harper Collins.

Smit, P., & Nyamapfene, K. (2009). Being an academic in contemporary South Africa. In C. Whitchurch & G. Gordon, *Academics and professional identities in higher education: The challenges of diversifying workplace*, New York, NY: Routledge.

Sorcinelli, M. (1992). New and junior academics stress: Research and responses. *New Directions in Teaching and Learning, 50, (27-37).*

Spafford, M., Nygaard, V., & Gregor, F. (2006). Navigating the different spaces: Experiences of inclusion and isolation among racially minoritized faculty in Canada. *Canadian Journal of Higher Education*, 36 (1), 1-27.

Speight, J. (2015). *Educating scientists and engineers for academic and non-academic career success.* Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.

Stewart, J.C. (1990). A causal model of faculty turnover intentions. *Research in Higher Education*, 31(5), 405-424.

Stewart, P., Ornstein, M., & Drakich, J. (2009). Gender and promotion at Canadian universities. Canadian *Review of Sociology*, 46(1), 59-85.

Surdykowski, G. (2011). The board of governors of Laurentian university and the Laurentian University faculty association. Retrieved from http: //www. lufapul.ca/pdf/ Arbitration Decisions.

Sweeney, D.P., & McFarlin, D.B. (1993). Workers' evaluations of the ends and the means: An examination of four models of distributive and procedural justice. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes,* 55, 23-40.

Taylor, D., & Moghaddam, F. (1994). *Theories of inter-group relations: International social psychological perspectives.* Westport, CA: Greenwood.

Teichler, U., Arimoto, A., & Cummings, W. (2013). *The changing academic profession: Major findings of a comparative survey.* New York, NY: Springer.

Telly, C., Wendell, F., & Scott, W. (1971). The relationship of inequity to turnover among hourly workers. *Administrative Science Quarterly,* 16(2), 164-172.

Thomas, J. (1993). *Within these gates: Academic work, academic leadership, university life and the presidency.* Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Tierney, W.G. (2004). Academic freedom and tenure: Between fiction and reality. *The Journal of Higher Education,* 75(2), 161-265.

Tierney, W.G. (2001). *Faculty at work in schools of education: Rethinking roles and rewards for the twenty first century.* New York, NY: State of New York University Press.

Todd, Z., Madill, A., Shaw, N., & Brown, N. (2008). Faculty members' perceptions of how academic work is evaluated: Similarities and differences by gender. *Sex Roles,* 59 (11), 765-775.

Trower, C. (2009). What is current policy? In R. Chait (Eds.), *The questions of tenure,* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 32-68.

Tsanoff, R. (2016). *Schopenhauer's criticism of Kant's theory of experience*. London: Forgotten Books.

Tudiver, N. (1999). *Universities for sale: Resisting corporate control over Canadian higher education*. Toronto, ON: James Lorimer & Company Ltd.

Tullock, G. (1994). The Effect of Unionization on Faculty Salaries and Compensation. *Journal of Labor Research,* 15 (2), 199-200.

Twale, D. (2013). *A faculty guide for succeeding in academe*. New York, NY: Routledge.

University of Toronto Governing Council. (2015). Policy and procedures on academic appointments. Retrieved from http://www.governingcouncil.utoronto.ca/Assets/

University of British Columbia. (2015). "Tenure, Promotion & Reappointment for Faculty Members." Retrieved from http://www.hr.ubc.ca/faculty-relations/tenure-promotion-reappointment-confirmation/tenure -promotion-reappointment-for-faculty-members/

Vakola, M., & Bouradas, D. (2005). Antecedents and consequences of organizational silence: an empirical investigation. *Employees Relation,* 27(4), 441-458.

Young, M. (1958). *The rise of meritocracy*. Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Publishers.

Walsh, A. (2014). *Criminological theory: Assessing philosophical assumptions*. London: Routledge.

Watts, R. (1992). Universities and public policies. In J. Cutt & R. Dobell (Eds.), *Public purse, public purpose: Autonomy and accountability in the groves of academe*. Halifax, NS: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 75-99.

Weinrib, J., Glen, J., Scott-Metcalfe, A., Rubenson, K., Gingras, W., & Snee, I. (2013). Canadian university academics' perceptions of job satisfaction: The future is not what it used to be. In P. Bentley et al (Eds.), *Job satisfaction around the academic world,* Dordrecht: Springer, 83-102.

Wells, R. (2007). International faculty in U.S. community colleges. In R. Raby & E. Valeau (Eds.), *International reform efforts and challenges in community colleges,* San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 77-82.

Whicker, M.L., Kronenfeld, J.J., & Strickland, R.A. (1993). *Getting tenure*. London: SAGE Publications.

Widom, C. S., & Burke, B. W. (1978). Performance, attitudes and professional socialization of women in academia. *Sex Roles*, 4, 549-562.

Williams, A. (2016). The uncertain path to full Professor: Vague criteria may signal to some faculty members that a promotion to the top is out of their reach. Chronicle of Higher Education,

William, C. (2016). *Effective management*. Boston, MA: Cengage Learning.

Willow, B., & Sherry, J. (2010). When the tenure road is rocky: Toward integrated selves and institutions. *Journal of Educational Thought,* 44 (1), 147-161.

Wines, W., & Lau, T. (2006). Observations on the folly of using student evaluations of college teaching for faculty evaluation, pay, and retention decisions and its implications for academic freedom. *William & Mary Journal of Women and the Law,* 13(1), 167-202.

Winkler, J. A. (2000). Faculty reappointment, tenure, and promotion: Barriers for women. *Professional Geographer* 52 (4), 737-750.

Witchurch, C., & Gordon, G. (2009). *Academic and professional identities in higher education: The challenge of a diversifying workforce.* London: Routledge.

Wyn, J., Acker, S., & Richards, E. (2000). Making a difference: Women in management in Australian and Canadian faculties of education. *Gender and Education,* 12(4), 435-447.

Zahed, R. K. (2015). The mediating effect of social undermining on the relationship between organizational justice and organizational silence. The case study: Tax organizations of far province. *European Online Journal of Natural and Social Sciences*, 4(4), 752-760.

Zhou, Y., & Volkwein, J. (2004). Examining the influence on faculty departure intentions: A comparison of tenured versus non-tenured faculty at research universities using NSOPF-99. *Research in Higher Education,* 45(2), 139-176.

Zhou, Y. (2001). Examining the influences on faculty departure intentions: A national study using NSOPF-99. Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: Letter of consent and ethics certificate

McGill

Department of Integrated Studies in Education

Participant Consent Form

February 19, 2016

Researcher: Saturnin Espoir Ndandala
PhD Candidate, DISE, McGill University
saturnin.dandala@mail.mcgill.ca
(514) 416-8099

Co-supervisors: Dr. Annie Savard, Associate Professor
DISE, Faculty of Education, McGill University
(514) 398-4527 Ext. 09445
annie.savard@mcgill.ca

Title of Project: Tenure and promotion evaluations: Academics' perceptions at Canadian universities' faculties of education.

REB #: 391-0316

Sponsor(s): None

Dear professors,

I'm currently looking for potential participants for my fieldwork research. Thusly, I would like to request your participation if possible. Meanwhile, I've described my dissertation topic and purpose as explained beneath.

Purpose of the Study: My research aims on exploring and investigating whether pre-tenure and post-tenure performance reviews as a discourse of meritocracy affect the perceptions of unionized and non-unionized Canadian universities' education professors.

Study Procedures: Mixed methods will be used in the collection and analysis of data. Each semi-structured interview with participants will last about 40 minutes. Telephone and VoIP interviews will be audio recorded, and used for transcription purpose only, then destroyed afterward. Responding to survey questionnaire will take 15 minutes. Coding will be done through a cross-sectional analysis of satisfaction/dissatisfaction responses (interview and survey data). This research and the dissemination of findings in a written thesis will be completed within one year. Results may also be published in scholarly journals that pertain to the field of higher education management.

Voluntary Participation*:* Participation in this study is voluntary. You have the rights to decline to answer any question and can withdraw from this study at any time. If you decide to withdraw, your data will be destroyed unless you give your permission otherwise. Data will be de-identified one month after data collection is completed. Once de-identified, data can no longer be withdrawn. Moreover, your confidentiality will be guaranteed through the whole stage of study; from data collection, coding, analysis to dissemination. If there is to be deception or incomplete disclosure of the purpose of the study for any reason, you will be given additional information about the study after the completion of your participation.

Potential Risks: There are no anticipated risks in participating in this research. Yet, when using your workplace email, your institution might monitor its component. Thus, I would like to advise you to use your non-workplace emails to preserve your confidentiality.

Potential Benefits: Participating in this research might not benefit you personally. Yet, collected data will enable me to design an evaluation model that university administrations, faculty associations and unions, and policymakers can implement to enhance equitable and accurate performance reviews.

Compensation: Once my dissertation is completed, you will have access to final findings.

Confidentiality: As the principal investigator, I am the only one who will have access to your identifiable data. Your participation is confidential, and no third party will have access to your information. The recordings will not be disseminated to the public, but solely used by me.

If you need any further clarification regarding this research study, please feel free to contact me at: saturnin.dandala@mail.mcgill.ca or at 514-416-8099.

If you have any ethical concerns or complaints about your participation in this study, and want to speak with someone not on the research team, please contact the McGill Ethics Manager at 514-398-6831 or lynda.mcneil@mcgill.ca".

APPENDIX B: Interview and survey participants, questions, and statistical tables

Table 14: Profile of interview participants/timeline

Participants	Academic rank	Sex	Institution	Interview completion date
#1	Associate professor	Female	Non-unionized	4/11/2016
# 2	Full professor	Female	Non-unionized	4/15/2016
#3	Assistant professor	Female	Non-unionized	4/22/2016
#4	Assistant professor	Male	Unionized	4/26/2016
#5	Associate professor	Male	Unionized	4/26/2016
#6	Full professor	Male	Unionized	4/29/2016
#7	Full professor	Female	Unionized	4/29/2016
#8	Full professor	Female	Unionized	5/2/2016
#9	Assistant professor	Female	Non-unionized	5/3/2016
#10	Associate professor	Female	Non-unionized	5/5/2016
#11	Full professor	Male	Unionized	5/5/2016
#12	Full professor	Male	Unionized	5/6/2016
#13	Associate professor	Male	Non-unionized	5/9/2016
#14	Assistant professor	Female	Non-unionized	5/9/2016
#15	Assistant professor	Female	Unionized	5/9/2016
#16	Full professor	Male	Unionized	5/17/2016
#17	Full professor	Male	Non-unionized	5/18/2016

#18	Associate professor	Female	Unionized	5/18/2016
#19	Assistant professor	Male	Non-unionized	5/20/2016
#20	Associate professor	Male	Non-unionized	5/20/2016

Table 15: Profile of survey participants

Professorial cluster	Sex	Institutional status
Full professor	Male	Unionized
Associate prof	Male	Non-Unionized
Associate prof	Male	Unionized
Associate prof	Male	Unionized
Assistant prof	Female	Unionized
Associate prof	Male	Non-Unionized
Associate prof	Male	Unionized
Associate prof	Female	Unionized
Associate prof	Male	Unionized
Associate prof	Female	Non-Unionized
Assistant professor	Male	Unionized
Assistant professor	Male	Non-Unionized
Assistant professor	Female	Unionized
Assistant professor	Male	Unionized
Full professor	Male	Unionized
Assistant professor	Male	Non-Unionized
Assistant professor	Female	Unionized
Assistant professor	Male	Unionized
Assistant professor	Male	Unionized
Associate prof	Female	Non-Unionized
Associate prof	Female	Unionized
Associate prof	Female	Unionized
Assistant professor	Male	Unionized
Associate prof	Female	Non-Unionized
Assistant professor	Female	Unionized
Full professor	Female	Unionized
Full professor	Female	Unionized
Associate prof	Female	Non-Unionized

Assistant professor	Male	Unionized
Assistant professor	Male	Unionized
Associate prof	Male	Non-Unionized
Assistant professor	Female	Non-Unionized
Associate prof	Female	Unionized
Assistant professor	Female	Unionized
Assistant professor	Male	Non-Unionized
Associate prof	Male	Unionized
Assistant professor	Female	Non-Unionized
Assistant professor	Female	Non-Unionized
Assistant professor	Female	Non-Unionized
Associate prof	Female	Unionized
Full professor	Female	Unionized
Associate prof	Female	Unionized
Assistant professor	Male	Unionized
Assistant professor	Male	Non-Unionized
Assistant professor	Male	Non-Unionized
Full professor	Female	Non-Unionized
Assistant professor	Female	Unionized
Full professor	Male	Unionized
Associate prof	Female	Unionized
Associate prof	Male	Non-Unionized
Full professor	Male	Non-Unionized
Associate prof	Male	Non-Unionized
Full professor	Male	Non-Unionized
Associate prof	Female	Non-Unionized
Assistant professor	Female	Non-Unionized
Full professor	Male	Non-Unionized
Full professor	Female	Unionized
Assistant professor	Female	Unionized
Associate prof	Female	Unionized
Assistant professor	Male	Non-Unionized
Assistant professor	Male	Unionized

Associate prof	Female	Unionized
Assistant professor	Female	Unionized
Associate prof	Female	Non-Unionized
Full professor	Male	Unionized
Assistant professor	Male	Unionized
Full professor	Male	Non-Unionized
Assistant professor	Female	Unionized
Associate prof	Male	Unionized
Full professor	Female	Unionized
Associate prof	Male	Unionized
Associate prof	Female	Unionized
Associate prof	Male	Non-Unionized
Assistant professor	Male	Non-Unionized
Associate prof	Female	Non-Unionized
Assistant professor	Male	Non-Unionized
Full professor	Male	Non-Unionized
Full professor	Female	Non-Unionized
Associate prof	Female	Unionized
Associate prof	Male	Unionized
Full professor	Female	Unionized
Assistant professor	Female	Unionized
Assistant professor	Female	Unionized

Table 16: Interview guideline questions

1-What is your professorial rank and gender?
2-What are your opinions about the definition of merit embedded in your university tenure and promotion agreements?
3-What are your opinions regarding the standards applied to assess tenure and promotion criteria (research, teaching, service and others)?
4-Were all criteria (tenure, teaching and service) equally considered and evaluated?
5-Do you think that the evaluations of your performance and dossier are/were not based on procedural justice? If not, why?
6-Do you think that tenure and promotion performance reviews have affected your satisfaction or dissatisfaction? If yes, why?
7-Are/were you dissatisfied with the course evaluation filed by your students? If not, why?
8-Are/were you dissatisfied with the peer ratings that were done on your academic input?
9-Are/were you dissatisfied with the external evaluations that were conducted on your academic input?
10- Are/were you dissatisfied with the performance reviews that were conducted on your dossier by department tenure and promotion committee?
11- Are/were you dissatisfied with the performance reviews that were

conducted on your dossier by university tenure and promotion committee?

12-Have you experienced any unfairness or perceived any discrepancy in ones of aforementioned performance reviews? If yes, please explain

13-As a result of your experience with aforementioned performance reviews, have you already intended to leave your institution?

14-Did the unionized or non-unionized tenure agreements of your institution play a determinant role during your tenure or promotion process?

15-In your own words, how do you rate your work performance (excellent, good, average…etc)?

16-If there is anything else that you would like to mention, please feel free to comment.

Table 17: Survey questionnaire

1-What is your professorial rank and gender?

Full professor Associate professor Assistant professor	Male Female

2-Do you think that tenure and promotion performance reviews have affected your satisfaction or dissatisfaction?

3-Are/were you dissatisfied with the course evaluation filed by your students?

4-Are/were you dissatisfied with the peer ratings that were done on your academic input?

5-Are/were you dissatisfied with the external evaluations that were conducted on your academic input?

6- Are/were you dissatisfied with the performance reviews that were conducted on your dossier by department tenure and promotion committee?

7- Are/were you dissatisfied with the performance reviews that were conducted on your dossier by university tenure and promotion committee?

8-As a result of your experience with aforementioned performance reviews, have you already intended to leave your institution?

Table 18: Descriptive statistics

Variables	N	Mean values	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Sex	49	0.4693878	0.5042338	0	1.0000000
Merit definition	49	0.6734694	0.4738035	0	1.0000000
Student evaluation	49	0.7142857	0.4564355	0	1.0000000
Peer rating	49	0.7551020	0.4344830	0	1.0000000
External eval	49	0.7346939	0.4460713	0	1.0000000
Dept dossier eval	49	0.8571429	0.3535534	0	1.0000000
Institutional status	49	0.5918367	0.4965870	0	1.0000000

Table 19: Descriptive statistics

	Sex	Merit definition	Student evaluation
Mean	0.4693877551	0.6734693878	0.7142857143
Std	0.5042337758	0.4738035415	0.4564354646

	Peer rating	External evaluation	Dept dossier evaluation	Institutional status
Mean	0.7551020408	0.7346938776	0.8571428571	0.5918367347
Std	0.4344830379	0.4460712856	0.3535533906	0.4965869908

Table 20: Correlation matrix

	Sex	Merit definition	Student evaluation	Peer rating
Sex	1.0000	-.1299	0.1422	0.0602
Merit definition	-.1299	1.0000	0.0413	0.3119
Student course evaluation	0.1422	0.0413	1.0000	0.2701
Peer rating	0.0602	0.3119	0.2701	1.0000
External evaluation	-.0832	0.2716	0.1316	0.0877
Dept dossier evaluation	0.0334	0.3376	0.0000	0.1744
Institutional status	-.1341	0.1301	0.1182	0.0099

Table 21: Correlation matrix

	EXTERNAL EVALUATION	DEPT DOSSIER EVALUATION	INSTITUTIONAL STATUS
SEX	-.0832	0.0334	-.1341
MERIT DEFINITION	0.2716	0.3376	0.1301
STUDENT COURSE EVALUATION	0.1316	0.0000	0.1182
PEER RATING	0.0877	0.1744	0.0099
EXTERNAL EVALUATION	1.0000	0.2831	0.1593
DEPT DOSSIER EVALUATION	0.2831	1.0000	0.2543
INSTITUTIONAL STATUS	0.1593	0.2543	1.0000

Table 22: The Eigen values of correlation matrix				
	Eigen value	**Difference**	**Proportion**	**Cumulated**
1	1.91386127	0.44889130	0.2127	0.2127
2	1.46496997	0.32041738	0.1628	0.3754
3	1.14455259	0.15634036	0.1272	0.5026
4	0.98821223	0.05051762	0.1098	0.6124
5	0.93769461	0.04723701	0.1042	0.7166
6	0.89045761	0.21837795	0.0989	0.8155
7	0.67207966	0.13873071	0.0747	0.8902
8	0.53334895	0.07852585	0.0593	0.9495
9	0.45482310		0.0505	1.0000

Table 23: Eigen vectors

	Prin1	Prin2	Prin3	Prin4	Prin5	Prin6	Prin7	Prin8	Prin9
Sex	-.057561	0.591762	0.111874	0.022421	-.411266	0.467403	-.059231	-.035671	0.491019
Merit definition	0.509217	-.067056	-.020855	-.418631	-.038095	-.221729	0.337140	-.525852	0.346001
Student_course evaluations	0.236619	0.348231	-.373975	0.647976	0.015258	-.113779	-.003596	-.434401	-.247226
Peer ratings	0.385267	0.304642	-.346873	-.178247	-.135686	-.440546	-.281648	0.555768	0.077300
External evaluations	0.424104	-.261679	-.142362	0.222523	-.201042	0.419400	0.544016	0.402891	-.085364
Dept dossier evaluations	0.485543	-.072771	0.216483	-.207397	-.075257	0.397346	-.556050	-.155591	-.414881
Institutional status	0.335277	-.077602	0.491519	0.445294	0.435402	-.088823	-.165196	0.150578	0.440752