THE ISLAMIC STATE IN INDONESIA

THE RISE OF THE IDEOLOGY, THE MOVEMENT FOR ITS CREATION AND THE THEORY OF THE MASJUMI

BY

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P R E F A C E

With the emergence of newly independent Muslim countries in the last two decades, the idea of the Islamic state, which first appeared in Turkey during the 1876 Constitutional movement and then in Egypt in the movement of the al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn of the 1940's and early 1950's, came more and more to the fore, in particular in Pakistan and Indonesia. It is felt that little is known about the Indonesian idea, while relatively much has been written about the Turkish, Egyptian and Pakistan cases.

This thesis is an attempt to trace the development of the idea of the Islamic state in Indonesia and to see, through the development, the place it occupies in the political life of the country. It is composed of three chapters, the first dealing with the rise of the ideology, the second with the movement of its creation and the third with the theory of the leaders of the Masjumi, as the largest and most important of all the Indonesian Islamic parties. Without a look into the Indonesian theory, the study would not be complete.

In order to avoid confusion, it is deemed necessary to clarify the meanings of some of the terms

used in this work. An Islamic state is a state which constitutionally adopts Islām as the religion or the foundation of the state. An Islamist is the Muslim who aspires the creation of such a state. The nationalist is the adversary of the Indonesian Islamist. The term nationalist is preferred to the traditional term secularist to denote the antagonist of the Islamist, for the Indonesian nationalist is not a secularist in the exact meaning of the word. The Indonesian nationalist strives for the adoption of the Pantja Sila as the constitutional foundation of the state, and the first principle of the Pantja Sila is the belief in the Absolute One God. The Pantja Sila does not specify that He is the God of Islām or the God of Christianity or the God of any other religion existing in Indonesia. The Pantja Sila keeps a neutral stand with regard to the religions. Hence, the Islamists, except in rare cases, do not call their adversaries secularists, but refer to them as nationalists or religious neutrals (golongan netral agama). The Islamic group, a translation of the Indonesian golongan Islam, is a term used in Indonesian politics to denote the whole group of Islamists from the different Indonesian Islamic parties, in contrast to the nationalist group (golongan nasional). The Islamic group are divided into two main groups, the modernists (kaum muda) who call for the return to the Qur'ān and Sunnah as the two original sources for understanding Islām

and for the re-interpretation of the Islamic teachings in terms of the modern demands of life; and the traditionalists (kaum tua) who strive for a strong adherence to the four Islamic madhhabs. The Islamic group, despite the different approach of the modernists and traditionalists to Islām, are generally treated as one group in Indonesian politics, for in the demand of Islām as the constitutional foundation of the state they form a strong unity.

A note on spelling and transliteration would not be out of place. The following constitute the main differences between the Indonesian and the English spelling:

Indonesian	English
ch	kh (khedive)
dj	j
j	y (young)
ng	ng (sing)
nj	gn (champagne)
sj	sh
tj	ch (charter)

The Arabic transliteration is the one in use in the Institute of Islamic Studies. For Arabic words used as Indonesian proper names, however, the Indonesian spelling is used.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

THE RISE OF THE IDEOLOGY

The ideology of the Islamic State in Indonesia did not emerge in an abrupt manner, but was the product of a long development. The ideology was one outcome of the role that Islām had played (through the Islamic movement) in the struggle of the Indonesians for the political independence of their country. According to the nationalist point of view this struggle began with the creation of the Budi Utomo in 1908, but the Islamic group consider 1905, the date of the establishment of the Sarekat Dagang Islam, as the starting point. In a more extreme view they even claim that the struggle -- in the form of self defence against foreign rule -- started since the days of Imam Bondjol, Diponegoro, Sultan Hasanuddin and Sultan Hidajat, leaders who fought against the attempt to impose Dutch rule early in the nineteenth century.[1] This period has been called by some authors[2] the period of Indonesian prenationalism. The creation of the Sarekat Dagang Islam in 1905 on this extreme view marks only the start of the organized struggle.

As will be seen, there was at the start of the organized struggle as yet no idea of the Islamic State. The aim of the Sarekat Dagang Islam was to defend the

economic interest of its members against the unfavourable implications of the rise of Dutch and Chinese capital in Indonesian internal trade and small industry. It was only after its reorganization into the Sarekat Islam in 1912, that it started to think in terms of self-rule. This desire for self-rule in turn developed later into the idea of independence, first on a secular and then on an Islamic basis. It was only during the last months of Japanese military rule, after Japan had proclaimed in September, 1944, that she would grant Indonesia her independence, that the idea of the Islamic State came publicly to the fore.

Before entering the discussion of the details of this development it is worthwhile to describe the circumstances in which the first signs of nationalism emerged in Indonesia around the turn of the century.

Knowledge about the coming of Islām in the archipelago is scanty. But it is a generally accepted theory that Islām was first brought to the islands in the thirteenth century by Indian merchants, who had visited the archipelago since early in the third century. With them they brought Hinduism and two Hindu kingdoms are famous in Indonesian history, the Kingdom of Sjriwidjaja, with Palembang in South-Sumatra as its centrum (7th - 14th century), and the Kingdom of Madjapahit, with Madjapahit in

Central-Java as its capital (13th - 15th century). Both had in their respective periods of glory a territory of more or less the same extent as that of present-day Indonesia.

Islām reached Indonesia after it had lost much of its original vigour. It was no longer the Islām that was introduced into Syria, Egypt and other countries in the Middle-East. It was an Islām that had passed through Persia and India; a mystical Islām rather than a traditional Islām. This mystical Islām found a fertile soil in the already deeply Hindu influenced Indonesia, especially Java. The Indonesian Muslims of that time were, indeed, more interested in Islamic mysticism and mystical experience rather than in Islamic theology and jurisprudence.[3]

It was only after the direct contact of Indonesian Muslims with Mecca through the performance of the ḥaj, that traditional Islām began to penetrate Indonesian Islām. Beginning from the seventeenth century pilgrims from Indonesia started to visit Mecca. For example the Indonesian Ṣūfī Abdul Rauf, not only visited but stayed for nineteen years in different places in Arabia sometime around the middle of the seventeenth century.[4] But it would appear that the interest of Indonesians lay still in sufism rather than in the sharī'ah. When the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, and the old searoute from Europe to the East around the Cape of Good Hope was diverted to the

new shorter way through the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, an easier and cheaper means of transportation had made itself available for the Indonesians to perform the ḥaj and to study Islām at Mecca. Statistics, indeed, indicate that from an annual average of 2000 pilgrims in the period of 1853-58, the number was increased to 7300 annually at the beginning of the twentieth century.[5]

After their return to Indonesia, those Indonesians who made their study at Mecca opened religious schools in various parts of the country. They slowly spread traditional Islām in the Indonesian community, thereby pushing mystical Islām more and more to the background. At the turn of the century, as remarked by Hurgronje, the religious schools increased in number as never before.[6] And it seems that these religious schools were the only formal education which existed in Indonesia around 1900.

Arabs, especially those from Hadramawt, now that the transportation between their country and Indonesia was easy and cheap, came and settled in Indonesia. With them they brought traditional Islām. Some of them also opened schools and thus had a share in spreading traditional Islām in Indonesia. The time came when it was no longer the Islamic mystics, but the Islamic theologians and jurists, who were highly honoured and respected in the Indonesian society.

While in Arabia, the Indonesian pilgrims and students no doubt came into contact with al-Afghānī's and

Abduh's modernist ideas and some of them, like Sjeich Taher Djalaluddin, even left Mecca and proceeded to Cairo to continue their studies at the Azhar. At the time when traditional Islām was still being planted in the country Islamic modernism also reached Indonesia. It came first via Singapore, where Said Muhammad Agil, Sjeich Muhammad Alkalali and Sjeich Taher Djalaluddin, issued in 1910 the Malay periodical Al-Imām, which carried the ideas of Riḍā's Al-Manār. Padang, in Central-Sumatra was soon affected by these new ideas, and in 1911 H. Abdullah Ahmad, assisted by H. Abdul Karim Amrullah and H. Muhammad Thaib, issued another periodical Al-Munīr.[7]

It should be stressed that the rise of modernism in Indonesia was not a reaction against traditional Islām, as the case was in the Middle East. The turn of the century was a period of religious revival in Indonesia, in which traditionalism and modernism appeared approximately at the same time as a reaction against mystical Islām. Whereas traditionalism had a great appeal in rural areas, modernism found its supporters among the rising class of Western educated Indonesians.

Among the Arab community in Indonesia it was the Arabs in the capital who were first roused by the new ideas. The Djam'iat Chair, which was founded in 1901 but attained official status only in 1905, was the first to

establish a religious school in which a secular learning was taught alongside the traditional Islamic program. Its reformism seems to be restricted in the introduction of European languages and Western sciences in the curriculum while its approach on Islām remained to be traditional rather than modern. It sent students to Istanbul for further Islamic education and invited 'ulamā' from abroad to teach in its school. On their invitation Sjeich Ahmad Surkati, a Sudanese 'ālim of the 'Abduh School, arrived in Djakarta in 1912, but did not stay long with the Djam'iat Chair. Probably because of dissatisfaction with the limited reformism of the Djam'iat Chair, he founded another association Al-Iṣlāḥ wa al-Irshād. In 1915 it opened a school in Djakarta and issued a periodical called Al-Zākhirah, which introduced the new ideas of 'Abduh to the Muslim community.[8]

In one of his visits to the interior of Java Surkati met H. Ahmad Dahlan who was also an ardent admirer of 'Abduh, and the two men promised each other to work to rehabitate Islām and the Muslims in Indonesia. Ahmad Surkati, with his Al-Iṣlāḥ wa al-Irshād, would work among the Arab community and Ahmad Dahlan among the Indonesians by establishing the Muhammadijah.[9] The Muhammadijah was established in 1912 and, as will be seen, soon had and still has an important role in the modernism of Indonesian Islām.

In the meantime new views concerning Dutch policy towards Indonesia were developing in Holland. Inspired by liberal ideas on relations with the colonies that began to appear under socialistic influences at that time in Europe, some progressive Dutch politicians began to think not only in terms of the welfare of the Dutch but also in terms of the welfare of the Indonesian people themselves. The Dutch policy of economic exploitation of Indonesia began to be criticized and voices calling for the compensation of thetremendous profit that Holland had gained from its forced Cultural System[10] began to be heard. The liberal C.T. van Deventer for example argued in an article, Een Eereschuld (A debt of honour), written in 1899, that the profit, which he estimated to be slightly under 200 million guilders, should be repaid.[11]

The new orientation in Dutch colonial policy led to the official adoption of the Ethical Policy in 1901. It called for the further economic development of Indonesia by private capital and for the extension of autonomy, which would include the delegation of power from the Hague to Djakarta and from European to Indonesian officers. "The new policy", observes Benda, "was to make native welfare its main concern breaking with a past of colonial exploitation whether governmental or private."[12]

It was under the stimulus of the Ethical Policy that Hurgronje proferred his advice on an Islamic policy for the Dutch government to handle local rebellions under religious leaders and to deal with the idea of pan-Islamism. Pan-Islamism had been promoted by al-Afghānī and Sultan Abdul Hamid to strengthen the latter's position in his capacity as Khalīfah of the Muslims. Pan-Islamism, with its idea of a universal Muslim brotherhood and unity and with its aspiration for the Muslims' liberation from Western domination, also had its repercussions on the Muslims of Indonesia. Turkey, as the greatest Muslim country of that time, was considered to be the Islamic power which would come to help the Muslims in their efforts to free themselves from their non-Muslim Western rulers. Reports of the Turkish-Greek war of 1898 as they appeared in the Indonesian press evoked a pan-Islamic sentiment. The recapture of Adrianople was celebrated with a feast in Riauw (Central-Sumatra) while reports of Turkish defeats were called lies by the Utusan Melaju at Padang.[13]

The Dutch administrators in their ignorance of Islām had thought the Khalīfah, like the Pope, to have power over all Muslims. Hurgronje came with the helpful information that in Islām there is no clergy owing obedience to the Khalīfah in Turkey. He urged that the Dutch administration would be wise to make a separation between purely religious matters and politics in its policy

towards Islām in Indonesia. With regard to the former the government should adopt a policy of neutrality, but in political matters it must reject any foreign interference from Turkey or other countries and must curb any political uprising on the part of the Indonesian Muslims, if necessary by force. In the eyes of Hurgronje, however, this policy would not provide a permanent solution. The permanent solution would lie in the assimilation of the Indonesians into Dutch civilisation until there would be a complete unity between the subjects of the Queen in the West and those in the East. This great aim could be achieved by the introduction into and the promotion of Western education in Indonesia.[14]

The end of the nineteenth century was a period of the rise of religious schools; and the beginning of this century, as a result of the implementation of Hurgronje's policy, was the time of the expansion of Western education. Western education was introduced as early as 1893 with the foundation of Indonesian primary schools in which instruction was given in Malay. In 1903 European primary schools were opened for the first time to Indonesian boys and girls, and by the effort of Hurgronje sons of leading Indonesians attended these schools. The demand for European primary education in time came to a point where the European primary schools could not cope with it and this led to the

opening of the Hollandsch Inlandsche Scholen, primary schools for Indonesians in which instruction was given in Dutch. In 1900-1902 the Dokter Djawa School, an institution for training vaccinators was reorganized into the School Tot Opleiding Van Indische Artsen, abbreviated into Stovia, a school for training doctors, in which, according to H. Agus Salim, the Indonesian sense of unity and nationalism originated.[15] Other schools followed, the Agricultural School in 1903, the Veterinary School in 1907 and the Law School in 1908. Colleges were introduced in the 1920's, that of Engineering at Bandung in 1902, that of Law in 1924 and that of Medicine in 1927.[16]

With the turn of the century sons of leading Indonesians began also to pursue their studies in Holland, where they formed a non-political association, the Indische Vereeniging in 1908. In 1922 the Association was transformed into the Perhimpunan Indonesia, one of the sources of Indonesian nationalism. The schools established by the Dutch administration were far from being sufficient to meet the need of the millions of Indonesians for a better education. In consequence private schools, termed by the administration as wilde scholen (wild schools) came into existence. The most important were the secular nationalistic Taman Siswa schools, first opened in 1922. The Muhammadijah on its part, started to establish schools in 1920, schools which, while meeting the requirements and standards of

Westernized education, included in their curriculum essential religious education. Some of these private schools like those of the Muhammadijah came to receive government subsidies and to be under government supervision. They were, consequently, excluded from the category of wild schools.

In the economic field the Ethical Policy, in spite of its aims, led to a further deterioration of the Indonesian peasants' life. With the introduction of private capital into Indonesia in 1870 more and more land was needed for large agricultural enterprises. This development upset the economic life of the peasants. The increased flux of private capital at the turn of the century worsened the situation. According to an estimate made in 1929, 20 to 25 per cent of the total rice field area of Java was leased by the peasants to European entrepreneurs in return for advance paid by the latter.[17] As Pluvier remarks, the leasing of land transformed the importance of land from mainly a field of labour into a direct source of cash,[18] i.e. without its cultivation by the peasants. The result was that a few might become richer, but the majority of the people remained poor if they did not in fact become poorer. It was natural that the western enterprises would take only the best and richest land, and the peasants were powerless to oppose the village

chief through whom land deals were made. The result was a rapid increase of landless agriculture workers. Furthermore the introduction of a money economy into the villages upset the communalistic life of the peasants. Now they had to pay taxes in money and not in kind as was the case during the forced Cultivation System. This development occurred at a time when there were yet no credit facilities in the rural areas. "Often because of inability to repay these loans, the peasant was forced to grow crops designated by his creditor, selling them to him at a price set by the latter. Thereby he became a tenant on his own land, with the profits of his labour going to his creditor."[19]

There was another important economic factor adversely affecting Indonesian life in the last half of the nineteenth century. With Holland's development as an industrial state about 1860, Indonesia had become an important market for Holland's expanding industries as well as a main source of raw material. The flow of Dutch industrial products into Indonesia created problems for the Indonesian small industries. From another side, the Chinese living in Indonesia, encouraged by the awakening interest of the homeland towards overseas Chinese, and by the Japanese acquisition of an equal position with Europeans living in Indonesia in 1899, also demanded improvements for themselves. Consequently, the pass system

which restricted their movements in the country was abolished, and they were enabled to go to the interior parts to make trade. If the Indonesians at that time were in an unfavourable economic condition, such was far from the case with the Chinese. Their capital was for the most part invested in pawn and opium shops which by that time had all been taken over by the government. This capital, thus released, was free to be invested in other enterprises, and the Chinese constituted a strong competition for Indonesian merchants and small industrialists of the interior. All these developments intensified the economic problems of the Indonesians. Not only peasants were affected, but now urban merchants and small industrialists, especially those engaged in the -- to the Indonesians important batik industry -- were in difficulties.

It was in these circumstances of religious revival and reformism, of the rise of western education and of the economic decline of the people in general that the first signs of nationalism emerged in Indonesia.

The Indonesian merchants of the principal cities of Java, their commercial interest being thus endangered, began to think of ways to overcome the new problems. Raden Mas Tirtoadisurjo, a graduate of the newly established Dutch School of Administrators (Osvia), but

dissatisfied with the racial discrimination he had experienced in government services, left his government post and sought his future in other fields. Supported by Indonesian and Arab merchants in Djakarta he published a commercial journal called Medan Prijaji (Noble's Forum) and founded in 1909 the Sarekat Dagang Islamijah (Islamic Trade Union) at Djakarta and in 1911 another at Bogor with the name of Sarekat Dagang Islam.[20] In the meantime H. Samanhudi,[21] a wealthy batik dealer in Central Java, where the Chinese competition seemed to be very strong, also felt the need for such an organization and invited Tirtoadisurjo to organize another Sarekat Dagang Islam at Solo. The organization flourished rapidly and was soon able to organize widespread boycotts against the Chinese, who were considered by the large number of its hadji[22] members not merely as adversaries in trade but also as kāfirs. The Chinese began to be attacked in the streets and their shops to be damaged. Rioting reached such a proportion that the Head of the Residency of Surakarta had to issue a decree curtailing the activities of the organization.[23]

Meanwhile the rising Indonesian intellectual group, which had benefited from the newly launched western education felt also the need for an association to promote

its cultural and educational interests. The Budi Utomo (Noble Striving) was then established in 1908, by students of the Stovia like Sutomo and Gunawan Mangusnkusumo. The general aim of the association was to raise the cultural, educational and economic life of the people.[24]

None of these early associations, though they carried the seed of nationalism and the Islamic ideology, had a political character. The Djam'iat Chair and the Muhammadijah were mainly educational, the Sarekat Dagang Islam was mainly economic; while the Budi Utomo was mainly cultural. The first political party was established on September 6, 1912 under the name of Indische Partij by Dowes-Dekker a distant relative of Multatuli.[25] It had the freedom of Indonesia as its goal, which at that time was called Hindia Timur (East Indies). Like the Ottomanists, who advocated the creation of an Ottoman nationalism out of the various ethnic groups that lived in the Ottoman Empire, so also Dowes-Dekker envisaged the creation of an East Indian nationalism that would embrace the Indonesians, Europeans, Eurasians and Asians who were living in the archipelago and were willing to accept it as their country. His motto was: The Indies for those who make their home there.[26] Unlike the other organizations,

this movement appealed to territorial connections and to common interest, not to religion. It had a membership of about 1300 Indonesians and some 6000 Eurasians. Within a year the party was suppressed and Dowes-Dekker, together with Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Suwardi Surjaningrat, who joined him in the leadership of the party, were exiled but permitted to go to Holland.

Before entering upon a further discussion on the rise of Indonesian nationalism, it is important first to say a few words on the political-geographical condition of Indonesia at that time. Java, being the most cultivated and the most progressive of all the Indonesian Islands, had been the focus of Dutch rule. As a consequence, up to the twentieth century, the Dutch had an effective control only on Java and Madura. The other islands, but for small scattered enclaves, were ruled by Indonesian sultans, radjas and other rulers, loosely bound to Holland by contracts. With the turn of the century, pushed by the increased desire for colonial expansion among the European powers, Holland began to consolidate its authority over the whole of the archipelago. The expansion had led to wars with some of the Indonesian rulers. The most famous was the Acheh war, which did not end until 1913, when the last guerilla leader surrendered himself to the Dutch authorities. It was only after Dutch expansion to other

islands that one may rightfully speak of Indonesia as a geographical-political entity under the rule of the Netherlands.

At the turn of the century and for some years afterwards there was yet no sense of belonging to one country or to one nation among the different ethnic groups of Indonesia. There was yet no sense of being Indonesians; rather the different groups still thought and acted in terms of their respective ethnic identities. There was only the consciousness of being a Javanese, a Sundanese (West-Java), a Madurese, (East-Java), an Achehnese (North-Sumatra), a Batak or Minangkabau (Central-Sumatra), and an Ambonese or Menadonese (East-Indonesia). At that time, as Bouman remarks, the ethnic consciousness was highly developed among most of the peoples of Indonesia.[27]

Hence, the first signs of nationalism, when they appeared by the turn of the century, had a local nature with religious overtones. The Budi Utomo itself, in the early years of its existence did not think in terms of the whole of Indonesia. It advocated Javanese culture adapted to modern conditions. A perusal of the names of its leadership and of its aims indicates that it was mainly a Javanese organization, led by Javanese intellectuals with a purpose that was predominantly Javanese cultural. The

aim of the organization, as it appeared in the government's decree of December 28, 1909 was to co-operate for the harmonious development of the land and people of Java and Madura.[28] It had what Blumberger described as a "Great Java" ideology.[29]

The Sudanese of West Java seemed not to feel at home in the Budi Utomo with its Central-Javanese emphasis. In 1914 they established their own organization the Pasundan with the promotion of the national customs of the Sundanese people through intellectual, moral and social development as its aim. So also the people of Madura founded the Perserikatan Madura in 1920, the Sumatrans founded the Sarekat Sumatra in 1918, the people of Minahasa in the Celebes founded the Rukun Minahasa in 1912, and even the tiny island of Timor had its own organization, the Timorsch Verbond, established in 1921.

While all these organizations advocated local nationalism, the Indische Partij of Dowes-Dekker on the other hand envisaged an East-Indian nationalism, while the Sarekat Dagang Islam, which was transformed on September 10, 1912 into the Sarekat Islam, (thereby relinquishing its mainly economic character), advocated Islamic nationalism. United by Islam the organization was joined by members of the different Indonesian ethnic groups. In

the leadership one finds then persons such as Abdul Muis and H. Agus Salim, both from Sumatra, along with Tjokroaminoto and others from Java.

Religion in the time of religious revival had a strong influence on the population. The influence is reflected in the religious interest of the organizations. Even the Budi Utomo, before the crystallization of its ideological basis had some interest in Islām, and men like H. Mudjtiba lectured the membership on Islām.[30] In 1917 the administration of the Budi Utomo presented a pro-Islamic paragraph in its Declaration of Principles: "maintaining Islamic religion without infringing upon freedom of religion", but having been attacked by secular minded prominent members of the organization, it was amended into: "Budi Utomo maintains a neutral standpoint in the area of religion."[31] Dr. Sutomo himself, one of the leading leaders of the Budi Utomo, was a member of the Muhammadijah executive.[32]

It was mainly because of its religious appeal that the Sarekat Islam flourished and was able to gain followers, not only in urban centers but also in rural areas. Its aims, as announced in its congress of 1913, were to promote, in accordance with the teachings of Islām and by means not in contradiction with the laws of

the land, the agricultural, commercial, industrial and educational interests of the people, defending Islām against wrong conceptions, promoting religious life among the people and mutual support of its members.[33] Though it had included no political program in its aim, its activities, as will be seen, were mostly political in nature.

The commercial program and the anti-Chinese attitude of the Sarekat Islam attracted the urban Islamic trade communities, and its program to fight for the betterment of the material state of the people drew the peasants to its fold. The defence of Islām against attacks invited the support of the 'ulamā' and hadjis. The hadjis, whose number had increased greatly after the creation of transport facilities to Mecca, had a leading role as religious teachers or as men of prestige in the Indonesian villages. Their authority increased the more with the decline of the prestige of the local administrators of the Dutch rule, whom the peasants usually identified as the main cause of their economic distress. Instead of going to these administrators, the peasants now had resort to the hadjis for advice even on their worldly problems. Under their influence whole villages became members of the Sarekat Islam.

The charismatic leadership of Tjokroaminoto himself was another factor in the rapid growth of the organization. Though a product of western education in the Osvia, he was, having been raised in a religious family, also well versed in the teachings of Islām. He was a capable orator, and it is believed by many that Ir. Sukarno, who during his student's days stayed with him for some time, acquired his skill in oratory from Tjokroaminoto.[34] His eloquent speeches attracted the masses, and the peasants in their economic hardships saw in him the promised Ratu Adil, the messiah, who had come to save them from their distress.

In 1909 the Budi Utomo had a membership of 10000. The membership of the Sarekat Islam amounted in 1916 to 800,000[35] and in 1919 it reached two and a quarter million.[36] This rapid growth was astonishing even to the leadership of the Sarekat Islam itself.

Encouraged by this great following, the Sarekat Islam plunged into the political arena. It could now claim to be a national organization. The congress of 1916 was proclaimed a national congress, where Tjokroaminoto declared that the term "national" implied the creation of a unity of all the peoples of Indonesia in such a way as to establish a nation. The motto for achieving the objective was: together with the government and in support

of the government."[37] But, when necessary, criticism of the Dutch government's policy would be used to improve the welfare of the people. He further expressed the hope that there would be soon a council through which the people would be able to join in the administration and in the lawmaking of the country. The goal of self-government he hoped would be achieved within ten years.[38] Thus, as it is fairly typical with new nationalist movements, the Sarekat Islam wanted to co-operate with the colonial rule. It did not abandon this co-operative attitude but under pressure of the rising non-co-operation policy of the secular nationalist movement in the early 1930's.

The demanded council was granted in the form of the Volksraad, (People's Council) in 1918, though in the words of Kahin, it was "chiefly a sounding board, useful to the government in determining the views of the Netherlands Indies community".[39] It was, in fact, purely an advisory council. Only in 1927 was it given a colegislative power, but the right of veto of the Governor General made it rather ineffective to further the national interest of the Indonesians.

Among other demands of the Sarekat Islam met by the Dutch government were the final abolition of the forced Cultivation System, the opening of government jobs to all qualified persons regardless of race, the expansion of

of education, and the unification of the criminal code for Europeans and Indonesians.[40]

In the meantime the demand for self-government was pushed more and more to the surface. The newspaper Neratja under H. Agus Salim stated on October 25, 1917:

> The goal of the Central Sarekat Islam is to achieve an increasing influence of the peoples and ethnic groups of the Netherlands Indies in the administration and government, with self-administration at the end in view.
> The Central Sarekat Islam denies the right of any people or group of people to rule another people or group of people.
> In consideration of the fact that the majority of the native people exist in miserable living conditions, the C.S.I. will continuously oppose any domination by sinful capitalism.
> In order to properly exercise civil rights, the C.S.I. regards moral as well as intellectual development a necessity. For this development she regards religion as the best means.
> With due respect to all other religions, ...the C.S.I. regards Islam as the most suitable religion for the moral development of the people.
> The state should remain outside religious affairs and handle all religions on an equal basis.[41]

In the national congress of 1917, the Sarekat Islam became more aggressive. Instead of self-government, now independence was demanded.[42] The way would still be co-operation with the government, but if it did not lead to success, then "the leadership of the Sarekat Islam knows how to sacrifice themselves for their land and their people".[43]

Their program for independence and their policy of co-operation with the colonial rule might appear

incompatible. In planning the program the leaders of the Sarekat Islam were undoubtedly influenced by the Dutch Ethical Policy, which, among others, designed the delegation of power from the Hague to Djakarta. By co-operating with the colonial rule the leaders hoped that the Netherlands could be persuaded to grant Indonesia her independence instead of self-government as originally projected in the Ethical Policy. It was the secular nationalist leaders who first came to the realization that independence could not be achieved through co-operation with the colonial rule, and, therefore, adopted the non-co-operative policy. But, in view of the restrictions, introduced later by the Dutch rule on Indonesian political activities, the nationalist leaders themselves had to embrace in the second half of the 1930's the co-operative policy.

The popular power and the aggressive stand of the Sarekat Islam attracted the secular minded Western educated intellectuals. Dowes-Dekker, who returned to Indonesia in 1918, tried to win the organization to his East Indian nationalistic point of view. On the attractive power of the Sarekat Islam, Suwardi himself wrote that, as the Budi Utomo was only a national, cultural and social movement, many leaders left it and joined the Sarekat Islam because of its national, democratic and radical stand. Non-Muslims like Dowes-

Dekker, he explained, supported the Sarekat Islam for its democratic and just principle and for its demand for national independence.[44] Indeed Suwardi himself belonged to those who left the Budi Utomo and together with Abdul Muis and A. Widiadisastra he established the Bandung branch of the Sarekat Islam before he was exiled to Holland.[45]

The prijaji, i.e. the Indonesian nobility, administrators and civil servants of the Dutch government, were excluded from the Sarekat Islam membership by a resolution adopted in the 1913 Congress. The resolution must be seen in the light of the traditional Indonesian distrust toward the pro-Dutch attitude of the prijaji group. The feeling was that, by allowing them to become members, they might impede the progress of the movement. The prijaji themselves, in order to preserve their positions in theDutch administration, did not make any attempt to join the organization. But after it had been made clear that the policy of the Sarekat Islam was to co-operate with the government, the prijai thought it wise to join this rising popular organization. The leadership of the Sarekat Islam on their part saw also no harm in admitting the prijaji, who by that time had already come under the influence of the nationalistic aspirations of

the movement. The original distrust began to diminish. The reasoning was, if the Sarekat Islam accepted to co-operate with the Dutch rulers themselves, why could it not accept the co-operation of the Indonesian prijaji group? Moreover, the leadership of the Sarekat Islam hoped to benefit from the influence and power of the regional rulers and chiefs over the population in their respective areas. By 1916 prominent elements in the higher Indonesian administrators' group, for example Achmad Djajadiningrat, the Regent of Semarang in West Java and Kusumo Utojo also from West Java had become active members of the Sarekat Islam.[46]

The support given by almost every group of people in Indonesian society - the intellectuals, the 'ulamā', the prijaji, the urban middle class and most important of all the peasants in rural areas -- increased the power and prestige of the Sarekat Islam. It was the Sarekat Islam's appeal to the rural masses that was most attractive to the Dutch communist Sneevliet, who came to Indonesia and with the help of three other Dutchmen established the I.S.D.V. (Indies Social Democratic Organization), which had a strong hold over the Union of Tram andRailway Employees of Semarang, a town in Central-Java. Being Dutchmen and non-Muslims, they realized the impossibility for them to capture

the masses. The idea came to them to infiltrate the Sarekat Islam and to gain control of its leadership. In the persons of young Indonesians like Semaun and Darsono, leaders of the Semarang branch of the Sarekat Islam, they found a favourable response. Both Semaun and Darsono joined the I.S.D.V. and Semaun soon became one of its important leaders.

By 1918 Semaun and Darsono had managed to become members of the central body of the Sarekat Islam. Their inclusion in the central leadership, attributable to their new secular and revolutionary ideas, soon caused a controversy within the leadership which led to a split and at the same time to the rapid decline of the Sarekat Islam.

Inspired by communistic ideas Semaun now rejected the Islamic foundation of the Sarekat Islam, demanded revolutionary action and accused the organization's moderate members of being bourgeois. The Sarekat Islam, he argued, must be built on a new foundation, viz. the common interest of the working class. "Religion", said Semaun, "can give no pure criteria. Christians and Muhammedans live in the same land and have the same interest."[47] Differences in religion would open the way for the policy of <u>divide et impera</u>.[48]

At first Tjokroaminoto made an attempt to preserve the unity of the leadership and led the Sarekat

Islam to adopt a more revolutionary program. In the Volksraad, in which he and Abdul Muis were elected representatives of the Sarekat Islam, they joined the radical group. Attempts were also made to bridge the gap between the Islamic stand under the leadership of H. Agus Salim and the secular Marxism of the Semarang Branch. A beginning was made toward expounding Marxism in Islamic terms. "The surplus value" of Marx, for example, was identified with the ribā and social security with the zakāt. Since the basis of capitalism was surplus value, which according to this view was equivalent to ribā, it followed that Islām was also against capitalism.[49] Land, which was the source of all production and the basis for industry, had been made the property of the state by the Prophet.[50] Hence H. Agus Salim maintained that the Prophet had preached a socialist economy twelve centuries before Marx was born.[51] This led the communist press to claim that the Sarekat Islam had admitted that there was communism in Islām. Against this claim the Sarekat Islam declared that it had, indeed, made such an admission, but that the communism of Islām had nothing to do with modern-day communist ideas of free love and the communist program to fight against pan-Islamism.[52]

All efforts to preserve the unity of the Sarekat Islam proved to be vain; a split was unavoidable. The

moderate socialism and the pan-Islamism of the Sarekat Islam were not the class socialism and the universal internationalism of the communists. The Fourth National Congress of 1919 rejected the extreme proposals of the Semarang branch and, in consequence, Semaun, Darsono and other communist-minded members on May 23, 1920, established their own party called Perhimpunan Komunis Hindia (PKH) which later became the Indonesian community party (PKI). The movement was split into two: an Islamic group with Jogja as its center and a communist group with Semarang as its source of power.

A struggle broke out between the central leadership of the Sarekat Islam and the PKH for control of the various local branches of the former. Through the latter's active propaganda tactics, the communists were able to capture a majority[53] of the branches, but could not hold them for long. The short term of their success was due to their attack on religion. The religious feeling of the religious leaders and <u>hadjis</u> in the villages was hurt, and the large membership of the branches dwindled greatly. An effort by the communist leaders to remedy their grave mistake by establishing Red Sarekat Islam branches, in which the Islamic appeal was again revived, did not succeed. An ill-prepared revolution launched by the communists in 1926-1927 failed, and the PKH was banned and its leaders exiled.

The split in its membership did great damage to the original Sarekat Islam. It lost membership, not only on the village level, but also in urban centers. The socialistic attitude of the Sarekat Islam and their liberal interpretation of Islam under the rising influence of the modernist Muhammadijah were not acceptable to the Islamic trading community and the conservative 'ulamā'. Added to this were the organization's financial difficulties, which forced its press organs to accept advertisements from Chinese merchants. In consequence, the Sarekat Islam was forced to modify its original extremist attitude towards the Chinese community.

Under the leadership of H. Agus Salim, Tjokroaminoto having been arrested in 1920, efforts were made to reorganize the party. In its National Congress of 1921 a resolution on party discipline was adopted. No member of the Sarekat Islam could any longer at the same time hold membership in any other party, whereupon the communist members left the organization. With the loss of membership in Java, attempts were made to gain more support in the other islands of Indonesia and at the same time a return to the religious appeal was launched. Islām, as the common religion in all these islands, would again be made the rallying point. Each island would have its own congress. For propaganda purposes Abdul Muis visited Central Sumatra in 1923, while Tjokroaminoto went to

Borneo but by the order of the Dutch administration both had to leave the places they visited.

The Sarekat Islam, as Tjokroaminoto himself openly admitted, was already sick.[54] Its Islamic appeal found competition in the modernist Muhammadijah and the traditional Nahdatul Ulama. Its socialistic appeal had been taken away by the communist while its nationalistic ideals were being taken over by a nascent pure nationalist movement. Moreover, the new step taken by the Dutch administration as a result of the communist revolution to isolate the peasants from urban political movements was another great barrier for the Sarekat Islam to regain its former strength.

The first political organization, which had a pure Indonesian nationalism as a basis -- in contrast to the international outlook of the Sarekat Islam with its pan-Islamism and the PKH with its international communism and to a certain extent also the Indische Partaij of Dowes-Dekker with its East Indian nationalism -- was Perserikatan Nasional Indonesia, the future Indonesian nationalist party PNI. It was established in Bandung in April, 1927, by Ir. Sukarno, Tjiptomangunkusumo and other intellectuals. National independence, as envisaged by the Sarekat Islam, was adopted as the aim of the new party.

But for the achievement of independence the party would not depend on international help, but rather on the power and capacity of the Indonesians themselves. To wait for "an airoplane from Moscow or a Caliph from Istanbul"[55] was useless. Independence meant the cessation of Dutch rule, and hence, it could be achieved only by way of non-co-operation.

Pure Indonesian nationalism, like Turkish nationalism, which, though it originated in Turkey came forward first in Salonika, was also bred outside Indonesia -- in the Netherlands, by students associated in the Perhimpunan Indonesia. It has been stated that this association was the re-organized Indische Vereeniging. Under the new leadership of Iwa Kusumasumantri, Muhammad Hatta and others, a new goal was adopted, i.e. to achieve for Indonesia a form of government truly responsible to the people.[56] In 1924 the goal was revised into the liberation of Indonesia by means of a self-conscious and self-reliant nationalist mass action.[57] The organization's organ was renamed Indonesia Merdeka (Free Indonesia).

The nationalist ideas of the Perhimpunan Indonesia were brought into Indonesia by returning university graduates who, by establishing study clubs in the various important towns of Java, promoted them among the Indonesian

intellectuals. The Bandung Study Club under the energetic leadership of Ir. Sukarno, inspired by these ideas, took the initiative for the creation of the envisaged self-conscious and self-reliant mass action. Ir. Sukarno, who is a capable orator of an ability to equal Tjokroaminoto, aroused the interest of the urban population. The peasants, however, showed no signs of important reaction. Their apathy was due partly to the newness of the idea, partly to its non-Islamic basis, but above all, due to the Dutch success in sealing off the rural population from urban political influences.

With the disappearance of the PKH from the political arena and the decline of the Sarekat Islam, the leadership of the political movement in Indonesia, (except at the time of the Japanese rule, during which no political activities were allowed), was taken over by the group of secular nationalist intellectuals. Thus, when Ir. Sukarno was arrested in 1929 because of his revolutionary speeches, the leadership passed to other nationalists, like Sartono of the Partindo, (Partai Indonesia), Muhammad Hatta and Sutan Sjahrir from Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, Amir Sjarifuddin, Adnan Kapau Gani and Muhammad Jamin of the Gerindo (Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia). But these parties had never equalled

the Sarekat Islam in its large following. The PNI, the most famous among them, never had a membership of more than 10,000.[58]

The Sarekat Islam, which had been transformed into Partai Sarekat Islam (PSI) in 1923, in the meantime emphasized more and more its Islamic policy. Instead of the National Congresses of the early years it now organized All-Islam congresses, the first of which was held from October 31 to November 2, 1922. In the first Congress a new aim was proclaimed: to strive for unity and material co-operation of Muslims on problems concerning Islām.[59] A resolution was also adopted to send a telegram of congratulation to Mustafa Kamal for the success he had achieved in the defence of Turkey. When the caliphate problem arose, a caliphate committee was formed; and it was decided to send Tjokroaminoto and H. Agus Salim to the proposed Caliphate Congress of 1925 in Cairo. The World Islamic Congress of 1926 in Mecca was attended by Tjokroaminoto and K. H. Mansur from the Muhammadijah. After their return the All-Islam Congress was made a branch of the World Islamic Congress under the name of al-Mu'tamar al-ʿĀlam al-Islāmī Farʿ al-Hind al-Sharqīyah.

The rising secular nationalistic ideas, like the secular Marxist ideas that had preceded them, could not but

affect the PSI. Explaining his stand on nationalism, Tjokroaminoto declared that the PSI recognized a nationalism based on Islamic principles and would co-operate with other peoples to achieve the freedom of all nations. The PSI was rather for "internationalism" and "mono-humanism". Hence, the PSI sympathized with the nationalist movement in China, where 19 million Muslims were suppressed.[60] At the same time an emphasis was placed on the idea of striving for national freedom on Islamic principles. In a speech Surjopranoto expressed the hope that "this Islamic country might have an Islamic government",[61] while Sukiman explained that freedom meant "an Islamic government under its own flag".[62] For the first time a vague idea of the Indonesian Islamic state emerged in the Islamic movement.

The PSI also relinquished its previous co-operative stand and adopted the nationalist idea of non-co-operation. Tjokroaminoto began to talk of military education and of jihād to defend the fatherland.[63] Under nationalistic influence, the Sarekat Islam for the second time changed its name, this time into Partai Sareka Islam Indonesia (PSII), which it has kept up to this time. But despite this renovation in name and program, the PSII has never been able to regain its original power. On the

contrary, controversies among the leadership about the question of co-operation and non-co-operation, which emerged after the death of Tjokroaminoto in 1934, led to a further split in the organization. The PSII was pushed more and more to the background in the Indonesian political movement.

The Muhammadijah, though it has consistently remained aloof from politics did exert influence on the movement for freedom. It will thus not be out of place to describe in a few words the origin and the activities of this organization. In the Netherlands parliamentary election of 1909, the Christian religious parties gained a majority of votes, and J. H. de Waal Malefijt, a man of staunch religious convictions, became Minister of Colonies.[64] The Dutch government's policy of religious neutrality began to be criticized as ineffective to bring about the expected result of Dutch western education among the Indonesians. The remedy was thought to be the introduction of Christian religious instruction into the government schools. A demand for introducing Christian religious instruction, however, was rejected by the government; but it agreed to the extension of Christian missionary activities in Indonesia and to a program of subsidies to schools founded by churches. Consequently

there was an increase of almost 300 per cent in the period between 1910 and 1912 in the amount of subsidies granted to the church sponsored normal schools and an increase of 40 per cent in church sponsored schools since 1910.[65]

The expansion of Christian missionary work together with the expansion of the secular western education of the Ethical Policy were two of the main factors which led to the establishment of the Muhammadijah on November 18, 1912. The modernist leaders realized that a mystical, dogmatic and traditional Islām could never be attractive to the rising western secular intellectuals. For them reason was of primary importance; their loyalty might be gained only by a rational approach to Islām. If Islām was to be preserved against the rising secular and Christian trends, then Islamic modernism must be introduced into the Indonesian society. It was by its emphasis on rationalism and its opposition to superstition that the Muhammadijah was able to attract the Indonesian intellectuals into its fold. The Muhammadijah further believed that for the political development of the country, it was imperative that the population must be first educated. Like the Ikhwān al-Muslimīn of Egupt, its immediate aim was not the formation of an Islamic State but the formation of an Islamic society through education.

Its program included therefore the spreading of Islamic teachings among the population through tablīgh (lectures) and the establishment of schools in which religious courses and the secular educational program of the Dutch schools were combined. By 1924 it had 4000 members with 29 branches, 8 Hollandsch Inlandsche Schoolen, 1 Teachers Training College, and 32 Primary schools. Moreover, it had 14 religious schools.[66] By 1938, as reported by Pantjaran Amal of February 25, 1938 it had 852 branches, and 898 sub-branches with a total membership of 250,000, owned 834 mosques and langgars (small houses for prayer), 31 public libraries, and 1,174 schools.[67]

In view of the fact that the Muhammadijah schools were on the same standard as that of the Dutch schools and had the same courses as those given in the government's schools, religiously minded Indonesians preferred to send their children to the Muhammadijah schools rather than to the Christian or even to the religiously neutral schools. As von der Mehden observed, it was in the field of education that the Muhammadijah had a powerful influence on the nationalist movement.[68]

Though not a political party, the Muhammadijah was guided by the nature of Islām which draws no clear cut line between purely religious and purely secular matters;

it could not keep itself out of politics. To quote Kahin: "Actually the progressive Moslem social concepts which it sought to advance could not be divested of political overtones. The Muhammadijah could not help but develop the political consciousness of its members and the pupils taught in its many schools. It was a still, but deep tributary of political nationalism and quietly but sustainedly nourished and strengthened that stream."[69]

As early as 1924 the Muhammadijah began to interfere in political matters. Angered by the speeches of communist leaders, which they considered were humilitating to Islām, the Muhammadijah prevented the communists from pursuing their public meeting in Jogja. In Central-Sumatra, where the leadership came into the hands of the dynamic young men of the Sumatra Thawalib organization, its interference with politics was more conspicuous. Through their activities the Muhammadijah there got involved in the communist revolution of 1927. In the controversy between Islām and <u>adat</u> in which the latter was supported by the Dutch government, the Muhammadijah came sometimes into conflict with the government.

With the Sarekat Islam the Muhammadijah maintained a close co-operation from the beginning especially through the agency of its founder K. H. Ahmad Dahlan. There was a

close relation between the two organizations, the Muhammadijah working in the cultural field, the Sarekat Islam in the political. Although it was the official policy of the Muhammadijah not to deal with political matters, nothing prevented its leaders and members becoming involved in politics. It was not a rare occurrence that the leadership of the Sarekat Islam, the Muhammadijah and the All-Islam Congress were in the hands of the same persons. In the All-Islam Congress, the Muhammadijah took an active part on the question of the caliphate, and one of the delegates to Mecca was K. H. Mansur, the leader of the Muhammadijah.

The Muhammadijah's antipathy toward and propaganda against Christian missionaries aroused dissatisfaction with the non-Muslim Dutch rule. Similarly also its attacks on government acts which were considered to be in contradiction to Islamic law, or not to be in the interest of Islām, like the proposed marriage law of the 1930's or the Guru ordinance, which obliged religious teachers to ask for permission to teach from the administration, were highly appreciated by the Indonesian Muslim community. As Bousqet remarks, it would be very wrong to conclude that the members of the Muhammadijah had no political ideas and it would not be far from the truth to affirm

that they were quite as anti-Dutch as the other nationalists.[70]

Through the joint efforts of the Muhammadijah and the PSI an Islamic youth organization, the Jong Islamieten Bond (Young Muslims Union) was established in 1925. Membership was open to students or graduates of 14 to 30 years old. Like the Muhammadijah the JIB did not deal officially with politics but left political activity to the will of its members. It was established as a reaction against the growing ethnic youth organizations such as Young Java, Young Sumatra, and Young Minahasa, which attempted to strengthen their respective local nationalisms. Influenced by this disuniting trend, the JIB worked for an Islamic unity with a nationalistic tint. Its nationalism was termed by its leader R. Sam as "ruim nationalisme" a vast nationalism, which included even Muslims of other countries,[71] for the Muslims nationalism meant love of one's own land and people, but also love of their co-religionists in other countries and, indeed, of the whole of humanity.[72] The three Indonesian nationalist principles of one land, one people and one language, were acceptable to them only if Islām were made the uniting force. Another leader, Wiwoho, said that Islām preaches nationalism with internationalism as its background.[73] The nationalism of the JIB, according to another leader,

intended to bridge the inter-insular gap in Indonesian nationalism by means of Islām.[74] By 1927 the organization had 15 branches, 2 of which were in Sumatra with a membership of 1,700. On the importance of the JIB in the Indonesian political movement Van Niel writes:

> ...a group of young leaders emerged, who through a deep religious conviction stood in close contact with a large number of the Indonesian people and who wielded a great influence among broad segments of the Indonesian population. More than any group they came to interject themselves between the people and the group of Westernized administrative leaders. During the colonial period they remained passive toward the outside government and viewed their task in terms of winning influence within their own society, but in later years they were to form one of the most active elements in the creation of the new Indonesian state.[75]

In Sumatra itself, the Sumatra Thawalib organization, established in 1918, was a source of Islamic nationalism. After ten years of existence it had 40 religious schools with 17,000 students. According to a report made by van der Plas,[76] the standard of education in these schools was very high and in contradiction to the conservative religious schools, education there was not based on memorizing but on thinking and understanding. About 1000 students graduated every year, and in the words of Demang Rusad,[77] head of the local administration, they were "Muslim intellectuals and leaders of the future".

These young men came soon under the influence of the nationalist trend of Ir. Sukarno's PNI; and in 1930, under the leadership of Muchtar Lutfi, a graduate of the Azhar, they organized a political party, Persatuan Muslimin Indonesia, later better known under the name of Permi. Like the PNI it adopted a radical, non-co-operative stand to achieve the independence of Indonesia. Its organ Medan Rakjat included articles with socialistic tendencies, but like the PNI, it had also a short life. In 1932 Muchtar Lutfi was arrested and exiled. The Thawalib idea, however, was spread by its graduates, who took up teaching outside Central-Sumatra and went as far as the Celebes in the Eastern part of Indonesia.

Another Muslim organization was the Nahdatul Ulama, established in January, 1926, by 'ulamā' of the Pesantren of Tebu Ireng in East-Java. Unlike the modernist Muhammadijah, the Nahdatul Ulama had a traditional approach to Islām. Their policy during the Dutch rule was to make a separation between religious matters and politics.[78] Their abstention from politics, officially and in practice, was responsible for the fact that the Nahdatul Ulama had no influence of significance on the political movement during the Dutch rule. Whereas the Muhammadijah had an urban following, the Nahdatul Ulama had its source

of power in the rural areas, especially in East Java. By 1935 it claimed to have 68 branches with 67,000 members.

With the appearance of the threat of World War II in the thirties, the need for unity among the various Indonesian organizations was keenly felt. The first step to this end was taken by K. H. Mansur of the Muhammadijah and K. H. Dahlan and K. H. Abdul Wahab of the Nahdatul Ulama. Their efforts led to the establishment of the Miai, (Madjlis Islam A'la Indonesia) in September 1937.[79] The new body was a confederation of Islamic organizations with the Muhammadijah and the Nahdatul Ulama as its most important members. By this time the young elements in the Nahdatul Ulama were beginning to forsake the stand of the conservative older leaders and were able to find a platform of co-operation with the modernist Muhammadijah. Later the PSII joined the Miai, which though a confederation of mainly non-political Islamic organizations, was forced by political developments in Indonesia to enter the area of politics.

In the meantime the nationalist political parties also felt the need of such a confederation, but an initiative taken by the PSII did not produce the expected result. It was in 1939 that the needed union was established under the name Gabungan Politik Indonesia, Gapi. A close co-operation with the Miai was achieved and now the

Indonesian national movement felt itself strong enough to demand the independence of the country from the Netherlands. On the initiative of the Gapi a program of "Indonesia Berparlemen", a parliament for Indonesia, as a step towards full independence, was launched. The Miai supported this demand, but in line with its Islamic policy, wanted a parliament with Islām as its basis; two-thirds of its members must be Muslims. In the envisaged independent Indonesia the Head of State must be a Muslim and a special Ministry of Islamic Affairs must be established.[80] A clearer idea of the Islamic State was now produced by the Indonesian Islamic movement. In answer, the nationalist group spoke of these demands as premature and better to be discussed at a future date.

To consolidate their efforts, the Gapi and the Miai along with the PVPN, a union of government employees, united themselves in a greater union called Madjlis Rakjat Indonesia (MRI) which was established on April 14, 1941. The MRI would constitute the representative body of the Indonesian people in their struggle to have a parliament. The Dutch government, however, replied that constitutional reforms in Indonesia could be undertaken only after the liberation of the Netherlands from German occupation.[81] Disappointed by this negative answer, the Indonesian

national movement adopted a passive attitude towards the Dutch defence efforts when Japan attacked the country in 1942.

Despite their inexperience of Islām, as compared with the Dutch, the Japanese seemed also to perceive that to have an effective rule over the Muslims, a separation must be made between purely religious and political matters. Thus during their short rule over Indonesia the Japanese pursued the Dutch policy designed by Hurgronje, with the difference, however, that they prohibited any political organization or movement. The party which gained from this policy was the Islamic group. Shortly after the Japanese army took over power, all political activity in Indonesia was banned.[82] The Miai, being a non-political organization, could be exempted from this prohibition. It seems, however, that there was another reason for the Japanese authorities' wish to preserve the Miai. They had recognized the power of Islām over the Indonesian community especially in rural areas as evidenced by the activities of the Sarekat Islam during its heyday. The Miai, moreover was composed of the two biggest Islamic organizations in the country, the Muhammadijah with its urban following and the Nahdatul Ulama with its power in rural areas. Besides, Indonesian Islām was known to be

anti-Western. The secular nationalist group, on the other hand, had their power limited to the urban areas and on account of their western education, were considered to be pro-Western. Japan was in need of the support of the Indonesian people for her war efforts, not only of their moral but, most of all, of their economic support. She tried to gain them by adopting a friendly attitude towards Islām.

Shortly after the take over of power, Colonel Horie, head of the newly established Religious Affairs Office, visited the Kwitang Mosque of Djakarta accompanied by a Japanese Muslim Hadji Inada and soon placed all mosques of the capital under the protection of the Japanese army.[83] A short time thereafter, accompanied by three men of the Miai, Colonel Horie and five Japanese in Arabian dress assumed the title of hadji and Islamic names and made a tour of the important Islamic centers on Java.[84] The highest Japanese authority in Indonesia, Lt.-Gen. Imamura, requested Wondoamiseno, Chairman of the Miai, in an audience "to ask the Muslim community to forgive any mistake which the Dai Nippon army might be unwittingly committing in particular those touching on Islamic matters."[85]

Under Japanese sponsorship, a congress of Muslims, which was attended by thirty leaders of Islamic

organizations, was held in September, 1942, in Hotel des Indes, the biggest hotel in Djakarta, which during the Dutch rule was reserved for Europeans. Then for the first time in their lives the 'ulamā' were invited to attend a reception at the gubernatorial palace in Djakarta in December, 1942. In an address to them Lt.-Gen. Imamura said:

> As you know, gentlemen, it has been one of our aims to protect and pay due respect to Islām. Yet, some problems have arisen as the result of mutual misunderstandings. The [Indonesian] people know too little about the customs of Dai Nippon, while we, on the other hand, are as yet insufficiently informed about the Islamic religion and way of life, because only a very few Muslims live in Nippon. We shall now [therefore] institute a thorough study of Islām, with a view to arriving at a better relationship...[86]

Gestures like these, unprecedented in the time of the Dutch rule, naturally impressed the Indonesians and aroused in the 'ulamā' a sense of dignity. Their willingness to co-operate with Japanese military rule, however, was compromised by the ceremony of Saikeirei, the deep bow towards Tokio in reverence to the Japanese Emperor. The Sakeirei ceremony resembled the rukū' in the Islamic prayer, and was considered as a kind of worship given the Japanese Emperor. This, of course, was not acceptable to the Indonesian Muslims. An effort on the part of the 'ulamā' was undertaken for the abolition of this

obligatory practice. Leaders close to the Japanese Religious Affairs Office approached the Japanese authorities on the matter. K. H. Mansur, for example, communicated to the Japanese that co-operation between Indonesian Muslims and the Japanese army could be achieved on condition that the Muslims' religion was not offended; if their religion was, however, offended, then it should be realized that Muslims believe in defending their religion, wherever this may lead them. Furthermore, all Muslims understand this matter.[87]

One of the influential 'ulamā', Dr. A. K. Amrullah, openly defied the Japanese order respecting Saikeirei in a congress of 'ulamā' held at Bandung in 1942. At the opening ceremony of Saikeirei, while all others performed it, he remained seated. On account of this Drs. M. Hatta called him "the first 'ālim who proclaimed the spiritual revolution against Japan in Indonesia.[88] The 'ulamā's opposition to this practice led to its abolition in 1943.

The 'ulamā's opposition led the Japanese to believe that the Miai was still inspired by the anti-colonial attitude of the Dutch period, and they decided to bypass the organization. It should be remembered that in September, 1942, a new Miai executive was elected, in

which the political party PSII won the leadership. To get rid of the Miai with its new political leadership, the Japanese military rule took the step in September, 1943, in the form of granting legal status to the Muhammadijah and the Nahdatul Ulama. All other organizations were deprived of such status. Shortly thereafter the Miai was forced to dissolve itself.

Now that this "anti-colonial" Islamic organization was liquidated, the Religious Affairs Office took other steps to establish a new organization in the form of Masjumi (Madjlis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia), Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims. Its membership was open to organizations with legal status and to individual 'ulamā' but subject to the approval of the Religious Affairs Office. At the time of its foundation only the Muhammadijah and the Nahdatul Ulama were members. In early 1944, two other small Islamic organizations, having been granted official status, joined the Masjumi.

Under the auspices of the Religious Affairs Office the Masjumi continued to gain strength. It was allowed to publish its own organ Suara Muslimin Indonesia. In the reorganization of the Religious Affairs Office, in August 1944, K. H. Hasjim Asj'ari, President of the Masjumi, became Head of the Office, assisted by A. K. Muzakkir, a prominent Muhammadijah leader, and K. H. Wahid

Hasjim, a well-known leader of the Nahdatul Ulama.[89] Through this Office and through its bi-weekly magazine Sinar, published since March, 1944, the Masjumi was able to influence the Indonesian Muslim masses via the thousands of religious teachers on the village level. Unlike the Suara Muslimin Indonesia, the Sinar was printed in local languages beside the Indonesian and in Arabic script. The former was printed in Roman characters and was destined for urban readers.

The village religious teachers had been politicized by a training course, introduced among them by the Religious Affairs Office in 1943. The aim of the training was to strengthen their understanding of the world situation and to increase their spirit that they might be willing to give the fullest support to the government.

In contrast to this favourable policy toward Indonesian Islām the Japanese attitude toward Indonesian nationalism was far from being positive. Unlike the Islamic group, the nationalists never had an organization of their own nor an organ to promote their own interest during the Japanese rule. It is true that on April 24, 1942, a mass movement under the name Triple A[90] was launched under the co-leadership of a young Parindra leader, Samsudin. Efforts were made at that time to

organize the Muslims into one organization to be part of that body, but no such efforts were undertaken to group the nationalists into one organization. By the end of 1942 the Triple A movement was abandoned, and the Miai, which at that time had already been recognized by the Japanese military rule, continued to exist as the only organization in the Indonesian movement.

In 1943 another organization, the Putra (Pusat Tenaga Rakjat) was established. The Putra was supposed to be a political party, which could have promoted the nationalist interest. But, since it was closely controlled by the Japanese authorities, it had no freedom of action. Moreover, its aim was mainly to further the Japanese interest, viz. victory in war, increase of production, defence of Great Asia and spreading the Japanese language. Again in this instance leadership was not entrusted wholly to the nationalists. K. H. Mansur from the Muhammadijah formed its top-leadership together with Ir. Sukarno, Drs. M. Hatta and Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, who in the days of the Sarekat Islam was more known under the name of Suwardi Surjaningrat. Toward the end of 1943, the Putra together with the Miai ceased also to exist.

A new mass movement was founded in 1944, Djawa Hōkōkai (People's Service Association); it was not, however, a nationalist organization but rather a conglomeration of

Indonesians, Eurasians, Arabs and Chinese. Its goal was to promote the Japanese defensive program. All inhabitants of over fourteen years, irrespective of their nationality, must enter the organization to fulfil their duties for the defence of the country. Top positions had been always shared by leaders of the nationalists and of the Islamic group. Ir. Sukarno, and K. H. Hasjim Asj'ari, Chairman of the Masjumi, were appointed as the two leading Indonesian advisors to the Head of the Military Administration, who at the same time was also head of the Hōkōkai. Management at the center was shared between Drs. M. Hatta and K. H. Mansur.[91]

It was in the Central Advisory Council, founded in the second half of 1943, that the nationalists, being in a majority, gained some power. In the Volksraad of Dutch rule, the Muslim membership was two of a total of sixty; in the central Advisory Council the number was increased to six in a total of forty-three. When the Japanese military rulers, on account of the unfavourable turn of the war, gave its consent to a nationalist demand for creation of an Indonesian army in 1943, Muslims, as Benda remarks, played an outstanding role from the very beginning in it.[92] The officer corps was composed mostly of religious teachers. Kasman Singodimedjo, a prominent

leader of the Masjumi, was appointed as senior officer. With increased deterioration of their military position, the Japanese at last allowed the Masjumi to create its own army, the Hizbullah, at the beginning of 1945. This has been called "the most spectacular event in the Islamic movement".[93]

When Japan promised on September 9, 1944, to grant Indonesia her independence, a change in Japanese policy towards the Islamic and the nationalist groups resulted. The nationalists, on account of their western education and training, were obviously more capable than the 'ulamā', though the latter also had in their ranks a small group of western educated intellectuals who might have taken over and continued the government of the country along the Western lines on which it had been ruled for a time. This change of policy manifested itself in the transfer of important governmental posts to the nationalists. The posts of residents, the political heads of residencies, for example, were entrusted to nationalists like Sutardjo, Surose and Suwiro.[94]

The leadership of the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence was not given to an Islamic leader, but to Dr. Radjiman Wediodiningrat. Ir. Sukarno and Drs. M. Hatta were members of the committee.[95] It was

in one of the meetings of this Committee that Ir. Sukarno on June 1, 1945, delivered his speech on the Pantjasila, the five basic principles of the state. When the Indonesian Independence Preparation Committee was founded on August 7, 1945, it was Ir. Sukarno who was appointed to be its chairman, and Drs. M. Hatta its vice-chairman. Only sixteen of its members were representatives of the Islamic ideology.[96]

The Islamic group who "at the beginning had great hope that with Japanese co-operation an Islamic State would be established in Indonesia,"[97] began now to see that their hope would not be realized. For them, indeed, it had been a foregone conclusion that once independent, Indonesia would be an Islamic state. For K. H. Wahid Hasjim, for example, "the most important question was not what ultimately the place of Islām would be in the independent state, but by what means that place should be assured.[98] Another 'alim, K. H. A. Mukti, said that the time had come to revive again the past glory of Islamic states in Indonesia.[99]

But the Japanese military rulers, once they had realized that Japan's Great Asia policy, on account of her imminent military defeat, was on its way to collapse -- and, hence, were no longer in need of the support of the

the Indonesian people which they had tried to gain by their friendly attitude towards Islām -- ceased their support to the Indonesian Islamic movement. Through Nishimura, head of the General Affairs Department, Japan made her official stand clear: "While we clearly appreciate the bonds which exist between the Indonesian people and Islām, the Dai Nippon authorities have no slightest blueprint or plan concerning the place which the Islamic religion should occupy in the government."[100]

The Indonesians had to settle the problem of the place of Islām in the future state for themselves. The Islamic leaders had to console themselves with the great gain in power and influence that the Islamic movement had achieved as a consequence of the hitherto favourable Japanese attitude towards Indonesian Islām even though the motivating drive had been largely Japanese self-interest. The increase in their power put them into a position to defend their interests in the new nationalist controlled Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee. Their new situation of strength was quite in contrast with their insignificance during the last years of Dutch rule.

A clash of interest emerged in the Preparatory Committee. The Islamic group wanted an Islamic State, in which the Law should be the <u>sharī'ah</u>, while the nationalists

wanted a state based on the Pantjasila of Ir. Sukarno, not on religion. To find a solution for this conflict a small committee consisting of nine members was founded. The nationalists were represented in the committee by Ir. Sukarno, Drs. M. Hatta, M. Yamin, A. Subardjo and A. Maramis, the only Christian in the committee. The representatives of the Islamic group were H. Agus Salim, K. H. Wahid Hasjim, A. K. Musakkir and Abikusno.[101]

The result of the sub-committee's deliberations was a compromise in the form of the Djakarta Charter. The Charter was based upon the provisions of the Pantjasila (the belief in the Absolute One God, humanity, nationalism, democracy and social justice), but also included an Islamic provision attached to the first principle, so that it reads: the belief in the Absolute One God with the obligation of observing the Islamic shari'āh on the Muslims.[102] When this compromise was brought to the Preparatory Committee of Indonesian Independence, members of the Islamic group tried to remove the term "on the Muslims" from the text. Kibagus Hadikusumo, for example, argued that the term implied the existence of two Laws in the new state, one for the Muslims and one for non-Muslims. The Islamic group wanted the provision to read: The Republic of Indonesia is based upon the belief in the

Absolute One God with the obligation of observing the Islamic sharī'ah. Ir. Sukarno, however, maintained that the whole text of the Djakarta Charter was the result of a compromise between the Islamic and nationalist groups and could not be modified. In this he was supported by Abkusno from the Islamic group, and the original text was approved by the Preparatory Committee.[103] Thus when the Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed on August 17, 1945, it did not emerge as an Islamic State but neither was it clearly a secular state.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER I

1. See for example M. Natsir in Capita Selecta (Djakarta: Pendis, 1957), vol. II, p.124.

2. For example Fred R. von der Mehden in Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia (Madison: Wisconsin Press, 1963), p.27, and Dr. J. M. Pluvier in Overzicht van de Ontwikkeling der Nationalistische Beweging in Indonesië, in de jaren 1930 tot 1942 ('s-Gravenhage, Bandung: van Hoeve, 1953), p.13.

3. More on this mystical nature of Indonesian Islam see Drewes, "Mysticism and Activism" in Gustave E. von Grunebaum, Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp.288 ff.

4. See D. A. Rinkes, Abdoerraoef van Singkel, Bijdrage tot de kennis van de mystiek op Sumatra en Java (Heerenveen: Hekema, 1909), p.25.

5. See C. S. Hurgronje, Verspreide Geschriften (Bonn and Leipzig: Kurt Schroeder, 1924), vol. IV, ii, pp.178 ff.

6. Ibid., vol. II, i, p.102.

7. See Hamka as quoted by H. Aboebakar, Sedjarah Hidup K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim dan Karangan Tersiar (Djakarta: Panitia Buku Peringatan Alm. K. H. A. Wahid Hasjim, 1957), pp.239/40.

8. Ibid., pp.228/32.

9. Related by Hamka as quoted by A. M. Ali, The Muhammadijah Movement, A Biographical Introduction, an MA thesis, IIS, McGill University, 1957, p.49. More on the Muhammadijah see infra, pp.36 ff.

10. In Dutch Cultuurstelsel; as planned by Gov. Gen. van den Bosch the Cultural System specified that one fifth of the peasant's land should be cultivated with products destined for exports. It was applied in 1830 and was officially abolished in 1916. (Ensiklopedia Indonesia, Bandung and 's-Gravenhage: van Hoeve, n.d.).

11. R. Van Niel, The Emergence of the Modern Indonesian Elite (The Hague and Bandung: van Hoeve, 1960), p.8.

12. Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945 (The Hague and Bandung: van Hoeve, 1958), p.28.

13. Dr. H. Bouman, Enige Beschouwingen over de Ontwikkeling van het Indonesisch Nationalisme op Sumatra's Westkust, (Groningen and Batavia: Wolters, 1949), p.57.

14. This policy is largely expounded in "Politique Musulmane de la Hollande" in Verspreide Geschriften, op. cit., IV, ii, pp.227-316.

15. See Amelz, H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, Hidup dan Perdjuangannja (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, n.d.), vol. I, pp.14-15.

16. For details on the expansion of western schools, see van Niel, op. cit., under index education.

17. See George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), p.17.

18. Pluvier, op. cit., p.5.

19. Jz. Moerman, as quoted by Kahin, op. cit., p.21.

20. J. TH. Petrus Blumberger, De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie (Haarlem: Tjeenk Willink & Zoon, 1931), p.56.

21. Muslim authors insist that Samanhudi was the first to establish an organization also called Sarekat Dagang Islam at Solo on 16 October 1905 and hence they claim that he should be considered the father of Indonesian nationalism and not Dr. Wahidin Sudirohusodo, the original founder of Budi Otomo in 1908 as claimed by the nationalists. See Timur Jaylani, The Sarekat Islam Movement, MA thesis, IIS, McGill University, 1959, pp.34 ff. According to Blumberger the first Sarekat Dagang Islam was founded by Tirtoadisurjo and Samanhudi requested him to organize another one at Solo.

22. A hadji is the one who had performed the haj and as such gains prestige in the community, especially on the village level.

23. Blumberger, op. cit., pp.56-57.

24. Ibid., p.19.

25. The real name of Multatuli was Eduard Dowes-Dekker, and was an Assistant Head of Residency in West-Java. Later he became an author and his writings call for the abolishment of colonialism.

26. Quoted in Kahin, op. cit., p.70.

27. Bouman, op. cit., p.31.

28. See Blumberger, op. cit., p.20.

29. Ibid., p.38.

30. See von der Mehden, op. cit., p.29.

31. Ibid., p.30.

32. See Benda, op. cit., p.215, note 55.

33. See Blumberger, op. cit., p.62.

34. See Amelz, op. cit., p.68 and p.124.

35. Blumberger, op. cit., p.63.

36. Encyclopaedia van Nederlandsch-Indie (2nd. ed.; 's-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1927), vol. V, p.370.

37. See Blumberger, op. cit., p.63.

38. See Van Niel, op. cit., p.127.

39. Kahin, op. cit., p.40.

40. See Van Niel, op. cit., p.134.

41. As quoted in ibid., pp.134/5. In this English translation of the article van Niel uses the term "self-administration". It must be pointed out that the leaders of the Sarekat Islam spoke of "pemerentahan sendiri", which is self-government.

42. See Kahin, op. cit., p.72 and Amelz, op. cit., p.107.

43. Abdul Muis in Blumberger, op. cit., p.65.

44. See Amelz, op. cit., pp.29-30.

45. See Van Niel, op. cit., p.107.

46. Ibid., pp.125/6.

47. Quoted in von der Mehden, op. cit., p.60.

48. See Blumberger, op. cit., p.74.

49. Tjokroaminoto in Amelz, op. cit., p.146.

50. Tjokroaminoto in ibid., p.143.

51. See Kahin, op. cit., p.76.

52. See Blumberger, op. cit., p.72.

53. Ibid., p.311.

54. Ibid., p.76.

55. Ir. Sukarno as quoted in Kahin, op. cit., p.91.

56. See Blumberger, op. cit., p.185.

57. Ibid., p.187.

58. See von der Mehden, op. cit., p.79.

59. See Blumberger, op. cit., p.77.

60. Ibid., p.87.

61. Ibid., p.322.

62. Ibid., p.329.

63. Ibid., p.315.

64. See Van Niel, op. cit., p.70.

65. Ibid., p.98.

66. See Blumberger, op. cit., p.97.

67. See Ali, op. cit., p.74.

68. Von der Mehden, op. cit., p.197.

69. Kahin, op. cit., pp.87-88.

70. G. H. Bousquet, La Politique Musulmane et Coloniale des Pays-Bas (Paris: Centre d'Etude de Politique Etrangère, n.d.), p.17.

71. See Blumberger, op. cit., p.174.

72. Ibid., p.405.

73. Ibid., p.406.

74. Ibid., p.407.

75. Van Niel, op. cit., p.168.

76. See Bouman, op. cit., p.70.

77. Ibid., p.71.

78. More on this see M. Na'im, The Nahdatul Ulama Party, MA thesis, IIS, McGill University, 1960, pp.194 ff.

79. See Pluvier, op. cit., p.130.

80. Ibid., p.182.

81. Ibid., p.192.

82. See Aboebakar, op. cit., p.172.

83. See Benda, op. cit., p.111, in which many of the informations and ideas of this part of the work originate.

84. See M. A. Aziz, Japanese Colonialism and Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), p.201.

85. See Benda, op. cit., p.122.

86. Ibid., for a more complete text in Indonesian see Aboebakar, op. cit., pp.324/5.

87. See Benda, op. cit., p.126.

88. See Hamka, Ajahku, Riwajat Hidup Dr. A. K. Amrullah dan Perdjuangan Kaum Agama (Djakarta: 1950), p.151.

89. See Benda, op. cit., p.166.

90. AAA stood for Japan the leader of Asia, Japan the protector of Asia and Japan the light of Asia. See Aziz, op. cit., p.209.

91. See Benda, op. cit., p.156.

92. Ibid., p.138.

93. Ibid., p.179.

94. See Kahin, op. cit., p.121.

95. Ibid.

96. Nur, D., Masjumi, Its Organization, Ideology and Political Role in Indonesia, MA thesis, Cornell University, New York, 1960, p.30.

97. Aboebakar, op. cit., p.336.

98. See Benda, op. cit., p.189.

99. See Aboebakar, op. cit., p.339.

100. See Benda, op. cit., p.188.

101. See Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante [hereafter cited as Dasar Negara] (Bandung: Sekretariat Konstituante, n.d.), vol. I, p.296.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid., pp.304/5.

CHAPTER II

THE MOVEMENT FOR THE CREATION OF THE ISLAMIC STATE

With the decline of the Japanese authority during the last days of their military rule in Indonesia, the nationalist leaders, possessed of administrative and political capabilities, emerged as the new force to fill the political vacuum existing before the landing of the Allied Forces on Java. The Islamic leaders by contrast were relegated more and more to an inferior position in the direction of political developments in the country.

Thus, it came about that arrangements and preparations for Indonesian independence came fully into the hands of the nationalist group. Responsibility was undertaken by persons such as Ir. Sukarno, Drs. M. Hatta, S. Sjahrir and the Marxist youth of the anti-Japanese underground movement under the leadership of Sukarno. The nationalists, in consequence, enjoyed a position of great influence and power in the formation of the future state while the Islamic group had no direct participation in these significant events.

A short description of the political events that took place around the time of the proclamation of independence in August 1945, is not out of place to

demonstrate the inactivity of the Islamic group.

A disagreement on the manner of proclaiming the independence arose among the nationalist leaders. Drs. M. Hatta has written that S. Sjahrir visited him on 14th August, 1945, and suggested that independence should not be proclaimed by the Independence Preparatory Committee for fear that it would be claimed by the Allies to be of Japanese origin. The best way, according to S. Sjahrir, would be for Ir. Sukarno, in his capacity as the leader of the Indonesian people, to proclaim independence in the name of the whole of Indonesia. Ir. Sukarno, as Chairman of the Committee, however, was of the opinion, that he could not act without the Committee. The Marxist youth, indifferent to such quarrels, thought the proclamation of independence less important that the immediate seizure of power from the Japanese military rule. Like S. Sjahrir, they thought that independence should be proclaimed in a fashion completely free from Japanese sponsorship. In an effort to attain their goal they kidnapped Ir. Sukarno and Drs. M. Hatta and brought them to a small town south of Djakarta, but failed to force their ideas on the two leaders. This incident prevented Sukarno and Hatta from leading the meeting of the Preparatory Committee in Djakarta; and when it was known that they had been kidnapped, A. Subardjo, Chief of the Consulting Office of

the Japanese Navy HQ in Java came and brought them back to the capital to preside at the meeting. The meeting decided that independence should be proclaimed in the name of the Indonesian people and that the proclamation should be signed by Sukarno and Hatta as the chief top leaders of the people.[1]

Unlike the Marxist youth, the Islamic group made no attempt to play a leading role in the proclamation of independence, so that they might be able to exert their influence in shaping the nature of the Republic of Indonesia which soon would be established. For the time being they were inactive.

On August 18, 1945, one day after the proclamation of independence, the Preparatory Committee met and adopted the Provisional Constitution, as laid down by a special body of the Committee. It was agreed that the Djakarta Charter would serve as its Preamble. But when the Preamble was actually read by Drs. M. Hatta for approval, the Islamic provision "with the obligation of observing the Islamic <u>sharī'ah</u> on its adherents" was omitted. In spite of the blow to aspirations for an Islamic ideology in Indonesia, no protest was raised at that time by the Islamic representatives.[2] The meeting further elected Ir. Sukarno and Drs. Hatta, respectively President and Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia. Their

election overturned the tradition that the top positions should be shared among nationalist and Islamic leaders as the practice had been during the Japanese period. When President Sukarno announced the composition of his first cabinet, only two of its members represented the Islamic group, both of whom held rather unimportant ministerial posts, Abikusno Tjokrosujoso as Minister of Communications, and A. Wahid Hasjim as Minister of State without portfolio.[3]

On August 19, 1945 the Independence Preparatory Committee was transformed into a Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat or KNIP (Central Indonesian National Committee), which served as an advisory body to the government. Here again the Islamic representation was small. Only 35 out of its 290 members belonged to the Islamic group; and when the Committee's membership was raised in 1947 to 514, the Islamic group received an increase of only 25 out of the 314 new members.[4] The effect was to make their percentage in the representative body still lower than it had been before. The composition of the KNIP was made not only on the basis of party representation but also on that of occupational and regional representation. Out of the 200 members of the original KNIP 129 represented the parties. By 1947 the Dutch propaganda against the Republic had

penetrated various parts of Indonesia and in some of the regions the local leaders even agreed to co-operate with the Dutch army. To counteract this Dutch move, the Republican government deemed it necessary to increase the regional representation in the revised KNIP with more than five times their original number. The workers and the peasant had also by that time manifested their power in the fight against the Dutch attempt to re-establish their rule in the country. To appease them their representation must also be raised in the revised KNIP. Out of its 514 members, only 222 represented the parties. This explains the low representation of the Islamic group in the KNIP.

Under the leadership of Tan Malaka, the Marxist group made further attempts to seize the control of the Republic during the precarious days of its early existence. They used the Dutch threat to crush the Republic and to arrest its top leaders as a pretext to obtain from President Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta a statement on the future leadership of the new state in case both of them should be arrested or murdered. It was Tan Malaka's wish that he should be made the only heir of the leadership, but Sukarno and Hatta, realizing that he was far from being a national leader with a great following, appointed instead four leaders: Tan Malaka himself representing the Marxists,

S. Sjahrir the socialists,Wongsonegoro the Prijaji group and Iwa Kusumasumantri the Islamic trend.[5]

No such attempt at seizing power and exerting their influence was undertaken by the Islamic group. The appointment of Iwa Kusumasumantri, who was not known in the leadership of the Islamic movement, but was and is considered to belong to the group of leftist nationalists, reflects truly the degree of inactivity and insensibility of the Islamic group in those early days of the Republic.

Several factors are responsible for the indifference and inactivity of the Islamic group. In that period the leadership of the Islamic movement was still in the hands of men of the older generation like Dr. Sukiman, H. A. Salim and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso. The younger dynamic generation with their thorough Western education, such as Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, and Jusuf Wibisono, did not emerge yet in the Islamic leadership. It was only towards the end of 1948 that they began to have influence over the political direction of the Islamic group. The Islamic movement of that time was lacking a dynamic leadership who would have been able to compete with the nationalist and Marxist leaderships. The Islamic group was also short of influential intellectuals from whom President Sukarno would have been able to make his choice in his appointments of that period.

Like all Indonesians, the Islamic group were at that time too happy and too pre-occupied with the newly gained independence, an independence which had been long dreamed of and which, in the light of the material superiority of the Western colonial powers in contrast with the weak position of the colonized countries, seemed at times to be a very far and difficult goal to obtain. Independence for the Islamic group meant not only the independence of Indonesia, but also the independence of the "Indonesian Islamic Ummah" and the "freedom of Islam".[6] Now that they had obtained their precious independence, the Dutch issued their threat to crush the Republic, while the Allied Forces had begun to land to help the Dutch in re-establishing their former rule over the country. It was only natural in such circumstances that the main aim of the leaders, Islamic as well as nationalist, was to prepare the people for the defence of their independence and to put aside their minor disagreements.

There was, moreover, the fact that the government of the Republic of Indonesia was not a government of non-Muslims. Its President, Ir. Sukarno, is a Muslim, who as recently as 1962, reaffirmed that he was still a member of the Muhammadijah.[7] In the 1930's he used to write articles on Islām, in which he expounded the idea that Islām is progressive and that the Muslims should not copy old

traditions. "Also in politics", he wrote, "the Muslims must not copy the old traditions and must not revive the time of the right-guided Caliphs. Why do Islamic politicians in this country always project a political system like that of the time of the right-guided Caliphs?"[8] As Anshari remarks, he proposed the use of rationalization in understanding and interpreting the Islamic teachings which stirred the Islamic public opinion of that time in Indonesia.[9] During his exile in Sumatra, he was active in the Muhammadijah and married Fatmawati, a girl of the Aisjijah, the women's section of the Muhammadijah. Although a nationalist, he thus had also dealt with Islamic questions. It must be pointed out that, by dealing with Islamic questions, President Sukarno must not necessarily belong to the Islamic group. President Sukarno has always been a nationalist. But in view of his close connections with Islamic leaders, such as Tjokroaminoto and K. H. Ahmad Dahlan, and with communist leaders like Sneevliet, he had not been free from Islamic and Marxist influences. He himself has written: "The influences that the leaders had implanted in my soul are responsible for the political view that I have to-day. I have once said that I am a blend of religionism, nationalism and socialism."[10]

One of the demands of the Islamic group was the condition that the Head of State must be a Muslim and this

condition had been fulfilled in the person of President Sukarno. Moreover, the Republic's Vice-President, Drs. M. Hatta, is a man who is known to be a devout Muslim. The Ministers also, all but two of them, were Muslims. Under such Muslim leaders the Islamic group felt that the "freedom of Islam" would not be jeopardized. This idea is reflected in a statement of Natsir, in which he said that the Pantja Sila was the result of consultation among leaders held at a time when the independence struggle was at its height. Hence, he believed that in the light of such a background the leaders, the majority of whom were Muslims, would not lay down principles in contradiction with the teachings of Islām.[11]

Furthermore, the Pantja Sila, as Natsir's statement implies, was considered by the Islamic group not to be in contradiction with Islām. For them the five principles of the Pantja Sila, the belief in the Absolute One God, humanity, nationalism, democracy and social justice, belonged among the principles of Islām. As Natsir said, the Pantja Sila was derived from the thousand of <u>silas</u> (principles) found in Islām and it was in an Islamic state that it would flourish and prosper.[12] These principles, according to PSII leaders, already existed in the foundation of the party, and, hence, when the Pantja

Sila was formulated, there was no problem for them to accept it.[13] The Djakarta Charter, which embodies the five principles, was accepted because it was in agreement with Islām. A perusal of the text, in fact, would reveal that it was governed by an Islamic spirit. The original text, before it was modified on August 18, 1945, included the opening verse Bi ism Allāh al-Raḥmān al-Raḥīm after the heading Preamble in the Provisional Constitution. In one of the Independence Preparatory Committee's meeting, M. Yamin from the nationalist group, proposed that the verse should be placed before the Preamble, so that the Preamble would be in agreement with the Islamic feeling.[14] In the final text the opening verse was, however, omitted but the phrase Atas berkat rahmat Allah Jang Maha-Kuasa in the third paragraph was retained so that it reads "With the blessings and mercy of Allah the Most Powerful ... the people of Indonesia hereby proclaim their independence".[15] The term Tuhan, which appears in the first principle Ketuhanan Jang Maha-Esa, is, for Indonesian Muslims, as van Nieuwenhuijze explains, simply equivalent to Allah.[16] When originally introduced, Ir. Sukarno put the section containing the phrase at the bottom of the principles, but on the suggestion of others it was raised to the top. Commenting on this modification, Vice-President M. Hatta

said that, by the change, the belief in the Absolute One God had become the source of guidance for all the other principles, and that the State and the government had obtained a strong moral foundation.[17]

In other words there was a view among the Islamic group that the Republic of Indonesia was already fulfilling many of the conditions of the Islamic state. In the eyes of Z. A. Ahmad, it even had fulfilled more conditions than those prevailing in states which claimed themselves to be Islamic. According to him an Islamic state should be sovereign, should have a constitution, a parliament and a republican form, should be based on religion, law, and consultation, and should be pursuing a policy of peace. At least seven of these eight characteristics in his opinion had been fulfilled by the Republic. Hence "the State that we now have can be made the stepping stone, or to use the words of Bung Karno the golden bridge, [in the endeavour] to create the Islamic State in Indonesia."[18] If this was his view, Natsir went even further. As late as 1952, he claimed in a speech before the Parliament of Pakistan that the Republic of Indonesia, like Pakistan, was an Islamic State, for Islām had been recognized as the religion of the Indonesian people despite the fact that the Constitution did not stipulate that the religion of the State was Islām. The Constitution clearly stated,

however, that it believed in the Absolute One God.[19]

The foregoing factors explain the attitude of inactivity and tranquility which the Islamic group manifested after the proclamation of independence. The days of the revolution were not the appropriate time to press on to the realization of their Islamic ideas. For them the defence of the independence of Indonesia must have the first priority. This idea is implied in a speech of Kasman Singodimedjo in the Constituent Assembly where he explained why the Islamic group did not raise a protest when the Islamic provision was removed from the Djakarta Charter on August 18, 1945. That particular time, he said, in view of the Japanese defeat and the landing of the Allied Forces, was inappropriate for deep discussion of the matter.[20]

To sum up, the existing Republic of Indonesia for some of the Islamic group was already sufficiently and truly Islamic; and though the majority did not concur, the Republic was acceptable at least as a stepping stone to the creation of a genuinely Islamic state. Before proceeding to discussion of the efforts undertaken by the Islamic group in realizing their ideas, it should be recalled that the Islamic group was composed of two factions, the modernists and the traditionalists. Between the two factions there existed a difference about the manner of creating the Islamic state. The modernists projected first the establishment of the Islamic society

and then the Islamic state, while the traditionalists held an exactly opposite view.[21] With their idea of al-amr bi al-ma'rūf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar to be implemented by the power of the state the traditionalists were of the opinion that the Islamic society could best be created by the Islamic state. Both, however, agreed to co-operate with the Republic while following a policy designed to transform it into an Islamic state by constitutional methods.

Although the Masjumi of the Japanese period still existed after the proclamation of independence, it was inactive and, being only a social organization, could not meet the need of the Islamic group for a party to organize their movement. The opportunity to establish such an organization came when the government in its announcement of November 5, 1945 encouraged the creation of political parties in the country. In the conference of the Islamic group held a few days later in Djokjakarta, the Republican capital during the days of the revolution, it was decided to create one political party as the sole Islamic political organization for the whole of Indonesia. By a narrow margin, 52-50, it was agreed to call the party Masjumi rather than Partai Rakjat Islam (Party of the Islamic people).[22] Like the Masjumi of the pre-independence days, it was also composed mainly of the

Nahdatul Ulama and the Muhammadijah.

The leadership of the new party was shared between the modernists and the traditionalists. The latter, consisting mostly of 'ulamā', formed the Madjlis Sjura which served as a legislative body of the party, while the former were associated in the Central Board, which operated as the executive body. The Muktamar (the congress) was the highest body in the organization of the party. With the change that appeared in the Indonesian political sphere after the proclamation of independence, it was the modernists with their western education and training who came to the fore in the political activities of the party. It is obvious that the modernists were better equipped for filling the administrative and ministerial posts in the government of the Republic. And it was these modernists who controlled and made the policy of the party.

In line with its policy to co-operate with and transform the Republic into an Islamic state, the party made no mention of an immediate and forceful creation of the Islamic state in its program. The program dealt rather with matters such as:

- the defence of the independence of the Republic by jihād and the withdrawal of the Allied Forces from Indonesia;[23]

- the spread of the Islamic ideology;[24]
- the implementation of the Islamic ideology in the affairs of the State and the strengthening of the principles of the Republic - in particular that of the belief in the Absolute One God - in such a way that it would lead to the official establishment of the Islamic state in Indonesia;[25]
- the introduction of obligatory (not merely optional) religious education in government schools.[26]

The program included many other political, social, economic, educational and defensive aims mostly of a secular character.[27]

Prominent members of the modernist faction were Dr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, Dr. Abu Hanifah, Muhammad Rum, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Jusuf Wibisono, Muhammad Natsir, and Hadji Agus Salim. The last five held ministerial posts in the Sjahrir Cabinet of 1946/47. All of them had been ministers on several occasions, while Dr. Sukiman and M. Natsir were Premiers in the early 1950's. The last Prime Minister of this group was Burhanuddin, under whose administration the 1955 election was held. M. Rum was the leader of the Indonesian Delegation for the last

negotiation with the Dutch, which resulted in the Rum-Royen Agreement of May 1949 that later led to the Round Table Conference in the Hague where the Dutch government agreed to transfer its sovereignty over Indonesia officially to the Republic on December 27, 1949. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara was Head of the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia in Sumatra which was formed after the fall of Djokjakarta and the arrest of President Sukarno, Vice-President Hatta and other top leaders of the Republic by the Dutch army on December 17, 1948. Before his departure to Sumatra Vice-President Hatta had given Sjafruddin Prawiranegara a mandate to take over the leadership, which he returned back to President Sukarno in June 1949, after the Republic, on the order of the Security Council, had been re-installed in Djokjakarta. In Java the fight was continued under the leadership of Dr. Sukiman.

The greatest achievement during the early period of the Masjumi's constitutional efforts was the creation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, a demand that went as far back as 1939, when the Indonesian movement launched its program of "Indonesia Berparlemen".[28] The aim was that the office of the Religious Affairs should not remain a part of a department, as the case was during the Dutch

and Japanese rule, or a section of the Ministry of Education as it was during the early days of the Republic. As a subordinate to a Minister of Education, who in many cases would be a secular nationalist, the Head of the Religious Section would not be free to promote the religious life of the people in accordance with the wishes of the Islamic group. They protested, therefore, that this condition did not differ from that of the Dutch and Japanese system. Now that Indonesia had become independent, the religious affairs of the people should be entrusted to a special ministry. Making use of the first principle of the Pantja Sila, the Islamic group pressed for the creation of a department. They succeeded, when in January, 1946, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was established with M. Rasjidi as its first Minister.

All religious matters that formerly were the responsibility of other governmental bodies, such as the appointment of penghulus (religious officials entrusted with the performance of marriages as well as their dissolution, and the calculation of inheritance, etc.), formerly in hands of Residents (Heads of residencies), and the appointment of imāms for mosques, formerly made by Heads of regencies, were now transferred to the new Ministry.[29] To its activities belonged the administration,

guidance and supervision of religious education in government and private schools as well as in madrasahs, the training of religious teachers and penghulus, the administration and supervision of marriages and divorces and the administration and supervision of religious jurisdiction.[30]

The creation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs had great importance for the Islamic group. They were enabled to become more independent in planning their Islamic program, and through the Minister of Religious Affairs, who by necessity had to be an Islamic leader, they secured a permanent channel to voice their ideas in cabinet deliberations. Moreover, religious education, which came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry, constitutes a significant field of activities for them to spread their Islamic ideas. To use the words of van Nieuwenhuijze "the Ministry of Religion, in which the highest posts were held by Muslims, could by its wide administrative power stir up hopes for the eventual realization of the Islamic state ideal."[31]

Two of the three pre-war demands of the Islamic group had thus been fulfilled. The Head of State was a Muslim, and a Ministry of Religious Affairs had been established. Their demand for a two-thirds representation in the representative body, however, resulted in a decrease

of their number from 35 out of 200 to 60 out of 514.[32] Their demand for an election[33] at the time of the war for independence was unpractical. Various parts of the country were at that time occupied by the Dutch army. It is hardly necessary to point out that in such occupied areas election could not be held. The first Indonesian election could be held only in 1955; and, as will be seen, although the Islamic group came out as the strongest group, the two-thirds representation they demanded was not given to them by the Indonesian voters.[34]

The difference of opinion among the Islamic group was not confined to the major difference between modernists and traditionalists alone. Among the latter themselves there was again a disagreement with regard to the nature of the Republic of Indonesia. One party, holding the same idea as the modernists, considered the Republic not to be in contradiction with Islamic principles and accepted it as a foundation upon which to create the Islamic state. A second party, however, considered the Republic to be secular, and opposed it. They saw their duty as the creation of an Islamic state in place of the Republic.

To this last group belonged Kartosuwirjo, who was one of the leaders of the prewar Sarekat Islam and who

had a great influence in the Preanger in West Java. After the formation of the Masjumi as a political party he was nominated its representative in West Java. From the very beginning it seems that he did not approve of the Republic of Indonesia by reason of its failure to be based officially on Islām. Thus when he was made a member of the KNIP in 1945, he was not interested in the appointment.[35] In 1947 he was offered the post of second Vice-Minister of Defence, but he rejected it.[36] To oppose the Republic of Indonesia openly in those days, however, would certainly have led to failure. As S. Sjahrir discovered during a two weeks trip through Java, the Republic had a tremendous and enthusiastic backing by the people everywhere.[37] Sukarno and Hatta, the two leaders who had proclaimed independence, had become too popular among the population to be opposed by leaders of even Sjahrir's fame. Hence, Sjahrir, who originally refused to work with them, changed his attitude.

The popularity of the Republic and the fact that the majority of his colleagues in the Islamic group approved the new State and agreed to co-operate with its Government forced Kartosuwirjo to adopt an attitude of waiting while closely observing the direction that would be followed by the Republic. Would it develop into an Islamic state or would it become more secular? For him

the answer on this question came in July, 1947, when the leadership of the Republican government fell into the hands of a Marxist group under Amir Sjarifuddin, with whom the Masjumi refused to co-operate. Amir Sjarifuddin, beside being a Marxist, was also a Christian. Making use of his position as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, Amir Sjarifuddin managed to spread his influence in the army. It need hardly be remarked that in time of war the army is the most important instrument of a state. This development seems to have convinced Kartosuwirjo that the Republic was pursuing the "wrong direction" and that the time had come to move decisively toward the realization of his idea.

The Ranville Agreement of early 1948 provided him with an opportunity to take the first steps. In accordance with the terms of the agreement, the Republican forces were evacuated from the pockets they occupied in the Dutch controlled areas of West Java. The forces of the Hizbullah and Sabilullah, having rejected the Agreement, however, remained behind. Kartosuwirjo, to whom the Agreement was also unacceptable, came forward and created out of these two groups a defence organization which he called Darul Islam, to continue the fight against the Dutch army in West Java. On March 1, 1948, he organized an Islamic meeting in the area, in which it was decided

that existing circumstances necessitated the creation of a Madjlis Umat Islam headed by an Imām responsible to God and to society, and that this Mulim society should assume the form of a provisional Islamic state with Kartosuwirjo as Imām. After the Dutch created the State of Pasundan in West Java on March 19, 1948, Kartosuwirjo proclaimed his Provisional State to be the Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia) then existing only in West Java.[38] Towards the end of the year the Islamic State became opnely anti-Republican. The TNI, the Republican Army, was labelled the "army of unbelievers"[39] and the Republican Government a "government of Kāfirs".[40] Merdeka, the secular greeting of the Republic was superseded by the Islamic al-salām ʿalaikum. When it became clear to Kartosuwirjo that the Republican Government after the fall of Djokjakarta would be re-installed and possibly would gain sovereignty over the whole of Indonesia, he proclaimed on August 7, 1949 the Negara Islam Indonesia to cover all the Indonesian islands.

The State of Kartosuwirjo was mainly organized along the historical Islamic concept. The Head of State was called Imām and was assisted by a Dewān Fatwā, an advisory body, consisting of a Grand Muftī and six Muftīs, all appointed by the Head of State. The cabinet was composed of the Imām and his ten Ministers. Beside the

army, which was renamed Tentara Islam Indonesia (the Islamic Army of Indonesia), it had also a police force, so organized as to reach every village in the areas controlled by the NII. This government structure began to function in June 1948.[41] The army, the TII, consisted of two divisions, one in Central Java under Amir Fatah and the other in West Java under Kamran. The army wore real uniforms but lacked arms and ammunitions.[42] The State's main financial means came from taxes which its civil service collected from the people.

To gain support outside West Java, Kartosuwirjo sent emissaries to other parts of Indonesia. Before his proclamation that the NII included the whole of Indonesia, he even appointed a representative in Djokjakarta with instructions to make clear to the Republican authorities that the responsibility for military operations in West Java rested exclusively with the Imām.[43]

In South Celebes a guerilla group of about 4000 men under Kahar Muzakkar, being unsatisfied with the solution proposed by the Republican Government with regard to their future position, organized themselves in 1951 to oppose the Republic. Kahar Muzakkar divided the area under his control into several districts, appointed new officials, and demanded that each district must collect taxes from the people. In return he established schools

and clinics for the population. Soon, like Kartosuwirjo, he branded the leaders of the Republic as Belanda Hitam (black Dutch).[44] In 1953, he associated his movement with that of Kartosuwirjo. By this action the territory of the NII came to include the areas which were under the actual control of Kahar Muzakkar in South Celebes, where the Imām appointed him as his governor.

Another Islamic leader, Daud Beureuh, the Military Governor of Acheh, had been dissatisfied since the early days of the Republic with the secularistic trend of the leaders in Djokjakarta. Acheh had been the first part of Indonesia to come into contact with Islām and it was there that the first Indonesian Muslim kingdoms were established in the 13th century. By virtue of its long Islamic tradition its people have the reputation among Indonesians as strongly devout Muslims. It should be kept in mind also that Acheh was the last part of Indonesia to surrender itself to the Dutch rule at the turn of this century. During the revolution the class of 'ulamā' succeeded in seizing the political leadership of the region from the traditional secular rulers. Acheh has been, indeed, the most fertile ground for the Islamic movement in Indonesia.

Like Kartusuwirjo, Daud Beureuh also adopted an attitude of waiting while following closely the political trend of the Republic. Whereas the former took

his decision to lay the foundation of his Islamic state in 1947, when the leadership in government shifted to the Marxist group, Daud Beureuh waited until the leadership shifted again in July, 1953, this time to "leftist nationalists", under Ali Sastroamidjojo, rather than Marxists. Sastroamidjojo, however, had the support of the communist PKI.[45] As in 1947, once again the Masjumi refused to join the cabinet.

Sensing that something was breeding in Acheh, the Central Government decided to transfer Daud Beureuh to Djakarta, (the capital of the Republic, after the transfer of sovereignty in December, 1949) to be replaced by a Javanese Indonesian, Danubroto, but he refused to go to Djakarta, handed in his resignation,[46] and remained in Acheh. Soon he launched his new movement and proclaimed in September, 1953, the inclusion of Acheh among the territory of the NII. Kartosuwirjo nominated him governor in this new territory of the Islamic State. A rebellion against the authority of Djakarta broke out, and within a short time most of the region came under the control of the NII. But in November, 1953, all important cities and towns were recaptured by the Republican army, and the NII area in Acheh, like that in West Java and South Celebes, was limited to the mountainous interior part of the region.

During the 1958 PRRI rebellion of the military leaders of Central Sumatra and North Celebes, in which they were supported by Islamic leaders like Natsir, Sjafruddin and Burhanuddin, and socialist leaders like Sumitro, Assat and Rasjid, Daud Beureuh joined forces with the insurgents. Although they achieved unity, the rebels were soon reduced to guerilla activities, because of the strong blockade applied by Djakarta to cut them off from the outer world.

In the capital, the army leaders were in the meantime concerned with the rising power and influence of the cummunist PKI in Indonesian politics and began to search for anti-communist allies to curb the communist power. As one of the main causes of the PRRI rebellion had been the growing communist influence, it was thus not surprising that the army leaders, were open to a negotiated settlement with the PRRI. President Sukarno opposed but settlement was achieved in 1961. In line with the government's policy to promote internal security in the rebellion plagued country, the army leaders did not confine their efforts to achieve a settlement with the PRRI, but also with the NII in its three territories, West Java, South Celebes and Acheh. To a large extent the army leaders succeeded in their efforts. By October, 1961, most of the PRRI men as well as those of Kahar Muzakkar and Daud Beureuh had

"returned to the fold of the Republic", the official term used to describe the end of hostilities toward the Republic. But Kartosuwirjo refused the settlement. The army launched a new drive against him late in 1961, and in June, 1962, he was captured and was later sentenced to death charged with an attempt to assassinate President Sukarno.

With the return of the NII men in Acheh and South Celebes to the fold of the Republic and the death of Kartosuwirjo, the revolutionary movement to establish the Islamic state came to an end.

To revert to the constitutional wing of the Islamic movement a split occurred in the Masjumi in 1952. It should be kept in mind that the Masjumi was composed of two large non-political organizations, the modernist Muhammadijah and the traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama, and that after the proclamation of independence, the modernists, with their western education, were pushed forward by circumstances to dominate the leadership of the party and to represent it in the various Republican cabinets. As a result, the traditionalists ceased to play an important role in the party; and their discontent was aggravated by the 1949 resolution of the Masjumi to modify the position of the Madjlis Sjuro from that of a legislative body into that of an advisory organ. This resolution barred the

'ulamā' associated in the Madjlis Sjuro from having a real say in the policies and activities of the party. All problems, the traditionalists complained, had been settled solely on the basis of political considerations without due attention being paid to religious guidance.[47] The resolution reflects the difference of opinion between the modernists and traditionalists which in time came more and more to the fore. As will be seen (in Chapter III) the modernists idea of the Islamic state differs from that of the traditionalists. In the modernist understanding the 'ulamā' have little place in the organization of the Islamic state. As they see it, the 'ulamā' with their traditional Islamic education have not the necessary training for the administration of a modern state.

As a remedy, attempts had been made on the part of The Nahdatul Ulama to change the nature of the Masjumi from a party with affiliate non-political member bodies into a confederation of parties. The Nahdatul Ulama intended to become a political party itself so that it might have more voice in the Masjumi leadership. But the endeavour failed; and when the Nahdatul Ulama was made a party in 1952, a split in the Masjumi was unavoidable. Together with two other minor Islamic Parties, the PSSI and the Perti (the traditionalist party of Central Sumatra), the Nahdatul Ulama formed a confederation under the name

of Liga Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim League) in August of the same year. This split no doubt weakened the position of the Islamic group.

In the policies of the Republican central power a change of direction was taking place in 1953. By 1952 a difference of opinion between President Sukarno and Vice-President Hatta had begun to manifest itself more and more clearly. For the latter the revolution had ended with the close of the independence war whereby the Republic obtained international recognition. The rebellions, the political anarchy and the economic disorganizations that plagued the country, were, in the eyes of the Vice-President, the result of the revolution not having been checked in due time. "Those who believe that the national revolution has not finished yet are totally mistaken. A revolution is a sudden social outburst, which creates an '<u>Umwertung aller Werte</u>'. Therefore a revolution cannot last very long, not more than a few weeks or a few months. Then it must be checked and the time of consolidation begins, whereby efforts must be taken to realize the goals of the revolution. That, which has not finished yet, is not the revolution itself, but the efforts to realize its ideals..."[48]

The President, however, held the opposite view.

In his opinion the revolution had not ended yet. "...as I have said over and over again", he stated in a speech, "not only is our revolution not yet completed, but our ideals have not been attained."[49] "Our duty to-day, brothers and sisters, is not only to build and to construct. Our duty is still to destroy, we have still a duty to tear down. ...Colonialism [in Indonesia] is not yet dead, imperialism is not yet dead. We must continue the struggle to destroy imperialism and colonialism."[50]

For Vice-President Hatta the period of destroying had ended and the post-independence period should be a time of upbuilding. Because of the lack of Indonesian know-how and capital, the Republic was still in need of foreign enterprises, capital, and technicians to build up what had been destroyed during the revolution. To President Sukarno, however, this foreign capital and foreign experts were a form of colonialism and imperialism, of which the Republic must rid itself as soon as possible if it were to have complete political and economic independence.

This divergence of opinion was responsible for the deterioration of relations between the two leaders. In time the President became less receptive to the advice of the Vice-President. The split became official after the Vice-President resigned from his post in 1956.

From the end of the independence war up to 1953 the government of the country was in the hands of leaders who followed Vice-President Hatta's policy. They were drawn from the Masjumi, the Socialist PSI and the right wing of the nationalist PNI. By 1952, however, because of their failure to introduce important improvements in the general condition of the country, opposition to them became powerful. The influence of the leftist nationalist group, who were in favour of the President's political outlook, began to rise. In 1953, the leftist nationalists succeeded to come to power, when the first cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo was established. The Masjumi, it must be recalled, refused to co-operate with Sastroamidjojo's government, but the Nahdatul Ulama, which by that time had already become a political party, however, agreed to participate in that cabinet. It did so despite the fact that the communist PKI was indirectly affecting the policy of the government through the Progressive Fraction and the Indonesian Peasant Front, both of which were organizations under communist influence and both of which were represented in the cabinet. In addition, the cabinet had to rely in some cases on the support of the PKI in parliament. An example was the Masjumi non-confidence motion of 1954, which was rejected in Parliament with the help of 17 votes of the communist PKI and 6 votes of

communist influenced organizations.[51] Co-operation between the PKI and the PNI began to be displayed and this marked the beginning of the rise of the influence and the power of the communists in Indonesian politics.

In 1951 D. N. Aidit succeeded in taking over the leadership of the party from Alimin of the older generation communists. The first step he took was to erase the stigma of the Madiun revolt which the communists had launched in 1948 to seize power from Sukarno and Hatta at a time when the Republic was still at war against the Dutch. This act had been considered by many Indonesians as a stab in the back of the Republic and the PKI was labelled as a "traitor". The PKI's international outlook, furthermore, created the impression among Indonesians that the PKI had no nationalistic aspirations. The fact that in their congresses and demonstrations they displayed communist flags and photos of Russian communist leaders, such as Lenin and Stalin, increased the belief of Indonesians that the PKI leaders wanted to replace the Republic by a communist state owing allegiance to Moscow. In line with the shift from left to right in international communism that took place in 1951, the PKI under its new young leadership, began by 1952 to identify itself with Indonesian nationalism. In its January conference of that

year Aidit announced the guide lines of the new strategy: the formation of a united national front including a national bourgeoisie, the liquidation of the Darul Islam, and the development of communist mass-movement.[52] For the first time after the Madiun revolt, co-operation with the Republican government began to be planned. Though the PKI had already announced support for the Wilopo cabinet of 1952-1953, it was during the Sastroamidjojo cabinet of 1953-1955 that the support and co-operation with the government actually began to be effective. President Sukarno began also to be praised and the Pantja Sila to find support from PKI leaders. In spite of the glaring conflict of communist atheism with the Pantja Sila's first principle, the belief in the Absolute One God, the PKI, perhaps for strategical purposes, accepted the Pantja Sila officially in 1954.

The Nahdatul Ulama, confident that communism would have no appeal to the Indonesian masses on account of its atheism was not much disturbed. The PNI, more afraid of the Islamic ideology of the Masjumi, to which they thought the Indonesian people more receptive than to the international mindedness of the PKI, accepted the support offered by communist leaders to the Sastroamidjojo cabinet. The PKI itself considered the Masjumi as its main

enemy, and constant efforts were undertaken by its leaders to deepen the already existing split between the Nahdatul Ulama and the PNI on one hand and the Masjumi on the other.

These developments alarmed the Masjumi leaders. The acceptance of the five principles of the State by the PKI caused them to realize that the Pantja Sila, by virtue of its nature as "an abstraction, a pure concept, which in reality cannot stand alone",[53] could be interpreted by each ideological group in accordance with its own wishes. Consequently, a change of attitude towards the Pantja Sila occurred in the Islamic group, in particular within the Masjumi. Some of them began to criticize the Pantja Sila openly, while at the same time hammering on the necessity of basing the State on Islamic principles. The Pantja Sila, having been accepted by the PKI, could, in their opinion no longer be used as a fortress against communism in Indonesia.

As Feith[54] remarks, the new phase of the political controversy was sparked by a speech of President Sukarno delivered in South Kalimantan, on January 27, 1953, in which he was reported to have said that if the Islamic State were established in Indonesia, many areas, the population of which were not Muslims like the Moluccas, Bali, Flores, Timor, the Kai Islands and Sulawesi, would secede.[55] The Nahdatul Ulama, the Masjumi, the Perti and

other organizations from the Islamic group strongly protested against this speech. The Front Muballigh Islam of North Sumatra declared that the Pantja Sila, though not in conflict with Islām, did not fulfill all the requirements of the Islamic teachings.[56] In a mi'raj speech, Isa Anshari, a Masjumi leader, observed: "The central question is whether the state is to be based on God's law or not".[57] His statement only implied a belief in the divinity of the Islamic ideology, but Kasman Singodimedjo later stated openly that the ideology had been created by God while all other ideologies were man-made.[58] By statements like these they were trying to create the impression that the Pantja Sila was far inferior to the Islamic ideology.

Another speech of the President provoked a stronger reaction from the Islamic group. In May, 1954, he gave a lecture in Makassar in which he explained the meaning of the belief in God, the first principle of the Pantja Sila. The explanation was understood by the 'ulamā' to mean that the animistic belief in spirits and ghosts was a kind of belief in God that was acceptable from the standpoint of the Pantja Sila. This stirred their religious sentiment, and consequently they issued a fatwā explaining that it was harām for a Muslim to express such ideas, let alone to profess them.[59] The Front Pembelaan Islam, in answer to the same speech, adopted in its

meeting of May 30, 1954, a resolution to reject the Pantja Sila as interpreted by the President.[60]

Amidst the storm of the controversy, Natsir expressed a softer judgment. The Pantja Sila for Muslims, he said, was not something strange and in conflict with the teachings of the Qurān, but this does not mean that it is identical with or that it embraces all of the Islamic teachings. The Pantja Sila embodies some of the principles of Islām and it was in an Islamic climate that it would prosper. But if its principle of the belief in God fell down, then all of the Pantja Sila would be meaningless. In such a case only its frame would remain.[61]

In rejoinder the nationalists accused the Islamic group of planning to supplant the Pantja Sila by another ideology, the Red-and-White national flag with that of the Crescent-and-Star, and the national anthem Indonesia Raja with the Marhaban (a song dedicated to the commemoration of the arrival of the Prophet at Medina after his flight from Mecca). These steps, in the eyes of the nationalists, amounted to betrayal of the independence proclamation of 1945.[62]

In the meantime the time of the first Indonesian general election was approaching. The debates and discussions led up to the election which was held in an atmosphere of bitterness between the Islamic and

nationalist groups, marked by charges and counter-charges.

For obvious reasons, the Islamic group considered the rising communists as the gravest menace to their Islamic ideology. It was their conviction that once in power, the PKI would do away with the first principle of the Pantja Sila and transform the Republic into a communist state. Moreover, the communist leaders did not hesitate to use unscrupulous techniques in their campaign, such as promising free land to the landless, spreading rumours that Masjumi agents were poisoning village wells (for which they provided guards) and inventing the stories that West Irian was a daughter of President Sukarno, whom the Dutch had abducted and who would be returned only if the people voted communist.[63] To give a nationalist image to the PKI, they identified themselves with the President and the Pantja Sila while at the same time accusing the Masjumi of being a tool of imperialism and exploiting the opposition of some of the Masjumi leaders to the President and their criticism of the Pantja Sila to the benefit of the PKI.

In their counter-attack the Masjumi leaders employed religious arguments. They labelled the communists as atheists. An Anti-Communist Front under Isa Anshari came into existence which freely made use of the term kāfirs to denounce the PKI. The 'ulamā' in their

conferences issued fatwās in which they expounded the result of their ijtihād on communism. The Madjlis Sjuro of the Masjumi of West Java in October, 1954, concluded that it was harām to become a member of the PKI, that a Muslim who professed communism became a murtad on whom the performance of an Islamic burial was not wājib.[64] The 'ulamā' of the Persatuan Islam of Bandung on November 11, 1954, also issued a fatwā, which, while bearing out the same judgment, went even further to forbid Muslims to perform Islamic burials on such "murtads" and Muslim women to enter into marriage relationship with them.[65]

It seems that the Masjumi party leadership did not approve this extremist view of the Isa Anshari group, and to save the party from its unfavourable effects, the Central Madjlis Sjuro decided in the Masjumi conference of 26-27 December, 1954, to stop the activities of the Anti-Communist Front. At the same time it adopted a softer attitude toward the communists. Communism, it was emphasized, was in contradiction with the faith in the Power of God, and, hence, communism was kufr. But only those who professed communism consciously and in faith were termed kāfirs, while those who followed it without understanding were only astray, and should be brought back to Islām.[66]

Prior to all these developments, the conference of the ʿulamāʾ of Indonesia, which was held in Medan on April 14, 1953, concluded that it was wājib for Indonesian Muslims to elect only those candidates, who aspired to the implementation of the teachings and laws of Islam in the state.[67] As A. Wahab Hasjim of the Nahdatul Ulama explains, this resolution meant that it was ḥarām for a Muslim to elect a non-Muslim, or even a Muslim, who did not aspire for the application of the sharīʿah, despite the fact that he might be a member of the Nahdatul Ulama.[68] Obviously this resolution was aimed not only at the communists but also at the nationalists and other secularists.

But the Islamic parties themselves, in their competition to obtain more votes for their respective parties, did not restrain themselves from attacking each other. The traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama and Perti claimed that the modernist Masjumi group were not upholding Islām but changing and deforming it. They pointed to the casualness of the Masjumi towards the question of madhhab, to their use of Indonesian in a number of types of prayers, and their tolerance towards the wearing of Western clothes in prayer.[69] From their side, the modernists accused the traditionalists of being too conservative in their understanding of Islam and too religiously militant.

Voting for this group, they claimed, would mean that the Muslims would be compelled to observe prayer. Among the modernist group, they further argued, prayer was a personal question between the individual concerned and God.[70]

In view of their different understanding of Islām the wisdom of speaking of the Islamic group could be questioned. It could be argued that, since the group is divided into modernists and traditionalists, their power is not real. On account of their firm agreement on the creation of the Islamic state in Indonesia, however, they have been treated as one group in Indonesian politics. As their speeches and the voting in the Constituent Assembly witness, the traditionalists and modernists were one in rejecting the Pantja Sila and in demanding Islām to be made the cohstitutional basis of the state. With regard to their internal differences, efforts from both sides had usually been undertaken to eliminate the causes. On the sensitive question of the madhhab, for example, the Madjlis Sjuro of the Masjumi in its resolution of December, 1954, declared that the party fully respected the madhhabs and would avoid madhhabic controversies which might lead to a split in the Islamic group. Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that the traditionalists themselves have been changing their attitude towards Islām. It if was unimaginable

in the 1920's that the traditionalist would co-operate with the modernists, the younger generation of the traditionalists had so much changed their approach to Islām from that of the older generation, that they could join forces with the modernists in the Miai of 1939 and later again in the Masjumi. It is a general accepted view in Indonesian politics, therefore, that the departure of the Nahdatul Ulama from the Masjumi was mainly not because of conceptual differences but mainly because of the traditionalist dissatisfaction with their inferior position in the leadership of the Masjumi. The change is continuing to take place. To the traditionalist youth, Mecca, which was the centrum of the Islamic learning of their fathers, has lost its appeal. More and more students of the traditionalist camp now consider Cairo as the centrum of their Islamic higher studies, where they are apt to come under the influence of the modern ideas of al-Afghānī and ʿAbduh, which before had already their impacts on the Indonesian modernists. The present general feeling among the Indonesian students in Cairo, from both the modernist and traditionalist camps, is that they have no basic ideological differences. When the students return to Indonesia, they no doubt will replace their fathers in the leadership of the traditionalist parties and organizations and will be more capable than their fathers in finding a common platform of co-operation with the modernists.

The election was held on September 29, 1955, and resulted in bringing four parties to the top, the PNI with 22.3 per cent of the total votes and 57 seats, the Masjumi 20.9 per cent and 57 seats, the Nahdatul Ulama 18.4 per cent and 45 seats and the PKI 16.4 per cent and 39 seats. Each of all the other parties obtained less than 3 per cent of the votes.[71]

It was generally agreed that the votes obtained by the Masjumi were unexpectedly low and that those given to the Nahdatul Ulama were unexpectedly high. But taking into consideration the composition of the Masjumi after the withdrawal of the Nahdatul Ulama from that party, the result of the election could not be other than it was. It should be remembered that the strength of the Masjumi, before the split, was based on two organizations, the Nahdatul Ulama with its rural support in East and Central Java and the Muhammadijah with its following dispersed throughout the whole of Indonesia. When the Nahdatul Ulama withdrew from the Masjumi, it took away with it its strong rural support in the densely populated sections of East and Central Java. The election results show that, out of the 6,955,141 votes that the Nahdatul Ulama obtained, 5,142,860 came from these two regions.[72] Were there no split in the Masjumi, its power would have been much greater than before, for it would have been by far

the largest party in the country.

On the whole the Islamic parties came out of the election as the strongest ideological group. They obtained 43.9 per cent of the total votes with 116 seats out of 257, as against 57 seats out of 233 in the pre-election Provisional Parliament. The nationalists, by contrast, obtained only 24.3 per cent of votes with 63 seats thus suffering a loss as compared to their pre-election position when they had 74 seats out of 232. Like the Islamic group the PKI made also a big gain in the election. It had only 17 seats in the Provisional Parliament, but it now had 39. A big loser was the socialist party PSI with its 2 per cent of votes and 5 seats. In the Provisional Parliament with its 14 seats it was one of the big parties.[73]

The power of the Islamic group, like that of the Sarekat Islam of the second decade of the century, lay still in the villages through the hadjis and religious teachers and in the Islamic minded business men of the middle class and the small landowners. But unlike the Sarekat Islam, which was the only party of its time, the Islamic group now had to compete with other influential parties of the nationalist and communist ideologies. To the intellectuals and the prijaji group with their casual interest in Islām the appeal of the PNI, which identified itself with President Sukarno as the leader of the nation,

was more attractive. The PKI with its proletariat program could draw to its fold the workers in cities, towns and plantations and with its promise to give land to the landless the abangan elements (the nominal Muslims) on the village level. Hence, as the election indicated the Islamic appeal of the prewar Sarekat Islam was no longer strong enough to compete with the appeal of the other ideologies of the post-independence period. The spread of secular Western education and the rise of nationalistic ideas in the Indonesian society are mainly responsible for this development.

The election for the Constitutional Assembly, which was held in December of the same year, brought no major change in the division of the political power among the various parties. The votes cast for the Islamic group as well as for the nationalists and the other groups remained more or less the same. Out of the 520 seats the Islamic group obtained 228.[74]

It was obvious that the election would not be able to resolve the fundamental problem between the Islamic group and the nationalists. The former, though they came out of the election as the strongest group could not get their Islamic ideology accepted by the Constituent Assembly in which two-thirds of the total votes were needed

for the adoption of such a vital resolution. The same was the position of the group supporting the Pantja Sila with regard to their demand to adopt it as the official basis of the Republic. The hope of each of the opposing groups lay in gaining the votes of those members who were wavering and undecided as to which of the two ideologies to choose.

In its two years of existence the Constituent Assembly produced nothing substantial. It became a forum of ideological debates. Criticism of the Pantja Sila, already undertaken during the election campaign, was resumed in an increasing way in the Assembly. Whereas before the Islamists had considered the Pantja Sila to be in agreement with Islām and, hence, acceptable to them, they believed it to be un-Islamic and no longer acceptable. Even Natsir now argued that the Pantja Sila could not be accepted as a "religion", for the source and the background of its first principle were secular and not God's revelation. Its belief in God came only in the form of an unrevealed "feeling of the existence of God". Such a belief was a creation of man and consequently was apt to change from time to time.[75] As a result of a compromise, "the raison d'etre of the Pantja Sila was to remain neutral, to be above all ideologies".[76] A Pantja Sila which it itself was void of a basis, W. A. Rachman claimed, could not be made the basis of the State.[77] Such an empty

Pantja Sila, Anshari asserted, would not be able to fight communism, but communism would flourish under such a Pantja Sila.[78]

The Pantja Sila group maintained that if Islām were made the basis of the State, the result would be a disunity among the Indonesian people. Rustam Ikrat explained that the "Islamic State" of the sixteenth century in Java had mercilessly killed people and leaders who disagreed with their "Islamic" ideas and the same thing was being practiced by the Darul Islam in West Java.[79] In Atmo Darmanto's view, the adoption of Islām as the basis of the State would lead not only to disunion but to a civil war in Indonesia. Under the Pantja Sila, however, all religions would function undisturbedly, and peace would reign over the country.[80] As for Suwirjo, he objected to Islām being made the basis of the State, because Islām was pure and sublime, while the state, manipulated by man's desire, must be involved in corrupted activities.[81]

Such was the trend of the discussion in the Constituent Assembly; and when it came to voting, neither group could obtain the necessary two-thirds majority. An impasse was unavoidable.

In the meantime, political developments outside the Constituent Assembly took another direction. The

army, afforded an opportunity by the proclamation of martial law in early 1957, on account of the increasingly tense situation in the country, began to use its power to interfere in politics. By virtue of the martial law, the Chief of Staff became the Central War Administrator while his Territorial Commanders assumed the position of Regional War Administrators. Their success in reducing the PRRI rebellions in Sumatra and Celebes to guerilla activities greatly increased their prestige and power. By the middle of 1958, political parties had no longer the important role they had played before in Indonesian politics. The army leaders, basing their action on the martial law, limited political activities, which they considered might be detrimental to the security of the State.

By that time President Sukarno had already introduced his idea of the Guided Democracy, which found support among the army leaders. They, however, thought that Guided Democracy could best be implemented by the re-adoption of the 1945 Constitution, which would provide the President with a strong executive power. This step, it was hoped, would bring a solution to the impasse in the Constituent Assembly. A proposal to this effect was introduced in the Assembly. To appease the Islamic group, the Islamic provision "With the obligation of observing the Islamic <u>sharī'ah</u> on its adherents" was re-instated in

the Djakarta Charter, which itself was to be accepted officially as an historic document. The Masjumi opposed the proposal, while the Nahdatul Ulama were willing to accept it on condition that the Charter be included in the 1945 Constitution. This condition was refused by the Government. With both the Masjumi and the Nahdatul Ulama opposing, the proposal could not obtain the necessary two-thirds votes. The army came into action and banned all political activities. Early July 1959, the President dissolved the Constituent Assembly and proclaimed by a Presidential decree the re-adoption of the 1945 Constitution. In 1960 he dissolved the 1955 Parliament and installed in its place the Gotong Rojong Parliament, in which members were nominated by the Government. The Masjumi and the PSI because of their refusal to accept the new Constitution and to condemn the PRRI rebellion were declared illegal, and none of their members were nominated to the new parliament. These developments caused the parties to lose any decisive voice they might have had in the politics of the country.

With the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and the relegation of party politics to the background, the movement for the establishment of the Islamic state by constitutional means had to a great extent lost its field of activity.

Thus both the revolutionary movement of the Darul Islam and the constitutional method of the Islamic parties ended in a failure. Although they failed, the movement,-- not in the form of establishing the Islamic state but by giving shape to the Islamic provision of the Djakarta Charter -- has been resumed through other channels. Making use of the Islamic provision, the Islamic group, which agreed to co-operate with the Government, demanded its application in practical life. In this they received the support of the Islamically oriented leaders in the Government and the army. General A. H. Nasution, for example, in his speech before the Muhammadijah conference of 1962, urged that the Muhammadijah and the other Islamic organizations should not go into isolation, but must be actively participating in the effort for the realization of "a just and prosperous society" in Indonesia, in particular in the endeavour to renormalize conditions in areas that had been under rebel control. In the speech he also emphasized the important position which the 'ulamā' hold in society and expresses the hope that the Madjlis Ulama (The Board of 'Ulamā'), established in 1961, would be expanded until it reached the village level so that the Indonesian Muslim community could get the greatest benefit from it.[82]

The relegation of party politics to the background

created the impression that the field of activities for the Islamic organization had become small. Furthermore, the involvement of some leaders of the Islamic group, in particular leaders of the Muhammadijah, in the local rebellions occasioned the feeling that their political activities were being closely watched by the authorities. This feeling gave rise to the belief that they had no freedom in their political movement. In an attempt to eradicate this impression, the Minister of Religious Affairs explained to the 1962 conference of the Djamijatul Washlijah that there was still a wide scope of activities for the Islamic organizations. The work for the realization of the principle of observing the sharī'ah by its adherents, he claimed, would not be an easy task.[83]

The most important achievement for the Islamic groups at this stage seems to have been the inclusion of elements of the Islamic sharī'ah in the laws of the autonomous Islamically minded Acheh.[84] The Government's policy has been to allow regions to adopt regional laws on religion, adat and education from the sharī'ah on condition that they are not in conflict with the main ideals and the laws of the State.[85] This policy could have a far reaching effect. Regions with strong religious sentiments, such as West Java and South Celebes, would now be able to include in their local laws elements of the

sharī'ah. The implementation of the sharī'ah has been the aspiration of the Islamic group. If other regions followed the example of Acheh the sharī'ah would gradually replace the adat, a goal for which the Muhammadijah has been striving since tens of years. Moreover, this policy would diminish the cause for dissatisfaction and, hence, for rebellions in regions where Islām has a strong influence over the population. In fact, it had been the idea of some leaders, such as Natsir and Daud Beureuh, that, if the transformation of the Republic into an Islamic state would be impossible, the alternative would be the creation of autonomous regions. Each region would have the freedom to adopt the kind of local laws it thought suitable for its population. This would not only mean the adoption of Islamic laws by the Islamic regions, but also the adoption of a Christian way of life in Christian areas like North Celebes and a Hindu way of life in the predominantly Hindu island of Bali.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER II

1. M. Hatta, Verspreide Geschriften, (Djakarta and Surabaja: van der Peet, 1952), pp.330-40.

2. See Dasar Negara, op. cit., vol. I, pp.311-16.

3. See Kahin, op. cit., p.139.

4. See Ibid., p.201.

5. See Ibid., p.150.

6. See Masjumi resolutions of October 12, 1944 in Aboebakar, op. cit., p.341.

7. See "Presiden Sukarno mengharapkan Rakjat Indonesia berikan aktivita sebesar2-nja untuk masjarakat adil-makmur", Gema Islam, Djakarta, December 1962, p.5.

8. Quoted in M. Isa Anshari, Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam (Medan: Seiful, 1951), p.215.

9. Ibid., p.77.

10. See Amelz, op. cit., p.11.

11. Natsir, op. cit., p.148.

12. Ibid., p.293.

13. See Aboebakar, op. cit., p.584.

14. See Dasar Negara, op. cit., p.302.

15. See M. Yamin, Proklamasi dan Konstitusi Republik Indonesia (Djakarta: Djambatan, 1958), p.189.

16. Van Nieuwenhuijze, C.A. O., Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia (The Hague and Bandung: van Hoeve, 1958), pp.208 ff.

17. See Upatjara Pengangkatan Muhammad Hatta mendjadi Doctor Honoris Causa dalam Ilmu Hukum pada Universitas Gadjah Mada, [henceforth to be referred to as Upatjara], (Djakarta: Djambatan, n.d.), p.48.

18. Ahmad, Z. A., Membentuk Negara Islam (Djakarta: Widjaja, 1956), pp.114/5.

19. Natsir, op. cit., p.61.

20. See Dasar Negara, op. cit., vol. I, p.187.

21. See Naim, op. cit., p.151. For their difference on the nature of the Islamic state see infra pp.121 ff.

22. See Kahin, op. cit., p.156, note 14.

23. See Masjumi's programs in Aboebakar, op. cit., p.352.

24. Ibid., p.354.

25. Ibid., p.357.

26. Ibid., p.364.

27. Ibid., pp.352-77.

28. Supra, p.45.

29. See the Announcement of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of April 26, 1946 in Aboebakar op. cit., p.596.

30. See Republican Government's Regulations of 1949 and 1950 in ibid., pp.600-601.

31. van Nieuwenhuijze, op. cit., p.236.

32. Supra, p.68.

33. See Masjumi's urgency program in Aboebakar, op. cit., p.362.

34. Infra, p.106.

35. See Henri J. H. Alers, Om een Rode of Groene Merdeka, 10 Jaren Binnenlandse Politiek Indonesie 1943-1953 (n.p.: De Pelgrim, 1956), p.240.

36. See Kahin, op. cit., p.329.

37. Ibid., p.147.

38. See van Nieuwenhuijze, op. cit., pp.170-71.

39. See Alers, op. cit., p.243.

40. Ibid., p.246.

41. See van Nieuwenhuijze, op. cit., pp.171-72.

42. See Alers, op. cit., p.247.

43. See van Neiuwenhuijze, op. cit., p.172.

44. See Alers, op. cit., p.263.

45. Infra, p.95.

46. See Alers, op. cit., p.268.

47. See Aboebakar, op. cit., p.478.

48. Upatjara, op. cit., p.55.

49. President Sukarno, Marhaen and Proletarian, Translation Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1960), p.2.

50. Ibid., p.12.

51. See Arnold C. Brackman, Indonesian Communism, A History (New York: Praeger, 1963), p.192.

52. Ibid., p.171.

53. M. Natsir, Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara (Bandung, n.d.), p.26.

54. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, [henceforth to be referred to as The Decline], (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p.281.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid., p.282.

57. Ibid., p.283.

58. Ibid., p.363.

59. See Dasar Negara, op. cit., vol. II, p.248.

60. Ibid., vol. II, p.251.

61. See Capita Selecta, op. cit., vol. II, 149.

62. See Isa Anshari "Hanja Negara Islam jang Kami amanatkan kepada Anggauta Konstituante", Hikmah, Djakarta, June 9, 1956.

63. See Brackman, op. cit., p.217.

64. See Dasar Negara, op. cit., vol. II, pp.284-85.

65. Ibid., vol. II, p.288.

66. Masjumi, Pedoman Perdjuangan (Djakarta, 1955), pp.92-3.

67. See Ahmad, op. cit., p.222.

68. See Aboebakar, op. cit., p.758.

69. See Feith, Herbert, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 [henceforth referred to as Elections], (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1957), pp.15/6.

70. See Aboebakar, op. cit., p.759.

71. See Faith, Elections, op. cit., pp.58-59.

72. Ibid., p.66.

73. For all these calculations see ibid., pp.58-59.

74. Ibid., p.65.

75. Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara, op. cit., pp.24/5. The term Tuhan in the first principle of the Pantja Sila is for Indonesians equivalent to Allah, the God of Islam. On account of this understanding the Pantja Sila was considered by the Islamic group to be Islamic. Natsir's reference to the Pantja Sila as a religion, must be understood in the light of this idea.

76. Ibid., p.29. After the explanations given by President Sukarno it became clear to the Islamic group that the term Tuhan in the Pantja Sila did not necessarily mean Allah. The term could mean the God of Islām or the God of Christianity or the God of any other religion existing in Indonesia. In other words, the Pantja Sila,

as a device to preserve the unity of the country, keeps a neutral stand with regard to religion. This neutral stand is considered by Natsir the raison d'etre of the Pantja Sila. Once the Pantja Sila adopted one of the existing ideas of God in the country, it would cease to be a Pantja Sila; it would be transformed into an Islamic or a Christian or other concept.

77. See Dasar Negara, op. cit., vol. II, p.478.

78. Ibid., vol. II, p.242.

79. Ibid., vol. II, pp.3-4.

80. Ibid., vol. II, pp.320-21.

81. Ibid., vol. II, p.159.

82. See "Tidak akan ada Pembatasan2 dan tak boleh ada Halangan bagi Usaha2 dibidang Keagamaan", Gema Islam, December 15, 1962, p.4.

83. See Al-Bahist, "Dari Al-Washlijah hingga Kedudukan Agama", Gema Islam, January 1, 1963, p.5.

84. Ibid., p.4.

85. Ibid.

CHAPTER III

THE THEORY OF THE MASJUMI LEADERS

References to the Islamic state have been made on many occasions in the first two chapters without, however, saying much about its nature as understood by the Islamic group. It is now the intention of this chapter to deal with this question.

It should be made clear that the modernists and traditionalists, because of their different approaches to Islām, do not entertain a wholly identical theory of the Islamic state. The traditionalists, in contrast to the modernists, strongly adhere to the observance of the madhhabs. It is a generally accepted fact, that the Nahdatul Ulama, the main organizations of the traditionalists, was established in 1926 as a reaction against the rising modernist view of the Muhammadijah. The early 1920's, as described by Aboebakar, was a time of controversies between the traditionalist and modernist 'ulamā'. The former, under the leadership of K. H. Abdul Wahab, a prominent 'ālim in East Java, defended their faith in the madhhabs, while Sjeich Ahmad Surkati and K. H. Ahmad Dahlan from the modernist trend, called for their abandonment and for return to the Qur'ān and Sunnah

as the sole sources for understanding and interpreting Islām.[1]

In their polemic, xxxx, the traditionalists accused the modernists of working to undermine the authority of the madhhabs and of trying to create new mujtahids. The modernists, in reply, asserted that the degeneration of Islām was caused by the attitude of many Muslims who placed the books of fiqh in a position superior to the Qur'ān and Sunnah. They claimed that at the time of the Prophet and of the first generation of Muslims after him, when there were as yet no books of fiqh, Islām was powerful and progressive. Hence, the study of Islām, they argued, must be made, as at that time, directly by reference to the Qur'ān and Sunnah and without paying heed to the books of fiqh.[2]

This question was so important for the traditionalists that in 1927 they sent a delegation, consisting of K. H. Abdul Wahab and Sjeich Ahmad Ganim to Mecca to defend their idea of adherence to the madhhabs which, they thought, was being endangered by the Wahhabism of the newly established government of ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āl Ṣuʿūd.

It is thus not surprising that the goal of the Nahdatul Ulama, as mentioned in its 1926 Constitution, was

"the promotion of a strong adherence to one of the four madhhabs".[3] This goal was maintained by the leaders of the Nahdatul Ulama after its transformation into a political party in 1952. Its new Constitution states that the basis of the party is Islām and that its aim is the application of the sharī'ah, in accordance with one of the four madhhabs as the laws of the State in the fields of worship, marriage, social relations, criminality and morality.[4] It further states that Muslims believing in the madhhabs can be accepted to be members of the party.[5]

It is clear that the Islamic state, which the traditionalists planned to establish was what could be termed a madhhabic state or in the words of van der Kroef "a state based exclusively on 'Shāfi'ītic Law'."[6] The modernists, as mainly represented by the Masjumi, advocated an Islamic state based on the Qur'ān and Sunnah.

As implied in its heading, this chapter will deal only with the theory of the leaders of the Masjumi. It should be pointed out that there is as yet no detailed official theory of the Masjumi on the Islamic state. Its official political program included only the following six items:[7]

1. A republican form of state with the teachings of Islām as its basis.

2. Freedom of religion must be guaranteed.

3. A presidential democracy in which the President is responsible before parliament.

4. As Indonesia is composed of different ethnic entities, parliament must consist of two chambers, a House of Representatives, representing the people, and a Senate, representing the provinces.

5. Human rights must be guaranteed.

6. Women are equal with men in their political, social and economic rights.

All that exists beside these official short statements, are ideas of prominent Masjumi leaders, which they expressed in the form of speeches, lectures, articles, booklets and sometimes also books. It should be stressed, therefore, that what will be described here is not the official theory of the Masjumi, but the theory as expressed by its prominent leaders. As they are leading persons in the party, their ideas can be accepted to reflect more or less the party's official stand.

There is in general a lack of information about the theory of the Islamic state in Indonesia. The explanation may lie in the fact that leaders of the Islamic group from the day of the proclamation of independence up to now have been occupied more in practical politics than in writing down their ideas. And if there are some publications bearing the modernist point of view, such is

not the case with regard to the traditionalist theory. The latter, with their strong adherence to the madhhabs and their traditional approach to Islām, perhaps, find it superfluous to write about the Islamic state, since the theory of the khilāfah has been dealt with by medieval jurists such as al-Māwardī, Ibn Jamā'ah and others.

This lack of publications on the part of the Nahdatul Ulama leaders is the main reason for the choice of the theory of the Masjumi leaders. Another consideration is the fact that the Masjumi, as shown by the outcome of the 1955 general election, was the strongest of all the Islamic parties. And unlike the other parties, it had, furthermore, a nationwide following. The stronghold of the Nahdatul Ulama was confined to Java, but the backing of the Masjumi was scattered throughout the whole of Indonesia. The result of the election indicates that 85.6 per cent of the total votes, which the Nahdatul Ulama obtained for the 1955 parliament, came from the four electoral districts of Java, and only 14.4 per cent from the rest of Indonesia.[8] The Masjumi, on the other hand, led in ten of the fifteen electoral districts.[9] Of the total votes that it obtained, 51.3 per cent came from Java and 48.7 per cent from the other Indonesian islands.[10] No wonder that this election result led some authors to describe the Nahdatul Ulama, along with the nationalist PNI

and the communist PKI, each of which also obtained more than 85 per cent of their votes in Java, as 'Java-parties'.[11] In contrast to this mainly regional character of the Nahdatul Ulama, the Masjumi had a more national nature. Its theory would thus find a backing over a larger area of Indonesia than the other Islamic parties.

Still another consideration is the modern outlook of the top leadership of the Masjumi, which has been described by some authors as 'moderate'. Speaking on Natsir, for example, Kahin observes that his "approach to the place of Islām in politics was moderate and consistent with Indonesian realities and if ever fully understood would probably not have alarmed Indonesian Christians, Sukarno, or the members of the Indonesian Nationalist Party."[12] If there must be ever again a compromise between the Islamic group and the nationalists to solve the problems of the country, as was the case in 1945, the Masjumi's ideas might probably serve as a basis for an eventual future agreement.

To revert to the discussion of the theory itself, it is hardly necessary to point out that, like all Islamists, the Masjumi leaders believe that Islām is not merely a religion, in the sense of a system of faith and worship. Just as for Maudūdī Islām is a well ordered system, a consistent whole, resting on a definite set of

clear cut postulates,[13] for Natsir it is not only a complete civilization, but a philosophy of life and an ideology for which the Muslims live and die.[14] Similarly Ḥasan al-Bannā of the Ikhwān al-Muslimīn conceived Islām to be a nizām, a complete order, encompassing all man's worldly and religious affairs[15] and embodying a political, ajudicial, a defensive and a moral system,[16] and for Isa Anshari of the Masjumi, Islām is a complete law, covering all aspects of human life.[17] H. A. Malik Ahmad, a Masjumi member of the defunct Indonesian Constituent Assembly, understands Islām to be a complete social organization, introduced by the Prophet in the form of God's revelation.[18] Hamka, another prominent Masjumi leader, believes that Islām is all inclusive and can deal with the problems of this modern world. The West, he claims, has achieved its present progress, because it has made use of the system prescribed by Islām and the Muslim remained backward, because they have forsaken the Islamic way of life.[19]

This view of Islām as a nizām is rather new. The idea originates in the nature of Islām as a religion which embodies principles pertaining to men's relations with each other as well as with God, all bound together in a certain unity of outlook. No clear cut line is drawn between the two types of relations. It was Ibn Taymīyah who began to make a distinction between ʿibādāt and muʿāmalāt.

ʿAbduh later adopted this distinction and introduced the idea that whereas the Qur'ān and Sunnah laid down specific rules about ʿibādāt, they laid down only general principles about muʿāmalāt, leaving it to men to apply them to all circumstances of life. The idea that Islām is not merely a religion, but that it further embodies political principles began to emerge. Maṣlaḥah began to be identified by Muslim writers with utility, shūrā with parliamentary democracy and ijmāʿ with public opinion. Under the impact of the idea of Western civilization which came to the East in the nineteenth century, Muslim thinkers began also to speak of an Islamic civilization. In time Islām itself was identified with civilization. In the twentieth century, when the idea of socialism and communism had penetrated the Muslim world, Islām for Muslim writers was no longer merely a civilization. Islām has become a system of life like socialism and communism. Ḥassan al-Bannā speaks then of Islām as a niẓām, Maudūdī considers it a well ordered system and Natsir refers to it as an ideology.

Thus Islām, in the Masjumi's understanding, is concerned not only with questions of how man should worship his Creator, but it deals also with questions of man's earthly life. Like al-Bannā, who says that "Islām directs al-dīn as it directs the worldly affairs of man",[20] they consider al-dīn, religion itself, to be a part of the

Islamic system. Natsir, therefore, resents that understanding of Islām which holds it to be a religion confined to the mosques. Islām, he explains, consists not merely of prayers, fasting once a year, performing the haj and paying zakāh; it deals not merely with matters between man and God but also with matters between man and nature as well as between man and man.[21] In the words of Adnan Lubis, another Masjumi member of the Indonesian Constituent Assembly, Islām embodies both i'tiqādāt and sharī'ah. As one major division of Islām, sharī'ah deals with different aspects of human life; those having to do with the worship of God are called 'ibādah, those with marriage munākaḥah, those with human social relations mu'āmalāt, and those with crimes jināyāt,[22] A more comprehensive concept is given by Anshari when he says that the teachings of Islām affect human life, not only with regard to man's relation with his Creator, but also with regard to his relation with his society in its political, economic, social, ethical and cultural aspects.[23]

Consequently, Mitchell's statement with regard to the ideas of the Ikhwān, can also be applied to that of the Masjumi leaders. For them also, "the word 'Islām' was not a synonym for the word 'religion'[24] rather there was a total word, which included in its meaning the

categories of religion, politics, economics, society, etc."[25]

Despite this all inclusive idea of Islām, the Masjumi leaders still consider Islām to be a religion. But religion for them has inevitably a more comprehensive sense than what is usually understood by the term. In his writing on "Religion and State" Natsir argues that "religion" in the understanding of Islām does not refer merely to the system of the worship of God but it comprehends also all the social principles and the laws (ḥudūd) which have been laid down in the Qur'ān.[26] H. A. Malik Ahmad cannot agree with the definition stating that religion is the way of man's communication with the Supreme Spiritual Force and believes that such an understanding leads people to have an unclear idea of Islām.[27] Such a definition according to Natsir can be applied to various other religions, but not to Islām.[28]

The logical conclusion from this comprehensive idea of religion is that the religious duties of a Muslim for the Masjumi leaders do not consist only of worshipping God. Such is exactly Natsir's understanding when he claims that farḍ ʿain constitutes one's duty towards God and farḍ kifāyah one's duty towards society, which must be performed by every individual Muslim. "These two farḍs cannot be separated from each other, for if one is detached

from the other, the unity will be broken and what would remain would be only half of the whole. In modern terms the latter is called social, economic and political duties ... The merit of a man and the value of his religious life is assessed in accordance with his attitude towards society." Based on the Qur'ānic verses CVII/1-7,[29] he further argues, that though a Muslim prays five times a day and fasts the whole month of Ramaḍān, he is considered to be belying religion, as long as he does not care to help the orphans and the poor.[30]

Such an understanding of one's religious duties, if applied, would have a far reaching effect. Since the religious duties of a Muslim are not only to worship his God, but also to help his fellow human beings in social, economic and political life, it follows that helping the poor, establishing orphanages, organizing the state, organizing the economic life of the nation etc. are thus not social duties, but religious duties. In other words, if the duty of the Muslim to worship God is established by divine decrees, so also is his duty to perform social services determined by a divine order. If the non-performance of one's duty to worship his Creator constitutes a sin only towards God, the neglect of the social duties is not only a sin towards society, but also a sin towards God Himself. Hence, the social duties seem to be of a higher

order for the Masjumi leaders than the duty to worship God; moreover, the latter, being performed mainly for one's own well being in the hereafter, has a sense of individualism. This fact may explain why they consider prayer, fasting, etc. as personal questions between the individual man and his God and why they would not compel people to perform these ritual acts.

From their all inclusive idea of Islām it is obvious that for the Masjumi leaders there can be no separation of state and religion in their theory of the Islamic state. It is worthwhile to note that when they speak of secularism, it is this idea of the separation of state and religion which they have in mind. They do not understand secularism in its broader sense as used by the sociologist, according to whom secularization can take place not only in the political sphere but also in other social fields and not only in the form of a conflict between religion and world but also in the form of a conflict between the forces of tradition and the forces of change. In explaining the meaning of secularism, Natsir for example says that 'secular' literally means dealing with worldly affairs, and politically separating spiritual from worldly affairs, as two different and even antagonistic spheres of life, in which preference is given to the temporal above the spiritual affairs.[31] But sometimes they

have a confused idea of secularism. A speech of Natsir before the Constituent Assembly, of which the following is a short summary, is an example of that confusion.

A secularist does not accept revelation as one of the sources of faith and knowledge, for faith and moral values for him are merely the product of society. Human values in such an understanding have degenerated from being of divine origin to being of human creation. The danger of this idea lies in the belief of the secularist that man is superior to the values of society. The concept of God and religion, consequently, assumes a relative character and changes with the growing human creative ability. Hence, there is no clear guidance of life for men in a secularistic society, while men are in need of an unchangeable foundation of a philosophy of life to stand upon in this world. The unfavourable effect of secularism in the political field is witnessed by the spread of Nazism in Europe. In support of this claim Natsir produced Hermann Rauschning's reasoning that Nazism came into existence not because of Hitler, but because of other different factors, the most important of which was indifference towards religious and moral values. This attitude of disregard towards religion and moral values, he finds to be the product of secularism. Those responsible for the emergence of Nazism were, therefore, not only the Germans

but the whole of Western culture, i.e. the influence of secularism in Western culture. With regard to Indonesia itself, it is because of this secularism, he says, that symptoms of the degeneration of moral values have begun to appear and atheism has begun to spread in the country.[32]

In one sense Natsir in this speech is confusing secularism with atheism. In effect, he is saying that the secularist is the one who rejects religion, and not the one who aspires the separation between religion and state, nor the one who aims at the withdrawal of certain aspects of life from the authority of religion or tradition. In another sense he is seeing atheism as the product of secularism, when he says that atheism begins to spread because of secularism. Natsir delivered the speech in reaction to President Sukarno's argument that man's concept of God and religion changes with the growing human creative ability. During the developments which have taken place in human society, man at the beginning worshipped stones, trees and animals, then spirits and then supernatural powers. Now, in this modern period of scientific progress, when man, in his efforts to satisfy his needs, no longer depends so much on supernatural powers as on his ability to control and change his natural environment, man begins to lose his faith in God and religion and atheism begins to spread. It seems that Natsir has been deeply influenced by President Sukarno's secularistic exposition of the evolution of man's

idea of religion, from the primitive worship of stones to the disbelief in religion, to the extent that he confuses secularism with atheism.

The word secular, in fact, is an unfamiliar term for Indonesians. No wonder that most of the other Masjumi leaders avoid the use of the term and prefer to use the more familiar Dutch term "scheiding van kerk en staat" (the separation between church and state). As there is no concept of church in Islām, they replace the term church by the word religion. Thus Adnan Lubis argues that while there are people who say that religion must be separated from state and that what belongs to God must be rendered to God and what belongs to Caesar must be rendered to Caesar, Islām says that Caesar too must be rendered to God and that the state must not be separated from religion.[33] This language is reminiscent of al-Bannā's statement that "there is not in the teachings of Islām a rendering to Caesar that which is Caesar's and to God what is God's but rather ... Caesar and what belongs to Caesar is for God Almighty alone".[34]

That Islām for them is an ideology like communism or socialism is clear from their use of the Dutch term "ideologie" to describe that idea, as well as from their comparison of Islām with other ideologies. Natsir for example writes: "The Muslims have their own philosophy of

life, their own outlook of life and ideology, just like the Christians have their philosophy of life and ideology or like the fascists and communists have their own respective ideologies."[35] Anshari, after stating that the Islamic teachings deal with the political, economic, social, ethical and cultural life of the Muslims, argues that there is in Islām a kind of socialism, which is not based on the dialectic materialism of Marx, because materialism, he says, is in conflict with the non-materialistic philosopny of the Muslims.[36] A state without an ideology, in the opinion of Z. A. Ahmad, another Masjumi leader and author of "Membentuk Negara Islam" (The Form of the Islamic State), can easily crumble, for the ideology is the foundation on which the state must be established. As far as the Muslims are concerned, he finds, that this ideological foundation has been provided for by Islām.[37]

In considering Islām an ideology, these Masjumi leaders are one with other Islamists. Leaders of the Ikhwan like M. al-Ghazālī, ʿAbd al-Qādir Ūdah and S. Quṭb, have the same idea and make the same comparison. In commenting on the "deviation of Muslim rulers from the Islamic way of government", al-Ghazālī for example wonders what would remain of communism in the USSR if they were governed by men with no communist belief and what of the present system in the USA if they were ruled by men opposing

democracy.[38] Like them Maudūdī also speaks of an "Islamic ideology".[39]

It must be noted that their comparison of Islām as an ideology with Christianity and democracy manifests a confusion either in their understanding of ideology as a totality of political ideas, or in their understanding of Christianity as merely a religion and democracy as a form of government.

Such is their idea of Islām. It is for them not only an all inclusive religion, but a philosophy of life, an ideology and a complete social organization, in which the state cannot be separated from religion.

As they conceive it, Islām, thus renders it necessary for Muslims to establish the Islamic state. In this connection it is worthwhile to remark that the Masjumi leaders, like other Islamists, believe that what the Prophet had created was not only an ummah, but a state. Their reference to the community that the Prophet founded in Medinah as the first Islamic state is a clear proof of this idea. In rationalizing this necessity, Natsir argues that the Qur'ān has no power of itself to implement its social laws. "To guarantee the implementation of these laws and principles Islām is in need of a temporal power, the power of the state; just like other books of law, the Qur'ān can do nothing by itself; its laws cannot come into

into force by their own."[40] Commenting on ʿAlī ʿAbd al-Rāziq's idea that the Prophet did not come to establish a state but to establish a religion, Natsir remarks that it was not necessary for the Prophet to come with a special order to establish a state, for states can exist and have existed with or without Islām. What the Prophet had brought with him, he says, were certain principles concerning the organization of the state and it is now the observation of these principles that he finds of the most importance.[41]

Anshari, on his part, derives the necessity of the creation of the Islamic state from verse IV/59: "Obey Allah and the Messenger and those of you who are in authority (ūlī al-amr)". The term ūlī al-amr he interprets to mean "the leaders of the state". Hence, this verse in his opinion embodies three aims: the duty to create a state, the duty to install the Head of State and the duty to obey the Head of State.[42] To these arguments of Natsir and Anshari, Hamka adds the ijmāʿ of the ʿulamā'.[43]

Although their understandings of Islām are more or less similar, their definitions of the Islamic state, however, manifest a difference of opinion. For Natsir, as has been seen, the Republic of Indonesia, with its belief in the Absolute One God as specified in the Pantja Sila, was already an Islamic State.[44] For Anshari the Islamic

state is one in which the Islamic sharī'ah is implemented.[45] Such is also the understanding of H. M. Saleh Suaidy when he says: "An Islamic State is a state in which the laws of Islām are implemented by the state itself in all its affairs."[46] For K. H. Asnawi Hadisiswojo, the Islamic state seems to be a state run by Muslims though its laws may be the adat and not the sharī'ah, when he refers to the fifteenth century Kingdom of Demak as an Islamic state.[47] It is Ahmad, in his book "Membentuk Negara Islam", who gives a clear description of his understanding of the Islamic State. The following is the summary of his idea.

The Islamic state is not one in which the Head of State merely bears an Islamic title, like Khalīfah or Imām or Sulṭān, for the Islamic ideology is not merely a question of formality. States calling themselves Islamic states such as Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, cannot be accepted as being already in agreement with the Islamic ideology.[48] Constitutional provisions that the state is an Islamic state, or that Islām is its official religion, or that the Head of State must be a Muslim, or again that the ideological foundation of the state is Islām, do not qualify a state to be truly Islamic. To be truly Islamic, a state must fulfill at least five conditions:

1. The majority of the population must be Muslims. This majority must be reflected in the central

and provincial representative bodies.

2. The Head of State must be a Muslim.

3. The ideology of the state must be in agreement with the Islamic ideology or at least not in contradiction with it. The Islamic social principles must be included in the ideology of the state, though they may come under another name such as Pantja Sila.

4. The laws of the state must not contradict the laws of Islām. Though it is the right of the people's representatives to make laws, the Constitution must guarantee that each promulgated law may not come into conflict with the Islamic laws.

5. The constitution must stipulate that the principle of shūrā as well as other democratic principles should be carried out by the state and its organs.[49]

Despite these diverse statements, it can be inferred from the Masjumi's fight in the Constituent Assembly to make Islām the ideological basis of the state in the porposed constitution, that an Islamic State for them is a state in which the constitution specifies that Islām is its foundation. What they demand, many of the members of the Islamic group in the Assembly have said is nothing more than a statement in the Constitution that Islām is the basis of the State. Their intention was, once

accepted, such a constitutional provision would provide them with a basis to make the state more Islamic. This argument may appear like a strategy. But, anyhow, the statements imply the meaning that in their fight for the establishment of the Islamic state in Indonesia, they would be satisfied if the Constitution stipulates that Islām is the basis of the state. The logical conclusion is that such a state in their opinion would be already Islamic, for, were it not the case, they would not have been satisfied with such a constitutional provision. Moreover, the fact that they accepted the Republic of Indonesia, though based on the Pantja Sila and not on Islām, to be already Islamic, or to be already fulfilling many of the conditions of the Islamic state, or at least to be a basis for the establishment of a genuine Islamic state in Indonesia, is in support of this conclusion. They seem to reason as follows: A Muslim is the one who professes the belief in the Absolute One God and in the prophethood of Muḥammad; whether he is a true Muslim or not is another matter. In the same way an Islamic state is a state which accepts Islām as its foundation; whether it is a genuine Islamic state is again another question.

In this understanding they are again one with the Ikhwān and probably also with Maudūdī. Al-Bannā, in fact, considered pre-revolutionary Egypt to be already an

Islamic state, for its "constitution clearly stipulates in article 194: The official religion of the State is Islām and Arabic the its language."[50] More or less the same idea seemed to have been entertained by Maudūdī. This can be concluded from his referring to Pakistan as "our Islamic Republic",[51] from his acceptance of the 1956 Constitution "in spite of all its drawbacks",[52] and from his endeavour "to transform Pakistan into an ideal Islamic State in a few years"[53] and "to develop it into a full-fledged Islamic State".[54] Pakistan for Maudūdī was thus already Islamic although not an ideal or full-fledged Islamic State.

The Masjumi leaders together with the leaders of the other Indonesian Islamic parties make much use of the term "a state based on Islām". Their frequent use of this term raises the question of how Islām will be able to organize a modern state. The answer is given by Natsir. Islām, he claims, does not deal with the technical details of administration, which are always changing in accordance with changing circumstances. Islām does not concern itself with such details as compiling the budget of a state, the regulation of foreign exchange or with traffic for example. Islām gives only the basic foundations, which are suitable to human nature, eternal, unchangeable and applicable in all places and all times.[55] As examples of

the basic foundations he mentions the principle of shūrā, the duty of Muslims to obey the political authorities as long as the latter act in accordance with the teachings of Islam, the prohibition of alcoholic drinks, gambling and prostitution, the rules concerning marriage, divorce and inheritance, the duty to pay the zakāh and the prohibition of usury (ribā). "It is principles like these that are found in Islām ... principles dealing with the life of the individual man and of the society, which, for the interest of man and society, cannot and may not be modified. All matters, which are not dealt with by Islām, can be organized in accordance with the demand of the time..."[56] The basic rule in dealing with this question, he says, is that in ʿibādah everything is forbidden except what is ordained, while in muʿāmalah, everything is permissible except what is forbidden. Outside the basic foundations and the few limits that Islām prescribes, man has an extensive field for initiatives by using his ratio or his ijtihād on all problems of life according to place and time. Islām would interfere only when human initiative comes into conflict with the prescribed foundations and limits.[57]

It is interesting to note that Natsir's basic rule, just sketched, is more or less similar to Maudūdī's principle "that whatever has not been disallowed is allowed",[58] which the legislature, according to him, should

follow in the formation of laws in cases for which no basic guidance is provided by Islām.

As to the nature of the government of the Islamic state, the Masjumi leaders like those of the Ikhwān, are at pains to explain that it would not be a government of the Sulṭāns of the past nor that of men of religion. Quṭb claims that Sulṭāns only pretended to rule in the name of Islām, while in fact, they were far away from the Islamic spirit and law.[59] Natsir argues on the same line. People imagine, he says, that the government of the Islamic state would be headed by a severe old man, wearing a large turban, with a rosary in his hands, smoking a hookah and surrounded by an harem. This traditional idea of the Islamic government, in his view, must first be wiped out to pave the way for the creation of the Islamic state. A government, whose leaders neglect the interest of the people, suppress their rights and use Islām and piety only as masks, while they theyselves are full of sins, he says, is not an Islamic government.[60]

In the eyes of Quṭb "men of religion" are the last men to represent the Islamic ideology, for neither their education, nor their culture, nor their deeds and nor even their dress and appearance reflect Islām.[61] So also, Ahmad of the Masjumi, claims that neither the ʿulamā', nor the fuqahā', nor the ahl al-tafsīr would assume power

in the Islamic State.[62] The same idea is expressed by Natsir when he maintains that the Islamic state is not a theocracy, in the sense of a system of government by a priestly order, who act as the agent of God on earth.[63] In Islam, he argues, there is no priesthood, but only men of religion called 'ulamā', who are no more than teachers or imāms in prayers.[64]

For Anshari the adoption of the Islamic ideology would not mean "the return to the period of camels and dates nor to the period of the Prophet and his Companions.[65] A more extreme view is given by M. Rusjad Nurdin, another Masjumi member of the Constituent Assembly, when he explains that neither Egypt, nor Iraq, nor Syria, nor Turkey, nor Yemen, nor Pakistan, nor even the "state" the Prophet had originally established would be taken as a model. "We will make our own model in accordance with our own nature and wish, suitable to our own circumstances and time ...".[66] It is worthwhile to note that this negative description emerged as a reaction against the nationalist allegation that the Islamic group would transform the Republic of Indonesia into a medieval state like some of the Islamic countries in the Middle East. It is in trying to repudiate this accusation that the Masjumi leaders claimed that they had not the intention to copy any of the systems of government of the Islamic countries.

It should be clear by now that the sharī'ah has a significant role in the Masjumi leaders' theory of the Islamic state. The core of the Islamist idea of the Islamic state consists in the implementation or non-implementation of the sharī'ah. In the words of Quṭb "Every government which implements the sharī'ah is an Islamic government no matter whatever type or name it adopts. Each government which does not implement the sharī'ah is not recognized by Islām although it might be run by men of religion and might have an Islamic name."[67] Or as Maudūdī puts it: "The point that should be clearly understood here is that if an Islamic society consciously resolves not to accept the sharī'ah and decides to enact its own constitution and laws or borrow them from any other source in disregard of the sharī'ah, such a society breaks its contract with God and forfeits its right to be called 'Islamic'."[68] As has been seen some Masjumi leaders base their definition of the Islamic state on the implementation of the sharī'ah.[69]

Hence it is of considerable importance to see what they mean by sharī'ah. For Quṭb[70] and Maudūdī[71] sharī'ah is not synonymous with fiqh, and the Masjumi leaders hold the same idea. But whereas their Egyptian and Pakistan counterparts make much use of the term sharī'ah, they speak more of Islamic principles and

Islamic law. As is clear from their debates with the traditionalists, they do not accept the fiqh as authoritative. Criticizing the traditionalist 'ulamā', Hamka observes: "I saw 'ulamā' bound by outdated books of fiqh. They consider these books, which were written seven hundred years ago as [embodying] sacred laws which may not be disputed."[72] For al-Bannā the sources of the sharī'ah are the Qur'ān, the genuine Sunnah and the tradition of the Salaf[73] and for Maudūdī the Qur'ān, Sunnah and ijma',[74] and for the Masjumi leaders the sources are only the Qur'ān and Sunnah.

In the understanding of Anshari, the degeneration of the Muslims started when they left the Qur'ān and Sunnah and referred instead to books of fiqh written by the muqallidīn.[75] Their revival, he asserts, can be achieved only when they return back to the two original sources.[76] As for Natsir, he calls for the purification of the sharī'ah from all kinds of superstition by using ijtihād,[77] in which the Qur'ān and Sunnah should be used as the criteria.[78]

Ijmā' for these Masjumi leaders does not constitute a source of law. Natsir finds it difficult to know the exact nature of ijmā', whether it was the consensus of all 'ulamā' or only of the majority of them,

or only of those of Egypt or of those of Turkey, or again whether it must be the consensus of the four Imāms. "In short", he says, "the meaning of the ijmā' of the 'ulamā' is stretchable like a rubber so that it no longer has any sense."[79] For Anshari it is the ijmā' of the Companions that may[80] be followed.[81] Ahmad, when explaining the sources of legislation in the Islamic state, also makes no mention of ijmā'. The sources according to him are the Qur'ān, the Sunnah and ijtihād based on the two original sources.[82]

Ijtihād is considered by Natsir as a very important element in Islām, which can preserve its teachings from becoming static and outmoded. Ijtihād in his opinion is an instrument to make Islamic teachings adaptable for all times. It has the capacity of solving problems of changing temporal life.[83]

Unlike the leaders of the Ikhwān[84] and unlike Maudūdī,[85] who still adhere to the traditional qualifications of the mujtahids, the Masjumi leaders make no mention of the qualifications. Ahmad, who enumerates ijtihād as a third source of legislation, specifies that the only qualification for membership in the legislature of the Islamic state, is the people's confidence in the candidate. He may be a man of religion or not. Beside

the legislature, however, he finds that there must be another body, who will decide in the event of disagreement between the members of the legislature. As the decision of this body must be founded on the Qur'ān and Sunnah, he thinks that its members must be composed of "men who know and understand the laws of Islām",[86] without giving any further details of their qualifications.

The indifference of the Masjumi leaders with regard to the adherence to the traditional qualifications of the mujtahid might be explained by their division of the Islamic religious duties into two groups farḍ ʿain and farḍ kifāyah or as Anshari puts it the ʿubūdīyah and the muʿāmalah maʿ al-nās. In the field of ʿubūdīyah rationalization cannot be applied. One cannot explain by reason, for example, why the maghrib prayer consists of three rakʿāt while the subḥ prayer of two only. In this matter of ʿubūdīyah, Anshari claims, the Muslims must follow the Prophet and may not introduce modifications. But in the field of muʿāmalah maʿ al-nās the Muslims, he argues, must apply rationalization, for the Prophet did not give clear examples of the methods for creating a society with social justice, organizing an economy and for applying such Islamic principles as co-operation.[87]

Thus, the Masjumi leaders seem to argue that ijtihād would be applied not so much in matters of man's

duty to worship God, which would be the speciality of the 'ulamā', as in man's social duties towards his fellow human being and his society, on which the traditional 'ulamā' would not be well versed. Leaders, who have a fair knowledge and understanding of the laws of Islām, would be able to do that ijtihād in the legislature. Moreover, as implied in Natsir's explanation on the ability of Islām to organize a modern state,[88] the principles and limits prescribed by Islām are only few in number, so that the ijtihād in the field of mu'āmalah ma' al-nās would not be as difficult as the ijtihād in the field of 'ubūdīyah. It does not imply, however, that 'ulamā', well versed in the traditional Islamic learning as well as in modern sciences, would be excluded from practicing the ijtihād. Such 'ulamā' in their understanding would be the ideal persons to do the ijtihād.

To sum up, sharī'ah for the Masjumi leaders is not synonymous with fiqh. Sharī'ah for them is rather the body of the commandments as embodied in the Qur'ān and Sunnah. Ijmā' is not a source of law. The ijmā' of the Companions may be followed; it is not binding upon Muslims. Ijtihād is an important instrument in understanding and interpreting the commandments, but would be applied mainly in man's social duties. It is not necessary that ijtihād in this type of duties should be done by 'ulamā'.

Such is the understanding of the Masjumi leaders on the nature of the Islamic state and the relevant question of sharī'ah. As to its organization, the main principles are that it must be based on the sovereignty of the people as well as on the principle of shūrā and that it must have a constitution, a parliament and a republican form.

In the question of political sovereignty Maudūdī puts the stress on the sovereignty of God,[89] The leaders of the Masjumi, on the other hand, lay the emphasis on the sovereignty of the people. According to Anshari, the state that Islām prescribes is "a state with people's sovereignty",[90] a state in which "the people has the authority and sovereignty over the Caliph, who must subject himself to the shūrā of the people".[91] "Democracy and people's sovereignty", Hamka remarks, "is our goal in the structure of government."[92]

What they mean by this sovereignty of the people in relation to the traditional Islamic idea of the sovereignty of God, is explained by Ahmad. Along with faithfulness (amānah), justice, the belief in God, he considers the sovereignty of the people as the fourth among the basic foundations of the Islamic state. This concept of the sovereignty of the people he derives from the term ūlī al-amr in verse IV/59. This verse, according

to him, implies that beside the authority of God and His Messenger, there is no other higher authority except that of the ūlī al-amr. He cannot agree with the interpretation that the ūlī al-amr are the Sulṭans, or Heads of State or the military leaders, for there is no guarantee that their commands will not be in conflict with the Qur'ān and Sunnah, while the decisions of the ūlī al-amr, according to him, are guaranteed not to contradict the Qur'ān and Sunnah. Nor can he agree with the interpretation that the ūlī al-amr are the 'ulamā', for they have not the necessary characteristics to assume the highest authority in the state. It is true, he says, that from the point of view of jurisprudence, the 'ulamā' occupy a high position in society, but they lack the power to enforce their laws on the people. In his view, the ūlū al-amr cannot be but the representatives of the people in parliament, who have the highest authority in the state. Their authority, according to him, is only a degree lower than that of God and the Prophet.

In clarifying this interpretation, he claims that the phrase "from amongst you" in the verse means from amongst the people, which implies that the ūlū al-amr consist of men whom the people agree to nominate or elect. Their decisions represent the decisions of the people themselves, and in obeying them the people are obeying their

own selves. That the ūlū al-amr must be elected he deduces from the same phrase. As he understands it, the phrase means that it is impossible for all the people to exercise a direct political sovereignty, and, hence, they must delegate it to some of them, and this delegation is done by election.[93] But why this delegation should be made by election, he does not explain.

In the Islamic state "the ūlū al-amr have the highest sovereignty"[94] but their sovereignty seems not to be absolute, for beside the "sovereignty of the people" he speaks also of the "sovereignty of God",[95] which he explains to be higher than the former.[96] Thus, according to him, there are two sovereigns in the Islamic state, God and the people. The sovereignty of the people is limited by the sovereignty of God or in other words the sovereignty of the people is under the sovereignty of God. The same understanding is reflected in Natsir's explanation of the meaning of shūrā in Islām. Not everything, he argues, must be submitted to the deliberation and decision of parliament in the Islamic state. Matters, which have been decided upon by the Qur'ān, such as the prohibition of gambling and the consumption of alcoholic drinks, are no longer matters to be discussed by parliament. The most that parliament can do with regard

to such matters, he says, is to determine the ways of their implementation.[97]

Sovereignty, as understood by the Masjumi leaders, is thus not Hobbes' absolute sovereignty, which is limited only by the power of the sovereign himself. Their sovereignty is rather the sovereignty of Bodin, who considered that the sovereign was bound by the law of God and the law of nature. Like the author of the Vindiciae contra tyrannos they consider that God and the people are superiors in the state. Like the Levellers of seventeenth century England they conceive that the legislature has no indefinite power. The Levellers thought that parliament's legislative power should be limited by the Agreement of the People, which expressly laid down the rule that certain enumerated rights of the citizens must not be touched. Likewise, the Masjumi leaders believe that the laws as embodied in the Qur'ān and Sunnah may not be touched by parliament. A similar idea is given by Maudūdī, but the impression that one gets from his exposition of the sovereignty of God, is that his sovereignty of the people is more limited than the sovereignty of the people as understood by the Masjumi leaders. Their understanding is that the divine limitations on the sovereignty of the poeple are few in number.

Closely connected with the sovereignty of the

people is the principle of shūrā. This principle of consultation cannot be applied on questions of ʿibādah, but only on temporal matters. The state must apply it on all its affairs from the important work of compiling its constitution, making its laws, and the election of its Head to the every day conduct of government. The most important shūrā is that of parliament, and it is this parliamentary shūrā that is closely related to the sovereignty of the people. The ūlī al-amr after an extensive and free consultation adopt their decisions by a majority of votes. These decisions are now binding on all, on the people as well as on the Head of State, and even on the ūlī al-amr themselves, for the latter's power and authority do not originate in their individual personal character as the representatives of the people, but in their collective decisions in the shūrā. In the words of Ahmad "it is the shūrā that causes them to have authority".[98]

That the Islamic state must have a constitution is deduced by Ahmad, though not in a convincing way, again from verse IV/59. As he explains it, the verse implies the existence of two kinds of laws. The phrase "obey God and the Messenger" refers to the divinely established law of the Qur'ān and Sunnah, while the phrase "[obey] the ūlī al-amr" alludes to the man made laws of the representatives

of the people. The highest body of laws, that man makes, he says, is the constitution. In the Islamic state there are thus two bodies of laws, a body of "never changing and absolute" laws, which he calls the Eternal Laws, and a body of man-made laws, to which he gives the term Basic Laws. The Eternal Laws are the laws as specified in the Qur'ān and Sunnah and all other laws must be made in agreement with them. The Basic Laws, being man-made, are, in contrast to the Eternal Laws, possible of being modified.[99]

Hence he suggests that the constitution of the Islamic state should be divided into two parts, the "preamble" which embodies the Eternal Laws, and the "body of the constitution", which includes the Basic Laws.[100] The Qur'ān and Sunnah cannot be an adequate substitute for the constitution, for the everchanging problems of man's life cannot be solved once for all by unchangeable laws.[101]

It is interesting to note that Ahmad's interpretation of "obey the ūlī al-amr" greatly differs from the ʿulamā''s usual interpretation of the phrase. Whereas the ʿulamā' interpret the ūlī al-amr to mean the Muslim rulers and the ʿulamā', Ahmad is of the opinion that the ūlī al-amr could not be but the representatives of the people, whether they are men of religion or not. As will be seen, he, furthermore, thinks that the non-Muslim can

also become ūlī al-amr. Such an interpretation, no doubt, would have a great secularizing effect, not only on the character of the ūlī al-amr, but also on the nature of the law that they would lay down. No wonder that the Islamic constitution, as Ahmad conceives it, differs greatly from that of al-Hudaybī of the Ikhwān, who thinks that the Qur'ān in itself is a complete constitution. It also differs from that of Maudūdī, who considers the constitution to be given in the sharī'ah, despite the fact that he accepted the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan.

The need of the Islamic state for a parliament comes from the principle of shūrā. The phrase "wa amruhum shūrā" in verse XLII/38 is understood by Anshari to include consultation in the affairs of the state, and the command "wa shāwirhum fī al-amr" in verse III/159 is interpreted by him to mean placing responsibility on the people and giving them the right of supervision and control.[102] This consultation and supervision can be best done through parliament. In the understanding of Ahmad, this parliamentary consultation was already practiced during the time of the Prophet for, according to him, "the council of the Companions represented the first Islamic parliament".[103] As to the technical procedure of electing the ūlī al-amr he admits that there was no precedent in

Islamic history and, therefore, leaves it over to the individual Islamic state to find its own proper system. As is clear from Natsir's explanation of the meaning of shūrā, the sovereignty of parliament in the Islamic state is not absolute, but limited by the authority of the Qur'ān and Sunnah. In cases, where there have been laws as specified by these two sources, parliament has to adopt them; in other cases parliament will be free to promulgate laws, which, however, may not come in conflict with the provisions of the Qur'ān and Sunnah. The organ that will decide on what agrees with the Qur'an and Sunnah, as has been noted, is a special body whose members are to be composed of men who know and understand the laws of Islām. With regard to the qualification of the members of parliament, it has been stated, that the only requirement is the confidence of the people in them, whether they belong to the group of men of religion or not. This is in contrast with ʿUdah's view that all or at least most of the members of parliament must constitute of men with perfect knowledge of the sharīʿah.[104]

The Masjumi leaders are one with the Ikhwān in their deduction of democracy and parliamentary life from the principle of shūrā, but they are, on the other hand, poles apart in the question of the party system. According

to the Ikhwān[105] and Maudūdī,[106] the Islamic state knows only one single party. The Masjumi leaders find that such a system is in contradiction with democracy. The multi-party system for them is an important element in the democratic way of life. Natsir, for example, in a reaction against President Sukarno's intention to abolish the multi-party system in Indonesia, declared that "if the parties are buried, democracy will be buried automatically."[107]

Ahmad infers from the phrase "fa in tanāza'tum fī shay'" of verse IV/59, that the Qur'ān from the time of its revelation, has made clear that there will be a difference of opinion between the ūlī al-amr, and a difference of opinion according to the Prophet himself, he observes, is a grace for the ummah.[108] On the basis of this argument he justifies the existence of the multi-party system in the Islamic state. But whether the bi-party system of the USA or the multi-party system of France would be better for the Islamic state, he does not specify. The viewpoint of the Masjumi itself on the party system is based on verse II/148: "To each is a goal to which God turns him, thus strive together towards all that is good".[109] Hence, the Masjumi regards the multi-party system as a means of competition for the establishment of man's mutual well-being in society.

The Islamic state that the Masjumi leaders have in mind is of the republican type. "Our goal", writes Anshari, "is a republican state ... led by an elected Head of State who accepts his nomination as a trust from God and from the people."[110] The Head of State can have the title of Khalīfah or Imām or Amīr al-Mu'munīn or Sulṭān or President, for, according to them there is no obligation in Islām to call him Khalīfah. The essential thing is that he does not assume the power of an absolute monarch.

In the eyes of Ahmad, the early four Khalīfahs had these characteristics in them. They were not Monarchs but "Presidents elected" by the people.[111] Hence, he argues that Islām, centuries ago decided to adopt the republic as its type of government, and that the khilāfah was not a monarchy. The khilāfah existed only until the death of ʿAlī, after which it was abolished by Muʿāwiah's introduction of the monarchical system.[112] The term "elected", which he uses to denote the different ways of the nomination of the four Khalīfahs gives the impression that they were elected in accordance with the modern method of electing a Head of State. It need hardly be remarked that the Khalīfahs were not elected in the modern sense of the term, but nominated by a group of people like Abū Bakr or even by a single person as the case was with ʿUmar's nomination by the first Khalīfah. Each nomination

must then be confirmed by a public bay'ah. In saying that the Khalīfahs were not monarchs, Ahmad is right but terming them as Presidents elected by the people is not wholly in agreement with historical facts. Furthermore, the Khalīfahs were nominated for life, while Presidents are traditionally elected for a certain period.

The Khalīfah assumes the highest post in the Islamic state, but his authority is under that of the council of ūlī al-amr. Like present day Presidents, he is head of the executive power, promulgates laws in co-operation with the legislature, and exercises the sovereignty of the people.[113] But in order to prevent his monopolizing all the authority of the state, he must be assisted by a council of ministers in the administration of the state.[114] Unlike the ordinary President, however, the duty of the Khalīfah is not only to safeguard the safety of the state but also to safeguard the religions of the people.[115] In this capacity, he must protect all the religions existing in the state.[116] He will stay in office not for life, but for a certain period. The main qualifications of a candidate for the khilāfah are his being a Muslim, personal integrity, knowledge of state affairs and administration, capacity to perform his duty and soundness of the five senses.[117]

His being of the tribe of Quraysh as prescribed

by certain traditions is considered by Ahmad to be an outmoded claim and in conflict with democracy.[118] But on the other hand, he agrees to add to the four qualifications another one, that of nationality, for he thinks that the national interest of modern states requires that the Head of State must be elected from amongst their respective own nationals.[119] The proposal to specify the khilāfah for the 'ulamā', however, he refuses,[120] probably on account of his understanding that the administration of a modern state is not the province of the 'ulamā'. To these qualifications of Ahmad, Anshari adds two others, good knowledge of the Islamic religion[121] and undisputed faith in Islām.[122]

In the enumeration of the qualifications of the Head of State the Masjumi leaders cite more or less the same attributes as given by the Ikhwān[123] and Maudūdī,[124] but it is interesting to note that the former make no mention of the male sex of the candidate as specified by their Egyptian and Pakistan counterparts. Whether this omission of mention of sex, in the light of the Masjumi's program to give women equal rights with men in the political, social and economic spheres, implies that a female Muslim can be elected to become Head of State is not very clear.

From the statement of Nurdin about a special

Indonesian model of the Islamic state and from Ahmad's adoption of nationality as a qualification of the Khalīfah, it is clear that their Islamic state must have a national character. Indeed, nationalism, in their opinion, does not contradict Islām. Natsir, on the contrary, finds that Islām promotes nationalism, as a social value and as something belonging to human nature, and it is the practice of Islām, he says, to respect human nature and to preserve social values. Moreover, he finds verse XLIX/13: "... We made you nations and tribes, that you may know one another ..." to embody a clear approval of nationalism by Islām. But he finds Islām at the same time to be aware of the danger of excessive nationalism, which may degenerate into chauvinism, racialism and xenophobia, and "therefore the verse further says that the most noble of you in the sight of God is the best in conduct".[125]

Accordingly, the Islamic state in the opinion of Ahmad has first of all a national character. "Every Islamic nation can establish its state in its own territory. It can be established in the center of the desert among the Arab people or in the middle of the Pacific Ocean among the people of Indonesia."[126]

Nationalism in their understanding is not incompatible with the international trend of Islām, for if

the first character of their Islamic state is its national feature, its second character is its international aspect. This international aspect, according to Ahmad, can take the form of a federation of all the Islamic states, but gives no further details as he finds it premature to discuss the matter deeply. "It is still too idealistic for the present struggle of the Muslims."[127]

Vaster than this Islamic internationalism Natsir conceives a kind of universalism, for it is his conviction that the teachings and principles of Islām are intended for the whole of mankind. "The Muslims must show to the world that the virtues brought by Islām are not the monopoly of Muslims, but that they are a grace to humanity."[128] It is further his conviction that Islām is for peace, and, hence, he calls for the suppression of mutual misunderstanding and mutual suspicions among the nations and for an active Muslim co-operation with the United Nations to establish an effective international relation among the nations of the world.[129]

This idea of universalism is reflected in the official program of the Masjumi itself. In its project on foreign relations there is no trace of pan-Islamism as advocated by the Ikhwān and Maudūdī, but mention is made that the Masjumi will endeavour to establish good and friendly relations with all nations, in particular with

those believing in God and in democracy, as well as to support the United Nations as an organization for the defence of peace.[130] The verse quoted in support of this policy of friendship and peace is IV/114: "There is no good in much of their secret conferences save in [him] who enjoins almsgiving and kindness and peacemaking among the people".[131]

In line with this universal outlook, the Masjumi leaders call for the promotion of tolerance. In the eyes of Natsir, tolerance is a virtue of the true Muslim and it must be an active tolerance, a tolerance that appreciates and respects the faith of others. Appreciation and respect only are for him still insufficient. He finds it the duty of Muslims to defend the religious freedom of others. This duty he derives from verse XXII/40,[132] which he interprets to mean that the Muslim must fight for the defence of cloisters, churches, oratories and mosques.[133] In accordance with this idea and based on verse II/256: "There is no coercion in religion", the Masjumi, therefore, includes in its program the endeavour to make the state guarantee religious freedom.[134]

In conformity with this idea of religious tolerance and religious freedom, the Masjumi leaders, unlike the Ikhwān[135] and Maudūdī,[136] do not refer to the non-Muslims as <u>dhimmīs</u>, but use instead other terms such

as "warganegara jang beragama lain" (citizens with other religious belief), "pemeluk agama lain" (followers of other religion) and "saudara-saudara kita dari kaum Kristen" (our Christian brothers). In the theory of Ahmad, the non-Muslims, as citizens, have the same rights as the Muslims in the Islamic state. Like the Muslims they have the freedom to express their own religious belief, to form organizations, and to speak. They have the same right to assume state posts, civil as well as military, the right to elect and to be elected, the right of education and equality before the law.[137] Hence, the non-Muslims in the Islamic state can become ministers and even Prime Ministers, for the only state position reserved for Muslims is the post of Head of State. As they have the same right of election, they can become ūlī al-amr also, but care must be taken that they do not occupy in the legislature such a position that might be detrimental to the interest of Islām.[138]

As for the method of guaranteeing that the non-Muslims would not occupy a majority position in the legislature, Ahmad leaves it over to every Islamic state to decide. For himself this question constitutes no problem, for, in his theory, the Islamic state can be established only in a country where Muslims form the over-

whelming majority of the population. As the people have the complete freedom to elect, the non-Muslim minority in his understanding would not have the chance to form a majority in the legislature. As he sees it, there is no need to invent a device to curb non-Muslim representation in parliament. In such a way he tries to avoid the accusation that the Islamic state would be practicing an undemocratic method of election.

For Maudūdī,[139] with his emphasis on the sovereignty of God in his version of the Islamic state, and for ʿŪdah,[140] with his idea of the Qur'ān as the constitution of the Ikhwān's Islamic state, it is difficult to find an appropriate modern term to denote the Islamic state. The Masjumi leaders, with their stress on the sovereignty of the people meet no difficulty in designating their Islamic state as democratic. Ahmad calls it a "democratic state"[141] or a "Republic"[142] and Anshari "Negara Kedaulatan Rakjat"[143] (a state of People's Sovereignty). Natsir, while using the terms "Democratic State based on Islām"[144] and "Democratic Islamic State",[145] wonders whether it can also be called a "Theistic Democracy".[146]

Such are the main aspects of the Masjumi leaders' theory of the Islamic state. It is a theory produced by leaders of two types of educational background. The

Masjumi leaders can be roughly divided into two factions. One faction consists of leaders like Natsir and Sjafruddin who had mainly a Western education, to which, however, they added a deep knowledge of Islām. The other faction comprises of leaders like Ahmad and Anshari who had mainly a religious education, but succeeded by their own efforts to have a certain degree of Western learning.

In their religious outlook the two factions are deeply influenced by ʿAbduh's modernist ideas. But, whereas the former adopt a more liberal attitude in their approach to Islām, the latter are less liberal in their interpretations of the religion. In their political outlook both factions are greatly affected by the political developments in Indonesia. Their ideas came out as a reaction to two different kinds of influences; those of the ideas of the Western educated and semi-secular nationalists and those of the ideas of their traditionalist counterparts. The Masjumi leaders had to make their ideas acceptable to both the nationalists and the traditionalists, if they wanted their theory to be accepted as the constitutional basis of the Indonesian state.

It is in the light of these facts that their ideas on the Islamic state should be assessed.

FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER III

1. See Aboebakar, op. cit., p.411.

2. See Blumberger, op. cit., p.95.

3. Ibid., p.89.

4. See Ahmad, op. cit., p.428.

5. See Aboebakar, op. cit., p.509.

6. Justus A. van der Kroef, "Some Social and Political Aspects of Islam in Indonesia", The Islamic Review, XLV, No. 7 (July 1957), p.37.

7. See Pedoman Perdjoangan, op. cit., p.60.

8. See Elections, op. cit., p.62.

9. Ibid., pp.66-72.

10. See Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy", in R. T. McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven: Yale University, 1963), p.437.

11. Ibid., p.318.

12. George McTurnan Kahin, "Indonesia", in George McTurnan Kahin, ed., Major Governments of Asia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1958), p.554.

13. Sayyid Abul A'lā Maudūdī, The Islamic Law and Constitution, trans. and ed. Khurshid Ahmad, (2nd. ed.; Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd., 1960), p.133.

14. See Capita Selecta, vol. II, op. cit., p.157.

15. See Ilā al-Shabāb [hereafter cited as Shabāb] (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, undated), p.13.

16. See Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn Taht Rāyah al-Qur'ān (Cairo: Dar al-Kitāb al-'Arabi, undated), pp.13-15.

17. See Dasar Negara, vol. II, op. cit., p.192.

18. Ibid., vol. II, p.441.

19. H. Abdul Malik K. A., Lembaga Hidup (4th ed.; Djakarta: Widjaja, 1955), pp.246/7.

20. See Mushkilātunā fī dau' al-Nizam al-Islāmī [hereafter cited as Mushkilātunā] (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, undated), p.18.

21. See Capita Selecta, op. cit., vol. II, p.59.

22. See Dasar Negara, op. cit., vol. II, p.26.

23. See Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, op. cit., p.51.

24. Religion in the sense of a system of worship, and not in the comprehensive sense as understood by the Masjumi leaders.

25. R. P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers, a Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1960, p.400.

26. See Islam sebagai Ideologie (2nd. ed.; Djakarta: Pustaka Aida, undated), p.11.

27. See Dasar Negara, op. cit., vol. II, pp.440/1.

28. See Capita Selecta, op. cit., vol. II, p.157.

29. The verses are: Hast thou observed him who belieth religion? That is he who repelleth the orphan, And urgeth not the feeding of the needy. Ah, woe unto worshippers, Who are heedless of their prayer; Who would be seen (at worship), Yet refuse small kindness. (Transl. Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall in The Meaning of the Glorious Koran).

30. See Capita Selecta, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 136/7.

31. Ibid., p.122.

32. See Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara, op. cit., pp.12-21.

33. See Dasar Negara, op. cit., vol. II, p.28.

34. As quoted by Mitchell, op. cit., pp.400/1.

35. See Islam Sebagai Ideologie, op. cit., p.10.

36. See Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, op. cit., p.52.

37. See Membentuk Negara Islam, op. cit., pp.153/4.

38. See Kayfa Nafham al-Islām [hereafter cited as Kayfa] (1st. ed.; Cairo: Dār al-Kutubal-Ḥadīthah, 1957), p.111.

39. See The Islamic Law and Constitution, op. cit., p.133.

40. See Islam Sebagai Ideologie, op. cit., p.11.

41. Ibid., p.16.

42. See Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, op. cit., p.246.

43. See Lembaga Hidup, op. cit., p.69.

44. Supra, p.75.

45. See Falsafah Perdjuangan Hidup, op. cit., p.208.

46. See Buah Kongres Muslimin Indonesia (Djokjakarta: undated), p.181.

47. See Dasar Negara, op. cit., vol. II, p.46.

48. See Membentuk Negara Islam, op. cit., pp.17-18.

49. Ibid., pp.165/6.

50. See Mushkilātunā, op. cit., p.14.

51. See The Islamic Law and Constitution, op. cit., p.389.

52. Ibid., p.407.

53. Ibid., p.409.

54. Ibid., p.410.

55. See Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara, op. cit., p.29.

56. See Islam Sebagai Ideologie, op. cit., pp.20-21.

57. See Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara, op. cit., p.29.

58. See The Islamic Law and Constitution, op. cit., p.239.

59. See Ma'rakah al-Islām wa al-Ra'sumālīyah [hereafter cited as Ma'rakah] (2nd. ed.; Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 1952), p.81.

60. See Islam Sebagai Ideologie, op. cit., p.12.

61. See Ma'rakah, op. cit., p.80.

62. See Membentuk Negara Islam, op. cit., p.85.

63. See Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara, op. cit., p.30.

64. See Capita Selecta, op. cit., vol. II, p.66.

65. See Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, op. cit., p.214.

66. See Dasar Negara, op. cit., vol. I, p.428.

67. See Al-'Adālah al-Ijtimā'īyah fī al-Islām [hereafter cited as 'Adālah] (4th ed.; Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, undated), p.98.

68. See The Islamic Law and Constitution, op. cit., p.50.

69. Supra, p.139.

70. "... many people", Quṭb writes, "confuse the sharī'ah with the historical beginning of the fiqh and think that deriving laws from the sharī'ah would mean depending on the provisions of the fiqh only; and naturally the fiqh cannot meet the demands of modern societies." See Ma'rakah, op. cit., p.85.

71. In Maudūdī's view "it is not binding to accept any and every saying or expression of opinion by an authority on fiqh, or anything and everything written in a book of fiqh. This is so, because everything contained in a book of fiqh does not constitute Islamic Law." See The Islamic Law and Constitution, op. cit., p.115.

72. See Lembaga Hidup, op. cit., p.74.

73. See Shabāb, op. cit., p.7.

74. See The Islamic Law and Constitution, op. cit., p.115.

75. See Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, op. cit., p.71.

76. Ibid., p.76.

77. See Lembaga Hidup, op. cit., p.163.

78. See Islam Sebagai Ideologie, op. cit., p.22.

79. Ibid., p.14.

80. Underline by present writer.

81. See Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, op. cit., p.68.

82. See Membentuk Negara Islam, op. cit., p.254.

83. See Capita Selecta, op. cit., vol. II, p.121.

84. Al-Ghazālī for example mentions the memorization and the knowledge of the Qur'ān, knowledge of the Sunnah, proper knowledge of the Arabic language and grammar, to which he adds personal integrity, and knowledge

of the origin and history of the different schools of law in Islām. See Kayfa, op. cit., pp.215/6.

85. The qualifications mentioned by Maudūdī are faith in the sharī'ah, proper knowledge of the Arabic language, knowledge and insight in the teachings of the Qur'ān and Sunnah, acquaintance with the contributions of earlier jurists and mujtahids, acquaintance with the problems and conditions of present time, and commendable character and conduct. See The Islamic Law and Constitution, op. cit., pp.80/1.

86. See Membentuk Negara Islam, op. cit., p.231.

87. See Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, op. cit., pp.78-80. This language of Anshari is similar to al-Ghazālī's idea that the door of ijtihād on 'ibādah could be closed, for it would bring nothing new beside what had been produced by the early mujtahids, but that it should be left open on the question of mu'āmalah, for the assumption that the early mujtahids had come to the top of ijtihād in this field, means that life has come to a standstill, that no new social problems have arisen and that civilization has stopped to develop. See Kayfa, op. cit., pp.210/3. The same idea is held by Maudūdī, when he says that there is no scope for legislation in the field of worships, but well in the field of individual and social affairs, though limited. See The Islamic Law and Constitution, op. cit., p.89.

88. Supra, p.143.

89. See The Islamic Law and Constitution, op. cit., pp.228-235.

90. See Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, op. cit., p.219.

91. Ibid., p.227.

92. See Lembaga Hidup, op. cit., p.74.

93. See Membentuk Negara Islam, op. cit., pp.74-75.

94. Ibid., p.213.

95. Ibid., p.87.

96. Ibid., p.87 and p.101.

97. See Islam Sebagai Ideologie, op. cit., p.23.

98. See Membentuk Negara Islam, op. cit., p.236. For comparison, al-Bannā derives his principle of "the respect of the people" also from this idea of shūrā. He believes that it was the practice of the Prophet and the Companions to consult the leading people in the community before deciding upon important matters. See Mushkilātunā, op. cit., p.42. This idea leads him further to the modern conception of parliamentary representation, for respect of the people, as he sees it, implies their representation and active participation in government. See Mushkilātunā, op. cit., pp.60/1.

99. See Membentuk Negara Islam, op. cit., pp.96/7.

100. Ibid., p.100.

101. Ibid., p.405. If Ahmad is so positive about the inadequacy of the Qur'ān and Sunnah to become the constitution of the Islamic state, al-Hudaybī from the Ikhwān is of the opinion that there is no need for another constitution, for "the Qur'ān is a complete constitution in itself, embodying every necessary rule to build up the ummah". See Dustūrunā, (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, undated), p.5. Al-Bannā, however, considers the pre-revolution Constitution of Egypt to be more or less Islamic and needs only some amendments. See Mushkilātunā, op. cit., p.52. Maudūdī, as has been noted, accepted the 1956 Constitution of Pakistan.

102. See Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, op. cit., pp.219/20.

103. See Membentuk Negara Islam, op. cit., p.111.

104. To this perfect knowledge of the sharīʿah, ʿUdah adds the knowledge of modern arts and sciences, wisdom and good judgment. The quality of ijtihād he does not demand from every individual member, for it is the body as a whole who should make the ijtihād. (See Al-Islām wa Awḍāʿunā al-Siāsīyah [hereafter cited as Awḍaʿunā], (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1951), pp.144-158.

105. The unity of the ummah, together with the responsibility of the ruler and the respect of the will of the people, are the three principles of al-Bannā's political system. The unity of the ummah according to him requires the absence of a multi-party system, which he finds not to be in contradiction with the Western parliamentary system, for "the existence of parties, though a tradition in the West, is not an essential part of the system". See Mushkilātunā, op. cit., p.47. In the opinion of ʿŪdah, there is no opposition in the shura (parliamentary) system of Islām. He explicitly says that once a decision has been adopted by a majority of votes, it has become not only the opinion of the majority but of all the members of the body of shūrā. The minority, according to him, should be the first to carry out the decision, and has no right to raise the decided question again in future meetings. See Awḍāʿunā, op. cit., p.153. Hence it is the belief of the Ikhwān that the parliamentary system is not in need of the party formula and this explains their constant appeal for the dissolution of the Egyptian parties, to be combined in one popular organization.

106. Mududūdī finds that, according to the conventions of the Caliphs, there was in their "parliaments" neither any specific Government Party nor any specific Opposition Party. The whole "parliament" was their party as long as they kept to the right path. See The Islamic Law and Constitution, op. cit., p.258. Hence he thinks that "the formation of parties and cliques within the Legislative Assemblies would be constitutionally prohibited", though "various parties in the country may take part in the election as parties for sending to the Assemblies the most suitable members in their opinion". Ibid., p.346.

107. As quoted by Herbert Feith in The Decline, op. cit., p.518.

108. See Membentuk Negara Islam, op. cit., p.115.

109. See Pedoman Perdjuangan, op. cit., p.47.

110. See Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, op. cit., p.218.

111. See Membentuk Negara Islam, op. cit., p.119.

112. Ibid., p.120.

113. Ibid., p.179.

114. Ibid., p.159.

115. Ibid., p.180.

116. Ibid., p.68.

117. Ibid., p.184.

118. Ibid., p.185.

119. Ibid.

120. Ibid., p.186.

121. See Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, op. cit., p.248.

122. Ibid., p.250.

123. ʿUdah for example mentions being an adult male Muslim, knowledge of the sharīʿah, knowledge of the general sciences, just character and leadership as the qualifications of the Head of State. Like Ahmad he does not uphold the quality of belonging to the house of Quraysh. See Awḍāʾunā, op.cit., pp.101-109.

124. For Maudūdī the qualifications are being a Muslim, a male, an adult, a sane person and a citizen of the Islamic state. See The Islamic Law and Constitution, op. cit., p.261.

125. See Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara, op. cit., p.39.

126. See Membentuk Negara Islam, op. cit., p.420. An idea of nationalism expressed in such explicit terms, is missing with the Ikhwān. In discussing this question, al-Bannā makes use of the terms waṭanīyah and qaumīyah, but both his waṭan and quam are not based on geographical limits, but on faith. All the lands, where there are Muslims, are the waṭan of the Ikhwān. See Shabāb, op. cit., p.14. All those who share their faith are their qaum. Says al-Bannā: "Our qaumīyah is a universal kinship." See Ilā Ayy Shayʾ Nadʿū al-Nās, (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, undated), p.16. The same can be said about Maudūdī to whom citizenship has to be common among all Islamic states. According to him the right of Islamic citizenship is to be

granted to every Muslim irrespective of his place of birth, once he has entered the territory of the Islamic state concerned. Every Muslim is to be regarded eligible for all positions in an Islamic state without any distinction of race, nationality or class. See The Islamic Way of Life (2nd. ed.; Lahore: , 1955), pp.22 ff.

127. See Membentuk Negara Islam, op. cit., p.421. In contrast to this idea of Ahmad, ʿŪdah is of the opinion that all the Muslims must make one state under one Head of State. The existence of more than one Islamic state after the invention of communication facilities, according to him, can no longer be justified. See Awḍāʿunā op. cit., p.165. But Quṭb thinks that for the present it is not necessary that the Muslim countries should come under one government, it would be sufficient for him if they form one block. See Maʿrakah, op. cit., p.78.

128. See Capita Selecta, op. cit., vol. II, p.109.

129. Ibid., pp.63/4.

130. See Pedoman Perdjuangan, op. cit., pp.64/5.

131. Ibid., pp.50/1.

132. The verse says: Those who have been driven from their homes unjustly because they said: Our Lord is Allah - For had it not been for Allah's repelling some men by means of others, cloisters and churches and oratories and mosques, wherein the name of Allah is oft mentioned, would assuredly have been pulled down. Verily Allah helpeth one who helpeth Him. Lo! Allah is Strong, Almighty. (Glorious Koran).

133. See Capita Selecta, op. cit., pp.227/8.

134. See Pedoman Perdjuangan, op. cit., p.60.

135. See for example ʿŪdah in Awḍaʿuna, op. cit., p.208.

136. See The Islamic Law and Constitution, op. cit., pp.304 ff.

137. See Membentuk Negara Islam, op. cit., p.64.

138. Ibid., p.223.

139. Maudūdī coins a new term "theo-democracy". See The Islamic Law and Constitution, op. cit., p.148.

140. ʿUdah is of the opinion that the Islamic state is unique in its nature; it is not a despotic rule, for it has the Qur'ān as its constitution, but again not constitutional, for a constitution is made by men, nor parliamentary, for the shūrā system has no opposition, nor theocratic for government in Islām does not derive its power from God but from the ummah, nor a republic, for the Head of the Islamic state is elected for life, nor a dictatorship for the Islamic system is based on shūrā, nor a kingdom for there is no hereditary succession in Islām. Such are his arguments. See Awḍāʿunā, op. cit., pp.76-80.

141. See Membentuk Negara Islam, op. cit., p.101.

142. Ibid., p.123.

143. See Falsafah Perdjuangan Islam, op. cit., p.219.

144. See Islam Sebagai Dasar Negara, op. cit., p.8.

145. Ibid., p.30.

146. Ibid.

CONCLUSION

Islām plays an important role in Indonesian political life. Unlike Turkey, where Islām -- through the idea of the universal ummah and the millet system of the Ottoman Empire -- had a restraining effect on the rise of Turkish nationalism, in Indonesia Islām was a force that promoted the rise and growth of Indonesian nationalism. Because of the natural division of the Indonesian people into various ethnic groups, each with its own language, history, social structure and traditions, the first manifestation of nationalism that appeared in the country had an ethnic character. It was mainly Islām, as the common religion of the overwhelming majority of the Indonesian people, that created in them the consciousness of belonging to the same group of people. Islām was their rallying point of identity. It was through Islām that the different ethnic groups were united into a larger comprehensive community. Islām was able to break the power of local nationalism and by virtue of this paved the way for the emergence of Indonesian nationalism.

To this uniting force of Islām, must, of course, be added the awareness of the Indonesian people of being commonly ruled by a foreign power. But here again, Islām, as a faith was able to create a clear cut line that divided

the non-Muslim alien rulers from their Indonesian Muslim subjects. The growth of the power of Islām in Indonesian politics, with its enmity to foreign non-Muslim rule, increased the widening gap that existed between the Indonesians and their Western rulers. Soon the idea of independence emerged.

For the Islamic leaders it seems to have been a matter of course that the Indonesian state would be Islamic in character once independence was obtained. The early Islamic leaders seemed to be certain that the future independent Indonesia, because of its overwhelming Muslim population and Muslim leaders, would be ruled by Muslims in accordance with Islamic principles. This explains the vagueness of the program of the Sarekat Islam during its early days of existence.

It was only after the rise of secular ideas, as brought forth by the communist and nationalist movements, that the Islamic leaders began to be aware that the future independent state of Indonesia would not automatically be an Islamic state. Their Islamic ideology, challenged by secular ideologies, was not the only ideology which had an appeal in the country. This awareness became stronger after the leadership in Indonesian politics slipped from their hands to fall into the more capable hands of the nationalists.

The rise of secularism in Indonesian political life forced the Islamists to concentrate more and more on their Islamic ideology. It caused them to realize the necessity of fighting for the adoption of Islām as the official foundation of the state. Thus, it was the secularistic menace of the communist leaders, who infiltrated the central leadership of the Sarekat Islam, that pushed Tjokroaminoto and Agus Salim in 1923 to emphasize the Islamic foundation of their movement. It was the increasingly secularistic policies of the Republican Central Government that moved Kartosuwirjo in 1948 and Daud Beureuh in 1953 to proclaim their Islamic States in West Java and North Sumatra respectively. It was also after the realization of the secular nature of the Pantja Sila, that the Islamic group began to reject it as the foundation of the state and to express in a more concrete manner their ideas about the Islamic state.

The theory of the Islamic state -- at least as it is articulated by the Masjumi leaders -- differs very little from the theory of the state as it is now being practiced by the Republic of Indonesia, except for the provision that Islamic social principles as embodied in the Qur'ān and Sunnah must be supreme. In the Masjumi leaders' conception the Islamic state is a national,

constitutional and republican state, based on the sovereignty of the people and organized in accordance with modern standards of political administration.

Their theory differs from the more traditional theories of the al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn in Egypt and Maudūdī in Pakistan. The approach of the Masjumi leaders consists of taking the state of Indonesia as a model and then introducing Islamic principles into it. The approach of the Ikhwān and Maudūdī, however, is to take the traditional Islamic state and theory as their model and then try to adapt Egypt and Pakistan to that model.

The fact that Indonesia had not been tied to Islamic political and social order in the past, is responsible for the liberal attitude of the Masjumi leaders in forming their theory of the Islamic state. Unlike the Muslims in the Middle East and those of the sub-continent of India, the Muslims of Indonesia have no Islamic past, of which they could be proud. If they looked back to their own history, they would only come across the great Hindu Kingdoms of Sriwidjaja and Madjapshit, which the Islamists, of course, could not take as models for their Islamic state. Whereas the Islamists in the Middle East and Pakistan have the tendency to look into their past, the Indonesian Islamists look to the future. Their aspiration is to create their own Islamic history. Their being free from the past and their rejection

of any other source beside the Qur'ān and Sunnah as their authority in understanding and interpreting Islām, have enabled the Indonesian Islamists to adapt Islām more freely to modern circumstances and conditions of life.

Challenged by secular ideologies, the Islamic ideology in Indonesia, after being vague at the beginning, has become more and more crystallized. It now forms a complete ideology, which constitutes a power in Indonesian politics. Along with the Pantja Sila it was one of the two largest ideological forces in the Constituent Assembly. Though the communist party became the third largest ideological group after the 1955 election in Indonesia, the communist ideology did not emerge as a third force in the Assembly. The stigma of the 1948 communist rebellion, the communist rejection of religion and the international character of the communist ideology, were the main factors responsible for the unpopularity of communism for the religiously and nationally minded Indonesians. It was with the intention to eradicate this image that the communist leaders decided temporarily to renounce their ideology and to adopt the Pantja Sila.

The constitutional issue in the Constituent Assembly was thus confined to the choice between the Islamic ideology and the Pantja Sila. The division of

power in the Assembly, however, did not permit either ideology to defeat the other. After the dissolution of the Assembly and the introduction of a temporary constitutional solution by President Sukarno and the army leaders in the form of the re-adoption of the 1945 Constitution and the re-introduction of the Islamic provision, the constitutional issue ceased temporarily to exist. It appears that the future issue, in view of the growing power of the communists, will be no longer among two but three groups, the non-secular Islamists, the semi-secular nationalists, and the totally secular communists. The problem for the Islamists seems to be how to retain, not to speak of increasing, their strength in a country where secular power is gaining by the day. This problem is not exclusive to the Islamists of Indonesia. Islamists in other Muslim countries face the same problem. The difference is that for the Indonesian Islamists the problem has been greatly aggravated by the rapid increase in power of the communists. In no other Muslim country is communism so menacing as in Indonesia.

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